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Streamlining of contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department

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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation) to the Faculty of Commerce, Law, and Management, University of the Witwatersrand

April 2021

Declaration

I Molupe Matsumunyane declare that this research report entitled 'Streamlining of contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department' is my own unaided work. I have acknowledged, attributed, and referenced all ideas sourced elsewhere. I am hereby submitting it in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (Public sector monitoring and evaluation) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. I have not submitted this report before for any other degree or examination to any other institution.



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Signed at Johannesburg on 30th April 2021

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ABSTRACT

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Thesis title: Streamlining of contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department

In recent times, the efficacy and impact of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) on the development of low income countries has been placed under a lot of scrutiny. Following the demise of apartheid in 1994, South Africa became a recipient of ODA from various international sources. In this respect, the National Treasury of South Africa is responsible for the overall management and coordination of ODA (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). However, the responsibility and accountability for the implementation of ODA rests with the respective National Departments (National Treasury of South Africa, 2003). This includes the responsibility for monitoring, reporting and evaluating the delivery of ODA programmes.

The problem is that, monitoring and evaluation of South African public service initiatives is sometimes seen to be highly fragmented and Departments tend to develop instruments that do not adhere to, for example the various monitoring and reporting instruments developed in the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the National Treasury (Porter & Goldman, 2013)

This study seeks to qualitatively interrogate how to align multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements involving ODA supported interventions at Government Departments in general, uses the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) as the case study.

The findings reveal that each ODA programme has its own legal agreements that prescribe the governance structures and institutional arrangements. This means that every ODA programme has unique institutional arrangements in place that the Government of South Africa has to adapt to. In order to remedy this, the Government of SA should explore setting up an independent State Entity that will oversee and manage all ODA initiatives. Successful institutional arrangements require that implementation be allocated to one single entity which will render high priority to the development interventions.

Johannesburg, April 2021

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INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

1.1 Background

In recent times, the efficacy and impact of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) on the development of low income countries has been placed under a lot of scrutiny. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018) defines ODA as Public Sector aid that fosters the economic development and prosperity of developing countries. By its very nature, ODA often involves a variety of partners including the recipient country, the donor and the implementing entities (Jobin, 2008).

Following the demise of apartheid in 1994, South Africa became a recipient of ODA from various international sources. In this respect, the National Treasury of South Africa is responsible for the overall management and coordination of ODA (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). However, the responsibility and accountability for the implementation of ODA rests with the respective National Departments (National Treasury of South Africa, 2003). This includes the responsibility for monitoring, reporting and evaluating the delivery of ODA programmes.

This study seeks to interrogate how to align multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements involving ODA supported interventions at Government Departments in general, and at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) in particular. The DSBD's mandate is to provide enhanced support to small business and cooperatives, with an emphasis on programmes to advance entrepreneurship amongst women, the youth, and people with disabilities to contribute to job creation and economic growth (National Government of South Africa, 2019; South Africa Government, 2017). Similar to other Departments, it is a recipient of ODA from various international sources.

The problem is that, monitoring and evaluation of South African public service initiatives is sometimes seen to be highly fragmented and Departments tend to develop instruments that do not adhere to, for example the various monitoring and reporting instruments developed in the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the National Treasury (Porter & Goldman, 2013).

Further, there are various challenges associated with monitoring and evaluating multi-actor ODA initiatives in South Africa. First, there are power differentials in existence between the donors and the recipient Government entities. These power differences

between the actors are more likely to sway the outcomes of the initiatives (Kusters et al., 2016). It is thus important to ensure that all actors are able to participate in the development of monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements without the decisions being dominated by the donors.

In fact, some commentators have lamented that the SA Government's systems for monitoring and reporting on data fall short and cannot be relied on to produce accurate and complete data (Law Library of Congress, 2015). This situation creates serious challenges relating to monitoring and evaluating ODA initiatives by Government Departments. As a result, donors are hesitant to use the country's M & E systems and often develop parallel M & E systems that are sometimes blamed for increasing reporting burdens and constrain institutionalization of M & E (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015).

To compound this, the power of donors to influence and direct decisions regarding the priorities of country programmes and their associated M & E frameworks is stronger when there is a heavy reliance of recipient countries on ODA. Invariably, this has been observed to be occurring through the use of conditionality in policy-based lending or through the support of other vertical programmes that are informed by particular policy approaches favourable to the donor (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008).

In order to counter this state of affairs, joint and participatory approaches to monitoring and evaluation have been developed mainly in response to this multi-actor complexity (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008). The dominant themes from the literature on building harmonised M & E institutional arrangements revolve around participatory approaches that have elements of drawing a path towards achieving results. The literature emphasises that M & E institutional arrangements processes need to be carefully planned from the onset and must include stakeholders from inception to close-out (Hermans et al., 2012; Kawonga et al., 2012). Oftentimes, this is seemingly the case because the literature concerning participatory M & E in South Africa shows that they have been lauded for their ability to demonstrate relevance and results even in the midst of the paucity of development funds.

There are numerous studies across the globe that have explored the potential benefits and importance of streamlining multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015; Chapman, 2014; Csiernik et al., 2015; Evans School of Policy Analysis and Research, 2015; Evans School of Policy Analysis and Research, 2016;

Guerra-Lo´ pez & Hicks, 2014; Hassenforder, Pittock, Barreteau, Daniell, & Ferrand, 2016; Ibrahim, Cadotte & Bernstein, 2015). There is however, limited literature on harmonising multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements in the Global South and consequently most of the literature that is interrogated originates from the Global North. This is a knowledge gap that that this study intends to fill.

Empirical evidence suggests that Governments and donors are increasingly having distinct and separate M & E institutional arrangements and systems with minimal harmonization and alignment. There are various factors that have been noted as the causes of this state including low levels of trust of recipient countries' systems, and limited coordination of M & E efforts by recipient countries (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015; Evans School Policy Analysis and Research, 2015; Evans School Policy Analysis and Research, 2016).

This study is situated within the institutional arrangements academic field. It is important to note that institutional arrangements is also a method, a process, and an interpretive framework (Ginsburgh & Throsby, 2014). The key components of institutional arrangements are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements (Palthe, 2014). Within these components, the key attributes relating to streamlining M & E institutional arrangements are policies, work rules and norms, habits, beliefs and values. Finally, we aim to interpret the empirical findings using institutional theory to interpret the findings of this research. More generally, this research interrogates the streamlining of contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements at the DSBD.

1.2 Towards the streamlining of contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department

1.2.1 The research problem statement

South Africa like other low and middle income countries occasionally relies on foreign aid, termed Official Development Assistance, to assist in funding some of its developmental objectives. In this respect, the National Treasury of SA provides the legal frameworks relating to the management of donor funds (National Treasury, 2013). On the other hand, the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation is tasked with "facilitating, influencing and supporting effective planning, monitoring and evaluation of government programmes aimed at improving service delivery, outcomes

and impact on society" (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2015). However, there are no legal or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of Official Development Assistance in South Africa.

Noting the fragmented state of M & E in the country, the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in the year 2007 launched the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System which acts as the overarching M & E system for public institutions (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2007). A critical proviso was that prevailing M & E capacities in Government Departments must be preserved, linked and streamlined within the framework of the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (Abrahams, 2015). However, the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System policy framework does not provide guidance on how to structure and harmonise institutional arrangements of Official Development Assistance.

In addition, the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation has also found that there is no collective guiding framework on how to harmonise M & E concepts and practices in the Public Service in general (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). This situation poses a significant risk to the success of Official Development Assistance interventions because alignment and harmonisation of multi-stakeholder M & E systems has been identified as a key determinant of the effectiveness of development aid (Paris Declaration, 2005).

The Department of Small Business Development, a fairly new Ministry formed in 2014 (South Africa Government, 2017), is a recipient of Official Development Assistance from various sources including the European Union and is required to align and streamline its M & E institutional arrangements with those of donors. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to its development partners. The main challenge is that optimal programme results will not be achieved and the opportunity lies in the development an innovative approach that can be used in other similar contexts. Additionally, in the literature there is a paucity of approaches to streamlining institutional arrangements that can cater for diverse programmes spanning a variety of sectors and not sector-specific.

1.2.2 The research purpose statement

The purpose of this research is to interrogate how to streamline contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving Official Development Assistance supported interventions at the Department of Small Business Development. First, a literature review will be undertaken to understand and explore different approaches to harmonising contrasting M & E institutional arrangements.

We use the institutional arrangements perspective as our general lens in this research. To be specific, it provides for attributes such as policies, work rules and norms which are key to this research. Further, we use the institution theory to interpret the empirical results. The theory was developed to understand how institutions are organised, adopted and diffused into societies. It assumes that organisations that adopt societally rationalised and legitimised elements of institutionalisation, increase the chances of their survival and their resource mobilisation capabilities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Thereafter, a research strategy, research design, procedure and methods (Wotela, 2017) that are suitable for interpretation of M & E institutional arrangements are proposed. Fourth, we select an appropriate case (the Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises Programme) then we collect, collate, process and analyse data to ascertain how the approach can be implemented. Last, we determine if the approach will yield any desired results.

The key challenge is that there is no collective guiding framework on how to harmonise multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements in SA. In order to address this challenge, this study utilises institutional theory as the general lens in this study. Significantly, it provides attributes such as regulations, policies, work norms and values which are critical for this research. Further, this research is expected to contribute to the body of evidence regarding approaches that can be applied to harmonising multi stakeholder institutional M & E arrangements at Government Departments in South Africa generally and more specifically at the Department of Small Business Development.

1.2.3 The research questions

1.2.3.1 What are the policies and rules that are used to streamline contrasting multi stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)?

Research proposition: There could be a difference amongst the available policies and rules in their ability to streamline contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development.

1.2.3.2 What are the work norms and habits governing relationships between the Department of Small Business Development and external actors?

Research proposition: There could be a difference at the Department of Small Business Development in results between programmes that have differing works norms and habits to those at the Department of Small Business Development and those that do not.

1.2.3.3 What are the different beliefs and values governing multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development?

Research proposition: There could be different beliefs and values between Government programmes and donor supported programmes at the Department of Small Business Development.

1.2.3.4 What are the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD?

Research proposition: There could be an impact to be derived after applying harmonised institutional arrangements in multi stakeholder programmes at the Department of Small Business Development.

1.3 Delimitations of the research

This research is descriptive in nature and focused on officials from the Department of Small Business Development, the Ecosystem development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme and the National Treasury International Development Cooperation Unit. The study sample comprises of middle and senior management at the respective institutions who are responsible for the implementation of the programme. This research applied a purposive sampling technique in order to identify the research respondents. The empirical

data was analysed using summative content analysis, also known as content analysis in order to evaluate the semantic content of information (Cooper & Schindler, 2014).

1.4 Justification of the research

This research fills the gap left by a paucity of research on streamlining institutional arrangements of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) interventions in South Africa. Crucially, this study contributes to the field of institutional theory. It shows that it is possible to integrate institutional theory into monitoring and evaluation whilst addressing the challenges- such as lack of alignment between M & E frameworks- associated with applying a strategic management approach. Focusing on the key components of institutional theory: namely, the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive (Palthe, 2014) this study picked up the following elements relating to streamlining M & E institutional arrangements: policies, work rules and norms, habits, beliefs and values. This research also proposes a way for applying qualitative methods to resolve sociological research questions. It uses empirical data to propose an approach towards streamlining multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements.

1.5 Preface to the research report

To this end, the report has six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a literature review covering the problem, the past studies, the explanatory framework and the conceptual framework. This chapter commences with describing the Department of Small Business Development in order to understand the context of the research. Furthermore, this chapter also includes a root-cause problem analysis of the problem which reveals the core reasons for the challenges associated with monitoring and evaluating Overseas Development Assistance initiatives in South Africa. In order to uncover the knowledge gap, this chapter also includes a review of similar past and current studies that have explored how to streamline multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements.

Therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the research strategy, design, procedures, reliability and validity measures as well as limitations. This study also utilises the qualitative research strategy and a cross-sectional research design like most studies reviewed. Similar to other past studies on institutional arrangements, the research procedure and methods also apply a semi-structured interview guide and purposive sampling to gather in-depth data on M

& E institutional arrangements in the physical context Department of Small Business Development.

Chapter 4 presents and discusses the findings, respectively, to interrogating our research questions while Chapter 6 summarises and concludes the research.

REVIEWING LITERATURE TO DERIVE THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter has four broad objectives; namely to understand the research problem (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) to identify the knowledge gap (Section 2.3), to develop a theoretical framework for interpreting the findings (Sections **Error! Reference source not found.**, **Error! Reference source not found.**, and **Error! Reference source not found.**), and to conceptualise the research approach (Section 2.7). Specifically, in Section 2.1, the study briefly describes the research context in preparation for Section 2.2 in which we detail the research problem. In Section 2.3, we review literature on studies that have attempted to harmonise multi-actor monitoring and evaluation frameworks. With this knowledge, we situate our research within monitoring and evaluation studies and its key component and attributes in Sections **Error! Reference source not found.** and **Error! Reference source not found.**. Having identified institutional theory as the most relevant explanatory framework for this research, we discuss this theory and the results chain in Section **Error! Reference source not found.**. The last Section (2.7) provides a road map of how this research intends to develop a harmonised approach to streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in South Africa.

2.1 The Department of Small Business Development; history and description


This chapter commences with describing the Department of Small Business Development in order to understand the context of the research. This exercise will serve two critical purposes: it provides the context to the discussions in the other subcomponents of the conceptual framework and it will inform the discussions around the "target population" in Chapter 3 (Wotela, 2017b).

South Africa is a constitutional state comprised of the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. The Executive is headed by the President who is the head of cabinet and appoints Ministers who head up National Ministries also called Departments (South Africa Government, 2017; South Africa History Online, 2019).

The South African Government has focused on small businesses for a long time. The National Small Business Act was promulgated in 1996 and led to the enactment of the

National Small Business Council with its stated purpose being to "represent and promote the interests of small business" and to "advise the national, provincial, and local spheres of government on social and economic policy that promotes the development of small business" (Catholic Parliamentary Liason Office, 2014: 1). The Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) was formed in 2014 (Stellenbosch University, 2016) and is part of the 26 National Departments of government. The mission of the DSBD is to focus on enhanced support to small business and cooperatives, with an emphasis on programmes to advance entrepreneurship amongst women, the youth, and people with disabilities to contribute to job creation and economic growth (National Government of South Africa, 2019; South Africa Government, 2017). Figure 1 below shows the organogram of the DSBD (Department of Small Business Development, 2019)

Figure 1: Organisational Structure of the Department of Small Business Development



Source: The Department of Small Business Development Annual Performance Plan 2019/2020

As illustrated in figure 1 above, the Minister is appointed by the President and is the executive authority responsible for the overall leadership of the Department and also co-ordinates the formulation of policies and laws and oversees the performance of the Department (Education and Training Unit For Democracy and Development, n.d.). The accounting authority of the Department is the Director-General. Importantly, the overall function of Monitoring and Evaluation is nested in Branch 2: Sector Policy and Research (Department of Small Business Development, 2019).

Notwithstanding, the central Department for public service in South Africa is the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). The DPSA was established in terms of the Public Service Act of 1994: Act 103 of 1994 (Government of South Africa, 2019). The Department provides the main policy lead to all Government Departments in developing norms and standards, systems and processes, human resources management and general governance to all other state entities.

The DSBD, like other Government Departments, is a recipient of official development assistance from various international sources. This aid is termed Official Development Assistance (ODA) and can take various forms including multilateral, regional or bilateral support, or even project-based support under global facilities (National Treasury of South Africa, 2003). The next section discusses ODA interventions in the South African Public Sector.

2.1.2 Official Development Assistance and Multi-Stakeholder Interventions in South Africa

In recent times, the efficacy and impact of ODA on the development of low income countries has been placed under a lot of scrutiny. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018) defines ODA as Public Sector aid that fosters the economic development and prosperity of developing countries. Similarly, the National Treasury of South Africa (2003: 1) describes it as "official resource flows from the international donor community to South Africa in the form of grants, technical co-operation and financial co-operation, where the South African Government is held at least partially responsible or accountable for the management of such resource".

Following the demise of apartheid in 1994, South Africa became a recipient of ODA from various international sources. The National Treasury of South Africa is responsible for the overall management and coordination of ODA (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). However the responsibility and accountability for the implementation of ODA rests with the respective National Departments (National Treasury of South Africa, 2003). This includes the responsibility for monitoring, reporting and evaluating the delivery of ODA programmes.

The problem is that, monitoring and evaluation of South African public service initiatives is sometimes seen to be highly fragmented and Departments tend to develop instruments that do not cohere, for example the divergent monitoring and reporting instruments developed in the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the National Treasury (Porter & Goldman, 2013).

In fact, some commentators have lamented that the country's systems for monitoring and reporting on data fall short and cannot be relied to produce accurate and complete data (Law Library of Congress, 2015). In South Africa, DPME gathers monitoring reports dealing with government's priority outcomes, and on the other hand performance and financial monitoring of departments is the responsibility of the National Treasury. This dual reporting mandates creates challenges relating to monitoring and evaluating ODA initiatives by Government Departments. As a result, donors are hesitant to use the country's M & E systems and often develop parallel M & E systems that are sometimes blamed for increasing reporting burdens and constrain institutionalization of M & E (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015).

2.1.3 Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation of Official Development Assistance in South Africa

The functions of the DPSA have gradually evolved with time from transforming and modernising the Government entities to rendering implementation support and firming up monitoring and evaluation functions (Government of South Africa, 2019). Monitoring and evaluation in the SA public service commenced in 1994 and prior to its advent, was initially not a precondition in the civil service (Matsiliza, 2012). Due to the fragmented nature of monitoring and evaluation in Government (Abrahams, 2015), South Africa in the year 2005 introduced a Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System

(GWMES) that is based in the newly formed Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME). The DPME is housed in the Presidency (Monitoring, & Dpme, n.d.) and was formed in the year 2010. It is the overall custodian of this GWMES (Abrahams, 2015). The Presidency is the one that leads M & E in the SA public service, determines the framework for M & E and does this by delegating some responsibilities to the National Treasury to ensure efficiency. Further, the Public Service Commission is responsible for public sector governance and the Department of Public Service and Administration is in charge of overall service delivery (Matsiliza, 2012).

This GWMES M & E system follows a Results Based Management (RBM) approach that places greater emphasis on outcomes and not activities (Porter et al., 2013). It seems that judging by the adoption and fusion of M & E in all SA Government Departments, the system seems to be well developed in the country although M & E has not yet been fully entrenched as a mechanism for enhancing service delivery (Abrahams, 2015). However, there are large resources (including human and informational) that are needed to support this M & E system and there is a need to improve the coordination of transversal and multi-actor programmes (Matsiliza, 2012).

The overarching framework for guiding monitoring and evaluation in the South African Public Service is the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWMES) that is based in the newly formed Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) which is housed in the Presidency (Monitoring, & Dpme, n.d.). However, the GWMES framework does not provide guidance on how to structure and harmonise monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of Official Development Assistance supported interventions.

By their nature, multi-stakeholder interventions are characterised by cross-sector collaboration and have become popular in South Africa in the last decade (Brouwer et al., 2013). These interventions range from domestic forums to global coordination processes. However, although they vary in terms of functions and forms, the common denominator is that the stakeholders' interests are diverse in nature and there is usually a lot at stake (Brouwer et al., 2013).

The year 2000 heralded a new era in monitoring and evaluation in the South African Public Sector. In that year, most Government Departments formed their own M & E

units though they mostly focused on monitoring (Abrahams, 2015). This posed a serious challenge in terms of judging the merits and success of Government Programmes. In light of this particular challenge, the South African Public Service Commission (PSC) reports that Government Departments do not regard M & E as an important performance management mechanism because of the lack of systems to evaluate programmes (Jili & Mthethwa, 2016).

When the Government Departments and entities receive ODA, the onus is on them to undertake monitoring and evaluation of such multi-stakeholder initiatives. In this respect, Government Departments follow the prescripts of the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System when monitoring and reporting interventions and programmes funded by various donors have specific objectives, which call for specific monitoring and evaluation frameworks (World Health Organisation, 2008).

As a result of the differing monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements used by donors and the South African Government, there is a need to streamline and align them in order to improve programme efficacy. Amongst others, the streamlining of monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in the public and development spheres, is concerned with the degree to which governments and donors utilise common monitoring and evaluation frameworks, indicators and reporting systems (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, Richardson & True, 2015). Effectively aligned and harmonized M & E frameworks have been lauded for their ability to amplify the joint efficacy of development interventions. (EPAR, 2016).

However, the prevailing problem is that the DPME has recently found that there is no collective guiding framework to harmonise M & E concepts and practices in the Public Service in general (DPME, 2014). This situation poses a significant risk to the success of Official Development Assistance (ODA) interventions because alignment and harmonisation of M & E systems, in particular, has been identified as a key determinant of the effectiveness of development aid (Paris Declaration, 2005). Alignment refers to the provision of development assistance by donors in a manner that responds to partner nations' priorities and needs whilst supporting and utilising partner countries' own systems and establishments (OECD, 2012). Importantly, alignment entails not only using the recipient countries' systems but recognises that their usage can assist in strengthening them (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2008).

Furthermore, ODA supported interventions are also characterised by uncertainty, vagueness and complexity (Kusters et al., 2017). Due to differing and competing interests within these platforms and asymmetric relations, stakeholders are likely to hold different views on programme goals, outcomes, outputs and activities (Kusters et al., 2017.) As a result, these diverse interests need to be aligned in order to ensure effective programme delivery.

Oftentimes, donors and recipient governments usually have different reporting systems and these competing requirements may pose a risk to the successful implementation of programmes. These multiplicity of requirements may pose a challenge to the harmonization of M & E frameworks (National Planning Commission, 2013). At the institutional level, the multiplicity of donor procedures and requirements may be a challenge when harmonizing the M&E system.

Due to the fact that stakeholders have different M & E systems with differing quality and capacity which are diverse, it is often challenging to develop aligned M & E frameworks (Capacity for Development, 2010). It is still challenging to have common M&E because many donors have different requirements. Almost all multi-stakeholder programmes have in place some system of monitoring and evaluation although the quality and the capacity are different and sometimes not satisfactory. The establishment of efficient multi stakeholder M&E systems is a long term process and it is not advisable to expect short term results and efficiency.

The end result is that the monitoring and evaluation of multi-stakeholder initiatives in the South African public sector is complex and unique. Notwithstanding the available network of institutional capacities, the various agencies involved in the overlapping scope of activities and control is quite a challenge for the DPME (C. Nelson, 2016). These challenges are discussed in more detail the next section.

2.2 Challenges with Monitoring and evaluation of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: Causes, Symptoms and Consequences

This section deals with the different challenges experienced with multi-actor M & E institutional arrangements and how they have been dealt with. There are suggestions in the literature that multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements are uncoordinated, data is fragmented and there is reluctance to use government set norms and standards (Kawonga et al., 2012). Some commentators for example (Mueller-Hirth, 2012), suggest that this is caused by donor driven development interventions that have driven M & E to become a development activity on its own.


Traditional M & E Frameworks are built to assess compliance- they are designed to answer questions such as "did the project achieve that?", "How many outputs did they produce?" (Kusek & Rist, 2004: 11; Mueller-Hirth, 2012: 12). This means that the frameworks and systems are more focused on tracking implementation and assigning responsibility but do not give decision makers an understanding around why a programme succeeded or failed. However, result based approaches are designed to answer the more fundamental questions such as "what has the programme achieved?" with a focus more on outcomes than on outputs.

Linked with the above challenge is the fact that organizations implementing results based M & E systems are more likely forced to undergo drastic behavioural changes in the way organizations and public entities are governed and controlled (Mayne, 2007). If not managed carefully, this can lead to resistance and non-adoption of M & E frameworks by organizations. The cumulative effect of such would be a scenario wherein M & E frameworks are viewed as a nuisance and are treated as a box ticking exercise by the designated employees.

Decision makers also need to understand that it takes time for M & E systems to be institutionalized and some authors suggest that it takes at least five years for an M & E system to be fully integrated into the fabric of an organization (Mayne, 2007). That is a relatively long time given that a lot of projects' duration is less than five years. This can possibly be cured by using participatory M & E approaches (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015a; Hassenforder et al., 2016) that will ensure the alignment and effectiveness of M & E frameworks with community needs.

There are various challenges associated with monitoring and evaluating Official Development Assistance (ODA) initiatives in South Africa. First, there are power differentials in existence between the donors and the recipient Government entities. These power differences between the actors are more likely to sway the outcomes of the initiatives (Kusters et al., n.d.). It is important to ensure that all actors are able to participate in the development of monitoring and evaluation frameworks without the decisions being dominated by the donors. Figure 2 below shows the problem tree that shows how the linkages between the challenges and how they were derived from symptoms, root causes and consequences. Figure 2 below outlines the problem tree.

Figure 2: Problem Tree



As can be seen from Figure 2 above, the power of donors to influence and direct decisions regarding the priorities of country programmes and their associated M & E frameworks is stronger when there is a heavy reliance of recipient countries on ODA. This has been observed to be occurring through the use of conditionality in policy-based lending or through the support of other vertical programmes that are informed by particular policy approaches favourable to the donor (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008).

In order to counter this, joint and participatory approaches to monitoring and evaluation have been developed mainly in response to this multi-actor complexity (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008). The dominant themes from the literature on building M & E frameworks revolve around participatory approaches that have elements of drawing a path towards achieving results. The literature emphasises that M & E framework development processes need to be carefully planned from the onset and must include stakeholders from inception to close-out (Hermans et al., 2012; Kawonga et al., 2012). This is seemingly the case because the literature concerning participatory M & E in South Africa shows that they have been lauded for their ability to demonstrate relevance and results even in the midst of the paucity of development funds.

Likewise, the common theme in the M & E literature is that they acknowledge that using participatory processes for developing M & E frameworks is appropriate although it is challenging due to a variety of reasons (Hassenforder et al., 2016). Firstly, every single participatory process is distinctive (Hermans et al., 2012), is context specific (Serrona et al., 2014) and requires a lot of time and money to execute (Mueller-Hirth, 2012). Also, framework developers need to be mindful of unexpected events that might emerge during the development of the frameworks (Bryson et al., 2011) and researchers need to anticipate this phenomena and prepare for it. This is an important aspect of framework development and is meant to increase the likelihood of stakeholder "buy-in" and can increase the chances of programme success.

In the South African Public Sector, many programmes fail because they have underestimated the importance of being participatory and building consensus amongst the different stakeholders that are affected by interventions. Oftentimes M & E experts and programme developers are brought in to design social programmes with the best of intentions but fail to develop successful programmes that

address core societal needs simply because they have underestimated the need to adopt a participatory process in the programme development. As the literature has demonstrated, this step needs to be preceded by consensus amongst funders on the M & E objectives and the realisation that M & E is shaped by power relations.

To surmise, the key challenge for multi-actor M & E institutional arrangements that needs to be addressed is centred on the need to develop harmonized frameworks that are adaptive and can be modified as the programmes progress to cater for gaps in the initial frameworks (Hassenforder et al., 2016). Evaluators and programme designers need to be mindful that programme implementation is dynamic in nature and programmes are sometimes altered along the way in order to ensure programme success.

2.2.1 Results Chain and Logframe of the Ecosystem development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) Programme

Strategic context of the EDSE programme

South Africa's development goals are driven by the National Development Plan which targets the speeding up growth and transforming the economy to create decent work and sustainable livelihoods, aims to build economic and social infrastructure, ensure a comprehensive rural development strategy linked to land and agrarian reform and food security and wants to strengthen the skills and human resource base, amongst other priorities also aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Reducing unemployment is thus one of the overriding concerns of South Africa's development policies and programmes. To achieve full employment, the country needs to create 11 million more jobs by 2030. Job creation from the SMME sector is expected to substantially contribute to achieving the job creation targets. However, the country's growth trajectory has not resulted in job creation at the required scale, especially from the SMME sector. Unlocking employment opportunities in the SMME sector require addressing the myriad of challenges experienced by business proprietors, especially access to markets.

The needs of SMMEs can be easily defined amongst six key areas: access to information and knowledge management, access to markets, access to finance, enterprise development support, need

for infrastructure development at firm and sector levels and access to technology. The Ecosystem development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme through its ecosystem approach ensures these needs are addressed at the systemic level by capacitating state and private sector actors responsible for policy and strategies relating to SMME development and support.

