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Industrial decentralization and regional development in South Africa

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2015-01-09
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/16371

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> efforts to redistribute population and economic activity are consistently undermined by the primate city and core region biases inherent in many sectoral policies - import substitution, subsidized urban services, internal terms of trade distortions and so on.

As it happens, many Government policies, actions or expenditure have some effect on the spatial distribution of productive activities (and consequently the distribution of population). Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1988: 18) add to Richardson's point above, by suggesting that some of the most powerful influences of the "where" of development are macro-economic policies, governmental structure, tax systems, pricing policies and sectoral investment plans. In fact, "limiting sectoral distortions can do more for decentralized develcpments than a host of explicitly spatial policies".

This begs the question - is there any room for spatial policies, or should they be abandoned altogether? The spatial organization of the population has been a major goal of South African regional policy; in fact it has overridden other policy considerations, as has been shown in the discussion on industrial decentralization. This dissertation has examined some of the more explicitly spatial issues pertinent to regional policy, namely industrial decentralization and growth pole theory.

This chapter will begin by providing a broader conceptual theoretical framework for urban development. This will be followed by an evaluation of some of the major and rather well-worn debates in regional planning: those of the optimal city size and rates of city growth. Since this is also a major debate in South African regional policy, South African urbanization policy will be briefly considered.

An important issue this raises then, is whether South Africa should have a regional policy at all, given the comparative impotence of spatial policy. An analysis of this issue at large will lend support to the idea of some form of policy intervention. The vehicle for this is a secondary city strategy (based on an extension of the tenets of growth pole theory). Finally, brief reference will be made to some of the appropriate economic underpinnings of such a spatial strategy, and to whether South Africa should adopt an export orientated, import substitution or inward industrialization strategy, or combinations thereof. (The regional planner will of course be at pains to point out where this should occur in space.)

THE CONCEPTUAL BASE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

According to Mabogunje (1980: 199), a desirable spatial order is conducive to a more realistic set of policies for the overall development of a country. There is a need to determine which type of urban development will engender the full mobilization of a country's population and resources - a good starting point for the discussion is Christaller's (1933, 1966) Central Place Theory, modified by Lösch in 1941, 1954 (Whyte, 1982).

Central place theory represents an idealised type of systems of cities, with only two location factors: those of transfer costs and agglomeration economies. This (deductive) theory attempts to explain the spatial patterns of trade and service centres - goods and services are distributed to consumers from centres which are scattered uniformly in space. Similarly, the size of markets is uniform, and is determined by

transfer costs on the output, density of demand per unit area, and scale economies in the production and/or marketing of the output (Hoover and Giarratani 1984: 233).

The end result is that the number of central places in a country is closely correlated with the level of goods and services obtaining in the space economy (Mabogunje 1980). The primary spatial organizing principle of this theory is **efficiency**, the limits of which are defined in terms of threshold and range of goods and services. Central place theory assumed that if this desired pattern did not exist, then the region was not being **optimally serviced** (Dewar et al. 1986: 25).

However, empirical evidence shows that instead of this uniform arrangement, urban systems in developed countries most often have rank-sized or log-normal distributions of cities. (This means that the size of any city can be determined by regarding the inverse of its rank as its proportion of the capital city population. This then suggests a dispersed urbanization process, and national unity in political and economic terms.)

But as Mabogunje (1980) points out, neither these deductive models, nor empirical evidence of city-size distributions, is relevant to developing countries. Deductive models, besides their patently unrealistic assumptions, erroneously concentrate on the **demand** for, and **marketing** of, goods and services. As regards empirical findings, it would seem that for less developed and developing countries, it is the primate city system, rather than the rank-size distribution which represents the normal state of affairs.

The concern with a desirable system of urban centres cannot be divorced from a programme of industrialization though. Economic development and urbanization are highly inter-related processes (Richardson 1977). Thus, sectoral shifts such as a change in agricultural or industrial strategy often result in concomitant spacial changes in population distribution and activity. This then implies that:

> ... growth pole policies should not be divorced from the broader concept of a national development strategy. Agglomeration economies are urban in character, and the promotion of a national urban development strategy will have direct inter-regional repercussions. The growth pole approach, whatever its limitations, integrates urban and regional development. In developing countries at least, the promotion of regional development cannot be divorced from urbanization strategies, and growth poles arguably still have a role in such strategies (Richardson 1977: 3).

If this is indeed true, there is another question to be asked, one which is presupposed in the above quote - should there be intervention to overcome disparities and/or manage metropolitan areas? The observations of Williamson (1965), discussed in the chapter on growth poles, revealed that during the initial stages of development, inter-regional income disparities tend to increase. The result is that the leading city region tends to dominate in terms of factors of production and innovative impulses. In other words, the condition of cumulative causation obtains and inter and intra-regional income disparities are manifest. Policy-makers traditionally seek to overcome these disparities by trying to decentralize activities from the highly urbanized core region to the essentially rural periphery.

Alternatively, planners can simply accept the fact of uneven development and actually facilitate migration from periphery to core (Hall 1987: 240). This translates to an acceptance of the fact that "backwash" can predominate over "spread". Although possibly anathema to some planners, this should not be seen as a sign of policy failure. The latter "heretical" view is being increasingly argued today. It has been opposed many times in the past, on the presumed grounds of negative returns to scale and urban externalities in metropolitan areas. In effect, this is the (optimal) city size problem, one of the three major concerns of regional planners, touched upon in chapter two and discussed in more detail shortly.

In order to frame subsequent discussion though, it is necessary to consider the urban dimensions of regional policy.

URBAN DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL POLICY

The pattern of urban development within a nation is influenced by global and national economic forces. The resultant pattern of urban growth in turn influences the relative economic forces of different regions and the towns and cities within them (Richardson and Townroe 1986: 657). The result is differential expansion of the rate of growth in towns and cities and this frequently causes government concern. Consequently governments have embarked upon national urban development or population distribution policies. These generic policies are complementary to regional economic development policies and embrace curbing the growth of large cities, decentralizing growth, promoting secondary cities, expanding agricultural service centres or generating industrial growth complexes.

"To the extent that regional development strategies focus on promoting manufacturing and quaternary services, these strategies must pay some attention to urban structure, because most establishments in these centres are located in urban centres" (ibid: 658). After all, growth poles impicitly concern the pole as well as its hinterland - the two can and should not be divorced. Many urban economists have viewed the city as an isolated production unit, ignoring its relations with surrounding space, except for some exogenous flows.

