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UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND

South African Foreign Policy Decision Making on Climate Change

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management,
University of Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

March 2016

Declaration

I declare that, “**South Africa’s foreign Policy Decision Making on Climate Change**” is my own unaided work. It is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in the Republic of South Africa. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examinations in any other University.

Signed: _____

Name: Bongiwe Ngcobo

On this day of March 2016

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late mother and sister, my husband, my grandmother and my brother.

Acknowledgements

As the saying goes ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ indeed this thesis is a product of collective efforts of different hands that laboured and soldered with me throughout the progression of this project. It is true that a collaboration of different ideas yield better outcomes. I am indebted to a few individuals who dedicated their ideas, intellects and time during the development phase of this research until the end. I’m mostly appreciative of my supervisor Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk who has not only supervised my work but has also mentored and ushered me while I navigated the complexities of academic research and presentation. The opportunities he afforded me have contributed immensely to my personal growth as a researcher and aspiring academic. His treasured advice and recommendations, his guidance and insights have been a source of great strength for me. I’m also thankful to Fred Goede whose experience and knowledge on the subject have inspired me to be creative. I’m grateful for the assistance I received from my colleague John Ringson who motivated me and walked with me through this process and Mrs Hlengiwe Cele for her support and motivation. Lastly, this thesis wouldn’t be a success if it wasn’t for the participation of different individuals from prominent organisations who dedicated their valuable time and information. In particular I am grateful to the Department of Environmental Affairs, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, The Presidency, Earth Life Africa, World Wildlife Fund and the Institute for Global Dialogue.

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List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BAU	Business As Usual
BASIC	Brazil South Africa India and China
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China South Africa
COP17	17 th session of the Conference of the Parties
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DoE	Department of Energy
EJN	Economic Justice Network
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LTMS	Long Term Mitigation Scenarios
NCCRP	National Climate Change Response Policy
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environmental Management Act
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCAS	Policy Coordination And Services
PCC	Presidential Coordination Council
SANBI	South African National Biodiversity Institute
SACP	South African Communist Party
SBG	Scenario Building Group
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN	United Nations

UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
USA	United States of America

ABSTRACT

This thesis was greatly motivated by the desire to understand and explain the foreign policy decision making process of the South African government on climate change. The study deploys Allison and Zelikow's triple model from their famous analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis as lenses in unmasking the complexities associated with processes of foreign policy decision making, on climate decisions in South Africa. In spite of the multi-sectoral interventions of government, business, NGO's, civil society and academics in mitigating the impact of climate change, the decision making process excluded participation of other stakeholders at the political level. This was evident in 2009 at Copenhagen when the president announced that South Africa had committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. A possible explanation why the multi-stakeholders participation was excluded in setting these numerical targets in the climate change decision making process, lies with the failure of the incumbent government to uphold the democratic principles of inclusive participation. Drawing from the work of Allison and Zelikow (1999), that state that it is not adequate to explain government's events on decision making through the Rational Actor Model only, it is more useful to also consider the organisational processes and government politics from which the decision emerged. In this regard, interviews and documentary analysis were deployed within a qualitative case study design to gain an in-depth understanding of South African foreign policy decision making processes on climate change targets. Overwhelmingly, the study established that there was a gross exclusion of multi-stakeholders participation in foreign policy decision making on setting the climate targets, ignoring the effects of the outcome of those decisions on socio-economic issues. This study therefore concluded that, although efforts are being put into place to ensure maximum participation by both government and other actors, there is still a need for South African government to allow participation of external actors. Premised in the forgoing conclusion, it is recommended that South African government foreign policy decisions on climate change can work better if entrenched on other multi-stakeholders' decisions and following inclusive participation at the political level.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Contextualisation

1.1 Introduction

Climate change is a global environmental issue that can be addressed through a collective effort. This effort requires that countries play their part in addressing climate change. In this context climate change is the change of climate induced by humans, either directly or indirectly, which changes the composition of the atmosphere, furthermore it contributes to climate variation that is felt throughout the planet (United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992). Perpetual pervasiveness of climate change has become a thorn in the flesh for both developed and developing countries. Adverse effects of accumulation of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) in the atmosphere are felt throughout the earth by all nations. This metamorphological process of climate change is posing a threat towards human life and the environment due to inter alia increasing temperatures, reductions in water availability and rising sea levels.

The change in the composition of the atmosphere is collectively known as global warming due to the tenacious increase of global temperatures. Dutt and Gaioli (2007) offer a scientific explanation of global warming, namely it is caused by the gradual increase of the earth's temperature as a result of increasing concentration of gases such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O) which are also called Greenhouse Gases (GHG). Often commentators and politicians use global warming and climate change concepts interchangeably as if they mean the same thing. Before interrogating these issues, it is beneficial for this study to distinguish the two. Climate change refers to the alteration process of the climatic conditions of the earth whether by increase or decrease of temperatures, whereas global warming is associated with unrelenting increase of global temperatures (IPCC, 2007).

In order to address climate change and its detrimental effects, in 1992 the UNFCCC provided a platform for all nations to discuss and negotiate how climate change can be tackled. Obligation to address climate change lies with industrialised countries that emit most carbon such as Germany, Russia, USA and emerging economies such as Brazil, China and India. However emergence of climate change has also engendered the genesis of a climate

injustice phenomenon whereby the poorest countries that don't make a significant contribution to the change of climate are the most vulnerable to climate change effects.

Subsequently, countries that emit most GHG are adamant to commit to mitigate (reducing their emissions of GHG) climate change and assist developing countries to implement adaptation (responding to adverse effects of climate change), to deal with the adverse effects of climate change (National Climate Change Response Policy, 2011). As a result climate change negotiations have dragged on for twenty one years without yielding a tangible outcome. Developed countries such as the United State of America (USA) and regions such as the European Union (EU) had been leading in the climate change negotiations prior to COP15 in Copenhagen, yet COP15 was signified by the absence of leadership on climate change issues, which offered an opportunity for emerging countries such as South Africa, India, China and Brazil to lead negotiations and press for an agreement particularly to support developing countries (Death, 2011). This trend has given rise to a growing salience of SA's global environmental politics and its dominance in the climate change negotiations under the developing countries. To emphasise their leadership role, South Africa took a bold step in 2009 at the 15th Conference of the Parties and made an announcement that astounded both the domestic community and international community. South Africa had committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025.

It was unanticipated and suprising that a developing industrializing country such as South Africa whose energy is mostly generated from coal made such an announcement (Shahbaz, Tiwari & Nasir, 2013). According to Shahbaz et al. (2013) South Africa is one of the biggest carbon emitters on the continent due to its coal intensive economy as a result of coal generated electricity used in the metallurgical industry, petrochemical industry, daily business operations, government and household's electricity usage. In this context South Africa is labelled an "emitter" due to the voluminous amounts of GHG released into the atmosphere. According to Shahbaz et al. (2013) the country is responsible for 1% of the world's carbon emissions, where 77% of its energy need is generated by coal. South Africa's carbon emissions have increased with the growth of the economy. This was visible immediately post 1994 after the democratic government had taken over. The South African economy displayed some strength and grew up to 4.3% between 2001 and 2007, even though later this growth was halted by the economic crisis in 2007, empirical evidence indicates that economic growth in SA increases carbon emissions (Shahbaz et al., 2013: 1453).

1.2 Legislative framework

South Africa became a signatory to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in 1995 which commits countries to stabilise GHG in the atmosphere (Richards, 2008). South Africa is also signatory to other international treaties such as on Ozone Layer Protection, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Seals, Endangered Species, Hazardous Waste, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation, and Wetland Protection (Richards, 2008). South Africa has various laws pertaining to the management and protection of the environment. South Africa's climate change response is guided by the constitution of the country and the National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (NEMA). Climate change is also supported and referenced in other legislation such as the White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management (2000) and the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act of 2004 (DEA, 2004: 3). The National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) provides a number of frameworks for development of policy to enable the country to deal with challenges of climate change (Das, 2013). Additionally there is also a Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) study which was concluded in July of 2008, the NCCRP White paper which included a Flagship Programme, Mitigation Potential Analysis programme, Desired Emission Reduction Outcomes programme and the proposed Carbon Tax which according to the South African government is meant to manage and simplify South Africa's obligation to the UNFCCC (NCCRP WP, 2011).

1.3 Research problem

There has been a perceptible increase of environmental agendas in the South African Foreign Policy, which has been visible in the country's dominance in global environmental politics. Notwithstanding SA's carbon intensive economy, SA made an ambitious announcement about reducing carbon emissions. On the 6th of December 2009 the newly elected president of the Republic of SA Honorable Jacob Zuma announced that SA had committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. This foreign policy decision emerged after a ministerial committee sat at a climate change conference where the Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) project was initiated (Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), 2004). In order to achieve this objective, SA would have to conceive innovative techniques to shape a climate robust environment which will have to lower the carbon intense economy substantially. Understanding that SA is a high carbon country whose economy is vastly dependent on coal, this announcement sent shocks both to domestic and international

parties. Although the LTMS was a consultative scenario process, the targets were not agreed through the project.

Domestically, NGO's, civil societies, academics and private sector reacted with shock and concern when the decision was announced in 2009. This response was based on the knowledge that SA has a carbon intensive economy and that SA didn't have the capacity to meet such targets within that time. Therefore an inquiry was necessary to probe into the decision making process of the SA government particularly on international climate change obligations. SA foreign policy provides guidelines on how international climate change obligations are tackled. According to Landsberg (2014) SA's foreign policy indicates that SA has a mandate to participate in the global system of governance. Consequently, climate change has become a foreign policy and diplomacy issue for SA prompting it to actively pursue global environmental politics to better respond to climate change challenges (Death, 2011). SA voluntarily became a member of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which it signed in 1994 and ratified in 1997. South Africa signed the accession to the Kyoto Protocol in 2002; both of which are global platforms for climate change negotiations so that South Africa could participate in these challenges (Death, 2011).

Previous research on South African Foreign Policy has focused on general developments since post 1994 where most analysts have been interested in the transition and continuity of foreign policy under the three democratic presidents. For instance, Landsberg (2014) focused on Jacob Zuma's Foreign Policy objectives highlighting the absence of synergy between these objectives and the national interest. John Siko focused on South Africa's foreign policy and influential actors from the time of Smuts to Thabo Mbeki which has helped to understand the players who influenced decision making in South Africa (Siko, 2014). Some analysts have also studied the growing interest of South African diplomacy in global environmental politics (Death, 2011). To some extent others have analysed the South African foreign policy decision making focusing on the decision makers and decision making processes of the new South Africa post 1994 (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). But there hasn't been a study on foreign policy decisions and climate change in which analysts explain how decisions are made in climate change negotiations. There is a need to understand the process of South African foreign policy decision making particularly on climate change. A reduction in carbon emissions might have a negative impact on the economy considering that South Africa is an energy intensive economy. Even if South Africa pursues renewable energy the cost of using

this energy poses a strain on South Africa's financial resources which might also affect the economy, even though renewable energy costs are reducing slowly.

Minimal research has been directed to analysing climate change and South African foreign policy decision making, particularly on the carbon emission reduction commitments. The decision to commit to reduce carbon emission is a demonstration that SA is taking responsibility for its contribution to climate change. However this decision requires that SA makes certain sacrifices in order to meet the 34% and 42% targets. There is therefore a need to explain how important foreign policy decisions on climate change are made, there is a need to know about those who makes and influences these decisions and there is also a need to know about those who advises the decision makers. This study will shed some light on the actors of SA foreign policy decision making on climate change, highlighting those who are involved in advising the President on decision making and those who make the final decision.

SA is a carbon intensive economy due to its high use of coal energy. According to the National Development Plan (NDP) strategy, SA is one of the biggest emitters ranking number 42nd in the world. This has compelled South Africa to respond to the UNFCCC's call to reduce carbon emissions together with other emitter countries (National Planning Commission (NPC), 2012). Being challenged with high poverty, high unemployment and high inequalities, required SA to set goals to improve the economy of the country and to promote sustainable development and economic growth. These goals are tabulated in the NDP vision 2030 (NPC, 2012).

A low carbon economy can be achieved through the use of renewable energy such as solar. However the use of solar and wind remains capital expensive and will require SA to sacrifice some items in the fiscal budget to afford a smooth transition to renewable energy in order to achieve the set carbon emission reduction targets. This research aims to examine the South African foreign policy decision making process on climate change leading to the carbon emission reduction commitment made by President Jacob Zuma in 2009. The study will explore the factors and processes that led to this decision, the actors involved including the advisors and influencers and the rationale behind this decision.

1.4 Research questions

The study was guided by the main question:

How does South African government decide on its international climate change obligation?

The following sub-questions are asked in order to gather the specific information required for this study:

- 1) How does foreign policy decision making work in the South African context?
- 2) Who sets the government's foreign policy agenda particularly on climate change?
- 3) Who advises the president and his cabinet on climate change?

1.5 Research purpose

This study aimed at gaining an understanding of South African foreign policymaking in the field of climate change decisions. The broader decision-making context, foreign policy processes, the actors and the organisational structures is the bone of content in this study. The study will be centered on the announcement made by President Jacob Zuma on South Africa's commitment to reduce carbon emission by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. However, the study is not interested in the private sector and how it prepares itself to deal with effects of carbon reduction in SA, but the focus of this study is on SA government foreign policy decision making process that led to the announcement being made.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The study is organised in the following manner: Chapter one contextualises the problem under study and present both the research questions and objectives of the study. Chapter two presents the literature review in two sections; the first part discusses the theory focusing on Allison and Zelikow's three conceptual models of foreign policy analysis based on their study of the Cuban Missile Crisis and International Relations theory; the second part presents the conceptual framework of the study in which the concept of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis are explored. The SA public policy and influential actors are also discussed and the climate change concept and its politics are delved into. Chapter three presents a methodology that focuses on the application of Allison and Zelikow's triple models; it also explores the case study assembly. Chapter four presents the findings from interviews and documents of foreign policy decision making on climate change. Chapter five presents the analysis and interpretation of findings. Chapter six contains the summary and conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the pertinent literature underpinning the study in order to establish a solid theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. The literature review chapter was organised into three broad sections. The first part consist of theory and concept section, which articulates the theories that underlies the study and also foreign policy concept which discusses different variables and concepts that helps to explain the social phenomenon and reality of the study. Secondly, the climate change concept is explored and the SA position on climate is discussed. Thirdly, Allison and Zelikow's models are applied to the study. Theoretically, this study was informed by the triple models popularised by Alison and Zelikow's (1999) namely; Rational Actor Model; Organisational Model; and the Governmental politics model respectively. These models aided the study in providing a better understanding of decision making in foreign policy and how international climate change obligations are decided. Conceptually, different variables and concepts pertinent to the study were reviewed so as to view the research problem beyond its superficial overview. A typical example of these variables include, but is not limited to foreign policy as a subfield of International Relations focusing on foreign policy decision making; and climate change as an international obligation for which important decisions are taken.

The study focuses on foreign policy decision making looking closer into decision analysis in order to explain how the decision was taken. Allison and Zelikow (1999) provide a window to look through this decision in three different models stipulated above. In the context of this study, the models are defined as instruments used to simplify problems we don't understand. Further to this, Van Nieuwkerk (2006) opined that models can be understood as frameworks which can be used to explore the complexities of the social phenomenon. Therefore, using Rational Actor Model I, Organisational Behaviour Model II and Governmental Politics Model III for this study aided the researcher to approach the problem in three dimensional perspectives namely; national goals; organizational procedures; and governmental politics. Lastly, the literature review focuses on climate change as a global challenge and the global environmental politics associated with it.

Part One: Theory and Concepts

Concepts were reviewed as a visual display of the models that underlie this study. Miles and Huberman (1994) define concepts as variables and a picture of what the theories or models say is going on with the phenomenon under review. Thus, below are the typical concepts reviewed in this study.

2.1 International Relations (IR) theories

Theories are potential sources of interpretation and explaining befuddling events. Foreign policy analysts spend a momentous amount of time evaluating their assumptions and that of others in order to achieve greater clarity on events and issues as they happen (McGowan and Nel, 2002). Different theoretical perspectives lead to different research focuses, different interpretations and understandings. McGowan & Nel (2002) define IR theories as sets of concepts, arguments and statements which analysts and scholars use to defend their assumptions in foreign policy. IR theories are important instruments in foreign policy as they offer theoretical approaches that are used to explain and understand foreign policy decisions. In foreign policy analysis analysts are influenced by IR theories such as realism, liberalism and institutionalism. Four IR theories have been identified which will be discussed below.

2.1.1 Classical realism

The predominant theoretic approach in the analysis of international affairs has been the realist school of thought. Realism became popular in the foreign policy analysis after the end of World War II (Hill, 2003). Realists assume that the state is a major actor in the international relations system. It assumes that states act rationally and it is based on the assumption that power is a big factor for states (McGowan & Nel, 2002). Realists view the international system as an anarchy meaning even though the system is organised there is no central rule and accordingly it is perfectly fine for states to look after their own interests. Classical realism advocates include Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

2.1.2 Neorealism

Members of this school of thought have distinguished themselves from earlier realists in two different dimensions: first, in the aspiration to be 'scientific' and second in the stress they place on systematic level of variables. According to Allison & Zelikow (1999) neo-realism assumes that the international system is anarchy where distribution of capabilities and balance of power are a means of survival. Neo-realist view that structural constraints cause some nations to behave in a certain way and avoid acting in the other way. A popular champion of neo-realism is Kenneth Waltz whose theory suggests that differences in the

aggregate power of states are measured in terms of military, GNP and capabilities which are the decisive variables. Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) attempts to yield a more rigorous theory of realism. According to Waltz (1979) 'structural realism' is the appropriate identification of the international condition in which states live. Waltz predicts that foreign policy can be used to exploit opportunities to enrich state capabilities and through alliances with other states, a state can restore its balance of power (Waltz, 1979). Hill (2003) criticises neo-realism for its limited abilities of failing to deal with foreign policy at different levels and therefore deems it unsatisfactory.

2.1.3 Idealism

Idealism also referred to as liberalism is another theoretical approach used in foreign policy analysis (McGowan & Nel, 2002). Liberalism states that a nation's structure of domestic government, the values and views of citizens affect the behavior of nations in the international community (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The liberal school of thought rediscovered that democracies never or rarely go to war with other democracies which is a significant development in the studies of international relations. Liberal theorists argue that a nation which reveres and promotes human rights, political and economic pluralism is more likely to reflect these values in its external behavior in the international community (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). One can regard Mandela as a liberal leader because he pursued peace, morality, promotion of human rights and cooperation.

2.1.4 International institutionalism

International institutionalism moves a further step above Neorealism focusing on system-wide institutions and interactions as the major causal factor. This school of thought assumes that cooperation between states should be structured by institutions and that these institutions soften anarchy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). International institutionalists started by focusing on the notable increase of important international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organisation and International Court of Justice. The leading champion of international institutionalism, Robert Keohane (1984), acknowledges that structural systems are important but further insists that institutions are also important when explaining behavior of nations. Keohane (1984) was also quick to criticise institutionalist theory for its incompleteness and insufficiency to provide adequate explanations of nation's behavior. What has come out of this theory is that in areas of environmental degradation, health and humanitarian issues, nations are organised by international

institutions like the United Nations (UN) to commit to agreements that benefit all the nations in the international system.

2.2 Foreign policy

Foreign policy may be approached in many different ways within International Relations which will be explored briefly below. The foundation of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is built on its reaction to the influence of realism (Alden & Alan, 2012: 3). Realism is famous in International Relations as many scholars and analysts have used it to think about international relations. As indicated earlier in this chapter, realists recognise that states are important in the international community. Secondly, realists assume that all humans are driven by the desire to dominate and that the most powerful, will dominate the weaker. Thirdly, states pursue power and security and lastly it maintains that states act rational and make choices that will maximise their power (Allison & Zelikow, 199: 27). Realists believe that scholars should probe into international relations structures and the power of states in order to understand the outcomes of foreign policy decisions (Alden & Alan, 2012: 4). Realism had been criticised for its failure to allow a thorough analysis on decision making and its emphasis on power but this inadequacy was later purged and supplemented by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in the creation of Neo-realism, which emphasised the balance of power. Even so scholars like Hill (2003) have criticised the application of neo-realism in foreign policy analysis, citing that it is highly limiting as an approach and is barely discussed. Regardless, neo-realism is still relevant in IR.

The core focus of FPA is the investigation into decision making, processes, decision makers and conditions that affect foreign policy. FPA is not only concerned about the primary actors within government who are involved in decision making but it also looks into other agencies outside government who influence policy. Two definitions came out from literature, the first one from Webber & Smith (2002) defines foreign policy as a set of goals and objectives set by the government as the main actor which administers and manages the state's external relations with other nationals. The second one from Hill (2003: 3) defines foreign policy as 'a sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations'. Therefore in the study of Foreign policy the focus is on understanding and explaining the processes and behaviors associated with decision making of actors in foreign policy and link it with the international world of politics they are part of.

In summary, it appears from literature that there is an ongoing interaction between the FPA and IR disciplines. FPA mostly looks deep into the behavior of actors in the international system and is an analyses of decision making processes. While the behavior of states internationally is important to understanding foreign policy, the behavior of a state in its domestic environment is also equally important and the interaction between international and domestic sources of behavior cannot be ignored. Looking at the realist paradigm and viewing FPA from this point of view, it suggests that we look into national goals and objectives to explain decision making. However the foreign policy decision making approach rejects this assumption but rather focuses on the behavior of international actors.

2.2.1 Foreign policy actors

In view with the notion that a nation's decisions are not made by a nation but by a group of individuals or just individuals, one asks: who matters in foreign policy? Who makes foreign policy decisions? Allison and Zelikow's third model Governmental Politics acknowledges that decision making in foreign policy involves different actors which are organised in concentric circles (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255). Susan Booysen shares the same view but provides a different approach suggesting that we can view the public and foreign policy players in South Africa as clusters divided into primary, secondary and tertiary clusters (Booyesen, 2001). This section will examine the key actors in foreign policy and the role they play in policy formulation or policy making.

Webber and Smith also indicate that there are different layers of actors in foreign policy decision making pointing out that 'there is a key distinction to be made between those who participate continuously and effectively – and those who shape and influence policies from time to time' (Webber & Smith, 2002). John Siko identifies different groups of actors in South Africa such as the President, Government Departments, Ruling parties, Parliament, Academia, Press and Public Opinion (Siko, 2014). This section will discuss the key actors in foreign policy decision making using the approach offered by Allison and Zelikow (1999) and Susan Booysen (2001).

2.2.1.1 Central circle of players

President and office of the President

According to Hill (2003) heads of state or presidents have a responsibility to make high level decisions as they are on top of the government hierarchy. The president has the responsibility to establish relationships with other countries and negotiate at the international community

level. President J. F. Kennedy was also dominant in the American foreign policy being very involved in decision making of many issues such as the Cuban Missile Crises where he became an important player in the decision making process (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). It therefore becomes significant to understand a president's decision making in foreign policy analysis in order to get a better understanding. According to Siko (2014: 246) in South Africa leaders such as Thabo Mbeki and Verwoerd played a dominant role in making foreign policy. He was passionate and very involved in the South African foreign policy both as deputy president and president he was known for being the advocate for Africa and being recognised in the global economic governance. He advanced this commitment by creating the NEPAD and other structures aimed at addressing the continent's underdevelopment. He pressed for solidarity with Africa and the global South or developing countries in an effort to bring about equity and prosperity.

Above the ministerial committees and Presidential Coordination Council (PCC) Mbeki added Policy Coordination And Services (PCAS) structures whose mandate was to monitor and oversee progress in foreign policy delivery.

Cabinet

Allison and Zelikow are right to say 'Government is not an individual. It is not just a president and his entourage, nor even just the presidency and Congress. It is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders sit formally on this conglomerate. But government perceives problems through organisational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organisations process information; governments act as these organisations enact routines' (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 143). In government foreign policy formulation and decision making is an interactive process which involves departmental ministers, department principals and agencies.

Ministers are not only involved in foreign policy implementation but they are also involved in foreign policy making. According to Booysen (2001) the South African cabinet is the core agency in policy making and policy implementation functioning through Cabinet Clusters. Siko (2014) argues that this arrangement has not been uniform with all South African presidents. For instance during Mandela, Malan and de Klerk's tenures there was a lack of coordination and coherence between the presidency and different departments and agencies, whereas it was different with Mbeki and Botha who promoted coordination and interaction

with different government departments and principals on foreign policy processes. Mbeki was directly involved in foreign policy decision making but also encouraged interdepartmental coordination through a cabinet cluster system such as the PCAS which Mbeki created to link the Presidency with government departments. Booysen (2001) had earlier noted that the PCAS was not functioning optimally in that there was still a gap between the Presidency and government departments on foreign policy issues. Later Siko (2014) indicated that Mbeki worked towards closing this gap ensuring that PCAS was serving its purpose as a bridge between Presidency and government department. In SA, the ministers of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Defence, Intelligence and Trade and Industry are major players in foreign policy (Siko, 2014: 8).

