

The role of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy making towards BRICS

By

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Abstract

The study investigated the role of non-state actors in the formulation of South African policy positions relating to the agenda of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) Alliance. The study noted global trends which indicate that foreign policy decision making was no longer the preserve of the State. Non-state actors were visibly contributing to foreign policy formulation, influencing and shaping of national positions in relation to decisions that involve other countries or institutions beyond the national borders.

A range of state and non-state actors from diverse backgrounds who have engaged in BRICS processes were interviewed. The research findings suggest that South Africa's membership of BRICS is useful for promoting its geo-political and economic interests in an emerging multi-polar world. The study concluded that when holding dialogues, or engaging in processes on BRICS within the country or with BRICS countries, the government has much to benefit from systematic engagements with non-state actors in all their diversity as it enriches policy outcomes. However, currently there is no optimal engagement strategy between the state and most non-state actors.

The study presents building blocks that can be used to develop an engagement strategy that elevates the role of non-state actors in foreign policy making towards BRICS. The research used these building blocks to develop a conceptual BRICS non-state actors' engagement model that can be adapted to any foreign policy space, dubbed the Jambaya-Nyakujarah foreign policy non-state actors engagement model (LJN FP-NSA engagement model). It is proposed that promoting the national interest in BRICS or any other foreign policy platform be explicitly positioned as the main anchor driving all the levels of engagement on any foreign policy issue. The model also propose that stakeholders understand the primary external arenas of engagement that influence national level debates. The study therefore, put forward a model that seeks to strengthen sector-specific and cross-sector collaboration at the non-state actor level, as well as structured engagements between state and non-state actors.

Key words

foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, BRICS, South Africa, non-state actors, participation, non-state actors' engagement model, Jambaya-Nyakujarah foreign policy non-state actors' engagement model (LJN FP-NSA engagement model)

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Date: 26 May 2017

DEDICATION

To ...

...my dearest phenomenal husband and friend, Albert Nyakujarah.

and three daughters Mwaita, Tadiwa and Nokutenda.

My dad Charles Jambaya, who has always been my number one cheer leader and my mother Susan Jambaya - for being my rock.

The stoogeville – Isabella Jambaya Razunguzwa and Kudzai Jambaya Chimanga we remain on the same team.

My aunt Mercy Magaya ... my other mother, gone too soon.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean Pacific region
ACFA	Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DHET	Department of Higher Education and Training
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
ECOSOC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
EFF	Economic Freedom Front
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IAP2	The International Association for Public Participation
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IR	International Relations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
SACOIR	South Africa Council for International Relations
TNAs	Transnational actors

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The State and its national interests mainly drive foreign policy in South Africa, like the rest of the world. However, developments domestically and in the global arena challenge this traditionalist realist approach to international relations which is state-centric. Global trends show that there is an increasingly important role for and undeniable influence of non-state actors in its various formations (Vincent, 2002; Nel & Van der Westhuizen, 2003; Hill, 2003). They are acting not just as beneficiaries of the outputs of foreign policy, but also in contributing to the formulation, influencing and shaping of national positions in relation to decisions that involve other countries or institutions beyond the national borders (Vincent, 2002; Nel & van der Westhuizen, 2003).

South Africa has not been blind to this and could be argued to have adopted an idealist or neo-realist approach to international relations as demonstrated by its foreign policy approach and public pronouncements – at least on paper and more recently in form. For example, speaking at the launch of the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) on 16 July 2015, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane acknowledged this, “As a constantly developing organisation (DIRCO), the experience we gather in the course of executing our mandate has taught us that in the complex interdependent world of today, practicing international relations is no longer the sole preserve of states” (DIRCO, 2015). Nkoana-Mashabane added, “Indeed, global corporations, civil society organisations, sub-national structures and even private individuals have increasingly become active citizens of the world in this highly webbed global village” (DIRCO, 2015). SACOIR provides a consultative forum in which non-state actors and government experts can participate with DIRCO on the development and implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy (DIRCO, 2015).

Vincent (2002) attributes the increase in non-state interactions to “advances in communications technology coupled with innovations in cross-border transport, computer networks and telecommunications which are enabling these actors to influence the ideas, values and political persuasions of large numbers people around the globe” (p.164).

Mindful that States make the final foreign policy decisions, this research report does not seek to overstate the role and influence of non-state actors. Vincent (2002) buttresses this notion, “While their (non-state actors) rise in profile does not necessarily mean that we are witnessing the eminent demise of the nation state, it does call for a new approach to

international relations, an approach which sees the world as a multidimensional and characterised by multiple, complex interactions, rather than by interactions between states alone” (p.162).

Neither does the research report seek to grapple with the question many scholars such as Nel & van der Westhuizen (2003, p. 1) have raised, “Does it matter whether policies geared toward an environment beyond borders of the State are formulated and conducted in a democratic manner?” What we know from various readings such as Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2002), Hill (2003), Bohler-Muller (2012), Gumede (2014) and Siko (2014) amongst others, as will be demonstrated in the literature review section later on, is that from a liberal lens of foreign policy analysis, the answer is yes. In fact, it is critical in order to improve the quality of foreign policy outputs in this ever-changing transnational environment but also because citizens are at the centre of all policy making.

If non-state actors’ participation is critical in democratic societies like South Africa, perhaps there is one question that political individuals or bureaucrats charged with the responsibility and are constitutionally accountable for making South Africa’s foreign policy decisions are challenged with. The question revolves around how to engage with the various actors who often have divergent positions and interests before coming up with a national position on a particular issue.

The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Federation has developed a public participation Spectrum to help groups define the public’s role in any public participation process (IAP2 International Federation, 2014). The IAP2 Spectrum is quickly becoming an international standard and offers guidance that could assist South Africa’s government and non-state actors to conceptualise an engagement model, as chapters that follow will show.

This sets the stage for the context of the study which follows in the next sub-section. The rest of the chapter will include the following sub-sections: a problem statement followed by a purpose statement, significance of the study, delimitations of the study and definition of terms.

1.2 Context of the study

South Africa joined BRICS at the invitation of China in 2010 (Wasserman, 2012) which it accepted since there is a natural fit with its foreign policy ideological orientation of South-South cooperation and the need to challenge the traditional global-north hegemony. Like in any other geopolitical alliance, South Africa needs to constantly take up a national position

on various issues such as climate change, peace and security, nuclear disarmament, establishment of a bank and development aid.

One of the dilemmas faced by the country was how to engage various actors in consultative processes as highlighted in the previous section. South Africa quickly realised a gap – there was no mechanism for establishing a national position in consultation with non-state actors in a systematic and non-partisan way that serves the national interests like the other four countries in the BRICS alliance seemed to be able to do. It seemed they were readily able to align their thinkers, civil societies and academics amongst the various stakeholders behind their country positions. In fact, by the second BRICS Heads of State Summit held in Brazil 2010, a joint statement by the initial four countries formally welcomed the establishment of a conference of think tanks (Cosser, 2013).

Van Nieuwkerk (2012) cites this as one of the reasons why South African Cabinet saw the need to establish a think tank saying other “BRIC countries have dedicated national BRICS Think Tanks which assist their Governments with research and policy studies regarding BRICS and related international issues” (p. 2). In September 2012 Cabinet identified the need to institute a BRICS-specific think tank (van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

South Africa had to quickly also align its intelligentsia from civil society, academics, business leaders and other stakeholders. Institute of Development Studies (2014) observed that, “Civil society organisations in many BRICS countries are increasingly important, both in development cooperation and in influencing debate and public discourse in terms of foreign policy” (p. 4). This led to cabinet designating the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) as the incubator of the South African BRICS Think Tank for the 2013/14 financial year supported by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) (Cosser, 2013).

However, the reality is that there are a variety of non-state actor formations and their views and motives for involvement in foreign policy decision making or simply international politics is just as varied. For example, academics would probably give unemotional, logical, calculated responses. Social movements may bring in another picture likely to be ideologically driven positions and similarly with civil society or interest groups or the private sector which is driven by profit maximisation domestically and outside its borders. All these groups will individually give one solution and pretend the others do not exist.

In the case of South Africa, assuming an official has to advise the minister on a particular position to take in BRICS as part of the BRICS Think Tank that listens to all of the non-state sector which ideas or inputs would she or he take and what would she or he leave. What would be the mechanism to filter and develop a country position or a position in the national interest? Several authors (Dube, 2013; IDS, 2014; Stephen & Zürn, 2014), make similar observations in terms of the need for a mechanism for sifting both domestic and transnational non-state actors preferences with several authors presenting this in the context of their relationship with either rising global powers or the BRICS formation.

Dube (2013) contends that there are issues that South Africa still needed to deal with domestically within BRICS, in a critique of the fifth BRICS Summit hosted in Durban, South Africa in 2013. Ensuring public participation for its membership in BRICS emerged as the key issue along with the need for more consultations with African countries in relation to the BRICS agenda and the fact that the country does not combine its foreign policy tools with commercial diplomacy (Dube, 2013). Most non-governmental organisations still feel left out of the BRICS agenda and have had to organise parallel meetings on the side lines of BRICS until 2015 when HSRC invited them to participate formally in the 7th BRICS Summit in Russia when the first formal civil society forum was held under the banner BRICS Civic (Letlojane, personal communication, December, 2015).

Therefore, as argued by the IDS (2014), “It is critical that as their (civil society) involvement grows, there is a further need to build mechanisms for engaging CSO expertise, both through institutional forums with government and in building networks across civil society” (p.4). Stephen and Zürn (2014) go a step further by problematising emerging powers and transnational NGOs as two types of actors that are “relatively new sources of influence in international affairs, and both are perceived as holding different preferences for global governance than traditional centres of power (the global North)” (p.3). They however, go on to enquire how “these two sets of agents relate” by either intersecting or diverging in terms of their demands towards international institutions for example (Stephen & Zürn, 2014, p.3).

In order to understand the different motives for influencing foreign policy decisions by various non-state actors, Hill (2003) emphasises that distinguishing the different types of transnational actors and various constituencies of foreign policy helps us to appreciate the range of activity. For example, he categorises transnational actors into three - territorial – which seek a territorial base, like states ii) ideological or cultural that promote ideas or ways of thinking across national frontiers and iii) economic whose primary focus is wealth creation.

But given the “wide divergence in government attitudes and civil society influence, it is unlikely that such mechanisms can be employed on a bloc-wide basis” (IDS, *ibid*). The five countries that make up BRICS are quite different in their orientation towards democracy, human rights and public participation in governance and policy making processes, including foreign policy. This will be explored further as part of the research.

IAP2 International Federation (2014)’s Public Participation Spectrum offers a systematic guide to help groups define the public’s role in any public participation process (IAP2 International Federation, 2014). The spectrum moves from a lower level to a higher level of engagement that is: Inform – Consult – Involve – Collaborate – Empower (IAP2 International Federation, 2014). Applying this model could assist DIRCO and related government departments to systematically determine the level of engagement with the different groups of non-state actors, but also depending on the decision or issue at hand, on BRICS and by implication foreign policy making in general.

This research report will conceptualise a framework for optimising non-state actors’ participation in foreign policy making in rising powers. This will be achieved through an assessment of the current model for non-state sector inputs into South Africa’s national positions relating to BRICS, even if this is an interim measure. It will also make recommendations on how the South African State can develop a civil society capacity and mechanism to promote BRICS positions in a manner that not only serves the country’s national interests but also benefits Africa which is the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy.

It is noteworthy that this area, although under-researched, is important from a number of perspectives: Firstly, in general, from the perspective of rising powers and non-state actors seeking to influence global governance and provide a balance of powers to the traditional hegemony. Secondly from the perspective of the gap noted by Dube (2013), which called for South Africa to ensure public participation for its membership in BRICS. Thirdly because the need has been identified by Cabinet and there have been efforts to conceptualise various models for establishment of a South Africa BRICS broad-based think tank such as those presented in a concept paper by Van Nieuwkerk (2012). Currently the Human Science and Research Centre based BRICS think tank is thinking of ways of how it can engage civil society in a participatory way (Letlojane, personal communication, December, 2015).

1.3 Problem statement

South Africa is a member of the geopolitical alliance, BRICS made up of five diverse countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In this alliance, South Africa often has to take up positions on various issues. In the same vein, the South African government as demonstrated by public policy statements recognises that in democratic societies, practicing international relations is no longer the sole preserve of states and other actors outside government have come to occupy the space. There is need to also ensure public participation in foreign policy decision making processes even though it is known that civil society in South Africa can be aggressive and competitive.

The problem is how bureaucrats charged with the responsibility and are constitutionally accountable for making South Africa's foreign policy decisions can arrive at a national position after taking into consideration the divergent positions and interests of all sectors of society in its BRICS engagements. Currently, the South Africa government has no mechanism to arrive at a national position in its BRICS engagements that is broad-based and is representative of all sectors. There is need to create a mechanism for engaging all sectors to ensure that the country benefits but also Africa from its membership in this geopolitical alliance, since Africa is the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy.

1.3.1 Research questions

To address the problem statement the research was guided by the key question:

How non-state actors contribute to and what should their role be in South African foreign policy making?

The sub-questions that will guide data collection for the study are:

Does an inclusive consultative process in foreign policy making matter?

To what extent do non-state actors contribute to South Africa foreign policy making?

How do non-state actors contribute to South African national positions on BRICS?

How does South Africa develop a civil society capacity to promote BRICS positions?

1.4 Purpose statement

The research report aims to conceptualise a framework for South Africa to develop a civil society capacity and mechanism to promote its BRICS positions in a manner that not only serves the country's national interests but also benefits Africa.

1.5 Significance of the study

BRICS is under researched as an area of academic enquiry let alone in relation to non-state actor participation. It is anticipated that this study will add to existing literature on non-state actors' participation in South Africa's foreign policy decision making in general but in particular their participation in BRICS alliance. If the findings are sound, this could offer an alternative model on how to systematically engage South Africa's non-state actors in BRICS decision making process and possibly foreign policy making in general.

1.6 Delimitations of the study

The study focuses only on non-state participation in BRICS dialogues and decision-making processes.

1.7 Definition of non-state actors

Literature provides a range of definitions for non-state actors but with many similarities. What differs is the criteria with which the same actors have been categorised. The categorisation by various scholars will be discussed further in the literature review section. Broadly non-state actors "are organisations with sufficient power to influence and cause a change even though they do not belong to any established institution of a state" (Chaudhry, 2013, p. 168).

The term is sometimes used interchangeably with the term transnational actors in international relations and foreign policy analysis to capture the interactions between states, people and private organisations. The pioneering work of Rosenau, Keohane and Nye in the 1970s (as cited in Hill, 2003) define transnational relations as "contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government" (p. 189). Transnational actors are those "private groups or even individuals who while they require the physical facilities inside states, do not need governments in order to conduct international relations (Hill, 2003, p. 189). Risse (1995) as cited by Thiel (2009), provide a similar definition of transnational actors: "political, social, cultural, and economic agents or groups which operate trans-societal and/or trans-governmental across borders in pursuit of their goals, to a certain degree independently from domestic governmental considerations (p. 7116-33).

Vincent (2002) maintains non-state actors but refers to the same transnational activity by describing them as "actors and agents in the global political system, which are not states but which nevertheless can have considerable impact on global politics" (p. 163).

It is also important to understand how governments view non-state actors. To achieve this, the research paper compares definitions provided by a range of intergovernmental organisations and one geopolitical alliance: European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and BRICS alliance.

The EU uses non-state actors to describe “a range of organisations that bring together the principal, existing, emerging structures of society outside the government and public administration” (European Union, n.d). NSAs are created voluntarily by citizens, their aim being to promote an issue or an interest, either general or specific and are independent of the State and can be profit or non-profit-making organisations (European Union, n.d).

The EU like the National Intelligence Council (2007) in the US contend that the definition of non-state actors or civil society “cannot be univocal and universal” as there is no consensus on who should fall under this category. As established under the Cotonou Agreement, signed between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, “each ACP country can define, according to its national context, which categories of organizations form part of civil society (CS) or, more in general, enter the category of non-state actors” (European Union, n.d).

The tone is slightly different in the African Union which refers to all non-state actors as civil society. Civil society engagement with the African Union is channelled through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) established as an advisory organ used as a “vehicle for building a strong partnership between governments and all segments of African civil society” (African Union, 2008)

Against this background, for the purposes of this research non-state actors refers to organisations or individuals that are independent of government that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, levels.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of key texts on foreign policy analysis which helped to ground the research; and analyses of literature on non-state actors' role in foreign policy decision making, South Africa's foreign policy and the country's engagement with BRICS.

The chapter begins by laying the foundation on the researcher's understanding of foreign policy analysis based on key texts. This includes its history, theories and approaches to the subject and the dynamics of actors, decision making and implementation of the same. Some space is dedicated to understanding non-state actors in foreign policy decision making in general and in South Africa. The cornerstones of South Africa's foreign policy in general are presented followed by a section on South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS. The literature review ends with an analysis of the works of various scholars' work on South Africa's involvement of non-state actors in BRICS processes and an overall conclusion drawn.

2.2 Theoretical overview of foreign policy analysis

Literature shows that foreign policy analysis remains a complex construct with tensions around the definitions and approaches between the academics and non-academics with no single theory to explain the making and implementation of foreign policy (Hill, 2003; Vincent, 2002; Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995). It is grounded in systems theory.

Hoffman and Wolfers (as cited in Hill, 2003) point that foreign policy is not just about breaking down into constituent parts – concepts, processes and impact but involves understanding the deeper meaning (psychoanalysis) than what appears on the surface. This would involve discerning the interplay between political or psychological factors, domestic factors as well as global factors (Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995; Hill, 2003; Van Nieuwkerk, 2015). Foreign Policy is composed of the goals, values, decisions and actions taken by states in the context of the external relations of national societies. It is an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies" (Webber and Smith, 2002, p. 9-10).

Evident from the various readings is that Foreign Policy Analysis has evolved as a subset of the broad subject of International Relations. Key authors in the field of study shed some light regards what is International Relations and Foreign Policy and where the subtle distinctions between the two reside; albeit with the same ambiguity inherent in the nature of the subject.

The lens with which the different scholars explain this is dependent on the dominant theory they subscribe to.

Hudson (2005, as cited in Alden, 2011) explains the points of departure between the two saying International Relations focuses on the role and influence of structural constraints on the international system while Foreign Policy Analysis is more inclined to analysing the intrinsic potential of human agency to affect and even change the international system (Alden, 2011). She asserts that, “point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision makers” (Hudson, 2005). While Hill (2003) concurs with her, his core argument is that foreign policy is and should remain a central part of understanding International Relations but do so in a manner that pays attention to the changing political conditions at both the domestic and international levels. He therefore attempts to interpret and reassess the evolution of the subject following what he views as significant world events to be discussed in ensuing sections.

The sections that follow present and analyse some of the key authors, definitions of as well as various theories and approaches to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. This also includes interrogating literature on the making of foreign policy; actors and agents; and foreign policy implementation.

2.3 History of, theories and approaches to foreign policy analysis

There are various theories and approaches to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis as stated above and these influence how the two fields of study are defined. This can be traced back to the history of the subject. Hill (2003) argues that foreign policy is always changing and so should ideally not be generalised but because of “imperial expansion world war and economic integration there is currency in seeing the world and the international political system”. He views the following milestones in the international arena as key to catalysing the metamorphosis of foreign policy analysis: the end of the Cold War; acceleration of the processes of globalisation and the challenge to the conventional notion of the “Westphalia system” which refers to the principle of sovereign states. (Hill, 2003, pp. 11-13).

More recently scholars have added 9/11, when the World Trade Centre in the United States of America was attacked by terrorists, as a significant event that even led to renewed interest in the subject of foreign policy (Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2012, p. 2). According to Smith et al (2012) one of the most notable outcome of the attacks and subsequent response was the

resultant focussed attention on the centrality of decisions taken by states and other *independent actors* such as the al-Qaeda. Since then there is a growing body of literature on USA's role in the world which draws on and is relevant to foreign policy (Smith, et al, 2012).

McGowan & Nel (2002) primarily distinguish between two distinct schools of thought - the traditional "realist or state-centric realism" and the contemporary "liberal-pluralist (multi-centric)" definitions). The latter builds on the former. In the case of the realist or state-centric realism the State is the main actor in world politics. Citing various scholars such as Modelski (1962:3); Frankel (1963:1); White, (1989:1) and Said et al. (1995:30, 26), McGowan and Nel (2002) acknowledge that various definitions they put forward have common denominators and make similar assumptions. Realists define foreign policy as "an activity on behalf of the State, concerning inter-state relations within the international system" (Vincent, 2002, p. 111). The assumptions underpinning the various scholars are that state is the only actor, is rational and driven by national interests in relation to its external and inter-state environment (Vincent, 2002, p. 112).

The liberal-pluralist definitions build on the same basic views of the traditional approach but challenge the fact that the State is the only actor and is rational. This theory propounds that the State is not the only actor instead there are also non-state actors such as transnational companies, NGOs, as well as domestic at play meaning there are moments when there is non-rationality in foreign policy decision making. McGowan and Nel (2002) thus approach foreign policy from the liberal standpoint and define foreign policy "as the sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders" (Vale & Mphaisha, 1999, p. 89 as cited in McGowan & Nel, 2002).

