

Research Report

Collaborative Governance and the Social Compact during the Covid-19 pandemic

**Submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree Master of Management
from the School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS)**

**Submitted by
Adele Gilbert
1802201**

**Supervisor
Prof. Robert van Niekerk**

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DECLARATION

I, **Adele Gilbert**, declare that this research report is my original work. Any portions which are not I have referenced appropriately. The report is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Management at the School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand.

The research report has not, either in whole or in part been submitted before for any degree or examination in this, or any other University.

Date: December 2022

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'AG', written over a light blue horizontal line.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is dedicated to all South Africans who lost their lives during COVID-19 pandemic and those who continue to suffer the after effects.

Immense gratitude and respect to my supervisor Professor Robert van Niekerk for his guidance, knowledge and perseverance.

To my family and friends – thank you for your continued support and encouragement throughout this process.

“Let us forge a new consensus to confront a new reality, a consensus that unites us behind our shared determination to reform our economy and rebuild our institutions.

Let us get to work.

Let us rebuild our country.

And let us leave no one behind.”

(Presidency, 2022)

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

B4SA – Business for South Africa

BBC – Black Business Council

BUSA – Business Unity South Africa

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

ERRP – Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan

GEAR - Growth, Employment, and Redistribution

ILO - International Labour Organisation

LMP – Local Manufacturing Partnership

LSF – Localisation Support Fund

MDMA – Medical Devices Manufacturing Association

MIDP – Motor Industry Development Programme

MLC – Millennium Labour Council

NEDLAC - National Economic Development and Labour Council

NIP – National Industrial Participation Programme

NPM - New Public Management

NRCS – National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications

PPE – Personal Protective Equipment

SAA – South African Airways

SABS – South African Bureau of Standards

SACTWU - South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union

SAHPRA – South African Health Products Regulatory Authority

SIU – Special Investigating Unit

ABSTRACT

South Africa has a strong history of tripartite co-operation and collaborative governance since democratic rule in 1994. As a democratic developing country, through the constitution, South Africa aims to follow the principles of good governance and promotes broad social actor (labour, business and civil society) inclusion as a means to develop a more equal and inclusive society. This form of governance is used across the various tiers of government in South Africa namely national, provincial and local, taking on a range of different institutional forms. It has also been used to tackle a diverse range of issues in sectors including but not limited to health, environment, economic and education.

The purpose of this research study was to investigate collaborative governance in the local manufacture of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the insights this has provided on the challenges, obstacles and prospects for establishing a social compact for a South African economic recovery post the COVID-19 pandemic. This was done by exploring the understanding of collaborative governance and social compacting and the perspective of different social actors to the success of using these forms as a means to achieve successful collaborative outcomes for society during the pandemic. The study then considered what insights this process of collaborative governance has provided to guide the development of a social compact. Lastly the study explored if social solidarity plays any role in collaborative governance and what this enables within such an institutional setting.

The outcome of the research has revealed the importance major external shocks such as a global pandemic play in creating a context of shared risk, creating the potential for uniting social actors in the pursuit of solutions which serve the broader society. This has been contrasted by findings in relation to the effects of sectoral interests on the outcomes of collaborative governance, as well as the layered complexity of social actor groupings within South Africa and its impact on long term societal gains. It appears that this, along with a number of other challenges, poses significant obstacles to the development and implementation of a more society-centred social compact for South Africa, which is supported by implementation and accountability across social actors aimed at real societal transformation.

1. CHAPTER - INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background


The aim of this research study is to investigate collaborative governance in the local manufacture of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the insights this has provided on the challenges, obstacles and prospects for establishing a social compact for South African economic recovery post the COVID-19 pandemic. In the context of this proposal collaborative governance refers to the formal creation of a social partnership structure between government departments and non-governmental actors to address social issues of national importance. Social compacting refers to mutually beneficial agreements reached consensually between state and non-state actors (business, civil society, trade-unions) aimed at a developmental goal of economic and social benefit for society. South Africa has entered into numerous social accords and sector compacts during the past 27 years of democracy yet it has struggled to reach agreement on a national social compact. Understanding and explaining the key reasons why, through a case study of the experience of the manufacture of PPEs during the COVID-19 pandemic, is the primary motivation for this research study.

1.1.1 The Covid-19 Context

The context of the study is the scale of social fracturing further exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic in South Africa and its damaging social effects and consequences. Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, the country was struggling with increasingly high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment. Now the pandemic has shone a spotlight on the fault lines of our socially fractured society and has further exposed the scale of social polarisation and inequality (Francis et al., 2020a). During President Cyril Ramaphosa's State of the Nation speech in February

2021 he indicated that South Africa had an unemployment rate of 30,8% (Presidency, 2021), by Q4 of 2021 (February 2022) Statistics South Africa reported this as 35,3% (StatsSA, 2022, p. 12). This estimate is based on the conservative definition of unemployment which does not include discouraged work seekers and notes expanded “unemployment rate at 46,2%” (StatsSA, 2022, p. 13). While the COVID-19 pandemic manifests as a health crisis its consequences and impact on social and economic wellbeing suggests a wider social crisis, which has exacerbated even further pre-pandemic levels of inequality and poverty. Illustrations of this social crisis include loss of income specifically in lower paid jobs, restrictions of movement affecting informal traders, curfews exacerbating incidents of gender based violence, limited or no access to schooling and water in poorer communities – these are only a few of the issues.

Figure 1 - Summary of the South African Unemployment Figures Jan 2019 - Jan 2022



(Trading Economics, n.d.)

In relation to global policy responses to the numerous ramifications of the pandemic, the call has been made from various international and local quarters for collaboration between diverse partners effected by the pandemic to collectively resolve the

economic and social issues which have emerged during this pandemic (Global Deal, 2020; ILO, 2020b; Mary Kauzya, 2020; Presidency, 2021; Wallace Foundation, 2020).

The International Labour Association (ILO) for example has stressed the need for “swift and coordinated policy responses” and “constructive and persistent social dialogue between governments and social partners” (ILO, 2020a, p. 2,15). However, it is necessary to explore if co-operation or collaboration between social actors does indeed deliver more inclusive societies?

1.1.2 Setting the Context: The History of Tripartite / Corporatist Collaboration in the SA Democratic Era

South Africa has a strong history of tripartite co-operation and collaborative governance since democratic rule in 1994. This form of governance is used across the various tiers of government in South Africa namely national, provincial and local, taking on a range of different institutional forms. It has also been used to tackle a diverse range of issues in sectors including but not limited to health, the environment, the economic sector and education.

In 1996 South Africa established its premier tri-partite or corporatist institution for social dialogue and collaboration the National Economic Development and Labour Forum (NEDLAC). Its founding Act creates representation for government, labour and business, and more recently, also the community constituency. NEDLAC is based on the principles of equal representation and consensus seeking (Kim & van der Westhuizen, 2015), with its main purpose to encourage inclusive and developmental policy outcomes for the country by ensuring social actor participation in policy development. However, various authors (Mbongo, 2020, p. 4; McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 11) have raised concern about the fact the NEDLAC seems to

represent elite political and economic interests – “exclusivist representation” (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 11), not serving the whole of society agenda.

In July 2000 the Millennium Labour Council (MLC) was established as a high level bilateral forum between business and labour leadership as a platform which served as a think tank, which is designed to permit parties to investigate possible options, and to forge agreement. The framework was more around open-ended dialogue and the ability to explore and filter ideas. It was very clear that the MLC was not established as an institution for negotiation as NEDLAC was already established for this purpose. The aim of the MLC by contrast was to bridge the divide which existed between organised labour and the capital class in the country and to foster trust amongst parties with the goal of addressing societal issues through reaching consensus on economic strategies for developmental objectives.

The MLC identified two objectives as their main target namely: reducing poverty and inequality, and reducing job loss and raising the levels of employment (Jansen, 2001, p. 54). While we have well established institutions the effectiveness of these institutions is being questioned, especially because after almost three decades of existence South Africa is now listed as “the most unequal country in the world, ranking first among 164 countries in the World Bank’s global database of Gini coefficients, which measure inequality of per capita consumption (or income, depending on the country)” (Sulla et al., 2022, p. 1).

Figure 2 - Regional Comparison of Gini Coefficient




Figure 2 above depicts a comparison with countries in the SACU region, which based on the “most recent data put South Africa’s Gini index at 67 in 2018” (Sulla et al., 2022, p. 13).

As such, we cannot assume that collaborative governance will automatically result in a social compact that substantively addresses the social and economic crisis that confronts the country. A key consideration is the ability to turn the policy goals of this collaborative process into societal outcomes that have a real transformative impact on society – a problem which South Africa still seems to be grappling with.

1.1.3 Institutions in the Pandemic

During the pandemic a number of institutions were central to responding to the crisis created including NEDLAC, which was used by the President to facilitate numerous discussions around specific policy responses including those linked to liquor, transport and, social and economic assistance. Despite this, many authors are of the view that this institution has failed in its goal to achieve a social compact for South Africa (Kim & van der Westhuizen, 2015, p. 97; McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 11). Additionally, there is merit in engaging with new institutions to investigate alternate forms of governance that could assist our established institutions to repurpose or transform. Also, various studies have already been concluded that have focussed on NEDLAC during the past 26 years.

New institutions were formed during the pandemic including the Solidarity Fund created in March 2020 with the main task and focus to manage and augment the relief interventions of government. The Solidarity Fund is an independently-run rapid response vehicle created as a platform where South Africans and international allies, could provide their financial support for South Africa during the pandemic. The funds

raised have been used to support various initiatives during the pandemic across three key areas namely: health related projects, humanitarian support in communities and programmes to assist behavioural change across South Africa.

Another institution created during the pandemic was a broad over-arching business initiative called Business for South Africa (B4SA) – a volunteer alliance in the business sector formed to support government with services through and beyond the pandemic, and working toward the effective execution of the agreed economic recovery strategy. The latter two institutions particularly as they are outside of the established governance structures are important when considering the effects of new alliances, social actor interests, networks and the availability of resources. These are potentially important elements for establishing robust collaboration and the implementation of any economic recovery strategy.

Walter Korpi (Korpi, 2006), a social theorist, provides a conceptual model that interrogates the relative balance and organisation of power between social actors in securing a common, beneficial outcome which is institutionalised and this conceptual prism will be adapted to the case of collaborative governance in South Africa, drawing out its strength and weaknesses for understanding the dynamics of the South African case. As noted by Korpi (2006) in his Power Resource Model, social actors have access to power resources but often represent a range of divergent interests. Multi-party collaborations create a dynamic interplay between these interests, which particularly at a national level have overarching outcomes for society at large.

Especially during a significant crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which has an impact across the whole of society, collaborative governance can potentially be used as a mechanism to secure inclusive, sustainable solutions that are for the public good instead of narrow, sectional interests. It is for this reason that critically reflecting on

the experience of collaborative governance during a period of crisis could provide insights into the potential and challenges for establishing an effective social compact in South Africa.

It should be noted that social compacting has been used on many occasions in South Africa to try and address economic and social issues including through for example the “Jobs Summit”, “the Growth and Development Summit” and the “Social Cohesion Summit” (MISTRA, 2014, p. 3). More recently, a process of sectoral co-operation in key economic sectors (described as Master Plan development) has been embarked on in South Africa as a means of encouraging inclusive, sustainable economic development between social actors (Mashimbye, 2021b). However despite the collaborative success of some of these plans, there is still much scepticism on the effectiveness of social compacts and their actual success as a mechanism for effecting social change in the country. This is linked to two very important elements of a social compact namely, the institutions used to give effect to the compact and secondly, the implementation of the agreements in the compact.

The concepts of both collaborative governance and social compacting therefore needs to be subjected to research interrogation, to explore their relationship and what insights this provides in relation to the potential for, and obstacles and challenges to a durable South African social compact that can effect and sustain social transformation within the wider society, specifically the systematic reduction of inequality through policy action aimed at re-distribution of wealth and resources.

1.1.5 PPE Case Study

The significance of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) as a focus of the case-study in relation to collaborative governance relates to the initial stages of the COVID-19

pandemic in March 2020. When infection numbers started increasing at a rapid rate, there was a realisation of the shortage of face-masks and medical PPE in the South Africa.

Due to various local and international circumstances the country was “unprepared and ill equipped to meet the sudden surge in demand” for these items (Mashimbye, 2021a). Various commentators have argued convincingly that this problem is the result of our economic system which is based on a market privileging or neo-liberal model of accumulation and extraction which has increasingly contributed to the inequality in our society (Benach, 2021, p. 4; van Barneveld et al., 2020, p. 135). Countries across the globe also experienced a “shortage of PPE equipment” (van Barneveld et al., 2020, p. 137) as international value chains were halted for extended periods at a time and prices of PPE soared. For South Africa this was significant because before the pandemic emerged, it was “dependent on imports for more than 90 percent of its medical PPE” (Mashimbye, 2021a) - in a country with mass unemployment. One of the main reasons for this is that South Africa has remained an exporter of raw materials (especially minerals) since the apartheid era and an importer of technology and instruments of production (Kondlo, 2015, p. 12). This has severely impeded its industrialisation effort, significantly reducing its manufacturing capacity, critical for the reduction of unemployment.

In an attempt to address this, a collaborative governance initiative was started between government, business and labour to build local manufacturing capacity in the short to medium term. The work of the Local Manufacturing Partnership (LMP), was arguably significant (Mashimbye, 2021a). In the space of a few months the LMP collaboration has taken South Africa to the point where the country has not only sufficient locally produced PPE but is able to explore export opportunities. However,

the success of this collaboration has been undermined by a number of obstacles, including administrative issues within government, availability of funding, inter-departmental responsibilities, procurement responsibilities between spheres of government, private sector autonomy, as well as a lack of manufacturing capacity.

The above hurdles and challenges have explanatory resonance in the Korpi Power Resource model in relation to the conflict of interests which are part of the engagement and exchange between diverse social actors (key amongst which are government, civil society, business) and which has the potential to create cleavages between the social actors. Also, social actors are not homogenous but represent a host of different sectional interests across society. This adds to the complexity of implementing collaborative governance and the ability to develop a social compact that represents society at large. Additionally, a perceived lack of interest in the public good as evidenced in the corruption on PPE tenders within many of the provinces (Daily Despatch, 2020; Polity, 2021), is one of many reasons which highlight the obstacles to developing and sustaining an egalitarian social compact, unlocking a transformation of our society.

1.1.5 Political Economy

It is crucial to take into account South Africa's exceptionally unstable political economy while developing a social compact. Part of the reason for this is that post democracy, the country has continued to pursue an inequality inducing neo-liberal development agenda which has resulted in many more “have-nots” than “haves” in our society. According to Thompson & Wissink (2018, p. 32) the state has been caught pursuing both nation building and global competitiveness, which arguably has caused a policy disconnect especially because the latter seems to have been given priority. This essentially means that there has been a focus on industrial policies which favour

extraction at the expense of secondary industrialisation and employment, significantly hampering efforts to reduce inequality, poverty and unemployment. As such, while South Africa is able to produce wealth it seems it faces challenges in terms of ensuring distribution of wealth across society (Ramokgopa, 2013, p. 401).

Essentially, the inequality, poverty and unemployment across South Africa is still very much constituted along race, class and gender lines, impacting the black majority and women most significantly (AFP, 2022; Motlanthe, 2017, p. 26). The intersection of these unresolved concerns over a lengthy period of the democratic era has created a tumultuous social and political environment in the country. This has also been very evident during the COVID-19 pandemic where these sectors of society have been particularly hard hit by pandemic restrictions.

Additionally, the political landscape has also undergone significant upheaval in the last two decades with the ruling party being consumed with significant factional battles pitting political elites against each other in the battle to secure sectional interests. This does not only play out at national level but is also very evident at a sub-national level where some areas of government, such as municipalities are considered dysfunctional (Thompson & Wissink, 2018, p. 35). South Africa's political economy seems to resemble an "unsettled political settlement" that impacts policy consistency, redistribution of resources and the effectiveness of institutions (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 16). This also speaks very strongly to the issue of institutions which are a central component of the political economy of a country, since they are vital to power, resource allocation and implementation. The governance challenges in the South Africa political environment is considered to have created "hollowed out, weak institutions" however, the pandemic in the form of a catalytic crisis arguably created an opportunity for a policy rethink on the manner in which these institutions

can be transformed to be more inclusive and serve a more egalitarian societal good (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 12).

It is therefore important to recognise that the economic and political spheres of society cannot be separated from each other, they directly impact each other and therefore the type of society that is created over time.

1.1.6 Economic and Social Outcomes for Society

It is therefore, essential to analyse the outcomes of collaborative governance in relation to the manufacture of PPE which compelled co-operation under acute adverse conditions and whether the resultant forms of engagement have contributed either positively or negatively to developing a robust social compact in South Africa. Negotiation, trade-offs and bargains occurring within the platform of collaborative governance could result in certain positive outcomes for society at large but is by no means a certainty, a view which is supported by Korpi's power resource model (Korpi, 2006). This must be understood specifically because a social compact has the potential under certain conditions to challenge the current discourse and structure of society at a political, social and economic level in a more transformative direction but equally in a more inequality inducing direction. The question is how to understand the circumstances and conditions that support effective struggles against inequality and in favour of social justice through mechanisms such as a social compact. The case of PPE production through collaborative governance and in the wider context and conditions of the Covid-19 crisis allows for such an examination.

Collaborative governance potentially allows for an inclusion of diverse actors and a broadening of dialogue in finding solutions to public problems (such as health, education, housing and so forth). How does this inclusion contribute though to the

emergence of a “collective language” (Vasta, 2010, p. 510) which opens the possibility for a collective consciousness to emerge between social partners?

Emile Durkheim (Mishra & Rath, 2020) was of the view that collective consciousness is a key ingredient to creating social solidarity because it creates a collective understanding as well as obligations. It is these obligations and outcomes of collaborative governance which could provide the impetus for a more egalitarian social compact to emerge in South Africa. In 1994 we achieved an electoral and political transformation, however for society to change fundamentally we also require this to be matched by a socio-economic transformation (Motlanthe, 2017, p. 23), which relates back to the political economy of our country.