As an employer of 66 percent of the economically active people, SMMEs are the drivers of economic growth in SA. The risks to this growth will be staggering and retard SAs growth plans. Employment provided by SMMEs (including the owners) increased to 10.8 million in 2019 Q1, accounting for 66 percent of economy-wide employment.

EDSE Results Chain

This section will discuss the results chain and the logframe of the intervention under study, that is the Ecosystem for Small Enterprise Development (EDSE) programme. The results chain provides a description of the overall logic underpinning how a development intervention is expected to achieve its results. It does so by decoding the results chain of a programme into inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts (Results Based Org, 2016; World Bank, 2013). Table 1 below depicts illustrates the EDSE results chain.

Table 1: Ecosystem for Small Enterprise Development (EDSE) Programme Results Chain

Logframe	**Performance Indicators**		
Results Chain	**Indicator**	**Baseline Values**	**Target Values**
Impact: Inclusive and sustainable economic growth and employment creation in South Africa	GDP Growth rate	GDP 1.2% (first quarter 2016)	GDP growth 5% in 2022
Outcome 1: Improved competitiveness of SMMEs and their ability to meet procurement requirements of large multi-nationals/local corporations and state-owned enterprises	Rand value of contracts awarded to SMMEs participating in the programme	0	6%
Outcome 2: Improved access to finance especially for SMMEs with limited/no access to finance.	Number of jobs facilitated (created and sustained) reporting to be disaggregated by gender	69 450	288 049
Outcome 3: Improved regulatory and administrative environment for SMMEs	World Bank Group SA "Ease of Doing Business" Distance to Frontier (DTF) score (out of 100)	64,89	68,00
Outcome 4: Effective and efficient management structures and systems of the Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme operational	Efficacy level of the EDSE programme management structures and systems	0	Level 4 Strategic Level
Key Assumptions In the run-up to the general election, and thereafter, the government of South Africa remains committed to improving the conditions for SMMEs as a key engine of economic growth and development. Even if there is a change in the mandate or institutional embedding of DSBD – there will still be a department within the government of SA that specifically deals with SMME policy, and thus the project has a beneficiary institution to work with on policy development Seda's role remains similar to the current role and DSBD, as its core funder, remains committed to fund the operation of Seda Sefa intermediaries will match the support granted by the EDSE programme Sefa's mandate does not change and remains in charge of the disbursing the budget support funds along the lines set out in the Financing Agreement		**Key Risks** Political changes may result in a lower Government commitment, hampering the efforts of the project, in particular for the policy and regulatory reforms planned. The role of Seda could change (e.g. it could be merged with another organisation over the course of the project), leading to a change of mandate and direction, or a delay to implementing the strategy currently agreed with Seda.	

Source: Ecosystem for Small Enterprise Development Financing Agreement (2018)

As demonstrated in Table 1 above, the overall intended impact of the programme is to achieve inclusive and sustainable economic growth and employment creation in South Africa. In M & E parlance, an impact is defined as the positive or negative, intended or unintended effects of a development intervention on a specific population (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013; Westcott, 2016). In essence, an impact statement outlines the positive and negative long term effects of programmes or projects on target groups.

The Financing Agreement (FA) between the European Union and the Government of South Africa was signed in July 2017 and gave effect to the EDSE programme. At the time, the country's economic growth forecasts were more bullish and it was anticipated that the GDP growth rate of 5 percent in 2022 was feasible (EU-SA Financing Agreement, 2017). However, following the national Treasury's 2018 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), 2021 GDP growth rate projections have been revised downward to 2.1% (Department of National Treasury, 2019). The reasons outlined for the downward revision of the GDP forecasts is the "fragile recovery in employment and investment, and a less supportive global trade environment" (Department of National Treasury, 2019).

Due to the above, programme implementers are already cognisant that the original target of 6 percent GDP growth rate in 2019 will most likely not be achieved. According to Bours (2014) performance targets need to be S-M-A-R-T, that is:

S- Specific
M- Measurable
A- Achievable
R- Realistic
T- Time bound

With programme implementers already realising in the year 2019 that the targeted 6% GDP growth rate in 2022 will not be achievable, the logical step then would be that this target would be revised down accordingly in the FA. The EU FA allows for the amending of the duration and budget of the

agreement if the need arises. These amendments are called 'riders' (The National Treasury, 2013). However a rider cannot be done to amend the impact targets because EU Budget Support projects (the EDSE programme included) do not allow riders to be made to performance indicators retroactively (The National Treasury, 2013). At programme close-out, this clause is likely to result in programme being perceived as a failure because the impact performance target is likely not going to be achieved.

Figure 2 also outlines the four planned outcomes of the EDSE programme. By definition, an outcome is the intended and unintended results of an intervention that accrue to specific beneficiaries in the short to medium term (Adaptation Fund, 2011). The programme first outcome seeks to achieve "improved competitiveness of SMMEs and their ability to meet procurement requirements of large multi-nationals/local corporations and state-owned enterprises". This outcome's wording seems to be problematic because the term 'competitiveness' is a construct that is affected by many aspects and can be subject to interpretation based on the purposes for which it has been defined (Sipa et al., 2015). As a result, this outcome may become subject to interpretation and contestation when the programme is evaluated after its close out.

The second outcome seeks to achieve "Improved access to finance especially for SMMEs with limited/no access to finance." This outcome has a specific objective to strengthen the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (Sefa) to be able to play a facilitation role in the SMME finance landscape, by using EU funds, to co-invest into innovative SMME finance instruments that achieve an improvement in access to finance for SMMEs. Next to that, operations are strengthened to better operate the current loan book, and future fund-of-fund operations. The objective is to improve access to funding to the underserved, high-risk SMMEs which are ordinarily unable to secure funding from banks

The baseline number of jobs reported for outcome 2 is 69, 450 jobs and through the support of the programme, 288 049 jobs are targeted to be facilitated by 2022. This figure represents the creation of more than four times the number of jobs that were reported at baseline year of 2018. Similar to the discussions raised concerning the programme impact target, it remains to be seen whether it will be feasible to achieve it in the timeframe allocated for the programme.

The third outcome relates to achieving an "Improved regulatory and administrative environment for SMMEs". Essentially, this outcome aims to contribute to the removing and easing of the 'red tape' that SMMEs face in participating in the economy. Red tape is the onerous laws, regulations and certifications that the Government demands of SMMEs to comply with in order to operate legally (Darroll & Corrigan, 2013).

In order to track these programme results, the programme has set up outcome 4 which seeks to realise "Effective and efficient management structures and systems of the Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme operational". This is more of an internal outcome that the programme has set up in order achieve good overall programme management. It has been observed that one of the key benefits of good programme management is that improves the chances of achieving the planned programme results (Northen Ireland Business Board, 2019). On the other hand, caution needs to be applied not to overburden implementers with intensive bureaucratic adherence when executing programme management (Project Management Institute, 2015).

2.3 Methods, data, findings, and conclusions of studies on and evaluations of recruitment and placement

A research knowledge gap is a critical part of a research and forms an important component on the conceptual framework (Wotela, 2017). This section will examine empirical studies on harmonising institutional arrangements in ODA and public sector interventions. The purpose is to identify the knowledge gap around harmonisation of institutional arrangements generally and specifically in the South African context and to justify if the research is worth pursuing (Wotela, 2017b). The section also studies how previous primary research around the topic was conducted and how the other previous authors executed their studies and explores the results and conclusions they drew. In this process, the interpretive frameworks that the previous studies used to discuss their findings will be explored.

This literature interrogation will also assist with uncovering the research approaches, designs, procedures and methods that similar research have utilised (Wotela, 2017b). This will help in informing how the research will be executed and assist with answering the research questions, purpose and problem statement whilst also making a contribution to the current knowledge gap.

The development of multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements faces a particular challenge of how to select the most suitable methodological options to track programme implementation (Jamieson, 2011) and as a result the studying of previous empirical results should assist in regard. These methodological approaches will also be a key part in informing the conceptual framework of this study.

It is important to note that this review is not designed to be an exhaustive inquiry into institutional arrangements nor M & E as a field- instead it is meant to provide a critical analysis of the international and local issues surrounding harmonization institutional arrangements. The literature reviewed was produced mainly in the last decade with a strong emphasis on literature written in the past five years.

In the year 2007, South Africa introduced a Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWMES) that is based in the newly formed Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) that is housed in the Presidency (Monitoring, & Dpme, n.d.). The DPME was formed in 2010 and is the overall custodian of this GWMES.

This M & E system follows a Results Based Management (RBM) approach that places emphasis on outcomes not activities (Porter et al., 2013). However, there are large resources (including human and informational) that are needed to support this M & E system. It seems that judging by the adoption and fusion of M & E in all Government Departments, the system seems to be well developed in the country although M & E has not yet been fully entrenched as a mechanism for enhancing service delivery.

However, the picture is not so rosy when it comes to M & E in South African Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs). There are views that their M & E systems are mostly uncoordinated, data is fragmented and there is reluctance to use government set norms and standards (Kawonga et al., 2012). Apparently this is caused by donor driven development interventions that have driven M & E to become a development activity on its own (Mueller-Hirth, 2012). This can possibly be cured by using participatory M & E approaches (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015a; Hassenforder et al., 2016) that will ensure the alignment and effectiveness of M & E frameworks with community needs.

This section will look at the emerging literature surrounding the development of harmonised M & E frameworks. There are four main approaches identified, namely: the logic model approach, the ecosystems services research approach, the Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Process (IMEP) approach, the monitoring and evaluation of participatory planning processes (MEPPP) framework. These approaches are explored further in the next section.

2.3.1 The Logic Model Approach

Csiernik, Chaulk, McQuaid & Kate McKeon (2015) applied the logic model approach to design a multi-stakeholder Employee Assistance Programme in Canada. A logic model is a visual way of showing a programmes' route from activities to results (Markiewicz & Patrick, 2016). It traces the pathway of achieving results from the resources required to undertake activities, shows the outputs that will be produced and finally shows how outcomes (short-term, medium term and long term) will be produced. The origins of the logic model approach can be traced back to the Canadian government's launching of compulsory results planning frameworks in the 1970s (Jamieson, 2011).

The logic model arranges together separate items and puts them under larger groupings and develops a conceptual framework of how a programme can work (Clarke, 2014). The M & E framework is then derived from the logic model (Serrona et al., 2014). It is considered an important part of project management and is ideally developed at the planning stages of a programme. The processes involved in developing a logic model encourages programme developers to be creative about deciding how a programme will achieve its goals (Csiernik et al., 2015a)

There are many variations to the structure of the logic model (Karuntzos et al., 2017). According to Markiewicz & Patrick (2016) there are five main components of the logic model;

1. **Inputs**- sometimes called resources. These are the required financial, human and other resources required to undertake programme activities.

2**. Activities**- actions taken by the programme to lead to the predetermined outputs (Markiewicz & Patrick, 2016)


3. **Outputs**- products that result from the activities (Karuntzos et al., 2017)

4. **Outcomes-** changes experienced as a result of an intervention over time.

5. **Assumptions**- describe the external factors that may affect the accomplishment or non-accomplishment of outcomes (Serrona et al., 2014).

Figure 3 below shows the logic model for an employee assistance programme developed by Csiernik, Chaulk, McQuaid & Kate McKeon (2015). The programme has three components, also known as objectives supported by specific activities. Also, it is interesting that the programme has no medium term outcomes but has short term and long term outcomes. The study utilised a mixed methods research strategy and semi-structured interviews were held with key internal stakeholders and distributed an online survey to collect quantitative data from the rest of the organisation's employees. The key research finding is that the utilisation of a logic model in a multi-stakeholder programme enables the structured analysis of a programme. It also allows for a well-constructed framework that enables the making of choices in the detailed examination through both quantitative and qualitative means of activities, outputs and outcomes.

Figure 3: Logic Model Employee Assistance Programme



Source: (Csiernik et al., 2015a)

Crucially, the logic model approach has been criticised for its perceived weakness in dealing with the complexity of multi component programmes (Craig, 2013). Nonetheless, they have been lauded for being valuable in terms of its precision and objectivity in project management (Serrona et al., 2014). The next approach that will be examined is the ecosystems services research approach to developing M & E frameworks.


2.3.2 Ecosystems services research theory approach

The ecosystems services research theory approach is mainly used for developing environmental M & E frameworks but is also increasingly being used to develop social programmes M & E frameworks (Chapman, 2014). Ecosystem services have been defined as the benefits that human beings derive from ecosystems (Liu et al., 2010). These benefits include provision of services such as food and water, regulation of droughts and diseases that affect human beings and other animals. This theory shines the light on how much nature matters to human beings and then advocates that human an environmental challenges need to be addressed together (Chapman, 2014).

When developing an M & E framework utilising this approach, the aim is to develop a structure that will include both biological and social outcomes in one framework. The main advantage of the approach is that unlike with logic model approach which assumes a linear relationship between programme activities, outputs, and outcomes, this approach is not rigid and does not assume a linear relationship to programme models and it is more suitable for designing and studying more complex systems such as natural systems (S. Chapman, personal communication, August 26, 2017).

The framework has six key components: "programme need, programme activities, pathway processes, moderating processes, outcomes, and programme value" (Chapman, 2014). Figure 4 below shows these components in more detail.

Figure 4: M & E framework for ecosystems services approach



Source: (Chapman, 2014)

As figure 4 above shows, the first step in applying the framework is identifying the eco-social service needs of the target population that will be addressed by the programme. The process for achieving the programme outcome is then put in place (that is "the intervention") and is then closely monitored. Subsequently, the expected programme outcomes are then specified. The outcomes are then disaggregated into 3 parts: the ecosystem service outcomes, benefits to human beings and finally the value of the programme. Afterwards, the programme that will address the identified needs is clearly defined and described.

One of the major criticism levelled against this approach is that the approach has a limited ability to rigorously measure interactions between biological and social components at the same time (Chapman, 2014). There are many interactions that happen in social and biological systems that do not occur along a temporal scale and this model does not seem to be the best approach to measure them. This implies that the framework is ideally utilised only for environmental programmes. Nevertheless, some useful integrated research is beginning to emerge that seems geared to close the gap ecosystems and social systems (Liu et al., 2010).

The next M & E approach that will be studied is the Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Process (IMEP).


2.3.3 Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Process (IMEP)

The IMEP process uses the grounded performance improvement theory to guide the development of an M & E framework (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015b). Performance improvement seeks to "to identify measurable performance gaps (problems or opportunities); understand its causal factors, and identify solution alternatives that address the causes of the problem; select the most effective and cost-efficient solutions; and finally monitor, evaluate, and improve those solutions, to ensure performance problems and their root causes have been resolved" (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015: 22).

The greatest strength of the IMEP is that, unlike the logic model that places indicators linearly into the inputs/resources, activities, outputs and outcomes, the IMEP approach attempts to determine the relationship among the chosen indicators. Indicators are defined as variables that give a means to demonstrate changes that are related to an

intervention (Development, 2017). They are essentially yardsticks of development interventions(*Indicators Discussion Paper*, n.d.). Figure 3 below shows IMEP M & E framework development approach.

Figure 5: IMEP M & E framework development approach



Source: (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015b)

As shown in figure 3 above, the first step in the process is the identification of stakeholders and their expectations. Stakeholders are defined as all parties who are affected either positively or negatively by the impact of a programme or policy (Yusuf, 2015). After stakeholders' expectations have been identified, their consensus is sought in determining the key decisions and objectives of the programme. These objectives are

framed in a measurable format to enable tracking and evaluation. Subsequently, measurable indicators are developed followed by an outline of the data collection methods and analysis procedures. Finally, stakeholders are given continuous feedback and progress reports together with action plans. These plans are valuable because they foster a sense of project ownership among the stakeholders (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015b).

The research utilized a mixed methods research strategy and applied a case study research design to collect data from the respondents belonging to a trade union in an unspecified East African country. Interviews with key stakeholders using a semi-structured interview guide and a questionnaire administered to farmers were used to collect the primary data.

The greatest limitation of the approach is linked to its greatest strength- the focus and heavy reliance on building a holistic basket of performance indicators. The approach seems to be based on the belief that the more the number of indicators, the better the value of the M & E system (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015; Swaans, Puskur, Taye, & Haile, 2013).

2.3 Conclusion

As shown above, there are numerous studies across the globe that have explored the potential benefits and importance of harmonising multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangement in the past decades (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015; Chapman, 2014; Csiernik et al., 2015; Evans School of Policy Analysis and Research, 2015; Evans School of Policy Analysis and Research, 2016; Guerra-Lo´ pez & Hicks, 2014; Hassenforder, Pittock, Barreteau, Daniell, & Ferrand, 2016; Ibrahim, Cadotte & Bernstein, 2015). There is however, limited literature on harmonising multi-stakeholder M & E frameworks in the Global South and consequently most of the literature that is interrogated originates from the Global North.

Most of the studies reviewed utilised a qualitative research strategy involving the interviewing of key stakeholders to obtain the necessary information used in the respective M & E frameworks developed. Some articles relied upon a qualitative research strategy combined with a grounded theory approach to craft the M & E frameworks. This study will also adopt the same qualitative research strategy.

The studies reviewed have shown that are many interpretive frameworks that can be used to harmonise M & E frameworks, namely: the logframe approach, the ecosystems services research approach, monitoring and evaluation of participatory planning processes (MEPPP) Framework, the Impact Monitoring and Evaluation model, and lastly the grounded theory approach. These theoretical approaches can be used to also identify key attributes of the frameworks. Most of the studies reviewed utilised content analysis to help in identifying the key attributes required in an M & E framework and in deciding on the appropriate approach to its development (Ibrahim et al., 2015).

The studies reviewed utilised various data collection tools for collecting information relating to the development of M & E frameworks including semi-structured interview guides and questionnaires. Participatory approaches including the usage of facilitated workshops and semi-structured interview guides informed the development of many M & E frameworks. For example, the development of the National M & E framework for solid waste management in the Philippines (Serrona et al., 2014) entailed the review of various country level frameworks and systems in order to aggregate and align the frameworks to what is deemed international best practice.

Depending on the objectives and differing contexts, the reviewed studies used various research designs to develop M & E frameworks including case studies and cross-sectional research designs. The case study research design has been found to be predominant one in the literature surrounding the development of M & E frameworks. The case study research design has in some cases been combined with a cross-sectional design that encompasses the review of documents to develop an M & E framework.

In the studies reviewed earlier, a variety of sampling techniques have been utilised to select respondents with a purposive sampling strategy being the most common one. Non-random sampling techniques including snowball sampling were used to select participants of the studies. Most studies used non-random techniques including purposive and snowball sampling techniques to select research participants. This is in line with previous studies which have shown that in social science research, the identification and selection

of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest utilised a purposive sampling strategy (Palinkas et al., 2015).

Various data processing techniques were used in the respective studies. Most of the data that was collected to inform the M & E frameworks was found to be qualitative in nature. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed. Before concluding the interviewing stage and processing the qualitative data, the researchers ensured that data saturation had happened. Subsequently, transcription of the audio recordings was undertaken prior to data being analysed.

In the studies reviewed, the data analysis stage happened directly after the data was cleaned and processed. The information analysis involved the coding of the transcribed data, data reduction, data display, making and verifying conclusions. Following the transcription, coding and content analysis of the data, links between the variables were established following various approaches including the causal cluster approach (Hassenforder et al., 2016).

There are interesting findings that can be gleaned from the reviewed studies. Many countries are facing challenges regarding the coordination, alignment and harmonization of M & E frameworks with those of donor countries. Empirical results suggests that some countries are working to align their government and donor M & E systems and decrease redundancies but these efforts are also encountering challenges. However, the studies empirical studies that were reviewed were unable to shed light on what exactly these challenges are.

Empirical evidence also suggests that governments and donors are increasingly having distinct and separate M & E frameworks and systems with minimal harmonization and alignment. There are various factors that have been noted as the causes of this state including low levels of trust of recipient countries' systems, and limited coordination of M & E efforts by recipient countries (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015; Evans School Policy Analysis and Research, 2015; Evans School Policy Analysis and Research, 2016).

Furthermore, it has been found that many Government M & E systems derive their indicators from exogenous frameworks such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) although many continue to run parallel M & E systems. However, the studies reviewed do not explain how these indicators were derived.

Knowledge gaps have been identified in the studies that were previewed. These gaps can be classified into two: administrative and technical knowledge gaps. Administrative knowledge gaps are mainly concerned with the logistical issues surrounding the collection of data whilst the technical gaps revolve around the possible influence of donors on the contents of the M & E frameworks.

Several administrative knowledge gaps related to the manner that empirical data was sourced, others were due to gaps in skills around data processing whilst others were as a result of the specificities of the processes involved in developing the frameworks. Some M & E frameworks were based only on dedicated plans and strategies and did not include other sources of information in their development. This lack of diversity in content constitutes a possible knowledge gap that will need to be filled by future research.

Another administrative knowledge gap detected is the sole, selection of participants using non-random techniques and the usage of already existing frameworks area. On the other hand, the main technical limitation observed has been the possible influencing of framework by the respective donors who funded the exercises.

Therefore, in order to address the knowledge gaps identified, this study will utilise a qualitative research strategy and also apply a case study research design to explore how to harmonise multi stakeholder M & E frameworks. The study will utilise the institutional theory to discuss the findings.


2.4 Describing institutional arrangements and its key components and processes

This section is aimed at providing the research with the academic context for investigating the research attributes (Wotela, 2016). It discusses and outlines the purpose of the academic field of institutional arrangements in which this study is located. It starts by first defining them, outlining their purpose, presents the established facts and the key debates. Then a discussion on components of institutional arrangements follows and then lastly its processes are outlined. Consequently, in order to be comprehensive as well as critical, there needs to be a discussion of the field of study that the research is located in.

Figure 6 below links development as a field of study and its components and processes, (Wotela, 2017a). Development is a political term that involves the improvement in the use of available resources by a country leading to socio-economic and environment transformation to a desired state (Abuiyada, 2018). In fact, development has five components, specifically cultural development, political development, economic development, social development and environmental development (Wotela, 2017a). Importantly, as (Sumner & Tribe, (2008) development has two critical processes: immanent (unintentional or natural) and imminent (intentional or willed). This study is concerned with the imminent processes of development, which are also called development interventions in M & E, as shown in figure 6 below.

A development intervention and, therefore, M&E can be at policy level, programme level or project level (Kusek & Rist 2004; Wotela, 2017a). In order to understand those three levels of development interventions, we first need to grasp public policy before proceeding further. Public policy is "a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern.... Public policies are those policies developed by governmental bodies and officials" (Hill & Hupe, 2002: 5). It has five components, mainly leadership, governance, political economy, institutional arrangements or analysis and organisational arrangements or analysis (Wotela, 2017a). Public policy processes include research, decision-making and the public policy cycle (Wotela, 2017a).

Figure 6: Illustrating the development (and its components and processes), public policy (and its components and processes) and the key stages of the public policy cycle framework. Adapted from Wotela (2017a).



2.4.1 Some facts and issues in institutional analysis

Institutional arrangements have been defined as the rules, policies, norms and values that are applied to ensure the effective execution of organizational goals (Mills et al., 2019; Sumner & Tribe, 2008). In this instance, institutions are defined as the norms and rules that prescribe, prohibit, or allow specific deeds by actors in a policy environment. Norms are considered to be the collective understandings around acceptable behaviours and their transgressions may result in social or political rather than legal consequences (Baldwin, 2019).

March & Olsen (1986) argue that the study of institutional arrangements is critical because political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. In other words, institutions are political actors by nature and also comprise standard operating procedures that are created to define and defend interests.

What then is the purpose of studying institutional arrangements? It is primarily aimed at studying the conditions (legal, regulatory or otherwise) and environment required for the successful implementation of public policy. In fact, Nelson, Nikolakis, & Martin-Chan, (2019) maintain that the main purpose of analysing institutional arrangements is to shed more light on how to deliver the right conditions for facilitating collective action and ordered rule.

Put differently, the purpose of studying institutional arrangements is on how organizations work and the conditions necessary for effective execution of public policy. However, some authors contend that its focus is not primarily about how public policy develops instead it is about how organizations work, what happens within organizations with responsibilities for the implementation of public policy (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Given the above, one can then conclude that it is mainly aimed at studying the conditions (legal, regulatory or otherwise) and environment required for the succesful implementation of public policy.

There are many established facts in institutional arrangements. It is widely acknowledged that there is a need to consider how institutions are formed and how values, norms and systems are developed in order to ensure successful implementation of development interventions. In fact, Baldwin (2019: 246) goes further to assert that institutional arrangements are also key in influencing "which stakeholders participate, how they deliberate and share information, and how stakeholder engagement processes connect to policy decisions".

Correspondingly, successful institutional arrangements require that implementation be allocated to entities whose policy stance is in line with the institution and which will render high priority to the development intervention. The fulfilment of this condition is enhanced when a new organization is created with a well-defined mandate following a rigorous political engagement, as the intervention will be its top priority and the formation of new positions creates opportunities for the involvement of statutory supporters (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). Alternatively, implementation can be allocated to an established existing entity that regards the intervention as consistent with its mission and is in search of new programmes (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979).

Likewise, there are some key issues and debates in institutional arrangements. First, effective institutional arrangements need to be placed in their constitutional and institutional context and supported by adequate planning, budgeting and political support. This key is a key theme commonly ignored by mainstream scholars (Hill & Hupe, 2002).

In the same way, some authors also contest that any serious development intervention that places emphasis on results, needs an institutional arrangement that uses results data in planning, budgeting and overall decision-making (Porter & Goldman., 2013). Programme effectiveness can be enhanced by the application and consistent usage of results information in the policy cycle.

This view is also supported by Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) who go further to argue that without active political support from key political actors, implementers will struggle to overcome the resistance and other critical organizational behaviour changes inherent in executing programmes. In short, political support is critical towards ensuring that major institutional reforms and arrangements are put in place successfully.

Various authors have played a seminal role in framing institutional arrangements in a systematic way, and have outlined its three pillars (components):

• regulative: resting upon 'expedience' in as much as people recognize the coercive power of work rule systems and policies

• normative: resting upon social obligations, including work norms and habits.

• cognitive: depending upon taken-for-granted cultural assumptions around beliefs and values (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Palthe, 2014).

These components act in concert in mutually reinforcing means to add to the institutional context. Table 2 below demonstrates some of the main dimensions by which these components differ.

Table 1. Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements Associated with Organizational Change

	Regulative	*Normative*	*Cognitive*
Legitimacy	Legal systems	Moral and ethical systems	Cultural systems
Central Rudiments	Policies and rules	Work roles, habits and norms	Values, beliefs and assumptions
System Change Drivers	Legal obligation	Moral obligation	Change values are internalized
System Change Sustainers	Fear and coercion	Duty and responsibility	Social identity and personal desire
Behavioral Reasoning	Have to	Ought to	Want to

Source: (Palthe, 2014: 61)

As shown in table 2 above, scholars subscribing to the regulative view of institutions tend to view institutional arrangements as a consequence of exogenous market forces and regulative institutional tools such as policies and rules. In contrast, normative theorists put more emphasis on social obligations and focus more on informal configurations than formal structures. Finally, cognitive theorists, pay more attention on the belief systems and values when institutions go through major changes (Hill & Hupe, 2002).

Various authors have outlined the processes in institutional arrangements. One school of thought is centred around the policy formulator and implementer and can be classified according to three models:

(a) a center-to-periphery process

(b) a bi-lateral process
(c) a multi-lateral process (Lane, 1983).

A centre-to-periphery process resembles Wildavsky's control model (Wildavsky 1977), as both include elements of a simple rational decision model:
(i) unambiguous policy goals
(ii) clear and predictable technology, that is, the means-end hierarchy is integrated and reliable
(iii) simple enforcement rules between the formator and enactor of policy (superordinate) and the implementer also called a subordinate (Lane, 1983:21).

On the other hand, a bilateral process in institutional arrangements is simply a combination of the centre-periphery one and the multilateral models (Lane, 1983). Lastly, a multi-lateral process refers to coordinating relations among three or more partners in accordance with certain agreed upon principles (Ruggie, 2018). The next section explores the key attributes of institutional arrangements.

2.5 Attributes of institutional arrangements that are key to monitoring and evaluation

This section establishes and discusses the major attributes of institutional arrangements that are key to this research. The purpose of this section is to assist in determining how to collect, collate, process and analyse the qualitative information of the research. In essence, the discussion of attributes is meant to lay the foundation for the questions that will be included in the data collection instrument that will ultimately assist with answering the research questions. Given that they are grounded in a delineated academic home; attributes also assist with identifying the relevant theoretical framework that will be used to interpret the data collected.

