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A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

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Title: The Agrarian Counter-Revolution in the Transvaal and the Origins of Segregation: 1902-1913.

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The agrarian counter-revolution in the Transvaal and the origins of segregation: 1902-1913.

This paper seeks to examine the circumstances surrounding the rise of a segregationist ideology in South Africa during the decade after the Boer War, culminating in the Natives' Land Act of 1913. In tracing this development, the approach is essentially one of establishing a relationship between the underlying structures that made segregation materially possible and the cleavages within the white political system that increasingly drove the polity towards an ideology of segregation.

Such a relationship can be seen as crucial for the success of any form of segregation, which was the political response by a colonial superstructure to a changing economic base (1), since it sought to reverse any change in the relationship between coloniser and colonised (2). It is necessary, however, in delineating this process of change, to be historically specific and show which groups within the society were able, through access to political power, to effect major economic and political gains for themselves. This approach may be said to contrast with much of the current descriptive analysis that seeks to explain changes through the application of terminology. Thus, though it might be possible to describe change within South Africa through a model of "development and underdevelopment" (3) or of "internal colonialism" (4), this does not explain how and why such changes occurred. In the final analysis, the developments analysed in this paper occurred through the access and application of political power and there was very little that was inevitable about this. Though it might be theoretically possible to account for political changes through a "theory of the superstructure", as Wolpe suggest (5), such a deterministic view of history is precluded by the unpredictability in the flow and influence of ideas.

However, ideas themselves are anchored in some kind of material reality and their nature and importance have recently been seen by Legassick. In a series of seminar papers, he has shown how a distinct segregatory model emerged in South Africa:

> The model grew out of and reacted back on a social system, emphasising certain features and ignoring others, shaped by the system and reshaping it (6),

and this paper seeks to expand further some of Legassick's analysis and set the development of ideas more firmly within a sociological context where pressures from groups and interests edged the political system to some form of separatism. Any straight "history of ideas" runs into the problem of giving a false impression of the nature of ideological change: ideas do not exist in vacuo but only survive within social structures. In this respect the problem is the same as that surrounding the English church before the Civil War; as Christopher Hill has argued:

> The connexions between different groups of ideas are subtle and difficult to analyse, but they exist: they exist because of the unity of the individual and of the society in which he lives. It is to the structure of society that we must look for the keys to interpretation. Otherwise we shall distort and do violence to the history we are studying (7).

In the Transvaal, however, there is a further factor which can help to unify the focus of analysis. The economic system and social structure was dominated by two great interests: mining capitalism and agriculture and these substantially defined the nature and course of political change. Though it is probably true, as for example Mawby has argued (8), that the mining capitalists especially did not directly influence political decision making, certainly before 1907, there is

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vertheless a close and direct similarity between economic interest groups and
liticians within capitalist societies. Some analysts, in fact, have pointed out
w the liberal democratic system, in its nature, resembles the working of the free-
rket system (9) and it is certainly fair to assume that both politicians and business-
n seek to maximise "resources": the former political (votes) the latter material
rofits). In this latter respect, therefore, the politicians in the Transvaal can
seen as "political entrepreneurs" (10) who sought to maximise the voting potential
issues that they saw as salient. These issues would fluctuate according to their
rceptions of political cleavages: before the advent of Responsible Government in the
ansvaal in 1907, for example, the opposition focused around issues like language
ghts, Chinese labour and return of Boer War exiles and compensation for the War (11).
no particular time was the "Native question" the salient political issue, partly
cause of a tacit agreement to "keep it out of party politics" and partly because,
like the Cape, there was no political leverage that could be exerted by non-whites
thin the white political system by means of the qualified franchise (12).

wever, in a basic sense, the issue of power between whites and blacks in the Transvaal
is a salient issue for on it depended the nature of the Colony's political and economic
ture. In the initial period after the Boer War, the Transvaal was presented with a
allenge from below by its non-whites who, with certain limited gains they had managed
make during the War, sought to change the power relations between the racial groups.
addition, with the advent of Responsible Government in 1907, the Transvaal was faced
th a political challenge in the form of the envisaged Union or Federation of South
rica and the need to formulate a clear and distinct "native policy". Any such
licy would have to define the Transvaal's position vis a vis the Cape African
anchise and seek, as a minimum, a compromise which did not endanger the existing
stem of power relations in the Transvaal where white politicians did not, as it can
argued they had to in the Cape, compete for non-white votes and mobilise their
olitical resources" accordingly.

ese challenges to the system of power relations in the Transvaal eventually produced
political response that sought to stabilise and entrench the balance of power there.
is the argument of this paper that this response was facilitated through the
velopment and articulation of an ideology of segregation that was successfully embedded
ithin white political thinking after 1907. Through analysing the nature of these
olitical challenges in the Transvaal and the response to them, it is hoped to throw
re light on the nature of segregation in South Africa and the reasons for its extension
South Africa in the twentieth century (13).

challenge presented by non-whites after the Boer War: 1902-1907:

e agrarian sector of the Transvaal economy after the Boer War was still basically
naracterised by feudal relations of production (14), as it had been in the Nineteenth
entury. However, this feudalism was starting to change and it is here that the main
nitial challenge from non-whites came. Large numbers of Africans, though they did not
wn any actual land, were being gradually integrated into the European-dominated
conomy as tenants and squatters on white farms and through growing migrant labour
nto the towns and cities, especially Johannesburg and Pretoria. In addition, there
ere established government locations where traditional African political structures
urvived in a modified form under the rule of the chiefs and there were also a small
umber of wholly African-owned farms, though they were usually registered in the names
f missionaries, as well as a number of Africans living in "undefined" locations and
overnment Crown Lands. In statistical terms, the picture in 1903 at the time of the
irst, rather inaccurate census appeared as follows.

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TABLE ONE.

Dispersal of Africans in the Transvaal, 1903.

	Area in sq. mls.	Est. Pop.	Density per sq. ml.
Govt. Locations	2,054	111,919	54.0
Farms owned by Africans.	712	41,180	57,8
Undefined Locations:			
a) Private Farms	3,932	134,880	34,3
b) Govt. Farms & Crown Lands	1,175	81,820	69,0
Remainder	103,323	235,867	2,2
Total	111,196	605,666	av. 5,4

Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1904.

This system, however, by no means encouraged agricultural efficiency. Farming tended to be practised on an "extensive" scale and produced a low output: in 1907, for example, South Africa as a whole was importing nearly £5 millions of meat, butter, cheese and other agricultural products that could well be produced at home (15). Similarly, in the Transvaal, the years after the Boer War were bad ones and large amounts of agricultural produce were still being imported (16). This inefficiency brought continual complaints, as for example by the Union Department of Agriculture:

> The curse of South African agriculture is the big farm. The size of the average farm in the Transvaal is 5000 acres, in the United States 143, in Great Britain 63 and in Belgium 14½ ... It is appalling to contemplate the vast tracts of land that are owned by single individuals all over the Union. You see a poor, daub cottage, a few starved cattle, a mealie patch of five acres of green, and you are told that the total area of the property is 5000 acres (17).

This was in 1912 but even before then there were repeated calls for "Closer Land Settlement" which would enable more productive use of the land while at the same time encouraging an extensive policy of white immigration and land settlement. Immediately after the Boer War, in fact, there was a general hope among many English-speakers that the Milner administration would shift the population balance against the Boers through encouraging settlement on the land and in 1904 a "Handbook for Settlers" published by the Department of Agriculture argued:

> That the Transvaal possesses great possibilities as regards agriculture cannot be doubted...
>
> There appears to be no reason why, in the near future, the agriculture of the new colonies should not only supply their own local market, and those

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> perhaps of neighbouring states, who are large importers of foreign produce, but it is probable that products for which the country is specially adapted will find the European market available (18).

But hopes such as these depended upon a restructuring of the agricultural system eliminating competition from both the poorer Boers and the nascent African peasant class which, as the analysis will later show, had the potential of edging its way gradually into the market system. On the other hand, this strategy for agricultural development depended in turn upon the use of political power and the ability to wield it credibly. It was clear, in the initial period after the war, that the Milner administration did seek to use this power won through war, though the logical implication of complete social engineering that the Milner administration envisaged (19) failed eventually through inability to carry conviction both among the Transvaal British population and the politicians in Britain (20). Nevertheless, at first, Lagden's attitude on the question of war compensation for Boer farmers was explicit:

> They are like the Kaffirs, a very ungrateful people. The more you do for them the more they want (21).

