

the Community ..."

(1)

The well-known economist was P.N.C. Okigbo who, reinforced by a team of permanent secretaries and officials, began to negotiate with the EEC Commission. In July, 1963, following a declaration of intent by the Council of Ministers, Nigeria applied to begin exploratory talks. These were held from 21st to 28th November and served to clarify the problems involved and define the broad outlines within which a trade agreement could be negotiated. These negotiations were to take three years, during which Okigbo made no less than forty trips between Lagos and Brussels. (2)

V. The Question of Reciprocity.

Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome which governs negotiations for association, stipulates that there must be reciprocal rights and obligations. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade stipulates that any concessions by way of a decrease in tariffs must be extended to all other members of the GATT on a most favoured nation basis. Officials of the Community informed the Nigerian delegation that if Nigeria were to obtain a special agreement extending the Community's free trade area facilities to Nigeria, then in return Nigeria had to offer reciprocal facilities to the EEC in Nigerian markets.

"... if the Community were to dispense with the principle in negotiations with Nigeria (and with the East African countries), it would be difficult to justify its being retained in the Yaounde Convention. On the other hand, to demand a full measure of reciprocity, in order to retain the semblance of negotiations between equals, would do violence to the realities - namely, that the economic (and, therefore, bargaining) powers of the Community and any developing country were not equal. Consequently, Nigeria insisted that in the light of these realities and imperatives, any application of the principle of reciprocity in an ensuing agreement with the Community must be nominal and token." (3)

This requirement involved a number of difficulties for the Nigerian Government believed in and practised an open door

1. HRD, Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, p. 183.
2. Okigbo, P.N.C., op. cit., Preface p. vii.
3. Ibid., p. 121.

foreign trade policy that was liberal and non-discriminatory. With the exceptions of Japan, Hong Kong and East Europe, it at no time practised discrimination against imports by reference to source. In the international fora of GATT and UNCTAD, Nigerian representatives and repeatedly stated that Nigeria opposed the extension of preferential systems. By granting exclusive concessions to only six countries, this policy would be breached. The Government also wished to continue to benefit from Commonwealth preferences in the United Kingdom market, which remained the country's most important single market and the most important single source of imports. Similarly, the diversification of Nigeria's foreign trade imposed the need to maintain a non-discriminatory policy, particularly, for example, against the United States.

"... Three conditions must hold simultaneously before Nigeria can create customs preferences in favour of the Community: the commodities must be such that:

- a. the Community accounts for most of the imports into Nigeria;
- b. imports from the United Kingdom are relatively minor;
- c. the interest of important third countries ... is not seriously threatened.

Out of over 950 major tariff positions in the Nigerian import list, only about forty items come close to meeting these requirements." (1)

In other words, the only concessions which the EEC could reasonably obtain, were an agreement to be of any economic advantage to Nigeria, would have to be of a token nature.

VI. The Agreement

The EEC had therefore to find a formula which both satisfied Nigeria's requirements and allayed the fears of the associated states that, were their privileges to be extended to Nigeria, their exports would be seriously prejudiced. Such a formula was found. All Nigerian products, with the exception of four, were to enter the Common Market free of duty. The four exceptions were products which were of importance both to Nigeria and to the eighteen associated states - cocoa, groundnut oil, palm oil and plywood. For these items a system of tariff quotas was to be instituted. The Community would admit free of duty a quantity calculated as the average of the six

1. Ibid., p. 124.

member nations' imports of the commodities in the three years, 1962 to 1964: this basic quota would be increased by 3% each year during which the agreement continued. Within these quotas the products would enter free of duty; beyond the quotas they would attract the rate of duty applicable to all third countries. The increase of 3% was expected to cover the likely increases in exports of plywood and groundnut oil, but about 15% of the increased exports of cocoa and palm oil would attract duty. It soon became clear that a yet larger proportion of all four would be dutiable: for example, had the agreement been in force in 1965, about 40,000 tons, or 30% of Nigerian cocoa would have been unable to enter the Community free of duty.

The problem of what Nigeria could offer in return has already been discussed. The token reciprocal gesture made was that a small group of 26 commodities, carefully chosen so as not to harm trade with Britain, was carved out for the granting of preferences to the EEC and the margin of these preferences was kept to a minimum - between 2% and 5%. The following products were listed: butter, macaroni, potatoes, sparkling wines, vermouth, brandy, bitters and liqueurs, building and monumental stones, beads, other household equipment, other internal combustion engines, parts and accessories of internal combustion engines, automatic vending machines, parts and accessories of machinery, other floating structures, plated headgear, parts and accessories of musical instruments, imitation jewellery, smoking pipes, sardines, other prepared fish, tomato paste and puree, beer, pile and chenille fabrics of silk, domestic radiograms and watches. The relative significance of the list was slight, for in 1964 it accounted for only £3 million, and 1.3% of total imports from all sources, and 5.4% of imports from the Common Market. Although the items were sufficiently varied to enable each of the member-states of the Community to gain something, the total effect on trade was likely to be insignificant. The agreement was to last until 31st May, 1969 and would come into effect on ratification by the governments of the Six. No interim arrangements were made.

The negotiations were concluded under the military regime of General Ironsi and the signing of the agreement took place about a fortnight before he fell. On 16th July in the National Hall in Lagos, Brigadier Ogundipe, on behalf of the

National Military Government, and the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, on behalf of the EEC, amidst much ceremony, signed the agreement. Ratification was all that was lacking.

VII. British Attitude.

Britain, itself excluded from the EEC, was somewhat piqued at the step Nigeria had taken. When British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, visited Nigeria, he commented that Nigeria was showing an 'element of preference for new friends'. A few months later in the House of Commons Mr Cledwyn Hughes, a junior minister in the department, gave the following answer to a question on the subject:

"They said that everything possible had been done to avoid damage to British trade interests, but they gave no indication that the Nigerian Government would be prepared to reconsider their offers of preferences to the Community. We felt bound, therefore, to inform the Nigerian Government that if they should in fact discriminate against British interests in this way, the British Government might be obliged to reconsider the treatment of imports from Nigeria in the British market."

(1)

In Nigeria the comment was made that the Federal Government's answer should not merely have been that it had protected British interests:

"... What they might have said ... was that because Britain had never done anything to protect Nigeria's interests since establishment of the EEC and the growth of the idea of 'association' of African territories, with its discriminatory tariffs, Nigeria's leaders have had to look to their own salvation; and if in the process British interests were injured, that was too bad."

(2)

Britain went further, officially informing the Common Market Commission of its disapproval of the terms of the proposed association agreement between Nigeria and the Common Market. Three objections were made, first, that the association agreement which would establish preferences for the EEC and Nigeria in each others' markets would not establish a free trade area and was thus not in conformity with the rules of GATT; secondly, Nigeria had always had an open door trading policy, and should not have been required to give preferences; and thirdly, although Britain gave preferences to developing countries within the Com-

1. West Africa, 13.11.65, p. 1281.
2. Ibid., 21.8.65, p. 925.

monwealth it did not demand that preferences be given in return. (1)

America made a similar protest: to the EEC Commission and the six member governments over their decision to extend to Nigeria preferential trading rights. This was in accordance with America's policy of opposing any further enlargement in the world's preferential trading systems, which inevitably discriminate against those countries excluded. (2)

VIII. France's Role.

In 1961 the young British-orientated Nigeria had the effrontery to break off diplomatic relations with de Gaulle's France. Two years later that same country was trying to negotiate an agreement with de Gaulle's Community. If Nigeria was prepared to let bygones be bygones, France was not. France certainly gave the impression that it intended to make Nigeria pay for the misdemeanour as time upon time it delayed the progress of negotiations.

Within the EEC five of the six countries supported Nigeria's application, and in particular the Netherlands and West Germany aided Okigbo in his negotiations. These five favoured negotiations following immediately after the exploratory talks of November, but France insisted on further studies; reasoning firstly, that Nigeria's size and importance could threaten the economic well-being of the eighteen associate states, and, secondly, that Nigeria was guilty of holding contradictory views - at the same time as attempting to gain advantages from the European tariff wall, Nigerian representatives were standing up at trade conferences in Geneva and strongly denouncing preferential trade systems.

It was France which asked that Nigeria make greater concessions than it had been offering, before allowing association with the Community. It was France also which held up negotiations when it decided to boycott all meetings of the Community. Nigerian press comment on the boycott was strong. The Morning Post described France as the 'conceited problem child of Europe' and the Daily Express urged Nigeria not to be dis-

1. African Economic Digest, No. 32, 6.8.65, p. 314.

2. Africa Research Bulletin - Economic, No. 6, 1965, p. 326b.

couraged by 'this capricious behaviour of France'. (1)

In France's absence Nigeria and the other members managed to produce a draft agreement. On returning, France expressed approval of the draft, but not before pressing Nigeria to allow a clause to be included which would cover mineral oil.

After the signing of the agreement, France remained the key to the question of ratification. The Netherlands Government ratified immediately; the others were prepared to wait upon France's decision. France, however, made no decisions and no announcements - it just did not ratify the agreement; and it began to dawn on the Nigerians by mid-1968 that they appeared to be managing satisfactorily without any agreement, and that France in reality had no intention of signing at all. Finally, the General decided to support Biafra.

IX. Nigeria Repudiates the Agreement.

On 3rd October, 1968 Nigeria announced that it no longer wished to have associate membership with the EEC on the grounds that the projected Nigerian association with the Community was no longer relevant to the nation's needs. A statement issued by the Federal Ministry of Trade said that the current civil war had 'demonstrated the basic strength and independence of the Nigerian economy which could be jeopardised by neo-colonialist arrangements like association with the EEC now or in the future'. (2) The repudiation was clearly a reaction to France's championing of the Biafran cause. It would, however, hardly annoy France which had, after all, not ratified the agreement nor wished to see it brought into practice; but it might anger Germany and Holland, which had put some effort into supporting Nigeria's case.

This repudiation meant that when the Yaounde states met at the end of May, 1969 to negotiate a new treaty, Nigeria was not able to attend; and the prospect of attendance, which could have resulted in a strengthening of Nigeria's position, was at that stage about all that might have made the lengthy negotiations worth while. The reference to neo-colonialism

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., No. 9, 1968, p. 1154b.

and the return of Franco-Nigerian antagonism apparently takes one back to the point of departure; and the overwhelming impression gained is of great and unnecessary dissipation of energy. Nigeria, however, is too large an African market for Europe to ignore and the EEC too important for Nigeria to neglect. There can be little doubt that when conditions in Nigeria return to normal some form of negotiation for some form of agreement will once again be initiated.

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CHAPTER IV : THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN
POLICY FROM INDEPENDENCE TO SECESSION

"... We are in fact asking to become as a son who has left his father's compound and has now to make his own way in the world." - Prime Minister Balewa. (1)

"People go from the known to the unknown." - Foreign Minister Wachuku. (2)

Much about Nigeria's approach to foreign affairs is contained in these two brief sentences. A great deal more is to be found in Sir Abubakar's first comprehensive statement on foreign policy to the House of Representatives on 20th August, 1960, a statement of overriding significance for, although presented in general terms, it established the blueprint for Nigeria's conduct of foreign policy and provided the authoritative framework within which Nigeria's leaders took decisions when confronted with specific issues. Thus, for example, when in 1964 the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet were criticised for neglecting to debate foreign affairs and for failing to explain stands on particular issues, the Foreign Minister answered by reminding members who did not know what Nigeria's foreign policy was, that 'on the 20th August, 1960, the foreign policy of Nigeria was declared in this House and that was printed and circulated to Members'. (3) The statement further provided the first clear example of the quiet tone and moderate style of Sir Abubakar which he attempted to inculcate in those representing Nigeria abroad.

"In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and of its citizens.

We have already declared our intention of applying to join both the Commonwealth and the United Nations. In regard to the former it is important to understand that all members of the Commonwealth are autonomous communities equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. While therefore bene-

1. HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 28.

2. Ibid., Vol. 11(b), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 892.

3. Ibid., Vol. 15(a), 12 - 26 March, 1964, p. 162.

fitting greatly from the free interchange of ideas and consultation between the members of the Commonwealth, and from their experience within the framework of the United Nations we shall nevertheless have a free hand to select those policies which we consider to be most advantageous for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in the principles of the United Nations. We shall, of course, endeavour to remain on friendly terms with every nation which recognizes and respects our sovereignty, and we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone. So far as is possible the policy for each occasion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interests.

We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. This freedom of action will be an essential feature of our policy and will ensure that full attention is paid to the opinions expressed by our representatives. Our policies, as I have said before, will be founded on Nigeria's interests and will be consistent with the moral and democratic principles on which our constitution is based.

Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find a solution to its problems and to foster the growth of a common understanding among all the nations, and especially among the new nations of this continent. We are determined to encourage the development of common ties between all states. The difficulties which will confront us in promoting the friendly association of independent countries in Africa are fully appreciated, but we believe that they can be overcome if a start is made by emphasizing and building upon the cultural and economic links which already exist.

This will be followed up by a policy of securing an agreed plan for the improvement of inter-territorial communications and transport facilities, and by the pooling of resources for higher education and scientific research. Although it would be premature at this stage to think in terms of a Common Market for Africa, we are intending to work towards the expansion of trade and travel, and to secure an agreed plan for the improvement of inter-territorial communications and the like.

On the problem of boundaries, our view is that although in the past some of these were created artificially by the European powers, which even went so far as to split some communities into three parts each administered by a different Colonial Power, nevertheless those boundaries should be respected and, in the interests of peace, must remain the recognized boundaries until such time as the peoples concerned decide of their own free will to merge into one larger unit. We shall discourage any attempts to influence such communities by force or through

undue pressure to change, since such interference could only result in unrest and in harm to the overall plan for the future of this great continent.

It is true that Africa is changing every day. We rejoice to see so many countries becoming independent; but with the good developments there are bound to be some bad ones, and we are troubled by the signs which we see of the ideological war between the great powers of the world creeping into Africa. We shall therefore take steps to persuade the African leaders to take serious note of this distressing trend, and we shall make every effort to bring them together, so that having been made aware of the danger we may all find a way to unite our efforts in preventing Africa from becoming an area of crisis and world tension.

We shall not however allow our direct and primary interest in African affairs to blind us to the grave and vital issues which darken the wider international scene. In the United Nations, and in any other way possible, we shall direct our energies and influence to helping to reach solutions which will contribute to the peace of the nations and the well-being of mankind.

To sum up, we shall do everything in our power to foster co-operation among the countries of Africa and particularly of this part of Africa, and in so far as is compatible with the national interest, and with our membership of the British Commonwealth and of the United Nations, we shall maintain cordial relations with all the other nations of the world, firmly opposing all forms of aggression and striving always to obtain the observance everywhere of those human rights which all parties in Nigeria have agreed upon as fundamental, in particular freedom from racial or religious discrimination." (1)

In these terms, and in those contained in his address to the General Assembly on Nigeria's admittance as the ninety-ninth member of the United Nations, did Sir Abubakar spell out the theoretical bases to guide the new nation and its leaders in the first years of independence.

F. Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.

"The British Government, as the previous Colonial ruler, I think, is bound to be suspect a little: possibly anything they do has to be looked at to see that it isn't neo-colonialism." (2)

In 1861 Docemo ceded Lagos to Acting Consul McKoskey

1. Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, op. cit., p. 56.
2. Robertson, Sir James, Nigeria in 1965, an address to a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society, 3.6.65, African Affairs, Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 64, No. 257, October, 1965, pp. 256 - 257.

and the British flag was raised. In 1960 Britain granted sovereignty to the Federation of Nigeria and the British flag was lowered. So ended a century of British rule; but not of British influence.

In the years leading up to independence there was every indication that Nigeria of necessity and of choice would choose to remain closely linked to Britain and the Commonwealth. On the basis of earlier experience every effort was made by the Colonial Office to prevent a recurrence of previous errors, and to offer Nigeria every advantage - financial aid, scholarships, training of the army and civil service. Particular attention was given to the development of a Nigerian foreign service; to this end Francis Cumming-Bruce was despatched to Nigeria in 1955, a diplomatic training course for Nigerians was arranged at Oxford and Nigerians were permitted to serve as supernumeraries in British High Commissions. The dual aim was to assist the new leaders to overcome the initial disruptive forces of the immediate post-independence period and to ensure a feeling of goodwill for Britain amongst people and politicians, thus avoiding any need for the latter to demonstrate dramatically their new-found independence. In this they succeeded, particularly with the Northern leaders, for after independence Sir Abubakar frequently spoke of the colonial period with nostalgia and Sir Ahmadu admitted that the Northern leaders and the colonial administrators had spoken the same language. (1) In 1956 the Queen paid a highly successful visit to Nigeria which Sir Ahmadu described as 'happy and glorious' and later a statue of the Queen was unveiled in Parliament. The Military Force Amendment Act of 1958 demonstrated Nigeria's appreciation of the need for British military assistance and the intention to continue availing itself of it. Sir James Robertson, the last Governor and the first Governor-General, was a suitable choice and was admired as

1. One bitter criticism which Sir Ahmadu had of the British Government was its handling of the Suez crisis in 1956: "Meanwhile, the tragedy of Egypt was going on. Fortunately, the elections took people's minds off the dreadful hash in that Great Britain was making in the Middle East, ending in the deplorable and wholly unjustified attack on Egypt which did not even have the merit of efficient planning and determined execution." Bello, Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 197.

the man who brought Nigeria to independence. In 1960 Harold Macmillan was well received, and the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester attended the independence celebrations. This amiable ending to a long period of British rule, and the fact that Britain remained Nigeria's dominant trading partner, source of investment and venue for study led Sir Abubakar to say that Britain would never be regarded as a foreign country, and to declare to the final Constitutional Conference in London that in Nigeria there was no thought of, let alone wish for, the establishment of a Republic.

In general the Colonial Office succeeded, for after independence there was no sudden eruption of anti-British feeling and the existing relationship did not alter radically. Inevitable and gradual trends, however, served to increase the distance between the two countries. The United States became Nigeria's chief source of financial aid, numerous countries, particularly those of the EEC, diffused British domination of Nigeria's trade, and as an independent country in Africa Nigeria was obliged to make new friends, to express and attempt to stand by political principles on colonialism and racialism, and to take an interest in the pressures of non-aligned and African countries. Yet dependence on Britain and close ties continued: Federal and Regional Ministers continued to visit the United Kingdom as guests of the British Government (for example, the Federal Minister of Pensions and Establishments, Mr Jacob Obando, in 1964) and Nigerians continued to receive knighthoods and honours (for example, the Governor of the Western Region, Chief Odeleye Fadahunsi), and about ten thousand Nigerians studied in Britain every year. After a visit by Eton boys to play fives in Northern Nigeria four boys from that Region went to Britain to play fives against Eton, Charterhouse, Shrewsbury and Highgate; and to top it all, Chief Akintola's son, Tokunbu, became the first African to enter Eton.

Formal steps were taken to sever some of the ties. To demonstrate to Africa and the world Nigeria's comprehensive sovereignty and to appease radical pressures, a Republic was declared on 1st October, 1963. According to Sir Abubakar ties had been maintained with the Queen as Head of State because it was useful in the early stages of independence and was regarded as

an interim arrangement', but the time had arrived 'to reflect more realistically the independence and the sovereignty of Nigeria'.⁽¹⁾ Nigeria chose to remain in the Commonwealth, however, accepting the Queen as its Head. The Queen's statue was moved to a lesser position; the General Council of the Bar abolished the status and privileges of Queen's Counsel; the National Honours Bill was passed urging the Government to prevent foreign countries (that is, Britain) from conferring honours on Nigerians; and a motion was passed calling on the Government to consider renaming monuments and institutions.

Fear of neo-colonialism made the former mother country a potential enemy, and any suggestion of condescension, interference, renewed control and criticism were bitterly resented. Though financial assistance from Britain was appreciated, economic dependence on Britain chafed. The sensibilities of a newly independent country in the process of cutting the apron strings are certainly analogous to those of a growing child exerting its individualism. Lack of tact by the mother and over-sensitivity on the part of the child may lead to over-reaction. It was in this context that the failure of the responsible parent authorities to appreciate the feelings of the offspring led to their most serious errors.

The underlying cause of strain was Nigeria's suspicion that the British Government as represented by its officials in Nigeria exerted an undue influence over the country and its policies, domestic and foreign; in Aminu Kano's words British officials behaved as if they were 'masters of [Nigeria's] destiny'.⁽²⁾ This suspicion was exacerbated by the Exchange of Letters between Lord Head, the first High Commissioner to Nigeria, and Prime Minister Balewa under which Nigeria assumed all obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom which arose from any valid international agreement entered into by the UK Government, insofar as such instruments might be held applicable to Nigeria. In this apprehensive atmosphere Lord Head was not the ideal choice. Although capable and esteemed by Nigeria's leaders the role he envisaged for himself

1. HRD, Vol. 11(h), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 1137.

2. Ibid., Vol. 2, 13 - 20 April, 1961, p. 601.

was too prominent, and even anachronistic in the context of Africa's newest and largest nation. He was not entirely at fault in this, for Government leaders encouraged him by frequent consultations and by defending his actions in Parliament, yet he acted with some lack of discretion. Thus Awo could describe him to students in London as Nigeria's de facto ruler; and the All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference called on the Government to 'remove the U.K. High Commission from the Marina to another place of comfortable distance from the Prime Minister's residence',⁽¹⁾ to scrap all British traditional practices and to establish a Republic in order to erase any impression of imperial control. Francis Cumming-Bruce who succeeded him played no less important a role, as witnessed by his presence at the meeting between senior Cabinet Ministers, General Ironsi and senior police officers after the January military revolt; but he successfully executed his duties without giving backbenchers and the press reason for complaints of interference.