2.2.1.2 Middle circle of players

Ruling Party

Ruling parties occupy a unique ground in foreign policy of a nation as they play a decision maker role in government decision making. However involvement of ruling parties in foreign policy is unique within a country and cannot be generalized. In South Africa post 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) played a significant role in influencing foreign policy decision making especially on issues such as the Zimbabwe human rights abuse and on acknowledging Western Sahara and acknowledging China (Siko, 2014). During Mandela's term as president many foreign policy issues were discussed and debated in the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) and its subcommittee which then informed decisions, however during Mbeki's term the ANC's impact on policy was reduced as Mbeki's PCAS took over policy roles (Siko, 2014). This view suggests that ruling parties in their capacities play an important political role in influencing foreign policy decisions.

Parliament

Siko (2014) argues that even though legislatures are in a good position to influence foreign policy they still do not utilise the power to challenge and influence the government executive on its foreign policy priorities. Reasons cited include parliamentarians that are often concerned with retaining their offices and secondly parliamentarians rarely have competencies in foreign affairs and lack interest in foreign policy issues. Susan Booysen indicates that the parliamentary caucus in SA is not as effective as it is supposed to be highlighting that their role is often overshadowed by government executives (Booyesen, 2001). John Siko shares the same views with Booysen pointing out that in both pre and post 1994 parliament had little impact on the South African Government's foreign policy due to

executive eccentric trends (Siko, 2014). The taking over of executives on foreign policy process has deterred potential influence of parliament on foreign policy.

2.2.1.3 Outer circle of players

Academics and think tanks

Academics add value to the policy debates through first-hand interactions, written products and training. They hold great potential to influence decision makers thinking over time if they are allowed to. One cannot ignore the contribution of academics in policy making since they provide policy thinking and analysis. Think tanks have helped to shape and device foreign policy; they also educate the public and empower leaders. During the 1994 transition and post 1994 in South Africa a group of academics were organised by Thabo Mbeki to address foreign policy issues. This provided academics with an opportunity to get involved in government policy making, something they had been limited to do before the transition. The period during 1990 and 1994 granted academics access to government policy processes where they were actively involved in policy formulation drafting key documents and establishing frameworks for foreign and defense policy. Even during Mbeki's tenure academics inputs was widely sought and exhausted, however their participation was limited to certain issues (Siko, 2014).

According to Hunter (2000) in countries such as United States of America academics and think tanks play a role in generating ideas for foreign policy, they have an impact on power and they also bring people together to discuss policy options. The USA government has used academics and think tanks to build support for policies and to help create consensus about issues which are important. Both academics and thinks tanks have played a significant role in USA foreign policy through training of government leaders, shaping future policies and educating the American public. Academics add valuable insights through research, training and generating ideas which help shape policy, but the extent to which they influence foreign policy is not yet known.

Business

Both South African and international business have expanded their presence in the South African policy making. From Mandela's time to Mbeki business people were given an opportunity to contribute by presenting their views during policy making. According to Booysen (2001), Mbeki had a group of 'private tank thinkers' who played an important role in policy development. Institutions such as Business Unity South Africa, South African

Chamber of Business and South African Chamber of Commerce were key players who would work closely with Mbeki and they had a large impact on emerging policy. However Siko (2014) later argues that business was ineffective in its participation in foreign policy development due to disinterest in government policy development and more focus on profit maximization of their business, and the absence of unity in the business community contributed to this ineffectiveness.

2.3 South African public policy

Booyesen (2001) argues that to understand policymaking in South Africa one needs to focus the analyses on an array of interactive complexities of policy actors. Susan Booyesen provides a perspective where policy can be assessed from an interactive policy cluster which is an approach that can be used to understand participation and trends in policymaking (Booyesen, 2001). Policymaking between 1990 and 2001 in SA was based on the rules of consultation and participation. Indeed policy formulation, planning and implementation involved consultation with core institutions such as the Presidency, Cabinet, African National Congress (ANC), political civil servants and policy bureaucrats (Booyesen, 2001).

In the period between 1994 and 1999 the Presidency became a core cluster in policymaking, more particularly policy planning and coordinating, however there seemed to be less implementation and monitoring from this office once the policy was developed (Booyesen, 2001). According to Siko (2014), during Thabo Mbeki's era there was more emphasis on policy implementation particularly in foreign policy than during Mandela's era. The Cabinet also became a core agency in policymaking and implementation during this era working through inter-ministerial clusters together with the Presidency and the ANC. However this cluster could not yield sufficient results because there was still a need for strong policy coordination, monitoring and processing that needed to be done. According to Booyesen (2001) the policy bureaucrats cluster which included policy advisors, top government employees, researchers and consultants had more influence on policymaking because of their involvement in policy planning, implementation and monitoring. This cluster was meant to pursue consultation with communities and stakeholders but it phased out in the late 2000 due to lack of consistency and commitment.

The ANC with its alliances COSATU and South African Communist Party (SACP) had minimal impact on policy but had influence in multiple policy domains (Booyesen, 2001). The alliances pursued to ensure interest of the poor was protected in policymaking particularly

policies on issues of employment, economy and transformation. Other clusters such as business, NGO's, parliament, provinces and local government had minimal influence while the Constitutional Court became a powerful policy stimulus enforcing legislation and policies.

This cluster perspective provided by Booysen (2001) seem to indicate that during the transition period of 1994 to 2001 South African policymaking was centralised within a certain sphere driven by consultation and a need to deliver which involved selected clusters within and outside government's political circles who influenced policymaking.

2.4 Theoretical literature review

As already been highlighted in the introductory section above, the triple model popularised by Allison in his first publication of 1971 which was analysing the decision making of the famous Cuban Missile Crisis, was updated in a consortium with Zelikow (1999). This is the theoretical model that this study uses. These triple models are explained in detail in the subsequent sections.

2.4.1 Allison and Zelikow's conceptual models

In order to analyse the South African foreign policy decision making on climate change, this study adopted Allison and Zelikow's (1999) models. In Allison and Zelikow's view the rational actor model is valuable for the explanation of government actions however it is still necessary to supplement this model with the other two models namely: the organizational behavior model and the governmental politics model to empower analysts to probe into government organisations and bureaucracies who get involved in the policy process. In this view, the approach for the analysis of this study is based on the three models. However, these triple models are used as theory to explain the foreign policy decision made by SA to reduce carbon emissions. The model was used as a three-in-one model so as to appropriate the analysis of the multilayered social phenomenon under investigation in this study.

This section provides an explanation on the multilayered models provided by Allison and Zelikow (1999). Most often when government action transpires we seek to understand why a particular government might have chosen that action. While most analysts may assume that such actions may be understood by analysing single individuals perceived as decision makers, the 'decision maker' of national policy is not an individual but rather a conglomerate of large organisations and actors (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 5). In this view, most of the foreign policy analysts and policymakers reflect on issues of foreign policy through

conceptual models. According to Allison and Zelikow (1999), conceptual models offer analyst direction of where to look for answers and how to find them in their attempt to explain government actions.

Allison and Zelikow (1999) offer foreign policy analysts and policymakers with three different windows. This enables them to view on different angles so that they can respond to one question in three different dimensions. To reiterate what Allison and Zelikow had highlighted earlier, even though the Rational Actor Model I is favorable, it has proven to be more useful when supplemented by the Organisational Behavior Model II and the Governmental Politics Model II. In this case, the three models were found to be more suitable for this study to explain how decision making works within the South African government. In order to explain and demonstrate how nations make decisions for example in Model I, analysts would frame their question as: why did this nation act this way? The response to this question would precisely focus on goals and objectives of the nation.

2.4.1.1 Model I: Rational Actor Model

The attempt to explain national events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations is the trademark of the Rational Actor model. This was Allison's first model of foreign policy which was introduced after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This model is grounded on rational action and rationality. The theory of rational action allows analysts to be in the shoes of the decision maker and develop a sense that they understand and are able to explain what happened. Accordingly, Allison & Zelikow, (1999: 16-17) asserts that, 'rationality refers to consistent, value maximizing choice within specified constraints. The Rational Actor model swings between decision and choice where a decision assumes a decider and choice among alternatives with references to some goals'. At this level the assumption is that the state is a decision maker who speaks with one voice and is clear about its strategic objectives. Tayfur (1994: 130) summarises the assumptions of the rational actor model in this manner 'those who act in the name of government get full information; take every opportunity into consideration and decide on the best policy'.

Thus, Allison and Zelikow (1999: 18) identify four core concepts which validate the Rational Actor Model. They are:

1. Goals and objectives are explained as the interest and values of the agent that are translated into a payoff or utility or preference function which represents the desirable utility of alternatives set of consequences. The agent is expected to be able to rank in

order of preference each possible set of consequences that might result from a particular action.

2. An alternative is where the rational agent must select from a list of alternatives displayed before him or her in the situation.
3. Consequences is the third core concept which simply means that for each alternative is attached a set of consequences that will follow, if a particular alternative is selected or chosen.
4. Choice-rationality versions can be explained as a rational choice which consists of simply selecting that alternative whose consequences in the decision maker's functions best.

The four concepts presented above suggest that humans act rationally and that they apply rationality in decision making. Rationality plays a critical role in this model because the assumption of rationality adds a powerful explanatory principle that is if a person acts rationally his behavior can be explained in terms of what they are trying to achieve. According to Allison and Zelikow (1999: 25), the general principle which is central to the Rational Actor model: the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of a state's (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative of actions, (3) estimates of consequences and (4) net evaluation of each set of consequences. Further to this, Allison and Zelikow (1999:25) argued that this produces a powerful proposition: that 'an increase in the perceived costs of alternatives reduces the likelihood of that action being chosen and a decrease in the perceived cost of an alternative increases the likelihood of that action being chosen'. The assumptions of this model suggest that government acts as a unitary factor, which when faced with a policy challenge weighs carefully all the available options and calculates the cost of each, before they select the most suitable option. Alden and Alan (2012: 16) further articulates that the state identifies, prioritises foreign policy goals and fulfils these goals by selecting the least costly option.

Tayfur (1994) criticises the Rational Actor model in that the assumptions of rationality have serious setbacks. Firstly government people rarely act rational as suggested by the Rational Actor model but they struggle to attain information to consider all the alternatives. Secondly, the decision makers do not always review all the alternatives but only decide when they come across the acceptable choice. Later, Neack at al. (1995) also criticised the Rational Actor

model for not being adequate enough to assess the decision making process due its shortcoming on failing to provide information. Kafle (2015) as well criticised the Rational Actor Model's assumption for being problematic in that it ignores the psychological factors which have an impact on a decision maker or an actor. Even so, the Rational Actor model still proves to be useful because it channels the analyst to find information about the actor's objectives, their strategy and action in order to understand the actor's behavior in foreign policy decision making. This model encourages analysts to establish a relationship between objectives and actions of the actor to be able to understand foreign policy decision making. Therefore it becomes important to approach decision making analysis through this model because it offers understanding of the state's behavior in decision making processes.

2.4.2.1 Model II: Organisational Behavior Model

This model explains the behavior of organisations during decision making process. The Organisational Behavior model is based on these assumptions: Government behavior in the international community can be understood as outputs of large organisations operating according to standardised behavior. Governments comprise of existing organisations each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. In this model the focus is on organisational behavior not individuals, and therefore explanations are based on organisational practices and purposes. It is also significant to realise that organisations create capabilities which enable human members to achieve and perform tasks that would otherwise be impossible to achieve without these capabilities. Existing organisations and their programs and procedures reflects constraints on the decision maker's choice because goals and objectives are well established; therefore limiting choices based on the standard operating procedures (SOPs) (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 145).

Large organisations consist of large numbers of human resources whose behavior must be controlled and coordinated. Coordination requires SOPs which are an organisation's rules to which things must be done. Any government makes use of fixed SOPs and programs which determines their behavior inside and outside their organisation. In decision making processes organisations follow rules, routines and norms to make a choice after generating alternatives through research and processes. These rules and routines are valuable to those who use them to get something done, yet may seem impractical to those who do not use them.

According to Allison and Zelikow (1999: 143) this model considers Organisational Actor as not a monolithic nation or government but a constellation of loosely allied organisations on

top of which government leaders sit, each with a substantial life of its own. Secondly according to this model actions of international politics are outputs of organisational processes. Outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must make their decisions about an issue. Even though government leaders may decide to modify their output, behavior is influenced by previously established procedure and processes (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 164). Kafle (2015) praises this model for its ability to allow government to emphasise all available options under difficult circumstances and that it allows decentralisation and power sharing. Further to this, the model proposes that in the analysis of decision making processes it is not adequate to assume that the outcome of an action is as a result of national objectives that the nation is pursuing. It encourages analysts and scholars to also consider the possibility of a decision as a result of set government procedures and processes producing outputs. This model highlights the important role domestic politics play in influencing the decision making process.

2.4.2.2 Model III: Governmental Politics Model

Model II's grasp of government action as organised output enlarges the classical model's efforts to understand government's behavior as the choices of a unitary decision maker. But beyond model II analysis lie a further more refined level of analysis. The leaders who sit at the top of the organization are no monoliths. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his or her own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within government (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255).

Government behavior in international politics can thus be understood according to the third model, not as choice and not as organisational outputs but as results of a bargaining game. Outcomes are formed and deformed by the interaction of competing preferences (1999: 255). Unlike the Rational Actor model the Governmental Politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players who have different goals and agendas. The players do not make a unitary rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics. This goes to reflect the name of this model, politics, which is a game where anything can happen anytime. In this model analysts focus on the games and players to display bargains and compromises and also to display coalitions in order to explain why a particular government decision was taken.

Allison and Zelikow (1999) argues that according to this model government is organised in successive concentric circles where political leaders who sit at the top of the apparatus of

national government together with their officials who occupy top position form a circle of central players. Lower level officials may be found in the middle layer and then NGOs, businesses and public citizens form an outer circle. Webber and Smith (2002: 40) share the same sentiment and add that the players are organised in a hierarchy with inner and outer circles of influence in decision making. Suzan Booysen has also employed a similar approach while analysing the South African public policy where she speaks of primary, secondary and tertiary clusters of role players (Booyesen, 1991). Based on this model it is therefore important to understand the interchange of role players in order to understand a foreign policy issue.

The ongoing struggles in the outer circles influences those who are directly involved in the government decision making process in the case at hand. So Model III focuses on those who are engaged in this interaction. Most players 'represent' different departments or agencies along with an interest and constituencies their organisation serves. People differ about what must be done and even though they are pulling in different directions they still produce a resultant. The chess pieces are moved not simply for the reasons that support the cause, nor because of the routines of organisations that enact an alternative, but according to the power and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question. Everyday players are faced with issues which require their attention. The character of emerging issues and the pace at which the game is played converge to yield government 'decisions' and 'actions' as *collages*. To explain why a particular government decision was made or why one particular or why one pattern of government behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players to display the coalitions, bargains and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 256-257). According to Neack et al. (1995) the Governmental politics model tends to be problematic in that it uses a lengthy process which requires information on procedures and activities within government which indicates that it will be difficult to attain since governments have specific rules on internal information.

This model has gone a level further suggesting that it is not adequate to focus on government as unitary actor who functions on a rational system or focusing on government procedures and processes which produces outputs but evaluation of individuals as agencies who compete for what they want to produce a resultant. As Allison and Zelikow (1999: 227) put it 'a hauling a pulling' game which is necessary not about the best outcome but about the best player. This model also considers the importance of individuals and the role they play in the decision making process.

Part Two: Climate Change, Policy Intervention and South African Position

2.5 Climate change

Human activities such as industrialisation, population growth and urbanisation have accelerated the increase of Greenhouse gases (GHG) namely: Carbon dioxide (CO₂), Methane (CH₄), Nitrous oxide (NO₂), Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆) which have contributed significantly to global warming commonly known as climate change (Winkler et al., 2011). Industrialisation has contributed immensely to the increase of concentration of GHG gases in the atmosphere exacerbating the climate change process. CO₂ is the most contributing GHG due to the high use of its sources such as combustion of coal and oil which are economic strengths of most countries both in the North and South. Warming of the climate system is undeniable as is now evident from observations of global increases in average temperatures, melting of snow, the global rising of sea levels and the increase in drought especially in the African continent.

2.5.1 The climate change international regime

In 1988 The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) organized a panel of scientist to deliberate on climate change which then gave birth to the IPCC whose mandate was to put together scientific knowledge on climate change and outline possible responses (Paterson & Grubb, 1992; Berliner, 2003). According to Das (2003), this panel created a platform for discussion and negotiations which involved pursuing nations to reduce their Greenhouse Gas Emission contributing to climate change.

The climate change talks began at the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 whose outcome produced the declaration encompassing a set of principles to encourage the international community in the preservation and enhancement of human environment (Das, 2013: 208). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 gave birth to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty whose mandate was to stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (Das, 2013). The Kyoto Protocol was established in Japan in 1997 to pursue the UNFCCC objective of committing nations to reduce greenhouse gases coming into effect in 2005 (Moodley, Mabugu & Hassan, 2005). All climate change treaties and conventions takes place at the Conference of Parties (COP) which started in 1995 to serve as the Meeting of Parties under the UNFCCC where countries negotiate, agree or disagree on carbon

emissions reductions (Das, 2013). According to Moodley et al. (2005) South Africa is a signatory both to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These international institutions aim to provide a platform for all nations to discuss climate change and its impacts and then negotiate so that they can reach agreements on how they can possibly reduce emissions and prevent further rise in global temperatures. However climate talks which have been going on since COP1 have not stemmed the increase in GHG emissions due to political struggles which produces hauling and pushing amongst players, over burden sharing responsibility over climate change. The divides between North and South are highly visible at the negotiations. The North and South divisions is discussed below.

2.5.2 The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol flows from the UNFCCC principles and objectives and is also driven by its own targets. The Kyoto Protocol was created to set targets that nations would adopt to reduce temperatures. First, it asked developed nations to reduce GHG emissions by 5.2 % by 2008 and 2009 on average and then it also created the Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism to allow developed countries to reduce GHG emissions (IPPC, 2007). The UNFCCC was heading in the right direction with the inception of the Kyoto Protocol, however the Protocol has failed to produce positive results towards emissions reduction globally. Since its endorsement in Rio de Janeiro, the Kyoto Protocol has failed to make nations commit to reducing emissions. Das (2013) adds that Kyoto was a great disappointment because it allows nations to set climate change objective on their own pace, resulting in dragging of feet towards making tangible commitments.

Partial participation has also been a setback of the Protocol leading to countries such as the United States of America (USA) not rectifying the treaty citing inequity in burden sharing (Das, 2013: 210). Indeed disagreements and pointing of fingers is inherent to Kyoto Protocol perpetuating inequality resulting in a clash of interest and growing distrust among signatories. Despite clear goals and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol the failure to make countries agree on a binding climate change mitigation plan is indication that Kyoto Protocol was unsuccessful to achieve its goal until it expired in 2012. However the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will still allow countries to continue negotiating even though other developed countries such as Japan, New Zealand and Canada refused to enter into a legally binding agreement.

In summary, it is clear that climate change summits in various conferences are dominated by politics especially the North and South divides and nations are always looking for their country's best interest. Even though efforts are made to reach significant actions to combat climate change they have yielded no results to curb climate change.

2.5.3 North and South divisions

The burden of reducing emissions should be shared between the North and the South countries to ensure that in the process of resolving the climate change problem equality issues are not ignored. The divisions between North and South have been visible since Rio de Janeiro (Paterson & Grubb, 1992; Barnajee, 2012). Barnajee (2012) is of the view that developed countries are pursuing protection of their wealth in these negotiations they even buy poor countries to lobby with them. Even so SA together with Brazil, China and India took a lead in negotiations since the COP15 in Copenhagen emphasising that developing countries should not be placed in the same category of commitment with developed countries (Das, 2013). It seems that politics and power remain at the centre of these multilateral environmental negotiations. It also seems that equality is being ignored which is disappointing because as a results progress is delayed. The reason behind all this is because countries seem to be interested in promoting their national interest.

2.5.4 South Africa on climate change

The impacts of increasing global temperatures are now visible in SA. The country is experiencing increased evaporation of water accompanied by tenacious droughts which are now becoming a norm. The biodiversity is also vulnerable to shrinkage in area if the warming persist and South Africa will feel a great pinch in forestry, fisheries and agriculture if adaptation plans are not implemented sooner (DEA, 2013). For this reason SA has been making efforts tackling climate change and even committed to reduce carbon emissions in 2009 at Copenhagen.

As a non- Annexure 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol, South Africa is not obligated to any legal binding commitment but is required to set its own carbon emissions target (Moodley et al., 2005). South Africa is responsible for an estimated 500 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions per annum which according to Shahbaz et al. (2013) contribute to 1% of the carbon emitted to the atmosphere. South Africa is an industrialising country with a growing economy whose production is dependent on energy with 77% of this energy coming from coal (Shahbaz et al., 2013). Based on these views it can be seen that carbon reductions will impact on the economy and economic growth will impact on the carbon mitigation plans.

South Africa could pursue renewable energy options such as solar and wind energy to achieve their target. However this option would be extremely expensive for SA and will require that they sacrifice some items on the fiscal policy in order to suffice for it.

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal and has become one of the most unsettling and most critical challenges facing policy makers globally. The world's environment, ecosystem, agriculture and human species are threatened by the effects of climate change. Even though climate change is a global issue the responsibility to save the world still lies with major emitters of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) like China, the (USA), Russia, Brazil and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) countries (Shahbaz et al., 2013). The United Nations Commission on Climate Change creates a platform for nations to negotiate and decide on how to abate climate change.

2.5.5 Mitigation and adaptation in South Africa

It is believed that the first action to address climate change is to deal with the root cause by reducing GHG instigated by human activities. A collective action required from all nations is to mitigate and adapt. Mitigation 'refers to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or enhance carbon storage' and 'adaptation refers to those actions that aim to minimise the negative effects or exploit the potential opportunities provided by climate change' (Yulundhika & Nugrahanti, 2014: 66). Mitigation and adaptation is an approach that practitioners could adopt to respond to climate change impacts.

South Africa took action to resume the process to scrutinise the potential for mitigation of its GHG emissions in 2006. SA would do this by developing a Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) with the goal to provide scientific analysis that would inform Cabinet's decisions on the long term climate change policy which would provide a clear and mandated position for South African negotiators at the UNFCCC (DEA, 2007). The LTMS group or Scenario Building Team (SBT) as it was called included strategic thinkers of government, business, NGO's, academics, business and civil society which produced a LTMS document to inform climate change policy decision. The SBT worked on building scenarios which were based on the international climate change context. The first scenario was based on "Growth without Constraints", In this scenario the group asked, what the South African economy would look like in 2050 with unabated greenhouse emissions? It would look at economic growth patterns, energy efficiency and coal substitutes to build this scenario. The second scenario was based on "Required by science" the group asked, what South Africa could achieve by 2050 if it had

all the resources and technology its needed to contribute to the global mitigation effort that is required to stabilise climate change? In this scenario South Africa would join the global community and negotiate a fair share target to contribute towards stabilisation of the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere (DEA, 2007).

Both of these scenarios would later inform the 34% and 42% targets South Africa committed to in Copenhagen in 2009.

Part Three: Application of Allison and Zelikow's Triple Models to SA Foreign Policy on Climate Change

2.6 Application of Allison and Zelikow's triple model

This section will apply the three models explained above to the problem under study in order to answer the main research question: *How does the South African government decides its international climate change obligations?*

In an attempt to understand how decision making works in government the researcher built the methodology of data collection on these three conceptual models. With this approach the researcher attempts to provide an explanation of the decision without focusing on describing the event alone but also identifying factors that led to the event. As indicated earlier the study adopted the same approach used by Graham Allison (1971) on the Cuban Missile Crisis for his explanation of the event. The advantage of applying the three models is that they offer analyst the opportunity to look at one problem in three different lenses and at the same time it exposes the analyst to a wide range of actors who play role in government decision making.

2.6.1 Level 1: Rational Actor Model I

The South African government could be viewed as a unitary rational actor who made a foreign policy decision to pursue a national goal or objective. For this level of explanation the researcher examines official government documents such as communiqués, policy statements and reports which are intrinsic to this decision. At this level the study would want to understand the following critical areas: (i) why did the state make this decision? (ii) What international problem was the state trying to solve? (iii) What objective was the state pursuing? Noting that government documents are not easily accessible the analysis goes a level down into the Organisational Behavior model in order to access specific information needed for this study. The second level is discussed below.

2.6.2 Level 2: Organisational Behavior model II

In this level the researcher looked at how departments or agencies within the South African government arrive at a particular decision. Even though the assumption is that decisions are a result of established organisational procedures and pressures the focus at this level was the critical foreign policy decision which is the commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 34 % in 2020 and 42 % in 2025. At this level the analysis focused on actors within government departments and agencies who are involved in international climate change obligations. The researcher pursued to identify the departments, agencies and key actors who make the international climate change obligations decisions. The study pursued to establish: (i) from what organizational context, procedure and pressure did this decision emerge? (ii) What role did the organisations and agencies play in the making of this decision? (iii) What capabilities and constraints did the organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process?

Now that the literature has looked into the organizational behavior, it turns into reviewing the governmental politics. The researcher is aware that even within the departments and agencies there might be conflicts and competitions which require a more refined level of investigation. Therefore the analysis would go beyond the Organisational Politics model to the third level which is the Governmental Politics discussed below.

