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THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF NIGERIA

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the developing international relations of nigeria

by david hirschmann

dissertation submitted to the faculty of arts, university of the witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts.

30th september, 1969.

I declare that the dissertation which is herewith submitted for the degree of master of arts in the university of the witwatersrand is entirely my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for a degree in any other university.

signed David Hirschmann

date 15th October 1969

I wish to express my gratitude to professor b. cockram for his advice and guidance; to the university of the witwatersrand for granting a research bursary; to all the good ladies of jan smuts house for their friendly assistance; to my father, without whose support this thesis could not have been produced; to my mother for her help and encouragement; and to spana for typing the thesis.

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CHAPTER I : THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA

"Events in Nigeria, Hirschmann, have amused me somewhat. You may remember that I had the nerve to suggest that you couldn't understand Nigeria's foreign policy and general international course if you had no idea of its internal tribal structure. Well? Do you still disagree. I am sorry it has taken a war to prove my point." (1)

Today Nigeria (inclusive of the secessionist Republic of Biafra) covers an area of 356,669 square miles. This makes it half as large as Western Europe and four times as large as the United Kingdom. The much disputed 1963 census figures put the population at 55,600,000, the highest in Africa, the fourth highest in the Commonwealth and the thirteenth in the world.

Nigeria is located on the north coast of the Gulf of Guinea and its coastline, which includes the Bights of Benin and Biafra, stretches for 500 miles from Badagry in the west to Calabar in the east. It shares its western boundary with Dahomey, its northern boundary with Niger and its eastern boundary with Cameroun. In the extreme north-east corner a shared border with Chad runs through Lake Chad. All Nigeria's neighbours, therefore, are former French colonies.

The drainage system provided by the great Niger River and its tributary, the Benue, is the most striking physical feature. Flowing from north-west and north-east through the middle of the territory to the sea, these two rivers divide Nigeria into three land blocs and provide relatively easy access to the heart of the country. This feature has been of great importance; along their valleys came most ancestors of Nigeria's present inhabitants.

From the coast northwards Nigeria falls into four geographical regions. The first is a dense belt of mangrove forests and swamps stretching along the length of the coast, where the temperature and humidity are generally high. The mangroves once extended much further north, but human settlement has encroached, especially in the west, where they terminate about 50 miles from Lagos. Behind them lies the Nigerian rainforest which covers most of the south, running through the old Western,

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1. Letter from a friend, Arthur A. Mawby, at Cambridge University, dd. 8.1.68.

Mid-Western and Eastern Regions, and divided almost centrally by the Niger. Further north the rainforest yields to savannah country extending to the northern frontier and the fringes of the Sahara. The northern dry savannah, with increased temperature ranges and lower humidity levels, stretches from Sokoto to Lake Chad and in parts reaches as far south as Oyo in the old Western Region. Its southern edge is bounded by the Jos plateau, with which it merges in Bornu. The altitude of much of the north is over 1,000 feet above sea level, with the centre of this plateau rising to 2,000 feet and, in the Jos area, to an average of 4,000 feet. Here was the location of Nigeria's oldest known civilisation, the Nok culture.

A. Early History and Migrations.

What is known of Nigeria's history goes back well over 2,000 years. Little, however, is clear since the main sources are oral traditions, legends and myths, and only in the north, where the Kanuri and Hausa peoples had made contact with an Arab culture, were any extensive written records kept before the nineteenth century.

The oldest known tools made by man in Nigeria, pebble tools from the earlier African Stone Age, were found near Bussa along the Niger in north-west Nigeria. A later period of this Age, the Acheulean period, is well represented by hand axes found on the Jos plateau, for one of which a radio carbon date of more than 39,000 years BC has been obtained. Sangoan man who followed, and who probably knew how to make fire, can be traced through tools found in the valley of the Sokoto River and in the Abuja-Kebbi region as well as round Bussa. Ground stone axes of the Neolithic period are to be found in many parts of the country, indicating a wide distribution of population in the late Stone Ages.

A major change in the population pattern seems to have taken place from about 2,000 BC onwards. Owing to climatic change and misuse of the lands of the Sahara which produced desert conditions, many pastoral peoples were forced to move south. Of both Berber and Negro stock, they knew how to cultivate wheat and barley and in the south encountered Negro populations, who, while not settled farmers, practised vegeculture. The crops of the Sahara were not easily cultivated in the tropics; for this reason,

and because the old food gathering techniques of the original inhabitants no longer sufficed, the new mixed population developed large-scale farming of a wide range of new crops. Thus emerged the late Stone Age culture of Nok whose name was subsequently given to a widespread culture that flourished on the Jos plateau between 900 BC and 200 AD.

There is little information on Nigerian history during the first thousand years AD. Almost certainly population pressures from the north forced people from the Nigerian plateau south-eastwards through the Cameroons into Equatorial Africa where, with their iron weapons, they displaced the local pygmies. This would account for the close linguistic relationship of the people of the plateau with those of Equatorial Africa. At about the same time, from other parts of Africa, in small and larger groups, both Negro and Hamitic peoples were migrating towards Nigeria. The Negroes, whose original home remains doubtful, were the first to arrive. The most plausible theory, based on legends of origin and archeological evidence, places their source in north-east Africa, whence they migrated westwards by way of the open land south of the Sahara and north of the Congo basin and the tropical forest, crossing the Bornu plains into Nigeria and fanning out in all directions; most of them moving 'along the valley of the Benue north-westwards to the Niger and north-east up the Congola to the headwaters of Lake Chad'.(1)

From the numerous legends of origin it is reasonable to infer that the Yoruba and Hausa peoples arrived at about the same time from the same areas in north-eastern Africa and that they had for centuries had historical and cultural connections. Population movements and influences of later migrants from the Middle East and North Africa had by 1400 AD resulted in great differences between these peoples of the northern savannah and the southern forest areas.

In the course of time neither the Negroes nor the Hamites have remained as pure race groups. In the north there are small enclaves of Arab peoples who have a common origin with the Hamites in Kano, Sokoto, Zaria and Bornu, known as Shuwa Arabs. The cattle Fulani are probably the purest Hamitic stock, while

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1. Arikpo, Okoi, The Development of Modern Nigeria, Middlesex, 1967, p. 16.

NIGERIA : APPROXIMATE AREAS OF STATES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.



NIGERIA : APPROXIMATE AREAS OF STATES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.



THE MAJOR TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN NIGERIA TODAY.



the Ijo of the Niger Delta are the most Negroid.

B. Later History and the Tribes.

When Britain carved out Nigeria for itself it created 'perhaps the most artificial of the many administrative units created in the course of the European occupation of Africa'.(1)

I. The North, the Hausa, the Fulani and Islam; the British.

An important formative influence on the culture, the way of life and the social and political organisation in the North was its geography. The open savannah country permitted far larger groupings than did the southern forested areas. The relative lack of wild fruits and roots and the denser populations necessitated the practice of both agriculture and irrigation, and these in turn led to the consolidation of groups to protect their farmlands. Conditions were moreover favourable to freer and greater movement: horses were able to survive owing to the absence of the tsetse fly, and political control could be enforced over great distances. The necessity for organised cavalry led to quasi-feudal forms of economic, social and political organisation.

Thus there developed centralised states ruled by powerful monarchs, based on the agricultural and physical advantages of the northern savannah. The military strength of these states far exceeded that of the smaller southern units; yet, enclosed as they were in dense forest impenetrable to horsemen, they could not be subjected by the north.

The great Hausa peoples occupied most of the northern half of north Nigeria, principally the provinces of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Zaria, and penetrated southward to an irregular extent. The Hausa have been unified through their common culture, religion and history rather than because of ethnic distinction. The basic social unit is the extended family, determined by consanguinity and not affinity. Islam inculcated the values of a class system, in which social superiors are regarded with deference, their authority being accepted as the will of God. They are a Negro people, yet their language is distantly related to those of the Semitic and Hamitic races. Political unity, however, was not attained until their conquest by the Fulani. The

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1. Lord Hailey, in Post, K.W.J., Is There a Case for Biafra?, International Affairs, January, 1968, p. 27.

seven original Hausa states or Bakwai, were said to have been founded about 2,000 years ago by Bawo and his six sons[1] which did provide a common traditional unity; and these states have survived to form the basis of the northern pro-

In medieval times there flourished in Western and Central Sudan (including the north of Nigeria) a succession of powerful states, the last of which came to an end only with colonial occupation. The Hausa walled city-state of Kano and the Kanuri Empire of Kanem-Bornu (which in the twelfth century was accredited with an army of 120,000 men and 100,000 horse, excluding mercenaries) as well as the states of Ghana, Mali and Songhai might well be described as 'market empires, since the basis of their prosperity lay not so much in what they produced themselves ... but as middlemen in the exchange of products between North Africa and areas to the south of them'.[2] Through such trans-Saharan trade these Sudanese states made contact with the world of Islam. The religion was first accepted by only a small minority, mainly among the ruling classes (Mai-Ure, who ruled from 1085 to 1097, was the first ruler to be converted), eventually becoming the imperial culture and finally being established by 1500 throughout the Northern states.

Zaria, the most southerly of the Hausa states, was in a position to gain importance as the chief supplier of slaves to Katsina and Kano. Kano reached its zenith in about 1500 and by 1700 it was Katsina which had won the long struggle for ascendancy and control of trade along the caravan routes and for about a hundred years it was to remain the leading commercial and cultural centre in Northern Nigeria.

Islam conferred on the people of the Western Sudan a

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1. A legend tells that Bayajidda, son of Abdulahi, King of Bagdad, quarrelled with his father and travelled first to Bornu and then to Daura where his son Bawo was born. Bawo 'killed the sacred serpent that guarded the well at Daura and prevented people from drawing water there. The queen of Daura was so pleased at the death of the snake that she gave her daughter in marriage to Bawo, and out of that union were born the seven children who founded the seven Hausa states... in addition to the seven legitimate sons there were seven illegitimate ones, who founded the kingdoms of Kebbi, Zamfara, Nupe, Gwari, Yoruba, Kwararafa (Jukun) ...' Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 15.
2. Crowder, Michael, The Story of Nigeria, Second Edition, London, 1966, pp. 35 and 36.

literate culture. The Arabic language linked them culturally with North Africa. Literacy facilitated trade and brought with it the law of the Koran and Moslem administrative systems. Until the nineteenth century, however, it did not bring about any revolutionary change and did not fundamentally alter the traditional bases upon which African political and social life depended. In the nineteenth century this situation was to be completely transformed by the impact of agressive Islamic revolutionary movements, highly critical of traditional political and social organisation and determined to overthrow the old societies and supersede them with new systems more strictly obedient to Islam.

These movements received their impetus from the Fulani peoples, notably the Torodbe, who had come under the influence of Islam as early as the eleventh century and who by the fourteenth century had become proselytisers of their religion throughout the Western Sudan. They had 'originated in the Senegal area - probably as a result of intermarriage between 'white' Berber and Negro groups - and emerged as a 'red'-skinned, straight-nosed race speaking a distinct language which is difficult to classify'.(1) Essentially a cattle people, they were allowed to spread throughout the savannah area, permitted by peoples like the Hausa to graze their cattle on the land in return for the value of the manure. By the end of the sixteenth century they had established themselves throughout Hausaland, and with the collapse of the Songhai Empire at about this time, became the main standard bearers of Islam.

Three types of Fulani may be distinguished - the pastoral nomadic, the settled, and the dynastic.(2) The first are peaceful herders, non-Negroid and often indifferent Moslems or even pagans. The second group, largely agricultural, and intermixed with Hausa and other Negro groups are the fanatic Moslems. In fact it was the Fulani who settled in the towns and became learned and literate in Islamic culture who led the Islamic religious revolution. The dynastic group consists of families of Emirs and officials of the Emirates. Their greatest distinction was their ability to build states through wars of conquest and to administer and control them.

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1. Flint, John E., Nigeria and Ghana, New Jersey, 1966, p. 9.
2. Blitz, L. Franklin, The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government, London and Lagos, 1965, p. 23.

The causes, motives and aims underlying the great Jihad of 1804 are not simple to explain. To Usman (Othman) dan Fodio, who headed this holy war, the purpose was similar to that of other movements taking place in Cyrenaica, Saudi Arabia and the Western Sudan, and to those of the Mahdi in former Egyptian Sudan:

> "... 'a return to the pure and primitive faith of Islam, purged of heresies and accretions'. This implied the attempt to restore the original model of the Islamic State, as it was believed to have existed in the time of the Prophet and the first four Caliphas: a State in which social justice, administered in the light of the Shari'a by God-fearing rulers, took the place of the arbitrary decisions of irresponsible - and effectively non-Moslem - despots." (1)

But for many of the great number who joinad the war there were other reasons: the insecurity of the minority Fulani group, greatly outnumbered by the Hausa; the feeling of resentment of the 'cattle' Fulani against the Habe Hausa for heavy taxation and raids on their animals; and simple tribal loyalty which persuaded many Fulani who were not aven Moslems to join the cause. Harsh taxation and other forms of oppression resulted in Hausa commoners joining Dan Fodio and there were influential urban Fulani who had their own economic and political reasons for supporting the war.

Usman dan Fodio, a Torodbe born in 1754, a famous Moslem scholar and reformist from Gobir, found himself at the centre of this unrest. In 1804 he initiated a war that was soon to sweep away most of the Hausa kings, and during the next thirty years to bring the whole of Hausaland and, with a few exceptions, all of Northern Nigeria under the suzerainty of the Fulani. The Shehu entrusted his army to his son, Bello, and to his brother, Abdullahi, who had taken control of the great Hausa cities by 1807 and most of Hausaland by 1808. Their first serious setbacks came in the east where Bornu under Kanembu repelled them and in the south where the expansion of the empire ran into further difficulty on encountering the Nupe and Yoruba peoples and the pagans of the inaccessible hill areas of the Middle Belt; parts of Kebbi were also not conquered. Dan Fodio divided his new empire into an Eastern and a Western sector. The former

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1. Hodgkin, Thomas, in Crowder, Michael, op. cit., p. 96.

with headquarters at Sokoto came under the administration of his son Bello and the latter with headquarters at Gwandu was administered by Abdullahi. The Shehu himself chose to make Sokoto his home and this city was in fact the supreme centre. In 1817 he died, and Bello succeeded him as the first Sultan of Sokoto. By 1830 the Fulani were masters of nearly all the north of Nigeria, effectively bringing uniform government to this huge area and superimposing on the traditional feudal administration of the Hausas a system of theocratic tax-collecting Sultanates. In the peaceful conditions so created a great revival in Moslem learning took place, and commerce and trade, centred again in Kano, throve on a much larger scale than under the Hausas.

For a period the new rulers administered their Emirates in accordance with the principles of Koranic law but later their high standards and reforming zeal steadily degenerated into corruption and tyranny. Large-scale slave-raiding was resumed, not only on their pagan neighbours but even on their own subjects. Sokoto and Gwandu nonetheless remained in control and the Fulani maintained their position as the ruling class; and by admitting Hausas, by intermarrying with them, and by influencing them in the direction of a purer form of Islam, they prevented any serious racial conflict. The two peoples eventually came to represent one cultural pattern, very definitely Moslem in inspiration.

During most of the nineteenth century events which seemed of little import to the north, but which were of vital significance to its future, were taking place in the southern coastal areas.[1] Britain, steadily but haphazardly, took control of the south of Nigeria. As explorers opened up the hinterland, as traders saw the benefits of trading directly with the north, and as German and French pressures increased in the scramble for west African territory, the British Government was forced to turn its attention to the 'dark' north. Although Denham had visited Bornu in 1823 and Clapperton Sokoto and Kano in 1824 there was virtually no European contact with the north before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It was the man who came to be known as the founder of modern Nigeria, George

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1. British activity in Nigeria is discussed in the next section. The actions of the British in the north can better be understood in the light of their overall aims in Nigeria.

Dashwood Goldie Taubman, who in effect succeeded in bringing the north into the British sphere of influence. He was determined to prevent the French and Germans from securing the lands of the Niger Basin. Given the right to make treaties and acting as if he had a charter, he had by 1884 concluded thirty-seven treaties with local chiefs. When in that year the Germans despatched Herr Flegel to sign treaties with the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu it was Goldie, through Joseph Thompson, who prevented him so doing. This was the more important since the Berlin Conference of 1885 based delimitation on effective occupation, and as a result of Goldie's work Britain had little difficulty in laying claim to the whole area around the Niger.

It was nevertheless little more than a cartographical claim. In 1886 the Royal Niger Company was given a charter, but it had little authority beyond the gun range of its river vessels. Only in 1897 was any effective administration introduced into the north, troops of the Royal Niger Company having defeated the forces of the Emirs of Nupe and Ilorin, and obtained treaties from them. Not until 1900 when the northern part of Nigeria became the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the British flag was hoisted at Lokoja were real attempts made to establish British control. Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard, the first High Commissioner, had only £135,000 to set up administration over fifteen million people. In order to handle this seemingly impossible task he formulated his policy of indirect rule, which attempted merely to create favourable conditions for trade and to ensure those essentials considered basic to human behaviour. Lugard's successors, Sir Percy Girouard and Sir Hesketh Bell, consolidated his policy of minimal interference in the affairs of the Native Authorities, leaving each Emir very much master of his own house. Even so it was not a straightforward or peaceful task. In 1901 campaigns had to be launched against Bida and Kontagora and later campaigns against Yola, Abija and Keffi. Sokoto, Gwandu and Kano remained hostile and refused to abandon slave-raiding or, indeed, to have anything to do with the new administration; and it was in consequence of a provocative letter from Abdurrahman, the Sultan of Sokoto, that Lugard took the decision to bring the north under control by military action. In early 1903 he took Kano, Katsina and Gwandu, and on

14th March the Sokoto army was defeated. Lugard made it clear that the old empire of Usman Dan Fodio was at an end.

> "The old treaties are dead, you have killed them... They [the Fulani] ... have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British... Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country." (1)

Although in 1906 there was an uprising at Satiru where a whole company of British soldiers was murdered, Sokoto remained loyal and the uprising was soon crushed. By the end of 1906 the conquest of Northern Nigeria was complete.

Two policy decisions were taken in this period which were to be of great significance. The first was the establishment of indirect rule which left most of the power in the hands of the traditional rulers and which in effect left the political system and hierarchy as it was under the Fulani Empire. The second was the agreement Lugard made with the Sultan of Sokoto not to allow Christian missionaries to enter any Moslem Emirate without the Emir's consent, thus excluding the north from the influence of Christianity, the English language and Western education.

II. The South, the Yoruba and the British.

Though there is evidence to suggest that early migrations of the Yoruba's ancestors took place some time between 2,000 and 1,000 BC, legend dates the main migrations from about the eighth century AD by relating them to the establishment of the Moslem religion at Mecca whence the Yorubas' 'mythical ancestor, Oduduwa, was expelled by his Moslem neighbours for worshipping idols. Oduduwa and his followers fled westwards and finally reached Ife, where they settled. Oduduwa's eldest son had seven children, who founded the original seven kingdoms of the Yoruba. The seventh son, Oranyan, founded the Oyo kingdom ...' (2)

The social organisation of the forest belt peoples was generally small, based largely on local kinship ties and contained within small villages rarely exceeding a thousand inhabitants. The most distinctive cultural trait of the Yoruba was their organisation into a system of towns, each ruled by an

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1. Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1902, Appendix III, p. 105, in Crowder, Michael, op. cit., p. 226.
2. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 18.

oba, assisted by chiefs responsible for different aspects - defence, judiciary, trade, etc. Frequently a group of towns whose rulers claimed common descent formed a chiefdom. The system of towns facilitated a growth of trade among the Yorubas themselves, and between them and the neighbouring northern groups. These contacts led to a wide diffusion of ideas and in no small measure contributed to the fact that in religious terms, the Yorubas are the least homogeneous of Nigeria's major tribes and, in fact, the least united.

