

Prior to the building of the new township, the black population of Windhoek had been housed in two separate informal settlements on the periphery of the white town. The larger or "main" location was situated to the west of the white township, while the smaller was located on the borders of Klein Windhoek in the east. In keeping with colonial practice, the locations were not administered as an integral part of the town. In 1927 an advisory board was established for the main locations. This consisted of 12 black members (six elected and six appointed) under the chairmanship of the white location superintendent. Representation on the board was organized along ethnic lines, with the location superintendent ensuring by means of the appointed members that each major ethnic or regional group would be represented. In 1932 the main location was reorganized. Roads were laid out and ethnic subdivisions created, although it would appear that the ethnic divisions were not strictly applied. Plots were rented from the municipality for a minimal monthly fee, and all housing was built by the people themselves. Although of a poor quality, these houses were of considerable economic and personal value to the people, as accommodation which provided a foothold in the urban areas and as a means of supplementing income through rent.¹⁰⁰

Plans to build a new black township in Windhoek were already mooted in the 1940's, and by 1947 a committee of municipal and central government officials had been formed to look into the question of a new township.¹⁰¹ In the same year, Pokkiesdraai, a compound for Ovambo and other northern contract workers, was established not far from the future site of Katutura. Plans to move the main black township located on the western periphery of Windhoek only came to fruition in the 1950s, however, when they were given impetus by further growth and development of

the white settlement and the more rigorous segregation policies of the new Nationalist administration in South Africa. By this time the white settlement had expanded close to the borders of the main location and the local authorities became increasingly concerned about health conditions in the overcrowded, impoverished and neglected township.¹⁰²

Opposition to the move manifested itself early, even among the cowed and collaborationist members of the Windhoek Location Advisory Board.¹⁰³

It is one of the ironies of colonial thinking that extracts of the proceedings of early location board meetings quoted by officials at a meeting with township residents in 1959 to show that black residents had been adequately consulted about the move, should actually illustrate the opposition of residents to the move and the authorities' total disregard of their wishes.¹⁰⁴

At a board meeting in June 1954, for example, boardman Aaron Mungunda (later dubbed by black nationalists as an "indefatigable, self-confessed agent of the South African government and police") stated: "We are fond of this place and have no wish to move, but if we have to move, it must be to the south-western side, because the north-western side is not good. We are in favour of the building of improved houses".¹⁰⁵

In the one area where the board was given a choice, the selection of a name for the new township, boardmen also expressed their rejection of the scheme. The name Katutira, meaning "the place where people do not live", was unanimously accepted by the board.¹⁰⁶ Further evidence of resistance against removal is contained in the positions adopted by officials in relation to the move. In October 1959, for example, a white official drew attention to the fact that in terms of article 16 of

Proclamation No. 56 of 1951, local authorities were empowered to condemn buildings which posed a health hazard, without being obliged to pay compensation. He went on to threaten that in those cases where people refused to cooperate, the local authorities might well refuse to pay compensation. At the same meeting when location residents were allowed to put questions to the officials attending the meeting, all the boardmen and other residents who expressed opinions were unanimous in their opposition to the move. The boardmen emphasized that the idea of the move had come from the town council. Both the board and the township residents had opposed the removal and had on several occasions brought this to the attention of the authorities. The board favoured better housing, but on the present site. While there was some disagreement among speakers about whether the board had (under pressure from the administration) finally approved the scheme, they unambiguously stated that they had originally opposed the move.

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Besides members of the advisory board, other residents also spoke at the meeting in October 1959, making it absolutely clear that residents were implacably opposed to the removal. Among those who spoke were a number of people who held prominent positions in the newly-formed nationalist organizations. Speaker after speaker made it clear that they were not responsible for the new township and were determined to resist the removal. It was clear, they said, that the only reason for the erection of the new "location" was to accommodate South Africa's apartheid policy. The administration had claimed that it could not extend the existing townships to three white land owners to the west of the township refused their property. Yet it expected 15 000 location residents to move. Was the administration not aware that it was trying to impose its apartheid policy on a place which did not belong to it?

Do you not know that this place belongs to us and us alone?
We are people who are in our own country and have no need to
go to another place. We will not allow apartheid (here). If
we move to Katutura then we will allow apartheid (here). 108

Opposition to the removal coalesced around a number of issues, the major being the contention that the move was primarily motivated by the administration's apartheid policy. The authorities had claimed on several occasions that the removal was necessary to improve the poor housing conditions in the Windhoek location. While those who opposed the move admitted that conditions in the location were appalling, they maintained that this was a result of poverty, which in turn was at least partly a result of the apartheid policy which imposed restrictions on their ability to obtain better employment at higher wages. It was argued that if the administration merely wanted to improve living conditions, it could have built new houses in the old location. The authorities' counter-argument that the location was too small to accommodate expansion was rejected. It was conceded that some white land might have to be expropriated, but this was referable to moving a whole community. However, even if there had been no more room for expansion, further land could have been made available in other parts of the town without having
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to remove the existing township.

The authorities' argument that Katutura would be located closer to the town's industrial area was resented because it showed that blacks were "regarded as inanimate assets for future industrial expansion, to be moved without their consent whenever and wherever they are needed".
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Those who opposed the move argued that the real reason for the removal was that white housing had been built up to the borders of the township and that the old location therefore stood in the way of further white

expansion. Because of the apartheid policy, the authorities regarded it as undesirable for whites and blacks to live close to one another. The South African Minister of Native Affairs had stated in the Senate in 1956 that rationalization of his government's segregation policies demanded that there be a buffer strip of at least 500 yards between a black location and the settlement of any other racial group. In order to satisfy this demand, "incorrectly situated" locations would have to be removed and replaced with "correctly situated" locations.¹¹¹ The removal was a further cause of insecurity among blacks because it was always the blacks who were forced to move for the convenience of whites. Should further expansion occur in Windhoek, blacks might be forced to move once again.¹¹²

The move to Katutura would also impose additional financial costs on the already impoverished residents of the location. Firstly, it would entail an increase of rental from 3/6d to approximately 20/-, that is raising housing costs more than five times what they were in the old location. Furthermore, Katutura was about six kms from the centre of town. This would not only entail additional transport costs to work, but also put further difficulties in the way of blacks wanting to use the shopping and other facilities in the town of Windhoek.¹¹³

As with other future removals, underlying the reluctance to move was an attachment to the existing settlement, a realization that the community could not be reproduced elsewhere, particularly not under the circumstances envisaged for Katutura by the authorities:

It was as if the very hardship of life in the Old Location created a great family in which each member looked out for every other.

In spite of the hardship, there was a strange contentment

with Old Location life; in the midst of so much noise, a serenity.¹¹⁴

The very disorder of the old township provided a degree of security against interference by the authorities. For example, people without passes could find refuge there because it was impossible for an outsider to locate anyone without asking:

The most precious aspect of Old Location life was the lack of government presence. Here the people found a reprieve from the Boers' efforts to implement their apartheid state.¹¹⁵

In Katutura the situation would be very different. In many ways the township resembled a labour compound. Provision had been made for fencing off the new township and entrance to it would be strictly controlled. Ethnic zoning was to be strictly applied so that even houses were numbered according to the ethnic groups of residents. Every resident was to be registered with the authorities and residence permits could be revoked and people deported to the reserves. Officials were empowered to enter homes at any time and without notice. Forty-eight hours notice had to be given for any public meeting or "assembly of persons", and no one was allowed to collect money in the township without the superintendent's permission. Furthermore, there was no security of tenure. Residents would not be granted freehold tenancy, and the town council was empowered to cancel a site permit for the contravention¹¹⁶ of any regulation, including non-payment of rent.

The Katutura removal not only provided an issue on which the vast majority of blacks in Windhoek were united, but also posed a direct threat to the newly formed nationalist organizations. In particular the zoning of the township in accordance with ethnic groups, and the restrictions placed on meetings and fund-raising put significant obstacles in the way

of nationalist organization. The commission of enquiry which investigated the shootings in the Windhoek location in December 1959 and the events that led to this confrontation, placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of nationalist leaders in engineering the confrontation. Glossing over the "alleged grievance" of township residents, it dwelt instead on a series of letters that had passed between nationalist leaders, in particular on letters sent to Namibian leaders by Kerina in New York. These letters were meant to prove that opposition to the removal "was organized by the Hereros in Windhoek at the instigation of their protagonists in New York".¹¹⁷ The letters, it was argued, also showed that "the opposition to the location removal must be maintained with the object of strengthening the hands of those who were endeavouring to achieve their political aims through the intervention of the UNO." It therefore rejected the reasons for resistance to the removal put forward by the nationalist leaders.

The reasons for the opposition put forward by the self-appointed leaders of the Native population are not acceptable, for the letters sent from New York to those same leaders show clearly that the riot and the violence of which it formed part, was exactly what the team which claimed to represent them at the United Nations was hoping for. They wanted it to happen and, when African blood was shed, they were, as Kerina so naively put it, prepared "to make the most of it".¹¹⁸

While there can be little doubt that the nationalist movement and its leaders played a major role in organizing opposition to the removal, the Commission's interpretation represents a gross distortion of the real situation. Opposition to the removal was not simply "organized by the Hereros in Windhoek", as the Commission suggested. Considerable evidence exists to show that other ethnic groups were not only opposed to the move, but took active steps to express their opposition. For example, the OPO with its largely Ovambo membership played a major role in orga-

nizing resistance to the removal.¹¹⁹ Damara women had also played a major role in the march on the administrator's residence on 3 December.¹²⁰ At the meeting with administration officials in October 1959, speakers who opposed the removal represented a broad spectrum of the population, including Hereros, Ovambos, Damaras and Mbanderus.¹²¹

It is also clear that local leaders played a more important role than "protagonists in New York". More specifically, Kerina's role was vastly exaggerated. Although this extremely ambitious man was very free with his advice (and even instructions) to nationalist leaders in Namibia, it is clear that his suggestions were seldom, if ever, followed, and that he had little influence on events in the territory. Through his position in the United States, he had established good contact with Toivo and other OPO leaders, but in 1959 he held no recognized position in any of the nationalist organizations and enjoyed little credibility, particularly among the Herero leadership. Kerina's political career in SWAPO and NUDO in the early 1960s was shortlived, and whatever credibility he managed to establish was destroyed by his ambitious machination and tendency to create paper organizations with himself as supreme leader.¹²²

Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to show that opposition to the removal had pre-dated the creation of the nationalist organizations. When the opposition of the Location Advisory Board had proved ineffective, their failure had pointed the way to alternative leadership and strategies. That nationalist leaders found it opportune to mobilize on the basis of this issue or that they perceived that it could strengthen their position at the UN, is no reason to lose sight of grievances that underlay resistance to the removal, and that these grievances were

directly related to the issues of UN trusteeship and South Africa's administration of the territory. Furthermore, it is clear the nationalist leaders would not have been able to exploit this issue, if it had not already existed as an issue.

There was, however, an element of truth in the commission's interpretation of events. With resistance to the removal united under the nationalist movement, confrontation with the authorities (who were determined not to give way) became inevitable. The authorities were no longer dealing with the pliant location advisory board, but with organized location residents who were becoming increasingly angry and defiant. At a mass meeting of residents with the authorities on 2 December, for example, the location superintendent was shouted down when he suggested that "Katutura" meant "we want to go and stay there". When the mayor of Windhoek attempted to intervene, he too was greeted with jeers and chants (in Afrikaans) of "Boers, go to Kakamas".¹²³ The meeting eventually broke up and the officials were forced to beat a humiliating retreat.¹²⁴

On the following day (3 December) about 200 black women marched to the administration offices, the administrator's residence and the magistrate offices to voice their opposition to the removal. The police maintained that the protesters had adopted a "threatening attitude" and that some had carried stones, although they conceded that none of the stones had been thrown.¹²⁵ A few days later a boycott was set in motion of all municipal facilities in the location, including the beer hall, cinema and bus service. According to the petition submitted by Chief Kutako, SWANU and the OPO to the commission of enquiry that followed the shootings, it was decided to embark on the boycott

because the residents had no adequate means of making known their opposition to the removal and furthermore because it seemed that the authorities wished to carry on the removal irrespective of whether the residents agreed or not.¹²⁶

On 10 December the authorities called another meeting with location residents. At this meeting the authorities adopted a more hardline approach, issuing thinly veiled threats¹²⁷ against the boycotters and those who continued to resist the removal. Later that evening municipal police attempted to break up pickets at the municipal beer hall. There are conflicting versions of the events that ensued. The authorities, supported by the commission of enquiry, maintained that the municipal police who tried to break up the pickets were stoned and that a large and threatening crowd of people gathered outside the beerhall. When police reinforcements, under the command of Major Lombard,¹²⁸ arrived, the crowd had grown. Some of the men were armed with iron bars, sticks and stones. Lombard requested the crowd to disperse, but they simply jeered at him. It appeared to him that the crowd was moving closer and that the lives of his men were endangered. A second request to disperse was also ignored, and even the attempts of Uatja Kauketu (the SWANU leader) to get the crowd to leave failed. While Kauketu was still persuading the crowd to disperse, stones were thrown at the police from all directions. Lombard, believing that the policemen were in "an extremely dangerous position", gave the order to fire.¹²⁹

The major difference in the account of the nationalist leaders was their denial that the crowd had started throwing stones before the police opened fire. They maintained that the crowd that gathered outside the beerhall, was orderly, and that it had assembled because people were curious about the presence of the police. Moreover, not everyone had

heard the order to disperse, and Kaukuetu and other SWANU officials were still arranging for the crowd to leave when the police opened fire. Some of the people attempted to retaliate by throwing stones after the shooting began. The nationalist leaders said in their petition to the commission that they were not convinced that the presence of the police was necessary "to prevent damage to life or property".¹³⁰

Some confirmation is lent to the authorities' account by John Ja-Otto's description of the shootings.¹³¹ Otto arrived late on the scene to see the police being forced back slowly by an angry crowd of men and women. As he and a companion took shelter behind a police car, rocks were thrown over their heads. The policemen scrambled for safety behind a row of cars from which they eventually opened fire. Otto reports that the cars were still a hundred feet away when the shooting started and that no attempt was made to use the bullhorn in the possession of the police to warn the crowd that they were going to open fire. The police then continued to fire on the fleeing and panic stricken crowd.

Eleven people died as a result of the shooting and 44 were injured. The Commission of Enquiry ruled that the police were justified in firing on the crowd, and that they and the municipal officials present would have lost their lives if they had not resorted to fire-arms.¹³² Ironically, the incident helped to speed up the removal because substantial numbers of residents fled after the shootings and asked for accommodation in Katutura because they feared that they would be victimized for not actively supporting the resistance to the removal.¹³³ One of the tactics used by the authorities to force people to move to Katutura after 1960 was to build new schools in Katutura. Those parents who lived in the "old location" but wanted their children to attend the schools in

Katutura, were faced with transport costs of between R4 and R5 per child per month - a prohibitively high sum for the majority of black Namibians.¹³⁴

A number of important developments marked the aftermath of the shootings. In an attempt to crush the nationalist movement, the state resorted to repression, forcing some of the most important nationalist leaders into exile. This in turn was to lead to the development of a new form of politics.¹³⁵ Conflict between the indigenous leadership and the intelligentsia, which had been temporarily suppressed during the removal campaign, once again broke out into the open. The conflict came to a head in January 1960 during the sitting of the Hall Commission of Enquiry into the Windhoek location shootings of the previous month. A joint memorandum was presented to the Commission by Kutako, Kaukuetu and Nujoma, and both Kaukuetu and Nujoma gave oral evidence. However, when Kapuuo was called upon to give evidence, he denied that he had ever been a member of SWANU, and, according to Kozonguizi, even denied that he was an advisor of Chief Kutako.¹³⁶ While members of the intelligentsia regarded Kapuuo's denial as a betrayal of the nationalist movement and an indication of his personal cowardice,¹³⁷ it is likely that the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the formal relationships between the different Namibian organizations was responsible for this new source of conflict. Although Kapuuo had played a prominent role in helping to launch SWANU, he had never formally joined the organization and had even declined to stand for election to the SWANU executive. Furthermore, as Ngavirue points out, attempts by Kaukuetu and other members of the SWANU intelligentsia to limit the influence of Kapuuo and the Chief's Council on SWANU had been so successful, that by the time the commission of

enquiry sat, SWANU was "beyond the reach of the man who had christened
138 it".

Kozonguizi maintains that many people were shocked by Kapuuo's evidence to the commission and felt that he had betrayed his people. As a result some opposed his succession to the chieftainship, and in fighting for his political survival Kapuuo "intensified" his campaign against SWANU, "especially amongst the Hereros and the OPU members whom he regarded as his personal property".

They were told that SWANU stood for violence, and was directly responsible for the deaths caused by the shootings. They were asked to resign from SWANU.¹³⁹

It was also said that SWANU was opposed to "the institution of Chieftainship and in particular to Chief Hosea Kutako". When several SWANU members unsuccessfully opposed Kapuuo's nomination as deputy to Kutako, the Chief's Council embarked on a "further campaign" against SWANU, claiming that SWANU had led the opposition against Kapuuo as they wanted to destroy the integrity of the Herero tribe. The gap which had opened up between the intelligentsia and the indigenous leadership would
140 not be breached and this was to have serious implications for SWANU.