A second misjudgement which led to the first serious controversy and to bitterness and mistrust of Britain, much of it based on misunderstanding, was the signing of the Defence Pact.⁽²⁾ The term 'pact' was hardly appropriate as it was little more than an agreement for the British Government to continue to assist in training and equipping Nigeria's army, in exchange for certain overflying rights and the use of certain Nigerian airfields for aircraft tropicalisation trials. It was clearly no military alliance; and Britain could have obtained the same results by an informal agreement.

On 19th November, 1960 Alhaji Ribadu, Minister of Defence, moved a resolution calling on Parliament to agree to the Defence Pact, while Awo led the attack on the motion. Admitting that he had signed the agreement in London, Awo went on to point out that the four leaders - Awo, Balewa, Bello and Azikiwe - had been 'bundled to No. 10 Downing Street' and informed that the setting of a date for independence was conditional on their signing; this he considered to be 'bare-faced, unabashed and undue influence'.⁽³⁾

1. West Africa, 2.9.61, p. 975.

2. The Defence Pact is discussed in Section D: Pragmatic Alignment with the West.

3. HRD, 14 - 29 November, 1960, p. 61.

he continued that there had been a further 'unknown and hidden document' which represented an attempt 'to swindle this country out of its sovereignty', granting Britain land for staging purposes for aircraft and special port facilities at Lagos and port Harcourt; and he concluded that even were the motion defeated Nigeria had already been irrevocably committed to a military alliance with Britain through the Exchange of Letters. Sir Abubakar denied the truth of Awo's allegations and pointed out to him that both Islam and Christianity held that it was a sin to lie. (1) But the denunciation of the Pact did not end with Awolowo or with the AG for that matter; NCNC radicals attacked it and even some NEC members questioned its wisdom. Nevertheless the motion was carried by 166 votes to 38. It was, however, the most unpopular act of the Government and much of the resentment found its focus on the British Government. Seen in conjunction with the Exchange of Letters the imagination of the Pact's opponents in seeing intrigue was given free rein; Britain was accused of neo-colonialism, of tying Nigeria to NATO and of making a sham of Nigeria's independence.

Eventually in January, 1962 the Pact was abrogated by mutual agreement with the stated purpose of ending further misunderstanding. 'Each Government will, however, endeavour to afford to the other at all times such assistance and facilities in defence matters as are appropriate between partners in the Commonwealth.' (2) When the motion congratulating the Government on this was proposed a number of speakers expressed serious doubts. Joseph Tarka said that although 'the letter of the Pact is dead and buried, its lively ghost thrives through its remains' and stated that the abrogation agreement was so couched as to cover a further agreement, possibly more sinister in nature. (3) The substance of the agreement remained; but since it had been the formal pact which had caused the outcry against Britain, the formal abrogation effectively ended the tension.

The next storm broke over the Enahoro Affair which in 1963 became something of a 'cause célèbre'. (4) Chief Anthony

1. Ibid., p. 64.

2. Commonwealth Survey, No. 17, 14.8.62, p. 668.

3. HRD, Vol. 1, 21 March - 7 April, 1962, pp. 387 - 398.

4. Punch, 24.10.65, p. 775.

Enahoro, finding himself implicated in treasonable activities escaped to Ghana and then to Britain where he was accommodated in Brixton Prison for six months while legal and political battles raged around his head over the question of deportation. The Labour Party chose to make it a party issue and was attacked in Nigeria for slighting Nigeria, its courts and system of justice. Much of the British press also opposed the extradition, and this too was condemned in Nigeria. The Conservative Party was caught between the pressures exerted by factions which believed that Enahoro would not be accorded a just trial in Nigeria, and the necessity to demonstrate its support for the Government of the largest African Commonwealth country. It attempted to find a via media by promising to return Enahoro if the Nigerian Government would give an assurance that he would not be subject to the death penalty and that he would be free to select his own defence counsel, even were this to include a non-Nigerian lawyer.

This led to a rumpus in the Nigerian Parliament and press where the move was seen as a British attempt to discredit Nigeria and to detract from the country's sovereignty; and there were calls for a severance of diplomatic relations. Mallam Muh-tari Sarkin Bai believed Britain was determined to demonstrate that Nigeria was politically unstable and accused Prime Minister Macmillan of attempting to exert pressure on Nigeria's law courts.⁽¹⁾ Lord Head was alleged to have been meddling with the country's judiciary in an attempt to obtain the required assurances;⁽²⁾ and the Daily Times editorial of 28th March, 1963 stressed that the Nigerian judiciary was as independent of executive interference as the British, and that Mr Macmillan should therefore appreciate that Sir Abubakar could not assure him before the trial what the penalty would be.⁽³⁾ Mr E.C.A. Akwivu's view was that were Nigeria's Government white-dominated as that of Southern Rhodesia, the British Government would not have been prepared to 'uphold outrage',⁽⁴⁾ and Mallam Uwaisai Karni went

1. HRD, Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, p. 29.
2. Ibid., p. 334.
3. News from Nigeria, No. 25, 30.3.63, p. 10.
4. HRD, Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, p. 82.

so far as to accuse the British Government of having supported the AG plot to overthrow the Federal Government. ⁽¹⁾ In a moment of truth Mr I.A. Brown rose to say:

"It appears that many of those who spoke about Britain were mostly Government Back Benchers and I know that when Ministers go to London for a loan of about £80,000,000 they will tell the British people not to mind those boys." ⁽²⁾

Lord Head was sufficiently alarmed to inform the British Government that the retention of Enahoro would cause a serious disruption in relations, and eventually the Home Secretary extradited him, a move which was upheld in the House of Commons by a majority of 56. Mr Macmillan justified this by saying that since independence Nigeria had 'scrupulously followed both the letter and the spirit of the institutions Britain had bequeathed to her' and that refusal to deport Enahoro would amount to 'a vote of no confidence in her judiciary'. ⁽³⁾ In Nigerian eyes, however, the delay had already demonstrated Britain's lack of confidence; and the Conservative Party was not accorded any gratitude for returning Enahoro, but merely criticised for dallying.

A further element of irritation, demonstrated during both the Western crisis and the Enahoro affair, was criticism by the British press of Nigeria's leaders and politics. These were not accepted purely as the criticism of foreign newspapers, but rather as another British attempt to interfere in Nigeria's affairs and discredit the country in the eyes of the world. Speakers in Parliament frequently denounced the UK as a whole on this count and called on the British Parliament to put a stop to it. Chief Ayo Rosiji, in reply to a Ministerial statement that the British press was independent of the Government, gave a very clear example of the confused thinking underlying these attacks:

"Is it not true that the British press is influenced by the financial control of its proprietors? Is it not true that the British press is influenced by the moneys they have earned, moneys of the poor people of this country which are paid to agents of the AG overseas to malign this nation ⁽⁴⁾ overseas."

1. Ibid., p. 368.
2. Ibid., p. 130.
3. West Africa, 20.4.63, p. 449.
4. HRD, Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, p. 38.

The principle of appeal to the Privy Council, as illustrated in two cases - the National Bank Case and the Adegbenro-Akintola Case - was considered a further limitation on Nigeria's independence. In the former case the Federal Government under the terms of the Commissions and Tribunal Act attempted to enquire into the National Bank established by the Western Regional Government, but the Federal Supreme Court declared some sections of the Act null and void. Sir Abubakar's agreement to let the case go on appeal to the Privy Council led to much criticism and the President of the Nigerian Youth Council, Dr Tunji Otegbeye, accused him of selling Nigerian sovereignty. In the latter case the Privy Council reversed the decision of the Federal Supreme Court and declared that Adegbenro and not Akintola was the legal Premier of the Western Region. On this occasion it was the Government which saw in the reversal an attempt to thwart its intentions; the Western House of Assembly retroactively passed a law removing the Governor's right to dismiss a Premier and the Federal Government nullified the Privy Council verdict.

On the other hand, while Britain was required not to interfere in Nigerian affairs, it was nevertheless required to look after Nigeria's interests. Thus, for example, the UK was attacked for not having given sufficient support to Nigerian calls for cocoa price stabilisation; and, of more importance, Britain's application to join the EEC was resented as it was felt that Nigeria's interests were being ignored.

"... in spite of protests from such important friends as Nigeria, Britain was prepared to go in to the European Community ... Now the fact that someone we take as a friend should take such a vital step without regard to your own feelings should make us think twice about how real the friendship is." (1)

The second major source of friction arose over questions of colonialism and white racialism. As ex-British colonialists in close relationship with Britain, Nigerians felt that they had both a right and a duty to question and criticise concerning these matters. Frustrated by their own ineffectiveness they looked to the UK and the Commonwealth to take responsibility.

1. Mr F.A.M. Amadi, Ibid., p. 44.

ty, heed their appeals and take steps to eradicate them.

South Africa presented a perennial source of criticism and Britain was frequently denounced for alleged hypocrisy and cowardliness in relations with the Republic, particularly in connection with voting in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. Even on the occasion when a motion congratulating Harold Macmillan on his 'winds of change' speech to the South African Parliament was proposed, numerous speakers expressed doubts about his sincerity. One speaker remarked that on his return to Britain he had made no clear anti-apartheid statement in the House of Commons and this, together with British abstentions in the Security Council, indicated 'that Britain has conspired with South Africa'.⁽¹⁾

In a foreign policy debate the following year Mallam Abubakar Isandu described British voting in the UN as 'very repulsive and colonialistic', and the British people as having 'not the slightest human touch', and called on the Government to review its relations with the Commonwealth.⁽²⁾ British arms sales to South Africa were also denounced. The Daily Times editorial of 22nd July, 1963 cited South Africa's 'boasting' of its military might and warned:

"... if the Western powers of which Britain should normally be our first choice in friendship and solidarity could arm our enemies to the extent that they can now brag and dazzle their military strength before our eyes; if they persist in selling to, or bartering more arms to South Africa, then we had better reconsider the whole question of our relations with Britain without further delay."⁽³⁾

In general Britain was censured for retention of any colonies and accused of decelerating their independence; yet once independence had been granted to most of them, British policies returned briefly to favour. For example, in 1960 Mallam Muhtari Sarkin Bai condemned the British government for the detention of Jomo Kenyatta and Dr Banda, and challenged it to take positive steps within six months to see that Africans were no longer oppressed, lest Nigeria alter its position in the Commonwealth;⁽⁴⁾

1. Mr P.B.Ekanem, Ibid., 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 159.
2. HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 365.
3. News from Nigeria, No. 56, 24.7.63, p. 19.
4. HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 64.

in 1961 Mr R.N. Moujeke protested against Britain voting against anything favourable to 'blacks' and unfavourable to 'whites'; (1) and in 1963 in the General Assembly Mr Okeke censured the British Government for having made no substantial progress in regard to the constitutional and economic advancement of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland which, he said, were in danger of being swallowed up by South Africa. (2) The UK was also attacked at various times for not opposing France over Algeria, for not having done more to prevent French bomb tests in the Sahara, for being a member of NATO, for supplying arms to Portugal, for allowing certain financial groups to assist Tshombe and for some of the troubles in the Congo. If its colonial policies outside of Africa were found wanting, these too were condemned; for example, Mr Okeke in the speech referred to, rejected British policy in Aden where he said the inhabitants considered the Federation of South Arabia 'an imposition, and a device to perpetuate colonial rule'. (3)

Nevertheless, it was Southern Rhodesia which far outstripped any other issue as a source of bitterness, particularly since Nigerians felt that the British Government had had ample opportunity to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority régime, and that their leaders had given timely warning to Britain to exercise its responsibility. In 1962 Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Wachuku, told the General Assembly that Britain could not divorce itself from its responsibility in Southern Rhodesia, and being aware that majority rule was essential, should take the appropriate steps before it was too late. 'If you know that must be so, why not start doing it now?' (4) In 1963 Nuhu Bamali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, informed Parliament that Nigeria had advised the British Government of the iniquity and dangers of granting independence to a minority government. (5)

Once Ian Smith had declared UDI, Nigeria made use of

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1. Ibid., 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 242.
 2. United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1272, 14.12.63, para. 96.
 3. Ibid., para. 99.
 4. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1153, 15.10.62, para. 119.
 5. HRD, Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, p. 224.

two methods, wittingly and unwittingly, in order to bring pressure to bear on Britain to topple the régime. On the one hand the normally conservative Premier Akintola, speaking to the Western House of Assembly, said:

"... We condemn unequivocally the perfidious manner in which the Government of Britain is handling the Rhodesian situation. We do feel there has never been any evidence of sincerity so far. We feel very much ashamed as a member of the Commonwealth." (1)

Bamali employed as much invective as any other African leader at the OAU Conference at Addis Ababa and threatened to break off relations with Britain if the rebellion had not been quashed by 15th December. On the other hand, Chief Ayo Rosiji, Federal Minister of Information, informed pressmen in Ghana that Nigeria's relations with Britain were far too important to sever diplomatic ties; and Sir Abubakar, while admitting that the economic sanctions threatened by Britain were unsatisfactory and that the only method of dealing with Ian Smith was savagely and with force, nevertheless defended Britain's action on the grounds that this was a delicate question and that Britain could not be blamed for moving cautiously. Nigeria's approach of denouncing British policy while simultaneously attempting to co-operate in order to encourage stronger action, continued under the Military Government of General Ironsi. In the Security Council Nigeria's representatives had some strong things to say about British handling of the question. On 9th April, 1966 Mr Iyalla remarked that economic sanctions then in force were useless as long as South Africa continued to allow oil through to Rhodesia and while many other vital products continued to flow in. Having been told that economic sanctions would bring the Smith régime crashing down in a matter of weeks, Iyalla said: 'I beg this Council to understand our bewilderment and pardon our scepticism'; (2) and noting that Britain was for the first time introducing an element of force to prevent the Joanna V from offloading her oil, he continued:

"... All we ask ... is that it extend this desirable use of force into Rhodesia ... I can't real-

1. West Africa, 18.12.65, p. 1442.

2. UN Security Council, Meeting 1277, 9.4.66, para. 29.

ly understand why the country responsible for the administration of the affairs of Rhodesia should refuse to accept more powers, because all we are saying is: you ask for more powers to intercept ships on the high seas. We want you to take more powers to intercept not only ships on the high seas but tankers coming from other places and all other vehicles that may bring anything that will give succour to Mr. Smith in Rhodesia." (1)

On 17th May, 1966 Mr Adebo spoke disparagingly of the British record in Rhodesia which he said was 'as painful as it is long', and held Britain 'altogether responsible for the muddle in Southern Rhodesia'. (2)

"The first significant error that was made by that Government - and we pointed it out at the time - was to forswear in advance the use of force in settling the problem of Rhodesia... It did not seem to us to be common sense to tell a potential burglar in advance, I am going to do all I can to stop you from burgling, short of the application of any force. It would sound ... like an invitation to burglary. How can we blame Smith, then, if he proceeded on his reckless course?" (3)

Yet, while denouncing Britain strongly and in all cases supporting motions and amendments calling on it to take stronger action, once these were defeated Nigerian representatives supported British efforts in an attempt to accomplish anything at all.

The first conclusion to be drawn from Anglo-Nigerian relations from 1960 to 1966 was that at the highest levels they remained extremely cordial, condemnation and invective flowing primarily from backbenchers and the press. When Britain's voting was criticised the Foreign Minister informed the House that Britain, like any other independent country, was free to express its views and to vote in accordance with its own policies; when the British press was attacked, the Foreign Minister explained that it was a free press over which the British Government had no control; and Prime Minister Balewa, Foreign Minister Wachuku and Finance Minister Okotie-Eboh were never heard to threaten any severance of diplomatic relations. Although there were misunderstandings which produced outcries on the public level, private channels of communication between Sir Abubakar and his Cabinet on the one hand and the British High Commissioners and the

1. Ibid., para. 33.

2. Ibid., Meeting 1279, 17.5.66, para. 26.

3. Ibid., para. 29.

British Government were at all times kept open; and by diplomatic methods Nigeria's Prime Minister was usually able to achieve satisfactory solutions to issues which generated tension between the two countries. With the exception of the occasional eruptions cited, ties between Britain and Nigeria remained close and satisfactory and Britain did not, in fact, come to be regarded as a foreign country.

At independence Nigeria, not surprisingly, chose to retain its membership of the Commonwealth. This had been the expressed policy of all three major parties and the wish of the Prime Minister, the Regional Premiers and all delegates to the final constitutional conferences, thus reflecting a sense of close association with Britain. On achieving Republican status Nigeria again chose to remain within the Commonwealth. President Asikiwe in a broadcast to the nation explained that this choice was based on Nigeria's 'deep appreciation of the traditions, ideals, values, and practices which make the Commonwealth a bastion of democracy ...' (1) The economic advantages of continuing membership were obvious. In fact this aspect loomed so large that on one occasion while in London the Minister of Finance found it necessary to deny that the prospect of continuing British aid was the sole reason for Nigeria seeking membership. (2)

Sir Abubakar viewed the Commonwealth not as a rigid alliance but as a multi-racial international club in which all members were autonomous and equal in status, and while able to benefit from the exchange of ideas and political consultation with other members, each remained free to follow the policies it considered most advantageous. Although appreciating the advantages of loose association he frequently expressed the hope that it would become a more tightly-knit, and possibly a closer trading community. He believed that the Commonwealth could make a greater contribution towards world peace by 'throwing its weight behind our struggle to eliminate colonialism and racialism, by demonstrating 'more effectively its support for the ideals and principles of justice and freedom' and 'by intensi-

1. African World, November, 1963, p. 4.
2. Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 28.7.59, in Anglin, Douglas G., op. cit., p. 259.

fyng intra-Commonwealth assistance so that we may achieve better results from our concerted efforts to abolish poverty and tensions generated by gross inequalities of wealth'. (1)

Although Nigeria's leaders gave their full support to the Commonwealth, it did not escape criticism. Besides protests against South Africa's membership and accusations that the Commonwealth discriminated between its white and black citizens, much of the expressed disapproval was really disapprobation of the British Government, for in the eyes of many they were indistinguishable. Thus, on the occasions when relations with the UK were most strained, the Commonwealth came in for severe onslaughts, and frequently a condemnation of British colonial policy was followed by a plea to reconsider Nigeria's position in the Commonwealth. Such thinking, for example, often revealed in Parliamentary speeches, was contained in the editorial of the Morning Post of 26th March, 1963, concerning the Enahoro affair:

"As Britain is at liberty to cling to her traditions so do we consider it our sacred duty to preserve Nigeria; so do we not consider ourselves bound to remain with a Commonwealth in which any one member, on the pretext of preserving her traditions, can harbour even those accused of seeking to sabotage all that is good and sacred in our country.

The Commonwealth of Nations cannot long survive as a community of undeclared foes; nor can it thrive on a diet of mutual distrust." (2)

Other doubts expressed were that it was merely an instrument whereby Britain could safeguard its economic position in the colonies and encourage them to hold political views close to its own; (3) that it would have the effect of dividing Africa still more obviously between French and English speaking nations; that it might put a brake on the Pan-African cause and the establishment of a West African Community; (4) and that South Africa's membership engendered grave misgivings.

"... Within this same Commonwealth we have odd fellows. These odd fellows seem to be South Africa and the Central African Federation, and here we are asking to sit side by side with them. In their country you find fellow African being mauled, op-

1. New Commonwealth, August, 1964, p. 432.

2. News from Nigeria, No. 24, 27.3.63, p. 8.

3. Mr A. Nkomolafe, HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 361.

4. Dr Chike Odi, HRD, Vol. 1, 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 107.

pressed, ruled by a microscopic minority of whites. We do hope that the Commonwealth is going to satisfy our aspirations." (1)

It soon did, and Sir Abubakar was accorded much of the credit. What part he played is not known, but he did inform the nation on his return that he had threatened to withdraw, for he could not have looked his countrymen in the face were South Africa to have continued as a member. Although Awolowo charged him with teaming up with the Commonwealth radicals only at the expedient moment it was generally believed that he had been one of the protagonists; and Sir Abubakar, his prestige greatly enhanced, returned home in a blaze of glory. His own view of South Africa's departure was that in the Commonwealth, an association embracing all races, colours and creeds, it was incumbent on all members to respect fundamental human rights; and that those finding this principle unacceptable should quit. He considered South Africa's exit a blessing for it would save the Commonwealth much embarrassment and allow it to grow from strength to strength.

Nigeria took an active role in Commonwealth affairs, participating for example in the Commonwealth Arts Festival in London in 1964, attending Commonwealth Information Ministers' Conferences, Commonwealth Auditors-Generals' Conferences and Meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and Sir Abubakar religiously representing Nigeria at all the Prime Ministers' Conferences; in addition the 1965 Commonwealth Broadcasting Conference, the 1966 Council of the Association of Commonwealth Universities and the Fourth Commonwealth Education Conference were convened in Nigeria. Sir Abubakar himself was considered by many to be the pride of the Commonwealth. As Canada's Lester Pearson tried to encourage a rapport between white and black members, so Sir Abubakar saw his role as bringing black thinking closer to white and thus functioned as an African counterweight to the militancy of Nkrumah. Sir Alec Douglas-Home's appreciation of his achievements was borne out by his visit to Nigeria in 1964 - the first occasion on which only one African country had been singled out for a visit -

1. HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 44.

leading a British columnist to write that Balewa's Government was the most adult of the Commonwealth African Governments, merited this special attention and evidenced the fact that while all Commonwealth States are equal, some are more equal than others'.⁽¹⁾ Sir Abubakar gave the clearest and most significant demonstration of his position in connection with Southern Rhodesia. Though at Prime Ministers' Conferences he supported effective action to prevent Ian Smith from assuming independence illegally, he nevertheless manifested his belief that the Africans of Rhodesia were not ready to assume control of the country and that any proposed solution must envisage the white and African peoples living together in harmony. He was given credit for much of the preparedness of the Africans to compromise and for the decision of Australia, New Zealand and Canada to support the principle of majority rule. His final act was to organise a Prime Ministers' Conference in Lagos in January, 1966 (the first such conference to be convened outside of London and the first held to pursue a single topic), in the belief that this would bring him increased prestige at home and divert the attention of Nigerians from the deteriorating situation in their country.