The extent of the grasslands, to within fifty miles of the coast in parts of south-western Nigeria, enabled tribes there to build up impressive kingdoms; the two great Yoruba states were Oyo and Benin, both purely African and neither stimulated to expansion by external influences. The sixteenth century saw the rise of the Oyo Empire which eventually controlled most of Yorubaland. At its zenith Oyo stretched from Togo to Benin and from the mangrove swamps to the Niger; but by the end of the eighteenth century it had effectively come to an end. Benin was bounded to the east by the Niger and to the west by Porto Novo. It was highly organised and, backed by a large army, controlled substantial coastal areas. Its sculpture and bronzes of the time are world renowned. By the eighteenth century the power of Benin, too, was spent. An important factor in Yoruba history of this period was the long struggle with the northern Moslems and the alliances and cultural links with the Middle Belt peoples. Rivalry with the north scarred them deeply and distrust of and bitterness towards the north have remained until the present time.

In 1472 Portuguese explorers had discovered the coast of Nigeria, and Ruy de Sequina, commanding one of the expeditions, had landed on the island of Lagos, then a military outpost of the kingdom of Benin. In 1485 another Portuguese trader, Alfonso d'Aveiro reached Benin city. The arrival of the Portuguese marked the first stage in the complete re-orientation of the economy and in the profound, if gradual, revolution in West African history. A shift of trade commenced to the Atlantic coast, which instead of being peripheral to commercial life became its centre. The Portuguese developed their trade from the island of Sao Thome and from Gwato, where they built a factory or trading station, mainly to trade with Benin; what began prin-

cipally as a trade in peppers had by 1510 become almost exclusively a trade in slaves.

In 1553 the first English ship captain, Windham, visited Benin, which date marked the end of Portuguese monopoly of trade on the West Coast. Dutch, Spanish, Brandenburgers, Portuguese and French competed for slaves but the English soon established themselves as leaders both in trade and in export of slaves. Benin and Lagos were centres of the traffic and Bonny, New Calabar and Old Calabar grew up directly in response to its needs. The Europeans obtained the co-operation of the local peoples in order to ensure their supply. Little continued to be known of the interior and the course of the Niger itself was still unexplored.

As slavery had been the vehicle of British influence until the end of the eighteenth century, so anti-slavery was the means by which the British built up their control in Nigeria in the nineteenth. In 1807 Parliament passed an Act prohibiting the slave trade to British subjects and from that time strenuous efforts were made to stamp out the traffic and to build up an alternative trade, which could be termed legitimate. With this aim in mind official and commercial attitudes towards local rulers altered, and their sovereignty, previously respected, now became more liable to inroads. Britain was prepared to take over the authority of coastal chiefs in order to promote commerce. In 1820 there had been only 38 British merchantmen trading in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, by 1840 there were 134. Exports of palm oil increased from 200 tons in 1804 and 13,945 tons in 1834 to 25,285 tons in 1845.(1) Simultaneously Britain began to establish itself politically in Nigeria. In 1837 an anti-slavery patrol deposed the Regent in Bonny who had, contrary to treaty, imprisoned a British trader, and William Dappa Pepple was installed. Within a few years, so rapid was British encroachment that even Pepple complained of it.

During this period explorers had been busy charting the way to the interior. Exploration of the Niger can be dated from 1788 with the formation of the African Association. In 1796 *Mungo Park reached the Niger River from Gambia* and by 1824 the expeditions of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney had revealed the

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1. Crowder, Michael, op. cit., p. 131.

possibilities of trade.

> "It was not until 1830 that the Lander brothers proved that some of the 'rivers', which European vessels had visited for more than three centuries, were in fact the mouths of the Niger, and only parts of the intricate system of waterways which made up its immense delta. Attempts were at once made to develop trade with the hinterland along the course of the Niger and its main tributary, the Benue, but the mortality among the crews of the vessels that ascended the rivers was so great that the idea was abandoned for a while." (1)

In 1832 the Quorra and the Alburkah were the first British ships to reach the confluence of the Benue with the Niger. With British naval supremacy established on the Niger tremendous and unexpected possibilities were opened to British trade, once the prophylactic qualities of quinine had been demonstrated by Dr Baikie's expedition 900 miles up the Niger to Yola in 1854.

Partly as a reaction to events and partly as a response to colonial policy Britain steadily consolidated its influence. In 1849 a consul was appointed with headquarters on the Spanish island of Fernando Po. The British invaded and captured Lagos in 1851, forcing Kosoko from his throne on grounds of slave trading and restored his uncle, Akitoye, on the latter's promise to abolish the traffic within his dominions. In 1852 the British Government agreed to subsidise a small fleet of steamers, owned by Macgregor Laird, which were to form the basis of a regular mail service between Liverpool and West Africa. This increased greatly the number of traders coming to the area. By 1856 there were nearly 200 firms operating in the Delta. In 1853 John Beecroft, the British Consul in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, presiding over a Court of Equity, had William Dappa Pepple sent into exile from Bonny, and it was not until 1861 that he returned. In 1854 the Dahomeyans invaded Abeokuta. Beecroft had issued ammunition to the Egba army through the missionaries there and this saved the town from the otherwise better equipped enemy - the first British intervention in the wars in Yorubaland. In 1857 factories or trading stations were established at Aba and Onitsha on the Niger and at Lokoja at the confluence of the Benue with the Niger. In 1861 Docemo agreed to cede Lagos to Acting Consul McKoskny in return for a pension of

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1. Burns, Sir Alex, Sixty Years of British Rule, The Times, London, Special Number on Nigeria, 29.9.60, p. 2.

£1,030 a year. The stated aims of the Foreign Office for this annexation were to secure the people of Lagos from slave trading, to develop legitimate trade with the town and to exercise a beneficial influence on the surrounding tribes. Henry Stanhope Freeman was appointed Governor of Lagos and he proceeded to annex Palma, Lekki and Badagry. In 1865 the Egba besieged Ikorodu, which was strategic for Ibadan's supplies from the coast. The new Lieutenant-Governor Glover despatched West Indian troops from Lagos who defeated the Egba, so extending British authority well beyond the frontiers of Lagos. This period convinced the British that if the interior were to be opened up to legitimate trade, British authority would have to be paramount, and the constant tribal wars terminated. Control was further extended through treaties: in the sixties and seventies these were aimed at the abolition of slavery while in the eighties their purpose was to place territories under British protection.

Goldie, though extremely active in this regard, did not confine himself to treaty making. By 1878 there were four major companies working on the Niger: Messrs Alexander Miller Brothers and Company (Glasgow), James Pinnock and Company (Liverpool), West African Company (Manchester), and the Central African Trading Company (London). These firms were not only in cut-throat competition with each other but were constantly threatened by hostile tribes and foreign, particularly French, companies. Goldie persuaded the four firms that the remedy for over-competition was merger and monopoly and they joined to form the United Africa Company. Then by a price war Goldie succeeded in forcing the French companies out of business.

French and German interests were nonetheless increasing in the area, and their encroachment into the Niger hinterlands constituted a threat to eventual British control. In 1883 Jules Ferry, a known imperialist, became Prime Minister of France and in July, 1884 Germany declared a protectorate over the Cameroons. It was these opposing interests in West Africa which led directly to the Berlin Conference of 1885, which, working on the basis of effective occupation, recognised that British interests were paramount along the coast between Lagos and the Cameroons and in the hinterland. Britain therefore formally proclaimed a protectorate over 'the territories on the line of coast between the British Protectorate of Lagos and the right or

western bank of the Rio del Rey' and the 'territories on both banks of the Niger, from its confluence with the river Benue at Lokoja to the sea, as well as the territories on both banks of the river Benue, from the confluence up to and including Ibi'.(1)

Britain now had no hesitation in involving itself further. The Oil Rivers Protectorate was set up, and administered by a Consul General at Calabar. Goldie's Company, renamed the Royal Niger Company, received a Royal Charter granting it political authority in the hinterland of the Niger Delta and on both banks of the Niger and Benue. The Company established its headquarters at Asaba and set about securing a trade monopoly. In 1893 the Oil Rivers Protectorate became the Niger Coast Protectorate covering all territories which had made treaties with Britain and were not included within the scope of the Charter of the Royal Niger Company. Delta middlemen resented this increasing encroachment but they and anyone else who interfered with trade or continued slave trading or human sacrifices were dealt with by military action. Such were Jaja of Opobo, deported in 1887, Nana of the Benin River, defeated in 1894 and the Oba of Benin who had sanctioned the massacre of an unarmed British party. In 1897 Benin was defeated and the Oba, Ovenramwen, deported. So, too, the Brassmen, who revolted against the Royal Niger Company, were defeated in 1895 at Nembe. In Yorubaland the Lagos Government steadily extended control. In 1886 the British Governor, Sir William Macgregor, managed to secure a precarious and temporary peace. In 1890 a small British garrison was placed at Ilaro. In 1892 the Ijebu were defeated, an important step in the occupation of Yorubaland. In 1893 Sir Gilbert Carter set out on a trek, which when completed, left Yorubaland in effect a Protectorate. Agreements were concluded with, among others, Ibadan and the Alafin of Oyo and Carter was able to end a sixteen year war between Ibadan and Ilorin.

The eastern boundary of Nigeria was settled with Germany. There was, however, a serious threat of conflict with France over the western boundary which almost erupted in 1894 over the so-called 'Nikki steeplechase'. Although there had been agreement on a border between Dahomey and Lagos, this did not extend effectively for more than a hundred miles inland and

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1. London Gazette, 5th June, 1885, in Crowder, Michael, op. cit., p. 187.

a large area of indefinition existed. The solution involved a race to determine who could sign a treaty with the King of Nikki; Lugard defeated his French opponent, Decoeur, by five days and secured the treaty for Britain. In 1898 an Anglo-French convention settled the boundary.

In view of these and other difficulties it was decided to cancel the Charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1899 and place the whole country under direct Government control. On 1st January, 1900 the north of Nigeria became the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The Niger Coast Protectorate and all the Royal Niger Company's former territory as far north as Idah were included in the new Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos and its Yoruba protected states remained a colony under the Governor of Lagos. The Emirate of Ilorin, the scene of so much warfare, was included in Northern Nigeria. The year 1906, when the Lagos Protectorate was merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the north was finally pacified, can be taken as marking the beginning of effective British administration. On 1st January, 1914 the whole country was amalgamated and superficially unity was given to Nigeria.

The effects of these changes on the social and economic organisation of the peoples were profound. The coastal states, previously dependent on the savannah tribes, had become the centres of trade and had exploited this advantage for both commercial and political motives. The slave trade had turned small fishing villages into sizeable towns of five to ten thousand people, and the increased emphasis on economic achievement rather than on traditional status began to alter the old bases of political power. The suppression of the slave trade resulted in a further revolution in the economy, by basing it on trade in the products of the forests. Free markets of a size hitherto unprecedented were created, internal tolls on the movement of goods disappeared and movement of persons became increasingly safe. In the administrative centres the number of white officials grew steadily, the employment of African clerks increased and other wage earners were attracted. Retail trade expanded, farmers began to bring food to markets, rents were charged and barter was replaced by the use of currency. Roads were built and the construction of a railway commenced. From 1906 the breakdown of traditional structures was markedly more rapid.

The introduction of European goods stimulated new wants and wealth increasingly replaced traditional status as the basis of prestige, a process which continued for the next fifty years.

Of almost equal significance as the European explorers, traders and administrators were the missionaries. Early missionaries had a dual purpose, to replace the slave traffic by legitimate trade and to convert Africans to Christianity. The Church of Scotland established itself at Calabar, the Church Missionary Society in the Niger Delta and up the Niger River; and the Methodists, Baptists, and the Church Missionary Society penetrated Yorubaland. This was a zealous Christian movement, condemnatory of indigenous society and resolved to replace it with the new religion and a society based on its tenets. The years 1850 to 1865 saw a great expansion of missionary activity; for example, the Yoruba Mission established stations at Oyo, Iseyin, Saki, Ogbomosho, Ijaye, Ilaro and Isago and by 1851 most of the New Testament was available in Yoruba. The missionaries spread into remote areas as well as making an impact in the towns. Wherever they went they built schools, so bringing not only Christianity to the people, but the English language and Western education, which were to be most powerful factors of change. The English language gave a common tongue to members of diverse tribes and education became a second new indicator of status. As the British occupied the country and created a demand for indigenous employees the material benefits of Christian education became obvious. It was from the early converts that the first Nigerian educated elite emerged.

Most of this activity was among the Yoruba enabling this people to surge ahead of the other major groups and creating an imbalance vis-a-vis the isolated north that was to have a considerable political effect.

III. The Ibos of the East.

Three theories of the origin of the Ibos have been advanced. One denies migration to the east of Nigeria from elsewhere (except in the case of the Onitsha Ibo); another tradition tells of migrations similar to those of the Yoruba and Hausa, but like the Ijaw, Ibibio and Jukun these groups were said to have moved along the valley of the Benue and then southwards; and a third places their origin in north-east Africa, whence they

migrated south-westwards into the central Congo, then through the Cameroons to south-east Nigeria, absorbing on their way sufficient cultural traits of the Bantu peoples for their language to assume a semi-Bantu character.

Though the Ibo have no tradition of political unity their language, culture and social structure show similar features. The basic social unit was the extended family, the highest form of political organisation being the village group, consisting of clusters of villages each subject to an Okpara, who with the other Okparas administered the village group's affairs. Each group was completely autonomous. They developed neither monarchical forms of government nor elaborate state organisations; thick forests and the tsetse fly played a large part in keeping political organisation small. The nearest approach to an external integrating element was provided by the oracles which administered justice and had agents in the villages for this purpose. Tradition lays great stress on individual achievement and their small societies left much freedom to the individual. Ibo women enjoyed an unusually high status, being allowed to hold personal property including the profits of trading. Population pressures and land hunger, however, forced many Ibo to migrate to the cities of the north and the west. There they proved remarkably successful as clerks and traders. They settled in their own communities, particularly in the north, where they were forced to live in sabon garis, or strangers' quarters.

Though contact with the European traders and missionaries came later to the Ibos than to the Yorubas they reacted swiftly to the challenges of European culture, commerce and education, their individualism and relative lack of reverence for traditional rulers facilitating their progress. By 1900, although the major areas of resistance to British authority had been overcome, other parts of the eastern provinces continued to give trouble, and it took many punitive expeditions to bring the whole of Iboland under British influence. The first major operation was against Aro, guardian of the peoples of the east. Later expeditions had to be launched against Ogoja, Owerri, Ibibio, Urhobo and Western Ibo and some parts of Iboland were not brought under British control until as late as 1918.

IV. Other Tribes.

While it is correct to say that each of the three major regions is dominated by one of the above-mentioned peoples, it is inaccurate to say that each of the regions is inhabited by those peoples or that each region corresponds to an ethnic division. There are, for instance, in addition to the Hausa and Fulani at least one hundred other linguistic groups, large and small, which make up fifty per cent of the population of the North. Possibly the best known of these tribes is the Tiv of the Middle Belt, celebrated for their resistance to Fulani hegemony and their hostility to Islam. The broken country of the area helped them and numerous other small tribes to protect themselves against the great northern states. They were an expansive people, their fundamental unit being no larger than the compound, and the British were amazed at the apparent state of anarchy in which they lived. To the east of the Hausa are the Kanuri of Bornu, who, though Moslem by religion and culturally similar to the Hausa-Fulani, prevented Fulani occupation during the great Jihad, have remained distinct from them and speak a language of the Central Sahara family unrelated to Hausa. Other large tribes are the Nupe, Idom, Igalla, Birom, Igbirra, Borgu and Ilorin. They differ from the Hausa-Fulani, and in varying degrees have been connected with the southern people.

In Western Nigeria there are several tribes distinguishable from the dominant Yorubas. In 1953, of a population of 6.2 million, one million were Edo, a half-million Urhobo, 365,000 Western Ibo and over 80,000 Ijaw. Most famous of these are the Edo which built up the powerful Benin Empire and, while related to the Yoruba, have a stronger sense of political unity. The Oba was the focal point of the system and his role as religious head resulted in a proportionately higher number of pagans in this area.

In the eastern half of the Eastern Region live a kaleidoscope of smaller tribes speaking languages related to Bantu. The Ijo of the Niger Delta form one of the main cultural minorities of the East. They originally acted as middlemen between the Ibo and Ibibio of the hinterland and the European traders; and in slaving times they raided the Ibo villages and sold the men into slavery. They, like the other main group, the Efik-Ibibio, who had also dominated the Ibo, suffered a sense of

frustration when power passed to the latter. The Efik and Ibibibio speak mutually intelligible languages but their cultures differed in that the Efik were ruled by quasi-monarchical institutions, whereas the Ibibio were organised in much smaller units and ruled by elders.

These minorities were to play a significant if not always consistent part in the political development of the Regions and the Country. One result of their presence was that they formed buffers between the three major groups, which for some time prevented their hostility becoming too sharply defined. Further, arising out of fear of domination, they exerted pressure for the creation of more states and formed political parties to this end.

C. Political and Constitutional Development, 1914 - 1967.

I. From Amalgamation to World War II.

On 1st January, 1914 the whole country was amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, the former Northern and Southern Protectorates becoming the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria, while Lagos was styled the Colony of Lagos. Lugard was appointed the first Governor-General. Against the advice of others who also knew the country, he decided to maintain the distinction between North and South, administration being effectively regionalised under Lieutenant-Governors. This served only to increase the differences between the two regions, which was further aggravated by the success of indirect rule in the North and its failure in the South. According to Lugard:

> "The system of Native Administration in the separate Government of Northern Nigeria had been based on the authority of the Native Chiefs. The policy of the Government was that these Chiefs should govern their people, not as independent but as dependent Rulers. The orders of Government are not conveyed to the people through them, but emanate from them in accordance, where necessary, with instructions received through the Resident. While they themselves are controlled by Government in matters of policy and of importance, their people are controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves." (1)

A system that depended fundamentally on a fulcrum of

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1. Report by Sir F.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria 1912 - 19, (1919), in Crowder, Michael, op. cit., p. 245.

authority could not be a great success in the West where the Oyo was not in the powerful position of the Emir, and was irrelevant in the loosely organised societies of the East, where the Warrant chiefs were very unpopular and backed by little traditional authority. Lugard decreased the already limited powers of the Legislative Council by restricting its authority to Lagos and replaced it with an unwieldy Nigerian Council, consisting of thirty Europeans and six Nigerians, three nominated from the North and three from the South. As its functions were purely advisory and as it met only once a year it proved of little value.

World War I saw Nigerian troops participating in the Cameroons, Niger, Togo and in East Africa. Allied war propaganda which stressed the fight for democracy and the rights of small nations, and the British promise of eventual self-government to India stimulated the hopes of a small group of nationalists, British-educated Yorubas centred in Lagos. The ideas of men like Edward Wilmot Blyden, a West Indian living in Liberia, J. Africanus Horton, a Gold Coast / tor, J.P. Jackson, a Liberian, and of W.E. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey and President Woodrow Wilson, began to filter through to Nigeria. Although Lugard had created a Nigerian unit, and some soon began to identify themselves with it, the upsurge of nationalism after the war really originated as a protest movement promoting greater participation in the public affairs of the Colony. In 1920 some Nigerian lawyers, doctors and merchants from Lagos and Calabar participated in a conference held in Accra by a body known as the National Congress of British West Africa. This Congress considered the whole of British West Africa its domain and aimed at diverting attention from the indirect rule policy and placing control in the hands of legislative councils. A delegation to the Secretary of State was unsuccessful.

For the first time, however, the British authorities conceded the principle of elections. In 1922 Sir Hugh Clifford recast the Legislative Council to consist of forty-six members, ten of whom were Nigerians, of whom four were to be elected, three from Lagos and one from Calabar, by adult males with an income of £100 a year. It was to legislate for the Colony and the Southern Province while the Governor continued to legislate for the Northern Province. The outcome of the Accra conference and

of these alterations in the Council was the formation of the first political parties in Lagos - the Nigerian National Democratic party, led by Herbert Macaulay, and an opposition, conservative, Peoples' Union. The former, whose objective was the enfranchisement of the people of Lagos, won all three seats and continued to dominate the politics of the Colony for the next decade. Neither party sought nor received popular support, their membership remaining small and their interests sectional. A further event of importance in the twenties was the founding in London in 1925 of the West African Students' Union by a Nigerian, Ladipo Solanke.

