

The Green New Deal as Counter-Hegemony

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Compulsory Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:

Date:

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Abstract

This thesis explores the counter-hegemonic potential of the Green New Deal, by enquiring as to whether the Green New Deal can be considered a counter-hegemonic project in the United States. This paper's analysis is rooted in an appreciation of the ways in which politico-ideological projects are formed within a historical context. The structural frameworks that make up societies are a result of these historically determined politico-ideological projects. These politico-ideological projects, which are more commonly understood through the notion of cultural hegemony, are how we understand the character of an existing social order.

Therefore, in its efforts to determine whether the Green New Deal can be considered a counter-hegemonic project this paper begins this process through an outline of the New Deal; which serves as a historical analogue of the Green New Deal. From this point the paper explores the historical construction of the two principle hegemonic projects of the post-war era, embedded liberalism and neoliberalism. The elucidation of these two hegemonic projects and the transition between them, gives us a contextual understanding of what hegemonic projects are, how they are formed, the forces responsible for their formation and the nature of hegemonic transitions. From this perspective the paper gives specific focus to carbon capital, as a faction of the current ruling hegemonic coalition in the United States. The emphasis on carbon capital gives us an understanding of the place occupied by the fossil fuel industry within the current hegemonic order, which also gives us a deeper understanding of how any counter-hegemonic project must work to counteract their influence. Finally the paper ends with an interrogation of the Green New Deal and its potential as a counter- hegemonic project; building off of the historical context of the previous chapters. The analysis is done through an exploration of the origins of the Green New Deal, framing and the challenges of building a coalition of pro-Green New Deal forces.

The concluding argument of this thesis is that the Green New Deal framework can not yet be considered as a counter-hegemonic project. The paper argues that the Green New Deal framework represents a spectrum where one end reflects the politico-ideological principles of the current hegemonic project and on the opposite

end a more radical and truly counter-hegemonic project. The paper argues that the Green New Deal currently represents a process of “interest articulation and aggregation” with counter-hegemonic potential, building towards a truly counter-hegemonic project.

Glossary

GND	Green New Deal
#NODAPL	Dakota Access Pipeline protests
WWII	World War II
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees Celsius	IPBES SR15
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	iIPCC
Works Progress Administration	WPA
Global Political Economy	GPE
International Political Economy	IPE
National Industry Recovery Act	NIRA
Public Works Administration	PWA
National Recovery Administration	NRA
Tennessee Valley Authority	TVA
National Labor Relations Act	Wagner Act
Securities and Exchange Commission	SEC
National Youth Administration	NYA
Agricultural Adjustment Administration	AAA
Federal Housing Act	FHA
National Housing Act of 1934	NHA
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries	OPEC
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act	CISA
Federal Power Commission	FPC
National Energy Policy Development Group	NEPDG

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“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”

-Antonio Gramsci (1971:276).

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background and Motivation

The release of the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees Celsius (SR15) delivered a blunt warning for the preservation of the existing global order. The SR15 was the result of a collaborative effort by 91 authors from 40 different countries, citing over 6000 scientific references. Its major findings were that a 1.5 Degrees Celsius limit in global warming is possible. But what is required for this target to be met is an expeditious reduction in emissions and "rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). The SR15 also suggests that stopping global warming at 1.5 instead of 2 degrees would help limit increasing damage to ecosystems, human health and wellbeing on a planetary scale (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). In addition to this, it suggests that a 2 degrees temperature increase could lead to the increase in the occurrence of extreme weather patterns: rising sea levels, decreased Arctic sea ice, coral bleaching and a loss of ecosystems; among other adverse effects (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). The SR15 indicates that to achieving this 1.5 degrees limit would require "global net human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide (CO₂)" to be reduced by 45 per cent from 2010 levels by the year 2030, and for it to reach "net zero" by 2050 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). The severity of the IPCC report is reflected by that of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services' (IPBES) 2019 Global Assessment Report. The same call for "rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of human society" was echoed by the United Nations' panel on Biodiversity chair Sir Robert Watson at the 7th session of the IPBES Plenary meeting, in May 2019 (Media Release: Nature's Dangerous Decline 'Unprecedented'; Species Extinction Rates 'Accelerating,' 2019). The immediate question put forward by these findings of these reports is what would "rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects

of society" look like? What does such a change entail? To understand what this requires, is to have a clear appreciation of the nature of the structure which underpins the existing social order.

The gravity of this imminent crisis, and the requirements of large-scale reduction of emissions and the associated challenges of achieving such a reduction, are the key principles behind the promotion of a policy framework in the United States that has been termed Green New Deal. This concept of a Green New Deal in the United States, or a set of large-scale policies which aim to address climate change is originally attributed to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman who argued the case for one in a 2007 column (Roberts, 2018). This would later be expanded on in his book *Hot, Flat, and Crowded* (Roberts, 2018). This notion of a Green New Deal would eventually form the centrepiece of the United States' Green Party candidate, Jill Stein's 2016 presidential campaign. The Green New Deal concept would eventually develop beyond the Green Party platform into a joint draft resolution and proposed stimulus package, drafted by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts. This resolution seeks to swiftly deploy the United States federal government, societal and industrial resources, to construct a sustainable and low-carbon society. The core areas of focus for the Green New Deal are: a reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions to zero within the next 10 years; stimulating large-scale growth in clean manufacturing; achieving all the United States' energy needs through clean, renewable and zero-emissions energy sources; rapidly cutting emissions and pollution related to agricultural production; upgrading infrastructure (particularly transportation and house), whilst ensuring all infrastructure bills which pass through Congress are aimed at addressing climate change; a federal jobs guarantee, with a living wage for all workers; welfare and social justice, to ensure access to quality healthcare for all, affordable housing, economic security, clean water, clean air and healthy food while also correcting systemic and social exclusion and injustices (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). How each of these goals will be achieved have yet to be fully expanded on in policy form. But it is made clear in the resolution that the federal government must play a central role in providing public financing, technical expertise, and public investment towards research and development; and the implementation and enforcement of

environmental protections and the expansion of workers' rights (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019).

In the short time since its introduction, the resolution has generated great debate within the mainstream of the American political landscape (Worland, 2019). Those who support the Green New Deal, argue that the framework, more generally, is an example of the exact example of the "rapid and far-reaching changes" which the SR15 calls for to avoid the most destructive effects of climate change (Worland, 2019). Opposition towards the Green New Deal has been primarily political and ideological in nature. The main arguments against it describe it as a financially extravagant proposal which seeks to covertly ensure traditional left-wing economic policies; as opposed to it being a necessary environmental intervention (Worland, 2019). According to data collected by left-wing polling firm Data for Progress, the Green New Deal - and the policies it entails - enjoy strong support across the United States. Their data indicates that only six states demonstrated below 50 per cent support for the Green New Deal (Data for Progress, 2019). The state with the lowest support was Wyoming at 44 per cent; the other states below 50 per cent were Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma and West Virginia (Data for Progress, 2019). This is in large part due to the work of the Sunrise Movement, activist groups and prominent advocates of the Green New Deal who have worked to increase its support amongst the populace since its introduction to the public consciousness in November 2018. Due to its growth in popularity, the language of a Green New Deal has come to represent the most popular manner in which members of the Democratic Party choose to describe comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change. The growing popularity of the language of a Green New Deal is most clearly indicated by 12 out of the 14 candidates in the 2020 Democratic Primary - meeting the debate criteria in October 2019 - calling for a Green New Deal in their climate policy proposals (Data for Progress, 2019). Over the course of the 2020 Democratic Primary, leading environmental scientists and climate activist groups singled out Bernie Sanders' Green New Deal as the most superior to all the other candidates in the field (D'Angelo, 2020). Notwithstanding questions of affordability, a proposed programme of this scale - with its potential to reconfigure all facets of the United States' existing social order - has not been seen since WWII (Roberts, 2018). This level of mobilisation is precisely what congresswoman Alexandria

Ocasio-Cortez and senator Ed Markey call for in their resolution. Describing the required mobilisation towards the implementation of a Green New Deal as a "new national, social, industrial and economic mobilisation on a scale not seen since World War II and the New Deal" (Green New Deal Resolution, 2019:4).

Research Questions

The central question of this paper is, "Can the Green New Deal be considered a counter-hegemonic project"? The secondary questions which this paper asks are: "What is a hegemonic project", "What is the existing hegemonic project" and "How the Green New Deal challenges the existing hegemonic structure?".

Chapter Outline:

Chapter two, will provide the theoretical and analytical framework according to which the above questions will be explored. The theoretical framework which this paper employs is neo-Gramscian, transnational historical materialism. This chapter will begin by outlining this framework through an introduction of the neo-Gramscian lens, how a historical materialist method is applied to the study of global political economy and followed by an outline key themes which are relevant to our analysis of the Green New Deal and its potential as a counter-hegemonic project. The chapter then goes on to define some of the key concepts that emerge from its Gramscian roots; most importantly the Gramscian concept of "hegemony". Finally, the chapter ends with an interrogation of alternative theoretical perspectives to hegemony.

Chapter three, explores: what the New Deal was; how New Deal liberalism represented the refinement of working-class ideals; the merging of the common interests of the working class through the formation of the New Deal coalition; and how this coalition would act as the foundation of a post-war hegemonic project of embedded liberalism.

Chapter four, explores the historical construction of hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism: their accumulation strategies, their political

and sociological ordering of society; and how these act as mechanisms through which hegemonic projects are maintained. This chapter will also explore the historical transition between these projects.

Chapter five, examines how the fossil fuel industry extended its influence within the context of existing hegemonic structures. Due to the limitations of this paper's scope, the chapter will not focus on the position of carbon capital within the historic bloc of embedded liberalism, it will instead give a greater focus to the merging of its interests with that of the neoliberal project. This analysis begins by locating the position of carbon capital within the United State's political economy during the transition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism; early threats to its future in the neoliberal order; how it merged with the neoliberal order; and the different positions of the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations towards the fossil fuel industry more generally.

Chapter six, explores how the Green New Deal serves as a counter-hegemonic project. The first part examines the contemporary origins of the Green New Deal. The chapter will then go on to explore how the Green New Deal, as a politico-ideological project, can be outlined.

Chapter seven, is a continuation from the context set by the of the previous chapter by exploring how Bernie Sanders' presidential campaign provides a framework for understanding how a radical Green New Deal could approach the construction of the coalition that would push for its implementation.

The **final chapter** of this paper is the conclusion, which will summarise and synthesise the analysis of the previous chapters. This chapter anchors the analysis of the previous chapters in the transnational historical materialist perspective. From this position, it provides its final analysis of whether the Green New Deal can be considered a counter-hegemonic project.

Limitations/Delineation of Study

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Green New Deal represents a paradigm shift in the social, economic and political structure of the United States? To understand the scale of the change proposed by the Green New Deal, we must first determine the nature of the existing politico-ideological projects which form the structural basis of a social order. An analysis of the relationship between politico-ideological projects and the structural basis of a social order, provides a picture of the existing orthodoxy that the Green New Deal seeks to confront. A delineation of this orthodoxy will help provide a clearer understanding of how the Green New Deal seeks to challenge the politico-ideological projects which give the existing social order its legitimacy. This analysis will be rooted in an acknowledgement of the historical nature of politico-ideological formations. This appreciation of the historical context is an attempt to conduct a non-reductionist analysis of the relationship between structure and agency in determining the nature of the state.

This paper does not aim to analyse the economic merit of the Green New Deal. It instead seeks to examine whether it aims to disrupt the existing social and political power relations that encourage the entrenchment of carbon interests within the current political, economic and social order of the United States. These questions have been answered through the analysis of key texts surrounding this topic. No interviews were conducted with any members of the social groups or movements affiliated with the Green New Deal. Undoubtedly this would have served as a rich source of information that could have added greater depth to this research. However, I believe that the primary and secondary texts available were extensive and appropriate for the scope of this paper to produce clear and insightful research. Furthermore, due to its scope, this paper only seeks to explore the counter-hegemonic potential of the Green New Deal to create a basis for future research that may expand on this analysis. This future research would give greater focus to the economic, political and social strategies which could expand on the Green New Deal's counter-hegemonic potential.

Chapter 2: Theoretical and Analytical Framework

Neo-Gramscian Perspectives

The neo-Gramscian perspective, referred to as transnational historical materialism by - Professor of International Relations at the VU University Amsterdam - Henk Overbeek, is an application of a historical materialist method to the study of international relations and the global political economy (GPE) (Overbeek, 2000:168). The roots of neo-Gramscianism within the field of international political economy (IPE) are located in the work of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Mark Rupert and Dutch scholars such as Kees van der Pijl, Overbeek, and Otto Holman (Radice, 2013:53). This approach draws heavily on the writings of Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci. Neo-Gramscianism looks at how a particular grouping of social forces, dominant ideological formations and the state establish and uphold world orders (Jameson et. al., 1988). Transnational historical materialism differs from other theories of international relations as it seeks to explore the origins, development and nature of historical structures, rather than simply accepting that states and the relationships between them – often seen as anarchic – as a given. The origins of the Neo-Gramscian approach and how Gramsci's ideas could be utilised in an exploration of power structures in the GPE are rooted in an article by Canadian political scientist Robert W. Cox's article *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory* and its follow up piece *Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Methods*. Cox's 1987 book, *Production, Power and World Order* also helped create the link between Gramscian theory and the neo-Gramscian of GPE. In these texts, Cox employs a Gramscian approach to the concept of hegemony, which is different from that of the realist approach where hegemony is understood as the domination of one state over several others (Howson and Smith, 2008). Cox also incorporates Gramsci's "state theory", the notion of historic blocs and elites as "organic intellectuals".

Key Themes

Like most theoretical perspectives, there is a wide variety of authors and applications of the neo-Gramscian or transnational historical materialist approach. Despite the different applications of the various authors who have utilised this theoretical approach, there are several common core themes which occur in most works of transnational historical materialist analysis, to varying degrees. The most relevant of these themes for this particular study are: "commodification and the deepening of capitalist relations of production"; 'the political articulation of class interests" and "counter-hegemony".

Commodification and the Deepening of Capitalist Relations of Production

Historical materialism at its core, is a historical analysis of the ways human beings have ordered the production and reproduction of their material existence and how these patterns shape society (Satgar, 2013:61). Marx described this as "the totality of all activity undertaken by human beings" being done as a means of reproducing their existence (Overbeek, 2000:172). Cox argues that societies are set apart by a distinct hierarchical arrangement of several modes of social relations of production (Overbeek, 2000:172-173). Within these modes of social relations of production, there exists a specific arrangement of social forces, which determine (and are themselves determined by) a state's form (Overbeek, 2000:172-173). These social forces are responsible for more than dictating state form, they are also responsible for directing a state's location within the international division of labour and the international system, more broadly (Cox, 1987:1). Cox stresses that the connections between relations of production, state forms and world order, all have a material, institutional and ideological elements (Cox, 1987:1). In addition to this, there is no pre-arranged hierarchy between these elements (Overbeek, 2000:173).

Political Articulation of Class Interest

Perhaps the most acutely Gramscian of our themes is the second theme, the "political articulation of class interests" (Overbeek, 2000:173). This theme explores and reveals how political power goes beyond a primary reliance on the control of the state's coercive apparatus. Instead, in this instance, political power is spread through

a wide range of institutions and relationships across civil society (Overbeek, 2000:173). This form of class rule, or hegemony, is built on consent and only relies on the coercive apparatus of the state as a last resort (Overbeek, 2000:173). The ideological and moral aspects of this "consensual rule" help secure the historic bloc - "configuration of social forces upon which state power rests" - and its hegemony over society more generally (Cox, 1987:105). Organic intellectuals from within the dominant social groups create and spread the ideological and moral perspectives, framing them as "common sense" to tie subordinate groups into the existing social order (Gramsci, 1971:181-182). A fundamental question within transnational historical materialism, under this theme, is what influences the content of the hegemonic ideology; and by extension the strategic aim of a historic bloc (Overbeek, 2000:174)? The "capital fractions approach" is a systematic attempt to achieve this, through an exploration of the relationship between the content of hegemonic ideas and the basic dynamics of capital accumulation (Overbeek, 2000:174). This form of analysis stems from Capital Volume 2, where Karl Marx examines the different functional forms that capital takes within the circuits that make up the greater reproductive circuit of capital; commodity capital, money capital and productive capital (Overbeek, 2000:174). These fractions, in concrete terms, are comparable to businesses, financial firms and industry (Van Der Pijl, 1998:49-63). Moreover, this process - through which capital is split into different forms - also helps form class fractions which carry with them shared aims, interests and experiences which set the foundations for "a coalition of interests aspiring to represent the 'general interest'" (Overbeek, 2000:174). The ultimate aims of class struggle are political aims associated with the struggle for power within the state. As the ruling class, the bourgeoisie must demonstrate a specific class position which represents the "essence" of this general interest. During the process in which a particular definition of the general interest is formulated - through the work of organic intellectuals, planning groups and politicians - the different interests compete for dominance. Thus, at the level of class, the bourgeoisie is constantly busy building coalitions to go beyond the specificities of special interests (Van Der Pijl, 1998:50).

The uneven development of productive forces, capital's hostility to regulation and discipline, and the diffusive nature of competition, all work against the creation of a universal "all-encompassing" programme which gives equal priority to all the

competing interests of these different capital and class fractions. This then leads to a continued struggle for political leadership and hegemony. Individual units of capital partake in a process of interest accumulation/aggregation as functional and historical fractions of capital; such as "money capital, merchant banks or late 19th-century German heavy industry (Van Der Pijl, 1998:50). From their specific position, each seeks to try to create the type of momentum they need to influence the general direction of society more generally.

"The actual relevance of the fractioning of the bourgeoisie resides in the continuous attempt (which itself is the result of competition) of the individual capitals to make their specific interests appear as the general interest at the level of the state" (Hickel, 1975:151).

Thus, it is only through their actions that fractions become recognisable.

Eventually, through a multidimensional process, class strategy develops beyond its fractional beginnings uniting into "concepts of control" (Van Der Pijl, 1998:51). Concepts of control represent "frameworks of thought and practice" through which a particular worldview of the ruling class is shaped into a societal "common sense" which sets the general limits for what society sees as possible (Van Der Pijl, 1998:51). These concepts of control represent the manifestations of the "general interest" (Van Der Pijl, 1984:1-20). A concept of control is implied when it is hegemonic, thus making a specific approach to capitalist development, orthodoxy. The analysis of different concepts of control reveals how "capitalism" has existed in historically dependent, impermanent forms; things such as the welfare state which were normal in a specific period, are widely denounced in another (Van Der Pijl, 1998:51). The set of principles which make up the existing orthodoxy, are not set in stone. The same is true for changes in labour processes, modes of accumulation, forms of state/society relations, the disciplining of capital and the widening and/or deepening of commodification (Van Der Pijl, 1998:51). There are four main concepts of control identified, within transnational historical materialist literature, which articulate the capitalist general interest at both the world scale and at the national level. These four concepts are liberal internationalism, a state monopoly tendency, corporate liberalism - embedded liberalism - and neoliberalism (Van Der Pijl,

1998:63). Each concept of control is associated with its own particular patterns of accumulation, internationalisation and class struggle. The patterns of accumulation for the four concepts of control are: extensive accumulation (liberal internationalism), intensive accumulation (state monopoly tendency), progressive accumulation (corporate liberalism) and virtual accumulation (neoliberalism) (Van Der Pijl, 1998:64). Progressive accumulation in particular refers to the combination of labour and capital-intensive processes seen in the production of mixed goods seen in the automobile, chemical and electrical engineering industries (Van Der Pijl, 1998:56). This is characteristic of the 1950s post-war period of innovation and research intensive industrialisation that has more generally been understood as the Fordist era of production in the advanced capitalist countries of North America and Europe. Virtual accumulation refers to a historically new configuration of capital following progressive accumulation, which is characterised by a growing dominance and centrality of finance capital (Van Der Pijl, 1998:57). A concept of control more generally understood as neoliberalism.

To use a Gramscian description, concepts of control describe the ideological and hegemonic structure of specific historical arrangements of capital. Concepts of control also reveal the relationship between structure and agency. Structure is expressed through the patterns of accumulation and agency is depicted in the social forces that emerge from production relations, who compete over the direction of the accumulation process, and the role and nature of the state (Overbeek, 2000:174). Concepts of control represent the strategic aspect of a historic bloc's formation, by connecting the creation of political and ideological projects to the structural foundations of a social order (Overbeek, 2000:174).

Counter-Hegemony

Furthermore, the neo-Gramscian approach is all the more relevant a theoretical framework for this study as it is (argued by Cox to be) a critical theory (Radice, 2008:54). As a critical theory, it is well suited to the purposes of this study as it interrogates the "historical origins of a given social order" and leaves room for a potential transition to a new one (Radice, 2008:54). This is explored through the third theme of "counter-hegemony". Whilst, transnational historical materialism has been

consistently strong in its ability to analyse the process of global restructuring, the historical transitions across and mapping of hegemonic concepts of control, it has been much weaker in its ability to analyse the possible resistance to dominant social forces (such as transnational capital) in the prevailing hegemonic structure of neoliberalism (Overbeek, 2000:179). In his analysis of transnational class formation, Van Der Pijl concludes that the cadre class - which represents transnational socialisation in the current hegemonic structure - may be in the best position to initiate transformative action (Overbeek, 2000:179). Despite this, Van Der Pijl does not give a clear strategic view as to how they may achieve this transformative action.