Nigeria found the Commonwealth an expedient and valuable association in which to remain and it reaped the anticipated benefits of participation - continued British aid, CDC investments, increasing Canadian aid and the benefits of schemes such as SCAAP - while also making of it a forum in which to propagate the Government's views, with unexpected success. The effect of the fellow-membership of the Central African Federation and of the contact between Sir Abubakar and Sir Roy Welensky was to mitigate Nigeria's derogatory opinions of the administration of the Federation. On the other hand a significant influence of the various Commonwealth meetings was to bring Nigeria's leaders into contact with radical, neutralist and Afro-Asian leaders like Nehru, Nyerere and Nkrumah, which encouraged cautious Nigerians to take up stronger positions, to make use of more dynamic terminology, and without diverging too far

1. Colvin, Ian, In Search of the Commonwealth, The Times, London, 18.3.64.

from fundamental principles to attempt to sound more in tune with pan-Africanist and non-aligned thought. This was, however, more a question of style than of substance, for the essential effect of Nigeria's cordial relations with Britain and with the Commonwealth was that it perpetuated inherent leanings towards the West.

II. Live and Let Live in Africa.

A. Micro-nationalism.

"Micro-nationalism is national introversion, born of the difficulties which many new states have in establishing their internal stability. The champions of this doctrine believe, rightly or wrongly, that it is easier to combat subversion, to maintain order, to substitute a new order for the old order in a relatively small territorial space... they hold ... that the phenomenon of tribalism has still not disappeared ... [and this] ... hinders the elimination of frontiers and the enlargement of the territorial bases of the nations." (1)

Accepting the unlikelihood of any term containing the prefix 'micro' being apt in a Nigerian context, it was manifest from the first murmurings concerning foreign policy that Nigeria's leaders intended to follow a micro-nationalist policy in Africa. Despite the strong emotional appeal and the mystique of the concepts of African personality and of militant pan-Africanism, Jaja Wachuku proclaimed in no uncertain terms that Nigeria intended to adopt 'clear and practicable policies' in Africa and not 'fatuous or sentimental' ones designed merely for 'propaganda purposes'. (2)

Nigeria's attitude towards African unity emanated directly from its own history and was conditioned to a considerable degree by experience in the last decade before independence. Nigeria was an Africa in microcosm, and in those years its leaders faced many of the problems foreseen in any attempt to unify Africa: the bitterness of irreconcilable tribes; the question of distribution of power between centre and regions; allocation of revenue to regions; federalisation of police; minorities demanding the creation of more states; states threatening secession; conflicting ambitions of leaders; regional boundary disputes;


1. Thiam, Doudou, op. cit., pp. 7 and 8.
2. HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 333.

and the distribution of benefits - scholarships, financial aid and industry. Nigeria's leaders were all too aware that the federation which had been constructed was resting on precarious foundations and could be shattered at any moment: with all the idealistic talk of Nigerian unity and Nigerian nationalism they appreciated that they had achieved co-operation only after much bitter wrangling and hard bargaining. Thus it was not surprising that Nigeria's leaders lacked romanticism and optimism about the possibilities of uniting the continent. So time-consuming and taxing had these negotiations been, furthermore, that they had had little time to acquaint themselves with progressive African thought, let alone formulate their own theories - Nigeria produced no Senghor or Sekou Touré; and Sir Abubakar summed up the views of the most prominent of them when he asserted that the greatest single contribution Nigeria could make to Africa and to world peace would be 'to show how a country containing so many diverse elements can find a peaceful solution to its internal difficulties'.⁽¹⁾ Maintenance of some degree of unity and the prevention of tribal difficulties erupting required emphasis on national identification and consciousness and excluded the pan-African demand for loyalty to some larger unit. Further, Nigeria discounted the over-simplified view that the colonialists lay at the core of all Africa's turmoil and that had they never set foot on the continent its peoples would have been at one. Sir Abubakar went even so far as to say that 'Europe did not divide Africa - it united squabbling villages and made nations of them'.⁽²⁾

Nigeria had the size and the resources for viability, and had little need to join with any other country. On the contrary, the initial step suggested for African unity - union with one's neighbours - would have required the country to shoulder further economic liabilities; and the leaders, notably the Sardauna, argued that Nigeria had sufficient difficulty in organising its own development without incurring unnecessary expenditure. In addition, they could not conceive of formal ties between French and English-speaking states with their numerous

1. Ibid., 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 31.
2. The Economist, 17.6.61, p. 1240.

NIGERIA'S POSITION IN WEST AFRICA



differences, and they saw problems in any attempted unification of the North African states, who were more pan-Arab than pan-African, with the black states of tropical Africa; there was also widespread suspicion of the ambitions of Nkrumah and Nasser.

Finally, the Nigerian Government's attitude towards Africa was determined by the political realities consequent upon the 1959 election. Zik, the one leader who had played a part in pan-African developments, elected to fill an honorary position and Awo, after adopting a fiery pan-Africanist stance, had little subsequent opportunity to exert any influence. On the other hand, the Sardauna, who was in a position of dominance, was regarded as one of Africa's leading conservatives; and the background, personality and beliefs of Sir Abubakar precluded him from following the more unrealistic and militant concepts of pan-Africanism; it was the latter's views that were to be prominent in the development of African co-operation. Suspicious of high-sounding and illusionary phraseology, strongly opposed to militancy, and believing in the value of the human personality far above the concept of African personality (which, he maintained, was founded in an inferiority complex), Sir Abubakar opposed all blocs, even an African bloc, which he feared would undermine Nigeria's determination to decide particular issues on their merit alone. Thus when Sir Abubakar took the rostrum before the General Assembly on Nigeria's acceptance as the ninety-ninth member of the UN, he proclaimed to the world that Nigeria considered any ideas of African union impractical.

"... I do not rule out the possibility of eventual union, but for the present it is unrealistic to expect countries to give up the sovereignty which they have so recently acquired; and I am quite sure that it is wrong to imagine that political union could of itself bring the countries together; on the contrary, it will follow as the natural consequence of co-operation in other fields. So I wish to state that I think it will be the greatest threat to peace in Africa if any country sets out to undermine the authority of the properly chosen leaders of another state with a view to imposing political union. That state with a view to imposing political union. That way there can only be trouble. In the fullness of time, as political relations develop and there is more and more consultation between the states of a regional grouping, then political union may well be the natural result; but it would be wrong either to impose it or to seek to hasten the process unduly." (1)

1. Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

B. Functional and Regional Co-operation.

"... If we would pool our wisdom, vision and experience, there is no doubt that we should be able to convert the misfortune of the past into the greatest benefits of the future." - Sir Abubakar, January, 1961. (1)

To say that the Nigerian Government opposed proposals for the immediate unification of Africa is not to say that it isolated itself from the continent; on the contrary, its contribution to Africa was significant. What was lacked in fiery rhetoric, utopianism and originality was more than made up for in realism and knack for compromise. Inasmuch as Nkrumah was the impresario of militant pan-Africanism, so Sir Abubakar's honesty, sincerity and goodwill saw him regarded as the craftsman of African co-operation. Jaja Wachuku once told a group of American journalists that Nigeria's concept of a United States of Africa was a pyramid, built on a broad base, incorporating economic, technical, social and educational co-operation, with political unity at the apex. He said that were the pyramid to be inverted there would be a very great danger that it would sink or topple as the broad base was constructed above. Therefore, envisaging pan-Africanism as an evolutionary process which might never even culminate in African unity, Nigeria set about creating a solid foundation on which to build African concord.

The underlying reasons were firstly, that Africans knew little of their own continent and of its inhabitants; secondly, that the most useful initial pursuits would be those in which they could find common ground and from which they stood to benefit in practice; thirdly, that without a substantial increase in intra-African trade there could be no economic integration; and fourthly, that without economic integration any form of political amalgamation would remain in the realm of myth. To these ends personal contact had to be encouraged, not only among political leaders but also among ordinary citizens. Travel facilities had to be improved, the requirements of visas and travel permits for Africans dispensed with, and universities and schools opened to the youth of other countries of the conti-

1. Ibid., p. 112.

ment. Conferences had to be held to pool the wisdom and experiences of member states in the fields of research, nutrition, medicine, tropical diseases, agriculture and higher education. Telecommunications and postal facilities had to be extended and roads and railways developed to accommodate the needs of neighbouring states and to facilitate the movement of goods and persons. Customs and tariff barriers had to be lowered, trade agreements signed and industrial development co-ordinated, so leading to free trade areas and thereafter to the establishment of a common market. And so, through personal contact and economic interdependence an African esprit de corps would develop which could, the people of the continent so desiring, provide the impulse towards political union.

An extension of Nigerian Ministers' gradual approach to African partnership was to be found in their emphasis on regional collaboration as a necessary preliminary step. Dr Okpara, Premier of the East, was the chief advocate of the theory which sought to divide Africa into five regions, North, West, Central, East and South; cultural and economic co-operation were to be intensified within the confines of each grouping until such time as there were five regional federations, which could then commence to build an African federation or confederation. Dr K.O. Mbadiwe asserted that this was the Federal Government's view and Sir Abubakar himself corroborated it on a number of occasions, one of which was the African summit meeting in Addis Ababa in May, 1963:

"... We want an African Common Market. But, can we achieve it by taking the continent as a whole? Or can we achieve it by certain groupings in Africa? What appears to us to be more practical is that we should have an African Common Market based on certain groupings. We are thinking of a North African grouping which will include the Sudan; a West African grouping which will extend to the River Congo; an East African grouping which will include almost all the Central African countries. If we base our examination on these groupings, I think we will arrive at a very successful establishment of an African Common Market ..."

(1)

1. Ibid., pp. 152 - 163.

This policy was the focus of much criticism at home where it was felt to be undynamic and to be isolating Nigeria from the rest of Africa. Youth and student movements, the All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference, left-wing trade unions, some of the press, NCNC radicals and the AG all took turns to chastise the Government. When it proposed a motion calling for support for its foreign policy, Chief Enahoro declared that, were a policy advocating functional co-operation to be accepted at a time 'when the climate of progressive opinions throughout Africa is overwhelmingly in favour of organic union', it would be to the disgust of progressive elements throughout Nigeria. Such a policy, he said, was worse than conservative: 'it is effete; it is feeble'.⁽¹⁾ The Federal Government could not afford to ignore these calls and it took pains not only to associate Nigeria with the rest of Africa but to carry out some of the practical principles it had enunciated; trade and air service agreements were signed; telecommunication and radio links were multiplied; there was a regular exchange of visits between leaders; universities and even schools were opened to a number of students from other African countries; it participated in most, and acted as host to, numerous African conferences on a great variety of issues and topics; signed customs agreements with neighbours; and took part in the Niger River Commission and the Chad Basin Commission.⁽²⁾ But further than practical co-operation the Government would not go. If any step required them to surrender an iota of sovereignty or to make any substantial economic sacrifice, they drew back.

C. The Question of Leadership.

Nigeria was Africa's giant. With a population about twice as large as the next most populous country on the continent, relatively large resources of manpower, both skilled and unskilled, a stable economy, a varied agriculture and increasing sales

1. HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 345. Criticism on one occasion extended to traffic regulations: 'You will find that of all African countries that surround Nigeria, it is only Nigeria that drives on the left hand side of the road. This, in my opinion, is not in the interest of African unity.' Alhaji L. Daura, HRD, Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, p. 35.
2. See Chapter III, Subsection VIII.

of mineral oil, it was potentially Africa's mightiest nation. Delighted with the approach of independence, many politically conscious Nigerians were optimistic that theirs was a nation which would not only fall in line but was destined to attain a position of leadership in African affairs.

"... Nigeria has a responsibility to spearhead the impact of the African personality in world affairs... ... Nigeria cannot afford to stay at the background ... Nigeria must show by her size, her population, her economic potentialities and all the resources at her command, she is prepared to lead Africa ..."

- Chief Okotie-Eboh. (1)

Kalu Bzera spoke of the role given to Nigeria in herently and even Prime Minister Balewa called on his people to strive to build a strong, united Nigeria capable of fulfilling 'her destiny as the leader of the African continent'. (2)

Nigerian leadership of Africa was not, however, the vocation visualised by Sir Abubakar. He had no wish to enter into an aggressive race for personal paramountcy with other ambitious African heads of state; he rejected the concept of a Nigerian personality in the same way that he rejected that of an African personality; the measured approach he embarked upon hardly fitted a role which required militancy and charisma; he was resolved not to allow Nigeria to impose itself or its policies upon its neighbours or any other countries in Africa; and, principally, his government's chief concern was the maintenance of internal stability and domestic development and to this end all else had to be subject. Rather he trusted that once Nigeria's sincerity and realism came to be understood African states would automatically acknowledge its leadership.

"If we conduct ourselves well, and if we appear well-meaning to the countries of Africa there is no reason why they should not give to us our recognised position by virtue of our size and population, but it is not for us to go out to show to the smaller nations that we are big in size and population and therefore they have to come trailing behind us." (3)

To attain predominance Nigeria had to overcome the deep and continuing suspicion in many African quarters that it was not only a tool of Western imperialism but an obstruction to African progress. If its policies proved sound, Nigeria's

1. NRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 74.
2. Ibid., Vol. 3, 5 - 18 August, 1959, p. 288.
3. Ibid., January, 1961, p.

quietness would, when disillusionment with the virulent invective of Africa's revolutionaries increased, come to be seen as strength. In addition its ability to act as host, to stage-manage numerous African conferences, and to provide able leadership in diverse fields, would heighten its prestige; and enable it to achieve the prominence befitting Africa's largest nation. Nigeria's Foreign Minister became the first African to head a UN Conciliation Commission; the Minister of Labour (J.M. Johnson) the first African to preside over a conference of the ILO; and Prime Minister Balewa one of the few Africans to be invited to address the United States Congress. Nigeria took its place on numerous UN sub-committees and was elected to the Security Council. The Minister of Justice and Attorney-General (Dr T.O. Elias) chaired the first meeting of the Commission of African Jurists; the Minister of Health (Dr Majekodunmi) was elected Vice-President of the Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission of the OAU and presided over the sixteenth Conference of the WHO; Wachiuku succeeded Doudou Thiam to the Presidency of the Council of Foreign Ministers; a Nigerian was elected President of the Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Nigeria was elected to the nine-nation African Committee of Liberation and a Nigerian judge elected to the International Court of Justice (Justice Onyeama). Some significant African conferences were held in Lagos, particularly those convened on Nigeria's own initiative to prevent African discord from escalating and thus ending all hope of harmony; as were many seminars, meetings and conferences to consider practical problems.

But as Sir Abubakar had prophesied, the Federal Government's credibility and authority lasted as long as it was able to administer its own affairs with success. With the first military coup, the assassination of Sir Abubakar and other prominent leaders, and their replacement by new and relatively unknown voices, Nigeria's importance waned. General Ikonsi had insufficient time to imprint his beliefs and style on domestic policies let alone make any impact on those of Africa, and General Gowon, faced with the besetting problem of his country accelerating into the chaos of a civil war, has never been in a position to attempt to reassert Nigeria's dominance.

D. Canons of Co-existence.

Peace and stability in Africa was the end; mutual respect for the territorial integrity of member states was the means. On this foundation Nigeria proceeded to construct an unwritten codification of rules, which usually reinforced but occasionally contradicted one another, for the the conduct of intra-African relations. Rules One and Two were self-imposed with the object of exemplifying Nigeria's methods to the continent; while Rules Three to Eight were directed at the rest of Africa. Rule One imposed upon Nigeria a duty to follow a good-neighbour policy towards all African territories. Rule Two was that no predisposition be shown towards expansionism. Rule Three required that all boundaries, no matter how arbitrarily they had been delineated, or how many tribes and families they had divided, were to be respected. Rule Four decreed that whatever the Nigerian assessment of the personalities and policies of other African governments there was to be no interference in their internal affairs. Rule Five, a corollary of Four, expressed unqualified condemnation of any state carrying on subversive activities within another state. Rule Six emphasised the value of negotiation and called upon all African countries to attempt to understand one another, to compromise and to meet to discuss disputes before allowing them to erupt into open hostility. Rule seven rejected assassination and violence as a means of effecting a change of government. Rule Eight prescribed that African disputes must be settled within Africa without resort to external assistance with all its complicating consequences.

E. Vindication at Monrovia, Lagos and Addis Ababa.

Eight months after independence, Sir Abubakar, still a relatively unknown face in African politics, led a Nigerian delegation to Monrovia to participate in a conference of twenty African states, called primarily in reaction to the formation of the Casablanca bloc. When he returned home a few days later, he had already made his mark in Africa. From the start he gave evidence of his talent for compromise by preventing the Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute from being itemised on the agenda and substituting a point concerning the creation of machinery to settle border disputes. He also succeeded in precluding President Ahidjo of Cameroun from presenting to the Conference his quarrel with Nigeria concerning the Northern Cameroons plebiscite.

Above all, he succeeded in imprinting Nigerian policies on the resolutions adopted: the delegates agreed to the principles of equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for sovereignty, denunciation of subversion, settlement of differences by peaceful means and co-operation based on tolerance, not on political integration. In addition the Conference condemned colonialism, apartheid and the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and set up a commission to work out details for scientific, technical and cultural co-operation.

Encouraged and pleasantly surprised by the overwhelming sympathy for his views, and believing it essential to maintain the impetus of the moderate movement, Sir Abubakar ignored Awo's verbal assault on the Monrovia Conference and proceeded to organise a Conference of African Heads of State to be held in January, 1962 in Lagos. Urged by the All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference to take the initiative in bridging the gap between the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs, and by his own burgeoning confidence, he visited Guinea in an attempt to woo Sekou Toure to the Lagos Conference, and proclaimed the abrogation of the Defence Pact; but to no avail. Lagos had not been prepared to go to Casablanca ⁽¹⁾ and Casablanca was no more prepared to come to Lagos; there was a trenchant ideological distinction between the two groups, as admitted and described by Zik in the opening address:

"It is the conspicuous absence of specific declaration, on the part of the Casablanca States of their inflexible belief in the fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia regarding the inalienable right of African States, as at presently constituted, to legal equality, irrespective of their area and population; the right of African States to self-determination; the right of African States to safety from interference in their internal affairs through subversive activities engineered by supposedly friendly States; the right of African States to be secure in the inviolability of their territories from external aggression." ⁽²⁾

1. The Prime Minister informed Parliament in April, 1961 that Nigeria had been invited to attend the Casablanca Conference, but only thirteen days prior to its commencement, and because of the limited time available and previous commitments, he did not attend.
2. Daily Times, 26.1.62, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 93.

In spite of the absence of the five Casablanca countries, as well as Liberia, Tunisia and the Sudan (owing to the failure to invite the Algerian Provisional Government) and Tanganyika (because of the resignation of Prime Minister Nyerere) the Conference was significant, primarily because it produced a Charter for the Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy States which became in essence the model of the Charter signed the following year in Addis Ababa. In it were contained many of the tenets which Nigeria held essential for African harmony: inter-alia, economic and financial co-operation, combination of effort in the fields of nutrition and education, co-ordination of campaigns against endemic and tropical diseases and mutual assistance in vocational training and workers' welfare. Apartheid, colonialism and nuclear testing were again denounced and brotherly support expressed for the Algerian people in their fight for freedom.

Nigerians approved. One of the strongest critics of the Government's policies on Africa, Dr Kalu Ezeru, proposed a motion congratulating the Government on the Conference which he asserted was moulded by those 'virtues characteristic of Nigeria': compromise, comradeship, pragmatism and caution.⁽¹⁾ The major objection was the non-invitation of the Algerian Provisional Government, described as a blunder. The Government's answer was that it had not been its decision, but that of the majority, and as such it could not have acted otherwise.

At the Addis Ababa summit meeting in May, 1963⁽²⁾ Nkrumah's call for close African unity, a common foreign policy, a common set of diplomatic representatives, a continental economic and industrial development plan and a common currency were rejected; the school of thought headed by Haile Selassie and Sir Abubakar was bolstered by support from Nyerere, Tubman, Sekou Touré (who announced the demise of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union) and even from Nasser and Ben Bella; and the Conference culminated in the signing on 25th May of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, which derived its origin directly from the

1. HRD, Vol. 1, 21 March - 7 April, 1962, p. 403.

2. Two countries were absent: Morocco because of the presence of Mauritania, and Togo because of the non-recognition of its new régime.

Lagos Charter. At its core lay the principles of peaceful co-operation and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and not those of political integration. The cautious and gradualist conviction which Nigeria had contributed to the African theatre had joined hands with other moderate forces emanating from Ethiopia, Liberia and the French-speaking states, and had gained ascendancy over the forces of radicalism and militancy. Sir Abubakar had been vindicated.