It is evident that this pandemic has created an economic and social crisis which has exposed all sectors, creating a collective risk and greater “social interdependence” (Kantzara, 2014, p. 267). As such, how do we ensure that outcomes agreed during the collaboration are implementable and have an equitable longer term effect on economic and social policy for the country? These are the key underlying questions that inform and motivate this research study.

1.2 Research Problem Statement

Research has been undertaken covering areas such as cross-sector collaboration, social partnerships and public-private partnerships, over a range of different sectors including food security, healthcare and water management (Aylett, 2010; Hamer & Mays, 2020; Mahlangu et al., 2019a). Most of this research seems to focus on specific community based interventions and projects. However, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic there is a gap in the research and studies relating to the importance of

collaborative governance and the focus on its outcomes as a contributor to social compacting at a national level.

Collaborative governance has been part of the South African governance system since democracy in 1994. During the COVID-19 pandemic numerous political leaders including President Ramaphosa have repeatedly highlighted the importance of collaborative governance as a mechanism to drive our economic recovery and assist in forging “a new social compact” (Francis et al., 2020a, p. 348). The President has said that this new compact “will build on the co-operation being forged among social partners” during the pandemic (Francis et al., 2020a, p. 348; Ramaphosa, 2020, p. 6). There is no-one-size-fits-all approach to developing and implementing a social compact however, there are possibly periods in time where the balance of power shifts between social classes that creates an impetus for social change (Korpi, 2006, p. 80).

1.3 Research Purpose Statement

The aim of this research study is to explore how collaborative governance in relation to the local manufacture of PPE has provided insight into social compacting for a South African economic recovery post the COVID-19 pandemic.

The purpose of this research study is to gain a deeper understanding of collaborative governance and its contribution to understanding social compacting in South Africa. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a better understanding of social partner collaboration during the pandemic and provide insight into how we could adopt a more egalitarian approach to our social compacting and therefore also our public policy responses to social problems in South Africa (Francis et al., 2020a, p. 342). The outcomes of collaboration could lead at one optimistic level to a new consciousness in our society, the planting of a seed which leads us closer to the intention of our Constitution but this is by no means a forgone conclusion. Crisis such as this

pandemic are often believed to have the ability to be a catalyst for fundamental social change and transformation but this trajectory is filled with complexity and challenge. This study aims to investigate and reflect on these complexities and challenges.

1.4 Research Question

What has the institutional experience of collaborative governance been in the ethical provision of PPE during the Covid-19 pandemic and what insights does this provide about the challenges and prospects for social compacting in South Africa?

The related sub-questions which inform the primary research question above are as follows:

- a. What are the challenges, obstacles and potential for collaborative governance in relation to the rollout of PPEs and how do these relate to social compacting?
- b. What insights are provided by the experience of collaborative governance during the pandemic and in which ways has this shaped the debate on a more egalitarian social compact for South Africa?
- c. How is the concept of social solidarity understood by different collective actors (business, labour, government) working within a collaborative governance framework and how does such understanding manifest itself institutionally?

2. CHAPTER - LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on collaborative governance over the past two decades attempts to shed light on what might constitute effective collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 2012a). Most of the research undertaken has focussed on the social capital aspects of collaboration including networks, relationships, trust and power, as well as issues of leadership, processes and outcomes aimed at achieving collaborative success (Bryson et al., 2015). The available evidence suggests that collaborative governance has not been considered from perspectives informed by the development of social compacts.

2.1 Definition

Ran & Qi (2018: 836) provide a functional **definition on collaborative governance**, which indicates that it is “*the collaboration of different organizations from public, private, and civic sectors working together as stakeholders based on deliberative consensus and collective decision making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually*” (Ran & Qi, 2018, p. 836). This definition is helpful in providing a framework within which the case study on PPE will be examined and will inform the discussion on collaborative governance within the context of this literature review. **Social solidarity**, an aligned concept of social compacting, on the other hand is defined as “normative obligations to help each other and to make sacrifices to reach a common goal” (Hofmann et al., 2019, p. 649). In social partnerships like collaborations, social solidarity may represent acting for the “common good” for some while for others it may be concerned with “sharing resources” (Hofmann et al., 2019, p. 652). Obtaining insight into how this concept is understood by different social actors is quite important when considering specific policy outcomes.

2.2 Social Compacts

The development of social compacts is not a new phenomenon, rather it has been used in various countries across the globe from South America, to Europe to Africa. In each country the issue a social compact has aimed to resolve and the format it has taken, including the constituencies involved, have differed, importantly so to have the results (Furness & Trautner, 2020; Luiz, 2014; MISTRA, 2014; Mkandawire, 2012). South Africa has struggled continually during the last two decades to conclude a social compact but regularly there are calls for a new social compact to be concluded (Francis et al., 2020b, p. 1; Gwaindepi, 2014, p. 481). The most recent pronouncement on this being the 2022 State of the Nation address by president Ramaphosa in which he promised a social compact in 100 days. Luiz notes that social compacts have tended to be more successful in developed, industrialised countries than in developing countries that are highly fractured, such as South Africa (Luiz, 2014, p. 235). Additionally, Luiz (2014, p. 236) indicates that social compacts should “reflect the interrelatedness of mutual wellbeing” across society, however the equilibrium within society is not static and as such a social compact cannot be seen as a golden wand to resolve all economic and social issues in society (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 5). Institutionally, when considering a social compact in South Africa the go-to has always been NEDLAC. However this in itself is problematic as NEDLAC does not fully represent the South African society (Bassett, 2004). A proposal that has been made instead, is that the social compact should be much more inclusive from both a stakeholder and issue perspective (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 3). Does this imply greater inclusion in the current institution or the use of a different institution as a means of enabling greater inclusion?

A view expressed by the Mapungubwe Institute is that outcomes of a social compact should be communicated and owned by society, to promote an understanding and appreciation of the sacrifices made by sectors to ensure the long-term development of society (MISTRA, 2014, p. 5).

2.3 Meta Governance & Complexity

An important theme that has emerged out of the literature on collaborative governance is firstly, that it is extremely complex, resulting in “compound collaboration” (Ansell, 2015, p. 108). Whilst Ansell refers specifically to the relationship between the international and national levels, the concept of compound collaboration is also important when considering national to regional or local collaboration. This kind of “meta-governance” (Ansell, 2015, p. 96) has been very prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa with collaboration at the national, provincial and local levels. Complexity not only has relevance in relation to the impact of the external environment on society such as a health pandemic, but it also refers to internal engagement between different stakeholders from a vertical and horizontal perspective. Whilst decisions may be taken at the national level, the implementation of those decisions may occur at provincial and local level, including “planning, implementing and monitoring” (Mangan et al., 2020, p. 249).

2.4 Alternatives to Capitalist Systems

Although, collaborative governance has been used as a vehicle to address many issues in South Africa before the pandemic, the COVID-19 health crisis has specifically “created a window of opportunity” (Bryson et al., 2015, p. 647) to enable a different form of collaborative governance. This is informed furthermore by the need for accountability across sectors (Carmody, 2008; Poku & Sundewall, 2018; Ran & Qi,

2019) and between social actors in society aimed at an inclusive search for solutions to common economic and social problems. The point which Leach et al. argue is that this presents a possible opportunity for “plurality and negotiation around workable post-capitalist alternatives” (2021: p.138) because the current capitalist system has created immense risk for the whole of society. This might significantly affect the type of social compact that South Africa enters into, either nationally or at the sector level. The outcomes of collaboration are therefore critical for informing the type of social compact agreed to, whether implicitly or explicitly.

2.5 Multi-Dimensional Crisis

The case study which forms part of the study is focused on the local manufacture of medical PPE for the country. Collaborative governance would be crucial to find sustainable solutions to this issue because they are “beyond the scope and resources of any single sector”(Mahlangu et al., 2019b, p. 1), encouraging a “shared responsibility” (Alfirdaus et al., 2015, p. 51) or “collective responsibility” (Mishra & Rath, 2020, p. 4). History has shown that “across the different public health emergencies, epidemics and disease outbreaks” that “cross-sectoral collaborations emerged as key to the effectiveness of the response” (Schiavo, 2020, p. 3). South Africa has faced numerous crises requiring collaborative governance including in response to the HIV/Aids pandemic (Mahlangu et al., 2019b) and also the financial crisis of 2008 (Presidency, 2009). However, unlike crises such as HIV/Aids or the financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic has created a “multi-dimensional” crisis (Carmody, 2008, p. 65) that requires short term and medium term solutions to deal with an evolving pandemic and long-term solutions to address significant societal issues such as unemployment and inequality.

Consequently, the context of the pandemic intensifies the urgency for forms of collaborative governance, especially in the short to medium-term, to ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently. These solutions, especially in the long-term become important in contributing to an understanding of a new social compact for South Africa. A national and international crisis such as Covid-19 “act as powerful incentives for concertation” between social actors because the challenges are difficult to resolve independently (Mkandawire, 2012, p. 7).

2.6 Representation and Resources

In relation to the matter of representation, which can also be referred to as inclusion and therefore by virtue also exclusion, it has been covered significantly over time. However, this has often been in relation to traditional governance forums such as political parties, trade unions, public participation or formally legislated institutions (Koski et al., 2018, p. 359). not as much has been researched in relation to representation within the collaborative governance sphere. The issue of representation is considered quite important from the perspective of agenda setting, access to resources, power distribution and networks to name a few. The reality is that the design of collaborative governance forums can facilitate the inclusion and exclusion of sectors of society tagged as “selective activation” (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 573). This seems to refer to a conscious decision being made to include or exclude certain stakeholders from participation, which on the surface seems to represent a potential power dynamic and could have a negative impact such as to “undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy” (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 571) of the collaboration. Additionally, it may impact the level of implementation of decisions/actions emanating from the collaboration thereby enabling or disabling a collective course of action (Emerson et al., 2012b, p. 11).

Some authors offer further justifications for why this can be advantageous, such as the possibility of achieving greater levels of collaborative success, access to resources and expertise by being more strategic and discriminating about representation (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 571). Korpi's power resource model (Korpi, 2006) identifies the importance of recognising that all social actors have access to different resources and knowledge, which can then be activated if needed during collaboration. An important issue which is raised by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh is the need to get "the right people" (Emerson et al., 2012a, p. 11) to participate in the collaboration. But who decides on the inclusion and exclusion and are there specific criteria to consider when deciding on composition? The ability to include and exclude representation shows a level and type of power that is utilised, which aligns with Korpi's power resource model. McCandless also notes that current government institutions such as NEDLAC are a clear example of "exclusivist representation...as an elite club" (McCandless & Manduna, 2021, p. 11) which has been a key reason for its inability to forge a social compact for South Africa. A key finding in one of the studies suggests that context also plays a very important role in decisions about collaborative inclusion, an important issue to consider in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 582). This is supported by Francis et al who note that the "pandemic may have created the conditions for a viable social compact in South Africa" (Francis et al , 2020b, p. 3) especially because of its impact across all sectors of society.

2.7 Interdependence

The pandemic has also witnessed a significant amount of "interdependence" (Scott et al., 2020, p. 261) emerging across stakeholders and sectors and forms of "inter-connectedness" (Murithi, 2006, p. 14).

As such, the context within which cross-sector collaboration during COVID-19 occurred in South Africa is important to consider as it “shapes collaboration and contributions” of social actors including their “opinions, perceptions and decisions” (Nabyonga-Orem et al., 2016, p. 316). The pandemic opens potential pathways to “transform the crisis into an opportunity to reimagine the social contract” (van Barneveld et al., 2020, p. 150) where a more egalitarian approach could be adopted for South Africa for a post-pandemic recovery.

In the European Union and South East Asia contexts, the focus was on the “nature of the institutional mechanism” (Liverani et al., 2012, p. 585) needing to be developed to manage engagement and dialogue and to aid the process of collaboration, continuity and transparency. The issue of transparency in collaboration is very important especially if we consider that the Covid-19 pandemic created a context in which most engagements were not in-person, yet the need to achieve speedy decision-making based on trust was critical to the solutions being proposed. Therefore collaboration prompted by values like “trust and transparency” (Schiavo, 2020, p. 2) play an important role in determining whether stakeholders are able to consider challenging and innovative solutions to address the specific societal challenge at hand. Schiavo stresses the importance of values in a collaborative response to the pandemic especially the need for “fairness and transparency” (Schiavo, 2020, p. 3) as these are very important in advancing equity but also ethical decision making and implementation.

2.8 Sectoral Interests

Collaborative governance could become an enabler of “mutual understanding” and “shared commitment” to provide the necessary public value and solution to the issue at hand (Emerson et al., 2012a, p. 14).

This is especially important when considering that stakeholders entering collaborative governance arrangements represent defined constituencies and that under specific conditions they could be adversarial and contentious in their engagements. The question is under what conditions is such a “shared commitment” possible and what are the obstacles and challenges to its realisation? Poku et al note in relation to this concern that governance structures are not the reason collaborations fail, instead it is the “outcomes of our interests and values” (Poku & Sundewall, 2018, p. 480) that create challenges. At different junctures there are a host of interests therefore that are being represented – there are always “motivations” (Alfirdaus et al., 2015, p. 53) whether economic or political. There are significant “complexities that lie at the junctures where power, institutions, values, laws and norms meet” (Poku & Sundewall, 2018, p. 481). It therefore becomes important to consider how the outcomes of collaborative governance can inform a social compact as opposed to a narrow focus on sectional interests and constituencies. It is noted that a “mentality driven by narrow self-interest” is the outcome of a lack of diverse engagement across society, as well as limited cross sector partnerships (MISTRA, 2014, p. 8). There is agreement from Bassett that since its inception the areas of engagement at NEDLAC have become much narrower than expected, very much based on constituency interests at any given point, and not necessarily in line with key societal issues requiring negotiation (Bassett, 2004, p. 554)

2.9 Innovation and Co-Creation

So within the context of a pandemic, collaborative governance can be considered significant for its ability to assist in “solving societal problems by extending and integrating resources” (Ran & Qi, 2018, p. 836) and generating more innovative

solutions – from a social compacting perspective it is referred to as a “matter of exchange” (Alfirdaus et al., 2015, p. 45) of resources of mutual benefit.

The aim according to Schwartz & Yen (2017, p. 2) should be to utilise a “whole-of-society approach” which especially in this pandemic would move beyond only the health dimension, contributing to solutions that are socially and economically sustainable. The ability to activate the relevant resources effectively contributes to joint solutions and “collective actions” (Mishra & Rath, 2020, p. 1), but this requires stakeholders to “make concessions” (Alfirdaus et al., 2015, p. 45). The issue is who primarily stands to gain and who loses from the manner in which these concessions are arrived at? By combining different sets of resources, solutions are created which could potentially lead to an outcome greater than if stakeholder efforts were divided. The ability in other words to “co-create change” (Geerlof, 2019, p. 231) and contribute to a “socially just and economically sustainable society” (Geerlof, 2019, p. 230) impelled by “transformation towards the common good” post the Covid-19 pandemic (Benach, 2021, p. 4). Collaborative governance therefore is critical in unlocking “innovation, greater responsiveness to complex situations; and leveraging knowledge, expertise and resources” (Mahlangu et al., 2019b, p. 1). The question is does this actually occur in practice and what can we learn from scrutiny of a specific case such as the production and provision of PPE through collaborative governance?

2.10 Collective Risk

The ability to create improved solutions that contribute to societal good and “public value” (Bryson et al., 2015, p. 649) is referred to further as “collaborative advantage” (Doberstein, 2016, p. 820). This is an important concept because, as indicated above, it should not be assumed that collaborative governance by its very existence creates

an advantage. Instead it creates an opportunity for “alternative paths to consensus” and knowing (Doberstein, 2016).

The concept of collaborative advantage could aid in gaining a deeper understanding of how (if at all) collaborative governance has contributed to a better outcome for society in the short term and could also contribute to the content of a social compact, since the current pandemic “threatens collective futures” (Leach et al., 2021, p. 137), a risk for all sectors. Mishra & Rath make reference to “collective consciousness” (Mishra & Rath, 2020, p. 4) which is developed through social solidarity and acts as a “binding force”. This collective consciousness is quite central to the development of a social compact which could contribute to greater equity and cohesion in society in the longer term.

It is undeniable that COVID-19 creates significant risk and challenges beyond health producing “multi-dimensional risks”, and therefore as referred to by McCandless and Manduna (2021, p13) it can be viewed as a “threat multiplier”. Therefore it is crucial to take “a wider, interdisciplinary view” during this pandemic because it unfolds amidst moving arenas of politics, economics, law and society (Carney & Bennett, 2014, p. 144). For collaborative governance to be effective it is crucial for principles of “responsiveness, participation, transparency and accountability” to be entrenched (Mahlangu et al., 2019b, p. 12). These elements are considered central to a process that has ethical integrity and collective accountability.

2.11 Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan

Before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, the country was already experiencing significant economic and social difficulties. The impact of the pandemic exacerbated this already tenuous situation. In an effort to address the social and

economic fallout during the pandemic the social partners through the forum of NEDLAC agreed with President Ramaphosa to the development of an Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP), which was approved in December 2020.

Figure 3 depicts the South African context from a socio-economic perspective as displayed in the document (Presidency, 2020, p. 7).

Figure 3 - SA's Top Socio Economic Challenges



The ERRP is “aimed at stimulating equitable and inclusive growth” in the South African economy through a range of measures agreed by the social partners at NEDLAC (Presidency, 2020, p. 2). To achieve this, approximately six key enablers were identified, with one of these being “social compacting”, in fact a section in the document elaborates on the importance of social compacting in achieving the goals of the ERRP (Presidency, 2020, p. 4). This highlights the importance which the current administration has placed on social compacting and probably also a realisation by government that the issues faced by the country requires much broader participation.

Some key issues raised in the ERRP which may be of relevance to this study are outlined below:

1. Emphasis placed on the development of local capacity as a means to increase our manufacturing capacity, reduce unemployment and focus on locally produced goods, resulting in less imports.

2. Social compacting is not only described at a national level but it needs to be a focus across all three spheres of governance namely national, provincial and local. Although social compacts are often negotiated at a national level, implementation can be much more widespread.
3. A very brief mention is made of the utilization of state procurement to support the development of local industries. Compliance with this is an area we have battled with significantly over the past two decades.
4. The document notes that all social sectors have a contribution to make in the form of capabilities and skills, therefore the success of this plan is not only in the hands of government but sectors.
5. Uniting around one vision is raised as an important element of the movement towards a successful ERRP. It appears the country has struggled to achieve during the past two decades.
6. The ERRP recognises that not all social partners or sectors will make an equal contribution to the implementation of the ERRP, however it does acknowledge that despite this fact all social partners have a role to play in its success.

