

✓ ADLER

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
Title: Of Shop Floors and Rugby Fields: The Social Basis of  
Auto Worker Solidarity.

by: Glenn Adler

No 366

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND  
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL RESEARCH  
10001 GERMISTON, SOUTH AFRICA  
TELEPHONE 011 717 1211  
FACSIMILE 011 717 1212  
ELECTRONIC MAIL: IASR@WITWATERSRAND.AC.ZA

# Uitenhage, Residential and Industrial Areas, c. 1970



## I. INTRODUCTION\*

Athol Fugard, John Kani, and Winston Ntshona's 1972 play, *Sizwe Bansi is Dead*, opens with the main character, Styles, sitting in his photographic studio in Port Elizabeth's New Brighton township, reminiscing about working at Ford some years before. He recalls the time when the General Foreman, "Baas" Bradley informed the workers about special duties for the day: they were to conduct an unprecedented "General Cleaning" of the factory. For hours the men struggled to remove accumulated dirt and oil from the machines and the factory floor. They were then handed brushes and were ordered to paint lines on the floor indicating danger areas, a concern for safety not previously shown by the company. Finally, they were ordered to take showers, and were provided with hitherto unknown luxuries such as hot water, soap and real towels, and were then given new overalls, tools, aprons, and gloves.

Finally "Baas" Bradley gathered the workers together to explain their unusual work regimen, using Styles as translator:

"Tell the boys in your language, that this is a very big day in their lives.'  
 'Gentlemen, this old fool says this is a hell of a big day in our lives.'  
 The men laughed.  
 'They are very happy to hear that, sir.'  
 'Tell the boys that Mr Henry Ford the Second, the owner of this place is going to visit us. Tell them Mr Ford is the big Baas. He owns the plant and everything in it.'  
 'Gentlemen, old Bradley says this Ford is a big bastard. He owns everything in this building, which means you as well'....  
 'Styles, tell the boys that when Mr Henry Ford comes into the plant I want them all to look happy. We will slow down the speed of the line so that they can sing and smile while they are working.'  
 'Gentlemen, he says that when the door opens and his grandmother walks in you must see to it that you are wearing a mask of smiles. Hide your true feelings, brothers. You must sing. The joyous songs of the days of old before we had fools like this one next to me to worry about.' [To Bradley] 'Yes sir!'"<sup>1</sup>

The great man's visit is an anti-climax: Ford peers in from the factory door, abruptly returns to his waiting car and drives off. But if the visit was over, the working day was not: management immediately ordered the line speed doubled, pushing the workers to make up production lost during the general cleaning. Styles, angry at the games he must play to retain such a job, resentful of being "treated like a monkey," decides to leave wage labor behind him, and opens up his own business.

The fictional Styles opts out of factory life, and takes his chances in the lower petite-bourgeoisie of independent township entrepreneurs. The character is in part modelled on John Kani's actual experiences as a worker at Ford; Kani, of course, quit Ford to become one of the most accomplished actors in modern South African theater. But Styles' decision illustrates the limited choices available to black workers as a whole in the auto plants in the late 1960s. Blacks in general, and Africans in particular, received poor wages for performing the worst jobs, and faced virtually unbridled supervisory despotism. For coloureds, the promise of union protection was still some years away, while Africans were to wait another decade for rights of union representation. It was only in the years after 1968 that African activists at Volkswagen even dared speak privately about unions. Opting out was not an act of opportunism, but of desperation; the only alternatives were either the false face of the smiling, minstrel-like puppet Styles was forced to become, or waiting patiently until conditions changed and some kind of union activity became possible again.

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\*This paper is drawn from two chapters of my doctoral thesis, "The Factory Belongs to All Who Work In It: Race, Class, and Collective Action in the South African Motor Industry, 1967-1986," Columbia University, 1994.

In June 1980, barely a decade after the events portrayed in the first scene of *Sizwe Bansi is Dead*, Volkswagen workers embarked on a strike which could only have appeared as an unattainable fantasy to workers in the 1960s. In constructing their union, the workers provided themselves with the possibility of another option beyond the narrow range offered to Styles and his brothers. To opting out, selling out, or minstrelsy was added the choice of achieving individual aims by joining a collective force in pursuit of collective goals.

The 1980 Volkswagen strike was a watershed in the development of the autoworkers' union. Moreover, the Volkswagen workers' mass action was all the more unusual because workers were successful: they maintained discipline and were able to marshal their collective force with a negotiation strategy which could yield positive results. But most unusual of all was that their solidarity crossed the dividing lines defined by the government-imposed racial classification system: Africans joined with their coloured co-workers in industrial action and mass protest. The 1980 strike demonstrated a rare cross-race solidarity in contrast to unionizing efforts elsewhere in the country, including the one developing in the automobile plants down the road in Port Elizabeth, where workers fractured on lines of race, leading to years of bitter recriminations and internecine battles between unionists. Nowhere else in the motor industry had the union achieved such clear unity across racial lines. Despite its importance, such cross-race unity has been taken for granted in all accounts of the union and the labor movement itself. The basis of this solidarity is the subject of this paper.

In doing so, it will - for reasons of space - deemphasize shop-floor and broader social and political factors giving rise to militance which were, roughly speaking, similar for both coloured and African workers. Instead, it will emphasize social processes which help to explain why such militance was expressed in a non-racial manner uniting coloureds and Africans. A number of important social relationships, shaped in large part by the legacy of the uneven application of apartheid in Uitenhage, bridged racially defined community divides and brought coloured and African workers into close personal contact at work and off-work. Through these relationships both ordinary workers as well as labor activists came to identify each other as familiars rather than strangers, enabling them to devise a politics of solidarity that defied the statutorily defined racial categorizations. Non-racial unionism did not arise simply because workers shared similar grievances that enabled them to act collectively, but in large part because particular social movement activists were able to help workers define their problems in a non-racial way, and to provide non-racial class-collective solutions for these problems.

## II. SOCIAL MOVEMENT EXPLANATIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

One of the great difficulties in explaining collective action in South Africa - as elsewhere - is the tendency to separate macro-level or structural explanations from more agency-based and voluntaristic accounts of political and social events. In terms of theories of social movements, most explanations of collective action fall within the sphere, respectively of theories of New Social Movements (NSM), and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT).<sup>2</sup>

NSM stresses larger structural processes which give rise to social movements and which shape the movements' ideological character. In large part, NSM sees social movements as a product of the transition from industrial capitalism and modernity to post-modernity and post-materialism. Not only do these movements take up qualitatively new demands, but they do so in a qualitatively different manner. Eschewing participation in established bureaucratic structures and institutions (usually, though not exclusively including party systems), these movements prefer forms of mass mobilization, direct action, and participatory models of democracy: a new form of politics supposedly characteristic of post-modern societies.<sup>3</sup>

RMT, on the other hand, focuses more on the internal life of social movements. Writers in this tradition spend less time analyzing the effects of social and political structures on movements; based on the assumption that grievances exist in all societies at all times, they prioritize the way organizations are created to mobilize such potential.<sup>4</sup> RMT thus examines the creation of social movement organizations

(SMOs), the activists/entrepreneurs who create and staff such organizations, and the resources they create and use in pursuit of their goals.

Neither approach, however, does a satisfactory job of addressing the problem of structure and agency. According to Klandermans and Tarrow, NSM "too easily assumes that mobilization potentials form spontaneously through societal developments," ignoring the fact that social movements themselves play a role in shaping peoples' ideas which impel them towards mobilization. On the other hand, RMT focuses too narrowly on how social movements mobilize, but largely ignores how changes in social structure create potentials for mobilization.<sup>5</sup> Stated another way, NSM too often tends to view collective action as a mysterious reflex "exploding," "emanating," or otherwise arising unexplained from structural conditions, while RMT may tend to emphasize activists creating their politics little constrained by external conditions.

Klandermans and Tarrow argue that an integration of the two approaches is necessary to understand "how the potential for social movements which emerges from the social and political structure...is *translated* into social and political action." They hope to illuminate processes which intervene between structural change and the activities of social movements.<sup>6</sup> Klandermans has developed the concept of "consensus mobilization" to account for social movements' efforts to help potential members interpret the grievances arising from structural change. Consensus mobilization will involve at the outset the movement helping people to identify the source of their grievance in systemic rather than personal terms, and to accept that systemic solutions are required. Furthermore, movements modify people's views of their grievances and, most importantly, what they can do about them; movements must facilitate what McAdam refers to as "cognitive liberation," a crucial step in motivating individuals to act.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the most important way in which consensus mobilization occurs is through what McAdam has labelled the "micromobilization context," which he defines as "that small group setting in which processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce mobilization for collective action."<sup>8</sup> Recruits to social movement activism are seldom drawn out of the blue, so to speak, but are instead already integrated into preexisting social networks conducive to mobilization.<sup>9</sup> Such networks provide "rudiments of organization" for a nascent movement, such as leadership, communication infrastructure, and other means which are necessary conditions for action. "As preexisting groups," McAdam argues, "these contexts provide the established roles and lines of interaction necessary for action to unfold." More subtly, and more importantly, these micromobilization contexts "supply the established structures of solidary incentives on which most social behavior depends....the myriad interpersonal rewards that attend ongoing participation in any established group."<sup>10</sup> Social movement activists may "appropriate" the established associational networks and emotional ties to such organizations and transfer them to the new movement.

