

STREET TRADE BLOCK LEADERS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF STREET
TRADE:
Narrating untold stories in Inner City Johannesburg



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ABSTRACT

Street trading management is relatively undocumented and quite complex. This entails dealing with informality, mobility, fluidity, survivalism and entrepreneurship, competition over land uses, and complex politics. There is limited understanding of municipal management and its every day practice in Johannesburg. Municipal management is characterised by opacity, rumours of corruption and informal practices. One character in this system through which the everyday practice of street trading management can be approached is the trader block leader. A street trader block leader is an elected representative of traders who negotiates and communicates with the municipal management on behalf of traders. A Block leader is a street trader that has been allocated space formally by municipal management according to the CoJ policy. They have to occupy a designated space like any other trader. From the managements view point a trader block leader is the eyes and ears of management on the street. Block leaders play the part of a broker mediating between state and traders. They can also be viewed as an extension of the state at street level because they receive 20% discount on rentals as a reward for their work. The purpose of this research is to explore, present and analyse street trading management at street level in inner city Johannesburg, through the lens of block trader leaders discourses and practices, at the interface between state and traders.

Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own work. It is submitted for Honours in Urban and Regional Planning to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any degree to any other university.

.....

(Signature of candidate)

.....day of.....year.....

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Acronyms

CJP- CENTRAL JOHANNESBURG PARTNERSHIP

COJ- CITY OF JOHANNESBURG

CUBES- CENTRE FOR URBANISM AND BUILT ENVIRONMENT STUDIES

DED- DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

GIDA- GAUTENG INFORMAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE

JMPD- JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

JPC- JOHANNESBURG PROPERTY COMPANY

MTC- METROPOLITAN TRADING COMPANY

NUT- NIGERIAN UNION OF TRADERS

OCS- OPERATION CLEAN SWEEP

OVOAHA- ONE VOICE OF ALL HAWKERS ASSOCIATION

SAITF- SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMAL TRADERS FORUM

SANTRA- SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL TRADERS RETAIL ALLIANCE

SMME- SMALL MEDIUM AND MICRO ENTERPRISE

1. Chapter one: Introduction

1.1. Background

In most cities of the global south street trading is a reality and its management remains a challenge in most of them. There is limited documentation on how street trading management works (beyond repression). Solutions or management models are not ready made as “Cities are simply too individual and specific in their needs and vulnerabilities for standardized solutions” (UN Habitat 2014, 3). It is arguable that street trading management remains a challenge in African cities because it can be considered as a continent in transition, from colonial Africa to Post-colonial Africa. The transition may bring about complexities in the systems used to govern or manage urban areas. Most African cities continue to apply colonial laws in post-colonial Africa (UN Habitat, 2014). This type of urban planning reproduces colonial cities in post-colonial times which in turn does not solve problems the cities is facing but creates more problems if not the same ones.

Street trading management in Johannesburg

Johannesburg like any other African city is no exception. It is also facing challenges in urban management and continues to reproduce the apartheid city in practice although it produces progressive policies. An example of this is how street trading is managed in inner city Johannesburg. Street traders are perceived as dirtying the city and contributing to ‘unwanted’ factors in the city. They are often chased away or harassed by the JMPD. In 2013 the City introduced a ‘clean up’ campaign of cleaning up the streets. The main aim was said to be differentiating ‘illegal’ traders from those that are legal (legality is determined by ownership of a smartcard and demarcated stall). All traders were then chased away and forbidden to trade whether they had a smartcard or not (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014).

When the state criminalises street trading it is incentivising or giving traders the opportunity to become unmanageable. Street trading criminalisation occurs when economically viable streets are termed non-trading zones, for traders those economically viable streets are seen as an opportunity (Matjomane, 2013). When they trade there they are deemed illegal and unmanageable. According to Roy (2009, 10), “when the state inscribes activities that are authorised and unauthorised, they are creating an environment where the trader feels as if

they are in battle with the City”. This can make the traders uncooperative and combative/antagonistic towards the City. The presence of JMPD officials in the city impounding trader’s goods does not make the situation any easier or help with easing off the tension on the streets. This only creates a sense of fear amongst traders.

Informal governance and block leaders

According to (Stone, 1989) formal organisations give rise to informal arrangements due to their limited formal authority. The same can be said for government systems. Due to their limitations and inflexibility it is difficult to get things done, as a result informal government systems emerge (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). Such informal networks can be argued to be ‘problem-solving networks’ or ways in which the poor can access the state. In Johannesburg an informal system of governing street trade has developed. At the moment there is limited information or research done on the management system.

The management system was discovered while conducting the third year report named a Political Landscape of street trade Organisations in inner City Johannesburg; post Operation Clean sweep (contents of the report will be fully explained in the motivation) in 2014. There were some interesting statements and discoveries that were unexplored and unknown. An example of such was City block leaders. There is limited information on the subject and little to no documentation of the phenomena. This research report seeks to shed some light on the operations of block leaders, what they do, how they manage street trading with the City and how the whole management system functions. It is also of importance to investigate whether this type of management system is efficient or not.

The management system involves block leaders, MTC and the DED. Block leaders are elected at block level by traders so they can represent them in meetings with the City and MTC. Street trading organisations often accuse block leaders of undermining them and ‘selling out’ to the City. MTC is the company that was in charge of managing street trading and reported to the DED which has a department that deals specifically with informal trading policy and by-laws. MTC has now been dissolved and incorporated into JPC. It is alleged that the dissolution occurred as a result of mismanagement of funds in the company. The management system started when traders were approached by the City to

nominate and elect their representative in each block so they could attend meetings and relay the information back to traders and also voice out the trader's issues. This was also a way of allowing traders to participate in the management of street trading.

It should be taken into account that the street trading management system is said to be informal because it is operating in an informal arena and also because "informal systems, by contrast [to formal ones], are based on implicit and unwritten understandings, they reflect socio-cultural norms and routines, and underlying patterns of interactions among socioeconomic classes and ethnic groups" (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002, 1).

1.2. Motivation

The report A Political Landscape of street trade Organisations in inner City Johannesburg; post Operation Clean Sweep was about investigating street trade organisations in Johannesburg's inner city. There were various reasons as to why street trade organisations were used as an object of research. Some of the reasons is that street trade organisations leaders were viewed as opportunistic, street trade organisations were not perceived as social movement in academia and also because street trade organisations played a major role in fighting Operation Clean Sweep (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014).

Although the report was constructed by third year students who at the time were not really familiar with research it was very informative. Each organisation has a history, a mandate and something they are working towards. This just shows how much the street trading industry is organised although it has been argued to be disorganised and disorderly. It also shows how street traders mobilise and deal with issues that traders are facing on a daily basis that the City is unable to solve on a daily basis. Such issues as conflicts between traders over customers, if the City had to be involved every time such a problem arose, resources that are scarce and time would be wasted in trying to solve such problems daily. With street trader organisations dealing with such issues, it makes management of street trading a bit easier for the City.

"We used to solve these issues easily during our monthly meetings as block leaders. But they stopped, before even Operation Clean Sweep, because of MTC's internal problems. So now it is difficult to solve issues [...] Last month, we as block leaders tried to meet with JPC managing

Director, Helen Botes. We went as a group, block leaders from Delters, Jeppe, Bree, Plein, and Edith Cavell... We went twice to her office to try and set up a meeting, send her the agenda of the meeting – the list of issues that needed resolution. But she never replied, and we could not meet her (Nigerian Union Traders organisation leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

Within the report it was learnt that street trade organisations are not the only body working with the City in trying to manage street trading. The City also dealt with City block leaders before organisations were created. After the creation of organisations the City now deals with both block leaders and street trader organisation. The creation of organisations destabilised the functionality of City block leader's management of street trading. There is a difference between how street trade organisations and block leaders approach challenges or issues in regards with managing street trade and how to get problems solved. From the above quote, City block leaders are less aggressive when trying to solve problems. When they tried to set up a meeting with Helen Botes from JPC it was a way of trying to solve problems through communication, sitting down and trying to come up with a solution. This may be one of the reasons why street trade organisations label block leaders as "lacking strategic perspective" (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, 8). Street trade organisations are often antagonistic when dealing with the City and trying to solve problems. An example of this is seen when SAITF and SANTRA take the City to court on OCS.

The difference in approach can be said to lead traders to believe more or depend more on organisations than on block leaders as organisations bring out results. Organisations managed to bring traders back into the streets after OCS, this was the hope traders needed to break away from the block leader management system as it did not bring results as all they do is talk. Organisations on the other hand are not afraid to take the City to court which is perceived by the traders as being courageous and standing up to the City as opposed to block leaders who are 'puppets' of the City and are "lacking strategic perspective" (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, 8).

For instance, we requested that the cash office be reopened, for traders to be able to pay their rent to JPC quickly, rather than spend time queuing in a bank to pay just R50 or R100. Traders are losing money because of the closure of this cash office. We also have an issue with illegal traders invading demarcated spaces and chasing legal traders, or painting fake demarcated spaces. These traders are not paying rent – they need to be chased or legalised so that they pay, like us. A third issue was that before OCS we submitted changes of traders' names on

demarcated spaces: this has not been followed up, putting legal traders at risk of harassment by the JMPD” (Nigerian Union Traders organisation leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

From the above quote it can be deduced that block leaders used to solve issues that street traders dealt with on a daily basis and how street trading was managed on the ground or in practice. Just like organisations, block leaders mobilised as a collective in order to have their voices heard. It can be argued that when block leaders mobilised they were trying to strengthen their voice as Lindell (2010b) qualifies street trader’s voice as weak. Informal arrangements are about mobilising efforts in order to better manage street trading at ground level; it is not about absolute control (Stone, 1989).

Information on how block leaders used to work with the City is scarce. This research is presented as a gap found in the third year report. It aims to fill in the gaps on what block leaders used to do, who they communicated with in the City to help them solve problems they were facing on a daily basis, and to find out what the relationship between block leaders, MTC and DED was and how that arrangement worked.

“Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world”

-Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed

This system of management is different from the approaches the City usually uses; it is complex, sensitive and ridden with politics. It can be argued that the City has begun to use a different approach to facilitate a less repressive and more progressive approach to managing street trading. The City is trying to get away from the present repressive system although the block leader system of management has its flaws and is repressive in practice (to a certain extent), it is a more creative and realistic system of management. This type of management allows for participation of street traders through representation allowing them to voice out their issues. Although the City’s agenda can be questioned as to whether they really do want to integrate street trading in the city, the management system brought a sense of cooperation and stability in the inner city. It has been said that for one to fight with their opponent and persuade them to do what is good for oneself is to pretend to become their friend, pretend to have their best interest at heart but at the end it’s about

manipulation, influence and control of one over the other. Delving deeper into this research will help in understanding the nature of the relationship between the City and block leaders, moreover it will help in understanding and learning from a management system that is inclusionary and self-regulatory (traders managing themselves) and how it can be improved for future use in a complex terrain such as street trading.

1.3. Identifying the problem statement

It is interesting that there are different modes or ways that street traders were represented in their engagements with the City. This has caused a divide within the traders themselves as organisations are generally suspicious of block leaders and claim they undermine them

“The City tells our members ‘don’t join the organizations: this is the City’s street, not One Voice’s. They will ask the block to elect their block leader, call all block leaders to meetings without calling organizations” (One Voice of All Hawkers Association leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014).

The question that one asks when such a conviction has been made is whether the City is applying the ‘divide and rule’ strategy in order to gain control over the streets. Street trader organisations feel excluded and undermined when they are not called to meetings which are made specifically for block leaders. This may be one of the reasons that influenced trader’s perspectives on block leaders working for the City. When organisations are excluded to some meetings it grows suspicions on what the meetings are about from the organisations side.

“When the City builds markets for traders, they say ‘we don’t negotiate with organizations, we talk to traders and block leaders. Elect a committee and we will engage with that committee. We can’t talk to you as SAITF’. But we as SAITF are the one raising issues here, and as a result the City ends up talking to us” (South African Informal Traders Forum leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

The City has tried to enforce and legitimise block leaders and that they should be trader’s representatives but that proved difficult. The battle of legitimising block leaders as the only representatives of traders became difficult and almost impossible to solve when the two

bodies overlapped. Block leaders that were supposed to be the ones representing traders were now being represented by organisations when block leaders started affiliating with trader organisations. Although a few block leaders were part of organisations and some organisations leaders, a lot more block leaders affiliated with organisations during OCS for protection against the City. The affiliations complicated an already complicated terrain even more.

“SAITF did not attend the block leader meeting [on the 30th of September]– the block leaders who belong to SAITF reported to us – sometime we accompany them to these meetings but it was not the case there” (South African Informal Traders Forum leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

When block leaders are affiliated to organisations, confusion arises on the motives or the agendas of those block leaders. Although they attend meetings as block leaders, they are also part of an organisation. Being a block leader and an organisation member cannot be separated, at the back of one’s mind either being a block leader or a street trader organisation member or leader will outweigh the other. When this happens the persons tend to make decisions based on who they associate themselves better with at that point- a block leader or an organisation member.

Although the overlap brings about confusion it also is an opportunity to acquire networks that can be used for both parties benefit. The network is acquired through being a block leader or an organisation leader but because the network is being acquired by an individual (out of the context of whether the individual is a block leader or an organisation leader) it can be used to benefit either block leaders or street trader organisation. In both cases street traders benefit regardless of where they have placed their hope or trust because at the end of the day both parties still serve street traders interest even though they might not agree on a few things.

1.4. Research study area

Johannesburg has been described as the city where the biggest deals have been made. It is recognised as one of the most powerful commercial areas in Africa and a gateway into sub-Saharan Africa (City of Johannesburg, 2015). Situated in the Gauteng province, it has one of


the largest populations sitting at approximately 3, 2 million residents distributed across 1 006 930 households (City of Johannesburg, 2015).