"the concrete history of our present world and the development of its ruling classes to global unification under a neoliberal concept, teach us that such a community [i.e. a classless society] cannot come about in a single act. Only through the cumulative momentum of a series of particular, largely contingent episodes, can we hope that the forces capable of imposing limits on the capitalist exploitation of people and nature can prevail, and the suicidal drive of neoliberalism be reversed" (Van Der Pijl, 1998: 165).

On the other hand, Cox argues that resistance must occur from the patient build-up of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc, "a new historic bloc capable of sustaining a long war of position until it is strong enough to become an alternative basis of polity" (Cox, 1991:349). French sociologist, Andre C. Drainville, argues that a transnational historical materialist approach cannot wait for a patient build-up of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc, rather it must now begin to "give way to more active sorties against transnational neoliberalism, and the analysis of concepts of control must beget original concepts of resistance" (Drainville, 1994:125). Through an application of transnational historical materialism –and applying the neo-Gramscian framework for the possible change in a historic structure - Canadian sociologists William K. Carroll and Robert S. Ratner, propose a path towards forging an alternative hegemony to overcome the current climate and ecological crises. Carroll and Ratner argue, that counter-hegemonic movements must join both the aspects of justice with the ecology; that social forces seeking hegemonic status must progressively indicate an ability to present "solutions to a variety of issues related to nature and the environment" (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:12). In other words, such

movements need to find ways of "developing alternative forms of production and reproduction" or "alternative conceptions of nature-society relations"; going beyond the politics of resistance (Karriem, 2009:318). Carroll and Ratner, state that foundational challenge to the counter-hegemonic movements is to build up "their counter-hegemonic capacities so that an oppositional culture can be sustained against the colonising and marginalising moves of capital and state" (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:13). According to Carroll and Ratner, to overcome this specific challenge a movement must increase its creative ability: to take part in the process of community-building, attending to the needs of their constituents, and mobilising and participating in collective action (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:13). Counter-hegemonic movements should aim to achieve each of these objectives by articulating a shared interest with other movements (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:13). In addition to this, they must avoid being co-opted or marginalised by the system. Carroll and Ratner, also state that a movement's ability to successfully attend to these objectives, must be reinforced with an ability to recognise its political project, as a "cultural politics of recognitions" where injustices originate from social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:13). Another way to view this political project is as a "material politics of redistribution" where injustices originate from societies political and economic structures (Carroll and Ratner, 2010:13).

Gramscian Concepts

Hegemony

To gain a clear understanding of the neo-Gramscian approach of transnational historical materialism, one must have a foundational understanding of the Gramscian concepts which are central to it. Chief amongst these is the Gramscian conception of hegemony. This idea in its simplest form refers to "a combination of coercion and consent which is not merely exercised by the state, but by civil society as well (Howson and Smith, 2008). Gramsci places a special emphasis on rule through coercion. There are two central currents which underline the Gramscian conception of hegemony. The first of these comes from debates within the Third International regarding strategies of the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent formation of a

socialist state; the second comes from the works of Niccolo Machiavelli (Cox, 1993:50). In the case of the first strand, hegemony was a concept used in Lenin's descriptions of the dominance and leadership of the working class in a democratic revolution (Cox, 1993:50). In this conception, the working class enacted its hegemony over the direction of allied classes - such as the peasantry- whilst dominating enemy classes. This conception of hegemony applied exclusively to the role played by the working class in directing workers, peasants and other groups who would be supportive of the revolution. The Machiavellian influence is taken from Machiavelli's concept of power as a combination of consent and coercion (Cox, 1993:52). If the consensual aspect of power acts as its dominant characteristic, hegemony is maintained. Whereas, coercion always remains dormant, and more generally exercised on the periphery. Gramsci marries these two influences towards a new conception of hegemony by inverting the first strand and describing hegemony as something held by the bourgeoisie; and the various mechanisms of domination held by the dominant classes. Enabling him to distinguish between instances where the bourgeoisie had ascended to a hegemonic position versus those where it had not (Cox, 1993:51). Gramsci's conception of hegemony is directly linked to his conception of the capitalist state. Gramsci's conception of hegemony led to a more organic interpretation of the state. One which went beyond the static notion of the state as exclusively meaning "government". Gramsci's conception of the state is split into the notion of political society and civil society. According to this distinction political society refers to the realm of political institutions and legal constitutional control (Gramsci, 1971:245). This refers more directly to structures such as the police, the army legislative bodies and the legal system. Civil society, on the other hand, represents ideological institutions (Mayo, 2008:22). This domain, and the institutions that it consists of, are more commonly understood as the non-state or private sphere, which determines the relationship between the state and the economy. The distinction Gramsci makes between the political and civil societies is a conceptual one, in reality, the two are more generally known to overlap. Both political and civil society act as the two levers through which hegemony is exercised within a capitalist state, according to Gramsci. Political society represents the domain of the coercive and civil society represents that of consent. In this hegemonic order - more specifically that of the modern capitalist state as outlined by Gramsci – the links between consent and coercion are often obscured by economic dependency or the

economic power relations which encourages groups and individuals to abide by the logic of the system even when consent and coercion do not occur. Furthermore, civil society and its network of institutions work to uphold the existing hegemonic order, being closely linked to the interests of the most influential social groups; primarily the bourgeoisie (Mayo, 2008:22).

The Machiavellian influence, as previously described, in the Gramscian concept of hegemony is what allows this broader understanding of it as it applies to relations of domination and subordination; which can also be expanded to relations of world order (Cox, 1994:52). Despite this broader usage, it is still necessary to note that these power relations are not separate from their social basis, instead, they give greater clarity to what the social basis of these power relations are. For Gramsci, the most distinct feature of hegemony is its fluidity and non-static nature. It constantly remains open to renewal and recreation, negotiation and renegotiation (Mayo, 2008:24). Due to its incomplete and selective nature (Williams, 1976), there are many moments where fissures appear which create a space for counter-hegemonic actions. Gramsci argued that the area most vulnerable to counter-hegemonic activity is that which protects the foundations of hegemony itself, civil society (Mayo, 2008:24). Gramsci identifies two distinct strategies to overthrow the existing order, in the efforts of replacing it with a new set of social relations. The first of these is what Gramsci calls 'a war of manoeuvre', which is the explicit act or attempt to transform the State and its coercive apparatus by directly overthrowing said State (Cox, 1994:52). Gramsci argued that this approach to attaining social change was inadvisable in advanced capitalist democracies as its success relied largely on a State where civil society was underdeveloped and unstructured. Gramsci's argument specifically referred to the case of Russia before the revolution and its perceived underdevelopment in relation to the more advanced capitalist democracies of North America and Europe (Cox, 1994:52). The degree to which this strategy may be "inadvisable" for other developing nations, which lack the institutional stability of the advanced capitalist nations, is debatable. But for the purposes of this paper's focus on the United States, it is important to note that there is room to debate the fluidity of these positions. But an extensive examination of this fluidity within the context of the United States is beyond the scope of this paper.

Gramsci's work deviates from the economic mysticism and determinism of other Marxist thinkers who preceded him. Gramsci critiques deterministic notions of revolution 'as a moment of unprecedented mass enlightenment' or that some form of economic collapse would act as a catalyst to a revolutionary moment. Instead, Gramsci believed that a process of State transformation and its coercive apparatus would have to occur before a counter-hegemonic group could truly take control. Gramsci used the case of Western Europe during the same period to contrast that of Russia, where economic collapse was not enough to spark a revolution, as its civil society was advanced and structured enough to protect the existing social order (Cox, 1994:52). This brings us to the second strategy which Gramsci describes as a 'war of position'. A 'war of position' refers to the construction of a new hegemony or alternative vision of the world by challenging prevailing social organisation and cultural influences (Mayo, 2008:24). More explicitly this refers to a "seizure" of civil society by counter-hegemonic forces. Due to the space occupied by civil society as the defender of the prevailing hegemonic order, a 'war of position' would require the creation of alternative institutions and alternative intellectual materials within the current societal order (Cox, 1994:53). It would also require stronger links between subordinate groups, that would have to work towards building a counter-hegemonic movement whilst resisting the temptation of accepting incremental gains (that fit within the framework of bourgeois hegemony) for the respective subordinate groups within such a movement (Cox, 1994:53). It is this process which leads to the formation of a historic bloc, or the complex grouping of classes, factions or forces which act as a structure seeking to create a new order (Cox, 1994:56).

Historic Bloc

A historic bloc represents a historical consensus:

"between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements." (Gill, 2002:58).

This form of grouping, aligned in this way around a set of hegemonic ideas, whether prominent or nascent, is the structure which Gramsci described as a historic bloc (Cox, 1994:56). In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci describes this notion of the

historic bloc and dialectical concept, meaning the reciprocal nature of all the constituent elements interact to form a greater union (Gramsci, 1971:366). These interacting elements are what he refers to as the superstructure and structure (Cox, 1994:56). Gramsci sees ideas (the ideological) and material conditions (the economic sphere) as being closely linked or reciprocal in how they influence each other. Gramsci juxtaposes the realm of political, ethical and ideological activity with that of the economic, to avoid reducing one into the other (Cox, 1994:56).

The coalition of class forces which make up the historic bloc requires a hegemonic social class for it to exist. A dominant hegemonic class can maintain unity and coherence within the bloc through the promotion of a common culture (Cox, 1994:56-57). On the other hand, the creation of a new historic bloc requires a deliberate and planned drive from its leaders. This would-be hegemonic class, would not only have to "seize" civil society and the economy, it would have to create a compelling set of ideas and arguments to help build the network of organisations and institutions it would need for its 'war of position' (Gill, 2002:58).

Intellectuals, Good Sense and Common Sense

Intellectuals

Gramsci's definition includes a much larger group of social agents than what the term is commonly used to define. The Gramscian category of "intellectuals" extends beyond scholars and artists - or what he referred to as the "organisers of culture" - to officials who occupy "technical" and "directive" roles in society (Ramos Jr., 1982). Gramsci argued that "all men are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all intellectuals by social function" (Gramsci, 1971:3). Gramsci divides intellectuals into the two functional categories, traditional and organic intellectuals (Ramos Jr., 1982). Traditional intellectuals are tied to tradition and the works of past intellectuals. They are linked to disciplines and knowledge-producing institutions and seek "to represent a historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms" (Gramsci, 1971). Traditional intellectuals have an inter-class character to them, but their position is rooted in past and present class relations whilst hiding

their links to different historical class formations (Gramsci, 1971:3). The second category is that of organic intellectuals, who are more directly linked to their specific social class and the economic structure of society. Organic intellectuals are less identifiable by their profession - which could be any job that corresponds with the specific class of the individual - they are instead identified by their role in guiding the ideas and aspirations representing the class to which they are an organic member of (Gramsci, 1971:3). Every new social group that has come into being through a new field which acts as an "essential function in the world of economic production" organically generates, simultaneously with itself, intellectuals who give this new social group "homogeneity and an awareness of their own function" across the economic, social and political landscape (Gramsci, 1971:7). The concept of organic intellectuals is an effective tool used by Gramsci to put emphasis on the kinds of connections between specific knowledge producers and specific classes (Crehan, 2016:82). At its core, the concept is built on an understanding of class formation where history as a progressive force, leads to the formation of new economic spaces which in turn generate "commonalities of interest" (Crehan, 2016:82). These commonalities of interest - which Marx describes as "class-in-itself" - create the possibilities (emphasis on possibilities) for the appearance "of new self-conscious classes"- what Marx calls class-for-itself (Crehan, 2016:82). The historic transition from the feudal system to the capitalist system, is an example of this transition from class-in-itself to class-for-itself; as the disintegration of the feudal system brought with it the development of a new bourgeois class (Crehan, 2016:82). Thus, the creation of this new class occurred simultaneously with the creation of its organic intellectuals and it is in their function as knowledge producers that they give this new class "homogeneity and an awareness of their own function" in economic, social and political fields (Gramsci, 1971:7).

Within the context of class struggle, the organic intellectuals who are created from the subaltern forces - the term Gramsci uses to describe social groups which have no power of representation in the dominant socio-economic institutions of society (working class/the proletariat/peasantry) - seeking hegemony, have the functional role of building direct consensus. Which positions them outside of political society, leaving only civil society open for them to operate on a coercive basis. Therefore these organic intellectuals must persuade the working class, through a war of

position, to unite around common class interests which can be consolidated into a coherent counter-hegemonic project. It is through a war of position that organic intellectuals will seek to ideologically win over the traditional intellectuals. This process of assimilation is made more effective by the speed at which the subaltern, or working class, can develop their own organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971:10). Winning over traditional intellectuals helps increase the likelihood of "spontaneous" consent to a new social order (Ramos Jr., 1982).

Common Sense and Good Sense

The organic intellectuals' practical task of uniting the subaltern, or working class, masses around shared common interests requires the formation of "new popular beliefs" or a new "common sense" (Gramsci, 1971:424). When speaking of common sense, Gramsci refers to "the 'spontaneous' feelings of the masses" (Gramsci, 1971:198-199). Spontaneity in this instance refers to the fact that these feelings "are not the result of any systematic educational activity on the part of any already conscious leading group, but have been formed through everyday experience illuminated by 'common sense' "(Gramsci, 1971:198-199). This subaltern, or working class, common sense is an implicit philosophy. The formation of this new common sense must also be met with the creation of "a new culture and a new philosophy which will be rooted in the popular consciousness with the same solidity and imperative quality as traditional beliefs" (Gramsci, 1971:424). To create this new common sense organic intellectuals must identify, refine and expand the good sense that exists within common sense

Alternative Approaches to Hegemony and their Limitations

The concept of hegemony is a long-standing concept within the study of GPE and international relations. It has also been employed more specifically by theorists aligned with the perspectives of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power" is an example of a liberal hegemonic project, which seeks to rule through the socialisation of a "hegemons" values; which in his conception refers to that of the United States (Persaud, 2016:551). This application

serves as a direct contrast to that of the "zero-sum" perspective of the neorealist perspective, which argues for a "winner takes all" approach; whereas the neoliberal institutionalists argue that absolute gains within a given system, promote the likelihood of cooperation (Persaud, 2016:551). The institutional aspect of neoliberal institutionalism refers to regimes which are differentiated along different "issues areas". The cooperation is located in hierarchical institutions, whose hierarchical essence reveals the state-centric nature of this application of liberalism (Persaud, 2016:551). Regimes are seen as being better suited for producing superior information, coordination and whilst limiting negative traits in a system such as cheating. These regimes are formed through the "leadership" of a hegemonic power (Persaud, 2016:551). Necessitating a state with the adequate amounts of resources and credibility to create an international order, that has the legitimacy and capacity to gain support without the use of coercion. Neoliberal institutionalism emphasises different forms of cooperation within the GPE and how leadership is structured. A Neo-Gramscian, or transnational historical materialist approach also focuses on how consensus is achieved, but goes beyond this to illustrate how it also acts as a form of domination. Which differs from the neoliberal institutionalist approach which views hegemonic actions as a sign of good leadership. Both approaches emphasise legitimacy, with the neo-Gramscians placing a greater focus on the "processes of legitimation" (Persaud, 2016:551). More specifically how that process interacts with production, state power and ideology (Persaud, 2016:551). The neorealist approach can also be identified as a problem-solving theory, as it works off of the assumption that the core elements of the international system remain constant (Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 2003). The neorealist perspective sees states as the only significant actors; as opposed to neoliberal institutionalists who as the most important actors, whilst using regimes to promote their interests. Therefore, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism both fail to provide a more comprehensive analysis of structural change, beyond these elements. Furthermore, these traditional theoretical perspectives preserve the dominant social and power relations - particularly their inequalities - of existing structures by labelling them as constants (Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 2003). As a critical theory, neo-Gramscian transnational historical materialism, "does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing" (Cox 1981: 129). This

makes the neo-Gramscian, transnational historical materialist framework, the most appropriate theoretical approach for this paper's analysis of the origins and nature of the existing social and power relations of the United States and whether the Green New Deal seeks to change them.

Chapter 3: The New Deal

Introduction

Politically the New Deal helped expand the space for progressive policies within the mainstream of the United States' political discourse, whilst its policies helped give a material indication of the possible scale at which the federal government could act to implement progressive interventions that improve the material welfare of its citizens. This material aspect also helped expand the collective imagination of progressive forces, within the United States' political landscape. The New Deal's historical function, as a political project, was to act as a "process of interest articulation and aggregation". This process would help set the foundations for the hegemonic order of embedded liberalism that would follow WWII. The policies of the New Deal created a popular interpretation, or specifically American understanding, of the concept of the welfare state. This American conceptualisation of the welfare state was a manifestation of the good sense that was born out of the working class population's common sense experience of the Great Depression. New Deal liberalism, represents the process of articulation and intensification of the working-class population's good sense. It is only in the post-war period that this process comes into maturity. Through the consolidation of the common interests of the working class, and aligned forces of productive capital, into a general interest represented by the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism. The following chapter will explore: what the New Deal was; how New Deal liberalism represented the articulation and development of good sense, within the working class' common sense experience of the Depression; the merging of the common interests of the working class through the formation of the New Deal coalition; and how this coalition would act as the foundation of a post-war historic bloc, centred around the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism.

The New Deal as a Process of Interest Articulation and Aggregation

The New Deal was a series of financial reforms, public works projects, programmes and regulations in the United States, put in place by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a response to the Great Depression. These economic and public service programmes were implemented between 1933 and 1939 and focused primarily on what has been termed by historians as the "3 Rs": relief, reform and recovery. Relief being for the unemployed and the poor suffering from the crises; recovery for the economy which was greatly impacted by the depression; and reform for the financial system to avert a future depression (Berkin et al., 2011). Today in their description of the New Deal, historians make a distinction between a First New Deal (1933-1934) and a Second New Deal (1935-1936); the second one often being described as more bold and ambitious than the first (Berkin et al., 2011). The term "new deal", which the plan would come to be known as, originated from the 1932 acceptance speech Roosevelt gave when he accepted the Democratic Party's nomination for president (Berkin et al., 2011:726). In this speech, Roosevelt established what would be the key message behind his campaign by stating that he and (by extension) the Democratic Party would not be afraid of moving away from "all foolish traditions" and that he promised "a new deal for the American people" (Berkin et al., 2011:726). In this acceptance speech, Roosevelt did not offer a set of concrete plans or ideas to solve the country's immediate problems, and it was instead the media which ran with the notion of a "new deal" that gave Roosevelt his campaign slogan of the New Deal (Berkin et al., 2011:726). It was only following Roosevelt's election where proper action, informing the set of principles and ideas that would come to underpin the programmes of the New Deal, began to take place.

The Intellectual Work of Shaping the New Deal "Good Sense" Into The New Common Sense

The first significant step in the creation of the New Deal was the formation of Roosevelt's team of advisors who would come to be known as the "Brain Trust". This Brain Trust was a group of specialists in law, economics and social welfare who would serve the intellectual function to help guide and develop the social and economic principles of the New Deal; in their capacity as advisors (Berkin et al., 2011:727). But this alone, did not yet lead to the formation of the unified and

coherent programme that the New Deal would come to be known as. There were major differences in how the Brain Trust and Roosevelt's other advisors felt the economic crises should be approached. Some felt that the Roosevelt administration would be better served by working in collaboration with big business through the implementation of regulations and mutual planning on economic matters; whereas others believed that the Roosevelt administration should promote social programmes and greater competition within the economy (Berkin et al., 2011:727). But the arguably more significant intellectual contribution in shaping the policies of the New Deal and the corresponding political project of New Deal liberalism was the role of organic intellectuals in Roosevelt's cabinet and prominent left-wing critics of the New Deal such as Secretary of Labour Frances Perkins; Secretary of Agriculture - later Vice President and Secretary of Commerce - Henry A. Wallace; Father Charles Coughlin, a Roman Catholic priest with an influential radio listenership of 30 million Americans; Senator Huey Long of Louisiana; and Dr Francis Townsend a California public health physician (Berkin et al., 2011:733).

Perkins, who had previously been a settlement house worker, is a historical example of the potential influence of a working-class organic intellectual (Berkin et al., 2011:616). In her nomination as Secretary of Labour - having previously served Roosevelt a similar position when he was Governor of New York —, Perkins accepted the offer only on the condition that she was able to advance specific legislation (Berkin et al., 2011:717). Her priorities were a forty-hour workweek, minimum wage, unemployment compensation, banning child labour, federal aid for unemployment relief and social security, among other things (Downey, 2009). Roosevelt agreed that she would be given room to implement these policies, granted that she found her means of bringing these policies to life (Berkin et al., 2011:719). Her prioritisation of worker's welfare in this policy form, demonstrates the form in which a working-class organic intellectual's articulation and refinement of working-class good sense, can result in the formation of a new common sense. Her policies and her contributions to the jobs and relief programmes of the New Deal, reveal how the aggregation of a class' refined common interests can be shaped into a more generalised political interest. Perkin's greatest contribution in this regard was the creation of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Berkin et al., 2011:719). Equally the intellectual contributions of Wallace were born out of his rural background; working as a writer and editor for his

family-owned farm paper "Wallace's Farm" (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1970:177). During his entry into the Roosevelt administration, Wallace brought with him a perspective and objectives that would serve as the bedrock of the New Deal farm relief programmes and orientation towards economic reforms (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1970:177). Wallace went beyond his position as a Secretary of Agriculture, positioning himself as a "New Deal philosopher" and a champion of socio-economic reform. Wallace's philosophy was a combination of theological elements from "the Social Gospel", an appreciation for the great changes brought on by the industrial revolution and institutional economics (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1970:177). Wallace was also a supporter of the economic theories of Thorstein Veblen (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1970:177).

