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Casualisation of Labour in the Zambian mining industry with specific reference to Mopani Copper Mines Plc

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the of Masters of Arts Degree in Labour and Development, Economic Policy, Globalisation and Labour (Labour Policy and Globalisation).

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Abstract

Zambia has been implementing economic liberalisation policies at the advice of the IMF and the World Bank, to reverse years of economic decline that began with the commodity crisis of the 1970s. As a strategy for economic growth, these included, the deregulation of foreign investment, removal of currency controls, trade liberalisation, decontrolling prices, cutting food subsidies, reduction of state control in running the economy and privatization of state run companies. The rapid implementation of these measures by the Zambian government has seen a change in employment trends in the mining industry from permanent employment to casualisation of labour. These measures have resulted into negative social and economic consequences on the lives of the casualised mine workers such as job insecurity, poor health and safety standards, lack of protection and union representation, poor remuneration, lack of pension, and other forms of exploitation. Despite booms and busts in the copper price, employment levels have been drastically dropping especially among the permanent mine workers as a cost cutting measure. The role of the state in the running of the mines which Zambia has depended on since independence has diminished significantly and the state is increasingly succumbing to the dictates of the mining Trans-National Corporations (TNCs). The study which was conducted among casualised/contract rock ore drillers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc reaffirms arguments by previous researchers that economic liberalisation has not achieved the high expectations that Zambians wished for and that there is need for government and trade unions to protect the welfare and working conditions of these casualised mine workers who have become a new set of underclass. Through in-depth interviews, observations and documentary analysis, this research has brought to light the social and economic experiences of casualised/contract rock ore drillers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc and questions whether Zambian mine workers were better off when the mines were being run by the state than is currently the case under TNCs.

Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Masters of Arts in Labour and Development, Economic Policy, Globalisation and Labour (Labour Policy and Globalisation) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before any other degree or examination in any other University nor has it been prepared under the auspices or assistance of any body, organisation or person outside of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Yewa Kumwenda

----- day of -----, 2016

Dedication

This research is dedicated to all the casual/contract mineworkers in Zambia.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES/PICTURES..... .Error! Bookmark not defined.

Introduction 1

Aim of the Study 3

Research Rationale..... 3

Chapter Outline..... 4

Chapter One 6

**1.0GLOBALISATION, NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE CASUALISATION OF
LABOUR 6**

1.1 Introduction..... 6

1.2 History of copper mining in Zambia 6

1.3 Global Neoliberal Agenda-Privatisation and Development Agreements (D.A.s) 12

1.4 Value Addition versus Exploitation of Human and Natural Resources- New
Resentments (Casualisation and poverty) 17

1.5 Role of the State, labour legal framework and trade unions 22

1.6 The Washington Consensus versus the Decent Work Agenda..... 25

1.7 Conclusion 26

Chapter Two..... 27

2.0 TRENDS IN FLEXIBLE LABOUR..... 27

2.1 Introduction..... 27

2.2 Dwindling Trade Union membership..... 27

2.3 Job Insecurity 28

2.4 Attack on collective bargaining 29

2.5 Varying terms and conditions of work 29

2.6 Safety and environmental problems..... 30

2.7 Outsourcing..... 31

2.8 Occupational dismantling and lack of training for the local workforce 31

2.9 Standard working time 32

2.10 Eroded social protection policy.....	33
2.11 Theoretical departure points	33
2.12 Conclusion	36
Chapter Three	37
3.0 METHODOLOGY	37
3.1 Introduction.....	37
3.2 The value of Qualitative Research Methods.....	37
3.3 In-depth interviews.....	38
3.4 Observation.....	40
3.5 Available Secondary Data	41
3.6 Selection of the research site	42
3.7 Sampling.....	42
3.8 Data collection, interpretation and analysis.....	43
3.9 Gaining Access and Ethical Issues.....	44
3.10 Limitations of the research	45
3.11 Conclusion	46
Chapter Four.....	47
4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS	47
4.1 Introduction.....	47
4.2. Characteristics of the sample	47
4.3 The experience of working as a rock ore driller	48
4.4 Type of contracts that rock ore drillers are under	49
4.5 Safety, health and environment.....	50
4.6 Wages and conditions of service.....	54
4.7 The threat of Loan Sharks	56
4.8 Failing to support my family	57
4.9 Disciplinary code and grievance procedure.....	57
4.10 Trade Union representation and busting.....	58
4.11 Medical cover.....	59
4.12 Owners of contracting companies.....	59

4.13 Pension Scheme and Workers Compensation Scheme	60
4.14 Training	61
4.15 Employment during ZCCM and under MCM Plc	61
4.16 Where is our government?	62
4.17 Conclusion	63
Chapter 5	64
5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	64
5.1 Introduction.....	64
5.2 Conclusion	65
5.3 Recommendations	68
REFERENCE LIST	72
APPENDICES	80
Semi Standard Interview Schedule For Casual/Contract Rock Ore Drillers.....	80
Letter to Volunteer Participants (Participant Information Sheet)	83
Participant Consent Form.....	84

LIST OF TABLES/PICTURES

Table 1: Mopani Copper Mines Plc Employment Trends from 2000 to 201520

Table 2: List of Interview Participants 39

Table 3: List of Contracting Companies where participants work40

Picture 1: Picture of Injured Rock Ore Driller52

Picture 2: Picture of Injured Rock Ore Driller 53

Picture 3: Pay slip 1 55

Picture 4: Pay slip 2 55

Introduction

The oil crisis of the 1970s and the resultant debt crisis for developing countries, including Zambia, saw most of them embark on neoliberal reforms to reverse years of economic decline. These economic measures were prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank from the late 1970s onwards. As a strategy for economic growth, these included, the “deregulation of foreign investment, removal of currency controls, trade liberalisation, decontrolling prices, cutting food subsidies, reduction of state control in running the economy and privatization of state run companies” (Kapasa, 2009:4-5; Fraser and Lungu, 2007:9).

The above changes have been taking place under the influence of a process of globalisation which Stiglitz (2002), has characterised as the removal of barriers and closer integration of national economies into the international economy. Silver has called this ‘spatial fix’, where capital is transferred to other parts of the world with lower labour costs and less organised working classes (Silver, 2003:161). However, the nature of economic growth after embarking on these economic restructuring programmes has led to “massive job losses, growing inequalities, unemployment, casualisation and high poverty” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:2-3). This confirms the view that neoliberal globalisation is primarily a phenomenon of jobless growth with the little employment created which has not kept up with population increases (Bieler et al., 2008:9).

At the peak of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), the state conglomerate which used to run the mines, there were over 60 000 permanent employees in the mining industry. When the mining sector privatisation programme that took place from 1997 to 2002 was complete, “it left the levels of full time employment at less than 19 000” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22). Today, there are less than “30 000 permanent employees and over 60 000 employees are now casualised” (ICMM, 2014:61), yet the copper price rose sharply from 2004 to 2007 and from 2009 to 2014. There was growing casualization in the midst of boom in a sector that had not experienced declining profits in the above period, but yet it was still shifting to casualized workers. Subsequently, with copper prices falling below US\$6000 per tonne for most part of 2015, mining companies have already announced plans to retrench more permanent mine workers.

“More and more mine workers in permanent employment are losing their jobs and are re-employed as casual/contract workers or have been replaced by casual or contract workers” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22-23). Casual work, which is supposed to be a form of temporary employment, has acquired the status of permanent employment in Zambia without the statutory benefits associated with permanence. For Zambia, casual workers occupy a precarious position in the workplace and society, and are effectively a new set of ‘underclass’.

“The Zambian people have yet to see greater and notable improvement in their living standards since the privatization of the copper mines and have not benefited from the sale and operations of the copper mines to the extent that foreign investors (Trans-National Corporations-TNCs) have” (Kapasa, 2009:2-3). This is in line with what Stiglitz (2002) argues about globalisation as a force with devastating effects, particularly on the poor. Stiglitz (2002) argues that the IMF backed reckless liberalization, privatization, and deregulation has not worked for equity and extermination of poverty but has instead violated developing countries’ sovereignties.

“One theme of the ‘neo liberals’ has been that countries should increase labour market flexibility which means an agenda for transferring risks and insecurity onto workers and their families” (Standing, 2011:1). These changing patterns of work (e.g. casual, contract, temporary, part-time employments, subcontracting, etc.) occasioned by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in Africa, have created concerns for workers and trade unions alike in Zambia.

The International Labour Organization ILO (2007) defines casuals as workers who have an explicit or implicit contract of employment which is not expected to continue for more than a short period, whose duration is to be determined by national circumstances. This ambiguous definition has led to varying definitions of casual and contract workers and their rights in different jurisdictions. Casualisation of labour is described by Boyer (1988:212) as “being anything ranging from effecting a more rapid adjustment of employment (such as the ability to hire and fire easily), increasing part-time work, fixed-term contracts and temporary jobs”. Basso (2003) defines casualisation as the spread of poor conditions of work that range from employment insecurity, irregular hours, intermittent employment, and low wages to an absence of standard employment benefits.

The Employment Act Chapter 268 of the Laws of Zambia defines a casual employee as “any employee the terms of whose employment provide for his payment at the end of each day and

who is not engaged for a longer period than twenty four hours at a time”. The Employment Act Chapter 268 further says a casual employee may be employed up to a maximum period of six months upon which the concerned employee is supposed to serve on permanent and pensionable conditions of service.

Through contractors that mining TNCs have brought on board, most of the employees are working as permanent casuals with or without renewable contracts for years and this is being done to avoid meeting statutory obligations a practice that is not in conformity with the spirit and intention of the Act. These employees have now become permanent casuals and this has created for the first time in the Zambian mining industry, a ‘poor working class’ who are ready to work for anything as long as they are in employment (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:3). Standing (2011) says this labour market flexibility has created a ‘global precariat’, without an anchor of stability prone to listen to ugly voices, and use their votes and money to give those voices a political platform of increasing influence. Standing (2011) further says the very success of the ‘neo-liberal’ agenda, embraced by governments of all complexions, has created an incipient political monster, a new dangerous class and action is needed before that monster comes to life.

Aim of the Study

The main aim of this study is to examine the social and economic experiences of casualisation on the casualised mineworkers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc as a consequence of economic liberalisation. The research focuses on the causes and extent of labour casualisation, the role that International Financial Institutions (IFIs), TNCs and government played in labour casualisation and the effects of this policy on the mineworkers. The importance of this research rests in its contribution to the research agenda on issues of economic restructuring and employment in developing countries and what repercussions such issues have for future policy formulation. The key research question is: **What are the social and economic experiences of casualisation on the casualised mine workers in the Zambian mining industry at MCM Plc on the Copperbelt province?**

Research Rationale

Stiglitz (2002) argues that globalisation has had devastating effects particularly on the poor. It should be acknowledged that losses that accrue are more visible in developing countries. Dev (2000) says the negative effects of restructuring are mostly concentrated among a particular

group of workers while the gains such as the new finance which is invested in to rehabilitate the industry and increase productivity are widely diffused and less visible.

Therefore, this research is expected to gather evidence on the experiences of casualisation on casual employees as a result of privatisation at MCM Plc.

The research will also assess how the rapid approach to restructuring by the MMD government especially in Zambia's mining industry has had an effect on the labour market and on the lives of the mineworkers. This has affected the livelihoods of workers at this mine and society leading to greater inequalities in income distribution between permanent and casualised employees.

Most research on casualisation in Zambia has generalised the issue across various sectors of the economy without talking to the affected employees to bring out their experiences and concerns.

Casualisation of labour in the context of flexible labour markets and workplaces allows the employer to adjust the size of the workforce in order to meet market demands and remain profitable. This trend is the preferred route at MCM Plc regardless of the copper price. Subsequently, the labour movement which has been campaigning for stable jobs with long-term employment security and benefit trappings that go with it has been adversely affected.

Finally, it is hoped that the findings will help to mobilize casual workers to organize and strengthen their voice against exploitation by capital. It is also hoped that trade unions, civil society, etc., can use the information to begin to organise this class of employees, which Standing (2011) calls an 'incipient political monster' and 'a new dangerous class' and lobby for change of policy by government on casualisation.

Chapter Outline

The research report is divided into five chapters.

Chapter One presents the literature framework for this research. The literature review will begin with theoretical debates on globalisation and neoliberal economics and discussions on the importance of copper mining in Zambia and why the industry was nationalised soon after independence from colonial rule. It will also look at its performance leading to privatisation and the conditions the Zambian governments (the United National Independence Party- UNIP

and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy-MMD) were given by the IMF and the World Bank, changes in labour legislation and the rise of casualisation and multiplicity of trade unions. These changes, have eventually led to casualisation in the Zambian mining industry which has resulted in negative social and economic experiences for casualised mine workers.

Chapter Two will look at global trends in flexible labour that are currently obtaining at MCM Plc. This is an important concept, as casualisation of labour is encouraged where there is a flexible labour market. As the thesis aims to bring out the experiences of the casualised mine workers, a discussion on the features of flexible labour markets and their effects is essential.

Chapter Three will look at the methodology applied in conducting this research. It is shown in this chapter that qualitative research method was the basic method adopted. However, I triangulated the method that is, via in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and observation to ensure that correct data was collected. The data analysis and interpretation techniques are also explained together with the sampling method. Ethical issues as well as strengths and limitations of the study are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Four is devoted to the research findings covering the casualised mineworkers at MCM Plc on the Copperbelt province in Zambia. It shows the experiences that casual/contract rock ore drillers are going through following economic liberalisation and deregulation of the labour market in the mining industry and how Zambia's extremely policy changes have impacted on casualised/contract workers. The chapter also provides an analysis on the findings of the study.

Chapter Five carries the conclusions and recommendations. On the basis of these findings, the chapter makes suggestions and recommendations on the way forward and how to minimise the negative consequences of economic reforms on workers.

Chapter One

1.0 GLOBALISATION, NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE CASUALISATION OF LABOUR

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will review what previous scholars and researchers have observed and written about globalisation, neoliberal economics and casualisation of labour.

The literature review will begin with discussions on the history and importance of copper mining in Zambia and why the industry was nationalised. It will also look at its performance leading to privatisation and the conditions the Zambian governments (the United National Independence Party- UNIP and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy-MMD) were given by the IMF and the World Bank, changes in labour legislation and the rise of casualisation and multiplicity of trade unions. These changes, have eventually led to casualisation in the Zambian mining industry which has resulted into negative experiences on the social and economic lives of casualised mine workers.

1.2 History of copper mining in Zambia

Zambia is the world's 7th copper producer. In 2013, copper accounted for 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80% of export earnings (African Business, 2013). Although Zambia has abundant resources of other metals (including cobalt and gold), gemstones (diamonds and emeralds) and coal and uranium, copper mining dominated the Zambian economy throughout the colonial and immediate post-colonial period since its discovery by the British South African Company (BSAC) in the early 1900s.

A central legacy of the colonial period (1899-1964) was the exploitation of Northern Rhodesia's (modern Zambia) vast copper deposits in two phases. The first phase was by the BSAC who administered the territory after being issued with a Charter in 1889 by Great Britain to enter into treaties with indigenous rulers of various territories for the purposes of exploring and extracting mineral resources. This situation continued until 1924 (Craig, 1999:16; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4). In 1911, the British unified these indigenous territories to form Northern Rhodesia (Craig, 1999; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4; Saasa, 1987). The second phase saw direct rule by the British government from 1924 to 1964, but with control and licensing of mining rights remaining with the BSAC, using its 1889 Charter to issue

exploration and development of concessions, leading notably to the discovery of the copper reserves that by 1964 dominated the economy of the territory (Craig, 1999:16; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4; Saasa, 1987:7).