Important consequences were to flow also from the repressive measures adopted by the colonial authorities against the leadership of the nationalist movement. Following the Hall Commission of Enquiry, Sam Nujoma was finally deported to Ovamboland, and Nathan Mbaeva, propaganda and organizing secretary of SWANU, was ordered out of Windhoek and confined to Epukiro reserve near the Bechuanaland boundary.¹⁴¹ A number of other prominent political leaders fled the territory shortly after this. For example, in August 1960, Kaukuetu (vice-president of SWANU) and Charles

Kauraisa (Walvis Bay representative of SWANU) left the country to take up scholarships in Sweden. Shortly before this Tunguru Huaraka had left for Ghana to take up a scholarship there and Vita Kaukuetu and Ambrose Kandjii left for East and North Africa respectively. All were denied travel documents and therefore left the country illegally. Kauraisa became SWANU representative in Stockholm, Huaraka in Ghana, Vita Kaukuetu in Dar es Salaam and Kandjii in Cairo (North Africa). Other SWANU members who went overseas early were Ngavirue, Mbaeva, Munamava, Moses Katjiuongua and Clement Vei. Many of those who went abroad took up scholarships. Significant changes were also introduced in the SWANU executive. By 1961, with both Kozonguizi and Kaukuetu abroad, John Muundjua became acting deputy-president; with Nathan Mbaeva restricted to Epukiro and then fleeing the country, Hitjevi Vei became assistant secretary and acting national propaganda and organizing secretary; Eb Kazapua replaced Louis Melengani as national treasurer; and all the members of Chief's Council who had served on the SWANU executive withdrew from the organization.

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Conclusion

Resistance to the Katutura removal and the consequent confrontation with the state was to signal a major turning point in the history of Namibian nationalism. Not only did this resistance provide the first major issue of the new organizations in their attempts to mobilize support, but it reflected the establishment of a new form of politics in the territory. Although the indigenous leaders still enjoyed enormous support and the Herero Chief's Council remained (for at least a few years) the single most powerful African political grouping in the territory, major new forces had emerged from the urban areas and power was slipping out of the hands of the indigenous leadership. The Herero Chief's Council was

to respond sharply to this new challenge, by attempting to destroy SWANU while strengthening its links with the OPO/SWAPO. This was to have important implications for the unity of the nationalist movement.

The flowering of the new politics in the urban areas was to last but a short time, however. The confrontation in the Old Location was followed by severe repression of nationalist leaders. These vigorous attempts by the state to stamp out the new organizations were to have highly significant but unanticipated consequences. Although the state did not succeed in completely destroying the new movement, it imposed heavy constraints on the new organizations, rendering them a great deal less effective. The new organizations survived within the territory, but in a form which was mere shadow of their power during the days of the Katutura campaign. For example, Kozonguizi reported in August 1961 that "organization at home was rather on a low ebb due to lack of funds, transport and full time organizers, and also lack of propaganda medium eg. newspaper."¹⁴³

Far more significant than the mere survival of the organizations in the territory, was the flight abroad of many of the most significant leaders of the nationalist movement. In exile, these leaders were to regroup and to forge a new base from which they were to launch a far more serious challenge to the colonial state in Namibia. In exile also new conflicts and cleavages were to emerge between the individual leaders and organizations themselves. This new struggle was to centre on the control of organizational and material resources which became available in exile. These issues will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Endnotes for chapter twelve

1. M.J. Olivier, *Inboorlingsbeleid en administrasie in die mandaatgebied van Suidwes-Afrika*. D.Phil. thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1961, p. 16. The figures include contract workers.
2. W. Pendleton, *Katutura: a place where we do not stay*. San Diego: San Diego University Press, 1974, p. 19.
3. Olivier, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-9. See also chapter 8.
4. Pendleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21; Also see chapter ten above.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
6. In their petitions to the United Nations, Herero leaders, for example, consistently demanded the return of their tribal lands even though this was an issue with which non-Hereros could not identify. See chapter 10, above.
7. John ja Otto, for example, maintains that it was impossible for an outsider to locate anyone in the Old Locations without asking a resident for directions. J. ja Otto, *Battlefront Namibia*. London: Heinemann, 1982, p. 44. See also reasons for resistance to Katutura removal, below.
8. P. Maylam, *Shackled by the contradictions: the municipal response to African urbanization in Durban c. 1920-1950*. Paper presented to the Workshop on African Urban Life in Durban in the Twentieth Century, University of Natal, Durban, 1983.
9. Pendleton, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
10. M.W. Swanson, "The Durban system": roots of urban apartheid in colonial Natal'. *African Studies*, 35, 3-4, 1976, 171-2.
11. P. Foster, 'Education and social inequality in sub-Saharan Africa'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18, 1, 1980, 233.
12. See SWAA A50/4.
13. SWAA A50/4, Native Affairs Circular No. 4 of 1949, 30/6/49.
14. In 1926, for example, the administrator outlined "the two principles that guide the education of natives": Blacks should be developed on their "own lines" and in a gradual ("step by step") fashion. Until the mid-1930s black education was therefore left to the missions which received small subsidies from the administration. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1926, U.G. 22-27, 1927, pp. 58-59.
15. The Herero indigenous leadership rejected the mission schools as being created for the sole purpose of turning blacks into useful servants for the whites. From the early 1930s they began putting pressure on the authorities to provide government schools and upgrade the standard of education. See Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1931, p. 66; 1932, pp. 72-73; 1933, pp. 32-36.

16. See Union of South Africa, Administrator's Reports, 1935, p. 40; 1936, p. 39; 1937, p. 43; 1938, p. 43; 1939, p. 102. See also chapter 10.

17. Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Non-European Education, Part I: Native Education*, November 1958, p. 54.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88. Averages per pupil calculated by writer.

19. Although the nature of available data does not allow for exact comparisons, calculations from figures provided by the education commission indicate that approximately 19 percent of Herero and Nama children and 22 percent of Damara children were in schools in 1958. (These percentages are based on the total numbers of children and not on those of school-going age). The small advantage enjoyed by the Damaras is probably a product of the larger proportion of their population resident in towns. (*Ibid.*, pp. 17 and 63.)

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-37, 50, 82; F. Troup, *In face of fear: Michael Scott's challenge to South Africa*. London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 214; J. Ellis, *Education, repression and liberation: Namibia*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1984, pp. 13-14, 18-20.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

24. A. Gouldner, *The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class*. London: MacMillan, 1979, p. 3.

25. See, for example, H. Vei, *South West African National Union*. Windhoek: SWANU National Headquarters, undated (subsequently, Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6); Interviews with Jarietendu Kozonguizi, Windhoek, 7/12/78; 8/12/78 & 27/8/79 (subsequently, Kozonguizi interviews); Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3 and below.

26. Interviews with Emil Appolus, Windhoek, 23/4/78; 24/4/78 & 26/1/80 (subsequently, Appolus interviews). Also see chapter 11, section on OPD constitution.

27. Gouldner, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

28. See, for example, J.H. Kautsky, E. Shils and H.J. Benda, in J.H. Kautsky (ed.), *Political change in underdeveloped countries*. New York: John Wiley, 1967, pp. 45-6, 200-201 & 241.

29. For example, in spite of being among the most educationally advanced Namibians of the their time, Emil Appolus and Uatja Kaukuetu worked as labourers on a road gang during the late 1950s. Appolus interviews.

30. Z. Ngavirue, *Political parties and interest groups in South West Africa: a study of a plural society*. Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1973, p. 296. (Emphasis added.) Ngavirue was himself a prominent member of the intelligentsia.

31. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 297. (Emphasis added.)
32. For examples, see sections on SWASB and SWAPA below
33. Pendleton, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Also see A. du Pisani, 'Reflections on the role of ethnicity in the politics of Namibia'. *Africanus*, 7, 1 & 2, 1977.
34. See below. Also see chapters 10 and 13.
35. Interview with J. Kozonguizi, Windhoek, 7/12/78; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-7.
36. SWAA A240/32, Manager, Municipal Native Affairs Department, Windhoek - Chief Native Commissioner, 10/2/47. See also AIS - Native Affairs Department, Windhoek, undated.
37. AIS constitution, in the possession of founder-member, Desiderius Kukuri, Windhoek.
38. SWAA A240/32, Manager, Municipal Native Affairs Department, Windhoek - Chief Native Commissioner, 8/3/47.
39. See SWAA A50/68, 'Bantu Welfare Society and Club'. Judging from correspondence in the administration's files, Bowker was the guiding spirit behind the club, although he was always careful to attribute the initiative to his wife.
40. SWAA A50/68, O. Bowker - Town Clerk, 12/6/34.
41. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
42. Berthold Himuine, secretary of the AIS, was the first African in Namibia to obtain a matriculation certificate and was later selected by Hosea Kutako for a scholarship to study at Oxford. Although his application of admission to Magdalen College was accepted, the colonial authorities refused to issue him with a passport. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-8.
43. SWAA A240/32, African Improvement Society - Native Affairs Department, Windhoek, undated (circa February 1947).
44. Kozonguizi interviews.
45. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 5.
46. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 2; No. 4, p. 5.
47. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 5.
48. The society ceased to function as its prominent members became increasingly involved in the politics of the nationalist movement. In 1980 when the writer interviewed former members of the association, the AIS still had about R700 in its bank account, although it had not functioned for 20 years. Interviews with D. Kukuri, Windhoek, 29/8/79 and J. Katjerungu, Windhoek, 19/1/80.

49. SWAA A50/235, 'Bantu newspaper - "Ondjerera"'.

50. The first meeting of the Student Body was held in the International Hall in Windhoek.

51. H.L. Hamutenya & G.H. Geingob, 'African rationalism in Namibia', in C.P. Potholm & R. Dale (eds.), *Southern Africa in perspective*. New York: Free Press, 1972., p. 188.

52. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 5.

53. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 2. According to Ngavirue (*op. cit.*, p. 291) the SWASB "was crippled at a very early stage; it was never able to hold a general meeting after the founding conference, and thus operated as a small committee for the three years of its existence".

54. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6, p. 1.

55. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 1, p. 1.

56. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 2.

57. See Foreword by B.N. Butler to M. Kerina, *Namibia: the making of a nation*. New York: Books in Focus, 1981.

58. Kerina left for the United States at the end of 1952 to take up a scholarship at Lincoln University. At his farewell party in Windhoek he shocked his colleagues by praising the authorities for granting him a passport and condemning those who "spread false propaganda" overseas. His statement which was reported in the local press "hung like an albatross around the neck of Getzen as the people of SWA continued to disown him when he tried to procure authority to speak for them abroad". (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 2.) It was also claimed that Kerina had informed the police that the Herero leaders Berthold Himumine and Clemens Kapuuo were "behind" Chief Kutako's petitions to the UN, and that he had moved from the African to the Coloured section of the location in order to secure his passport. In 1954 Kerina sought authority to represent the Hereros at the UN, but was refused because of the distrust he had inspired on his departure. (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 8, pp. 1-3 and No. 5, p. 1.)

59. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 5.

60. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6, p. 1.

61. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 3.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 5.

64. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 3 & No. 1, p. 2.

65. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 3.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.* In 1959 members of SWAPA founded a newspaper called the *South West News* which aimed to foster nationalist consciousness among its black readership. The paper was, however, banned in 1960. Hamutenya and Geingob, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

68. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6, p. 1.

69. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 3.

70. Kozonguizi interviews. See also chapter II, above.

71. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, p. 2.

72. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-6.

73. Although Kerina/Getzen had been in the United States since 1952, and had petitioned the UN on behalf of the OPO, the SWASB and the Hoachanas reserves, he did not enjoy the confidence of most Namibian leaders, who had not forgotten the way in which he had identified himself with colonial interests in order to secure a passport to travel to the United States. This suspicion was compounded when Kerina later claimed that he had escaped from Namibia, in an attempt to create the impression that he was not in possession of a passport. After Getzen's departure, Kozonguizi had made attempts to persuade the Chiefs' Council to recognize Kerina as their spokesman at the United Nations. When these efforts failed, Kozonguizi had authorized Kerina to petition the UN on behalf of the SWASB, but was forced to reverse this decision by members of the student organisation. In 1958 Michael Scott finally managed to persuade the Chiefs' Council to grant Kerina the right to speak on their behalf when he met an Herero delegation in Bechuanaland. However, a year later Scott expressed dissatisfaction with Kerina and argued that both he and Kerina had been out of Namibia for so long that they were no longer familiar with conditions there, and that someone with more recent experience of conditions and developments in Namibia was needed at the UN. As a result the Chiefs' Council decided to send Kozonguizi to New York. He left in January 1959 for the United States via Bechuanaland, after having addressed an Herero "tribal conference" in the Aminius reserve on the question of establishing a national political organization. Late in 1959 Hans Peukes whose passport had been withdrawn by the authorities when he tried to embark for Norway, fled the country and joined Kerina and Kozonguizi at the UN. They were later joined by the Rev. Marcus Kooper who had been forcefully removed from the Hoachanas reserve. (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, p. 3, No. 3, p. 4-5 & No. 1, p. 2-3.)

74. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 4.

75. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-6. Initially the committee consisted of five people, Clemens Kapuuo, John Garvey Muundjua, Bartholomew Karuaera, Erwin Tjirimuje and Zedekia Ngavirue (chairman). Uatja Kaukuetu and Tunguru Huaraka were later co-opted onto the committee and some members of the Chiefs' Council and *Ozohaze* (all of whom had a right to attend meetings) took part in the deliberations of the committee. It is significant that all the members of the committee were Hereros.

76. Kozonguizi interview.

77. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, 296.
78. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 5. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, 297.
79. Kapuuo who was at this time employed as a teacher and was chairman of the advisory council of Chief Kutako, had declined a position on the SWANU executive. Members of the intelligentsia charged that although Kapuuo did not want a formal position in SWANU, he wished to dominate the organization by having his supporters elected to the executive.
80. Given the intelligentsia's charge that the indigenous leadership was "tribalistic"/ethnically exclusive, this accusation was extremely telling.
81. Kozonguizi Documents, no. 4, p. 8.
82. See Kozonguizi Documents, No. 16, p. 2.
83. Kozonguizi was later to acknowledge (interview, 1980) that the OPO played a major role in his election. Sam Nujoma had arrived at the election meeting with a large contingent of migrant workers who threw their weight behind Kozonguizi. Also see Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-9.
84. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
85. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6, p. 2. No. 3, p. 5 & No. 4, p. 8; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
86. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.
87. See chapter 11, above.
88. Interview, Solomon Mifima, Windhoek, 29/8/69.
89. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.
90. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 6.
91. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
93. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.: SWANU constitution, signed by Uaseta Mbuha, secretary general, SWANU, undated. (Emphasis added.)
94. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
95. See, for example, Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 4. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 6.
96. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 6.
97. SWAPO's official history of Namibia does in fact refer to the shootings in the Windhoek location at the culmination of the anti-Kututura campaign as "Namibia's Sharpeville". Department of Information and publicity, SWAPO of Namibia, *To be born a nation: the liberation*

struggle for Namibia. London: Zed Press, 1981, p. 174.

98. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 6, p. 2.

99. See, for example, protests against removals in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, oral arguments, documents, South West Africa Cases, 1966, Vol. 1*. The Hague, 1967-70 (subsequently, International Court of Justice, 1966), pp. 168-9.

100. Pendleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27; D. Simon, 'The evolution of Windhoek 1890-1980', in C. Saunders, *Perspectives on Namibia: past and present*. Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1983, pp. 92-3.

101. SWAA A50/75, 'Minutes of the meeting of the Windhoek Non-European Township Advisory Board Held in the Windhoek Bantu Welfare Club Hall on 4th June, 1947, at 2 p.m.'

102. Pendleton, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-3; Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 22 & No. 19, p. 1. Segregation of the colonized population of Windhoek was taken a step further with the opening of the Coloured township of Khomasdal in 1966. By January 1972 only 178 Coloureds were still living in Katutura. (Pendleton, *op. cit.*, p. 42).

103. Pendleton (*op. cit.*, p. 45) maintained that the board was viewed by many blacks as "an extension of white authority, and Africans were suspicious of its intentions ... This suspicion was given strength when Board members tried to influence Africans to move to Katutura from the main location at the request of a White official. Board members complained that they had no influence over the people and were afraid of being beaten up. One Board member's house was burned down when he moved to Katutura in 1966 ..."

104. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18.

105. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 12, p. 11. Katutura was eventually established in the north-west.

106. This was announced at a board meeting on 17 April 1957. In 1959 boardman Kamberipa in emphasizing that the board had always opposed the removal, said that this was why it had decided to call the new township Katutura. (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, pp. 23-4.) See also Pendleton, *op. cit.*; Simon *op. cit.*, p. 95.