Lagden was able to persuade the administration to take a harsh line on the restitution of Boer cattle which had been taken from, or in many cases "loaned to", the African tribes. The Resolution 450 of 1902 was suspended through Lagden's pressure and this meant that the Boers could no longer expect state backing in their cases which would now have to be pursued through private law suits. The ostensible reason for this "owing to the attitude taken up by the Boer farmers" (22) but the more general reason lay in the preference of the Milner administration to tackle the Boer question first and leave the African one till later, especially as there was extreme caution not to foment any African rebellion. Thus, any restitution of cattle to the Boers, in Lagden's words "naturally caused restlessness and set up a strong feeling of injustice in the minds of the native who wanted to keep the cattle which they have lawfully gained, and did not want compensation in return" (23)

This policy, combined with a general financial stringency on poor white relief was aimed initially at removing the economic base of the rural Afrikaner classes who, it was hoped, would be swamped by large-scale English settlement that would remove the problem once and for all. It had, politically, the opposite effect in that it mobilised the mass of Afrikaners into opposition. Denoon, for example, has seen Het Volk's formation in 1905 as "little more than a public acknowledgment of an uninterrupted but unofficial existence" (24) and certainly as far back as May 1904 at the Boer Congress the first seeds were being sown. Here Botha asked for aid to the bywoner class and employment for them in the civil service and the police force (25) and it was clear that the Milner policy was beginning to produce unforeseen political repercussions. Botha claimed that the £3 million state aid promised at the Treaty of Vereeniging had not been forthcoming and a focus was started on the "poor white" problem that was to lead to the establishment of the Transvaal Indigency Commission in 1906.

The existence of a class of poor whites in a racially divided context as the Transvaal after the Boer War can be seen as one crucial factor that destroyed any possibility of exploiting divisions within Afrikanerdom between Hensoppers and Bittereinders and the potential class cleavages that these differences suggested. Instead, economic differences tended to get masked over in a cleavage defined along "national" lines, though it was not incidental that the leadership of Het Volk was dominated by such wealthy landowners as Botha and Rissik (26). The actual basis of this potential class cleavage needs much further research: most usefully, perhaps, by looking at the composition of Agricultural Societies and their relationship to the Transvaal Agricultural Union, of which Botha was made an Honourary Vice-President in 1904. From his early offer of seats on the Legislative Council to Botha, Smuts and De La Rey and his reluctance to pursue legal action against Botha for dubious

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land deals (27), Milner was clearly interested in some kind of political accord with the Afrikaner leaders that would have produced a clearer class alignment in Transvaal politics than actually occurred. It was the long-run imperialist objective of swamping Afrikaner nationalism by a British counter nationalism that can be considered the crucial factor in defeating Milner's objectives; as Denoon has argued:

> Milner's paternalistic contempt for Afrikaners as a whole, and his conviction that nationality over-rode every other interest, immunised him against overt malice. If he had been vindictive, and had diverted the government's resources to the patronage of the bijwoner class, the consequences for Transvaal Afrikaner prospects might have been very serious indeed (28).

Instead, British imperial rule in the Transvaal created the political preconditions for the saliency of the poor white vote to be mobilised on a nationalist basis while at the same time, as the later accord between Het Volk and the Labour Party at both the 1906 and 1910 elections showed, potential was created for splitting the British vote in the Transvaal on class lines and thus creating a parliamentary majority which, after 1907, as Mawby has argued, left the British in the Transvaal a mere pressure group (29).

There was an important aura attached to the white vote in the Transvaal which could be made to appear as threatened by the swamping from non-whites: whether it be over the "Chinese slave labour issue" or pressure on skilled white jobs in the urban area on which the Transvaal Indigency Commission reported. It was on this point that Botha laboured in his memorandum to the Labour Commission in 1903, saying the "threat" meant that the Transvaal could become like Natal with its large Indian population:

> It would be disastrous to the interests of the white population of South Africa if a similar mistake were made in the Transvaal (30).

The emotive issue of preserving the white race from non-white economic competition on both the land and in industry provided at least an important political precondition for a separatist political stance, given certainly the cleavages on national grounds, which have been outlined. As the inhabitants of Potgietersrust petitioned Rissik at the Department of Native Affairs on the advent of Responsible Government:

> White people who are through bread compelled to plough for the natives, to earn a piece of bread in that way, are unable to do so without carrying a Pass for that purpose... (31).

This suggests a clear loss of social status on racial as well as economic grounds and indicates one probable source for the rejection of "kaffirwerk", to be institutionalized in the Colour Bar Act of the Hertzog government. The actual extent of this kind of white poverty in the Transvaal needs further research, though it is hampered by the absence of any proper census before 1911. The Carnegie Commission reached no actual conclusion on the number of rural poor, though it shows that the rural population increased in the Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 by 41.31% and that in 1911 the while male population engaged in agricultural pursuits was 43,774 (53,079 by 1936) (32). Professor Macmillan has estimated that the "rural poor", using criteria based on the Johannesburg Relief Board, was between 20 and 30%. This makes the poverty figure in the Transvaal by 1911, at a conservative estimate, at around 9000 in terms of male voters (33). Clearly, the white poverty issue was not unimportant in terms of votes out of a total franchise of 106,594 and this point did not seem to be lost on Het Volk in its electioneering.

These developments, however, need to be set within a general context of a growing economic and political challenge from non-whites which crucially defined the nature of political action from the white polity. In the rural areas, of some 11,650 farms,

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less than half were occupied by white farmers (34) and the growing competition from non-whites presented the polity with a need to define a coherent "native policy". Such a policy as there was lacked exactitude and tended to be based, as far as the main principles were concerned, on the policy introduced under the British occupation of 1877 to 1881 (35). The system then introduced made the Native Administrator supreme chief of all the African tribes, on the Natal system, and the landdrosts became administrators of native law, which was recognisable in the Transvaal courts. The Shepstonian ideas of segregation (36) were further introduced in the Pretoria Convention of 1881 when a Locations Commission was created in order to demarcate native locations. These British provisions were supplemented by a Squatters Law (plakkers Wet) in 1895 which sought, very unsuccessfully, to limit the number of squatters to five families per farm. By the end of the Boer War, however, many of these instruments of a "native policy" had not been very rigidly enforced, squatting was rampant and uncontrolled and many locations remained to be beaconed off.

This was the system inherited by the British colonial administration in 1902 when Sir Godfrey Lagden, former Resident Commissioner in Basutoland, became Commissioner of Native Affairs. While he sought to deal with the immediate question of claims by Boer farmers, the policy towards the African tribes was one of caution. The general consciousness of the Africans was raised by the expectations engendered by the War, especially when they had been promised cattle by the British in return for aid against the Boers. Chief Sekukuni, for example, was promised such cattle by General Kitchener "if you do not allow them (the Boers) to pass into your country" (37): a fact which, when it was pointed out to him, Lagden found "extremely embarressing" (38). The general attitude prevailing among the Africans was not lost on Lagden either; as Hogge, the Resident Commissioner for Sekukuniland, reported:

> ...the feeling is one for entire independence from the Government, Sekukuni paying tribute only in the form of the Hut Tax to be collected by him and handed over in large sums to the Government (39),

and there were similar reports from the Western Transvaal. Here reports indicated a general state of terror among the Boer farmers as they tried to return to their farms after the war only to find them occupied by Linchwe's Bakgatla. The tribes here had done well financially out of the war and were well armed so that, as one traveller reported in 1903:

> Up to December last year not a single Boer had dared to come back to the Pilandsberg, but now a few are summoning up courage to do so, relying on the South African Constabulary (40).

There was also, in the Northern Transvaal, the legacy of the rebellion of the Venda under Chief M'phephu in 1898, leading to the latter's expulsion into Rhodesia. Lagden was at first against his return after the Boer War and the tribe continued to be ruled by the chiefs and M'phephu's brother. It was only in July 1904 that M'phephu was allowed to return "subject to his good behaviour and without prejudice to any land policy which the Government may hereafter deem fit to adopt" (41)

In this situation, Lagden was unable at first to enforce any firm policy. The main strategy was to proceed cautiously and to look for the first signs of resistance. "experience has... taught many of us" he wrote to Wheelright, the Native Commissioner for the Northern Transvaal, "to read the signs (of revolt) in ways that the ordinary public do not look for, particularly when impertinence is shown to messengers - that is almost a sure sign of something wrong" (42). The first step, then, was to proceed with a cautious policy of disarmament and a large number of guns were bought from the Africans for £3 when they often cost, in Gazaland, from £10 to £15. "If anything could have caused open resistance" Lagden wrote again to Wheelright "It would presumably have been disarmament" (43).

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With disarmament accomplished relatively successfully, although there were reports in 1903 that the Bakgatla were still well armed (44), Lagden was able to proceed to the task of re-establishing the structure of native administration in the Transvaal. Though he undoubtedly based much of his policy on the precedent of the Transvaal Republic, another clear influence was that of his experience in Basutoland. Lagden wrote later in glowing terms of the success of the policy pursued in Basutoland, and this clearly shaped his thinking about the most effective way of delegating power to African chiefs in a system of indirect rule that was applied, as John Benyon has shown, through the High Commission in South Africa (45). "The predominant thought in the minds of those who were set the task of rebuilding the structure so much shattered by the Gun War", Lagden wrote of Basutoland, "was to enlist in the effort the cooperation of the natives themselves. This could only be done by inducing their leaders with certain powers and giving them an interest in the conduct of their own affairs" (46).