2.6.3 Level 3: Governmental Politics model III

The focus at this level is on politics of decision making within government departments and agencies where the researcher looked closer into the role of individual decision makers such as the president and his agency, ministers and their advisers looking closer the competition between them. As Allison and Zelikow (1999) states individuals in this group are players in a competitive game as such the decision is a resultant of bargaining amongst players. At this level the literature is interested in identifying the games and players to display the bargains and competitions. Therefore the following questions were asked at this level: (i) what kind of bargaining among which players produced the foreign policy decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions? (ii) Who are the players? (iii) What is the game?

2.7 Concluding remarks

To this end, this Literature review chapter has attempted to articulate the theoretical underpinnings of the study, which was presented in the form of Alison and Zelikow's (1999) triple model that include the Rational Actor model, Organizational Behaviour model; and Governmental Politics model. The Rational Actor model revealed that foreign policy

decisions are results of calculated accounts and goals of a nation. Interestingly this model is based on the assumption that a nation is a unitary actor in decision making who speaks with one voice, pursuing one goal and fulfilling national interest. The Rational Actor model is built on the rationality principle suggesting that people act rationally when they make decisions. This point therefore validates the assumption of the Rational Actor model that when faced with a crisis, a nation selects one choice from a list of alternatives having calculated and weighs the consequences of each alternative. Therefore according to this model if we attempt to explain national events we should analyse the calculations and goals of a nation. Contesting these assumptions is the Organizational Behaviour model which revealed that foreign policy decisions emerge from organisational processes, procedures and culture. In other words this model suggests that in order to understand a nation's foreign policy decision analysts should pay attention to SOP's and organisational process. The emphasis is on organisations and not individuals. In contrast, Governmental Politics model puts more emphasis on individual actors than organisations. This model revealed that government action should not be viewed as choice or organisational outputs but as a political result. Players compete to achieve goals which serve their personal interest. The output is a result of bargaining amongst players and the most powerful wins. Linking these to the problem under study which is South Africa's decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025, the three conceptual models suggested that this decision can be explained in three different approaches using the themes offered by these models.

The second attempt was the provision of the conceptual framework laid down in this literature review. Different themes ranging from foreign policy to climate change were identified. Firstly, it was revealed that foreign policy is a subfield of international relations and is built on realist assumptions. Foreign policy actors are essential in foreign policy decision making, however the level of influence is not similar to, for example the president and his ministers, are more involved in decision making than the other groups in the outer circles. Secondly, established climate regimes have provided a platform for nations to negotiate and commit themselves to addressing the climate change predicament. However the climate change regime system is surrounded by politics, inequalities and divisions between the South and North countries which have complicated the negotiations.

The following chapter discusses the methods employed to conduct this study. The case study design is explained, the data collection methods are discussed and analysis of data is also explained.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research design adopted as well as the methodological foundations underlying the study. It focuses on the unit of analysis of the research and it describes the methodology of the study. The chapter begins by discussing the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study, it then discusses the unit of analysis and then restatement of the Allison and Zelikow's models as a method of analysis. It also explores the case study design selected for the study. The researcher's approach to data collection is also described as well as the selection of interviews and the interview process.

3.1 Philosophical perspective

Wagner et al. (2012) and Merriam's (2009) discussion of philosophical perspectives have been helpful in determining this study's qualitative philosophical underpinnings. Based on the philosophical orientation, Merriam (2009: 8) makes distinctions amongst three forms of research which is positivist, critical and interpretive.

A study is considered a positivist research if it is able to prove what it proposes and able to quantify variables. Merriam (2009: 8) further emphasises that 'knowledge gained through the study of this reality has been labelled scientific and included the establishment of laws'. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) seemingly argue that with positivist research, knowledge is developed through accumulation of observable facts. Examples of studies done from a positivist approach include the Higher Education HIV and AIDS (HEAIDS) study, a survey conducted on 23 public higher education institutions in SA to determine prevalence of HIV and AIDS in higher education institutions (Weberloff, 2014). Ritchie and Lewis (2003:9) criticise positivist research because it limits a researcher from producing detailed explanations. Therefore the nature of this study could not allow for the positivist approach because positivism assumes that reality is visible and measurable and that the only acceptable knowledge is scientifically proven (Merriam, 2009). Besides, the positivism approach is more suitable for quantitative studies.

A study may be categorised critical if its objective is to critique, challenges, empowers and transforms existing systems (Merriam, 2009: 10). Those who undertake critical research seeks to bring about change in the social setup. Critical theory assumes that people can

challenge their economic, equity and knowledge conditions. Critical research is emancipatory in nature in that it challenges oppressive social dominion. Wagner et al. (2012: 56) refers to it as “transformative or emancipatory paradigm” suggesting that this term encompasses a category of research design with a common theme of emancipating and transforming communities. Critical research is founded on the epistemological traditions that knowledge is true if it can practically empower and transform the lives of people and also on the ontological traditions that social reality is constantly changing (Wagner et al., 2012). This study is not situated in transformative paradigm or critical theory because it does not intend to challenge any system in the social domain but rather focuses on contributing to knowledge by understanding decision making process.

The study is located in the interpretive tradition due to its qualitative nature. This suggests an epistemological and ontological belief that reality is constructed through social interaction. Merriam (2009) earlier argued that interpretivism in qualitative research means the study views reality not as single reality but as multiple realities implying that there are multiple interpretations to a single event. The study’s approach is to understand the event through the world of others, using interviews to gather information. Wagner et al. (2013) supports this approach and argues that interpretivism is all about understanding the world as others experience it. Wagner et al. (2013: 56) further explains ‘Reality, in this sense, is limited to context, space, time and individual or group in a given situation and cannot be generalised into one common reality’. The approach of the study was also located on the epistemological assumptions that the truth lies with the human experience. Indeed, the assumption is that what people view as the truth is culture bound, context specific and historically dependent.

3.2 Unit of analysis

The study adopts a single case study design containing one single unit of analysis. According to Yin (2003: 22), unit of analysis is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined. Analysis of this case study is centered on explanation of the process of decision making through the application of three conceptual models of foreign policy decision making. The analysis will focus on the South African foreign policy decision on the international environmental obligation to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. The analysis of this unit provides a context from which a case study can be described and analysed to answer the research question: *How does South African government decides its international climate change obligation?* A case study approach was used to gain understanding and explain the decision making process that surrounded the event where

South Africa decided on a carbon emission target in 2009. Further to this, government officials have been key informants providing the most specific information which has enabled the study to answer the research question. Government officials had details such as actors, decision making processes and international environmental obligations amongst others.

3.3 Allison and Zelikow's models

Allison (1969: 690) argues that 'conceptual models both fix the mesh of the net that the analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action or decision and direct him to cast his net in select ponds, at certain depth in order to catch the fish he is after'. Since this study aims to explain a decision made by the South African government, it adopted Allison and Zelikow's (1999) conceptual models as a method of analysis which allowed the researcher to probe into the problem in three different lenses. All three models- Rational Actor, Organisational Behavior and Governmental Politics provide a base for improved explanation.

3.4 Research design: Case study

A case study research design is popular in psychology, anthropology, medicine and sociology. According to Merriam (2009: 39) case studies gained popularity during the 1960s and 1970s. From this time going forward many writers have offered different approaches to conduct case studies, for instance Merriam (1998) provides a detailed account of how case studies can be used and Yin (2009) also offered a different approach suggesting that a case study can be used for both qualitative and quantitative methods. Creswell (2013: 99) distinguishes three types of case studies which include the intrinsic case study, instrumental case study and collective or multiple case studies. Similarly Merriam (2009) also identified historical and observational case study, intrinsic and instrumental and multiple case studies. An instrumental case study design is considered for this research.

A case study is suitable for learning more about an inadequately understood situation (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014). Merriam (2009) defines a case study as a study of a particular case in a real life setting within a bounded system. Yin (2014) defines a case study as an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon within its real world context. Yin (2014: 16) further emphasises that 'you would want to do a case study research because you want to understand a real world case and assume that such an understanding is likely to involve important contextual conditions pertinent to your case'. Both definitions enable a researcher to differentiate a case study from other methods. Further to this, the bounded system in this case

is signified by the focus on the decision that was taken in a particular event. The event itself is a boundary, because it fences in what will be studied (Merriam, 2009). Numerous foreign policy studies have adopted the form of a case study because it provides appropriate analysis of events. One very famous example of a case study was conducted by Allison and Zelikow in the *Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1999). A local example includes Prof van Nieuwkerk's multiple case studies in the *South African Post-Apartheid Policy Decision-Making on African Crises* report (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). This study intends to understand the South African foreign policy decision made in 2009 to reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. The events that led to this decision are significant in order to understand how this decision was made for example to determine who the government members were, stakeholders, those who influenced the decision and lastly the rationale for this decision. The case study will allow the use of multiple sources of information in data collection which in this study will be interviews and documents.

A case study design offers an in-depth understanding of the problem being examined and also produces a full account of a phenomenon (Merriam, 1998: 41). The intention of using a case study in this research is to gain understanding.

The researcher has also considered limitations offered by the case study such as bias, generalizability, validity and reliability. As Merriam (1998) states, the lack of rigor in case studies is linked to the problem of bias. Yin (2003: 9) is of the same view alarming that '... the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigor of the case study research' citing the problem being the case study investigators who often allow bias views to influence the findings. To deal with these threats the researcher has focused on context specific knowledge to avoid generalizability, to be objective and discourage biasness. Further to this Yin (2003: 33) suggested these four tests to be used to test the quality of research:

- Construct validity: establishing the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied.
- Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship whereby a certain condition is shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships.
- External validity: establishing a domain where a study's findings can be generalized.

- Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study- such as the data collection can be repeated with the same results.

The four tests tabulated above have been employed to ensure rigor of the study.

3.5 Justification of a single case study

Yin (2003: 5) identifies six types of case studies based on a 2x3 matrix. A case study research method can be based on a single case study or multiple case studies. A single case study consists of one case study only whose analysis focuses on one case. A multiple case study has more than one case investigated and involves collecting and analysing data from numerous cases (Merriam, 1998: 40). A single case study was used to address the research question for this study: How does the South African government decide which international environmental obligations to undertake and which ones not to? The methodology used to conduct this study is the comparison of Allison and Zelikow's (1999) three models on South African foreign policy decision making process which suits a single case study in that a single case study represent a substantial contribution in knowledge and theory building by challenging, confirming and extending the theory (Yin, 2014: 51). The multiple case study was not selected because it tends to be problematic and difficult to manage and could not suit the nature of this study as it investigates a single case. Merriam (2009:50) argues that data from different sites is too much to manage. Further, Yin (2014: 57) also cautions that 'the conduct of a multiple case study can require extensive resources and time beyond a single student or independent research investigator'. Indeed the multiple case study method would not be suitable for this study since the study is conducted for an academic purpose which is required to be completed within a limited period of time.

3.6 Types of case studies

Yin (2003:2) discusses three types of case studies identifying them as exploratory case study, descriptive case study and explanatory case study. Yin (2003:5) further articulates; an exploratory case study (whether single or multiple case study) is aimed at defining the questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study (not necessarily a case study) or determining the feasibility of the desired research procedures. A descriptive case study presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its context. An explanatory case study presents data bearing on cause- effect relationship- explaining how events happen. An explanatory case study was considered for this research because the objective of the study is to explain a decision making process based on a particular event. Explanatory case study will allow the

study to explain how the event happened. Exploratory case study couldn't be used because of the use of a pilot study which is not what this study is doing and lastly, it is also not a descriptive case study because it fails to express the causal effect relationship and only covers the scope of description of an object (Yin, 2003: 23).

3.7 Selection criteria for case study

Selection of the research question posed for the case study was based on three issues at the time which are discussed below.

1. The opinion held by several stakeholders is that SA did not have the capacity or resources to achieve a 34% and 42% carbon emission reduction within the set time frames of 2020 and 2025.
2. SA is a coal intensive economy meaning a reduction in coal use due to a strict national greenhouse gas emissions reduction target would harm the economy of SA. At the time of the announcement SA's economy was expected to grow by 5% and a greenhouse target would subdue economic growth.
3. SA had just come out of recession and needed significant economic growth to overcome the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

3.8 Research approach

A qualitative method has been followed in conducting this study because it suited the objective and purpose of the study. According to Leedy & Ormrod (2014) qualitative methods permit a researcher to attain insight about a particular phenomenon and provide an opportunity to evaluate effectiveness of particular policies and practices. Creswell (2007) adds that a qualitative method allows the researcher to understand the situation in its natural setting and also allows the use of multiple methods of data collection. This is what the study is trying to do, to understand the foreign policy decision making process in South Africa. A number of writers have attempted to capture the essence of qualitative research through definitions. Three of these definitions are discussed. Merriam (2009: 3) for example has defined qualitative methods as 'the notion of inquiring into, or investigating something in a systematic manner'. Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 16) provide a more broader definition namely 'qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs and values) within their social worlds. A more specific definition was offered by Wagner et al. (2012:

126) saying that qualitative research is concerned with understanding the process and understanding both the social and the cultural context which shapes different behaviors. Wagner's definition is much closer to what the study is intending to do; namely understanding the decision making process in the setting of South African foreign policy. Wagner et al. (2012) argues that the advantage of using qualitative methods is that it is rich and deep in explorations and also rich in data descriptions. The research question for this study could not allow the use of quantitative methods because the focus in quantitative research is on numbers rather than description. The focus of this study is to understand and explain a phenomenon. Merriam (2009: 13) validates this approach reporting that '... qualitative researchers are interested in *understanding the meaning people have constructed*, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world'.

3.9 Data collection instrument and procedure

The researcher has considered multiple methods of data collection to explain the foreign policy decision making process relevant to this case. The main data technique employed in this study is semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Semi-structured interviews were used together to gather information. Interviews have proven to be the most valuable source of information for this study. As indicated earlier the study adopts Allison and Zelikow's foreign policy models to explain the foreign policy decision making in three different levels (Rational Actor model, Organisational Behavior model and Governmental Politics model). The study seeks to collect data guided by these levels using interviews and documents as instruments of data collection. Yin (2014: 110) reports that interviews in case study evaluation can be semi-structured or open ended. Yin further explains that the researcher is confronted with two tasks when conducting interviews; first to follow the questions in the interview guide; second to ask follow up questions in an unbiased manner. Documents are important to substantiate interview information. The study used both approaches recommended by Yin.

3.9.1 Primary data

The case study relied on interviews conducted with key individuals who have been closely involved in the case and could provide specific information. The study pursued semi-structured and open ended interviews as a primary source of information. According to Merriam (2009: 90) with semi-structured interviews specific information is desired from the respondents. The investigator makes use of an interview guide with a list of questions. Yin (2014) argues that ability of semi-structured interviews to be able to guide a researcher to

focus on the case study topic and be able to provide explanations as well as personal views is beneficial. Merriam (2009: 90) further commends semi-structured interviews in that they allow a researcher to respond to the current situation at hand and to new ideas. The study itself could not allow the use of formal or structured interviews since the study intends to understand and explain decision making processes. The nature of structured interviews would impede this objective in that it uses predetermined questions which limit access to the participant's perspective and understanding of the world (Merriam, 2009: 90).

For Level 2 (Organisational Behavior model) explanations, semi-structured interviews were conducted with department officials within government who were involved in the making of this particular decision. Lastly for explanation in Level 3 (Governmental Politics model) the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with key individuals central to the decision making of this case. Leedy and Ormrod (2014) encourage the use of interviews for data collection in qualitative studies in that interviews yield ample amount of useful data. Semi-structured interviews allow flexibility while being guided by a set of questions (Merriam, 2009). The researcher used a tape recorder and a notebook to ensure all the details of the interviews were captured. The study will pursue mining of data from government official documents for explanation in Level 1 (Rational Actor model). The researcher will seek insights from documents such as policy statements (white papers), cabinet minutes, government reports and speeches made by members of the cabinet and the president.

3.9.2 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants from Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), Department of International Relations and Co-operations (DIRCO), civil society groups, analysts and academics. The interview process was met with constraints due to unavailability of some interviewees who were in Paris for the COP21 meeting at the time, and as a result these interviews were done via email. Even though the researcher was guided by listed protocol questions, probing techniques were applied in order to dig deeper into answers and thoughts provided by the respondents. Probes are questions or comments that follow up on something already asked. Probing questions were the “*who*, *when*, *what* and *where*” questions (Merriam, 2009: 101). To provide a more accurate version of the interview, a cellphone was used to record all interviews and a notepad was also used to capture notes during the interview.

3.9.3 Secondary data

Secondary documents were also considered for analysis. According to Wagner et al. (2013: 141) secondary documents are documents written after the event that the author has not eye witnessed. Secondary data was gathered from published articles and reports on the South African climate change target decision made in 2009 in Copenhagen. The opinions and views gathered from these sources were corroborated with primary data to augment evidence. Yin (2014: 107) adds that documents are able to provide other specific details to corroborate information from other sources.

3.10 Sampling

A purposive sampling technique was considered for selection of interview participants. Out of the 15 participants who were selected for semi-structured interviews, only 10 were available. According to Merriam (1998) purposive sampling is most suitable for qualitative studies because it is based on the assumption that the researcher wants to gain insight and understanding. Wagner et al. (2013: 92) further explains ‘with probability sampling the researcher relies on his or her own experience, previous research or ingenuity to find the participants in such a manner that they can be considered to be representative of the population and usually uses specific selection criteria to identify the most suitable individuals’. Based on this view the researcher considered the interview participants carefully ensuring that all the participants have knowledge and details of the case study being investigated. The selection criterion that was used for the sample is in this manner: all the participants selected for semi-structured interviews have been involved in the climate change talks and negotiations for the past 8 years. This was in the period between 2008 and 2015 where most climate change policy developments and target announcement activities took place in South Africa.

Snowball sampling was employed most often to find a network of participants who were involved in the foreign policy decision making of carbon emission reduction. Most key government respondents were found using this technique which allowed the researcher to access the responders with the rich information needed for this case.

3.11 Data analysis

This section discusses the analysis method adopted by this study. It first discusses analysis of documents and then discusses analysis of interviews.

3.11.1 Documents analysis

Analysis of government documents was done in order to mine data needed to address the research question. Concerning documents Wagner et al. (2013: 141) advises that ‘the focus should be on the meaning of the document, the situation in which it emerges and the importance of the interaction that results from the document’. The researcher focused on documents that are intrinsic to the study especially those that emerged from the event. This approach is endorsed by Wagner et al. (2013) arguing that documents can be conceived as symbolic representations of the event. The main documents that were analysed included the White Paper on Climate Change, Climate Change Response Policy, Long Term Mitigation Scenario document and Financial Mail article. These documents were obtained from the Department of Environmental Affairs archives. Content analysis was adopted for the analysis of documents. Bryman (2012: 556) describes content analysis as a process that involves searching out of underlying themes in the documents. Later Wagner et al. (2013: 141) advised that the analysis should be a critical examination of material rather a description. The documents mentioned above were gathered from DEA, they were then analysed, coded and themes were extracted from each document. Meanings were also created from themes to construct sentences. Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 201) identifies nine different types of analysis approaches and praises content analysis due to its emphasis on capturing and interpreting common sense and meaning making in data whereas others such as discourse analysis, narrative analysis and conversation analysis focus on language and structure of talk. According to Merriam (1998) content analysis focuses on the communication of meaning and it puts an emphasis on themes to emerge from data.

3.11.2 Interviews

What came out from discussions with other researchers is that data analysis is the most challenging stage due to the voluminous data that must be processed. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) further explain that a researcher needs to demonstrate creativity, enthusiasm and systematic searching when doing data analysis. A common procedure in the analysis of qualitative data is the identification of themes and categories which is achieved by subsuming data into categories. The study adopted the qualitative thematic analysis in order to get meaning from interviews. Thematic analysis is defined by Wagner et al. (2013: 231) as a general approach to analysing qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns in the data. Qualitative thematic analysis suits this case study in that the researcher aims to understand the process of decision making in South African foreign policy. The aim is therefore to construct meanings from themes. In a case study analysis the researcher

categorises the data and seeks patterns in hope that case relevant meaning will emerge (Creswell, 2013). The researcher adopted the data analysis of a case study tabulated by Leedy & Ormrod (2014) in the following process:

1. Organizing of details about the case which will be done on completion of each and every interview to ensure the researcher is not overwhelmed by the volumes of data
2. Coding or categorization of data which encompasses aggregation of data into small categories to produce detailed descriptions
3. Themes will be produced from aggregated codes where the researcher will be looking for detailed descriptions and
4. In the interpretation process the researcher will organize themes in order to get meaning from the data.

3.12 Ethical considerations

Ethics is a critical aspect when conducting research because it ensures that the participants are not exploited but protected during and after the study is completed. According to Wagner et al. (2013: 70) it becomes a researcher's responsibility to ensure a participant is aware of what the study is about and what they are supposed to do. The researcher also needs to inform the participants on how issues of anonymity and confidentiality will be addressed. Merriam (2009: 230) argues that pre-established guidelines are not adequate to address ethical dilemmas alone but should be supplemented with the researchers own sensitivity and values. This view is vindicated by Yin (2013) in his book highlighting that a researcher is an important instrument in qualitative methods. Merriam (2009: 230) further argues that 'ethical dilemmas are likely to emerge with regard to the collection of data and in the dissemination of findings'. To deal with such ethical discrepancy in this study during data collection and analysis the researcher ensured that participants were protected throughout the duration of the study and that the participants were well informed. Further to this, the study followed four guidelines suggested by Christians (2000: 144) in order to deal with ethical dilemmas. They are discussed below:

1. Informed consent: proper respect for human freedom generally includes two necessary conditions. First, subject must agree to voluntarily participate- that is without physically or psychological coercion. Second, their agreement must be based on full and open information;

2. Deception: in emphasizing informed consent, social science codes of ethics uniformly oppose deception. The straight forward application of this principle suggests that researchers design different experiments free of active deception;
3. Privacy and confidentiality: codes of ethics insist on safeguards to protect people's identity and those of the research locations. Confidentiality must be assured as the primary safeguard against unwanted exposure; and
4. Accuracy: ensuring that data are accurate is a cardinal principle in social research.

3.13 Concluding summary

In this chapter the research design and the methodological foundations were discussed. In addition unit of analysis, research approach, data collection, data analysis and ethical issues were also discussed. The chapter has provided a structure of the study and how data was collected.

The following Chapter four presents data gathered from interviews and documents. Interviews were conducted with different stakeholders who participated in the decision making process.

CHAPTER 4

Data Presentation

4.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed presentation of research results relating to the *South African government's decision-making on international climate change obligations*. The study's research objectives focused on an understanding of foreign policy decision making; government's foreign policy key actors regarding climate change; and determination of the president's advisors on climate change issues. Thus the research is orchestrated on the political and socio-economic driver in SA which dates back to 2009. Findings indicated that consultations driven by government departments with different stakeholder on climate change are highly inclusive, however critical decision making processes is an internal process that involves cabinet and the president. As a result respondents such as NGO'S, business, civil society and academics believed the process is overly fenced.

In this study data were presented as follows: the first part presents data gathered from semi-structured interviews and open-ended interviews; the second part presents data collected from documents. Allison and Zelikow's (1999) triple models namely Rational Actor model I, Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics Model III are presented. Thematic analysis was used to extract themes from the data. Thematic analysis is defined by Wagner et al. as a general approach used to analyse qualitative data that involves identifying themes and patterns in the data (2013: 231). Thematic analysis allowed the researcher access to understand foreign policy decision making processes from a participant's perspective. Fifteen people were interviewed from the following categories: Government officials, academics, analysts, civil society and business. Initially 15 respondents were selected but only 10 could be reached for interviews. All the participants had been involved in the case study under investigation and had provided prominent information. The case study is based on the South African decision to commit to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. Subsequently, themes were also extracted from three documents obtained from the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) using content analysis.

Therefore this chapter is organised in this manner: First, interviewees are coded and divided into the following categories; Government officials- category 1, Civil society- category 2, Academics- category 3 and Analysts- category 4. Interviewees were coded in order to address

ethical issues such as confidentiality. Second, data is presented according to the questions based on the three models in the following manner; firstly findings responding to the Rational Actor model I are presented according to four questions; secondly, findings responding to second model Organisational Behavior model II are presented according to four questions; and lastly findings are also presented based on Governmental Politics model III using the five questions. Third, findings of data mined from documents are presented as follows; first data from governments is presented and discussed; and secondary data from a journal article is also presented and discussed. Below **Table 1** illustrates categories and codes of participants.

Presentation of research findings Part 1: Interviews

Table 1 Matrix of respondents and the three models

Respondents	Codes	Model I	Model II	Model III
Government officials	INT1M-1 INT1M-2 INT1M-3 INT1M-4	X	X	
Civil society	INT2M-1 INT2M-2	X		
Academics	INT3M-1 INT3M-2	X		X
Analysts	INT4M-1 INT4F-2	X		X

Table 1 tabulates the respondents who participated in the semi-structured interviews. As indicated in the table, there were four different categories of respondents who were interviewed and the codes were created based on the categories. For instance the code for government official is INT1M-1 which means INT- interview, 1- of the first category on the table, M- male respondent and 1- respondent number 1, as well as for Analysts INT4F-2 which is translated in this manner; INT- interview, 4- of the forth category, F- female respondent, 2- respondent number 2 in the category. Data from interviews is presented according to the interview questions, this was intentionally done to provide a clear picture of how data was gathered. Data mined from documents is presented thereafter. Three documents were analysed, interpreted and presented.