McAdam's insight is to show how such micromobilization contexts link macro conditions favorable to mobilization to individuals' decisions to participate. Through the strong interpersonal ties already existing in micromobilization contexts, social movement activists are in a better position to produce "cognitive liberation." In such contexts potential recruits to the movement are not meeting strangers, but activists whose credentials are previously established in the group. Not only is such trust important, but recruits may also feel loyalty to the group and to leaders which facilitates their acceptance of ideas, and this may provide a subtle pressure against deviation. Thus, while previously developed attitudes favorable towards the movement may "push" a recruit towards activism, "a prior history of activism and integration into supportive networks acts as the structural 'pull' encouraging the individual to make good on his or her strongly held beliefs."<sup>11</sup>

The organizations and networks McAdam identifies do not have to be political in nature, nor do recruits have to be members of organizations. Micromobilization contexts may be formal organizations, formal or informal communication networks, and interpersonal networks. They may occur in all spheres of life: religious, school, youth group, or sporting bodies, as well as in ethnic, gender, and community groups. What is important is that through such prior engagement recruits will have already been introduced as part of apparently "normal" (i.e. natural) and "acceptable" activity to movement-like

organizational practices and rudimentary forms of collective action. In this way the existing, relatively non-controversial collective fabric of society provides the foundation on which activists build social movements.

The concept of micromobilization context helps to explain the way social movements translate structural possibilities into concrete action. For present purposes, it provides a crucial conceptual bridge which allows an explanation of the problem defined at the outset: how African and coloured auto workers came to act together, defining themselves as a "we," as a collectivity with certain shared meanings, identities, and interests, which could be translated into collective action.

### III. FACTORY FLOOR ORGANIZATION IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

#### *A. BLACK WORKERS' ENCOUNTERS WITH RACIAL DESPOTISM*

When Elijah "Scoma" Antonie first entered the Volkswagen factory in February 1960, just one month before the Sharpeville emergency, Africans made up a small percentage of the VW workforce, and were confined to the most menial tasks in the factory. White supervision ruled the factory with an iron fist. Scoma was appalled by the blatant favoritism and discrimination:

When I was introduced in that department it was said to me, "You see these whites who are standing here, they are all your foremen. Even if a white man says you must go and pick up shit, you must go and pick it up."

His first reaction was aggressive: "I will never pick up shit. I have come to work here. If a white man has done shit, it is for him to pick up that shit." Scoma was not alone. Though workers were quiescent during the 1960s, they were certainly not content with their lot. Fury lay under the surface calm.

Vuyo Kwinana entered the factory only in 1972. But when he arrived, he was told by his foreman that blacks cannot go to the toilet any time they pleased. "I have got to register my name according to the alphabet. A goes first to the toilet, then B second, then C third in order." On his first day Kwinana made a decision:

I felt on that particular day, "I am not fit to work here." Half-past four will be too far for me to stretch, but I made it an option to stay in this department, clean out the waste, and throw it out the window.

Both Scoma and Kwinana entered the factory with ideas which predisposed them to reject such practices. When he joined Volkswagen, Kwinana had been a member of the ANC underground since 1957, and had served a two-and-a-half year prison term in the 1960s for being a member of the banned organization. Kwinana's father had been a leading - though conservative - figure in the ANC in East London, before the family moved to Uitenhage in 1951.<sup>12</sup> Vuyisile Tole was one of the activists who had recruited him into the underground; Tole had been a worker at Uitenhage's Fine Wool Products [Veldspun] and had been dismissed during a locally celebrated 1955 strike.<sup>13</sup> He had learned his trade unionism - and was himself recruited into the ANC and MK - via Raymond Mhlaba of the ANC and SACP and Themba Paulos of the ANC and TWIU.

Scoma had not been a member of the ANC, but he had gained an understanding of trade unions through lectures on the ANC and SACTU given by Zola Nqini, a local ANC and SACTU activist. He had also heard stories about the exploits of TWIU unionists and their strike against Fine Wool Products in December 1955.<sup>14</sup> Both Scoma and Kwinana developed second thoughts about confronting the Volkswagen foremen directly. Scoma was counselled by an older, more experienced worker:

There was an ex-teacher who used to work in that department, and he called me to one side and said, "Hey, you've got to be very careful. You should go slow, because most of

the chaps here are very weak and they can sell you openly to these whites." And I was wearing a school blazer then. Then as time goes on, I checked my way, how to make these people aware that a trade union is very useful.

Scoma adopted a wise policy, given the era. From the beginning of the industry in the 1920s through to the 1970s, foremen possessed vast discretionary powers, including the right to grant incremental wage increases for workers, and most significantly, the power to hire and fire. It made little difference that for most of its history white workers formed the bulk of the labor force in the motor industry: supervisorial despotism was a hallmark of the industry irrespective of the racial composition of the workforce.

## ***B. THE FORMATION OF NUMARWOSA AND THE UAW***

The conditions Scoma described in the 1960s did not begin to change until after an Industrial Council was established for the Eastern Cape motor industry in 1969. Oddly enough, the first breach in the wall of management authority was made by the white *Yster en Stal Unie*, which managed to use access to the National Party and the Minister of Labour and threats of imposing Job Reservation to win union recognition in 1967 and the subsequent establishment of an Industrial Council. The existence of an IC for the industry meant that the legal space existed to bring coloured workers into the same framework, and in 1967 the Trade Union Council of South Africa [TUCSA] sponsored an effort to organize coloured automobile workers in Port Elizabeth.<sup>15</sup> Within months factory-level organizing committees had been established at the three Port Elizabeth motor plants, Ford, General Motors, and Rover, and a new union was launched: the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa [NUMARWOSA].

Discriminatory practices on wage rates, promotions, and working conditions were foremost in workers' minds. Each of the organizing committees set about building on these grievances to create a wider base within their respective plants. At first they attempted to create a network of contacts in different factory departments. Most contact people, while not resistant to the idea of a union, were reluctant to meet, even secretly. They viewed a unionizing drive with considerable suspicion, remembering the bannings, treason trials, and other repression meted out to activists. Among those who were interested, few individuals were willing to take a leadership role. The factory organizers quickly identified a strategy to overcome workers' reluctance; they identified and engaged senior long-service workers who had some standing in the factory and in the coloured community, such as ex-teachers and rugby stars, and who were able - within the limits of the time - to stand up to foremen. The factory committee activists recruited such elder workers on an individual basis, and by bringing them into the project, eased entry for other workers who identified with them.

As the organizing base grew, every department would have one or two volunteers helping the organizing committee. These individuals would emphasize the workers' concrete grievances, especially regarding foreman and pay, rather than broader political issues. Their efforts were in part facilitated by the legality of their initiative: though workers were certainly opening themselves up to victimization, their recruitment to NUMARWOSA did not contravene any existing laws. Finally, the activists would not expose any names to management until they had enrolled a substantial majority of the workforce.

Starting in mid-1967 it took less than a year at Ford to sign up more than 50% of the coloured workforce. The union began holding regular general meetings in the community for the new membership. In April 1968, after ten months of organizing, the union elected an interim branch committee to administer the union's affairs, a leadership that could come out publicly as advocates of the union. After it became a formally registered union and gained entry to the IC in 1971, NUMARWOSA leaders began planning a more ambitious strategy of national industrial unionism. As it was slowly elaborated over the years 1971-1973, the strategy entailed an extension of its organizing efforts to Durban and the Transvaal, mergers with other unions organizing automobile workers, and the commitment to organizing on a non-racial basis.<sup>16</sup>

NUMARWOSA's Executive Council took its first policy decision to approach African workers in late 1972.<sup>17</sup> Its initial attempts were unsuccessful, partly because its organizing efforts were dissipated

across Port Elizabeth, East London and Uitenhage, and partly because, before the 1973 Durban strikes, there was no national impetus supporting African worker organization.

Moreover, there were significant legal obstacles: as a registered union, NUMARWOSA could not have African members. The union initially sent stop order forms to the companies they thought would enroll African workers, hoping to create a *fait accompli*. Management rejected this approach, and NUMARWOSA's leaders had to find ways to bypass the legal restrictions on African representation in registered unions. In April 1973, the union adopted a familiar strategy through which coloured and white unions had long dominated African workers: it established a parallel union, the United Automobile, Rubber, and Allied Workers Union of South Africa [UAW].

The aim behind the new approach was to organize Africans until the UAW's strength was comparable to NUMARWOSA's and then to merge the two organizations once the legal situation allowed such a move. In contrast to the typical TUCSA parallel union, whose leaders were appointed by the executive of the all-white union, the UAW would have leaders elected by the members, and a separate executive which could take decisions on behalf of the membership. The two unions held joint meetings, and formed a combined Advisory Council on which sat representatives from the executives of both organizations.<sup>18</sup> The UAW was never seen by NUMARWOSA as a means of control over Africans, nor as a permanent structure, but as nothing more than a tactical device for organizing Africans into one union of auto workers, once the legal climate permitted. Though UAW could not yet have recognized shop stewards on the factory floor, its leaders functioned as *de facto* stewards, who would be brought into NUMARWOSA's existing structures after the two unions united. The merger would finally occur in October 1980: NUMARWOSA, UAW, and the WPMWU joined to form the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union [NAAWU], the first truly national industrial union within the emerging union movement.<sup>19</sup>

### C. FACTORY FLOOR ORGANIZATION AT VOLKSWAGEN

Volkswagen began hiring coloureds only in 1968, and NUMARWOSA immediately began organizing them.<sup>20</sup> In May 1969 more than 50% of the coloureds at Volkswagen were organized, and NUMARWOSA was soon formally recognized by management. At that point, Volkswagen management took the extremely rare step of introducing a Liaison Committee as a forum to address minor grievances of African workers. Though Volkswagen workers would soon challenge its structure, the Liaison Committee at first operated as in other companies in South Africa: worker members and the secretary, Elias Jonas, were appointed by management, rather than elected by the workers.<sup>21</sup>

By contrast to NUMARWOSA's rapid gains among coloured workers, the process of organizing African workers was slow and painstaking, given their exclusion from the Labour Relations Act. Albert Gomomo was a worker in the Printing Department, which was in the area adjacent to Scoma, who worked in Dealer Aids. Gomomo had been a local activist in the PAC before it was banned, and had worked at the Gubb and Inggs woolwashery in the 1950s before coming to Volkswagen. Gubb and Inggs was near the Fine Wools plant, and Gomomo had been exposed to the TWIU activists who once organized in that plant. He was thus knowledgeable about trade unions and had a clear political perspective before coming to Volkswagen. Scoma did not know Gomomo, but Gomomo knew him, as Scoma was a player on the Swallows rugby club, which Gomomo served as an official.

