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Shades of blackness: politicians' performances of blackness in South Africa

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School of Languages and Literature

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ABSTRACT

Over the decades, the concept of race has been interpreted and altered in various ways. Supposed characteristics have been imposed by society on groups of individuals as stereotypes of what they should be or do. This is the basis for racism, as it has been proven through studies on genetics that all races of humans bear the same genetic makeup. This has not only allowed for divisions between races but has created space for differences within them. However, scholars have, in recent years, come to an understanding of race as a social construct that is performed, instead of something that humans are born with. This study seeks primarily, to explore the diverse and fluid black identities that are present within South Africa's political sphere. It seeks to understand the varying and opposing ways in which South African politicians display their blackness, and simultaneously develop an understanding of how this is received by the media and the South African public alike.

To establish these differences, this study seeks to employ three case studies from the South African political landscape. The case studies are the ANC's Jacob Zuma, the EFF's Julius Malema and the DA's Mmusi Maimane. The study hopes that in exploring three very different political personas, some of the many varying tropes that exist will become lucid. In To structure this study, one speech by each case study politician has been selected as a text to be analysed. This speech, in turn, consists of three components which are critically unpacked: a video recording of the speech, an article posted alongside it and comments posted below it.

All three components of the text are analysed in detail, to ascertain the different approaches and responses (both by the author of the article and the public commenters) each politician receives with regards to their black identity. These responses then feed the research in terms of understanding the tropes of blackness that each politician enacts, determined by a range of factors including their specific masculinities, accents, dress styles, approaches to the systems in place and so forth.

INTRODUCTION

Race and racism, it would seem, are as old as time. However, these concepts are not, as most believe, something that we are born with. Through time, race has become understood as a construct which is social and acted upon, instead of innate characteristics. Supposed racial characteristics have been constructed, altered, and maintained by societies through time, and have come to represent certain ideas of what it means to be part of a certain racial group. "Beginning in the seventeenth century, race emerged under multiple contact-zone and colonial conditions" (Doyle 2011: 116). The concept of race underwent many reworks, until "the early twentieth century in the West [when] it emerged as *the* defining term – for history, identity and political destiny" (Doyle 2011: 116). People of all colours – "black, white, red and brown" subscribed to this idea and their authors began to write "freedom stories as proof of their people's racial legitimacy" (Doyle 2011: 117). It was only centuries later that this concept was declared incorrect. "In 1950, UNESCO issued a statement asserting that all humans belong to the same species and that "race" is not a biological reality but a myth" (Sussman 2014: 3). This statement came after multiple studies by an "international panel of anthropologists, geneticists, sociologists and psychologists… [who] were most knowledgeable about the topic of human variation" (Sussman 2014: 4). This idea has since been backed up by the American Anthropological Association and the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (Sussman 2014: 4).

Race is thus maintained as a socially constructed system which includes and excludes people. In so doing, the 'them' is defined from 'us'- so much so that divisions have occurred not merely between, but within what are known as standard racial groups. This is determined by factors which include and exclude people from specific racial factions. This paper seeks to explore the ways in which race, specifically the black race, and imperatively, blackness, is enacted by certain political figures. It looks to use discourse to explore the ways in which blackness is fluid and cannot be defined within strict confines, and thus seeks to recognise some of the varying identities of blackness that exist in the South African political landscape.

In utilising the above outlined concepts of blackness, that is, as something that is fluid and is being continually re-constructed through time, this paper looks to explore how blackness in South Africa manifests itself. To do this, this research project analyses three case studies in the local context. Three key players from South Africa's political landscape have been chosen. The

case studies represent different kinds of blackness, in that they embody different notions of what blackness is thought to mean. I am interested in understanding how these forms of blackness manifest as well as how they are received. This study is essentially centred around understanding how blackness is manifested within each of the case study politicians, alongside other factors (such as masculinity, education, class and so forth) as an integral part of their identities. It seeks to delve into how each politician invokes various tropes of blackness. However, it is imperative to note that by no means do I declare these three case studies as the only existing performances of blackness that exist. Instead, this study seeks to explore some of the many ways in which people, particularly men, in South Africa perform blackness within the public sphere. This allows for an understanding into what blackness is imagined to mean at this point in time. I have selected, for understanding their positions regarding what it means to be black, three black South African men who dominate the South African political sphere in that they represent the country's three main political parties. These individuals serve, in their capacities as politicians, as influencers to the common public and determiners of the fate of the country at large. I have chosen to conduct this study within the political realm as I believe it to be one of the building blocks upon which a country is built. The case studies are Jacob Zuma of the African National Congress (ANC) Jacob Zuma, Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Julius Malema and Mmusi Maimane of the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The first case study politician, Jacob Zuma, has been selected as, at the commencement of this study, he was the most fundamental player in the landscape of South African politics –given that he was South Africa's president and leader of the ruling party, the ANC. He was replaced as president by Cyril Ramaphosa on 15 February 2018 (Merten 2018). The second case study is Julius Malema, who is the leader of the EFF, an upstart far-left party. The third and last case study in this project is Mmusi Maimane, who was formerly a high-level member of South Africa's most well-known opposition party, the DA, and has gone on in the course of this study to become its leader (Areff 2015). I undertake a discourse analysis of three related speeches for each politician, which each comprise of a video, an article posted alongside this video and comments posted below it. The speeches were made available to the public by online media house, News24. All three speeches were selected for their popularity at the time of publication, as they made headlines and attracted a huge social media following, with each speech garnering over 500 000 views. The articles on each speech and URLs which link to the videos' online publication are attached as appendices at the end of this dissertation.

Through the key political figures outlined above, this project seeks to unravel the varieties present within the concept of blackness. In outlining the personas of these three individuals, different understandings, and what could be called different identities of blackness are made apparent. I am interested in understanding how each of these case studies portray their blackness, and how it is received by the media as well as certain members of the South African public. This research project thus looks to delve into the varying kinds of blackness that are represented within the South African political landscape, which is essential when considering that South Africa is a country plagued by a racially contested past. The project is also largely focused on understanding mediation in this regard. The project delves into how each politician's black identity is represented by the media. It also looks at the two-way flow, that is, the idea that this media content is not blindly received by the public but is also fed back from it. It explores how the audience is now the consumer who can report back on what it is fed. In the same breath, it is worth acknowledging that this project seeks to understand the responses that a particular group of social media users have regarding the portrayals of blackness being discussed in this study, and that this group cannot and does not represent the opinions of all South Africans.

"The concept of representation has come to occupy an important place in the study of cultures" (Khan 2014: 15), and how politicians are represented and received is an arena of substantial interest. This is particularly true in a country like South Africa, in which race has been a topic which has caused substantial divides. Since South Africa overcame the oppressive apartheid regime, its political sphere has been dominated by black politicians. This study is essential in delving into the tropes of blackness each of these politicians displays, to understand and acknowledge that blackness is fluid. Each of the chosen case study politicians assert themselves within a certain understanding of what it means to be black. To quote Stuart Hall, they each "describe or depict, by description or portrayal or imagination," (1997: 15) specific characteristics which allow them to identify within their own unique blackness. In recent South African media, there have been many enquiries into the blackness of individuals which look to establish an understanding of what it means to be black. One particular text which strikes the chord of this study significantly is an advertisement by Metro FM launched in 2009. The advertisement is titled "What makes you black?" and is centred around the understanding of what people consider typically "black". It asks the questions, "Is it the colour of your skin? Is it your nose? Is it your hair?" and so forth, while its imagery features black individuals who contrast what is typically associated with these characteristics. This study is driven by such

notions – that to be black does not mean to assert to a certain kind of blackness, but instead, that varying and often opposing tropes of blackness are prevalent in South Africa as well as worldwide. This study draws on a body of work that hopes to do away with definable and restricted ideas of what blackness entails and seeks instead to develop the notion that blackness is ultimately fluid and ever-evolving.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Several works have been carried out which relate to this research project, as they focus on a range of topics that are relevant to this study. These include but are not limited to masculinity – with particular reference to black masculinity, race as a pertinent topic within South African culture, race in a new light – as racial identity, blackness as once stifled and now emancipated, and the concept of ubuntu. These themes are open to interpretation, and many different understandings of each have been provided by scholars and authors of varying fields.

Morrell explores the concept of masculinity just as the concept of blackness has been explored in this study: as ever-changing and unfixed. "Masculinity", he writes, "is fluid, changing and historically constructed" (2001: 10). He goes on to explain masculinity as "a gender identity which is personal in the sense that an individual has a specific experience of what it means to be, in this case a boy/man" (2001: 10). Morrell elaborates, noting that masculinities are influenced by certain expectations society places on boys and men, which he refers to as "social prescriptions" which outline what boys and men may and may not acceptably do (2001: 10). These so-called prescriptions, explains Morrell, "originate primarily with the ruling class, which through a process of contestation, disseminates these values through wider society" (2001: 10). This is a point which bears significant relevance to the study at hand, for the case studies whom this project focuses on are essentially the ruling class of South Africa. The masculinities they enact, given that masculinity is fluid and ever-changing, thus infiltrate by means of media forms, the communities within South Africa. This is a point echoed by Milani, who notes that "masculinity is never in the singular but is instead a set of performances that one carries out by employing linguistic and other meaning-making resources within normative constraints about how a man should sound, appear and behave" (2015: 10). Added to this is the idea of black masculinity in particular. Ferber explains that "the depiction[s] of black masculinity as inherently inferior, violent and hypersexual" (2007: 19) are common. He also suggests the historical stereotypes of black men being associated with physical aggression and natural athleticism (2007: 20). All of the characteristics used to describe black men and thus, black masculinity are associated with negativity, while whiteness is characterised as having "fortitude, intelligence, moral character, strategy, and good organization" (2007: 20). Kopano builds on this, claiming that such black masculinities have been hindered by "post-apartheid lawmakers [who] unwittingly affirm what might be called radicalized, tribalistic masculinity

and (hetero)sexism amongst blacks" (2013: 138). Author bell hooks explores the ways in which previously enslaved black men in the USA were figuratively emasculated in that they were robbed of their masculinity by being owned and ruled by white people. hooks explains that the rule of the white man denied black men the opportunity to assert their masculinity by their own standards (2004: 3) and as a result, black men were "unable to consider alternatives to patriarchal masculinity" (2004: 55). It is thus partially true that black men have accepted what the white men have deemed them to be, but "it is also true that they have resisted accepting this image" (hooks 2004: 12) as they strive to develop their own masculine identities. Magubane elaborates on this, writing that blackness thus became a contested topic. On the one hand, it "epitomized a compromised masculinity that was incapable of social production", while on the other hand, "blackness epitomized a rampant, out of control sexuality that threatened to swamp and overwhelm the white race" (2004: 178). The concept of black masculinity has evolved over the decades, and this is no different within the context of South Africa. This notion is backed up by Tjelle who makes the claim that "colonialism never destroyed traditional African masculinities" (2013: 87).

In post-apartheid South Africa, one is constantly surrounded by the politics of race. The concept of race has always and will most likely continue to be one which stands strong, as does the dynamic of racial inequality in South Africa. Puttnick notes that despite South Africa overcoming its harsh apartheid realities, "racial categories, racism and other such relics of apartheid are still manifested in society and undoubtedly impact on the lives and identities of South Africans" (2011: 3). During apartheid, the inequalities between racial groups was evident and open, but today, the injustices are far more unassuming. Puttnick explains that these inequalities manifest themselves through "a vast majority of the country's black population remaining marginalized in the socio-economic sphere" and white political dominance still being the socio-economic norm (2011: 3) to name a few. Race thus "still continues to exert a great force over the identities and everyday lives of South Africans" (Puttnick 2011: 4).

Added to the previously mentioned ideas of race and blackness in particular, Gracia explores the concept of race as more than physical as part and parcel of one's identity. This concept, referred to as "racial identity" concurs with the previously discussed idea that race is in fact, a social construct, and proposes that race has more to do with "a sense of identity that informs our behavior and how we think of others" (2007:6). This school of thought seeks to understand that race is not merely related to the outer appearance of an individual, but is deeply rooted in how they choose to carry themselves. Such an idea indicates the importance of understanding

race as integral to the identity of an individual. It can be said then that the blackness of the case studies discussed in this project are inseparable from their identities. Gracia asserts that the "political well-being of a nation requires the promotion of racial identity" (2007:14) and this is particularly important in this study, given that each of the case studies makes up factions of South Africa's political landscape.

South Africa has undergone significant changes over the past few decades, specifically within the political domain which, once controlled by the oppressive apartheid regime has since been liberated. Despite the country's current political landscape boasting racial difference, blackness within South Africa was once largely suppressed. Nzimande refers to this as the "cancer of colonialism and apartheid [which] tampered with and shattered the [discussed] identities of South African blacks" (2008: 227). Livermon adds to this, noting that there is a need for "renegotiat[ion] of identity [so as to] contest the stifling categories imposed upon blackness in the apartheid era that the post-apartheid era has not completely escaped" (2012: 187). This bears relevance to this study as it shows the progress that has been made with regards to blackness, so its various and endless tropes can now be explored.

Another theme which arises through the course of this study is that of ubuntu. "Ubuntu is an African concept of personhood in which the identity of the self is understood to be formed interdependently through community" (2009: 1-2). Mangcu notes that "black nationalist leadership [who have] appropriated concepts such as ubuntu to appeal for a new solidarity… [seem to be held] back from getting out into the communities to make the connections that would bring ubuntu forth" (2009: 24). While politicians may seek to encourage ubuntu, to establish themselves as advocates for togetherness and unity in South Africa, the three case study politicians approach the topic within their political deliveries differently. Themes of education, class, violence and aesthetics, which all relate to the discursive discussions of togetherness, also have a place in the analyses of this project.

This section has expounded the foundations upon which this research study is based. It has explained, by means of various scholars and authors, an array of aspects that relate to the project, namely the contested field of black masculinity, South Africa as a racially conscious nation and the concept of togetherness or ubuntu.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section serves to outline the various theories employed in understanding the identities of blackness that exist in this study. These include the understanding of politicians as celebrities and thus commodities who are seeking to market themselves, Stuart Hall's encoding and decoding model, the two-way flow that new media facilitates, the notion of race as having a huge place in South African culture, the idea that race is non-biological and is thus performative, and the important idea that blackness is fluid and cannot be defined within strict confines.

Turner, in a book about celebrities as commodities who need to be sold to the larger public notes how politicians have assumed a similar nature. A "trend [has emerged that] actively encourages the merging of organized politics with the production processes of celebrity" (2004: 151). In addition to politicians playing a vital role in the functioning of a country, they now also have the added pressure of 'selling' themselves to the larger public. This refers to the politician as something that must be received well by the public in order to be successful. Turner elaborates, noting that the process of accomplishing this is not as simple as "selling the glamour and presence of the spectacular politician, or of seeking new ways of tailoring the political for a wider range of markets" (2004: 151) but instead also deals with how the politician is received by the media (2004: 152). Steps are thus strategically taken "by publicists in 'building a conventional celebrity sell' in order to get a politician elected" (2004: 150). The role of the media is imperative here, as they play a vital role in the way politicians are represented to the public, which is discussed throughout the course of this study.

Another theme which emerges in this study is related to the way in which politicians portray themselves and how this is often contrasted by how they are received. In theoretical terms, Stuart Hall explains this as the process of encoding and decoding. Hall argues that the process of consumption as a circuit or loop is problematic, in that its linearity, that is "sender/message/receiver" is lacking in "structured conception of the different moments as a complex structure of relations" (1973: 91). He explains that to think of the process of mass communications in such simple terms is unrealistic, given the fact that "structure [is] produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments" (Hall 1973: 91). Due to the complexity of communications, the message sent is seldom the one that is received (Procter 2004: 45). While the outdated theory is explained in a linear fashion: essentially,

information is sent from the sender, via the message, to the receiver (Procter 2004: 59), Hall proposes that communication be characterised instead by "production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction" so as to acknowledge the different ways in which texts may be received. Hall explicates that "if no 'meaning' is taken, there can be no consumption" (1973: 91). Hall's theory is centred on the understanding that while a sender may code a message in a particular way, its meaning can and often is received in alternate ways. The receivers here are seen as powerful forces who can and do decode messages they receive in unanticipated ways. In the context of this project, this theory is especially relevant as we see how the case study politicians aim to communicate certain portrayals of blackness and how these are often received with contempt, sarcasm and disregard by the audience.

The encoding and decoding process discussed above is facilitated by intercommunication. The concept of intercommunication is centred around the notion that communication is vast and ever-increasing. While previous media forms such as newspapers and television only allowed for a one-way flow of information, media today enables users to engage with media on a more critical and interactive level. The mass media model, as put by Gade and Lowrey, "largely assumed a one-way flow of information from media to audience" (2011: 22). This model has quickly eroded and has now evolved into one which is largely based on intercommunication. "Digital media, and their increasingly numerous applications, empower the public in ways that were unforeseen a decade ago" (Gade and Lowrey 2011: 22). Today, "anyone with access to a computer and rudimentary technical expertise can create their own media products", and in the context of this study, create "news and commentary that transcends geographic boundaries" (Gade and Lowrey 2011: 22). This two-way flow has enabled media users to become media engagers: they can express criticisms of the information the mass media feeds them. "Access to media as an element of the general right to freedom of expression concerns [such] two-way information flow; [as it deals directly with] the imparting process from the forum of media and, at the other end of the spectrum, the public's right to receive" (Thorgeirsdottir 2005: 27). Such media, which is "capable of providing the populace with a coherent flow of relevant and diverse information and ideas is essential for the enlightenment process, which is a prerequisite for democratic elections", (2005: 27) notes Thorgeirsdottir. This is important in the context of this study, as it claims that the two-way flow of information that exists in our world today directly impacts on politics in a democracy, which plays into how political performances are affected. Parmelee and Bichard concur with this idea, noting that "Leaders who want to increase their

two-way communication with followers could use several methods: replying to followers' comments [and] soliciting commenters' advice on political matters" (2012: 66).

Khosrowpour explains that with the advent of interactive media, such as the media being analysed in this study, "the two-way-flow of information between the content user and the content producer" (2012: 511) is enabled. In instances such as this study, politicians are campaigning themselves in the hope of being favoured by the audience, that is, south African citizens. Strahle explains that this allows "users the possibility to discuss and comment" (2017: 244) which in turn allows for better decision making when it comes to the reception of a politician. This two-step flow is thus integral to this study as it demonstrates how the public's interaction with the politician via media enables for different understandings which may complicate how politicians hope to portray themselves to the public. This two-step flow is further enabled by social media which allows the public to express their opinions openly. In the case of this study, this interactivity is enabled by means of comments sections in which members of the South African public are able to critique and comment on speeches delivered by the case study politicians.