In the administrative field, the early thirties saw Sir Donald Cameron, the Governor, attempt to reform the system of indirect rule which was becoming increasingly retrogressive. In the East he reorganised the Native Authorities to correspond with the so-called live units of government, usually small collections of hamlets and villages. To emphasise Nigerian unity he abolished the posts of Lieutenant-Governor of Northern and Southern Nigeria. A resurgence of nationalism occurred in the late thirties with the advent of a new generation of men which looked beyond the tangle of Lagos politics. Nigerians, other than British-educated Yorubas, and towns other than Lagos, began to take an interest in politics.

> "A new leadership ... came forward and was provided largely by American-trained graduates... American education produced a different type of graduate, whose standard of education was much lower than that of the British-trained, but who did not have imparted to him an automatic sense *of belonging to a privileged élite.*
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> But the American-educated Africans had a different attitude to the masses, and were impatient with the cautious approach of the old élite. If their education was crude and lacking in subtlety, this of itself allowed them to communicate with a mass African audience in a new style." (1)

One such graduate was an Ibo named Nnamdi Azikiwe, who returned in 1937 having served a journalistic apprenticeship in the Gold Coast. He founded the West African Pilot which for twenty years was to be the leading organ of nationalist opinion. In 1934 a

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1. Flint, John E., op. cit., pp. 159 and 160.

a group of educated young radicals led by men like H.O. Davies, Dr J.C. Vaughan, Samuel Akinsanya and Ernest Ikoli had founded the Lagos Youth Movement. In 1937 under Davies' influence it was renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement. As its objectives it had the promotion of better understanding and co-operation between tribes in order to unite them, independence for Nigeria within the British Empire, and employment opportunities equal to those enjoyed by non-Nigerians. Azikiwe threw his weight behind the organisation and by bringing Ibo and Ibibio people into it, helped to transform it from a local Yoruba-Lagos affair into a widespread southern organisation. In 1938 it won the Lagos town council elections and the three elective seats in the Legislative Council, thus ending Macaulay's political dominance in Lagos. Its newspaper, the Service, later called the Daily Service, joined the West African Pilot in the spread of the nationalist gospel. In 1939 the Nigerian Union of Students was formed at the Abeokuta Grammar School. The increased participation of educated Nigerians in politics caused concern as to their future role in the country. It was the War which was finally to decide that role.

II. From World War II to Independence.

> "... it is the era when Nigeria advanced from the first experience of Ministerial government to full independence, the era of the development of a rigid Federal system, and the era when Nigerians showed such aptitude for self-government, and for political negotiation, that independence has been the culmination less of a political struggle than of a constitutional and administrative exercise." (1)

This statement, correct so far as it goes, is not the whole story.

World War II did a great deal to intensify nationalist ferment. Large numbers of Nigerians saw action and came into contact with ordinary Europeans who were different from the privileged colonial administrators. More important was the war propaganda against German racialism and Japanese imperialism, the signing of the Atlantic Charter, and Clement Attlee's assurance to a Conference of the West African Students' Union in London that the Charter applied to Africa. The War made independence

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1. Williams, David, End of the Era of the Big Three, The Times, London, Special Number on Nigeria, 29.9.60, p. iv.

inevitable and accelerated its realisation. On the other hand, tribalism, Nigeria's ever-present reality, made the possible success of such independence doubtful and in fact served to delay its realisation. *Through good sense and compromise it was* submerged in time for independence, but tribal ambitions and antagonisms were never resolved.

a. Parties.

i. NCNC and the East.

Tribal emotions were aroused in 1941 in a quarrel within the Nigerian Youth Movement over the candidature of Samuel Akinsanya for a seat in the Legislative Council. Zik and his followers withdrew and it became an entirely Yoruba organisation and 'ultimately degenerated into desuetude',(1) thus impeding southern political unity. On 26th August, 1944 Zik launched his own party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) with himself as Secretary and Herbert Macaulay as President. This party added considerable impetus to the movement towards independence. The NCNC started as a national party but through circumstances evolved into an Ibo, Eastern party: firstly, the split in the Nigerian Youth Movement had serious tribal connotations and left the Ibo with a feeling of resentment; secondly, the Ibo people in the East and in their separate communities in the North and the West, in an effort to catch up educationally with the Yoruba people, began to form mutual benefit associations which then tended to federate in organisations like the Pan-Ibo Federal Union. In 1948 as a result of ill-feeling between Yoruba and Ibo the Ibo State Union was established. In the 1951 elections Zik was successful in Lagos, but the Action Group was able to exclude him from the Federal Assembly. Again this seemed to the Ibo a betrayal of unity for the sake of Yoruba tribal interests, and so Pan-Ibo pressures gained strength within the party. Of the three major parties, however, the NCNC did remain the most genuinely national.

ii. Action Group and the West.

The party that took the lead in the Western Region had its origin in a society formed in 1945 in London called the Egbe

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1. Azikiwe, Nnamdi, The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria, Office of the Commissioner in the United Kingdom for the Eastern Region of Nigeria, August, 1957, p. 8.

Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa). It was founded by Obafemi Awolowo, an Ijebu Yoruba, who had opposed Zik in the Nigerian Youth Movement. He returned in 1947 and established the first branch in Nigeria. It originated as a cultural organisation but soon became the focus of pan-Yoruba feeling. In 1951 Awolowo transformed it into a full-scale political party, the Action Group (AG). The Obas realised that their only hope of survival lay in moving with the tide of political change, and co-operated. In the late forties a Lagos lawyer, Chief Bode Thomas, began to expound a policy which, according to Zik, was 'a banner of extreme racialism',[1] until 1955 when, for the benefit of public opinion, it took on a more national character.

iii. NPC and the North.

The nationalist movement made far less impact on the politically backward north than on the south. The Moslem rulers feared for their own positions, and the North's fear of southern domination was accentuated by their resentment of southerners, particularly the Ibos in their midst, who held the best clerical and technical posts. Most educated Northerners, the hard core of whom came from Katsina Training College, had neither the inclination nor the power to challenge the traditional order, and therefore decided to associate with the Northern rulers to present a united front. The Emirs who appreciated the advantages of co-operating with them, were receptive.

By force of personality, as well as by virtue of membership of the foremost Fulani family of Sokoto, (direct descendants of Othman dan Fodio), Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, emerged as leader. He was ably assisted by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who had graduated from teaching. In 1949 the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) was formed and in the discussions with Macpherson and the elections that followed it became a political party, Moslem and conservative in inspiration. In his book, My Life, Ahmadu Bello explained the NPC's views on the southern Nigerians and the unity of Nigeria:

> "... We called it [NPC] Northern because we wanted to unite the Northern people and at that time we were not looking much beyond our own borders. ... We all found it [Lagos] very strange ...

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1. Azikiwe, Nnamdi, op. cit., p. 18.

> and ... alien to our ideas of life and we found that the Members for the other Regions might well belong to another world so far as we were concerned." (1)

After his delegation had been booed in Lagos in 1953 he wrote that there were 'agitations in favour of secession'.

> "I must say it looked very tempting. We were certainly 'viable'...
>
> There were, however, two things of the most vital importance in our way. The first was that the greater part of the revenue of Nigeria comes from customs duties collected on the coast on all goods brought over the wharves...
>
> The second difficulty was similar to it. Would it be possible to send our goods down to the coast for shipment by rail or road, and what guarantee would there be that they would get there at all?...
>
> ... We had no sentimental illusions about leaving the others: they had acted in such a way that it was abundantly clear to us that they would sooner see the back of us; but what about this transport difficulty?" (2)

iv. Other Parties.

There were numerous minor parties, some founded on an ideology, some based on a tribe. Of these only examples can be given. In the North there was a progressive opposition party grouped around Aminu Kano called the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and a United Middle Belt Congress, led by J.S. Tarka, and supported by the Tiv peoples which pressed for a Middle Belt region separate from the North. In the south 'ideological' opposition parties included the United National Independence Party and Dr Chike Obi's Dynamic Party. Others, formed for the purpose of representing minority interests and advocating separate regions included the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State Movement and the Mid-West State Movement.

b. Issues.

The first concerned the timing of independence. The chief element of delay was the lack of mass political organisation and administrative experience in the North, as a result of which Northern leaders feared that in an independent Nigeria the south would dominate. The NPC incurred the hostility of the

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1. Bello, Sir Ahmadu, My Life, Cambridge, 1962, p. 85.
2. Ibid., pp. 135 and 136.

NCNC and the AC as it succeeded in retarding the pace of the movement towards independence. The second concerned the status of Lagos. The NPC and NCNC co-operated in an effort to turn the most developed Yoruba city into a federal territory. This helped prepare the way for their later alliance and at the same time served to keep the southern parties apart. AG resentment against the decision to federalise Lagos led the party to take a strong emotional stand against the Colonial Office and increased the influence of the party's more radical members. The third, the question of minorities, remained a live issue until independence. The problem of safeguarding minority interests and of the creation of new states found the AG and NCNC again opposing the NPC. None were created, but AG support for such states in the North and East and NCNC support for them in the West resulted in their finding electoral support in these areas. The fourth issue revolved around the division of power between the centre and the regions. The NCNC proposed a strong central government; the AG preferred strong regional governments; and the NPC wanted as much power for the regions as was possible. Apart from the division of power the question of revenue allocation was vitally important. In general it can be said that regionalism triumphed.

c. Conferences and Constitutions.

In 1946, without consultation, the Governor, Sir Arthur Richards, produced the first of the constitutions. It provided for a central legislature of 45 for all Nigeria; 28 were to be Nigerians, of whom 4 were to be elected. A regional House of Assembly was established in each of the regions, which had advisory powers only. In the North there was to be a House of Chiefs. On the one hand a unifying effect was achieved by bringing the North into the central legislature; on the other, it formally introduced the regional concept and established the basis of a very unwieldy federation with one region twice the size in area and population of the other two. These proposals were attacked on every side by Nigerian nationalists and the NCNC led protests and sent a delegation to Britain. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, told them to return and try to make it work.

Sir John Macpherson replaced Sir Arthur Richards in

April, 1949 and immediately called a series of national and regional conferences to shape a new system. These discussions made Nigerians confront the difficult problem of harmonising their divergent interests and the three years in which the new constitution was negotiated were dominated by tribal nationalism. In January, 1952 Macpherson's constitution came into effect. It established a Council of Ministers consisting of 18 members, of whom 12 were to be Nigerians and 6 officials. The Nigerians were to be nominated by the Regional Legislatures, each region nominating the same number. A House of Representatives was also established, consisting of 142 members, of whom 136 were to be Nigerians. A House of Chiefs was introduced in the West and the regional legislative bodies were given legislative powers on a limited number of topics, subject to the approval of the Governor. In Nigeria's first general election, the NPC swept the North, the NCNC took the East with a large majority and the AG won the West with 49 out of 80 seats.

The constitution was destined for a short life. There was no ministerial responsibility; two of the parties wanted greater regional autonomy; and a more precise definition of the functions of the regional and central governments was required. The NCNC found itself in an intolerable position, since its leaders were excluded from the national legislature and, owing to an internal crisis, there was a minority government in the East. It was the AG, however, which precipitated the final breakdown. On 1st April, 1953 Anthony Enahoro, an AG backbencher, introduced a bill demanding self-government by 1956. The NPC opposed it, leading to an AG and NCNC walkout. The Northern members were booed and insulted by Lagos crowds, and they seriously contemplated secession. The position further deteriorated when Awolowo announced a tour to Kano. The Resident prohibited this rather tactless move but enough tension had been generated to lead to communal rioting in the North in which 36 people were killed and 277 injured, according to the official count. Shortly afterwards the Northern legislative bodies passed an eight point resolution which, in effect, demanded dissolution of the Federation. One point required that each Region 'shall have complete legislative and executive autonomy' with respect to all matters except Defence, External Affairs, Customs and a West African Research Institute for which a non-political cent-

ral agency would be responsible.[1]

Against this background, a conference in London in 1953 was to prove surprisingly successful. A federal constitution was agreed in which residual powers were to be transferred to the regions as distinct from the centre as had been the case under the old constitution. The bitter issue of the status of Lagos was decided by arbitration which went in favour of federalising the city. The Nigerian police force was to be federalised. When the resumed conference began in Lagos in 1954 the AG demanded that the right of secession be included in the constitution. This was rejected. Each region was to have its own public service, revenue allocation was to be on the basis of derivation, and the Market Boards were regionalised, thus dividing Nigeria into three economic units. On 1st October, 1954, therefore, a new constitution which declared Nigeria to be a federation, came into existence. The Council of Ministers, to be composed of 10 Nigerians and 3 ex officio Ministers was given responsibility for the formulation and execution of policy. Instead of Ministers being nominated by the regional assemblies, they were to be nominated by the leader of the party which gained the majority of seats in that region in the federal elections. The House of Representatives was increased to 184 members, half of whom were to be Northerners. In the elections the NPC won over 80 of the 92 seats in the North, the NCNC won the East with ease and managed to defeat the AG in the West. Thus the NCNC had the right to choose 6 Federal Ministers, while the NPC had the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives. This made coalition inevitable, and even though it required some compromise of the two parties it was this that made federal cooperation possible.

In 1955 Sir James Robertson succeeded Sir John Macpherson and he proved to be an excellent choice to lead Nigeria to independence. In 1956 the Queen paid a highly successful visit to Nigeria. At the 1957 London Conference, arrangements were concluded to enable the East and West to achieve self-government later in the year. It was also decided that a House of Chiefs should be set up in the East and that on the dissolution of the House of Representatives towards the end of 1959 there should be two federal legislative houses, a Senate and a House of Repre-

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1. Bello, Sir Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 144.

sentatives. Membership of the latter was to be enlarged to 320, elected on the basis of one member for each 100,000 people. The Senate was to consist of 12 members from each region and the Cameroons, 4 from Lagos and 4 special members. A fiscal commission was appointed to restudy the earlier decision on revenue allocation.

When the conference was resumed in 1958 it was agreed that the North should become self-governing in March, 1959 and that should the Federal Parliament pass a resolution asking for independence, Her Majesty's Government would make the necessary arrangements. The fiscal commission recommended, on the basis of sensible new criteria, the establishment of a pool of federally-collected revenue to be shared as follows: to the North 40%, to the West 24%, to the East 31% and to the Southern Cameroons 5%.

The outcome of the elections which took place in 1959 was as follows:

	North	East	West	Lagos	Total (1)
NPC and allies	135	1+	7**	-	143
NCNC/NEPU	8	58	21	2	89
AG	25	14	33	1	73
Independents	6*	-	1	-	7
	174	73	62	3	312

* Declared subsequently for NPC.
\+ Mabolaja Grand Alliance.
** Niger Delta Congress.

After a week of negotiation, the NCNC decided not to co-operate with the AG, but in accordance with a pre-election understanding to form a coalition with the NPC. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was knighted, became the first Prime Minister. Zik opted for the uninfluential post of President of the Senate. Soon after independence, however, on 16th November, he became Nigeria's first indigenous Governor-General. Awolowo became Leader of the Opposition. Ahmadu Bello preferred to remain Premier of the North rather than to join in federal politics. The Prime Minister introduced the motion asking for independence at the January

1. Crowder, Michael, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

THE FOUR STATES OF NIGERIA UNDER CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.



session and it was approved unanimously. On 29th June the United Kingdom Parliament passed the necessary legislation granting Nigeria fully responsible status. On 1st October, 1960 Nigeria celebrated its independence.

In accordance with a decision of the United Nations General Assembly, and after a plebiscite held in the northern section of the British-administered trust territory of the Cameroons, both the northern and southern sections of the Cameroons were administratively separated from Nigeria on 1st October, and remained so until their future was settled by a further plebiscite: the southern part elected to join Cameroun, and the northern part to join Nigeria, where it became known as the Sardauna Province of Northern Nigeria. (The NCNC accordingly altered its name to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens.)

III. From Independence to Secession.

It was now to be seen whether, left to their own devices, the Nigerian peoples would be able to overcome their differences and find sufficient in common to become a Nigerian people. Although the three main cultural groups were engaged in a complicated and precarious balancing act hope of success was high. Unfortunately, however, 'the 'political frame' left by the British proved unable to withstand the centrifugal pressures of the 'political facts' '.(1) Yet again it was tribalism which lay at the core of these 'political facts' and which erupted in a series of crises which were eventually to tear the Federation asunder.

During this period a new state, the Mid-West, was carved out of the eastern non-Yoruba part of the Western Region, against the opposition of the AG. On 1st October, 1963 Nigeria became a Republic with Zik as its first President. The Tiv peoples' hostiltiy to Kaduna continued and serious conflict flared up on occasions, notably in February and October, 1964. In 1965 at the Lagos University, a federal institution, an Ibo was replaced by a Yoruba as Vice-Chancellor causing yet another serious tribal quarrel: 'this story is one of hidden politics and barefaced tribalism'.(2)

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1. Post, K.W.J., op. cit., p. 29.
2. Africa Confidential, No. 17, 27.8.65, p. 6.

Corruption spread among both politicians and civil servants, and changes of party allegiance, misuse of public funds, lavish spending and large motorcars increased the cynicism of the populace about politicians and politics. The work of the Federal Parliament not only became increasingly irrelevant to the needs of the country but also decreased in volume. It was said by Joseph Tarka that 'this honourable House has created two records. The first is a record for short sittings and the second is a record for long vacations, plus expenses paid'.(1) A groundswell of popular discontent mounted as it became apparent that it was only the politicians who were getting richer. Unemployment spread steadily and led to a number of serious strikes, the most effective of which were the Republic Day strike of 1963 and the Joint Action Committee's thirteen-day strike in May and June, 1964, both of which were handled incompetently by the Federal Government. Amongst the politically conscious, and some of the military, disgust became the prevalent emotion aroused by politics and politicians, scepticism grew about the whole democratic system and with it a yearning for a strong, incorruptible dictator.

a. Crisis in the Western Region, 1962.

For a year and a half the country progressed peacefully enough. Then in May, 1962 the AG split in two and the Federal Government decided to take advantage of the situation. One AG group was led by the party leader, Awolowo. He had become convinced that the future lay not in the existing form of appeal to the electorate, but in a more radical, socialist policy which would find increasing favour among the people as their disappointment with the slow rate of socio-economic growth under the Federal Government increased. Supported by the younger men, he began to emphasise the 'democratic socialism' of the AG programme and to try to spread this policy to the Northern Region. The other group was led by Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, deputy leader of the party and Premier of the West. Akintola, a wealthy chief and a moderate, having a great affinity with the respectable and aristocratic rulers of the NPC, felt that the AG

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1. House of Representatives Debates (hereinafter referred to as HRD), Fifth Session, Vol. 16, 23 - 28 September, 1964, p. 143.

had no future in the political wilderness and should join the federal coalition. Backed by the businessmen of the party he opposed the drift towards socialism and the campaign at the national level which, he believed, could only draw the fire of the Federal Government on the West. Apart from this difference over policy, a personal rivalry and animosity developed between the two leaders, particularly since Awolowo on a number of occasions overruled decisions reached in the Western Cabinet on regional affairs. Akintola's view was that Awolowo's place was leading the opposition in the Federal Parliament and not interfering in the day-to-day running of the Region. Dissension came into the open at the annual party convention in Jos in April, 1962, and the party finally split towards the end of May, when, at a meeting of the Federal Executive Committee, which Akintola refused to attend, it was decided that Akintola should be removed from the offices of deputy leader of the party and Premier of the Region. A majority of members of the House of Assembly went to the Ibadan High Court to swear an affidavit reaffirming lack of confidence in Akintola and finding him guilty of maladministration, anti-party activities and indiscipline. The Governor of the Region dismissed him on the grounds that he no longer enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the House of Assembly. To replace him the AG appointed Alhaji Dawuda Soroye Adegbenro, the first Moslem to be a Premier in a southern region. Akintola announced that he had written to the Federal Prime Minister asking that he request the Queen to dismiss the Governor and informing him that he intended to test the legality of his dismissal in court. The disintegration of the Regional Government became obvious when rioting broke out in the Western House and the police, acting under Federal Government instructions, cleared the House and locked it.(1)

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1. An official statement on the proceedings of the House reads: "Chief Odebiyi (Minister of Finance and Leader of the House) was about to move the first business motion of the day when Mr. E.O. Oke ... jumped up, raised an alarm and flung a chair across the floor of the House.
   Mr. F. Ebubodike ... seized the Mace and smashed it on Mr. Speaker's table.
   Mr. S.A. Adeniya ... then seized a chair and hit the Minister of Trade and Industry ... on the head... At this stage members of the Akintola faction assisted by the NCNC

The NPC and NCNC decided to exploit the division of their opponents and strike a powerful blow at the AG. One reason was simply a dislike, even hatred, felt by some of their leaders towards Awolowo and his party and another, fear and distrust of his new policy of appealing to the socially discontented elements throughout the country. Both had an equal interest in thwarting his plans. After the rioting in the Western House, which had the tacit support of the Federal Government, Sir Abubakar introduced a bill declaring a state of emergency in the West. He said that no responsible government could allow this to continue 'without taking adequate measures to ensure that there is an early return to the Region of peace, order and good Government'.(1) Awolowo maintained, however, that this was 'a calculated, premeditated attempt on the part of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to try, if they could, to castrate the Action Group, to disturb the welfare of the people of Western Nigeria who have always been looked upon as the foes of the N.P.C.',(2) and pointed out that the disturbance was started by Akintola's supporters. The motion was passed by 232 votes to 44.(3) A state of emergency was declared, the Regional Government suspended and Senator Dr M.A. Majekodunmi, the Federal Minister of Health, appointed Administrator. Step by step the AG was crippled. Awolowo and a number of other leaders were restricted. Then in September, 1963 the trials of 30 opposition members began. Awolowo was found guilty of treasonable felony and sentenced to ten years imprisonment; another AG leader, Anthony Enahoro, was sentenced to fifteen years (later reduced to seven). Meanwhile the Coker Commission was appointed to investigate the AG's financial malpractices. It found Awolowo had not conformed to the standards of practice required but absolved Akintola of any guilt.

