

**Tourism-Led Development in South Africa:
a case study of the Makuleke partnership with Wilderness Safaris**

by

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Tourism and Development

Wits School of Arts
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, South Africa

May 2011

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, nor has it been prepared under the aegis of any other body or organisation or person outside the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

May Shehab
May 8th, 2011
Killarney, Johannesburg

Dedication

To my family.

Abstract

Through a case study of the relationship between the rural Makuleke community and the regional tourism operator Wilderness Safaris, this thesis examines the impact of tourism partnerships on community development in post-apartheid South Africa. The study considers the tourism component of the 'Makuleke model', a concept used frequently in academic and popular literature to refer to the community's landmark land restitution case involving the Kruger National Park (KNP).

Thirty years after experiencing a forced removal by the apartheid regime, the Makuleke community in 1998 was able to regain their lost land (the Pafuri area of Kruger National Park) and benefit from it through conservation and tourism. The Makuleke have partnered with three tourism operators, their main concessionaire being Wilderness Safaris. Their contractual agreement obliges the tourism company to pay lease fees to the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA) and to employ Makuleke residents. To further community development, Wilderness Safaris established a joint venture with the Makuleke CPA, and also runs an environmental education programme for children.

Evidence for this thesis was collected over a two and a half year period (from May 2007 to December 2009) using three methodological approaches: archival research, participant observation and semi-structured, open-ended interviews. In analysing the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris partnership, findings reveal that ten years after the land claim, the commended 'Makuleke model' is neither as conceptually coherent nor as practically successful as is commonly supposed. I argue that although the model denotes success, a closer scrutiny of its foundations, assumptions and context expose inherent forces and practices that hinder its long-term effective implementation.

Influenced by post-development theory, I question perceptions of equality in benefit distribution, critique the juxtaposition of traditional with modern values, and examine contestations over power within the Makuleke community. I demonstrate how these features undermine the potential for the genuine transformation and broad-based social upliftment that tourism-led development purposes to achieve at Makuleke. My research findings confirm post-development theoretical propositions that criticise the contradictions in orthodox development procedures and call for a rethinking of the premises upon which approaches to community upliftment through tourism are generally founded.

KEYWORDS: Tourism, South Africa, Kruger National Park, Makuleke, Wilderness Safaris, traditional leadership, land claims, rural development, post-development theory.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to many people who assisted me in various ways during the course of my research. Above all, I would like to thank my parents Monir and Sylvia, for their continuous encouragement and backing throughout my stay in South Africa. The same goes to the rest of my family: Nadia, Karim, Farida and Aida who supported me in spite of all the time I spent away from them.

My greatest debt goes to my supervisor, Prof. Lara Allen for her unconditional support and consistent guidance on both a professional and personal level.

I wish to acknowledge the contributions of all the individuals at Makuleke who invited me into their lives, kindly taking time to show me around their villages, answering my many inquisitive questions, and providing me with insights into their community. I learned a great deal from my conversations with Makuleke residents and I am grateful for their intricate explanations of how they understand the projects that surround them and the way in which they envision their world. I am especially grateful for the cooperation of the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee, Chief Joas Phahlela Makuleke, Livingstone Maluleke, and Lamson Maluleke. In addition, I would like to thank the staff of Pafuri Camp for their trust in me and for sharing their concerns and their dreams.

I am especially indebted to Wilderness Safaris for giving me the opportunity to work at Makuleke. I am thankful to the Wilderness Safaris management who spent many hours of their time discussing and deliberating over the Makuleke partnership and its community engagement projects. My obligations go to Clive Poultney, Malcolm McCulloch, Patrick Boddam-Wetham, Chris Roche, James Ramsey, and Heather Wilson. I also extend my gratitude to Steve Collins for entrusting me with the GTZ archive.

Finally, I am grateful to my friends in Johannesburg for their unrelenting support throughout my studies and encouragement to “hang in there” during the last stages of my writing. My thanks then, to Serge Merhi who introduced me to South Africa and my South African family: Marietjie Myburg, Ruloef Oleofsen, Deb Milne, Anna Starke and Mark Rorich.

May Shehab
Johannesburg
May 2011

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List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
ASL	African Safari Lodge
BBBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BOT	Build, Operate and Transfer
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CITES	Convention for the International Trade in Endangered Species
CITW	Children in the Wilderness
CLaRA	Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPA	Communal Property Association
CPA Exco.	Communal Property Association Executive Committee
CPPP	Community Public Private Partnership
CSI	Corporate Social Investment
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DEAT	Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DLA	Department of Land Affairs
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ERM	Environmental Resources Management Consulting Firm
ET	EcoTraining Camp
EWT	Endangered Wildlife Trust
Exco.	Executive Committee
FGASA	Field Guides Association of Southern Africa
FoM	Friends of Makuleke
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GLTP	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
GTZ	Dutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
GPI	Global Partnership Initiative
GRI	Global Reporting Initiative
HITW	Hole in the Wall
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
JMB	Joint Management Board
JMC	Joint Management Committee
JV	Joint Venture
KNP	Kruger National Park
LCC	Land Claims Commission

LRC	Legal Resources Centre
MCC&H	Makuleke Community Centre and Homestay (Also referred to as B&B)
MIS	Makuleke Irrigation Scheme
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NPB	National Parks Board (previous name for SANParks)
NRS	N'tomeni Ranger Services
OBE	Outcomes Based Education
PLAAS	Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
PTO	Permission to Occupy
RDG	Restitution Discretionary Grant
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADT	South African Development Trust
SANParks	South African National Parks
SASSETA	Safety and Security Sector Education Training Authority
SBSC	Small Business Support Company
SMME	Small Medium Enterprises
TA	Tribal/Traditional Authority
TEP	Tourism Enterprise Programme
THETA	The Tourism, Hospitality, Sport Education and Training Authority
TO	The Outpost Lodge
TRANSFORM	Training and Support for Resource Management Programme
WNLA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
WS	Wilderness Safaris
WWB	Webber Wentzel Bowens

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
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
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
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Map 2 Limpopo Province and the Kruger National Park (www.krugerparktour.com/kruger-map.html)



Map 3 The three tourism concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park (The Outpost, Pafuri Camp, EcoTraining) and N'tomeni Ranger Services. (Google Maps 2011)



Map 4 N'tlhaveni: the three residential settlements to which the Makuleke were removed (Makuleke, Mabiligwe and Makahlule). (Google Maps 2011)

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to Tourism-Led Development at Makuleke

*“To my best friends: the Makuleke people.
I wish you the best of luck
with the future development of your area.”*

Former President, Nelson Mandela
Hand-written note on the
Makuleke Restitution Discretionary Grant
Document
November 26, 1996

1.1 The Makuleke Case Study: an introduction

Since the early 19th century, the Makuleke people and their environment have attracted much international interest over the years. Archaeologists, geologists, missionaries, historians, anthropologists, researchers and aid agents have all documented the events that characterise the Makuleke people and their environs in the remote north-eastern corner of South Africa.¹

The Makuleke story is one of loss and regain; of forced relocation and the struggle for survival; of redressing past injustice; and of reclaiming their integrity. The issue at the heart of it all is land. Theirs is a portion of terrain (the Pafuri triangle) that

¹ I use the term Makuleke in this thesis to refer to both a people and a place. ‘Old Makuleke’ denotes the place where the community lived prior to 1969 in the Pafuri triangle, while ‘Makuleke’ also alludes to the three settlement villages outside of Kruger National Park where the community currently resides in an area called N’tlhaveni in northern Limpopo Province (see map 7).

was excised by the apartheid government in 1969 to enable the expansion of Kruger National Park (KNP) and to secure the north-eastern borders of South Africa.²

Having endured the brutal experience of a forced removal under the apartheid regime, the Makuleke were able to call for justice under the post-1994 democratic South Africa. As a result of their land claim, ownership of the Pafuri area was allocated to the Makuleke in 1998, an event that marked the first land restitution case in the country involving a national park. The process of regaining their land was far from simple, however. It required extensive negotiations, commitment and resolve to face the oncoming challenges. Nevertheless, the Makuleke persevered and their efforts paid off. Today, the community owns an invaluable section of the Kruger National Park, renamed the Makuleke Contract Park, and rather than returning to live on their ancestral land, the community opted to utilise the area for conservation and tourism.

The Makuleke people's fame mainly stems from their perceived accomplishment in combining a number of unprecedented achievements involving a successful land claim against the Kruger National Park, a joint management agreement with South African National Park (SANParks), and synthesising traditional and democratic forms of governance. In addition, the community has also been commended for its commitment towards nature conservation and its pursuit of community development through tourism partnerships. For many communities in southern Africa, the Makuleke have become a symbol of rural progress; their achievements regarded as a 'model' worthy of replication. As a result, the community's perceived

² According to Lee Berger (2007), "the 'triangle' is created by the intersection of two great rivers – the ancient and dying Limpopo, which more than 65 million years ago had its origins in the Angolan highlands, and the young and powerful Luvuvhu river, which is actively carving its way through the sandstones of the region and in the process creating the impressive Lanner Gorge. Their intersection at Crook's Corner creates a triangle of land that not only forms a meeting point of three countries – South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique – but also forms a natural choke point for wildlife crossing from North to South and back, and a unique ecological region." (1)

success has attracted many other land-claimants, both from South Africa and beyond, who have visited the Makuleke to learn from their experience.

A decade after the successful land claim, however, the situation at Makuleke has evolved in various directions. Although two up-market tourism operations, a field guide training facility and a ranger station did in fact materialise in the Makuleke Contract Park, the promises made by advisors to the community of lucrative shares and significant employment opportunities that would boost community development proved to be ill-founded.

The complications and challenges that have arisen in relation to the Makuleke land claim arrangements are likely to have strongly influenced the decision made in 2009 by the Cabinet of the South African government to revoke any further land claims against Kruger National Park. Conflicts of interest and power struggles between the various stakeholders reputedly have made it unattractive for South African National Parks to repeat the Makuleke model with other claimants (Groenewald and Rawoot 2009: 8). Instead of granting title deeds, as in the Makuleke case, Cabinet has opted rather for equitable redress with regard to the settlement of outstanding land claims in Kruger National Park. According to Pulane Molefe (2009), such communities are to be compensated with the awarding of alternative land or financial reimbursement (1). Although pending land claimants against Kruger National Park will not be able to follow in Makuleke footsteps, there are still many useful insights offered by the community's experience. As one Makuleke leader proclaimed:

At the beginning, I thought this land claim and its subsequent operations was just a dream, but now I see that the dream is a reality with a lot of challenges. I am not convinced that our model is the best model, but one thing that makes me happy is that communities coming not only from South Africa, but even from across the borders, can learn from our community and when they go back, they can advance our model. (int. 2008)

1.2 An Overview of Previous Research on the Makuleke

The Pafuri triangle and its inhabitants have been the subjects of many texts since the mid-19th century. The triangle, bordering Zimbabwe and Mozambique, is cradled between the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers and is unique both geologically and ecologically. Pafuri was home to the Makuleke people for roughly 150 years and during that time, the area was bustling with activity. Records show that ivory hunters, illegal labour recruiters, traders, missionaries and immigrants traversed the Pafuri and interacted with the Makuleke.

The most recent defining moment in the area's history is when the Makuleke reclaimed their land at Pafuri thirty years after their forced removal. The events surrounding this move have been the subject of much anticipation and controversy in relation to a number of topics. In this overview of research on the Makuleke and their environment, I present a non-exhaustive list of such writings, some of which are dedicated exclusively to the Makuleke and others that mention the Makuleke in relation to discussions of other issues. I divide the extensive list into the following themes and present each section in chronological order: ethnography, history and natural history; land claims; community-based natural resource management; tourism and poverty reduction; the Makuleke area as part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park; and inquiries into governance, identity and ethnicity.

Regarding the first theme, ethnography, history and natural history, the seminal ethnographic landmark works on the Tsonga people (the ethnic group under which the Makuleke are classified), are Henri Junod's (1905) *The Ba-Thonga [sic.] of the Transvaal* in which he discusses Tsonga history, language, literature, morality and religion;³ and David Hammond-Tooke's (1937) *The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa* that includes a section on the Tsonga people (part of the Bantu cultural

³ 'Thonga' spelled in this way represents the Zulu pronunciation of the term (Hammond-Tooke 1974: 69).

groups) and a detailed account describing their habitat, ethnic classification and livelihoods from before the intrusion of whites into South Africa to the time of high apartheid.

The account of the “Swiss Evangelical Mission to Shangaan Tribes (1875-1925)” by Edgar Brookes (c. 1925) also presents a detailed description of the history, livelihoods and customs of the Tsonga people with whom the Swiss missionaries worked closely. Further, B.H. Dicke (1926) writes about the Makuleke in the “First Voortrekkers to the Northern Transvaal and the Massacre of the van Rensburg Trek”, showing how the then Chief Maluleke Hlekana “extracted the first great blood price paid by the intrepid voortrekkers” in 1836 (1021).⁴ In addition, Thomas Bulpin’s (1954) legendary fictional novel, *The Ivory Trail*, relates the story of a white hunter who operated in the old Makuleke area between the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers in the late 19th century.

Historic chronicles written more recently on the Makuleke include Patrick Harries’ (1981) account of the Thonga [*sic*] and a discussion of Henry Junod’s “conversion to anthropology ... and [his] avowed aim to record ethnographic data which could then be analysed by the anthropologist and the historian” (37, 39). The most recent documentation of Makuleke history is notably Harries’ (1987) “A Forgotten Corner of the Transvaal” in which he depicts a “worm’s eye view” of Makuleke oral history and song (93). Martin Murray (1995) writes on “Blackbirding at ‘Crooks Corner’ from 1910-1940, in which he investigates the illegal labour recruiting for the Witwatersrand gold mines that occurred in the north-eastern corner of South Africa, including the old Makuleke area. Further, Lee Berger’s (2007) paper, “A History of the Makuleke” presents an overview of the geological landscape and ancient cultural civilisation of the Pafuri triangle.

⁴ Chief Hlekana was the chief of the Makuleke people from 1833 to 1856 (also spelled Hlaniki by Bruchmann 2006:43). (See list of chiefs in Appendix 2).

After the South African transition to full democracy on April 27th, 1994, and the beginnings of land reform policies, the Makuleke became a high profile case representative of the first successful land claim against a protected conservation area in South Africa. A number of advisors, researchers and scholars documented and analysed the events of that time. Examples of informative texts on the second theme, the Makuleke land claim, include Marlene Winberg's (1998) consideration of the Makuleke in her presentation of different voices from communities experiencing land reform; and Bertus De Villiers' (1999) comprehensive legal account of the Makuleke land claim process. Furthermore, a financial overview and discussion of development options for the Makuleke region is reported by Richard Davies (1999); and a detailed analysis of the power relations and environmental conflicts between the Makuleke Communal Property Association and the National Parks Board is presented by Conrad Steenkamp (2001);⁵ In 2003, Teresa Connor published a piece on home and belonging in the Pafuri border zone between South Africa and Mozambique, focusing specifically on the "socio-economic and historical patterns of place and identity in the Pafuri Triangle" (93).

The third theme by which I have categorised the existing literature on the Makuleke is community-based natural resource management, a topic that drew the attention of many scholars who examined this aspect of the Makuleke land reform model. These analytical works include: Conrad Steenkamp and Jana Urh (2000) who discuss the conflicts of interest between rural communities and conservation groups in general, but specifically focus on the power relations that existed between the Makuleke and the National Parks Board during and after the land claim process. Barbara Tapela (2001) writes on community participation in natural resources management and uses the Makuleke community as a case study for her Masters thesis in Geography. Hannah Reid (2001) examines contractual national parks and

⁵ The National Parks Board (NPB) was renamed the South African National Parks (SANParks) in 1998.

centres her analysis on the joint management arrangement of the Makuleke region of the Kruger National Park. Further, Maano Ramutsindela (2002) analyses the “drawing of statutory environmental conservation policies into the ambit of land reform” and presents a juxtaposition of “historical material and trajectories of restitution in order to shed light on the contestation between national goals and community interests” (15). In addition, Ulli Poonan (2002) presents a paper outlining the key achievements and challenges of the Makuleke in building natural assets as community assets; and Sheona Shackleton and Bruce Campbell et al. (2002) include the Makuleke in a comparative study on “the impacts of natural resource devolution policies in several Asian and southern African countries from the perspective of local people” (1).

Continuing the theme of community-based natural resources management, Hector Magome and James Murombedzi (2003) discuss opportunities for rural communities to benefit from their land claims against national parks, comparing two cases: the Nama people’s case against the Richtersveld National Park and the Makuleke case against Kruger National Park. Further, Conrad Steenkamp (2003) discusses the Makuleke “model”, providing an overview of the “Makuleke Agreement and its implications, and the community level institutional framework” that was established during the land claim. In this analysis, Steenkamp (2003) also discusses the issue of replicating the Makuleke experience elsewhere, and “attempts to view the Makuleke ‘model’ in relation to emerging policy directions in the region” (2). Caroline Ashley and Zolile Ntshona (2003) also examine the Makuleke ‘model’, but centre on its possible replication in the Wild Coast for communities aiming to become involved in tourism and forestry development.

Eddie Koch and Christo Fabricius et al. (2004) include the Makuleke case study in their book on *Rights, Resources and Rural Development in Southern Africa*; and Ruth Hall (2004) refers to the Makuleke in her status report on land and agrarian reform in South Africa. Furthermore, Julia Friedman (2005), in her Bachelor of Arts thesis

in environmental studies, discusses how the Makuleke land claim forced the community to “adopt a new relationship with their land in the Pafuri – one that is based on the potential economic profits that the land will yield through community-based natural resource management and ecotourism” (3).

Bertus De Villiers and Marlize van den Berg (2006) present a chapter entitled “The Makuleke National Park” in their discussion of the complexity of land reform in South Africa; and Christopher Thornhill and David Mello (2007) write about the restitution of land rights in South Africa, using the Makuleke as a case study for a successful land claim. Thornhill and Mello (2007) argue that “the significance of the successful land claim is not only about ownership, it is more about the management and the sustainable use of natural resources found on such land for the benefit of the community” (284).

Steven Robins and Kees van der Waal (2008, 2010) draw attention to the complexity of the Makuleke land reform model and discuss “how the Makuleke community in Limpopo Province achieved iconic status in relation to land reform and community-based conservation discourses in South Africa and beyond” (53). In addition, Aninka Claassens and Moray Hathorn (2008) examine the Makuleke as one of three land restitution cases in relation to South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 (CLaRA).

More recently, Jasson Urbach and Laura Grube (2009) presented a case study for the Freemarket Foundation on the Makuleke Land Restitution and Conservation Project with specific emphasis on conservation law, community-based natural resources management and private sector partnerships; and Francois Louw (2010) wrote a Masters thesis in social anthropology on the Makuleke in relation to “a new development culture [that] has been cultivated at the end of the 20th century in reaction to the ‘crisis of development’ and the need to bring relief to impoverished communities” (3).

A fourth theme in the writings on the Makuleke considers the role of tourism in poverty reduction. For instance, Barbara Tapela and Omaru-Ojungu (1999) deliberates on bridging the gap between wildlife conservation and rural development; and the Makuleke were explored as a pro-poor tourism pilot study by Karin Mahony and Jurgens van Zyl (2001). The role of the tourism sector in expanding economic opportunities is explored by Mahony and van Zyl (2002); and Dilys Roe and Caroline Ashley (2004) also discuss the Makuleke case in relation to tourism and the poor. Furthermore, Caroline Ashley and Clive Poultney et al. (2005) provide insights to “assist tourism companies to take advantage of opportunities to contribute more to the local economy” through local procurement, products and partnerships (1).

The impact of tourism on poverty alleviation continues to be an analytical focus. Robin Turner (2004) writes on community-based tourism and conservation at Makuleke; and in a comparative study, Peter John Massyn (2006) evaluates outcomes of the Madikwe and Makuleke land claims, and their optimisation of integrating their land into the tourism market (3). Moreover, Caroline Ashley and Peter de Brine et al. (2007) profile the Makuleke partnership with Wilderness Safaris as part of a number of case profiles on the role of tourism in expanding economic opportunity in developing countries. The Makuleke involvement in public-private partnerships is presented by Steve Collins (2008); and Steve Collins and Herman Snel (2008) report on the GTZ TRANSFORM programme implemented in the Makuleke villages outside the Kruger National Park from 1996-2007.

Furthermore, as the Makuleke Contract Park lies at the heart of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) spanning Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique, much attention has been dedicated to addressing issues of transboundary conservation, along with tourism and community land rights in this context. Examples include: William Wolmer (2003), who refers to the Makuleke land claim in his article on Transboundary Natural Resource Management in the flagship Great

Limpopo Transfrontier Park initiative. In this study, Wolmer (2003) investigates “the competing agendas and points of conflict surrounding the initiative at global, national and local levels and ... the potential impact on agrarian livelihoods” (261).

Carla Dyll (2004) wrote a Masters thesis in social science on environmental decision-making in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park where she argues that “popular rhetoric surrounding the GLTP [had] not taken place in reality” and that “policies and action plans for the GLTP were developed by the state with little public participation” (1). Further, Anna Spenceley (2005a) presents a scoping report on the three countries involved in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and includes the Makuleke Contract Park; and in (2005b and 2006a), Spenceley (2006a) relates strategic visions to local activities that promote sustainable tourism development, describing “state and private sector tourism within the GLTP and planning initiatives that may promote responsible tourism”. Spenceley further describes “the achievements by community-based tourism enterprises and public-private partnerships in generating economic, social and environmental benefits” (649).

Anna Spenceley and Pamhidzai Dzingirai et al. (2008) discuss the economic impacts of tourism in the GLTP conservation areas, and Marja Spierenburg and Harry Wels (2006) present “a brief history of the use of maps and fences in wildlife conservation”. In Spierenburg and Steenkamp et al. (2007), the authors analyse the “effects of policies on the distribution of profits and other benefits within natural resource commodity chains” (ii).

In Marja Spierenburg and Conrad Steenkamp et al. (2008) a comparison between experiences of local residents on the South African side of the GLTP with those on the Mozambican side is deliberated. The article “explores how negotiations [across the borders] and interactions affected the institutional choices made with regards to the management of the GLTP and how these shaped the control and benefits of local residents” (87). As a chapter in *Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation*

(2008), Webster Whande and Helen Suich also relate the Makuleke involvement in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park conservation initiative.

Turning from economic to political assessments, Bram Buscher (2006) discusses the paradox between politics and anti-politics in Transfrontier Conservation Areas as a “deciding factor in how transfrontier environmental governance and institutions are shaped and operate” (1). And in an anthropological study, Natalie Grime (2006) explores the creation of the GLTP as a tri-national park and “its effects on the local, rural, poor, and indigenous populations living within and around park boundaries” (208).

More recent investigations on the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area include Heidi Hansen’s (2008) Master of Science thesis on community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri and the development of a cultural heritage site in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park; along with Shadab Khan’s (2009) Maputo conference paper on sustainable development and community participation in the Transfrontier Park. In addition, relations between local communities and the private sector in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park are examined by Marja Spierenburg and Harry Wels et al. (2009).

A fifth research dimension on the Makuleke case relates to questions of governance, identity, and ethnicity. An inquiry by David Bunn (2001) into “landscape aesthetics, labour management, and conceptions of ethnic sovereignty in ... the early Kruger National Park” reveals that “in the example of the Makuleke land claim ... distinct government departments competed to establish different allegories of paternalistic racial management” (5). Steve Collins (2003a) writes about community-led partnerships for conservation and development; and in (2003b), reports on governance institutions at Makuleke. Furthermore, Steven Robins (2003) questions some key assumptions of post-development and anti-development theorists who reject “‘exogenous development’ that does not necessarily reflect the needs and desires of beneficiaries” (265) and presents a case for Makuleke institutional

hybridity and the community's creation of 'indigenous modernities' as a response to development interventions. In addition, John and Jean Comaroff (2009) refer to the Makuleke in their analysis of ethnicity and the commodification of human identity as a direct consequence of neoliberalism.

A number of other topics were also discussed in relation to the Makuleke community: Training featured as the topic in Magiel Marnewick's (2005) Honours thesis on the impacts of community training in nature conservation on Makuleke students; and the effects of social research on rural communities was analysed by Barbara Tapela and Lamson Maluleke et al. (2007), as well as by Barbara Tapela and Bram Buscher et al. (2009). Further, David Grossman and Phillipa Holden (2009) consider transformation and contractual national parks in their analysis of the Makuleke as one of three examples of rural communities who use their land for conservation purposes. In this analysis, Grossman and Holden (2009) "demonstrate the considerable challenge of working with cobbled-together 'communities', including problems of internal differentiation and conflict, especially when the park agency is relatively inexperienced in these matters and its commitment to environmental justice may not reach down through the agency to field staff" (282). Lastly, another study on identity and ethnicity is Izak van Zyl's (2010) Masters thesis on the spirit of ethno-enterprise, cultural incorporation and branding among the Makuleke.

Some research was conducted on the development of farming enterprises at Makuleke. Reports on the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme include: Barbara Tapela's (2008) discussion on community livelihoods in the wake of agricultural commercialisation; Robert Pellizzoli's (2009) presentation on gender perspectives from the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme; and Joshua Baloyi's (2010) analysis of constraints facing smallholder farmers in the agri-business value chain.

In sum, a large proportion of reports and studies have focused on the 'Makuleke model', its key feature according to Ashley and Ntshona (2003) being:

that the community wins the claim and gets rights to the land that is currently used for conservation and/or tourism, but rights are conditional on limited change in land-use. Thus they get an asset for commercial development (via tourism), but do not gain land for residing or agriculture. (41)

1.3 Study Objectives

This thesis constitutes an in-depth examination of tourism-led development at Makuleke. More specifically, the study interrogates one particular aspect of the 'Makuleke model': the relationship between the Makuleke CPA,⁶ and its primary tourism partner, Wilderness Safaris.⁷ Although an equally strong constituent of the 'Makuleke model' rests on the Makuleke CPA's partnership with South African National Park (SANParks), this relationship does not form part of this inquiry.

Essentially, this research aims to reveal the complexities of partnerships between rural communities and private sector tourism operators. I discuss the impacts of private partnerships on community development, variances in perceptions of value between partners, and resulting contestations over power. For this investigation, the central research questions are:

- What defines the relationship between the Makuleke CPA and their private sector partners, Wilderness Safaris?
- To what extent have anticipated benefits from this tourism partnership (and its related development offshoots) materialised for the Makuleke community?
- How has tourism-led development affected the Makuleke?
- What hinders the successful implementation of community development projects at Makuleke?

⁶ The Makuleke CPA is the legal entity through which representatives from the Makuleke, in the form of an Executive Committee, manage their restored land on behalf of the community.

⁷ Wilderness Safaris is a responsible ecotourism and conservation company operating three categories of camps: Premier, Classic and Wilderness Adventures. Their camp in the Makuleke Contract Park, Pafuri Camp, was first marketed under the company's main sales channel: 'Wilderness Safaris'. In 2008 Pafuri Camp was marketed under 'Safaris & Adventure Camps', and is currently marketed under the 'Wilderness Adventures' sales channel. For the purposes of this study, I will use the Wilderness Safaris general brand throughout the discussion.

- And lastly, what does the Makuleke case suggest about post-development theory?

The study's conclusions are based on the analysis of three aspects of the Makuleke community's relationship with Wilderness Safaris: first, the concession agreement between the two parties, with its related conservation and anti-poaching activities inside the Makuleke Contract Park; second, the economic development projects at N'tlhaveeni (the residential settlement villages of the Makuleke) in which the Makuleke engaged in a joint venture partnership with Wilderness Safaris in the form of a Small Business Support Company (SBSC); and third, a children's environmental and life-skills programme initiated by Wilderness Safaris investing in educating Makuleke youths in the areas of conservation and life-skills. Details of these three aspects are discussed in section 1.5.

The study draws on arguments made by post-development theory, an approach that articulates disillusionment with orthodox post World War II development practice, and in particular the "deep flaws in the ideas which inform this project of development, rather than just superficial problems regarding the way in which the project has been implemented" (Matthews 2004: 382). Specifically, I draw inspiration from what Joseph Ahorro (2008) refers to as the "second wave of post-development theory"; a modification from its first phase that originated in the 1990s that called for "alternatives to development" based on the failure of the development agenda in most of the Third World (Latouche 1993; Escobar 1995). Ahorro (2008) argues that post-development does not idealise life in pre-modern societies and does not abandon the goal of improving people's lives; rather, it calls for development projects to entail "meaningful consultations with those directly affected" (3-4). Furthermore, Ahorro (2008) asserts that this second wave of post-development:

Initiates a wider critique of development on all levels that has not been possible beforehand. An interrogation of development helps us take a full account of what works and what does not work, of which programs do more harm than good, and most importantly of the disparity of power relations between those offering and receiving development. (3)

According to this view, it is argued that a variety of options and avenues should be explored in an attempt to achieve a 'better life' for the 'poor'. In this study, I explore the avenue of tourism and its impact on a rural community seeking 'development'. Petri Hottola (2009) states that "Southern Africa is currently one of the world's most significant 'laboratories' for observing the role of tourism in economic and social development" (ix). In the Makuleke case, the successful land claim has indeed set the community en route to 'development', and the mechanism proposed to achieve this goal is through tourism and conservation initiatives. The question, however, is to what end and by what means? As part of my study, I trace the causal links that led the Makuleke to the situation in which they find themselves today. Evidently, the community's expectations of a significant increase in prosperity and economic development through tourism were inflated, and with regard to broad-based community upliftment ten years after the land claim, only limited progress has been achieved.

This thesis unpacks tourism-led development efforts at Makuleke. Conclusions show how development interventions aiming to alleviate poverty at Makuleke since the land claim have focused mainly on economic assistance, democratising leadership, and promoting conservation ideals within the community. The underlying assumptions in these efforts are that economic assistance and the democratisation of political power will lead to 'development'. In terms of economic upliftment, critics argue that the flaw with this kind of assistance is that "poverty is interpreted as an economic disease requiring economic remedies" (Daubon 2007:2). In this regard, post-development theorists reject the linear "modernist notion that

'becoming developed' must be based on material values ... economic growth, material accumulation and mass consumption" (Andreasson 2010: 7). The argument calls for a "rethinking of what it means to develop" and advocates a "holistic conceptualisation of social harmony that does not separate cultural, spiritual and ecological facets of development from economic and political ones" (Ibid: 7).

By immersing myself in the case and observing the surrounding socio-political dynamics that controlled particular situations on the ground, I was able to uncover some of the forces that obstruct the successful implementation of development at Makuleke. I interpret these deductions using insights from post-development theory that allow for an in-depth analysis of some of the fundamental challenges facing the Makuleke's quest for development. I propose that the problems of development at Makuleke lie in the assumptions and ideas on which community development were (and currently still are) based. My argument is that improved implementation of the current framework used to implement the community projects at Makuleke is not the answer to achieving positive change in terms of a better life for the community. What is necessary is a reorientation of the project of development in its entirety, a rethinking of the premises upon which some of these ideas were founded based on a recognition of cultural constituents, existing social relationships, along with the needs and aspirations of the community as expressed by the recipients of these development efforts.

Ultimately, my thesis does not purport to resolve the problems facing the Makuleke. However, my goal is to bring to the fore the perspectives of the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris with regards to pertinent issues, to present their goals and objectives, and to reveal their individual assumptions, views and values. As Serge Latouche (1993) explains, the intellectual's role is to "spell out [events and perspectives] through critical analysis", but not to "formulate precise plans of action for others" (25). Latouche (1993) believes:

In doing that, one risks betraying one's vocation as an intellectual. The commitment to analysis does not necessarily lead to an output of prescriptions for concrete 'action'. The demand for such 'action' is itself an imperative of the techno-economic system, which simply presupposes that analysis and thought, if they are to be useful, must have an instrumental role in producing actionable recipes. (Ibid: 25)

Without being prescriptive, my aim is to unearth the complexities involved in processes of planning and implementation of development interventions at Makuleke, and to identify a number of causes that led to specific outcomes. Using evidence derived from archival documents, participant observation and interviews, I demonstrate that the Makuleke 'model' is neither as conceptually coherent nor as practically successful as is commonly supposed. I argue that although the model seems to denote success, a closer scrutiny of its foundations, assumptions and context expose inherent forces and practices that hinder its long-term effective implementation.

1.4 Research Methodology

This investigation is situated within the disciplines of tourism and development studies. However, the methodologies I use in my inquiry are adopted from the disciplines of anthropology and history, including oral history. I use these methodologies not exclusively to describe or critique past and present everyday life at Makuleke, but to understand the way in which development interventions function and the manner in which the people involved perceive and experience them. By using this method, my objective is to contribute to the ultimate goal of reorienting future development practice in similar contexts. To obtain data for my research, I opted to triangulate archival investigation, participant observation, and semi-structured open-ended interviews. These three methods were ideal in

conveying the manner in which the development projects at Makuleke were structured and implemented, and also allowed me to decipher and interpret the underlying forces at play.

Despite the substantial research that has been conducted on the Makuleke (as demonstrated in section 1.2), critics have drawn attention to the common impression that the community does not see much benefit from all the research that has transpired over the years (Tapela and Maluleke et al. 2007: 68, 75; pers. com. Makuleke leadership 2007). Bearing in mind the “research fatigue” experienced by the Makuleke (Tapela and Maluleke et al. 2007: 80), my main aim was to provide practical contributions to the community whilst conducting my fieldwork at the villages. I tried to engage with specific projects and assist wherever possible, both to give back to the community in a meaningful way, and to gain a thorough understanding of how these projects functioned and what difficulties were experienced on the ground. My involvement with the Makuleke, then, occurred on two levels: through practical project support with assignments designated by Wilderness Safaris, and through research based at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Wilderness Safaris, with whom I was associated as a capacity-builder and in a monitoring and evaluation role, is the main private sector partner of the Makuleke CPA. The company is described in *Conde Nast Traveller Magazine* (June/July 2001) as a southern African photographic safari company founded by guides who gradually evolved their business “from a no-frills bird tour in Botswana to safari tourism” (Salole 2006: 209). By 2008, the company had become one of the largest safari operators, with sixty tourism properties in seven southern African countries, employing some 2,500 staff across the region. Currently, 1,600 of the total staff work in the camps, eighty-five percent of whom are employed from local communities. In addition, Wilderness Safaris traverses over and provides financial

viability for more than 2.8 million hectares of conservation land (Roche 2008: 2).

The company identifies itself as:

A conservation organisation and ecotourism company dedicated to responsible tourism throughout the areas in which it operates in southern Africa. Its goal is to share these wild areas with guests from all over the world, while at the same time helping to ensure the future protection of Africa's spectacular wildlife heritage and sharing the benefits of tourism with local communities. (Wilderness Safaris Profile 2009)

My access to Makuleke was enabled through the position I was offered by Wilderness Safaris to assist in monitoring, evaluating and developing their joint venture community initiatives. My first visit to the community was on May 31st, 2007, to attend a hand-over workshop organised by GTZ TRANSFORM.⁸ This workshop was attended by Makuleke leaders and project staff, Wilderness Safaris representatives, and GTZ TRANSFORM personnel. The aim of the meeting was to discuss the way forward for the joint venture between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris, to clarify the relationship between these two entities with regards to the two small businesses (the Hydroponic Farm and the Bed & Breakfast), as well as to hand over assets that had been financed by GTZ TRANSFORM to the newly formed Small Business Support Company (SBSC) (Massyn 2007: 1). (Chapter Six presents an in-depth discussion of the SBSC projects.) Subsequent to this meeting, I applied for research consent from the Makuleke CPA, which functioned as a formal clarification of my dual role as researcher from Wits University and employee of the Wilderness Wildlife Trust. This research consent was approved by the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee in August 2007, and I was granted permission to analyse the community projects linked to Wilderness Safaris. In this

⁸ GTZ TRANSFORM was a cooperative project between the German government and the South African Ministry for Environment and Tourism from 1996 to 2007. In German, GTZ stands for *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*.

way, I was able to gain first hand information on the two partners and become fully engaged in the issues I was investigating.

The conditions of my employment contract were that the Wilderness Wildlife Trust would cover the costs of my research in exchange for the submission of feedback and reports on the progress of the Small Business Support Company projects at Makuleke, along with capacity-building assistance to project staff.⁹ I was employed based on the fact that I was “attached to a university and had experience in the tourism industry” (Poultney 2007b: 3). My duties were to implement effective operating systems at the Makuleke B&B, and to assist with staff training and marketing of the establishment. I was also asked to report on the activities of the Hydroponic Farm at Makuleke and inform Wilderness Safaris with regard to its progress and challenges. Subsequently, given that I was spending a significant amount of time in the villages, I was asked to support the Children in the Wilderness (CITW) programme by conducting Follow-Up sessions at the Makuleke B&B and setting up Environmental Clubs at the five schools at the Makuleke villages.¹⁰

In April 2008, I signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Children in the Wilderness to fulfil the part-time role of Follow-Up Programme Coordinator. The proviso was that, alongside my part-time employment obligations as CITW coordinator, I would also be evaluating the programme for my PhD research and therefore would be granted interviews with staff and participants along with access to reports, correspondences and other written materials for research purposes. However, as Children in the Wilderness did not constitute part of my initial research project, I had not acquired ethics clearance to interview children under the age of

⁹ Wilderness Safaris Wildlife Trust supports a wide variety of projects in southern Africa, within the categories of wildlife management, research and education. These projects address the needs of existing wildlife populations, seek solutions to save endangered species and provide education and training for local people and their communities. The stated goal of the Trust is to make a difference to Africa, her wildlife and her people (*Wilderness Wildlife Trust* 2005).

¹⁰ Children in the Wilderness (CITW) is an educational environmental and life-skills programme implemented by Wilderness Safaris in cooperation with communities surrounding the areas in which the company operates its lodges.

eighteen years. For this reason, I refrained from interviewing the children who participated in this programme. My analysis is based on insights derived indirectly from participant observation, and on extensive interviews conducted with the children's schoolteachers, programme mentors and other adult personnel involved with the programme. (Analysis of the Children in the Wilderness programme follows in Chapter Seven).

Significantly, the timing of my research proved crucial in my gaining an overall view of the interface between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. This was a matter of coincidence, since I became involved with the joint venture projects just as they were being handed over by GTZ TRANSFORM to the Small Business Support Company in 2007, and my participation with Children in the Wilderness began in 2008, just as the programme was expanding into the villages in an attempt to achieve more sustainable outreach.

Furthermore, my research lasted for as long as the community projects were in what I term the initial phases of progression, and I was able fully to experience this first cycle of events. Although it can prove difficult to decide when to end a period of fieldwork, again by chance, circumstances towards the end of 2009 led to a shift in the relationship between the two partners: on the one hand, the joint venture was weakening and was eventually dissolved in May 2010, and on the other hand, the Children in the Wilderness Programme was strengthening and grew to the extent of requiring a full-time employee (a position I was offered, but did not take up because I believe it is important for sustainability that a local person take on the role). It therefore seemed an opportune point to end my data collection phase since I had witnessed a complete cycle of the stages of project planning and implementation for both the Small Business Support Company and Children in the Wilderness.

My formal role with the Makuleke community projects ended in December 2009. Nonetheless, I volunteered as resource person throughout 2010, attending meetings and workshops related to the joint venture and the updating of the Makuleke Master

Plan (discussed further in Chapter Four), as well as corresponding with community members and Wilderness Safaris staff offering information and recommendations when requested.

1.5 Research Strategy: a case study approach

To investigate the procedures and outcomes of a tourism partnership between a rural community and a private sector tourism operator, I consider a case study approach to be most appropriate. According to Karen Horsch and Cami Anderson (1997), the case study methodology, “by investigating phenomena in their real-life context, can be a very important tool in opening the ‘black box’ of how interventions and program effectiveness are linked” (1). The method creates an enabling approach to address “descriptive or explanatory questions and aims to produce a first-hand understanding of people and events” (Yin 2004: 3). As stated by Horsch and Anderson (1997), rather than traditional experimental and quasi-experimental designs that may “measure outcomes and some process variables, but fall short in dealing with the dynamic that is inherent in community-based collaborative initiatives”, the case study is considered advantageous in gaining a deeper understanding of experiences on the ground (1). Moreover, Bill Gillham (2004) suggests that the case study as research strategy works well since “the naturalistic style of case study research makes it particularly appropriate to study human phenomena” (2). For these reasons, I argue that the case study is a suitable approach through which to unravel the complexities experienced by rural communities in tourism partnerships.

Within my main case study, the Makuleke CPA partnership with Wilderness Safaris, I evaluate three different modes of engagement between the two parties and present them as embedded sub-case studies. The main sub-case is the concession agreement between the two parties, which includes the lease arrangement

regarding the development of a safari tourism operation in the Makuleke Contract Park. Out of this partnership, the second and third sub-cases were initiated at the Makuleke villages in N'tlhaveni: first, the joint venture businesses under the Small Business Support Company (SBSC); and second, the Children in the Wilderness Programme (CITW), an educational initiative focusing on environmental awareness and life-skills development.




Diagram 2 Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris Partnership and Community Engagement Programmes.

I was only a full participant observer in two of these three sub-cases. The initial and main partnership deal (the concession agreement) had been signed in 2003, and the alliance between the two parties was well underway when I began my research. However, issues arose during the period of my fieldwork that offer insights into the complexities that emerge from such partnership arrangements a few years after agreements have been signed. My primary concern in this investigation is to understand the processes through which tourism-led development projects function, and to identify the reasons that contribute towards their success or failure.

1.6 Fieldwork Procedures

The fact that I was employed by Wilderness Safaris provided me with a number of benefits: it enabled me to access the research site easily; it facilitated my introduction to community leaders and project staff; and it allowed me to be genuinely involved in the projects. It was also convenient to have accommodation at the Makuleke B&B where I could spend the day working on the projects in the villages and have my own space in the evenings to transcribe interviews or write down field notes. Furthermore, I witnessed first hand the difficulties challenging the B&B, especially in the first seven months of its incorporation into the joint venture when the establishment suffered from water shortages along with other infrastructural problems. These experiences enabled me to understand the conditions under which the B&B was expected to operate, and why it was so difficult to tackle the problems that beset its proper functioning and restore things to working order. The length of time I spent at Makuleke also made it easier to arrange and conduct interviews as it allowed me the flexibility to cater to the interviewees' schedules. Since I only began interviewing people after having spent many months in the field, I had become reasonably acquainted with the respondents. By that time, the interviewees were more open to sharing their thoughts and experiences with me than I suspect would have been the case if I had launched into my inquiries upon my arrival at Makuleke.

The fieldwork I conducted for this study stretched over a period of two and a half years (May 2007 to December 2009), which allowed me sufficient time to gain insights into complex issues. I was weary of the criticism of much development research, expressed by Robert Chambers (1999) for instance, as embodying the phenomenon of "rural development tourism" whereby the "rural experience of most urban outsiders is limited to the brief and hurried visits from urban centres" (2). Chambers states that usually these visitors have three things in common: they come from urban areas; they want to find something out; and they are short of time (Chambers 1999: 11). Not only is the quality of research conducted under such conditions questionable, but it is also discourteous to rural people to assume that

complex issues affecting their lives can be understood and reported on within a short space of time.

Nevertheless, self-criticism is also noteworthy here. Although I did spend much time at Makuleke, I still cannot claim to have a clear understanding of the cultural values that drive people to act in certain ways. I became aware of the existence of some attributes specific to rural culture in that area such as witchcraft, tall poppy syndrome, local politics and generational issues, for example, but I cannot claim for this to be a study of culture as such: a deep analysis of these subjects is beyond the scope of this research.¹¹

Furthermore, I believe that in all likelihood, I had some influence on the outcome of events related to the projects I was working on, simply because it was in my interest to see them succeed. Although I could identify the deep-rooted problems of the joint venture early on and had suspected that its failure was inevitable, my presence there possibly extended the duration of this occurrence. Trying to save the projects drew out their lifespan, but during that time, I came to the realization that there were social and political forces outside of those at play within the Small Business Support Company that impacted strongly on the performance of the joint venture. These forces became increasingly apparent and their powers ever more formidable the more I gained insight into the socio-political dynamics at Makuleke, their

¹¹ 'Tall poppy syndrome' is a phrase predominantly used in Australia that has its roots in the early 20th century (Peeters 2004: 4). The term varies slightly in its meanings, but converges on "a perceived tendency to discredit or disparage those who have achieved notable wealth or prominence ... with allusion to the idea of the poppy as a flower whose showy appearance does not represent real worth" (Knowles 2006). As explained by Peeters (2004), the expressions to *cut down the tall poppies* or to *cut the tall poppies down to size* are used to refer to a verbal activity [uttering criticism] that people are said to take delight in (8). In the Australian context, suggests Peeters (2004), people are "suspicious of the kind of free-flowing unconcealed ambition or pride that often stems from becoming *too* successful" and "No matter how successful Australians are, their ultimate aim must always remain to be like everyone else" (21; emphasis in original). This attitude denotes a sense of egalitarianism in Australian society (Ibid: 21) and to an extent, applies to situations I experienced at Makuleke.

cultural practices and their deep-rooted networks of social relationships. I became increasingly concerned with the assumptions upon which the development projects were based as these embodied weak foundations for projects that were intended to be long-term. I concluded that no matter how much time and expertise were invested in the projects as they stood, ultimately, results depended largely on variables external to the projects themselves, variables that limited the possibility for those who were involved in the projects to remedy the many difficulties that transpired.

Furthermore, my positionality had some effect on my research procedures. Much of my time was spent fulfilling tasks for the development of the joint venture projects and the running of the Children in the Wilderness programme. My stay at the village was largely dedicated to problem-solving, meetings, dealing with construction workers to upgrade the B&B, administrative and training tasks, thereby restricting the time I could spend socializing with the larger community. Although this position may have limited my understanding of larger social issues at Makuleke, it certainly opened avenues for rigorous analysis of the projects I was investigating. In essence, my role as researcher was to understand the inner workings of the organisations I was involved with. My position as employee allowed me to become an insider with regard to the projects and this affected what people revealed to me in their interviews and informal discussions. In some instances, I was used as a 'messenger' to relay community's thoughts and opinions to people in powerful positions.

As I conducted my research, I emphasised some inquiries over others. Essentially, I was interested to find out what people who are involved with the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris projects understood more generally about the relationship between the two partners. For this reason, I focused my attention on perceptions of people who directly affected the success or failure of the enterprises I was investigating.

1.7 Methods of Data Collection and Ethical Considerations

For the purposes of this research, I collected data using three methods of inquiry: archival research, participant observation and in-depth, semi-structured open-ended interviews. My archival data was obtained primarily from GTZ TRANSFORM records as well as from published and unpublished materials. My role as participant observer was based on having a specific function within the community and as reporter to Wilderness Safaris on progress and events taking place at Makuleke; and I conducted in-depth interviews amounting to fifty-six audio recorded face-to-face interviews and thirty-one non-recorded personal communications. (See list of interviews and personal communications in Appendix 4 and 5). Interviews included people in leadership positions at Makuleke (CPA Executive Committee and Tribal Authority members), teachers, Pafuri Camp staff, Small Business Support Company staff, unemployed village residents, Makuleke youths over the age of eighteen, Wilderness Safaris management, and staff at the Johannesburg head office, along with external consultants, historians, legal advisors and government officials who were connected to the Makuleke in various ways.

For the most part, in order to preserve the anonymity of informants, I refer to my interviewees according to their professional capacity or position within the community. The exception is when an interviewee is high profile and speaks as a spokesperson for a particular constituency. For example, Chief Makuleke, Livingstone Maluleke (local councillor and CPA Executive Committee Member), and Lamson Maluleke (Joint Management Board Implementation Officer) are leaders who speak as public figures representing their community. Similarly, Malcolm McCulloch (Wilderness Safaris Chairman and Children in the Wilderness Chairman of the Board) and Clive Poultney (Wilderness Safaris Community Liaison and Security Officer) speak on behalf of Wilderness Safaris as an organisation. However, if interviewee's statements expressed personal opinions that might be contentious, then I assure anonymity in their quotations.

1.7.1 Archival Records

Since the start of my research coincided with the ending of the GTZ TRANSFORM initiative at Makuleke and the closure of their offices in Pretoria, I was kindly handed all the relevant Makuleke documentation by the National Project Coordinator, on condition that I offer it to the Makuleke at the end of my research and credit GTZ TRANSFORM as the archival source. This archive gave me access to pertinent information that consistently tracked development initiatives at Makuleke from the beginning of the land restitution case in 1996 to the end of the GTZ TRANSFORM programme in 2007. Amongst these documents were legal agreements, correspondences, proposals, reports, published materials, newspaper articles, brochures, and minutes of meetings. These records were of great value in providing a context for my research, and made it possible to trace accurately the chronological developments of the projects I was investigating. The archive also enabled me to incorporate information from these accounts into parts of my study that deal with the historical developments of Makuleke. I triangulated this information with perspectives expressed in oral histories that I collected through interviews, so as not to skew my analysis towards the written record and the perspectives of those with the educational capacity to create it.

Wilderness Safaris also made much of its archival documentation available to me. The company's public domain documents include reports, mission statements, press releases, advertisements, and public relations materials; while sources not in the public domain include internal company reports and newsletters, minutes of meetings, staff training manuals, memos, budgets and financial records, along with some internal and external correspondences. In this way I gained a relatively comprehensive and meaningful view of the company's perspective derived from credible and verifiable sources, or its organisational 'subculture', to use Alan

Bryman's term. This does not mean, however, that all documents can be regarded as "providing objective accounts of a state of affairs" (Bryman 2008: 522). I examined and interrogated these documents in relation to other sources of data such as observations, conversations and interviews that I conducted myself. I used the different stances taken by the authors of these documents "as a platform for developing insights into the processes and factors that lie behind divergence. In this instance, the documents are interesting in bringing out the role and significance of subcultures within the organization" (Bryman 2008: 522-523).

The archival documents functioned as records of the events and decision-making processes that took place at Makuleke and also revealed the plans, obstacles and actions that ensued. However, it is important to recognise that documents need to be analysed in context and assessed for bias, and that they are normally produced "in order to convey an impression, one that will be favourable to the authors and those whom they represent" (Bryman 2008: 526). The significance of data collected in this manner is not whether the information in the documents is true or false, but for the materials to be understood as "social facts" that were produced, shared and used in socially organised ways for specific purposes and within distinctive contexts (OBSSR: 11).

1.7.2 Participant Observation

My participation in the community development initiatives of Wilderness Safaris with the Makuleke CPA afforded me the opportunity to be consistently involved in the daily operations of these ventures. I spent an average of ten days per month at Makuleke for the first two years, in addition to intermittent stays at Pafuri Camp to attend community-related meetings and workshops, and to train staff and run Children in the Wilderness camps. Along with my formal obligations associated with the development projects, I also took part in Makuleke social events. These

included Makuleke Heritage Day, funerals, church services as well as attending events such as the opening of the Qasa Learning Centre when such opportunities arose. I was also in regular contact with the five schools in the three villages, mainly to coordinate events linked to the Children in the Wilderness programme.

The time I spent at Makuleke enabled me to experience local dynamics of village life by becoming involved with Makuleke residents through work and social occasions. Similarly, my reporting obligations to Wilderness Safaris, which included attending meetings with their directors and staff, allowed me to gain an internal perspective of the modus operandi of the organisation, its perceptions and outlook. As Gillham (2004) suggests, the “concern with process (leading to the outcomes or ‘results’) can be key to understanding what needs to be done to change things” (7). The day-to-day operations along with the many difficulties I witnessed throughout my fieldwork therefore gave me the opportunity to capture these processes. My dual researcher and employee roles enabled me to be flexible in handling situations and people, and helped me navigate my way through the various field relationships that I encountered, an experience that Bryman (2008) espouses as beneficial for social research (412).

1.7.3 Interviews

Louis Cohen and Lawrence Manion (1991) note that in-depth interviews “validate other methods and go deeper into the motivations of respondents and their reasons for responding as they do” (309). Further, Bryman (2008) suggests that semi-structured interviews allow the interviewee a great deal of leeway in how to reply and the emphasis is on gaining “access to the world views of members of a social setting” (438). As a result, such interviews tend to be “flexible, responding to the direction in which interviewees take the interview and perhaps adjusting the

emphases in the research as a result of significant issues that emerge in the course of interviews” (Ibid: 437).

The main aim of the interviews I conducted was to accumulate rich qualitative data concerning respondents’ experiences and opinions on specific topics. I asked interviewees to read and sign an interview consent form that explained my affiliation with Wits University. Thereafter, I held the interviews face-to-face and recorded them on a digital voice recorder. After a basic explanation of my research topic, I followed a set of questions in the manner of a guided conversation usually beginning with brief introductions of the interviewees and accounts of how they began their careers. Having eased into the conversation, I followed my interview guide as much as possible, but at some points intentionally diverged from the original set of questions to further probe certain lines of thought that I had not previously considered and that I knew would be useful for my inquiry. I ended all my interviews by asking the respondents whether they had any questions they would like to ask me. In most cases, especially with community members, I was asked what would become of my research and how it would benefit the community. I explained that I hoped my work would offer practical value to better understand community development projects through tourism partnerships, and that it would shed light on certain obstacles and issues that hinder success and that had not been considered previously. In a number of instances this explanation generated discussions that were also recorded and often proved to be of considerable value. On average, the interviews lasted between half an hour to two hours each.

The majority of the interviews I conducted at Makuleke were with people whom I had befriended during the time of my work on the development projects. I believe that their responses to my questions were sincere and on many occasions the interviewees said that they had divulged certain information simply because they “knew me well” and because they considered me a “true friend of Makuleke”. This sincerity had both positive and negative consequences. Although the respondents’

openness allowed me to understand certain issues and perspectives more clearly, I nevertheless experienced an ethical dilemma over what to do with some of the information that could potentially jeopardise those who disclosed sensitive details. For this reason, I have ensured the anonymity of respondents who revealed potentially offensive concerns. In addition, I might be criticised for interviewer-bias in some instances because of my affiliation to Wilderness Safaris. To the best of my ability, I tried to circumvent this perception with community respondents through the manner in which I posed the interview questions and generally, the interviewees expressed approval of my aim to make a neutral evaluation.

As with the interviews conducted at Makuleke, I only began interviewing Wilderness Safaris staff well into my second year of fieldwork. By that time, I had become fairly well acquainted with most staff and they readily divulged their opinions on the topics we discussed. In addition, I also probed most of the Wilderness Safaris senior staff with insights I had received from previous interviews with Makuleke leaders and residents, asking the respondents how they felt about the community's perceptions. Using this approach, I aimed at bridging part of the communication gap between the two partners and to assess their awareness of each other's concerns, opinions and values.

I later fully transcribed the interviews verbatim. I chose to record and transcribe interviews rather than take notes for four reasons: first, so that I would not be distracted by having to write while the interviewee is speaking; second, so that I could give the interviewee my full attention, concentrate on the conversation, ensure that it flowed naturally and probe interesting issues that arose during the conversation; third, so that I could later verify interviewee's statements; and fourth, to facilitate drawing out recurring issues from these conversations that I might have missed while the interview was being conducted. Although transcriptions were heavily time consuming, the detailed information proved essential during the analysis phase.

I coded the interviews for analysis using Nvivo Qualitative Analysis software. This computer software assisted me in managing my data and eased the drawing out of recurring themes. I then linked the codes with other relevant sources that were also uploaded into the programme. The software facilitated searching for particular nodes in the data and compiling these into manageable parts.¹² As proponents of computer assisted qualitative data analysis argue, “it serves to facilitate an accurate and transparent data analysis process while also providing a quick and simple way of counting who said what and when, which in turn, provides a reliable, general picture of the data” (Welsh 2002: 3). I further complemented the software analysis with manual interrogation of the data so that, as Elaine Welsh (2002) advocates, I could validate (or not) my own impressions and interpret the data more confidently (Ibid: 3, 6).

1.8 Rationale for Using Multiple Sources of Evidence

The case study method offers the opportunity to use a variety of data sources. I used the three sources of evidence discussed above as converging lines of inquiry in a process of methodological triangulation, the aim of which was to establish the validity and reliability of the data collected (Yin 2003: 97-98). Nigel and Jane Fielding (1986) suggest that this between-method approach refers to the application of “different methods to the same subject in explicit relation to each other” (25). To illustrate, Fielding and Fielding (1986) state:

The term “triangulation” derives from surveying. Knowing a single landmark only locates one somewhere along a line in a direction from the landmark, whereas with two landmarks one can take bearings on both and locate oneself at their intersection. (23)

¹² In Nvivo, nodes are defined as units of analysis or containers for storing ideas and coding. These are also at times referred to as themes or variables.

Furthermore, the different methods of data collection have their individual strengths and weaknesses with regard to accessing different kinds of information. Triangulating data from the various methods, therefore, allows for a more balanced and better-constrained interpretation. In addition to converging methods, I also triangulated the data *within* the sources of evidence I used in this study. I compared data relating to the same phenomenon and analysed it from the perspectives of the two partners (the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris) and neutral observers in juxtaposition. As stated by Fielding and Fielding (1986), such comparisons “lessen recourse to the assertion of privileged insight” (24-25).

1.9 Thesis Structure

This thesis comprises eight chapters. In Chapter One I introduce the case study, outline past research on the Makuleke and present the study’s objectives. In the second part of the chapter, I explain my research methodology beginning with my research strategy and fieldwork experience. I then turn to my three methods of data collection: archival research, participant observation and semi-structured open-ended interviews. Finally, I explain my rationale for using, and triangulating between these particular sources of evidence.

In Chapter Two, I review recent literature on global tourism and its impacts, illustrating current debates on the advantages and disadvantages of tourism as a contributor to rural development. I then focus my discussion on tourism in South Africa, both during and after the apartheid era that ended in 1994. Here I begin to place tourism within theoretical debates in the discipline of development studies, exploring the propositions and criticisms of post- World War II development theory. Further, I introduce post-development theory, from which this study draws inspiration. I present both the theory’s principles and arguments, along with the reasons it has been criticised and opposed. I then begin to address the role of the

private sector in community development in its various forms: corporate social responsibility and corporate partnerships with rural communities. Furthermore, I examine bilateral co-operation in South Africa with particular emphasis on the role of the GTZ in shaping land reform policies in the country. Last, I explore the relationships between land reform and tourism development in the post-apartheid South African context, investigating the involvement of different major players such as the private sector and government agencies.

A historic overview of Makuleke follows in Chapter Three, beginning with life at old Makuleke in the Pafuri triangle from the early 1800s, to the forced removal to N'tlhaveni in 1969. I discuss historical issues that affected the Makuleke between 1969 and 1998, including the creation of the Gazankulu homeland and the chieftaincy dispute with neighbouring Chief Mhinga. I end the chapter with a discussion of the land restitution process that took place from 1996-1998 that culminated in the Makuleke successfully regaining their ancestral land inside Kruger National Park.

I consider the post-land claim institutional arrangements at Makuleke in Chapter Four. I begin with an explanation of the existing traditional structures and continue to present the more recent democratic institutions formed subsequent to the successful land claim. The aim of establishing democratic institutions was to consolidate Makuleke control over their land and to enable the community to benefit from income generated through commercial tourism activities in the Makuleke Contract Park. I discuss how this income is deposited in a Trust to be used for communal development projects and how decisions over suitable projects are made through consultations in the Makuleke Development Forum. Further, I examine the land-use options available to the Makuleke, the threats they face with regard to land tenure, along with their strategies for conflict resolution. I conclude with an analysis of the socio-political dynamic at Makuleke and the ways in which this impacts on operational matters within Makuleke institutions.

The next three chapters analyse the three sub-cases that constitute the core of my research. In Chapter Five, I address tourism developments in the Makuleke Contract Park and briefly describe the tendering process, initial investor interest, and the subsequent establishment of two tourism lodges and a training facility in the Park: The Outpost, Pafuri Camp, and EcoTraining. I also present the security and anti-poaching operations that were necessary for the establishment of tourism activities in that area. In the discussion and interpretation section of this chapter, I analyse the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris contract agreement, and the benefits and constraints it poses for both partners. I disclose the predicted and actual figures of tourism income to the Makuleke CPA and then question the objectives and core values of the two partners in this tourism venture. Next, I explore the notion of tourism sustainability and the balancing of economic, environmental and social objectives; the concern over raised expectations and negotiated power; and the importance of intangible factors in tourism partnerships. I conclude with using insights from post-development theory to expand my analysis further.

In Chapter Six, I explore a community development project at Makuleke village, established in the form of a joint venture partnership between Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA. This joint venture company, called the Small Business Support Company, consisted of two initial projects on which I focus my inquiry: a community Bed and Breakfast and a hydroponic fresh produce farm. After presenting the background information for both these projects, I discuss the outcomes of this joint venture. I question the notions of power and the socio-political influences on these businesses, the perceptions of ownership, function and structure of the company and the viability of entrepreneurship at Makuleke. Finally, I discuss my findings in relation to post-development theoretical propositions.

In Chapter Seven, I examine the Children in the Wilderness programme, an educational and life-skills initiative established by Wilderness Safaris as part of their community engagement efforts. I begin with a brief overview of education in the

Makuleke villages and then describe the evolution of the Children in the Wilderness programme as a whole, its vision and objectives, its operational methods, its funding strategies, and the way in which the programme has expanded from its inception at Makuleke in the form of children's camps at Pafuri Camp to its Follow-Up programme and Environmental Clubs at the Makuleke schools. In the interpretation and discussion section, I draw attention to the benefits, values and potential conflicts with regards to the Children in the Wilderness programme. I examine the impact of the programme on both children and staff members, the conservation values that are promoted through Children in the Wilderness, and end with a consideration of the issue concerning power struggles and control over the programme by the various actors involved. Once again, I turn to post-development theoretical insights to gain a deeper understanding of the issues in question.

In the concluding Chapter Eight, I analyse the tourism aspect of the Makuleke model. I illustrate the intentions versus the realities that materialised with respect to tourism-led development at Makuleke by portraying two cyclical images of a growing and a diminishing spiral. I then interpret the spiral with reference to its four main categories: the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris partnership; the benefits that accrued from this relationship; the manner in which these benefits were distributed amongst the broader Makuleke community; and the effects this course of action had on the achievement of development and community upliftment. I specifically question the assumptions upon which the Makuleke model was founded and the ideas that informed the development plans at Makuleke. Using propositions from post-development critics, I question the development trajectory at Makuleke and deduce that although the model is well intended, it does not entirely address the contemporary realities of the community. Finally, I conclude by exposing some critical issues that affected the Makuleke during the time of my research and offer recommendations for development reform. I end on a more optimistic note, envisioning the possibility of positive changes to development at

Makuleke in the future based on promising evidence that transpired towards the end of my research in the villages.

1.10 Conclusion

In this chapter I introduced my case study: the partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. I presented a basic review of previous research on the Makuleke community both prior and subsequent to the successful land claim of 1998. I then assessed the effects on my research of my dual positionality as a researcher affiliated with Wits University, and as a Wilderness Wildlife Trust and Children in the Wilderness employee. Through the reporting and assistance position I was assigned by the Wilderness Wildlife Trust, I was able to immerse myself in the community development projects that became the core sub-cases for my study. I aimed to portray the issues that evolve and the difficulties that transpire in tourism-led community development, focusing on three main themes: benefits, values and contestations over power. Furthermore, I explained my research methodology for this study, a triangulation of three methods of data collection, namely, examining archival records, engaging in participant observation, and conducting face-to-face semi-structured open-ended interviews with Makuleke residents, Wilderness Safaris staff and individuals related to this partnership including legal advisors and government personnel among others.

My aim is to reveal some insights into issues that affect the people of Makuleke (both leaders and 'commoners') along with concerns experienced by their partners, Wilderness Safaris. I endeavour to present these in a constructive manner in order to create awareness of the intricacies facing partnerships between rural communities and tourism organisations more broadly. The difficulties I present in this study are not meant to spurn such partnerships. On the contrary, the idea is to

come to an understanding of the complexities facing this constituent of the Makuleke model in an effort to facilitate replication of the effective aspects of the model, and modify aspects that work less well.

CHAPTER TWO

A Review of Tourism Research and Theoretical Debates

2.1 Introduction

The prevailing writings on tourism and development to date are situated within the modernist post World War II development theoretical framework. What I propose to do in this study is to examine the possibility of analysing a tourism-led development initiative in South Africa using arguments made by post-development theory. The aim here is to gain a more intricate understanding of tourism partnerships by using an alternative analytical approach. This also addresses a gap in the literature with regard to the practicality of acting on post-development critiques. Beginning with a review of the literature on the subject of tourism research, I then turn to discuss the role of tourism in community development. I present two theoretical frameworks: post World War II development and post-development ideologies, and link these to a discussion of private sector involvement in community development, external aid programmes, and land reform in South Africa.

2.2 Global Tourism and its impacts: a brief overview

The capitalist nature of tourism has allowed it to become a powerful global force. In the early 1990s, tourism became the third largest item in world trade (Harrison 1992: 4) and according to the World Tourism Organisation, generated US\$ 852 billion in export earnings in 2009 (WTO 2011). The industry is produced by

international tour operators, directed by consumer trends, and staged by tourist destinations. In accordance with Neoliberal ideology, international agencies speak of tourism as a force for economic growth and international understanding (Crick 1989: 318), and governments of the third world are anxious to promote tourism in their countries to achieve their desired ends of economic development. It is not surprising then, that James Lett (1989) credits modern tourism as the “largest peaceful movement of people across cultural boundaries in the history of the world” (265).

Tourism was initially assumed to be a “smokeless industry”, requiring relatively little initial capital investment and stimulating rapid economic growth. This, however, soon proved questionable (Visser and Rogerson 2004: 202). The industry is now criticised for contributing to imbalances of power, wealth and control, especially in third world countries (Goudie and Khan et al. 1999: 26). In fact, critics argue that it raised unrealistic expectations (Harrison 1992: 2), and in many places has increased foreign domination and dependency, stimulated socioeconomic and spatial polarisation, led to environmental destruction, induced cultural alienation, and the loss of social control and identity among host communities (Brohman 1996: 48).

In response to the dilemmas caused by these problems and resulting criticism, various organisations worldwide direct their efforts towards developing new tourism initiatives that are believed to have a positive impact on sustainable development, poverty alleviation and the enhancement of cultural diversity. For instance, the UNESCO’s tourism, culture and development programme is aiming to “protect and promote cultural and natural heritage sites ... through national and international tourism that meets visitors’ expectations while empowering local communities and ensuring resource sustainability” (Barre 2002: 2). Further, the World Travel & Tourism Council, established in 1990, is a forum for top global business leaders in all parts of the travel and tourism industry worldwide who are

expressing increasing interest in promoting public and private stakeholder collaboration by “practicing responsible capitalism and corporate citizenship” (Chastanet 2002: 1). For many tourism companies, the benefits of taking this line are far reaching, with more positive publicity ultimately leading to more business.

2.3 Tourism in South Africa

The policy of apartheid in South Africa (1948-1994) with its institutionalised racial segregation and control over black individuals’ rights and freedoms meant that the majority of the South African population was largely excluded from the benefits of the country’s social, political and economic development. By 1990, apartheid was starting to lose ground as President Frederik Willem de Klerk announced reforms that would lead to the end of white minority rule. At that time, South Africa’s political trajectory was influenced by global movements that included the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1990 (Chimbelu 2010). The push for political reform in South Africa led to the first multi-racial elections in April 1994 in which black South Africans voted for the first time and Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC), was elected president of South Africa (Ibid: 2010). National reforms spanned all socio-economic and political sectors and had to include new strategies and plans for South Africa to enter an era of full democracy.

One of the objectives of South Africa’s democratic transition was “building a better and richer life for all” (ANC 1994 election campaign slogan) and was based on the country’s 1955 Freedom Charter. This aim was to be achieved through progressive reform of society including reconciliation between different race groups. The process of reaching these objectives was to be instituted through the radical restructuring of the country’s national institutions, investing in infrastructure, focusing on training the unskilled workforce, and land reform among other initiatives (GTZ 2008: 5). The most common trope used to refer to the ideals of

post-1994 democratic South Africa was the term “rainbow nation”, coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Habib 1996: 1).