F. The Congo.

Confronted for the first time with a real and uniquely confused situation, Nigeria made a circumspect debut into the Congo morass; and so placed itself within the category of the moderates whose distinguishing features were lack of emotional content in their judgement, a greater inclination to deal with the Congo in terms of institutions and procedures rather than personalities and symbols, a greater concern with achieving order than with the ascendancy of one or other group, and support for strengthening the UN mandate in order to cope with the disorder.⁽¹⁾ Both in its pronouncements and in its performance the Nigerian Government remained remarkably consistent in its tenets and method of approach. From the start Sir Abubakar admitted to the UN General Assembly that much about the Congo remained obscure to him and recommended the despatch of a fact-finding mission: 'without a proper and thorough diagnosis, it is idle to pretend that an effective remedy can be prescribed'. He emphasised that at the political level the problem should be left primarily for Africa to settle and that the Congo should not be allowed to become an ideological battleground of the world powers. New elections were required and the UN should deal only with the authorised leaders, who although unacceptable to some countries, had to be supported. And finally he called on African states to open their universities and schools to Congolese and to assist with sub-professional training in community development, co-operatives and agricultural extension work.⁽²⁾

Nigeria was one of the arch-supporters of the UN in the Congo. Within two months of its independence the Foreign Minis-

1. See Good, Robert C., *Four African Views on the Congo Crisis*, Africa Report, June, 1961, p. 3.
2. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 893, 8.10.60, pp. 534-8.

ter, Jaja Wachuku, was elected Chairman of the UN Congo Conciliation Commission and Nigeria despatched a first battalion of troops to serve with the UN Emergency Force. Sir Abubakar instructed his troops as follows:

"You are going to the Congo as soldiers; nothing less, nothing more. You will go there as soldiers. You are to listen and to obey the United Nations Command. And whatever you are told to do just do it as soldiers. You should have no interest whatsoever in the affairs of the Congo." (1)

The maintenance of these troops had by the end of March, 1961 cost Nigeria £90,000 for the military forces and £19,000 for the police contingent. But the Government believed in their necessity if the first objective of the Congo, namely peace, was to be attained; and when, in Parliament, a motion was proposed regretting the failure of the UN in the Congo (and in particular the failure to prevent the murder of Lumumba), the Prime Minister's amendment advocating continued support for the UN was accepted. So, too, in the General Assembly Nigeria endorsed the UN performance in the Congo and Nigerian delegates would not hear of the Secretary-General being called upon to resign.

Nigeria subscribed strictly to the principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo. Although there was some sympathy for Tshombe's original plea for a federation (many Nigerians presumed that if a federal form of government suited Nigeria, it was still more apt for a country twice the size), there was none for his secession and his arrest in May, 1961 was welcomed.

"Katanga is part and parcel of the Republic of the Congo and any country that dares to suggest that Katanga will by any means be taken out of the Congo is an enemy of Africa as far as we are concerned." (2)

While on the one hand there was strong support in Nigeria for Lumumba among such groups as the National Union of Nigerian Students and the Nigerian Youth Congress and many writers championed his cause, (3) on the other Nigeria's leaders were

1. HRD, November, 1960, p. 251.

2. Jaja Wachuku, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 40.

3. See Post, K.W.J., Nigerian Pamphleteers and the Congo, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1964, p. 405.

suspicious of his flirtation with the East and his radicalism and felt more in sympathy with Kasavubu, nevertheless they remained non-partisan. This was owing partly to the belief that the Chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission was required to demonstrate his impartiality and partly to the conviction that support for one of the leaders would amount to an intrusion into the Congo's domestic affairs. Once there was an apparent end to the dilemma the Nigerian Government expressed its wholehearted support of the Central Government headed by Prime Minister Adoula.⁽¹⁾ In 1963 both Wachuku and Sir Abubakar visited the Congo to discuss co-operation and assistance, and both General Mobutu and Prime Minister Adoula came to Nigeria to express their gratitude for its contribution to Congolese unity; when the Federal Government was called upon to secure the release of Gizenga, Wachuku replied that no country had the right to dictate to another whom it should release.⁽²⁾

Despite an onslaught of abuse Nigeria persevered with the principle in 1964. Firstly, when Tshombe was recalled to power, the Nigerian Government insisted that his was the legitimate Government of the Congo, and warranted respect as such, and that a refusal to recognise him would be an intolerable interference in the Congo's legitimate right to appoint its own leaders. When the OAU thwarted Tshombe's attempt to attend the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments in Cairo, Sir Abubakar dissociated himself from the decision which he said was in direct contradiction to the principles of the OAU Charter. Secondly, Nigeria defended the Congolese Government's right to invite the United States and Belgium to evacuate their citizens resident in Stanleyville and to use any means available (bar the use of mercenaries) to subdue the rebellion. Recalling British assistance in the East African army mutinies, Wachuku declared that it was the prerogative of sovereign states to appeal to friends in time of need. The real interventionists, he said, were not the USA and Belgium but those African countries which had failed to accept the fact that the Congo (Leopoldville) was a sovereign independent state which should be allowed to

1. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 36.
2. HRD, Vol. 11(b), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 892.

manage her own affairs'. (1)

G. No Expansionist or Aggressive Intentions.

"... Nigeria is a peaceful country which has no territorial ambitions and no intention of attacking her neighbours ..." - Sir Abubakar, 1960. (2)

Although some of Nigeria's boundaries cut through ethnic groups and there have been occasional border disputes and skirmishes, neither the Nigerian Government, which had ample territory to administer, nor the Governments of its neighbours, which were too weak and too dependent upon its goodwill, have made any attempt to escalate them into international conflagrations. The border with Niger has remained peaceful, principally because it was only casually controlled, with little effort to hinder the nomadic Tuareg people crossing it at will or to block any other citizens of Niger coming across in search of work in the large northern cities. The only misunderstanding occurred in 1965 when members of the Sawaba party, proscribed in Niger, crossed the border and were arrested by Nigerian police. Since there was no extradition treaty and Nigeria showed little inclination to return them, a Minister of State from Niger had to fly to Nigeria to secure their release as their complicity in a plot to overthrow President Diori was suspected. On the Dahomeyan border there was some contention over a number of villages, including Sentamula, where it was alleged that Dahomeyan Chiefs were assuming control and a 'strong international boundary' was requested. (3) After the Government appointed a Commission to investigate the matter, there was no further flare-up.

In 1960, 1964 and 1965 there were serious charges against Cameroun for acting as if it controlled both sides of the Rio del Rey; while in the Old Calabar area it was alleged that soldiers from the Western Cameroun region had crossed the border, looted the fishing settlements, confiscated property and

1. News from Nigeria, No. 68, 5.12.64, p. 1.

2. HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 29.

3. Ibid., 15 - 30 November, 1961, p. 181. Chief Eshahor opposed this as it ran counter to the principles of pan-Africanism which favoured the removal, not the creation, of stricter boundaries. Ibid., p. 183.

beat the men in order to force them to pay taxes. (1) The Federal Government's answer was to consult with the Government of the Cameroun Republic and jointly to appoint a team of surveyors to study the disputed sites. In 1964 Nigerian newspapers reported that 800 Nigerian employees of the Cameroun Government had been declared redundant and expelled from the country; and both the West African Pilot (24.4.64) and the Daily Telegraph (24.4.64) urged the Government to take similar action against Camerounians living in Nigeria. (2) The Government chose, however, to accept the version of the Cameroun Ambassador to Nigeria, that, owing mainly to reorganisation by the Commonwealth Development Corporation, both Nigerians and Camerounians had had their appointments terminated and that no-one had been expelled from the country.

The only charge that the Nigerian Government had acquired territory not legitimately its own was made by the Cameroun Government after a plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons had decided in favour of joining that territory to Northern Nigeria. At the UN, both in the Fourth Committee and in the General Assembly, the Camerounians contested the validity of the plebiscite, pointing to irregularities admitted by the Plebiscite Commissioner: mainly that during the relevant period the territory had not been administered as a strictly separate unit from Nigeria and that the only authorities present during and before the plebiscite had been Nigerian; and thus that the guarantees with which the UN had sought to prevent undue influence upon the illiterate population had been circumvented. Twenty-three countries thought these arguments sufficiently valid to vote against the transfer of the territory to Nigeria: France and 11 French-speaking African states (Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Cameroun, Chad, Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey), 4 Latin-American states (Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil), the Congo (Leopoldville), Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, Israel, Cambodia and China. Ten countries abstained: Togo, Panama, Peru, Colombia,

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1. Ibid., Vol. 15(a), 1964, p. 170; and Ibid., Vol. 18(a), 24 March - 9 April, 1965, p. 279.
 2. News from Nigeria, No. 23, 25.4.64, p. 6.

El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Portugal, Spain and Italy. There were 64 countries, including the Commonwealth, the Arab States, Eastern Europe, the UK and the USA, which voted in favour. (1) The French representative, M. Kosciusko-Morizet, expressed the fear that a 'disguised annexation' was 'being perpetrated, under the label of the United Nations, against the will of the peoples'. (2) Mr Okala, the Camerounian Foreign Minister, referred to the decision as the 'Funeral' of the people of the Northern Cameroons. (3)

"Permit me to say, on behalf of the Republic of Cameroun, that the United Nations has delivered our brothers to an authority which, for forty-five years, has held them in the position of slaves. I well weigh my words, for there is no other territory in Africa where one still finds, in the very middle of the twentieth century, a 97 per cent illiteracy rate ..."

(4)

"As for me, I say to my brothers in Northern Cameroon that the Republic of Cameroun does not forget them. We cannot forget them. They were, they are, they remain our brothers, and they are in the hands of strangers."

(5)

Certainly the Sardauna was known to have been extremely anxious that the Northern Cameroons should join Northern Nigeria and so extend his own domain into a closer replica of the old Fulani Empire; and certainly Nigerian officials were present in far greater numbers than those of the Cameroun Republic; and, as was shortly to be discovered, Nigerians were not above rigging elections. On the other hand, there were no outbreaks of violence after the plebiscite; and in similar conditions, though lacking the factor of the Sardauna's determination, the plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons had decided in favour of amalgamation with Cameroun; and in that case there had been no complaints. To the extent that the Nigerians did bring such pressure to bear on the people, they were guilty of aggression.

In only one case was there any popular appeal for expansion. Since 1920 the Spanish authorities had been recruiting Nigerians, mainly Eastern Ibos, to work as labourers on the is-

1. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 994, 21.4.61, p. 465.
2. Ibid., para. 208.
3. Ibid., para. 235.
4. Ibid., para. 240.
5. Ibid., para. 248.

land of Fernando Po. By 1963 there were about 33,000 Nigerian contract labourers there who, together with non-contract labourers and women and children, constituted about half the island's population. In 1962, spearheaded by a series of articles in the Sunday Times by Peter Enahoro entitled 'The Brutal Island', and by Eze Oguerri II's 'The Island of Horror', in which it was alleged that Nigerians were being treated like slaves, there was a popular demand for annexation. Cruelty to Nigerians was interpreted as an insult to the State which could only be rectified by absorbing the island. Many who called for annexation of the island of Fernando Po named it Nigeria's Goa, and used India's annexation of that island to justify their arguments. In 1963 a Nigerian labourer, identified as one Nwosu, while attempting to go to the Nigerian Consulate to protest a wage cut was shot dead by guardsmen, leading to an outcry in Nigeria and a motion in Parliament demanding that the Government take 'drastic measures to prevent a recurrence'. Such action, according to the proposer, included annexation.⁽¹⁾ In 1965 two Nigerians were killed in scuffles with armed guards, again raising an outcry and a motion in Parliament, this time calling on the Government to 'enter into negotiations with the Spanish authorities with a view to acquiring the Island of Fernando Po'.⁽²⁾ But the Government would not budge; it refused to be stampeded into hasty action and there was no evidence that it gave serious thought to annexation. Nigeria's Minister of Labour, Chief J.M. Johnson, visited the island on a number of occasions, consulted the Spanish authorities, concluded labour agreements guaranteeing certain safeguards and privileges for the labourers, prohibited a Press team from going to the island, rejected the motions calling for annexation, and repeatedly declared that Nigeria had no intention of acquiring Fernando Po or any other territory.

H. Good Neighbour.

"I have said many times that we in Nigeria will not impose ourselves on other people, but I always maintain that whenever a request for assistance is made

1. HRD, Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, pp. 110 and 111.
2. Ibid., Vol. 18(b), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, p. 627.

on our time, on our resources, we shall always be willing to give whatever assistance we can to the other countries in Africa... That is our policy, and I call it 'Live and Let Live in Africa'." (1)

Prior to independence, Nigeria had expressed the intention of playing the role of good neighbour to fellow African states and the desire to assist and advise in those fields in which the country was relatively well-endowed. In making a positive effort to fulfill such a role, Nigeria was one of the few African countries which listed in its Financial Estimates an item entitled 'Technical Assistance to African Countries', and which developed anything like a systematic programme of assistance. This took four forms: scholarships tenable at Nigerian universities and schools; technical training; loan of personnel, technical, administrative, legal and military; and small financial grants.

Under the 1963 - 1964 scholarship programme some 30 students from independent and non-independent countries were studying at Ibadan (17 in the medical faculty); 6 at Nsukka and a few at Zaria, Ife and Lagos, while 15 (10 from non-independent countries) were attending schools in the Eastern Region. Sir Ahmadu Bello, on his 'state' visits to Niger and Cameroun offered scholarships to Northern Nigerian schools and to the University at Zaria; and when President Nyerere visited Nigeria in 1965 he was offered 20 scholarships to Zaria and 12 to Ife.

Technical training is given primarily in the field of administration and in this the Federal Training Centre at Lagos performed an important function. In 1964 11 administrative officers from Tanganyika and 10 from Liberia attended courses at the Centre and in April, 1965 11 secretary-typists from Tanzania returned home from a course at the Centre. Within a period of 18 months (1964 - 1965) a total of 60 Congolese police officers graduated from the Southern Police College, Ikeja. There was an exchange of student-teachers with Guinea and of research workers with Senegal; and before achieving their independence Nigeria had trained personnel from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

1. Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, op. cit., p. 82.

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1. Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, op. cit., p. 82.

The Nigerian Government loaned technical and legal personnel on the basis that it paid the inducement allowance and travel costs while the recipient governments paid the salaries. Under this system a Nigerian, Sir Udo Udoma, became the first African Chief Justice of Uganda, five Nigerian barristers were appointed Resident Magistrates in Tanzania and three in Nyasaland (and later Malawi), one, Mr Justice Kashim, served on the Malawi Bench and another, Mr Luke Emejulu, as the Malawi Director of Public Prosecutions. Dr S.O. Biobaku, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ife, was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia; and Nigeria despatched advisers to Sierra Leone in the fields of auditing, meteorology and broadcasting. In addition to providing soldiers and police to serve with the UN forces in the Congo, Nigeria acceded to the request of President Nyerere to send troops to his country as part of a plan to replace the British troops which had helped him to restore order.

Nigeria donated, inter alia, £15,000 to Uganda towards its Independence Scholarship Fund, £10,000 to Malawi to commemorate its independence, £19,000 to the effort to save the historic treasures of Nubia endangered by the building of the Aswan Dam, and gave substantial quantities of groundnuts to help its neighbours in times of drought.

J. Respect for boundaries.

Nigeria proclaimed a policy akin to an intertemporal law for Africa, establishing the dateline at the independence of each individual African state. For itself it undertook to respect its own boundaries and expected all African states to do the same. The Government frequently signified its disapproval of the haphazard and artificial manner in which the colonial powers had divided Africa, often slicing through tribes and smaller groupings. Nevertheless, each country was to live within its inherited confines and the borders so created respected; for the countries so formed had come to regard themselves as units independent of one another and they should be permitted to retain such forms until their peoples elected, of their own choice, to alter them. Any attempt to influence these peoples by force or undue pressure would be opposed by Nigeria.

The problem had two aspects: firstly, there was the

question of the dissolution of boundaries to enable separate states to submerge themselves in larger units; and secondly, there was the question of claims by one state on the territory of another on the basis of some tribal affinity which had been ignored by the colonialists. Nigeria was emphatically opposed to both, believing that such claims, if condoned, would cause Africa to degenerate into a chaotic process of grab and counter-grab. (1) At home this policy was frequently assailed by those who contended that such enshrinement of existing borders was directly contrary to the spirit of pan-Africanism. In Parliament Enahoro once put his view thus:

"Christian Clergymen have often said 'Those whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder'. I want to say to this Government that those whom God has joined together, and whom the imperialists have put asunder, we must strive to join together." (2)

Thus Morocco's claim that Mauritania was an artificial creation of France and actually a part of Morocco could not be entertained by Nigerian Ministers. Nigeria recognised Mauritania, sent the Foreign Minister and a Minister of State to its independence celebrations, and championed the case for its representation in the United Nations, accusing Russia of misusing the veto to exclude Mauritania, and of unnecessarily confusing the issue by tying it to the representation of Communist China and Outer Mongolia. Somalia's claim to part of Ethiopia was similarly repudiated, and Nigeria set itself up as a theoretical guardian of Togo's border against any possible incursions by Ghana. When disputants were prepared to negotiate Nigeria was more than ready to assist; thus a Nigerian served as a member of the Commission on the Morocco-Algerian border dispute, and when Niger and Dahomey differed over the control of the island of Ite in the River Niger, Nigeria sent an emissary to both Soglo and Diori to stave off a serious conflict.

1. "I think every country in Africa should forget and abandon the idea of looking to another territory in Africa with an eye to grabbing and acquiring its neighbour's territory with the intent of expanding. That is the beginning of a decline." - Jaja Wachuku, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 48.
2. HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 346.

K. Non-Interference in Internal Affairs.

"We in the Federal Government believe that all countries in Africa should be given a chance to develop in the way they think is right for them, and it is not our business to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. - Sir Abubakar, 1961. (1)

The Nigerian Government was determined to retain its own sovereignty and to administer and develop its own country in the manner deemed most advantageous, free from external intervention. It believed, in turn, that it was incumbent for it to respect the right of other African states to do the same and that it was of paramount importance for the maintenance of stability in Africa that all states should follow suit. On the positive side this meant that the Nigerian Government accepted the right of the East African states to call in Britain, of Gabon to call in France and of the Congo to call in Belgium and the USA to quash uprisings; of Sekou Touré to practise socialism and of Houphouët-Boigny to practise capitalism; and of Nyerere to pursue a policy of non-alignment and of Tuzman to remain Western-orientated. Sir Abubakar was prepared to extend this principle to Swaziland's right to maintain friendly relations with South Africa in spite of his convictions concerning apartheid. Following talks with Prince Makhosini Dlamini in Lagos in 1965 he stated that he had advised the leaders of Swaziland, on the basis that their primary duty was to their people, to be kindful of the geographic and economic realities of their country and that 'they should not be carried away by unrealistic political slogans which, if taken at face value, would reduce Swaziland to shambles'. (2)

On the negative side it meant that African states must refrain from attempting to influence the domestic policies of other African countries. The term 'non-interference' was comprehensively understood to embrace all activity aimed either at disrupting an established system or at toppling leaders. Such a definition stretched the whole gamut from the despatch of saboteurs across the border to harbouring refugees, non-recognition of disliked régimes and even to adverse criticism.

1. Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, op. cit., p. 80.
2. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 5, 1965, p. 293a.

Although Nigerian Ministers accused a number of countries of this felony in regard to the Congo (and specifically the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi for allowing their territory to be used as a base for armed intrusions over the border), in their eyes the arch-enemy was Nkrumah's Ghana. But their most dramatic implementation of the principle of non-intervention followed the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in January, 1963. From the beginning they believed that the plot had not been perpetrated entirely by Togolese but had in fact been engineered by Ghana, which, they felt, would benefit from Olympio's removal from the scene. These suspicions were augmented by Ghana's immediate recognition of Grunitzky's régime and the accrediting of a mission to it. Jaja announced that recognition of the new régime would be regarded as an unfriendly act and that, for the purposes of security, the Nigerian Government considered that its country's borders extended to Af-lao, that is, the Ghana-Togo border, which amounted to a provocative challenge to Nkrumah. When accused by Ezera of being guilty of interference, and also of 'brinkmanship' (1) Jaja replied that:

"It would have been a tragedy and an act of bad faith if the Head of State for Togo was so dastardly murdered, and this country did nothing to ward off would-be wolves from devouring that small, harmless state 30 miles wide and 500 miles long. We made that statement and those who understand the language were advised not to do anything which might upset Africa. Consequently Togo still retains her independence although the Government is unstable." (2)

On Nigeria's initiative the Monrovia Foreign Ministers gathered in Lagos on 24th January and Jaja, having been unanimously elected Chairman, made it quite clear who the 'would-be wolves' were considered to be. He called on the Conference to 'define its attitude to the presence of Ghanaian troops' massed on the

1. Ezera wrote that Wachuku had "by his attempted recourse to a policy of brinkmanship committed a reckless blunder unsurpassed in the diplomatic history of new African states". Ezera, Kalu, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria*, Cambridge, Second Edition, 1964, p. 294.
2. HRD, Vol. 11(a), March - April, 1963, p. 217.

Togolese border which constituted a threat to Togo's independence and territorial integrity.⁽¹⁾ Among the decisions taken were Resolution I which condemned political assassination as a means of overthrowing a government or of settling political conflicts and Resolution V which recommended that when there was sufficient evidence that subversion had been engineered by another state, diplomatic relations with that state should be severed by all members of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation.⁽²⁾ Once the dust had settled, it appeared that the coup had been an internal undertaking, yet Sir Abubakar and Sekou Touré, whose policies on this issue ran parallel, refused to recognise Grunitzky even after he received an overwhelming vote of approval on 7th May; and they persuaded the summit meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa not to invite Togo. Having realised that they had possibly been over-zealous, the Nigerian Government later sent Minister of State, Bamali, on a courtesy visit to Grunitzky and in June the Nigerian Prime Minister and the Guinean President issued a joint statement recognising his Government. This was followed by a Togolese goodwill mission, headed by Minister of Health, Victor Vovor, and another Nigerian mission, led by Minister of State, Dr Esin, in 1964.

In June, 1965 the Nigerian Government acted in a similarly firm manner, for which it reaped much credit. After the OAU Conference in Cairo in July, 1964 Africa's old divisions began to reassert themselves. The French states reformed themselves in the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation (OCAM) and decided to recognise Tshombe. Nkrumah called them neo-colonialist puppets and flaunted the presence in his country of refugees from theirs. Presidents Yameogo of Upper Volta and Diouri of Niger flew to Lagos to inform Sir Abubakar that they would boycott the OAU meeting scheduled for Accra in September, 1965 unless Nkrumah ceased to encourage subversive plots against them. Balewa, who had some complaints of his own, including the presence in Ghana of Nigerian refugees wanted by the courts, initiated a conference in Lagos to investigate the allegations and try to prevent a complete disintegration of the OAU. In his address he called for strict adherence to the three cardinal prin-

1. News from Nigeria, No. 8, 26.1.63, Supplement.
2. Ibid., No. 9, 30.1.63, p. 1.

ciples of the Organisation: non-interference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and condemnation of subversive activity, and issued his own ultimatum that Nigeria would not be represented unless these principles were respected; he stated on another occasion that he personally would find it hard to visit a capital and dine and laugh with men who were wanted by the Nigerian Police. (1) After four days of discussion the delegates agreed to attend on condition that Ghana somehow disposed of the refugees for the period of the Conference.