Neack, Hey and Haney (1995) similarly observe the differences between traditional and pluralist concepts and acknowledge that the study has changed over time. However, they focus mostly on the idea that "the study of foreign policy has moved into a second generation" and thus dwell more on the changes in relation to methodological approaches to foreign policy analysis. They argue that the first-generation analysis or comparative foreign policy analysis used "quantitative, positivist (scientific) models of theory building and methodologies" and based on data. First generation analysts attempted to develop a "unified" approach to the field of study with a common methodology (Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995).

On the other the second generation of foreign policy analysis scholars argue that there can be no one single theory but rather any theory would have to be relevant to the context and informed by evidence from real world events or an empirical analysis. Therefore, there can

be no single explanation for decisions but rather issues such as time; region or issue at hand among various factors can to influence the decision to substitute one foreign policy choice with another. Second generation policy analysis builds on middle range theories developed and discarded by the first-generation policy analysis scholars and use diverse methods including both qualitative and quantitative techniques compared to first generation that used mainly quantitative approaches (Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995). There are other new insights offered by subsequent scholars around the evolution of theories around foreign policy.

Christopher Hill (2003) builds on previous approaches and similarly applies middle range theories to examine factors beyond the state. These are theories that “were not general accounts of all foreign policy behaviours but instead were accounts of either the foreign policies of some types of states or foreign policy in specific situations” (Hudson, 2012, p 15). For example, he focuses on the individual decision maker’s (or group of decision-makers’) influence such as their perception and geopolitics in determining foreign policy choices. Like the previous scholars mentioned, he is also cynical that an overarching single theory of foreign policy can be achieved. He refers to the traditional approach to foreign policy as classical realism that focused on the “state as a single, coherent actor pursuing clear national interests in a rational manner, with varying degrees of success according to the talents of particular leaders and the constraints of the circumstance” (Hill, 2003).

Hill analyses the approaches of foreign policy in a slightly different way by referring to neo-realism put forward by Kenneth Waltz in 1970s which put forward the notion that the “international system was dominant (and) there was a scientific set of propositions and the appeal of balance of power theory to which deals with the system’s hegemon” (Hill, 2003, p. 7). However, it did not receive much attention and did not seem to have relevance. It stressed that states are mainly driven by the need to maximise their security largely through the exercise of power and independence (Hill, 2003).

The theory of rational choice or public choice which was premised on how foreign policy evolved around the need to adapt to the market or economics. (Campbell, 1998; Doty, 1996; Henrik Larsen, 1997, as cited in Hill, 2003) put forward the theory of Post – positivism which argued that language is important as it is critical to national identity in that it reinforces “national and statist culture” therefore has a lot to tell about mindsets and actions. In fact, he argues that it is an untapped resource. (Hansen, 2012) refers to the issue of language as discourse analysis in the context of post-structuralism. He identifies the key scholars in the field as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida who drew attention to the political power of language. The core arguments between the two academics are similar - language creates

and communicates values, norms and identities of nation states or communities (Hansen, 2012). Most important is Hill's significant contribution was his attempt to connect foreign policy analysis to the underlying questions of all political life: "who benefits?" "What is the right course of action" and "which institutions best serve our desired ends" (Hill, 2003).

(Jackson & Sorensen, 2012; Smith, et al, 2012) also disaggregate foreign policy theories into realism and liberalism but add the dimension of constructivism in addition to discourse analysis. Constructivism is an approach that came about as a criticism to realism and liberalism for their static nature and inability to predict momentous events (Hudson, 2012). It offers a way to understand "the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest and the prospects for change" (Hudson, 2012, p. 80).

The approach also helps explain how foreign policy might be able to effect change from one form of anarchy to the other (Hudson, 2012, p. 81). Jackson & Sorensen (2012) refer to this as social constructivism that is ideas before interests. It is perhaps the reason why James Rosenau (2011, as cited in Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2012) underscored the importance of his pre-theory of foreign policy (1966) which stressed the need "for comparative analysis of when, how and why different countries undertook to link themselves to the international system in the ways they do" (Smith, et al, 2012, p.v). This gave birth to the Comparative Foreign Policy approach. Therefore, the major contribution of this is that it "offered a means of analysing the conduct of foreign policy in previous years as well as anticipating future developments in a country's external behaviour. It highlighted the virtues of case studies as a basis of comparing, analysing and interpreting foreign policy phenomena" (Smith, et al, 2012, p. v; Hill, 2003).

Rosenau (2011) raises two emerging issues that are less widely explored through foreign policy literature – what he calls the skills revolution and the other is the organisation explosion. They significantly shape the demeanour of a country's foreign policy (Smith, et al, 2012, p ix). He argues that people everywhere in every country and community throughout the world are increasingly able to trace distant events through a series of interactions back into their own homes or pocketbooks. The skill revolution is understood to consist of three main dimensions: (i) the analytical that is, linking course of events to the observer's personal situation through the internet that could create news scenarios (ii) the emotional involving how people feel and judge situations and; (iii) the imaginative being the ability to imagine alternative futures for themselves without trapping themselves in their circumstances in their heads at least (Smith, et al, 2012, p. ix). Various media and communication channels have facilitated this.

The organisational explosion which is also not yet developed as a theory speaks to the rapid increase in the number of voluntary associations the world over. A multi-sector approach has been adopted involving ordinary citizens as well as elites and activists and working together to address “shared needs and goals” (Smith, et al, 2012, p. x). The social media has also become a major issue around foreign policy as it “breaches the wall of the state” (Smith, et al, 2012, p. x). Another of Rosenau (2011) major contribution to literature, though not yet fully developed, is the proposed “integration of the skill revolution, the organisational explosion and the political consequences of the social media revolution into the analysis of dynamics that shape foreign policy which is not an easy task” (Smith, et al, 2012, p. X). He argues “what a country does abroad is highly dependent on the skills and attitudes shared amongst their populations at home. Taken together the three variables account for a great deal of the variance from one country to another and from one point in time to another” (Smith, et al, 2012, p. X).

2.4 Foreign policy making dynamics

As stated at the beginning of this chapter there are many variables that are central to probing the dynamics of foreign policy making. Van Nieuwkerk (personal communication, 2015) puts forward a framework through which the dynamics can be interrogated. He identifies the following broad issues as cornerstones: the making of foreign policy, actors and agents and foreign policy implementation. Hudson (2012, p. 4) brings to bare the three main themes in the evolution of foreign policy. These frameworks will guide the next sections.

According to Hudson (2012), first there was foreign policy making inspired by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin in the 1950s and the subsequent literature on bureaucratic and organisational politics of the 60s and 70s. Second there was focus on the psychological dimension of foreign policy making and thirdly the attempt to develop a theory of comparative analysis inspired by Jim Rosenau between genotypes of states and the sources of their foreign policy in the 1960s.

As a result, Hudson (2012) brings more clarity on three paradigmatic works of foreign policy. Richard Snyder (1954, 1963 and 2002) contributed a focus on the decision process itself as part of the explanation rather than just foreign policy outputs. The second was James Rosenau (1966) who led to the development of actor-specific theory that would lead to the development of generalisable propositions at the level of the middle range theory. The third is by Harold and Margaret Sprout who argue that foreign policy can only be explained with

reference to the psychological, situational, political and social contexts of the individuals involved in decision making” (Hudson, 2012, p.15).

Webber & Smith (2002) approach to contemplating the making of foreign policy is similar to Keahone & Nye (1977/2001, p. 220, as cited by Lesage & Graaf (2015). It is based on the principle that it is always important to be mindful of the context or the foreign policy arena. A government’s ability to access all resources at their disposal and efficient use of the same provide a litmus test on its effectiveness of its foreign policy (Webber & Smith, 2002). There are a variety of actors as well as diverse issues and interests that characterise the space hence different outcomes.

On close analysis, Keahone & Nye (1977/2001:220) as cited by Lesage & Graaf (2015) seem to combine the traditional and liberalist approaches to foreign policy analysis and in particular to assess a nation’s ability to influence the global political system. A nation can be considered a rising power based on the complex metrics that “take into account behavioural aspects (the ability to get the outcomes you want) and power resource (the possession of resources that are usually associated with the ability to get the outcomes you want), including economic growth, military (projection) capabilities and soft power”. In fact, there is an emerging body of academic literature on rising or re-emerging powers and multilateral organisations coming together for strategic purposes with the aim of creating some form of economic, political or institutional counter-balance to the current biased global system; and challenges the established hegemonic powers (Lesage & Graaf, 2015). For example, BRICS captures the shifting power configuration in the international system.

Van Nieuwkerk (2015) developed a conceptual model to help understand how states prioritise in terms the foreign policy decision making process. This is in the form of a quadrant with the fixed variables (x-axis) ranging from concrete to abstract foreign policy objects and the y – axis being from high priority to low in priority. The objectives are categorised broadly into core objectives, middle range activities to long range. He aptly summarises outputs of foreign policy as national orientations, roles and objectives.

From the above it can be deduced that there are only a few certainties in foreign policy. What we do know is that foreign policy is complex and there is no single theory. This is because the world is ever changing and the challenges have neither a single cause nor single solution and therefore require a set of solutions. The state is not a single actor there are other actors. In fact, human decision makers are core to foreign policy analysis.

What we also know is that foreign policy “is linked to the notion of statehood and government; implies a capacity to distinguish between the domestic politics and external relations of national societies, and to form policies directed at external ‘targets’; cannot be detached from notions of strategy and action which embody goals, values and decisions and involves tasks of design, management and control,” Van Nieuwkerk (personal communication, 2015). Webber & Smith (2002) sum up foreign policy implementation succinctly- that it is less about what is achieved in the end but a “process” issue which may involve never reaching a final resolution.

2.5 Non-state actors in foreign policy decision making

There are many similarities in the way scholars and various actors such as multi-lateral institutions define non-state actors. The difference lies in the sub-categorisation of the groups of non-state actors. For example, Vincent 2002 uses groups for non-state actors whereas Hill (2003) suggests several possible ways of classifying transnational actors as will be discussed below. For example, Vincent (2002) explains non-state actors in groups: first group; liberation movements, secessionist groups, terrorists and criminal organisations; second group - international non-governmental organisation and transnational social movements; thirdly, multinational corporations; and lastly, individuals. Others include trade unions and religious organisations.

This is slightly different from Hill (2003) who offers several ways to understand the variety of transnational actors and calls this the taxonomy of the TNAs. First per the type of organisation and can therefore can distinguish churches, multinational corporations, trade unions, political parties and terrorist groups. Hill (2003) however argues that there are limitations in that this it cannot give guidance on the roles or importance of these actors. Size and power could provide a sense of hierarchy to work with but this can also be misleading as one would need to compare like with like which is rarely the case – for example trying to compare the Catholic Church with Ford Motor Company (p.195).

Hill 2003 proposes a “tripartite division” which he believes every transnational actor fits into: Territorial – these either use or seek some territorial base; ii) ideological/cultural – seek to promote ideas or ways of thinking across national frontiers; and iii) economic, whose primary focus is wealth creation. The European Union groups them as social partners (including civil society in all its formations and trade unions), private sector and economic partners (European Union, n.d.).

However, the AU has a broader definition and emphasises the grassroots level. The IGO has left civil society to organise themselves under ECOSOC established by Heads of State in 2004. The categories identified by the AU are: “a)Social groups such as those representing women, children, the youth, the elderly and people with disability and special needs; b)Professional groups such as associations of artists, engineers, health practitioners, social workers, media, teachers, sport associations, legal professionals, social scientists, academia, business organizations, national chambers of commerce, workers, employers, industry and agriculture as well as other private sector interest groups; c)Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) and voluntary organisations; d) Cultural organizations and e) social and professional groups in the African Diaspora in accordance with the definition approved by the Executive Council” (African Union, n.d).

Various scholars reflect on the importance of non-state actors in foreign policy making with some agreement. It is widely believed that they enrich foreign policy and its outcomes (Van Wyk, 1999; Nel & van Nieuwkerk, 1997, as cited in Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 2002, p251). “However to be taken seriously and their input has to be aggregated and coordinated in the policy process” Frankel (1968, p.70-83, as cited in Pere & van Nieuwkerk 2002, p. 251).

This is also highlighted in a speech by the then chair of the African Union, Tanzania President, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete during the launch of ECOSOC said, “this event today has its uniqueness and significance in the annals of international organizations. This is the first time that an institution such as the African Union that began as an intergovernmental organization is incorporating non-state actors as full partners in the policy making process. In following this path, the African Union has gone beyond the mere processes of consultation that other institutions still adhere to. Africa therefore, has given the values of democratization and inclusiveness, a more holistic and enduring meaning and significance” (African Union, 2008).

It is Hill (2003) who stands out in unpacking the types of non-state actors and how this impacts on their relationship with the state in relation to foreign policy decision making. In general, non-state actors aim is to influence or change policy and where they do not get attention, they will demand it especially in democratic settings (Hill, 2003). It is therefore it is prudent for states to listen and “calculate the mix of different kinds of actors they need to deal with and what kind of rainbow coalition it might be necessary to assemble to influence the various forces in civil societies and private enterprise as well as intergovernmental institutions,” (Hill, 2003, p. 193). Therefore policy has much “to be conducted through a variety of bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral channels” (Hill, 2003, p. 194).

According to Hill (2003) the territorial group of Non-state actors often commands the maximum attention of even the most powerful states Hill (p. 195). The ideological transnational actors which include actors such as scientists, educators, and media are usually focused on pursuing one single cause or promoting a way of life. Because they lack the means to achieve the desired ends by themselves they usually work with states in the transnational environment. States may have difficulty in controlling them and have little choice but to adapt (Hill, 2003). However economic transnational actors “have an impact on millions of people and are a factor in the making of state economic policy but also in the international economy. They present powerful pressures in favour of trade liberalisation, tax incentives, favourable regimes for the free movement of labour and exploitation of minerals for example. In general, they pull in the same general direction as states and against the preferences of others” (Hill, 2003, p. 203).

Of the literature encountered it is Hill’s (2003) ability to distinguish the different types of transnational actors that provides the most clarity in understanding the nature of challenges that they pose to and their relationships with states. He identifies three relationship models which have been summarised as follows: Firstly, there is the normal or bargaining relationship which is a functional relationship, coexistence but with direct lobbying and dialogue with the state on issues they do not agree on the foreign policy.

Secondly is the competitive relationship which involves either side displaying an obvious use of power and contesting the legitimacy of the other. There is not much incentive for the transnational actors to deal directly with governments and therefore go behind their backs directly to domestic society to either capacitate the later to challenge government or stimulate discussions on policy options. They could even cause states to fight each other Governments could react by choosing to ignore the TNAs activities, reinforcing the strength of their position or even enact legislation to deny them freedom of movement or use military force or adopting draconian controls over the movements of people and money (Hill, 2003).


Thirdly is the transcending relationship where the non-state actors simply go about their business and find their own allies who are not necessarily states. There can be little to no relationship with states and where it exists it is uneasy (Hill, 2003).

To be able to participate non-state actors should possess capacity to engage effectively. Communities should have both human capacity and social capacity. Human capacity refers to “the skills, knowledge and abilities of individuals” and social capacity is the “nature and

strength of relationships and level of trust that exists between individuals” (The State of Victoria, 2013).

In the literature encountered, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) provides a framework for understanding the concept of public participation. Non-state actors’ participation in foreign policy could be viewed in the same lens. The state would need to be clear and determine the level of engagement they want to have with non-state actors depending on the issue at hand. The spectrum moves from a lower level of engagement which is one way (inform) to the highest level of empowering. Table 1 highlights the different levels of the engagement.

Table 1: IAP2’s Public participation spectrum



The diagram illustrates the IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum as a horizontal progression from left to right, indicated by a large orange arrow at the top labeled "INCREASING IMPACT ON THE DECISION". The spectrum is divided into five levels: INFORM, CONSULT, INVOLVE, COLLABORATE, and EMPOWER. Each level is represented by a purple box containing a description of the public participation goal and a corresponding promise to the public.

	INFORM	CONSULT	INVOLVE	COLLABORATE	EMPOWER
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GOAL	To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions.	To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions.	To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered.	To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.	To place final decision making in the hands of the public.
PROMISE TO THE PUBLIC	We will keep you informed.	We will keep you informed, listen to and acknowledge concerns and aspirations, and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.	We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.	We will look to you for advice and innovation in formulating solutions and incorporate your advice and recommendations into the decisions to the maximum extent possible.	We will implement what you decide.

Figure1: IAP2’s Public Participation Spectrum

Source: https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/foundations_course/IAP2_P2_Spectrum_FINAL.pdf

2.6 Non-state actors in South Africa’s foreign policy making

In 2011, the country announced a shift in its foreign policy to embrace the African philosophy of Ubuntu as the cornerstone of its foreign policy (Mbola, 2011). “Ubuntu means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of

others” (DIRCO, 2011). Apart from shaping the country’s national consciousness, democratic transformation and nation-building processes, the concept has come to inform the country’s approach to diplomacy that respects all nations, peoples and cultures and its vision of a better world for all (DIRCO, 2011).

In 2011, the country announced a shift in its foreign policy to embrace the African philosophy of Ubuntu as the cornerstone of its foreign policy (Mbola, 2011). “Ubuntu means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others” (DIRCO, 2011). Apart from shaping the country’s national consciousness, democratic transformation and nation-building processes, the concept has come to inform the country’s approach to diplomacy that respects all nations, peoples and cultures and its vision of a better world for all (DIRCO, 2011).

By interpretation therefore South Africa’s actions within multilateral forums including the UN, AU and BRICS should presumably exhibit a more collaborative environment that emphasises participation and consultation (Bohler-Muller, 2012) and is liberalist approach to foreign relations. This is in contrast to the picture painted by Tim Hughes (2004) and John Siko (2014) when he asserted that the two former Presidents of South Africa in the post-Apartheid era Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were strikingly foreign policy presidents. In fact, Hughes (2004) challenges Max Weber’s statement that the bureaucracy rules through routine administration asserts that the research on actors in South Africa’s foreign policy had shown that in the President Mbeki era, in particular, “the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs neither set the agenda nor dominate the discussion; it is mainly the Presidency that drives the discourse.”

According to Bohler-Muller (2012), the government was probably trying to demonstrate that “its global agenda and those agendas determined in multilateral forums are more transparent and that diplomats and other national representatives remain accountable to South Africans for decisions taken in the global arena”. To illustrate the emergence of diplomacy of Ubuntu and perhaps a more liberal-pluralist approach to foreign policy, the Minister in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation referred to a developing spirit of participation in international affairs. She said, “This should be understood not only as a partnership between states but also, importantly, as a partnership between a state and its people through a social compact”.

In fact, the White Paper alluded to earlier, asserts that, “The business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of

dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people” (DIRCO, 2011). The name change also speaks to this from the Department of Foreign Affairs to that of International Relations and Cooperation in 2009 and reflects the department’s role in building more meaningful and more open relations and partnerships (Mbola, 2011).

While it has taken many years to come to life since the 1996 proposal to establish an Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (ACFA) (Tim Hughes, 2004), South Africa launched SAICO in 2015. SACOIR serves as a domestic advisory council on international relations and is meant to provide a consultative forum in which non-state actors and government experts can participate with DIRCO on the development and implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy (DIRCO, 2015). SACOIR will have 25 members drawn from a wide spectrum of South African society including civil society; academia; business; labour and national departments who will serve for three years. They will have demonstrated a clear understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy and the manner in which its international relations are conducted.

South Africa has established a BRICS Think Tank in 2013 through a Cabinet decision which appointed the Human Sciences Research Council as incubator of the national think tank for a period of one year. A successor structure is yet to be put forward. Most of the work on the Think Tank has been centred on Academic Forum with its mandate stemming from a Memorandum of Understanding for enhancing cooperation between BRICS academic institutions that had been signed the year before. Following reports and events on South Africa’s participation in BRICS engagements, it is known that the country has nominated members to the BRICS Business Council representing various industries and sectors in the BRICS nations (Centre for BRICS Studies and BRICS Business Council, n.d.). It would seem that there is no details mechanism to get these members gets a mandate from the local business community before taking positions in the BRICS Business Council except to mention that they work in five thematic areas.

In going through the literature so far there is a glaring gap on civil society participation in BRICS except for non-peer reviewed reports of parallel meetings to the annual BRICS Heads of State Summit such as that held in Durban in 2013. This forms part of the aims of this study to evaluate what civil society participation has been like in BRICS and use this as a basis to recommend an optimal way of ensuring that various sectors’ views are considered when coming up with a national position.

2.7 BRICS as a geopolitical alliance

Founded in 2008, BRICS is a geopolitical grouping made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill first coined the acronym in 2001. South Africa only joined the grouping in 2011. Although the intellectual trigger to focus on this grouping was from investment banking not academia, one of the academics (not named) who led the push as a social science landed credence to "O'Neill's thinking (that) provided a certain broader legitimacy for this area of study" (Chin, 2015).

Out of the reviewed literature, it is the recent published works of Chin (2015) that stood out in providing both a cross sectional and longitudinal analyses of BRICS as an academic area of enquiry. Chin (2015)'s main finding following an assessment of the emerging body of literature of rising powers and multilateral institutions is that "the literature on BRICS and multilateral organisations has evolved in three phases, and is currently in the middle of the third phase". Understanding this trajectory is relevant because it helps to build a framework of analysis and to situate South Africa's position in BRICS.