Under the administration of President Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), however, South Africa’s policies were brought into line with those advocated by the global Neoliberal movement that began in the west in the late 1970s and early 1980s and matured in the 1990s. The emphasis was on progress defined as economic growth with a focus on production of the maximum rather than the optimum (Andreasson 2005: 61). The peculiarly post-apartheid South African variant on global neoliberalism was the 2003 policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), the intention of which was to create a black economic elite. This policy produced the desired results but was increasingly resented by the majority of the black population that benefited little from this radicalised redistribution of wealth. In 2003, a new policy intending to address this was instituted called Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). With higher expectations raised for more widespread gains, service delivery to rural South Africa became a priority under the administration of President Jacob Zuma (2009-present).¹³ As argued by David Mello (2010), compared to the more complacent reactions taken by the Mbeki administration in the face of discontent and popular protests, the challenge for President Zuma is to be, “more proactive and make the constitutional principles relating to democracy and citizen participation a reality by consulting citizens and listening to reasonable demands and wishes” (99).

In comparison to the late apartheid years, when tourism to South Africa was severely affected by the anti-apartheid movement and resulting international sanctions (Visser and Rogerson 2004: 201), the 1994 transition to full democracy saw a boom in international tourism that contributed to enhancing the country’s economic development. A number of post-apartheid tourism policies were introduced, initially in line with the country’s 1994 populist Reconstruction and

¹³ The interim president Kgalema Motlanthe served from 2008-2009.

Development Program (RDP), and later elaborated in relation to the more neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) initiative of 1996-2000. These policies were integrated into other programs including the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Program (ISRDP) of 2001, the Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP) of 2004, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) of 2006, and the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) identified in the 1998 *White Paper on Local Government* as “a key tool of local government that is concerned with promoting the economic and social development of communities” (Harrison 2006: 187).

In 2009, President Zuma reorganised the environmental and tourism portfolios “to improve service delivery” (DEAT 2009: 1). The Environmental Affairs portfolio of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism was placed under the newly created Department of Water and Environmental Affairs, and separated from the Department of Tourism. However, both departments remain “focused on ensuring that they deliver on commitments made in the strategic plan of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism ” of 2008/2009 that preceded them (DEAT 2010: 10; PMG 2008). According to Palesa Kadi, specialist for rural development at the Department of Tourism, the Department is currently formulating *The Rural Tourism Strategic Framework* in an effort to merge rural development and tourism in one policy document (RED Summit 2010: 17).

Broadly speaking, South Africa’s tourism strategy also conformed to the shifting global tourism trends of the past decade. As part of the manifestation of BEE and BBBEE, the Tourism Enterprise Programme (TEP), launched in 2000, aims to identify and develop partnerships and synergies between emerging business, community business entities and corporate businesses. It also provides business skills training and capacity building for emerging enterprises (Poultney and Spenceley 2001: 39). Moreover, initiatives such as Pro-poor Tourism and Fair Trade in Tourism were introduced in an attempt to substantially benefit previously

disadvantaged local communities by encouraging their integration into the tourism sector (Roe and Goodwin et al. 2004: 152, 154-55; Janis 2010: 19).

At the Rural Economic Development Summit of 2010, tourism was featured as one of four sectors essential for the development of rural South Africa (RED Summit 2010). However, assessments of the impact of tourism on rural development since 1994 noted that although many tourism-led development projects had been established throughout South Africa, a large number of “white elephants” had been created countrywide, and it was suggested there was a need for investigations into the problems facing these emerging tourism enterprises. In an analysis presented by Jennifer Seif (Executive Director of Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa), she asserted that “white elephants” are a result of “lack of sufficient baseline research before implementation” (RED Summit 2010). Seif suggested that “tourism developers should research and understand their markets more strategically” in order to be able to deliver on the promise of current tourist trends (RED Summit 2010).

Trends in tourism are continuously reshaped and redefined. Research by the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) indicates that an increasing percentage of tourists “are now demanding higher environmental standards from tourist services, as well as greater commitment to local communities and economies” (WTO 2002: 7). John Urry (2002) attributes this phenomenon to the emergence of what he calls “post-tourists” who are reacting against mass tourism. As a result of this demand, several types of niche tourism options have emerged as alternatives to mass tourism. Community-based tourism is one type of alternative tourism defined as: “tourism activities or enterprises that involve local communities, occur on their lands, and are based on their cultural and natural assets and attractions” (Nelson 2004: 3). In line with this trend, South Africa has capitalised on its diverse natural and cultural assets to promote alternative tourism (Jansen van Veuren 2003), covering a wide range of

activities, services and types of accommodation, from backpacker guesthouses to luxury safari lodges.

The disillusionment with mass tourism and the problems it has triggered in many parts of the developing world has led some analysts to focus their attention on debating the pros and cons of this type of tourism (Brohman 1996: 63).

Community-based tourism, being one alternative to mass tourism, has gained much attention in such discussions. Within the tourism literature, the main debates revolve around the claims that community-based tourism opens up new opportunities for rural people who have limited market capital to engage in the global economy. Community tourism proponents encourage people in rural areas to engage in tourism activities by taking advantage of their unique natural and cultural resources that would be attractive to tourists visiting from the 'developed' world. Advocates of this view also assert that the development of cultural or community tourism leads to the reinforcement of local identity in the face of globalisation (Rekom and Go 2006) and can be used as a means to promote equitable, sustainable development in marginalised communities (Scheyvens 2000).

The rosy forecasts of community-based tourism have been criticised by many who believe that although this form of tourism is less destructive than mass tourism, it may nevertheless create rapid changes in local culture and "threaten the very resources upon which the industry is ultimately built" (Nadeau 2006: 65). Further, proponents of dependency theory argue that tourism can incur potential negative effects on host populations. Critics of the industry also maintain that, in many cases, tourism initiatives can be economically unsustainable and can give rise to social inequality; promote marginalisation (Cater 1995); lead to the commodification of culture (Greenwood 1977); or as a result of what John Urry (2002) refers to as the "tourist gaze", create inauthentic experiences for tourists and hosts alike (McCannel 1973). In addition, Vandana Shiva (1988) cautions against the kinds of "development" initiatives that may lead to "underdevelopment" and the further

marginalisation of poor people as a result of corporate and technocratic self-interest (vii).

There are truths in both of these fundamentally opposed accounts, but in order to fully appreciate the potential of the contribution of tourism to community development, it is important to situate the industry within broader theoretical debates. Stephen Britton (1991) insists that there is a “need to understand how tourism is involved in this, [and for] theorisation that recognizes, and unveils, tourism as a capitalistically organized activity driven by the inherent and defining social dynamics of that system, with its attendant production, social, and ideological relations” (451). Using this frame of reference, I will consider theoretical debates in development studies (section 2.3.1) and relate these to discussions in tourism-led development in the final chapter of this thesis.

2.4 Tourism and Theoretical Discourse

As a social and economic activity, tourism falls within a number of theoretical frameworks. It is an integral part of the globalisation process since it involves people travelling to distant locations, interacting with different cultures (Rekom and Go 2006: 768), and it is also considered an important contributor to economic development processes particularly in the third world. This was exemplified in April 1999, when tourism was featured for the first time on the agenda of the United Nations Sustainable Development Commission as a potential catalyst for poverty alleviation (Guttman 1999: 56). Since then, tourism has attracted major global attention in the decade between the Rio and Johannesburg Earth Summits (1992 and 2002 respectively) (Chastanet 2002: 1).

As explained by Chris Rogerson and Gustav Visser (2004), the concept of using tourism to contribute towards social and economic development began to be

acknowledged in Africa in the post-colonial era (3). Prior to that, tourism throughout Africa was essentially “developed by colonialists for colonialists” and generally excluded black Africans (Harrison 2000: 37). This was particularly the case in South Africa, where under the apartheid regime, not only was the country’s black population denied access to “whites-only” tourism facilities, such as certain beaches and national parks, which were deemed “the exclusive preserve of South Africa’s privileged white population”, but indigenous populations were also physically removed from their ancestral lands “to make way for wildlife conservation” (Rogerson and Visser 2004: 4). In many respects, therefore, the tourism sector under apartheid was *anti*-developmental (Ibid: 4, emphasis in original).

Riding the development bandwagon, African governments’ interest in tourism increased significantly towards the turn of the 21st century when the industry was resorted to as “a source of growth and diversification,” with its potential to meaningfully contribute to developing the economies of rural communities in particular (Christie and Crompton 2001: 1). While tourism was credited by policy makers for being an “effective means of achieving development,” (Telfer 2002: 12), concern also rose over the “efficacy of tourism-led economic development” (Rogerson and Visser 2004: 2). Many academics and practitioners cautioned against assumptions of sustainable development through tourism,¹⁴ as development in itself is a highly complex and contested field wherein the impacts of tourism could diffuse across any number of directions. In order to assess the impacts of tourism on rural communities, the analysis should therefore be assessed within the frameworks of development ideologies.

¹⁴ See research by Renaud Lapeyre (2010) on community-based tourism enterprises in Namibia where he provides evidence that the sustainability of community-tourism ventures is to be questioned (757).

2.4.1 Development Ideology

The idea of development generally gained ground in the post-World War II era. In the years following the War, Europe launched a massive reconstruction programme designed by the United States Government. This programme, or Marshall Plan, began to be implemented on June 5, 1947 and as Tony Binns (2008) explains, “While the Marshall Plan was heralded as US financial help to the devastated economies and infrastructures of Western Europe, this ‘goodwill gesture’ was also designed to stimulate markets for America’s burgeoning manufacturing sector” (81). With US\$17 billion allotted to the reconstruction of mainly the UK, France, West Germany and Italy, the Marshall Plan lent credence to the “role of overseas economic aid” (Ibid: 81).

The idea of developing poorer countries was subsequently introduced by President Harry Truman in his famous inaugural speech on January 20, 1949. In “Point Four” of this speech, the President announced:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.... Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people.... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development. (1989: 44-48)

Remarking on Truman’s Inaugural Address, Gilbert Rist (2007) illustrates how this notion of ‘development’ took hold internationally:

Strangely enough, the international career of the term ‘development’, coupled with the notion of ‘underdevelopment’, started as a ‘public relations gimmick thrown in by a professional

speech-writer', since President Truman merely wanted to include in his 1949 Inaugural Address a fourth point that would sound 'a bit original'. So from the very beginning, when the idea was first aired in international circles, no one – not even the US President – really knew what 'development' was all about. This did not, however, prevent the word from gaining wide acceptance. Nevertheless, this unintentional stroke of genius turned the two antagonists – colonisers vs. colonised – into seemingly equal members of the same family, henceforth considered either more or less 'developed'. The dominant view was that time – but also money and political will – would suffice to fill the gap between the two sides. (485-486)

Different parts of the world were thereafter labelled in these geopolitical terms. Klaus Dodds (2008) explains that as a result of the conflict between the United States-led Western powers and the Soviet bloc during the Cold War era, "Key geographical designations, such as 'First World' and 'Third World', were deployed by Western social scientists in an attempt to highlight the profound differences between the United States and the Soviet Union" (4). The notion of 'three worlds', clarifies Escobar (1995), comprised the "free industrialized nations, the Communist industrialized nations, and the poor, non-industrialized nations, constituting the First, Second, and Third World respectively (Escobar 1995: 31).

In the geopolitical race to promote certain ideologies such as Communism (associated with the Soviet Union and China) or liberal democracy and capitalism (associated with the United States and Western Europe), newly decolonised countries in South Asia, Africa and Asia were targeted by these two blocs "to project influence [and] extend trading opportunities.... Both sides used the existence of this cold war to plan and implement development programmes, aid assistance, volunteer groups, trade stimulation, academic exchanges and/or arms sales" (Dodds 2008: 5). As a result, "development" took hold in the Third World as "a powerful combination of policy, action and understanding" (Sidaway 2008: 16). This strategy entailed the attempt of rich countries with financial and technological weight to "secure progress the world over" through technical assistance programmes designed and

implemented by western 'experts' (Escobar 1995: 39; Senarclens 2005: 194).

Escobar (1995) emphasises:

A look at their own past instilled in them the firm conviction that this was not only possible – let alone desirable – but perhaps even inevitable. Sooner or later the poor countries would become rich, and the underdeveloped world would be developed. A new type of economic knowledge and an enriched experience with the design and management of social systems made this goal look even more plausible. Now it was a matter of an appropriate strategy to do it, of setting in motion the right forces to ensure progress and world happiness. (39)

The economy then became the framework of the modern social sciences, representing the foundational basis on which our “ordinary understandings of social life are built” (Mitchell 2002: 6). Humanitarian concern began to engage itself in the struggle towards “rising living standards, which would manifest themselves in rising incomes (growth), and in turn translate into improved health, nutrition, education and personal autonomy” (Rapley 2004: 350). The notion of growth became a central theme to all development strategies. In fact, growth and increased consumption have since then been regarded as “necessit(ies) rather than choice(s), and to improve living conditions, growth must be pursued at all times” (Andreasson 2005: 60). Money became the main concern of this era of modernisation, an era that advocated that proper adherence to the faith in accumulation would lead to social, cultural and political progress (Andreasson 2005: 57; Escobar, 1995: 40). Money, therefore, represented the bridge to all other values and in that sense gained the proclaimed status of “god of our times” (Frisby and Featherstone 1997: 239, 250).

The practice of “development” led to the emergence of a classical discourse on the subject in the late 1940s. Development studies was thereafter formally accepted in institutional circles in the 1950s and 1960s assuming “the possibility of an

autonomous, (inter)disciplinary field, containing a set of theoretical cores with development economics as a respected member of the family” (Hettne 2008: 8). A number of theoretical schools including modernisation, structuralism, dependency and “another development” concerned themselves with specific problems related to “national development in the so-called “Third World”” (Ibid: 8). The debate ranged from strong advocacy of the principles postulated by development thought that aims to eradicate poverty, induce growth and foster prosperity and equality; to questioning the intentions, merits and outcomes of development.

The comparative methodology and developmental orientation of development studies grew out of modernisation theory, but its “normative and progressive political character and its interdisciplinary conceptual frameworks” were inherited from dependency theory (Schuurman 2008: 12). In opposition to modernisation theory’s right wing stance, dependency theory gained ground in the 1960s for its “critique of the development paths, policies and strategies” (Conway and Heynen 2008: 92). More than a theoretical formulation, dependency theory is, “a way of understanding historically embedded, political-economic relations of peripheral capitalist countries ... within the broader context of the global economy” (Ibid: 92). The basic tenet of the dependency school was that “European development was predicated on the active *underdevelopment* of the non-European world” (Peet and Hartwick 1999: 107; emphasis in original). As Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick (1999) explain:

For dependency theorists, Europe’s development was based on external destruction: brutal conquest, colonial control, and the stripping of non-Western societies of their peoples, resources, and surpluses. From historical processes like these came a new global geography of European First World center and non-European Third World periphery. (107)

Although “development” was extensively theorised, some critics argued that the actual meaning of the term remained and still remains ambiguous. As Emma Crewe and Elizabeth Harrison (1998) have noted, development is generally

interpreted to signify two very distinct meanings:

On the one hand, development intervention involves a set of institutions, policies, and practices with an identifiable history. In this sense, development has sometimes been characterized as an industry. The activities of organizations like the World Bank, United Nations, bilateral donors, and NGOs are described as 'development'. Many date development in this sense from post-war decolonization. On the other hand, development is clearly also an ideal, an objective towards which institutions and individuals claim to strive. This aim is seen as inherently good, implying a positive change, but its content is not necessarily specified. (14-15)

Both meanings of development suggest a division between countries that are defined, in development terms, to be more or less developed than others. In addition, Crewe and Harrison (1998) argue that although development practice has been criticised, the inherent ideal of development is generally not challenged (15).

2.4.2 Criticisms of Post-World War II Development Theory

By the 1980s, a rising dissatisfaction began to surface amongst analysts and practitioners from both developed and developing parts of the world with regards to the manner in which development progressed and infiltrated throughout the Third World. David Harvey (1994) expresses the discontents that arose towards:

A modernization process that promised development, emancipation from want, and full integration into Fordism, but which delivered destruction of local cultures, much oppression, and various forms of capitalist domination in return for rather meagre gains in living standards and services (e.g. public health) for any except a very affluent indigenous elite that chose to collaborate actively with international capital. (139)

A number theoretical schools emerged presenting critiques on various levels and discussions abounded regarding the so-called “impasse in development studies” (Schuurman 2008: 13). Examples of these include critical theory, post-modernism and ecological movements among others. The deconstruction of development by the post-structuralists allowed the possibility of imagining a post-development era, “one in which the centrality of development as an organising principle of social life would no longer hold” (Escobar 2000: 11). A common feature in these movements was that they began to doubt the motives behind development, along with the validity of its procedures. After years of interventions in poor countries, critics realised that “instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression” (Escobar 1995: 4).

Scrutinising the approach of orthodox capitalist development, critics from various schools of thought showed that a number of reasons lay behind the dissatisfactory outcomes of development initiatives in the Third World. Some analysts called for different types of development, while others advocated the outright rejection of development within the framework of global capitalism. Such rejection was based on a consideration that the idea of development is a “contradiction in terms” since unlimited growth would necessarily lead to “apocalyptic disaster” (Andreasson 2005: 66, 75). Some evaluations focused on the methods used in development implementation, arguing that these are flawed. As Crewe and Harrison (1998) explain:

Developers are predisposed to find a uniformity and predictability within the communities with which they work that does not exist in reality. Furthermore, there is an implied compatibility, or even confluence of interests between different people that should be explored rather than merely taken for granted. These more radical theorists see development itself as a Western-generated idea that has served to perpetuate relations of subordination in its creation of the ‘Third World’ as the underdeveloped ‘other’. (16)

Another issue of contention is the manner in which the Third World is represented by development discourse. First, the Third World tends to be represented as, “a child in need of guidance” (Escobar 1995: 30); second, patronising and demeaning imagery is used in the name of development (Smith and Yanacopulos 2004: 657-658); and third, a kind of “capitalism of mercy” is used by aid organisations who compete to enhance their standing (Hancock 1989: 16). Moreover, a certain public discourse of “development as charity” emerged that creates a particular relationship between the northern publics and the poor (Smith and Yanacopulos 2004: 661). Development propaganda began to play on first world people’s emotions enticing the rich to contribute money and sponsorships in an attempt to uplift the poor from their state of underdevelopment. The aim was to raise the poor to an ‘acceptable’ living standard through growth and eventual material prosperity.

Generally, post-World War II capitalist development was condemned by various critical theories for its motives, approaches and procedures. Beyond such appraisals, critics from the post-development school argued that one of the main reasons for the failure of development in Third World countries was that poverty had become politicised. Over and above turning the poor into consumers, the poor were also turned into “objects of knowledge and management” (Escobar 1995: 23). In addition, advocates of post-development thought argued that there was a reliance on western knowledge systems excluding all other ways of knowing in addition to a reduction of qualitative values to quantitative terms where practical life had to be measured, calculated and assessed in numeric terms (Escobar 1995: 12, 23). This kind of development, where the objective is to homogenize and westernise the entire world is not acceptable to theorists of the post-development school. Serge Latouche (1993) describes this phenomena stating that “The current trend, facilitated by the availability of new technologies for data storage and numerical computation, is to accumulate fabulous supplies of data, without taking the time necessary to make good use of them, let alone to think critically about their

interpretation” (28).

The discourse constructed by development is also criticised for its “creation of an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge and exercising power over the Third World” (Escobar 1995: 9). Andy Storey (2000) insists that the real purpose of the development exercise is to, “discipline and dominate” (41) and Escobar (1995) accuses the movement of putting in operation “new forms of power and control, more subtle and refined... than perhaps ever before” with the net effect of disabling poor people’s ability to “define and take care of their own lives” (39).

Further, within the development paradigm, the subjects (poor) are expected to adjust to the western global system, a system that has become the ideal and the utopia towards which the Third World is enticed to progress (Andreasson 2005: 65). In that sense, Latouche (1993) describes the West as “a steamroller crushing all cultures in its path” (22). Not only is there a “planet-wide movement towards uniformity” (Ibid: 23), but if the ‘poor’ fail to adjust to western norms, they are “assumed to be ignorant of the magical powers of markets and capitalism,” and therefore need assistance and guidance from the developed nations who will steer them in the right direction (Andreasson 2005: 57).

Additionally, some critics maintain that development thinking is “steeped in social engineering”. The argument holds that the ambition of development to shape economies and societies according to western models makes it “interventionist and managerialist”. It involves: “telling other people what to do - in the name of modernisation, nation building, progress, mobilisation, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation and even empowerment and participation (participatory management)” (Pieterse 2000: 7). The line of reasoning here is that this type of social management is not condoned, as it flies in the face of acknowledging people’s autonomy. It also assumes that there is only one worldview that must be adhered to and only one way of attaining fulfilment in life.

Although the claims of development theorists can be considered altruistic and convincing on some level, critics contend that the basis on which their ideas are premised is flawed. This view holds that capitalism in its current form of unlimited accumulation intensifies global polarisation between rich and poor, and since the development paradigm remains linked to modern ideals of growth and progress, it therefore “pushes rich and poor alike toward their common fate: an abyss of irreversible ecological destruction and political, economic and social breakdown” (Andreasson 2005: 59, 73). Andreasson (2005) insists that such a development paradigm, “has failed, is doomed to continue failing, and will likely produce terminal crisis for humankind” (59). Development is therefore accused of being, “an arbitrary concept rooted in a meta-narrative which, in turn, reflects the interests of its practitioners” and has as its aim, not improvement of conditions for the disadvantaged, but their control and domination (Rapley 2004: 350, 352).

2.4.3 Propositions of Post-Development Theory

A variety of mostly leftist intellectual traditions gave rise to the idea of post-development in the early 1990s.¹⁵ This theory’s main concern is to unpack development and scrutinise it “through the lens of the problematic of modernity” (Pieterse 2000: 11). One of the issues that post-development theorists contend with is the assertion in development discourse that “there is ‘no alternative’ to Western-led liberalization and marketization” (Andreasson 2005: 70). In response to such proclamations, advocates of post-development emphasise the particular and reject

¹⁵ Some of the most influential texts initiating post-development thought include: James Ferguson’s (1990) *The Anti-politics Machine: development, depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*, Wolfgang Sachs’ (1992) *The Development Dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power*, Serge Latouche’s (1993) *In the Wake of the Affluent Society*, and Arturo Escobar’s (1995) *Encountering Development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*. More recent important texts include Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree’s (2005) *The Post-Development Reader*, Stefan Andreasson’s (2010) *Africa’s Development Impasse: rethinking the political economy of transformation*, and the second edition of Wolfgang Sachs’ (2010) *The Development Dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power*.

the idea that there can, or should be, one model of development (Rapley 2004: 351). Furthermore, the economic mindset based on capitalist development produces a reductionist view of human existence (Pieterse 2000: 176). Post-development theorists speak of “the possibility of articulating a view of social change as a project that could be conceived of not only in economic terms, but as a whole life project, in which the material aspects would be not the goal and the limit but a space of possibilities for broader individual and collective endeavours, culturally defined” (Escobar 1995: 83).

The radical reaction to the dilemmas of development was not only based on its failure to produce results, but because of its “intentions, its worldviews and mindset” (Pieterse 2000: 175). Post-development “focuses on the underlying premises and motives of development” and what sets it apart from other critical approaches is that some earlier post-development proponents (referred to by Joseph Ahorro (2005) as the first wave of post-development theorists), “reject the desirability of development” altogether (Pieterse 2000: 2; Storey 2000: 40). It must be recognised, however, that not all post-development theorists fully reject the idea of development as such. While Escobar (1995) in his earlier writings calls for alternatives to development, other more recent theorists such as Stefan Andreasson (2010), for example, do not deny globalization or modernity, but strive “to find some ways of living with it and imaginatively transcending it” (78). Escobar (2010) relates the Ecuadorian example of “*buen vivir* (in Spanish)” or “collective wellbeing” that forms the basis of Ecuador’s new constitution. This concept, as explained by Alberto Acosta (2009), “entails a ‘conceptual rupture’ with the conceptions of development of the previous six decades” (39). The idea of “*buen vivir*” “constitutes an opportunity to construct collectively a new development regime ... that resonates as much with the cosmovisions of ethnic groups as with the principles of ecology” (Escobar 2010: 21).

One of the main features of post-development studies is its post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis. It “involves the careful scrutiny of language and text as a framework of presuppositions and structures of thought” (Pieterse 2000: 180). Susan Maiava (2002) suggests that “if development is the colonialism of the mind, then post-development involves decolonisation of the mind” (1). Maiava (2002) explains that post-development discourse analysis:

Reveals how the Third World is represented as backward, helpless, problematic, needy and poor. This became ‘knowledge’. If people are poor and needy it follows that intervention is required. So this knowledge shapes power and development practice. In short, unequal discourse sustains unequal relations and current development practice. (2)

The notion of poverty, for instance, is one such concept that according to post-development theorists is an imposed representation. As stated by Wolfgang Sachs (2010), poverty in development discourse “incorporates a materialistic prejudice” and is linked to economic growth (xii). Furthermore, explains Andreasson (2005), western standard bearers of neoliberalism refer to poverty as “a lack of material goods required to maintain life, basic health and some degree of life options” (58). Post-development advocates disagree with this definition, arguing that other aspects of poverty, “such as poverty of the soul or mind, may as well afflict people living in materially wealthy conditions – as suggested by the notion of ‘affluenza’” (Andreasson 2005: 58). And although, Majid Rahnema (2010) recognises that destitution or imposed poverty “undoubtedly hurts, degrades and drives people into desperation,” he nevertheless dismisses the notion stating that poverty “is also a myth, a construct and the invention of a particular civilization” (174).

In this sense, the way in which people who lack material wealth are portrayed by development discourse, affects the way they are perceived by outsiders along with their perception of themselves, and this leads to the psychological conviction of inadequacy and helplessness. In line with Michel Foucault’s work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social reality, the labelling of certain

concepts unveils “the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible” (Escobar 1995: 5). This kind of discourse production is heavily criticised by post-development authors who hold that such “pejorative representations of the Third World as backward and problematic,” sanctions the need for developmental intervention (Siemiatycki 2005: 58).

Furthermore, in development studies, benefits tend to be measured and statistical information produced to showcase the results of interventions. As Georg Simmel (1950) notes, such calculations denote “reducing qualitative values to quantitative terms through calculating the exactness of practical life” (13). Post-development theorists argue that life cannot be measured in this way and that drawing conclusions from such calculations miss essential ingredients that define a society. The reason for this, as explained by Stefan Andreasson (2010), is because “a holistic conceptualization of social harmony and well-being [should] not separate cultural, spiritual and ecological facets of development from economic and political ones” (7). Also, the notion of poverty cannot be measured using material possessions as a yardstick. As Richard Sharpley (2002) contends, “Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it a relation between means and ends; above all it is a relation between people” (34).

What is distinctive for post-development, as expressed by Maiava (2002), is that:

We are not talking about reform, but a revolution in thinking. The alternative is indigenous people determining their own future, confident, not intimidated, but free people determining what they want to do and doing it for themselves, exercising agency, actively moving forward to create better lives and improve their well-being according to their own priorities and criteria as they have done for millennia. (2)

The idea is that it is necessary to be able to conceive of different forms of development projects that exist in various cultures without being fixed in limited western hegemonic thought processes. It may be argued that some poor communities have limited resources, technology or capacity to achieve their

development objectives. For this reason, post-development does not repudiate the idea of change and the quest for a better life, but questions what it means 'to develop' and the use of specified western methods to achieve such change (Andreasson 2010: 70).

Latouche's (1993) conviction is that development functions within the "mechanics of exclusion", meaning that the "dominant mode of thought which exalts ... unchecked competitiveness pretends none the less that *everyone can win*" (116-117; emphasis in original). This is clearly not the case since unlimited growth inherently excludes vast numbers of people. Furthermore, development practitioners use "objective statistics" to prove the win-win nature of development. For example, they calculate the increase of roads, railways, factories and life-expectancy in Africa, benefits that are "hard to deny" (Ibid: 117). However, Latouche (1993) continues to question the effects of such benefits:

Are those the real stakes of world competition? It is only modern society that has propagated the belief that *true wealth* is a stock of objects and kilometres of roads. Most of the hundreds of thousands of cultures in human history have not been greatly interested in the creation of new objects and new needs. The remaining survivors of non-Western cultures continue to show a grand indifference to most of our gadgets and an even greater allergy to the logic of their production.... In the cultural scheme of things, the quantity of objects does not *ipso facto* have any significance. Goods are not the Good. (117; emphasis in original)

Following this logic, post-development ideology concerns itself with issues beyond the promotion of material prosperity. It is concerned with issues of "structural violence, environmental and cultural destruction, impoverishment, marginalization and dependency" (Simon 2006: 11). Jan Pieterse (2000) explains that post-development "is to development what 'deep ecology' is to environmental management" (2). The theory's proponents argue that:

Instead of searching for grand alternative models or strategies, what is needed is the investigation of alternative representations and practices in concrete local settings, particularly as they exist in contexts of hybridization, collective action, and political mobilization. This proposal is developed in the context of the ecological phase of capital and the struggles over the world's biological diversity. (Escobar 1995: 19)

What the theory calls for is, "a willingness to somehow step outside the dominant world of what James Ferguson terms 'acceptable statements and utterances' and to prioritize and valorize other statements and worldviews" (Storey 2000: 42). Post-development authors maintain that "real development" can ultimately be achieved through an "organic system of culturally sensitive, community-oriented improvement". This can only be realised with the further engagement of those indigenous and marginalized knowledge's which promote diversity, equity and justice" (Siemiatycki 2005: 60).

In addition, post-development theory argues for the inclusion of "a communitarian view of human nature and relations" (Andreasson 2010: 5). This argument suggests that orthodox development generally advocates individualism as the organising principle of society, whereas post-development theory calls for the consideration of more "relations between human beings than by utilitarian, individual, economic functions" (Zaoual 2005: 33). Hassan Zaoual (2005) states that "the individualistic rationality of the Western economic model makes individuals more fragile and can, at any moment, plunge them into absolute poverty" (32). Communal relationships and cultivating a sense of belonging are therefore important tools in guarding against vulnerability. In fact, individualism and private property was traditionally considered alien to most rural black cultures and, for instance, contradict the traditional Zulu and Xhosa philosophies of *Ubuntu* and *Seriti* which resonate more with black African social relations.

In some black African contexts, the value systems of *Ubuntu* and *Seriti* represent examples of a different socio-cultural framework. Although these concepts have been described in a variety of forms by southern African philosophers, the various conceptions of these two terms converge on some basic points. Erasmus Prinsloo (1998) states that “*Ubuntu* takes seriously the view that man is basically a social being [and that] most *Ubuntu* thinkers formulate their views in terms of “a person is a person through other persons” (Makhudu 1993: 40-41) or “I am, because you are”. In this way, “human dignity gains a central place and seems to be related both to morality and rationality” (43). Nono Makhudu (1993) further explains that the development of human potential “requires traits such as warmth, empathy, understanding, the ability to communicate, interaction, participation, sharing, reciprocation, harmony, cooperation, and a shared world-view, which collectively make up *Ubuntu* culture” (41).

Complementing *Ubuntu*, the concept of *Seriti*, as defined by Ronald Nicolson (2008), denotes a “quality of power that is invested in a person. It is the respect with which a person is regarded in the community ... [and is] prized above worldly wealth, positions, or status” (9). To clarify, Nicolson (2008) explains: “It does a person no good to have many possessions, but no respect from the community” (Ibid: 9). Furthermore, Steve Biko (2000) attests that: “Attitudes of Africans to property again show just how un-individualistic the African is ... Most things were jointly owned by the group ... the land belonged to the people and was merely under the control of the local chief on behalf of the people” (28). Moreover, in Munyaradzi Murove’s (2008) opinion, “this praise of individual self-seeking is considered vulgar in African thought because it presumes amorality as the main reason for the flourishing of wealth” (92). Giving consideration to such ideas, some post-development theorists aim to translate these indigenous ideas into actual politics and to produce a clear break with the modern development project. The result, argues Andreasson (2010), “would constitute one conceivable path towards transformation and a sustainable future” (8).

2.4.4. Criticisms of Post-Development Theory

Although post-development has many analytical insights to offer, some scholars contend that it is not yet theoretically developed and that it falls short in its dichotomous thinking of pro and anti development (Pieterse 2000: 2, 8). Such analysts argue that the theory does not take into consideration the “complexity of motives and motions in modernity and development” and that “even though at given points particular constellations of thinking and policy seem to present a solid whole and facade, there are inconsistencies underneath and the actual course of development theory and policy shows constant changes of direction and numerous improvisations” (Ibid: 8).

Another point of contention is the post-development authors themselves, who “celebrate the resistance of non-Western societies to Western domination,” but whose thoughts and philosophies remain thoroughly Western in their “intellectual origins and central claims (particularly [the] stress on subjectivity)” (Rapley 2004: 353). This criticism, however, is defended by Escobar (2000) who maintains that the post-development movement arose out of ideas generated by proponents from a wide range of backgrounds both from the North and South, and professes that these authors can be described as having “diverse experiences, intellectual and political interests and connections to social movements” (13).

Furthermore, Pieterse (2000) acknowledges that post-development theory contributed to the conception of positive claims, “associated with affirmative counterpoints such as indigenous knowledge and cultural diversity, Gandian frugality as opposed to consumerism, and conviviality ... for grassroots movements and local struggles” (8). Nonetheless, critics argue that none of these claims are specific to post-development and therefore not enough evidence is presented by some of its proponents to reach convincingly the conclusion of rejecting development (Ibid: 8). Moreover, much post-development literature has also been

accused of “focusing only on a critique of development without offering any suggestions for how to move forward” (McKinnon 2008: 281). Ultimately, for Pieterse (2000), post-development seems to be caught in a “rhetorical gridlock ... offering no politics besides the self-organizing capacity of the poor, which actually lets the development responsibility of states and international institutions off the hook” (Ibid: 11).

In addition to these criticisms, post-development seems to have some gaps that should be addressed. Andreasson (2005) remarks that if the theory’s call for the rejection of development seems to be unreasonable, it is only because the world today is faced with the inevitability of the capitalist system and the only plausible alternative would be drastic revolutionary measures (73). Since this proposition would be considered unwarranted, or at least undesirable by most people, another option would be the gradual reform of capitalism to endow it with a human face. This could be approached by involving the private sector in development interventions and instilling a sense of obligation and accountability in business enterprises.

2.5 The Role of the Private Sector in Community Development

With the neoliberal turn of 1996 in South Africa, the African National Congress began to stress that businesses would play a significant role in the transformation of South Africa “for broad-based development to be possible and societal stability ensured” (Andreasson 2010: 161). As a result, businesses began to embrace the concept of “corporate citizenship” and the private sector “began to assert its priorities and identity more strongly” (Fig 2005: 600). This endeavour was accomplished in a number of different ways including partnerships, joint ventures and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) among others.

2.5.1 Corporate Social Responsibility

In an attempt to enhance equity and balance throughout the world, a large proportion of the private sector moved beyond the pure profit motive to applying concepts such as ethical consumerism, Fair Trade and accountable business practices. David Simon (2006) maintains that “experience has shown that such campaigns are making a real difference to the producers and workers concerned, reducing or avoiding exploitation, and enabling Fair Trade beneficiaries to improve their quality of life and undertake social investment in their communities” (17). One measure of curbing the negative effects of capitalism is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a concept that is gaining significant momentum internationally.

The basic idea of Corporate Social Responsibility was initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century by wealthy business people such as Andrew Carnegie in the United States (Kolk and Tulder et al. 1999: 148). The notion emerged from the belief that “firms should not only be concerned with profit-making”, but should address the “imbalance created by the growing size and power of firms” (Ibid: 148). In its present form, states Rhys Jenkins (2005), this concept is arguably “the latest manifestation of a longstanding debate over the relationship between business and society” (526).

Since the late nineteenth century when the corporation rose to its modern form,¹⁶ the debate over Corporate Social Responsibility has “ebbed and flowed, through periods when corporations extend their control and periods in which society attempts to regulate the growth of corporate power and corporations attempt to re-

¹⁶ The corporation was originally set up “to serve the public good Corporation lawyers gained rights through the US Supreme Court using the 14th Amendment (set up to protect slaves) that gives them the rights of a person. In the last century, the corporation is given more and more rights while people are increasingly stripped of theirs. Having acquired the rights of immortal persons ... by law, the corporation can only consider the interests of their shareholders. It is legally bound to put its bottom line before everything else, even the public good” (Achbar and Abbott, et al. 2004.)

establish their legitimacy in the face of public criticism” (Jenkins 2005: 526). During the 1960s and 1970s, increased efforts to regulate corporate activity occurred (Ibid: 526). The concept developed with the realisation that firms have responsibilities towards their environment that go beyond their legal and economic obligations (Mcguire 1963). It was essentially a matter of ethics, of the perceived need for corporations to respond to the environmental and social concerns present around them through the introduction of corporate codes of conduct that could “address the regularity void left by processes of globalization” (Kolk and Tulder et al. 1999: 143).

In South Africa, the term Corporate Social Investment (CSI) is preferred by some over Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) since, as David Fig (2005) explains, the concept of investment “asks no questions about legacy, memory, history, justice, or moral and ethical responsibilities” that could be associated with the apartheid era (601). To use Altron Group’s definition of the concept of Corporate Social Investment in South Africa, “CSI encompasses projects that are external to the business or outward looking; projects undertaken for the purpose of uplifting communities in general and those which have a strong developmental approach. It also includes projects with a focus on social, developmental or community aspects where the investment is not primarily driven as a marketing initiative” (Altron 2008: 2).

As promising as the Corporate Social Investment initiative sounds, post-development theorists among other critics are sceptical of the real benefits that could emerge from such a proposal. Andreasson (2010) explains that the “political push for business to shoulder an increased responsibility for transformation and development resulted in proactive if controversial (in terms of intentions and effectiveness) moves by big business to take a lead in promoting inclusive corporate governance and increasing accountability in CSR” (161). Criticisms aside, many private sector enterprises became heavily involved in community upliftment programmes in recent years.

The term Corporate Social Responsibility was standardised when “key institutional players (such as the 2002-founded European Academy of Business in Society), key media (such as the *Financial Times*) and to a growing degree, corporate-oriented publications seem to have made this term an increasingly popular label” (Matten and Moon 2004: 324). Its popularity coincided with a shift in the view of international development in this period. Businesses had generally been excluded from development thinking and “although western companies operated in developing countries, they were either ignored by development professionals or seen as problematic” (Blowfield 2005: 516). This corresponded with the change of focus in development in the past quarter century from being “primarily about economic growth,” to being centred on “social dimensions of development as exemplified by the creation of the Human Development Index by the United Nations Development Programme” in 1990 (Jenkins 2005: 529).

Effectively, Corporate Social Responsibility became “intertwined with international development and the related goals of poverty alleviation and sustainability” (Blowfield 2005: 515). Although it is not clear whether this is a “good or bad facet of globalization,” states Michael Blowfield (2005), perhaps it is sufficient for companies to:

shake off the legacy of certain economists, and admit that they have always needed to manage their relationship with wider society, and if others acknowledge the limits to what can be expected of business and its contribution to the public good, then it will be easier to see in CSR the moral vision of capitalism. (Ibid: 516)

The oil and gas sector, with Shell at the forefront, has been among the leading industries in championing Corporate Social Responsibility (Frynas 2005: 581), paving the way for many other businesses including the tourism industry to follow suit. Julie Pirsch and Shruti Gupta et al. (2007) maintain that Corporate Social Responsibility is becoming an “increasingly popular element of corporate marketing

strategies [and that] companies are under growing pressure to embrace social responsibility, in part due to emerging public standards for social performance (e.g. the United Nations Global Compact)” (125). Notwithstanding the aims of corporations in their pursuit of Corporate Social Responsibility, Ralf Barkemeyer (2009) insists that “doubts are raised regarding the general suitability of the current mode of predominantly voluntary, business-led CSR instruments to tackle some of the most pressing developmental challenges ... in particular, the sustainability of development ... power relations between stakeholders, differences in values and priorities, and the reliance on business self-regulation” (274-276).

With regards to the tourism sector, Derek Hall and Frances Brown (2008) explain that “tourism is essentially a business, or series of businesses” and maintain that there is no doubt that the main objective of tourism is to make profit in the short-term, often at the expense of longer-term cultural and environmental loss (1022). However, the authors argue that this does not exclude the potential for tourism to be part of a balanced approach to ‘development’, therefore being a force for sustained well-being (Ibid: 1023). In the opinion of Hall and Brown (2008), the tourism industry generally aims for:

win-win situations through trade-offs for all stakeholders involved:
tourism entrepreneurs and employees, local and central
government and their agencies, ‘host’ communities, tourists, and
the environment within which the activities of tourism take place.
(2008: 1023)

Despite the fact that many tourism companies, especially in South Africa, do engage in Corporate Social Responsibility, in Barkemeyer’s (2009) opinion, the *laissez-faire* approach with which these initiatives are characterized is “unlikely to produce meaningful contributions towards a more sustainable and inclusive development in the South” (286). For this reason, some companies have resorted to partnerships with communities with legally binding agreements that ensure commitment and regulate processes of collaboration.

2.5.2 Corporate Partnerships with Rural Communities

According to Christian Mommers and Margit van Wessel (2009), “The term ‘partnership’ reflects a set of values, typically encompassing equality, transparency, shared responsibility, joint decision making, trust, and mutual understanding” (160). Implicit in the term is the idea of reciprocal behaviour, but with time and depending on circumstances, this behaviour can fluctuate between cooperation and competition. Alfred Wong (1999) maintains that the crucial element in partnerships is “perceptions of goal interdependence”. In other words, partners need to have a common vision towards which they strive. This is important because “these perceptions affect their expectations and actions,” which bears directly on the maintenance of the partnership relationship (S787). Wong (1999) notes:

Cooperative goals serve as a glue in the relationship between the ... partners. They give a vision of common fate to the partners which generates trust between partners and commitment to the relationship, such as in the form of investment in resources, technical support or advice for the other partner. The partners will have an open-minded discussion whenever there are problems to be solved. Because both sides can have open discussions, it is easier for the parties to handle their conflicts and maintain a harmonious relationship. (S791)

Although the logic of partnerships is straightforward in theory, their implementation can be highly convoluted. Stuart Macdonald and Tom Chrisp (2005) suggest: “All organizations have strengths, but no organization has all the strengths required to do everything” (307). For this reason, the idea of partnerships appears to be valid and logical. Joining forces to accomplish certain goals by using the available resources of the parties involved seems to be a feasible proposition. Furthermore, Macdonald and Chrisp (2005) maintain that partnerships are “among the least costly, least uncertain and least enduring methods of acquiring external assets” (308). It can therefore be deduced that on a theoretical level, partnerships are beneficial arrangements by and large. Despite this positive outlook, however,

empirical realities could demonstrate altogether different scenarios. People, types of relationships, agendas, capacities, along with external market forces, time, culture, power and countless other factors influence the dynamics of a partnership, causing it to be in constant flux. The difficulty of grasping the concept lies in its fluidity, but partnerships have nevertheless been deemed the 'holy grail' for cooperation between two entities (Mommers and van Wessel 2009: 161).

Furthermore, partnerships are dynamic in that they require ongoing exchange between the parties, a continuous process of giving and receiving, and of negotiating and compromising. Despite such understandings, money and power tend to undermine assumed equalities. As Crewe and Harrison (1998) explain:

There is an obvious power imbalance between the giver and receiver of money, especially if the funds always go in the same direction. The power inequalities, however, do not determine the behaviour of those involved Rather the impact of the practices of each group are conditioned by their place in power structures. (77)

Partnerships, however, are not only restricted to the corporate world. These highly complex relationships exist in a variety of forms and can occur between different institutions, whether private, governmental, non-governmental or community-based, each with their own capacities, objectives, value-systems and worldviews. In addition, there are different activities that can be undertaken through partnerships. Examples of these include: "giving grants, technical assistance or equipment, sharing information, managing projects jointly, and joining forces to lobby decision-makers" (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 72). Funds gathered through taxation in developed countries are channelled by government aid-agencies either bilaterally (directly from government to government) or multilaterally (through international agencies such as the United Nations and the World Bank) (Ibid: 71). With the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa too engaged in a number of such bilateral agreements. One of these agreements was with the German government.

2.6 The Involvement of the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GTZ) in South Africa

Unlike most other African countries, foreign aid accounted for only 1% of the South African government's budget in 2008.¹⁷ South Africa's approach to development aid also differed from that of other countries in that it emphasised the importance of local ownership and determined the manner in which foreign support should be utilised (GTZ 2008: 4-5). Notably, the South African government did not request international assistance merely through financial aid. The aim was to engage in Technical Cooperation, which "assists in developing the capacity of South Africans through the transfer of knowledge, experiences and skills" (GTZ 2008: 5).

Two years prior to South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) together with a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), requested the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GTZ) to provide specialist advice with regard to the development of the new South Africa. According to the GTZ, Germany in particular was approached because it had itself set an excellent example of "track record in local government" and its policies and interests corresponded with those of South Africa. In response, the GTZ "mobilized expertise for and participated in the discussions on the development of policies and concepts for the future system of skills development" in South Africa (GTZ 2008: 6). The GTZ cooperated beyond 1994 and assisted the African National Congress in achieving their development goals. Specifically, the two countries opted to concentrate development efforts on "limited areas to achieve maximum impact", and in 2002 the South African government engaged in a bilateral cooperation programme that focused on three main areas of development: "skills development,

¹⁷ In comparison to more than 50% in countries such as Mozambique or Uganda, for example (GTZ 2008: 5).

good governance, and local governance and development – while addressing HIV/Aids as a major cross-cutting issue” (GTZ 2008: 5).

As part of this cooperation, the South African government sought the technical assistance of the GTZ with regards to specific issues concerning “policy related to land claims and community ownership of land in protected areas” (Collins and Snel 2008: 86). The call for such assistance came about after the passing of two crucial policy documents that year that attempted to instigate “some dramatic policy changes regarding the rights of black South Africans, many of which have profound effects on the management and future of the country’s protected areas” (Reid 2001: 138). The first of these documents was the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996, which was formed to “enable communities to form juristic persons, to be known as communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written constitution” (CPA Act 1996).¹⁸ This meant that communities could, through such associations, legally regain land lost as a result of forced evictions during the apartheid era. The second document is the 1996 White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism, which states that its vision is to:

develop the tourism sector as a national priority in a sustainable and acceptable manner, so that it will contribute significantly to the improvement of the quality of life of every South African. As a lead sector within the national economic strategy, a globally competitive tourism industry will be a major force in the reconstruction and development efforts of the government. (DEAT 1996: 4.1)

The focus then was geared towards land reform and the promotion of tourism in

¹⁸ The Communal Property Associations Act stipulates that:

- It is desirable that disadvantaged communities should be able to establish appropriate legal institutions through which they may acquire, hold and manage property in common;
- It is necessary to ensure that such institutions are established and managed in a manner which is non-discriminatory, equitable and democratic and that such institutions be accountable to their members;
- It is necessary to ensure that members of such institutions are protected against abuse of power by other members (The Communal Property Associations Act 1996).

South Africa. To achieve this, ownership of large tracts of land was to be “transferred from whites to Africans” through restitution, redistribution or land tenure (Hall 2007: 88). Furthermore, since tourism was identified as an essential industry for national reconstruction and development in the post-apartheid era, tourist businesses were considered potential contributors to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), create employment, earn foreign exchange, spawn entrepreneurship and create new services (DEAT 1996: 7). Therefore, through transforming land ownership rights and the opening of opportunities through tourism, rural communities were to be strengthened and developed.

2.7 Land Reform and Tourism Development: The GTZ TRANSFORM Programme in South Africa (1996-2007)

As argued by Rogerson and Visser (2004), South Africa’s entry on the global stage of tourism was delayed by the isolationism of the old apartheid system, but has expanded spectacularly since 1993 (5). As part of the strategic development plan of the post-apartheid era, the South African government prioritised “tourism as one of five economic growth sectors on which to focus its efforts to support investment and facilitate growth” (SATOUR 2008: 20). Tourism also featured in many land claims associated with protected areas where restitution was applied for on the basis of potential economic development through the tourism sector. In some cases, international assistance was requested to help with the planning and implementation of land reform and GTZ TRANSFORM is an example of one programme that evolved in response. The GTZ became involved in managing and implementing tourism projects in a joint venture programme with the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, through the Training and Support for Resource Management Programme (TRANSFORM). The objective was for TRANSFORM to work with South African communities in the field and learn lessons that would inform the process of policy-making, specifically in relation to protected

areas and communal management agreements (Collins and Snel 2008: 85). One community with which GTZ TRANSFORM was involved is the Makuleke community of northern Limpopo province to which this study now turns.

CHAPTER THREE

Historical Overview of the Makuleke

The land of the Makuleke,
Is very big,
It is very big and beautiful,
From Pafuri right into Limpopo,
It is very big and beautiful,
The Mabobos, Mabuvubyi and Vhubyini call it home.
Let us thank God for giving us good leaders and beautiful land.

“Tiko ra Makuleke”
(Anthem of the Makuleke people)
Our Hearts Are Healing,
GG Performance Script 2006

3.1 Introduction

To encapsulate the historical background of the Makuleke, this chapter draws on evidence presented both by members of the Makuleke community and by outside observers. Archival sources dating back from the late 19th century to recent personal interviews conducted for the purposes of this research provide evidence for the main narrative in this overview. I acknowledge that the individuals who recounted incidents of Makuleke history each had preconceptions and agendas particular to their time, location and political orientation. Accordingly, their reports may have created socio-cultural or political blind spots in some instances or could have been used to promote certain positions of authority. Nevertheless, the evidence I present allows for some insight into the historical context of the Makuleke that led to their contemporary realities.

3.2 Old Makuleke: Life at Pafuri (early 1800s – 1969)


From the early 19th century, the Makuleke, a clan within the Shangaan/Tsonga ethnic group, lived in the Pafuri triangle. This triangle is located between the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers in the extreme north-eastern part of South Africa on the border with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Thomas Bulpin (1981), in his somewhat romantic historical novel *The Ivory Trail*, describes the Pafuri area as the place “where the Luvuvhu River twists its way through the wilderness to join the great Limpopo.” Bulpin (1981) depicts Pafuri as “a forgotten corner of the Transvaal,¹⁹ left all alone to brood in the solitude and the silence of the bush” (13). Eminently, the Makuleke are known for their annihilation of the first Voortrekkers (Dutch/Afrikaans pioneers) who came to the northern Transvaal in 1836 (Dicke 1926: 1019; Harries 1987: 96; Ramutsindela 2002: 17).²⁰

Maano Ramutsindela (2002) traces the origin of the Makuleke from the “confluence of the Limpopo and Olifants rivers in present-day Mozambique, from where they were pushed to the northern corner of the Transvaal (in South Africa) by a dissident Zulu army under the leadership of Soshangane” (16).²¹ Dicke (1926) explains that in 1836, Chief Shinhambane Maluleke of the Thonga [*sic.*] tribes (also referred to as Hlekane) and who was credited for annihilating the Voortrekkers, “moved by way of the Limvubu [*sic.*] River” and “followed the existing trade route from the East coast to Tshikundo Kop” (1019). In this move, Chief Hlekana “gradually and, apparently according to plan, occupied everything in these parts worth having, and ... secured for himself and his people supplies of everything required – meat, skins, material for defence, offence and trade” (1020). Having settled at Pafuri in the early 19th century, it is in this area that the Maluleke clan identifies itself historically.

¹⁹ The Transvaal encompasses present day Limpopo province. In 1910, the Transvaal, which means across the Vaal River, became one of four provinces of the Union of South Africa (*Transvaal: the Old Transvaal Province* 2010: 1).

²⁰ Harries (1987) sites 1834 as the year the Makuleke Chief annihilated the Voortrekkers (96).

²¹ Chief Soshangane is also referred to as Chief Manukosi (Dicke 1926: 1019).



Map 5 Pafuri Nature Reserve demarcating Old Makuleke Villages. (Steenkamp 2001: 35)

The Makuleke lived in the Pafuri triangle for approximately 150 years until they were forcefully removed from it by the apartheid government on September 13th, 1969 (Harries 1987: 107). The land area they occupied at Pafuri was approximately 26,500 hectares, of which about 4,500 hectares was known as Mabiligwe (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 3). Other villages inhabited by the Makuleke at Pafuri include Humula, Khombo, Manqeba, Tlhabyani, Makwadzi, and Mukenyi (Steenkamp 2001: 35). Martin Murray (1995) describes this tri-border area of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the 19th century as “sparsely populated with a few scattered African settlements and a handful of white shopkeepers, big game hunters, ivory poachers, transport riders, missionaries, traders, and roughnecks” (381).




Figure 1 Pafuri Landscape. Left: Baobab Tree, Right: Luvuvhu River
(Photos: May Shehab 2008)

A number of early European travellers in the late nineteenth century referred to the Pafuri triangle as “miniature Egypt” because its agricultural practices were dependent on flood irrigation as opposed to the meagre irregular rainfall of the area. The annual inundations of alluvium and floodwater allowed for the production of maize, sorghum and wild vegetables such as pumpkins, melons and beans (Harries 1987: 101).

According to historical records, the livelihoods and cultural systems of the Makuleke were well adapted to the natural wealth that was abundant in their region. Men hunted wild animals and women harvested indigenous fruits and roasted land snails under hot coals (Winberg 1998: 11). The Makuleke made conical reed baskets (*xironga*) to trap fish from the Luvuvhu and Limpopo rivers. Another fishing method they used was to poison pools with the bark of the *lowveld croton* or the *appelblaar*. The dead fish would float to the surface and could easily be collected (Harries 1987: 99-100). Thereafter, the catch would be dried, smoked or salted (Winberg 1998: 11). The Makuleke also made wine called *uchema* made from the *lala* palms, and used the palm leaf to weave mats, bags, baskets and beer strainers (Harries 1987: 101). Furthermore, traditional healers used the roots, leaves and berries from the many trees that flourished in the area to develop a vast set of

pharmacological remedies to cure ailments suffered by their people (Koch 2003a: 3). Grandmother Midlayi Makuleke, Chief Makuleke's mother, reminisced:

We never starved at Pafuri. We struggled and some of us died from diseases or wild animals, but mostly, our children grew up strong We used roots and plants to cure our children when they got sick. We soaked the leaves from the *Nkobva* bush, strung them together and put them on the face for a headache. Pafuri looked after us and we looked after Pafuri. (Winberg 1998: 10-11)

Chief Joas Phahlela Makuleke asserts that at Pafuri, land was plentiful and was held communally in terms of shared rules of customary tenure. The Makuleke had one chief and nine headmen.²² The chief's role was to regulate the use of common and communal land and veld resources, to give permission to outsiders to graze on Makuleke land during times of drought, and together with the village headmen, deal with community disputes. Generally, chiefs were not involved in land allocation matters with regards to community members. Residential sites and arable land were distributed through decisions taken by extended family structures, with only limited involvement by the chief (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 5). Grandmother Makuleke explains:

Our people had a tight control over nature. The chief's council announced when we could plant or harvest. You could not just go and cut green grass. No, you had to wait until the elders told you that the grass was ready. You were punished if you burnt a bush without permission. I was not allowed to cut from a young tree. We only took dry branches from old trees. In this way, we protected nature and ourselves. (Winberg 1998: 11)

Even though the Pafuri region has been described as subject to recurrent droughts, tsetse-ridden, malarial, barren and inhospitable (Murray 1995: 381), the Makuleke claim that the abundance of natural wealth at Pafuri allowed them to lead a fulfilled subsistence life-style (Koch and Collins 2006: 3). Organised into a number of villages and governed by their traditional leaders, the Makuleke held communal

²² Other sources, such as Harries (1987: 109), refer to only seven headmen (sub-chiefs).

values and, as Moray Hathorn and Aninka Claassens (2008) suggest “managed to maintain a relatively independent existence” (339).


3.3 Hunters, Labour Recruiters and Early European Pioneers in the Pafuri Area

As observed by Murray (1995), hunters first started operating in the Pafuri area in the mid-nineteenth century when the ivory frontier was pushed from the southern areas of Olifants-Nkomati to the northern Olifants-Limpopo in the 1860s. Murray (1995) states that ivory had been “the single most significant export item of the Transvaal prior to the discovery of gold” (381). The “Ivory Trail”, as it came to be known, heading towards Makuleke from the southwest, stretched from “the Great North Road at Soekmekaar in present day Limpopo province, midway between the then railhead at Pietersberg (now Polokwane) and Louis Trichardt (now Makhado) and continued north east through the areas of Klein Letaba and Shingwedzi to the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu rivers at Pafuri at the far north-east corner of the Transvaal (Bulpin 1981:15; Murray 1995: 381).²³ (See Map 6).

The ivory trail is described by Bulpin (1981) as “a rough sort of road, really just the scar of passing wagon wheels. Of milestones and signposts it had none; but instead, its twisting undulations through the bush were beacons with the memories of all the adventures which had taken place along that wanderers’ way in years gone by” (15). Shangaans, who lived on both sides of the Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian borders (current day Mozambique and Zimbabwe respectively), together with white hunters, slaughtered elephants for their ivory, and game for their valuable skins during the mid-nineteenth century. Murray (1995) contends that because such

²³ Klein Letaba is characterized by Bulpin (1981) as “a major milestone along this ivory trail. Allegedly, it was there that a disreputable old character, known to all and sundry as De Fon Siku, had a wayside hotel and carried on a trade (roaring in more ways than one) with the passing adventurers and the rough crowd of miners from the lonely bushveld mines such as the Birthday, Louis Moore, and the Golden Ophir” (15).

items constituted lucrative exports from the Transvaal, these valuable resources were quickly depleted (381-382).



In order to abide by Wits University copyright regulations, the digital version of this thesis can present only the reference for this map. Please see: Bulpin 1957: inside cover.

Map 6 The Ivory Trail, Labour Routes and Crooks Corner. (Bulpin 1957: inside cover)

By 1886, the Witwatersrand gold discoveries opened up a market in the area for what came to be called “Black Ivory”. Murray (1995) relates how labour recruiters came to Pafuri to find men from Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the

Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) to work in the mines. This illegal “trafficking in natives” known as “blackbirding” was a highly remunerative business and attracted unscrupulous fortune-hunters who specialised in smuggling African labour (Murray 1995: 374). The migrants passing through their area opened up opportunities for the Makuleke to come into contact with the outside world. Patrick Harries (1987) mentions that some Makuleke were able to generate income by selling their produce to this new market and many Makuleke sold “copies of their tax receipts, which served as identity documents [in South Africa] to Rhodesian workers” (102). Once across the South African border, these new recruits “would then be transported by the [Native Recruiting Corporation] to Johannesburg via Sibasa to work in the gold mines.” Benefiting from trade in this way, the Makuleke were economically self-sufficient, allowing them “to have little need ... to undertake wage labour” (Ibid: 102).

Towards the end of the 19th century, recounts Harries (1987), Swiss missionaries of the Free Church of the Canton de Vaud in Switzerland arrived in the area and established an outpost at Pafuri in 1890 (318). The Swiss set up the first rudimentary mission school at Old Makuleke in 1911, and by 1920 had an attendance of about twenty to twenty-five children, mostly girls. Harries (1987) also specifies that by 1937, the school boasted seventy-five students and in 1969, the year of the Makuleke removal, there were one hundred and twenty students attending this school of two classrooms (97, 103-104).²⁴

In early 1910, a store was set up by Alec Thompson and William Pye (taken over in the mid 1950s by John Fernandez), which served as an important supply point and meeting place.²⁵ Harries (1987) suggests that by that time, “there was sufficient

²⁴ Discussions with Makuleke Communal Property Association Executive Committee members suggest that there were two primary schools at old Makuleke (Pafuri) by 1969: Makuleke and Mabiligwe Primary Schools, both of which were moved to N’tlhaveni at the time of the removal (pers. com. 2011).

²⁵ Bulpin (1981) describes Alec Thompson as: “a nondescript individual who permanently looks as though he had shaved a week before” (20). William Pye is referred to in “The Ivory Trail” as: “the

commerce in the area to merit the erection of a store alongside the Makuleke chief's homestead" and that in 1913, there were "some sixteen European labour recruiters ... known to operate in the Pafuri triangle" (97).



Figure 2 Left: Ruins of John Fernandez' Store, placard stating that this Makuleke store was built by Alec Thompson and William Pye in 1910.
Right: Ruins of Old Makuleke
(Photos: May Shehab)

3.4 Crooks Corner

As conveyed by Bulpin (1981), starting from the late 19th century, the north-eastern corner of the Transvaal gained a reputation from these lawless white labour recruiters and hunters and came to be known as the legendary 'Crooks Corner' (13). As Harries (1987) explains, the area was dubbed Crooks Corner, "because of the ease with which unlicensed recruiters were able to operate across international frontiers and illegally recruit workers and poach game in Rhodesia and Mozambique" (98). (See Map 6).

most loquacious of all the inhabitants of Crooks' Corner". He was an Irishman, "a short, sandy-haired character, formerly a regular soldier, with a fund of humour, who was always laughing. Pye was a man who had been knocking around the bush for half his life. In former years he had run the store at the Louis Moore mine. Then he had wandered off to Crooks' Corner, built himself a hut, and earned a precarious existence as a recruiter of native labour for the mines and transport rider for the store" (22).

Murray (1995) relates how itinerant black African work-seekers, driven by grinding poverty across the borders, were lured to the employment opportunities in South Africa (380). Most of them were Shangaans who were highly valued by mine-owners as underground labourers for gold mines (Ibid: 381). A handful of scoundrels tapped into the labour demand of the gold mines and nefariously exploited these vulnerable and unsuspecting Africans using tricks and ploys to trap and smuggle them across the Limpopo (Ibid: 374). By the turn of the century, Crooks Corner had become the centre of a “vast, profitable, and mostly clandestine merry-go-round of people and goods.” Its remote location made it a “smuggler’s paradise” and the ‘crooks’ eventually organized themselves into gangs that managed to evade arrest by “slipping in and out of Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories” that bordered the Pafuri triangle of South Africa (Murray 1995: 375, 382).

The illicit labour recruiting at Crooks Corner lasted for decades because state officials in all three countries were unable to curb the practice (Murray 1995: 375-376). Only in 1918 did the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association of the Chamber of Mines set up a post just south of the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu rivers to regulate the recruitment of foreign Africans entering Pafuri. With cooperation from the Mozambique police, the British South Africa Company, (established in southern Rhodesia by Cecil Rhodes in 1889 and modelled after the British East India Company), was finally able to crack down on unlicensed recruiting (Harries 1987: 98).

European intrusion into the area also manifested itself during the early twentieth century when game reserves began to be proclaimed in the region. According to Harries (1987), in 1903, the area south of the Luvuvhu River was declared the Xingwedzi Game Reserve by the colonial administration and many Africans, including the people of Chief Mhinga, were removed from this region (98). In 1919, a ranger’s post was built at Punda Milia (current Punda Maria), about midway

between Makuleke and Mhinga areas, and in 1926 the Xingwedzi Game Reserve was joined with the southern Sabi Game Reserve to form the Kruger National Park (Harries 1987: 98). According to a Swiss Missionary Archive paper *Rapport de Mhinga* (1920), Makuleke hunters were “declared ‘poachers’ and were beginning to appear before the magistrate at Sibasa [when] Park officials [began to] complain to the Native Affairs Department, that a tighter control should be exercised over the Makulekes” (Ibid: 99).

Harries (1987) relates how the way of life of the Makuleke, who resided to the north of the then Kruger National Park border was inimical to conservationists. The reason for this perception is because the Makuleke lived off subsistence hunting and fishing, hunting in their area for social and political purposes and pursuing lion and leopard skins for their chiefs. Using traps, snares, bows and arrows and a few guns, the Makuleke were generally able to hunt without restrictions. Their fishing methods too were considered wasteful, and eventually led to the prohibition of fishing in the Luvuhu River by the National Parks Board, since officially, this river lay within the border of the Kruger National Park at the time (100).

Parks Board’s desire to protect animals and fish ... led to the initial impetus for the removal of the Makuleke from the Pafuri area in 1931 (Harries 1987: 98, 104). That year, Parks Board was also beginning a “programme of road construction aimed at opening the northern section of the Kruger National Park to tourism” and it was envisaged that “the incorporation of the Pafuri triangle into the Park would preserve an ecologically rich area and end the poaching of animals in the northern reaches of the Park as well as those migrating through the Pafuri triangle” (Ibid: 104). Upon hearing word of a potential forced removal, the Makuleke reacted in various ways: some crossed the border northward into Rhodesia, some moved to sub-chief Qasa, “whose area was not threatened with incorporation into the Park”, and others moved to Chief Mhinga (Harries 1987: 105). After a failed attempt of removing the remaining Makuleke out of the area, “the Makuleke possession of the Pafuri triangle

remained unchallenged for the next twenty years” until the National Party Government came to power in 1948 and instituted “homelands” for black Africans (105). From that time onwards, the boundaries of the Kruger National Park expanded as “indigenous communities were turfed out to make way for the game reserve. The local people were pushed off the land to make way for tourists, conservationists, and wild animals” (LRC 2001: 17).

3.5 The Forced Removal to N'tlhaveni

A proposal was put forward in 1930 by the National Parks Board to include the Pafuri area into the boundaries of Kruger National Park and the magistrate tried to entice the Makuleke to move to an area that was promised to have running water, primary schools and each of the Makuleke’s seven sub-chiefs would be granted a residential block whose population would later grow with the addition of other uprooted Tsonga speakers evicted from surrounding areas (Harries 1987: 109).²⁶ Moreover, in 1933, the district surrounding the old Makuleke villages (Makuleke’s ‘location’) in the Pafuri triangle was proclaimed the Pafuri Game Reserve and was administered by the National Parks Board until 1952, when the Reserve’s administration was returned to provincial control “explaining the situation as unworkable” (Carruthers 1993: 17).

Jane Carruthers (1995) explains that the issue of removing the Makuleke initially became complicated when in the early 1930s the Native Affairs Department (NAD) sided with the Makuleke and refused to give its permission to relocate the community (98). As stated in the Mouton report (1996), the Department of Agriculture also had its reservations, fearing that the incorporation of Pafuri into the

²⁶ According to Patrick Harries (1987), the seven sub-chiefs were: Qasa, Tlhabyani, Homula, Khombo, Manqeba, Makwadzi and Mukenyi. Qasa and Tlhabyani were the only ones who accompanied the Makuleke regent to N'tlhaveni during the removal. The rest of the sub-chiefs, together with their people, fled across the river to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (107, 110).

Kruger National Park would lead to the spread of foot and mouth disease and *rinderpest* (Ramutsindela 2002: 17). The situation remained unresolved for two decades and eventually, in 1950, the National Parks Board secretary at the time, Johan Van Graan, spoke out against this unfair situation:

Is it wise to take this step in view of the reputation of the alleged suppression of native races? It is obvious that Pafuri is better agriculturally than the dry piece of grazing land we offer in exchange ... frankly, I foresee in this gain of today, if we acquire the Pafuri, the future germ of destruction of the whole Park. (Carruthers 1995: 98)

In addition to the internal disagreements within apartheid government structures, there was also local resistance to the removal of the Makuleke. Chief Rubin Mugakula Makuleke (1914-1967) was considered the long-standing “fighter and resister of the forced removal” (Tivani Speech, Makuleke Heritage Day 2007) and two years prior to the forced removal, the chief suddenly died. Ramutsindela (2002) states that “it is popularly thought [that Chief Rubin Mugakula] was poisoned for his refusal to move by a certain white man by the name of Van Zyl” (17). The chief’s “alleged poisoning was dramatised at the signing (of the agreement) ceremony held at N’tlhaveni on May 30, 1998” (Ramutsindela 2002: 17).²⁷ Further, in a personal discussion with a Makuleke resident, it was acknowledged that Van Zyl was affiliated with SANParks. The interviewee said, “This SANParks guy, Van Zyl, gave a lady medicine (poison) to pour into Chief Rubin’s beer because he refused to give in to the removal” (pers. com. 2009).