4.1 Rational Actor Model I

Questions drawn for this model were answered by all categories as indicated in **Table 1**. These questions relate to the national goals and national interests governments pursue in their

foreign policy decision making processes (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The focus in this model is on SA's goals and objectives on international climate change obligations. The intention was to determine national goals and objectives SA was pursuing when the Copenhagen decision was made. Data is presented in the following manner: data is presented according to four sub-headings which are; government decision to tackle climate change, SA trying to solve an international problem, other options available and best choice under the conditions. Responses from government officials, civil society, academics and analysts are discussed. Direct quotations from respondents are presented as data for each question.

4.1.1 Findings on government's decision to tackle climate change

The focus on this question was to determine why the SA government made the Copenhagen decision. Respondents from all four categories provided different explanations for the Copenhagen decision.

4.1.1.1 Responses of government officials on government's decision to tackle climate change

Government officials suggest that the South African government's decision was motivated by different reasons. According to the respondents in this category South Africa was trying to make a contribution on addressing climate change. An explanation given by one respondent was that SA was acting in good faith considering the threats the country and other countries in the continent are faced with. Moreover SA considered the negative impact of climate change would have on the island countries which are more vulnerable due to sea level increase. As a member of the global community SA wanted to make its fair contribution. Secondly, respondents also indicated that SA was also strengthening its partnership with different groups such as the Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) group, the G77 and China. Even though SA worked more with the BASIC group than the Africa group in 2009; their focus was on encouraging more South –South cooperation. Thirdly, SA was sending a positive signal to other parties particularly developed countries saying “look we are a developing country but we are willing to play our part”. So it was a way to demonstrate that SA took mitigation serious and to also encourage others to do so. Lastly, it was indicated that SA wanted to play a national role to ensure its citizens understand the threat posed by climate change. So it was also about reaffirming to South Africans that they are protected.

All the respondents in this category indicated that SA had a reputation of a bridge builder, and so it was important to take the lead and voluntary commit to reducing carbon emissions with the hope that others would follow.

Table 2 Responses of government officials on government's decision to tackle climate change

Participants	Why did South Africa make the decision to tackle climate change?
INT1M-1	Politically it was a very interesting stand as most countries would keep this at their back pocket and leverage this until they are able to reduce carbon but SA went up front as a developing nation it was powerful and well received as well. With that done the climate change policy was easy.
INT1M-2	We have our personality in the UNFCCC and it's very complex and it's really several levels to it that... you know we are a developing country, we are member of Africa group G77, member of BASIC but we are also... and we have a national role. We have a kind of a personality of being a bridge builder problem solver and being progressive because we want to be part of the multilateral system. So at that time we were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. We would have wanted to send a positive signal to say we are prepared to take mitigation seriously, because if you look at Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time.
INT1M-3	If you look at SA's foreign policy of Ubuntu and all of that, they make an analysis of the international system broadly such as socio-political and otherwise and in there they capture climate change as one of those factors that face us not just as SA but as a globe and which has a very negative impact significantly felt especially amongst developing countries. The FP indicate to us we need to take the lead and making certain that we preserve the environment such that we bequeath it to future generations in better condition so we are focusing on the immediate challenges but we also focusing on the long term kind of horizon. This is a sustainable development issue in order that sustainable development is prevailed and can be sustained this is one of the key factors that requires to be addressed. It has economic implications bearings, it has political and various other social aspects. We were contributing, and we still do contribute.
INT1M-4	Well legally speaking we were not in a commitment and all sort of things but it wasn't mandatory it was a voluntary commitment to take action in 2009 and that has now changed but at that time in 2009 and SA was trying to make a contribution addressing the problem with climate change both in terms of mitigation in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Table 2 above present responses from government officials indicating that government's decision to tackle climate change was based on their act of good faith to motivate others to respond climate change mitigation, to play a national role, to foster South-South cooperation, to strengthen partnerships with BASIC, Africa group and to establish new partnerships with

BRICS. Further, responses indicate that South Africa takes climate change mitigation seriously and are willing to play their part as a global citizen. This view is supported by INT1M-2 in their response:

We have a kind of a personality of being a bridge builder problem solver and being progressive because we and to be part of the multilateral system. So at that time we were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. We would have wanted to send a positive signal to say we are prepared to take mitigation seriously, because if you look at Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time.

Both respondents emphasised that SA's decision was motivated by political desires to pursue multilateral system participation and also to motivate others to pledge. This was indicated by INT1M-2 respondent:

Politically it was a very interesting stand as most countries would keep this at their back pocket and leverage this until they are able to reduce carbon but SA went up front as a developing nation it was powerful and well received as well. With that done the climate change policy was easy.

INT1M-3 presented a slightly different view on why SA made the decision to tackle climate change. According to this respondent SA was fulfilling the SA Foreign policy when they made the decision to tackle climate change. One of the SA objectives specifies that SA has lead in preservation of the environment in order to save it for future generations. SA was also pursuing sustainable development. This view is narrated by INT1M-3 below:

The FP indicate to us we need to take the lead and making certain that we preserve the environment such that we bequeath it to future generations in better condition so we are focusing on the immediate challenges but we also focusing on the long term kind of horizon. This is a sustainable development issue in order that sustainable development is prevailed and can be sustained this is one of the key factors that requires to be addressed. It has economic implications bearings, it has political and various other social aspects.

4.1.1.2 Responses of civil society on government's decision to tackle climate change

Responses from civil society indicated a more diverse interpretation of the government decision to tackle climate change, than that of government officials. Civil society in this context represents a group of people who lobbies and advocates for climate justice, who also put pressure on government to commit to reduce emissions and ensure that SA's natural heritage and people are protected from the threats of climate change. Response from this group indicated mixed views about government's decision to tackle climate change for instance a member of the INT2M-1 highlighted that:

In terms of the decision making context South Africa was being constructive and trying to help solve the problem and that's why it was very important that we put the commitment as a condition so we were always saying this is what we will do if we get the finance and technology support.

The member of INT1M-2 had this to say:

All they were doing is emissions reduction from some future pathway, which was unlikely to ever happen. So it wasn't an emission reduction offer, it was nothing but spin. So the fundamental that's our critique of the process. But run the math yourself and you will see. The irony is that we are now ahead, that offer when it came out, it basically took them by surprise but President Zuma just made it. I think the rest of the government including the negotiating team was scrambled at the time.

Table 3 below provide narratives of civil society discussing their views on SA government's decision to tackle climate change:

Table 3 responses of civil societies on government's decision to tackle climate change

Respondents	Why did South Africa make the decision to tackle climate change?
INT2M-1	South Africa by stepping out early was creating momentum and comfortability for others because South Africa is a developing country this move created a comfortability for others to do the same. In terms of the decision making context South Africa was being constructive and trying to help solve the problem and that's why it was very important that we put the commitment as a condition so we were always saying this is what we will do if we get the finance and technology support.
INT2M-2	All they were doing is emissions reduction from some future pathway, which was unlikely to ever happen. So it wasn't an emission reduction offer, it was nothing but spin. So the fundamental that's our critique of the process. But run the math yourself and you will see. The irony is that we are now ahead, that offer when it came out, it basically took them by surprise but President Zuma just made it. I think the rest of the government including the negotiating team was scrambled at the time. That led to the process led by Peter Lukey of the DEA to try and make that presidential offer and somehow manage it into the LTMS to the targets that's where peak plateau and decline scenario came from. So the process of trying to take what the president was saying and sort of like run it towards the official bureaucratic process and a bit of reality and tries to make it work. That Copenhagen offer wasn't supplemented by peak plateau decline which is kind of enshrined by the white paper and that has provided for SA's INDC's this year.
INT2M-3	The decision not to tackle climate change properly can be seen as a rational response to power in society, and the class bias of South Africa's ruling party. The basic problem is what can be termed the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC): a very powerful network of

	corporate and state interests whose accumulation of profits and power rely upon not addressing climate change.
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The table above illustrates responses from civil society which indicates diversity in their reaction to the government decision to tackle climate change. WWF welcomed the SA decision viewing it as an important step to solve the climate change problem. The respondent shared a similar view with both INT1M-2 and INT1M-1 that SA action was to motivate others to do commit to reducing carbon emission. INT1M-2 further added that:

South Africa by stepping out early was creating momentum and comfortability for others because South Africa is a developing country this move created a comfortability for others to do the same.

Contrary to this response, INT2M-2 provided a detailed background to explain why SA made the decision to tackle climate change. INT2M-2 indicated the following; the percentages (34% and 42%) were taken from an unrealistic scenario called Business As Usual (BAU) contained in the LTMS which was a policy created for economic expansion, the worst case scenario was not properly calculated but someone made it up in the heads, it wasn't emission reduction but a spin, and lastly the peak plateau and decline projections were never planned for. These views are supported by the respondent's comments below:

I think you need to do the math on the decision because prior to the decision in 2009 there was a policy process called a Long Term Mitigation Scenario, the offer that was given at Copenhagen was a reduction from the Business As Usual scenario pathway in the LTMS. Now if you look at what that BAU entail it was something like 3 to 4 new coal plants a whole bunch of new coal power stations, it was massive expansion of the economy... things that were totally unrealistic at the time.

In summary, responses from civil society presented above indicate different views about government's decision, some civil societies welcome government's action while others criticised it.

4.1.1.3 Responses of academic on SA government's decision to tackle climate change

Academics provided a brief view on why SA made the decision to tackle climate change. Their views put more emphasis on climate change and SA economy. The views indicate that SA emits more emissions than other countries because of the economy which is highly coal intensive. **Table 4** below present views provided by academics.

Table 4 responses of academics on SA government's decision to tackle climate change

Respondent	Why did the South African government make the decision to tackle climate change?
INT3M-1	The South African economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels and coal in particular; much more so than benchmark and competitor economies and countries. As a result the South African GHG emissions are disproportionately high when expressed per unit of economy like GDP, or per unit of energy consumed, or per capita. The risk is the South African economy is not internationally competitive in a carbon constrained world.

The view from the academic is that SA was taking the responsibility by making a contribution to reduce carbon emissions. Further, SA is one of the biggest carbon emitters in the world being a carbon intensive economy and therefore it was important to display willingness to participate in tackling climate change. INT4M-2 also indicated that carbon reduction and elimination puts SA at risk since the economy is highly dependent on coal.

4.1.1.4 Responses of analysts on SA government's decision to tackle climate change

The analysts that were interviewed are foreign policy analysts who have been watching and following climate change negotiations since 2009. Findings from analysts indicated a number of possible reasons that could have motivated the government's decision to tackle climate change which highlights the following: SA was setting a tone for developed countries SA, needed to raise its profile and to establish its case as host country for the Durban COP17 which was to take place in 2011, the BRICS was in its developmental stage and SA was to join it the following year, SA was strengthening its relationship with BASIC and pressure to commit to reduce carbon emissions. Responses from analysts were not contradictory, but their perspectives seemed to be suggesting that SA's decision was rather strategic. **Table 5** below provides an illustration of responses by analysis of SA's decision to tackle climate change.

Table 5 responses of analysts on SA government decision to tackle climate change

Respondent	Why did the South African government make the decision to tackle climate change?
INT4M-1	You look at other people perspective, for example there was a view that said politically it was decided that SA needed to indicate a higher ambition in order to saddle with pace for Denmark. As the host and chair UNFCCC needed SA to raise its profile and establish

	<p>its case as a country in climate change mitigation at Copenhagen. Copenhagen's biggest challenge was low ambitions, they were very few ambitions from key players many were just talking about accepting the idea of carbon, reducing carbon emissions. Just bought the idea of technology transfer, just bought the idea of financing mechanism. They had low ambitions, they were merely accepting the idea not making the actual commitment. But we noticed that around the same time BRICS had started to assert itself globally as an important voice and it takes up development issues around that time as well, from political issues to development issues as well. Statement the nation feels something valuable, I guess that is part of the calculations.</p>
INT4F-2	<p>At COP15 this is what came to the fore: you had the Africa group walking out at talks. You had a lot of pressure on the Kyoto and what it would mean and SA was pursuing... put it in the context of their own foreign policy. We were pursuing gender, we were pursuing South-South cooperation put it in that context what was South Africa pursuing in partnerships? So it 2009 this was just ahead of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. COP15 was 2009 SA only joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally started the first meeting in 2011.....But there is ...there was a formation of BASIC and emerging powers looking at South-South cooperation and promoting the Africa agenda. But it's kind of gone outside this African focusing by isolating itself from the African group by going along with the BASIC countries.</p>

As indicated in **Table 5** both INT4M-1 and INT4F-2 emphasise SA's decision to tackle climate change was motivated by political desires to foster and strengthen partnerships, to motivate others to act on climate change and also to prepare for the COP which was to take place in Durban in 2011. This was emphasised by INT4M-1:

But we noticed that around the same time BRICS had started to assert itself globally as an important voice and it takes up development issues around that time as well, from political issues to development issues as well.....So I think there was a bit of an edge to show higher ambitions in the hope that would stimulate similar behaviour by other key actors especially emerging powers so that you could have a good deal coming out between Copenhagen and Durban.

This view was reiterated by INT4F-2:

So it 2009 this was just ahead of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. COP15 was 2009 SA only joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally started the first meeting in 2011.....But there is ...there was a formation of BASIC and emerging powers looking at South-South cooperation and promoting the Africa agenda.

Further to this INT3M-2 hinted that the decision was also public relations oriented highlighting that “There was Public Relations sense about it making this bold statement the nation feels something valuable, I guess that is part of the calculations”.

4.1.2 Findings on South Africa’s decision as part of solving an international problem

The finding on SA’s decision as part of solving the problem indicated different views from all the categories (*refer to Table 1*). For instance Government category respondents indicated that SA government was solving a problem, academics also shared the same view whereas civil society were divided in their views.

4.1.2.1 Responses of government officials on South Africa’s decision as part of solving an international problem.

Findings in this category indicate that SA was trying to solve the climate change problem by deciding to commit to reduce carbon emissions. Respondents in this group were directly involved in the preparation for Copenhagen and decision making processes and so they were very clear on what government’s intention were when this decision was made. They emphasised that SA’s intention was to be part of the solution. Findings in this category can be summed up as follows, SA was addressing the climate change problem, demonstration of good faith, climate change is a serious threat for SA, SA government has an obligation to protect the vulnerable poor people in rural areas from the threats of climate change, SA has to make a fair share contribution as per UNFCCC and lastly SA wanted other parties to commit too so they could all make a significant contribution to carbon reductions. All these views are presented in **Table 6** below.

Table 6 responses of government officials on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Respondent	What international problem was South Africa trying to solve?
INT1M-1	The reality is that even if we became climate angels overnight say for instance we stop using fossil fuel tomorrow but the rest of the world didn’t we will still suffer it so it is a negotiation for the world we have to rely on other people to do the right thing. So in order for other people to do the right thing we need to do the right thing. Our commitment (in Copenhagen) was a show of good faith and that’s what it is it’s a show of good faith. We were saying we will do this because it’s a good thing you must also do the same. So SA in terms of the international environmental justice has to make a fair share contribution, that’s why the two objectives of the policy are really important: South Africa will make a fair contribution same with the world: we will do this we want you to do the same.

INT1M-2	Climate change is one of the greatest threats facing the planet and can only be addressed collectively by the international community. Recent years show increasing temperatures in various regions, and increasing extremities in weather patterns which are irreversibly changing our world.
INT1M-3	So this is a climate change issue with economic implications, for instance look at the drought that is currently felt around the country various provinces the output that is compromised. You look at the region Sub-Saharan Africa also drought issues, water shortages and climate change issues, how economies are impacted. Because this is rooted on emissions that accumulate over a period of time and as a result the climate system is distorted and has these effects and we have to adapt to these conditions. And we look as well into such factors as the fossil fuel that you have access to and largely in our case its coal, we are a coal based economy, we are ambitious enough that we would shift towards renewables, we were ambitious enough to indicate even in Copenhagen that we would reduce our emissions by 34% BAU by 2020 and 42% BAU 2025 that they would plateau in 2025 before they decline. Even the current economic performance is not well you have seen reports even from such entities as World Bank and IMF indicating the reduction in growth.
INT1M-4	Well legally speaking we were not in a commitment and all sort of things but it wasn't mandatory it was a voluntary commitment to take action in 2009 and that has now changed but at that time in 2009 and SA was trying to make a contribution addressing the problem with climate change both in terms of mitigation in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In the table above respondent INT1M-1 indicates that SA was trying to solve the problem of climate change by committing to reduce carbon emission. INT1M-1 still emphasised that SA government's commitment was a demonstration of good faith. This particular respondent led the LTMS team in 2008 and 2009 that created the BAU scenarios which were later converted into the 34% and 42% figures included in the commitment pledge by SA. INT1M-1 was also part of the government negotiating team. Concerning this, INT1M-1 provided this information:

Our commitment (in Copenhagen) was a show of good faith and that's what it is it's a show of good faith. We were saying we will do this because it's a good thing you must also do the same. And you know this is true, unlike the countries like Saudi Arabia with massive oil wealth who kind of believe that because if their wealth... if people suddenly stop buying oil because of climate change or if it becomes too hot they will

have enough money to build up defenses against climate change so they will build houses with air conditioning because they have enough money to defend themselves.

Further to this, INT1M-3 also highlighted that SA was contributing to solving the climate change problem:

Superficially it's the climate change problem to which we contribute to its solution, we can only contribute, no one party can solve it which is why we put an emphasis on the idea of multilateralism. We are one of those contributors and we want to shape the world. Like I indicated if you look at various reports like IPCC it will point at some of the disproportionate impact that significantly compromise economies of many developing countries which I said has economic implications.

The popular view from this category is that SA was taking action against climate change and contributing to addressing the problem because it was the 'right thing to do' not only for SA citizens but also for other vulnerable countries.

4.1.2.2 Responses of civil society on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Civil society indicated different views on the question of whether SA was trying to solve an international problem when the decision to reduce carbon emissions was made. For instance respondent INT2M-2 indicated that SA was not trying to address climate change but instead it is failing to take responsibility for their contribution to climate change. This is supported by the text below by respondent INT2M-2:

Here is a developing country, especially a BRICS category country, you have a certain amount of carbon, and SA is higher. So in fact SA has been taking carbon space from other developing countries like Malawi. So SA is actually really part of the problem and viewing more from the European and American side of the problem rather than being a victim or a solution to the problem. So it is a big equity debate which gets lost in the rapture of poverty.

Table 7 below provides a detailed discussion on civil society responses.

Table 7 responses of civil society on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Respondent	What international problem was South Africa trying to solve?
INT2M-1	I don't know if there was any pressure but it is possible that there might have been pressure coming from developed countries especially when they insisted for equality or pressure from less developed countries who wanted to do something because they are more in danger. But don't think the announcement was because of international pressure but it was to put SA out there it a little bit of prestige and also try and get things moving, leading by example.

INT2M-2	No, no one is trying to address climate change. The COP process was now been held 21 times, you know not quite but roughly 21 years. The idea is that we would provide a global solution in line with very much of CFC's convention. That would then provide a pathway for the globe to peak reduce and decline, its carbon emissions in line with keeping warming under 2 degrees. So now at 21 attempts to this and they are nowhere close to getting any kind of agreement that is even remotely close to a 2 degrees pathway. Here is a developing country, especially a BRICS category country, you have a certain amount of carbon, SA is higher. So in fact SA has been taking carbon space from other developing countries like Malawi. So SA is actually really part of the problem and viewing more from the European and American side of the problem rather than being a victim or a solution to the problem. So it is a big equity debate which gets lost in the rapture of poverty.
INT2M-3	The simple problem for the South African MEC is how to assure that an alliance of high-polluting BRICS countries with the United States ("the Copenhagen Accord") can be greenwashed so as to make it appear that the government is joining the responsible members of the international community to solve a deadly problem: climate change. So the 'problem' that Pretoria was trying to 'solve' was simple: how to 'talk left' (against climate change) but 'pollute right' (causing more).

As indicated in **Table 7**, respondent INT2M-1 indicates that SA's decision didn't come out as a results of international pressure but instead SA displayed strong leadership when they made the announcement.

4.1.2.3 Responses of academic on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Response offered by respondent INT4M-1 indicates that this decision was as a result of political pressure for countries to set targets for carbon emission reductions, moreover he reiterated what INT5M-2 indicated that SA was positioning itself for the COP17 in Durban (see *Table 3*). Respondent INT4M-1 was also quick to highlight that SA is one of the biggest carbon emitters and they wanted to be part of the solution. **Table 8** below provides direct quotations from academics respondents.

Table 8 findings of academic in South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Respondent	What international problem was South Africa trying to solve?
INT3M-1	Of the 200-odd countries that signed the UNFCCC, South Africa features in the top dozen to emissions expressed in any of these emission intensity units mentioned in 1.1. In addition, South Africa (President Zuma) attended COP15 in Copenhagen where there was significant political pressure to announce a country target, plus two years later Durban was hosting the COP17 in Durban and launched the National White Paper on Climate Change Response a month before the event.

4.1.2.4 Responses of analysts on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Findings of analysts on SA trying to solve an international problem indicate expanded reasons which explain whether SA was trying to solve an international problem when they made the decision to reduce carbon emissions or not. For instance respondents indicated that SA had intended to speed up the negotiation process and get all the countries to commit; that their decision was a build-up for Durban; SA was playing a geopolitical international game; and again to encourage others to do the same.

Table 9 Response of analysts on South Africa trying to solve an international problem

Respondent	What international problem was South Africa trying to solve?
INT4M-1	Low ambition and to avoid the prospect of failure. Climate change negotiations have been warbling from point to point like the negotiations they have been very slow and non-outcomes outcomes. Outcomes that are just declarations but they are not binding, they are legal they are not implemented. That would have been part of it. Second politically for me, politically they had aspired a more ambitious response from others so that we have strong decisions taken by critical countries in the run-up to Durban. They were thinking about the next COP, and if you are host you are worried what would happen when I host. It must be also there were domestic issues in terms of alleviating SA standing in the eyes of the South Africans on this matter about which we are so much into.
INT4F-2	What problem were they trying to solve? By doing what? By negotiating? By making the decision? I'm not sure if they were trying to solve a problem I think they were playing the...like I said they were playing two level game and they were focusing them on the international level. Eeh... it could be because we don't know behind closed doors how these decisions are made. But like I said it could be on the one side trying to demonstrate SA commitment to being part of the multilateral negotiations to

	say “look developing countries are taking an active role in reducing emissions therefore we also require developed countries to take more of a role, look what we are doing, look at what India is doing and look at what China is doing they are committing to these reductions
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Table 9 above tabulate responses of analysts indicating different views on whether SA was trying to solve an international problem. According to INT4M-1 SA government was trying to solve an international problem when they came forward with the targets for emission reductions by speeding up the process of climate change negotiations and also building up for Durban COP to ensure there would be a tangible outcome. In this view INT4M-1 remarked:

Low ambition and also to avoid the prospect of failure. Climate change negotiations have been warbling from point to point like the negotiations they have been very slow and non-outcomes outcomes. Outcomes that are just declarations but they are not binding, they are legal they are not implemented. That would have been part of it. Second politically for me, politically they had aspire a more ambitious response from others so that we have strong decisions taken by critical countries in the run-up to Durban.

Further to this INT4F-2 indicated that this decision was not well received domestically because of the negative implications it was feared to impose on the South African economic and its impact on SA citizens. INT4F-2 shaped their views in this manner:

But at the domestic role level it was... it had implications and people were not pleased to hear that there was going to be serious emission cuts and how that was going to play out and you'll see the discussions on carbon tax. And carbon tax ... I mean they were talking about it then already.

4.1.3 Findings on other options available for South Africa to address this issue

Findings on this question indicate diversified views from all categories of respondents. Government respondents indicate that SA government didn't have any other options available to address the climate change issue. Contrastingly, civil society, academics and analysts indicated that there few other options which could have been explored. Possible options highlighted by respondents included energy efficiency, transport emissions reduction, adaptation commitment and renewable energy. Government respondents emphasised that this was the only option based on what SA government was aiming to achieve which was to pursue a multilateral solution.

4.1.3.1 Responses of government officials on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Some government respondents have emphasised that SA government didn't have any other option available at the time than to commit to reduce carbon emission by 34% and 42%, while other respondents have indicated that government had many other options available. Government had initial weighed and calculated other options such as energy efficiency and nuclear energy through the LTMS process and finally decided on carbon emissions reduction. This view is supported by respondent INT1M-3:

Well of course there are always other options they could have had other numbers but eventually there had been a process on the mitigation side which is mainly where I worked having LTMS for SA the LTMS process which ... and out of that many other specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that matter or transport options many technical options were examined and then that was done a couple of years before Copenhagen met.