The ERRP itself is an outcome of social dialogue and compacting, with various commitments allocated to the social partners, across a range of agreements. Whether this plan differs from others that have gone before remains to be seen, however a major opportunity has been created through the pandemic for greater understanding by social partners around fundamental issues affecting the South African society.

2.12 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical prism which will be applied to open up and consider the case study in relation to the research questions which drive this study is the Power Resource Model

developed by sociologist Walter Korpi (Korpi, 2006). While originally developed within the context of the social democracies of Scandinavia, Korpi's framework focused on the organisation, mobilisation and distribution of power between social actors and arguably provides valuable conceptual insights in relation to this research study focused on collaborative governance and social compacting in South Africa during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Korpi's model suggests that understanding the access that different social actors have to resources of power is important in relation to their interaction with each other, and that the range and scope of power resources do not remain constant but over time are able to develop or diminish depending on the context of the society in which it exists (Korpi, 2006, p. 77). This element is useful when considering the complexity of engagement between social actors during the collaborative governance partnership on PPE, which has displayed a range of opportunities and challenges for our society. Korpi's model highlights that there is a recognition between social actors of a societal issue that needs to be resolved, which requires an aligning of their respective power resources amongst specific social actors with shared concerns and interests and this ultimately gives rise to a specific type of institution which is directed at resolving the issue (Korpi, 2006, p. 81). This is the very basis on which collaborations such as the LMP on PPE was formed where social actors including business, labour and government realised the importance of creating the capacity to manufacture our own PPE in South Africa and that to achieve this within the short term of the pandemic would require the resources of all social actors.

Crises in society such as that exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic have an impact on social and economic conditions and have the ability to alter the distribution of power between social actors. Korpi notes that this kind of change in distribution

creates the impetus for the formation of alliances in which the social actors are forced to work together to achieve a solution which could be beneficial for society at large (Korpi, 2006, p. 80). Whilst Korpi is mainly focussing on a macro level of analysis this conception can also be used at sub-national or local levels. Korpi mainly addresses the issue of interaction between social actors from a class perspective i.e. labour versus capital classes in society (Korpi, 2006, p. 84), possibly the main area of cleavage in a relatively homogenous society such as Sweden. In a South African context however, this is by no means the only dimension, as cleavages whilst also class based could be formed along cultural, race or gender dimensions. This could give rise to other important actors such as special interest groups, political parties or agencies that also have access to specific power resources and therefore affect the alliances formed and their outcomes for society.

A key concept which Korpi addresses is that of “societal bargaining” involving co-operation and conflict between social actors (Korpi, 2006, p. 82). He notes that this interaction to resolve conflicts of interest between classes is what leads to settlements and outcomes for society which could have an impact on the ideologies which inform the regime of distribution within society. This is especially useful when considering the engagements which have taken place within the Local Manufacturing Partnership on PPE and what impact it has on the principles of social compacting within South Africa. Collaborative governance by its very nature creates a forum for bargaining and co-operation. How has the Local Manufacturing Partnership (LMP) on PPE used collaborative governance to reach settlements which are equitable and progressive for the South African society, but that also strikes a balance between the interests of the social actors such as manufacturers of PPE, the labour unions and government as regulators?

Another area where the Korpi model provides insight is in relation to the “exchange relations” (Korpi, 2006, p. 80) between the different social actors / classes and that this exchange over time is able to contribute towards a change in consciousness between actors. The LMP on PPE comprises social actors including government, labour and capital formations. They have engaged over a period of a few months and this exchange of ideas and information may result in a change in understanding of the ideas and ideologies which different groups currently hold. The impact on this could be a change in outcome or policy that affects how the manufacture of PPE occurs in South Africa, which could then affect issues such as distribution, inequality and employment. Korpi notes that changes in the distribution of power resources, which can occur as a result of various factors, has the ability to open a window which leads to social change (Korpi, 2006, p. 80). Whilst this can occur resulting from bargaining and negotiation, there are also periods in society that create a platform for different forms of compromise. The theoretical framework of Korpi will be engaged with in relation to the case study on PPE and social compacting in the South African context as a means of addressing the questions which inform the research study.

3. CHAPTER - RESEARCH STRATEGY, DESIGN AND METHODS

This section's goal is to outline the research plan, methodology, process, and procedures that were employed for this project.

3.1 Research Approach

The aim of this research is to explore through a case-study approach how collaborative governance in relation to the local manufacture of PPE provides insight into social compacting within South Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic. An appropriate approach for this research would therefore be an interpretivist paradigm which promotes the concept of contextual meaning. Ontologically this paradigm acknowledges that there are multiple perspectives on the manner in which collaborative governance has contributed to shaping views on a possible future social compact for South Africa. Collaborative governance can also be termed cross-sector collaboration, meaning that each of the sectors or actors involved could have a different reality or truth in relation to the phenomena researched. This also supports the epistemological perspective, which proposes that knowledge should be viewed from a subjective perspective, “asserting that social reality is made from the perceptions and consequent actions of social actors - people” (Thornhill et al., 2016, p. 130). Knowledge exists and is created within a specific context and environment which has an effect on the creation of that knowledge. The different perspectives, ideas and thoughts for each participant would mean that there is “more than one way of making meaning from the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 20) collected.

Based on their unique perception and experience, each of the research sectors or actors (industry, government, and trade unions) represented in the research, offered a partial understanding of the occurrence. However, whilst the information gained from

interviewees is important in this research it was also very important for the integrity of the findings to include a process of fact-checking or triangulation.

Documents and data such as minutes of the LMP meetings, policy statements or announcements and presentations on the progress within the forum were interrogated with the aim of aligning information but also from a fact checking perspective to ensure that information put forward by interviewees was accurate. In addition, scrutiny and analysis of primary documents provided some insights which were not necessarily reflected in the interviews, this helped to enrich the data gathered and strengthened the analysis in relation to the research questions. This process of triangulation was built into the research process to assist in understanding and validating the information shared in interviews and in some ways also assisted in adding to the knowledge gained during interviews.

The research strategy that was used is a qualitative method of study, which is ideal because of the phenomenon being explored and it allowed for “a complex, detailed understanding of the issue” (Creswell & Poth, 2016, p. 84) explored in this research.

3.2 Research Design

The chosen option was case study design and this was led by the research question, the site and case specific to this research. Case study research is concerned with the “complexity and particular nature of the case in question” (Bryman, 2012, p. 67). In this instance the unit of analysis is the cross-sectoral collaboration forum that was established to address issues of PPE shortage in South Africa during the pandemic. This case was explored to understand in detail the elements relating to collaborative governance, specifically to gain a deeper understanding of how this could contribute to social compacting in South Africa.

A case study approach was beneficial for this particular research because it allowed for a deep exploration of collaborative governance and the concept of social compacting, including exploration of social solidarity as an outcome for society.

3.2.1 Case Study

A case study design was used for this research as a means to explore the collaborative governance forum on PPE. In chapter one of this research the full details of the case study has been outlined to ensure a thorough explanation of the various components. This is a single case study and it is commonly accepted that this format provides a depth of data and information (O'Sullivan et al., 2016, p. 67) and an opportunity to explore the complexity and specific nature of the case (Bryman, 2012, p. 66) since data on only one specific case is being collected and explored. One of the limitations identified with this method is the ability to replicate this kind of study in the future since the sample size i.e. the case, is only one. This of course means that the external generalisability of the case is affected. However, this is an issue that the researcher was aware of and care has been taken to address relevant issues concerning the framework used later in this chapter through discussing the issues of sampling, positionality, reliability, and various other items.

3.3 Research Tools and their Application

For this particular research topic, data from both primary and secondary sources were employed. Primary data refers to information that was directly collected by the researcher or information obtained by the researcher which was not processed yet. In this instance primary data was collected through interviews with representatives from each of the sectors that participated in the cross sector collaboration forum i.e. government, business, labour and relevant government agencies. Use was made of a semi-structured interview guide (**see Annexure A**) as this provided both consistency

and flexibility during the interview process. The element of flexibility is particularly important since this was an exploratory study where participants were encouraged to share their views and ideas of collaborative governance within the context of the pandemic and implications for social compacting. Another set of primary data was documentation from the meetings held. Additionally, my researcher notes taken during the interviews were also used as a source of data.

When doing interviews a reliable apparatus for recording is necessary but in addition it is also important to ensure storage of the data in a secure platform. From an ethical perspective, permission was explicitly and transparently obtained to do the research from the Department of Trade Industry and Competition (dtic) as the lead government department and also the Local Manufacturing Partnership governance panel. Additionally, permission to participate was sought from each of the sector actors. In each case this was done through a formal, personalised letter with clear details of the intentions of the research study and the anticipated role of the interviewee. Participants were requested to complete consent forms which outlined the permissions granted by each participant and they were asked to confirm this as part of the recording of the interview.

Other sources of data were also used to engage with the specific elements of collaboration that occurred such as presentations, speeches, manufacturing data and media interviews. This information was useful in terms of developing the questions for the primary data source but also in order to comprehend the development of the collaborative governance forum, its agenda setting and the procedures and mechanisms proposed to resolve the issues related to PPE in the context of the pandemic.

3.4 Sampling

As indicated, this was a qualitative study, aimed at obtaining in-depth insight into the issues of collaborative governance and social compacting.

The sampling technique used was purposive. The goal of “purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed” (Bryman, 2012, p. 418). The reasoning for this is that the information can only be obtained from a very select group of people that formed part of the cross-sector collaborative governance forum namely the LMP. There are four broad categories that were represented, namely, government, private sector, civil society (trade unions) and relevant government agencies. In total 14 interviews were planned however, a total of 11 were completed.

Below is a summary of the interviews that were planned and completed.

	Government	Private Sector	Civil Society/ Trade Union	Agency
Planned	4	4	4	2
Actual	3	4	2	2

The key government department interviewed was the dtic. Business was represented by B4SA which is a partnership of a number of businesses in South Africa. In this instance Trade Unions were represented by COSATU and SACTWU federations respectively.

Proudly South African, an agency of the dtic, is a driving force behind many collaborative initiatives and its implementation, represented the government agency.

Some of the specific representatives and relevant persons interviewed include:

- Chairperson of the LMP and advisor to the Minister of the dtic
- Government and their agency representatives

- Labour representatives
- Various business representatives on the LMP Governance Panel
- Members of the LMP working groups

3.5 Process of Analysis

Data was collected through eleven targeted in-depth face-to-face interviews, using a semi-structured interview schedule. This information went through a process of transcribing word-for-word from the audio recording and then cleaned for grammatical, spelling or punctuation errors. Once this was completed, the process of reading the transcripts was undertaken. This iterative process was quite important since it was through this that themes started becoming evident within the collected data.

Initially broad themes were identified, linked to the questions asked or key areas identified in the collaborative governance model/framework. However, to enable thematic analysis to take place the transcripts were coded. Coding required close engagement with the data to understand the meaning expressed in the transcripts. This is referred to as “familiarization and involves reading words actively, analytically and critically” (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 205) to understand what was being intended by the participant. Objectivity during this process was critical and why the process of triangulation of various data sources was important, since it assisted with an understanding of information shared during interviews but also aided in obtaining greater clarity on subjective data presented during interviews. This process resulted in a deconstructed transcript with parcels of information that was thematised and interpreted.

In Chapter 4 of this Report, a detailed discussion is undertaken on the analysis process used to engage with the data including elements such as interviews,

transcription and data analysis. The majority of Chapter 4 then provides a detailed analysis and discussion of the data represented in the transcripts.

3.6 Limitations, feasibility and positionality

The focus of this study is on collaborative governance, and the case involves a number of stakeholders located in different provinces of the country.

However, during the COVID-19 pandemic engagement has been mainly via digital platforms, which provided functionality in recording interviews. The anticipated challenge was that it was harder to establish rapport over digital platforms than in a face-to-face scenario. Due to the nature of the interviews cognisance specific monitoring of power outages (i.e. load shedding) was required as this could have caused delays and logistical problems during interviews.

The stakeholders interviewed were all very senior within their organisations which sometimes created a limitation from a time and access perspective. To compensate for this, sessions were planned well in advance to ensure that there was sufficient time for rescheduling if necessary to conclude an interview. This was only required on two occasions where due to other commitments, interviews were held over two sessions.

It was also important for me to consider that my subjective, professional position as a representative of government within NEDLAC, could have an impact on the openness of the interviewees within the labour constituency as we work in a professional context and thus the need for careful explanation of the projects intentions so that the mutually beneficial but unequivocally independent value of the research exercise is made clear. This was further managed through self-awareness in the interview process of 1) by the type of questions being asked and 2) the process followed to ensure confidentiality of interviewees e.g. instead of quoting direct names interviewees are identified as “Participant 4”. It was important to ensure that the research process does not

prejudice any of the interviewees in any way that can be controlled for and accurately captured the insight shared by interviewees, irrespective of the sector represented. Additionally, I am self-funding my studies and the research.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

Ethics is an integral part of both quantitative and qualitative research, encompassing “all stages and aspects” of the research project (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 61).

3.7.1 Personal Disclosure and Objectivity

Firstly, personal disclosure is important within research as a means to honour the ethics framework regarding honesty, trust and integrity. From the research proposal stage of the process, including the participant interviews and within this report itself I have declared my affiliation to NEDLAC and therefore a link to some interview participants that are also represented at NEDLAC. Even though this research was not about NEDLAC, to ensure credibility it was important to disclose this. Some participants asked directly for clarity on my professional role within government, which I addressed during interviews. The above process has also assisted in laying the platform to be objective during the interviews and the analysis process, which removed areas of bias or under influence. The ethical rules which have been set out by the Wits School of Governance have formed the basis and framework for the research concluded.

3.7.2 Informed Consent

Appropriate permission was obtained from all participants which was achieved through a formal letter addressed to each, with a consent form and an information sheet outlining the full extent of the process. The information sheet covered issues of consent, recording of interviews, transcripts, storage, security of information and non-disclosure of identity. The nature of the research study required that only audio

recording was utilised however, it was essential that participants agreed to the recording. Interviews were only conducted and used once consent forms were signed by participants, it must be noted the consent forms made allowance for participants to agree or not to agree to be part of the research. Also, before the start of each interview participants had the opportunity to ask any clarity seeking questions.

3.7.3 Anonymity and Confidentiality

Confidentiality in relation to interviews and transcripts was managed appropriately according to the framework provided by the Wits Ethics Committee process. It was essential to devise a mechanism (transcript numbering instead of naming) to ensure that interviewees were not identifiable and that transcripts would be kept secure after the interviews. The element of anonymity and confidentiality is very important within the research process, if agreed to the researcher should ensure that all efforts are made to uphold this, in line with good general ethics during the research process.

Anonymity and confidentiality was managed through each participant receiving a label which simply references the interview number i.e. P08 (participant number 8) however during the analysis section this reference would be linked to a social sector namely labour, government or business. None of the interview participants were identified by their birth names, the analysis was important from a sector perspective.

3.8 Validity, reliability, dependability

The validity of this project was strongly linked to being able to interview the informants that participated directly in the cross-sector collaboration on PPE during the pandemic. This enabled a more reliable, critical reflection of the processes and engagements that took place in the fieldwork stage, especially because a semi-structured interview process allowed for an indepth interrogation of the key issues amongst a diversity of actors.

This research process underwent a number of checks and balances along the way to ensure dependability and reliability, including as mentioned ethical approval, supervisor oversight and engagement, researcher diary recording the steps taken and a project plan outlining how the research was undertaken. Additionally, steps such as checking of data and triangulation was built into the research process to ensure that information was validated by different participants. All these steps were aimed at addressing issues of validity, reliability and dependability of the research process and findings.

4. CHAPTER - DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the findings are presented of the research concluded in the case study on Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic. To reiterate the study's goal was to investigate the lessons learned from collaborative governance to understanding the potential, limits and challenges of social compacting in the South African context. Additionally, the study also sought to gain insight into the understanding of the concept social solidarity amongst the different social actors that participated in the PPE Case Study. These issues are particularly important as we transition the COVID-19 pandemic, which has a profound effect on South African society from a social and economic perspective.

At the end of March 2022, South Africa marked two years since the hard lockdown and the state of disaster implemented nationally in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. This period is also instructive in that it provides an opportune time to consider the robustness of the agreement referred to as the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan established between social partners at NEDLAC at the end of 2020 in the context of societal adversity. Additionally, there is discussion about a wider social compact for South Africa as regularly reflected in the President's State of the Nation addresses (Presidency, 2021, 2022) that could aid economic recovery and social cohesion, following the devastating effects of COVID-19 on our society.

4.2 Interviews

The interview process was conducted over a period of four months between November 2021 and February 2022.

The benefit of this timeline was that it provided sufficient time for the transcription of each of the interviews before the next interview was scheduled. This was helpful in reflecting on the interviews already conducted and sharpening the focus of the interview questions to elicit the data sought as well as being able to learn from and methodologically improve the entire process reflexively. Before the formal interviews of the identified candidates began, two pilot interviews were conducted as means to check the clarity of the questions being asked, to assess the time required for the interviews and to reflect on the coherence of the questions included in the questionnaire.

A summary of the interview candidates is provided in the methodology section of this report. The interview number allocated to each participant was randomly done and it is important to note that interviews were scheduled based on participant availability (from a time and date perspective). All participants are senior within their organisations with constrained availability, making it a difficult process to secure them for the required time to undertake the interview. In some instances the interview had to be rescheduled at very short notice which resulted in the need to complete these over two interview sessions. These were all challenges that had to be managed as the process unfolded and required a significant amount of flexibility on my part as the researcher and also on the part of the participants.

Three mechanisms were used to record interviews or part of interviews. Due to COVID-19 all interviews were held digitally via the MS Teams platform which allows for the recording of the interview – each interview has an audio recording and verbatim transcript. Additionally, during the interview written notes were recorded of key issues that were raised or on which additional information was required.