1.2.1 Under colonial rule

Under colonial rule, the economic performance of Zambia was largely driven by Anglo American Corporation and American Metal Climax(Amax), major share-holders in BSAC, which began to operate the Northern Rhodesia mines in the 1930s (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4; Muchimba, 2010:9). The first copper mine opened in 1928 in Roan Antelope, now Luanshya, a place where a British hunter found copper by coincidence. During colonialism, Northern Rhodesia was regarded by its British rulers as a major source of mineral wealth to support the more economically advanced Southern Rhodesia under Central African Federation (CAF) when three British colonial territories namely Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia were merged into a federation. In the decades of foreign leadership the mines were owned and managed by two private companies, the Roan Selection Trust and the Anglo American Corporation (Muchimba, 2010:10; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4-5). The establishment of CAF and the landlocked nature of Zambia rendered the territory economically dependent on neighbouring states. In particular, Zimbabwe and South Africa provided the main export routes for Zambian goods. This hugely restricted manoeuvrability for economic independence (Saasa, 1987:13-14). Rapid industrialization, besides requiring the increase production and supply of agriculture products and essential commodities, required an increased and steady supply of labour.

To ensure a steady supply of labour, the colonial government introduced poll tax, which required every adult male person of a certain age limit to pay tax, whether or not he earned income in form of money (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011). This tax forced many Africans to switch from traditional crops to produce cash crops to raise money for poll tax while others drifted to urban areas in search of employment to enable them pay poll tax (FES, 2011; MUZ, 1991).

Before the introduction of poll tax, African employees only stayed in towns on the mines for very few months, after which they returned to their villages with a bicycle or radio (MUZ, 1991).

As the population of the Copperbelt rose to thousands, there emerged problems of industrialization in which neither workers nor management nor the colonial government had

any means or experience to guide company operations, communicate with each other or to address any conflict or outstanding problem. This throwing of people from many different parts of Zambia and outlying countries of Tanzania, Malawi, Zaire, etc., without town and industrial experience into the unfamiliar melting pot of the Copperbelt brought problems of employment to the fore with the white employees occupying all the better paying jobs and even being highly paid for jobs requiring skills of modest kind (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011). It must be noted that the men who moved to new towns, which were built from scratch to house mine workers and European owners and managers, experimented with new urban lifestyles (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:4).

In 1934, European trade unionism was introduced at Nkana mine for European miners who feared that without colour bar, African mine workers would take over their jobs (MUZ, 1991). The Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers Union (NRMWU) was formed with the help of the Mineworkers Union of South Africa and fought for better wages and conditions of service for its members (FES, 2011; MUZ, 1991).

The following year, the colonial government changed the calculation of poll tax reducing it in rural areas by 25% in an effort to reduce the over-supply of labour in urban areas (MUZ, 1991). Africans had previously been taxed according to their areas. With immediate effect, all Africans in urban areas were to pay 15%, an increase of about 30% for Africans from North Eastern Zambia – Luapula and Northern provinces (MUZ, 1991). MUZ report (1991) says the mining company through sudden notices and public address through the mine police announced the hike of poll tax without a corresponding increase in wages. This sudden devaluation of wages in May 1935 sparked the first Copperbelt strike where unorganized African workers took industrial action to advance their demands for better wages and conditions of service (MUZ, 1991). At Roan Antelope, the strike turned into riots; troops were flown from Lusaka, 6 men were killed and 22 were wounded, while 44 supposed ring leaders were arrested. At Nkana, mobile police opened fire on a crowd of miners demonstrating at the compound office killing 17 workers and wounding 63 in just under 45 minutes of shooting (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011).

The Elder tribal representative council which had been formed by the mining company to help to recruit mine workers and resolve problems of African mine workers according to areas of origin and tribe proved of little assistance (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:5). “Whereas the companies used “tribal” organizations to recruit labour and to communicate with their

workforce, mine workers' determination to self-organize led to the development of the Copperbelt's famously powerful unions" (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:5). Subsequent strikes demanding better wages and conditions of service for African mine workers and equal pay for equal work with European mine workers forced the British government with the help of the British Trade Union Congress to help form a trade union for African mine workers (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011).

The first African trade union was soon followed by the first branch of the African Mineworkers Union at Nkana. In 1949, branches all over the Copperbelt were amalgamated into the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Trade Union (NRAMTU) and formally recognized by the mining companies on 9th August 1949 (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011).

The formation of NRAMTU achieved so many benefits for the members that the mining companies and the colonial government started applying 'divide and rule' tactics and instigated the formation of the Mine African Staff Association (MASA) for clerks and supervisory workers in 1954 and the following year in 1955 another association called Mines African Police Association (MAPA) for mine police (MUZ, 1991; FES, 2011).

The NRAMTU's prestige soared and membership increased. A series of strike starting in April 1956 involving 46 African drivers at Roan sparked off by an alleged grievance against an African supervisor was immediately followed by three strikes in May and June involving 2,700 African miners at Nchanga, 7,400 at Rhokana and 25,000 at other Copperbelt mines. Six more strikes between July and August involving 43,050 African miners at Mufulira, Rhokana, Bancroft, Roan Antelope, Broken Hill, Chibuluma and Nchanga mines were conducted in protest of the compulsory introduction of monthly pay for staff category employees while general mine workers were left in the cold. These strikes forced the colonial government to declare a state of emergency and arrested 33 union leaders (MUZ, 1991).

Towards the end of 1956, NRAMTU under Lawrence Chola Katilungu, Mathews Delux Nkoloma, Jameson K Namitengo, Robinson Chisanga Puta, Harry Bwalya Chiyungi and N K Ziwa made three demands: a substantial wage increase, to be weekly paid and a closed shop. On the issue of African advancement, the European mine workers union surrendered 24 jobs to Africans and the Staff Association wrote to the union to form a united force in fighting for African mine workers (MUZ, 1991).

Roy Welensky, who helped found the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and later became its Prime Minister, 1956-1963, and a substantial white community in Northern Rhodesia, saw the African trade unions, not as a vehicle to be used for the improvement of the African workers' lives per se, but as a vehicle to be used for the continued domination of the Africans by the Europeans (FES, 2011:5). "Welensky and a substantial portion of the white community were really worried about the fact that the Africans had the potential to organise themselves against their employers. They decided that the energy of the African workers, therefore, had to be harnessed and guided lest it fell into the wrong hands and was used against the interests of the Europeans" (FES, 2011:5). Behind this line of thinking was the assumption that it was normally easier to control people who were organised in a trade union than it was to control a non-union mob.

FES (2011) states that the history of labour in the mining industry during the colonial period clearly indicates that the African mine workers were working on full time basis with trade union representation to bargain for better wages and conditions of service that their fellow European mine workers performing the same jobs enjoyed.

1.2.2 Mining after independence and nationalisation

After gaining independence, Zambia's first president Kenneth Kaunda spurred a lot of hope for poverty alleviation and development of the country. Copper mining was meant to play a crucial role in this foreseen prosperity. The mines remained in private hands for the first years. The need for copper miners meant that a high percentage of Zambia's male workforce was—often forcibly— by extra economic coercion, encouraged to leave their subsistence farms and work in the mines. This led to the neglect of the agricultural sector and Zambia's reliance on copper exports—a trend that has continued to affect the national economy (Muchimba, 2010:10).

At its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, copper mining accounted for more than 80% of the country's foreign exchange earnings, over 50% of government revenue and at least 20% of total formal sector employment (Kapasa, 2009:4). In 1969, Zambia was classified a middle-income country, with one of the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Africa – three times that of Kenya, twice that of Egypt, and higher than those of Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea (Fraser and Lungu, 2008:7; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:6). Zambia followed an economic programme drafted in 1965 by mostly expatriate government officials (Martin, 1972:51) but Kaunda was developing his own philosophy of 'Humanism' (Kaunda,

1968a; Gertzel, et al. 1984:9). This philosophy was ambiguous lacking clear economic policy and had no clarity between it and socialism, and was intended to overcome factionalism and unify all communities under a concept of 'man'. Humanism rejected doctrines of socialism but did allow for socialist policies (Bostock and Harvey, 1972:5). Kaunda was a critic of capitalism but supported the benefits of a market economy with socialist policies (Kaunda, 1969:44).

In 1968, Kaunda had raised concerns about, the failure of the mining companies who were expropriate 80% of profits, to invest in developing the mines and warned against an economic dependence on copper and the concurrent power this availed the 'small group of people in the mining industry' (Kaunda, 1968b:45). Subsequent to this, Kaunda nationalised the copper mines in 1969 in the hope that nationalisation would enable the state to direct the profits of the copper mines towards building social and economic infrastructure. To encourage reinvestment, the nationalisation reforms included a 50% restriction on profit remittances (Saasa, 1987:28; Fraser and Larmer, 2010:8). The two nationalized companies were later combined in to form a giant mining conglomerate, majority owned by the state: Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – ZCCM (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:8). With high copper prices on the world market, the country saw during the period 1969–1975 an unprecedented investment in the construction of new schools, hospitals and roads, using surpluses from copper revenues. This state intervention, which amounted to a centralised command of the economy, was thus seen as a legitimate attempt by the state to reduce foreign control of the economy and also as a fulfilment of the promise of independence among the middle class, labour, peasantry and the masses in general (Fraser and Lungu, 2008:7). Kaunda reiterated that the nationalisations of mines, banks, large enterprises and abolition of private insurance firms to be replaced by the state insurance company were not socialist, but to indigenise control through state capitalism until the workers could become shareholders (Chileshe, 1981:104-105; Martin, 1972:250; Berry, 2015:45).

Craig (1991:1) suggested that nationalisations were in response to an inability of the private sector to meet state development objectives. Revenues from copper mining were to be used for the development of up and down stream diversification, but the global fall in copper prices reduced revenues available to successfully implement this strategy as copper revenue which accounted for 71% of government revenues in 1965 fell to 58% by 1970, 13% by 1975 and 0% by 1979 (Saasa, 1987:7; Berry, 2015:46).

When the copper price on the world market in the late 1970s begun to slump, the Zambian government was forced to borrow money from the IMF and the World Bank (Adepoju, 1993:71). However, the IMF argued that the country's problems were both structural and due to mismanagement, and made liberalisation of the economy, including devaluation of the country's currency, a reduction in the mine labour force and a general wage freeze as conditions (Adepoju, 1993:72). Throughout the economic crisis, ZCCM was treated as a 'cash cow,' milked without corresponding investment in machinery and prospecting ventures (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:9). "No new mines were opened after 1979, and as ore bodies within the existing mines were found deeper underground, the cost of production rose. ZCCM production collapsed from a high of 750,000 tonnes in 1973 to 257,000 tonnes in 2000. Between 1974 and 1994, per capita income declined by 50%, leaving Zambia the 25th-poorest country in the world" (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:9). The government had no plans to privatize the once-private enterprises, which had by then become a burden to the taxpayers (Adepoju, 1993:72). However, in the late 1980's, the UNIP government grudgingly began to partially implement some of the IMF economic policies but abandoned the programme of privatization of the parastatals and liberalisation of factor markets and later severed relations with the Fund on grounds that conditions were too harsh (Adepoju, 1993: 72). With lack of funds from the IMF, World Bank and donor countries and because of the delay in the implementation of the restructuring programme, a firm ground was laid for the defeat of the UNIP government. Fraser and Lungu (2008:9) reveal that by the time Zambia accepted a new adjustment programme in 1989, it was too late for the ruling party UNIP and Kaunda as the citizens had lost confidence in the government. Repeated urban food riots, industrial unrest, and eventually the loss of support for the ruling party from the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), saw the unions support an opposition political party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), headed by Frederick Chiluba, a former ZCTU president, which swept the board in the elections in 1991 (Adepoju, 1993:72; Fraser and Lungu, 2008:9). The MMD government then accelerated IMF and World Bank economic reforms (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:9).

1.3 Global Neoliberal Agenda-Privatisation and Development Agreements (D.A.s)

As alluded to above, privatisation was part of the overall economic reform of the economy and was spearheaded by international financial institutions. Satgar (2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009) agrees that the international economy over the past three decades has

experienced a shift that has laid the basis for global capitalist structures of accumulation to emerge. Describing it as ‘unleashing a new scramble in Africa’, Satgar (2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009) admits that global neo-liberal restructuring is establishing a global market civilisation and attempting to end the era of national capitalism and autonomous development. “Transnational factions of Africa’s ruling classes have embraced and internalised neo-liberalism as a new concept of control and ensured that an African version of neo-liberal capital is organised” (Satgar, 2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009: 51).

The new MMD government embraced the reforms, enacted the Privatisation Act in 1992 and proceeded to privatise the mines as a response to underperformance of the mining sector, which was reflected in three symptoms (Kapasa, 2009:9-10):

- a) The industry’s decline, revealed by declining contribution of mining to GDP
- b) The decline of government revenue from mineral export receipts; and
- c) The declining contribution of mining to overall formal employment.

Fraser and Larmer (2010) say that although the ZCTU and MMD both argued for some privatizations before the 1991 elections, neither endorsed the sale of ZCCM. In the 1992 public debate over the World Bank’s request for ZCCM to be sold, the ZCTU, the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ), the churches, much of the press, and some of the MMD cabinet opposed the proposal, saying the process could wait 20 to 30 years (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:12).

Simutanyi (1996) contended that trade unions remained in favour of privatisation although Paul Kafumbe, the General Secretary of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) stated they had suggested strategic industries such as mining should not be privatised. However, in 1995, MUZ endorsed the sale of ZCCM (Simutanyi, 1996:836; Berry, 2015:49). “This may have resulted from continued redundancies in the sector since 1985 and a belief that the private sector might develop and grow employment opportunities through improved efficiency” (Simutanyi, 1996:836). Privatisation therefore had broad support amongst business, trade unions and intellectuals (Rakner, 1994:12; Berry, 2015:46).

The government unbundled the ZCCM and sold its assets in business packages on the advice of German-based firm Kienbaum Development Services, which was contracted by the World

Bank (Kapasa, 2009:5). Fraser and Lungu (2007) report that the outcome of the tender process was that as follows:

1. Nkana mine and assets were packaged with Mufulira mine (including the copper concentrators and refinery assets), to form the largest company (at that time) - Mopani Copper Mines Plc (MCM).
2. The second largest grouping included the mines and other assets at Nchanga which were paired with those at Konkola and Nampundwe to form a company called Konkola Copper Mines Plc (KCM).
3. The smaller facilities at Baluba and Luanshya mines were put together with a copper concentrator and the Milyashi greenfield site. These were known as the Roan Antelope Mining Corporation of Zambia (RAMCOZ).
4. The mining assets at Chambishi were split off from the other assets to form a company called Chambishi Mines Plc.
5. The smelter at Chambishi was sold together with the acid and cobalt plants and Nkana slag dumps to form a company called Chambishi Metals Plc.
6. An acid plant, and the Kansanshi copper deposit were put together to form Bwana Mkubwa Mines Ltd.
7. The mine at Kalulushi was sold as a firm called Chibuluma Mines Plc.

The mines have thus undergone three major phases. From their establishment to 1969, the mines were in private hands under the control of the Roan Select Trust-RST and Anglo-American Corporation-AAC (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:12). In the period after 1969, then mines were first nationalised and then in 1982 merged to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Although ZCCM was a state enterprise, ACC through its subsidiary, Zambia Copper Investment (ZCI) continued to hold 27.3% of the shares and pre-emptive rights to buy back the shares that government offered ZCCM at a later date before they were offered to anyone else (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:12).

The privatisation of Zambia's copper mines paved the way for increased levels of foreign direct investment in the economy (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:10). The incentives provided to the mining companies were very attractive to investors. However, the weakness of the Zambian state was clearly demonstrated in the Development Agreements (D.A.s') it signed with the mining companies at the expense of the welfare of the Copperbelt province communities. As part of corporate strategy, mining TNCs pressurised the "MMD government into signing

D.A.s' which were not in the interest of the Zambian people" (Kapasa, 2009:9; Fraser and Lungu, 2007:15)

The D.A.s' allowed companies to outsource some of their mining operations and employ Zambians as casuals, avoid paying a good deal of corporate tax by carrying forward losses for periods of between 15 and 20 years on a 'first in, first out' basis, meaning that losses in the first year of operations, and the subsequent investment in the later years, could be subtracted in subsequent years from taxable profits. They were also granted deductions of 100 per cent of capital expenditure in the year in which the expenditure was incurred, and were exempted from paying customs and excise duties or any other duty or import tax levied on machinery and equipment (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:15). Furthermore, the government undertook not to amend any of these tax regimes for as long as between 15 and 20 years (Kapasa, 2009:9; Fraser and Lungu, 2007:15). The D.A.s' however, covered more than taxation issues. They also covered "management of social services - where mining companies were no longer compelled to carry out corporate social responsibility programmes and the environment - where mining companies were indemnified from paying pollution damages on the environment" (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:15-16).