As the above authors note, "the spatial thrust of any regional development policy is seen in the relative growth rates of cities and urban areas, region by region" (ibid: 658). Although urban and economic growth are not synonymous, there is usually a positive correlation between population growth and growth of economic activity. The growth of the formal manufacturing sector is a major determinant of the spatial distribution of economic growth rates, yet it is dangerous to measure regional development by only the number of new jobs and factories. This was demonstrated in the discussion on Bell and industrial decentralization - this means then that the number of decentralizing industries should not be confused with the number and type of jobs which are being created and should not be taken as an indicator of policy success.

Although it is difficult to determine the quantitative impact and effectiveness of spatial policies, (Richardson 1987: 209) points to some of the more qualitative facets of intervention which might enhance prospects of success. These facets are of utmost importance regarding planning recommendations for South African policy:

a) The Timing of any Intervention is Critical

In the early stages of economic development, spatial policies are relatively impotent in the face of rural dispersion and high concentration in a limited number of urban centres. Industrial decentralization or secondary city policies will waste scarce resources and generally be ineffective unless they are applied at intermediate stages of development. Intermediate stages are probably characterised by regional markets beginning to cross scale economy thresholds, pecuniary diseconomies and congestion emerging in the primate city and core regions, and polarization forces showing signs of weakening spontaneously (ibid).

b) Urban and Rural Development Policies are Complementary and not Alternatives

This debate is particularly arid when applied to countries which are experiencing rapid population growth and modest levels of urbanization, because only comprehensive policies with both urban and rural components will have any chance of success. The extreme views of the pro-urban and pro-rural schools are as follows:

The former school argues that rural outmigration reduces the rural labour surplus, increases agricultural per capita output and that remittances from urban areas help to raise rural incomes. Also, the urban marginal product of industrial labour is higher than that of rural areas, and per capita public service costs are

lower. Urban migration also tends to dampen inflationary tendencies and reinforce agglomeration economies.

The pro-rural school views outmigration as selective in age and skills, resulting in the export of capital. This worsens rural income distribution because remittances correspondingly accrue to the better off rural homesteads. The cost of public services in rural areas may therefore rise. In general this school associates itself with the diseconomies of scale, increasing with city size and growth, and sees inmigration as contributing to lower income levels and greater political instability.

Neither an exclusively rural nor urban focused strategy is desirable - underinvestment in urbanization can result in a restriction of future growth of urban absorptive capacity, and too much investment in urban areas can accelerate urban migration and lower food production per capita indices. As Richardson (1987: 211) puts it:

> A comprehensive spatial strategy needs to be based on the complementarity of metropolitan (especially primate), and other urban and rural development policies. Although this point is increasingly being appreciated by policy makers, the problem of identifying an optimal spatial mix remains, simply because resources are too constrained to allocate all the investment resources needed at each spatial level at each point in time.

c) Promotion of Small Towns and Intermediate Cities (STICS) is a Dominant Theme in Recent Spatial Strategies

In essence, a STIC strategy is supposed to slow down migration to primate cities, chiefly by retaining those who might be tempted to move on up the urban hierarchy. According to Richardson, such a strategy stresses indigenous development such as agro-processing, small-scale industry and the informal sector. Also, it directs more attention to social infrastructure than economi and industrial infrastructure. However, the term "intermediate city" is used rather loosely here. Rondinelli's (1983) definition of secondary cities is preferred - here much larger, diversified centres are envisaged. The differences between secondary cities and intermediate cities and the ramifications of the former are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

d) Policies to Slow Down Primate City Growth may be Justifiable and Effective

Almost all the respondents to the Fifth U.N. Population Inquiry in 1983 had a spatial policy goal of slowing down the growth of the primate city. According to Richardson (1987: 211), there are a few cases where policy makers may be justified in the above question. Firstly, higher per capita absorption costs may off-set agglomeration and efficiency advantages. (This has happened in Karachi - the city is about 60 per cent more efficient than the national average, but 70 per cent more costly.) Secondly,

cities such as Lagos, Mexico City and Cairo have indeed experienced severe congestion costs and communication diseconomies. Thirdly, shelter and service lags may become too severe at high primate city growth rates and implementation difficulties may raise per capita costs. Finally, "a social consensus that the primate city is becoming unacceptably large relative to the national urban system as a whole, may be sufficient justification for intervening" (ibid).

In the final analysis though, Richardson notes that most policies to slow down primacy have been ineffective. The moderate success attained in Cuba was due to chronic underinvestment in the metropolitan capital stock, whilst "success" in Kampuchea was as a result of the forced removal of population. The slowdown in primate city growth in São Paulo, Mexico City, Lima, Cairo and Djakarta has usually been "the result of spontaneous forces or the spill-over of development beyond defined metropolitan boundaries" (ibid).

The above arguments form part of one of the major debates and concerns in regional development planning: that of perceived excessive size and rates of growth of cities.

The city size / primacy debate is so pervasive and important for its policy implications (especially in South Africa), that it merits separate discussion.

THE EXCESSIVE CITY SIZE AND RATES OF GROWTH DEBATE

This elusive problem, also called the "urban externalities" problem, has been discussed in the literature for about two decades, but with little resolution or consensus (Rodwin 1981; Hall 1987). The issue of city size and metropolitan dominance has been repeatedly stressed by South African spatial planners since the 1970s (Dewar 1987: 156). Essentially the debate revolves around the assertion that once cities reach a certain population size, the per capita cost of providing public services increases. It is also held that large and rapidly growing cities exhibit diseconomies of scale, manifest in more crime, pollution, congestion, and so on. This rapid growth is also supposed to have a negative impact on other centres - in other words, primate cities are deemed to be undesirable. It is held that policy intervention will curb this state of affairs.

In order to justify industrial decentralization policies, governments often argue that cities are unable to cope with rapid rates of growth and resultant diseconomies of scale. This begs the question of whether migration to the supposedly too large city can be sufficiently slowed down, usually by a process of industrial decentralization. Besides the aforementioned lack of success with policies to reduce inequalities generally, the track record of specifically industrial decentralization in slowing city growth rates is dismal (Dewar 1987: 155).