This previous experience of Basutoland clearly influenced Lagden on the means by which the overall policy of Milnerism (47) could be attained. This point needs stressing because Legassick, for example, has been concerned to stress the role of British imperial hegemony in South Africa and its ultimate end in view while under-rating the means to attain it:

> ...SANAC was prepared as a guideline for future reference in the best imperial tradition through a synthesis of imperial guidelines with local expertise. The measure of the influence of the period of British hegemony is the extent to which its recommendations were disseminated, adopted, and implemented; and the extent and manner in which this was done by Imperial representatives (48).

This view ignores the system of administration established in the Transvaal by Milner where considerable departmental autonomy was permitted and there were often considerable clashes of opinion and personality (48). Most of Lagden's time during the time SANAC was doing its work was spent on departmental matters in the Transvaal; even the Orange River Colony came only slightly into the scheme of things, since that too was run on autonomous lines (50). So, in the absence of further research on the exact influences exerted on SANAC, it may be safely argued that one of the dominant considerations was that of establishing an effective system of native policy in the Transvaal.

This argument is illuminated by the similarity between the policy of native administration in the Transvaal and the report of SANAC. As early as 1902, for example, Lagden wrote to Wheelright:

> It is being reported that the power of the chiefs is being displaced by the power assumed by the Native Commissioner. . This is perfectly correct because we shall do no good until the chiefs are simply our policemen (51) Emphasis added.

while immediately after the SANAC report was published in 1905 and before Lagden went on leave to England, a memorandum was written on the applicability of the SANAC proposals to the Transvaal (no other such memoranda were found in the Transvaal archives relating to other parts of South Africa). The general objectives of SANAC were described as indicating "the general conditions now prevailing and to suggest a policy for South Africa as a whole to aim at in view of Confederation" (52). Nevertheless, several of the report's recommendations were immediately applicable to the Transvaal since it was "..desirable to move steadily and quietly so as to avoid any unnecessary disturbance of the native mind" (53). In particular, paragraphs 184-199 to regulate the purchase of land by Africans and paragraphs 200-211 on the demarcation of Native Locations so that there could be ensured "the early definition and delimitation of all lands dedicated and set apart with a view to finality in the provision of land

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for the native population" (54). These objectives suggests that SANAC, in a short term view, was part of the general policy of establishing an effective system of native administration in the Transvaal, though clearly its recommendations were envisaged as being applicable to the rest of South Africa when it was united in some form of union.

In this respect, SANAC can be seen as the first step in a political response to the economic and political challenge being made by non-whites in the Transvaal. The most important of these was the economic challenge presented by the growth of groups of peasant farmers who showed an increasing response to the pull of the market (55), and similar features can be observed in this growth of an African peasantry to those in the Ciskei observed by Bundy, though no generalizations should be drawn from this work (56). Certainly the level of the economic response was dictated by the kind of social structures in which the peasantry existed. It is possible, given differing social structures, to talk of "different peasantries" (57) with the ultimate criterion being one of "having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land" (58), although such rights also involve other rights and obligations in a wider economic system. A peasant system of agriculture, therefore, cannot be said to be a distinct mode of production like capitalism or feudalism but is dependent on another mode, i.e. capitalism. This crucial point is important when the rise of a peasantry is observed in South Africa for at no stage did the peasants concerned have the sufficient economic or political power to enforce their productive system onto the economy as a whole. In the Transvaal, for example, it is only possible to observe certain features of a peasantry which suggest more of a potential peasant class if the politico-economic preconditions for its survival had not been removed as early as they were.

When one analyses the nature of these "different peasantries" in the Transvaal, however, two main groups emerge. On the one hand these was a small group of independent African farmers who usually held title to land through missions and had been able to gain access to land both before and after the Boer War. Most of these farmers were concentrated around the Rustenburg area in the Western Transvaal. On the other hand, there were those Africans who squatted on Crown land or European farms or were still in locations. In varying degrees, their social structures were less individualistic than the small "entrepreneurial" class of independent farmers and were typified by wider kinship structures with political power resting with headmen and chief (59). The latter group could be said to show far less of a rational economic response to the pull of the market, though as the analysis will show, such features were not entirely absent in the period after the Boer War.

The first group of peasant farmers in the Western Transvaal, therefore, could be said to be the most advanced and they indicated the potential for the peasantry as a whole in the Transvaal. The Sub-Native Commissioner at Pilansberg, near Linchwe's Location, reported in 1910, for example:

> I know of two natives who cultivate tobacco. One of them got 100,000 plants last year, and another native informed me that he had 30,000 (60).

while at Nylstroom, there was a report of farmers showing an awareness of the potential for new crops:

> ...a good class of Hickory King maize is grown in the Southern Waterberg, the seed being obtained from the settlers in that part. The Natives were not slow to realize the heavier yield and better price realised by this class of maize. The Natives in the Central and Southern Waterberg find a ready sale for their produce at the various country stores (61).

African farmers in this part of the Transvaal, where there was a railway, did not

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only depend on stores to buy their produce, for at Marico:

> The Natives are improving their methods of farming and using better class machinery, and manuring their lands. If the season is a good one, the grain is exported to Johannesburg for which they use their oxen to transport their produce to Zeerust Railway Station (62).

It should be emphasised that this market awareness was at this time selective and other parts of the Transvaal remained backward. The Venda, for example, were reported as "curiously superstitious about irrigation, and, in latter years, though excellent facilities exist, they do not attempt to undertake new irrigation" (63). In addition, the improvements that did take place often probably were due in no small measure to the influence of missions; this is an area which needs further research, using mission records. But the Independent African churches were also an influence too, especially when any of their members had been abroad and had possibly come in contact with the ideas on industrial education of Booker T. Washington. In their evidence to SANAC, for example, three members of the Ethiopian Church of Zion (formerly part of the African Methodist Episcopal Church) states that they sought education for Africans so that:

> ...they would be allowed to buy farms outside for themselves, and to create schools on them, whereon they could be taught industrial work (64).

The importance of this lies in the possibility that, given the economic possibilities, the Independent Churches could establish a counter-ideology among non-whites during this period after the Boer War. At SANAC, again, it was stated that the African Methodist Episcopal Church, established in 1893, had by 1904 established 13 schools with 4 to 5000 members and was applying for state aid (65).

The potential political challenge resulting can be perhaps most usefully seen from the nature and spread of African farms over the Transvaal.

Table Two.

Farms owned by Africans in Transvaal, 1903-4.

Division	District	No. Farms	Area (acres)
Northern	Zoutpansberg	2	5,000
Eastern	Middelburg	2	7,136
Central	Pretoria	22	111,979
Western	Rustenburg	76	387,730
North Western	Waterburg	4	23,580
South Eastern	Wakkerstroom	1	10,720

Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1904.

The very nature of this kind of economic activity began to run into opposition with the prevailing ideology of white economic and political domination. In Pretoria, for example, it was reported that:

> ...owing to the unscrupulous methods adopted by produce dealers of a certain class, representations were made with the result that two educated Native Constables were detailed for special duty on the market to protect native interests (66).

This growing economic power was also almost certainly a fillip behind the nascent political protest in the Transvaal by Africans after the Boer War which led to the eventual formation of the South African Native National Congress (67). One petition by the Native United Political Association of the Transvaal to the

...10/...

King of England protested on "The prohibition of Natives from purchasing Landed Property in the Transvaal Colony" in 1905 (68). The African farmer class clearly were gaining the potential to organise politically and this may well have been a crucial factor governing the response from the white polity. The most important point about this political opposition at this time was its failure to perceive the realities of the balance of power in South Africa and the continuing belief, as Walshe has shown (69), up to the end of the First World War that petitions and delegations to Britain would alter the situation in South Africa. In addition, as the very nature of the petition presupposes, there was a manifest belief in the essential goodwill of white politicians in South Africa who, it was hoped, would listen sympathetically to the Africans' case. Even Sol Plaatje, for example, could not entertain the idea that Hertzog would let down the Africans. As he wrote to W.P. Schreiner in 1910:

> I was very much struck by the tactics of General Hertzog 20 years back when he addressed a Dutch party at Fauresmith in favour of two Native prisoners. I was but a youngster then but I will never forget the episode and I have carried with me a warm admiration for the general all these years and I will be very much surprised if he also does not see the justice of our modest request for immediate relief (70).