Father Charles, Senator Long and Dr Townsend each produced different critiques of and proposals for the New Deal. Father Coughlin's organisation the National Union for Social Justice proposed a guaranteed annual income, the redistribution of wealth, stronger anti-monopoly laws, and the nationalisation of the banking sector (Berkin et al., 2011:733). Senator Long also proposed a broad-based plan known as the "Share the Wealth" plan which offered an annual \$2000 for every family, home, car, radio and a university education for children (Berkin et al., 2011:733). Long's plan, which proposed a 100 per cent tax for incomes over \$1 million, saw Share the Wealth societies across the U.S. gain large support with 4 million followers across the country (Berkin et al., 2011:733). Dr Townsend's proposals were targeted towards the elderly, recommending a \$200 monthly check to non-working Americans over the age of 60 (Berkin et al., 2011:733). There was also increasing pressure from workers and unions for legislation that would strengthen unionisation and assist industrial workers; this was largely due to raised expectations from the NRA coupled with the growing dissatisfaction from its perceived limitations (Berkin et al., 2011:733).

The First and Second New Deal

First New Deal (1933-1934)

The New Deal was officially kicked off by what historians have since labelled as the "first 100 days", indicating the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration.

This period saw the first set of initiatives implemented to counteract the worst effects of the Great Depression. This began with the Emergency Banking Act - which was passed by Congress on the 9th of March 1933 - which aimed restore the public's trust in the banking system by allowing the Federal Reserve and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to support the banks through funds and buying stocks from particular banks (Berkin et al., 2011:728). Once the banks across the United States became operational again, the New Deal had begun in earnest. The New Deal as it came into being in the months following Roosevelt's entry into the office of the presidency began to chart three, distinct but at times often overlapping, paths of: relief, recovery and reform.

Relief was characterised by the initiatives which sought to bring immediate assistance to the members of the population that were the most affected by the effects of the depression. It is also characterised by the efforts which sought to bring assistance to those who were unemployed. The programmes which were most indicative of this relief effort were those focused on public works, farms and rural areas. The National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) which was passed on June 16th 1933, created the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) (Berkin et al., 2011). The PWA used public funding to build infrastructure which would have wider societal benefits, such as schools, roads, hospitals, government buildings and dams (Berkin et al., 2011). This helped put a great number of the unemployed to work. The NRA, on the other hand, worked to introduce regulations to industry through the creation of codes of "fair practices" (Berkin et al., 2011). This administration's operations would eventually be stopped by a unanimous 1935 U.S. Supreme Court decision, but a great number of its labour provisions would be carried forward in the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), that was passed in the same year (Berkin et al., 2011). Thus its long term legacy would be a sharp growth in union power, which would later become a strong group within the New Deal Coalition that would dominate the political landscape in the following years (Berkin et al., 2011). The initiatives which characterised the recovery effort, sought to pull the U.S. economy out of depression and back to normal health. Initiatives such as the NRA and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) also fit into this category. The TVA, which was launched in 1933, was an innovative project which sought to halt flooding, generate electricity and modernise poor farms

in the Tennessee Valley area (Berkin et al., 2011:730). This ambitious project was a key example of federally directed regional planning and development. The New Deal also saw private homeownership as a key step in the recovery effort. The shifting of focus towards greater relief and reform efforts in the Second New Deal is evident in the programmes that were implemented during this period. Some of the initiatives implemented as a part of the relief and recovery efforts could also be categorised as being part of the category of reform. More specifically, this refers to the NHA and FHA, and the Second Agricultural Adjustment Act. But most of the programmes which could be categorised as reform efforts, all sought to address issues which the Roosevelt administration understood as being expressions of the inherent instability of the market, which the federal government would have to stabilise (Berkin et al., 2011:37). Initiatives which fell under this category were: The Bank Act of 1933, the Beer and Wine Revenue Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Indian Reorganisation Act, Reciprocal Trade Agreement, the REA, Wagner Act, Social Security, Public Utilities Holding Company Act, Revenue Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Second New Deal (1935-1938)

The New Deal had begun with close to unanimous support from Congress and the populace. But this began to change with the steady stream of new programmes and initiatives being produced by the Roosevelt administration, and corresponding economic improvements (Berkin et al., 2011:733). Criticism of the New Deal came from both the left and right of the political spectrum. Republicans and those on the right began to oppose the relief programmes, increasing government intervention in the private sector and federal spending; as they felt that these were all threats to capitalism (Berkin et al., 2011:733). In response to his critics on the left, Roosevelt shifted his priorities and put a greater emphasis on relief and reform efforts. In 1935 -with a strong Democratic majority from the state and congressional elections of the previous year- what historians call the "Second New Deal" began, which was markedly more liberal and bold than that which came before. This period began properly, with what historians call the "Second Hundred Days" of legislation". The first initiative during this period was the creation of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The WPA - which was created through \$5 billion made

available from Congress for further relief efforts - was successful in achieving its aim of increasing employment, as it employed over 2.1 million Americans a year between 1935 and 1938 (Berkin et al., 2011:734). Much of this labour was geared towards public works programmes. The WPA built on the strengths of the PWA as it set a maximum 140-hour work month, increased wages above relief payments; and created jobs for artists, musicians, photographers, white-collar workers and professionals (Berkin et al., 2011:734). The WPA also had a strong focus on women, employing between 300 000 and 400 000 women a year (Berkin et al., 2011:734). It is also worth noting that in the implementation of these programmes, efforts to increase the levels of employment among African Americans were successful across the north-eastern states, but were met with less success in the South (Berkin et al., 2011:734). The National Youth Administration (NYA) was another extension of the relief efforts made during the Second New Deal. The NYA was a programme which successfully contributed aid to university and high school students, whilst establishing programmes for young people who did not attend school. The crowning achievement of this Second Hundred days and one of the most long-lasting legacies of the New Deal was the Social Security Act of 1935. This Social Security Act, although passed in 1935 would only officially begin in 1937. This act allowed for the creation of systems of old-age, disability and unemployment insurance and child welfare payments. The WPA helped solidify Roosevelt's support amongst the people, but it would be the passing of this Social Security Act, that would represent the character of the Second Hundred Days and a notable shift in the role of the government in society (Berkin et al., 2011:735). It is worth noting that the Social Security system created by the New Deal, was significantly limited and conservative in comparison to European models and New Deal critic Dr Townsend's plan (Berkin et al., 2011:735). Despite it signifying a major shift in the way in which the government saw its responsibility to its population, some of its more notable limitations were that: it necessitated payments from workers, it did not cover domestic and agricultural workers, and it failed to provide health insurance (Berkin et al., 2011:735). Within two years of its implementation, every state provided employment compensation to more than 28 million people; with payments between \$15 and \$18 a week (Berkin et al., 2011:735). The Second Hundred Days also saw the passage of the NLRA or the Wagner Act, which also led to the formation of the National Labour Relations Board, which helped safeguard worker's rights; most

notably the right hold elections to decide union representation and to stop unfair labour practices, particularly the firing or blacklisting of workers who participated in union activity (Berkin et al., 2011:735). The protections of the Wagner Act did not extend to agricultural, non-unionised and service industry workers. Despite this, it was instrumental in helping to create a stronger base of support from labour (Berkin et al., 2011:735). Other legislation passed within the Second Hundred Days were the income tax increases for those who earned over \$50 000 per annum; regulatory controls for public utilities; and The Resettlement Act to help sharecroppers and small farmers affected by the AAA and the Dust Bowl (Berkin et al., 2011:735).

By the end of 1935, Roosevelt found himself in a comfortable position to win re-election in the 1936 elections. The work done by his administration throughout the year had helped solidify his popularity amongst the populace, which in turn weakened the position of his conservative opposition from the Republican Party (Berkin et al., 2011:735). With regards to his critics on the left, Senator Long was assassinated in 1935, whilst Townsend and Coughlin formed a third-party opposition with the establishment of the Union Party (Berkin et al., 2011:735). Despite winning re-election, there was a sharp halt in the introduction of "new" New Deal legislation mainly due to opposition from the Supreme Court and a recession in 1937 into 1938 (Berkin et al., 2011:736-737). Despite the decline in support for the New Deal during Roosevelt's second term, his administration was able to pass two more pieces of legislation which would come to be the last pieces of New Deal legislation. These were the second Agricultural Adjustment Act and The Fair Labor Standards Act, which were both passed in 1938. The latter of the two acts was particularly significant as it saw the establishment of a standard workweek, a set minimum wage and the abolishment of child labour (Berkin et al., 2011:738). Its minimum-wage provision was specifically advantageous to nonunionised, unskilled and non-white workers, who were not covered by the Wagner Act. Following the increasing number of Republican Congress People elected in the 1938 elections, the New Deal in its legislative form had officially come to an end. But the changes it had established had already set the foundations for shaping the social, economic and political principles -New Deal liberalism - of a more cohesive and mature hegemonic project of embedded liberalism in the post-war United States.

New Deal Coalition and the Formation of a Historic Bloc

The New Deal represented a seismic shift in the political landscape of the United States through the consolidation of political power around the Democratic Party, giving them seven out of nine presidential elections between 1933 to 1969. This grip on power was rooted in the ideological base set by the policies of the New Deal. The policies of the New Deal - and the influence of intellectuals like Perkins and Wallace on the creation and framing of these policies - helped set the ideological parameters hegemonic project of embedded liberalism that would come into being after WWII. The forces that would come together to form the historic bloc which would uphold the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism, were united around the New Deal's interpretation of the welfare state. This American variant of the concept of the welfare state, would be concretised in the corporate liberal concept of control. Structurally the forces which formed this emergent historic bloc were: the southern states, traditional democrats, labour unions (made stronger by New Deal programmes), non-white and white voters (Schlesinger, 2003). This political alignment materialised into what was termed the New Deal Coalition. In simple terms, the New Deal Coalition was a political alliance of social forces (with their commensurate classes), which embodied the historic bloc of the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism. This political alliance represented a coalescence of class interests, articulated and given form by the policies of the New Deal. This political alignment of forces gave Roosevelt the popular support he needed to enact the large-scale government programmes which the New Deal required. The New Deal as a political project and as a set of policies helped set the foundations for the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism. The process of alignment that would set in motion the formation of this historic bloc, was driven by two factors: the intellectual role played by members of the Roosevelt Administration, such as Henry A. Wallace and Frances Perkins, in capturing and consolidating the common interests of the working class in policy form; and the Roosevelt administration's ability to co-opt left-wing support.

Co-opting Left-Wing Support

With the growing levels of anti-capitalist sentiment, which threatened the prevailing political structure of the United States – following the 1929 stock market crash – there was an increasing segment of the population that was amenable to social democratic reforms. It is a point of great historical significance that despite the rapid growth in class consciousness across the United States, there was no national alternative left-wing ideological formation that could break the two-party structure of the United States' political landscape. It is also worth noting that it is due to this, Roosevelt could garner enough support from the left to capture and maintain a hold on power. Despite it being evident that Roosevelt's agenda was one that sought to save capitalism, rather than transform it (Lipset and Marks, 2000).

Roosevelt was successful in co-opting left-wing support through the use of two key strategies: incorporating the demands of a great variety of groups into his rhetoric and by bringing leaders of different left-wing social forces into what would eventually become the New Deal Coalition (Lipset and Marks, 2000). An example of the former is in the threat that Roosevelt faced in 1935 from Senator Long - and his "Share The Wealth" societies – running as a third-party challenger in the 1936 elections. Roosevelt responded by shifting left both in policy and in rhetoric, to weaken his opponent's position. Through the introduction of a wealth tax act, that was put before Congress in June 1935, Roosevelt said he would "throw to the wolves the 46 men who are reported to have incomes over one million dollars a year" and that he was determined to "steal Long's thunder" (Dallek, 2018: 224). In discussions to those who would be affected by such policies, such as millionaire William Randolph Hearst, to whom Roosevelt said "I want to save our system, the capitalistic system... I want to equalise the distribution of wealth" (Dallek, 2018: 224). It was in this period before his re-election that Roosevelt showed greater support for trade unions. Roosevelt sought to create a coalition of forces outside of the conventional Democratic Party structures. Raymond Moley - one of the organisers of the "brain trust" - argued that Roosevelt's policies and statements during this period sought to align him with the aspirations of farmers, the unemployed and non-whites (Lipset and Marks, 2000). Moley went on to state that Roosevelt also sought to align himself with "the membership of the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO), Norman Thomas'

vanishing army of orthodox Socialists, Republican progressives and Farmer-Labourites, Share-the-Weathers, single-taxers, Sinclairites, Townsendites and Coughlinites" (Lipset and Marks, 2000).

In his second strategy of gaining support from radical and economically debilitated constituencies, Roosevelt worked to enlist progressive leaders from dissenting groups by reassuring them to feel part of his coalition. Roosevelt achieved this by extending federal support to progressive leaders who held state and local public office, specifically states such as Minnesota, Wisconsin and New York, which each held a strong third party presence (Lipset and Marks, 2000). Electorally, Roosevelt also offered support to strong non-Democrats such as Minnesota governor Floyd Olson (Farmer-Labor Party), New York City mayor Fiorello La Guardia (American Labor Party), Nebraska senator George Norris (Independent), Wisconsin governor Phillip La Follette (Progressive Party) and his brother Senator Robert La Follette Jr. (Progressive Party) (Lipset and Marks, 2000). Roosevelt had made a concerted effort to achieve an ideological realignment within the Democratic Party. He aimed to ensure the transformation of the party into an ideologically coherent progressive party, or a party of "militant liberalism" (Milkis, 1985:483). His 1936 presidential campaign was more indicative of this approach, as Roosevelt ran the campaign as a progressive coalition rather than an exclusively Democratic Party initiative. As New Deal historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. states - in his book "The Politics of Upheaval: 1935-1936, The Age of Roosevelt" - the concept of a progressive coalition grew closer towards the 1936 elections, replacing the proposal for national unity that dominated the framing of the First New Deal (Schlesinger, 2003:1082). As Schlesinger describes, Roosevelt's strategy had changed in his campaign for a second term, in the following way:

"As the campaign developed, the Democratic party seemed more and more submerged in the New Deal coalition. The most active campaigners in addition to Roosevelt—[Harold] Ickes, [Henry] Wallace, Hugh Johnson—were men identified with the New Deal, not with the professional Democratic organization. Loyalty to the cause superseded loyalty to the party as the criterion for administration support...It was evident that the basis of the campaign would be the mobilization beyond the

Democratic party of all the elements in the New Deal coalition—liberals, labour, farmers, women, minorities" (Schlesinger, 2003).

Conclusion

A bridge into the post-war era

By the end of the 1930s the New Deal Coalition, had cemented itself within the United States' political landscape. The outbreak of WWII and Roosevelt's death, in April 1945, threatened the longevity of the still-developing political project of New Deal liberalism. But the election of Harry S. Truman - the Vice President at the time of Roosevelt's death - and his retention of Wallace (as Secretary of Commerce) and Eleanor Roosevelt (as an advisor), were early indications that nascent project New Deal liberalism would be allowed to continue beyond Roosevelt. The security of New Deal liberalism was further guaranteed by the fact that Truman, who was a liberal democrat from the Midwest, was intent on continuing the legacy of the New Deal and bringing Roosevelt's concept of an Economic Bill of Rights to life (Byrnes, 2000). This is perhaps best captured by Truman's proposed Fair Deal, which he had outlined in his 1949 State of the Union address (Byrnes, 2000). The Fair Deal - which sought to continue the legacy of the New Deal with new additions which would help cement Truman's legacy - served as a representation to the Truman administration's approach to domestic policy during his time in office till 1953 (Byrnes, 2000). The Truman administration would act as the bridge which would carry on the legacy of Roosevelt's unfinished project of New Deal liberalism into the post-war era. This placed a more organised New Deal coalition, in a more privileged position than their conservative rivals, to position the ideological project of embedded liberalism - a matured form of the collective ideas and interests of New Deal liberalism - as the post-war hegemonic order.

Chapter 4: The Historical Transition in Hegemonic Projects

Introduction

According to the Gramscian perspective, there is a dialectical relationship between the power which occurs from the process of capital accumulation and power which is located in political and cultural practices (Carroll, 2020). To the point that this dialectical relationship combines into a way of life that creates the institutional and ideological basis for a historic bloc (Carroll, 2020). In the United States, the post-war era of economic growth, saw the complementary structures of Fordist mass production and consumption (accumulation strategy) and embedded liberalism in the form of the Keynesian Welfare state (hegemonic project) come to make up a historic bloc, which also held organised labour within it. This bloc would eventually come apart during the 1970s oil crisis. From this there was a transition into the neoliberal hegemonic project. This new hegemonic order which was geared towards finance capital and an asset owning middle-class, saw the removal of labour from the bloc bringing with it greater precarity for the working class (Van Der Pijl and Yurchenko 2014). The neoliberal project saw the formation of a smaller bloc, with a greater focus on elite interests. This rejection of class compromise and a reassertion of elite interests above all, would be characterised by the accumulation strategy of transnational production coupled with domestic mass consumption, that would expand the existing inequalities between the working class and elites under a capitalist system. This chapter will outline the historical construction of hegemonic projects, their accumulation strategies, the relationship between these strategies and concepts of control; as the mechanism through which hegemonic projects are maintained. Furthermore, this chapter will also illustrate how the historical transition between the embedded liberalism and neoliberalism occurred; through the process of interest articulation and aggregation in the formation of the neoliberal bloc.

The Post-War Era of Embedded Liberalism

During the post-war period the existing hegemonic project was characterised by the principles of "embedded liberalism"; Keynesian demand management, a Fordist accumulation and the welfare state (Ruggie, 1982). The state's function in this arrangement was to maintain a balance between the interests of capital and organised labour, whilst providing social protections in the form of welfare for its citizens. Structurally this took the form of a government-business-labour coalition; productive capital being the capital fraction with the greatest level of representation. This class compromise was promoted as the principal component in ensuring social stability (Harvey, 2005:10-11). Industrial policy and a set of standards for social welfare, were set by the state. This organisation of society by the project of embedded liberalism was an effort in demonstrating New Deal liberalism's politico-ideological approach to social order. This politico-ideological perspective was one which sought to emphasise "how market processes, entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment" (Harvey, 2005:11). The mechanism through which the economic structure's accumulation strategy and the politico-ideological principles of welfare are brought together is characterised by the corporate liberal concept of control.

The Keynesian Welfare State: The Synthesis Between Fordist Accumulation and New Deal Liberalism

Fordist Model of Accumulation

The New Deal, through the creation of its welfare systems, helped set the foundations to shift the United States' towards a Fordist-Keynesian Welfare State. To understand the character of the United States' Keynesian Welfare State, requires an explanation of the Fordist system as an accumulation strategy. The concept of Fordism directly refers to the system of mass production and social organisation of the labour process which was introduced by Henry Ford at the Ford Motor Company (Clarke, 1992:13). Fordism is a concept which describes the arrangement of social

forces involved in the process of production - or modes of social relations of production – in the period following Ford's innovation till the 1980s (Clarke, 1992:13). There are four different levels according to which Fordist accumulation strategy has been analysed: the labour process, the regime of accumulation and its modes of socialisation and regulation (Jessop,1992:2). The Fordist labour process describes the specific social and technical division of labour associated with the standardised production of goods. Fordist "mass production" is rooted in technical divisions of labour influenced by Taylorist tendencies, of breaking down tasks and assigning individual tasks to individual labourers 1980s (Clarke, 1992:19). But where Fordism diverged from Taylorism was tasks were divided according to skilled and unskilled tasks. Beyond this division, Fordism aimed to unite the labour force into an organic body, where "the productive contribution of each individual and group was dependent on the contribution of every other" 1980s (Clarke, 1992:19). The dominance or logic of mass production is applied to all sectors of a firm and is seen as the source of its strength; thus all other processes and activities should be geared towards maintaining and improving this (Jessop,1992:2). As an accumulation regime, Fordism is an unbroken cycle of growth driven by mass production and mass consumption. A Fordist reproduction cycle which is confined within its national boundaries follows a cycle of: rising productivity built on economies of scale in mass production, increased incomes due to increases in productivity, a rise in mass demand due to increases in wages, an increase in profits due to the full utilisation of capacity, increases in investment in machinery and techniques tied to mass production, resulting in continued increases in productivity (Jessop,1992:2-3). It is not required that all sectors of the economy employ Fordist techniques, rather growth is ensured by dominant sectors being Fordist in their approach. Mass production requires a mass market, which is built from the increased output of goods such as housing, oil, steel and electricity, matched by the increased provision of services such as retail and consumer credit (Jessop,1992:3). Fordism also acts as a combination of norms, institutions, organisational forms, social networks and patterns of behaviour which maintain and direct the Fordist accumulation regime. This network of institutional forms can be expressed in the way in which capital circulates and how such networks are reproduced and interact with each other (Jessop,1992:3). Commercial capital also plays a central role in organising the matrix of social forces which guide the Fordist cycle of mass production and

consumption. The Fordist social relations of production see the mass production of standardised goods oriented to a generalised public rather than a particular target market, which necessitates the formation of distinct channels and feedback loops between mass producers and mass demand (Jessop,1992:5). This is achieved through: mass advertising, mass retailing, mass credit and consumer research (Jessop,1992:5). The diffusion of the ideas and logic of mass consumption throughout these channels is made possible through mass media (Beniger, 1986).