4.3 Data Transcription

The transcription process proved a lengthy one which took approximately 4 months to complete despite the use of transcription software to provide a first draft text report. I then used the audio recording along with the draft text report to review and clean the transcripts for each of the participants – eleven in total comprising government, business, labour and agency representatives. Transcription is very often treated as a ‘minor or merely technical concern’ however, in reality it is a critical part of the research process and a very time consuming one which must be factored into the design of the research (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 161). There are different approaches to transcription. The focus during this transcription was providing a verbatim record of *what* was said. As such I did not aim to provide any paralinguistic features in my transcript (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 162) such as non-verbal sounds or behaviour. This would also not have been possible because recordings were only done in an audio format and not audio visual.

All interviews were conducted in English and all participants were engaged and present in the interview process which made the transcription process clear in terms of understanding their interview responses. The transcription process subsequently involved cleaning of the data to address issues such as repetition of words, insert punctuation where it was necessary, correct spelling errors and a host of other technical issues which are critical in ensuring the transcripts are prepared for coding and analysis.

4.4 Analysing Interview Transcripts

Much like transcription, coding and analysis also proved a very time consuming and lengthy process. Braun & Clark suggest that it is important to start by familiarising oneself with the data (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 204).

Having completed all the transcriptions myself I believe the process of familiarisation started during transcription. It took a few reads of the data before I could start engaging with the content and meanings that were being described by participants which really supports the view that analysis is “not a passive process” rather an iterative process in which meaning is constantly being revealed the more one works through the data sets (Braun & Clarke, 2014, p. 205).

The data collected provided a perspective on collaborative governance during a time of immense crisis in South Africa i.e. the COVID-19 pandemic and essentially represents the views, thoughts, perceptions, experiences and opinions of the various social partners that participated in the LMP forum to ensure that South Africa had increased capacity to produce its own PPE during this crisis, a commodity previously imported.

As the process of analysis unfolded, data relevant to the key areas being researched was coded and this was then developed into broader/ over-arching themes and sub-themes. Even the coding and theme selection processes had to be streamlined because of the wealth and richness of the data collected. Whilst the themes identified relate to the main research question they are also closely tied to the key areas of focus which the interview questions aimed to extract information on. Below is a summary of questionnaire structure and the key concepts covered:

Section 1 – focus was specifically on the participant’s understanding of the collaborative governance framework and how participants view its contribution to the development of the PPE forum and eventual outcomes.

Section 2 – the focus is on the participant's understanding of the development of a social compact for South Africa and on different views expressed on what its focus should be to develop our society.

Section 3 – aims to hone in specifically on the Local Manufacturing Partnership and on the operation of this forum within the context of COVID-19, as well as trying to extract whether the fundamentals of this collaborative governance forum was able to provide a framework for social compacting going forward in South Africa.

Section 4 – explores the concept of social solidarity amongst social partners by uncovering how this concept is understood but also whether it has been displayed within the institution of the LMP.

These questions are over-layed with Walter Korpi's power resource model which forms the basis of the conceptual and theoretical framework for this research and therefore provides some broad themes which contribute to the analysis of the data collected and the dimensions of collaborative governance explored.

4.5 Analysing the Data

The following section is used to present the insights that emerged after analysing the data from participants who took part in the research. The structure of this section relates to the specific questions that were posed to the participants.

SECTION 1 - COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

1. In your view what constitutes collaborative governance?

Participants from each of the sectors have a clear understanding of the framework used to describe collaborative governance, which appears to be influenced in part by the fact that this type of framework has been utilized in

South Africa to engage across social sectors previously. As some participants indicated, this falls within the constitutional imperative of participatory democracy in which all sectors of society should be able to participate and be heard on issues of national importance. This is illustrated by government participant **[P1]** indicating:

“...the governing party don't just establish or develop or create policies or legislation, but they do so in considering the voices of others in the South African population...”

And a second government participant **[P10]** noted:

“...in our constitution, there's an embeddedness there that the state must ensure that we have transparency.”

This view was supported by both labour and business participants who focussed on the inclusion of social actors in decision making and a deliberate effort to consider different perspectives and viewpoints, with the aim of incorporating this into decisions made for society. There was a recognition of the importance of different social actors and their contribution to providing alternative perspectives.

The labour participant **[P7]** noted that:

“...decision making that incorporates the views of labour and business and other groupings...doesn't just pay lip service through social dialogue...that we actually are prepared to listen to their views and to take on board what they may propose...”

There was agreement on this from business, however an interview participant raised a concern about the relevancy of the specific representatives in the governance structure, specific to the goal of the forum. **[P11]**: *“parties that are required to move a project forward”* and secondly, *“a coalition of the willing”* that essentially *“pull together to drive a common purpose”*. Representation within collaboration is important in the functioning of the governance structure but also bears significance when considering the breadth of stakeholder participation, issues to be negotiated and the successful implementation of agreements.

Another important element raised by participants relates to the fact that a formal governance structure should enable inclusive engagement, transparency, information sharing, implementation and problem solving across the social sectors. Participant **[P3]** provided a good summary of the importance of governance:

“...the word governance is very important because there's a moral, there's a legal, there's an ethical perspective all related to governance.”

This was supported by a government agency participant **[P4]**, noting that the parties involved “*collectively govern*” it is not only the responsibility of one social actor to govern but this must be a shared responsibility and possibly creates an enabling environment because it involves “*putting up the systems and structure in place from a reporting and information sharing point of view*” **[P11]**. This relates closely to the issue of transparency raised earlier in this discussion.

Sub-themes explored:

a. Why do you think the Local Manufacturing Partnership collaborative governance initiative was successful (or not)?

The overwhelming response to this question intimates the successful achievement of the mandate or goal of this forum in the respondent's perception, which was to enable South African manufacturers to be able to manufacture the necessary quantities of PPE and medical equipment to support the country during COVID-19. Labour representative **[P7]** noted:

“...it was successful because I think it used the strengths of many different parts of the kind of social actors in society. And it relied on those and it brought those together, which allowed us to achieve things which otherwise may have been more difficult. It was successful because I think there was a kind of an urgent need to act and there was a realization by those involved to do so.”

The gauge to measure success was also attributed to the number of companies that were assisted in a short period of time, noted by a government agency [P3] and government participant [P10] respectively:

“On black and white the number of companies that were assisted, I think there's 60 plus now. It's just phenomenal to know how everybody came together to assist these companies to become procurement ready.”

“We went from almost zero capacity for PPE to then capacity for 64 new companies that are able to produce this”.

So whilst there is a perception of success on the part of the interview respondents, it is important to consider the reasons why the Local Manufacturing Partnership is considered a success as this may provide some insight about future collaborations. Reasons for the perceived success of the forum as noted by various participants include: a clear mandate, contribution by all the relevant social stakeholders, specificity of what needed to be achieved, the context of the pandemic, rationale behind joining forces across sectors, the structure of the actual forum and the ability to manage “political noise” i.e. ability to manage interference and pressure on the LMP from senior representatives from within all sectors. Representatives from business [P5] and [P6] noted:

“I think for me the initial success of the LMP was down to...a very clear mandate for the LMP as those different work streams, different aspects got going....” [P5]

“...I think it is one of those few platforms that we managed to bring in government, we managed to bring in unions, and we managed to bring in business for this specific task at hand...It was there to serve a particular purpose.” [P6]

Additionally, a business representative [P11] also pointed to the context within which this collaboration was occurring namely, the COVID-19 pandemic and the urgency which this created across all sectors of society.

“...it was successful to the extent that we managed to ramp up local production...Why? We did have a crisis, nothing like a crisis to focus attention and energy”.

And secondly, the participant indicated that *“the material issues and risk were well understood”* by all the social actors and this was a key factor in creating a sense of unity amongst social actors, possibly contributing to perceived levels of success.

The response from a government participant [P10] did not disagree with the view expressed by the business representative on the context of urgency in relation to ensuring productive manufacturing outputs. Two additional points were however stressed, related to values and focus, namely trust between members of the LMP and secondly, establishing clarity in the objective which brought members of the collaborative governance partnership together, possibly resulting in benefits to state capacity and industry.

“Yes, it was very successful from my standpoint...I was able to see first-hand the energies of people that had not, I don't think I've even met some of these individuals to date, and it was an effort where there was an overarching objective that everybody knew to capacitate the state and to assist the industries.” [P10]

b. What benefit has there been in the use of a collaborative governance framework for the provision of PPE during COVID-19?

Responses to this question started to provide an insight on some of the substantive issues in relation to cross sector collaborations or partnerships, whether in a formal institutionalised setting or more purpose driven format like the LMP. Trust between social actors and a shared vision were regular themes raised throughout the research. Government participant [P2] had the following input:

“...the issue of trust between social partners or among social partners, that's key. You find that in certain instances we find that we don't share the same vision in terms of dealing with the economic challenges of the country. So this partnership for me was so

critical in developing that shared vision, of the importance of manufacturing in the country...".

Additionally, there was a recognition by some participants that the solutions to the creation of PPE manufacturing capacity could not rest with one specific sector or stakeholder, a partnership approach delivers a potentially more positive result than any one sector could deliver on its own especially in a crisis induced context such as COVID-19 where time was a key factor creating a great sense of urgency. Each sector has access to skills and resources which are much more effective when combined, however the ideological divide between social actors and lack trust are often hurdles to co-operation. A government agency participant [P4] summed up the importance of collaborative governance for the LMP as follows:

"I think the biggest benefit has been that you were able to tap into the existing intellect in the country. It was not an initiative that was limited to capacity that existed within one constituency, the fact that all constituencies could fully participate enabled the collaboration to tap into the intellect, the know-how, the capacity that exists across all sectors of society...and so it was a well-informed process throughout, from beginning until the end...."

This focused attention on the collaborative governance process including concerns related to access to information, skills, resources, networks and capabilities. These potentially become more accessible when social actors commit, deliver and are held accountable but it was suggested that it requires a conscious orchestration and relevant intervention as noted by government participant [P8]:

"the power of the LMP Governance Panel...was actually in the orchestration and in the choreography, of finding and jointly problem solving, of finding the resources and the capabilities to bring into those solutions, in a very agile way...the most powerful assets that we had was the collective networks and assets, that came together in the LMP."

To some extent the business participants [P11] and [P5] agreed with this conscious orchestration and engaging social actors' strengths, but also recognised the importance of the different contributions made by social actors:

"...to actually execute and implement, that means you've got to deploy your resource, you've got to make decisions, you've got to work within a time frame. You've got to commit to deliverables. You've got to problem solve and in order to do that, you need the relevant parties. I mean, it could not have been achieved in silos..."

"...each member of the partnership bringing their specific expertise and warranted skill set to be able to, you know, deliver the outcome that everyone was pursuing."

An important part of social compacting is therefore to create an ability to not only access resources but also to activate them so that benefit can be derived to achieve the desired goal. To enable this requires a form of governance in which there is trust, availability of relevant information and access to skills beyond that which is represented in the collaboration. Therefore, alignment of social actors towards a specific goal and a willingness to make resources available becomes critical.

c. Why has this collaboration been so important for South Africa and how does it benefit our society?

Numerous benefits are listed by participants which could benefit South Africa going forward. Some of these are very tangible as outlined by government agency participant [P3]:

"If we think that 60 plus businesses have been assisted there have been a number of livelihoods that have been affected positively...So it showcases the fact that if we stand together we can achieve a lot."

This view was supported by the labour representative [P7] who noted:

"...the LMP also showed us the importance of the different stakeholders recognizing each other's strengths and being able to then work together based on that".

In the short-term the outcome is that these companies have been capacitated to produce the various PPE products, in some instances enabling them to extend their product lines and diversify. This directly affected the ability of these companies to remain operational during the COVID-19 pandemic and keep staff employed. Secondly, in relation to COVID-19, South Africa is now much less dependent on imports for these specific PPE items.

According to participants the LMP has showcased the industrial capacity still available in South Africa so that *“despite global supply chain disruptions, as a country and as an economy, we can fend for ourselves and we can meet the demand that exists [for PPE] in the country” [P4]*. The lessons of this type of initiative are important for informing other industries that are reliant on exports to consider a similar strategy because this could also have an added effect in relation to employment within sectors and their supporting value chains.

Notably, within an environment where the ability of our institutions is questioned this is an example of a forum which has seemingly achieved its mandate and shown the ability of a diverse group of social partners to use the capability in the country to achieve shared developmental objectives for the country. Additionally, according to participants this was achieved in a very short timeframe, in a legally compliant and transparent manner, practising good governance. This was well illustrated by a business participant [P5] who indicated:

“There is an underlying capability and capacity in South Africa to get things done that have usually taken quite frankly years, within a couple of months and done compliantly and transparently with the different partners coming together. That with the right support is able to activate and effectively supply product that up until the start of COVID, had all but left the local manufacturing domain and was imported.”

An added lesson identified is that once the country is able to fulfil its local requirements of PPE, opportunities exist to export these products within Africa and beyond.

Arguably the biggest lesson identified by participants was that manufacturing capacity can be developed and increased, 'it can be done' if all social actors are committed and accountable to work towards achieving the same outcome. This is more challenging than expected given the significant fractures existing across our society both economically and socially.

SECTION 2 - SOCIAL COMPACT

2. What do you understand by the term social compacting?

Amongst participants there seems to be an understanding of what social compacting entails including the inclusion of all social sectors of society namely business, government and labour. Not all participants were specific about the inclusion of a civil society/ community element within social compacting.

From government participants [P2] and [P10] respectively, the key areas identified in relation to social compacting relate to specific social actor interests, resource commitment by sectors, responsibility and accountability across social sectors and the element of contestation between social actors. This is represented as follows:

"Policymaking by its very nature is contested...there are vested interest...it's dynamic and it's about relationships and vision for me by all the parties in any country."

"...each stakeholder commits to doing X and doing Y, and each stakeholder brings resources and energy to that. So it's not an activity that's just on one person or one entities' shoulders."

This aligns with areas highlighted by business focussing on the development of “agreements”, a “willingness to work together” and the achievement of “common goals” [P5]. Another business participant [P11] illustrated social compacting by referring to “an agreement across the board and meeting of the minds where everybody I guess can stand to win something” but this is done on the basis that “everybody has to bring something to the table”. This give and take or contestation requires “a lot of legwork, a lot of problem solving, a lot of understanding who gains to win or lose” in an effort to find “the sweet spot” which will require all sectors to accept some losses for the good of society.

The labour representative [P7] view is in agreement with that outlined by other participants that:

“social partners...each make commitments in terms of their ability and resources and ...make compromises based on what's possible for them... everybody comes to the table, both in terms of ...what they would want, but also what they can give and do.”

However, two elements which are of importance when considering a future social compact would be the specific sector contribution and compromise, the most likely areas for contestation. It should be noted, as reflected in Korpi’s power resource model that not all sectors have access to the same amount or type of resources, nor do these resources remain constant over time which adds to the complexity of concluding a social compact. The labour representative [P9]:

“...social compacting is important...to have a sense of common purpose and to make sure that the credibility, integrity of public policy has a lot more support.”

The LMP possibly reflects a level of compromise that is not based on narrow sectoral interests but is linked more closely to the greater societal need during the pandemic. Reflecting on the issue of “more support” as raised by labour this could suggest that a social compact must be considered beyond the parties who

negotiate the agreement, with greater emphasis on broader buy-in from the key sectors of society whose support will be required for implementation and long-term societal impact. Additionally, the matter of resource activation by social actors is one which must be considered closely because within the negotiation process there is not equality of contribution nor will there necessarily be an equal outcome for social partners, instead the benefit (or sweet spot) should be premised on the envisaged positive outcome for society.

Sub-themes explored:

a. What relevance do you think a social compact has for South Africa?

The consensus was that there is a need for a social compact in South Africa going forward especially because there are many issues that should be addressed in society and all sectors should contribute to finding workable solutions.

Government agency participants [P3] and [P4] expressed the view that:

“The intention is beautiful...I don't always know if these things are effective. So the great thing about the Local Manufacturing Partnership there was more action and less talk.”

“...it's very important... we have seen how different compacts that have been completed in the past in this country have contributed to the attainment of a lot of objectives.”

On the other hand the labour representatives view [P7] and [P9] on this matter is as follows:

“we need a social compact in South Africa now more than ever...needs to be a coming together of people who are taking a longer term view of what we need to do in society”

“(social compacts)...can hold significant benefit and it's something that I think you know is needed. It's something that's elusive because often, especially on business side when they talk about it it's really about expecting others, including government and labour to make sacrifices, amend what they would want...to tone down their demands andespecially on the business side there being a recognition that you know they themselves would have to do that also.”

The labour view seems to indicate that whilst a social compact is needed there are significant issues affecting its development and finalisation. Labour raises a lack of compromise on the side of business as well as the fact that there seems to be short term planning, instead of long term societal vision that changes society structurally.

Business also raised a lack of trust between social actors, which could result from a lack of understanding, a misalignment of goals or a lack of implementation of past agreements concluded during the past 27 years between social partners, which seems to have seen slow or limited implementation. This is illustrated through business participants [P5] and [P11]:

“So I think you know there remains in South Africa a lot of mistrust as I've learned through particularly through this (process)...in terms of what each social partner actually is pursuing and whether there's clarity on whether there's alignment on that and mistrust in terms of commitment and delivery which I think persists and that then it is for me I think where – despite what we sometimes see on paper-, the reality in the execution does not reflect it. And so that mistrust obviously comes back to an alignment, or in our case a misalignment in terms of expectations and priorities.”

“...I think social compacting is incredibly important. No one party can do it on their own. I however think that we haven't got it right on a broader scale because we don't have trust. There are such a wide range of objectives and there's an inability to prioritize because there are so many things we are trying to address at the same time.”

The view expressed by business above is supported by labour participants [P7] and [P9] in relation to implementation and trust deficit indicating that:

“there are commitments....and the implementation of it, you know, becomes a problem....people committing to do something and then not doing it. So now if you're not doing it, why should I be doing what I said I will and then it becomes a bit of a standoff as to who should be moving first and so on.”

“So social compacting clearly has its value but it also presents major challenges...the big challenge is the lack of implementation.”

This suggests that if the issues of trust, accountability, narrow compromise and implementation are not addressed within the framework of the social compact, an agreed social compact will remain elusive in South Africa. These key areas could be considered building blocks that should form the foundation of a South African social compact if it is to gain traction in the long-term.

b. What does this suggest about a new social compact for South Africa in your observation?