107. The Board had of course been placed in the invidious position of being representatives without power. While they were powerless to prevent the removal, they were expected to oppose it by the location residents. At the same time, if a move was inevitable, it was in the interests of at least some location residents that this should take place as soon as possible. In April 1956, for example, a boardman anxiously enquired about when the move would take place. There were many people, he said, who wanted to erect new houses or affect improvements to their existing houses, but were afraid to do so because of the threatened removal. (Boardman Kapuu, Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 23.) When Dr Hendrik Verwoerd visited Windhoek in 1955, boardmen had posed the same question. (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 25.) These enquiries were later interpreted by the authorities (and possibly

also some of the location residents) as support for the move to the new township.

108. Nathanael Mbaeva in Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 25.

109. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 20, pp. 4-7.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 8. As this memorandum which was signed by Kutako, Kaukuetu and Nujoma, offers the most comprehensive analysis of the reasons underlying resistance to the removal, it has been used extensively in the account that follows.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 5 & 7.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

114. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

116. Kozonguizi Documents, no. 20, p. 11-14; Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 23. A further possible reason for resistance to the removal, especially among women, was the threat of a more tightly regulated township held for people involved in informal sector activities, particularly the illegal brewing and selling of liquor. For example, Pendleton found in the late 1960s that many women supplemented their incomes from this source, and that some were able to support themselves entirely in this way. Although the authorities were unable in the long term to suppress the illegal sale of alcohol in the new township, there are indications that the removal might initially have decreased the trade. Pendleton, (*op. cit.*, p. 58) found that the sale of beer in the Katutura municipal beer hall had dropped from 28 000 gallon per month in 1961 to only 60 gallons in 1971. It is likely that this decrease in legal sales reflected a resumption or increase in the illegal trade. Also relevant was the important role played by Damara women in the protest march on the administrator's residence at the height of resistance to the removal. (See Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-291). As Damara women were heavily involved in the illegal sale of liquor, the removal would entail a serious threat to an important source of income.

117. Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the occurrences in the Windhoek location on the night of the 10th and 11th December 1959, and into the direct causes which led to these occurrences.* U.G. 23-60. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1960 (subsequently, Report on Windhoek location, December 1959), p. 10.

118. *Ibid.* A similar argument was put forward by South Africa at the International Court of Justice (See International Court of Justice, 1966, volume XI, and especially the evidence of Kurt Dahmann, pp. 458-49) when letters from Kerina were used extensively to show that the nationalist organizations were "brought about by instigations from people in America" (p. 460).

119. See, for example, Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-54.
120. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 19, p. 3; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-291.
121. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 18, p. 24-25.
122. See below, chapter 13.
123. The chant, "Boers, go to Kakamas", contained a thinly veiled insult in that, although Kakamas is a town in the northern Cape, the first syllable of its name is identical to an Afrikaans obscenity meaning excrement.
124. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-50. In his account of the meeting, Otto maintains that Nujoma remarked at its conclusion that he was worried because "(y)ou can't make fools of Boers ... Sooner or later they were going to make us pay for this". (Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 50).
125. Report on Windhoek location, December 1959, p. 2.
126. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 20, p. 16.
127. For example, the police chief, a Major Lombard, told a story about men hunting a lion. When the lion entered the bush, the hunters decided not to follow because they could not tell who would be hurt. The people of the location were also hunting a lion, Lombard said, and as they did not know who would be hurt they should stop. (Kozonguizi Documents No. 20, p. 18; Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51).
128. The police chief who had earlier that day related the story of the lion and hunters.
129. Report on Windhoek location, December 1959, pp. 2-3.
130. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 20, p. 18-20; No. 19, p. 4.
131. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53.
132. Report on Windhoek location, December 1959, pp. 4.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 11; Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
134. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 13, (Article by J.G. Muundjua in 'Vanguard', 3, 2, 1963), p. 1.
135. See chapter 13.
136. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 6.
137. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
138. *Ibid.* It is also possible that Kapuuo feared that association with SWANU and the violence of December 1959 might destroy his chances of succeeding the ailing Kutako as chief of the Hereros. Although the chieftainship was an extremely powerful position politically, it was to some extent dependent on the support, or at very least the tacit

approval, of the colonial administration.

139. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 7. Kapuuo was subsequently to write to Kozonguizi, asking him to resign from SWANU because it was opposed by Chief Kutako.

140. See chapter 13, below.

141. It was also at this juncture that Oliver Tambo, at that time working as a lawyer in Johannesburg, was briefed to come to Windhoek, but was refused permission to enter Namibia. Kozonguizi Documents, No: 6, p. 2.

142 Kozonguizi Documents, no. 6, p. 2-3; No. 7, p. 1.

143. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 7, p. 1.

Chapter thirteen

EXILE POLITICS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

The exile environment

With the flight of some of the most important nationalist leaders into exile, the history of Namibian nationalism entered a new phase. The possibility of establishing bases abroad confronted the newly formed nationalist organizations with an alternative political environment which held both new opportunities and new difficulties and constraints. In some respects the survival of the organizations was contingent on the availability of an external base. With the exception of the Herero Chiefs' Council (which by virtue of its 'ethnic' constitution and willingness to cooperate sometimes with the state was more acceptable to the colonial authorities), no significant political organization had been able to withstand the repressive powers of the colonial state. Following the shootings in the Windhoek location at the end of 1959, the state clamped down heavily on the new organizations. These repressive policies were given further impetus by the Sharpeville crisis in South Africa in April 1960 and correspondingly repressive measures adopted against the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and other organizations in South Africa.

Although such conditions made effective political mobilization difficult, it is even more obvious that any form of military challenge launched from within the territory could only have ended in disaster for those foolish, or brave, enough to have attempted it. The possibilities of pursuing the political struggle from an international platform and of

establishing military bases in neighbouring states, .herefore changed the whole complexion of nationalist politics, for the first time putting anti-colonial forces in a position from which they would be able to pose a real threat to the colonial state.

However, while the possibility of an external base provided new opportunities, it also set new problems for the nationalist organizations and imposed new constraints upon them.¹ In his analysis of the exile po' - tics of black South African political organizations, Tom Lodge² identifies three major sets of problems associated with the environment of exile politics. These relate, firstly, to the difficulties of securing and maintaining sanctuaries in foreign states as well as sources of material and moral aid. Another set of problems is raised by the relationship between internal and external activities, in particular by the difficulties of maintaining contact between the different leaders and keeping internal resistance alive. Thirdly, there are the problems of keeping the external movement together under the difficult conditions imposed by exile. To these might be added a fourth set of problems, relating to the contradictions and tensions of combining military and political activities within a single organization.

As will be illustrated below, similar problems were faced by the Namibian organizations and were to have profound consequences for the movement in general. The different ways in which the two organizations (and individuals within them) were to respond to these new problems and challenges was to be a decisive factor in the unfolding of their relative fortunes.

The need to secure material and diplomatic support thrust the Namibian

organizations into the complex and precarious sphere of international politics, posing new challenges to their inexperienced leaderships and creating new tensions both within and between the different organizations. For SWANU, with its young intellectual leadership, the choices were clear. Frustrated by the long years of petitioning the United Nations without definite results, the SWANU external leadership was openly to reject the UN with its dominant Western interests³ and to align itself with the Chinese who were perceived as the most radical of the super powers. This critical stance was to extend also to the Organisation of African Unity and in particular the Organisation's Liberation Committee. The approach of the SWAPO leadership, on the other hand, was far more cautious and pragmatic. In contrast to SWANU, SWAPO avoided open rejection of the UN, solicited aid from both East and West, and responded with eagerness and flexibility to the demands and opportunities presented by the OAU. These different responses were to be decisive not only in determining their international credibility and effectiveness, but also in shaping the relations of the two organizations with internally-based interests like the Chiefs' Council.

Closely related to these opportunities and limitations of operating in an international context were the various problems associated with keeping the movement together under the difficult conditions imposed by exile. In his study of Angolan revolutionary politics, John Marcum argues that the debilitating effects of exile provide an important key to the understanding of nationalist movements.⁴ The major focus of Marcum's account is on the "social psychology of exile" and on the ways in which the stresses and insecurities of exile undermine discipline and self-reliance, activate latent cleavages, foster resentments and factionalism, and ultimately contribute to nationalist disunity, the triviali-

zation of politics and political irrelevance.⁵

Although the psychological pressures of exile undoubtedly helped to undermine the unity and effectiveness of the Namibian nationalist movement, emphasizing psychological factors can detract from the political issues that often underlay infighting and factionalism. For example, the fissures that opened up between the different components and factions of the Namibian nationalist movement in exile, generally followed the fault lines of political and personal interests evident before the move abroad. It is not always clear therefore whether these cleavages might not have manifested themselves even within the country. The difficulties of exile also need to be counter-balanced by an appreciation of the pressures brought to bear on internal leaders by a powerful and repressive state.

While disunity and the trivialization of politics appear to have been common among most exiled movements, it is important to see such behaviour within its correct context. The survival of individuals within the international context was closely tied up with that of the organizations themselves. While survival of the exiled movement was dependent on aid from the international community, it is also clear that the life-chances of individuals within a specific organization were to a large extent dependent on the success of that organization in exploiting opportunities on the international level. By the same token individuals within the organizations were forced to exploit the available opportunities both within and outside their organizations in order to secure their existence in exile. Under such circumstances, and in conjunction with the exaggerated ambitions and personal visions of some nationalist

leaders, confusions between the aims and interests of individuals and those of the organizations to which they belonged were likely.

Further complications were introduced by the way in which strategies of personal survival would sometimes influence the effectiveness of the organizations themselves. While a basic condition of individual survival was to secure a well-paid position in the movement hierarchies, a second-best option was to acquire a bursary for further study. This held two advantages: It allowed the student to live off his bursary, and secondly, increased his future chances of alternative employment.⁶ This alternative, however, also imposed penalties in that study removed one, if only temporarily, from the political sphere. This had implications not only for competitions for positions within the organizations, but also for the effectiveness of leadership, particularly when office holders combined study with their political activities. Thus SWANU officials who managed to maintain their political posts while studying, found the time they could devote to party matters painfully circumscribed and *this affected the success of their leadership.*

A third set of problems revolved around the duplication of leadership structures within the country and abroad, and the possibility of conflicts arising between these different sets of leaders. Besides the difficulties of maintaining contact and communication between internal and external representatives, different conditions existed for those *inside the country*, and such differences often called for divergent strategies. The dual structure also raised the dilemma of where to locate the organizations' centres of command. Should they be inside the country where close contact and consultation could be maintained with the people, but where leaders would be subjected to harassment by the

police, or outside the country where sources of aid were located and where potential military bases existed? While SWAPO appears to have given primacy to the latter, SWANU, (at least in its propaganda) choose to emphasize the importance of the former.

The responses of the two organizations should be analysed against the backdrop for their respective structures and ideologies. In each case the composition of interests represented in the organizations and their political bases appear to have been crucial in determining their responses to the conditions encountered in exile. Before examining these relationships, however, it is necessary to qualify some of the assertions made in earlier chapters about the composition of the nationalist organizations. There, the nationalist organizations were identified with specific groups and interests such as the intelligentsia, migrant workers and the indigenous Herero leadership. While such identifications were helpful in establishing the social and political bases of the different organizations and in understanding their responses to the situations in which they found themselves, the contrasts can be overdrawn and lead to simplification of a more complex reality. This becomes especially apparent in the years that followed the founding of SWAPO and SWANU, when both organizations attempted to expand their memberships by building on their original bases. To some extent differences existed within the organizations even at the time of their founding. This was apparent in SWAPO, for example, where qualitative differences existed between the groups that gathered around Toivo in Cape Town, and those led by Sam Nujoma in Windhoek. Though members of the Cape Town group had originally been migrant workers, their leaders appeared to enjoy higher standards of education than those of most

migrant workers. Both Toivo and Shipanga had been teachers, for example. Furthermore they enjoyed closer relations with both South African organizations and with members of the Namibian intelligentsia. The tensions generated by these differences were to become more manifested in later years and were to result in expulsions, defections and a major split in SWAPO in 1976.

Sources of disunity: SWANU and the Chiefs' Council

The movement of most of the major nationalist leaders into exile was also to have important implications for the unity of the nationalist movement. Although cracks in the national alliance set up to oppose the removal to Katutura were already evident before the external organizations were created⁷ the conditions and requirements of exile politics helped to speed up the process of disintegration. Faced with the full repressive powers of the colonial state, nationalist leaders were forced to maintain some semblance of unity and a degree of respect for alternative viewpoints. Outside the country the need to maintain a united front became less urgent. Besides the temptations of courting the diversity of potential donors and backers, and of gaining influential positions within international organizations, the distance put between internal and external leaders made communication and the exchange of viewpoints difficult. Internal and external leaders were dealing with very different sets of problems and circumstances so that the responses of one set of leaders was not always meaningful to the other. This is clearly illustrated by the conflict that arose between the Chiefs' Council (who operated exclusively from inside the country) and the external leaders of SWANU.

The final division of the nationalist coalitions into SWANU, SWAPO and the Chiefs' Council in the early 1960's hinged chiefly on the conflict between the intelligentsia and the indigenous leadership. According to Jarietendu Kozonguizi⁸ who was president of SWANU between 1959 and 1966, "the basic contradiction was that between SWANU on the one hand and the council on the other". As suggested in the previous chapter, the conflict between SWANU and the Chiefs' Council essentially involved a struggle between the intelligentsia and the Herero indigenous leadership for dominance over the nationalist movement.

The Herero indigenous leadership had emerged in the 1930's and 1940's as the most powerful organized black political grouping in the territory. While the origins of its power lay in its ethnic base and its manipulation of indigenous and ethnic symbols, it was not averse to working with other groups, creating a joint council with the Namas and also encouraging the Damaras to participate. With the emergence of new politically aware groupings in the late 1950's, the Herero leadership played a key role, encouraging Sam Nujoma to organize Ovambo migrant labourers in Windhoek and drawing into its organization some of the young intellectuals emerging from schools and colleges. In spite of its mistrust of the intelligentsia, the Chiefs' Council of Kutako and Witbooi took a great deal of the initiative in launching the nationalist movement. In doing so, however, the Herero indigenous leadership brought with it a specific conception of nationalism. While it supported the idea of national unity, it saw such unity more in terms of an aggregate of semi-autonomous ethnic groups united in their struggle against the colonial state, than of an undifferentiated nation defined purely by its inclusion within state boundaries. Such an arrangement would clearly serve the interests of the indigenous leadership who

wished to maintain their power base, but was anathema to the emerging intelligentsia. In line with its own interests, the intelligentsia visualized a form of national unity which completely transcended ethnic or sub-national groupings. It therefore attempted to base its appeal on its educational qualifications, opposing this to the "backward tribalism" of the indigenous leadership. This in turn aroused the suspicion of the indigenous leaders.

The conflict between the intelligentsia and the Chiefs' Council may largely be seen as a direct product of their different interpretations of nationalism, which in turn determined their understanding of the role of SWANU as a nationalist coalition. For the indigenous leadership with its conception of nationalism as an aggregate of ethnic groups, SWANU was merely a forum of different political interests in which the most powerful interest, in this case the Chiefs' Council, would hold sway. While it conceded the usefulness of the educational skills of the intelligentsia, the indigenous leadership did not regard the handful of young intellectuals as a significant political interest. Unlike the Chiefs' Council with its solid base in Herero politics, the intelligentsia did not have an identifiable constituency. It would appear that OPO/SWAPO leaders like Sam Nujoma, Louis Nelengani and Peter Nanjema initially shared these sentiments about the relative political significance of the intelligentsia and the indigenous leadership.⁹

For the intelligentsia, on the other hand, SWANU was more than simply a coalition or aggregate of autonomous groupings. They saw SWANU as the creation of a common radical nationalism which would sweep aside "tribalism" and all pre-existing groups. While the Chiefs' Council was repre-

sentative only of a narrow tribal interest, the intelligentsia saw themselves as representative of an emerging national interest. As the chief protagonists of nationalism, they were the natural leaders of the national movement.¹⁰ The leadership role they had played in the resistance to the Katutura removal and the recognition that had been accorded to them was proof of their representativeness and relevance.¹¹

Relations between the Chiefs' Council and SWANU deteriorated rapidly after the shootings in the Windhoek location in December 1959. The misgivings that the Chiefs' Council had had about the SWANU leadership were reinforced by the violent outcome of the anti-removal campaign which had been organized chiefly by SWANU leaders.¹² During the Commission of Enquiry into the shootings Clemens Kapuuo, the deputy of Chief Kutako, dissociated himself from SWANU¹³ and was branded a coward and traitor by the SWANU leaders. Further recriminations followed when the Chiefs' Council made use of SWANU's name in petitions to the United Nations.

