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Pyramid Schemes: Resurrecting Tikal through the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex

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ABSTRACT

Carved out of the jungle by American big business, Penn Museum's project at Tikal to restore massive pyramids and showcase Maya civilization was a direct outgrowth of government, military, and corporate connections. The story of Pennsylvania in the Petén is about American involvement in developing tourism, infrastructure, research stations, training, and the making of Guatemalan heritage citizens. It is also about increasing US government vigilance south of the border after the 1954 CIA-backed coup, whether in forging anti-communist alliances or commercial concessions. Philanthropists supporting Tikal were themselves representatives from US banking, oil, agriculture, aviation, and tourism sectors, making it impossible to disentangle archaeology from industrial and political adventurism. Extractive economies involving archaeology, oil, chicle, and bananas all ferried equipment and products back and forth to the Petén via American boats and planes, along dirt roads and airstrips built by American firms. Sold as the first great city of the Americas and costing almost a million dollars, the resurrection of Tikal underlines the ineluctable dependencies between security, espionage, international politics, corporations, conservation, and donor economies.

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When the trumpet sounded
everything was prepared on earth,
and Jehovah gave the world
to Coca-Cola Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors, and other corporations.
The United Fruit Company
reserved for itself the most juicy
piece, the central coast of my world,
the delicate waist of America
Pablo Neruda, 1950

Introduction

In the heart of the tropical jungle lies Tikal, one of the major sites of Maya civilization, inhabited from the 6th century B.C. to the 10th century A.D. One of the largest urban centers in the southern Maya lowlands, Tikal began as a small village (900–300 B.C.) and grew into an important ceremonial center with the construction of major pyramids and temples (600–900 A.D.) and development of Maya hieroglyphic language. Tikal was ruled by a dynasty of over 30 kings, sustaining a population of over 100,000 people (Sharer and Traxler 2006). The ceremonial center is comprised of temples, palaces, and public squares, while the remains of dwellings are scattered beyond. The central part of the city alone contains 3000 buildings and covers about 16 km^2. Designated a World Heritage site in 1979, Tikal National Park is located in northern Guatemala's Petén Province and today encompasses 575 km^2 of jungle and thousands of ruined structures. Under the directorship of Froelich Rainey, the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology spent 14 years (1956–1969) restoring Tikal's monumental pyramids and temples after years of planning and political setbacks. Rainey had a certain genius for promoting archaeology and public relations (Meskell 2022a, 2022b), reflected in his all-American career trajectory from cowboy to explorer, soldier, Foreign Service officer, State Department consultant, archaeologist, and finally museum director. He was also a skilled Cold War operator who persuaded his colleagues from academia, government, and philanthropy that national goals could be achieved through international excavations. All of these experiences would be brought to bear at Tikal.

At Tikal, Rainey created novel campaigns for monumental self-sponsorship, media funding, crude corporate logics for cultural resource management, and forged partnerships with military-led, socially-engineered infrastructural programs. Indeed, one could argue that the multifaceted nature of archaeological operations abroad held particular appeal for the American government and foreign policy makers, which was distinct from academic and philanthropic concerns, such that the former could be conducted without fully informing the latter. Penn's partnership with FYDEP, Guatemala's National Enterprise for the Economic Development of Petén, which was underwritten by US military and counterinsurgency strategy, is the most striking example. In his bid to sell archaeology, Rainey directly positioned Tikal as a driver for the goals of education, medicine, development, regional stability, and cross-border understanding, and in doing so indirectly bolstered America's anti-communism and counterinsurgency efforts in Guatemala. Additionally, he was an early advocate of cultural tourism for development, yet this too was expedited by the goodwill and political agendas of military governments and multinational companies. And while many of the key actors at Tikal were identified from the outset (see Coe 1990), the wider implications of such arrangements have not been critically analyzed, as they have with other Mesoamerican sites

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including Copan (Joyce 2005, 2013; Luke 2019; Mortensen 2014), El Tajin (Holley-Kline 2020), Chichen Iza (Breglia 2006), Quiriguá (Martin 2018), and Teotihuacan (Bueno 2016).

Money, mercantilism, and the military were central from the start. Rainey had designs for Tikal on such a grand scale that they necessitated not only political access but vast financing, the latter being the single most pressing issue. Rainey recalled how Percy Madeira, President of Philadelphia's Land Title bank and President and Chairman of Penn Museum, had been the one to urge exploration in 1947 of the "jungle-bound 'ghost' city of Tikal."[1] Another prominent Museum board member, Samuel B. Eckert, a former US Air Force pilot and Vice President for Marketing at Sun Oil, had photographed Tikal from the air in 1937, landing at an airstrip cleared by the American chewing gum industry (Mathews 2009). Rainey, Madeira, and Eckert began the planning campaign, recruiting John Dimick, who had previously restored the site of Zaculeu for the United Fruit Company in Boston, and Edwin Shook from the Carnegie Institute of Washington. Yet their plans were stalled when the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbenz proved challenging for American Cold War ambitions.

Árbenz's policies, like those of Juan José Arévalo before him, instituted government initiatives that sought to rein in United Fruit's power. That, in turn, created an alliance between the Guatemalan military, local landowners, the US government, and the leaders of other Central American countries against the Guatemalan government (Bucheli 2008, 438). The highly profitable United Fruit Company objected to the cessation of exploitative labor practices in Guatemala and began lobbying back home to overthrow the Guatemalan government: both John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had United Fruit links (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2020, 106). In 1952, President Truman authorized Operation PBFortune to topple Árbenz, under the guise of stamping out communism. When Eisenhower took office in 1953, he continued this effort, and in 1954, a coup backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) installed in power Carlos Castillo Armas, a military dictator who would be open to US anti-communism, industry, aid, and American archaeologists. It is noteworthy that among the political operatives of the US government throughout the 20th century were a long line of archaeologists. Eisenhower's "iron triangle" was now fully operational, and archaeology was firmly entrenched within the military-industrial-academic complex.