Events some three years later were to prove him drastically wrong. As the analysis will seek to show in the next section, the white polity's response was to seek to remove this potential economic base behind African political action with the result that the African National Congress remained an essentially urban organisation led by an African middle class elite.

In addition to the small independent class of African farmers, there was also a growing economic response, albeit at a more simple level, by Africans in traditional social structures. As their dispersal shows, this question was most relevant to the Northern Transvaal.

Table Three.

Division	District	Government Locations		Undefined Locations/
		No.	Area	Crown Lands.
Northern	Zoutpansberg	18	519,731	405,362
Eastern	Middelberg	4	238,187	182,568
Central	Pretoria	3	20,974	-
Western	Rustenburg	4	412,409	7,093
North Western	Waterburg	4	165,167	49,180
South Eastern	Wakkerstroom	-	-	1,200

Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1904.

Africans under communal tenure were traditionally thought as backward and without much internal capacity to modernize: the modernization ethic was believed to lie in the wholly European-base culture of the white economy (71). But as events among the Pedi of Chief Sekukuni after the Boer War showed, this view was not wholly true. One of the grievances made plain to the Resident Commissioner for the district under Lagden was the role of trading stores in the area. In an interview with Hogge in 1902, it was explained that the South African Republic before the War had backed a rival chief to Sekukuni, a man called Kolani, who was in turn backed by the owner of a store on the location, a Mr. Hannan. During the war itself, with the relaxation of Boer control, Sekukuni was able to seize power from Kolani and capture his arms (supplied by the Boers through Hannan). It was then explained:

> All Sekukuni's enemies put their furniture in Hannam's store for safety. Hannan's clerk took a rifle and joined Kolani. Sekukuni showed these

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> things to his men and told them to take only those things away as he did not wish to have Hannan's own goods whilst he was away. There is only one white man who bought his store and that is Mr. Lawrence who has never hated anyone. President Kruger said that Hannan's and other stores only changed hands as the English won. Everyone paid Mr. Lawrence, even the Boers. ...Mr. Lawrence is the only store keeper who has never meddled in politics (72).

This evidence suggests an attitude that fully realised the political implications of traders and shows the crucial influence stores had on the internal politics of Sekukuniland. Even those African farmers under communal tenure were conversant with the pull of the European market and sought to exercise some leverage on the influence of traders. It was not incidental, therefore, that one of the grievances expressed expressed by chiefs at SANAC was the inability of Africans to own trading stores:

> We are grieved that we see the Government allowing people to trade on grounds that we have purchased, and yet we do not know whom these people pay. The Government stops us from earning our livelihood with our own belongings (73).

This was clearly another factor in the economic and political challenge to European hegemony: as peasants, these Africans, in Monica Wilson's words were "radicals who could and did adapt to a new world" (74) and were either going to win a growing place within the European economic system, with its concomitant political power, or else be repelled by a response which, while utilizing the African labour supply within the economic system, resisted the political implications of this. This was the basis for the dialogue on the whole separatist issue that was to emerge in the Transvaal in order to define the polity's response.

There were, however, certain parameters within which this response could be defined. In a memorandum on squatting attached to the 1904 Report of the Department of Native Affairs, Lagden publicly stated his views on the nature of squatting and his proposals to deal with them. Regarding the question of locations, he ruled out the the possibility of breaking them up and forcing the Africans to work in the European economy: this was likely to "react in a way most detrimental to the interests of the country", as would any rigid enforcement of the 1895 Squatters Law (75). Instead, the implication of the memorandum was that only selective enforcement of the Squatters Law should be pursued, especially where there was heavy squatting on low veld land and where there were few European settlers, as in the Zoutpansberg and Waterberg, while the firm basis for long-term policy would lie in the principles attached to land settlement, upon which SANAC was to report. In this respect, then, a general context for policy was defined which, while ruling out direct government compulsion, nevertheless initiated a distinct ideological framework within which political decisions could be made.

This framework was further defined by the state's clear opposition to forced labour in order to relieve the labour shortage in the European economy after the Boer War. As Lagden wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs in 1906 before leaving office:

> ...whilst we all wish Natives to go out and work and see no harm in a little useful family pressure, the Government cannot lend itself to forced labour. The forcing must be the force of circumstances and not the force of the law (76) Emphasis added.

It was the circumstances, then, that were to be defined, in the best Nineteenth Century liberal tradition that restricted the sphere of governmental activity.

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The means, therefore, were to be established from which the desirable ends, on Adam Smith's analogy of the "invisible hand",were expected to accrue. It was not expected that the state, per se, would pursue these ends directly by itself, though with the withdrawal of British imperial power this liberal definition of policy left itself open to being manipulated by state power which could impose upon it a mobilising state ideology which, in its nature, resembled more that of the Hegelian tradition in Central European political thought. For the meantime, however, the means of policy were seen to crucially lie in sound principles of land settlement. "It is neither useful nor reasonable" Lagden wrote in a report of 1904, "to expect that the Natives should be endowed with land in such quantity and on such terms as enable them to live at leisure" (77), though he did not at this stage propose a fully segregationist policy that actually restricted the Africans' right to purchase land. It was only with SANAC in 1905 that this became officially recommended for the first time, thus initiating a segregationist ideological response from within the white polity.

The post-war British colonial administration in the Transvaal can nevertheless be said to have established certain essential preconditions for the establishment of the ideology of segregation. On the finer points of policy they baulked, preferring to leave them until after Responsible Government. In similarity of perceptions of politics and class interests, though, they were close to many groupings within South Africa and, as Denoon has argued, in some respects the Milner Administration, autonomous as it was, often identified and merged in with the Progressives, who were in turn blamed for the disasters of Milnerism at the 1906 election (78). But the form and nature of segregation as such remained to be developed after Responsible Government, when, in turn, the Transvaal was faced with the question of articulating a distinct "native policy" in regard to the coming Union in South Africa. In addition, any such segregationist ideology as emerged would depend, for its point of reference, on the access to political power in South Africa and not on any imperial ties as such. This access to political power was structured on both racial and class lines and, in the absence of any sizeable liberal external intervention from Britain, was able to reinforce and not contradict, the material and political preconditions already laid down. Upon this the ideological response of the white polity was established.

The response from within the white polity: 1907 to 1913:

With the establishment of Responsible Government in the Transvaal, a whole debate was initiated over "native policy" and the correct kind of "solution" to the question of power for whites vis a vis non whites. Out of this debate there emerged the ideology of segregation which, though tentatively introduced by Smuts in the 1911 Mines and Works Act, found concrete form in the agrarian sector with the 1913 Land Act.

Perhaps because it was a debate with a polity already structured on racial lines, the segregationist stance which emerged can be seen to depend upon the same political conditions as its counterpart in the American South at the time of the Jim Crow laws. C. Vann Woodward has written on this period that:

> The South's adoption of extreme racism was due not so much to a conversion as it was to a relaxation of the opposition. All the elements of fear, jealousy, proscription, hatred, and fanaticism had long been present, as they are present in various degrees of intensity in any society. What enabled them to rise to dominance was not so much cleverness or ingenuity as it was a general weakening and discrediting of the numerous forces that had hitherto kept them in check....(79).

A similar process can be seen to occur in the Transvaal, strongly influenced in fact

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by the same segregationist ideas imported from the American South. The growing strength of non-whites in agriculture in the Transvaal, as indeed in areas of Natal and the Cape, polarised the question of power more sharply on racial lines. Within the white society as a whole, the either- or arguments of the "fusionists" versus the "segregationists" became more intense and the latter were able to exploit the factors Woodward mentions of fear, jealousu, hatred etc. to their advantage. In addition, the withdrawal of British imperial influence left the liberals more isolated than hitherto and the liberal elements at work in England, often stemming anyway from pro-Boer sympathisers (80), woke up too late to be effective. In these circumstances, the protagonists of segregation met little serious opposition and what debate there was took place in their own terms: i.e. even the opponents of diehard segregation argued within at least a separatist mould, to be repeated by liberal thinkers in South Africa right up to the Second World War (81).

The segregationists were also able to pitch their arguments on a level of political saliency that the liberals could not match. In a racially defined political system as that of the Transvaal, no politician would venture to risk his career on an issue of granting votes to non-whites, while all the political parties in turn campaigned on platforms that restricted political rights to whites only. The restricted democratic system of the Transvaal itself generated a momentum towards greater racial exclusiveness and this was in turn to define the nature of the debate.

It is possible, therefore, to see two component aspects to the ideological response from the polity: 1) The general structure of the ideological debate and 2) The Political application of the ideas that the debate generated. It is proposed to analyse these in turn before seeing the culmination of the segregationist ideology in the 1913 Land Act.