Emerging from the Togo coup a new principle developed under which the Nigerian Government would refuse to condone assassination and violence as a method of changing a government. Once it appeared that the charges against Ghana would not hold, Nigeria based non-recognition on this principle. Accordingly, after Boumedienne's coup in Algeria Balewa declared that the OAU should not appear to approve of President Ben Bella's overthrow since the methods used were clearly repugnant to the OAU Charter. (2) Admirable as these sentiments may have been, and in view of the infectious nature of assassination and violence, sensible as they may have been, they were not only unfeasible in Africa but also amounted to interference, which culminated in January, 1966 in sad irony. Not surprisingly neither Military régime gave any thought to the fact that Sir Abubakar would have denounced their methods and perhaps not even have recognised them as the legitimate Governments of Nigeria. Thus Ironsi's Government recognised the new Military Government in Ghana immediately on the grounds that the 'change of government in Ghana is an internal affair of Ghana and we do not expect foreign countries will interfere ... The principle of non-intervention is supreme in this case'. (3)

L. Balewa's Nigeria and Nkrumah's Ghana.

"... a case between an elephant and an ant."
- Sir Abubakar, 1965. (4)

Alighting upon them some centuries back the mother country discovered that her two prospective West African daugh-

1. West African Pilot, 22.4.65, in Mackintosh, John P., op. cit., p. 281.
2. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 6, 1965, p. 315a.
3. Ibid., No. 2, 1966, pp. 485c and 486a.
4. HRD, Vol. 18(b), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, p. 586.

ters by adoption had similar backgrounds: early colonisation by Negro races, an early agricultural revolution and discovery of iron technology, a strong Islamic influence upon the northern parts of the territories and a subjection to European slave trading. Their period of tutelage, too, appeared similar: the growth of legitimate trade and the development of towns, the English language and Western education brought by missionaries, the overriding influence of British colonial administration, and the growth of nationalist movements demanding independence. However, by the time of their coming of age a few years ago they had grown to be very different, not only in appearance but also in personality. Nigeria with fifty million people grouped within a large federal system, based on three large tribes, maintained a multiparty structure operating through parliamentary forms of government and was among Africa's most liberal regimes; it had produced a quiet, modest leader concerned in foreign affairs with realities and compromise, who constantly strove to accommodate to varying domestic demands. Ghana's six million people, on the other hand, were organised on a unitary one-party basis, and its parliamentary system had been modified to create a presidential order founded on a strong personality cult; it had produced a messianic and militant leader, aggressively determined to achieve a position of leadership on the African continent irrespective of domestic needs. It remained a consistent source of irritation to Nigeria's leaders that radicals within their country looked to Nkrumah as the true African leader: the AG compared his dynamism with the dullness of the NPC reactionaries; a theme on the opening day of the All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference was Nkrumah's superior standing in Africa and in the world; and in Parliament the comparison was frequently drawn:

"... I must say quite clearly that little Ghana is stealing the show from great Nigeria ...

... Nkrumah is writing his name and the name of Ghana on the minds and history of the African people. African people all over the world are coming to regard Ghana as the symbol of a new dynamism, a new nationalism. That is the kind of leadership we want in Nigeria to-day." (1)

1. Mr W.O. Briggs, HRD, Vol. 2, 13 - 20 April, 1961, p. 608.

publicly Sir Abubakar refused to be drawn into a race for leadership, and would frequently reply to statements of this kind that such competition was suitable on a football field, not in matters of national importance.⁽¹⁾ Undoubtedly, however, he reaped much satisfaction from his growing prestige and from the fact that the path Africa chose in 1963 was along the lines he had recommended, and not those of Nkrumah.

The very distinct policies followed by the two Commonwealth sister countries drew them almost inevitably into conflict, which, if not actually initiated by the caustic comment of their newspapers, was almost always aggravated by it. Although tension had been generated previously - three of the first four persons deported from Ghana under the Ghanaian Deportation Act were Nigerians, and Nigerians as a group living in Ghana were hard hit by the Ghanaian Exchange Control Act, both interpreted as unfriendly acts - nevertheless 1962 saw the rivalry transformed into positive bitterness. In January Ghana turned down the invitation to attend the Lagos Conference, and Zik harshly criticised this decision. A.K. Bardon, Chairman of Ghana's Convention Peoples' Party's Bureau of African Affairs, asserted that Zik's speech had been prepared in London, and references to Zik as the 'voice of London' became frequent in Ghanaian newspapers. The Nigerian press replied by referring to Ghana's President as 'the fuhrer of Accra' (West African Pilot, 12.2.62) and by describing Bardon's statement as 'insolent' (Daily Times, 14.2.62) and 'insulting as it is stupid' (Daily Express, 17.2.62).⁽²⁾ The Federal Government filed a formal protest and Nkrumah dissociated himself from the statement.

After Awolowo's turn to radicalism and socialism and his cordial visit to Nkrumah, Ghana's newspapers decided to champion his cause in the Western Region crisis. The Ghanaian Evening News condemned the suppression of the AG and referred to Nigeria's Prime Minister as a 'dark-skinned Englishman'. The West African Pilot replied by describing Ghana as 'the most terrible, pitiless and primitive dictatorship in Black Africa, and in all Africa she is in competition with only South Africa for the first place as the premier graveyard of democratic traditions

1. Ibid., p. 609.

2. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 95.

and institutions'.⁽¹⁾ Jaja Wachuku, at a press conference, accused Ghana of using its High Commission in Lagos as a centre of subversion, and of training Nigerians at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba as saboteurs and mentioned that Nigeria could topple Ghana in six months. The Ghanaian Times replied colourfully:

"...championing the cause of the fantastically rich elite of those of Nigeria's ruling politicians who want to keep people in continued poverty and perpetual tribalist disunity is a character named Jaja Wachuku. Of course, this clown does not matter much for he barks and howls at things his accomplices dream about in the sleepless nights of political indigestion and immaturity." (2)

Tawia Adamafio, Ghanaian Information Minister and Acting Foreign Minister, said that Jaja's boast that Nigeria could defeat Ghana in six months was amusing and his accusations ridiculous, their only purpose being to divert attention from domestic troubles (this charge was repeated by Dr Chike Obi, President of Nigeria's Dynamic Party, and in view of the timing of the press conference might well have contained some truth).

During the treason trials evidence was led that AG thugs had been trained at the Winneba Institute; and later in the year Ghana not only refused Nigeria's application, made in terms of the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881, to extradite three refugees wanted by the Nigerian Police, but also appointed the men concerned to senior posts: S.G. Ikoku as senior lecturer at Winneba, Ayo Adebajo to Radio Ghana and J.O. Aluko to the Ghana Trade Union Council. This period of disaffection reached a climax with the murder of President Olympio, when Nigeria issued an undisguised ultimatum to Ghana.

Then followed a rapprochement during which the leaders met at Addis Ababa, Jaja paid a brief visit to Accra and Ghana's Foreign Minister, Kojo Botsio, returned the compliment. During his stay in Nigeria Botsio praised Sir Abubakar's contribution to Africa, spoke of a joint currency and common air and shipping lines, blamed the imperialists for all past differences, and asserted that a new stage of goodwill had begun.

Towards the end of 1964 discord reappeared, beginning

1. West Africa, 16.6.62, p. 663.
2. Ibid.

with Nigeria's recognition of Tshombe and its defence of the Congo's right to call in Western powers for assistance, followed by the usual tirade of condemnation in the Ghanaian press. Then came the news of the death of Nkrumah's former opponent, Dr Danquah, on which Nigeria's President made a public statement:

"It is an irony of history that a great pioneer of Ghanaian scholarship should die in a detention camp barely eight years after his country had become free from foreign domination. As one who fought side by side with Danquah in order to liquidate colonialism in Africa, I personally regret the circumstances surrounding his death." (1)

On 5th March over Radio Dar-es-Salaam a certain Captain Kissongo of the Congo Revolutionary Army declared that six Nigerians had been captured and others killed in the fighting in Lulemba in northern Katanga. He said that the Nigerian soldiers had informed him that they had been sent by their Government to support Tshombe and that a Nigerian battalion was operating in the area. (2) Although Nigeria denied any knowledge of recruitment of its soldiers, to Ghana the news merely confirmed what was already believed. Ghanaian students demonstrated at Nigeria's High Commission in Accra and caused considerable damage to the building which received no police protection. In Lagos the United Labour Congress led a protest outside the Ghanaian High Commission, hurling paint onto the building and calling for a breach of diplomatic relations, a plea repeated by a number of members of Parliament. (3) Sir Abubakar said that Ghana had lied in accusing Nigeria of sending troops to help Tshombe and referred to Accra as the headquarters of subversion in Africa:

"I never want to appear to show that Nigeria competes with Ghana in any way... I always want us in Nigeria to look at this Ghana business as a case between an elephant and an ant. An ant can go over the body of the elephant, play there and drop, and perhaps die." (4)

Finally some French-speaking states accused Ghana's President of fostering subversion in their countries and Balewa answered

1. Ibid., 13.2.65, p. 182.
2. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 3, 1965, p. 255b.
3. See HRD, Vol. 18(a), 24 March - 9 April, 1965, pp. 41 and 406.
4. Ibid., Vol. 18(b), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, p. 586.

their appeals by calling a conference with the purpose of making Ghana back down and, by implication, admit its errors. Shortly after, both Mkrumah and Balewa were deposed; while the former's attempts at supra-national unions had failed and the latter's practical policy of co-operation had been generally accepted, they themselves had not had the time comprehensively to convince one another of the rightness of their own ways.

All Nigeria's Military Governors had spent some time at the Officers' Training Course at Teshie near Accra and some had had as classmates Ghanaian senior officers while at Sandhurst; their accession to power and Lieutenant-General Ankrah's coup in Ghana introduced a new chapter in the relations of the two countries based on 'a good old-boy network'. (1)

M. The Military Falls into Step.

In April, 1966 General Ironsi made a fairly comprehensive statement on Africa, the contents of which revealed that his Military Government intended to uphold and perpetuate the tenets of his predecessor. The tone was moderate and the principles could have been expounded by the late Prime Minister himself. He stressed the importance of OAU members settling disputes within the framework of the Organisation, the need for a spirit of conciliation and faith in Africa, the fact that disunity could give comfort only to their enemies, the cardinal rule that internal matters of member states were for those states to determine (which must be taken to apply to military régimes) and that contemplation of military intervention in a sister country would entail a repudiation of the principles of the OAU Charter, which no true African state could ignore. (2) General Gowon demonstrated his willingness to pursue a good-neighbour policy by donating £10,000 to the Kenya drought fund and by authorising the despatch of two Nigerians from the Nigerian Oil Palm Research Institute as advisers to Gambia. In the Ghana-Guinea conflict Nigeria proposed to both parties that the dispute be resolved by 'quiet diplomacy and with a spirit of African brotherhood', (3) and sent Commodore J.E.A. Way, head of the Nigerian Navy and a member of the Supreme Military Council, to

1. Africa Confidential, No. 1, 6.1.67, p. 1.
2. News from Nigeria, No. 5, 2.4.66, p. 14.
3. Nigeria Weekly News Review, Vol. 1, No. 16, 4.11.66, p. 1.

plead with Ghana's Military Government to release the Guinean Foreign Minister, M. Louis Lansana Beauvogti, and eighteen others being held in custody until Guinea released the one hundred Ghanaians alleged to be held there; after which he visited Conakry in a further attempt to settle the matter. As if to crown the evidence of policy perpetuation, Gowon's representative to the fourth OAU Conference in Addis Ababa, Colonel Adebayo, with military precision, described the idea of an African continental government as 'mad'.⁽¹⁾

III. Colonialism and White Domination.

"... Whether it is the colonization under Portugal in the territories of Angola and Mozambique, or the Central African Federation existing in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, or still the ungodly régime of apartheid with its hideous and abominable racial policies, the problem is essentially one of minority groups, who for centuries have enjoyed undeserved privileges and the political domination of vast majorities and who in varying degrees are aided by their friends in Europe, usually of the same racial origin, with economic and military power, and are loath to appreciate the signs of the times and to read the writing on the wall.

"... My Government and people are firm in their conviction that our independence will remain meaningless until the whole of Africa has been liberated from colonial domination." - Adebayo Adeyinka, United Nations, 1962. ⁽²⁾

A. The 1970 Resolution.

A cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy was to secure the demise of all forms of colonialism on the African continent. Based, however, both on Nigeria's own careful preparation for independence and on a comparison of its development with that of the Congo, Nigerian leaders eschewed the oft-voiced African view that lack of political, educational and economic progress provided no valid reason for continued foreign domination. Their belief in the wisdom of measured progress towards independence was revealed in 1961 in their support for a resolution at the UN of which the first paragraph read that 'all colonial, dependent and Non-Self-Governing Territories and peoples in Africa shall attain independence by, before, and not later than 1 December 1970'.⁽³⁾ By pan-African standards this was equivalent to

1. West Africa, 19.11.66, p. 1342.
2. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1170, 20.11.62, paras. 106 and 107.
3. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1050, 10.11.61, para. 12.

sentencing colonial peoples to perpetual subjection and in the eyes of many African countries this was Nigeria's poorest hour in the UN. It was not only Africa that took Nigeria to task; Mr Lapin, the Soviet delegate, who had proposed setting the deadline at 1962, interpreted Wachuku's proposal thus:

"Here and there voices are heard asserting that in Africa, for instance, the time-limit for granting independence must be extended by almost ten years. This would mean that we would have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that, for many years to come, the peoples of South West Africa will be obliged to endure the mediaeval barbarism of the South African racialists. It would mean that the people of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia must also live under conditions of terror and repression. No, we would be failing in our duty to humanity if we continued to acquiesce in the retention of the colonial system." (1)

In the Federal Parliament denunciation was no less severe, and it was not only the opposition which condemned Jaja - Enahoro referred to the '1970' resolution as 'this gross betrayal of the African Revolution' (2) - the severest condemnation coming from Alhaji Mohammed Muhtari Sarkin Bai, a senior NPC member and Chief Government Whip, who in his first onslaught said, 'Nigeria in the eyes of all African independent States is regarded as a stooge of Britain', (3) and in his second went further:

"There is nothing more shameful than for a Nigerian Minister in the person of the hon. Jaja Wachuku ... to submit to imperialistic manoeuvres. It was Portugal and not the United States and Britain, as I claimed in my last speech, which instigated the Minister to table the '1970' resolution at the United Nations... In fact, it was a Portuguese who drafted that resolution for him." (4)

The realism of Jaja's answers did not in any way dilute their unpopularity. In reply to his critics, both in the General Assembly and in the Nigerian Parliament, he explained that his proposal did not mean that any country ready for independence would have to wait until 1970; that it was useless to set unrealistic dates without consideration of the wishes of the people concerned and of the controlling powers; that the human problem of white settler populations must be taken into account;

1. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1048, 7.11.61, para. 80.
2. H.K.D., Vol. 1, 21 March - 7 April, 1962, p. 222.
3. Ibid., 15 - 30 November, 1961, p. 138.
4. Ibid., Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 850.

that it would disrupt the orderly development of Africa to grant sovereignty to territories unprepared for the responsibility; that premature sovereignty facilitated intervention by foreign powers; that by settling a reasonable date the co-operation of Britain had been secured; that Portugal had not even agreed to the principle of independence; and that, in any case, there was nothing the UN could do to enforce the resolution. (1) Two years later he reminded Parliament that the course of events appeared to be upholding many of his predictions:

"... I remember somebody then suggested 1962 as the year in which the whole of black Africa should be free. Another Member said 1963. The year 1962 has come and gone, 1963 is almost over and very soon we will have 1964 and this House will be dissolved, and yet the whole of black Africa will still not be free. A new Parliament will come to discuss the question of freedom for the whole of Africa, and, perhaps, it may well be that 1970 - the target date - may come and go and the whole of Africa may still not be free." (2)

B. France.

"... The bloated bladder of a frog which pretended to be as big as an elephant would burst in the end, and so be it with arrogant France." (3)
- Chief Akintola, 1961.

France's nuclear tests in the deserts of Algeria in 1959 exploded all hopes of Franco-Nigerian accord and left behind a rift, yet to be bridged. Relations between the two countries never seemed to have a chance. It was not so much French colonialism in a formal sense that lay at the source of the continuing discord; rather, as Nigerians saw it, it was de Gaulle's haughty and colonialistic attitude, his apparent indifference to African sensibilities and his abuse of the African continent. Prior to independence, based on a genuine, if misinformed, anxiety at the prospect of radio-active fallout being blown across the Sahara into Northern Nigeria and poisoning cattle, crops and people, the Federal Parliament urged France to desist from the proposed tests. After the first tests the Prime Minister led a Ministerial delegation to request that British Colonial

1. See HRD, 15 - 30 November, 1961, pp. 142 and 143 and UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1050, 10.11.61, paras. 9 - 62.
2. HRD, Vol. 11(b), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 912. Nigeria ultimately dropped the resolution and supported a compromise proposal specifying no date; but continued to accept 1970 as a realistic date.
3. West Africa, 7.1.61, p. 18.

Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, convey to France Nigeria's concern and on his return joined with other African states in calling on France to discontinue. Thus when France conducted the third series of tests in December, 1960, Nigeria saw in it a deliberate affront to all new African states, (1) and immediately broke off diplomatic relations. The French Ambassador, M. Raymond Offroy, and his entire staff were ordered to leave the country within forty-eight hours and an embargo was placed on French aircraft and shipping. This was one of the few occasions when the Federal Government received the unqualified and sweeping approval of the country's radicals; and it was one of the few occasions when a decision proved premature. Within a week Dahomey and Niger begged Nigeria to lift the embargo on goods moving to and from their territories, and the Government agreed. No other country broke off relations and when the Algerian Provisional Government, as part of the terms of the ceasefire, agreed to the continuance of nuclear testing on Algerian soil, Nigeria's move appeared futile. Further embarrassment was caused by the fact that De Gaulle was in no hurry to re-establish diplomatic ties and that eventually it was Nigeria, and not France, which found it necessary to initiate moves towards reopening formal contact.

In accordance with its overall policy on colonialism Nigeria repudiated both the claim that Algeria was part of metropolitan France and the concept of partitioning Algeria to allay the fears of the one million inhabitants of French origin; (2) and in 1962 Nigeria twice co-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly appealing to France to recognise the Provisional Government and to negotiate with it on a basis of self-determination. Sir Abubakar attempted to co-operate with President Bourguiba of Tunisia to press the Western powers to use their influence on France, and he met the Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, M. Ferhat Abbas, and pledged his support. Yet Ni-

1. "What a brandishing show of power by a stubborn reckless man to the innocent and powerless people of Africa!" Mr A.A. Omissade, HRD, Vol. 1, 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 128.
2. See Mr Ngilexuma, UN General Assembly, First Committee, Meeting 1226, 19.12.61, para. 17.

geria refused to grant recognition to that Government, leading Anthony Enahoro to ask of the Government how it found it possible to call on France to recognise a Government which it itself did not.⁽¹⁾ Despite the Government's congratulations on the ceasefire, recognition was still withheld. This reluctance might have resulted from a wish to grant recognition, not on the basis of emotional appeal, but because the régime concerned fulfilled traditionally acceptable requirements; or it might have been an attempt to win the gratitude of de Gaulle or at least not to aggravate him any further.

The third major occasion on which Nigeria denounced French policy was during the Third Special Session of the General Assembly called to consider the situation obtaining in Bizerta. Nigeria was one of thirty-two co-sponsors of the draft resolution recognising the sovereignty of Tunisia and calling on France to withdraw its forces. The Government's view was that once Tunisia had decided that the French troops should leave their base, France was obliged to accept the decision despite a pre-independence agreement permitting them to remain:

"... if an agreement is forced on a country, then that country is either not sovereign or if it is, its sovereignty has certainly been violated and the agreement, unless reaffirmed after the country has won or regained its sovereignty, has no binding force.

Now, let us apply the principle ... to Tunisia. Up to 1956 Tunisia was a colonial dependency of France. One of the legacies and limiting conditions of its independence was the continuing presence of French troops in Bizerta ... Tunisia, of course, was not sovereign at the time of the establishment of this military base and the people of that country, in their desire for independence, had no alternative but to accept the condition imposed by France.

"... surely there is no agreement and there never has been one." - Muhammad Mgileruma, 1961. (2)

These three issues were not the only irritants serving to perpetuate the distrust: they were augmented by France's promotion of the Cameroun case against Nigeria over the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons; by French voting at the UN, symbolis-

1. HRD, Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 858.
2. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1004, 25.8.61, paras. 57 - 59.

ed by the abstention in the Security Council on the Rhodesian question; by France's continued sales of military equipment to the Republic of South Africa; and by the French Government's first delaying the progress of Nigeria's negotiations with the EEC and then failing to ratify the tediously constructed agreement.