Gomomo approached Scoma, and their first discussions focused on rugby. Only later did they focus on ANC and PAC politics. But Gomomo gradually encouraged Scoma to come forward and take a more active role in building organization at Volkswagen. The workers' mounting complaints about the Liaison Committee spurred them to discuss trade unionism.

Their first step was to talk with other workers in their respective departments whom they knew and trusted. Sometimes they would talk during lunch, or outside the factory after work in shebeens. They targeted other elder workers who had some experience of the ANC and PAC in the 1950s, and who had some experience in the trade union movement at that time. In their forays around the plant they would often encounter such workers, as many Volkswagen employees had worked at Fine Wools as their



first job. Mongameli Davids and a Mr. Ndingane were among the first to enter the network. They were, on their own initiative, working in a similar fashion in their own departments, finding three or four like-minded workers to engage in regular discussions. They worked secretly, linking back to Gomomo, in a cell system somewhat analogous to that developed in political struggle in the late 1950s.

In developing their organization, the network members discussed their general approach. They wanted to build a union, but realized that such a task was impossible for African workers at that time. They also developed their own critique of the failings of SACTU, in particular of its close links to the ANC, which saw committee members of the one organization serving on the committee of the other. As Scoma put it,

That is a mistake. If the ANC is banned, it stands to reason SACTU is also going to be banned. Now in order to avoid that, we did not want to align ourselves with the ANC directly. We wanted to be an independent body.

Independence paid another dividend: the nascent organization was non-partisan, and attracted activists from the camps of both exile organizations, as well as apolitical workers. Furthermore, the political independence of the initiative helped reduce ordinary workers' fears of joining an organization whose membership could be construed as "political." The early 1970s were so repressive that even a hint of connection to the banned liberation movements could result in intervention by the security police; the union's political strategy helped remove their efforts from the political field, and altered ordinary workers' calculus of participation in favor of engagement.

After the Liaison Committee was introduced, and workers became disenchanted with what they perceived as the stooge-like behavior of the management-appointed workers, the secret network came upon the idea that they could take over the Liaison Committee as a first step towards developing a union. Gomomo secretly introduced Scoma to contacts in other areas of the factory, canvassing them about putting him onto the Committee to ensure that such a step would not be seen as selling out to management. Gomomo recruited his younger brother, John Gomomo, as another candidate for the Committee.<sup>22</sup> Both Scoma and John Gomomo had excellent work records, so neither could be easily victimized, and they were not members of the banned political organizations. They could come forward as acceptable public fronts for the growing network.<sup>23</sup>

Scoma and Gomomo approached management to complain about the behavior of the management appointees to the Liaison Committee, and won the right to elect African workers to the structure. In 1971 both became members of the Committee, and once elected, they were able to win the appointment of a new secretary, Elcott Rhoxa, a staunch member of their circle. From the Liaison Committee they began to take up workers' grievances, operating as quasi-shop stewards. Much of their time was occupied fighting unfair dismissals and job upgrading cases, but they also pushed the company to finance community creches, a scholarship scheme for workers' children, and a sports stadium for Kwanobuhle township.

Targeting the Liaison Committee was strategically wise. Volkswagen had itself established the committee, and it was less threatening to management to mobilize workers around its inadequacies than it was to organize a union. Ordinary workers would feel more comfortable enlisting in the project, as their fear of victimization by management was reduced. In this way, the activists' strategy helped reduce an important obstacle for ordinary workers to join the organization.

The takeover of the Liaison Committee did not occur in a vacuum. From Scoma's first days on the Committee he had begun discussions with Chris "Papa" Williams, then NUMARWOSA President, and one of the strongest advocates in the union for the new policy of organizing Africans. Williams had been involved in non-racial rugby as a coach and manager, and, fortuitously, frequently found himself working in Albert Gomomo's department at Volkswagen. Through Gomomo the NUMARWOSA President was in close contact with the growing informal network among African workers. Scoma also had a number of close friends among coloured workers, against whom he played in local friendly rugby matches, and whom he knew from rugby administration. Through them he met the other

NUMARWOSA shop stewards and began to cement friendships. The NUMARWOSA shop stewards and the insurgent Liaison Committee members began to meet regularly prior to Committee meetings, to discuss the agenda, and to ensure that the subject matter of the Liaison Committee did not undermine what the union was simultaneously negotiating with management. In this way the coloured union ensured they would not be undercut by African workers, and also that workers would present a united front to management. Their joint work developed to the point where the NUMARWOSA shop steward and the Liaison Committee members met routinely to discuss all matters brought up before management.

These informal joint meetings were in place by 1973 when NUMARWOSA decided to form the UAW. Indeed, as Williams was one of the stronger advocates of the NUMARWOSA policy, it is highly likely that his experience with Gomomo and the other African workers at Volkswagen influenced his thinking on the broader union policy, as he had very direct and practical experience that such bonds could in fact be built.

With the creation of the UAW - at least on paper - the NUMARWOSA activists began wooing African workers. At Volkswagen the policy proceeded slowly, as the shop stewards invited the Liaison Committee insurgents to the NUMARWOSA offices in Port Elizabeth, and to the coloured union's offices in Uitenhage to discuss their joint problems. Slowly the idea developed that the Liaison Committee could serve as a base from which to organize African workers into the UAW, and seek some form of recognition from management.

The social networks, which were the foundation on which the union grew, were not limited to those between coloured activists in NUMARWOSA and Africans on the Liaison Committee. As the network Gomomo constructed was non-partisan, it intersected the ANC's clandestine cell system. Working underground, Congress members in Volkswagen strove to build the UAW by encouraging those within their influence to join.<sup>24</sup>

As Vuyo Kwinana reflected,

We knew NUMARWOSA was very powerful as a trade union. We had no doubts about it, but our main purpose was to bring the black workforce over to NUMARWOSA's side....We fully influenced our people to join UAW and join NUMARWOSA.

Kwinana had no problems building a union which was politically "independent" from his own organization, nor was he under instructions to penetrate Volkswagen. But after experiencing discrimination in the company, he decided to help organize the workforce:

I had to contact my organization afterwards, and told them about the plight of the workers. Then they said, "Do influence the workers as much as possible. We will try and assist you if we can." So my work was to destroy the Liaison Committee and establish a trade union at VW. That was my prime duties as an ANC worker, as an ANC member.

Through workers like Kwinana the cells influenced the Liaison Committee members to "motivate them what direction to take, what strategy to apply."

A cell member would secretly approach workers in his department whom he trusted and, after talking with them at length, would encourage them to move into other areas of the factory, from where they would remain in touch with him on a regular basis. Kwinana described the typical manner in which the cells - without announcing their identity - would influence workers:

Scoma is in my department. He reports to me practically every day what their plans are in the Liaison Committee. We in turn, investigate from NUMARWOSA, because a friend of mine is...a coloured shop steward at Body Shop. He draws information from

this coloured chap, and bring them to us. And we sit down to analyze the information brought by this coloured and to the Liaison Committee we said, "This is wrong. These people must not move this way, they must move this direction." And then we start to influence now and encourage the Liaison Committee to move in this line.

These individuals almost never became shop stewards or office-bearers of the union, but instead kept a low profile as ordinary workers on the floor, from where they could quietly exert their influence by discussing issues with other workers.

Themba Dyassi was a central figure in the clandestine system. He was a member of Kwinana's cell, and a welder in the Body Shop. He first became involved in politics at school in the late 1940s, and after being expelled found work in Uitenhage with a building contractor, but lost his job in the victimization which followed the November 1952 Port Elizabeth stay-at-home.<sup>25</sup> After finding work at Goodyear in Uitenhage, he entered the ANC cell structures, from where he was eventually recruited into MK. He was arrested in April 1964 while preparing to leave the country for military training. Sentenced to 2 1/2 years for membership in the ANC, he served most of his time on Robben Island, where he decided that upon his release he would return to factory work and attempt to build trade unions. In 1967 he got a job at GKV in Uitenhage, and after a brief spell back at Goodyear took a job at Volkswagen in late 1974. Dyassi deliberately avoided taking a leadership role in the union, and especially avoided becoming a shop steward. He preferred to remain on the line:

Being a shop steward is a very difficult job because most of the time you are at the offices. But being a worker, we are amongst workers. You can actually see what is happening. Being a shop steward you are told what was happening there at the work place.

From his position on the floor Dyassi could directly influence workers in his area, bring them into the union, and mediate between ordinary workers and the stewards. He recruited promising individuals into the union and into the ANC underground structure, and provided valuable political education and discipline, especially to younger members. He was part of the bedrock structure of both the union and the ANC: both organizations' direct link to ordinary workers whom the movements wanted to mobilize.

The ANC cell network operated inside the factory, during lunch times and breaks, and outside the factory in the townships.

We met informally outside the factory in the cell structure....we would ask a chap from VW, especially the coloureds, to come and drink with us over the Saturday, then we start questioning him, "What do you think about this and that?" We found that, more or less, they are very positive, they want to work closer, and sympathized greatly with the African. So we saw very fertile ground for us to influence them.

The coloured worker would not have been aware that he was meeting with the underground; as far as he understood, he was meeting ordinary Volkswagen workers in a social gathering at which they "talked shop." Through these networks the cell members gained a broad purchase on developments inside Volkswagen, and given the members' commitments to building the union, solidified its presence in the factory.

In Volkswagen NUMARWOSA developed something it lacked in virtually all its other workplaces: extremely close links between its leaders and prominent African workers who had legitimacy in the eyes of the African workforce. These connections made it far easier to present the idea of developing the UAW, which was, after all, a parallel union that could easily be construed as part of an oppressive strategy by coloured workers to dominate Africans. To have workers like Albert Gomomo and Vuyo Kwinana as advocates of the UAW helped clear away any misgivings about the organization's *bona fides*.