Opposition, smashed chairs and tables. Police had to use tear gas to disperse the scuffling. Mr. Speaker then suspended sitting for 2½ hours. The House reassembled at 11.30 am.

But members of the Akintola faction ... assisted by a number of Opposition members started smashing chairs in their bid to prevent the meeting." West Africa, 2.6.62, p. 607.

1. *NRD*, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 1101.
2. Ibid., p. 1103.
3. Ibid., p. 1119.

Findings of malpractices, although correct, could have been proved in other Regions as well. The AG rejected them as Awolowo had been prevented from attending the hearings and giving evidence.

In July, 1962 the Federal Supreme Court found that the Western Governor had exceeded his powers in removing Akintola from the Premiership without an actual vote in the House of Assembly. In May, 1963 the Privy Council quashed this and upheld Adegbenro's appointment.(1) The Western House of Assembly then passed a retroactive law amending the Constitution with effect from 1960, and removing the Governor's right to dismiss the Premier from office; and in June, 1963 the Federal Parliament nullified the Privy Council verdict. The Governor of the West, an Awolowo supporter, was retired and replaced by one with NCNC sympathies; and to 'complete the dismemberment of the old Action Group empire, the new Mid-West State was created in mid-1963 out of the non-Yoruba elements in the West';(2) 'there was not the slightest doubt that the Mid-West state was created not solely to allay the fears of the minorities in that area but to neutralize Action Group influence there' (3)

On 1st January, 1963 the state of emergency was ended and without an election Akintola emerged as the leader of a new party, the United Peoples' Party (UPP), a pro-NPC splinter of the AG, which joined with the NCNC to form the Regional Government, with Akintola as Premier. Thus the AG was effectively precluded from controlling a region in which the party had the support of the majority of voters. Despite all that had happened to Awolowo and the AG, the party proved its strength by winning to Lagos Municipal Elections late in 1962. The attempt at mak-

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1. Section 33 (10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria (Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council) laid down that the Governor had the power to dismiss the Regional Premier when 'it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly'. The Privy Council held that the words 'it appears to him' provided 'no limitation as to the material on which he was to base his judgement or the contacts to which he might resort for the purpose'. Adegbenro versus Akintola, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Appeal Cases, 1963, p. 615.
2. Schwarz, W., Tribalism and Politics in Nigeria, World Today, Vol. 22, November, 1966, p. 464.
3. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 94.

ing democracy work in Nigeria had suffered its first severe set-back, one from which it was never given time to recover.

b. Crisis over the Census, 1963 - 1964.

It was not, however, the destruction of the AG which enabled the NPC to maintain its hegemony, but its announced population lead - a lead which southerners, both Ibo and Yoruba, questioned. The previous census had been held under British rule in 1952-53 and the suspicion was that for motives of their own, the British had inflated the Northern figures. On the basis of that census the North had been given 173 seats, the East 74, the West 62 and Lagos 3. The NCNC had come to realise, too, that far from being able to manipulate the NPC leaders, it was itself likely always to remain the junior partner in the coalition. Thus southern politicians, NCNC as well as AG, looked to the census of late 1962 to redress the balance. In these circumstances the census operation was fought like an election and produced results which were inflated in some areas and upon the validity of which the NCNC and NPC could not agree.

In December, 1963 a second census was taken and this time the results were so inflated in all regions that Nigeria's population stood at the astonishing total of 55.6 million. The comparative census totals were as follows:

Region	1963 Census	1952-3 Census	House of Representatives 1964
North	29,758,875	16.2 m.	167
East	12,394,646	7.2 m.	70
West	10,265,846	6.1 m.	57
Mid-West	2,535,337		14
Lagos	625,352	35,000	4
Total	55.6 m.	32 m.	312

For all the inflating of numbers this left the North-south balance practically as before and the disappointment for the southern parties imposed a fatal strain on the NCNC-NPC coalition. Dr Michael Iheonukura Okpara, Premier of the Eastern Region, and Zik's successor as leader of the NCNC, declared there had been 'astronomical inflation' and described the figures as 'worse than useless'. Premier Osadebay regarded them as a 'stu-

pendous joke' [1] and the AG condemned them strongly. The Eastern Government went so far as to challenge them in court, but the challenge was dismissed. Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the North, decided on a strong line and stated that he was ready for a complete showdown if the NCNC and AG did not accept the figures. A deadlock ensued with the Elections for the Federal Parliament due, but by deciding to fight the elections the southern parties accepted by implication the validity of the returns.

c: The General Election, December, 1964.

i. New Polarisation of Parties.

In the West, the split in the regional coalition government which followed the census, was intentionally aggravated by Chief Akintola who, with NPC backing, took an increasingly anti-Ibo stand. He succeeded in detaching the fourteen Yoruba Assembly members of the NCNC and with them formed a new p. ..y, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, with the main objective of furthering the interests of the Yoruba people and having a conservative social policy. As the governing party it issued a white paper in which it accused the Ibo people of attempting dominate the country by filling the key positions in Government and state corporations. This change was backed by a similar though more moderate statement from the NPC and in the North feeling against the Ibo residents became so intense that the Premier had to intervene personally to restrain his people from violence against them.

The first clear break in the coalition took place when the NPC supported the Mid-West Democratic Front against the NCNC in the first election in the Mid-W. t early in 1964. Though the Front lost badly it seemed at one stage as if its anti-Ibo propaganda and claim to have the Federal Government on its side might cost the NCNC control of the Region. Further, the NCNC noticed that to an increasing extent the NPC was allying itself with dissident elements in the south, and NCNC leaders were aware of their vulnerability in those parts of the East that still hankered after the setting up of a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) state.

After the census figures had been published the NCNC

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1. Flint, John E., op. cit., p. 16.

realised that if it were not to remain merely an ineffectual partner in the coalition it had to make a bid for power at the centre and it had to do so before all opposition in the North had eroded. Owing to the rapprochement between North and West, the East was threatened with isolation and it was natural that the NCNC turn to the other southern party, the AG. In May Dr Okpara toured the Western Region accompanied by the leader of the AG, Adegbenro. The dangerous southern 'Christian' Alliance was beginning to take shape. In June they agreed to an alliance and in July to fight the election jointly. In October the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) was formed, with Dr Okpara as the leader and the NCNC as the senior partner. The second party was the AG led by Adegbenro, but whose rallying point remained the imprisoned Awolowo. They were joined by the Northern Progressive Front, made up of Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union and J.S. Tarka's United Middle Belt Congress.

At the same time another alliance was being forged. A certain design might be seen in the actions of the NPC. Its support for Akintola and his formation of the NNDP; its anti-Ibo propaganda; its championing of the Mid-West Democratic Front against the NCNC, and its contact with dissident groups in the East all seem to reveal an attempt to extend control to the East. Thus, in the same way as the East and the NCNC had been used to destroy the AG, so now the West and the NNDP were to be used to cripple the NCNC and divide up the East; and just as the creation of the Mid-West State had weakened the West, so would a COR state disrupt the East. On 20th August the Nigerian National Alliance was formed (the NNA) led by the NPC and Ahmadu Bello. Its chief ally was the NNDP under Akintola, who had achieved the alliance for which he had worked. It included the Mid-West Democratic Front, the Niger Delta Congress, the Dynamic Party, the Republican Party and the Lagos State United Front.

ii. The Election.

The election which was in reality a straight fight between North and south degenerated into intimidation and violence as the Governments of each region used their power to make it almost impossible for outside parties to campaign in their regions. Complaints of thuggery, irregularities and interference came from all parts of the country and UPGA claimed that four thousand party workers had been arrested in the North and forty

candidates jailed so as to allow NPC candidates to be returned unopposed. The greatest turbulence, however, was to be found in the strife-torn Western Region, where both sides hired organised bands of thugs for the purpose of intimidating individuals and breaking up meetings. The Federal Electoral Commission began to disintegrate; though the majority agreed that irregularities had been serious in many places, only two of the six (from the East and the Mid-West) actually wanted the election postponed. After the close of nominations it was announced that 78 candidates had been elected unopposed, 61 of whom were NPC. UPGA believed that only discrimination could have produced this total of unopposed NPC candidates, described the election as a gigantic fraud and called for a boycott of the election if it were not postponed. The Prime Minister refused and on 30th December polling began. In the East and in Lagos the boycott was so effective that almost no polling took place; in the West and Mid-West Regions voting was confused and partial while the North remained unaffected. The NNA swept the North as expected and, owing to UPGA's boycott, was able to triumph in the West, emerging with an overwhelming majority of 198 out of 312 seats. Thus the NCNC had failed to shake the NPC hold in the North or even to create a solid UPGA bloc in the south by securing an AG victory in the West. 1st to 4th January saw the apogee of the crisis. Zik, the President, whose sympathies lay with the NCNC, did not have the constitutional power to order another election and the NCNC could do nothing to reverse the situation but secede. It seems that Sir Abubakar called the secession bluff and that the NCNC, brought to the brink of shattering the Federation, drew back. At first Zik refused to call on Sir Abubakar to form a new government, but on 4th January he gave way on the understanding that a broad-based national government be formed. When the Cabinet was formed, 4 of the 17 Ministers were members of the NCNC. In those areas in which elections had not been held, new elections took place and UPGA obtained 52 seats to give it a total of 108. The uneasy alliance of North and East was thus restored, in the Government at any rate, but the wounds of the election had struck deep.

d. <u>The Regional Election in the West, October, 1965</u>.

Strife in the West nad not been settled and the events of December, 1964, serious as they were, paled beside those that

followed in October, 1965. This was the first regional election since the state of emergency which had returned Akintola to power. It had for a long time been evident that in spite of its control of the administrative machinery the NNDP could not win any genuinely free election against the AG. After UPGA's defeat in the general election its only hope lay in the belief that Akintola, however much he rigged the election, could not win. Such a victory would defeat the NPC's ambitions in the south, give UPGA control of all three southern regions and enable it to challenge the North in the Senate. Akintola was equally determined to win. He had ruled with a heavy hand and he had no wish to suffer the consequences of being forced out of power by his opponents. Also, if UPGA won and were able to secure a majority in the Senate, the NPC would either have to come to terms with it and jettison the NNDP or alternatively hasten a North-south showdown. It was therefore crucial that the NNDP be confirmed in office.

Akintola proved an unequalled master of election techniques and 'never in the short history of parliamentary elections in Nigeria was there such massive rigging as occurred in Western Nigeria in October'.(1) Such were the lengths to which his administration went to remain in office that during a Parliamentary debate in which examples of irregularities were cited,(2) one speaker rose to conclude: 'any surprise then that Mr. Ian

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1. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 140.
2. It is interesting to quote a few examples, taken mainly from Parliamentary debates, but confirmed by journals, newspapers and books, of such irregularities.

   "As everyone knows, in many places the results were transposed - ... in Ondo North Constituency where Chief Adekeye won 13,099 votes to defeat his opponent who scored.. only 1,870 votes was declared as the successful candidate...

   One Mr Olusa who said that he has crossed carpet at Owo won as an U.P.G.A. candidate. After he had won it was announced there that he won, but after some time the W.N.B.S. and later Rosiji's N.B.C. ... announced that Mr Olusa had lost the election. So, Olusa who was in a fix declared for the N.N.D.P., and immediately after that time another news item flashed out again that Olusa had won the election...

   ... It was this same way that an Electoral Officer, on the daybefore election, was caught with 44 certificates of those who had already won before the election took place!

   There was an incident at Mushin here. People were talking about Ballot Boxes, and so one small girl told the people that if they were looking for Ballot Boxes, they

Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, spoke in the way he did about Nigeria'.(1) Mr E.E. Esua, Chairman of the Western Nigeria Electoral Commission, complained that his Commission had been impotent and admitted to many irregularities concerning police thuggery and unopposed candidates. Although Akintola won and, with the continued support of the Federal Government, declared himself elected, he was never able to establish his authority and the Region rapidly deteriorated into chaos. Not only frustrated politicians, but a disgusted public could see no advantage in legal activities and took the law into their own hands. When challenged in Parliament Sir Abubakar replied:

> "As far as I am aware, the elections in the West were held, and the authority which is competent to announce the winners of the elections - the Western Nigerian Electoral Commission - had told us that the N.N.D.P. had won the elections. As far as I am aware, too, the Governor of Western Nigeria had called upon the leader of the N.N.D.P. to form the Government." (2)

By Christmas week disturbances and lawlessness in the West were widespread and still increasing, and the Nigerian police admitted that the task of maintaining law and order was beyond them. Yet the Federal Government refused to declare a state of emergency on the grounds that it was a regional matter. This might be compared with their immediate declaration of a state of emergency in 1962 when the situation was far less critical. Nigeria was at the brink, and something had to happen.

e. The Military Takes Over, January, 1966.

Mr R.B.K. Okafor: 'In view of the sorrowful incident which has taken place within the last few hours, I beg to move that this House do now adjourn.' (3) And so at 9.20 am. on

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were in her mother's house." - Mr W.O. Briggs, HRD, Vol. 19, October, 1965, pp. 140 and 141.

Chief O.B. Akin-Olugbade gave some further examples: "There were fifteen candidates fraudulently returned unopposed ..."; UPGA candidates were refused entry to polling and counting stations; "Dumping of ballot papers in N.N.D.P. boxes"; and "Millions of ballot papers found with N.N.D.P. agents". Ibid., p. 149.

A correspondent of West Africa wrote: "I have been able to verify to my own satisfaction that a 'pregnant' woman was discovered on examination to have ballot papers inside her robes." West Africa, 16.10.65, p. 1151.

1. Chief V.O. Onabanjo, HRD, Vol. 19, October, 1965, p. 143.
2. Ibid., p. 199.
3. Ibid., Vol. 20, 12-15 January, 1966, p. 54.

Saturday, 15th January the House adjourned, many members not even being aware of the nature of the sorrowful incident. It was, in fact, that Nigeria's first Republic had come to an end. In the explosive situation that resulted from the October elections with the people's refusal to accept Akintola, the Western Government's inability to control the chaos and the Federal Government's unwillingness to exercise its responsibility for order, certain Ibo officers decided to act. Appalled at the prospect that they might be called in to maintain Akintola in power and at the real possibility of the Sardauna of Sokoto imposing his own military solution, they moved first.

In the early hours of 15th January the officers deposed with swift efficiency political leaders in the federal and regional capitals. In Kaduna a small detachment under Major Chukuma Nzeogwu shot Ahmadu Bello and took control. In the south Sir Abubakar and his Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh, were shot and Chief Akintola met the same fate. By dawn the broadcasting and telecommunications centres in Lagos, the Federal Parliament and other key buildings had been surrounded, and roadblocks established along the airport road. On 16th January it as reported that after a further discussion by the Federal Cainet the administration of the country had been transferred as a temporary measure to the army under Major-General John Aguiyi-Ironsi. At 11.50 pm. the Acting President, Dr Nwafor Orizu, broadcast to the nation that he had been advised by the Council of Ministers to hand over the country to the armed forces: Major Nzeogwu and his 'Supreme Council of the Revolution' surrendered and gave to Ironsi a 'declaration of loyalty'.

> "Whatever part they themselves are now to play, the mutiny of Nigeria's 'middle rank' officers has led to a military régime. And that is what they wanted. That, too, is what a great number of civilian Nigerians want, and politicians of all persuasions in Nigeria seem to have been quick to realise that this is no time to compete with the soldiers. Even the leaders of the two Regional governments which were unaffected by the mutiny have gracefully stood aside to let General Aguiyi-Ironsi's military governors take over. And throughout the country a most remarkable calm has reigned..." (1)

A Supreme Military Council was established to administer the new

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1. West Africa, 22.1.66, p. 81.

Federal Military Government. Military Governors were appointed to head the Regions and were to be assisted by the ex-regional Governors.

Two factors, however, were to lead to a frustration of hopes for peace. In the first place, Ironsi lacked the capacity to solve Nigeria's problems. Instead of providing leadership he surrounded himself with a small circle of Ibo friends. What was to have been the first truly Nigerian Government degenerated into rule by an Ibo clique, out of touch with opinion in the non-Ibo parts of the country. It was the inexpert advice Ironsi was to receive from them that led to the unification decree and the first riots.

> "... there was [secondly] the vexed position of the fate of the plotters of the January 15 incident. Some Nigerians thought of them as heroes in leading the overthrow of the much hated politicians but their killings of innocent army officers mainly from Regions other than their own, inflicted a major wound on the Nigerian army famous for its discipline. It is unfortunate that a decision one way or the other was not promptly taken in this regard. When it was learnt in some quarters of the army that those directly involved, although detained in various prison establishments in the country were being paid their regular salaries plus other allowances, the hitherto smothered feeling that those concerned should have been brought to book according to military tradition apparently began to show expression in the impatience of a section of the army. The already charged situation reached an explosive point when a very strong rumour started circulating that there was a further plot to annihilate army officers and civilians from the same Region as most of those who had been killed in January. This was the immediate cause of the events of July 29." (1)

The advice which Ironsi received was to take the bull of tribalism by the horns, abolish the federal system and declare Nigeria a unitary state. This he did on 24th May by means of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, No. 34 of 1966. The former Regions were abolished and replaced by groups of provinces. Nigeria ceased to be described as a Federation and became known as the Republic of Nigeria. The former Federal Military Government and the Central Council became respectively the National Military Government and the Executive Coun-

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1. Government Statement on the Current Nigerian Situation, Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos, undated, para. 7.

cil. The top grades of all five civil services were centralised. The Federal Territory of Lagos became the Capital Territory of Lagos. Some 107 political parties and tribal associations were banned.

> "The provisions of the decree [Ironsi declared] are intended to remove the last vestiges of the intense regionalism of the recent past and to produce that cohesion in the governmental structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount objective of the National Military Government and, indeed, of every true Nigerian, namely, national unity." (1)

It seemed clear to the people of the North that under the unitary system the more advanced Ibo would assume control of everything. The Unification Decree was interpreted there as final proof that Ironsi's Government represented an Ibo conspiracy to rule the North, and the country. Five days later tribal riots began in seven towns in the North on an unprecedented scale, ostensibly against the Decree, and resulting in destruction of the property and lives of many people of Eastern Nigerian origin - between 600 and 1,000 died between May and June.

f. The Northern Officers' Counter Coup, July, 1966.