Chin asserts that "the foundational phase was based on how the contemporary group of rising states positioned themselves in relation to the established multilateral arrangements and global order more broadly" (Chin, 2015, p. 20). The second phase rigorously interrogated into the "preferences of the individual rising states to assess whether or to what degree the rising powers actually wanted to be incorporated into the existing multilateral arrangements" (Chin, 2015, p. 20). Apart from comparing their foreign policy agendas, contributions during the phase also looked at their behaviour whether it was promoting the "status quo or revisionist" approach (Chin, 2015, p. 20). Others looked at their socialisation into the multilateral arrangements while others focussed on how to best integrate them into existing international regimes (Chin, 2015, p. 20). He goes on to observe that there is an analytical shift in the third phase where emerging literature and published works are addressing a gap which had become apparent "whether the rising powers are trying to (re)share the global norms and roles" even though they selectively entrench some of the established rules (Chin, 2015).

It is quite evident from the literature shows that BRICS as a collective and members in their individual countries has become a force to reckon with and does challenge the status quo regards established the traditional international hegemonic power countries and multilateral organisations (Bohler-Muller, 2012; Bond, 2013; Gumede, 2013; Lesage & Graaf, 2015). Literature suggests that this group of countries among other rising powers seek to "restructure global trade, economic and political architecture to give Africa and developing

countries a fairer say – and therefore make them better able to compete with their Western counterparts” (Gumede, 2013, kindle location 208-210).

One of the key texts by William Gumede (2013) views the BRICS alliance mostly from a liberal lens of IR as “not simply a geopolitical, trade or economic one; it is a strategic and tactical alliance based on each country focusing on securing common interests as well as those of their individual countries” (Gumede, 2013, p. 260-262). While literature shows that neo- realism theoretical approach discussed in the section above and put forward by Kenneth Waltz in 1970s did not thrive, it is this paper’s author’s own assertion that this helps us understand the aims of the BRICS alliance better. The BRICS alliance is inspired by the need to challenge the current dominant “international system” and gives weight to the balance of power theory” as a deal with the system’s hegemon” (Hill, 2003, p. 7) in this case the Global North’s dominance.

This could also be explained through the constructivism approach that criticises realism and liberalism for their lack of adaptability to changing nature and inability to predict momentous events as put forward in the section above by Hudson (2012). It offers a way to understand why this particular set of countries would like to work together and align their approach to dealing with the current Western hegemony. Hence scholars talk of rising powers that may either take over or neutralise the powerful dominant groupings.

South Africa foregrounds Africa as the cornerstone of its foreign policy as outlined in the policy document and stressed during relevant engagements. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)’s vision is “An African Continent, which is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united, and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable” (DIRCO, 2015).

Literature shows that the Government of South Africa has put forward its strategic position as the most powerful country in Africa as one of the key justifications for being in BRICS when you consider many dimensions beyond economic factors (Nigeria has a larger economy than South Africa). This can also be explained by the pre-theory of foreign policy as explained above (1966) which stressed the need “for comparative analysis of when, how and why different countries undertook to link themselves to the international system in the ways they do” (Smith, et al, 2012, p.v).

2.8 South Africa’s foreign policy towards BRICS and non-state actors’ divergent positions

The government of South Africa (DIRCO, 2013) has declared Africa as the centrepiece of South Africa's foreign policy. Scholars such as Gumede (2013) Alden & Schoeman(2013) and (Keet, 2013) working on issues of the global order acknowledge this. Therefore, South African foreign policy has been geared towards "positioning itself not only as a voice for less influential African and developing countries, but also to take a leading role in mobilising these countries to forge strategic alliances that will advance their common interests in global forums and negotiations. That alone, from a strategic point of view, will make it difficult for any global developing country alliance to exclude South Africa" (Gumede, 2013, kindle locations 262-265).

It is this thinking that has influenced South Africa's positions in BRICS as a representative of African voices apart from pursuing its own national interests. There are however mixed interpretations of South Africa's presence in the BRICS formation, let alone its significance to the African continent in terms of bringing benefits. On the one hand, some scholars like Gumede (2013) view South Africa as well positioned to be in BRICS and seen as playing a leading role in Africa with even greater potential that needs to be harnessed. O'Niell (2013), referred to earlier in this section, previously expressed misgivings about South Africa's admission into BRICS has joined the optimists by acknowledging the country's "important role to play within the BRICS grouping, both as gateway to the continent and as a catalyst for African integration". He was speaking at the tenth annual conference of the African Venture Capital Association in Cape Town in April 2013 (SouthAfrica.info, 2013).

Other academics such as (Alden & Schoeman, 2013) view it as punching above its waist. There is even a school of thought that South Africa has joined other sub-imperialists – Brazil, Russia, India and China from the Global South (Bond, 2013). Then there are some scholars (Chin, 2015) and (Gumede, 2013) who view South Africa as a "middle power" – that is, neither anti-imperialist nor sub imperialist.

Another argument is that "BRICS cannot be a global alliance of strategic developing countries without a representative country from Africa, since the other members are leading countries in continents dominated by developing countries...South Africa is not only a representative of the African continent but, as the largest economy, the most advanced democracy and the most influential country in Africa, it is also the continent's regional power" (Gumede, 2013, kindle locations 108-114).

At the opening of the 5th BRICS Academic Forum held ahead of the BRICS Summit, South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane

demonstrated that she was not oblivious to the scepticism held by several quarters on the usefulness of the geopolitical grouping (DIRCO, 2014). She argued that, “To see BRICS countries as ‘sub-imperialist’ is the result of a dogmatic application of classical notions of imperialism and the centre-periphery model of American sociologist and world-systems analyst Immanuel Wallerstein, to a situation that is fundamentally different from what these theories were trying to explain” (DIRCO, 2014) . Rather, she challenged scholars to be “innovative and courageous enough to develop new tools of analysis and theoretical models when history challenges us to do so” (DIRCO, 2014).

It is this challenge that calls us to find common ground and establish a national position not just with academics but all sectors of society. Some non-state actors may exhibit the realist approach to international relations in terms of the lenses that they view BRICS Summits and dynamics. They are of the opinion that the five players are all in it for themselves but when they come together they pretend to work together yet “spy” or steal from each other’s briefings and reports. So, they are of the view that South Africa BRICS is out of your league move on and would urge the country to leave.

This has not been without contestations as reflected by several scholars (Bond, 2013; Dube, 2013; Keet, 2013; Chin, 2015). To start with literature shows that the politicians and policy makers do not have the same viewpoint on the need for South Africa to be in the grouping. Within the ruling party the Africa National Congress (ANC), there is an influential group spanning both the party’s left and left-of-centrists that believe that South Africa should rather just align itself solely with India and Brazil as per the original formation IBSA referred to in sections above which seems to have been overtaken by BRICS (Gumede, 2013). At least they are seen as fellow developing democracies (Gumede, 2013). For example, former Public Enterprises Minister is quoted saying, ‘If we let [China and India] enter Africa on their own ... We may find it is not only our minerals that are dominated by foreigners, but also our infrastructure” (Gumede, 2013).

Some opposition parties alike have echoed these sentiments depending on the extent of how leftist or rightist they are The Economic Freedom Party (EFF) is also unsympathetic to the idea. The party’s Commander in Chief Julius Malema argues that South Africa will be a “small country among the biggest economies and populations, and our contribution might be meaningless” thereby rendering the country vulnerable because “people use us to get into Africa, take mineral resources raw as they are and leave South Africa and Africa. The Chinese are number one in doing that” (Gumede, 2013, kindle locations 122 - 123).

However, some scholars and non-state actors lean on the liberal approach to foreign policy analysis when they look at the BRICS Alliance. They believe that when we cooperate, we learn from mistakes, we share, peace is possible. The assumption is that the five countries are trying to pursue common interests in pursuing common objectives and South Africa fits in there with its soft power and could thus have the ability to change norms and values on the international stage.

For example, a scholar who seems to be a strong advocate for South Africa's membership (Gumede, 2013, kindle locations 258-260) believes that "the question of whether South Africa should be a member of BRICS is misplaced. The argument that the small size of South Africa's economy, its sluggish growth and its smaller population compared to the other BRICS countries disqualify it from being a BRICS is also wrong". Alden & Schoeman (2013), similarly views BRICS as having joint giants with much to gain if they play this role well.

The lack of uniformity in civil society views is demonstrated by (Dube, 2013) (Keet, 2013) who problematise the motivation for including South Africa in BRICS by the other member states and expectations of its role therein. For example, while the paper by civil society (Keet, 2013) is not published or peer reviewed it adds weight to the discussion as it is part of the work of experts working in the area of global institutions and the international system.

Keet (2013) problematises the motivation as two pronged. On the one hand, the "inclusion of South Africa may to a degree reflect the intention of the major powers in Asia and Latin America simply to make a symbolic political gesture towards Africa, the other major continent of the South or to advance the economic interests to increase their competitiveness in the so called rising Africa which is also targeted by their rivals in the North" (Keet, 2013). From the South Africa perspective of being a gateway into Africa, the question is whether "South Africa welcomes the prospect of enhanced economic opportunities in Africa provided to it by playing facilitating and/or cooperative role for the other BRIC countries and companies in Africa" (Keet, 2013).

On the other hand, "South Africa and the companies with their own ambitions in Africa actually feel threatened and outflanked by bigger companies and much bigger BRIC companies in relation to Africa" (Keet, 2013). For example, when you compare BRIC agricultural exports to Africa to assess how they are competing with South Africa's exports to Africa, South Africa has been losing market share compared to the original BRIC countries in Africa virtually in all African markets except Zimbabwe, and in all products except in fats and

oils (Sandrey, 2013, p. 2). How do companies in South Africa react to this development in the context of BRICS is interesting in the long run.

Bond (2013) is more forthright in his criticism of South Africa's membership in the grouping saying its role is the same as the rest of Member States in BRIC which is akin to playing "deputy sheriff duty in BRIC thereby promoting "sub-imperialism (which is) a lubricant for neo-imperialism". He asserts that "Those scholars who argue that South Africa's role is neither anti-imperialist nor sub-imperialist — that as a 'middle power', Pretoria attempts to constructively 'lead' Africa while acting in the continent's interests, by 'building strategic partnerships in a constant effort to win over the confidence of fellow African states, and to convince the world community of its regional power status', thus seeking 'non-hegemonic cooperation' with other African countries are missing an opportunity to interrogate the power relations with the critical sensibility that these times demand," (Bond, 2013, p. 253). He cites the fact that the super-exploitative extractive industries based upon migrant labour, without regard to community degradation and ecological damage (e.g. the well-known Marikana platinum mine so profitable to Lonmin until 2012), continue to be the primary form of BRICS' engagement with Africa. (Bond, 2013, p. 253). So here transnational actors are not viewed in good light.

Then there is the middle ground. Some scholars position South Africa as a "middle power" wielding soft power (Chin, 2015; Gumede, 2013). Cooper (1997, as cited in Lesage & Graaf, 2015) defined middle powers in world politics as "states that are able to carve out niches for themselves in international diplomacy without necessarily commanding the same capacities as the true great powers in the international system". For example, Gumede (2013, kindle locations 79-81) says "If strategic, and if it has the right quality of leadership and ideas, a robust democracy, and it acts as South Africa Inc., the country could be the factory of a rapidly growing Africa, much as Japan was in Asia immediately after the Second World War. While part of BRICS, South Africa must balance its engagement between BRICS, other emerging markets such as Turkey, and the industrial powers in the West".

South Africa could take advantage of the fact that it is not a standalone economy as it is closely linked to the Southern Africa Customs Union and Southern Africa Development Cooperation Member States' economies (Gumede, 2013). O'Neill (SouthAfrica.info, 2013) is agreeable arguing that, "If Africa could improve its technology, education and governance standards, as well as strengthen its trade and infrastructure links and here was the role South Africa could play then my goodness me, it is not only the next decade [that is going to be Africa's], it is going to be the next three or four".

2.9 Conclusion

South Africa is in BRICS and that is not changing anytime soon. Given that there are many divergent views from different stakeholders on South Africa's role and position in BRICS, the research will evaluate these systematically including models that have been put forward and use the outcomes to recommend a way of getting South Africa to arrive at a national position on BRICS decisions and processes while accommodating the wide spectrum of society.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provided a description and justification of the selection of the qualitative method of data collection as it is most appropriate for this study. This is because the research sought to discover new insights in the behaviour of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making. It was also a suitable method for “exploring processes or systems that are best understood through interacting with those involved in the process” (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012, p. 125). In this case, this was achieved by interacting with those who have worked with BRICS and the South African foreign policy making process in relation to BRICS.

This method therefore enabled the researcher to make sense of and interpret social phenomena such as opinions, perceptions, interaction and behaviour (Creswell, 1998; Kitchen & Tate, 2000; Flowerdew & Martin, 2005, as cited by Rahim, 2014, p.43). It also provides flexibility and ability to delve beyond the surface to gain the inner-most experiences of participants (Strauss and Corbin 2008) as cited by Rahim (2014, p.43)).

In order to make sense of it all, the research employed foreign policy analysis tools by focussing on non-state actors as important actors and agents in foreign policy decision making.

3.2 Research design and approach

The design used two key methods. The core method used is the basic interpretive study where the research sought to understand the meaning participants have constructed in their work and in their experiences. In this case understanding how do non-state actors in their various formations make sense of their experience in BRICS processes. The researcher was the primary instrument for data collection and data analysis. The process was inductive and results presented are purely descriptive.

It is important to note that this methodology is core to interpretive social science approach and apart from being interpretive the outcomes will be subjective, impressionistic and diagnostic (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). There is generally no wrong or right answer.

The second was document analyses of three key documents which complemented the interviews. Two of these aimed to conceptualise non-state actor participation while the third is the BRICS strategy document.

3.3 Sample and sampling method

The research made use of random purposive sampling to select the interviewees. The researcher aimed to conduct 20 interviews comprising a mix of state and non-state actors including at least two stakeholders from any of the other BRICS countries. However, she was only able to get 14 (70%) of these due to time constraints experienced by those who had been selected to participate. As the literature interrogated in this sub-section shows, the number reached is adequate because their responses provided in-depth insights of the phenomenon under study

According to Onwuegbuzie & Leech (2007), random purposeful sampling entails that, “the researcher chooses cases at random from the sampling frame consisting of a purposefully selected sample. That is, the researcher first obtains a list of individuals of interest for study using one of the other methods of purposeful sampling, and then randomly selects a desired number of individuals from this list”. In this regard, the method employed was snowball sampling where participants who were already selected for the study assisted the researcher to recruit more informants (Onwuegbuzie & Leech , 2007).

In this regard, interviewees were deliberately selected from a range of individuals with diverse backgrounds to bring in multiple perspectives. These included representatives from - DIRCO (the key government department responsible for implementing South Africa’s foreign policy), civil society, academia, a political party, a faith based organisation and non-affiliated individuals (List of interviewees is attached at Appendix 2)

Coyne (1997) helps us understand purposive sampling further. She cites Sandelowski (1995) concurring with Patton (1990) that all “types of sampling in qualitative research may be encompassed under the broad term of purposive sampling”. Patton contends that the power of this method lies in “selecting information rich cases for study in depth... (that is) those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of importance to the purpose of the research.”

The research leaned mostly on Morse (1991)’s definition, as cited by Coyne (1997), who described purposive sampling as initially “choosing to interview informants with a broad knowledge of the topic or those who have undergone the experience and whose experience is considered typical.” As the study progressed the description was expanded with more specific information and participants with that particular knowledge were deliberately sought.

3.4 Procedure for data collection

Data was collected using a mix of primary and secondary data – interviews, observations and document analysis. The interviews were taped and later transcribed. This enabled the researcher to store the content of all the interviews. This meant that it was possible to consult the records and analyse systematically at the researcher's convenience (Star, 2014).

Secondary data was used from document analyses of proposed model(s) for non-state actor participation in BRICS and; observations of the current forms of non-state actors' engagement with BRICS in South Africa and other BRICS countries.

3.5 The research instrument

A structured open questionnaire formed the main research instrument. This consisted of one closed ended question and 17 open ended questions. An interview schedule was drawn up but this was difficult to follow because this depended on the availability of the targeted interviewees. The questionnaire was further divided into six sections to help unpack specific issues in the research. The questionnaire is in Appendix A.

Because of the open-ended approach to almost all questions except one, the researcher was able to collect much data than if the instrument was closed. However, the challenge experienced was that the packaging of information that came in varied from subject to subject. It took quite a bit of work and time for the researcher to string the common themes that emerged as well as highlight the differences and nuances.

3.6 Data analysis and interpretation

Content analysis was done. The researcher coded the emerging themes which formed the basis of the data analysis. The only challenge as with other

3.7 Limitation of the study

A key limitation to the study was that the researcher was not able to access some of the critical high-level officials engaged in BRICS processes except two. They were available for an interview later at dates than anticipated which delayed the study. This could be because officials are bound by confidentiality and may not be able to disclose all the necessary information that could enrich findings of the study.

The researcher tried to address the limitations in advance. She made efforts to pre-determine the list of officials to be interviewed and made contact with some of them in advance. The researcher emphasised the issue of anonymity and confidentiality to the interviewees especially where sensitive information was concerned. During interviews, the researcher recorded these to enhance the accuracy of transcripts.

3.8 Validity and reliability

Every measure was taken to ensure that there is credibility through participation, validation and triangulation during data collection and data analysis. The researcher endeavoured to increase validity by ensuring that the study participants were clear why the research was being conducted, how I would collect the data and what I would use it for. The researcher tried to eliminate bias by planning the selection of participants purposefully by ensuring that they are from diverse backgrounds. The aim was to ensure that multiple views were obtained on the phenomena under study. I triangulated the information from study participants with the literature I encountered during the literature review to increase reliability and credibility of the study findings. Further to increase credibility, the researcher merely recorded the experiences and views of the study participants without putting in her biases.

3.9 Ethics

The researcher made sure that the interviewees were voluntary and were aware of the purpose of the research to ensure that they do not feel threatened. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained while the researcher will not fabricate information concerning the study.

While I work in an intergovernmental organisation and work with the Government of South Africa, the researcher is confident that this did not interfere or influence the research process and outcomes.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the investigation into the role of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS. The findings in this research derive from interviews with state and non-state actors who have engaged in BRICS processes in some way. As highlighted in Chapter 3, interviewees were deliberately selected from a range of individuals with diverse backgrounds to bring in multiple perspectives.

The researcher aimed to interview 20 people but only managed to get 14 (70%) due to time constraints with those who had been selected to participate. These were sufficient as their responses provided in-depth insights of the phenomenon under study. They responded to a specific set of open ended questions (See Appendix 1). For the rest of this chapter the respondents will be referred to as participants and will remain anonymous. The researcher endeavoured to use the actual words of the participants in reporting the findings.

This chapter also draws on a review of a few reports and articles that participants made available to the researcher during the interviews. This was used to elaborate their positions.

4.2 Perceptions on whether participation in BRICS benefits South Africa

The researcher found it necessary to first gauge participants' perceptions of whether they view South Africa's participation in BRICS as useful or not useful. By implication it determines whether the country's citizens would find it worthwhile to engage in the processes relating to BRICS, thereby necessitating an engagement model.

4.2.1 Usefulness of South Africa's participation in BRICS

Nine (64%) out of the 14 participants perceive South Africa's participation in BRICS as categorically useful. Of this group government representatives and one civil society representative were more emphatic saying it is "very useful". There were nuances to this response, albeit sometimes contradictory as the later part of this section will show. Four (29%) of these – civil society and one academic - found the participation both useful and not useful "depending on the lens you put on". Several reasons were sighted with common themes emerging. Only one (7%), person an academic and author of several publications on South Africa's foreign policy and BRICS said it is not useful (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016).

When participants were asked a further question on the reasons *why they found South Africa participation in BRICS useful or not useful respectfully*, several themes emerged as discussed in the section below. Many acknowledged that it is still early days for South Africa to determine this since the country only recently joined the bloc (in 2011).

To a large extent it is useful

One participant (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016) summarised South Africa's prospects when he said, "When you look at the five pillars prioritised by BRICS there is a lot in store for South Africa with lots more to be expected and gained by the country". Themes that emerged include: geo-political significance, political economy strategy, broadening governance, learning between peoples and advancing national interests.

Geo-political significance

The most common theme from those interviewed is the view that BRICS is a strategic geo-political alliance. Therefore, in terms of its own strategic interest it is useful for South Africa to be in the BRICS alliance. One of the participants, from civil society aptly summarised this point of view:

"A lot of people have stated that it is a misnomer for South Africa to be in the BRICS acronym because it is the smaller of all the players there. If you are measuring the BRICS based on the economic size then, South Africa should not be in the BRICS because there are way bigger economies such as Mexico and Turkey amongst others. But if you look at being in the BRICS alliance as not only about the economic significance but the geopolitical economic significance then you see the importance of South Africa being there" (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

This is especially so given South Africa's role at regional and continental level. This is perhaps the reason South Africa was invited into BRICS to have a country from the African continent represented.

At least all participants concurred (including those with nuanced responses) that the five-member group of countries present a challenge to what was emerging to be a unipolar world after the demise of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this gives South Africa an opportunity to be among the countries providing an alternative platform for shaping development thinking globally, also for shaping and providing an alternative to development finance. Hence from a geopolitical strategic sense, it is useful for South Africa to be in the BRICS.