1) The general structure of the ideological debate:

Interestingly enough, the debate on segregation mainly took place in the Transvaal and the reason was not incidental. Many of the initial ideas started to be discussed before Responsible Government and involved many members of the Milner administration. Legassick, in fact, has pinpointed the basic origin of the debate in the Fortnightly Club, a group mainly composed of the Kindergarten and other members of the administration (some forty in number) who presented papers at fortnightly gatherings in 1906 (82). The influence of this group was to be seen on the Closer Union movement and one of the club's members, Richard Feetham, was influential in establishing it (83).

However, with a perusal of the Pim Papers, it is clear that the influences Legassick mentions can be traced further back to before the report of SANAC. One of the main influences on both Lagden and Lionel Curtis, who Legassick has located as the central figure in the debate on segregation at the Fortnightly Club, was Howard Pim, who in turn was to become President of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in 1908.

In 1903, Pim wrote a paper for the Transvaal Philosophical Society on The Native Question in South Africa which argued, in an undefined manner, the case for some kind of racial separation. Using in particular the analysis of James Bryce on the American South, Pim argued that slavery had brought about the degradation of the poor whites who were rendered economically superfluous. Once, however, the slave was freed this question was alleviated so that in South Africa too:

> ...I think we may also conclude that if the Native in this country work voluntarily as free men in the open market, we

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need not fear the degradation of the white man (84).

On the other hand, it was most unlikely that the African would be admitted to a position of any equality, despite the need for his labour. The question of any solution lay in the labour question for which there was needed "a condition of stable equilibrium, a condition economically sound, to maintain which all natural laws will assist" (85). So far, Pim continued, only three solutions have been offered on this: legal and moral pressure on the Africans, increased recruitment and the use of imported Asiatic labour. Rejecting the first he said it either involved the use of direct pressure, which he rejected, or higher taxes which in turn meant higher wages which the mining industry sought to resist. The second solution only put off the evil day while, thirdly, the Asiatic labour question meant the continued dependence on imported labour. Rejecting all these solutions, Pim argued that the only way the question could ultimately be tackled was by increasing the efficiency of the white economy and reducing dependence on non-white labour:

> The only way in which Native wages can permanently be kept down to a reasonable figure is by making the Native as far as possible unnecessary to us. In some way or other we must learn to do without him unless and until he offers himself upon terms which suit us. This should also be done as soon as possible, as every day's delay means that a wage rise and we shall have to meet him on a higher wage level (86).

This approach impressed Lagden who wrote to Pim in November of the same year asking him to send a dozen copies of the paper so that it could be distributed to every member of SANAC, which was shortly to meet at Glen Grey (87). Lagden was later to hold that Glen Grey was largely a failure and an alternative strategy was needed; though this may have been the product of the SANAC hearings, it may well also have been a result of reading Pim's paper, which argued that the Act "..gives everything for nothing. The grantees obtain their allotments without having rendered service to the State: and the size of these allotments forbids them doing more with them than raising sufficient produce to keep themselves and their families, so that at no time of their lives do they benefit the state, although they share its most valuable asset" (88). In this respect, an alternative approach was needed and Pim was able to develop his argument further some two years later.

In 1905, the British Association, a London body interested in the promotion of science and education visited South Africa to hold a conference in Johannesburg in August. It was divided into several sections and section "F" was concerned with Economic Science. Larden was asked to give an address but was unable to do so since he was due to take his deferred leave in England. Lagden thus wrote to Pim asking him to give a paper, an offer which Pim accepted. Pim's paper was called Some Aspects of the South African Native Problem and is the first traceable discussion of the question of segregation in South Africa, upon which Lionel Curtis's paper on Segregation (89) was almost certainly drawn.

Pim's argument was to stress the value of locations in the development of any native policy in South Africa. There was both a general strategic argument in their helping to maintain the white population for:

> One great safeguard the white populations surrounding these reserves undoubtedly have ... is the native's intense love for his own country;

but, in addition, there was a crucial economic argument in favour of the reserves.

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Though white agriculture, argued Pim, had shown that it was able to successfully compete with African agriculture and could probably supply the food needs of the black population, there was the value of the location as a supplier of labour that overrode this loss of a potential market for white farmers:

> The reserve is a sanatorium where they (the Africans) can recruit: if they are disabled they remain there. Their own tribal system keeps them under discipline, and if they become criminals there is not the slightest difficulty in bringing them to justice. All this without expense to the white community...
>
> As time goes on these location burdens will increase, and the proportion of persons in the locations really able to work will still further diminish... it is a fair assumption that at the outset one-fifth of the location population (I take it that the location consists of families) is able to work. This means that the wages paid by the employers will have to be sufficient to support four other persons beside the workmen. Can it be supposed that this will lead to a reduction in native wages. If these persons live in a reserve, on the other hand, they will all take part in growing their own food, and in no way depend upon the white community (emphasis added).

These arguments from a professional man like Pim received a wide hearing among policy makers and "experts" on the native situation. What they crucially do is to underline the economic motives for continuing with the present native policy based on reserves and to transform them into suppliers of cheap labour at wage rates below the subsistence of an ordinarily free market (90). In addition they provided the basis for a policy that was soon to become known as "segregation" and for an ideology of race separation:

> ...the differences between the native social system and our own are so great that the two can never really form parts of one social organism, any more than the races can amalgamate.

Such an ideology, however, needed to be more historically orientated than a mere repetition of the traditional pattern of race relations in South Africa. An ideology, in fact, orders traditional concepts and symbols and provides an overall framework, or, as Clifford Geertz has suggested, a "cultural system" (91), which in turn defines consciousness. In order to do this, however, an ideology has to first establish itself within the prevailing culture and it has to accordingly direct perceptions into certain channels. It has, in other words, to provide a "social construction of reality" (92) that envisages a future social condition: this is why, therefore, "segregation", with its vision of a distinct future pattern of race relations, is qualitatively different to traditional concepts of racial separatism that essentially drift along on an ad hoc basis with only a vague sense of a future model of racial patterning. It was this historicist element in segregation that was to emerge as the discussion on native policy developed in the Transvaal.

Pim, for example, presented another paper at the Fortnightly Club called The Question of Race on November 15th 1906. Here he argued the case for a distinct native policy which "should if possible be drawn together by the thread of some definite view as to the probable future". Here, three distinct alternatives were offered: firstly, there was fusion of the races, which Pim considered "unthinkable as long as we retain our self respect", secondly, "their intermingling throughout the country as distinct races, indivisible elements in our social organism", which again Pim rejected on the grounds of the natural differences of the races:

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> ...at quite an early stage in the intercourse between these peoples and the white race, the centrifugal forces overcome the centripetal, the two races each tend to segregate, and each commences to build up for itself its own public opinion, social standards, and peculiar interests;

but the argument for the third alternative of segregation went on to suggest a case for territorial division based on land ownership:

> To root the native firmly in the land gives the country as a whole the best security it can obtain for a stable and quiet future. He will be content there as he can be nowhere else, and he will have something to lose if he should misbehave himself. Cattle he values, and land he will be gin to value as his ownership becomes limited and circumscribed.

The argument was based upon a rather idyllic concept of traditional African society, on which at that time no really substantial fieldwork had been made (the first was to be Junod's Life of a South African Tribe) and much of the thinking on African social structures was based on the static and unhistorical interpretations of Dudley Kidd's The Essential Kaffir published at the beginning of the century and followed by Kaffir Socialism in 1908.

The effect of Pim's paper on that of Lionel Curtis at the Fortnightly Club is clear. Called The Place of Subject Peoples in the Empire, Curtis advanced similar arguments in a more rigorous and ideological mode. The first objective, he stated, was "towards encouraging a proper state of mind on the part of the European population in South Africa". (Emphasis added) Looking at the question from an imperial angle, Curtis argued that the main question was to formulate a solution such that South Africa should not always be in a state where it was taught "to think of falling back on British troops for the suppression of native disorder even as a last resort" and the solution to this lay on lines suggested by Pim. Curtis's view, however, was intensely ideological:

> Great problems like these cannot be solved in a day but given one authority in South Africa with a strong hand guided for generations by a clear purpose there is nothing to prevent the gradual segregations of the natives in the great locations already set apart (93) (emphasis added).

A statement like this rings with an air of familiarity for most South African today and shows clearly the strong ideological content implicit in the concept of segregation. The importance of the statement lies in its undoubted influence on those involved in the Closer Union movement. This question has been substantially ignored by Leonard Thompson when he discusses what he calls "the impulse towards union" (94). It seems clear that from the very beginning these segregationist arguments were implicit in the movement towards closer union. In the Fortnightly Club membership, for example, was W. Wybergh who was to become editor of The State which was founded in 1908 as the organ of the Closer Union Movement. On the committee of this journal was Howard Pim, Richard Feetham (author on the paper at the Fortnightly Club on federation in South Africa), Philip Kerr anf F. Burger, Secretary of Het Volk while Patrick Duncan was chairman. In its second number in February 1909, The State argued that "the policy of segregation deserves more careful study" (95). By this time, Howard Pim was President of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society, founded in 1908 to promote "...the study and discussion of the South African native question, with a view to enunciating and advocating a liberal, consistent and practical Native policy throughout South Africa" (96) The influence of this Society almost certainly made Pim break with the more extreme

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segregationist thought that was beginning to prevail in South Africa and to take a position that, though still separatist, sought to establish the principle that:

> we are trustees for and not owners of the power we possess over our fellow men, whether we have obtained it by inheritance or even by our own individual efforts. The principle once accepted we are bound to see that all those we rule, including the native races of this country, are placed in a position to obtain for themselves the opportunities that will give scope to any capacity they may have for self development (97).