While biological "understandings" of race have been prevalent for many decades, it is only more recently that race has become understood as a social construct. Jackson and Weidman note that in trying to understand when the concept of race emerged, they took their study back to the time of Aristotle. It was found that "enslaved barbarians…were not racially different from the Greeks who enslaved them" (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 3). They further note that even after the rise of Islam in the 630s, when there "was a series of serious conflicts between Islam and Christianity… the division between people was religious, not racial" (2004: 5). Hannaford notes that much later, during the 19th and 20th centuries, the word "race" was used to describe "cultural characteristics such as language or religion, or hypothetically 'pure' physical types" (1996: 17). He notes that the idea was used assuming that a "race" was a homogenous group of people who are biologically or linguistically similar, and distinguishable from other groups by their particular characteristics (1996: 17). Such distinguishing came when Europeans began to enslave the people with whom they experienced no territorial disputes – Africans. The "Atlantic system" of commerce was based on people from one continent, Europe, taking people from another continent, Africa, to a third continent, the Americas, to serve as a labour supply to generate wealth for the first continent. This arrangement was a racial system (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 7). Klein notes the enslaved people performed largely domestic and even religious functions, "serving as everything from concubines to sacrificial victims, and

performed all types of service from those of warrior or administrator to agricultural laborer" (2010: 7). Jackson and Weidman note that as such practices progressed, New World blackness and slavery became closely linked. "To be black was to be a slave and to be a slave was to be black" (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 7). Such association of blackness with slavery is integral in understanding how racial ideology developed in European thought, as "race came to mean ever-larger groups of people" (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 7). As Europeans became aware of the differences between themselves, such as being French, Spanish or Italian, "they recognized that there were different African nationalities and different nationalities among the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas" (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 7). However, differences between ethnicities were erased in European eyes, and "they began seeing the white race, black race, yellow race, and red race" (Jackson and Weidman 2004: 7). But the concept of race did not stop evolving here.

Peter Figueroa makes the argument that in the case of race, "actors believe or implicitly accept that there is an 'essential' link between real or fictional 'natural' features and certain social, historical, cultural or personality 'facts', real or imagined" (1991: 55). Race here refers not just to objective "'characteristics' of 'groups', but especially to constructed identities resulting from collective processes of categorization, definition and identification – whether other-identification or self-identification" (Figueroa 1991: 55). Another scholar who explores this is Lopez, as he notes that "the invention of national origins and unassimilable races was as much a project of state building as it was one of ideology" (2017: 72). These ideas fundamentally point to race as a created concept and not one which has fixed bases of any sort. When it comes to such a concept, much focus is placed on differences. These differences can be of "superficial or trivial nature – such as food, dress or folklore" (Figueroa 1991: 55), but still play an integral role in establishing variety. These notions were crucial in establishing the political mythologies of apartheid. Figueroa therefore calls race a false construct of racist thinking, racist relations, and racist systems (1991: 55).

Added to this argument is the biological approach posed by Fitzgerald. She notes that geneticists made the argument that "humans are animals [and when any animal breeds they are] of the same species. Any further breakdown in the species of 'human being', then, is social, for after mapping the human genome, geneticists have not identified a gene that is found strictly in one racial group and not in another" (2014: 21). This affirms the idea that race is, in fact, a social construct, as research has identified that the genetic make-up of a darker skinned person is the same as the genetic make-up of another light-skinned individual. Thus, race is a construct

which is perceived, for as Fanon has written, "it is the racist who creates his inferior" (1952: 69). Race is a social construct that people use in order to distinguish "us" from "them". This stems from "the need to appeal to someone to help us to form our opinion of ourselves" as has been posited by Foucault (Gros 2010: 44) and is integral in establishing social hierarchies.

Alongside the ideas of race as un-biological comes the idea of race as performative. Judith Butler is of the view that "gender is performative…in that it is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body" (1990: 6). She explains that "what we take to be an "internal" feature of ourselves is one that we anticipate and produce through certain bodily acts, at an extreme, hallucinatory effect of naturalized gestures" (1990: 7). Ehlers builds on this notion of gender performativity as she notes that "Race is performative because it is an act – or, more precisely a series of repeated acts – that brings into being what it names" (2012: 6). This is due to the demands of discipline and performative constraints, which assume that race is an "insurmountable limit or closed system" (2012: 10). She further asserts "[the fact that] race operates as a limit appears particularly so for black subjects" (2012: 10). What this refers to is race as a closed set of definitions which place people in certain categories. However, this study seeks essentially to understand race, and blackness in particular as different to this – flexible in its definition. The study seeks to explore the notion of blackness as one which is performed, and thus an enactment of each politician, rather than a definition of what they are. The study's focus is on how each of the case study politicians invoke and use certain ideas about blackness to present themselves in certain ways. It subsequently is focused on how the media and public react to these performances with their own performances and often reimagine what the politicians' performances mean. Several African American critics and theorists likewise maintain that "blackness must now be defined as a mediated, socially constructed and gendered practice" (Zackodnik 2004: 56). This is a point of significant importance, as the case study politicians featured in this study are evaluated in similar fashion, to unpack the specific black identities they each enact. This study seeks to challenge the notion of "race theory [which]speaks to race as power effect, a metaphor or construct naturalized or grounded through appeals to the body and bodily differences" (Zackodnik 2004: 156) by asserting race as performative and thus fluid.

To develop a more structured understanding of the concept of blackness as performed instead of innate, this study uses a book by Nadine Ehlers, titled Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles against Subjection. Ehlers notes that "If discipline is a set of practices and techniques that 'makes' individuals, [her] interest is to establish how race might

be seen as a form of discipline – a disciplinary practice - that molds and modifies identity through targeting the body" (2012: 4). "Discipline" here, refers to "the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility" as has been explained by Foucault (Sheridan 1975: 138). Ehlers thus looks to understand how the physical attributes we possess are made the scapegoat of the performances we enact as they are labelled as racial tendencies. "If discipline is a form of power that is productive…law - as a modality of discipline - was used to 'make' racial subjects, raced bodies, and to augment the idea that race is a truth" (2012: 6). She argues here that race is, in fact, not a matter of reality, but one which we have, over time, come to perceive within certain brackets. How people fit in and out of race is a matter of cordons we have set in our minds. "Race", writes Ehlers, "is performative because it is an act – or, more precisely a series of repeated acts - that brings into being what it names" (2012: 6). Ehlers notes that when dealing with race as something which is carried out or performed there is always the question of how individuals struggle against subjection and how racial norms might be re-thought. What also comes into question is how racial norms might be rerouted in a new direction – "given that the coercive demands of discipline and performative constraints make it seem like race is an insurmountable limit or closed system" (2012: 10). Linked to this is the idea posed by Sawyer, who states that racial hierarchy is flexible: that racism is not "a dichotomous variable but rather a continuum that changes over time" (2006: 19). In using this concept of continued racism, we can avoid the rigidity of racism, as we can to explore it in, as Sawyer puts it, "ambiguous racial categories and patterns of inclusion and exclusion" (2006: 19). This is, as Ehlers asserts, "particularly so for black subjects" (2012: 10).

Another theme that is recurrent throughout this study is that of race as a tool for political gain. Each of the politician case studies in this project strategically or subconsciously position themselves within a certain frame of blackness which may enable them to be more relatable to black South Africans. Price, who studied political language in the USA introduces this concept as a noun, that is "race whisperer: one who is seamlessly and agilely able to employ racial language and tropes by using personal experiences or common historical themes to engage and mobilize diverse racial constituencies" (2016: 1). Price discusses, by means of former US President Barack Obama's political presentations, how "racial rhetoric [can] mobilize voters, neutralize opponents and unsettle or reinforce the contemporary racial order" (2016: 4). Although Price's study was conducted in the US, it bears significance to this study. South Africa's racial history, tainted by apartheid, has hugely impacted on the political system in

which the country exists today. Politicians thus employ race as a personal mechanism with which they can target and attract those they deliver speeches to. Just as Price, in her book, studies how "Obama uses racial schemas to galvanize the support of identity groups" (2016: 5), so too do I explore how case studies Zuma, Malema and Maimane employ race, and particularly blackness, to identify with certain South Africans.

Touré notes that "a single notion of Blackness was perilous from the start. The experiences of millions of black souls could hardly be summarized in myths of unity aimed at freeing us [that is, black people] from the vicious unanimity of identity imposed on us by ignorant racists" (2011: xvi). Essentially, this quote gives light to the varying, divided and diverging kinds of black individuals who enact their own ideas of blackness. Such notions are popular, as Gates writes that there are millions of ways to be black (Walker 2012: x). He elaborates claiming that blackness is "both definitive and interpretive, confining and liberating, imposed and embraced" (Walker 2012:x) and this solidifies that blackness is anything but solid – it is fluid, ever-changing and evolving. This points to race as a system which is complex, fluid, contingent and unstable. This idea is echoed by Biko, who wrote that "Touré poses the idea of "post-Blackness", noting it not as the idea that blackness has reached its end, but rather, that "the narrow understanding of what Blackness means" (2011: xv) is over. He further notes that "We can't argue a priori Blackness, a Blackness that is given and remains steady despite the ebb and flow of history and struggle" (2011: xv), and thus, this project seeks to explore some of the very different kinds of blackness that are displayed by means of such performances and their reception.

This section has sought to outline the theoretical underpinnings used to conduct this study. Notions of the politician as a celebrity and thus, as a commodity, Stuart Hall's model of encoding and decoding, the two-way flow new media provides, race as a social construct and as performative, race as used for political gain and blackness as ever-changing and fluid have been delved into, to explicate their role in this study.

RESEARCH QUESTION

How do South Africa's most prominent black politicians represent their black identities in political speeches and how are these personas of blackness received by the media and public alike?

METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides a discussion of the study's methods and procedures. Firstly, it explores the approach taken: a qualitative approach situated in three specific case studies. It also outlines why each of the speeches have been chosen as representations of the case studies being discussed. The discursive approach is taken in analysing the three components of the speeches, that is, the video, article and subsequent comments.

I use a critically qualitative approach for this research project. According to Braun and Clarke, this approach "takes an interrogative stance to the meanings expressed in data, and unpacks the ideas and concepts associated with them [which] often tie into broader social meanings" (2013: 329). I seek to understand the underlying meanings which are presented in the texts I analyse, namely, the videos, articles and comments which are relevant to the case studies at hand. In so doing, the study develops an understanding of the varying tropes of blackness associated with each of the case study politicians.

Essentially, I employ a discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a qualitative method used to study social constructs (Koekemoer 2017: 11). When breaking this down further, discourse is defined as "verbal communication [or]a formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing" (Mills 1997: 1). Discourse can thus "be used in a broader sense to include all language units with definable communicative functions, whether spoken or written" (Mills 1997: 3). Such aspects are in turn used to establish how reality is socially constructed by people who give meaning and significance to the material world (Burr 2005: 220). All elements which make up the basis for this study (that is, the videos, the articles and the comments) can thus be included under the definition of discourse as "discourse analysis is the close study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life" (Taylor 2013: 4). It can further be understood as "focused on the structure of naturally occurring language, as found in 'discourses'" (Mills 1997: 3). This study is thus based on understanding how the texts analysed are understood as part of the imaginings of blackness in the world.

I delve into this by critically analysing the language, tone and gesture employed in the texts. Any themes which arise through analysing these case study videos and articles or themes that recur through analysing their comments are delved into to investigate the varying public performances of blackness that exist within the study. These were analysed both for how they

were performed and thus, intended, as well as how they were received. This includes but is not limited to what politicians pay respect to, such as their loyalties, their roles as traditional black men as corrupt, blackness as influenced by whiteness, blackness as progressive and so forth. I allow the case studies at hand to feed the research directly.

The three speeches chosen were all delivered in the first half of 2015 and given in Parliament. The case study speeches are as follows:

1. Jacob Zuma's speech delivered on 27 May 2015
2. Julius Malema's speech delivered on 17 April 2015
3. Mmusi Maimane's speech delivered on 17 February 2015

These speeches have been selected because of the attention they have received from both the media and the public. Each speech was the subject of much interest in South Africa, as it discussed local issues of concern, such as then-president Jacob Zuma's excessive expenditure on his homestead, opposition parties' responses to this, and xenophobic attacks, to name a few. The speeches are discussed in order of popularity within South African politics. The order in which the speeches are analysed is due to their ratings reflected as the amount of times each speech has been viewed. All three speeches attracted a huge social following, with Zuma's speech hitting 798 450 views, Malema's gaining an audience of 586 038 views and Maimane's attracting 538 579 views.

President Zuma's speech, given during his response to the presidency budget vote debate became the object of much interest, as Zuma waved his hands, laughing and mocking opposition parties. He poked fun at the way certain parliamentarians pronounced "Nkandla"[1] and laughed at Maimane's "broken man" speech which challenged the operations of Zuma in his capacity as a president.

[1] Nkandla is former President Jacob Zuma's homestead which gained the attention of the media, and thus the public for its planned expansion in 2011 (Tandwa). It was exposed by the media that the renovations at Zuma's homestead to the value of R246-million would be paid for by the South African taxpayer (Roussouw 2015). In January 2013, the DA requested that Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela launch an investigation into the upgrades at Nkandla. Madonsela's report on Nkandla revealed Zuma and his family had unduly benefitted from the upgrades.

The second speech analysed in this project was delivered by Malema and directed at Zuma. The EFF leader lashed out at the president, saying that he had "lost control over the country", following Zuma's son's negative comments towards foreign nationals[2].

The final speech analysed in this project was previously mentioned in Jacob Zuma's speech as the "broken man" speech delivered by now-DA leader, Mmusi Maimane. This speech, given as part of the State of the Nation Address (SONA)[3] debate was directed at President Zuma. It became known as the "broken man" speech after Maimane called Zuma as a "broken man presiding over a broken society".

This study begins by unpacking the discursive qualities fed through by speeches made by the politicians. Each speech is focused on by first critically analysing its video and subsequent analyses of its article and comments. A discursive approach is taken when unpacking the specific words and terms chosen as part of these speeches. However, it is imperative to note that the visual, verbal, and the linguistic cues of each speech are all analysed, as the analyses are conducted on the performance of the speeches, rather than their transcripts. This is because just as the content of these speeches plays an important role in understanding each case study black identity, so too do the underlying discourses fed through in the way the speeches are presented. Imbeau notes that "The significance of a speech act lies in the way it is articulated and in the possible action patterns this articulation form induces one to accomplish" (2009: 259). It can thus be said that speeches can be critiqued in more ways than in terms of the words being said. This is because the actual text of the speech, most likely strategically written to insinuate certain ideas, does not always present a full understanding of the politician. Instead, the politicians' presentations allow for an understanding of the blackness they try to embody. This is based on the notion that "Discursive acts are used for constructing identity and positioning the self against the others" (Imbeau 2005: 260).

In undertaking this study, I begin by analysing video footage of these speeches, published by News24. News24 is an online news site established in 1998 and quickly gained momentum as South Africa's premium online news source (Media24: 2015). It aims to "inform, entertain, educate and connect people through print, digital and ecommerce platforms" (2015). I engage

[2] In 2015, former President Jacob Zuma's son, Edward Zuma made the comment that South Africa was "sitting on a ticking time bomb of them [foreigners] taking over the country" (Khoza 2015). He later told journalists that he stood by his xenophobic remarks and that "foreigners needed to leave the country" (Khoza 2015).
[3] The State of the Nation Address or SONA is "an annual address to the nation by the President of the Republic of South Africa as the Head of State which focuses on the current political and socio-economic state of the nation" (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 2017).

with every aspect of discourse these videos offer, because as Fairclough explains, discourse refers to "spoken or written language use", along with other kinds of "semiotic activity" (1993: 54). Handal and Vaage further this point, as they note that "Discourses are evident in both written and spoken language, as well as in body language, dress, and pragmatic styles of interaction, among other things" (2005: 89). Paltridge further notes that discourse includes "not only [how we] 'display' who we are but also how we want people to see us. [Thus,] using spoken and written discourse, people both 'perform' and 'create' particular social, and gendered, identities" (2012: 1). The dress style, body language, accents and general presentation of each of the politicians are taken into account. I watched the videos multiple times, making notes of my observations regarding how the politicians are dressed, the way in which they speak and so forth. This data was collected by means of carefully watching the videos, accompanied by detailed notes which were then analysed to find the themes that recurred between them.

The short articles posted alongside the videos of the speeches are the second object of analysis for this study. This allows for an understanding of how the media perceive each of the case study politicians, which I critiqued in terms of their blackness. The three chosen articles are titled, "Zuma mocks opposition while calling for respect", "5 moments Mmusi Maimane burned Zuma" and "You have lost control of the country – Malema to Zuma". All three articles are easily accessible online. A discourse analysis of the structure, wording and modalities of the articles has been done to ascertain deeper meanings behind the articles. I begin by unpacking the tone used by the authors of these articles in the single sentences that headline them. Develotte and Rechniewski claim that news "headlines are particularly revealing of the social, cultural and therefore national representations circulating in society at a given time" (2001: 1). These headlines act as a frame which sets the tone in which the case studies are received. I then unpack the ways in which these articles discuss the case study politicians. Develotte and Rechniewski note that language and discourse are integral to power. This "power produces meanings, categories and practices in society, enabling them to flourish" (2001: 189). In analysing the content within these articles, paying particular attention to the way in which the politicians are discussed, I am able to evaluate how they are perceived by the media and link this to how they add to each politician's particular black identity. Certain words of interest were pulled out of these short articles as starting points as data, around which arguments were then built.

