

Footnote

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CHAPTER THREE

The Specific Reasons of Communist China's Aid to Africa

Prior to the mid 1950s, Communist China had no political interest in Africa, hence no aid was extended to Africa. Communist China's involvement into African affairs started during the mid-1950s, with the granting of aid to Egypt in 1956. Since 1960, large amounts of Chinese aid have flowed into Africa, making Africa a major recipient of Communist China's aid. There are three major reasons for Communist China's aid to Africa (a) Communist China's African Policy; (b) the Sino-Soviet clash; and (c) the challenge of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

PART I

Communist China's African Policy

Most policies are subject to constant change, since their continuance and development are dependent upon the changes the policy induces and upon the political environment. Two major elements can be distinguished as major catalysts in the change in Communist China's African policy. Firstly, the Communist Chinese political

structure of totalitarian dictatorship tends to engender far more impact on its foreign policy than does its international milieu. The constant struggle for political power in Communist China has led to economic and social upheaval which profoundly affects and influences foreign policy decisions. Secondly, the interactions between Communist China and the superpowers are continuously influencing Peking's foreign policy. This independent role of Communist China is a global rather than a regional power assertion. The independent global role Communist China strives for and the continuing internal socio-economic upheavals both play a pivotal role in shaping its world outlook and its relationship with African countries¹.

Due to these influences, Communist Chinese participation in Africa may be divided into distinct stages. i.e. (1) Non-involvement between 1949-1955; (2) Policy between 1956 to 1959 (Stage One); (3) Policy between 1960 to 1965 (Stage Two); (4) Policy between 1966 to 1969 (Stage Three); (5) Policy between 1970 to 1980 (Stage Four). With each change in policy a similar change was apparent in Communist China's aid programmes.

(1) Non-Involvement

Prior to 1954, internal and external military conflicts and the Cold War prevented Peking's global foreign policy from actualization². The influence of these two factors

on Communist China's foreign policy behaviour should not be underestimated — the establishment of the Communist government in 1949 did little to settle the internal situation which had arisen after the collapse of the Nationalist Government³. The Nationalist Government now operated from Taiwan and its naval and air forces continued to challenge the new and inexperienced communist regime — particularly along the costal areas. Mainland China was suffering from severe economic problems: its industry was destroyed and struggled to obtain supplies from domestic sources and from abroad, resulting in partial paralysis which in turn caused a general decline to 56 percent of its previous production capacity. Agricultural output dropped by 25-30 percent⁴, and the JMP lost its foreign market value⁵. Due to these serious internal problems all government efforts were directed at the incorporation of Tibet into China, the "liberation" of Taiwan, the establishment of new political and administrative institutions, the restoration of the economy to its prewar level⁶. It is therefore understandable that little consideration was directed towards foreign policy such as an African policy as all efforts were centered on domestic affairs and the continuation of relations with the Communist world.

(2) Policy between 1956-1959

Communist China's concern about African affairs was initiated by its interest in world politics. In 1953

the U.S. declared its support for the government of the Republic of China and appointed an Ambassador to Taipei — a formal recognition of the Republic of China as the only legal government of China⁷. The U.S. had also embarked on the containment of Communism through an economic and commercial embargo which included Communist China. The U.S. became a direct threat to Communist China, and the latter began to pursue means of counteracting this threat.

A second issue which led Chinese Communists to look at Africa was the Sino-Soviet rift which began after Stalin's death in 1953. His successors promulgated a policy of "peaceful coexistence" towards the West. Communist China viewed this stance as "Revisionist", accusing the Soviets of having deviated from the Communist doctrine and insisting that they were no longer a true ally.

In order to break U.S. containment and shake off the Soviet umbilical cord, Communist China looked for support among other nations. As Europe, America and Australia were traditionally associated with the United States and as Eastern Europe was under Soviet domination, it was difficult for Communist China to gain allies there. "Black Africa", now emerging from colonial control and engaged in fighting for its independence, sought allies not associated with the previous colonial powers. Hence

Africa became an ideal arena for Communist China to extend its influence and to get support.

Between 1956-1959, Communist China's efforts were concentrated on North Africa, and Egypt was a springboard of Communist China's activities towards other North African countries. In 1954, en route to the Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai stopped at New Delhi and signed a joint declaration with the Indian Premier Nehru on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" to demonstrate China's friendly attitude towards other countries. This resulted in Communist China's invitation to the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in the following year. At this conference Communist China declared its support for African states that struggled for independence, and established contact with Egypt. In his address to Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai stated that

"Once again the Chinese people extend their full sympathy and support to the struggle of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia for self-determination and independence — and the just struggle waged by all the people of Asia and Africa to shake off colonial oppression and win national independence and the people's freedom".

Chou En-lai's words and deeds at Bandung impressed many African delegates and he succeeded in establishing a working relationship with the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. Communist China then signed an agreement on cultural cooperation with Egypt on May 31, 1955 and another trade agreement in August 1955. In May 1956 Egypt recognised Communist China and embassies were opened shortly afterwards in Peking and Cairo. Cairo became Communist China's first base in Africa from which Peking directed its influence towards other African countries. Together with the establishment of diplomatic relations, Communist China extended \$4.7 million worth of foreign aid to Egypt the year after the outbreak of the Suez⁹ Crisis.

The Algerian War of 1957 to 1962 gave Communist China another opportunity to extend its aid to African states. Algeria was the most important part of the French colonies in Africa and it constituted the pivot of French colonial power in Africa. Hence the Algerian fight for independence was viewed by African people as a crucial issue — a challenge between a European power seemingly determined to remain and Nationalists determined to expel the European power. In the eyes of the Chinese Communist leadership, the war not only gave Communist China a chance to demonstrate sincerity in support of the anti-colonialism movements, but also offered an opportunity to attack the

French government, an ally of the United States, which had not yet had established diplomatic ties with Communist China. The Peking government gave full support to the FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale). It is reported that FLN's admission to an Asian-African Solidarity Committee in Cairo 1957 was the result of Communist China's efforts¹⁰. In the Autumn of 1958, the FLN announced the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary Government which Communist China immediately recognised — the first Communist country to do so¹¹.

Communist China also sent a congratulatory message to the FLN leader, Ferhat Abbas, and praised the establishment of the government. In an editorial of the People's Daily, Chinese Communists said that this provisional government would

"exert a tremendous influence on the national independence movement of the African people. The armed struggle of the Algerian people have always been a source of great inspiration for the other African people under the yoke of colonialism"¹²

Communist China's support of Algerian Revolutionary movement was not only in words, but also in deeds. Between 1958 and 1959 Communist China provided the provisional government with some ammunition and promised \$20 million economic assistance for the purchase of

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weapons and other goods .

However, Communist China's aid in support of the Algerian Revolutionary movement was not only to bring about an independent Algeria but also to defeat France. When de Gaulle proposed a peaceful solution through a referendum in September 1959, the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the proposal, while Communist China remained insistent on military actions to gain Algerian independence. Communist China told the Algerian people that

"French imperialism is now engaged in a dark conspiracy the plan for 'ceasefire' negotiations and for a 'people's referendum' in Algeria, proposed by President de Gaulle a month ago, is nothing but a sugared-coated posion.....There is merely a tactical difference in the situation: France is now trying to obtain a trick what it has not been able to attain by force
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of arms"

In summary, Peking's political, economic, trade and cultural relations with African countries during this period were exploratory in nature. They could be seen as starting points of Peking's African policy. In 1957

and 1958 Communist China participated in the international fairs at Casablanca and Tunis. In the cultural field, it began radio broadcasts to Africa in 1956. In 1958 the first New China News Agency office in Africa was established in Cairo. In the military field, after the Afro-Asian Conference, Peking supported the Algerian FLN in its armed struggle for independence. As a result of these incidents Communist China had forged broad contacts in Africa by 1959. Of the nine sovereign states, four — Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan — had recognized the Peking regime¹⁵. Peking's initiatives in Africa had more or less paid off and the groundwork was laid for future inroads in the continent.

(3) Policy between 1960-1965

During this period, Peking mounted a major campaign to extend her influence in Africa, wooing different nations on the continent more or less indiscriminately. At the height of its diplomatic offensive (1963-1964), Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi toured the region, and Communist China committed a total of \$ 190.1 million in aid to seven African states¹⁶. Three major factors had compelled Communist China to escalate its activities towards Africa. Firstly, Communist China's Three Red Flags Movement ("Great Leap Forward", "United Line" and "Commune") had failed completely. The internal failure in the social and economic programmes prompted Peking to divert attention from the internal situation towards international

affairs. Secondly, the decolonialization movement in Africa reached a peak during this time. Between January 1960 and December 1965, 29 African colonies won their independence, with sixteen African states gaining independence in 1960 alone¹⁷. In China's eyes, these countries, for long under the control of Western powers, were seen as the most suitable areas in which to uphold the banner of anti-colonism and anti-imperialism. They contended that peace was a goal which could be reached only with great effort, and that there existed an excellent situation for struggle. They also argued that the national democratic movement in Africa was an important force in defence of world peace. In an editorial of Red Flag, Chinese Communists urged the African people to fight against imperialism:

"In defence of the interest in the peace movement, it is necessary to continue to heighten the fighting will of the people of the world, rely on the mass of the world's people and win and defend peace through broad, just struggles. The enemies of peace are still feverishly active. It is necessary to explore their schemes and weaknesses so as to enable the masses to recognize their true roles and have

full courage and confidence to defend
 themselves instead of being afraid¹⁸
 of them or begging them for peace" .