"Tikal had the incontestable allure of fabled size, structural preservation and an outstanding 'romanticism'," William Coe wrote (1990, 1), that winning "combination that in part had brought the institution to seriously consider a long and heavily financed undertaking." However, the very idea of tackling Tikal emerged at the behest of Penn Museum's wealthy donors, themselves leaders of American banking and industry, rather than coming from academic research agendas; Rainey referred to the donors as "those wise old Philadelphians" (Rainey 1992, 127). Yet the exact timing was entirely precipitated by political events. In 1955, Rainey complained to Nelson Rockefeller, who had funded the excavations at Palenque (Schele 2012) and was interested in collecting Maya sculpture (Doyle 2019): "I have been for the past eight years, with the University Museum, working towards the opportunity to restore Tikal. Our plans had practically materialized a few years ago when excess profits were a useful talking point and our government also displayed some interest. Unfortunately the Guatemalan government at that moment chose to lean distinctly towards communism. All of our plans were discarded at once and Tikal accumulated more years of decay. When President Castillo took over we decided to start anew."[2] In 1955, after years of frenetic fundraising, Penn Museum received a permit from the Guatemalan government and its Institute of Anthropology and History (IDEAH) to begin work at the "foliage-covered metropolis of skyscraper temples, lavish palaces, dwellings, paved expressways."[3] But the problem was precisely the vast scale of Tikal, mobilizing "twentieth century diggers to explore eight square miles of central city alone, not to mention the suburbs of unknown extent" (Rainey 1992, 130).

Penn began in earnest in 1956, when the Guatemalan military constructed a new airstrip, bringing Tikal within an hour's flight of Guatemala City and making major work there a practical possibility. Guatemala deployed the state-owned airline Aviateca and offered free flights on battered DC-3s for Tikal project members. Such a valuable resource was used as a selling point to American foundations and granting agencies. The military also helped clear the jungle for excavation, brought in heavy equipment, and assisted with transport, mapping, and reconnaissance (Figure 1).

Rainey acknowledged that Penn's Tikal Project was made possible by changing circumstances in 1955. He bemoaned that all the years influenced by the Monroe Doctrine had resulted in isolationism in archaeology, a situation he sought to remedy in Guatemala for the benefit of archaeology and America (see also Tripp 2004). Rainey credited the "sincere and enthusiastic support of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, President of the Republic of Guatemala, and many other Guatemalans," including Carlos Samayoa, Director of the Institute of Anthropology and History (IDEAH); Antonio Tejeda, Director of the National Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology; Adolfo Molina Orantes, Member of the President's Council; and Colonel Ramiro Gereda Asturias, Army Chief of Staff. Together, Rainey declared (1956, 5), they had embarked upon a Guatemalan-American venture



Figure 1. Guatemalan Air Force plane, Tikal, courtesy of Penn Museum.

in cultural relations resulting in the rediscovery of America's greatest monument to its ancient civilization.

Entrepreneurial Archaeology

Expensive excavations, experimental techniques, American companies and connections, and donor economies all characterized Penn's adventures in the jungles of Petén. The Tikal Project, like Penn Museum's many other expeditions, was shaped by Froelich Rainey's vision for an American-style international archaeology. And from the outset, Tikal was tinged with an American-style liberal developmentalism characteristic of post-World War II agendas abroad (Meskell and Luke 2021; Mitchell 2011). Through his energetic campaigns and collaborations, Rainey pioneered scientific, conservation, socio-economic, and diplomatic contributions in and through archaeology. For that to materialize in Guatemala, he sought the advice of Sylvanus Morley, the Maya archaeologist, epigrapher, and spy (Harris and Sadler 2003). Morley, Tikal Project members Edwin Shook (Harris and Sadler 2003, 312; Shook 1998, 79), John Dimick, and indeed Rainey himself (Rainey 1992) all either worked as agents or provided intelligence to the US government during their careers as archaeologists and were exceedingly well-connected.

As early as 1948, Rainey asked Morley how he might win support for Tikal from organizations like the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Rockefeller, Ford, and Guggenheim, as well as from American corporations. Morley died that same year, dealing a blow to Rainey's expansive ambition. His death, coupled with political instability, anti-US sentiment, and the withdrawal of US companies, negatively impacted Penn's funding. The Guatemalan government had issued Penn a formal permit in 1957 for five years on the proviso that the Museum must raise $20,000 annually or the permit might be revoked; the Museum's project would be exempt from import tax, but all workers must be Guatemalan. The need to raise $100,000 in advance caused frenzied fundraising activity back in Philadelphia. But the full cost of restoring Tikal was an even more daunting and entrepreneurial enterprise.

Wealthy oil engineer and amateur archaeologist John Dimick argued that Tikal could be brought back to its "original beauty" in a ten-year program costing only $300,000 per year—an estimate that was never achieved. That projected cost would include material, equipment, labor, and the salaries and expenses of scientific personnel. Dimick believed there existed no opportunity in the "history of our country where so much could be accomplished for an equivalent amount."[4] He estimated that 90% of funds could be allocated to the Museum in Philadelphia and only 10% need stay in Guatemala. In attempting to garner US dollars, Rainey boasted that Project Tikal would be a great field laboratory of archaeology and anthropology for the students of the 23 American universities offering those subjects. But that proposition actually came from American granting agencies after they rejected Rainey's funding applications, suggesting that he raise the money himself from partnerships with other universities; it was a scheme that never eventuated. Undaunted, Rainey believed restoring Tikal was worth the money, since "in this time of international uncertainty and a fending off of aggressive gestures by others," it provided "a living working example of our American way by giving back to Latin America its wondrous, glorious and picturesque culture."[5] To promote Tikal, Penn promised to complete and open to visitors from afar a monument to western hemisphere solidarity and good will that would stand a thousand years and be the outstanding attraction of two continents.[6] Famed American archaeologist from the Carnegie Institution Alfred Kidder agreed: "Tikal, if properly developed, would be the Karnak of the New World."[7]

Director Rainey's vision of Tikal says perhaps more about the director's desires than about the Maya site itself: "Vast stone pyramids could be seen from the air thrusting their glistening white peaks up above 200-foot-high trees in the Petén's virgin forest" (Rainey 1992, 183). Work began at Tikal in 1956 by establishing a camp, clearing parts of the site, and cutting roads and trails through the jungle. Detailed mapping started in 1957, along with small-scale excavations. In 1958, Penn initiated excavations in the heart of the site, the North Acropolis, with its large group of temples flanking the Great Plaza. By 1959, Penn were prepared to operate on a year-round basis, sponsoring two major, interrelated programs: archaeology and conservation. The first, Rainey boasted, was directed toward answering some of the many problems still confronting students of Maya culture history. The second, involving excavation and gathering of archaeological data, was designed to preserve many of the great architectural monuments of Tikal, unique in size and grandeur.