There was agreement from participants as noted above, on the need for a social compact in South Africa, simultaneously realising that reaching agreement on a national social compact is still a very difficult task.

In support of this government participant [P1] noted: *"...our attempts so far and in particular the last attempt - we still struggling with it. I'm making reference here to the Eskom social compact...as we speak there is still load shedding..."*

Government participant [P2] acknowledged that there seems to be a lack of vision and a trust deficit in South Africa - *"To be honest with you, I don't see a shared vision in many of the sectors that we have...there still is no trust in the country."*

As attempts to conclude a social compact continue, an important suggestion has been made that could assist in addressing both the shared vision as well as building trust amongst social partners. All business participants [P5], [P6] and [P11] suggested sectoral compacts, collaborative partnerships and joint projects as mechanisms to develop stepping stones towards a national social compact.

"I think what it [LMP] illustrates to me is maybe a broad sweeping social compact is going to be particularly challenging, and then perhaps you know, as you look at South Africa we perhaps better off looking at social compacts that are focused on very clear

specific and aligned outcomes....But whenever I look at a broad social compact, there's just such a variety of participants and interests at play.” [P5]

Business participant [P6] went as far as suggesting we “*revisit our understanding of social compact, that a more decentralized, modern approach is needed.*”

The suggestion is not replacing a national compact but possibly considering a different route to reaching agreement and consensus between sectors which could facilitate joint implementation, direct sector accountability, societal benefit, co-creation and ultimately a move towards a trust credit. Currently, in South Africa the foundation of trust between social actors seems to have been eroded, contributing to the difficulty in concluding a national social compact.

Whilst sector compacts could be beneficial to address certain kinds of issues, a national compact is required to effect broader societal change.

As noted by government agency participant [P4]:

“...the LMP...demonstrates the fact that all sectors of society can benefit from a common cause of social compacts from collaborative partnerships.”

Business [P5] noted that during “*the LMP and this COVID there was such an immediate focus in terms of what we needed to do and...complete alignment...but I suppose the urgency in the crisis did allow a bit of a focus and a prioritisation of some of the drivers*”

The labour representative [P7] added a different dimension to this, noting that there is a place for sectoral compacts but there are a number of issues that have to be resolved at a national level and this requires all social actors to be allowed to bring their issues to the table:

“a broader national compact is important for dealing with issues that are not sectoral jobs issues or sectoral industry issues...I have hope that a national social compact can exist...but it will take significant movement and ambition for it to happen...there's just certain things that are not on the table....”

Both labour [P9] and business [P11] reflected on the urgency of a national social compact because for South Africa to “*push back against the level of corruption that*

appears to be endemic” in the country, will require a “relook” of our current plans and consensus across society on the way forward. Business agreed noting that

“our current situation is pretty dire, if you look at our inequality, the poverty, joblessness. There is so much that we need to fix and get right...”

On the basis of this, the business participant [P11] suggested a different approach that perhaps builds a strong foundation on which a social compact can eventually be reached. The approach is outlined below:

“...maybe what we need are some wins along the way to get us there....I think if you're going to try and do something at national level, it's going to please everybody, tick every box - ain't going to happen.”

So, I think for me ring fence sort of projects or programs that can show wins along the way is absolutely a better way to go. Because we need to show traction and success, because otherwise it's just everyone goes back into that same old loop of same old, same kind of prejudices or issues depending on which parties are in the room. Where is the sweet spot, where is the win, win, win, win, win for everybody?”

The above suggests that our democracy may not have matured to a level where social actors are able to negotiate in the interest of the broader society and that the level of fragmentation that exists across social sectors is significant. It is therefore unlikely that negotiation in current forums will achieve the desired aim, what appears necessary is a different approach which broadens engagement even within sectors to create the opportunity for new ideas, perspectives, resources and agreements. This requires a willingness to include issues in the discussion which may previously have been removed from the agenda.

c. What should the societal aim of a social compact be for South Africa?

The predominant three issues that face our society were mentioned by most participants namely unemployment, poverty and inequality as the issues that should be addressed in a social compact.

“Unemployment breeds poverty and the inequality continues to grow, so the triple challenge that is talked about so much continues to hound our country.” [P4]

However, building on this a number of participants noted that economic inclusion would have a significant impact across society. There appears to be a view that if unemployment is reduced we will be in a better position as a society to address other societal challenges.

Government participants [P2] and [P10] noted:

“...South Africa is having economic problems. If we resolve the economic problems of growth, of unemployment and of access...”

“...economic equality, creating an economically viable state...that's better for everybody. Currently, we have political equality, in a sense, but we don't have economic equality.”

A view from a business participant [P5] supports this view:

“I think the societal aim has to be, you know, ultimately a more equitable society and the ability for a greater percentage of the population to also participate economically.”

The view expressed by participants seems to suggest a focus needs to be placed on strengthening our economy so that there is greater economic inclusion. However, to achieve this labour participant [P7] touches on an interesting concept, namely that we need a stronger focus on social cohesion, a greater sense of *“...in it together than we are at the moment, at the moment it's not the case”*. This insight also links to a bigger concept namely social solidarity in which the required compromise across social strata could encourage a fundamental shift in society.

It appears that in relation to a social compact there does not seem to be contestation on the aim but rather the action that should be taken to achieve that aim – the compromise. This appears to be where social actors encounter hurdles in concluding a social compact because ideologically their views differ on the steps to achieve this. As noted by labour participant [P7]:

“...it's not just to say we must deal with inequality, there's like building blocks and separate tools that we must use to deal with it.”

Business [P11] echoed this sentiment noting:

“I can't imagine anybody who would not want to be in a country where there's less poverty, less joblessness, less hunger....How do we get there?”

Government [P1] and [P2] did raise two very important points in relation to the societal aim of a social compact – firstly, it should not be assumed that the representatives who negotiate a social compact know what society wants. It is suggested that there should be a mechanism to determine this more clearly especially because it should be remembered that social actors also represent varying interests when negotiating. Secondly, the prism through which a social compact is viewed differs between those who are employed and form part of the economy *“as compared to somebody who has lost hope”* [P2]. These issues could be important when considering representation and broader inclusion in the process of social compacting because those who occupy the seats around the table should be empowered to negotiate for society, not narrow portions of society i.e. the employed or their affiliates/members. Consideration should therefore be given to the structure used to negotiate a social compact and the manner in which representation is managed or determined. This has particular relevance because no social sector in South Africa is homogenous which creates a broad range of competing interests across society.

SECTION 3 – LOCAL MANUFACTURING PARTNERSHIP

- 3. What in your view are the challenges, obstacles and potential for collaborative governance in relation to the rollout of PPEs? Secondly do you have any views on how these relate to social compacting?**

This section focusses specifically on the Local Manufacturing Partnership (LMP), trying to identify specific challenges and lessons that can be used in relation to

understanding the development of a social compact for South Africa going forward.

Sub-themes explored:

a. What have the challenges or obstacles been to the rollout of PPE within the LMP?

The biggest challenge identified by participants was around procurement of PPE once the actual products had been manufactured by South African companies. Various participants raised the issue of corruption in PPE procurement that occurred during the pandemic and that the LMP had assisted the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) with matters in this regard. As noted by a government representative [P2] – *“You know this [PPE corruption] was the biggest embarrassment for the country.”* Participants noted that this kind of activity acted in direct opposition to the work done in the LMP and could be seen as a factor contributing to the trust deficit in the country.

Besides this, the procurement issue pointed to a number of other concerns. It appears that both the public and private sector actors are not supporting local production, instead they continue to import PPE products. Government participant [P2] noted:

“...people just exploited the weaknesses in our public procurement system, and it is not only the public sector...the private sector really has not shown any willingness to buy locally manufactured products...so if you can't get the right price, then there's no incentive for the private sector to buy locally manufactured products. And the impact of that is that then people will be unemployed. Now it goes back to the issue of whether the society trust or if they believe in the social contracting.”

This once again confronts the issue of one vision for South Africa and seems to point to a clear disregard of the “multiplier effect” [P2] that local production can have on our society, alternatively it represents selfish pursuit of profit and

interests within social sectors. The issue of product import also touches on the issue of vested interests which was raised by various interviewees including labour participants [P7] and [P9] as follows:

“So we create this local supply side, instead of.... provincial and local government then and others placing enormous amount of orders from these factories you see this continual importation of products and almost you know significant fight back against it...same applies for business.”

“...so they must buy products from the companies that have been set up now through the LMP. But many of them have established networks of corruption supplying or procurement of kickbacks and all of the other stuff. So they go back to that networks that they have that benefit...supply chains are international, and the networks and corrupt channels are international....”

Business participant [P11] to a certain extent agreed with this view from the perspective that companies have developed global supply chain networks which are not easy to disassemble and would require a clear directive from senior business executives at company level.

This seems to shed light on various issues that could affect social compacting, namely representation of social sectors, trust deficit, implementation of agreements, as well as accountability and commitment between social actors. It may support the view of government agency participant [P4] that “*economic patriotism*” on the part of social actors cannot be guaranteed. This point is reinforced by business participant [P5] in noting that in South Africa there is “*often a perception that we either cannot or do not do it in South Africa, and that if we do it in South Africa, it's not compliant or it's not competitive*”. Participants indicated that this is a perception in both the private and the public sectors.

Related to this demand side issue is that of stakeholder representation and at which point in a process stakeholders should be included to facilitate improved implementation and positive outcomes. This problem wasn't foreseen by the

LMP because it was assumed that there would be broad buy-in. It raises a question in relation to concluding a social compact, that is, broad buy-in to agreements reached and how to negate any negative effects during implementation. If we accept that social actors are not homogenous, what mechanism should be used to ensure that they engage more broadly with their constituencies to broaden buy-in – this would need to be considered across government, business, labour and community sectors.

Despite all the PPE procurement struggles which occurred in South Africa during the pandemic, government participant [P8] noted that *“ironically, you know, there's an Economist article that tells the story of how Hong Kong or hospitals in Hong Kong were buying masks from South Africa”*, and the same occurred in countries in Europe. According to participant [P8] the disaster of the LMP, is that it hasn't translated into a new PPE manufacturing sector in South Africa and the trust that was created between the social actors during this collaborative governance initiative has been eroded. Even the companies that were assisted by the LMP have lost trust. This points to a serious challenge at implementation level which could undermine agreements reached in a national social compact.

b. What do you consider major successes during this collaborative governance initiative?

As indicated previously, there is a perception amongst participants of the LMP success, that one of the biggest achievements was the speed with which the team was able to achieve this outcome for South Africa during the crisis.

Business participant [P11] illustrated as follows:

“...we demonstrated tangibly that it's possible to do that and achieve a lot more than you know I'd ever seen trying to work collaboratively as I always do...but it takes resolve.

It takes some fit for purpose resources, people, a defined problem and end goal, a sense of urgency. A win, win, win, win, sweet spot."

This view was supported by both government [P2] and government agency [P4] in relation to the commitment and determination to achieve the desired goal:

"...when we have the vision, there is much that can be done...We were able to link some of the manufacturer's with markets and others are now exporting...We were able to expose corruption,...we were able to show the world that working together we can do much."

"...we have demonstrated that a partnership, a collaborative partnership of all social partners with as many sectors of society as possible with a common goal can achieve...."

The issue of commitment is important and has also been raised in relation to senior executive level commitment. A participant noted that the assistance of senior leaders across social partners, to resolve issues was an important contributor to the speed with which the LMP was able to achieve its goal. This evidence suggests a level of urgency horizontally and vertically in relation to implementation.

Labour participants [P7] and [P9] were in agreement with the above but also added the role of the LMP to:

"...set up production in many products in which we had never had production before - that was significant."

"...the ability to convince many of the businesses to become involved in this project and to pivot their businesses to develop new products and to invest in this was significant. This resulted in jobs being saved, the creation of more jobs, and also critically our ability as a country to effectively respond to this pandemic."

Business participant [P5] raised the importance of being able to firstly access and secondly leverage the skill, expertise and capability in the country across all relevant sectors as contributing factors to the perceived success of the LMP.

"...just the ability to leverage specific expertise both at a technical, government and business level to co-ordinate and impact this focus. I think the ability to deploy that

expertise into the right places at the right time really did unlock and accelerate the activities that were underway”.

Additionally business [P6] made reference to the actual governance structure utilised for the LMP, mostly comprised of volunteers from across the different social sectors. Whilst this was possible during the pandemic, it is not considered a feasible solution for the development or implementation of a national social compact. However, it does suggest that greater thought should be given to the implementation mechanism, which should not be limited to current frameworks only i.e. NEDLAC structures.

Interview participants shared that despite the voluntary nature of the LMP the governance structure seemed to exhibit transparency and a high level of commitment and accountability from participants both at the operational level and within the technical working groups.

Some respondents indicated, this was a win for all and the LMP seems to have displayed that South Africa has the resources, the skill and the people to achieve positive outcomes for the country. Government participant [P8] noted:

“...the entire machinery of the LMP was made up of people who actually had never worked in that value chain, and were not invested in that value chain at all. So there were no issues of conflicts of interest. The trust levels were very different... you need the independent resources doing the work, and you're managing that conflict of interest very effectively.”

An interesting outcome expressed by participants is the development of a broad base of “institutional memory” of social partner collaboration beyond normal institutional forums such as NEDLAC. This could be important in the development of an extended collaborative footprint in the country, considering a significant amount of people involved in the LMP, especially from a technical level had been part of this type of broad sector collaboration for the first time. On

a certain level it does serve as a positive reference point for those who participated.

c. What lessons can we learn from this collaboration to inform a South African social compact in the longer-term?

An issue raised by government [P1] was the importance of being able to access the “*owners of the means of production*” i.e. the factory owners and to convince them to participate in this project.

“...the factory that they had potentiality at that point in time did not manufacture PPE's....But because of the need of the country, they realize that it is in their best interest that they deliver what is in the countries best interests and still be sustainable...”

This suggests the broadening of participation beyond the normal social actors involved in formal policy engagement and a possible emphasis on the stakeholders needed at an implementation level required to deliver on the social compact. This again places emphasis on the importance of considering a social compact from a multi-levelled perspective, since there are different social actors that may be required at different levels in the process, beyond simply the negotiation of the social compact.

Secondly, as noted by government agency participant [P4] – when we are dealing with societal issues it is not the responsibility of one social actor for example government to solve the issues being addressed, it requires commitment and accountability from all social actors because “*this is a problem that confronted all of us, and collectively we worked towards a solution.*” In considering future social compacts it appears it is necessary to determine how to enable greater buy-in to agreements as well as to develop mechanisms that encourage implementation and accountability across social sectors.

Business participants [P6] and [P11] noted the importance of implementation and trying to find mechanisms that reduce the “*political noise*”, encouraging collectives like the LMP to work freely with minimal interference by parties with vested interests. It is suggested that political noise can potentially affect the outcomes of negotiations and compromises to a level where the wellbeing of society is not central to the outcome. The participants illustrated this point as follows:

“It was not a political structure per say, but it was a delivery mechanism...a collaborative platform that has a clear delivery mechanism with clear targets and outcomes.... It was not about ideologies and concepts, it was purely implementation.” [P6]

“We have good resources that really can be deployed to achieve tangible outcomes in a short space of time provided we can keep the noise away. So the noise I mean, I'm going to say the politics and when I say politics, I don't just mean government, I mean industry. You know there is like, there might be parochial vested interests or you know short term interests and you know that really detracts from effectively implementing a project and an end goal”. [P11]

One of the lessons labour representatives highlighted is that each social partner is able to contribute to the collaboration and that there should be greater recognition of the different resources and skills which each social actor is able to contribute. Labour representative [P7] raised the perceived lack of project management skills which exists particularly in government and the degree of importance this carried in terms of the LMP implementation, noting:

“...business especially brought great project management skills...a kind of tenacity and willingness and an energy to follow through, to push through and to achieve goals and that is missing, I think in government. So you know to me if we have an active developmental state, we need that in government.”

Labour participant [P9] added:

“I think the lesson is that it can be done. We can change the structure of the economy. We can ensure that there are better partnerships and synergies built between supply and demand, and re-invigorate South Africa's industrial capacity and ability.”

Lastly, government participant [P10] identified a lesson related to risk, particularly the risk of not taking action. It was suggested that the pandemic created a crisis context enabling the urgency and commitment displayed by social partners. This gives rise to an observation – at what point will the social and economic crisis in South Africa motivate this same level of urgency and commitment from social actors? Participant [P10] noted that the risk of societal uprising seems possible, the pandemic appears to have increased the societal risk of an uprising.

Government participant [P8] indicated that a key lesson to learn is that social compacting works, the LMP has exhibited this and has possibly created a ‘*demonstration effect*’ of collaboration and social compacting. It appears that to achieve the suggested positive results require “*active orchestration*” at various levels to facilitate resource mobilization across sectors and to encourage social actors to remain engaged and accountable. Social compacting appears to require a ‘*coalition of leaders*’ from across the social actors to facilitate action and commitment over an extended period, beyond negotiation.

d. What has this collaboration identified as the key pillars of a possible social compact for South Africa?

Here participants provided key insights into areas that may underpin the development of a social compact for South Africa based on the experience of the LMP. As a starting point one of the government agency participants [P3] identified four key pillars that could be considered in relation to a social compact namely:

*“I think **transparency** is probably the most important thing, instead of trying to showcase your best side, you showcase the raw truth...**Agility** is important so you know*

*something doesn't work can we change?...Trust is important...and the **commitment** to actually sit and do the work together."*

However, I think there has been a strong indication from research participants during earlier responses that there seems to be a trust deficit in the country between social partners. If there is a trust deficit amongst social actors, it is unlikely that a social compact can be concluded, unless thought is given to a mechanism which would enable trust to be rebuilt over time.

The pillars of transparency and good governance were also raised by both labour and business research participants. However, the focus will now turn to some additional issues raised that could be important in the process of considering a different approach to social compacting.

Firstly, the issue of representation was raised, in the context of ensuring that there is broader consultation and encouraging more voices to be heard in the development and implementation of the compact. Government participant [P1] noted:

"...So once you've identified who the players are in terms of developing a specific social compact....you must be able to identify who should be party to the conversation...Who in the end makes a decision that says ok, now we have the right people, now we can start talking...some voices are stifled in very significant political areas"

Business participant [P6] touched on a similar issue when noting the importance to 'get the right stakeholders':

"I think the concept of broad stakeholders, we like to think of stakeholders in South Africa as broad that represent broad constituencies. I don't think it works. I think we need to be much more focused in terms of finding stakeholders".