By definition, attributes are the varying characteristics of a phenomenon that allow for the breaking down of multifaceted phenomenon into little pieces that one can then ask questions about when collecting data (Wotela, n.d.). Put differently, research attributes are the doorway to identifying an interpretive framework, theoretical or otherwise, that can be employed to interpret empirical results of the study (Wotela, n.d.). This means that

attributes assist with identifying what information to collect in order to answer the research questions. We first start by looking at the attributes of regulative pillars, then move on to those of normative pillars and finally examine those of cultural-cognitive pillars.

2.5.1 Key Attributes of Regulative Pillars of Institutions

As discussed in the previous section, and illustrated in figure 3, institutional arrangements can be broken down into three pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Starting with the regulative pillar, this section will discuss the key attributes associated with the three pillars. Regulative pillars of institutions are premised on the view that individual behaviour is shaped and coerced by regulatory aspects of institutions. This takes the form of punishment for those who fail to abide by them and rewards for those who comply (Butler, 1997; Palthe, 2014). In essence, organisational change is deemed to be as a result of regulations and individuals' conformity to them (Palthe, 2014).

Correspondingly, the purpose of regulative pillars of organisations is to implement a set of work rules and policies that are meant to coerce organisational action and actors' interests through the threat of legal action. For example, Hoffman (1999) maintains that the only way to drive organisational change is through regulations implemented through coercive ways. However, Meyer & Rowan (1977) hold a slightly different view and instead argue that the purpose of regulative pillars is to organise and prescribe individuals along prescribed lines and to ensure that they have the means for relating to each other.

Similarly, the established facts seem to support the view that the regulative pillar is based on coercing organisational change through the meting out of sanctions for non-compliance and rewards for compliance. The main theme of this pillar is that social behaviour can be controlled through rule-setting (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This view is popular among rational choice scholars (Butler, 1997) who are of the view that organisational behaviour is anchored in rule systems, hence the need for regulative work rules and policies (Palthe, 2014).

Interestingly, the main attributes of regulative pillars of institutions are laws, work policies and work rules. The aim of these components is to induce coercion in actors' behaviour (Peton & Pezé, 2014). We shall then briefly discuss each of these attributes. In institutional

theory, laws are defined as "the regulations or actions that are taken by governments" (Li, Moy, Lam, & Chu, 2020: 328). In essence, laws are meant to be followed by institutions within countries' jurisdictions. As a result, Palthe (2014) contends that organisations craft laws that are in pursuance of their interests and it is mandatory for individual organisational members to conform to them so they can be rewarded or else they will face sanctions.

Admittedly, the state is the lawmaker and ensures implementation and coordination of the law. Flowing from this, laws and conformity to legal systems form the core basis for legitimacy of the regulatory pillar of institutions. Put simply, scholars who stress the importance of regulatory pillars of institutions believe that institutions derive stability through legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Peton & Pezé, 2014) and abiding by the law. Legitimacy is a siplified observation or assumption that the activities of an organisation are desirable, appropriate and correct in terms of a socially made up system of standards, philosophies and principles (Scott et al., 2004).

Importantly, in order to answer the research questions and achieve the research purpose, this study will examine the relevant SA laws and legal prescripts guiding Overseas Development Aid (ODA) institutional arrangements.

The second attribute of regulative pillars of institutions is work policies. By definition, work policies are the elements that give direction in and control the actions of an entity and its employees (Venter & Levy, 2009). Work policies symbolise organisational values that govern the decision-making of management and guide employees' experiences (Foote et al., 2005). Policies are essentially the action plans that lay down the course and direction for achieving organisational goals.

As a result, organisations have an assortment of policies that coordinate their internal and external operations. Some examples include policies concerning monitoring and evaluation, compensation, promotion, reporting and others (Foote et al., 2005). In order to respond to the research questions and fulfill the research purpose, policies governing institutional arrangements of the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) with external actors will be investigated.

Lastly, we now shift our focus to the last attribute of the regulatory pillars of institutions which is work rules. These are highly linked to work policies in that they both seek to guide organisational behaviour of actors in an organisation. Work rules are the set of tenets that prescribe and support employees to take decisions in accordance with the goals and values of an organisation (Richebé & Bensaïd, 2002). They are intended to minimise the uncertainty and opacity in udertaking tasks and to further the interests of an entity and those of its employees (Weichbrodt & Grote, 2010).

Some scholars argue work rules are concerned with what happens concerning employee behaviour while others contend that that they are meant to regulate the activities of organisations (Venter & Levy, 2009). In order to respond to the research questions and fulfill the research purpose, work rules governing relationships between the DSBD and external actors will be investigated.

To conclude, the processes of regulatory pillars of institutions are centered on the setting of rules, their monitoring and ensuring compliance thereof. They rest on their usage to ensure compliance and to achieve conformity to legal systems in place (Butler, 1997). However, some scholars argue that regulative pillars of institutions are based purely on regulatory processes that are intended to effect changes in individuals' behaviour in an organisation (Peton & Pezé, 2014). From the above, it can then be concluded that this pillar stresses the ability of legal instruments in ensuring organisatioal change. The next section deals with the attributes of normative pillars of institutions.

2.5.2 Key Attributes of Normative Pillars of Institutions

Normative pillars of institutions are based on norms regarding social behaviour and place strong emphasis on defining organisational goals and proposing ways of achieving them, within the prescripts of identified 'appropriate' ways and organisational standard operating procedures. Scott et al. (2004) further argues that normative pillars of institutions are premised on the moral social obligation of individuals and their role in effecting organisational changes. However, Butler (1997) also indicates that these pillars emphasise moral obligations of individuals and do not prescribe formal structures for pursuing organisational changes. In short, these pillars are focused on the taken-for-granted assumptions that influence organisational change.

Similarly, the purpose of the normative pillar of institutions is to encourage organisational change through the encouragement of a sense of moral obligation and conforming to organisational norms in place. For example, Palthe (2014) agrees and points out that the primary objective of normative pillars of institutions is to emphasize the enactment of organisational change out of sense of moral duty and social obligation. Examples of normative institutions include professional associations that can utilise social obligation prescripts to persuade certain behaviour within an organisation or industry (Kshetri, 2010).

The established fact surrounding normative pillars seems to be that they facilitate organisational change through social obligation placed on individuals rather than through forcing change through rules ala regulative pillars. They provide rights and responsibilities as well as social obligations that need to be considered by individuals in an organisation (Hoffman, 1999). Also, they are characterised by their emphasis on bestowing rights, responsibilities and privileges on individuals (Butler, 1997).

Notwithstanding, there are some key issues and debates surrounding the normative pillars of organisations. The main debate is centered on the notion that work norms and values are the bedrock of social order underpinning organisational change. Some authors argue instead that organisational change is derived primarily from the moral roots of organisations (Butler, 1997; Palthe, 2014). Whilst others contend that the main aim of these pillar is to create stability in an organisation (Alexander & Alexander, 2018). What then can be deduced is that these pillars emphasise both a sense of moral obligation and stability as the necessary ingredients for effecting organisational change.

Critically, the attributes of the regulative pillar of institutions are workplace norms and habits. Some scholars assert that the components of normative pillars are habits, values and roles that guide organizational structures and the conduct of individuals inside those structures (Alexander & Alexander, 2018). Others maintain that that the components of normative pillars of institutions are only workplace norms and habits (Palthe, 2014). What is common amongst them is that workplace norms and habits are the main attributes of the regulative pillar of institutions.

By way of definition, work place norms are attributes of normative pillars of institutions that stipulate how things should be done (Palthe, 2014). In fact, Baldwin (2019: 247) insists that "norms are shared understandings about acceptable behaviour; norm violations may incur social or political, rather than legal, consequences". In short, they define legitimate ways of achieving desired organisational goals. In order to respond to the research questions and fulfill the research purpose, work norms governing institutional arrangements between the DSBD and developemnt partners will be investigated.

The other attribute of normative pillars of institutions is workplace habits. These work habits "can be conceived as reflecting a dimension of automatic (habit strength) and controlled (work routines) patterns of behaviours that are performed frequently in response to situational cues" (Hinsz, Nickell, & Park, 2007: 107). Put differently, they can be considered as be self-imposed codes of conduct (Kshetri, 2010) that are ingrained in the routine environment of workers in response to specific stimuli. These habits will be measured using the Workplace Attitude Category Rankings (Webber et al., 2015)

The processes of normative pillars of institutions consist of the expectations about shared norms and values that are applicable to members of an organisation. These processes in include setting the moral guidelines of what is deemed to be appropriate or not (de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 2010). In other words, honesty is an esteemed value and the prescriptions about how individuals are supposed to behave are held by other actors in the same situation. The next section examines the cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions.

2.5.3 Key Attributes of Cutural-Cognitive Pillars of Organisations

The cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions are the shared symbols and understandings of social reality and the lenses used to study it. These symbols can take the form of words, signs and other gestures as well as mental models that help to shape the meaning of social reality (Palthe, 2014). These pillars advocate for organisational change to be driven by employees and internalized rather than it being imposed by rules or regulations. It also calls for the change to be culturally supported by the organisation (Hoffman, 1999)

What then is the purpose of cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions? The purpose of cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions is to advocate for organisational change by encouraging people to desire the change by tapping into their shared values, beliefs and assumptions. The aim of which is to ultimately provide meaning to social reality through providing common taken-for-granted understandings (Butler, 1997). This pillar also provides for the internalization of change values as a means of achieving organisational change.

The established fact concerning this institutional pillar is that it calls for organisational change to be individual driven and centered around a shared understanding of reality. In fact, cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions advocate for organisational change by making individuals want the change rather than forcing it (Alvarez & Urbano, 2012). Consequently, this pillar emphasizes for socially mediated social reality through the forming of common understandings of the meaning of social reality (Butler, 1997)

Similarly, the key issue surrounding this pillar is that the basis for its legitimacy is that it advocates and emphasises that change should not be forced but should rather happen voluntarily. That is, it postulates that lasting organizational change can only be achieved if it emanates from individual members of an organisation and is driven by them (Palthe, 2014). As a result, this pillar is considered in the main to be more difficult to identify and pin point because they are usually more entrenched (Scott et al., 2004). That is why this institutional pillar is the most informal pillar of the three institutional pillars.

Interestingly, the main attributes of cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions are values and beliefs which are assumed to influence reality. Values, also known as objectives (de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 2010) encompass conceptions of the desired or preferable and the development of standards to which prevailing structures or behaviours can be likened and evaluated (Scott et al., 2004). Values can be further broken down into two: "values as the desired and values as the desirable" (Hofstede, 1984). Values as "the desired" are what individuals inherently want to achieve and they individually wish for in their lives (Vauclair, 2009). On the other hand, values as the desirable values as "the desirable" are what individuals "ought" to endeavour for or what they should wish for in their lives (Vauclair, 2009). As a result, the two values are concerned with values of

differing natures. Given that values are psychological constructs and are individual specific, they are notoriously difficult to measure.

In conclusion, we now focus our attention on beliefs. Broadly speaking, beliefs are an individual's subjective probability conclusions around some discriminable facet of their world (Spector, 2012). That is, they are not empirically based or scientifically proven (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). They are essentially concerned with how an individual's understanding about themselves and their environment and thus shape an individual's behaviour in an organisation. As a direct result, organizations develop in accordance to institutionalized beliefs (Scott et al., 2004) that ultimately give shape to their corporate culture.

2.6 Interpretive Frameworks for Institutional Arrangements

This section establishes and discusses the interpretive framework for the research. Importantly, this theoretical interrogation later on helps in interpreting the empirical research results. This section begins with a discussion of all possible frameworks in the academic context of the study (that's is institutional arrangements) before ultimately identifying the one that will be used. However, given the wide scope and breadth of the academic context of institutional arrangements, it is not possible to include all the applicable frameworks and instead, only the notable frameworks in the academic field of study have been considered.

Before we begin our discussion, it is important to note that even though we identified Development as the academic home of the study, there are frameworks found in Sociology that can be germane in interpreting research findings on streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in South African National Departments. As a result, apart from institutional theory, we also examine these theories prior to selecting those relevant to this study.

In order to contextualise interpretive frameworks in institutional arrangements, that is those accepted by institutional theorists, we first briefly interrogate three theories, that is, bureaucracy, power and institutional theory. As a result, institutional theory will be discussed here as well. First we discuss bureaucracy theory, followed by the power and lastly institutional theories.

2.6.1 Bureaucracy in Institutional Arrangements

The genesis of bureaucracy can be traced back to the examination of the English and German legal systems by Max Weber in the early nineteenth century during the first industrial revolution (Weber, 1947). As a direct consequence of the disenchantment in the world amongst some segments of society at the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars started studying the powers that underpin European legal systems. Max Weber was the first one to use and describe the term and was driven by curiosity about how power was consolidated in the legal system and how institutions fit into general public administration (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This included the study of bureaucratisation and the evolution of the entire institutional systems in place.

The core foundation of bureaucracy lies in its emphasis on the importance of embedding institutional arrangements that emphasise administrative tasks in organisations (Akindele, Afolabi, Pitan, & Gidado, 2016). This theory considers rationalisation as an inevitable consequence of the historical changes that were happening. Put simply, bureaucracy was developed during the first industrial revolution with a purpose of organising and directing the activities of an organisation along a set of specific institutional structural arrangements.

Some commentators argue that the primary purpose of the bureaucratic system was to ensure that economic growth that was happening as a result of the industrial revolution was also serving the interests of a particular section of stakeholders (Mohamed, 2017). What this means is that they are of the view that bureaucracy is essentially a societal invention that is concerned with the rationalisation of society and the application of human judgement to solve complex world problems.

What then does bureaucracy seek to describe and explain? Several authors have grappled with this phenomenon with Max Weber and Karl Marx being at the forefront. They postulated that it is based on the division of labour, establishment of organisational hierarchy, and the continuous hiring of people who adhere to the above institutional norms (Serpa & Ferreira, 2019).

In fact, Bennis (1965) emphasises that it is mainly concerned with administratively organising institutions by setting rules, policies and guidelines to direct what is appropriate and what is not. In this sense, bureaucracy is thus in line with supporting the regulatory pillars of institutions. Others maintain that it is a social invention that aims to control human behaviour in organisation to turn it more into a 'social machine' (Tunde Akindele et al., 2016).

There was a boom in bureaucratic organisations in nineteenth century America. The reason that was cited as the cause was the advent of the industrial revolution which coincided with a demand for a highly competitive and stable environment akin to the one promised by bureaucracy (Kweit & Kweit, 2019). Proponents of bureaucracy have celebrated it for its perceived informality and uniform manner of treating employees in an institution. They point out that it improves predictability in an institution thus improving the efficiency and effectiveness of an enterprise (Weber, 1947). These are said to happen as a direct result of its perceived emphasis on rationality.

The chief usefulness of administrative bureaucracy can be found in its support for the division of labour. This was a new way of thinking in the workplace which was credited with optimising skills of personnel and ultimately improving production and effectiveness of organisations (Serpa & Ferreira, 2019).

Some authors have pointed out limitations of bureaucratic institutions. Chief amongst them has been its perceived creation of members of an elite class in society whose interests are then pursued at the expense of the rest of the masses (Weber, 1947). Separately, it has also been criticised for its lack of flexibility and its fixation with rules and procedures (Serpa & Ferreira, 2019; Tunde Akindele et al., 2016). These have been blamed by some for apparent lack of innovation in bureaucratic organisations. These weaknesses led to the development of other alternative frameworks for interpreting institutional frameworks. The next section discusses the concept of Power.

2.6.2 Power and Institutional Arrangements

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were contestations and debates amongst several leading thinkers around the existence of power in societies. The development of the concept was ignited by Dahl when he sought to investigate the power dynamics in

how New Haven, in the United States, was actually governed and who actually 'called the shots" (Lukes, 2015). He concluded that the concept of power is concerned with actors' desire to impose their institutional arrangements on others in order to secure the fulfilment of their interests. It is concerned with the methods that are used to impose or allow institutional change to happen in favour of other parties (Dahl, 1957). The intractable arguments revolved around what exactly constitutes power and how can it be measured to prove its very existence.

It seems that the consensus is that power was developed to study the behaviour of actors when presented with situations that may or may not affect their vested interests in a particular phenomenon. That is, will they choose to act in a certain manner to affect the outcome of a situation or will they rather elect not to act at all (Allison, 1974). As a result it is considered by some to be a dispositional concept that deals with hypothetical states about what would happen given certain conditions (Mohamed, 2017).

Furthermore, the concept of power was designed to measure and compare the influence that two or more actors have upon a specific scenario or situation. Some authors argue that the concept of power was developed to hypothesise about what would happen if and when power was exercised (Whitt & Lukes, 1980). As a result, they agreed that power need not be unleashed for it to be there and instead it is concerned with the ability to exercise it.

There are several instances that have been mentioned as demonstrating the usefulness of the concept of power. Some postulate that its significance lies in its ability to provide the potential alternatives that an actor can have at their disposal when confronted with a specific set of circumstances (Dahl, 1957). Others allude to its strong ability to assist with studying the behavioural aspects of decision-making (Mohamed, 2017). As a result they maintain that close analysis of power can yield deep insights into the ways in which society allocates forces that enables certain actors to exercise certain dispositions on some individuals and not on others (Whitt & Lukes, 1980). Most importantly, the study of power has the ability to provides the theoretical basis for the examination of the potential deficiencies of the options at their disposal prior to committing to a decision (Dahl, 1957).

Similar to other constructs in the social sciences, power has proven difficult to operationally define and measure. As a result, some authors have even called for it to be disaggregated and instead be labelled as Power 1, Power 2 and so on in relation to Situation 1, Situation 2 etcetera (Dahl, 1957). They also argue that power is not a completely quantifiable concept but is instead an arbitrary concept that is partially quantifiable (Allison, 1974).

Another strong criticism of power is that its accepted operational definition does not offer criterion that can be utilised to adequately reveal the existence or non-existence of power (Lukes, 2015). As a result, some authors argue that power as a concept cannot be measured at all (Allison, 1974). This is a very controversial assertion that in essence negates the concept of power. This has led to Allison (1974) contentiously calling for the complete scrapping of the concept altogether. Perhaps this discussion can be concluded by referring to the famous words of Albert Einstein (n.d) "'Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted". The next section examines the institutional theory interpretive framework.

2.6.3 Institutions Theory and Institutional Arrangements

Several authors have been identified as the pioneers of the development of institution theory. Amongst the scholars credited with its development are Marx and Weber, Cooley and Mead, to Veblen and Commons and finally Meyer and Rowan (Scott et al., 2004). From their writings, it may be inferred that it was developed with the primary intention of studying the conditions that contributed to the formation and coordination of formal structures in society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In other words, one the of main reasons for the formation of institutional theory has been cited as uncovering and learning about formal and rational human systems and how they operate (Tolbert & Zucker, 2012). Notwithstanding, the pivotal event that seems to have led to the formation of institution theory in the end of the Nineteenth Century was the need to fine tune the general functionalist social theory.

At the time, there were also debates surrounding the structuring of formal and informal institutions vis a vis the way they were controlled and the blue prints for their functions. Some viewed them as executing their functions according to their conformance to their

structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Others wanted to study how they influenced macro global frameworks (Tolbert & Zucker, 2012).

What then is the intended purpose of institutional theory? Various authors (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 2012) are of the view that the main aim of institution theory is to provide stability to social life and to safeguard the interests of specific stakeholders. This view is strongly supported by those theorists who seek to understand the emergence of power and interests in society in the style of Marx and Weber. On the other hand, some authors postulated that the main function of institutions was to establish stability and meaning to human existence (Mohamed, 2017).

This theory is also concerned with why institutions were created, how they gain legitimacy and ultimately what makes them fail or succeed. In essence, it can be considered to be an instrument that is used to study the social nature of organisations (Scott et al., 2004). Institutional theory seeks to understand how institutions are organised, adopted and diffused into societies. This is because, organisations that adopt societally rationalised and legitimised elements of institutionalisation, increase the chances of their survival and their resource mobilisation capabilities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

There are many strengths that have been attributed to this theory. For example some commentators are of the view that by its nature, institution theory can be considered as both a process, a method and an interpretive framework (Tolbert & Zucker, 2012). It caters for the measuring and assessment of the organisational decisions undertaken and is able to quantify the impact thereof (Mohamed, 2017). The principal usefulness of this theory is derived from its ability in understanding the commonalities amongst organisations that survive turbulence in their respective industries and those that do not (Scott et al., 2004).

The principal limitation about this theory is that it has to date not been institutionalized because of the lack of a common understanding regarding the definition of key concepts, methodologies and measures within its tradition (Tolbert & Zucker, 2012). Although the theory does include a set of agreed upon components, it is however not associated with standard variables nor methodologies to guide its application (Mohamed, 2017). Despite

these perceived limitations, this theory is still considered by some to be the gold standard in studying about the mechanics of how organizations function (Scott et al., 2004).

From the above discussion and given the attributes of institutional theory outlined in the previous section and its alignment with the study objectives, this paper will utilise it to interpret the empirical findings of the research.

2.7 Streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements: a conceptual framework

The aim of this study is to propose how to streamline contrasting multi-actor monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), a National Department in South Africa. Following the interrogation of the literature and introduction of the research problem, the purpose statement, the research questions as well as the associated hypothesis, the purpose of this section is to outline the conceptual framework. This section then serves as the summary and conclusion of the literature reviewed.

The conceptual framework consists of what was traditionally known as the literature review chapter of the research. The purpose of developing a conceptual framework is to inform and sharpen the development of the research title, problem statement, purpose statement and research questions. Ravitch and Riggan (2012), argue that this framework is constructed by the researcher from pieces found in various places and as such it is not 'found' but is rather built from a literature review. The ultimate goal of a conceptual framework is to categorize and describe concepts relevant to the study and map relationships among them (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

There are four purposes of a conceptual framework. First it serves to assist the researcher to unpack the main variables and concepts in the study. Second, it helps the researcher to construct the methodological approach of the study (that is the research design, target population and research sample, data collection & analysis). Third, it provides guidance in the fourth chapter of the research- the interpretation of the findings of the study. This

is a very critical role that it plays especially if there is no widely accepted theoretical framework in place. Last, it helps in informing future studies specifically for the frameworks that infuse the literature review with the empirical data collected.

This section will follow the approach suggested by Wotela (2017b) when outlining a conceptual framework. First, we will provide a succinct physical research context of the relatively new DSBD. Afterwards, we will then summarize the different challenges experienced with institutionalising multi-actor M & E arrangements specifically looking at the symptoms, root causes and consequences. Third, we will then briefly go over the main points of studies that have explored institutionalising M & E arrangements in multi-stakeholder initiatives with the intention of uncovering the knowledge gaps that exist.

Thereafter, we will move onto briefly summarising the interpretive framework that will be used to discuss the empirical findings- institutional theory- and its associated components (regulative, normative and cognitive). Earlier we had determined that institutional arrangements also called institutional theory by some is a method, a process, and an interpretive framework (Ginsburgh & Throsby, 2014).

Fifth, we will then summarise the respective attributes of the components that were uncovered in the previous step.

This chapter commenced with describing the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) in order to understand the context of the research. First off, this study seeks to interrogate how to align multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving Official Development Assistance (ODA) supported interventions at the DSBD.

The DSBD mandate is to focus on enhanced support to small business and cooperatives, with an emphasis on programmes to advance entrepreneurship amongst women, the youth, and people with disabilities to contribute to job creation and economic growth (National Government of South Africa, 2019; South Africa Government, 2017). Similar to other Departments, it is a recipient of ODA from various international sources.

Due to challenges experienced with harmonising donors' and the country's M & E systems, donors often develop parallel M & systems that are sometimes blamed for

increasing reporting burdens and constrain institutionalization of M & E (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015). This situation negatively affects programme delivery and success.

Furthermore, a root-cause problem analysis of this problem reveals that the core reasons for the challenges associated with ODA institutional arrangements in South Africa includes lack of (i) harmonization of M & E institutional arrangements, (ii) streamlining of M & E systems across the whole of Government, (iii) diverse and competing interests between donors and recipient countries, (iv) existence of power differentials between the donors and the recipient Government entities.

Admittedly, these power differences between the actors are more likely to heavily sway the outcomes of the ODA initiatives (Kusters et al., n.d.). and result in donors influencing and directing decisions concerning the priorities of recipient countries. It is important to ensure that all actors are able to participate in the development of monitoring and evaluation frameworks without the decisions being dominated by the donors. Otherwise, country priority programmes will not be implemented successfully.

In the same vein, similar past and current studies have explored how to streamline multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements. In Section 2.3, we detailed the research strategies, designs, procedure and methods they applied, the results they presented, and their discussions and conclusions. Table 3 below presents a concise summary of those studies.

More specifically, past studies on the subject- for example, Chapman (2014), Csiernik, Chaulk, McQuaid & Kate McKeon (2015), and Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, (2015)- revealed that (i) the utilisation of a logic model in multi-stakeholder programme, enables the structured analysis of a programme, (ii) the greatest strength of the Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Process (IMEP) is that, unlike the logic model that places indicators linearly into the inputs/resources, activities, outputs and outcomes, the IMEP approach attempts to determine the relationship among the chosen indicators that are determined by stakeholders and (iii) suggestions from the literature for identifying indicators and measures for components and component variables of multi-stakeholder initiatives.

The most perceptible knowledge gap displayed by these studies, besides that none of them actually undertook their studies in SA- that have predominantly applied a mixed methods research strategy, and the cross-sectional research design- is that they do not study the institutional arrangements involved in multi-stakeholder M & E frameworks and the possible influencing of frameworks by the respective donors who funded the exercises. Therefore, the empirical section of this study will focus on the institutional arrangements that enable or inhibit the streamlining of multi-stakeholder M & E initiatives.

This study will also utilise the qualitative research strategy and a cross-sectional research design like most studies reviewed. By implication, the research procedure and methods will also apply a semi-structured interview guide and purposive sampling to gather in-depth data on M & E institutional arrangements in the physical context (DSBD). This approach is supported by Scott et al. (2004) who suggest using qualitative strategy, procedure and methods when interrogating institutional arrangements within formal structures. Table 3 below outlines the studies reviewed, together with their research strategies, interpretive frameworks, conclusions and knowledge gaps.

Author & year	Title	Aims & objectives	Research strategy, design, procedure and methods	Interpretive frameworks applied	Discussion & conclusion	Knowledge gap
Csiernik, Chaulk, McQuaid & Kate McKeon (2015)	Applies the Logic Model Process to Employee Assistance Programme	The article describes logic models and illustrates how they can be applied in the context of designing an Employee Assistance Programme.	Mixed methods, cross-sectional research design, Case study, questionnaire and an interview guide	Logic model	The key research finding is that the utilisation of a logic model in. multi-stakeholder programme, enables the structured analysis of a programme. It also allows for a well-constructed framework that enables the making of choices in the detailed examination through both quantitative and qualitative means of activities, outputs and outcomes.	Crucially, the logic model approach has been criticised for its perceived weakness in dealing with the complexity of multi component programmes (Craig, 2013)
Chapman (2014)	A framework for monitoring social process and outcomes in environmental programmes	This article draws upon ecosystem services theory to develop a framework to guide the M&E of collaborative environmental programmes with anticipated social benefits	Qualitative research strategy. No research design, procedure and methods detailed	Ecosystems services research	The article provides suggestions from the literature for identifying indicators and measures for components and component variables, and concludes with an example of how the framework was used to inform the M&E of an adaptive co-management programme in western Kenya.	The framework seems limited in its ability to monitor and evaluate both biological and social factors at the same time. The framework is suitable only for environmental programmes.
Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, (2015)	The participatory design of a performance oriented monitoring and evaluation system in an international development environment	The paper uses the impact monitoring and evaluation process systemic performance improvement framework to develop an M & E framework for a trade union	Mixed methods research strategy and a cross-sectional research design case study. Interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and a questionnaire were used to collect the primary data.	Grounded performance improvement theory.	The greatest strength of the Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Process (IMEP) is that, unlike the logic model that places indicators linearly into the inputs/resources, activities, outputs and outcomes, the IMEP approach attempts to determine the relationship among the chosen indicators that are determined by stakeholders.	The greatest limitation of the approach is linked to its greatest strength- the focus and heavy reliance on building a holistic basket of performance indicators. The approach seems to be based on the belief that the more the number of indicators, the better the value of the M & E system (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015; Swaans, Puskur, Taye, & Haile, 2013).