Many of the participants who found South Africa's participation useful, asserted that the alliance members can strategise collectively in terms of the type of development trajectory needed for developing countries especially in a context where the world is changing. This is very important because it gives a different reference point from the traditional Western developed countries like United States of America, United Kingdom and Germany which have always been the global norm setters. One of the participants gave the view that "What (the world) needs are different reference points of view to be able to tackle the issues of this century differently from how people have done it in the past" (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016). He said that countries cannot follow German's development plan that was put together after the Second World War as the needs were different from the needs many developing countries have today.

Political economic strategy

Closely linked to geo-political significance, at least 8 (57%) participants explicitly identified political economic strategy as one of the reasons why BRICS is a useful alliance for South Africa. A participant from the main opposition party, Shadow Minister for International Relations and Cooperation for the Democratic Alliance in South Africa said the country "could benefit in terms of the GDP of the BRICS countries and the population size of those countries" (Respondent J, Personal communication, 2016). Specifically, the country could benefit from the capacity of BRICS which in terms of the sheer size of the Gross Domestic Product is just over 20% of the gross world product and a combined GDP (PPP) of around US\$37 trillion and an estimated 40% of the world population. It means South Africa will have enhanced access to this market if it uses the position strategically.

About 50% of the participants mentioned the fact that South Africa will be part of a group of countries providing alternative development finance through the BRICS' New Development Bank which established its Africa offices in Johannesburg. It is the first institution to be established by BRICS. The participant highlighted what President Jacob Zuma mentioned in parliament that the bank will have a big role on the African continent and enhances South Africa's position. This provides an alternative to the hegemonic multi-lateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that have occupied a dominant position while creating a problem of policy space for the developing world.

Another participant who wanted to remain anonymous, and worked for a think tank, the Human Science and Research Council (HSRC) intimated that the BRICS New Development Bank provides an alternative and because South Africa is in Africa and this is where the rationale for including South Africa possibly stems from:

“If one looks at the financial infrastructure and the economic governance infrastructure South Africa is most advanced on the African continent. Therefore, is important for South Africa to be a member of the BRICS (Respondent Personal communication, 2016)” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

This view was shared by another participant who did not want to be named said “(the bank) is a strategic idea” from an economic diplomacy perspective but it may be too early to evaluate the policy impact for South Africa.

Advancing national interests, perhaps African interests too.

Two (14%) of the participants from DIRCO a key government department responsible for foreign policy expressed that BRICS can provide a platform for South Africa to advance its national interests. One of the senior officials who preferred not to be named said, “The benefits for South Africa, staying on a global level... we utilise that to advance our national interests as well as regional interests” (Respondent B, personal communication, 2016). BRICS is made up of “all major regional players in the (Global) South”. The benefits “are more than economic” and include issues such as security where South Africa plays a critical role.

Another participant from government recalled the 2013 BRICS Summit held in Durban, where South Africa government used the platform to have Africa outreach programmes. The South Africa President invited fellow African leaders to participate which provided them with a great opportunity to interact with BRICS countries for the first time in the context of a BRICS Summit. The official reinforced that “this is in line with our foreign policy regarding the African agenda in almost everything that we do” (Respondent C, personal communication, 2016). According to him, the way the country uses the platforms to advance their national interests can be traced to UN level meetings, or when G20 countries meet and BRICS holds their own side meeting and coordinates their positions. For example, they did this on the issue of terrorism at G20 where they managed to put up a strong voice as the BRICS alliance.

Contrary to this position, the participant from the opposition party like three others interviewed, expressed concern that participation may not be useful because South Africa does not know its purpose in BRICS whether at political or economic levels. The challenge is for South Africa to understand what it wants from BRICS then it will be useful for the country. South Africa has not defined its national interests clearly.

Broadening governance

Broadening governance is another of the themes that emerged from the interviews. One of the participants who has closely monitored and written about BRICS presented a view that “BRICS is actually broadening itself to not only to be an economic bloc but to be a political player as a governance bloc so that in itself is very important in terms of alternative leadership” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

Another participant intimated, “Although BRICS initial thrust was to drop trade barriers and improve trade there is a lot more that South Africa can learn from the other four countries and they could in turn learn from South Africa that can benefit all”. For example, South Africa’s rich human rights culture could be a positive influence on the other countries especially Russia and China that are viewed to have limited democratic processes. The participant added that if,

“...one looks at the role of south Africa in matters of regional or global governance be it in within the African continent or in UN, G20 and now in particular BRICS, I think it (BRICS) is an institution with potential to deliver significant public policy gains depending on the policy matters that one might be arguing from” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

For example, he cited South Africa’s own influence on its BRICS peers in very important global meetings and negotiations.

“We have seen this during the Post 2015 development agenda, negotiations of human rights resolutions at United Nations fora and we have also seen this when South Africa was trying to engage with Russia within BRICS on the Ukraine crisis” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

South Africa’s usefulness has also been seen in its engagements

“to assist the establishment of a civil Society platform. I think that is useful. We are thus also seeing increasingly, South-South cooperation through the BRICS between civil society which is positive because they follow political processes” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

Learning between peoples

A participant from a think tank expressed the usefulness in terms of learning between people. This was substantiated by another participant from civil society who said that the countries, all from the global South and emerging economies except Russia share similar experiences – inequalities, marginalisation of huge population groups, poverty. According to participants, it amplifies the voice from the South on the global stage so that these issues can be taken on in a big way, where there is less constructive engagement. This will also take invisible walls off between the countries. A participant (Respondent D, personal communication, 2016), recalled how South Africa interacted with Russia and China during apartheid which has influenced the current perception that the relationship is around ammunition and nuclear bombing. Yet there are positive things that can be learnt from the two countries.

Another reason put forward by a participant is that South Africa share a similar history of cooperation with Brazil and India including around social movement building, democracy and promoting human rights. South Africa and India have contributed a lot in the world's democracy producing icons such as Nelson Mandela who fought against human rights and Mahatma Gandhi struggled against inequalities respectively. Similarly, in Brazil there is a history of use of slaves in the sugar plantations. So, with these experiences there are lessons to be brought to the table in looking out for rural communities including poor women when trying to foster development including infrastructure development.

One of the participants from a think tank said there is evidence already on why it is useful for South Africa such as the introduction of university partnerships and a University network that is being established. This provides opportunities for people and students to move across any of the BRICS member countries ensuring mutual benefit.

...but of course, there are dilemmas

The participants were not oblivious to the contradictions when you look at the issues from another angle and were mindful of the dilemmas that being a member of BRICS bring to South Africa. One participant from a civil society organisation that presents opportunities for dialogue on foreign policy matters among other governance issues, argued that

“there are obvious dilemmas that come with being a member of BRICS (in terms of perceptions) because South Africa has always wanted to shed off the big brother image when it comes to African countries” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

This is reinforced by being in BRICS with the coming in of the President Jacob Zuma administration. The participant pointed out this as a distinctive feature whilst also lamenting the loss of momentum on things like the NEPAD initiative which it premised on African Renaissance. The silver lining is the emphasis on infrastructure development in Africa, also a big thing for the Zuma Administration.

The contradiction is that being the only African member of BRICS does not necessarily mean that South Africa is a gateway to Africa. The participant asserted that it is more complicated than that. Much depends on whether South Africa will have significant influence within the BRICS or it is just going to be a matter of China being the bigger player dominating the discourse.

At least six (43%) of participants said a question could be raised around the human rights issues. One of them asked, "Why does South Africa involve itself with countries like Russia and China where there is almost no tolerance of civil and political rights, human rights, democracy. Civil society activity is largely denied and at best controlled."

The participant continued,

"In Russia, it is perceived that there are categories of civil society and there is a class considered undesirable. Government deals with foreigners who question issues of human rights or corruption as it makes them uncomfortable. Similarly, in China there is no relationship between civil society and government officials. If you receive funding from outside and advancing foreign policy issues that they do not agree with you are deemed not important and are not listened to" (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

The same participant argued that if one reads the ANC policy document, there is a bit of over emphasis on the relationship with China and South Africa's role within BRICS and there is a perception that there is an extent to which there is watering down of South Africa's strong stance on human rights issues. He expressed concern that this is not only a reflection of South Africa's reading of what its membership of the BRICS entails but also its response to Africa making sure that South Africa moves with rest of the continent. ANC may therefore not articulate human rights issues in a certain light and language so as not to alienate itself from the rest of Africa and the participant expressed the likelihood that the same applies to ANC government's relationship with Member States in BRICS.

However, one participant was quick to add that it would be “very narrow” to use that as a basis for South Africa not be involved in BRICS. South Africa should be free to interact and the good human rights record can be imparted to others in the alliance.

Useful to a few and not useful to most – it is a class issue

An outlier, one (7%) of the participants, Respondent I (personal communication, 2016), found South Africa’s participation not useful. The researcher deliberately presented Bond’s arguments separately because they are quite divergent from the others. This participant classified the country’s participation in BRICS as a fantasy and further qualified it as a “lovely fantasy”. In fact, he proffered a different school of thought, which stratifies BRICS engagement at different levels seemingly dependent on the class of individuals, institutions and their economic background. Having participated in and watched at the different levels of interaction, he is of the view that there is “a BRICS from below, BRICS in the middle and BRICS from above”.

He asserts that BRICS from above comprises State BRICS and Business BRICS while BRICS from the middle is “begging BRICS to let them in until Russia (CIVIC BRICS); the BRICS from above did not want to see the BRICS from the middle and basically tries to crush any opposition from BRICS from below.” The respondent concludes that “there is no space for ordinary people and for people who have progressive vision and agendas and offered to give details of how (he) has tried to explore that space and how the space simply does not exist.”

He put forward that BRICS is only useful

“to the most parasitical elites in the country and those are the ones that have been generally promoting BRICS along with careerist academics and careerist NGOs but for 99% of South Africa the BRICS is an amplification of the disaster that we have seen especially since the transition took a turn towards neo-liberalism” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016).

He further asserted that the activities of BRICS countries and BRICS as a whole amplify inequality, poverty, unemployment, extractive industry and environmental destruction globally with climate change. This is the reason he “takes a pessimistic perspective about BRICS from above but an optimistic perspective about BRICS from below”. Respondent I (personal communication, 2016), contrasted this with BRICS from below which

“has a great future of fighting for basics rights of people to socio-economic opportunities, political objectives of freedom and liberation and decent standards of living and environmental sustainability”.

He attributes this to the fact that three countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) in BRICS are democratic with progressive social movements with two of the countries, Brazil and South Africa, with exceptionally interesting labour movements. The labour movements with limits of the existing strategies that they have adopted in the last 20 years are very clear so they are trying new strategies which have enormous potential and that to him is why BRICS is such a great network because from below, the protests and the critics are the future.

He also states that.

“BRICS from above is more of the same which is frankly disastrous because it is particularly important where BRICS amplifies the power of the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) among other international organisations” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016)

He argued that FIFA is “... a very good reflection of why BRICS is not a solution to the world’s problems but actually it makes them much- much worse than when there was no BRICS.”

Respondent I (personal communication, 2016) describes the “one percent” as parasitical elites like himself, people who take money out of the country, who are in the extractive industry and the jet setting conference people as the ones who have done well but the remainder been done badly 99.9%.”

Bond participant used the category of finance to demonstrate his assertion that BRICS is *not* an alternative discourse to the Western hegemony. He says that the BRICS’ New Development Bank and contingent reserve arrangement are not that different to the workings of the IMF and World Bank.

He presents the view that they are “going to be worse and not the same” adding that the IMF is,

“extremely undemocratic and neo-liberal” and elaborates why the contingent reserve arrangement for example is worse than the IMF. The reason he proffers is that “this is

because BRICS talks left and walks right (because) BRICS wanted to reform the IMF but this is not evident in practice” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016).

To substantiate this, he recalled that South Africa gave IMF special drawing rights expansion of \$US750 billion in 2009 and then in 2012 BRICS countries gave \$US75 billion to the IMF to expand its power. In essence, BRICS amplified the IMF’s neo-liberalism and then the only thing that the BRICS said was “in exchange for \$75 billion ... South Africa wanted IMF to be nastier to Europe and especially to Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland”. According to him,

“what we saw was the one percent of the BRICS giving the taxpayer funds from the BRICS, our funds, to the IMF to brutalize the Greek people and other Southern Europeans. The brutalities in those countries since 2012 has been obvious. A final example on the IMF is that you see that the IMF has a new voting structure as of January 2016. At the end of December 2015, the IMF was restructured so several countries got more power. The ones that are the most important are Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) and then a lot of countries lost their voting power” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016)

He added,

“So, China went up 35%, Russia 21%, all those countries got more voting power, the BRIC. I didn’t say BRICS, I said BRIC because the countries that lost voting power started with Nigeria at 41% decline in voting power in the IMF, Venezuela 41% and all the way down to South Africa 21%. The countries that lost were the third world countries plus a few unfortunate middle-income countries and the countries that won were the BRIC countries” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016).

According to Respondent I (personal communication, 2016), this reflects a bloc that does not work in complete harmony, obviously, they kicked South Africa off the IMF boat but also it amplifies and legitimizes the power of what he would call “the natural imperialism”. .

He emphasised that “BRICS are financial sub-imperialism for legitimating the IMF and extending IMF power and legitimacy into the emerging markets.” Further, he asserts that the second part of world finance is the World Bank and the new development bank of the BRICS is going to work hand and glove with the World Bank. The World Bank fully endorsed the BRICS development bank. In this regard, the participant “does not see a real model of BRICS from below (basic needs development)” and instead sees “megaprojects and neo-liberalism”.

In fact Respondent I (personal communication, 2016), argued that BRICS countries positions on climate change will not benefit South Africa or other African nations and that “BRICS projects are very much involved in climate change amplification so that is a second good example of the BRICS being part of the imperial system legitimating what the imperialists do”. He reiterated that these are the two biggest issues of the world today are climate change and economic vulnerability per surveys which found that people around the world care mostly about climate change and global economic vulnerability.

4.2.2. The extent which South Africa’s membership in BRICS has benefited the country

The previous question dealt with the ideal situation of how BRICS *could* benefit South Africa, this section seeks to establish whether South Africa has reaped these benefits of being a member of BRICS. The findings so far show that the country has benefitted mainly in terms of enhancing its global standing. At the same time, more than 50% of the participants asserted that South Africa has not really capitalised on this space to its benefit and instead needs to clearly define what its national interests are within the BRICS alliance.

South Africa a new kid on the bloc ... too soon to tell

One of the participants from government said that it was still early to assess the benefits because South Africa is a new kid on the bloc. He however pointed out that membership of BRICS has contributed to strengthening of South Africa’ foreign policy. There are BRICS Sherpas who are dedicated to advising government and educating non-state actors on BRICS and how to participate in the processes.

Enhanced global standing ... a status thing

Even though they acknowledge the fact that South Africa has been “punching above its weight” almost all the participants (93%) except one, alluded to the issue that it comes with an enhanced status and respect to be listed among these emerging economies having the benefit of doing a common political economic strategy with the other four peers. A participant, an academic, said the fact that South Africa is in the group with countries with the fastest growing economies by being linked to China, South Africa has enhanced its voice to a certain extent while another reiterated this saying it is on the “global map” which gives a bit of weight to its standing in the world. South Africa is “part of the configuration in the geopolitical sense which moves from economic North-South to South -South and depending on what happens in the future with BRICS, South Africa will have opportunities”.

The New Development Bank in South Africa's backyard

BRICS is an informal network but they have, to an extent, formalised and institutionalised their relationship through the establishment of the BRICS Bank which is a binding and legal institution. Many of the participants cited the New Development Bank as the major benefit for South Africa. The participant from the main opposition party in South Africa said that “so far the benefit that is tangible is the fact that the New Development Bank Africa regional office (is) based in Johannesburg. Therefore, South Africa will have a leadership role to play in Africa operations.

There is space to engage

South Africa as the second biggest economy in Africa, its participation in the BRICS provide the country with a space to engage with the emerging economies from different continents that is Latin America (Brazil) Asia (India and China) and Russia. The respective countries are major economies in their own right and their populations are already in billions in the case of China and India. South Africa's participation in the BRICS gives the nation a sense of pride because it is the only country in Africa that is a member of both the BRICS and the G20.

...but no growth and no development

Unlike the perception expressed above, one of the participants from civil society said, “not so much”. on the question of whether South African participation in BRICS adds value to South African growth and development.

She said,

“We have not seen any tangible benefits from South Africa's membership in BRICS. If you talk of increased investments, more opportunities for South Africa or any kind of development that derives from South Africa's membership I have not seen it yet” (Respondent F, personal communication, 2016).

Her concern was that while South Africa hosted the BRICS Summit in 2013, there are bilateral agreements with Russia and Russian businesses in South Africa, China doing a lot in South Africa in terms of little projects in mining or construction, but in terms of big projects that add value to the country's economic growth linked to the government infrastructural development plan there is nothing tangible. She argued that if it is there it is not yet in the public domain adding “Perhaps it could be a factor of South African government communication I do not know”.

Not capitalising on existing opportunities

One of the academic participants an expert on BRICS and author of several BRICS publications said, “the challenge is that South Africa has not structured its participation in BRICS in a way that benefits the country and seems to have lost out more.” He argued that Africa is growing and needs things like investment, trains, technology and equipment among others because most of the infrastructure is colonial. Yet South Africa has failed to piggy-back on a growing Africa while other countries have capitalised on this phenomenon. For example, South Africa has been building trains here while Africa would like to expand their railway networks. Yet Chinese have come in and are increasing in numbers why is South Africa not there. Currently the Chinese have lunched onto this – for example in Rwanda and Kenya. It’s been other BRICS countries and not South Africa who have benefited from engaging in Africa.

4.3 Current state and role of non-state actors’ participation in dialogues on and decision making towards BRICS in South Africa

This section seeks to understand the state and role of non-state actors’ participation in dialogues and decision making towards BRICS in South Africa. In order to do this, it is important to understand who is currently sitting at the table; the role these sectors or actors have played in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy towards BRICS and the need understand if participants perceive these actors to be representative of South African society.

Almost all participants interviewed who have followed the BRICS processes where able to describe how different categories of non-state actors have participated in BRICS processes broadly. However, the kind of participation identified is mainly linked to the BRICS Summits. For example, one participant from government explained how the different categories of institutions have participated per assigned tracks – Track I, Track II, Track III and so forth. Another participant from an organisation that hosts the BRICS Think Tank Council explained these Tracks with Track I representing government; Think Tanks and the academic forum fall into Track II while civil society constitutes Track III.

4.3.1 Sectors involved in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy towards BRICS

In response to the question on *participants’ knowledge of which sectors have been involved in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy towards BRICS*, participants gave varied viewpoints depending on where they are sitting. Those who are in were largely of the view that all sectors are represented whereas those on the periphery felt that there were other sectors who need to be broad on board. For example, participants from government interviewed said

that all sectors have been involved saying, “it would be difficult to identify any one that has been left out.”

Academia, Think Tanks and Business council dominate

All participants identified the academia, Think Tanks and the BRICS Business Council as the key constituencies most involved in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy towards BRICS. This is evidenced by where and when these groups meet. The BRICS Academic Forum takes place prior the BRICS Summit; the BRICS Business platform takes place in the margins and in some cases prior the BRICS Summit. Some of the participants were wary of the fact that government appoints some of the non-state actors especially in the Business Council. One participant also said organisations like medical, engineering and to some extent education are in constant dialogue.

Civil society depending on which side of the fence you sit

There was a generally acknowledgment among participants that civil society beyond the three categories mentioned in the previous section, has only started being formally recognised when the first BRIC CIVIC Forum took place Russia BRICS Summit in 2015. Before that civil society used to organise parallel meetings that were not recognised officially like in 2013 when the BRICS Summit was held in Durban, South Africa.

Several participants were of the view that civil society has been given space to participate. One of the participants from a civil society organisation that has participated in BRICS spaces said that there has been considerable space given and prospects for civil society participation are high. He however acknowledged that civil society is a broad concept and the organisations participating may not be as inclusive adding that even some of the most controversial individuals have been accorded space. Another participant pointed out that government has been coordinating with civil society even between meetings. It is however difficult to evaluate if it has been effective but as far as he is concerned he was invited when BRICS vision and strategy was being developed for example. However, there are missing groups. He gave the example of indigenous people in South Africa like the San and the Khoi who are likely not to have met native Indians or native Chinese people.

The youth have begun participating in BRICS and there has already been a BRICS youth summit which provided a platform to explore opportunities that can benefit this country’s youth. For example, through scholarship programmes and exchange of academics and the attendance was high in 2015.

The participant from a faith based organisation intimated that “obviously in some way we also have faith based organisations” who have participated but this is not representative of all faith communities. However, an academic interviewed said that the faith based organisations participate but are among the most naïve. These are people who fought for justice in apartheid but are not being consistent because when they see a class struggle they run the other direction.

Labour movements have been participating but in a limited way. One of the participants said another way of thinking of labour movements’ involvement in foreign policy making including towards BRICS is to consider the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in the context of the tripartite alliance that constitute the African National Congress which is the ruling party in South Africa. This is an avenue that facilitates the contribution of labour to policy positions of government including foreign policy – so in this regard labour plays a role. Though the participant added that NEDLAC serves to rubberstamp government positions most of the time.