C. Portugal.

"... For this is no more than semantic camouflage of the worst colonial system still in existence today on the African continent." - Muhammad Ngileruma, 1962. (1)

Nigeria repudiated in its entirety the concept of Portuguese Provinces in Africa. Angola and Mozambique were the homes of black men and could 'never, never, never be Portuguese'; they were part and parcel of the African continent and could not be 'transformed by magic or by any form of mesmerism to become Portuguese territories'. (2) Nigeria saw the Portuguese administration in Africa as the most reactionary and oppressive of the colonialist régimes, under which the only function of the economy was to bolster that of Portugal and the sole purpose of education there to create black Portuguese, an administration which permitted the most ghastly atrocities against the local inhabitants: Nigeria's representative at the UN accused Portugal of murdering between thirty and thirty-five thousand Angolans in the period February to May, 1961. (3) The Government therefore aimed at exacting from Portugal a three-fold revolution in African policy: Portugal, firstly, must accept the ultimate right to independence of the people under its control; secondly, must cease to regard the nationalists as bandits and rebels, and must negotiate with them as legitimate nationalists to determine their future; and thirdly, must set about creating conditions which would ensure the orderly progress of the territories towards independence.

To these ends Nigerian delegates poured a consistent stream of abuse on Portugal at the UN and at other international conferences, strove to achieve the expulsion of Portugal from

1. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1090, 17.1.62, para. 17.
2. Jaja Wachuku, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 21.
3. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1090, 17.1.62, para. 15.

all such conferences except the UN, and regularly censured the NATO countries for supplying arms to Portugal. Nigeria served as a member of the African Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-salaam and gave financial assistance to the nationalists fighting in Angola and Mozambique. Certainly the Portuguese Government came to regard Nigeria's attitude as 'one of clear hostility'.⁽¹⁾ Yet Nigeria's relative restraint, which on occasions manifested itself as confusion, led to indignation at home, much of it focussed on Foreign Minister Wachuku. Support of the '1970' resolution was thought to have lost Nigeria more prestige than any other move. And, following the precedent of the delay in recognising the Algerian Provisional Government, the Nigerian Government ignored popular clamour in declining to recognise Holden Roberto's Provisional Government until October, 1963 when de facto recognition was granted. Answering those who criticised this hesitation, Wachuku said that it was 'better to be judicious and careful and do the thing at the right time when it will be effective, decisive and conclusive', than to rush in too quickly.⁽²⁾ The Government was also reluctant to place an embargo on Portuguese goods or to sever diplomatic ties, probably because of the small but increasingly advantageous trade with that country: exports to Portugal rose from about £278,000 in 1962 and £1.8 million in 1963 and £4.6 million in 1965 to about £7 million in 1967, whereas imports remained negligible. Thus when, in August, 1963, a motion was proposed in Parliament that the Government 'break off diplomatic relations with Portugal and ban all Portuguese aircraft and ships from Nigerian Ports',⁽³⁾ Minister of State Bamali, on behalf of the Government, proposed the following amendment which was accepted:

"That this House notes with satisfaction the

1. Portuguese Embassy, Pretoria, Letter dd. 17.10.68, Ref. No. 107. The paragraph reads in full: "The general attitude of the Nigerian Government has been, and still is, one of clear hostility towards Portugal, such as at International Conferences and Organisations. Nigeria is one of the main contributors to the fund of the Liberation Committee of the A.U.C., which gives support to the terrorist movements which operate in the Portuguese Provinces of Angola and Mozambique."
2. HRD, Vol. 15(b), 31 March - 11 April, 1964, p. 934.
3. Ibid., Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, p. 7.

all such conferences except the UN, and regularly censured the NATO countries for supplying arms to Portugal. Nigeria served as a member of the African Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam and gave financial assistance to the nationalists fighting in Angola and Mozambique. Certainly the Portuguese Government came to regard Nigeria's attitude as 'one of clear hostility'.⁽¹⁾ Yet Nigeria's relative restraint, which on occasions manifested itself as confusion, led to indignation at home, much of it focussed on Foreign Minister Wachuku. Support of the '1970' resolution was thought to have lost Nigeria more prestige than any other move. And, following the precedent of the delay in recognising the Algerian Provisional Government, the Nigerian Government ignored popular clamour in declining to recognise Holden Roberto's Provisional Government until October, 1963 when de facto recognition was granted. Answering those who criticised this hesitation, Wachuku said that it was 'better to be judicious and careful and do the thing at the right time when it will be effective, decisive and conclusive', than to rush in too quickly.⁽²⁾ The Government was also reluctant to place an embargo on Portuguese goods or to sever diplomatic ties, probably because of the small but increasingly advantageous trade with that country: exports to Portugal rose from about £278,000 in 1962 and £1.8 million in 1963 and £4.6 million in 1965 to about £7 million in 1967, whereas imports remained negligible. Thus when, in August, 1963, a motion was proposed in Parliament that the Government 'break off diplomatic relations with Portugal and ban all Portuguese aircraft and ships from Nigerian Ports',⁽³⁾ Minister of State Bamali, on behalf of the Government, proposed the following amendment which was accepted:

"That this House notes with satisfaction the

1. Portuguese Embassy, Pretoria, Letter dd. 17.10.68, Ref. No. 107. The paragraph reads in full: "The general attitude of the Nigerian Government has been, and still is, one of clear hostility towards Portugal, such as at International Conferences and Organisations. Nigeria is one of the main contributors to the fund of the Liberation Committee of the A.U.O., which gives support to the terrorist movements which operate in the Portuguese Provinces of Angola and Mozambique."
2. HRD, Vol. 15(b), 31 March - 11 April, 1964, p. 934.
3. Ibid., Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, p. 7.

'humiliation and indignity' before the world assembly and to 'keep on whipping them until they have learned their lesson'. (1) The leader of his own party, Dr Michael Okpara, dissociated himself from this view, declaring that Africa would be better off with both South Africa and Portugal out of the UN; and the Daily Times again took up the cudgels in an editorial entitled 'Does This Man Speak for Us?':

"Should Nigeria continue to allow Mr Wachuku to parade Mr. Wachuku, financed by Nigeria?

The answer is obvious. Mr. Wachuku gave it himself at his Press conference. He said. The External Affairs Ministry is not my personal heritage.

Jolly Good! Let the Prime Minister get him out of there before he changes his mind." (2)

D. South Africa.

"It is very sad that, in a continent where millions go hungry and uneducated, South Africa has chosen to waste its tremendous wealth on military means in an attempt to crush the undying spirit of man in the name of apartheid." - Sir Abubakar, Cairo, 1964. (3)

The coincidence of the Sharpeville killings with the approaching independence of Nigeria set the seal on Nigeria's condemnatory attitude towards South Africa. A motion was introduced in Parliament calling for immediate steps to ban the import of South African goods; the Government accepted it and it was passed unanimously. Though a direct result of the Sharpeville incident it reflected an overall hostility to everything connected with the South African Government. The tone of the proposer of the motion was typical of the continuous barrage of vituperation flowing from the mouths of Parliamentary backbenchers and newspaper columnists:

"... I hardly need to go over the spate of intolerance, hate, oppression and unbelievably violent subjection to which millions of our brethren are faced by a Godless, heartless, despotic Government headed by a merciless, bloodthirsty Dutchman in the person of Dr Verwoerd." (4)

A good deal of comment on South Africa was off-beam: for example, in the same speech Mr Lamuye assured Parliament that the South African Government was in the process of murdering off

1. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1221, 30.9.63, para. 71.
2. News from Nigeria, No. 78, 30.10.63, p. 9.
3. Ibid., No. 45, 29.7.64, Appendix.
4. HRD, Vol. 1, 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 134.

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one of the African populations under its control by providing it with poisoned milk; ⁽¹⁾ Kalu Ezeora informed Parliament that he had it on good authority that South Africa feared Nigeria because of its large population, and planned to launch an attack on Nigeria early in 1961; ⁽²⁾ and after Dr Verwoerd's assassination Radio Lagos (6.9.66) declared that the fact that he was murdered by a white man and not a black man proved that apartheid was not only repugnant to the black peoples of the world but had shocked world opinion. ⁽³⁾

Nigeria's leaders concurred with the spirit of these statements but transformed the hyperbole and tirade into a relatively moderate and realistic derogation of apartheid. Firstly, they were aware that the possibilities of attacking South Africa were nil; Jaja pointed out to Parliament that Nigeria had neither the aerial nor the maritime equipment to launch an attack and, regarding the suggestion that Nigeria should drop bombs on South Africa, questioned whether those speakers were referring to 'mango bombs'. ⁽⁴⁾ At the UN he proclaimed that Nigeria had no wish to treat the whites of South Africa as aliens to be driven into the sea; he opposed South Africa's expulsion from the UN, and on one occasion made a statement which was criticised as an apparent, if vague, acceptance of separate development:

"Now South Africa is already a federation ... If they [the whites] want to be by themselves, if they do not wish to be exterminated, why not set aside one area sufficient for three or four million people, an area with sufficient room for expansion, for this group, dividing the rest of the country into other states each with its own provincial legislature. Then in a federation, in the federal houses, all will be represented. That would be a solution. They are afraid that this might deprive them of all power; but if they like, there could be a senate in which there would be equal representation, and they would thus be represented in the central legislature. In their own area they would always have complete control." ⁽⁵⁾

Sir Abubakar with his undying trust in the value of negotiation and personal contact offered to exchange ambassadors with South

1. Ibid., p. 136.

2. Ibid., Vol. 2, 19 April - 2 May, 1960, p. 519.

3. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 9, 1966, p. 615a.

4. HRD, Vol. 12, 31 July - 9 August, 1963, p. 52.

5. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1221, 30.9.63, para. 122.

Africa as well as to visit the country were he invited; for he believed that he would somehow be able to reassure the Afrikaner of the good intentions of the African people and persuade them that their policies, sincere but misconceived, and based on a neurotic fear of the black man, were in fact unfounded. When in the South African Parliament the Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaff, challenged the Prime Minister to invite Sir Abubakar, Dr Verwoerd replied:

"Now I have met Balewa and have spoken to him privately and at the conference table while in London and tried to get a fair outlook from him on the South African situation, particularly in view of the discussions at the Prime Ministers' Conference. My opinion is that he is not a moderate (as is suggested so often) with regard to relations between White and Black. I think he is wrongly described as such. He is a fanatic in respect of his own cause. I am not blaming him for that. Many of us are fanatics in our own cause ... There are certain factors which have to be taken into account. One is that this man did not either wait for an invitation in the ordinary way, nor did he approach us through diplomatic channels as one would expect from the head of a government." (1)

In his view Balewa was daring South Africa to invite him while at the same time continuing to show enmity towards the Republic. (2)

Nigeria's embargo on the importation of goods from South Africa was effective: imports decreased from £1 million in 1959 (3) to £120,000 in 1962 and to £8,000 in 1964. Within Nigeria the Government declared that no white South Africans would be employed by any corporations or agencies under the aegis of the Government; South African Airways were barred from landing in Nigeria; the South African Dutch Reformed Church was expelled from Nigeria (although there were only twelve members); no South African was permitted to enter Nigeria; (4) and South African postal and money orders were declared non-negotiable. At the UN

1. House of Assembly Debates (South Africa), 1962, Vol. 3, March 19 - May 11, Col. 3758.
2. Ibid., Col. 3759.
3. West Africa, 15.4.61, p. 415.
4. When the writer visited the Nigerian Embassy in London to enquire about the possibilities of obtaining a visa, the official in charge informed him that he had no blanket instructions to exclude South Africans from entering Nigeria. He added that in the case of a South African wishing to visit for Nigeria for academic reasons, the chances of obtaining a visa were good (February, 1967).

Nigeria was at the forefront of many concerted Afro-Asian attacks on South Africa; and urged France and Britain to desist from selling arms to South Africa, and Western countries in general to restrict their economic relations with the Republic. In 1963, in Geneva, Nigeria's Minister of Labour, who had been elected to preside over the ILO Conference, relinquished the position in sympathy with the African delegates who had walked out in protest against South Africa's presence; and in Rome in that year the Chairman of Nigeria Airways, Chief I.O. Dafe, left an IATA Conference for the same reason. Balewa played a significant role in South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, and voiced his opposition to South Africa's policies in almost every foreign policy speech, as did all Nigeria's leaders, including the Sardauna who gave a personal donation of £500 to South Africa's African National Congress to assist it in its struggle against apartheid.⁽¹⁾ When Dr Verwoerd was assassinated joyful throngs of people paraded in the streets of Lagos and the only comment of Gowon's Government was made by its representative to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Brigadier B.O. Ogunidiye, who said that there 'may be a message in this for Mr. Ian Smith of Rhodesia'.⁽²⁾

In dealing with South Africa, as with colonialism, Nigerians took it for granted that neither their own policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, nor Article 2(7) of the UN Charter were applicable. Nevertheless, when confronted with these arguments Nigeria's various representatives justified their policies in various ways: as long as there was racial discrimination against African people anywhere Nigeria could not consider it an internal affair;⁽³⁾ in the view of 25 African states the situation in South Africa threatened international peace and security and that fact had to be reckoned with irrespective of what outsiders thought;⁽⁴⁾ South Africa as it existed was not the type of state recognised as such by the General Assembly because it had adopted certain policies condemned by that

1. Africa Report, January, 1965, p. 29.

2. West Africa, 10.9.66, p. 1045.

3. Wadhuku, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 944, 13.12.60, para. 62.

4. Ifeagwu, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 961, 7.3.61, para. 107.

Assembly; (1) apartheid as practised in South Africa amounted to slavery and therefore obviously could not be considered an internal affair; (2) in South Africa persons of Indian and Indo-Pakistani origin were discriminated against in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Charter and therefore the UN was fully competent to deal with their treatment; (3) and finally:

"... The historic trial going on in Israel of a miserable individual, Eichmann, is a reminder to us, a tragic reminder of the blind path to which bigotry can lead humanity. When the Nazis were systematically exterminating six million Jews in Germany, all kinds of excuses were used for non-interference in internal affairs. But we all know what this led to eventually." (4)

Thus it was not surprising that the Nigerian view of South Africa's mandate over South West Africa was not a legalistic one. In 1962 Wachuku informed the General Assembly that as far as Nigeria was concerned there was no question of legality or illegality; since 'our law is clear. South West Africa is an African territory. The minority in South Africa can not do anything to change that'. (5) At the Fifth Special Session of the UN called in April, 1967 Chief Adebo remained consistent to Wachuku's words. In co-sponsoring the Afro-Pakistani resolution he declared that South Africa's mandate was henceforth terminated. A UN Council, to be responsible to the General Assembly, based in South West Africa and financed out of the regular UN budget, as well as from revenues collected in the territory, was to constitute a UN presence in the transitional period before the people of South West Africa could themselves assume power. Any action by South Africa which obstructed the Council's discharge of its duties would amount to a violation of the resolution which should be dealt with appropriately by the Security Council. (6) Nigeria was elected to serve as one of 11 members on

1. Wachuku, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1238, 11.10.63, para. 119.
2. Ibid., para. 121.
3. Ngileruma, UN General Assembly, Special Political Committee, 230th Meeting, 23.3.61, para. 2.
4. Ifeagwu, UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 961, 7.3.61, para. 107.
5. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1153, 15.10.62, para. 125.
6. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1506, 26.4.67, paras. 6 - 25.

the UN Council for South West Africa, later called the Council for Namibia.

B. Central African Federation.

In June, 1969 Sir Roy Welensky declared that Sir Abubakar had been one of 'two great Black Africans' he had known. (1) The respect was mutual and Sir Abubakar denied that Sir Roy was a racist. This friendship, together with co-membership of the Commonwealth, lay at the basis of Nigeria's confused dealing with the Federation. The Federation was represented at Nigeria's independence celebrations by Sir Malcolm Barrow, Minister of Home Affairs; a Nigerian Parliamentary delegation visited the Federation as guests of Sir Roy; there was an exchange of High Commissioners and in 1962 the Federation appointed its first African High Commissioner, Mr Masotsha Hove, to Nigeria. This policy came in for much criticism in Nigeria and Joshua Nkomo in Southern Rhodesia charged that Nigeria's diplomatic recognition of the Federation constituted an aggression against the African people. Even when the dissolution of the Federation was imminent, Wachuku refused to send home the High Commissioner 'precipitously' before dissolution was final. (2) Yet, for all this, Nigerian leaders frequently expressed sympathy for the African nationalist movements there. In May, 1962, Joseph Tarka remonstrated with the Government:

"But what is this talk about the Prime Minister planning to visit South Africa and Sir Roy's Central African Federation at the invitation of those self-imposed imperialist Governments, at this particular time? Worse still, while we support Kaunda, Nkomo and Dr. Banda against the continuance of Sir Roy's pet Federation, we have foolishly and, perhaps blindly walked into British shoes by inheriting her recognition of the Central African Federation through our acceptance of Sir Roy's Envoy soon after Independence..."

Now, the cheek of it all is not merely the diplomatic recognition alone, it is the fact that Sir Roy Welensky is sending a stooge of an African to sell his dirty Federation to us." (3)

On 31st December, 1963 the issue was formally resolved; but on 11th November, 1965 it was replaced by one of far greater drama

1. The Star, Johannesburg, 30.6.69, p. 3. The other leader to whom Sir Roy referred was Moise Tshombe.
2. HRD, Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, p. 332.
3. Ibid., Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 597.

and bitterness.

F. Rhodesia.

"Rebellion has no other remedy than to crush it by force and, since Mr. Smith rebelled against the constituted authority, the only way to handle him is to deal with him savagely." - Sir Abubakar, November, 1965. (1)

With the object of 'toppling ... the totalitarian and grotesque administration imposed by some usurpers in Salisbury', (2) the Nigerian Government announced the following measures within a few days of Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence: all passports and travel documents issued by the new régime would be regarded as invalid; all economic relations with Rhodesia were severed and its status as a member of the sterling area, as far as Nigeria was concerned, lapsed; all trade and payment transactions were suspended; Rhodesian accounts, hitherto designated as scheduled territory accounts, were designated 'Rhodesia accounts' and blocked; no payments could be made from these accounts without the prior approval of the Central Bank; such approval would not normally be granted unless they related to payments for debts to Nigerians incurred before UDI; and aircraft going to or returning from Rhodesia would not be allowed landing facilities or overflying rights, except those travelling there with the purpose of ending the illegal régime. Nigeria also declared that all possible assistance would be given to member states of the OAU bordering on Rhodesia to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of retaliation from Rhodesia following any measures taken by African states. (3)

At Sir Abubakar's initiative a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was called in Lagos in January, 1966 at which he put forward the following proposals: that the 1961 Constitution be abrogated; that the armed forces and judiciary be placed under the control of the Queen; that arrangements be made whereby the Executive Council would be presided over by the Governor; that the new Executive Council be comprised of all races; that arrangements be made to formulate a new Constitution; that all nationalist leaders in prison or restricted should be released.

1. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 11, 1965, p. 409b.
2. UN Security Council, Meeting 1277, 9. 4.66, para. 28.
3. News from Nigeria, No. 20, 20.11.65, p. 1a.

ad and be allowed to participate in all further constitutional conferences; and that after the termination of the rebellion Rhodesia should follow the same governmental procedures as existed in the former British colonies. (1) Sir Abubakar expanded on the final point in his last interview before his death, given on 15th January to the Commercial Editor of 'West Africa'. He was asked whether he 'set a time limit for the achievement of majority rule' and he answered:

"No, you can't put a time limit on it. British [direct] rule in Rhodesia should be exactly as it has been for former British colonial territories who have achieved independence - though it needn't take as long as it did for us. But there must be time for Africans to be trained and to gain experience ... not just the politicians, but the civil servants as well; and there must be time for the whites to get used to the idea of majority rule... For this, the existence of the whites will have to be recognized, and majority rule assured. I think it can be done, and probably much quicker now than before; really you know UDI was a blessing for Africans. Mr. Smith was really very foolish." (2)

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September, 1966, Brigadier Ogundipe insisted on full majority rule in Rhodesia; recommended recourse to the UN to demand mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter which deals with 'action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'; and in the General Assembly and the Security Council Nigeria's Delegates maintained that only by mandatory sanctions, with which South Africa must be forced to comply, and by the use of force, could Mr Smith's Government be brought down. (3)

D. Pragmatic Alignment with the West.

'We consider it wrong for the federal government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any one of the power blocs', said Sir Abubakar in his first policy statement. (4) 'We are willing to learn before we rush into the field of international politics, but we are totally unwilling to be diverted from the ideals which we think true', he proclaimed to the General Assembly. (5) 'We are neither in the Western bloc or in the

1. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 1, 1966, p. 452c.
2. West Africa, 29.1.66, p. 113.
3. See above, pp. 190 - 192.
4. Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, op. cit., p. 57.
5. Ibid., p. 69.

Eastern bloc. We are in Africa', (1) asserted Foreign Minister Wachuku to Parliament on one occasion and 'we shall be the final arbiters of our attitude', on another. (2) 'Nigeria must not inherit anybody's prejudices', pleaded one Parliamentarian. (3) 'We want to play the role of non-partisans', expressed another. (4) 'We must not find ourselves in such a position in international affairs that we should feel morally bound to support some policy which does not have our wholehearted or intellectual backing' wrote the Sardauna. (5)

For all the pleas for and the assertions of non-alignment Nigeria's leaders had little, if any, intention of disrupting the close ties with the West and of allowing their country to drift about in the uncertain and sometimes lonely world of genuine non-alignment. As promised they followed a policy which they deemed in Nigeria's national interest, but such a policy, as they interpreted it, dictated that Nigeria remain within the warmth and security of the Western domain. For Nigeria had inherited an all-embracing alignment with the West. A long and close association with the UK culminated in independence, carefully negotiated, prepared for and stage-managed by the British Colonial Office to leave Nigeria feeling goodwill and gratitude towards, close cultural affinity with, and economic dependence upon the mother country. Such bonds facilitated immediate understanding with the countries of the Commonwealth and with the United States. As the independence celebrations concluded and the distinguished guests returned home, and as Nigeria's leaders raised their eyes to see from whence came their help and traced the paths of aid, trade and investment to their sources, they found that their attention was focussed on the West, and ipso facto their backs turned on the East. They found this neither surprising nor uncomfortable for they felt at home with the West: their political institutions, their schools and legal systems, and their economic structure with its emphasis on private enterprise and its currency tied to sterling had all been set in the Western mould; they had themselves been educated in the West and

1. HRD, Vol. 1, 29 March - 12 April, 1961, p. 238.
2. Ibid., Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p.
3. Mr R.B.K. Okafor, HRD, 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 344.
4. Kalu Ezera, HRD, 30 March - 2 May, 1960, p. 406.
5. Bello, Sir Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 235.

had grown to appreciate the Western concepts of democracy and to feel an empathy with the people and essential principles of those countries; and finally, their official language enabled them to communicate easily. At the helm of Nigeria's administration were cautious and practical men who understood the need to develop the country economically and industrially, to increase rapidly the number of the educated, to raise the standard of living and to be able to defend their borders from outside aggression; and they presumed that to achieve such ends they would continue to require Western assistance.