A basic inadequacy in Ironsi's calculations was his failure to appreciate that tribal hostility had corrod[ed] the army and become so intense. The one instrument he of as being truly national above all others failed him. He [was] in Ibadan to plead for support for his scheme when in the early hours of 29th July a spontaneous army mutiny broke out at Abeokuta Barracks. It spread to the barracks at Ikeja and before dawn to Ibadan. Fifty soldiers entered the State House there and kidnapped Ironsi and his host, Lieutenant-Colonel Fajuyi, the Military Governor of the Western Provinces. Later they were both reported killed. In the barracks Northern soldiers, some over-suspicious and others revengeful, began to kill Ibo officers and soldiers, and these panic killings spread. Before midnight on 29th-30th July, however, fighting stopped and Brigadier Ogundipe, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command and second-in-command to Ironsi, began negotiations with the rebels, allegedly turning on their demands for outright secession by the North

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1. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 5, May, 1966, p. 534b., ('Political' denotes 'Political, Social and Cultural'.)

and West or at least a return to the status quo ante 15th January. Ogundipe declined to succeed Ironsi and Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon was asked to do so. Gowon, a popular young Northern officer, agreed to assume command provided the North did not break away and that all regions revert to the federal system. In his first broadcast Gowon announced that the events of the previous seven months had convinced him that 'the basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time',(1) and that there should be a return to the position prior to Decree 34. Within a month he issued a decree by which Nigeria reverted to the federal system, abolishing Ironsi's unification innovations.

Among many of the Northerners, the moderation of the Head of State, a Northerner but a Christian and of a minor tribe, seemed irksome; and mutinous troops resumed the anti-Ibo pogroms. The death roll among the Ibo soared as did the number fleeing home. As a counter measure to the massacres in the North the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, on 4th October ordered all non-Easterners living in the East to be repatriated to their home areas under armed escort. When the madness subsided and the counting was done it was estimated that up to 30,000 Ibo-speaking people had been murdered and that two million had fled homewards as refugees.

g. The East Secedes.

> "... scarcely a single Eastern family has not suffered directly or indirectly from the massacre, mutilation or robbery of Easterners in the North, or their flight home. The events of May, it is conceded in the East, could have been a delayed reaction to the murder of Sir Abubakar and the Sardauna. The murder of Easterners in the army last July, it is even conceded, was a delayed reply to the murder of senior, non-Eastern officers in January. But the appalling slaughter of September-October is variously attributed in the East to the desire of 'old politicians' to destroy the constitutional talks in Lagos, to the determination of unnamed Northerners to eradicate Eastern commercial influence in the North, or to a Northern desire to wipe out the East as the only force standing in the way of Northern domination." (2)

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1. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 9.
2. Matchet's Diary, West Africa, 15.4.67, p. 485.

It was not only the murders, the robberies and the refugees that impelled Easterners to move away from their former homes but also the fact that the Federal Military Government had been either unwilling or unable to prevent the atrocities. In October, after the massacres, the East refused to attend the Constitutional Conference until its demand was met that all soldiers of Northern origin based in Lagos, Ikeja and Ibadan be removed. The condition was not met and no conference was attended by Eastern representatives until the Chairman of the National Liberation Council of Ghana, Lieutenant-General Ankrah, offered his services to bring the two parties together. With his encouragement and co-operation the Supreme Military Council met at Aburi in Ghana on 4th and 5th January, 1967. In the communiqué, agreement was reported on all items, but it soon appeared that there was no agreement on their interpretation. General Gowon's view was that the military leaders had agreed to return to the constitutional position before 17th January, 1966 and that any powers which had been removed from the Regions after 17th January should be restored to them. Agreement had been reached for the Supreme Military Council to deal 'with all matters of national importance affecting the whole country', but it was 'never the intention' that the Regional Governors should have the power to veto decisions of that Council.(1) Ojukwu, on the other hand, said that it was 'unanimously agreed that it was in the interests of the safety of this nation that the regions should move slightly further apart than before'.(2) The decisions at Aburi, therefore, went beyond Gowon's interpretation: federal, executive and legislative power, in Ojukwu's view, was to be vested in the Supreme Military Council rather than in the Supreme Commander, and any decision affecting the whole country referred to the Council to obtain the concurrence of all the Military Governors before becoming law. The difference was fundamental. A return to the pre-January position would leave the Federation intact: that was what Gowon wanted and that was how he interpreted Aburi. The introduction of a collegiate executive where each Governor had a veto would greatly weaken the Federation: that was what Ojukwu wanted and that was his interpretation of Aburi. In March they

1. West Africa, 11.3.67, p. 329.
2. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 1, 1967, p. 698c.

restated their positions, and Ojukwu gave Gowon until 31st March to implement the Aburi agreement; otherwise he would carry it out unilaterally.

True to his word, Ojukwu on 31st March decreed that all revenues collected in the Region on behalf of the Federal Government should be paid to the East Nigerian Government (Revenue Collection Edict, 1967). It did not affect oil royalties , which were paid through the Bank of England. On 4th April air services between the East and the rest of the Federation were discontinued by the East and later a Nigeria Airways aircraft was seized. On 18th April Ojukwu took the final step before secession. He issued the Statutory Bodies Edict, 1967, which set up a Statutory Bodies Council and transferred ten Government agencies to it: the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, Nigeria Airways, the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, the Nigerian Coal Corporation, the Nigerian National Shipping Lines, the Nigerian Ports Authority, the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, the Nigerian Railways Corporation, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs and the Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre.

In a broadcast to the nation on 27th May Colonel Gowon said that the continued defiance of federal authority by the Eastern Region had produced uncertainty and insecurity generally and had 'pushed the country with increasing tempo toward total disintegration and possible civil war.'.(1) Gowon had long been of the view that the Federation could only survive if the old Regions were further subdivided to eliminate the overwhelming position of the North; this was his answer to those who claimed that the July coup had simply restored the North to dominance. He thus issued a decree establishing twelve new states in expectation of the East's secession; an announcement intended to convey to the non-Ibo people of the East that at last they were to be granted the autonomy they had so long demanded. They were to compare this status with their future under Ojukwu's breakaway country and were thus given an added incentive to join the federal effort in the coming struggle. By splitting the East in three - one state for the Ibo and two for the minority groups - Gowon took from the Ibos their outlet to the sea, Port Harcourt,

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1. Ibid., No. 5, 1967, p. 778a.

and the oil-rich areas of the East. This would leave Iboland landlocked, poor and overcrowded; and secession followed immediately. On the same day a joint meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders and the Consultative Assembly at Enugu authorised Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu to declare independence. On 30th May he announced that Eastern Nigeria would henceforth be known as the Republic of Biafra and that all political ties between it and the Federation were totally dissolved. Gowon immediately responded that the 'ill advised statement' by Ojukwu was an act of rebellion which would be crushed. Full economic sanctions were introduced and a war of polemics and propaganda followed. But civil war was inevitable. Having tottered so long on the brink Nigeria had finally gone over. 30th June was aptly described by Ojukwu as the Zero Hour. The suffering, the bitter fighting and the wholesale manslaughter and starvation that were to follow could never have been imagined by those who made the decisions.

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chapter 2 - factors relevant to the formation of nigeria's international relations under civilian government

the men who made the decisions
- bello - balewa - azikiwe - awolowo - okpara - akintola - osadebay - okotie-eboh - wachuku - mbadiwe - enahoro - ribadu - dipcharima - kano - tarka - ezera
- conclusions and comparisons

other factors influencing international relations
- historical factors
- geographic and demographic factors
- the pressures of federalism
- economic factors
- the major political parties
  - the 1959 election
  - after the 1959 election
  - the 1964 election
- trade unions
- youth organisations
- all-nigeria peoples' conference
- military influences

summary

CHAPTER II : FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE FORMATION OF NIGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNDER CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

> "The foreign policy of a country depends on a whole series of factors acting simultaneously and not always in the same direction. It is the sum of these factors, however, which determines and guides foreign policy. We must observe these factors, analyse them and estimate their strength, i.e. the amount of influence which they exert. We must also study them in a dynamic perspective - not just at a given moment but in their historical development." (1)

Before the military coup of January, 1966, Nigeria was one of the few countries on the continent of Africa whose foreign policy was affected by pressures and factors comparable with those of the developed countries of the West - there was a large body of able leaders offering alternate policies, there were three major and a few minor political parties with varied views on foreign affairs, there was a free press, and there were student and youth movements, trade unions, and so on.

From the time when Nigerians were informed of the date of independence, and the leaders realised that a foreign policy would have to be formulated, until democracy suffered its first serious setback with the crisis in the Western Region (a period of about three years), all these pressures and factors prevailed. Once opposition leaders were imprisoned and the major opposition party crippled, some of these pressures disappeared. As the position in the country continued to become increasingly critical so a decreasing amount of time was devoted to foreign affairs, which in terms of the needs of the troubled country had become something of a luxury. Foreign policy debates in Parliament ceased almost completely and Parliament itself met less and less frequently and sat for shorter periods.

A. The Men Who Made the Decisions.

> "Concrete foreign policy decisions, of course, are made, not by a society at large, but by certain designated smaller groups within it ... Generally the ambiguity in hypothesizing about relations be-

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1. Thiam, Doudou, The Foreign Policy of African States, London, 1965, Introduction, p. xi.

> tween social values and foreign policy could probably be better avoided if attention was focussed on the values of such select groups ... The elite groups often constitute a tiny minority that differs from the majority in education, occupation, wealth, successful upward mobility, experience with urbanism and other aspects of the modern world, and other crucial characteristics." (1)

While quite clearly the men who carry the most weight in decision-making cannot be separated from their backgrounds - or for that matter from their regions and parties - nevertheless their personalities and characters play a central role in the formulation of foreign policy; and their development and experiences are among the chief factors accounting for its pattern. This is very true of Africa, and this is very true of Nigeria.

The Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria, 1953 - 1966.

The Sardauna was born in 1910 in Rabah in the Sokoto district of the North. The first Sultan of Sokoto, Muhaman Bello, son of Dan Fodio, was Ahmadu's great-grandfather. He was also well connected on his maternal side, his grandmother being the daughter of the fourth Fulani Emir of Kano, and he asserted a claim to descent on both sides from the Holy Prophet.

He grew up in Sokoto and until the age of sixteen attended the Regional School there. He then went to the Katsina Teachers' Training College from which he returned to teach in Sokoto until appointed a government official. In 1938 he became the Sardauna of Sokoto, (2) and in 1944 was appointed General Secretary of the Sokoto Native Authority. He travelled to England in 1948 where he studied forestry, agriculture and British government. In 1949 he was appointed to the Northern House of Assembly and, when the NPC became a political party, emerged as its leader. In 1953 he became Premier of the North. Until self-government he, and his deputy, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were able to operate independently of direct mass support and without popular accountability. In fact they were modern politicians in the quite limited sense that they were parliamentarians.

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1. Lystadt, Robert A., Cultural and Psychological Factors, in African Diplomacy, ed. Mackay, Vernon, London, 1966, Chapter VI, p. 92.
2. In the feudal period the Sardauna was Commander-in-Chief of the noble warrior class or the royal army.

> "... Here is a man of the most formal piety, conversant with the Koran and Fulani traditions, yet a devotee of cricket and fives; an African Moslem Chief who strangely assumes, in his sudden switches of identity, an English public school mentality." (1)

The Sardauna's roots and experience disposed him to concern himself particularly with religion, obedience, order, stability and discipline, his rule being founded on the precepts of Islam: 'There is no power in me save through Allah. In Him do I trust and to Him do I turn'.(2)

He was not only the head of the largest party in Nigeria and the Premier of the largest Region, but also the outstanding contender for appointment as Sultan of Sokoto, the most prestigious position of the old Fulani Empire. As the most powerful man in Nigeria, he became a symbol of conservatism. Since to him the North was of greater importance than the Federation as a whole, he chose to remain Premier of his Region and allow his Deputy, Sir Abubakar, to become Prime Minister of the Federal Government, believing that he would retain considerable influence over him. He felt his own position to be in no way inferior to that of the Prime Minister,(3) and was later to embarass him by statements on foreign policy, particularly in connection with pan-Islam and the Middle East.

Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister, 1957 - 1966.

When Sir Abubakar was assassinated in the military coup of January, 1966 Kwame Nkrumah, in a special broadcast, commented that Sir Abubakar had 'died a victim of forces he did not understand and a martyr to a neo-colonialist system of which he was merely the figurehead. Deeply religious, honest and sincere in his personal dealings, striving valiantly to master a situation which was beyond his capacity, he has fallen in a struggle whose nature he never understood'.(4)

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1. Diamond, Stanley, Nigeria - Model of a Colonial Failure, New York, 1967, American Committee on Africa (Occasional Paper: 6), p. 26.
2. Holy Koran, Chapter XI, Verse 88, in Bello, Ahmadu, op. cit, Preface p. ix. On the same page he states: "I have always based my actions on my inward convictions, on my conscience and on the dictates of my religion".
3. "... they do not understand that the Premier of any Region is not in any way subordinate to the Prime Minister: our paths are, in fact, quite separate and our functions do not overlap ..." Bello, Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 208.
4. West Africa, 29.1.66, p. 133.

Balewa's status in traditional terms was as humble as the Sardauna's was exalted. Born in the Bauchi Emirate in 1912, son of a commoner whose title, Garkuwan Shamaki (literally bodyguard or keeper of the horses), was at that time conferred strictly on members of slave lineages. He attended the village school, the Bauchi Provincial School and then Katsina Teachers' Training College from which he graduated in 1933. In 1945 he was awarded a scholarship to London University's Institute of Education.

In 1946 he became the first traditionally non-eligible person to be appointed to the Emir of Bauchi's Council. In 1947 he was elected for Bauchi to the Northern House of Assembly and to the Legislative Council of the country as a whole, and in 1951 was re-elected to these bodies, the latter renamed the House of Representatives. In 1952 he was appointed Minister of Works and in 1954 Minister of Transport, and in this capacity visited the United States and Holland to study water transport. He received the OBE in 1952 and the CBE in 1955, and was knighted at independence, having become Prime Minister on 30th August, 1957.

> "The central feature of Balewa's experience then is upward social mobility ... A singularly low-born member of an emphatically ascriptive society that change has incorporated rather than displaced, Balewa's socio-political point of vantage is truly that of the 'new man'." (1)

He understood the necessity of balancing his progressive ideals with his respect for the conservative traditionalism of the North, and in striving for a harmonious reconciliation of the two, acquired an ability for compromise and a belief in pragmatism. These made him the one man who might have kept Nigeria together had he had sufficient time to consolidate his control. There was 'something old-fashioned, patriarchal, about him' and in the realm of ideas he was cautious and compared to a nineteenth century liberal.(2) He had no inclination for fire and venom and never became a charismatic figure around whom all Nigerians would rally.

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1. Whittaker, C.S. Jr., Three Perspectives on Hierarchy, Political Thought and Ledership in Northern Nigeria, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. III, 1965, p. 6.
2. Italiaander, Rolf, The New Leaders of Africa, London, 1961, pp. 195 - 196.

Whatever the pressures of the Sardauna and the North, his own personality and judgement were to have a profound effect upon the tone of Nigeria's foreign policy. His restraint, moderation and knack for compromise typified Nigeria's international policies as did his undogmatic, non-domineering and non-militarist approach; and while his lack of dynamism might have lost Nigeria some support, his own personal integrity won Nigeria much respect. Two further aspects of his management of foreign affairs merit notice. These were his skilful avoidance of a policy that would drive Nigeria's tribes further apart, exemplified by his opposition to the alteration of boundaries in Africa; and secondly, the manner in which he prevented an intensification of religious differences: his handling of the Israeli loan was a case in point.

Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Premier of the East, 1954 - 1959, Governor-General, 1960 - 1963; President, 1963 - 1966.

Azikiwe, commonly known as Zik, was the one man who might have been to Nigeria what Nkrumah was to Ghana or Sekou Touré was to Guinea. Here was the charismatic figure who for twenty-five years had been in the forefront of pan-African thought, the nationalist firebrand, the 'man of triumphal tours, big gestures, the crowds and the limelight'.(1)

He was born in 1904 into a Methodist, Ibo family and received a Western-Christian education at the C.M.S. Central School in Onitsha, the Hope Waddel Training College in Calabar and the Methodist Boys' High School in Lagos. He spent nine years in the United States working his way through Storer College, West Virginia, and Howard, Lincoln, Columbia and Pennsylvania Universities, obtaining an MA in philosophy and an MSc in anthropology. During his last four years he lectured in history and political science at Lincoln and later received honorary doctorates from both Lincoln and Howard. He also completed a course in journalism. In 1934 he visited London for the publication of his first book, 'Liberia in World Politics'. He then went to the Gold Coast to edit the African Morning Post and in 1937 returned to Nigeria. His reputation for invective, political skill, oratory and organisation preceded him and shortly after

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1. Williams, David, The Times, London, Special Supplement on Nigeria, 29.9.60, p. iv.

arriving in Lagos he became a member of the Nigerian Youth Movement Executive and founded the West African Pilot. He was the moving spirit behind the formation of the NCNC in 1944 and in 1946 was elected President of the party.

He became a member of the Legislative Council in Lagos, held important posts in the Eastern and Western Houses of Assembly, and was named Premier of the East in 1954. He was excluded from becoming Prime Minister by the size of the North and the political victory of the NPC. He took his party into a coalition with the NPC and in so doing, had to compromise some of his ideals. After the 1959 election he opted out of active politics to become, firstly, President of the Senate, then Governor-General and finally President of Nigeria.

His influence, nevertheless, was great, particularly on young southern intellectuals, and much of the radical pressure that built up in the south found its source in his writings and in the policies he instilled into the NCNC, all of which had the effect of attracting the foreign policy of the coalition government towards Pan-Africanist and neutralist positions.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Premier of the West, 1954 - 1959; Leader of the Opposition, 1960 - 1963.

Awolowo, frequently referred to as Awo, was born in a village in Western Nigeria, attended his village school, a Wesleyan Secondary school and the Methodist School at Abeokuta. He worked as a school teacher, a moneylender, a transport operator, a produce dealer and a journalist, and in 1944 received a Bachelor of Commerce degree through correspondence with London University. He then attended that University, obtaining a Bachelor of Laws degree, and founded the Yoruba cultural organisation, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, later organised into the Action Group, which he led to victory in the West in 1951. He became Minister of Local Government and in 1954 Premier of his Region. After the Federal Elections of 1959 he became Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House of Representatives. In 1963 he was found guilty of treasonable felony and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In August, 1966 General Gowon released him and once again he was to spring into prominence.

Before independence he was described as one of the 'more moderate nationalists in Nigeria' who disapproved of the policies of both Zik and Nkrumah and as 'a man of compromise ...

who resembles the prime minister in this respect'.[1] His view on neutrality was that it represented 'an unmitigated disservice to humanity' and he found pan-Africanism to be unrealistic in both its political and economic connotations.

After independence, however, this caution and pro-Western approach were to undergo a complete somersault and Awolowo was to make vigorous calls for neutralism and pan-Africanism, using the Defence Pact as the vehicle for this dramatic change.[2]

Dr Michael Iheonukara Okpara, Premier of the East, 1960 - 1966.

He was born in an Ibo village in 1920 and was educated entirely in Nigeria, spending seven years at Yaba, then Nigeria's centre of medical education; and practised at Umuahia. He was present at the formation of the NCNC but it was only after the shootings at Enugu in 1949 that he entered politics. He was at one stage arrested and put under surveillance. In 1953 he was elected to the Eastern House of Assembly and was appointed Minister without Portfolio. In the NCNC split he supported Zik, and on the latter's return to power, Okpara was made Minister of Health. In 1957 he became Minister of Production and in 1959 Minister of Agriculture; and when Zik left active politics he succeeded to the Premiership of the East and the Presidency of the NCNC, which positions he held until 1966. He is at present one of Colonel Ojukwu's chief civilian advisers.

He has been described as 'an ardent devotee of the philosophy which he has called Pragmatic African Socialism'[3] and a convinced pan-Africanist, believing that Nigeria's struggle for unification taught 'that the voyage to African Union should be made at the pace of the slowest boat'.[4] As a first step, he advocated the division of Africa into regional groupings, each to promote cultural and economic ties between its member states, and, on the basis of sufficient understanding, to form political federations, foundations for an African federation, confederation or common market.

Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Premier of the West, 1960 - 1966.