Broad stakeholder groupings are useful from a co-ordination perspective but over time they change and so in determining the relevant stakeholders, there should not be a fixation with the current structures and demographic profiles only, but an effort should be made to incorporate other groups and relevant

stakeholders - to broaden participation, resources, skill and buy-in to implementation. Access is important not only from a resource perspective but also from a decision making perspective.

Additionally, business participants **[P5]** and **[P11]** raised important issues about the commitment of social partners which could be seen by the willingness to bring resources to negotiation, then utilizing and activating these resources. This is important because it moves a social compact from a paper agreement to actual implementation which is focused on a clear end goal.

*“...the recognition...and ability to leverage one another's expertise and skills around a common goal. I think the other is the recognition of or the ability to identify and deploy expertise as required, to unlock or unblock opportunities that exist.” **[P5]***

This is one of the biggest challenges which a future social compact for South would need to unlock, numerous participants alluded to past plans failing at implementation phase.

Labour on the other hand focussed on two additional issues namely compromise and political will, which is not restricted to government – political will across all social actors to make bold decisions that will fundamentally change the trajectory of the South African society. Labour participant **[P9]** noted:

“...we are not politically bold enough to take the hard decisions that's required to turn around our society, and so that's the big weakness for me at the moment...In our, you know societies where we have the institutions for dialogue and compacting, but we don't have the political will...we are not matching our words with actions to ensure that we enforce the agenda change.”

Another key element raised by government **[P2]** was the consideration of how we use our institutions to achieve a social compact but also if in their current form they are appropriate for what we need to achieve both in terms of negotiating a compact and implementation of agreements. This does create an

opportunity to consider new options in relation to institutional structures required to drive implementation and broader buy-in to a social compact.

“So the social compacting for me, you can come up with the conceptual framework. It can be very broad or sectoral. But you need institutions...Remember we have NEDLAC as the kind of broader institution to deal with the social compact....NEDLAC was not adequate for me to deal with this particular challenge....you know a crisis also creates innovation.”

The last point that was raised relates to the issues of ‘quick wins’ [P10] which ties back to the issue of trust and building momentum – possibly this could assist to build trust and momentum amongst social actors. This could prove relevant for understanding constraints, issues creating deadlock and also the type of structure needed to extend social partner involvement beyond the negotiating phase.

e. How could collaborative governance influence the direction of public policy aimed at addressing inequality and poverty going forward?

There was a general agreement amongst participants that collaborative governance should influence the direction of public policy however, at this stage it is not having the significant impact that it should. Responses were not directly related to inequality and poverty but provide some good insight. The starting point as noted by government [P2] is that: *“as government we can drive it, but as government we are not necessarily producers”* - Relating to the implementation of policy which is the responsibility of all social actors not only government. What the LMP displayed was that we should not *‘debate politics that much but we must implement’*.

The view amongst participants was that collaborative governance should influence public policy because it allows for a much broader range of societal perspective and voices to be heard, and for different ideas and possibilities to be

considered, as well as identification of unintended consequences of a policy by understanding the practical application amongst different actors in society. A view expressed by business [P5]:

"...my hope would be that collaborative governance would mean a way better voicing of, or consolidation of perspectives from different participants who are having to, you know, I think practically implement or engage with different policy. ...South Africa is excellent at drafting legislation and putting the regulatory frameworks in place, we're just not necessarily always good at making them practical or realistic."

To some extent labour [P7] was in agreement with this approach but also raised the issue that despite representation of all social actors in the policy process this does not guarantee the inclusion of all issues for debate:

"I suppose that a willingness to listen and debate all the different viewpoints and demands around items... issues of a kind of a sacrifice for a greater good...you know all of that has a crucial role to play." This raises a question about who decides on the items to be included and excluded within the process of social compacting.

But labour [P9] also provided insight into instances where the process had indeed worked well and resulted in progressive policy change however, it was also suggested that implementation seems to be the problem.

"...look at the Companies Amendment Bill that's in NEDLAC now. I mean, the representation for workers on the boards, the wage disparities having to be indicated in annual reports. All of those things are progressive moves forward". [P9]

Business [P11] was in support of the fact that we have good policy in South Africa which is partially a result of a collaborative approach to developing policy, however more work should be done to mitigate unintended consequences of public policy and to ensure alignment between policies.

"...one thing that I'm sure you're not unfamiliar with is industry or business always saying coherence, cohesion and alignment in policy...I think in a collaborative way we

would get good feedback loops as to how things are working, where they aren't, where there might be unintended consequences.”

So whilst a collaborative governance framework is part of our public policy process it seems to be hampered by the ability of social actors to have key issues negotiated in the relevant forums and by a perceived lack of appropriate implementation of policy. It appears our institutions are not appropriately equipped to manage the implementation element and to collaboratively provide relevant oversight of policy to prevent possible unintended consequences. The issue of implementation has been raised on numerous occasions by interview participants as a hurdle to social compacting and also public policy.

SECTION 4 – SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

- 1. How is the concept of social solidarity understood by different collective actors (business, labour, government) working within a collaborative governance institutional framework and how does such understanding manifest itself institutionally?**

The issue of social solidarity was viewed with interest and acknowledged as important by interview participants however, there does not seem to be a belief that this is evident in our society except at a more local level during for example, crisis such as floods or fires. In relation to the institution of the Local Manufacturing Partnership, some participants indicated that they do not believe the LMP would have been successful if there was not a high degree of social solidarity.

Some participants made reference to a perceived unity or oneness which existed amongst LMP participants, despite the majority of engagement being via digital platforms and participants (especially in work streams), not having worked

together before. There was an acknowledgement that the context created by the crisis and the impact on all sectors may have contributed to the solidarity experienced within the LMP and that this solidarity is not necessarily continuing as the pandemic concludes. It did however create an opportunity for the participants in the LMP to experience a form of social solidarity within the institution of the LMP.

However, government participant [P2] argued that there does not seem to be social solidarity based on shared purpose between social actors in South Africa: *“there's not going to be solidarity if we don't share the same vision and the objective that we want to achieve...”*.

This was supported by business participant [P6] who indicated that *“...we like to show social solidarity in a generic way but without being impactful...in South Africa we have a problem of poverty you know. Does business really show social solidarity towards the poor and marginalised in this country?...We are a profit driven society”*.

It is worth considering that what may have displayed as social solidarity may actually have been more linked to the expedience of the situation, especially because the health risk related to COVID-19 was similar for everyone. Evidence from the research suggests that as the pandemic has dissipated, there appears to have been a return to narrow sector interests, especially an increased focus on localized company interests. Thus while interviewees may have identified institutional social solidarity within the LMP, this unfortunately has not translated into broader solidarity across social actors beyond the crisis.

Sub-themes explored:

- a. **What is your understanding of social solidarity within this collaborative governance initiative?**

Firstly, participants seemed to agree that social solidarity did exist within this collaborative forum however, the reasons for its existence are quite varied, ranging from a government participant [P2] noting that it was linked to the context of the crisis – protecting what is ours:

“...with PPE because it was a crisis, if your house is burning or your neighbours house, you will go out and assist in stopping the fire.”

In another instance government participant [P8] referred to a ‘burning platform’ created by the context of the pandemic, noting the following:

“...without social solidarity the LMP would never have happened. That’s people saying this matters, we’re doing this because we need to protect our health care workers...it was the burning platform combined with the fact that actually the leadership of the companies and the departments and the unions that were involved in the LMP, did have a sense of social solidarity that was heavily inspired by the extent of the emergency...”

Government [P10] reflected on the actual representatives who formed part of the LMP and its work streams indicating that in most instances they were strangers that had never worked together. In fact to this day many have not even met each other because most of the engagement took place digitally. Yet this group seemed to represent a high degree of solidarity and focus around achieving the common goal.

This is contrasted by the views of government agency participant [P4] who focussed on firstly, that a problem must be acknowledged, secondly that it impacts society at large and thirdly that a collective effort is made to address the issues in which some actors may lose while others gain but the outcome is good for society overall. This last point is an important element of social solidarity which is premised on an overall achievement for society, despite what a sector may need to forgo.

Business participant [P5] seemed to share this view but also focussed on the fact that within the collaboration social actors approach the issue from differing perspectives but ultimately the decisions made should be about the best outcome for society:

"...we're in this together and we all have different roles to play....recognizing that we are coming at it from different starting points and different perspectives...that when we are making decisions, it is in the best interests of the country, and that's the majority of South Africans as opposed to a very selfish and insular decisions or focus areas that are not necessarily in the best interests of the broader population or community."

Labour participants [P7] and [P9] also had a strong focus on the ability to act for society, to ensure that everyone is included and that the outcome serves society, trying to ensure that *'nobody falls through the cracks'*.

"Seeing what's needed and seeing that there is a crisis and acting on it...how different people then work together to achieve something not just for themselves or for their own constituency or their own paymaster but for others because that would help the country."

On reflection, it appears that central to a socially solidaristic approach is the need to have a clear agreement on the actual societal problem that requires attention because although it may affect all social actors differently, social solidarity requires all social actors to have the same resolve. This leads to the issue of interests and compromise – what the respondents seem to identify is the need for a different level of compromise, where sectoral interests are positioned secondary to societal need. Thirdly, for this to be achieved may require a rethink in relation to constituency representation within the governance structure/ institution used to negotiate a social compact.

b. How has social solidarity been displayed within the institution of collaborative governance?

This section proved quite interesting because arguably it reflects a struggle by social actors to substantively link social solidarity to specific actions, processes or displays within the institution of the LMP.

A focus for government [P2] was on the **networks** of social partners in enabling the outcomes for society as a display of solidarity within the LMP:

“...solidarity has to do with your networks, because we can meet together, but if we don't have networks and networks in a sense that....he was able to call certain individuals when there was a challenge with sanitizer. He was able to call liquor manufacturers to make alcohol available. So it's not solidarity in isolation.”

Government [P8] also paid specific attention to the intellectual capital that was invested in this project as a means of displaying solidarity:

“...the time investment, energy investment and intellectual kind of headspace investment by the leadership of the social partners in delivering this thing was a function of social solidarity. The kind of CEOs that were engaged in this from companies or senior business leaders and government leaders or union leaders would never, I mean these are not the people who sit in NEDLAC. These are people who before the pandemic were full time committed, all they did was run their business...”

The above view was supported by government agency participant [P4] who also noted the seniority of representatives that worked on this project and made capacity available at no cost to resolve the issues and to achieve the goal. This participant also noted the importance of decision making that was not based on constituency mandates but rather on solving the PPE problem. Participant [P4] from government agency noted:

“We said, can we find companies that are in a position to respond to this call. I mean, we took condom manufacturers and we said, because it's latex, can you come and use that latex facility to produce latex gloves? None of us have a vested interest, we just saw the capacity and we said, can you pivot and repurpose the factory to produce this...it was about that solidarity behind achieving a common goal of saying - this is for the country, this is for the people who are employed in those businesses”.

Business [P6] agreed with this noting – *“It was about the chance to get as much local capacity as possible and I think that's where we demonstrated social solidarity for the benefit of the production companies.”*

Business participant [P11] had a much broader focus on the long term impact of the work of the LMP in ensuring the sustainability of the businesses that were assisted, the eventual procurement of PPE locally and therefore the creation of more jobs in the economy which could then have a long-term effect on society – this in itself was perceived as a display of social solidarity.

The views expressed by social actors seems to indicate that social solidarity within an institutional setting has a number of dimensions which could be linked to access to resources and a willingness to activate this for the benefit of the broader society. Secondly, it appears that an institution in which social actor mandates are not prescribed lends itself to a more socially solidaristic experience amongst social actors. The reasons for this possibly warrant further research.

Lastly, what seems to be suggested is that short term gains must be put on hold, to create an opportunity for long-term planning that creates societal change, which could then represent social solidarity.

Labour [P7] raised a very important point about social solidarity namely, seeing a need and making a decision to ‘*act on it*’ – the action can of course take many forms and in this instance *“business and labour understood that there was a national crisis and hence gave of the resources you know without charging anyone”*.

The research displays that context played a significant part in the type of social solidarity displayed at institutional level because the balance of power between social actors, especially business and labour was altered. It was therefore in the

best interest of all to make these PPE items available and to use the resources at their disposal to achieve this.

c. Has the context of the pandemic created any opportunities for new solidarity amongst social partners?

There is a sense that the pandemic should have created an opportunity for new solidarity amongst social partners but that it may unfortunately not have achieved that in the long run. At the time of the LMP there certainly appears to have been high levels of social solidarity but participants have reflected on a waning of this as the pandemic has progressed.

Government agency participant **[P4]** reflected on the fact that members of the LMP operated as a unit, not focussed on mandates and constituency identities.

“We were all part of the Local Manufacturing Partnership Governance Panel, and we had those work streams that were populated by people coming from each of these constituencies. And all of them were there...not representing the interests of their constituency, but only the common cause. And all of us focused on the job at hand.”

This sentiment was echoed by business **[P6]** who recounted the period during which the LMP was active, specifically the recognition of the societal risk created by the pandemic. Secondly, there is reference to the ability to use this momentum to operate differently or create a new way.

“When we created B4SA (Business for SA)...we were able to put petty differences aside, people could come together and all of us volunteered to a large extent because...there was a shared risk across all the parties. That was the success of COVID that fact that all parties recognized, understand that we have a shared risk and we can put the political agendas aside and focus on rebuilding through COVID.”

Unfortunately, the momentum and solidarity experienced during the height of the pandemic seems according to some participants to have dissipated, the most surprising element being the speed with which it has occurred. Business **[P5]** and government **[P8]** participants noted the following in this regard:

“Unfortunately, in some of the work that I'm currently involved in, still supporting you know the link to the Economic Reconstruction Recovery Plan (ERRP), I have to say the number of engagements both at a private and public sector level, it seems that we have reverted to type and lost in my mind, some of that broader perspective: society lead perspective, community perspective...if you look at business often it's no longer a sector discussion it's back to an individual business focus. And so I think there's pockets of it...I guess I feel that to a degree it's dissipated faster than I would have expected.”

“So it's dissipating, but I think the memory is rich...you need to harness this thing because it's still there, it's still bubbling, but you know you need to fire up the engines again...I think we're at risk of losing it... I mean, we had the post democracy dividend. You know, for four years it was rainbow and boerewors and braai right and now, like everybody hates each other and doesn't trust each other, and we're risking that again I think...So there's a kind of a heat and friction in the system, which I think is going to start pulling at the threads of this solidarity.” [P8]

This is important for us to understand as a society as we look to rebuild after COVID and also as we consider the development of a social compact. However, we must recognise that before the pandemic started the country was fragmented across a number of spheres, the pandemic has heightened this. As such we may be operating from even more of a deficit than before the pandemic. The assumption that social actors are more closely aligned because of COVID should not be assumed because of some positive achievements. Instead there should be an exercise to understand what it is that pulled us together as social actors and how do we harness that for the good of all in our country?

From a labour perspective there was a sense that there is a need for us to harness the opportunities that have presented themselves, however, not a convincing argument that this would necessarily occur. One of the key reasons for this is that whilst the pandemic may have been an equalizer across social sectors from a health perspective, from an economic and social perspective everyone experienced it differently, possibly intensifying the fragmentation.

Labour [P7] noted:

“...had everybody lost jobs and lost income across the board, you know it would have been bad, but we all would have felt listen we in the same boat. I don't think that's the case. So I think the inequality that's arisen out of the pandemic, creates the need for us to be and to do something and to find and to use social solidarity and compacting to fix that.”

Labour [P9] also noted the opportunity that has been created by the COVID pandemic for us to take bolder decisions as society to address our social and economic issues.

“So here is a massive crisis, with all of its ramifications on all sectors of society, and there was an opportunity for us to deal with it in a meaningful way. So we're not dealing with the fundamental fault lines within our society...it's about coming together in those discussions, but holding ourselves to account to dealing with the manifestation of some of the challenges that arose from COVID”.

It is quite difficult though in the current political, economic and social climate to envisage a scenario where “*bolder decisions*” will be taken. It seems more likely that the fractures which have widened during the pandemic will create a more protectionist approach across sectors to protect vested interests, with less of a focus on societal transformation. However, the other side of this is that the high degree of unemployment and social fracturing may compel a more socially solidaristic compromise because of the risk and threat this poses to society.

By way of conclusion, this chapter has aimed to share the different views, perceptions and understanding which social actors have in relation to collaborative governance and the insight this might provide on the development of a social compact for South Africa emanating from the experience of the LMP. There seems to be a clear indication that the pandemic has exposed the fragmentation in our society even further and that this makes a social compact between social actors a critical deliverable for South Africa, but a difficult and unlikely scenario unless a number of key areas are elevated, and suitably

addressed within the development process. However, despite this need there are a number of hurdles which need to be addressed to enable this to take place including but not limited to a lack of shared vision, lack of trust, vested interests, political agendas, lack of implementation and accountability.

A study of the Local Manufacturing Partnership has however offered some insight into a different governance form in which social actors have combined to achieve some positive results for the country during the pandemic. Whilst social solidarity within the collaborative institution is provided as one reason for the success of this forum, the risk to life posed by the pandemic seems to have created a more compelling reason to succeed. The issue of institutional social solidarity should receive more coverage in research going forward.

5. CHAPTER - INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter discusses the main findings of this research project and how the findings relate to the concepts of collaborative governance and social compacting during the COVID-19 pandemic.

5.1 Economic And Social Impact Of COVID-19

As an introductory question I aimed to gain some insight of the interviewees perception of the social and economic impact of COVID-19 on our society and the country at large. Almost in unison there was agreement on the devastating impact which the country has felt and a realisation that (when the research was conducted in 2021) as a country we still do not understand the full impact of the pandemic on South Africa. A second view expressed was that we were “caught off guard by COVID” [P6] and that “no one expected the negative impact of COVID” [P2] even globally.

From a South African perspective the pandemic has had a significant economic impact with “a lot of businesses that have folded” [P3], especially smaller businesses and this of course has had a direct social impact with many employees losing their jobs and livelihoods. The social impact of this across society is significant as witnessed by the riots and insurrections that occurred in KZN and Gauteng during the second half of 2021.