The debates surrounding city size occur at two inter-related levels, according to Dewar (1987) and Dewar et al. (1982: 56). These levels are a) the regional (or national) level, where the pertinent issues are whether

growth should be dispersed or concentrated and whether national space should be balanced or not; and b) the local level, where the issue is whether economies of scale (positively correlated with city size) actually outweigh the manifestations of diseconomies of scale such as population, congestion, and the rising cost of social overhead capital (which apparently also set in with increasing city size).

At the regional or national level, the issue is not so much one of size, but of primacy, where the space economy is dominated by one or a few metropolitan areas. Firstly, this is viewed as detrimental because it is seen as having an adverse affect on national economic growth. Secondly, the primate city is accused of appropriating surplus from the peripheral areas, usurping the resources of these areas and exacerbating urban bias in investment (Dewar 1987: 156). There are a number of responses to these assertions:

Evidence suggests that primacy, especially where there are sufficient agglomeration economies, can have a positive effect on the growth rate of GNP (Dewar 1987, Tomlinson 1988). Besides the association between increased primacy and faster GNP growth, there are positive links between the growth of large metropolitan areas and social indicators such as school enrolments, literacy, declining infant mortality, nutritional intake, life expectancy and falling birth and death rates (Richardson 1987).

There is little evidence to support the contention that costs of social overhead capital rise with increasing city size, and the argument that the core "underdevelops" the periphery is dubious and depends largely on one's ideological approach. In any case,

underdevelopment is more a function of political and economic context than spatial form. The policy implication of combating "underdevelopment" by constraining the growth of dominant areas is, as Dewar (1987: 156) says, "unjustifiable, if not downright dangerous. The development problem (sic) is strengthening the weaker areas, not weakening the stronger".

Regarding the accusation of urban bias, Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1988: 19) argue that it is inappropriate to talk of "urban bias" in government policies and plans, because many smaller urban centres have been just as "starved" of public investments as many rural areas. The accusation of urban bias applies not only across relative space, but also in absolute space. This means that many of the inhabitants within large urban areas receive little benefit from or access to wage employment. The above authors and Dewar (1987) suggest that there is little empirical evidence of "urban bias" between and within large (and even intermediate sized) urban areas.

Furthermore, Tomlinson (1988: 20-21) observes that in the first place it is unclear what a policy of removing urban bias means, and that this "removal" does not necessarily promise development in poor or lagging regions. (Growth could merely shift to other attractive areas.) Anyway, considering the political power of white South African farmers, evident in the vast debt burden where 60 000 "white" farming units owe R14 billion, "common sense causes one to imagine that the bias may well have gone the other way" (ibid).

Notwithstanding a spatial bias in investment, governments have often resorted to more direct methods

of influencing settlement. As Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1988: 18) note, the "artificial and repressive controls on migration to large cities, as has been tried in South Africa" are no solution to social and economic inequities. The best way to alter migration flows is to address their causes, such as increasing concentration of agricultural land ownership, soil erosion, drought and low crop prices (which remove rural inhabitants' livelihoods).

There are many other problems in the debate at large: One is the delineation of city (in terms of population and/or area) and municipal boundaries contained in the city. Boundaries may be redrawn, just as regions may be arbitrarily or expediently defined (Gore 1984). "Optimum" city size (where optimum is taken as the maximization of net per capita income) is often determined by the use of cost-benefit analysis. However, determining, measuring and ranking monetary and non-monetary costs, (such as congestion and crime); and benefits such as agglomeration economies and wider consumer choice is highly problematic.

It is essential to adopt a more macro and relational perspective, because the "metropolitan perspective", which looks inward towards possible correlations between city size and per capita income, ignores considerations of whether the city contributes to regional and/or national aggregate efficiency. It is also difficult to determine which ranking of the size of cities, it any, is optimal.

Furthermore, there is no direct relationship between city size and city function, particularly as the urban hierarchy is descended. Anyway, the size-function relationship of cities is altered by the degree of

specialization among cities and the degree of interaction between a node and its hinterland. With regard to costs, Dewar et al (1982: 59) observe that the benefits of agglomeration economies over scale diseconomies have not been satisfactorily costed and evidence for this is inconclusive. In fact, as size increases, both costs and revenues change form, making it even more difficult to determine an optimal city size. As Richardson (1977: 67) says:

> the social costs mainly affect the population, especially the poor, while the agglomeration economies benefit industry. Indeed, in some respects what is bad for households (e.g. rapid immigration) may be good for business firms. The presence of poverty, pollution, inadequate housing and other LDC metropolis symptoms has no direct impact on the attractiveness of these cities to business.

The latter statement is contentious - as has been discovered with regard to decentralization, many entrepreneurs (especially their families), may be reluctant to move to areas where there is poverty, inadequate housing, and so on. In fact, many of these "problems" do not stem from excessive size or growth rates, but from governments' own failure to recover service and facility costs from enterprises located in such cities. Failure to do this means that these enterprises are being subsidised, and that the costs of these externalities are being "dumped" on the poorer groups in the city (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1988: 16).

Despite these cases, the spuriousness of the city argument is well illustrated. Rather than size, it is form, context and structure of the city which are more important considerations (Dewar et al 1982: 59). It must also be recognised that "there is no simple technical solution to the matters in question ... there

can be no single 'best' form of social intervention for the improvement of such structure" (McCarthy and Smit 1984: 1).

The city size and rates of growth issues have generated much debate. Richardson (1977), somewhat ahead of his time, concluded that "the safest course is to exclude city size per se as a guideline for spatial policy". Indeed, empirical studies have shown that it is not cost effective to try and discourage productive investment in large urban centres (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1988: 16). A more pertinent issue is that of how existing activities in cities affect national social and economic development as a whole, and how government policies enhance or counteract this.

It has been noted that spatial policies are comparatively impotent. It is somewhat ironic that at the same time as governments are trying to divert population away from large areas by means of spatial or co-ercive policies, their macro-economic and pricing policies, together with sectoral plans and the tax system may be acting to concentrate new employment opportunities in the larger cities (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1987; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). It appears then that some attention should be directed at not only the size and rates of growth of cities, but also the role of cities per se in regional development, and the accompanying "aspatial" policies.

The Role of Cities in Regional Development

The morass resulting from the above debate would seem to indicate that cities are passe in regional development. On the contrary, "the existence of sizable urban centres seems to be a necessary, (though

not always sufficient) condition for the transition from a basically agrarian economy to an advanced economy with high productivity and a wide range of productive activities - cities are a region's eyes and ears" (Hoover and Giarratani 1984: 338).