Despite the upturn in copper prices from 2004 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2014 on the international market, mining companies, have continued to provide reduced services to the communities and are employing fewer and fewer permanent employees.

Underpinning many of the problems discussed above was a culture of official secrecy which made it difficult for citizens to access data and documentation on Development Agreements (D.A.s) and thus put pressure on companies and government to deliver greater benefits (Fraser and Lungu, 2007: 17). Fraser and Lungu (2007) reveal that almost a decade after D.A.s were struck, trade unions, Members of Parliament, local government, and even the regulating authorities that were supposed to keep the companies to the promises they made in the agreements were not allowed to see them.

Fraser and Lungu (2007:18) state that the tax and environmental concessions in the D.A.s partly reflected that the principal aim of privatisation – establishing an attractive investment environment to bring in new money – was prioritised above ensuring that new investors accepted responsibilities to share wealth that would flow from their operations. They further explain that concessions were a result of the fact that Zambian negotiators found themselves in a weak position as the mines were sold when the price of copper was so low that ZCCM

was making year-on-year losses resulting in the assets being sold cheaply with few things attached (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:18). Secondly, government was being pushed by the World Bank to sell and potential purchasers knew this. Although the state did delay for several years, it severely weakened its negotiating position (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:18). Thirdly, although the government stated that one of its objective for the privatisation was that it should be a transparent process, consistent with good order in the industry, and the World Bank and the IMF, who oversaw the talks, claim to be in favour of good governance and transparency, the process was extremely secretive as there was no consultation with stakeholders or public discussion of the terms of the agreements (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:18). Fraser and Lungu (2007) say that although the mine workers union, MUZ, did have brief discussions with the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry was not leading the process. Whatever the weakness of the Zambia's negotiators, there was no excuse for the manner in which massive multinational investors were enabled to blackmail one of the world's poorest countries to provide special concessions from its national laws and yet many of these companies are signed up for Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on investment which are designated to promote good corporate governance (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:19).

Benefits of privatisation which Kapasa (2009) alluded to above, did not materialise. Trade unions and civil society organisations were compelled to pressure the government to renegotiate the agreements under the Levy Mwanawasa presidency after contents of the D.A.s were leaked. In January 2008 President Mwanawasa surprised Parliament, donors, and the companies by announcing the one thing donors and mining TNCs had insisted he avoid—the unilateral imposition of new windfall taxes on mining multinationals. The companies had believed their D.A.s guaranteed that massive tax incentives were “locked in” (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:19). However, in his January 2008 budget announcement, the Zambian finance minister laid out the detail of a new mining tax regime, effective from April of that year, and designed to capture a greater share of windfall profits (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:19). Parliament voted to approve the budget.

The key political point was this: in spite of the donors' declared preferences, in spite of the companies' legalistic bluster, Mwanawasa demonstrated that African governments and parliament ultimately retain some autonomy of action, some legalistic sovereignty (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:19-20). The announcement took the companies, donors, and the Zambian media by surprise, particularly when deputy finance minister Jonas Shakafuswa confirmed

that the decision was a direct result of public pressure and announced that there would be no negotiations with the companies; rather, the new regime would be imposed through an executive decision (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:20).

Although the pressure worked, it was largely because of the support from the church and the civil society organisations as trade union power had diminished. This confirms what Kraus observed about market-oriented policies when he said, “trade unions, which played a pivotal role in the struggle for freedom and independence, have seen their members not being beneficiaries of the market-oriented policies of the successor governments” (Kraus, 2007:255). Consequently, Kraus (2007) says labour protests and strikes have often continued being called by workers whose living standards and organizational rights have suffered under the democratic regimes they were crucial in creating.

1.4 Value Addition versus Exploitation of Human and Natural Resources- New Resentments (Casualisation and poverty)

Muchimba (2010) says an old dispute, not only in Zambia but among all countries with an abundance of natural resources and confrontation with TNCs from foreign countries, is about whether their naturally given richness is exploited by those companies instead of extracting the highest benefit for the people of the countries out of the mining activities. Southall and Melber (2009) say that the then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2006 noted that foreign investment in Africa had increased by 200% over the last five years, but that it still focused on extracting natural resources rather than developing local communities. Governments and people are relying on the foreigners who have the potential of large-scale investment and technology to subsist on the international market by economies of scale (Muchimba, 2010: 20). “The problematic issue which is mainly claimed is the maintenance of the naturally enriched countries in an underdeveloped status compared to the capitally enriched countries for which the majority of the minerals are extracted” (Muchimba, 2010:20).

“The investments into the extraction of natural resources still lack a comprehensive trickle-down effect to the local economy in Zambia, which might lead to prosperous businesses by nationals” (Muchimba, 2010:21). Furthermore, the mines are perceived as exporting entities contributing less to development, through creating jobs, improving the infrastructure for transport and production, as well as backing the communities by some social investments.

From an economic perspective, the question is how far the mines and their operators are adding value to the national economy despite the extraction of these natural resources.

Muchimba (2010) writes that ever since the 1930s and throughout the history of the ZCCM from 1982 up to 2000, the mines established a corporate culture which extended past a workplace involvement. “The employers in the mining industry provided for all employees’ needs such as housing, hospitals and medical assistance, education for children, subsidized food, free electricity, water, transport, and all social amenities for sport, recreation, and social welfare, as well as clubs in the mining communities” (Muchimba, 2010:21). The mines also encouraged the mushrooming of various economic, agricultural and social activities mainly dependant on the incomes of the miners. These included shopping facilities, agricultural establishments for the supply of foodstuffs to the mine areas and other industrial activities (Fraser and Lungu, 2008:8; Muchimba, 2008:21).

The greatest impact of privatisation on the Copperbelt is the mass unemployment it has generated. Full time employment has slumped from its historic peak of 62 222 full time in 1976 to the present 30 000 in 2015 (ICMM, 2014:61). This might go lower because of the collapse of the copper price on the world market recorded since the second quarter of 2015. MCM plc issued a 60 day notice to government and mining trade unions in September 2015, that following the slump in copper prices, it was going to retrench 4 300 permanent employees. The company cited lower copper prices, an electricity shortage and unpaid value-added tax refunds as the reasons behind its decision during a meeting with union leaders (Bloomberg, 2015). The company has not announced how many casual/contractors will be affected but the number of permanent employees to be retrenched has double from over 2000 in 2008-9 period when there was a global recession to 4300. During the ZCCM era, retrenchment was not a common word, it was retirement and those about to retire were equipped and prepared for employment exit through training in advance (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22). Most mining investors stripped labour force to bare bones and although they have since slightly increased their total employment levels, rather than taking on permanent workers, they have tended to offer fixed-term contracts with no job security and no pension, or to sub-contract much of their work out (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22). Since privatisation, almost all of the growth in employment in the mines has been for those employed by contracting firms.

In most mining companies, jobs such as ‘development’ (digging new seams) have been passed to sub-contracting firms which have hired many ex-miners to work the same sites they previously worked but this time indirectly via sub-contracting firms (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22). These workers are on a lower wage with no medical cover, no housing and other fringe benefits that permanent employees enjoy.

Issues of safety and mine accidents have been on the rise as all mining work such as development and timbering which used to be done by mining companies themselves has been sub-contracted and contractors force their workers to work hard to be paid more (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:24). A weakening of the position of labour in relation to capital and increased informalization of work contracts can be summarised as the most important changes during the last 10 to 15 years in the situation of the working classes (Bieler, et al., 2008:11).


From the time the Kitwe and Mufulira assets were sold to MCM, there is today a huge contrast between the ZCCM’s comprehensive employees’ social welfare and conditions of work compared to the current status of the mining industry under private hands. There has been a complete abandonment of the policy whereby recreation clubs, playing fields, swimming pools, public libraries, community halls, public parks and gardens and the network of a number of social activities and infrastructure were provided at the expense of mining companies (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:8; Muchimba, 20010:21).

At the time that Nkana and Mufulira mines were being sold to Glencore Plc, full time employment was over 8 624 for both Nkana and Mufulira mines, while there were 1 920 contractors (Muchimba, 2008:21; MCM, 2015). As at December 31st 2014, the number for permanent employees was 9 342, with 11 375 being on casual/contract employment conditions. The casualised employees have been employed by contractor companies subcontracted by MCM Plc as agreed in the D.A.s’. Fraser and Lungu (2007:23) say “most mining companies have shifted workers onto rolling, fixed-term contracts on significantly less beneficial terms and conditions, or the jobs have been ‘contracted-out’ to companies that pay in many cases less than half the monthly wage offered to permanent workers for the same work in the same mine, and in some cases, just one tenth of this figure”.

Table 1: EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AT MCM SINCE THE YEAR 2000

The Table 1 below shows the number of permanent employees and casual (contractor) employees at Mopani Copper Mines Plc since privatisation in the year 2000 to March 2015:

Source: Mopani Copper Mines Plc 2015.



The Table 1 above confirms that MCM has not created many full time employment opportunities for the citizens since privatisation despite the sharp rise in copper prices from

2004 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2014. For example, by 31st December 2000, MCM had 8 624 full time employees compared to 9 343 at the end of 2014. MCM has never increased full time employment levels beyond 1 300 since it took over the mines 15 years ago despite the copper boom in prices and rise in production figures in the above years. The year 2007 had highest number of full employees at 9 783. However, the number drastically reduced during recession (2008-2009) when over 2000 employees were retrenched. Table 1 further indicates that as part of corporate strategy, MCM has instead been growing casual/contract employment from 1 920 employees that it inherited from ZCCM (Nkana and Mufulira mines) when it took over to 11 375 by 31st December 2014. There has been a boom of casual/contract employment instead.

The above picture is in contrast with the ICMM report (2014) which stipulates that since the year 2000, copper production has increased from 257,000 tonnes to over 700,000 tonnes per annum and is expected to increase to over 1,000,000 metric tonnes per annum. In terms of GDP, the Zambian economy has been growing by between 5% and 7% a year since 2004. However, despite such economic progress, Zambia remains one of the least developed countries in Africa, ranking 141 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI Report, 2014:2). The ICMM report (2014), says poverty and inequality remain high, with almost two-thirds of people are living below the international poverty line.

The Guardian (2011) says a leaked audit report on MCM done by Grant Thornton and Econ Poyry revealed that MCM's records of expenditure and income were not trustworthy and that the company was using derivatives trades to shift profits out of Zambia in order to minimise its tax bill in the country. The World Bank and Bank of Zambia uncovered that MCM had been using transfer pricing, including selling to Glencore at below LME pricing, and alleged overvaluations on imports and externalisation of resources through management contracts with overseas subsidiaries (Haglund, 2010:120; Al Jazeera, 18 June 2011 cited in Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2012:112; Cobham, Jansky & Prats, 2014). The mine declared for over a decade that it had not been making any profits. In this sense, increased mining investment exacerbated by 'race to the bottom' has not led to an improvement in the social life of the majority Zambians. This has resulted in lower wages, worse working conditions especially for casualised employees and fewer environmental protections. MCM however denied the above allegations and Haglund (2010:97-99) cautioned against the validity of the press arguments due to lack of reliable information.

There is no doubt that the change in the quality of employment can be linked to economic globalisation and the corporate strategy of these TNCs and at MCM, the quality of employment, does not fit into the International Labour Organisation (ILO) notion of decent work. According to ILO definition of decent work (www.ilo.org/decentwork), “it is the availability of employment in conditions of freedom, equity, human security and dignity.” ILO further says, “decent work involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men”. The above picture is different at MCM Plc.

1.5 Role of the State, labour legal framework and trade unions

Although advocates of the neo-liberal agenda speak so romantically about policies of privatization, deregulation, free trade and minimalistic role of the state, they avoid discussing how globalisation has led to the withering of state sovereignty in developing countries such as Zambia. Before the on-set of globalisation and liberalization, the state was seen as a protector of the domestic economy against external forces. With the re-definition of the role of the state under the Washington consensus, the state is now largely seen a transmission belt between national and international interests and in most cases this transmission is lopsided with the national being on the receiving end. To support this point, Satgar(in Southall and Melber, 2009) states that the making of Afro-neo-liberal capitalism has been a violent and brutal process, consisting of three overlapping post-colonial conjunctures. These are: “first, the defeat of actual and potentially radical post-colonial state development projects – revolutionary nationalist, African socialist and Marxist-Leninist; second, the debt crisis and national adjustment; and third, limited democratisation and continental restructuring to meet the requirements of transnational capital” (Satgar in Southall and Melber, 2009:41). Satgar argues that the great transformation to bring about Afro-neo-liberal capitalism had devastating consequences. “The de-territorialising and disembedding of the African market meant rolling back state intervention. Structural adjustment was aggressively championed through strategies like privatisation, liberalisation and monetarism. It was as though the already ravaged African state had to walk through a bonfire: it had to be subsumed by the market” (Satgar, 2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009:43).

The government's role, as part of conditions set by the IMF and World Bank, in amending parts of Chapters 268 and 269 of the laws of Zambia governing employment and trade unions and employer relations from 1992 to 2000 to allow for labour flexibility and plurality of trade unions has exacerbated the problem of casualisation in the mining industry. As earlier alluded to, "one claim the neo-liberals made in the 1980s was the need for countries to pursue 'labour market flexibility' in order to prevent a rise in labour costs and financial capital being invested in those countries rather than at home" (Standing, 2011:6). Standing (2011) says flexibility has many dimensions such as wage flexibility meaning speeding up adjustments to changes in demand, particularly downwards; and employment flexibility meaning easy and costless ability of firms to change employment levels, particularly downwards, implying a reduction in employment security and protection; and job flexibility-moving employees around inside the firm and changing job structures with minimal opposition or cost and skill flexibility meaning being able to adjust workers' skills easily.

Flexibility, which was a necessary price for retaining investment as Standing (2011) put it, meant systematically making employees more insecure. Standing (2011) says as globalisation proceeded, and as governments and corporations chased each other in making their labour relations more flexible, the number of people in insecure forms of employment multiplied. Standing (2011) says in the drive for market efficiency, barriers to commodification were dismantled. Standing (2011) says a neo-liberal principle was that regulations were required to prevent collective interests acting as barriers to competition. "This was an attack on collective institutions such as trade unions as representatives of employees...that this concoction splintered labour arrangements and created a class fragmentation" (Standing, 2011:26).

This was seen in the mining industry in Zambia where the amendments to the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993, affected the labour movement. Furthermore, in 1997 the government introduced legislation to end the "one-industry, one-union" rule (Fraser and Larmer, 2010:11). The law was repealed allowing for plurality of unions. More unions have emerged, some have split away from the mainstream unions while others have disaffiliated from ZCTU making the labour movement today more divided than ever in the history of the country. The once strong Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) has been weakened by new trade unions that have come on board such as the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers (NUMAW), United Mineworkers Union of Zambia (UMUZ) and a nurses union, Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation (ZUNO) which has targeted nurses working in mine hospitals and clinics. The new unions which have come on board claim the MUZ has not

adequately represented the interests and welfare of mineworkers following privatization. However, plurality of unions in the mining industry is being viewed as a strategy by TNCs to weaken the voice of workers and the once strong labour movement that advocated for long-term, stable, fixed-hour jobs with established routes for advancement, subject to unionisation and collective agreement. The country now has two trade union federations, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which was formed after independence, and the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia (FFTUZ) which was created after the amendment of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1997.

The unions' efforts in the mining industry have been mainly concentrated on organizing the approximately 30 000 permanent mine workers in the mining industry across the country. MUZ (2014) reports indicate that as at December 2014, Mopani had 7 243 eligible to be unionised permanent employees under the following unions: MUZ-4 668, NUMAW-1 518, UMUZ- 852 and ZUNO - 207. The above information is not inclusive of the over 11 000 casual/contract employees as the above unions have made little strides in organising this class of employees. This has led to this class of employees to be exploited by capital and is going through difficult social and economic challenges. There are growing inequalities between casual/contract employees and permanent employees in terms of trade union representation, salaries, housing allowance, health benefits, bonuses, pensions, training and safety and health issues, etc. The current situation is creating for the first time amongst mine workers a category of the 'working poor' (Fraser and Lungu, 2007: 23). Muchimba (2010) says there is today a huge contrast between the ZCCM's comprehensive employees' social welfare and conditions of work compared to the current status of the mining industry under private hands.