Penn launched the Tikal Project with an appropriation of $20,000 from the Museum's research funds. Yet the set-up expenditures and commitments for the first three to four years totaled approximately $2 million. This imbalance plagued the project from the outset—outsized ambition but insufficient finances, which ultimately fell back on wealthy individuals who were already backing Penn Museum. As it happened, the members of this close-knit circle of personal contacts were also senior representatives of foundations, banks, and companies, often engaged in extractive industries. In the 1940s, Sylvanus Morley had strategically advised Penn on American businesses operating south of the border. And there was reason to be optimistic, since Rainey and his Board had personal contacts with the captains of American industry, including those at Wrigley's, Pan American, Sun Oil, Atlantic Refinery, and United Fruit. Moreover, a previous Penn Museum director, George Byron Gordon, had worked closely with United Fruit in Honduras (Luke 2006). The promise of future funds was premised on leveraging American goodwill in cultural matters, a kind of quid pro quo trading conservation for extraction. Yet it proved difficult for the Museum to extract cash from this East Coast gentleman's club, and instead the latter assisted in kind, supplying airplanes and landing strips, boats and roads, transportation and equipment.

What transpired was that American businesses operating in Guatemala were susceptible to political shocks, albeit of their own making, arising from American interference. President Árbenz had rightly explained to his citizens that America used the "pretext of anti-communism" to invade their nation and overthrow his government, but the "truth is very different. The truth is to be found in the financial interests of the fruit company and other US monopolies" (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2020, 199). And those monopolies also impacted the success of saving Tikal. The Carnegie Institution's Alfred Kidder had warned Penn about unsettled

conditions in Middle America and the negative attitude of the Guatemalan government toward American corporations. United Fruit, for example, encountered all manner of trouble. Since the Guatemalan government was changing from day to day, the company felt there no point in "making good" with the authorities by investing in cultural projects. Pan American Airlines was also nervous.[8] John Sims, from the US Department of Commerce, believed airlines like Pan Am should encourage the opening up of the jungle by means of archaeology. Sims admitted to "hav[ing] been bitten, stung, scratched, kicked, berated, buffeted, and beset from all points by the archeological bug."[9] He offered his time, facilities, and assistance in building an airstrip within "easy strolling distance from Tikal."[10] In return, Sims only hoped to "tag along" with the excavators. Tikal's Field Director Edwin Shook was similarly convinced that the US Ambassador to Guatemala would help Penn raise capital, being an archaeological enthusiast and successful businessman. But most of these plans failed, and the vast sums needed for Tikal never materialized (Figure 2).

Ultimately, Wrigley's, United Fruit, and numerous American oil companies were uninterested in writing checks to restore pyramids. John Dimick, on the payroll at United Fruit, thought he could secure funds for Tikal but was unsuccessful. He was later appointed director of the Tikal Project and was known for his organizational and engineering skills, having worked with artillery during World War I and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Furthermore, Dimick combined his archaeological interest with US government assignments while working in Latin America for the Central Intelligence Agency (Price 2016, 228). At United Fruit Company, he arranged for free freight to Guatemala for all of Penn's equipment (Caterpillar tractors, drilling equipment, and trucks), expedited for free at Puerto Barrios. The Guatemalan Air Force then flew the equipment to Tikal. Military planes dropped in "bags of corn, beans, canned goods … small tools which had been lying in Guatemala for days now dropped out of the sky at our feet. Later trucks and bulldozers would be dismantled and also brought by air, even a sawmill" (Dimick 1968, 103). Today, those jeeps, tractors, drills, and gasoline engines are still visible today, rusting in the jungle (Figure 3). The Museum bought heavy equipment in Philadelphia at special discounts, and United Fruit agreed to ship four tons gratis per voyage. But by 1960, United Fruit, considered the quintessential representative of American imperialism in Central America (Bucheli 2008), offered only a 25% discount on transportation on their ships. With the growing hostility to the US in Latin America, the company was effectively moving from the role of producer to that of marketer. During the 1960s, the company jettisoned it fixed assets—its main source of risk (Bucheli 2008, 44; Martin 2018, 191). While Dimick and others continually appealed to United Fruit for hard currency over the years, it was not forthcoming.

In a similar manner to archaeology, American big business was exceedingly industrious in carving out concessions in the Petén. Edwin Shook, on loan to Tikal from the Carnegie Institution of Washington (Shook 1998), described dealing with some twenty oil companies. As with United Fruit and its bananas, this extractive industry was not keen to donate money either, perhaps as a result of a steady deterioration in cross-border corporate relations. Oil companies were only willing to lend support in kind: opening up trails between archaeological sites using bulldozers; loaning trucks, a helicopter, and other equipment; helping with flights and transport; and offering other forms of practical assistance but refusing to donate money. Indeed, the commensurability between archaeology and oil-related knowledges and methodologies has been well documented (Holley-Kline 2020). Yet this influx of American oil prospection had other implications and unintended consequences: its surveying and sub-surface exploration was revealing new archaeological deposits and discoveries, and they also required management.

One Penn archaeologist, Linton Satterthwaite, complained that "[w]e are snowed under with reports of new archaeological sites with carved stela in the Petén. The ones immediately adjacent to Tikal, we will be able to handle from here."[11] However, those discovered at Xutilhá by Lloyd Miller, Manager of Signal Oil Co., were another matter: Miller had built his helicopter pad in the main plaza of the site.[12] The problem was obvious, Satterthwaite added, and one that archaeologists and trustees must address: "Should the University Museum, apart from the Tikal Project and budget, take advantage of the new discoveries made by the Oil Companies in the [sic] Peten, when the information is



Figure 2. Bulldozer clearing Tikal, courtesy of Penn Museum.