Thus, cities are in fact crucial to development. They act as inter-regional points of contact and help to bring people, resources and ideas together in a concentrated fashion. Jacobs (1984: 193) has long championed the cause of cities in development. She sees them as uniquely necessary to economic life, serving as primary developers and expanders. However, cities require continual inputs of energy in two forms: innovations (a function of human insight), and ample replacements of imports (a product of human capacity to make adaptive imitations). "The usefulness of cities is that they supply contexts in which those inputs - insights and adaptations - can be successfully injected into economic life". Jacobs sees the city as the "indispensible hatchery of new jobs and economic advances for society as a whole" (Hill 1988: 302). The importance of the city in a national context has been underestimated - nations are not discrete economic units, "although intellectually we pretend that they are and compile statistics about them based on that goofy premise" (Jacobs 1984: 162). In fact, cities are the specific economic units that can replace imports with their own production, and the specific units that cast up streams of new kinds of exports. "It is bootless to suppose that amorphous, undifferentiated statistical collections of a nation's economies perform those functions, because they don't" (ibid).

In line with chapter two's recommendations to consider both the absolute and relative aspects of space, it

becomes important to discover how cities relate to other cities in the space economy.

As noted earlier, central place theory represents an idealised system of cities, but of course the assumptions of this theory do not apply to many urban activities, including most kinds of manufacturing activity. Furthermore, some of these activities appear to locate without regard to the size of the city (Hoover and Giarratani 1984: 233).

In the real world, location is a (frequently delayed) response to changes in factors such as population, regional income levels, transfer costs and technology. The picture then, is one of dynamically changing equilibrium (Hoover and Giarratani 1984: 211). It does appear though that once a city reaches a substantial size, it develops agglomeration economies which engender further growth.

> If the growth of an urban area persists long enough to raise the area to some critical size (a quarter of a million population?), structural characteristics, such as industrial diversification, political power, huge fixed investments, a rich local market, and a steady supply of industrial leadership may almost ensure its continued growth (Hoover and Giarratani 1984: 204).

Whilst these criteria are important for the growth of a city, the term "ratchet" is a misnomer, in that it indicates an irreversibility of growth beyond a certain critical size. In fact, it is quite possible for cities to fluctuate in size and rate of growth, as a result of a number of factors (as indicated above). The "absolute" dimension of the city has been briefly considered above. The "relative" dimension examines cities vis-a-vis other cities and settlements; in other words, the settlement hierarchy.

The simplest way of describing the settlement or national urban hierarchy, is in terms of the distribution of city sizes and the spatial distribution of city sizes; in other words, inter-urban sizes and distances (Richardson 1977).

There are a number of debates relating to the settlement hierarchy. The major policy debate hinges upon whether it is "desirable, or possible, to promote a fully developed and integrated urban hierarchy in developing countries" (Dewar et al 1986: 141). Proponents argue that such a hierarchy facilitates development such as large-scale industrial development at upper hierarchical tiers, and rural development at lower tiers. Functional urban hierarchies are also seen to help break down colonial or neo-colonial enclave development, and expedite the diffusion of innovations.

Opponents hold that such a policy is inappropriate for developing countries - it is too expensive to distribute resources throughout the hierarchy, and rural demand, accessibility (and indeed development pathologies) are not evenly spread either (ibid).

It is also difficult to establish whether a national urban hierarchy is indeed an inefficient spatial structure. The efficiency of the space economy is determined by the forces of agglomeration economies and diseconomies, and spatial frictions (transport and communication costs and general resistances to spatial interaction) (Richardson 1977: 16). Agglomeration economies induce concentration, whilst diseconomies and spatial friction can promote dispersion. But the relationships between agglomeration economies and city

size, and between spatial and physical distance are neither linear nor regular. (Agglomeration economies such as climate and social amenity have nothing to do with city size, for example. Similarly, different modes of travel erode the correlation between physical distance and spatial friction).

Furthermore, "efficiency" is a function of society's goals. For example, if interregional equity is an important policy objective for a society, then a dispersed urban system might be regarded as highly efficient by that society.

Richardson (1977: 17) sums up:

> Efficiency has to be understood in terms of compatibility with policy goals, both spatial and non-spatial. The result is that there is no unique, efficient, settlement pattern. Efficient national urban hierarchies will vary from country to country simply because the mix of policy objectives and their ranking vary... What constitutes an efficient national urban hierarchy will also change in a given country over time as industrialization advances, as per capita incomes increase, as communication and transportation costs fall and as spatial perceptions change. These arguments suggest that attempts to control and influence city sizes to conform to some preconceived theoretical model (e.g. the rank-size distribution) are usually unsound.

It would appear then that just as was the case with the excessive city size and rates of growth debate, there is lack of consensus as to whether a functional urban hierarchy is essential to development. But neither is there full agreement as to whether planners should intervene in the space economy.

REGIONAL POLICY: TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE?

The next sections pursue the issue of whether South Africa should indeed have a regional policy. More succinctly, the question is whether growth should be diverted from the main core area, the PWV. It will be argued that growth should not so much be diverted, as engendered in a few favourable peripheral areas.

A number of issues thus arise - they are conveniently phrased in terms of questions relating to "pushes and pulls" in the space economy:

a) Should there be a policy push outwards from the core, or is there justification for the city size and rates of growth arguments in South Africa? In other words, is decentralization a valid strategy because South African cities are too big?

b) Are there grounds for intervention because of a pull from peripheral areas? This pull could be in the form of the absolute and/or relative state of socio-economic indicators, such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities (in other parts of the space economy).

c) Are there other factors which invite some form of regional policy?

These questions are now addressed in turn:

a) Is the city size and rates of growth argument valid in South Africa?

It should be quite clear from the preceding discussion that despite the lack of consensus regarding the whole city size and rates of growth debate, there is little rationale for curbing the growth of large cities. To do so is to fly directly in the face of the basic economic dynamics which cause concentration (Dewar 1987: 176). Certainly, in the South African case, the PWV as the primary system of cities, is not experiencing diseconomies of scale (Tomlinson 1986, Bos 1989). In fact, given its resource endowments, and agglomeration economies, it is the best equipped area to deal with "regional problems". This assertion is bolstered by the fact that the cost of creating jobs in the periphery is about four times higher than that in the metropolitan areas (Zille 1984, cited in Dewar 1987: 157). Similarly, for the first five years of its implementation, the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (1967), resulted in the loss of 9,2 jobs for every one created in alternative areas (cited in Bos 1989: 70).