As argued above, there are huge social costs to unemployment such as anxiety among workers who have managed to keep their jobs, additional financial burden on family members who manage to remain in employed and the withdraw of children from school to support the family. Stiglitz (2002) explains that these kinds of social consequences of unemployment endure long past the immediate loss of a job. More often, the practice of dismissing workers seems common when a firm is sold to foreign investors whose greater obligation is to the shareholders who would want to maximise stock value by reducing costs. Local or domestic firms, on the other hand, being attuned to the social context may be reluctant to retrench workers if they know there are no alternative jobs available. This was evident when government was running the mines through ZCCM.

1.6 The Washington Consensus versus the Decent Work Agenda

The desire by states to pursue the neo-liberal agenda as a basis for ensuring the efficient allocation of resources and stimulate economic growth has resulted in what Aguiar and Herold (2006) call the exteriorization of economic relationships, which were previously internal to the structure of companies. The state, through the adoption of deregulation policies, which are central to the Washington Consensus, has undermined the protection of workers and lowered labour standards. The workers feel abandoned by the state as they see flexibility as an affront on the protection of their rights and freedom. Workers have been deprived of their “industrial citizenship rights” through the restructuring of the state regulation covering the workplace and in the false belief that employers will be forced by the market to protect workers (Aguiar and Herod, 2006). In line with the Washington consensus, countries in the global south have deregulated not in tandem with their individual needs but rushed by the IMF, World Bank and WTO. It is this imbalance in negotiations that has forced most countries into excessive poverty, misery and set the clock of development in reverse. Fergusson (1999) says markets in developing countries opened too fast or rapidly for competition before financial institutions were established while jobs were destroyed faster than new ones were created giving rise to unemployment and poverty leading to a process of ‘disconnection’.

Global neoliberal restructuring is establishing a global market civilisation and attempting to end the era of national capitalism and autonomous development (Southall and Melber, 2009:51). The new scramble for Africa cannot be understood outside this process where transnational fractions of Africa’s ruling classes have embraced and internalised neoliberalism as a new concept of control and ensured that an African version of neoliberal capitalism is organised (Satgar, 2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009:51). Satgar (2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009) further posits that in addition, global mutations in US led neoliberalism, informed by war on terror, have “post-Washington consensus” which will lead to African neoliberalism giving in to US led and imposed world order.

The result of transformation and dismantling of state regulation in developing countries in line with the Washington consensus has been the subjection of workers to immiseration and exposure to abuse by employers through the destruction and weakening of independent trade unions which are the only institutions left to protect workers and push for better wages in industries threatened by cheap imports through liberalised trade. According to ILO, it is

believed that the rights of capital are better protected than the rights of workers (ILO Report: 2004). For the ILO, fair rules for trade, capital and greater access to markets are needed to provide more space developing countries. Further, the ILO suggests that there should exist basic social protection, respect for core labour standards and adequate adjustment assistance for workers in all countries to provide more security to individuals, families and communities. Felstead and Jewson (1999) agree that non-standard employment is increasing together with the pressures for lessening job security and employment protection due to international competition, the operations of TNCs and the diffusion of new organisational and managerial models and that these forces for change are mediated through the social, political and institutional structures within each country. This has technically meant the erosion of state sovereignty in the running of the economy as there is free flow of international capital and control and influence is exerted by TNCs and IFIs on resources.

1.7 Conclusion

The chapter has traced the history of mining in Zambia and its importance to the economy of the country from the colonial times, after independence and what led to nationalisation, and how the mines and other industries were privatised again at the insistence of the IMF and World Bank as part of economic restructuring to salvage an economy that was collapsing. As a consequence of the economic reforms, the chapter has talked about rising unemployment, mass retrenchments, high inequality and poverty, and new labour flexibility patterns that have come with the neoliberal agenda and globalisation.

Chapter Two

2.0 TRENDS IN FLEXIBLE LABOUR

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on trends in labour flexibility that have emerged in the mining industry following privatisation. This is an important concept, as the casualisation of labour is encouraged where there is a flexible labour market. As the thesis aims to bring out the social and economic experiences of the casualised mine workers, a discussion on the features of flexible labour markets and their effects is essential.

In flexible workplaces like the Zambian mining industry, the tendency is for TNCs to incorporate mine workers in the form of temporary, part-time and casual work as a means of adapting to market demands. Market demands range from increased international competition requiring firms to produce more efficiently, pressures to reduce operational costs in the form of salaries and benefits for permanent workers and the general desire of employers to generate as much profit as possible. Standing (2011) calls it the process of labour re-commodification, making the labour relationship more responsive to demand and supply, as measured by its price, the wage resulting in eroding all forms of labour security.

2.2 Dwindling Trade Union membership

As earlier alluded to, flexibility in the workplace is deemed to have a negative effect on trade union membership as the casual workers that are incorporated into the workplace are often not members of any union. Unions are often unable to organise casual workers because they are opposed to casualisation, and casual work is designed precisely to make organisation of such workers difficult.

The result is that with the dwindling numbers of permanent, unionised workers, comes the dwindling of union numbers because the unions are unable to absorb the casualised mine workers.

FES (2011) says the trend of declining employment as a result of the MMD Government's economic policies continued and the labour movement leadership described 2005 as a disastrous year in terms of job creation. Although some jobs were created in 2005, most of them were casual jobs. A former trade unionist who had become an opposition MP warned

that there would be a gun-free coup in Zambia due to unemployment (FES, 2011:11). The picture has worsened in 2015, with MCM planning to put their mining activities under care and maintenance following the fall in the copper price, an electricity shortage and unpaid value-added tax refunds by government. MCM has planned to retrench over 5300 permanent employees. As at 21st November 2015, 4300 were declared redundant by MCM and another big mining TNC, Vedanta Resources was planning to shut down Konkola Copper Mines Plc, Nchanga underground mine (Bloomberg, 2015). MCM is quiet about the un-unionised 11,000 casual/contract workers that will be affected by this decision and yet they are in the majority.

Standing (2011) states that stable employees are more inclined to organise collectively, since they are more secure and confident in taking on their employers. He says employment security goes with representation security (Standing, 2001:31). Representation security that comes through trade unions has dwindled in the mining industry since privatisation.

2.3 Job Insecurity

The decision of mining TNCs to implement labour flexibility following the signed D.A.s has a bearing on the ways in which the labour market has changed over the years in the Zambian mining industry.

Casual workers are deprived of the security that permanent workers enjoy. This is due to the contractual nature of their employment relationship and the fact that they are easily disposed off because they are not adequately protected by legislation.

In *Capital* (Vol.1) by Karl Marx (1990/1867), capitalist production is not primarily for meeting human needs. What capitalists want is the production of use-value only because, and in so far as, they form the material substratum of exchange-value, and are the bearers of exchange-value. Marx (1990/187) says the capitalists have the objective of subjecting workers to produce a use-value that has exchange-value and secondly they want that commodity to be greater in value than the sum of the commodities used to produce it, namely the means of production and labour-power.

Standing (2011:36) says the essence of flexibility is to make it possible for firms to change the division of labour quickly without cost and shift workers between tasks, position and places. He says this has brought painful changes such as employment and job insecurity and

has expanded the ‘precariat’ (casual workers with low incomes or the working poor) Standing (2011:36).

Fraser and Lungu (2007:23) state that employers have resisted the right of unions to organise workers, and the recognition of the rights of those on rolling short-term contracts to representation and job security.

2.4 Attack on collective bargaining

Secure employment with good pay and conditions of work is under attack all over the globe. Global economic integration and changes in production, business organization and technology are undermining full-time jobs with good social benefits and protection against dismissals (IndustriALL, 2014). IndustriALL (2014) observes that as demands for flexible labour markets increase, companies are resorting to outsourcing and subcontracting with precarious work exploding beyond legitimate needs.

Collective bargaining, which trade unions have used to guarantee trade union representation, job security, better wages, training and development opportunities, occupational safety and health protection, standard hours of work, social security and social protection coverage, mobility towards better-quality jobs or positions, among others is threatened by growing precarious work.

IndustriALL (2014) says precarious work is often deliberately used as a way to undermine union organization and collective bargaining as trade unions universally face difficulties to organize and represent precarious workers whose association with a single workplace may be weak and short. “In several countries, agency and outsourced jobs are reclassified in a way that legally prevents these workers from being eligible for membership in the union where they work. Unions are as such prevented by law from representing and bargaining for outsourced or agency workers in their industrial sector...” (IndustriALL, 2014:5).

The Zambian scenario at MCM is not different as trade unions face similar challenges and casual/contract mine workers have lost the benefits that come with collective bargaining.

2.5 Varying terms and conditions of work

An extremely hierarchical system of employment has developed with terms and conditions of workers performing the same tasks, often in the same mines, varying wildly (Fraser and

Lungu, 2007:23). According to Fraser and Lungu (2007) while wages and pensions between contract and permanent mine workers are probably the most significant differences, contract workers have no access to medical insurance or free treatment for their dependants that permanent workers have.

For instance, in the absence of medical aid, the casual/contract workers are unable to access private healthcare facilities or the hospital that is available to MCM employees. Likewise, in the absence of private pensions, these workers will have to rely on state pensions after retirement and have no gratuity to rely on after leaving employment. In the event that a worker or a person become unemployed or has to leave work due to old age they fall through the social safety net. Casualisation exacerbates this problem because the low wages make it impossible for workers to save for retirement. Under such circumstances a worker does not have social support and has to depend on other family members or try subsistence farming. Contributory social insurance schemes are based on an employment relationship, particularly fulltime employment. Casuals by definition do not have benefits such as medical aid, retirement benefits and cannot afford to take out private insurance.

Furthermore, the casualisation of the labour force can be viewed as a feature that has the potential to limit the stability and prosperity of a society. These mine workers get hired and fired on a whim; continue to endure poor working conditions, limited benefits and less pay than permanent workers. Standing (2011) says that not only has the level of income received by most workers gone down but their income insecurity has gone up and wage differentials have widened enormously, including differential between regularly employees and those near the precariat. Standing (2011) argues that while those in permanent employment had retained and continue to gain an array of enterprise benefits and privileges, with bonuses, paid medical leave, medical insurance, paid holidays, crèches, subsidised transport, subsidised housing and much else, the precariat have been deprived of them altogether.

2.6 Safety and environmental problems

Fraser and Lungu (2007) state that unequal terms and conditions for workers doing similar jobs are most certain to generate significant resentment and this could have negative effects on safety within the mines. Fraser and Lungu (2007) reveal that officials from the Mine Safety Department report that development is carried out under 'support compliance' regulations that require that as they dig into a new tunnel, miners should not be asked to work

in an unsupported roof-span of more than 2 metres, in order to avoid rock-falls. However mine safety inspectors' report, "you will find that somebody has gone mad and developed 20 metres because you know most of the development is now done by contractors who are paid by the metre, so they go mad developing and they leave people exposed without support in roof sheets. That is the most common accident-rock fall. Sure enough you go there and find someone just scratching their heads and they say, 'sorry, I was under pressure.' So my biggest worry is the use of contractors, when I joined the mines, all this work, development, timbering, etc. used to be done by mining companies themselves" (Fraser and Lungu, 2007: 24).

Health and safety practice across the mining industry is extremely uneven and high fatality rates in the privatised mines, as well as incidents of lax safety implementation are constantly raised by workers and residents as one of the litany of complaints against mining companies.

Fraser and Lungu (2007:26) report that failure for example to provide straight forward safety equipment such as boots and hard hats are widely reported.

2.7 Outsourcing

In an effort to achieve increased levels of casualisation in the workplace, mining TNCs have outsourced their so-called 'non-core' functions to external companies. However, Fraser and Lungu (2007) state that core functions such as 'development' (digging new seams) have been passed on to sub-contracting firms. "This has meant that many ex-miners have been hired to work the same site they previously worked, but this time indirectly employed via sub-contracting firms" (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:22). Casualised mine workers are doing the same development or mining jobs but on short term contracts-three months, without union representation, on low wages, no medical cover and other fringe benefits (Fraser and Lungu, 2007). The rise of outsourcing is a method that mining TNCs are using to minimise costs.

2.8 Occupational dismantling and lack of training for the local workforce

Changes in occupational structures have disrupted the capacity of people to control and develop their occupational potential (Standing, 2011). "In the globalisation era, governments quietly dismantled the institutions of 'self-regulation' of professions and crafts, and in their place erected elaborate systems of state regulation. These removed the capacity of occupational bodies to set their own standards, to control entry to their occupation, to

establish and reproduce their ethics and ways of doing things, to set rates of pay and entitlements, to establish ways of disciplining and sanctioning members, to set procedures for promotion and for other forms of career advancement, and much else” (Standing, 2011: 39).

Mining TNCs have abandoned providing training and of their own management and workforce a precedent set by ZCCM to develop Zambian human resources. Rather, they choose to employ expatriates in all senior and technical roles. Fraser and Lungu (2007) reveal that mining TNCs seem to do so because labour laws are antiquated. “The current labour laws are weak on the engagement of expatriate staff by new investors and the differences between their incomes and those of the local staff. Many new investors take advantage of the situation by recruiting their managers in management positions and paying them heftily, compared to local experts of similar qualifications and experience” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:57).

Standing (2011) says globalising the labour process has produced a decline in upward mobility and there is now a greater probability of remaining at the bottom of the wage scale for life for and this will widen inequality.

2.9 Standard working time

The Employment Act Chapter 268 clearly stipulates that the standard or normal working time a shift is 8 hours per day and workers who work over time or on a public holiday must be paid. In the mining industry, mine workers work for 48 hours per week. However, it has been observed in the mining industry, among contract/casual mine workers, that there is no payment for holidays, sickness, interruptions of work due to weather or any other cause. Felstead and Jewson (1999) describe this scenario as shift pay. Shift pay involves a distinctive temporality which is characteristic of mass employment on a casual basis with minimum employer-employee responsibilities.

“It is take-it-or leave-it, ‘no frills’ form of payment, with minimum transaction costs or elaborate apparatuses for managing the wage reduction. In an industry beset by extended chains of subcontracting, no employer bears the cost of maintaining or reproducing the quality of labour. The risks and costs are ‘downloaded’ to the individual” (Felstead and Jewson, 1999:30).

2.10 Eroded social protection policy

The key issue about the neoliberal era is that it destroyed or eroded social protection policy. Kunitz (2013) says social protection policy is about providing for those unable to provide for themselves, the poor, the incapacitated, the unemployed, and those not supposed to work such as children and women during maternity. Mkandawire (in Paus, 2013:67) points out that post-war social policy depended on “a strong fiscal base”. With the economic crisis state revenue was reduced with declining capitalist profits and accompanying reduced tax collections. As a result social programmes could not be sustained. Harris and Scully (2015:17) concurs, adding that during this time social spending was cut and some social insurance programmes were privatised, creating “a social policy vacuum”.

In the Zambian scenario, as early as 1929, the private mining companies had become responsible for the provision of sanitary and orderly compounds to house employees, supplied food rations for their employees on a weekly basis, provided competent medical care in all mining settlements and also provided recreation clubs for employees (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:8). Fraser and Lungu (2007) explain that after the mines were nationalised, ZCCM continued to carry out social protection programmes for mine workers and people living in mining communities by providing free education to miners’ children, subsidizing housing and food, electricity, water and transport. The company provided services to the whole community and managed the environment in mine townships by maintaining roads and collected refuse as well as providing cafeterias, bars and social clubs dotted over the mine townships (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:8). “They encouraged the growth of economic and social activities dependent on miners’ income such as shops, farms to supply food to the mine areas and other industrial activities and built youth and women development schemes. Social case agencies were charged with investigating social conditions in the townships” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:8)

The scenario has changed after privatisation with the above paternalistic activities being eroded. MCM says its core business is to mine copper and not to provide for the above as the taxes that are paid to government are supposed to take care of social protection.