Son of a prominent Yoruba trader, he was born in 1910

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1. Italiaander, Rolf, op. cit., p. 204.
2. This change of policy is discussed below under the sub-section on Political Parties.
3. Nigeria Trade Journal, No. 3, 1965, p. 110.
4. News from Nigeria, No. 33, 17.6.64, p. 10.

in Ogbomosho. At the age of four he was taken to the North where he learnt Hausa, attending the Sudan Interior Mission School at Mina. At twelve he returned to Ogbomosho, went to a Baptist day school and the Baptist Teachers' Training College, after which he taught at the Baptist Academy in Lagos. When three fellow teachers were dismissed for agitating he, in his capacity as Secretary of the Baptist Workers' Union, resigned and went to work as a railway clerk. He became active in the Nigerian Youth Movement and in 1943 was appointed editor of its newspaper, the Daily Service. In 1946 he won a British Council Bursary to Oxford to study public administration and later read law.

In 1950 he returned to Lagos where he served as the AG legal adviser and one of Awo's chief lieutenants. In 1951 he was elected to the Western House of Assembly and the Central House, being appointed Minister of Labour, and in 1953 Minister of Health. From 1954 to 1957 he led the opposition in the House of Representatives; from 1957 to 1959 he served as Minister of Communications under Sir Abubakar; and in 1954 he was elected Premier of the West, a position which he held until his assassination in the coup of January, 1966.(1)

Akintola opposed the idea of a United States of Africa, believing it was unrealistic to expect the abdication of individual sovereignty; and that once anti-imperialism ceased to be a rallying call there might well be difficulty in finding other common causes which would serve to bring Africa together. He recommended a gradual increase of economic co-operation, principally on a regional basis, and an African organisation modelled on the British Commonwealth. He was of the opinion that racial discrimination in South Africa might lead to serious conflict but warned that the African states must proceed with caution in attempting to combat it. He suggested that Nigeria despatch an ambassador to South Africa to learn the facts of the situation, thus enabling Nigeria to take action based on full knowledge of that country.

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1. His split with Awolowo, his leadership of the United Peoples' Party, his coalition with the North and his rigging of elections have been discussed in Chapter I.

Chief Dennis Chukude Osadebay, President of the Senate, 1960 - 1963; Premier of the Mid-West, 1964 - 1966.

Osadebay, an Ibo, was born in 1912. His interest in politics led him to co-operate with Zik and Herbert Macaulay in forming the NCNC in 1944, and he rose to a position in the Central Committee. He attended London University where he read law and graduated in 1949. When Zik took office as Governor-General, he succeeded him as President of the Senate, and when the people of the Mid-West and the Federal Parliament voted in favour of the establishment of a fourth region, he was transferred there as temporary administrator and then, having led the NCNC to victory, became the first Premier of the Mid-West.

He differed from most other politicians in his belief that under Nigerian conditions the British party system was artificial. His view was that so long as freedom of speech was preserved a one-party system could not only be more intelligible to the people and make better use of available talent, but could also 'give more scope for genuine opposition and criticism and less for personal ambitions'.(1)

Chief Festus Samuel Okotie-Eboh, Minister of Finance, 1957 - 1966.

Of noble and wealthy stock, Okotie-Eboh was born in 1912. He attended Sapele Baptist School and in 1930 was engaged as an assessment clerk in the Sapele Township Office. From 1931 to 1935 he taught, and then joined the British Bata Shoe Company. In 1945 he took up employment with the Czechoslovak Bata Shoe Company, under whose sponsorship he visited Prague to undertake a diploma course in business organisation.

> "He was there ... during the Communist seizure of power: and while he deplored the Communists' rejection of democracy, he was, as a successful business man, almost as upset by their indifference to efficiency in industry, shown by the substitution of political for technical tests in choosing managers. It was this experience rather than theoretical devotion to private enterprise which made him ... impervious to Soviet overtures." (2)

He returned to become extremely successful in commerce, his major financial interests being in rubber, timber and a chain of schools. He was known to buy a big new car every year.

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1. West Africa, 15.2.64, p. 173.
2. Ibid., 21.9.57, p. 893.

In 1951 Zik, a lifelong friend, persuaded him to stand in the West on an NCNC platform which he did successfully. In 1955 he was appointed Minister of Labour and Welfare and in September, 1957 became Nigeria's first Minister of Finance, a position he held until his assassination in January, 1966. He served as Leader of the Government in the House of Representatives, and in the foreign policy division in the NCNC the conservative faction came under his leadership. Of greater importance was his guidance of the economic policies of Nigeria: he appreciated the need for foreign investment and aid, and set about creating a conducive economic climate which guaranteed against state interference and nationalisation, and which necessitated maintaining good relations with the West.

Jaja Anucha Wachuku, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1961 - 1964.

He was born in 1918 into a family whose standing in the Aba district aided his political career. Having received his earlier education in Eastern Nigeria, he went to the Higher College, Yaba, the Gold Coast Peoples' College and then to read law at Trinity College, Dublin, where he completed a Doctorate of Laws and won numerous prizes for oratory.

He returned to practise in Aba, and joined the NCNC as legal adviser. In 1952 he became its Deputy Leader in the Eastern House. In the party split [illegible] oke away from Zik but returned to the NCNC in 1957, and [illegible]e House of Representatives; and was appointed Ministe[illegible] Economic Development by Sir Abubakar. Having performed well at the United Nations, however, he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August, 1961. He impressed the Western countries with his restraint and the UN with his sound grasp of international problems, and these qualities, toge[illegible]r with Nigeria's advent on the international scene, led to [illegible] election as the Chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission on the Congo.

Wachuku was soon to run into trouble. Although at independence he was classified as a radical, he was attacked strongly in Parliament by some members of the NCNC and by the AG for the moderation of his foreign policy statements. He came under heavier fire, however, from Cabinet Ministers and Northerners for failing to consult his colleagues at the UN and for neglecting to seek authority from Lagos before making some of his statements, as also for personal bombast. The attacks grew so

strong that in late 1963 the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Senator Nuhu Bamali, on behalf of the Cabinet, was forced to repudiate one such statement and it was Bamali, not Wachuku, who led the Nigerian Delegation to a Conference of Foreign Ministers in October, 1963.

After the 1964 elections Wachuku was appointed to the position of Minister of Aviation, Sir Abubakar himself again taking control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a while, before appointing Bamali Foreign Minister.

Dr Kingsley Ozuomba Mbadiwe, Adviser on African Affairs to Sir Abubakar, and later Minister of Trade.

He was born in 1915, the son of a well-to-do Eastern Ibo businessman. He was educated in various parts of Nigeria, including the Hope Waddel Training College and the Baptist Academy, Lagos. In his early twenties he worked as a reporter and news agent for Zik's newly-formed West African Pilot, and so was introduced to nationalist politics.

Taking Zik as his model he set out for the United States in 1939 where he attended Lincoln, Columbia and New York Universities, obtaining degrees in banking and finance and in government. While in the United States he became a popular lecturer and published a book: 'British and Axis Aims in Africa'. (In 1956 he was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Laws at Lincoln.)

In 1948 he returned to Nigeria and joined the NCNC. In 1951 he was elected to the Eastern and Central Houses, becoming within a few years Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and then of Communications and Aviation. In 1957 he was appointed Leader of the NCNC in the Federal House and entered Sir Abubakar's Cabinet as *Minister of Commerce* and Industry.

Mbadiwe was considered something of a firebrand, and in 1958 broke with Zik on the grounds that Zik's nationalism was too moderate. He was dismissed from party office and replied by forming the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which resulted in his losing his seat in the 1959 elections. He rejoined the party and regained his seat and in May, 1961 the Prime Minister, in answer to calls for the establishment of a Ministry to handle relations with African countries, appointed him his Personal Adviser on African Affairs. This was adjudged to be one of the Prime Minster's shrewdest domestic moves for he could 'now appear to be listening to the extreme nationalists

without needing to take their advice'.[1] It also had the effect of bringing a strong critic into line. One of Mbadiwe's first moves was to call the All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference in August, 1961.[2] He accompanied the Prime Minister to Monrovia and on his visit to the United States. He became Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office and took his place, after the 1964 elections, as Minister of Trade.

Chief Anthony Eronsele Osoghale Enahoro, AG Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born in 1923 in Uromi in the Mid-West, he attended Government schools in Uromi and Owo and King's College, Lagos. He followed a career in journalism and served as editor of a number of newspapers: Southern Nigerian Defender, 1944; Daily Comment, 1945 and 1947 - 1949; West African Pilot (Associate Editor), 1946; and the Nigerian Star, 1950 - 1953. He was elected General Secretary of the AG in 1953 and served in both the Western and Central Houses.

He became Awo's deputy in the House of Representatives and acted as the opposition's chief spokesman on foreign affairs. As such, he stuck very close to Awo. When Awo was pro-Western, so was he; when Awo became radical, so did he; when Awo was jailed for ten years for treasonable felony, he received fifteen years; and when Awo was released in August, 1966 to take up a position in Gowon's Executive Council, so too was Enahoro.

Before independence Enahoro supported what he termed selective or independent alignment. He pointed out that because of Nigeria's desire to remain in the sterling area, the country was economically aligned, and continued:

> "We are aligned with the State in this particular regard which believes in the same things which we believe... We agree with the Western concepts of liberty and the dignity of the individual. And so in this field we have our commitments. Even in the military question, the Prime Minister suggested that he hoped that we would continue to take advantage of the training facilities offered by the United Kingdom." (3)

This implied acceptance of UK military assistance may be compared with his statements after independence in which he strongly at-

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1. The Economist, 17.6.61, p. 1240.
2. See below.
3. HRD, March - May, 1960, p. 403.

tacked the Government for duplicity in advocating a policy of non-alignment while at the same time maintaining a Defence Pact with the United Kingdom.

Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu, Minister of Defence, 1960 - 1965.

He was born into a Fulani family, living in Ribadu in the North, in 1910. He attended a Koranic School, taught for a few years and worked as an accountant for the Adamawa Native Authority. In 1936 he was elected to succeed his father as village head, a great honour, and in 1946 he received a British Council Bursary to study local government in Britain.

In 1947 he became a member of the Northern House of Assembly and in 1951 was elected to that House and to the House of Representatives, where he was appointed Minister of Lands and Natural Resources. In 1954 his portfolio was changed to that of Mines, Power and Lagos Affairs, in 1960 to Mines and Power, and on independence he was appointed Nigeria's first Minister of Defence.

It was early in his term that the Defence Pact issue came to a head, causing the first major foreign policy controversy. He proposed the motion authorising the Government to conclude the agreement, pointing out that for some time after independence Nigeria would require military assistance. Although the agreement was later abrogated Ribadu maintained close military ties with Britain. He did, however, succeed in decreasing Nigeria's dependence on aid from the mother country by obtaining West German, Canadian, and to a lesser extent, Ethiopian assistance; while increasing Nigeria's prestige by the despatch of Nigerian troops to the Congo and Tanzania.

His political position, stemming from his squire origins, was considerably to the right of Sir Abubakar, and the mutual respect which developed between him and the Sardauna added to his influence. He died in 1965.

Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1958 - 1965.

The son of the village head of Dipchari in the North, he was born in 1917. He attended Primary School in Dikwa where, as is the custom with sons of notable families, he was brought up in the Shehu's Palace; and then proceeded to Maiduguri and Katsina Higher College.

He taught at Bornu until 1946 when he entered commerce as an agent for one of the large business concerns, John Holt and Company. In 1947 he was elected to the executive of the NCNC and attended some of the constitutional conferences in London. In 1954 he was asked by the NPC to contest the seat for Bornu East and was elected to the House of Representatives. He served as President of the Bornu branch of the NPC and held various Native Authority posts. Sir Abubakar invited him to serve as Minister without Portfolio and in July, 1958 he replaced Dr Mbadiwe as Minister of Commerce and Industry. In the last Cabinet he was appointed Minister of Transport.

His views were similar to, and reinforced, those of Chief Okotie-Eboh since he was 'concerned with the practical rather than the doctrinaire approach to economic theory' exemplified by this statement:

> "It follows that since we need capital and expert assistance to promote the development of our economy, and since we cannot provide these factors from within the country, we must get them from overseas." (1)

Mallam Aminu Kano, Leader of NEFU and Government Whip.

He was born into the Fulani clan of Kano Emirate known as the Genawa, having neither royal nor noble status, but renowned as jurists, priests and scholars, Aminu Kano sprang from just such a family, his father having been Acting Chief Alkali (Moslem judge) of Kano and his grandfather a celebrated Mallam (religious scholar).

After his education at Kaduna College he travelled to England where he came into contact with personalities on the left wing of the Labour Party and read extensively Marx, Laski and Gandhi. His background and education kindled a strong distaste for the Northern hierarchical system in which he saw the antithesis of democracy. Thus, in 1950, he resigned his teaching post because he believed that his country was 'a prisoner of the Anglo-Fulani autocracy or the unpopular indirect rule system'; and because there was no freedom to criticise what he considered the 'most unjust and anachronistic and un-Islamic form of hollow institutions promulgated by Lugard'. (2)

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1. HRD, 15-30 November, 1961, p. 357.
2. Daily Comet, 11.11.50, pp. 1 and 4, in Whittaker, C.S.Jr., op. cit., p. 8.

Requiring the support of a mass political organisation, he joined the Northern Elements Progressive Union and soon assumed leader[illegible] Though generally regarded as more radical than the NCNC [illegible] illied itself to that party in the 1959 elections and [illegible] and itself in an extraordinary position when the NCNC associated with the NPC, NEPU's main enemy. In this circuitous fashion Aminu Kano came to be appointed Deputy Chief Whip for the governing party, the majority of which he opposed.

This did not prevent him from voicing his opposition on many issues and joining forces with the radicals of the NCNC, notably Dr Kalu Ezera, in attacking Government foreign policy. Before independence, for example, he expressed his belief in a great African union; he attacked the training of Nigerian diplomats by foreign powers; and though a Moslem, objected to the idea of a foreign policy dominated by Moslem countries. After independence he condemned the imbalance of Nigeria's friendship in favour of the West and pressed for a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs to aid the Government in pursuing a strict course of non-alignment.

Joseph Sarwuan Tarka, Leader of the UMBC and Vice-President of the AG.

He was born in 1932, the son of a farmer and clan head. In 1947 he went to the Teachers' Training College at Bauchi, home town of Sir Abubakar, where Aminu Kano was his tutor for a time. The influence of these two men stimulated Tarka to interest himself in public affairs. He returned to the Tiv country to teach for the Native Authority. In 1956, however, owing to his opposition to the Native Authority system, he resigned and entered the political arena on a full-time basis. He was elected President-General of the United Middle [illegible]t Congress, whose dominating characteristics were hatred of Hausa-Fulani domination and the desire for a separate state. The support of the AG for the UMBC resulted in an alliance of the two parties and Tarka was elected Vice-President of the AG.

During his career numerous charges, including that of treasonable felony (together with Awolowo) were brought against Tarka, but he was consistently acquitted. Finally, in 1965, he was imprisoned for insulting the Premier of the North and for inciting disturbances. He was released by Gowon and appointed

to head the Ministry of Transport.

In the House of Representatives he had been the Opposition spokesman on commerce and industry, and on foreign policy he tended to fall in line with Awolowo. Before independence his views on non-alignment approximated to those of Awo, and he called on Nigerians to be either Western or Eastern democrats and 'since we are not disciples of the Marxist theory, we are Western Democrats'.(1) Subsequent to independence he endorsed the overall AG alterations in policy.

Dr Kalu Ezera, NCNC Member for Bende East.

When the uneasiness of radical members of the NCNC concerning Government foreign policy came into the open, their chief spokesman was a young intellectual, Dr Kalu Ezera, an Ibo representing the constituency of Bende East.

Before entering Parliament he had obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree from Lincoln University, a Master of Arts from Harvard and a Doctorate of Philosophy from Oxford. He was appointed a lecturer in Government at the University College of Ibadan and when the University of Nigeria was established in Nsukka he became Associate Professor of Government and Dean of the Faculty of Social Studies.

Though a member of the governing coalition, he was one of its most vocal critics on foreign policy. As one of its original detractors, he charged it with lack of dynamism, condemned the Defence Pact and challenged the Governmer attend the Belgrade Conference of neutral states and to ar Spanish island of Fernando Po.

Conclusions and Comparisons.

The development of these sixteen personalities has been described in an attempt to understand the background to the foreign policies which each adopted and advocated, and the totality of Nigeria's international relations, largely a synthesis of the clash and blend of their views. The biographical factors selected are those bound to have influenced their political attitudes generally, and predisposed the approach of each towards radicalism or conservatism.

These terms must be perceived within their Nigerian

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1. HRD, 11-22 January, 1960, p. 102.

context, which, compared with other African states, was itself a conservative context. To the most radical of this group, non-alignment consisted in a balanced policy favouring neither East nor West - in Mali, however, their terminology would have been deemed mild and restrained.

Factors of origin judged likely to create a predisposition towards conservatism are age, traditional status, family wealth, Northern, Hausa-Fulani background, and Islam. On the other hand, youth, humble origin, Southern, Christian or animist upbringing tend to produce a propensity for radicalism.

School education also tended to consolidate these intrinsic factors. Northern education induced a respect for Islam and a conformity with traditional systems and values, and looked to Mecca and Medina for inspiration. Christian-sectarian education, while not necessarily progressive in itself, evoked in its teaching of the English language and Western values, a receptivity to new ideas and an awareness of the West.

The effects of higher education abroad, while generally enlightening, were conditioned by background; so that where one student might absorb new concepts, another would reinforce old ones.

Occupational and professional categories evince the individual's personal contacts, his social and financial attainments, and hint at the nature of his political leanings.

Little new can be deduced from formal party affiliations since they were invariably consequent upon education and membership of tribe, region and religion, except that views had frequently to be adjusted to gain general support in the founding of new parties, or tempered and accommodated to accord with the fluctuating policies of established parties. No background information could have anticipated some of the reversals in policy motivated by reasons either of expediency or of compromise.

Ahmadu Bello (born 1910), Muhammadu Ribadu (1910), and Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (1917) were all of royal or noble birth, brought up as the sons of important men and in accordance with Islam. They all attended Teachers' Training Colleges in the North, and taught and worked for the Native Authority. Both Bello and Ribadu studied in England while Dipcharima entered commerce. With such very similar backgrounds it was in the natural course of events that all three men should join and become senior members of the NPC; and that of this group, they (in particular

Bello and Ribadu) were considered the most conservative and their influence was towards the maintenance of close relations with fellow Moslem states.

Sir Abubakar differed from these men in the significant fact that he was of lowly birth and had worked his way to a position of eminence. He too was a product of a Northern Moslem education, and of Katsina Teachers' Training College, after which he taught in the North. He studied further in England where the British democratic processes, and the resultant opportunities for individual advancement, impressed him. His attempt to adapt these principles to the North produced a rational and practical politician who appreciated the limitations of progress in the African context. Both his nature and his experience led him to follow a restrained foreign policy based on a willingness to learn, a wish to please and a spirit of quiet compromise.

The two Northern personalities who rejected the NPC and the conservatism for which it stood, may be compared. Aminu Kano's family was one respected for its educational achievements rather than its traditional status. As a youth Kano saw his father, a respected judge, at variance with the Government and the Native Authority. Though he was brought up within Islam, a spirit of independence was inculcated in him which sanctioned his absorption of leftist thought while a student in Britain. He endeavoured to employ such ideals in domestic policy to revolutionise Islam and the North, and in foreign policy to induce greater dynamism and radicalism. On the other hand, Joseph Tarka, as a Tiv, had nothing in common with the Hausa-Fulani against whom his people had consistently and sometimes violently fought. His essential aim, to improve the lot of his people, he contrived to carry out by allying his party with the anti-Northern Action Group; and to obtain its support he was willing, though originally no radical, to endorse its shift to the left in foreign policy.