A third factor determining the increase of Chinese interest in Africa was the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following the open clash with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, Communist China sought to challenge Soviet diplomatic influence in world politics and to subvert Soviet revolutionary credibility. Africa became a battlefield for Sino-Soviet conflicts.

The highlight of Communist China's diplomatic offensive was Chou En-lai's visit to Africa. From December 13, 1963 to February 29, 1964, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi visited thirteen African and Asian countries. Ten of them were African states — the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. An important aim of Chou En-lai's tour was to portray China as both revolutionary and peaceful, dedicated to the eventual overthrow of capitalism, and willing to cooperate with non-aligned states. Chou En-lai also wanted to project the image of a China as¹⁹ powerful enough to aid the less-developed African states . While congratulating every host country for having broken its colonial shackles, freeing itself from enslavement, the Chinese leader was anxious to convey to his African audiences the need for continuing struggle along the

road of independent development. In every African capital, Chou reiterated with different degrees of emphasis the Chinese contention that imperialist powers were trying to impose their political and economic control on Africa. Therefore he insisted that the struggle for political independence had to be complemented by a policy of economic self-reliance. He argued that Western economic aid merely increased the financial and economic difficulties of the newly independent countries, and stressed the unique quality of Chinese aid which, though small in scale, was reliable, practical, constructive and in the interest of the independent development of the countries concerned²⁰. He also presented, in his tour, the Africans with the "Five-Eight" formula: Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence for Sino-African political relations and Eight Principles for economic relations. The formula could be summarized as follows: (1) China would lead the struggle against "old and new imperialism" for the establishment of totally independent, sovereign African States; (2) Communist China would provide aid with most favourable terms, directed towards creating self-sufficient, diversified economies in the shortest time possible; (3) Communist China approved of, and would support, the strong African desires for peace and non-alignment, basing its action on the Bandung principles; and (4) China favoured all activities leading to the greater unity of Africa²¹ and the Afro-Asian world.

In order to implement these principles, several agreements were signed in 1964 with Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville) and the United Arab Republic. In the agreement with Kenya of May 1964 Communist China promised a credit of about \$ 15 million to be given in goods over the next five years and repaid after 1975 in goods and convertible free currency²². A similar interest-free loan valued at \$ 42 million²³ was extended to Tanzania in June.

The second stage of Peking's African policy was significant because Communist China was coming to play an increasingly important role in the affairs of the Third World and the globe²⁴. Nevertheless since Communist China wanted to support revolutionary forces but at the same time could not afford to lose the friendship with the ruling African governments, Peking at times backed both established governments and the revolutionary groups opposing them²⁵. For example, while Peking gave considerable aid to the Burundi government, covertly it supported Burundi revolutionary groups²⁶. Thus the Chinese leadership violated the much vaunted Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence by interfering in the internal affairs of African countries²⁷. This provoked hostile reactions. Outraged by Chinese Communists' intervention in their domestic affairs, one government after another broke off relations with Peking, Burundi,

Ghana, Central African Republic, Kenya and Tunisia²⁸.

(4) Policy between 1966-1969

During this period, Chinese influence in a number of African states was reduced or excluded. The setback of Chinese policy in Africa was partly the outcome of its interference in some African nations' internal affairs, and its support of revolutionary forces attempting to overthrow the ruling governments. For most African countries it was post-independence period, when their major concern lay in the strengthening of power and nation-building²⁹. Chinese attitude towards revolutionary groups became absolutely intolerable to the African governments. The discovery of a plot by the Chinese-supported Sawaba party to overthrow the government of Diori Hamani of Niger in late 1964, led to Diori Hamani's denunciation of the Chinese Communists. President Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta followed in denouncing Communist China's subversive activities³⁰.

The Great Cultural Revolution broke out in mainland China during this period. This revolution had adverse effects on China's foreign policies. In 1967 Communist China recalled all its ambassadors, except the one stationed in Cairo. These ambassadors were recalled to Peking nominally to participate in the Cultural Revolution,

but in fact they went back to answer a battery of questions by the "Youthful Red Guards"³¹, directed at the Foreign Ministry and its top personnel. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence of Chinese foreign policy were dropped³², and a "Rebellious Diplomacy" emerged to generate "Great turmoil, great division and great reform"³³. The content of this new policy included: (1) towards the Communist countries, China was to support opposing parties or to reorganize "Marx-Leninist parties" to carry out the "disruptive and divisive line"; (2) towards non-Communist countries, China was to assist anti-government forces to implement the "people's line"; (3) towards Asia, Africa and Latin America, China's policy was to support Communist guerrillas with the object of establishing the "rebellious line". This policy put Communist China at loggerheads with numerous governments. Incidents such as mutual expulsion of students, reporters and diplomats were frequent. This policy also seriously damaged the relations between Communist China and African countries. For instance, Sino-Kenyan relations deteriorated when the Chinese charge d'affaires distributed Mao's books and medals in spite of the Kenyan government's disapproval. This incident finally led to the mutual expulsion of the representatives and to the brink of severance of diplomatic relations.

The high degree of instability of African politics was also an important reason of Communist China's setback in this period. The first setback came at the beginning of 1966. Following the coup d'etat in Dahomey in late 1965, the new government decided to terminate Sino-Dahomeyan relations. On January 3, 1966, the Foreign Office informed the Chinese Ambassador of Dahomey's decision to break off diplomatic relations, and ordered Communist China's agricultural experts to leave. ³⁴ A coup d'etat in the Central African Republic resulted in the overthrow of President David Dacks and his replacement by Colonel Bokassa. Shortly thereafter, the new Military Government decided to sever diplomatic relations with Communist China and expelled all Chinese personnel. ³⁵ In explaining their action, the Central African Republic accused Communist China to have assisted the deposed President in setting up a private people's army, and large arms caches were discovered in the State House together with documents on the formation of the army and on how to conduct guerrilla warfare. ³⁶

Sino-Ghana relations started to deteriorate in early 1966, when a coup d'etat took place to overthrow President Nkrumah during his visit to Peking. The new military government demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese technical experts, including 13 guerrilla warfare instructors, and the reduction of the Chinese Embassy staff to eighteen people. However, this did not cause Communist

China to desist. Rather, Peking used its diplomatic presence as a source of intelligence for the deposed President to launch a comeback. This finally led to the Ghananian government's decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Communist China on October 20, 1966³⁷.

The "rebellious diplomacy" brought about the isolation of the Chinese regime in the world. In Africa the number of states having formal relations with Communist China dropped from 18 in 1965 to 13 in 1969³⁸. This forced Communist China to shift its policy from indiscriminately seeking recognition and support in the whole Africa to selective relations with a limited number of African states which shared a similar ideology and common interest with Peking³⁹. Under this policy, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali and Mauritania became Peking's main target countries and the major recipients of aid.

Though with Chinese leaders busying themselves in factional struggle and the foreign affairs system being crippled, Communist China managed to maintain a constant contact with the target countries and helped them build railways. The preliminary survey for the Mali-Guinea railway project was completed on November 15, 1968⁴⁰. Several aid projects for Guinea and Congo were also completed later on. Medical teams and agricultural experts became active in these target countries. Furthermore,

the biggest and most important foreign aid project that Communist China has ever undertaken in Africa — the Tanzania - Zambia Railway — was signed in 1967, in which Peking pledged large economic and technical aid to Tanzania and Zambia. The Railway project marked a shift of Communist China's interest to East Africa⁴¹.

(5) Policy after 1969

The fourth period of Communist China's African policy started in 1969. It was a period of re-grouping and reappraisal. The Great Cultural Revolution, now having run its course, had severely sapped the strength of Communist China and had impaired its foreign relations. The military conflict with Soviet troops on the Ussuri River in March 1969 and the subsequent increase of Soviet military forces along China's northern border posed an immediate threat to Peking. To extricate itself from such a predicament, the Chinese Communist regime started to restore its international standing and to make friends with as many nations as possible. Hence, Africa, which constitutes the largest proportion of Third World, was surely an area which Communist China could not afford to neglect.

With the lessons learned from past failures, Communist China greatly revised its policy towards Africa. During the fourth period, Communist China applied simultaneously the two tactics of friendship with all African countries

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and of selective fraternization . The former was in line with the "united front" offensive to restore the influence among African nations. The latter was directed to consolidate ideology and political interest with a few target states.

Under the former tactics, Communist China restaffed its various embassies from 1969. On June 12, 1969, it announced the appointment of ambassadors to Tanzania, Guinea, and Zambia. Ambassadors to Mauritania, People's Republic of Congo, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Somalia were also despatched later on. The diplomats Peking sent out to Africa were chosen from the cream of its foreign service personnel. This fact showed that Peking placed much significance upon Africa ⁴³ . From the beginning of the 1970s, the Chinese Communist regime invited African heads of states to visit Mainland China, and meanwhile concluded numerous aid agreements with these states.