2.11 Theoretical departure points

The findings agree with what Marx postulated that under capitalism, “the most dynamic mode of production in world history and the most important sources of economic growth

were the valorisation and accumulation compulsions which individual capitalists are subjected to” (Martinussen, 1997: 22). Marx postulated that to achieve profit, the capitalist must exploit labour by paying workers less than the equivalent of the value they produce and that it was the workers and not the capitalists who generate value (Martinussen, 1997: 22).

According to Marx, increased technical and organic composition of capital, will result in marginalisation of large segments of potential working population and consequently, the establishment of a reserve army of unemployed workers (Martinussen, 1997:24). It is these that capital is exploiting by paying meagre wages and poor conditions of service and this has the potential to bring social and political conflicts.

Satgar (in Southall and Melber, 2009) argues that globalisation is about capitalists being able to get into and take over markets which they were previously kept out of by government regulation, especially protection of local industries against cheap imports. Hundreds of millions of poor people in the developing world have been further impoverished because TNCs are now able to come in and take over the markets and resources that used to be preserved for the benefit of locals.

Modern day economic management thinking dictates that national economies are run based on the free market model. “Following the dismantling and collapse of the communist system and the ever increasing influence for the integration of national economies into the global economy, national economies are increasingly being driven by neo-liberalism under the guise of free market principle through a new concept of control by transnational neo-liberalism” (Satgar, 2009 in Southall and Melber, 2009:40).

However, Polanyi (2001) describes the market as an institution that could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society. Polanyi (2001) argues against the claim that implies that the economy is autonomous of social relations as opposed to it being embedded in society. Polanyi (2001) shows that the assumptions of economic theory differ from the reality of human societies. According to Polanyi (2001) the main problem is with the way in which economic theory defines commodities to include land, labour and money, what he calls ‘commoditization’. According to Polanyi, “a commodity is something that has been produced for sale in the market” (2001:25). Based on this definition, he then argues that land, labour and money are fictitious commodities because they were not originally produced for sale. He argues that labour is

simply an activity of human beings, land is subdivided nature, and the supply of money and credit in modern societies is necessarily shaped by government policies. He argues that economic theory assumes that these fictitious commodities will behave in the same way as real commodities, but insists that this sleight of hand has fatal consequences. This leads him to conclude that economic theorising is based on a lie and that this lie places human society at risk.

Polanyi argues that “our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into wilderness” (Polanyi, 2001:3-4)

Polanyi argues that before the nineteenth century, the economy was always embedded in society, meaning that the economy was not autonomous but subordinated to politics, religion and other social relations (Polanyi, 2001:xxiv). Polanyi argues that it is simply wrong to treat nature and human beings as objects whose price will be determined entirely by the market, saying such concept violates the principles that have governed societies for centuries (Polanyi, 2001:xxv).

Polanyi further argues that even though the economy is supposed to be self-regulating, the state must play an ongoing role of adjusting the supply of money and credit to avoid the twin dangers of inflation and deflation and similarly, manage shifting demand for employees by providing relief in periods of unemployment, by educating and training future workers, and by seeking to influence migration flows (Polanyi, 2001:xxvi).

Using Polanyi’s perspective, it is contended that labour is a fictitious commodity and any attempt to treat human beings as a commodity like any other would necessarily lead to deeply felt grievances and resistance. The argument here is that as the unrestrained market pushes human society to the edge, the people refuse to march to their own destruction and begin to retreat from the tenets of market self-regulating to save society from destruction (Block, 2001). Silver (2003) says if we observe the contemporary process of globalisation through Polanyian lens, we would expect a new swing of pendulum or countermovement of workers and other social groups demanding protection.

Stiglitz in his forward to Polanyi’s “The Great Transformation” says “we have moved, by and large, to a more balanced position, one that recognises both the power of the market, and the

necessity that governments play a larger role in the economy, though the bounds of that remain in dispute” Polanyi, 2001:vii).

However, Burawoy (2005) argues that with the emergence of a strong market, there was a greater role of the state being ‘captured’ by short-sighted classes who would mercilessly advance their own narrow economic interests and once this occurs the executive of the state becomes not the vehicle of social protection but an instrument of market fundamentalism, of a narrow class who own and control the most profitable industries, banks and media channels.

2.12 Conclusion

This chapter has provided supporting evidence that mining TNCs like MCM are using global trends in flexible labour to implement labour flexibility. They do this in order to save on the costs of employing permanent workers. The chapter has discussed how flexibility in the workplace and outsourcing has affected trade union membership and representation and collective bargaining. It has also discussed the varying terms and conditions of work existing between permanent and casual/contract workers and how safety and health issues have been compromised by labour flexibility. Finally, it has revealed a shift on social protection under the neo-liberal reforms that Zambia has embarked on.

Chapter Three

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Given that this study was aimed at understanding the social and economic experiences of casual/contract workers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc as a consequence of economic restructuring, I used the qualitative method to help me gain the rich and detailed description of the casualised mineworkers experiences of their social world (Neuman, 1994). This chapter discusses the use of in-depth interviews, participant observation, the strengths and benefits of triangulating methods as well as the limitations of the study. Issues of ethics are also discussed.

3.2 The value of Qualitative Research Methods

The study adopted a qualitative research method, deeming this the most appropriate to research the topic because it allows the researcher an opportunity to gather information in person with respondents. While the statistical quantitative method provides broad outlines of employment trends, these needed to be supplemented with qualitative methods to help me gain the rich and detailed description of the casualised mineworkers experiences of their social world (Neuman, 1994). "Making use of qualitative research also affords the researcher the opportunity to gain information-rich texts from the personal interviews that are conducted. Social research has been described as a process where the researcher is involved in learning and acquiring information about the social world" (Neuman, 2003:2). The methodology that is used within social science refers to how the research is done, and manifests in the research design, which is a strategic framework for action that connects the research questions and the implementation of the research (Durrheim, 1999:29). The research used qualitative methods to answer each research question and made use of a triangulation of measures through the use of interviews, observations and secondary data. In my research, I used the triangulation methodological approach to come up with answers to the social and economic experiences of casualisation on casualised employees at MCM Plc.

In the social sciences, triangulation is often used to indicate that three (or more) methods are used in a study in order to check the results. "The concept of triangulation is borrowed from navigational and land surveying techniques that determine a single point in space with the

convergence of measurements taken from two other distinct points", (Rothbauer 2008:892-894). The idea is that one can be more confident with a result if different methods lead to the same result. Crosswell (2008) says triangulation in research increases the credibility of the research by drawing on simple viewpoints. Crosswell (2008) further says researchers feel confident that they are moving towards accuracy and reliability as they tap into a variety of sources of information, confirmation, individuals and process of data collection.

3.3 In-depth interviews

In my research, I used in-depth interviews (one-on-one)– with individual casual/contract rock ore driller mineworkers, typically lasting from 30 to 90 minutes.

In-depth interviewing, also known as unstructured interviewing, is a type of interview which researchers use to elicit information in order to achieve a holistic understanding of the interviewee's point of view or situation; it can also be used to explore interesting areas for further investigation (Patton, 1987: 112). This type of interview involves asking informants open-ended questions, and probing wherever necessary to obtain data deemed useful by the researcher. As in-depth interviewing often involves qualitative data, it is also called qualitative interviewing. Patton (1987:113) suggests three basic approaches to conducting qualitative interviewing but I picked on two which were relevant to this research:

(i) The informal conversational interview

This type of interview resembles a chat, during which the informants may sometimes forget that they are being interviewed. Most of the questions asked will flow from the immediate context. Informal conversational interviews are useful for exploring interesting topic/s for investigation and are typical of 'ongoing' participant observation fieldwork.

(ii) The general interview guide approach (commonly called guided interview)

When employing this approach for interviewing, a basic checklist is prepared to make sure that all relevant topics are covered. The interviewer is still free to explore, probe and ask questions deemed interesting to the researcher. This type of interview approach is useful for eliciting information about specific topics. For this research a formulated checklist as a basis to interview informants could be used as it allowed for in-depth probing while permitting me to keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim of the study.

For the semi structured questions set, the above methodological approach helped me come up with answers to the social and economic experiences of casualisation on casualised employees at MCM.

A total of 24 in-depth interviews were conducted with mineworkers who had worked as rock ore drillers for a period ranging from 8 to 15 years. All the participants were male as there are no female rock ore drillers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc or at any other mine in Zambia. The work experience was important in assisting me to get more information as they spoke more broadly about their experiences working as casual/contract mineworkers (Greenstein, 2003:56). This also enabled me to have an understanding of their experiences at work and in the community where they stay.

When carrying out the in-depth interviews, I utilised both a note book as well as a voice recorder. The use of a voice recorder was negotiated before-hand with respondents; it was not imposed on the interviewees (see appendix for informed consent form). The note book was annotated after an interview. The recorded data on the voice recorder was transcribed before it was analysed. All the 24 interviews that I carried out were recorded with the consent of the interviewees. In addition, I also jotted some notes during the interviews for information I did not expect to get and for follow up questions on issues that I did not clearly understand.

Table 2: List of Interview Participants

List of interviewees	Number of participants
Central Shaft	10
South Ore Body Shaft (SOB)	5
Mindola Shaft	9
Total	24

The Table 2 above shows the number of participants interviewed and the shaft they work from at Nkana mine site owned by Mopani Copper Mines Plc.

Table 3: List of contracting companies where participants work

Name of the contracting company	No. of participants	Name of the shaft at Nkana mine site
Frekam	2	SOB Shaft
Seismo	2	SOB Shaft
Chimwenda Investments	1	SOB Shaft
Rockmech	2	Mindola Shaft
Reliant Drilling	2	Mindola Shaft
Opermin	2	Mindola Shaft
Canbert Enterprises	2	Mindola Shaft
Taluwo Consortia	2	Mindola Shaft
Timaja Drilling	2	Central Shaft
Chimwenda Investments	3	Central Shaft
Classic Mining	2	Central Shaft
Mwamona	2	Central Shaft
Total	24	

The Table 3 above shows the number of participants that were interviewed from the listed contracting companies that they work for. Some companies like Chimwenda Investments and Canbert Enterprises have contracts both at Central and SOB shafts. I made an effort to at least interview two participants from each contracting firm. There are more contracting companies than shown above that have rock ore drilling contracts with MCM Plc.

3.4 Observation

This involves observing and participating in the current social setting of the subject which I want to penetrate about (Neuman, 1994). The opportunity given to me to interview the participant from their homes gave me an understanding of how they live and see what they were explaining with regards to the questions I was asking them.

At one house, I was given an opportunity to ask a child why he had stopped going to school and at another I was given an opportunity to interview an injured rock ore driller mineworker who was the bread winner of the family but was unable to work because of the mine accident he was involved in in 2011.

At another family, I saw how a loan shark (shylock) came to collect his money from a rock ore driller who had just been paid. Other rock ore drillers showed me their latest payslips to prove to me what they were telling me about low wages.

Participant observation also enabled me to interact with people of different levels, experiences and aspirations. This method exposed me to information as events transpired (Neuman, 2003). The method supplemented the findings from interviews by enabling me to have a better understanding of what the participants were explaining.

The observations I made during the visits were noted during the meetings and some were kept as mental notes up to a point where I was able to write the information in the note book without drawing the attention or ire of the observed to avoid making the respondents suspicious.

Analytical notes were compiled in a separate notebook to record constraints and methodological issues and plan the way forward.

3.5 Available Secondary Data

A range of printed resources required during this research also proved useful in enhancing my knowledge and understanding of issues within the context of the subject under research. The search for secondary data was conducted by accessing, among others, daily newspaper reports, journals, internet articles, library sources, official records, public documents, other researched articles, books and dissertations. Baker (1994) writes that these documents help in documenting new knowledge, new approaches as well as valuable new findings by bringing to the fore a number of facts and figures. Baker (1994) explains that many social research projects can equally rely on data previously collected for other topics. Written documents proved useful when collecting data from the region as this provided country data which deepened my understanding of specific issues of interest related to this research.

In order to get an overall impression of the impact of rapid economic restructuring on the labour market, the research drew on data from existing records on mining labour market statistics from Zambia and South Africa. The Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) was very helpful in providing key data in employment trends in the mining sector from the colonial period to-date.

3.6 Selection of the research site

The study used Mopani Copper Mines Plc and Kitwe was selected as the research site. The reasoning behind this is that Mopani Copper Mines Plc has its headquarters in Kitwe where most of the casualised employees are found at Nkana mine site. Nkana mine site has got Central, Mindola, Mindola Sub-Vertical and South Ore Body (SOB) Shafts including several open pit mines. Concentration was on the shafts where rock ore drillers work from.

“The possible setting in which the study will be conducted must be identified, and the access thereto considered” (Morse, 1994:222). “In many cases, the decision to use a particular research site is tied closely to obtaining access to the subjects, as poor site selection or poor sample decisions may weaken or ruin eventual findings” (Berg, 2001:29). With the above in mind, the person-to-person data collection took place in the location identified by the respondents themselves in order to create maximum comfort for them or the homes of the respondents to carefully come up with information on the social and economic experiences of casualisation on the mine workers. Some participants were comfortable with being interviewed away from their work place to places near their homes while others were interviewed from their homes. I had to do interviews in Mindolo township which is located near the Mindola and Mindola Sub-Vertical Shafts, former Nkana cinema area which is located near Central Shaft, Wusakile and Chamboli townships which are located near the SOB Shaft.

3.7 Sampling

The logic of using a sample of subjects is to make inferences about some larger population from a smaller one. In this regard, the research made use of purposive sampling, which aims to select typical or representative subjects. This category of sampling is sometimes called judgmental sampling (Berg, 2001:32). This form of sampling is used to select unique cases in a specialized population, where the researcher wants to identify cases for an in-depth investigation (Neuman, 2003:63). By making use of purposive sampling, the research is able to focus specifically on a case because it illustrates some feature or process in which the researcher is interested (Silverman, 2010:141).

The purpose of this research was to acquire information about the social and economic experiences of increasing levels of casualisation of labour in Mopani Copper Mines on the Copperbelt province. It made sense, therefore, that with this specific purpose in mind, 20 to

30 casual workers who are rock driller operators would be sampled in the quest for such information. Snowball sampling was also be used. “This is sometimes the best way to locate subjects with certain attributes or characteristics necessary to a study” (Berg, 2001:33). “The basic strategy of snowballing involves first identifying several people with relevant characteristics and interviewing them. These subjects are then asked for the names of other people who possess the same attributes as they do” (Berg, 2001:33). It is literally identifying or selecting the cases in a network through a snowball effect (Neuman, 2003:214). In this regard, some casual workers were asked, where possible, to provide some links to other key people. Rock driller operators who have worked for more than 8 to 15 years as casuals were interviewed sometimes more than once to get more information on how casualisation has affected them.

3.8 Data collection, interpretation and analysis

The methods of data collection employed in the research project were interviews and thematic content analysis, observations and secondary data. It is maintained that interviews generate useful information about lived experiences and their meanings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:633). Interviewing is one of the most common and powerful ways in which we try to understand people. The most common form of interviewing involves individual, face-to-face verbal interchange (Fontana and Frey, 2000:645). A thematic content analysis was chosen because it allows for comprehending, synthesizing, theorizing and re-contextualizing data (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). It was mainly on the lines of nature of economic growth after embarking on these economic restructuring programmes which have led to massive job losses, growing inequalities, unemployment, casualisation and high poverty.

The semi-standardised interview form was used. “This is because it is located between the extremes of completely standardized and completely unstandardised interviewing. It involves the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and/or special topics; these questions are typically asked of the interviewees in a consistent order, but interviewers are allowed freedom to digress and probe beyond the answers to their prepared and standardized questions” (Berg, 2001:70). This type of interviewing allowed the researcher to probe deeper in trying to find meaning to the responses of the casual employees. Essentially, more information was gathered when difficult questions were answered, as this created an opportunity for further investigation, which ultimately resulted in a greater understanding of the subject.

The semi-standard interview was beneficial in that the researcher was afforded the opportunity to ask follow-up questions in an effort to obtain a response from casual workers. Secondly, the researcher was able to rephrase some questions that were not understood by the respondents - at times, this involved translating the questions in order for the casual worker to be able to respond to the best of their ability (see appendix of an interview schedule).