Figure 3. Penn equipment in the jungle, courtesy of the author.

certain on monuments and architecture, or release the information to other institutions for their exploration and credit."[13] But Rainey and his team took this one step further, entering into the corporate logics of cultural resource reporting and management. This was seen as a new, entrepreneurial opportunity to raise funds for Tikal. But even with the promise of revenue, Shook complained, "I have been trying for two years to keep the oil companies interested and reporting to us on archaeological sites. They have been doing so but there are twenty some companies and time does not permit keeping a close touch with any one of them. It is very unsatisfactory as nothing can be done about the sites even when the companies make a particular effort to report them."[14] Yet this was an opportunity for the archaeologists to sell their services to raise money for excavations and restoration at Tikal, so that one set of discoveries might fund another. And since voluntary corporate social responsibility from oil companies was not forthcoming, archaeological consulting provided another avenue to extract cash. "It is more than obvious that we need extra personnel for survey work. Such companies which might support extra personnel require cultivation and personal attention to carry through," Satterthwaite reported; he noted how "[e]ach company is an individual problem, and for the future if we can show one oil company that their reports yield results there is a good chance that more interest will be shown by the others to support archaeology."[15]

Signal Oil, however, did invite Penn archaeologists to Xutilhá. And their assistance was required at Sacpeten after Petty Geophysical Company made the discovery while mapping the Petén Area E-55 concession of Esso Standard.[16] Indeed, Shook wanted the oil companies looking to the Tikal Project when they discovered new sites, while Rainey wanted to "sell a particular company one or more of its own discoveries. If that could be done once, others would be likely to fall in line. Signal Oil Company and Xultihá look suitable from this point of view."[17] Rainey calculated that Penn "would then be in a position to try again for oil company support, and with or without it there will be some time to find someone to take care of this sort of collateral work without disrupting the Tikal program itself."[18] Each company would pay $2000–3000 annually for archaeological inspectors, who would be on call to inspect and record, then advise the Guatemalan authorities and the company how to proceed without damaging the site.[19] The archaeologists stressed that it made better business sense to include the archaeologists in the reporting phase and then, in turn, the oil industry would finance the archaeologists. For example, Penn quoted a fee of $1000 for a one-month job at Xutilhá. However, the scheme was rejected by Sun Oil, where Penn Museum's own Samuel Eckert had once been Vice President for Marketing. Unsurprisingly, each oil company had its own way of working, some without any archaeological oversight whatsoever. Some would have their own geologists conduct the fieldwork and write up their findings (Vinson 1960), sidestepping the Tikal team altogether.

Privatizing Pyramids in the Petén

Along with failing corporate initiatives and applications to academic agencies came more personal philanthropic strategies. And while Sylvanus Morley had created the "Friends of Chichén Itzá" to raise money in the late 1930s (Villela 2000), Penn's ventures went even further. In 1958, Froelich Rainey approached *Life* magazine to discuss its coverage of Tikal. "We revised the agreement so that they give us $4,000 for exclusive rights for nine months, after they make their pictures and do their art work, about the end of March."[20] *Life* agreed to send its representatives, photographers, and illustrators to Tikal to showcase Penn's excavations and restoration efforts, reporting on the archaeologists, ruins, tombs, and artifacts. This exclusive deal gave Rainey a brilliant idea about the further privatization of individual monuments: "It might just be the gimmick which would excite others to finance the restoration of similar structures. In other words, as you say, if we could get across the idea in a LIFE story that one individual was taking over the restoration of that one structure as a kind of memorial and unique personal experience it could very well catch on with a rush."[21] That same year, 1958, Edwin Shook calculated the costs of restoration for this exclusive club of individual donors. The two Great Temples of Tikal, I and II, might be excavated, thoroughly explored, and solidified for an estimated $75,000 each or $25,000 per season over three seasons (Figure 4). The cost for the smaller temples of the North Acropolis ranged between $20,000 and $30,000 each. Shook estimated that the four fronting directly onto the Main Plaza were large and required $30,000. Tikal contributions thus far had been modest, yet steady. The Dimicks had promised $6000 for the restoration account, Fenimore Johnson $3000, and $2000 was to come from another source. Dimick was not only running Tikal's restoration, he was underwriting it with his wife, while creating the American fundraising apparatus: "I collected my photographs and story into an improvised brochure and returned to the U.S.A. My weapon was in hand, now whom to attack?" (Dimick 1968, 104). Thus far, Rainey had been relying on his own people, Penn Museum's Board and supporters, for in-house funding. So taking it to the next level of self-promotion and immortalization seemed only natural.



Figure 4. Temple II, also known as the Temple of the Masks, Tikal, courtesy of Penn Museum.

One of the first people to sponsor a pyramid with a personal plaque was Percy Madeira, President and Chairman of Penn Museum. Dimick's wife Teena, possessor of a family fortune in her own right, whose family included ambassadors and a fortune from Corning Glass, agreed to finance restoration of a major temple on the central plaza, hoping it would entice others to do the same. The couple hoped to have their story covered in *Life* magazine, showcasing how one individual was assuming the cost of one monument. Rainey was determined to make this a very real case: he asked his team to identify a specific temple to be known as the Teena Dimick Project, to start immediately, and to calculate how much Penn could reasonably expend upon the restoration of a single temple per year. Rainey quipped, "she will be the bellwether for other pleasant people who would like to leave a modest little monument to themselves."[22] This set in motion the idea of wealthy individuals sponsoring monuments as a form of self-promotion.

In tandem with this personalization, Rainey decided it was "time to establish understandable names for these structures, as at Chichén, rather than simply numbers. It is very important from the standpoint of getting financial sponsors for the restoration. You can imagine how dull it would be to give $100,000 to restore 'E-sub 7' and how much more effective it is if you are restoring 'The Temple of the Warriors' and this should be established before the LIFE story is written."[23] When Dimick wanted to restore one of the two main temples and was willing to pay $75,000 over three years, Rainey insisted on a good, dramatic name. Some of his colleagues suggested names like the Temple of the Red Stela, the Temple of the Giant Jaguar, and the Temple of the Masks. As Snead (1999) cautioned some 30 years ago, the specific issue of patronage in American archaeology has broad implications but has been little studied, impacting everything from disciplinary professionalization and standards of competence to ethics and epistemologies.