Corporate Liberalism

Corporate liberalism as a concept of control reflects the combination of the politico-ideological project of New Deal liberalism and the economic accumulation strategy of the Fordist accumulation model. The Fordist accumulation model cannot be separate from the notion of the Keynesian Welfare state. The Fordist accumulation strategy relies on Keynesian macroeconomic principles to initiate the cycle of mass production and consumption (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:11). The production of goods gave workers employment, which gave them income to consume these goods, returning the money invested at the initial site of production back into the hands of productive capital (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:12). Beyond the economic sphere, this cycle was encouraged through an intentional ideological framing of a "desired" lifestyle to encourage the consumption habits which promoted this production model. The rise of the automobile industry is an example of this strategic framing of lifestyle and its contribution to connected industries of steel and iron industries (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:12). The social reproduction of the worker became a responsibility of the state. New Deal-style "social protections" safeguarded against any disturbances or reductions in a worker's earning power (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:12). This particular function of welfare, indicates its essential function within the corporal liberal concept of control. The profit distribution structure of Keynesian demand management was one rooted in limiting the potential impulsivity of an investor who chooses to reduce their contribution of capital to the production process.

It was particularly during the post-war period that the United States saw the increasing solidification of Keynesian characteristics within its economic structure. It

is worth noting that the inclusion of Keynesian macroeconomic principles were a legacy of the wartime effort, as the New Deal – whilst having generously expanded the government's understanding of its role in the provision of welfare - was not explicitly Keynesian. Roosevelt's programmes made a point to avoid deficit spending. The Roosevelt administration had never fully accepted the Keynesian approach of government spending as a means of ensuring economic recovery. Roosevelt and the New Deal's commitment to balanced budgets, is evident in positions taken by Budget Director Lewis Williams Douglas, who drafted the Economy Act of 1933, and Henry Morgenthau the Secretary of the Treasury Department (Stein, 1984 245-246). By 1939, the United States' economy began to show signs of recovery, reaching levels of growth experienced before the 1929 crash and 1937 recession; but the unemployment rate had not yet seen a significant decrease (Berkin et al., 2011:738). It was only through the intervention of "wartime Keynesianism", in which increased government spending in the United States' mobilisation for the Second World War, helped push the economy fully out of Depression (Berkin et al., 2011:738). It was in 1944, at the tail end of the war and after successive years of experiencing the positive effects of continued deficit spending, where Roosevelt famously called for an Economic Bill of Rights in 1944, saying "We have come to a clear realisation of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. 'Necessitous men are not free men.' People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made" (Roosevelt, 1944).

The Decline of Embedded Liberalism and the rise of the Neoliberalism

The era of embedded liberalism in the United States began to unravel with the decline of the New Deal Coalition, during the mid to late 1960s. The defining issues of the 1960s - particularly civil rights, the Vietnam War and urban unrest - led to several splits between members of the coalition. This period marked a steady unravelling of the "unity of struggles" which represented the underlying basis of consent to the socio-economic order of the post-war period of embedded liberalism within the United States. The various contradictions which had remained dormant

within the bloc during its ascendancy and peak, had finally begun to overwhelm it during this period. But ultimately it was the simultaneous occurrence of the declining coalition, an amalgamation of economic crises and the ascendancy of a new historic bloc amid the aforementioned crises, which led to the transition from the hegemonic project characterised by embedded liberalism to that of neoliberalism. The explication of this shift requires an understanding of the context of the 1970s and the economic crises which precipitated this shift, followed by a delineation of the formation of a new historic bloc and how it would in turn - through its conception of a new "common sense" - lead to corresponding transformations at the level of the social relations of production and that of the state form.

The combination of high rates of inflation, high unemployment, stagnant growth, surplus capacity and low rates of investments in the 1970s, accelerated the steady decline of the consensus of embedded liberalism built and maintained by the bloc represented by the New Deal Coalition. During the post-war period, recessions were usually addressed through the implementation of Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy - which sought to achieve political principles of "full employment" - which provided a moderately inflationary stimulus to the economy (Cox, 1987:284). Inflation within reason had come to be commonly accepted as a means of increasing employment and propelling growth during periods marked by a dip in economic growth. The problem of inflation became progressively worse and consistent during the 1970s. But it was especially exacerbated by the 1973-1974 oil crisis, which occurred as a result of an increase in global oil prices by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil (Office of the Historian, 2012). This, in turn, led to an increase in food prices and other affected industries. What this resulted in was a breakdown in the historical consensus formed between the material forces, institutions as ideologies which had fostered and maintained the era of embedded liberalism. This breakdown in the alliance of different class forces that had politically organised around the set of hegemonic ideas of embedded liberalism - furthermore the guidance which had strategically held together its various elements - began to breakdown across other advanced capitalist countries, in the years after 1974-1975 (Cox 1987:281). What occurred during this period was the beginning of a shift in class struggle. The government came to be more gradually aligned with the interests of capital to help generate the conditions which would be attractive enough

to convince businesses to invest more into the economy. This led to labour being put on a weaker footing in its ability to negotiate successfully. Thus signalling the end of the central role of tripartite power relations within the prevailing social relations of production (Cox 1987:281). This initiated the shift towards an accumulation strategy rooted in transnational production and finance. This systemic breakdown in the post-war Keynesian consensus was further impacted by greater adjustments in social relations in the form of changes made in labour regulations, increased austerity on welfare spending and employment benefits, and a greater emphasis on increasing "business confidence" (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:120).

The Rise and Consolidation of the Neoliberal Project

Historic bloc formation and the construction of a general interest

These changes came about as a result of a particular arrangement of ideological, material and institutional forces that would combine effectively during the economic turmoil of the 1970s to establish a hegemonic project around the political and economic ideas of neoliberalism. The function of organic intellectuals who would set the theoretical dimensions and direction of neoliberalism was initially generated by a small but dedicated group of academic economists, historians and philosophers, that had converged around Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek, through the creation of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (Harvey, 2005: 19-20). The group's founding statement argued that "The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared" ("The Mont Pelerin Society", n.d.). The statement went on to claim that the disappearance these "essential conditions" had been "fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions, it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved" ("The Mont Pelerin Society", n.d.). Their adoption of the term neoliberal was a sign of their commitment to the free market principles of the neo-classical economics that had

been developed during the latter half of the 19th century (Harvey, 2005: 20). Hayek's articulation of the political philosophy of classical liberalism naturally stood in opposition to the state-interventionist theories of British economist John Maynard Keynes, in the name of individual freedoms and it was seen as the inherent "rationality" of the market. State intervention was seen as being susceptible to political bias depending on the strength of the various social forces engaged in the political process such as trade unions, environmental groups or political and trade lobbies (Harvey, 2005: 20). Hayek's 1944 book *The Road to Serfdom*, underlined the core points of his political philosophy. In which he argues that government intervention in the economy - such as post-war Keynesian interventions - and the efforts made to secure welfare would inevitably lead to totalitarianism (Hickel, 2016:142). Thus, Hayek concludes that true freedom can only be achieved through unrestricted market capitalism (Hayek, 1944).

The monetarist economic theory of Milton Friedman, acted as a second foundational pillar to the nascent neoliberal bloc. Monetarism offered a critique of what it saw as the Keynesian tendency to create economic inefficiencies, whilst generating high rates of inflation due to "macroeconomic mismanagement and the accommodation of worker's demands" (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:121). This perspective emboldened the state's move away from the principles of the New Deal which had been merged with the Keynesian macroeconomic approach of the post-war era of embedded liberalism. Friedman's 1962 book, *Capitalism and Freedom*, contained a number of these approaches and with them more socio-economic interventions that would prove to be core principles within the neoliberal perspective. The ideas included but were not limited to the elimination of: trade barriers, public education, currency controls, labour regulation and progressive taxes. These two core ideological principles of neoliberalism - as outlined by Hayek and Friedman - also helped provide legitimacy for this realignment of the state towards the interests of capital as a representation of society in its entirety, and in doing so ushering a new era of state-led attacks on the working class. Despite it not being an entirely coherent theoretical framework in and of itself, neoliberal theory at its core is rooted in the idea that decisions made by the state with regards to investment and capital accumulation would generally be prone to error as they could not compete with the accuracy of the information provided by the market (Harvey, 2005: 20). This belief in the supremacy

of markets is the core of the set of hegemonic ideas that would come to guide the constituent elements of the neoliberal historic bloc. This central tenet proved effective in maintaining the neoliberal consensus despite the internal contradictions, at the level of ideology between its deep cynicism towards most forms of state intervention and the endorsement of a state which intervenes to - at times coercively - secure private property rights and individual liberties. This consensus was reinforced further by the material capabilities and institutional backing of influential and wealthy elites, and the heads of major corporate entities - representatives of the hegemonic social class - who had historically been openly against government intervention and regulation (Harvey, 2005: 22). More specifically groups and organisations such as the Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation and the Business Roundtable would help to diffuse and engrain neoliberal thinking into the public consciousness, by promoting the association of neoliberalism and democracy within civil society.

Neoliberalism as a hegemonic construct

The results of the process of interest articulation and aggregation, performed by the organic intellectuals of neoliberalism and other aligned institutional and material forces, began to take shape in the form of a new neoliberal concept of control. As a concept of control, politically neoliberalism can be understood through its two seemingly contradictory core components: its liberal and neoconservative aspects. The liberal aspect as described in the previous paragraph, refers to its political ideology of: individual freedom and choice, a market society, laissez-faire economics and a minimal government (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:15). Its neoconservative aspect is based on the principles of: a strong government, social authoritarianism, a disciplined society, social hierarchy and subordination to the nation-state (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:15). The prevalence of the liberal or neoconservative political features are more generally tied to the Democratic or Republican administrations in power during the neoliberal era. The Democratic administrations of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, represent the liberal political dimensions of neoliberalism. On the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush and Donald Trump, represent the neoconservative political dimensions of the neoliberal concept of control. It can be

argued that there did exist a neoconservative strain worthy of note within the Obama administration. Despite the Obama administration's greater inclination towards multilateralism, when compared to that of the Bush administration, there existed strong neoconservative features to the administration's domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic front, the neoconservative features of the Obama administration are seen in his administration's continuation and expansion of key Bush era's mass surveillance apparatus, particularly in the case of the Patriot Act and the Department of Homeland Security. This is exemplified by the administration's implementation of a \$1.1 trillion dollar spending bill, in 2015, which included a section on the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) which sought to allow private companies to pass on information to federal agencies (Rosenfeld, 2015). This essentially allowed private companies to share information with the Department of Defense (and the National Security Agency) without being sued (Rosenfeld, 2015). The Obama administration's strong punitive position against whistleblowers Chelsea Manning and Edwin Snowden, also serve as strong examples in which subordination to the nation state was promoted at the risk of endangering liberal democratic norms (Maass, 2016). On the foreign policy front the United State's covert involvement in Yemen, drone strikes in Pakistan, its intervention in Libya and the continuation of Guantanamo Bay indicate the continuation of Bush era neoconservative foreign policy decisions (Iddawela, 2011:3).

The contradictory combination of these two aspects, reflect the fractional interest of transnational finance capital as the general interest of its historic bloc. But finance capital's interests of liberalisation, privatisation and internationalisation - and their resultant effects - must be balanced out with other factors to allow for the construction of a hegemonic project. This project requires a politico-ideological basis to elicit support, in the same way, embedded liberalism built on the notion of welfare framed by New Deal liberalism. The interests of transnational finance capital represent the "politics of power", much like that of Fordist accumulation under Keynesian demand management. It required a "politics of support". Neoconservatism provided the neoliberal elites with an appropriate "politics of support" which was built on: "moral conservatism, xenophobia, law and order, and the notion of family" (Overbeek and Van Der Pijl, 2003:15). The degree to which these two aspects are expressed by the neoliberal bloc, depend on the political

faction within the bloc (Democrat or Republican) with the most political control at the time.

The Reagan Administration and the implementation of a hegemonic construct

But it was only under the presidency of Ronald Reagan where the most consequential shift in the institutionalisation of the neoliberal project. The Reagan administration signalled the introduction of neoliberalism as the new political and economic orthodoxy. It is during Reagan's presidency that neoliberalism as a hegemonic project is most clearly revealed as a political project which sought to bring about the necessary conditions for capital accumulation and the transferral of power to the economic elites (Harvey, 2005: 22). Reagan's presidency sees a concrete shift towards the interests of capital, more generally, and finance capital more specifically being concretised within the state. The Reagan administration initially came into power on a platform committed to expanding individual freedoms by freeing capitalism from restrictions imposed on it by the state. The principles upon which this neoliberal form of state, which sought to unlock the "fettered" potential of capitalism, were directly rooted in the ideological formulations of Hayek and Friedman. These broad but defining principles promoted by the Reagan administration encapsulated the politico-ideological perspective of the emergent neoliberal social order. These principles were: the reduction of taxes on the rich, decreases in state spending, the privatisation of utilities, the deregulation of financial markets and the suppressing the power of unions (Hickel, 2016:144). The administration's implementation of these policies would go on to expand and strengthen the emergent historic bloc (Harvey, 2005: 25). Reagan also made significant appointments to enact decisions which reflected neoliberal notions of a non-interventionist state, in matters regarding environmental regulations, occupational safety and health care. This new wave of deregulation in all sectors of the state and the economy increased the range of areas available for corporate entities to expand their interests. Tax breaks on investment allowed for the movement of capital away from unionised areas towards the more weakly regulated regions of the south and the west; with a drop in the personal tax rate from 70 to 28 per cent (Harvey, 2005: 25). This period also saw rapid deindustrialisation and

transnationalisation of production in the advanced capitalist nations of North America and Europe, through the ideological justification of the market as the primary means of promoting competition and innovation. This process of deindustrialisation and transnationalisation of production also extended to nations of the global south under the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a response to the 1980s Debt Crisis. This debt crisis is often referred to as the Latin American debt crisis, due to the trend of Latin American countries defaulting on loans that they had taken on in the 1970s (United Nations, 2017:53). This debt crisis was also experienced by African countries, who were also subjected to similar policies of structural adjustment; namely stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation (United Nations, 2017:50). East Asia, and to a lesser degree South Asia, followed a different path based on a developmental strategy that promoted rapid industrialisation and a central role for the state in these processes (United Nations, 2017:51).

In 1982, the Reagan administration also worked to purge the halls of the IMF and the World Bank of Keynesian influence. By the end of the decade, the majority of economics departments in universities across the United States would also contribute to the spread of neoliberal thought to economists outside of the country (Harvey, 2005:93). Economics departments would gradually begin to advance ideas of fiscal conservatism in the public sector - rejecting full employment and social protections - and inflation controls as necessary features of economic policy (Harvey, 2005:93). Reagan's presidency saw the establishment of a politico-ideological project within the state that represented a clean break from the notions of embedded liberalism, Fordist production relations, and Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies. Replacing these ideological foundations of the post-war socio-economic order were the accelerated prioritisation of enterprise corporatism, monetarism, supply-side economics and notions of competitiveness within the market (Morton, 2003:163). The changes brought about in this new form of state were justified as necessary interventions to counteract the effects of the increased cost of social policies as a result of the diminished tax base caused by the stagnant growth and the "energy crisis" of the 1970s.

Conclusion

The Consequences of the Neoliberal Project

The historical transition from hegemonic project embedded liberalism to neoliberalism can be divided into three key features: the restoration of capital's social dominance, the restructuring of production and a United States driven integration of international elites (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). Politically the transition to neoliberalism represented a shift in power relations away from the majority - working class and middle class - to the elites. It also indicated a rightward shift within both major parties as trade unions and mass organisations were weakened. The weakening and disorganisation of the working class, through the implementation of the neoliberal concept of control, have led to and are a result of: increased unemployment, greater personal debt, cuts in wages, cuts in social welfare and greater international competition (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). The concentration of wealth and power facilitated by neoliberalism, have further discouraged workers and the working class more generally from being able to imagine and work towards alternatives. Political economists Alfredo Saad-Filho and Alison Ayers (2008:124), argue that despite the aforementioned consequences of the neoliberal project there are five key factors which increase the possibility for counter-hegemonic transitions. The first, is the focus on "business confidence", which leaves the neoliberal project vulnerable to security due to the fluctuations in changing business interests (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). Second, is that an overemphasis on the interests of finance capital at the expense of smaller businesses and workers which lead to a slowdown in economic growth caused by low inflation, thus contributing to increases in unemployment, wage stagnation and income concentration (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). Third, practice of deregulation breaks down state policymaking capacity and economic planning, which exacerbates existing unemployment issues; whilst barring the use of industrial policy to develop "socially determined priorities" (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). These fluctuations are further aggravated by the promotion of "market freedom". Fourth, the neoliberal policies which lead to unemployment and the destruction of industries, are only categorised as inefficient after the fact (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). This destructive effect is rarely met with an equally productive response which

addresses these inefficiencies. This results in the introduction and intensification of structural unemployment, poverty, precarity and other social inequalities (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:124). Finally, these policies are not self-correcting policies, which results in their continued implementation despite their continued failure (Saad-Filho and Ayers, 2008:125). These collective limitations of the neoliberal concept of control, and more broadly its hegemonic project create a growing base of dissatisfaction due to the nature of its elite slant. This inevitably leaves it vulnerable to counter-hegemonic action, as it continues to increase the structural disparities and the experience of relative deprivation across society.

Chapter 5: The Merging Interests of Carbon Capital and the Neoliberal Project

Introduction

The era of embedded liberalism was underpinned by a requirement to achieve a corresponding supply of resources and fuel to continue its system of accumulation. The Fordist regime of mass production and consumption saw the displacement of coal by oil as a key fossil fuel of choice (Carroll, 2020:34). This Fordist accumulation strategy saw workers more closely integrated into a dynamic of class compromise, driven by consumption (Mitchell, 2011). Thus, allowing for carbon capital to extend its influence into every aspect of life, as petroleum became the "lifeblood" of the economy (Huber, 2013). It is this dynamic which precipitated the drastic increase in global carbon emissions throughout the rest of the 20th century. This chapter will explore how carbon capital extended its influence within the context of existing hegemonic structures. Due to the limitations of this paper's scope, the chapter will not focus on the position of carbon capital with the historic bloc of embedded liberalism, it will instead give a greater focus to the merging of its interests with that of the neoliberal project. We will begin this analysis with an examination of the historical role played by the 1970s oil crisis in ending the era of embedded liberalism. This will be followed by an account of carbon capital's position within this crisis. From this understanding, the chapter will interrogate the threat of early climate science on the carbon capital's ability to secure its place within the growing neoliberal bloc, how it was able to build societal consent despite early knowledge of the existential threat of continued fossil fuel consumption and final how its interests were politically aggregated within the neoliberal bloc. In this chapter, we make a linguistic distinction between carbon capital as a faction of capital, rather than a fraction of capital. The "capital fractions approach" speaks to the different functional forms which capital takes within the larger reproductive circuit of capital; commodity capital, money capital and productive capital (Overbeek, 2000:174). The narrative distinction of

carbon capital as a faction of capital represents its position as a distinct group within a historic bloc. The characterisation of carbon capital as a faction of capital emphasises the political and intellectual function of carbon capital, in directing the material and accumulation strategies of hegemonic projects. This chapter aims to articulate the ways in which carbon capital, a distinct social force within the dominant historic bloc, pursues its own interests separate from that of other factions of capital within the ruling class of a particular hegemonic project. More specifically the use of this narrative distinction within this chapter, aims to indicate the ways in which carbon capital as a faction within the dominant historic bloc was able to articulate its interests during the transition between the hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism. Through this, the following chapter seeks to expand on the ways in which said interests were strengthened and entrenched following the transition into the neoliberal hegemonic project.

The Strategic Positioning of Carbon Interests

How carbon capital manipulated the "Energy Crisis" of the 1970s

During the period of global financial restructuring that occurred in the post-war era, there was a shift in the value of this new order from gold reserves to oil (Mitchell, 2011:414). The gold reserves of the European nations had been used up during WWII to pay for American imports of coal, oil and other supplies (Mitchell, 2011:414). At the conclusion of the war the United States held 80 percent of the world's gold reserves. Following the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944 the nations of the world pegged the value of their currency to the US dollar and by extension its gold reserves. In reality the strength of the dollar was sustained by its convertibility to oil, as it produced two-thirds of the world's supply by the end of the war (Mitchell, 2011:414). The United States was also able to expand its influence towards the trade of the emerging Middle East produced oil, as they controlled the majority of international oil trade due to the dollar's use as the primary currency for its purchase (Mitchell, 2011:414). Thus making oil a foundational material and financial feature in the period of stability experienced during the era of embedded liberalism.

The period of stability experienced during the era of embedded liberalism, bolstered by the material capabilities and institutional capacity of carbon capital, would eventually be brought down by the 1973-1974 OPEC oil crisis. The centrality of oil within the hegemonic order of embedded liberalism, would not only lead to the collapse of the coalition of forces - which constituted the historic bloc - that had maintained this socio-economic order but it would also weaken the position of labour which had been reliant on the prosperity engendered by this hegemonic project. The 1973-1974 oil crisis presented the emergent neoliberal historic bloc a prime opportunity to present their legitimacy of ideological perspective as a means of understanding and addressing the crisis. The middle-class population of the US, that had now become accustomed to secure and plentiful supply of petroleum, now began to face scarcity and anxiety over an essential commodity that they had taken for granted. As the OPEC states began to increase their control in the management of oil production, transnational oil corporations sought to increase prices by 50 per cent or more (Mitchell, 2011:178). This was an attempt to transfer the pressure from the price increases initiated by the oil-producing nations to the consumer, to allow the firms to protect their profits. The main barrier to the introduction of such a price increase by these firms was the threat of consumers switching to alternative fuels such as coal, natural gas and nuclear power. Thus these transnational oil corporations understood that a restriction in oil supplies would not be enough to secure their profits, thus necessitating a disruption in alternative energy sources. This led to the union of institutional, material and ideological forces in the form of the state (under the Nixon administration), carbon capital, the media, academics and economists, forming a consensus around what came to be known as the energy crisis (Mitchell, 2011:178). Understanding the threat that alternative energy sources posed to their business, the major oil corporations within the United States began to divide the profits gained from their monopoly over the sale of oil across the Middle East, Europe and the rest of the world between payments to shareholders in the United States, whilst being using the rest to buy up shares in competing energy sources (Mitchell, 2011:179). This strategy is what would lead to the transformation of oil corporations within the United States, from occupying the position of a distinct group amongst several other competing corporate forces - representing capital across the energy sector - into the consolidated material and institutional force of

carbon capital which would later represent the United States' energy sector more generally.