As was detailed earlier in section, this study is situated within the institutional arrangements academic field. It is interesting to note that institutional arrangements is a method, a process, and an interpretive framework (Ginsburgh & Throsby, 2014). The key components of institutional theory are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements (Palthe, 2014). Within these components, the key attributes we picked up relating to streamlining M & E institutional arrangements are policies, work rules and norms, habits, beliefs and values. Finally, we aim to interpret the empirical findings using institutional theory to interpret the findings of this research. Figure 7 below outlines the study's conceptual framework.




Figure 5: A proposed framework for Streamlining multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation arrangements in National Government Departments in South Africa (adapted from Hlatshwayo & Wotela, 2018)

3. RESEARCH STRATEGY, DESIGN, PROCEDURE AND METHODS

In Section 1.2.3, we have posed four questions that this research report intends to answer—that is, 'What are the different policies and rules that can be used to harmonise multi stakeholder interventions at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)?', 'What are the different beliefs and values that are required to harmonise multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements the DSBD?', What is the impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD and what outcomes are they leading to or likely to add to?'

We have since reviewed literature and developed an interpretative as well as conceptual framework that will guide the choices of techniques we will use. This chapter identifies and describes research approach, design as well as procedure and methods that we employ in this research to collect, process, and analyse empirical evidence. Broadly, it has three objectives; namely, to identify and describe the research strategy (Section 3.1), the research design (Section 3.2), as well as the procedure and methods (Section 3.3). The chapter also describes the reliability and validity measures (Section 3.4) that this research applies to make it credible as well as the potential technical and administrative limitations of the choices we make (Section 3.5).

3.1 Qualitative Research strategy

A research strategy encompasses the techniques used to collect and analyse data in research (Neuman, 2014). Some authors (Bryman, 2016a; Nayak & Singh, 2016) consider a research strategy to be a general approach to planning a research study which outlines the ontological and epistemological positions that the study will take. What is common amongst these descriptions of a research strategy is that it is a methodological approach that a study will adopt to plan, collect and analyse data in a study.

The literature identifies three research strategies: qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods. On the basis of the justification provided by (Ibrahim et al., 2015) when we interrogated the research knowledge gap of this research in Section 2.3, we have also utilised a qualitative research strategy that we deliberate in this section.

A qualitative research strategy uses words to interpret observations and unravel patterns of relationships in the data. It applies the inductive approach to the relationship between theory and the social world (Bryman, 2016a), which according to Creswell (2014: 32) entails "a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation". This research strategy emphasises words and non-numerical data to discover meanings and understand social phenomena (Babbie, 2016; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Hence, it is predominantly influenced by post-positivism (Bryman, 2016a), a philosophical orientation that is concerned with the causes of outcomes that are observed in the 'real world' (Creswell, John, 2014). The above-mentioned features of a qualitative research strategy have provided many benefits (like the interpretation of patterns of relationships in data) and thus was used in this study. Additionally, this research strategy has been effectively utilised in other previous research that studied similar phenomenon as this study, as illustrated below.

There have been numerous studies that have utilised a qualitative research strategy to investigate how to streamline institutional arrangements in multi-actor programmes, as per this study. For instance, Ibrahim et al. (2015) successfully applied a qualitative research strategy to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework for international surgical initiatives. One of the main objectives of the study was to develop a M & E strategy that includes key priorities of both donors and recipients. The utilization of this strategy assisted with defining the meaning of the attributes to include in the M & E system.

Another similar study by Hassenforder et al. (2016), applied a qualitative research strategy to develop a framework for evaluating projects that have adopted a participatory planning approach: the Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Planning Processes (MEPPP) to set up institutional arrangements. The use of a qualitative research strategy enabled the evaluators to design data collection tools that are adaptive and could be "modified on the way". The benefit of this type of research is that it allowed the identification of attributes that were not anticipated in the initial M & E framework that was developed.

Lastly, Csiernik et al. (2015a) undertook a study on how the Logic Model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. The application of the qualitative research strategy assisted the researchers in evaluating how to evaluate the efficacy of multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements and how to assess all the key components associated with it. The qualitative research

strategy had the advantage of collecting data about the problem and bringing together information from other similar programmes that were confronted with the same issue.

Gathering research and information about the problem, gleaning information from other programmes that have been successful or ineffective in addressing the issue, and establishing the desired outcome are all crucial to determine prior to beginning the Logic Model development and evaluation process.

Given that the purpose of this study is to interrogate how to align contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving donor supported interventions, the qualitative research strategy has assisted with understanding and exploring different approaches to harmonising contrasting M & E institutional arrangements. Importantly, it also assisted with understanding the social world within which the programme operates.

3.2 Research design

A research design is a plan and framework of how research data will be collected and analysed (Bryman, 2016a). Also, Babbie (2016) argues it also encompasses methods of how research questions will be answered. In short, a research design is a set of decisions that detail how a research will be undertaken and how data will be collected and analysed (Cooper, Donald & Schindler, 2014; Neuman & William, 2014). In the literature, there can be found five generic research designs, namely: experimental, case study, longitudinal, comparative and cross-sectional (Bryman, 2016a). In essence, a research design is simply the way that data is collected by a researcher.

This research employs a case study research design, also called an idiographic research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). This research design entails the comprehensive and rigorous analysis of a solitary case (Bryman, 2016a). It is also known as case history and, in some rare instances, can also be used to study various features of a few cases (Neuman & William, 2014), and this approach is called a "a multiple or collective case study" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016: 271). The cases can be individuals, groups, events or ethnographic units (Babbie, 2016).

In short, a case study research design involves the intensive study of a phenomenon for a defined period of time (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). This design has been lauded for being the most useful design for learning more about a poorly understood phenomenon, and

thus it will be appropriate for use in this study. This research design has been used in other studies that have examined similar phenomenon to this research, as explained below.

There are similar studies that have applied the case study research design. For example, Hassenforder et al. (2016) used a case study research design in Rwanda to interrogate institutional arrangements for a multi-stakeholder donor supported programme. There were multiple pilot sites involved and a large number of respondents needed to accessed simultaneously, so the study utilised a case study research design to ensure that efficiencies could be derived. The application of the case study design also assisted the researcher in identifying attributes that can influence the effective design of multi-actor institutional arrangements.

Similarly, Guerra-Lopez & Hicks (2015a) applied a case study research design to craft a multi-actor M & E institutional arrangements geared for human and institutional capacity development. The main benefit they derived from using the case study research design was that it produced context-specific information that delivered a problem-solving function in the assessment of institutional arrangements.

Lastly, a previous study undertaken by the Evans School Policy Analysis and Research (2016) utilised a case study research design to examine the extent of the alignment of donors' institutional arrangements with those of donor countries. The usage of a case study research design assisted the study with generating new ideas on how multi-actor institutional arrangements can be structured for existing donor supported programmes.

This study aims to examine how to align multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving donor supported interventions for a solitary case. Similar to the other studies outlined above that used this research design (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015a; Hassenforder et al., 2016; Evans School Policy Analysis and Research, 2016), this study explores how to structure multi-actor institutional arrangements using a single case. In order to generate detailed qualitative information, this study also applies a case study research design.

Given the above, the application of a case study research design has benefited the study in many ways. Amongst others, the case study research design assisted with generating new ideas about how to best structure multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements.

3.3 Research procedure and methods

This section documents the actual procedure and the methods employed in this research to collect, process, and analyse empirical evidence. Broadly, we detail the data and information collection instruments (Section 3.3.1), the target population and sampling of respondents (Section 3.3.2), the ethical considerations during the research process (Section 3.3.3), the data and information collection process and storage (Section 3.3.4), the data and information processing and analysis (Section 3.3.5) as well as the background description of the respondents who provided empirical evidence for this research study (Section 3.3.6).

3.3.1 Research data and information collection instrument

Data collection tools are the instruments that are utilised to gather data concerning social reality for research studies (Creswell, 2014). They can be classified into two- some are for gathering qualitative data and others for collecting quantitative data (Neuman & William, 2014). These tools come in various forms and guises but there are essentially two types- an observation schedule and interview guide (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). This study utilises an interview guide to collect qualitative data.

Notwithstanding, Leedy & Ormrod (2016) explain that there are a variety of data collection instruments including questionnaires (for quantitative data), interview guides and document analysis (for qualitative data). As the name implies, an interview guide is used to direct the questions that a researcher will pose to respondents when undertaking an in-depth interview or a focus group interview (Creswell, 2014). The major strength of an interview guide is that it allows the interviewer to ask follow-up questions and to further probe participants' responses (Nayak & Singh, 2016). Given these benefits, this study utilises an interview guide to collect the qualitative data.

Furthermore, Bryman (2016) maintains that there three types of data collection instrument structures: unstructured, semi-structured and fully structured -also referred to as a questionnaire). A semi-structured interview guide has a collection of questions centred around specific topics that an interviewer asks a participant (Bryman, 2016a). This interview guide comprises of questions that follow a logical relationship and is administered by a researcher after a pre-test (Nayak & Singh, 2016). The main advantage

of this data collection instrument is that it has relative high capacity to give insights into how study participants see the world (Bryman, 2016a). This study utilises a semi-structured interview guide to collect data from the respondents.

Previous studies that have explored similar phenomenon to this study have utilised a semi-structured interview guide. For instance, Csiernik et al. (2015a) undertook a study on how the Logic Model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. The utilisation of a semi-structured interview guide assisted the researchers in collecting detailed data on how to evaluate the efficacy of multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements. The semi-structured interview guide had the distinct advantage of assisting the researchers in collecting detailed data about the problem and probing the participants further about information from other similar programmes that were confronted with the same issue.

In the same manner, a study undertaken to develop the multi-actor National M & E framework for solid waste management in the Philippines (Serrona et al., 2014) entailed the review of various country level frameworks and systems in order to aggregate and align the frameworks to what they deemed as international best practice. The data collection was carried using a semi-structured interview guide to interview the research respondents. The main advantage it provided was the flexibility it gave to the interviewers to ask follow-up questions to the open-ended questions- this also proved to be of benefit to this research.

Finally, a study an earlier study undertaken by the Evans School Policy Analysis and Research (2016) utilised a semi-structured interview guide to examine the alignment of donors' institutional arrangements with those of donor countries. The usage of a semi-structured interview guide assisted the researchers with gathering new ideas on how multi-actor institutional arrangements can be structured for existing donor supported programmes- this was also beneficial to this research.

Research instrument- source of questions

The questions developed for the semi-structured interview guide encompass questions developed by the researcher from the research attributes previously interrogated in the literature review. From the literature review, we were able to identify the primary attributes of institutional arrangements- rules, norms and cultural-cognitive beliefs.

The first five questions in the interview guide elicited information on rules and regulations, the next three on norms and the last four collected information on cultural-cognitive beliefs. The interview guide is attached as Appendix 2 to this report.

3.3.2 Research target population and selection of respondents

3.3.2.1 Research target population

The target population of a research has been described as a collection of units from which a sample is to be drawn (Bryman, 2016a). The definition offered by Bryman (2016a) emphasises the word "units" because the target population does not necessarily refer to humans only. This definition is in line with that suggested by (Leavy, 2017) who also maintains that a target population is a group of elements that a researcher will ultimately make generalizations about.

The target population for this research was middle and senior management who were responsible for the implementation of the programme at the Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme management unit, the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) and the National Treasury International Development Cooperation unit. All senior and middle managers (Deputy Directors, Directors and Chief Directors) involved in the implementation of this programme at these institutions were invited to participate in the research.

Earlier studies that have studied similar phenomenon as this study have also targeted senior and middle managers. For example, a recent study by Hassenforder et al. (2016), applied a qualitative research strategy to develop a framework for evaluating projects that have adopted a participatory planning approach: the Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Planning Processes (MEPPP) to set up multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements. The target population, amongst others, comprised of the senior management who were also responsible for the conceptualisation of the framework. The main benefit derived from utilising this target population was that they had first-hand knowledge of the inner workings of the programme being implemented. By including the senior leadership of the programme in the target population, this benefit was realised in this research.

Another similar study by Serrona et al. (2014) to develop a multi-actor National M & E framework for solid waste management in the Philippines entailed the review of various country level frameworks and systems in order to aggregate and align the frameworks to what is deemed international best practice institutional arrangements structuring. The authors interviewed respondents from the Government and the support agencies responsible for implementing the programme. As a result, the views gathered represented those of diverse stakeholders. This study also enjoyed similar benefits to the aforementioned study.

Last, Csiernik et al. (2015a) undertook a study on how the logic model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. The researchers gathered information through interviewing key stakeholders together with external beneficiaries involved with leading the programme. This approach had the advantage of collecting data from decision-makers and was credited with fast-tracking the validation of the study. This current study also improved its content validity by selecting a similar target population.

Concerning the identification of the target population, the researcher benefited from the approaches as indicated by the studies reviewed earlier. First, the researcher was granted access to the middle and senior officials at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) and its entities, and was able to obtain permission to interview them. Similar to the experiences of Hassenforder et al. (2016), the senior leadership at the institutions were able to provide first-hand knowledge of the inner workings of the programme being implemented and its associated institutional arrangements. Second, in line with Serrona et al. (2014), the inclusion of the DSBD officials together with its implementing partners provided diverse and broad views.

3.3.2.1 Sampling or selecting respondents from the target population

Sampling is defined as the selection of a few number of cases from a large pool (Neuman, 2014). Similarly, Bryman (2012: 174) also describes sampling as the recording of "all units in the population from which the sample will be selected". Sampling is done in order to draw conclusions about the target population. There is one sampling principle that is common in qualitative research: non-probability sampling.

This research utilised a non-probability sampling technique to select the respondents who were interviewed. Non-probability sampling involves the selection of units in a population in a non-random manner thus making the probability of selecting some cases more likely than others (Bryman, 2016a).

The nonprobability sampling method entails depending on available subjects to select the cases for the research (Babbie, 2016). The types of non-probability sampling techniques in qualitative research are: purposive sampling, convenience sampling, snowball sampling, quota sampling. The utilisation of the non-probability sampling technique in this study, proved to be the most effective approach to finding the research participants who can adequately provide information that responds to the research objectives.

In line with the above, this research applied purposive sampling to select the research respondents. Babbie (2016) describes purposive sampling as a sampling technique in which a researcher judges and selects cases on the basis of which ones will be the most useful to their study. In other words, this technique is used to locate participants that are highly specific and can respond to the research questions that are asked (Bryman, 2012). In some instances, it can also be used to find participants that are difficult and hard to reach (Neuman, 2014). Therefore, before a researcher applies this sampling technique, sampling criteria are defined and the respondents have to conform to them before being selected (Cooper, & Schindler, 2014).

As shown earlier, the sampling criteria utilised in this study comprised officials who have been part of the conceptualisation, design and or implementation of the programme. Following the granting of permission to conduct the study by the DBSD, the Department was requested to provide a full list of Senior and Middle Management Officials who were responsible for the conceptualisation and or implementation of the EDSE programme. A list with a total of 18 officials was provided and eight of the Officials agreed to be interviewed virtually on the Zoom computer application.

Similar studies have effectively utilised purposive sampling in the past. For example, a recent study by (Ibrahim et al., 2015) successfully applied a purposive sampling to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework for international surgical initiatives. One of the main objectives of the study was to develop a M & E strategy that includes

key priorities of both donors and recipients. The utilisation of this strategy was credited with assisting the researchers with achieving the research objectives in a time and cost-effective manner than if they had used other sampling techniques. Given time and cost constraints faced by the researcher, this study also benefited from using the sampling technique as well in that the data collection process took approximately two weeks to complete despite the setbacks presented by the Covid-19 global health pandemic at the time of data collection.

In the same manner, a study by Hassenforder et al. (2016), used purposive sampling to select participants who participated in developing a framework for evaluating projects that have adopted a participatory planning approach: the Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Planning Processes (MEPPP) to set up institutional arrangements. The use this sampling technique enabled the evaluators to design data collection tools that are adaptive and could be "modified on the way". The benefit of this type of research is that it allowed the researchers to "balance conditions in terms of gender, geographical provenance, and profession" Hassenforder et al. (2016: 91) amongst the research participants. In other words, it assisted the researchers with getting diverse views from a wide array of participants. This was also be advantageous to this research in that there were broad and divergent views obtained from the respondents who were purposively selected to partake in the study.

Finally, a research by Csiernik et al. (2015a) Csiernik et al. (2015a) undertook a study on how the Logic Model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. The application of purposive sampling assisted the researchers in identifying the critical stakeholder who crafted the institutional arrangements of the EAP. Purposive sampling had the distinct advantage of bringing together information from participants who had developed other similar programmes that were confronted with the same issue. This approach also benefited this study as well in that the key role players were part of the respondents.

3.3.3 Ethical considerations when collecting research data

This component deals with the important issues of ethics and the researcher's positionality. Ethics is typically concerned with morality- what is wrong and right (Babbie, 2016). A researcher has to be aware of the ethical obligations that he has to his participants

and the research community. The researcher's primary focus is the protection of research participants and as a result, Bryman (2012) posits that there are four main ethical principles in social research:

a) No harm to participants

b) Obtaining informed consent

c) Not invading privacy of respondents

d) Not deceiving respondents.

The researcher is a Masters in Management student at the University of the Witwatersrand. The purpose of this research is strictly academic, this research is self-sponsored and the researcher did not derive any economic benefit from this study. Below is an indication of how the four ethical principles described by (Bryman, 2012) were be adhered to in this study:

a) No harm to participants.

The researcher should never cause harm to participants. Harm can take many forms including physical, self-esteem and causing participants stress (Bryman, 2012). This research did not harm the respondents in any way or drive them to lose their self-esteem (Neuman, 2014). Also, before the researcher could proceed with undertaking the study, ethical clearance was obtained from the Wits University Academic Ethics Committee. This committee reviewed the research proposal and data collection tools to ensure that no participants suffer no harm.

b) Obtaining informed consent.

Participation in research should be voluntary and participants were provided with complete information regarding the risks they might face (Babbie, 2016). Afterwards, once they agreed to participate, they signed a document indicating their consent to be a part of the research (Bryman, 2016a; Neuman, 2014). In order to adhere to this ethical principle, the researcher sought and obtained informed consent before undertaking the interviews. The research participants were provided with full information so that they can make a decision on whether they will participate or not in the research (Bryman, 2016b). A consent form was provided for the participants to sign if they agreed to participate in the research.

c) Not invading privacy of respondents.

Participants have a right to privacy. This research protected participants' right privacy by not disclosing their identity after the interviews have been conducted. Also, once the interviews had been recorded, they were then transcribed and stored in a password encrypted computer. The researcher was the only one with access to the computer and data.

d) Not deceiving respondents

Deception is concerned with instances in which the researcher lies to participants or disguises the research whilst not fully disclosing the objectives and methods of the study (Bryman, 2016a). In order to counter this, the researcher provided full information concerning the study in the consent form and once they agreed to participate, they were required to sign the form indicating consent. The participants were not deceived or coerced to participate in the study at any stage of the research.

This research also observed and respected these ethical obligations at all stages of the study.

Positionality

Last we outline the researcher's positionality in the study. The main factor that shaped the researcher's interest in the study was that the researcher worked as a monitoring and evaluation specialist at the National Treasury (NT) for a period of three years in the years 2015 to 2018. In that period, the researcher was evaluating programmes that the NT was implementing together with donors and became acutely aware of the challenges faced with harmonising the respective institutional arrangements with donors' respective ones.

Subsequent to departing the NT, the researcher was then engaged to do monitoring and evaluation at the European Union funded Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme. Similarly, the same challenges with harmonising institutional arrangements at the NT were observed by the researcher in this role. This then sparked the curiosity of the researcher even more and resulted in the conceptualisation of this study.

As illustrated above, the researcher has worked together with many of the role-players involved in the study. At all stages of the research, the researcher was aware of his influence and was also conscious of any potential biases that may occur. In order to minimise any potential biases, the researcher crafted a reflection memo that he filled after each interview in order to reflect on his influence and to continually interrogate his impact on the study. Considering these limitations and my positionality as a monitoring and evaluation practitioner, the researcher conducted a qualitative study to explore how multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements are formed.

Finally, as a monitoring and evaluation practitioner and researcher, I understand and am aware of the roles and responsibilities of officials who were involved in the research, but I lack understanding of what it is like to be a senior decision-maker in respect of overseas development assistance initiatives. As a result, I undertook this research because I have always wanted to understand more about how decision-makers streamline contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements.

3.3.4 Research data and information collection process and storage

Data collection entails the gathering of information from one simple setting to a large survey in various parts of the world (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). The main purpose of data collection is to harvest data in order to answer the study's research questions as formulated by the researcher (Creswell, 2014). Data is usually collected from a sample that is presumed to represent the general population of interest (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016).
There are four modes of data collection namely: the four mode (participant observation or ethnography, interviews (face-to-face, telephone, or internet-based), focus group discussion, documents). Based on the literature review undertaken, this study had intended to utilise face-to-face interviews to collect the primary data.

However, due to the constraints of social distancing necessitated by the Covid-19 global health pandemic, the researcher was unable to meet the participants face to face. Consequently, the interviews were held virtually on the Zoom computer application platform. Importantly, Roberts et al., 2021 argue that when designed and implemented comprehensively, virtual interviews can be as practical and rigorous as face-to-face-interviews. The interview stage for this research lasted for two weeks.

In addition, face-to-face interviews comprise of a data collection engagement in which an interviewer poses question to a participant (Babbie, 2016). Essentially an interview involves an interaction between a researcher and a single respondent (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). They have been credited as having the highest response rate, compared to other data collection modes and allow for the longest and most intense discussions (Neuman, 2014). The intense discussions with participants in this research lasted for between one hour minimum and one and half hours at most.

Similar studies have used face-to-face interviews to collect empirical data from respondents. A research undertaken by Ibrahim et al. (2015) successfully applied face-to-face interviews to collect data during the development of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework for an international surgical initiative. One of the main objectives of the study was to develop a M & E strategy that includes key priorities of both donors and recipients. The utilization of face-to-face interviews also assisted with defining the meaning of some of the attributes that were included in the data collection instrument.

Also, another similar study by Guerra-Lopez & Hicks (2015a) to craft a multi-actor M & E framework geared for human and institutional capacity development, utilised face-to-face interviews to collect empirical data from sampled respondents. Following the interviews held with the respondents, the researchers identified themes and established linkages between them before proceeding to draw conclusions. As articulated earlier, the researcher was unable to conduct face-to-face interviews due to the Covid-19 global health pandemic but instead he used the Zoom computer platform to interview respondents.

Last, Csiernik et al. (2015a) undertook a study on how the Logic Model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. The utilisation of face-to-face interviews to collect empirical data assisted the researchers in evaluating how to evaluate the efficacy of multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements and how to assess all the key components associated with it. The face-to-face interviews had the advantage of collecting data about the problem and bringing together information from other similar programmes that were confronted with the same issue. Although this research utilised the Zoom computer platform to interview the respondents, it also experienced the similar benefits as the Csiernik et al. (2015a) study.

Following collection of the data from the respondents and in order to protect the privacy of respondents, the data was stored in a password protected computer and was only accessed by the researcher (Babbie, 2016).

3.3.5 Research data and information processing and analysis

This section describes the research data and information processing and analysis procedures that were followed.

3.3.5.1 Research data and information processing

Data processing involves the reorganization of raw data into a format appropriate for capturing into a computer (Neuman, 2014). It usually entails transcribing, thematic analysis and data fragmentation (Babbie, 2016; Cooper & Schindler, 2014) for qualitative data. The steps that were followed are further elaborated below.

Step 1: Transcription

Cooper & Schindler (2014) maintain that data transcription refers to the conversion of words from an interview into written form. This process is not restricted to text alone (Babbie, 2016). Following data collection, interview recordings were transcribed verbatim so that all the information from the respondents is captured. This approach is in line with that adopted by Csiernik et al. (2015a) who undertook a study on how the Logic Model evaluation process can be applied to develop a multi-actor Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) in Canada. After recording the data on digital recorders during the interviews, the researchers also transcribed them verbatim. The main benefit we derived was that were able to collect all the "rich" data from the respondents.

Step 2: Thematic analysis

Following the verbatim transcription of the data, themes were drawn from the interview transcripts in a process that is also known as thematic analysis. This process involves the determination of themes using inductive and deductive thematic analysis to decode raw data (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). This study will adopt the same approach. A similar study by Guerra-Lopez & Hicks (2015a) to craft a multi-actor M & E framework geared for human and institutional capacity development, utilises thematic analysis as well. The

researchers identified themes and established linkages between them before proceeding to draw conclusions.

Step 3: Data fragmentation

Data fragmentation refers to the knotting together of many similar themes into extensive accounts that have consistency in their meaning (Bryman, 2016a). In essence, it involves the splitting or scattering of data in separate areas (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). This research applied data fragmentation by coding the data into distinct portions. This was in line with a similar study by Hassenforder et al. (2016), who applied data fragmentation to develop a framework for evaluating projects that have adopted a participatory planning approach: the Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Planning Processes (MEPPP) to set up institutional arrangements.

Research data and information analysis

Data analysis refers to the systematic organization, integration and examination of data whilst looking for patterns and connections amongst the details therein (Neuman, 2014). In short, it entails the management and interpreting of data (Bryman, 2016a). The principal objective of data analysis is the uncovering of patterns in the data that can assist with understanding social phenomena (Babbie, 2016). In the end, data analysis reduces the collected data to a manageable size (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Bryman (2012) lists various qualitative data analysis techniques that can be utilised including: qualitative content analysis, grounded theory and narrative analysis. This research utilised qualitative content analysis to interpret the empirical data.

Qualitative content analysis, also known as content analysis, is a technique that examines the content and information included in transcripts or other forms of communication media (Neuman, 2014, Bryman 2012). Its main objective is to evaluate the semantic content of information (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Applying content analysis to this research allowed us to garner a deeper understanding of data about how contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements are streamlined (Guerra-Lopez & Hicks, 2015a).

There are recent and similar studies that have applied content analysis to investigate how multi-actor institutional arrangements are developed. For instance, a study undertaken by Ibrahim et al. (2015) successfully applied a content analysis to analyse data collected during the development of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework for an international surgical initiatives. One of the main objectives of the study was to develop a M & E strategy that includes key priorities of both donors and recipients. The utilization of content analysis assisted with defining the meaning of the attributes to include in the M & E system.

Also, a study by , Guerra-Lopez & Hicks (2015a) applied content analysis to craft a multi-actor M & E framework geared for human and institutional capacity development. The main benefit they derived from using content analysis was that it allowed the researchers to conduct an in-depth analysis of qualitative data by uncovering information about how distinct sub-groups organize multi-actor institutional arrangements.

Finally, a study to develop a multi-actor National M & E framework for solid waste management in the Philippines (Serrona et al., 2014) entailed the review of various country level frameworks and systems in order to aggregate and align the frameworks to what is deemed international best practice. The data analysis was done through thematic analysis. The main advantage it provided was that it provided deep insight into complex models of M & E frameworks.

3.3.6 Description of the research respondents

This section provides the most important features used to describe and authenticate the study participants. This predominantly comprised of eleven questions as detailed in the data collection instrument (Section 3.3.1) and the researcher ensured that the participants are eligible to answer the research questions (Babbie, 2014).

Age: respondents must be above 18 years old.

Employment: respondents must be employed at the DSBD or any of its entities.

Role: respondents must be in middle or senior management of the respective targeted institutions.

Number of years in role: Respondents must have been in their roles for at least one year.

Table 4 below presents the names of the actual respondents' titles, gender, designation and organisations represented.

Table 4: Respondents Profile

Respondent Number	Gender	Job Title	Organisation
1.	Male	Programme Management & Planning Expert	Ecosystems Development for Small Enterprise (DSBD)
2.	Male	Chief Director- International Development Cooperation	National Treasury
3.	Male	Chief Director- Business Information Unit Sector and Market Development	DSBD
4.	Female	Deputy Director- International Development Cooperation	National Treasury
5.	Male	Team leader- Ecosystems Development for Small Enterprise	DSBD
6.	Female	Elize Koekemoer - Director Policy and Research	DSBD
7.	Male	Director- International Development Cooperation	National Treasury

The next section discusses the research strengths and weaknesses of the research.