Unable to exercise control over, or even influence, the SWANU leadership, the Chief's Council decided to withdraw its support from the organization, and early in 1960 Kutako wrote to Kozonguizi asking him to withdraw from SWANU. Kozonguizi replied that he would not resign because he had been elected by SWANU members and that SWANU as a national organization had no part in "Herero tribal matters":

I further expressed myself clearly on tribalism stating that if I had to choose between the aims and objectives of SWANU and my allegiance to the Tribe, I would take my stand against tribalism.¹⁴

Kozonguizi's uncompromising rejection of the Chiefs' Council was to have serious repercussions not only for SWANU, but for the nationalist move-

ment in general. The outrage that it inspired among the indigenous leadership should be seen against the background of Kozonguizi's earlier relationship with the Chiefs' Council, that he was their official representative at the United Nations, and that it was through their intervention that he had been elected president of SWANU. Given the trust Kozonguizi had been accorded by the Chiefs' Council, he was arguably the man best placed to affect a reconciliation between the intelligentsia and the indigenous leadership, and therefore to hold the fragile nationalist coalition together. ¹⁵ Instead, a wedge was driven between SWANU and the Chiefs' Council:

My letter to the Chiefs' Advisory Council, I understand, shocked them very much. But having recovered from the shock they intensified the campaign against SWANU and against me. They had relied on my resignation to deal SWANU a crushing blow. Now that I did not resign from SWANU their hopes had been shattered. They now felt that I had to be destroyed if SWANU had to be destroyed.¹⁶

The break between the Chiefs' Council and SWANU not only represented the beginning of the decline of SWANU, but, in the final analysis, led also to the political isolation of the Herero indigenous leadership and consequently to the exclusion of the greater part of the Herero people from the mainstream of nationalist politics. Deeply distrustful of nationalist politics, the Herero leadership eventually led a majority of the Hereros into the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) with its strong ethnic bias. Without the support of the Chiefs' Council (representing both Herero and Nama interests) the SWANU leadership was cut loose from a significant political base, without which its chances of attracting further support were drastically reduced.

Sources of disunity: SWANU and SWAPO

Perhaps the most serious consequence of the SWANU-Chief Council split, however, was the impact it had on the nationalist coalition as a whole. Not only did the split result in the withdrawal of the Chiefs' Council, but it also increased the distance between SWANU and the OPO/SWAPO. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the OPO had maintained firm ties with the Chiefs' Council.¹⁷ With the split between SWANU and the Chiefs' Council, OPO/SWAPO continued to cooperate with the latter, and Sam Nujoma and Louis Nelengani (who had represented the OPO in SWANU) withdrew from the SWANU executive.¹⁸ The relationship between OPO/SWAPO and the Chiefs' Council lasted until 1963 and during this period various petitions were sent to the United Nations in the names of Chief Kutako, Chief Witbooi and OPO/SWAPO.¹⁹

The conflict between SWANU and the Chiefs' Council was not the only reason for OPO/SWAPO's decision to cut its ties with SWANU. The decision to change the name of the organization from Ovamboland People's Organization to the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was taken some time before the final split between SWANU and the Chiefs' Council.²⁰ According to Emil Appolus, who enjoyed a close relationship with Sam Nujoma during the early years of SWAPO/OPO, the OPO leader had shared the misgivings of the Chiefs' Council about the intelligentsia. Appolus maintains that Nujoma never felt at ease in SWANU and did not actively participate in the coalition organization. Although he had been elected to the SWANU executive, Nujoma had not been assigned a significant position in the organization. Both Mburumba Kerina and Jacob Kuhangwa were not given positions in SWANU, and they were later to play an important role in persuading Nujoma to withdraw completely from SWANU and reconstitute the OPO as a national organization. On a more

concrete level, moreover, Nujoma had been attracted to the Chiefs' Council by the solidity of its political base, in contrast to the political weakness of the intelligentsia.²¹ With the withdrawal of the support of the Chiefs' Council, from SWANU, there was therefore even less reason to continue working with the organization. Another factor in SWAPO's decision to loosen its ties with SWANU, was the influence of Mburumba Kerina, who had been in the United States since 1956. Various sources²² are in agreement that Kerina played an influential role in persuading Nujoma to transform the OPD into a national organization and to change its name to SWAPO. Although Kerina had kept in constant touch with nationalist leaders in Namibia and Cape Town, he had not been elected to any office in SWANU or the OPO and therefore remained outside the official nationalist leadership. With the change of name, Kerina became chairman, while Nujoma retained the presidency. According to SWAPO vice-president Louis Nelengani, the organization had decided to change its name in order to accommodate non-Ovambos and non-migrant workers.

S.W.A.P.O., the name only is proof that we profess unity whereas O.P.O. sounded as though it was for the Ovambo people only.²³

Following the name-change, a number of new members were co-opted into the leadership structure of SWAPO. Among these were Ismail Fortune who became secretary-general, Dr Kenneth Abrahams and his wife, Ottilie, and Mburumba Kerina. Ngavirue maintains that "since these people had not been elected to leadership by the migrant labourers upon whom S.W.A.P.O. was founded, they had no basis of power in the organization. They were consequently expelled as easily as they were co-opted when they differed with the original leadership."²⁴

Shortly after the SWANU-Chiefs' Council split, Kozonguizi paid an official visit to China and, because he "was no longer the spokesman for Chief Kutako", took the opportunity to air his "personal views on the United Nations, and in particular the influence of the Western Powers, led by the United States of America."²⁵ In his statement, Kozonguizi launched a strong attack on the United States, Britain and France, and criticized the United Nations for being dominated by the US and failing to take action on Namibia. By his own admission, Kozonguizi's statement succeeded in "shocking" and alienating sympathizers in Britain and the US, as well as in Namibia, although he maintained that it "forced the Western Powers to take a much more positive stand on SWA as they feared 'communist infiltration' through me."²⁶ In a statement signed by Kerina, Nujoma and Jacob Kuhangwa, SWAPO dissociated itself from Kozonguizi's China broadcast and reaffirming its confidence in the UN. Michael Scott also expressed alarm, and in a letter to Kutako asked the Chiefs' Council to do something to neutralize the "harm" done by Kozonguizi. Subsequently the Chiefs' Council also wrote to the UN dissociating itself from Kozonguizi's statement and expressing gratitude for the support rendered by the world body. In spite of the misgivings of some members of the SWANU executive, Kozonguizi refused to withdraw his statement, and reaffirmed his views in a letter to the United Nations.²⁷

²⁸
Some radical commentators have interpreted statements such as that of Kozonguizi in China as a sign of the political maturity and progressive nature of the SWANU leadership. It is more likely, however, that they reflected the political inexperience of the intelligentsia and their failure to comprehend the marginal support they enjoyed both in Namibia and abroad. As would later become apparent, SWANU could not afford to

alienate support, particularly in the precarious environment of international politics. While the SWANU leaders excelled in political rhetoric, they were not able to match their rhetoric with action. It is ironic, for example, that in spite of its highly critical attitude to the UN and of the effectiveness of petitions to the world body, by the mid-1960's the SWANU external leadership resorted once again to petitioning the UN as a major political activity:

Like the chiefs, S.W.A.N.U. and S.W.A.P.O. also used written and oral petitions to the United Nations as a method of political struggle. In fact by the mid-sixties S.W.A.N.U. had reverted to this weapon which they had always regarded as ineffective.²⁹

The sum effect of Kozonguizi's broadcast was to increase the distrust that SWAPO and the Chiefs' Council felt for the SWANU leadership and to alienate both the UN and potential backers among the Western powers. By increasing the distance between SWANU and the other founding organizations of the nationalist coalition, it also placed a further obstacle in the way of later attempts to reunite the nationalist movement. In 1961, for example, local SWANU leaders made several unsuccessful attempts to meet with Chief Kutako to discuss their differences.

After its break with the Chiefs' Council, SWANU concentrated its efforts on attempting to restore unity and cooperation with SWAPO. These attempts were, however, bedevilled by the hostility of the Chiefs' Council and SWAPO's close relationship with the Council. Although SWAPO would eventually loosen its ties with the Council, by the time this happened, conditions no longer favoured a merger between SWANU and SWAPO. The two organizations had existed independently of one another for too long and had developed distinctive interests and political styles. The SWANU leaders had already succeeded in alienating so much

support, locally and on the international level, that they had little to offer SWAPO. Furthermore, SWAPO leaders had developed vested interests in party positions and these might be threatened if SWANU leaders were to be accommodated within a new party structure.

While on a tour of independent African states during the first half of 1960 and prior to the conversion of the OPO into SWAPO, Kozonguizi had met with Nujoma in Monrovia "to review the political situation at home". According to Kozonguizi, Nujoma was unable to offer an adequate explanation for his role in both SWANU and OPO, but said that OPO members might feel that "they were being swallowed by the other tribes" if the OPO lost its name through a merger.³⁰ Kozonguizi in turn promised to recommend to a change of name to the SWANU executive if this would facilitate the merger. This appeared to satisfy Nujoma, and the two leaders co-signed a letter recommending a merger of the two organizations under a new name. Kozonguizi maintains that although Nujoma was under pressure from both Kerina and internal OPO leaders to change the name of his organization and thus broaden its base, the OPO president was at this time opposed to a name change, unless it was part of a merger with SWANU.³¹

The proposal of a merger, however, met with strong opposition from OPO leaders in Namibia. Louis Nelegani, vice-president of the OPO, indicated to SWANU leaders that the OPO did not want to work with SWANU "because SWANU was not in the good books of the Chiefs' Council".³² Kozonguizi continued to urge SWANU leaders to work for a merger. However, when Nujoma and Kozonguizi met in New York in July 1960, the OPO leader said that as far as he was concerned the matter was closed, as the OPO in Namibia had already decided to change the organization's name

³³
to SWAPO.

In June 1961 Kozonguizi announced in Accra that SWANU was ready to join forces with other Namibian political groupings "either in a complete merger or in a United Front". He undertook to recommend the dissolution of SWANU if the other leaders were prepared to do the same with their organizations.³⁴ A few months later, allegedly at the instigation of Clemens Kapuuo of the Chiefs' Council, L.H. Nepela, acting-president of SWAPO in Namibia, attacked SWANU in an interview with a Windhoek newspaper.³⁵ In May and June of the following year SWANU and SWAPO delegates attending a "freedom fighters' conference" at Winneba, Ghana, undertook to recommend to their national executives that the achievement of national unity "should be the primary and most immediate objective of all South West Africans irrespective of their political or other affiliations". The Winneba statement called for the establishment of a "working relationship" between SWAPO and SWANU as a first step towards "the unification of all pro-liberation forces". The delegates also agreed to end public recriminations between the two organizations.³⁶

Encouraged by these developments, Kozonguizi met Kerina in New York in July of that year to discuss the prospects of unifying the two organizations. Kerina who clearly still harboured ambitions of heading a nationalist coalition, proposed the formation of a single party, the National Independence People's Party (NIPP) which would embrace all Namibian political organizations including SWANU, SWAPO and the Chiefs' Council. Shortly after their meeting Kerina circulated copies of an agreement bearing both his and Kozonguizi's signatures. Kozonguizi, however, vehemently denied that he had signed the agreement and "maintained that

they had only concurred that 'one organization' would be the most effective basis of unity for South West Africa".³⁷ The SWAPO leadership also responded with anger to the proposal, maintaining that Kerina had no authority to enter into agreements on behalf of SWAPO. Kerina was therefore precipitately expelled from the party for "attempting to overthrow President Nujoma in favour of what Kerina Getzen termed educated leadership. And also for fraternizing with the American Metal Climax;³⁸ and for collecting funds which were not handed over to the Party."

Finding itself increasingly isolated externally and with only marginal support in Namibia, the SWANU leadership became more and more preoccupied with the idea of affecting some form of unity with SWAPO. When the OAU was launched in 1963, Kozonguizi submitted a memorandum recommending that a "commission should be set up to study the causes and conditions of disunity in freedom movements in non-liberated areas and on the basis of their findings to make recommendations to the movements for unity and to the N.L.B" (National Liberation Bureau).³⁹

A new attempt to forge a united front was made in the same year when a joint meeting of the SWANU and SWAPO national executives in Windhoek decided to launch the South West Africa National Liberation Front (SWANLIF). The initiative for the creation of a united front this time came almost exclusively from the internal leaderships of SWAPO and SWANU, and appears to have been associated with the loosening of ties between SWAPO and the Chiefs' Council.⁴⁰ SWANLIF brought together these two organizations and a number of other smaller groups including the Rehoboth Council (*Basteraad*), the Rehoboth *Burgher Vereniging*, the *Volksorganisasie van Suidwes Afrika* (VOSWA), and the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO). As the front was

intended to function both externally and internally, representatives of the external leaderships of SWAPO and SWANU met in Dar es Salaam in December 1963 to formulate a working basis for the coalition. A joint memorandum suggesting basic principles on which SWANLIF could be organized was drafted and at a later meeting in the same month the proposed constitution of the front was discussed and proposals submitted to the national executives in the territory.⁴¹

As a major idea behind the formation of the united front was for members of the alliance to cooperate in joint programmes, a memorandum was submitted to the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee, recommending that aid for the liberation movement should not be given to individual organizations but to SWANLIF. This proved to be unacceptable to members of the SWAPO leadership who were not present at the meeting, and as a result SWANLIF failed to become a reality externally, although it did exist "for some time" within the territory.⁴² The launching of SWANLIF represented the last major attempt to coordinate the efforts of SWAPO and SWANU in the 1960s.⁴³ Ngavirue sums up the relationship between the two organizations as follows:

The position at the end of 1966 was that there was no formal co-operation between the two parties, except for a few joint petitions to the United Nations and some foreign governments. On the whole, there was not much hostility between SWANU and SWAPO. Indeed, even though their efforts might be dispersed, the two parties often complemented each other".⁴⁴

Kozonguizi has directly attributed the demise of SWANLIF to the international affiliations of the two organizations, and in particular to the "Sino-Soviet schism":

(I)t is no secret that because of the influence which these powers (ie. China and the Soviet Union) exerted on the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) the unity of S.W.A.P.O. and S.W.A.N.U. was not to be.⁴⁵

International relations and affiliations

While the relationships of the Namibian nationalist organizations to foreign governments and their participation in international organizations should not be seen as a primary cause of division between SWAPO and SWANU, they did serve to complicate relations between the two organizations. Essentially, the international affiliations of the two organizations between 1960 and 1966 fall into two distinct phases, an initial phase from 1960 to 1962 when SWANU developed close ties with China while SWAPO was regarded with sympathy by the west, and a second phase from 1963 when the Soviet Union gave its backing to SWAPO.

Under the leadership of Kozonguizi, SWANU initially played a relatively prominent role in international politics, and its early and intense involvement in various international bodies may go some way towards explaining the radical stance adopted by its leadership in the first half of the 1960s. Possibly because of his links with the ANC,⁴⁷ Kozonguizi gained early access to the Anti-Apartheid Movement and was associated with the foundation of the boycott movement in 1959. SWANU was also a member of the South African United Front (SAUF) in the early 1960's, together with the ANC, PAC, SAIC and SWAPO.⁴⁸ Kozonguizi had also secured SWANU membership of both the All African People's Conference and Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and from 1960 served on the executive of the AAPSO.⁴⁹ Although SWANU saw itself as "non-aligned" in the cold war between East and West,⁵⁰ it adopted a strong stand against imperialism. This appears to be associated with Kozonguizi's involvement in the AAPSO.⁵¹ According to Ngavirue, Kozonguizi departed from the 1960 AAPSO conference in Conakry with a firm commitment to an anti-imperialist platform:

After this conference, Kozonguizi took a position which would henceforth characterise S.W.A.N.U.'s policy. S.W.A.N.U. declared itself to be non-aligned i.e. the cold war between East and West, but 'violently ... against Western imperialism'.⁵²

The close relationship that SWANU developed with China was apparently also related to its stand on imperialism. Kozonguizi⁵³ maintained that the SWANU leadership regarded the Soviet Union as "another big power" which shared much in common with the United States. Chinese policies were also perceived as being more militant and revolutionary, and their brand of revolutionary politics appeared to be more understandable to Kozonguizi. It was essentially the SWANU leadership's tirades against Western imperialism, and in particular Kozonguizi's Peking broadcast in 1960, that alienated the West and earned SWANU the reputation of a radical, "pro-communist" organization.

In much the same way as Kozonguizi's Peking broadcast helped to create an image of SWANU as a radical organization, so SWAPO's criticism of the broadcast and SWANU propaganda about SWAPO's western links, cast SWAPO in a pro-Western light.⁵⁴ It is likely that such perceptions of the two organizations inclined the United States government away from SWANU and towards SWAPO, which was seen even by radical commentators like Ruth First⁵⁵ as the more conservative of the two organizations. Following Kozonguizi's Peking broadcast, the SWANU leader was regarded as *persona non grata* by the United States government, and it was only through his⁵⁶ links with the UN that he was able to gain access to that country.

It is not clear, however, to what extent the SWAPO leadership exploited the relatively friendlier attitude of the Americans. Kozonguizi,⁵⁷ for example, maintains that during the early 1960's SWAPO enjoyed a close

relationship with the American State Department. The SWANU leadership had also accused SWAPO of maintaining close relations with the American Climax Company which had large mining interests in Namibia.⁵⁸ One should not, however, read too much into the alignment of the nationalist organization with eastern and western bloc countries. As Hamutenya and Geingob have remarked, the implications of such alignments can be misleading.