Eventually, it was conservationists in collaboration with government police, the South African National Defence Force and Chief Mhinga who together planned to oust the Makuleke from Pafuri. Police arrived in government trucks on September 13th, 1969 and forced approximately 1,700 resistant Makuleke to leave their

²⁷ The agreement refers to the land restitution settlement agreement of 1998.

homes,²⁸ pack up their belongings, leave their livestock behind and move 100 km south west to an area called N'tlhaveni just outside Kruger National Park's Punda Maria gate.²⁹ During this event, South African security forces burned down the Makuleke's deserted *rondavels* and livestock *kraals* to discourage them from returning to their homes (Harries 1987: 107, 110; Collins [undated]: 1).

The current Chief Joas Phahlela Makuleke (who has been the Makuleke chief since 1976) remembers the brutal experience of the removal: "It was a kind of war," says Makuleke. "It was not a matter of hating the white man but what the government was doing. Can you imagine? They said to get us onto the trucks they'd have to shoot a few of us first. They were few and we were many, but they intended to shoot" (LRC 2001: 18). The village elders also describe the removal that they witnessed over three decades earlier. They explain how they were:

dumped on a stretch of dry *mopane* scrub near the Punda Maria border of the park The uprooted families were each given two tents and a quarter-acre of bush. The dry savannah conditions at N'tlhaveni did not have the rich mix of natural resources that existed on the floodplains of the two rivers. The *lala* palm did not grow there. There were not as many wild fruits and herbs. There were no fish ... and no hard *Lubombo* ironwood to build homes. Many of the men had to find work in the cities, so the women had to do much of the ploughing and building. (Koch 2003a: 3)


Unlike the decentralised family settlements within nearby fields at Pafuri (Harries 1987: 102), the resettlement at N'tlhaveni was "laid out in three 'closer settlement' residential blocks with designated areas of arable land and strictly controlled

²⁸ Although Harries (1987: 107) sites the population at Pafuri to be over 3,000, a census in the late 1940s found that approximately 1,200 persons were living at Makuleke location with another 400 in the vicinity. In 1971 it was stated that 353 families were affected, with an estimated total number of persons between 1,650 and 1,780 (Makuleke's Location Report in de Villiers 1999: 122). Hector Magome and James Murombedzi (2003) site 1,500 Makuleke residents removed in 1969 (4).

²⁹ Some sources such as Claassens and Hathorn (2008) site the distance between Pafuri and N'tlhaveni as 60km. The discrepancy between these distances depends on whether the calculation is a direct line drawn from a map, or whether the road/travel distance is taken into consideration, which would amount to 100km.

rotational grazing camps” as part of the South African Development Trust-administered ‘betterment’ scheme (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 335). The three residential blocks allotted to the Makuleke at N’tlhaveni are Makahlule, Makuleke and Mabiligwe (Blocks H, I and J respectively). These were located close to the western boundary of the Kruger National Park and to the south of the road that leads to the Punda Maria gate entrance into the Park (the R524) (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 7). Prior to the removal, Harries (1987) explains that “the people were given tickets which allocated to them stands within the three residential blocks in northern N’tlhaveni” (111). Chief Makuleke was assigned to Block I (Makuleke), while sub-chief Qasa was assigned to Block J (Boxahuku) and Headman Makahlule was assigned to Block H (Makahlule) (Ibid: 111).³⁰ (See Map 7).

³⁰ There is a possible error in Harries’ (1987) description of sub-chiefs and their allocation of Blocks at N’tlhaveni. Harries states that sub-chief Qasa was assigned to Block H and that headman Makahlule was assigned to Block J. This is unlikely to have been the case since the village name of Block H is Makahlule. This is possibly a misprint between Blocks H and J.



Map 7 Makuleke Map Before and After Forced Removal.
 (Claassens and Cousins 2008: 335; map prepared by John Hall 2008)

The structure of the settlements at N'tlhaveni were very different from the arrangement of homes at Pafuri. In preparation for the removal, the bush at N'tlhaveni was bulldozed in 1968 to make way for residential blocks (Harries 1987: 108). Gilbert Nwaila, a former member of the Makuleke Tribal Authority, says that at the three Makuleke villages, "everyone had to live on the lines of the roads, which severely restricted privacy and forced people to walk vast distances to reach their fields" (Koch 2003a: 4). Described as a barren and dry area, food resources were meagre compared to what was available at Pafuri. No hunting or fishing was permitted in N'tlhaveni and people faced fines and arrests for unauthorised cutting of wood (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 340). Nwaila conveys that it was difficult to farm under such conditions, and that it was a great misfortune to be so far from their ancestors' graves. Malnutrition was rife and famine killed their children (Koch 2003a: 3-4). Furthermore, bouts of illness and diarrhoea caused many deaths and the severe drought that struck following the removal created more devastating effects on the Makuleke. The intolerable conditions were interpreted by some members of the community to be "the inevitable consequence of separation from the graves of their ancestors" (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 340).

In addition, the South African Development Trust "designated areas of arable land and strictly controlled rotational grazing camps" (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 335). The Makuleke, however, found it difficult to adapt to this new arrangement. Grandmother Makuleke explains:

When we came to N'tlaveni, there were no trees like our trees. Just bushveld. We did not know them, so we did not know what they were good for. There were no berries or land snails. Our children had more children. We became many and this was the beginning of starvation and sickness for too many people. I could not teach my children how to make drums from the trees because there were no trees in N'tlaveni. Now our young people do not believe in the trees' voices because they cannot hear them. They cannot treat nature in a sacred way, because we could not teach them how. (Winberg 1998: 12)

The Makuleke did not only have to endure the physical harshness of the environment at N'tlhaveni, but had to accept being moved into the area of jurisdiction of another chief, Adolf Mhinga (legal notice of 1976).³¹ Aninka Claassens and Moray Hathorn (2008) state that “without their knowledge, they [Makuleke] were put within the boundaries of the Mhinga Tribal Authority ... [even though] they assert that they are, and have always been, a separate community with their own traditional leader” (276). Chief Makuleke describes the situation as follows:

The Mhinga Tribal Authority was complicit in our forced removal. The removal of the Makuleke community to the Mhinga Tribal Authority's area of jurisdiction was no doubt an attempt to subjugate us. The forced removal completely disrupted the settled and successful existence we had in the Pafuri area. It was a removal motivated by and implemented in terms of the racist and discriminatory laws and policies of the time. To a substantial degree, it reduced us to poverty and dependency on cheap wage labour in industrial Johannesburg in the period following the removal. Our prosperous way of life at Makuleke was destroyed. (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 7)

The area formerly occupied by the Makuleke at Pafuri was planned in 1969 to be divided into several portions, the smaller of which would serve as the northern border of defence for the Republic of South Africa (the Madimbo Corridor); another to be consolidated into the homeland of Venda; and the third and largest portion (the Pafuri triangle) to be incorporated into the Kruger National Park (Land Claims Court 1998: 1). Harries (1987) suggests that the primary reason given for including Pafuri in the National Park was to “preserve an ecologically rich area and end the poaching of animals in the northern reaches of the Park as well as those migrating through the Pafuri triangle” (104). Carruthers (1995) argues that the Pafuri area

³¹ Adolf Sunduza Mhinga was appointed in 1950 by the governor general who used the Native Administration act 38 of 1927 [subsequently Black Administration Act] to designate him as ‘chief of the Amashangane tribe [equivalent to Shangaan and Tsonga] resident in Mhinga's and Makuleke's locations in the Sibasa area’ (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 339). Adolf Mhinga was Minister of Justice in Gazankulu when the 1976 notice was issued (Ibid: 338).

was “managed for the benefit of white tourists and not purely in the interests of increasing the number of animals” (64). She contends that since 1926, the value of Kruger National Park was linked to the sentimentality of white South Africans and their “nostalgia for a romantic and rural past which was engendered by urbanization and increased industrialization”. These values were not shared with black Africans who were regarded as poachers and were therefore excluded and alienated from their natural environment. Black Africans were also never invited to enjoy the South African national parks as visitors (99).

Most importantly, however, the removal served an altogether more pertinent objective: that of national security for the apartheid state. This third objective was pursued through establishing military presence and the absence of human settlement (Whande 2007: 18). By 1971, most of the Makuleke region was incorporated into Kruger National Park and the Madimbo Corridor served as military *cordon sanitaire* (Turner 2004: 168). Webster Whande (2007) points out:

The significance that at the time of the extension of the Kruger National Park into the Pafuri triangle, there was increased activity of armed liberation movements in the southern African region, especially in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Viewed from this angle, the park was strategically located to allay security fears of the white population in South Africa or, at least, to monitor the borders around South Africa more closely. (23)

Labour represented a fourth reason for uprooting the Makuleke from their land. Ramutsindela (2002) and Whande (2007) suggest that “access to game by the community was considered an obstacle towards the supply of the much needed labour” on the emerging white commercial farms and mines (17; 11). Carruthers (1995) also states that the Transvaal Game Protection Association believed that the subsistence lifestyles of the Makuleke through their destruction of game was preventing them from entering this much sought-after labour market (31).

Lastly, a fifth reason for the forced removal was the consolidation of the Bantustans in the early 1950s (the ethnic homelands for African communities – further discussed section 3.6). The National Party’s territorial ambitions included forming a “system of ‘tribal’ authorities and ‘homelandisation’ that required the grouping of tribal areas into bantustans.” Peter Delius (2008) states that in section 2(2) and (3) of the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951,³² it is stipulated that “a tribal authority should be ‘established in respect of the area assigned to a chief or headman of the tribe or community in question’ and that the relevant areas had to be made known by notice in the *Government Gazette*” (231). The Makuleke were required to fit into this prescribed “jigsaw puzzle”, and at the same time, the influential Chief Mhinga (who was also Minister of Justice in the former Gazankulu Bantustan) wanted Chief Makuleke to be brought under his control (Ramutsindela 2002: 17; Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 9; Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 338).

Summing up, the Makuleke removal can be attributed to five distinct motives: conservation and the protection of flora and fauna; the benefit of white South African tourists; national security of the South African borders; the supply of labour to commercial farms and mines; and the consolidation of the ethnic homelands (bantustans). Arguably, the labour issue can be subsumed under the drive for homeland consolidation.


3.6 The Creation of Gazankulu: a Black South African Homeland (Bantustan)

At the beginning of the 20th century, the government of the Union of South Africa began to divide land along racial divisions. The 1913 Land Act allocated seven percent of the country’s land for black African occupation and in 1936, the Native Trust and Land Act increased the land allocated to 13.6% (Cooper 1991: 240). When the Bantu Authorities Act 68 was passed in 1951, bantustans or homelands

³² Renamed the Black Authorities Act.

came into existence. Margaret Nash (1980) describes these bantustans as “separate land areas in which ownership, occupation and use are based on racial or ethnic factors, and are decided primarily by the white minority group” (45). Webster Whande (2007) states that homeland planning was portrayed “as a move to better the lives of the majority black people through settlement patterns that allowed for easier provision of services. In reality, however, these promises were never met; instead, the planned villages acted as political control areas” (18).

A total of ten bantustans were created within South Africa, of which four were granted ‘independence’ by the Republic, meaning that they were not recognised by any other country in the world (Oakes 1992: 378). These four ‘independent’ bantustans are Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, and were allocated ‘independence’ status in 1976, 1977, 1979 and 1981 respectively (Egero 1991: 9). The remaining six bantustans were declared “self-governing territories” and constituted Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa (Ibid: 10-11). As suggested by Bertil Egero (1991), “the South African bantustans are generally regarded as the cornerstone of separate development under *apartheid*” (7; emphasis in original).



Map 8 Bantustan Territories of South Africa.
(UC Press, undated)

In theory, each of the ten bantustans was allocated to a “particular ethnic group, each with its own administration” (Cooper 1991: 241). According to the Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing (1989), the total area of bantustans constituted some seventeen million hectares and comprised about one third of South Africa’s population (compared to white-owned farms that totalled

seventy-seven million hectares).³³ Almost all land was held communally and was distributed by chiefs or headmen on the basis of one family, one plot (Cooper 1991: 239-240). In an analysis of why Bantustans were created, Nash (1980) asserts:

There is good reason to believe that the motive behind ... Bantustans, (was) as much economic as political or ideological. That they were instituted at the behest of white farmers wanting protection from black competition, plus an assured supply of 'cheap' labour; and continue(d) to serve this function in relation to the whole 'white' economy of South Africa. (45)

The homeland designed by the apartheid government for the Shangaan/Tsonga peoples was named Gazankulu, a non-independent bantustan comprised of four detached portions of lowveld, two of which adjoined Kruger National Park. The capital of Gazankulu was Giyani, in the northern detached portion of the state. In 1959, the Bantu Self Governing Act was passed, and Gazankulu was declared a self-governing territory with its own legislative assembly, established in 1973 in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (21) of 1971. This Act stated that "the Bantu people of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous people but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture" (Harries 1987: 106). Furthermore, the Gazankulu homeland included the Malamulule Magisterial District that was part of Chief Mhinga's location and that, in turn, included the area to which the Makuleke were removed (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 8).

The emergence of bantustans changed the relationships between traditional leaders and their subjects. "Until the 1950s," asserts David Cooper (1991), "the chiefs and headmen who made up the tribal authority held largely ceremonial positions. In many areas they were elected by the clan or community but were ultimately responsible to local government officials" (241). Delius (2008) explains that the imposition of the system of Bantu authorities was faced with "considerable popular

³³ In 1985, South Africa's population totalled approximately 33.5 million (Egero 1991: 8). Other sources state total population of South Africa as 31.3 million at the time (NationMaster.com).

opposition ... [and that] individuals who were ready to cooperate with the new order replaced individual chiefs who proved reluctant to accept the new system – often for fear of alienating their subjects” (230). As a result, some chiefs, who were considered relatively junior, but were keen to support the bantustan system, were able to supersede more senior chiefs who showed resistance. Chiefs who cooperated with the new system were backed by the state and were endowed with powerful leadership positions that differed from their customary roles. An example of new powers was the control over their subjects in terms of issuing passes to leave rural areas to seek employment in the cities, a position that was previously allocated to white magistrates or commissioners (Ibid: 230). New powers enabled chiefs, “to make increasing demands on the time and money of their subjects”. Furthermore, a variety of levies were imposed on subjects together with the demand for gifts, bribes and long hours of labour in the chief’s field or in his household. In many instances, levies were misappropriated by chiefs and councillors, and high levels of maladministration and corruption ensued. This resulted in the mounting resentment of many subjects leading to outright conflict in some instances (Ibid: 230-231).

Nash (1980) points out that for a minority of educated blacks in the bantustans, “attractive perks” were offered: they were “encouraged and induced to become mini-capitalists, bureaucrats and enforcement-agents such as police and the army” (54). In Nash’s (1980) opinion, the picture was bleak for the rest of the people living in the homelands. Their lives were dependent on bantustan policy, which meant “near-starvation through unemployment in remote arid, overcrowded denser settlements out of sight of the ‘civilized’ world” (54). The bleak situation is depicted by Cooper (1991), who believes that:

Inequality within bantustans is worsened by the fact that the authorities make capital available to develop large state farms, rather than trying to upgrade subsistence agriculture in which most people are involved. Meanwhile, along with the other negative effects of migrancy on village life, those forced to sell

their labour lose farming customs and know-how. Often people survive only because the limited resources available in the communities are shared between families. The community ties which exist are maintained by the women left behind when migrants have to go to jobs in mines, farms and cities. (240)

Although the original function of bantustans was to “provide a substance base for the migrant labour system” (Cooper 1991: 241), this plan eventually proved problematic. By 1991, populations in the bantustans had considerably increased, there was lack of capital, and tribal authorities were deemed corrupt; forces that ultimately undermined the economic objectives of bantustans. Accordingly, Cooper (1991) shows that a shift occurred at that time, whereby the “most important function of bantustans [became] the political control of the millions who, if allowed to urbanise, would threaten the stability of the apartheid system” (241).

3.7 The Makuleke Chieftaincy Dispute

The bantustan policy of ethnic consolidation impacted severely on the Makuleke. Harries (1987) asserts that this policy is what began the longstanding dispute around the Makuleke chieftaincy (107). The Makuleke disapproved of the fact that they were placed under the jurisdiction of Chief Mhinga after their removal in 1969, a chief who they consider was complicit with the state and was a driving force behind their removal from Pafuri. Further, Chief Mhinga would possibly be able to lay claim on Pafuri were he to be recognized by the High Court of South Africa as the legitimate chief over the Makuleke. For this reason, the dispute between Chief Makuleke and Chief Mhinga is of considerable importance in this case study since the loss of the Makuleke Chieftaincy rights could mean the loss of their legitimate rights over not only Pafuri, but also the land they currently inhabit at N'tlhaveni.

The Makuleke chieftaincy dispute has caused much friction and at times violent contestation between the two clans. Historically, Harries (1987) recounts that on the basis of relation “through a common founding ancestor whose direct male descendant is recognized as chief, the Makuleke are a junior branch of the Tsonga-speaking Maluleke clan which itself forms part of the larger N’wanati clan ... also known as Makwakwas” (96). As explained by Harries (1987), in the early nineteenth century, when the Maluleke clan was dislodged from their homeland in Mozambique and were pushed by the northern Nguni group led by Shoshangane (Manukosi) to the Lowveld, the Maluleke eventually pressed northwards to Dzendwenkop under the leadership of Nkuri. Nkuri’s son Makuleke (Hlekane) then led his people to settle in the Pafuri area at the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu rivers. Following the death of Nkuri, Makuleke recognised his elder brother Mhinga as chief of the Maluleke clan (96).

Claassens and Hathorn (2008) confirm that the oral histories of both the Mhinga and Makuleke clans agree on a common ancestor, but mention that this is one of the only points of agreement between the two clans (339). Joas Phahlela, the current chief Makuleke, also recognises that genealogically, the Makuleke and Mhinga clans were “both Amashangane tribes and had their origins when two brothers from earlier generations split and formed separate tribes under their leadership” (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 10). Chief Makuleke asserts that it is clear from the Native Locations Report of 1905 that “the Makuleke were well established as a separate tribe in their own right” (Ibid: 10). Subsequently, in 1907, the Transvaal Native Location Commission recognised two separate ‘locations’ for Mhinga and Makuleke, effectively identifying them as two discrete tribes”; the Makuleke situated to the north of Mhinga’s location and separated by other clans (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 338-339).

Harries (1987) contends that Chief Adolf Mhinga had a long-standing quest to incorporate the Makuleke under his rule. Furthermore, Claassens and Hathorn

(2008) state that Chief Adolf Mhinga had the foresight to have included as part of the Mhinga Tribal Authority area gazetted in 1954, “thousands of Tsonga-speaking people who were moved into the empty resettlement land under his control” (338). As early as 1952, Chief Mhinga stated in the Tomlinson Commission that he was willing to have the Makuleke, “brought more firmly under his control by their removal to his locality” in return for being compensated with other land outside the Kruger National Park (Harries 1987: 105).³⁴ That being the case, Mhinga clearly stated his intention to subjugate the Makuleke.

Under the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951, old tribal authorities, such as the Mhinga Tribal Authority, were converted into ‘new’ Traditional Councils.³⁵ The Bantu laws confirmed apartheid tribal boundaries and enforced certain composition requirements (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 336). By 1962, the Malamulele District (Regional Authority) had become one of the main areas to which ethnic XiTsonga speakers (Shangaans) were relocated from urban areas and elsewhere in South Africa, and Chief Mhinga, together with various other Tsonga-Shangaan chiefs, dominated the Malamulele Regional Authority (Harries 1987: 106-107). The Commissioner General in Giyani describes how in 1973, 11,000 persons were brought into the districts of Malamulele and Giyani from the neighbouring Venda and Lebowa territories (Ibid: 107). According to Claassens and Hathorn (2008), N’tlhaveni (the area encompassing the three Makuleke settlements or blocks) became the central node of Malamulele to which “relocation and ethnic consolidation of Tsonga speakers” took place (340).

Claassens (2008) explains that Mhinga used his position of power as Minister of Justice within the Bantustan machinery to consolidate and expand his ‘tribal’ land

³⁴ The Tomlinson Commission manifested “a move towards segregation on ethnic rather than merely spatial lines” (Harries 1987: 106).

³⁵ The Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 was renamed the Black Authorities Act, and in 2003 was replaced by the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41.

base (317). In agreement with this explanation, Chief Joas Phahlela protested against the actions of Chief Mhinga asserting that:

The Makuleke community had, as a direct result of the discriminatory laws, policies and practices of the apartheid government, been incorporated into the Mhinga Tribal Authority and placed under the jurisdiction and control of a rival chieftaincy. That chief was also Minister of Justice in one of the artificial institutions created by the apartheid government in the form of the Gazankulu homeland and thus a participant in the decision of the Gazankulu government to demote me from chief to headman and to subjugate the Makuleke community to his authority.

Despite having been recognized as a separate tribe with a separate chief by the authorities as early as 1905 in the Native Locations Commission report, I was effectively stripped of my status as chief and the Makuleke community was stripped of their status as an independent tribe and of their entitlement as an independent tribe to be led by their hereditary chief. (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 9-10)

Officially, Chief Joas Phahlela came to power in 1976 after his father,³⁶ Hosi Rubin Mugakula, had passed away in 1967 (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 337; Mugakula Affidavit 2006: 9).³⁷ Samuel Jutas-Dumazi Maluleke, Joas Phahlela's uncle, was appointed in 1968 as regent pending his nephew's reaching of age and served this post till 1973. Joas Phahlela then took over the reins as chief of the Makuleke community at the age of twenty-eight (int. 2008; Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 8).³⁸

From the perspective of Chief Mhinga, Joas Phahlela "has always been a headman under the Mhinga traditional council". Mhinga states that "this is illustrated in the lineage of headmen of the Makulekes" (Mhinga's answering affidavit: 1679, para. 5.1 in CLaRA Case # 11678/05 2008: 34). Mhinga further argues that "the Native Location Commission's designation and recognition of Mugakula (Joas Phahlela) as headman was indeed in line with the history of the Mhingas" (CLaRA Case #

³⁶ In a personal interview with Chief Joas Phahlela Makuleke, he states that he took over the reigns as chief in 1974.

³⁷ Patrick Harries (1987) states that the old chief died in 1969 (108).


³⁸ Age based on Chief Joas Phahlela's South African Identification number.

11678/05 2008: 34). Legally, state Claassens and Hathorn (2008), Joas Phahlela was appointed by the Chief Minister of Gazankulu as headman of the three areas (Blocks H, I and J) under the Mhinga Tribal Council in 1976 and that these three blocks were “set aside as the compensatory resettlement land for the Makuleke” (337). Joas Phahlela does not dispute the fact that the Makuleke community was moved into the area of jurisdiction of the Mhinga Traditional Council. He affirms that:

instead of being appointed chief, in accordance with my hereditary entitlement, I was appointed by the Gazankulu homeland government as a headman of the people resident at Blocks H, I and J (N'tlhaveni). The appointment was made with effect from 18 October, 1976 whereby the certificate of appointment states that ‘his enhanced status shall in no way affect the rights, privileges, obligations and responsibilities of the Chief of the Mhinga Tribal Authority (Adolf Mhinga) in respect of the said area or persons who are resident therein. (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 9)

In an interview with Livingstone Maluleke (Chief Makuleke’s younger brother and Councillor of Makuleke Village), he stated that:

Even in the past, our fathers and other people who came here in 1969 were not satisfied of being under the Mhinga Traditional Authority, but there was very little that they could do then because the law of this country was very tough. Unfortunately, the Makuleke people could not reach Thohoyandou, the Bantu Administrative offices at the time, so the Mhingas would represent them. And they [Mhingas] started saying, “No, the Makuleke people are ours, they are our subjects, so we can take information and give them” [the Bantu authorities]. So this is how things started to be difficult. (int. 2008)



Map 9 The Portion of the Farm N'tlhaveni 2 MU presently occupied by the Makuleke community. Map shows the three Makuleke Settlements in relation to Mhinga's extension
 Block H (Makahlule), Block I (Makuleke) and Block J (Mabiligwe).
 (The Makuleke Land Claim Settlement Agreement 1998: 34)

Notwithstanding the fact that the Makuleke community was removed to N'tlhaveni, an area under the jurisdiction of Chief Mhinga, the Makuleke nevertheless established a separate tribal office, the status of which is disputed by Mhinga (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 337). Chief Joas Phahlela used to receive a government salary via Mhinga's Tribal Office, since at that time, headmen, as opposed to chiefs, did not qualify to receive government salaries (Ibid: 341). Under this arrangement, the Makuleke tribal office comprised of a salaried staff who administered the springbok PTO system directly from this office.³⁹ However, Chief Makuleke no longer receives this salary because it was suspended by Chief Cydrick Mhinga based on Makuleke's refusal to attend activities of the Mhinga traditional council and failing to perform certain traditional duties including handing over levies collected from the Makuleke community to the Mhinga Tribal Authority. Since the successful land claim in 1998, Chief Makuleke receives a salary through the Makuleke CPA office, from funds generated mainly through its tourism lease fees (Ibid: 241-242).

Aggravating the relationship between the two chieftaincies, in 1992 Chief Cydrick Mhinga appointed a headman of his choice (Joseph Nwamba) at Makahlule (Block H), an area considered by Joas Phahlela to be under his "limited area of jurisdiction" (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 10; pers. com. Hathorn 2010). Joas Phahlela argues that the appointment of Joseph Nwamba is "unlawful" since under the Black Administration Act of 1927, "chiefs were not given the power to appoint headmen". Only the Minister, or if delegated thereto by the Minister, could headmen be appointed (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 10). Conversely, Chief Mhinga asserts that the reason he instituted Joseph Nwamba is because there are many people who have been moved to Block H who do not belong to the Makuleke clan and that it is these

³⁹ The Springbok PTO (Permission to Occupy) system is otherwise known by its form number GK 56. The PTO regulations (Black Land Areas Regulations R188 of 1969), which continue to operate in many South African rural areas, state that "certificates are issued by government officials, but tribal authorities play a key 'advisory' role in the process. In terms of the regulations, PTOs cannot be sold and are not inheritable. They can only be issued to men, or to the elderly widow of a male holder" (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 283; 337).

outsiders who “agitated for a separate headman” (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 338).

Personal discussions with Makuleke residents reveal that Block H is divided into two ‘camps’: those who support Chief Makuleke and those who support Joseph Nwamba. For this reason, upheavals arise and clashes frequently occur between the two ‘camps’. When Nwamba came to speak to the people of Makuleke a few years ago, “the school children ran after his car, threw stones, and chased him away” (pers. com. Makuleke residents 2009). Claassens and Hathorn (2008) maintain that not only does Nwamba refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Makuleke Tribal Office and its record-keeping systems, but he also:

sells land to people for amounts ranging between R100 – R600 without issuing springboks. He has reallocated land held by Makuleke people to his followers who now substantially outnumber the original Makuleke residents. A series of disputes over control of veld resources such as wood and building sand have degenerated into violence. Several people have been charged with public violence for resisting Nwamba’s actions. (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 338)

From Nwamba’s point of view, he is equal in status to Chief Makuleke, and for this reason, he does not need to refer disputes ‘up’ to him. Nwamba, as a headman, regards himself as answerable to Chief Mhinga and therefore, undermines Makuleke’s authority within his three villages (Claassens 2008: 285).

Contested chieftaincies are not a new phenomenon, however. In the opinion of Peter Delius (2008), ascendance to chieftaincy is a recurring source of conflict within African societies. Delius (2008) states:

While chiefs consulted, they were not elected to their office. In most African societies clear rules were laid down as to who should become chief. The ideal was that the eldest son of the most senior wife would become chief on the death of his father, but there were also a number of subsidiary rules stipulating what should be done if the heir was a minor or if no heir had been born at the death of the chief.... Recent research strongly suggests that the idea that rules were necessarily

successful in determining who succeeded to office in pre-colonial South Africa is fundamentally flawed. (215-216)

Furthermore, Delius (2008) suggests that it is an oversimplification to regard succession of chieftaincy as determined by specific rules. Notwithstanding the importance of such rules, Delius (2008) states: “Reality was more complex and allowed for competitive political processes shaped by the interplay of popularity and power to determine who acceded to high office” (216).

The complexity of contestations over chieftainship can also be found at Makuleke. Besides the dispute between Chief Makuleke and Chief Mhinga, there are internal differences within the Makuleke community itself with regards to the issue of rightful chieftainship (as is the case in many other rural communities under tribal leadership). A number of Makuleke residents alluded to the idea that some people are not convinced of Joas Phahlela’s rightful ascendance to his current status as chief of the Makuleke. Some believe that Harry Mugakula, Joas Phahlela’s brother who died during the land claim, should have been the rightful chief. The reason given for this is because Harry Mugakula was the firstborn to Chief Rubin Mugakula’s bride of choice, as opposed to Joas Phahlela’s mother, who was an ‘inherited’ wife after the death of Chief Rubin Mugakula’s brother. Harry Mugakula’s mother is considered to be the lawful wife and therefore *her* firstborn should have been the rightful chief in the opinion of some Makuleke community members. According to this view, Joas Phahlela should only have been an interim chief until Harry came of age. Residents at Makuleke contend that the elders who had supported Harry Mugakula years ago are no longer alive to take up this issue and generally speaking, the topic is not readily discussed in public (pers. com. Makuleke residents 2009).

Claassens (2008) maintains that disputes over spheres of authority between chiefs and headmen are a common occurrence in rural South Africa (285, 349). Claassens and Hathorn (2008) further explain that:

Traditional leadership disputes are notoriously intractable, which is unsurprising given the vested interests and identity issues at stake. Before colonialism, the outcome would have been determined by the leader who could muster most support, either politically or in battle. However, the colonial government changed that in favour of the principle of government-as-arbiter. Once external agencies adjudicate traditional leadership disputes, the outcome depends less on who enjoys most support and more on arcane historical investigations into whether historical sources refer to a particular forebear as a headman or a chief. (346)

The complexity of disputes over traditional leadership lead to the commissioning of legal inquiries to assist in resolving the controversies. Two of these are the Ralushai and the more recent Nhlapo commissions of inquiry.

3.8 The Ralushai and Nhlapo Commissions of Inquiry into Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims

Because of the conflict over authority between the Makuleke and Mhinga chieftaincies, the Makuleke took part in a commission of inquiry appointed by the former president Thabo Mbeki in 2004 “to investigate, inter alia, instances where legitimate traditional leaders had, during the apartheid era, been banished, deposed or driven into exile because they differed with the government of the day” (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 13). Victor Ralushai, a Professor from the University of Venda, headed a two-year inquiry that began in 1996. Ralushai concluded that the status of some of the traditional leaders had been undermined because of forced removals and that in the case of the Makuleke Chief, he recommended that Makuleke’s “chieftainship should be restored” (Aja 2005: 3; Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 13-14; Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 346).

Nonetheless, the Ralushai Commission's Report was never made public, and in 1998 the Premier of Limpopo Province neither accepted nor rejected the recommendations of the Commission (CLaRA Court Case 2008: 34). Instead, the former Premier handed over the report to the Ministry for Provincial and Local Government to develop the process of "a national policy on the matter of traditional leadership disputes and claims" (Xundu 2004). In Chief Mhinga's opinion, a commission of inquiry "is a tool to assist the Executive in the task of government (and that) the Executive is not obliged to either accept the factual findings or the recommendations of a commission" (Mhinga's answering affidavit 2008 par. 32.3). Because the document was never released, the Makuleke officially remain part of the Mhinga community (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 336; 346).

The issue of the Makuleke chieftainship was also part of another commission of inquiry called the Nhlapo Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims established in terms of the Framework Act 41 (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 346). Heading this inquiry is Ronald Thandabantu Nhlapo, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Professor of Law at the University of Cape Town (Affidavit Nhlapo 2006: par. 1.3). The Nhlapo Commission was appointed by President Thabo Mbeki in 2003 to investigate chieftainship and royal disputes in the country dating back to 1927 (Khumalo 2007: 1). From the viewpoint of Claassens and Hathorn (2008), "the Nhlapo Commission remains as yet an unexploded bomb" (349). In 2010, five kingships were recognised and another five were stripped of their status (Majavu 2010: 1), however, disputes the next level down, including that between the Makuleke and Mhinga Tribal Authority, have yet to be resolved. A legal case awaits a hearing in court (pers. com. Hathorn 2010).

3.9 Claiming the Land Back – The Land Restitution Process

On April 27th, 1994, South Africa held its first non-racial fully democratic elections. The African National Congress (ANC) won sixty-three percent of the votes and Nelson Mandela was sworn in as South Africa's president on May 10th, 1994. With the advent of democratic rule, all ten bantustans, including the former so-called independent ones, were incorporated into the nine provinces of the new South Africa and Gazankulu became part of the Northern Province (renamed Limpopo Province) (Saunders and Southey 2001: 21).

With these changes having taken place in South Africa, the question of land proved to be crucial. Former South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk remarked in 1991 that:

Of all the processes which have brought about the inequitable distribution of wealth and power that characterizes present day South Africa, none has more decisive and more immediate importance to most black South Africans than the dispossession of land. To an agrarian community, whose entire economic and social structure is based on the distribution of land, dispossession was akin to national destruction.


To reverse the damage inflicted on South African society in the past (especially since 1913), the 1996 constitution of South Africa placed a duty on government to facilitate citizens' access to land by establishing a constitutional mandate that would effectively ensure the equitable distribution of land through either Restitution, Redistribution or Security of Tenure (Report of the National Land Summit 2005: 6-7). Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) states that "A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress (25.7)."

den Berg 2006: 4). The claim included: the northern part of the Kruger National Park (the Pafuri triangle), a portion of the Makuya Park, a portion of the Mashakatini Nature Reserve and a portion of the land held by the Mutele Tribal Authority in Venda, now known as the Makuleke 6MU (LRC 2003: 30) (see Map 10). At the time of the claim, Pafuri was under the control of SANParks (previously National Parks Board) and the small conservation areas adjacent to the Kruger National Park fell under the Northern Province Conservation Department and the Department of Defence (de Villiers 1999: 4). In their claim, the Makuleke community argued that they were “deprived of their land rights in the furtherance of discriminatory policies and practices; that they were removed from the land against their will; and that no adequate compensation was offered to them for the land and possessions lost” (de Villiers 1999: 46). In response, the Land Claims Court of South Africa stated that the Makuleke claim was a complex one for several reasons:

- The land is patently of importance for purposes of conservation and the promotion of biodiversity;
- It is strategically important, with the northern border forming the border between Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa and the eastern point of the land reaching as far as the border with Mozambique;
- A portion of the land is used by the South African National Defence Force for purposes of patrolling the border with a view to controlling illegal immigration;
- There appear to be mineral deposits on the land;
- The broader public as beneficiaries of the establishment of national parks also have an interest in the matter, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the sense that they have had access to the area for some time for purposes of recreation and enjoyment of a protected natural environment;
- The claim was further complicated by the fact that the Makuleke Community was claiming ownership of the land. This was not a right which the community enjoyed before the removal;⁴⁰


⁴⁰ Conversely, Chapter 1, section xi in the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22, 1994 states that “‘right in land’ means any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question.” The Makuleke had occupied the land in question for a period of approximately 150 – 200 years, therefore qualifying for land restitution (Land Claims Court 1998: 1).

- There were also a large number of interested parties involved. They were the Makuleke Community, the South African National Parks, the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the Minister of Minerals and Energy, the Minister of Defence and the Member of the Executive Council for Agriculture, Land and Environment, in the Northern Province Government (The Land Claims Court of South Africa 1998: 2-3).



Map 11 The Matshakatini Nature Reserve (Madimbo Corridor) part of which was included in the Makuleke Contract Park (Bosch 1998: 329).

In general, none of the parties involved opposed the land claim as such. The only obstacle was Chief Mhinga’s argument that the Makuleke fell under his jurisdiction and that “he alone had *locus standi* to bring the claim to court”. The Land Claims Commissioner, however, overruled this statement and the Makuleke were able to proceed with their claim (de Villiers 1999: 48). Having solved this issue, the interested parties emphasised that “the long-term conservation status of the land required protection within the context of the restitution of land rights They argued that it might be in the national as well as community interest to develop a win-win solution founded on some form of joint management of the area” (de Villiers 1999: 4).



Map 12 Makuya Park in relation to the Matshakatini Nature Reserve (Madimbo Corridor) and Pafuri (Bosch 1998: 33).

After two years of intense negotiations, the claim was successfully resolved by way of a settlement agreement between all the interested parties providing for restoration of the land to a Communal Property Association (CPA) formed by the Makuleke community. The Land Claims Court approved the settlement agreement in 1998 and described it as commendable since the matter was quite complex (Dodson 1998: 3). Subsequently, the claimed land was transferred to the Makuleke CPA by order of the Land Claims Court on December 15th, 1998 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 1999: 1). The transfer took place by way of a Deed of Grant and amounted to a total area of 22,733 Hectares of land (Affidavit Mugakula 2006: 14). According to Claassens and Hathorn (2008), the Makuleke 'location' (see Map 5) is "a small area (501 ha) relative to the land actually occupied and used by the

Makuleke (18,842 ha)” at Pafuri prior to the removal. The authors maintain that this “discrepancy was recognised during the restitution process and [that] the area restored to the Makuleke is thus much larger than the ‘location’” (338).

A few conditions were attached to the Makuleke land restoration aimed at “ensuring that the land is maintained as a conservation area on which no development or activity may take place except that which is compatible with the use of the area for conservation and ecotourism” (Dodson 1998: 4). There was a prohibition on mining, prospecting, residence, or agriculture and the land was only to be used for conservation purposes for a period of 99 years. No development was allowed to take place on the land without positive results from an environmental impact assessment, and if the land were ever put up for tender, SANParks would retain the right of first refusal (Reid 2001: 140). Having agreed to these terms, Bertus De Villiers (1999) states: “They indicated that they wanted its conservation status protected, and that eco-tourism should be the only form of commercial activity allowed” (50).

Winberg (1998) draws attention to the diversity in opinions among the Makuleke community with regards to land use options at Pafuri. She portrays some Makuleke elders who would have liked to return to their ancestral land, but who were convinced that it would be better to stay at N’tlhaveni after long discussions at community forums. “As you can see, there is nothing left of the Makuleke in Pafuri,” says Grandma Makuleke, who further explains:

Even our ancestral graves are covered by grass. The Park’s rangers did not allow us to come regularly with hoes to clean our ancestors’ graves. How can we give up everything we have built again? Our children do not know how to survive from nature in Pafuri. We do not want to move again because it took us a long time to build what we have here [at N’tlhaveni]. (Winberg 1998: 12-13)

It was only the elders, however, who would have preferred to return to the Old Makuleke. The younger generations were happy to have the Pafuri area returned to their community. Some expected to receive financial compensation for the land and divide it amongst the legitimate claimants, while others were satisfied to use the funds communally.

3.10 Conclusion

The historic chronology briefly described in this chapter depicts the volatile experiences of the Makuleke community. The chapter highlights key events related to the Makuleke, beginning with their life at Old Makuleke in the Pafuri triangle from the early 1800s, through to their forced removal in 1969, and their successful land claim in 1998. Historians such as Harries (1987) suggest that the Makuleke community was distinguished by a high level of independence at Pafuri, which was enabled by the abundance of natural resources, and self-sufficiency in comparison to other communities. Furthermore, other scholars such as Steven Robins and Kees van der Waal (2008) demonstrate that the Makuleke gained through their “intense interaction with traders and neighbouring communities ... shaped by factors including war, drought, refugee movements, trade and tourism” (56). In addition, Murray (1995) shows how the Makuleke were involved in the ivory trade of the mid-nineteenth century, and how they were able to benefit economically from trading with the illegal labour recruiters operating in Crook’s Corner towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Since the government’s first attempt at removing the Makuleke in 1931, the community has shown steadfastness and resolve in resisting their relocation and holding on to their independent identity. Eventually, their power waned and in 1969 their resistance was overcome. The Makuleke were removed to N’tlhaveni, a

settlement area that proved to be harsh to live in and represented a manifestation of their defeat. The main problem, however, was that the Makuleke identity was in jeopardy subsequent to their removal and placement under the jurisdiction of the rival Mhinga Traditional Authority. Although the Makuleke were successful in reclaiming their lost land at Pafuri, the chieftaincy issue still poses an obstacle to their anticipated independence.

CHAPTER FOUR

Governance and Institutional Arrangements at Makuleke

4.1 Introduction

The land restitution battle fought by the Makuleke over a period of two years (1996-1998) culminated in a series of agreements, deeds and partnership contracts signed between the Makuleke, government departments and private sector enterprises, giving the community legal rights and a fair amount of control over their land. Because of their chieftaincy dispute with Chief Mhinga and their own legally unrecognised Traditional Authority, the Makuleke established democratic institutional structures through which they would be able to operate and benefit from the assets they acquired: they established a Communal Property Association (CPA) with democratically elected executive board members to manage the commercialisation of the Pafuri area; they formed a Joint Management Board (JMB) as a partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Kruger National Park (KNP) to manage the conservation of the Pafuri area; they concluded three partnership agreements between the Makuleke CPA and private tourism operators; and formed a Joint Management Committee (JMC) to serve as a platform for discussion with the private concessionaires. In addition, the coordination of development ideas and the management of funds were delegated to the Makuleke Development Forum and the Makuleke Development Trust respectively.

Security of tenure, however, was not entirely guaranteed, as land acts subsequent to the Restitution of Land Act of 1994 threatened the community's property rights. The Makuleke challenged the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 because it would have had serious implications for both their restituted land at Pafuri and the land on which they currently dwell at N'tlhaveni. Their challenge was successful and the Act

was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in May 2010 (LRC 2010: 1).

4.2 The Makuleke Contract Park

The land claim Settlement Agreement of 1998 transferred the ownership of the Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park to the Makuleke CPA by way of Deed of Grant.⁴¹ To make this possible, the Region was de-proclaimed as part of a Schedule 1 National Park by a resolution of parliament in terms of Section 2(3) of the National Parks Act,⁴² and was re-proclaimed as a Schedule 2b national park, also referred to as a Contract National Park managed jointly by the Makuleke CPA and the South African National Parks (SANParks) (Master Plan 2000: 8; Koch 2003a: 4). The land previously known as the Pafuri triangle was renamed the Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park through an agreement that is valid for fifty years (Master Plan 2000: 8; de Villiers 1999: 61).⁴³ It is possible to cancel the Agreement after twenty-five years and it may also be extended for a further period acceptable to the parties after the initial fifty-year period has elapsed (de Villiers 1999: 61).

⁴¹ The Agreement refers to the main land claim Settlement Agreement of 1998 between the Makuleke community, SANParks, the Legal Resources Centre and six government departments (Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Minister of Public Works, Minister of Land Affairs, Minister of Minerals and Energy, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Defense) in addition to the Member of the Executive Council for Agriculture, Land and Environment, Northern Province (Main Agreement 1998: cover page).

⁴² A *Schedule 1* national park is the highest protection afforded to conservation land. According to the *National Parks Act*, "state land, or land owned by SANParks together with mineral rights, is declared a *Schedule 1* National Park. Such land may be deproclaimed as a national park only if parliament supports the deproclamation with a majority in both houses. The deproclamation of land belonging to private persons (such as the Makuleke), or where the mineral rights do not belong to the state, can be done by the Minister of Environmental Affairs by notice in the Gazette" (*National Parks Act 1976*: s2; de Villiers, 1999: 129).

⁴³ Also referred to as the Makuleke Contract Park.



Figure 3 The Makuleke area of the Kruger National Park, renamed the Makuleke Contract Park
(Photo: Pafuri Camp Guide 2008)

The Contract Park was created in accordance with the provision that was added in 1986 to the National Parks Act of 1976 stipulating that “SANP and a private landowner may agree to have his land declared a national park, or part of a national park, under conditions that are mutually acceptable” (National Parks Act section 2B 1(b)).⁴⁴ The reason this provision was added was because there were limited funds available to purchase new land for national parks. The 1986 provision allowed for the expansion of national parks through joint ventures with private landowners. Furthermore, this new joint venture philosophy enabled the combination of conservation with private interests through partnerships with landowners (de Villiers 1999: 61). The Makuleke were entitled to such partnerships and therefore proceeded to create the required institutional structures necessary to legally conclude agreements and contracts.

⁴⁴ South African National Parks is referred to as SANParks in this thesis, unless quoting from other documents that refer to the organization as SANP.

4.3 Institutional Structures at Makuleke

4.3.1 The Makuleke Traditional Authority

Prior to the land claim, the main governing structure at Makuleke was the Traditional Authority. Historians recount that the Makuleke community was governed by traditional leadership, with chieftainship determined by lineage. This type of leadership, explains David Mello (2010) “represents a unique and African way of governing communities, and has existed in South Africa for as long as African people have lived in communities needing guidance, leadership and administration” (104). According to Delius (2008), “the principle that bound members of a particular chiefdom together was the recognition of a particular chief – usually drawn from a dominant or royal lineage” (214). The responsibility of a chief, explains Delius (2008) was to allocate land and to provide their subjects with defence from enemies. Chiefs were also expected to:

help them [subjects] in times of economic need, assist them with rain-making, maintain proper relations with the ancestors, punish witches and resolve difficult disputes in their courts. Subjects were expected to pay tribute to the chiefs in the form of a small proportion of the produce of the fields, their herds and the hunt, and to provide labour when called upon for both military and productive purposes. In most societies there was a broad distinction between those closely related to the chiefs, who were known as royals, and unrelated groups who constituted a commoner class or category. (Ibid: 214)

Patrick Harries (1987) describes similar roles attributed to the Makuleke chiefs from the time of their recognition by the Transvaal Native Location Commission in 1907 until the forced removal of 1969. Harries (1987) states that:

The Makuleke community was administered and controlled by the chief who ensured the payment of general tax to the government. He

maintained his status and patronage through the collection of taxes on hunting, fishing, palm wine and labour migrancy. The Makuleke chief was fortunate in that, unlike most other African chiefs whose power was undermined by land alienation, his ability to distribute land was not reduced to the area within the borders of an imposed reserve. (104)

Although Harries (1987) suggests that the Makuleke were able to maintain their independence in the years prior to their removal (96, 98), this autonomy was lost when they were resettled at N'tlhaveni and when Chief Makuleke was appointed as headman of the three settlements (Blocks H, I and J) under the Mhinga Tribal Council in 1976.

In a personal interview, Livingstone Maluleke (2008) recounted the chieftaincy situation. His role as spokesperson of the Makuleke community and the manner in which he articulates the set of circumstances deserves quoting him at length here:⁴⁵

The Chief [Joas Phahlela Mugakula] is my brother in terms of relationship. We, the Makuleke community, were not very much constituted, as our chief was robbed of his chieftainship. In the establishment of the Gazankulu bantustan in 1973,⁴⁶ Chief Mhinga was a minister in that Gazankulu government. In some way, a proclamation was passed to incorporate the Makuleke people into the Mhinga Traditional Authority. We looked for these laws and we found them. Then we started to question why this was done, and if it was done, why it could not be corrected because the right thing is that Mhinga is independent, and so too is Makuleke independent. As we started, it was a terrible war! It needed people with a lot of strategic approach, people with tolerance, with understanding, who would attend long meetings until twelve o'clock at night sometimes. We formed a committee and I was the secretary of that committee. I developed a very powerful strength in that position because if you are the secretariat of an organisation like this, you have to have information,

⁴⁵ Livingstone Maluleke is one of the main drivers of the land claim process. He is an influential leader at Makuleke fulfilling a number of functions including: village Councillor, Chairperson of the JMB, CPA Exco. Member for four terms until 2010, and Principal of Boxahuku Primary School till 2008. Livingstone has left his posts at Makuleke and is now employed by the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP).

⁴⁶ In 1973, the Gazankulu bantustan became officially self-governed.

you must have time, you must be devoted, you must understand and have knowledge That was in 1993-1994 and we knew at that time that the Gazankulu government was very close to becoming defunct. We knew the ANC [African National Congress] was taking over because we had a lot of information from comrades telling us that everything would change and be o.k. They guided us and told us to tolerate the threats of Chief Mhinga. We structured ourselves to be close to each other and we became hostile towards Mhinga. They wanted to come here and hold meetings, but we resisted and barricaded the roads. I could stand up and sing songs and everybody, every child here at Makuleke would come out and join the struggle.⁴⁷

I realised that if I did not help the chief regain his chieftaincy, if I ran away, then the Makuleke community would suffer forever. Our chief needed support. He needed a lot of people around him and that is why we structured ourselves around him and said we would fight for him. We collected money from the community here, about ZAR 50,000 to pay lawyers to help us. This money, however, was exhausted very quickly because private lawyers wanted a lot of money.

Then a journalist by the name of Eddie Koch came to Makuleke and told us that we could claim our land from which we were removed in 1969. We were reluctant to trust a white guy because after all, our people suffered tremendously in the Kruger National Park because of these white guys. "Who are you?" we, asked him. "Where do you come from and how are you going to help us?" Eddie explained everything very strategically, but he could not tell us how giving him information would help us. All he said is, "the world will know when I write your story in the *Mail & Guardian* so people will know the truth". He was not sure what would happen after that. After two weeks, the *Mail & Guardian* reported our story and the Legal Resources Centre called for us. The Legal Resources Centre said we should present our story of being integrated into the Mhinga Traditional Authority and that our chieftainship was robbed from us. That is what we want, our chieftainship.

At the time, our chief was so depressed because when someone says you are not a chief, you become sad. These Mhingas were very powerful. They influenced the Gazankulu government to stop our chief's salary. Our chief was so depressed, so we told him not to worry.

⁴⁷ The struggle turned into open conflict when Mhinga arrived at Makuleke in 1994 together with a potential donor to try and convert the Makuleke Tribal Authority Office into a crèche. According to Steenkamp (2001), "a mob of angry, stone-throwing community members hounded him out of the village" (219).

We surrounded him and made prayers, we clapped together and people gave the chief ZAR 10, ZAR 20, ZAR 30 to buy *mielie-meal* and to try and keep his pocket going. We were also manoeuvring politically. Comrades came from Johannesburg to help us. They spoke with Mhinga and asked why he stopped our Chief's salary. They were very harsh and said, "Is that your money or is it the government's money?" and Mhinga answered, "but we are in conflict". Instead of going on with Mhinga, we spoke with the Gazankulu administrators and questioned why they were taking instructions from an equal man because our chief has got an argument, that of chieftainship. That was around 1994 when we had won the elections The ANC were putting the provinces into good shape, so those were the preliminary people who would occupy government positions in the premier's office in the commission of chieftainship. They just gave instructions and in two weeks' time, our chief's salary was paid out, all of it. That started to give us promise, power and courage and the Chief also developed trust in us.

We said, "We know you are our chief and we are going to do everything that you become our chief". So we presented at the Legal Resources Centre, and then they split our case into two: a land claim and a chieftainship claim. (int. 2008)

Implicit in this rendition of the Makuleke struggle is the importance of solving the chieftaincy dispute with Chief Mhinga and how the "harsh experiences" suffered by the Makuleke, "brought the people closer together as a united community" (LRC 2001: 17). Consultancy reports written on the Makuleke suggest that "by South African standards, the Makuleke community is characterised by a high degree of internal social cohesion" (The Makuleke Region of the KNP [undated]: 3; LRC 2001: 17-18). Even though other groups of people have been incorporated into the Makuleke villages through forced removals during the apartheid era, the Makuleke seem to have retained their unity. As Conrad Steenkamp (2000) clarifies:

The Makuleke are a 'composite' community that has nonetheless managed to forge a strong common identity – a distinctive 'Makuleke' identity. They were relocated as a 'community', but other ethnic Tsonga-Shangaan speakers from 'Venda-speaking' areas were resettled with them in the N'tlhaveni District of Gazankulu. These additions to

the original Makuleke core group, with its strong affiliation to the existence of a separate Makuleke Chieftaincy, were assimilated quite effectively. (18)

These assimilated groups live under the jurisdiction of Makuleke leadership. Livingstone Maluleke describes the roles of different traditional leadership structures at Makuleke as follows:

The role of the royal family is to provide the leadership of the community while the role of the traditional authority is to provide for the administration of the villages The royal council is composed of members of the royal family but also includes some commoners who have emerged ... by showing responsibility and volunteering for certain functions. (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 342)

With regards to land allocations, Steve Robins and Kees van der Waal (2008) point out the different interpretations of who “owns the land”. In the challenge to the Communal Land Rights Act 11 (2004), members of the Makuleke Traditional Authority indicated that “people, rather than the chief, own the land, and that it is the neighbourhood which decides on the acceptability of new settlers”. However, Robins and van der Waal (2008) further point to the perception of some people at Makuleke who consider the royal family to be the owners of the land and that “land use is under the jurisdiction of the Royal Family” (63). Generally, important decisions would be discussed at community meetings where the leadership was described by Steenkamp (2001) as, “unusually accountable to the broader community” (56). This sensitivity towards accountability stems from “the leadership’s exposure to a long history of conflict with influential external enemies and strategic need to take the community along in their decision making” (Ibid: 56).

Other institutions that existed prior to 1994 were the civic associations with their allied structures from the three Makuleke settlements. As evidenced by Steenkamp (2001), “The civic associations came into being in the late 1980s as part of the

national drive to challenge the Tribal Authority system built up by the previous government” (218). Civic representatives were elected by special interest groups who would generally serve as a counterforce to Tribal Authorities. Unlike elsewhere in South Africa, however, the civic association at Makuleke strategically cooperated with the Tribal Authority in a joint effort to protect Makuleke against the Mhinga Tribal Authority (Steenkamp 2001: 220).

After the land claim, the Land Claims Commission (LCC) required the Makuleke to establish a number of “hard structures” as a prerequisite for the return of ownership of the land to the community (Steenkamp 2001: 218). Leadership dynamics changed thereafter to include democratic structures in line with African National Congress (ANC) ideology whereby an elected executive membership called the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee (Exco.) would administer the Pafuri area on behalf of the community.

4.3.2 The Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA)

Prior to the Makuleke community’s submission for land restitution, says the Makuleke CPA Administrative Officer, leaders of the Makuleke community came together to form the first formal Land Claims Committee (int. 2010).⁴⁸ This committee was formed to replace its predecessor, the Tribal Authority Executive, in response to the National Parks Board negotiators who “expressed reservations about ‘representivity’ of the Tribal Authority Executive” and required the election of committee members (Steenkamp 2001: 221). The Committee was assisted by legal experts from not only the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), but from non-governmental organisations such as the Friends of Makuleke (FoM), international

⁴⁸ The Land Claims Committee included nine community leaders: Evans Nwaila, Gibson Maluleke, Gilbert Nwaila, Lamson Maluleke, Livingstone Maluleke, Mavis Hatlane, Rixon Josini, Samson Sambo and Vettlee Chauke (alphabetically listed). Chief Joas Phahlela Chief served as absentee chairperson (pers. com. Vettlee Chauke 2010; Steenkamp 2001: 221).

cooperation organizations such as the GTZ, along with the Land Claims Commission and the Department of Land Affairs (int. Livingstone Maluleke 2008). “With this kind of support”, says Maluleke, “the Makuleke Land Claims Committee managed to successfully win the claim over Pafuri, which culminated in the signing of the Settlement Agreement in May 1998” (int. 2008).

During the land claim negotiations, issues of identity arose, and a distinction had to be made as to who precisely qualified as a legitimate claimant. Mavis Hatlane (CPA General Secretary) delineates:⁴⁹

When the Land Claims Commission wanted to legitimate claimants, they realised that some people who were physically removed from Old Makuleke were not residents [at the three settlement villages allocated to Makulekes]. Some people who were removed did not join these villages. They decided to join other existing communities. My family, for instance, decided to join the Mhinga community. For this reason [because they were original residents of Old Makuleke despite having joined the Mhinga community], we were regarded as legitimate claimants, because we were physically removed from Pafuri. (int. 2008)

A list of claimants was compiled by the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights (approximately 15,000 claimants), dividing the claimants into Categories A and B.⁵⁰ Thereafter, the Makuleke community was required to establish a structure to act as a legal entity to manage the restored land on behalf of the claimants (int. CPA Admin. Officer 2010). All those who were forcibly removed from the Pafuri region in 1969, their decedents and all other residents who reside at Makuleke

⁴⁹ Mavis Hatlane is one of the longest standing members in a leadership position at Makuleke. She formed part of the initial Land Claims Committee and later served on the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee for five terms. She also works as a teacher at N’wanati High School. Hatlane resides in Mhinga.

⁵⁰ Category A claimants were people who actually lived at Pafuri before the removal, whereas Category B claimants, comprising approximately 30%, came from elsewhere and were incorporated into Makuleke (Steenkamp 2001: 222). The number of households stated in the report on the Facilitation of the Restitution Discretionary Grant Application of the Makuleke CPA (2000) is: Makuleke (881 households), Mabiligwe (590 households), Makahlule (215 households) (Coning 2000: 9). By comparison, population statistics provided by the Makuleke Clinic in 2007 state, Makuleke (4,090 individuals), Mabiligwe (2,056 individuals), and Makahlule (1,509 individuals).

became members of the Makuleke CPA (Steenkamp and Urh 2000: 3). Other individuals could also apply for CPA membership until the deadline of December 15th, 2003, if they could prove that they were dispossessed of rights to land due to their forced removal as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices during or about 1969, or that they were the direct descendants of a CPA member (Dodson 1998: 14).

Steve Collins (2002) suggests that although CPAs were becoming a “fixture of rural South Africa (with approximately 300 CPAs registered by 2002) ... they were not the only form of community land-ownership structures set up by communities” (3). Other structures include: Trusts, Section 21 Companies, or existing Tribal Authorities who retain ownership of the land for the benefit of their community. Furthermore, Collins (2002) states that “the common aspect of all of these is that the land is owned and managed on behalf of community members and that these members are entitled to be involved in the workings of these structures” (Ibid: 3).

The function of the CPA Act 28 (1996) is to “help any group of people legally buy, keep and use land together as a group” (DLA 1999: 3). Furthermore, the CPA as an institution encompasses a number of benefits: it entitles the community to “own property like land and other things like tractors, tools or buildings; buy and sell property; borrow money from a bank and use its property ... as a guarantee for a loan; or take someone to court” (DLA 1999: 5). The primary objective of the Makuleke CPA is to manage and use the Pafuri area for the benefit of its members in a participatory and non-discriminatory manner (The Makuleke Region of the KNP [undated]: 3).

In accordance with the CPA Act 28 (1996), the Makuleke CPA drew up its constitution on January 23rd, 1999 in which it stipulated all managerial and administrative details including the restored property, CPA membership, executive committee membership, meetings and reporting, finance and records, security of tenure and termination, legal capacity and dispute resolution (Constitution CPA

1999: 1-25). The Constitution was translated into Xi-Tsonga and made available at the CPA office to all community members wishing to peruse it (*Deku Newsletter* March/April 2003: 3). Subsequent to drawing up their constitution, the Makuleke registered their CPA on February 8th of that year with the Department of Land Affairs.

Nine individuals from the Makuleke community were democratically elected to form the first Executive Committee for the Makuleke CPA.⁵¹ The Constitution states that committee members are to serve a three-year term and can either be re-elected or substituted at subsequent elections (Constitution CPA 1999: section 13).

Furthermore, the Makuleke addressed the role of traditional authority in their community and decided to make a provision for Chief Joas Phahlela Makuleke to serve in an ex-officio capacity as chairman of the CPA (Koch 2003a: 5). The report on the Makuleke Institutional Review Task Group (2001) states that “it is suggested for the Chief to play a special unifying and conciliatory role (like a ‘presidential’ position).” The report also suggests, “To do this, it means that he should not play a role at a project level and could perhaps receive a slightly higher honorarium” (2). The Chief served as chairman for the first three CPA terms (1999, 2000 and 2003) until this arrangement was amended and other people were elected as chairpersons for the following terms.⁵²

According to Bertus de Villiers and Marlize van den Berg (2006), the reasons for removing Chief Joas Phahlela from his status as Chairman of the CPA in 2006 was to allow for other people to fill this position (16). Steve Collins and Herman Snel (2008) explain that rising tensions between the Makuleke CPA and the Tribal Authority over allocation of funds led GTZ TRANSFORM to ask “the Department of Land Affairs to run a workshop and clarify the different roles and responsibilities”.

⁵¹ The CPA Executive Committee includes a chair, vice-chair, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, vice-treasurer, and four additional members representing the villages of Makuleke, Mabiligwe, Makahlule and Mhinga.

⁵² For a list of all CPA Executive Committee members (1999 to 2010), see Appendix 3.

The outcome of this workshop was the acknowledgement of the conflict of interest between the Traditional Authority and the CPA Executive. For this reason, it was “asserted that the chief could not be the chairperson of the CPA Executive” (99). Furthermore, an interview with a royal family member revealed that there are other reasons why it proved unsuitable for the Chief to serve as Chairman. In this interviewee’s opinion, it was the royal family that decided for the Chief to discontinue his role within the CPA. Norman explains: “When the CPA holds a meeting, everyone asks questions and this undermines the dignity of our Chief. Another thing is that in our culture, no one can speak after the Chief has concluded his statements” (pers. com. 2008). Such cultural traditions were incompatible with the democratic principles of the CPA and measures had to be taken to bridge the divide. According to de Villiers and den Berg (2006), Chief Makuleke’s role shifted thereafter to fulfil more of a supervisory function outside of the day-to-day operational tasks of the CPA, a role that the community considers to be more akin to his status (16). Subsequently, in the 2006 elections, a new chairman of the CPA, Eric Tivani (also chairperson of the Royal Council), was voted in, and in April 2010, Bios Hlungwani, a former police Commissioner and close friend of Chief Makuleke, was elected for this position.

The Makuleke CPA Constitution (1999) states that at least half the CPA Executive committee members should be female (section 13.7). At the handover workshop of the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee (August 15-16, 2006, at The Ranch in Limpopo Province), concern was raised about female representation on the Executive Committee. The explanation given for the fact that no more than three women ever served on the Executive Committee was that “most community females cannot read and write” (Handover Workshop Report 2006: 6). Moreover, conversations with community members in 2008 disclosed other reasons for minimal female representation. “It is disrespectful for women to stand up to their chief and, for this reason, it is difficult for women to fill this position”, stated a Makuleke resident (pers. com. 2009).

In addition to the elected executive members, the CPA includes an Administrative Officer and an Implementation Officer. These positions are carried out by full-time staff members amongst whose duties are “to provide the CPA with a ‘face’ when it deals with the public” (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 16). The Administrator and Implementation Officers undertake financial administration and office management roles such as co-ordinating CPA activities and meetings, writing correspondences, as well as reports and papers for discussion (Ibid: 16). The CPA Administration Officer in 2008 says that she has learned a lot from her position: “When I was working with Lamson (first Implementation Officer), he used to give me time for training, so for instance, I was trained for SMME [Small and Medium Enterprises]. He gave me power and he authorised me to be trained for financial administration under MAFISA” (int. 2008).⁵³

The CPA also includes a number of sub-committees that hold specific functions. The three major sub-committees deal with conservation issues, commercial negotiations and recruitment of staff. In addition, the Makuleke Development Trust is the governing body for the disbursement of funds at Makuleke. Seven trustees serve in office including four CPA members, a representative from the Department of Land Affairs, a representative from the community’s auditing firm (Maitland Trust Limited) and one from the community’s legal firm (Webber Wentzel Bowens) (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 16-17; The Makuleke Development Trust Deed 2001: 5).⁵⁴ The Makuleke Development Trust governs all income accrued to the CPA from government grants, from the commercial activities in the Makuleke Contract Park and other revenue sources. According to David Lancaster, the Webber Wentzel Bowens representative on the Makuleke Development Trust, “the idea was to pool

⁵³ MAFISA is a management consultancy agency based in Johannesburg.

⁵⁴ Webber Wenzel Bowens provides free legal services to the Makuleke Community as part of their community assistance programme. According to David Lancaster, their roles are threefold: they are the commercial legal advisors to the Makuleke; they represent one of the Trustees on the Makuleke Development Trust; and they provide litigation for disputes with other communities and legislation affecting traditional leadership issues (int. 2008).

It is estimated that by 2006, up to ZAR 1 million in free legal advice was given to the CPA (de Villiers and den berg, 2006: 20).

all the money together to get maximum return on investment” (int. 2010). The CPA Administrative Officer states that the first money that entered the Trust is the Restitution Discretionary Grant amounting to approximately ZAR 4.5 million (int. 2008).

In each of the three villages, a Development Forum was established comprising of ten people per village.⁵⁵ As stated by Livingstone Maluleke, one of the functions of the Development Forum is, “to connect the development initiatives of the community with all the other structures in the community and to ensure that developments that affect the Makuleke are integrated with local municipal issues and Integrated Development Plan (IDP) project implementation (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 342). The CPA Executive Committee is meant to consult with the forums, “using them as a sounding board, identifying spending priorities through them, utilising them to communicate with the beneficiaries, as well as channelling development funds for projects through them” (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 17). In addition, the development forums allow for the involvement of more beneficiaries in the process of decision-making and governance, thereby giving more legitimacy to the CPA through public monitoring of checks and balances as well as allowing more people to be trained for future CPA executive positions (Ibid: 17). The CPA Administrator describes the Development Forum as, “actually a consultative forum. The CPA Executive Committee consults the different community structures before it starts any projects” (pers. com. 2010).

⁵⁵ The Makuleke Development Forum consists of various community structures, i.e. Civics Associations, Church Organisations, Youth Groups, Women’s Groups, the Disabled, the Royal Family, the Tribal Council, Sports Groups, Health Committee, Community Development Structures (water, electricity, businesses), and the Traditional Healers Association. Farmers have not yet properly constituted themselves as a structure, but planning is underway. (CPA 2005: 2; Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 342; pers. com. CPA Administrative Officer 2009).

3.3.3 The Joint Management Board

In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the conservation management of the Makuleke Contract Park falls under the control of a Joint Management Board (JMB) and its duty is to oversee the day-to-day activities of the region. The Joint Management Board five-year strategic plan states that its mission is, “maintaining the ecological integrity of the Makuleke Region in a way that would enhance the economic development to the benefit of all members of the Makuleke community” (2005: 5). This relatively new approach to conservation in Kruger National Park was meant to be participatory and practice-based, process driven, goal directed, critical, collaborative, inclusive and enabling (Ibid: 6).

The Joint Management Board consists of six members in total: three appointed by SANParks and three by the Makuleke CPA, with chairmanship of the Joint Management Board rotating annually between the two parties. Furthermore, decisions are made by consensus and the Agreement provides for a series of deadlock breaking mechanisms (Master Plan 2000: 8). Joint Management Board meetings take place a minimum of six times per year and advisors or guests may be invited to these meetings for their expertise, but on the provision that they are not entitled to vote. This allows for the involvement of more members of the community in the activities of the Board (de Villiers 1999: 62). Joint Management Board resolutions in order to be of force and effect must be approved by both SANParks and the Makuleke CPA (Settlement Agreement 1998: 12).

The Makuleke CPA has the right to accrue income from all permissible commercial activities undertaken in the Makuleke Region except for gate fees that are charged for visitors entering the Kruger National Park via the Pafuri Gate. These fees accrue to SANParks and are meant to offset the management costs of SANParks. Such costs include the maintenance of all facilities that are solely required for conservation functions, including conservation management, the rehabilitation of land and the

administration of the Joint Management Board (Settlement Agreement 1998: 18). The community, however, bears the cost of maintaining infrastructure for tourism and other commercial purposes. In the case of shared infrastructure, a ratio is determined by the Joint Management Board to cover costs (de Villiers 1999: 70).

A Master Plan outlining the plan for Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Makuleke Region was drafted in 2000 by David Grossman and Willem van Riet, who acted in their capacities as consultants to the Makuleke. According to Lamson Maluleke (the JMB Implementation Officer), the plan “set out the policies and principles for the conservation management and related development in the Makuleke Region” (Report on Strategic Workshop 2005: 3). Together with detailed descriptions of the Pafuri area, the Master Plan (2000) includes the vision, mission and objectives of the region with regards to tourism development and sustainable environmental management of the Makuleke Contract Park (Ibid: 3-5).