However, at the same time “many of our companies that are linked to global supply and value chains” [P9], had great difficulty accessing those supply chains which created opportunities for small business to develop.

If we consider the social perspective, COVID-19 has really “shone a spotlight on the social divide” [P5] in South Africa and has highlighted the “challenges that the majority of our population are facing” [P5]. There could be a case for the fact that it has “exacerbated the kind of chasm that exists between the rich and poor” [P7] because

the reality in such a fractured society as South Africa, not all parts of our society has been affected in the same way. The poorer sectors of society have by far suffered the biggest impact especially because of a lack of access to a range of resources that mediate economic and social vulnerability – there is general consensus on this across the participants in the research.

One of the participants noted that the impact of the pandemic has been significant and now “suddenly we are in a different conversation” [P8], referring to the fact that our perspective as a country has been compelled to change with new possibilities of finding collective solutions to address our social and economic crisis. Alternatively, the COVID crisis may result in a contingent state of finding solutions to the immediate issues induced by the crisis and then regressing back to the pre-crisis status quo as the country stabilizes. This is a significant issue for the research study because it allows consideration on whether we are prepared to change our paradigm and learn from what we have experienced during the pandemic. A change in paradigm would reflect an urgency in trying to address critical issues such as unemployment, the utilisation of different collaborative frameworks to encourage engagement between social actors and broader representation, the inclusion of issues on the agenda that may up to now have been suppressed and a political will (across all social actors) to make difficult compromises that enable the recovery process to progress with a sense of urgency.

The next few sections will cover a discussion on the key analyses from this study in relation to the research question and the sub-questions.

Research Question

What has the institutional experience of collaborative governance been in the ethical provision of PPE during the Covid-19 pandemic and what insights does

this provide about the challenges and prospects for social compacting in South Africa?

5.2 Brief Overview of the Power Resource Model

Walter Korpi's model focused on the organisation, mobilisation and distribution of power between social actors. He suggested that understanding the access that different social actors have to resources of power is important in relation to their interaction with each other, and that the range and scope of power resources do not remain constant but over time are able to develop or diminish depending on the context of the society in which it exists (Korpi, 2006, p. 77). Korpi's model highlights that there is a recognition between social actors of a societal issue that needs to be resolved, which requires an aligning of their respective power resources amongst specific social actors with shared concerns and interests and this ultimately gives rise to a specific type of institution which is directed at resolving the issue (Korpi, 2006, p. 81). Moments such as crisis or pandemics have the ability to alter power relations according to Korpi, noting that this kind of change in distribution creates the impetus for the formation of alliances in which the social actors are forced to work together to achieve a solution which could be beneficial for society at large (Korpi, 2006, p. 80).

5.3 Challenges, Obstacles and Potential for Collaborative Governance

The starting point for any collaboration is the need to resolve an issue or crisis which has developed and impacts at a society level, that means it does not only affect one social sector or social strata. In this specific instance the context of the issue was the COVID-19 pandemic that created a shortage and limited access to PPE because the bulk of this commodity (which comprises a number of different items) was imported into South Africa. The result was a significant health crisis which could be resolved by

developing the local manufacturing capacity in this sector – this was the main purpose of the Local Manufacturing Partnership (LMP).

5.3.1 Institutions and Governance Framework

Korpi in his Power Resource Model identified two main types of power resources namely “capital and the control over the means of production” and secondly “human capital” and that the activation of such resources has a cost factor which is why the holders or owners are always keen to ensure an efficiency in how these resources are activated (Korpi, 2006, p. 77,78). Firstly, the LMP through its membership is a representation of these main power resources since the collaboration comprised significant representation from social actors including business (owners of production) through the alliance of B4SA (Business for South Africa) and trade unions (human capital) in the form of Cosatu and SACTWU. However, beyond these two main owners of power resources we also see the inclusion of other important social actors with power resources such as government departments and their agencies.

In the LMP this was specifically the Department of Trade Industry & Competition (dtic), Department of Science and Innovation, Department of Health and government agencies such as Proudly South Africa, a state investment promotion company.

The research evidence indicates that whilst initially primary owners of power resources i.e. business, government and labour unions - had been working independently to resolve the PPE issue, at some point the collective actors saw the benefit in combining efforts by aligning their resources. This was compelled by the threat posed to life created by the pandemic, initial restriction on external value chains to procure PPE, knowledge of the manufacturing sector in South Africa, specificity of certain functions within government and, necessary expertise and skill required to deliver on the PPE requirement for South Africa within a very short timeframe. Once

this societal need and alignment was agreed to amongst the actors it created the need for an institution and governance framework to manage the efficient use of the power resources. Some research participants acknowledged that the PPE issue could not have been resolved by any one social actor on their own – none of the social actors possess all the necessary resources to solve this issue. Therefore, this could point to a possible expedient relationship between social actors which was based on the need created within the circumstance of pandemic. It was beneficial for all social actors to co-operate and to find suitable solutions in the shortest timeframe because of the life threatening nature of the crisis.

However, whilst the Korpi model identifies the major owners of power resources the model does not seem to address an important issue of composition of these owners. None of these major power owners are homogenous, for example, business comprises many different business sizes, types, sectors and the same could be said for government which comprises various national departments, provincial departments, local government and agencies. As such the range of interests represented at any given time is quite varied and complex and could therefore have a significant impact on the manner in which power resources are activated.

As such the institutional arrangement and governance framework are important in relation to how resources are maximised and activated to achieve the goal, which has resonance with the Korpi model in the manner in which power resources are activated affects the type of institution created. The research evidence supports the fact that the institutional arrangements established and implemented in the case of PPE were well suited for the collaborative effort and encouraged a sharing of information and data in a more transparent manner than is often experienced amongst these social actors. The LMP comprised two structures namely the Governance Panel (decision making

body) and secondly, the technical working groups (one for each PPE item being manufactured). Early in the process senior legal representation was drafted to assist with the management of conflict of interest. Representatives on either structure participated based on their knowledge and relevance to the manufacture of PPE.

During the height of the pandemic, the Governance Panel met weekly and the names of companies assisted were published during these meetings – minutes of the LMP meetings support this. The research goes further to note that there was a great level of trust between social actors participating in this forum, partially attributable to the governance framework which encouraged openness and transparency in decision making. In the research and meeting minutes this was illustrated through the sharing of data on supply and demand requirements of PPE products, information on the actual companies being assisted (by name), access which manufacturing experts had to specific manufacturing plants to assist business processes to be changed for PPE production, conflict of interest process that existed as part of the governance process, chairpersonship was easily switched between social actors, joint social actor representation on all the technical working groups and the governance process involved in managing meetings and sharing of documentation between LMP participants.

5.3.2 Goals and Differing Interests

The main goal of the LMP was to create manufacturing capacity in South Africa to provide the relevant medical grade PPE during the COVID-19 pandemic. The need for these products as participants noted was a “life and death situation” making it an imperative for the LMP to find a solution that would benefit the South African society. As such the base assumption made by the LMP, reflected by research participants, was that “we are all in this together” referring to a broad commitment across social

actors participating that they were all working towards the same goal, which would then assume a level of social solidarity within the institution of the LMP. However, was this togetherness genuine long term solidarity or merely circumstantial? The research findings suggest that it was circumstantial because as the crisis dissipated it became harder to access the same level of human and financial resources required for a prolonged development programme. By way of example – phase 2 of the LMP was aimed to assist with the availability of medical equipment for vaccinations. This project did not get the same level of traction as the development of manufacturing capacity during the early part of the pandemic. It appears the issue of togetherness or solidarity may have existed only between the members of the LMP for the duration of the project and that once the crisis dissipated and social actors returned to their usual areas of work, the fragmentation that exists between sectors became the dominant experience again. Suggesting that addressing the deep levels of fragmentation in South Africa requires much more than isolated collaborative experiences.

In the power resource model Korpi addresses the issue of class conflict specifically as it relates to capital and labour, and emphasises this conflict as the key kind of cleavage in society. Whilst this may have been appropriate for the historical context and country location of Korpi at the time (Sweden in the 1970s), this has not necessarily been supported by the research findings. The research reflects that the LMP was not a contested space in which there was class conflict or a space in which narrow social actor interests were presented, instead what has been revealed is a consensual engagement between social actors with the main purpose of solving the PPE crisis. This type of engagement may therefore reflect a greater focus on finding solutions than actually elevating class interests. However, it is possible that due to the nature of the crisis class interests were suspended with the sole focus on resolving the

PPE problem. It is possible that an international crisis of this magnitude has the ability to temporarily suspend social actor interests in favour of supporting more socially beneficial outcomes.

The research reflects that in a very short amount of time the LMP was able to deliver sufficient capacity to supply the country across all the relevant products i.e. enough local capacity was developed for South Africa. Yet with all that capacity there was a very small percentage of procurement in the country from both the public and the private sector. The belief that “economic patriotism” [P4] would be applied because of the pandemic, proved null and void. Both public and private institutions continued to access their international supply channels citing reasons such as high prices, poor quality and standards to defer to imports.

Both private and public institutions were more committed to supporting international supply chains than to supporting the local sector development. Even though the outcome of supporting the latter could have a very positive impact on our society through job creation, preventing companies from closing and supporting industrial development at a time of great economic hardship. This proves that there are many different economic interests at play within and across social partners which will make the negotiation and conclusion of a social compact very difficult. Secondly, the difficulty of managing interests cannot only be considered between social actors negotiating but also within each social sector where interests are diverse.

Constituent social actors are not homogenous and existed in a specific context before the pandemic began. If we take government for example, it comprises diversely organised national government departments, parastatal agencies, provincial government departments, and there should be an appreciation that even in a crisis

each department and agency will work to fulfil its own mandate. The mandate of the Department of Health is healthcare however the mandate of the dtic is economic and industrial development – different imperatives inform the departments, seemingly they are not easily reconcilable even in a crisis. These two mandates represent a microcosm of the interests at play within government alone. The same can be said for capital who represent a host of interests including local owned business, multi-national, small business, black owned business to name a few. Each of the broader social sectors represent a diverse set of competing interests that have to be considered and either forgone or reconciled during the process of social compacting.

The process of determining the priority of preference would possibly need to be guided by the ultimate aim of the social compact but could also require the development of a metrics/framework to manage decision making in this regard. Therefore, the Korpi model which places an explanatory emphasis on class cleavages seems too restricted as the primary means of explanation of the South African case which has cleavages on a range of fronts, even within classes. As such when considering the development of a social compact it would be imperative to take into consideration not only the local context but also the manner in which local sectors are tied into interests beyond the borders of South Africa through international supply chains and agreements. So the outcomes of collaborative governance and social compacting can be, as in this case, significantly hampered by the manner in which interests are presented and managed.

5.3.3 Co-operation, Access and Broad Buy-in

In his power resource model Korpi notes that outcomes are achieved through bargaining, settlements and co-operation between the different collectives (Korpi,

2006). Amongst the representatives working within the LMP there was significant co-operation, with social actors able to access their resources to achieve the goal. Various interview informants referenced the importance of LMP participants being able to access resources outside of the actual collaborative forum and the ability to activate those resources. Examples of this co-operation include accessing owners of manufacturing plants that opened production lines to produce PPE, companies providing relevant technical expertise to assist in resolving product related issues, identification of relevant manufacturers who could assist with raw materials, access to senior officials across all the social actors at short notice to assist in problem solving and decision making, to name a few. This represents a significant level of co-operation amongst social partners.

One of Korpi's key areas of discussion in the power resource model centres on the element of exchange between social actors in society and the manner in which power affects the way exchanges occurs. He notes that the kind of exchange in which actors have a common interest in reaching agreements and settlements is based on a positive sum approach (Korpi, 1985, p. 36). While the research findings are consistent with this conclusion as outlined above the findings also point to conflicts of interest external to the institutional forum of the LMP which affect the exchange relations and outcomes for society more broadly. This is critical in the context of the development and negotiation of a social compact for South Africa.

The ability to translate the settlements or outcomes of the exchange between social actors into positive long term societal change is not only dependent on the agreements reached within the collaborative forum but on buy-in at a much broader societal level. This is borne out by a key challenge experienced by the LMP. As the local manufacturing capacity of PPE was increasing the expectation was for public

and private sector organisations to procure from the local manufacturers. Unfortunately despite many attempts this was only achieved on a limited basis.

The external stakeholders who would be eventual users of these products were not part of the LMP, it appears that they did not buy-in to the goal of local supply of these products. Despite numerous efforts by senior leadership of the governance panel to engage with national and provincial government departments, and private hospital groups, there was very little uptake of the products that were produced. These interventions had limited effect which identifies lack of buy-in from the broader social sectors as a significant issue that would affect the ability of the LMP to contribute to broader societal gains.

This raises some interesting questions about how a collaborative governance initiative comprising social partners is actually representative of society, especially if the outcomes struggle to achieve the desired impact for society. The research suggests that the conflict of interest between social actors is not constrained to the specific actors within the collaborative governance forum making exchange relations between and within social actors very complex. This is especially because power resources in a socially fragmented society such as South Africa is very diffuse and should not be assumed to all be directed at the same outcomes.

5.4 Insights Provided by Collaborative Governance to Shape the Debate

5.4.1 Shared Risk and One Vision

One of the areas that was repeated continuously by interviewees in the research was the issue of a single clear vision i.e. the LMP was not trying to resolve all medical device issues it was focussed only on developing the manufacturing capacity of the eight specific PPE products. Such a vision provided the necessary focus for each of the constituencies and enabled them to mobilize as a collective with the aim of solving

the problem of the PPE shortage. More importantly because of the clarity of the vision it allowed all the social partners to clearly understand what they could contribute to achieving this vision, that is, using their respective agency. The power resources available to each social actor may not be the same but all sectors have access to resources and should be able to mobilise these when necessary. According to Korpi the kind of activation of power resources referred to in this instance is called exchange and is based on the principle of the mutual use of rewards between social actors (Korpi, 1985, p. 36).

The exchange between social actors is not based on conflict or pressure and therefore it creates what one of the interview participants referred to as the “*sweet spot*” which essentially resembles a win-win for all social actors. This does not mean that power resources are not applicable, rather the manner in which it is utilised and activated is different than if the interaction is overtly conflictual. Korpi notes that no exchange will take place unless all parties benefit (Korpi, 1985, p. 36). The development of a social compact is possibly more contested in nature than the exchange which occurred in the LMP however, the issue of benefits accrued is important. One could argue that resolving a shared risk is a benefit for all parties, even though all may not benefit equally and this may be an important starting point for the development of a social compact. If we consider the work of the LMP, one of the issues that galvanised the social compact amongst the social actors was the shared risk, even though not necessarily equal across all strata.

From a societal perspective this created a “common enemy” which all social actors in the country faced – the research points to this being part of the reason social actors were galvanised around a common vision which then enabled a more collaborative exchange. Additionally, if we consider this from a power resource perspective, Korpi

notes that the range and scope of power resources do not remain constant but over time are able to develop or diminish depending on the context of the society in which it exists. This is particularly relevant in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. All sectors of society faced risks which may have differed from an equality perspective per sector but the risk existed at a significant level for all. South Africa is a capitalist economy in which the owners of the means of production, the capitalist class are considered to have an upper hand in relation to access to power resources. However, during the pandemic this distribution of power within the South African society was altered.

During lockdown many businesses faced restrictions (temporary closures, limited trading hours, product prohibitions) which weakened their power position. This impacted labour unions as well, whose members are the employees of the businesses. This alteration or shift in distribution of power resources may have been quite decisive in elevating the shared risk amongst social actors, contributing to a more expedient engagement between them. Various interview informants acknowledged that no social partner possessed all the necessary resources to achieve what the LMP did. It took all social partners turning up at the table and contributing to realize the one vision. The research supports the exchange relations aimed at achieving the one vision however, some contributions by research participants also indicate a return to “business as usual” i.e. social actor positionalities as the effects of the pandemic dissipated.

The Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP) whilst a government plan, signed in December 2020, was negotiated in the multi-stakeholder institution of NEDLAC. A study of the progress made with the agreements in this plan may provide some insight into the level of commitment that exists between social actors at this point in our COVID recovery - beyond the scope of this study.

5.4.2 Enabling Reciprocity and Concessions

The Covid-19 pandemic created both a health crisis but also a crisis of access to international supply chains, which affected the country's ability to access PPE equipment in both the public and private sectors. The situation as it existed required a sense of urgency and it was displayed across all social partners participating in the LMP. But the LMP is essentially an institution created for the purpose of enabling decision-making and the distribution of power resources in relation to solving the PPE crisis. The Korpi model highlights the relevance of the distribution of power resources in the formation of institutions as it has the ability to affect decision making within an institution but also, it is able to shape the actions of social actors (Korpi, 2006, p. 81). As mentioned above the issue of shared risk amongst social actors is quite important in terms of understanding the engagement between the different social actors. However, it is important to consider other factors in the country at the time such as the political fragmentation in the political economy, a huge lack of trust between social sectors, cleavages across social strata and a general lack of shared vision amongst social actors. The research findings highlight these issues across the different social sectors and confirm that the pandemic magnified the social and economic fragmentation in the country.

The research shows that the LMP was able create a space for exchange and compromise towards a positive outcome – co-creation amongst social actors. The LMP did not operate on the basis of constituency positionalities or cumbersome mandates which allowed a much faster process to unfold, numerous participants referenced the speed with which results were achieved. Despite the trust deficit that many research participants eluded too, the LMP was able to optimise the resources available to find workable solutions to the challenges confronted. Reciprocity is critical in building closer relations between social actors and instilling a greater sense of trust.

The focus of the LMP was on solutions and on implementation - the actors learnt and solved together, but also created a space where information was shared. If issues could not be resolved by the work streams or the governance panel it was referred to more senior representatives to assist with unblocking and there was a political willingness.

Even though the LMP was modelled along the lines of the key social actors as represented in NEDLAC, the actual structure and operation of the forum was different from current institutions, encouraging a greater openness and transparency between social actors. It appears from the research that the LMP was based on consensual engagement and exchange around contingent issues and not on contested, adversarial positions. Korpi suggests in his model that within certain circumstances settlements are the outcomes of important changes in the distribution of power (Korpi, 2006, p. 81) which is endorsed by the research.