Once the above analysis is done, an engagement with the comments made by members of the public, posted below the articles, is made. Paltridge notes that "Discourse analysis examines how the use of language is influenced by relationships between participants as well as the effects the use of language has upon social identities and relations. Thus, a discourse analysis of the comments is carried out to establish the way that language and power flow between the speakers who are the producers and the audience who are the receivers. It also considers how views of the world, and identities, are constructed through the use of discourse" (2012: 2), which this project seeks to unravel in terms of the politicians' black identities. Furthermore, discourse analysis examines "patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used" (Paltridge 2012: 2). This concept aids me in understanding how the authors of the posted comments receive the case studies, which, in turn, helps establish a sense of how they are perceived in terms of their blackness. Golbeck notes that when analysing aspects of the social web, such as these comments, "the networks are simply too big to be analysed in their entirety" (2013: 1). Many of the comments posted are irrelevant to the study at hand, thus I decided to base my analysis only on relevant comments. A comment is considered relevant to the study if it referred explicitly or inadvertently to the concept of the black identity. While this entails sifting through each comment, which may be time consuming, it ensures that no material goes unnoticed. As I perused through the comments section of each of the articles, I briefly flagged them as relevant or not to my study. Themes, which differ in each chapter due to the varied nature of the content have been developed according to their repeated mention in the comments. I then made a note of each comment, along with the name of its author, to not lose track of it. Once I had a corpus of comments to work through, I began the analysis. I unpacked each of the comments in terms of how they related to the specific case study politician's black identity. This allowed for insight into how each politician was received by a group of the South African public. It is imperative to note that this group is by no means a representation of the South African public at large, but instead, is a group of individuals who have not been affected by the aforementioned "digital divide". Langa explains that in South Africa "access and distribution of technology is largely defined by the racial categories of apartheid" and as a result, "low-income earners with the least access to technological media are predominantly Africans, with access improving progressively for coloureds, Indians and whites" (2002: 135). The same kind of racial dynamic is true for this project, as can be inferred from the names of the commenters throughout the analysis.

This project sought to unpack and understand, by means of the three sets of texts explained above, the ways in which the three case study politicians establish their own understandings and black identity and how these were, in turn, received by the media and the public. The politicians were analysed in terms of their discursive features: the way they presented the speeches as well as how the media presented them, and as a result, how they were received by the public.

FINDINGS

ZUMA

Introduction

Former president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma is the first politician up for analysis in this study. At the time of the commencement of this study, Jacob Zuma was the president of South Africa. It was only in February 2018, during which this project was undergoing revision, that he stepped down from this position. During the period of this research project, Jacob Zuma was thus the most senior and arguably the most important figure in South African politics.

On 12 April 1942, Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma was born into the Zuma clan at Nkandla (Gordin 2008: 1). As the child of a domestic worker, Zuma received little formal education as he needed to work to supplement his family's income (Butler 2017: 148). Being part of this clan meant Zuma came from a long line of strong and powerful individuals, for as Gordin puts it, Zuma's "tribe has been called 'Africa's Sparta'" (2008: 2). Zuma grew up under trying circumstances, as "an impoverished son of the soil from a family of peasants" (Gordin 2008: 2). In a detailed biography, Zuma told Gordin about his simple and traditionally African childhood, in which he tended cattle and hunted birds (2008: 4). He lived a humble life as the eldest son in his family.

When it comes to politics, Zuma has a long history as part of South Africa's most prominent party since democracy. He began his political journey as a young boy, when he joined the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1959 (ANC 2017). At the time, Zuma was just 17 years old. His journey with the ANC has lasted ever since, as Zuma went on to become an active member of the ANC by participating in the Defiance Campaign, adoption of the Freedom Charter, the anti-pass campaign and the historic Women's March of 1956 (ANC 2017). Zuma "served with and drew inspiration and knowledge from giants of the struggle such as Harry Gwala, Steven Dlamini, Moses Mabhida, and John Nkadimeng" (ANC 2017). In 1963, Zuma was convicted of aspiring to overthrow the apartheid government and aged just 21, he began his sentence on Robben Island alongside other freedom fighters (ANC 2017). Zuma's struggle continued, as he was

exiled to Swaziland and then Mozambique (Sellstrom 2002: 416) as soon as he was released from prison. He spent his years of exile alongside former President Thabo Mbeki and Albert Dlomo (ANC 2017) and later moved to the ANC's head office in Zambia where he became the head of the intelligence department (Butler 2017: 148). The years passed by, and in 1984, "Zuma was appointed the Deputy Chief Representative of the ANC" (ANC 2017). When the ANC began to negotiate with the apartheid regime in the 1980s, Zuma served as an integral member of the ANC, as he was among those who led the discussions (ANC 2017). Zuma then "attended the Convention for a Democratic South Africa as an ANC representative" (ANC 2017). Years passed with Zuma being elected for various posts within the ANC, and in 1999, "he became Thabo Mbeki's deputy president" (Butler 2017: 148). For as long as he has been in politics, Jacob Zuma has been a controversial figure. Butler notes his political journey as turbulent, as he writes that Zuma has been "implicated in various fraud and corruption charges that he and his supporters denigrated as politically inspired" (2017: 148). Despite the many challenges he faced in getting to the top, "he demonstrated enormous political resilience to fight off legal and political challenges and to secure the ANC presidency in 2007" (Butler 2017: 148). Two years later, when the party won the national election, Jacob Zuma was elected as the president of the Republic of South Africa (ANC 2017).

Sean Jacobs, in his biography of Zuma, notes that when President Mbeki's term came to an end, no one thought of Zuma, then his, as a strong contender. "He hardly featured in the daily cut and thrust of national politics, save for spearheading a 'moral regeneration' effort and co-chairing a national body to coordinate the government's AIDS prevention and treatment effort with NGOs", notes Jacobs (2010: 2). Zuma only became a household name when his corruption charges, as an associate of Shabir Shaik (known for procuring bribes for Zuma from arms manufacturers) emerged (Jacobs 2010: 2). Zuma's notoriety continued to spiral, as he was "charged with raping the HIV-positive daughter of his former cellmate on Robben Island" (Jacobs 2010: 2). However, Jacobs notes that Zuma's redemption was swift. As soon as he was acquitted of the charges, Zuma sprang back into action. Zuma has also remained involved in "perpetual scandals, concerning upgrades to his private residence in Nkandla, alleged nuclear procurement corruption, the enrichment of his family and his political allies, his numerous wives, children and sexual associations, and a host of other matters" (Butler 2017: 148). Jacobs notes that due to his many misdemeanours, "By most accounts, Zuma would have been set for certain political isolation…but instead, a combination of factors resurrected his political career" (2010: 2), such as his warm personality which contrasted with Mbeki's coldness, and

his background as the poor child of a single mother (Jacobs 2010:2). Jacobs makes the claim that despite Zuma's corruption, "Mbeki's critics inside the ANC and its allies found in Jacob Zuma — 'the 100% Percent Zulu Boy' — an ambitious politician and willing accomplice" (2010: 2). This was echoed by members of South Africa's ruling party, the ANC, when "Zuma trounced Mbeki in elections for party leader [when] he won nearly twice the number of voters Mbeki got" (Jacobs 2010: 2). Despite Zuma's recent resignation from the presidency in February 2018 (Marrian 2018), he still remains an integral player in the realm of South African politics. He "is a social conservative who has bolstered the influence of traditionalism and patriarchy in the movement and in the country" (Butler 2002: 148). It is for this reason that Jacob Zuma is the first case study in this project surrounding blackness.

The purpose of this chapter is to unpack the discursive constructions of blackness that Jacob Zuma draws on in order to entrench a specific persona. This is done by means of a selected speech which carefully considers his political performance. I do this by critically engaging and further, analysing three forms of media material from a speech delivered by Zuma on 27 May 2015 during the 2015 State of the Nation Address Debate, namely its video, the article posted alongside it and the comments posted below it. How Zuma presents his black identity as well as how this is received by the media and members of the public alike are dealt with in the sections below. This chapter shows the disjuncture between how Zuma asserts his blackness and how he is received.

Video Analysis

As the video begins, President Zuma appears dressed in Western formal wear. This is considered "acceptable" (Macleod 2002: 33) given the parliamentary environment he is in. Macleod explains that "the logical decision would be to dress in acceptable office clothes [such as] suits or jackets, long-sleeved shirts, collars and ties for men" (2002: 33). Zuma is here dressed in a black suit and a red tie. This dress implies a sense of respect for Parliament, as he is following protocol when it comes to how one should be presented in such a dignified house. Despite the fact that Parliament not included a prescription of what can and cannot be worn in the house (Makinana 2016), a majority of MPs still conform to the "Pre-1994 [rules of dress code in] South Africa [which] regarded the correct dress for any business occasion as conforming to white (Western or European) norms and standards" (Macleod 2002: 33). This points to the harsh realities of apartheid which still influence the ways in which people in South Africa think. Kuchta asserts that "the wardrobe of power [is] itself a form of power [and is

thus] important to political culture precisely because it embodie[s] social, sexual, political, religious and economic relations [as it gives] them shape, materiality and visibility" (2002: 7). Thus, "clothing [previously] put power in plain view; it shaped the way in which power was thought and enacted and reformulated" (Kuchta 2002: 7) and still does today. The clothing worn by people of status, such as politicians, is thus of extreme importance as it establishes the power they hold. Tennen explains that "wearing a three-piece suit might mark power by differentiating the wearer from the [others], perhaps even reminding them of his dominant position in the institutional hierarchy" (1994: 623). However, she explains that the symbol of the suit "can either signal power or solidarity - depending on the setting" (1994: 623). Moosa notes that navigating dress codes in South African Parliament has become tricky, especially considering the different stances politicians such as Malema have recently taken. This is discussed at a later point in this project. However, Moosa claims that, "A professional and dignified dress code is coherent with dignified conduct and can only positively enhance the notion of professionalism which is in line with Section 195(1)(a) of the Constitution, which provides that 'A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained'" (Moosa 2015). Due to the problematic legacy left behind by colonisation and then apartheid, anything Western is still received with positivity. Adam and Moodley explain that "for the colonized minds of apartheid South Africans – Afrikaners and blacks alike – anything imported from abroad, from fashion to academic expertise, carried a mythical quality and undeserved privilege" (2005: 74). The modern three-piece suit was first introduced in 1661 in England (Kuchta 2002: 78) and thus holds value for minds still influenced by colonialism and apartheid. In saying this, Moosa explicates that dress code that MPs are encouraged to wear is in line with this ideology, to which most comply. Zuma is one such politician. What is interesting here is the emphasis placed on politicians dressing in Western formal wear, as a means of dignified and respectful attire. In Zuma complying with this, he comports himself as compliant and respectful of Western traditions. While this does not take away from Zuma's blackness, it does place the arena of politics into question. The notion that Western (white) formal dress is still associated with professionalism and dignity point to Parliament and the political sphere as a whole as still being largely influenced by the systems and structures of whiteness. This could prove a challenging factor when it comes to Zuma asserting his black identity, as he purports himself as somewhat Western to comfortably fit into the world of politics.

Keeping with the visual theme of this analysis, we now move on to discuss another integral aspect – body language. Sanders explains that certain behaviours have come to be expected of

presidents. To "act presidentially", according to Sanders, means to look good and deliver speeches with ease (2018). As Zuma stands, dressed appropriately (as has been previously discussed) and begins his speech, we see him behaving "presidentially" – he stands confidently, given the high status he has. He begins his speech without hesitation and standing upright. Gesturing to Mmusi Maimane who became leader of the DA over the course of this study, Zuma begins his speech with a chuckle as he refers to his "good friends, the opposition". "People mock others not only by words but also by sophisticated' methods like gestures, mimicry, body language or other covert ways of communication" (Yahya 2011: 36). As Zuma throws his hands up into the air and laughs, it becomes clear that he is mocking his opposition. Instead of standing upright and behaving in a dignified manner, as is expected of a president (Ellis 2012: 38) and proceeding with his speech, Zuma sways his body and smirks throughout, particularly when elaborating through a fake-English accent how certain South Africans have mispronounced "Nkandla", which is discussed in detail at a later stage. This is a point of contradiction, for although Zuma begins his speech as seemingly presidential and upright, he challenges this by means of his alternative attitude displayed in his body language. Zuma then re-enacts a scenario he claims happens too often in Parliament, where politicians call points of order regarding his Nkandla homestead. As he does so, he uses hand gestures to emphasise his points of "three investigations made" and "very important issues discussed". As his re-enactment comes to an end, Zuma rolls his eyes, insinuating his frustration with the issue. He then pauses to laugh, shaking his head in disbelief. Speaking with a great deal of gusto, Zuma goes on to express what he calls the "poverty of politics in opposition parties". This is done by him making chicken-like gestures, as he bends his arms at the elbow and moves them up and down. He does not subscribe to a black middle-class accent (which is similar to the white accent), but instead, places his pride for his typically black accent on full view all while using his body to support his argument. His tone and actions are friendly, to suggest closeness to those he is addressing. In so doing, Zuma purports himself as proud of his ethnicity, which aids in his presentation of his blackness as a man of the people.

This is continued when Zuma refers to the DA and other opposition parties. He says that if one were to listen to them, "Hey, hey, I'm telling you, you can think you live in another world". This colloquial, relaxed language can be seen as a tactic by Zuma used to gain popularity in the realm of South African politics. Kendall notes that certain leaders use "colloquial English, the comfortable, familiar language people unders[tand]" and this greatly aids them in establishing them as "one of the people" (2000: 115). This is apparent when Zuma uses a casual

and non-authoritarian voice in order to open the floor for himself by means of engaging the members of Parliament and public equally, in a friendly manner. It is furthered by Zuma's use of South African slang. He concludes his speech by saying "Jirre!" – a word used in South Africa to express surprise or disbelief. In Zuma employing popular South African slang, not only does he comport himself as easy going, but he asserts himself as "one of the people". He makes use of such a colloquial term to position himself as informal, laid-back and relatable. Estrin and Mehus note that "*politicians* often *use slang* to create the "common touch" (1974: 79) as this helps them in being received as friendly, one of the people, and relatable.

Zuma then proceeds to discuss the matters at hand, one of which is his homestead – Nkandla. Dubbed "Nkandlagate" by the media, the issue being discussed deals with "Zuma's renovation of his rural home in Nkandla using 248-million rand of the taxpayers' money leading to accusations of misusing public funds [which] sparked a wild outcry [by the South African public] on many fronts" (Mabweazara 2015: 110). Referring to those who have queried his expenditure on Nkandla as "some people", he demonstrates his indifference for a topic which millions of South Africans hold in very serious regard. This is displayed in the way he uses the words, instead of the actual words: the words used are laden with cynicism as they are accompanied by smirking. Zuma then proceeds to critique the way in which the word "Nkandla" should be pronounced. This can be seen as a rhetorical strategy that has the effect of shutting down the accusations of his corruption, and instead drawing attention to his attitude towards the issue at hand. In Zuma opening the discussion about Nkandla with such a humorous approach, he diverts attention away from the actual issue. "Some people," says Zuma, "who could not pronounce Nkandla, they've now learned", coupled with a range of hand gestures, from resting his finger tips on the podium and then shaking his hands, to full body movements which point to his restlessness and annoyance with the topic. Zuma then laughs and shakes his head, as he is cheered on by, presumably, other ANC MPs. As the speech continues, Zuma's body language, including shaking his head, smirking and laughing, points to further disregard of the concerns surrounding Nkandla. This works two ways– it firstly distracts from larger issues but also uses the aspect of accent to code the critique of Nkandla as excessive and problematic as an issue for white people. This, in turn, undermines his black opposition. In so doing, Zuma creates a sense of friendliness with those he is addressing, which in turn interpolates those who are observing him into feeling that they are being addressed by an associate.

“N-kaaandla! N-kaaaaandla! N-kaaaandla!” proclaims Zuma, referring to how certain South Africans pronounce the name of his homestead. Faking an obvious and deliberate accent known to be attached to white people in South Africa, Zuma purposefully targets members of the opposition, who he claims are fixated with his homestead. Accents play a huge role when people are distinguishing the ‘us’ from ‘them’– particularly in South Africa, given our vast multi-racial landscape. Accents are even more significant in the case of distinguishing one’s blackness – a key feature in this study. Rajend Mesthrie discusses, in a book regarding World Englishes, how identities and accents become more fluid in a deracialising climate. He explains how “Apartheid South Africa produced at least five main ethnic Englishes, sharply different in accent and syntax” (Mesthrie 2007: 4). This is a point that goes to show, that even though South Africa has largely overcome the oppressive apartheid regime, there are many aspects of its unequal legacy which still exist today. One such consequence is the fact that ethnic differentiations still exist. Mesthrie discusses how people of colour now have opportunities to choose their places of residence, friends, jobs, education and professions, but clearly explicates how “English is the language of distinction of the middle class” (2007: 4). Urszula Clark expands on Mestrie’s notion by arguing that due to South Africa’s rigid system of racial and social segregation between white, black, coloured and Indian people, “the linguistic practices of these four groups differed, and each one can be categorized as identifiably different” (2013: 90). As noted above, Zuma mocks what he deems the mispronunciation of “Nkandla” in an accent usually linked to white English-speaking South Africans. Zuma draws on a reservoir of ethnic pride in his audience and thus positions himself as closer to the black English-speaking South Africans who have accents like his, and the non-English speaking black people alike. Thus, in Zuma expressing, humorously, how certain people mispronounce “Nkandla”, he is asserting that the disapproval of his expenditure is essentially a white problem. This way, Zuma draws in the approval of black South Africans. This is certified by his suggestion previously noted that the “opposition” are angered by the spending at Nkandla. Despite South Africa’s emancipation from apartheid, the DA still largely resembles a white party (Piombo and Nijzink 2005: 133). Over the years, the party has been criticised for this, most recently for comprising of only four white councillors and one Indian councillor (Mbanjwa 2018). The party has thus been referred to as concerning and regressive given the diversity of South Africa (Mbanjwa 2018). This feeds into Zuma asserting himself as part of the “people”, for as Webb notes, English in South Africa “is a symbol of liberation for some…and a site of contestation [for others]” (2002: 18).

However, it is important to note that with the advent of what is referred to as "the new South Africa", meant to be void of racial disparity, the once-segregated groups of South Africa have significantly changed. While these groups are still largely obviously "groups", there are new differences which serve to distinguish new groups. Erbert notes the experience of a South African black youth which concurs with this argument. "As soon as you hear somebody like me who went to UCT [University of Cape Town], who has an accent like mine... [you think] I'm a sell-out... and that I don't understand what it's like to be poor" (Erbert 2014: 117). This stems from the idea posed by Tayob et al. that one of the ways that blackness is policed in South Africa today is by accent. They write about how middle-class black learners, when given access to white schools became known to be "whitely" (2004: 91). Such people are today classified as being not "truly"' black, particularly when they speak English with a "white" accent (Tayob et al. 2004: 91). This then plays into Zuma criticising black South Africans whose accents resemble white South Africans'. Thus, in Zuma explicitly denouncing those who, according to him, mispronounce "Nkandla", he asserts himself as different from middle class black South Africans. This, in turn, allows him to reiterate himself as "one of the people".