The first step to data analysis is linked to the process of extracting themes by reviewing the literature. The themes come from the casual rock ore drillers/mineworkers being studied and also from already agreed upon professional definitions, from local common-sense constructs, and from researchers' values, theoretical orientation, and personal experience with the subject matter (Straus and Corbin, 1990).

Besides literature, themes were also derived based on analysis of words i.e. word repetitions and a careful reading of larger blocks of texts. I targeted words that occurred more often, and categorised them as being salient in the minds of respondents. Words such 'job insecurity', and 'poor wages', were some which were identified.

Analysis of data was guided by research questions. Here, the method of grounded theory (Babbie and Mouton, 1998) was applied where researchers are allowed to study a relatively unknown social phenomenon around which no specified theory may exist. Through data collection and analysis, a theory emerged which speaks to the phenomenon being studied. Logical analysis was built around the selected themes. Coding was used a tool to facilitate discovery and further investigation of data (Straus and Corbin, 1990:80-90).

3.9 Gaining Access and Ethical Issues

There was no need to ask for permission to gain access from MCM Plc to Nkana mine site as the research participants were being interviewed outside the mine site in their free time and at places of their choice.

Before any research could commence ethical approval was sought from the University of the Witwatersrand ethical committee by submitting the required application. Ethics approval was granted by the University of the Witwatersrand and I proceeded to interview the participants.

Burton (2000), states that in any research, cooperation must be voluntary. Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and no coercion was used to make participants partake in this

study. Each participant was given an information sheet which gave details of my research. An explanation was given (both in English and Icibemba languages) that their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any time without any prejudice to them. Details were also given about confidentiality and anonymity in the reporting of my findings in my thesis. The informants were assured of confidentiality. Signed consent was requested from the participants stating that they understood the criteria of their participation. Permission was sought to record the interviews of the participants and also written consent was obtained to utilize an audio recorder (see appendix for participant information sheet and participant consent form).

3.10 Limitations of the research

The study acknowledges that the different research instruments used in this study had some limitations. In order to minimise the weaknesses of the research instruments used, I made use of a triangulation of methods (interviews, observation and secondary data). This allowed the extension of the strengths of each instrument and limited the weaknesses.

Owing to the limited amount of money and time, the research was only conducted on a part of population known as the sample.

Time was the biggest constraint in this research as I was required to interview 20-30 participants in five weeks and some participants were to be interviewed at least twice.

The use of English as the official communication tool was one serious shortcoming I faced as most of the participants could not clearly articulate themselves in English. However, since I grew up on the Copperbelt province, I could easily switch to Icibemba which is the commonly spoken language.

The use of a recorder was a very convenient way of capturing the discussion and I was lucky that all the 24 participants agreed to be recorded without expressing any reservation especially after being assured of confidentiality and anonymity. The semi standard interview schedules that I used proved helpful as they kept me focused to information I needed but also allowed me to ask new questions on information that they were giving.

I would have loved to interview at least two rock ore drillers that were victims of mine accidents but only managed one as the other one refused as he was suspicious about the

motives of the research despite explaining the research rationale and giving assurances about confidentiality and anonymity.

Snowball sampling and purposive sampling methods were very helpful in my research but not representative enough. I would have loved to interview more rock ore drillers from all contracting companies under MCM Plc but limited time frame and financial resources could not allow me.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter has recognized the various data collection techniques used in this research and as well as the data interpretation methods. It has shown that I heavily relied on qualitative methods though these were triangulated with other methods to increase validity and reliability of the research outcomes.

Chapter Four

4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the research findings covering the casualised mine workers at Mopani Copper Mines Plc on the Copperbelt province in Zambia. It will reveal the experiences that casualised rock ore drillers are going through following the rapid approach to restructuring by the MMD government in Zambia's mining industry. This has had an effect on the labour market and on the lives of the mine workers leading to greater inequalities in income distribution between permanent and casualised employees. The names used in this chapter are **pseudo names**.

4.2. Characteristics of the sample

I managed to interview 24 rock ore drillers from different contractors listed in chapter three. I used semi-structured interview schedule which guided me in asking the questions and observations from those who allowed me to interview them from their homes. All the 24 rock ore driller agreed to be audio taped. One of the 24 rock ore drillers is no longer in employment after being involved in a mine accident in 2011 which has left him with an injured left leg which has failed to heal.

All the rock ore drillers stay in Chamboli, Wusakile and Mindola townships of Kitwe city except for one who stays in Kalulushi. I made sure that the participants represented a broad spectrum of rock ore drillers.

The houses they live in are rented mud built houses plastered with cement and roofed with asbestos which were constructed in the period 1930s to 1960s by AAC. The houses do not have inbuilt toilets and occupants use communal toilets. MCM's project of a toilet for every home has not yet benefitted all mining houses which are supplied with water for only 2 hours a day. None of the participants owned a house.

The ages of the rock ore drillers in the sample ranged from 30 – 50 age range. The largest age range of 40% was between 31 – 40, followed by the age range 41 – 50 at 35% and lastly the age range 21 – 30 was at 25%. The above scenario arose as I was looking for drillers that

have worked for a period between 8 to 15 years. All the participants were male as the mining regulations in Zambia do not allow females to work as rock ore drillers.

Of the 24 participants, 23 are married while one was on separated with his wife.

Out of the 11 contracting companies that the participants worked for, 5 were owned by Zambians and 6 were foreign owned. Of the foreign owned, one was owned by an Indian, while the rest were owned by Peruvians.

4.3 The experience of working as a rock ore driller

All the 24 participants were jack-hammer rock ore drillers. “Drilling is the central work activity in the support, drill and blast cycle in mining and embodies considerable tacit, experiential and practical skill. Respected within mining communities, rock drillers perform the hardest job and face the most hazardous conditions underground” (Stewart, 2015 in Pons-Vignon and Nkosi 2015:109).

“The rock ore drillers were originally described as jack-hammer hands and drilled the rock by hand. Since the introduction of the machine rock drill, they are known as ‘machine operators’ or RDOs” (Stewart, in Pons-Vignon and Nkosi 2015:109).

In Zambia, they are also known as machine operators or drillers and work in pairs. They explained to me that they are the ‘owners of the mine’ because a mine cannot do without them. In South Africa in the 1930s, “they were viewed by their peers as ‘the kings of the mine’ due to both their rigour of their work and their earnings which were higher than their immediate supervisors (Stewart, in Pons-Vignon and Nkosi 2015:109).

They explained that their job involves working in hot stopes with temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius caused by rock temperature, machinery and fissure water, among others. They lamented that there is a lot of dust and little ventilation where they work from and they sweat throughout the shift. Ventilation which is required to clear toxic fumes from blasting and removing exhaust fumes from diesel equipment is very poor. They carry 2.5 litres containers of drinking water as domestic water is not supplied and complained that it is not even enough to take them through the shift.

They revealed that their job is taxing, rigorous and dangerous and there are rock falls that happen from time to time despite the ground support (support required to hold wall and ceiling to hold the ground together using bolts, welded wire mesh and steel rods) that they do.

We work very hard to meet daily targets under difficult conditions and yet are paid lowly. This mine cannot do without us and I wonder why we are not permanent workers. We are given 2 big buns and cocoa before we go underground but fellow Peruvian rock ore drillers come with better food packed in lunch boxes (Interview, Nsonta Ilunga 22nd June 2015).

3.4 Type of contracts that rock ore drillers are under

As earlier alluded to, the D.A.s' that were signed between the Zambian government and the mining TNCs allowed the latter to outsource some of their mining operations and employ Zambians as casuals.

There were only 1 920 contractors at the time Glencore International took over MCM Plc in 2000 as shown in Table 1. During the ZCCM era, drilling of ore was mostly done by full time employees and to a lesser extent by a subsidiary of ZCCM called Mpelembe Drilling Company (MDC).

Muchimba (2010) says MDC mine workers were full time employees of MDC and enjoyed similar wages and conditions of service as ZCCM mine workers.

Of the 24 participants interviewed, only 10 acknowledged that they annually sign one year employment contracts with their employers. The rest revealed that they signed what they referred to as 'engagement forms' when they were first employed. They said that every time they asked when they were going to sign contracts, company management officials did not give a positive answer.

I have no job security because I do not have any employment contract with my company. I feel like I can be fired anytime without benefits because there is no proof of any contract. I only signed engagement forms when I was employed. The contract is supposed to indicate my salary and other conditions of service such as housing allowance, sick pay, annual leave pay, medical cover, gratuity and pension, among others. I worked under ZCCM and under MDC before joining this contractor that I have worked for since 2003 as a rock ore driller and have not signed any contract. I am a permanent casual worker (Interview, Harrison Kalulushi 10th July 2015).

He further disclosed that during the ZCCM era, MDC employees and their dependants attended the same hospitals, stayed in the same mine houses, children went to the same schools, etc. as ZCCM employees and their dependents. Only the company bus differentiated us from ZCCM buses and there was no big difference between salaries of ZCCM and MDC drillers.

The amendment of the Employment Act, Chapter 268 has led to most workers in the mining industry to be engaged as contractors/casuals through subcontracting contracts to avoid meeting statutory obligations, a practice that is not in conformity with the spirit and intention of the Act. These employees have now become permanent casuals and this has created for the first time in the Zambian mining industry, a 'poor working class' who are ready to work for anything as long as they are in employment (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:3).

3.5 Safety, health and environment

Mining companies in Zambia continue to follow outlined Integrated Safety, Health, Environment and Quality (SHEQ) Management Safety Systems that conforms to the planned arrangements and requirements of OHSAS 18001, ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. These systems have proved effective if properly implemented. However, data obtained by MUZ (2014) in their Secretarial Report covering the period 2010 to 2013 from the Mine Safety Department, a government department tasked to monitor and evaluate mines on safety, health and environment, reveals that MCM Plc had 302 Lost Time Injuries (LTIs) and 23 fatal accidents. Most of these accidents have happened to contract mine workers.

According to the Mine Safety Regulations, we are supposed to receive Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) twice a year. This includes a hard hat, overalls, gum boots, gloves, respirators, ear plugs, etc. We only receive PPE once a year and that is after the MCM safety officials ask why our overalls and gum boots are torn. We are forced to buy our own overalls or gum boots because our companies do not have PPE readily available. So instead of being told to stay away from work for wrong PPE and lose pay, we are forced to use our meagre salaries to buy PPE (Interview, James Banda 16th July 2015).

Other participants revealed that they ask for discarded gum boots and other PPE from MCM employees to avoid being deemed absent on account of wrong PPE. One rock ore driller

said he works in a wet area and his gum boots are torn allowing underground water to sip through. He showed me how the underground mine water has affected his feet.

Masuzg'o Zg'ambo who was involved in a mine accident in 2011 revealed to me that on that fateful day, he was not feeling well and decided to report to his shift boss so that he could be allowed to go to the hospital. The shift boss told him to drill at least for an hour before he could go to the hospital. Unfortunately he experienced a rock fall which trapped his left leg from the knee. He was hospitalised for almost 6 months.

When I was discharged, I could not walk so I was using clutches. My company paid my full salary for three months and later told me I had been medically discharged. I was not paid anything. I went to the Workers Compensation Board to seek help. They told me that my company was not making monthly contributions as per law. The owner of the company got scared and made backdated payments. After assessing the extent of my injury, the Workers Compensation Board told me that I was entitled to a monthly payment of K140. What can I do with such an amount of amount? My rentals are K300 every month and I have to buy food, pay for water and electricity, pay for school fees for my children and other necessities. How am I going to manage? This injury is not healing since 2011. It swells and is very painful. I have sued the company to compensate me properly. They need to buy me a house and support me monthly. I got injured while making money for them. (Interview, Masuzg'o Zg'ambo 6th July 2015).

Picture 1: The picture shows the leg of an injured rock ore driller



Picture 2: The picture shows the injured rock ore driller with his former workmate



The MUZ Secretarial Report (2014) says that the strict ZCCM safety, health and environment policy has been discarded by new mine owners. Contracting companies are under pressure to meet set monthly targets and they put rock ore drillers to work under pressure hence the rise in mine accidents. The participants lamented that they sometimes suffered from fatigue because of working for more than 8 hours a day. Although MCM Plc has a safety policy which states that, ‘if it is not safe, do not do it. Make it safe and do it,’ rock ore drillers are forced to work in hazardous areas for fear of losing their jobs. They revealed that contractors are made to work in hazardous areas while MCM Plc employees work in safer areas. There is need for MCM Plc, the contractors and the mine workers to develop a culture in which the right to a safe and healthy working environment is respected at all levels and where government, mine owners and mine workers actively participate in securing a safe and healthy working environment through a system of defined rights, responsibilities and duties, and where the principle of prevention is accorded the highest priority.

3.6 Wages and conditions of service

Fraser and Lungu (2007) report that the Zambia Chamber of Mines claim that offering fewer and fewer workers living wages, job security and a pension is ‘international best practice’. The Chamber of Mines argue “the world has been reduced to a global village where multinational companies practices are being replicated in all countries of investment and Zambia is no exception. It is recognised that for the mining companies to remain competitive at international level, they have to adopt internationally accepted best practices” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:25).

In 2006, the then MCM Plc CEO Tim Henderson claimed to have adopted a completely different attitude towards labour hire companies by getting rid of them (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:25). Fraser and Lungu (2007), report that MCM Plc adopted a policy of employees working directly under the company or through contracting firms and made a rule that contractors pay their employees 85% of MCM average wage.

However, the wages and conditions of service that rock ore drillers have at MCM Plc give a different picture. Only 6 out of 24 participants were earning between K1500 – K2000. The rest of the participants’ monthly wages were between K500 – K1200. Payslips shown to me proved the claims right and some allowed me to take pictures of their payslips which are shown below. The above wages are far below the 85% that the MCM policy set in 2006 as the lowest paid employee at MCM Plc earns a net pay of above K3300 monthly.

The participants further claimed that they have no specific pay date as they are paid between the 10th to the 15th day of every month and in some cases after the 15th day.

For three months, we were being paid after the 15th day, making it hard for us to plan our budgets. Since we have no union to speak on our behalf, we organised ourselves and agreed to report for work but not work. Others went to the radio station to denounce the unfair treatment of rock ore drillers by our company. MCM Plc management officials got concerned and summoned the owners of our contracting firm and threatened to cancel the contract if they were not going to pay us. By the close of the day, we received notifications from our bank that salaries were deposited. They only pay us when we threaten to go on strike and yet MCM Plc pays them on time (Interview, Nkanka Nkata 21st July 2015).

Picture 3: The picture is showing a pay slip of a rock driller

 TIMAJA ENTERPRISES LTD Exploration Mining, Geotechnical Drilling, Supply of Mining Equipments, P.P.E. Hire of labour, Construction works and General dealers.									
MONTH	MAY, 2015	NRCNO.		DATE					
	0	0		29/05/2015					
BWALYA GIFT		BASIC PAY		1,200.00	CATEGORY				
CUM TAX INCO	TAXABLE PAY	SSN			LEAVE VALUE	40.00			
0		2011	DAYS	168.00	ACCRUED LEAVE PAY	1,400.00			
TAX PAYE	0.00	HOURS WORKED	0.00						
PPE DISCOUNT	70.50	N/DAYS	0.00						30.00
NAPSA	0.00	O/TIME HOURS	0.00						120.00
LEAVE DAYS	0.00	SUNDAYS HOURS	0.00						
OTHER DEDUCTIONS	0.00	BONUS	0.00						290.77
BONUS	0.00	LEAVE DAYS	0.00						
CASH ADVANCE		HOUSING ALL							1,410.00
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS		70.50	TOTAL INCOME						
					NET PAY				
					ROUND OFF NET PAY				
					1,339.50				
					1,340.00				
RECEIVED BY _____									

As observed by Polanyi (2001) any attempt to treat human beings as a commodity like any other would necessarily lead to deeply felt grievances and resistance. The argument here is that as the unrestrained market pushes human society to the edge, the people refuse to march to their own destruction and begin to retreat from the tenets of market self-regulating to save society from destruction (Block, 2001). Without the help of trade unions, I found out that rock ore drillers showed traces of insurrection in fighting for better wages and conditions of service although they were unorganised and scattered in different contracting firms.

The participants further claimed that even if they met production targets, they were not paid any bonuses like their counterparts, the permanent workers at MCM Plc.