The strategy of intensified government-to-government relations reaped its first harvest when Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia announced their recognition of Communist China in mid-1970. Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Burundi, Rwanda and Senegal, soon followed to establish, or restore, ties with Peking in 1971. As more African countries recognized Peking, Communist China

eventually found its way into the United Nations. Supported mostly by the Third World countries, on October 25, 1971 Communist China was admitted to the United Nations as the authentic representative of China, and it inherited all the rights from the Republic of China. This move not only brought Communist China into international arena to compete for big power status, it also encouraged the Chinese Communists to step up their aid policy toward Africa. Table 3-1 shows that most African countries received Peking's aid during the period after 1969.

In line with the policy of selective fraternization, Communist China concentrated its efforts on Portuguese East Africa, and Tanzania in particular. Tanzania was regarded by Communist China as a short cut through which assistance could be funneled southward to the black national movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa⁴⁴. In 1970 Communist China concluded 35 aid agreements with 16 countries, eight of them were African countries: Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia⁴⁵. Three countries took the loan's share of \$ 600 million: \$ 200 million each to Tanzania and Zambia for the railway project and a \$ 200 million credit to Pakistan. The aid for the Tanzania-Zambia Railway was the largest single undertaking of Communist economic assistance ever made. The project, was completed in 1976 and was the most important project

Communist China undertook after 1970.

In summary, it is clear that Communist China's aid to Africa changes whenever Peking's African policy changes. Table 3-1 reflects the relationship between Peking's African policy and its aid to Africa.

TABLE 3-1

Communist China's Aid to Africa in Four Periods

\$ million

PERIODS COUNTRIES	1956-1959	1960-1965	1966-1969	1970-1979
Algeria	10	60,64	42	40
Benin				44
Burundi				20
Cameroon				70
Central Africa		8		
Chad				50.47
Congo		5,6	3,26	
Egypt	4,7	130		28
Ethiopia				140
Ghana		42	1,4	
Guinea		25	50	11
Guinea Bissau				17
Kenya		17,8		0,75
Madagascar				66
Mali		35	3	107
Mauritania			8	238,5
Morocco		0,62		79
Mozambique				59
Niger				51
Rwanda				22
Cambodia				17
Senegal				49
Sierre Leone				30
Somalia		21,67		114,1
Sudan				115,6
Tanzania		55,3	115,4	450
Togo				70
Tunisia				45
Uganda		15		
Upper Volta				53
Zaire				100
Zambia			33,6	290
TOTAL	14,7	416,63	256,66	2377,42

Source: Study on West Africa and North West Africa (Taipei:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1982) P. 117

PART II

Sino-Soviet Conflict

The relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union has exerted an important influence on Chinese foreign policy. Three reasons account for this: (1) the Soviet Union as the most powerful Communist state had assisted Mao in establishing his regime; (2) the Soviet Union is China's closest, geographically speaking, neighbour and is historically antagonistic to China; and (3) the Soviet Union is one of the two "hegemonies" as termed by Communist China, and is viewed as a competitor pursuing superpower ambition both within the Communist bloc and the world at large. Therefore, the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union not only has direct impact on Chinese behaviour in dealing with the Soviet Union, but also affects Chinese policy toward other countries, including the African ones. Many experts on Chinese affairs argue that Communist China's interest in Africa is a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict. It is pointed out that "Chinese support for the (African) movements, not according to merit, but according to the dictates of the Sino-Soviet dispute"⁴⁶. Alan Hutchison also indicates that "All theoretical, practical justification for Chinese action or inaction in regard to the liberation movements are of small significance compared with the exigencies of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

With very few exceptions, China's choice of movement to support, and for her actions towards these and the other groups, have been dictated by the need to challenge, surpass or embarrass the Soviet Union"⁴⁷ .

It is therefore a reliable way to study the history of Sino-Soviet conflict in order to understand the motive of Communist China's aid to Africa.

According to A. Doak Barnett, the origin of Sino-Soviet rift could be traced far back to the outbreak of Korean War in 1950⁴⁸ . However, the evidence of it was only seen in 1954, when Stalin had already died and Chinese Communist Party had consolidated its authority throughout the mainland China⁴⁹ .

The death of Stalin had significant effect on the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. While Stalin lived, the Chinese Communists, however much they resented Stalin's insistence on Soviet primacy, seemed prepared to accept or acquiesce in a position as junior partner in their alliance with the Soviet Union. Although Mao and his closest associates undoubtedly did not like much what Stalin did, they respected him as a giant of communist world. When Stalin died, China's leaders doubtlessly would not give the same respect to his successors. Mao may have at that time started to view himself as the senior leader in the world Communist move-

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ments .

The Sino-Soviet relations started to deteriorate from the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which was held from February 14 to 25, 1956. On occasion of that Congress Khrushchev made a speech denouncing Stalin. His de-Stalinization speech came unexpectedly and shocked and displeased Communist China. In a secret letter to the Soviet Party, the Chinese Communists stated that the real difference between themselves and Khrushchev began when Khrushchev denied Stalin's positive role in his speech to the 20th Congress. The letter also blamed Khrushchev for not having discussed with the other Communist parties beforehand⁵¹. The Russian leaders apparently viewed de-Stalinization as a policy they alone could decide. But in Chinese opinion, it had far-reaching implications, both ideologically and politically to China and the entire Communist bloc and their world movements, thus they should have had a say. China's leaders feared that de-Stalinization might threaten the legitimacy of Communist regimes and parties everywhere, weaken the unity of the Communist bloc, and affect adversely the worldwide struggle against the capitalist world. On April 5, 1956 the People's Daily argued that

"In completely negating Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev in effect negated the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fundamental

theories of Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended and developed. It was at the Congress that Khrushchev, in his summary report, began the repudiation of Marxism-Leninism on a number of questions of principle"⁵²

Moreover, the sweeping attack against Stalin's "Cult of personality" made Mao fear that his primacy might be undermined, as he was holding a position in China as superior as that of Stalin in Soviet Union.

Another disagreement emerged from the 20th CPSU was the dispute over the new world view contained in Soviet new foreign policy. In the 20th Congress, Khrushchev introduced a new guidance of Soviet foreign policy and global revolutionary strategy. The new guidance contained three parts. Firstly, Khrushchev professed that peaceful co-existence was not a mere tactical expedient but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy, based on his certainty of the victory of Communism in peaceful competition. He insisted there was no alternative to peaceful co-existence. Secondly, Khrushchev modified Marxists-Leninist dogma that war was inevitable as long as capitalism survived by saying "war is not a fatalistic inevitability". He said the new evolution of Marxist-Leninist dogma stemmed from the existence of "mighty social and political forces" which possessed formidable

means to prevent the imperialists from embarking on wars. Thirdly, Khrushchev said there was an increasing possibility of a non-violent transition to socialism in capitalist countries⁵³. These views conflicted with many aspects of the model for revolution espoused by Mao Tse-tung. Chinese Communists condemned the new Soviet leader as revisionist and said:

"In esse this erroneous thesis is a clear revision of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state and revolution and clear denial of the universal significance of the root of the October⁵⁴ Revolution".

During this juncture Peking first promised aid to Egypt. The timing of Communist China's aid to Egypt at a time when Chinese Communists candidly exposed their disagreement with Soviet leaders in the article "The Historical Experience of Proletarian Totalitarianism"⁵⁵, which first documented the Sino-Soviet rift⁵⁶, was no mere coincidence. The aid to Egypt was actually a reaction to the troubled state of Sino-Soviet relationship.

Sino-Soviet rift escalated further when Soviet Union successfully launched its first intercontinental missile and earth satellite in 1957. To this success, Chinese Communists argued that the world balance had shifted in favour of the Communist bloc and that all communist

countries should actively exploit the new situation. Mao publically proclaimed a new era of the "East wind prevails over the West wind" and urged the Soviet Union to adopt a more militant world policy⁵⁷. However, Khrushchev was not so sanguine as Mao. He was determined to achieve strategic balance with the United States and minimize the risks of nuclear war. He moved ahead with his peaceful coexistence policy and looked for "detente" with Washington. This made Chinese Communists fear that the Soviet Union might sacrifice their interest in the Taiwan area and elsewhere⁵⁸. The Sino-Soviet rift had an impact in Africa during 1958 when Communist China granted recognition to the Algerian FLN. Moscow could not afford to take this step, which might have adversely affected its relations with Paris and the French and Algerian Communist Parties⁵⁹. The intention of Peking's move was to compromise Moscow's claim to be the leading supporter of national liberation movements⁶⁰.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has escalated from 1960. In late 1950s, there emerged two different opinions within the Chinese ruling class on Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union. One opinion advocated exerting new pressure on Moscow to alter its policies even at the risk of exacerbating tension, the other called for compromises and efforts to repair relations. The result of these differences was the purge of Peng Teh-huai, the then

Minister of Defence, who was in favour of a compromising approach toward USSR⁶¹. After the purge of Peng, Communist China launched a number of direct ideological attacks on USSR and brought Sino-Soviet dispute to a new stage.

In a bitter article titled "Long Live Leninism" in Red Flag, a main theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, Communist China staged a sweeping ideological condemnation of the Soviet Union for abandoning Leninist principles and basic Communist values. This article focus on questions of basic ideology and revolutionary strategy, stressing the necessity of continuing class struggle, the inevitability of violence and armed revolution, as well as repudiating reliance on "peaceful co-existence"⁶².

The Soviet reaction to Chinese attacks was the discontinuance of aid programmes and the recall of all its advisors and technical experts from China in the Summer of 1960. This move severely damaged Communist China's economy. Since then, the Chinese have decided to develop their economy on their own, and have reduced their links with the Soviet Union to the minimum⁶³.