This view was to contrast quite markedly with the segregationist ides of Wybergh, editor of The State and also a member of the Native Affairs Society, and Fred Bell who captured control of the Society in 1910 and was the dominating influence until the Society's demise in 1911 (the last meeting was in 1912). Wybergh, for example, drove The State by 1910 to the position that:

> If South Africa is to remain a white man's country it is essential that the whole of the soil now available for white men should be occupied and worked by a strenuous race of white farmers, as the struggle of the future will be an economic battle between whites and blacks (98) (Emphasis added).

This was in a favourable review of a paper by Bell "A Suggested Solution to the South African Race Problem" which was read at a joint meeting of the Native Affairs Society and the Union Club in October 1909. Bell's paper popularised the issues for a wider audience and was able to make an appeal on a vehemently racist set of arguments. Arguing the case for segregation on the two premises that "the native is a lowe race and as such should be aided and guided by the white race" and that "each race should be encouraged to develop separately along its own natural line", Bell was able to appeal directly to prejudice and fear:

> It has been said that three courses only are before us - extermination, assimilation, or segregation. I make bold to say that if segregation, or separation, be not adopted, extermination will come about through assimilation, but it will be the white race which will be absorbed! (99)

By the time, then, that Pim made his final address to the Native Affairs Society in 1910 pleading for the use of scientific analysis and the further gathering of data on "the native question" (100), the momentum of the argument had shifted to a considerably more ideological position. The activities of the Native Affairs Society were suspended under Bell's presidency because of the 1910 election and the ostensibly non-political role the Society saw itself as having precluded direct political discussion. However, the political implications were fairly clear in that two of its members, Cresswell and Wybergh, joined the Labour Party which was to fight the election on the most overtly segregationist platform (101). There is evidence, and in his papers there is the suggestion that he sought to revive the White League, a body which had been active over the Chinese labour issue and had sent a deputation to Lord Milner (102). In a leaflet printed by the same printers and carrying the same statements as one produced by the White League, there was the warning:

> Vote Nationalist at this Crisis, whatever your party, unless you want the Nigger vote...
> Beware! Giving one vote in the Union Parliament for Dr. Jameson's desire, and you have the Nigger vote all over South Africa (103).

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The impact of this kind of propaganda needs further research, but it does suggest trends away from the general view expressed by Thompson that the non-white factor was not an important issue in the 1910 election: the fact that the Labour Party won four seats on the Reef on an ostensibly segregationist policy and that electoral pacts were made with Het Volk in several other seats suggests that the non-white issue had some saliency despite the prevalence of the cleavages over Hertzogism. At the very least, the 1910 election was the opportunity for the whole segregation debate to permeate through into the political system with important repercussions, as the next section of this paper seeks to show.

2. The political application of the segregation debate: 1910 to 1913:

With the general ppularisation of the ideas on segregation discussed in the earlier part of the first decade of the century, the essential nature of the ideological debate in the Transvaal on "the native question" could be said to have been formed by 1910. With the exception of Patrick Duncan's Suggestions for a Native Policy, which essentially continued the liberal separatist strand represented by Pim after 1908, there were no major new contributions until after the First World War when non-whites like Jabavu were also to participate (104).

However, at the same time, the ideas the debate generated can be seen to play an increasingly important role in the political response by the white policy. Compared to the 1907 election, for example, the Het Volk ideology of "conciliation" could be seen to have failed: the gained only 55% of the Transvaal seats compared to their previous win of 63%, while Hertzog wiped the board in the Orange Free State, winning 16 seats to 1 won by the Unionists. Clearly national and "racial" questions (defined in Boer-British terms) were the most salient issues and, if the testimony of Van den Heever is to be accepted, the dominant motives of Hertzog were national ones, formed in fact in his student days (105). On the other hand, Hertzog's nationalist ambitions depended upon his gaining support in the Transvaal and hence destroying the "conciliation" policy of Botha and Smuts. The latter, however, were committed to this whole issue to a profound extent by 1910 (106) while the whole philosophical approach of Smuts, the guiding mind of Het Volk, was substantially different, in its British empiricist mould, to that of Hertzog. These different approaches were in turn to lead, after the split in 1913 and the formation of the Nationalist Party, to what Stadler has called respectively the conciliationist strategy of the S.A.P. and the mobilisationist strategy of the Nationalists (107). But in the initial period after 1910, there is the clear implication in some of Hertzog's correspondence that he was looking for an issue that would help to mobilise Afrikaner supporters on more than a mere anti-conciliationist and anti "foreign fortune seekers" platform.

This issue could be seen in segregation and in an interesting exchange of letters with Fred Bell in 1911 to 1912, Hertzog can be seen to realise its inherent political value. As he wrote to Bell on 25th September 1911:

> I cannot help thanking you for the valuable hints you have given me on this modus operandi. I fully agree with you .. I am glad to have from you what you consider points that may give rise to opposition (108),

while regarding Bell's ideas on the subject of segregation, he later wrote:

> I think you should not publish your statement before something definite is going to be done by the party - at any rate first see whether the party is going to tackle the question (109).

Instead, therefore, of suggesting segregation as a matter of party policy, Hertzog

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preferred to wait and see whether Burton, as the Minister of Native Affairs, was going to produce segregationist legislation. The whole question, however, depended upon timing and with the National Congress of the SAP due to be held at Bloemfontein in November 1911, Hertzog prepared to wait. As he wrote to Bell on the 19th October:

> I feel very hopeful of our ideas ultimately prevailing. In the meanwhile we must be very careful not to precipitate matters in too great a hurry. You know I do not by that mean that we should pursue a dilatory course, but sowing must necessarily precede reaping (110) (Emphasis added).

The result of the Bloemfontein Congress was not a positive statement on Native Policy and Botha instead concentrated upon his favourite theme of encouraging white immigration and land settlement (111). In addition, Burton's Squatters Bill introduced early in 1912 sought only to regulate squatting and did not seek to restrict the right of Africans to purchase land. The Bill was dropped anyway in the 1912 session, possibly because, as Plaatje maintains, Burton conceded to the case of a deputation sent to him in Cape Town of the recently formed South African Native National Congress (112), but also because Botha was afraid of incurring the hostility of the British Government: after a speech by Selbourne in the House of Lords attacking the Bill as introducing forced labour, Botha sent a telegram to Burton on the same day drawing his attention to it (113), clearly evidencing his concern. The overall result, therefore, was that by May when Hertzog became Minister of Native Affairs in addition to that of Justice, the Government had failed to evolve a coherent Native Policy and this gave Hertzog his opportunity.

Hertzog came to Native Affairs with few original ideas or experience, but was nevertheless determined to turn it into some sort of political advantage. As he wrote to Bell on the 16th August 1912:

> I am very much impressed by the vastness and importance of the subject, but no less confident of a favourable solution of its most salient problems;

and at the same time showed that he "was very pleased to see Maurice Evans's suggestion as to a solution" (114). Maurice Evans in his book Black and White in South East Africa published in 1910 argued three main principles of policy, based upon separatism though, not overly, segregation. These principles were that 1) The White Man must govern; 2) that the Parliament elected by white men "must realize that while it is their duty to decide upon the lines of policy to be adopted, they must develop a large measure of power to those specifically qualified, and must refrain from undue interference" and 3) that "the main lines of policy must be separation as far as possible" (115) Ideas such as these, together with Bell's influence, were crucial to the thinking of Hertzog while he was at the Native Affairs Department. Bell, for example, continued to correspond with Hertzog until November 1912, one month before the De Wildt speech when Hertzog was expelled from the Botha cabinet. He was especially influenced by Bell's hostility to the mildly separatist proposals of Duncan's pamphlet Suggestions for a Native Policy, published in 1912, which did not suggest any simple solution in the form of legislation, which was what Bell argued, "but in a slow and painful revision of our attitudes to the native" (116). Hertzog's approach lay in some form of legislation, however, and he wrote to Bell on 12th November 1912:

> I am getting ahead quite nicely, and hope in another month's time to have the whole matter far enough advanced for discussion with my colleagues (117),