Figure 1: map of Johannesburg and the location of the inner city



(City of Johannesburg, 2015)

Figure 2: A zoomed in location of the inner city



(City of Johannesburg, 2015)

It is considered to be the largest economy in the country due to its diverse economic sectors both informal and formal. Due to the many opportunities the city offers, people have migrated from different parts of Africa to seek job opportunities but not all of them were lucky to find jobs. Those that were not so lucky to find employment in the formal sector turned to entrepreneurship and started their own businesses on the streets of inner city Johannesburg.

Block leaders are located in the CBD which is the core of the city. This is a very interesting place to be trading in Johannesburg as there are a lot more challenges in big cities with big dreams and is trying to uphold a certain image. For Johannesburg that image does not include traders, it promotes exclusion and exploitation of not only traders but the marginalised as well. Trading in the streets of Johannesburg has proved to be a battle during apartheid and post-apartheid. Street trading is still very much restricted and 'unwanted' in the inner city and OCS is proof of that.

1.5. Objectives

This research aims to investigate how street trading can be managed in a less restrictive manner using the case study in the Johannesburg inner city where street traders are playing a role in the management of street trading. It further aims:

- To investigate processes and procedures used in managing street traders by block leaders, in conjunction with City officials
- To understand block leaders roles as street trade managers, their power and the limitation to their power
- To make recommendations on the development and sustainable management system being used by block leaders

1.6. Research question and sub-questions


To what extent are (or were) block leaders participating in the governance of street trading in inner city Johannesburg?

Sub questions

- What are (were) the roles of block leaders? What do they do on an everyday basis?
- Do block leaders have a say in obtaining trading space for traders?
- What is there relationship with the City – with which officials do they engage generally?
- What are the issues they bring forward to City officials, and are they able to have the issues resolved?
- How are they elected by traders, how often? How are they reporting to traders?
- Did the relationship change when JPC took over from MTC, how and why?
- How has it changed after Operation Clean Sweep?

1.7. Conceptual framework


Figure 3: location of research



The above diagram shows the location of research which is found in the intersection of three converging themes. This shows the complexity of the research topic and how it can be understood as understanding the research would require understanding what is going on in the three other spheres.

Concept map.

Figure 4: mapping of concepts



Decentralisation- the concept of decentralisation best fits in the delegation of power and functions from central authority to other scales of authority. In this case it is the distribution of authority from the DED to block leaders allowing them to play a part in managing street traders with MTC and representing traders during negotiations or meetings with the City.

Participation- participation in this case is interactive participation where the DED created space for street traders to voice out their issues or concerns through block leaders. Street traders communicate their issue to block leaders and block leaders take those issues to the DED in a meeting setup and they try and come up with a solution for those issues.

Clientelism- clientelism in this context is the exchange of in a system where personal networks matter or in a system where bureaucrats are not only defined by their official status but also by their personal experiences, feelings or interests. Block leaders exchange their loyalty to officials for the small power they possess. That is being recognised by the

City as legitimate representatives of street traders. During their day to day interaction with MTC programme officials or City officials from the DED the block leaders have the chance to influence the officials decisions to implement policy and their decision will not only be influenced by their profession but also by how they feel or perceive the situation.

Mobilisation- mobilisation in this case refers to the organisation of block leaders into a functional group that is acting upon its mandate or work ethic of serving traders and representing them in the management of street trading. Block leaders ensure to the best of their capabilities or to the extent of their powers that issues that the street traders have voiced out are taking into consideration and voiced out.

Street level bureaucracy- According to Lipsky (2010) street level bureaucracy is when government officials are able to exercise discretion on how they do their work. The discretion or decisions that these officials make are sometimes influenced by the daily interaction that the officials have with the citizens. In this case it can be argue that block leaders are street level bureaucrats as they exercise their discretionary power when dealing with different matters concerning the management of street trading. Block leaders are not government officials but they are working together with the DED as representatives of traders and looking out for the trader's interest in decision making.

Informal politics- for the purpose of this research informal politics can be described as the blurred lines between decentralisation, participation and clientelism. Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldief (2011) argue that dialogues that are focused on participation and decentralisation focus on a 'humanised' state where politicians can be held accountable at local level. Dialogues on clientelism and corruption "denounce the 'personalization' and arbitrariness of existing relationships between the state and low income residents in particular" (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldief 2011, 446)

1.8. Research limitations and its impact on the research report

The phrase "nothing for us without us" is a buzz word amongst street traders. When the City invited traders to elect representatives who will represent them in meetings with City officials; that was a turnaround point. This was when street traders were given a chance to

voice out their issues as they were systematically excluded for representing themselves. They were often represented by people that have never walked a mile in their steps. Block leaders as representatives of street traders and managers of the street can be viewed as being part of the state. The state is divided into different sections that are sometimes linked to one another and sometimes not. Block leaders can be viewed as being part of the state from the municipality level as they are assisting in managing street traders, which is the responsibility of the municipality according to Section 125(1) of the South African constitution.

Block leaders have been given the authority and power to make decisions in the management of street trading on behalf of traders and the City recognises those decisions. It should be noted that even though they are part of the state they are operating in an informal capacity. This places them in a difficult position as they don't have enough power to stop attacks or harassment of JMPD officers on traders. Different parts of the state may conflict as they are being governed by different rules, regulations and laws and also because one has more power or authority than the other. The difference between JMPD and block leaders is that they are on different ends of the state. The one is enforcing law and order through fear (JMPD) and intimidation and the other (block leaders) is trying to manage street trading in a less forceful way.

The state is complex and heterogeneous; hence investigating from the block leader's perspective only reveals part of the state. Other parts of the state are left understood. This means that the bigger picture is not completely connected or linked together; only a part of the puzzle has been completed. It should be taken into account that this research, conducted at Honours level, is just a small part of understanding how some parts of the state functions. Yet, getting clarity on this small part might contribute to knowledge on how street trading is managed on the ground.

1.9. Chapter outline

This research report will consist of five chapters.

Chapter one is the introduction. The focus of this chapter is to introduce the research topic, background, rationale, problem statement and what it aims to achieve. The reader is given an idea of what the research wholly entails through the chapter outline. It also sets out the

limitations of the study that may have affected (or not) the results or outcomes of the study. By means of a study area that is presented in the report it becomes possible to place the information in space.

Chapter two comprises of the literature review. There is no existing literature on block leaders and street trade management at the moment but surrounding literature will be used based on key concepts of the research report.

Chapter three will be the methodology. This is based on the processes that were taken during the research to reach the final outcome of the final research report. Those are the steps taken when conducting the research such as interviews, the challenges faced and how they were overcome when conducting the research.

Chapter four will be focused on analysing the findings. The analysis will be based on information provided by block leaders through interviews, observations and a spending a day or three with a block leader. This means that this research will be conducted from 'the bottom' thus other perspectives such as those of officials who are operating inside the realms of the state may be difficult to gather.

Chapter five is the conclusion and recommendations. This chapter is building from the previous chapter on analysis to make a conclusion that is thorough. Recommendations will be made based on analysis. This will assist in better understanding the challenges that are faced with managing street trading and come up with better solutions.

2. Literature review

2.1. Introduction

There has not been a lot of literature written on street trade management or block leaders. This research is an exploration on the management system of street trading that includes traders themselves. Traders are being represented by block leaders whom they elected. Because the research is exploratory the literature review will focus on three themes that will assist in understanding the state as an entity by studying it from its margins and how street trading management has progressed or not in Johannesburg. The three themes are: the state in urban governance (street level bureaucracy), street trading governance and finally street trading mobilisation.

2.2. The state in urban governance

According to Lipsky (2010,3), “Street-level bureaucrats are “policy makers” due to the inherent *discretion* involved in their interactions with the public and the astonishing *impact* that their decisions have on the lives of citizens”. Block leaders can be said to be street level bureaucrats as they have discretionary power in their daily activities of managing street traders. Block leaders are the ones who decide who gets allocated which stall and who doesn’t or who should be given a warning for breaking the house rules or the by-laws and who should be reported to MTC immediately. As block leaders are also street traders and are going through the same hardships and discriminations that everyday traders are going through their discretion is bias due to the same experiences the trader and block leader has. An example of this may be when a trader is violating a house rule such as not keeping their trading space clean. Instead of giving the trader up to JMPD, he/she may talk to the trader first and make him understand the consequences of violating such a rule or give the trader a warning before giving them up to JMPD.

Block leaders can be seen as the porous border of the state, the bottom of the state, as they are delegated some power to manage the street at the block level. Block leaders have been delegated power by street traders to represent them and make decisions affecting them on their behalf when negotiating with the City. The City (DED) has also delegated powers to block leaders to assist or have an input in the allocation and demarcation of stalls. It can be hypothesized that blocks leaders are brokers who play an active role in settling conflicts and

ensuring that street traders are respecting by-laws, house rules and mediating issues with the City. Block leaders may use their power to push their own interests through using information to benefit their organisations or by not clearly defining the boundary (if there's one) between being a block leader or an organisation leader if they are. When they do this they are in turn employing their own set of rules in their everyday practice (Mkhize, 2014).

One could also argue that the authority block leaders have been given makes them responsible for the management of the streets and to ensure that the by-laws and policies are followed making them in turn 'implementers'. Due to that block leaders are operating at local level they do not have that much power to make drastic changes in the way the streets are managed. Although drastic changes cannot be made to policies they have the power to shape what happens in practice through their everyday discretion. Although not much can be done to change policy it does however change or shape governmentality.

Governmentality in this case refers to the way in which the state exercises control over its population. The manner in which the state governs street traders can no longer be the same as before block leaders were representing street traders. It can be hypothesized that the City is using covert power over street traders through the use of block leaders. By using covert power the City still has control over what happens on the streets without having to deal with people revolting and demanding change as they 'think' they are in control and managing streets with the City. The City has 'disguised' the power that traders have as 'power to' when in reality is 'power over' the traders. Traders are given small power so that they feel as if they are being involved in the management of street trading, but because the final decision of what happens in the management of street trading is made by the DED or MTC, block leaders are only there to take care of problems that the DED and MTC do not want to take responsibility for as it is too costly and time consuming.

Having block leaders do that job is saving the DED and MTC money and time. It is like killing two birds with one stone. By giving small power to block leaders the state has eluded a revolution of traders wanting to become part of managing the streets they work on. If the City had risked a battle against the traders it might have been a case of total loose or total win just as the OCS case. By giving the traders what they want the city avoided having to

lose more power as they currently hold now which would have given traders more decision making powers on what goes on in the streets.

Lipsky (2010) states that bureaucrats operating at local level or street level are limited by the state or institution through lack of resources and the law and procedures of how things are done in government that bind them. The power or authority of block leaders is limited by the state. An example of this is that they have to work together with MTC officials who have the power to allocate trading space. When allocating trading space, block leaders do not have the authority to allocate, but they do have the authority to suggest that the trading space be given to a specific person. The limitation presented by the state gives street level bureaucrats certain room to manoeuvre although they are bounded and restricted by law and their hierarchies. There is however a sort of flexibility embedded in law and procedure they can use to their benefit. This room to manoeuvre is presented by decentralisation, participation and personal relationships formed with traders and state officials that can be used to their advantage such as, who is next in line to be allocated a stall.

Lipsky (2010) states that achieving the balance between flexibility and compassion on the one hand and the importance of rigid rule application is difficult as there is no format on how management should be conducted but it is thus conducted as a response to situations. In simple terms the day to day running's of the street creates personal relationships between block leaders and street traders. This can result in some traders getting first preference because of which block leader they know and are close to, or because of which organisation they belong to as some block leaders are affiliated into organisations. (Chatterjee 1947, 73) states that: "it is entirely possible that the negotiations on the ground did not respect the principles of bureaucratic rationality or even the provisions of the law". Traders can be given certain perks such as being moved first in line in the waiting list of allocations of stalls because of the personal relationship they might have with the block leader.

According to (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2011) participation and decentralisation in relation to clientelism are all characterised by personal interaction and by flexibility and adaptation to local, if not individual situations, in the links between the state and the citizen: this then blurs the line between participation, decentralisation and clientelism.

Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of power in terms of accountability and responsibility. In centralised systems the state also needs to interact with the people hence there are people at operating at ground level. In a decentralised state there are more people operating at ground level than in a centralised state, this in turn grows street level bureaucracy in decentralised systems than in centralised ones. Although it is not clear which power or how much power block leaders have, block leaders have been given the authority to make decisions regarding street trade management and take accountability or responsibility when necessary. This form of decentralisation extending to street traders is a way in which the City can better manage, control and influence how street trading can be governed in the city. By doing so the City is giving power to the traders through participation which they can use to shape the city and not just voicing out their opinions. It is through decentralisation that block leaders become street level bureaucrats.

In this case it is argued that not only personal relationships that block leaders form with street traders that creates that client-broker relationship but also the fact that block leaders are street traders themselves. There is no black or white, it is also not clear cut or there is no guide as to operate because of the personal dynamics involved. An advantage of such personal relationships is that they allow the poor to access the state but they also have a person they can hold reliable because they know who is accountable and who they have to go to if they need to hold someone accountable. For this research it is essential to understand the relationship between the DED and block leaders as involving them in the management of streets is both a form of clientelism, and an attempt at decentralised and participatory governance.

2.3. Street trade governance

Yiftachel (2009) argues that strict by-laws and regulation incentivise urban informality. When the City of Johannesburg creates by-laws and regulations, those that are not favoured by the rules become excluded which results in them not obeying the rules. For people to not obey rules is because rules had to be set in place. For people to operate in the informal it is because they were not catered for in the formal or excluded. To maintain rule of order and control over the traders the state uses policies which are progressive in some places and not so progressive in others. A comparison of policy objectives is conducted below in order to show which direction the City is going in regards to street trade governance.