Excessive city size and growth in South Africa is, in fact, something of a red herring - "the PWV is not facing problems related to scale as much as it is the difficulty of overcoming the distinctly inefficient and expensive form of the apartheid city" (Tomlinson 1988: 18).

b) Does the state of socio-economic indicators require intervention in the space economy?

It is clear that poverty, inequality and unemployment are pervasive in peripheral areas. Of course, these problems are not confined to the periphery, but are also manifest throughout the space economy. In the interests of "efficiency" then, it would seem that policy should direct investment to the primary areas, such as the PWV and the coastal metropoles. However, in the pursuit of some form of spatial (and social) equity, it is held that some form of investment should occur away from the core. This does not mean however, that investment should necessarily be co-erced **away from** the core. Rather, the ideal recommendation is to promote development in favoured and selected peripheral areas.

Similarly, as was pointed out in chapter two, spatial equity is no guarantee of social equity. It is largely up to macro-economic and sectoral policies, and legislative and budgetary factors to engender development and bring about social equity. In the end then, there is some compromise of efficiency in favour of some equity. (This is also so because of political demands - for example, politicians clamouring for growth pole status in their representative areas.) An additional motivation for policy intervention arises when one considers the level of poverty, inequality and unemployment obtaining in the space-economy.

Poverty and Inequality

Poverty is pervasive - after deducting household subsistence level from household income, 56 per cent of the black population has no disposable income, including income for housing (de Vos 1986, cited in Tomlinson 1988). This pervasiveness is both spatial and temporal - there is little cause for optimism for a reduction in poverty in a post-apartheid South Africa. As Tomlinson (1988) points out, South Africa is a middle-income developing country, with a per capita GDP of just over $2 000 and a Gini co-efficient of income inequality of 0,57 - the same as that of Brazil and Mexico (Devereaux 1983, cited). Since this value is typical of middle-income countries, the demise of apartheid is unlikely to bring about a wholesale demise in poverty. "What apartheid has done is structure inequality along racial lines rather than actually produce that inequality" (Tomlinson 1988). Although the value of this co-efficient in South Africa is similar to Brazil's and Mexico's, these two centres are marked by very high levels of inequality. Especially when it is noted that the Gini co-efficient of 0,57 applies to only employed households, South Africa has an unacceptably high inequality amongst middle income countries.

Unemployment

The existing and expected unemployment scenarios also point to the need for some kind of remedial action - total unemployment has been rising steadily since 1960. Even without the effects of

sanctions, it will probably rise to nearly 44 per cent by the year 2000. If the sanctions scenario is included, this figure could exceed 55 per cent - this means that at the turn of the century, there could be 9,8 million unemployed people in South Africa, instead of 7,8 million without sanctions (Bethlehem 1988a: 7). Another threat to employment is the lack of investment funds - the rate of increase of real GDP and the growth of employment have been dismal, as shown in the table below.

TABLE 4: GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

	AVERAGE INCREASE PER CENT PER ANNUM						
	REAL		ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION				
			EMPLOYMENT				
PERIOD	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	FIXED CAPITAL STOCK	SKILLED	UNSKILLED	TOTAL	UNEMPLOYMENT	TOTAL
1950-4	4,9	6,2	2,6	2,7	2,7	1,9	2,5
1955-9	4,1	4,9	2,0	2,3	2,2	3,6	2,5
1960-4	5,8	4,4	3,1	1,4	2,0	6,0	2,9
1965-9	5,5	6,1	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,1	3,1
1970-4	4,7	7,1	2,9	2,3	2,5	2,9	2,6
1975-9	2,1	5,2	1,9	0,9	1,3	5,4	2,5
1980-4	2,4	4,3	1,3	1,4	1,4	5,1	2,6
1985-9a	1,5	2,9	1,6	0,7	1,0	5,1	2,5
1990-4a	2,5	3,7	3,0	1,4	2,0	3,2	2,5
1995-9a	2,5	3,7	3,0	1,3	2,0	3,2	2,5

Sources: South African Reserve Bank (b)
Central Statistical Services (b)
National Manpower Commission (b)

Notes: (a) Projected
(b) In respect of historical data only

Cited in Bethlehem (1988: 84)

Unemployment has in fact been a major problem in most industrialized countries since the stagflation experience of the 1970s (Bethlehem

1988; Truu 1977). The South African economy has not been able to contend with population increases and demographic shifts, especially the rapid rate and extent of black urbanization, and this has aggravated the state of black unemployment. Some of the reasons for South Africa's economic failures in the 1980s are the sharp gold price fluctuations, inflationary pressures, difficult external environmental factors which have affected all commodity-based third-world exporters, severely adverse and unusual climatic conditions, and macro-economic stabilization policy errors on the part of the monetary and fiscal authorities (Bethlehem 1988a: 5).

In sum then, the traditional development indicators of poverty, inequality and unemployment are significant and distressing in South Africa. Optimism is reduced when it is considered that the population growth rate is about 2,5 per cent per annum and the rate of increase of urban blacks is 7,5 per cent per annum (Bethlehem 1988a). This means that the economy will not be able to meet the extensive demand for employment and there can be no wastage of scarce factors of production. As stated earlier, the PWV predominates in terms of population, employment and GGP. The PWV is also likely to best be able to tackle these problems, by virtue of its agglomeration economies. Doesn't this mean that the rest of the space economy should be left to the workings of the market? The answer is no, for the reasons discussed in the next section.

c) Other Factors which Invite some form of Regional Policy

As previously noted, spatial and aspatial policies and their effects should not be confused. Regional policy has traditionally been perceived as dealing with the spatial; different from other "aspatial" policies, because it "seeks some explicitly defined spatial effects through spatial means" (Gore 1984: 212). However, as this dissertation has argued, the regional policy net needs to be cast much wider, and it should seek to marry "aspatial" and spatial policies.

Policy intervention has also been justified in terms of efficiency / equity criteria, neo-classical analysis and a structural adjustment programme.