3.4 Research strengths—reliability and validity measures applied

This section details the reliability and validity measures that have been applies in this study. Applying reliability and validity measures to a study strengthens the quality of a study. They are regarded as useful criteria for the judging of social research. Reliability is "concerned with the question of whether the results of a study are repeatable and consistent whilst validity deals with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research." (Bryman, 2016a: 48). In order to further understand the meanings of reliability and validity, it is important to understand the various definitions provided by various qualitative researchers.

Reliability

As described above, reliability is concerned with the dependability or consistency in the measurement of a variable or attribute (Neuman, 2014). It investigates whether the same data would have been gathered every time in recurrent measurements of the same phenomenon (Babbie, 2016). Included in the definition of reliability is the idea of replicability of the results of a research. In effect, it deals with estimating the extent to which measurement of a phenomenon does not have random or unstable error (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). A reliable instrument produces similar results when a test is retested at a different time.

In order to ensure reliability in this research, we applied the trustworthiness criterion through enhancing the credibility of the findings. A similar study by (Hassenforder et al., 2016) applied this criterion in a study to develop a framework for evaluating projects that have adopted a participatory planning approach: the Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Planning Processes (MEPPP) to set up institutional arrangements. The researchers ensured the credibility of the study by undertaking site triangulation. This entailed interviewing a broad range of stakeholders from a variety of organisations. As

illustrated earlier in this chapter, this research applied this same technique by interviewing respondents from the National Department and its entities. The benefit to be derived from site triangulation is that the researcher obtained a variety of perspectives from the respondents resulting in a stable view of the phenomenon.

Validity

Validity in qualitative research is concerned with how effectively social reality is measured using the constructs that have been devised by a research (Neuman, 2014). It refers to the degree to which an empirical measurement sufficiently captures the true meaning of the construct under investigation (Babbie, 2016). It estimates the extent of the degree to which the construct does not have and unstable error (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). There are four main criterions of validity in qualitative research, namely: credibility, dependability, transferability, and conformability. This research applied the dependability criterion, also known as internal validity.

Internal validity is concerned with ensuring that constructs developed in a study do not contain errors inherent in the design of a study that might lead to false conclusions (Neuman, 2014). A study that is dependable is one that accurately depicts the construct under investigation (Babbie, 2014 & Bryman, 2012).

A research by Serrona et al. (2014) to develop the multi-actor National M & E framework for solid waste management in the Philippines (Serrona et al., 2014) entailed the review of various country level M & E frameworks and systems in order to aggregate and align the frameworks to what is deemed international best practice. In an effort to improve the validity of the research, the authors applied the dependability criterion to the study. In this respect, they undertook an inquiry audit. This entailed engaging the services of a researcher who is an expert in the field coming on board to examine the methodology applied and the findings of the research.

3.5 Research weaknesses—technical and administrative limitations

This research may possibly be beset by the following technical and administrative limitations:

Technical limitations

Research design. With respect to the research design, seemingly this study could have benefitted from the application of a mixed-method research strategy. However, given the limited time allocated for the research and in order to address the research objectives, the researcher opted for a qualitative research strategy. In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the research findings, the study was validated with a few experts in institutional arrangements.

Sampling strategy. Purposive sampling is considered by some to be less scientifically rigorous by some. However, given the highly technical requirements of this research, the researcher endeavoured to strategically target only the most relevant stakeholders.

Administrative limitations

These are concerned with some logistical challenges likely to affect the research (Babbie, 2014).

Low response rate. Given that the interviews were initially planned to be conducted face-to-face but the world was confronted with an unprecedented global health pandemic (COVID-19), the response rate was lower than expected. In order to mitigate this, participants were given an option to be interviewed on online meeting applications such as Zoom or Skype and all of the interviews happened through Zoom.

Time-frame. The study involved collecting data from 7 respondents. However, given the limited time allocated for data collection and analysis. In order to make efficient usage of time, the researcher engaged the services of a student who assisted with the verbatim transcription of four interview recordings.


4 Presentation of research results

This chapter presents the products of the research methods and procedures outlined in the previous chapter. This part is constrained to only providing information related to the research questions and propositions as outlined in Chapter 1. Earlier, Chapter 2 interrogates the research problem within the DSBD, the research knowledge gap, the attributes of interest within their academic context and the interpretive frameworks for interpreting the empirical research results. After the development of the conceptual framework in Chapter 2, we then detailed the research strategy, design and procedures in Chapter 3 to gather, organise, process and analyse the empirical data whose results are outlined here. Afterwards, the interpretive framework (institution theory) from Chapter 2 will be summoned to interpret and discuss the research results in Chapter 5.

By answering the research questions in Chapter 1, we aim to achieve our research purpose and consequently address the research problem. The research questions compelled us to probe their associated attributes in Chapter 2. In order to gather empirical data on those attributes, we asked the questions appended in the semi-structured interview guide in Appendix 1 of this report. It is important to note that in line with Wotela (2018), this section is restricted to only presenting the empirical results whilst the next section goes beyond and discusses the empirical results.

The relationships between the themes and subthemes that emerged from the analysis of the interview transcripts is shown in the form of a network diagram in figure 12 below. It should be noted that displaying qualitative data in the forms of diagrams and figures is generally not common (Verdinelli & Scagnoli, 2013). Further, it has been noted that the primary strength associated with displaying themes in the form of networks is that it allows the focus to be put on numerous themes and sub themes simultaneously (Miles et al., 2014). To surmise, networks assist with portraying the linkages and relationships amongst themes and sub-themes. Figure 8 below presents the network of the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the empirical data.

Figure 8: Aligning Multi-stakeholder ODA Interventions at the DSBD



Source (Author's own interpretation)

Form the figure 12 above and in line with the research questions, we can surmise that there are four major themes that have emerged following the interrogation of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in SA National Government Departments generally and to the DSBD specifically. The first theme explores the policies and rules that South African Departments have instituted to harmonise ODA. The second deals with work norms and habits that govern South African Government Departments relationships with external actors. The third theme presents the beliefs and values that Government Departments have instituted in harmonising ODA interventions in South Africa. The last theme unpacks the outcomes of harmonising institutional arrangements and what impact are they leading to or likely to lead to. First, we start by answering the first research question using the empirical data gathered.

4.1 Policies and rules that South African Departments have instituted to harmonise ODA

This section presents and provides the empirical results collected to determine the relationship between the different policies and rules governing ODA between the DSBD and external actors at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), including the comparison of the results to those of similar studies. Broadly, we present the empirical results (Section 4.3.1), discuss the key themes (Section 4.3.1.1), provide the answers to the research question (Section 4.3.1.2) and compare these empirical results to what other similar studies found (Section 4.3.2)

4.1.1 Presentation of empirical results

4.1.1.1 Discussion of key themes- policies and rules

When discussing the different policies and rules governing ODA between the DSBD and external actors at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), several empirical themes emerged. The first theme that emerged pertains to the financing agreements in place between the SA Government and the respective donors. Financing Agreements (FA) are the covenants that prescribe the sets of rules (modalities) in which the allocated donor funds can be used (National Treasury, 2013). They also set out the implementation and management modalities of programmes. Typically, for each single programme, only one FA is entered into by the SA Government and a designated donor (National Treasury, 2013). The intention of having only one FA is to seemingly reduce transaction costs involved in ODA. Respondents 1, 4 and 6 elaborate on the contents of the FA.

> *"DSBD must also look at the financing agreement which is the legal base for implementation of the programme."* Respondent 1

"The first document that would have to be mentioned has to be the financing agreement. And the financing agreement is the overarching agreement governing the programme and that would be signed by generally the minister of finance as well the senior representative from the EU. And within the financing agreement they will be all sorts of information included such as budgets, such as organizational set up and responsibilities, they'd be information in terms of monitoring and reporting, evaluations, audits, communications and visibility, when the various transfers need to be released, timelines and result indicators. All of that information is actually included within a financing agreement. However, they are very limited in terms of detailing the respective roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in a donor funded programme.". Respondent 2.

"Because your project plan is attached to your financing agreement. Your financing agreement is a legal document that says the European Union will provide the National Treasury, specifically the DBE and Department of Labour with X amount of money over X amount of years, treasury is responsible to look after the money, Minister of Finance signs off and they counterpart on the EU , they usually sign first basically, but the financing agreements comes with the project design as well around what has been planned, but its still quite a high level plan around what they want to do, and its also budget that then is attached to the financing agreement." Respondent 4

"*From my side it's a little gentler. Its more personal, it ends on experience of what has happened. And in that sense, we find that it isn't a problem, that generally gets encountered because the draft financing agreement takes place and sometimes there would be coordination with the department. Because the department is involved, because the department sits on the meeting of PSC, there tends to be a fair amount of understanding…you know what a programme is supposed to be funded for, you know which areas of activities the programme will become involved in and if they present something that is not aligned to this, it should be fairly clear to them why it can't be funded as it isn't aligned within the financing agreement*."
Respondent 6

4.1.1.2 Discussion of key themes- legal prescripts and regulations

The second theme relates to the legal prescripts and regulations in place that govern the relationship between the SA Government and the donors. In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the National Treasury Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for ODA (2003), require that there should be mutual accountability

in the management of ODA. This implies that both the SA Government and the donors are expected to be jointly accountable for formulating the regulatory framework for managing ODA.

> *"So, there is a very strong accountability line which is obviously all the legal agreements of government from ODA partners so they are no way that can actually slip through ad do what they like with it. I am not saying it, please don't misunderstand me that mechanism exist to support. So, if we stop the programme it will stop, and the DG (Director General) of the treasury has the final authorization to stop the programme. We have stopped programmes in the past and if we find that compliance is poor we stop it, if we find that people are misusing the funds we stop it and we institute audits, independent audits, we ask the AG (Accountant General) if the AG can't do, if they can't do it we go independent…"* Respondent 5

> *"So, there is very strong control mechanism in that process which makes to overall governance also because the EU insist in every country it works that there is an authorizing officer and that authorizing officer has the power to stop the programme even beyond the EU. So, the EU won't get involved in the programme stopping unless they find fraud, but we can stop it if they find there is irregularities and unacceptable behaviour in a government department"* Respondent 7

4.1.1.3 Discussion of key themes- governance arrangements

The last theme pertains to the prescribed ODA governance arrangements in place to manage and control ODA in SA. This is a critical area of ODA management and the SA Government requires that it should be the one setting out, leading and coordinating the developmental policies and strategies that all donors must subscribe to (National Treasury, 2013). Respondents 1, 5 and 6 shared their thoughts on the issue.

> *"What are the active governance structures overseeing the programme? What role do they play? To whom are the structures accountable?*
> *PSC – governance (see minutes which David can share with you)*
> *PMU (Programme Management Unit)– implementation arrangements*
> *Annual Consultations with EU and SA review the work progress and measures to reinforce programme implementation*
> *Mid term review – independent review of progress and recommendations for implementation improvements or rearrangements*

End of programme evaluation – done independently
Monitoring missions – EU led review of progress achieved" Respondent 1

"…obviously treasury always keeps reserves the right to approve or disapprove financing, so certainly in our case while the PSC is the overarching body that approves concept notes and approves business plans, work plans for the release of funding, they are still governed by the PFMA (Public Finance Management Act) in our case obviously…the Public Finance Management Act. So that still falls under the ambit of the Treasury. The Budget Support funds flow through the fiscus and still subject to the PFMA and the Treasury also withhold the right to sign off funds..." Respondent 5

"In terms of the members in a programme steering committee because it's not reflected in this diagram, all of your key stakeholders are written here, so you'd see DSBD; you'd see the EU, you'd see the National Treasury, you'd see National Treasury IDC you would also see some participation from what I'd call 'civil society' or academia also being involved and the programme steering committee". Respondent 6

Respondents expressed their knowledge of the various governance structures in place for managing ODA. Some respondents mentioned that the Project Steering Committee (PSC), is the structure that they are most familiar with and is the one responsible for creating common understanding between the Department and the donor. Essentially, they view the PSC as being critical for guiding the management and implementation of the ODA programmes. These views are articulated by respondents 2 and 4.

"Because the department is involved, because the department sits on the meeting of PSC, there tends to be a fair amount of understanding…you know what a programme is supposed to be funded for, you know which areas of activities the programme will become involved in and if they present something that is not aligned to this, it should be fairly clear to them why it can't be funded as it isn't aligned within the financing agreement…" Respondent 2

"But ultimately, any business plan has to be approved by the steering committee, that's why the steering committee is the first thing before even the business and the work plans are approved. They put together the steering committee because you don't want this to be between the department and the National Treasury only and the independent office that I am talking about, we need this

thing to also put it to the test of various stakeholders that are part of that particular steering committee so that when you…when they are governance issues that arise during the mid-term evaluation or even the last pan evaluation they…the steering committee should have actually been the buffer in terms of providing an oversite in whatever implementing mechanism that we put in place…" Respondent 4

The next section presents the participants' responses to the research question.

4.1.3 Response to the research question- policies and rules

This section presents and provides the empirical evidence collected when answering the first research question, namely: what are the policies and rules that are used to streamline contrasting multi stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)?

In order to examine the existing policies governing multi-stakeholder interventions, participants were asked to provide their views on the regulations, policies, rules and guidelines used to streamline contrasting multi stakeholder institutional arrangements in the SA Government in general and the DSBD in particular. The participants expressed mixed views when asked to give their understandings on this question. Some respondents indicated that the rules and policies are formed on the basis of the strategic priorities that the Departments would have set for the sector that they are responsible for.

In other words, the respective Department's strategic plan and Annual Performance Plans (APPs) would provide the strategic priorities of the Government Departments. These priorities would in turn, provide direction on the regulations and policies that will apply to the ODA initiatives being implemented. This view is more prominently articulated by respondent 1 and 2 who elaborate that:

"So, sometimes that happens, so there's two ways…the coming in of partners they know that they should not supporting anything that is not a priority aligned to our priorities which is why we work at the budget office of the National Treasury and not in the International Relations Unit of Government…" Respondent 2

Some respondents were opposed to this view and indicated that the finance agreement between the respective donors and the Government is the document that puts forward the rules and any special conditions that will be applied in an ODA programme:

> *"And then when it comes to a specific intervention like in this case, the EDSE programme which is one of many programmes, it is then regulated by a financing agreement. And that financing agreement outlines the rules that going to be applied; it also provides the result areas; it also indicates the modality of how the funds will flow; it also outlines any conditions any special conditions, in other words for example if they are targets that have to be meet before the resources are released. Those are all in the finance agreement, so that finance agreement is binding…binding on both parties, it's commitment by EU to say we will bring in resources, it is also a agreement binding the South African government to say yes we will manage these resources in a certain manner which is very clear and very transparentt…"* Respondent 3

Correspondingly, respondents also indicated that following the endorsement of finance agreements between the Government and the respective donors, guidelines are formulated which operationalise the work rules that have been formed:

> *"Those are then developed jointly between the…like in this case they have a technical assistance team which then comes in to operationalize the work rule so that's now at a lower level where National Treasury's guidelines basically give an indication, give a roadmap of what goes and what doesn't go, what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. And then the department, through the assistant, the technical assistant team now operationalize the work rules that have been agreed upon in the financing agreement …"* Respondent 1

> "*The first document that would have to be mentioned has to be the financing agreement. And the financing agreement is the overarching agreement governing the programme and that would be signed by generally the minister of finance as well the senior representative from the EU. And within the financing agreement they will be all sorts of information included such as budgets, such as organizational set up and responsibilities, they'd be information in terms of monitoring and evaluation, rules and regulations, audits, communications and visibility, when the various transfers needs to be released, timelines and result indicators. All of that information is actually included within a financing agreement."* Respondent 8

Respondent 4 went on to elaborate on the contents of a financing agreement:

> "*The EDSE programme is sector budget programme, because it is sector budget support it is a type of Budget Support to government, which means they will have some conditions in the financing agreement. There is a section called the 'general conditions of the financing agreement' which stipulates audit issues, stipulates conclusion of agreements and who may sign and who may actually then qualify for the money and how the money is transferred and so on, so the general conditions. Within that same financing agreement, it is what we call a 'technical provisions' which means it spells out what will be supported in the programme, so that is the bases of the legal framework for a programme with government with the EU. Where the government department then will implement the programme in this case, I think they will tell you there's a small TA (Technical Assistance) component…well not small but a reasonable size and what rules they adhere to because its international tender and so on…but for the rest of the money that we transfer to them from the South African government, received through the EU to South Africa, we actually have a legislation which is the RDP Fund Act (Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund Act) which governs the overall management of money and transfers of money and help people account and report and so on…and then there is other legislations which you could point out... the PFMA (Public Finance Management Act) must be used and if its municipal level it's the MFMA (Municipal Finance Management Act) , there provincial procumbent policy frame of that, there are legislations that relate to VAT (Value Added Tax) and SARS (South African Revenue Services) regulations which they have to adhere too. So, there is a host those aspects which they need to comply with, they would be using the South African Government systems to implement the money we transfer from the Treasury…the EU money that's transferred. So, the EU transfers into us there is a process for that, there's payment files and David and the team work together with the departments concern to comply with the conditions set up by the EU for release of fixed and valuable transfers in a programme of this nature."* Respondent 4

Similarly, respondents indicated that the financing agreement is a product of consultations and negotiations between the donor and the host country. In other words, it is not a one-sided document whose contents are unilaterally imposed on the beneficiary country:

"Financing agreement is an agreement between the two countries. So, why they bring some proposal in terms of the objectives that they need to pursue but the finance agreement…remember it has to be signed by two countries basically. …while the donor country will be saying these are the areas we will be focusing on. But in terms of the parameters the host country needs to actually agree on those particular parameters…so it's not a one-sided approach." Respondent 8

Some respondents also agreed and explained the role of the Department's Director General (DG) in the setting and maintaining of rules. They further explained that the rule-setting is based on the principles of good governance:

"*Then of course, each department as you know the PFMA is doing, it legislates the accountabilities and the governance mechanisms for each, so in every department the PFMA prescribes the accounting officer as the reporting officer in the department so good governance proceeds. So, the CFO (Chief Financial Officer) only supports the accounting officer who's the DG so that's the technical bureaucratic governance. Every programme of ODA must provide us with the endorsement of Director General of the department, not the Minister the Director General. Because the PFMA grants the Director General accounting authority right…So together with the DG, we as the managers of ODA insist on a mechanism of good governance at the government and the department level."* Respondent 2

In sharp contrast to the above, other respondents proffered differing opinions and maintained that it is not the respective DGs who are responsible for ODA but instead it is the Minister of Finance (housed at the National Treasury).

"Okay. So, the National Treasury is the recipient department okay…and the legal prescript is that our minister, the Minister of Finance is responsible for that funding. So, if there's any risk it is carried by the Treasury and that's why we have the RDP account to make sure that the risk is mitigated and also reporting as they come. So, in terms of the setup, recipient departments report to Treasury and most programmes will have the programmeming structures." Respondent 7

Furthermore, there were also concurring views that indicated that it is the sole responsibility of the National Treasury, through the International Development

Cooperation (IDC) unit, that is responsible for setting the overall rules and regulations governing ODA in the Government, and not the respective DGs of Departments:

> *"So, you would have a situation whereby there's already existing regulations in place in terms of how Official Development Assistance is handled, if you take for instance the national IDC unit, all of our mandate and our function is actually to manage and oversee all Official Development Assistance in South Africa, particularly at a governmental perspective whether it be National, Provincial or Municipal involved in that perspective. But in terms of drafting new regulations it isn't exactly a sphere where new regulations are needed to be updated on an annual basis and also it wouldn't be an area where DSBD themselves would be changing any regulations. So, what the DSBD would come is when they needed to change their own regulation to small businesses but then would only be for the South African policy perspective and there shouldn't be any influence from a foreign donor."* Respondent 4

Seemingly, the volume of rules and regulations sometimes proves burdensome as expressed by some of the respondents:

> *"So, it's not ideal to work with so many rules and regulations but I think that is the nature of bilateral agreements, you are funded by expanding from one government to another government so it's inevitable that you will deal with so much bureaucracy and administration."* Respondent 6

Lastly, there are also rules pertaining to the organisations and entities that donors can support. For example, donors are not allowed to support political parties:

> "*And then there is other rules which says you may not go and directly give out money to any leadership or political leaders…"* Respondent 2

Also, even if Departments individually source and receive donor support, the rule is that the Department must declare it and have it approved by the National Treasury.

> "*So, when people ask for money, they must also in inform the treasury that they are going and asking the Germans for the support and what the support will provide. And they must declare to us what they get and how they are using it. That's all the accountability, transparency and*

reporting that we must ensure. The other rules…like for example they should not support anything that is counterrevolutionary to the current state, so in other words they must not do anything that undermines the legitimacy of this democratic state." Respondent 4

From the foregoing answering of the research question, it is evident that respondents have divergent views regarding the rule-setting in multi-stakeholder ODA initiatives. The next component compares the empirical results to those obtained by other similar studies.

4.1.3 Comparison of research results to other similar studies

This section presents the comparison of the empirical results with those of other similar studies. The intention of having only one Financing Agreement (FA) is to seemingly reduce transaction costs involved in Overseas Development Aid (ODA). Our results are similar to Paul & Vandeninden (2012) who found that the choice of FAs affect the net aid transaction costs but argue that the minimisation of transaction costs should not be primary focus in ODA development.

The research participants criticised the apparent lack of consistency between the donors' policies as well as the SA Government's own policies and rules. This was also highlighted by Matchell (1997) as one of the major criticisms of the modalities of aid delivery. Similarly, one of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) principles advocates for ensuring Alignment, that is, ODA needs to be delivered using the existing country structures rather than parallel structures.

Last, participants bemoaned the voluminous bureaucracy that is involved in managing ODA supported programmes. They indicated that these bureaucratic hurdles are likely to diminish aid effectiveness as inordinate amounts of time and efforts are spent on compliance with donors' rules. The results are also similar to those found by (Acharya et al., 2006), "there are very strong reasons to believe that, all other considerations aside, aid often underperforms because it flows through too many institutional channels. This generates high transactions costs within each recipient nation, and so reduces the value of aid".

The next section details the work norms and habits governing relationships between the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) and external actors.

4.2 Work norms and habits that govern South African Government Departments relationships with external actors

This section presents and provides the empirical results collected to ascertain the work norms and habits governing relationships between the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD and external actors, including the comparison of the results to those of similar studies. Broadly, we present the empirical results (Section 4.2.1), discuss the key themes (Section 4.2.2), provide the answers to the research question (Section 4.2.1.2) and compare these empirical results to what other similar studies found (Section 4.2.2)

4.2.1 Presentation of the empirical results

4.2.1.1 Discussion of key themes- Overseas Development Assistance M & E

There were contrasting views in terms of how respondents believe Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) should proceed. Some respondents are of the view that the ODA supported interventions are mandated to use existing Government M & E systems:

> "*So, the modality that the EDSE programme is utilizing as you know is called Budget Support and because it is Budget Support, it then insists that any monitoring and evaluation that is undertaken should be based on the South African Government M&E system…*" Respondent 3

On the other hand, some participants suggest that every ODA programme usually sets up its own independent M & E system which then brings with it its own specific set of challenges:

> "*Further, in terms of more specific tools, so if you look at the EU for instance or the German support or most bilateral partners, they would add a specific budget line item to deal with one or two evaluations. If that is not put in, then it would be specified in the agreement…in that contract between the partners, especially at the recipient level to say that, who is responsible for the M&E…*" Respondent 2

"*Now typically a project modality then entails setting up independent M&E for the project, so you are not just subsuming everything into the national systems or the government systems. You are then setting up a different M&E system and I think that's where the challenge now comes in, that because Government in its day to day activities is not utilizing the typical EU Budget Support."* Respondent 7

"And when the ODA programme ends then we are supposed to use the Government's own M&E systems, so whatever the government is using, coming from DPME (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation) or the Department itself having its own M&E then becomes applicable, but because during implementation we were utilizing the combination of the project modality and Budget Support modality you then have to evaluate and monitor this intervention EDSE in very separate and unique manner. Which is where we are at the moment, so we have an M&E for the EDSE programme and the idea is to try and make ways of how the EDSE programme M&E can also try to be aligned to the Government's overall M&E system or alternatively the Departments M&E system." Respondent 5

There were further divergent views expressed on who should ultimately be responsible for monitoring and evaluation in a multi-stakeholder programme. Some respondents are of the opinion that it should be done by donors:

"*…monitoring and evaluation is supposed to be done by EU anyway, because being the donor they need to do that. So, they will tell you that we will actually monitor the implementation of this but we also going to do what we call mid-term evaluation of the programme, where they are going to send their expertise to interview key stakeholders so that they get a sense in terms of how this money has been utilized, how impactful it has been in terms of the objectives of that particular donor.*" Respondent 1

Whilst others are of the view that monitoring and evaluating ODA interventions should ideally be done by the National Treasury International Development Cooperation (IDC) office:

"*Look I mean it hasn't been really difficult because there is a coordinating mechanism, for instance the IDC in the international donor office in the National Treasury is doing a coordination of all these donors, so they should actually provide the resources (experts) for doing the monitoring and evaluation of these ODA programmes*". Respondent 3

It is interesting to note that respondent 4 from the IDC concurs and indicates that they also align M & E according to the requirements of the donor:

"*Okay. So, the National Treasury is the recipient department okay…and the legal prescript is that our minister, the Minister of Finance is responsible for that funding. So, if there's any risk it is carried by the Treasury and that's why we have the RDP account to make sure that the risk is mitigated and also reporting as they come. So, in terms of the setup, recipient departments report to Treasury and most programmes will have the programming structures. What the IDC has done, is that it will consider what type of M & E the partner or the funder requires and align it to make sure that we have the requisite detail to also approve finance to do evaluations, to do monitoring etc…"* Respondent 4

That being said, it is noteworthy that there are contradictions in views expressed by National Treasury (NT) IDC (International Development Cooperation) Officials interviewed regarding how M & E is structured in ODA supported interventions. As shown above, respondent 4 indicates that M & E is done according to the funder's requirements, whilst respondent 2 indicates that M & E is actually Government M & E systems are used when the ODA budget iabove R 100 million:

"*When developing M & E to support a development project NT, the relevant line department and development partners agree which procedures to follow. These are nowadays determined by the size of the project. For example, it would be difficult to manage a programme of more than R 100m using development partner procedures so this is done in rare situations. Most often it is agreed that SA government M & E procedures must be followed for many reasons including that government departments build levels of efficiency and effectiveness in use of government systems.*" Respondent 2

On the other hand, some respondents lamented that monitoring and evaluating ODA programmes using donor requirements, is generally characterized by too much bureaucracy and administration:

> *"So, its not ideal to work with so many rules and regulations when undertaking ODA M & E, but I think that is the nature of bilateral agreements, you are funded by expanding from one government to another government so its inevitable that you will deal with too much bureaucracy and administration*." Respondent 6

Last, some respondents indicate that they would prefer to use the donors' M & E systems due to the perceived shortfalls of the Government M & E system:

> "*The Budget Support Programmes use government M&E systems. The problem is that in general terms, the M&E system of government is itself weak which reinforces poor implementation…"* Respondent 1

The shortfall in Government M & E systems mentioned above leads to a sub-theme that explores informants' views on weaknesses in Government affecting the implementation of donor projects.

4.2.1.2 Discussion of key themes- weaknesses in Government affecting the implementation of ODA programmes

When discussing the are the work norms and habits governing relationships between the DSBD and external actors at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), several empirical themes emerged. The first theme that emerged pertains to weaknesses in Government affecting the implementation of ODA programmes.

Participants expressed various views on perceived weaknesses in Government affecting the implementation of donor projects. First, they bemoaned what they perceive as a lack of commitment of Government officials to ODA supported initiatives. They indicated that due to the comparatively low budgets that donors bring to the table compared to their already Government allocated budgets- officials sometimes exhibit low levels of commitment to ODA initiatives.