Small wonder then that the Soviet Union observed Nigeria's independence with little optimism and without much fanfare. How ripe for a proletarian revolution could a country be in which the most powerful personality was one of Africa's leading conservatives and whose favoured pastimes were cricket and fives; whose Prime Minister was a humble, old-fashioned liberal, renowned for his dislike of dogma, violence and Communism; whose Finance Minister was a devout believer in the advantages of capitalism and who bought a new motor car every year; whose laws imposed a ban on Communist literature; whose passports were not endorsed for visits to East European countries; whose largest political party appeared unaware of Communism as a factor in world affairs; whose opposition party referred to it as an atheistic materialism devoted to the destruction of all that was noblest in man; and whose most neutral and radical major political party could speak of the United States in the warmest of terms?

"The NCNC equally believes that Nigeria's relations with the United States should be one of very intimate and cordial relationship. Needless to emphasize our deep admiration of and affection for the United States, its ways of life, its championship of the freedom and equality of man everywhere and, no less important its greatness.

One cannot help but admire a country born in revolution from the depths of colonial status to the majestic height of world leadership." (1)

Moscow's delegation to the independence celebrations was led by the Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, S.M. Krushchyan, and Deputy Foreign Minister, Y.A. Malik. Their ac-

1. Daily Times, 23.10.59, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 20.

tivities received little attention in the Soviet press and less in Nigerian newspapers. They passed on a congratulatory note from Premier Krushchev to Sir Abubakar, which, they said, should be regarded as a formal application to establish an embassy. Nigeria's Prime Minister responded that the note did not conform with Nigerian requirements. When he met Krushchev at a dinner in New York the following week, an exchange of ambassadors was doubtlessly raised; for when he returned to Nigeria he declared that he had informed the Russians that it was Nigeria's policy to give consideration first to Commonwealth nations, then to countries with consulates in Nigeria before independence and thirdly to other nations such as the USSR, whose applications would be considered on their merits. On 11th November, 1960, the Moscow press reported that Foreign Minister Gromyko had submitted an application in compliance with Nigeria's requirements.⁽¹⁾ A year and a half later a Soviet Embassy was established. Balewa had made it quite clear and not for the first time that entente with the East would be a very gradual process, and that he intended to perpetuate alignment with the West.

The first clear evidence of the Nigerian Government's antipathy towards Communism had been provided in 1958 by its refusal to grant a passport to Mrs F. Ransome-Kuti. Although she had declared that she wished to travel to the UK for health reasons, the Government, on the basis of her previous visits to Eastern Europe and Peking and the return ticket to East Berlin with which she had been provided by the Women's International Democratic Federation, chose not to believe her. When challenged in Parliament with illegitimate interference in freedom of movement, the Prime Minister answered that it was within the power of the issuing authority to refuse a passport.

"... These powers are, in fact, rarely exercised, but one of the occasions on which they are exercised is in the case of an applicant who wishes to travel behind the Iron Curtain and there are sufficient grounds to show would become or be likely to become involved in Communist activity."⁽²⁾

He went on to point out that it was well established practice to

1. See Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, *Nigeria as Seen from Moscow*, Africa Report, January, 1961, p. 9.
2. HRD, Vol. 1, 18 February - 5 March, 1958, p. 396.

exclude Communists from all branches of the Nigerian public service and that it was the view of the Cabinet that to allow unrestricted access into Communist countries was not in Nigeria's best interest.

"... I and my Colleagues are determined that, while we are responsible for the Government of the Federation of Nigeria and for the welfare of its people, we shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of Communism and communistic ideas into Nigeria. I feel sure that the whole House will endorse this policy." (1)

Six weeks after independence the Federal Government attested overtly to the fact that its policy was not to accept passively the well-established bonds with the UK, but to take positive action to cement them by the signing of a Defence Agreement, placed before Parliament in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1960. Recognising that it was in their common interest to preserve peace and to provide for their mutual defence, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Nigeria agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the Federation and the United Kingdom Government each undertake to afford to the other such assistance as may be necessary for mutual defence, and to consult together on the measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest co-operation between them for this purpose.

Article II

1. The two Governments will foster the closest co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. In particular, the United Kingdom Government will, on request, furnish the Government of the Federation to such extent and on such terms as may be agreed between the two Governments with assistance for the training and development of the armed forces of the Federation and other assistance as set out in this Article.

2. The United Kingdom Government will, if so requested by the Government of the Federation, provide personnel to assist in the staffing, administration and training of the armed forces of the Federation.

3. The United Kingdom Government will make available facilities for the training of members of the armed forces of the Federation. In particular places will be made available for officers cadets and other ranks at training establishments in the United Kingdom, such as the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, the Mons Officer Ca-

1. Ibid., p. 397.

det School, Aldershot, the Staff College, Camberley, Arms Schools, Arm and Service Schools and other training establishments and on such instructional and specialist training courses as may be necessary. If at some future date the Federation creates an Air Force, the United Kingdom Government will likewise provide training on a similar basis for the Federation of officers and personnel.

4. The United Kingdom Government will, in consultation with the Government of the Federation, make every effort to ensure for the armed forces of the Federation an adequate supply of such modern weapons (including new types of weapons which may be developed) as may be considered necessary and suitable for the armed forces of the Federation.

5. The United Kingdom Government will, if so requested by the Government of the Federation, consult with the Government of the Federation with a view to making available to that Government any warships which may be required by the Royal Nigerian Navy.

6. The United Kingdom Government will, at the request of the Government of the Federation, make available any expert advice and assistance in operational and technical matters which may be necessary to the armed forces of the Federation. The United Kingdom Government will also provide, if requested by the Government of the Federation, professional and technical advice in the planning of the base installations which are to be constructed for the Royal Nigerian Navy.

7. The United Kingdom Government will pay landing fees for the use of civil airfields in the Federation by the aircraft referred to in Article III of this Agreement (not being aircraft of or under the control of the armed forces of the Federation) at the rate applicable to civil aircraft of comparable size and will reimburse the Government of the Federation any extra expenditure incurred in this connection by the Government of the Federation at the request of the United Kingdom Government for the provisions of any supplies, services and facilities additional to those required by the Government of the Federation for its own purposes.

Article III

The Government of the Federation and the United Kingdom Government each undertake to accord to military aircraft of and aircraft under the control of the armed forces of the other unrestricted overflying and air staging facilities in the Federation and in the United Kingdom and dependent territories respectively.

Article IV

On request by the United Kingdom Government, the Government of the Federation agrees to make available facilities at Kano and Lagos airfields for the holding of tropicalisation trials of aircraft. Should the Government of the Federation so request, the United Kingdom Government will make available to the Government of the Federation the general results of such trials.

Article V

The Government of the Federation and the United Kingdom

dom. Government will afford each other an adequate opportunity for comment upon any major administrative or legislative proposals which may affect the operation of this Agreement.

The Agreement was severely denounced in Nigeria as detracting from a policy of non-alignment. The Government was accused of paying lip service to such a policy while in the process of binding Nigeria even more closely to one of the major Western powers and, it was believed, to the much maligned North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. These fears were reinforced when Nigeria's name was omitted from the original list of countries invited to the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States, scheduled for 1st September, 1961. At a preparatory meeting in Cairo a definition of non-alignment was produced, one aspect of which precluded military alliances or formal agreements. On this basis was Nigeria excluded. Probably, on realisation of the small number of states complying with the definition, a new list was compiled and Nigeria received a belated invitation. Displeased by the delay, the invitation was rejected on the grounds that if a non-aligned country joined a non-aligned bloc it ceased to be non-aligned.

Having thus signposted the path westwards the Government continued, with occasional cautious detours, along it. One year after independence the list of countries which had given aid to Nigeria had risen to ten, all Western: Australia, Britain, Canada, West Germany, Japan, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United States. The overwhelming share of the financial aid received derived from the United States, the World Bank group and the United Kingdom; trade was dominated by the UK and the countries of the EEC; and the preponderance of foreign investment was British. When, for example, the Government chose to look beyond Britain for military assistance, it was to countries like Canada and West Germany. The Six Year Development Plan which crystallised the country's economic structure increased its dependence on foreign capital and, of necessity, identified it still further with the capitalist Western world. Within a year of independence a number of Nigerian Ministers had visited the United States, including the Sardauna, Chief Akinola and Sir Abubakar, who headed a Ministerial delegation on an eight-day state visit at President Kennedy's invitation. During

his stay he conferred with the President and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, appeared on television and delivered an address to the US House of Representatives in which he declared: 'we admire the American way of life, and we respect the people of the United States for their love of freedom'.⁽¹⁾ In the United Nations Nigeria sponsored the '1970' resolution in opposition to the Soviet '1962' resolution; eschewed the Russian 'troika' principle on the basis that it would render the UN ineffective; championed the UN action in the Congo and challenged the USSR to pay up its arrears to the UN; and repudiated Krushchev's proposal for a summit meeting of Heads of States to discuss disarmament despite its own membership of the UN Disarmament Committee. The first embassies established outside Africa (except at Jeddah to deal with pilgrims) were in London, New York, Bonn and Rome; and only thereafter in Moscow. While encouraging the immediate creation of a British High Commission and a US Embassy in the prestigious Ikoyi and Apapa, and placing no limits on the size of their staffs, the establishment of a Soviet Embassy was postponed for eighteen months, no help was given to find accommodation for it and a ceiling of ten was placed on the staff. This was justified by General Gowon's Government in 1966:

"This decision cannot be regarded as one of blind discrimination. Rather, a sense of proportion demands that a country cannot be represented in another country by personnel whose size is out of proportion to their specified diplomatic duties.

It cannot be easily discounted that Nigeria's economic and political relations with the Soviet Union, at the time of our independence, did not justify Soviet representation here beyond the limit of ten."⁽²⁾

The Government exposed its partiality for the United States in numerous other ways. The Nigerian Ambassador there congratulated the Government of the US on the orbital space flight in February, 1962 and termed it a triumph for 'all the Free World';⁽³⁾ he named one of his children after President Kennedy; members of the Peace Corps were welcomed in large numbers; Nigeria participated in Project Mercury by allowing the establishment of a US space vehicle tracking station and by co-operating with the SYNCOM

1. Balewa, Sir Abubakar, op. cit., p. 104.

2. Nigeria Weekly News Review, Vol. 1, No. 13, 14.10.66, p. 8.

3. Daily Express, 22.2.62, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 103n.

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2. Nigeria Weekly News Review, Vol. 1, No. 13, 14.10.66, p. 8.
3. Daily Express, 22.2.62, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 103n.

communications satellite project; received Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, on two occasions; warmly entertained astronauts Gordon and Cooper on their courtesy visit; and justified the resumption of US nuclear tests in the air. According to Sir Abubakar, 'President Kennedy had no alternative' to the resumption:

"... What keeps uncertain peace in the world is the fact that both Eastern and Western powers are in possession of nuclear weapons. If by chance the balance is allowed to shift in favour of one side, it will certainly be a calamity for the world." (1)

This pro-Western position was consolidated by the maintenance of a special friendship with Britain and a continuing belief in the significance of the Commonwealth: inter alia, the UK High Commissioner continued to be consulted on matters of importance, all three Prime Ministers, Macmillan, Home and Wilson visited Nigeria, the number of Nigerians studying in Britain each year rose to about 17,000 and Britain remained Nigeria's military crutch.

For its pro-Western stance the Federal Government was pelted with accusations of hypocrisy and of surrendering Nigeria's sovereignty to the forces of neo-colonialism. 'We are regarded as the 'good boys' of the British Empire' objected Dr O.E. Emenike, Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Soviet-Nigeria Friendship Society. (2) 'The world looks upon Nigerians as British stooges', protested Ibrahim Gusau. (3) '... it seems we are 99.99 per cent pro-West in our foreign policy', said one critic, (4) and the 'West takes us for granted and the East ignores us as already committed', professed another, who continued:

"I think we should not always aim to have phrases like, 'responsible, statesmanlike, mature,' etc. applied to us by the Western World press. Sometimes I have the suspicion that what these phrases really imply are dutifulness, docility and stooge mentality." (5)

1. West Africa, 10.3.62, p. 271.

2. HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 89.

3. Ibid., Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 852.

4. Mr E.E. Inyang, HRD, Vol. 18(a), 24 March - 9 April, 1965, p. 61.

5. Dr R.C.B. Mgbaronye, HRD, Vol. 18(b), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, pp.

students rioted in opposition to the Defence Agreement; Parliamentarians remonstrated with the Government's non-attendance at the Belgrade Conference; Nigeria's passports were described as 'nothing but the handwork of our colonial masters'; (1) and the US satellite and tracking station, it was argued, made Nigeria a target for Soviet destruction. There were appeals to lift the ban on Communist literature, to stop Communist witchhunting, to accept scholarships offered by East Europe, to allow unimpeded travel facilities to those countries, to invite Krushchev to visit Nigeria and to expel neo-colonialist agencies such as Moral Rearmament and the Peace Corps. Criticism of the Government's reluctance to permit young Nigerians to study in Communist countries was exemplified in an editorial of the West African Pilot (3.9.63) entitled 'Road Barred to Moscow':

"No explanation has been given why 19 Moscow-bound students were stopped from travelling last week ... the students' episode is just one more example that we have not outgrown one of the prejudices we inherited from the old era. Students trained in Eastern Europe are automatically suspect; they cannot be anything but Communist agitators. How stupid!

How will the Russians take our professions of friendship if we refuse to allow our children to study in their country." (2)

Awolowo succumbed to the wishes of radical Nigerians who were disappointed with their Government's reticence to demonstrate to the world Nigeria's independence from the West and its indisposition to take positive steps to establish a rapport with the East, when he told a meeting of students in London that every 'vestige and channel of undue influence of Britain and her allies in and on Nigeria must be totally eradicated'. (3)

Partly in response to these pressures and partly in the course of expanding the sphere of international contacts, Nigeria made gradual adjustments in policy, for a caveat of alignment with the West was not total isolation from the East. On 22nd November, 1961 Sir Abubakar announced that the ban on subversive literature had been lifted as an 'expression of faith

1. Mallam Alhajan Yerima Balla, HRD, 20 July - 4 September, 1961, p. 236.
2. News from Nigeria, No. 67, 4.9.63, p. 13.
3. West Africa, 9.9.61, p. 1009.

by the Government in the common sense of the Nigerian people and their firm belief in democratic principles'. He warned, however, that were it to be discovered that such literature constituted a threat to the security of the state, he would not hesitate to reimpose the ban.⁽¹⁾ In January, 1962 to comply with the requirements of leadership in Africa and to encourage the attendance of the Casablanca bloc at the Lagos Conference, Nigeria ended the Defence Pact, thus formally severing the military ties with the UK; but the terms of the abrogation agreement disclosed that those bonds were in essence to remain intact. So, too, associate membership of the EEC was rejected on the grounds that it would bind Nigeria irrevocably to Western Europe; but an Ambassador was posted to Brussels to negotiate some other form of agreement. Gradually, impediments to travel to the East were removed. In March, 1962 the Passport Office was transferred from the Police to the Civil Service under the direct control of the Foreign Ministry; and Wachuku declared that it was the policy of his Ministry that all passports issued to adults would be endorsed as valid for all countries. Although the proportion of students going to Eastern Europe on legal passports increased and authorisation to travel to Communist countries was easier to come by, questions in Parliament two years later evidenced the fact that restrictions still existed, and the Military Government announced again that, as from March, 1966 Nigerian passports were universally valid. In April, 1962 the Soviet Union established an Embassy in Lagos, followed at a rate of about one a year by Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia; and Nigeria posted an Ambassador to Moscow. All these countries offered scholarships which were gradually more willingly accepted, and Nigeria made efforts to legalise the position of students who had travelled to Eastern Europe without legal documents; Minister of Health, Majekodunmi, spent eighteen days in Russia and Czechoslovakia during which time he met many of these students and discussed their plight.

In August, 1963 an eleven-man Nigerian Parliamentary

1. HRD, 15 - 30 November, 1961, p. 8.

Delegation visited Russia at the invitation of the Council of the supreme Soviet and in 1964 representatives of the Lagos City Council were received in Russia by the Moscow City Council; in that year, also, a Delegation of the Supreme Soviet paid a return visit to Nigeria as guests of the Federal Parliament. In Nigeria friendship societies sprang up to strengthen cultural relations and foster personal contact: for example, the Nigeria-Soviet Friendship Society exchanged visits with its counterpart and received a gift of a film projector; the Nigerian-Polish Friendship and Cultural Association was presented with a consignment of medicines for Ibadan Hospital; the Nigeria-Czechoslovakia Friendship Society entertained the editor of the Czech periodical 'Solidarity' and a representative of Radio Prague. Both the Foreign Minister, Wachuku, and the Minister of State, Bamali, spent time in Moscow and Eastern Europe; in June, 1965 the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Malik, spent four days in Nigeria; in January, 1966 the Yugoslavian Assistant Foreign Minister, Ivo Sarajcic, called at Lagos; and in July, 1965 Sir Francis Ibiom, Governor of the Eastern Region, travelled to the USSR as the guest of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Soviet Shahtior football team made a brief tour of Nigeria as did a twenty-man variety troupe of Russian performers. In addition, opponents of the Government were not hampered; two trade unionists, Goodluck and Bassey, visited Russia and Hungary respectively, Mrs Ransome-Kuti was permitted to attend the 1964 Conference of the WIDE in Bulgaria, in 1965 a delegation from the Nigerian Youth Congress went to East Germany, and in April, 1966 Dr Tunji Otegbeye attended a meeting of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1966 the Government sponsored a ten-day Yugoslavian photographic exhibition in Nigeria, and donated 25,000 to the Skopje Earthquake Fund. Nigerians participated in seminars and conferences concerned, for example, with economic planning and infectious diseases in Eastern European countries. On Ironsi's assumption of power Kossygin sent him a personal letter of congratulation and a memento of Luna 9; and, on Gowon's accession, the Soviet Ambassador, Romanov, conveyed to him his best wishes and presented him with books on Soviet sport, painting, sculpture and carving, and Gowon despatched a special representative, V. Adegoroye, to confer with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

In addition to radical pressures within Nigeria and the natural increment in contact with Eastern Europe there were certain other factors which, under different circumstances, might have driven a wedge between Nigeria and the West. Firstly, one aspect of non-alignment was non-involvement: the Nigerian Government was unprepared to shoulder the traditional antagonisms for and disputes with the Communist world, issues considered by the United States, for example, of great importance - Korea, Berlin and Hungary. Other than expressing willingness to assist with any peace efforts Nigerian representatives evinced their disinterest or non-interest at the UN by consistently abstaining in voting on these matters. Secondly, Nigeria's representatives frequently declared that they could not be neutral regarding Africa. In this context they frequently denounced the West - the USA, the UK and Western Europe - for expanding trade with and investment in South Africa and thereby bolstering the white Government there; for aligning themselves in NATO with the arch-colonialist country, Portugal, and for supplying Portugal with arms; and for their voting at the UN on issues bearing on colonialism, South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia which compared, from the Nigerian point of view, very unfavourably with the voting of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thirdly, while Nigeria's senior leaders refrained from harsh criticism of the United States, lesser, but more vociferous, politicians and the press regularly reviled American actions. For example, Aminu Kano accused the USA and the CIA of financing Mobutu's army, (1) and Mr P. Nnaemeka Agu condemned the US for the use of poisonous gas and napalm in Vietnam. (2) Newspapers protested against the maltreatment of Negroes and the maintenance of missile bases in Turkey, after Russia had withdrawn from Cuba; and a Daily Express editorial (15.5.64) entitled 'Yankee Aggression' criticised the embargo on Cuba as follows:

"This policy represents super-power politics at its worst.

For many years United States Governments have given active support to the most corrupt dictatorial régimes in Latin America.

1. HRD, Vol. 2, 13 - 20 April, 1961, p. 602.
2. Ibid., Vol. 18(B), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, p. 761.

As far as the Americans are concerned Dr. Castro's crime is that he has tried to introduce social justice into the economy of his country.

He has also removed the stranglehold of American capitalists of the economy of his country.

It is significant that the United States Government are more zealous about crushing Cuba, than in righting the crimes of the Verwoerd régime against the African majority in South Africa." (1)

Fourthly, economic sense determined that Nigeria should make every effort to multiply the markets for its imports and increase the potential sources of aid. Thus the Federal Economic Mission, regional economic missions and representatives of Produce Marketing Boards visited the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China; trade agreements were signed and Nigeria participated in trade fairs; and, after a lengthy period of procrastination by the civilian Government, General Gowon declared that Nigeria would take advantage of their offers of financial aid. Whether it was merely part of the gradually expanding contact, or whether it was predetermined Soviet policy, Eastern Europe and particularly Russian activity increased in proportion to the disorder reigning in the country.

For all this, Nigeria remained a nation whose leanings were definitely towards the West. When Gowon's Government explained that the reason Nigeria was represented only in Moscow and not in other East European capitals was 'a matter of expediency rather than discrimination', (2) it was merely a disclosure of the negative segment of Nigeria's pragmatic alignment; the close ties with the West were upheld not as some enshrined article of faith, but rather because history had made them convenient and economics imperative.