Efficiency / Equity Criteria

Firstly, regional policy may be required to maximise a national welfare function in terms of efficiency criteria (maximisation of growth via optimal allocation of resources); and in terms of equity criteria (reduction of spatial disparities in income, employment and poverty, for example). Provided there are no external diseconomies and structural bottlenecks, and output is able to increase, these efficiency and equity objectives should be compatible (Black et al. 1987).

However, especially in developing countries, such compatability is difficult to achieve, since it is customary for growth to be disequilibrating.

The result is a spatial concentration of resources and the multiplier and accelerator effects which are normally associated with agglomeration economies. The need thus arises for an equity / efficiency trade-off. This can be achieved through a linear programming approach (national growth is maximised only after a minimum level of inter-regional equity has been targeted); or by a cost-benefit exercise which weighs efficiency criteria against a "need" or equity index (Black et al. 1987: 23).

As demonstrated in chapter four, South African regional policy has been based on a welfare function dictated by political considerations rather than by any efficiency / equity mix. However, some element of the latter seems to surface in the Good Hope Strategy, when the strategy assigns "relative development needs" to the different development regions. So, for example, it has been determined that region "D" has the highest relative development need compared to the other eight regions, which indicates a need for policy intervention.

The Neo-Classical Approach

The neo-classical approach typically argues against the need for regional policy. It is assumed that factor mobility will bring about equilibrium. However, regional policy is sometimes motivated in order to rectify obstacles to efficient market functioning, such as licensing arrangements. Policy is also supposed to improve resource mobility, disseminate information, correct imperfections in the money

and capital markets, and remove institutional deficiencies which give rise to monopolistic practices. Black et al. (1987: 25) cite Oates' (1972) theory of fiscal federalism - "resource allocation is often best corrected by means of a **spatially differentiated policy package** which takes account of the peculiar supply and demand conditions in particular areas or regions" (own emphasis). This approach might also entail grants from central to local and regional authorities - this of course warrants more local or regional autonomy.

Structural Adjustment

A third possible motivation for regional policy is as part of a structural adjustment strategy. This would enable a region to adapt to changes in comparative advantage as a result of shifts in demand and supply in international markets. Successful regional policy therefore, is that which enhances emerging comparative advantage, (and arrests declining comparative advantage); and maximises the gains from trade and specialization. This could be achieved through a tax reduction or subsidy, the level of which would correlate desired levels of profit, output and employment; and which could accord with regional differences and comparative cost advantages. Black et al. (1987) cite many studies which provide empirical support for a selective or discriminatory approach to industrialization, (such as has been successfully employed in South Korea and South-east Asia). Again, this illustrates the dangers of applying a blanket approach to the provision of incentives,

such as has occurred in the South African decentralization programme.

Taking Region D as illustrative of the case for regional policy, it is clear that the principle of selectivity would limit policy to the promotion of the textiles, clothing, electrical machinery and other labour intensive industries (Black et al. 1987). These industries have a comparative advantage here, whereas the non-electrical machinery, heavy metals and industrial chemicals industries enjoy comparative advantage in the PWV.

Black et al. (1987) identify three kinds of critical industries in Region D. These are a) key or propulsive industries which have a comparative advantage; b) resource-based industries which process or use regional agricultural or mineral inputs; and c) small-scale industries which produce mostly for local markets in Transkei and the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and East London-King Williamstown-Ciskei markets. The table below shows the ranking of industries in Region D according to a number of criteria.

TABLE 5: RANKING OF INDUSTRIES IN REGION D

INDUSTRY	CRITERIA					
	MARKET POTEN-TIAL	LINK-AGE POTEN-TIAL	COST ADVAN-TAGE	EMPLOY-MENT POTEN-TIAL	EXTER-NAL ECONO-MIES	TOTAL
Textiles	1	2	1	1	1	6
Clothing	1	2	2	2	1	8
Electrical Cables and Conductors	2	1	2	0	1	6
Electrical Appliances	1	1	1	0	1	4
Micro-electronics	2	2	1-2	1-2	2	8-10
Motor Components	1	2	1	1	2	7
Chemical Products	1	0	1	0	2	4
Beneficiation of Agricultural Exports	0-1	2	2	0	1	5-6
Food Processing	2	2	2	1	1	8
Industrial Minerals	1	1	2	1	1	6
Small-scale Manufac-turing	0-1	0-1	1	1	0	2-4

Source: Appendix II and First and Second Interim Reports. Black et al. (1987)

It is thus clear that the industrial centres in the region have a relative advantage in the production of textiles, clothing, electrical cables and conductors, micro-electronics and motor components, and in the processing of food items such as dairy products, meat, vegetables and fruit.

Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage's links with its hinterland enable it to act as a centre for the processing of wool, mohair, skins and hides. The comparative advantage of the smaller centres in Transkei lies in the promotion of timber-based manufacturing and extraction of certain mineral deposits. The latter centres could be seen as an inexpensive means of "countering the backwash effects associated with the proposed expansion of

key manufacturing industries in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and East London-King Williamstown-Ciskei" (ibid: 51).

Other Justifications for Regional Policy

Besides economic considerations, there are other factors which make a case for regional policy. Political differences mean that regional policy, as discussed in chapter two, can be an important placatory instrument for governments. This was one of the major themes of Gore's (1984) work. As Tomlinson (1988: 19) puts it, "regional inequality gives rise to political divisions which are especially potent if the regions correspond to different ethnic groups". Whilst this is not to ignore class issues or simplistically adopt notions of tribalism, it is to say that conflict stemming from regional inequalities is likely to be exacerbated by ethnic and/or class divisions.

The decision whether to embark on a regional strategy or not is also a function of value judgments. Chapter two touched on some of the inherent dichotomies in selecting development strategies (rural-urban, concentration-dispersion and so on). These are fundamental decisions which need to be taken in any regional strategy - as noted previously, notions of "development" are a major informant of any regional strategy and are certainly subject to the value judgements of planners, politicians and intended beneficiaries.

The situation is well summarised by Gilbert (1981: 171-172):

> desirable balance between cities remains in the minds of the politician, planner or academic; value judgments and political commitments are as important in the recommendation of spatial deconcentration and decentralization as technical criteria.