Respondent INT1M-3 indicates that government had other options to choose rather than the commitment. Further to this, the final decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions was informed by a rigorous process which involved building of future scenarios. **Table 10** below contains findings of government officials.

Table 10 Responses of government officials on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Respondent	What other options did it have to address this issue?
INT1M-1	No I don't think so because South Africa is a large emitter per capita, it depends on how you look at it someone says we are number 14 in terms of carbon emission so we are way up we are with the forces of darkness and evil when it comes to climate change. so if we didn't make the commitment we would become a paraya, that's the last thing you want I mean if for instance you have a situation in terms of your global standing and suddenly the people in Vanuatu Island are beggars in the state and they say SA you caused to be this way I mean we can put up with that sort of situation its good enabling us in one hand but it's about thing of global ethics as well we have to play our role
INT1M-2	South Africa is committed to tackling climate change and has already been implementing various national policies and regional/sub-regional approaches to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change. However one country cannot tackle this challenge alone, as all nations have to take on their fair share of the global effort. South Africa therefore had no option but to pursue a multilateral solution under the UNFCCC.
INT1M-3	We could only pledge, remember part of these negotiations are as

	<p>a results of not only climate change. I indicated earlier economic dynamics but also significantly political imperatives they come into play. I will not talk much into that, maybe somebody at DIRCO responded in more political undertones than I can. But the other option we would have had, but at the time I would want to think it had not reached a certain level of maturity. We had an option to say we want to put forward assistance on the adaptation side because looking at the nature of that pledge its more mitigation centric it's about reducing GHG emissions by certain percentages that are stated and the pledge does not address the side of adaptation. In comparison with the policy that we later adopted in 2011 you will see that it does have two legs; mitigation component and adaptation component.</p>
INT1M-4	<p>Well of course there are always other options they could have had other numbers but eventually there had been a process on the mitigation side which is mainly where I worked having LTMS for SA the LTMS process which ehm... and out of that many other specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that matter or transport options many technical options were examined and then that was done a couple of years before Copenhagen meted. Some of those options that were looked at technically were put together by the presidency you know. But those particular numbers of 34% BAU and 42% by 2025 came, of course the presidency could have chosen other technical options but they chose what they chose it was a political decision.</p>

In the table above INT1M-1 and INT1M-2 indicate that SA government didn't have other options either than committing to reduce carbon emissions. This view is expressed by INT1M-1 below.

No I don't think so because South Africa is a large emitter per capita, it depends on how you look at it someone says we are number 14 in terms of carbon emission so we are way up we are with the forces of darkness and evil when it comes to climate change.

This was validated by INT1M-2:

South Africa is committed to tackling climate change and has already been implementing various national policies and regional/sub-regional approaches to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change. However one country cannot tackle this challenge alone, as all nations have to take on their fair share of the global effort. South Africa therefore had no option but to pursue a multilateral solution under the UNFCCC.

And INT1M-4:

We could only pledge, remember part of these negotiations are as a results of not only climate change. I indicated earlier economic dynamics but also significantly political imperatives they come into play.

INT1M-4 was also quick to highlight that another possible option would have been adaption

According to the two respondents SA didn't have any other choice than the one it settled with. There is also an indication that SA was making its contribution by choosing the option to reduce carbon emissions.

4.1.3.2 Responses of civil society on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

This section presents responses of civil society on other options available for SA. Findings in this group indicate that like many other countries that had different options to choose from, SA government also had different options available. However SA government opted for an economy wide option which was based on the Business As Usual scenario created from the LTMS process. Further, civil societies have indicated that SA government contrasted itself when it announced to reduce carbon emissions but later decided to build two coal electricity generating plants (Medupi and Kusile) to support power provision in SA. This view is narrated by INT2M-2 below:

The then Minister of Environment Minister van Schalkwyk went to the Bali COP and gave an rousing speech about how we must do staff and he was widely lauded as being a great example of being a good example of climate justice and he said all the right things and he gave a very strong speech at the COP, you know quite a lot of garbage. He comes back to SA and incredible shocking afterwards gives environmental authorisation for the Medupi and Kusile power station. So on one hand government wants to do something about it and believe in climate change, on the other hand they still pursue high carbon climate change.

The excerpt above indicates that in 2007 before SA the commitment in 2009, SA was already demonstrating an attitude of willingness and energy to tackle climate change. However their behavior at international climate change meetings was contradicting goals of the country back home and therefore for INT2M-2 what SA government was implementing was not aligned with what they demonstrated at COPs meetings. **Table 11** below tabulate responses from civil society groups.

Table 11 Responses of civil society on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Respondent	What other options did it have to address this issue?
INT2M-1	Basically SA had other options. So some countries didn't even talk... so we call it BAU like we have an economy wide target

	because it's what you will do across economies. So some countries made pledges like in the transport sector they would reduce emissions by this much or they would roll out a certain amount of renewable energy etc. so there was a lot of different options that SA could put forward, in the end they elected to go for an economy wide target for . China had efficiency targets, so they basically said they would increase their efficiency by this much.
INT2M-2	People know these things but they act contrary towards these things. And if you look at what we are doing at the moment; we have a renewable energy programme, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) that has got good results prices have been falling. If that programme is not dramatically expanded, there is a lot of carbon. Instead we now have a base of coal hiring people around. People have been chosen on it, we will hear in the next month who they were and then will have another round to further develop the coal infrastructure, we want to do natural gas which is one of the things we should be doing that are not theoretical. Policies are there, processes are there, infrastructure is there but we are not doing them because we prefer automatic development. They are implementing the staff they want to do.
INT2M3	It could have immediately cut back on all the activities above, and shifted all available state subsidies towards renewable energy (solar, wind, tidal), public transport, compact urbanisation, cleaner production, lower conspicuous consumption, 'zero-waste' disposal strategies, and genuinely green finance, with Public-Public, Public-People and Public-Proletarian partnerships.

4.1.3.3 Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Responses of academics indicate a different range of other options that respondent INT3M-1 believes SA government should have pursued instead of the commitment that was made. INT3M-1 highlighted that SA government could have considered options such as implementation national and internal decarbonisation strategies. Further to this, INT3M-1 also advises that SA government could have avoided hosting a COP meeting in Durban because this put the country on the spotlight. The lack of implementation of policies and programmes by SA government also came out from the academics responses. This was highlighted by INT3M-1 in this response:

The country is already renowned for not implementing policies in other spheres of international commitments. The 2020 and 2025 targets promised in Copenhagen will not be met, which was known to be an unattainable target at the time with Medupi

already being built, economy growing and population expanding and no technological solutions available at the time and very unlikely to be fully implemented within a decade later.

INT2M-2 had earlier shared the same sentiments about SA government's challenge in implementation of policies and programmes, this is illustrated below:

Policies are there, processes are there, infrastructure is there but we are not doing them because we prefer automatic development.

Based on these comments academics believe that implementation of climate change policies and programmes are still a challenge for SA government. This challenge inhibits SA government to make significant progress in tackling climate change.

Table 12 Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Respondent	What other options did it have to address this issue?
INT3M-1	South Africa could have ducked the issue by sending lower level attendees to the UNFCCC COP meetings (like Australia and Canada have done before by sending a Minister or even lower representative, instead of the head of state) which will not easily result in commitments. South Africa could have decided not to host a COP, as Australia, Canada and the US have done in the last decade. South Africa could have focused on national and internal implementation of decarbonisation strategies and implementation of the National CCRWP, instead of hanging big promises on the international clock of COP negotiations in Warsaw. The country is already renowned for not implementing policies in other spheres of international commitments. The 2020 and 2025 targets promised in Copenhagen will not be met, which was known to be an unattainable target at the time with Medupi already being built, economy growing and population expanding and no technological solutions available at the time and very unlikely to be fully implemented within a decade later.

4.1.3.4 Responses of analysts on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address the climate change issue either than committing to reducing carbon emission by 34% and 42% indicates that there were other available options which could have been explored by SA government at the time such as committing to adaptation, committing to technology and capacity. What also came out is that the percentages which were used as targets had been calculated and so it was

easy for SA government to use what was already there than starting a process of calculating. In short, they chose the easy way out.

Table 13 Responses of analysts on other options available for South Africa to address this issue.

Respondent	What other options did it have to address this issue?
INT4M-1	It was an ambitious decision, they had an option of being like everybody else of just having a policy commitment. Like commit to adaptation, commit to technology, commit to capacity.
INT4F-2	Look the commitments had already been made, remember the stats were already there. Zuma Just announced what was in the LTMS which was from a team that had researched it for 5 to 6 years in advance. So that's merely where the fact of figures came from... was from that discussion and scientific evidence which has been subsequently disputed, most people actually didn't agree with the LTMS especially if you go speak to guys at WWF things like that they... you can even talk to them about those decisions but this is a LTMS. So he was just relaying something that was an output policy well it wasn't a policy document it was a scenario document. And I think that was based on that particular time and context where those figures came from.

In **Table 14** data indicate that analysts were divided in their views. INT4M-1 seem to indicate that SA government had other options to pursue such as:

It was an ambitious decision, they had an option of being like everybody else of just having a policy commitment. Like commit to adaptation, commit to technology, commit to capacity.

This view was earlier underlined by INT2M-1(see **Table 12**) suggesting examples of other option that SA could have explored as indicate below:

So some countries made pledges like in the transport sector they would reduce emissions by this much or they would roll out a certain amount of renewable energy etc. So there were a lot of different options that SA could put forward

4.1.4 Findings on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Findings in this category indicated different views and different interpretation of SA government's decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions. There is an indication that it was the best choice for what it was intended to achieve which was pursuing to be part of the multilateral system. Others indicated that if the decision's intention was to stimulate commitment from other parties then it was a good choice. Further to this, information

provided by respondents also indicated that it was a conditional decision which clearly stated that SA is willing to commit provided there is technology, funding and capacity support from developed countries. There was also an emphasis on what SA wanted to achieve when the decision was made, for instance it was indicated that SA government had been working on the LTMS for years which was its plan to tackle climate change but also acknowledging that tackling climate will require all parties to commit. So the intention was to encourage everyone to act by submitting substantial pledges to reduce carbon emissions.

4.1. 4.1 Responses of government officials on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Findings of government officials on South African government's best choice indicated that government's decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions was the best choice even though it shocked and displeased most South Africans it was still the best choice. Government officials responded highlighted that the process of making the targets was not a 'thumb suck' but a well calculated scientific process. This view is narrated by INT1M-1:

Well the thing is.... And the nice thing is as you can see there's a lot of research behind those numbers as well it wasn't a thumb suck, it was a little bit of a thumb suck about the percentages, percentages were calculated based on a whole bunch of science that was done before so in that essence I mean... even though there was a push back from the industry to say 'you sold this LTMS thing purely as a piece of research now you making international commitments based on this piece of research'.

INT1M-1 further revealed that the process started in 2005 when SA realised that climate change was not a fantasy but a reality.

Table 14 Responses of government on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Respondent	What was the South African government's best choice under the conditions?
INT1M-1	Well the thing is.... And the nice thing is as you can see there's a lot of research behind those numbers as well it wasn't a thumb suck, it was a little bit of a thumb suck about the percentages, percentages were calculated based on a whole bunch of science that was done before so in that essence I mean... even though there was a push back from the industry to say 'you sold this LTMS thing purely as a piece of research now you making international commitments based on this piece of research'. The reality is that it's a political decision, it's the president who makes those decisions, so.... But it's an informed decision it wasn't like waking up in the morning and saying "ah what do I feel like today?" they were properly informed. You can see it was years of

	information which started right in 2005 to, 2006, 2007 all the way up to 2008 so it was a well-informed position.
INT1M-2	Under the conditions as an African and developing country that faces socio-economic challenges and both developmental and environmental imperatives, South Africa's choice has been to help construct and further develop a multilateral approach to the climate change challenge. South Africa believes that only a multilateral rules-based system will build confidence that all Parties are taking on their fair share of the global effort, given their common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC) and the principle of equity. It is important for us as a developing country that the multilateral process on climate change be respected and that decisions and agreements adopted by the UNFCCC, such as the Paris Agreement, should serve our twin objectives/choice of ensuring environmental integrity, whilst protecting the development space of developing countries. To be successful, the new legal agreement must be fair.
INTM-3	Ja it's what we pronounce the country under the circumstances. It's the best choice it was rationalised by those who were there before me. So it was the next best option at the time, it was cautionary captured to have the safe guards that I have alluded to. So we were not exposing our economies our developments you know, without putting in place checks and balances against this. So it was not recklessly done it was wisely, you know, captured and done. The pledge itself in terms of technical mechanism its informed by what is referred to as the LTMS that goes back to about 2005 in terms of its research well consulted at the time based on the information, with some information gaps that existed. That's what could be arrived at for Copenhagen.
INTM-4	Those particular numbers of 34% BAU and 42% by 2025 came, of course the presidency could have chosen other technical options but they chose what they chose it was a political decision.

In **Table 14** above INT1M-2 also indicated that it was important for SA as a developing country to build a multilateral approach to the climate change issue and so SA believes that all parties should participate in their fair share of the global effort.

4.1.4.2 Responses of civil society on South African government's best choice under the conditions.

Civil society provided different views on SA government's best choice under the conditions. First they seem to indicate that SA was not under pressure to make the announcement but they decided to do it for a particular reason. But the views also indicate that it was not the

best choice based on the contradictory that SA seems to say one thing while they do something of the opposite.

Table 15 Responses of civil society on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Respondent	What was the South African government's best choice under the conditions?
INT2M-1	At the point in Copenhagen they didn't have to say anything. It was a choice to say something at all. And then in terms of what they said, what they put forward, they are very much at a very very broad range. If you go look at ehm... if you google Copenhagen pages you will find the documents which list all the different pledges the countries made subsequently. You can actually Google Copenhagen or Cancun and you will see there the different.
INT2M-2	Well let me give you a practical example, I mean in... the Bali COP, can't remember which COP it was. The then Minister of Environment Minister van Schalkwyk went to the Bali COP and gave an rousing speech about how we must do stuff and he was widely lauded as being a great example of being a good example of climate justice and he said all the right things and he gave a very strong speech at the COPE, you know quite a lot of garbage. He comes back to SA and incredible shocking afterwards gives environmental authorisation for the Medupi and Kusile power stations. So on one hand government wants to do something about it and believe in climate change, on the other hand they still pursue high carbon climate change. So even at the time, we are talking about prior to that, those dynamics were pretty much there. So I don't believe that government believe in climate change but they are not like denialist but they are not doing actions in a manner that is believable which is very weird because it's not just a SA carbon it's a global carbon people do that all the time.
INT2M-3	The government's choice was to continue to promote the status quo power structure – including the mining industry – so that its main clientele's policies would remain intact and so that the existing ruling party could stay in power.

As indicated in **Table 15** above INT2M-2 highlighted the contradiction in the behavior of SA at the international community and the behaviour domestically which seems to suggest that making the announcement was not the best option for SA under those conditions since their actions seem unbelievable:

So on one hand government wants to do something about it and believe in climate change, on the other hand they still pursue high carbon climate change. So even at the time, we are talking about prior to that, those dynamics were pretty much there. So I don't believe that government believe in climate change but they are not like denialist but they are not doing actions in a manner that is believable which is very weird because it's not just a SA carbon it's a global carbon people do that all the time.

INT2M-2 indicates that SA government is not denialist but their actions seem to indicate minimal seriousness when it comes to addressing climate change.

4.1.4.3 Responses of academics on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Findings from academics on SA government's best choice under the conditions indicated that it would have been a better choice if the approach was communicated and debated by different ministers and stakeholders before the announcement was made. According to INT3M-1 most South Africans mostly business, civil society and some government officials who had been actively involved in the policy development process on climate change were taken aback when the announcement was made. INT3M-1 further illuminates there hasn't been any implementation since the announcement was made in 2009. This view is articulated by INT3M-1 below

A better choice would have been better cross-ministerial buy-in to the targets and plans from the beginning-when the strategy was set in 2005 and the targets were carefully reviewed by each department before announcement in Copenhagen in 2009....since each target assigned to other departments is slipping already and target dates passed years ago.

These views are well tabulated in **Table 16** below.

Table 16 Findings of academics on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Respondent	What was the South African government's best choice under the conditions?
INT3M-1	A better choice would have been better cross-ministerial buy-in to the targets and plans from the beginning-when the strategy was set in 2005 and the targets were carefully reviewed by each department before announcement in Copenhagen in 2009. Climate is not an environmental problem only. It would have resulted in much accelerated implementation of the NCCRWP plans, since each target assigned to other departments is slipping already and target dates passed years ago.

4.1.4.4 Responses of analysts on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Analyst provided a different perspective to view SA government's decision. According to this group of respondents SA government made a good choice by committing to reduce carbon emissions based on the following reasons; climate change is a serious threat to mankind and nature and therefore SA was addressing it; climate change is a global issue and SA cannot solve it alone and therefore the decision was meant to stimulates other parties to act; it was a good choice because SA also attached conditions; and the LTMS was a good strategy which was well calculated. **Table 17** below provides responses from analysts.

Table 17 Responses of analysts on South African government's best choice under the conditions

Respondent	What was the South African government's best choice under the conditions?
INT4M-2	Personally I think it was a good choice to stimulate the ambitions. We should all be concerned that climate change issue is a real issue. So it's a real issue... you can see the draught right now, there are many consequences of climate change. It can be that countries everywhere they need more. So it was good if it was designed to stimulate greater commitment around the table, then in that way it was good. It was risky though because you are committing to commitment that might require a lot of funding but of cause people must remember that SA commitment was big, 40%, but at the end it says this is all dependents on technology transfer, finance and adaptation support. It is saying developed countries "if you produce this, produce this, we will do these" ... because you are saying I will produce this if...in a way then it's a last resort.
INT4F-2	I don't think there was an alternative discussion or strategy or anything else on the table except the LTMS that went with then to Copenhagen. Eehm... but no I wouldn't know if there was an alternative it was a use of an existing scenario which would have been presented to him I suppose.

As indicated in the table above analysts agree that the commitment was a good choice. They also indicated that it was only a good choice if the intention was to stimulate ambitions from other parties. This view is narrated by INT4M-1 below:

It was risky though because you are committing to commitment that might require a lot of funding but of cause people must remember that SA commitment was big, 40%, but at the end it says this is all dependents on technology transfer, finance and adaptation support. It is saying developed countries "if you produce this, produce

this, we will do these” ... because you are saying I will produce this if...in a way then it’s a last resort.

INT4M-1 indicates that SA’s commitment had conditions which stated that the commitment was only attainable provided there was support. INT4F-2 emphasised that SA’s decision was a good choice if it was their goal from the beginning. SA had been working on the LTMS since 2000 which was designed with the intention to forecast economic growth while addressing climate change.

4.2 Organisational Behavior Model II

This model focuses on governmental processes and procedures which could have produced the decision being analysed. Subsequently, questions for this model were answered by government officials only (see Table 1). The purpose is to develop an understanding on whether SA’s decision to commit to reduce climate change by 34% and 42% was as a result of decision making by organisational departments and agencies that exist within the SA government. As advised by Allison and Zelikow (1999: 5) the focus on this model was on existing organisational concepts, their functions and their standard operating procedures used to attain information. Three government officials were interviewed to respond to the questions formulated based on the assumptions of the Organisational Behavior model. Four questions were developed based on the Organisational Behavior model, these questions were used to gather data related to governmental processes and procedures which contributes to a government foreign policy decision making process.

4.2.1 Responses on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets

First, it is imperative to shed light on the arrangement of respondents before conferring their responses. There are four respondents who were interviewed in the category of government officials one of which is a consultant permanently working with SA government on climate change under the following tracts; preparation, research and negotiations. This respondent (INT1M-3) has worked with government on climate change since 2005 leading the LTMS process, producing the 34% and 42% target numbers and further co-leading negotiations at COP meetings. As such, respondent INT1M-3 could only respond to questions related to the climate process itself but could not respond to internal departmental processes. Proceeding further to the findings in this category, findings on the role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets indicate that different government departments participated during the preparation process when government was building the LTMS from 2005 until

2010. DEA was leading the LTMS process and also leading negotiations at Copenhagen COP15. The department of environment (DEA) leads in climate change issue as they specialize in technical environmental issues from policy development to implementation. Even though DIRCO play a supporting role the department also takes political lead in negotiations. Other departments such as Energy, Trade and Industry and Water and Sanitation participate but don't have any leading role.

4.2.1.1 Findings of government officials on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets

Findings of government officials on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets indicate that DEA was leading the process of preparation and co-negotiated with DIRCO. During the LTMS development process DEA led consultation with different stakeholders such as business, government agencies, civil society and other government departments. The policy that was developed from these consultations informed the president's Copenhagen decision. The LTMS scenarios were later used to build the 34% and 42% which was announced as SA's carbon emissions targets at Copenhagen. This view is validated by INT1M-1 below:

However the LTMS from which the 34% and 42% came from was developed by DEA with the involvement of ESKOM and other stakeholders. DEA, in this case the minister, advised the president on the decision.

Even though DIRCO lead in negotiations, findings have indicated that DIRCO was not involved in Copenhagen but only the Minister had been part of the political decision making team which is the ministerial committee. This view was further emphasised by INT1M-2

Well in Copenhagen days The Minister (DIRCO) was consulted and was part of the political decision making process. We don't know the specific details, we don't know how the pledge came about. This team (DIRCO) only became more prominent after Copenhagen and specialised in negotiations when SA was hosting Durban COP in 2011.

According to respondent INT1M-2, DIRCO works with the Chief State Advisor who plays the role of chief negotiator for the South African government at COPs meetings and negotiations. **Table 18** below consists of findings of government officials.

Table 18 Responses of government officials on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets

Respondent	What role did your department play in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of targets

INT1M-1	The final decisions, the 34% and 42%, those were the numbers we had never seen before, they were from a discussion of very high level cabinet I guess. However the LTMS from which the 34% and 42% came from was developed by DEA with the involvement of ESKOM and other stakeholders. DEA, in this case the minister, advised the president on the decision.
INT1M-2	And we have a very good coordination with multiple stakeholders particularly environmental affairs because environmental affairs is the lead national actor national implementation but DIRCO is the lead for the negotiation as part of the foreign policy thing so we work with Advocate de Wit who is the Chief state advisor International Law. She is SA's lead negotiator. And we also have Deputy Director General Global Governance and Continental Affairs Ambassador Diseko she oversees multilateral brunch but she also was last year the Chair of G77. So our personal role is really to support the lead negotiator and last year our focus was on G77.
INT1M3	Remember we are an environment department and when it comes to negotiations part of the mandate is that we coordinate SA's position in preparation for each of the COPs. Now that requires of us that we liaise with different... we don't have all the expertise within because there might be some Water and Sanitation issues, there might be issues that lead to Agriculture that might require of us to draw from DAF, there are issues that has to do with DIRCO because DIRCO is the coordinator that go out you know internationally. So we draw from those and various other departments, hence I even included Department of Energy. So ours is more of a coordinating role, a facultative role and we lead the delegation as well.
INT1M-4	well before Copenhagen we at ERC and others who had been involved in the LMTS we did a lot of technical analysis. But immediately in terms of setting the, some numbers emerged the proposed immediately for Copenhagen, that wasn't, weren't directly involved. It was a process run by the DEA and then the final stage by the Presidency. So it was a political process and as academics we wouldn't have been involved in a political process.

4.2.1.2 Responses on the role played by organisations and agencies in the making of this decision, that is setting of the 34% and 42% targets.

Responses on the role played by organisations and agencies in the setting of 34% and 42% targets indicates that different government departments and agencies such as government departments, civil society, business, NGO's, FBO's and academics participated in the process that led to the development of the LTMS which produced the targets. DEA led the LTMS sessions together with the Energy Research Centre at UCT which was consulted by government to provide research and advice on climate change. Other departments such as

Energy, Water and Transport provided support. It also emerged that these organisations actively participated in a cross-cut consultation as part of COP meeting preparations where they are encouraged to comment on what government would have prepared for negotiations.

Table 19 Response on the role played by organisations and agencies in the making of this decision, that is setting of the 34% and 42% targets.

Respondent	What role did organisations and agencies play in the making of this decision? That is setting of the 34% and 42% targets?
INT1M-1	We thought before having a policy we needed to have a conference so we decided to have two conferences at once a climate change conference and policy conference. Outcome of the conference is that climate change was accepted and its dangers were realised. So government believed that climate change was real and happening. The conference gave government a mandate to write policies on climate change. it was a very participatory conference with deputy president attending it was high profile. What came out of the conference was that we are a coal base economy there's little we can do but that wasn't accepted because we had to do something so we started to do the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). It was agreed that we would do the LTMS which has been repeated around the world. UCT was employed to run with the process. We had an NGO called North North-South. We put together a scenario building team with national government, private companies, provincial departments, municipalities and NGOs. We started by estimating the emission projections by sector like transport, water, energy etc.
INT1M-2	Well when we developing our negotiation positions of course we have brainstorming sessions with key stakeholders from DEA and from other departments and it depends on what the topic is of course and then we develop our position. Under DEA there is a whole series of a committee which are there to mmmh stakeholder stakeholder consultation and for getting views and that's eeh....they have IGCCC and NCCC so they have multiple established structures and we would go there and give briefings on..... you know on whatever session just happened and give briefing on our position and to hear views.
INT1M-3	There were number of sessions that were held during the LTMS development and there was a number of stakeholders that participated in that space that are crosscutting like the one I have indicated before. The current practice which has been there, it's a practice that has been ongoing. In terms of the current procedure and process is that we consult with different departments and we consult with businesses. They even make written representations like when we were doing the INDC, they would put forward the views, they would point out it shortcomings. Businesses like BUSA critiquing and making suggestions.