For reasons which remain unclear, the organizing drive only got started in 1975, perhaps because

of NUMARWOSA's preoccupation with withdrawing from TUCSA. But the Liaison insurgents affiliated to the UAW launched another drive between 1976 and early 1977. Volkswagen management was well aware that the Liaison insurgents were organizing a union, but they had no idea how successful the drive had been. They were soon to find out. In mid-1977 an unlikely pair of visitors appeared at the plant one day to meet the Managing Director, Peter Searle and Ollie Rademeyer, the Industrial Relations Director. The delegation consisted of Werner Thonnessen, Assistant General Secretary of the International Metalworkers Federation, visiting South Africa for meetings of the South African Coordinating Council of the IMF, and Johnny Mke, President of the UAW. It was no mere courtesy call: Thonnessen and Mke brought with them stop order forms signed by more than 60% of Volkswagen's African employees. Management quickly decided that UAW was supported by the African workers, and recognized it. Thus, well before the Wiehahn labor law reforms were announced, Volkswagen recognized the UAW, gave them stop-order facilities, and scrapped the Liaison Committee. To comply with existing law the members' stop orders were technically defined as contributions to a burial fund.

The four insurgent members of the Liaison committee immediately stood for election as UAW shop stewards, entering the structure established by the coloured union in the early 1970s. Scoma and John Gomomo were elected to the corps of 4 UAW and 4 NUMARWOSA stewards,<sup>26</sup> and were taken on shop steward training courses conducted by NUMARWOSA.<sup>27</sup> The two unions shared offices, held joint meetings, and made decisions together in a Branch Executive Committee which included elected representatives from both. UAW observers sat with NUMARWOSA in the Industrial Council, and together they plotted their strategy there. By the following year they were discussing strategies for merging the two unions. Thus, on the shop floor, the Liaison Committee insurgents - now recast in the role of UAW shop stewards - and the NUMARWOSA activists were realizing the strategy developed within NUMARWOSA in 1972-73 to build one non-racial industrial union of automobile workers.

What made the Volkswagen experience unusual is that at no other plant in the entire country did NUMARWOSA-UAW succeed in unifying coloureds and Africans into a single unit. At Ford a racial division of labor meant that coloureds were congregated at its Neave plant, while its Struandale Engine and Cortina Plants had almost entirely African workforces. UAW organized workers at Engine Plant, but they never successfully united with NUMARWOSA at Neave, the way the two unions had done at Volkswagen. Nor did UAW succeed at the much larger Cortina assembly plant. Instead, after a series of wildcat strikes in late 1979 and early 1980 this plant was to be organized by a breakaway African grouping which would soon form the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union [MACWUSA]. At General Motors, too, the NUMARWOSA branch was long hostile to organizing Africans, and UAW never took off. After 1980 the overwhelming majority of African workers at GM would also be organized by MACWUSA.

#### **IV: FRIENDSHIP AND FAMILIARITY: SOCIAL NETWORKS OF SOLIDARITY**

An analysis of the workplace and labor process would certainly be important in accounting for why it was that *unions* formed as collective responses to shared conditions.<sup>28</sup> Workers' cross-race solidarity, however, cannot be explained simply by reference to their insertion into a labor process which engendered a sense of cooperation amongst workers and grievances against management. Indeed, very similar working conditions were present in the plants when whites were the bulk of semi-skilled operatives, and did not encourage the development of solidarity among them. It certainly did not foster solidarity between white and black workers when the latter came into the factories in the 1960s. Indeed, similar conditions of work were present in the Port Elizabeth auto plants, and workers there did not develop a collective body linking coloureds and Africans. An explanation of cross-race solidarity must therefore take into account social relations outside the factory.

## ***A. APARTHEID'S CHICKENS COMING HOME TO ROOST: THE CONSEQUENCES OF KABAHS FAILED REMOVAL***

### **1. The Uneven Application of Racial Separation**

Since the 1840s, Uitenhage's African population has resided in the Kabah Location. Kabah's population was always racially diverse: between the 1930s and 1950s coloureds made up approximately 25% of those living in the "African" location. From the 1950s, however, many coloureds left Kabah as new Municipally-built sub-economic and economic letting schemes were started in Gerald Smith and Thomas Gamble townships, and a freehold private housing development opened known as Jubilee Park. Nonetheless, many coloureds remained behind in Kabah even into the 1970s, and these coloured housing schemes were in fact built in extremely close proximity to the Location. Social contact between Africans and coloureds was the norm rather than the exception, and indeed, before the passage of the Population Registration Act in 1950 and the application of the Pass Laws for Africans, the line separating coloureds from Africans was rather fluid, more notional than statutory.

One of the main aims of apartheid legislation after 1948 was not simply the spatial segregation of residential areas, but the thorough separation of social, political, and economic activities. Group Areas, for example, were drawn in such a manner that a member of a certain group would not need to traverse another race's Group Area on the way to work or to shop. Virtually any form of contact was made extremely difficult. Other pieces of legislation enshrined this racist principle: new laws banned cross-racial sex or marriage, separate educational systems kept school children apart, while the Labour Relations Act of 1956 included clauses prohibiting different races from joining the same trade union.

Of course if the "blueprint's" aim was to achieve full segregation, it proved extremely difficult in practice to sort out the diverse, racially heterogeneous areas of certain cities, especially in the Cape Province where Africans, coloureds, and Indians all had long traditions of property ownership in areas zoned for white occupation under the Group Areas Act. The extent of heterogeneity differed from place to place, while the struggle to impose apartheid legislation proceeded at an uneven pace and was often resisted by local authorities.<sup>29</sup>

In Uitenhage, the central state's desire forcibly to remove Kabah consistently came undone, through a combination of resistance by the local Council, shortage of funds at the national level, and general bureaucratic inefficiency. Removals from Kabah to the new African township at Kwanobuhle began only in 1968, and even then, at such a slow pace that Kabah's African population remained relatively intact through the 1970s. With a huge urban influx due to the disastrous drought of the early 1980s, Kabah's population in 1985 was as large as ever. Its persistence was a continued affront to apartheid planners' dreams for a racially ordered community.<sup>30</sup> In Port Elizabeth, on the other hand, the extensive historical practices of local segregation, coupled with the removal of Africans from Korsten after 1955 meant that Africans and coloureds were almost entirely separated from one another by 1957-58.<sup>31</sup>

### **2. Contact Across the Divide**

In contrast to the racially-engineered geography of Port Elizabeth, Kabah's delayed removal created structural possibilities well into the 1980s for contact between Africans and coloureds, who were either living in the same neighborhood or in close proximity. Most of these contacts grow out of the long history of contact in the community before it began to be chopped apart on the Procrustean bed of apartheid planning.

Workers who grew up in Kabah have rich memories of contact with people from other races. Most coloureds lived in the south-eastern section of Kabah, the Baines Road and Middle Street area. One African worker remembered the area clearly:

Middle Street, the street that was actually the dividing street between the coloureds and

the Africans....So we used to grow up and play in the same street with the coloureds...that's where we got our Afrikaans. I didn't get my Afrikaans in school....We sort of got friendly with the coloureds. We regarded ourselves as one people.

The same worker recalls going to church services at the mostly coloured Apostolic Faith church and at the Dale Street Congregational Church, the latter under the leadership of Rev. C.W. Hendrickse and later, his son, Rev. Alan Hendrickse.

Other workers recall joining with coloured children to look after livestock on the north-eastern edge of Kabah. The bush provided respite for children in many ways, as one coloured worker recalled:

Sometimes on hot days, there was a big dam...there at the other side of the hill, the other side of the bosch. We'd go there, learning each other how to fish....Well, we had no fishing rods. If you see a fish you have got a big stick, you just hit that fish with that stick. Sometimes you are fortunate, sometimes you are not fortunate.

A coloured worker, who grew up with Africans in Blikkiesdorp, across Maduna Road from the main area of Kabah, recalled what he and his friends did for entertainment:

It was near to the bush, we as guys got a big place alone, where we always played rugby, go and play in the bush, cowboys and crooks. It was a lot of fun to live there.

The statutorily-imposed definitions of race and residential segregation upset what were in fact sometimes extremely close and comfortable relations between different "races." But the official categories did not mesh with people's direct experience in more ways than one. Color, alone, was hardly a clear demarcation of official racial identity, as one worker explained:

You sometimes cannot easily identify a coloured from a black man. You can only identify him by listening to his speech, and you say, "Hey, this is a coloured man. I didn't know he was a coloured." Most people think that I'm a coloured...because of the color of my skin. It's what happens in most cases.

For the people themselves, social practices, such as language or adherence to African customary practices like circumcision and *lobola* were more crucial to determining group inclusion than were biological considerations, such as skin color or facial features. Social practices are of course far more malleable than biological characteristics, and people can adopt or reject certain practices for a variety of reasons.

Adoption came about through intermarriage in at least two cases among those interviewed. The mother of the worker who above described the Middle Street area, was the daughter of a Sotho woman and a coloured man, and was officially classified as coloured; the workers' father was a Xhosa. As a child the worker learned to speak Xhosa, Afrikaans, and seSotho. But his mother's brothers and sisters have coloured spouses, live in Uitenhage's coloured areas, and are legally considered to be coloured people. While his brothers and sisters are legally African, his cousins are legally coloured. This didn't present a problem for the worker concerned:

I see them as my brothers and sisters. We are in fact one in the same people who see no difference at all. As far as they are concerned, I usually go there and sleep overnight and their friends in turn take us as their brothers and sisters. And also when they do come over to this end our brothers and sisters and our friends take them as the same.

Nor did the worker experience strife with his cousins over participation in his customs:

When we do make our customs, some of them attend, because when there is meat, we *braai* [barbecue] the meat, cook the meat, they take it, they have no objections at all. And I've seen lately that the coloureds also have adopted some of our customs, because some of the coloureds are actually African people. If your mother is coloured and your

father is black, and you choose to be coloured, you go and live in a coloured area and you grow up as a coloured, but since your father was an African, you still have to abide by your father's customs. And unfortunately for you, you are staying in a coloured area where these customs are not being practiced. But, I've seen changes lately that most of the coloureds [who have African fathers] are being circumcised.