In terms of the above arguments and the writer's own value judgements, it is argued that there is a case for regional policy intervention in South Africa. The next section addresses the possible form of such intervention:

POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF REGIONAL STRATEGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

It has been shown that much of the substance of any regional strategy could contain elements of growth pole theory and the extension thereof (to secondary cities). It will be remembered that it is vital to adhere to the theoretical requirements of growth pole theory; to integrate conceptions of "development" and "space"; and to incorporate the temporal dimension. As Richardson (1987: 198) put it, the required time horizon for any hope of success with growth poles is about twenty years, usually too long for the comfort of most politicians.

Allied to the **duration** of policy is the **timing** of such a policy. Given South Africa's present level of development, secondary cities are probably the best means of engendering development in specific regions (Tomlinson 1988). Secondary cities were briefly introduced in chapter three, the question now is what form they should it take and when they should be promoted.

Secondary Cities in General Terms

It was concluded earlier that secondary cities should be of reasonable size (immediately below metropolitan areas in the urban hierarchy), and contain a significant number of people. Candidates for secondary city status should also have economic potential and should be few in number and judiciously selected. As Hall (1987: 241-242) states:

> I am not opposed to the argument that it may be right to promote second-order centres as growth poles. Since, after a certain point, these cities tend to grow even faster than the leading city, it may be possible to anticipate and encourage this process. However, the evidence - admittedly fragmentary - suggests that only a limited number of such centres, located in the more favoured peripheral regions, will join it.

Also, policy-makers have now realised that decentralization policies have failed because of the lack of sufficiently large and diversified secondary or intermediate cities. It is also thought now that a sectorally balanced industrialization pattern may help to promote equitable growth. This in itself requires both accelerated and expanded development of not only industry, but agriculture and commerce too (Rondinelli 1983).

Despite certain similarities between growth poles and secondary cities, there is the danger that SCs may also suffer from terminological anarchy and therefore be used in the wrong context and for the wrong reasons. SCs should not be confused with intermediate cities. Also, according to Richardson (1987: 213) a programme promoting small towns and intermediate cities should not be confused with a growth centre strategy. Whilst

the latter will promote industrialization and maximum linkages with other sectors,

> a STIC strategy stresses indigenous development, such as agroprocessing, small-scale industry and the informal sector, rather than the attraction of large-scale industry from outside; it builds on the potential interactions between the growth of the city and the agricultural character of its hinterland; and it gives relatively more attention to social infrastructure than to an almost exclusive reliance on economic and industrial infrastructure. This last point suggests that a shelter and services investment programme will be a key component of a STICs strategy. Resource constraints in countries with a sizable number of STICs rule out simultaneous interventions in all cities. The problem can be resolved by selectivity (perhaps initially focusing on a limited set of high-potential centres), replicability (finding out which measures work best - especially institutional and managerial reforms with moderate investment requirements - to permit the rapid diffusion of learning benefits to cities outside the priority set), and phasing (substitution of new cities within the priority set over time to minimize the political costs of a highly discriminatory strategy).

Nevertheless, many of the principles of STICs and SCs are common. Tomlinson (1988: 22) noting Richardson's emphasis on shelter and housing, maintains that this "suggests a potential marriage between a secondary city strategy and an attempt to exploit the benefits from public expenditure on the provision of serviced sites for housing". This means that local (especially construction) industries will be spurred on, and infrastructural investment is much more selective. Furthermore, any state assistance should be geared not to trying to achieve the near impossible (a vast number of self-sustaining growth poles in the outer periphery in small urban centres), but to enable regional firms to help themselves by expanding markets and developing local linkages.

Rondinelli (1986: 198-199) proffers more guidelines for the selection of secondary cities. In the first place, not all SCs should be developed simultaneously, nor must resources be distributed equally amongst them. Secondly, the economies of SCs could be strengthened by extending social overhead capital, strengthening the economic base and employment structure. Also the growth and diversification of selected smaller towns and market centres could be stimulated in order to increase the number and geographic distribution of centres within the national settlement system. Furthermore, the physical, social, economic and political linkages between SCs and other settlements could be bolstered, thereby providing greater access to services and job opportunities.

The planning, financial and administrative capacity of local governments could also be strengthened - in fact, secondary cities have a good chance of success if they are the capitals of federal states (Friedmann and Weaver 1979). This is probably because of the attendant stimulation of the tertiary (and even quaternary) sectors, and the fact that local elites are more likely to contribute to the local economy when they feel they have a stake in it. This may be turned around and applied to the South African case. Whilst noting the reservations of authors such as Bell (1987) regarding the federal option, other authors feel that there is little hope of successful federalism without regional development. As Lombard (1983: 141) would have it:

> The federal approach to the distribution of power would remain no more than an interesting fantasy unless the economic policies of the government succeed in changing the balance of economic

> development between the PWV area on the one hand and the other regions of South Africa on the other, in favour of the latter. To succeed, however, government and public opinion will have to understand and accept that within each sub-region, the normally market-oriented economic processes of nodal industrial agglomeration, geographic migration, economic integration and social and political association cannot and should not be suppressed.

According to Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 5), decentralization (embracing deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization), should not be viewed as a "quick fix" for administrative, political or economic problems.

A more realistic view would be to see decentralization as one of a range of administrative or organizational policies. These policies are intended to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of various levels of government under suitable conditions (ibid: 20). The criteria for successful decentralization include: a limited scope, building on top of existing administrative capacity, a lengthy time horizon or institutionalization (centring around specific financial functions), incremental transfer of responsibility and authority, limited donor involvement, and the inclusion of a training component.

Rondinelli (1983: 380) cites the World Bank - "to be effective, decentralization policies must be applied consistently over an extended period. A stop-go approach which provides private investors with ambiguous signals reduces their willingness to move from the largest cities".

The Timing and Possible Nature of Secondary Cities

In trying to determine the timing of a secondary city strategy it is useful to look at some of the models which describe stages of development. For the purposes of this discussion the descriptions by Hall (1987); Hamer (1985) and Faridad (1981) will be briefly analysed.

Beginning with broader processes, Faridad (1981: 96-97) recognises that "if the national economy develops by way of spatial polarization, this implies that regional problems are an inevitable by-product of growth processes, regardless of whether they receive attention from policy-makers". He notes that although economic reasoning helps to explain economic concentration, it is difficult to explain why after a certain point, development tends to disperse into other regions. The core-periphery model offers a partial explanation. According to this model, development consists of four stages.