SWAPO, as an organization, had never opposed identification with socialist countries. In fact, by the time Kozonguizi made his statement in Peking, SWAPO had already sent students, including some of its top leadership, to study in these countries. It was actually Kerina who unilaterally took it upon himself to criticise Kozonguizi's Peking speech.⁵⁹

A number of interesting points flow from the carefully-worded analysis of Hamutenya and Geingob, both of whom are closely associated with SWAPO. Firstly, it is significant that they do not deny SWAPO's relationship with Western governments, including that of the United States, but rather emphasize that SWAPO was *not* opposed to alignments with the socialist countries. What they do deny is that there was any connection between SWAPO and the American Metal Climax Company.⁶⁰ Also of interest is their claim that it was Kerina who unilaterally took it upon himself to criticize Kozonguizi's Peking broadcast. Although Kerina did have a reputation of taking matters into his own hands without consulting the rest of the party, the statement criticizing Kozonguizi was allegedly signed by Nujoma and Kuhangua, as well as Kerina.⁶¹ Furthermore, if the major SWAPO leaders had strongly disagreed with Kerina's statement, it is likely that some action would have been taken against him at the time. Instead, Kerina was expelled from the organization two years later. The main reason for his expulsion appeared to revolve around his challenge to Nujoma's leadership and his unauthorized attempts to create

a new nationalist coalition, but his fraternization with the American Metal Climax Company was also mentioned as grounds for his expulsion.⁶² Thirdly, Hamutenya and Geingob's emphasis on SWAPO *"as an organization"* suggests that the party accommodated important divergence of opinion on policy issues.⁶³

In spite of these difficulties and qualifications, the main points of Hamutenya and Geingob, that SWAPO was not opposed to contacts with the western bloc and that policy differences between the two organizations have been exaggerated, remain substantially correct and even find support among SWANU officials. Ngavirue,⁶⁴ for example, maintains that

... both S.W.A.N.U. and S.W.A.P.O. remained non-aligned in the cold war between East and West, at least until 1966. The difference lay in the outward expression of their policies - S.W.A.N.U. defined its version of non-alignment, S.W.A.P.O. did not. The absence of definition in S.W.A.P.O.'s policy of non-alignment made it easy for the party to adapt to the political environment in each country.

Kozonguizi took a similar view, arguing that "on paper" there were no basic differences between SWAPO and SWANU. "In policy and orientation, however, there may be differences in position taken on specific issues: Tensions sometimes make these appear fundamental but as they are usually in the form of reaction to external situations that do change with time and condition,) it is our view that they cannot prevent unity between the two Organisations."⁶⁵ There were, however, major differences in the ways in which the two organizations put their policies into practice. These differences were perceived by Kozonguizi as "inconsistencies" and "contradictions" in SWAPO policy and ideology. As examples, Kozonguizi cites SWAPO criticism of his Peking broadcast, Kerina's collaboration with the American Metal Climax Company and the links between some SWAPO members and the Liberal Party of South Africa. These conflicted

strongly with SWAPO's pan-Africanist stand and its support for the public ownership of all basic industries.⁶⁶

The differences between SWAPO and SWANU in this period therefore related more to issues of political style than of policy. What distinguished the two organizations was not fundamental disagreements on policy, but rather the form of their responses to the international environment. While SWANU aimed for ideological purity and was virulent in its attacks on "imperialists" and other enemies, SWAPO's approach was characterized by a distinctive pragmatism and flexibility. Kozonguizi (echoing Ngavirue's notion of "environmental adaptation" above) clearly depicts this feature of SWAPO's approach:

...SWAPO has not been selective or critical of any potential sources of assistance. So that any organisation or individuals which spring to their support as long as they were not working for South Africa were not discouraged. Whatever the motives of these individuals and organisations as long as they gave publicity to SWAPO were not openly criticised. Moreover through association with African leaders the leaders of SWAPO for better or worse have come to understand the "idiom of Africa" and to say or do those things which "turned" Africa "on".⁶⁷

SWAPO's pragmatism was also manifested in the looseness of its organizational structure which appears to have accommodated divergent viewpoints, resulting in tensions which have sometimes flared into open conflict and even personal violence. Ngavirue,⁶⁸ for example, maintains that the ideological positions (and thus their implementation of policy) of different SWAPO leaders were often clear reflections of the countries in which they found themselves. Thus Jacob Kuhangwa, secretary-general of SWAPO, and Mburumba Kerina, chairman until 1962, were students in the United States and therefore sensitive to attacks on the West. Vice-president Louis Nelengani, on the other hand, had been based in the Soviet Union and until 1965 headed the SWAPO office in Cairo. Nelengani

objected strongly to Kuhangwa and Nujoma's visit to the United States, which culminated in a violent confrontation in Dar es Salaam.⁶⁹ Similar tensions were said to have existed between Andreas Shipanga (secretary for publicity) who had close ties with political interests in West Germany,⁷⁰ and Sam Nujoma who was opposed to such ties.

One indirect but important consequence of SWANU's early affiliation with the Chinese, was the impact this had on the developing rivalry between China and the Soviet Union in their sponsorship of liberation movements. An analysis of the complexities of the relationship of the two socialist super powers to the liberation movement and the impact of their rivalry on such bodies as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization falls outside the aims of this thesis, and could indeed form the basis for another dissertation. However, what is relevant is the impact Sino-Soviet rivalry had on the relationship between SWANU and SWAPO. According to Kozonguizi, the Sino-Soviet dispute significantly altered the relationship that had developed between the two organizations prior to 1964, and besides acting as an additional impediment to unity, played a role in the decline of SWANU after 1966. He argues that because SWANU had early established links with the Chinese, the Russians choose to support SWAPO. This had the effect of increasing the distance between the two Namibian organizations and, in Kozonguizi's view, contributed to the failure of SWANLIF after 1964. Furthermore, as tensions between the super power escalated, the relative positions of SWANU and SWAPO within the international political arena were profoundly affected. Until the mid-1960's, SWANU had enjoyed at least one advantage over SWAPO in that it was a member of the APPSO, while SWAPO was not.⁷¹

By 1966, however, the Chinese were proving to be unequal competitors for influence within the APPSO, and boycotted the conference held in Nicosia in February 1967. It was at this conference that SWANU was expelled from the APPSO and SWAPO admitted. According to Kozonguizi, SWANU's expulsion was a major factor in the decline of the organization and its subsequent loss of OAU recognition in 1968. Admission to the AAPSO and sole recognition by the OAU Liberation Committee considerably strengthened SWAPO's position externally and acted as an incentive to the movement to organize internally.⁷²

SWANU thus found themselves not only non grata in Washington and its allies, but having to contend with the might of the Russian influence in Eastern Europe as well. SWAPO found itself in the favourable position of being accepted in the West and in the Soviet oriented Socialist countries. This was the beginning of SWAPO's external ascendancy.⁷³

The issue of military struggle

Although the Sino-Soviet schism undoubtedly played a role in the decline of SWANU and ascendancy of SWAPO, a number of other factors were crucial. Not least among these were the relative responses of the two organizations to the possibilities of (and demands for) military involvement against the South African presence in Namibia. Notwithstanding the critical stance adopted by the intelligentsia in relation to the UN, most, if not all, of the political leaders who left Namibia in 1960-61 still harboured high expectations of the world body.

We were very naïve, politically immature, at that time. We thought the UN was going to come in the next day. It was just a matter of us going there and telling them to come.⁷⁴

Although some intellectuals associated with the Namibian movement, like Kenneth Abrahams for example, had begun to familiarize themselves with the principles of guerrilla warfare at the beginning of the decade,⁷⁵ the military option remained a vague possibility, and the young nation-

list leaders, for the most part, pinned their hopes on UN intervention.⁷⁶ Disillusionment after 1960 with the United Nations and what it could achieve for Namibian nationalism, therefore played a role in the decision to resort to armed struggle:

By 1962 ... SWAPO had come to the realization that to rely on the United Nations' intervention to liberate Namibia was to leave this liberation to mere chance. SWAPO decided that political and military efforts in pursuit of national liberation were not contradictory, but rather they were complementary and should be pursued concurrently.⁷⁷

Another crucial factor in SWAPO's decision to launch a guerilla war was the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Dar es Salaam. Most of these refugees were Ovambo contract workers who had found their way to Tanzania via Botswana. It is one of the ironies of the Namibian situation that measures like the contract system and the isolation of the northern areas which aimed to insulate the northern labour reserves from outside political influences, actually contributed significantly to the establishment of an effective nationalist challenge to colonial rule. In chapter twelve it was illustrated how the contract system helped to politicize contract workers and led indirectly to the formation of the OPO in Cape Town. Similarly, the contract labour system together with the limitation of education in the northern territories, played a major role in helping to provide the manpower necessary to start a guerrilla army in exile. On a very general level, the tradition of mobility associated with the contract system and the various strategies developed by migrant labourers to escape this system, acted as an encouragement to contract labourers to undertake the arduous journey to Dar es Salaam. The contract system, however, contributed also more directly to the flight from Namibia, in that many of the men arriving in Dar es Salaam were recruits of the Wenela labour organization for the South African

mines. These recruits were flown to South Africa via Francistown in Bechuanaland, and simply deserted either en route to the mines or on their return home. They then made their own way, mostly by foot (until SWAPO established an organized conduit for ferrying refugees to Zambia),⁷⁸ to Dar es Salaam.

The arrival of large numbers of refugees in Dar es Salaam initially created enormous problems for the external leadership of SWAPO. Many of those arriving in Tanzania in the early 1960's hoped to be able to further their education, but as a majority of them had only the most rudimentary schooling, it was difficult to obtain scholarships for them. It was essentially those for whom scholarships could not be obtained who formed the nucleus of the SWAPO guerrilla force.⁷⁹ That the majority of early recruits had anticipated furthering their education rather than training as a fighting force, created additional difficulties for the SWAPO leadership. Emil Appolus who was secretary for publicity of SWAPO at the time, maintains that he was "frightened by the calibre" of recruits when he and other members of the executive visited a SWAPO training camp in the mid-1960s:

They were very reluctant as they wanted to go to school. I felt that these people were not motivated by a struggle because they didn't understand it. And there was a lot of deserting from the camp ... But of course the calibre improved as time went on. And we were now sending the brighter ones to China and the Soviet Union who would in turn come back and train the others. So when that programme started things improved.⁸⁰

SWANU faced a very different situation. Having broken with the Chiefs' Council, its ability to mobilize mass support was severely limited and its appeal remained restricted largely to a small and relatively privileged urban population. As Kozonguizi points out, SWANU

did not have the historical accident of a mass of their members finding themselves abroad and from whom the surplus could be shorn off and diverted into 'military' training.⁸¹

This difficulty was clearly reflected in SWANU policy. Rather than create a guerrilla army outside Namibia, SWANU opted for training "a few cadres" abroad who would then return to Namibia and "with the necessary mandate on the spot train their people there".⁸² Although a number of their members did receive military training, the SWANU plan never got off the ground, and the organization's trained men joined SWAPO's military wing.⁸³ In conjunction with the idea that military training should take place inside Namibia, the SWANU leadership also emphasized the importance of operating internally and of obtaining "a mandate from the people."

Following the flight of its major leaders into exile, SWAPO became increasingly externally-oriented. This trend was reinforced by the guerrilla war, so that "(a)lthough (in theory S.W.A.P.O.'s headquarters throughout the sixties was in Windhoek, the organization was forced to shift its main centre of activities to Dar es Salaam."⁸⁴ The SWANU leadership was critical of these developments. In 1965, for example, Kozonguizi lashed out at SWAPO's involvement in Africa in the SWANU publication, *Freedom*:

During the last five years the struggle has been between those who believed that the struggle of South West Africa could be won in Offices in Africa and those who feel that it has to be waged at home with the supplementary help of Africa and other freedom loving people.⁸⁵

Kozonguizi went on to attack SWAPO's involvement of Namibian refugees, "the majority of them with no record of active participation in the struggle for liberation in South West Africa", in its military training:

Unfortunately the need for bread and bread which understandably

has induced these people to identify themselves with the struggle has been interpreted by many African states as an indication of the support enjoyed at home by the Organisation that sponsored them externally.⁸⁶

However, besides its shortage of manpower externally, SWANU faced a number of other logistic difficulties in launching a guerrilla war. The organization had been able to make little, if any, political headway in the northern parts of the territory and in consequence drew its support from the police zone, and particularly from the Hereros. The vast majority of SWAPO recruits, on the other hand, were from the northern areas. As a result they were familiar with the languages and conditions of these areas, and therefore had less difficulty in mingling with or securing aid from the local population. The only realistic alternative open to SWANU would have been to infiltrate guerrillas through Botswana into eastern Namibia.⁸⁷ This, however, presented a number of problems. The nature of the terrain and vegetational covering differs markedly between eastern and northern Namibia. While the north is relatively thickly wooded and therefore suited to guerrilla warfare, the semi-desert eastern Sandveld would offer little cover to guerrilla infiltrators.

Furthermore, the eastern areas were thinly populated in relation to the north, making it easier for the authorities to detect infiltration. Because of their proximity to white settlements, these areas were also more thoroughly patrolled. Finally, SWANU guerrillas could expect little support from the indigenous Herero leadership who not only had developed a strong antipathy for the organization, but had long had reservations about violent confrontation with the colonial authorities. While the Ovambo indigenous leadership were strongly opposed to SWAPO, significant sections of the peasantry identified with the SWAPO cause

and were therefore willing to aid the organization's guerrillas. SWANU, on the other hand, had had little success in the political penetration of the Herero reserves where the majority of people remained loyal to the indigenous leadership.

Limitations of the SWANU leadership

These practical difficulties were compounded by the specific nature of the SWANU leadership. Kozonguizi, for example, acknowledged⁸⁸ that, as intellectuals, SWANU leaders were inclined to emphasize the difficulties involved in launching a guerrilla war, rather than taking practical steps to draw up and implement a plan. The theoretical and ideological inclinations of SWANU contrast sharply with SWAPO's pragmatic and practical bent.⁸⁹ This difference is aptly highlighted by Ngavirue who maintains that while the two organizations shared similar objectives, SWANU was "an ideological party which often set out its principles and followed them consistently, while S.W.A.P.O. tended to pay less attention to theory than practical considerations at any given moment or place." The peculiar emphases of the SWANU leadership are vividly illustrated by an editorial published in the SWANU mouthpiece, *Freedom* in 1965. Responding to taunts that SWANU had become a "family club" and "minority group", the editorial asserted that the "political criminals" who opposed and slandered SWANU would eventually be exposed and discarded in a "true revolution", and that "genuine revolutionaries carry the national democratic revolution through to the end. This is an inexorable law of history. The interpretation of events from this point of view is called historical materialism":

As for the mechanical and subjectivist assertion that SWA will be 'free not later than 1963' and armed struggle 'mid 1964' and all the related nonsense, we have not much to say. For this shows very clearly a lamentable lack of knowledge of the theory and general conduct of a liberation war, let alone

the strategy and tactics ...

The specific nature of the SWANU leadership is even more clearly illustrated by its response when it was requested by the OAU Liberation Committee to submit plans for a guerrilla war. While SWAPO promptly complied with the request, the SWANU leadership balked. It felt that it would not be safe to inform the Liberation Committee of its plans as "in that committee let alone in the O.A.U. itself, countries which were either friendly to South Africa or friends of South Africa were members." ⁹¹ As Kozonguizi ⁹² later explained in an interview, the SWANU executive decided to draw up plans for a war, but not to divulge these to the Liberation Committee. The failure to produce plans was in turn interpreted by the Liberation Committee as an indication that SWANU did not have any.

There was some justification for SWANU's reluctance to share its plans with the Liberation Committee, particularly as the organization had decided to train its guerrillas inside the country. SWAPO was therefore less vulnerable because its military efforts were essentially externally-based. What is more difficult to understand, however, is the way in which SWANU expressed its lack of confidence in the OAU. In an analysis of the major reasons for the decline of SWANU as an organization, Kozonguizi ⁹³ mentions the unrestrained and tactless criticisms that "SWANU's very articulate external leaders" levelled against some African leaders, the OAU and the UN, so that "all told whatever SWAPO's propaganda and however honest SWANU conduct it is not easy to see how SWANU could have escaped the wrath of the OAU". An example of the way in which the SWANU leadership incurred the displeasure of the OAU is provided by Kozonguizi's address to the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Confe-

rence in Havana in January 1966, at which the SWANU president raised the issue of aid from external sources and the need for ideological purity and independence from "imperialist" influences:

The so-called African Liberation Committee has not been anything but merely an instrument of certain African countries through which they distribute patronage to favoured and trusted puppeteers. In this so-called liberation committee, liberation movements are not represented. They are petitioners whilst countries such as Tshombe's and ~~Patrice~~ Congo hold important positions in it and those in executive positions have no idea about the areas for which they have to plan positive action... We in SWANU have earned unpopularity in influential circles in Africa. Yes, simply because we are men of principles, simply because we refuse to be bribed, simply because we could have no truck with the train of political prostitution and corruption."⁹⁴

Such criticism was unlikely to have endeared SWANU to the OAU and must ultimately have contributed to the OAU's decision in 1968 to withdraw its recognition of the Namibian organization. It must also have played a role in the later decision of the UN General Assembly to recognize SWAPO as the sole authentic voice of the Namibian people.