Ostensibly, funds were raised from private individuals and a few foundations, but the latter, too, were furnished through personal networks: John and Teena Dimick, her sister Alice Tully (the opera singer and philanthropist), the wealthy heiress Sarah Mellon Scaife; some 25–50 individuals each year giving small sums up to $5000, but most less than $100; and four of five members of the Museum Board contributing $1000 apiece annually.[24] Affluent individuals came by way of Museum connections or by wishing to visit Tikal and enjoy preferential access, free flights, VIP treatment, and unfettered access to the excavators. Sarah Scaife was one such VIP. The heiress had wanted to visit Tikal in 1947, but overland transport had proven off-putting. Years later, in 1955, she was invited to visit more comfortably and subsequently donated $75,000. Then, on March 5, 1956, Edwin Shook dramatically stopped her departing plane on the airstrip, recalling her to the Temple of the Red Stela to "witness" the spectacular "discovery" of a jade mask, literally "lifting the lid" on a treasure for the patron (Scott 2015). But Tikal's lure was also its burden, not only taxing on staff time but paradoxically on its finances, such as through the excessive number of guests who expected lodging and free flights.

Amateur archaeologists and American adventurism also encouraged the onslaught of other extractive economies. Alfred Tozzer (1911) once noted how chicle gatherers had conveniently cut trails through the jungle that facilitated access and knowledge of the ruins. Private individuals increasingly visited Tikal and ventured into the surrounding jungle. Some were caught illegally digging and looting antiquities, including figurines and polychromes, at nearby oil-drilling sites like Naranjo. Tourism was such that Shook suggested building a physical plant at Tikal, a hotel that might manage visitor demand and simultaneously raise money for the project. He offered to negotiate a contract with the local government, since they, too, were interested in developing Petén for their own reasons. Some 45,000 people were visiting Guatemala annually, according to Shook, and they could be channeled into the Petén. This cross-fertilization reveals how oil, airplanes, tourism, and archaeology were bound up together.

Yet Penn Museum received meager funding from American government and academic sources. In 1956, the Tikal project was surviving on $34,000, rather than the required $100,000. By 1958, it was running on $60,000, while realizing that each temple restoration required $100,000. Rainey and his colleagues repeatedly approached the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Viking Fund (now the Wenner-Gren Foundation) but were routinely rejected. In 1959, the NSF finally awarded Tikal $23,000 and in 1960, another $20,000, yet these grants were never quite adequate to the project's scale. In late 1958, the Avalon Foundation allocated $150,000 for Tikal, while Ford and the Carnegie Institution of Washington remained unsupportive. The American Philosophical Association gave $30,000 from the Johnson Fund, spread over three years. After many years of petitioning by the Museum's inner circle, the Rockefeller Foundation finally gave a paltry $10,000, ultimately causing more embarrassment than jubilation. Dimick (1968, 100) initially believed "foundations will leap at the chance to finance Tikal, be offended if they are not invited. My awakening was to be harsh." Instead, the Museum failed to attract the foundation funds it had expected for large-scale reconstruction work and thus could only continue in a limited capacity.

Foundations such as Rockefeller exerted considerable power during the Cold War to deflect any movement towards socialism at home or abroad. The new millionaires of robber baron infamy viewed foundations as a way to exercise considerable social control through philanthropy (Roelofs 2015). Moreover, it is well documented that the CIA used foundations as conduits for its international operations (Parmar 2012), and archaeology could provide the perfect cover. The private foundations that sponsored international fieldwork abroad during this period often had close ties to military and intelligence agencies; Rainey regularly appealed to some of the most powerful that were hand-in-glove with the State Department. Castañeda (2005) describes the Carnegie Institution's long engagement with espionage in supporting scientists, specifically archaeologists in the Maya region (see Shook and Houston 1990). The Carnegie Institution in Washington thus constituted a "third space" in the public sphere between the governmental agencies of science and the university (Castañeda 2005, 29; see also Weeks and Hill 2006). Its president, Vannevar Bush, believed the institution's mission should underwrite an intense national effort to apply the natural sciences to national defense, insisting that it should respond fully to the call of government. In sum, such agencies mediated the concerns of the state, big business, party politics, and foreign policy as regards academia and furnished forums for constructing elite expertise,

consensus, and forward planning in America's interests (Parmar 2012, 5).

Guatemala and Governments

Froelich Rainey and his Tikal team were busy courting companies and American philanthropists for over a decade while simultaneously attempting to engage American and Guatemalan governments to garner financial support. This, too, was a mixed and limited success, revealing more about politicking and Cold War interests than archaeological exploration and conservation.

Rainey tried to sell Tikal to various American ambassadors stationed in Guatemala, like Norman Armour, who Rainey knew through his former wartime military exploits. He promoted Tikal as "the most exciting excavation in America" and asked Armour to fund it as a way of re-establishing cultural relations with Guatemala. Rainey lobbied Ambassador Spruille Braden through various personal connections and dropped his name as often as possible in correspondence. Braden was an American diplomat, businessman, and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, known for his extreme anti-communist views (Immerman 1980, 635). He served as the ambassador to various Latin American countries and as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. More controversially, he was a paid lobbyist for United Fruit and helped devise the 1954 coup d'état that overthrew President Árbenz. The US had promised Carlos Castillo Armas some $3 million to finance an invasion and that United Fruit would supply the arms (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2020, 126). Braden considered archaeology a good defense against communism for a sister republic such as Guatemala and was willing to mention these views personally to President Castillo Armas. However, as with the corporate sector, the US government was not willing to directly finance archaeological missions within Cold War logics. Cultural Affairs officers at the US Embassy were equally pessimistic about supporting Tikal and downright dismissive of securing government funding for any excavation.

Braden attempted to use his influence with colleagues like Dean Rusk, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State and then President of the Rockefeller Foundation, later becoming US Secretary of State. Rusk cautioned Braden about Ford's negative attitude toward Latin America, due to the political situation. They wrote personally to Henry Ford II for assistance, if not cash then in kind: a tractor, a jeep, a dump truck, a small diesel-powered sawmill, and a diesel light plant.[25] The Ford Motor Company responded that it would not be possible to contribute either the items of equipment or funds with which to purchase them. The philanthropic activities of Ford Motor Company Fund and Ford Motor Company were directed toward a concept of industrial citizenship, which meant participating in community-wide activities rather than research efforts. Here, even military and government connections were insufficient to garner support.