Respondent J (personal communication, 2016), from the main opposition party noted that political parties are hardly involved before BRICS Summits arguing that foreign policy is bureaucratic and elitist, so it is in the hands and the domain of the Head of State and the minister of Foreign affairs. Therefore, it leaves little scope for other political parties to get involved in. However, there is now a BRICS parliamentary forum which provides opportunity for engagement during Summits. Another avenue is when decisions involve processes that require parliamentary approval for issues such as the establishment of a BRICS Bank. In that regard parliamentarians’ role, has been indirect in the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees of Trade and Industry, International relations and of Justice in terms of the international treaties and alliances.

BRICS from above, BRICS from the middle and BRICS from below

As raised in previous sections, one of the participants categorised civil society into “civilised society which is very active and there’s uncivil society which is even more active but not in the official process” (Respondent I, personal communication, 2016). He asserts that what is visible is BRICS from above with very little coming from BRICS from below. He proffers that the civilised society is probably led by South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) “which masquerades itself as representing the interest of the ninety nine percent in civilised society BRICS”.

He reiterated that those from NGOs are BRICS from the middle are just individuals pursuing careers and not the interests of the communities. He challenged them to emulate India and Brazil activists who have won the battle on generic medicine for example, the working class in most BRICS are protesting at a world record in China they are forty thousand protesters a year and South Africa have won the most militant working class from EFF.

4.3.2. Role played by civil society actors in shaping South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS

Participants gave quite divergent views in response to the question *on what role have these actors (in the previous section) played in shaping South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS*. As raised by one of the participants from government, to understand the roles played by the different sectors in foreign policy decision making, it is important to understand the channels of influence that are available to these groups. For example, in the case of the BRICS Business Council, the work that they do goes via the Foreign Affairs officials. In the case of South Africa, the Director General or the Deputy Director General from DIRCO may call a meeting or for inputs on a certain issue. The outcomes of the engagements are taken to the BRICS Sherpa and the Minister. The Minister then includes these as part of South Africa's position at the Heads of State Summit. So, their inputs are received at that level. In this regard, they seem to play a crucial role in decision making.

Almost all participants concurred that academics and business sectors were identified as the most influential groups. This was attributed to the fact that they are mandated by government, well organised and have a clear platform because of the formalised structures that go in tandem with the BRICS Summit and shape the engagements in between Summits. Participants did raise the fact that there are political nuances particularly for countries like Russia, China and to some extent India as the Thinks Tanks are perceived to be aligned to government.

The business community featured highest on the list of stakeholders who have significantly contributed to South Africa's BRICS strategy document. One of the participants raised that

“Business has an upper hand and there is a coalition of business people and institutions that are interested in business opportunities in BRICS countries as well as beyond. They therefore engage as a collective in terms of bargaining and influencing policy direction” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

He intimated that,

“if you peruse through the BRICS strategy one would easily see the influence of the BRICS business council regardless of the origin, whether it be in Russia or China, so it is the same for South Africa. They even have a website” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

Business sector in BRICS were an important factor in the post-2008 financial crisis era viewed as key players in coming up with solutions to the challenges experienced during that period. They are also deemed an ally in solving South Africa’s triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and infrastructural development. The participant mentioned that “we look at the private sector as an important source of economic growth and development so whatever they say we have to listen”.

Participants interviewed raised several challenges regarding business sector participation. Cronyism is one of the issues raised by Respondent F (personal communication, 2016). She argued that it “complicates issues” adding that;

“When you look at a BRICS business forum or structures that have been created around BRICS business forum in South Africa, it tends to focus alone on black businesses. There is an element of cronyism so the question is whether the people in those structures are the right kind of business people”

Respondent F’s concern is that if;

“you talk of people who are going to contribute to a country’s strategy you want to look at both small and big businesses that are involved in multinational initiatives and beyond too. I think that is the weakness of the structure” (Respondent F, personal communication, 2016).

Another participant asserted that there is a disjuncture between what the government says of the private sector and how the private sector engages government. There is no synergy between government and big private sector companies because there is a certain level of mistrust and as a result to do not always move in unison. He however did not elaborate on specific issues where government and business are divergent. A participant from academia expressed concern that some businesses have been benefitting from South Africa’s dealings with BRICS countries such as NASPERS while other sections are suffering such as the textile industry.

Similarly, academics’ participation success was attributed to the institutionalisation of academic forum and therefore have managed to influence BRICS foreign policy. Stimulating

debate on BRICS, proposing policy solutions to government and looking at challenges affecting BRIC countries from a policy perspective and advise government were identified as the key roles of the academia in BRICS foreign policy decisions. They even contributed to drafting of the BRICS strategy document and so generally South Africa has benefited well from their participation. One of the participants described them as independent but working with government.

From the Think Tank perspective, a participant interviewed explained that,

“the organisation (a Think Tank) had been instrumental in drawing up that long-term vision that we now follow ... and for the other (BRICS) countries our partners are at the same level that we are, as research organization that we are. So, with the BRICS think tank it been very clear what their role is” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

Where participants showed divergent views is the level of other civil society sectors' participation and influence in BRICS processes. More than 60% of the participants felt that civil society participation has so far been minimum, let alone the level of influence. While civil society has provided inputs, some participants felt that it is still to be an evaluation whether the participation has been effective and has translated into action by government in the context of BRICS engagements. In the beginning because they held parallel meetings that were not part of the BRICS formal tracks, civil society did not have much influence. It is only starting now after the first CIVIC BRICS Conference held in 2015 in Russia that the door is slightly open. A participant from government confirmed that the civil society outcomes were taken to the Foreign Minister who then passed the communique to the Heads of State Summit. However, beyond the communique it is not clear whether any decision has been taken or strategic direction changed as a direct result of civil society participation.

While one participant expressed uncertainty on whether government listens to civil society while another said that “Government has organised stakeholder meetings and they have invited us to those meetings together with think tanks and other civil society groups. They then discuss issues of concern with the stake holders and they have the opportunity to influence.”

There was also another view that civil society has not played much of a role. A few NGOs like Oxfam have been “trying to set up some BRICS Civil Society Forum of some sort with the support from the government”. The first big summit that civil society held in 2015 showed that the role of civil society was unclear including how to engage. The participant said that

“While we know that what they said contributed to the Heads of State Summit eventually. We find the process of how this needs to be done still needs to be unpacked, so (this research) is going to be very helpful to motivate how all these different types of organisations can come together” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

He was hopeful because there is an understanding that the different BRICS groupings are looking for sustained systematic ways of bringing everyone together right now and if they have something that talks about this is very useful.

Respondent A also expressed that,

“civil society’s influence is determined by the extent to which the BRICS Sherpas are giving voice and opportunities to civil society. At least there is a formal engagement process where the things get passed on. But it is almost as if, it depends on the country which is hosting the Summit to determine how these things get passed on (to Heads of State Summit)” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

A participant expressed his hope, “Russia set the precedent in 2015 when a BRICS CIVICS Forum was held, followed by India. It is anticipated that this trajectory will continue.”

4.3.3. Perceptions of representativity of non-state actors that participate in BRICS

Except for participants from government and a few others from civil society, most participants (60%) interviewed were of the view that civil society groupings currently participating in BRICS is not representative of South Africa.

Participants from DIRCO said civil society organisations that have participated are representative of South African Society. One said, “I think to a large extent yes, there is a large variety of different civil societies and we have some initiatives in Cape Town, Durban, Gauteng and other places” but saw the need to expand to other places in the country. This was echoed by about 40% participants from civil society representatives interviewed who have been sitting at the table in terms of BRICS processes.

However, Respondent J, from the main opposition party proffered that, “There is need for improvement in terms of involvement of the broader society where BRICS is concerned, so

far it has been an elitist organisation and not broad enough” (Respondent J, personal communication, 2016).

He put forward that BRICS is a bureaucratic institution and most of the interaction is at the executive levels. The processes have not come down to the ground.” There is movement for broader participation of broader civil society. He pointed to the fact that “there is need to have civil society, political parties, religious sector, because so far we have the academics, business, government and labour are the most dominant and consistent”.

Civil society formations and academics out of touch with communities

Of those who participated, the quality of participation was also questioned by participants. Several participants were of the view that civil society organisations are pursuing a radical stance and are out of touch with the communities that they claim to represent. Similarly, academics tend to focus on theory and on how the world should be. They fail to respond to what the world is and instead speak of an ideal world. From that perspective, some participants felt that these stakeholders are out of touch. A concern was raised that the average person on the street is likely to have no idea what BRICS is even some professionals have no idea how BRICS impacts on them.

It is difficult to be representative

Several participants problematised the issue of being representative. One of the participants proffered that “It will never be representative” arguing that once a government is elected in a democratic multi-party system like South Africa then they are the ones who will make national policy. “He who wins elections forms government then policy will be formulated.”

The participant drew parallels with the NEDLAC which is an institutionalised and legally recognised policy making space that brings labour, business, civil society and government together. In this regard when it comes to civil society, it does not mean that everyone is there, it just means that whoever is invited hoping that they are representative of the views and needs of the people. Business is part of civil society and even then, in business not everyone is there; academics not all universities and colleges are there. The participant concluded that,

“to an extent and in comparison, to other processes especially with a focus on international affairs and foreign policy, I think it (BRICS processes) has been

progressive though much more could still be done particularly in domesticating the BRICS agenda” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

To achieve this, he suggested that at national level there is need to ensure that there is a buy in from citizens and they are aware of South Africa’s role in BRICS and somewhere else in matters of international fora and multilateralism. This participant said “I am satisfied ... even now civil society (is) running short of things to say about BRICS because there is nothing hidden. Of course, there will be issues of disagreement like nuclear and Russia.”

Even within the same sector there may be differences in leanings and to ensure all the viewpoints are represented can also be difficult according to participants interviewed. For example, Think Tanks which are part of civil society have different leanings. There are those who are extreme leftist, then those who are left whilst others are moderate and others right wing so the issue of ensuring its representative is work in progress. The participant called on everyone to be patient with each other until BRICS is representative.

Respondent G was of the view that,

“Even within civil society there is Action-aid, Oxfam and so and we all assume they are representative of the people ensuring that their needs and views are reflecting the people’s voice. The question then becomes to what extent you consult citizens or the constituents that the different organisations serve. Whether it is the big business sector which is organised there is need representatives for the small and medium entrepreneurs too for them to participate and influence decisions. For example, countries like China and India where there is high entrepreneurial spirit but there is also heavy participation by the state-owned enterprises, whereas in Brazil and South Africa, its more influenced by the big business sector. The ordinary citizen who might be an entrepreneur or an ordinary activist finds it difficult to participate” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

The challenges of representativity call for the need to build alliances and harness citizens’ and groupings’ collective strength and capacities so that we are then able to influence policy matters related to BRICS. One participant said that collecting inputs from a variety of players to make policy recommendations is difficult like the submissions at BRICS have been a cumbersome process to agree on a sentence or even a comma, so one can imagine when it comes to submitting a paragraph and a booklet.

At BRICS Summits, the level of representation depends on the host country

In terms of the CIVIC BRICS, as civil society participation at BRICS Summits has come to be known, it is up to the host country to decide who comes. For example, at the first official civil society forum in Russia, it was the host government that sent the invitations to organisations and individuals. The participant who closely follows BRICS summits mentioned that “We advise them of certain organisations that could come but it is up to them to make the decision”.

For example, in 2015 the government contacted HSRC which hosts the Think Tank to help them identify groups. They tried to bring in organisations they have worked with. According to a participant from the organisation,

“It was not 100% representative because of the struggle in how the vetting process is done. They need to have a very thorough understanding of the civil society groupings and what level the organisations operate at and who is it that they support” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

He asserted that civil society groupings by their very nature are very different. Some are involved in the grass roots level, where they actively engage in communities, whereas there are some that are involved with government meetings at that level. Therefore, it is important to understand what type of organisation you want to engage and how you bring them in.

The participant described the process of inviting groups,

“In the end, we contacted quite a few people and because they were contacted last minute they could not go as they had other planned things. There was also trouble with the visas with some visas being approved only a week before or even less from when they needed to leave” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016).

Even from the outset the organisation that were selected were too few and just a small section was representative. He said that even though they are a research institution they saw the need to engage the community and tried to step up seminars and colloquiums but had not budgeted for that. The organisation then tried to bring other groups like youth on board as well as trade unions but as this is not their space it was difficult. Trade unions participated at the three preparatory meetings held in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town ahead of Moscow in 2015.

It is important to broaden the notion of civil society

Another issue brought to the fore is the need to broaden the notion of civil society. Respondent L (personal communication, 2016) an academic where he argues that South Africa is not harnessing the assets and skills of the non-state actors like the huge minority groups present in South Africa. There is a common understanding that one must understand the culture of the country you are dealing with when you conduct trade negotiations.

He said,

“Why does the government (of South Africa) not link up with minority groups here like the Jewish and Chinese to understand their cultures ahead of doing deals abroad with China for example. Lessons can be drawn from NASPAR where the Chinese own 35% and are doing extra-ordinarily well in SAPPI” (Respondent L, personal communication, 2016).

He asserts that the government is not using this civil society capacity to reap the benefits of being in BRICS. For example, lessons could be learnt even from Indian and Chinese families who are rooted in South Africa who have companies on the continent that have been in existence for over 100. It is important to learn what it is that has led them to do well.

4.4 Widening the circle

This section seeks to determine whether it necessary to widen the circle of the non-state actors participating in BRICS dialogues and decision making. If so, the research aimed to gain an understanding of who is missing, what has limited their participation and if they participated what value they would bring.

4.4.1 Necessity of participation of different sections of South African society BRICS dialogues or decision making

In response to the question, *do you think it is necessary to ensure participation of the different sections of South African society when it comes to dialogues on or decision making towards BRICS*, there was a broad consensus among the participants on the need to ensure participation of different sections of South African society. One of the participants from academia summed up the view of the most of those interviewed when he said, “Broadly we need all of South Africa capacity to contribute reminding all that most intellectual, financial and knowledge lies outside of the state” (Respondent L, personal communication, 2016). However, there were a few outliers who felt that there was no need and the issue of BRICS should be the preserve of experts and those who have an interest in the matter. It was not necessary to involve everyone.

Conceptual issues came to the fore

Participants brought several conceptual issues to the fore in responding to the issue of participation by different sectors of South African society in dialogues and decision making towards BRICS. Most common was the need to unpack the issue of participation, understanding what BRICS is, consensus building and establishing horizontal networks among others. One of the participants argued that it was important to understand the idea of participation in governance issues.

He said,

“Participation has always been an issue in terms of global governance issues (and) in terms of development frameworks. It has also been an issue to have a balanced combination of bottom up approaches, even where sometimes the top down approach is something we cannot avoid.”

He added,

“It is always important, it can only enhance the partnerships. If we want to define human development in a holistic way, then we should be concerned about issues of human rights, issues of inclusivity and how minority issues are addressed” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

Respondent K was also of the view that from civil society expressed that there has always been a sense that DIRCO has not been engaging sufficiently with civil society in South Africa. He described several reasons why this is conceptually important for the country.

“The first one is that the Constitution always promotes participation, so a participatory foreign policy is a concept that is important in the South African space. Second is that there is a lot of civil society groups in the country that work regionally, continentally and globally because of the country’s unique position of having access resources. In this regard, there are a lot of foreign policy Think Tanks and civil society groups who would want to engage with South Africa” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

He also recalled how South Africa is an important player on the globe and the continent with Pretoria being second to Washington in the world in term of the number of diplomats deployed globally. Therefore, foreign policy is a significant issue in South Africa “which makes consultations quite an important”.

The participant highlighted how DIRCO has used public diplomacy and called on agents of public diplomacy program to be more engaged with civil society. He reiterated the challenge raised in previous sections on the way civil society is structured at the moment but also the fact that officials and diplomats “focus more on popularising South Africa’s foreign policy and less about consulting. So that is a bit of a challenge.”

To facilitate civil society participation, a participant applauded how DIRCO has established a council for international relations SACOIR led by former Minister Aziz Pahad. It is meant to facilitate engagement with civil society and academics. SACOIR is meant to be independent and sort of policies South Africa’s foreign policy. He however challenged its independence saying, “While it is a fantastic initiative but there will always be questions around its independence and whether it should receive its budget from DIRCO or if it should have separate budget so that its autonomous.”

In drawing parallels with the challenge government faces in ensuring civil society participation in foreign policy, a participant highlighted the Open Government Partnership (OGP), as one area where DIRCO has been engaging in several ways. While it is necessary to ensure different sectors participate the government is still grappling with coming up with a national engagement strategy. The main critique from the participant is that “when they (DIRCO) want to engage with civil society it is often at short notice and there is a propensity towards box ticking. So, there is no meaningful engagement.”

Another example that could be drawn on is how DIRCO calls impromptu meetings with civil society from time to time to brief them on several issues, especially ahead of UN major events Climate Change talks. These situations usually take the form of updating sessions than collecting views. There are also dialogues related to the European Union and South Africa on human rights where civil society participation from both sides has been visible. So, South Africa tries to partner with civil society to practice public diplomacy which is encouraging but not from a decision-making perspective. However, the participant commended South Africa’s effort compared to other African countries. The only issue is that the country has set for itself a high standard so should not necessarily compare with poorly performing countries.

Another theme that came up is that is very difficult to give a straight forward position on whether it is important to ensure inclusion of all sections of civil society in BRICS engagements and decision-making process. Having worked for one of the think tanks that has BRICS as one of its focus areas, she argued that, “the fact that not everyone is

participating “is the nature of the beast”. There is need to appreciate what BRICS is especially for those people who are involved. They seem to lack the understanding that the BRICS is a new forming group of countries.

“BRICS is actually a collective and can do nothing for South Africa in terms of other challenges that they as fellow BRICS are also facing”. She questioned if one thinks India is going to abandon its labour issues and deal with South Africa. “No that is not going to happen. In any case there are inter-ministerial meetings happening but nothing comes out of it” (Respondent F, personal communication, 2016).

Linked to this is the issue that there is no adequate information available around BRICS. This is experienced by all groups whether it is academic, civil societies, business. This is one of the reasons that there is a lack of appreciation of what BRICS is and its role as explained in the sections above. Respondent M (personal communication, 2016) asserted that, “The bulk of the conversations are devoid of reality ... It is only useful to widen the circle if you are really sure that those who you are dealing with know and appreciate BRICS” to make it worthwhile. It would also help if government carries much of the communication so that everyone understands the logic of participating in the BRICS. This will enable citizens to subscribe to the agenda. Currently there are a lot of prejudices and myths around BRICS and China. Some of it is because people are not aware or exposed. It is therefore important to ensure a wider representation of civil society.

Rather the platform could be used to champion pure learning challenging South Africa to learn from how Brazil is addressing similar challenges they face such as racism, social inequality and economic inequality. She argued that “but we do not see that”. If BRICS is about pure learning, there is nothing they can do for each other like giving aid. Every Summit there is emphasis on economic growth or BRICS condemns this and that and BRICS support so and so. The participant felt that it is a talk shop as she is yet to see the tangible results in terms of its benefit to the average person on the ground. By implication it may not be necessary to for the people’s involvement in BRICS processes.

Consensus

Participants identified bringing in citizen voices including advocacy groups as important for accountability and consensus building. However, this means governments may not tackle certain issues because of the need to reach consensus at all costs to ensure that the interstate cooperation thrives.

Horizontal networks, enhancing South-South Cooperation

An issue highlighted by participants is that participation across sectors enhances South-South cooperation. Civil society is often accused by government of receiving money from the west thus perceived to be pushing a western agenda, so looking at BRICS not only as a platform for government is essential in that we start to have those horizontal networks that will allow for all forms of collaboration between citizens in these countries. This could be around a myriad of thematic areas including women empowerment, disabilities, youths and so forth. India, China and Brazil are emerging economies and important players not only in South Africa but on the continent. In a context where South Africa is one of the biggest players on the continent and there are joint economic activities or investments in mining ventures and construction by these BRICS countries they tend to have a social cost. For example, in the case of mining there may be issues such as displacement of local communities this provides opportunities for societies affected by the mining operation to be at the table and enjoy solidarity from other communities in the BRICS countries. Together they can apply pressure to authorities in their respective countries to ensure that the ventures are sensitive to the socio-economic impact of these joint investments.

Bringing out the human face

Linked to horizontal networks, a theme that emerged is that including several sectors of civil society can help bring out the human face. This is an important aspect in development cooperation. The paradox is that development often comes with underdevelopment of marginalised communities. This is exacerbated by the fact that BRICS countries are already characterised by some of the most unequal societies such as Brazil, one of the most unequal country in the world along with South Africa and India also faced with high levels of inequality. There are many people in these countries who feel that they are being left behind. In that sense being representative of society is important, not only for South Africa.

4.4.2 Mapping missing sectors and actors who should be actively involved in BRICS

To unpack sectors and actors who are currently not participating but should be actively involved in BRICS processes, Respondent K (personal communication, 2016) argued that it is important to explore how we understand civil society. He said most of the time civil society is usually limited to what has become conventional civil society that is funded by Northerners and working mostly on human rights. Even with conventional civil society it is much broader than that. There are community based organisations, there is the tripartite alliance in South Africa which includes the labour sector, political parties, private sector including banking and associations like BUSA, academia and so forth. He alluded to “a notion that DIRCO is (perceived to be) arrogant and there have not really been listening to their mother body, the

African National Congress, so there is a bit of tension there” but that is also another way of thinking of non-state actors.