As his speech continues, Zuma pauses to laugh and then continues. This matter, Zuma says, is problematic as it "emphasises the poverty of politics in our opposition parties". Zuma goes on to validate that claims such as these are part of the reason he is unable to deal with "very meaningful contributions". Here, Zuma uses formal and political language to professionalise his approach. One of the contributions he mentions was made by Mmusi Maimane in a speech made some time before. Zuma once again, with jest and vibrancy mimics Maimane saying about Zuma: "There is a broken president, in a broken country", all while moving his arms in a chicken-like stance, then shaking his head in a way that suggests disappointment. These gestures coupled with mockery and jeering are not common in a speech delivered in Parliament. Many different responses resulted from this speech, including the cheering and laughing from certain members of Parliament (presumably part of the ANC) which can be heard throughout the speech, and the indifference of others. Wilson notes, in his book discussing the underlying discourses of political speeches, that silence in response to such enactments may mean a withdrawal from the subject or lack of engagement with the topic being discussed (2008: 127). This notion coupled with actions (or the lack thereof) displayed by some MPs, such as folded arms and cheeks in hand, point to Zuma being received as boring, unimpressive and certainly not humorous, despite his attempts. Regarding presentations such as this, which appear to be intentionally humorous, Wilson explains that "while laughter is not a judgment of the political",

these speeches in fact allow a space of judgment to which different members of the public will respond differently, between "the decision to laugh or to revolt" (2008: 127). While many MPs chose to laugh in response to Zuma's speech, those who do not, respond to it with disregard, by displaying unamused faces seen at the very end of the video snippet.

Having critically analysed the actual video of Zuma's speech, I now move on to understand the interpretation of this event through the eyes of the media.

Article Analysis

The article being discussed below was written by journalist Andisiwe Makinana. It was initially published by the City Press and later adapted for online publication by News24.

When it comes to media texts, every aspect is calculated to attract the attention of the reader. Joylon Mitchell explains regarding news as a whole, "there is a necessary selection, compression and simplification in the construction of news stories" (2002: 14). No matter how spontaneous it may seem, news that is delivered to us is as the result of "carefully choreographed stop watch culture" (2002: 14). One of the most immediate aspects of the text in question is the photograph accompanying the article. Dressed in a suit, Zuma sits slouched over a Parliament desk. With his eyes barely open and his lip overturned, he appears unbothered by the events that are underway. The picture lacks colour as it has only maple tones from the furniture and black tones from Zuma's clothing. This picture paints Zuma as uninterested. This suggests that the media team who put the article together wanted to represent Zuma as neglectful of his parliamentary duties.

Zuma's body language is a vital point of analysis. Pease and Pease make the argument that body language has become imperative in understanding people, especially politicians. They assert that "Politicians spend much of their time ducking, dodging, avoiding, pretending, lying, hiding their emotions and feelings, using smokescreens or mirrors and waving to imaginary friends in the crowd. But we instinctively know that they will eventually be tripped up by contradictory body language signals, so we love to watch them closely, in anticipation of catching them out" (2004: 8). With that in mind, the act of catching a politician out lies, to a great extent, with the journalist, whose role it becomes to select specific images which help communicate a specific message. The journalist or media worker thus acts as a middle-man between the politician and the public. Wall et al. note that "Mediation is the act of going 'in-

between'… 'an audience' and 'the world', but this simple process has some very complex implications" (2006: 79). They elaborate by noting that there are "technical considerations which means that reality can never be 'captured' in its entirety and there are social, economic and political factors weighing on those who have to make decisions in the mediating process" (2006: 80). This has been elaborated upon by Ross who notes that "mass/mediated communication both produces, and is a product of a specific social order, making it essentially political" (2005: 53) in that it seeks "to persuade, seeking to define one reality as opposed to another, including and excluding while at the same time informing and entertaining" (Silverstone 2005: 192). Thus, media workers have the task of selecting aspects which make up the text which will persuade the audience in a certain direction, for as Nisbet notes, "words…are like triggers that help individuals negotiate meaning through the lens of existing cultural beliefs and worldviews" (D'Angelo and Kuypers 2010: 46). Over all, Makinana expresses, by means of her writing, a highly critical view of Zuma, which is explored in detail below.

The text of article begins in a cynical tone. The headline, which reads "Zuma mocks opposition, while calling for respect" points to the irony insinuated by the journalist. Here, emphasis is being placed on how paradoxical it is that Zuma, in his speech, asks fellow ministers to respect Parliament by only raising issues of substance, but does so by means of laughing, gestures and poking fun at the opposition. Negrea notes that "the use of figurative language in headlines, …especially irony, stems from the news reporters' constant and urgent need to grab readers' attention… [and then] serves to guide the reader through the whole text" (2014: 199-200). Thus, starting off this article with irony asserts a specific idea of Zuma as cynical and sarcastic in the minds of the readers. The irony in the headline already establishes the outlook that the media house looks to assert in the mind of the viewer – one that is critical of Zuma. By asserting that Zuma mocked the opposition, the article elucidates his flaw and more so, his unprofessionalism in the house of Parliament.

The article then mentions the way in which Zuma "admonished" opposition parties for their behaviour in opposing the ANC. By use of the word "admonished", which insinuates a scolding, the article positions Zuma as a figure of disciplinary authority. Tozer asserts that with regards to leadership, "most people respond better to communication made 'with' them rather than 'at' them" (2012: 202). Therefore, in the journalist suggesting that Zuma talked "at" members of Parliament, instead of communicating with them, it points to him asserting his

autocracy. In so doing, the article shows Zuma as establishing himself as hierarchy in the sphere of Parliament and essentially, demoting the opposition parties in two ways: firstly, by "admonishing" or talking with condescension to them, and secondly, in criticising their points of order as unimportant and invalid. Zuma here asserts his blackness as one of authority. This could be linked to the Zulu culture to which Zuma belongs, by asserting that "Zulu men are authoritative and the decision makers" (Teer-Tomaselli and Dyll-Myklebust 2012: 463). This feeds into Zuma's black identity as one which does not conform to white ideals and instead leans to traditional black roles in society.

While it is insinuated throughout the article by means of negative words and sources (as is discussed below) that Zuma was not well received, it appears that there is still an attempt on the part of the journalist to remain objective. The article claims that Zuma "advised" his fellow MPs on how to behave, suggesting a change in tone from the previously noted insinuation that Zuma "admonished" them. The article then mentions the "booing MPs" who responded to Zuma's claims that they behave in a way which is unserious and unprofessional. This inclusion of the MPs' disparagement of Zuma is crucial. This disapproval cannot be heard when one watches the video, yet the article mentions this heckling to support its condemnation of Zuma's behaviour. While the booing points out the disregard MPs have for Zuma, the fact that the journalist chose to include this information in the article, despite it not being audible in the video further emphasises the unpleasant regard the media outlet and particularly, the journalist holds Zuma in. This is a claim that Allan notes is not imagined, but rather, an actuality. Allan claims that journalism is "less a matter of certain subjects being off limits" and instead, "more a question of a certain stances having to be taken regarding how they are reported" (2010: 24). Thus, it can be deduced that in the media house choosing to include this detail, its stance on the subject at hand is, in fact, skewed against the politician being discussed.

As the article progresses, Makinana mentions how Zuma responded to the constant requests he received from MPs to discuss his spending on his Nkandla homestead. While she uses a direct quote from Zuma, noting his statement that MPs suffered from a "poverty of politics", she goes on to paraphrase that Zuma believed them to be "obsessed with discussing a house of one man instead of discussing issues of national importance". Once again, Makinana's choice of words is telling. "Obsession" is a word synonymous with fixation. To have an obsession means to be infatuated, consumed by and crazed by it. As Kauffman notes, "to many, obsession carries a negative connotation" (2015: 127). This is because to be obsessed means to allow something

to take over your being. Thus, in Makinana making this claim, she is demonstrating, through her choice of words, Zuma's outlook on the Nkandla issue. While Zuma does express his annoyance with the topic, Makinana uses a hyperbolic term to place extra emphasis on the fact that Zuma believes fellow MPs to be fixated on his homestead. This suggests her discontent with his response to the matter.

On the same topic, using specific terms to explain the Nkandla scandal, Makinana refers to it as Zuma's "expenditure of almost a quarter of a billion rand on upgrading his private homestead". With the use of these explicit, detailed and embellished words, emphasising "a billion rand", the article highlights the intensity of the issue at hand. Makinana uses these emotive terms to trigger a certain response of anger or disappointment in the reader. The use of these specific words, which are designed to sound excessive point to the outrageousness of the situation. Potter's framework of regard to mass media productions notes that journalists often take informational elements and exaggerate them to engage audience members' emotions more strongly (2009: 222). The article employs terms which are shock-worthy, and in so doing, captivates readers. Instead of noting Zuma's fault in simple terms, that is, by writing "R246-million", this sensationalised terminology allows it to impact far more in the mind of the reader. Furthermore, Makinana writes that Zuma said, "You can't sit here and discuss the house of one man. Just a house." In pointing out Zuma's referral to Nkandla as "just a house", the article once again indicates discontent with his attitude by reiterating his lack of seriousness to an audience which holds the Nkandla expenditure as tremendously important. This point is then furthered with mention of the "loud applause from the ANC benches". In explaining that the audible appreciation of Zuma's disregard for public concern came from the ANC benches, the viewpoint that ANC members share when it comes to such unjustified expenditures becomes clear to the reader. Makinana here points to Zuma's black identity as one which emphasises the self before the other, by means of his excessive expenditure at Nkandla.

Makinana continues, noting that Zuma "spent about five minutes mocking opposition MPs". Through use of the word "mocking", Makinana points to the lack of respect that Zuma has for fellow members of Parliament. When someone is mocked, they are undermined. Theorists of emotions, Tracy, Roberts and Tangney assert that one of "the best elicitors of humiliation [is] mocking" (2007: 362). Thus, Makinana's use of the word "mocking" suggests that Zuma is mistreating fellow MPs. While this is done covertly, through his jeers at what they consider important and their accents, Makinana explicates that his mistreatment is evident.

While every component of the text is being analysed, there are some points which repeat themselves in the analysis of the video clip, comments and article. This includes how the article turns its attention to accents, when it claims Zuma "mimick[ed] a fake English accent – which has been previously discussed. By Makinana referring to Zuma's accent here as "fake", she once again attaches a particular inference to the article. The word "fake often carries a negative connotation" as it refers to something being "artificial" or "not natural" (D'Alleva 2010: 64). In addition to this, by pointing out that Zuma uses an "English" accent in a negative way, Makinana implies Zuma's distance from those who speak this way. Through these choice of words, Makinana purports Zuma in a negative tone, as disrespectful to those who speak this way.

Another interesting feature of Makinana's commentary is that she raises issues discussed in Zuma's speech, but not highlighted in News24's shortened video clip. One of these is the Marikana Massacre[4]. She explains how Zuma notes that opposition parties had asked him to release the Marikana report during a previous debate, which proved they had what Zuma called, "no substantial political issues to raise in Parliament". Here, she strategically mentions the most high-profile MPs that Zuma critiques in his speech – his opposition. First, Makinana indirectly cites the EFF, communicating an event that was not visible during the video. Makinana writes that the "EFF held a silent protest during [the] debate, with its MPs holding up placards with the words: "Release Marikana report". By establishing Zuma's negativity towards the issue of Marikana, and thus reiterating his negligence towards it, and then identifying the EFF (and their leader, Malema) as the opposite, Makinana indirectly suggests an alternative to readers. Here, the article reiterates the importance of Marikana and inattention of Zuma. Nisbet notes that "in storytelling, communicators can select from a plurality of interpretations" (D'Angelo and Kuypers 2010: 46). This is done through a process of framing, which "can help determine the outcomes of a decision or action by the way the situation is described" (Wylie 2003: 7). Framing "establishes an information bas that affects the reader or viewers' analyzing process" (Wylie 2003: 7). The process of framing positions a topic within a certain frame, to alter the way in which it is presented and subsequently received. As a journalist, Makinana is likely aware of how the chosen words, including certain observations, quotes and sources can

[4] Dubbed the Marikana Massacre, the shooting at the Marikana miners' strike took place on 16 August 2012 in the North West province of South Africa. The miners had been striking for a pay raise. It was the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since the end of apartheid and resulted in 34 miners being killed.

influence the mind of the reader. Kuypers notes that "The press finds those who agree with its argument more readily than those who do not" (2014: 188). This then confirms the idea that the press uses outside sources to support its own point of view (Kuypers 2014: 188). Thus, in Makinana choosing to include the behaviour of the EFF which cannot be seen in the video, she practises framing. She frames the article as against Zuma and in favour of his opposition, which points to him being received negatively once again.

This is then exacerbated when Makinana uses then-DA spokesperson and now-leader, Mmusi Maimane as her next source. Makinana notes Maimane's standpoint, by quoting him as "criticis[ing] Zuma's speech saying it showed a poor grasp of the seriousness of the crises and issues that face South Africa and its people". She elaborates on this with direct quotes from Maimane which refer to unemployment levels and lack of service delivery, for which he blames Zuma. Maimane is quoted as saying "From the energy crisis that promises three more years of load-shedding and job-shedding; to the economy, which has shed 2 million jobs and raised unemployment to 36,1% since President Zuma was elected to office" (Makinana 2015). These phrases set out the faults of Zuma. At no point does the article quote any ANC member, which skews its list of sources. Schafer and Crichlow explain that "Multiple sources not only provide a wide range of information and perspectives, but also let us, as much as possible, "triangulate" the information, that is check for biases, confirm or refute accounts, and try to resolve contradictions" (2010:76). Thus, by using only with sources from the opposition, this article appears skewed. The article mentioned how ANC members cheered and prodded Zuma on. If Makinana was to include the standpoints of such MPs, the views expressed would alter her argument, resulting in a more balanced account of events. This reiterates Makinana's stance with regards to Zuma, as she indirectly and covertly exposes his faults through using Maimane as a scapegoat, noting the "load-shedding" (a controlled and planned shut-down of electricity) and "job-shedding" (the loss of jobs as a result of the electricity crisis) which took place under his presidency. The inclusion of sources who are critical about Zuma's governance asserts Zuma's unjust political practices. Given that the article previously discusses his squandering of public funds used on renovations at his homestead and then uses the above sources to critique his public service challenges, Makinana is making the point that Zuma's black identity shows neglect for his people. This is reiterated by Makinana including a direct quote by Maimane who believes that "Every time the President steps up to the National Assembly podium, the country is left with even less hope and an image of a jester, rather than a leader who has solutions to solving the country's problems". This comment points to the discontent that certain

South Africans have when it comes to Zuma. In Makinana choosing to include this comment, she is concluding with the notion that Zuma represents himself as nonchalant instead of as a problem-solver, a view further expressed by members of the South African public in the comment section below.

Comments Analysis

This section explores the ways in which the comments posted below the article received Jacob Zuma in terms of his black identity. It does so by means of themes such as Zuma being strongly disliked, uneducated, extravagant and corrupt.

From the onset, many commenters openly declared their abhorrence for President Zuma. A range of comments referred to Zuma as "arrogant", an "oppressor", an "assh#le", "worthless", a "doos" and a "prick". Gouws and Statsiulis point out the freedom South Africans have when it comes to disliking a certain political figure. "It is completely acceptable to disrespect Jacob Zuma, as it is to disrespect Helen Zille or Bantu Holomisa or Terror Lekota", they note (2014: 216). They further assert that many people do, indeed, dislike Zuma (2014: 216), which is evident in the comments noted above. In the South African political landscape, this has come to be part of the way in which citizens express themselves. This stems from the fact that as South Africans, freedom of speech is seen as "an instrument of democratic government" (Mubangizi 2004: 87). However, online platforms such as the News24 comment section also enable users to post things they would most likely not say in the real world, for as Gagliardone et al. note, online "networking platforms may enable distinct ways for hate messages to spread" (2015: 36).

Some commenters claim that ANC supporters are mindless in their voting. Interestingly, Zuma is criticised by non-black commenters such as those above for his negligence in taking care of black South Africans. Such commentary takes a direct hit at Zuma as a black president. It is a preconceived notion that Zuma is black and thus, should work extra hard to better the lives of black people. However, in not doing so, it is not only Zuma who is being criticised, but the ANC supporters too. Many commenters hold voters, most of whom are black in South Africa (given its demographics) liable when it comes to where the power lies. They insist the presidency of Zuma and the ultimate dominance of the ANC in general is as a result of the naivety of black voters who continue to vote for said individual and party. One such commenter, screen name "Revelgen" notes: "when the majority of the people in this country

are properly educated, he [Zuma] WILL be voted out along with the totally corrupt ANC. Voter ignorance is all that is now keeping the ANC in power. But the fact is: THE ANC ROBS THE POOR. So it's time the voters woke up". Such comments use racist stereotypes of black people as uneducated and incapable, but also suggest that black South Africans are capable of overcoming their "voter ignorance". Other comments of this nature include "can't people WAKE UP... stop keeping this moron and his cronies in power! CAN'T you SEE what a mockery he is making of you!" (Van Heerden). This kind of logic insinuates these commenters, in this case are predominantly white people, are in a position of superiority as they can see the truth they claim black voters are ignorant of. This is largely echoed by other commenters. Commenter Yekani writes, "I wish most black people can wake up and see that ANC is fooling them. I wish most black [people] can be educated and know who to vote for, [because] they are the [reason] for this Useless Leader". Here, a black person is reiterating the logic mentioned above, but does so by removing himself from the group of those who need to "see the truth", as he mentions "most black people" instead of all. This comment is associating whiteness with intellect and better decision making. This stems from the common "racial lie... that whites are more intelligent than blacks" (Holtzman and Sharpe 2014: 295). This kind of racist thinking also associates this white intellect with civilisation, as it proposes that when black people become as educated as white people, they will vote in the same way that white people do. Sharing this sentiment is Terence Keys, who comments that the "Majority of [Zuma's] voters will never see this video, because they don't have power or can't read" – making a direct hit at the service delivery issues and the state schooling system in South Africa, as well as the lack of opportunity black South Africans face, all while referring to black people as uneducated. Zuma is indirectly attacked here for his lack of change and development in the country. Essentially, commenters such as these are passing the blame on to what they deem as the ignorance of voters. This points to the flawed logic that black people are stupid and being manipulated by Zuma who is here viewed as a trickster. Zuma's black identity is here viewed as thriving on a lack of intelligence on the part of his supporters.