Other avenues were pursued by Colonel Truman Smith, once considered "one of the busiest men in the Pentagon Army Intelligence" but by then retired, with a passion for restoring Tikal. Smith had served as a US Army infantry officer, military attaché, and intelligence officer. During the war, he was a personal advisor to General George C. Marshall. Later, he influenced the establishment of the new German Bundeswehr and its role in the Cold War. Smith considered that "Tikal is on such a vast scale that only Guatemalan & US governments' financial support in cooperation could have done the job that ought to have been done. Perhaps a consortium of universities and foundations could have done it—but even that I doubt … Tikal as it stands today is 70% yours. I wish I could leave such a monument to the world."[26] Colonel Smith was so strongly committed to the multivalent utility of Tikal for American interests that he suggested that military funds could be made available for Tikal, for an airstrip for example, "under the cover of Caribbean air defense," while a hotel could be built on-site "under the pretext of expanding the Guatemalan tourist industry."[27] Indeed, during the 1960s, American military aid increased substantially, reaching its peak in 1963, when the Guatemalan army received $2.6 million (Ibarra 2006, 199). Rainey attempted to convince US government agencies that supporting Tikal extended beyond archaeology to bolstering international relations and advancing development in the Petén, all of which would ensure cordial relations with the Guatemalan government. For all these reasons, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was approached, but declined. USAID designed its assistance programs to capture the "hearts and minds" of Guatemalan workers and peasants in order to steer them away from the guerrillas (Streeter 2006). America deemed Guatemala fertile ground for US-designed counterinsurgencies elsewhere and a suitable pilot plan for the continent (see below). USAID nation-building in Guatemala included literacy projects, rural leadership training, housing, agricultural resettlement, and Peace Corps volunteers but, perhaps happily in retrospect, not American excavations. In light of more strategic priorities and despite all the overtures, personal networks, and relentless name-dropping, instrumentalizing Tikal for American national purposes failed. Archaeologist Michael Coe complained that "[a]ll sorts of Congresistas [Congressmen] have come through here on their way back, and we have been chauffeuring, feeding, etc.," all to no avail (Figure 5).[28]

In sum, American government agencies were not fiscally supportive and only offered meager in-kind assistance, such as sharing geological maps of Tikal produced by the Department of the Interior. Like their northern counterparts, the Guatemalans had no hard currency to spare but provided more local support and infrastructure for the project. Rainey and his colleagues conveniently blamed this shortfall on the "ousted communist regime" and its imputed looting of the nation's treasury. After the assassination of Castillo Armas, President Ydígoras Fuentes expressed his desire to give the project $5000 per month, but even $1000 was doubtful, given the economic and political upheaval.[29] Support, yet again, remained in kind. As part of Penn's "collaboration" with Guatemalan authorities, soldiers stationed at the military base at Poptún had been deployed to clear and maintain the airstrip at Tikal. Soldiers took charge of airport security and water drainage. The government provided Air Force transport for men and supplies from Guatemala City and arranged duty-free importation of equipment and supplies; the Defense Ministry helped recruit the workforce and loaned experts from the Institute of Anthropology and History, including a photographer and surveyor. In return, on one occasion Penn personnel were asked to provide



Figure 5. President Ydígoras looks at photos with George Guillemin, April 1958, courtesy of Penn Museum.

"housing" for Army Chief of Staff Colonel Asturias, there for an unstated purpose. More formally, the project hosted various Guatemalan presidents, who would fly to Tikal accompanied by planeloads of government officials and friends. "Yesterday, not exactly unexpectedly but with no definite announcement, the President of Guatemala with a retinue of thirty to forty-odd people, descended on us at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. He whipped through the site, saw the new discovery, glanced at the excavation and repair work, and the whole batch left about 5:30. There was no time to give him more than a superficial glimpse at the Project's work. He seemed very pleased with everything and extended hearty congratulations."[30] The loss of Castillo Armas in 1957, with his close American allegiance to the CIA, United Fruit, and American archaeologists, coupled with the Cuban invasion in 1961, caused some momentary consternation. Yet Rainey believed that such events would in no way affect the Tikal project: "We have already passed through one change of government with the assassination of President Armas and we found the new government equally cooperative. It is obvious that our work at Tikal [is] such an advantage to the Guatemalans that almost any government would wish to continue it."[31] No mention was made of the civil war that raged from 1960–1996, the death squads, the revolutionary guerilla movement, or human rights violations that disproportionately affected the Maya (Cojti Ren 2006; Totten 2017). One team member acknowledged much later, however, that the "violence that has taken such an appalling and long-lasting toll in Guatemala was getting underway in the early 1960s, but was not yet noticeable at Tikal" (Moholy-Nagy 2020, 12). America embraced Guatemala's authoritarian regimes and the central role of its military and encouraged a theory of modernization that reinforced the superiority of the market, with the predictable result of repression, not development nor modernization.

By early 1963, Rainey was drafting Penn's exit strategy, not because of the political situation but due more to the economic struggles of funding continued excavation and restoration. To the president of the university, he wrote that the University Museum would soon complete the restoration and preservation phase of its project at Tikal. Work of that nature would therefore cease. Rainey's decision was enforced by the termination of grants to the Museum. Indeed, over 1963–1964, Penn's major financial grants from the Avalon Foundation, Scaife Foundation, and Dimick Foundation all ended. At the end of the 1964 season, major excavation and restoration was thus finished. Thereafter, in 1965 and 1966, the Museum was forced to reduce expenditures to just $20,000.[32] That reduced figure was the minimum amount required to satisfy the Museum's contract with the Guatemalan government of $175,000. Rainey was adamant that the Museum was not responsible for the stabilization of structures it had excavated.[33] And, he stated, there were other interesting projects to pursue. But there were dire consequences, such as "turning off the labor force, selling equipment, and so forth."[34]