In 2010, the Makuleke CPA and Joint Management Board approached the consulting firm ERM Southern Africa (Environmental Resources Management Consulting Firm) to update their Master Plan in accordance with the developments of the Contract Park over the years. A number of workshops and meetings have taken place with the various stakeholders and the reconfigured Master Plan is due to be completed in 2011.

4.3.4 The Joint Management Committee

In addition to the Joint Management Board, the tourism concessionaires are included in a further structure, namely, the Joint Management Committee (JMC). At Joint Management Committee meetings, issues pertinent to the three tourism concessions are discussed together with representatives from the Joint Management Board. Examples of such issues include: fence lines that need approval by the

Department of Agriculture, off-road driving regulations, the Children in the Wilderness programme, and staff identity cards to enter Kruger National Park (pers. com. Pafuri Camp manager 2008).

In my interview with Pafuri Camp Manager, she said, “It is becoming very difficult to coordinate everyone’s schedules for Joint Management Committee meetings” (int. 2008). For this reason and for the sake of simplifying the structures, the Joint Management Committee is currently in the process of being reformed so that the concessionaires may join the quarterly meetings of the Joint Management Board instead of meeting separately and then having to report to the different committees. The plan is for a full time concession manager to be employed whose duty would be to coordinate the three concessions and link these to the Joint Management Board. This manager would be able to attend the Joint Management Board meetings albeit in a non-voting capacity (pers. com. Poultney 2010). The new arrangement is intended to allow for more effective communication between the different stakeholders, to connect and to coordinate the different institutional structures at Makuleke.

4.4 Conflict Resolution

In preparation for potential conflicts between the Makuleke CPA and SANParks, an appropriate mechanism was put in place to resolve disputes in a cordial manner. The possibility of the contract establishing the park being cancelled one day was also accounted for. De Villiers (1999) notes that “the community did not want to be locked into an agreement where SANParks could constantly oppose or undermine its commercial activities; while SANParks could not afford to be managing an area against the letter and spirit of a national park (71). For this reason, the Settlement Agreement makes provisions for possible disputes and stipulates the precise course of action that should be taken to reach consensus on any issue between the two

parties. If the parties are unable to resolve the problem through discussions at arranged meetings, then either party is entitled to refer the matter to mediation (Settlement Agreement 1998: 20). And if after mediation, consensus is still not achieved, it is submitted for arbitration to either an independent chartered accountant or a practicing advocate or an attorney, depending on whether the dispute is over a financial or legal matter (Ibid: 23). If agreement is not reached up to that point, it is possible for the contract to be annulled (de Villiers 1999: 71).

In the event that the Makuleke Region is excluded from the Kruger National Park as a contractual park, the provisions stipulated in the Settlement Agreement cease to be of any further force or effect. However, the Makuleke CPA may resort to SANParks for advice regarding the future use of the land (Settlement Agreement 1998: 21). Several options would be available to the Makuleke CPA as the full owners of the land: they may accordingly “sell, alienate or otherwise dispose of, or hypothecate or otherwise encumber the land” on condition that the land shall first be offered to SANParks in terms of the Deed of Grant. Moreover, SANParks must also be informed in due time by written notice were the Makuleke CPA to opt for mortgaging the land (Ibid: 21).

The Settlement Agreement is meant to serve as a governing law in which the Makuleke CPA and SANParks commit themselves to support each other in implementing the terms and conditions of the Agreement (Settlement Agreement 1998: 26). De Villiers clarifies that:

While this provision may at face value be of little practical assistance, it symbolizes the spirit in which the agreement is nested and may in time become an important beacon to guide the parties should conflicts arise. In more than one sense it can be described as a Directive Principle for Joint Management. (1999: 72)

4.5 Benefiting From the Land

The Makuleke CPA obtains exclusive entitlement over the commercial and use rights to the Makuleke Region in terms of the Deed of Grant (Master Plan 2000: 8; Settlement Agreement 1998: 16). A series of economic projects were launched as part of the land claim negotiations. Income-generation for the community constituted a large proportion of the debate and was at first initiated through trophy hunting. Later, hunting was replaced with tourism and employment in conservation and the community also has access to some natural resources in the Makuleke Contract Park, as stipulated in their Settlement Agreement (1998).

4.5.1 Consumptive Utilisation – Trophy Hunting

Trophy hunting was the Makuleke's first attempt at income-generation from their repossessed land. Even though the Pafuri region of the Kruger National Park was known to have very low densities of wildlife at the time, hunting was condoned providing it followed the rules and regulations of SANParks, and was in line with the conservation requirements of the area (The Makuleke Region of the KNP [undated]: 4). On this basis, SANParks agreed that "the question of hunting African elephants would have to be in terms of the Convention for the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) rules, regulations and agreement of which South Africa is a signatory" (Tabane 2000: 1).

Subsequent to this agreement, the Joint Management Board concurred that hunting would take place during the initial period of tourism planning and concession bidding. The reason for this was because hunting was seen to provide, "an important source of revenue to bolster income to the Makuleke, especially in the early years before tourist numbers start[ed] to increase" (Davies 1999: 13).

Furthermore, it was expected that, with time, hunting would become less significant as tourism and hunting do not usually mix well (Ibid: 13).

According to Collins (2004), the first hunt took place in 2000 with two elephants and two buffaloes being the overall target. Wayne Wagner, the professional trophy-hunting outfitter, invited some of the Makuleke CPA members to visit Nevada, USA, where they were able to generate wide publicity and bid for the highest prices for their animals. There was some international protest over this tender since elephant culling had stopped in South African National Parks at the time. With negative publicity mounting over this issue, the South African government was pressured to prohibit the hunt. Nevertheless, after conservation officials reassessed the agreement, the Makuleke CPA was permitted to proceed with their hunts provided they were 'sustainable'. As the hunt took place, SANParks conservation officials served as overseers to ensure ethical and professional procedures were followed (3).

In 2001, the quota of animals to be hunted was increased to include zebra, kudu, impala, nyala and eland; the latter two species being the cause of another outcry, this time from SANParks representatives on the Joint Management Board (CPA 2003: 2). As explained by Collins (2004), their argument rested on the grounds that these animals were already scarce in the Makuleke Region of the park and should not be considered for hunting (3). The Joint Management Board conflict management process was followed to resolve this dispute. An expert (Hall-Martin Consulting CC) was consulted and after careful examination, proving that there is no indication that nyala populations were declining and that eland numbers were only declining slowly, the ruling was in favour of the Makuleke CPA who were then able to proceed with the hunt (Ibid: 3; Hall-Martin 2001: 1).

The following year, the Makuleke CPA reverted to hunting only elephant and buffalo as these species proved to be the most lucrative (Collins 2004: 3). The quota for 2002 included three elephants and six buffaloes for hunting and in 2003, this quota

increased to five elephants and seven buffaloes on the grounds that this would be the last hunting season for the Makuleke as the tourism concessions were underway and would start operating soon after (Ibid: 3).

By 2003, the Makuleke CPA was generating approximately ZAR 1.5 million per year.⁵⁶ Collins (2004) states that this money was spent on community upliftment projects including renovating school buildings, drilling boreholes, providing bursaries for top students and a feeding scheme for the poorest families in the villages. Collins (2004) also mentions that the meat from the hunts was distributed amongst the three villages once the hunter had taken his trophy (3-4). A personal interview with Chief Makuleke revealed that ZAR 70,000 was given to N'wanati High School and each of the four primary schools was allotted ZAR 50,000 for renovations and the addition of classrooms. Makahlule Primary School, however, was given ZAR 500,000 to erect four classrooms and an administration block (int. 2008). Trophy hunting was therefore justified on the grounds that income derived from this activity was beneficial in contributing towards the development of the education institutions at the three Makuleke settlement villages.

4.5.2 Tourism and Conservation in the Pafuri Area

Feasibility studies conducted for the CPA just after the land claim compared projected income from tourism and conservation with other forms of land use. The outcome indicated that:

Notwithstanding the relative remoteness of the Pafuri region – these industries [conservation and tourism] will generate revenues and jobs for the community far in excess of cattle farming and other agricultural

⁵⁶ The exchange rate at the time was approximately ZAR 7.00 to US\$ 1.00.

forms of land use [which are now, in any case, not permissible in terms of the agreement]. (The Makuleke Region of the KNP: 4)

Moreover, de Villiers (1999) emphasises that one of the main reasons why the Makuleke community decided to retain the national park status of their land and to concentrate on eco-tourism is the potential employment opportunities that eco-tourism offers. However, some criticism abounded regarding such projections and de Villiers notes that:

On various occasions during negotiations SANParks expressed concern that the expectations of the community about the creation of large-scale employment might be overestimated. Concern was also expressed that the community might have received advice from potential developers giving rise to a conflict of interest – by inflating community expectations and so serving the developers' own ends. (65)

With regards to tourism development, the Makuleke CPA, in consultation with SANParks, has the right to determine tender procedures to be followed by prospective partners wishing to tender for developments within the Makuleke Contract Park. The Joint Management Board is entitled to review the tender requirements and draft agreements to ensure that such documents comply with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement and the Master Plan. The Joint Management Board could also recommend changes and played the role of monitoring both the fairness of the tender procedures and the compliance of the developments with the regulations (Settlement Agreement 1998: 17).

The tourism developments have two concurrent objectives: environmental protection and economic return for the Makuleke CPA. The Joint Management Board Master Plan (2000) states that the principles and objectives of tourism would be “underpinned by sustainable environmental practices” and that tourism would “be used as a development tool for the empowerment and financial benefit of the

Makuleke community” (30). In addition, the broad tourism objectives of the Contract Park include:

Developing tourism with dignity, encouraging mutual respect for all cultures; encouraging appropriate tourism education, training, awareness and capacity building programmes using tourism as a catalyst for human development; promoting knowledge about the historical and cultural aspects of Makuleke as well as the natural environment; and monitoring and minimising potential adverse social impacts of tourism. (Ibid: 30)

Having the right to conduct all commercial activities on the land, the Makuleke CPA is obliged to adhere to a number of conditions as stated in the Settlement Agreement (1998): first, the developmental constraints and opportunities set out in the Master Plan (2000) must be taken into consideration; second, no activity contrary to the objectives of a contractual park in terms of the National Parks Act (1976) may be undertaken; and third, no formal human exclusion areas may be created. In addition, the Settlement Agreement (1998) specifies that due consideration must be given to these factors: topographical and environmental constraints such as seasonal heat, malaria, the semi-arid nature of the land, unreliable rainfall, shallow top-soil areas, the presence of anthrax and other animal diseases; distribution patterns of game, flood plains and seasonal flooding; the potential Ramsar status of certain areas; and constraints on the land created by vegetation with potential use for medicinal purposes (16). As was foreseen in the Agreement, the Makuleke area was in fact declared a Ramsar Site in 2007, meaning that it has been declared a wetland of international importance.

Furthermore, the Makuleke CPA is also obliged to follow the principles for wildlife management as set out in the Master Plan (2000). Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) have to be conducted with respect to any proposed development or change of land use in the Region, and the Makuleke CPA has to ensure that all necessary steps are taken to harmonise development on both sides of

the Luvuvhu River, addressing the effect of any activities undertaken on one side of the river, on the other side (Settlement Agreement 1998: 17).

Marketing the destination was also given due consideration. The Settlement Agreement states that the Makuleke CPA in cooperation with SANParks should where possible “harmonise their tourism activities so as to maximize the number of visitors to the northern part of the park” (de Villiers 1999: 67). Suggestions were put forth at the outset of development planning that included the introduction of a “cultural route to introduce visitors to the cultural heritage and other attractions of the area ... such as Crooks Corner, the Thulamela historical site, the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu rivers, the Theba mine employment site, and the Makuleke traditional kraal” (de Villiers 1999: 67). Although such initial plans were envisioned and stipulated in the Settlement Agreement (1998), the marketing strategy that actually materialised did not follow the prescribed plan. Marketing the destination became almost completely dependent on the efforts of the private concessionaires with only little input from SANParks. According to Pafuri Camp management, one major drawback was the general promotion of the Pafuri area as a Big Five destination, which in comparison with other areas further south in the Kruger National Park, was not competitive enough at that time (pers. com. 2008).

Substantial effort was made by the concessionaires to promote the historic and cultural aspects of the area into their tours such as the ancient ruins of Thulamela, for example. Unfortunately, the fact that Thulamela lies on the southern side of the Luvuvhu River, just outside the Makuleke Contract Park, means that it falls under the jurisdiction of SANParks, with special permits and vehicle specifications necessary to access that area. Although Wilderness Safaris has persisted in pursuing and enacting the legal requirements to reach the site, which lies a mere four

kilometres from Pafuri Camp, the company has not been able to receive permission from SANParks to date to take their guests to Thulamela.⁵⁷

For a period of about a year (2008-2009), the cultural heritage of the Makuleke was promoted at their three concessions through half-day village tours that took tourists on excursions to N'tlhaveni (A detailed discussion of the three Makuleke concessions follows in Chapter Five). The tour included a visit to the Makuleke settlements where a local guide took tourists to the traditional herbalist (*inyanga*) to hear about medicinal plants, herbal and holistic health and divination, and its contrast with sorcery and witchcraft; then a traditional meal was served at the Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (B&B); and finally a dramatic performance was staged portraying the Makuleke eviction from the Kruger National Park, their land struggle and the eventual restoration of their land. (Details of this tour are presented in Chapter Six, section 6.3.2.2).

4.5.3 Additional Utilisation Rights: access to natural resources

Besides gaining from trophy hunting and tourism, the Makuleke also have utilization rights of natural resources in the Contract Park. According to de Villiers (1999), utilization rights refer to the use of natural resources by the local community such as collection of firewood and medicinal plants, fishing and hunting (67). No extensive form of utilisation is allowed in Schedule 1 national parks in terms of the National Parks Act, however, contractual parks such as the Makuleke Region, “may be used in a variety of ways that include hunting, plant collection and other forms of utilisation of natural resources” (Ibid: 68). The Makuleke CPA also has the right to use sand, stone, rock, gravel, clay and soil for the purposes of building and other

⁵⁷ Tours to Thulamela can be arranged through SANParks. According to Pafuri Camp management, the difficulty with this, however, is that the SANParks guides are unreliable since they arrive late at Pafuri Camp simply because they have to come from their station at Punda Maria gate (100 km trip) to take Pafuri guests round the corner to Thulamela (4 km from Pafuri Camp) (pers. com. 2009).

activities on the land in terms of the Master Plan (2000), whereas mineral rights are not granted (Settlement Agreement 1998: 17).

Community access to the Makuleke Region of the Park is determined by the Joint Management Board (Settlement Agreement 1998: section 33). So far, the parties agree that “community members may have free entry to the park for cultural and religious events, provided they are properly organised and under the control of the Joint Management Board. However, when community members visit the park as ordinary tourists, a gate fee is payable” (de Villiers 1999: 69).

The Settlement Agreement (1998) also states that the Makuleke CPA has the right to establish a research facility as well as a number of cultural tourism attractions including a museum about the Makuleke people and a royal kraal in the Makuleke Contract Park (section 33). These plans have yet to come to fruition as to date none of these facilities have been established. Most of the research conducted in the Contract Park is done in association with the Makuleke CPA, Kruger National Park authorities, and the private concessionaires.

4.6 Threats to Land Tenure

Legal statutes such as the Communal Land Rights Bill of 2002 attempted “to give communities a choice of what institutions they want to use to hold and manage their land” (Collins 2002: 3). Much controversy has surrounded this Bill and subsequent laws including the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003, the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 (CLaRA), and the Traditional Courts Bill B15 of 2008. Although the Makuleke were successful in possessing a level of ownership rights to the Pafuri area of the Kruger National Park through restitution, the tenure security of that land together with the land on which they

reside outside the park (Blocks H, I and J in N'tlhaveni) was threatened by these laws and in particular, by the Communal Land Rights Act.

Phil Mtimkulu [undated] states that the main issue lies in the vagueness of the place and role of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa. Mtimkulu [undated] says that although the Constitution of South Africa (1994) recognises the institution [of traditional leaders]..., “less than half a page (Chapter 12) is devoted to one of the country’s longest surviving structures” (1). Mtimkulu [undated] further suggests that:

Traditional leaders have ruled traditional authorities under their jurisdiction as their personal fiefdoms for many years. These leaders were not elected to their positions but inherited them. It was a family affair with the son succeeding his father or uncle. Under South Africa’s previous political system they enjoyed many privileges as they connived with the government in the enforcement of apartheid. (1)

With regards to issues concerning land, Ben Cousins (2009) explains: “Land questions have played a key role in the history of South Africa, and their successful resolution is critically important for stability, democracy and development” (1). Cousins (2009) also notes that historically, from the 17th century onwards, indigenous black people have been dispossessed of their land by white settlers who used the land for commercial farming. This created a “racially polarized and highly unequal society”, says Cousins. He further illustrates:

From 1948 to 1990, the apartheid government relocated millions of black people, in both urban and rural areas, attempting to create separate racial zones and ethnically-defined ‘homelands’. Productive land was lost and the small-scale farming that helped rural households to survive was undermined. In contrast, white commercial farmers were given massive financial support and subsidies, and over time they became highly productive. (1)

After the democratic elections of 1994, land reform was considered, “a high priority by the Mandela government” to redress past oppressions (Cousins 2009: 1).

Although reform has been slower than originally anticipated, it became a focus point in the African National Congress 2009 election manifesto. Cousins (2009) contends that land therefore “carries a powerful political charge” and that reform “can make a significant contribution to poverty reduction” (1).

Reform, however, is complex and has elicited much debate amongst land activists in recent years. According to Janet Love (2008), traditional leaders in South Africa have strongly objected to, “a system of elected local government being extended into ‘their’ areas” since 1994. Love (2008) states that “for ten years, they [traditional leaders] blocked the repeal of apartheid laws that bolstered their powers, demanding that an ‘acceptable’ new legal framework be put in place first (xii). For this reason, The Communal Land Rights Act, was rushed through Parliament ahead of the 2004 elections (Groenewald 2008: 1). Furthermore, Robins and van der Waal (2008) also suggest the possibility that “the provision made for the control over land by traditional authorities in the Act was the result of a deal between the government and the traditional leader lobby, just before the elections of 2004” (61).

Tony Harding (2007) explains that the Communal Land Rights Act “makes provision for wide-ranging administrative powers by traditional authorities over any communal land, including land restored to communities under the land reform programme” (1). This could have implications on communities such as the Makuleke who already won their land back through restitution. Further, Henk Smith (2008) states that:

The core of the Act deals with the transfer of land title from the state to traditional communities; the registration of individual land rights within ‘communally owned’ areas; and the use of traditional council or modified tribal authority structures to administer the land and represent the ‘community’ as owner. Its legal effect is to transform and recast customary law and traditional councils. (39)

“The Act,” says Groenewald (2008), would “affect about 21 million people living under traditional leadership, by handing control of their communally-owned land

over to traditional leaders for administration. The intention of legislation ... is to give millions of rural South Africans security of tenure” (1).

Harding (2007) argues that the land reform programme has been weakened by the Communal Land Rights Act, which “could render democratic community land rights under the CPA Act redundant” (1). Moreover, Harding (2007) explains: “The CLaRA makes provision for wide-ranging administrative powers by traditional authorities over any communal land, including land restored to communities under the land reform programme” (1). This means that the law erodes rural people’s few remaining rights over land by giving greater powers to tribal authorities created under apartheid policies. The author (2007) also suggests that such powers would exceed those “envisaged by apartheid’s own architects” since some politically ambitious traditional authorities are using land claims “to extend their tribal jurisdiction through the government’s land reform programme” (1).

In addition, Stephan Hofstatter (2010b) maintains that “with this law, opportunities for abuse of power for personal gain would be rife, especially with lucrative mining, logging or tourism concessions in the offing” (2). In the Makuleke case, Cousins (2008) points out that “these men, or their sons [chiefs who cooperated with the apartheid government including Chief Mhinga], are asserting that restitution awards should be made directly to the traditional councils they head, rather than to CPAs and Trusts established by those who were removed” (25). In this way, Chief Mhinga would be able to control the Pafuri area and benefit from the income it generates.

In response to such claims, the Makuleke and three other communities challenged the constitutionality of the Communal Land Rights Act in March 2006, and Webber Wentzel Bowens represented the Makuleke in the Pretoria High Court.⁵⁸ According to the Legal Resources Centre, the four communities argued that the Communal Land Rights Act “is invalid and unconstitutional and will take them back to

⁵⁸ The other three communities are the Kalkfontein, Mayaeyane and Dixe communities represented by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC 2008: 1).

‘apartheid-era tribal units’” (Groenewald 2008: 1). The main objections the applicants presented towards the Act were: that the Act would give traditional leaders undemocratic and unprecedented powers without taking into account traditional methods of accountability; that it would undermine women’s rights and black ownership of land; that the bill had been rushed through Parliament before the 2004 elections without following the provincial consultation process required by the Constitution; and that the Act contravenes section 25 of the Constitution, which requires that a ‘person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress’ (Groenewald 2008: 1; LRC 2008: 1).

Moray Hathorn (Webber Wentzel Bowens legal advisor to the Makuleke) pointed out in an interview that the passing of the Act would have had “very serious implications for the Makuleke”. In Hathorn’s opinion, “the Act would have resulted in the land held in the Kruger quite probably being transferred to the Mhinga Tribal Authority and in relation to the land at N’tlhaveni, the same thing” (int. 2010). Claassens and Hathorn (2008) state that since the Makuleke won the restitution claim in 1998, Chief Mhinga has been “desperate for the new laws” (341). The authors noted that disputes escalated after the land claim because the Makuleke began to “have money to initiate development projects in the villages and pay salaries from the money generated by the land owned by the CPA”. In addition, according to Chief Makuleke, Chief Mhinga “was struck off the roll of attorneys [in November 1992] and ... both his standing and his income have been negatively affected” (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 341). The Makuleke tribal council explains that the reason Mhinga was “so desperate for the new laws” is because without them, Chief Mhinga “is finished here” (Ibid: 341).

Criticising the Communal Land Rights Act, Harding (2007) argues that there is a “racial double standard still at the heart of national thinking about black property rights”. He states that:

The decision taken by [then] Agriculture and Land Affairs Minister Lulu Xingwana to place unilateral restrictions on the title deeds of beneficiary communities of the land restitution process [and her] generous interpretation on her powers in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act was made without any consultation among stakeholders interested in land reform and property rights. (Harding 2007: 1)

Harding (2007) continues to suggest that black property rights stand in stark contrast to “the so-called (white) property rights and free-market lobbyists”. From Harding’s point of view, “their [lobbyists] silence confirms what land activists have always believed: they are concerned about corporate property rights and have disassociated themselves from the property issues affecting the rural poor” (1). Hofstatter (2010a) also contends that “the law was intended to unlock wealth in impoverished rural areas by converting communal plots to freehold tenure. But a clause inserted in 2003 [to the Communal Land Rights Bill] gave unelected chiefs unprecedented powers to make land use rules, even for communities who owned their properties” (1).

Hofstatter (2010b) describes the Court Hearing as “surreal” since it seemed “inconceivable this law even existed” (1). He explains how politicians in the Department of Land Affairs interpreted the Act to enable lifting the rural people of former homelands by “converting communal lands to freehold tenure ... by allowing villagers to use their plots as collateral for loans that would fund growth. In this way, dead capital would be magically transformed into productive capital in the form of real estate worth billions” (Ibid: 1). “This is an appealing notion that has some merit”, admits Hofstatter (2010b). But he further argues that although poor families in the Transkei should be able to:

trade or lease their land like any other property owner in Clifton, [this] obscures the fact that there is very little cash to go round in the former homelands. Little or nothing was spent on developing infrastructure, industry or markets. Opportunities for revenue, such as concession fees, were generally monopolized by a pliant but parasitic elite propped up by apartheid security forces. (Hofstatter 2010b: 1)

On October 30th 2009, Judge AP Ledwaba of the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria handed down judgment in the Communal Land Rights Act legal challenge. Ben Cousins (2009) states that “the judge declared that 15 key provisions of the Act, and in particular those providing for the transfer and registration of communal land, the determination of rights by the Minister and the establishment and composition of land administration committees, [were] invalid and unconstitutional” (1). Subsequent to this ruling, the four communities then took the matter to the Constitutional Court to confirm the Act as invalid. In addition, the Legal Resources Centre announced:

The communities also appealed against the High Court’s refusal to declare CLaRA invalid for failure to enact it in accordance with the correct procedure, and brought a new challenge to the validity of CLaRA on the basis that the South African Parliament failed to comply with its obligations to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process. (LRC 2010: 1)

In Hofstatter’s (2010b) opinion, the Communal Land Rights Act would sentence “half of [South Africa’s] citizens to a life of autocracy and second-class property rights.” The author remarked, “That this injustice was endorsed by a democratically elected Parliament lent it a legitimacy it lacked under colonial or apartheid government”. For this reason, Hofstatter (2010b) suggested that the Communal Land Rights Act should be “consigned to the rubbish bin of history” (2).

After seven years of fighting against the Communal Land Rights Act, the four communities finally won their case in May 2010. Hathorn explains, “CLaRA has been

removed from the statute books because it has been declared unconstitutional in its entirety. On procedural grounds, the parliament did not deal with it properly, and so they have got to go back and literally start the bill from scratch again” (int. 2010).

4.7 Analysis of Democratic Institutions in the Rural Context

Having reviewed the institutional structures at Makuleke and highlighted the role they play in managing the Makuleke Contract Park, two levels of analysis can be undertaken. The first is the influence of the existing socio-political dimensions at Makuleke, and the second is the operational robustness of the new institutional structures.

4.7.1 Socio-Political Dynamics at Makuleke

The institutional arrangements that were created to manage the Makuleke Contract Park were, in Steenkamp’s (2001) opinion, “imposed by the state *de novo* without considering and with *remarkably* little insight into the political dynamic on the ground” (226; emphasis in original). The existing political dynamic was based on traditional forms of governance and management of internal communal affairs including access to land and utilisation rights, for example. The modern structure of the Makuleke CPA, however, cooperates with external stakeholders to commercialise and manage the Makuleke Contract Park. In theory, there is a division of roles between the traditional and democratic structures, but in reality, these roles overlap in certain instances and their boundaries are often blurred. Furthermore, the relationship between the Makuleke Tribal Authority and the Makuleke CPA has been described by analysts such as Eddie Koch (2003a) as a merger or a synthesis, and by activists within the legal Resources Centre (LRC) and

the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) as a successful reconciliation between 'modern' and 'traditional' institutions (Robins and van der Waal 2008: 55). The question that remains is how this merger, synthesis and reconciliation of the traditional with the modern and democratic manifested itself within the broader community, and what effect this had on the community as a whole?

In Steenkamp's (2001) analysis, even though the traditional institutional framework did not have a constitution, it was characterised by a mechanism of accountability through the exercise of tribal council meetings and general community meetings in association with the civics (226). These methods of incorporating broader society into decision-making processes were what the common people in the community were accustomed to. With the formation of new structures of governance, however, many people became excluded from the process of participation because of their unfamiliarity with, and intimidation by, the new structures. A number of interviews I conducted at Makuleke revealed that while at the outset, people did in fact attend annual public meetings organised by the Makuleke CPA, they eventually stopped attending these. One Makuleke resident stated:

Yes, I attended only two CPA meetings, then I got bored. Just like most people at Makuleke, I think attending CPA meetings is pointless. Every time someone asks a question concerning a certain project, they never get a straight answer. You can't know what the CPA is doing. They just avoid answering your questions, so people get bored and don't bother going anymore. The elections are the same. It doesn't matter what you say. They do what they want. (int. 2009)

In relation to agencies embarking upon participatory development, Jean-Philippe Platteau and Frederic Gaspart (2003) convey that "it is very tempting to ask communities or specific groups to 'elect' leaders. Unfortunately, however, such a solution is bound to produce perverse results and to be self-defeating" (1688). Confirming this sentiment, another Makuleke resident stated that the number of people decreased at each election:

People don't show up anymore. You may find that only thirty or fifty people came to the election and this last election [2006] was worse because people heard that some members have already been elected. Why should they come then? It seems as if people have been elected outside already. We are just here to confirm. We have lost faith, yes, we have lost faith. (int. 2008)

The intimidating factor was the inability of many Makuleke people, mainly the elderly and uneducated, to understand the new forms of governance and its complex jargon. Lamson Maluleke explained:

It is about the level of understanding. Let me give you a practical example: if you talk about business and development to an elderly or uneducated person, they will not understand this jargon. They will not understand the whole issue of post-modernism the way I understand it. That, of course, becomes a stumbling block. It hampers development. (int. 2008)

“The modernization of administration and the ignoring of traditional values and customs can only be a recipe for conflict in rural areas,” says David Mello (2010: 105). In the case of the Makuleke, the relationship between the Tribal Authority and the Makuleke CPA is indeed conflictual at times. Although the relationship has been described as “hybrid” and a “merger” between traditional and modern institutional frameworks (Koch 2003a; Robins 2008), power and control seems to swing back and forth between the two institutions across time. In 2001, Steenkamp remarked that the “tribal council was gradually being cannibalised by its younger brother, the CPA” (224). Evidence from my research, however, suggests that the opposite was the case from 2007 to 2009. In this period, power seemed to have shifted more in the direction of the Traditional Authority as many statements in the interviews conducted at Makuleke alluded to the strong grip that the Traditional Authority held over the CPA. The Chairperson of the Makuleke CPA in 2008 openly declared the plans of the Tribal Authority stating:

Once we are recognised by the government as our own Tribal Authority, we will take over ... because those are the people (Tribal Authority) who own the community. The CPA will then go out ... It is like from long ago, everything will be controlled by the Tribal Authority ... inside the park as well. (int. 2008)

This plan of the Traditional Authority aiming to take over the CPA is confirmed by another critical resident at Makuleke who stated:

The CPA is losing power. People from the royal family are serving on the executive committee of the CPA and they instruct the staff. Their minds are there to destroy the CPA so that the royal family might come in and run things and administer things, though they were not there when we struggled for the land claim Now they are taking the powers and are instructing. Everything is complicated. (int. 2008)

According to Steenkamp (2001), there were obligations by the Department of Land Affairs as part of the land reform process “to upgrade the community’s collective tenure in N’tlhaveni, placing also the land on which they reside and use for agricultural and other purposes under the control of the CPA” (224). These changes have not taken place to date, and if they had, would possibly not have been appreciated by the traditional leaders at Makuleke. Based on my interview with the CPA Chairman and other members of the community, it is evident that the balance of power has shifted towards the traditional structures. Pending the Chief’s formal recognition by government, some leaders would gladly do away with the democratic governance institutions and revert to traditional forms of leadership. However, what exactly such traditional leadership (prior to its manipulation by the apartheid government) would entail is not known at present since, as Mello (2010) points out, “the administrative processes constituting African traditional leadership have regrettably not been well documented” (104).

As a result of this issue, there is a move towards the recognition of traditional leadership structures in the Zuma administration since “sidelining traditional

leaders in rural areas has proved to be a problem in South Africa under previous administrations” (Mello 2010: 104). This effort is evidenced by president Zuma’s renaming and repositioning of the previous Department of Local and Provincial Government to that of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. It remains to be seen how the exact position and responsibilities of traditional leaders will be defined and how the Makuleke leaders will interpret and utilise these changes to suit their needs.

Despite these developments, it is evident that not all Makuleke residents are inclined towards the reestablishment of traditional leadership in their community. Those who do value democratic principles criticise the traditional leaders for “complicating things”. One politically active resident explained:

Things didn’t work right [after the land claim], let me be open, because they were thinking about empowering our Traditional Leader. And they *are* empowering! ... The committee has discussed the issue with the community and they have agreed to honour our chief as he was the one who was a chairperson all over. They thought of constructing that palace and buying that car for him from the hunting resources Some people are saying that the land claim was successful because we excluded the chieftainship. There was friction with the chieftainship and when we applied for the land claim, the land came to the people as part of the CPA. You must know that this is for the royal family, though the constitution doesn’t say anything about the traditional leadership or royal family. But because of powers now, we are working under instructions from the traditional leadership or royal family. And as I think it is known worldwide, chiefs are instructors sometimes. They say, “This is my land and you can’t say anything. You must do what I want.” So these are the things that make us not achieve or not implement and things are not working the way we expected. Can you see that all the money that now comes from the camps is working for the administration, chief and Traditional Authority? Even though there is money, which is working for the CPA, it is less than that which is working for the Traditional Authority and royal family. There is not even a single cent that they release to join the Discretionary Grant for community development. So I think things are not working the way we expected and people are crying outside. They are not benefiting because there is nothing. They are not benefiting anything from the money that comes from the lodges. (int. 2008)

The standing of the Traditional Authority within the Makuleke community is at its core an issue of identity. Prior to the land claim, Makuleke identity was, as Steenkamp (2001) suggests, “the expression of ‘otherness’ relative to the Mhinga and the National Parks Board”. The separatist Makuleke identity was based on the “reinvention of an idealistic past and driven at least in part by new interest groups” that emerged just before the land claim, including the civic groups with their association with the ANC (Steenkamp 2001: 55). Even after the introduction of tourism into the Contract Park, the Makuleke express their sense of unity. According to Jean and John Comaroff (2009), one prominent man at Makuleke stated that with “all the talk about tourism, even when it has been a cause of conflict, has ‘served to bind us together [into] a community’” (15).

The unity that was portrayed during the land claim produced a unique image of Makuleke identity for which the community was highly commended by outside observers. This unity today is questionable and it is possible that it was also merely a façade created for the public in the past. Despite many claims of unity, Steenkamp (2001) suggests that it is common for every social group to have inherent diversity based on “religious affiliations, socio-economic differentiation, different degrees of association with modern urban life, and the persistence of minority groups asserting an anti-hegemonic separateness” (55).

The findings of this research reveal that the main distinction lies between those who support the Traditional Authority and those more in favour of democratic leadership. Some were also caught in between the two, and yet others seemed either disinterested with the matter or did not want to convey their affiliation. The binary distinction between traditional and democratic/modern, however simplistic, sheds light on reasons behind the failure of some structures to deliver on their promises to the people of Makuleke. The dispensation impacted on the ability of people to question their leaders and to hold them to account, and it also created a

sense of fear, frustration and hopelessness amongst many people at Makuleke. Instances I observed in over two years of research included 'common people' being intimidated and threatened by royal family members. Comments in interviews included phrases such as, "if you voice your opinion, they will cut you down", "nepotism happens here" and "there is nothing you can do". Although Lamson Maluleke insisted that the Makuleke philosophy is: "We disagree to agree", stating that the Makuleke are "very good at making decisions, differing and differing, but at the end, agreeing upon one approach", there is a fine line between discussing, convincing and imposing, and it is difficult to assess exactly to what extent community consultations are really conducted in a fair and equitable manner.

The issue at the heart of the matter at Makuleke, as in many other communities, is elite capture. Platteau and Gaspart (2003) maintain that "as long as the grassroots are not sufficiently empowered through suitable training programs and processes aimed at making them aware of their rights and confident enough to assert them, benefits are likely to be largely preempted by local elites acting on their behalf" (1687). What became apparent in this study is that the institutional structures at Makuleke, although in line with the democratic wave in post-apartheid South Africa, well thought through and successfully actualised, did eventually experience a number of loopholes, most clearly evident in operational matters.

4.7.2 Operational Matters at the Makuleke Democratic Institutions

In comparison to other Communal Property Associations in South Africa that have become dysfunctional in recent years, the Makuleke CPA has managed to maintain itself.⁵⁹ According to Jeff Sebape (Director of Tenure Reform at the Department of

⁵⁹ One example of a dysfunctional CPA is the Elandskloof case in the Cederberg Mountains. According to Michael Barry (2009), lack of communication at the outset between state departments, the

Land Affairs), “CPAs are intended for communities with no traditional authority, but in the cases where they operate in communities with traditional leadership, there can be problems if the traditional leaders do not want to recognise the CPA” (int. 2009). Although it would be incorrect to interpret the Makuleke traditional leadership as “not recognising” the CPA officially, there is, however, a sense that there is an informal repudiation of the institution. The façade of acceptance is necessary for access to donor funding and for the formalities required to commercialise the Contract Park. Nevertheless, the CPA can be manipulated through the individuals who constitute it and those whose fundamental affiliation is with the Traditional Authority could influence decisions and the allocation of funds.

The success of the CPA, therefore, depends to a large extent on the characters of the Executive Committee members and on whether they adopt “an autocratic or democratic approach” (Mello 2010: 101). Undeniably, an autocratic approach is likely to constrain effective public participation, while a democratic approach should encourage the free-flow of opinion and new ideas. As the democratic approach is closely related to an individual’s personality traits and would be difficult to prescribe in any form of legislation (Ibid: 101), more emphasis on accountability and monitoring would be beneficial.

Communication is another deterring factor in the effective operationalisation of the institutions at Makuleke. In Hector Magome’s (SANParks Managing Executive, Conservation Services) opinion, “Communication and bad personal relations between people are problematic. We need good relationships and people need to understand their vision and roles” (Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop transcript 2010). In the case where individual personalities clash, the functioning of an organisation is impeded and frustration abounds. Collins points out that “You can have the best policies, but if an individual stops cooperating, you will have

inability to deliver upon promises, and concurrent fierce conflict within the community resulted in the collapse of their CPA and being placed under the Director General of Land Affairs (1).

problems” (Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop transcript 2010). In my interview with the Pafuri Camp Manager, she also highlighted communication as one of the main impediments to effective cooperation. She said, “I don’t communicate with the CPA very often anymore because I feel I get no help from them at all” (int. 2008). Similarly, Jack Greeff (manager of the anti-poaching unit in the Makuleke Contract Park) complained of the lack of response from the Makuleke CPA to his correspondences:

Well, my communications with the CPA in the past five years is zero. I’ve sent a report in, I got no feedback. I’ve sent correspondence there, I got no feedback. I got not even one recognition that they have received the correspondence. I can bring you one email that the Administration Officer has sent me last year ... I can frame it... it’s the first and only email that I received from the CPA in five years! (int. 2008)

The lack of correspondence may possibly be attributed to the uncertainty as to who possesses executive powers in institutions such as the Makuleke CPA, Joint Management Board or Joint Management Committee. Referring to the Joint Management Board structure, Magome (2010) points out that once the board of directors makes decisions, “the buck doesn’t stop there”, since most decisions still need to be ratified by the Makuleke CPA and Kruger National Park. This creates a weakness in the structure and accentuates problems. Magome interprets this situation as follows:

We have a body corporate that has got false teeth. The Joint Management Board does not have a way to make things work. Lamson [Implementation Officer] does not have a team to operationalise. We need a committee and need these guys to have their voices heard. We need to look at this model and get it to work better from the SANParks side. (Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop transcript 2010)

Similar problems abound at the Joint Management Committee level. Clive Poultney (Wilderness Safaris Community Liaison and Security Officer) commented on the lack

of authority to implement decisions taken and meetings that were “a waste of time because nothing actually came of them”. Poultney recommended that the Joint Management Committee “should in fact be an operative structure that subsumes everything else underneath it, where the concessionaires, conservation authority and the community structure participate and be able to make certain decisions across the board”. Without such mandates, the committee simply “doesn’t have teeth” (int. 2009).

One of the main problems with the CPA, as pointed to by a number of democratically-inclined community leaders is the lack of institutional memory. As one representative explained:

One disadvantage of this organisation is that people are elected to serve in the executive committee only for three years and everyone is willing to get in because they know that they get honorariums They come in having their own minds and what I have realised in these people is that no one comes to serve the committee, willing to upgrade or develop the experience of the previous ones. Everyone wants to do his/her own thing. And once they leave [the committee], the next ones arrive with no information and they can’t go ahead. (int. 2008)

One longstanding Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member also complained of the experience that is lost with the exiting members of the CPA, especially those who served in the early rounds and received extensive training by the GTZ and other NGOs. This interviewee expressed his concern stating:

If they [trained CPA Exco. members] don’t get re-elected, where does that information go? Can you still get it back there and implement it? If say, I disappear from the executive here, are they going to get the information that I have? No way! You can’t call me. You won’t call me any longer. Even the office may forget about me because I am no longer active. I don’t have the mandate. That’s the challenge that we have as an institution: sustainability. (int. 2008)

The lack of capacity of newly-elected CPA Executive Committee members leads to the problem of accountability. Jeff Sebape (Director of Tenure Reform at the Department of Land Affairs) explained that there is generally no training for CPA members. Instead:

They use knowledge from outside experiences or whatever knowledge they may have acquired from the appointed lawyers (who are appointed by the provincial offices to write the CPA constitutions). Based on the constitution, the community must monitor itself. The Department cannot be there forever, but if problems persist, then the Director General can intervene or appoint mediators to help resolve the issues. (int. 2009)

Sebape further illustrated that most problems with CPAs stem both from under-educated members and the elements of greediness and selfishness that create disjuncture within the organisation. "It is mostly about personal issues," he said (int. 2009).

The rotation problem, however, was not only a setback on the Makuleke CPA side, since a similar situation was declared in a GTZ Progress Report (2007) with regards to Wilderness Safaris. In respect to this, the report states:

One of the key problems faced by the program was the changing of responsible people representing Wilderness Safaris and many of the original ideas for activities were based on one individual's ideas rather than a true understanding of what was sustainable and what the community wanted. When he left the company no one agreed with his ideas. Over the last 7 months the project has proceeded well because a social facilitation consultant has been appointed by Wilderness Safaris to consistently represent them and make decisions". (Progress Report Wilderness GTZ PPP 2007: 5)

Over and above the aforementioned difficulties, lack of effective control over finances and spending has been identified as one of the key constraints to successful organisational performance of the Makuleke CPA. By 2010, a state of financial crisis

was experienced by the CPA and external intervention was requested from the Land Claims Commission. Tshinetisa Moila, from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform in Polokwane, mentioned that the CPA complained that their lives have not improved although there was an influx of money from the tourism concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park. Moila identified the problem as one of maladministration, where approximately 70% of the CPA income was appropriated “by a few elite” (int. 2010). “This is a serious problem,” stated Moila. “It is not fair because it means that the rest of the community only received 30% of this income. It should be the other way round, where administration and the chief’s salary takes 20% and the rest is spent on actual projects” (int. 2010).

Analysing the Makuleke CPA Administrative Budget of 2010-2011, I discovered that the income from the three tourism concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park was projected to be spent on salaries and honoraria, administrative costs, travel costs, traditional authority support, and technical services with only ZAR 1,491 remaining (see Figure 4). This shows that after covering the costs of running the Makuleke CPA and Tribal Authority, there is scant left over to invest in community projects. One criticism of the spending habits of the Makuleke CPA was that their spending was not investment or development-oriented. A Pafuri staff member commented, “Most of the money is spent on salaries, servicing the vehicles and administration costs. They do not spend money on things that generate income” (int. 2009). Analysing the CPA finances of 2009, I found an ironic situation whereby income from the Makuleke Contract Park was used exclusively to fund the administration of the income from the Park.




Figure 4 Ratios of Makuleke CPA Budget (2010-2011).

Salaries and Honoraria include those of CPA Executive Committee, Chief Makuleke, JMB Implementation Officer, CPA Implementation Officer, and CPA Office Administrator.

One key factor driving some of the difficulties experienced with the institutions at Makuleke is the prevailing mindset of the stakeholders involved. The notion of land ownership and the extent to which the Makuleke community actually practices its property rights over Pafuri is a question that emerged at the Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop at Pafuri Camp in July 2010. Magome observed that although the Makuleke have title deed over the Pafuri area, the general perception is different. “It does not feel like the community owns the land because Kruger National Park still seems to be in control,” maintained Magome. In his opinion, “community-owned land, in a sense, continues to be owned by the state”. As an example, he illustrated how he can access the Makuleke Contract Park freely, whereas in comparison, he would need permission to access the privately-owned Sabi Sands, even though the two should essentially be the same. “There is a need,” states Magome, “to start recognising community-ownership as private ownership [because] this is a form of ‘ecological apartheid’. We need to sort out a different mental construct for community land ownership in the new South Africa ... and

rectify this part of the Makuleke Model” (Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop transcript 2010).

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter presented the formal forms of governance at Makuleke encompassing both traditional and democratic institutions. Each institution holds specific functions in the community and together, they have allowed for a significant amount of Makuleke control over their land and resources. The Makuleke have been commended in the public sphere for the structures they established and their ability to effectively merge traditional systems of local governance with modern democratic ones (Koch 2003a: 5). While officially, the traditional structures concern themselves with community affairs at N’tlhaveni, the modern institutions of governance are responsible for management of the Makuleke Contract Park and accessing benefits through the conservation and commercial utilisation of that land. In practice, however, this dichotomous definition is not strictly adhered to and there is a blurring of distinctions between the roles of the two structures.

The chapter further illustrated how some new laws concerned with Land Reform, such as the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, could have jeopardised Makuleke land tenure if the community had not succeeded in challenging the Act. Their successful lawsuit, which had this Act declared unconstitutional, enabled the Makuleke to escape this predicament and the Pafuri area remains safely under Makuleke CPA control.

My analysis of the institutional structures showed that there was an ebb and flow of power and control between traditional and democratic systems of governance. Whilst there was an increase of power in the early days of the Makuleke CPA, this seems to have shifted over the years in the direction of the Tribal Authority, which

infiltrated the executive positions of the CPA, thereby gaining control and access to resources from the tourism operations at Pafuri.

Nevertheless, I argue that the ebb and flow of this power shift is likely to continue as the realisation of the Makuleke model unfolds in the wake of external forces. For example, the victory over the constitutionality of the Communal Land Rights Act in 2010 strengthened the Makuleke institutional structures. Their future and that of all rural communities will benefit from being “effectively involved in deliberations on legislation that has an impact on customary law” (LRG 2010: 2).

The democratic institutional arrangements created at Makuleke subsequent to the successful land claim were meant to give effect to community empowerment and equality. Nonetheless, conflicting agendas created a power imbalance between the democratic and traditional institutions. Although these agendas were successfully veiled by a formal adherence to the organisations’ procedures, in practice and unofficially, there was an ongoing struggle for power and elite capture of the majority of the resources prevailed. However, despite these events that were apparent during the course of my research, I nevertheless predict that through the democratic principles constituting the Makuleke CPA and the introduction of new CPA Executive Committee members, there is a chance that individuals with different capacities, ideas and intentions could affect CPA outcomes, and in turn, redress the problems experienced in the past.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Development of Tourism in the Makuleke Contract Park

“We should have invested some of the money from the concessions, rather than spend it the way we did.”

Lamson Maluleke, 2008

5.1 Introduction

Evaluations of tourism-led development generally argue that impacts on rural communities are either advantageous, in terms of creating employment opportunities and inducing income-generating activities, or unfavourable because of the possible disruption to, and commodification of, local culture, pressure on infrastructure, or exacerbation of imbalances of power (Goudie and Khan et. al. 1999: 26). Fortunately, the Makuleke case is impervious to many of the adverse attributes associated with tourism in rural areas. This is because the Makuleke model predominantly places tourism activities outside the area now inhabited by the community. The type of tourism associated with the Makuleke is mainly nature-based or safari tourism, taking place inside the Makuleke area of the Kruger National Park (the Makuleke Contract Park). This arrangement shields the Makuleke from the deleterious effects of tourism, yet allows the community to access benefits through lease fees, training and employment.

The central concern of Chapter Five is an inquiry into one aspect of the Makuleke model, namely, the commercialisation and tourism development of the Makuleke Contract Park. A description of the partnerships between the Makuleke CPA and the three private sector concessionaires is presented, and one concessionaire in particular (Wilderness Safaris) is critically explored. The basic area of interrogation in this partnership is the Concession Agreement that prescribes details of, and

formalises the relationship between the two parties. Section 5.2 presents a brief account of the Makuleke Contract Park tendering process and the culmination of the three concession agreements between the Makuleke CPA and its private sector partners: The Outpost, Wilderness Safaris and EcoTraining. Section 5.3 then outlines the Security and Anti-poaching training service that was initiated by the private sector concessionaires to protect the region and ensure wildlife preservation. The focus then shifts in section 5.4 to a discussion and interpretation of community partnerships with private sector tourism operators. A critical analysis explores archival and legal documents, interview data, along with information gathered from meetings and workshops to explain the manner in which the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris agreement manifested itself on the ground, the resulting successes and challenges, and finally, the outcomes of the partnership experience.

Furthermore, Chapter Five aims to answer the following questions: To what extent has the Makuleke community gained from their decision to use their land for eco-tourism and conservation? What were their expectations, and what effectively transpired over the years? Who gained and who did not? In what ways did the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris partnership impact on the Makuleke community? And how can post-development theory be utilised to interpret the Makuleke’s involvement in tourism?

5.2 Tendering the Makuleke Contract Park

As introduced in Chapter Two (section 2.5), GTZ TRANSFORM’s involvement at Makuleke extends over a period of many years beginning with assistance related to the Makuleke land claim, and bilateral cooperation with the Department of Land Affairs and Kruger National Park in the beginning of the 1990s. During that time,

GTZ TRANSFORM went through several phases of development assistance, the first of which aimed at “supporting the communities involved in building up tourism facilities within their respective reserves and to empower them to manage their land and utilise its resources” (Steenkamp 2001: 136). The programme’s objective was aimed in particular at “supporting communities that had a stake in nature conservation areas through ownership, or a claim to ownership”. The outcome was intended to “improve income at the grass roots level – to be generated from tourism and hunting activities related to conservation, as all other land use options were ruled out” (Collins and Snel 2008: 87).

Makuleke was one of three pilot sites chosen by the South African government in 1998 to receive GTZ TRANSFORM’s assistance.⁶⁰ The role of TRANSFORM was “to help design and implement some initial policy guidelines and try out intervention approaches that could become models for success combining tourism, conservation and rural development” (Collins and Snel 2008: 86). The GTZ TRANSFORM projects at Makuleke used a “Community-Public-Private-Partnership (CPPP) approach which relied on private sector partners to engage in building, operating and transferring tourism lodges in transparent concession processes” (Ibid: 88). Furthermore, the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA) based its model on the South African strategy of “integrating conservation and sustainable natural resource management within a new democratic and human rights framework” (Ibid: 87).

Within this context, and as part of the *Main Agreement Relating to the Makuleke Land Claim (1998)*,⁶¹ the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA) was awarded the right to commercialise its newly acquired land. The Settlement Agreement (1998) states that the Makuleke CPA may determine tender procedures with prospective partners, but must consult with SANParks with regards to these

⁶⁰ The other two pilot sites were Kosi Bay and the Richtersveld communities in South Africa.

⁶¹ Also referred to as the Settlement Agreement.

procedures. In addition, the duties of the Joint Management Board are to study the draft tender requirements to ensure that they comply with the Settlement Agreement (1998) and the Master Plan (2000); to monitor whether the agreements are fair and are followed; and to monitor the developments within the Makuleke Region to ascertain whether they comply with the Settlement Agreement (1998) and the Master Plan (2000) (Settlement Agreement Clause 32: 16).

The first attempt to commercialise the Makuleke Contract Park was between 2000 and 2002 when the Makuleke CPA conducted a tender process in order to attract high-end tourism concessions to that area (Lancaster and Westgate et al. 2004: 2). The commercial sub-committee of the CPA negotiated the tenders with the help of experts from the Webber Wentzel Bowens (WWB) law firm who, to date, provide continuous support to the community (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 20). Furthermore, a team of external tourism and development practitioners who consolidated themselves into a structure called Friends of Makuleke (FoM) helped with the commercial development planning of the Makuleke area and assisted with community capacity building (Massyn 2006: 19). Once a proposal was put forth, the Joint Management Board had to approve that environmental requirements were complied with (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 20). Within three years, agreements were concluded between The Outpost (2001), Wilderness Safaris (2003) and EcoTraining (2004) to build three eco-tourism lodges in the area, with a commitment on the part of these concessionaires to provide training and employment opportunities for the Makuleke community (Lancaster and Westgate et al. 2004: 2).

5.2.1 The Outpost Lodge

The first Makuleke tender was awarded to Matswani Safaris in 2001 for the building of a luxury tourist lodge by the name of The Outpost on the western end of the

Makuleke region.⁶² According to Peter John Massyn (2006), the Makuleke CPA chose this developer from a list of private firms who applied for the tender (20). To finance the lodge, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) backed The Outpost with “debt funding of more than ZAR 6 million, despite concerns about the remoteness of the area” (Lunsche 2005: 1). Such concerns were overlooked because the Industrial Development Corporation showed interest in backing “the land claims model and the prospect of jobs in the impoverished Limpopo province” (Ibid: 1).




Figure 5 The Outpost Lodge accommodation and pool area.
(Photos: The Outpost)

Designed by Italian-born architect Enrico Daffonchio, The Outpost is described in *Business Day* as “a small, ultraluxurious lodge perched on a koppie above the Luvuvhu River, with expansive views all the way to Mozambique” (Moon 2001: 15). To construct the lodge, labour was used from the Makuleke community and the building process was completed by the end of 2002 (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 21; pers. com. The Outpost concession manager 2008). The contract entailed developing and operating an initial twenty-four-bed lodge based on a renewable fifteen-year Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) concession contract that is valid for

⁶² Matswani Safaris is a hospitality firm that also operates an up market guesthouse in Johannesburg (Ten Boppass), and the Honeyguide Tented Safari Camp in the Manyeleti Reserve in Limpopo.

thirty years (Collins 2010b: 5).⁶³ The concessionaire has the option of adding another twelve beds and is entitled to have access over the Makuleke area for the purposes of game viewing (Concession Contract 2001: 12). According to the Concession Contract (2001), The Outpost paid an initial fee of ZAR 150,000 to the Makuleke CPA in terms of the concession agreement, 8% of Annual Gross Revenue is paid on a quarterly basis to the CPA, and 2% of Annual Gross Revenue is paid to the Makuleke Trust (8). In addition, monthly traversing fees of ZAR 1,500 per game drive vehicle is paid to the CPA (18-19).⁶⁴ The Contract (2001) also stipulates that the parties accordingly agreed that “their joint mission, to be achieved through co-operation, shall be to actively pursue the social and economic upliftment of the community and the protection, conservation and propagation of indigenous wild animals, fish and indigenous plants in the Makuleke area” (27). Moreover, at the end of the concession period, the concessionaire “shall hand over the Improvements to the CPA free of charges ... free of liabilities, in good condition and shall not be entitled to payment of any monies in connection therewith” (Concession Contract 2001: 23). After discussing the clauses of the agreement, the Makuleke CPA signed their first tourism contract on May 23, 2001 in anticipation of training, employment opportunities and lucrative returns.

Massyn (2006) points out that in the first few years of The Outpost’s operation, the projected economic returns did not materialise mainly due to “the difficulty of pioneering a new and remote destination at a time of tight trading” (22). However, Michael Moon (2001) reveals that the reason the lodge was able to cover its costs over the first few years is the backing of its senior partner’s (Christoff van Staden) other business: Kimony Holdings, a magnetite mining company in the Richard’s Bay area (15). Furthermore, in an interview with the *Financial Mail*, van Staden notes

⁶³ Build, Operate and Transfer back “implies that the project developer will acquire access to the land under a secure tenure arrangement, will build and/or renovate whatever improvements are required for the project and maintain such improvements for the duration of the project. At the end of the occupation period, the project developer will deliver possession of the land and buildings to the Makuleke Authority (as owners thereof in law)” (Master Plan 2000: Clause 6.4.2).

⁶⁴ The Outpost currently operates three game drive vehicles.

that after four years of low occupancies, the repayments to the Industrial Development Corporation were a “heavy burden” over the previous two years, “as visitor numbers [were] well below expectations” (Lunsche 2005: 1).

The financial constraints experienced by The Outpost led to the sale of the lodge by Matswani Safaris to Johannesburg-based Rare Earth Retreats in 2006 and occupancies subsequently rose to some degree. By 2008, the lodge was employing twenty people from the Makuleke community and had supported community projects by way of donations and purchase of fresh vegetables from the Makuleke Fresh Produce farm when such produce was available (details of this farm are discussed in Chapter Six). Although the lodge was creating job opportunities and was supporting community projects, by 2010, however, its lease fees to the Makuleke CPA was still low in relation to initial projections, and the Makuleke CPA began to urge The Outpost to enter into Phase Two of its developments (the addition of twelve beds).

5.2.2 Elsmore Investments

Elsmore Investments, headed by Peter John Massyn, signed a contractual agreement named the Luvuvhu Concession Contract with the Makuleke CPA on August 9, 2002. The Contract stipulated the development of a lodge within the Makuleke Contract Park consisting of a maximum of thirty guest beds and the development of a second lodge consisting of twenty beds. This contract was valid for an initial period of fifteen years, renewable for two further consecutive periods of fifteen years, subject to termination in accordance with the Concession Contract (Concession Agreement 2004: 11).

An addendum to the Luvuvhu Concession Contract (2002) between the Makuleke CPA and Elsmore Investments, added in May 2004, states that “Elsmore hereby

relinquishes all of the rights granted to it and is released from all of the obligations imposed upon it in terms of the Luvuvhu Concession Contract” (2). This decision was based upon an agreement with Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA that Massyn would “waive his rights in favour of Wilderness Safaris entering into a business venture with the Makuleke community at no cost to the community” (Minutes of Meeting 2003: 2). A financial deal was struck between the parties involved whereby Wilderness Safaris effectively “bought Massyn’s concession out” (int. Westgate 2010). It was also agreed that Elsmore would “have the right of first refusal if Wilderness Safaris does not deliver” (int. Collins 2010). In 2010, there emerged a renewed interest by Massyn to construct a twenty-six-bed lodge in the Makuleke Contract Park (Minutes of Meeting WS/ERM November 24, 2010). Negotiations for this plan were still underway at time of writing, pending the outcome of the reviewed Master Plan relating to the feasible number of beds in the Contract Park.

5.2.3 Wilderness Safaris (Pafuri Camp)

A second invitation for tender was advertised by the Makuleke CPA on December 10, 2002, for interested companies to submit bids in Johannesburg (*Deku Newsletter* 2003: 1). Wilderness Safaris applied for this tender and an agreement was signed with the Makuleke CPA on July 30, 2003, for the construction of a fifty-two-bed luxury lodge along the Luvuvhu River named Pafuri Camp. The concession agreement included the right for Wilderness Safaris to construct an additional eighteen-bed lodge within the following three to five years. This concession agreement was valued at ZAR 45 million, the rights of which were granted for a period of fifteen years, renewable for two further periods of equal terms (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 21; Concession Contract: 13-14).




Figure 6 Pafuri Camp (Photos: May Shehab)

An initial fee, made up of two lump sums of ZAR 75,000 each, was paid to the Makuleke CPA upfront, to be recoverable from the CPA at the end of years four and five of the agreement, “provided that the Concessionaire has met a minimum of 50% of the projected annual payment targets” (Concession Contract 2003: 19). In addition, Wilderness Safaris’ concession fee is equal to 8% of the Gross Annual Revenue generated at Pafuri Camp and is payable to the Makuleke CPA in quarterly instalments. The Agreement also stipulates that Wilderness Safaris, “shall carry out ... its further community development obligations as set out in the Agreement”. These included supplying three schools with computers, sports equipment and ten bursaries (Concession Contract 2003: 19; Annexure 3: 45). Furthermore, Wilderness Safaris negotiated a deal that gave the company a majority concession lease on Makuleke land (approximately 70%, with The Outpost and EcoTraining having 30%) (int. Patrick Boddam-Wetham 2008). The company was also awarded the right to develop staff training facilities including the EcoTraining Camp for prospective guides (Concession Contract 2003: 13). To ease access to the Makuleke Contract Park, the existing Pafuri airstrip was repaired for use by charter flights to serve both The Outpost and Pafuri Camp.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Some controversy occurred around the damage caused to the Pafuri airstrip and its need for repair for use by the lodges. Some Kruger National Park personnel concurred that the “airstrip was

Although De Villiers and den Berg warned that “the Pafuri area never had as high a level of tourism as the southern parts of the Kruger National Park due mainly to such factors as its remoteness, lack of supportive tourism facilities outside the park, limited infrastructure, the prevalence of malaria, and harsh climate”, Wilderness Safaris nevertheless opted to construct Pafuri Camp because the company believed that the area had “the potential to offer a ‘true wilderness’ experience ... and the Makuleke region is well known for its diversity of bird life and the prevalence of some scarce species of game” (de Villiers and den Berg 2006: 15, 22). The area was also deemed attractive because it lies at the centre of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), which is expected to be a prominent tourism destination and conservation area in the near future (Ibid: 22). As stated by Caroline Ashley and Peter de Brine et al. (2007), Wilderness Safaris operates in “perhaps the most remote, pristine, and diverse area in Kruger National Park and [shares] this with its guests” (35).

damaged by the floods of 2000”, but further investigations indicated that “most of the damage was in fact not caused by the floods, but by the deliberate depositing of soil onto the airstrip ... while under KNP control” (Lancaster and Westgate et. al 2004: 4).



Map 13 Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) Conservation Area. (Spenceley and Dzingirai et al. 2008: cover page)

During the construction phase of Pafuri Camp, Wilderness Safaris employed members of the Makuleke community who had the necessary skills. Thereafter, the Makuleke CPA identified suitable members for long-term employment at Pafuri Camp. Some Makuleke students were sponsored by Wilderness Safaris to attend the field guide training course at EcoTraining and were subsequently offered guiding positions at Pafuri Camp. In addition, others were sponsored by the Wilderness Wildlife Trust for certification in Natural Resource Management from the Southern African Wildlife College (*Education Bursaries* 2008). In 2010, the Camp was employing sixty-one staff members from the Makuleke community, many of them in senior positions such as guides and managers of all departments at the camp.

One issue of concern for Wilderness Safaris when they began their investments in the Makuleke Contract Park was the poaching activities prevalent in the Pafuri area. At the time of signing the concession agreement, the South African military was patrolling the northern boundary outside the Park along the Madimbo Corridor and the Kruger National Park game rangers were policing the Pafuri triangle (Whande 2007: 18). Even after the land claim, in terms of the settlement agreement, the Makuleke were permitted to engage in trophy hunting during the period of lodge construction on the condition that the hunts were performed in a sustainable manner and had no negative impact on the region's biodiversity. These hunting concessions were sanctioned by SANParks and provided substantial revenue to the Makuleke CPA that it used for the construction of classrooms and clinics at the villages (as detailed in Chapter Four).

From Wilderness Safaris' point of view, hunting activities in the area had a negative impact on wildlife and resulted in low densities of animals for tourist game viewing (Ashley, et al. 2007: 35; Massyn 2006: 24). Although the company had agreed for the commercial trophy hunting to continue for some time, it insisted that the hunts should end once the lodge was built. This was because Wilderness Safaris considers "hunting to be incompatible with photographic tourism" and because the two

activities could not be sustained in tandem (Massyn 2006: 23). The Makuleke CPA agreed to this condition and to date, there has been no commercial hunting in the Makuleke Contract Park since the opening of Pafuri Camp in 2005.

While a resolution on trophy hunting was reached between the two partners, illegal poaching activities were still rife in the area. In Wilderness Safari's opinion, "Kruger National Park had failed to protect the Makuleke Region as part of its contractual obligation in terms of the Agreement There had been no arrests of any poachers and no snares were lifted in the region by Kruger National Park personnel" (Lancaster and Westgate et al. 2004: 2). To avoid further environmental damage and economic loss, the company decided to fund the establishment of a private anti-poaching unit named N'tomeni Ranger Services (NRS) that same year (2003). Details of this establishment are discussed in section (5.3).

5.2.4 EcoTraining Camp

Before Wilderness Safaris tendered for the Pafuri Camp concession, a training facility by the name of EcoTraining was "invited to be a part of the tender process as it was felt the training component would strengthen their bid" (pers. com. Lex Hes, co-owner of EcoTraining 2011).⁶⁶ As Pafuri Camp was in its construction process, EcoTraining drew up a contract with the Makuleke CPA in 2004 as the third concessionaire in the Makuleke Contract Park. In terms of the Agreement, EcoTraining obtained the "right to build and operate a Training Camp ... in the Makuleke Area" (EcoTraining Concession Agreement 2004: 9). This facility would

⁶⁶ EcoTraining presents itself as the pioneer and leader of practical wildlife and nature-based training programs in Southern Africa. The organisation believes that no-one can truly experience Africa's wild places without actually spending time in the wild. All their courses are conducted from bush camps in the middle of great wilderness areas (EcoTraining website: General Information).

provide Makuleke students the opportunity to receive qualifications for field guide training, opening avenues for subsequent employment at tourism lodges.



Figure 7 EcoTraining Camp, Makuleke Contract Park
(Photos: Afreco Tours Limited)

EcoTraining specialises in trails guide and walking field guide qualifications, experiential courses for the ‘educated tourist’ and specialist courses such as birding, tracking, navigation and orientation, in addition to wilderness first aid. Cultural awareness is also included as part of the training, with a module on Makuleke history required for those wishing to guide in the Makuleke Contract Park (pers. com. Bruce Lawson 2008).

EcoTraining’s partnership with the Makuleke community is based on a fifteen-year renewable contract and, according to Anton Lategan (co-owner of EcoTraining), lease fees are paid to the Makuleke CPA either through “financial contribution or training contribution annually” (pers. com. 2011). The Concession Agreement states that the Makuleke students can receive the standard training courses on offer by Allenby Campus at the concessionaire’s various training facilities around South Africa, free of charge and on an annual basis. In addition, one student may be granted a bursary to study the game ranging diploma course at Allenby Campus in Pretoria. The game ranging diploma was valued at ZAR 19,000 and the standard

training courses were valued at ZAR 8,995 per student, at the time the contract was signed (EcoTraining Concession Agreement 2004: 3). Collectively, both sets of bursaries amounted to ZAR 155,000 in 2007 (EcoTraining Concession Agreement 2004: 3), and had risen to just above ZAR 200,000 by 2010 (pers. com. Lex Hes 2011).⁶⁷

Thirty-one Makuleke students were trained at EcoTraining between 2004 and 2010. The training of the first sixteen students in 2004 “offset the Concessionaire’s concession payment obligations as set out in the Agreement for the first year of the concession” (EcoTraining Concession Agreement 2004: 4). Thereafter, the Makuleke CPA decided each year whether to take the payment or training option. Lategan explained this procedure as follows:

There is a market related rental figure which is converted either into a financial contribution or a training contribution annually. That decision is made by the CPA Exco. annually and we have responded accordingly each year through their chosen form of rental compensation. Over the last six years there has been roughly an even spread of training delivered or money paid and each year is likely to change due to their internal political cycles and social needs in the community. Some years they need cash and other years they have a strong youth group who want training opportunities. This will likely continue in some rough average due to financial and social demands being expressed through the Exco. and their relative delivery as leaders. There is a cycle in my opinion and this has mostly to do with social and political pressure from the constituent community and that is the way it should be. (pers. com. 2011)

From 2005 to 2007, the Makuleke CPA opted for the financial contribution, and in 2008 a second group of Makuleke students were trained. Since then, the CPA has requested payment (pers. com. Lex Hes 2011).

Two trained Makuleke are currently working as field guides at Pafuri Camp while others have found jobs elsewhere in Kruger National Park. When asked about the employment status of trained Makuleke students, Lategan clarified:

⁶⁷ The Makuleke lease fee income statement 2006-2009 shows that in 2007, income from EcoTraining amounted to ZAR 160,655.