"*I think one would like to see…a level of commitment by the department. You see the tension in a South African environment is that the department is managing multi-billion-rand budgets and the donor is coming in with a couple of millions assistance. So, you might let's say a particular programme which SEDA is implementing and that programme is bringing R15 million over three years, but that manager he is managing a budget of maybe R2/3 million over R50 million. And this R50 million is obviously peanuts as far as this individual is concerned, so the level of commitment therefore goes down because what its saying is 'look you bothering me, they are regulations, a lot of paperwork that is required to access R15 million, yet a sign a small piece of paper and I get R200/300 million from National Treasury, so why must I bother? And I have to report on it, I don't have the same requirements when I am managing a much bigger programme*…" Respondent 4

Similar sentiments were also expressed by respondent 1:

"*So, the department would be informed that 'here is a pot of money that's coming through, give us areas where you feel resources should be deployed'. And it takes time you know, for them again like I am saying they look at it and 'say ten million, five million, why must I really bother myself?'"* Respondent 1

In addition, many respondents lamented what they perceive as low levels of capacity of Government officials to perform their designated functions. They gave examples of officials being appointed in posts such as M & E without having the requisite skills and experience:

"*Capacity in terms of the ability to do the work; capacity in terms of being in some cases stretched to be able to respond. I mean like you remember…you recall in the M&E department when we were interacting with our colleagues and they were very open in terms of saying look they never run an M&E function in their entire career, but yet they are now having an M&E entity that they have to manage. So, clearly that individual or those individuals require a great deal of capacity in order for them to deliver.*" Respondent 5

There were further comments about the lack of M & E capacity at the Department:

"I think we are very clear, we've got a clear logframe and we have to have a logframe, and we have had to, we've had the luxury of having being able to develop our own plan, and of course the department does as well to some extent but I think from an M&E perspective, part of the challenge think with them is that is that they don't have M&E experts on board and they don't have officials who necessarily got an M&E background…" Respondent 5

This view is also reinforced by respondent 8, who complains about the Government official lacking the necessary competencies and skills to manage ODA programmes:

"*Look I think one thing that one would say has been a bit of a stumbling block is the coordination of these things. For instance it's because of lack of capacity sometimes in certain areas in government we find that you end up not aligning or technical assistance that's supposed to align itself very clearly with the Budget Support, so in essence when you provide a technical assistance it needs to align itself towards the projects that are there so that it actually match the support. But in this case, you find that the technical assistant ends up being utilized as sort of a project leads and this is not how this is supposed to happen. It supposed to provide guidance in a sense, but because of the nature of lack of expertise in government, we unfortunately end up gravitating towards technical aspects as we are actually the lead individual in the project from the Government side, whereas it's not supposed to be the case*." Respondent 8

Some respondents suggest that the Government generally has less capacity because there are simply not enough numbers of trained and skilled officials to oversee implementation of programmes:

"*So I think official, as an official in a South African state, I think we (a) we've got far less capacity in terms of the size of country that we have per capita…the number of people we have in the country. Typically, if you went to European contact they might have 4 times more officials than we do. (b) Partly because of our essentially our bureaucracy, taking DSBD as a good example, there has been it takes a long time to settle a department down. So there has been, so typically you'll have most of the senior managers in acting positions. (c) There has been a lot of political interference over the last particularly under the previous dispensation where the former president played a significant, well certainly the administration played a significant role in deploying cadres. I think that was a major problem that has ripple effects all the way through departments. You could see it in areas like minerals and energy and whatever, social development,*

wherever these big tenders are. So, I think a whole lot of reasons are sitting there behind why we've got weak capacity and we are probably a lot weaker than we were ten years ago." Respondent 7

The next section presents the participants' responses to the research question.

4.2.1.3 Response to the research question

The research question posed is what are the work norms and habits governing relationships between the DSBD and external actors? With reference to the second research question, this section presents participants' views on their views about work norms and habits governing relationships between the DSBD and external actors. Many respondents know of the existence of National Treasury (NT) guidelines on how ODA should be applied in National Departments. This view is also shared by respondents 1 and 4 who submits that these guidelines are clear in setting out the parameters of how ODA should be deployed in the respective Government Departments:

"*Okay, so National Treasury has developed very clear guidelines on Official Development Assistance (ODA), and those guidelines stipulate how any incoming aid into South Africa should be deployed. And they do insist that incoming Official Development Assistances should be aligned to the priorities of the country- that's number one. They also insist that it should utilise South African government assistance, in other words like an Official Development Assistance should be on budget and will be reported on budget and also monitored, evaluated utilising South African government procedures and systems. So, right from the outset they set out very clear guidelines on how any incoming Official Development Assistance should be regulated in South Africa*." Respondent 1

Respondent 4 goes on to outline the specific Acts and regulations governing ODA in SA:

"*…we actually have a legislation which is the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) Fund Act which governs the overall management of money and transfers of money and help people account and report and so on…and then there is other legislations which you could point out... the PFMA (Public Finance Management Act) must be used and if its municipal level it's the MFMA (Municipal Finance Management Act), there's the Preferential*

Procumbent Policy Framework Act of that, there are legislations that relate to VAT (Value Added Tax) and SARS (South African Revenue Service) regulations which they have to adhere to..." Respondent 4

In contrast, some respondents indicate that different donors seem to apply differing ways of deploying ODA in National Governments. For example, the European Union (EU) is understood to prefer providing ODA in the form of budget support programmes with differing norms to those prescribed for by the NT. This view is articulated by respondent 4:

"*…the European Commission has different ways of supporting us. The EDSE (Ecosystems Development for Small Business Development) programme is a sector budget programme. Given that it is a sector budget support it is a type of Budget Support to government, which means they will have some conditions in the financing agreement. There is a section called the 'general conditions of the financing agreement' which stipulates audit issues, stipulates conclusion of agreements and who may sign and who may actually then qualify for the money and how the money is transferred and so on, so the general conditions. Within that same financing agreement, it is what we call a 'technical provisions' which means it spells out what will be supported in the programme, so that is the bases of the legal framework for a programme with government with the EU…*" Respondent 4

Despite these differences existing in the norms and habits surrounding ODA deployment, the majority of respondents agree that when the ODA funds land in SA, they are housed at the National Treasury. This view is also articulated prominently by respondent 6:

"*Well donor supported programmes, for instance you would have an EU supported programme for instance coming to the country and say we are going to support small businesses, obviously that money will not land at DSBD directly, it will land at what we call IDC at National Treasury- which is essentially the International Donor Office at National Treasury. That money will actually be housed there.*" Respondent 6

There were sub-themes that emerged regarding how ODA is then monitored and evaluated. The respondents indicated that there are modalities in place regarding the

Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) of these donor funds. First, some respondents indicated that an office must be set up to oversee the management of the funds:

> *"…and then you couch those particular programmes but then you need also to set up an office that is going to be looking at this very closely. Because remember there are multi-stakeholders that are supposed to have an interest in this. So, you need to put up an independent office that will be looking after this money that will be also making sure that the proposal in terms of the business and work plans are up to the tee, before that money can be channelled to the department. So, that office should be independent from DSBD but very liaise with the department very closely*." Respondent 3

Second, the respondents also indicated that the "independent" office, namely the Programme Management Unit (PMU) that manages the donor funds is accountable to the Project Steering Committee (PSC):

> "*So, that is the structuring basically of how thing is going to be…So, all those projects that are point around that particular objective are going to be approved by the project steering committee and then be actually translated into business and work plans for all the implementing partners to implement those projects. And then be monitored by that particular steering committee to be a watch dog or oversight structure that makes sure that implementation goes smoothly in terms of those projects. So, that is how the institutional arrangement is actually formulated around the donor funding*." Respondent 1.

> *"Multi stakeholders are brought in through a Programme Steering Committee to oversee the programme. A separate Programme Management Unit PMU) is set up to assist with programme management for the department through low capacity to take on additional responsibilities created by the programme. All documents and steps to implement will follow government processes except for the PMU appointment and TA facility."* Respondent 5

The next section provides a comparison of the research results to other similar studies.

4.2.2 Comparison of research results to other similar studies

This section details the comparison of the research results with other similar studies. The respondents indicated that there is an apparent unwillingness of the donors to use already

existing country M & E systems. One of the reasons cited for this is the donors' lack of trust in the effectiveness of these systems. These findings are similar to those of Martinez-alvarez et al., (2017) and The World Bank (1998) who reported that one of the reasons for the low achievement of results by donor funded programmes is the undermining of recipient countries' systems by donors who set up parallel systems.

Further, the participants observed that there is at times low levels of commitment of SA Government Officials to donor funded initiatives. They submitted the reason for this as being the comparatively low budgets allocated by donors versus what the SA Government Departments' budgets already allocate. The results are similar to the ones found by Mukuni & Bill (2014) who also discovered a link between the quantum of the donor budgets and the perceived dedication of officials to donor programmes.

The respondents also complained about the seeming low levels of implementation capacity of Government Officials. They complained that there were weak institutional capacities to effectively manage donor programmes and these had a negative effect on the general effectiveness of aid. These results are similar to those found by Burnside & Dollar (2000) who found that aid is more effective in countries with strong institutional mechanisms in place to direct and coordinate aid.

4.3 Beliefs and values that Government Departments have instituted in harmonising of ODA interventions in South Africa

This section presents and provides the empirical results collected to ascertain the existing beliefs and values governing multi stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), including the comparison of the results to those of similar studies. Generally, we present the empirical results (4.1.1), discuss the key themes (Section 4.1.2), provide the answers to the research question (Section 4.1.1.2) and compare these empirical results to what other similar studies found (Section 4.1.2)

4.3.1 Presentation of empirical research results

4.3.1.1 Discussion of key themes- unwritten rules

There were several themes that emerged from the data. The first theme is concerned with what the respondents consider as the unwritten rules needs in ODA supported initiatives. With regards to this theme, many of the respondents were of the view that mutual respect, accountability and transparency are the key ingredients. Many of the respondents consider those as the unwritten rules that need to be there for the ODA partnership to bear fruit. For instance, respondent 1 observes that:

> *"I think when it comes to the unwritten rules, the issue of respect on both parties is key. It is not anywhere documented that we have to have mutual respect and accountability, but that to me is one fundamental point. The other unwritten rule is the issue of transparency and the accountability that has to really be respected and given due consideration by both parties, it's never documented, it's never written but it's also assumed." Respondent 1*

This view is further reinforced by Respondent 7 who argues that the sovereignty of the both the donor and recipient country must always be adhered to. This he maintains ensures that donors do not bully the recipient countries simply because the donors have access to resources.

> *"The other unwritten rule is the issue of non-interference, in other words yes you are coming with your money but don't come in to bully the partner. Yes, the partner is looking for resources but also the partner requires a level of space where they can continue doing what they want to do, while they are at the same time coming into to be given resources." Respondent 7*

Nonetheless, there are some divergent opinions as well. One camp appears to be of the view that even though donors are bringing the required support to National Departments, oftentimes their support comes with a lot of requirements for donors to be showcased which then ends up overshadowing the work being done by the respective Departments. In the end the Department is now put into a position wherein its seen to be accountable more to the donors than to the citizens of the country. This view is much more pronounced with respondent 3, who states that:

"The other unwritten rule that I see, is from a donor perspective…the donor needs a recognition for the sources that they are putting on the ground. Yes, they do have guidelines on visibility and communication normally in all these programmes, but the donors oftentimes expect to be given more than the just recognition for what they have also contributed. This leads to a situation in which it might appear to our citizenry that were are no longer accountable to them but are now reporting to the donors." Respondent 3

The second camp seems to believe that there is tension that is brought about by perceived meagre funds allocated by donors when compared with the already existing budgets of the departments. This belief then results in lessened commitment by some officials when engaging with donor supported programmes. For instance, respondent 4 maintains that:

"*I think one would like to see more levels of commitment by the Department. You see the tension in a South African environment is that the department is managing multi-billion-rand budgets and the donor is coming in with a couple of millions assistance. So, you might let's say a particular programme which SEDA (Small Enterprises Development Agency) is implementing with donor support and that programme is bringing* R *15 million over three years, but that manager he is managing a budget of over* R *50 million. And this* R *15 million from donors is obviously peanuts as far as this individual is concerned, so the level of commitment therefore goes down because what its saying is 'look you bothering me, they are regulations, a lot of paperwork that is required to access* R*15 million, yet a sign a small piece of paper and I get* R*200/300 million from National Treasury, so why must I bother? And I have to report on it, I don't have the same requirements when I am managing a much bigger programme*'. Respondent 4

The last camp appears to be on the middle ground and maintains that even before Departments interact with donors, there are existing values and beliefs that have been established over time. These have been reinforced through prescripts such as directives. This view is most prominent in respondent 1, who argues that:

"*Okay, so the norms and appropriate behaviour are two ways. So, in other words…South Africa has norms and behaviours so do departments and that has been established over time through practice and through directives. So, the first thing we say to our partners when they come to South Africa is they come through officially the government of South Africa represented by the treasury, not Environment or anybody else…And the reason for that is we need to see whose*

giving what money and we centralize accountability and allocation purposes, you know the treasury is around efficient allocation and utilization of public resources." Respondent 1

To surmise, the sentiment from the respondents seems to be that donors' support is welcome but should be deployed in a manner that respects the sovereignty of the recipient country. Also, participants seem to suggest that the processes around manage and report on those donor funds do need to be cumbersome. The next section presents the participants' responses to the research question.

4.3.1.2 Response to the research question

This section answers the research question we posed earlier, namely: what are the different beliefs and values governing multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements at the DSBD? The respondents indicated that there is generally high levels of understanding and coordination on what issues need to be supported. These sentiments were articulated by respondents 4 and 7:

"From my side it's a little gentler. Its more personal, it ends on experience of what has happened. And in that sense, we find that it isn't a problem, that generally gets encountered because the draft financing agreement takes place and sometimes there would be coordination with the department. Because the department is involved, because the department sits on the meeting of PSC, there tends to be a fair amount of understanding…you know what a programme is supposed to be funded for, you know which areas of activities the programme will become involved in and if they present something that is not aligned to this, it should be fairly clear to them why it can't be funded as it isn't aligned within the financing agreement." Respondent 4

So, we tend to find that people are generally reasonable, and they understand why something can or cannot be done, they have been involved in the process. So, that's why we generally don't seem to encounter this types of problems, if we do encounter we discuss them and find a meaningful resolution but of a situation like that wouldn't happen, that's then where what I'd call situations that Robin has referred on, that would then be the 'not so' nice direction that it would have to go to. Respondent 7

It also emerged that the number of donors actively assisting the SA Government has been dwindling over the years. This has been attributed to the notion that SA is becoming a

middle-income country and thus the donors consider the country to be on the road to recovery.

"So, a lot of partners that have invested here heavily have stayed only in the private…the UK is a prime example. Germany is a positive example and UK is a negative example…the UK actually decided to discipline South Africa in 2017/16, in fact they started discussions in 2014/ 2015. So, what is happening with them is that they decided that they want to leave this country because they think that South Africa was on a road to recovery and was becoming a upper middle income country and so on, so they used a lot of what we call the 'global balance' to disengage to use it in South Africa and then thereby exist the system. What we find is, if those partners continue to do that, then South Africa will be left pretty much on its own very soon." Respondent 8

"If you look at the number of partnerships now where we still struggling with policies, refinement and implementation, partners have reduced significantly, we used to have about 32 to 34 partners supporting South Africa and now we have to 8 to 10 which means there is a drastic reduction in political goodwill and developmental agenda for South Africa despite the fact that the region is still struggling…" Respondent 2

However, the respondents indicated that they would still like to see more partners on board who can assist the country to eliminate poverty.

"We want to see actually our poor people break out of poverty, so we need to see more partners having the same mind-set, and we need to see global discussions and dialogues, addressing this problem of reduced engagement with what we call 'middle-income' countries which are called to be more developed than others and they not withdraw support…" Respondent 5

In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), one of the values that the SA Government subscribes to is the belief that it has capable Government systems. This is demonstrated in the Government's insistence that ODA programmes should be implemented by the Government unless agreed beforehand with the respective donor.

"All programmes of ODA are implemented by government unless agreed beforehand that there would be an implementing partner. Which could include agencies of government or other international organisations (GIZ for Germany, ENABLE for Belgium, UN agencies, etc.)" Respondent 2

Another demonstration of the seeming high levels of country ownership can be found in the existence of country strategy papers that the country has in place. Beyond the National Development Plan (NDP), the country insists on formulating country strategy papers with respective donors.

> *"We also have what are mostly called Country Strategy Papers with each development partner. In these we identify key priorities of development for the country and DP (Development Partners) focus areas within the broad strategy document. Some partners go further and develop indicative programme areas. Once those are developed then they are used to guide broad programme areas. IDC then engages relevant line and or several line departments with DP to plan a concept. Once agreed then a full independent feasibility study determines the exact details of the programme in consultation with all stakeholders and overseen by IDC (International Development Cooperation) and line and DP. The study then is refined into a proposal for financing by DP HQ through some bureaucratic processes on DP side and then our side."* Respondent 4

> *When programmes are developed they must firstly take account of government policy and guidelines including ODA. All development partners are aware of these and IDC brings it to their attention when drafting any new programmes. Once SA government agrees that there is sufficient compliance or alignment then the programme is sent for approvals at their HQ of DP and then by our legal services (DOJ for domestic law and DIRCO for international law compliance).* Respondent 2

Similarly, the country is a signatory to various global compacts which guide how donors and recipient countries should work.

> *"The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the various global compacts and high level meetings (Ghana, Busan, Mexico, Accra, etc.) and nowadays the new Global Partnership Forum supported by UNDP and OECD DAC that prescribe how DPs and Partner Countries should work together generally and specifically"* Respondent 4

Importantly, the respondents indicated that the key values guiding relationships with donors are shared goodwill, transparency, accountability and commitment to the SA Government's development cooperation goals and agenda.

"The other key aspect is the shared goodwill, transparency, accountability and commitment to our development cooperation goals and agenda which are the key drivers for our development cooperation relationships" Respondent 4

These values resonate with the five Principles contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), namely: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. The next section compares the research results to what other similar studies found.

4.3.2 Comparison of research results to other similar studies

This section provides a comparison of the empirical results outlined above with those of similar studies that we interrogated when determining the knowledge gap. The participants indicated that the number of donors actively supporting the SA Government has been steadily declining over the years. They reported the reason for the decline as being that SA is no longer perceived as a low-income country and instead is now classified as a middle-income country. These results are different to those observed in Tanzania- which has also seen a steady decline in the number of donors' supporting its Government. The reason attributed for the decline in donors in Tanzania is that donors were under pressure to achieve and demonstrate results (Martinez-alvarez et al., 2017)

The participants also indicated that there needs to be mutual trust and accountability between the donors and the recipient countries. They went further to indicate that at the heart of the relationship should be transparency and the mutual respect of each country's sovereignty. These results are similar to those of Chowdhury and Garonna (2007) who maintain that the centrepiece to successful ODA is shared values amongst the recipient and donor countries.

4.4 Intended outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD

This section presents and provides the empirical results collected to ascertain the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), including the comparison of the results to those of similar studies. Generally, we present the empirical results (4.1.1), discuss the key themes (Section 4.1.2), provide the answers to the research question (Section 4.1.1.2) and compare these empirical results to what other similar studies found (Section 4.1.2)

4.4.1 Presentation of empirical results

This section answers the research question we posed earlier, namely: what are the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD).

4.4.1.1 Discussion of key theme- outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements

This section provides the themes concerning the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD. Some respondents indicated that the National Treasury (NT) already provides clear guidelines on how multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements should be harmonised.

> *"Okay, so National Treasury has developed very clear guidelines on Official Development Assistants (ODA), and those guidelines stipulate how any incoming aid into South Africa should be deployed. And they do insist that incoming Official Development Assistances should be aligned to the priorities of the country that's number one. They also insist that it should utilize South African government assistance, in other words like an Official Development Assistant should be on budget and will be reported on budget and also monitored, evaluated utilizing South African government procedures and systems. So, right from the outset they set out very clear guidelines on how any incoming Official Development Assistance should be regulated in South Africa."* Respondent 1

In contrast, some respondents indicated that different partners utilise their own systems and come up with their own monitoring and reporting systems that are different from the ones utilised by the Government:

"Remember when EU says we want to support South Africa to implement a particular project and here is funding in 45 million in Euros that we are actually providing as a donor funder. And then that particular EU being a block but now in this case actually I will actually consider it as a country, we will have to enter into a particular agreement that draws very clearly the parameters of how that money is going to be utilised and how the reporting is supposed to look like and that reporting in terms of what are the oversite structures that need to be created and also what level of monitoring is supposed to be happening…" Respondent 7

"*So, the modality that the EDSE programme is utilizing as you know is called Budget Support and because it is Budget Support, it then insist that any monitoring and evaluation that is undertaken should be based on the South African government M&E system and that the EDSE should not have a separate M&E system, but of course because South Africa utilizes Budget Support in a very different way, in a sense that they want each and every intervention that is coming in to be reported upon, to monitored, to be evaluated. It then becomes more like a project type of Official Development Assistance modality. Now typically a project modality then entails setting up independent M&E for the project, so you are not just subsuming everything into the national systems or the government systems. You are then setting up a different M&E system and I think that's where the challenge now comes in…"* Respondent 3

4.4.1.2 Response to the research question

This section presents and provides the empirical evidence collected when answering the last research question, namely: what are the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD? Almost all the respondents expect positive outcomes to materialise once ODA M & E institutional arrangements are harmonised. In line with the principle of alignment espoused in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective (2005), many of the respondents are of the view that there should not be a separate donor M & E system to begin with. They further explained that using a single M & E system for both Departments and ODA supported programmes would ensure greater coherence and tracking of overall performance of the Department as a whole. For instance, respondent 1 and 5 are of the view that:

"*So…that's a very good question you are asking. I think to start with if DSBD had a strong M&E system, what the donor programme is doing should be entangled with the DSBD M&E system. In other*

words, there shouldn't be any separate M&E system, we should just basically fit into to what DSBD is doing and what DSBD is tracking, we should then have that information when coming into the programme. At the programme level you could do certain monitoring and evaluation, in other words at a much lower level…at a micro level your own internal M&E just to track some of your targets that you have set…" Respondent 1

"And the more we have greater alignment of institutional arrangements, including coordination and coherence in the support for policy and policy writing, the more we can deliver it (ODA programmes) better and the better the results will be then, so that's why we do the way we do. Respondent 5

Some respondents agreed that the absence of a well-established M & E system at the DSBD is the reason why donors sometimes elect to rely on their own M & E system instead of using the Department's own M & E system. In this respect, respondent 5 explains that:

"But broadly as a Government support programme and also as a Budget Support programme we should really be just relying on the M&E of DSBD and then drawing information from that M&E. But because it's not fully in place or not really well established, it therefore then means you end up having to rely on this independent M&E that has been set up for the programme. I mean when know…as you know this programme has got three key results areas. The first one looking at competitiveness of SMME's, DSBD should be tracking that…so we don't even need to have separate indicators…we should actually say to DSBD 'tell us how you monitor competitiveness of SMME's in the country…". Respondent 5

The Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness (2005) advocate for harmonization of aid-that is, countries should have in place their own measurable frameworks to monitor and assess progress of programmes. Similarly, the harmonization of M & E systems has also been cited as having the potential of aligning programme reporting and thus contributing to the achievement of programme results. This view is strongly articulated by respondents 2 and 8:

"And the more there is coordination and coherence in the M & E systems, the more we can deliver it better and the better the results will be then, so that's why we do the way we do." Respondent 2

"Secondly, we talk about access to finance, improving access to finance. Again, we should be able to go to DSBD and say tell me how you monitor, how do you evaluate finance in the country. Then thirdly we are talking of improving the regulatory and administrative environment for SMME's, these are core areas of the responsibility of DSBD as the department which is clearly heading the development of SMME's. So, we should then be able to go to them and say, 'give me your indicators that you are using, give me your baseline information…so how do you then monitor?' And then we report according to their M&E indicators. But in this instance, we do not have those indicators so the programme then has to construct its own indicators at a programme level, whereas really, we should have been just been feeding to what is already established at a national level." Respondent 8

The divergent M & E systems used by the Department and the ODA programme could result in differing results being reported by the Department and the programme. This view is explained by respondent 4

So, since the M & E systems between the programme and the Department are different: the M & E logframe, the intervention logic, the change that has been established in this programme then becomes something different to what you have at a national level. So, in brief they should be efforts to try and make sure that by the time this programme is done, the department has an M&E which in a way mirrors what the programmes M&E system is attempting to evaluate and monitor". Respondent 4

There were also views that one of the reasons for the divergent M & E systems is the lack of donors' trust in the SA Government's M & E system. The respondents indicated that unifying M & E systems may result in complementarity of results and would reduce unnecessary bureaucracy. For example, respondents 1 and 3 states that:

"So, there is a lot of things we want to see our partners do. We want to also see them do less tiding in other words come here and tells us we must do fifteen things for you before we get any money, that's tiding. We don't want you to create fifteen thousand bureaucracies like the EU is doing currently, we want you to actually have a streamlined M & E process- trust the SA Government, get Government to report to you on how they are doing and work in complementarity. So, we want a lot of things to be done…" Respondent 3

"What would you like to see more of and less of in the relationship? Less corruption and poor implementation, better absorption of finances provided, resources used for purposes specified at the outset

and not used as slush funds, improved implementation capacity and policy implementation on the government of SA side and more financing, less onerous bureaucracy, more implementation support on the DP (Development Partner) side." Respondent 1

On the other hand, there a few dissenting voices that indicated that donors' M & E systems are different from the ones used by the SA Government and thus, they do not foresee harmonization happening. This view is more apparent with respondent 3

"No, no its different. Remember M&E in government is very different, for instance while we doing M&E in the department is highly centralized that's why we have the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation which is centralizing any monitoring, even though some of the activities are monitored in nature but they are actually centralized in terms of M&E. However, we also have EU donor funding is different in the sense that they really…it's a follow the money approach…" Respondent 3

The next section provides a comparison of the empirical research results with what other similar studies have found.

4.4.2 Comparison of research results to other similar studies

This section presents the comparison of the empirical results with those of other similar studies. The empirical findings relating to the challenges surrounding the designing of institutional arrangements that can produce the desired outcomes, are similar to those found by Boyer & Boyer (2001). Their study found that there is complexity and difficulty involved in setting up M & E systems when there are many stakeholders involved.

Furthermore, respondents pointed out that the political and bureaucratic hurdles that involve donors supported interventions are at the heart of the unwillingness of Governments to use donor systems. Similarly, Winters (2012) found that the red tape involved with using donor systems adds to the transaction costs of aid and create hesitancy of recipient countries to using them. The next section concludes the Chapter.

4.5 Conclusion

This Chapter presented the products from collecting, processing and analyzing the research information collected from the research participants. Financing agreements are the encompass the key the policies and rules used streamline contrasting multi stakeholder

institutional arrangements at the DSBD. Further, the key legal prescript guiding ODA is the National Treasury Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for ODA (2003). There is voluminous bureaucracy involved in managing ODA supported interventions which is likely to diminish the effectiveness of aid. One of the chief causes of this bureaucracy is the contrasting M & E requirements and systems of differing donors. Similarly, each donor has in place distinct governance arrangements for their ODA which places an additional burden on recipient countries. They key unwritten rules surrounding multistakeholder ODA are mutual respect, accountability and the respect of the sovereignty of both the recipient and donor countries. The next chapter discusses and interprets the empirical findings.

5. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This research set out to interrogate how multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) supported interventions are streamlined at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD). In order to achieve this objective, the paper posed four research questions. First, what are the different policies and rules that are used to harmonise multi-stakeholder interventions at the DSBD? Second, what are the work norms and habits surrounding relationships between the DSBD and external actors? Third, what are the different beliefs and values governing multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements at the DSBD? Last and critically, what are the outcomes of harmonising institutional arrangements and what impact are they leading to or likely to lead to?

This chapter uses the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 (institutional theory) to interpret the research findings presented in Chapter 4. Particularly, the elements of institutional theory that guide the interpretations in this chapter are policies and rules, work norms and habits, beliefs and values. In this respect, Section 5.1 discusses the policies and rules that SA Departments have used for harmonising multi-stakeholder ODA, Section 5.2 discusses the work norms and habits that govern SA Government relationships with external actors. Section 5.3 discusses the beliefs and values that SA Government Departments have instituted in harmonising ODA interventions. Lastly, Section 5.4 discusses the intended outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD. To be more precise, this section dissects what these results mean in the view of (i.) the research process, (ii.) conceptualisation, (iii.) existing literature, and (iv) the interpretive framework.

5.1 Policies and rules that South African Departments have instituted to harmonise ODA

This section discusses the research findings pertaining to the available policies and rules (regulations) for harmonising multi-stakeholder ODA initiatives. We first set out to interrogate how to align multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving ODA supported interventions at the DSBD. The research found that both locally and abroad,

there is a paucity of approaches to aligning institutional arrangements that can cater for diverse programmes spanning a variety of sectors and not sector-specific.