Picture 4: The picture is showing a pay slip of a rock ore driller

HEAD OFFICE		CHIMWENDA INVESTMENTS LIMITED				Page: 46	
EMPNO: CHI655		NAME: MUFWEMPA JORDAN		GRADE: 01		PAY STATEMENT FOR: JUNE 2015	
N.R.C: 309827/16/1		TAXABLE YTD GRS		GRATUITY YTD		SALARY RATE	
GROSS PAY YTD		TAX PAID YTD		NAPSA YTD		PENSION YTD	
2,278.80		0.00		113.94		0.00	
LEAVE DAYS		LEAVE PAY		LEAVE DAYS		LEAVE PAY	
0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
CODE DEDUCTIONS		BALANCE		AMOUNT		CODE EARNINGS	
D00 P.A.Y.E (Income Tax)				0.00		P00 BASIC PAY	
D02 NAPSA CONTR				57.42		P06 HOUSING ALLOWANCE	
D04 PERSONAL LEVY				7.50		001 LEAVE DAYS	
D07 ROUNDING RECOVER				0.12			
D08 ROUNDING ADJUST				0.36			
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS		65.40				TOTAL EARNINGS	
PAY METHOD INDO ZAMBIA BANK						TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	
Soc. Sec. No: 1						NET PAY	
						1,148.40	
						65.40	
						1,083.00	

Since housing is not provided, the participants revealed that they are paid a housing allowance. From the few pay slips that I was allowed to see and take pictures of, the allowance ranged from K97 to K280 and yet most of the participants rent houses that charge K300 and above.

I cannot afford to rent a 2 or 3 bedroomed house, so I only rent 2 rooms built behind the main house at K300. My wife and I occupy the bedroom and all my three children sleep in the sitting room. One of my children who is at secondary school was chased from school because I have failed to pay his school fees. I keep making promises to the Head teacher that I will pay but I cannot manage. My employer does not allow us to get a salary advance even when you have difficult challenges. When faced with a funeral, management says go and borrow from somewhere else, we will repay through your salary but they never do. In short, we have no funeral grant or education allowance for our children. We only have a basic salary and a housing allowance (Interview, Collins Bwembya 19th July 2015).

The participants also revealed they are never paid their over-time allowance for the hours worked after a normal 8 hour shift. They said their companies are breaking the law on over-time and despite numerous complaints by rock ore drillers, the situation has not improved. They lamented that even when summoned to work during public holidays, they are paid as a normal day.

The participants also revealed that they have not been paid any gratuity since they started working. For those who sign annual contracts, they said they are made to sign new contracts devoid of gratuity.

They complained that it is difficult to bargain for better wages and conditions of service as these are arrived at individual level and they have no collective bargaining unit to negotiate for them as casuals/contractors in the mining industry.

4.7 The threat of Loan Sharks

All the participants revealed that they are forced to borrow money from 'loan sharks' or 'shylocks' because their meagre salaries cannot take them through the month. They said they borrowed from shylocks at 50% interest. They lamented that they are forced to borrow from shylocks because their companies do not accept payment of salary advance and have not

facilitated borrowing from micro financial institutions like Bayport, Unity Finance and Blue Finance, among others which only charge 20% interest on borrowed money.

During an interview session with one participant, a shylock came to ask for his money back with interest. He lamented that the participant had not repaid the money or the interest as agreed. He threatened to grab some house hold properties and sell them to recover his money. He accused the participant on not giving him a proper pay date and dodging from repaying the loan which had now accumulated from K300 to K750 in 3 months. The issue was only resolved after the principle amount of K300 was paid and the loan was frozen. The participant agreed to repay the balance in two instalments of K375. He explained that most of his workmates were in the same predicament because of poor wages. He lamented that it was difficult to make budget in K1000 and also be expected to meet other expenses of supporting his parents and his mother-in-law. He explained that he also supports his siblings apart from his own family.

4.8 Failing to support my family

Participants complained that they are unable to support their families because of the meagre salaries they are paid. One participant lamented that he is now separated from his wife because of unending financial problems.

My wife has left me because I cannot afford to support the family. I am failing to feed my children or pay for their school fees. I even fail to support my own parents or my parents-in-law. My wife was tired of this life style and left me. She has gone back to her parents. This is a disgrace because society out there knows that I work but what I get is not enough to support my family (Interview, Emmanuel Chabwe 30th June 2015).

4.9 Disciplinary code and grievance procedure

Participants complained of not having seen the disciplinary code and grievance procedure of their companies. They revealed that disciplinary cases are poor handled that most of them have not been given fair case hearing. They accused their companies of not following any disciplinary code.

My company treated me unfairly when I was accused of inciting other rock ore drillers of asking for a pay rise. They owner of the company asked me to report

to his office for a case hearing. When I went there, I was not attended to from 8am in the morning to 5pm in the afternoon. He asked me to see him the following day and the same thing happened. He only attended to me on the third day and there was no case hearing at all. He told me he had suspended me from for 14 days without pay and asked me to leave. I was not given a chance to exonerate myself. I lost half of my salary and my family went through a painful time. If there were jobs elsewhere, I could have resigned but I had no option but to return for work after two weeks (Interview, Duncan Jabulani 24th June 2015).

I heard similar stories from most of the participants and they lamented that if they have grievances, they fear to voice them out to their superiors for fear of being dismissed. They disclosed that it was better to keep their jobs than not have a job at all as jobs there were no jobs on the Copperbelt.

4.10 Trade Union representation and busting

The participants revealed that they would really want to join any of the trade unions that represent workers in the mining sector but the owners of the contracting companies would not allow them to.

We went to NUMAW and got forms for recruitment. A good number of rock ore drillers signed to join the union. When management officials discovered that we wanted to join the union, they fired the ring leaders. Since then, workers are scared of joining a trade union although most of them are willing to (Interview, Chashupa Michelo 28th June 2015).

The Industrial and Labour Relations Act Chapter 269 Section 5, gives workers the right to take part in the formation of a trade union; the right to be a member of a trade union of that employee's choice and the right, at any appropriate time, to take part in the activities of a trade union, among other rights. When asked if they had sought help from the union or the District Labour Office, to make their companies abide by the provisions of the law, they responded that both institutions have failed them. "As MUZ, we had no choice but to go into new areas that we never use to consider for unionization. What has happened, we have met stiff challenges. Zambia's weak labour legislation makes organising workers, particularly in new workplaces, difficult. Unions cannot simply go into a company and announce that they want to recruit" (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:24).

Part of the reasons that participants revealed why contracting companies bend the rules is that they are not enforced and they believe they can get away with it.

4.11 Medical cover

Since privatisation, retrenched ZCCM mine workers and their families who previously had access to mine hospitals have found it difficult to access health care because of higher fees at mine hospitals now in the hands of TNCs. Similarly, despite working for contracting firms under MCM Plc, the participants revealed that only few contracting companies are providing medical cover for their employees at an MCM run hospital called Wusakile Mine Hospital. Most of them have medical schemes at government run hospitals that only cover them and not their spouses or family members. Some revealed that they do not have any medical cover at all.

My company does not provide any medical cover at all. If I fall sick because of the dust that I inhale underground, I have to pay for my medication as government hospitals no medicine. The doctor only writes you a prescription and you have to look for money to pay for the medicine at the chemist/pharmacy. When you ask the company to help, they ask us to look for money elsewhere promising to refund but they do not. If you do not provide a sick note from the doctor, you will be deemed absent. Sometimes even if you produce a sick note, the company will not give you sick pay (Interview, Charles Chifita 9th July 2015).

MCM Plc on the other hand provides free medical cover for all their employees and their dependants at their two Bupa certified hospitals and pay for specialist treatment that their hospitals cannot offer. Not all contract/casual workers have access to the same health care that full time employees have and yet they are core to the operations of the mine. For those that have access to the above hospitals, access is only given to them and not their dependents and deductions are made from the workers' salaries for costs incurred.

4.12 Owners of contracting companies

The participants revealed that owners of most drilling companies that are subcontracted in MCM were Zambian owned companies. Others were Peruvian and South African owned. One particular contracting company that was accused of not paying the rock ore drillers on

time was alleged to be owned by some top senior managers at MCM who have used a Zambia businessman as front to disguise that they own the company. This is what one participant said about the company.

We are not paid on time by the owner of this company. When MCM pays him for work that we have done for the company, he sometimes goes to the USA on holidays to watch wrestling since he is a fan. When this happens, it means we will be delayed in getting our pay. It is only when we protest that he will quickly come back to Zambia and pay us. MCM authorities are aware of how he mistreats us but are not willing to terminate his contract because we have heard that some top managers are co-owners of this company with him. That is why our suffering will not stop. We are told that reporting a company that mistreats its employees will result in termination of contracts but this particular company gets away with it (Interview, Kanyembo Katai 5th July 2015)

Although other participants claimed that the story was true, it was difficult for me to verify the story as that was not part of my research.

4.13 Pension Scheme and Workers Compensation Scheme

All the interviewed participants revealed that they only rely on the state pension scheme called National Pensions Scheme Authority (NAPSA). They complained that MCM employees have a private pension scheme with a pension and insurance company called Africa Life and also with NAPSA, a state pension.

When we are fired or our work is terminated, we do not get any gratuity. We walk away with nothing. Our friends who visit NAPSA offices to check on pension contributions that are deducted from payslips find that our companies do not send our contributions to NAPSA. It means that we shall have no pension when we reach 55 years. When we ask our companies why they do not remit our contributions to NAPSA or why we have no social security numbers, they threaten us with dismissals. Even contributions to Workers Compensation Board which help former employees who were injured during the course of work are not remitted as per law (Interview, Owen Mweemba 23rd July 2015).

4.14 Training

Mining companies can contribute to the Zambian economy by providing experience and training for their own management and workforce. However these benefits can only occur if the companies develop good human resources and training programmes and commit to building up the skills of the Zambians rather than employing expatriate workers. Some participants working for contractors of Peruvian origin lamented that they work with Peruvian rock ore drillers who are earning between K30 000 to K40 000 a month compared to K1 000 which they were earning. It was difficult to prove the allegation as my focus was on Zambian rock ore drillers.

During ZCCM days, one could start as a helper and then become a driller. Later, he would be sent for training to learn how to blast and so on. There was good career progression and trade schools were training miners. It is different today as the only training we do is learning to blast and it ends there. We also wonder why they would bring an expatriate driller from Peru when we have been mining since 1920s'. They are learning from us and at the end of the day, they are even paid more money than us (Interview, Taalo Chishimba 22nd July 2015).

The participants lamented that during ZCCM era, only expatriates with special skills were allowed to come into the country and would work alongside Zambians to train them for a specific period unlike the current situation where contracting companies from Peru are bringing rock ore drillers as expatriates, jobs that locals can do.

Fraser and Lungu (2007) state that the current labour laws are weak on the engagement of expatriate staff by new investors and the differences between their incomes and those of local staff are huge.

4.15 Employment during ZCCM and under MCM Plc

The older participants that I interviewed recalled that during ZCCM, they had better conditions of service as they were provided with housing, free electricity and water. They also revealed that they had job security and a strong union to represent them during disciplinary hearings. In terms of safety, health and environment, they claimed that safety rules were strictly followed and PPE was given to them every 6 months as per mining safety

regulations. They also revealed that they were not made to pay for annual pneumoconiosis tests every miner undergoes as per law. They revealed that production bonus was given to them if they achieved set targets and that Christmas bonus paid at the end of the year to every miner. They recalled that ZCCM did not just take care of them as workers, but also took care of their families by providing free education and quality medical care for all dependants. They revealed that corporate social responsibility programmes like sponsoring sports clubs, youth development and women schemes were done very well by ZCCM. Miners who were about to retire were trained in entrepreneurial skills that would keep them afloat after retirement.

They lamented that under contracting companies, the above conditions of services have been eroded. They lamented that there is today a big difference between employees who work for MCM and those who work for contractors unlike during the ZCCM era.

4.16 Where is our government?

The participants revealed that government has not been helpful in resolving the plight of casual/contract mine workers and yet it helped create the problem by weakening the labour regulatory framework. They called for the amendment of the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act, and the two principle laws that regulate the labour market, the Employment Act Chapter 268 and the Industrial and Labour Relations Act Chapter 269.

We miners removed the MMD government from power because they were siding with investors instead of listening to the workers plight. The PF government did well when it came to power by increasing the minimum wage from K429 to K1000 but they did that in 2012. Our salaries have not been increased since 2012 because the Minimum Wage Act has not been amended. They have not enacted new laws to ban casualisation as they promised during the campaign. They have been in power since 2011 but nothing has changed. We were very hopeful that this government would make laws to ensure job security, safety and health for mine workers, medical cover for our families, better pension schemes and so on. Prices of essential commodities are rising up on a yearly basis but our salaries are stuck because government is not raising the minimum wage. When we complain to the District Labour Office, they tell us to just go back for work as they are no other jobs that are available on the labour market (Interview, Nanaka Nomugodi 23rd July 2015).

The participants complained that they see no benefit of having privatised the mines as there has been no significant improvement in their lives, mining community and the country, as hoped for. They accused the government and mining TNCs of putting investment and profits before decent and dignified work, issues that have exacerbated casualisation of labour. They lamented the high employee vulnerability in Zambia due the high levels of unemployment and accompanying poverty. They observed that poverty has bred a dangerous work environment where many desperate jobseekers in the labour force are willing to take any job for survival purposes rather than dignity.

4.17 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed what casual/contract rock ore driller mine workers are going through in their daily working lives. The findings reveal increased vulnerability of mine workers through the casualisation of labour in the absence of labour laws to protect them. It has also revealed that labour market remains fragile with the high levels of unemployment and this is a result of inability of the economy to absorb the growing labour force. Consequently, the structure and quality of employment has equally changed over the years with a shift from durable and permanent jobs to part-time, temporal and casual employment that is poorly remunerated. MCM and other mining TNCs have taken advantage of weak policies and legal framework to engage the majority of its work force as casual/contract labour in order to cut down on costs and maximise on profits. The findings also point to inadequate and limited trade union actions and responses to casualisation of labour. Finally, the findings reveal growing inequalities between permanent mine workers and casual/contract mine workers working for the same industry.

Chapter 5

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The economic performance of Zambia from the time that copper was first discovered in the early 1920s has seen four phases. The first phase was when BSAC administered the territory and all proceeds from copper were expropriated and what was left behind was for recapitalisation of the mines and building strategic towns where copper was discovered and improving the transport system to continue with the exploitation of the mineral. The second phase was after independence in 1964 when the copper price soared on the world market and the Kaunda government nationalised the mines and implemented a mixed economic policy under a variety of African socialism that saw proceeds from the mines being used to massively develop the country (Craig, 1999:19). Zambia shifted from a multi-party to implement a one-party system. The third phase saw the plunge in price of copper and other commodities on the world market forcing the government to borrow from the IMF and World Bank to support an ailing economy. By 1983, Zambia had agreed to its first IMF and World Bank SAP, including a privatisation of all state parastatals including the mines, but the programme was paused briefly following riots in 1987 (Saasa, 1996: Berry, 2015). The fourth phase saw Zambia return to a multi-party system and the Kaunda government lost power in a democratic election to the MMD under Frederick Chiluba. It is a period in which most parastatals were privatised, including the mines.

The Zambian government had an interventionist approach to development after independence to correct huge inequalities brought about by colonialism between African and non-Africans and to ensure proceeds from copper earnings provided a solution. Employment in the mining sector before and after independence was long term and stable. Even with the plunge of the copper price in the 1970s and 1980s, government resisted the use of mass redundancies and casualisation of labour as a cost reduction measure to save the mines. Employment was regarded not as a tool for survival purposes, but with dignity.

However, when the MMD took office in 1991, the country's economy had plunged. Basic social services such as provision of health and education were appalling. The government made it clear to the people that it would have to effect austerity measures as prescribed by the IMF (Rakner, et al. 1999). Seen by the international donor community as a model of

liberalisation, Zambia privatised most parastatals and borrowed heavily to finance development.