These cases raise complicated questions about the processes through which people develop racial identities, a subject beyond the theoretical scope of this work. However, at a more prosaic level the social practices described above led to important interactions across legally-constituted communities, which reveal a great deal about workers' actual lived experience of race.

In the case of this particular worker, he regularly (though not frequently) had occasion to visit relatives in the coloured areas and for them to visit him in Kwanobuhle. Nor were the visits fleeting encounters for trivial reasons, but were in fact sustained over weekends, and were organized around important, meaningful family rituals. For many other workers, visits across the apartheid divides were extremely common, and covered a range of activities from spur-of-the-moment socializing, to political and union gatherings, to sports.

Almost two-thirds of the Volkswagen workers interviewed visited across the community/race divide on a regular basis. Well more than half the African workers visited into coloured communities, while almost all the coloured workers visited into African communities. On average, African workers paid more than 3 visits a month to coloured communities, while coloured workers paid just under 10 visits a month to African communities. Over half the workers interviewed visited across the racial divide at least once a month. A small number visited less frequently, while fewer than 4 in 10 never paid such visits.

By contrast, at General Motors African and coloured workers socialize across the racial divide rather less frequently than Volkswagen workers. African workers visited coloured areas an average of 1.5 times per month, while coloured workers visited African areas on average 3 times per month. One quarter of the coloureds and a third of the African workers interviewed at GM paid one or more visits across the racial divide. However, well more than two-thirds of all workers paid less than one visit per month, or never visited at all.<sup>32</sup>

The figures for coloured workers at GM roughly parallel the findings from Marianne Roux's 1973 survey of coloured automobile workers in Port Elizabeth. She found that only 22% of the coloured workers interviewed paid one or more visits to African work friends in the month prior to being surveyed. These figures are not due to a general lack of sociability among coloured workers in Port Elizabeth: 84% of the workers surveyed had paid one or more visits to other coloured work friends during the same period.<sup>33</sup> The image which emerges is of very frequent contact between Africans and coloureds in Uitenhage, though rather greater frequency of contact by coloureds to African areas than the reverse, but of very little similar cross-race contact between Port Elizabeth Africans and coloureds.

In contrast to the apartheid ideal of total separation, the statutory divisions between Africans and coloureds broke down in practice as a result of social interaction in a variety of spheres: people joined together in pubs, weekend parties, sport, churches, even in inter-marriage. In this wide range of activities African and coloured workers daily created social bonds of friendship and affection, contacts in which they learned first-hand of each other's lives, and came to share experiences and understandings. In large measure these exchanges formed the social basis of solidarity which supports a wide range of oppositional and cross-race social movement activity. Of course the imposition of a more thorough-going apartheid in Port Elizabeth did not prevent the emergence of strong social movements there, but it did profoundly shape the character of those movements, rendering it far more difficult for joint involvement of Africans and coloureds in the same project.

Of all the areas of social interaction, one in particular proved most important as the meeting ground between African and coloured auto workers. For both African and coloured men sport was one of the most important areas of community activity, and no sport had a greater purchase on their loyalty

than does rugby football. It was the dominant group sport among young African and coloured workers growing up in the Eastern Cape from the 1940s to the 1960s, and the way it was played in the two towns captures the differences in social interaction between Africans and coloureds in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth.

## ***B. KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE BALL: RUGBY, INTERACTION, AND SOLIDARITY***

### **1. The Game of Choice**

Rugby football is commonly associated with South Africa's white population, especially Afrikaners, where it assumes the dimensions of a civil religion.<sup>34</sup> In most of South Africa rugby is a white game, while blacks largely follow and participate in other sports such as cricket, road running, boxing, and of most importance, soccer. In the Eastern Cape, however, rugby has long been the game of choice for both African and coloured people, and is followed with religious fervor.<sup>35</sup> It is occasionally played between white and black teams, but more commonly, it is a game played by and between coloureds and Africans. Rugby is thus an important arena in which the two groups are brought together socially on a routine basis.

Rugby was imported to the Eastern Cape by British missionaries, and formed an important part of the curriculum at mission schools. In the missionaries' perspective, proper training in cricket and rugby were considered crucial to weaning Africans from tribal pursuits and fostering an educated, assimilated elite on an English model.<sup>36</sup> The first sides were based at these educational institutions. The first adult club was formed in Port Elizabeth in 1887, and the game quickly spread to towns throughout the region.<sup>37</sup>

According to Peires, since the 19th century the game has been closely associated with the central concerns of black communities, serving not only as entertainment, but "as a vehicle of popular culture and as an outlet for personal achievement and ambition" which always attracted the leading civic and intellectual figures. In communities with few avenues for personal or political expression, "energies which might otherwise have been devoted to local or national service were displaced into rugby." Indeed, in the last twenty years, Peires convincingly argues, rugby was transformed from a substitute for politics to "an arena of national struggle, attacking a particularly vulnerable heel of the apartheid state."

Such a transformation was aided by the National Party's own politicization of sport and its application of rigid apartheid to such pursuits. Sport *per se* could not be banned, though incredible obstacles could be thrown in the way of sports administrators and players.<sup>38</sup> Administrative pressures could be placed on undesirable sides or breakaway unions, by denying clubs access to facilities. In fact, it was the state's refusal in 1973 to recognize the Kwazakhele Rugby Union [KWARU], which had broken away from the official and racially-exclusive South African African Rugby Board [SAARB], which pushed KWARU into the arms of the South African Rugby Union [SARU], an affiliate of the anti-apartheid South African Council on Sport [SACOS]. KWARU was excluded from the well-serviced stadium in Kwazakhele, and state radio refused to broadcast the Union's matches. The heavy-handed action by the state rallied popular sentiment to KWARU, and virtually all of the better players and teams in Port Elizabeth moved over to the new non-racial union. KWARU became a nesting ground for non-racial political activists, including both Black Consciousness and ANC-aligned figures, who endorsed the goals of non-racial sport and opposition to state policy.

The government's encouragement of the game, if only on a racially divided basis, created space for people to operate and (within limits) to pursue their own agendas. Rugby matches were among the only places where blacks could legally gather into large crowds, and the events could be quickly transformed into political events at half-time or during a break in play: an impromptu speech might be made, a freedom song sung, a hat passed around for a political cause, or a moment of silence observed. At a less overt level, the political symbolism would not be lost on the audience if, at the occasional match between black and white sides, the black team demolished its opponent.<sup>39</sup>



## 2. Non-Racial Rugby and Social Interaction in Uitenhage

At an organized level, Uitenhage teams had long played together in "friendly" matches pitting sides from Kabah or Kwanobuhle against sides from the coloured areas or from the district. Such contact grew much more frequent when both coloured and African sides broke away in the 1970s from their respective racially-exclusive official bodies to join the SARU-affiliated Uitenhage and District Rugby Union where they would play fixtures together on a regular basis, and would compete for local cups and the Union and SARU championships. By contrast, after KWARU broke away from the SAARB, it formed a separate union within SACOS, while coloured sides in Port Elizabeth continued to play under SARU's Eastern Province Rugby Union. Thus sides from Port Elizabeth's African and coloured townships would not play together within the same league, but only on the occasional friendly basis, or at the level of inter-provincial play for the SARU championship.

Rugby brought African and coloured people in Uitenhage into extremely close contact. With the rising power of the SACOS-affiliated SARU in Uitenhage, teams began to integrate: in small numbers Africans joined once all-coloured teams, like Excelsiors, and some coloureds joined African sides, such as Swallows. These "cross-overs" were welcomed into the full range of club activity, which brought them into regular contact with teammates from across the race divide. One coloured worker who joined Swallows journeyed regularly to Kwanobuhle for practice and for matches. As a result, he established close friendships with his teammates, and would visit frequently:

[Before the emergency] That was every weekend. I stay overnight sometimes in 'Nobuhle and in Langa location. Oh, I have got a lot of friends there. I've got a lot of African friends.

This particular form of integration was relatively unusual, as most teams remained strongly based in neighborhoods, and with the consolidation of Group Areas from the late 1960s, the racial separation of communities largely defined the character of the teams.

Notwithstanding the internal composition of the sides, during the season clubs affiliated to the Uitenhage and District Rugby Union would play each other every weekend, which meant that for some period of time coloureds would visit African townships and Africans would visit coloured areas. Teams would at least travel through different communities and players would be exposed to conditions faced by others. As one African worker put it:

We happen to be staying together. Even in my team, we've got some coloured chaps, and even in my [rugby] Union we've got a coloured team from Rosedale and Gamble. So on weekends, sometimes you play there during the weekends, or they come here, or we play at Langa. Always together.

The keen dedication and single-mindedness sportsmen show on the field extended to their entertainments after the match: the game would often be but a prelude to a full evening or even weekend of socializing:

Sometimes we play at their places. Some of the chaps they slept there. [Then] they take their coloured chaps, their friends which they have there, to Kwanobuhle.

The parties are often raucous affairs of singing and dancing, well supplied with barbecued meat and alcohol, but with a strong camaraderie among teammates, as well as between members of opposing sides. In this way people from different officially-designated races spent considerable time together in the intimate, personal space of a family home.

## 3. A Tale of Two Unions: NAAWU and the Uitenhage and District Rugby Union

Relationships established through rugby for purely social purposes played an important role in cementing

ties between workers which were drawn upon in the union's struggle for recognition and consolidation. Rugby was not simply a venue for social interaction between coloureds and Africans, but a site of contact between coloured and African *workers*. Workers in Uitenhage were keen sportsmen, both as participants and spectators. Half of those interviewed were themselves either active sportsmen or former athletes who had become administrators of sports clubs or leagues. Many more were simply spectators or club supporters. Though some of the shop stewards were retired athletes, none were simultaneously involved in sport and union activities, as sport consumed too much time.