Secondly, the research findings show that there is no single legal or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of ODA in South Africa. Instead there are various fragmented pieces of legislation aiming to do this. For example, there is the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (PPPFA), Revenue Act, Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund (RDP Fund Act), Customs and excise duty Act together with various regulations and prescriptions from the National Treasury (NT) relating to Supply Chain Management (SCM) and procurement generally.

According to the World Bank Comprehensive Development Framework, ODA recipients must provide the appropriate legislative and policy frameworks for effective aid delivery that will then result in alignment of support the country's strategic objectives (Wolfensoh, 2000). However, the research findings show that the opposite situation is happening in SA.

These fragmented regulations and legislations in SA may lead to the diminishing of the effectiveness of aid in the country. One of the Principles in the Paris Declarations of Aid Effectiveness (2007), maintains that in order for aid to be effective, countries should ensure alignment of their national fiduciary systems. Before alignment can happen, it means that countries need to have streamlined regulations and legislations pertaining to ODA.

Furthermore, the Paris Declaration Principle of alignment also postulates that if aid is delivered in ways that undermine recipient countries' systems, development outcomes are at risk of not being achieved (Martinez-alvarez et al., 2017). This is in line with one of the central tenets of institutional theory- aligned rules and regulations establish stability and meaning to institutions which are in turn likely to end up in the achievement of results.

However, there are strands of literature that are in conflict with these results. For instance, Harmer & Ray (2009) assert that alignment of aid delivery with recipient countries'

systems should be outside of the aid initiatives in place. That is, ODA should involve assistance by means of direct budget support, which will be easier for recipient countries' systems to handle than individual programme-based support. As the name implies, direct budget support involves the allocation of fiscal resources into the recipient country's National Budget. This is also in line with the recent trends that donors such as the European Union have been following (European Commission, 2020).

Further criticisms of Paris Declaration Principle of alignment is that alignment is by nature a bureaucratic solution to a problem that is to a large degree political (Chandy, 2011.) In other words, the failure of institutional arrangements is not due to bureaucratic failings of institutional arrangements, rather institutional arrangements inefficiencies are as a result of the incentives behind aid modalities. This point is in line with the institution theory interpretive framework which seeks to align actors' competing interests to achieve organisational goals.

On the basis of the research findings, a strong argument has been made that since ODA delivery in SA is handled by multiple institutions simultaneously, coordination failures are likely to happen resulting in the reduction of the impact of ODA (Martens et al., 2002). Also, the results show that there are no legal or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder ODA institutional arrangements in South Africa. This situation means that the country is unable to provide optimal direction, consistency and focus in implementing ODA initiatives. Therefore, more needs to be done to resolve this issue of the fragmentation of regulations and weak coordination of actors.

5.2 Work norms and habits that govern South African Government Departments relationships with external actors

This section discusses the research findings pertaining to the work norms and habits governing South African Government Departments' relationships with external actors. The SA Government requires that any donor who seeks to provide assistance needs to go through the National Treasury (NT) first. That is, the NT is the central Department responsible for managing ODA in the country. If the donor does not come through the NT, then they should at the least inform the NT of the support they are receiving.

One of the prevailing norms is that when ODA programmes are developed, they should ideally take account of Government's ODA policies and guidelines. Development partners are made aware of these by the National Treasury through the International Development Cooperation (IDC) Unit which brings it to their attention when drafting any new programmes. Once the SA government agrees that there is sufficient compliance of the programme with its rules and regulations, then it is sent for approvals at the Development partner (DP) and then to the legal services Department of Justice (DOJ) for domestic law and DIRCO for international law compliance). Furthermore, all ODA programmes are implemented by the SA Government unless agreed before hand that there would be an implementing partner. The implementing partner could include agencies of government or other international organisations (GIZ for Germany, ENABLE for Belgium, UN agencies, etc.).

Various donors have differing institutional arrangements when dispensing of ODA. This brings challenges to the host country, including avoidable transactional costs, when having to cater for the multiple donors bringing forth assistance. Ways and means need to be found to harmonise the various donors' institutional arrangements pertaining to ODA delivery to avoid overburdening the recipient countries.

Research findings show that in order to foster country ownership and with the support of donors, capacity of recipient countries needs to be bolstered so that the modalities and institutional arrangements of aid delivery are based on their systems and not the donors' systems. In other words, institutional arrangements need to fit in with countries' strategic objectives and processes of aid delivery should ideally then be country-led by the recipient countries.

Donor funded development programmes involve reciprocal obligations and often deliver optimal results when they follow institutional arrangements of recipient countries (Jobin, 2008). This can be witnessed by the paradigm shift in aid focus. In the past the emphasis in aid programmes was on the finances and policies of recipient countries but now the focus has shifted to the actual institutions responsible for aid delivery.

On the other hand, there are also concerns that the phasing out of donor driven ODA institutional arrangements, programme implementation units to be precise, will be

extremely difficult and can jeopardise the achievement of aid programme objectives Wood, Betts, Etta, Gayfer, Kabell, Ngwira, Sagasti, Samaranayake (2011). The results are compatible with Scott et al. (2004) who showed that power dynamics play a critical role in how institutional arrangements are structured in donor funded development programmes. These power dynamics are often skewed in favour of the donors.

One of the Declarations in the Paris agreement is that donors are advised to use recipient country systems, as far as possible to implement aid programmes rather than to create other parallel structures. This will contribute towards the attainment of alignment of ODA with country systems and priorities. (OECD, 2012). However, there are also dissenting voices to using recipient countries' systems. For instance, Wood, Betts, Etta, Gayfer, Kabell, Ngwira, Sagasti, Samaranayake (2011), argue that the usage of parallel institutional arrangements to deliver aid does side-step recipient countries' systems in order to ensure more effective aid delivery. These divergent views demonstrate that donors and recipient countries have diverse and competing interests.

As a result, it is not surprising to see that ODA is mostly donor driven and not country-led. Donor demands also seem to take precedence in the partnerships with recipient countries. This is in contrast to the Paris Declaration which prescribes that ODA should be. The next section discusses the findings on the beliefs and values that Government Departments have instituted in harmonising of ODA interventions in South Africa.

5.3 Beliefs and values that Government Departments have instituted in harmonising of ODA interventions in South Africa

There are beliefs and values that have been identified as driving the harmonisation of contrasting ODA institutional arrangements in SA. The research findings indicate that accountability is the key belief and value that, in principle, should govern ODA initiatives. Further, the following ODA accountability structures were found:

- At the European Union (EU) Delegation to South Africa, the Operations Section is responsible for the management and technical follow up of the ODA contracts.

- As set out in the Financing Agreement for the SMMEs Programme, the Programme is managed through a Programme Steering Committee (PSC) co-chaired by the DSBD and the National Treasury and including, as members, relevant departments/agencies such as the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), the EU Delegation, private sector association(s)/chamber(s), and academic(s)/think tank(s) specialised in the field, and other development partners engaged in similar activities. The role of the PSC is, among others, to provide strategic guidance and direction and overall oversight for the programme.
- In accordance with the Financing Agreement, the Technical Assistance Team (TAT) is an important component of the organisation setup to assure day-to-day management and coordination of the implementation of the Programme, and to assist the PSC.
- An Operations Steering Group (Operations Committee) comprising of the lead beneficiaries of the Technical Assistance Programme (including DSBD, DAFF, DTI, SEFA and SEDA) to deal with important operational matters during implementation.

The above multiple accountability actors and structures are responsible for the governance and implementation of the programme. This situation is not ideal and is not unique to the EDSE programme because in SA, each ODA programme has its own distinct legal agreements that prescribe the governance structures and institutional arrangements. This means that every ODA programme has unique institutional arrangements in place that the Government of SA has to adapt to. The effectiveness of aid is likely to be diminished by the constant need of the SA Government to adapt its systems to accommodate donors differing institutional arrangements. This situation is compounded by the fact that the Paris Aid declaration does not provide guidance on how to align aid interventions and bring uniformity to the streamlining of aid (Chandy, 2011).

The research findings also show that the other value that seems to be prevalent is that donors are aware that they should not supporting interventions that are not aligned to the priorities of the country. Also, when Departments request donor support, they must also inform the National Treasury that they are going to be asking for the support and what

the support will entail. In addition, they must declare to the Treasury what support they are getting and how they are using it.

One of the central beliefs that emerged from the research is that the sovereignty of the country should always be respected. In this respect, donors are not expected to support anything that is counterrevolutionary to the current state, so in other words they must not do anything that undermines the legitimacy of the democratic state. This means that donors are also forbidden for funding political parties, amongst others.

Last, the other key value that came from the research findings is the notion that all ODA programmes should have political support from the Government. This is in line with the seminal work by Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) who go further to argue that without active political support from key political actors, implementers will struggle to overcome the resistance and other critical organizational behaviour changes inherent in executing ODA programmes. In short, political support is critical towards ensuring that major institutional reforms and arrangements are put in place successfully. Notwithstanding, these findings are compatible with institutional theory which posits that agenda setting is done by the donors due to their wielding more power in the ODA relationship (Ulibarri et al., 2019).

The next section discusses the intended outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD.

5.4 Intended outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD

This section discusses the research findings surrounding the intended outcomes and impact of harmonising ODA institutional arrangements at the DSBD. The research findings indicate that there are guidelines in place at the National Treasury (NT) for coordinating and setting up institutional arrangements. In fact, the NT requires that "SA Government systems are used for allocation, planning, implementation, procurement, accounting, reporting, monitoring and evaluation." (National Treasury, 2013: 8).

However, this research found that the only officials who know about their presence are NT officials. In other words, there is information asymmetry existing between the NT and other Departments. This is a perilous situation because the interests and of those

involved in ODA institutional arrangements are not always aligned to those of the recipients' countries' interests (Sabbi & Stroh, 2020).

The research findings also indicate that there would be more certainty in ODA delivery if the country's institutional arrangements were predetermined and consistent. One of the reasons cited by donors for not using SA institutional arrangements is that the SA Government has a generally weak monitoring and evaluation systems. However, the Paris Declarations are precisely meant to alleviate this by recommending that donors and recipient countries should collaborate and improve Government systems which would also improve the national fiduciary systems capacity of the recipient countries.

Further, the research findings indicate that the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWMES) policy framework does not provide guidance on how to structure and harmonise monitoring and evaluation frameworks of Official Development Assistance multi- stakeholder interventions. Any serious development intervention that places emphasis on results, needs an institutional arrangement that uses results data in planning, budgeting and overall decision-making (Porter & Goldman., 2013). Programme effectiveness can be enhanced by the application and consistent usage of results information in the policy cycle.

However, caution must be exercised because, the heavy emphasis on the achievement of results in ODA interventions, sometimes leads programme implementers generating results to satisfy donors' targets irrespective of actual delivery. Further, results based management (which is the centrepiece of most ODA programmes in SA) incentivises ODA actors to intentionally set very simple and easy to achieve targets in order to satisfy donors expectations (Sabbi, 2020). These results are in line with institutions theory which maintains that stakeholders have differing interests when undertaking ODA. The recipient country requires ODA in order to achieve its developmental objectives whilst the donor has other agendas that may be in conflict with the recipients' interests. This has been observed to be occurring through the use of conditionality in policy-based lending or through the support of other vertical programmes that are informed by particular policy approaches favourable to the donor (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008).

It also emerged from the research that one of the key areas that needs to be harmonised is the SA Government's M & E systems. Donor driven development interventions have been lambasted for driving M & E to become a development activity on its own (Mueller-Hirth, 2012). As a result, an inordinate amount of time and resources are spent on doing donor M & E. There needs to be more trust by development partners in the systems of recipient countries. This will be in line with the Paris Declaration which advocates for the joint management and focus on the measurement of results (OECD, 2012).

Before institutional arrangements can be harmonised, successful institutional arrangements require that implementation be allocated to entities whose policy stance is in line with the recipient institution and which will render high priority to the development intervention. The fulfilment of this condition is enhanced when a new organization is created with a well-defined mandate following a rigorous political engagement, as the intervention will be its top priority and the formation of new positions creates opportunities for the involvement of statutory supporters. Alternatively, implementation can be allocated to an established existing entity that regards the intervention as consistent with its mission and is in search of new programmes.

Each ODA programme has its own legal agreements that prescribe the governance structures and institutional arrangements. This means that every ODA programme has unique institutional arrangements in place that the Government of SA has to adapt to. The effectiveness of aid is likely to be diminished by the constant need of the SA Government to adapt its systems to accommodate donors differing institutional arrangements.

There is lack of coherence and consistency in the instruments used for monitoring and evaluating ODA initiatives. For example, the NT has instruments that are distinct from those prescribed by DPME. At the end of the day, there are no uniform set of M & E instruments for ODA in SA. Utlimately, the dual reporting (to NT and the DPME) by Government Departments is considered by some to be a burden (Biscaye, La Fayette, Martin, 2015). Effective institutional arrangements need to be placed in their constitutional and institutional context and supported by adequate planning, budgeting and political support (Hill & Hupe, 2002).

Transaction costs of ODA in SA are also increased by the parallel M & E systems that donors develop when they dispense of ODA in SA. Given the power dynamics that are skewed in favour of donors, the SA Government obliges and accommodates contrasting M & E systems that create challenges for ODA M & E. The next section concludes the research.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter used institutional theory to interpret the research findings. Particularly, the elements of institutional theory that guide the interpretations in this chapter are policies and rules, work norms and habits, beliefs and values. There is no single legal or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of ODA in South Africa. Instead there are various fragmented pieces of legislation aiming to do this. Further, various donors have differing institutional arrangements when dispensing of ODA. This brings challenges to the host country, including avoidable transactional costs, when having to cater for the multiple donors bringing forth assistance. Finally, every ODA programme has unique institutional arrangements in place that the Government of SA has to adapt to. The effectiveness of aid is likely to be diminished by the constant need of the SA Government to adapt its systems to accommodate donors differing institutional arrangements. The next chapter provides the summary, conclusions, limitations, and recommendations of the research.

6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter we summarise the conclusions derived from findings related to interrogating how to align contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements involving ODA supported interventions at Government Departments in general, and at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) in particular. Further, this chapter also presents the study limitations, proposes recommendations for policy and suggests directions for further research.

6.1 Summary

This section provides a summary of the, introduction to research component, conceptual framework component, research strategy, design, procedure and methods component, empirical research results component, and the research findings component. The research aimed to interrogate how to align contrasting Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) institutional arrangements. To begin with, it was found that there is a paucity of research on streamlining institutional arrangements of ODA interventions in South Africa. The literature also pointed out that multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements are uncoordinated, the data is fragmented and there is a reluctance to use government set norms and standards (Kawonga et al., 2012).

Linked with this, the main challenge encountered is that there are no legal or policy frameworks framework to provide guidance on how to harmonise contrasting institutional arrangements of ODA interventions in the country. Institutions are political actors by nature and also comprise standard operating procedures that are created to define and defend interests. the purpose of studying institutional arrangements is on how organizations work and the conditions necessary for effective execution of public policy.

However, some authors contend that the focus of studying institutional arrangements is not primarily about how public policy develops instead it is about how organizations work, what happens within organizations with responsibilities for the implementation of public policy (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Given the above, one can then conclude that the interrogation of institutional arrangements is aimed at studying the conditions (legal, regulatory or otherwise) and environment required for the successful implementation of

public policy. In this respect, the research uncovered the key attributes relating to streamlining M & E institutional arrangements, namely: policies, work rules and norms, habits, beliefs and values.

The research is qualitative in nature and did not test hypothesis. This study explores how to streamline contrasting multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements using a single case and in order to generate detailed qualitative information, this study also applies a case study research design and involved semi-structured interviews with purposely selected respondents. Due to the Covid-19 global health pandemic that struck during the research process, the researcher was unable to undertake face-to-face interviews with respondents and instead, the interviews were done on the Zoom virtual computer platform.

The research finds that Financing Agreements (FA) are the covenants that prescribe the sets of rules (modalities) in which allocated donor funds for a programme can be used (National Treasury, 2013). They also set out the implementation and management modalities of programmes. However, they are very thin in terms of detailing the respective roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in a ODA programme.

Additionally, respondents indicated that the key values guiding institutional arrangements between donors and the SA Government are shared goodwill, transparency, accountability and commitment to the SA Government's development cooperation goals and agenda. These values resonate with the five Principles contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), namely: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability

Further, the respondents expect positive outcomes to materialise once ODA M & E institutional arrangements are harmonised. In line with the principle of alignment espoused in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective (2005), many of the respondents are of the view that there should not be a separate donor M & E system to begin with.

The research findings also show that there is no single legal or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of ODA in South Africa. Instead there are various fragmented pieces of legislation aiming to do this. For example, there is the Public Finance

Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (PPPFA), Revenue Act, Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund (RDP Fund Act), Customs and excise duty Act together with various regulations and prescriptions from the National Treasury (NT) relating to Supply Chain Management (SCM) and procurement generally. Despite this, the SA Government requires that any donor who seeks to provide assistance needs to go through the National Treasury (NT) first. That is, the NT is the central Department responsible for managing ODA in the country.

There is a general belief that there are too many accountability structures overseeing ODA programmes. In a typical ODA programme, there are usually more than five accountability structures. These include the donor, Programme Management Unit (PMU), National Treasury International Development Cooperation (NT IDC), a Programme Steering Committee (PSC), the Technical Assistance Team (i.e. the consultants on the ground) and the Operations Steering Group (Operations Committee). Adding to the complexity of ODA arrangements, the donor programmes usually cuts across Departments and the three spheres of Government (National, Provincial and Local) in an environment where intergovernmental relations are highly complex.

Critically, research findings indicate that there are guidelines in place at the National Treasury (NT) for coordinating and setting up institutional arrangements. The guideline being referenced is the Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the Management of Official Development Assistance (2002) which by all intents and purposes is a dated document. Notwithstanding, this research found that the only officials who know about its presence are NT officials.

The ideal state of ODA occurs when it is mutually beneficial and development driven with lesser political agendas being pursued by donors providing support and Governments respecting and using these resources as strategic value enhancers. In order for this to happen, harmonised institutional arrangements need to be in place to support ODA delivery. These ideal institutional arrangements would ultimately result in reduced transaction costs and less onerous bureaucracy in ODA administration. The next section outlines the conclusions of the research.

6.2 Conclusions

This section links as explicitly as possible with the summary articulated above and discusses the conclusions pertaining to the, research conceptualisation, conceptual framework, research strategy, design, procedure and methods, empirical research results, and research findings. By their nature, multi-stakeholder interventions are characterised by cross-sector collaboration and have become popular in South Africa in the last decade (Brouwer et al., 2013). These interventions range from domestic forums to global coordination processes. However, although they vary in terms of functions and forms, the common denominator is that the stakeholders' interests are diverse in nature and there is usually a lot at stake (Brouwer et al., 2013).

However, there is no collective guiding framework on how to harmonise M & E concepts and practices in the Public Service in general (DPME, 2014). The danger posed by this situation is that the country is unable to provide optimal direction, consistency and focus in implementing ODA initiatives. The attributes of institutional arrangements interrogated in this research provided sufficient information to interrogate institutional arrangements at the Ecosystem Development for Small Enterprises (EDSE) programme.

By interrogating how to streamline multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving ODA supported interventions at the DSBD, this research has shown that that there would be more certainty and efficacy in ODA delivery if the country's institutional arrangements were predetermined and consistent. There are various challenges associated with ODA institutional arrangements in South Africa. One of the main challenges is that there are power differentials in existence between the donors and the recipient Government entities. These power differences between the actors are more likely to sway the outcomes of the initiatives (Kusters et al., n.d.). Thus, there is a need to consider how institutions are formed and how values, norms and systems are developed in order to ensure successful implementation of development interventions.

As indicated, the Covid-19 global health pandemic erupted whilst the research process was in progress. However, despite the challenges brought about by the pandemic, data collection proceeded smoothly due to the usage of virtual computer platforms such as Zoom.

Some respondents indicated that the rules and policies are formed on the basis of the strategic priorities that the Departments would have set for the sector that they are responsible for. In other words, the respective Department's strategic plan and Annual Performance Plans (APPs) would provide the strategic priorities of the Government Departments. These priorities would in turn, provide direction on the regulations and policies that will apply to the ODA initiatives being implemented. Ideally then, the institutional arrangements need to fit in with country's strategic objectives and processes of aid delivery should ideally then be country-led by the recipient countries. In spite of the requirement that all ODA should be transmitted through the NT, the research indicates that various donors have differing institutional arrangements when dispensing of ODA.

As a result of the above, there are too many governance actors and structures responsible for the governance and implementation of a typical ODA programme, as was shown with the EDSE programme. This situation is not ideal and is not unique to the EDSE programme because as alluded to earlier, each ODA programme has its own distinct legal agreements that prescribe the governance structures and institutional arrangements.

The research also finds that there is information asymmetry existing between the NT and other Departments regarding guidelines for managing ODA. For example, we found that officials are not aware that there are guidelines in place at the National Treasury (NT) for coordinating and setting up institutional arrangements. The guideline being referenced is the Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the Management of Official Development Assistance (2002). This is a perilous situation because the interests and of those involved in ODA institutional arrangements are not always aligned to those of the recipients' countries' interests (Sabbi & Stroh, 2020).

Together with respect and mutual accountability, sovereignty has also been identified as a key value and belief underpinning institutional arrangements between SA and donors. that donors' support is welcome but should be deployed in a manner that respects the sovereignty of the recipient country. Also, participants seem to suggest that the processes around monitoring and report on those donor funds do need to be cumbersome. The next section outlines the limitations of the study.

6.3 Limitations

This section links with the summary and the conclusions and discusses the limitations of this research process and content pertaining to the research conceptualisation, empirical research results, and research findings. By nature, multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements are complex. Thus, the role of the operational government counterpart will be pivotal for ensuring that the implementing entity is doing not only what is required by the ODA Programme but is in line with the functions and mandates of those respective Departments being served by the ODA Programme.

There will be a need to pilot the approaches to streamlining ODA institutional arrangements in order to generate learnings. A one-size-fits-all approach for the respective donors might not work given that Government Departments operate in many distinct sectors. There are other attributes that were not investigated in this study. For instance, institution assumptions were not included amongst the variables considered.

Further, the research is descriptive in nature and did not test hypothesis. Due to the nature of the purpose of the study, that is interrogating contrasting institutional arrangements, the target population of the study was small thus resulting in a small sample size. Many officials who were informally approached to participate in the study indicated that they would not be able to effectively respond to the questions about how to streamline contrasting institutional arrangements.

Another methodological limitation is that the selection of a single case by the researcher could have also included some bias given that only one ODA programme was examined in this research. This examination of a solitary case can result in reduced empirical clout of the study. However, it should be noted that this is common limitation expressed about case studies in general (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Notwithstanding, this criticism of case study research has been strongly refuted by Idowu (2016) who asserts that a single case is sufficient provided it satisfies the planned objectives of the research.

Also, instead of institutional arrangements being the stumbling block to ODA initiatives achieving their results, the challenge with streamlining institutional arrangements could be more to do with officials' technical competence and less to do with the actual institutional arrangements. Also, it could be possible that a framework to streamline the

contrasting institutional arrangements is not required and instead challenges could be as a result of unclear roles and responsibilities between the development partners and the SA Government. The next section discusses the proposed study recommendations.

6.4 Recommendations

This section linking in with the summary, the conclusions, and the limitations discusses the recommendations for policy and future research.

6.4.1 Policy recommendations

Based on the National systems (such as the GWMES) need to be strengthened before alignment can happen. Currently, there are fragmented regulations and legislations in SA may lead to the diminishing of the effectiveness of aid in the country. One of the Principles in the Paris Declarations of Aid Effectiveness (2007), maintains that in order for aid to be effective, countries should ensure alignment of their national fiduciary systems.

Given that the Draft Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the Management of Official Development Assistance (2002) is more than 19 years old and SA has ratified many ODA conventions since the year 2002- the Policy may need to be completely overhauled and revamped. Thereafter, the document should be we widely disseminated across all Spheres of Government. However, caution should be exercised when reviewing the Policy because this exercise might take considerable time and delay the conception of new ODA programmes.

In addition, National Systems (such as the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System) need to be strengthened before alignment can happen. Currently, there are fragmented National Systems in SA may lead to the diminishing of the effectiveness of aid in the country. One of the Principles in the Paris Declarations of Aid Effectiveness (2007), maintains that in order for aid to be effective, countries should ensure alignment of their national fiduciary systems. Alternatively, ODA could involve assistance by means of budget support, which will be easier for the country's systems to handle than individual programme-based support.

Based on these conclusions, practitioners should consider having more policy certainty around Government ODA priorities. The SA Government should be the one setting the agenda on what priorities they would like ODA to focus on and not the other way around. On paper the SA Government is the one that sets its ODA priorities based on Strategies already in place but in reality and oftentimes the donors are the ones that set the ODA priorities for the country.

Also, we believe the State should set up an independent State Entity that will oversee and manage all ODA initiatives. Successful institutional arrangements require that implementation be allocated to one single entity which will render high priority to the development interventions. Currently, each ODA programme has its own legal agreements that prescribe the governance structures and institutional arrangements. This means that every ODA programme has unique institutional arrangements in place that the Government of SA has to adapt to.

Presently, ODA implementation and governance is fragmented across different government institutions and regional and international organizations. The results of ODA programmes will be enhanced when a new organization to oversee all ODA is created with a well-defined mandate following a rigorous political engagement, as ODA management will be its top priority and the formation of new positions creates opportunities for the involvement of statutory supporters. Alternatively, the State could appoint ODA focal people (or permanent structures) at the Departments who will coordinate ODA initiatives. In this way, institutional memory and learnings will be retained in-house and there will not be human resources turnover every time an ODA programme comes to an end.

6.4.2 Recommendations for future research

This section outlines the recommendations for future research. To better understand the implications of these results, future studies could include other attributes of institutional arrangements, specifically those related to cultural-cognitive elements. At the same time, these future studies could also investigate "institution assumptions" as part of the attributes to be studied.

Consider doing a mixed method survey and test hypothesis in future studies. This will potentially uncover other attributes of institutions arrangements that this study may have overlooked.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1- In-depth Interview Guide

In-depth Interview Guide

1. Please share the process of how regulations and work rules are developed in ODA programmes at the Department?

2. Tell me how you have noticed regulations and work rules being applied in multi-actor programmes at the DSBD?

3. In your opinion, how can donors' and the Department's regulations and work rules be aligned?

4. How are financing agreements (or rules) governing the relationship between donors and the Department developed?

5. Are you aware of any legal prescripts governing the relationship between donors and the SA Government? If so please elaborate.

5. How are work role expectations between donor programmes and the Department formed?

6. What are the main unwritten rules around what you consider as appropriate behaviour when engaging with donor supported programmes?

7. How would you like the relationship between the Department (treasury) and the donors to look like?
What would you like to see more of and less of in the relationship?

8. What are the similarities and differences in the way that M & E is structured at the Department versus at the programme?

9.What changes, if any, do you think would happen if M & E arrangements/structures at the DSBD and the programme are aligned?

10. What are the active governance structures overseeing the programme? What role do they play? To whom are the structures accountable?

Appendix 2- Ethics Clearance Letter

Research Office:
Sithembile Xaba
Tel: 011 717 3133
Email: sithembile.xaba@wits.ac.za
Research Director:
Prof Pundy Pillay
Tel: 011 717 3808
Email: pundy.pillay@wits.ac.za

02 November 2020

To whom it may concern

This serves to confirm that **Mr. Molupe Matsumunyane** student number **1054831** is registered for the Masters of Management in Governance at the Wits School of Governance. The title of his Research is: **Streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department**. Ethics Clearance Number: **WSG-2020-21**

Mr. Molupe Matsumunyane defended his proposal on 04th May 2018, he was granted ethics clearance on the previous ethics system. The Defence panel members approved the ethics component of the research and the Research Director issued a letter to enable the student to proceed with obtaining data and completing his research.

All candidates must satisfy the University's ethical standards for research. Your ethics application has been received and reviewed by the Wits School of Governance Human Research Ethics Committee.

Your ethical clearance has been approved subject to you getting permission to conduct research from all sites where research is conducted. The letter(s) of permission to undertake research must be submitted to the WSG Research Office and kept on file with your final proposal and other ethics documents.