In the late 1960s, 24 oil corporations had gained enough control over natural gas production that they were responsible for three-quarters of the United States' production of natural gas (Mitchell, 2011:179). They then went on to buy up coal companies, transforming the United States coal industry from a cartel of coal-producing entities into a subdivision within larger industries that relied on coal energy (Mitchell, 2011:179). Furthermore, in this greater consolidation of the energy sector under the major oil corporations, they also extended their operations into uranium mining. Which led to their control of 40 percent of all United States uranium reserves by 1970 (Mitchell, 2011:179). This particular venture into the nuclear power industry led to the Department of Interior accusing the major oil corporations of purchasing leases on federal land for the mining of uranium so that they could "sit on the leases to increase the price and produce an energy crisis (Mitchell, 2011:179). In their attempt to increase the price of oil, the major oil corporations fought for higher natural gas prices. When the Federal Power Commission (FPC) turned down their petition to increase prices in 1968, there was a sudden announcement of a decline in supply by the natural gas producers; this was followed by a steady drop in the discovery of new natural gas sources (Mitchell, 2011:179). A year after this, President Nixon would appoint John Nassikas as the head of the FPC, who would, in turn, announce that there was an energy crisis. This declaration was then met with an unexpected increase in the price of natural gas. Nassikas stated that FPC regulation had long maintained the price of natural gas at an artificially low rate, which was significantly lower than the fuel's true value in the free market; which was also far below the price of competing fuels such as coal and oil ("The New York Times", 1975). Nassikas went on to argue that these low gas prices helped stimulate demand whilst hindering investment in new production, thus leading to the shortage in supply ("The New York Times", 1975). This investment never occurred and later Congressional investigations would discover that Nassikas had based his response to shortages on data provided by the natural gas corporations, rather than the higher estimates recorded in data provided by the Commission's staff (Anderson, 1971). Oil corporations were also able to increase concerns regarding inadequate supply of oil by increasing estimations around future demands and decreasing that of recoverable

reserves (Mitchell, 2011:180). Following the 1973-1974 oil crisis, the Federal Energy Administration created Project Independence, whose estimates also reflected the inflated calculations of the industry whilst also setting the foundation for the National Energy Act of 1978, which would ban the inclusion of natural gas across new power plants and allowing oil corporations to increase their prices eight times more than what they had been (Mitchell, 2011:180). This decision was justified as a means of ensuring that the United States' reserves would be protected against the weaponisation of oil production by the oil-producing nations of the Middle East. This instead led to a 26 per cent drop in natural gas consumption within the United States, increasing consumer demand for Middle Eastern oil (Mitchell, 2011:180).

Following his retirement, former director of the Institute of Gas Technology, Henry Linden, confirmed the use of exaggerated estimates as a means of promoting the narrative of an "energy crises". Writing in the *Annual Review of Energy and Environment*, Linden states that the flawed projections of future oil and gas demands during this period were part of a "seemingly self-serving exercise" (Linden, 1996:32). He went on to state that several other beliefs surrounding the narrative of an "energy crisis" during this period were "fictitious" and largely due to "misguided government intervention in the energy market" (Linden, 1996:32). The fictitiousness of this "energy crisis" is made evident when considering the profits made by major oil corporations during the 1973-1974 period. In 1973 Occidental Petroleum Company had announced a 665 per cent increase in profits from the previous year alone (Sherrill, 1979). In 1974, OPEC raised the price to five times what it had been three years prior and the end of this same year, Exxon Corporation shot up to the top of the Fortune 500 list; with Texaco, Mobil, and Standard Oil of California and the Gulf all entered into the top seven rankings (Sherrill, 1979).

The ability of major oil corporations to manipulate the perceived "energy crisis", was not merely an error on the government's part, but rather it was a transformation which they had supported. This is more clearly illustrated by the steps taken by the Nixon administration during this period, to increase the government's control across the different forms of fuel and power. The most emblematic action in this endeavour is the creation of a National Energy Office in the White House, in June 1973, following Congress' continued rejection of attempts to create a Department of Energy

and Natural Resources. In 1974 the White House Energy Office would be changed into the Federal Energy Administration and later this would evolve into the Department of Energy under the presidency of Jimmy Carter. These changes at the level of the state revealed the growth in carbon capital's ability to shape and direct the dimensions of the prevailing hegemonic project, as it inserted itself and its interests as an inseparable feature within the general understanding of that project. This indulgent approach to carbon capital is best reflected in the words of Rogers C. B. Morton, Nixon's Interior Secretary who - during a White House briefing of oil executives - promised that they had nothing to fear from the Office of Oil and Gas, stating that "our mission is to serve you, not regulate you... We try to avoid it... I pledge to you that the department is at your service" (Sherrill, 1979). This sentiment was carried into the Carter administration, where Energy Secretary James Schlesinger made assurances - to attendees at a conference by the American Petroleum Institute - that they (through Carter's help) would witness "a Golden Age for the industry" over the next 20 years, which would rival "the romance of oil of the past" (Sherrill, 1979). This material and institutional consolidation of the energy sector was similarly met with the merging of academic and policy research regarding fuels, under the singular topic of energy during the 1970s (Mitchell, 2011:180). What had first begun as an energy crisis caused by several intersecting and conflicting events concerning a variety of natural resources and modes of power generation, suddenly became a more targeted issue of an "oil crisis". Suspicions surrounding the validity of this energy crisis were further strengthened by the almost immediate abundance in natural gas production which followed president Carter's introduction of a new bill which would deregulate new natural gas after regular annual increases (Sherrill, 1979). But despite natural gas' overnight transformation into a surplus commodity, its price would now be 50 per cent higher than what it had been before the "energy crisis" (Sherrill, 1979). These events and the changes brought about through them, indicate changes in the states' increasing orientation towards the identification and advancement of the general interests of capital. The creation of the "energy crisis" and the initial attempts at deregulation which it would bring about, also indicate how the state - under the hegemonic project of neoliberalism - would, in turn, become a representation of corporate power.

Securing a place in the neoliberal bloc

It is necessary to consider that this moment in the growth of carbon capital's future political influence, could have also historically signalled the "beginning of the end"; for its prospects as a directive faction of capital within any future hegemonic project. In 1977, geophysicist Gordon Macdonald and other members of the elite scientific advisory group JASON, drafted a report on the long term effects of carbon dioxide on the planet's climate (Rich, 2018:1). The report showed that large concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would lead to an increase in global temperatures, which would have catastrophic consequences for the planet (Rich, 2018:1). This report would eventually be shared widely enough amongst scientists and policymakers for President Carter's Office of Science and Technology Policy to commission a group of scientists, led by Jule Charney, to analyse whether the JASON reports results were accurate. This report which would come to be known as the Charney Report - *Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment* - was released soon after. This report confirmed the results of the JASON study, whilst emphasising that the doubling of carbon dioxide levels in the earth's atmosphere, could lead to a 3 degrees Celsius warming (Rich, 2018:2). The report was accepted by the government, scientists and the fossil fuel industry. The fossil fuel industry had already begun studying the effects of carbon dioxide. Exxon had released a report, as early as 1957, on the connection between fossil fuel consumption and carbon concentration in the atmosphere (Rich, 2018:2). The American Petroleum Institute had also conducted its own research and had also discovered that burning fossil fuels leads to global warming (Rich, 2018:2). Carbon capital chose not to act on this information, despite having had prior knowledge of these effects of its industry on the planet. The responsibility had instead been deferred to the United States' government and environmental scientists to discover this knowledge and act on it. The energy crisis of the 1970s seemed to contribute to this approach, with the concerns over decreasing economic growth as a result of decreased production of fossil fuels. The arrival of the Charney report and its acceptance amongst members of the federal government and scientific community, indicated an end to the future of the fossil fuel industry as the blame for global warming would be placed on them. Furthermore, any policies designed in response to this existential threat would also directly affect their industry's continued prosperity.

In the initial period of the report's release government agencies, scientists and politicians had already begun to react. In April 1980, President Carter instructed the National Academy of Sciences to study climate change and the National Commission on Air Quality began to send out invitations for a policy meeting in October (Rich, 2018:2). These actions all suggested action or legislation to limit carbon emissions would be forthcoming. But this early response would soon be rolled back with the election of Ronald Reagan. With his entry into office, Reagan soon began to remove environmental protections and made appointments to the EPA and Interior Department that were aligned to carbon capital and deregulation (Rich, 2018:3). Whilst the Reagan administration continued with its policies of deregulation the impact of the Charney Report had not yet been entirely eroded. President Carter's early request to the National Academy of Sciences led to a 3-year process, including 100 experts, which resulted in a new report (Rich, 2018:5). The 1983 *Changing Climate* report, backed up the validity of the Charney Report's findings without contributing any new information or way forward (Rich, 2018:5). Despite stressing the need for urgent action in the report, committee chairman Willaim Nierenberg publicly dismissed the need for urgent action, proposing that future generations would be better suited to deal with the problems of climate change (Rich, 2018:5). These statements only helped to remove the possible public pressure carbon capital could face from such a report, giving the Reagan administration more room to ignore any calls for immediate interventions to the long term threat of climate change. The lack of urgency exhibited by the Reagan administration in responding to the report helped bolster the confidence of carbon capital that they could continue in their production of carbon-based fuels. The narrative that "nothing could be done in the present", acted as a political assurance to carbon capital that its business would not be interrupted in the short to medium term. This narrative also allowed politicians, the public and capital more generally, to believe that there was less of a need to respond in the short to medium term.

In 1988, the Republican presidential candidate, George H. W. Bush embraced Congress's plan to determine the amount of carbon emitted by the United States and how this could be reduced by 20 per cent (Rich, 2018:8). This once again resurrected carbon capital's previous fears of impending taxes and regulations aimed

at limiting the effects of fossil fuel combustion. This was further reinforced by the introduction of thirty-two climate bills in 1988 (Rich, 2018:8). Increasing action from other nations and a statement by newly appointed Secretary of State, James Baker at an IPCC that the earth could likely "not afford to wait until all the uncertainties of global climate change have been resolved" (Goshko, 1989). This renewed pressure was supported by many in Congress, encouraging both Democrats and Republican senators in 1989 to urge President Bush to reduce emissions in the United States, in line with promises he had made as a presidential candidate (Rich, 2018:8). In November of the same year, 400 officials from 65 countries attended the Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change (Noordwijk Climate Conference) to create a framework for an international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions. This was the first major political climate conference. The Dutch proposal to limit emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, gained the support of the majority delegates in attendance (Rich, 2018:9). But following the reluctance of the United States, Britain, Japan and the Soviet Union to accept this proposal, the conference instead pivoted away from setting an emissions target and instead ended with a statement of support for emission stabilisation (Rich, 2018:10). This moment serves as a historical juncture that represents the reinforcement of carbon capital's position within the neoliberal hegemonic project and their position within the centre of the neoliberal bloc. Despite the continued investments into research on climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions internationally, domestically within the United States, greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase steadily in the years following the Noordwijk Climate Conference. In this period carbon capital has grown more secure within the neoliberal order and more adept at censoring climate science, whilst distributing disinformation. In the years following the release of the Charney Report, carbon capital has effectively managed to merge the interpretation of its general interest with that of the neoliberal project. It has been so effective in this effort, since the release of the Charney Report, that its general interest as a faction of capital cannot be separated from the general interest of the neoliberal project as it has come to be understood.

The relationship between fossil fuels and neoliberal society

The hegemonic project of neoliberalism - as described in the previous chapter - was a project to restore class power following the post-war compromise of embedded liberalism; which saw a reduction in the share of national wealth held by the country's elites (Harvey, 2007). The hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism within the United States helped promote an ideology of individualism, competition and markets as the optimal means of attending to socio-economic matters. The hegemonic discourses of the neoliberal project reflect the ideas and notions which became "common sense" across civil society and the state, during the neoliberal era. The neoliberal project saw a "corporatisation" of civil society, through the creation of an all-encompassing cultural perspective which sought to produce market identities, values and practices. The ascendancy of neoliberalism's market-driven discourse was promoted by the historical bloc made up of the ideological, material and institutional forces of: corporations, neoliberal and neoclassical academics, and politicians from both the Democratic and Republican parties. It was through the systematic dismantling of both the welfare state and union power, in conjunction with the commodification of public spheres, that this once emergent historic bloc was capable of upending the preceding hegemonic social order. As it was outlined in the previous chapter, the changes that brought about in the social relations of production and its resultant effect on the state form, were made possible by the direction of a hegemonic class made up of corporate and right-wing political and academic forces.

Given this structure, it would not be accurate to identify carbon capital as a sub-category of corporate forces within the neoliberal historic bloc, when considering the material role of fossil fuels in powering and facilitating the neoliberal conceptions of common sense (Huber, 2012). Fossil fuels allowed for the material basis on which the hegemonic "common sense" of the neoliberal socio-economic order was built on. Fossil fuels allowed for the expansion of suburbia, necessitating a way of life centred around the use of private vehicles as the primary mode of transportation. This meant that transportation would also mediate how the growing suburban population - which had long since been entrenched in the Fordist conceptions of mass production and mass consumption - interacted with the built environment. The post-war era had created the foundations of a new ideology of freedom and prosperity in which petroleum products - marketed and sold by carbon capital - were seen as essential and inescapable. The post-war economic gains which had been generated through

the construction of a large sector of suburban society, slowly led to an intensification of a petty-bourgeois layer of white suburban homeowners geared towards the protection and continuation of their new conceptions of prosperity rooted in the Fordist notions of consumption (Huber, 2012:300). This new conception of the "American way of life" was rooted in the notions of private homeownership, which in itself was an evolution of the principle of private property; a foundational tenet within the capitalist system. The decentralisation of places of residence, production and leisure, would help promote - what Thomas and Mary Edsall described in their book *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* - the notion of conservative egalitarianism. The concept of conservative egalitarianism refers to the belief that "everyone has an equal opportunity to work hard and succeed in life" (Edsall and Edsall, 1991:147). This notion is more generally understood as the concept of "bootstrapping", the belief that one could pull themselves up the socio-economic ladder through hard work and individual effort. This idea captures the logic of the neoliberal "common sense". The construction of a "propertied mass of homeowners" - rooted in the notion of a "successful" life represented by the material requirements of a house, car and family - is how motivated petty-bourgeois give support to the neoliberal order (Huber, 2012:301). It is in this picture of individual personal freedom, where the marketing of specific "essential" petroleum products (fuel, plastics, synthetic fabrics etc.), sets the material foundation for the greater structure of the neoliberal hegemonic project and its ideological underpinnings of individual choice and freedom.

This material connection between the hegemonic project of neoliberalism - through its principles of individual freedom and choice - and fossil fuels, gives carbon capital more discursive power than any other group (within the neoliberal historic bloc) (Eaton, 2019:3). This discursive power gives it the ability to shape norms, values and beliefs through which consent and the co-option of opposing forces is achieved (Eaton, 2019:3). In its efforts to exercise its discursive power within civil society, carbon capital utilises the material and institutional forces of: policy planning groups, political parties, lobbies, universities, research centres, community organisations and astroturf advocacy groups (Eaton, 2019:3). This network of social forces through which carbon capital exercises its discursive power within the neoliberal historic bloc, is what Professor William K. Carroll calls a "regime of obstruction"; which frames

climate and energy issues in a manner which allows for the continued extraction of fossil fuels (Eaton, 2019:3). According to the research of environmental sociologists Robert Brulle of Drexel University (Brulle, 2019), it is estimated that between 2000-2016 more than \$2 billion has been spent on lobbying around climate issues. This figure, Brulle argues, is only a conservative estimate, as it does not account for the money carbon capital has spent on public relations campaigns (Brulle, 2019).

The Relationship Between Fossil Fuels and the State in the 21st Century

The Bush Administration

Before the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush's top foreign policy focus was to ensure an increased flow of oil from producers outside of the United States (Klare, 2004:3). Before his inauguration, the United States had gone through significant shortages in the supply of oil and natural gas across large parts of the United States (Klare, 2004:3). This also saw an increase in oil imports by 50 per cent of total consumption, leading to an increased panic regarding the United State's ability to secure long term supply (Klare, 2004:3). This led to an early emphasis on the positioning of securing oil supply as a core interest of maintaining the health and stability of the United States' economy. Which effectively led to the administration directly framing the interests of carbon capital to the common interests of capital in general. Increasing carbon capital's influence and control across the material base (the economy) of the neoliberal bloc. Oil was framed as specifically crucial to the health of the economy as it accounted for two-fifths of the United States' entire energy supply and was the main source of fuel for transportation; it also powered the military vehicles like tanks, ships, planes and helicopters (Klare, 2004:3). At a National Energy Summit in March 2001, Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham made a statement that "America faces a major energy supply crisis over the next two decades," (Klare, 2004:3). He went on to argue that "the failure to meet this challenge will threaten our nation's economic prosperity, compromise our national security, and literally alter the way we lead our lives" (Klare, 2004:3).

The Bush administration, which occupied the political function of directing the neoliberal project, had begun to more overtly express the general interest of carbon capital as that of the neoliberal bloc itself. Its first initiative in this capacity was to establish the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), made up of senior government representatives who were tasked with the formulation of a long term energy strategy (Downey and Roberts, 2016:2). NEPDG, headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, was made up of 300 officials from the energy industry. This grouping was the direct embodiment of carbon capital; with 18 oil, mining and gas associations included, BP and the vice president of Exxon Mobil (Downey and Roberts, 2016:2). There was only one consultation with environmental specialists following the drafting of the group's report, which stated that "energy security must be the priority of the United States trade and foreign policy" (Downey and Roberts, 2016:2). The NEPDG aimed to increase global oil production, diversify foreign oil suppliers, and the removal of economic and political obstacles to the United States ability to procure oil (Downey and Roberts, 2016:2). The direction of the NEPDG served as the first part in the 21st-century reaffirmation of the centrality of fossil fuels - specifically oil - to the political and economic interests of the United States. This was a re-articulation of carbon's centrality to ensuring the continuation of the neoliberal concept of control - at the level of accumulation and politico-ideological framing - and its ability to maintain the parameters of possibility in society.

The Obama Administration

The Obama administration, which promised a shift from the Bush administration, only solidified the location of the Democratic Party within the neoliberal bloc whilst emphasising the merger of carbon interests with the historic bloc's interest. Despite the administration's initial positive rhetoric regarding clean energy, its record with regards to the production of oil and hydrocarbons paints a contradictory picture. By the end of President Obama's term in 2016, the United States had become the leading producer of oil and hydrocarbons for five years in a row (Doman, 2017). The United States had already achieved supremacy in natural gas production at the start of the administration in 2009, surpassing Russia, and surpassing Saudi Arabia in 2013 for hydrocarbons (Doman, 2017). The total production of oil consists of many different liquid fuel types such as crude oil, extra-heavy oil and bitumen; in 2016

approximately 60 percent of total petroleum hydrocarbon production was crude oil and lease condensate (Doman, 2017). The diversification of carbon production under the Obama administration contradicts its administration's earlier rhetorical support of new accumulation strategies and climate multilateralism; which will be explored further in the next chapter.

Trump Administration

Since the inauguration of Donald Trump, as US President in January 2017, the United States has turned its back on several international and domestic policies and regulations addressing climate change. The Trump administration's rejection of core principles of the neoliberal project - multilateralism and transnational production - have led many to believe that President Trump's election signalled a disintegration of the neoliberal bloc; or the end of the neoliberal project. On the other hand, there have arguably been no clear indications that the Trump administration is a class project which seeks to reorganise the balance of power between the elites and the working class. The Trump administration's rejection of certain longstanding features of the neoliberal project, represents an intra-class conflict. The adjustments made by the administration to the dominant politico-ideological project of the United States, more accurately represent a shift in the positioning of certain capital factions. The Trump administration has served as the most explicit indicator of carbon capital's political influence within the neoliberal project. Carbon capital is one of the existing constituencies, within the neoliberal bloc, that has been elevated by Trump's ascendancy. The first, and perhaps, most explicit indicator of this influence was the appointment of Rex Tillerson (former CEO of Exxon Mobil) as his first choice for Secretary of State (Crooks, 2017).

This has allowed the Trump administration to openly wage war on policies aimed at achieving emissions reductions and environmental protections. Since its inception, the Trump administration has actively signalled its alignment to the interests of carbon capital through its open hostility towards climate and environmental policies at a federal level. Federal environmental institutions have experienced significant cuts to their budgets, whilst the work of climate scientists has been openly rejected by the administration (Depledge, Jotzo and Winkler, 2018:813). The Trump

administration's promise to withdraw from the Paris Agreement embodies and encapsulates its entire position on climate change. The Trump administration has worked openly to promote the interests of carbon capital at both the national and global level. The appointment of Scott Pruitt as head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is another indication of the institution's symbiotic relationship with carbon capital. Pruitt, in his capacity as the former Attorney General of Oklahoma, received large financial contributions from the fossil fuel industry and has on several occasions, openly rejected the scientific consensus on climate change (Chiacu and Volcovici, 2017). The Trump administration's actions -- often framed as rebellious - are only an escalation of a longstanding legacy of American exceptionalism (Winkler et al., 2018:813). An example of this is the United States senate's uniform rejection of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Depledge, Jotzo and Winkler, 2018:813). Sincere action on climate change from the Trump administration is antithetical to its interests, as the political embodiment of carbon capital.