Some of the key activists in the formation of the union forged their initial acquaintances and friendships on the rugby field. These relationships could be drawn upon in the workplace by the union struggling for recognition. Elijah Antonie, for example, was a player on Swallows football club when Albert Gomomo was an administrator, where Gomomo could take the measure of the man.

Finally, sport provided a forum for conscientization, for the development and transmission of ideas which could serve simultaneously to promote athletic and workplace unity between coloured and Africans. SARU had been launched in 1962, but made no inroads among African rugby players in the Eastern Cape until the early 1970s. KWARU's break with the SAARB was driven by administrative conflicts rather than principle, and initially it sought refuge as a separate union under SAARB, rather than taking up sides with SARU. It was only in 1973, after the SAARB - backed up by the state - rejected KWARU's application that the new union joined the ranks of non-racial rugby. The same situation obtained in Uitenhage, where the apartheid rugby bodies remained strong into the early 1970s. It was only after KWARU's break from the racial structures that Uitenhage sportsmen began discussing the possibilities of non-racial sport.

KWARU's existence provided an exit option for Uitenhage clubs dissatisfied - for whatever reason - with the Uitenhage African Rugby Board (affiliated to the SAARB). After the 1974 season the first split in the Uitenhage body occurred when one African team, Star of Hope, jumped to KWARU. The breakaway encouraged others to do the same, but sports activists on the Swallows Rugby Football Club had a more sophisticated strategy in mind.

Swallows was a powerful club in the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, fielding impressive teams in all three divisions, and it was one of the biggest clubs in the Board. But it also contained a large number of conscientized political and union activists who carried ulterior agendas with them into the club rooms.

Elcott Rhoza was one such activist. He was once a player and later served as an official for Swallows. After obtaining his BA degree from the University of Fort Hare, he went to work at Volkswagen, where he became a member of the inner circle of union activists around Albert Gomomo - who was himself an official of Swallows - building representative shop floor structures for Africans and seeking unity with NUMARWOSA. When the union insurgents took over Volkswagen's Liaison Committee in the early 1970s, Rhoza was elected as the Committee's secretary.

Rhoza began his career as a sports activist while at Fort Hare playing in the SARU-affiliated South Eastern District Rugby Union, where he was recruited to the cause of non-racial sport by the Union's vice-president, a staunch member of the Pan Africanist Congress. Rhoza's adherence to non-racial sport grew out of a principle:

We should integrate so that...a player can be judged according to his merit. We don't want to see people playing according to their racial grouping....So we felt we should have one board where everybody's talent or performance can be measured, because we cannot know if I am a star in an African Board and this one is a star in a coloured Board, and you are a star in a white Board, then we will not know actually who is a star in South Africa. What we wanted was that South Africa be represented by all people who live in it.

His concluding line not only echoes the Freedom Charter, but also expresses an elemental concept of

justice and equality that individuals should be allowed to succeed or fail on their own merit.

But the cause of non-racial sport was promoted for both principled and instrumental reasons. According to Rhoxa, the attack on racial sporting structures simultaneously promoted the pursuit of broader goals extending well beyond the touch-lines on the rugby field:

I felt that it is important now to politicize our members and the community through rugby, and then rugby now will be used as a platform to express our political aspiration. Rugby should not be played for mere pleasure. We should now use rugby as a weapon to break the racial attitude of the South African government. We felt that we should use it as a platform to conscientize our members. Because after we have joined the non-racial sport we started talking about the non-racial policy, how important, how advantageous it will be to us. And then the principles and policy of the African National Congress now also came into meetings, where it was also incorporated in the whole thing.

Where open political organization was impossible in the vicious repression of the 1960s, sport presented an opportunity for continued activity:

If we establish a political organization, it will be in jeopardy, because it's easy for the government to ban it. But it will be very difficult for the government to ban sport, and say people should not play sport. But now you must use sport as a channel through which we can express our aspiration. What was important was that people should be rallied in that [non-racial] direction, they should be reorganized and repoliticized, so that they should know how we should live in this country.

Rhoxa worked with a number of other activists. Ronnie Boyce was also a student at Fort Hare, and along with other graduates from Lovedale and Healdtown, joined the efforts to bring Uitenhage's African clubs over to the cause of non-racial sport. Boyce was one of the UAW's original complement of four shop stewards at Volkswagen. There were also a number of graduates of Limekhaya High School in Uitenhage and Newell High School in Port Elizabeth who joined their efforts, the latter spurred on by their involvement in the South African Students' Organisation [SASO] and the Black Consciousness Movement, both of which were extremely strong in Port Elizabeth. A younger generation of activists, raised in the student movement of the 1970s thus found common cause in sport with older workers and activists, such as Albert Gomomo and Scoma, who had direct experience of the 1950s and the repression of the next decade.

Rhoxa tells the story of Newell alumni on Swallows who were pressured into non-racial sport as a result of growing embarrassment at having to represent an all-African team in the official structures while playing friendly matches against their former school-mates, now firmly in the KWARU fold. The sports activists manipulated these sentiments to encourage especially the younger players - who usually had direct or indirect experience of the student movements burgeoning around the country in the wake of the Soweto uprising - to leave the SAARB. In addition to these more political motivations, the sports activists generously folded into the mixture more pragmatic arguments calculated to appeal to the player's ambitions: that by remaining in the racial structures they would never have the opportunity to compete at an international level and that the splits which had occurred - and which would increase - would rob them of effective competition as the best teams left for the non-racial fold.<sup>40</sup> His story provides an excellent example of how micromobilization contexts exert sometimes subtle moral suasion on potential recruits to a movement: activists may use the recruit's desire to be well thought of by his peers as a way of coaxing him into participation.

Swallows did break with the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, but instead of following the Star of Hope Club into KWARU, the non-racial activists steered the club into the SARU-affiliated Uitenhage and District Rugby Union, making Swallows the first African club to join coloured teams in the cause of non-racial sport. Rhoxa was elected as the Swallows delegate to approach SARU for applications:

So we decided to join the Uitenhage and District Rugby Union, which was then all coloured, now to show the people that we didn't join the SARU fold just because we wanted to accommodate ourselves, but what made us join them is that we felt we have adopted the *principle* of non-racialism.

The principle was not uniformly accepted, however. Some Swallows players and officials stayed behind in the Uitenhage African Rugby Board, but even some of those who went over to Uitenhage and District maintained their old consciousness.

The non-racial sport activists used various educational means to change these African sportsmen's attitudes. The activists' would often sit down with younger players and "preach" non-racialism:

Now, fresh chaps who have joined us, we are trying to show them that rugby is not playing only for mere enjoyment. We have another cause, it is a matter of principle now, and that they should not look on rugby just as a sport. Some of them still have their racial attitude. When we play there [in the coloured areas] you see them shouting, "Coloureds," and all that, they use the word, "hottentots," which is that word for coloured. We try and tell them that, no, they should not speak in that manner now, and that they should see coloureds irrespective of color as a brother, since we play under non-racial sport.

These discussions would take place informally and casually, among the players and officials:

When we come to the meetings we are dealing only with the business, but outside when we meet, we speak rugby. We also talk about the subject of non-racialism, how important and how advantageous to us....We leave rugby practices, as we go home on the bus, we are watching sport, and during off-season, when we meet we have parties, we also talk about rugby.

In this way they hoped to consolidate the political project of building non-racial rugby in the town.

These discussions would include mostly Africans and some coloureds, both non-workers and workers, and among the latter would be a considerable number of Volkswagen employees. In addition to the activists, there were seven or eight Swallows players who were Volkswagen employees, as were the club's President, Secretary, and Vice-Secretary. The activists' preaching thus fell on a broader network of Volkswagen workers, who in turn could influence their co-workers.

But Rhoxa and the Swallows were not alone. Other activists in the UAW, such as Kenny Tshaka, were also active in non-racial rugby politics; he later became a member of the UAW and then NAAWU Executive Committees at Volkswagen, but in rugby circles he was one of the non-racial activists from Star of Hope who chose not to move to KWARU. Instead, he launched a new club, Lions, which affiliated to Uitenhage and District. He played a formidable role conscientizing the mostly younger players who joined his team in the politics of non-racialism.<sup>41</sup>

The efforts by African sports leaders to bring the most important clubs over to the non-racial sports movement parallels and reinforces the efforts by workplace leaders to build a united body under the auspices of NUMARWOSA. In both cases, coloured activists had built organizations in the 1960s - Uitenhage and Districts in the case of rugby and NUMARWOSA at the workplace - and had broken free of racially restrictive national bodies - the South African Rugby Federation and the Trade Union Council of South Africa - but had not succeeded in bridging the racial divide against which they were founded.

In both cases, on a very local level African activists were themselves developing an inclusive policy of non-racialism which encouraged them to look for opportunities for broader unity. Indeed, the search for sporting and workplace unity often involved the very same individuals. Albert Gomomo, a crucial figure in the organization of workers at Volkswagen was simultaneously a major figure in the

development of non-racial rugby. Gomomo happened to be working close to Chris "Papa" Williams, who was simultaneously a key administrator in SARU rugby and the President of NUMARWOSA. Through such personal and sometimes rather serendipitous processes activists from both sides in these two spheres found each other. Thus the familiarity which preexisted in rugby smoothed the process through which coloured and African activists organized on a non-racial basis in the workplace.