You may commence your data collection under the guidance of your supervisor. In the event that the scope, methodology or nature of the research changes, you are required to submit another ethics application reflecting the changes.

The onus is on you as the candidate, with support from your supervisor, to ensure your research complies with university human research ethics policies and protocols at all stages of the research process.

It is recommended that you keep this letter in a safe place as you are responsible for ensuring you have proof of ethics clearance and have lodged the ethics clearance / protocol number with Faculty before final submission of your research report. If you do not have an ethics clearance number, you are not permitted to graduate.

Please do not hesitate to contact me - if you have any queries.
Yours sincerely
Prof Pundy Pillay
Research Director

Appendix 3- Department of Small Business Development Approval Letter

Leroy Research Contact At DSBD 16 October 2020 at 11:28

RE: [URL protection applied] Request for access to conduct research at DSBD Details

To: Molupe Matsumunyane, Cc: Emmanuel Mabunda, Hendrilien Rossouw

Good day,

Approval has been granted for this research, on condition that it accommodates employee responsibilities and maintains business continuity.
I have communicated with the relevant ADDG to get the names of Senior Managers within the Branch that you can communicate with in order to ID relevant staff and finalise your calendar for planned engagements.
Also, before you initiate the research I will send you a confidentiality agreement for sign-off (later today).

Regards,
Leroy K.

Appendix 4- consent form

Consent Form

Title: Streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department
Molupe Andreas Matsumunyane

I, …….., agree to participate in this research project. The research has been explained to me and I understand what my participation will involve. I agree to the following:

(Please circle the relevant options below).

I agree that my participation will remain anonymous	YES	NO
I agree that the researcher may use anonymous quotes in his / her research report	YES	NO
I agree that the interview may be audio recorded	YES	NO
I agree that the information I provide may be used anonymously after this project has ended, for academic purposes	YES	NO

…… (signature)

…… (name of participant)

…… (date)

…… (signature)

…… (name of person seeking consent)

…… (date)

1. Please share the process of how policies and work rules are developed in multi-stakeholder programmes at the Department?

2. Tell me how you have noticed donor' policies and work rules being applied in multi-actor programmes at the DSBD?

3. How can donors' and the Department's policies and work rules be aligned?

4. How are agreements (or rules) governing the relationship between donors and the Department developed?

5. Are you aware of any legal prescripts governing the relationship between donors and the SA Government? If so pls elaborate.

5. How are work role expectations between donor programmes and the Department formed?

6. What are the unwritten rules around what you consider as appropriate behaviour when engaging with donor supported programmes?

7. How would you like the relationship between the Department and the programme to look like?
What would you like to see more of and less of in the relationship?

8. What are the similarities and differences in the way that M & E is structured at the Department versus at the programme?

9.What changes, if any, do you think would happen if M & E arrangements/structures at the DSBD and the programme are aligned?

Appendix 5- Research consistency matrix

Title	Streamlining contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements in a South African National Department
Problem statement	South Africa (SA) like other low and middle income countries occasionally relies on foreign aid, termed Official Development Assistance, (ODA) to assist in funding some of its developmental objectives. In this respect, the National Treasury of SA provides the legal frameworks relating to the management of donor funds (National Treasury, 2013). On the other hand, the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) is tasked with "facilitating, influencing and supporting effective planning, monitoring and evaluation of government programmes aimed at improving service delivery, outcomes and impact on society" (DPME, 2015). However, there is no single legal Act or policy frameworks guiding the streamlining of the contrasting multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation institutional arrangements of ODA in South Africa. However, the GWMES policy framework does not provide guidance on how to structure and harmonise institutional arrangements of ODA. In addition, the DPME has recently found that there is no collective guiding framework on how to harmonise M & E concepts and practices in the Public Service in general (DPME, 2014). This situation poses a significant risk to the success of ODA interventions because alignment and harmonisation of multi-stakeholder M & E systems has been identified as a key determinant of the effectiveness of development aid (Paris Declaration, 2005). The Department of Small Business Development, a fairly new Ministry formed in 2014 (South Africa Government, 2017), is a recipient of ODA from various sources including the European Union and is required to align and streamline its M & E institutional arrangements with those of donors. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to policy makers. The main challenge is that program results will not be achieved and the opportunity lies in the development an innovative approach that can be used in other similar contexts. Additionally, in the literature there is a paucity of approaches to aligning institutional arrangements that can cater for diverse programmes spanning a variety of sectors and not sector-specific.
Purpose statement	The purpose of this research is to interrogate how to align multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements involving Official Development Assistance (ODA) supported interventions at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD). First, a literature review will be undertaken to understand and explore different approaches to harmonising contrasting M & E institutional arrangements. We use the development field of study perspective as our general lens in this research. To be specific, it provides for attributes such as policies, work rules and norms which are key to this research. Further, we use the institution theory to interpret the empirical results. The theory was developed to understand how institutions are organised, adopted and diffused into societies. It assumes that organisations that adopt societally rationalised and legitimised elements of institutionalisation, increase the chances of their survival and their resource mobilisation capabilities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), even though we do not have empirical results on this attributes.
Research Question	What are the different policies and rules that can be used to harmonise multi stakeholder interventions at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)?
Research Question	What are the work norms and habits governing relationships between the DSBD and external actors?
Research Question	What are the different beliefs and values that are required to harmonise multi-stakeholder M & E institutional arrangements the DSBD?
Research Question	What is the impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD and what outcomes are they leading to or likely to add to?

Research Question	**Attributes/variables**	**Data/information collection instrument**	**Data/information collection processing and analysis**
What are the policies and rules that are used to streamline contrasting multi stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)?	Laws, policies	Please share the process of how policies and work rules are developed in multi-stakeholder programmes at the Department?	Thematic analysis, data fragmentation
		Tell me how you have noticed donor' policies and work rules being applied in multi-actor programmes at the DSBD?	
	Work rules	How can donors' and the Department's	

		policies and work rules be aligned?	
		How are agreements (or rules) governing the relationship between donors and the Department developed?	
	Laws	Are you aware of any legal prescripts governing the relationship between donors and the SA Government? If so pls elaborate.	

Research Question	**Attributes/variables**	**Data/information collection instrument**	**Data/information collection processing and analysis**
What are the work norms and habits governing relationships between the Department of Small Business Development and external actors?	Work roles	How are work role expectations between donor programmes and the Department formed	Thematic analysis, data fragmentation
	Norms and habits	What are the unwritten rules when engaging with donor supported programmes?	

Research Question	**Attributes/variables**	**Data/information collection instrument**	**Data/information collection processing and analysis**
What are the different beliefs	Values	How would you like the relationship	

and values governing multi-stakeholder institutional arrangements at the Department of Small Business Development?		between the Department and the programme to look like? What would you like to see more of and less of in the relationship?	Thematic analysis, data fragmentation
	Beliefs	What are the similarities and differences in the way that M & E is structured at the Department versus at the programme?	

Research Question	**Attributes/variables**	**Data/information collection instrument**	**Data/information collection processing and analysis**
What are the outcomes and impact of harmonising institutional arrangements at the DSBD?	Impact	What changes, if any, do you think would happen if M & E arrangements/structures at the DSBD and the programme are aligned?	Thematic analysis, data fragmentation

Appendix 5- Example interview transcript

Key:

I: Interviewer

F: Female

I: So, I would kindly at the point ask for permission that we may record this interview because we going to transcribe it verbatim.

F: Yes, you may.

I: Okay, thank you very much. Can you please share with us the process of how policies and work rules are developed in ODA supported interventions at the department...in government?

F: Are you recording it? I don't see your recording running…

I: No, I am recording it on my cellphone.

F: Oooh okay, I thought you recording the zoom session. You asking me what is what developed?

I: The process of how work rules that govern ODA supported interventions are developed?

F: Okay. So, in terms of the Official Development Assistance and I think it is also important to also mention that the bilateral agreements that the National Treasury is also responsible for…that is government to government negotiations of course. It is then underpinned by the government structures which are familiar, and which are utilized by the different partners. So, if you look at the areas of support then it would usually be the strategic document to say…let's say strategic priorities and for South Africa those strategic priorities would be directly aligned to the National Developing Plan. And also, then must also be linked to the medium framework around what the government prioritizes in that period of time. We do program design documents, that then at the high level underpins what would be government structures. So, in a program design document, there would be the levels of responsibility that would be outlined to say it's Department of Small Business and Enterprise or the Department of Basic Education, these are the responsible recipients. The alignment in terms of reporting…because the Minister of Finance signs up on

all these agreements, the ultimate responsibility around reporting lies with the Minister of Finance. But for the specific program arrangements it would be DG's and the minister that sign. Further, in terms of more specific tools, so if you look at the EU for instance or the German support or most bilateral partners, they would add a specific budget line item to deal with one or two evaluations. If that is not put in, then it would be specified in the agreement…in that contract between the partners, especially at the recipient level to say that, who is responsible for the M&E. So, at the project level they would also be a project steering committee and there would be terms of reference developed for project steering committee in terms of who's the chair, who are the members and what's the purpose of it etc. So those are all tools that are negotiated upfront, once the agreements and the finance have become available and have been signed off. Then in terms of the specific project design those tools are basically put into a agreement that the recipient inform, together with the funder, together with treasury, the trilateral arrangement and then also treasury would then support and with the funder, the recipient would step up those structures going forward. So, it is at that level…it doesn't happen in between, it just pops up. It is negotiated right at the beginning before you receive the funding.

I: Okay, thank you very much for that elaborate explanation. Can you tell me…how are these…you alluded to financing agreements, how they are…that government relationship between the donors and government how they are developed, you talked about bilateral agreements etc. But can you please elaborate more on how this financing agreements are kind of developed?

F: Okay so if I can make an example again of the European Union, we would in the past…we would have had Multi Annual Indicative Program, or a MAIP as we called it and that strategic document would have been developed through a number of consultations with government, treasury, recipients departments based on thr priorities of the day. So, when you look for instance the last MAIP is from 2014 to 2020 and there we met with departments of…dealing with education, Department of Basic and Higher Education, we dealt with DTI , small business in terms of defining what the strategy looks like…so partners before you even get to that, they discuss it, that is the IDC's role, International Development Cooperation role for instance within Treasury,

to say they take these priority areas to the EU and the EU then finds a match to say 'okay this fits within what we want to do' because the EU always got a strategy and I think their strategy are high in 2030 that they have, but there is always alignment between high level strategies of the EU and of South Africa, to look at what are the needs there, and that is how I…the MAIP or the strategic document is always a fit between the funder and the recipient government okay…in this case South Africa and this is the EU, so there is policies and under the policies they find a fit. So, I was starting to make an example of say for instance in the last MAIP for instance said 'we have challenges with education as the TVET thinking and then also around youth unemployment' so we did like a scoping exercise then and we will get consultants in place. So, strategic documents will also assist with independent expertise to come on board and help us think through it because are technocrats, we also have got specific expertise, but if you want to speak to someone about TVET and what needs to happen for TVET collage graduates to find work in the market, then you need to have an expert to basically just help you talk through that and also to find the research around what is happening out there, what would be a good fit for South Africa. So, we go through a formulation process okay for the financing agreement, to say this is basically what South Africa want to achieve around youth unemployment around the project design… to look at, what's the problem and what are the challenges. So now we have said we need to look at education, the pathways for youth to get into employment, so what does it mean when we refer to a pathway and so we discuss it with higher education, the HSRC does work around market analyses…labour market analysis for youth for the head with labour. What is the Department of Labour doing around youth unemployment, so you look at all the players that is operating in that setting in terms of youth employment in the higher education sector and then you unpack all of that in terms of the fiscality's study. Because now you have a number of questions and you also have your policy documents…say the National Development set 500 jobs for youth over X amount of years, what are the indicators around that and of course tracking and looking at what can be done. Also what is in place already to make sure there isn't implication, so all of that goes into the scoping or the fiscality exercise…and it can take easily a year to two years to design a program because now you have most of your

answers in terms of what are the problems, what are the challenges and also you get the sense of opportunities. And most of the time you also want to know what happens already and then you start to write with independent people and with your set of stakeholders, you start to write what the program could look like. And to look what are the elements, what can be built in, do you expertise, do you need international people; do you need local people and that is also at that level where you have your project steering committees, your M&E, your data-mining…all of those kinds of things thought through that goes into that project plan. Because your project plan is attached to your financing agreement. Your financing agreement is a legal document that says the European Union will provide the National Treasury, specifically the DBE and Department of Labour with X amount of money over X amount of years, treasury is responsible to look after the money, Minister of Finance signs off and they counterpart on the EU , they usually sign first basically, but the financing agreements comes with the project design as well around what has been planned, but its still quite a high level plan around what they want to do, and its also budget that then is attached to the financing agreement. And the issue is that is quite a consult and participatory process in South Africa, so if for instance we had a great idea with the EU to roll out fantastic ICT infrastructure and Department of Labour comes back and says 'no no no no no we need to work in the remote rural areas' that's not going to work we need to actually to have mobile facilities to go into areas so that their children can have access to computers and things like that, we need to provide that . So, it's not…the funder tells us treasury what they would want to give. It is treasury specifically in IDC bringing in the required stakeholders to say this is actually what would be useful within context to South Africa. And that is the financing agreement issue and of course then the program project design and the budget that is designed in parallel with that and it all needs to come together at the end of the day for signal. Does that make sense? I know its…

I: No, it makes perfect sense and you have taken step by step, much appreciated for that. So, are you aware of any legal prescripts governing the relationship between donors and the SA government? You spoke about bilateral agreements etc etc but from the South African side are you aware of any kind legal instruments that guide that relationship?

F: Yes, so the RDP Act, the Reconstruction and Development Project Act that guides that relationship quite well. In the National Development Plan itself, they are the last chapter deals…chapter 12 I think its now chapter 14. Deals with what can be done and also what is in place already to make sure international and regional relationships. So, there is acknowledgment that those partnerships are critical. If you also then look at the Department of International Relations how that was refined after the National Developing Plan, you will also see they place focus in terms of partnerships and international relations, that level from a South Africa perspective. I think in terms of the intention in the planning from a South African perspective, those are perhaps the two core ones that guides it. And then of course with treasury you have your core rules that networks the RDP and the establishment of the account itself that is reported on separately. So, funders money does not go into our National Revenue Fund, its kept separately and its accounted for separately. And I think that is very good practice in terms of South Africa, so I think it was set up quite well cause even in terms of the auditor general make sure that gets audited, so that is another legal prescripts…it needs to get audited and so yes those are the legal requirements.

I: Okay, so you talked about the rules at treasury that govern how such regulated or applied…so I would assume that the donors would have their own kind of rules as well regarding their funds etc and how programs should be run. Have you seen how are those aligned, the one from SA and the ones from their respective donors?

F: So, if we look at the modalities…so in South Africa the European Union provided the sector budget support and you will…if you go to the IDC website you will see…You actually have to go the Treasury website and you will find our site its at the bottom of the page basically, you go to the IDC website. You will see there, guides and manuals for sector budget support and then so for the EU, I am not sure if you would like to use this example but for the EU has got different modalities that then determine your leverage around rules of country origin. So you have your classical projects which is for instance similar to the Pink Program or FMEP, because if you look at the FMEP, FMEP is EU kind of project or FMIS now, they are a classical project so they have to follow a bit of the PFMA and they have to follow the MFMA. And also, in terms of the

tender procedures they have to follow the EU standard procedures if it's over a threshold. When you deal with sector budget support from the EU, the EU says 'here is R200 million…euros rather for the Department of Basic Education' and then Treasury allocates that money on a annual basis but also based on a similar way in terms of the program design…there is a financing agreement, there is always a financing agreement, there's also a project document, there is always a budget. But the modality of how the money can get spent and how its transferred is different to a classical project. So, then the short answer is yes there is an upfront negotiation around the modalities that will be used. If you look at the Pink project for instance, the Pink Project it is funded by SECO, no funding flows through the National Treasury. So, the support is contacted and in consultation with the National Treasury the recipient unit or …and the funding is from SECO to the company that supports the work but no funding is directly channelled through the RDP account so that is different modality. With the EU they provide the funding to treasury and for sector budget support they would give us and we would apply for trans-payments, so we would apply to determine the financing agreement when you look at the budget, if its R200 million over 5 years or 7 years, do we do two trans per year or do we do two trans per year over 5 years. So is it 5 trans, is it 6 trans or is it 7 trans, we look at the cash flow requirements and how the project will sting and then it usually gets revised after you look are the pattern and the trend. But that's for instance what we do with the, what we have done with the EU before, and you also get for instance Germany okay... Germany they use…they don't use the PFMA, they do direct funding and they invest most of their funding to South Africa, they invest through GAZ. So, with Germany you will get very good technical assistances and program support, so they give you warm bodies so they also pay for South Africans, but they don't necessarily give development financing, the money is likely to go from EU to Treasury to manage, that's not many projects that happen that way. They report to us in terms of the investment but they don't transfer funds there so how they use their money, they will use purely using German policies and procedures where with the EU it would be a combination of the EU PRAG, PRAG is practical rules and guidelines and the PFMA then. So, it depends on who your funder is.

I: Okay, thank you very much. It seems to me after this explanation you've given to me that different donors comes up with different rules, so is that an ideal situation in your view, that they would now…the Germans do it this way, the SWITZ this way, the EU that way, do you think that is an ideal set up in your view?

F: Well I think in terms of treasury there is an equipped capacity to accommodate different governance funding requirements, so I think it is not necessarily ideal because you would want to work in a more streamlined way of course. But I think 20 years into having these relationships, the Treasury, the IDC specifically have refined how they work, what are the negotiations etc. For instance, with the EU if a contract is more than a million euros for instance, the EU does the whole procurement…sorry it's this guy's grass that's irritating me (coughs)

I: No, you can just take a break and have some water Natalie.

F: What was I saying…

I: Okay, you were talking about the funding requirements by different donors.

F: Yes, so with the tenders for the EU for instance, the over a million euros the EU will say 'okay we do an international tender' because then you can have a bigger funding envelop, in terms of getting more resources on board now. If you compare, I've actually looked at what does the PRAG require and what does PFMA require and actually it doesn't matter which one you run, which tender process you run. You will come out with a similar outcome, have a similar outcome because it will take you a similar amount of time. With the checks and balances because both South Africa and the European Union are big bureaucracies, the EU is like 53 times larger than South Africa meaning in terms of member states, so its does require of course extra thinking and additional resources to implement projects compliantly and with optimal accountability. And that's why I think the sector budget support work quite well but I think the classical projects like the FMIS , like the parliamentary program, they've also because they have been running for years, they have also refined how they work kind of thing. So, its not ideal to work with so many rules and regulations but I think that is the nature of bilateral agreements, you are funded by expanding from one government to another government so its inevitable that you will deal with so much bureaucracy and administration.

I: Okay, so then…how are work rule expectations between the donor programs and departments formed? Like for example you mentioned…you talked about like for example the Pink Program this side and then the Treasury, so how are work rules between the two formed?

F: Okay. So, the National Treasury is the recipient department okay…and the legal prescript is that our minister, the Minister of Finance is responsible for that funding. So, if there's any risk it is carried by the Treasury and that's why we have the RDP account to make sure that the risk is mitigated and also reporting as they come. So, in terms of the setup, recipient departments report to Treasury and most programs will have the programming structures. What the IDC has done, is that it will consider what level of report the partner or the funder requires and align it to make sure that we have the requisite detail to also approve finance to do evaluations, to do monitoring etc. So, its usually a combination of what's required on both sides and you see over the years they have developed what we call template in reporting. In terms of the setup between the recipient department and Treasury and the funder the program steering committee is one of the core structures, so your PSC is your strategic entity and of course operates for the life of the program and most programs they have their final evaluations during the closure period. So, that PSC's will be active until the final evaluations is signed off even if there is not communication that they strategically oversee. So, that's basically the aligns and in terms of recipient departments or recipients they have to report to Treasury because otherwise they cannot have any funding for whatever they want to do because that is stipulated in the financing agreement. And there are different…so depending on what kind of project to do, of course Treasury we oversee, we manage, we are strategically involved but the implementors are the departments and might be national with provincial and local entities because as Treasury we do not implement they basically IDC supports, strategically inform and manage etc so that's the arrangements basically around that.

I: Okay, thank you very much. Given your vast experience in Treasury and the IDC, what would you say…we are talking about norms here. What would you say are the unwritten rules around what is considered to be appropriate and

inappropriate when you engage with donors? Like the norms that developed through the years…

F: I think what you always have to remember is that you can never speak as an individual, I cannot speak as Molupe or Natalie. You speak as a Treasury; you speak as the EU okay and I think that's high level of professionalization and good conduct has always kept me in good stead in terms of that discussion. I think the norms and standards in terms of…for instance our work that we do… that IDC does at National Treasury with the Official Development Assistance Coordinators those are representative in national government that is responsible for ODA into their departments. So, we asked them, and we also assist them to develop strategies around what do they want. Like for instance they know upfront…okay for the next five years or seven years we have X amount of work that needs to happen around youth unemployment, we don't have enough money to do specific pilots and maybe wants to replicate or upscale some work, we need to get that money from outside, so that's a strategy in place. So, we assist those ODA coordinators to have a bridge between the funders and them, so they can come to us and we sit with them around the table and say 'what is it that you need' let's package it properly and bring the funders in. So, we do a bit of coaching, we do prep work, we do strategic leverage to make sure that proper conversations can happen, and the departments can also know that they can say 'thank you' to funding. In terms of norms and standards, I think norm is that you have to make sure that counterparts do speak to each other, so if a funder requests to speak with our minister, then we need to bring the ministers okay…and the opportunities that people also support around having high level discussions, so those are part of the norms and standards. But I think things that you don't necessarily get in books and learn from the sector things is that you need to be honest…

I: Sorry Natalie, I lost you a bit where you talked on honesty. You know what, I am just going to cut this video so that we reserve the battery, and this does not happen again.

F: Okay.

I: Yes, you were talking about honesty…

F: Yes, I think the…when you go out and ask somebody for money…and I think Robin will touch on it a bit as well, so we don't go in as politicians because

as government offciials we represent the government, you work for the National Treasury, you don't work for the ANC, or the EFF or whatever. You represent the country, so we have policies aligned requests that we have and that is how we work. And I think the honesty around, do we need, what are we good at, what are we not good at is usually appreciated by funders. I mean if I take Germany for instance, Germany is not the best advance really at IT, the IT infrastructure, so South Africa is much more advanced in terms of online banking, renewing, registrations, car registration online and thing like that. Germany does not do that, does not operate like that. So there is that level of honesty to say, okay I am not an expert of IT, so I am not going to offer you support around the IT sort of work and yes…I think your other norm is that you always represent your country, represent you department, you cant go as an individual you always uphold the governance. And I think from South Africa's side because we have a good policy framework in place with the RDP account, the Act, there is a lot of confidence that we will keep funding safeguarded or use the way it was intended to be used by the international partners.

I: Thank you very much Natalie. In terms of the relationship between the department and the donors, respective donors, how would you like too…what would you like to see more off and less off in the relationship?

F: So, there is an evenness in terms of the strength of leadership in our departments, the national departments especially. And I see that if you don't have strong leadership you bring funders sin their expertise, they basically take over. So, what I would like to see is strong leadership in terms of the development part of South Africa. In terms of the development sector that you work in, and to guide donors, when they get their budget allocated to South Africa, they have teams working very hard to make sure that their money gets spent meaningfully. So, from the South Africans…also with the program kind of set up we see that quite often in departments take on funding envelopes…and then because of the amount of the resources they have available to them in terms of their divisions that is responsible for the funded programs, they end up neglecting either the program or funds around that…around that kind of work. And that is where leadership is quite important to actually say 'listen we do want to implement this program with respect to EU or US, Germany but we actually need additional resources to do this or we

should do it this way'. So, I have seen quite often that the departments take on support, without thinking it through because its good support. And then something falls through the cracks, so I think leadership it's a non-negotiable…good leadership I must actually say that. Good leadership that …ODA in South Africa is supposed to fund innovation in the ANU setting and that is really something that is lacking. I used to struggle with department to just think out of the box a little bit, because if our take cuts are not new…even with our national departments…our national departments would come to us with funding requests for what the vultures provide for …and no funder wants to fund salaries and basic stuff that should be provided by government and that is when funders then also just lose their appetite to work with departments. So, I would like to see more innovation, I would like to see more openness from government to work differently because we stuck. Every now and then I would like to also see that the leadership where there are gaps and actually bring in resources an bring in new thinking for them to do that. And for them to monitor how the projects are doing, a number of excellent projects wills just die after a funder has existed because there is a gap between the project and then constantly talking treasury and leadership to say this is what is working and this is how much it costs, and this is actually what we need to take forward. So that vision in terms of wanting to create medium to longer term change is where we are lacking in terms of the development space in South Africa. We have received such a long list of projects and programs and at the end of the day they do tire bureaucrats and technocrats because it isn't necessarily a full picture. I think that's a mouthful, let me stop there.

I: Thank you Natalie. In terms of 'if' and 'when' disagreements arise between donors and the department, how are these resolved? You talked about the government structures such as the PSC etc, well in your experience how have you seen these being resolved?

F: There is usually a…for…so there are again a number of different levels. So, say for instance a program implemented for instance the Department of Health, if there are irregular expenditure on some of the work that they've been doing, we question that okay…and we deal with that and if it does get…First of all we try resolve it as the IDC, that is their responsibility as IDC to manage and strategically oversee the implementation. The RDP office…the RDP account

office with Denise they will also check that there isn't duplication around the items that get funded from the Health or the program areas. So, the IDC will try deal with this specific issues and of course those issues also get taken, if its of strategic value where there was huge mismanagement, if there's under expenditure if there is over expenditure, it gets tabled at the program steering committee and they try resolve there with being our voices. And then in terms of operational and management issue, it will get resolved in the IDC…is that there are audits, queries or financial issues that don't get resolved, its escalated to the DG's and then the IDC will do memos and draft letters to the DG's to talk to each other and if that doesn't get resolved at that level which it usually does it gets escalated to a ministerial level and that's usually the case. We try…or National Treasury usually try to risk mitigate so it is not often that issues get escalated to the partner or the funder okay…the international funder. Treasury will try and contain it and resolve it as treasury before the EU or Germany gets called in. With the EU that's in the financing agreement and also for Germany, they have the legal right to bring in their international audits or their auditor general to come and do forensic audits in terms of the recipient department. So, that is written into the agreements up front and that's why the full task of the National Treasury, specifically IDC would be to mitigate that risk for South Africa, so that's basically what happens.

I: Okay, thank you very much. Now we are reaching the…just one/ two questions and then we are done. So, in terms of M&E what are the similarities and differences that you have noticed in the way M&E structured, for example the Treasury…the donor like EU?

F: So…maybe for the Treasury level the recipient is important to track to do M&E, to make sure that you respond to the MTS priorities, the APP's and the annual plans and it also fits into the National Development Plan targets, and those will be negotiated upfront. The EU will have to basically monitor when we use the EU structure for instance or the Germans, we use the OECD M&E guidelines for the framework. The 5 areas as I said relevance, sustainability, impact …those 5 indicators that they have. And South Africa also uses that quite extensively so the difference would be around your policy areas that you want to look at. So, the EU will always want to look at the interventions implemented in South Africa or anywhere in the world to fit into their horizon

2020-2030…their high-level policies that they have. And of course, a strategic document is key in terms of making sure that you can always write back your actions of the 5 years to you 5-year strategy that you design. So, there is an annual reflection process within Treasury, for instance the EU but also with all funders there is an annual reflection. Basically, to say, that this is what we wanted to do, this is where we at, there is progress, updates…so those are the annual meetings that happens across the spectrum with funders and that's now outside of the PSC and the technical and things like that. So, in terms of M&E there is good alignment between South Africa Treasury and the funders actually around that. I think it's quite complimentary and supplementary to have a good picture around what happens and how does it refer back to it. In South Africa of course, as you are aware of, when we do the evaluations, the EU for instance and Germany they will do mid-term evaluations and the fund evaluations. In South Africa we also look at formative and summative evaluations in terms of mid-term and in terms of…and find an evaluation the focuses then in terms of summative to have a more like overall cost-efficiency perceptive, so I think there is good alignment and there is more openness about what are required and what are paid or what are put in place in terms of these program areas actually…so yah.

I: Okay thank you very much Natalie. We have come to the end of the interview. I appreciate so much your valuable views and your time.

~~The end.