Azikiwe, Mbadiwe and Ezera were three Easterners, who despite their differing ages, had virtually parallel histories. None was of noble birth (though Mbadiwe was of a wealthy family), and all received Christian-sectarian educations. All attended both better and lesser known universities in the USA, which country generally produced a more revolutionary type of graduate

impatient with the old order.[1] On return all pursued the more liberal occupations of journalist and lecturer - rather than those of teacher, professional or businessman - so widening still further the gap between them and most of the sixteen. They all became members of the NCNC in which progressive climate they could exercise their talents for strong oratory and advance their views - outward-looking and in tune with the rest of Africa, but discordant with the cautious, unexciting NPC line. Zik's exit from active politics and Mbadiwe's entry into Sir Abubakar's Cabinet served to mute though not to silence their criticism; Ezera, as a far younger man holding no position of responsibility, remained one of the most vociferous critics of the Government's foreign policy.

One may also usefully compare and contrast the careers of the two Western politicians, Awolowo and Akintola. Born within a year of each other, their early education was Christian - Awo's at Wesleyan and Akintola's at Baptist schools - followed by law studies in England. At independence they were fairly conservative, overtly pro-Western and wary of Pan-Africanism. When Awo chose to redirect the course of AG policy towards domestic socialism and foreign radicalism their underlying differences became manifest. Being of wealthy stock, and in accord with the capitalist interests in the party, Akintola rejected socialism; having mastered the Hausa language while at school in the North and having established an affinity with Northern leaders, notably the Sardauna and Prime Minister Balewa, he refused to countenance a further widening of the breach between the North and the West. Thus he split with his leader and allied himself with the NPC in whose more sober climate he felt at home and of whose measured foreign policy he approved.

The histories of Michael Okpara and Anthony Enahoro ran roughly parallel. Of similar age, they attended Government schools in the south, and received all their higher education in Nigeria, and neither entered commerce or teaching - Okpara was a medical doctor and Enahoro a journalist - as the majority of the group under discussion did. Okpara by joining the NCNC and Enahoro the AG exhibited regional loyalty, and both were to de-

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1. Flint, John E., op. cit., pp. 159 - 160.

monstrate strong personal loyalty to their respective leaders, Zik and Awo. It was this adherence to the foreign policies of their leaders that was principally to account for their own variance in outlook. Before independence their differences were in degree; while Okpara was a practical promoter of pan-Africanism, Enahoro was unenthusiastic; and while Okpara supported non-alignment, though appreciating the importance of ties with the West, Enahoro advocated independent or selective alignment. Their post-independence attitudes matched those of their leaders; so that Okpara retained his beliefs but tried not to embarass the Coalition Government while it lasted, and Enahoro became a virulent neutralist and pan-Africanist, and an outspoken critic of what he termed the Government's reactionary foreign policy.

Okotie-Eboh, Wachuku and Osadebay, born within six years of each other, attended Government and Christian schools in the East and Mid-West and furthered their education in Czechoslovakia, Eire and Britain respectively; and all returned to Nigeria to join and attain eminence in the NCNC. Okotie-Eboh, of wealthy stock, was a successful businessman and capable administrator, and strove to establish a sound national economy which necessitated dependence upon the West. His age, financial and social status and his disillusionment with Communist business methods produced the most conservative senior member of the NCNC. Wachuku, also of wealthy parents, tended towards radicalism, possibly as a result of influences encountered during his sojourn in the Gold Coast or his period in Dublin. When, however, he was required to accommodate himself to coalition policies in Sir Abubakar's Cabinet, he demonstrated his willingness, for a time at least, to discipline himself and compromise. Osadebay, while in the Senate, proved to be a sober radical, but when the Mid-West State was created he devoted most of his attention to promoting its development.

Reflecting and generalising on the group as a whole, it can be deduced that a foreign policy which the majority of these men controlled would be conservative, pro-Western and lacking in pan-African fervour.

At independence the majority of the group were over the age of forty-five. Most were born into families of nobility, standing or wealth. Although only five were Moslem, four of them occupied very senior positions in the country - Prime Minis-

ter, Premier of the North, Minister of Defence and Minister of Commerce and Industry. (This would also bring substantial pressure to bear on the Government to establish closer relations with Moslem states.) Nine received education in Britain and only three in the United States resulting in a greater moderation than had these numbers been reversed. In all cases these were satisfactory period in their lives, creating an affinity and warmth towards those countries and a wish to maintain close bonds with them. On the other hand, none had been educated in Communist countries[1] and this could result only in coolness towards and wariness of Communism and the East. None except Wachuku had studied in another African country, and none except Azikiwe had spent any time working in another African country, and there is little evidence of travel or personal contact within the continent. This accounted for Nigeria's ignorance of Africa and the resultant lack of zeal for the establishment of stronger links with its peoples. The majority had been teachers or professional and businessmen, occupations which usually imply conservatism. This was reinforced by the fact that none had backgrounds of labour or trade union leadership.[2]

Pressures for a more radical, neutralist and pan-Africanist foreign policy can be expressed numerically: eleven of the sixteen were non-Moslem; ten had received Southern-Christian-sectarian educations; and twelve had undergone the broadening experience of higher education abroad. In addition, Southerners were far more knowledgeable about and articulate on foreign affairs; and the appeal of radicalism was far more emotional, passionate and romantic than that of tame realism. The numbers belied the facts for moderate pressures outweighed progressive. Conservatism was further strengthened by the fact that outside of this group it had the backing of a parliamentary majority.

At independence nine of the sixteen could be counted as conservatives - the four NPC leaders, the four opposition AG members and Okotie-Eboh - and seven as radicals - all the NCNC members except Okotie-Eboh. The radicalism of those seven was diluted somewhat by the effects of coalition. The AG's attempt to step into the vaccuum on the left previously occupied by the

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1. Okotie-Eboh's period in Prague was under a non-Communist régime.
2. The Baptist Workers' Union in which Akintola had worked was more a religious than a labour association.

NCNC resulted for a period of about two years in a radical majority within this group. With the split in the AG, however, the imprisonment of Awolowo and Enahoro and Akintola's unfettered freedom to declare his conservatism, conservatives once again outnumbered progressives in this select group and even in the relatively conservative Nigerian context.

B. Other Factors Influencing International Relations.

I. Historical Factors.

> "As far as international politics is concerned, perhaps Nigeria's lack of a national history is its greatest virtue. Like the United States in the nineteenth century, Nigeria in the twentieth century is free to find its position in the world largely unrestrained by repressive traditions. It has no national past, real or fancied, to recover; it has no traditional enemies; it has no common mythology with holy scriptures to which national policy must be made to appear to conform; it has no competition among religious leaders, each claiming to know the true way as laid down in ancient revelations; it does not have to appeal to past national principles to compel present national acceptance of new objectives; it has no common economic history to which national policy must conform, or which must be repudiated in order to have a viable contemporary policy; it has no common traditional political structure to restrict the direction it may take; it does not even have a common religious hero to whose teachings policy must conform in order to get universal acceptance; in short, Nigeria as a nation is more fully free than India, Burma or even China." (1)

But, although Nigeria as a nation had no common tradition to limit its freedom of choice, its component regions had their own very long histories. Thus evolved three different nations in three separate regions, each with its own culture and at its own stage of development, each with its respective political party and political leaders. Such a background necessitated a foreign policy developed on a basis of internal compromise. In order to satisfy three major parties, each answerable to a distinct following, Nigeria had to forge a foreign policy in which the process of give and take was an essential element.

Nigeria's own careful preparation for independence

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1. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 10 and 11.

proved to most of the leaders the wisdom of slow but steady progress.(1) Further, the country's own heterogeneity and the great difficulty experienced in bringing the peoples together gave Nigeria's leaders some insight into the immense problems involved in uniting Africa, so confirming the advantages of a measured approach. Nevertheless, having been a colony and having shared the pre-independence experiences of other African countries Nigerians had sentiments in common with Africa; and having argued the evils of colonialism to achieve sovereignty, it was natural to take a stand which would accelerate decolonisation in the rest of the continent.

Of Nigeria's historical relations with other countries the association with Britain was certainly 'the most imposing heritage'; on the one hand there was the memory of suffering under slavery and colonialism, and on the other there was 'Britain's graceful withdrawal by negotiation which left a certain reservoir of good will'.(2) Nigerian culture had assimilated much that was British and its leaders in particular were tied by bonds of friendship to the British people. In the pre-independence period of negotiations all factions had been represented and none felt excluded. Ties with Britain were thus maintained, and would not easily be broken; yet the actions of the former mother country were constantly under review for any hints of renewed colonialism.

II. Geographic and Demographic Factors.

These to a large degree were determined by historical factors. Owing to British imperialism and colonial fiat Nigeria's boundaries contained one of the largest land masses in Africa. Sheer size was enhanced by the variety and quantity of agricultural production and the mineral resources embraced

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1. "...A particularly relevant aspect of Nigeria's own history that may help to explain Nigeria's moderate position on the timing of African independence is that the senior party in her coalition government, the NPC, had itself sought to delay Nigeria's independence." Schwarz, F.A.O., Nigeria. The Tribes, the Nation or the Race. The Politics of Independence, Massachusetts, 1965, p. 218, fn.
2. Nunn, Grady H., Nigerian Foreign Relations, in The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government, ed. Blitz, L. Franklin, London and Lagos, 1965, Chapter 10, p. 251.

therein. The population, as declared after the 1963 census, stood at twice that of the next most populous country in Africa, Egypt. And the combination of huge manpower resources within a vast area and extensive natural resources made Nigeria potentially the most powerful country on the continent, which would be expected to play a dominant role in African affairs and become a leading spokesman for Africa.

The latent power of the country was, however, diminished by the lack of integration of its peoples; and Nigeria's leaders had to tread a wary path in formulating foreign policy to accommodate diverse groups. This point has been brought home only too clearly by the dissipation of Nigeria's influence resulting directly from the civil war.

Religious diversity also affected foreign policy. About half the Nigerian population was Moslem and the presence of pilgrims travelling to Mecca through the Sudan and Saudi Arabia necessitated maintaining cordial ties with these countries. By the same token it has created a dichotomy in relations with the Middle East, many Moslems wishing to express open support for their co-religionists in their struggle with Israel. Further, the conservative-radical diversity on foreign policy frequently corresponded with religious differences, Islam in general having a restraining influence on policies which might otherwise have been more radical.

Finally, population density, particularly in the south, resulted in fairly large migration of Nigerians to the nearby island of Fernando Po, to the western part of Cameroun and to Ghana. Their treatment was from time to time a source of official concern.

III. The Pressures of Federalism.

The Exclusive Legislative List, Section 15 of the Constitution, provided that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs. This was accepted as the final word on the subject, in theory at any rate, by writers and politicians except for the present Commissioner for External Affairs in Gowon's Government, Okoi Arikpo. His view was based on an examination of Section 69 of the Constitution which reads:

> "Parliament may make laws for Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the Legislative Lists for the purpose of implementing any treaty, convention or agreement between

the Federation and any other country or any arrangement with or decision of an international organization of which the Federation is a member: Provided that any provision of law enacted in pursuance of this section shall not come into operation in a Region unless the Governor of that Region has consented to its having effect."

Arikpo's interpretation of the effect of Section 69 was as follows:

"... This simply meant that in such matters as education (other than higher education), agriculture, health and other residual matters, the Federal executive authority could not legislate to implement international agreements of the Regional Governments. In respect of any such matter, notwithstanding the constitutional provision that external affairs were the exclusive responsibility of the Federal authority, a Regional Government might refuse to give its consent or approval to legislation enacted by the Federal legislature. If, therefore, the Federal Government entered into an agreement with the Government of Israel to supply scientific apparatus to all secondary schools in Nigeria, the Government of Northern Nigeria could, exercising its constitutional right, quite properly have refused to allow the use of such scientific apparatus in any secondary school in Northern Nigeria. No Nigerian need have been surprised that the Northern Region Premier was pursuing a different foreign policy from that of the Federal Government." (1)

Arikpo is discussing a statement made by Sir Ahmadu Bello late in 1965 to the effect that for him the State of Israel did not exist. But surely there is a difference between a Region having the right to prevent encroachment on its legislative field by the Federal Government circumventing the Constitution by making international agreements - which is certainly the object of the provisional clause in Section 69 - and a Regional Government making foreign policy statements and decisions which the Constitution expressly forbids. Thus while the North would be fully entitled to refuse the benefits of a loan from Israel, its Premier had no constitutional right to make statements on the recognition of Israel. Certainly Sir Abubakar had clear views on the subject. For example, when in August, 1964 the Prime Minister and Sir Ahmadu arrived in Lagos together, a reporter asked Sir Ahmadu for his views on the Congo. The Prime

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1. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., pp. 160 and 161.

Minister intervened, saying 'this is a matter for the Federal Government. I take objection to this question and will not like Regional Premiers talking about it.' (1)

This was but theoretical, and even prior to independence was not borne out in practice. Before October, 1960 when the Regions were self-governing but foreign policy remained the domain of the British Government, regional overseas missions seeking economic and cultural ties became a common occurrence. After independence Regional Governments, encouraged by their strong constitutional positions, continued these missions which often blurred the Nigerian image and embarassed the Federal Government, for inevitably they expressed views on world and African questions which did not always conform to those of the Federal Government, or to each other.

This problem was further complicated by the fact that Regional Premiers were either leaders or deputy leaders of political parties and had to promulgate the parties' views on foreign affairs. How could their constitutional positions which prohibited them from making statements be reconciled with the party positions which required this of them? Further, the Regional Premiers did not accept that their positions were in any way inferior to those of Federal Ministers; this was particularly so in the case of the Premier of the North.

The anomalous position of the North concerning relations with Israel has been referred to. While the Southern regions went out of their way to establish friendly relations with Israel - both Okpara and Akintola visited that country - and practised a policy of strict neutrality towards the Middle East in accordance with Federal policy, the North made its antagonism towards Israel and its support for the Arab countries clear.

A second controversy revolved around the Northern Premier's 1961 visit to the Middle East and Pakistan during which he was reputed to have said he was exploring the possibilities of establishing a pan-Islamic commonwealth. There was an outcry in the southern press and an embarassed Sir Abubakar denied that the statement had been made, but added that if it had, it would have been ultra vires the powers of a Regional Premier.

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1. West African Pilot, 28.8.64, in Mackintosh, John P., Nigerian Government and Politics, Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 285.

On other occasions Sir Ahmadu stated that he had lost confidence in the UN at a time when Sir Abubakar was expressing support for the Organisation, and he attacked the United States for resuming nuclear tests while the Prime Minister declared his understanding of the American decision.

Before independence when the Federal Coalition was still formulating a foreign policy, Premier Okpara, on behalf of the people of Eastern Nigeria, congratulated President Nkrumah when Ghana attained republican status, praised its constitutional provision for the surrender of its sovereignty to a United States of Africa, and expressed the hope that other African countries would follow suit. In 1962 when the Federal Government congratulated Nkrumah on Ghana's fifth anniversary and commended his contribution towards the solving of world problems and the unification of Africa, Okpara, enraged by charges that Ghana was financing the Dynamic Party which opposed the NCNC in the East and by Nkrumah's criticism of Zik's speech at the Lagos Conference in January, 1962, publicly denounced Nkrumah for subversion and for insults to Nigeria's leader.

The most serious alleged interference by the Western Region Government was reported in Nigerian newspapers as the attempt to establish a Western Nigeria Information and Industrial Development Office in New York. The Prime Minister immediately wrote to Premier Akintola pointing out that this was constitutionally prohibited. Akintola replied that the reports were false and reiterated his respect for the Constitution. The West was further charged with seeking aid from France at the same time as Nigeria was in the process of vigorous condemnation of French bomb tests in the Sahara.(1)

Although these pressures on foreign policy did not differ in kind from those exerted by political parties and their leaders, they did give the impression that the Federal Government was not the only spokesman on foreign affairs, that it was not always entirely in control and generally that Nigeria was speaking with too many voices.

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1. Minister of Economic Development, HRD, 30 March - 9 May, 1960, p. 227.

IV. Economic Factors.[1]

> "The economic forces affecting politics and foreign policy stem from a) the structure and nature of a country's domestic economy and its external economic and financial relationships; b) the objectives of the government and people as to the kind of economy and external relationships they want; and c) the tension between a) and b)." (2)

Put into Nigerian terms: a) Nigeria was an underdeveloped country, with much potential, but lacking the capital and skilled labour to realise that potential; it was heavily dependent on Britain and the West for aid, trade and investment; b) Nigeria wanted to be a developed, industrial nation, economically self-sufficient, free to trade with the world, and able to exert political sovereignty unhampered by economic dependence; and c) the tensions arose from the difference between what Nigeria was and what it aimed to be, and from the frustration at not finding a short path from a) to b).

To advance from a) to b) Nigeria needed an enormous amount of foreign capital and know-how, and from the time of independence it was clear that the only chance of obtaining these in substantial quantities was from the West. In 1962, for example, the source of about 70% of imports was the West, while 90% of exports went to the West. The comparable figures for the Soviet bloc were 4% and 1%. The rest of the world - Africa, Asia and South America - accounted for 25% of imports and less than 10% of exports.

Virtually all the aid Nigeria received came directly from Western sources, or indirectly through international bodies under Western control. About half the aid available to Nigeria in 1962 was American, in which year, apart from scholarships, the only Eastern European aid was a credit of an unspecified amount offered in March, 1962 and a possible £15 million Polish loan which was under discussion.

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1. A full discussion of Nigeria's economic policies, both internal and external, and of its external economic relations follows in the next Chapter. That discussion cannot be divorced from the present one; rather, it will serve as a detailed extension. The aim of the present sub-section, however, is to analyse the influence of Nigeria's economic needs and objectives on the development of its foreign policy.
2. Kamarck, Andrew M., Economic Determinants, in Mackay, Vernon, op. cit., Chapter III, p. 55.

80% of the £200 million of overseas investment was British, and the balance, apart from some Lebanese and Indian capital, was also Western. There was no Soviet bloc investment.

If, after independence, any change were to have taken place in the pattern of Nigeria's economic alignment with the West, it would necessarily have been gradual. In March, 1962, the Nigerian Government promulgated the Six Year Development Plan, involving £676.5 million, of which one-half (£338 million) would have to come from foreign loans and grants. Economic missions were sent to all parts of the world, paying special attention to the Communist countries, but despite trade agreements and offers of future aid from the latter, it remained clear that most aid would still come from the West.

Does economic alignment lead automatically to political alignment?

> "To accept outside economic aid, no matter from what source, or however minimal the strings attached, represents psychologically a degree of infringement upon sovereignty." (1)

> "The problem is further complicated by the fact that the great powers are trying to establish zones of influence - they ... are anxious to extend their contacts, widen the circle of their friends and allies, and at times, to exercise a discreet but positive imperium over them." (2)

External economic pressures may influence foreign policy to a lesser or greater extent: either conditions are imposed on the receiving country, or implied; or the receiving country may strive, consciously or unconsciously, to present an image agreeable to the donor country; and at the very least, this could mean not going out of one's way to annoy donor states in matters vital to them but only marginal to one's own interests'. (3)

Did Nigeria, in developing its foreign policy, take into account the necessity of retaining the goodwill of donor or potential donor countries, and by its acts on the international stage try to satisfy them? The degree to which it did so was commensurate with the degree to which external economic fac-

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1. Cowan, L. Gray, Political Determinants, in Mackay, Vernon, op. cit., Chapter VI, p. 122.
2. Thiam, Doudou, op. cit., p. 99.
3. Anglin, Douglas G., Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 250.

tors influenced foreign policy, limited sovereignty and detracted from the policy of non-alignment.

In certain cases Nigeria's determination to express its sovereignty and its policy of non-alignment prevailed over economic pressures. Nigeria's dependence on American goodwill has been made clear. Under the American Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) of 1951 it is stated:

> "All military, economic or financial assistance to any nation shall ... be terminated forthwith if such nation ... knowingly permits the shipment to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, of any ... items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war."

Nigeria did produce such a commodity - columbite, an additive for hardening steel used in nuclear and space devices. During the Korean War Britain introduced strict control of its export, but in October, 1962 the Nigerian Government quietly lifted the restrictions, a move inspired principally by a desire to develop new markets overseas', but also having 'a political motive - to assert the principle of non-alignment'.(1) The State Department reminded the Nigerian Government of the terms of the Battle Act but the Nigerians were undeterred. On 2nd July, 1963 Nigeria concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet Union under which the signatories undertook to encourage trade in a wide range of products, specifically including columbite. However, no columbite was shipped to the Soviet Union which appeared to have adequate reserves and the United States did not feel the mere readiness to sell to be of sufficient importance to pursue the matter.