## VI: WAR OF MANEUVER: THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1980 AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION AT VOLKSWAGEN

Jurrie Harris and the rest of the NUMARWOSA-UAW negotiating team had only a vague idea what the next few weeks would hold for them when they convened a general meeting of Volkswagen workers on Sunday morning 15 June 1980 in Uitenhage's Jubilee Hall. The meeting was a report-back on the wage talks then taking place in the IC in Port Elizabeth. The talks deadlocked on the first day after NUMARWOSA-UAW demanded a "living wage" of R2.00 per hour, up from the prevailing minimum of R1.15, while the companies offered only R1.30. When the local magistrate banned the report-back as well as a hastily planned meeting later that day at a church in Kabah, the workers were incensed, and decided then and there to stop work the next day to continue the report back, this time on company premises.<sup>42</sup>

On 16 June workers showed up for work at the normal time, but gathered on the lawns in front of Managing Director Peter Searle's office, to receive the aborted report-back. They directed their shop stewards, Harris, Johnson, and Mpushe to negotiate directly with top management, fearing that if they left the factory premises they would be locked out, lose their leverage over the company, and with it any chance to bargain.

Instead of a meeting with management, the workers were addressed by the Labour Relations manager, Ivan Broderick, who told them management would respond to their demands, but only if they went back to work. His intervention was not, to say the least, well received. Scoma relates the events which followed:

He promised Peter Searle that he knows Africans, so he will be able to speak to them. Then Africans showed him that he did not know them. They let him come into the group, then they surrounded him, they started to beat him.

Kwinana was also present at the meeting, and adds the following details:

He wanted to address the workers himself, that's where he got the beating. Workers told him, "We are sick and tired of your tactics. You are not our leader. Our leaders are the shop stewards, and...we give our undertaking to the shop stewards to meet Peter Searle and top management, not you." We didn't recognize Broderick and the Labor Relations Department *en bloc*. We didn't want our complaints channeled through them. We want channels through our shop stewards and to the top management, because we wanted a direct reply.

The workers forcibly rejected management's preferred mode of communication, and replaced it with their own chosen form of negotiation. The company had recognized NUMARWOSA and later the UAW in the hope of having a negotiating partner who could speak for the entire workforce. Now that "partner" was speaking with a unified voice backed up by thousands of workers gathered together on the company grounds. These spokesmen were not chosen at the spur of the moment, but had spent ten years establishing structures in the factory and building their own credibility as the workers' democratically elected leaders.

The shop stewards remained locked in discussion with management until the early afternoon, and returned to the workers without a settlement, whereupon the workforce voted to strike. They walked out the gates, and triumphantly marched through "white" Uitenhage following a number of different paths back to their respective townships. The largest contingent, made up almost exclusively of

African workers, headed southwest back to Kwanobuhle, crossing a large cement bridge over the Swartkops River, and passing a huge, foul-smelling sewerage plant before arriving home in the African township. The other group - made up of both coloureds and Africans - headed northwest along Durban Street and into the central business district, where they turned north towards Kabah and towards the coloured townships stretching off towards the foot of the Groot Winterhoek mountains. At the fork where Kamesh and Maduna Roads intersect, the workers separated, each to their own racially segregated residential areas: Africans and some coloureds towards Kabah, the mass of the coloureds towards the townships of Gerald Smith, Thomas Gamble, and Rosedale. The geography of the workers' march out of the factory itself highlights the racial and residential divisions between workers which elsewhere have undercut concerted worker action, but which Volkswagen workers had been able to overcome.

Gcinuhlanga Gxowa participated in the walkout and march through town. "To me it was a new experience," he said, "because I was used to the school strikes, and it was my first year at work." Student strikes in 1977 had been violently suppressed by the SAP, but Gxowa was struck by the "system's" different reaction to the Volkswagen workers.

Actually the police were just standing in the center of the town, when we were passing and moving as that *huge* group of people from work, moving through the town. They were standing. They couldn't do anything, because we were the strongest force that they had ever seen in Uitenhage, and it was just orderly, so nobody was fearing anything.

Kwinana marched with some measure of pain and foreboding.

I know what happens, I know the aftermath of a breakdown, what follows, because I know. I am the first one to be sacked, because they know they don't want me at the factory, because I was convicted for ANC activity before.

Nonetheless he was jubilant.

We are commanding. *We* are commanding. The workers are commanding now. No more the police or the Labour Relations Department.

A new era of industrial relations had begun.

The strike continued for another three weeks, during which time the workers met daily in the car park in front of the plant. There they would gather to receive report backs from the negotiators, and make collective decisions. In such a way workers could recreate the "collective worker" identity normally imposed by the factory and its division of labor, but weakened once they walked out the gates. The Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation, a civic body dominated by NUMARWOSA-UAW shop stewards, provided an organizational focus in the townships, holding meetings, distributing leaflets, and conducting house visits. Furthermore, the informal networks among shop stewards and workers, as well as the ANC cell system developed during the 1970s provided communication and support links between workers which bolstered the strike. The strike was eventually settled through the intervention of an IMF negotiator who held talks with Rademeyer to broker an agreement acceptable to both sides.<sup>43</sup>

The workers' return to Volkswagen was as significant as their departure, because it was as uneventful as the walkout had been dramatic. Once the union had agreed to the settlement, all the strikers returned to work *en masse*, leaving no doubt that they were the true force representing the workers. During the strike the company had tried many times to crack the workers' solidarity: the gates remained open, and it offered to grant the wage increase to any worker who returned; VW even hired a helicopter to drop leaflets in the townships promoting their offer. No more than fifty or sixty workers responded. But once the union made its agreement, everyone returned.

The conclusion of the strike reaffirmed and validated the workers' initial motivations to act: they had risked a great deal by striking, and had not only won important concessions, but emerged intact with no victimization by the company nor by the police. The lesson regarding the advantages of disciplined collective action was evident for all.

In the years following the strike, the newly-merged union, NAAWU, would use the its resources - the strength and legitimacy of the shop steward system, informal networks, international intervention, and most importantly, the solidarity between African and coloured workers - again and again in a protracted "war of position" with management. In the immediate aftermath of the strike it was the first workplace where the new unions won the right to full-time shop stewards, workers paid by the company, who spent their entire working day involved in union affairs.<sup>44</sup> By the mid-1980s NAAWU had 5 full-time and 26 part-time shop stewards, giving the union an extremely deep base on the shop floor. In building off of its initial success in 1980, it won further concessions regarding disciplinary and retrenchment procedures and protection from supervisory abuses which provided substantial benefits to its members and expanded workers' control.

## **VI: CONCLUSION: SHOPFLOORS, RUGBY FIELDS, AND WORKER SOLIDARITY**

The structure of residential life in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth produced in Uitenhage many opportunities for cross-race contact between Africans and coloureds, while producing a far more thorough segregation in Port Elizabeth. The informal and formal networks described by the concept micromobilization context were heavily shaped by these social patterns, and tended to reproduce them. In Uitenhage these social networks tended to include Africans and coloureds, while in Port Elizabeth they did not, and tended to remain bottled up in workers' racially defined communities. In short, the micromobilization contexts - and the patterns of familiarity, trust, and affinity - crucial for building the union in Uitenhage were defined as much by class as by race, while in Port Elizabeth, race was a far more prominent factor.

Relationships between African and coloured union activists in the workplace were thus facilitated by a range of prior contacts growing out of Uitenhage's racially mixed Kabah Location. These contacts were most pronounced in the micromobilization context of rugby. Rugby brought ordinary workers together in meaningful relationships which provided Africans and coloureds sustained involvement in each others' social lives away from work. At the level of union leadership, coloured rugby players served as intermediaries introducing African union activists to coloured shop stewards, softening their mutual distrust. In these ways, coloureds and Africans at all levels of the workforce could face each other as familiars rather than strangers; as acquaintances rather than with steely disregard for the alien "other;" as people with a store of common experiences rather than merely antagonisms; people to be included in a common organization around shared interests. The social experience of sport, as well as the broader social linkages sketched above constituted a set of bridging experiences and networks between coloureds and Africans, providing both the foundation and the means upon which a non-racial union could be built.

## NOTES

1. The passage is quoted from Athol Fugard, John Kani, and Winston Ntshona, *Sizwe Bansi is Dead*, in Athol Fugard, *Statements* (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1986), p. 7.
2. Sidney Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest," Western Societies Program Occasional Paper No. 21 (2nd edition), Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1991; and Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, "Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988).
3. For an argument on the distinctiveness of new social movements, see Alain Touraine, *The Voice and The Eye* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements," in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 43-66 and Dieter Rucht, "The Strategies and Action Repertoires in New Movements," in Dalton and Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order*, pp. 156-175. The strongest criticism against the newness of NSMs has been levelled by Gunnar Olofsson, "After the Working-class Movement? An Essay on What's 'New' and What's 'Social' in the New Social Movements," *Acta Sociologica* 31:1 (1988).
4. Dalton, Kuechler, and Burklin, "The Challenge of New Movements," p. 9.
5. Klandermans and Tarrow, "Mobilization into Social Movements," pp. 13-14.
6. Klandermans and Tarrow, "Mobilization into Social Movements," p. 10.
7. McAdam explains cognitive liberation in terms of three interrelated cognitions: that people who ordinarily accept the legitimacy of authority come to believe that their rulers are unjust; that ordinarily fatalistic people, who accept the inevitability of existing arrangements, begin asserting rights that imply demands for change; and that people who ordinarily think of themselves as helpless come to believe they have the capacity to change their lot. In the absence of any of these three cognitive developments, people will lose either the motive or will for collective action. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
8. Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts," in *From Structure to Action* edited by Klandermans et al., p. 134-135.
9. Doug McAdam, "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer" *American Journal of Sociology* 92:1 (July 1986).
10. McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts," p. 136.
11. McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts," p. 151.
12. V.M. Kwinana was a high school teacher in East London, and was the dominant figure in the town's more conservative "Congress B" faction; he also led the opposition to the activist boycott strategy endorsed by the 1949 Cape ANC Conference. Interview with V. Kwinana; Lodge, *Black Politics*, p. 57.
13. In December 1955 131 members of the SACTU-affiliated Textile Workers' Industrial Union at the Fine Wools struck work in protest of forced overtime, after the company refused their demand for an overtime rate of 2 shillings per hour. The workers were convicted of conducting an illegal strike, but the union chose to fight their convictions in the Grahamstown Supreme Court, which upheld their appeal. Not only did the workers win a wage increase, but through their legal action they established an important precedent that workers could not be compelled to work overtime unless their contract



specified such an obligation. See Ken Luckhardt and Brenda Wall, *Organize...or Starve! The History of the South African Congress of Trade Unions* (New York: International Publishers, 1980), 230; "Judges uphold appeal by Native strikers," *Eastern Province Herald* 23 May 1956. For years afterward, the TWIU's victory would resonate in Uitenhage workers' historical memories.