Following the escalation of Sino-Soviet rift in 1960s, Communist China increased tremendously its activities in Africa. One of the reasons for Chou En-lai's tour to

Africa in 1963-64 was to seek African support to counter the Soviet Union. Colli Legum indicated that "Before his arrival in Africa, Chou En-lai had set his highest hopes on Algeria, Mali, Ghana and Guinea for support against Moscow"⁶⁴. Dr. G.P. Deshpande also believed that Chou En-lai was to explain the Sino-Soviet dispute to African countries and to acquire China's big power status during his tour⁶⁵. He said that "the debate on the Sino-Soviet dispute helped Chou En-lai to put across the image of China as a power with a global perspective... (The African) statesmen could not have escaped the impression that China was now more than a regional power and had global preoccupations"⁶⁶. During his tour Chou En-lai promised a big amount of aid to African nations, which was interpreted as a show-off of China's strength and generosity, and its status of a global power. In his study, G. Muniu found that during 1961-64 Communist China's aid to Africa expanded rapidly to the amount of \$ 247 million. He attributed this sudden increase to the escalating Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and struggle for influence in developing Africa⁶⁷.

Sino-Soviet relationship further worsened during the period of the Great Cultural Revolution, which erupted in 1966 and ended in 1969. During this period, Communist China was engulfed by countless political struggles over its various domestic policies and problems.

The revolution had also an immediate and great impact on foreign affairs. When Peking's leaders adopted a revolutionary posture of extreme militancy, Red Guards were encouraged to attack foreign embassies. In Peking, Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy. Chinese propaganda against the Soviet Union was now savage, and the Russians counterattacked by condemning virtually everything that Mao was attempting to do in mainland China. And in Moscow militant Chinese students were involved in open brawls, fighting each other because of clashing points of view.

The year of 1969 was a watershed of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The deep-rooted rift culminated in border war in March 1969, which brought about the complete break-up of the two countries.

According to a Chinese statement, more than four thousand minor border incidents and provocation had been initiated by the Soviet Union between 1964 and 1969⁶⁸. Finally the Sino-Soviet boundary burst into flames in March 1969, triggered off by a tiny inhabited island named Chenpao by China and Damansky by Russians, in the ice-bound Ussuri River. The Chenpao island was not assigned to either country by the treaty, which defined Sino-Soviet border along the Ussuri River in 1860 and had been in dispute for many years before 1969. As both Communist China and the Soviet Union claimed Chenpao island as their territory and sent troops to occupy it,

they eventually clashed militarily on March 2, 14 and 15 in 1969. After the Chenpao incident, the Sino-Soviet relationship entered a situation of complete rupture.

After the burst of Chenpao Island War, the tension between the Soviet Union and Communist China reached a climax. The Russians strengthened their defence forces along Sino-Soviet border and sought to improve its relations with North Korea and Vietnam. It was obvious that the Soviet Union was to encircle Communist China. Therefore it became urgent for Communist China to gain friendship in the Third World to break its isolation and to challenge Soviet influence. This is the reason why Peking's aid to Africa after 1970 has tremendously increased.

Table 3-2 shows how Communist China competed with the Soviet Union by delivering aid to Africa, and table 3-3 vividly indicates that Peking's aid to African liberation movements was aimed to fight against Moscow.

TABLE 3-2

Chinese and Soviet Aid Commitments to Africa, 1954-1966 and
1970-1977

\$ Million

	1954-1966		1970- 1977	
	China	USSR	China	USSR
Algeria	52	236	40	479
Angola	--	--	--	10
Benin	--	--	44	--
Burundi	--	--	20	--
Cameroon	--	8	71	--
Central African Empire	4	--	--	2
Chad	--	--	50	2
Congo	25	10	--	4
Egypt	85	1,001	28	299
Equatorial Guinea	--	--	--	1
Ethiopia	--	102	85	3
Gambia	--	--	17	--
Ghana	42	93	--	1
Guinea	56	106	11	3
Guinea-Bissau	--	--	17	14
Kenya	18	48	--	--
Liberia	--	--	10	--
Madagascar	--	--	66	--
Mali	55	59	4	--
Mauritania	--	--	59	1
Mauritius	--	--	35	--
Morocco	--	44	32	44
Mozambique	--	--	59	3
Niger	--	--	51	2
Nigeria	--	--	--	7
Rwanda	--	--	22	1
Senegal	--	7	49	2
Sierra Leone	--	28	30	--
Somalia	22	66	111	87
Sudan	--	22	82	--
Tanzania	54	20	305	19
Togo	--	--	45	--
Tunisia	--	34	97	55
Uganda	15	16	--	--
Upper Volta	--	--	52	1
Zaire	--	--	100	--
Zambia	--	--	290	--
TOTALS	\$428	\$1,900	\$1,882	\$1,040

Source: Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow
(eds) China, the Soviet Union, and the West:
Strategic and Political Dimension in the 1980s
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) P. 203

TABLE 3-3
Soviet and Chinese Support of Major National Liberation Movements to 1970

Territory	Organization	Certain or Probable Recipients of Support from		Not Recipient of Support from China or the Soviet Union
		Soviet Union	China	
Angola	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE)			MPLA UNITA GRAE
Mozambique	Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (FRELIMO) Comité Revolucionário de Mocambique (COREMO)	FRELIMO		
Portuguese Guinea	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)	PAIGC		
Rhodesia	Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	ZAPU	ZANU	
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC) Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	ANC	PAC	
South-West Africa	South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) South-West African National Union (SWANU)	SWAPO	SWANU	

Source: Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) P. 101

PART III

The Challenge from the Republic of China

Another important reason why Communist China felt compelled to join in the "aid war" in Africa was the challenge posed by the Republic of China.

Following the Chinese Communist seizure of the power in the late 1940s, the previous government of the Republic of China had moved to Taiwan to pursue the "recovery of the mainland". In the eyes of Chinese Communists, the existence of the government of the R.O.C. was seen as a major threat to their regime for several reasons. Firstly, since Taiwan is an integral part of China, the subjection of this area to another authority meant that Chinese Communists had failed to establish control over the whole of China; secondly, since the government of the R.O.C. still commanded military force in Taiwan and the offshore islands, there was the distinct danger that the R.O.C. would wage a "recovery war" on the mainland; thirdly, the government of the R.O.C. claimed that it was not only the legitimate government of the whole of China, but it was also prepared to resume control over the mainland. Therefore, as long as the government of the Republic of China existed, it presented an ideological symbol of anti-Communism for the Chinese people and was in a position to cause internal rebellions in mainland China.

Finally, although the government of the R.O.C. had already moved to Taiwan, it still maintained its seat in the United Nations as the only legal representative of the whole of China. This fact theoretically denied the status of Communist China in the international arena. For these reasons, ever since the late 1940s, Communist China has been guided by the resolve to "liberate Taiwan". This objective has always been high on its list of priorities.

In order to "liberate" Taiwan. Communist China tried every possible way to subdue the government of the R.O.C. . It originally intended to "liberate" Taiwan by force and engaged the forces of the R.O.C. in the so-called "Taiwan Straits Crises" in 1954 and 1958. However, it failed in these military actions, and hence concentrated its energy to compete with the R.O.C. in the political arena, especially to gain diplomatic recognition as well as the seat in the United Nations.

The competition for the representation of China in the United Nations started in 1950. The government of the R.O.C. claimed that it was the only legal government for the whole of China as it was one of the builders of the U.N. and had been recognized by the world during World War II; meanwhile Communist China also insisted that it was the only legal government of the whole of China.

From 1950 to 1970, both the Republic of China and Communist China regarded the question of representation in the U.N. as a high priority within their diplomatic policy. Their competition not only brought the question to the attention of every session of the General Assembly, and the question of membership to every U.N. body⁶⁹, but also pushed them into the "aid war" in Africa.

During the Fifth Congress of the United Nations in 1950, the Soviet Union first presented the proposal that the Republic of China could not represent China again and that its membership in the Security Council of the United Nations should be replaced by Communist China. The Russian sponsored resolution was defeated by a vote of three in favour, six against and two abstention. However, this defeat did not deter Communist China's ambitions to get into the international organization. Peking's leaders still viewed the U.N. as a place for the new regime to secure the world's recognition of its legitimacy and its power status. They still strove consistently to be seated in the many U.N. organs both directly as well as through the help of the Soviet Union and India⁷⁰. During that time the situation was not unfavourable towards Communist China. Trygve Halvdan Lie, the Secretary General of the U.N., believed that the U.N. should admit Peking and sought to bring this to pass. His special memorandum on legal aspects of the problem

of representation in the U.N. strongly supported Peking's position⁷¹. But when Communist China intervened in the Korean War and was condemned as an aggressor by the U.N.,⁷² it encountered a series of failures in the international organization.