Rainey was unapologetic about terminating work at Tikal and claimed that Penn Museum had appropriated and spent more than $700,000, approximately three times the amount stipulated in the original contract and more than has ever been allotted to an archaeological project of equal duration in the western hemisphere.[35] In his list of achievements, he argued that Penn had gone above and beyond: building and maintaining roads beyond its own requirements and connecting other Maya sites; clearing the jungle growth from Maya buildings and repairing them; building an attractive hotel to accommodate tourists and visiting scientists; and installing and maintaining an independent power and water supply. Other successes lay in the realm of social engineering, such as constructing and maintaining a group of sanitary dwellings for the workmen and their families; building and stocking a first aid and pharmaceutical structure; constructing a school for the workmen's children; and paying the salary of a schoolteacher/pharmacist, plus providing his housing. Finally, there were Tikal's academic legacies: providing field training for Guatemalan students, paying their expenses at Tikal, and obtaining funds from a private American donor to match those for construction of a museum at Tikal.[36]

Ultimately, Rainey intended to terminate the project in 1965. However, Penn's additional years at Tikal were subsidized by the Guatemalan government under the National Enterprise for the Economic Development of Petén (FYDEP). The agreement was also dependent upon the continued support of Guatemalan anthropologists and historians at IDEAH (Coe 1990, 3), a dependency of the Ministry of Education established by Juan José Arévalo in 1946. During the 1960s, the most extensive and best-funded project in Guatemala was FYDEP's colonization of Petén, functionally an American "frontier colonization" enacted through the military-led organization. Following Gould (2018, 141), "infrastructure-making was FYDEP's most important function, but it also regulated natural resource extraction, promoted cultural activities, and functioned as a 'state within a state.'" Penn Museum worked in conjunction with FYDEP on developing the Tikal Museum, the Tikal hotel, and regional tourism, quarrying projects, water, and other infrastructure projects. By the mid-1960s,

FYDEP was "the government agency that mediate[d] funds to Tikal"[37] and hired Rudy Larios and Miguel Orrego. Penn's desire to develop Tikal was well-suited to FYDEP's mission to build schools, hospitals, barracks, roads, and airstrips.

FYDEP primarily served US military objectives, in that colonization of the forest frontiers would prevent insurgents from taking refuge. It should be remembered that Guatemala was the first Latin American nation to embrace the Kennedy Administration's counterinsurgent "hearts and minds" program, officially known as military civic action (MCA). The government's interventions at Tikal accorded with MCA's priorities both to establish military-civilian rapport and to contribute to the socio-economic development of the nation (Gould 2018, 6). The Petén was thus instrumentalized by diverse actors and institutions that invested in frontier development for different reasons, with Penn serving as part of the effort (see also Yaeger and Borgstede 2004). Cultural projects like restoring Tikal, fostering heritage tourism, and carving out Tikal National Park could also be mobilized for broader American military strategies such as counterinsurgency and Cold War advantage. FYDEP's work in the Petén would be taken up and reoriented by NGOs and government agencies (Gould 2018, 154), with funding from USAID and other sources (Figure 6).

Tikal was, quite simply, "not only the most expensive and complicated research operation ever launched in more than 75 years of Museum research around the world, but the most difficult for [Rainey] in nearly thirty years of backstopping the Museum's expeditions" (Rainey 1992, 189). American archaeological techniques proved an impediment to answering the big questions of Maya archaeology, and Rainey bemoaned that just a few excavators focused on tiny trenches fixated on separating occupation levels or digging a few test pits when there were more than 100 pyramids, acres of palaces, hundreds of ruined buildings, and several thousand house mounds. All that money, equipment, and effort expended, but Americanist archaeologists were unwilling to approach Tikal with the scale of exploration Penn Museum had undertaken in Egypt and the Middle East. Even bringing Robert Dyson from Hasanlu, Iran, to Tikal to direct one season could not remedy an excavation strategy spanning some 14 years.



Figure 6. Excavations at Tikal, courtesy of Penn Museum.

Penn Museum's approach to Maya archaeology had taken shape with the work of Alden Mason and Linton Satterthwaite at Piedras Negras in the 1930s. At Tikal, through Linton Satterthwaite and William Coe, this tradition merged with the earlier Uaxactun archaeological field tradition, through Edwin Shook, and came to dominate Maya archaeology of the late 1950s and 1960s (Black 1990, 273). Given Penn's grand ambition, curtailed as it was by limited funding, the Museum developed the first university-government partnership in Maya archaeology, between a Latin American government and a North American university (Kidder 1968, 8). Chinchilla Mazariegos describes how Tikal became a prime tourist destination, making archaeological work relevant for the country's economy. The project also succeeded in providing training opportunities for Guatemalan personnel and students who subsequently played important roles in the development of professional archaeology in Guatemala (Chinchilla Mazariegos 2012, 62).

Concluding Thoughts on Penn in the Petén

In 1970, Rainey described circling over the airfield and the ruins of Tikal with the Du Pont Company's Sam Carpenter in his plane: all the years of work flashed before his eyes. He remarked on the dense jungle, with two or three temple roof-combs flashing white through the tree-tops and a tiny clearing with a few huts near the airstrip. He witnessed the bustle of Air Force planes unloading trucks, bulldozers, a sawmill, and a power plant. Then three settlements appeared—that of the archaeologists with their single workmen, another for the married workmen with a sawmill, school, and dispensary, and a separate group of buildings to accommodate the many tourists arriving daily. Finally, there was the brilliant white expanse of ruins around the great Central Plaza, which Penn had cleared and preserved during the previous years: a breathtaking sight for anyone. Rainey (1970, 3) acknowledged that the Guatemala Air Force and state-owned Aviateca had made the whole operation possible from the start. Tikal was, in his view, an outstanding example of the best kind of international cultural cooperation, which had produced something of worldwide significance.

Rainey's closing vignette for Penn's work in the Petén neatly encapsulates archaeological and American adventurism in Tikal, replete with its entanglement of corporate, military, governmental, and academic interests. From the identification and initial financing of Tikal, to its clearance, water sourcing, infrastructure, equipment, and transportation, to its excavation, conservation, and tourist development: all were underwritten by American business and foundation dollars and mutually beneficial donor connections (for parallels, see Luke 2019). Financiers and philanthropists were virtually indistinguishable. Archaeological expeditions to Tikal equally reveal the dependencies and implications of American business investment, national governments and politicians, Cold War espionage, and security and military operations for preservation in the Petén. Yet given Guatemala's growing violence, the 1960s saw greater US investment in shoring up the economy, military, and police to enhance stability, rather than addressing socio-economic inequalities or underwriting cultural projects.