The first example is an international example which is the City of Melbourne. One of its policy objectives is to enable street activity that complements the existing retail/commercial sector, is sensitive to the needs of city users and residents and provides diversity and consumer choice (City of Melbourne, 2011). For the City of Melbourne the emphasis is on providing choice and activities that complement existing retail. Basically the emphasis is on land use. It is taken into account that street trading does affect land use and should be considered when making plans for the city. The existences of traders on the streets does affect its surrounding land use such whether positively or negatively. In order to avoid the negative effect on land use in the City of Johannesburg, it is therefore recommended to incorporate street trading in the land use management plan or design of the city. By incorporating street trading in the land use management plan of the city will benefit both the city and the public at large. This is not only convenient for customers but also for the City as traders are already recognised as permanent on the streets.

To better understand the difference between cities and how they govern informal trading, it is useful to compare Ekurhuleni's policy and City of Johannesburg's policy on street trading. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan qualifies as an example because both City of Johannesburg Metropolitan and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan used to fall under Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area before it was broken down into smaller Metros for administration purposes (Baralink Development Strategy, 1999). It would be interesting to examine which route each Metro took.

Ekurhuleni's objective is based on creating a favourable economic environment (City of Ekurhuleni, 2008). With the focus on creating a favourable economic environment it can be argued that the City takes into consideration the traders, their views and perceive them as being part of the economy.

The City of Johannesburg aims at creating a well-managed informal trading sector which takes care of the needs of its stakeholders. For the City of Johannesburg the focus is on management that will take good care of its stakeholders. Stakeholders in this case may be developers, street traders, pedestrians or property owners to name a few. The main aim is to ensure that all stake holders' needs are taken care of in a balanced manner where there are no stake holders being favoured or sought to be better than others.

The objectives differently influence the way in which street trading is governed in both cities. An example of this is how stalls are allocated in both cities. According to (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2008, 16) “Street traders shall be allocated site and facility only by a designated employee and or official of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in consultation with the street trader, and or associations or organization of street traders”. City of Johannesburg’s allocation of stalls is completely different from that of Ekurhuleni. According to (City of Johannesburg 2009, 14), “MTC shall develop criteria for the determination of space allocation in accordance with this policy”. The process of allocating stalls seems fairly transparent in Ekurhuleni as traders are part of the process but in Johannesburg the process is not as transparent. This may be due to the fact that MTC is in charge of the allocation which is a private entity and is supposed to functions like a business. Ekurhuleni is taking charge and not leasing the management of street traders to a private entity.

Policy objectives make a difference when it comes to how the City intends to achieve its goal. It also assists in coming with appropriate strategies to help them reach their goal. An example is how City of Ekurhuleni is aimed at creating a favourable economic environment and to achieve that they involve traders in the allocation of stalls. For Johannesburg, the aim is to well-manage informal trading and take care of the needs of its stakeholders and its strategy was to have MTC manage and allocate stalls on behalf of traders. Their needs are catered for because they are being allocated stalls which mean the City achieved its goal.

2.4. Street trade mobilisation

Street traders are mostly perceived as the “other” in the city and not necessarily as people whom are trying to make a living just like anyone else. The participation model or approach that the DED came up with, created what Cornwall (2008) calls ‘invited spaces of participation’. Invited spaces are generally less antagonistic than ‘invented spaces of participation’ as they are meant to foster a cooperative attitude between society and the state. There is supposed to be a neutrality or balance of power, although one can also argue that it is an illusion of balanced power, this is not the focus of the research but it might be an important point for the research as block leaders are seen as being ‘sold out’ to the city, especially by street trader organisations (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). For the purpose of this

research, block leaders are mobilising as they are being organized, joining forces with the DED and representing traders' interests.

Bayat (1997) supports my argument that street traders' presence on the streets is a form of resistance. This is so because the traders are operating outside legal parameters thus making them 'informal' or 'illegal' (Chatterjee, 1947). Bayat (1997) further argues that informal people use 'passive networks' to connect as they share similar problems thus they are visible to each other. While block leaders also use networks they do not use 'passive networks'. The election process they went through when becoming block leaders makes them a visible network. In this case street traders use their networks which they acquired through being block leaders or street trader organisation leaders. These networks assist the traders in solving problems and resisting against the city by making it possible for majority of traders to trade in the inner city with or without registration.

As street traders are elected to represent traders, it can be argued that this is a form of mobilisation. This can be seen through street trading becoming an active resistance due to its constant threat of removal by the City in the everyday life. Operation Clean Sweep elevated this threat as traders no longer feel safe even though they might be working with the City to better manage street trading. Active resistance of traders can be seen through the use of social media, protests and confronting the City by taking them to court (Matjomane 2013 and Bosaka *et al*, 2014). Another form of resistance is through mass mobilisation, networks of people going through the same issues and this takes place in particular spaces in the city. They mobilise in order to gain access to resources and build local autonomy. It is essential in my research to understand the passive networks of street traders and how they work, how they manage to acquire access to resources through these networks

An example of an active network is how one person may hold several positions in different structures of local politics. This means that they are acquiring more networks as they will be working with a lot of different people. Hygins Chukwu from NUT hold different positions which includes a leader in the street trade organisation, a city block leader, a member of Informal Traders Forum and a member of the community Policing Forum . It would be very interesting to map those networks and how they operate. Does it get things done faster

when people come to him as a block leader as he knows who to talk to; those are the kind of questions to ask.

According to Cornwall (2008) invited spaces are spaces of participation that is facilitated by the local authority, a developer or state officials. She argues that the power holder is the one who organises community participation. The DED organised or initiated the space for block leaders to operate, hence they are the ones who gave “power” to the street traders to elect their block leaders but they operate within certain parameters and they perform certain duties. It is uncertain as to whether block leaders have power to make decisions on their own or whether they are autonomous of the DED in managing the streets. Such a dynamic is questionable, is the state engaging on ‘real’ participation or is it just an illusion to keep the traders busy and happy and make them feel as if they really are playing a role in governing the streets. Traders might become active implementers of the status quo, the pacification and compliance of the traders.

According to Cornwall (2008) the management system involving block leaders, MTC and the DED can be described to be ‘interactive participation’, it is a process wherein participation is joint and it is not done just to tick of the box but participation is seen as a right. Although street traders may be exercising their rights by participating there is little or no transformation in power relations because it is unclear if block leaders truly have the power to make decisions in managing street trading.

According to Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) and Matjomane (2013) different street trader organisations have been identified and investigated on how they have mobilised in fighting for their rights. They both briefly touch on the issue of City block leaders and how they are competing with street trade organisations and allegedly conspiring with the DED. This leads to city block leaders not being trusted by street trader organisation. It is important to find out the relationship and dynamics that go on between the two.

3. Chapter three: Methodology

3.1. Introduction

For a research to be considered valid, it has to be based on philosophical underpinnings and which method will yield the best knowledge for a given research question. Certain paradigms will be a medium through which the research will be explored. To best answer the research question, a qualitative approach has been undertaken. Qualitative research is concerned with describing reality and uncovering how certain realities function and what these realities are. For my research it is the best approach as it will assist in uncovering how the block leader's work with the City to manage street trading and what is it that they do. It is also important to use this approach as the research will be based on investigating the practice of street trading management looking at block leaders as street managers. This will assist in finding out the system is about, who block leaders are, what powers they hold and whether this kind of management systems is efficient or not.

3.2. Research paradigm

Qualitative research has three underpinning guidelines or philosophical assumptions that will be employed in this study. Namely they are positivist, interpretive and critical post-modernist. With reference from Terre Blanche and Durrheim, (1999), research has three dimensions which are epistemology, ontology and methodology. A paradigm is considered an ideology or way of thinking that encompasses all three dimensions of research and links them together.

The positivist paradigm is mostly concerned with quantitative research, thus most part of this paradigm is not applicable in this research. The part that is of interest in this research is that positivism is concerned with uncovering truth and presenting it in empirical ways (Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit 2004, p. 17). This research is concerned in uncovering truth by exploring a group of street traders which are block leaders and how they used to work with City in managing street traders. According to positivist, human behaviour is considered passive; it is controlled and determined by external factors. In this study it will be of importance to explore if this was the case for street trade block leaders in how they used to manage the streets.

Interpretivists argue that there is no correct route or formula to knowledge (Willis, 1990). According to (Meyers, 2009) reality is created through interaction of persons in society on a daily basis such as language, consciousness or shared meaning. In my understanding this means that reality is constructed through relating to a particular situation. For example it can be argued that street bureaucrats have established a relationship with the people. MTC officials in this study were now able to relate to the street traders as they are able to see the day to day dealings or activities of street traders and what they go through. They were able to do that through observation and their own interpretation of the situation.

Critical postmodernism is a combination of critical theory and postmodernism. This is somewhat the most vital paradigm that shapes the research as it is about interrogating findings and not just taking them or accepting them at face value. It is also important because it is about empowering and unpacking the power structures and politics involved. For the City or DED to involve street traders in the management street trading in the inner city, it is a form of liberation: but it will be important to question to what extent these block leaders hold the power.

3.3. A more practical take on methodology

To attain a more practical approach to the methodology, my methodology will be based on various aspects of data collection such as interviews, observations and other possible ways that will tackle issues of data collection such as using existing documents. This is a problem as there are not many documents recorded about the management of street trading by block leaders and the City. This is a stumbling block but other ways can be used as alternatives to mitigate that.

Interviews

The practical part of the methodology was primarily based on interviews with block leaders in the inner city. Initially the plan was to interview 15 block leaders from different networks in order to get a variety. Getting and securing interviews was not as easy as I thought it would have been so I ended up interviewing 8 block leaders. Getting both sides of the story is of vital importance in order to attain balance and a better understanding of the management system the way it is understood by both block leaders and City officials. Acquiring an interview with City officials proved difficult but as time went on I managed to interview two City officials; a property specialist at JPC and the former CEO of MTC. Getting

interviews from City officials was difficult as they are also conscious of how they are portrayed as being against traders whereas they view themselves as striving to empower traders. It should be noted that there are departments that are striving to empower traders and there are some departments also within the state striving to get rid of traders. One department reflects on the other or state departments are seen to be one and not separated because they are all part of the state but they are separated in practice according to their functions.

For this research in particular, I expected people to be uncooperative and intimidated when conducting interviews considering the environment in which street traders often find themselves in. the fear of the City from traders plays a big role in them being protective of themselves. For the interviews to be fruitful I had to come up with a strategy to help ease the tension. I used a network that was established in 2014 during the third Year report. The leader of the organization (a block leader himself) I was researching agreed to help me by introducing me to other block leaders in the inner city that he knew of. This was my entry point into the research.

Theoretically block leaders are supposed to be in every part of the inner city, having the leader introduce me to his network of block leaders would only cover just a portion of the inner city block leaders. In order to get more block leaders from different parts of the city, I used the relationship that CUBES had established with street traders as an entry point into acquiring block leaders in other parts of the city.

The person I communicated with to get more information on who block leaders were and which parts of the city they were operating was a block leader himself and a trader organization leader. Although he could not help me at that particular moment he referred me to one of he's colleagues who not only gave me an interview but introduced me to a network of block leaders of his own. What was interesting about this is the way he went about in helping me find out who were block leaders. He started a chain reaction; he would introduce me to the next block leader and ask that block leader to introduce me to another block leader. This not only got me into his network but into networks of those he introduced me to. It was interesting to watch such a network unfold as street traders know each other very well, it revealed that block leaders operating in different block with similar but not the same problems communicate often and know each other. Even though they were working

in different ways and approaching challenges they had in different ways, they were still friendly to each other even though they disagree on some matters.

Challenges

Because the research was based on people and people are different, interviews had their challenges. Some challenges were easy to deal with and some challenges were frustrating and challenged my own understanding of character. The introductions of CUBES and wits did help in easing up the tensions but some people were very reluctant to let their opinion known. Some were afraid that I was from the City, DED or JMPD. I stated my name, year study and what the research was about it still didn't help. When I showed them my student card is when they become more at ease but didn't want to be quoted and still refused to answer some questions as they didn't feel comfortable.

"Please don't tell anyone that I am the one who told you this. I don't want people from the City or Department to know that I had a talk with you" (block leader 5, 2015).

The statement was said to me by one of the block leaders as I was leaving seeking reassurance that the interview was only for the purposed of research. I ensured him once more that it was sorely for research and nothing else; I also told him that the report would be anonymised in order to protect his identity.

There were those that are comfortable talking about general things but once the interview starts they become hostile and want or ensure that they are not misquoted or misunderstood. From my observations I gathered that the hostility comes from somewhere and maybe the reason for the hostility was because of the element that there is a lot of politics between block leaders and street trader organisations on that particular street. It became a stumbling block as one of the interviewees from that street was very observant and critical of what should be written and what should not be written. He ensured of what he wanted on record and off record by demanding that I write what he says word for word in my notes and read it back to him for approval. At first it was very frustrating and made me angry as he was hindering me from gathering information which I needed. After a short while what he was saying revealed something that made me understand that he is just protecting himself. From what I gathered during the interview he has been misrepresented before and was accused of working for the City. I think that is what he was trying to avoid.

His answers were very straight forward and didn't want anything that was not in the interview guideline to be written down. The issue was that he had a lot to say but doesn't want to open up.

After the interview I spent a few hours with him in his stalls as he was telling me stories of how he started trading and how the trading conditions were back then as opposed to now. What was most interesting for me was the fact that he started trading during the apartheid era and when he compared it to the conditions of trading now he was disappointed. I continued asking questions about what he was telling me, the one question that stood out was when I asked him if he thought trading conditions would become better in the future. He did not answer immediately but instead he said I should listen to a conversation he often has with one of his friends about God, human nature, politics and religion.