The result of Peking's condemnation of aggression was that the non-Communist members of the U.N. clearly understood the essence of the Communist regime and therefore they either followed the United States' viewpoint, that Peking was guilty of aggression of fighting the police force of the U.N., or assumed a non-committal attitude towards the question of the representation of China. This made the entry of Communist China to this international organization more difficult than it was before. An example of the result was Mr. Victor Balaunde's speech to the General Assembly in 1957. He expressed the feeling of many of his colleagues:

"We cannot forget that the government of Communist China has been condemned by this Assembly for open aggression.... The consequences of that aggression have not yet been repaired; Korea remains divided. There was similar action in Vietnam and that country remains divided. What gesture has Communist China made towards respect for the principles which the United Nations justly upheld and

applied? What signs of repentance ...
 has Communist China given us to justify
 a change in our attitude?"⁷³


Facing the strong opposition from most U.N. members which were led by the United States, Communist China began to criticize this international organization as a
 stooge of the United States⁷⁴. However, it did not give up the hope of entering into the U.N. . Peking's leaders saw that the struggle in the immediate future between the "socialist" and "imperialist" camps would take place in the "intermediate zone", which included some capitalist and many neutral countries as well as many territories still under colonial control in Asia and Africa. Therefore they adopted a policy of "encircling the developed areas from the underdeveloped areas"⁷⁵ and tried to rally these countries and would-be nations within the "intermediate zone" in order to reform the United Nations and to bring Communist China into the international organization. In an editorial the People's Daily stated:

"The development of history is not determined by the main U.N. voting machine. The majority in the U.N. can by no means save imperialism from its inevitable doom. Further, even this United States voting machine in the U.N. is becoming less efficient,..... Today we are in a minority, but tomorrow, we can predict

that we will be in the majority ⁷⁶ ".

The international situation in the 1960s was conducive for Communist China to apply its new policy. In 1945 only four independent states existed on the African continent: Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and South Africa. Following the Second World War, nationalism engulfed Africa. Self-determination was widely accepted as a principle of international morality, especially after the issuance of the "Declaration On Granting Independence To Colonial Countries and People" by the General Assembly of the United Nations ⁷⁷. In line with these historical trends, African people began to demand freedom from European colonial control. Gradually, African states were released into independence. Libya was the first African country to gain its independence. In 1960 alone, seventeen African states were granted independent status by their colonial masters. (See Map 3-1) Sixteen of these were admitted as new members of the United Nations ⁷⁸ in the same year. These newly independent countries formed an important new group in the U.N.. Among the 98 members of the General Assembly in 1960, 26 of them came from Africa, thus constituting more than one-fourth of the whole membership ⁷⁹. Hence, these new countries were bound to have a great impact on the question of Chinese representation. If Communist China wanted to enter this international organization, it had to gain the support of these countries.

Map 3 - 1



Source: Alan C.G. Best and Harm J. de Blij, *African Survey* (New York: John Wiley & Son 1977) p. 100

Nevertheless, at the same time, the government of the Republic of China also perceived the importance of African states in safeguarding its representation in the various U.N. organs. The government of the Republic of China realised that the decolonization of Africa would run its inevitable course and that an increasing number of African states would exert a decisive effect on U.N. voting. In order to strengthen its position in the U.N. and to win the friendship of these newly-independent African nations, it had to strengthen its cooperation with these countries and to cement its political relationship with them. Therefore, a new African policy was formulated in the Republic of China in 1960.

The new policy of the Republic of China towards Africa was three-pronged: (1) to improve diplomatic relations; (2) to promote mutual visits; and (3) to launch technical cooperation programme.

To improve its diplomatic ties with African nations, the Republic of China first sent a large delegation, headed by its Minister of Economic Affairs C.J. Yang and Deputy Foreign Minister H.K. Yang, to attend the independence celebration of Cameroon in January 1960. This delegation not only successfully established contacts with African leaders of both Cameroon and other African countries, but also reached an agreement with the Cameroon government to establish diplomatic ties. On its return

trip, this delegation visited Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea, Tunisia, Somalia and Ethiopia. It received a warm welcome from these countries. These first contacts prepared the way for better, and constructive, relations. Later the same year, when more African states became independent, the government of the Republic of China immediately sent delegations to express its congratulations to most of these countries and to establish diplomatic relations with them. This friendly gesture gave R.O.C. the response it had looked for. By the end of 1964, nineteen African countries had established diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China. This number increased to twenty-two in 1968.

Before 1960 the government of the Republic of China had few contacts with Africa. Thereafter, in order to improve mutual understanding with African countries, the government of the Republic of China decided to invite African leaders. Between 1960 and 1981 more than two thousand Africans from forty African countries had visited the Republic of China in Taiwan. These visitors included African political and military leaders, Congressmen, journalists, business leaders and agricultural experts. The most prominent personalities were Jean Bedel Bokassa (President of Central African Republic), Hastings Kamuzu Banda (President of Malawi), General Mobutu Sese Seko

(President of Zaire), Balthazar Johannes Vorster (President of the Republic of South Africa), Leabua Jonathan (Premier of Lesotho), Sr. Wosagur Ramgoolam (Premier of Mauritius), Habib Thiam (Premier of Senegal), Philibert Tsiranana⁸⁰ (President of Malagasy Republic) . These visitors were much impressed by the achievements of the Republic of China in the field of political, military, social and economical constructions. On the other hand the officials of the Republic of China also continuously toured African countries to convey the goodwill of their government and the people. The mutual visits doubtlessly contributed to the improvement of mutual understanding and better relations between African countries and the Republic of China.

Technical cooperation was the focal point of the African policy of Republic of China. The government of the Republic of China had realised that traditional diplomacy, such as sending delegations to independence celebrations or establishing diplomatic relations, was not sufficient to secure African support on important issues. In order to consolidate its relations with African states it had to increase its cooperation substantially to the mutual benefit of all parties involved. During the period immediately after independence, the newly-independent African countries were suffering from poverty and backwardness. They were economically

weak and needed foreign technical assistance, especially in the agricultural field. Meanwhile, the Republic of China had achieved noticable achievements in the technical field and was noted for its successful food production programs⁸¹. Under these circumstances, a technical cooperation plan named "Operation Vanguard" was formulated, and the first agricultural mission consisting of eleven agricultural experts was sent to Liberia in November 1961⁸² to assist the country in producing agricultural goods. Since the work of the agricultural mission was very successful, more African governments requested the Republic of China to send agricultural missions to their countries. Later the cooperation plan was expanded to include handicraft, nursing, veterinary, science, medicine, fisheries,⁸³ road-building, sugar plantation and communication. During the ten-year period from 1961 to 1971, over sixty agreements, or treaties, on technical cooperation were signed between the Republic of China and more than⁸⁴ twenty African states.

To promote the agricultural technology of African countries, the Republic of China established a special agricultural course in Taipei in 1962 to train African agricultural personnel. The government of the Republic of China assisted African agricultural trainees by the way of offering bursaries. From 1962 to 1974, 718 Africans recruited from thirty different countries⁸⁵ were channeled through these programmes.

The technical cooperation plan was highly appreciated by African people and won respect and friendship from them. A New York Times report described the work of these agricultural missions as "a green revolution" which the Republic of China had brought to Africa⁸⁶. The Ivory Coast government expressed Africa's appreciation for the R.O.C.'s agricultural cooperation programmes in an official newspaper article before it severed diplomatic ties with the Republic of China in March 1983⁸⁷. The effectiveness of the technical cooperation programmes in the diplomatic field was clearly reflected in the voting behavior on the question of Chinese Representation in U.N. . During the session of the 24th Assembly of the U.N. in 1960, only two African states came out in favor of the R.O.C.'s position. Two years later, when the General Assembly discussed the question of Chinese representation, seventeen African countries supported the government of the R.O.C. This number continuously increased between 1966 and 1969,⁸⁸ that is, 17, 19, 20, and 21, respectively, until it lost its membership in 1971.

The success of the Republic of China in Africa without question posed a threat and challenge to Communist China in its efforts to gain the support of African states in the U.N., and inevitably forced it into aid competition with the Republic of China in Africa.

For this reason, Communist China launched a new aid offensive in Africa after 1960 and most of its aid programmes consisted of agricultural missions, road-building teams, etc.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Principles and Records of Communist China's Aid to Africa

PART I

The Beginning of Communist China's Aid to Africa

Communist China's contacts with African countries started early, in some cases even before the Chinese Communist Party had attained victory in 1949. Many key figures who later held important posts in Communist Chinese foreign relations, notably Liao Cheng-chih and Liu Ning-i, met African delegates in Soviet financed international organizations. A handful of Africans, including Walter Sisulu, paid an early visit to China. Chinese attention to African affairs also started as early as 1950. In that year the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, "The People's Daily", first commented on South African politics. The commentator damned the Malan government of South Africa and the anti-communist measures it proposed. A month later it also joined in protest against South African apartheid legislation. However, Communist China's contacts with Africa before 1955 were few and far between, its commentary on Africa was neither persistent nor very loud. Frequent Chinese references to Africa did not begin until the time of the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia between April 18 and April 24, 1955.

The Bandung Conference was an important link in establishing Communist Chinese and African relations, leading to Communist China's first diplomatic contact with African countries as well as to its meeting with African National liberation movements. Before the Bandung Conference, which was initiated by India in an attempt to destroy the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Communist China had already kept in mind of the change in the international situation and the impending would-be Sino-Soviet rift. Therefore, it began to pay attention to Afro-Asian nations and tried to please the Third World. In June 1954 Chou En-lai visited India and endorsed, together with Nehru, the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence"⁵. Later he said in New Delhi

"All the nations of the world can peacefully coexist, whether they are big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of social system each of them has. The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self-determination must⁶ be respected".