It is tough as we haven't kept in touch with all of them and the typical South African cycle of unemployment and frictional unemployment applies here, so it certainly will reflect differently in the short, medium and long term. Many have been employed in related fields, some have stayed on as guides but they all have benefited from this training as they continue to impact positively in their ecological and social spheres of influence due to the training and understanding of the environment they've received. Those that have become guides, such as Godfrey at Pafuri are doing well. Some are spread throughout the region in similar roles. Our EcoTraining mission and value to the community would be underestimated if quantified [through finding employment] only. The people who are tending to the cattle and goats that we have trained are now not killing every squirrel or cutting down every tree. They are teaching their kids about the interrelatedness of man and nature through their behaviour in the ecology. The ex-trainee dry land maize farmers are now made aware of erosion, soils, geology and weather not to mention some basic grasp of carrying capacity and sustainability. Some ex-Ecotrainees will go on to become lawyers or teachers but their time and training with us will influence who and what they teach and practise. (pers. com. 2011)

In addition to benefits from certified training, the EcoTraining staff also includes three Makuleke community members who work in junior staff positions as stipulated in the Agreement. During the time of this research, EcoTraining also supported the community by purchasing vegetables from the Fresh Produce Farm at the village when available, and by sending their overseas students for a Makuleke village tour to gain a cultural experience (pers. com. Lawson 2008).

5.3 Security and Anti-Poaching Facility (N'tomeni Ranger Services)

In the early stages of tourism development in the Makuleke Contract Park, the GTZ and Wilderness Safaris discussed the creation of conservation-related businesses

linking the Makuleke community with the concessionaires in the Makuleke region. In order to protect visitors to the Pafuri border area and to ensure good game viewing for tourists, the concessionaires asserted that a security operation had to be put in place in the Makuleke Contract Park. It was agreed that a community-owned training facility was needed in the area, primarily for patrolling and anti-poaching operations, and also to serve as a training site for a variety of conservation-related courses including field guide and ranger training (GTZ 2005: 1; GTZ 2006b: 1).



Figure 8 N'tomeni Ranger Services at Old Mabiligwe.
Left: lecture room; Right: snares collected from the Makuleke Contract Park
(Photos: May Shehab)

Initially, the objectives of the training facility were threefold: first, the facility was expected to generate some income in order to reduce the costs of security operations; second, it would further develop the capacity of the Makuleke rangers to secure their land; and third, while the training was taking place and the trainees were in the field, extra rangers would be on the ground thereby increasing the anti-poaching presence in the Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park (GTZ 2006b: 1). The aim was for the training centre to be accredited by SASSETA (Safety and Security Sector Education Training Authority), THETA (The Tourism, Hospitality, Sport Education and Training Authority) and FGASA (Field Guide Association of Southern Africa), and for course programmes to be developed and marketed by the

Makuleke CPA Executive Committee, the Concessionaires and SANParks (GTZ 2006b: 1). It was envisioned that establishing an accredited, well managed and fully equipped ranger training facility in the Contract Park would “provide a facility in the most remote part of the country where training and development is much needed” (GTZ 2006b: 3).

In January 2003, Wilderness Safaris and GTZ approached the N’tomeni Ranger Services (NRS), headed by Major Jack Greeff, to perform security and anti-poaching services in the Makuleke Contract Park.⁶⁸ The request was for N’tomeni Ranger Services to fulfil the agreements stipulated in the Makuleke Master Plan (2000) of developing and implementing effective security management through training local Makuleke community members as Field Rangers and to “develop the rangers to the point where they can protect and manage the area themselves in cooperation with Kruger National Park”. After initial doubt as to whether N’tomeni Ranger Services, a private security company, would be allowed to operate in the area, SANParks eventually approved the position and the N’tomeni Ranger Services began their operations at the beginning of 2003 (Greeff 2008a: 1).

With funds accessed from the Public Private Partnership unit of the GTZ, along with sponsorships from various sources, the Makuleke Ranger Project was constructed and all facilities from vehicles and firearms to accommodation and office equipment were made available (Collins 2006: 1; Greeff 2008b: 1).⁶⁹

Fifteen men from the community were selected and trained in May 2003, in what came to be called The Makuleke Conservation Project. The operation was initially based in a camp on the Luvuvhu River where Pafuri Camp was being constructed at the time, and the N’tomeni Ranger Services cooperated with the Kruger National

⁶⁸ N’tomeni Ranger Services (NRS) is a Wildlife Management company specializing in the protection of natural resources. As a professional natural resource outfit, NRS provides security and environmental monitoring to assigned environments (Greeff 2005: 1-3).

⁶⁹ Sponsors included Daimler Chrysler, Extrata Mining, SANP Honorary Rangers, Clover SA, Ellies Electronics and the Wilderness Trust (Greeff 2008b: 1).

Park rangers to get to know the area. Three months later, however, at the end of September 2003, N'tomeni Ranger Services decided to continue on their own due to differences in methods of operation between Kruger National Park and N'tomeni Ranger Services that caused frustration amongst N'tomeni rangers. An agreement was reached whereby Kruger Park's Pafuri rangers were withdrawn to south of the Luvuvhu River outside of the Makuleke Contract Park, and the N'tomeni rangers continued to operate inside the Makuleke area (Greeff 2008a: 1).

After three months of patrols from the Luvuvhu River campsite, the N'tomeni Ranger Services moved northwards to the Old Mabiligwe military base beside the Limpopo River. A 'high-density operation' was launched by N'tomeni Ranger Services with the assistance of experienced rangers from Welgevonden, and within the first month and a half of operations in 2003, they recovered over 750 snares and made forty arrests inside the Makuleke Contract Park. Greeff explains that "this was in sharp contrast to the few old snares and no arrests of the two months operating with Kruger National Park rangers in the same area" (Greeff 2008a: 1). By 2004 the number of snares recovered had increased to about 2,700, after which their numbers declined due to the effective control of poaching activities by N'tomeni Ranger Services and their cooperation with Acacia Safaris in Zimbabwe just across the border (marked by the Limpopo River) (Greeff 2008a: 1).




Chart 5.1 Snares found by N'tomeni Ranger Services in the Makuleke Contract Park 2003-2007. (Chris Roche, Wilderness Safaris)

According to Greeff, the project ran “extremely well and a lot of progress was made in many fields initially”. An example of progress cited by Greeff included bringing under control problems with “cattle and people ... in the area of Tshikuyu Spring and Banyini Pan” because this section was partly unfenced. The problem was solved when N'tomeni Rangers met with the government veterinary services and managed to “erect a fence which finally sealed off the Makuleke land from the Venda land and brought an end to the cattle incursions into the area” (Greeff 2008a: 2). Other achievements included finding an illegal mass buffalo capture site under Mabyeni Mountain where buffalo had been captured in 1999 and 2003; the arrest and conviction of skin smugglers who were found in possession of 129 genet skins and

one leopard skin; the dismissal of a South African Defence Force poacher; and the dismissal of a corrupt police detective after he had released an arrested poacher (Greeff 2008a: 11-12). Admittedly, Greeff states that “it was too late to save the dead wood ‘mini’ habitat of the area, as firewood was extracted at a massive scale” (2008a: 2). However, Greeff asserts that by 2008, the security of the area was generally under control and wildlife numbers had increased dramatically.

Although the N’tomeni Ranger Services successfully brought security to the Makuleke Contract Park, a number of problems began to emerge that eventually led to their withdrawal from the area in March 2010. From Greeff’s perspective:

At about 2004, the current Operations Officer of the Joint Management Board was appointed. Progress slowed down to an almost complete halt. Relations with outside parties were damaged and cooperation with some even ceased due to the influence of this individual. All sorts of other problems also started ... delaying or hampering the progress of the project to the point where N’tomeni Ranger Services stopped advanced training and sourcing of sponsorship for the project. (2008a: 2)

Despite the conflicts between Greeff and the new Operations Officer of the Joint Management Board, N’tomeni Ranger Services continued with its obligations to secure the area. Subsequently, more difficulties began to arise and the N’tomeni Ranger Services discovered that it was “suddenly branded ‘illegal’ by the very same persons that allowed it to commence operations in 2003” (Greeff 2008a: 2). Greeff explains in his 2008 Status Report:

This [illegal branding] led to problems such as very negative staff attitudes and other disciplinary problems. The end result was a total breakdown of communication between the Joint Management Board and N’tomeni Ranger Services. Communication between NRS and CPA also never really existed. They simply did not react to any form of communication. (2008a: 2)

To compound the problems facing the Makuleke Ranger initiative, a shooting incident with poachers in December 2007 left four Makuleke rangers charged with

the unlawful killing of two poachers in the Madimbo Corridor. This shooting incident took place in an area called Matshakathini, a game reserve next to the Makuleke concession that was still under the South African Defence Force Madimbo training base at the time (Poultney 2008a: 1). The problem was that the Makuleke CPA considered this region to lie outside of the area of jurisdiction of N'tomeni Ranger Services and the CPA highly criticised the fact that their rangers were operating there since this was not part of the agreement signed with N'tomeni Ranger Services (int. CPA Administration Officer 2008). Conversely, Greeff did not consider operating in the Madimbo Corridor as illegal because he had permission from the military to protect the boundaries of the Makuleke Contract Park by creating a buffer zone and securing the Corridor. According to Greeff, he had reported this permission to the Makuleke CPA, but noted that "they don't even read the reports" (pers. com. Greeff 2008).

An issue of particular concern at Makuleke was that the charged rangers were traumatised because in their opinion they had "in good faith and under life threatening conditions carried out law enforcement, whereupon they were locked up and accused of murder" (Poultney 2008a: 1). This issue caused unrest in the community at large as anger was unleashed amongst Makuleke residents who feared for their lives after a gang from Venda intimidated them on a number of occasions (Mathye 2008a: 4). In an interview for the local tabloid, the *Daily Sun*, a Makuleke resident reportedly exclaimed, "These people tell us they want revenge for the killing of their brothers ... now I fear that my children will have no one to look after them when I am dead" (Ibid: 4). A state of panic and confusion set in at Makuleke and the N'tomeni Ranger Services was subsequently accused of endangering the safety of the Makuleke rangers. The rangers were granted bail by the Mutale Magistrate until a hearing that was to be held in Thohoyandou Magistrates Court on June 11, 2008, but eventually the case was withdrawn (Mathye 2008a: 4).

This shooting incident exposed two important issues: first, the lack of a clear legal and operational framework under which N'tomeni Ranger Services could function; and second, it revealed that the complexity and circumstances under which N'tomeni Ranger Services operated were not fully appreciated by some stakeholders. As Poultney states, “the smuggling of contraband, illegal movement of people, the bush meat trade, stock theft for slaughter and sale, proposed developments such as the corridor between the Makuleke concession and Madimbo, and the Transfrontier developments all have an impact on anti-poaching and the rangers” (2008: 3). These issues were discussed in a meeting between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris, and it was agreed that “private security arrangements are essential since without a well organised anti-poaching service, the safety of animals and guests would be at serious risk” (Poultney 2008a: 2). This understanding, however, did not last long and shortly afterwards, the Makuleke insisted on having the Kruger National Park rangers take over the Makuleke Ranger Training facility.

Greeff ended his contract at the Makuleke Contract Park on May 31, 2010, and at an informal meeting indicated that he expected trouble as poachers heard of his departure. In his opinion, Kruger National Park rangers were not adequately equipped to secure the area and he predicted two major consequences as a result: a rise in poaching and illegal trafficking soon after the Kruger National Park take-over, and renewed military presence in the area (pers. com. Greeff 2010).

At the time of writing, the danger from poaching had been largely “mitigated by the wet season where it is difficult to set snares effectively, and by the Limpopo [River] in full spate”. However, there had been reports of high impact game such as elephants and a young lioness being snared and sometimes killed (pers. com. Poultney 2011) (See Figure 9). According to Poultney, the difficulty with the new arrangements is that the Kruger National Park Section Ranger has a small team that has to cover 100,000 hectares, whereas the N'tomeni Ranger Services had only

operated in the Makuleke Contract Park comprising a quarter of this area. To mitigate this shortfall, a joint operations team was set up with the South African Police Service (SAPS) border line patrols, border post and other security personnel. In addition, the South African Defence Force (SANDF) have also been deployed to curb illegal entry and trafficking in contraband (Ibid: 2011).



Figure 9 Successful lion snare removal at Pafuri January 18, 2011
(Photos: Walter Jubber 2011)

5.4 Discussion and Interpretation of the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris Contractual Agreement

This section analyses the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris contractual agreement in order to understand its intentions in relation to the actual events that unfolded since its signing in 2003. The concession contract represents the foundational document of the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris relationship in that it prescribes the rights and obligations of the two parties involved. In discussing this relationship, I reveal the concerns and reservations of both parties prior to signing the agreement, along with the reasons behind their ultimate decision to enter into this alliance. Five years into Pafuri Camp's operation, the partnership can be credited for a number of benefits, although some complications and unforeseen consequences also began to surface.

5.4.1 The Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris Contract Agreement: benefits and constraints

To gain a sufficient understanding of tourism-led development, I propose that a combined consideration of economic and socio-political factors is required. In line with arguments from post-development theory, I do not evaluate benefits and constraints using an economic yardstick exclusively. I also concur with Amanda Stronza and Gardillo's (2008) statement that economic benefits accrued to rural communities through eco-tourism cannot be considered indicators of success in isolation from other forms of impacts. These authors maintain that in most tourism research, "benefits have been defined as primarily economic, measurable as new employment or cash income", but a more thorough assessment should include socio-cultural impacts if not psychological ones as well (Stronza and Gardillo 2008: 449; Pearce and Moscardo 2001: 41). In addition, I maintain that analysing benefit distribution throughout a 'community' is a highly contested issue, not only because the notion of a 'community' in itself is an arbitrary concept, but because rooting out the existence of various groupings and alliances poses considerable difficulties. Using Philip Pearce and Gianna Moscardo's (2001) definition of community, I apply the term in this study to mean "an interacting communicating and dynamic entity" (41), and give the views of all interviewees equal weight in an attempt to portray the variety of perspectives concerning the issues in question.⁷⁰

Furthermore, according to Bill Bramwell and Bernard Lane (1999), the term "partnerships is used to describe regular, cross-sectoral interactions between

⁷⁰ An important aspect defining the Makuleke community is the demographic statistic used in the Application for the Restitution Discretionary Grant (2000), which is 1,508 households in Makuleke, Mabiligwe and Makahlule (Blocks H, I and J) as well as in Mhinga. (At an average of five persons per household this equates to approximately 7,500 people.) This figure has substantially increased since then (to approximately 19,000 residents) and includes two new village extensions: Khombo between Makahlule and Makuleke, and Humula near N'wanati High School in Makuleke (pers. com. village residents 2010).

parties based on at least some agreed rules or norms, intended to address a common issue or to achieve a specific ... goal or goals” (179). In the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris scenario, the partnership goal in theory is directed towards maintaining a certain income level from eco-tourism activities whilst actively engaging in the conservation of the Pafuri area of the Kruger National Park and the promotion of local economic development (Koch 2003a: 8). This is to be achieved through Wilderness Safaris’ commitment to recruit and train Makuleke residents in the fields of conservation, tourism and hospitality, along with offering support to other socio-economic community upliftment initiatives at the three Makuleke villages (Concession Contract 2003: Clause 30). A discussion of community upliftment activities follows in Chapters Six and Seven.

As Brian Child and Chris Weaver (2006) assert, commercial partnerships “provide powerful entry points for community development ... [and] if money earned from wildlife is appropriately allocated within communities, it creates incentives for long-term conservation and can mould institutional development” (37). With this idea in mind, the Makuleke CPA chose its own private sector partners. The two parties discussed their intention of entering into this partnership and after much deliberation, the Makuleke CPA, with assistance from what Marja Spierenburg and Conrad Steenkamp et al. (2008) term their “competent legal advisors”, took on the offer and signed the deal (92).⁷¹

A large celebration took place at Makuleke on July 30, 2003, attended by “government, NGO officials and the Makuleke community ... and included Mvuso Msimang, then SANParks CEO, who promised that SANParks will continue its support to the people of Makuleke” (*Deku Newsletter* 2003: 1, 7). Colin Bell, then

⁷¹ Spierenburg and Steenkamp et al. (2008) note that the legal advisors (Friends of Makuleke – FoM) had been “disbanded shortly before the signing of the contract”, but that some of its members “continued to advise the Makuleke”. The authors note that “responses from former members were mixed. One felt that this was the best deal that the Makuleke were likely to get; another advised the Makuleke not to sign the agreement as it stood. However, this advice came one day before the signing ceremony and was not followed.” (93)

CEO of Wilderness Safaris, presented a three-legged pot to the community as a symbolic gift and stated that the three legs represented: the Makuleke community, the concessionaires, and SANParks. Bell explained, "Each of these legs needs to be strong for the pot to stand upright. Without three strong legs it will fall over. If each leg is strong, the pot can create the most fantastic food which we all can feed on" (Kgosana 2003: 3). By way of this analogy, Bell also put forth the principles of collaboration, interdependence, and equality, attributes that put the Makuleke on equal footing with their private sector partners and SANParks.

The reasons from the community's perspective for entering into a partnership with the private company Wilderness Safaris, as declared in the Concession Contract, include: income through lease fees; employment, training and education in tourism and conservation; in addition to acquiring a tourism asset when the concession period has elapsed (Clause 30.2). Furthermore, Koch (2003a) points out that one other reason was the desire to be linked to and supported by a renowned tourism company (6), and a number of Makuleke residents have mentioned the importance of the sense of pride and self-esteem that has resulted from engaging in high-end tourism on Makuleke land (pers. com. Makuleke residents 2008-2009).

Some stated intentions for partnering with the Makuleke CPA from Wilderness Safari's point of view include: the company's commercial interest in eco-tourism and the aim of creating a sustainable business at Pafuri; access to prime wilderness areas; the ability to sustain the company's conservation proposition; access to a form of land tenure; increasing Wilderness Safaris' conservation areas; the fact that the Pafuri area lies at the heart of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park (GLTP) with high tourism potential; and anticipated buy-in from the Makuleke community in sharing conservation values (ints. Wilderness Safaris management 2009). As proposed by the Wilderness Safaris Chairman, if these values were to be successfully instilled in the Makuleke community, the tourism product would in turn be enhanced (int. 2009).

Notwithstanding the declared incentives for either party to enter into this long-term partnership, there were a number of concerns expressed by both partners as well as by some critical onlookers. For Wilderness Safaris, these included the remoteness of the location, which makes Pafuri difficult to include as part of a circuit route, and low game densities, in particular those considered high-impact species (the 'Big Five'), due to intensive illegal hunting (prior to the introduction of the anti-poaching unit into the area) (pers. com. Wilderness Safaris management 2008-2010). In addition, there were fears that the Contract Park's poor internal road network and having to deal with internal problems of the Makuleke CPA (governance, administrative and political) could have a negative impact on the partnership (Collins 2010b: 2).

For the Makuleke CPA, concerns were also raised by a number of commentators. The main issues related to the duration of the agreement, the exclusivity deal, and the choices offered to the Makuleke CPA. In Spierenburg and Steenkamp et al.'s (2008) opinion, "the Makuleke signed a surprisingly unfavourable agreement with ... the safari operator, Wilderness Safaris" (92). The authors specify their reasoning behind this sentiment stating that:

The duration of this concession is 45 years, a very long period, especially considering that the contract does little to hold the private sector partner to a certain level of performance and does not contain clear exit clauses that would allow the Makuleke to extract themselves from an unprofitable relationship. (Spierenburg and Steenkamp et al. 2008: 92)

This statement suggests that if the tourism operator fails to generate the anticipated income, the Makuleke CPA will be in a vulnerable position. The Outpost had already exemplified this concern, when its inability to attract sufficient tourist numbers led to low income and in turn low lease fees to the Makuleke CPA. As predicted by Spierenburg and Steenkamp et al. (2008), the CPA was unable to hold their partners to account, a situation that fostered a sense of powerlessness on the community's side.

If interpreted from a purely orthodox developmental perspective, Richard Butler's Tourism Area Cycle (1980) provides an appropriate analytical framework here (see Figure 10). The concern over the length of time before handing over the lodge to the community can be explained using this theory, which is based on the "idea of a consistent process through which tourist areas evolve" (5). This premise suggests that there is a pattern of evolution of a tourist area that can be characterised by a number of identifiable features (Agarwal 1997: 65). The hypothetical evolutionary process of a tourism destination starts with the "exploration stage" and follows the stages of: "involvement, development, consolidation and stagnation before it reaches its ultimate decline" (Butler 1980: 7-9). Butler explains:

Visitors will come to an area in small numbers initially, restricted by lack of access, facilities, and local knowledge. As facilities are provided and awareness grows, visitor numbers will increase. With marketing, information dissemination, and further facility provision, the area's popularity will grow rapidly. Eventually, however, the rate of increase in visitor numbers will decline as levels of carrying capacity are reached. These may be identified in terms of environmental factors ... of physical plant ... or of social factors. As the attractiveness of the area declines relative to other areas, because of overuse and the impacts of visitors, the actual number of visitors may also eventually decline. (1980: 6)




Figure 10 Richard Butler’s Hypothetical Evolution of a Tourist Area (Butler 1980: 7)

Although Butler (1980) maintains that at the end of the cycle, a rejuvenation stage is possible, he also states that “it is almost certain that this stage will never be reached without a complete change in the attractions on which tourism is based” (9).

Notwithstanding this forecast, Butler’s theory has been challenged and studies such as the examination of tourism in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania by Hovinen (1981) show that “Butler’s model did not adequately describe the industry’s evolution” in that location (Agarwal 1997: 66). Some criticisms of the theory include problems and limitations related to “internal and external factors that influence resort evolution” (Ibid: 66). Reasons such as the rate of development, the

ease of access, government policy and competing destinations influence the success of a tourism operation. Another important factor is tourist demand, which fluctuates depending on the changing nature of the clientele as the destination evolves (Ibid: 66-67). The Makuleke partnership deal, therefore, cannot be rebuked based exclusively on the duration of its contract, but Butler's theory does suggest the possibility of a decline stage by the end of the concession period. For this reason, the community should be forewarned in order to take necessary precautions and consider alternative development options.

Even though the infrastructure of Pafuri Camp is required to be in "good condition" upon handover (Concession Contract 2003: 22.1), the concern in relation to the transfer of the lodge to the Makuleke CPA involves the statement in the concession contract that the Concessionaire shall be entitled to remove all 'softs' that it owns in the Makuleke Area on the expiry of the concession period. These include movables consisting of vehicles, appliances, crockery and linen. Implicit in this clause is the fact that the Makuleke CPA will have to ensure the availability of financing by 2048 to be able to replace all these 'softs' in order to continue lodge operations. Another concern relates to the tourism training offered to the Makuleke by the various NGOs and by Wilderness Safaris on site. In my view, this type of training is incomplete with regard to what is needed to operate an entire tourism operation. Examples of crucial components that are missing in present and past training are marketing, reservations and sales. These tasks are currently carried out by Wilderness Safaris staff at the company's Head Office in Johannesburg, and the Makuleke are entirely excluded from these functions. When it is time for the Makuleke CPA to take over Pafuri Camp, their lack of experience in these fields will prove to be problematic. The CPA could possibly outsource these particular tasks or bring in a new operator to manage Pafuri Camp, but this would curtail the Makulekes' potential for expertise in tourism and their ability to maximise profits from their camp.

Criticism was also expressed in relation to the Wilderness Safaris “*exclusive* commercial rights over the Makuleke land for a period of 45 years” (Massyn 2006: 23; emphasis in original). Although Massyn (2006) states that the Makuleke have “foreclosed all further commercial development on their land for a period of 45 years” (23), in practice this is questionable since other tourism developers have put forth requests to the Makuleke CPA for development in 2009 and the CPA has not outright rejected these requests. Moreover, Massyn himself is currently negotiating the development of two lodges with twenty-six beds and three game-drive vehicles in the Makuleke Contract Park (Minutes of Meeting WS/ERM, Nov. 24, 2010).

Questioning the exclusivity claim of Wilderness Safaris, James Westgate (Webber Wentzel Bowens Legal Advisor to Makuleke CPA) clarified the issue by stating that this must be seen in context: “It is not exclusive because The Outpost was already there, but in terms of allowing further development, that is correct”. Westgate elaborated:

There were not that many bidders who were prepared to take the risk of developing an unknown area of the park, political issues around Mozambique and Zimbabwe being just across the river. So when Wilderness Safaris expressed interest as a bidder, they actually had quite a bit of commercial clout because there weren't very many options available to the community at that stage and Wilderness Safaris obviously had a fabulous track record. They were by far the largest and most developed tourism operator that expressed an interest of developing in the area. (int. 2010)

Moreover, because of Wilderness Safari's target of selling unique experiences to their guests, “they can't afford to have 4000 self drive tourists cruising around on their roads”, says Westgate, who further explains that it is in this context that “exclusivity should be seen rather than just a case of Wilderness Safaris throwing their weight around or trying to stop the community from developing” (int. Westgate 2010). In addition, the issue of exclusivity in the Concession Agreement is dependent on the development of Stage Two by Wilderness Safaris: the addition of

eighteen beds within three years of the Agreement, that is, by 2006. According to the Concession Contract (2003), Stage Two was to be fulfilled unless Wilderness Safaris experienced circumstances beyond their control, including *force majeure*, but not including a downturn in Wilderness's business or in the tourist industry as a whole (20.1.3).

Another criticism expressed by Massyn (2006) is the "prohibition of hunting on Makuleke land" (23). Massyn noted:

Wilderness Safaris also considers hunting to be incompatible with photographic tourism and insisted that the CPA stop commercial trophy hunting on their land as a condition for the deal between the two parties This means that the CPA has effectively foregone future hunting revenue in favour of lodge development. Again, it remains to be seen whether the long term gains for the Makuleke from the Wilderness deal outweigh the opportunity costs associated with the closure of the hunting option. (2006: 23)

Despite the perception that Wilderness Safaris prevents the Makuleke from hunting, the Concession Agreement between the two parties states that "the CPA reserves the right to harvest natural resources, including the right to hunt, within the Mabiligwe Area, for a maximum period of three weeks in a calendar year" (2003: 32.2).

Effectively, the option of hunting still seems to be on the table, as in 2010, Chief Makuleke requested permission to hunt and the issue is still under review at the time of writing.

5.4.2 Tourism Income to the Makuleke CPA

Reiterating the original vision to which all stakeholders in the Makuleke Contract Park vowed their commitment, it was confirmed at the Makuleke Concession Tourism Workshop in July 2010 that the aim was for: "the Makuleke region to have profitable tourist businesses that create jobs for community members and income

for the CPA to fund community development” (3). One of the main problems faced by the Makuleke CPA in 2010 was the lack of funds for community development projects since most of the income from the concessionaires was spent on administrative costs for the CPA and Tribal Authority offices (pers. com. Collins 2010; Figure 4 in Chapter Four of this thesis).

With income to the Makuleke CPA well below projections, by 2010, the institution found itself in a precarious financial situation. Chief Makuleke complained that “there is no money in the concession” and that he needed more money to implement development projects at Makuleke (int. 2008). The perception that there is low income from the concessionaires is based on comparing Wilderness Safaris’ initial projected forecast of ZAR 3.1 million from 9% turnover in the fourth year of operations (Koch 2003b) with the actual amount of ZAR 540,451 that materialised in income to the Makuleke CPA from lease fees in 2009 (Wilderness Safaris unpublished data 2011). Community leaders also lamented the prohibition of hunting since this could have provided an instant source of income with minimal costs to set up (pers. com. CPA Exco. 2009; int. Westgate 2010). With the global economic recession of 2008 reaching its peak in 2009, the tourism industry suffered and lease fees to the Makuleke from their three concessionaires amounted to ZAR 872,025 in total that year (See Table 1, CPA Lease Fees Statement 2010).

An investigation I conducted into the reasons behind the discrepancy between the initial projections and the reality of income to the CPA that actually materialised revealed a number of causes for the slow returns on investment. Some of these reasons are common to the tourism industry more broadly, but findings also shed light on other incidents that influenced the turnout of events particularly regarding the Makuleke CPA–Wilderness Safaris partnership.

5.5 Tourism Partnership: Objectives and Core Values

At a Makuleke Concession Tourism Workshop in 2010, Hector Magome (SANParks Managing Executive Conservation Services) referred to Colin Bell's three-legged pot analogy and stated that "the pot has been lop-sided because in this tripod type of model, the community always dangles along" (Makuleke Region Tourism Workshop transcript). In order to assess the reasons for this outcome, I interrogate the objectives and core values of the partners involved. I base my assessment on statements in the Master Plan (2000) and the Concession Contract (2003) referring to each partner's duties and obligations.

The Master Plan (2000) stipulates that the concessionaires' obligation is to promote eco-tourism and to establish "related activities that will confirm the area as a key destination able to contribute to the economic growth of the Makuleke community and the region" (40). Furthermore, private investors are also responsible for "offering employment to the Makuleke community; providing contacts to Makuleke SMMEs for services, opportunities and produce; setting up appropriate capacity-building and training programmes; and maintaining the facilities and related infrastructure for the period of the projects" (Ibid: 40).

Acknowledging the required duties towards its partners, Wilderness Safaris infused its own company core values to achieve the development objectives of the Makuleke CPA. These values were expressed in interviews with members of the Wilderness Safaris management team who described them as: the desire to build a sustainable conservation business through experience-based tourism, through conservation efforts and through building awareness; to be authentic, honest, honour our promises and not pretend to be something we cannot be; to look after and care for each other, our guests and the environment; to partner with and build relationships with surrounding communities who can benefit from where Wilderness Safaris

operates and in turn, contribute to building sustainable conservation economies (pers. ints. 2009).

Further, Wilderness Safaris management asserts that the partnership with the Makuleke CPA manifests the company's business philosophy. Their approach, states the Wilderness Safaris chairman, is based on the idea that "the better community relations you have, the better conservation you have, the better your tourism profit all the time ... [and] provided everything is in balance, you can afford to invest more because your product is better" (int. 2009). According to this view, more investments in community relations and conservation would then translate into more benefits for the community in terms of income from enhanced tourism operations. In this way, the development objectives of both partners would be achieved: "It is a process and the process is forever. It never ends," adds the chairman (int. 2009).

The upward spiral described by the Wilderness Safaris chairman echoes Geoffrey Wall's (1997) proposition that "if tourism is to contribute to sustainable development, it must be economically viable, environmentally sensitive, and culturally appropriate" (487). In theory, this proposition is perfectly plausible, but the chairman points out that in practice, balancing these objectives poses substantial challenges. Certain aims must be achieved before others and Wilderness Safaris' main responsibility is to ensure the functioning and sustainability of its business:

The first priority, like anything, has to be sustainability. Sustainability is a function of our business model working and our capacity to continue. The first and biggest responsibility that we have is to make profits and employ our staff happily. If we do that, and we do that consistently year after year, I would say we're more than about 80% of the way to having delivered on our promise. What that also does is it gives you the capacity to make new promises and to do different things. But until you are consistently doing that, you can't do other things. That is the biggest issue. (int. 2009)

Effectively, therefore, the Makuleke CPA is in a position of dependency on the tourism concessionaires whose primary goal is their own economic bottom line. The concessionaires provide the income for community development objectives at Makuleke, and the CPA has, at this point, no other income options available.

5.5.1 Tourism Sustainability: balancing economic, environmental and social objectives

Based on the concept of sustainable development that was introduced by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, the concept of sustainability “has been adopted and applied in a wide range of human contexts” (Pigram and Wahab 1997: 3).⁷² In the case of the Makuleke community’s partnership with Wilderness Safaris, the concern for sustainability features in a variety of forms. First and foremost, as the chairman pointed out, the tourism component has to be sustainable as a business in order to achieve the other anticipated objectives (conservation and community development). These objectives should also in turn benefit from continuity and sustainability. For James Ramsey (Wilderness Safaris South African Operations Director), Wilderness Safaris is positioned at the centre of the three main stakeholders (Makuleke CPA, private concessions, and Kruger National Park). Each of these stakeholders has different expectations, but they all need to be reconcilable. In Ramsey’s opinion:

They [stakeholders’ expectations] have to be compatible even though we all want different ideals. If it is Kruger Park’s only ideal, they would have that area clearly for no economic gain. They are conservationists. Even within an organisation like Kruger Park, you have different ideals. You’ve got the conservationists and you’ve got what I would call the realists who understand that tourism is a vital part of conservation. You’ve got the Makulekes whose prime

⁷² The Brundtland Commission defines sustainable development as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 4).

goal is to get as much economic benefit from their land, which is understandable, and then you've got Wilderness Safaris saying, well we are conservationists, but our conservation model is only workable if it is financially sustainable. So we're almost kind of the bridge of the whole thing. So if you've got three different parties with three different ideal goals there is always going to be a compromise of some form between everybody, and somebody is going to be unhappy with something at the end of it. It's like a marriage, there's a lot of compromise! (int. 2009)

Tourism analysts argue that "the underlying credo of tourism is growth which, in the harshly competitive world of tourism, translates into profits, returns on investment and market share" (Ibid: 34). Consequently, the struggle to keep afloat in the competitive tourism market requires much expertise, particularly for tourism operators who deliver the final product or service to clients. The ripple effects of sustainability, therefore, begin with the sustainability of the tourism business first, since a successful business is the prerequisite for the delivery of other expectations. That being the case, a central issue of concern would be the ambitious task of ensuring the sustainability of the tourism industry itself. As Malcolm Crick (1989) argues, "international tourism is a highly complex system," (314) and as Robert Prosser (1994) further asserts, there is much evidence demonstrating its challenges and vulnerability (28).

With regards to the expected ripple effects of tourism and its contribution to community development, many arguments have emerged over the years, but two main contrasting perspectives are generally proposed: For Salah Wahab and John Pigram (1997), tourism can play a positive role in community development in that "sustainable development and management of tourism resources should coincide with economic, socio-cultural, health, safety and environmental objectives" (277). In contrast, Stephen Britton (1982) asserts that the promotion of tourism is "a highly ambiguous development strategy" (332). The reason for this is that while tourism is expected to bring benefits to host communities, the industry in itself is

fickle (Page 2009: 482), and therefore should not be depended upon for community upliftment. In Britton's (1982) opinion, tourism "frequently perpetuates class and regional inequalities, economic problems and social tensions" (332). According to this understanding, if tourism is considered to be the cause of such difficulties, then it would be difficult to imagine that developing the tourism industry could possibly coexist with social development objectives. Mowforth and Munt (1998) concur and further point to the reality that "all forms of tourism are tied into the growth and expansion of capitalist relations of production" (172). For such analysts, this fact ultimately makes tourism "a highly controversial phenomenon" (Weaver 1998: 22). It follows that, in the context of these varying approaches to tourism, the question remains as to whether eco-tourism can be instrumental in contributing towards rural development? For instance, Joseph Mbaiwa's (2003) study on tourism impacts in the Okavango Delta, Botswana, proves that there has been a "general failure by tourism to significantly contribute to rural poverty alleviation" in that area (157). Whether or not this holds true for other regions depends on the individual circumstances of each endeavour.

Wilderness Safaris' own previous experiences reveal such failures. At Rocktail Bay and Ndumu Lodges in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa,⁷³ Wilderness Safaris had concluded partnership agreements with the rural communities living around their lodges. A Harvard study on Corporate Social Investment at Rocktail Bay and Ndumu (2008) deduced that:

Although tourism has been pronounced as the panacea to poverty in these remote areas mostly by people outside of the industry, [it has been concluded that] community partnerships can realistically only deliver against the commercial viability, competitiveness in the market and the size of the beneficiary community. (Ashley and Brine 2007a: 2)

⁷³ Rocktail Bay Camp opened in 1992 and Ndumu Camp opened in 1995. Both camps are currently closed, but the new Rocktail Beach Camp remains in operation since 2008.

Taking these experiences into account, guarantees for community benefits through tourism partnerships must be questioned, and the promise of tourism's delivery on expectations needs to be realistically considered and well managed from the onset.

5.5.2 Raised Expectations and Negotiated Power

Delivering tourism benefits expected by communities is a challenging task, particularly when hopes have been inflated to unrealistic levels. Reviewing the course of events that took place at Makuleke since their land claim, evidence shows that a number of factors converged and led to the raising of unrealistic expectations. First, the community's hopes were escalated by the media hype that followed the first successful land claim against a National Park in South Africa. Second, the community's external advisors focused on the many benefits that could be accrued through the commercialisation of community land without adequately explaining the possible risks. Third, the financial projections of profits from the tourism enterprises in the Makuleke Contract Park, calculated by the tourism operators and approved by the community's advisors, were seriously overstated. This raises ethical concerns, since some people argue that the projections were presented in this manner "in order to quickly convince the community and get the concession," as was mentioned on two occasions during the course of this research by people involved in the partnership (pers. com. 2009). From the point of view of Prosser (2004), these methods of "dangling the potential benefits in front of local communities" are some of the factors that contribute towards raised expectations about what a private concessionaire can commit to (34). Notwithstanding the anticipation of the meaningful enactment of a rural community's partnership with a private tourism developer within a co-managed conservation area, some realities were undeniably overlooked. To illustrate, Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the variance

between predicted and actual figures from the tourism concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park in relation to lease fees, wages and anti-poaching expenses.

Comparative Figures of Income to The Makuleke CPA

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Predicted Wilderness Safaris lease fees to Makuleke CPA (2003)	--	R1,523,241	R2,100,150	R2,689,748	R3,166,555	R6,629,794
Actual Wilderness Safaris lease fees to Makuleke CPA 2006-2010	--	R230,633	R496,836	R1,077,532	R540,451	R2,345,453

Table 1 Predicted versus Actual Wilderness Safaris Lease fees to the Makuleke CPA 2005-2009

(Koch 2003b Makuleke Concession Projections by Wilderness Safaris based on 9% turnover of 80 bed Camp; Unpublished Wilderness Safaris Data 2010)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Actual Wilderness Safaris lease fees to Makuleke CPA 2006-2010	--	R230,633	R496,836	R1,077,532	R540,451	R2,345,453
Actual The Outpost Lodge lease fees to Makuleke CPA	R91,007	R108,443	R210,472	R241,458	R151,574	R802,946
Actual EcoTraining lease fees to Makuleke CPA	--	R21,890	R160,655	R172,270	R180,000	R534,815
Total actual payments by 3 concessionaires (Wilderness Safaris, The Outpost & EcoTraining combined)	R91,007	R360,957	R867,964	R1,491,261	R872,025	R3,683,215

Table 2 Actual Lease fees to the Makuleke CPA from three concessionaires 2005-2009

(Unpublished Makuleke CPA Data 2010)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Wilderness Safari's (2003) predicted permanent job income to Makuleke	R1,411,200	R1,720,320	R1,942,080	R2,056,320	R6,629,794
Wilderness Safari's actual staff costs (all staff including management, not restricted to Makuleke) Makuleke staff represent 85% of total staff and earn approximately 50% of total staff wages.	R1,336,922	R2,173,745	R3,029,588	R3,213,368	R9,753,623

Table 3 Predicted permanent wages to Makuleke employees versus actual staff costs of Pafuri Camp
(Unpublished Makuleke CPA Data 2011)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Wilderness Safari's (2003) predicted anti-poaching expenditure	--	R300,000	R300,000	R300,000	R300,000	R1,200,000
Wilderness Safaris Actual Anti-poaching Costs	R512,404	R773,612	R675,592	R718,494	R768,125	R3,448,230

Table 4 Predicted versus Actual Anti-Poaching Costs paid by Wilderness Safaris 2005-2009
(Unpublished Wilderness Safaris Data 2003, 2011)

The figures in the tables above show the contrast between projected figures and actual figures that materialised from the tourism concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park. Evidently, the projections were highly optimistic and resulted in inflated expectations. It must be acknowledged, however, that expectations were raised on the account of both parties in this partnership. From the community's perspective, they expected jobs, significant income from tourism for the Makuleke CPA, development projects at the villages, better infrastructure, better education

facilities, thriving businesses, freedom and the exercise of democratic principles in governance, to name a few (pers. coms. community residents 2008-2009).

For Wilderness Safaris, the expectation was mainly support from both the Kruger National Park and the Makuleke CPA for their developments. Specifically, Wilderness Safaris anticipated efficient Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) processes from Kruger National Park and the maintenance of infrastructure and roads in the concession area by the Joint Management Board. The concessionaire looked forward to cooperation with the community and Kruger National Park regarding the battle against poaching in, and hunting on the boundaries of, the Contract Park. Wilderness Safaris also expected a spirit of collaboration and mutual understanding to pervade the relevant governance structures that were created, particularly the Joint Management Board and the Joint Management Committee (pers. coms. Wilderness Safaris management 2008-2009). In addition, Wilderness Safaris anticipated benefits based on the fact that Pafuri lies within the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) that could enhance the tourism product (Collins 2010b: 3-4).

To date, the expectations of both parties have only been partially fulfilled. Although the tourism establishments were indeed successful in setting up their lodges, and contributed towards training and employing members of the Makuleke community countless problems emerged and the initial hopes of thriving tourism businesses dwindled over the years. Concerns were raised amongst the community regarding the distribution of income to Makuleke staff at the tourism lodges since some employees earned much higher salaries than others depending on their position and qualification. Some people at Makuleke also questioned the selection process for employment at the tourism lodges and complained that fair procedures were not followed and that certain powerful families in the community usurped employment opportunities.

The significant financial returns from the tourism developments, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, did not materialise for a number of reasons and these have been interpreted in various ways. For instance, Lamson Maluleke (the Joint Management Board Implementation Officer) blames the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee's own lack of foresight for the turnout of the financial situation at Makuleke today. From his perspective, the issue revolves around planning and investment:

We didn't plan for our own unforeseen circumstances. We should have invested some of the money from the concessions rather than spend it the way we did. Suppose we had invested in a property development. If we had spent, for argument's sake, ZAR 3 million on that property, ten years down the line we would have received more than that by now. So that didn't come to us. You see what I am saying? We have to blame ourselves that we didn't plan to that effect. It is not yet too late. We can still invest in a property development as a CPA like other communities. If we had built a shopping complex around Malamulele, what would have happened today? Yes, we would have been carrying some debts, but I believe that ten years down the line we would have been the merchants of this region. So it goes with the extent of our planning. Do we see money today and want to spend all of it? Or do we see money today and see investment opportunities? (int. 2008)

The issue of foresight and planning surfaced in other interviews including Makuleke CPA Executive Committee members who expressed regrets on how the institution's initial income was spent. Sharing the sentiment of many other people in the community, one CPA Executive Committee member suggested that it would have been more beneficial to distribute money amongst the community's individual families:

The money was used haphazardly, which worried me a great deal because this money was for the benefit of the people. The community here should have gotten compensation because the government handed over our land. It (Land Affairs, through the Land Restitution Grant) gave us ZAR 4.5 million. That is very little to compensate the whole village here. So we used that money to electrify our villages, but we have been robbed by our municipality [because the money has still not been reimbursed]. If you add the income from hunting, it will be close to ZAR 6 million. Each family would have received about ZAR 15,000, but unfortunately we didn't

do that. We utilised the money for electricity, for the chief to run his office, take his child to school, and to get his remuneration. (int. 2008)⁷⁴

Other perspectives imply that the problem lies in the level of commitment from the two partners in implementing envisioned projects. Clive Poultney (Wilderness Safaris Community Liaison Officer) points out that “it is difficult for local people to fully understand the complexities of the tourism industry ... and it takes strong leadership and sustained engagement for things to work” (int. 2009). Commitment is also disrupted when there is a lack of institutional memory and operational capacity. Lack of balanced continuity at the Makuleke CPA not only impacts directly on Makuleke residents, but also impacts indirectly on the performance of Wilderness Safaris with respect to fulfilling its obligations towards the community. “It becomes frustrating to work with dysfunctional institutions”, explained Ramsey:

The relationship between Wilderness Safaris and the CPA is an area of concern because the CPA members change, so that’s where it’s important to make sure that the likes of the old guys remain in there. Issues of the CPA handing over from one CPA [committee] to the other CPA, and then the new CPA comes and they don’t necessarily have the historic knowledge of what has happened. They don’t have an understanding of the contractual obligations. And they might not have the clout within the community that they’ve actually got a say. So that is definitely an area of long term concern because every time you’ve got a new CPA you’ve got to go through a whole process again of trying to get them up to speed and that’s where I would say, if there’s NGO kind of funding to be obtained and the likes of Webber Wentzel Bowens people to ensure that there’s some kind of sustainability in the hand-over processes, and skills training to actually understand what it means to be a CPA member. What are your duties as a CPA member and what is the basis of all these deals? And the contracts that are in place? That kind of stuff is just very frustrating. That’s why I say that to me, there are some very good individuals involved, but it’s important to keep those individuals on there ... because they have got the

⁷⁴ In fact, if ZAR 6 million were divided among 15,000 residents, the result would be ZAR 400 per person or ZAR 4,000 for a family of ten people.

knowledge ... otherwise there is a massive knowledge vacuum. (int. 2009)

Given the sentiments expressed above, it becomes clear that gaining from a partnership deal in tourism is a lengthy process that depends on a number of conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for actual benefits to materialise. The notion of benefits in itself is a controversial topic and requires some scrutiny as the term lends itself to varied interpretations.

5.5.3 Tangible and Intangible Effects of Tourism Partnerships

There are different types of benefits a community can gain by engaging in tourism activities. Over and above economic benefits, Regina Scheyvens (1999) argues that eco-tourism is important for the social empowerment of a community. In her opinion, it “enhances the local community’s equilibrium [and] community cohesion is improved ... [when] some funds raised are used for community development purposes” (247). Furthermore, on a psychological level, Scheyvens (1999) maintains that “self-esteem is enhanced because of outside recognition of the uniqueness and value of their [community’s] culture and natural resources [and] Increasing confidence leads them to seek out further education and training opportunities” (247). On a political level, Scheyvens (1999) argues that local communities gain access to a “forum through which people can raise questions ... and [have] a political structure, which fairly represents the needs and interests of all community groups” (247).

With the successful land claim, psychological benefits cannot be underestimated as these were highly regarded by the Makuleke who considered the successful claim to have made a considerable difference in their lives. The sense of “pride” and “joy” was expressed on numerous occasions by residents who were proud to be Makuleke because they succeeded in regaining their lost land. However, this pride seems to

have withered as time passed. One Makuleke resident explained, “I used to be very proud after the land claim, but now, I can’t say I am from Makuleke with pride anymore ... because of the state of our developments now” (int. 2008).

Notwithstanding their psychological gains, some members of the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee revealed aspects of their relationship with the private sector that did not contribute to their sense of empowerment. Communication was identified as one of the main problems. According to a Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member, when The Outpost lodge was sold, the Makuleke CPA was not notified; and when the financing for N’tomeni Ranger Services were negotiated, the Makuleke CPA was also excluded from the process. Further, these grievances were expressed in an interview with a Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member who stated that “Wilderness Safaris went directly to The Outpost [when negotiating N’tomeni Ranger Services]. I felt this is really unfair. They are not in partnership with The Outpost. They are in partnership with the Makuleke CPA. They are undermining us.” (int. 2008). This sense of being undercut not only applies to the Makuleke CPA’s relationship with the private sector, but extends to their other partners as well. As Collins explained:

Sometimes it’s lack of recognition of rights. SANParks, for instance, will go ahead and participate in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and those ministries that signed the settlement agreement of the Makuleke go and participate, make decisions that affect the Makuleke CPA and don’t involve them in the process. It’s just a lack of respect. They wouldn’t do it if it were Richard Branson who owned that piece of land there. It wouldn’t reach international agreements committing your land to transfrontier parks without seriously getting you to understand and sign and say thank you. So I think that’s often the problem. It’s not that the decisions being made are wrong by the authorities, but they just lack respect. (int. 2010)

Not only does the Makuleke CPA feel sidelined and disrespected at times, they have also alluded to being threatened by their partners on various occasions: “Sometimes

when we try to negotiate something, they can have an attitude towards us Sometimes they will pressurise us and threaten us by saying they will close the camp and we will have to pay them out” (int. CPA Exco. member 2008).

In certain instances, difficulties arise due to personality conflicts and individuals “simply not getting along” such as the case of Jack Greeff of N’tomeni Ranger Services and the Joint Management Board Implementation Officer (int. Greeff 2008). Relationships of this nature create sensitivities in partnerships and have caused delays or failures of complete projects. As one CPA Executive Committee member explained, “Sometimes I don’t like the manner in which they [private concessionaires] actually treat us. We know that we are also making our own mistakes, but I don’t want them to dictate to us They think that they can manipulate us the way they want, but I don’t compromise” (int. 2008).

From Wilderness Safari’s perspective, they too experience difficulties with their partners. If the Makuleke CPA does not keep to their end of the agreement in terms of ensuring that the Contract Park is managed at an acceptable level, then Wilderness Safaris’ business is not viable in that area and the tourism operation is not a worthwhile venture. Other incidents that irk Wilderness Safaris is when the Makuleke CPA hold discussions with new potential investors despite being aware of the limited carrying capacity of the Contract Park , and when they insist on hunting knowing that this would potentially have negative repercussions on the tourism businesses.

Interviews and conversations I held with Makuleke residents revealed that people within the community hold different opinions with regards to the turnout of events after the restitution of their land. Those who have been employed expressed satisfaction and appreciated the skills training and opportunities that have opened up as a result (int. CPA members and Pafuri Camp employees 2008). Pafuri Camp employees expressed their satisfaction with statements such as: “Wilderness Safaris puts much on our table”; “We are happy to work at Pafuri”; “Wilderness Safaris is

doing their best, but we cannot expect them to do everything. We have to meet them half way” (pers. ints. 2008). Only a minority group amongst the employees complained about low wages or not being given the chance to prove themselves at the lodge (int. Pafuri Camp staff 2008). Some members of the community expressed further sentiments: one Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member said she understands that “tourism cannot employ everyone” and another felt that some people do not put in the effort and are “simply not employable” (int. 2008).

One recurring complaint was that there were “only certain groups of people who were benefiting from the tourism operations in the park”. References were made to unfair recruitment measures that favoured “particular powerful groups at Makuleke” (pers. com. Makuleke residents 2008). Since recruitment for jobs had to be processed through the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee, there does seem to have been room for manipulation and favouritism to the vexation of many at the village. This was also clear to Wilderness Safaris management who pointed out:

There is always an opportunistic sector in any community. And that might be particular people who are able to lead or mislead people quite often. Some manage to use the opportunities to their benefit, in some sense to the detriment of other people. It's like anything, some people will benefit, and other people not and the difficulty is to find out whether they are benefiting at the expense of others. I think in this particular case it's working that way because although there are some overall benefits that they've actually accrued from what's happened in the last ten years in terms of infrastructure and jobs etc., which are obvious, but there are certain people that have benefited in a much greater way than others and I think people start to question whether the overall impact has actually met the expectations. I would imagine if people were free to talk without intimidation from those people that have benefited or are trying to use the situation to benefit, you'd find that they probably haven't benefited that much. (int. 2009)

5.5.4 Forces Obstructing Tourism-led Development at Makuleke

As in any society, there are competing factions within the Makuleke. The most evident factions are generally between those who possess some form of power (financial or through patronage from powerful elites) and the common people who are not 'connected'. The words "jealousy" and "envy" were often used in interviews at the Makuleke villages, and some even recounted tales of witchcraft that are common to this area of northern Limpopo and Venda. As observed by Isak Niehaus (1997) in his study on *Witchcraft, Power and Politics in the South African Lowveld*, witchcraft does not refer to visible actions such as rape, adultery or theft. Rather, it denotes, "mystical deeds that are imagined to be motivated by envy, malice and resentment" (191).⁷⁵ Reasons behind the casting of spells and witch-hunts are commonly attributed to tensions over money. Niehaus (1997) explains: "money, like water, embodies positive and negative qualities. Money sustains life, but causes tension, strife and bloodshed" (116). In addition, Niehaus asserts that "it is necessary to recognise that witchcraft is not only a protean metaphor for expressing conflicts in social relations. It deals with the issues of misfortune and suffering, and is therefore also a component of worldview and religion" (37).

Makuleke residents explained the powerful role of *sangomas* (traditional practitioners of herbal medicine, divination and counselling) in the area and confirmed, "Even if people are Christians, they still believe in the powers of their traditional healers. There are more people who visit *sangomas* than those who go to Church If people feel sick, they first go to the clinic. If medication does not work within a short period of time, they go straight to the *sangoma*. And even pastors visit *sangomas*" (pers. com. 2009). Some of the stories relayed in confidence at Makuleke reveal that because of such complex social dynamics, achieving financial success is much more difficult in rural South African settings than is generally the case in urban areas.

⁷⁵ Isak Niehaus' study on witchcraft in Bushbuckridge is particularly relevant to this study because of the proximity of the two locations (260 km between Bushbuckridge and Malamulele) and their common language, XiTsonga (also referred to as Shangaan).

Furthermore, Makuleke residents remarked that although visits to the *sangoma* are mainly for healing purposes, some people use these powers to “access evil spirits”. Philip Peek (1991) argues that divinatory consultations are “motivated by an intense desire to know the real reasons for the occurrence of events” and that diviners are resorted to in times of crises when there is “no sufficient body of knowledge available to enable people to cope in practical terms with the hazards of life” (194). Moreover, Niehaus (1997) clarifies that “witches are driven by envy and jealousy and by desire to harm more fortunate persons who reside close to them” (197). In confirmation of this premise, some residents at Makuleke revealed alleged incidents of witchcraft at their village: “People get jealous of successful people or those who are prosperous,” said one Makuleke resident who asserted that he had experienced the effects of evil spells himself. His own afflictions included, “lice crawling on his back that disappeared once you looked at it ... being unable to walk for a long time, ... and having repeated punctures in [his vehicle’s] tyres every time [he] reached a particular destination [a source of his income]” (pers. com. 2010).

Another resident explained:

People go to the *sangoma*, mix herbs in their hands, blow it into the air and it will make you feel sick or have something bad happen to you. Sometimes people inflict cancer, infertility or failure upon each other Sometimes people stop your hands from working ... not physically by coming here and making you stop working, but through the world of evil spirits. (pers. com. 2010)

Questioning how people can protect themselves against such evil spirits, the response was, “if they pray a lot, they will be safe” (int. 2010).

5.5.5 Theoretical Discussion

Through a conventional orthodox development analysis, the tourism establishment (Pafuri Camp) and its associated anti-poaching services in the Makuleke Contract Park can be credited for providing new employment opportunities in the tourism and conservation sectors, along with creating a stream of income to the community through lease fees and wages that did not previously exist. However, the projects can be criticised for not entirely delivering on initial promises. Figures presented in Tables 1, 3 and 4 illustrate that the financial outcome of the Makuleke CPA / Wilderness Safaris partnership is far below initial expert projections. As discussed earlier, a number of reasons were offered by both parties with regard to why they chose to enter into this tourism partnership and what difficulties they experienced as a result of this relationship. Examining these reasons reminds us of Latouche's (1993) comment that "the ability to 'sell the argument' counts for more than [the] capability to 'deliver the goods'" (114).

A more complex interpretation of these findings can be made using insights from post-development theory. The tourism partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris can be commended for being based on participatory approaches in decision-making; for acknowledging a certain level of respect and equality between the two partners; for being ecologically sensitive; and for conforming to the community's wishes of pursuing economic development objectives to elevate their standard of living through tourism and conservation initiatives. Notably, the idea of a partnership is especially relevant to post-development discourse because "it directly contradicts the view that development [is] a top-down authoritarian program" (Ziai 2009: 184). In the Makuleke instance, the community is technically on a par with a private sector firm in a business alliance. The intention is to uplift the community through dividends acquired from the tourism industry.

What can be established from this arrangement is that the Makuleke community possess the desire to improve its standard of living and has therefore pursued a capitalist form of development to achieve this goal. Explicitly, the Makuleke community's desire to pursue economic development is "charged with hopes for redress and self-affirmation" (Sachs 2010: viii). In this regard, Sachs (2010) argues that even though orthodox development is an invention of the West, it is not simply an imposition. "On the contrary," states Sachs (2010), "as the desire for recognition and equity is framed in terms of the civilizational model of the powerful nations, the South has emerged as the staunchest defender of development" (viii).

The central criticism by post-development, however, is not the pursuit of development or better living standards as such, but the methods by which these are achieved in orthodox development initiatives. In most cases, such methods include "structural violence, environmental and cultural destruction, impoverishment, marginalization and dependency ... which also fail to deliver the much lauded promises of 'development'" (Simon 2006: 11). Such accusations are not congruous with the Makuleke partnership scenario: first, because the tourism concessionaire was invited through a public tender by the community to invest in their land; second, because the investor is on equal footing with the community in terms of their contractual agreement; third, because the agreement is environmentally (and to a limited extent culturally) sensitive; fourth, because the partnership contributed to an increase in income to the community (although less than initially predicted); and fifth, because even if the private sector partner were to pull out at some point, the community should not face "impoverishment" since it would still retain its land asset and be able to use it for further investments (albeit at the risk of tourism market fluctuations).

However, following some arguments postulated by post-development theory, some faults can also be identified with regards to the partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. For example, the course of action taken by the

Makuleke in entering into a partnership with the private tourism operator demonstrates that the Makuleke have prioritised economic gain over other developmental objectives. Latouche (1993) comments on this issue, stating that with economic development interventions, “the ethic of business becomes that for life” (105). This point relates to the post-development argument that suggests a reductionist view of existence by demoting qualitative values to quantitative ones (Escobar 1995: 12) whereby the partnership’s success or failure is calculated using figures that might not give an indication of how exactly the community is affected by such figures. If the Makuleke were to widen their interpretation of what development means to *them*, perhaps a diversification to include non-economic objectives would be useful.

5.6 Conclusion

Chapter Five analysed the tourism developments in the Makuleke Contract Park and addressed the complexities that can arise from a tourism partnership between a rural community and a private sector tourism operator. Three stages of the partnership between Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA was investigated from the perspectives of both parties: the impetus for entering into such a commercial alliance; the initial reservations and concerns; along with the actual incidents experienced throughout the course of the relationship.

I discussed two aspects of these developments in both economic and non-economic terms. After winning their land restitution case, the Makuleke felt pride and their self-regard increased to an even greater extent when contracts were signed with the tourism concessionaires. Although the Makuleke CPA initially held the upper hand in its possession of power to choose potential partners, this control soon dissipated once the contractual agreements were concluded with Wilderness Safaris and the other concessionaires. Complaints from CPA Executive Committee members

surfaced alluding to instances of disempowerment whereby they felt undermined, disrespected and threatened at times.

From the onset, Wilderness Safaris was able to impose restrictions on the Makuleke CPA in view of the fact that there were not many bidders prepared to take the risk of developing a tourism operation in an unknown area (int. Westgate 2010). Even though the Makuleke CPA accepted these restrictions at the time, there have been a number of incidents where power struggles between the two parties emerged. Consequently, the high anticipation of a sizable income stream from these tourism partnerships was deflated once the real financial dividends were dealt out to the Makuleke CPA. This, together with a perception of unequal distribution of income amongst the community, led to further grievances. Some of these ill feelings resulted in the rise of jealousy amongst the Makuleke, a dangerous occurrence in an area rife with practices of witchcraft.

Notwithstanding the differences between anticipated and real financial returns to the Makuleke CPA, people at Makuleke did acknowledge the benefits gained from the partnership in terms of employment, income from lease fees, and training. Nevertheless, the discussions in this chapter show that delivering on promises in tourism-led development is a complex process that is dependent on solid foundational premises, existing socio-political dynamics and fluid market forces.

Finally, I analysed my findings using claims postulated by post-development theorists in an attempt to show how post-development theory might guide tourism partnerships in practice. In this particular instance, a number of positive interpretations unfolded regarding the idea of a partnership which confirms post-development rationalisation. However, the focus by the Makuleke community themselves on economic objectives as the primary goal of development undermines the variety of possibilities to achieve a more broadly defined better life at Makuleke.

CHAPTER SIX

Economic Development Projects at Makuleke: a tale of two businesses

“The only way we know is if we work, we expect a salary by the end of the month.”

*Farmer at Hydroponic Farm
May 31, 2007*

6.1 Introduction

In an effort to provide more employment opportunities for the Makuleke people, diversifying the economic base, and creating linkages between the villages and the tourism operations in the Makuleke Contract Park,⁷⁶ a joint venture agreement was concluded between the two partners, the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. Chapter Six presents an in-depth analysis of this joint venture initiative, namely, the Small Business Support Company (SBSC). The discussion begins with the processes that led to the implementation of the Small Business Support Company at Makuleke village and continues with an analysis of the relationships formed and events that took place during the course of this partnership. The chapter is divided into three main parts: section 6.2 contextualises the discussion by detailing the involvement of the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GTZ TRANSFORM) with the Makuleke community, and the establishment of the joint venture Small Business Support Company.⁷⁷ Section 6.3 focuses on the two small businesses that fall under the umbrella of this joint venture: the Hydroponic Fresh Produce Farming project

⁷⁶ The villages here refer to the Makahlule, Makuleke and Mabiligwe settlements (Blocks H, I & J respectively).

⁷⁷ GTZ TRANSFORM is an external assistance agency that was involved in a bilateral programme between the South African government and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Agency for Development Cooperation, GTZ). The Programme managed and implemented tourism projects in a joint venture programme with the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), through the Training and Support for Resource Management Programme (TRANSFRORM) (Collins and Snel 2008: 85).

(commonly referred to as the Hydroponic Farm) and the Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (commonly known as the Makuleke B&B). Each of these businesses is critically analysed based on data collected through participant observation, semi-structured interviews and archival records. Further section 6.4 interrogates literature in development studies and relates it to the joint venture experience in terms of three main themes: questions of power and socio-political influences; the lack of clarity with regards to the ownership, function and structure of the Small Business Support Company; and the viability of entrepreneurship at Makuleke.

6.2 Context and Background: GTZ TRANSFORM projects at Makuleke and the founding of the Small Business Support Company

As discussed in Chapter Five, GTZ TRANSFORM assisted the Makuleke community with engaging in tourism partnerships as a means of empowerment through employment and training in how to manage and utilise their resources. As a result of tourism employment opportunities in the Contract Park, Steve Collins and Herman Snel (2008) observe that there was an increase in the flow of income into the community, but it seemed that “most of the money is quickly spent outside the villages due to the lack of small businesses”. To counter this leakage, GTZ TRANSFORM aimed to assist small business start-ups at N’tlhaveni, fostering economic growth and development (98).

Through its Public Private Partnership Unit, GTZ TRANSFORM raised funds to support the creation of a number of small businesses at Makuleke village that would link to the tourism and conservation initiatives taking place in the Makuleke region of the Kruger National Park (Collins and Snel 2008: 88). Building on the partnership agreement with Wilderness Safaris, funds were made available “due to the fact that Wilderness Safaris have a European shareholder” (GTZ 2006c: 1). This shareholder

(The Travel Corporation, London) was used in lieu of partnering with a government institution, an exception to standard funding procedures because the GTZ is essentially a bilateral agency (pers. com. Poultney 2011). The provision of these funds was dependent on the economic feasibility of these small businesses in addition to “Wilderness Safaris making a contribution in terms of time and funds to the projects” (GTZ 2006c: 1). The aim of this contract was to ensure that the community that owns the land in the park benefits as much as possible from the tourist economy being generated from it (Ibid: 1). As stated by Conrad Steenkamp (2001), this objective was based on the confidence of GTZ that the involvement of the private sector would give community projects “a high chance of being commercially viable and sustainable” (136).

A number of small businesses were therefore supported by GTZ TRANSFORM at Makuleke. According to GTZ archives, these included:

- Constructing a fresh produce hydroponic farm aimed at supplying the lodges and other markets with fresh vegetables (ZAR 715,557 invested);
- Upgrading the Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (B&B) to an acceptable standard for tourist overnight stays (ZAR 154,989 invested);
- Building a ranger training facility at the old Mabiligwe military base in the Makuleke Contract Park aimed to train Makuleke rangers in anti-poaching. The objective was to secure the Pafuri area from illegal hunting and to raise the numbers of wildlife necessary for purposes of conservation and tourism (ZAR 206,695 invested);
- The production of a coffee table book on the history of the Makuleke region and the culture of the Makuleke people entitled *Kings, Crooks and Elephants: A history of the Makuleke, an African Tribe* (ZAR 35,000 invested);
- Training a cultural theatre group (*The Makuleke GG*) to give performances for tourists at the Makuleke B&B amphitheatre (ZAR 23,050 invested);
- A six months cyber tracker support consultancy. This consultancy was meant to train Makuleke rangers in cyber tracker technology to capture data on flora and fauna from the Contract Park to be used by the CPA and Joint Management Board when making Park management decisions (ZAR 21,980 invested);

- The establishment of a newsletter [*Deku Newsletter*] (ZAR 30,000 invested);
- Setting up notice Boards in the three villages (ZAR 15,000 invested);
- Translating and printing of the Makuleke CPA Constitution into XiTsonga (ZAR 5,000 invested);
- Donation of broadcasting equipment for the establishment of a local radio station (equipment donated by a Canadian NGO);
- Establishing a textile and craft production project to produce items for sale to tourists and lodges (no funds invested). (Collins and Snel 2008: 88-89; GTZ archives)

In the following sections, I will focus on the first two of these projects, which fall under the rubric of the joint venture company formed in partnership with Wilderness Safaris.

6.3 The Makuleke Small Business Support Company (SBSC)

In 2004, GTZ TRANSFORM registered the joint venture as a Section 21 Company to be the initial holding company for two small businesses at Makuleke: the Hydroponic Fresh Produce Farm and the Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (B&B).⁷⁸ The intention was for these projects to produce enough income to support themselves and to generate profits to be used to fund the development of other enterprises in the community (See Figure 11). In addition to setting up infrastructure for these businesses, a vehicle (a Hyundai 2.6 pick-up) was purchased by GTZ TRANSFORM to service the farming project and the B&B (ZAR 140,626 invested).

⁷⁸ From this point forward, I will refer to the Makuleke Community Centre and Homestay by its common name, the Makuleke B&B.




Figure 11 Small Business Support Company Structure

The Section 21 status of the Makuleke Small Business Support Company meant that it was a not-for-profit organisation. The idea was to employ staff from the community who would manage the company, market its products, access business support services, give advice and look after the assets purchased for the company (GTZ 2006c: 2). According to the Small Business Support Company’s Memorandum of Association (2005), “the company has a total authorised share capital of ZAR 100.00 consisting of 100 ordinary par value shares of ZAR 1.00 each with an issued share capital of ZAR 1.00 consisting of 1 ordinary par value share of ZAR 1.00” (WWB: article A). These shares were then transferred to Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke Trust, representing the members of the company (Ibid: article 1; Memorandum of Association 2005: article 31.2).

At the start, the Small Business Support Company’s management structure was composed of four directors: two from the Makuleke CPA and two from Wilderness Safaris (See Figure 12). According to the Articles of Association (2005, Ordinary Resolution 2), the four individuals were “appointed as directors of the Company, each appointment having been considered and voted upon separately” (Peters 2005: 2). As stated in the Minutes of the company meeting in July 2006, the role of the directors was to be an advisory one whereby they would “agree on new

developments and their funding, as well as ensure the correct running of the companies” (Mullen 2006: 2).




Figure 12 Small Business Support Company Management Structure

GTZ TRANSFORM registered the company in February 2006 and auditors from Deloitte & Touche were appointed. Three bank accounts were opened in Malamulele (one account for the Small Business Support Company, one for the hydroponic farm and a third for the B&B) and all assets were insured in November 2006 for a period of one year, the costs of which were covered by the GTZ TRANSFORM (Mullen 2006: 3). Once the businesses were all established, a handover meeting took place at the Makuleke B&B on May 31, 2007. At that meeting all enterprise assets were transferred from GTZ TRANSFORM to the Makuleke Small Business Support Company, and its board of directors was from then onwards responsible for managing the businesses.

My personal involvement with the Makuleke Small Business Support Company began at that meeting in 2007, and I was commissioned by Wilderness Safaris to report on the progress of the businesses at the time so that Wilderness Safaris could assist with future developments. My position was understood by those involved in the projects as that of a part-time employee of Wilderness Safaris whose job was to report on, and assist in the running of, the Makuleke Small Business Support

Company. As a result, much of the evidence I present from this point forward in my analysis is derived from participant observation.