Youth can be a formidable force

Several participants identified the youth as a formidable force and yet are often not included in most processes especially at international level. Be it at the United Nations, G20 and other such fora. They are often not part of the mainstream discourse and often have side contributions which is a big critic brought forward by at least 30% of the participants. For example, one participant gave the example of G20 which tries to have youth forums on a regular basis but thinks that they are not taken seriously.

To demonstrate the power of the youth (Respondent F, personal communication, 2016) said, “Think Tunisia and the Arab Spring was championed by the youth. If you look at the previous revolutions the youths were at the forefront.” Careful attention needs to be paid to this issue because youths form the bulk of those that are not employed and are often biggest source of the disturbances. She gave the example of how it is manifesting itself in South Africa in the form of university fees protests and offshoot political parties like the Economic Freedom Front comprised mainly of youths who are frustrated. There is concern that it does not seem like government is paying much attention but is seen to be consulting the formalised structures like the academics and business sector.

The unorganised communities

Most participants cited commonly “unorganised” communities comprising mainly of grassroots organisations, most faith based organisations and small entrepreneurs as examples of communities that should be brought on board. Respondent G (personal communication, 2016), drew an example of how vibrant engagements can be when it involves communities where he cited the self-organised civil society forum that ran parallel to the 2013 Durban BRICS Summit, was impressed with the level of participation by community activists representing Southern Durban environmental organisations. They were participating and sharing experiences on the impact of BRICS investments in the extractive sector and this gave that human face which helps to shape the views of the policy makers and hence policy. He added “I would say more grassroots and small enterprises because the big business sector is already there while not in totality but it already has a voice.”

Engagement beyond economics and trade

At least nine (64%) of the participants said the engagement BRICS engagement was all about economics and trade so it would be difficult to include other issues. One of the

participants, a professor, summed it up by quoting Bill Clinton who said, “it is the economy, stupid”.

Another participant raised an identical issue,

“It is all about economics. They (BRICS) are there for themselves, as much as they act as a collective, at the end of the day. That is, they attempted to and they still do, spy on each other in the run up to BRICS summit so that they know what the other is producing on this and this item, so it is about economic diplomacy” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016)

However, it should be added that the countries are trying to be mindful of “principles around effective aid and development, non-conditional support, especially from South Africa, China, India, to an extent Brazil and maybe not so much Russia.

Not the same organisations over and over

Participants interviewed from DIRCO intimated that civil society groups participating in BRICS processes should be more inclusive and it would be more desirable if more diverse organisations attend BRICS parallel meetings even if not official ones. They observed that “the same organisations participate again and again and there should be different ones and perhaps this could help influence government’s role.”

4.4.3 Understanding what has limited civil society’s participation

Almost all participants identified time and money as limiting civil society members and organisations’ participation in BRICS processes. One participant from government mentioned that government is not able to give this money to civil society organisations to facilitate their participation in such processes. Therefore, organisations such as the HSRC host meetings because they are well resourced.

Another issue identified by those interviewed was the issue of the nature of BRICS engagements. For example, the participant from the main opposition party presented the view that it partly because of the “elitist nature of BRICS discussions” so it becomes difficult for community based organisations and other marginalised communities to effectively contribute. In addition, advocacy by civil society groups already involved is required to motivate others. He lamented that, “once these engagements take place, there is no systematic follow up on the matters raised. This could take the form of action plan following a meeting; identifying a champion that will take the matters forward and a way that people can work together” (Respondent J, personal communication, 2016).

A participant similarly lamented,

“There is no one to officially facilitate how civil society can work together and this is linked to budget. In India and China there are initial investments that people are willing to make. For example, paying whether R10 or R20,000 to invest in the infrastructure that can be used to keep people in the loop and ensure participation and continuous dialogue” (Respondent H, personal communication, 2016).

In South Africa after summits there is no feedback loop to appraise other people and ensure other interests are developed. That is the major difficulty since “there is nobody else left to pick up the pieces after the meetings and conferences.” Hence this limits participation.

4.4.4 Unpacking the value addition that currently excluded civil society organisations would bring

Most participants responded to this question together with the previous questions on identifying actors that are not actively involved or not participating visibly in BRICS processes and thought leadership.

A key issue not discussed earlier is that all these groups could help define South Africa’s national interest. For example, a participant from an institution that holds public dialogues on South Africa’s foreign policy mentioned that “It could also be a way to make sure that no-one is not left behind and everyone is taken on board to achieve a desired goal of advancing and enhancing South Africa’s national interest.”

4.5 Conceptualising an engagement model for non-state actors’ participation in BRICS processes in South Africa

This section presents participants’ suggestions of an engagement model for non-state actors’ participation in BRICS processes in South Africa. It seemed quite a difficult task to come up with a comprehensive model for those interviewed though there were insights that can provide a foundation to develop such a model. Most felt that it is civil society that should organise and determine the nature and ways of engaging government regards BRICS processes or foreign policy making for that matter.

4.5.1 Perceptions on government’s role in facilitating civil society participation in BRICS

There were two main schools of thought that emerged from the question *How do you think government can facilitate their participation*. More than 60% of participants asserted that it was not government’s business neither is it ideal for them to organise civil society’s participation in BRICS processes but instead government should focus on creating an

enabling environment to facilitate their participation. The remainder suggested that while government may not prescribe how they should be organised they need to provide the resources and suggested some of the ways that government could facilitate the engagement.

A participant singled out SACOIR as missed opportunity by government to make the advisory body more representative or at least in the future, the process that leads to selection of the people who serve can be done in a way that demonstrates more transparency and inclusivity. This would then be one of the avenues for civil society to engage on BRICS along with other foreign policy matters in an inclusive way.

To ensure meaningful participation, it was suggested that government should

“shift away from an updating approach to real engagement that says we (government) want to formulate this policy, how do we do it? What are the views of the interested stakeholders so that even those rules of engagement about when does the government appraise people are also outcome of that process?” (Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

A participant suggested that government could enhance participation by improving the asymmetrical distribution of resources to increase the capacity of civil society to be able to engage. Currently the trend is that civil society organisations that are better resourced like Oxfam are in a better position to influence foreign policy discussions. This is because they can advocate and have better chances of securing a platform with policy makers because they have the resources to do so. The suggestion from one participant was that to have a truly consultative process would involve going all out to as many people as possible so that those who are participating are not only because they have resources to do so that everyone who must be involved is involved.

One suggestion put forward is that government could hold a national dialogue by hosting an annual national summit on BRICS. Invitees would include labour, religious organisations, civil society, business, political parties, local communities and all possible stakeholders in one room to unpack South Africa’s role in BRICS, what it means for South Africans and explore the benefits that the country can derive out of this alliance. However, the dialogue would have to be continuous because of the nature of international relations in that it evolves.

The engagement process would involve public diplomacy anchored by DIRCO but working with other government departments such as Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), tourism, Department of Small Business, Department of Economic Development and all those that are involved in BRICS. They would do this with civil society based on the respective groupings' levels of interest.

In the absence of an NGO coordinating body, government does not have capacity

Respondent B (personal communication, 2016) from DIRCO mentioned that, "Government has been very frank to say that we can facilitate but just imagine how many NGOs and Civil society members there are throughout the country. There needs to be a way of organising." The participant lamented the fact that the South African NGO Coalition that used to bring together all civil society organisations under one umbrella is no longer functional or at least a vibrant entity even though it has not shut completely. There is no mechanism to ensure that any grouping selected is representative of civil society. However, the participant was quick to point out that SANGOCO itself was a challenge because it was just another bureaucracy. This void gives an opportunity for real multi thematic way of organising. Engaging BRICs is not about everything at the same time, but being able to pull organisations with interest to focus on the respective issues within their competence areas.

Government cannot be convener and funder

More than 60% of participants from both civil society and government were reluctant to say, "government could facilitate." A common refrain was that rather government should just open the space but it depends on who and how the facilitation is done. Another participant expressed "fear that once government is given the responsibility to organise civil society then there will be "Government Organised NGOs (GONGOs) and not NGOS". To illustrate why this is not ideal one participant gave an example of what happened in Russia ahead of the CIVIC BRICS Forum. The civil society that worked closely with government to organise the civil society forum was "likely viewed as just government organised civil society whether it was a think tank or an NGO, there was a government hand in it, when things get choreographed there is no space to articulate views freely without upsetting the system."

However, the participant contrasted this with the South African government for opening the space and opportunity for engagement. The BRICS Sherpa and BRICS secretary responded instantly to messages and would invite civil society to some of their meetings. It is only an issue of expanding more on the public diplomacy around BRICs and domesticating the BRICS agenda and vice versa. The foreign policy needs to better articulate the question of

national interest. So, that articulation of what national interest depends on the issue under discussion. This is where there are complaints from civil society if not all voices are heard. For example, when nuclear deals were signed with China in the name of national interest to ensure that there is energy security, people only heard about it when there was a big deal with Russia. Linking these issues would give better prospects for coordination and effective citizen participation.

Another limitation cited is that government works according to election cycles – especially decision makers even though bureaucrats are meant to be apolitical they work according to the instructions from the ruling party of the day. So, they are likely not to include dissenting voices. Therefore, government cannot be expected to be the convener of things and the funder because those funds are likely to be channelled to civil society that supports government or wants to be in government.

As government opens the space, civil society needs to organise first

Linked to opening of space is the issue that civil society needs to organise itself first so that it can occupy the space offered effectively. One participant said, “civil society must put their house in order first”. Another participant from civil society said,

“I would say first we would need to organise ourselves as non-state actors across different sectors and diplomatic areas, build our collective capacity for engagement with BRICS and other policy making forums, whether lateral or domestic” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

He added that it was a

“Constitutional imperative as you would know that it is there in the Constitution that there should be participation by citizens and other organised formations in governance so there is better articulation of views and inputs of the citizens” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

For example, during the preparatory meetings for the BRICS Summit in Russia in 2015, civil society was not coordinated and there were different voices in terms of approach. There were different opinions on how civil society could engage. According to the participant, “Some people preferred inside lobbying while others advocated for street protests and others wanted both strategies used.” He added, “I guess there is sufficient consensus around the role of BRICS in the world in South Africa but we differ on tactics and strategies on how best

we can engage.” In the lead to the Summit held in Russia, there was such a rift so much that others decided not to travel based on principle.

The participant from government put forward that while there is recognition that civil society needs to have a voice “it is up to them as well, the government has done a lot to try and pull them in, you cannot force them”. He was of the view that he could not put forward an engagement model as government but civil society should do that.

However, while Respondent J (personal communication, 2016) from the main opposition party agreed on the need for civil society to organise itself domestically so that they speak with one voice, he was of the view that, “they should be organised systematically by government” arguing that it was difficult to imagine civil society from Soweto organising itself to go to a Summit with civil society in Brazil, “you need government to facilitate that as long as they are organised domestically, then government can facilitate that”.

Scope to build from the BRICS CIVIC Forum in Russia

Some participants who attended the BRICS CIVIC Forum in Moscow were of the view that there is scope to build from the effort made that year to institutionalise civil society participation at BRICS during that 2015 summit. One of the participant from the faith based organisation network (Respondent E, personal communication, 2016) was part of the people who wrote a concept note on formalizing or institutionalizing BRICS civil society ahead of Russia. This involved negotiating with Sherpas from South Africa, India, Brazil and even the Chinese and Russia. What surprised them is that even if the Russians are considered not that open to independent civil society they were the first to institutionalise a CIVIC BRICS. The result is that the Moscow Declaration recognises civil society as an emerging faculty in BRICS.

4.5.2 Forms of participation and designing engagements

Several forms of participation were suggested by participants and are highlighted in this section. What emerged is that there should be local ownership where people can identify their own organisation’s contributions in the outcomes of all forms of engagement. Some of the suggestions put forward are around BRICS Summit preparations while some involve continuous engagement.

Participants agreed that this is a difficult process and would always have contestations. It was suggested that perhaps it would be prudent to start small by bringing organisations that are willing to be active in this space. Once they get the ball rolling, they can start to widen the

network and then bring in more people. This would ensure that there is a core set of people that are willing to actively engage in that. Respondent A (personal communication, 2016), gave an example government officials hold seminars every two months or so but there is a risk that at times there is some form of fatigue on issues, especially on issues that have been discussed for too long or the other extreme not sufficiently. In that regard government struggles to get good participation in those events. Equally there is need to figure out a way to effectively engage people and not lose momentum once you start.

Respondent A (personal communication, 2016) gave an analogy that after the Russia Summit there was energy and we said to people whether you are representative or not it's up to you now to spread the word. This is because all those who attended belong to organisations and are linked so can start to bring in more people. But this energy lasted for a short time as civil society is quiet. Participants praised that some organisations have the "back to country sessions" where they brain storming, but it has not sustained which is a challenge. The few people involved do not work on these issues full time in their organisations or communities.

The most common recurring theme raised by more than 50% of the participants in one form or another was workshops at local level or some form of community level engagement. A participant argued that the BRICS civil society engagement should learn from other forms of community engagements already taking place. He said that in a collective space of democracy there are examples of national participation such as imbizos, several legislative frameworks and the Integrated Development Plans which are all frameworks for citizen participation in local level and national planning processes. So, when it comes to national issues of multilateral and global governance, similar approaches need to be employed. It is a question of how government qualitatively facilitates this. The different civil society groups should also be able to convene on their own such as business and academics that already do.

He also argued that engagement in BRICS could take lessons from multilateral forums for example like the African Development Bank which has a framework for enhanced citizen's engagement and for accountability. Russia was just the beginning and it should now be for all BRICS countries' civil society to have an institutionalised mechanism for policy dialogue. The question will always be to what extent will everyone be involved - who is in and who is out and may never be exhaustive. It should just be a mutually beneficial process with whoever is involved."

A participant suggested that “During those engagements civil society can internally identify who should represent them”. For example, Summits take place away from the country let alone the communities - you need a way of collecting inputs that are locally endorsed which can be consolidated and passed on to Heads of State at the Summits and have a mechanism for providing feedback. At the moment, participation is stuck at that level where inputs go to the summit and ends there.

Participants came up with other suggestions such as establishing a crosscutting platform like NEDLAC or a governing body or committee of different constituencies like SANGOCO, which will be a formalised accountability process between civil society and government led by DIRCO or one that is semi-institutionalised.

Thematic advocacy clusters and one broad civil society network

Thematic advocacy engagements were another form of participation proffered. This would entail that organisations do advocacy work organised into different thematic sectors like gender, tax, and land among different themes. Then civil society groupings amongst themselves can then come up with the structures with support from those organisations with funding dedicated to this. They could set up some sort of network with likeminded people grouped together and they coordinate their finances and manage the process – either targeted at BRICS specifically or to engage on foreign policy issues.

Participants identified resources and leadership as a pre-requisite that would enable any form of structure. One participant said, “... without resources that would actually be difficult”. Another added,

“Whatever platform that is conceived should have leadership otherwise that platform is doomed. It is important to have a systematic way of engaging and be semi-institutionalised. A framework should be in existence for interaction between the stakeholders that is, civil society and government where sectors will come together and engage in issues that are important in South Africa” (Respondent F, personal communication, 2016).

For example, during Sustainable Development Goals consultations where the UN Secretary General identified a few coordinators and they put out questions and gathered responses. These responses, were made visual so that people could engage online.

Online engagement

Linked to visualising data was a recurring theme that engagements could take place on the internet. A participant suggested that you could explore at a lot of virtual networks or internet based solutions and set up forums for people to suggest a model. Based on the interactions, the information could be used to understand what type of organisations are participating and what they would like to participate in as well as the type of engagement they would like. This could then lead to the process of developing a model or an online platform.

Through this channel there could be formal and informal interactions. One participant argued that this way it is quite easy for people to link with each other. Partners can be identified who lead the process.

Another participant lamented that

“Currently, internet is underutilised even for domestic purposes and ensure that those in remote areas have access while also increasing the country’s bandwidth. This would complement exchange visits and other forms of local and international cooperation with BRICS countries” (Respondent H, personal communication, 2016).

Perhaps a revolution?

One of the participants gave a different suggestion that warrants a discussion on its own. There is a view that civil society should have a revolution and put in place socialist political parties. This is because he believed it is naïve to believe that BRICS is set up to help South Africa or individual countries. Instead he asserts that it is set up to extract products and rip off the ordinary person. Therefore, civil society should not support BRICS and instead become a “nuisance” to the establishment to achieve change.

4.5.3 Thinking about modalities and purposes of BRICS civil society engagements?

The modalities of engagement and consultation should be improved so that participation is “truly as broad as possible”. Participants put forward several suggestions for the purpose and modalities of such engagements.

Some participants suggested periodic consultations. For example, there can be structured quarterly meetings complemented by ad hoc ones as the need arises. Another participant suggested three levels of engagement. He proposed that the first would involve crafting of policies which should be more inclusive. Then the second is through SACOIR or some other way which can be used as a vehicle to host a civil society conference one or if need be twice a year to related to foreign policy including BRICS. The third level would be the ad hoc

meetings that cannot be avoided. In essence, consultations should not be reactive but proactive.

Whatever avenues are available or made available to civil society it is important to ensure that what is ends up at the Heads of State Summit and become something that the countries adopt. Civil society must involve government to ensure that the recommendations that are put forward are passed on to those attending the Summit. So, it is difficult to understand those that advocate for the exclusion of government because if the civil society movement put outs recommendations they have to answer to where would they go from there and how would they be officially recognised.

The respondents lamented that while there are some few initiatives that happen within the year many more activities happen two months before the BRICS Summit goes on where there are engagements and recommendations go to the HOS and then there is a quiet period again. There is a quiet period and then suddenly when it nearly time for another summit there is a spike of activities again.

Another challenge that came out strongly over and over is that civil society does not have some form of structures in place where organisations can be engaged or involved. This would require funding and preparations to get civil society ready for summit. This is not happening systematically. One participant referred to 2015 when there was a lot of engagement and government was trying to formulate a strategy for the BRICS, which follows the 5 pillars. By 2016 the pillars had been identified and were gearing for research into those five areas but there was not much engagement. A respondent argued that it remains important to develop and test some form of structure that says that this is how civil society should engage. There is need for some form of structure that allows organisations to communicate between themselves.

Modalities should ensure that representatives gather people's positions on the issues that they are discussing and organise them according to the BRICS Pillars or even the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and formulate positions based on what these goals mean to people before the ideas get passed on.

One of the participants also suggested that perhaps the engagements should not only be limited to the BRICS countries particularly around the Summit but other countries as well. For

example, in Russia civil society organisations were invited from countries that surround BRICS countries like Zimbabwe, Argentina, Mexico.

He said,

“It opened my eyes to the things that are happening internationally, so Russia had actually invited organisations from the rest of the BRICS and surrounding countries. Civil Society had the opportunity to understand what the other countries are going through, you can identify with their struggles and there a lot of discussion that goes on. It is important that engagements are continuous and do not wait for a summit to engage these organisations that are willing to participate” (Respondent A, personal communication, 2016)

Similarly another participant highlighted that modalities need to take into account that decisions in BRICS are by consensus. Not all five countries agree on something. Similarly, civil society formations may not necessarily agree and the engagement mechanism needs to take that into consideration. There are issues such as defence and military issues that can be contentious.

4.6 How does South Africa develop a civil society capacity to promote BRICS positions?

Participants surfaced several ways that South Africa could develop civil society capacity. One participant said however to be able to do this it is important to “understand what needs doing and what is on the fixed agenda in terms of South Africa’s engagement in BRICS. This should determine the capacity gaps that need to be addressed about how civil society interacts with BRICS processes. They can then identify areas that can be learnt from other countries or those that South Africa needs to invest in.” A participant cautioned that for this to work DIRCO should not act in secret but be open to the public. For example, if the President is going to China, citizens should have an idea of the contents of the mission beyond announcing that he has gone out of the country. This will ensure that civil society develops the capacity to be able to promote positions on the issues being discussed.

Another issue highlighted by a participant is that, “DIRCO should hold meetings to orient civil society by giving full briefings to civil society on the developments regarding BRICS so that they remain abreast of the issues exercising the Member States.” A government participant said that DIRCO has tried to do this. The challenge is that of the civil society involved in BRICS, a big proportion of pure academics who do not necessarily relate to the ordinary

person on a practical level. For instance, an academic from economics can write a paper about how BRICS could capitalise on the alliance to create economic growth but that paper does not talk to the ordinary person and sometimes even the realities of the world and is mostly theoretical. That is the difficulty with engaging mainly academics only and may not develop the capacity of the other civil society members.

Participants identified issues of interests as important to consider when designing the engagement model because you have to be reminded that non-state actors are funded by other parties and it is also about the flavour of the month. BRICS was very appealing in 2013 because South Africa was hosting the summit and everyone was working on the BRICS.

Continuous engagement is necessary

Continuous engagement was also another way of building civil society capacity that was identified by participants. While it is important to follow the BRICS Summit and big events as a necessary aspect of policy making just like following the State of the Nation Address which provides a basis for the Budget speech usually made just after; it would be necessary to anchor this within the realm of building a civil society global movement. This should constitute civil society from the Global South having space to express solidarity amongst nations and amongst people to people.