Beginning of the guerrilla war

Guerrilla units were infiltrated into Namibia from the second half of 1966 and war officially declared on 26 August of that year.⁹⁵ The misgivings expressed by the SWANU leadership about launching a guerrilla war against the South African forces were to some extent justified because SWAPO experienced severe logistic difficulties during the initial phase of the war. The SWAPO forces were able to make little military impact on the well-trained and equipped South African forces. A black guard of the collaborative Ovambo headman, Jacob Ashipala, was killed in December and a few buildings destroyed and a night-watchman wounded in Oshikango,⁹⁶ but by the end of 1966 no white casualties, military or civilian, had been reported, in spite of heavy casualties

suffered by the SWAPO forces.⁹⁷ Some of the guerrilla units appear to have been intercepted even before they crossed into Namibia.⁹⁸ The guerrillas also experienced trouble with informers, and a guerrilla camp at Ongulumbashe was raided by police on 26 August 1966, that is the day on which the war was officially declared.⁹⁹ A dismal picture also emerges of the guerrillas who had entered Namibia and who were on the run from the police and tribal authorities. It appears that these guerrillas were desperately short of funds, were unable to procure sufficient food, did not have adequate clothing, and were sometimes even reduced to begging.¹⁰⁰

A major difficulty experienced by the guerrillas was that they had been trained in a number of different countries such as Algeria, Egypt, North Korea and the Soviet Union, and had therefore adopted different styles of guerrilla warfare. This resulted in disagreements about tactics and difficulties of coordination. Abrahams who was working as a doctor in Zambia and had close contact with the SWAPO guerrillas, maintains that the war was "very badly managed", that little account was taken of circumstances in Namibia, and that the inexperience of SWAPO forces resulted in heavy losses of life.¹⁰¹

In spite of these difficulties and the failure of the guerrillas to inflict significant losses on the South African presence in Namibia, their activities created difficulties for both settlers and the colonial state. Problems were experienced, for example, in patrolling the borders, and the chief of the South African security police admitted in October 1966 that the South African security forces were experiencing "big problems" in Ovamboland:

The terrain and the people are not known to our police. At

places the border is only an imaginary one and it is difficult to apprehend the terrorists because they are moving continuously.¹⁰²

However, by far the most important gains accruing to SWAPO were political. In spite of its poor military record in the 1960's, the war significantly boosted SWAPO's prestige both locally and abroad. South Africa's reaction to the war (as Kozonguizi¹⁰³ aptly put it, "SWAPO overnight became the 'bogy man'") served to publicize SWAPO's cause and to force Namibians, particularly those in Ovamboland, to make a straight choice between SWAPO and the South African government. With the outbreak of the war in Namibia, South Africa tightened its political control over the country. The Suppression of Communism Act which had been published in the territory a few years before, was applied for the first time in December 1966 when three of SWAPO's local officials, including Toivo, were arrested. These officials, together with a number of captured guerrillas were tried in two much publicized cases in 1967 and 1968.¹⁰⁴ This together with publicity given to SWAPO guerrilla activity, the presence of South African security forces in the north, and signs of insecurity among whites, all helped to bolster the cause of SWAPO and to counter military losses with symbolic gains. On the international level the launching of the war, while not the only factor, was ultimately decisive in influencing organizations like the OAU and AAPSO to accord sole recognition to SWAPO, and thus finally to consign SWANU to the status of a peripheral organization.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on two major and related issues, the failure of the Namibian nationalist movement to achieve unity, and the emergence of SWAPO as the major nationalist organization. In both cases it was shown

how a variety of different factors were responsible for these outcomes. In this concluding section an attempt will be made to structure these diverse factors by relating them to the distinctive social bases of the three groups that launched the nationalist movement. The composition of the different organizations and their responses should in turn be seen against the background of the external environment and the changes this introduced in Namibian politics. *For example, the movement of SWAPO and SWANU leaders into exile had important implications for the unity of the nationalist movement. Not only did it effectively put external leaders out of reach of the repressive measures of the colonial state (thus undermining an important reason for maintaining unity), but it also raised the stakes for the different organizations:*

When we got abroad, it was no longer the old location politics. Stakes were getting higher... because now it was a matter of the UN, prestige and who is going to petition for whom, and who is going to be the spokesman and so on. SWAPO and SWANU) ... because we were now looking for aid, assistance and it was money that we were soliciting for. And that was one of the main causes of the break.¹⁰⁵

Given the importance of the external environment in helping to shape the development of the nationalist movement, the failure of the Chiefs' Council to establish an effective external base must be seen as a crucial factor in its development and the erosion of the prestige it enjoyed at the launching of the nationalist movement. With the exception of representatives at the UN, the Chiefs' Council did not concern itself with establishing an external base. The lack of external involvement of the Council, in common with many of its other responses, may in turn be related to its ethnic base and its appeal to indigenous symbols to bolster its authority. While the Council did involve itself in the broad nationalist movement, its political base restricted its definition of nationalism to that of an aggregate of discrete ethnic or regional

interests. The issues to which it gave priority therefore tended to be localized and at times even parochial. For example, the demand for the return of the land formerly occupied by the Hereros continued to be a major issue for the Herero indigenous leadership, while SWAPO and SWANU regarded this issue as subordinate to the question of national independence.^{10c} These local interests militated against involvement in the international sphere.

Because of their localization, the indigenous leadership was also less capable of understanding the central concerns and ideological stances of external leaders, and it is probable that this contributed to their strong reactions to the political statements and activities of nationalist leaders abroad. A number of other factors may also have been responsible for the conservative inclinations of the indigenous leadership. With their major support located among the peasantry in the reserves, the caution and conservatism of the Chiefs' Council was not necessarily out of step with its followers. Furthermore, the Council had a long history of combining challenge of the colonial authorities with negotiation and the extraction of concessions. Indeed, its power was to a significant extent dependent on the recognition and cooperation of the colonial authorities, and it did not have an external base to fall back on should the colonial state act against it. The Chiefs' Council therefore had more to lose than either SWAPO or SWANU, and it is not difficult to see why it shrank from violent confrontations with the colonial state.

In contrast to the Council, SWAPO's major focus of activity was external, and as such it was ideally placed to launch a guerrilla war.

Having already attracted the wrath of the colonial state (by threatening its major supply of labour) and drawing its support from among the least privileged sections of the population, SWAPO also had little to lose in a violent confrontation with the state. It has already been shown how the contract labour system with its tradition of mobility and the isolation of the north contributed to the build up of sufficient manpower to launch a war. SWAPO's reliance on contract labourers for its political base may, however, also be related to other aspects of its policy and political style.

In earlier chapters it was argued that migrant labourers are more likely to opt for a nationalist rather than a socialist strategy because their political and economic vulnerability makes cooperation with other interests essential to their survival. SWAPO was therefore attracted to the Chiefs' Council by the latter's solid political base, and continued to cooperate with the Council long after the split with SWANU. That its ties with the Council were loosened after 1962 may in turn be related to SWAPO's discovery of far more powerful allies abroad. The distinctive pragmatism adopted by the external leadership of SWAPO is also consistent with this hypothesis. It may be argued that the marginal and often precarious existence of migrant workers, and in fact most Ovambos, in the police zone, provided valuable training for the different, but equally precarious external environment. While it is true that the two contexts called for different strategies of survival, they had in common the necessity to avoid making enemies and to accept assistance from whatever source it was offered. This is particularly the case of migrants who broke their contracts and took up illegal residence in the towns where they were forced to rely on the more permanent residents to hide and feed them, and of course not to

report them to the police. This situation which was so common among migrant workers,¹⁰⁷ must have underlined the danger of giving offence to potential allies and the need to restrain expressions of personal dislike or prejudice.

While SWAPO's pragmatic approach clearly paid dividends, the political base from which the movement grew was also crucial in another respect. Unlike the other members of the nationalist coalition, SWAPO constructed a political base on both class and ethnic criteria. Within the specific colonial context of Namibia which demanded a rigid segmentation of the labour force on ethnic lines, class and ethnicity were so closely linked that they were almost inseparable. While the majority of Namibian contract workers were Ovambos, the confusion of the two categories went further than this. In colonial circles, for example, contract workers were simply referred to as "Ovambos". SWAPO was therefore able to use both class and ethnic identifications to mobilize support - although there is no evidence to suggest that it used ethnic identifications at the expense of its broader nationalism.¹⁰⁸ By means of its early identification with Ovambos, SWAPO gained access to more than half of the black population. Unlike SWANU whose access to the Herero reserves was blocked by the still popular indigenous leaders, SWAPO was aided by the system of indirect rule which had thoroughly corrupted the indigenous leadership of Ovamboland by forcing it to choose between subservience to colonial authority or elimination.¹⁰⁹ In contrast with SWANU which concerned itself with more abstract issues, SWAPO was also able to mobilize support around the labour issue, thus tapping a grievance which was immediately relevant to the lives of nearly all black Namibians.

Finally SWAPO appears to have been favoured by the calibre of its leadership. Like the Chiefs' Council which owed a great deal to the inspired leadership of Hosea Kutako, SWAPO appears to have benefitted enormously from the shrewd, energetic and unpretentious leadership of Sam Nujoma. Although Nujoma has been subjected to considerable criticism from some quarters,¹¹⁰ it is revealing that even prominent SWANU leaders were prepared to concede that the energy and political acumen of Nujoma has contributed a great deal to SWAPO's progress. In an analysis of the advantages enjoyed by SWAPO, Kozonguizi, for example, maintained that one of SWAPO's strengths "has been in the single-mindedness and presence of their lobby in the person of their president. It is not an exaggeration to say that during the last fifteen years he has spent hardly a month in one place."¹¹¹

The most problematic of the three components of the nationalist movement was SWANU, with its erratic and puzzling responses and propensity to alienate support. Such responses are only comprehensible when seen against the background of the distinctive intellectual composition of SWANU. Perhaps the most crucial feature of the Namibian intelligentsia (both inside and outside SWANU) was their lack of a political base. While they aspired to lead the nationalist movement, their links to the social formation were tenuous. The tenuousness of the relationship of intellectuals to their societies has most often been depicted in cultural terms. Third World intellectuals, in particular, are seen as "alien and disoriented" persons who are a product of the "modernizing and conservative" features of colonialism,¹¹² as "a product of alien education more or less precariously grafted on indigenous non-Western societies",¹¹³ or as created by their "prolonged contact with modern culture" which resulted in "a partial transformation of the self and a

changed relationship to the authority of the dead and the living".¹¹⁴

While such cultural disjunctions are undoubtedly of importance, and are perhaps manifested in the contempt with which the Namibian intelligentsia held the indigenous leadership, there are also structural features to the alienation of the intelligentsia which held significant political implications. The intelligentsia *does not form part* of a social group in the same sense as a class or ethnic-based movement does. Instead intelligentsias are categorized in terms of specific characteristics acquired by *individuals*, namely their educational and cultural advancement. As intellectuals, they do not occupy a specific position within the structure of production which they share with other groupings, nor can they claim to be representative of an indigenous, pre-existing or primordial entity. Rather their identification is with a broad national unit which is still in the process of formation and which is defined in terms of essentially arbitrary territorial boundaries. As Harry Bendal¹¹⁵ noted in an early essay on Third World intelligentsias, they do not "sociologically speaking, as a rule represent anyone but themselves".

The relationship of the Namibian intelligentsia to the social formation was even more tenuous than is usually the case in Third World countries. There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, the intelligentsia had to compete with two alternative organizations, both with well established political bases. In particular, the popularity and prestige of the indigenous leadership effectively blocked SWANU's attempts at mobilization in central Namibia.¹¹⁶ Secondly, unlike the majority of other African states, the prospect of independence for Namibia has for a long

time been rather remote. Particularly in the 1960's when the majority of other African states were gaining independence, South Africa showed little sign of loosening its grip over the territory or even of granting a degree of self-government. Consequently, there was little hope of the intelligentsia been able to exercise their specific skills in legislative or bureaucratic roles, and thus boosting their prestige. Even opportunities in commerce were painfully circumscribed by the settler monopoly over commercial activity.

With its access to a political base blocked, the intelligentsia were thus increasingly forced to fall back on their only real resource, their claim to educational and cultural superiority. This was manifested, for example, in their depiction of the indigenous leadership and other opponents as backward, uneducated or illiterate. It also found expression in their propensity for rhetoric rather than action, because, as Gouldner¹¹⁷ points out, the central mode of political influence used by and characteristic of intellectuals is communication. As a group intellectuals lack economic power and physical force, and therefore attempt to achieve their aims "primarily by rhetoric, by persuasion and argument through publishing and speaking".

As has been illustrated in the body of this chapter, SWANU excelled in rhetoric, debate and analysis.¹¹⁸ SWANU leaders like Kozonguizi initially excelled in international forums like the AAPSO, and it was essentially through the articulate criticisms of SWANU's external leaders that the organization succeeded in alienating the Chiefs' Council, the UN, the major Western powers and the OAU. The leanings of the SWANU leadership towards academic and theoretical pursuits was not only manifest in the number of its leaders who were full-time students, but is

explicitly stated, for example, in an editorial in the SWANU publication *Freedom*:

The most important thing is to be good at learning, at analysing the various situations, the factors behind the facts and appraising the various forces. We must know how to integrate theory and practice.¹¹⁹

SWANU leaders were themselves not unaware of their rhetorical and theoretical inclinations and what this had cost the organization. Kozonguizi,¹²⁰ for example, mentions the unrestrained criticisms of "SWANU's very articulate external leaders" as one of the reasons for the decline of the organization. He concludes that "whatever SWAPO's propaganda and however honest SWANU conduct(,) it is not easy to see how SWANU could have escaped the wrath of the OAU".

The rhetorical skills and inclinations of the intelligentsia do not, however, on their own provide a full explanation of the tactlessness and lack of restraint of the SWANU leadership. For a more complete explanation, it is necessary to refer to what Gouldner has called the "culture of critical discourse" (CCD) associated with intellectuals. Essentially CCD refers to the theoretical proclivities of intellectuals which lead to "an exaltation of theory over practice and to doctrinal conformity for its own sake."¹²¹ While CCD encourages such virtues as circumspection, carefulness, self-discipline, earnestness and commitment, it can lead also to vices such as "an unhealthy self-consciousness, ...stilted convoluted speech, an inhibition of play, imagination and passion, and continual pressure for expressive discipline ..."

Calling for watchfulness and self-discipline, CCD is productive of intellectual reflexivity and the loss of warmth and spontaneity. Moreover, the very reflexivity stresses the importance of adjusting action to some pattern of propriety. There is therefore a structured inflexibility when facing

changing situations; there is a certain disregard of the differences in situations; and an insistence on hewing to the required rule.(122) This inflexibility and insensitivity to the force of differing contexts, this inclination to impose one set of rules on different cases also goes by the ancient name of dogmatism. Set in the context of human relationships, the vulnerability of the new class to dogmatism along with its very task-centredness, imply a certain insensitivity to persons, to their feelings and reactions, and open the way to the disruption of human solidarity.(123) Political brutality, then, finds a grounding in the culture of critical discourse, the new rationality may paradoxically allow a new darkness at noon.(124)

Endnotes for chapter thirteen

1. John Marcum, (*The Angolan revolution, Volume II: Exile politics and guerilla warfare, 1962-1976*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1978, p. 221) succinctly summarizes the doubled-edged nature of exile politics in the following passage: "External moral and material support can prove crucial, even decisive, to the fortunes of an insurgent and/or exile movement. It can represent the margin of advantage leading to the eclipse of a rival or the collapse of incumbent authority. It can also be dysfunctional. It sometimes encourages escapism - diverting energy into the self-delusion of exile governments, diplomatic travel, and international conferences; divisiveness - superimposing external cleavages (for example, Sino-Soviet, Soviet American, and Arab-Israeli) that foster, reinforce, or manipulate internecine rivalries; and dependency - substituting charity and patron-client relationships for self-reliance, realism and independence. ... External help can facilitate, enable. But it can divert, deform or dominate if it is allowed to substitute for the internal generation of revolutionary purpose, structure and action." See also J. Marcum 'The exile condition and revolutionary effectiveness: Southern Africa liberation movements', in C.P. Potholm & R. Dale (eds.), *Southern Africa in perspective: essays in regional politics*. New York: Free Press, 1972, pp. 262-75.
2. T. Lodge, *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983, p. 295. The problems identified by Lodge overlap to some extent with those demarcated by Marcum (1972, *op. cit.*, p. 263).
3. Rejection of the UN as ineffective because of its Western dominance may be seen as premature, as the world body was itself undergoing a process of change as more and more newly-independent Third World countries took their seats in the General Assembly.
4. Marcum, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
5. *Ibid.* See, for example, pp. 7-119 & 181-183. See also Marcum, 1972, *op. cit.*, pp. 274 ..
6. In later years when the need for military recruits became more pressing, study also provided a legitimate way of avoiding the rigours of military and guerilla warfare.
7. See chapter 12, above.
8. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 4.
9. Interviews with Emil Appolus, Windhoek, 23/4/78; 24/4/78 & 26/1/80 (subsequently, Appolus interviews).
10. The extent to which members of the intelligentsia identified themselves with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana during this period is quite striking. Interview with Jarietendu Kozonguizi, Windhoek, 7/12/78; 8/12/78 & 27/8/79 (subsequently, Kozonguizi interviews); Appolus interviews.
11. It is not clear, however, to what extent the tacit support of the indigenous leadership lent legitimacy to the leadership role assumed by the intelligentsia.

12. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.

13. See chapter 12.

14. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 8.

15. More than a decade later after he had been forced out of SWANU and spent a number of years in the political wilderness, Kozonguizi re-established links with the Herero indigenous leadership then reconstituted as the National Unity Democratic Party (NUDO).

16. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 9.

17. It was the Chiefs' Council, for example, which helped Sam Nujoma out of the country when he decided to go into exile.

18. Emil Appolus had earlier been suspended from SWANU because decisions taken by the SWANU executive had appeared in the *Windhoek Advertiser* (for which Appolus worked as a reporter) before they had been officially released. He was later to join SWAPO (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 8.)

19. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8. and No. 3, p. 8.

20. Sw: 19 April 1960 as the date on which the OPO changed its name to order to broaden the organization "into a national united Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia, *born a nation: the liberation struggle for Namibia*. London: Zed Press, 1981, p. 176. The SWAPO publication does not, however, discuss the implications this had for national unity as SWANU had originally been constituted as a national organization which included the OPO.

21. Appolus interviews.

22. Kozonguizi interviews; Z. Ngavirue, *Political parties and interest groups in South West Africa: a study of a plural society*. Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1973, p. 304; R. First, *South West Africa*. Harmondsworth: Penguin African Library, 1963, p. 202.

23. Letter to editor, *Windhoek Advertiser*, 1960, circa June, cited by Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

24. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 304. While Ngavirue is essentially correct about the ease with which these members of the intelligentsia were expelled from SWAPO, his emphasis involves a simplification. SWAPO members who had been "elected to the leadership by the migrant workers" were also expelled from the organization, during the Shipanga debacle in 1976, for example. There is also evidence to suggest that Kerina did not simply "differ" with the leadership, but was actually attempting to subvert the leadership of Nujoma.

25. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 9.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

28. See, for example, Ruth First, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-4 & 206-7.

29. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

30. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 7.

31. *Ibid.*; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

32. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 8. See also Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

33. A letter announcing the change in name and signed by Nelengani and Fortune had appeared in the Namibian press. The SWANU leadership in Namibia claimed that a few days before the publication of the letter announcing the change in the OPO's name, Fortune had approached them offering to join SWANU if he was appointed to their executive. The offer had been turned down. Fortune had earlier incurred the suspicion of the SWANU leaders when he had moved to Katutura of his own accord, in spite of resistance to the removal. These suspicions were strengthened when in September 1960, Fortune obtained a passport from the South African authorities in spite of being secretary-general of SWAPO.

34. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 5.

35. *Windhoek Advertiser*, 14/9/1961, cited in Kozonguizi Documents, No. 1, p. 3.

36. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 7, p. 4; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

37. *Freedom*, May/June, 1963, cited by Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

38. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 9, p. 4. Elsewhere Kozonguizi comments that after his expulsion from SWAPO, "Kerina was ... inspired in the creation of imaginary new Parties and engaged in activities purported to unite the existing ones". Kozonguizi Documents, No. 9, p. 4.

39. See Kozonguizi Documents, Nos. 11 & 14.

40. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.

41. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 2, p. 6-7.

42. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

43. Further attempts to bring together SWAPO, SWANU and various smaller, internally-based political groupings were made in the early 1970s with the launching of umbrella organizations such as the National Convention (1971/2) and the Namibia National Convention (1975).

44. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 340-1.

45. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 8.

46. However, in spite of the backing SWAPO has received from the Soviet Union, the organization was able to retain significant liberal and anti-

communist support in Europe. This may be related to the highly pragmatic approach adopted by SWAPO, an issue which is discussed below.

47. See chapters 11 and 12.

48. Although SWAPO was also a member of the SAUF, it appeared to have maintained a relatively low profile and withdrew from the organisation before discord between ANC and PAC members eventually caused its dissolution. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 7, p. 3 & No. 5, p. 4; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

49. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, p. 4.

50. See, for example, Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

51. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

52. See also, 'Freedom', Feb./April, 1963, p. 11.

53. Kozonguizi interview, 8/12/78.

54. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

55. First, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7.

56. Kozonguizi interviews.

57. Kozonguizi interview, 8/12/78.

58. R. Gibson, *African liberation movements: contemporary struggles against white minority rule*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 123; R. First, *op. cit.*, p. 206-7; Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

59. H.L. Hamutenya & G.H. Geingob, 'African nationalism in Namibia', in C.P. Potholm & R. Dale (eds.), *South Africa in perspective*. New York: Free Press, 1972, p. 90.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

61. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 3, p. 9.

62. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 9, p. 4.

63. This point will be taken up later in the chapter.

64. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-7.

65. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 10, p. 1.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

67. Kozonguizi Documents No. 4, p. 10-11.

68. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

69. Kuhangwa was paralysed as a result of being stabbed. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 337; Kozonguizi interviews.

70. Appolus interviews.

71. The policy of the AAPSO was to admit only one organization per country, and as SWANU had early gained access to the international forum and had established itself on the executive, SWAPO was effectively excluded.

72. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, p. 5 & No. 4, p. 8-9. See also Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 338. For an account of the events leading up to the expulsion of SWANU from the AAPSO, see Gibson, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-29.

73. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, p. 5.

74. Appolus interviews.

75. Abrahams had specifically formed a club for this purpose in Cape Town. He maintains that when Nelson Mandela went on trial in 1964 and revealed the names of the books he had been reading on guerilla warfare, "it was the same reading list which we had. We all read the same books and all made the same mistakes." Interview with Dr Kenneth Abrahams, Windhoek, 25/8/79 (subsequently, Abrahams interview).

76. Interviews with Solomon Mifima, Windhoek, 23/8/79; 29/8/79 & 8/1/80 (subsequently, Mifima interviews). Hamutenya and Geingob, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

77. Hamutenya and Geingob *op. cit.*, p. 91. Disillusionment with the UN is even more clearly expressed in a report on the SWAPO executive meeting of 2-9 November, 1963 at the time when the decision to launch the war was taken: "Our countrymen in their innocence and trust, believed that the United Nations would drive out the white South African settlers and restore our land to us. This time has brought only disillusionment. The visit of Mr Carpio drove the final nail into the coffin of the United Nations' reputation in S.W.A." South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, Court Record 1/69, *State versus M. Victory and seven others* (subsequently, *State versus M. Victory and others*): court Exhibit A.D. 6, SWAPO, Dar es Salaam, Report on meeting of the National Executive Committee 2-9 November 1963, p. 597.

78. Appolus interviews.

79. *Ibid.* See also evidence of Israel Ipinge, Theophilus Hainbodi and Finderus Laban Ijambo in *State versus M. Victory and others*, *op. cit.*

80. *Ibid.* The court record of *State versus M. Victory and others*, *op. cit.*, provides further evidence that many of those recruited to SWAPO's guerrilla force left Namibia in order to further their education and did not even know of the military programme until they arrived in Tanzania. Theophilus Hainbodi, for example, told the court that when he arrived in Tanzania with a number of other refugees, they were told by Peter Nanyemba that those without a standard six education would have to go to a military camp because SWAPO needed soldiers. (p. 146) Hainbodi also states in his evidence that he was unable to study further at the school in his area, and those schools which offered a more advanced education were too far away.

81. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 9. See also No. 5. p. 5.
82. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 9.
83. Abrahams interview.
84. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 376.
85. *Freedom*, August, 1965.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Abrahams interview.
88. Kozonguizi interview, 7/12/78.
89. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 338.
90. *Freedom*, August, 1965. Whereas political propaganda of this sort should always be approached with caution, it is felt that this quotation does illustrate very clearly the elitism of SWANU, its heavy emphasis on theory and learning, and its reliance on concepts such as the "inexorable laws of history". While it is possible to argue that SWAPO propaganda has produced equal absurdities, the style of SWAPO propaganda is more populist and nationalist in nature, and its emphasis more on practical action.
91. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 9.
92. Kozonguizi interviews, 7 & 8/12/78.
93. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 10.
94. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 15, p. 3-4.
95. In March 1966 Sam Nujoma flew back to Namibia in a private aircraft after the SWAPO executive had decided that he should "lead the struggle from within". He was arrested at the Windhoek airport and detained for two days before being "deported" back to Zambia. *Namibia Today*, 1, 1, January 1967; Interviews with Abrahams, Mifima and Appolus.
96. See, for example, evidence of T.G. Sauer, State vs M. Victory and other, *op. cit.*, pp. 342ff.
97. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 376.
98. See, for example, evidence of Israel Ipinge, State vs M. Victory and others, *op. cit.*
99. *Ibid.* See evidence of Theodore Hanjanja, pp. 288ff and Major T.J. Swanepoel, pp. 481ff.
100. *Ibid.* See court exhibits SD1, SD2, SD10, SD11, SD13, SD15, OK33 and OK44.

101. Abrahams interview. Abrahams maintains, for example that little attention was given to security. The members of guerilla units openly discussed their missions with friends before leaving, and were driven out of Lusaka singing loudly. "So that everybody in Lusaka knew two days before hand where the SWAPO guerrillas were going to strike."

102. *Windhoek Advertiser*, 19/10/66, cited by Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

103. Kozonguizi Documents, no. 4, p. 11.

104. Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

105. Appolus interviews.

106. See, for example, Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

107. See, for example, V. Ndadi, *Breaking Contract: the story of Vinnia Ndadi*. Richmond: LSM Press, 1974.

108. The relationship between ethnic and national identifications is dealt with in more detail in the introduction and conclusion of this dissertation.

109. See chapter eight, above. For examples of the corruption of the Ovambo chiefs and headmen and its impact on the peasantry, see State vs M. Victory and others, *op. cit.*, evidence of Finderus Labon Ijambo, pp. 372ff.

110. Abrahams interview.

111. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 10. See also Ngavirue, *op. cit.*, p. 374. J.H. Kautsky, E. Shils and H.J. Benda, in J.H. Kautsky (ed.), *Political change in underdeveloped countries*. New York: John Wiley, 1967, pp. 45-6, 200-201 & 241.

112. J.H. Kautsky, 'Nationalism', in J.H. Kautsky (ed.), *Political change in underdeveloped countries*. New York: John Wiley, 1967, pp. 47-49.

113. H.J. Benda, 'Non-Western intelligentsias as political elites', in J.H. Kautsky (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 240.

114. E. Shils, 'The intellectuals in the political development of the new states', in J.H. Kautsky (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 199.

115. Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

116. In spite of its professed horror for tribalism, the SWANU leadership was not above the use of indigenous and ethnic symbols in attempting to establish support for itself. In the early 1960s, for example, prominent SWANU leaders like Mbaeva and Tjingaete exploited tensions between the Mbanderus (a distinct section of the Hereros) and the Hereros under Kutako and Kapuuo to affect a split in the ranks of the Chiefs' Council. In order to accomplish this, Munuku, a "high born" Mbanderu was brought back into Namibia from Botswana to act as leader of the Mbanderus. Kozonguizi (interview, 27/8/79) maintained that "Munuku's line throughout has been one of stressing the Mbanderu element

which sometimes becomes an embarrassment not only to SWANU but to the NNF" (Namibia National Front).

117. A. Gouldner, *The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class*. London: MacMillan, 1979, p. 64.

118. It is, for example, no coincidence that this chapter has relied so heavily on material provided by people who were associated with SWANU (as well as former SWAPO members who were essentially intellectuals). Not only have SWANU leaders provided the lion's share of published material on the nationalist movement, but it was the writer's experience that intellectuals in general were both more willing to discuss the movement and more capable at providing clear and relatively objective accounts.

119. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 12, p. 21. It is significant that this passage was part of an extended attack on SWAPO for its naive anticipations of the results that would flow from armed struggle and to the prestige accorded to the organization for preparing itself for a guerrilla war.

120. Kozonguizi Documents, No. 4, p. 10.

121. Gouldner, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84

122. There are numerous example of rule-orientation and inflexible insistence on patterns of propriety in both the actions and writings of SWANU leaders and other members of the intelligentsia. These tendencies are reflected, for example, in the incomprehension of SWANU leaders when faced with the pragmatism and flexibility of SWAPO. Thus Kozonguizi expresses misgivings about "what seems to be inconsistencies albeit (s/c) contradictions, in the policies, pronouncements and practices of SWAPO at home and abroad ..." (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 5, -p. 1). Similarly, Ngavirue, (*op. cit.*, pp. 337-8) is puzzled by the extent to which SWAPO's pragmatism paid dividends:

S.W.A.P.O. made no enemies abroad. It is a paradox that when S.W.A.N.U. defined its policy of non-alignment cogently, there were hardly any power willing to back it. S.W.A.N.U. found it difficult to prove that its stand against imperialism did not mean an alliance with the East as against the West ... In spite of this, the Soviet Union was later to vote for the expulsion of S.W.A.N.U. from the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation. With hindsight it might be argued that the benefits of non-alignment - getting help wherever it is obtainable - are maximised at that point where the definition of this philosophy is at its vaguest.

The pattern-orientation and insistence on propriety of the intelligentsia is also clearly illustrated by SWANU's insistence on "principles": As for SWANU, it is founded and is run on principles. And we are not prepared to bargain whatever may be the offer or abandon them whatever may be the price. In the same way we are against being deceived we do not wish to deceive others... (Kozonguizi Documents, No. 12, p. 2.

123. The body of this chapter provides sufficient examples of the ways in which SWANU leaders succeeded in alienating a remarkably broad

cross-section of interests through its tactlessness and insensitivity to the feelings of others.

124. In spite of its humiliation in the 1960s, the last has not been seen of the Namibian intelligentsia. Notwithstanding their radical rhetoric during this period, many have returned to Namibia and are currently involved in political and bureaucratic capacities in the Multi-Party Conference. Should Namibia be granted independence, it is likely they will emerge into even greater prominence as their skills are ideally suited to occupying positions in the state. The quotation is from Gouldner, *op. cit.*, p. 84. (Emphases in the original.)

CONCLUSION

One of the aims of this study was to focus on political processes of exclusion and group formation that do not easily lend themselves to class analysis, but which are nevertheless centrally related to political realities in southern Africa, and especially to African nationalism. The theoretical issues associated with this aim have already been discussed in some detail in the introduction and applied to the empirical data presented in the body of the thesis. This brief conclusion therefore will be limited to a discussion of two specific, but related issues associated with the dynamics of exclusion and group formation. In keeping with the dual concerns highlighted by the definition of nationalism, these issues centre on the role of the state in creating the pre-conditions for the emergence of nationalism, and the relationship of cultural identifications to some of the basic types of nationalist responses. In Africa the dominant nationalisms have generally been state-based, taking their bearings from the boundaries fashioned by the imperial powers, but nevertheless incorporating elements of cultural or communal identification.

The state's role in restructuring space

In the introduction to this study it was argued that the colonial state radically restructured political space by bringing together formerly distinct and autonomous communities and creating spatial discontinuities where none had previously existed. In this way the colonial state created a basis for the emergence of territorial nationalism. However, the restructuring of political space takes place on various levels. On the most basic level, the redefinition of political space involved the

setting of distinct territorial boundaries within which the state exercised its sovereignty. However, the creation of clearly defined territorial units, together with the radical claims to sovereignty, provided the colonial state with considerable power to redefine and manipulate territorial space internally.

In Namibia the drawing of rigid internal boundaries has been one of the bases of state dominance and the construction of the racial order. The earliest and crudest manipulations of internal political space were represented by policies of 'divide and rule' through which the state made use of pre-colonial divisions to impose its dominance over indigenous communities. There is a degree of continuity between these early strategies of 'divide and rule' and later policies of establishing boundaries between white farmers and black pastoralists, the creation of reserves for blacks, attempts to preserve the urban areas for whites, and the creation of a boundary between the police zone and the northern areas. All of these devices involved the creation of intra-territorial divisions over which the state maintained its dominance.

However, the salience of internal boundaries relates to the control over movement and the access to both material and cultural resources afforded to different segments of the population. In Namibia the contract labour system provides a prime example of how the manipulation of boundaries and control over movement and access to labour markets, was intimately related to marked differences in wages and employment conditions between different segments of the black population. Similarly, by means of the creation of reserves the colonial state was able to displace pastoral groupings from the prime farming areas of the territory and relocate

them in the peripheral areas in order to accommodate white commercial farmers. Following this relocation, a battery of measures, ranging from the imposition of grazing fees to the co-optation of indigenous leaders, were introduced to facilitate the extraction and control of labour.