One key issue which was raised is that this type of solution finding and implementation does not simply happen organically but that it requires purposeful orchestration. This means that it requires leadership and it requires active participation and action on a continual and regular basis to ensure progress. Added to this is the importance of the political will to enable the forum to operate without undue interference in the decision making process, a view expressed by some participants.

An important lesson for the negotiation of the social compact is that the process of negotiation may require different forms of institutions which are not as adversarial as the current formations but instead creates the space for more co-creation and reciprocity between social actors. Additionally, the institutional structure used should encourage more consensual engagement and exchange of information, with strong leadership that is focussed on moving the process forward – purposeful orchestration.

It appears that if we are to make headway with a social compact we cannot afford to follow the same process or use the same institutions that have been used to date, if this is done there is a significant risk of not achieving a national compact.

5.4.3 Ownership, Buy-in and Representation of Voices

The LMP collaborative governance forum has manifest that social partners are committed to working together to resolve issues which have an impact on society, and that if required they are prepared to use the necessary resources to do so. This is particularly evident by the number of companies that were assisted to be fully accredited and ready to manufacture the necessary PPE capacity. When the LMP started there were three accredited companies in the country, by the time the governance forum completed its work 64 companies in total had been assisted. However, despite these efforts, research participants have raised serious concerns about the inability of the team to affect the actual purchase of the PPE within South Africa. The biggest problem raised was that both the public and private sector refused for various reasons to allocate their procurement spend to support these companies. To address the issue numerous engagements were held with senior government officials and private sector leadership in an attempt to promote the companies in the LMP, to understand and remove bottlenecks and to address concerns that may hinder the uptake of PPE within these entities. The result as outlined in the research was small percentage procurements in comparison to the actual amount that was purchased during the period i.e. R200 million out of a possible R1 billion worth of product.

Emanating from this was two key lessons – firstly, the issues of supply and demand are inseparable and should have formed part of the mandate of the LMP from the start. The focus was on supply, assuming that regulations, patriotism and the

pandemic would ensure support for these companies. Secondly, even during a pandemic there are a range of interests being represented, particularly in a country that is as politically, economically and socially fragmented as South Africa.

These interests have to be understood and managed as part of the settlements being negotiated within institutions such as the LMP. If we then link this back to the development of a social compact for South Africa, it becomes evident that broader buy-in to the settlements and the outcomes of such agreements are required. For there to be much broader societal impact in the long term requires a much broader buy-in at all levels within the state. This could assist in enabling broader ownership and accountability in relation to the agreed outcomes.

Some lessons for the development of the social compact is that it should not be perceived as an elitist activity concluded in certain institutions only by certain representatives. This could create a disconnect between what is negotiated and what is actually required by society. Additionally, are sufficient measures being considered to encourage greater contributions from within the social sectors, so that if a compact is concluded it will have broad traction within society? The LMP has demonstrated that you cannot problem solve and then try to focus on implementation, this should be built into the process from the start.

In his power resource model Korpi introduces the concept of societal bargaining in which the two main classes namely labour and capital filter their power resources through institutions to reach settlements (Korpi, 2006, p. 82). Whilst the experience of the LMP supports this kind of bargaining between social actors, the Korpi model is too restricted in only considering class as an important element. The LMP displays a range of other elements including the importance of political support and commitment, industry buy-in and international alliances to name a few as critical to consider in achieving a long term outcome for society. This is particularly important because the

distribution of power in South Africa is so diffuse across the various strata and Korpi notes that in societal bargaining the short and long term outcomes can vary based on the distribution of power (Korpi, 2006, p. 83). As indicated previously the various social actors are not homogenous and should not be expected to automatically be acting together for society.

Therefore the issues of representation are quite important – if we consider societal bargaining as valid then we must also consider who represents society and is negotiating settlements that are in the long term interest of society. This would be critical when initiating the process of social compacting because a question could be raised about whether current institutions are fully representative of the South African society and possess a good knowledge of what society requires as an outcome of the social compact.

The LMP research suggests that societal bargaining is much more complex than only reaching institutional settlements, there must be a conscious effort to create more robust institutions to encourage greater buy-in to settlements beyond the negotiating table. Secondly, the LMP has displayed a model that seems more inclusive of voices creating opportunities to form part of the solutions and implementation of agreements, thereby encouraging greater inclusion and utilization of expertise that exists in the country. It is by no means a perfect model because it was based on volunteerism and secondment of resources which come with their own challenges but it encouraged a breadth of engagement beyond what current institutions in South Africa offer.

5.4.4 Positionalities and Trust

The history of corporatism in South Africa seems to encourage the equal representation of social actors within social dialogue institutions as an accepted

model. Whilst it is important to encourage equal participation in policy and decision making, feedback from the research participants indicates that this is not necessarily the *sine qua non* for effective engagement or for effective outcomes within an institution. Research participants reflected on the representation on the Governance Panel (and work streams), not based on equal representation, rather it focussed on the relevance of the individuals representing the sector, their relevance to addressing the issues requiring solutions. Most of the representatives within this collaborative forum had not worked together before and the majority of the engagement within this institution was done using digital platforms – the pandemic necessitated this approach. Despite this, many interviewees spoke of the trust surplus that existed between representatives and how this manifest in the relative ease with which information was shared, the decisiveness of decisions, the access to senior leadership, the ability to problem solve as a collective and the utilization of skills in appropriate areas. This seems to suggest that in an institution where actors do not focus on positionalities, the environment is more conducive to collective action across sectors and to a higher degree of trust.

This process essentially seems to have enabled a significant amount of trust to develop between members of the collective but also to develop trust between the institution (LMP) and the companies that were capacitated. This is quite an important achievement, for a private company to allow unknown technical experts access to their intellectual property and knowledge, to enable a pivot in the production capacity of their business, is quite significant. This was made possible because firstly, it enabled companies to diversify their products and to keep staff employed. Secondly, the expertise to assist with this process was made available through the collaborative governance initiative at no cost to the company. Thirdly, the networks the social actors

in the LMP were able to access and also, the willingness and ability to contribute to the production capacity of the country during the crisis. However, as mentioned above this may have been expedient trust necessitated by the crisis.

Korpi was of the view that power resources play an important role in creating the conditions which enable decisions and actions in institutions (Korpi, 1985, p. 38). Additionally, he also noted that the distribution of power between social actors plays an important part in the manner in which institutions function but also in relation to the strategies and decisions collectives take to resolve issues within society (Korpi, 2006, p. 81). The view expressed by Korpi suggests that institutions should be robust enough to facilitate collaboration across social actors, allowing for greater transparency, building of trust, sharing of resources – the ultimate outcome being a better result for society. As indicated, the research participants confirmed the view that the institution of the LMP was robust enough to enable delivery – it facilitated contributions by all sectors to resolve the challenges, with real tangible results.

Institutions must be designed to enable the deployment of necessary resources such as product testing, project management, product specifications, logistics, availability of raw material to manufacture, pivoting factories to produce new products – this is an important issue when considering a social compact for South Africa because it relates directly to the ability to implement agreements. This would be vital to the sustainability of the social compact and ultimately the outcomes. Currently, one of the biggest hurdles in relation to social compacts in South Africa is that it fails at implementation – the research reveals that through co-creation trust is built, enabling positive outcomes that positively affect implementation.

The research has also revealed two very important issues: firstly, just as quickly as trust is built it can dissipate. As companies were capacitated the trust factor within the

LMP and the companies involved grew. However, this trust was eroded by a lack of procurement from public and private sector, and issues such as PPE corruption. Neither of these issues were the responsibility of the LMP but they have affected the efforts of the LMP. Secondly, a number of participants made reference to the Master Plan process currently underway, within a number of key sectors, as examples of sectoral social compacts. The proposal was that these types of collaborations may be important to build a foundation of trust and delivery between social actors that will enable the development of a national social compact for the country. Additionally, it would also contribute to strengthening the fabric of our collaborative institutions and developing a shared history of collaboration in which trust is a central pillar.

5.5 Social Solidarity

The Korpi model does not directly address the issue of social solidarity through the power resource model. Although this could be quite an important theme in relation to class struggle and enabling societal change that is more equitable and inclusive. However, the Korpi model does raise a number of very important issues which may contribute to a greater understanding of social solidarity. For this reason the research aimed to gain an understanding of how institutional actors engage with the concept of social solidarity, especially because the development of a social compact requires solidarity at different levels within the South African society at a more institutional level.

One of the key elements in the Korpi model involves changes in the distribution of power and the importance which this holds for social change in a society. He notes that this can affect a number of important elements within society including shaping the actions which are taken by collectives, it either creates new institutions or alters the manner in which they operate, it has a profound effect on the type of settlements

that are reached between social actors and it facilitates the formation of new collectives or alliances (Korpi, 2006, pp. 80–82). Based on this it seems plausible that societies are more or less socially solidaristic depending on the distribution of power across social actors, as such there is agreement with part of what Korpi proposes. The concept of social solidarity in South Africa is often highlighted around events such as programmes for the underprivileged and unemployed, or around natural disasters in which society rallies to assist the affected parties. However, at an institutional level the concept and practise of social solidarity seems to be more evasive/ elusive.

Turning to the research findings – participants for the most part agreed with the importance of social solidarity especially in relation to the development of a social compact - the two things were almost seen as inseparable. However there was an opinion from participants that institutionally South Africa lacks a practise of social solidarity partly because social actors / sectors do not share a common vision of how to address the socio-economic issues in the country, there is a wedge between the public and private sector which doesn't enable the kind of solidarity required, there is too much of a focus on insular decisions and narrow interest, and there are too many political agendas being pursued. This supports views expressed throughout the research of a lack of trust between social actors.

However from an LMP perspective, participants indicated that this forum could not have achieved its goals without social solidarity. The pandemic created the burning platform namely a shared risk across all sectors of society and this allowed social actors to step out of their institutional labels of business, labour and government into a relatively more inclusive collective where the mandate was to solve the PPE shortage for South Africa as the Local Manufacturing Partnership. According to some participants this was a group of individuals who worked as a collective but were able

to access resources such as networks, factory owners, industry leaders, skills, data and knowledge within their sector to achieve the LMP goal.

Participants also referred to the decision making in the LMP being about making decisions that were best for the country and not specific sectors. There was a recognition in the LMP that they were approaching this issue from different perspectives and vantage points but that ultimately they were working towards the same goal, every sector had to contribute to achieve success. These findings seem to support the Korpi view that a change in distribution of power, even if temporarily can lead to some degree of social solidarity within an institutional setting. The change in distribution creates the space for exchange instead of conflict to occur within the institution thereby enabling different forms of decision making and ultimately different agreements. Social solidarity was not written into a founding document of the LMP as a key pillar, instead it developed organically within the institution.

So the key question would be – has this translated into greater social solidarity beyond the work of the LMP and has it translated into extended gains for our society? Whilst the scope of the study does not expressly cover the period after the LMP concluded its work, various interviewees shared insights into the post-LMP experience. Firstly, the experience outside of the LMP does not resemble the state of “we’re all in this together” – inequality has been exacerbated by the wider conflicts across South African society and the trust deficit associated with corruption. Secondly, in response to the pandemic various initiatives were started, however months after they have begun the impetus, urgency and action seems to have reduced. Participants reflected on a situation in which social actors are reverting to usual type and form in which a broader society perspective is lost, but most importantly this regression has occurred

much faster than anticipated. Issues such as PPE corruption which have been exposed during the past few months point to a lack of social solidarity.

What all of the above seemingly suggests is that structurally we have not been able to facilitate a substantive social change in our society. A significant amount of work is required to transform our institutions so that principles of social solidarity are not merely crisis-driven but are institutionalised to address the real challenges which face our society. This kind of outcome would be more in line with what one participant shared in relation to a “post democracy dividend of rainbows, boerewors and braai”. Is there a post-COVID dividend for South Africa in which we develop an economy of solidarity?

6. CHAPTER - CLOSING REMARKS

6.1 Conclusion

The research of the Local Manufacturing Partnership, tasked with ensuring the development of local manufacturing capacity of PPE for South Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic has been instructive in providing insight into dimensions that require consideration when engaging in collaborative governance at a country level. Additionally, the research through the narratives of the interview participants has provided important insight into the key challenges possibly facing future collaborative governance initiatives, and lessons for future social compacts to help drive economic recovery as the country starts emerging out of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Some key reflections:

- i. The nature and severity of the context in which collaboration takes place is important because it potentially changes the power dynamics between social actors thereby creating more room for negotiation and the possibility of different, more egalitarian outcomes. However, this must be considered in relation to the perceived risk identified by each social strata.
- ii. Identifying areas of shared risk between social actors and being explicit about them could be important in the manner in which social actors respond to agreements. It also seems to have the effect of creating a socially solidaristic approach to problem solving and the manner in which social actors decide to activate their resources.
- iii. Before a social compact is negotiated, thought must be given to the representation of social actors so that participation in developing a social compact broadens. Linked to this is the fact that social actors are not

homogenous nor do their groupings remain the same over time, which means it is vital to understand the process that can be used for greater inclusivity in voice and resource deployment. Social actor representation changes because society changes. Therefore, if society is changing it is imperative that the representatives negotiating on behalf of society should also change and be more representative.

- iv. A social compact is only as good as the implementation of the agreements, this requires the relevant skills to drive the various agreements forward across all social actors, ensuring accountability. Leadership is therefore critical – not only at a political level but across the social actors to ensure traction and to build trust amongst social actors. It appears that a lack of trust is part of the reason for the lack of implementation of previous agreements.
- v. There is a trust deficit amongst social actors so concluding any form of national social compact will be very difficult. Whilst social actors are able to co-create around an issue of PPE manufacture, the reality is that once the element of shared risk is reduced the fractures between social actors come to the fore and they revert to their previous positionalities. Therefore, before embarking on a new social compact it is important to determine mechanisms to build trust between social actors. This could be done through the sectoral master plans and various other programmes or projects agreed by social partners.
- vi. The PPE case study suggests that if there is political will across the social actors then it is possible to achieve significant outcomes that affect society. However, it must be remembered that implementation does not happen at the same level as negotiation. Whilst negotiation may take place at the national level where constituencies are represented by a central body, on the other hand implementation is much more dispersed, requiring buy-in from a much broader constituency base with a significant amount of diverse interests. As such these

interests must be acknowledged and managed during the negotiation of the social compact, to prevent hurdles as the implementation process unfolds. Implementation cannot be taken as a given across social actors, including government.

- vii. Social solidarity should be a central pillar of any social compact that is negotiated, as it would encourage social actors to consider a different type of compromise, more focussed on societal change than sectoral interests. It does appear that social solidarity at an institutional level is present however, at present this seems to be more prevalent within implementation than as a core pillar of negotiation.
- viii. The fractures in South African society exist however, under certain circumstances social actors have displayed an ability to set their interests and positionalities aside to achieve an outcome for society not only their constituencies. However, linked this is the manner in which agreements are facilitated beyond the actual collaborative governance forum – where fractures and interests do not mirror that which occurs within the forum. This is a crucial issue so manage in the development of a social compact.

6.2 Limitations and Further Studies

The issue of social solidarity within an institutional setting has been covered during this research however, this has highlighted the need for further research and engagement on this issue. An area that requires specific attention is in relation to the manifestation of social solidarity within different institutional settings. Secondly, is social solidarity affected by the perceived power and available resources of specific social actors. The issue of social solidarity may prove important in the process of developing a social compact for South Africa, especially one which requires a more

egalitarian approach and aims to fundamentally improve the economic and social conditions of society.

Another area of study which would be very useful in relation to the long term rollout of a social compact is in relation to the area of “implementation” which a number of interviewees raised as an area of concern. Two relevant programmes where this should be considered are in relation to the implementation of the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan and the second area is in relation to sectoral compacts, referred to as Master Plans. Especially the latter, could provide significant insights into the manner in which representation of constituencies has been managed, management of sector interests and the facilitation of broader buy-in to these plans.

The Local Manufacturing Partnership collaborative governance forum has displayed that positive outcomes can be achieved when social actors are required to find solutions for the country, this despite the high level of fracture and political instability in the country. It has however, displayed important lessons to inform the negotiation of a social compact for South Africa.

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APPENDICES

Indicative Interview Guide

Good day, in this interview we will be focussing on the collaborative governance forum referred to as the Local Manufacturing Partnership (LMP) that was created to develop our PPE capacity in South Africa. The focus is on the outcomes of this collaboration and what the collaboration teaches or shows us in terms of the development of a social compact for South Africa. Please share using your own words and feel free to share any incidents, thoughts, and ideas that you have in relation to the collaboration.

Introductory Question

How would you describe the social and economic impact of COVID-19 on South Africa society?

Interview Questions

1. In your view what constitutes collaborative governance?

Sub-themes to be explored:

- a. Why do you think the LMP collaborative governance initiative was successful (or not)?
- b. What benefit has there been in the use of a collaborative governance framework for the provision of PPE during COVID-19?
- c. Why has this collaboration been so important for South Africa and how does it benefit our society?

2. What do you understand by the term social compacting?

Sub-themes to be explored:

- a. What relevance do you think it has for South Africa?
- b. What does this suggest about a new social compact for South Africa in your observation?
- c. What should the societal aim of a social compact be for South Africa?

3. What in your view are the challenges, obstacles and potential for collaborative governance in relation to the rollout of PPEs? Secondly do you have any views on how these relate to social compacting?

Sub-themes to be explored:

- a. What have the challenges or obstacles been to the rollout of PPE within the LMP?
 - b. What do you consider major successes during this collaborative governance initiative?
 - c. What is your view on the development of a social compact for South Africa?
 - d. What lessons can we learn from this collaboration to inform a South African social compact in the longer-term?
 - e. What has this collaboration identified as the key pillars of a possible social compact for South Africa?
 - f. How could collaborative governance influence the direction of public policy aimed at addressing inequality and poverty going forward?
- 4. How is the concept of social solidarity understood by different collective actors (business, labour, government) working within a collaborative governance institutional framework and how does such understanding manifest itself institutionally?**

Sub-themes to be explored:

- a. What is your understanding of social solidarity within this collaborative governance initiative?
 - b. How has social solidarity been displayed within the institution of collaborative governance?
- 5. What do you see as the legacy of this collaboration for our society?**
-