Conclusion

In 2019, the six large oil and gas corporations in the US reported over \$55 billion in combined profits; these six companies alone have gained over 2.4 dollars in profits since 1990 (Taxpayers For Common Sense, 2020:1). Despite their great profitability throughout this period, carbon capital has continued to benefit from large subsidies from the federal government. They have also been exempt from paying for climate-related costs occurring from events such as floods, storms and droughts. An indication of the material benefits carbon capital has enjoyed throughout the duration of the neoliberal project. But its positioning within the Trump administration has allowed for carbon capital to enjoy a level of influence more clearly defined, than in any previous administration. President Trump's declaration of climate change as a Chinese hoax and the government withdrawal from its leadership role on the matter, is the endpoint of the process of interest merger between carbon capital and the neoliberal project; which began in earnest following the Noordwijk Climate Conference. Following the "energy crisis" of the 1970s, the release of the Charney Report and the lack of action in subsequent years - culminating in the Noordwijk Climate Conference - fossil fuels have enjoyed a secure position of being responsible for the "production and reproduction of life" in neoliberal society (Huber,

2013:26). To understand the influence of carbon capital and the government's inability to decisively address the existential threat posed by the fossil fuel industry, requires an exploration of how a reliance on fossil fuels permeates throughout the common sense of the neoliberal project. The acceptance of a particular form of life generated by specific regimes of energy consumption, represents consent to the form of social order determined by the neoliberal project. The various actions taken by successive administrations during the neoliberal era - towards securing the carbon dependent regime of energy consumption - are done in the efforts of maintaining this project. There can be no clearer indication that in our analysis of climate change and the challenges faced by the United States inadequately addressing it, that we cannot separate the interests of carbon capital from the general interests of the neoliberal project. To address the United States dependence on fossil fuel consumption, is to reconfigure both the prevailing economic structure and politico-ideological project of the neoliberal project.

Chapter 6: What Is a "Real" Green New Deal?

Introduction

The failures of the Obama administration

The future of the Green New Deal relies heavily on whether those who seek to mobilise around it can learn from the many failures of previous climate policies, whilst being keenly aware of how the prevailing neoliberal hegemonic order seeks to maintain itself; particularly in times of crisis. The dominant narrative surrounding the

lack of successful climate action (promoted by Democratic leaders), is that the blame falls squarely on the unwavering denial of Republican leaders. But in actuality, the record of the Democratic Party's approach to this issue greatly contradicts such arguments. The Obama presidency stands as the most recent and visceral example of how the Democratic establishment is embedded within the hegemonic project of neoliberalism; by extension the degree to which they would be opposed to systemic change. President Obama, who had entered office amidst the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression, was presented with an opportunity equal to that of Roosevelt to initiate a shift away from the prevailing hegemonic order which had created the crisis. But this was not to be the case, as was made apparent at the start of the Obama administration when the president chose to bail out the same banks and financial institutions responsible for the crisis. It is often stated that in choosing to restore the system to its usual functioning the administration had bailed out the banks at the expense of over 9.3 million citizens who lost their homes (Dayen, 2016). But what is often less spoken of is the number of other ways in which the Obama administration had worked to maintain the status quo. President Obama's ascendency into White House, occurred through an electoral platform which promised to build "Main Street" not Wall Street, and to approach climate change as "an opportunity", because if a new energy economy were to be created to lead to the creation of a million new jobs (Klein, 2014:97). Obama had promised that a clean energy economy would propel the US economy into the future, in a way similar to computers over the preceding decades (Klein, 2014:97). Furthermore, in this articulation of an alternative energy future for the US, the then-presidential nominee, also emphasised a need to reduce the US' reliance on foreign oil ("The First Presidential Debate", 2008). This seemed like an indication that the Obama administration would push to introduce bold climate legislation in the early period of the administration. The 2008 financial crisis had left the neoliberal hegemonic project at its weakest since its triumph over the project of embedded liberalism. The neoliberal bloc which had maintained neoliberal hegemony was also facing its crisis of legitimacy, as it was no longer able to manufacture and maintain consent for its ideological project amongst the population as its material and institutional capabilities had been largely diminished by the financial crisis. Public faith in free-market ideas were at an all-time low, and support for "common sense" sentiments against government intervention in the markets had begun to shatter. This put the Obama

administration in an advantageous position when designing its stimulus package worth over \$800 billion. In addition to this, two of the three largest car manufacturers - important allies to the forces of carbon capital - were now at the mercy of the government, as they sought to ensure their survival (Klein, 2014:97). Despite this favourable alignment of factors in favour of systemic change, the Obama administration instead moved towards securing the neoliberal project and rebuilding the strength of the neoliberal bloc which had maintained it in the decades prior.

Notable steps taken by the administration to maintain the prevailing hegemonic order were the rejection of: an idea to build a federally owned clean energy grid to avoid "crowding out private actors", rejecting a proposal for the establishment of federal green banks which would help fund low-energy building upgrades, clean energy development and high-voltage transmission wires (Aronoff et. al., 2019:15). This effort to maintain the status quo is most clearly represented in the administration's unwillingness to use its majority in the Senate to promote genuinely progressive reforms. As opposed to the bipartisan compromise of the stimulus package - the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) - which was pushed through the Senate with small amounts of Republican support; with up to a quarter of the \$820 billion stimulus being provided for tax cuts (Aronoff et. al., 2019:15). Despite this, it is worth noting that during this period the administration allocated \$90 billion towards clean energy initiatives, in the form of energy and research development, subsidised wind and solar development, and high-speed rail (which failed to be developed) (Aronoff et. al., 2019:16). The most famous beneficiary of the \$90 billion state investment in clean energy was the electric vehicle and clean energy company Tesla, Inc. Which would have not been able to establish itself in the car manufacturing industry without this investment. The perceived benefits of ARRA on wind, solar and battery innovation, would factor into the centrist defence of the administration's stimulus as an initiative which requires more praise than it has received. Whereas the more progressive critique of the green stimulus is that it purposefully failed to make green investment a more generally accepted attempt towards a transformative government jobs programme and housing rescue (Aronoff et. al., 2019:16). What was more explicit in the administration's response to the financial crisis (in contrast to the historical comparison of the Roosevelt administration), is that it made a great effort to ensure that any of the actions it took

could not be framed or described as "socialist". This attempt at narrative framing is best represented through the roles of Larry Summers and Timothy Geithner within the administration; both helping to prevent the majority of large scale public interventions into the economy (Aronoff et. al., 2019:16). During the immediate response of the Obama administration to the Recession, the state had committed trillions of dollars towards saving Wall Street and the real estate industry, found itself in a position where it had effectively been in control of these sectors and the financial services sector. But rather than use this power to push through populist policies which would generate an appetite for more radical and extensive progressive actions; much like FDR had during his administration. Obama had said to CEOs in the financial sector, early 2009, that his administration was "the only thing between you and the pitchforks" (Javers, 2009).

As Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol states in their 2013 report *Naming The Problem: What It Will Take To Counter Climate Extremism and Engage Americans in The Fight Against Global Warming*, that the Obama administration's approach to satisfying elites during the financial crisis led to the defeat of the 2009 Waxman-Markey climate bill (Skocpol, 2013). In its efforts towards an elite compromise, the administration sidelined grassroots, environmental activists, whilst creating a space for a select number of NGOs and fossil fuel executives, reducing whatever political space had been created by the financial crisis (Aronoff et. al., 2019:16). It is necessary to note that the bill, although strongly focused on addressing the climate crisis, had still made several major concessions to the carbon capital despite it being killed by the Senate in 2010 (Aronoff et. al., 2019:16). In its second term, the Obama administration made a more concerted effort to take steps in the direction of improving the US' energy efficiency - by shutting down coal plants - and addressing the climate crisis. The Paris Agreement stands as the biggest achievement in the administration's climate policy. This achievement, despite being a historic moment, represents the Obama administration's continued loyalty to the neoliberal project. The low carbon agreements made by signatories in the Agreement did not match the goal to keep warming below 2 degrees celsius. Furthermore, the administration's failure to build a Roosevelt style New Deal coalition and its insistence on maintaining bipartisan consensus, ultimately allowed for a Trump-style takeover which would effectively roll back any progress made by the

Obama administration. In 2019 former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Treasury in the Clinton administration, Brad DeLong stated that the neoliberal project as they had envisioned, had failed. DeLong had played an essential role in securing neoliberal hegemony, as an intellectual who helped extend the influence of neoliberal ideology within the Democratic Party during his time in the Clinton administration. DeLong identifies this perceived failure as being due to the Democratic Party's inability over 25 years "to attract more Republican coalition partners, we failed to energize our own base, and we failed to produce enough large-scale obvious policy wins to cement the centre into a durable governing coalition" (Beauchamp, 2009).

The Contemporary Origins of the Green New Deal

A Generational Shift in Environmental Politics

The exploration of the GND's origins - the bloc of forces in its favour and the demographic makeup of these forces - are closely linked with the generational shift in environmental politics which occurred towards the end of the Obama administration. The most significant event during this period, which served as both a catalyst and indication of this shift, was the Dakota Access Pipeline protests. These were a series of protests (more commonly referred to as #NODAPL), started by a group of indigenous youth activists of the Lakota Nation to prevent the completion of the Dakota Access Pipeline (Elbein, 2017). This underground pipeline ran from the Bakken shale oil fields in northwest North Dakota through the state of South Dakota and Iowa to an oil tank farm in Patoka, Illinois ("The Facts | Dakota Access Pipeline Facts," n.d.). When originally announced the pipeline planned to run through lands that held spiritual, environmental and cultural significance to the Lakota Nation. The #NODAPL protests generated a large amount of attention on social media, initiating a large number of youth activists into environmental politics. One of these young activists inspired by the #NODAPL protests - more specifically the protests around Standing Rock - was future Democratic congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Witt, 2018).

A week after her unprecedented victory over long-standing Democratic congressman - Joe Crowley in a New York primary in the November 2018 midterm elections - democratic socialist Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez joined young climate activists from the Sunrise Movement who were protesting outside of incoming Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, calling for a Green New Deal. Immediately after this show of solidarity with the young activists, Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez, promised to make the Green New Deal a priority. In response to this, many other incoming members of congress added their support to this call for a Green New Deal, namely: Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, Deb Haaland and Antonio Delgado (Corbett, 2018). In the weeks after they were joined by other more established members of Congress such as Representatives John Lewis, Earl Blumenauer, Jose Serrano (Burke, 2018). By the end of the month, there were eighteen Democratic members of Congress co-sponsoring the proposed formation of a House Select Committee on a Green New Deal and the rejection of campaign donations from fossil fuel companies. This proposed committee would be tasked with providing a "detailed national, industrial, economic mobilisation plan capable of making the US economy 'carbon neutral' while promoting 'economic and environmental justice and equality'" to be released by the start of 2020, in conjunction with draft legislation to be put into place within 90 days (Klein, 2018). By November 30th, there were already up to 105 different organisations in support of the Green New Deal initiative. Most notably these groups included: 350.org, Greenpeace USA, Sierra Club, Extinction Rebellion, Democratic Socialists of America, Zero Hour and The Leap (Germanos, 2018). By January 10th, 2019 the number of organisations in support of a Green New Deal had gone over 600 ("Legislation to Address the Urgent Threat of Climate Change", 2019). This show of support was captured in a letter submitted to Congress where these organisations called for the implementation of policies which sought to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, more specifically: ending fossil fuel extraction and subsidies, transitioning to 100 per cent renewable energy by 2035, the expansion of public transportation and firm emission reductions as opposed to carbon trading ("Legislation to Address the Urgent Threat of Climate Change", 2019).

A month after her swearing-in, Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey released a fourteen-page resolution which called for a Green New Deal (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). Some of the resolution's more noteworthy proposals are calls

for a US transition to 100 per cent renewables; large investments into low carbon public transportation infrastructure (particularly high-speed rail systems) and electric cars; a jobs guarantee, universal health care and increased minimum wages. Despite it being described as a large scale plan aimed solely at addressing the climate crisis - in an interview for "The Washington Post Magazine - Ocasio-Cortez's former chief of staff (Saikat Chakrabarti) described the Green New Deal as not originally being a "climate thing" (Montgomery, 2019). Chakrabarti instead referred to it as a "how-do-you-change-the-entire-economy thing", which sought to grapple with the dual challenges of meeting the existential challenge of the climate crisis whilst building an economy with "more broadly shared prosperity, equitability and justice throughout" (Montgomery, 2019). The intersection between the resolution's core pillars of tackling the climate crisis whilst fundamentally restructuring the political economy of the United States, is evident when considering its main objectives. Some of the main goals - of this "10-year national mobilisation" - that the resolution calls for are as follows:

- Guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States.
- Providing all people of the United States with – (i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) access to clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, and nature.
- Providing resources, training, and high-quality education, including higher education, to all people of the United States.
- Meeting 100 per cent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.
- Repairing and upgrading the infrastructure in the United States, including . . . by eliminating pollution and greenhouse gas emissions as much as technologically feasible.
- Building or upgrading to energy-efficient, distributed, and 'smart' power grids, and working to ensure affordable access to electricity.
- Upgrading all existing buildings in the United States and building new buildings to achieve maximal energy efficiency, water efficiency, safety, affordability, comfort, and durability, including through electrification.

- Overhauling transportation systems in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector as much as is technologically feasible, including through investment in – (i) zero-emission vehicle infrastructure and manufacturing; (ii) clean, affordable, and accessible public transportation; and (iii) high-speed rail.
- Spurring massive growth in clean manufacturing in the United States and removing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing and industry as much as is technologically feasible.
- Working collaboratively with farmers and ranchers in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector as much as is technologically feasible.

(Ocasio-Cortez, 2019).

The ideas captured in this resolution echoes that of legislation in the states of California and New York which seek to prioritise investments into clean energy, racialised and working-class communities, and the expansion of social security programmes; particularly in its calls for the expansion and increased access to public programmes such as free public tuition at tertiary level and Medicare for All (Aronoff et. al., 2019:17). In essence, this resolution captures the ideas which several major labour unions, environmental and climate justice movements, and progressive members of the Green Party USA have mobilised around in the past. This is reflected in the resolution itself. As it states that "a Green New Deal must be developed through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labour unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia and business" (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). This resolution represents a clean break from Obama era climate and economic policy, thus signalling an emergent counter-hegemonic project to that of the neoliberal hegemonic order maintained by both the Democratic and Republican establishments since the days of the Reagan administration. Its counter-hegemonic character is evident in the contrast it draws between its proposed programme of action and the policies of the Obama administration - which initially promised to bring fundamental social and economic change - through its calls for large scale economic transformation. Unlike the policies of the Obama administration, the Green New Deal does not limit itself to rhetorical change whilst seeking bipartisan consensus on what

the realistic scale of this change should be. Instead, the Green New Deal roots itself in the world's foremost climate science. Its scope is articulated and guided by the scale of the existential threat to humanity brought by the climate crisis. Being what it is, the resolution only provides an outline of a nascent counter-hegemonic project. Following the introduction of this policy framework to the mainstream, the struggle to determine the dimensions and meaning of this emergent project had begun. The struggle to provide a more solid set of steps which will come to determine whether the Green New Deal evolves into a truly counter-hegemonic project - or whether it is instead subsumed into the neoliberal hegemonic order (much like Obama administration) - is dependant on the alignment of material, institutional and ideological forces which seek to politically organise around it. The formation of this new historic bloc, is dependent on the direct guidance of the leaders who seek to organise around these ideas.

The Process of Articulation

The difference between a "faux Green New Deal" and a radical Green New Deal

Since its introduction into the mainstream, the struggle over the character of a Green New Deal has seen grassroots movements, presidential aspirants, political pundits and policy experts take clear and intentional steps towards articulating their perspectives regarding climate change. Like the original New Deal, the Green New Deal in its current form - as a proposed programme of action - represents a process of interest articulation and aggregation. To identify its counter-hegemonic potential, we must first understand the draw of a picture of what can be considered a truly counter-hegemonic Green New Deal and what can be considered the co-option of Green New Deal rhetoric for the continuation of the neoliberal project. Amongst the many forces seeking to direct the process of determining the politico-ideological framework of a Green New Deal, are centrist economists, technocrats and pundits who aim to co-opt the new burst of progressive energy to promote policies which

greatly reduce its scale and ambition (Aronoff et. al., 2019:17). Given that the concept of hegemony refers to the dominant social order, counter-hegemony would represent a significant transition away from the prevailing social order towards a new one. In this paper, this has been described through the transition from the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism towards that of neoliberalism. Despite the fact that the aforementioned hegemonic projects still fit within the capitalist mode of production, they both represent two distinct politico-ideological projects. The counter-hegemonic potential of the GND can be measured by the degree to which its politico-ideological structure is removed from that of neoliberal hegemony. This does not necessarily suggest a return to embedded liberalism. As a counter-hegemonic project, the GND could exist as a politico-ideological framework that fits comfortably within the greater structure of the capitalist mode of production. But a more distinct separation from the politico-ideological structure of the neoliberal project would require a political and ideological project which goes so far as to directly challenge the foundational logic of capital accumulation which defines the capitalist mode of production. This suggests that the counter-hegemonic potential of the GND can be measured along a spectrum which is not limited according to a specific set of values, but shifts along a continuum. One end of this spectrum would represent a GND firmly positioned within the neoliberal hegemonic project - where the influence of carbon capital is significantly reduced - and on the other end a GND which noticeably is post-capitalist in its orientation.

In their book *A Planet To Win: Why We Need A Green New Deal*, Aronoff et. al., (2019), make the distinction between a "faux Green New Deal" and a "radical Green New Deal". This distinction is a useful device, allowing us to see the Green New Deal as a spectrum. On the one end of the spectrum are the foundations of a truly counter-hegemonic project (a radical Green New Deal) and on the other end is a set of ideas contained within the prevailing neoliberal hegemonic order (a faux Green New Deal). A faux Green New Deal refers to the aforementioned co-option of Green New Deal ideas and rhetoric, towards implementing a less ambitious and restrictive programme. This characterisation of the Green New Deal, is a moderate articulation of the programme which sees the decarbonisation of the US economy and energy sector by the mid-2030s as over-ambitious (Aronoff et. al., 2019:17). In addition to this, those who promote a faux Green New Deal also argue that the social elements

of the programme are expensive and unnecessary. It is the latter perspective which reveals the class character of the faux Green New Deal as being embedded within the logic of the class project of the prevailing neoliberal hegemonic order. Advocates of a faux Green New Deal also, more generally, tend to favour carbon taxes and large investments into the research and development (R&D) of renewable and carbon capture technologies, as the primary means through which a gradual and efficient decarbonisation of the US economy should be achieved (Aronoff et. al., 2019:17). This focus on the distinction between a faux and radical Green New Deal does not seek to measure which between the two perceives climate change as a real existential threat; as they both seek to take a well planned and deliberate approach towards tackling climate change. The approach of a faux Green New Deal is not one rooted in climate denialism, it is one which accepts the validity of climate science. Instead, a faux Green New Deal represents a technocratic view which perceives progress in tackling climate change as more likely to be obtained through a limited and measured approach; focusing primarily on energy, with minimal intervention in economic and social policy. This technocratic approach favours a consensus between policy elites to ensure the implementation of climate policies. It is this procedural approach, with its heavy emphasis on consensus, which informs a faux Green New Deal's perspective towards decarbonisation through the alleviation of social inequalities - via an expansion of social services and public control of markets - as a misguided and reckless effort (Aronoff et. al., 2019:17). Thus a generous understanding of a faux Green New Deal, is that it is one which accepts the gravity of climate change whilst internalising the "common sense" of the neoliberal hegemonic order. If it is to be understood that a truly counter-hegemonic project is one which indicates a transformational shift from the prevailing hegemonic order, then such a project would not aim for incremental gains as an end in itself. This is what distinguishes a radical Green New Deal, from a faux Green New Deal, as the truly counter-hegemonic project. In their usage of the word radical Aronoff et. al., (2019) refer to the Latin origin of the word, radix meaning root. More simply put, it is the difference between systemic change aimed at addressing the underlying causes of the crisis versus a technocratic fix which aims to deal with the symptoms of the crisis.