There is, however, another vital dimension to these issues. Seen within the theoretical framework developed in this study, internal boundaries also controlled the access that different segments of the population were able to gain to cultural resources. As Gellner has argued, in an industrial setting the state not only enjoys a monopoly over the instruments of coercion, but also provides a fulcrum for the common or standardized culture on which industrial societies are based. The relationship between the construction of internal boundaries and access to cultural resources - not only between whites and blacks, but between different segments of the black population - is perhaps best illustrated by the differential distribution of education among the different categories of the population. Another crucial example relates to the maintenance of the urban areas as an exclusive preserve for whites, not only by severely limiting the influx of blacks into the towns, but by the imposition of rigid segregation between different categories of population within these towns. As the urban areas represent the major centres for the development of a common "industrial culture", these restrictions were an effective restraint on assimilation of the industrial culture.

The monopolization of cultural resources and the inhibition of the development of a common or standardized culture, that is, a common set of procedures and a medium of communication for participation in the industrial economy, held a number of important implications for the

evolution of a racial order in Namibia. Firstly, it allowed a reification of culture as a resource associated with specific biological groups and therefore provided an alternative basis for legitimization of the racial order, based on 'cultural differences'. More important, however, it put those excluded from the common 'industrial culture' at a severe disadvantage. This must be seen against the background of the undermining of pre-colonial formations so that they were no longer able to provide viable forms of political and economic organization. While the dispossession of indigenous communities and the disruption of their social organization took more direct forms in the police zone than in the northern areas, the results were essentially the same: Black communities were no longer able to operate effectively in terms of pre-colonial forms of organization. However, the racial order prevented these disrupted communities from adapting to the new industrial context and of thus participating on equal terms within the colonial economy. The degree of exclusion was of course related to the types of boundaries erected against various segments of the population. Thus while all blacks were denied a degree of access to the common culture, exclusion was most extreme in the case of those located beyond the police zone.

Thirdly, the inhibition of a common culture puts obstacles in the way of unified resistance to colonial domination and, more specifically, the development of nationalism. The colonial state therefore not only creates the pre-conditions for the emergence of nationalism by means of the restructuring of political space in terms of its external boundaries, but may also actively inhibit the development of nationalism by the imposition of internal boundaries. This is illustrated by the development of nationalism in Namibia. During the early 1920s, the constraints imposed on the state by the transition of regimes, weakened colonial

controls, allowing indigenous communities to transcend the limitations of pre-colonial divisions and identify themselves with external organizations and ideologies. However, following its recovery from the uncertainties and disruptions of the transition of regimes, the state was able to regain control. Its major responses, besides direct military and police action, to the resistance of the 1920s, involved the placing of restrictions on mobility both within the territory and across its borders, the exploitation of divisions in the black population, and the creation of reserves. Thereafter, a characteristic response of the administration to any sign of resistance or political organization was to deport the leaders of such resistance from the towns and labour compounds to the reserves, or even from one reserve to another.¹

While state strategies of containing resistance proved extremely effective until the outbreak of World War II, they were considerably less successful after the war when industrialization and economic growth created increasing tensions between industrial development and territorial segregation. Both the internal and external boundaries of the state became increasingly permeable. For example, the state was unable to stem the tide of black urbanization, and the urban areas became one of the major centres of resistance. Similarly, education provided another means of escaping the totalitarian controls of the state and even of moving beyond the territorial boundaries of Namibia. Perhaps most important, contract workers were able to penetrate the external boundaries of the state and gain access to South Africa where state controls were less rigorous and the opportunities for political socialization and organization were greater. From the beginning of the 1960s when the state intensified its repression of the newly-formed nationalist organiza-

controls, allowing indigenous communities to transcend the limitations of pre-colonial divisions and identify themselves with external organizations and ideologies. However, following its recovery from the uncertainties and disruptions of the transition of regimes, the state was able to regain control. Its major responses, besides direct military and police action, to the resistance of the 1920s, involved the placing of restrictions on mobility both within the territory and across its borders, the exploitation of divisions in the black population, and the creation of reserves. Thereafter, a characteristic response of the administration to any sign of resistance or political organization was to deport the leaders of such resistance from the towns and labour compounds to the reserves, or even from one reserve to another.¹

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tions, the option of exile assumed increasing importance. It was essentially from external bases that the nationalist movement launched its diplomatic and military offensives.

This highlights a central weakness of the contemporary territorial state. Although one of the major strengths of the contemporary state lies in its ability to manipulate space within its clearly demarcated boundaries, it is unable to extend its dominance beyond its boundaries. It may thus be argued that both the enormous power of the contemporary state and its greatest weakness are based on the clearly defined territorial limits placed on its sovereignty. This is demonstrated, for example, by the impotence of even the most powerful contemporary states to counteract small, externally-based guerrilla or terrorist movements.

'Exclusivist' and 'inclusivist' nationalisms

The construction of internal state boundaries is also related to the second major issue raised in this conclusion, namely the distinction between 'inclusivist' and 'exclusivist' nationalisms, or alternatively 'integrationist' and 'orthodox' nationalisms.² Although this distinction has often been overdrawn - all real nationalisms incorporate elements of both polar types - essentially the distinction has been used to differentiate between political organizations and movements which place the emphasis on communal or cultural identities, especially race, and those which employ more 'rationalist' criteria, such as class interests or state territorial boundaries. Lodge³ who offers the most comprehensive description of 'exclusivist' nationalism (although he does not himself use this term), associates it with populism and romantic nationalism and traces its origins to the peripheries rather than the centres of polit-

ical authority. Thus 'exclusivist' nationalists tend to take their ideological bearings from the rural areas and the peripheries of transitional societies, commonly resort to the use of symbols and myths, and generally employ less formal, loosely structured, non-bureaucratic and affective modes of organization and mobilization. Most important within the context of this study, Lodge characterizes 'exclusivist' movements as resistant to the assimilation of urban industrial culture.

The distinction drawn between 'exclusivist' and 'inclusivist' nationalisms is echoed by the often-made distinction between political (or state-based) nationalisms and cultural (romantic) nationalisms. To a large degree it corresponds also to the elements of the definition of nationalism employed in this study. This suggests that a key difference between 'inclusivist' and 'exclusivist' nationalisms may be in their relative emphases on state or cultural/communal boundaries. In terms of the logic of the definition of nationalism employed in this study, all nationalisms are necessarily exclusive in the broad sense of the term, although they might differ in relation to their degree of exclusiveness. In the narrower sense of accommodating different racial or ethnic groups, most African nationalisms - in as far as they can be identified as distinctly black or African - incorporate elements of exclusive identities. The use of class criteria to distinguish 'inclusivist' nationalisms also appears to be tenuous, because nationalist movements usually consist of amalgams or coalitions of different classes and ideological orientations.

Unlike its South African counterpart, the Namibian nationalist movement did not become involved in a debate about whether the movement should be multi- or uni-racial. This never became an issue probably because of the

small number of whites in the territory who could potentially be drawn into an alliance with black nationalists. Instead external alliances and alignments proved crucial, particularly in the early 1960s when the nationalist organizations were attempting to establish themselves in the international arena. Ideological identifications therefore tended to be more directly based on major benefactors and sources of aid, rather than on grassroots or class interests. This produced some rather strange ideological permutations. Thus SWANU with its essentially petty bourgeois basis, initially identified most closely with radicalism and socialism, while SWAPO which came closest to being a "workers' party" initially adopted a more cautious and at times liberal and even pro-Western stance.

The major cleavages in Namibian politics were to be found rather between a territorial or state-based nationalism, associated with SWANU and, to a lesser extent, SWAPO, and cultural or ethnic-based nationalisms, such as that of the Herero Chiefs' Council. These differences are not easily accommodated within the exclusivist-inclusivist distinction. While it is possible to argue that Herero nationalism was 'exclusivist' because it represented the interests of and mobilized only a specific section of the population, it is also evident that the Herero leadership played a key role in the launching of a territorial nationalist movement. The Hereros had also been at the forefront of the Garveyist movement in the early 1920s, pleading the case for a broad-based black unity. Many of these leaders were later to secure prominent positions in the Herero Chiefs' Council and to take the initiative in petitioning the United Nations on behalf of all black Namibians. Even particularistic symbols such as the day of commemoration of the Herero chiefs were later to be

incorporated into the broader nationalist movement.

It has already been suggested that the basic difference between the broad nationalist movement (represented by SWANU and, to a lesser degree, by "WAPU) and sub-territorial nationalisms like that of the Herero Chiefs' Council, relates to their respective use of state and cultural/communal boundaries as bases of political mobilization and group formation. This distinction must, however, be located within the general theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. In terms of this framework, Namibian nationalism is seen as essentially a response to the cultural exclusion and disadvantages of a rigid racial order.

Within the context of a firmly entrenched racial order, excluded groups may resort to one of two fundamental strategies. They may accept the dominance of the industrial culture and attempt to assimilate those aspects of it which their strictly limited access allows. This strategy, however, also entails an acceptance of the lowly and degrading statuses associated with the racial order, because even limited access to the colonial-industrial centre was only possible on terms set by the ruling groups who monopolized the industrial culture. Thus an Ovambo who wished to gain access to the industrial economy was forced to accept the conditions of the contract labour system and all the degradations associated with it. All black Namibians who wished to live in the urban-industrial centres had no choice but to take up residence in tightly-controlled and personally degrading "locations" on the peripheries of towns.

The alternative strategy was to withdraw as far as possible from the industrial culture and draw instead on indigenous cultural resources. This was the alternative chosen by the Herero indigenous leadership in the mid-1920s. This choice is only meaningful within the context of colonial society during the latter half of the 1920s. This was a context in which attempts to forge a broad-based unity and challenge the state on its own (political and military) terms had proved futile in face of the power wielded by the state. Rather than accept the subservient statuses allocated to them, the Herero leadership instead chose to withdraw to the reserves that had been allocated to them, and to draw on their pre-colonial cultural resources in order to construct a power base independent of the industrial culture. This strategy was to prove extremely effective.

The withdrawal of the Hereros was, however, not unqualified. Once they had established a political base in the reserves, they began to apply pressure on the colonial authorities to upgrade their educational facilities. Assimilation of the industrial culture remained selective, however, and the major orientations of the Hereros were still towards Herero, rather than industrial, culture. Later, particularly after World War II, new opportunities were to become available. Specifically, new opportunities of challenging the colonial authorities (by means of petitions to the UN, for example) were opened up. Again the Herero leadership took the lead in exploiting these new opportunities.

In spite of its leadership role, however, the strategy of selective withdrawal entailed certain costs and limitations. To a certain degree the Herero leadership remained a captive of its choice of symbols and its particularistic and ethnic power base. Selective withdrawal also

helped to create a cleavage between those who had received a relatively advanced Western education and the less educated leadership. The tensions of this cleavage were to tear apart the nationalist alliance of SWANU and eventually to detach the majority of Hereros from the mainstream of Namibian nationalism.

It has been argued that of all the groupings that made up Namibian nationalism, the intelligentsia were the most ardent territorial nationalists. This is consistent with their urbanization and their close association with a cosmopolitan industrial culture gained through their advanced education. The intelligentsia could gain most from a close identification with the industrial culture and a radical territorial nationalism which would brook no sub-national divisions. It therefore attempted to establish an independent political base by undermining that of the indigenous leadership and emphasizing the importance of education as a qualification for leadership of the nationalist movement. This emphasis not only put the indigenous leadership at a disadvantage, but initially also the OPO/SWAPO, so that SWAPO increased its distance from the intelligentsia and for a time joined in an alliance with the indigenous leadership. In spite of the differences that developed between these two components of the nationalist movement, SWAPO was later to acknowledge its debt to the Herero leadership by launching its guerrilla war on the Herero day of commemoration.

While there are a number of difficulties associated with the 'exclusivist' or populist strategy of the Herero leadership, particularly in the face of a dominant and steadily advancing industrial culture, the alternative of a territorial or state-based nationalism is itself

not without problems. The triumph of territorial nationalism in Africa has been accompanied by numerous problems relating to national unity, political legitimacy and socio-economic development. The boundaries of the territorial state have often provided only a tenuous basis for unity and societal cohesion. It is also becoming increasingly common for Africanists to argue that the major development problems in post-colonial Africa may be traced to the gap that was opened up between a rationalist and formalist state and a population which is still rooted in an 'economy of affection'.⁴ By their rejection of indigenous culture in the pursuit of state power and its concomitant industrial culture, African nationalist leaders may have opened a gap between the post-colonial state and the majorities of their populations. As Goran Hyden has concluded, "there are no shortcuts to progress, that is, no society escapes its past in looking for a future."⁵

Endnotes for conclusion

1. In 1960, after a number of unsuccessful attempts, the colonial authorities finally succeed in securing the deportation of Sam Nujoma to Ovamboland, even though he had rights of residence in the urban areas. It was this move that prompted Nujoma to go into exile.

2. See, for example, S.Y. Abdi, *Racial belief systems of nationalist movements: a case study of Angola and South Africa*. Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver, 1976; C.M. Gerhart, *Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1979; T.G. Lodge, *Insurrectionism in South Africa: the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Poqo, 1959-1965*. D. Phil. thesis, University of York, 1984.

3. Lodge, *op. cit.*.

4. G. Hyden, *No shortcuts to progress: African development administration in perspective*. London: Heinemann, 1983; Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C., *Personal rule in black Africa*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1982; R. Sandbrook, 'The state and economic stagnation in in tropical Africa'. *World Development*, 14, 3, 1986, pp. 319-32.

5. Hyden, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

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ADM 3360	Bushman, Treatment of vagrants
ADM 3370	Administration Annual Report, 1916
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ADM 3604/9	Native Affairs General. Destitute and indigent Natives Feeding of 1916-1917
ADM 3823/3	Ovambo Labour (vols. 1-6)

(ii) Confidential Files

ADM C82	Rewards to informers, 1917
ADM C248	Industrial Coloured (s/c) Workers' Union, SWA 1920-1924

Archives of the Secretary for South West Africa, 1920-1950 (SWAA)

(i) General Files

SWAA A 18/1	Alleged Hottentot rising at Kalkfontein South, 1920-1921
SWAA A 50/1	Native Affairs: Application by Natives and Coloureds for acquisition of land in S.W.A., 1920-1949
SWAA A 50/4	Native Affairs: Credit to Natives, 1922-1950

ADM 2794/8	Ovambo Labour: Labourers from Okavango District, 1917-1919
ADM 2989	Bastards General: Lease of woodrights, 1916
ADM 2989/2	Bastards General: Petition to General Botha by S.V. Thomas, 1915-1916
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A 312: Semi-official and private papers accumulated by administrators, secretaries, under-secretaries and minor officials of the S.W.A. administration, 1915-1950 (Accession 312)

A312, Item 25	Land Settlement, applications for farms, native reserves, etc, 1920
A312, Item 39	Posts and Telegraphs, 1923-1936
A312, Item 73	Bondelzwarts, 1870-1923
A312, Item 74	Ovambo Chief Mandume, 1916-1917
A312, Item 75	Natives, General, 1916-1939
A312, Item 76	Chief Ipumbu, Ovamboland, 1922-1923
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A312, Item 78	Rehoboth people, 1922-1924
A312, Item 79	Rehoboth matters, 1924-1925
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LLU 2/10/2	Political Agitation, 1931-1942
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PM 214a/8/1916	Report by the Administrator on the Administration of the Protectorate of South West Africa, 9th July, 1915 to 1st March 1916
GG 50/1026	Natives: Portuguese East Africa
GG 50/1029	Natives: Miscellaneous (1922)
GG 50/1036	Natives: Miscellaneous (1923)
GG 50/1500	Natives: Miscellaneous (1924)
K 21	Archives of the Secretary of the South West Africa Commission

Department of Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Library

A 842	J.C. Smuts Papers
AI/DJ	J.H. Hofmeyr Papers
AD 843	A.B. Xuma Papers
AB 702	Rev. M. Scott Papers
AH 646	Trade Union Council of South Africa Records
AD 1175/AII	Food and Canning Workers' Union Records

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D. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY WRITER

Abrahams, K.	Windhoek, 25/8/79.
Appolus, E.	Windhoek, 23/4/78; 24/4/78; 26/1/80.
Katjerungu, J.	Windhoek, 19/1/80.
Konzonguizi, J.	Windhoek, 7/12/78; 8/12/78; 27/8/79.
Mifima, S.	Windhoek, 23/8/79; 29/8/79; 8/1/80.
Muundjua, J.	Windhoek, 26/1/80.
Ngavirue, Z.	Windhoek, 30/8/79.
Veli, H.	Windhoek, 22/8/79.

Author Emmett Anthony Brian

Name of thesis The Rise Of African Nationalism In South West Africa/namibia1915-1966. 1987

PUBLISHER:

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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