Table 19 above indicates that the process of producing targets was consultative and inclusive cutting across most government departments and different organisations. **INT1M-1** indicated that the process of target setting begin with building of scenarios through the LTMS process which was led by ERC at UCT. This view is presented below:

What came out of the conference was that we are a coal base economy there's little we can do but that wasn't accepted because we had to do something so we started to do the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). It was agreed that we would do the LTMS which has been repeated around the world. UCT was employed to run with the process. We had an NGO called North North South. We put together a scenario building team with national government, private companies, provincial departments, municipalities and NGOs.

INT1M-3 further elucidates on this point:

There were number of sessions that were held during the LTMS development and there was a number of stakeholders that participated in that space that are crosscutting like the one I have indicated before. The current practice which has been there, it's a practice that has been ongoing. In terms of the current procedure and process is that we consult with different departments and we consult with businesses. They even make written representations like when we were doing the INDC, they would put forward the views, they would point out it shortcomings.

Drawing from this information, the targets were not produced by government alone behind closed doors but there is consultation that takes place which allows for different agencies to be involved. The setting of targets was also a consultative process which allowed participation of different agencies which are mentioned above.

4.2.1.2 Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints did organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process

Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints exerted by organisational procedures and pressures on the decision making process indicate that sometimes government departments are constrained by certain aspects that hinders them from producing the optimum results especially on climate change. There was also an indication that consultations led by DEA with different stakeholders provide valuable technical information that inform cabinet decisions. The information produced from these sessions become useful for the president and the cabinet when making decisions relating to climate change **Table: 20** below tabulate findings of government officials.

Table 20 Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints that organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process

Respondent	What capabilities and constraints did organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process?
INT1M-1	It was guided by participation processes and science so it participation with stakeholders up until the final decision, the final decision no one knew, it was government governing I mean that's what government does government governs because it can't please everybody but it tries, the idea is it can't please everybody all the time to get as much participation as possible but eventually government has to make a decision. Importantly is that LTMS conferences informed that decision but the final decision and the numbers are basically a decision made by presidency.
INT1M-2	Well when we developing our negotiation positions of course we have brainstorming sessions with key stakeholders from DEA and from other departments and it depends on what the topic is of course and then we develop our position. Under DEA there is a whole series of a committee which are there to mmmh stakeholder stakeholder consultation and for getting views and that's eeh....they have IGCCC and NCCC so they have multiple established structures. There's an established structure for getting our national position approved at that level approved by cabinet you know there is the president and there's a pool of cabinet level committee you know it's not..... It goes through multiple levels so by the time we get there we have a national negotiating position. Of course last year... we also a member of Africa Group, member of the BASIC and we are G77 so G77 positions of course are developed by the membership so whatever national position we forge has to be consistent with the Africa positon and the G77 position.
INT1M-3	Key among the constraints is the research capability internally. We don't have sufficient research capability which is why it can be outsourced to other entities. You look at the research on LTMS, it was led by ERC. How we have done our INDC we have used ERC again but we have used CSIR. So in terms of research that's part of the limitation there, but they do the technical analysis and we convey the political message that comes out of that. They provide backing in terms of the technical support side because there would be questions even after you submitted your INDC. The other aspect in terms of constraints is capacity, within the branch climate change and air quality there are chief directorate, ours that focus on international. So capacity issues, research aspects and money.

INT1M-3 indicates that DEA is mostly constrained due to insufficient technical support, financial support and capacity support which sometimes hinders the department on certain deliveries. DEA leads on the technical aspects of climate change and it also leads domestically. However it becomes imperative that the department outsources some technical skills and research due to insufficient capacity to offer these aspects when preparing for COP meetings and negotiations. INT1M-3 further explains:

Key among the constraints is the research capability internally. We don't have sufficient research capability which is why it can be outsourced to other entities... So finance remains a constraint, capacity and research. You go to negotiations countries like USA have researchers there, they have economists, they have scientists, they have linguists a whole lot of technicians within their delegation.

Research, finance and capacity seem to be the main constraints during decision making on climate change issues. These three constraints hinder government from handling information that is used to make climate change decision.

4.2.1.3 Responses of government officials on organisational context, pressure and procedure from which the Copenhagen decision emerge

Responses in this category indicate that organisational context, pressure and procedure didn't have much contribution on the outcome of the decision. The decision making process was aligned with cabinet procedures. Minister of DEA advised the president based on the information which was produced from the LTMS consultation process. The Minister of DIRCO was invited to be part of the decision making process but the minister and DIRCO were not involved from the preparation and negotiation process. The 34% and 42% were decided by the ministerial committee even though they were produced by a scientist specialist. **Table 21** below present findings from government officials

Table: 21 Findings of government officials on organisational context, pressure and procedure did the Copenhagen decision emerge?

Respondent	From what organisational context, pressure and procedure did the Copenhagen decision emerge?
INT1M-1	It was completely aligned with the cabinet's procedures, as it is stated in the white paper, cabinet agreed on peak plateau and decline. Those numbers were very pretty much cabinets decision from 2008 so this is a reflection of that.
INT1M-2	DIRCO was not involved, from the process, last year DEA was more involved doing road shows, business was more involved and NGO so it was much more. but the one thing which is very important to understand though with the UNFCCC is that developed countries have ... had a legal obligation to report whereas developing

	countries such as SA have not up to now.
INT1M-3	The process is that we convene delegation meetings for instance and then we would ask the various departments to... and we would guide to what the key country priorities are sustainable development issues, poverty eradication, reducing unemployment, improving literacy and all of those contributing towards economic growth. So we give that guidance in terms of the broader picture and we would expect them to provide inputs to each of the negotiating items under the various subsidiaries coding of the UNFCCC in preparation for our overall position. So there would be a position for each item contributed by the team. That is what we would then take and circulate through the structures of IGCCC comprises of various departments. We would consult on that through other structures like your NCCC that comprises of NGO's, private sector entities you name them and also government departments but we go beyond that to various other forums as requested and required to table that out. So that's part of the process that we embark upon. Part of the process as well is to go to Africa, Africa group of negotiators. There is such a structure where we try and align some of these issues.

4.2.1.4 Responses of government officials on government departments' decision making process

Findings of government officials on government departments' indicated there are existing processes that must be followed when a climate change decision has to be made. Specialists inform their respective directors who discusses information with the Director General who then informs and advises the minister on which direction to take. INT1M-1 provided this information on government departments' decision making process:

You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a decision for your minister, you put forward recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top officials make policy decisions, policy is politics by its nature...Minister would then simply say well I disagree or come give me some more briefings or I want to hear someone else or I want to have a meeting on my own and then she will make a decision so that's how it works.

Further to this respondent INT1M-2 reported that their department follows a similar process where a proposal with recommendations is sent to the DG to the Minister who then advises the President.

Table 22 Responses of government officials on government department's decision making process

Respondent	How does decision making work in your department?
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INT1M-1	<p>You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a decision for your minister, you put forward recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top officials make policy decisions, policy is politics by its nature. Typical decision is when I want have... looking for a policy decision from minister we would put together recommendations the minister with as much information and we would make recommendations to say minister we would like you to consider this, we would like you to consider this. Minister would then simply say well I disagree or come give me some more briefings or I want to hear someone else or I want to have a meeting on my own and then she will make a decision so that's how it works.</p>
INT1M-2	<p>In this department... well we were restructuring recently, first the ADP this is the specific project we're talking about it's a four year. Because the state attorney is the advisor our team is established around her in normal times we would just be part of the environment department chief directorate. The decision making would still be from the multilateral branch. We report to the Chief Director multilateral who report to the DG and then the Minister sign off. Deputy Minister stands in if the Minister is not available.</p>
INT1M-3	<p>The decision making process, it will sometimes be bottom up, when the political stance and information is taken it will come from the top, it's what the cabinet requires of us. In terms of process, you are to put proposals by way of, because administrative justice has to be done, you write down either a proposal which you would refer to as a submission and justify it in terms of the analysis, it must be justified in terms of key options, whether it does take into account interest of the country at the forefront. But now because the organisation is hierarchical in nature it will have to move from my level, director level. Either in relation to the position or implications of the decision taken that yielded from negotiations. He can either recommend that or not recommend that. He has powers to recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the DDG can support the recommendation of the Chief Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it have to come back you review you incorporate some of the suggestions it will move on to the DG level and then the Minister can approve, he's got approval powers.</p>

Table 22 above indicates that decision making process at DIRCO and DEA is similar. There is a line of report that is being followed for instance at DIRCO specialists and technical personnel would report information to multilateral directorate who report to Director – General who will then advice the minister on a particular decision. This is narrated by INT1M-2:

The decision making would still be from the multilateral branch. We report to the Chief Director multilateral who report to the DG and then the Minister sign off. Deputy Minister stands in if the Minister is not available.

The statement above corroborates with INT1M-1 view that climate change decisions are made by top officials such as minister and president. INT1M-3 provided a broader explanation of the internal decision making process in the following manner:

Either in relation to the position or implications of the decision taken that yielded from negotiations. He can either recommend that or not recommend that. He has powers to recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the DDG can support the recommendation of the Chief Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it have to come back you review you incorporate some of the suggestions it will move on to the DG level and then the Minister can approve, he's got approval powers.

4.2.1.5 Responses of government officials on the government's foreign policy agenda on climate change

Findings in this category indicated that cabinet set government foreign policy agenda on climate change. Recommendations are submitted to the cabinet who advises the president who then makes the decision. The minister at DEA plays a major role in technical and policy advise while the minister at DIRCO would advise on multilateral issues. The process is the same as the one narrated by INT1M-1 earlier (see **Table 21**) which indicates that cabinet and the president set the foreign policy agenda even though ground work is done by specialists and technical personnel.

Table 23 Responses on the government's foreign policy agenda on climate change

Respondent	Who sets the government's foreign policy agenda on climate change?
INT1M-1	No once again, it's the cabinet that makes those decisions, we would make recommendations and cabinet make decisions, that's how government policy works. There's no...especially on climate change because it's cross cutting so in this department its environmental department has a strong role to play.
INT1M-2	When we were negotiating these past few years we were negotiating under the ADP. In a technical COP, technical

	department lead if it's a political COP it becomes important to have political leaders. Division of labor is quite clear that when it comes to national implantation its DEA, the national focal point of the UNFCCC is also DEA. So they are the lead national department and we are the lead in foreign policy, the other departments are part of the national team.
INT1M-3	Our mandate is to lead when it comes to climate issues and climate change is one of those but we cannot do that because our scope is more domestically focused as the department. We do that now when it comes to climate change in partnership with DIRCO because they are sort of some kind of overlapping mandate. Remember their focus is international and their focus is outward whilst we do work domestically and we have the technical capacity to be able to negotiate more in depth in climate change. They are the political arm because this climate change needs to be reconciled with other developments and other forums and in fact if you look at the negotiations DIRCO would be leading in terms of some of the major negotiation tract.

4.3 Governmental Politics Model III

This model focused on internal politics and bureaucracies involved in decision making processes. The questions were created to determine the interactions and behaviour of the political players who were involved during the decision making that resulted in SA committing to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. Referring to Allison and Zelikow (1999: 6) the focus here is on the players whose interest and actions impact the issue in question, the factors that shape players perception and the performance of the players. Questions of this model were intentionally directed to analysts who followed the process of decision making concerning the announcement that was made thereafter. These analysts watched the behaviour of political actors from a distance and were able to provide an account of their views in making the decision on the 34% and 42% targets. The questions for this module were directed to analysts only, however only one respondent from the analysts category was able to provide information as the other respondent indicated their interest is on SA behaviour in the international system and not domestically.

4.3.1 Findings on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and action

Responses on the players and values that count in shaping the choice and actions refers to those who participate in the political decision making process and their views which shape the outcome of a decision, in this context, on climate change. The focus is how the actor or the players behave during the decision making process in order to determine whether they were able to influence the outcome of the decision.

4.3.1.1 Responses of analysts on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and action

Responses of analysts on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and action seem to indicate that different types of ministers and political parties, particularly the ruling party, and trade unions participate in the political decision making on climate change obligations.

Table 24 Findings on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and action

Respondent	Who are the players? Whose views and values count in shaping the choice and action?
INT4M-1	It depends on issues, with climate of course the concerns of labour, the concerns of environmental, the concerns of the ANC and the concerns of the international level on climate change then there could be others as well they are secondary but for me primarily; the ANC; trade unions especially COSATU; business, organised business so a combination of those interest must inform what is being said and decided.

In **Table: 24** Above indicate that other parties such as business, COSATU and ANC also inform decision making on international climate change obligations. This is validated by INT4M-1:

..the concerns of the ANC and the concerns of the international level on climate change then there could be others as well they are secondary but for me primarily; the ANC; trade unions especially COSATU; business, organised business so a combination of those interest must inform what is being said and decided.

4.3.2 Findings on actors who advise the president

Responses on who advises the president are focused on those who offer advice to the president on climate change issue particularly when a decision has to be made. The president

is often surrounded by individuals who support him in terms of advice on many issues but the focus in this study is on international climate change obligations.

4.3.2.1 Responses of analysts on who advises the president

Findings on who advises the president indicates that the president is advised by the DEA minister and DIRCO minister on issues of climate change obligation. These two ministers are informed by their departmental technicians through the DG's as indicated earlier by INT1M-4 (see Table 21):

... He can either recommend that or not recommend that. He has powers to recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the DDG can support the recommendation of the Chief Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it have to come back you review you incorporate some of the suggestions it will move on to the DG level and then the Minister can approve...

Staff within the two departments inform the ministers for international climate change decisions that need to be taken. **Table 25** below presents the details of responses from analysts.

Table 25 Responses of analyst on who advises the president

Respondent	Who advises the president?
INT4M-1	For climate change the president is advised by two ministers; the minister of DEA and minister of DIRCO and of course his international advisors. But it seems to me those are the critical one and it is meant to be so. The minister and his advisors... those two departments have a lot to do with what the president decides on international climate change issues.

INT4M-1 indicates that ministers of the two departments; DEA and DIRCO both advise the president on international climate change issues:

For climate change the president is advised by two ministers; the minister of DEA and minister of DIRCO and of course his international advisors. But it seems to me those are the critical one and it is meant to be so. The minister and advisors.

It also came out that ministers have their own advisors who assist them in decision making especially when the president has to be advised.

4.3.3 Findings on what the process is all about

This question was intended to determine what the process of decision making is about, at the political level. The focus is on the president and the cabinet that make international climate

change decisions. It also focuses on other parties that get involved in climate change decision making.

4.3.3.1 Responses of analysts on what the process is all about

Findings on what the process is all about indicate that ministers decide first and present those decision to the cabinet. The cabinet then recommends the best decision to the president which would produce a desirable outcome. They would also present available option that could be exploited. INT4M-1 further explains the process:

So the president has to follow the cabinet committee's conceded proposal which says "these are conceded, calculations have been made, and implications have been calculated" and staff like that because you can't thumb sucks something that could cost us.

The findings are presented in **Table 26** below.

Table 26 Responses of analysts on what the process is all about

Respondent	What is the process all about?
INT4M-1	I'm not sure but what I know is that I participated in the national process developing the national edition (audition) on climate change and it was huge, it was something like 8 different meetings, civil society side, and regional side. And then there is also an inter-departmental one that happens internally. So when the president has to decide, the ministers would have decided, the cabinet that would have been put together would have put before him the options to him and say these are the options and then they would say we recommend these ones. So the president has to follow the cabinet committee's conceded proposal which says "these are conceded, calculations have been made, and implications have been calculated" and staff like that because you can't thumb sucks something that could cost us. Because its international negotiations they would have been advised on what your actions trigger and what your action do not trigger.

Findings further indicate that when the cabinet decided on international obligations their decision has to either trigger or de-trigger something. Even on this decision under study the cabinet should have been advised on what this decision would trigger in climate change negotiations.

4.3.4 Findings on what kind of bargaining among which players produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon emission

This question was intended to attain information about actors or players and their behavior in the decision making process. Since this is a political decision it is imperative that the players' behavior is analysed in order to discover how their behavior and actions shaped the outcome of the decision.

4.3.4.1 Responses of analysts on what kind of bargaining among which players produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon emission.

Findings in this section indicate that ministers who form part of the cabinet committee to pursue their departmental agendas or garner support from other cabinet members. There is also a sense of competition present amongst cabinet members during the process of decision making. Below is a detail presentation of findings from analysts.

Findings of this question indicate that competition exist amongst ministers issues of climate change. However all these tensions and disagreements are managed and harmonised in the cabinet committee before recommendations are presented to the president. This view is narrated by INT4M-1:

But my own sense is the system works as I know all these tension get up to the cabinet committee and then takes an institutionalised position now it's no longer a discipline of DIRCO, DEA or Water Affairs but it integrates all their interests and then its harmonises everything the country then decides. I remember the news report about these two ministers fighting but I guess it was talking about the processes trying to influence what the cabinet committee is going to decide. Once the Cabinet Com decides it's too hardy to want to still go solo.

Table 27 Responses of analysts on bargaining among players that produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions

Respondent	What kind of bargaining among from which players produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions?
INT4M-1	By virtue of the fact that you are saying there are these various politicians. There is competition amongst them at a lower level, in the entire process there is a lot of contestation because there are different concerns that comes in. Department of water affairs wants to use this climate change thing to garner more support for its water plans and staff. Similarly the country's cabinet committee there is a lot of competition in cabinet committee and that is where... that's why we have the cabinet committee to exhaust this tension so that when it comes to the president the committee has found a consensus position. So its

	limits the amount of competition that gets to the president himself. There is a lot of competition especially between DIRCO and DEA these two departments that lead they are very important. But my own sense is the system works as I know all these tension get up to the cabinet committee and then takes an institutionalised position now it's no longer a discipline of DIRCO, DEA or Water Affairs but it integrates all their interests and then its harmonises everything the country then decides
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Presentation of research findings Part 2: Document data

This section presents data gathered from documents which were analysed in order to answer the question; *How does South African government decide which environmental obligations to tackle and which ones not to?* Data was mined from government documents such as; National Climate Change White Paper, LTMS; and secondary documents form journal articles. Data extracted from each document will is presented below:

4.4 National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP)

Topic: Mitigation

Scope: The White Paper presents the South African Government's vision for an effective climate change response and the long-term, just transition to a climate-resilient and lower-carbon economy and society.

Objectives: (i) Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through interventions that build and sustain South Africa's social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity. (ii) Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a timeframe that enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

Outcome: NCCRP is used as guideline for SA's response to climate change.

The White paper sets out South Africa's climate change response strategy by outlining mitigation and adaptation approach. The process of developing the White paper began after SA had announced its commitment targets at the Copenhagen COP15. According to the NCCRWP South Africa's approach to mitigation is informed by its contribution as a responsible citizen to the international effort to curb global emissions and its management

and development of poverty eradication challenges. SA's commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% was motivated by its commitment as a responsible global citizen. This is reported in the NCCRWP (p 25):

As a responsible global citizen and as a global citizen with morals as well as a legal obligations under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, SA is committed to contributing its fair share to global GHG mitigation in order to keep the temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius, in this regard, on 6 December 2009, the president announced that South Africa will implement mitigation actions that will collectively results in a 34% and 42% trajectory below its Business As Usual emission growth trajectory by 2020 and 2025 respectively.

The NCCRWP further illuminates on this statement highlighting that this commitment was conditional, it will materialise if SA receives technology, capacity and financial support from developed countries. This view is supported by the passage below:

In accordance with Article 4.7 the UNFCCC, the extent to which this outcome can be achieved depends on the extent to which developed countries meet their commitment to provide financial, technology and capacity-building support, this level of effort will enable South Africa's GHG emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for approximately a decade and decline in absolute terms thereafter.

Further, this announcement was motivated by SA's desire to make a fair contribution to the global mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as a global citizen. It was also based on the peak plateau decline trajectory which means that emissions were expected to peak during 2020 to 2050, remain stable for a decade and decline thereafter.

Cabinet fully considered the Long Term Mitigation Scenario study of the country's mitigation potential. This led to the announcement that South Africa's emissions should peak in the period from 2020 to 2025, remain stable for around a decade, and decline thereafter in absolute terms. The President confirmed this strategy policy direction at the 2009 National Climate Summit and further and further detailed this as a South African undertaking in the context of legal obligations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol of all legal to the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference in 2009.

According to NCCRWP SA is one of the highest carbon emitter per capita amongst developing countries. This is translated by SA's energy intensive economy dominated by significant processing of minerals, mining and a coal intensive energy system. NCCRWP (p 26) further reports that:

In terms of South Africa's latest Greenhouse Gas Inventory (base year 2000), the majority of South Africa's energy emission arose from electricity generation, which constituted around half of SA's energy emissions and just under 40% of total emissions in 2000. Transportation and energy in industry contributed just fewer than 10% each of total emissions and industrial process emissions constituted around 14%

of total emissions. Emissions from agriculture and land use in South Africa constitute only around 5% of emissions, compared to an average of 44% in developing countries as a whole.

The excerpt above indicates that SA contributes a lot more in carbon emissions than its developing country counterparts. Moreover it also reveals that coal generated electricity is the biggest contributor to SA's carbon emissions. In terms of mitigation, the NCCRWP indicates that SA has other mitigation options available even though they are limited. In 2009 SA opted for a carbon reduction option and committed to reduce carbon emissions by offering targets in numbers. Other options that could be looked at such as energy efficiency, renewable energy and demand energy were available, however SA opted for emissions reduction from energy generation since it is the biggest carbon contributor. In addition to this the NCCRWP states:

While opportunities for mitigation of emissions from non-energy sources do exist, large mitigation contributions will have to come from reduced emissions from energy generation and use. The main opportunities for mitigation and moving to a less emission-intensive energy mix, with consequent economic benefits of improved efficiency and competitiveness as well as incentivising economic growth in sectors with lower energy intensities.

4.5 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS)

Topic: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios strategic options for South Africa

Scope: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) is designed to provide a sound scientific analysis from which Cabinet could draw up a long-term climate policy. Such a policy would give South African negotiators under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) clear and mandated positions for their negotiations. It would also ensure that South African stakeholders understood and committed to a range of realistic strategies for future climate action.

Objectives: To determine possible ways of mitigating greenhouse gases, to explore mitigation options available, to determine to which extent they can reduce carbon and to what cost.

Outcome: Two scenarios were created; Growth Without Constraints; and Required by Science. Later 34% and 42% targets were developed for COP15.

LTMS is a process that was produced by a group of scientists, government officials, business and civil society which was designed for Cabinet to later draw a long term climate policy.

Such a policy was intended to provide clear and directed negotiations when they negotiate under the UNFCCC. Indeed conclusion of the process produced a Scenario Document (SD) of the LTMS process which is analysed to respond to the research question of this study. This document was later used by the Cabinet to develop the 34% and 42% targets which were committed in Copenhagen. According to the SD two scenarios that informed the targets were developed as part of the LTMS namely; Growth Without Constraints; and Required by Science scenario. In the ‘Growth Without Constraints’ scenario the scenario team asked; what would the SA economy and its greenhouse emissions look like in 2050? In other words this scenario focused on SA’s economic performance in 2050 if carbon emissions reduction were not considered. In the ‘Required by Science’ scenario the question was asked; if SA had all the resources and technology at its disposal to contribute to the global mitigation efforts that is required to stabilise the climate, what could it achieve by? **Table 24** below present the characteristics of both scenarios.

Table 28 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios

Scenario	Description
Growth Without Constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SA’s emissions in the base year 2003 stand at 440 megatons of CO₂-eq. By 2050 our emissions have quadrupled to around 1600 Mt per year. Overall fuel consumption grows more than five-fold, mainly in the industry and transport sectors there is no incentive for (and therefore no uptake of) energy efficiency, despite the potential net savings over time, demonstrating the typical market pattern of not taking up no-cost strategies. New coal-fired electricity generating plants use supercritical steam technology (23 GW, or 7 new plants, by 2050) or integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 13 (68 GW, or 21 new plants, by 2050). IGCC becomes attractive as it is only slightly more expensive but significantly more efficient than supercritical coal technology. Since no carbon constraints are imposed, no electricity plants have carbon capture and storage (CCS). A total of 9 new conventional nuclear plants are built, mostly between 2023 and 2040, adding 15 GW of new capacity. Twelve modules of PBMR (Pebble Bed Modular Reactors) are built for domestic use. Very few renewables enter the electricity mix in this Scenario. No electricity is generated from solar,

	thermal, or wind, with the only significant addition being 70 MW of landfill gas.
Required by Science Scenario	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In this scenario, called the Required by Science scenario, South Africa joins the world community in taking action to stabilise GHG concentrations, and negotiates a target as its fair contribution to this shared vision. • The IPCC15 tells us that to stabilise GHG concentrations, global reductions of between -60% to -80% from 1990 levels must be achieved 2100. The burden of sharing this target between nations is the subject of the international negotiations. • For South Africa, emissions would still rise at first, but they would have to peak at an appropriate level, and sufficiently early, to guarantee the required decline to the target range of this scenario. This implies large emissions reductions achieved through a coordinated mitigation programme at the national level with appropriate international assistance. • New technologies dominate the electricity generation and transport sectors, and the renewable and nuclear technologies encountered in the Growth without Constraints Scenario are taken up much earlier, and at a much larger scale.