One of the participants who has been taking part in BRICS processes said that his organisation,

“has been trying to engage on a continual process at national level by holding dialogues with citizens and bring business and government. It is important to express solidarity on topical social justice issues whether it is on gender justice looking at the issue of women’s rights in China or anything else” (Respondent G, personal communication, 2016).

Participants were aware that this is not easy but there is need to find common ground and identify synergies as is the case with European citizens.

4.7 Non-state actors - To participate or not to participate in South Africa’s BRICS processes

4.7.1 What would be the benefits for non-state actors’, especially civil society, participation in BRICS?

Participants were unanimous in the opinion that it is beneficial for non-state actors to participate in BRICS processes. Most expressed that there is a “massive benefit” for the government and country on the one hand and for civil society on the other. It also promotes ownership by the people of government’s decisions it takes in BRICS. A participant from government highlighted the intentional commitment in the BRICS strategy to promote “people to people connectivity”.

Policy influence is one benefit accrued from civil society participation. A participant from government said, “Influencing the long-term vision and the mindsets of leaders including the State Presidents of BRICS countries is one of the benefits of civil society involvement.” For example, during the Russia Summit, President Vladimir Putin addressed civil society at the CIVIC BRICS even though the country is perceived not to be too open to civil society participation.

Furthermore, civil society’s participation promotes ownership of government decisions and positions. Respondent C (personal communication, 2016) from government gave the example of civil society participation in developing the BRICS strategy. He said “If they were not participating they would have just maybe written their own outcome document and complained about it. The fact that they participated in it, they can own up to it ... because those are the representatives of people as well”.

While some maintained that civil society does not wield much influence one of the participants argued that there is a “sentimental benefit” given that there are efforts aimed at “redefining the global power relations in the sense that you can have civil society that is within BRICS also supported by their governments is a definite incentive. The amount of opportunity that the BRICS presents in terms of shaping the agenda, and because the BRICS is seen as a South-South platform, it gives it a lot of legitimacy, which then becomes an arena for civil society to articulate and shape the agenda of the Global South, so that when articulated in the global discourse, instead of shaping the discourse at the top, we have already started shaping the discourse at the regional level. He said this represents a different way to what has been happening.

At least 50% of participants identified networking and strengthening South-South cooperation thereby deepening partnerships is also an incentive for enhancing civil society participation. This also increases possibilities of new sources of financing for civil society activities. According to one participant, “we are sick and tired of the bigger brother approach of the global, not only in terms of government but our fellow civil society colleagues. We are hardly

equal partners, so if there is opportunity for a genuinely South-South momentum. What we have already seen is that they are already occupying the BRICS space, we may have missed the bus.”

A participant from academia felt that civil society participation helps to bring another perspective to issues because government is challenged by election cycles so government is not the best stakeholder in promoting the interests of the people in the sense that they would be more concerned of short term benefits instead of the long-term benefits. Therefore, you need different stakeholders that look beyond the next five years.

Potential collaboration between India, Brazil and South Africa where civil society is quite developed would be a key avenue to achieve this. There is potential for collaboration in areas such as rights, landlessness, holding government to account. The difficulty with a BRICS wide issue based engagement model will be with Russia and China who are considered not as democratic in their governance approach. However, there could still be collaboration in non-political issues or in global issues that Cha is also fighting for – for example an equitable trade regime. These include – joint research.

4.7.2 What are the potential pitfalls for non-state actors to watch out for as they participate in BRICS

All (100%) of the participants expressed the risk of co-option of civil society by government when they participate in BRICS. One participant from an organisation that facilitates dialogues on foreign policy said,

“It is always a dilemma being co-opted, I think the government should create an enabling environment for civil society or for any stakeholder to be able to go about their legitimate business. The government should also enable through provision of resources so more actors that are strategic and one of those is civil society. They are an important player and can reach where the state sometimes is not able to reach”
Respondent K, personal communication, 2016).

Co-option is not just by their respective governments but by funders as well. Because of the existing funding model where most funding is coming from Western States or similar organisations there is always the skepticism expressed by government where civil society has been accused of not being autonomous. Rather the narrative is that civil society is pushing the interest of certain countries. There is no doubt that the interest of civil society sometimes coincides with interests for certain outside governments, to some extent. It could be the way

certain interests are packaged, that they come in the form. The participant did not see anything wrong with that.

A participant questioned why the South African government does not support issues where they coincide with civil society. For example, civil society is often pushing for economic alternatives, when it comes to global governance; on climate change, the position of civil society tends to coincide more strongly with countries of the Global South. If one looks at issues to with Gender, South Africa's civil society position resonates quite well that of its government. Similarly, on peace and security, the critique around the securitisation of development, a position consistent to that of the SA government. In this regard government supporting advocacy on these issues should not be viewed as compromising civil society because their positions are consistent with each other. Of course, the dilemma with that is government is sometimes seen as condemning that they do not subscribe to. That is a dilemma civil society must deal with. Civil society also should navigate the current funding model, which depends on priorities of those that are giving money so that they also support issues that are important to civil society in the global south.

Another dilemma is that civil society may end up compromising by lowering demands on their government or get off the high moral ground so that it is seen not to be antagonising because of the opportunity to participate formally as CIVIC BRICS Forum now recognised by governments.

Peer learning is an advantage to civil society. One of the participants mentioned that for example Brazil seems to have achieved a remarkable drop in poverty levels and there is a robust engagement between civil society and the government. They work together to move things forward. India also has a vibrant civil society group that South Africa can learn from.

4.8 Emerging issues relating to role of non-state actors in foreign policy making towards BRICS in South Africa

Participants surfaced several issues that relate to BRICS that need to be considered for further research. A key issue is the need for BRICS countries remove travel restrictions between alliance members. It would be important for countries to recognise each other's passports and get rid of the visas. For example, during the Russia Summit some failed to travel because of late invitations and funding and therefore could not obtain their visas on time. So, it is important to "breakdown historical barriers that were created at different times and for different reasons".

Participants emphasised the need for South Africa to determine why it is in BRICS because, “if you look at the countries in BRICs they have influence in multi-lateral institutions. China is part of the permanent plan for disability council, part of the G7, India is the fastest growing economy in Asia. Brazil is the leader of Latin America. Russia is the best player in the United Nation Security Council. The question remains of how South Africa fits in”.

It is important that as civil society take up positions in BRICS or other foreign policy issues in South Africa, international based NGOs with presence in South Africa should not necessarily be at the forefront. Government will not take the civil society group seriously. There is the whole issue of local versus international issues. There is also competition between civil society organisations for resources visibility. There is a need for open dialogue.

An opportunity is for civil society to make the government aware of issues that you are working on, agenda and mission. A comparative platform is then created where Civil Societies in different countries can put forward their issues comparing with others in the BRICS countries. It will be important to have consensus around what the future of South Africa civil society participation as a collective will look like to coordinate efforts even if there are divergent views on certain issues.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the findings of the study. The previous chapter described the findings of the study and surfaced some of the important themes that emerged from interviews of the participants. In this chapter, the themes are examined to gain perspective on the role of non-state actors in BRICS foreign policy making. The researcher elaborated on the themes' relevance to the study in the context of the research objectives. In the discussion, parallels are drawn with the literature review to support or repudiate some of the assertions by participants in the study.

Key results show that there is consensus that South Africa's participation in BRICS is useful for geo-political and economic reasons in an emerging multi-polar world. When holding dialogues, or engaging in processes on BRICS within the country or with BRICS countries, the government has much to benefit from systematic engagements with non-state actors in all their diversity for several reasons presented in Chapter 4. However, the research findings show that currently there is no optimal engagement strategy between the state and most sections of the non-state actors.

Further, it seems to be a challenge even for officials and civil society practitioners engaging with BRICS, to recommend a coherent comprehensive strategy to engage non-state actors. However, the study presents building blocks that can be used to develop the engagement strategy. This chapter attempted to use these building blocks to towards developing a conceptual framework and civil society mechanism for South Africa to promote its BRICS positions in a manner that serves the national interests and benefits Africa.

5.2 Perceptions on whether participation in BRICS benefits South Africa

Literature showed mixed views on whether participation in BRICS is beneficial for South Africa. Similarly, findings presented in Chapter 4 show that the study participants expressed mixed perceptions on the usefulness of South Africa's participation in BRICS as this section will demonstrate.

On the one hand, a group of scholars display a liberal lens of IR in the manner they view South Africa as well positioned to be in BRICS arguing that the alliance is "not simply a geopolitical, trade or economic one, it is a strategic and tactical alliance..." (Gumede, 2013,

p. 260 – 262). O'Neill (2013) sees South Africa's role in BRICS as both a gateway to the continent and as a catalyst for African integration. This is echoed by at least 64% of participants in the study who felt that BRICS is beneficial for South Africa. Reasons cited included geopolitical significance in addition to political-economic significance, a mechanism for advancing national interests and perhaps African interests, learning between peoples, and contributing to broadening governance.

As raised in the previous chapter, this paper's author also understands South Africa's participation in BRICS from a neo-realism theoretical approach presented by Kenneth Waltz in 1970, that the alliance is inspired by the need to challenge the current hegemonic international system dominated by the Global North. Almost all participants, except one, concurred that being part of BRICS gives South Africa an opportunity to be among the countries providing an alternative platform for shaping development thinking globally and with the advent of the New Development Bank, present an alternative to development finance thinking too.

On the other hand, a few participants echoed the same views raised in the literature reviewed that South Africa maybe punching above its waist (Alden & Schoeman, 2013). Of the participants, only one (7%) was an outlier who asserted that the country's participation in BRICS is not useful calling it "a lovely fantasy". He was of the view that participation was based on class – BRICS from below, BRICS in the middle and BRICS from above. This is consistent with issues raised by Bond (2013) in the literature who believes that South Africa has joined a group of "sub-imperialists".

The dilemmas raised by most participants on the contradictions that being a member of BRICS bring to South Africa are shared by the various key texts interrogated in the literature review. These include the need to shake off the big brother image when engaging with other African countries as well as how a vibrant democracy like South African can justify its engagement with non-democratic countries like Russia and China that are on record for violating civil, political rights and human rights. This is backed by literature presented in Chapter 2 that shows that politicians, policy makers and civil society do not have the same viewpoint on the need for South Africa to be in the grouping Bond (2013), Dube (2013) and Keet (2013).

Some participants felt that it is too soon to tell if South Africa will benefit from BRICS with others adding that so far there is no growth or development directly attributable to its BRICS involvement. The other challenge is that South Africa has not capitalised on the space.

Overall, the dominant perceptions, albeit the nuances, leaned towards the view that it is useful for South Africa to participate in BRICS. Therefore, BRICS engagements present a platform for South Africa to test optimal state and non-state interactions that can enrich its foreign policy.

5.3 Current state and role of non-state actors' participation in dialogues on and decision making towards BRICS in South Africa

From a liberal lens of foreign policy analysis, literature shows that non-state actors participation enriches foreign policy and its outcomes Van Wyk (1999), Nel and Van Nieuwkerk (1997) as cited in Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2002, p251). This was echoed by participants of the study that non-state actors' effective participation would help government refine how it defines the country's national interest; and give impetus to South Africa's efforts to accelerate human development. This would also give more credence to one of the key tenets of its Constitution of a participatory democracy. However, using the BRICS lens, participants' responses pointed to the fact that much of non-state actors' participation in the processes is limited and is often linked to events; mainly the BRICS Summits rather than ongoing engagements that are issue-based or ongoing consultations to come up with national positions relating to BRICS.

All participants agreed that it is mostly the academia, think tanks and business sectors that have dominated the BRICS space. In terms of other sections of non-state actors there were mixed views depending on who was responding. This links closely with Hill (2003)'s attempt to connect foreign policy analysis to the underlying questions of all political life as raised in Chapter 2, p.g.22. This includes questions such as: "Who benefits?" "What is the right course of action" and "which institutions best serve our desired ends" (Hill, 2003). There is a perception held by many participants that only a selection of business representatives, NGOs, youth, faith based organisations, labour movements and political parties seem to have participated in BRICS Summits; with one participant arguing that only the "elites" were engaged. There is therefore a call for broader societal participation in BRICS processes and that those who participate take into consideration the needs of all citizens.

Another key theme that emerged from the participants is the lack of intra-sector and multi-sector coordination of non-state actors particularly civil society. This is cited as one of the reasons that makes it difficult to ensure inclusivity. Participants however acknowledged

government's efforts to include non-state actors. For example, DIRCO's public diplomacy approach; the call for officials to be more engaged with civil society and the formation of SAICOR as an indication that government recognises the importance of civil society.

A critique is a lack of structured engagement strategy by DIRCO which limits participation by many sectors such as calling meetings at short notice. There is no adequate information about BRICS mainly because it is relatively a new formation.

From the literature and the interviews conducted it can be concluded that there is a potential significant role for non-state actors to shape South Africa's engagements and decisions in BRICS. There is gap is to broaden engagement beyond the few groups and individuals who have participated in the past. Except for academia and the business sectors, the rest of non-state actors have largely been excluded or participated in a manner that is not substantive.

5.4 Widening the circle - does an inclusive consultative process in foreign policy making matter?

The speech quoted in Chapter 2 as part of literature reviewed of the then chair of the African Union, Tanzania President, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete during the launch of ECOSOC underscores the significance of inclusive foreign policy making. He said the launch demonstrated that "The African Union has gone beyond the mere processes of consultation that other institutions still adhere to. Africa therefore, has given the values of democratization and inclusiveness, a more holistic and enduring meaning and significance" (African Union, 2008). Various readings such as Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2002), Hill (2003), Bohler-Muller (2012), Gumede (2014) and Siko (2014) amongst others buttress this notion that from a liberal lens of foreign policy analysis it is necessary to have an inclusive foreign policy making process as it improves the quality of foreign policy outputs and because citizens are at the heart of all policy making.

To determine the nature of non-state actor participation and ensure an optimal and inclusive approach to consultative processes in BRICS it is important to understand how South Africa defines and views non-state actors. Literature presented in Chapter 2 explains how various theorists and organisations define non-state actors. This influences how they view non-state actor participation in policy making. (Hill, 2003; Vincent, 2002; African Union, 2008) and the European Union (n.d) subcategorise non-state actors in slightly different ways. Of the key texts examined, Hill (2003) stands out in unpacking the types of non-state actors and how

this impacts on their relationship with the state in relation to foreign policy making. He distinguishes the different relationships as normal or bargaining; competitive relationship and transcending relationship

Study participants also raised other conceptual issues regards participation by different sectors of South African society in dialogues and decision making towards BRICS. This includes questions around unpacking the issue of participation, understanding what BRICS is, consensus building and establishing horizontal networks among others. For example, ensuring a balance of bottom up approaches, even where sometimes the top down approach is something that cannot avoided. On the matter of BRICS one participant raised is of the notion that “BRICS is actually a collective and can do nothing for South Africa in terms of other challenges that they as fellow BRICS members are also facing”.

The research confirmed that money and time are key constraints that limit civil society participation in BRICS processes even when invitations are extended. The subject of foreign policy is also quite complex for some ordinary women and men to comprehend and rely on their representatives whether parliamentarians or NGOs or CBOs to break it down for them.

Therefore the findings of the study show that even if it is important to be representative of society in policy processes, the challenge for bureaucrats is to determine who, what, when and where to consult, when there is a decision to be made and requires public inputs. It is also critical to examine what the benefits will be from participation in BRICS engagements.

5.5 To participate or not to participate

From the responses to the key question on the benefits for non-state actors', especially civil society's, participation in BRICS processes, it can be deduced that most of the participants agreed that it is valuable for both government and citizens. This is despite that a few of the participants thought that the benefit was superficial for non-state actors.

Literature shows that non-state actors' participation in foreign policy could be viewed through the skills revolution and organisation explosion developing theories of foreign policy propounded by Rosenau in 2011 (Smith, et al, 2012, p ix). He argues that people everywhere in every country and community throughout the world are increasingly able to trace distant events through a series of interactions back into their own homes or pocketbooks. Rosenau (2011) attributes this to media and communications.

This is evident in the responses where participants linked civil society positions as often being consistent with the government of South Africa and other countries from the Global South on issues such as alternative global governance; climate change; securitisation of development among various issues. This is because governments and citizens from the Global South have access to information and have witnessed the disparities between the Global North and Global South and therefore aspire to bridge the divide.

Further, literature reviewed shows that the organisational explosion 'phenomena' (since it is still developing as a theory), has adopted a multi-sector approach involving ordinary citizens as well as elites and activists and working together to address "shared needs and goals" (Smith, et al, 2012, p. x). Social media is also now a major issue around foreign policy as it "breaches the wall of the state" (Smith, et al, 2012, p. x). This could be closely linked to the benefits cited by study participants saying that "collaboration and networking, particularly South-South cooperation" were identified as a huge benefit for citizens. This means that various stakeholders from across sectors can work together for example through the BRICS CIVIC Forum and other events through the various Tracks at the BRICS Summits. Through the interactions at various BRICS fora, government benefits through enriched policy outcomes and gains legitimacy through broader participation. Non-state actors would also help South Africa define the national interests.

However, participants identified co-option by respective BRICS governments and funders as some of the pitfalls that non-state actors must be cautious of during their engagements.

5.6 How does South Africa develop a civil society capacity to promote BRICS positions?

The study put forward several ways that South Africa could develop civil society capacity (human and social) to promote BRICS positions. A key issue was the need to first understand what needs doing and what is on the fixed agenda in terms of South Africa's engagement with BRICS. It is important to determine the capacity gaps that need to be addressed to determine what South Africa can invest in. Orientation meetings; dialogues and continuous engagements through various direct and indirect channels are among the strategies that were raised by most participants.

5.7 Conceptualising an engagement model for non-state actors' participation in BRICS processes in South Africa

The Foreign Policy White Paper alluded to in Chapter 2 asserts that, "The business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people" (DIRCO, 2011). Therefore it calls for the South Africa government to ensure optimal engagement with all stakeholders. As has been observed from literature and study participants currently South Africa has no mechanism to ensure optimal engagement with all stakeholders.

Further, Hill (2003) argues that non-state actors aim is to influence or change policy and where they do not get attention, they will demand it especially in democratic settings. Therefore, it is prudent for states to listen and "calculate the mix of different kinds of actors they need to deal with and what kind of rainbow coalition it might be necessary to assemble to influence the various forces in civil societies and private enterprise as well as intergovernmental institutions," (Hill, 2003, p. 193). It is important to keep this at the fore if South Africa government or any other institution should consider establishing an engagement model for non-state actors in BRICS or foreign policy processes for that matter.

There were already signs of civil society agitation as they demanded space during BRICS Summits when civil society held unofficial parallel sessions such as the one held during the 5th BRICS Summit held in Durban in 2013. This contributed to the formalisation of the civil society track BRICS Civil Forum during BRICS Summits starting with the one held in Moscow in 2015.

5.7.1 Building blocks for an engagement model for non-state actors' participation in BRICS

For a sustainable model, this paper attempts to assemble the building blocks presented by literature and participants of the study towards developing an engagement model for non-state actors' participation in BRICS processes in South Africa. There are many cornerstones:

- a) Document the benefits for having a sustainable non-state actors' engagement model for BRICS*

In developing the engagement model, it is imperative to map the benefits for conceptualising and implementing a sustainable engagement model for both the non-state actors and for government especially DIRCO as the implementing Department. This will form the basis of

the values, guiding principles and objectives for a non-state actor engagement strategy on BRICS.

b) Civil society need to be better organised and coordinated

Scholars agree that non-state actor inputs are critical in foreign policy making. However, “to be taken seriously their input has to be aggregated and coordinated in the policy process” (Frankel (1968, p.70-83) as cited in Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002, p. 251). Participants of the study agree that civil society needs to organise itself. This could be sectorally (e.g. business, civil society, etc) or thematically (such as economic, women’s sector, etc). The study made it clear that it is not the business of government to do this on non-state actors’ behalf. The South Africa BRICS Think Tank now hosted by the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS), SANGOCO, and other existing apex bodies provide a starting point for organising.

c) ... perhaps thematic advocacy clusters and one broad civil society network

Linked to the previous subsection on the need to coordinate, participants suggested that organising can take the form of thematic clusters falling under one broad civil society network. For example, Brazil has established a coalition – the Brazilian Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy established by NGOs and a few government ministries.

However, it is important for the mechanism to be as inclusive as possible. For example, one participant asserted that, “...most intellectual capital, financial resources and knowledge lie out of the state”. Further, both literature and participants affirmed that there is a variety of non-state actor formations and their views and motives for involvement in foreign policy decision making.

d) Defining South Africa’s national interest within BRICS as an entry point for coordination

Literature and study participants both indicate that South Africa is yet to define its national interest regards its BRICS engagement. Mobilising around the need for the broad-based participation towards this goal can provide a beginning.

e) Means of engagement

Whereas the previous engagements have been mainly informal, less institutionalised and based on discretion of the bureaucrats, perhaps more systematic engagements can be put in place. This could take various formats depending on the issue at hand including workshops, national dialogues and systematic outreach programmes could be used.

Those charged with responsibility to mobilise around BRICS processes could learn from good examples of national participation models such as imbizos and other forms of dialogues. Civil society can nominate who represents them in such fora. At the time of submission of the research report, the Minister of International Relations Maite Nkoana Mashabane was planning to host a BRICS Women's Debate in Free State in August 2017, led by herself targeting women in leadership. A concept note (2017) put together by DIRCO ahead of women's month highlighted that the debate sought to promote the BRICS strategy and ensure that women leaders understand the rationale behind this strategy. This is an example of targeted outreach programmes DIRCO can host in a more predictable manner. If it is consultative in nature this could take the form of surveys either going out to communities or using the internet to get responses. However, the later could lead to other groups being excluded.