The limitations of a faux Green New Deal

To gain a deeper understanding of the above-mentioned distinction between a radical Green New Deal and a faux Green New Deal - as a counter-hegemonic project versus a re-ordering of the prevailing neoliberal hegemony - we must bring greater focus onto the limitations of the latter. The SR15's - published by the IPCC on the 8th of October 2018 - the declaration that a 2 degrees increase in global warming could lead to the exacerbation of extreme weather patterns and rising sea levels (among other adverse effects), sets a clear marker as to the required scope and ambition of climate policies which seek to avert the worst effects of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Furthermore, the SR15's recommendations to limit warming to 1.5 degrees celsius - in conjunction with the IPBES' call for "rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of human society" - indicates that any form of climate policy which does not seek to implement actions which explicitly grapples with the challenges of achieving such measures, in essence, accepts the consequences of warming beyond 2 degrees celsius (Media Release: Nature's Dangerous Decline 'Unprecedented'; Species Extinction Rates 'Accelerating,' 2019). Due to this, a faux Green New Deal - through its weaker targets and the moderate rate at which it seeks to implement change - is a programme which essentially accepts global heating of 2 degrees Celsius or more. As a consequence of its moderation, this approach, in turn, risks greater damage from the resulting climate shocks which will occur from such an increase. A faux Green New Deal utilises tax incentives and price signals as its primary economic measures of implementing climate policies, making it especially susceptible to the fluctuations of the market (Aronoff et. al., 2019:18). Furthermore, a faux Green New Deal's primary objective at a structural level is to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. The scope and ambition of a faux Green New Deal does not extend to the restructuring of political, social and economic systems. This, therefore, indicates that the implementation of a faux Green New Deal is one based on ensuring elite consensus. The nature of a capitalist system, and by extension that of transnational social relations of production under neoliberalism, is that investments are made to maximise shareholder value. A reliance on market mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions, in an economic system which operates according to this logic, is unlikely to produce a substantial reduction in carbon

emissions; particularly when the fossil fuel industry continues to make up a great share of the US economy. In addition to this, the faux Green New Deal's attempt to use carbon taxes as a tool to encourage capital to invest in R&D of new technologies - such as geothermal energy, carbon capture and alternatives to conventional meat - does little to take into account the enormous lobbying power that carbon capital has built to politically undermine such efforts.

A radical Green New Deal and its counter-hegemonic potential

At this point, it is necessary for us to clearly define the concept of a radical Green New Deal, whilst clarifying why it can be considered as the basis for a truly counter-hegemonic project. As previously explained, a radical Green New Deal refers to a programme which seeks to address the roots of climate change. Therefore it is necessary to re-emphasise, that this means that its scope and ambition are informed by the severity and urgency of the most reputable climate science. The primary objective of a radical Green New Deal is to avoid climate catastrophe. Therefore, with the SR15's warning of widespread disruptions occurring from a 2 degrees celsius heating, a radical Green New Deal is one which seeks to limit heating to 1.5 degrees Celsius as recommended by both the IPCC and IPBES. All plans which seek to achieve a slow and gradual decarbonisation of the US economy, by 2040 earliest, are plans which accept 2.5 or 3 degrees of warming; and the additional risk of 4.5 degrees warming in countries of the Global South (Aronoff et. al., 2019:18) A radical Green New Deal looks beyond the immediate effects of warming within the context of the United States by taking into account the United States' responsibility to reduce emissions as quickly as it can to limit the effects of global warming on countries of the Global South. It is because it adhered to the scientific consensus, that the 2020s will require a drastic effort in transitioning from a carbon-intensive economy, that a radical Green New Deal rejects the use of market mechanisms as the primary means of effecting change. Which indicates a radical GND's willingness to break through the neoliberal concept of control. A radical Green New Deal is one which also emphasises the connection between social, economic and environmental policies. It sees the emphasis of these links as an important political strength, in the promotion of equality and mobilisation of mass support for

enacting structural change which breaks away from the prevailing neoliberal order. This means that a radical GND is one which contains the principles of a just transition. A just transition describes a set of strategies that facilitate the transition of entire communities to build prosperous economies which produce dignified, productive and ecologically sustainable livelihoods ("Just Transition - A Framework For Change", n.d.). The political, social and economic character of this transition could result in a social democratic arrangement. This would most accurately describe the GND proposed by Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Sanders (McTernan, 2020). A more radical articulation of the just transition, one which builds these strategies on principles of deep democracy and ecological resilience, would result in a GND far more radical than the more moderate social democratic configuration ("Just Transition - A Framework For Change", n.d.).

To achieve rapid decarbonisation of the United States a radical Green New Deal sees the public sector - and by extension public investment - as an important platform to organise and determine the speed, scale and scope of decarbonisation (Aronoff et. al., 2019:18). To expand on this, the radical Green New Deal would use the public sector to coordinate investment and production, like the government's efforts during WWII (Aronoff et. al., 2019:19). This approach stands in direct contrast to the neoliberal concept of control more generally, and its accumulation strategy more specifically. This wartime analogy only refers to the speed and scale at which a radical Green New Deal seeks to implement its programme of decarbonisation.

The scale of a radical GND takes inspiration, more directly, from the historical precedent set by Roosevelt's New Deal. It particularly draws inspiration from the New Deal government's successes in putting millions of people to work towards socially beneficial projects and directing investment towards public works, in its response to the Great Depression (Aronoff et. al., 2019:13). This is another example of the Green New Deal framework as a process of interest articulation and aggregation. A radical Green New Deal points to this historical example - of the government's ability to utilise the energy of the masses during a crisis (the Great Depression) to recover and increase the state's capacity to address a successive crisis (WWII) - as a justification of the plausibility of its ambition. The use of the term

"New Deal" in its naming is a deliberate exercise in expanding the "common sense" understanding of the public imagination, after four decades of neoliberalism's ideological efforts to weaken faith in public institutions (Aronoff et. al., 2019:19). Thus, one of the key tasks of a radical Green New Deal is to rebuild public institutions and promote industrial policy. A radical Green New Deal would seek to identify areas where such policy has already been implemented and act to redirect them towards the development of technologies which assist in decarbonisation; in the case of state-funded military research. In other cases, a radical Green New Deal would seek to increase funding and expand programmes currently working towards innovation and infrastructure development; such as the National Institute of Health and the Department of Energy's Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). Current experiments in states such as California and New York, in green banks and targeted green investments in marginalised communities, are examples of programmes which would be supported and expanded by a radical Green New Deal (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). Despite its embrace of federal power, the project of a radical Green New Deal is not one rooted in top-down control. Its political, social and economic objectives of addressing climate change - in conjunction with social inequality - not only inform its character but also help establish the range of forces who will determine the project's material form whilst guiding the transition it seeks to bring about. As stated in the Cortez-Markey resolution, "a Green New Deal must be developed through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labour unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses" (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019:10). Which suggests that a radical Green New Deal is not a return to a project of "green" embedded liberalism. Proponents of a radical Green New Deal seek to politically organise this alliance of class forces around the counter-hegemonic ideals of this potential project of aggregated interests. It is the aforementioned material, institutional and ideological forces which would make up the historic bloc of a radical Green New Deal. It is through a coalition of these forces that a radical Green New Deal would work to achieve its objective of fundamentally re-shaping the United States' social, political and economic order. It is through this collaboration, rather than its expansion of the public sector, that a radical Green New Deal distinguishes itself from a faux Green New Deal and by extension the hegemonic project of neoliberalism. Its use of federal

power goes beyond "greening" the neoliberal order, and instead empowers workers and the historically marginalised and vulnerable communities.

The most radical framings of the GND politico-ideological framework are those built from ecosocialist and indigenous perspectives. One of the key differences in ecosocialist perspective towards a GND is its perspective on how a GND should be won. This divergence from the general conception of a GND, rooted in electoral processes and the federal government of the United States, also indicates a notable difference in the politico-ideological character of the ecosocialist GND. An ecosocialist perspective is one which favours a GND which emerges from the grassroots struggles of the working class people and social movements ("An Ecosocialist Green New Deal: Guiding Principles", 2019). The ecosocialist perspective is one which explicitly links the fight against climate change as a struggle against the capitalist system ("An Ecosocialist Green New Deal: Guiding Principles", 2019). The ecosocialist conception of a radical GND seeks to build a counter-hegemonic bloc through the organisation of a mass base within the working class, through the "job-focused" elements of the just transition framework ("It's Eco-Socialism or Death" , 2019). This conception of a radical GND is articulated through the immediate and medium-term interests of the working class; primarily the need for jobs and a stable income. Through the just transition framework these interests are articulated around the development of existing green industries. An example of how these would be structured is seen in the strategy of Cooperation Jackson. Cooperation Jackson is a growing network of worker cooperatives in Jackson, Mississippi ("Who We Are", n.d.). Initiatives such as Cooperation Jackson seek to achieve this through the creation of new industries rooted in "community production" ("It's Eco-Socialism or Death" ,2019). This model of community production is an alternative production model which also adds to a political strategy of developing a broad "union-co-op" alliance, which aims to unite trade unions, worker's centers and worker cooperatives ("It's Eco-Socialism or Death" , 2019). This is one part of the ecosocialist strategy. The second part is a call for mass civil disobedience ("It's Eco-Socialism or Death" , 2019). This ecosocialist conception of a radical GND is one which views electoral politics as a tactic rather than "an end unto itself" ("It's Eco-Socialism or Death" , 2019). The Democratic Socialists of America's

ecosocialist caucus presents a set of guiding principles for “an ecosocialist GND”. The seven set of principles are as follows:

- Decarbonize the economy fully by 2030.
- Democratize control over major energy systems and resources.
- Center the working class in a just transition to an economy of societal and ecological care.
- Decommodify survival by guaranteeing living wages, healthcare, childcare, housing, food, water, energy, public transit, a healthy environment, and other necessities for all.
- Reinvent our communities to serve people and the planet, not profit. Facilitate the creation of neighborhood transition councils as hubs of distribution, education, participatory planning, and democratic decision-making.
- Demilitarize, decolonize, and strive for a future of international solidarity and cooperation. Enact policies and join in treaties to meet the existential threat of climate change and abandon the doomed strategy of global military domination.
- Redistribute resources from the worst polluters with just and progressive taxes on the rich, on big corporations, and on dirty industry, as well as by diverting funds away from policing, prisons, and our government’s bloated military budget, which have nothing to do with defense of people living within American borders and everything to do with maintaining imperial dominance over other nations and capitalist control of the world’s resources.

(“An Ecosocialist Green New Deal: Guiding Principles”, 2019).

The Red Deal, is an indigenous conception of a radical GND which builds on the GND to include a greater emphasis on decolonisation (Levy-Uyeda, 2019). The Red Deal was formed by a collection of community members, indigenous people and youth activists. It is based on four key principles that seek to expand on the foundation of the GND. The Red Deal is a project which sees an end to the usage of fossil fuels and settler colonialism as one goal (Estes, 2019). The Red Deal seeks to connect anti-capitalism and decolonisation within the framework, in the same way

that the GND seeks to link social justice struggles for free housing, free health care, free education and green jobs (Estes, 2019). The ideas of the Red Deal help build on the GND through its four principles; what creates crisis cannot solve it; change must come from below and move to the left; politicians cannot do what mass movements do; and the climate conversation must move from theory to action (Levy-Uyeda, 2019). .The first principle of the Red Deal, critiques the lack of explicit calls to end fossil fuel consumption within the GND. Proponents of the Red Deal argue that a radical GND should explicitly call for the banning of all forms of fossil fuel extraction (Levy-Uyeda, 2019). The second principle argues that mass movement politics must be recognised as the primary catalyst for change, which is tied to the third principle which directly critiques the electoralist tendencies within the GND; which fundamentally relies on its implementation through progressive politicians. The fourth principle brings together the first three, as a call to put this understanding into action (Levy-Uyeda, 2019). .

Conclusion

How a radical Green New Deal builds the material capabilities of a potential counter-hegemonic bloc

In their examination of the differences between a radical Green New Deal and a faux Green New Deal, Aronoff et. al., (2019) also give examples of how a radical Green New Deal would work to improve the material capabilities of the constituent forces it seeks to build around; much like Roosevelt's New Deal did for the group of forces which would eventually make up the New Deal coalition. A radical Green New Deal would have to address the social inequalities created by the legacy of racial discrimination in the United States. This means the articulation of interests within a radical Green New Deal must explicitly seek to not essentialise the working class and must work to reflect the diverse nature of its character. Investments into these communities would help give members of these historically disadvantaged communities greater control over production and increase their ability to channel

funding towards their community's specific needs (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). Such an initiative, in conjunction with a reversal of harmful policies such as mass incarceration, would act to rebuild and strengthen these communities. State support for the growth and expansion of non-market institutions which are managed by, and accountable to communities; such as land trusts, utilities, worker cooperatives and public credit unions (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). These measures are examples of how a radical Green New Deal would work to empower communities and give workers greater control of the direction of production. Which would help materially strengthen both groups and make them more likely to continue providing political support for this counter-hegemonic project. Another way in which workers could benefit from a radical Green New Deal, is through the promotion of worker co-ownership of large private companies. Measures like "inclusive ownership funds", which have already been proposed by some, could act as useful tools in a radical Green New Deal's attempts to increase worker co-ownership of large private companies (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). The activities taken in these efforts to reduce social inequality whilst fundamentally reshaping the US towards becoming a society which deliberately operates according to principles of decarbonisation, are an exercise in decentralising power. Despite its aim to overturn the neoliberal order - and the process of liberalisation which occurred with its construction - a radical Green New Deal's support of the public sector and public investment is not an attempt to return to the centralisation of the era of embedded liberalism. Federal power and federal spending, are a means of empowering communities at different levels, so that they may have greater control over their material conditions (Aronoff et. al., 2019:20). This is also one of the most significant differences between the character of a radical Green New Deal and a faux Green New Deal. A faux Green New Deal's emphasis on instruments like a carbon tax, effectively positions it within the neoliberal concept of control, by extension internalising its logic as the only means of addressing climate change.

The radical GND described by Aronoff et. al., represents the social democratic articulation of a GND. This conception of the GND represents a significant enough shift from the prevailing neoliberal project for it to be considered as counter-hegemonic in its action. But it does not represent the limits to how a radical conception of the GND can be understood. The more directly anti-capitalist programs

of the ecosocialist and indigenous approaches offer a more radically counter-hegemonic project. These approaches go so far beyond the mainstream conception of the GND that the value of them being linked to the concept of a GND becomes questionable.

Chapter 7: The Bernie Sanders Campaign as a Radical Green New Deal Approach

Introduction

Bernie Sander's Green New Deal Plan

Sanders' Green New Deal, is a proposal to launch a decade-spanning, national mobilisation to put climate change at the centre of every policy space; such as trade, immigration and foreign policy (Bernie Sanders, 2019). Sanders' Green New Deal is framed according to 13 specific goals and steps to achieve during the proposed mobilisation. These goals and steps as outlined on the campaign's official website are as follows:

- "Reaching 100 per cent renewable energy for electricity and transportation by no later than 2030 and complete decarbonization of the economy by 2050 at the latest"
- "Ending unemployment by creating 20 million jobs needed to solve the climate crisis. These jobs will be good-paying, union jobs with strong benefits and safety standards in steel and auto manufacturing, construction, energy efficiency retrofitting, coding and server farms, and renewable power plants. We will also create millions of jobs in sustainable agriculture, engineering, a reimagined and expanded Civilian Conservation Corp, and preserving our public lands."

- "Directly invest a historic \$16.3 trillion public investment toward these efforts, in line with the mobilization of resources made during the New Deal and WWII, but with an explicit choice to include black, indigenous and other minority communities who were systematically excluded in the past."
- "A just transition for workers. This plan will prioritize the fossil fuel workers who have powered our economy for more than a century and who have too often been neglected by corporations and politicians."
- "Declaring climate change a national emergency."
- "Saving American families money by weatherizing homes and lowering energy bills, building affordable and high-quality, modern public transportation, providing grants and trade-in programs for families and small businesses to purchase high-efficiency electric vehicles, and rebuilding our inefficient and crumbling infrastructure, including deploying universal, affordable high-speed internet."
- "Supporting small family farms by investing in ecologically regenerative and sustainable agriculture. "
- "Justice for frontline communities – especially under-resourced groups, communities of colour, Native Americans, people with disabilities, children and the elderly."
- "Commit to reducing emissions throughout the world, including providing \$200 billion to the Green Climate Fund, rejoining the Paris Agreement, and reasserting the United States' leadership in the global fight against climate change."
- "Meeting and exceeding our fair share of global emissions reductions.."
- "Making massive investments in research and development."
- "Expanding the climate justice movement."
- "Investing in conservation and public lands to heal our soils, forests, and prairie lands." (Bernie Sanders, 2019).

The plan seeks to pay for this mobilisation over 15 years: through litigation, fees, and taxes on the fossil fuel industry, whilst ending the subsidies it currently receives; creating revenue through the sale of energy generated by the regional Power Marketing Authorities; reducing military expenditure aimed at maintaining the United States' global oil dependence; tax collection from the 20 million jobs the plan seeks

to create; a decrease in the need for federal and state spending on social safety nets due to the creation of decent-paying unionised jobs; and increasing taxes on the wealthy and large corporations (Bernie Sanders, 2019).

There are three broad categories according to which the main goals and steps of Sanders' plan can be organised. These three categories are the ways in which Sanders' Green New Deal positions itself as a radical Green New Deal, whilst emphasising how the framework of a radical Green New Deal acts as a counter-hegemonic project which seeks to directly challenge that of the prevailing hegemonic order of neoliberalism. The three broad categories of the Sanders plan are: the transformation of the energy system to 100 per cent renewables, whilst creating 20 million jobs; "ending the greed of the fossil fuel industry" and holding them accountable; and rebuilding the United States economy by ensuring justice for frontline communities and a just transition for workers (Bernie Sanders, 2019). The first and third categories underline the Sanders plan's commitment to the scale of the Cortez-Markey resolution, whilst maintaining its values and commitment to social justice. The Sanders plan's promise to invest \$16.3 trillion towards its mobilisation effort, "in line with the mobilisation of resources made during the New Deal and WWII", is an example of the level of financial investment from the federal government sought by a radical Green New Deal (Bernie Sanders, 2019). Its goal of creating 20 million unionised jobs, whilst providing a just transition for workers in the fossil fuel industry, is also an indication of the Sanders plan's commitment to centring the wellbeing of workers as is required by a radical Green New Deal. The focus on frontline communities, particularly of African-American and Native American communities, also indicates how the Sanders plan centres racial and social justice to the ambition and scale of its mobilisation effort; as is required of a radical Green New Deal. Empowering historically marginalised communities, whilst increasing the security and power of workers - through good-paying unionised jobs - does much to directly undermine the prevailing social relations of production of the neoliberal hegemonic project. A radical Green New Deals' push towards rapid decarbonisation, would also result in the logic of mass consumption which has persisted from the era of Fordist production to that of transnational relations of production. But the most direct manner in which the Sanders campaign seeks to break down the neoliberal hegemonic order, is through its direct attack of carbon capital, and capital more generally. The plan's promise to fund its mobilisation efforts by ending subsidies

currently enjoyed by the fossil fuel industry and taking a greater share of its profits - income of executives and wealth - are the most direct indication of the plan's counter-hegemonic ambitions. Furthermore, the plan's additional promises to prosecute the fossil fuel industry for the damage it has caused, and the implementation of a wealth tax and higher corporate taxes, are all indications of the counter-hegemonic project's attempt to weaken the power of the hegemonic class of corporate and wealthy elites who direct and maintain the neoliberal hegemonic bloc. But for such a counter-hegemonic project of a radical Green New Deal to succeed - through Sanders' plan or beyond it - it requires a concerted effort from the leaders of such a movement to build a counter-hegemonic bloc of forces around workers and historically marginalised communities. But to do so requires an interrogation of how both groups have been alienated from the formal political process since the disintegration of the New Deal coalition. The efforts made by the Sanders campaign to build support for progressive programmes such as the Green New Deal and Medicare for All, provides us with a necessary understanding of some of the difficulties associated with building a multiracial working-class coalition.

Building Power Through A Diverse Coalition

Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and its Influence on Sanders' Multiracial Working Class Coalition

With the disintegration of the New Deal Coalition during the mid to late 1960s, the Democratic base saw itself divided along some new major voting blocs. Despite their differences, these groups all stood in general opposition to the programme of the Reagan administration. But it was only the progressive wing which could be more clearly described as having opposed not just the administration's programme more generally, but more specifically the neoliberal hegemonic project it represented. This was the terrain that Reverend Jesse Jackson, a former advisor to Martin Luther King Jr., entered when he joined the race for the Democratic Party's nomination in January 1984. Jackson's campaign serves as the most direct historical model for the 2020 Sanders campaign's approach to coalition building. Jackson's campaign sought to bring in thousands of new voters to the Democratic Party. Jackson ran an

extensively progressive campaign, rooted in the legacy in Dr King's 1968 Poor People's Campaign which sought to unite poor blacks, whites, Latino's and Native Americans to fight against poverty and inequality (Grim, 2019:28). Jackson's campaign would be built around what came to be known as the Rainbow Coalition. The Rainbow Coalition sought to united groups affected by racial discrimination and economic inequality by supporting: gay rights, single-payer healthcare, reparations for slavery, gender pay equity and an end to Reagan's "war on drugs" (Grim, 2019:28). Although Jackson would go on to lose the 1984 primary to Minnesota senator Walter Mondale, he would win five caucuses/primaries and more than 3 million votes (which represented 18 percent of the total) (Grim, 2019:28). Jackson would run again in 1988, this time against Massachusetts governor Mike Dukakis. This time around Jackson framed the Rainbow Coalition as a coalition of those who were left out under the Reagan administration; such as workers, farmers, the homeless and the unemployed (Geismer, 2020). Jackson reinforced his original message from the 1984 campaign by adding greater specificity to his policies which he would describe as "the opposite of Reaganomics" (Geismer, 2020). His campaign programme sought to ban family farm foreclosures; the introduction of civil rights legislation to protect members of the LGBT community; increasing infrastructure investment for roads and mass transit; increasing Social Security payments; introducing a national minimum for welfare benefits; and doubling federal spending on education (Geismer, 2020). Jackson's campaign also introduced a precursor to the Sanders campaign's current call for Medicare for All, through its endorsement of a universal single-payer healthcare system. Jackson criticised the existing public-private system as wasteful and argued for a national health programme which would be managed by the federal government, whilst being funded by increasing taxes on corporations (Geismer, 2020). These proposals helped generate support for Jackson's campaign amongst African-Americans on the South Side of Chicago, white workers in Michigan's automobile industry, farmers in Wisconsin and progressive groups in cities such as San Francisco and Boston (Geismer, 2020).