However, the reforms did not yield results that Zambians were willing to sacrifice for. McPherson (1995) argues that the new reforms did not bring fiscal stability and the new government had problems with implementation. This ties with what Stiglitz (2002) argued that implementation of these IFI policies were failing to deliver because they lacked democratic scrutiny and were not in tandem with individual needs of countries. He argues that they were simply rushed in terms of implementation, using wrong and inadequate policies and analysis (Stiglitz, 2002: XIV).

The reforms had an adverse effect on labour. There were massive redundancies in all the mines that were privatized. Statistics for 2015 show that formal employment in the mining sector has since declined and poverty has been on the upswing because of failure for people to secure jobs. The majority that are in employment in the mining sector are in short term contract or casual jobs employed by contracting companies sub-contracted by the mining TNCs. Stiglitz (2002) has argued that the impact on employment of privatization is that it has not create as many jobs as it destroyed. Further-more, Stiglitz explains that workers who lose their jobs tend to endure social consequences of unemployment long past the immediate loss of a job. Given the minimalist role of the state in a market economy, workers affected by job losses following privatization are subjected to poverty as they are deprived of their only means of reproducing themselves in the formal sector.

While Burawoy (1999) talks of the state administering the external conditions of the market and protecting society against the market, the state in Zambia has done little to protect labour from the invading free market. The state in this case has become not a vehicle for social protection but what Burawoy (1999) termed “an instrument of market fundamentalism..., far from protecting labour, the state watches impassively as jobs disappear and real wages plummet, waiting for the economic upsurge that never comes”.

5.2 Conclusion

As the report has shown, what is more worrying is the extent to which employment that was previously permanent is increasingly being casualised. At MCM for instance, the findings reveal increasing levels of casualisation far above what obtained when the mines were under state control. Whereas employment levels in the mines have reduced to less than half their

level before privatization casualisation is increasing. The 2008/2009 economic crises saw more permanent workers being retrenched at MCM but when the crisis ended, the retrenched workers were not retained, instead, there was a rise in casual/contract workers. It is clear that the 2015 plunge of the price of copper which has already seen 3 300 permanent mine workers retrenched will follow a similar pattern when the metal price goes up again.

Trade union representation is one of the missing links in addressing the rights of casual employees. However, this is an area of greatest weakness among the trade unions. While the law clearly does not restrict trade unions to organize this category of workers, little or no effort has been made by trade unions towards this end. The casual/contract workers interviewed were willing to join the trade union. Trade unions when asked why they are not organizing the casual employees usually give vague and unsatisfactory responses. On the other hand as revealed in the findings, the casual mineworkers point to fear to lose their jobs and general insecurity as reasons not to join unions. The casual employees are always in doubt whether the unions can really stand for them. What was clear during the research findings is that the trade unions are not simply doing enough to reach and organize this category of workers.

It was also observed that casual/contract mine workers do not have any other working conditions except for the remuneration that they receive at the end of the day which is totalled up at the end of the month. This analysis further reveals that the labour laws concerning employment, minimum wages and conditions of employment, employment benefits do not apply to casual employees. What was revealed is that casual/contract mine workers are not guaranteed a legal minimum wage (as they are sometimes [paid below the K1 100 thresholds] , job security, allowances or terminal benefits. Though the legal requirement is that all employees contribute 5 per cent of earnings to NAPSA (with 5 per cent matching contribution from employer) the Act fails to clarify whether a casual employee is legally required to contribute. Contracting companies have seen this as a loophole in the law and are not remitting contributions for their employees. The casual/contract mine workers are therefore positioned not to receive any terminal benefits when their employment comes to an end or when they clock 55 years.

The other area of concern is that the casual/contract mine workers are not contributing towards Pay As You Earn or income tax as they earn below the PAYE tax exemption rate on income under K3,300 (US\$300) as stipulated in the Income Tax Act. Government is losing revenue

that it would have generated had these rock ore drillers been directly employed by MCM as they would be paid above the tax exemption rate. One wonders why a core mining activity such as rock ore drilling could be sub-contracted if not for the reason of cutting costs and maximizing profits.

It has also been revealed that through casualisation, mine workers ultimately pass the burden of providing social protection to families/relatives, the government, the church and other charitable organizations. The incomes they earn cannot sustain them through the month or pay for school fees and hospital fees for their children. The society hence has to take a responsibility, which in the first place should have been taken by the employers. The findings reveal a worker is separated from his wife and children because of poor wages and the burden of taking care of his children passed on to his aging parents.

Although a casual/contract mine worker is free to join a trade union as guaranteed in the Industrial and Labour Relation Act the findings in the previous chapter have demonstrated that casual/contract employees are extremely vulnerable to intimidation with no job security as they are not covered by collective agreements in most cases and that labour laws offer little or no protection to them. Consequently, they remain highly vulnerable in the work place. Because they are not part to the collective agreements agreed between MCM are permanent workers representative (trade unions), they are not covered by internal company policy on important issues such as health and safety, including occupational accidents, HIV/AIDS, personal protective equipment, medical care, disciplinary code and grievance procedure, to mention a few.

Zambia has ratified several ILO labour Conventions including the 8 core labour standards. However, most relevant labour standards are ILO Convention 26 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery that calls for minimum wage tied to cost of basic needs and productivity. ILO Convention 158 on Termination of Employment that calls for legal protection of workers to severance pay on termination of employment and ILO Convention 87 and 98 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining respectively) that calls for the right of workers to organise and join unions without intimidation. The practice to roll over the fixed six months contracts for casual employees exploits a loophole in the labour laws as it fails to explicitly make it illegal to hire casual workers to fill permanent positions. Mining TNCs have taken advantage of this loophole to put the majority of the mine workers in Zambia under casual/contract work.

As the findings revealed, Government sees the role of TNCs as that of bringing in investment that is required to generate economic growth and wealth that in turn would create jobs and contribute to poverty reduction. Government is not interested in the type of jobs that will be created. Therefore, government is usually not keen to confront these investors by prescribing the type of jobs that they need to create for fear of losing these investors. As such government is willing to give a blind eye to some of the violations of workers' rights that come with the jobs created by these mining TNCs even where labour laws are being violated. While some of these TNCs may have good corporate policies that include good employment practices, these are not often adhered to in Zambia as the profit motive overrides everything else. The research findings reveal that mining TNCs are able to continue with the practices of casualization with de facto support from government and the Zambian or local managers as revealed by Kanyembo Katai in one of the findings on the owners of contracting companies.

5.3 Recommendations

In the face of increasing casualisation of labour in the mining industry, it is important to identify what role trade unions can play. This is critical because those affected by casualisation of labour are not only potential members, but are workers that by the very trade union principle whose interests they claim to represent. Having looked at the causes of casualisation in Zambia, the role government played and to how it has grown, it is important that this problem is taken up by trade unions as a serious concern because it is being used as a method of union busting by mining TNCs. There is need for solidarity between permanent and casual/contract workers to maximise pressure on mining TNCs. Solidarity of permanent workers can prove crucial in fighting for their regularisation and also using collective bargaining to settle casualisation and outsourcing of labour.

At the macro level high levels of poverty and unemployment tend to move in tandem with increasing casualisation of labour. Policies that are aimed at reducing or eradicating poverty are therefore crucial to tackling casualisation. The trade unions must in this respect engage government and other stakeholders including employers in national policy processes on poverty and employment. The Decent Work Country Programme Agenda (DWCPA) 2013-2016 is an important instrument that trade unions can use to advance the decent work agenda and campaign against casualisation of labour. It should be made clear that casualisation of labour is not a trade union problem alone but the society at large including government and employers.

Another observation is that labour laws in their current context have contributed to increased casualisation of labour. The labour laws do not seem to protect casual employees or give guarantees to protect their rights. Trade unions must use institutions such as the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council to press for labour law reforms with the aim of harmonizing all labour laws including those on NAPSA and income tax in particular regarding the definition of “employee” and “casual employee” and clarify legal provisions guaranteed to all distinct categories of employees including casual employees. Furthermore, labour laws must make explicitly illegal to casualised jobs that are permanent in nature such as the ones in mining TNCs like MCM Plc. Although the PF government with the help of FES and ILO has committed itself to implement new labour law reforms that were arrived at with the participation of all stake holders (labour movement, employers federation, etc.), there has been no clear implementation programme since 2011.

As earlier alluded, government and TNCs have a critical role to play. They must not put the quest for investment and profits before decent or dignity of employment. The ending of casualisation of work will benefit both government and TNCs through gains in productivity. Well remunerated workers as consumers and taxpayers contribute to wealth creation and growth and prosperity of the national economy. Well remunerated workers will also be able to sustain a social protection scheme that guarantees their well-being after their working life without putting any undue pressure on government, tax payers, the families and charity.

Trade unions can also try to use Global Framework Agreements as a bargaining tool against TNCs where they do exist in collaboration with other trade union organisations in those countries as well as with civil society to fight against casualisation in all operations of these TNCs.

From the findings, it is clear that trade unions must take action on casualisation of labour and put it as a permanent feature on their agenda. The work place is an important site of struggle for trade unions on ending casualisation and trade unions must rethink their strategies on organizing to include all categories of workers including casual employees. Trade unions must give casual employees confidence, motivation and protection from intimidation to exercise their rights to join unions as provided in the Industrial and Labour Relations Act and ILO labour standards. The trade unions must take advantage of the positive laws and instrument in achieving this objective.

Strengthening the capacity of shop stewards, education, information and knowledge is important in realizing the trade union strategy towards ending casualization. Trade unions must mount campaigns on workers' rights aimed at workers in distress such as casual employees. This is part of an important service trade unions can provide to this category of workers.

Trade unions must identify sectors in which casualisation of labour is most prevalent and develop innovative campaign strategies on casualization of labour to bring about public awareness on the adverse effects of casualization on workers' rights and society. Trade unions must seek strategic alliances with like-minded civil society and community organizations to increase their voice to influence government and TNCs towards action on casualisation of labour and ending it for the common good of society. Although there is an insignificant number of labour brokers in the Zambian mining industry, there is need for trade unions to have negotiated agreements with these work agencies and these negotiated agreements must also be done for subcontracting firms on behalf of casualised mine workers.

While it is not possible to do away with casual employment per se it is possible to end the casualisation of labour. It is also generally agreeable that casualisation of labour is against the trade union campaign on decent work for all and an assault on workers' rights. Therefore, it is the duty and responsibility of trade unions in taking the lead in the campaign against casualisation of labour and restoring decency and dignity to work in all its forms and categories. Trade unions must develop strategies on organizing that are inclusive to bring into union membership all workers regardless of the status of their employment. Building capacity in trade unions structures especially at shop steward level is important in addition to education and creating awareness on workers' rights.

The political will on part of government and TNCs in addressing the loopholes in labour laws and stopping employment practices that encourage casualization of labour is not only necessary but also essential. However, trade unions need to act and put in strategies that can lead to influencing government and multinational actions towards ending casualisation of labour.

Public awareness and building strategic alliances with like-minded civil society and community organizations is equally important.

For this study, it is clear that globalisation and neo-liberalism has meant further impoverishment for the already poor as it has not lead to improved living standards of people in the world and there are still existing inequalities between regional and national economies. It has shown that globalisation has been about developed countries reaping poor country through TNCs and leaving them to make modest improvements and progresses in their economies.

In conclusion, there should be economic growth that that favours social justice by improving the quality of human life which can be reflected in better health and life expectancy, better education system that seek to empower all and bridge inequalities and jobs that restore human dignity.

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APPENDICES

Semi Standard Interview Schedule For Casual/Contract Rock Ore Drillers

1. a. What is your age group?

15-19	1	30-34	4	45-49	7
20-24	2	35-39	5	50-54	8
25-29	3	40-44+	6	55+	9

- b. What is your marital status?

Single	1
Living with partner	2
Married	3
Divorced	4
Widowed	5

- c. What type of residence do you stay in?

High density area	1	Medium density area	2	Low density area	3
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- d. Is the house (residence) is owned or is rented.

Owned	1
Rented	2

2. Please explain the type of job that you perform?
3. What is the name of your contractor company?

4. Is it a Zambian or foreign company?
5. What type of employment contract do you have?
6. How long have you worked as a contractor?
7. Please explain to me your experiences working as a casual/contract employee?
8. What do you think about the nature of the job you do; does it deserve to be under contract or permanent employment?
9. Explain how you feel about your job?
10. Have you worked as a permanent employee in MCM or any other mine before?
If Yes, how long did you work and why did you stop? Please explain.
11. What is your current net income?

Up to K499	1	K1500-K1999	4	K3000-K3999	7
K500-K999	2	K2000-K2499	5	K4000-K5999	8
K1000-K1499	3	K2500-K2999	6	K6000+	9

12. Please explain to me how an agreement is reached with your employer concerning your income/pay.
13. Could you please explain how you manage through the month with the said net income in terms of food, electricity, rent, children, transport, etc?
14. Please tell me if you have ever borrowed from loan sharks? If yes what was experience?
15. Are you a member of any trade union?
16. Does your employer allow you to join a trade union of your choice?
17. Have you ever considered being a member of a trade union of your choice?
18. Could you please tell me how disciplinary cases handled at your work place?
19. Could you please explain the grievance procedure that is available at your work place?
20. How would you describe your company's policy on safety, health and environment?
21. In your opinion, is your company following health, safety and environmental issues strictly?
22. Please explain your company's policy on Protective Personal Equipment (PPE).
23. Does your company provide any medical insurance for you and your family?
24. Are you entitled to the following benefits?

- a. Compensation if injured
 - b. Gratuity at the end of the contract
 - c. Housing allowance
 - d. Funeral grant
 - e. National Pension Scheme (NAPSA)
 - f. Occupational pension scheme
 - g. Production bonus
 - h. Christmas bonus
 - i. Physical transport or transport allowance
 - j. Medical insurance
 - k. Sick pay
 - l. Annual leave
 - m. Over-time
 - n. Training
 - o. Off during public holidays
 - p. Representation during a disciplinary case hearing
 - q. Fair case hearing
25. Could you please explain why you work as a contractor and yet you are a rock driller operator? Can the mine do without rock ore drillers?
26. Is there anything that you can do about your employment status as a casual/contract employee?
27. Please tell me your opinion on the employment status of mine workers now compared to ZCCM days?

Letter to Volunteer Participants (Participant Information Sheet)



Letter to volunteer participants after initial contact

Dear Sir

Thank you for volunteering to be a participant in the research. This letter outlines the information regarding the research and your part in it. The title of this research will be: **‘Casualisation of Labour in the Zambian mining industry with specific reference to Mopani Copper Mines Plc.’**

The research is designed to explore the belief that new investors in the mining sector after the privatization of ZCCM, are employing more of contract/casual employees instead of full time employees and that this class of employees is undergoing negative social and economic experiences as a result of being contract/casualised employees. The research will take place in firms subcontracted by Mopani Copper Mines Plc from 15th June 2015 to 15th July 2015 through one-on-one interviews with you as a volunteer from this category of employees in your free time at a place of your choice.

There is no obligation at all for you to do any preparation. The interview should take no longer than 30-90 minutes. I will contact you within the next days to set up an interview time.

During the second stage I will invite you back where I will present my findings. You will then have the opportunity to refute or confirm these as well as give me feedback. It must be emphasised that no individual will be identified in the publishing stage of my research. The final results will be submitted as a Master’s thesis to the **University of the Witwatersrand** in Johannesburg South Africa.

If you have any questions you wish to discuss, my contact details are: yewa.kumwenda@gmail.com

Mobile: +260966946230/ +27793648855 (S. Africa)

Warm regards,

Yewa Kumwenda (Researcher)

Professor Roger Southall (Supervisor) +27727314552

Participant Consent Form



University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, South Africa
Sociology department Private Bag 3, Wits, 2050

Participant Consent Form in-depth interview

I hereby confirm that, I have been briefed on the research that **Yewa Kumwenda** is conducting on “**Casualisation of labour in the Zambian mining industry with specific reference to Mopani Copper Mines Plc**”. I understand that my participation in this research project is voluntary and that I have a right not to answer any questions that I do not feel comfortable with. In addition, I can withdraw my participation at any time I choose to do so. I also understand that the information I share will be held in the strictest confidence and anonymity by the researcher and I have allowed him to audio tape the in-depth interview.

Signed by (Participant name).....on (date).....at
(place).....

Participant signature.....