4.6 Secondary data

4.6.1 Financial Mail (FM), July 30, 2010

Topic: Global Warning: Climate change targets too steep for SA economy

Scope: the article was reviewing SA decision which was announced by the president on the 6th of December 2009 that SA had committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. The main focus was to reflect the response of business sector, civil society and the views of government officials, civil society and business.

Objectives: to determine whether the targets can be met, to determine what it means for the economy, for the cost of energy and state-owned and private companies which will have to reduce carbon emissions.

Outcome: SA emissions targets chosen in a rush, heavy cost burden for the economy.

Information presented on this document indicates that amongst other groups, business was flabbergasted by the president's announcements. Civil societies and NGO's were also amazed by the announcement having been involved in the consultation for COP meeting preparation. This information has indicated that the decision making was exclusive hence other stakeholders were surprised. According to FM President Zuma's announcement came as a surprise to South Africans, SA negotiating team and the international community. SA delegates in Copenhagen were also not aware of the decision and they had a different agenda going to the negotiations. FM reported:

But the bigger surprise was that Zuma committed to a numerical target, which throughout the pre-Copenhagen consultation process had not been mentioned. Most of the local delegates were already in Copenhagen when the statement was issued and were shocked that, even before the negotiations had begun, SA had committed to a numerical target.

South Africa was under pressure to commit to targets in order to get other parties from developed countries to commit, moreover developing countries were also putting pressure on developed countries to make a commitment. As a results China, India and Brazil made pledges to mitigate climate change. There was a concern that SA's commitment might have a negative impact on the economy, however FM reports that the commitment was dependent on provision of support by developed countries.

Government officials say SA's surprise commitment to a numerical target isn't as much of a problem as it looks. In line with the Copenhagen convention, the extent to which the action of developing countries will be implemented depends on the provision of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support by developed countries.

Even so private sector's disagreeable response is an indication that decision making process excluded them and other external actors. This is further reported in the FM.

Business involved in a pre-Copenhagen consultation process through Business Unity SA and state utility Eskom were the most stunned.

Interview respondents had earlier indicated that the decision making process excluded external actors at the political level which only includes cabinet and the president.

FM admitted that SA's ambitious targets had a potential to motivate other parties to commit to mitigate and play their role, however this commitment appeared to be more of a fantasy

when matched with macroeconomic and commercial reality. Unlike China, Brazil and India whose economy was blooming at the time, SA didn't have such confidence economically.

FM reported that percentages of the targets numbers were developed by the Energy Research Centre (ERC) from the LTMS process which involved consultation with government and business. The targets were based on the peak plateau decline trajectory which was decided by the cabinet. FM further reports that:

In mid- 2008 cabinet agreed that emissions would peak by 2020, plateau and then decline in absolute terms. The ERC reworked the scenarios, taking into account government's decision to build two new massive coal-fired power stations of Medupi and Kusile, each expected to emit an additional 30 Mt of CO₂ .

The peak plateau decline trajectory was based on the BAU which the climate change scenario built on economic growth. The 34% of the 2020 target was calculated per sector as indicated by FM below:

“Industry could take responsibility for 8% of the 34% reduction (23% of the total effort); electricity generation 6,6% (19% of the total effort); and the liquid fuels sector 7,9% (23% of the total effort) by 2020”.

According to FM SA business was not only shocked but they were also aggrieved by this announcement because of these two reasons: business had always stressed even during the LTMS consultation that scenarios cannot be used to set a policy because they are based on assumptions and estimations; and even if SA was to reduce carbon by 34% there was no technology in place for capturing of carbon up to the amount the scenario had estimated.

In accordance with the 34% and 42%, wind energy, solar thermal plant and nuclear plant were considered as alternatives to coal generated energy. According to FM both wind energy and solar thermal energy could not generate 100 MW compared to Eskom's 42 000 MW capacity when estimated. Moreover both wind and solar thermal energy proved to be much more expensive than coal which is another challenge for the SA economy. In contrast with this belief, FM reports that civil society was convinced that existing renewable energy and solar thermal power plants provide alternatives. The overall view of the FM was that SA's approach to achieving the 34% was very vague and unclear.

Findings from the FM document indicates that government's decision making is exclusive to top officials and that government viewed the LTMS as sufficient consultation with

stakeholders and therefore decision making on climate is an internal process that excludes external actors.

Conclusion

In summary, this chapter presented findings of the study from data collected through interviews and documents. Data was presented in this manner: part one presented all the data from interviews, and part two presented data from documents. The following chapter 5 present the analysis of the data that was presented in chapter 4. It begins with repetition of the research question and re-statement of research objectives, it then presents data according to the six major themes that emerged during data analysis and lastly it connects the themes with Allison and Zelikow's models.

CHAPTER 5

Analysis

5.0 Introduction

In recent years there has been a conspicuous increase of climate change obligations in the South African foreign policy agenda. As such South Africa (SA) has also been highly visible in the climate change multilateral system. In 2009 at the COP15 in Copenhagen SA made a startling announcement, they were committing to reduce carbon emission by 34 % in 2020 and 42% in 2025. This announcement seemed implausible to both domestic and international audiences considering that SA is a developing country with a high carbon intensive economy which is also faced with multiple social and economic challenges such as poverty, unemployment and equality. Taking into account that this was a foreign policy decision, it is imperative to understand how foreign policy decision making on international climate change obligations function in SA. The study then pursues to answer the main research question stated as follows: *How does South African Government decide on its international climate change obligations?*

In an attempt to answer this question, the study then followed the guidelines of the following objectives: (i) to understand how foreign policy decision making works; (ii) to determine government's foreign policy key actors particularly on climate change; and (iii) to determine who the president's advisors are on climate change.

The study's literature review was informed by Allison and Zelikow's (1999) triple models namely; Rational Actor model I; Organisational model II; and Governmental Politics model III (see chapter 2). These three models were reviewed in order to understand foreign policy decision making process in SA in the context of international climate change obligations. The application of these three models in this study was intended to explain the decision making process of the SA government as suggested by Allison and Zelikow (1999) in the following manner. Explain the decision by recounting the aims and calculations of the nation; to explain the decision as an output of large organisations operating according to standardised behavior; and lastly to explain the decision as a result of bargaining games among players in the national government. Allison and Zelikow (1999) have used the triple models to examine decision making process by applying these models to the historical seminal event of the

Cuban Missile Crisis. The conceptual models provided allowance for Allison and Zelikow (1999) to explain the central riddle of the crisis by combing out different important factors.

As a member of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC) and as a responsible global citizen, SA is expected to make a substantial contribution towards climate change mitigation. This obligation is also reflected in the National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) (White Paper) and the South African Foreign Policy document. Literature has revealed that as a non-Annexure 1 country, SA is not obligated to a legally binding commitment but is required to set its own carbon emission targets (*see chapter 2*). It is against this background that SA voluntarily committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. Findings have revealed that SA is one of the biggest emitters due to its carbon intensive economy dominated by energy based productions. As such SA is responsible for an estimated 500 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per annum to the atmosphere (*see chapter 2 page 22*).

In the previous chapter (chapter 4-data presentation) findings from different informants were presented and in this chapter analysis data is presented, analysed and theoretical implications are discussed. Thematic analysis was used for interviews and Content analysis for documents was also used. Wagner et al. (2012: 231) describes Thematic analysis as a general approach used to analyse qualitative data by creating themes or patterns in data. In Content analysis raw data is coded and categories are constructed which capture the relevant characteristics of the content of the document (Merriam, 2009: 205). Thematic analysis suits this case study in that the researcher aims to understand the process of decision making in South African foreign policy. The aim is therefore to construct meanings from themes. Content analysis was also favored because it afforded the researcher the opportunity to extract meaning from the selected documents (*see chapter 4*).

The three main objectives were used as a foundation to support major themes which emerged from the research findings. Accordingly the findings were interpreted and analysed in the following manner. Themes were extracted from understanding the functions of foreign policy decision making in South Africa; themes were also extracted from government foreign policy key actors in South Africa; and lastly themes were extracted from the president's advisors on climate change. Subsequently main themes were also extracted from the following documents: the National Climate Change Response Policy (White Paper); the Long Term Mitigation Scenario; and Financial Mail article. A critical analysis of theoretical implications

of this research was done using the Allison and Zelikow's (1999) triple models namely Rational Actor model I, Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics model III.

Allison and Zelikow (1999) offered this study a window through which the decision could be looked at, in three different dimensions. While the authors praise the Rational Actor model for its effectiveness in the analysis of decision making process, they also emphasize the application that the three models allow the analysts to penetrate not only individuals but large governmental organisations and political actors. As such Allison and Zelikow's (1999) conceptual models were adopted for theoretical consideration for SA foreign policy decision making on climate change.

5.1 Understanding the functions of foreign policy decision making in climate change

This objective of the study sought to establish the understanding of the functions of foreign policy decision making in climate change from the informants. Whilst the responses and views of people in this regard were copious, the political decision and conditional commitments in climate change were singled out as major recurring themes after the open and axial coding system for analysis in this study. However, it is also important to mention that national goals, developing country, progressive leadership and higher ambition in climate change were some of the views that came out from different informants. Thus, in this section, the political decision and conditional commitments are going to be interpreted and analyzed as the major areas that came out of the informants.

5.1.1 Theme 1: Political decision

Informants of the study indicated that South Africa's decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions was a *political decision*. This view seems to suggest that SA was pursuing its international political objectives when deciding to make the announcement of committing to reduce carbon emissions. Consequently, this view can be linked with two SA Foreign Policy objectives namely; to participate in the Global System of Governance; and Strengthening South-South Cooperation (Landsberg, 2014). The Global System of Governance objective was said to be met through 'continuing active engagement within global governance political, economic and sustainable development issues' and Strengthen South-South Cooperation would be achieved by building relationships with regional and sub-regional groups in the South (Lansberg, 2014: 164). Both these objectives were reiterated by different informants

from different categories (see chapter 4, table 1). For instance when asked why SA made the decision to tackle climate change, INT4M-1 indicated:

You look at other people's perspective, for example there was a view that said politically, it was decided that SA needed to indicate a higher ambition in order to paddle with pace for Denmark. As the host and chair UNFCCC needed SA to raise its profile and establish its case as a country in climate change mitigation at Copenhagen. But we noticed that around the same time BRICS had started to assert itself globally as an important voice and it takes up development issues around that time as well, from political issues to development issues as well.

And INT4F-2 shared the same view:

We were pursuing an agenda, we were pursuing South-South cooperation put it in that context what was South Africa pursuing in partnerships? So in 2009 this was just ahead of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. COP15 was 2009 SA only joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally started the first meeting in 2011But there is ...there was a formation of BASIC and emerging powers looking at South-South cooperation and promoting the Africa agenda.

Both informants indicate that SA's decision to commit to reducing carbon emissions was not literally meaning they were taking actions to reduce carbon emissions but it was a political decision intended to drive SA foreign policy agenda of strengthening sub-regional and regional relationship particularly with emerging economies such as BRICS, BASIC and Africa. It appears that SA assumed a directional approach when making the decision: first, SA's decision was driven by a particular motive to stimulate other parties of the UNFCCC to commit to reduce carbon emissions by taking a national position that would indicate the country's willingness to tackle climate change while ensuring that the country's economy is not exposed to detrimental effects of climate change decisions, second SA had to position itself with emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil for the country's economic enhancement. However this explanation still fails to explain the low levels of participation of external stakeholders such as business, NGO's, civil society and academics in the decision making process.

The decision making process didn't consider the implications the decision would have on development and the economy of the country. The justification provided by government officials for this approach was that decision making evolves in two phases: the first phase involves internal and external actors and the second phase of decision making involves the cabinet and president only (see chapter 4). Concerning participation in the decision making process, Allison and Zelikow (1999: 326-328) do not provide a standard structure, however

they do make a comparative distinction between the American decision making actors and the Soviet decision making actors, highlighting that the Soviet decision making group is exclusive and smaller while the American is inclusive and larger. Thus decision making processes differ within countries and the South African process is highly exclusive. It can be deduced that SA political decisions on climate excludes external actors limiting participation to ministers and the president.

As already been projected from chapter one the problem of the study is to explain why SA committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. It is therefore concluded that *political* considerations were the rationale behind South Africa's decision to commit to reducing carbon emissions and excludes external decision makers. This political decision has its background in South African foreign policy. The SA decision to commit to reducing carbon emissions can be explained as a political decision to fulfil SA foreign policy objectives.

5.1.2 Theme 2: Conditional commitments

According to the informants, SA's commitment to reduce carbon emissions was conditional. This view suggest that SA's decision was merely a display for recognition in climate change governance and most importantly to trigger and encourage others to take action by making significant commitments to reducing carbon emissions. Hence the statement by the President Jacob Zuma on the 6 December 2009 (National Climate Change Response Policy, 2011: 25):

South Africa will implement mitigation actions that will collectively result in a 34% and a 24% deviation below its 'Business As Usual' emissions growth trajectory by 2020 and 2025 respectively. In accordance with Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC, the extent in which the outcomes can be achieved depends on the extent to which developed countries meet their commitment to provide financial, capacity- building, technology development and technology transfer support to developing countries.

Indeed this statement is heavily conditional in that SA indicated its willingness to actively participate in addressing climate change but immediately attached a condition indicating this action will only be implemented if developed countries actively participate by providing support. Consequently, this approach compels one to look deeper into what SA was anticipating by proposing a conditional commitment. An analyst would ask; what was SA triggering by putting forward a conditional commitment? And what was SA de-triggering? In this instance SA was aiming to trigger vigorous participation from developed countries in order to address climate change challenges by committing to support developing countries in their mitigation efforts. Informants had indicated that negotiations had been going on for 21

years without any substantial agreement between the parties and SA took the lead by putting forward a conditional commitment in order to encourage parties to commit to addressing climate change. This view was relayed by INT4F-2:

But like I said it could be on the one side trying to demonstrate SA commitment to being part of the multilateral negotiations to say “look developing countries are taking an active role in reducing emissions therefore we also require developed countries to take more of a role, look what we are doing, look at what India is doing and look at what China is doing they are committing to these reductions”

And then INT1M-2:

So at that time we were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. We would have wanted to send a positive signal to say we are prepared to take mitigation seriously, because if you look at Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time.

Subsequently, in the absence of direction and significant commitment by developed countries, SA grabbed the opportunity to provide direction that all parties could follow by announcing the commitment itself and challenging others to participate. Not only did SA volunteer to act but it also provided areas of opportunity for developed countries to participate by supporting SA to meet their targets. Contrary to this explanation, other scholars have argued extensively about SA's leadership personality at the COP15 in Copenhagen. For instance Death (2011) in her article extensively discusses SA's budding interest in global environmental issues specifically looking at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, COP15 in 2009 and COP17 in 2011. Death (2011) offers an interesting yet intriguing explanation for this growing interest in which she argues that this kind of leadership displayed by SA in Copenhagen is grounded on symbolic and opportunistic leadership. Even though the commitment is conditional, the decision making process was treated with high secrecy.

5.2 The Government's foreign policy key actors on climate change in South Africa

The other objective of the study was to determine key SA government's actors on climate change from the information provided by the informants. Numerous themes emerged from collected data, but only two themes were selected based on their frequency of their occurrence. Internal Process and Climate Negotiations emerged as two major recurring themes under this objective. In the same manner, other themes that emerged in this category such as decision making and developing country were also noted. Therefore Internal Process and Climate Negotiations will be analysed as emerging themes of this objective.

5.2.1 Theme 1: Internal process

Informants of the study indicated that internal process was a critical aspect in the outcome of the decision for SA to commit to reduce carbon emissions. This theme suggests that several governmental processes produced this decision. Meaning, governmental procedures and processes were a build up to the outcome of the decision. It emerged from the informants that this decision was a process which started through a process called LTMS which was explained earlier. The process led by Department of Environmental Affairs was characterized by vast consultation with different stakeholders such as government departments, business, academics, unions and civil society. Subsequently, two scenarios were produced from this process namely; Growth without Constraints; and Required by Science. Informants indicated that these scenarios were accepted and approved by the Cabinet and thereafter presented to the President. It is from these two scenarios that the 34% and 42% were generated and was later presented as SA's negotiating position in Copenhagen. Even though this was a consultative process the final decision of the targets was made at a political level with an exclusion of the stakeholders as it only involves ministers and the president.

Informants indicated that in climate change international and domestic issues both DEA and DIRCO lead the process. The ministers of these departments inform and advise the president on technical climate change issues and a negotiation position that SA could pursue. DEA would lead in domestic processes and provide technical expertise for international negotiations and DIRCO would lead in political positioning of the country's negotiations. Empirically, the process procedurally starts with research by DEA, consultation with different stakeholders and then recommendations are presented to the President. President, ministers and government official become the core actors in climate change decision making process whereas others such as business, civil society, academics and unions are participating actors in the consultation process. Earlier in chapter 2 (Foreign policy actors) two South African scholars namely; Susan Booyesen (2007) and John Siko (2014) provided a cross-cut structure of South African foreign policy actors. Both authors confirm what has been indicated by informants that the process is quite consultative.

Findings indicated that government officials, civil society, business and academics don't exert much influence on climate change foreign policy decision issues as they are excluded from top level decision making. Internal processes limit participation of external actors to technical discussion but exclude them from political decision making processes. However

these stakeholders were consulted in the development of LTMS policy which informed the decision. INT1M-3 provided a glimpse of the process:

The decision making process, it will sometimes be bottom up, when the political stance and information is taken it will come from the top, it's what the cabinet requires of us. In terms of process, you are to put proposals by way of, because administrative justice has to be done, you write down either a proposal which you would refer to as a submission and justify it in terms of the analysis.

And INT1M-1earlier indicated:

You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a decision for your minister, you put forward recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top officials make policy decisions, policy is politics by its nature. Typical decision is when I want have... looking for a policy decision from minister we would put together recommendations the minister with as much information and we would make recommendations to say minister we would like you to consider this, we would like you to consider this.

Therefore it can be deducted that the internal process in foreign policy decision making in climate is exclusive of multi-stakeholder participation. However it does encourage consultation at lower level which doesn't exert significant influence on the decision making process.

5.2.2 Theme 2: Climate negotiations

Informants of the study indicated that deciding on a country's position for climate change negotiations evolved in two phases: first, intense consultation was done with the multi-stakeholders producing the LTMS which was to guide SA delegates when negotiating for climate. Two, contributions from multi-stakeholder consultation were presented to the cabinet for decision making at political level which excludes all the other external actors. This process lead us to the conclusion that stakeholders who were involved during the development of LTMS were not involved in the development of 34% and 42% targets which were committed in Copenhagen during the climate change negotiations which explains the shock and surprised reaction from stakeholders. The FM reported about the response of business when the decision was announced.

Business involved in pre- Copenhagen consultation process through Business Unity SA and Eskom, on which the burden may fall, were most stunned.

This statement indicates that external stakeholders were excluded from high level decision making process. One informant mentioned that even the SA delegates who were already in Copenhagen were surprised by the President's announcement stating that government

officials at lower levels were also excluded from the decision to set the 34% and 42% targets. The informant was also quick to indicate that process doesn't allow lower level officials to decide but their role is to inform decision making. In this case DEA informed the minister and cabinet however they didn't have an idea of the final decision.

The 34% and 42% targets were presented as SA's negotiating position in Copenhagen, however SA couldn't achieve their intended goal to get other parties to commit to reduce carbon emissions at the climate negotiations due to resistance from major economies. To fulfil with eagerness the requirements of the UNFCCC, the study revisited the International Relations theories (*see chapter 2*). The realist behavior and approach is visible in the negotiations particularly amongst the developed countries such as the USA whose hegemonic characteristics dominates and influence the outcome of the COP meetings. As Allison and Zelikow (1990) report it, realist pursues power and therefore protection of their countries' interest. And later McGowan and Nel (2002) argued that for realist' power is a major factor. USA's negotiation position contradicts that of developing countries, because of how these parties interpret equality. USA has always maintained that countries with emerging economies should receive the same treatment as developed countries which have resulted in non-agreement outcomes of COPs meetings. Furthermore, the failure of climate change negotiations to produce a tangible deal on climate change mitigations can be explained by the institutionalism failure. Institutionalism assumes that cooperation of states should be structured by international institutions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The UNFCCC regime has not been successful in coordinating a collaborative platform to encourage nations to address the climate change problem, instead countries like USA seem to take over and want to shape the outcome of negotiations and resist committing to supporting developing countries in their mitigation responsibilities. It is under this view that SA took a lead and announced their commitment in order to encourage others to do so.

5.3 The President's advisors on climate change in South Africa

The last objective of the study was to determine those who advise the president on climate change issues. Two major themes were selected even though there were numerous other themes. Decision making and Internal Politics are the two major themes which are as two emerging themes under this objective.

5.3.1 Theme 1: Decision making

According to the informants, decision making is a critical aspect of the decision making process on climate. Each country has its own unique process of making international

decisions. Hill (2003: 52) put forward a plausible proposition for foreign policy analysis that in order to fully understand what a state does it is necessary to do a comparative assessment between their domestic context and international position and between the problem faced and the nature of the decision making process employed to handle it. Indeed, decision making of a country on foreign policy issues is very much influenced by what the country intends to achieve in the international system. As indicated by informants, political decision making on international climate change issues is highly exclusive in SA with only ministers and the president as actors. Therefore other parties such as businesses, civil societies, unions, academics and official government official do not influence decision making on international climate change. However ministers are afforded the opportunity to influence the outcome since they are mandated to advise the president; particularly the minister of DEA who is a champion on climate change issues. DIRCO minister is also a prominent advisor on international climate change negotiations. According to Hill (2003) the minister of foreign affairs is the chief of foreign policy operations.

Based on the information provided by informants, the process leading to Copenhagen decision can be narrated in this manner. The decision making process was launched with an intensive consultative process which involved government officials, business, civil society, unions and academics, all contributed by providing input on SA's negotiating position. However it failed to include other stakeholders when the 34% and 42% decision was made.

5.3.2 Theme 2: Internal politics

Informants of this study indicated that internal politics in the form of competition was present in decision making process. It was indicated that ministers may differ in opinion and may try to influence a decision that would favour their departmental agendas. However this influence doesn't have a significant impact on the outcome of the decision as it is managed within a ministerial committee. Having said that, one cannot deny the existence of political actors in foreign policy decision making process, these political actors are ministers who advice and inform the president. Alden and Alan (2012: 33) argue that political actors consider implications of a foreign policy decision on their departmental portfolio, further 'bureaucracies also derive influence over foreign policy from their positions in the power-sharing compromising state and government, in which these large organisations and political actors have individual interests'. Interest might be a political actor's departmental goals and objectives. INT4M-1 had indicated that ministers compete and influence the process to produce an outcome that will favour their departmental activities, this is narrated below:

There is competition amongst them at a lower level, in the entire process there is a lot of contestation because there are different concerns that comes in. Department of water affairs wants to use this climate change thing to garner more support for its water plans and staff. Similarly the country's cabinet committee there is a lot of competition in cabinet committee and that is where...

5.4 Document analysis on climate change in South Africa

Supplementary to interviews, documentary analysis was also conducted to respond to the research question: *How does South African government decide its international environmental climate change obligations?* Three documents were perused namely NCCRP, LTMS, and a secondary document – a Financial Mail article. According to Wagner et al. (2012) documents can be primary, secondary and tertiary. Documentary data for this study was gathered from primary and secondary data, primary data included the NCCRP and also the LTMS policy. Secondary data was gathered from an FM article titled: “Global Warning: Climate change targets too high for SA economy” which discussed a recollection of how the decision to commit, was made. The following section analyses the findings of the three documents.

5.4.1 Document 1: National Climate Change Response Policy (White Paper)

The NCCRP was created after the 34% and 42% was announced in Copenhagen. As the NCCRP states that it was develop in order to promote mitigation and adaptation measures that will make development to be sustainable and in socio-economic and environmental terms. The policy presents the South African government's vision for an effective climate change response and the long-term, just transition to a climate resilient and lower-carbon economy and society. The NCCRP was analysed for this study and two major themes emerged; Mitigation Process; and Carbon Emissions which are discussed below.