The first stage is in pre-industrial societies, where the economy is composed of more or less independent centres. This is followed by industrialization in the second stage, where development is concentrated in a single strong centre, with limited and unidirectional contacts with other centres, and appropriate factors of production are concentrated in the main city. In the third stage, the integration process begins, but remains incomplete, and many undeveloped sub-centres remain. Finally, a functional independent system of cities (or a system based on the structure of the national urban hierarchy), is seen to develop.

According to Faridad, this model still needs to be delineated into concrete testable hypotheses, and the forces behind urban decentralization need to be understood. There are four main factors involved in the process of decentralization. These are urbanization as a result of population growth; increases in the level of income; changes in transport costs; and changes in space preferences. "In other words, the rate of decentralization is determined by the basic forces of development and therefore (it) is a by-product of the development process itself" (ibid: 98).

Hamer (1985b: 40) asserts that the degree of urbanization is closely associated with the rate of economic activity during the early stages of development. As time progresses, there is a systematic shift from resource-based activities to secondary (industrial) and tertiary (service-based) ones. These tend to locate in cities and in towns for the simple reason that productivity is enhanced by the concentration of people and capital, (in other words, agglomeration economies).

The size, number and distribution of cities is also affected by national or regional production patterns. Assuming an adequate resource endowment, urban evolution is likely to follow a predictable pattern. Early urbanization will be linked to servicing agriculture and many of the constraints associated with this level of development will be better overcome in larger centres. As long as these centres are able to produce goods relatively cheaply, there is likely to be little trade between cities and "the development of rapidly growing specialised secondary centres will be postponed" (ibid).

But assuming some public sector competence, development constraints should diminish, production should expand and diversify and other sub-sectors will appear. Metropolitan firms will create branch plants and take advantage of lower land, labour and transport costs. Secondary centres will only begin to emerge as their markets grow, as entrepreneurship within these centres grows, and in response to investment in the city by corporations based in the main centres. Ultimately, these secondary centres begin to specialise in certain activities and are able to lower costs because of agglomeration economies and economies of scale.

Concerning the role of public policy in these stages, Hamer notes that it is "quite useless" to try to force economic activity away from large centres in the early stages of development - during this stage economic activity has to be concentrated. (This is reminiscent of Dewar's (1987) exhortation not to fly in the face of economic forces.) As more infrastructure is established and more experience with industrial processes is gained, so secondary cities can be encouraged, for they will help to maximise national economic growth.

Public policies influence developments in particular cities primarily through the attraction of scarce skills (even if this is not intended). Implicit effects are of course difficult to gauge, but it appears that "any measure promoting a given activity will benefit the urban area in which it is located" (ibid: 41). So, for example, import substitution policies favour concentration of production and population in a major metropolis. It follows that if emphasis shifts away from a protectionist trade regime,

then this could serve to strengthen secondary cities. A time lag would accompany such policies and it would still be difficult for many cities to develop a diversified industrial base. This is because of constraints such as poor access to domestic or international markets, limited infrastructure and uneven distributions of skilled labour.

Nevertheless, reduction in market distortions, implemented to enhance primarily macro-economic performance, would also help to disperse production geographically over the long run. With reasonably uniform and relatively low protection for all sectors, for example, industrial activities would emerge that could provide the basis for the efficient growth of smaller centres. Simultaneously, careful management of the development process would allow for investments that would gradually ease location constraints. In the long run, most cities would be able to accommodate more producers, and modernization would no longer co-incide with growth in one or two centres (ibid: 41).

Hamer essentially repeats the notion that spatial policies cannot be considered independently of "aspatial" policies - spatial patterns of population and employment are the result of these policies, geographic features, and the stage of development; all of which influence the behaviour of firms and households.

Lastly, Hall's (1987: 238) general model of urban development is considered. In the initial stages, movement occurs from less favourable to more favourable areas - from regional periphery to core, from lower to higher metropolitan areas and from suburban ring (often still rural), to urban core. (This approximates

Richardson's "backwash" effect, which is then followed by "polarization reversal"). As corporations in the primate centre grow, they need more land, and this increased demand drives up the price of land. The result is that firms tend to move out to a "deconcentration ring", around the primate city. Growth in this area is more rapid here than in the city, and the city's population diminishes. Second order provincial cities then begin to grow faster and the primacy index falls. Eventually the whole urban system slows down and loses population. Thus rural-urban migration is actually reversed.

Although the model has general applicability, it is dependent on the complex interaction of economic, social, cultural and technical forces in specific contexts. It also appears that the model is less valid and reliable for developing than for developed countries.

Juxtaposing the above three descriptions of urban processes, it could be argued that South Africa is in the latter stages of the core-periphery model. South Africa is now at an intermediate stage of development (Simkins 1979) and polarization forces in the PWV are beginning to weaken spontaneously (Geyer 1987) (both authors cited in Bos 1989: 59).

It should be noted that although the PWV is relatively dominant, South Africa cannot really be considered as having a particularly primate distribution. In fact, South Africa has the ninth lowest degree of urban concentration compared to that of 125 other countries (Renaud 1979).

Hall (1987: 2) does note however that deconcentration from the first order city may precede accelerated growth of second-order cities. Any policy intervention should therefore aim firstly to run with the trend and promote deconcentration. This could be followed by early promotion of second-order centres and then finally to support spread effects into rural and small city hinterlands. This means that a secondary city strategy could be supported in South Africa, beginning in the next few years.

Care must be taken to assess the effects of existing policies. South Africa has a reasonably well-developed urban hierarchy, but the Government's "orderly urbanization strategy" has been criticized from many quarters. Its general objective is aimed at the "positive handling, management and stimulation of the natural urbanization processes in order to ensure that they come to pass in a constructive and planned manner to the benefit of everyone, with due consideration for the means and needs of South Africa in general and the RSA in particular" (Informa 1986: 6).

The "abandonment" of influx control was supposed to usher in a new era of urbanization strategy. As Friedman (1988: 31), puts it, the government's "latter attempt to dictate settlement revolves around anti-squatting, slums and group areas bills. This represents an attempt to regulate black urbanization rather than stop it".

Friedman (ibid) maintains that despite this goal of "orderly urbanization", Government interference and control has in fact made urbanization disorderly:

Author Boshoff Brian Charles
Name of thesis Industrial decentralization and regional development in South Africa. 1989

PUBLISHER:
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
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