Figure 13 Small Business Support Company Handover Meeting attended by GTZ TRANSFORM, Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris.
(Photos: May Shehab 2007)

From my initial inspection of the enterprise during the second half of 2007, it was evident that while the joint venture had good intentions, a number of structural flaws existed from the onset. For example, with regard to the B&B, the company had acquired a previously established asset, but had unfortunately also inherited a range of issues such as debt, lack of training, and a legacy of mismanagement in the operations of these assets. Throughout the subsequent three years (2007-2010) a great deal of effort was put into the Small Business Support Company in an attempt to sustain the businesses. Much time and resources were allocated by both Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA to support the enterprises, but after three years of continuous struggle, it became clear that the projects could not sustain themselves. Ultimately, at a meeting between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris in Johannesburg on May 24, 2010, it was decided that Wilderness Safaris would withdraw from the joint venture and that all assets would be returned to the

Makuleke CPA, thereby effectively ending the joint venture partnership (Minutes of SBSC Meeting Makuleke: 5).

The following analysis of the two small businesses reveals various issues that, when scrutinised both empirically and theoretically, offer insights into the reasons why the joint venture partnership was unsuccessful. The central concern of the remainder of this chapter is to assess the circumstances and events that took place during the years of operation that challenged the success of the Small Business Support Company in an effort to understand the multidimensionality and complexity of community joint venture partnerships with the private sector.

6.3.1 The Hydroponic Fresh Produce Farm

6.3.1.1 Background

Hydroponic farming is defined as the process of growing plants in sand, gravel, or liquid, with added nutrients but without soil (Hydroponics 2009). In early 2006, a Johannesburg-based contractor (Ashanti Logistics) was commissioned by GTZ TRANSFORM to construct the fresh produce hydroponic farm on a farming plot at Makuleke Village and oversaw the running of the farm until its handover to the Small Business Support Company in May 2007. At handover, the farm consisted of four greenhouse tunnels (80m x 20m), a packaging station, an office, a borehole, hydroponics drip irrigation equipment, and supplies of seedlings and fertilizers to start the project. GTZ also assisted in devising the legal documents and covering labour costs, training and staff salaries up to May 2007 (GTZ 2007: 2).



Figure 14 Fresh Produce at the Hydroponic Farm, Makuleke Village 2007
(Photos: May Shehab 2007)

In May 2006, ten villagers attended a two-week training course in hydroponics at Hefer Construction in Randfontein, and a production manager was employed from the Makuleke Traditional Authority. The trainees were chosen by the Makuleke CPA on the basis of their families losing land to the project that they had used for small-scale maize production (GTZ 2007: 2). Of the six trainees chosen to attend the hydroponics training school, “only four remained in the first year as the other trainees found work elsewhere” (Ibid: 2). In addition, an advertisement for the post of project manager of the Small Business Support Company was displayed at the three Makuleke villages, and a number of candidates were interviewed by a committee from Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA. The manager selected was contracted in November 2006 to oversee the two projects of the Small Business Support Company.



Figure 15 Fresh Produce grown in the tunnels and delivered to lodges in Makuleke Contract Park with Small Business Support Company Vehicle.
(Photos: Dave Hamman and May Shehab 2008)

The plan was for the fresh produce farm to produce vegetables (tomatoes, lettuce and spinach) for sale to the three lodges in the Makuleke Contract Park and to other markets (GTZ 2007: 2). According to the contractor, the crop cycle duration from planting seedlings to harvesting is approximately six weeks, and the first harvest was expected to be ready by August 2006 (Mullen 2006: 5). GTZ TRANSFORM anticipated that the lodges would place weekly orders and that the fresh produce would be delivered using the company vehicle.

In terms of wages, the initial proposition was that the farmers would not be paid a salary by the Small Business Support Company. Rather, they were to make their income directly from the sales of the fresh produce after covering expenses such as transport, a 10% sales commission to the company, seed and material purchases, electricity and water (GTZ 2006c: 2). Projected figures of ZAR 75,000 per month for tunnel production to ZAR 40,000 per month for a single crop such as tomatoes were cited by the contractor at the handover meeting in May 2007 at Makuleke.⁷⁹ After that meeting, the Small Business Support Company was given the responsibility of

⁷⁹ In the GTZ Status Report (2007) the projected income from fresh produce sale was estimated to be Euro 10,000 per month (2).

running the business and generating profits that would cover salaries and earn income to set up further entrepreneurial ventures.

Six months after inheriting the enterprise, many problems surfaced and it became patently clear that the farm “would never achieve what the contractor had predicted. In the best months, production had only come up to just over 5% of what was forecast” (Poultney 2008b: 2). Given this discrepancy between predictions and what actually transpired demonstrates that there were fundamental oversights in the planning and execution of this initiative. From the beginning, there was evidence of communication problems, inappropriate dispersion of project funds, insufficient training and staffing issues, and tense socio-political dynamics at Makuleke.

6.3.1.2 Hydroponic Farming in a Rural African Village?

The initial intention of establishing a hydroponic farm was to create a small business that would provide employment for community members and at the same time provide the tourism lodges in the Pafuri area of Kruger National Park with locally produced fresh vegetables. Distribution of produce (particularly tomatoes, spinach and lettuce) to the lodges in the Makuleke Contract Park began in June 2007 and all three lodge managers indicated that they were satisfied with the quality of their purchases from the community farm (pers. com. lodge management 2008). Although the farm did produce high quality vegetables from 2007 to 2008, my main concern was the long-term sustainability of the business since a preliminary literature search revealed that “hydroponic culture is possibly the most intensive method of crop production in today’s agricultural industry. In combination with greenhouses or protective covers, it is high technology and capital intensive” (Jensen and Alan 1995: 48).

Three main questions arose in relation to this finding: First, how did the idea of setting up a hydroponic farm at Makuleke come about? It seemed difficult to imagine that this could have been the community's request. Second, why choose the most capital intensive and technologically advanced method of farming for an initiative in rural Africa where it is particularly difficult to acquire essentials such as fertilizers and packaging materials, and even more difficult to acquire maintenance services for the hydroponics equipment? And third, how was this small farming business meant to provide consistent supply of fresh produce to the lodges and be able to compete with the lodges' other suppliers or find new markets and compete with established commercial farms already existing in this highly agricultural area?

Without delay, I set out to unravel the difficulties that were besetting the farm. I had not been able to locate a feasibility study, but from my own observations I concluded that a number of factors were affecting the success of the business. One of the main issues that hampered advancement was miscommunication between the partners and the misunderstandings that took place from the onset. As Clive Poultney, the Wilderness Safaris Community Liaison Officer and Chairman of the Small Business Support Company states in the *Work Plan for 2008*, "the work force of the farm never understood that they were an enterprise company on their own once the handover from GTZ took place" (2008b: 3).

During the time that GTZ TRANSFORM was establishing the project in 2006, the farm staff was accustomed to receiving their monthly salaries as part of the GTZ funding agreement. At the handover meeting at Makuleke in May 2007, the workforce was unexpectedly asked to make arrangements for their own income based on their sale of produce and successful running of the hydroponic farming business. At that point, GTZ TRANSFORM funds had come to an end and there was no more working capital left for the project. A strong reaction to this arrangement ensued at the handover meeting, and it became evident that the local workforce was neither interested in owning the project nor in being responsible for its

management. Their primary concern was to receive salaries at the end of each month (Massyn 2007: 2).

Moreover, at the handover meeting, the production manager declared his resignation and one of the farmers spoke out and said, “We were not aware that we would only be paid from the income generated from the produce Income [from sales] is not guaranteed to be the same every month, but a salary is. The only way we know, is if you work, you expect a salary by the end of the month” (Massyn 2007: 3). Having to own and manage the business in order to maintain their salaries was not what the farmers had in mind, and they were clearly dissatisfied with this arrangement. One farmer commented at the handover meeting, “Since you people came to take our parents’ farms, we never understood the nature of the business, how to get salaries, etc.” (Massyn 2007: 2). Why the farmers did not grasp the concept of the farm as a business is unclear. Either the organisers did not distinctly convey this message to the farmers, or the community was simply not accustomed to receiving funding for entrepreneurial start-ups, and expected GTZ TRANSFORM or the joint venture company to rather act as employer.

Another oversight was the wages that were set for the farmers. Even though the village councillor officially cautioned during a meeting and said, “We need to look at the employment situation in other sectors and compare to avoid difficult situations ... we don’t want to increase expectations” (Massyn 2007: 3), the farmers’ wages were nevertheless set at ZAR 2,000.00 per month, more than double the standard minimum wage level of farm workers in rural areas of ZAR 989.00 per month (SA Department of Labour 2007: 1). This meant that upon handover, the running costs including electricity, fertilisers, transport, seedlings, cleaning supplies, packaging equipment, and maintenance averaged ZAR 4,300.00 per month, and the total wages of the four farmers and manager (whose salary was split between the B&B and Hydroponic Farm) totalled ZAR 9,500.00. Together, these added up to ZAR 13,800.00, more than the total monthly income of the farm for the first six months of

operations, which averaged ZAR 10,900.00 (Poultney 2007a: 3). In response to the ensuing financial crisis, an agreement was reached between the company directors and the farmers to halve the employee's wages until more sales would be achieved. The earnings based on sales arrangement, as discussed at the handover meeting, was never followed through because the farmers insisted on receiving set wages. Understandably, the farmers did not have a hand in sales, and therefore did not want to bear the consequences of weak trade. Ultimately, this resulted in most of the farm's income being spent on salaries with little funds left to pay for other overheads.

Having no working capital to get the business off the ground, and with the strain of having to cover the large running costs associated with this highly technological type of farming, a dependency relationship ensued where finances from the B&B were transferred to the hydroponic farm in order to rescue the farm from the financial troubles that had accumulated. Such a commercial arrangement between the two enterprises was evidently not viable, and it proved to be unfeasible to sustain both businesses in the long run.

A further fundamental weakness of the farming project was insufficient training. The only training that had taken place was for farmers to learn about hydroponic farming techniques, for which they received certificates from Hefer Construction.⁸⁰ The Small Business Support Company manager had some previous experience from working at a local *spaza* shop, but was given no training in management or businesses skills for his new post, and was expected to manage and market the two businesses, and report to the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris directors. The manager's lack of marketing and business expertise resulted in much wasted produce since he was unable to effectively source new markets, coordinate lodge

⁸⁰ The course included: plant growth, definition, advantages and disadvantages of hydroponics, planning of a production unit, tunnel structures, site-preparation, tunnel erection and drainage, irrigation and climate control, growth instructions for tomato, cucumber and pepper production, plant pests and diseases and how to control them, harvesting and packing, marketing (www.hefer.co.za).

orders with production, plan replanting and timely purchasing of farm supplies, or to keep track of finances.



Figure 16 Left: Wasted fresh produce due to lack of sales.
Right: Tomatoes wilting due to lack of fertilisers.
(Photos: May Shehab 2008)

In an interview, the farm's leading customer (the Pafuri Camp manager) interpreted the problem in the following way:

It has to do with bad management. I don't think the people were trained properly on how to plant. There's no proper supervision of it. I think you need somebody that has been doing this kind of thing for a while. You can't just shove somebody into the project like that and expect them to have it all done 100%. So when the vegetables were there, it was quite amazing. Good quality, but the only problem was obviously there was no continuity or forward thinking going on. It was all about let's do this and let's do that. So it was all there, bam ... and then nothing. So that at the end of the day boils down to somebody to supervise it and do ongoing training, because you can't just go and say do this and that and then leave. I think they need to have supervision. That's what they're looking for. I mean, you can see from what was produced it can be done. It's just a matter of the right way to do it. So once it gets vegetables again, it'll be great! (int. 2008)

Furthermore, by the end of 2007, staff issues were mounting at the farm. Two more trained farm workers resigned due to their dissatisfaction with the decrease in wages and disillusionment resulting from misunderstandings relating to the farm as a business. Ultimately, those families who originally had plots to farm in that area lost their land, and their children who had been recruited to work on the hydroponic farm had become unemployed. Although in my interview with Collins, he states that the project was told that these families were compensated with alternative land (int. 2010), this was refuted during my interviews with other community members.

In an attempt to keep the farm running, the Makuleke CPA Small Business Support Company directors subsequently employed one other farmer to assist the two remaining employees, but it was not possible to send this new farmer for training due to strained financing at the farm. In addition, the lack of resources, the limited market, and high running costs led to much conflict among farm staff members, between farm staff and management, and tensions also arose between the Makuleke CPA Small Business Support Company directors and the CPA Executive Committee, largely due to lack of regular reporting. The Small Business Support Company staff consistently voiced their complaints to me concerning personal conflicts with other members of the project, and much time and effort was expended by others and myself in attempting to resolve these disputes.

Local socio-political maneuvering resulting from the advent of the Hydroponic Farm posed another setback for the project. As mentioned earlier, the land on which the infrastructure was built was farmland previously belonging to a number of Makuleke community members. I discovered through my conversations with people who were involved in the project that this land was allegedly seized from these residents by the chief in order to make way for the hydroponics project. One Makuleke resident remarked, "There were people who were occupying those plots. It was discussed that some of those people would be trained [in hydroponics] so that they can do better. The people agreed, but that power came to push the owners

out and bring the royal family in” [since the directors and some of the staff were associated with the royal family] (int. 2008). This statement indicates that the project developers were either not aware or not mindful of these kinds of political dynamics upon setting up the farm.

Furthermore, issues of a micro-political nature between the Makuleke CPA Small Business Support Company directors and the CPA Executive Committee also originated from previous political dissonance. When the Small Business Support Company management structures were set up, two CPA representative directors were selected from within the CPA Executive Committee, but with subsequent Makuleke CPA elections, the two chosen Small Business Support Company directors no longer served on the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee Board. This meant that the Makuleke CPA Small Business Support Company directors were no longer part of the CPA Executive Committee, yet they were not replaced by acting CPA Executive Committee members despite many criticisms of non-reporting voiced by the Makuleke CPA at general meetings. This caused much confusion with regards to the company projects as the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee were only accessing information concerning progress of the joint venture through the Wilderness Safaris directors and not through the ex-CPA representative directors.

Communication was clearly a problem in this respect and, coupled with a complex management structure and perplexing local politics, the end result was a relationship characterised more by conflict than cooperation. As Collins stated at the Small Business Support Company handover meeting in Johannesburg on May 24, 2010, “The idea of the Small Business Support Company was to strengthen the relationship between the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee and Wilderness Safaris, but it seems to be causing more tension rather than promoting the partnership” (Minutes of SBSC Meeting: 2). This outcome was evident to all those involved in the project, and although consistent efforts were expended by all the directors to help redress the situation, the farm became dysfunctional by the end of

2009 when crop production dwindled and sales averaged below ZAR 1,000 per month.

With no clause in the Small Business Support Company's legal documents enforcing the resignation of persons who are not representative of their organisation, and with consistent micro politics at Makuleke standing in the way of implementing such a condition, the hydroponic farm experienced an operational impasse. In addition, a number of other stumbling blocks typical to development initiatives more generally added to the malfunctioning of the farm. A particularly important aspect was the incomplete infrastructure of the farm at the time of initial handover to the community. Upon inspecting the farm at handover, it was evident that the plumbing installations were uncompleted, some equipment was defective, and no provisions had been made for marketing produce, maintenance or replenishing consumable supplies such as fertilisers and packaging materials. Despite the lack of adequate planning and incomplete execution, the project was nevertheless conferred to the community with celebration. GTZ TRANSFORM representatives and Makuleke leaders shook hands, took photographs, and final reports were submitted to the donors in Germany.



Figure 17 Left: Hydroponic Farm presented to community in July 2006.
Right: One example of incomplete infrastructure, photo showing no plumbing connected to wash basins at farm.
(Photos: Steve Collins 2006, May Shehab 2008)

Once GTZ TRANSFORM withdrew in May 2007, the Small Business Support Company was left to fend for itself. I spent many months at the beginning of my fieldwork working closely with the staff to complete plumbing installations, coordinate sales and transport, and ensure produce quality. Maintaining high quality depended mainly on the accurate mixing of fertilisers and the nearest place from where these ingredients could be purchased was Giyani, a distance of approximately eighty-five kilometres from Makuleke. Access to such crucial resources seems not to have been considered during the planning phase of the farm and proved to be cumbersome to organise and costly for the project.

Coordinating logistics and maintaining customer satisfaction also proved to be a challenge. Delivering produce to the lodges was expensive and time consuming because it requires approximately ninety minutes of driving from Makuleke Village through Kruger National Park to reach Pafuri Camp and a further thirty to sixty minutes to reach The Outpost and EcoTraining. Small orders from the lodges made it not worth driving the distance as the cost of fuel in relation to income from sales did not make logical business sense. At the same time, the lodges needed continuity and delivery guarantees from the farm, therefore adequate provisions had to be made to ensure customer satisfaction. With all the demands and constraints of the farm, it became evident to the farmers and manager that more than mere knowledge of planting and harvesting was required. A hydroponic farm is a business that calls for coordination with suppliers, infrastructure maintenance, quality control, staff management, marketing, sales, delivery, forward planning and so on. From Wilderness Safari's perspective, the Chairman explained:

You've got to understand farming these days to farm. Look, small hold farming, sure. If you want to plant your *mielies* [corn] and just make it work, that's easy. But if you want to have a business of farming, then you're up against agro-industries and big businesses. You know, small scale little farmers that are planting their *mielies* and living from day to day, they'll be wondering why the price is so low and why

fertilisers are not cheaper and all this stuff. That's the problem. (int. 2009)

The difficulty of running the operation eventually led to frustration among the staff and their interest in the project diminished rapidly. Unlike the subsistence farming they were familiar with, where seeds could be sown before the rainy season and harvested a few months later, the hydroponic farming system required intense labour and coordination, which the staff found taxing.

In an interview with Eric Tivani, then Makuleke CPA Executive Committee Chairman, he declared, "I don't think it's [the hydroponic farm] a good idea because that thing needs people who know how to operate such things. You can't build a thing for someone who can't operate it. It also needs money. Without money, we can't work there. We can't do it" (int. 2008). Further, another CPA Executive Committee member pointed out that although the farm was situated at Makuleke Village, "it did not actually supply the whole community" (int. 2008). Sale of the fresh produce was mainly targeted to supply markets external to the community, which was restricted to the tourism lodges inside the Contract Park, and the Saselamani Police Station, an additional contract the manager was able to source. Unfortunately, inconsistent production and supply made the contracted customers weary of ordering, and some crops such as lettuce could not even be sold locally since lettuce does not feature in the Makuleke traditional diet. Although a few Makuleke residents who lived near the farm did in fact purchase tomatoes and spinach at a reduced price, the problem of record-keeping and issuing cash purchase receipts proved to be another setback in commercial viability.⁸¹

A recurring complaint that arose in various contexts including that of the hydroponic farm is the issue of recruitment, where disputes emerged regarding how

⁸¹ The sale of fresh produce to institutions (lodges and police station) was accompanied by the appropriate paperwork for record keeping, whilst sales to individual community members was not consistently followed with the issuing of receipts and therefore proved difficult to keep track of.

individuals were selected and who had access to employment opportunities. An interview with a Makuleke staff member at Pafuri Camp exposed this concern:

At the end of the day, you have to make sure that those people who run the project are really honest. You don't have to take [recruit] everyone because he or she might be from the royal family. You have to look for people who are good in their minds and who have the capability of running such projects. So you don't have to take people because they are from the higher class. (int. 2008)

A number of statements of this nature point towards dissatisfaction expressed by some community members who felt that injustice was taking place when it came to job allocations in the villages. Although a clear recruitment policy was in place, whereby job openings would be posted at the three villages by the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee and applicants would be interviewed and screened, there still seemed to be loopholes in the process. In this context, the complaints are similar to those expressed by Pafuri Camp employees in the previous chapter where they alleged that too many people from certain alliances of power in the community found employment at the Camp.

More local politics surfaced with regards to the relationship between the Small Business Support Company and the Makuleke Chief. On several occasions, the Chief intervened in the affairs of the business, which generated lack of clarity regarding who was in charge (Minutes of SBSC Meeting, May 24, 2010: 1). In early 2007, the Chief ordered the closure of the farm because the farmers (one of whom was his daughter) did not receive their wages from GTZ TRANSFORM due to a financial shortfall at the time. One Makuleke resident recounts:

I still remember the day when the people there [at the farm] didn't make money for themselves to get salaries. The Chief himself went there and closed the project with the power of Chieftainship. So how did it [SBSC] change from being under the CPA and Wilderness Safaris? Can you see that? Things are complicated. When the Chief wanted to close the project, I

still remember Steve [GTZ TRANSFORM National Project Coordinator] was very cross at the time. The Chief said, "I am very cross". Steve said, "Yes, I am also cross because there is no one who has the power to close that project." Even myself, I don't know what authority is working there now. Previously I knew that it's for the community, it's for the people who are farming there. But it needs to be supported by the Makuleke CPA and GTZ who developed the resources and then it was granted to the CPA and Wilderness Safaris. Then the CPA and Wilderness Safaris supported those farmers to make profit so that they can bring back the money to the CPA. That is how I understood it before, but now things have changed the other way round. I don't understand what is happening. (int. 2008)

The ongoing involvement of the Chief in the affairs of the farming project not only caused confusion and misunderstandings, but his frequent interference also impacted on business operations. Quite often, for example, the Chief would order the project manager to run errands for him using the Small Business Support Company vehicle, thereby disrupting the manager's time and from a business point of view, effectively usurping the company's resources. One of the B&B staff protested:

Chief Makuleke is the head of our village. Well, he is part and parcel with us, yes, but the thing that I don't understand is when he just phones our manager and says, "Come with your car and go and fetch my mangoes and run this and that errand". He doesn't even want to know where James [the manager] is or what he is doing at that moment. He [the Chief] just calls him and tells him [the manager] to run errands with our company's car. While we say we want money to cover petrol costs, they say there is no money at the bank. He is using our petrol and when our car doesn't have petrol, we try to fill up petrol with our money from this business and we depend on that business. So what do you think of that? (int. 2008)

Scenarios such as the ones described above illustrate the complexity of power relations as they exist at village level. The chief's authority effectively surpassed any

other structures, and it was virtually impossible for community members to challenge their leader. Some people at the village alluded to instances of intimidation and threats to those who dared to voice their opinion on injustices taking place at the instigation of the royal household. Attempting to create a healthy business environment in such a context proved exceptionally difficult, and the inability to enforce clear rules and regulations contributed towards the Small Business Support Company's ultimate demise.

The failure of the hydroponic farm is therefore a consequence of a number of interrelated factors. The end result, I argue, is not only a direct outcome of operational issues including flawed design, inefficient management structure, financial strain, miscommunication and abuse of power among other problems, but is also a result of the fundamental assumptions and mindset of the conventional approach to development that the hydroponic farm represents. In the case of this farming project, the assumption was that the people at Makuleke were entrepreneurs by nature, and once the project was set up and instructions were given, somehow the community would run with the project. That aspiration did not materialise and, in my opinion, would not have succeeded even if the essential ingredients of the project were properly put in place (an effective business plan, good marketing, and working infrastructure, for example).



Figure 18 The Hydroponic Farm in its failed state.
(Photos: May Shehab 2010)

The reasons for this conclusion derive from a variety of key factors. First, the project idea did not stem from within the community. It was an alien idea delivered to the community by external players. This automatically excludes a sense of ownership of the project. Second, the highly technical form of farming was difficult to maintain due to logistical constraints relating to access to fertilisers and other necessary ingredients, and the difficulty of maintaining the highly specialised irrigation equipment. Third, this type of farming did not provide many jobs at the village and its produce was not intended to serve the community at large. Perhaps putting more effort into distributing the tomatoes and spinach amongst the community could have been more beneficial for both village residents and the project. Fourth, local politics was not taken into consideration. The tensions between the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee and the Small Business Support Company Directors representing the Makuleke CPA should have been attended to from the beginning, since this led to communication problems, misunderstandings and constant accusations. It was also evident that the community Directors never actually took the project on board as they often complained that they benefited nothing from giving their time and energy to the joint venture. In short, typical of an orthodox economic development model, the complexity of the developmental process was not appreciated by the implementers of this project. The point is that

the project failed not only because it was badly implemented, but because its founding principles were flawed. If similar strategies are followed, the mistakes made here will most likely be repeated in upcoming projects introduced at Makuleke.

6.3.2 The Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (B&B)

Another example of a failed development intervention is the Makuleke B&B and the trajectory of this initiative reveals a host of other difficulties experienced during the lifetime of the Small Business Support Company.

6.3.2.1 Background

The Makuleke B&B was initially built by the Makuleke CPA in 2001 with finance from the National Department of Public Works, and funding to complete the centre was provided by the Community Public Private Partnership (CPPP) unit of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).⁸² This accommodation establishment is located amongst residential homes at Makuleke village, adjacent to the Chief's house, the Traditional Authority and the Makuleke CPA offices. The B&B comprises six accommodation units in the shape of traditional African rondavels, each a double room with an en-suite bathroom. A central dining area and a replica of the traditional chief's rondavel lies at the centre of the facility, and there is also an outdoor amphitheatre for cultural performances. In 2001, the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee employed two housekeepers and handled the management

⁸² The name of the Makuleke Bed & Breakfast (B&B) was changed to Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay in 2007 by the Small Business Support Company directors who believed that the new name would be more attractive for the purposes of marketing to Wilderness Safaris guests. For more details on costs of constructing the Makuleke B&B, see Table 6.

and bookings of the B&B. The original intention was for the facility to serve as a “living museum” located at the village so that “local heritage and culture could be made available to visitors” (Minutes of Makuleke Workshop, April 24-25, 2001: 6). The first guests accommodated at the Makuleke B&B were tourists visiting the area to see the solar eclipse of 2001. Thereafter, the B&B managed by the Makuleke CPA, served mainly as accommodation for the many researchers, volunteers and land claimants from other areas that have visited the Makuleke since their successful land claim.



Figure 19 Makuleke Community Centre & Homestay (B&B) accommodation unit. (Photos: Dave Hamman 2008)

Many people familiar with the B&B would agree that to begin with, the establishment was a substandard facility with major flaws in its design. In an interview with Steve Collins, GTZ National Project Coordinator (2001-2007), he explained, “Yes, I’d say it [B&B] was mostly done [when GTZ got involved]. But it had been badly done before. I mean that thing has a history! That B&B, from the eclipse, its inauspicious opening, to what it is now ... there’s been problems” (int. 2010). In a facsimile correspondence dated February 19, 2003, to Peter Rich, the architect of the B&B, Collins questioned some features of the establishment including, “lack of ventilation in the rooms, no door between toilet and bedroom, no basin in bathroom, the dark mud walls and the solid bed platforms”. Collins stated

that such “bad design decisions ... left the community with a liability rather than an asset” (1-2).

In an effort to remedy the situation, and as part of the GTZ TRANSFORM initiative to “establish linkages between the Makuleke community and the lodge concessions in the Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park”, funds were directed towards upgrading the facility in 2006 (GTZ 2006a: 1-2). In 2007, the contractor commissioned by GTZ TRANSFORM (Ashanti Logistics) installed new bathroom amenities in the guest rooms, replaced beds, installed a main entrance gate, completed the reconstruction of the wall at the chief’s replica house, fitted the kitchen with equipment and catering supplies, installed a water pump, fixed lighting and planted some trees and flowering bushes. The contractor also put up road signage to market the Makuleke B&B and supplied some printed materials (business cards and letter-headed invoices). In addition, one grounds man and two chefs were employed from Makuleke and were to be trained by Ashanti.

With these improvements, the path was set to bring tourists from the Makuleke concessions in the park through to the village for a cultural experience, to get a glimpse into the history and culture of the area. Wilderness Safaris was prepared to include this cultural tour in their circuits, provided the establishment was of a reasonable standard to accommodate their guests. I personally gave a presentation at the Wilderness Safaris head office in Johannesburg in May 2008 spelling out to the ninety sales consultants the variety of projects, the activities and specialist tours available at Makuleke, the target market, incentive groups, and the breakdown of costs and rates. Makuleke tours and B&B accommodation prices were then entered into the Wilderness Safaris booking system in anticipation of further collaborative efforts with the Makuleke CPA through the joint venture.



Figure 20 Left: Makuleke GG Performers at the B&B Amphitheatre; Right: *Inyanga* (Traditional Herbalist) visited as part of Cultural Tours to Makuleke. (Photos: May Shehab 2008)

6.3.2.2 Operating a Village-Based Bed & Breakfast

As mentioned previously, my involvement with the Small Business Support Company began in May 2007, just as GTZ TRANSFORM was handing over the enterprise to the Makuleke CPA to form a joint venture partnership between the CPA and Wilderness Safaris. As with the hydroponic farm, I was asked by Wilderness Safaris to report on the existing state of affairs at the B&B so that support could be provided to ensure the business' functionality and sustainability. At that point, funding for the B&B improvements from GTZ TRANSFORM had just ended and the contractor who upgraded the facility had performed very poorly by any standard.⁸³ A similar scenario as at the hydroponic farm bedevilled the B&B. The long list of problems included: unsatisfactory and incomplete renovations where cheap materials were purchased and no adequate supervision was provided to install fittings and ensure proper functioning of renovations; unending crises with the water reticulation system due to poor workmanship and leakages; inadequate

⁸³ This is the same contractor as that of Hydroponic Farm (Ashanti Logistics), who also provides all supplies to Pafuri Camp from Johannesburg on a weekly basis. It was assumed that upgrading the B&B needed equipment from Johannesburg, which could be supplied by Ashanti Logistics, therefore cutting transport costs.

training of staff by the contractor; outstanding staff payments by the contractor; no working capital to go forward; dissatisfaction and confusion amongst staff and at the Traditional Authority regarding who was running the establishment; no marketing strategy; poor communication systems; poor access road; no technical amenities or office equipment; poor overall product (the design of the facility was impractical for running a tourism operation); and, lastly, an untrained project manager with no previous tourism or management experience (Shehab 2009: 6-17).

Faced with these difficulties, efforts were made by both the Makuleke CPA Executive Committee and Wilderness Safaris to remedy the situation. One of the first problems to be solved was the lack of water.⁸⁴ A borehole was sunk in December 2007 with revenue from a tour group donation (ZAR 10,000) and remaining costs supplied by the Makuleke CPA (approximately ZAR 2,000). After that, the Wilderness Trust donated funds to complete renovations, market the establishment and purchase office and communication equipment (ZAR 149,500). When these tasks were completed, I assisted the B&B manager with the following: the development of a booking system; the linking of the B&B rates and itineraries to the Wilderness Safaris main booking portal as part of a circuit tour; the creation of marketing materials with information on Village Tours, and the arrangement for these to be displayed at the three concessions in the Makuleke Contract Park. We also developed a website (www.makuleke.com) in March 2008 for the Small Business Support Company and its two subsidiary projects, and linked the website to online booking agencies for further exposure.

In addition to these improvements, the Makuleke Development Trust released funds (ZAR 98,500) to build a back area for the facility (a staff area, laundry and linen

⁸⁴ Water at Makuleke is provided by the municipality on a 3-day rotational basis between Makuleke and Makahlule (Block H). Thus storage tanks were necessary to ensure constant supply during days when water was not available from the municipality. However, in 2007, the B&B would frequently run out of water, not only as a result of guest, kitchen and garden use, but also from leaking toilets that emptied the water tanks during the night.

room) where there was none before.⁸⁵ After coordinating these upgrades, I discussed with the directors the need for training the chefs and housekeepers of the B&B. Wilderness Safaris offered to assist with training and the B&B staff were sent in succession to Pafuri Camp for a period of two weeks to experience a fully operational tourism facility. With training underway, the village tours were set in motion and the three concessionaires began sending their guests for cultural visits to Makuleke.



Figure 21 Makuleke Village Tour. Left: Traditional meal served at B&B. Right: Cultural performance (Makuleke GG) re-enacting forced removal. (Photos: Dave Hamman 2008)

On account of the upgrades and improvements made to the B&B, the establishment was able to support itself financially from 2007-2009 with the income it generated from guests staying at the facility along with income from the village tours. Marketing efforts paid off, with the website gaining exposure on the internet through online booking portals.⁸⁶ However, the main income to the B&B came from extended group bookings by researchers, development practitioners, people from

⁸⁵ Another faulty design feature of the B&B was the lack of a back area for storage and laundry. Until the back area was built, the housekeepers had used the guest-room cupboards for storage of linens and towels, leaving no room for the guests to put their personal belongings.

⁸⁶ After the website hosting subscription expired at the end of 2008, the manager chose not to renew the subscription even after persistent efforts on my part to convince him of its importance.

other communities who came to learn about the Makuleke land claim, and individual voluntourists.⁸⁷



Figure 22 Makuleke B&B renovations in May 2008.
(Photos: May Shehab 2008)

In addition to the fact that the Makuleke B&B proved to be financially viable during the time of this study, the village tours organised by the facility also provided opportunities for additional income to be dispensed throughout various segments of the community. For example, the GG cultural performers (named after the ‘Government Garage’ registration plates of the apartheid government vehicles used for forceful removals) had the opportunity to present their show in the amphitheatre of the B&B for all village tours and to other guests who visited Makuleke.⁸⁸ An *inyanga* (traditional healer) also received tour groups and demonstrated her trade for a set fee. Villagers provided transport for tourists from the concessions, traditional meals were prepared using local produce, and Makuleke guides escorted guests to the main sites of the village. In this way, the B&B spurred

⁸⁷ Voluntourism is leisure travel together with volunteer work. One example of a voluntourism activity that took place at Makuleke is that of an American couple who built a children’s library and learning centre at Boxahuku (Mabiligwe).

⁸⁸ The cultural performance at Makuleke originated with the *Women’s Msthogololo Dance Group* and was later named the *Makuleke GG* (Claassens and Hathorn 2008: 340). GTZ TRANSFORM funded the training and professionalization of the group to conduct performances for tourists depicting the historic forced removal of the Makuleke, their land claim, and their support for conservation and tourism (GTZ 2006d: 1).

opportunities for income-generating activities in other sectors at Makuleke who therefore also shared in the establishment's success. Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate a model village tour from Pafuri Camp including costs and revenues.

Activity	Duration	Time
Depart Pafuri Camp	-	07:00
Arrive at B&B	90 mins	08:30
Orientation at Makuleke B&B, introduction to guide	15 mins	08:45
Visit local <i>Inyanga</i> (traditional healer)	45 mins	09:30
Visit school/clinic/or hydroponic farm	60 mins	10:30
Traditional lunch at Makuleke B&B	60 mins	11:30
Makuleke GG performance	90 mins	13:00
Depart from B&B	10 mins	13:10
Arrive at Pafuri Camp	90 mins	14:40

Table 2 Itinerary for half-day village tour to Makuleke in 2008

Activity	Fixed Costs	Cost/pax
Transportation Pafuri – Makuleke – Pafuri	ZAR 300.00	
Local <i>Inyanga</i> (excluding private readings)	ZAR 200.00	ZAR 100/pax for private readings
Guided Tour	ZAR 150.00	
Traditional lunch at B&B		ZAR 65.00/pax
Makuleke GG performance	ZAR 400.00	

Table 3 Cost Breakdown for a minimum of four people when guests were charged ZAR 450.00pp. Two or less people were charged ZAR 600.00pp.

In spite of its relatively satisfactory economic performance over three years, the B&B experienced many difficulties. From a practical point of view, the lack of trained staff in the field of tourism and business was one of the biggest challenges. The Small Business Support Company had inherited the B&B with staff who had been working there for six years prior to the operationalisation of the joint venture. The housekeepers had been recruited based on the customary system of “picking IDs from a basket”.⁸⁹ The instructions the housekeepers were given by the Makuleke CPA was to clean the guest rooms every day, after which they could return to their homes. Difficulties arose in 2007, when I suddenly presented staff with more comprehensive roles and responsibilities, together with regulations for employment, based on the fact that the establishment had become part of the Small Business Support Company and was thus under new management. Inevitably, this caused some anguish amongst the staff who, under the new dispensation, had to exert more effort and spend more time on the job than they had been used to, with no increase in their monthly wages.

One example of a fundamental impediment to operational functionality was the system of handling cash at the Makuleke B&B. As mentioned earlier, the joint venture had opened three bank accounts: one for the Small Business Support Company, a second for the Hydroponic Farm and a third for the Makuleke B&B. When the farm could not cover its own expenses, money was transferred by the manager (on the authority of the directors) from the B&B account to help support the farm. Such movement of funds, and the limited record keeping to track movement, created much confusion and ultimately led to the draining of the B&B’s capital.

⁸⁹ In this system, which is considered fair, villagers put their identity documents in a basket, which are then picked out randomly as in a lottery. In some cases, recruitment was based on picking folded papers out of a basket that have either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ written on them. If one happens to select a ‘yes’, that means “you got the job” (int. B&B staff member 2008).

Another cash handling problem was that the local Makuleke CPA directors refused to give the manager petty-cash to cover minor expenses. This meant that every time money was needed at the facility, the manager had to follow the procedure of writing a requisition form, passing by one of the directors in the village who would write a cheque with the requested amount, driving to the bank in Malamulele (approximately 50 kilometres from Makuleke), standing in lengthy queues and withdrawing the cash from the B&B bank account. This process was not only complex and time-consuming, but was also very expensive to maintain, considering the cost of fuel for transport and bank charges.

To help reduce the number of trips to the bank, we attempted to set up an internet banking option. Although this service was a challenge to organise, since it is not common practice at banks in rural areas, we nevertheless managed to complete the required paperwork. Unfortunately, this option was subsequently never used because one of the local directors had no computer skills and would have needed assistance every time a transaction was to be made. And although the bank provided training in internet banking, the directors did not take up this offer. This example illustrates an oversight on the part of assistants to development for not only assuming the pre-existence of skills and capacitated individuals in a rural setting, but also that the relevant persons would take up training when such services are offered. However, this example also begs a question: while establishing any business requires a certain set of skills, why is it not ensured that the individuals who are recruited to operate the business actually possess these skills?

In my interview with Lamson Maluleke, he noted a further point: “Again, the question is, do we have that capacity as a community to manage these developments? This B&B was here for some time and it nearly became a white elephant. Yes, until you guys intervened, now it started to pick up. It is starting to realise its original intention” (int. 2008). This statement not only highlights the issue of capacity, but also hints at dependency. Maluleke acknowledges a lack of

capacity in the community and credits Wilderness Safaris for assisting in the management of the B&B. Nonetheless, from general conversations with Makuleke CPA members, I sensed that they expected Wilderness Safaris to manage the establishment *for* the community, rather than assist in training the staff to operate it themselves. Such a mindset ultimately reinforces the relationship of dependency in a partnership.

Moreover, I would also argue that the general perception that there is a lack of capacity in rural settings is flawed. I have met a number of individuals in the community who have substantial experience in various fields and others who show potential, competence and an eagerness to learn. However, the problem is that the skilled workforce struggles to find employment in the villages and most of them opt to migrate to urban areas where jobs are more readily available. The primary difficulty, as mentioned above in relation to the hydroponic farm, lies in the method of recruitment in the village, and the politics involved in recruitment processes more generally. In my opinion, therefore, recruitment is one of the fundamental issues that should be considered when expecting communities to take charge of projects. Specific emphasis needs to be placed on necessary skills for the job and these must be verified in practice prior to concluding an employment contract. This is not to say that other problems would not arise, but at least one would have a sense of what the employees are capable of, and their ability to contribute towards the business or project can be assessed from the onset. In addition, it is necessary to be mindful of local political dynamics and to be aware of the implications of recruiting people who are affiliated with certain political groups within communities. Age is another culturally-constructed constraint, whereby some employees might not accept being managed by a younger person. As difficult as such a recruitment process might be, it would surely be worthwhile to consider more carefully in order to have the right people in the right posts.

By the beginning of 2010, it was clear that both businesses had reached a state of collapse. The high operating costs of the hydroponic farm were depleting the B&B's financial resources and it could be argued that if the two projects were not connected, perhaps the B&B could have survived financially as it did in fact cover its own costs during the two years of operations as part of the Small Business Support Company. The problem, however, was mainly with its workforce, who was unable to take the establishment to the standard required by Wilderness Safaris to send its guests for overnight stays. Discussing these difficulties at a series of meetings between the joint venture partners together with facilitators and the legal representatives of the Makuleke CPA, it was eventually unanimously agreed that "the businesses were straining everyone" (Minutes of SBSC Handover Meeting 2010: 2). A decision was then taken for an "amicable divorce" of the joint venture as everyone had simply run out of patience. All Small Business Support Company assets were handed over to the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris offered its technical support to the community upon request (Ibid: 5).

In sum, the Small Business Support Company spent a substantial amount of money and invested a great deal of time and energy on two businesses at Makuleke for which there remains little to show today. Although there have been financial losses, I would argue that those involved in the Small Business Support Company have cashed in towards gains in experience and exposure to the benefits and constraints of business practices in a rural setting. Notwithstanding the frustrations experienced with the joint venture, there are many positive aspects to be learned from such failure that would assist in understanding the intricacies involved in rural development projects.

Makuleke B&B			
Source	Description	Year	ZAR
Department of Public Works	B&B construction	2000	518,400
Department of Arts, Culture, Science & Technology	Construction of amphitheatre and living museum at B&B	c. 2001	370,000
GTZ TRANSFORM	B&B Upgrade	2006-2007	154,989
Wilderness Wildlife Trust	Renovations, marketing, office equipment, research & training	2007	149,500
Makuleke CPA	Borehole top-up	2007	c. 2,000
Makuleke CPA	Refurbishments	2008	98,500
Total			c.1,293,389

Hydroponic Farm			
Source	Description	Year	ZAR
GTZ	Construction and training	2006-2007	715,557

Table 6 Setup Costs of the Makuleke B&B and Hydroponic Farm Since Inception

6.4 Discussion and Interpretation of the Small Business Support Company Outcomes

The previous sections presented empirical findings with regards to the Small Business Support Company and its two subsidiary projects. This section now turns to a discussion of the assumptions that underlie joint ventures; the question of power and socio-political influences on such initiatives; issues of ownership, function and structure of the Small Business Support Company; and finally, the viability of entrepreneurship at Makuleke.

6.4.1 Foundations of a Joint Venture

Joint ventures, in essence, are collaborative efforts. Barbara Gray (1985) defines collaboration as “a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of that domain” (227). Both parties involved in the Small Business Support Company acknowledged that they needed to work together to achieve certain objectives that were difficult to achieve separately. On the one hand, the community lacked appropriate skills and capacity to develop such enterprises and could benefit from partnering with an experienced business; and on the other hand, Wilderness Safaris felt the need to become involved in community development initiatives as part of their contractual obligations with their partners, the Makuleke CPA, and also to substantiate their community engagement profile. This partnership deal was in line with the premise that “collaboration among key players is a fundamental ingredient in sustainable development efforts” (Sautter and Leisen 1999: 312).

To ensure sustainability of a joint venture, a collaborative relationship between the partners must be coupled with a shared vision and consensus on how this vision is to be achieved. Tazim Jamal and Donald Getz (1995) contend that “collaboration offers a dynamic and flexible process for incorporating the often diverse views of multiple and interdependent stakeholders” (195). Common problems, however, include differences in opinions, values and worldviews that impact on the ability of partners from varied backgrounds to work together efficiently. GTZ TRANSFORM intended for collaborative efforts to take place in the Small Business Support Company and, in fact, processes of joint decision-making were followed through in extensive discussions, meetings and workshops. Nevertheless, interviews and observations during the course of this study show that although in practice the correct methods of collaborative decision-making were followed, in most cases the outcomes did not match the extent of the efforts.

6.4.2 Questions of Power and Socio-Political Influences

From its inception, the Small Business Support Company was fraught with complex relations of power. In this context, power is defined as, “the ability to impose one’s will or advance one’s own interest” (Reed 1997: 567). These types of power relations existed initially between the funders (GTZ TRANSFORM) and recipients (Makuleke CPA), then between the two partners of the Small Business Support Company (the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris), and extended within the company structure itself. Power was often also exercised by external forces that demonstrated control over the joint venture, such as interventions from the Chief and the Traditional Authority at Makuleke. Based on the empirical research I conducted on the Small Business Support Company, I deduce that although partnerships have the stated intention of promoting sustainable and equal relationships, in this particular case, existing contestations over power played a large role in the demise of the establishment.

In an interview with the Wilderness Safaris Chairman, he described the company’s relationship with the Makuleke as “still immature”, stating that they are “finding each other still” (int. 2010). Implicit in this statement is the recognition of a paucity of understanding between the two partners who at times have divergent views with regards to their objectives. Although the aim of financial gain is clear for both parties, they do not always agree when it comes to how this ambition is to be achieved. For example, the Small Business Support Company partnership cannot solely be considered a business deal since the main intent of the joint venture was community development. That being the case, I argue that as much as the Makuleke CPA was encouraged to delve into the world of business, so too was Wilderness Safaris foisted into community development activities prematurely, a situation that one of the Wilderness Safaris directors referred to as creating “an albatross”, saying, “I am not sure we are going to get it right, to be honest” (int. 2008). The director elaborated:

I think ideally, and in principle, it's [the Small Business Support Company] a great idea. From a practical point of view, that provides very definite challenges to manage and as we've discussed before and as we've found out, it requires a lot of input in terms of time and energy, and if you don't see any benefit coming from it over a relatively short period of time, let's say a period of three years, then one gets very tired and one is not motivated to put the time and energy that is required into it to ensure that it succeeds. So there is a payoff in terms of time and energy in input and the business benefit, the profit side of it. And if there is no profit at the end of three years, I'd like to see anybody put the same amount of time and energy into that project because ... listen, I'm not in the business of charity, o.k., and I don't think anybody is in Wilderness Safaris as a business. And this Small Business Support Company needs to succeed as a business entity or as a holding company. And if it doesn't succeed or is not perceived to be successful over a period of three years, then I think we got to ask questions as to how we readdress it, or we've got to pull out and admit that it's a failure and it's not going to work. But I think in terms of an idea and in principal, it's a very good idea. (int. 2009)

The message here suggests an overlap between the idea of a business partnership and the idea of charity. This director treats the joint venture as any other part of Wilderness Safari's operations and applies to it similar hard rules and procedures of the business world. He is not willing to expend more effort into the joint venture than would be necessary for any business and considers spending too much time and energy to be bordering on charity, which he denounces as incompatible with the company's commercial objectives.

6.4.3 Ownership, Function and Structure of the Small Business Support Company: a hazy picture

One fundamental difficulty the Small Business Support Company faced was the lack of a sense of ownership. Unlike the Pafuri Camp partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris, where it is clear that the Camp is currently owned by Wilderness Safaris and is to be transferred to the Makuleke CPA after forty-five

years, and that the land is owned by the Makuleke CPA and is managed jointly with SANParks, there was a “lack of clarity on the ownership of assets at the Small Business Support Company” (Minutes of SBSC Handover Meeting 2010: 1). Theoretically, the assets were owned by the joint venture, but “it certainly did not own the B&B,” for instance (Ibid: 1). This vagueness in who owns what assets added to the difficulties in operationalising the business. As stated at the final handover meeting in May 2010, “it would have been better to have a lease arrangement” (Ibid: 1). Such an arrangement would have provided more clarity to those involved and the business would have been structurally more robust.

The confusion over ownership emanated from the original intentions for setting up this joint venture. Collins explains that “the Small Business Support Company was not driven by either the Makuleke CPA or Wilderness Safaris, but a need was driven by GTZ TRANSFORM to disperse money into a 50%:50% asset in the form of a joint venture” (Minutes of SBSC Handover Meeting 2010: 5). In other words, the idea was pushed by an external donor (GTZ) to create a relationship in accordance with the donor’s own policies and expectations. This was a major factor in the community lacking a sense of ownership of the projects, and in frustrating their relationship with their partner, Wilderness Safaris. Apart from a lack of clarity on the proprietorship of assets, other key complications included: lack of documentation between Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA with regards to the Small Business Support Company; an ineffective management structure; confusion with regards to the deployment of funds; vague job descriptions; and no executive power vested in the manager who continuously had to seek approvals for day-to-day operational decisions from the four directors. Furthermore, my own involvement as a researcher was restricted to a mandate of assistance and reporting, and I did not have the directive to take actions. An atmosphere of uncertainty loomed over the project and much time was wasted calling for meetings and awaiting authorisations from directors. With regards to the lack of executive powers, one of the Wilderness Safaris Small Business Support Company directors stated, “If you are not the project

administrator or the project leader, you can only take your experience and support to a particular level and then let other people run with it. You cannot micromanage everything” (int. 2009).

One important question that I continuously sought to ascertain throughout my involvement at Makuleke was whether the intention of the joint venture partnership was to support and ensure the success of the businesses or to support the individuals who were employed by the businesses? I argue that these are two very different objectives and require different methods of assistance. On the one hand, if the individuals who are employed by a business do not have the capacity to perform their duties, it seems logical that the business could not thrive. Further, in relation to the Small Business Support Company, insufficient profits of one business would prevent the instigation of other community development projects (the original plan of the joint venture). Therefore, if the goal were to have a successful business venture with the aim of ensuring good economic returns, it would be essential to have capable employees. On the other hand, if the objective were to support community individuals to have access to jobs and the joint venture was required to provide these jobs, then the focus should have been on training and capacity building, with supervision and management from experienced individuals who could both oversee the training and the business components of the project as the trainees gained knowledge. In that case, there would need to be a clear division between the training and operational components of the business, and enough resources should be allocated to do both effectively.

One Makuleke resident, when I asked for his opinion on the joint venture partnership between the community and Wilderness Safaris, pointed out his concern over the apparent struggle to make the businesses work:

I must say we've got this Makuleke Cultural Centre and Homestay as well as the hydroponic Farm, and we had the privilege to be assisted both financially and in terms of governance by our partner Wilderness Safaris, but we seem to

be not using that opportunity to our benefit. The projects are there, but I don't see them running effectively. Or maybe it is because I had expectations, and I've already seen the potential in the projects, but we are still struggling with these projects. (int. 2009)

In analysing why the projects were struggling, I questioned perceptions of whose responsibility it was to make them work? GTZ TRANSFORM's idea of the joint venture was to lock the two partners into an equal relationship, but in practice, there evolved a definite dependence on Wilderness Safaris to direct the ventures based on their business expertise and financial resources. In a sense, the partnership had the counter effect of exonerating the Makuleke CPA since their involvement in the two projects effectively diminished after the Small Business Support Company was created and the CPA's presence was restricted to attending meetings and authorising decisions made by the Wilderness Safaris representatives. Essentially, the Makuleke CPA's main concern was economic gain and it did not exhibit a sense of ownership of the joint venture. This became evident when the CPA repeatedly requested to have the Makuleke Trust's loan to the B&B reimbursed, exemplifying a contradiction in their understanding of their role in the joint venture and that this money was invested in the upgrade of an establishment that they themselves were partners in.

The lack of clarity with regards to ownership and roles was coupled with a lack of commitment from both parties of the joint venture. Wilderness Safaris' community liaison officer (Clive Poultney) was self-critical when he admitted that there were "problems on either party's side" and that there was "lack of commitment to marketing the Makuleke Community Centre and Homestay properly [through Wilderness Safari's booking system]" (int. 2009). Poultney felt that as much as there was a lack of commitment on the Makuleke front to drive the business forward, there was also lack of commitment from Wilderness Safaris' side. On a practical level, Poultney mentioned that the B&B "could have been marketed better, but then

on the other side it was difficult for the local people to understand the industry to be able to take the product to a level of serviceability that would accommodate the Wilderness Safaris market” (int. 2009). In essence, the B&B was in a dilemma: it needed Wilderness Safari’s marketing and sales support, but at the same time, the B&B staff were neither able nor willing to produce a tourism product of the required level, and Wilderness Safaris was reluctant to send its guests to spend the night at the B&B until it was of a certain standard appropriate for their up-market clientele.

The hydroponic farm faced a similar predicament, although in this case, the lack of commitment could be attributed to the lack of expertise in hydroponics on the part of both partners. Having failed to counter the many problems experienced with the farm, Wilderness Safaris management admitted that “the idea was ill-founded and flawed from the get-go” (int. 2009), and that they [Wilderness Safaris] “haven’t got a clue how to farm” (int. WS management 2009). The lesson that can be learned from this experience is that if a private sector company is to engage in community development, it would make more sense to focus on the company’s core business activities, in this case conservation and tourism, rather than to expect the company to assist in industries it has limited or no experience in. Furthermore, with the intensive level of assistance required on the part of development actors to create economically viable small enterprises in a rural village, the difficulty lies in that the private sector partner [developer] may not consider its role to be both “provider and administrator” (int. WS management 2009). In reality, the more troubles the Small Business Support Company experienced, the more commitment from both partners began to fade. One of the Wilderness Safaris directors explained:

It is quite hard to sustain that commitment when it sometimes just becomes insurmountable. So on the one hand, you can understand that people’s commitment starts to wane because there are just no positive results. But then again you’ve got to then try and rekindle that commitment. Maybe that’s through a change of structure or a regular engagement of all the parties again. (int. 2009)

In addition, the more Wilderness Safaris attempted to rescue the businesses, the more powerful figures within the community began to characterise their actions as interventionist. At one point, Chief Makuleke accused Wilderness Safaris of taking over the projects. The Chief stated firmly, “you know the B&B is our cultural village and we must do all our cultural activities there. So if you take that place, I wouldn’t like it” (int. 2008). The Chief’s statement articulates a perception that Wilderness Safaris was making use of resources belonging to the Makuleke rather than assisting the community through the joint venture. This was an unwarranted accusation since Wilderness Safaris had no intention and had nothing to gain by engaging in such actions. What this situation reveals, however, is the Chief’s attempts to control an asset that should have been entirely within the jurisdiction of the Makuleke CPA. The reactions from various community leaders proved that there was a complex and inappropriate merger taking place between the traditional and democratic structures that mitigated against what would be considered, in modern democratic terms, to be good practice.

As had happened with the farm, sporadic interventions by the Chief thwarted proper management of the B&B. On several occasions, the Chief held large meetings at the B&B without informing the manager beforehand. This created awkward situations in relation to paying guests and caused ever-renewed speculation over the issue of ownership and control. At the Small Business Support Company handover meeting in May 2010, Poultney remarked, “Unfortunately there was a chasm between the two partners. What angered me is that Wilderness Safaris was accused of taking over the project. After that we ask, why carry on if we get reprimanded for it?” (Minutes of SBSC Handover Meeting 2010: 2). Ultimately, the non-community partner was made to carry the blame for what was effectively a struggle for control of the assets within the community (between the Makuleke CPA and the Traditional Authority), and this contributed towards undermining the partnership.

6.4.4 The Viability of Entrepreneurship at Makuleke

There are quite a few small entrepreneurship activities at Makuleke and even though many of them find it difficult to sustain their businesses, there are certain conditions that allow some ventures to thrive. I was told by Makuleke residents that most aspiring entrepreneurs have migrated to cities in search of better opportunities, but I did observe a number of small self-initiated enterprises in the villages during the period of my fieldwork (2007-2009). Self-motivated small informal businesses or services in the villages range from selling produce on the roadsides (fruit, vegetables, scones, drinks or air-time for cell phones), small *spaza* shops and transport services, to private commercial farming, craftsmanship and clean-up groups.



Figure 23 Trading at Makuleke. Left: Selling produce at roadside stand in front of Joas Phahlela Primary School. Right: a commercial shop at Makuleke. (Photos: Dave Hamman and May Shehab 2008)

Conversing with Makuleke residents about entrepreneurship in the villages, some pointed out the difficulties people encounter when attempting to set up their own projects. A teacher at Makuleke explained:

At our side, it's very much difficult. If you're not employed, what I usually see in the community is people just sell traditional beers. Some started with *spaza* shops, but not registered ones. Some are

selling oranges, bananas, and you find that the *spaza* is not big, just a little thing. Even when you look you find that it is not making money. They are just sitting there doing nothing. You might find that person is selling ten oranges per day and some vegetables, that's all Even if someone has a brilliant idea like selling fat cakes, you will find that it is difficult to maintain. Where are you going to get firewood? Because when you go there to fetch firewood, you will be arrested. And you will not have enough money to buy electricity. The price of flour is very expensive too, so it will be difficult to maintain that idea. (int. 2008)

Other than the financial and logistical difficulties of sustaining a small business at Makuleke, there are also social factors that inhibit success. From my observations, I deduce that a very important problem inhibiting people from engaging in entrepreneurial activities is intimidation through jealousy and witchcraft by those who "have nothing better to do with their time" or from "people in powerful positions" (pers. com. Makuleke residents 2010). One woman from the community explained:

People don't start projects on their own because of greed. If you start a project, once another person realises that you are making profit and doing well, he comes in with his jealousy to come and kick you out, or he uses any strategy that will hamper or disturb your future. (int. 2008)

Social barriers of this type are discouraging for anyone with ambitions, and not recognising their existence is a serious oversight on the part of outsiders who initiate development interventions. However, I am not proposing that the idea of entrepreneurship should be discarded in its entirety. The point is that developers should attempt to understand and address particular problematic circumstances such as witchcraft or tall poppy syndrome prior to initiating their interventions. In the case of Makuleke, working out the conditions that aggravate negative sentiments towards successful people would be a first step. Also, it would seem that assisting entrepreneurial initiatives that emerge from within the community (even if

influenced from elsewhere) would possibly have more positive impact than externally imposed ideas.

In spite of the financial, logistical and social barriers to entrepreneurship at Makuleke, there are in fact a number of success stories that are worthy of recognition. The three examples I portray here are efforts initiated by Makuleke residents regardless of external development interventions. The first is that of a self-employed pensioner at Makahlule village who established his own private farm, planting vegetables for sale to his community. According to Mzamani Mathye, Makuleke journalist for the *Daily Sun*, in 2008 this pensioner was remarkably successful with his market range growing beyond Makuleke villages to include other surrounding areas and five supermarkets in nearby towns. One customer from Makahlule said:

We are blessed to have this pensioner in our community. His vegetables are extremely cheap and all of us can afford it, whether rich or poor. Now we are also living a healthy life more than ever before. Back then, we used to travel long distances to look for relish, but now, we can only walk here. The old man is also creating job opportunities for us as the community. We are grateful to the old man for the job well done. (Mathye 2008c: 1)

A second example of an entrepreneurial activity is that of a young man at Makuleke who began his own business fixing wheelbarrows. According to Mathye (2008d), this young man took over his father's welding machine after the latter found employment in Johannesburg. The entrepreneur's welding services are rendered to a large number of households in the area that require this service.

One further illustration of self-initiated community service at Makuleke is a women's group called the Makuleke Cleaning Project. A group of twenty-one unemployed women came together to collect and recycle the village refuse in an attempt to combat the mounting threat of cholera. In my conversation with the women, they explained that they survive on donations from residents, but stated

that they would appreciate more support for their efforts. They mentioned that they would like to have working suits and gloves to ease their labour (pers. com. 2009). In recognition of their efforts, these women were honoured for their good work by the Vhembe District Municipality and the Makuleke Traditional Authority on Women's Day in 2011 (pers. com. Mathye 2011).



Figure 24 Left: Farming Entrepreneur at Makahlule Village. Right: Women sorting refuse as part of the Makuleke Cleaning Project.
(Photos: Mzamani Mathye 2008, 2011)

These three examples have one noticeable feature in common. Each of the services offered, whether primarily entrepreneurial or social, had the interests of the larger community in mind. In contrast to the Hydroponic Farm set up by GTZ TRANSFORM in cooperation with Wilderness Safaris to service the tourism lodges in the Contract Park, the pensioner's farm at Makahlule served the village residents first, and only then expanded to other markets. Similarly, fixing wheelbarrows serves a much-needed function at the villages, as does the Makuleke Cleaning Project. It is unlikely that residents would criticise or attempt to hamper efforts that offer tangible benefits or needed services to their community. In contrast, a facility such as the B&B, for instance, is geared towards servicing tourists and researchers, even though it is occasionally used for community gatherings. While it is understood that the B&B fulfils a necessary function to accommodate visitors, there have been

grievances expressed by residents that they do not have access to the facility (although organised communal functions were always welcomed).

These case studies suggest that two key points are crucial to the success of entrepreneurial projects in rural areas such as Makuleke: the concept of focusing on individuals' success in development projects, and the idea of targeting local needs as opposed to wider commercial markets. As was illustrated through the joint venture projects, the benefits accrued from these businesses mainly served the interests of individuals involved in the projects, primarily through wages. In addition, target markets for both projects were externally oriented: tourism lodges for the produce of the hydroponic farm and foreign visitors for the B&B. My argument here is that businesses and services that aim to benefit the community as a whole are more likely to succeed than those whose focus is restricted to individuals or whose target market is outside the villages. Inclusiveness also minimises feelings of jealousy or resentment towards entrepreneurs since everyone stands to gain from their services. In addition, community-focused enterprises also encourage local spending, thereby minimising leakage of much-needed cash flow out of the villages. With this in mind, it would be more appropriate for development interventions, whether encouraging entrepreneurship or providing services, to recognise cultural contexts by considering the effects of focusing on individuals in societies that function within communal value systems. As espoused by Munyaradzi Murove (2008) in his writings on post-colonial Africa, "economic relations must be sensitised to the well-being of the whole community, instead of being solely premised on individual acquisitiveness and self-aggrandisement" (107).

More often than not, there is a visible disconnect between the aims and operational methods of external development interventions with lived realities on the ground. Conventional development projects tend to focus on improving the economic livelihoods of individuals within a rural communal setting, but this may in fact produce more harm than good. As Isak Niehaus (2001) explains, witch-hunts occur

when there is “uninhibited pursuit of money ... [when people are] considered to be envious of wealthier residents, and particularly eager to attain wealth and positions of influence” (58-59). Furthermore, entrepreneurial activities that produce sudden wealth may result in social tensions. In Niehaus’ (2001) assessment, “Money ... used for personal enrichment was deemed to be extremely dangerous” (58). It may be for this reason that the farmers at the Hydroponic Farm expressed preference for wage labour as they regarded this form of employment as more stable and also more socially acceptable. The fact that the farm did not orient its efforts to service the community was also problematic.

Despite all the efforts that were invested into the joint venture partnership, I contend that its failure was predictable based on the way in which the venture was conceived, planned and executed. On the whole, the Small Business Support Company demonstrates an example of orthodox development interventions that have been extensively criticised for their “technocratic plans to construct [a rural communities’] future” (Crush 1995).

6.4.5 Theoretical Discussion

As with the previous chapter considering the concession agreement between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris, specific insights from post-development theory provide a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in achieving developmental objectives through a joint venture such as the Small Business Support Company. Referring to some of the post-development propositions, a number of observations can be made regarding the notions of help, partnerships, and unfounded assumptions.

Post-development theorists argue that generally speaking, modern help serves the interest of the helper and more often than not, is unhelpful to the recipient. In this

regard, Marianne Gronemeyer (2010) argues, “Self-interest is now the decisive factor in the provision of help” (62). The establishment of the Small Business Support Company supports this claim. As outlined in section 6.4.3, the idea of the joint venture was based on the need of GTZ to dispense of a certain available budget that had to be utilised for a 50%:50% joint venture enterprise. The point here, is that the joint venture was established to satisfy the need of the donor, not the recipient. It is difficult to imagine that the Makuleke community expressed the need for a hydroponic farm at their village. However, the GTZ, together with its expert consultants in South Africa, found it appropriate to allocate their funds in a highly technically advanced farming venture in rural Africa and linking that to a wider market outside of the village.

This gesture of help that is both modernising and dismissive of actual need is precisely what post-development theorists reject. They argue that conventional development aid for the sake of modernisation is generally considered to be “a struggle against backwardness ... [and] the delay of reason” (Gronemeyer 2010: 62). Using this logic, an ultra-modern farming enterprise was set up in a community that is on its way to being developed, “driven forward” along the development trajectory to shrink the gap between itself and the modern world. As Gronemeyer (2010) so aptly stated, in these situations, “help does not help” (67).

Tracing back the evolution of the Small Business Support Company from its inception phase as an external technical assistance project through to its transformation into a joint venture partnership arrangement with Wilderness Safaris by way of collaborative decision-making, the conversion experienced by the enterprise could be considered a step towards a post-developmental stance. The fact that the Small Business Support Company changed from a subordinate status of recipient of aid to an elevated status of business partner is commendable. This move substantiates the post-development emphasis on equality, respect and participation. However, even though this upgrade seemed theoretically sound, it

still did not satisfy an adequate form of development. Not only was the project unhelpful, but it also caused tensions and power struggles within the community, as well as between them and their partners.

Another point with regards to the Small Business Support Company's change of status regards the fact that the Makuleke Chief did not consider the initiation of the hydroponic farm and the upgrade of the B&B by the GTZ as an intervention. On the contrary, the assistance seems to have been welcomed by the Chief (who also served as Chairperson of the Makuleke CPA at the time). However, power struggles began once the businesses were elevated to a joint venture status and the Chief ironically accused the community's partner, Wilderness Safaris, of "taking over" the projects when their intention was to transform them into viable businesses. This situation proves that an adequate understanding of the socio-political milieu in which development projects are initiated is essential. Even though the structure of the joint venture seemed theoretically well grounded, existing power relations and cultural constraints within the community undermined its success as a profitable enterprise.

Ultimately, the Small Business Support Company was based on flawed assumptions to begin with. First, the idea that a highly technical externally initiated development enterprise, aiming to link a rural product to a competitive market with no clear marketing plan and false financial predictions would be able to succeed, is unreasonable. Second, the assumption that the joint venture would benefit 'the community' not only shows an oversight of the likelihood of elite capture, but also contributed towards perpetuating existing power relations within the community. And third, the Small Business Support Company was founded on what Latouche (1993) terms a "*technological catch-up strategy*" rather than an appropriate technology that is "suitably acclimatised and progressively domesticated" (178; emphasis in original).

Regarding the suitability of projects, it seems peculiar that self-initiated entrepreneurial projects such as the ones described in section 6.4.4 do not seem to constitute “development” at Makuleke. Even though the community-oriented vegetable farming enterprise, the fixing wheelbarrows service and the women’s clean-up group all fulfil necessary economic and social functions within the community, contribute to the well-being of its people, and seem to be running sustainably, these are overlooked as development efforts. Perhaps they are disregarded because they are informal or because there were no external “experts” involved who “externally defined” the people’s needs (Storey 2000: 41). Whatever the reasoning behind this, in my view, seeking out existing self-initiated ventures and supporting these both financially and by creating relevant support networks would be more productive than launching development projects that are based on external ideas and that most likely entrench and reproduce existing power relations. This type of help, I propose, would constitute more useful helpfulness.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I described and analysed a set of community development projects that were initiated by GTZ TRANSFORM at Makuleke village as part of a joint venture company between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. The plan, effectively, was for this joint venture to lock the two partners into a ‘joint brand’, thereby incentivising both parties to collaborate and support each other. I sought to detect the various underlying issues that beset the successful implementation of the enterprises and argued that the two examples (the Hydroponic Farm and the B&B), like many development interventions, were based on faulty assumptions, were badly executed, and were not focused on the enhancement of communal well-being.

A number of difficulties afflicted the joint venture even before it was handed over to the community. It began with the questionable premise that if GTZ TRANSFORM

and Wilderness Safaris provided finance, technology and short-term training, then people employed from the community would be able to run these enterprises profitably. Issues relating to intent, planning and execution were inherently problematic, and the Small Business Support Company inherited these adversities. More specifically, the projects were characterised by inappropriate design, misallocation of funds, insufficient training, high running costs, problematic recruitment, and lack of clarity with regards to roles played by each partner. Furthermore, the joint venture found itself entangled in contestations over power that manifested in interference by external structures in the businesses, misunderstandings between the partners, and a lack of commitment from both parties to ensure project sustainability.

The joint venture partnership was also founded on the ideals of joint decision-making, collaboration and aimed to commit the two parties to an equal relationship. What resulted, however, were power struggles and the lack of a sense of ownership of the projects by the community, along with heavy reliance on Wilderness Safaris to manage the businesses on their behalf. The lack of clarity in the foundations of the projects not only resulted in confusion over the joint venture partners' ownership of assets, but also over its priorities and responsibilities. This eventually generated a lack of commitment from both parties.

I showed how the neglect of socio-political factors hindered the effective implementation of the joint venture businesses. I then drew comparisons with self-initiated entrepreneurship projects that had the immediate needs and interests of the larger community in mind, and argued that these are more likely to succeed since they offer services or address needs that are communally required, or widely supported by community members. I drew attention to issues relating to feelings of jealousy and resentment of successful individuals at the villages although I acknowledge that this is not an exceptional occurrence at Makuleke, since the tall poppy syndrome is common to many other societies worldwide.