5.4.1.1 Mitigation process

Mitigation process emerged as one of the major themes of the study. The NCCRP indicate that mitigation was the main reason SA made the decision to commit to reducing carbon emissions 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. The NCCRP plainly state that ‘South Africa is committed to contribute its fair share to the global GHG mitigation efforts in order to keep temperatures increase well below 2 degrees Celsius’ (NCCRP, 2011). It was against this background that the president made the announcement that SA was committing to reduce carbon emissions as part of SA's fair share. However the 34% and 42% has not yet been implemented even though six years have passed since the announcement was made; instead government has since built two coal generated electricity plants Medupi and Kusile which

generate more tons of carbon. Consequently, SA is now faced with a dilemma of balancing economic growth and carbon reductions. Triangulating this information to the Copenhagen decision, it indicates that mitigation of climate was not the main rationale behind the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions. This view was also highlighted by INT3M-1:

It would have resulted in much accelerated implementation of the NCCRWP plans, since each target assigned to other departments is slipping already and target dates passed years ago.

This statement support the view that the commitment was not meant to be implemented but a statement to indicate that SA is serious about climate change. It also seems that these targets have been abandoned considering the fact that South Africa submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) which basically contains SA intended mitigation and adaptation goals based on the peak plateau decline trajectory and NCCRP principles (INDC, 2015). Even though SA is a responsible global country who is serious about climate change mitigation, the Copenhagen commitment was not solely intended for this reason only.

5.4.1.2 Carbon emissions

Carbon emission emerged as one of the major theory under this objective. Most respondents indicate that there is an urgent need to stabilize global carbon emissions which can be achieved through a global effort from all nations. Government officials emphasised that SA as a responsible global citizen was responding to the call by the UNFCCC to reduce carbon emissions when the decision was made. According to the NCCRP (see chapter 4) it was on this ground that the President announced SA's position to reduce carbon emission and committed to numbers. Carbon reduction alone cannot be accepted as the explanation for the decision made by SA government but the study also considers the explanation that the decision was also politically orientated.

5.4.2 Document 2: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS)

An LTMS was developed to produce a sound scientific analysis that would inform development of a policy. This document consists of two scenarios namely Growth without Constraints and Required by Science; both which produced the 34% and 42% targets. The LTMS was produced in 2007 and the targets were developed in 2009. The document also consists of a range of options that SA could explore to reduce carbon emissions such as renewable energy, wind energy and carbon tax. Arguably, the document failed to consider the political implications of climate change mitigation. For instance LTMS is based on the assumption that developed countries are required by UNFCCC to support developing

countries with finance, technology and capacity, of which this requirement has been the deterrent in the climate change negotiations due to unwillingness of developed countries to commit. The document also ignored technology evolution and development, the scenarios are limited to the technology that was perceived to be available at the time of the LTMS development. Both these factors namely political impact and technology would hinder SA to achieve the 34% and 42% targets. The LTMS was developed by a SBG (see Chapter 2) which comprised of government officials, business, NGO's, academics, civil society and trade unions, it was then presented to the cabinet as a guideline for SA negotiating position. The LTMS was used to develop the 34% and 42% targets by the Energy Research Centre on the cabinets behalf. FM reported:

Winkler's unit at the University of Cape Town, the Energy Research Centre (ERC) is the group that did the technical work for the 34% target.

However the stakeholders were excluded from the decision in which targets were developed and hence they were surprised. It is highlighted in the FM document that:

The "internationalization" of scenarios didn't please business 'we had always stressed that these were just scenarios. Scenarios make many assumptions that is how scenarios work. You can't use that information to set policy' says a businessman who took part in the scenario process.

This brings us to the conclusion that even though initial development of LTMS was consultative, the decision to commit to 34% and 42% excluded participation of multi-stakeholders and was made a cabinet issue instead of being a national issue.

5.5 Theoretical implications of the study

What can we learn by applying Allison and Zelikow's triple models namely Rational Actor model I, Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics model III in the South African decision making process on international climate change obligations? The main aim of the study was to gain understanding of SA decision making process on international climate change obligations. Can the three models offered by Allison and Zelikow deepen understanding of the SA decision making process? To recap, the Rational Actor model focuses on goals and objectives of the nation; Organisational Behavior model puts more emphasis on organisational outputs, to processes and procedures and their existing functions and systems; and lastly the Governmental Politics model focuses attention on the behavior of individuals and their interest in national government. In the methodology chapter (see chapter 3), the Copenhagen decision was identified as a case study for application of the three models.

In the following section the study will apply the three models to the Copenhagen decision based on the findings collected through interviews and documents.

5.5.1 Rational Actor Model I

In this model the study focused on the problem the state was trying to solve when the decision was made. In Allison and Zelikow's (1999) analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis under the Rational Actor model I they modeled their question in this manner; what problem was the state trying to solve? Consequently looking at the Copenhagen decision made by SA it is clear that this decision was well calculated. This view is supported by few respondents who indicated that the Copenhagen decision was thought through, that options and alternatives were weighed and consequences were considered. Initially the Copenhagen decision appeared problematic when viewed at face value in that it contained economic implications and was high risk for the SA government. However findings indicated that economic implication were considered based on the fact that the decision was not intended for implementation, but for political reasons to trigger action from other parties such as developed countries. This was earlier stressed by INT1M-3:

So it was the next best option at the time, it was cautionary captured to have the safe guards that I have alluded to. So we were not exposing our economies our developments you know, without putting in place checks and balances against this.

And then INT2M-4:

Personally I think it was a good choice to stimulate the ambitions. We should all be concerned that climate change issue is a real issue. So it's a real issue... you can see the drought right now, there are many consequences of climate change.

And also INT4F-4:

I don't... if you look back at it now I don't think it mattered either way. I mean back then it was used as a means to demonstrate as I said SA's particular pursuit on the role. But did they have a choice to something else or this is what they have been working towards? Eeh... this was the figures on the table this was the report that was presented.

As indicated by the respondent SA was looking out for the country's interest by pursuing national goals and objectives by suggesting their willingness to mitigate climate change to ensure SA, its citizens and its environment is protected from the risk of climate change. SA was also leading by example by encouraging others to take actions against climate change when all parties were unable to reach an agreement. Allison and Zelikow (1999: 18) suggested four core concepts (see chapter 2) associated with the rational actor model namely;

goals and objectives, alternatives, consequences and choice. These four concepts have been identified in the Copenhagen decision to reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. First, SA had well-articulated *goals and objectives* which were intended to be achieved when the Copenhagen decision was made, for instance the decision was meant to lobby for support on climate change mitigation from developed countries, to get all parties participating and to take action against climate change. Most informants indicated that SA had *alternatives* or other options from which they chose their decision from. As Allison and Zelikow (1999: 18) states ‘the rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before him or her’. This was visible in the responses given by INT1M3:

We had an option to say we want to put forward assistance on the adaptation side because looking at the nature of that pledge its more mitigation centric it's about reducing GHG emissions by certain percentages that are stated and the pledge does not address the side of adaptation.

And also INT1M4:

Well of course there are always other options they could have had other numbers but eventually there had been a process on the mitigation side which is mainly where I worked having LTMS for SA the LTMS process which ehm... and out of that many other specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that matter or transport options many technical options were examined and then that was done a couple of years before Copenhagen meted.

And finally INT1M1:

So there was a lot of different options that SA could put forward, in the end they elected to go for an economy wide target for. China had efficiency targets, so they basically said they would increase their efficiency by this much.

SA also considered *consequences* for the Copenhagen decision having calculated the risks associated with this decision. For each of the other options consequences were considered too. SA was aware that the decision would expose the economy to risks since it is carbon intensive economy and carbon reduction would have a negative impact on it. Moreover SA was also aware that the announcement of the decision would either receive the anticipated reception or a negative reception. The FM reported:

SA's commitment to an ambitious target will motivate for more and mitigating actions which will be good for SA's competitiveness in the long run. But the targets are far away from commercial and macroeconomics reality. Unlike China, India and Brazil whose booming economy mean abundant resources are available for mitigation actions, the SA state doesn't have similar influence.

Finally SA's decision was a well calculated *choice* where rationality had been applied. Informants indicated that the decision was as a result of an intensive consultative LTMS process. Decision makers had also sought advice from experts such as the Energy Research Centre on the LTMS process and also on the formulation of the 34% and 42% targets.

5.5.2 Organisational Behavior model II

Allison and Zelikow (1999:143) argued in their book 'But a government is not an individual. It is not just the president and his entourage, nor even just a presidency and Congress. It is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own'. Accordingly SA government behavior can also be understood according the Organisational Behavior model. Departmental processes and procedures were visible in the outcome of the Copenhagen decision as well as participation of government agencies. The process began with a consultation with different organisations and government agencies which produced the LTMS document. This document was recommended to the cabinet and president who later used it to develop the 34% and 42% targets. According to informants decision making process has levels, departmental officials inform and advise the cabinet or their ministers who then advice the president on the best option and its consequences. Referring to this process INT1M-3 commented 'So it's not a linear kind of a thing but for communication that has to go international; for instance it has to go that route and then there would be political aspect that come out where the cabinet may require certain things to be done within the space of climate change'. The cabinet makes political decisions based on the information provided by department officials.

Departments responsibilities were clear and well-structured for instance DEA was mandated with the responsibility of organizing and coordinating consultation with business, academics, civil society and NGO's during the preparation of COP17 in Copenhagen. DEA organised the team for negotiations and ensured that the minister and president had the necessary technical information. DIRCO was assigned with the responsibilities to handle the political part of negotiations which is to lobby with other parties such as G77 and China, Africa group and BASIC group and also to coherence. Other departments such as Energy, Water and Agriculture are included when it is necessary, for instance the Department of Energy was involved in Copenhagen because there were a lot of technical energy issues that were part of the negotiations. Department processes and procedures played a significant role in the decision making process of the Copenhagen decision in that involved departments were able

to organise themselves and perform all process that were required for the decision making process to take place.

5.5.3 Governmental Politics Model III

The strength of governmental politics model lies in its ability to explain the role of individual's in government decision making process. Allison and Zelikow (1999: 6) suggest that when approaching a decision through this model the focus should be on the players whose interest and actions impact the issue in question. In actual fact the focus in Organisational Politics model is to discover who did what to whom that resulted in the Copenhagen target commitment. Findings indicated that the Copenhagen decision was made at the Cabinet level. Other stakeholders were given an opportunity to participate in the LTMS development process from which the targets were formulated. As a results FM reported that business stakeholders who participated in the LTMS were enraged when the president made the announcement about committing to reduce carbon emissions:

The “internationalising” of targets based on the scenarios didn’t please business. “We had always stressed that these were just scenarios, scenarios make many assumptions, that is how scenarios work, you can’t use that information to set policy” says a business who took part in the scenario process.

And later reported:

Most of the local delegates were in Copenhagen when the announcement was made and were shocked that before the negotiations began SA had committed to a numerical target.

Both these statements indicate that the decision making process was exclusive, only ministers were involved at the political level where climate change decisions are made. Government officials and other stakeholders were not part of this process as their participation is limited to departmental consultation. However it was indicated that the 34% and 42% targets were developed by the Energy Research Center who also provided technical advise on the decision. Based on this information it can be concluded that the influence of secondary and tertiary actors (*see chapter 2*) was minimal on this decision; however ministers had greater influence on the outcome of the decision.

5.6 Arriving at the conclusion

It is evident that the Rational Actor model I had a significant influence in the Copenhagen decision. Empirically, the South African government was pursuing national interest, it was pursuing national goals and objectives, and it was positioning the country in global

environmental politics. Organisational processes and procedures were also visible in the build-up of the decision and making of the decision by different government departments allocated roles was based on the specialization of the department. For instance DEA was the champion organising consultations with other stakeholders and informing the cabinet. DEA has the responsibility to provide technical knowledge and lead in climate change issues domestically, whereas DIRCO leads in negotiations and in political issues internationally. We were able to explain the participation process through the Organisational Behavior model. This was indicated by most respondents and documents. Therefore the SA decision was well explained through the windows of Rational Actor model I and Organisational Behavior model II.

Chapter 6 is the last chapter and presents the conclusion of the study. The settings of chapter six begins with the summary of Alison and Zelikow's triple model, where the contribution of these models to the study is further discussed.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Recommendations

6.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the research process, it also reflects on the research findings and summarises Allison and Zelikow's models. In the introduction the research question is reiterated, emerging issues from the case study are also discussed and data collection process is reviewed. Lastly, application of Allison and Zelikow's to the case study is briefly discussed.

South Africa has emerged as a prominent global citizen whose participation in the global environmental politics is increasingly becoming vital to its persuasion of SA's foreign policy agenda. This pattern can be associated with the emergence of a new South Africa post 1994 which required that SA reposition itself in the international community by reviewing and reinventing its foreign policy. SA's relations with the outside were marked by isolation and growing marginalisation by international institutions (Death, 2013). Furthermore, estrangement by African counterparts and other countries who were displeased by the apartheid regime was visible. Democracy brought an opportunity for SA to re-integrate itself to the international community, this was pursued through its re-invented foreign policy and diplomacy.

Since 1994 SA has pursued participation in the multilateral system and as a result participated and hosted a number of international events such as World Parks Congress in 2003, World Conference against Racism in 2001, UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1999 and Xenophobia and Related Intolerances in 2001 (Death, 2011: 457). Since then SA took up the role of being a bridge-builder between the North and South, consequently SA assumed this role at the UNFCCC since 2009. SA has led climate change negotiations both in Copenhagen COP15 of 2009 and in Durban COP17 of 2011 by leading by example and encouraging parties to commit to reduce carbon emissions. The announcement made by SA President Jacob Zuma in 2009 for carbon emission targets before boarding the plane to Copenhagen and during the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, sent shocks globally and domestically. It was surprising that a developing country had committed to numerical targets considering its vast economic and development challenges notwithstanding its dependency on coal for electricity and production. SA committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025.

The decision making process leading to this commitment had flaws due to exclusion of external actors at the political level where the targets were decided.

6.2 Conclusion of Allison and Zelikow's models of Foreign Policy Analysis

6.2.1 Rational Actor model I

As indicated in the previous chapter the Rational Actor model views government intricacies as a unified actor pursuing national goals and objectives. Rational Actor model involves a decision, decider, a choice, alternative and goals: A decision necessitates a decider to make a choice out of available alternatives in pursuit of national goals. Additionally, Allison and Zelikow (1999:18) associates Rational Actor model with rationality which suggest that decision makers are able to think rationally when making decisions, they calculate risks associated with alternatives to decide on the best choice. Through this model the study is able to explain why SA made the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions in 2009, the study was also able to identify national goals SA government was pursuing when the decision was made and the study discovered there were other alternatives and risks which were considered before the choice was made. Consequently, the Rational Actor model was adequate for the explanation of the SA decision making process on the commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025.

6.2.2 Organisational Behaviour model II

This model explains how different organisations within government behave and how they contribute in decision making processes. The Organisational Behaviour model immerses into government organisational processes and procedures that produces a foreign policy decision. The notion is that foreign policy decision is an output of government organisation. This was also visible in the SA decision of committing to reduce carbon emissions in that government processes and procedures played a significant role. Departmental processes and procedures were applied through research which was done by DEA to gather technical knowledge required to inform the decision. Participation by different government departments and external actors such as academics, NGO's, civil societies and businesses was done for the development of the LTMS which was later used to develop the 34% and 42% targets. The Cabinet also had sessions for decision making process where they later advised the president on choices to be taken (see chapter 4). This evidence supports the views of this study that a part of this decision was as a result of governmental organisation outputs.

6.2.3 Governmental Politics model III

Minimal evidence points to the foreign policy decision making process as political resultant. As Allison and Zelikow (1999:255) alluded that the features of this model are competitive games where ‘actors are seen as players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organisational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by single, rational choice but by pulling and hauling; that is politics’.

Summary of results:

Case study	Model I	Model II	Model III
South African foreign policy decision making on climate change	Yes	Yes	Partially

6.3 SA government decision making process

Based on the experience provided by this study, SA’s decision making proved to be unique and couldn’t be compared with any other. As indicated earlier in the analysis chapter, the decision making process on climate change obligations consists of two phases: phase one was characterised by intense consultation with different stakeholders such as government departments, NGO’s, civil societies, academics and businesses who contributed in development of the LTMS policy, phase two was a political process which involved only the cabinet and the president but excluded external actors. The decision making of SA government on carbon emissions reductions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025 was exclusive to cabinet and president.

6.4 Contribution of Allison and Zelikow’s models

Allison and Zelikow’s triple models have made a significant contribution to this study. The Rational Actor model alone provides a powerful explanation of government events relating to national goals and objectives but inclusion of organisational process and government politics provided more understanding especially in the SA government setting. The latter looks deeper into behaviour of organisations within government and behaviour of individuals during decision making process. It was inadequate to explain the decision made by SA government using the Rational Actor model because of the complexity of the setup of SA government. It becomes problematic when one ignores SA’s bureaucratic and democratic

system instead focusing on national interest, assuming national government as a unitary body. SA is a democratic government which encourages participation of multiparty rather than a single party and participation of civil societies and other organisations.

Even though the models put more emphasis on the national interest in terms of this decision, it also provided an opportunity to deepen understanding of government organisational settings. Indeed governments are not just individuals but they are made up of different organisations and with each organisation allocated a specialty. Subsequently, a government decision is an output of collective efforts of different government organisation. Similarly, different government department such as DEA, DIRCO, Water and Energy brought in the technical element that informed this decision. Furthermore, processes such as consultation, organisation of negotiating team, organisation of cabinet committee and procedures of the decision making played a significant role in the outcome of the decision.

The contribution of Governmental Politics model cannot be ignored in government foreign policy decision making, however this model was not dominant in the SA government decision making process due to similar interest of the decision making actors. SA government includes cabinet members of the same party, the ruling party and therefore competition is minimal because the interest of the ruling party and the government are similar.

6.5 Recommendation

The researcher recommends that future studies of similar nature focus more on the political level of foreign policy decision making on climate change where cabinet members exert influence on the outcome of the decision. Such a study should put more emphasis on behaviour of cabinet members, personality of the president and the process itself. There is also a need to deepen understanding of the participation of the private sector on foreign policy decisions relating to climate change since reduction of carbon emissions affects them the most. In terms of Allison and Zelikow's models, the models do not consider the history of countries such as SA which has contributed immensely on its decision making settings. And lastly capturing of institutions such as the UNFCCC is necessary for the explanation of decision processes on climate change.

6.6 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, application of Allison and Zelikow's (1999) models on the analysis of foreign policy decision making process on climate change is highly recommended especially in Africa, however this must be content specific so that it yields better results. The use of the

three models in one study provides a powerful explanation about the state, government processes and bureaucracies within government. A more political approach is needed to address climate change issues as climate change has become a political matter rather than an environmental matter.

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Appendix

1.0 Interviews analysis

Thematic analysis- coding and themes

1.1 Rational Actor Model 1

Why did South African government make the decision to tackle climate change?			
Themes	Codes	Open coding	Axial coding
National Goals	NG	NG x10	
Developing Country	DC	DC x3	
Political Decision	PD	PD x11	PD
Progressive Leadership	PL	PL x7	
Higher Ambition	HA	HA x8	
Assumption Based	AB	AB x5	
International System	IS	IS x6	
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x12	CC
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x7	
Decision Making	DM	DM x5	
Carbon Emissions Reduction	CE	CE x11	
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x6	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x4	
Key Players	KP	KP x1	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x4	
International Pressure	IP	IP x3	
Economic Impact	EI	EI x8	

What international problem was South Africa trying to solve?			
Themes	Codes	Open-ended coding	Axial coding
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x6	
International Pressure	IP	IP x4	
Progressive Leadership	PL	PL x3	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x2	
Multilateral Systems	MS	MS x5	
International System	IS	IS x3	
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x9	
Climate Injustice	CI	CI x13	CI
Political Pressure	PP	PP x1	
Higher Ambition	HA	HA x2	
Political decision	PD	PD x6	
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x6	
Policy Development	PDV	PDV x4	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x16	CE
Economic Impact	EI	EI x11	
Responsible Citizen	RC	RC x4	
Developing Country	DC	DC x7	

What other options did South Africa have to address this issue?			
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x10	AP
Policy Development	PDV	PDV x7	
Multilateral Systems	MS	MS x2	
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x4	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x7	
Government Consultation	GC	GC x1	
Other Options	OP	OP x11	OP
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x6	
International System	IS	IS x1	
Decision Making	DM	DM x4	
Policy Development	PDV	PDV x7	
Progress Leadership	PL	PL x1	
National Goals	NG	NG x1	
Implementation	IMP	IMP x5	
Higher Ambition	HA	HA x1	

What was South African government's best choice under the conditions?			
Government Consultation	GC	GC x3	
Economic Impact	EI	EI x3	
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x4	
Political Decision	PD	PD x1	
Policy Development	PDV	PDV x3	
Decision making	DM	DM x3	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x7	MS
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x4	
Domestic Response	DR	DR x1	
Developing Country	DC	DC x5	
Internal Process	IP	IP x8	IP
Carbon Emission	CE	CE x4	
Implementation	IMP	IMP x1	
Higher Ambition	HA	HA x 2	
National Goals	NG	NG x	
Other Options	OP	OP x2	

1.2 Organisational Behaviour Model II

What role did organisations and agencies play in the making of this decision? That is setting of the 34% and 42% targets?			
Themes	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x2	
Internal Process	IP	IP x17	IP
Decision Making	DM	DM x3	
Policy Development	PDV	PDV x2	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x1	

Political Decision	PD	PD x3	
Climate Negotiations	AP	CN x4	CN
Government Consultation	GC	GC x2	
Decision Making	DM	DM x3	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x1	

What capabilities and constraints did organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process?

Theme	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Decision Making	DM	DM x5	
Government Consultation	GC	GC x5	
Internal Process	IP	IP x12	IP
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x9	CN
National Goals	NG	NG x3	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x5	
Departmental Roles	DR	DR x2	

From what organisational context, pressure and procedure did the Copenhagen decision emerge?

Themes	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Internal Process	IP	IP x3	IP
Developing Country	DC	DC x7	DC
Multilateral System	MS	MS x2	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x1	
Decision Maker	DM	DM x1	
Political Decision	PD	PD x1	
Departmental Roles	DR	DR x2	

How does decision making work in your department?

Themes	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Internal Process	IP	IP x14	IP
Multilateral System	MS	MS x2	
Decision Making	DM	DM x12	DM
National Goals	NG	NG x1	

Who sets the government's foreign policy agenda on climate change?

Themes	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Decision Making	DM	DM x2	
Carbon Emission	CE	CE x5	CE
Policy Development	PD	PD x4	PD
Climate Negotiation	CN	CN x2	
Internal Process	IP	IP x2	
Departmental Role	DR	DR x3	

1.3 Governmental Politics Model III

Who are the players? Whose views and values count in shaping the choice and actions?			
Themes	Codes	Open-coded	Axial
Internal Process	IP	IP x2	IP
International System	IS	IS x1	
Domestic Response	DR	DR x2	
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x3	CN
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x1	

Who are the advisors			
Internal Process	IP	IP x3	IP
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x2	
Decision Making	DM	DM x1	

What is the process all about?			
Government Consultation	GC	GC x1	
Internal Process	IP	IP x1	
Decision Making	DM	DM x4	DM
Rational Decision	RD	RD x2	
International System	IS	IS x2	
Climate Negotiations	CN	CN x1	
Other Options	OP	OP x3	

What kind of bargaining among from which players produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions?			
Internal Politics	IPT	IPT x6	IPT
Internal Process	IP	IP x3	
Decision Making	DM	DM x2	

2.0 Documentation Analysis

Content Analysis- coding and themes

2.1 National Climate Change Response White Paper

Government Consultation	GC	GC x2	
Legal Obligations	LB	LB x1	
International System	IS	IS x2	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x2	
Decision Making	DM	DM x1	
Mitigation Process	MP	MP x6	MP
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x1	

Scenario Process	SP	SP x1	
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x5	
Unexpected Announcement	UA	UA x1	
Developing Countries	DC	DC x1	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x5	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x4	
Policy Development	PD	PD x4	
Internal Process	IP	IP x2	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x12	CE
Economic Impact	EI	EI x1	

2.2 Long Term Mitigation Scenario

Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x6	
Electricity Generation	EG	EG x7	
Other Options	OP	OP x8	
Economic Impacts	EI	EI x2	
Mitigation Process	MP	MP x1	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x	
Scenario Process	SP	SP x4	
Addressing Problem	AP	AP x2	
Multilateral System	MS	MS x2	

2.3 Financial Mail (Secondary sources)

Decision making	DM	DM x2	
Conditional Commitment	CC	CC x4	
Climate negotiations	CN	CN x1	
Carbon Emissions	CE	CE x2	
Peak Plateau Decline	PPD	PPD x1	
Unexpected Announcement	UA	UA x	

1.2 Interview List

Interviewees	Organisation	Date
Fred Goede	North-West University	02/11/2015
Jaco du Toit	World Wildlife Fund	03/11/2015
Dr Lesley Masters	University of Johannesburg	15/11/2015
Peter Lukey	Department of Environmental Affairs	08/11/2015
Mkhuthazi Steleki	Department of Environmental Affairs	03/03/2016
Simon Cardy	DIRCO	13/01/2016

Dr Sphamandla Zondi	Institute for Global Dialogue	03/02/2016
Tristen Taylor	Earth Life Africa	03/02/2016
Prof Harold Winkler	Energy Research Centre	01/02/2016
Prof Patrick Bond	University of KwaZulu Natal	14/03/2016