V. Nigeria and the World.

A. United Nations.

"Throughout the coming session my Government will continue to give resolute support to the work of the United Nations and will exert all their influence to give effect to the spirit of the purpose for which that organisation was formed." (3)

1. News from Nigeria, No. 29, 16.5.64, p. 3.
2. Speech from the Throne, 1961, HRD, Vol. 1, 29 March - 12 April, 1961, p. 17.
3. Nigeria Weekly News Review, Vol. 1, No. 13, 14.10.66, p. 8.

Despite criticism within Nigeria that the UN operations in the Congo had failed hopelessly, that the Organisation was nothing but an implement of one or other, or both of the great powers and was serving no useful purpose, Nigeria remained an ardent devotee of the principles of the Charter and pursued a policy aimed at bolstering the world body. Nigeria's contribution was evidenced by service on numerous committees; for example, in 1963 and 1964, on the following General Assembly Committees: the Special Committee on the South African Government's policies of Apartheid, the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman, the Committee on a UN Capital Development Fund, the Executive Committee of the Programme of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Working Group to Examine Administrative and Budgetary Procedures, the International Law Commission and the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States; in 1963 on the following Economic and Social Council Organs: the Technical Assistance Committee, the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning and the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development. Nigeria was a member of the Executive Board of UNICEF, of the UN Special Fund Interim Co-ordinating Committee on International Commodity Arrangements, the FAO Inter-Governmental Committee on the World Food Programme and on the Preparatory Committee of UNCTAD; and in 1966 on four UNCTAD Committees: the Trade and Development Board, the permanent Sub-Committee on Commodities, the Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes and the Group on Preferences. In addition, Nigeria was asked by the Secretary-General to serve on his advisory committee on the Congo and was elected to the Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations, the Disarmament Committee and the Committee on the International Year of Human Rights. The Government regularly paid its share of the UN's expenses, about £60, 000 annually, and purchased £350,000 worth of UN bonds to help restore the Organisation to solvency, pledged about £1,800 annually to both UNHCR and UNRWA and £10,000 to the UN Institute for Training and Research in 1964, and, between March, 1964 and December, 1966 paid a total of about £3,800 to UNFICYP for peace keeping operations in Cyprus. (1) (Nigerian representatives consistently ad-

1. United Nations Year Book, 1960 - 1966.

vocated the extension of the UN mandate in Cyprus as the best method of maintaining peace.)

At the Nineteenth Session, Nigeria's permanent representative, Chief S.O. Adebo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Financing of Peace Keeping Operations, appealed in separate letters to Kosygin, Johnson, Wilson and de Gaulle to come together in an atmosphere of goodwill 'to resolve immediately the financial crisis' which he declared was 'a sword of Damocles hanging over the resumption of the General Assembly'.⁽¹⁾ When, all appeals having failed, the Albanian delegate attempted to force the issue, Adebo urged him not to press the Assembly 'to ascertain by vote what is altogether clear without a vote, that is to say, the general feeling of this Assembly that we stand by the non-voting procedure already agreed upon'.⁽²⁾

One of the cardinal aims of Nigeria on entering the UN was that its various bodies should be reconstituted so as to give Africans representation commensurate with their numbers; pointing out that it would be farcical for Africa with 25 members (and later more) not to be represented in the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and in the Secretariat, Wachuku declared that the time had come when the black man would be 'not only seen and heard, but felt and accepted'.⁽³⁾ He said he was aware of the so-called 'gentlemen's agreement' about distribution of representation but it would have to be altered to take into account 'the new gentlemen who had arrived'.⁽³⁾ Pressure for such alterations was sufficiently effective for the Charter to be amended so as to enlarge both the Security Council and the ESG. In 1966 Nigeria and Uganda received the endorsement of the then 36-nation African group and were elected to fill two of the four additional seats on the Security Council for terms of two years.

The Nigerian Government believed that two further modifications in the structure of the UN would enable the Organisation to fulfil its role as world peace keeper far more successfully; but here its chances of success were negligible. Firstly,

1. West Africa, 14.11.64, p. 1297.
2. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1329, 16.2.64, para. 98.
3. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 15.

it maintained that the right of veto of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council should be rescinded;

"It may be that we are beginning to see that the power of the veto has become obsolete... Indeed, my delegation would be happy to see the veto abolished, because now it is worthless. It has been more of an obstruction to the work of the United Nations than something which has preserved its rights and privileges. Once the veto is abolished, a bone of contention will have been removed and all of us in this Assembly will be here on the basis of equality." (1)

secondly, the delegates reasoned that the UN could never react effectively to situations which called for firm handling as long as the Secretary-General was hamstrung by lack of power. They therefore opposed not only the troika principle but also the concept of the Secretary-General as an international civil servant and urged that he be permitted more leeway and granted sufficient power to 'act freely' in accordance with his own 'conscience and the Charter', (2) to enable him to do what he felt best for the world body.

Despite failure to achieve these innovations, and a certain frustration experienced at the UN's inability to accomplish anything without the concurrence of the great powers, they remained consistent in championing the UN. In a nation-wide United Nations Day broadcast message, General Gowon reaffirmed his Government's faith in the Charter and pledged his nation's continued and unflinching support for the world body. (3)

B. Recognition of both Chinas.

"Nigeria fully recognises the Peoples' Republic of China and consequently favours her admission to the United Nations. Nevertheless Nigeria also concedes that the Government based in the island of Formosa has the necessary attributes of a State and has been an accepted member of the United Nations for over fifteen years. The solution of the problem must, therefore, take account of these factors in such a manner that both should be able to co-exist." (4)

- Foreign Minister Bamali, January, 1966.

Nigeria recognised both the Peoples' Republic of China (mainland China), of Mao Tse-tung and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

1. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1071, 5.12.61, para. 80.
2. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, para. 57.
3. Africa World, December, 1966, p. 13.
4. HRD, 12 - 15 January, 1966 (written answer), p. 57.

of Chiang Kai-shek, in the territories over which each exercised control; and was thus an advocate of the so-called two China theory. Although this policy was not universally supported in parliament - Aminu Kano referred to Formosa as a 'small province of the Mainland' and the 'breakaway Katanga of China'; ⁽¹⁾ and Mr I.A. Brown asserted that the United States had agreed to loan Nigeria \$80 million on condition that it upheld the two China theory, so enabling America to maintain military bases on the island ⁽²⁾ - it was subscribed to by the overwhelming number of Nigeria's politicians.

The Nigerian viewpoint was that the question was less one of legality than of fact. Whereas there had previously been one China, the civil war had split the country and the world had to accept that there were now two states in what used to be the territory of one. The régime which succeeded to the control of the mainland had administered the territory effectively; and the facts that it was the world's most populous nation and possessed nuclear weapons made it vital for international order that it be included in the mainstream of world deliberations and be admitted to the UN. Only thus could Red China be encouraged to submit to nuclear treaties and only thus could the world body overcome the unfortunate lack of communication, a factor underlined by China's invasion of India. However, the Government based on the island of Formosa satisfied all the requirements of statehood - territory, population and a competent Government - and as a founder member of the UN and a signatory to the Charter the reality of its presence could not be overlooked. Nigeria, therefore, did not accept the premise that the expulsion of Nationalist China was a condition precedent to the admission of mainland China. In the event of the latter applying for membership and accepting the principles of the Charter, it should be allowed to take its place in the General Assembly alongside Nationalist China. Nigeria disapproved both of American efforts to preclude the Assembly from debating the issue - describing it as intellectual imperialism - and the proposition that it was a question which had to be determined by a two-thirds ma-

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1. Ibid., Vol. 2, 13 - 20 April, 1961, p. 603.
 2. Ibid., Vol. 2, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 864.

jectory. (1)

C. Disarmament.

"Is it not illusory to think of nuclear weapons as effective weapons of war when the use of such weapons in any war means that there will be no victor and no vanquished?" - Minister of State, Matthew Mbu, Geneva, 1964. (2)

The Nigerian Government's anti-nuclear convictions were succinctly stated by its delegate to the UN First Committee, Mr. C.O. Ifeagwu, when he said that 'Nigeria was opposed to the testing of nuclear weapons of any size, by any State in any environment'; (3) they were manifestly exhibited by the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with France in protest against the nuclear tests in the Sahara; and they were, in general, sensibly pursued in the First Committee and at Geneva Disarmament Conferences with a clear appreciation of the limited progress possible: '... there can be no disarmament ... if the two blocs have no confidence in themselves. One may propose all sorts of things and if there is no trust it will be impossible'. (4) Nigeria pressed for an agreement to end the senseless expenditure of vast sums of money on the manufacture of weapons of destruction in a world riddled with poverty, hunger and disease, to be contained in a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which, it was argued, the nuclear powers owed not only to themselves but to all mankind. Nevertheless, realising both that such a possibility remained extremely unlikely and that there was little scope for taking an effective initiative, Nigeria accommodated itself to the role of encouraging any proposals of the great powers to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons and to limit their use. When the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed in Moscow on 5th August, 1963, Wachuku was instructed not only to ratify the agreement

1. See UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1071, 5.12.61, paras. 59 - 81; Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1302, 15.12.64, paras. 74 and 75; Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1375, 11.11.65, para. 87; and HRD, Vol. 15(b), 31 March - 11 April, 1964, pp. 934 - 936.
2. Africa Confidential, No. 11, 29.5.64, p. 5.
3. UN General Assembly, First Committee Meeting 1179, 27.10.61, para. 17.
4. Wachuku, HRD, Vol. 11(b), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 912.

but to do so once in Moscow, once in London and once in Washington, where he made a brief statement:

"The nuclear test-ban treaty, viewed in the context of complete and total disarmament, to some people may appear insignificant. On the other hand, if the test-ban treaty is viewed in the context of an outward and practical manifestation of the growing faith and confidence of the great nuclear Powers in the genuine, sincere and good intentions of one another to achieve the goal of total and complete disarmament, this treaty becomes more significant. I would describe it as a right step in the right direction and at the right time." (1)

At the same time Nigeria rejected the argument that there could be no suspension of testing before there was a formal treaty and urged the great powers to set an example by taking reciprocal steps to reduce the scope of tests, and in particular to halt underground tests; and requested them to accept the principle of effective international control through on-site inspections by uncommitted states.

Secondly, Nigeria pursued the policy of demarcating nuclear free zones, as had been done with the Antarctic, championed the African proposal that Africa be declared such, and recommended to Latin America that it follow suit. 'The intention was not to insulate Africa from the problems that faced the world, but to begin the denuclearization of the whole world with a region which had not yet been contaminated.' (2) Further, the considerations that made the nuclear powers unwilling to give an undertaking to proclaim a universal halt to tests did not apply to the African continent. (3) and by resolving to denuclearise their continent African states were making it impossible for themselves ever to acquire nuclear capability which was a first step to checking the proliferation of the problem.

In the field of non-nuclear armaments, Nigeria, with little to fear from its neighbours and with no intention of attacking anyone, supported President Johnson's 1966 proposal that methods of limiting the arms race should be explored on a regional basis. The representative of the Federal Military Go-

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1. UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1221, 30.9.63, para. 78.
 2. Mr Ifeagwu, UN General Assembly, First Committee Meeting 1194, 14.11.61, para. 7.
 3. Mr Ohi, UN General Assembly, First Committee Meeting 1387, 26.10.65, para. 42.

vernment in Geneva in August, 1966, Mr Ijewere, argued that nowhere in the world was there a greater need to implement these ideas than in Africa whose countries had little or nothing to spare for arms purposes. He believed that the problem should be tackled at two levels:

"The African countries themselves should initiate discussions on how to check the inflow of arms into the continent and the supplying countries should exercise restraint and show a greater sense of proportion in the matter." (1)

D. Berlin.

Nigeria recognised the de facto existence of two German States, but it granted de jure recognition only to the Federal Republic of Germany. Primarily on account to the substantial aid received from Bonn, Nigeria was prepared to obey not only the letter of the Hallstein Doctrine, but also the spirit: it neither established diplomatic relations with East Germany, nor did it cultivate too close an economic relationship; the numerous trade and goodwill missions that traversed Europe, East and West, consistently bypassed East Germany and of all the East European countries Nigeria failed to sign trade agreements with only the German Democratic Republic and Albania. Its request for the West German Luftwaffe to assume control of the construction and training of a Nigerian Air Force was a significant pointer to where its sympathies lay; in addition, in 1963 Willy Brandt, as Mayor of West Berlin, visited Nigeria; and in 1964 a Berlin Exhibition was held in Nigeria and Nigeria took part in the Berlin Arts Festival.

Nigeria entreated both power blocs to recognise the reality of two German states and to desist from accusing each other of doing on the other side exactly what it was doing on its own: in West Germany the three Western powers assisted that part of the country to develop according to their concepts of democratic and free institutions; while in East Germany the Soviet Union had administered the development of that part in terms of the principles of socialist democracy, and in both cases they had succeeded in building up powerful states; possibly they had

1. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 8, 1966, p. 601b.

vernment in Geneva in August, 1966, Mr Ifejiere, argued that nowhere in the world was there a greater need to implement these ideas than in Africa whose countries had little or nothing to spare for arms purposes. He believed that the problem should be tackled at two levels:

"The African countries themselves should initiate discussions on how to check the inflow of arms into the continent and the supplying countries should exercise restraint and show a greater sense of proportion in the matter." (1)

D. Berlin.

Nigeria recognised the de facto existence of two German States, but it granted de jure recognition only to the Federal Republic of Germany. Primarily on account to the substantial aid received from Bonn, Nigeria was prepared to obey not only the letter of the Hallstein Doctrine, but also the spirit: it neither established diplomatic relations with East Germany, nor did it cultivate too close an economic relationship; the numerous trade and goodwill missions that traversed Europe, East and West, consistently bypassed East Germany and of all the East European countries Nigeria failed to sign trade agreements with only the German Democratic Republic and Albania. Its request for the West German Luftwaffe to assume control of the construction and training of a Nigerian Air Force was a significant pointer to where its sympathies lay; in addition, in 1963 Willy Brandt, as Mayor of West Berlin, visited Nigeria; and in 1964 a Berlin Exhibition was held in Nigeria and Nigeria took part in the Berlin Arts Festival.

Nigeria entreated both power blocs to recognise the reality of two German states and to desist from accusing each other of doing on the other side exactly what it was doing on its own; in West Germany the three Western powers assisted that part of the country to develop according to their concepts of democratic and free institutions; while in East Germany the Soviet Union had administered the development of that part in terms of the principles of socialist democracy, and in both cases they had succeeded in building up powerful states; possibly they had

more success than they had anticipated. Were a third world war not to erupt from this feud, it was essential that the great powers either re-examine the question objectively rather than in terms of power politics, or that they call in states which were not involved to determine a peaceful solution. In Nigeria's view the Berlin dispute could best be solved by the exit of the occupying powers from the city and their replacement by UN troops made up of men from lesser, uncommitted nations. Such a UN presence would enable Berliners to live in peace, released from the shackles of cold war complications; and when a feasible constitution could be effected to reunify Germany on a Federal basis, Berlin and its environs would serve as the Federal capital. (1)

E. The Middle East.

"What is Israel? To me Israel does not exist." (2)
- Premier of the North, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello.

"I myself am almost an Israelite. I love and
admire Israel." (3)
- Premier of the East, Dr Michael Okpara.

"... this country does not take part in Israel-
Arab dispute." (4)
- Federal Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku.

So sounded the discordant trio.

When it came to dealing with the Middle East, as also with Moslem states, the Sardauna conducted his own foreign policy, seemingly oblivious of the limitations of the Constitution, the embarrassment of the Prime Minister and the indignation of the southern regions. He was a confirmed and habitual traveller; Africa Confidential wrote in February, 1964 that in the previous five months he had not stayed in Nigeria for more than two weeks at a time before leaving on another trip and that during that period he had visited the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, the UAR and Saudi Arabia; (5) apart from an-

1. See UN General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1031, 10.10.61, paras. 64 - 68; Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1153, 15.10.62, paras. 102 - 106; and Ibid., Plenary Meeting 1221, 30.9.63, para. 81.
2. West Africa, 4.9.65, p. 991.
3. Ibid., 3.11.62, p. 1223.
4. HRD, Vol. 15(b), 31 March - 11 April, 1964, p. 937.
5. Africa Confidential, No. 1, 21.2.64, p. 3.

annual pilgrimages from time to time he visited Jordan, Kuwait, India, Iran and the Lebanon and on all his trips he was welcomed as a leader in his own right. He subscribed to the principle of a pan-Islamic federation or Moslem league and saw his numerous meetings with Arab and Moslem leaders as serving to strengthen ties between brother Moslem states. He became Vice-President of the World Islamic League and made Kaduna the second head-quarters of the League. He frequently and publicly refused to recognise Israel and assured the Arab states that there was no infiltration of Israeli influence in his region. In the southern regions on the other hand, there was much admiration for Israel in its development in the face of huge problems. Kalu Ezera expressed their fear that the North would attempt to sway the Federal Government towards an anti-Israel stance; he wrote in the Daily Times (29.7.60) that 'the notion that the enemy of our brother is also our own enemy must be drastically modified'.⁽¹⁾ Both Okpara and Akintola visited Israel and both (later all three) southern Governments went to much trouble to build up economic and cultural ties with it, while refraining from any comment on the merits of the Middle East conflict. This was strictly in accordance with the Federal policy of neutrality and Federal aims to obtain assistance from any source. When in 1961 Nigeria succeeded in obtaining a loan from Israel the North condemned the agreement and announced that it would not accept any benefits deriving from it, and that it considered the acceptance of such aid to be an active involvement in the Middle East controversy. The Sardauna declared that when he wanted aid he knew where to get it and his Government's newspaper, the Daily Mail (9.6.61), wrote:

"The fact that Northern Nigeria will not receive aid from the Israeli Government in any shape or form is known to be a big headache to the Government of Israel.

After all, the North Regional Government is entitled to choose its friends.

The Israeli Government should know that it is an open secret that its Government is being run from the U.S.A. by the wealthy Jews there." (2)

1. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 83n.
2. Ibid., p. 82n.

Sir Abubakar was thus placed in a difficult position. He, himself, was a devout Moslem, a Northerner and a Deputy of the sardauna in the NPC; on the other hand, he abhorred the mixing of religion and politics which could only lead to increased bitterness in Nigeria, and he had to be constantly mindful of the views of his southern coalition partner, the NCNC. He decided to employ the issue to demonstrate his independence from the sardauna and to verify the fact that he spoke for all Nigeria. Thus he announced that Nigeria would certainly accept aid from Israel and that it would continue its policy of non-involvement in the Middle East. While he conceded that any region could refuse to take advantage of a loan he denied that any had the right to interfere with the Federal Government's acceptance of a loan.

In November, 1964 the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mrs Golda Meir, visited Nigeria, and Sir Abubakar again had a chance to demonstrate his position. The wives of the Heads of seven Arab Missions in Nigeria submitted a memorandum to the National Council of Women protesting against an invitation to Mrs Meir to address it. The Federal Government sent a protest note to the Heads of these Missions warning them that it 'viewed with great concern and seriousness the subtle attempt being made by some friendly countries to disturb the normal relations of friendship existing between the state of Israel and Nigeria'; that the action of the diplomats was an 'undue and unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria', and that it hoped that such interference would not be repeated. (1)

The only aspect of the Government's policy which was challenged was its failure to establish an Embassy in Israel, although it had done so in the United Arab Republic. Questions in Parliament, both oral and written, on the reasons for this were more frequent and more consistent than on any other topic. Justification for the need to appoint an Ambassador to Israel was that Israel was playing a significant role in the development of Nigeria through loans, technical advisers, bursaries and in some large-scale financial projects in the southern regions; that the numerous Nigerian students in Israel required

1. West Africa, 7.11.64, p. 1263.

a diplomatic representative to whom they could turn; that Nigeria could learn much from a small dynamic developing country; and that it was necessary in order to give credence to Nigeria's declared policy of treating equally with both sides in the conflict. The Government's answer was invariably the same: it could not afford to establish an embassy in Israel, as in many other countries in which it would like to do so, but that it was giving the matter considerable thought.⁽¹⁾ Though the suspicion existed that the real reason was that this would be too much for the Sardauna to countenance, the answer given by the Government was almost certainly valid.

General Ironsi, in welcoming the new Israeli Ambassador, Mr Ram Nirgad, reiterated that Nigeria would continue the policy of maintaining friendly relations with all states. Although during his short period of rule his only venture into the Middle Eastern sphere was to send a goodwill mission under Sir Kashim Ibrahim, the civilian adviser to the Military Governor of the North, to strengthen friendly relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the UAR, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, given time he would probably have demonstrated that his policy was consistent with that of his predecessor.

F. Further East.

The Vietnam war provided a clear example of an international confrontation of perilous potential upon which the Federal Government chose not to comment. Within Nigeria there was a large segment of opposition to US action: Dr R.C.B. Mgbaronye challenged the Government not to make a fetish of its policy of non-intervention and to protest publicly against the American adventure, for to condemn open aggression was not interference;⁽²⁾ Mallam Abubakar A. Ibrahim protested against the alleged use of poison gas by the US in the war;⁽³⁾ and Mr O.C.

1. See HRD, 15 August - 5 November, 1962, pp. 33 and 34; Ibid., Vol. 11(a), April, 1963, pp. 289 and 573; Ibid., Vol. 11(b), 16 April - 3 June, 1963, p. 886; Ibid., Vol. 15(a), 12 - 26 March, 1964, pp. 41 and 93; Ibid., Vol. 15(b), 31 March - 11 April, 1964, pp. 788, 926 and 933; Ibid., Vol. 19, 13 - 20 October, 1965, pp. 58 and 59.
2. Ibid., Vol. 18(b), 21 April - 6 May, 1965, p. 758.
3. Ibid., Vol. 18(a), 24 March - 9 April, 1965, p. 278.

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