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which suggests that a document was prepared while Hertzog was at the Native Affairs Department proposing segregationist legislation and that this in turn, as Tatz has argued, was crucial in the preparation of the Bill in 1913 introduced by Sauer restricting the Africans' rights to buy land (118). The political advantages of this for Hertzog were manifest: segregationist legislation were an attack on the Cape liberal tradition, instead of a political compromise between the Cape liberals like Burton and Sauer and the moderates in the Transvaal. Burton, for example, had written to Rissik at the time of the preparation of his Bill to regulate squatting that he did not consider it substantially different from the latter's Occupation of Lands Bill of 1908 which did not seek to restrict the Africans' right to buy land, and was criticised for its failure to do so (119). With his expulsion from the cabinet, however, having evidently chosen the right psychological moment with the De Wildt speech to attack the conciliation policy, Hertzog was in a good position to exploit the weak policies of the Botha government and this was possibly a reason why Botha selected the Cape liberal Sauer to succeed Hertzog while still basing his policy on the latter's principles: "whig men but tory measures", which was the essence of conciliationism. Though a Bill was not immediately drawn up, it was clear that as soon as any demand came for it from among the government's ranks, then they would have to make the essential concessions to preserve party unity. It is clear, too, from the Native Affairs Archive that no ready made proposals were at hand when General Lemmer asked the Minister of Native Affairs on February 18th 1913 what the portion of farms was in the Transvaal that were registered in the names of Africans during the previous three years and what was their extent and the amount paid for them. The immediate reply of the Minister was based on the fact that the Transvaal alone kept accurate records of such transactions, as a letter to the Minister from the Department of Lands implies (120). The matter, therefore, was not already "cut and dried" as Plaatje argued (121) and matters only developed under the threat of political pressure. On the 28th February 1913, an Orange Free State member moved that the government introduce a squatters bill and this was further amended by a Transvaal member "to take effective measures to restrict the purchase and lease of land by Natives" (122). The momentum of segregationist demands had actively reached into the ranks of the government's own supporters and it was then, and indeed on the same day, the 28th February, that a memorandum was drawn up by the Native Affairs Department suggesting a Natives Land Bill (123).

The Bill, however, failed to fulfill Hertzog's intentions of applying segregation to the whole of South Africa. The Cape was excluded, much to Hertzog's regrets (124), while Botha too, though accepting the general principles of the Bill, argued that the Bill did not contribute a solution to "this Native question" because "the time was not ripe for it by a long way" (125). This point was possibly made with one eye on the British government, in the hope that it would not create any opposition from his friends in the Liberal Government there, especially Sir William Harcourt. In addition, Botha stressed that the Bill meant separation and not segregation (126) and this, too, was probably intended to keep the support of the Cape liberal wing inside the government. In a general political sense, though, the Bill was a triumph for Hertzog for it led to a general expulsion of Africans from farms in the Orange Free State: a process which was well documented by R.W. Msimang and Sol Plaatje (127), though the impact of the Bill in the Transvaal needs further research. The strength of the Orange Free State support was evidenced by the virtual collapse of the SAP machine there when Hertzog left the party in 1914 to found the Nationalist Party (128). In addition, Hertzog probably felt that he could make gradual inroads into the SAP support in the Transvaal, a view that was summed up by Tielman Roos at the time of Hertzog's split in 1913:

> Our reports from the Transvaal are very favourable; the country is warmer, and if we strike quickly you should win it for your principles (129).

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This optimism was to pay off in the long run. When Hertzog left the SAP in November 1913, only eight Orange Free State MP's went with him, and the first Nationalist Congress in July 1914 was based on the Free State only (130). It was the outbreak of War and the rebellion which "were instrumental in giving the Hertzogite movement a national following" (131) and, as Trapido has suggested, the rebellion may well have had economic causes, based on poor white farmers who failed to benefit from Botha's land settlement policy (132). As an example of rather "primitive rebels", they certainly evidence some kind of rural discontent. On these grievances, Hertzogism, as a combination of nationalism and segregationism, was able to mobilise rural and urbanising Afrikaners into a populist movement that became a serious force by the 1915 election (133). Segregation finally entered into the thinking of the white polity.

Conclusion: the implications for South African politics:

The previous analysis has attempted to show that there are clear links in South African politics between Afrikaner nationalism as a mobilising political strategy and segregation. This is not to suggest that segregation was purely a product of Afrikaner thought and was not favoured by English speakers: as the analysis of the segregation debate in the Transvaal shows, the ideas were substantially discussed by English-speakers. On the other hand, the actual political application of segregation depended upon a context which was defined by the "racial" cleavages between Hertzogism and the conciliation policy of Botha and Smuts. This dependence thus appears to validate Garson's assertion that:

> There have always been two strands in South African politics, one of white-white questions and the other of black-white questions, and they have always been closely interwoven (134).

But, in addition, these "questions" need to be seen in a dynamic and cumulative manner. The rise of Hertzogism and Afrikaner nationalism implied a process of cumulative verzuiling (135) of the Afrikaner population; in turn, the attainment of power of the Hertzog government, in coalition with the segregationist Labour Party led by Creswell, in 1924 represented a further extension of the ideas of segregation from the agrarian sector to the industrial, aided by the Report of the Stallard Commission on Local Government, which recommended urban segregation (136) and the precedent of the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.

The rise of segregation in the post Boer War period and the development of a segregationist ideology in the Transvaal in the period after Responsible Government can, therefore, be seen as starting a long-term process. It has already been argued that the ideology of segregation was an intrinsic part of a political response by the white polity in the Transvaal to the challenges from non-whites in the agrarian sector (a challenge that, with growing industrialization after the First World War was to be increasingly seen in the industrial sector). This long-term process, in addition can also be seen as a counter revolution by agrarian and industrial interests within the white polity. "Our present situation" wrote Professor MacMillan in 1919 "has many points in common with those of England in the Eighteenth Century industrial revolution, when similar competition, with the practice of enclosures, drove the rural population into the towns to become the raw material of the labour which went to the building up of the great English industries" (137). He failed to specify the exact political mechanics of this and here there are very real differences to the English experience. Instead of a long and protracted struggle between Industrial and urban interests, which pervaded English politics effectively until the end of the Nineteenth Century (138). there can be seen to occur an alliance between them in South Africa that has all the mechanics of a different path towards modernization: what Barrington Moore, in fact, has called a "revolution from above" (139). The former path on the

...22/...

liberal democratic pattern in England ensured, to a large extent, some kind of reliance upon market mechanisms to ensure an adequate labour supply, the latter model of "revolution from above", on the other hand, relies essentially upon political mechanisms:

> The distinction I am trying to suggest is one between the use of political mechanisms (using the term broadly ...) on the one hand and reliance on the labour market, on the other hand, to ensure an adequate labour force for working the soil and the creation of an agricultural surplus for consumption by other classes. Those at the bottom suffer severely in both cases (140).

The path of South Africa, therefore, can be said to be characterised by a labour repressive economy which extracts a portion of surplus over and above that secured by a free market mechanism, using that term in its most classicla sense. This labour repression, in turn, helps to explain historically such a notion as a "white labour aristocracy" which exists in turn from a surplus extracted from the non-white urban and rural proletariat (141). The approach of this paper has been to point out the initial preconditions for this counter-revolution in the agrarian sector in the Transvaal in the first part of the century and to stress how, ultimately, they depended upon alignments within the white political system. A purely mechanistic analysis tracing all developments back to the economic base, as in the work of Wolpe (142), is not sufficient. In the final analysis, the whole trend in development depended on a political alliance between agrarian and industrial interests, and on this the final word must go to Botha speaking in the debate in 1908 on Rissik's Occupation of Lands Bill:

> We have two great industries; the one is the mining industry, the other agriculture and cattle farming. These two go hand in hand (143).

Paul Rich
University of the Witwatersrand, February 1975.

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Michael Burawoy, "A Colonial Model for Southern Africa", American Sociological Association, August 1973 (mimeo). The essential argument here is the South African political superstructure has maintained certain colonial features despite the advance of its economic base. This is because of the unique nature of South African capitalism which has intruded onto "colonial feudalism" which in turn "is the unique feature buttressing and perpetuating the colonial superstructure". (p.42).

2. Lichteim argues that "What it (imperialism) denotes is a relationship: specifically, the relationship of a ruling or controlling group to those under its dominion". See George Lichteim, Imperialism, Pelican, 1974, p.10.

3. Martin Legassick, "Development and Underdevelopment in South Africa", Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper, March 1971, (mimeo).

4. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid", Economy and Society, Vol.1, No.4 (Autumn 1972).

5. H. Wolpe, "Some Problems Concerning Revolutionary Consciousness", Socialist Register, 1970, p.275: "One requirement of a theory, if such a theory is possible, is the systematic demarcation or differentiation of the parts of the superstructure and the specification of the relationship between them". It is difficult, however, to see how this approach can escape the charge of historicism.