The endorsement of the Five Principles of Co-existence and the statement Chou En-lai made showed Communist China's attitude of support and alignment with Afro-Asian nations. It effectively paved the way for Peking's participation in the Bandung Conference, which served as a very helpful stepping stone for Peking to launch its African policy.

Although the result of the Bandung Conference was not as successful as was originally expected, Communist China really achieved some benefit from its participation in this Conference. Firstly, it built its prestige in Afro-Asian countries; and secondly it successfully established a bridgehead for its African policy in Cairo through which it made more contacts with other African countries.

The delegation of Communist China to the Bandung Conference was headed by Chou En-lai, then the premier and minister of foreign affairs. When the Conference was held, the atmosphere was not friendly to Communist China because among the twenty-nine participants there were fifteen anti-Communist countries and twelve neutral countries, and only two Communist ones⁷. The anti-Communist sentiment was strong at the meeting. Facing this situation, Chou En-lai decided not to submit the question of Taiwan and the matter of its entry into the U.N. to the meetings. This would avoid involving the Conference in disputes that would not arrive at a solution⁸. However, Chou was determined to lose no opportunity to raise Peking's prestige in the eyes of Asian and Africa people⁹ and to present his regime as the only true defender of their rights against the West. Chou En-lai's artful diplomacy made him appear reserved, moderate, and friendly. He acted first as a listener, and later as a pacifier between the disputing neutralists and anti-communists.

He confessed that they (The Chinese Communists) were Communists and atheists but he stressed that what they had in common with Asian and African people, was that they were suffering from the calamities of colonialism. His declaration that Communist China came to Bandung "to seek unity" and "not quarrel", to seek the "common ground" of anti-colonialism and "not to create divergence" and the statement that the Chinese Communists were prepared to establish normal relations with all the Asian and African countries "on the basis of strict adherence to the five principles"¹⁰ made a surprising impression and was warmly welcomed by the other participants.

In another speech before the political committee at the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai put forth the so-called "Seven Points"¹¹.

- (a) to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- (b) to abstain from aggression and threats against each other.
- (c) recognition of equality of races.
- (e) recognition of the equality of all nations, large and small.
- (f) to respect the rights of people of all countries to choose freely a way of life as well as political and economic systems.
- (g) to abstain from doing damage to each other.

In these "Seven Points" Chou En-lai not only showed the participants China's goodwill towards its neighbouring countries by reiterating the five principles of co-existence, he also tried to instigate Asian and African people's hatred towards Western countries. He said "The fourth point is recognition of equality of races. This point needs no explanation. We have always regarded different races as equal. Now China has not practiced any discrimination The fifth point is recognition of the equality of all nations, large and small. We attach special importance to this question because we are a big nation. It is easy for big nations to disregard small nations and have no respect for small nations. This is the result of tradition ¹²".

Chou En-lai's goodwill gesture and his personal performance ensured that he was regarded as the star of the meeting ¹³, and eventually increased Communist China's reputation among Asian and African states.

Another prominent achievement of Chou En-lai's participation in the Bandung Conference was that he made contact with the Egyptian leader Nasser. Through this connection Communist China soon erected its first embassy to Africa in Cairo.

Six African Countries were represented at the Conference:

Egypt, the Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya, and the Gold Coast (later Ghana). Among the six delegations, the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the most important figure for Communist China's venture into Africa. The importance of Egypt was due to the fact that Egypt was a big state, becoming increasingly independent of the West, and it was the leading state of the Arab League. The position of Egypt at Bandung was enhanced by the fact that eleven of the twenty-nine participating states were predominantly Muslim, and eight were members of the Arab League at the time of the conference. Meanwhile, the secretary general of the League was an Egyptian delegate¹⁴. Therefore the main person Chou En-lai wanted to contact was Nasser. A report suggested that Chou En-lai went to Bandung mainly with the intention of courting Egypt¹⁵.

Chou En-lai first met Nasser in Rangoon en route to Bandung. At their first meeting in Rangoon, Nasser told Chou En-lai that he was not willing to discuss political matters such as the recognition of Communist China or an Egyptian vote for the admission of Communist China to the U.N.¹⁶. At that time Chou En-lai realized that winning wider diplomatic recognition and political support, which Peking was eagerly seeking, should not be a prerequisite for, but rather the outcome of, establishing economic and cultural relations. Chou En-lai therefore carefully and patiently followed Egypt's lead and made no attempt to raise political issues at either Rangoon or Bandung.

Instead he offered Nasser Chinese assistance in connection with two of Egypt's principal concerns: arms purchases¹⁷ and the sale of Egypt's cotton. With regard to the former, Communist China played some role in bringing about the first major arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia¹⁸ announced in September 1955. As far as the latter is concerned Communist China promised to buy Egypt's cotton.

The Rangoon meeting was the beginning of fruitful Sino-Egypt relations. During the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai and Nasser talked together, and there were frequent contacts between Chinese and Egyptian delegations¹⁹. A sign of Communist China's success was the publication in the Cairo Press of pictures of Chou En-lai, Jawaharlal Nehru and Nasser as "the three champions of Afro-Asian²⁰ independence".

Although steps towards diplomatic relations with African countries were not mentioned, discussions on Sino-Egyptian trade and cultural ties were initiated at the Bandung Conference. The discussions continued even after the conference. During this period, Egypt was concerned about the failure of traditional Western markets to buy Egyptian cotton at the price Egypt asked. The harm caused to Egypt by this failure was tremendous because cotton provided 80 percent of Egypt's export revenue. Communist China immediately seized this chance to increase its relations with Egypt by promising to buy Egypt's cotton.

In July 1955, when the trade conversations were going on in Peking, Chinese representatives went to Cairo and contracted to buy 13,000 tons of cotton; 2,000 additional tons were purchased later. In August, an Egyptian delegation came to Peking and negotiated China's first trade agreement with an African country. At the same time it was agreed to set up a Chinese trade office in Cairo and an Egyptian trade office in Peking.

Cultural relations and agreements also served diplomatic purposes. From the time of the Bandung Conference, Communist China began to make extensive use of Islam to improve its relations with Egypt and other Arabian countries. Chinese Communists invited Muslim leaders to mainland China to witness the condition of Chinese muslims and appointed Chinese muslims as leaders and members of cultural delegations to the Middle East²¹. Furthermore in February 1956, Burkan Shahidi (Pao Erkhan), chairman of the China Islamic Association, and the holder of impressive political credentials headed a cultural delegation to Egypt and²² was received by the Egyptian premier.

Trade and cultural interactions paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties between Communist China and Egypt. On May 16, 1956 Egypt became the first African country to recognize the regime of Communist China. According to Haykal, a reason for Nasser's

decision to recognize Communist China was that he was worried about an imminent arms embargo by the United Nations. If this happened, Egypt's arms supplies would be cut off. On the other hand, Communist China, which had helped Egypt to conclude an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, "was not a member of the United Nations, so it would not be bound by any embargo-----". If other sources were cut off, China would provide the loophole. So in the Spring of 1956 Nasser extended diplomatic recognition²³ to Communist China". Since then Cairo has served as a bridgehead for Communist China's penetration into Africa. From there Chinese Communists could contact as many other African groups as possible and could make a concrete analysis of the general African situation.

The first Chinese aid to Africa flowed into Egypt in 1956 at the time of the Suez Crisis. On July 26, 1956, four days after the newly-appointed Chinese Ambassador, Chen Chia-kang, arrived in Cairo, Egypt announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Britain and France at once protested on the grounds that this step not only was an obvious violation of the viceregal convention with the company but also was incompatible with the international character of the waterway recognized in the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, and that it would imperil both its security and the universal freedom of navigation

²⁴
 through it . It seemed highly improbable that Communist China had anything to do with the nationalization, but it promptly reacted sympathetically and enthusiastically.

From the beginning, the British and French protest was accompanied by a rather ostentatious show of force. The Mediterranean fleet was reinforced, and steps were taken to build up military strength on Cyprus. Egyptian accounts deposited in Europe were blocked ²⁵ . On August 2 the United States, Britain and France issued a joint statement from London setting out the objections to Nasser's decision and suggesting a conference to discuss the issue. The proposal was rejected by Egypt. Communist China immediately expressed its support for the Egyptian decision in a newspaper editorial:

"The Egyptian Government's refusal to attend the London Conference arises from its concern to uphold its national sovereignty and dignity. This will --- certainly be understood and supported by all countries and people that respect Egypt's independence ²⁶ and sovereign rights" .

On September 12, Britain and France took further collective action. They drew the attention of the Security Council of the U.N. to Egypt's refusal to negotiate. Three days later, Mao Tse-tung addressed the Eighth Party Conference "We firmly support the entirely lawful

action of the government of Egypt in taking back the Suez Canal Company, and resolutely oppose any attempt to encroach on the sovereignty of Egypt and start armed intervention against that country"²⁷. He further announced that "the government and people of China will do their utmost to support the heroic struggle of the Egyptian people in defending their sovereignty over the Suez Canal"²⁸. Similar pledges of support came from the government, the army and other quarters in China. The Chinese Communists also repaid Egypt 20 million Swiss Francs soon after its deposits had been frozen and continued to buy cotton. Meanwhile, they also promised to provide Egypt, without payment, with a large quantity of necessary goods²⁹.