While much has been said about the intelligence of Zuma's supporters, his education also came under scrutiny in the comments. Sammons and Cunningham note that "genteel racism [has for decades] characterised Black people as lazy, stupid or acting inappropriately (2004: 8). While genteel refers to a politer and less offensive kind of racism, it is clear to see that the comments posted on this text are certainly the opposite. Commenters on this article seem to agree with the racist understandings of black people as lazy, stupid and acting inappropriately, and

emphasise such racist discourses associated with black people. Commenters referred to Zuma as a "jellyfish brainless idiot" (John Howard), "with a [standard] 2 education" (Jonas Morawi) and "an IQ of 10" (Wikus Venter). In addition, other commenters referred to Zuma as facing "leadership skills bankruptcy"– which was quickly defended by others, such as commenter Maja, who instead refers to it as "a lack of mental capacity". Several other commenters chose to discuss Zuma's lack of education. Reginald Jeeves, for example, commented that, "Our country [is] run by an unintelligent fool who is only good at being a populist and a criminal". Another commenter pointed out Zuma's poor intellect, referring to the stammers he has come to be known for while reading speeches. Zuma "cant even read properly... five thousand, 2 thousand.... close to a billion", wrote Sarawan. Commenter Van Rensburg referred to the way in which English words are used as a measure of intelligence – an area explored in detail in the early parts of this chapter, as he commented, "If pronunciation is an indication of education or intelligence I am afraid JZ scores a zero". Literature shows that Jacob Zuma began to change the "long line of missionary-educated graduates who had lead the ANC", as he is "the first leader of the ANC never to have seen the inside of a classroom" (Mangcu 2009: 36). Due to his poor background, Zuma "did not receive any formal education" (Venter 2008: 637). When Zuma became president, his lack of formal education came under scrutiny (Sibanda 2016: 41). From these comments, it is evident that Zuma is being judged by South Africans based on specific standards they have set regarding intellect. His lack of formal education leads to him being received negatively.

Many commenters pointed out their dissatisfaction with how Zuma conducted himself. A majority of such comments pointed to how they thought Zuma's mockery of the typically white middle-class accent was offensive. This is expected, as due to the digital divide (which has been previously discussed) a large majority of News24 commenters are likely to be white, and thus, the targets of Zuma's mockery. This stems from the unjust practices left behind by apartheid, which still results in "the digital divide whereby white people have more access to technology than blacks" (Emiri and Ofua 2013: 185-192). Some commenters directed their attacks on Zuma to how he "can't speak proper English himself" (Maurits Wilhelm Hagg) but chose to draw attention to the way other South Africans pronounce a single unfamiliar word: "Nkandla". Pronunciation and accents in general are significant in South Africa, as has been discussed above. This is a sentiment echoed by commenters. "Zuma, you can't pronounce 'violence', you say 'vaulence', 'vaulence', 'vaulence' like you can't learn a simple word", wrote commenter Francois Marais. Many commenters were angered by Zuma's critique on the

way certain people pronounce “Nkandla”. Zuma is seen as poking fun at those who have difficulty pronouncing a Zulu word, but commenters retaliate by questioning his intelligence, based on how he speaks English. This stems from the idea posed by Root, who notes that there is an “assumption that ‘standard’ English is a universal norm and a universal marker for intelligence” (1997: 74). Any other English then, pronounced with an accent due to English being the second language is considered inferior. Root elaborates that such English is discriminated against by those who speak “standard English” because it is associated with inferiority, lack of intelligence and “otherness” (1997: 74). Despite the fact that Zuma speaks English better than most non-natives would be able to speak isiZulu (Zuma’s first language), the emphasis from commenters is here placed on his unintelligence in that he is not proficient in English. This “hierarchal status of ‘standard’ English has long been refuted by postcolonial critique” (1997: 74) and this kind of criticism of Zuma thus feeds into understandings of the commenters as racist. However, it also points to Zuma’s assertion as one of the masses – who are predominantly black. Zuma is criticised for not subscribing to a black middle-class accent (which is similar to the white accent), but instead, placing his pride for his typically black accent on full view, as has been previously discussed.

Another theme that recurred in the comment section considered the continuous support that Zuma received from black South Africans. Rene Sutton angrily wrote, “I don't understand why the majority of black people vote for this man. He is taking YOUR money and instead of building schools for YOUR children, he is building himself a castle and then lying about it and then laughing in YOUR face”. Without directly saying it, Sutton is here suggesting that ANC supporters are gullible. This can be linked to stereotypical and racist ideologies, as noted by Fourie who wrote that “during the apartheid years, negative myths about black people [became popular], such as … that they cannot rule a country, are unskilled, cannot be educated and so on” (2001: 477). This is the point from which commenters such as Sutton are coming, in that they use these notions of black stupidity and self-helplessness to express their anger at Zuma. While these negative insinuations against black people have no basis, such comments point to Zuma as neglectful of black people which suggests his black identity is selfish.

Commenter Danielle Bella Hattingh echoes this ideology, as she poses a question to Zuma. “What have you done for the people that live in townships that live in the most outrageous circumstances? But you want to live in a castle?”, she asks. By directly questioning Zuma, using the word “you” as though Zuma would read this comment, the commenter is placing

Zuma in a position of accountability. She is directly holding Zuma liable for the poverty that South Africans face. In the same breath, Hattingh points out to Zuma what she calls the "outrageous circumstances" South Africans are living in. This serves as a lesson for Zuma from Hattingh on the conditions in which his people are living. She is suggesting that Zuma lacks such knowledge on the very place he governs. Furthermore, she refers to Zuma's Nkandla homestead as a "castle", directly implying that he lives as a king, while his people live in squander. Such commentary explicates the position of this commenter as a white person who blames the ills of society, that is, in this case, poverty, on a black person. She is pointing to the notion that black people in South Africa are no better off than they were under the apartheid rule, when the white minority ruled over the ways black people lived their lives – controlling where they resided and under what conditions. There is a sense, from comments such as these, that Zuma has failed his people. Firstly, he has failed in empathising with their strife as a black man, and secondly, he has done so as a president. Here, Zuma's black identity is infringed on by him being referred to as squandering of public funds to benefit himself.

Irene Hutchins compares Zuma to who she refers to as "his friend Bob from Zimbabwe", while Christien Scheepers says, "he will do the Mugabe thing. f@#n live forever and never quit! Evil reigns". These comments are comparing Zuma to former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe who is viewed as a tyrant and dictator to some (Bailey 2013: 78). Here, Zuma is being perceived as a corrupt black leader who will seek to fulfil his own needs before those of his people, which will ultimately result in the downfall of his people.

Conclusion

This section has outlined, by means of a discourse analysis of a video of a speech given by former president Jacob Zuma, the article posted alongside it and the comments posted below it, how Zuma is perceived in terms of his black identity.

From the outset, Zuma placed his blackness in question by means of his dress. In complying with the Western dress which has come to be expected in Parliament, Zuma established himself as professional and respectful of the traditions of Parliament. However, this worked simultaneously to comfortably place Zuma in the realm of politics, which remains influenced by the systems and structures of whiteness. The main means by which Zuma displayed his black identity, however, was by asserting a "them" and "us" position. Zuma attempted to establish himself as a president of the people. This was done by means of colloquial language

and slang. Zuma's tone of voice aided in this as he laughed and smirked throughout his speech. Zuma's attempted to establish himself as a people's president who is approachable and relatable. Zuma then furthered this by defining himself in opposition to those who speak with a particular accent. As he mocked the way certain people pronounce "Nkandla", Zuma used a fake English accent associated with white people. This allowed for his detachment from not only the opposition party, which he quotes as speaking in said accent, but white people in general. Zuma's comment on accents proved significant here, as it displayed his establishment of an "us" –, black people who speak as he does and are capable of pronouncing African words to his liking, and a "them" – white people and those who speak like white people, including the black middle-class.

The article attached to Zuma's speech began with cynicism. Author Makinana implied from the onset the irony behind Zuma's request for respect as he ridiculed opposition MPs. Her use of words pointed to her distaste for Zuma. This was furthered by means of her practices of framing, in which she discussed the EFF against Zuma, as well as her use of sources, when she cited DA's Maimane. Makinana's one-sided tone, in neglecting to use any ANC sources or points of view pointed to Zuma being received poorly by the media house. This points to Zuma's black identity being received and represented by the media house as neglectful of the needs of South Africans, unprofessional within the house of Parliament, disrespectful of fellow MPs and non-beneficial to South Africa.

Lastly, the comments section of Zuma's article displayed a sense of freedom of speech with largely white commenters openly declaring their dislike for him. Many commenters expressed their anger at how Zuma mocked the white accent and retaliated by pointing out his difficulties in pronouncing English words as well as numbers. Zuma's lack of formal education caused him to be highly criticised by commenters. He was also criticised for his expenditure at Nkandla which many pointed out as a disservice to "his people"– that is, black people. Zuma was thus ridiculed not just for being a bad black president. In this regard, those who supported Zuma were also criticised for their lack of intelligence.

Throughout this analysis, Zuma established his black identity as one which condemns the "other". Through his performance in this speech and in poking fun at those who are different to him, Zuma asserted his blackness as one which disregarded others' opinions. Zuma's use of informal tone and language enabled him to be understood as part of the people, but this was not well received by the press or the public. In the article, Zuma was criticised for being

dominating and disrespectful of the traditions of Parliament. Processes of news production such as framing and sources furthered these ideas. In the comments, Zuma was largely condemned for an array of reasons which pointed to him not being received as a president of the people, which he attempted throughout his speech. The video analysis found that Zuma attempted mainly to assert his black identity as one of the people, through his use of colloquial language and emphasising himself as non-white. But in the article and comments analyses Zuma was understood as not only detested and uneducated, but as a selfish – in his extreme squandering of public funds for his own benefit and corrupt ruling. Through this clear disjuncture, Zuma was understood, by means of this particular speech, as someone who embodied a blackness which places "the self before the other".

MALEMA

Introduction

After critiquing the speech of the former president, the next case study for inquiry is Julius Malema – founder and leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters.

Julius Sello Malema is a contentious character within the realm of South African politics. He was born in 1981 to a single mother who worked as a domestic worker (Mokoena 2012: 1). Malema grew up in the township of Seshego, laden with poverty and extreme political turbulence and thus, violence (Mokoena 2012: 1-2). Malema began his political ventures as a member of the ANC at just nine years old, when he joined a movement of the ANC called Masupatsela or 'Trailblazers' (SA History 2017). At this vulnerable and seemingly innocent age, Malema was "already a member of the pioneer movement" who "wore a hand me down uniform from former pioneers of Masupatsela [that] he was callous about" (Mokoena 2012: 2). All of this built Malema's political eagerness up, as he was "experienc[ing] becoming a comrade, a "big man in the making"" (Forde 2011: 71). He continued his interest in politics within the ANC, and at the age of 14, he was elected as both "chairperson of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) branch in Seshego and the regional chair in 1995" (SA History 2018). In 1997, Malema became the chair of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in Limpopo and in 2001 he went on to become the president of COSAS as a whole (SA History 2018). In 2002, Malema made one of his most significant political moves as he led the COSAS march by school pupils through the streets of Johannesburg which became infamously known for its violence (Incwajana 2017). In 2008, the ANCYL held its conference,

beset with alleged fraud and intimidation and which Malema himself later described as "unbecoming conduct" (Incwajana 2017). Over the years, Malema's public outbursts and meltdowns had become increasingly uncontrollable and as a result, had an array of disciplinary hearings regarding his violent and disruptive behaviour. This continued as Malema sang the lyrics "Shoot the Boer" (*Dubul'ibhunu*) in 2010. These are just a few of the instances in which Malema has displayed the violence that the commenters here refer to. Malema then became the leader of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in April 2008. In this role, "Malema has become one of the most contentious and ridiculed figures in South African political history" (Crowell 2012: 5). He was often mocked by South Africans for his outlandish public displays, which some deemed as ignorant, for as outlined by Crowell, Malema received only a substandard elementary education (2012: 5). Malema is "known for his controversial, socio-political statements and has become a frequent target for lampooning" (SA History 2018). Malema's "outspoken commentary on the African National Congress (ANC) as well as his merciless prodding of previously taboo South African issues such as land reform and nationalization has brought him domestic and international attention" (Crowell 2012: 5). In 2016, Malema was charged with an array of misdemeanours by the National Disciplinary Committee (NDC), including causing divisions within the ANC, barging into meetings of ANC members and calling white people 'criminals' (SA History). These charges sparked protests by ANCYL supporters who burned t-shirts bearing Zuma's face in his support. Malema was eventually found guilty for a number of the charges filed against him and thus, suspended from the ANC for five years (SA History). Malema used this opportunity to his advantage and branched off from the ANC entirely to begin his own political party. His violent behaviour continued, as in recent accounts, in 2016, Malema told Al-Jazeera that he was willing to remove Zuma's government through the "barrel of a gun" (Al-Jazeera 2016).

The Economic Freedom Fighters, popularly known as the EFF, was established in 2013 and has since gained huge momentum. Today, Malema boasts a large following of supporters despite his rocky political past. This is evident from election results in 2014, just two years into the inception of the EFF, in which the party "grabbed headlines, along with 6.35% of the votes in the election, making waves as a new opposition force in the country's political landscape" (Business Tech 2015). From the onset of the EFF, Malema's message has been clear. His mission is to pursue the "struggle for economic emancipation" (EFF 2017). Mokoena describes this as "Malema [taking] advantage of the political stage to rupture what he understood to be the silences on the perineal disadvantaging of 'black' people in South Africa" (2012: 1). The

EFF prides itself on being South Africa's "last hope for jobs and service delivery" (EFF 2017). While other politicians seek to target the country as a whole, Malema focuses on those who experience poverty on a daily basis. In South Africa, this makes up a large portion of the population, with 66.6% of all South Africans living in poverty every day (World Bank 2018). It is easy to see why Malema's political venture has been so successful in such a short space of time, but it has not come without scrutiny. Malema and the EFF have been criticised for being racist against whites, tender driven, militant and violent (SA History 2018). Malema has also been criticized for being extravagant in his lifestyle and dress.

The speech that is used in the critique of Malema was given in Parliament on 17 April 2015. While the speech was lengthy, only the most relevant parts of it, as documented by News24, are analysed in this chapter. As has been done with the previous chapters, three elements of the text are analysed. The segment posted on the News24 website is titled "WATCH: You have lost control of the country – Malema to Zuma".

Video Analysis

The first aspect of analysis is the video which documents Malema's speech. At first glance, Malema appears confident and upright, but is dressed differently to other members of Parliament. Malema and members of the EFF are well known for their unique dress in all spheres of political activity. While all other MPs adorn themselves in suits, ties and other Western formal dress, which has been outlined in previous chapters as the acceptable dress code, Malema and his counterparts choose to wear overalls which are commonly worn by labourers. These overalls are red, which not only acts as a distinguishing point in the political party's branding, but according to them, "appropriate[s] associations with the blood of workers, as well as the colour historically linked with socialists and communists" (Suttner 2014). The donning of the overall symbolises a oneness with those economically disempowered in South Africa. This speaks volumes, as he creates, by means of dress code, a strong sense of unity between himself and the economically disadvantaged who he is targeting. Malema uses dress here to undermine Zuma's attempt at being "a man of the people" as has been previously discussed. Bose notes that "for promoting national unity and solidarity, many things are needed viz., a common lingua franca, a common dress, a common diet, etc." (2004: 47). Furthermore, as Malema chooses to dress in the overalls in what is referred to as the most esteemed house in South Africa – Parliament, he is making the statement that the issue of poverty in South Africa cannot be ignored. He is, in a way, bringing the strife of the millions of South Africans who

face poverty daily into the chamber of Parliament, to make it conspicuous and visible. Malema also uses this as an opportunity to blatantly disregard what is expected of him in the house of Parliament. In wearing the overall instead of the expected Western suit and tie, Malema establishes himself as different in two ways: he is firstly and most obviously seen as different to others in Parliament, but more importantly, he is seen as non-compliant with the Western code of conduct which has become accepted as the norm within the house. In donning the uniform associated with those less represented in Parliament, Malema serves as their representative. He displays a strong sense of camaraderie with those he aims to target, but also works efficiently to comport himself within a specific kind of blackness. Gordon notes that black leaders have a specific role in dealing with the problems of black people (2000: 31). Malema works well to deal with such problems, in that he openly declares his discontent with the Western dress considered as normal in Parliament and instead chooses to dress in a way which represents the forgotten and undermined people in South Africa – those who are underprivileged and economically disempowered. He openly purports his black identity as one rooted in empowering other black people.

However, "the EFF has been attacked for disrespect, sometimes with serious injuries, for wearing overalls or domestic workers' clothes. Its dress has been described as ill-mannered, comparable to lacking respect for their grandmothers" (Suttner 2014). While the wearing of overalls may serve to render economic difficulties visible, it also dishevels the general appearance of Parliament. It has caused a significant amount of controversy, with ANC MPs proposing that Parliament prescribe a stricter dress code (eNCA 2015). Although the National Assembly rules committee decided against this (eNCA 2015), the use of overalls certainly creates a stir in Parliament. This may be what Malema hopes to do in bringing the clothing of the poor into what is regarded as the most esteemed house in South Africa. These clothes disturb the general proceedings of Parliament in that they serve as a reminder of the realities that many poor South Africans face daily. This is an unusual notion for MPs, some of whom remain cocooned by their own privilege. With Malema being the leader of the EFF, the insubordinate nature of the party is broadcast. Malema's defiance is also against the Western practices within Parliament, which feeds his non-conforming black identity. Henderson explains that "black masculinity does not conform to white standards" (2009: 152). In line with this, Malema uses the stereotype of the defiant black man to strengthen his public persona, particularly in the eyes of black South Africans who agree with his approach.

Throughout his presentation, Malema uses simple and easy-to-understand words. This is in contradiction to Maimane, who often uses complex language in order to get his message across (to be discussed in the following chapter). Malema, instead, uses words which ordinary South Africans can easily understand. But this is not solely for the benefit of those engaged in his speech, , Malema is establishing himself as one of the people. In the previous chapter, the same attempt was made by former president Zuma in his speech, but he was still received differently by the public. Here, Malema's presentation is modest and he works to adequately represent the people he aims to target – those who are economically disadvantaged. This use of common and simple language is effective, as Diels and Gorton explain a tactic used by politicians – their "tendency to tailor their campaign rhetoric to try to woo voters, especially unsophisticated, non-ideological and marginally engaged voters" (Hart 2014: 4). It encourages politicians to "use simple words and avoid complexity" (Hart 2014: 4). Despite this speech not being a campaign, per se, Malema employs the use of uncomplicated language to allow for relatability between him and those who subscribe to him politically, whom he in turn aims to represent. Malema is attempting to frame himself as the representative "of the people" and in so doing, presents his black identity in the same way.