6. Martin Legassick, "British hegemony and the origins of segration in South Africa, 1901-1914", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, February 1974 (mimeo) p.1.

7. Christopher Hill, Economic Problems of the Church, Panther Books, 1971, p.348.

8. A.A. Mawby, "The Political Behavior of the British Population in the Transvaal, Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1969.

9. For this resemblance see Anthony Downs, An Economic History of Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 1957, and William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962.

0. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Political Entrepreneurship and Patterns of Democratic Instability in Plural Societies", Race, XII, 4 (1971).

1. For notions of political "saliency" see Rabushka and Shepsle op. cit. and Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.

2. See, for example, Stanley Trapido, "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910", Journal of African History, IX, 1, (1968) pp. 79-98.

3. In this respect, the argument follows that of Tatz who has argued the case for segregation being "a cornerstone of South African Native policy from Union to the present day", CM. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1962, p.205.

4. The term "feudalism" in this context relates to the supply and use of labour. It is, as Dobb has argued, "an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his own volition to fulfull certain demands of an overlord, whether these demands take the form of service to be performed or of dues to be paid in money or in kind" (M. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, New York, International Publishers, 1963, p.35). This is in contrast to the capitalist system where the labourer is divorced from the means of production and the possibility of providing for his own subsistence and becomes dependent solely upon wages.

5. Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967, p. 128.

6. For example, 132,855,823 lbs. of wheat in 1906 costing £551,073 and 101,752,767 lbs. in 1908 at a cost of £482,016. Transvaal Agricultural Journal, Vol. VII, No.27 April 1909.

17. Agricultural Journal of South Africa, Vol IV, 1912, p.508.

18. Department of Agriculture, Handbook for Settlers, n.d. (1904?).

19. For the Milner "grand design" see G.H.L. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa 1899-1907, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965, p.36.

20. See in particular, D. Denoon, A Grand Illusion, Longman, 1973.

21. SNA 261, Lagden to Murrey, 24 December, 1902.

22. GOV 256, ref 383, Restitution of Cattle to Boers by Natives and Vice Versa, Department of Native Affairs, 22 December, 1902.

23. GOV 256, ref 383 Lagden to Milner 22 December 1902.

24. D. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony Period, 1900-1906", The Historical Journal, XI, 2, (1968), pp. 301-331, p.324.

25. See, for example, Botha's plea for state assistance for bywoners at the Boer Congress on 28 May 1904: "This would assist the people financially, put them on their feet again, and at the same time be the right way to ensure conciliation and unity in the country", The Star, 28 May 1904.

26. S. Trapido, "The South African Republic: Class formation and the state, 1850-1900", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Volume 3, 1973. D. Denoon, A Grand Illusion, pp. 79-95.

27. Denoon, op. cit., p.84.

28. Denoon, op. cit., pp.82-83.

29. Mawby, op. cit.

30. K. Hancock and D.J. Van der Peol, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume 2, No. 15, 15th September 1903, p. 126.

31. SNA, 262, Petition to the Honourable, the Minister for Native Affairs by the Inhabitants of Potgietersrust, c 1907.

32. Report of the Carnegie Commission, The Poor White Problem in South Africa, Part I, p.65.

33. W.M. Macmillan, The South African Agrarian Problem and Its Historical Development, Central News Agency Ltd., for Council of Education, Witwatersrand, 1919. This "poor white" factor is also of considerable importance when it is realised that only 32.07% of the total electorate were potential Boer voters on a religious classification. See N. Garson "Het Volk': the Botha-Smuts Party in the Transvaal", The Historical Journal, IX, 1 (1966), p.111.

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36. Brookes op. cit.; D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1971.

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One famous contemporary view, for example, is contained in Dudley Kidd's Kaffir Socialism, London, 1908, which sees the sole active force for change among Africans as accruing from European culture:

> I think that we should do better rather to return to the Clan-System and to Kafir modes of thought than to plunge the native races of South Africa into the vortex of our democratic and industrial life. However, if, as seems probable, we decide to push individualism, we should be more than ever anxious to develop all the various sides of the native's character so that he may be prepared for his new life under the changed conditions. (p.61). (emphasis added).

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9. Bell, A Suggested Solution, p.7.

10. Howard Pim, A plea for the scientific study of the races inhabiting South Africa, Address as retiring president, Transvaal Native Affairs Society, 1 March, 1910.

11. Thompson, op. cit. p.462. Elaine Katz points out that the Labour Party election programme of 1910 substantially represented the sentiments of craft unions who gave evidence to the Transvaal Mining Industry Commission in 1907 and that the programme's policy of segregation was already devised before Cresswell and Whybergh joined the Party in 1910. Cresswell, however, was to play a big role in the endorsement of territorial segregation at the Party's conference in 1911. See Elaine Katz, "The Origins and Early Development of Trade Unionism in the Transvaal, 1902-1913", M.A. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1973.

12. The White League had held a mass meeting at the Wanderers Hall in April 1903 when over 5000 people almost unanimously condemned the introduction of Chinese labour. Prominent among the members of the League was Councillor Quinn, who was to become mayor of Johannesburg and a prominent member of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society. See The African Review, May 2 1903.

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15. C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog, APB Bookshop, Johannesburg, 1946, pp. 37-38.

16. Noel Garson,"'Het Volk': The Botha-Smuts Party in the Transvaal, 1904-11", The Historical Journal, IX, 1 (1966), p.132.

17. A. Stadler, Ph.D Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, n.d.

18. Bell Papers, A 417, Hertzog to Bell, 25 September 1911.

19. Bell Papers, A 417, Hertzog to Bell, 25 September 1911.

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23. NA 282 7396/F684 (6), Burton to Botha, 28 June, 1912.

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26. P. Duncan, Suggestions for a Native Policy, p.8 Duncan saw segregation as historically following "naturally on the abandonment of the policy of repression.

27. Bell Papers A 417, Hertzog to Bell, 12 November 1912.

28. Tatz, op. cit. pp.17-20. See also Van den Heever, op. cit. p.154.

29. Transvaal Legislative Assembly Debates, Second Session, First Parliament, June 29 1908, col.518. The argument was that by failing to place restrictions on the African's ability to buy land and instead merely concentrating on the squatting issue, "the native....would....ultimately be in a position to control the agricultural industry.... and would become the owners of their mineral wealth".

Emphasis added., (speech by Sir W. Van Hulsteyn (Yeoville)).

120. NA 313 826/13814 (2) Sec. for Lands to Sec. for Native Affairs, 4 March, 1913.

121. Plaatje, op. cit. p.30.

122. House of Assembly Debates, Third Session, First Parliament, 28 February 1913, col.

123. NA 313 826/13/814 House of Assembly 28 February 1913 Memorandum on Special Notices of Motion (scribbled "debate adjourned to 19/3/13").

124. Op. cit. House of Assembly, col. 2502. See also Tatz, op. cit. pp.19-20.

125. Op. cit. House of Assembly, col. 2513. Tatz, op. cit. p. 20 states that Botha endorsed the views of Hertzog and Sauer, but this ignores the political context in which the debate took place. Sauer introduced the Bill much against his own personal preferences while Botha had not hitherto made any specifically segregationalist demands. Whilst Botha's views on native policy were clear and he wanted some kind of separatist policy to be applied to South Africa, it is not to be concluded from this that he saw native policy in quite the same ideological mould as Hertzog. In a minute August 1913 Botha, for example, described the 1913 Land Act as having a "general tenour" to carry the recommendations of SANAC "in regard to Purchase and Leasing as well as the final delimitation of Reserves, and will also be a step in settling the squatting question". N.A. 268 1681/13/ F639 (I) 18 August 1913. This suggests a strategy of continuing traditional native policy, whereas the segregationist stance saw it as part of an envisaged model of race relations in a future racially divided South Africa.

126. Op. cit. House of Assembly, col. 2513. This distinction reinforces the argument of (125).

127. Plaatje, op. cit. and letter to The Christian Express, December 1 1913 complaining of the latter's weak attitude to the Act and documenting evidence that was to be used in Native Life. See also R.W. Msimang, Natives Land Act 1913, Specific Cases of Evictions and Hardships, c 1913, "by the authority of the Records Committee of the SANNC". For the reaction of the South African Native National Congress see Walshe, op. cit. pp.44-56.

128. The South African Party, Report of the Head Committee, 1914 (JPL), which stated that at the end of 1913 there was no longer even a provisional executive committee operating in the Orange Free State.

129. Van den Heever, op. cit. p.156.

130. Stadler, op. cit. p.59.

131. Stadler, op. cit. p.59.

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134. N. Garson, "Party Politics and the Plural Society: South Africa 1910-1929", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Volume 1, 1970, p.127.

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