My understanding of the conversation was that it is human nature to be greedy, corrupt and push forward their agenda's. Whether be it in politics or religion everything is a choice and the choices we make on a daily basis influence our character. The state is comprised of different people with different agenda's and characters. Some good and some bad, others are more interested in looking out for themselves and making enough money build an empire and other are more interested in building a community where everyone is equal. From this I deduced that as much as it is perceived that street traders are wanted out of the streets by the city it's not everyone in the city that individually wants them out. Some people do not have anything to gain or lose whether street traders are operating in the streets or not but some have more to lose and gain than others and others are just doing their jobs so they get paid at the end of the day and survive just like street traders. It becomes their interest and goal to ensure that they are not there if it will benefit them. This reveals that there is more to the state than meets the eye. His final answer was that he doesn't see much change occurring regarding how street traders are perceived and the conditions in which they work.

Having to think about that carefully and analyse what he was made me see that some people have been mistreated by the system for too long and they have just given up. Young traders are enthusiastic and still have hope that street traders will be recognised and treated with respect as they are earning an honest living just like anyone else. I took notes

after the conversation the only issue was remembering quotes when taking notes long after the interview that was a disadvantage.

I realized that having an interview guideline present in an interview was a disadvantage for me because often when I was asking questions some interviewees would grab the interview guideline and only answer questions from there. They did not allow for follow up questions and they just skipped questions they did not want to answer. This taught me that when conducting interviews it should be more of a conversation than an interview. I had to understand that the interview guidelines were there to guide me and not necessarily be used as a questionnaire. In my next interviews I didn't have the interview guideline with me out in the open I only referred to it if I had forgotten something or to check if I had covered all the bases. This helped a lot because people were able to share information with me as if they were telling stories instead of being dictated by a guideline on what to say and what not to say.

Initially, during the beginning of this research there were ideas on shadowing a block leader for 3-4 days or conduct a focus group for block leaders to engage critically on pressing issues they might be facing. The idea was good at first but it has come to my attention that people may not be as critical and open in a focus group as they would individually due to the sensitivity of the matter. Interviewing them individually was the best solution in order to get more out of the interviews. The leader of the organisation I interviewed in third year was the person I had planned on shadowing but the issue is that he was not so keen on the idea and held back when asked if it was possible.

The alternative to that is either to keep pushing or try and get someone else who would not have a problem with being shadowed, or abandon that as a methodology. I later realized that the issue was probably because of the way I asked as I did not ask it strategically. I could have asked to spend a few days with him observing what he does as a block leader as it is less intimidating than asking to shadow him. This taught me to be strategic about how one goes about in doing things. Due to time and the end of research approaching I ended up abandoning the idea of shadowing him or anyone else and the focus group. I had enough information although I could have got more I had to end field work in order to focus on manufacturing and producing the report.

Efforts were made to interview former MTC CEO and the interview was informative, he referred me to his former colleague who holds the position of property manager at JPC and the Director of small and medium micro-sized enterprise [SMME]. The property manager responded but was unable to assist as he does not deal with street traders but market traders and taxi ranks. He referred me to his colleague who also works at JPC as a property specialist who gave me an overview of how management used to work with traders before OCS and how that relationship has deteriorated after OCS. The director of SMME unfortunately could not be reached but efforts were made to secure an interview to no avail.

In order to get that variety I interviewed block leaders from different organisations. Getting out of the NUT network and entering the field through other organisations or networks provided that variety. It is a strategic way to uncover information that one person may feel they cannot share about themselves from another block leaders. This is a way to unpack the politics, conflicts (if any) and what really happens during the process of managing street trading from a grassroots level. It is also a way to avoid being painted a perfect picture when that may not be the case. One has to really understand what is happening and the relationships that have been constructed, what role they play in this model.

Documents

Since there are no documents that really talks to the research question, this section is not applicable or that much useful. Although a few documents that talk about the relationship between MTC and street traders have been found the problem is that it does not specify whether the traders are block leaders, street trader organisation leaders or just ordinary traders. The information is a bit relevant and usable but I will have to think more about how the information can be best utilised to support my claims and findings. The 3rd year report is the best document that can be used so far as documentation form below and also because it is the only report that has information on the relationship between the city and block leaders. Basically in terms of using documents I had to make the best of what I had. A number of unofficial documents were gathered either from traders or City officials. Some documents were very useful and informative such as house rules that are an unofficial document regulating traders on how they should conduct themselves and behave on the

streets. Archived previous minutes from meeting held by different forums that block leaders attended where also made available.

Visual material

Visuals that will be most appropriate to use will be maps that will indicate the geography and territories of block leaders, how they share power, how they ally and how they work together spatially. It is important to locate these aspects in space as it will show the linkages and relationships in space.

Ethics

There are issues about ethics that have to be considered such as confidentiality and trust. When block leaders open up and share their experiences and knowledge on the subject of working with the city, they in some cases risk their reputation and credibility to the traders as they are already viewed as working with the City and helping cause a divide within the traders. It was made clear that whatever they say will be confidential if they so wish or if they want to remain anonymous for safety reasons. Anonymity is most vital as participants were not as open when interviewed others repeatedly stated that it should not be mentioned that they are the ones who gave the information as it is very risky. The damage that the revelation of who said what is damaging to block leaders and the damage will occur from both the traders and the City.

For the research to be effective and useful to both parties that are participating in the research, I as a researcher and Hygins as my entry point into the research, I sat down with him and negotiated on how the research can be effective or useful to him. For example it can be useful to Hygins as a means of mobilising block leaders and renegotiating with the City to work together with the block leaders as they were doing with MTC. Mobilising is a start to bringing change to street trading management and stand up to the City but also in a not so antagonistic way. By showing the City that the system was effective and the streets were manageable with participation from both ends of the stick (the City and block leaders), it could be the beginning or a starting point of a participatory model that is democratic and brings out results to say the least.

A feedback session will be conducted at the end of the report to the respondents in order to for them to see the final product for themselves and to show them that the material was

not to harm them but to compile a document for research purposes but they can also use it to their advantage. The feedback sessions will be in the form of a presentation or a short summary of what the report is about.

4. Chapter four: findings

This chapter presents and analyse the research findings, and is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on who block trader leaders are and what they do, presenting the history of block leader and how they became to be managers in the streets, in the broader context of the municipal street trading management system. Perceptions of street traders on block leaders and how block leaders perceive themselves will be included in order to test the idea whether one can consider block leaders as street level bureaucrats or not.

The second section focuses on the relationship between block leaders and organisations: from an apparent opposition, it will demonstrate how both structures of trader representation are intertwined and explore the role organisations play in the management structure of block leaders. The last section for this chapter concludes on the politics of block trader leader in street trading governance, looking at the relevance of concepts such as street level bureaucracy, clientelism and patron-broker relationships in understanding what role block leaders play in the management system.

4.1. Who are block leaders and what do they do?

To better understand how block leaders manage streets, the first step is to understand who block leaders are and what they do. Block leaders are theoretically area representatives elected at block level to represent traders in negotiations with the City and managing the streets (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). Block leaders are aimed at providing everyday contact for traders to gain access to the City. They work voluntarily, without being compensated for the money they spend, the money they lose when they attend meetings by leaving their stalls unoccupied and the time they use running errands in connection with managing the streets.

What trader block leaders say about their role and mandate is however slightly different:

“As block leaders you make sure you oversee the areas where traders are trading. No violation of house rules and by-laws, help street traders on what is required to be on a stand, like smart cards and ensure that there is no illegal trading in an un-demarcated space” (Block leader1, 2015).

“Block leaders ensure that people are trading in the right way so that law enforcement (JMPD) does not impound goods. We also mediate issues and address them to the City” (Block leader 2, 2015).

“As a block leader you manage trading space. See that everything is in place; see that there is no crime around the area. Make sure the coordination between JPC and the traders runs smoothly, rely any other new by-laws and possibly inform them of any orders of the day, make sure that the place is clean, see that the City’s by-laws are observed” (Block leader 4, 2015).

For most of the block leaders interviewed they understand their role as a block leader to be ensuring that the law is upheld. They do not talk about changing policy or fighting for trader’s rights, or even bringing their issues up, they mostly talk about ensuring that the by-laws and house rules are followed. Their job is to make sure that traders are in order and abiding by the rules.

“Management used to work with traders to enforce by-laws” (City official 1, 2015)

From the above quote it can be understood that block leaders’ main role when they started to work with management was simply to assist management enforce by-laws. They were operating at a technical level and the agreement or the capacity they were working in was not a political one. This may explain why block leaders are mainly focused on enforcing by-laws and house rules and do not get too much involved in the politics of negotiating terms and conditions for the traders.

“I also mediate issues and address them to the City. If traders have issues they come to me and I take them to MTC or the DED, I talk to the Programme manager from MTC and the director of Small, Medium and Micro-size enterprises from DED” (Block leader 2, 2015).

From the above quote it can be seen that although block leaders main task was to ensure that by-laws and house rules are followed, they also to some extent mediated issues between traders and the City. This means that there was a degree of interaction between block leaders and management in order to maintain peace on the streets. This qualifies block leaders as brokers and fixers on the streets. This echoes what Simone says about urban management in African cities (2010, 14):

“Management comes to rely on an intermediary sector of brokers and fixers who are not officially part of the municipal system but perform official duties. Because these are not formal sub-contractual agreements, such intermediaries require certain autonomy of operation as a

means of ensuring enumeration for the jobs they do. They have the flexibility to collect fees, a task that would otherwise not be necessary if citizens dealt with the bureaucracies themselves – if they actually could.)”.

Block leaders do not collect trading fees from street traders in Johannesburg, but they have the task of ensuring that house rules and by-laws are not violated, explain the house rules and lease agreements to the traders and ensure that people learn how to trade and how not to trade according to the by-laws so that JMPD does not impound their goods.

Roy (2005, 147) argues that: “State power is reproduced through the capacity to construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy”, which encompasses what Yiftachel (2009) calls the criminalisation of space. Although by-laws and house rules can be viewed as a necessity of upholding order and rule of law in the informal economy, they can also be viewed as a way to criminalise space by a definition, imposed by the top, of what is legal and illegal. By allowing street trade anywhere besides in restricted or prohibited areas, municipal authorities define what is legal from what is illegal more broadly than allowing street trade in specified vending zones (Bénit-Gbaffou, forthcoming).

“MTC needs to explain that some streets have their own waiting list. In fact, almost all the streets have their waiting list, kept by the block leader. Program officers from MTC, each allocated to a street, check the list and confirm with block leaders. There are MTC programme officers for each street, perhaps for each block: for instance, 3 program officers are responsible for Delvers Street. A block leader might recommend that one person is the next person on the list to be allocated a space in that block. All block leaders in the street endorse the allocation, the program officer signs, and it goes to the programme manager in MTC, who is the last person to sign. That is why people don’t fight for trading spaces. However this is no longer working today. Organisations do that now. My organization, NUT, does not allocate – it is block leaders who used to allocate, following the rules” (Organisation leader October 2014).

Block leaders also have a say in who has access to the waiting list and its management but they do not have the final decision. This is a type of procedure to ensure that there is order and control on who is allocated space and who is not. When a person is allocated trading space in a certain street the block leader is aware of this person as they will have seen them on the waiting list and in some cases they might have been the one to suggest that they get allocated space in that certain area.

“If licensing is not tightly regulated it can be abused and this is where block leaders come in. They explain how there are 11 traders in a 10 trader designated site. Block leaders together with traders know who’s next on the list for space” (Former MTC CEO, 2015).

The above quote shows that the City depends on traders and block leaders who are on the ground to oversee allocation of space as they are the ones who are in a position to know who is next on the waiting list and who is not. Block leaders are the ones responsible for managing and ensuring that space allocation is not abused or misused. Although programme officers are the ones that keep the waiting lists and traders register with program officers, block leaders are the ones that know the details of the waiting list. It can be hypothesised that program officers are more focused on the administration part of the waiting list that is registering traders, licensing them and entering them into the waiting list.

As block leaders are the ones who know who is next in the waiting list it gives them power over traders. This gives block leaders leverage over traders and encourages a broker fixer relationship. Block leaders as brokers have the capacity to cause chaos through the threat of disrupting traders’ access to management and the City. This may be to maintain the little power they have and to remain as block leaders. This patronage system allows the management of traders to run smoothly as it mitigates violence and allows for participation to occur in a peaceful environment as opposed to a hostile environment. Power does not only lie with management over traders and block leaders but it also lies with block leaders over traders.

It can also be viewed as a way of keeping to date with who is on the street and who isn’t not only through record but when the block leaders know you they can account for that particular space and verify that indeed it is occupied by that person. This also assists in keeping traders with no smartcards from occupying demarcated trading space. The only way for one to gain access to the waiting is if they are registered and own a smart card. In this way the waiting list works as a way of restricting the number of traders on the streets. This benefits most trader organisations that have block leaders in leadership positions in organisations as they are able to recruit traders through assisting them to get smartcards.

“South African’s are branded as being xenophobic but there is corruption between foreign nationals and officers. Foreign nationals can raise funds to skip the queue in the waiting list. The waiting list is corrupted. Most people were jumping the queue and it was mainly foreigners. There is an internal problem of unemployment in South Africa and foreign nationals are

dominating pavements. Programme officer are taking bribes without consulting a block leader, a block leader is then told that a person is there without knowing what procedures were followed” (block leader 8, 2015)

There are certain perceptions on the street that the waiting list is corrupt. It can be said that the waiting list is open to negotiations by block leaders and programme officers. These negotiations have no nationality. The system becomes a patronage system through the negotiations of who comes next on the waiting list. During negotiations it can be said that programme officers have power over block leaders. This is a vertical tie and allows block leaders to hold power over traders but also to solve problems through these vertical ties. The idea of the waiting list was working and made a difference on the streets because block leaders knew who was trading where and how long they had been trading there for. They were also aware of a new person coming in the stall and leaving the stall. This assisted program officers to keep track of the traders on a certain street. This was before OCS as block leaders are no longer working with programme officers and the waiting list is no longer in effect.