Malema opens this segment of his speech by greeting the speaker of the house as well as Zuma. He then goes on to make the claim that "the state is the elder of all of society". The state, at this point, was ruled by Zuma, and thus, Malema is indirectly suggesting Zuma is the elder who leads South Africa Here, the term 'elder' is given to an individual with a certain expectation placed upon them. In African culture, to which both Malema and Zuma belong, the "elder" is associated with wisdom, character and honesty (Shujaa and Shujaa 2015: 225). The Sage Encyclopedia of African Cultural Heritage notes that "Elders, as familial and community conveyers of cultural knowledge, traditions and customs, are guided by the cultural values, customs and traditions of their African ancestors" (Shujaa and Shujaa 2015: 227). As Malema calls Zuma the 'elder' of society, he does so with cynicism, for this assumed compliment is laden with a range of negative responsibility. He thus uses the term to undermine Zuma. He makes the claim that Zuma, in his role as the elder leader of the state has "become responsible for all the violence committed against [South Africa's] foreign nationals". This speech was delivered soon after a scourge of xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa, in which attacks on foreign nationals spiralled out of control. During these attacks, an estimated 400 informal shops owned by foreign nationals of Somali, Ethiopian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent were looted (SA History 2017). In addition to this, both a 14-year-old boy and two

Ethiopian men were killed. The attacks spread throughout South Africa, from Limpopo to KwaZulu Natal. These xenophobic attacks resulted in the widespread call for peace (All Africa 2015) from much of the South African public. As a result, refugee camps were set up to house the displaced foreign nationals. In mentioning this series of xenophobic attacks, Malema sides with foreign nationals in South Africa. Through use of the word "violence", Malema implies his condemnation ofthe issue at hand. Body-Gendrot and Spierenburg note that the word "violence" "strongly connotes behaviour that is illegitimate or unacceptable" and is usually associated with "irrationality and bestiality" (2009: 14). Thus, Malema's choice of words Malema plays into his negative standpoint of the attacks. He uses this to position Zuma as having the traits of irrationality and illegitimacy, and as a result positions himself as being alternate to those traits. In addition to this, Malema refers to the victims of the attacks as "our foreign nationals", which implies a sense of unity. By coupling together his disapproval of the acts, as well as figuratively taking the victims under his wing, Malema establishes a sense of protection for these individuals. He thus portrays himself as a leader who will stand up for the foreign nationals who make up 4.2% of South Africa's entire population (Wilkinson 2015). Malema is here asserting himself as morally upright in that he stands up for those who are in need. In so doing, he works simultaneously to denounce Zuma as reckless in his approach to the issue at hand. Malema thus frames himself as superior in the moral sense to Zuma by establishing himself as a man who supports foreign nationals instead of viewing them as outsiders. Mwakikagile asserts the belief that many of the problems faced by African countries can only be alleviated through working together at the "regional or continental level" (2001: 213). "This is because many African countries are too weak or too poor to be viable entities on an individual level" (Mwakikagile 2001: 213). Thus, in Malema suggesting his support for the foreign nationals, who mostly come from other African states, he is openly declaring his support for the upliftment of Africa and subsequently asserting the notion of ubuntu. "Ubuntu is an African concept of personhood in which the identity of the self is understood to be formed interpedently through community" (Battle 2009: 1). In Malema openly declaring his discontent with Zuma as one who allowed xenophobia under his watch, he is firstly denouncing Zuma's authority as African, for, to be African is to practise ubuntu, and secondly, he is establishing himself as an advocate for ubuntu. Malema goes on to directly implicate Zuma for the actions of South Africans against these foreign nationals. He makes the claim that "it was through the state that our people were taught that resolutions to differences should be through violence" – the difference here being nationality. Malema asserts that all the violence committed against foreign nationals was a result of Zuma's negligence on the issue. As the so-called elder of

society, Malema implies that Zuma holds the responsibility of the country in his hands. The task is upon Zuma to ensure that the state is run in an efficient and successful manner. It is also the role of the elder to pass down the customary traditions to maintain the values of African society. Thus, by Malema beginning his speech by first identifying Zuma as an elder responsible for the state, and then, by denouncing him as one who has caused upheaval in the state, Malema is directly attacking not only the leadership of Zuma in his capacity as president, but in a traditional context as well. "As elders, an essential role is to perpetuate the values and customs of their ancestors" (Shujaa and Shujaa 2015: 227), and by Malema accusing Zuma of neglecting the safety of South Africa's neighbours, he is attacking his role as a capable African man. In so doing, Malema elevates himself as the trustee of traditional values such as Ubuntu.

Malema proceeds to critique Zuma on an array of incidents that took place under his leadership. The attack begins with the deaths that took place at Marikana, a small town in the North West province of South Africa. He openly criticises Zuma for his management, or the lack thereof, when it came to the mass killings at Marikana – an issue of global interest and grave sensitivity. "It was under your leadership", says Malema, "that when you disagreed with people at Marikana, you killed them". Here, Malema targets another group of the South African public – the mining community. South Africa is a world leader in mining (Brand South Africa 2017) and millions of South Africans work in the mining sector. The mining community in South Africa remains extremely unsupported by the state (Langenhoven 2017), and thus, President Zuma. Malema then speaks of the unfolding events at Relela, a small town in the Limpopo province. "When people had problems in Relela, you killed them", says Malema. Residents of Relela are infuriated with the police's nonchalance with regards to muti-killings (Siluale 2014). Malema is here forcing accountability onto Zuma's shoulders and indirectly asserting himself as a man of structure and honesty. He is asserting that Zuma allowed the killings in Relela and is therefore allowing a culture of violence to become normalised within the police forces of South Africa. As Malema's attack on Zuma progresses, he mentions that Zuma once again used violence during service delivery protests. Malema states that, "When people had problems in Mothutlung[5], demanding water, you killed them". Malema then moves on to blame Zuma for

[5] In 2014, residents of Mothutlung, near Brits in the North West took to the streets to protest the lack of water in their area. According to police records, the Mothutlung community had a record of peaceful protests (Evans and Sosibo 2014). However, as the protest unfolded, tear gas was thrown and bullets were shot at protesters. This resulted in the death of three Mothutlung residents (eNCA).

another death – that of Andries Tatane[6]. "When Tatane protested against this state, you killed him," says Malema. While eight police officers were arrested for the assault and murder of Tatane, they were later acquitted of the crimes (Kings 2013),. Police brutality under Zuma's rule remained prevalent and Malema blames Zuma for this.

After making these claims Malema points out that Zuma "never believed in peaceful resolutions". This refers to Zuma's activities during the apartheid era. In 1960, the banning of the ANC led to the formation of its armed wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (SA History 2018). Trewhela explains that Zuma was linked to violent crimes during his time as part of the MK, including the murder of Thami Zulu, a former commander of the MK Natal operations (Trehwela 2009: 111). Zuma was allegedly linked to Zulu's murder as he "believed Zulu was a South Africa agent" and was involved in Zulu's 17-month- long detention (Trewhela 2009:111). Malema could also be indirectly referring to more recent accounts of Zuma encouraging police to use brutal force against those who oppose them (Suttner 2010: 28). The use of the word "never" evokes an emotive response in the viewer, as it connotes finality, suggesting that Zuma has always approached issues with violence. Although these incidents discuss different violent events in South Africa, Malema's discussion of them are centred around the same implications. As Malema voices his opinion in his role as a potential leader, he shows his support for the underrepresented communities affected by the violence he claims has been perpetuated under Zuma. In repeating "you killed them", Malema directly places the blame on Zuma. Members of parliament and the public watching this clip know t Zuma did not physically kill those at Marikana or Relela, but in Malema stating that he did, he emphasises Zuma's role in these matters and sarcastically places all the blame on Zuma. Here, an intensified blame is being put on Zuma two-fold – firstly, he is responsible for the not meeting a basic human need, and secondly, he is responsible for the way in which the protest action for this need was dealt with. Malema is here acting as the voice of justice, calling out Zuma's flaws and forcing him to be accountable for his actions. This raises Malema's black identity as one which opposes Zuma as violent and thus, emphasises his own as one of dignity and honour.

In calling out the various ways in which Zuma is responsible for the violence that plagues South Africa, Malema asserts himself as opposed to it. As he delivers this section of his speech, Malema's change in tone is notable. While he previously discussed Zuma in his role as part of

[6] During a service delivery protest, much like the one discussed above, in Ficksburg, 33-year-old Andries Tatane was killed by police officers.

the state, here, Malema directly approaches Zuma. He addresses him as "you", as he speaks of "your leadership" and says, "you killed them". The use of the word "you" implies straightforwardness. Malema points directly to Zuma and holds him accountable for the deaths at Marikana, Relela, Mothutlung and of Tatane. Nicholson notes that when it comes to the qualities that the public holds as essential when dealing with leaders, straightforwardness ranks at 36% (2009: 216). Honesty, however, ranks much higher at 89% (2009: 216). In calling out Zuma brutally and without hesitation, Malema attempts to achieve both these goals. He is thus attempting to establish himself as a potential leader of integrity, unafraid to make clear the gravity of a situation. Malema also portrays himself as a potential leader who will stand up for the underrepresented communities he here defends, for example, Marikana, Relela, Mothutlung and so on. Essentially, Malema is using these groups of people who he believes have been mistreated by Zuma to gain accolade, by suggesting that he is on their side. He thus suggests himself as a representative of the underprivileged and poor societies within the country, which plays into his black identity as a hero of black South Africans.

But Malema's criticism for Zuma does not solely rely on Zuma's alleged violence against the South African public. He also explains that Zuma displayed violence when it came to his two greatest oppositions – the EFF and the DA. "When there were differences not so long ago in this Parliament, you applied violence against the leadership of the EFF". He also mentions that Zuma responded through violence when the DA marched to Luthuli House (ANC headquarters) in support of job creation, and further asserts that Zuma reacted violently to "the structures of the EFF emerging at the lower level". Here, Malema is taking Zuma to task from a political standpoint. He questions Zuma's leadership skills in suggesting that even in a professional setting, Zuma displays violence. While Malema previously used groups of people to present himself as their hero, he here uses his own political party and an opposition party. Malema does this to explicate Zuma's improper conduct in the sphere of politics. By calling Zuma out on his violent approach to political oppositions, Malema asserts his professionalism and political correctness, which feeds into his black identity as one of progressiveness.

All the abovementioned statements lead to Malema asserting that Zuma "taught our people [South Africans] that everything else must be resolved through violence". Yllö and Torres note that "historically black South African men were marginalized and subordinated by British colonizers and the oppressive structure they created. After the British left…the Afrikaners claimed political and economic power continuing to marginalize Black South African masculinity" (2016: 98). This led to the emergence of what is called "street masculinity" and

"struggle masculinity" – both of which are laden with violence (Yllö and Torres 2016: 99). Thus, the history of black masculinity in South Africa has always been a violent one. Malema is suggesting that Zuma is the problem from which the violence in South Africa stems. He comments on Zuma's masculinity as a violent one, and in positioning himself as the solution to this problem, suggests his masculinity is nonviolent. This works to undermine the stereotype of black men as violent (Schneider 2004: 310) and suggests instead that violence is learned. By naming Zuma as the cause of violence in South Africa through mention of his historically violent past (involvement in uMkhonto we Sizwe), Malema is making reference to Zuma's ideologies as outdated. In his negative approach of this, he purports his black identity as forward-thinking. Here, he is suggesting himself as the young and progressive candidate who could replace Zuma's archaic ways of running a country.

It is interesting to note Malema's choice of words regarding Zuma's actions as leader of the state. In using the word "taught", Malema is implying that as the leader of South Africa, Zuma's role is also that of a teacher. Malema then goes on to elaborate on just how Zuma played a role in teaching South Africans the culture of violence. He continues, "You must take full responsibility for misleading our nation in that peaceful resolution does not exist and that those who do not listen (they) must be whipped into line". This is a comment on Zuma which places Malema in a different light. Although the physical act of whipping is not present here, in Malema choosing to use the word "whip", he opens the ways in which Zuma handles the country up to different interpretation. By use of the word "whip", Malema places Zuma in the same realm of those who colonised South Africa. In early times, colonists used whips on Khoi-San workers bartered as slaves (Osseo-Asare 2014: 172). While Malema calls Zuma out as guilty in this sense, he simultaneously places his stance as opposed to such punishment. In so doing, Malema asserts himself as a kind of emancipator from such stringent and violent means of disciplining a nation. He makes his claims against violence as a progressive and forward-thinker, which implies that he is capable of taking South Africa to new heights. This can be seen as means through which Malema tries to gain the support of the many South Africans who may not agree with Zuma's modus operandi and see the need for progressive, non-violent and non-aggressive forms of governance.

Malema then goes on to criticise Zuma in two roles that he plays – that of president and of father. "You have lost control of the country because you have lost control of your own family", says Malema. "Your own son continues to say these people [foreigners] must be killed" and "you stand up there and you do not say anything". Malema then refers to Zuma's son, Edward

as “a typical example of a family member that [Zuma] cannot whip into line”. Richter and Morell note that “The African notion of a father [refers to] a man who enacts the responsibility of caring for and protecting a child” (Marito et al. 2008: 151). Thus, in Zuma not taking responsibility for the irresponsible comments made by his son, he is losing credit as a good African father. In the same breath, as the elder of the state, Zuma plays the role of the father to the whole of South Africa. Once again, Malema makes the blatant comment that Zuma is also failing due to his negligence in ensuring the care and protection of the country. This is a metaphor for the millions of fatherless African households in South Africa. Richter and Morell once again note that “In much of Africa, child rearing is the shared responsibility of the extended family” (Garcia et al. 2008: 151), for which they blame various socio-economic factors. In this case, the metaphorical child is South Africa, and its absent father is Zuma. hooks reiterate this, making the claim that “unlike white males, black males did not have an institutionalized patriarchal-influenced morality to make them feel less manly if they abandoned families” (2004: 3). As Malema asserts his disdain for Zuma’s negligence of South Africa’s wellbeing, he assumes the role of the extended family who stands up to protect the orphaned child. In so doing, Malema not only clarifies himself as a capable and protective leader, but he also infiltrates the culture that plagues millions of fatherless households in South Africa – he fulfils the need for a protective figure. This becomes more apparent as Malema questions Zuma, asking, “How can you rule the country when you cannot rule over your own family?” – a point at which Malema brings Zuma’s masculinity into question. He is suggesting that Zuma has failed in his role as a father, and therefore has failed in a sphere of his masculinity. This concurrently serves to raise Malema’s role as more capable than Zuma: as a remedy who can rescue South Africa from the clutches of its failing father, Zuma. A situation like this is symbolic of common African patriarchal systems, in which the absent fathers are replaced by the “nearby guy” who acts as a psychological father (Rempson 2016: 97). Malema snatches the role of father from Zuma by declaring him incapable of acting as a father to the nation.

Malema continues to assume the role of responsibility as his speech progresses. “We have a responsibility from these incidences of xenophobia to teach our people that peaceful resolution is a sustainable solution to every problem we have”, he says. Here, Malema steps in as the figure of logic and progress, positioning himself as the forward-thinker who can bring newness to South Africa. Malema is comporting himself as a figure of advancement. This implies that he as the new and young politician can take South Africa forward and effectively away from

the old and backward-thinking Zuma. Being one of the younger politicians in the realm of South African politics, Malema uses his association with the youth to bolster his black identity as one of forward thinking.

As Malema's speech continues, so too do his direct attacks on Zuma's approach to the issues of violence in South Africa. "You come here [and] you want to condemn violence against xenophobia, but the Cubans have taught us that body language speaks volumes [more] than prepared speech". Sheehan and Jermyn state that "using body language as a form of expression is an integral part of Cuban communication" (2006: 92). In citing the Cubans as reference, Malema is putting his knowledge of international societies on display. In so doing, he asserts himself as knowledgeable and aware of more than is present in South Africa. But his mentioning of Cuba does more than display his knowledge of international politics and practice. Franklin explains that in 1977, when President Castro of Cuba met with thenANC president, , Oliver Tambo, it became clear how much the Cubans had been doing for South Africa. "Cuba had been providing aid to the ANC [which was] primarily educational…and more ANC doctors were trained in Cuba than anywhere else" (2016: 133). Cuba also played a role in military training for the ANC when the 1976 Soweto Uprising was underway (Franklin 2016: 133). In 1983, Castro and Tambo met to discuss strengthening ties between Cuba and the ANC (Franklin 2016: 187) In April 1990, just after his release from prison, then-ANC leader Nelson Mandela called Cuba an "inspiration" and "praised it for its human rights and liberty" (Franklin 2016: 266). These sentiments were furthered in July (Franklin 2016: 281) of the same year, when Mandela gave a speech at Cuba's annual celebration of the Moncada Attack. From this brief timeline, it is clear that the ANC and Cuba share a long history of camaraderie. Lapsley elaborates on this, noting Cuba's integral role in the development of South Africa post-apartheid. "Once South Africa became a democratic state, Cuba began sending us medical doctors and provided medical training to our own students" (2012: 265). "Although poor itself, it [Cuba] provided generous technical assistance to other developing countries in Southern Africa" (Lapsley 2012: 237). There is a rich history that is shared between South Africa, but particularly, between the ANC and Cuba. Malema thus uses his comment mentioned above as a way to poach this history from Zuma. He attempts to do this by drawing on this history and openly declaring his attachment to it. This could be seen as an attempt to gain the praise of ANC supporters who are familiar with the history shared with Cuba.

Furthermore, in Malema displaying his knowledge of South Africa's history with Cuba, he accomplishes two things: he shows off his superior knowledge but also displays a sense of

humility in admitting that he learned from foreigners. This is integral as one of the key topics of this speech is xenophobia. He then uses this knowledge to undermine how Zuma behaves with regards to different issues, saying, "You come with a prepared speech. Your body doesn't suggest any other leader that's concerned about the killings in KwaZulu-Natal. But when you were defending the spending in Nkandla, your body language was very [much more] strong than when you were defending the violent killings". Malema here introduces the viewer to the idea that he is capable of reading people through their body language.