In addition to exposing the practical difficulties experienced by the Small Business Support Company, I analysed the situation using insights from post-development theory. I focused on the concept of “help” that is so criticised by post-development theorists for its “unhelpfulness” in most orthodox development contexts. I also discussed the application of inappropriate technology in an attempt to achieve community development along with the oversight of the likelihood of elite capture, which negates the objective of equitable development. Sachs’ (2010) statement is opportune here, stating, “to invoke the right to development for the sake of greater equity is ... an untrustworthy undertaking” (x).

For all these reasons, I conclude that the Small Business Support Company represents a typical example of orthodox development initiatives where, generally, there is a disconnect between the aims of external development interventions with the lived experiences and needs of the people being ‘developed’. Nevertheless, I argue that although the Small Business Support Company would generally be interpreted as a complete failure, it provides some value in that it clearly highlights the complexities of development practice and of applying post-development theoretical critiques in the field. A consideration of the issues raised here should help “provide terms with which we can better understand the failures of development” (Siemiatycki 2005: 57).

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Children in the Wilderness Programme: Investment in Experiential Learning

“When we see a bird, we see meat. When we see a tree, we see wood ... We want to pursue nature for our own interests. Some of the learners maybe used to practice poaching and destroy nature. But this programme [CITW] will help them to conserve their own natural resources.”

*Primary School Teacher
Makuleke, 2008*

7.1 Introduction

Chapter Seven presents and discusses the Children in the Wilderness (CITW) programme, a children’s educational initiative developed by Wilderness Safaris in Botswana and adopted at Makuleke in 2005 with the opening of Pafuri Camp in the Makuleke Contract Park. CITW is a non-profit organisation that works in partnership with Wilderness Safaris and aims to facilitate sustainable conservation through leadership development. Although this initiative does not constitute part of the contractual obligation of Wilderness Safaris towards their partners, nevertheless, the company considers it an essential means to foster good relations with the Makuleke community, to invest in long-term educational gains for their children, and to contribute towards conservation and the preservation of earth’s natural resources. Considering that the majority of children at Makuleke have never entered the Kruger National Park prior to their participation in CITW, I demonstrate in this chapter how Wilderness Safaris, through its CITW initiative, serves to bridge the divide between the Makuleke community and their ancestral land (the Pafuri area) and aims to instil in Makuleke children a positive relationship with nature.

Operationally, the CITW regional coordinator and her immediate staff are based at the Wilderness Safaris head office in Johannesburg. This team is supplemented with other CITW personnel who drive the programme on the ground. These individuals are mainly drawn from the Wilderness Safaris lodges in each of the seven countries in which the company operates and usually includes lodge managers and staff.⁹⁰ In some cases, as in Makuleke, a community liaison person is employed by CITW to assist with the logistics of the programme and offer local insight.

Unlike the joint venture arrangement of the Small Business Support Company (discussed in Chapter Six), CITW is not in an official partnership with the Makuleke CPA. Rather, the Makuleke CPA cooperates with CITW by endorsing the initiative and acting as a link to the Makuleke schools at N'tlhaveni.⁹¹ CITW corresponds with the Makuleke CPA on a continuous basis, informing them of plans and procedures. From there, the CPA is requested to inform the school principals and correspondences are then passed on to the CITW representative teachers at each school for implementation. At the programme's inception, one teacher per school was appointed by the Makuleke CPA to take charge of CITW at their respective schools. As opposed to other teachers who come from other provinces, all five teachers that were selected for CITW are residents of the Makuleke villages. Their contribution to the programme includes selecting children for CITW Camps according to criteria predetermined by the CITW team in Johannesburg,⁹² filling out registration forms and coordinating the children to attend CITW Camps, Follow-Ups and Environmental Clubs (details of these three initiatives are discussed in section 7.4).

⁹⁰ The seven countries in which Wilderness Safaris operates are Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁹¹ There are four Primary Schools and one High School at N'tlhaveni: Makuleke Primary, Joas Phahlela Primary, and N'wanati High School at Makuleke; Boxahuku Primary at Mabiligwe; and Makahlule Primary at Block H.

⁹² The child selection criteria was decided upon based on discussions at workshops that included CITW coordinators, local community representatives from all seven countries in which the programme operates, and professional individuals who assisted in synchronizing the process.

My role with CITW began while I was working on the joint venture projects at Makuleke (2007-2009). Because I was spending much time at the villages, the CITW Regional Coordinator approached me to implement a CITW Follow-Up programme at Makuleke. Follow-Ups were intended to provide a sustainable extension of the CITW Camps that had been taking place at Pafuri Camp since 2005. Considering CITW's developmental aims through education, a significant constituent in the Wilderness Safaris–Makuleke CPA partnership, I was keen to assist in this endeavour. I signed a Memorandum of Understanding in April 2008 for the part-time post of CITW Follow-Up Coordinator, with the agreement that I would be able to include CITW in my research analysis concerning tourism-led development at Makuleke. Shortly thereafter, CITW sent me to Botswana to accompany a long-standing CITW coordinator on a visit to rural villages near the Okavango Delta to see first-hand how a Follow-Up programme is implemented. I also attended CITW training sessions in Johannesburg (2008) and Victoria Falls (2009), and after successfully setting up the Follow-Up programme at Makuleke in 2008, my role the following year expanded to include CITW staff training at Pafuri Camp, CITW Camp co-ordination and the setting up of Environmental Clubs at the Makuleke schools. In addition, I also volunteered as staff support for the fund-raising event *Tour de Tuli* Cycle Tour in 2010 (details of this tour are discussed in section 7.5).

In conjunction with my commitments towards CITW at Makuleke, I carried out ethnographic participant observation and gathered empirical data for this study. As with the Small Business Support Company, my methods included in-depth interviews with a variety of people involved with the CITW programme including members of the Makuleke CPA, the royal family, schoolteachers, CITW mentors at Pafuri Camp, Wilderness Safaris management and the Chairman of the CITW Board of Directors. In addition to these interviews and my direct participant observation in the field, I also consulted archival material including CITW training manuals, newsletters, minutes of meetings, and workshop reports.

In this chapter, I seek to present CITW as a developmental initiative aimed at educating Makuleke youths in conservation and life-skills. I demonstrate the extent to which this programme differs from other developmental initiatives at Makuleke and how it stands in contrast to the failed economic interventions at the villages. Although CITW has experienced its fair share of difficulties, its prospects, in my opinion, are promising based on its operational structure, its relationship with the community, its methods of benefit distribution, its values and its world-view.

The first part of the chapter (7.2) sets the stage by outlining the educational opportunities and constraints faced by Makuleke youths growing up at N'tlhaveni. I then describe the CITW programme in section (7.3), detailing its founding idea, how it developed, its vision and its long-term objectives. Further, I illustrate the operational aspects of CITW, including child selection processes and staff training methods as well as the philosophy behind the children's camps. In Section (7.4), I explain how CITW was extended from being an annual event at Pafuri Camp to include a Follow-Up programme and Environmental Clubs at the schools in the Makuleke villages. Thereafter, I present in section (7.5) an account of CITW fund-raising methods that finance the programme.

Interpretation and discussions follow in the third part of the chapter (7.6). I begin by interrogating the CITW vision, its objectives and the difficulties the programme faces at Makuleke. After illustrating the perceived impacts of CITW on children and staff, I then examine issues of concern to Wilderness Safaris regarding CITW's values, the ownership of the programme, and the sense of entitlement projected by the Makuleke. In addition, I inquire into community perceptions, in particular those of community leaders, teachers and mentors involved in CITW. I examine concerns over priority spending, curriculum input from teachers, and the CITW children's selection criteria. I then analyse these findings within the framework of the three main themes of this study: benefits, values and contestations over power, and finally, I evaluate the programme through the lens of post-development theory.

7.2 Makuleke Education: opportunities and constraints

Formal education was introduced to the Makuleke community in the early twentieth century. At Old Makuleke in Pafuri, the first western-style school was introduced by Swiss Missionaries in 1911. Patrick Harries (1987) establishes that:

In the 1920s the school was attended by twenty to twenty-five children, mostly girls. By 1937 attendance had grown to seventy-five and the Makuleke chief was collecting a tax, which totalled £2 14s 3d in that year, to pay a teacher with a Standard Six qualification. In the year of their removal, the school consisted of one hundred and twenty pupils, two teachers and two small classrooms. (103-104)⁹³

In an interview with Chief Joas Phahlela, he recounts his childhood at Old Makuleke: “I was born at Old Makuleke and was growing up there like other boys, looking after my parents’ cattle and donkeys and learning at school until I left it in 1956” (int. 2008).⁹⁴ According to the Makuleke CPA chairman, there were two primary schools at Old Makuleke: Makuleke Primary and Boxahuku Primary which was built in 1960, and they were both moved to N’tlhaveni during the forced removal in 1969 (pers. com. 2011).



Figure 25 Joas Phahlela Primary School.
(Photos: Pafuri Makuleke School Report 2008)

⁹³ In 1937, Chief Muchapi was the leader of the Makuleke community (see list of Makuleke chiefs in Appendix 2).

⁹⁴ According to Harries (1987), Joas Phahlela Mugakula Makuleke became Chief of the Makuleke community in 1975 (123). However, the chief himself sites 1976 as the year he was officially pronounced as chief (pers. com. 2008).

After settling at N'tlhaveni, another two primary schools were built at Blocks H and I. Makahlule Primary School was built in 1972 and more recently, the fourth primary school, Joas Phahlela Primary was established in 1992 (pers. com. school principals 2011). According to a Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member, N'wanati High School was constructed in 1975/76 between Blocks I and J,⁹⁵ but was partially demolished and moved to its new location in the late 1980s since "it was inside the demarcated area for the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme" (pers. com. 2011).⁹⁶ Over the years, funds were raised through various sources to add classrooms and refurbish the schools.⁹⁷ The numbers of enrolled children at the five schools in 2008 were: 500 learners at Makahlule Primary School in Block H; 433 learners at Makuleke Primary School at Block I; 707 learners at Joas Phahlela Primary School at Block I; 582 learners at Boxahuku Primary School at Block J; and 1,510 learners at N'wanati High School.



⁹⁵ The information concerning N'wanati High School differs in John Nkum's (1996) study on the Makuleke. Nkum's interviewees state that the high school was built in 1980 and that "The community built it by collecting money from everyone, and with government subsidies." (9).

⁹⁶ My interviewees stated a number of different narratives concerning the demolition of N'wanati High School. While some explained that it was demolished, others mentioned that its roof blew away in a storm.

⁹⁷ Between January 1982 and August 1983, a total of ZAR 2,515 was collected for the construction of classrooms to which the Gazankulu government was to add a subsidy of ZAR 4,000 (Harries 1987: 121). After the land claim in 1998, a number of NGOs and individuals contributed towards refurbishing schools including the Embassy of Japan that made a donation to improve Boxahuku Primary School. Part of the lease fees from the lodges in the Contract Park were also allocated to renovating the schools (int. Livingstone Maluleke).

Figure 26 Left: Demolished N’wanati High School.
Right: Lunch Break at Makuleke Primary School.
(Photos: Pafuri Makuleke School Report 2007 and May Shehab 2008)

The schools at Makuleke, as in many poverty-stricken areas in South Africa, face a number of difficulties including overcrowding and lack of resources. Connie Mbowani, a multi-award winning teacher from the Motsosi Lower Primary School in the Vaal Triangle argues that “learning doesn’t take place in a social vacuum”. This is because “for many learners countrywide the road to education is still littered with stumbling blocks – poverty, long distances they have to walk in order to get to school, inadequate facilities and derelict school buildings” (Moloi 2003). This is certainly also the case at Makuleke. In February 2009, a group of American volunteer teachers visited Boxahuku Primary School and reported their experience in *The Mercury News* upon their return to the United States. Sandy Sims (2009) writes:

They [American teachers] found classes with as many as 90 children and were surprised to find 40-plus students sitting in classrooms, waiting quietly for instructors who never showed up. There simply aren’t enough teachers to cover all the classes. The two American teachers slipped into these teacher-less classes and started instruction Pombo got around the English language problems by teaching songs with gestures to the younger learners. She found the children running up to her after class and in the village singing and gesturing. (5-6)

The American teachers also spoke with some of the primary school teachers at Boxahuku and shared their knowledge of the profession. After being allowed to conduct a classroom session, one of the Americans said, “Teachers, undertrained and overworked, expressed awe and surprise at the smallest teaching ‘trick’ we pulled” and that children who normally learn by rote, “were dumbfounded at the idea of playing a game in order to understand math” (Sims 2009: 6). The difficulty at schools, therefore, not only lies in the lack of facilities, but also in the teachers’ capacities to instruct and the children’s potential to learn.



Figure 27 Left: Makuleke youth walking to N’wanati High School.
Right: Lack of facilities at Boxahuku Primary School.
(Photos: Dave Hamman 2008)

Notwithstanding the problems facing schools at Makuleke, it must be acknowledged that there are many teachers at these schools praiseworthy for their inspirational motivation and positive influences on their students. One guide at Pafuri Camp stated that a teacher “had shown faith in him as a learner, and [that he] never wanted to disappoint that teacher” (Sims 2009: 1). I also spoke with several teachers who expressed pride at some of their students’ achievements after matriculating from N’wanati High School. Many of these students pursued tertiary education and I learned of one who was sponsored by the government to pursue a doctoral degree in Cuba (int. CPA Exco. member 2009). Furthermore, numerous examples of successful Makuleke can be found working as professionals such as lawyers, doctors and pilots in Johannesburg and other cities around South Africa (int. Greeff 2008; pers. com. Makuleke residents 2008-2009).

After the land claim, opportunities were made available at Makuleke in tourism and conservation. Since 1998, Makuleke youths have pursued degrees in field-guide training and other hospitality-related fields, and have found employment opportunities at the lodges in the Makuleke Contract Park. “We have lots of children who are very bright,” says a CPA Executive Committee Member. “But the problem is they have poor parents According to my sense, children should be sent to

tertiary schools for better education. They are lingering about here because their mothers and fathers do not work, no job, nothing” (int. 2008).



Figure 28 Makuleke youths. Left: Makahlule Primary School. Right: N'wanati High Schoolers. (Photos: Dave Hamman 2008)

Evidently, the socio-economic environment at Makuleke impacts on children's schooling experience. Not all children have the opportunity to attend school, and many drop out before completing Grade Twelve. A CITW survey with the school principals at Makuleke in 2008 cited that the main reasons for children dropping out of school are poverty and teen pregnancies. This was corroborated in my interviews: “Children have a shortage of food at home,” explained a Primary School Principal. “They also don't come to school when they don't have a uniform. If a child comes to school without a uniform, other children laugh at him” (int. 2010). School principals also cited alcoholism, HIV/Aids and other afflictions as difficulties faced by Makuleke youths. Moreover, another primary school teacher maintained that “poverty can drive you into bad behaviour sometimes ... some children leave school, drink, smoke *dagga* and steal” (int. 2008). He further explained:

I happen to meet several children doing the same thing: you find that a child is performing very well at school – excellent, and suddenly you find that that child doesn't complete the course. When we try to follow up, we find that he's joined the tavern, drinking, smoking. If you look at that child and you know the

potential of that child, it's very painful, it can hurt you. (int. 2008)

Another disadvantage apparent at Makuleke is the lack of recreation and sporting facilities. Although the children make do with the resources they have to play soccer or form choral or dance groups, for instance, recreation facilities are in short supply.



Figure 29 Children entertaining themselves at Makuleke.
Left: Playing marbles (Photo: May Shehab 2008).
Right: Playing soccer (Photo: Dave Hamman 2008).

Conversing with some high-school girls at Makuleke, I was told that the stresses of survival can force girls to drop out of school in order to enable them to assist their families with household chores. Also, some stated that their friends “intentionally get pregnant so as to access the child support grant of ZAR 230.00 per month” (pers. com. Makuleke youth 2008).

Teachers also relayed incidents of intimidation by their students where they felt that their place within the community could be jeopardised through scandal. A teacher at a Primary School explained:

There are lots of difficulties and challenges because working with children, the kids sometimes can talk about something that never happened. If the child doesn't like schooling, he can say bad things about the teacher. If the parents are not good enough, they can come and insult you. So that is the worst part of it when

you are facing some challenges like that. Because even if a child talks bad things about you and you are moving around the community, you are not considered a good member of the community. They look at you in the wrong way. But if you are doing good things, they will welcome you all the time and they will need your help. (int. 2008)

This statement provides some insight into the effects students can have on a teacher's social standing within the greater community. Teachers not only have to be concerned about their reputation, but also feel pressure to "do good" in order to maintain their status in the village.

Considering the abundance of problems facing Makuleke youths and adults in the teaching profession, additional edutainment programmes targeting the younger generations could provide much needed assistance. One possibility is children's camps that can influence the youth's morality and world-views through teaching useful life skills in an entertaining environment that is conducive to learning. According to Karla Henderson and Deborah Bialeschki et al. (2008), children's camps "aim to promote active participation, caring relationships, and emotional, social, spiritual, and physical growth for campers and staff" (3). Children in the Wilderness is one such initiative that aims to provide necessary support and educational benefits through its residential camps.

7.3 Children in the Wilderness: the founding of an idea

According to Wilderness Safaris, the founding idea of CITW started in August 2001 when the American actor Paul Newman visited one of the Wilderness Safaris camps in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. During his stay, Newman witnessed the devastating conditions of so many children in the region (Wilson 2008: 5). This experience sparked a conversation with camp management about Newman's charity organisation for children with serious illnesses, The Association of Hole in the Wall

Camps (HITW) in the United States.⁹⁸ The actor had founded the Hole in the Wall Gang Camp in 1988 in Ashford, Connecticut: “a wondrous place [that] became the starting point for what is now a global family of camps, providing life-changing experiences that are empowering, fun and always free of charge” (HITW 2008: 2).

As the story goes, Newman felt compelled to extend the Hole in the Wall Camp experience to Africa. He recommended that his Global Partnership Initiative (GPI) introduce the camp model to children living in the southern African region (HITW 2008: 2). By the end of his discussion with Camp management in Botswana, “it was suggested that the respective visions of his [Newman’s] children’s organisation ... and Wilderness Safaris’ be combined to create a new and uplifting African children’s environmental and life skills programme” (CITW 2008: 3). Wilderness Safaris embraced the idea and initiated the planning and implementation process of the CITW programme a few weeks after this conversation.



Figure 30 A child from Children in the Wilderness Camp at Pafuri Camp and the Children in the Wilderness Logo.
(Photos: CITW Pafuri Camp 2008)

⁹⁸ “The Association of Hole in the Wall Camps (HITW) leads the world’s largest family of camps for children with serious and life-threatening medical conditions. Founded by Paul Newman over two decades ago with the idea that no child should have to compromise their childhood because of a serious illness, the Association today oversees eleven full member camps in eight countries, eight new camps in various stages of development, and five Global Partnership Initiatives in Africa, Asia and Latin America” (HITW 2010: 1).

To lay the foundations of CITW, educators with over twenty years experience in children's camps were appointed from the United States to train Wilderness Safaris staff. There was also a Staff Exchange Programme that enhanced camp leadership and empowered staff teams by giving them the opportunity to "draw on the experiences and skills of peers; to share best practices, challenges, and questions" (GPI 2009: 1). This training was meant to enable the Wilderness Safaris staff to "return to their home programs with a toolkit full of valuable strategies, ideas and resources" (GPI 2009: 1). Thereafter, the trained staff combined what they had learned with their own local understanding of specific community and cultural issues in their regions and founded the CITW programme in southern Africa.

The programme materialised at the first CITW Camp at Vumbura Plains, Botswana in December 2001. The doors of this Wilderness Safaris luxury lodge were closed to paying guests in order to host children from surrounding villages. After a successful experience of running a CITW camp at Vumbura, Wilderness Safaris decided to expand the programme to all seven countries where the tourism company operates (see Footnote 90).

7.3.1 The Children in the Wilderness Vision

The CITW 2008 prospectus states that the programme dedicates its efforts to helping children in southern Africa "whose childhoods have been disrupted by life-threatening conditions such as illness, extreme poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic". Furthermore, the programme works towards "restoring a sense of hope, purpose and the possibility of a bright future to orphaned and vulnerable children that live alongside the protected areas and parks in which Wilderness Safaris operates" (Wilson 2008: 5).

Following Hole in the Wall ideals, the CITW vision aims to “create a network of learning sanctuaries that uplifts, conserves and cares for our children and our planet” (CITW 2008). This could be achieved by giving vulnerable children the chance to experience a fun-filled and educational camp, the focus of which is to ensure that the children continue with their schooling and are inspired by their unique environment (CITW 2008: 4). In addition, Heather Wilson, CITW Regional Coordinator (2008) states that the programme aims to “increase the capacity of young Africans to cope with life’s challenges and to educate, empower and inspire them to actualise their greatest potential. It also focuses on building awareness of and responsibility for their beautiful natural heritage” (5).

To encapsulate the philosophy of the programme, the CITW promotional DVD quotes the Senegalese environmentalist Baba Dioum:

In the end, we will conserve only what we love,
we will love only what we understand,
we will understand only what we are taught. (CITW DVD 2009)

In other words, the programme’s philosophy maintains that if children do not value or appreciate their environment, they cannot be expected to preserve it as they grow older. Moreover, if their lives’ circumstances are marred with poverty, disease and inequalities, the children would not have the opportunity to consider such an option. The key guiding principle for CITW is that in most instances the programme cannot “change the circumstances surrounding the life of a child. However, by empowering them and equipping them with life skills, [the] objective [is] to create resilient children, children who are able to better handle their lives and deal with life’s adversities” (Wilson 2008: 7). In this way, it is CITW’s conviction that through their programme a worthwhile contribution could be made towards addressing issues of extreme poverty and disempowerment in rural African villages.

7.3.2 The Child Selection Process: inclusions and exclusions

The child selection process for CITW is fundamental to the realisation of its long-term objectives. Realistically, only a limited number of children can be hosted at CITW camps every year; therefore they have to fall within specific selection criteria to qualify. Each country deals with this issue slightly differently, but the common theme is that all regions “work with vulnerable children” (Wilson 2008: 7). Annual workshops and training sessions are organised for CITW staff to discuss issues that emerge during the course of the programme. These meetings allow for problems to be addressed and for the programme to be further developed and refined.

After a few years of running the programme, the CITW board and staff members felt it appropriate to re-evaluate the selection criteria and to discuss the future of the programme on a regional level. On that account, a two-day CITW Environmental Workshop was held in Johannesburg in February 2009 and all participants from the seven countries in which the programme operates came together to discuss these issues. Malcolm McCulloch, CITW Chairman of the Board, stated in his opening speech, “CITW is a federal model, whereby enthused and empowered individuals work together within an agreed constitution and with broad set parameters”. During this speech, McCulloch also asserted that “CITW is well poised to move into a new phase, whereby we can grow and extend on our objectives” (Wilson 2009: 1).

During this Environmental Workshop, we discussed the long-term goal of CITW, and this led to an extensive debate that culminated in the alteration of the key objective of the programme. We agreed that the child selection criteria should include leadership potential rather than focus exclusively on vulnerability. The outcome of the debate was the recognition that CITW should not merely be a social upliftment programme, but that its new goal is: “To facilitate sustainable conservation through leadership development” (Wilson 2009: 5). Although the initial CITW objectives were in line with those of Newman’s Hole in the Wall camps, primarily focusing on

“life changing experiences for children with serious medical conditions” (HITW 2008: 1), from Wilderness Safaris’ perspective it was necessary for the aims to change in order to extend the sustainability of the programme and to accommodate the company’s broader, and longer-term goals. To achieve these goals, the selection criteria for participating children also had to be reviewed.

Until the 2009 workshop, many children had been excluded from CITW because they did not fit the criteria of vulnerability. Children of employed parents or from members of royal families, for instance, were never able to attend camps because they were not considered sufficiently needy. CITW coordinators raised concern that if such children were ignored, there could be negative repercussions. Leaders in the communities could possibly not fully support the programme; poor and vulnerable children might be victimised on returning to their communities; and there was likely to be little conservation impact in the long run (Wilson 2009: 7). It was therefore accorded that it is important to include non-vulnerable children to enable them to gain an appreciation of conservation principals. To exemplify, Geoffrey Aupiti, Botswana CITW Coordinator, commented that the threat to conservation is the Chiefs or other members of the communities being tempted by alternative sources of income: that is, from mining, hunting (both legal and illegal) and poaching (Ibid: 7). The workshop participants also considered the likelihood that royal children would become leaders in their communities irrespective of the influence of external development programmes. For this reason, it would be beneficial for children from such backgrounds to learn about environmental issues since they would one day be in a position to impact positively on conservation.

The inclusion of non-vulnerable children, however, did not mean that those who were vulnerable were to be excluded. We felt that CITW should continue to work with vulnerable children since they are always overlooked and generally do not have standing, voice or prospects for their future. We believed that since CITW offers the chance to create new visions and build self-esteem in vulnerable children,

the programme should be able to give them the opportunity to blossom and become leaders too. The outcome of the 2009 Environmental Workshop, therefore, culminated in the expansion in priority from the original goal of creating resilient children to a goal promoting conservation through leadership development, a vision more in line with Wilderness Safaris ideals.

7.3.3 Children in the Wilderness Staff Training

Although the emphasis is on the children, CITW Camps are also enlightening experiences for lodge staff members who become CITW Camp mentors for a week, and play a crucial role in the success of the programme. All lodge employees including managers, housekeepers, guides and chefs take part in CITW camps. For the few days in which the children reside at the lodges, the staff members' roles change from their routine of serving tourists, to becoming mentors for the children of their own communities. The experience is intended to be rewarding for the adults involved as CITW believes that staff can benefit from exchanging the roles they normally play in their professions with new roles that are both illuminating and entertaining.



Figure 31 CITW Staff Training at Pafuri Camp.
Left: Lecture, discussion and Exercises. Right: Practical Activities.
(Photos: Nicola Harris, CITW Johannesburg)

In preparation for each CITW Camp, an interactive training session involving exercises and games is held on site for two days to ensure that all staff involved have a clear understanding of the programme and its objectives, and are also taught how to implement activities and be good role models. During training, it is emphasised that, “first and foremost, CITW is about the children”. The CITW Training Manual explains: “The children are here to learn about environmental awareness, conservation, HIV/AIDS, health, peer-related issues, etc., but as importantly, they are here to grow.” Growth can be achieved by creating a safe haven for the children whereby the staff are encouraged to create “an environment where physical and emotional risks are managed well and participants are supported ... elements that are essential for learning” (2008: 9). By following these guidelines, the CITW staff is able to contribute positively towards the children’s development.



Figure 32 School Teachers attending CITW Staff Training at Pafuri Camp
December 2008.

(Photos: May Shehab and Nicola Harris)

As importantly, schoolteachers in the communities also stand to benefit from CITW. They too are invited to attend the CITW Staff Training sessions to become familiar with the CITW teaching methods, and to enable them to take this experience back to

their classrooms in their villages. The idea is for teachers to become acquainted with methods of education using games and fun to achieve a learning goal. CITW hopes that these teachers come to realise that “children learn best when it is fun”. In addition, training participants also begin to understand the importance of a healthy relationship between mentors and children. CITW emphasises the point that:

a relationship with a caring adult may be the most important factor in a child’s positive development. This is more important than learning specific life skills, more important than being in school, and more important than a safe community. All of these factors make a big difference, but the caring adult relationship makes more of an impact. (CITW Mentoring Approach 2008: 3)

7.3.4 Children in the Wilderness Camps: Learning Sanctuaries

In all the countries in which Wilderness Safaris operates, CITW camps average five nights, and the lodges that host the camps are transformed into educational and recreational havens during that time. The numbers of children who attend, the number of camp days, and the particular activities are dictated by the nature of the lodges, their locations and available facilities. A lodge by the seaside, for instance, would focus largely on marine activities, whereas a lodge in a bush environment would take children on game drives and involve them with terrestrial pursuits. The camps function somewhat differently in each of the countries, but they all follow the same guidelines, principals and objectives.

As regards Makuleke, the CITW experience began in November 2005 at Pafuri Camp. The first camp held at Pafuri had a unique selection criterion in that it hosted thirty children from various shelters in each of the metropolitan centres around South Africa (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth). The campers were chosen by the South African Police, and were aged between ten and sixteen years. As stated by Wilson, “The children participated in a six-day edutainment programme, with activities such as game drives, hugging baobab trees, T-shirt

painting and a bird identification course” (CITW 2008: 14). The following year, CITW at Pafuri Camp incorporated the selection criteria agreed to by all the Wilderness Safaris camps, and from that time forward, hosted forty-five children each year from the Makuleke community exclusively.



Figure 33 CITW Camp at Wilderness Safari’s Pafuri Camp, December 2008.
(Photos: May Shehab)

CITW activities at Pafuri camp focus on life skills development and fostering awareness of nature. The daily curriculums include a variety of activities such as game drives, nature walks, theatre performances, and making arts and crafts, for example. The children also engage in interactive workshops about wildlife, the geography and geology of the area, health, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, littering, recycling and the importance of wilderness areas to their communities, their countries and the world. On the whole, CITW aims for such activities to foster a sense of childhood in the campers, instil hope and self-esteem, as well as inspire an appreciation for wilderness areas.

7.4 Extension of the Children in the Wilderness Programme

7.4.1 Children in the Wilderness Follow-Up Programme

My discussions and interviews with teachers and community members revealed that the CITW camps at Pafuri gave much needed hope to many Makuleke children. However, teachers felt that to fulfil such hopes substantively, the programme could not only be a once off experience in a child's lifetime. In response to this sentiment, and in an attempt to advance the programme and make it more sustainable, the CITW board of directors called for the extension of the programme's benefits by keeping track of the children's development throughout their school terms. A meeting at Wilderness Safari's head office at the beginning of 2008 culminated in a decision to broaden my involvement with CITW and one of my duties was to plan and implement the Follow-Up Programme at Makuleke. This entailed gathering all the children who had attended CITW Camps at Pafuri since its inception in 2005 to take part in a one-day follow-up mini-camp every three months. The Follow-Ups were to be held at the Makuleke B&B at Makuleke village, and mentors from Pafuri Camp were to facilitate the sessions. Each Follow-Up was to recap what the children had learned during their CITW Camp, and introduce new themes, activities and games.

In August 2008, I conducted the first CITW Follow-Up programme at Makuleke. This programme offered the opportunity for CITW children from different schools to meet again and share their experiences. Great care was taken by the organisers to ensure that all children would be able to attend the Follow-Ups. We organised transportation for those who lived far from the Makuleke B&B, and teachers were requested to pursue those who had dropped out of school. The Follow-Up sessions were events encompassing song and dance along with new themes that offered further opportunities for the children to learn, discuss and share knowledge.



Figure 34 CITW Follow Up at Makuleke B&B
March 2009.
(Photos: May Shehab)

7.4.2 Children in the Wilderness Environmental Clubs

In 2009, the CITW Board of Directors felt the need to extend the CITW programme at Makuleke even further. A decision was therefore made to establish Environmental Clubs at the five schools at Makuleke. CITW gave two reasons for this: to ensure sustainability of the CITW programme, and to increase access for more children who would like to be involved. A Community Liaison from Makuleke was employed in April 2009 to coordinate the setting up of the Environmental Clubs with the schools. These clubs offered opportunities for all learners in the Makuleke villages who were interested in the environment to meet, learn, discuss and expand their knowledge of environmental issues. Unlike the Follow-Ups, Environmental Clubs were not limited to children who had attended CITW Camps before, but were open to any child who was interested in joining. The Environmental Clubs focused on teaching children about their environment and the conservation and sustainability thereof. In the process, they also learned and practiced many life skills such as leadership skills, teamwork, planning, problem-solving and interpersonal skills, to name a few. The principle was that “by educating children on

sound conservation practices, teaching them about sustainable use of resources and creating environmental leaders, one of the key contributors to conservation would be fulfilled” (CITW 2009).



Figure 35 CITW Environmental Club at Makuleke (Recycling Component)
August 2009.
(Photos: Bongani Baloyi, CITW Community Liaison)

The Environmental Clubs met every two months and by 2009 there were 200 members between the five schools with a student committee of three students per club. The three committee members at each school performed the roles of Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer, and were elected by their peers through democratic voting procedures. Environmental projects and tasks were identified and organised by the Community Liaison in cooperation with the CITW representative teachers and the student committee members. Club members were encouraged to participate in the planning process and develop their own ideas in order to encourage them to take ownership of their clubs. The Community Liaison held regular meetings with teachers at the Makuleke B&B to write reports, discuss upcoming projects, evaluate the sessions and provide feedback to me as programme coordinator. I then met with the regional programme coordinator at head office in Johannesburg to discuss progress made and to plan the way forward.

7.5 Funding Children in the Wilderness

To cover the operational costs of running Children in the Wilderness camps, Follow-Ups and Environmental Clubs in all seven countries, annual cycle tours are organised by CITW head office as fund-raising events. Since 2005, hundreds of participants cycled through national parks and border crossings as part of *Tour de Kruger*. According to CITW, that first year, *Tour de Kruger* hosted approximately 100 cyclists and included about thirty sponsors and a backup crew of eighty staff and volunteers who transported 80-100 tons of water, food and equipment over 350 kilometres in five days. Wilson (2008) states that “This innovative bike ride, in addition to being a unique opportunity for cyclists to ride through remote and beautiful National Parks, raised a significant amount of money for both Children in the Wilderness and the Peace Parks Foundation, a non-profit conservation organisation” (17). Since then, other cycle routes such as *Tour de Zambezi* and *Tour de Tuli* have been introduced. In 2010, the number of cyclists had increased to 450, with fifty-four cyclist-leaders, and 150 staff and volunteers travelling through four National Parks in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa (*Medscheme Tour de Tuli 2010*). Roughly, ZAR 2 million was raised through the *Tour de Tuli 2010* for CITW, but this is not the only source of income for the programme (McIntosh 2010: 6). To compliment the fundraising through cycle tours, CITW also depends on worldwide charitable donations from organisations and individuals who support the initiative.



Figure 36 Medscheme *Tour de Tuli* Cycle Tour 2010.
(Photos: May Shehab)

As has been demonstrated, CITW is a self-financed programme, continuously engaging in fund-raising activities to support its initiative. Although Wilderness Safaris offers its staff, camps and facilities free of charge, expenses such as food and transport are covered by CITW. The ZAR 2 million raised in 2010 through the *Tour de Tuli* cycle tour was distributed amongst the seven participating countries in which CITW is hosted. In addition, each country fund-raises separately to enable further development of the programme. This includes organising fund-raising events as well as sponsorships, donations and volunteerism.

The cost of running a CITW Camp at Pafuri, for instance, is approximately ZAR 140,000 to host forty-five children for seven nights. This cost includes transport, meals, programme material, training, T-shirts, giveaways and remuneration for a coordinator and a professional photographer. A CITW Follow-Up session at Makuleke B&B every three months, hosting 130 children, costs between ZAR 10,000 to ZAR 15,000 excluding staff wages. Furthermore, Environmental Clubs held at the individual schools at Makuleke every two months cost approximately ZAR 110,000 per year for 200 children (excluding wages). By the end of 2009, CITW had hosted 3,013 children in its programme in seven Southern African countries since its

inception in 2001. Of these, 178 children attended CITW at Pafuri Camp from 2005 to 2008.

7.6 Discussion and Interpretation of CITW Benefits, Values and Power

Besides the financial relationship between Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA, CITW offers a contribution in a different capacity to the Makuleke community. This contribution entails offering Makuleke youths educational opportunities in conservation and life-skills. As stated by Wilson (2010), CITW aims to endow rural children with a “different perspective and instil a passion for conservation, so that motivated environmentalists and leaders can emerge, who will one day be tasked with protecting our natural heritage” (3). Furthermore, the CITW Board of Directors Chairman, contends that the programme is targeting a handful of children “who will be able to gain from the experience and ultimately make a difference in their world. It’s like going over to study in a different world,” says McCulloch, “and that experience will therefore create more leadership” (int. 2009).

Although CITW is generally regarded as a worthwhile endeavour, the manner in which its contributions are interpreted by community members is dependent upon their own experiences with the programme and its relevance to their lived realities. Delving into the intricacies of CITW and giving consideration to the different role-players and how they interpret the programme’s function and objectives, offers an indication of the extent of the programme’s effectiveness.

7.6.1 An Examination of Benefits: impacts of CITW on children, staff and the Wilderness Safaris brand

The evidence I collected during my research shows that CITW has wide-reaching effects on all those involved, although not exclusively as intended by the organisers. From Wilderness Safaris' perspective, certain impacts are expected to take place given the curriculum, camp locations, teaching methods and overall philosophy of the programme. In this section I examine the extent to which these expectations are fulfilled. Further, through personal observations, discussions and interviews with the teachers and staff taking part in CITW, I analyse the extent to which the participants felt the programme impacted on the children and the effects it had on themselves as mentors.

Fundamental to the CITW programme is the promotion of environmental and life-skills education. This type of learning is meant to instil in the children a sense of hope for their future through positive experiences with caring people. Experiencing CITW camps should give the children an opportunity to envision possibilities in life and may induce in them the aspiration towards goals they had not previously considered.

To verify whether such anticipated outcomes are in fact achieved at Makuleke, I asked the teachers what they thought of CITW and whether they noticed any changes in the children's behaviour after camp. One teacher explained, "I think CITW is good and it would be even better if it was for all learners. They learn a lot here: they learn to be together, they learn about the bush, the animals and the plants" (int. primary school teacher 2008). Another teacher pointed out, "What I think is important is that CITW enables children from different families who have different challenges to be in one place where they are taught how to live together, how to share, and how to participate freely without any intimidation" (int. 2008). From my personal observations, interaction did indeed seem to play a significant

role in fostering new relationships. For instance, on the last day of CITW camp, I noticed children exchanging contact details as they bid each other tearful farewells.

Another positive impact of CITW that teachers referred to on several occasions is the opening up of possibilities for career paths. One teacher clarified:

You see, during the previous government, every learner would think that when he/she passed Standard 10, they would become either a policeman, a teacher or a nurse. But through this CITW programme, learners will change their mindset and be interested in conservation and tourism. I think those are some of the careers that are forgotten. (int. 2008)

The opening up of possibilities for future employment is also emphasised by the CITW board of directors. As McCulloch explains, the aim is not necessarily to convert CITW children into Wilderness Safaris employees, but to open up horizons that are meant to encourage children to see possibilities and potential prospects (pers. com. 2010). At Pafuri Camp, the children see people from their communities working as guides, managers, chefs, housekeepers and during a tour of the camp, members of staff explain their individual professions to the children. At a Follow-Up session focusing on Eco-Tourism, professions in the tourism and conservation fields were also discussed. That session confirmed that most of the children had minimal awareness of such possibilities prior to that discussion.

Back at school, teachers also identified a number of benefits experienced by the children. From the teacher's perspective, the children's affinity towards nature seems to be developing and their participation in camp activities has had a positive impact on their performance at school. As stated by a high-school teacher, "They [children] really like the camp, the bush and the environment. So at school they always come to me and say, 'Mr. Maluleke, when are we going down there again?'" (int. 2008). The teacher continued:

You find that when they come back to school from this programme, they are so excited. It changes their mindset and then they become positive with whatever the educator is coming up with at school. That's because CITW encourages learning, you see. They become

active and they want to learn time and again. So I think the programme is so good. (int. 2008)

Furthermore, the teachers themselves declared that they increase their own knowledge, not only about the benefits of nature and environmental concerns, but also in terms of pedagogical method and approach: they gain the ability to teach in a more interactive way and to be able to identify talents in children. As one teacher affirmed:

One of the very nice things we did today, for example, is learning about painting and drawing. It's very nice because we as teachers are able to identify those who really have that talent. We have realised that some of the learners are not that intelligent, but are good at art. They can do something with their hands, for example. Some of them are very good in colouring or building or drawing, which is good for them. The experience here helps us to identify those children and when we go back to school, we are going to do the same there. (int. 2008)

The reason teachers are able to identify talents in children during CITW camps as opposed to during regular school time is accounted for based on a number of problems that schools generally face in rural areas. "Here [at CITW Camp] we are dealing with a group of eight [per team]," said a teacher. "And at school you find sixty children in class and you cannot simply identify them. But here we can easily see who is not concentrating ... [and make sure that] the child will be active again (int. 2008). In this teacher's opinion, the inability to teach effectively at school is a direct result of overcrowded classrooms.

Another difficulty has to do with the language of instruction at schools. Under the Outcomes Based Education (OBE) curriculum, teaching all subjects in English only begins in Grade 4 (pers. com. CPA Exco. member 2011). Teachers cited the use of English as the medium of communication at camp as one of the advantages of CITW. One teacher explained:

At school they speak Xi-Tsonga, but here I can see that even if they are not able to speak English, they do understand more English

now. Some of them try to speak and when we go back to school, they will show the other children there that they can speak English. In this way, they will encourage other children and they are going to benefit from that even if they don't come here [to CITW camp]. (int. 2008)

Feedback from Pafuri Camp staff was also positive. Several mentors expressed their appreciation of the programme and stated that they personally had learned a great deal. One mentor said, "I will never hit my child again. You have taught me so much about dealing with children". And another elderly woman declared, "CITW has brought out the inner child in me. I can run and play with the children and be free! I have never felt like this before" (pers. com. 2008). These statements show that the CITW experience resonates strongly with mentors and has far-reaching effects that go beyond the core objectives of the programme.

All the approving expressions of advantageous experiences for children and staff undoubtedly reflect positively on Wilderness Safaris in its support of CITW. Further, the promotion of CITW through Wilderness Safaris' publicity channels (website, newsletters and community engagement profile) places the company in a favourable light with its shareholders and clients, and it also strengthens the relationship with their partners, the Makuleke CPA. To nurture this association, the company assists in raising more funds for CITW through the annual cycle tours and other financial and in-kind donations from encouraging organisations and individuals affiliated with Wilderness Safaris. Although the benefit from CITW is not directly translated into financial returns for Wilderness Safaris (although it can be argued that tourism clientele increase as they are attracted to responsible tourism operators), the anticipated benefit to the company is the ability to influence a set of values and the shaping of a mindset with regards to Wilderness Safaris' conservation agenda.

7.6.2 Conservation Values: promoting Wilderness Safaris ideals through CITW

Unlike other methods of community engagement, CITW allows Wilderness Safaris to “instil a value rather than merely a skill-set” (int. CITW Chairman 2009). The two main components of CITW values are education and conservation, values that the CITW Chairman believes to be scarce in rural communities:

What I’d like to understand, and what intrigues me about these rural communities, is to what extent are those children being given access to proper education, nutrition, getting an idea of what life’s about in their normal day-to-day lives? (int. 2009)

I asked teachers to share their thoughts concerning the reasons they entered into their profession. Their responses suggested that teachers are revered members of the community, but on further probing, I found the reasons behind people’s choice to teach to be highly problematic. I was told that many teachers end up in this profession simply because there are few alternatives. One primary school teacher stated, “I didn’t want to be an educator at all, but poverty brought me there” (int. 2008). This sentiment was also shared by others who mentioned that they entered the teaching profession not because they wanted to teach, but because it was a means to secure a pension. Having entered the teaching career on these grounds must have an impact on the quality of teaching and diminishes the chances for children to have the “proper education” that McCulloch refers to. On account of this situation, arguably CITW is well placed to play a crucial role in instilling the inspiration of the learning experience in both teachers and students.

Part of the Wilderness Safaris’ long-term objectives is to demonstrate the value of wildlife and vegetation, emphasising their importance in maintaining a healthy ecosystem for the future, and to encourage rural communities to use natural resources sustainably. To achieve these objectives, buy-in from rural communities into the

ideals of conservation is essential. One teacher suggested that this could be done by changing CITW children's mindsets in terms of their attitude towards wildlife:

I think we can change the children's worldview. I don't want to see a scenario whereby you find a person from Makuleke community going to the bush for poaching. I think these people need to be capacitated to understand that if they see an impala, they are not seeing meat, but they are seeing money. They can make money by conserving or by making that impala live longer. (int. 2008)

Interestingly, this statement implies that the substitution for seeing animals as meat is to see them as assets for income-generation. This statement shows an initiative on the part of this teacher to change the dominant Makuleke perception of an animal in terms of its use value (satisfying immediate hunger), to that of an economic value (income through tourism attraction). A change in fundamental attitude towards conservation ideals and the appreciation of wildlife is not reflected here, however, the negative effects of poaching seem to have been recognised.

In a Follow-Up session in 2009, we discussed the theme of 'poaching' with the CITW children. I was surprised to discover that it was the first time for the majority of students to hear that killing animals in the Kruger National Park was illegal. This proved the extent to which education in conservation is crucial if nature is to be conserved. Furthermore, the issue of poaching was also raised by teachers during my interviews. One primary school teacher said:

When we see a bird, we see meat. When we see a tree, we see wood. Everything that we see there [at the villages], we want to pursue nature for our own interests. Some of the learners maybe used to practice poaching and destroy nature. But this programme [CITW] will help them to conserve their own natural resources A bird to us is nothing. We never valued a bird. But after we went on a game drive yesterday with Alweet [guide], he sat and explained to us everything about birds. Alweet loves birds so much! He emphasised the colours, red beak etc. so even to those kids it's an experience. They are benefiting from this. When they go home, they will conserve this nature. They will even give this information to their parents. (int. 2008)

Statements such as these indicate that appreciating and understanding nature may contribute towards its preservation. This can only be achieved if coupled with responsible actions. The difficulty, however, lies in the limited natural resources in the Makuleke villages, which forces the community to exploit their environment unsustainably. As Harries (1987) mentions, the Makuleke need firewood for cooking, poles for construction of housing and cattle pens, and grass for thatching, for instance (121). Although people are fined and arrested for not obeying the Chief's orders, alternative resources are scarce and expensive.

Essentially, CITW addresses both ideological and practical issues. CITW children learn about the benefits of nature and the importance of conservation, but they also learn about values more broadly. This point was recognised by teachers and mentors during CITW Camps. One teacher mentioned that developing particular ideological traits is one of the key contributions of CITW. "They also learn values like respect, how to take care of themselves and how to take care of their things," said a teacher (int. 2008). The perception of wilderness areas therefore is not merely as assets with potential for economic gain. Rather, CITW aims to build awareness of the intrinsic value of nature and instils within the children the desire to understand, learn, and care for their surroundings and themselves.

7.6.3 Children in the Wilderness: contestations over power and control

While teachers, CPA Executive Committee members and CITW mentors expressed a great appreciation for CITW, some power struggles over who controls the programme and who should benefit from it did occur. For Wilderness Safaris, CITW camps are considered valuable experiences for the children to learn through interacting with nature in an inspiring and nurturing environment. Wilderness Safaris believes that such learning impacts positively on the children's ability to

cope with life's challenges, stimulates their interest in the environment, and improves their general wellbeing through their exposure to wilderness areas. Furthermore, Wilderness Safaris grants that CITW is a long-term project. In McCulloch's opinion, CITW is "a fantastic project given that all is in harmony. You do good, but very slowly ... and the time taken for the benefits of a CITW programme to impact on a community or on a property like Pafuri is pushed out probably ten to twenty years" (int. 2009). Educating the youth of Makuleke in this way is therefore deemed a valuable investment by the company, both for the children's own personal growth and for the benefit of conserving natural habitats in the long run.

For the Makuleke CPA, CITW fulfilled a number of functions. "I am in support of the programme," said the CPA Secretary General, "simply because the Makulekes are involved in tourism businesses and therefore our children must know about the environment and conservation" (int. 2008). The CPA Executive Committee members' encouragement for their youth to excel in conservation and tourism was based on the appreciation that these are the two fields the Makuleke community will have to be deeply engaged with in order to sustain their Contract Park.

Furthermore, the CITW Community Liaison at Makuleke explained:

People in the community now understand what the CITW programme is trying to achieve. I am happy that they [the community] now understand that sometimes you don't have to be given money. You have to be taught to fish instead of being given fish So our community members are starting to understand that we need to invest in education as well, other than in facilities or in other projects I think CITW is the right platform on which to build a good pool of expertise that we can draw from in terms of taking the community forward. It is a stepping-stone. (int. Baloyi 2009)

Baloyi's comments acknowledge the importance of education in building his community. However, his statements also suggest that the Makuleke are accustomed to receiving financial assistance and find it rather difficult to appreciate other types of support. From my experience working with CITW, I could see that a

large number of community members were indeed interested in the programme and wished for their children to attend. As encouraging as this eagerness was, it resulted in a number of difficulties that CITW had to tackle. One of these is the onerous and complex task of choosing which children should attend CITW Camps.

Members of the Makuleke community voiced concerns over the criteria of child selection for CITW camps. The issue of whether the children chosen were actually interested in the core agenda of the programme was a crucial point, and the initial selection criteria of focusing on the poor and vulnerable was criticised on a number of fronts. “We are not all interested in conservation,” said a CPA Executive Committee member. “You can take children from disadvantaged families [to CITW camps], but if they are not interested, then it is no good” (int. 2008). Others complained about the perception of poverty by CITW and how their own children were excluded simply because they were not considered sufficiently disadvantaged. “I am not considered poor because I have a job, so my child does not qualify to attend CITW,” said one Makuleke resident. “I also cannot pay for my child to go to Pafuri because I don’t get enough money, so my child will never be able to benefit from CITW” (int. 2008).

Moreover, some people raised other concerns relating to the selection process of the children for CITW camps. The general selection procedure was that teachers were given selection criteria by CITW and it was up to these teachers to choose a specified number of children from their schools to attend CITW Camps. In numerous interviews, doubts were raised as to whether these criteria were in fact followed: “Sometimes things get complicated,” said one CPA Executive Committee member. “What if someone doing the selection for CITW at school can just think that their own child or someone in their family should get an opportunity to go to camp too?” Interviewing one of the mentors during the 2008 CITW Camp at Pafuri, the concern about child selection was voiced once again: “As far as I understand, the CITW children should all be from poor families. I don’t think this is the case here [CITW

camp]. Some of the children here are from very good families. You will have to look into this” (int. CITW mentor 2008). The question of trust, therefore, played itself out on two levels: some members of the Makuleke community distrusted teachers who were affiliated with CITW, while CITW coordinators unquestioningly trusted the teachers who were tasked with the child selection process. After deliberating extensively over this issue, CITW initially judged that it is virtually impossible to control favouritism and nepotism, and therefore decided that this was a matter the community would have to resolve on its own accord.

The selection criteria appraisal was discussed at the 2009 Environmental Workshop, as it was considered to be a valid point raised by the community, and one that could possibly impact on the long-term objectives of CITW. After lengthy deliberations over a new set of selection criteria, the workshop participants agreed that the focus of CITW would shift towards children who expressed interest in the programme, and their selection would partially be based on their performance at the Environmental Clubs that were established at the schools. Leadership potential would constitute another criteria that would be determined by the children’s teachers. Expressing the importance of including children with leadership potential, one of the Wilderness Safaris directors remarked:

I think it’s probably good to have a combination, so the poor and vulnerable get an opportunity to do something that they haven’t necessarily had an opportunity to do before. But I also think it’s a good idea to get people onto the programme who’ve got more influence potentially within the community, children that have got influence amongst their peers. Hopefully then, the next generation can get out to a greater audience and spread their learning. It’s important for the programme to focus on people that have the positioning or say within the community to spread the word. (int. 2009)

Another issue pointed out by the community is that the long-term aspirations of CITW can be problematic for the poor. Interviewees suggested that the poorest in

particular do not have the privilege to plan far into the future. When survival is at stake, the main interests lie in the immediate situation. For this reason, some benefits that the community saw from CITW were interpreted differently from what the programme organisers had intended. For example: gifts, clothing, food and educational materials feature quite strongly in CITW in order to make the camp experience as fun and fulfilling as possible for its participants. As a result, the children and teachers tend to express great enthusiasm for receiving these possessions at the CITW camps, Follow-Ups and Environmental Clubs. Although we, as CITW organisers, initially considered this enthusiasm a positive sign, I eventually began to suspect that the main objective of CITW (education) was being overridden by interest in material handouts. One School principal stated in the CITW survey (2008), "Children are interested in the programme because they are given T-shirts, etc." The principal's assessment only mentioned "Learning about nature" at the very end of her list. Understandably, material possessions fill a void in a poor child's life, however, if the main motive for children's participation in CITW is the sense of entitlement to receiving gifts and T-shirts, then the effectiveness of the programme would have to be re-evaluated.

A noteworthy effect of CITW is the shift in the role of the Makuleke CPA in relation to this programme. In comparison to other development projects at Makuleke, the CPA's role is diminished and a different set of people are in control. Significantly, during the period I was involved in the programme, concerns were expressed by Makuleke CPA Executive Committee members and other Makuleke residents that they might be losing out on opportunities because of the powerful role played by teachers in CITW. This was because teachers were perceived to have full control over who was chosen to attend CITW camps.

However, there were also areas of concern from the teachers' perspectives. One main issue they raised was the extent of their own contribution towards the CITW programme. Remarks from teachers disclosed dissatisfaction on their part in terms

of their ability to play a part in the CITW curriculum design, as well as their contribution during camp. Teachers asserted that they would like to be more involved in the planning stages of CITW camps. One of the teachers argued:

We can give CITW our full support, because in my case, I don't think we are doing that at the moment. We are just observers for now whereas we could give some recommendations for the programme. We are going to give some input as well so that our input and your plan together can form a very powerful thing. (int. 2008)

This statement illustrates a proactive and constructive request for collaboration and power sharing. It entails not the expectation of receiving benefits, but calls for recognition of capacity and includes an offer of contribution and service alongside CITW's efforts.

Besides the concerns raised over the selection criteria, the lack of faith in the child selection process, and teachers' disapprovals over their contribution towards the programme, an interview with Chief Makuleke revealed that he held an altogether different opinion regarding what was problematic about CITW: "The programme is o.k.," asserted the Chief. "But I know that they have a lot of money. It would be better for them to give us that money and we will teach our children. They are not Wilderness' children" (int. 2008). The comments articulated by the Chief raise a number of issues: first, the idea that the children belong to the community and should not be interfered with by outsiders (even if they are the business partners of the Makuleke CPA); and second, the perception that money spent on environmental education could be better spent on more urgent needs as perceived by a Makuleke resident. Chief Makuleke subsequently clarified: "We have big problems here. We have no water. If we get money to improve our water, that would be good" (pers. com. 2008).

Underlying the Chief's statements is the issue of control over resources. The Chief understands that the only community members who hold some sway on CITW are the representative teachers and he is well aware that he has no control over CITW

money. This situation does not seem to sit well with the Chief, who would rather have a say in how this money is spent. When I presented the Chief's opinion to Wilderness Safaris, one of the South African Operations Directors responded:

To me, CITW is our programme. So if they [the Makuleke] want the programme to happen in the community, and they believe there's benefit to the children of the programme, then they do it under our terms. If they don't like it, then they're welcome to say we'd rather not have it Money is so important. In a way I can understand. Maybe we can take this as a comparison: this is Wilderness Safaris' money and a Wilderness Safaris programme, and we believe this is how it's best utilised; whereas our concession money that we pay through to the community, that's their money. It's not our money. And it's up to them to spend it how they see fit. And we might not agree that it gets spent in a fit manner, but it's not something that we necessarily have direct control over. Whereas the CITW programme, we believe that's the best way to spend the money and maybe it's a thing of saying o.k. we'll get input from the community if they feel the money could be spent in a different way, but we wouldn't give over control of that money to be potentially misspent. (int. 2009)

In addition to the above concern, there is the legal issue relating to spending funds raised to fulfil specific objectives. Money acquired through sponsorships, donations and cycling-tours is meant to serve a particular function: the CITW programme. The difference in opinion of how money should best be spent denotes the variance in priorities between the Chief and Wilderness Safaris and also shows in whose hands control over money lies. It is clear that with regards to CITW, Wilderness Safaris holds the reins in so far as they are the providers and the Makuleke children are the beneficiaries, whereas with the Small Business Support Company, for instance, the allocation of funds was in the hands of its directors, composed of both Wilderness Safaris and Makuleke representatives.

Financing CITW is a crucial issue because its activities require a substantial amount of money and resources. The economic downturn of 2008 strongly impacted on CITW to the extent that the CITW Camp at Pafuri Camp had to be cancelled in 2009.

Fortunately, CITW Camps resumed the following year, but this incident proved that without adequate financing, any development project is in jeopardy.

One of the praiseworthy aspects of CITW is that the coordinators regularly hold reflexive sessions with the community and other stakeholders to encourage feedback and discuss progress. In response, the coordinators adapt the programme and change policy and practice. But despite CITW's welcoming initiative to receive input from Makuleke community members and giving due consideration to their opinions, the resources of the programme are nevertheless in Wilderness Safari's command and the ultimate objective of environmental and life-skills education holds sway. The only aspects of the programme that are liable to change are the means through which these objectives are achieved. For this reason, CITW is increasingly encouraging community cooperation in decision-making and planning because ultimately, the programme co-ordinators anticipate that the Makuleke would take ownership of CITW and be able to operate it on their own in the future.

7.7 Theoretical Discussion

The Children in the Wilderness programme supports much of what post-development theorists consider important. The objectives of the CITW programme are non-economic, thereby complementing the focus on economic projects at the village; its aim is human development by nourishing children's personhood; it promotes notions of equality and respect; it encompasses a cultural and spiritual component in introducing the children to their ancestors' land; and it is environmentally conscious and encourages the children to appreciate nature. The long-term intentions of the programme and its concern for ethical conduct are also attributes that warrant approval.

One noteworthy point that post-development critics tend to highlight is that most orthodox development projects are “demeaning or patronising”. CITW, however, is structured in a manner that allows the community representatives to have sufficient control over the programme and it recognises the community’s agency and dignity (Smith and Yanacopulos 2004: 659). Significant efforts were made to encourage the Makuleke to take ownership of CITW and to be able to “run with the programme themselves”, as Wilson (2009) has noted (pers. com).

Notwithstanding the positive attributes of CITW when analysed from a post-development perspective, there are nevertheless some aspects for which the programme can also be criticised. Post-development critics, for instance, would possibly accuse the programme for not lending enough attention to indigenous environmental knowledge systems and for instilling western understandings of conservation and environmental protection in rural African children. Further criticism could suggest that Wilderness Safaris promotes its own value systems through the CITW programme and thereby perpetuates the company’s self-interest (Smith and Yanacopulos 2004: 661). The issue of priority spending might also surface, arguing that environmental education is not considered a priority from the community’s perspective (as evidenced by Chief Makuleke’s comments). Relatively speaking, however, I would argue that in comparison to the economic development initiatives implemented at Makuleke to date, the CITW programme deserves notable praise.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the CITW programme by detailing its objectives, the manner in which it functions, and the impacts it has on its members. CITW offers the Makuleke community the means to derive value from their land that goes

beyond financial gain. The methods of teaching used by CITW, in addition to the opportunities given to discover and learn are premised on the idea that having fun while learning is the most effective way to grasp knowledge, and that a comforting environment for the children creates novel experiences that are inspiring and nurturing.

Education, however, is not the only objective of CITW. As importantly, the programme offers a possibility for personal growth through simultaneously challenging and supporting the children. Developing the children's confidence and self-esteem could certainly impact on their future prospects. Furthermore, exposure to English as a means of communication and an awareness of different career paths in tourism and conservation are also enlightening. These benefits are not only restricted to children. Teachers and staff participating in CITW have also acknowledged the positive effects the programme has had on them, ranging from learning new teaching techniques to discovering talents in children.

The value of CITW was interpreted differently by various people involved in the programme. The conservation value espoused by Wilderness Safaris was converted into economic value in the understanding of some teachers. Similarly, the chief also felt that CITW money could better be utilised for more pressing purposes. Nevertheless, no one objected to the programme as such, and the ideal of conservation was also not challenged. One Makuleke member involved with CITW interpreted another reason for this *laissez faire* response: "Yes, I think the reason they [royal family and Makuleke CPA] don't have a problem with CITW is because there is no money involved in there. There is no tangible benefit, you know If it was something different, where somebody had to be employed and money were to come in, then they would interfere" (int. 2008).

CITW is also unique within the Makuleke-Wilderness Safaris relationship in that its domain of control is outside the conventional institutions dealing with development projects. Although the programme's agenda is clearly directed by Wilderness

Safaris, those in the community who coordinate the selection of children and engage with CITW are schoolteachers who are not members of the Makuleke leadership. Notwithstanding this fact, a certain level of involvement from the Makuleke CPA is nonetheless present in the form of reports presented by CITW and authorisations required for CITW camps, Follow-Ups and Environmental Club meetings. However, the non-financial nature of this development initiative casts CITW in a distinctive light, one that focuses on the qualitative dimensions of community development and cultivates a long-term relationship between the two partners in the process.

Enriching this critique, some insights from post-development theory demonstrate that while CITW is admirable for its long-term, human and ecological focus, it would nevertheless be criticised for inducing western notions of conservation, for sidelining indigenous forms of knowledge, and for not prioritising community concerns, needs and aspirations.

Although there might be some truth behind these critiques, I find them difficult to apply empirically in this particular scenario. The fact remains that CITW was initiated by a private sector company that expends considerable effort to fund-raise and use its resources for the programme.⁹⁹ It seems only reasonable for the company to spend this money in the way they deem appropriate. Scrutinising CITW from a post-development perspective therefore demonstrates the complexity of the theory's critique and the difficulty of practically applying these appraisals in certain contexts.

⁹⁹ CITW later received an independent non-profit status, but remained closely linked to Wilderness Safaris.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Makuleke Tourism-Led Development Spiral: partnership, benefits, distribution and development

“Let me say, the first five years I was satisfied [with community progress], but from then until now, I am not satisfied.”

*Makuleke resident
2008*

8.1 Introduction

In *Tourism Strategies and Local Responses in Southern Africa* (2009), Petri Hottola interrogates the idea of tourism-led development and, in particular, the claim that tourism offers “enormous potential for economic and social development”. “Potential there may be,” maintains Hottola, “but it is not that easy to harness in a sustainable way. Tourism is not the last-resort magic potion for socio-economic remedies but a demanding field of economic activity that needs to be addressed in a systematic, professional way” (1). The Makuleke scenario is a case in point: at the time of the land claim, expectations that tourism was the panacea for Makuleke development were raised high by government, aid professionals and experts in the legal and tourism industries. In the euphoria of the Makuleke model’s expected success, little mention was made of the possible risks and impacts the model’s achievement or failures would have on the people on the receiving end of this development.

Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the post-land claim arrangement has created a fundamental shift in the economic and political structure of the Makuleke community, a shift that is essentially a form of experimentation, linked to contingency and unpredictability. Bearing in mind that the Makuleke model

arrangement is the first of its kind in South Africa, and knowing the possible failures of tourism ventures based on their imminent connectivity to fluctuating world markets, the participants of the Makuleke tourism partnerships ventured into uncharted territory. Against this background, I concur with post-development theorists that it is time to “transcend the conventional development idea” (Sachs 2010: xii) and to reconsider the assumptions upon which the development project is based (Matthews 2004: 375). This, according to Wolfgang Sachs (2010), can be achieved by “cleansing the mind from development certainties ... self-sufficiency in consumption and profit-making, and renewed attention to non-material values” (xi-xiii).

8.2 Interpreting the Makuleke Model

A number of scholars have referred to the Makuleke model in their critiques of the Makuleke land claim. However, the way in which the model has been interpreted has varied depending on whether the focus was on its conservation proposition, namely, Community-Based Natural Resource Management or on its commercial proposition, in the form of Public-Private Partnerships. Broadly speaking, the concept is “propagated as a ‘model’ of how to make conservation work for local people,” but as Steenkamp (2003) argues, “those who propagate the Makuleke as a ‘model’ tend to do so by restricting themselves to the technical and structural aspects of the process ... thereby avoid[ing] the inevitable complexities and particularities of the situation on the ground” (12).

Essentially, the dominant agenda of the Makuleke model was to rectify past injustice through land restitution that would enable the Makuleke community to utilise their newly acquired asset for economic gain, provided they adhere to the principles of conservation. Accordingly, the idea of developing tourism activities in the Makuleke Contract Park included a number of objectives: maintaining the conservation status

of the Pafuri area of Kruger National Park; developing tourism partnerships between the Makuleke CPA and the private sector that would generate income from lease fees; and providing training and employment opportunities for Makuleke residents.

Reports on the Makuleke model thus far have mostly focused on conservation issues and, in particular, the community's progress in its pursuit of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). Issues of joint management between the Makuleke CPA and SANParks have been scrutinised and either hailed as a successful "win-win" solution to community involvement in conservation, or criticised as a form of "ecological apartheid" resulting from "unequal negotiation between relatively disadvantaged community representatives and sophisticated and advantaged officials of SANParks" (Magome and Murombedzi 2003: 119). As Magome and Murombedzi illustrate, "They are like chefs with quite different ideas on menus, and different powers to cook them" (Ibid: 119).

In the previous chapters of this thesis, I examined the commercial aspect of the Makuleke model. The commercialisation of the Makuleke Contract Park was intended to deliver sufficient financial support and training in tourism and conservation to enable the Makuleke community to uplift itself out of its current state of poverty while at the same time maintaining the conservation status of their land. My objective in this inquiry was to bring to the fore the complexities that arose as a result of the partnership between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris and to reveal the benefits and constraints of this alliance. In showcasing the partners' different perspectives, I was able to ascertain the varying standpoints on certain issues that affected this partnership. The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate a productive way forward by identifying the replicable merits and the mistakes to be avoided by initiatives in similar contexts, therefore increasing the possibility of more rewarding results in the future. The reason why such analysis has the potential to influence prospective initiatives in a substantive way is because

the 'Makuleke model' is widely espoused as an instance to be imitated. Furthermore, using insights from post-development theory allows for a richer investigation that opens new avenues for imagining possibilities of novel types of development.

8.3 The Tourism Aspect of the Makuleke Model

I interpret the Makuleke model as a triangulated relationship between co-management of the Park with SANParks to fulfil the conservation component of the model, and the tourism partnerships with the private sector to fulfil the commercialisation component. Ideally, the two constituents of the model should be balanced, with adequate conservation and park management efforts corresponding with commercial activities that deliver income and other benefits to the Makuleke community.

My focus here is on the partnership with Wilderness Safaris in particular and I represent this constituent of the Makuleke model as an expanding spiral (see Diagram 2). The intended ideal spiral begins with the business partnership and progresses towards the yielding of benefits. These benefits are then distributed within the community, and should eventually lead to broad-based community development. Effectively implemented, the cycle would expand, improving the partnership, and resulting in increased benefits, more distribution, further development and so on. Theoretically, this progressing spiral represents an integral part of what the Makuleke model aims to achieve.




Diagram 3 Anticipated Makuleke Tourism-Led Development Spiral

In reality, the events that have taken place since the beginning of the tourism partnership have not produced the anticipated results envisioned in the expanding spiral. Financial benefits did not meet initial predictions and, as discussed in Chapter Five, by 2009, income from the three tourism concessions barely covered Makuleke CPA and Traditional Authority administrative costs. As a result, general dissatisfaction within the Makuleke community with regards to income distribution became visible. This is evidenced by complaints regarding elite capture, the unequal and non-transparent control over resources and the lack of the CPA's delivery on promises. Instead of the Makuleke tourism-led development spiral expanding as initially planned, the events that took place signify a recoiling of the tourism spiral during the time of this research. Because of reduced income from tourism to the Makuleke CPA coupled with power struggles and external socio-political forces, distribution of income was affected and in turn, a state of arrested development set

in. Furthermore, the scramble for increased benefits and the pursuit of more income for the community (through new tourism concessionaires and renewed hunting possibilities), resulted in a strained relationship with Wilderness Safaris (see Diagram 3). As in any dynamic social process, the spiral shifts and adjusts itself in relation to new circumstances.