Nonetheless, it was the modes of exploration, the field practices, and the bilateral partnerships fostered by archaeology that proved most generative and appealing to the American government, rather than any particular research or interpretive agendas. Archaeology could still be instrumentalized for soft power objectives in ways that were implausible for the parallel extractive industries of oil, chicle, and bananas. Cultural exploration and conservation offered more pleasing covers than oil prospection, giving something back to Guatemala and forging partnerships between nations and institution-building. Penn Museum was no stranger to Cold War connectivities: Rainey had mastered these relations in Alaska with the Russians (Meskell 2022b), which subsequently propelled him into a position as an advisor to Henry Kissinger and Philadelphia's political think tank, the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He had brought nuclear applications in archaeology, with his personal links to Glenn Seaborg and the American Atomic Energy Commission, plus Silicon Valley tech firms, to Penn's field projects in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, deploying everything from spy planes to submarines (Meskell 2022a). He used his expeditions to Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan to provide intelligence and facilitate the work of covert agents for the American government (Meskell and LaPorte 2022; Rainey 1992). They, in turn, facilitated his international projects. And all of these activities and expeditions were running concurrently.

With a cultural Cold War raging, the CIA and other US agencies were eager to prove that America had become the "protector of western civilization" (Saunders 2013, 133). Cultural life was high on the agenda, and archaeology served as a diplomatic and academic cover for the furtherance of American government, military, and industrial objectives (Leslie 1993). Rainey wrote to New York Congressman John Rooney in 1964, boasting of how the Guatemalan government supported his archaeological excavations at Tikal: "This clearly proves that the University of Pennsylvania is now playing a major role in U.S.-Guatemalan relations, because of our archaeological dig. How would you say that stacks up with the tens of millions spent there by the Department of State in the A.I.D. Program?"[38] Perhaps Rainey hadn't fully appreciated that Tikal and the Museum's many other foreign expeditions were already performing the work of the state. He simply hadn't grasped the degree to which he was already representing American government interests: not simply in covert affairs, but in everyday field operations. And he was paying for the privilege by raising the considerable funds to advance that work through the Penn Museum. Today, critical reflexivity leads us to recognize cultural diplomacy in service of the state. Foreign archaeological projects are neither neutral nor inherently benevolent; instead, their tentacular reach can encompass and even exacerbate conflict, evictions, extractive industries, exploitative labor, and other agendas, routinely masked by the romance of ruins.

Notes

1. November 9, 1955, News Bureau, University of Pennsylvania. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, Box 1, 1955. Penn Museum Archives (hereafter PM).
2. Draft letter from Froelich Rainey to Nelson Rockefeller. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, Box 1, 1955. PM.
3. November 9, 1955, News Bureau, University of Pennsylvania. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, Box 1, 1955. PM.
4. John Dimick, 'Methods and Costs.' Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, Box 1, 1948–1950. PM.
5. June 3, 1948, Froelich Rainey to Sylvanus Morley. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Box 1. PM.
6. June 3, 1948, Froelich Rainey to Sylvanus Morley. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Box 1. PM.
7. June 1, 1948, A. V. Kidder to Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Box 1. PM.
8. December 23, 1948, A. V. Kidder to Percy Madeira. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Box 1. PM.
9. March 15, 1949, John Sims to Edwin Shook. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Folder 1. PM.
10. March 15, 1949, John Sims to Edwin Shook. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1950, Folder 1. PM.
11. January 16, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. Universidad del Valle de Guatemala Archives (hereafter UVG).
12. January 16, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. UVG.
13. January 16, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. UVG.
14. February 18, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. UVG.
15. February 18, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. UVG.
16. February 21, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 200. UVG.
17. January 25, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 41. UVG.
18. January 25, 1958, Linton Satterthwaite to Edwin Shook. Box 41. UVG.
19. April 8, 1957, Froelich Rainey to Sam Eckert. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1957, Box 1. PM.
20. February 8, 1958, Froelich Rainey to John Dimick. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1958, Box 2. PM.
21. February 8, 1958, Froelich Rainey to John Dimick. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1958, Box 2. PM.
22. February 14, 1958, Froelich Rainey to Phillip Wootten, *Life* magazine. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1958, Box 2. PM.
23. February 28, 1958, Froelich Rainey to Edwin Shook. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1958, Box 2. PM.
24. October 24, 1961, Froelich Rainey to William J. Mayer-Oakes, Box 33, Folder 4. UVG.
25. June 29, 1956, draft letter to Henry Ford II. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence, 1948–1956, Box 1. PM.
26. May 22, 1964, Col. Truman Smith to Edwin Shook. Folder 209. UVG.
27. Undated letter from Col. Truman Smith, sent to Froelich Rainey April 25, 1955, to be forwarded to A. V. Kidder. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1955, Box 1. PM.
28. August 2, 1958, Michael Coe to A. V. Kidder. CA: letters received by Edwin Shook, Folder 41. UVG.
29. April 9, 1961, Edwin Shook to Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1961, Box 3. PM.
30. February 25, 1960. Edwin Shook to Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1961, Box 3. PM.
31. December 7, 1960. Text by Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1961, Box 3. PM.
32. February 26, 1963, Froelich Rainey to Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1963, Box 4. PM.
33. May 13, 1964, Edwin Shook to Col. Truman Smith. Folder 209. UVG.
34. March 4, 1964, Froelich Rainey to Aubrey Trik. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1964, Box 4. PM.
35. Undated draft by Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1963, Box 4. PM.
36. Undated draft by Froelich Rainey. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1963, Box 4. PM.
37. Draft response to Heinrich Berlin from Froelich Rainey, Alfred Kidder II, Linton Satterthwaite, and William R. Coe, June 1966. Tikal Project, Administrative Correspondence 1966–1967, Box 4. PM.
38. September 11, 1964, Froelich Rainey to Congressman John Rooney. "R-" Correspondence 1947–1977. Froelich Rainey Director's Office Records. PM.

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