Malema is then interrupted as his time runs out, but continues to talk over these warnings. "Fellow South Africans", says Malema, "we need each other. Let us not kill each other". By use of the word "fellow", Malema implies a sense of brotherhood. Fellowship is synonymous with unity and suggests a sense of camaraderie. Instead of Malema authoritatively telling South Africans to "not kill each other", he establishes himself as part of the issues at hand. He suggests that in working together, greater results can be achieved. This is backed up by Malema using the words "we" and "us". Malema thus attempts to establish unity between himself and the South Africans to whom he is delivering this speech. He places himself at the centre of the "we" being discussed, which suggests this progress cannot happen without him. In the same breath, he suggests that he is humble and considers himself to be one of the laymen he is addressing. He purports his black identity here as a part of society and not above it, which contradicts the way he views Zuma – as arrogant and distant from his citizens.

In the final moments of his delivery, Malema says, "We need each other South Africans". Then, in a rambling tone, Malema quickly expresses his solidarity with the rest of Africa. "Let us not kill fellow Africans," he says. "We must refuse the artificial borders imposed on us by colonisers which have led to the division of Africa.". This is a point at which Malema asserts himself as African before South African. His choice of words is significant here. He makes the claim that the borders which separate African countries are simply "artificial" and have been "imposed" on Africa. Malema uses the imposition of the colonisers to refer to Pan-Africanism. Although the term Pan-Africanism is difficult to define, Immanuel Geiss proposes it as "intellectual and political movements…who regard people of African descent as homogenous", "ideas which have stressed or sought the cultural unity and political independence of Africa" and "ideas or political movements which advocate the political unity of Africa" (1974: 4). Thus, by criticising what he calls the artificial borders imposed by colonisers, he is establishing his support for Pan-Africanism and proposing himself as the leader that should rule over South Africa. In Malema asserting the oneness of Africa, he attempts to propose himself and the EFF

as the right choice for foreign nationals in South Africa, as this asserts them as revolutionary in their approach. Malema builds himself up as the one capable of unifying the entire continent. This sets him apart from Zuma whom he is criticising for his lack of unity with other Africans.

Malema then concludes his speech by declaring, "Africa, we are one!" This, though more political and less poetic, is reminiscent of Thabo Mbeki's "I am an African" speech, given in 1996 on behalf of the ANC, in which he declares unity and togetherness. This is done by his claims of being, first and foremost, "African". Mbeki does not separate himself as belonging to a particular region in Africa, but instead, asserts himself as belonging to the entire continent. This is echoed by his claim as "born of the peoples of the continent of Africa" (Soweto 2017). Mbeki further mentions "The pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear" (Soweto 2017), and further mentions states such as Ghana and Ethiopia. In so doing, Mbeki reiterates the unity or ubuntu that Africans must strive towards. Similarly, Malema asserts unity and togetherness with other African states, claiming no differences between them. Malema confirms himself as a leader who will stand by foreign nationals. He thus positions himself against Zuma, who has become known to fail in this regard. This can be viewed as an attempt by Malema which completely disregards Zuma's role as president. He skims by Zuma's South Africa and instead, draws on what has been called "a speech that shaped South Africa" (Evans 2018: 275), by a former leader, by declaring a similar message.

Article Analysis

After analysing the video clip of Malema's speech, the next aspect of this analysis is the article posted alongside it. Unlike the articles used for analyses of Zuma and Maimane, this article contains minimal information. Because no one journalist's name is listed as the author, it can be assumed that it was written by a team of journalists for News24.

The authors chose a quote from Malema's speech as the article's headline, which reads "You have lost control of the country – Malema to Zuma". Aspects of modality come into play here. "Modality as a property of language use is generally exploited by language users… [and is used to] establish either a favourable or unfavourable bias throughout the text to manipulate their readers' opinion" (Bonyadi 2011: 1). This can be seen from the onset of the article, as the editorial team responsible chose a quote which places Zuma in a negative light. In so doing, the team express disapproval for Zuma and potential favourability for Malema.

As the article begins, it is noted that Malema, in his role as EFF leader and member of parliament "lashed out" at President Zuma. To "lash out" means "to suddenly attack someone or something physically or criticize him, her, or it in an angry way" (Cambridge Dictionary 2017). Thus, the authors are suggesting anger on the part of Malema. This plays into his persona as a controversial politician, for Crowell notes that Malema is known for "hate speech, racial slurs, politically insensitive comments and outright attacks at political opponents" (2010: 52). This image of Malema differs greatly compared to the image he portrayed of himself in the previous section, in which he appears to be politically motivated, but builds his argument in a way which seems sensitive to those affected by the tyranny he claims Zuma is guilty of. This shows that discursive positioning does not necessarily work; Malema's portrayal of himself is read differently, by an audience's pre-existing knowledge about him. This points to the limits of political discourse within a mediatised landscape.

The authors then turn to how Malema dealt with Zuma's loss of control. They note that Malema "took President Jacob Zuma's son Edward to task". This implies a sense of determination on the part of Malema, which then, asserts him as a man of accountability as he is pointed out for critically assessing the President's son for his behaviour. The journalists then use a direct quote from Malema, in which he says, "Your own son continues to say these people must be killed. You stand up here and say nothing". While it is expected that a journalist chooses direct quotes from a speech to support their article, it is interesting this is the only one included in this article. It points to the journalists as agreeing with Malema. What is interesting about this article is the one-sided report. Quotes and phrases by Malema alone were used in the construction of this article, with no external sources used. This differs from the article about Zuma which contained sources from different political parties. Sloan and Mackay note that "many journalists slant the news - intentionally or inadvertently through the sources they choose" (2007: 143). In this case, the journalists who put together this article have chosen no additional sources and rely solely on the information posted in the video. This points to the article as skewed in its approach. The article then concludes with the journalists paraphrasing Malema's concerns over the xenophobic violence which he blames on Zuma.

Comments Analysis

In this section of the analysis, certain commenters expressed their full support for Malema. Such comments read "Ooh what a great leader u show Africa how inteligent u r well done juju we love u" (Mashao Malema) and "i think Malema is the one who gona do the. best to rule this

country" (Johannes Korogwe). Others wrote in praise of Malema's speech, such as Dee, who wrote "Perfect Speech, Wisdom speech.", and Musa Nkuna who said, "Couldn't have said it any better". This was further iterated by Dennis Partridge, who simply wrote "**applauds loudly**" (2015) and Qondile Duma who said "Viva Malema" (2015). These comments suggest that Malema does in fact have a following, mainly comprised of black people. This challenges the status quo because a majority of black South Africans still vote for the ANC (Erbert 2014: 131) which suggests Malema and the EFF are serious political contenders. Many commenters expressed their agreement with Malema in his condemnation for Zuma, such as Scott Bvukumbwe who wrote, "that's 100% true" and Solly Nkhoma who said, "Malema is right am supporting him". Comments such as these display the positive response that Malema gained from criticising Zuma. This points to his black identity as relatable and one which holds potential. However, Malema also came in for a great deal of criticism.

A clear theme throughout this comment section deals with Malema's accent. Commenter Steve Adams opened this area of criticism by asking "Vowlence or volence?". Malema was met with similar criticisms by commenters Colin-Debs Lucke and Michael Wingnut Campbell who also remarked on Malema's pronunciation of "violence" as "vow-lence". These comments point to the racism discussed previously in this study, expressed as "language mocking supports traditional hierarchies of racial privilege and racial degradation without seeming to be too blatantly racist" (Feagin 2014: 122). These comments point to the skewed understanding of black intelligence, with English as its marker. Wooten explains that "many whites privately believe that blacks are intellectually inferior" (2006: 300). Speaking English is often considered a marker by which this intelligence can be measured, for as Wachtel explains, "blacks who speak with an accent and grammar closer to "standard English" are perceived more positively by most whites and…are even perceived as more intelligent" (1999: 178). Thus, the commenters who are expressing their discontent with Malema's accent are in fact commenting on his level of intelligence. While Malema attempted to establish his black identity as progressive in the video analysis the commenters here see past that and instead, judge him as backward based on the way he speaks English.

This section also displayed a repeated mention of "for once" in reacting to Malema. Rayaan wrote, "I agree with Julius, for once" while Jenny en Stanley Nel wrote that "For once, [Malema] spoke sense". This was consistent with comments from Tanya Truckenbrodt who wrote, "For once Malema is right!" and Frances Kasonga who claimed that, "For once

Malema's speech was really true and touching". While these comments all express agreement with Malema, it is interesting to note that they come with a condition: "for once". What this suggests is these commenters do not usually agree with Malema but are here making an exception. Commenters may be supporting Malema due to his attack on Zuma. However, it could also be that they support Malema's comments on xenophobia. Perhaps commenters are inclined to support Malema "for once" as he speaks to their beliefs, either because he portrays himself as against Zuma or in support of foreign nationals. The fact that Malema appealed to a certain group of people "for once" points to him depicting a specific persona, to attract them. Malema strategically uses a combined rhetoric comprising of anti-Zuma, anti-xenophobia and pro-peace to gain popularity. He positions himself as having a progressive black identity through this manipulation.

While the above commenters explored Malema as negative but chose to make an exception for this speech, other commenters declared their hatred for him, blaming his stupidity and reckless spending. John Van Niekerk wrote that Malema was "as thick as pig sh@t**"**. Commenters such as Dineo Matea backed this up, calling Malema a "Stupid moron" and the EFF, "just a circus". This was reiterated continuously through the comments, as Bongani Ndaba made the claim that "each and every time in parliament we are watching or lessoning a stupid behaviour of EFF members". These are all comments which point to the fact that Malema is criticised by some South Africans as uneducated. In a dissertation titled The Rise of Julius Malema, Crowell explains that Malema never excelled academically. She notes that "Malema received a substandard elementary education… [and] was not particularly enamoured of academics" (2012: 50). She then goes further to explain that Malema's assumed disregard for an education are displayed in his poor matric results which have been highly publicised in South Africa. These are factors which contribute to the way in which Malema is received as uneducated. From the comments above, it is clear that members of the public display disregard for Malema because he is uneducated.

Another recurring theme found in the comments regarding Malema is as an elaborate spender. Jungleboy noted that "this man [Malema] has lost complete control of his finances by splurging on Gucci and Rolex and forgetting to pay his taxes". The idea that a black man can purchase products from international markets poses the idea of him buying into Western ideals. Here, Malema is not only seen as noncompliant with South African law by evading his taxes, but he is also seen as subscribing to the Western luxury system. Anyanwu notes that "black people

proceed to consume Western products and ideas so as to 'catch up' with the Western standard of living" (1976: 56). Malema is said to owe over R32-million to the South African Revenue Services (Mabuza 2015) in tax fees. Kenni Bernhardi and Bongani Ndaba added to the theme regarding Malema's financial situation, saying, "Firstly Malema pay your taxes then complain" and "malema plz [please] tell the nation when are you going to pay back our tax money that you steal". This was echoed by commenter Quinton HM who said, **"**how about Malema comes to the party by paying taxes like everybody else for starters! Living off tax money and people's emotions" and Muzi J Mbatha who wrote "Malema the thief pay back SARS money". Comments such as these continued, with Shirley Deysal writing "And the idiot can't see that… he also needs to PAY BACK THE MONEY!!!". The slogan "pay back the money" is often linked to the EFF for their continuous call for it against Zuma in Parliament. Here, commenter Deysal uses the EFF slogan against the EFF leader. Malema is seen as flashy and extravagant despite him owing R32.9-million in taxes (Venter 2017). He is thus criticised, as can be seen from these comments, for portraying himself as supporting economic freedom for all, yet he squanders funds and evades taxes. This plays into the perception of Malema being received in contradiction to how he attempts to depict himself in the speech.

Many commenters turned their attention to how Malema claims one thing and does another in a different context. The commenters here called Malema out for being a hypocrite for criticising Zuma's role in violence but being a proponent for violence since his political career started. Barry Pointeer said this was "Hypocrisy at its best" and Marina Oosthuizen questioned, "Well Malema has a good point but is he not being a hypocrite at the same time?" Glisson A Niekerk echoed this point, saying **"**This is a bit confusing as the EFF is known for using violence to get their message across" – a point backed up by Craig Shaun Henry who wrote, "Laughing at Julius, he is actually the most guilty of inciting violence in SA". Comments of this nature continued, with some writing that the EFF was in fact, responsible for stirring up much of South Africa's xenophobic violence (Groot Baas), and others referring to Malema's speech as "ironic" (Inge Fick) in light of the way in which the EFF behaves. Overall, these comments pointed to Malema as a hypocritical man. They suggest that Malema is dishonest in his approach to the matters at hand, as he preaches a culture of non-violence, yet acts in a manner which encourages it. Malema has become known for violence (as has been outlined in the introduction of this chapter) and thus, despite his endeavour to make claims against violent behaviour, the audience receives him as one who is guilty of carrying it out. This purports Malema's blackness as violent.

Another point which commenters mentioned defined Malema as a racist. Piet Pompiez wrote that Zuma should have told "malema to keep his racist corrupt mouth shut a long time ago" and The Kaiser wrote "I am not convinced by what Julius says, he is a racist himself". Ian Lev expressed his confusion with Malema, as he wrote "He is correct but at the same time he is a[n] anti minority racist prick," the minority here referring to white people. This comment is directly referring to Malema's anti-white comments, as have been previously discussed. He recently said that he would not call for the slaughter of whites, "at least for now" (eNCA 2016). In Malema openly positioning himself as one who dislikes white people based on the history of apartheid in South Africa, he has subscribed to a pro-blackness that is richly linked to an anti-whiteness. In so doing, Malema position himself as a certain kind of black man: one who rejects whiteness in lieu of black consciousness and Pan-Africanism, as has been previously discussed. However, non-white commenters also expressed their discontent with Malema in racial terms. Bongani Ndaba referred to him as "a racist, traibalist [tribalist], dictatorship small boy". This is also a point of significance in that it points to Malema as not well received by some of the black people for whom he is advocating. All these opinions point to Malema's black identity as racist and thus suggest dislike for him.

However, there are aspects for which Malema is liked, one of which is his straightforward nature. Richard Young writes, "There are many things I don't not agree with him [Malema] on. But he tells it like it is and on certain subjects I am happy that someone does it". This is a view shared by David Sweers who says, "Julius,,you speak the truth". Zinhle Zwane echoed this, writing "Quit[e] frankly malema was rite sometimes he is wrong but for now he is rite", as did Sean Stones who noted, "He is NO Angel but at least he called it!". Here, it can be noted that while Malema may not have the support of all the commenters, his speech has certainly convinced them to see him in a different light. Malema's attack on Zuma is perceived as honesty and this has opened him to a new range of potential supporters. His self-presentation has been discussed as simple, to the point and using common language which aid in his reception as being forthright. Malema's black identity is here received as relatable and friendly.

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has explored Julius Malema by means of three different texts, namely the video, article and comments related to his speech delivered in Parliament on 17 April 2015, to

establish an understanding his performance of black identity. In investigating this, it was deduced that Malema displays a hybrid of the traditional and the progressive, as is outlined below.

In contrast to Jacob Zuma, Malema displayed a unique dress code, that is, the red EFF overall designed to symbolise his solidarity with the poor in South Africa. Marable and Aidi make the claim that "African dress marks the distinction between them and others" (2009: 260), and while the dress here may not be traditionally African, it is meant to represent the African majority of the country. Malema thus asserted himself by means of action as one of the people, which Zuma sought to do verbally. This was also a tool used by Mandela, who in 1963, on the first day of his trial for leaving the country illegally, entered the courtroom wearing traditional draped cloth as he "wanted to show that he was an African in a white man's court" (Magoon 2008: 62). While this may have been seen as oppositional to the house of Parliament in which certain dress code, that is, Western suit and tie is expected, Malema wearing the overall also rendered the poverty that plagues South Africa visible. Biko has written that "the blacks relate their poverty to their blackness in concrete terms" (1972: 63). Thus, in Malema openly declaring himself as a frontliner for this cause, he is asserting his black identity as one which is linked directly to the greater masses. This was also viewed as a disruption to pParliament. In disobeying the structures of the house, Malema assets his blackness through defiance. Linked to this is an idea posed by Nascimento, who notes the "whitening ideology [as one which] preaches annihilation of the building of black identity" (2007: xi). Thus, in Malema positioning himself as a black man who does not comply with the Western traditions that have been set in Parliament, he solidifies his black identity as a strong force. In addition to this, Malema's use of simple and unintimidating language asserted him as a man of the people. He used uncomplicated words and spoke slowly in an attempt to be understood by those he is targeting – the economically disadvantaged, most of whom do not speak English as a first language. Malema also used symbolism of the African culture in order to undermine Zuma. These themes are held with high regard within African communities and, Malema used them in order to establish himself as a specific kind of proud, African leader.

He then went on to use Zuma's acts of violence to undermine Zuma's leadership, both within his own family and the country as a whole. He positioned himself against Zuma in this regard, establishing himself as a forward-thinker capable of moving South Africa forward. Malema also used the example of xenophobic attacks to declare his discontent with Zuma. In so doing, he affirmed himself strongly as African, which positioned him as a liberal and tolerant potential

leader to South Africans, while allowing him to possibly gain the support of other African nationals. This showed his value for togetherness or ubuntu. Malema employed the rich history that Cuba shared with South Africa to wrest the legacy of the ANC away from Zuma. Malema further purported characteristics of straightforwardness and the voice of justice which suggested his black identity as honourable and dignified. He appeared, through this analysis as the black hero of the people. All these examples establish Malema as progressive.

The article alongside this video, although short, displayed a one-sided bias with Malema, through using powerful language describing how Malema dealt with the issues at hand. Although it was skewed in Malema's favour in that it only used his quotes to support it, the article suggested Malema's blackness as violent. This pointed to a disjuncture between what is portrayed, or encoded, and what is received, or decoded.

In the comments section, Malema received a great deal of support, both in his capacity as a leader and specifically, for his attack on Zuma. Malema's accent which is known to be a typical black accent in South Africa, worked to his disadvantage in this section. This stemmed from racist comments based on the notion of English as a marker of intelligence. Some commenters implied a sense of detachment in supporting Malema "for once" only. This pointed to Malema as a politician to whom people cannot fully subscribe. Certain comments labelled Malema a hypocrite for his history of violence in the past. Malema was also referred to as a racist by white commenters who noted him as an "anti-minority". This positioned Malema within a certain kind of blackness as he is infamous for disliking white people. Other commenters praised Malema's honesty in the way he spoke to Zuma. However, this could be seen as them merely buying into his speech. He was also largely criticised for spending lavishly and evading taxes. While some of these comments acknowledged Malema as having potential to lead South Africa forward, most of the comments pointed to him being received as backward, violent, hypocritical and a squanderer.