Diagram 4 Actual Makuleke Tourism-Led Development Spiral 2005-2010

8.4 The Four Categories of the Makuleke Tourism-Led Development Spiral

The conceptualisation of the Makuleke tourism-led development spiral comprises four components: partnership, benefits, distribution and development. The following sections interrogate these components along four particular lines of

inquiry: the assumptions on which they were based; the actual positive results that materialised from each; the difficulties that were experienced; and post-development theoretical critiques. Finally, I discuss some recommendations for a way forward in achieving more positive results in enhancing people's well being at Makuleke (conceived in economic and non-economic terms) that can be applied to development interventions through tourism partnerships or alternative developmental initiatives.

8.4.1 Partnership

A number of assumptions underpin the partnership agreement between the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris. Essentially, the partnership is premised on the notion of equality between the two parties. This equality is reflected in the concession contract, which places the Makuleke CPA, as landowner, on equal footing with its concessionaire, or tenant. This equality is further solidified in the Makuleke CPA's future ownership of the tourism operation upon expiry of the contractual agreement.

The Makuleke partnership is also based on the presumption that until such time as the transfer of lodge ownership takes place, the CPA would be in a healthy and cooperative alliance with its partners. Further, it is assumed that the day-to-day affairs of this alliance would be coordinated through robust democratic institutions capable of administering the land, and willing to make decisions that benefit the tourism operations and, in turn, themselves and the community at large.

Most important, however, is the fact that the concession agreement was premised on financial predictions that would both cover the Makuleke CPA's land management costs and enable surplus dividends to be used for community development projects. In addition, an addendum to the agreement obliges

Wilderness Safaris to contribute to the Makuleke through initiatives considered to be “over and above the cooperation agreement” that include the provision of computers, sports equipment and bursaries to students “who have displayed their commitment to ... the eco-tourism industry” (Concession Contract 2003).

A few years into the agreement, it became evident that the reality that was unfolding differed substantially from the original plans and predictions. On the one hand, financial revenues from the tourism concession could not meet the predicted figures, but on the other hand, Wilderness Safaris engaged in community development projects that significantly exceed those stated in the concession agreement and its addendum. As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, Wilderness Safaris engaged with the Makuleke CPA in the Small Business Support Company and further contributed towards education in conservation and life-skills through the Children in the Wilderness programme.

In addition to these direct social and economic investments made by Wilderness Safaris, other spin-offs from their tourism business also materialised. These involved financial and in-kind contributions to the community by individual guests and Wilderness Safaris staff. Examples include Pafuri Camp guests who returned to Makuleke after a guided tour of the village to build a library and learning centre at Boxahuku (Block J). Other Pafuri Camp guests donated medical supplies to the Makuleke clinic and the Wilderness Angels (Wilderness Safaris staff members at Head Office in Johannesburg) regularly donate clothes and other durable goods to people in need.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Betsy Fullagar is one guest from Pafuri Camp who felt compelled to help the Makuleke community after her visit in 2007 to the area. She succeeded in building a library at Boxahuku (The Gaza Learning Centre) in 2009. For more information about her involvement with the community see www.inafricansshoes.com. Two other libraries in Blocks H and I have been built since then by Denise Ortiz through the Sharing To Learn programme (see www.sharingtolearn.org). Further, a large amount of medical supplies were donated to the Makuleke Clinic by an American tour group in 2009; however the majority of items were rejected by the nurses because they were past their expiry date.

Notwithstanding these positive outcomes of the Makuleke CPA's partnership with Wilderness Safaris, a number of difficulties were experienced by both parties (as discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven). One fundamental problem that impacted on the relationship between the two parties was the local power struggle between the CPA and the Traditional Authority. According to Wilderness Safaris management, getting involved in the politics of the CPA is neither appropriate nor is it their responsibility. Nevertheless, Wilderness Safaris management clearly recognises the "very strong position of the Tribal Authority" and understands that there is a "high risk that certain of [Wilderness Safaris'] efforts may be co-opted, not necessarily in the right direction" (int. 2009). If this situation remains and if neither Makuleke residents, nor the CPA's partners are able to have a say in how finances are spent, and no other institution can hold the CPA to account, then the potential for abuse of power is imminent and in this way, the Makuleke model risks failure.

But in spite of the political forces at work at Makuleke, Wilderness Safaris has focused its attention on fulfilling its mandate towards its partners. According to the Wilderness Safaris chairman, the company's partnership model rests on three pillars: community relations, conservation, and tourism profit. In an ideally balanced state, the three should "feed on themselves" whereby the one supports the next and ultimately the cycle becomes self-sufficient. Furthermore, the chairman explained that Wilderness Safaris' relationship with a community "is part of building a sustainable conservation business" (int. 2009). As discussed in Chapter Five, healthy community relations are theoretically meant to lead to better conservation, which in turn should lead to more tourism profits. However, says the chairman, difficulties emerge when the three pillars are not in balance, "because you drain one resource to do the other" (int. 2009).

At the time of my fieldwork, Wilderness Safaris was in its fifth year of operation in the Makuleke Contract Park, yet the chairman described the company's relationship with the Makuleke as "still immature" (int. 2009). He explained:

The Makulekes would take a chance of getting what they can from us, and I don't believe we are always delivering on our promises to them. We deliver on some of them, but on some others we don't. And there are various reasons for that: the most important reason I think is that from a Wilderness Safaris' proposition, the Pafuri/Makuleke offering is out on a limb. It doesn't fit with the rest of the Wilderness Safaris propositions. And it is a new product that is not financially standing on its own two feet yet. And therefore the people that are running it are, let's say, a little bit anxious about what it's got to do, not confident about going to deal with integrity necessarily with the community. Not that necessarily we have acted in bad faith, but I think we probably from time to time made promises that we haven't honoured. And certainly when we won the concession, there were promises made at an individual level, and I suppose at a corporate level, that were not properly understood by the company and its capacity to deliver it. (int. 2009)

What can be established from this analysis is that partnerships are dynamic, constantly shifting in a *mélange* of opportunities and constraints. It is unclear where the distinctions lie between working together in partnership and loosening the bonds a little for individual gain. The bonds are loosened when attention is focused on one "pillar" at the expense of another: too much concentration on getting the tourism concession to "stand on its own two feet", but neglecting the community, caused renewed interest by the Makuleke CPA in pursuing other forms of income (hunting or introducing new concessionaires, for example). Emphasis on conservation, anti-poaching and security drained resources from the tourism operation; and satisfying community demands in terms of delivering on initial promised income projections would make the tourism business unviable. Similarly, the Makuleke CPA loosened its bonds with its partners when expected financial returns were not delivered. Conservation principles were threatened in pursuit of economic gain through the CPA's request to renew its hunting concessions because tourism profits proved to be insufficient during and after the global recession.

It is evident, therefore, that there were forces and actions affecting the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris partnership that were not initially taken into consideration and could not have been predicted such as the global financial crisis and the contestations over power at Makuleke. Over time, it also became evident that the presumed equal relationship in this partnership was not accurate. The Makuleke CPA could not hold their partners to account for not delivering on their promises and simply had to make do with what they received. Unforeseen circumstances are expected in any relationship, however, it must be acknowledged that the notion of partnership is inherently a relatively “slippery idea”. Emma Crewe and Elizabeth Harrison (1998) argue that the very vagueness of the term is what makes it so appealing: “Given the plethora of uses, it is not easy to pinpoint what is meant by partnership. Indeed, it is arguable that, as with other loosely used terms such as empowerment and participation, part of the attractiveness of the term lies in its slipperiness” (73).

8.4.2 Benefits

The anticipated outcomes of the tourism partnership with Wilderness Safaris were threefold: financial benefits through lease fees, training and employment opportunities. The primary assumption was that money derived from tourism would develop the Makuleke community. This is spelled out in the Makuleke Master Plan (2000), which declares that “One of the underlying principles of the programme is the use of tourism as a development tool for the empowerment and financial benefit of the Makuleke community” (section 6.4.2). Little mention is made of any other forms of development. Only two items under the heading “Sustainable Benefit to the Membership of the Makuleke CPA” state that “proactive creation of opportunities for sustainable benefit to members of the CPA should take place”, and that “opportunities for qualitative benefit to members of the CPA should also be

maximized” (5.2.7). These rather vague propositions motion towards growth-led development and although cultural respect and qualitative benefits are mentioned in the Master Plan (2000), these do not seem to constitute essential components in the pursuit of ‘better’ living standards for the Makuleke.

Essentially, the benefits promised to the community are mostly material in nature. This mindset of alleviating the ills of a society through the injection of financial support is typical of orthodox development interventions. One of the premises of post-development theorists is a rejection of this modernist notion that “becoming developed” must be based exclusively on material values, accumulation and mass consumption (Andreasson 2010: 7). For Emmanuel N’Dione and Philippe de Leener et al. (2007), “the idea of a development based on impoverishing the concept of wealth is simply unacceptable; in particular when it degrades the human quality of relationships among people and their relationships with their environment” (368).

For advocates of post-development thought:

Everything has a value, not only that which is bought or sold. Wealth, therefore, has many dimensions. One becomes rich by taking advantage of the many canals that irrigate and diversify knowledge and wisdom, and stimulate mutual discoveries and recognition. People themselves are the main means for making this synergy work: hence the importance of supporting dynamic processes that rehabilitate people in all their dimensions, and that also rehabilitate relationships between themselves and their surroundings. (N’Dione and de Leener et al. 2007: 369)

I draw attention here to the notions of values and wealth because these are pivotal in the Makuleke case, specifically with regards to the issue of land. A comparison between the manner in which the Makuleke valued the Pafuri area before and after the land claim reveals significant differences. For the community, Pafuri prior to 1969 was their home and according to historians, the Makuleke inhabited this area communally and lived off the provisions of the terrain and the rivers that border it.

After the forced removal, Pafuri became a conservation area as part of the Kruger National Park, although David Grossman and Phillipa Holden (2005) point out that “Makuleke people still wryly refer to the somewhat ironic situation whereby land they had lived on and used for over a hundred years, came to be regarded as ‘pristine wilderness’ by conservationists” (6). Following the successful land claim, this same piece of ground that used to be valued by the community as their home became an asset with a market value, to be exploited commercially for tourism while being protected using conservation principles.

Decisions were made by community leaders at the time of the land claim process that essentially excluded many people from potentially benefiting from their restored land. Having opted to use their land for conservation and tourism, the community’s next step was to commercialise their newly acquired property and to tender it for tourism concessions. The process of deciding whether to utilise their land commercially was reputedly conducted in consultation with the community. However, the outcome of this discussion essentially resulted in the elders losing out. Those who had grown up at Makuleke and who were physically removed from it wished to return to their land, but because the Makuleke had little choice but to retain the conservation status of the land, this was not possible. These decisions were made because strategically, it is highly unlikely that the Makuleke would have won the land claim if the conservation status of Pafuri were not retained. For the elders, this meant that they could not regain the emotional and spiritual fulfilment embodied in their attachment to their land and their ancestors’ graves. Elaborating on the complexities of achieving consensus amongst the community with regard to how to use the land, Livingstone Maluleke, explained the process of community negotiations:

I want to be open and say, should our option of land use have diverted from the one that we have taken now, it would have been very difficult for us to get that land back because it is a national asset. Everybody nationally and internationally wants to see Kruger National Park as a conserved place, so the objections would be even

more powerful. But that was not all. We had to convince the claimants with what they want. Here in the village now we are talking of two diversities: the elderly people and the young people. The young people who were born after 1969 or just before 1969 do not know that land. They have never experienced that land and they do not have love for it at all. They don't understand why people still say, "We want to go back there". At that time [during negotiations], that understanding was not there. But we have got the elderly people here, men and women who grew up there, who explored that area and loved it and, you know, if they sing songs of the Makuleke area, you will see that they see it with passion. They think of the graves, they think of the things that they left there with passion, and they can be satisfied if somebody can take them back there. These were the dimensions in the community. And we had to balance the two. We had to explain until all of them came to one decision, to say, "Yes, we agree". We would say, "Yes, the young ones who today are standing here without jobs, a few of them will be employed there and are going to benefit. And in fact we will create jobs. You elderly people are old enough now. You can't have the strength, the resources to go and establish yourself again back there in terms of infrastructure." You know, you talk to people in a straightforward way and then they will start thinking, "Yes, but this guy is making sense". And you don't expect them to respond right there, but give them time and call on a meeting the next week. And they say, "No, we have agreed with what you say. Let's use it for conservation as long as you guys are going to study the situation, then you give us information. Then we don't have a problem." That is how you can see the conflicts which were arising, the tensions, the resistance, though some were soft, but they needed a lot of explanation. Yes, those are the resistances that were caused. (int. 2008)

Commercialising the land in this manner has therefore created a barrier between the community and their free access to their land. Furthermore, most Makuleke residents who are not directly involved with the tourism and conservation activities in the park feel no sense of benefit from the return of Pafuri to their community. For them, Pafuri's commodification is of no value. The Wilderness Safaris chairman expressed his opinion on people's different interpretations of land value, saying:

I do think that in traditional societies there is quite a lot of value put on the land because of its connection with the ancestors. Therefore, it has quite a lot of symbolic value to that community that we wouldn't necessarily understand. And I think there's quite a high value attached to that because especially in that community [Makuleke], it's terribly traditional in a way, or certainly busy with ancestors and spirits, so it's quite important to connect with your ancestors and where your ancestors were buried and where you lived is quite important to that connection. And then the other way they think about it is purely in economic terms. What money can they get out of this resource? (int. 2009)

The issue at hand here is primarily a generational one, with Makuleke elders having an emotional attachment to Pafuri and the younger generations wanting to reap financial benefits from tourism. As explained by community leaders, those who were born at N'tlhaveni have no personal connection to Pafuri and consider it a resource worth exploiting economically. The same position is held by those elders who realise that they cannot effectively utilise their access rights to Pafuri and therefore believe that they too deserve to gain from it since they were the ones who suffered most from the removal and have sacrificed their ability to return to their land. Benefits could be either financial or in kind, through the harvesting of natural resources, for instance. However, to date, neither of these types of gains has been forthcoming for the elderly. Other than the communal projects that the Makuleke CPA implemented in the first few years after the land claim, elders have neither seen financial benefits, nor have they been able to harvest natural resources from Pafuri. One CPA Executive Committee member stated, "We are not authorised to use natural resources. SANParks wants to develop a policy on utilisation of natural resources, but nobody harvests from there for now" (pers. com. 2011).

It is evident then, that the Makuleke are not fully utilising their land and are not benefiting from it even within the capacity they are authorised to. With restricted income and no utilisation of natural resources, the Makuleke CPA faces a dilemma with regard to benefit distribution.

8.3.3 Distribution

Having discussed the predictions regarding various benefits that were projected to accrue from tourism and comparing anticipations with materialised results, the next question to consider is the manner in which the benefits that did come about were distributed amongst the Makuleke. There were three assumptions here: first, that income from tourism would be used to benefit the broader Makuleke community; second, that income to individuals (through wages) would be distributed amongst larger family groups; and third, that employment opportunities in tourism and conservation would be fairly and equitably allocated.

The distribution of benefits that are most often cited by scholars covering the Makuleke case are the installation of electricity at the Makuleke villages, the upgrading of infrastructure in their five schools, the enhancement of the chief's estate, and the establishment of community clinics and training opportunities in the tourism and conservation sectors. These improvements were all developed with funding from government (such as the Restitution Grant, the Department of Trade and Industry) and non-governmental institutions (such as the Ford Foundation and the Endangered Wildlife Trust), along with income from trophy hunting concessions prior to the partnership with Wilderness Safaris. Once Pafuri Camp was built and the tourism operation began to function, income to the Makuleke CPA declined. Although it seems reasonable that the decrease in income should have been foreseen, as it commonly takes several years for tourism operations to establish themselves, the Makuleke were nevertheless quoted extravagant figures for immediate tourism revenues, which raised their hopes for lucrative returns. Notwithstanding this loss, however, employment opportunities to the Makuleke did increase through job opportunities at Pafuri Camp and N'tomeni Ranger Services from 2003 onwards.

Furthermore, from the time the Makuleke CPA began depending on income from tourism, the institution did not initiate any community development projects. Considering the manner in which the CPA functions, Makuleke residents are not able to hold their leaders to account, and their trust in the institution has diminished over the years due to unfulfilled promises. As one Pafuri staff member explained:

In 2002 or 2003, if I'm not mistaken, we had a meeting with the CPA committee and the Makuleke Development Forum. We agreed that we want to build our chief a nice house, which was a good move. But we must also look at poor families, those people who do not even have a house where they can run to in case of flood. Those people are still around, so we have agreed in that particular meeting that the CPA is going to build at least a one-room house with cement and put a nice roof [for each of these people]. They've never done that. We also agreed that if, let's say, there is somebody that passed Standard 10 at N'wanati High School and that child does not have money to go to further studies, the CPA must actually offer a bursary to that child. But they've never done that. We have spoken about this in 2003 and it was agreed upon, it's in the minutes, but never done. And look now, the chief has got a big house, his son is at school, but what I'm thinking now is that they said these things in order for us to agree that the chief must have a house and also Humphrey [Chief's son] must go to school, so they came up with the strategy of saying, "We are going to build houses for those people in need and we're going to offer bursaries for those kids in need". And we said, "It's fine, there's no problem", but they knew that they are not going to do that. They wanted us to say, "yes" because they had in their mind that they want to build a house for the chief. To me that is wrong. The CPA must do something for the community. And people are asking themselves now, if each family had money, their own money, perhaps it would be better. That's what they're saying now. (int. 2008)

Two reasons account for this lack of fair and equitable distribution: the income to the CPA was well below initial predictions; and internal problems within the Makuleke CPA began to surface at that time. The main reason for these internal problems was because under the democratic dispensation, many of the trained CPA

Executive Committee members were voted out by 2006 and new untrained people took over their positions. Unqualified, ill-equipped and short of finance, the new CPA Executive Committees were unable to deliver. Thus, it follows that the developments generally hailed as proof of the successful outcomes emanating from the Makuleke model cannot be credited to the community's involvement in tourism. As Tshinetisa Moila from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform in Polokwane confirmed, "The electricity project was a result of a grant [Restitution and Development Grant], not the land" (int. 2010). Other people at Makuleke also argue that the electricity project has nothing to do with the land claim since Makuleke was due to be electrified in 2008 regardless of their restitution achievement. Furthermore, John Nkum (1996) refers to the fact that there was already some electricity installed at Makuleke as early as 1992, bought by the Makuleke residents themselves. Nkum (1996) quotes Makuleke residents who stated that prior to the land claim, "those who could afford it had to pay ZAR 900 per person" for electricity (9). As a matter of fact, the Makuleke might ultimately have lost out by installing electricity using their own money, since they are currently experiencing difficulties in retrieving these funds from Eskom (the electricity parastatal), funds they were promised would be reimbursed in 2008 (Minutes of SBSC Handover Meeting 2010).

In general, benefits can be divided into two categories: those that primarily address the interests of individuals, and those that are more communal in nature. In the Makuleke instance, the first type of benefit includes the training of individuals in conservation and tourism, individual employment opportunities in these fields or in entrepreneurial micro-enterprise projects (such as the Small Business Support Company); and choosing individual children to attend the Children in the Wilderness camps. The second type of benefit mostly consists of the communal projects implemented by the Makuleke CPA thus far (installing electricity at the villages, refurbishing schools and adding classrooms, and building clinics). Even the money spent on building Chief Makuleke's house can be considered communal in

that it serves the political and psychological function of affirming Makuleke identity, sovereignty and prestige in response to the community's rival, the Mhinga chieftaincy. Having an appropriate residence for their traditional leader could be interpreted as worthwhile for the Makuleke, and as espoused by Ronald Nicolson (2008), constitutes "part of African respect for those in authority" (2).

One communal benefit that has not materialised in any meaningful way would be visitation rights to Pafuri. Notwithstanding the community's legal right to visit their area, in practice this rarely takes place. As one Makuleke CPA Executive Committee member explained:

Most people at Makuleke are not aware that they can visit Pafuri. We mentioned this at our last meeting telling the people that they can visit the park so long as they arrange this through the CPA beforehand and provide their own transport and food. The Joint Management Board will then grant them free entrance to the park and provide them with a ranger to accompany them. There are no restrictions, but people are not aware. (pers. com. 2011)

As stated by Makuleke residents, it is evident that in the first five or six years after the land claim (which I will refer to as phase one of the Makuleke model), the Makuleke CPA did in fact allocate both individual and communal benefits. However, from 2005, coinciding with the end of trophy hunting and with the effective beginning of the CPA's relationship with its main tourism partner, Wilderness Safaris, the communal benefits subsided and individual advantage took precedence at Makuleke. Bearing in mind the context of these events, during the first phase of the Makuleke model (roughly 1998-2005), there were significant sums of money in the CPA's coffers sourced from government, NGOs and hunting concessions. There was also close scrutiny of this newly democratic institution by numerous NGOs and media who were closely monitoring the Makuleke CPA's progress at the time. As the years went by, however, NGO and media attention diminished and during the time of this research, not a single NGO was active at Makuleke. Having been released

from the watchful eyes of external observers, the Makuleke CPA had room to maneuver using its privilege. As a result, the distribution of benefits began to be focused on individuals and the manner in which this was manipulated by people within the CPA caused discontent amongst those Makuleke residents who felt excluded in the process.

Notwithstanding *who* within the Makuleke community benefited from employment opportunities, the fact remains that some people at Makuleke were indeed able to access jobs in tourism and conservation. From there, the second level of distribution to consider, therefore, is the manner in which income from employment is expended within the community. In conventional development thought, it is assumed that providing an individual with a job translates into distribution of earnings amongst a household, and it is anticipated that the financial advantage of one person would benefit an entire family (statistically calculated in terms of numbers of dependents per employee). While this might be the case in some instances, it is not necessarily the norm. Many employed men and women I spoke with at Makuleke reserved their wages for themselves: to further their education, or to buy a car, new clothes or personal consumer goods. Furthermore, the fact that they earned their own income gave them a sense of independence. A staff member at Pafuri Camp commented, "I am earning money now and I am satisfied because I am not asking for money from someone else so that I can do this or that. So I feel happy. I can do it myself" (int. 2008).

James Ferguson (1990), in his study of Lesotho, also alludes to spending habits in the context of remittances from migrant workers. Ferguson (1990) states that one should "understand the fact that migrant workers, as a rule, never tell their wives how much money they earn" since they tend to have "a personal store of cash 'for their own enjoyment'" (150). Ferguson's (1990) point is illustrated in the Makuleke GG performance in which one scene portrays a man returning from working at the mines in Johannesburg. This migrant worker not only brings along a few gifts for his

wife, but also introduces her to his new fiancé from Johannesburg. As expected, this situation erupts into a quarrel between the two women who are both dependent on this man.

The way in which individuals negotiate sharing and spending therefore rests upon a variety of circumstances, values, needs and personal preferences. These issues are no different than would be the case in other parts of the world and the presumption that income to a young individual will be shared communally suggests a romanticisation of traditional ideals. I am not inferring that all people at Makuleke do not adhere to communal ideals. Rather, I argue that at Makuleke, dynamic negotiations between the self and others with regards to the sharing of wealth take place in an attempt to balance both individual and communal interests. A number of forces come into play in these processes including generational issues, a culture of greed (inspired by consumerism and the admiration of power and money), together with deep-rooted cultural norms and obligations, fear and intimidation.

Scholars on African ethics suggest that the manner in which material benefits are distributed within the larger community are of crucial importance, since spending habits may determine whether a person is accepted or rejected by the community. In relation to post-colonial Africa, Munyaradzi Murove (2008) refers to this in terms of Ali Mazuri's (1966) explanation of the profit motive versus the prestige motive. The dilemma that presents itself with financial success is that "the profit motive is incompatible with the prestige motive because the chief moral characteristic of the prestige motive gives precedence to the community before the profit motive" (94). Within this assertion, Murove (2008) clarifies that in such circumstances the individual only flourishes through acts of generosity. Were people to indulge in self-centred spending, they would be considered "a potential source of evil to the community" (94). However, the line between avarice and frugality is unclear, since as Benezet Bujo (1998) explains:

Saving money, for instance, could be taken as an excuse for refusing to offer necessary assistance to others. This may explain why even today, people in Africa do not hesitate to organize big feasts with relatives, friends and acquaintances and to spend money lavishly in order to keep human contacts as close as possible. (163)

Similar sentiments were expressed by Makuleke residents who pointed out the importance of communitarian behaviour. One man explained:

What I love about our community is its unity and how people share their things. When I go to my friend, I don't carry food to my friend. What my friend will eat, I will eat. When somebody lost his friend, I run to him to comfort him. When someone passes away here, everyone contributes so that maybe we can help. We are very supportive. (int. 2009)

The sharing of wealth can therefore be described as one of the fundamental forces that ties together communal relationships and, as Bujo (1998) shows, the non-sharing of wealth can induce adverse acts including sorcery (162). Jonathan Stadler (1994), in his study of generational relationships in a lowveld village in South Africa, further interprets this phenomenon as an “extremely destructive and dangerous mental condition” in some people (185). Stadler (1994) asserts that envy is perceived to be “endemic to rural settings, because differences in living conditions are more apparent within rural settlements than in urban ones ... [and that] feelings of envy can be provoked by someone wearing nice clothes, driving a new car, the smell of roasting chicken in a neighbour's homestead or by behaving arrogantly” (185).

As revealed in previous chapters, Makuleke residents did refer to instances of witchcraft that were motivated by jealousy. Resentment was particularly expressed towards individuals who were relatively financially successful at Makuleke. In addition, some villagers expressed dissatisfaction because they believed that there were too many members of the royal family serving on the CPA Executive Board and

too many affiliates of the royal family employed at Pafuri Camp. Furthermore, some staff members at Pafuri complained of being ill-treated by other employees. Even though there is evidence of much finger-pointing as to how and why certain people were able to access employment at Pafuri Camp, it became apparent that even within the so-called royal family 'camp' there were competing factions.

Jealousy and mistrust related to recruitment was also revealed with regards to the Small Business Support Company and Children in the Wilderness. There were accusations of unfair recruitment measures having taken place, and of inexperienced personnel being hired or placed in positions of control because of their affiliation with powerful groups within the community. One applicant relayed his own experience of being treated unfairly while seeking employment:

You know, I applied for the post [by sending a Curriculum Vitae to the CPA]. What happened was someone took the front page off my application where my phone number is written. It wasn't good. Someone came to me and said, "There was no front page of you and someone removed it in the office" I don't know why and who removed it Going through the CPA [to apply for jobs] is restricting people's opportunities ... because I should have come [to the interview] and failed by myself, not someone to make me fail before I try my luck. (pers. com. 2009)

Similarly, many comments from Makuleke residents suggested that the methods of child selection for Children in the Wilderness camps was unmerited, not because of the programme's policies, but rather due to the handling of the procedures by those local people in powerful positions.

On the whole, while I observed amongst the Makuleke a sense of communalism and unity, this was often undermined by fierce antagonism. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Makuleke were acclaimed by outsiders for the unity they demonstrated during the land claim process, and throughout my research individuals in the villages regularly spoke of their daily dependence on each other. However, interviewees also frequently alluded to the conflicts and antagonisms that arose

between people, mainly due to feelings of envy and discontent related to financial issues.

During my stay at the village, I was told numerous stories of fear and loathing at Makuleke. Statements I heard from Makuleke residents repeatedly included comments such as: “Things are too complicated”; “There is too much politics here”; and “Things are very sensitive here, it’s difficult to explain”. I was told of incidents where people were too afraid to voice their opinions that reflected opposition to certain powerful figures at the village lest they get into trouble or vile acts be inflicted upon them. In the course of my informal conversations with people at the villages, I was informed of instances where members of the community had stood up against others, wanting to hold them to account for various reasons, and were subsequently found dead shortly after. Four men, I was told, voiced their concern about certain financial issues, and within a month, all four had died.

In another instance, one man told me that he had worked for the government for a year. Wondering why he was never paid, he sent a letter to that government department to investigate this lack of payment. As it turned out, his salary was indeed being paid out, not to him directly, but to another powerful figure in the community who was expected to forward the payments. Upon finding out this information, the government employee did not dare to ask for the money he was earning and decided instead to resign from his post. A similar situation transpired in which a young man’s father who had passed away was owed some money from his employer at Makuleke. The young man’s mother did not have the courage to go and request the outstanding money because she feared negative repercussions.

A further instance of unusual local dynamics surfaced during a conversation I had with a neighbour at the Makuleke B&B. The neighbour asked me whether I was not afraid of spending the night there by myself for so long. When I assured her that I felt safe and did not believe there was a need to worry, she told me that she had found a naked man in her room a few nights earlier and that he quickly disappeared

when she screamed. I assumed that she must have been dreaming, but she insisted that this was real and that “these things happen at Makuleke”. I discovered later that such incidents are related to the belief in witchcraft.

The issue with the experiences of fear and intimidation described here is that existing realities at Makuleke include social dynamics and forces that are generally disregarded by development practitioners who tend to operate entirely according to empirical, observable and quantifiable data. In accordance with post-development theory, I argue that ignoring the broad domains of lived realities experienced by those being ‘developed’ is one of the primary flaws of orthodox development practice. Powerful social dynamics and forces of fear and ill-will drive people’s actions and in turn, influence the manner in which they relate to outsiders such as their commercial partners, employers or development practitioners in the Makuleke case. These forces, therefore, fundamentally impact on the ability of development to have positive impact on people’s lives.

8.3.4 Development

As alluded to in the previous sections, the ideas that inform progress in the Makuleke villages are mostly based on orthodox development speculations. It is assumed that once democratic institutions are established and a number of community leaders are trained in democratic governance, the remainder of the community, whether leaders or ‘commoners’, would then follow and be willing to embrace these modern norms within a short period of time. Essentially, the long-term expectation in the Makuleke model is to fully convert this rural community to the western capital-dominated democratic system that should thrive through profit-driven enterprises. Another supposition of the Makuleke model is that subsequent to the democratisation of governance, income from commercial tourism ventures in the Makuleke Contract Park would be equitably rolled out by the CPA in the form of

communal projects at N'tlhaveni. Furthermore, it is envisioned that after the concession agreement expires and the community takes over the ownership of the lodge, their income from tourism would increase substantially, and with such economic progress, the Makuleke community should be en route to 'development'.

By and large, Makuleke leaders have conveyed a genuine desire for progress. Considering the devastation experienced by the Makuleke after their forced removal in 1969, one can assume that much of their age-old livelihood methods were disrupted as a result. Consequently, external development interventions at Makuleke are generally welcomed by the community's leadership and, according to Chief Makuleke, no development propositions have been rejected since the land claim (int. 2008). Explicitly, the overarching request from the community's side is to address the fact that people are in need of financial support to alleviate the poverty that has engulfed them ever since their forced removal. To date, a significant number of initiatives aimed at poverty alleviation have been implemented at Makuleke by various actors including governmental, non-governmental and private sector organisations. These efforts have been geared towards the enhancement of the community's economy, providing infrastructural developments at the villages, and building capacity in political, economic and ecological domains. The partnership with Wilderness Safaris in particular aims at driving community development both economically and through training and education in conservation and tourism.

Steven Robins (2003) proposes that "in many parts of the developing world, it is the retreat of the neo-liberal state, rather than 'the tyranny of development', that poses the most serious threat to household livelihood strategies and economic survival" for rural communities (265). Given that my study investigates the partnership between the Makuleke CPA and a for-profit private company, this premise can also be questioned since evidence here shows that the community's involvement in enterprise solutions did not substantially contribute to its anticipated

'development'. Further, critics may denounce income from tourism for being a resource curse resulting in tensions, conflicts and disappointment. However, Robins (2003) also demonstrates that "responses to development are usually neither wholesale endorsements nor radical rejections of modernity and its bittersweet fruits," (280-281) and adopting Marshall Sahlins (1999) proposition of "indigenizing modernities", Robins (2003) argues that communities such as the Makuleke, "deploy hybrid and highly selective and situational responses to development interventions" (265). Findings from my research confirm this proposition. The Makuleke CPA was supportive of all the projects and programmes initiated by Wilderness Safaris, but only after elaborate discussions with community representatives and careful negotiations with their private sector partners. Generally, there was a sense of pride expressed in interviews that the Makuleke were partnering with such a prominent regional tourism operator, who benefited the community in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, the imbalanced power relationship was often mentioned and the sense that the community was "undermined" was also expressed (as discussed in Chapter Five).

The community's reactions to the development initiatives involving their partners were diverse and differed over time. Responses to the joint venture were primarily supportive, but as the CPA chairman stated, "the tunnel farm is good to be there, but it needs money to work ... and the problem is they employed a person who did not know about marketing" (int. 2008). Essentially, the hydroponic farm is a precise example of the types of development initiatives that are rejected by post-development theorists. Such developments are externally initiated, do not fulfil a prioritised need within the community (since the produce was not meant to be sold locally), and are highly technological, making the establishment difficult to operate and maintain. Moreover, communities lack a sense of ownership and control over such externally-initiated development projects. As was demonstrated at the GTZ TRANSFORM handover meeting in May 2007, the farmers working at the hydroponic farm clearly expressed their lack of interest in owning the project.

Again, a similar scenario struck the Makuleke B&B. Although the establishment was originally a community-initiated project, once Wilderness Safaris became involved in operating the B&B through the joint venture, the sense of ownership of the establishment subsided and Wilderness Safaris was expected to “make it work” (pers. com. CPA Exco. members 2008). At the same time, as discussed in Chapter Six, Chief Makuleke feared that the community was losing control over their B&B and accused Wilderness Safaris of taking it over (int. 2008).

Children in the Wilderness was also generally endorsed by the Makuleke. Other than the Chief’s comment that he would rather use that money for what he considered to be more urgent projects, there were no objections to the programme. The main reaction to Children in the Wilderness was an attempt to control who benefits from the opportunities it presented, and this manipulation of power led to a general dissatisfaction within the broader community. Responses to development interventions, therefore, are indeed “varied and situational”, but a further consideration is needed to take into account the particular circumstances into which each of these projects is placed.

In general, critics argue that conventional development efforts tend to overlook the real lived experiences of rural communities, focusing mainly on economic assistance. In this respect, Emma Crewe and Elizabeth Harrison (1998) suggest that there are two perceived engines for progress in conventional development: technology and money (30). These were precisely the items that were introduced by the GTZ TRANSFORM programme to the Makuleke through the Small Business Support Company: highly technological farming and money for business start-ups. As has been the case in development interventions throughout Africa since World War II, the assumption is that modernisation follows a linear trajectory from less to more developed (Andreasson 2010: 7), and that with the introduction of some technology and initial finance, benefits would begin to flow and ultimately, development would set in. The problem with this proposition is that one cannot

ignore the intricacies of rural life and the existing complex forces that influence behaviour. The expectation is that people should adapt to the requirements of introduced development initiatives in pursuit of democratisation, inclusion in the market economy and modernity broadly defined. The difficulty is, however, that to achieve these objectives, certain guarantees including the protection of property rights, functional elected representative governance, and the rule of law, along with individual rights and safety have to be enforced. As far as evidence from this research shows, these guarantees are not yet in place at Makuleke.

Unlike the deeply authentic traditional communities referred to by earlier post-development theorists such as Arturo Escobar (1995), who “reject development” and seek “alternatives to development”, the Makuleke case aptly relates to arguments proposed by more recent writings in post-development theory by Susan Maiava (2002), Sally Matthews (2004), Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson (2005), Katharine McKinnon (2008), and Stefan Andreasson (2010).¹⁰¹ Matthews (2004) articulates a foundational post-development argument stating that the rejection of development “should not ... be interpreted as a belief that the bettering of social organisation is impossible, nor as a call for a return to earlier ways of life” (376). Similarly, McKinnon (2008) states, “While anti-development critique concludes with the argument that the whole project of development is so problematic that it should not continue, post-development maintains some commitment to the hope that drives development interventions” (289). JK Gibson-Graham (2005) also argue that:

The postdevelopment agenda is not, as we see it, anti-development. The challenge of postdevelopment is not to give up on development, nor to see all development practice – past, present and future, in wealthy and poor countries – as tainted, failed, retrograde; as though there were something necessarily problematic and destructive about deliberate attempts to increase social wellbeing through economic intervention; as though there were a space of purity beyond or outside development that we could access through

¹⁰¹ An example of the destructive forces of development interventions to a deeply authentic rural community in India is discussed by Vandana Shiva (1988) in *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development*.

renunciation. The challenge is to imagine and practice development differently. (6)

In order to envision a radically different form of development practice, one must first ascertain the situation regarding current interventions and how “development” would be defined by a specific community. From what I have presented in this study, the ideological framework of development at Makuleke is partial and rather limited in its scope, mainly because it focuses on activities inside the Contract Park and pays relatively little attention to the villages at N’tlhaveni. This is evidenced by the existence of the Makuleke Master Plan (2000), which prescribes in detail the management and development plan for the Contract Park, while a similar planning document does not exist for the three Makuleke villages. The only mention of community development in the Master Plan (2000) lies embedded in general statements asserting the importance of “generating socio-economic development and sustainable employment opportunities”, “encouraging mutual respect for all cultures” and “encouraging appropriate tourism education, training, awareness and capacity building” for the Makuleke community (6.1.1).

To achieve effective development, Andreasson (2010) suggests that enhancement of people’s lives requires “a holistic conceptualization of social harmony and well-being that does not separate cultural, spiritual and ecological facets of development from economic and political ones” (7). So far, the cultural and spiritual facets have not been prioritised at Makuleke, and only the ecological facets in the park (as opposed to the ecology of the villages) has been emphasised. At N’tlhaveni, people still gather firewood in great quantities, for instance, and even if prohibited, no viable alternative energy sources are available since cooking with electric or gas stoves is unaffordable for most people in the villages.

One project that could be considered a contribution towards celebrating Makuleke culture is the enhancement of the GG performance (referred to in Chapter Six), since

it exhibits Makuleke history through a cultural presentation, effectively boosting the community's pride in their heritage. However, it might reasonably be argued that putting culture on show in this manner leads to the commodification of that culture in the sense defined by Davydd Greenwood (1977), and that this would further lead to what Dean MacCannel (1973) refers to as "inauthentic experiences" for tourists and hosts alike (592). Nevertheless, the post-development argument suggests that including culture, giving consideration to indigenous sources of knowledge and putting effort into restoring individual dignity, for example, would encompass a more holistic form of development than is currently the case at Makuleke (Andreasson 2010: 6-7).

The initiative that addresses facets that are beyond the economic and political is Wilderness Safaris' Children in the Wilderness programme. CITW intends to contribute to the wellbeing of Makuleke children and although this programme also focuses on the Contract Park by enhancing the children's interest in wilderness areas, the Follow-Up programme and environmental club curriculums, in the two years of my involvement, did address issues of relevance to the children's everyday lives at N'tlhaveni (such as Makuleke history and heritage, recycling and nutrition, for example). Despite the fact that the CITW programme is externally initiated and works to instil values not specifically articulated by the Makuleke community, I consider the programme commendable for its success in inspiring the children and cultivating their passion for learning, for offering joyful experiences, and for listening and acting upon the children's valid desires.

Andreasson (2010) also states that it is important to conceive of "different ideas about what development might entail and ... how societies could rethink development altogether so as to arrive at more propitious ways of improving well-being" (110). If the objective of development is to satisfy needs, this then calls for an understanding of what problems exist at the outset and what needs are lacking in the given society that reputedly requires development intervention. Nevertheless,

some critics argue that the methods of assessing such 'needs' and 'problems' are controversial. In this regard, N'Dione and de Leener et al. (2007) assert that:

Development ideology is entirely based on the idea that needs must be satisfied, at all costs [However], to use needs as a point of departure, we felt, led to an impasse. Needs are alienating, in the sense that they drive the individual to look further and further afield, outside of himself, far away and outside of his reference community. The only real essential need would seem to be a sense of harmony in one's life, in the place where one is living, with those around one. This is a need that cannot be the object of trade. (373-374)

The point here is that satisfying economic needs without considering social or psychological needs does not constitute holistic development and at the same time, sidelining existing social forces that impact on development interventions leads to undesirable results.

A revealing incident that highlighted the effects of disregarding or misunderstanding actual community needs in development efforts was a conversation I had with a couple of youths at Makuleke who had received qualifications in conservation a few years earlier. The youngsters felt that:

It is better the community stays out of the park because we know black people. We know how to hunt and we will finish the resources in the park. If we are allowed in there, we will cut down the trees and take grass for thatching. Right now we are cutting live trees in the village because the dry trees have been depleted. We are arguing with the government about that. We know how to track animals and hunt. Now that we have been trained as field rangers we even know how to hide from rangers. (pers. com. 2010)

The above statements explicitly demonstrate the naiveté of some development interventions and the misguided assumption that poor people's values can easily be changed through some education and training, even if the environment in which they live remains unchanged. The youth also show how some objectives can

actually backfire where, in this case, training in field ranging provided knowledge that could enable people to become more successful poachers.

For this reason, circumstances affecting people's lives must be considered when establishing development initiatives. As Crewe and Harrison (1998) argue, "Development activities are not introduced into a vacuum, into communities that have been isolated from external influences" (135). At Makuleke, the historic context of the community is important in that there is significant distrust of outsiders resulting from the brutal history of their forced removal. This is evident in Livingstone Maluleke's statement about how he first perceived Eddie Koch, the journalist who initiated the land claim process at Makuleke. In my interview with Maluleke, he said that community members were suspicious when Koch asked for information from the Makuleke:

We said, "What do you want to do with this information? You are also a white guy. How do we know that you are coming faithful? We don't trust a white guy. Our people have suffered quite tremendously in the Kruger National Park because of these white guys. They came there and told them wrong things altogether and you are coming here today when our hearts are so painful, who are you? Where do you come from and how are you going to help us?"

Other external actors were also regarded with suspicion, as Conrad Steenkamp (2001) declares. Accusations were also levelled against the Friends of Makuleke who were considered by some to be "'manipulating' the Makuleke in aid of commercial vested interest" (Steenkamp 2001: 234), and the GTZ TRANSFORM programme, which was perceived to be "colluding" with the National Parks Board (the precursor to SANParks) (Steenkamp and Urh 2000: 9). For this reason, it must be recognised that the initiation of more development projects at Makuleke that do not live up to their promises will reinforce the lack of trust and faith of the community towards outsiders and that this can be detrimental to constructive development.

Lastly, I argue that the Makuleke model was misconceived because the values that underpin it, like most post-World War II development projects, are “based on the universalisation of Western experience, and [do] not take into account the diversity of experiences, needs and aspirations of those it claims to assist” (Matthews 2004: 379). The community was expected to function as a fully democratic society that can hold their leaders to account and feel protected against acts of intimidation and oppression. As has been demonstrated in this study, this presumption is unfounded, since people still do not feel their rights are being met and are fearful of questioning those in power.

8.5 Recommendations

The recommendations I propose for bringing about positive change at Makuleke are drawn primarily from post-development considerations. As Matthews (2004) suggests, “such theories certainly do not view positive social change as impossible or undesirable” (376). But although many post-development theorists consider their role to be restricted to critical analysis, deconstructing orthodox development, and pointing out the reasons behind the failure of development projects, I believe that certain insights from post-development thought can be used empirically. I do not claim that these insights offer templates for how perfectly to implement alternative methods of improving people’s well being. However, I do consider that deciphering reasons behind the failure of development initiatives thus far offers a productive way forward in re-evaluating future assumptions. In addition, I strongly believe that the outlook for change can emerge from the Makuleke community itself. Despite relevant qualifications, it is difficult for someone who does not ‘belong’ to the community to fully appreciate their struggles, concerns and aspirations. For this reason, it is more likely for the quest for change to be successful if propositions were to emanate from within the community.

Robins (2003) rightly questions the merits of post-development hypotheses in the context of communities such as the Makuleke, but he bases his arguments on earlier writings of the post-development movement that focused on “valoriz[ing] peasant cultural autonomy and authenticity as part of a radical (and romantic) commitment to subaltern popular resistance to development, capitalism and modernity writ large” (267). More recent writings on post-development, however, offer propositions that could be helpful in interpreting the Makuleke case and provide insights into resolving some of the problems the community is currently facing. As Matthews (2004) notes, “post-development theory’s critique of development [is] useful, despite several limitations It is a set of valuable and useful ideas” that allow for discerning analyses of development interventions (383). My recommendations have less to do with prescriptive measures of how to do development better at Makuleke, and more to do with expanding the critical horizon of development practitioners in the hope of averting the pitfalls of past approaches.

Given that the development project at Makuleke has not lived up to expectations, the assumptions on which it was based need to be questioned. As presented in the sections above, the foundational premises of the four steps in the evolutionary Makuleke spiral did not deliver the anticipated outcomes: the tourism partnership did not produce the projected income to the Makuleke CPA; the benefits were not equitably distributed amongst the broader community; and the way in which available benefits were distributed did not lead to the substantive development of the community at large; and, finally as a result, the partners experienced a strained relationship. That being the case, I deduce that the assumptions of the model were misconceived and therefore, a re-evaluation and the inception of more appropriate foundational premises should improve development at Makuleke.

Sachs (2010) proposes that if ‘developers’ aim to curb the negative effects of well-meaning interventions, they should “search for less material notions of prosperity that make room for the dimensions of self-reliance, community, art or spirituality”

(xiii). Emphasis should be placed on the “underlying conviction that human well-being has many sources beyond money; drawing on them not only provides a base for different styles of prosperity, but makes people and communities more resilient against resource crises and economic shock” (Ibid: xiii). Accordingly, the promotion of communal relationships and the recognition of cultural value systems, such as the respect for elders, may assist in creatively enhancing the community’s prosperity and may curb some adverse effects of inappropriate development interventions.

To find new guiding ideas for development at Makuleke, it is important to recognise existing local social dynamics, which include both the constructive and destructive forces within the community that can either assist or hamper development projects. Building on productive forces such as family support networks and being mindful of development projects that could induce jealousy and resentment amongst the community would constitute a step forward. Moreover, caution should also be taken that development projects do not reinforce polarization between rich and poor (Andreasson 2005: 73). Ensuring that opportunities are fairly allocated may also reduce feelings of resentment within the community.

Another issue that caught my attention was that development efforts in the villages since the land claim were haphazard and non-aligned, with several organisations and individuals at work simultaneously. Although all interventions in the community are approved and registered by the Makuleke CPA, the different project organisers are mostly unaware of each other’s interventions. This situation can cause confusion, conflicts of interests and unnecessary repetitions of projects, and can also lead to frustration within the community. Perhaps if the Makuleke CPA were to create a clear development plan for the three Makuleke villages in N’tlhaveni, describing the community’s long-term aspirations and priorities, the disorderly nature of the current projects could be averted. A plan of this nature could be compiled by an inclusive committee of Makuleke leaders (traditional and democratic), village residents (including commoners, women, elders and youth), as

well as relevant advisors and legal personnel, and would thereby provide an important springboard for more effective change. The existence of such a plan, produced through broad-based community participation, would minimise unwarranted projects, would guide external ‘developers’ to fulfilling the self-identified needs of the community, and would enhance the accountability of Makuleke leaders.

What is required is a strategy that focuses not only on economic growth, but on “recovering the diversity of prosperity ... [based on] community and culture-based notions of well-being” (Sachs 2010: xii). A development plan that spells out local values and ambitions could also encourage additional funding agencies and individuals who would like to invest appropriately in Makuleke, but cannot ascertain what the community’s needs are other than the standard request for income-generating initiatives and more education. While a considerable number of volunteers have sent requests to Wilderness Safaris over the years seeking to engage in assistance initiatives at Makuleke, these could not be fully utilized to date since there exists no co-ordinated effort between the two partners (Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA) identifying how volunteers could best serve the community. As a result, many opportunities for support to the community are lost. A well-defined and inclusive development plan for the villages that addresses the Makuleke’s priorities and future aspirations could therefore set the stage for greater achievements.

8.5 Conclusion

Having established the two main propositions of the Makuleke model (conservation and commerce), its agenda and its objectives, I presented in this chapter an analysis of the tourism aspect of the Makuleke model. In this analysis, four main categories were emphasised: the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris partnership; the benefits

that accrued from this relationship; the manner in which these benefits were distributed amongst the Makuleke; and lastly, the effects this course of action had on the achievement of development and community upliftment at Makuleke.

After discussing the four categories, I deduced that the main cause of the difficulties experienced by the two parties was the assumptions upon which the Makuleke model was initially founded. The ideas that informed the development plans at Makuleke were modernist and western in that they introduced both democratic ideals and market-oriented progress. Although I do not condemn this approach, I do however, consider it partial and insensitive towards the values and contemporary social realities of the Makuleke.

I presented recommendations for reform at Makuleke to complement the economic development trajectory already in place. These include seeking less material methods of assistance that focus on collective well-being, recognise Makuleke culture and identity, and are sensitive towards the existing environment at N'tlhaveni. Prevailing constructive and destructive forces should be taken into account and projects should be mindful of their repercussions and the possibility of reinforcing the gap between rich and poor. An overall plan for development at the Makuleke villages akin to the Master Plan (2000) created for the Contract Park would be beneficial in creating a vision of progress for the community. The idea is for this plan to be developed by the Makuleke themselves since external projections determining “community needs” and “correct development” would likely be unfruitful.

With specific regard to the Makuleke CPA-Wilderness Safaris partnership, I concur with the Wilderness Safaris chairman that the relationship is “still in its infancy” and I do believe that the two partners have the capability and good will to make their alliance work. Significant changes in attitudes and governance practices towards the end of the period of my field research on the part of both the Makuleke CPA and Wilderness Safaris point to the possibility of the Makuleke Tourism Spiral returning

to its intended shape once more. On the one hand, the approach taken by the most recently elected CPA chairman (2010), a former Police Station Commissioner, both firm and conscientious in my opinion, promises to address the ills of the past and bring about meaningful social and economic reform with regard to both governance and accountability with the CPA. On the other hand, Wilderness Safaris is currently engaging in a new policy framework following the Global Ecosphere Retreat Certification, a philosophy based on the Zeitz Foundation's Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).¹⁰² The sustainability indicators for this certification are composed of "4 Cs": Conservation, Community, Culture and Commerce forming a new strategic plan for Wilderness Safaris to follow. These components together embody a more holistic approach to tourism-led development than has been the case thus far and, if planned and executed effectively, could bring about promising results.

Inherent in the "4 Cs" initiative is a rethinking of the whole strategy of doing business in a context where the environment and communities are involved. With Wilderness Safaris' commitment to increased focus on community and culture, and the demonstrated initiative from the Makuleke CPA with regard to internal reform, I anticipate encouraging outcomes. These new approaches mesh well with the attributes proposed by post-development thought that emphasise the consideration of cultural values in development interventions. There are signs that in this new era, the tourism-led development spiral may start to expand outwardly, and the Makuleke may yet achieve the positive results expected from their model.

¹⁰² The reason Wilderness Safaris is now using the GRI is because the Zeitz Foundation (a non-profit organization registered in Germany) is one of the company's shareholders (linked with PUMA who own a 20% stake in Wilderness Safaris), and the 4 Cs offer a convenient way of structuring the indicators (pers. com. Poultney 2011).

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APPENDIX 1

Makuleke Historical Timeline

1652	The fifth generation of Makuleke people is living at Old Makuleke.
18 th C.	White people arrive at Old Makuleke and name it Crooks Corner.
1836	Chief Shinhambane Maluleke Hlekana extracts the first great blood price paid by the van Rensburg Voortrekkers.
Mid-1800s	Hunters start operations in Pafuri and begin the ivory trade.
1886	Witwatersrand Gold discoveries and the beginning of illegal labour recruitment from Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
1889	British South Africa Company is established by Cecil Rhodes.
1890	Swiss Missionaries establish outpost at Pafuri to service spiritual needs of labour migrants.
1893	Swiss Missionaries establish themselves on the left bank of the Limpopo, immediately north of the Makuleke area.
1896	A white man (Barnard from Potchestroom) from Alice in the Eastern Cape treks through Pafuri and 'loses his way' to Mozambique. He recruits men for the mines in Johannesburg and pays them twelve pounds per person.
1903	Area south of the Luvuvhu River is declared the Xingwedzi Game Reserve.
1905	Native Location Report (Makuleke people recognized as a separate tribe).
1907	Transvaal Native Location Commission recognizes two separate locations for Mhinga and Makuleke clans.
1910	Store at Pafuri is set up by Alex Thompson and William Pye alongside the Makuleke Chief's homestead.
1910	Steven Hamilton comes to Old Makuleke and tries to control their use of natural resources. He outlaws fishing in the Luvuvhu River.
1911	First Mission School at Old Makuleke (Pafuri) is established by the Swiss missionaries of the Free Church of the Canton de Vaud in Switzerland.
1913	Natives' Land Act of 1913 (later changed to Black Land Act). ¹⁰³
1913	Labour recruiters start to operate actively in the Pafuri Triangle.
1918	The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association of the Chamber of Mines sets up a post south of the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers to regulate the recruitment of Africans entering Pafuri.
1919	Ranger's post built at Punda Maria.
1926	Xingwedzi Game Reserve connected to the southern Sabi Game Reserve to form the Kruger National Park.
1927	Native Administration Act (subsequently changed to Bantu Administration Act and later to Black Administration Act).

¹⁰³ Many of the South African laws dealing with segregation, 'native' administration and land were renamed at intervals over the years. This reflected attempts to disassociate such laws from the negative connotations they inevitably inspired, and to keep up when the apartheid state changed the term 'native' to 'Bantu' and later changed 'Bantu' to 'black' (Claassens and Cousins 2008: ix).

- 1928 The Makuleke are driven away from old Makuleke under the command of Stevenson Hamilton and relocated westward at Mabiligwe. The Makuleke area is declared a game reserve. Some Makuleke people flee to Mozambique and others flee to Zimbabwe.
- 1930 National Parks Board puts forward a proposal to include the Pafuri area into the Kruger National Park.
- 1931 First attempt to forcefully remove Makuleke community from Pafuri triangle.
- 1933 Proclamation of the Pafuri Game Reserve between the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers.
- 1936 Native Trust and Land Act (renamed Development Trust and Land Act).
- 1936 Makuleke community is prohibited from owning cattle; only donkeys and goats are permitted.
- 1948 National Party Government comes to power in South Africa.
- 1950 Chief Adolf Mhinga is appointed by the governor general as chief of the "Amashangane Tribe".
- 1951 Bantu Authorities Act 68 (renamed Black Authorities Act) introduced the Tribal Authorities system.
- 1952 Chief Mhinga states in Tomlinson Commission that the Makuleke people should be moved under his jurisdiction.
- 1954 Mhinga Tribal Authority is gazetted.
- 1955 Freedom Charter of South Africa is adopted by the ANC.
- 1957 Regulations Prescribing the Duties, Powers, Privileges and Conditions of Service of Chiefs and Headmen (Proclamation No. 110).
- 1959 The Bantu Self Governing Act is passed and Gazankulu is declared a self-governing territory with its own legislative assembly.
- 1965 A police unit is established next to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association station to maintain a *cordon sanitaire* on the border.
- 1967 Chief Rubin, Joas Phahlela Makuleke's father, passes away.
- 1968 Government bulldozes the bush at N'tlhaveni to make way for residential blocks (settlement villages) to which thousands of Tsonga-speakers would be forcefully removed.
- 1969 Makuleke forcefully removed from Pafuri to N'tlhaveni on September 13.
- 1970 Clinic constructed at Block D in N'tlhaveni.
- 1971 Incorporation of most of the Makuleke area into the Kruger National Park.
- 1971 Machangana Legislative Assembly R148.
- 1972-1973 Large numbers of Tsonga-speaking people uprooted from a township near Louis-Trichart (Makhado) and from Venda and are moved into N'tlhaveni.
- 1968-1972 Samuel Dumazi Maluleke, Joas Phahlela Makuleke's uncle, serves as interim Chief.
- 1972-1975 Piet Mugakula serves as acting chief of Makuleke people.
- 1973 Gazankulu is declared as self-governing territory with its own legislative assembly (Government Notice R15).
- 1974 Potable piped water is supplied at Makuleke.
- 1976 Joas Phahlela is appointed by Chief Minister of Gazankulu as headman of three areas (Blocks H, I and J) under the Mhinga Tribal Council.
- 1976 Conflict with Chief Mhinga.

- 1976 Dam is constructed on the Luvuvhu River and reticulation system is installed throughout N'tlhaveni.
- 1976 National Parks Act.
- 1980 Malamulele Hospital is constructed.
- 1980 Secondary school at Makuleke is built with financial contribution from the community and government subsidy.
- 1982 Wilderness Safaris is conceived in Botswana.
- 1983 State formally recognizes status of Chief Mhinga.
- 1986 Addition of provision to National Parks Act of 1976 stipulating that "SANP and a private landowner may agree to have his land declared a national park, or part of a national park, under conditions that are mutually acceptable" (National Parks Act section 2B 1(b)).
- 1986 The Makuleke tribal office is built by the community with government subsidy.
- 1988 Irrigation Scheme constructed. Cultivation commenced in 1991 with advent of piped water supply.
- 1990 Makuleke Clinic is partially built by community with subsidy from government.
- 1991 Representations are made to the government of Gazankulu seeking the establishment of a Tribal Authority in respect of the Makuleke community.
- 1991 Representation for a Makuleke Tribal Authority is made in a letter to the Director General, Department of the Chief Minister and Economic Affairs of the Government of Gazankulu on September 16.
- 1992 Initial electricity supply installed with a contribution of ZAR 900.00 per person. Only those who can afford to pay have access to electricity.
- 1994 First non-racial elections in South Africa. The end of apartheid rule. African National Congress Government takes over and Nelson Mandela is sworn in as President of South Africa on May 10.
- 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22.
- 1995 Makuleke Land Claim lodged on December 20.
- 1996 Constitution of South Africa enacted.
- 1996 Representations by the Makuleke to the Ralushai Commission of Inquiry into Traditional Leadership Disputes.
- 1996 Mouton Report is released.
- 1998 Land Claims Court of South Africa transfers the Pafuri Area to the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA) on December 15. The Main Settlement Agreement is signed.
- 1999 The Makuleke Communal Property Association Constitution is finalized on January 23 and the CPA is registered on February 8.
- 2002 The Communal Land Rights Bill is introduced, aimed at converting plots in ex-homelands to freehold title.
- 2003 The Traditional Leadership and Government Framework Act 41 is implemented. A clause giving traditional leaders more power over land use than they had under apartheid and colonial rule sparks widespread resistance.
- 2003 N'hlapo Commission of Inquiry into Traditional Leadership Disputes begins.
- 2003 Makuleke CPA signs Concession Contract with Wilderness Safaris.
- 2003 Anti-poaching unit is established at Pafuri (N'tomeni Ranger Services)

- 2004 Communal Land Rights Act 11 (CLaRA) is signed by President Thabo Mbeki into law. Constitutional challenge is launched by the Legal Resources Centre.
- 2005 Wilderness Safaris Pafuri Camp begins operations.
- 2005 First Children in the Wilderness (CITW) Camp at Pafuri Camp.
- 2006 Makuleke community challenges Communal Land Rights Act together with three other communities (Dixie, Kalkfontein, and Makgobistad).
- 2008 Traditional Courts Bill B15.
- 2008 Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights announces the settling of a cumulative total of 74,747 claims constituting 95% of all claims.
- 2008 Children in the Wilderness Follow-Up programme begins at Makuleke villages.
- 2008 Anti-poaching unit shooting incident close to Mabiligwe.
- 2009 Pretoria High Court rules parts of the Communal Land Rights Act unconstitutional on October 31. The Legal Resources Centre appeals to have the whole law set aside.
- 2009 Children in the Wilderness Camp is cancelled due to financial constraints.
- 2009 Children in the Wilderness Environmental Clubs are established at the five schools at N'tlhaveni.
- 2010 Constitutional Court upholds appeal and declares the entire Communal Land Rights law unconstitutional on May 11.
- 2010 Wilderness Safaris lists on the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Africa Board.
- 2010 Wilderness Safaris employs the 4 C's responsible tourism model as their philosophy in balancing financial, social and environmental equity (Conservation, Commerce, Community and Culture).

APPENDIX 2

List of Makuleke Chiefs

1700 – 1765	Chief Mashakadzi of the Makahluli “Ancient Father”
1765 – 1800	Chief Mlati and Phele
1802 – 1832	Chief Nhlaniki and Phele
1833 – 1856	Chief Hlaniki-Makuleke (spelled Hlekane in Harries 1987: 96) ¹⁰⁴
1857 – 1882	Chief Hlaniki
1883 – 1903	Chief Nkuzani
1904 – 1944	Chief Mugakula
1945 – 1967	Chief Phahlela Rubin
1968 - 1973	Chief Joas - Jutas-Dumazi
1974 – present	Chief Mugakula Phahlela Jutas Makuleke ¹⁰⁵

(Bruchmann 2006: 43, unpublished manuscript)

¹⁰⁴ Hlekane, according to Dicke (1926) “was not the chief’s real name, but only his ‘bonga’ name, that is, the name by which he was greeted and referred to by his people or anybody addressing him” (1018-1019).

¹⁰⁵ In other official documents, 1976 is cited as the year Joas Phahlela Mugakula became Chief of the Makuleke people.

APPENDIX 3

List of Makuleke Communal Property Association Executive Committee Members 1999-2010

Title	1999	2000
Chairperson	Chief Joas Phahlela	Chief Joas Phahlela
Deputy Chairperson	Gibson Maluleke	Gibson Maluleke
Secretary	Livingstone Maluleke	Denis Skalela
Deputy Secretary	Makamu Philemon (MP)	Toko Lydia Baloyi
Treasurer	Vetlee Chauke	Richard Domela
Village Rep Makuleke	Samson Sambo	Emily Chauke
Village Rep Mabiligwe	Evans Nwaila	Livingstone Maluleke
Village Rep Makahlule	Rexon Josini	Rexon Josini
Village Rep Mhinga	Mavis Hatlane	Mavis Hatlane

2003	2006	2010
Chief Joas Phahlela	Eric Tivani	Bios Hlungwane
Solomon Makhondo	Thomas Xibambu	Mavis Hatlane
Stanley Maluleke	Mavis Hatlane	Bongani Baloyi
Eric Tivani	Solomon Makhondo	Cynthia Yingwani
Grace Msaveni	Wissi Mthombeni	Solomon Makhondo
Abigail Shingange	Prison Baloyi	Eric Tivani
Livingstone Maluleke	Livingstone Maluleke	Given Ngobeni
John Khosa	Calvin Chauke	Calvin Chauke
Mavis Hatlane	Virginia Hatlane	Dora Madume

APPENDIX 4

List of Interviews

#	Interviews	Affiliation	Date
1.	Agnes Hlungwane	Makuleke Village	July 2, 2008
2.	Alex Botha	DLA, Pretoria	February 2, 2009
3.	Alweet Hlungwani	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008
4.	Attorney Hlungwane	Makuleke Village	October 5, 2009
5.	Bongani Baloyi	CITW	April 10, 2009
6.	Brett Greenaway	Pafuri Camp	April 2, 2008
7.	Callum Sargent	Pafuri Camp	May 21, 2008
8.	Chris Roche	WS Management	April 14, 2009
9.	Clive Poultney	WS CLO	February 16, 2009
10.	Concelia Maluleke	SBSC	July 2, 2008
11.	David Lancaster	WWB	November 24, 2010
12.	Derrick Nkuva	Pafuri Camp	April 4, 2008
13.	Edward Maluleke	Pafuri Camp	May 4, 2008
14.	Enos Maluleke	Makuleke Village	May 16, 2008
15.	Eric Tivani	Makuleke Village	May 16, 2008
16.	Ernest Maluleke	Pafuri Camp	April 2, 2008
17.	Eva Jeleni	Pafuri Camp	April 4, 2008
18.	Godfrey Baloyi	Pafuri Camp	April 2, 2008
19.	Grace Misareni	Makuleke Village	May 12, 2008
20.	Hanel de Wet	Pafuri Camp	May 4, 2008
21.	Jack Greeff	NRS	May 19, 2008
22.	James Maluleke	SBSC	October 6, 2009
23.	James Ramsey	WS Management	November 23, 2009
24.	James Westgate	WWB	November 19, 2010
25.	Jeff Sebape	DLA, Pretoria	February 2, 2009
26.	Jerry Hlungwani	Makuleke Village	May 12, 2008
27.	Joas Phahlela Makuleke	Makuleke Village	May 14, 2008
28.	Joannah Maluleke	SBSC	July 2, 2008
29.	John Chauke	Pafuri Camp	May 20, 2008
30.	Lamson Maluleke	Makuleke Village	April 2, 2008
31.	Leinah Chauke	Makuleke Village	May 12, 2008

#	Interviews	Affiliation	Date
32.	Livingstone Maluleke	Makuleke Village	May 2, 2008
33.	Lukas Mugakula	Pafuri Camp	January 8, 2009
34.	Major Maluleke	Pafuri Camp	April 4, 2008
35.	Malcolm McCulloch	WS Chairman	November 26, 2009
36.	Mavis Hatlane	Makuleke Village	May 15, 2008
37.	Murray Hathorn	WWB	November 29, 2010
38.	Nkhensani Novela	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008
39.	Olvia Masimsa	Pafuri Camp	April 4, 2008
40.	Pastor Khosa A.V.	Makuleke Village	October 2, 2008
41.	Patrick Boddam-Whetham	WS Management	November 16, 2009
42.	Piet Hobyane	Makuleke Village	May 12, 2008
43.	Ponani Patricia Baloi	Pafuri Camp	April 4, 2008
44.	Ronald Ndlovu	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008
45.	Sithe Gumbi	DLA, Pretoria	February 2, 2009
46.	Stanley Maluleke	Makuleke Village	May 12, 2008
47.	Steve Collins	GTZ TRANSFORM	May 18, 2010
48.	Thomas Shibambu	Makuleke Village	May 16, 2008
49.	Tshinetisa Moila	Land Reform, Polokwane	October 4, 2010
50.	Valencia Josini	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008
51.	Vettlee Macabele	Makuleke Village	May 15, 2008
52.	Walter Jubber	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008
53.	Warren Ozorio	Pafuri Camp	April 3, 2008

APPENDIX 5

List of Personal Communications

	Personal Communications	Affiliation	Date
1.	Anton Lategan	EcoTraining	2010
2.	Benes Maluleke	Makuleke Village	2008-2010
3.	Betsy Fullagar	Makuleke Village	2009
4.	Bios Hlungwani	Makuleke Village	2010
5.	Dee Lawson	EcoTraining	2007-2010
6.	Bruce Lawson	EcoTraining	2008-2010
7.	Chick Leigh	The Outpost	2008
8.	Concelia Maluleke	Makuleke B&B	2007-2008
9.	Dudley Mloi	Service Delivery Review	2008
10.	Elmon Chauke	Makuleke Village	2008-2010
11.	Enos Ngomezulu	Pafuri Camp	2007-2009
12.	GG Theatre Group	Makuleke Village	2007-2010
13.	Heather Wilson	CITW	2007-2010
14.	Henry Van Rensburg	SBSC	2007
15.	John Shibambo	Hydroponic Farm	2007-2010
16.	Kevin Johnston	The Outpost	2008-2009
17.	Leonard Mabasa	Makahlule Village	2007-2010
18.	Lex Hes	EcoTraining	2010
19.	Linnet Baloyi	Makuleke B&B	2007-2009
20.	Makamu Philemon (MP)	Makahlule Village	2007-2008
21.	Mzamani Mathye	Makahlule Village	2008-2010
22.	Nicola Harris	CITW	2007-2010
23.	Norman Maluleke	Makuleke Village	2008-2010
24.	Nwa-Hasani Makhondo	Makuleke Village	2008-2009
25.	Patrick Harries	Historian, Switzerland	18 Aug 2009
26.	Petronella Maluleke	Makuleke Village	2007-2008
27.	Raymond Hlungwani	Makuleke B&B	2007-2009
28.	Solomon Maluleke	Makuleke Village	2007-2009
29.	Thomas Ndube	The Outpost	2008
30.	Ursula Montgomery	Pafuri Camp	2008
31.	Ursula Tivani	Pafuri Camp	2007-2009