Another form of engagement could be through making use of various forms of media and information and communication technologies. Literature presented in Chapter 2, shows that one of Rosenau (2011)'s major contribution to the body of knowledge on foreign policy analysis though not yet fully developed, is the proposed "integration of the skill revolution, the organisational explosion and the political consequences of the social media revolution into the analysis of dynamics that shape foreign policy which is not an easy task" (Smith, et al, 2012, p. X). He espouses that media and communication have contributed to this. Participants also identified this as one of the effective engagement strategies between government and non-state actors. Currently DIRCO has set up a Radio Station which is quite a unique strategy to reach out to various stakeholders.

Social media is also a critical way of reaching out to masses including the youth as the population starts to use smart phones more and more. This would need to be balanced by traditional communication channels such as fact sheets, televisions and radio among others to ensure that no one is left behind.

5.7.2 Towards developing a model for non-state actors' engagement in BRICS processes in South Africa

A key critique from the study is the lack of a structured engagement strategy by DIRCO, such as calling meetings at short notice, which limits participation by many sectors. From the literature encountered the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) spectrum (2014) provides a framework to bridge this gap. This will help plan the nature of public engagement that the government of South Africa, particularly DIRCO could consider. This

also fits in with the various building blocks that the participants surfaced in the study. The goal, method of engagement and proposed level of engagement are dependent on the issue at hand. The researcher modified the model and added two new layers i) the proposed level of non-state actors' engagement to give direction to how government could approach BRICS public participation processes and ii) suggested key features that should drive the platforms of engagement. This is however, not exhaustive. Table 2. provides a schematic view of building blocks towards the designing an engagement model for BRICS processes.

Table 2. Towards a model for non-state actors' engagement in BRICS

	INFORM	CONSULT	INVOLVE	COLLABORATE	EMPOWER
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GOAL	Providing the public with objective information to assist them in understanding BRICS and foreign policy making	To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions related to BRICS.	Working directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that the public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered when making critical decisions that impact citizens. <i>E.g. positions on climate change;</i>	To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution. <i>E.g. 2015 Adoption of a comprehensive 'Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership'.</i>	To place final decision making in the hands of the public. <i>For example, civil society may be left to determine how to organise themselves for engaging on BRICS to ensure representativity</i>
PROMISE TO THE PUBLIC	DIRCO will keep the public informed	DIRCO will keep stakeholders informed, listen to and acknowledge concerns and aspirations and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision	We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how the public input influenced the decision	We will look to you for advice and innovation in formulating solutions and incorporate your advice and recommendations into the decisions to the maximum extent possible	We will implement what you decide
METHODS OF ENGAGEMENT	• Fact sheets • Information sharing • Dedicated web page	• Surveys • Opinion polls • Workshops • Expert panels • Public media • Internet tools e.g. social media	• Action research • Advisory committees • Open space technology	• Future search conference • Stakeholder visioning • Co-design • Web presence	• Facilitation of direct dialogue between stakeholders and government – directly

	INFORM	CONSULT	INVOLVE	COLLABORATE	EMPOWER
SOME KEY FEATURES	• Should be accessible in local language • Up to date information with statistics • Government creates/ reinforces a focal unit that is well resourced to collaborate with non-state	• A menu of decision options • Feedback on key decisions taken	• Vetting of contributors • Ensure credibility of those participating as experts • Acknowledge fresh perspectives	• Different non-state formations well documented with online presence • Partnerships formed	• Government webpage presence • Should have facility to work in small groups • Online break-away sessions
PROPOSED LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT	All the people of South Africa	• South Africa BRICS Think Tank	• South Africa BRICS Think Tank • Civil society representatives (as determined by civil society)	• SAICOR • BRICS Business Council South Africa • South Africa BRICS Think Tank • Civil society thematic or sector clusters (as determined by civil society) • BRICS Civic Forum	Non-state actors especially civil society self-organises to form an umbrella body that engages on BRICS but can also be a platform for other foreign policy engagements
	South Africa Foreign from lower level impact  Policy to high level impact				

Adapted by the researcher in May 2017 from the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) spectrum www.iap2.org (2014).

Mindful that it should not be the business of government to decide how non-state actors should be organised to participate in public policy processes including foreign policy making and decisions, the research concluded that it is critical for government to create a conducive environment for civil society to be participate at various levels.

Table 2 suggests that depending on the issue government could choose to inform the public which is just passing information through non-interactive channels as the communication is one way with the researcher proposing that this be targeted to all the people of South Africa based on the Constitutional guarantees including the right to information of issues that concern them. Some key features added by the researcher are that online communication or any other form should be accessible in local languages, endeavour to have up to date

information with statistics and that government creates or reinforces a dedicated unit within DIRCO to work closely with non-state actors on BRICS but also other foreign policy issues.

On matters that require public feedback, the framework recommends consultations using interactive tools such as surveys, expert panels, public media and opinion polls among various tools. During BRICS interactions, there are matters that impact on different groups of citizens for example when a company from a fellow BRICS nation sets up a plant in a local community in South Africa. To facilitate focused discussions, it would be good to provide a menu of decision options and the implications for example to guide public engagements and when the process is over, inform the public on the decisions taken.

It is important that the local communities for example are involved so that their concerns and aspirations are considered in the process. Or it could be a decision that will impact the citizens directly such as climate change positions. This could be facilitated through local or national level advisory committees and action research. Key features would include but not limited to vetting of contributors; ensure credibility of those participating as experts and acknowledge fresh perspectives.

A higher form of engagement is collaboration which is evident between BRICS Think Tanks from the different BRICS member states. This could be done through conferences. Civil society for example could form thematic or sector clusters so that like-minded organisations can work together to come up with alternatives or propose solutions to common challenges. To ensure collaboration, it would be important to document the different non-state formations and facilitate an online presence to allow would be newcomers to join as per criteria and for transparency. Partnerships would also be encouraged in this way.

The form of engagement that will yield the highest impact is when government leaves the decision to the public. In this regard, government could leave the decision to non-state actors to organise themselves in a manner that is inclusive and ensures efficient and effective engagement with BRICS processes with government but also other formations from the BRICS member states. It will be important that either government or the representative body for non-state actors have an online presence with a facility to work in small groups and or break away sessions.

It is anticipated that if government maps its BRICS engagements in the manner proposed in Table 1 and communicates with non-state actors beyond business and academic councils to

reach out to broader civil society, it will create a conducive environment for non-state actors to become better organised and move towards efficient and effective participation in BRICS processes. The aim will not be to just broadcast foreign policy decision, but facilitate the actual involvement of stakeholders in foreign policy-making.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

It is increasingly clear that the state is no longer the sole player in driving foreign policy and its national interests in South Africa and across the globe. Other role players have entered the arena in a more visible way and are contributing to formulation, influencing and shaping of national positions in relation to decisions that involve other countries or institutions. The challenge for policy makers is how to engage with the various actors who often have divergent positions and interests before coming up with a national position on a particular issue. This chapter presents the recommendations and conclusions of the study on non-state actor participation in BRICS.

6.2 Conclusions of the study

This study investigated the role of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy making towards BRICS and attempted to conceptualise an engagement model in a manner that not only serves the country's national interests but also benefits Africa. A qualitative method of data collection was used to get insights in the behaviour of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making with a specific focus on BRICS. Chapter 4 presented the findings of the study whilst in Chapter 5 these findings were analysed and a conceptual model was proposed as per the study objectives. The conclusions presented in this chapter are based on the main themes presented in the analysis of the study.

6.2.1 Does an inclusive consultative process in foreign policy making matter?

The study shows that it is important to ensure inclusive consultative process in foreign policy for several reasons. South Africa is constitutional democracy and therefore public participation in all policy making is imperative. In fact, the beneficiaries of the foreign policy who are the citizens should be involved to ensure that their concerns are considered in the final decisions. Inclusivity also enriches the policy outcomes. Findings show that inclusivity would put the country in a better position to harness assets and skills that lie outside of the state. Therefore, it is key that the bureaucrats charged with the responsibility and are constitutionally accountable for making foreign policy decisions ensure meaningful engagement with the non-state actors and not just make it a ticking the box interaction. This assists in providing a human face to development cooperation.

It was also observed that there are some efforts by government to facilitate inclusive foreign policy making by establishing SACOIR and having a series of sector engagements with non-state actors ahead of summits and in between summits. However, it is evident that it is difficult to ensure representativity even where efforts to be as inclusive are made. The challenge for the bureaucrats is who to engage with, when, how; hence a proposed model of engagement put forward by the research as part of recommendations in the next section. This is based on the building blocks in previous sections. It is anticipated that it will assist to respond to the questions of who, when and how to engage with when there is a need to reach out to non-state actors.

6.2.2 To what extent do non-state actors contribute to South African foreign policy making?

From the study, it can be concluded that using a BRICS lens, non-state actors' contribution to foreign policy making is limited. This is because only a few groups of non-state actors contribute to South African foreign policy meaningfully. In terms of BRICS engagements, it is particularly the business sector, the academia and very few big civil society organisations and individuals who are engaged systematically. With the advent of sector specific BRICS tracks during BRICS Summits there are other non-state actors such as parliamentarians, the youth and trade unions who participate at Summit level but with hardly any interaction at national level in between the annual BRICS Summits. Another key highlight is that those who participate are out of touch with communities that they purport to represent so their contribution does not always benefit the majority of citizens.

While the majority of study participants think that it is necessary to deepen the engagement to ensure much more contribution a few think that it is not necessary. Foreign policy making should be the preserve of organisations and individuals who are experts in foreign policy and have a keen interest.

6.2.3 How do non-state actors contribute to South African national positions on BRICS

There were divergent views on how non-state actors contribute to South African national positions on BRICS. It was argued that this highly depended on the channels of influence that are available to these groups. The BRICS Think Tank and BRICS Business Council are two sectors that have directly contributed to BRICS positions in a meaningful way so far. This is because they are mandated by government. They have contributed to the development of a BRICS strategy and formulating positions on many issues such as the conceptualisation of the National Development Bank.

For example, the South Africa Chapter of the Business Council has the ear of the foreign affairs officials as they interact directly with the Director General or Deputy Director General and the resolutions are taken to the Minister and BRICS Sherpa. These positions are then included by the Minister in South Africa's position at the Heads of State Summit. However, the critique was that there is no synergy on what government says and engages the private sector and vice versa.

Similarly, academics have influence because of the institutionalisation of the Academic Forum which has moved from HSRC to the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS) at the University of Witwatersrand.

Civil society in particular has participated in a patchy way. Only a handful of organisations and individuals participate based on willingness and availability of resources. It has taken long for civil society to be formally recognised even at the BRICS Summits and even then, their channel of influence is the Communique presented annually to the Foreign Minister during the BRICS Heads of State Summit. It remains to be evaluated to see if any decision has been made as a direct result of civil society participation.

A key challenge is that civil society is not as organised. In this regard, the research recommends ways in which civil society can self-organise in section 6.3 that follows.

6.2.4 How does South Africa develop a civil society capacity to promote BRICS positions

It can be concluded from the study that civil society capacity; that is, the human (skills, knowledge and abilities of individuals) and social (strength of relationships and level of trust that exists between individuals) capacities. Participants recommended that this could be achieved by first understanding what needs doing and what is the fixed agenda of terms of South Africa's engagement in BRICS as this would then determine capacity gaps.

Orientation meetings, information sharing and continuous meaningful engagement where the non-state actors obtain knowledge and learn was the dominant theme that emerged from the study. However, there is need to be mindful of the different interests exhibited by non-state actors as they are funded externally and could therefore be driven by the flavour of the month.


6.3 Recommendations of the study

The study found that there is limited engagement of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy making towards BRICS. The research aimed to conceptualise a framework to develop civil society capacity and mechanism to promote its BRICS positions in a manner that not only serves the country's national interests but also benefits Africa. The section that follows presents the conceptual framework.

6.3.1 A conceptual BRICS non-state actors' engagement model for South Africa

Based on the research findings, literature encountered and subsequent building blocks for designing an engagement model for non-state actors in BRICS processes discussed in the preceding sections, the research puts forward a conceptual framework for such an engagement model. A schematic presentation of the framework is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A conceptual BRICS non-state actors' engagement model for South Africa



The framework presented in Figure 1 assumes that the overarching goal that binds everyone is advancing the national interest. All engagements amongst state actors and between state actors and non-state actors are based on advancing the national interest. This is projected in the way they interact in the different arenas for engagement. In the case of BRICS some of the primary arenas for engagement are the BRICS Summits, the National Development Bank and Africa. The study participants challenged South Africa to be clear on what its national interest is in all its engagements.

Further the model considers that all States have a responsible government ministry or department that has a national mandate to coordinate foreign policy and that within the ministry there is a focal point for different aspects. In South Africa, DIRCO is the responsible department with this mandate as shown in the literature review. Like other BRICS nations, South Africa has appointed a BRICS Sherpa, the personal representative for the Head of State or Government that prepares for the BRICS Summit who is the key interlocuter in terms of BRICS engagement though this is conducted together with other bureaucrats under the guidance of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation.

The model takes into account the role of an independent advisory council on foreign policy. In South Africa, the government appointed South Africa Council of International Relations (SACOIR) referred to in the literature review. A tripartite linkage between government, other non-state actor formations and the appointed SACOIR. This will close the gap identified by some of the study participants that SACOIR is a missed opportunity to broaden citizen participation in foreign policy making.

The research then recommends that emanating from the broad citizenry, non-state actors self-organise around BRICS engagements by sector and together they constitute a South African National BRICS Non-state actors' platform. The same formations could use the same structures to engage on any other foreign policy issue besides BRICS. Some of the formations are straight forward and are operating quite effectively though according to the study participants they could be more inclusive. That is, the South Africa BRICS Think Tank, BRICS Business Council South Africa Chapter and to some extent the BRICS Parliamentary Assembly and South Africa Trade Unions could be argued to be straight forward in terms of coming together.

The only challenge would be the next suggested layer of BRICS non-state actor delegates where the researcher is recommending that two delegates (a leader and alternate delegate) are nominated to form a working group dubbed BRICS non-state Actors Delegates.

A key sector that would require a bit of work in self-organising is the civil society sector comprising a range of organisations that vary in thematic focus, size, influence, mandate, interests, territorial coverage among several factors. This is compounded by the fact that there is no umbrella organisation since South Africa Non-Governmental Coalition (SANGOCO) is not functioning effectively. The research proposes that the civil society grouping sub-categorise into thematic clusters or networks in an explicit way for ease of

working together on common agendas. For example, the gender sector no longer comes together under the Women's Coalition that existed before. While this study cannot prescribe as raised by many of the study participants, it is important to ensure inclusivity and that the needs of the marginalised communities are taken into consideration. For example, what will a mining investment from a fellow BRICS country mean in a particular community and what are the solidarity mechanisms. Figure 1 in the preceding section suggests some of the key features that should be embedded in the engagements.

In the literature reviewed, India presents an example, where non-state actors formed an umbrella body that engages on BRICS which can also be a platform for other foreign policy engagements (<https://peoplesbrics.org/about-the-forum/>). Non-state actors formed the *People's Forum* (TPF) on BRICS which is a collective platform of several people's movements, networks and civil society organisations from across India. According to the website, the TPF "will attempt to raise critical voices from below on social, ecological, political and economic concerns that are often ignored at inter-governmental processes such as BRICS". It adds that the TPF "will not only monitor and analyse developments at the official and business arenas, but also build solidarities across borders with like-minded groups to advance an alternative model of development that puts people before profit" (<https://peoplesbrics.org/about-the-forum/>).

The government of South Africa could also learn from the African Development Bank whose framework was referred to by one of the study participants. The bank's non-civil society engagement framework is based on three dimensions, "outreach, dialogue and partnership" and it is explicit in how this is going to be executed but still acknowledges that in some cases civil society would self-organise in terms of creating its own networks for example.

Figure 1 therefore, is at the heart of the role of non-state actors in BRICS processes and how they can be optimal engagement to enrich policy processes and outcomes. Also bearing in mind that foreign policy making is not an end, but what is important is the process (Van Nieuwkerk, 2015).

6.4 Contribution of this study

BRICS is under researched as an area of academic enquiry let alone in relation to non-state actor participation. This is in part because the loose alliance is still in its infancy. It is anticipated that this study will add to existing literature on non-state actors' participation in

South Africa's foreign policy decision making in general but their participation in the BRICS alliance. If the findings are sound, this could offer an alternative model on how to systematically engage South Africa's non-state actors in BRICS decision making process and possibly foreign policy making in general.

6.5 Areas for future research

As highlighted in section 4.8 in Chapter 4, the research surfaced a number of issues that need to be considered for future research. These include, the feasibility of removing travel restrictions between BRICS alliance members and get rid of visa restrictions as this hampers ease of travel at BRICS Summits and ability to interact and explore opportunities.

South Africa needs to clearly define its interests within the BRICS alliance and participants felt the country had not fully utilised its presence in the alliance. Further research could be carried out to determine how South Africa could best benefit from the BRICS alliance. Defining the national interest could also be a basis for dialogue between state and non-state actors.

6.6 Summary

This study aimed to examine the role of non-state actors towards foreign policy making towards BRICS by unpacking how non-state actors have participated in BRICS and contributed to the country's positions as well as how to develop civil society capacity. The study ended by recommending a conceptual framework for engaging non-state actors and promoting South Africa's BRICS positions.

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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The role of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS

Questionnaire

Perceptions on whether participation in BRICS benefits South Africa

1. In your opinion, South Africa's participation in BRICS is a) useful b) not useful?
2. Why do you say so?
3. To what extent has its membership in BRICS benefited the country, if at all?

Current state and role of non-state actors' participation in dialogues on and decision making towards BRICS in South Africa

4. To your knowledge, which sectors have been involved in shaping South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS?
5. What role have these sectors or actors played in shaping South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS?
6. Do you think they are representative of South African society?

Widening the circle

7. Do you think it is necessary to ensure participation of the different sections of South African society when it comes to dialogues on or decision making towards BRICS? Why do you say so?
8. Which other sectors and actors do you think should be actively involved that are not currently participating?
9. What has limited their participation?
10. What added value would these sectors that you feel are currently excluded bring to the process?

Conceptualising an engagement model for non-state actors' participation in BRICS processes in South Africa

11. How do you think government can facilitate their participation?
12. What form should this participation take and how would you design such engagements to ensure that it is representative?
13. What do you think should be the modalities and purposes of such engagements?
14. How does South Africa develop a civil society capacity to promote BRICS positions?

Non-state actors - To participate or not to participate in South Africa's BRICS processes

15. What would be the benefits for non-state actors', especially civil society, participation in BRICS?
16. What are the potential pitfalls for non-state actors to watch out for as they participate in BRICS

Additional information

17. Any other thoughts or comments on the issue of the role of non-state actors in South Africa's foreign policy towards BRICS?

APPENDIX B

**ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
BRICS
INTERVIEWEE LIST**

LOVENESS NYAKUJARAH, 718542

No.	Name	Position	Organisation	Justification	Researcher identity
1	Krish Chetty		HSRC – BRICS Research centre	Highly knowledgeable because he worked at the BRICS Secretariat when it was still under HSRC	A
2	Frank Stein	Assistant Director – BRICS	DIRCO	Nelia Barnard Directs government BRICS engagements internally and externally	B
3	Themban Maluleke	Foreign Services Officer – BRICS	DIRCO		C
4	Corlett Letlojane	National Coordinator	Human Rights Institute of Southern Africa	Submitted a concept note to the South African Sherpa for establishing a BRICS – Civil Society Forum	D
5	Malcom Damon	Executive Director	South Africa Network on Inequality (SANI) at Economic Justice Network (EJN) of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA)	Has participated in BRICS engagements – Will express views from the faith based sector perspective.	E
6	Memory Dube	Senior researcher	South African Institute of International Affairs	Has written on BRICS and has organised civil society parallel meetings alongside the BRICS Summits	F
7	Mthandazo Ndlovu	Programmes Manager	Oxfam	Oxfam has supported civil society organisations parallel meetings during BRICS Summits	G
8	Phiroshaw Camay	Executive Director	Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE)	Has been involved in BRICS engagements and is passionate about the need to develop a model for civil society engagement in BRICS processes	H
9	Patrick Bond	Professor	University of KwaZulu Natal and is a member of the BRICS from below Network	Academic and an active civil society - BRICS from below - who has participated in BRICS engagements and written extensively about the alliance.	I
10	Stevens Mokgalapa	Shadow Minister – International	Democratic Alliance	Main opposition political party in the country so insights would be valuable	J

No.	Name	Position	Organisation	Justification	Researcher identity
		Relations			
11	Dr Showers Mawowa	Research, Development and Coordination Manager	Southern Africa Liaison Office (SALO)	Organisation holds dialogues on BRICS	K
12	William Gumede	Associate Professor	Wits School of Governance	Has written and done extensive research on BRICS	L
13	Frank Konergay	Executive Director	Institute for Global Dialogue	Dialogue organisation	M
14	Patrick Mpedzisi	Independent consultant	-	Civil society member from outside South Africa with knowledge of BRICS	N