14. The lectures most likely occurred in the alternative schools set up by the ANC during the boycott of Bantu education after 1955.

15. The International Metalworkers' Federation provided a small grant to support the work of a part-time organizer. The man TUCSA entrusted with this task was Edgar Deane, secretary of the TUCSA-affiliated furniture union. Despite his later prominent role in the politically moderate and muddled TUCSA, where he was a member of the NEC, Deane had a solid left background in coloured politics, having played leadership roles in the Franchise Action Council, in the Congress-allied South African Coloured People's Organization, and in the Labour Party. See R.E. van der Ross, *The Rise and Decline of Apartheid: A Study of Political Movements among the Coloured People of South Africa, 1880-1985* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1986), 255-278, 307; Gavin Lewis, *Between the Wire and the Wall: A history of South African 'Coloured' politics* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1987), 267-274; Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart, eds, *From Protest to Challenge*, v. 3, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 12.

16. Most prominently, the Western Province Motor Workers' Union [WPMWU]. The search for allies brought NUMARWOSA into contact for the first time with the Durban grouping of fledgling unions organized by the Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Committee [TUACC], an alliance which would later provide the backbone of the Federation of South African Trade Unions and of the hegemony of shop-floor based industrial unionism in the new South African labor movement.

17. National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 26 November 1972, "Organising of African Labour."

18. National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa, "Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting," 24-25 March and 18-19 August 1973. Fred Sauls, NUMARWOSA's General Secretary, along with the Union's secretariat drew up the draft constitution of the UAW, which was then presented to the first general meeting of the new union for amendment and approval.

19. The links between NUMARWOSA-UAW and WPMWU grew closer through their joint experience in the South African Coordinating Council of the International Metalworkers Federation. In this context, both groupings lined up on the same side in opposition to the racist Confederation of Metal and Building Unions [CMBU], and slowly began to realize their common interests. They would be thrown together again in the talks which preceded the creation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions. For a discussion of the SACC, see Eddie Webster, *Cast in A Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), Chapter 8: "The International Factor: The IMF in South Africa, 1974-1980."

20. The company employed coloured workers as a result of pressure from the government's threatened implementation of a Coloured Labour Preference Policy for the Eastern Cape.

21. For these reasons Liaison Committees would be the type of "reform" most preferred by management after the 1973 Durban strikes, when the old system of excluding Africans from the industrial relations system became palpably unworkable. Volkswagen was one of 118 companies who introduced "non-statutory" Liaison Committees well in advance of the strikes.

22. See the interview with Gomomo, "Union Organisation in Volkswagen," *South African Labour Bulletin* 11:1 (September 1985), and "Profile: John Gomomo," *South African Labour Bulletin* 15:3 (September 1990).

23. Indeed, John Gomomo went on to become Uitenhage organizer for the Ciskei National Independence Party - in the eyes of both management and the state, hardly a dangerous political association. He went on to become a full-time shop steward at VW, Vice-President and then President

of the autoworkers' union, and is today President of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. In 1990 he, along with other prominent ex-FOSATU worker leaders publicly announced their supposedly long-standing affiliation to the South African Communist Party.

24. This would include actual ANC cell members and the broader network of workers with whom they had contact, but who were unaware of their actual identity.

25. The action was called to protest the declaration of a state of emergency in the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage magisterial districts in the aftermath of the New Brighton riots. The riots were in turn prompted by intensifying state repression against the Defiance Campaign and efforts by the Native Affairs Department to impose the provisions of the Urban Areas Act on Port Elizabeth.

26. The other shop stewards were Boyce, Mpushe, Harris, Redcliffe, Spiers, and Isaacs.

27. The company soon organized a European tour for the senior shop stewards from the unions, including *Yster en Stal*, to observe industrial relations systems in Germany, Belgium and Great Britain. Gomomo made extremely effective use of the trip, cementing bonds to the IG Metall union in Germany and the International Metalworkers Federation which would serve the union for years to come.

28. For further discussion of the labor process and the racial division of labor in the automobile plants, see Glenn Adler, "Skills, control, and 'careers at work': Possibilities for worker control in the South African motor industry" *South African Sociological Review* 5:2 (1993).

29. For a complete discussion of the application of the Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts, see Chapter 4 of my doctoral thesis, "Racial Segregation and its Impact on Working Class Communities in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage."

30. The state's most recent effort to remove Kabah was facilitated by the nation-wide crackdown under the 1986 State of Emergency. Despite moving approximately 35,000 people from Kabah to a site and service camp on the outskirts of Kwanobuhle, not all Africans were removed from Kabah - in particular the residents of some 700 formal houses in the McNaughton section of the old Location remained. As the emergency waned, as migrations from the rural areas continued, and as the powers formerly granted under the Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts fell away, the state was helpless to prevent the massive re-population of Kabah, the situation which obtains today.

31. For further discussion of racial segregation in Port Elizabeth, see A.J. Christopher, "Formal Segregation and population distribution in Port Elizabeth" *Contree* 24 (1988); "Apartheid Planning in South Africa: The Case of Port Elizabeth" *The Geographical Journal* 153:2 (July 1987); and "Race and Residence in Colonial Port Elizabeth" *South African Geographical Journal* 69:1 (1987). See also Jennifer Robinson, "The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African Cities-Port Elizabeth, 1923-1972," Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1990; and Bev Taylor, "Removing Port Elizabeth's Notorious Korsten Slums in the 1950s," and "South End and Fairview Removals and the Development of Bethelsdorp," unpublished papers (1990).

32. The figures from General Motors must be treated with great caution, as the research was interrupted by a major strike over the firm's proposed disinvestment, when fewer than half the projected interviews were completed. For a discussion of the strike, see my article, "What's Good for General Motors?: Black Workers' Response to Disinvestment, October-November 1986" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15:3 (April 1989). For a discussion of the effects of the strike on research possibilities see my article, "The Politics of Labor Research During a Liberation Struggle: Interviewing Black Workers in South Africa," in *International Annual of Oral History, 1990* edited by Ronald J. Grele (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1993).

33. Marianne Roux, "Perspectives and Values of Industrial Workers: The Emergence of Socio-Economic Consciousness Amongst Coloured Workers in the Motor Manufacturing Industry in the Eastern Cape," Ph.D. diss., Stellenbosch University, 1977, p. 163, 159.

34. The centrality of sport, and rugby in particular, in white culture and politics in South Africa remains entirely undeveloped as a subject of academic inquiry. The forthcoming work by Dr. John Nauright, of the University of Otago in New Zealand should rectify this serious gap in our understanding of South African society. For a brief discussion of the role of sport in Afrikaner politics in the 1960s and 1970s, see Wilkins and Strydom, *The Super-Afrikaners*, Chapter 14: Sports Policy. The debate among Broederbonders and Nationalist politicians around the inclusion of Maori players on the New Zealand rugby team constituted one arena of conflict which precipitated the 1969 split in the National Party, leading to the formation of the Herstigte Nasionale Party.

35. For social histories of sport in South Africa, see Tim Couzens, "An Introduction to the History of Football in South Africa," in *Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response*, edited by Belinda Bozzoli (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983); Andre Odendaal, "South Africa's Black Victorians: Sport and Society in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century, in *British Culture and Sport at Home and Abroad, 1700-1914*, edited by ?; and Jeff Peires, "Rugby in the Eastern Cape: a history," *Work in Progress* 17 (April 1981).

36. See Odendaal, "South Africa's Black Victorians," 195.

37. Neither rugby nor cricket caught on with Africans in Natal, the Orange Free State, or the Transvaal. Odendaal accounts for the lack of interest in Natal by pointing to the very prominent role of American rather than British missionaries in African education in the Province, while the lack of interest in the Afrikaner republics to the north may stem from a similar lack of penetration by English missionaries and the far stronger restrictions on African education and an African middle class there. In Peires' words, rugby "was never adopted by the northerners who saw something ridiculous in the spectacle of a grown man running around with a ball in his hands." Peires, "Rugby in the Eastern Cape," p. 1.

38. Peires, "Rugby in the Eastern Cape," 3, 5.

39. Years after the event, black workers still spoke fondly of the game in the 1970s between an African side composed of players from the official SAARB and a touring British side, where the visitors won convincingly, but in which a Volkswagen player, (and later full-time shop steward) Aaron Balintulo scored a try. By contrast, the workers would laughingly emphasize, the British team completely overwhelmed the all-white Springbok rugby team, which was shut out.

40. The Springboks held the claim to represent South Africa as a whole and the racial bodies were not recognized overseas.

41. Tshaka played a surprisingly similar role in the factory. He was never elected as a shop steward, but was extremely important behind the scenes as an activist and "conscientizer" among the rank-and-file.

42. For a detailed chronology and a superb analysis of the factors leading to the strike, see Martheanne Finnemore, "The mobilisation of Black workers in the auto industry in the Eastern Cape, 1970-1983," MA diss., University of Port Elizabeth, 1984.

43. The IMF negotiator was Karl Casserini. The real impasse occurred when the company increased its offer to R1.40 per hour, which was rejected by the workers, who remained out on strike. After that Volkswagen threatened to fire workers who remained out, but delayed action while the talks with Casserini gathered momentum. Eventually the company increased its offer to R1.42, and agreed to meet the R2.00 living wage target within 18 months; though falling well short of their original demand, the workers accepted the offer and returned to work.

44. Volkswagen was the first company to agree to the demand, and was preparing to implement the agreement, but Ford in Port Elizabeth jumped first and announced their agreement, and have been wrongly credited with the innovation.