Despite his loss, and the lack of support he received from the party establishment, Jackson's campaign helped initiate some changes which opened up greater space and opportunities within the Democratic Party for non-white Americans. His campaign and the Rainbow Coalition which it was built around, helped create a new

generation of African-American leaders within the Democratic Party. This includes Donna Brazile, the first black American to manage a presidential campaign (through Al Gore) and later the acting head of the Democratic National Convention (DNC); President Clinton's political affairs director, Minyon Moore; a former top official of the DNC, Yolanda Caraway; DNC veteran Rev. Leah Daughtry; and the first black Secretary of Labor (in the Clinton administration) Alexis Herman (Grim, 2019:30). In addition to this, the Jackson campaign also contributed to an entire stream of elected officials from (or affiliated with) the Democratic Party. These included: congresswoman Barbara Lee of California; Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa; congresswoman Maxine Waters of California; Jesse Jackson Jr., as a representative of the Chicago district which acted as his father's political base; and the first black American elected to the Senate, Carol Moseley Braun (Grim, 2019:31). There were several other positive effects of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition which would occur in the years after. The most immediate of these was the registration of 2 million new voters during the 1984 campaign, the majority of them African Americans (Grim, 2019:31). These 2 million new registered voters would go on to help the Democrats win eight seats - six of them from the Republicans - to gain control of the Senate voters; a number of them winning close contests in the South with the support of southern black voters (Grim, 2019:31). An additional million voters were registered during the 1988 campaign, which would help create more gains in the years after (Grim, 2019:31). New York City, Seattle and Durham saw the election of their first African American mayors, whilst Cleveland earned it's second (Grim, 2019:31). Following this, there were also the surprise wins of two of Jackson's little known (at the time) white supporters Paul Wellstone and Bernie Sanders, in their respective Senate and Congressional races. In the following year, Sanders would go on to help found the Congressional Progressive Caucus with fellow progressive lawmakers: Lane Evans who represented a Republican district as a rural populist for 24 years; the first Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) member to serve in Congress, Ron Dellums; Maxine Waters and Peter DeFazio (Grim, 2019:31).

The second-order effects of the Jackson campaign, leave open many questions regarding what other progressive achievements could have been attained had he been granted the nomination over Dukakis. Furthermore, could his nomination have set the foundations for a more secure long term, working-class coalition which could

have avoided the expansion of the policies of mass incarceration and the country's eventual rightward shift in the decades after? But what is certain from Jackson's campaign is that major political gain can be won through a diverse coalition based on racial and economic equality. When looking at the legacy of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, it is clear that this coalition arguably stands as the primary historical model along which the Sanders campaign has based its approach to building a multiracial working-class coalition during the 2020 Democratic Primary. Following his wins in the Iowa and Nevada caucuses, in his victory speech (for the latter) Sanders attributed his campaign's success to his "multigenerational" and "multiracial" coalition (Reston, 2020). In a survey released by Data for Progress, just before the Nevada caucuses, Sanders had the support of 64 percent of voters under the age 45 (Ganz et. al., 2020). In addition to this, Sanders also polled at 39 per cent amongst those without a university education and 66 per cent amongst the Latino community (Ganz et. al., 2020). In February 2020 Sanders' support amongst the Latino community also extended to the rest of the country, polling at 30 per cent (above every other candidate that had yet to drop out at the time) according to a Univision poll (Univision, 2020). Sanders' support amongst those without university education was also evident in his victories in New Hampshire and Iowa; which was 31 per cent and 30 per cent respectively (Bronner and Bacon Jr., 2020). Despite what the figures may be, for the different groups who have supported Sanders during the primary, there has been a clear and intentional effort from his 2020 campaign team to reach out to non-traditional and periphery groups; following in the spirit of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. Sanders' win in Nevada came off the back of a concerted effort by his campaign to increase Latino turnout and to organise specifically around these caucuses. Efforts such as hosting training sessions for organisers in Spanish and providing translation services at the caucuses, were crucial in securing his support amongst Latino voters (Chavez, 2020). One such training session, held near the famous Las Vegas "Strip", was conducted at the offices of Make the Road Action, an immigrants-rights group (Chavez, 2020). In Iowa, the Sanders campaign followed a similar strategy, by concentrating their efforts on increasing turnout amongst groups with historically low participation in caucuses, such as immigrants and young people (Addison Post, 2020). The lessons learnt in the Sanders campaign's ability to organise the groups which often remain at the fringes of the electoral process, are important and necessary parts in consolidating and expanding the diverse coalition

of forces required to form a counter-hegemonic bloc. It is important that the multiracial and youthful base of support which the Sanders campaign has been able to build, is maintained beyond the campaign. This coalition of forces requires further consolidation and direction beyond an electoral campaign if it is to truly become a counter-hegemonic bloc which seeks to implement a radical Green New Deal. The historical example of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, indicates both the potential positive second-order effects of this movement building effort and the speed with which these diverse forces can be co-opted into the prevailing hegemonic structure.

Rebuilding Labour Militancy

A challenge in building the coalition of forces necessary to achieve a radical Green New Deal, much like the one Sanders promotes, is rebuilding the strength of labour after four decades of neoliberal erosion. During the era of embedded liberalism, labour's strength came from its ability to bring business to a stop. Labour militancy during this period, presented a serious threat to business as usual. For a radical Green New Deal's counter-hegemonic project to succeed, it requires its constituent forces to be able to threaten the very same business as usual mentality which has led to the climate crisis. Organised labour also has the potential to mobilise working-class communities to build the strong movements necessary to push back against capital's ability to pit members of the working class against each other. In the past, coalitions between environmentalists and unions have often focused on the struggles of workers in the extractive industries (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). But in the case of a radical Green New Deal coalition, its focus would require a broader mandate of improving the material well being of the working class more generally. This is as much a point of strategy as it is about the principles of a radical Green New Deal. A just transition which limits itself to transitioning workers in the fossil fuel industry to clean energy jobs, limits its capacity to build a larger base of workers who will be prepared to fight for a Green New Deal. As of 2020, there are nearly 2 million workers in the coal, oil and gas industries within the United States (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). In comparison to this, there are approximately 3.6 million teachers and 18 million health care workers who form part of a larger collection of workers seeking secure union jobs (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). These workers are part of a broader base of low carbon work which a radical Green New Deal promotes and they are

already at the frontlines of labour militancy in the US. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics reported that more than 90 per cent of workers who went on strike in 2018, were those in health care, education and social assistance; and that these workers led half of all strikes which occurred between 2009 and 2018 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). As significant as this action has been, it still represents a sharp decline in the levels of labour militancy seen in the period leading up to Roosevelt's New Deal. Between 1927 and 1937, the number of strikes in the US went from 500 to 3 500 during the height of the New Deal (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). Despite this stark decline in labour militancy, these recent strikes point to the potential of labour organising in strengthening general working-class organisation. This can only occur if unions can breakthrough capital's ability to frame their struggles as ones which are in opposition to the public good. To achieve this, unions would need to become more proficient in connecting their struggles to that of communities more generally. Following this, they would then need to galvanise these communities to work alongside them to fight for the specific demands made by unions and the broader (connected) demands of the community. An example of this is the United Teachers of Los Angeles, who have been able to link workplace and community struggles through a "bargaining for the common good" model (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). In early 2019, when the teachers went on strike they were supported by their community. Through this added community support the teachers were able to win workplace-specific demands such as better contracts, more teachers, more school counsellors and more nurses (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). But what this support also allowed was for broader community level gains such as the creation of an immigrant defence fund and a commitment to more green spaces, and gardens (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). Teachers and healthcare workers are also in a unique position to help grow existing movements which seek to increase the provision of social services. A large number of teachers and healthcare workers are under state employees and those in the same field working in the private sector often rely on state funding (Aronoff et. al., 2019:47). On their website, under "Environmental and Climate Justice", National Nurses United argues that "bold action is needed to address the catastrophic health impacts of global warming, and the associated extreme weather conditions such as widespread drought, wildfires, and flooding all over the world" (National Nurses United, 2020). This statement is followed by a resolution on environmental and climate justice, which underlines the union's acknowledgement of

the seriousness of climate science and how the reality of climate change is linked to community struggles ("Resolution on Environmental and Climate Justice", 2020). This is an example of the form of solidarity which a renewed labour militancy must espouse, in the effort of creating a broader radical Green New Deal counter-hegemonic bloc. But to build such solidarity, advocates of a radical Green New Deal, such as Sanders, must also take seriously worker's concerns. Particularly those of workers in extractive sectors and construction

Conclusion

Production relations and building the base

Unfortunately for those who seek to promote a radical Green New Deal, such as the Sanders campaign, a large number of workers who would benefit from such a programme are still led by their doubts. Unionising green jobs is also an important step in strengthening the involvement of labour in a radical Green New Deal coalition, as it will also help to make these jobs more attractive to workers. Since the time of its introduction during the New Deal, the Wagner Act still stands as the most comprehensive range of labour protections afforded to workers in the United States (Aronoff et. al., 2019:48). Sanders' campaign and the broader coalition of forces which seek to enact a radical Green New Deal must go beyond this. As ambitious as the Wagner Act was during the time of its implementation, it was not long after its introduction that the Taft-Hartley Act was passed to limit the Wagner Act's scope (Gordon, 2017). Sanders' Green New Deal seeks to rebuild labour militancy through five measures: ensuring a just transition for workers; the introduction of strong labour standards; providing employers with tax credits to incentivise hiring transitioning employees; investment in workers' and de-industrialised communities economic development; and by protecting the rights of all workers to form a union without a threat or intimidation from management (Bernie Sanders, 2019). The campaign's plan to ensure a just transition through the creation of 20 million unionised jobs in the manufacturing sector, seeks to reverse the transnationalisation of production relations which occurred under neoliberalism. The plan's promise to spend \$1.3 trillion to ensure that workers in the fossil fuel and carbon-intensive industries receive work benefits, a living wage, training, and job placement are all efforts to reverse the

precarious nature of labour under transnationalised relations of production (Bernie Sanders, 2019). The benefits of programmes such as Medicare for All, promoted by the Sanders campaign, also help to increase the economic security of workers and strengthen their bargaining power in negotiations with their bosses; as employee healthcare benefits could no longer be used against workers to weaken their bargaining power. The implementation of strong labour standards, helps ensure that funding from the Green New Deal would help improve worker and community safety standards (Bernie Sanders, 2019). Investments in the economic development of workers and de-industrialised communities would also increase worker security, giving workers greater autonomy in economic decisions which affect them and their families. Finally, the protection of the right for all workers to unionise would have the strongest impact in reinforcing and increasing all the aforementioned efforts at increasing worker security. Sanders' Workplace Democracy Plan seeks to ensure the expansion of the trade union movement through the establishment of a sectoral collective bargaining system to set wages and benefits across all industries (Bernie Sanders, 2019).

Chapter 8: Conclusion

An exploration of the nature of the relationship between structure and agency

The application of a transnational historical materialist approach in this paper, was an attempt to understand the structural nature of society within a particular historical period and the changes in those structures across historical periods. The neo-Gramscian aspect - of the transnational historical materialist approach - functions as a means of promoting a non-reductionist approach to this paper's analysis of the politico-ideological projects which form the structural basis of a social order. Our historical examination of hegemonic projects, and the transitions between the hegemonic structures, acted as an examination of the nature of the relationship between structure and agency. Structure as previously outlined, refers to the historical accumulation strategies of capital and their application in the process of accumulation within specific historical periods. Agency refers to the visible social forces that occur from the domain of production relations, that carry out continuous struggles over the direction of accumulation strategies and the role and nature of the state (Overbeek, 2000:174). The aspect of agency in this paper is explained through concepts of control as the strategic component of a historic bloc's formation (Overbeek, 2000:174). Thus, it is through this application of a historical materialist approach that this paper has sought to understand the relationship between structure (accumulation strategies) and politico-ideological projects (hegemonic projects); concepts of control acting as a representation of this interaction, hence its identification as the strategic element of historic bloc formation. The analysis of the historical transition of these projects has revealed how dominant forces within society often synthesised existing structural conceptions of social order and corresponding politico-ideological projects together, through concepts of control. The important distinction being, that concepts of control only "control" the understanding

and framing of possibilities once a hegemonic project has been established. They are the material means through which the political coalition of forces within a historic bloc are able to maintain a hegemonic social order. This process was historically initiated by capital fractions in both the hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism; productive capital and finance capital respectively.

The functional position of these forces within the historical process was one of directing the interaction between historical elements of structure and agency across specific historic periods. In practical terms, capital fractions - as representatives of the dominant classes - were able to guide the interaction between existing accumulation strategies and the ideological contributions of affiliated intellectuals into a combined general interest (hegemonic project). In the era of embedded liberalism, production capital was able to encourage a Fordist model of accumulation, with the ideological support of Keynesian economics and the New Deal coalition. This interaction of forces is historically captured in the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism. The Fordist model of accumulation for this new project had been refined during the "wartime Keynesianism" of WWII (Jones, 1972). A similar process occurred under the neoliberal hegemonic project. Where money capital (finance capital), was able to promote mass consumption through transnational production relations (as the accumulation strategy) with the ideological support of neoclassical economics and neoliberal political philosophy. But where neoliberalism differs from embedded liberalism in the United States, is in its capacity to form political alliances within the mainstream of both the Republican and Democratic parties. This, as was highlighted in chapter 4, was facilitated through the seemingly contradictory mix of liberal and neoconservative elements within the neoliberal politico-ideological project. Which allowed for a much broader space for political elites within the neoliberal bloc. Giving the neoliberal bloc greater political security from elite friction than the structure of embedded liberalism.

The challenges of counter-hegemony

Carbon capital as the the "lifeblood" of the neoliberal social order

This analysis of carbon capital across the historical periods allows us to understand the true structural dynamics of a hegemonic project. Carbon capital as a "faction" of capital which is made up of different "fractions" of capital - being able to exercise its influence on both the productive and financial aspects of the United States economy, gives a different perspective to the notion of the historical periods of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism as struggles between different fractions of capital. Can the transitions in these historical structures be truly considered as changes within a hegemonic project, or as a reordering within a greater hegemonic order of capitalism? The diffusion of carbon capital's influence across the conventional political landscape of the United States across historical periods - in conjunction with the similar spread of a logic of mass consumption - suggests that both structural changes to the basis of production relations and politico-ideological projects must go beyond those of embedded liberalism to be truly counter-hegemonic. While the parameters of possibility between embedded liberalism and neoliberalism were guided by a proclivity to specific accumulation strategies - with a continued logic of a society being driven by accumulation through consumption - the reality of climate change necessitates a fundamental rethinking of an unopposed notion of endless accumulation. The role of fossil fuels in the expansion of accumulation and consumption, across the hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism, emphasises the need for this fundamental rethinking. The challenge of decarbonisation, and the pace at which it must occur, necessitates the need to understand the element of agency within these structures and how a society's collective ability to honestly address the contradictions of the prevailing social order is intentionally hindered by forces such as carbon capital. It is carbon capital's historical ability to mould itself to changes - politico-ideological projects and political alliances - within the capitalist system, that suggest that a truly counter-hegemonic project which seeks to address the reality of climate change within the United States must simultaneously address the capitalist logic of accumulation itself.

Defining a project through a simultaneous focus on structure, agency and the general interest

The Green New Deal, much like the original New Deal, indicates a contextual process of "interest articulation and aggregation". Like the New Deal, the Green New

Deal as a process, is a contextual response to a crisis. Unlike the New Deal, it is a response to multiple crises, occurring at different points of the plan's conception; the New Deal was a response to the effects of the Great Depression after the stock market crash of the 1920s. The Green New Deal is a response to two specific historical crises, conceptually linked by its response to an incoming crisis. The historical crises in question are: social inequality as a historic legacy of racial discrimination in the United States; and growing economic inequality (wealth and income inequality) as a legacy of neoliberalism. It is in this function as a response to crises, that the Green New Deal serves a process of "interest articulation and aggregation". But unlike the New Deal - whose process would mature into the hegemonic project of embedded liberalism - critiques, support and analysis of a Green New Deal also stress the difficulty of simultaneously formulating a hegemonic project, whilst mapping out a way towards achieving it. This is the challenge of the Green New Deal as a counter-hegemonic ideal. If we are to understand it as a process of "interest articulation and aggregation", then it would be more accurate for it to be described as an ideal. What differentiates the New Deal as a process of "interest articulation and aggregation" from embedded liberalism as a hegemonic project, is the ability of the latter to maintain itself through a hegemonic concept of control which synthesised a politico-ideological project with an accumulation strategy. The New Deal as a process helped concretise that politico-ideological project within the United States, whilst giving a form and order to the political alliances that would make up the historic bloc of embedded liberalism.

The distinction between a radical and faux Green New Deal indicates that the process of "interest articulation and aggregation" are still at an early stage. The spectrum at which these two ideals of a radical and a faux Green New Deal also point to the space which exists for organic intellectuals across the divide, who aim to address climate change, to aggregate and articulate their class interests. This is one aspect of why the Green New Deal remains an ideal and not a project, as its historical development could lead to the formulation of a concretely faux Green New Deal politico-ideological project. This faux Green New Deal would only change the politico-ideological nature of the prevailing hegemonic structure, whilst doing little to change the underlying structural nature of the social order. Whereas the development of a radical Green New Deal necessitates the development of new

relations of production, as it would be more aligned with the interests of the working class. This version of a radical GND is one more aligned with the anti-capitalist features of the ecosocialist perspectives and indigenous projects such as the Red Deal.

Limitations and considerations for developing a counter-hegemonic project

The Cortez-Markey Resolution represents a legislative attempt to intentionally structure a potential counter-hegemonic bloc, in the same way that the New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration helped aggregate the support of what would become the New Deal coalition. The Sanders campaign represents a similar process of aggregating support, but through elective politics. Together, both strategies would be historically analogous to the New Deal era. The two approaches represent a targeted approach, that is too reliant on gaining control of the political institutions of the United States. In a Gramscian sense, this could be seen as trying to capture political society before securing civil society. Or seeking to influence change in civil society and the economy, having already captured political society. The hegemonic projects of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism were maintained across Democratic and Republican administrations; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the former; Bill Clinton and Barack Obama in the latter (White House, 2020). Whilst the Green New Deal, in its most generic form, has been unable to generate any meaningful support from Republican politicians; in part due to the "Fox News effect" (Gustafson et al., 2019:940). In addition to this, unlike the historic blocs of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism, capital would not have a directive role within a counter-hegemonic bloc of a radical Green New Deal; as articulated by the Cortez-Markey Resolution and as indicated by the coalition-building strategy of the Sanders campaign. Which limits the material capacity of this aspirant counter-hegemonic bloc to challenge the prevailing hegemonic order.

This material limitation also affects the ability of social forces, which are for a radical Green New Deal, to direct and influence institutional forces; in the same manner as the neoliberal bloc. The Sanders campaign's approach to this material deficit was its plan to rebuild labour militancy and workplace democratisation. But the

implementation of this potential concept of control is still limited to the Sanders campaign and does not provide a broader strategy beyond electoral politics. In addition to this, the Sanders plan's commitment to disciplining carbon capital specifically - and capital more generally - does not provide a framework for addressing the existing logics of consumption that the current model of accumulation is based on. This necessitates the need for these forces to conceptualise and develop alternative institutions, or build "dual power". What the Sanders plan, and the campaign more broadly represent, is a possible framework for accelerating interest articulation and aggregation. Its approach to building a multiracial coalition of working-class citizens, also offers us an understanding of how organic intellectuals within this multi-racial working class can be identified to accelerate this process of interest articulation and aggregation. The recent increase in the militancy of teachers and healthcare workers are an example of the types of social forces, within the broader working class, that can perform the required function of organic intellectuals that develop working-class common sense towards a radical Green New Deal project. As this paper has outlined, the challenge faced by this radical Green New Deal ideal transitioning into a counter-hegemonic project, is that it must simultaneously account for structure and agency in its quest for historic change. But unlike the previous projects, pro-Green New Deal forces must intentionally create alternative production relations, where they can, in the prevailing hegemonic order to materially build the political alliances which will form its counter-hegemonic bloc.

In conclusion, it remains fundamentally clear that an aspirant-counter-hegemonic radical GND must confront these contradictions if it is to truly become a counter-hegemonic project. That is the contradiction of developing the ideological framework for this counter-hegemonic project whilst creating material and institutional illustrations of what this counter-hegemonic project represents. This would move the Green New Deal beyond its current position as an ideal locked within the context of a resolution, into a project which is given form and defined by the example of real material illustrations of its efforts to counteract the structural and politico-ideological logics of the neoliberal project. As outlined in the 6th chapter, the concept of a GND currently exists within a spectrum of least radical to strongly radical. The least radical of conception of the GND is one which remains firmly within the structure of a neoliberal hegemonic project. The degree to which the concept of a

GND becomes counter-hegemonic depends on how much it does to break down the politico-ideological structures of neoliberal hegemony and its concept of control. The GND is counter-hegemonic in this regard as its politico-ideological project (as framed in the Market-Ocasio-Cortez resolution) is one which seeks to weaken and shift power away from the fossil fuel driven neoliberal hegemony.

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