“How can the particular claims of marginal population groups, often grounded in violations of law, be made consistent with the pursuit of equal citizenship and virtue? To produce a viable and persuasive politics of the governed, there has to be a considerable act of mediation. Who can mediate?” (Chatterjee 1947, 64).

When block leaders negotiate space with officials for traders they become the mediator that Chatterjee (1947) talks about. When block leaders negotiate on behalf of the trader they are claiming the rights of traders as they are operating in the violation of law. Traders are unable to make negotiations for themselves because they are not seen as having full rights in the city due to their participation of violating the law. Block leaders although they also do not have full rights because they are also traders are able to negotiate as they have been legitimised by the City. This gives them degree to attain certain right even if they do not have full rights.

“As a block leader you tell the City that this is the next person on the waiting list. OCS stopped so many things and no trader has been allocated since” (Block leader 1, 2015).

“There were bigger problems after OCS. Kiosks were removed that’s why there was no demarcation when you come back. There is a neighbour you don’t know who claims the city put them there” (Block leader 8, 2015).

OCS not only stopped block leaders and programme officials workings on regulating licensing and the waiting list; it made it difficult to keep track of who is on the streets and who is not. It is now difficult to understand how space is allocated and what procedures are now followed. OCS was trying to 'clean' the streets and start from scratch but they were unable to achieve that and made it more difficult to keep track of traders in the inner city.

There is a waiting list of newcomers. Keeping record of how many are applying for stalls. You then have to go to MTC and tell them you want space. As soon as there is an opening they let you know. Officials come to block leaders and ask if the space is available or not (Block leader 2, 2015).

For one to be on the waiting list they have to be registered for a smartcard at MTC. Programme officials ask block leaders which spaces are occupied and which are not because they are the ones working on the ground on a daily basis. They know which stalls are occupied and which are not. Block leaders played a major role in organising street trader's allocation of space by advising programme officers on the availability and non-availability of space. Although they know more they do not have the powers to allocate stalls themselves because they do not work independently of programme officers.

Some street block leaders are less involved in the waiting list and allocation of stalls than others. They do not suggest who should be next for the allocation of stalls but they only show program officers which spaces are empty and which are occupied. This raises questions as to why some block leaders are more involved than others. Do some block leaders have more power than others or are some block leaders more outspoken than others?

"Block leaders are effective in terms of personalities. They stand their ground and report what's wrong. It creates enemies where officials do not want to be challenged. Their efficiency is constrained by program officers as they do not work individually of them" (City official 2, 2015).

By gathering from the above quote, it can be concluded that block leaders are different. Some are more outspoken than others and that's what makes them more efficient or inefficient. This was also realised while conducting field work. Some block leaders were eager to talk about issues relating to being a block leader. Some block leaders were more reserved and cautious of what they say. Block leaders who are more outspoken than others

may lead some streets to be more efficient in the management than others but most importantly participate and contribute to the management of streets more.

4.1.1. How block leaders are elected.

It is unclear when exactly block leaders were called to represent traders by the City. Based on the findings, traders were requested to elect block leaders at different times, for different reasons in various parts of the city.

“I have been a block leader since 2005. Mobilisation of block leaders started in 2005. MTC officials came and proposed that traders should mobilise that’s when traders group themselves and nominated leaders and went to MTC to endorse it” (block leader 1, 2015).

“I have been a block leader since 2000. There was no representative of street traders. The City came to take control of the streets. Each block was requested to have a leader” (block leader 2, 2015).

“I have been a block leader since 2007. I was elected because I was used to attending meetings and deliver information, I also know most of the people trading here. I am one of the oldest traders around. Knowing people is an advantage when you’re a block leader. There weren’t many people wanting to become block leaders” (block leader 4, 2015).

Citizenship can be used to either include or exclude (Lister, 2008). Traders are operating outside of the law which according to Chatterjee (1947) means they do not have ‘full’ rights as citizens. In this case citizenship has been used to exclude those operating in the informal realm. For traders to gain access to more rights than they have they have to be included in and recognised as equal citizens and not just people operating outside of the law.

The above shows how the City (MTC) came up with a strategy to include traders’ into the management system. In this way they can realise and exercise their rights as citizens of South Africa. According to the Constitution of South Africa every person has the right to choose their own trade or profession provided there is a conducive environment for them to trade.

“MTC introduced block leaders as a way to empower street traders to climb up the economic ladder and grow. Management is trying to grow/ empower traders. Management comes up with checks and balances to ensure house rules are followed’ (City official 2, 2015)

The above quotes are supporting quotes by traders stating that the City is the one that made a call to traders to nominate block leaders to represent them. According to

Buckmaster and Thomas (2009) exclusion is top down and inclusion is done to socially excluded people that are passive by the state. They further argue that inclusion can be viewed as active or coerced by the state and passive on those who are being included because they are viewed as having no agency of their own.

When it comes to street traders this statement does not apply because they are active and exercise their agency. They exercised their agency before the City came up with the idea of including them in the management of street trading through block leaders. When this occurred some traders had formed street trade organisations, the only issue is that they were not recognised by the City.

For one to become a block leader, one has to be nominated or elected by the traders themselves. After the election block leaders have to be endorsed by MTC for them to be official representatives of traders.

“Traders group themselves and nominated leaders and went to MTC to endorse it. Not a lot of people wanted to become block leaders. Elections are depended on each street/block when traders want to remove someone they can remove them but no one has been replaced yet” (block leader 1, 2015).

“There were three other people competing to become block leaders as well. There are three people standing as block leaders.....There have not been elections since the original committee. When someone decides to leave sector or passes away is then that they are replaced” (block leader 2, 2015).

For one to become a block leader they have to be selected (elected or nominated) by traders. The above quotes show that the process of elections vary according to the distinctness of each street and its needs. It can also be seen that there is no set date of elections in the city and elections occur only when needed. The last election occurred in 2013, the election did not happen in all streets but only in Eloff Street as there was a need for a block leader.

“There are too many block leaders in the inner city thus they condensed the number of block leaders into committee. 15 block leaders formed the committee in 2007 through elections. It is called the inner city block leaders committee” (Block leader 1, 2015).

“In the block leaders committee after every 3 years a new chairperson is elected” (block leader 2, 2015).

This was done to ensure the functionality of the system. Due to that there are many block leaders in the inner City; a committee of 15 members was created for management purposes. When dealing with a few people it is easier to manage them and hear everyone's opinion than when dealing with a larger group of people. It is also easier to reach an agreement or understanding with a few people than with a larger group of people.

"I was elected as by the people. A stand in was requested and there was a vacuum. I had to be formalised, formalisation happens, happened in Justice's office at MTC. They told us how many block leaders are needed at MTC boardroom and I was voted in. There were other candidates, 5 in total and only 3 were elected. I have been a block leader since 2011. According to MTC constitution elections are to be every 3 years. They have not done any follow ups on elections. When you say you need help that's when they organise elections" (block leader 8, 2015).

The formalisation of block leaders is a mandate that the MTC is supposed to carry out although no document is available. Formalisation occurs at MTC offices but it is not clear what procedures are followed for one to be formalised and recognised as a City block leader. How is the new block leader recognised by the traders and other state officials? It can be hypothesised that the constitution was put in place to deal with the procedures and how such issues are to be dealt with within the means of the law.

"There is no constitution only terms of reference for committees and block leaders" (City official 2, 2015).

The above quote is in contradiction with that of the block leader who states that there is a constitution that guides MTC on how management should be done and more specifically in reference to elections of block leaders. It can be assumed that the constitution and terms of reference may be one and the same but only differ on how different people refer to them. It remains unclear on whether a constitution or terms of reference does exist as the researcher never saw either document. Speculations can only be made on whether either document truly does exist. Efforts were made to try and see the constitution and terms of reference but to no avail.

When MTC did not do their job of organising follow up elections, this opened up a gap that leaders exploited to their benefit, such as being a block leader for as long as they can remember. This may also be due to that the constitution is not a public document

and most traders may not even have the knowledge that such a document exists. Without the knowledge or having seen the document there is no basis of calling for an election on the basis of the constitution. It is unclear if the terms of reference also state that follow up elections are to occur after 3 years.

This is a disadvantage as having the same leader for a long time does not allow for growth and new visions or goals. The same leadership allows only for things to be done the same way and in many cases change is not easily accepted because of the comfortability of a routinized leadership. It can also be viewed as an advantage, as the leaders become more knowledgeable on the day to day running of being a block leader and they may be prone to solve issues a lot quicker as they are already familiar with the system and management. A new person after 3 years would mean they have to start new networks of problem solving, build trust (of not only traders but officials as well) and learn how to manoeuvre the environment and get the job done at the same time.

MTC was failing to meet the constitutions stipulations that elections are to be run after every 3 years so that block leaders are rotated or changed. The need to change block leaders after 3 years can be analysed as trying to be democratic and allow people to step down if they want and give opportunities to those that would like to assume the role of being a street manager. It also tries to minimise clientelistic relationships between traders as it would probably take a while to earn trust. When block leaders are rotated a new relationship would have to be established and trust has to be earned. The time used to build trust between a block leader and a trader would minimise the clientelistic exchange of power for loyalty.

“Other elections were held in 2013, because they had to change lock leaders/re-elect block leaders” (block leader 7, 2015).

In some streets block leader elections only occur when there is a need. For an example some leaders are elected when one of the block leaders on that street decide to resign or they pass on. The manner in which MTC handled its matters was informal and not according to the rule of law. It can be argued that MTC operated in a way that was informal. For officials to wait till street traders go to them and demanded an election to occur when

elections were supposed to occur on a 3 year basis, was negligent and insinuates that most of the procedures put in place are not being followed.

“Elections can only happen per need pending per members concerns. We have a standing committee which we continuously work co-operatively” (block leader 4, 2015).

“There have not been any elections ever since” (block leader 6, 2015).

The above quotes indicate that elections only occur when members feel that it is necessary for them to occur. In this case, it can be deduced that members have the final say on how being a block leader is management administratively as what is stipulated in the constitution is not what happens in reality. This leaves the question of what other rules of order are ignored and for what reasons. It is also interesting that MTC chose not to amend the constitution, instead of stipulating that elections occur after every 3 years and state that elections occur per members request or when necessary.


According to Khisa (2013, 191), “the ‘informal state’ system reproduces its survival and legitimates its rule through maintaining aspects of legal-rational state structures, ceding power to varied constituencies as well as expanding the patronage network through the creation of numerous agencies”. It is arguable that the block leader management system (being informal) created a constitution as a means to legitimize its rule not necessarily applying and using it as an overarching law that lays foundations for all the laws, rules and procedures of the operations of MTC on block leaders.

For this research, an informal state “is a technology of control that simultaneously centralizes and fragments power through building structures parallel to legal and constitutional public institutions” (Khisa 2013, 193). MTC and JMPD can be said to be those structures for the City. Power has been fragmented into different state agencies but at the end of the day the state still has power over traders and street management. If the state fails to push its mandate through MTC they can use JMPD or the DED or any other state agency to push their mandate forward and get what they want.

4.1.2. Structure of the management system and how it functions

Before OCS, the structure of the management system was setup in a way that block leaders have some degree of contact with the City. When traders had grievances they would talk to block leaders who would take the matter to the City. Block leaders in the case were acting as mediators or brokers between the state and traders. They would particularly go to the programme manager at MTC and the director of SMME at DED to have the matters resolved.

Figure 5: Structure of management system before OCS.



The above graphic shows the hierarchy and structure of the management system before OCS. Below is a graphic trying to unpack the different institutions and what their functions are and how they fit into the management of informal street trading.

Block leaders committee used to meet every month with MTC in the MTC boardroom to discuss issues that traders had and what was happening on the ground. Issue that were on the agenda were mainly based on house rules such as sub-letting, selling of illegal products

and abandoning the stall to name a few. Traders had to following house rules for smooth running of the streets and maintain order.

“House rules are the day to day norms and standards that control trader’s behaviour” (City Official 2, 2015).

Block leaders committee is mainly focused on enforcing house rules and ensuring the smooth day to day management of the street together with program officers.

Figure 6: informal trader management institutions and functions





Figure 7: Structure of management system after OCS.



The above sketch depicts the relationship between management structures after OCS. The hatched line indicates that the relationship between the DED and Street trade organisation is weak. The same applies to the hatched line between the relationship between block leaders committee and MTC/JPC. Block leaders committee no longer meets every month or with MTC/JPC anymore. Street trade organisations still do not have a relationship with MTC/JPC but street trader organisations now have access to information from MTC/JPC that was previously restricted from them through block leaders.

“Associations brought power into forum. Block leaders have to go consult organisations when decision making with management” (City official 1, 2015).

Organisations do have influence on what goes on the relationship between MTC/JPC officials and block leaders through the affiliation of block leaders to organisations.

After OCS informal traders’ forum was suspended and is no longer functional. Existing channels of communication with the City have been severely affected and jeopardised. Relationships or communication between City officials and traders are done on an individual basis, with the exception of SAITF and SANTRA (organisations that took the City to court).

The two organisations deal with City officials and their legal representatives often on an antagonistic manner. Conflict mitigation ways have been compromised and are no longer functional.

“The City communicates more with organisations than with block leaders after OCS. There has been a change in how things are communicated after OCS. Things are not moving smoothly anymore, mostly because of organisation politics” (block leader 1, 2015).

Some block leaders feel that the City communicates more with trader organisations; organisations claim that the City does not communicate with them. Hypothetically speaking, block leaders may feel this way because of the individual communication between organisations and the City while the City does not communicate with block leaders individually anymore..

4.1.3. Block leaders profiles

Below are block leader profiles constructed while conducting interviews. I was able to interview 8 block leaders of whom 5 are members of the block leaders committee. These interviews were accessed through NUT, GIDA AND SANTRA networks. It came into realisations that not only are they organisations networks but they are block leader committee members networks. This shows that block leaders and organisations are intertwined. They maybe separate but they often overlap in certain aspects.