When Israel launched its drive into the Sinai Peninsula on October 30, Anglo-French forces also began to bombard and invade Egypt. The Chinese Communist government responded quickly. It condemned the aggression and declared its support of the Egyptian people. Peking warned that such aggression would not be tolerated, and that Communist China would adopt all possible measures to support Egypt. In an editorial of "The People's Daily", Communist China said:

"The armed aggression by the Anglo-French invaders, — is an open challenge to the solemn resolutions of the Asian-African conference. The Asian-African countries

and their people cannot allow the Anglo-French aggression to go on unchecked. As a participant in the Asian-African conference, China has the duty to carry out the resolutions of the conference by adopting all possible measures to defend peace in the Asian-African region, and to oppose colonialist aggression in order to support the righteous struggle of the Egyptian people and to strike a heavy blow to the violence of the aggressors. The most important task of all in the world who desire peace now is to strengthen unity, to adopt various measures that will effectively bring about the immediate cessation of the aggression by Britain, France and Israel, and to force³⁰ the aggressors back to where they came from".

From November 9, Communist China began registering volunteers who would presumably be transported to Egypt³¹ to fight as Chinese volunteers had fought in Korea. While this was in progress, Communist China's first aid agreement with an African country was signed. In this³² agreement, Communist China donated \$ 4.7 million to Egypt.

It was questionable whether Communist China would

actually have sent volunteers to Egypt if the Suez Crisis had not faded quickly under the efforts of the U.N., but Communist China's response during the Suez Crisis was important to Egypt and it earned China Egypt's thanks. Shortly after the invasion had begun, Cairo's ambassador in Peking called on Chou En-lai. Communist China's aid,³³ the ambassador said later, was "prompt and generous". President Nasser also expressed his gratitude for Communist³⁴ China's support in a message to Chou. In short, the Suez Crisis gave Communist China an opportunity to deliver its aid and expand its influence into Africa. Since then, more Communist China's aid has flowed into Africa.

PART II

The Eight Principles of Communist China's Aid Policy

Communist China extended aid to other countries as early as 1950, but it had not set out the detailed principles or guiding rules of its aid policy until 1964 when Chou En-lai visited thirteen African and Asian states. Chou En-lai's journey, which lasted from December 14, 1963 to February 4, 1964, took him to ten African nations and three Asian countries³⁵. When he was in Ghana on January 15, 1964, and later in Somalia, Chou En-lai expounded the Eight Principles of Communist China's Economic and Technical Assistance. The Eight Principles were the only concrete explanation of its aid policy and were regarded as the main guidelines in extending aid to African countries.

No evidence is available to explain why Communist China explicitly stated the principles of its aid policy only in 1964, but it is plausible to suggest that Communist China had not developed its own aid policy before 1964 for the following three reasons: (a) Communist China was a new regime which was established only in 1949. As has been pointed out before, its leaders were lacking in the experience of administering a government. Simultaneously, it was confronted by a lot of internal problems. Although it started to be involved in the business of extending aid as early as the establishment of its regime, at that

period its primary concern was still internal solidarity. This left its leaders no time to formulate its aid policy.

(b) The second explanation for the absence of a Communist Chinese aid policy was that, at the beginning of the Communist regime, its policy was "lean to one side" namely to the Soviet Union. Following Soviet policy, it was not imperative for Communist China to formulate its own policy. It just did what the Soviet Union did or what the Soviet Union asked it to do. Communist China's aid to the North Korea was obviously a result of this policy. Under these circumstances, the formulation of its own aid policy was postponed. (c)

Before the early 1950s, most of Communist China's aid recipients were countries traditionally tributary to China, or Communist bloc countries. The reason for the aid to these countries was to show either Chinese traditional status towards its former vassals or China's commitment to the Communist bloc. The reason for this kind of aid was simple, therefore there was no strong impetus to force Communist China to formulate its own aid policy.

In 1960 two incidents stimulated Communist China to formulate its own aid policy. Firstly, the Soviet Union stopped its aid to Communist China and withdrew all Soviet advisers to Communist China. This incident

caused Communist China to criticize the Soviet aid policy. It inevitably stimulated Chinese Communists to review their own aid actions to other countries. Secondly, the Republic of China launched its aid policy for Africa during this year. This was a well-planned policy which, during the following years, swiftly produced the results it had expected. If Communist China wanted to compete with the Republic of China in Africa, it could not afford to be without a well-planned policy.

Apart from these two incidents, the internal situation of mainland China was also suitable for the Chinese Communist Party to consider an aid policy. By 1960 the Communist Party had almost completed the consolidation of its authority over the mainland. This gave Communist leaders the opportunity to change their policy from an inward looking policy to an outward looking one.

In his speech to African people, Chou En-lai declared that, in providing economic and technical aid to other countries, the Communist Chinese government strictly observed eight principles :

- (a) The Chinese government would always base itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It would never regard such aid as a kind of unilateral distribution of alms, but as something mutual.

Through such aid, the friendly new emerging countries would gradually develop their own national economy, free themselves from colonial control, and strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in the world. This would in itself be a tremendous support to China.

- (b) In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government would strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and would never ask for any privileges or attach any conditions.
- (c) The Chinese government would provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and would extend the time limit for the payment so as to lighten the burden on the recipient countries as far as possible.
- (d) In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government would be not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road to self-reliance.

- (e) The Chinese government would try its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments might increase their income and accumulate capital.
- (f) The Chinese government would provide top-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese government would not measure up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese government would undertake to replace them.
- (g) In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government would see to it that the personnel of the recipient country would fully master such techniques.
- (h) The experts dispatched by the Chinese government to help with construction in the recipient countries, would have the same standard of living as the experts

of the recipient countries. The Chinese experts would not be allowed to make any special demands or enjoying any special amenities.

The formation of the Eight Principles was mainly based on three grounds: (1) Communist China's past experience, especially when it had received aid from the Soviet Union; (2) proletarian internationalism; and (3) the low level of Communist China's economic and technical development.

According to Ai Ching-chu, Communist China regards "equality and mutual benefit, mutual support, respect for the recipient countries' sovereignty and absence of any attached condition" as the basic principles guiding its economic and technical aid to foreign countries, because it was before subjected to untold enslavement and plunder by the imperialist powers in the dark years of old China³⁷. The dark years meant the century after 1840. During this period, China was suppressed by incursion of Western powers and chained by unequal treaties. Under the oppression of Western imperialists, Chinese hatred towards Western powers was strong. Judging by their own feelings, Chinese Communists understood that African people should have a hatred for their former colonial rulers. Hence, they could easily earn the Africans' admiration and

attention by declaring that they respected African people's equality and sovereignty.

Communist China's unpleasant experience in receiving aid from the Soviet Union also affected its aid policy to a large extent. Between 1950 and 1957 the Soviet Union had altogether given Communist China \$ 5,2 billion³⁸ in aid³⁹, which enabled Communist China to achieve a satisfactory economic development in its first Five Year Plan (1953-1957), and to lay its industrial foundation³⁹. However, the Chinese leaders had not been happy with the terms that the Soviet Union had imposed on them. In providing aid to Communist China, the Soviet Union had always made a series of economic demands and had insisted that it had had the final right to a decision on the future of Communism in Mainland China. Stalin had always insisted that all industrial and mineral enterprises had to be managed by Sino-Soviet cooperation, and that he had had the final right to decide on Chinese internal⁴⁰ affairs. This had embarrassed Mao Tse-tung.

1958 was the first year of Communist China's Second Five Year Plan. In May of that year, Communist China asked for more Soviet economic aid but this request was refused by Khrushchev. While Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating in 1960, the Soviet Union notified Peking that it would withdraw all Russian experts from China.

Although Communist China tried to persuade the Soviet Union to change its mind, it failed in doing so. This was a big blow to China at a time that it was suffering from the economic failure of the Great Leap Forward. Communist China later upbraided the Soviet Union for its decision to withdraw Russian experts later:

"Your behaviour in breaking your promise destroyed our economic plan and brought disaster to the structuring of Chinese socialism. You did this while China suffered a natural famine. It was against the morality of Communist society⁴¹".

The bitter experience Communist China had experienced in receiving aid from the Soviet Union, made it realize that, if it wanted to use aid to achieve its political purposes, it could not follow the example of the Soviet Union, otherwise the aid policy would be doomed to failure. Therefore, when it entered into competition with the Soviet Union and the Republic of China, it purposely showed its generosity and sincerity and stated that, in providing aid, the Communist Chinese government would always base itself on the principles of "equality and mutual benefit", "respect the sovereignty of the recipient country", "never ask for any privileges or attach any condition", and that its aid would be in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans, extending the time limit for the payment as far as possible".

The Eight Principles also originated from Proletarian internationalism. Chin Yi-wu confirmed this in his article⁴²

"In providing economic and technical aid to other countries, China abides by the eight principles made known by Premier Chou En-lai in late 1963 and early 1964 during his visit to Africa; these principles epitomize the basic principles of China's foreign aid in the spirit of internationalism".