After independence Britain offered to assume financial responsibility for the inducements required by, and the travel and educational allowances paid to British officials invited to serve in Nigeria. The offer was refused since Nigeria wished to be free to recruit experts from anywhere in the world, and an agreement of this nature might have given the impression that Nigeria was committed to accept only those whom Britain offered.

Nigeria also declined to conclude an arrangement whereby aid would be received from the EEC Overseas Development Fund,

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1. Anglin, Douglas G., op. cit., p. 252.

since it required associate membership of the Community. According to Sir Abubakar such participation in the Community would not have been compatible with the policy of non-alignment and would have hindered an unimpeded and enthusiastic promotion of African unity. For similar reasons Nigeria refused associate membership of the EEC, in spite of the economic advantage of such membership. Later, however, Lagos changed its position.

When France carried out the third series of atomic bomb tests in the Sahara, the first since independence, the Nigerian Government acted without any consideration of the economic consequences. Previously frustrated by the failure of its protests, it was now presented with the first opportunity to assert its newly acquired independence. The French ambassador was ordered out of the country and French aircraft and ships were banned. As this seriously retarded the development plans of Dahomey, Niger and Chad, the ban was soon lifted, but diplomatic relations were not restored for several years. In the interim France delayed permission for the appointment of a Nigerian ambassador to the EEC, hampered negotiations and held up the signing of the EEC agreement with Nigeria. This impulsive act of the Nigerian Government was considered an error, even in Nigeria.

In April,1961 the Government similarly imposed a total embargo on trade with South Africa, regardless of the loss of a potentially valuable market and source of aid. To have continued trade relations would have been too much for Nigerian politicians to swallow and would have resulted in Nigeria's exclusion from a position of leadership in Africa.

On other occasions, on the contrary, economic pressures triumphed over political principles. For example, although the Hallstein Doctrine did not refer to the suspension of economic aid, this would have been an inevitable result of a diplomatic breach. Thus to retain West German aid Nigeria was required neither to recognise, nor to cultivate too close a relationship with, East Germany. To Nigeria's leaders the question of German reunification was a cold war issue of little concern to them, which facilitated the Government pursuing a 'do-nothing' policy. However, they did in fact go further than mere non-recognition: no official Government representative visited that country, although numerous missions travelled across Europe, both East and West; and no trade agreement was signed with East

Germany although such agreements were concluded with almost all other European Communist nations. This policy was a sensible one, since the economic advantages of co-operation with West Germany were substantial and since Nigeria's interest in the political controversy was slight.

Similar reasoning would explain why Nigeria could not risk taking a stand against the United States over the invasion of Cuba, and why no official Nigerian delegation visited Cuba. The decision to remain in the Commonwealth was one in which economic self-interest was relevant. There was nothing unusual in this, but a repudiation of membership would have created an unfortunate impression in government and business circles in Britain, and probably in the United States as well. The Prime Minister, in proposing the motion asking for independence, said:

> "The reason why I personally want to see Nigeria taken into the Commonwealth is this... At present we are an under-developed country. In order to expand our economy we must seek investments from the richer and more developed countries ..." (1)

He also pointed out the advantage of other Commonwealth nations deputising for Nigeria's interests in those countries in which Nigeria could not afford to be represented.

Having rejected the idea of association with the EEC, the Nigerian Government soon realised that the country would suffer economically in competition with those African states which by the Yaounde Convention had become associate members. Thus negotiations began for some type of agreement, which, while not involving Nigeria in any of the institutions of the Community, would provide most of the economic benefits of association. Although economic pressures had not entirely prevailed, Nigeria had compromised in that its economic interests would be bound up with EEC interests and in that small tax preferences had been granted to the Six.

Economic interests had a clear influence on the choice of countries in which embassies were established. Of the first five diplomatic missions established outside Africa, four were in the West - in London, Washington, Bonn and Rome. (2) These

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1. HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 30.
2. The other was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, established to serve the interests of the pilgrims, though the Ambassador resided in Khartoum. The sixth mission was established in Moscow subsequently.

countries provided Nigeria with the bulk of aid received, took two-thirds of its exports and included four of its five best customers.

Regional governments also faced similar dilemmas involving questions of political principle and economic advantage. The North chose to discount the economic advantages of an Israeli loan and to stand by its pro-Moslem, pro-Arab sympathies. The Western Government was alleged to have ignored the principle involved in Federal Nigerian protests to France over the bomb tests and to have requested French economic aid. The Eastern Nigerian Government refused to have its freedom hampered by Arab pressures and the Eastern Nigerian Development Corporation went into partnership with Israeli companies, resulting in Jordan banning all trade with the ENDC.

Douglas G. Anglin concludes that although such external economic pressures had a clear influence on Nigeria's internal economic policies, their impact on foreign policy was not as great as might have been supposed. He points out that while there were but few examples of economic requirements having a significant effect on political decisions, there were a number where political principles prevailed over the possibilities of economic advantage:

> "... If the economic development of Nigeria is really as important as her leaders claim, it would be reasonable to expect that economic arguments would be decisive in all but the most vital issues affecting national security...
> ... This is to advance the somewhat unfashionable view that, in most cases, Nigerian leaders pursue the policies they do because, rightly or wrongly, they happen to believe in them...
> Personal and political conviction may be a better clue to an understanding of Nigerian foreign policy than crude economic determinism."(1)

Anglin's conclusions appear to contain two weaknesses: firstly there have been no attempts to claim that economic pressures direct Nigeria's foreign policy (so-called 'crude economic determinism'), and secondly, while personal conviction was important, that conviction was based on what was best for the country, and this in turn was surely decided with economic advantage as a principle criterion. This is not to go to the other ex-

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1. Anglin, Douglas G., op. cit., pp. 262 - 263.

treme and state that Western economic pressure determined Nigeria's foreign relations, for there were many other factors involved. Its influence, however, was substantial, and where the threat of non-continuance of aid was imminent, as with the Hallstein Doctrine, Nigeria accepted the condition. Had America exerted pressure on Nigeria in connection with the sale of columbite Nigeria would have yielded, quite probably, rather than lose American aid.(1) Thus while economic pressures might not have had the effect of making Nigeria overtly pro-Western, they did have a large influence in keeping the Government Western-orientated and in preventing it from taking up strongly anti-Western positions.

V. The Major Political Parties.

a. The 1959 Election.

Britain having agreed to grant independence to Nigeria, the election of December, 1959 thus became the first in which political parties were required to formulate foreign policies for an independant Nigeria. Owing to the tough and complicated internal issues which had absorbed the time of party leaders in the decade before independence, little thought had been given to international relations and none of the parties had a defined foreign policy at the commencement of the campaign.

It was Dr Azikiwe who broke the ice with a statement in the Daily Times of 22nd August, to the effect that foreign investment would be encouraged and no enterprise in existence before independence would be nationalised; the right to regulate commerce and industry would, however, be reserved; Nigeria would apply for membership of the United Nations and continue as a member of the Commonwealth; a neutralist foreign policy would be followed with adherence to 'no axis of geopolitics'; a good-neighbour policy would be pursued in relations with African countries, with whom an attempt would be made to establish closer economic and cultural ties.

Chief Awolowo in his reply on 11th September, and in a later speech, stated that although the AG would promote friendship with African countries, for three reasons it was 'unrealistic' to work for a United States of Africa or an African common market: new states would be unwilling to relinquish their sove-

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1. Anglin submits the opposite. Ibid., p. 253.

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reignty to this end, and any such pressures would produce 'suspicion, distrust and disharmony'; Nasser's totalitarianism and pan-Arab sentiments could only admit of a union in which Black Africa would become a satellite of Egypt and in his view the UAR, which had 'one foot in Africa and another in Asia Minor, was the very antithesis of a workable African community' (1); and finally, there was no possibility of co-operation with the whites of East and Southern Africa.

His opposition to a neutralist policy was expressed thus:

> "The question is, as between the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc, where can a man freely exercise his natural right to hold and express any opinion subject to such restrictions as may be laid down by laws enacted by the freely elected parliament of the land? The answer is obvious: it is in the Western Bloc...
>
> In the present world contest, when atheistic materialism is threatening to destroy or stifle all that is best and noblest in man, neutrality in international affairs, whether passive, positive or independent, is an unmitigated disservice to humanity."

Noting that some developing countries courted both East and West simultaneously, hoping to get 'the best of two worlds', he deplored such 'double-dealing' tactics as both 'disreputable and dangerous'. (2) Further, he declared that closer economic and cultural relations should be fostered within West Africa; that the cause of the oppressed peoples of Africa should be championed; that the British Commonwealth should be supported; and that Nigeria's goodwill towards the Western democracies should be emphasised.

Zik, though approving closer bonds with the United Kingdom and the United States, asserted that it would be 'foolhardy' to align Nigeria unconditionally with the West, (3) which included the 'worst colonial powers', a policy which would only

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1. West Africa, 19.9.59, p. 750.
2. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., pp. 16 and 17.
3. "Though Chief Awolowo never in so many words called for an alignment with the West, the inference to be drawn from his analysis and conclusions was obvious." Post, K.W.J., The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959, Oxford, 1963, p. 311.

result in 'antagonising certain powers' and in 'abdicating the sovereign right of Nigeria to exercise initiative in its foreign policy'. He strongly objected to Awo's contention that there was no 'community of interest' between the UAR and the rest of Africa.(1)

Replying on behalf of the AG, Chief Akintola stated that Nigeria's alignment with the Western democracies included not only the former colonial powers and the United States but also Commonwealth countries; that within the Commonwealth and Western context Nigeria would maintain its diplomatic initiative; that a choice of a friend did not necessarily imply the creation of an enemy (for example, India had relations with both the Commonwealth nations and Russia); and finally, that no sincere Nigerian would exchange British rule for Egyptian control.

Encumbered by domestic problems, it was not until 16th September that the NPC entered the foreign policy arena with the publication of a manifesto which opened with the words: 'Above all our Government will be based on the fear of God'. It denounced a policy of neutrality, declared that Nigeria should associate with countries whose policies were 'animated by the same beliefs as hers', maintain 'the closest relationship' with the UK, expand 'existing ties of friendship' with the USA, support the UN and the Commonwealth, and co-operate with other African countries, particularly those in West Africa. Regarding the last point, however, it was made quite clear that the NPC judged a West African federation or union to be 'premature'.(2)

At this stage the AG and NPC corresponded closely in their views. It was the NCNC which offered alternatives in that it supported a policy of neutralism and advocated closer political ties with Africa. These differences were shortly afterwards blurred, first in an NCNC-NEPU manifesto (9th October) and then in an NCNC policy paper (22nd October). The combined manifesto proclaimed that the alliance would not 'commit Nigeria to joining any military pacts' but would develop the armed forces 'on the basis of neutrality' like Switzerland; the question of 'neutrality in military matters' would be considered after independence in terms of the 'national interest'; it would 'main-

1. West Africa, 19.9.59, p. 750.
2. Daily Times, 18.9.59, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 18.

tain friendly relations with any sovereign state' which supported or enforced human rights and fundamental freedoms; and implement a 'policy of non-alignment with any particular axis of geopolitics' in order to preserve independence of 'approach to problems of international relations'.

The NCNC paper which followed, apparently without NEPU's agreement, made its policy on neutralism still more confusing. For it stressed the desire for continued friendship with the West and, expressing 'deep admiration and affection for the United States', declared that Nigeria's relations with the US should be 'very intimate and cordial'; and the following paragraph in no way enhanced the clarity of the party's intentions:

> "Although the NCNC prides itself as a Fabian Socialist party, which is stoutly opposed to Communism as a way of life, yet we do not believe that anti-Communism in and of itself, is a sufficient basis for a foreign policy. Our relations with the Eastern bloc should generally be based on a policy of peaceful co-existence while specifically it should be dictated only by Nigeria's national interest." (1)

The contents of this policy paper demonstrated that NCNC principles on pan-Africanism and West African unity were closer to those of the other two parties than had previously been realised. While favouring the concept of a West African federation, the NCNC appreciated that there were 'onerous difficulties involved' (including the integrationist policy of France), and recommended that 'the issue should remain a long term one'; and though it referred to pan-Africanism as a 'clarion call ... for the liberation of all African peoples ... the most passionate and yet the most constitutional appeal made in the history of modern nationalism', it was also termed a 'long term objective'.(2)

Thus as the election neared, it could be said that, although principles had been stated in fairly vague generalisations, the three major parties conformed closely on foreign policy. This was fortunate for a country on the brink of assuming sovereign status, since the multiplicity of its domestic problems was more than sufficient to handle. There was agreement on support for the UN, membership of the Commonwealth, close

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1. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 20.
2. Ibid.

identification with the UK, closer bonds with the USA, friendship with the West and a wariness of Communist countries. There was general agreement that pan-Africanism was at best an ideal, yet there was clearly a difference of emphasis: while, on the one hand, the North would strive to 'keep Nigeria from any but a token involvement with a Pan-African or a Pan-West African union, or indeed with the revolutionary forces sweeping the continent';[1] on the other hand, the NCNC stressed the importance of ultimate unity, suggesting, as a first step, the establishment of a West African Consultative Organisation to lay the foundations for a federation of West Africa. On the question of neutrality, the parties differed again merely in degree, for the effects of NCNC neutralist declarations were counteracted by subsequent pro-Western statements.

The Coalition Government joined an essentially conservative party with an essentially liberal, but not radical, party, the former being the more powerful. In addition the opposition was conservative and openly pro-Western; thus as the year 1960 commenced, foreign policy promised to be extremely moderate, Western-orientated and micro-nationalist.

b. After the 1959 Election.

The period of manifestos and generalised policy papers was over, and the year 1960 was to witness the beginning of trends and pressures towards neutralism, pan-Africanism and radicalism, that had either been hidden or had not in fact existed before the election.

Within the NCNC a split developed between the more conservative members led by Chief Okotie-Eboh, and the radical younger members, whose spokesman was Dr Kalu Ezera. Even while supporting the Coalition in their voting, the radicals, generally young, educated men who had not attained positions of responsibility, made their presence felt, articulately and effectively; and the Government leadership found it necessary to placate them. These radicals pressed for a policy of non-alignment, fearing that alignment with the West meant alignment with NATO; they were anxious that Moslem states should not have undue influence on Nigerian policies and that diplomacy should not be

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1. Diamond, Stanley, op. cit., p. 20.

left in the hands of non-Nigerians; they believed that some sort of pan-Africanism must be actively sought; condemned the Defence Pact; formed the Nigeria-Soviet Friendship Society under Dr O.B. Ememe; endeavoured to establish closer ties with Ghana and the Casablanca bloc; poured invective on apartheid; censured the Government for refusing to attend the Belgrade Conference of neutralist states and indicted the Government for lack of dynamism.

If the pressures within the NCNC had been hidden, those within the AG had not even existed and could not have been foreseen. In one of the strangest redirections of policy seen in Africa, Awolowo and the AG did a complete volte-face in foreign policy, becoming vigorously neutralist and pan-Africanist. From mild approval of the Defence Pact in May, 1960, the party rabidly rejected it in November; and by the end of that year most references to ties with the West had been dropped from AG statements. In June, 1961 Awo with some of his top leaders visited Ghana for five days, Nkrumah receiving them warmly. On their return, Awo advocated that Nigeria should join the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and denounced the Government's attendance at the Monrovia Conference which he alleged had been convened with Western financial backing. In July, 1961, Awo published an article in the AG paper, The Service, entitled 'My Plan for Africa', in which he charged that many of the 'ostensibly independent' African states were not free (this included all the Monrovia countries), since they had had military and economic ties forced upon them by the European mother countries. He proposed the formation of an Organisation for African Community, open to political parties and nationalistic movements, but not to governments. Its purpose would be to seek the fulfilment of ten 'aims and objectives'; the first being:

> "'Complete freedom and sovereignty for all those African States which are at present only nominally independent'; (2) setting of target dates 'in the very near future' for the independence of all African colonies; (3) 'immediate termination of the existence of any military base in any part of Africa'; (4) extermination of apartheid in South Africa; (5) outlawing of all discrimination against 'black people in particular and Africans in general' in Africa and other parts of the world; (6) defense of the 'dignity of the African'; (7) establishment of 'a community of interests among all the people of Africa';

(8) division of the continent 'into zones' as a first 'practical step towards the emergence of an All-African political union'; (9) introduction into each zone of a customs and monetary union and other forms of cooperation; and (10) non-involvement 'of all African countries in the present East-West power politics and struggles as well as non-partisanship in the Arab-Israeli dispute and conflict'." (1)

In September he continued his attacks in a speech to students in London in which he charged that the British High Commissioner was the real ruler of Nigeria, that NATO operated a secret wireless frequency in Nigeria, that Nigeria was a British satellite, that Sir Abubakar never made a decision without consulting Mr Macmillan, and that the Government had placed every obstacle in the way of a Russian Embassy being opened.

An authoritative explanation for this dramatic shift has not been discovered, but a number of theories have been put forward. Some attributed it to Awo's bitterness after losing the election and finding himself excluded from power and the leader of a weak opposition. Thus he switched to radicalism, an available attitude for an opposition party and one which would enable him to fulfil his proper function as leader of the opposition. But this view fails to explain why he altered policy so essentially as to lay the party open to charges of hypocrisy. Others attributed it to the influence of Nkrumah and in particular to the effects of his five-day visit to Ghana in June, 1961.(2) Since Awo had been moving in this direction for a year prior to this date, it would be an oversimplification to assign Nkrumah as the cause. It would be more accurate to say that his move to the left had led Awo to visit Ghana. Whatever the explana-

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1. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 64.
2. "This volte-face actually came after a five-day visit, early in June 1961, by Chief Awolowo and his top party leaders to Ghana ... On their return to Nigeria, Chief Awolowo, who is known as a strong and determined character, surprisingly showed signs of having been much influenced by Dr Nkrumah's views ..." Ezera, Kalu, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, Cambridge, Second Edition, 1964, p. 293.
"Chief Awolowo seems clearly to have been influenced by President Nkrumah's views in the course of his stay." Cowan, L. Gray, Nigerian Foreign Policy, in The Nigerian Political Scene, ed. Tilman, O., and Cole, Taylor, Cambridge, 1962, Chapter VI, p. 130.

tion, his stay accelerated the transformation.

It is necessary to recall that as a younger man Awo had been capable of radical thought as witnessed by some of the views expressed in his book, 'Path to Nigerian Freedom' for example: 'We of today are critical, unappreciative, and do not feel that we owe any debt of gratitude to the British'.(1) He may well have felt, that whereas it had been expedient to shelve his radicalism for a time, it was now advantageous to bring it into the open. For the change of foreign policy must be seen as part of the overall change of policy, whereby Awo hoped that the people of Nigeria, disappointed with the slow rate of progress of the Coalition Government, would look to a party with more utopian and socialist policies. Such internal policies are more compatible bedfellows with radical, neutralist, macro-nationalist ideals than with restrained and pro-Western ones. On the personal level, Awolowo seeing that, in the absence of Zik, there was no fiery, charismatic leader in Nigeria, may well have aspired to such a position. In addition, noting the developing split in the NCNC, he may have hoped to drive a wedge into that party by alienating still further the young progressives from the rest of the party and ultimately bringing them over to his side.

It was ironically Awo's AG which was riven by these policies; and Akintola's fears that AG opposition to the Federal Government would only draw the fire of the latter onto the party were strengthened by Awo's immoderate attacks on the Government's foreign policy. In 1963 Akintola and his newly organised United Peoples' Party resumed power in coalition with the Western NCNC, and the AG was weakened to the point of ineffectiveness.

The years after independence 'saw the NPC literally lifted by the articulate radicals of the NCNC, abetted by the Action Group and the press, and re-directed toward goals which that party had not even dreamed of before'.(2) But whether the reshaping of policy was substantial or superficial is difficult to discern; for what frequently occurred, in James Burnham's terms,(3) was that while the thesis (the nation's objectives in

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1. Awolowo, Obafemi, Path to Nigerian Freedom, London, 1947, p. 18.
2. Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. cit., p. 51.
3. Burnham, James, Dialectic of American Foreign Policy, South

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