Due to the release of the 3rd year report, A Political Landscape of Street Trader Organisations in inner City Johannesburg: Post Operation Clean Sweep (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014), most traders did not want to open up or be interviewed as they were afraid of what would happen to them after the interview. In many of the interviews conducted people did not want to open up before they were certain that I was not a journalist for officials or a City official for traders. The issue of anonymity was necessary in order to protect the identities of those interviews hence there is no location, name or trade

Portrait - Block leader 1

Gender: Male

Nationality: Nigerian

Age group: N/A

History



Has been a trader since 2004 and became a block leader in 2005. Block leader 1 is a part of the block leaders committee; he holds the position of secretary in the committee. He received training from the City. They had workshops on house rules and by-laws of the City and how to manage traders with other block leaders. Although workshops were held often the last one was 2-3 years ago. They stopped after Operation Clean Sweep. He also attended workshops and training at Braamfontein, at the Centre for the Study of violence and training at Braamfontein, at the (Centre for the Study of violence and Reconciliation,) which he said helped him a lot.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

I enjoy respect from people most. Since the job is demanding there is no time for family as there are always issues that needs to be solved. There is no day I don't get reports of issues it's usually 3-4 issues a day. I am always there to sort out issues for people meaning that I have to leave my stand unattended. The benefit of doing this job is that the City knows you.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

You need leadership skills to be a good block leader although some are in-born; you need skills on how to manage conflict and crisis.

Portrait - Block leader 2

Gender: Male

Nationality: South African

Age group: 60-65

History

Has been trading for more than 30 years and was elected as a block leader since 2000. He is part of the block leaders committee. Received training from the City in the form of workshops that were held at MTC offices together with other block leaders committee members. In the workshops they were taught how to behave, what to do, what not to do,



not to accept bribery, that there is no favouritism and skills on leaderships. The workshops happened every month in meetings.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

It helps me be in a position to help others. People are having difficulties and when I am a block leader I have a chance to help them.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

Skills needed to be a good block leader are advocacy and literacy

Portrait - Block leader 3

Gender: Male

Nationality: South African

Age group: 40-45



History

Has been trading since 1994 and became a block leader for almost 2 years now. He was voted in when one of the block leaders passed on. He is not part of the block leaders committee. He received no training to become a block leader.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?


I do not enjoy anything about being a block leader

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

You need no skills to become a block leader

Portrait - Block leader 4

Gender: Male



Nationality: Originally from Zimbabwe

Age group: 60-65

History

Has been trading since 1972 and is a block leader. He is the chairperson of a block and was elected for that position in 2010. He received training to be a block leader from the City, attended workshops for those training sessions. He is part of the block leaders committee.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

This is a voluntary work done on my own perception and will to serve myself and other traders efficiently. In this aspect I enjoy being a representative for my community needs and there are no wages

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

Skills needed to be a good block leader are: leadership skills, training, conflict resolution and business training and computer literacy

Portrait - Block leader 5

Gender: Male

Nationality: South African

Age group: 35-40



History

Started trading in 2003 and has been block leader since 2007. He received no training to become a block leader. He is not part of the block leaders committee.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

I do not enjoy being a block leader I only do it because no one can represent us on this block.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

You don't need any skills to be a good block leader.

Portrait - Block leader 6

Gender: Male

Nationality: South African

Age group: 45-50



History

He received no training to become a block leader. He is part of the block leaders committee.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

Not enjoyable. I tried to quit last year but was unsuccessful. Doing this job makes you lose your customers when you're attending meetings at the end of the month.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

Skills needed to be a good block leader is training, being taught how to become a block leader, how to handle people. Being short tempered is a big problem

Portrait - Block leader 7

Gender: Female

Nationality: South African

Age group: N/A



History

Has been trading since 2006 and became a block leader 4 years ago. Received training from SANTRA. She was taught how to handle situations. She is not part of the block leaders committee.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

I enjoy being a block leader because I like talking to people and sharing.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

Skills needed to be a good block leader is to respect others, know how to talk to people and live with people.

Portrait - Block leader 7

Gender: Male

Nationality: South African

Age group: N/A



History

He has been a block leader since 2011 and was voted in because there was a vacuum. He received no training to become a block leader if the market has confidence in you and your ability then it is fine. He is part of the block leaders committee.

What do you enjoy most about being a block leader?

Being available because availing one is important as a block leader.

In your view what skills do you need to be a good block leader?

Any leadership skills are needed as a block leader; have to be available, people call at night to solve problems. General leadership skills and it is time consuming.

It can be gathered from the above profiles that most block leaders that received training became block leaders during the introduction of the management system; they comprise the original block leaders and committee members. These profiles bring to light that block leaders that were elected later received no training which brings the question as to why the City did not train them just like they trained the original committee. Was happened that

stopped workshops to occur that even the original committee were no longer invited to participate in these workshops?

Some block leaders were elected to work with management (City) but they work with organisations and get help from organisations after OCS. SANTRA gave training to one of the block leaders and helps solve day to day issues for another block leader. As SANTRA was one of the organisations that took the City to court it is not viewed as capable of managing the streets and 'making things happen', traders believe that SANTRA is more capable than the City and has their best interest. The court case victory not only empowered traders but made them believe that SANTRA will fight for them against the City.

4.1.4. Perceptions of traders on block leaders and block leaders on themselves.

Block leaders have different desires in participating in the position as block leaders. Other block leaders take responsibility because they believe that they need to help other street traders and others form part of being block leaders because they want to gain social status. For some leaders without the rewards and personal attribution they would not want to become block leaders. Even though that may be the case, traders are still very much suspicious of block leaders and their motives. Most traders perceive block leaders to be working for the City. Some block leaders are offended by such comments and take them to heart.

"This is a voluntary work done on my own perception and will to serve myself and other traders efficiently. In this aspect I enjoy being a representative for my community needs and there are no wages. I often enjoy being perturbed and shouted and seen to be representing the City wherever they feel uncomfortable" (block leader 4, 2015).

Although the above leader was being sarcastic in saying he enjoys being slandered he actually finds it upsetting that he volunteers his time, money and will to be a block leader only to be defamed in return. Most block leaders were not asked on how traders perceive them but would spontaneously mention that traders think they are working for the City and that they get paid. In the above case the block leader was asked on whether he enjoys being a block leader or not, that's when he mentioned that traders do not trust block leaders. He also added on saying that block leaders are misrepresented by traders which was one of the reasons he did not feel comfortable discussing into detail what he does because he does not want to be misrepresented.

“I do not enjoy being a block leader because people might take the information you give them as lie or as if you’re the one who brought the problem and I don’t get profit from them” (block leader 5, 2015).

Traders view block leaders as “moles” that have been placed or disguised as block leaders and are actually informants of the state. The fact that trader organisations are also taking the stance that block leaders are working for the City does not make the matter any easier (can be seen from quotes in chapter 1 by One Voice of Hawkers Association leader accusing block leaders of working for the City), it amplifies what the traders are already insinuating. At the end traders easily believe that block leaders are working for the City and getting paid for it.

“Block leaders are seen as enemy to traders most times. Traders believe block leaders are getting money from somewhere for being a block leader. It is painful because we are not getting money from anywhere; it’s a job we don’t get paid for” (block leader 6, 2015).

The pressing issue seems to be that block leaders are enjoying the perks that come with being a block leader and getting paid by the City.

Some block leaders suggest that block leaders should be paid by The City for the work they are doing. This can be interpreted to mean that block leaders see themselves as working for the City or doing the City’s job but do not get paid for it. They are doing a job that an official from the municipality was supposed to be doing on a day-to day basis.

“It is a difficult job, if the City can employ us and pay for being a block leader it can be a nice thing” (block leader 5, 2015).

“Block leaders should earn money for the work they do” (block leader 6, 2015).

This confirms our hypothesis that block leaders can be seen as decentralised state agents, or street level bureaucrats. According to Lipsky (2010, 13 and 16), the theoretician of street level bureaucracy,

“Street level bureaucrats are built upon two interrelated facets of their positions; relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organisational authority.....Workers for the most part accept the legitimacy of the formal structure of authority and they are not in a position to dissent successfully”.

The same can be said for block leaders. Block leaders have accepted the legitimacy of formal structure authority which may be one of the reasons they are not antagonistic towards the City. They believe in negotiating with the City because they feel they are part of City unofficially.

Although not formally embedded in the state, them being ruled by bureaucratic rules and regulations such as house rules; trader block leaders operate within the means of the state apparatus. They are indirectly working for the state as they are upholding the states regulations and interests. It is in the state's interest that the by-laws and house rules are followed so as to maintain order and control. If block leaders do not ensure that the by-laws are followed JMPD can in-still those rules upon the traders. When operating within boundaries of rules and regulations street level bureaucrats have room to manoeuvre so do block leaders. Some of the decisions they make are based on the relationships they have built with traders and programme officers. They can allow traders they know and trust to pay rent the next month or when a trader they trust says they paid rent and did not receive a receipt they can easily believe them.

4.2. Spatial distribution of block leaders in the inner city

When asked how many block leaders are in the City, no block leader seems to know exactly how many they are. What they know is that there is supposed to be a block leader in each and every block where street trading is allowed, in the inner city.

"There is no exact figure of how many block leaders are in the inner city but they are many"
(block leader 1, 2015).

"Yes, there are block leaders in every part of the city. It is supposed to be so for immediate attention of problems" (block leader 4, 2015).

"I am not sure how many block leaders there are in the inner city but there are 3 block leaders in this street/block" (Block leader 6, 2015).

Theoretically every street is supposed to have 3 block leaders. Given the number of streets in the inner city this would amount to a lot of block leaders in the inner city.

"The number of block leaders in the inner city depends on the number of streets. It used to be 33 streets which equals to 33 block leaders. This is so because part of the street was outsourced (CID)" (Former MTC CEO, 2015).

It can be hypothesized that the 33 block leaders in 33 streets represents a block leader who is part of the block leaders committee. 33 block leaders representing 33 streets would mean that the 2 other block leaders on each street are not counted. This means that there is no precise of how many block leaders are in the inner city excluding traders in CID'S if they use the same management system and have block leaders.

Although there is no exact number of how many block leaders there are in the inner city, the map below shows organisation networks of block leaders. I had to go through organisations in order to acquire block leader networks. The networks below show predominantly GIDA networks, NUT and a few SANTRA networks. I did not have time unfortunately to work with SAITF leadership, but know that they too are working with their networks of block leaders. The location of block leaders depicted in this map were established by going around with some of the block leaders showing me where other block leaders can be found.

Figure 8: Location of block leaders in the inner city (Khwashaba, 2015).





Figure 9: Location of other block leaders in the inner city under different management.



The above map shows the fashion district where other block leaders are situated according to Block leader 1, 2015).

“There is no exact number of how many block leaders are there in the inner city but I work with block leaders from CJP located in the fashion district sometimes” (block leader 1, 2015).

Unfortunately due to the time and scope of the research block leaders from the fashion district could not be interviewed but it has been gathered that block leaders in the area do exist.

4.3. What we learn on MTC Street trading management system from the block leaders.

This section is will provide examples of what is involved in the managing of streets; from how disputes are resolved and who is involved, the different forums or committees that are there to deal with issues that arise and conflict management.

4.3.1. Conflict resolution and the part that house rules play.

Street traders are governed by house rules which they have to follow as they stipulate or give guidance on what should be done in case there are certain issues. When there is a

conflict the house rules also stipulate what should be done, who should do it and how it should be done.

The house rules are guidelines by MTC on how traders are to behave themselves. The house rules have to be followed by traders and enforced by MTC through the use of block leaders. The house rules comprise of how trading is setup, rentals, traders identifications and how public transport is to be managed. The house rules are not just for traders but public transport operators have to abide by them as well. There is crucial information on how trading is managed in the house rules such as the terms and conditions of a lease agreement and the role of the facility manager and communication protocol. The rules are formal and stipulated in a document that is not made public to everyone. For one to acquire the house rules document when they are not a trader, Public transport operator or an MTC official they would have to have acquired it from one the three groups of people. The rules are applied formally as procedure is followed but there is a degree of informality. The degree of informality is seen when some traders are not given their receipts because the program officer issuing the receipts want them to get in trouble. In this case block leaders have to intervene and report the program officer to management.

Figure 10: House rule guide on dispute (MTC house rules, 2011).

10 Dispute resolution

If any tenant has a dispute or grievance with the Company or with any other tenant or person trading from the facility, he or she will immediately raise the matter with the Facility Manager, Traders Committee, Public Transport Operators, Traders' ombudsman, who shall attempt to resolve the matter amicably. If the matter cannot be resolved by agreement between the parties, The Traders' Ombudsman shall determine a process to resolve the matter, but the Trader's Ombudsman's decision relating to any dispute shall be final. This shall not in any way limit the right of any party to appeal institute legal action for alternative appropriate relief.

The above picture is a extract from the MTC house rules giving guidance on what actions should be taken or followed in case of a dispute. These house rules were difficult to access as they are not publicised or found online. For one to gain access to them they have to get them from an MTC official or trader who is part of the block leaders committee (see annexure).

From the above extract it can be gathered that in case of a dispute between traders of if a trader has a complaint against MTC they have to talk to the Traders Committee which in this case refers to block leaders. Block leaders are the ones vested with the duty of solving disputes between traders but as can be realised from previous quotes if they are unable to solve the issue they take the matter to the block leaders committee, and if they are unable to solve the matter they take the issue to MTC. It can be hypothesised that in this case the traders' ombudsman are members of the ITF as it acts as an arbitrary committee. The traders committee is found in markets but block leaders committee is equivalent to the traders committee on the streets.