Communist China regards itself as a member and leader of the Third World and believes that to support other third world countries is beneficial to both itself and the recipient countries. It insists that all third world peoples have to support each other against imperialism, old and new colonialism and hegemonism. It was stated that

"The victories of the freindly Third World countries in their struggles against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism are a support and inspiration to the people of China and the rest of the world"⁴³

Peking also attacked imperialists for looking for special benefits for themselves, and interfering in the recipients' internal affairs in extending aid. It said: "the aid given by the imperialist countries which are pursuing a jungle war is characterized by severe conditions and demands for a variety of privileges"⁴⁴ ,

"(U.S.A.) uses its aid to interfere crudely in the internal affairs of the recipient countries, to seize various privileges, to make investments, to dump commodities, and to plunder raw and strategic materials in these countries, and force them to follow its dictates. It even resorts to submission to turn them into its satellites⁴⁵". In order to show the Third World Peking's sincere intention to help them against imperialist exploitation and its alignment with the Third World, Communist China subsequently declared that "the carrying out of internationalist duty makes it imperative to strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient countries and their status as equals"⁴⁶ and that "the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual support and respect will break through every barrier put up by all reactionary⁴⁷ forces, and play their role with overwhelming efficiency" .

In the Eight Principles, Communist China claimed that its government would help the recipient countries build projects which required less investment while yielding quicker results (Fifth Principle). This principle reflected Communist China's low level of economy and technology. As Communist China was a poor and backward country, its capability to aid other countries was very limited. As it could not supply large capital or advanced technical assistance to its recipient countries, the best alternative to making use of its scarce resources was to

"build projects which require less investment". Under this principle, most Chinese aid projects were labour-intensive ones like agricultural and road-building teams, with the exception of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway⁴⁸.

The Fourth Principle states that the purpose of the Chinese Government in providing aid to other countries was "to help them embark on the road of self-reliance". This was another reflection of Communist China's shortage of resources. In order to overcome the difficulty posed by lack of resources, Peking had to apply sufficient techniques and suitable ways of managing its aid programmes. An ingredient of Peking's effective management of aid programmes was the model of "self-reliance". Communist China contended that Western aid was nothing but a means of helping donors' domestic monopolies to continue exploiting the developing countries. Chinese Communists argued that "the foreign aid provided by imperialism and old and new Colonialism is nothing but an instrument of aggression"⁴⁹. On the other hand, they asserted that self-reliance was the best way for the Third World to develop their own economies. In this context Chinese Communists often quoted the proverb of the man who was given a fish, which would give him food for a day; but the man who was given a fishing-rod would have food for life⁵⁰. Therefore they encouraged and persuaded their recipient countries to make use of their own resources and the strength and wisdom of their people.

They said:

"In national construction, the Third World countries depend mainly on their own people. Foreign aid is only supplementary. The reliable way for these countries to develop their national economies and win economic liberation is to rely on their own efforts,
51
supplemented by foreign aid---"

As this model suited Communist China's economic capacity, it became a central part of Communist China's aid policy. "Self-reliance" was widely appreciated by African countries which were becoming increasingly disillusioned with their own development methods based upon the Western model which they inherited at the time they
52
gained their independence .

Another characteristic of Communist China's aid was the Eighth Principle which promised that Chinese experts would have the same standard of living as the local experts. This was the most visible difference between a Chinese and a Western aid project. Westerners tended to work in a directing capacity on a project and take little part in the actual work itself. They had a very high standard of living (usually considerably higher than they would have had in their own country) and they had little real contact with conditions. Westerners working in the

developing countries were often arrogant and frequently fostered elitist tendencies in the society. The Chinese engineers took part in manual work on projects. They lived very simply, in the same conditions as the African labourers, and asked for no special privileges for their technicians⁵³. The conduct of Chinese workers deeply impressed the Africans and earned them much applause from their local colleagues.

However, a question is easily raised by observers: Does Communist China really extend aid to African countries without asking for any privileges or attaching any conditions? As aid is a weapon of Communist China's foreign policy, it is extended to serve its political ends. Therefore it is unthinkable that Communist China would give African countries assistance without attaching conditions. Here it is worthwhile to cite the viewpoint of John F. Copper to understand how Communist China ensures that its conditions are met. John F. Copper says that, because of the political motivations behind most of Communist China's aid promises, its aid must be controlled as strictly or even more so than the aid given by Western countries or the Soviet Union. His opinion is that Peking has a variety of ways to control or oversee its aid donations. He says that aid talks are usually held simultaneously with official meetings. Thus political problems can be subtly tied to aid. Treaties are frequently

signed at the same time as aid agreements. There is a delay from the time the aid project is promised to the time it is actually implemented. During that time Peking can hint that it expects a change of view on certain issues. If this is not forthcoming, the project can be delayed or changed, if necessary, to the point where it is unacceptable to the recipient. Copper continues to explain that Peking can justify delays on the basis that China is a poor country and suffers shortages of goods, foreign exchange, transport facilities, etc. This same excuse is used for changing the conditions or scope of an aid project. Seldom is this questioned, and needless to say, it is effective in enlisting concessions from the recipient, or non-use of the aid.

Also, China grants much of its aid in goods or credits that are used to purchase Chinese goods or services. Certain goods can simply be declared unavailable or not for export, the prices raised considerably above the world market price, or the quality lowered.

Thirdly, Copper says, a great deal of China's aid is given in the form of projects that are designed by Chinese aid officials. Many of them specify that China will furnish engineers and labour. If the recipient does not approve of the nature of the project or the controls Chinese aid personnel have over its construction,

it can simply reject the project or negotiate at a
later date ----. Thus, he concludes, Chinese foreign
aid is, in fact, controlled more rigorously than
Western or Soviet aid .

PART III

Records of Communist China's Aid to Africa

Up to 1980, forty-four African countries had received aid from Communist China (see Table 4-1). The amount of Communist China's aid to these countries is about 3,000 million dollars (see Table 4-2). In order to achieve the aims mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, Communist China has delivered aid to Africa in two forms. On the one hand, it aids those countries which have adopted communism or maintain friendly relations with Communist China; on the other hand, it also supports those revolutionary movements which are attempting to topple the existing non-communist African governments. In the former case, Communist China's aid is overtly and legally transferred to the legal governments. The aid usually takes the forms of grants, loans, agricultural missions, medical missions, technical training, road building, arms supplies, of training the troops, and so on. In the latter case, Communist China has generally covertly delivered aid to guerrilla groups or revolutionary movements in the form of arms supplies or guerrilla training .

Following is a country-by-country analysis of Communist China's aid to various African countries and revolutionary movements.

Table 4-1

Communist China's Aid Recipients in Africa 1956-1980

Algeria	Mali
Angola	Mauritania
Benin	Mauritius
	Morocco
Botswana	Mozambique
Burundi	Niger
Cameroon	Nigeria
Cape Verde	Rwandan Republic
Central African Republic	Sao Tomé- Príncipe
Chad	Senegal
Comores	Seychelles
Congo	Sierra Leone
Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
Egypt	Sudan
Ethiopia	Tanzania
Gabon	Togo
Gambia	Tunisia
Ghana	Uganda
Guinea	Upper Volta
Guinea Bissau	Zaire
Kenya	Zambia
Liberia	Zimbabwe
Madagascar	

Source: Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist
 Less Developed Countries 1979 and 1954-1979
 CIA, 1980, p.2; John F. Copper "China's
 Foreign Aid in 1979-80" Occasional Papers/
 Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies no. 5, 1981

TABLE 4-2

Communist China's Economic Aid Extended to Africa 1956-1980

unit: \$ Million

	1954 - 1979	1979	1980
Total	2861	40	89,53
Algeria	150		
Angola	NA		
Benin	44		
Botswana	17		
Burundi	40	40	
Cameroon	71		
Cape Verde	2		
Central African Rep.	14		
Chad	50		
Comores	NA		
Congo	75		
Equatorial Guinea	NA		
Egypt	134		
Ethiopia	102		
Gabon	17		
Ghana	42		
Guinea	83		
Guinea Bissan	17		
Kenya	18		50
Liberia	23		
Madagascar	89		
Mali	100		
Mauritania	87		
Mauritius	35		
Morocco	35		
Mozambique	60		
Niger	52		
Nigeria	NA		
Rwanda Republic	22		
Sao Tomé and Príncipe	18		
Senegal	60		
Seychelles	4		
Sierra Leone	41		
Somalia	155		
Sudan	82		
Tanzania	362		
Togo	45		
Tunisia	97		
Uganda	15		
Upper Volta	51		
Zaire	103		
Zambia	331		12,83
Zimbabwe			26,7
Others	113		

Aid to Algeria

In late 1958, the Algerian National Front sent a small delegation to Peking to seek arms and other aid⁵⁶ and probably received assistance or a promise of aid. In the spring of 1959, another mission was sent, and it⁵⁷ was reported that China had given them weapons and aid. Communist China's aid to the Algerian rebels has been⁵⁸ estimated at \$ 10 million up to 1959. Subsequently, Peking provided military training for Algerian guerrillas, and Chinese arms and equipment were seen in Algeria.

After Algeria had become independent, Peking still continued to send aid to Algeria. In October 1963 Communist China extended an interest-free loan for \$ 50 million repayable over a 20 year period beginning in 1970⁵⁹ to Algeria. This loan was used for small industries, land reclamation, and for building roads across the Sahara to link Algeria's port cities with several of the land-locked sub-Saharan nations. In 1964 Peking provided the Algerian government with a commercial ship and four⁶⁰ transport planes.

It is uncertain how much of the 1963 loan was actually used. Certainly not all of it. Thus, on July 27, 1971, when an Algerian delegation was visiting Peking, Peking signed an agreement with the delegation to provide experts, equipment and an interest-free loan for \$40 million to help⁶¹ Algerian development under the 1963 agreement.

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