The minutes of these meetings were obtained from one of the task team members who voluntarily offered his minutes. The meeting was attended by the two traders who were being investigated, traders who are eye, witnesses, and members of the task team. Since the meeting was called under the banner of NUT and the traders are NUT affiliated and the organisation was unable to solve the problem the chairperson of the organisation was also present in the meeting. The chairperson of JPC was the one chairing the meeting as the stalls fall under JPC.

The inner city task team is a committee that falls under the informal traders' forum. The task team was created so as to delegate and have different committees dealing with different issues. The inner city task team was tasked with conflict resolution among traders that organisations or block leaders cannot solve on their own in order to keep peace. The forum committee comprises of members of the informal traders forum which means that its people are block leaders and organisation leaders. The meeting occurred under the banner of NUT because they were solving a problem that concerned NUT members as the issue was brought forth by NUT leadership. As the informal traders committee works as an arbitrary platform the task team were issues with the mandate to resolve the conflict as NUT was unable to do that. Block leaders and organisations work together to solve problems or get

things done in this forum. The task team is the one that deliberated and gave a verdict and way forward on the issue. This shows how organisations and block leaders worked together in practice to tackle issues before OCS.

Traders that are quarrelling are given the opportunity to give an account of what happened. The secretary of NUT organisation explained that the traders had a fight over customers and NUT organisation had to intervene to calm the situation down. The two traders did not cooperate and reported the matter to the police so that no one tries to resolve the problem, enforce discipline or try to punish them for their misconduct according to the house rules. Trying to solve the issue further as NUT organisation would have resulted in the organisation leaders being arrested. The matter was then reported to JPC (under which MTC now falls under) as issues are to be escalated to higher management if they are unable to be solved by block leaders or organisations leaders. Other traders also added their testimonies of what they witness happened. JMPD was attracted to the scene as it is their job to ensure that there is order and no fights breaking out on the streets.

The task team was the one that took the decision on what would happen and the way forward as they fall under an arbitrary forum. After discussing the final verdict of the task team was that the two traders would be suspended from trading for a short period. One trader would be suspended from trading for 1 week and the other for 4 weeks as he had similar cases against him at JPC: the trader who was suspended for 4 weeks was also being investigated by the task team for suspicion of sub-letting. Letters from JPC were to be issued to the two traders as explaining the results of the meeting and what it meant for them.

From the above case study one can say that the procedure or guideline stated in MTC house rules were followed and assisted in solving the dispute. As stated in the house rules when the NUT organisation leaders were unable to contain the matter, the task team stepped in and solved the conflict. Due to that the two traders were given the opportunity to plead their cases it shows that the system or procedure is democratic and allows for the even the smallest people have the right to express themselves and plead their cases. This shows that people's rights are respected and they are participating in a free environment. It also shows how conflict is escalated to higher management by organisation leaders and the de-escalation of conflict by traders calling the police in rather than trying to solve the matter within trading circles or DED and JPC.

The system used in this case can be said to be like that of the courts the difference being that the task team is the judge and the one that passes verdict and not a JPC official. Although the incident was seen by the organisations leadership and JMPD's intervention serving as proof that the incident occurred, the task team called them to order but they were allowed to present how the incident occurred according to them. As the traders were found guilty they were suspended as punishment for them to change their behaviour and adhere to the rules or norms of traders while on the streets.

When traders fight amongst themselves or with other people it can be argued to be deviant behaviour or deviating from the formally enacted rule. Traders are to report disputes to the block leaders committee which in this case they did not report the disputes they had with each other but instead they took it upon themselves to try and solve the matter through violence or fighting. By not adhering to the formally enacted rule traders can be said to have been deviant. The fight over customers can be said to be a reflection of the country's economic status (Faubion, 2014). For traders to be fighting for a customer it implies that every customer that one gets is of importance as they contribute to how much money that trader is going to make that particular day.

4.3.2. What we learn about state institutions from 'the bottom'

Informal trader's forum known as DED forum to some traders was city wide from Ivory Park to Orange farm. Since the forum was city wide committees were formed to make this workable and manageable. The two committees were the management committee which was headed by MTC and the by-law committee headed by JMPD.

"MTC committee requested to open the meeting with a list of what is to be discussed and the main issue was that they are getting visitors from other cities as to how they are managing their streets" (block leader 8, 2015).

One of the major things that the Informal traders Forum (chaired by DED) achieved was a course that traders had to attend at Wits Business School initiated by the City and was free. The Grow Your Business course was aimed at equipping traders with valuable business skills (City of Johannesburg, 2009). Block leaders would advance names of traders wanting to attend the course and the forum's agenda was to let people commit themselves to the courses.

This shows that before 2013's OCS (maybe under a different mayor) the City tried to be creative and considered traders and ways to empower and help them grow thus organise such courses to better their business skills so they can grow their businesses. The City also had other workshops and courses at Wits University where traders were taught about by-laws and environmental health to name a few. What destabilises such creativeness may be the change in political leadership after every term. Politicians come with different ideologies and goals every five years which shifts the goals of the departments based on what the mayor has planned to achieve. This constant reshuffling and goal resetting may affects how creative street trading policies can be.

4.3.3. What is the MTC (Block leaders Committee) forum and what does it deal with?

"The MTC forum mainly deals with house rules. For example as a trader you have to be within demarcated area, your stall has to be clean and the lease has to be what you said you'd sell" (block leader 8, 2015).

The MTC forum comprises of block leaders committee members and MTC management officials where issues are discussed and they try to find a solution. MTC forum is about house rules: subletting, selling illegal products and deserting a stand these are the main issues that the forum deals with. According to the house rules when signing a lease agreement one has to state what kind of merchandise they will be selling and that is included in the lease agreement. If one wants to stock they do not just change what they are selling what they are selling has to correspond with what is written in the lease agreement. This means that if a person wants to change from selling merchandise A to selling merchandise B they have to ask their block leader to talk to program officer and advise on the procedure that has to followed if one wants to change stock. In other words every trader has to stick to the terms and conditions of the lease they signed.

"The house rules state that no contraband items are to be sold on demarcated stalls. Our job as block leaders in the MTC forum is to ensure that there are no illegal products being sold e.g. DVD's, soil that most women eat and contraband cigarettes. You have to sell legal cigarettes and it is the program officer's job to find out if anything is contraband" (block leader 8, 2015).

From the above quote, it is found that soil eaten by women is criminalised at the same level as contraband cigarettes and pirated DVD's this is because medically the soil is harmful to a foetus due to high concentrations of mercury, and lead (Child, 2014). According to the

house rules food that is sold by traders have to be approved by the Dept. of health; soil eaten by women is not approved by the health dept. which makes selling it illegal.

To ensure that what is being sold is not illegal, program officers are assisted by JMPD with the support of the block leaders committee ensuring that all by-laws are being followed. Every trader has to be on their stand when a JMPD officer asks for smartcard or is doing an inspection. Inspections as such are done to avoid sub-letting of stalls which is one of the house rules that when violated the penalty is termination of lease. The owner of the stall has to be available for inspection every time there is an inspection. These inspections occur randomly to catch the traders off guard and cease all contraband or illegal products before they are hidden.

“When the raids occur traders are to not cause commotion. Sub-letting is illegal and not tolerated by management” (Block leader 8, 2015).

From the above, if a trader is aware of anyone sub-letting they have to report the matter to their block leader, the block leader has to present the person sub-letting to management if they really are found to be sub-letting. If a trader is to have a trader assistant for when they are attending meetings the person has to be registered at MTC and known of their existence by management. This is done to avoid people sub-letting and saying they are standing in for someone. If the trader is found out to be sub-letting or without a possession of a smartcard by JMPD; MTC will have to write a letter if the program officer feels that the trader's goods are to be given back to him or not if they feel that the goods should not be given back to the trader in order for JMPD to release the goods from JMPD holding. A hearing is then conducted for the trader if they are found to be sub-letting.

“One can plead their case to management and get a warning/ hearing instead of total termination of lease” (Block leader 8, 2015).

According to the house rules no stand is to be left unattended or empty. An empty stand has to be with reason and management should know about it. If a stand is deserted for 3 months it can be reassigned to someone else. If a person is going to be absent from their stall they have to inform their block leader of their absence in order to avoid their stall being given to someone. It may be a way for management is able to know which stands are occupied and which are not so they are allocated to other street trader.

“When JMPD conducts raids or inspections they are aware that some stalls may be empty as they owner is away and MTC is aware of that, it makes it easy for someone who is using the stall when the owner is away to prove to JMPD that they are not illegal or sub-letting the stall but just occupying it until the owner returns” (Block leader 8, 2015).

It’s also a way in which JMPD knows if someone is lying about being the owner of a stall or standing in for someone during a raid.

Another main management issue that block leaders have to do is to make traders aware of house rules and developments that occur on the streets e.g. pavements revamp. When this occurs they communicate with other block leaders from other street to look assist them in looking for space to relocate the traders that are affected by the development. The agreement with block leaders from other streets is that the traders being accommodate should not cause trouble or bring competition to those that were already trading there e.g. selling the same things as traders that were already selling there. If it happens that traders are selling the same items they are not placed next to each other to avoid competition.

It was only block leaders’ committee members who were allowed to attend meetings that occurred between block leaders committee and MTC management. The programme officer was the chair of the meetings, he was reporting to the program manager who was reporting to the former CEO of MTC. One of these people was always there in meetings that occurred in the forum but the programme officer was present in most of the meetings.

4.3.4. Trader block leaders role in the partnership between DED and City Property.

Streets are managed differently because they have different settings although generally block leaders seem to have similar issues such as JMPD impounding traders goods, OCS and last but not least attend meetings together. Hoek Street is peculiar and is one of its kinds as they have their own localised rules drawn by the City council.


“City council rules are almost the same as MTC rules because most of them were taken from MTC rules” (Block leader 2, 2015).

The street is divided into two parts Hoek 1 and 2; both sections have different block leaders and are managed differently. The localised house rules only apply in Hoek 1 and not Hoek 2.

Hoek 1 is of most interest as there is an agreement between City Property, the City and street traders. City Property is a private property company that mainly deals with renting

out flats and offices. The agreement came about as City Property owns property surrounding the linear market.

Figure 11: Hoek street linear market (Google, 2015)



Traders in Hoek 1 linear market are under MTC but there is a partnership between DED and City Property that came about as a solution to save the traders from being chased away by City Property. City Property was complaining about traders not having proper stalls to trade and a linear market was proposed that would accommodate traders. When plans were being made for the structures of the market, traders were not consulted at all on what the structure would look like. Traders were also not consulted about the agreement between City Property and the DED, they did not know anything about it until the partnership was finalised.

“They deceived us into believing that City Property officials were from MTC....We were told about the partnership between City Property and DED at the final stage of discussion” (Block leader 2, 2105).

Traders when then told through block leaders that they could cancel the deal if they are not happy but the government or DED had to beg that City Property should accommodate those that are there. Partnership between City Property and DED was to ensure that traders are not kicked out of the street. It was a way of keeping the traders in the street and respond to City Property’s requirements for formal trading spaces simultaneously. However, possibly due to lack of consultation with the traders and their leadership, the structure that was built to accommodate traders was

inadequate, as traders complain it does not protect the traders from harsh weather, whether rainy or sunny. Block leaders engaged with the City on the matter but the talks beard no fruit.

Figure 12: structure constructed for linear market traders (Khwashaba, 2015).



As it can be seen from the above picture, traders' demarcated stalls are outside of the structure. They are affected by rain or sunshine regardless this means that their stock is being affected as well. Fortunately most of the traders on this street sell clothing, footwear and accessories. Not many traders sell perishable goods such as food or fruits.

Regardless of the conditions of the market structure traders feel that they have no choice but to accept the partnership and market. They are just happy that they have a place to trade and are protected from JMPD. As part of the agreement, rent is paid on the 7th of each month to City Property. Each trader has their own statement from which they pay from as per smartcard. Not all was lost in the partnership, even though some stages of the partnership were rough, the partnership assisted illegal traders that were already trading there to be registered and legalised.

2015 marks the 4th year into the partnership. Traders, City Property and the DED have been working together to manage the market. Traders participate in managing the market by

censuring that rentals are paid, local house rules are followed and no noise or commotion occurs in the market. City Property also gave permission to block leaders to use their facilities for meetings with the DED's Xolani whenever it's free. Whenever block leaders feel they are faced with a challenge that they cannot resolve they talk to City Property to help them solve the matter then DED. It is arguable that block leaders from Hoek Street communicate with MTC on general issues that do not in any way affect City property. Since the partnership was made by DED on behalf of traders with City Property can be assumed that when issues are escalated to City Property and there still is no solution DED is then involved because the partnership does not include MTC. It can be hypothesised that when local house rules are violated the issue is taken up with City Property and not MTC because they are local house rules and not MTC house rules.

"We gather together and talk about issues as block leaders and if we cannot handle or resolve the matter we talk to City Property then DED. This helps ease the tension between traders due to organisation politics." (Block leader 2, 2015).

Hoek Street comprises of traders affiliated with organisations which makes it even more difficult to manage. According to block leader 2 (2015), organisations want to take control of the street which makes block leaders dispensable as they cannot manage traders with organisations affiliation. Organisations want to be recognised as capable managers of the street not only by management but by their fellow traders or affiliates. Block leaders and organisations in this case are fighting for the same territory but most of all they are fighting on who is the legitimate representative of traders on Hoek Street. When City Property or DED intervene they are able to mediate in such issues and help ease the tension between the two groups.

In this case block leaders take the role of street level bureaucrats and not brokers. They are more focused on enforcing local house rules and ensuring that there is peace in the market. The main block leaders focus on is crime, cleanliness and security of traders and customers on the street. The existence of house rules which most of them are adapted from general MTC house rules may have emerged due to the partnership between City Property, DED and traders. The rules may be there to control and manage traders by City Property so that there is order and constancy with traders. When traders cause chaos, City Property suffers as their business is dependent on the

control and order of traders surrounding their business. For example, if traders were disorderly customers would not be able to shop in the commercial shops around the market. For City Property tenants if the market was unclean and noisy then most of them would probably complain and would not want to live there or give management a hard time. Partnering with the traders instead of chasing them away was beneficial for City Property, DED and traders. DED did not have to look for alternatives where the traders can trade and traders did not have to lose their livelihood.

It also seems that DED was doing MTC's job in managing Hoek Street but this may be due to the partnership. It can be hypothesised that DED took over from MTC on Hoek Street when City Property was about to chase traders away. It is MTC's job to allocate trading space but it is the DED's job to decide which areas are suitable for trading or not. It is arguable that DED became involved in managing Hoek Street when traders were threatened to be evicted. Although it is not known on what the terms of agreement of the partnership between DED and City Property were; it can be speculated that DED agreed to getting more involved with the management of Hoek street if the traders were not chased away. In that way DED would be able to solve any issues that could escalate and destabilise City Property's business.

4.4. Looking deeper into the relationship between block leaders and street trader organisations.

The relationship between City block leaders and street trade organisations is complex and at times confusing. Despite its complexity, it is clear that block leaders and street trade organisations should be working together to manage streets instead of working against one another or competing. The two can complement each other. Street trade organisations are strategic and block leaders have a wide network they can use to solve problems, they also have the City's respect and willingness to work with them. But before being normative, let us hear what STO are saying about BL:

"The City tells our members 'don't join the organizations: this is the City's street, not One Voice's. They will ask the block to elect their block leader, call all block leaders to meetings without calling organizations. So, our members tend to stop supporting us, even if it is because of us that they are now trading legally". (One voice of All Hawkers Association leader, quoted in Bénéit-Gbaffou 2014).

For instance, we would work hard towards legalizing all the traders in a street. And then, when they are legalized, DED encourages them to elect block leaders, and tell them they don't have to join any organization, because the street is public" (One Voice of All Hawkers Association leader, quoted Bénit-Gbaffou 2014)

"It is another scheme by the City to divide the traders. We fight and work hard to legalise street traders, and then the City undermines our membership by organizing these elections of block leaders [...]. Then they call block leaders to meeting and they don't invite us. [...] We are fighting against that name 'block leaders', because the City gave it to us, we prefer to call our representatives 'area representatives', they also work at bigger scales" (One Voice of All Hawkers Association leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014)

"When the City builds markets for traders, they say 'we don't negotiate with organizations, we talk to traders and block leaders. Elect a committee and we will engage with that committee. We can't talk to you as SAITF'. But we as SAITF are the one raising issues here, and as a result the City ends up talking to us" (South African Informal Traders Forum leader, quoted in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

From the above quotes, it can be argued that the major issue is not just about organisations not trusting block leaders because they were initiated by the City. The main issues are about recognition and institutionalisation. According to McMenamin and Gwiazda (2011, 3), "Huntington defines institutionalisation as 'the process by which organizations acquire value and stability' (1968: 12)".

"Block leaders are being represented by organisations and some have to consult their organisations first for such interviews" (Block leader2, 2015).

"Each street is supposed to have 3 block leaders; one ordinary block leader, a committee member and his assistant. With interventions of associations some streets are deranged and no longer use that system because they are reporting to organisations but some streets are still functioning that way" (Block leader 2, 2015).

Block leaders are not happy about organisations trying to get recognition from the City s they feel that they make their jobs easier. Without organisations fighting them for power or wanting to manage the streets block leaders are the ones with power and benefit from

being block leaders. Organisations threaten block leaders legitimacy as there are trying to get recognition from the state (Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura, 2014).

Block leaders can be said to be institutionalised because according to the City they are perceived as stable and have value, hence they are prepared to dealing with them. Another reason why block leaders are valuable to the City may be because their being block leaders was endorsed by the City; this legitimises them in the eyes of the City.

Street trade organisations on the other hand cannot be seen as partners of the City because they often emerged out of contestation with the City. They are sometimes a threat to the City and its regime, this may be the reason the City tries to exclude them in meetings because they are seen as challenging the system rather than block leaders trying to make the system work.

Street trade organisations want recognition from the City as well. The City may not be in a position to dictate how traders choose to self-manage and who should be the one doing the management (block leaders or organisations). When the City decided to recognise block leaders over organisations traders became divided. For organisation to not be able to attend certain meetings raises suspicions on what occurred in those meetings. In this case, the City is using its resources and its position of power to legitimise its divide and rule strategy so that the still maintain power over the street and have the final say of what goes on or what does not go on in the streets.

“Most of the block leaders we interviewed only joined the organization last year, during or in the aftermath of Operation Clean Sweep...” (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, 62).

“It’s very hard for block leaders to fit into a lot of trader organisations as they are seen as a threat by the executive of these organisations” because of their recognition by the City. The amount of influence that block leaders had, due to their constant interaction with the traders on the ground, was not seen as a favourable thing and most executive committees were not ready to welcome them into the organisation in fears of them interfering with existing hierarchies” (Gauteng Informal Development Alliance leader, quoted in in Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

“Operation Clean Sweep, SANTRA’s firm stance and action against it, and its successful engagement in litigation, have broadened the organisation’s membership, and perhaps planted the seed of a structural change – as a number of inner city block leaders have joined the organisation and partly transform it” (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, 64).

“Through its action in response to the Operation, SANTRA gained popularity and experienced increase in its membership after its court victory, including a number of block leaders whose inclusion in the organisation might change some of its modes of working” (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, 84).

Most organisation leaders fear that block leaders might take their leadership positions if they are part of organisations or hold leadership positions in organisations. This brings about the question of visibility for block leaders, organisations are very vocal when it comes to arguing with the City and block leaders are not in a position to go against the City if they want to keep their power as block leader. Organisations may not want to involve block leaders in leadership positions not only because they are afraid that they might be in a position with more power but also because they might use the power they gain in organisations against them whether intentionally or non-intentionally. For organisation leaders; going against the City is not a matter they would have to think twice about, block leaders have to be careful on how they represent themselves to the City.

Although it may seem that organisations and block leaders are separate they are actually very intertwined in practice. Block leader and organisations networks are more or less the same because some of the organisation leaders are block leaders. Block leaders from SAITF attend meetings where only block leaders are allowed and report back to SAITF leadership (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). Although they are not part of leadership they are part of the organisation which makes the organisation benefit from having block leaders in their organisation.

“I talk to no one in the City and I can’t call MTC/JPC to help when there is a crisis but I can talk with leaders of street trading organisations to help” (Block leader 5, 2015).

“I received training from SANTRA and was taught how to handle situations” (Block leader 7, 2015).

The above quotes show that organisations and block leaders work together in practice solving issues that affect traders on a daily basis. Organisations are more involved in the management of street trading through block leaders. In some cases they do not just offer block leaders solution on how to solve issues or training but some one block leader does not talk directly to the City but goes to the organisation and they are the ones who talk to the City on her behalf. It is confusing whether she is an organisation block leader or a City block

leader because she does not have direct contact with the City but I was introduced to her by a fellow City block leader whom I had asked to lead me to another block leader after our interview.

5. Chapter five: conclusion and recommendations

Foucault (1977) states that; when knowledge is linked to power it has the power to make itself truth. It is also true that the greatest form of power is influence. The City has created the 'truth' that block leaders are operating in invited spaces of participation and that they have power in managing street trading. It should be taken into account that just because someone says something is the truth does not mean that it is actually the truth. It might be a reality that is constructed by power plays at hand or it might be the reality that someone wants you to see.

It was once said that if you want someone to do something without asking questions and feel as if they decided to do it is to make them feel as if they have run out of choices. By-laws, house rules and the constant harassment from JMPD made traders feel as if they do not have a choice in how streets are managed: what they can do is obey so they have a peaceful day going about doing their business. This was achieved through systematic power and even though where there is power there is also resistance of power; if the resistance is not strong enough to effect any change or is unaware that they can resist then the fight is lost and those in power will stay in power and create realities for those that are subjecting. Systematic power can be defined as having access to resources and decision makers through structural means it is also the power to define reality for oneself and others through structural means. This is done as a way to maintain power hierarchies where the powerful remain in power and the powerless remain powerless.

According to the Decentralization Thematic Team (no date), there are different types of decentralisation. This research showed to have a form of political and administrative decentralisation to block leaders. Political decentralisation is defined as giving citizens or their elected representatives more power in decision making or decision making processes. Administrative decentralisation mainly deals with redistributing authority and responsibility in regards to public services (Decentralization Thematic Team, no date). Block leaders are political and administrative decentralised agents of the state. One could argue that they do not have political powers at all but through politicising administrative duties they gain

political powers. Having more administrative powers has enabled block leaders to gain political powers by means of street level bureaucracy and allows them to be brokers mediating between the state and traders.

“Within this conceptualization of urban governance, informal relationships are at least as important as the formal. Indeed, it is clear that what actually happens in cities is determined by a multiplicity of informal decisions much more than by the formal decision-making processes of city government” (Devas 2004, 26).

Although block leaders are recognised as street level bureaucrats there is a level of informality embedded in how they do their day to day job. Block leaders are reliant on their informal networks as they are operating in an informal setting. Informal settings according to Chatterjee (1947) are negotiated spaces as people operating there are constantly fighting for their rights and their voices to be heard. Negotiated spaces often consist of a patron-broker relationship wherein brokers or politicians are used as mediators of legal and administrative public structures and agents. Block leaders are mediators between the state and traders mostly focused in administrative duties such as ensuring that by-laws and house rules are followed. Informal networks which come in forms of client- patron relationships are the marginalised access to the state and state resources. The trader becomes a client because of his place in the economy but also because of his place as an ordinary trader who is not participating in the management of the streets. Block leaders are brokers who mediate between the state and traders so traders can gain access to the state and its resources. Traders are dependent on block leaders as their brokers to gain access to the state.

“But it is also clear that these relationships are not between equals: differences in political power and influence reflect differences in income, wealth and economic power. Dealings between those with differing power and status often take place on the basis of patron-client relationships, in which the poor may be able to obtain certain benefits but from a position of continued dependence” (Devas 2004, 26).

Clientelistic relationships occur in unequal relations of power which leads to dependency of the client on the patron. In this case it has been observed that brokers (block leaders) do not have as much power as in a general client-broker relationship because traders can depend on organisations to get them what they want. It can be said that street traders’ organisations may also take the role of being a broker mediating between the state and

traders. Block leaders or street trader organisation leaders have a personalised relationship with traders as they are traders themselves. This makes it easy for traders to relate to them or believe that they have their best interest at heart; it also makes it easy for traders to hold them accountable as they know who they are and where they live.

Auyero (1999) argues that having the power to say yes to certain types of subjectivity can also be viewed as having power and exercising ones power. This can be supported by what Foucault argues that where there is power there is resistance even if one does not acknowledge it. Saying yes to clientelistic subjectivity of the traders can be argued to be a form of resistance as they have more chances to have their voices heard by the state if they are not seen as a threat.

Street level bureaucracy's discretionary power can be argued to bring power to block leaders as they are now able to determine what occurs in the day to day operations of managing street trade. This discretionary power determines how policy is implemented and to what success this policy will be. It is arguable that policies and frameworks can be progressive in theory but the power lies in implementation. Block leaders play a part in the implementation of managing street trade in inner city Johannesburg. As brokers block leaders gain more power by mediating between the City and traders, this is where they use their discretionary power through the relationships they built with traders and the City.

5.1. Recommendations

- Recognition of street trader organisations and block leaders as equal representatives of street traders.
- Transparency and involvement of traders in partnerships between the City and the private sector in the management of street trading.
- Participation between all stakeholders in the management of street trading and their perceptions or views.
- Street traders' participation in allocation of trading spaces and trading policy.
- Create continuous and institutionalised structures put in place to negotiate with traders (this may include block leaders and street trader organisations).
- Re-invent street trader's image from negative to positive e.g. portraying street traders as part of the city and playing a vital role in making the city vibrant and safe.

- Organise and co-ordinate institutions to better manage the licensing and registration of street traders.
- Introduce area-based management in streets that are not outsourced to the private sectors (RID's or CID's).

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Appendices

Meeting of the Innas City Task Team with
Troye St. Traders Under the banner of Nigerian
Traders Forum

Date: 11 September 2013

Venue: JPC (N76000) at Race St.)

Time: 9.00

Present:

- 1) Thuli Mkhize - Chairperson - (JPC)
- 2) Thabani Ndlovu - JPC
- 3) Sifiso - JPC
- 4) Task Team - Thabani Ndlovu
- Busisiwe Hodi
- Johanna Sibanyoni
- Mandla Mkhizeli
- 5) Troye St & Delvers St. Traders.

Chairperson: Opened meeting and asked
affected traders to give their own account
of what happened.

Hygien: Secretary of Nigeria Traders Forum explained that two traders had a fight and the Forum intervened to calm the situation but the two traders are not co-operating and ~~the~~ have reported the matter to the police so that if anyone tries to enforce discipline they will be arrested. Therefore he was forced to report the matter to JPC because the stalls belong to JPC.

Affected Traders: Both explained what happened and other traders also added their testimony.

Chairperson: Said from what was said it was clear a fight took place so that JMB was attracted to the scene, she was disappointed that one of the traders tried to lie and downplay the situation.

She said the Task Team will deliberate and come up with a sanction.

After deliberations; the verdict was as follows:

- 1) Trader Ezengio JTR065 will be suspended for 1 week and will resume trading on 19 September 2013
- 2) Trader Henry JTR069 will be suspended for 4 weeks and will resume trading on 10 October 2013
He also has a file of previous cases at JPC.
- 3) The committee was asked to look into issue of sub-letting at JTR069
- 4) The affected parties will get letters from JPC within 7 days explaining results of this meeting.