Overall, Malema presented himself as an alternative to Zuma. He positioned himself as more capable in declaring his discontent with Zuma as a president. Malema used both traditional and enlightened ideas to gain the support of the black and white communities alike. He also asserted his support for many undermined communities in the country. Ultimately, Malema asserted his black identity as a hybrid of the traditional and the progressive.

MAIMANE

Introduction

Mmusi Maimane is the final case study politician in this project. Maimane was born and raised in Soweto, South Africa (Pillay 2013), and at just 37 years old, Maimane is one of the country's youngest prominent political figures. Over the course of this study, Maimane went from being a key figure in the country's most dominant opposition party to becoming its leader.

Maimane grew up "during the final days of apartheid [and was] kept safe by his parents who enrolled him in a private Catholic school" (Baker 2016). This was the basis that set Maimane apart from the other case studies in this project who did not complete their formal education. Maimane went on to obtain several degrees, including a master's degree in Theology and a master's degree in Public Administration (DA 2017) from both local and international universities. In 2011, Maimane was selected as the national spokesperson of the DA, South Africa's leading opposition party. In 2014, Maimane became the leader of the DA in the National Assembly of South Africa (People's Assembly 2017). He was later elected as leader of the DA in 2015 succeeding the party's long-time leader, Helen Zille (Times Live 2015). Maimane not only acts as the current leader of the DA – which even after South Africa's legacy of segregation is known as a predominantly white party that happens to have a black leader (Baker 2016), but he also the first black man to lead the DA. Maimane has been criticised for his engagement with the DA based on the fact that he is a black man within a so-called white party. His rivals within the political realm have labelled Maimane a "sellout", a "coconut" and a "black puppet for white masters" (Baker 2016). Maimane has been likened to Barack Obama for his "stirring oratorical skills and cerebral aloofness" (Baker 2016). Despite Maimane's attempts to portray the DA as a party that reflects the diversity of South Africa, he has been "widely ridiculed for affecting a 'black' accent when addressing certain crowds - something Obama has been accused of as well" (Baker 2016). Maimane also shares similarities with Obama in the messages their political campaigns portray. Maimane's 2013 campaign titled "Believe" resembled Obama's "Hope" campaign in that they both featured black men displaying a sense of positivity as they gazed upward. The details of these campaigns were also similar, as will be discussed later in this chapter. According to the Mail & Guardian, not only do some of Maimane's campaign posters resemble the style of Obama's campaign posters, but there are also similarities in their speeches. Maimane's speeches are said to feature "the personal anecdotes and phrase chanting particular to Obama's oratory style" (Pillay 2013).

Maimane's multifaceted background also likens him to Obama: "He was born in Soweto, is multilingual, has multiple university degrees and a unique ability to connect with people from a variety of backgrounds" (Pillay 2013). He is also judged for his age, for as Butler notes "being born in 1980 [means that he is] relatively young for a party leader and his inexperience in comparison to his ANC antagonists has sometimes been exposed" (2017: 135).

Maimane's education has always been an important aspect of his life. According to Msomi, who wrote a book on his life, the now DA leader attended an independent primary school called St. Angela's (2016). As Maimane went on attend Allen Glen High School (iJoburg 2017), Msomi notes that he had been selected to be part of a group of scholars who did extra lessons in English, mathematics and science at Pace Commercial Secondary School. Pace had been established as part of a joint initiative by local and American business communities in 1981 as a specialist school in commercial subjects. To be selected for the weekend extra classes at the school invariably meant that you were performing above average (Msomi 2016). From this history, it is clear that Maimane's education played a major role in his development. Attending private schools and extra classes significantly impacted on the way Maimane progressed. However, this is not always viewed as positive in South Africa. Siemend, Davydova and Maier explain: "Private schools are usually described as the white schools [in which] a black person who suddenly develops a white accent... were called "coconuts" in society" (2012: 224).

The DA has always been one of the ANC's biggest rivals. Maimane, then, is one of Zuma's greatest competitors in the political landscape of South Africa. While the DA's popularity points to it being viewed positively by a range of South Africans, Maimane remains a figure of contestation, given the fact that he is ultimately the black leader of a party that has retained a stigma as white (Koekemoer 2017: 39).

In order to fully establish just how Maimane differs in his approaches and ideologies, and in the discursive constructions of blackness he enacts, this chapter unpacks the various features of a speech delivered by Maimane. The speech to be analysed was delivered during the 2015 State of the Nation debate. It later became known for its brazen attack on President Zuma. The text to be analysed is comprised of three aspects – a video, the article posted alongside it and the comments posted below it, as has been done with case studies Zuma and Malema. Analysing these aspects allows for an understanding of the ways in which Maimane portrays himself, as well as the ways in which he is received by the South African press and public.

Video Analysis

To begin this analysis, the visual aspects of the video are discussed. News24 has summarised by means of this video what are arguably the most important and poignant portions of this speech. As the speech begins, an upright and confident Maimane begins his attack on Zuma. He has a strong and powerful stance, standing up straight. Maimane is dressed in a black suit and striped tie, which conforms with the Western dress code that is expected in Parliament. This is a point already explored in the chapter regarding Zuma. However, it is important to reiterate a claim posed by Kuchta which states clothing as important, in that it puts power in plain view and works to shape the way in which power is thought, enacted and reformulated (2002: 7). Due to the nature of the house of Parliament, a dress code which enables and promotes professional uniformity is essential. This professional uniformity has come to be symbolised by dress. As Maimane complies with this, he is from the onset establishing himself as a man who has respect for the traditions and regulations of the white structures in place. He is thus asserting himself as compliant with the Western traditions of the house. Thus, in Maimane complying with the dress code, he performs appropriateness, which shows that he in a sense, 'belongs' within this space of power. While this may concur with his political standing, it is also problematic given the connotations attached to Maimane. In recent years, Maimane has been dubbed "a white man in black skin" by ANC MP, Bongani Mkongi (Citizen 2017). He is also criticized for arguing that "colour has no place in defining nationhood" (Koekemoer 2017:56) and his idea of a dream nation in which "colour is irrelevant" (Koekemoer 2017: 56) has been seen as problematic. These are factors which contribute to his black identity being received not as he aims to purport himself, that is, as professional, but instead, as one who conforms to the white ideals of professionalism.

Referring to him as the "one powerful man we have allowed to get away with too much for far too long", Maimane instantly launches his attack on Zuma. He is abrupt and direct in his approach. The word "powerful" plays an essential role in the way Maimane establishes Zuma in the eye of those engaged with the text. By suggesting that Zuma is powerful, Maimane places him in a bubble of questionability: we are forced, as viewers or listeners engaged in this clip, to question whether or not this is a positive thing. Paschen and Dihsmaier note that when it comes to power structures, to be "powerful" is not always positive. "The experience of powerlessness in the presence of powerful people explains the negative connotation of the term power" (2014: 186). They explain that while the experience of freedom and autonomy may be positive, the experience of limitation and restricted freedom is negative (2014: 186). This

struggle for power then gives rise to a psychological contract which must be negotiated by the powerful and the powerless. Essentially, "the people with a lot of power necessarily make decisions that deeply affect the freedom of others" (2014: 186). It is clear to see that these notions of power are extremely relevant, particularly in this case, when considering the power Zuma holds, as he governs South Africa. But by Maimane characterizing him as "powerful" in coherence with "getting away with too much for far too long", Maimane associates Zuma's power with negativity. Maimane uses the word "powerful" in a condescending way, which serves to undermine Zuma's power. This is seen from Maimane exposing Zuma as a man who has taken advantage of his position as "powerful". In so doing, Maimane shows the public how Zuma has faulted in his approach as powerful, which effectively places Zuma in a position of accountability for his actions. Furthermore, the use of the word "one" in "one powerful man…" points to Zuma as the culprit responsible for all the problems South Africa is facing. Maimane uses this tactic in order to position his blackness as one which is responsible, in that he holds those who fault accountable for their actions.

Maimane then turns his attention to the MPs present in the chamber and refers to Zuma. Maimane notes that this "honourable man" is in the presence of the members of Parliament as he delivers his speech. With this comment, Maimane is met with audible giggles from the crowd present – who presumably acknowledge his cynical tone. Without recognising this, Maimane continues his attack by speaking to Zuma himself. "In these very chambers, just five days ago, you broke Parliament", says Maimane to Zuma. Here, Maimane is referring to the incident that took place in the week before this speech was given, where police stormed into the National Assembly and forcibly removed members of the EFF. (Rademeyer 2015). In directing his full attention to Zuma Maimane uses accountability to intensify his attack. Claibourn explains that when the people of a country begin to legitimately question how they can get control of the government, the only answer is accountability (2011: 160). Thus, in Maimane acting as the voice of accountability, he not only places himself as directly opposing Zuma, but also aims to gain support from the people of South Africa. As he launches his attack, he is gaining momentum in his political feat two-fold: he exhibits himself as a man of accountability as he nit-picks the wrongs of Zuma, and in so doing, he is attempting to gain the trust of those who feel the same way.

One of the most significant factors in this speech revolves around name calling. Maimane uses a sarcastic tone when referring to Zuma. His unapologetic ambush on Zuma continues with him stating that to call Zuma a man of honour would not be fair. Instead of speaking of the

damage Zuma has allegedly caused in general terms, Maimane speaks brazenly. “Please understand”, says Maimane, “Honourable President, when I use the term ‘honourable’, I do it out of respect for the traditions and conventions of this august house. But please, do not take it literally, for you, Honourable President, are not an honourable man”. Here, Maimane is paying homage not only to a “tradition” or “convention” as he puts it, but he indirectly cites arule of the National Assembly which states that “No member shall refer to any other member by his or her first name or names only” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 2017). While Maimane’s acknowledgment of this may be passed off as a simple way to further condescend to Zuma, in his acknowledgment of the rules held high in Parliament, Maimane is once again suggesting his law-abiding nature, which points again to his “belonging” in this sphere. Furthermore, Maimane places himself in the seat of judgement, as he declares Zuma as a dishonourable man. South Africa’s first democratic Parliament was established in 1994 with 400 members elected through proportional representation (Lotter: 138), but due to South Africa’s history of colonisation and apartheid, Western practices still remain integrated in the country. In explaining that he conforms to such laws, Maimane shows respect for the Western influences in South Africa. This display then points to Maimane as having a black identity rooted in, in his own words, a “united, non-racial South Africa” (Koekemoer 2017: 56).

As with any other quality that a person may possess, the term “honourable” is defined differently by different individuals. Hendry and Watson explain that the definition of being “honourable” has evolved over time. They explicitly state that what a nation defines as “honourable” is “tantamount to the list of whatever is judged in a particular society to be morally appropriate” (2001: 41). Maimane is thus placing Zuma in the territory of those who do not respect laws, morals or ethics, and thus, disregard them in totality. Maimane displays a sense of ownership over the practice of “honour” by asserting himself as the one who deems others as honourable. He comports himself as a man of honour in posing the notion that he has the power to decide what is and is not considered “honourable”. Iliffe concurs with this, as he notes that honour, through Stewarts’ minimalist characterisation, which is void of any cultural specificity and designed for cross-cultural comparison, is simply “a right to respect” (2005: 4). What Iliffe is claiming is that when one is honourable, one is respected. Therefore, in Maimane openly declaring not only his discontent on a personal level with Zuma, but his discontent with him in his role as a president, Maimane is insinuating that Zuma is a man who does not deserve the respect of the people. In so doing, Maimane comports himself as the responsible leader.

The issue of honour can be viewed in another way regarding Zuma: the first, as has been discussed above, in his role as a president and secondly, Zuma as an African man. Societies around the world have developed, through their own cultures and traditions, definitions of what it means to be honourable. In African culture, Iliffe explains honour is far more than a mere quality. "The political behavior of postcolonial African rulers," writes Iliffe, "continues to be influenced by inherited notions of honour, especially honour in its prideful aspect" (2005: 328). Iliffe explains that while there may be aspects which are more important than honour, honour is directly linked to respect and is thus highly valued by African leaders (2005: 328). In addition to this, Iliffe asserts that this understanding of honour is very different to the notion of honour in Western society. For this reason, he explains, "colonial rule had failed to tame the heroic ethos, whose egotism found democratic principles confining rather than anarchic" (2005: 329). This then plays into the reasons for which Maimane condemns Zuma: for placing his own needs above those of South Africans, which acts as the basis of another comment made by Maimane following his claim on Zuma as a dishonourable man. Maimane referring to Zuma is dishonourable suggests he is the honourable one.

As Maimane's speech progresses, he points out Zuma's wrongdoings as a president. Maimane claims Zuma is "willing to break every democratic institution to try and fix the legal predicament [Zuma] finds himself in". He is referring again to the previous week's proceedings in which EFF MPs were forcibly removed from the National Assembly for persistently asking questions about Zuma's Nkandla homestead. "You are willing to break this Parliament if it means escaping accountability for the wrongs you have done," elaborates Maimane. This directly points to Zuma as one who places his ego, as mentioned by Illife, above democratic principles. In seeking to escape accountability, Zuma places himself before the needs of South Africans. In Maimane asserting that Zuma practises his leadership in such a way, he is working simultaneously to Zuma's detriment and his own benefit. As he calls Zuma out for being neglectful of such stringent laws and practices, Maimane reiterates the value of abiding by them. Essentially, Maimane uses Zuma's self-centred practices which are in sync with disregard for Parliament to establish a "them" and "us" notion. Choudhury notes that "there is significant evidence that implicit bias has a neurological base, with the roots of "us" and "them" firmly set in unconscious processing" (2015: 238) and while this may usually refer to bias regarding race, many other such biases exist. Morales makes the claim that "us" versus "them" can also relate to identity (2011: 199). By calling Zuma out for neglecting presidential and constitutional laws in favour of personal gain, Maimane is, in turn, asserting that he would

never do the same. This is because through establishing "us" and "them", difference is made. To point out someone's flaws suggests to those watching that you do not have them. He works in a way which frames Zuma in a certain light and simultaneously establishes himself as the opposite. Maimane is comporting himself as law abiding, selfless and non-egotistical. This suggests to those engaged in this text that Maimane would be a better president than Zuma as he would not abuse his position. There is an unfair stereotype that seeks "to portray Africans as people that are corrupt…and prone to self-enrichment by immoral means" (2004: 122). Maimane uses this stereotype to target Zuma and thus, purports to be the opposite. He thus creates a black identity that is comforting to non-blacks and particularly whites, as he positions his morality as above this stereotype.

Throughout his speech, Maimane narrates his words in a moderate tone. In so doing, Maimane not only establishes himself as dutiful to his role as a politician, but he also enables himself as a politician who can be trusted to uphold the conventions of parliament. This serves to establish him as a man of dignity within the realm of politics. Maimane uses his attack on Zuma to assert himself as respectful to Parliament. in Maimane openly declaring his attack on the black man who is our president, he is asserting himself as "another" kind of black man. He establishes himself as different to Zuma by calling out the wrongs he believes Zuma is guilty of. Maimane uses his criticism of Zuma to raise himself in the public eye. In calling Zuma "dishonourable" and wrongly "powerful", he comports himself as the opposite.

Maimane displays a strong sense of confidence in delivering this attack on Zuma. In so doing, he shows that he is at ease with a system which is a result of South Africa's past. Klug confirms that the establishment of South Africa's Parliament was inherited from the British (2010: 545). Thus, in Maimane showing his security in this realm, he shows he is comfortable with a language of confrontation, authority and accountability – a language of power. As he fits into this space with ease, Maimane comports his black identity in a specific way, as one which is not intimidated by a space designed for white rule. This works to both assert Maimane's blackness as powerful and to suggest his conformity to the standards of the Democratic Alliance. His conformity with the structures of Parliament work to establish himself as part of it, and in terms of blackness, this works to Maimane's disadvantage, given that these structures were put in place by an oppressive and colonial regime.

Maimane continues, once again speaking directly to Zuma, and exclaiming with gusto that Zuma is a "broken man presiding over a broken society". This is not the first time the concept

of "broken" is being raised. Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that Maimane made the claim of Zuma "breaking parliament". Once again, Maimane is suggesting that Zuma is not only incapable in his capacity as a man, but in his responsibility as a leader. This is thus a dual attack. Foremost, Maimane is commenting on Zuma as a man and as a patriarch. By declaring Zuma as such, Maimane is commenting on his masculinity, for there is the assumption that masculinity is "strong, logical, tough [and] functional" (Dragowski and Sharron-del Rio 2016: 278). Maimane then goes on to comment on Zuma's inability to function as president, which insinuates that he is incapable of leading. In insinuating that Zuma is "broken" in these regards, Maimane is opening Zuma's masculinity up to scepticism. White ideologues act as both "epitomiz[ing] a compromised masculinity that was incapable of social reproduction" and [epitomiz[ing] a rampant, out-of-control sexuality that threatened to swamp and overwhelm the white race" (Magubane 2004: 178) It is imperative to note here that within the culture of the African man, family is held in very high regard. "Relationships based on blood or marital ties …are very important in the traditional African context" (Njoh 2016: 78). Hopkins makes the claim that in African culture, it is not uncommon for the entire community to fall under the responsibility of the patriarch. "The traditional role of the family [is one] where patriarch rules and the woman has his children; man is still the center and authority of the family" (2014: 93). In this case, the family is the South African public. Maimane then criticises Zuma's masculinity and his role as a patriarch, thereby suggesting that he is capable of doing a better job of taking care of this family. Maimane is here attempting to assert his blackness as the role of the African head of the family.

Throughout his attack on Zuma, Maimane is met with resounding laughs and applause from the audience. This suggests that he is being received by fellow MPs in a positive light. When Maimane referred to Zuma as a "broken man", it drew a lot of attention through journalism and on social media. (Hawker 2015), which are both discussed in detail later in this project. It was arguably the most powerful moment in this speech which was evident from the speed at which it became a trending topic on Twitter in South Africa (Koza 2015). In openly declaring Zuma as dishonourable, Maimane is making a statement on the ways in which Zuma has ruled over South Africa – perhaps with reference to his dealings with the Gupta family[7] or extreme expenditure at his private homestead in Nkandla. This is a claim which aids Maimane in

[7] The Guptas are a prominent Indian family who moved to South Africa in 1993.They have become known for their wealth and alleged influence over the government, and Zuma in particular. They founded the pro-ANC newspaper, The New Age, and own the ANN7 news station. They have interests in Sahara computers as well as air transport, energy and mining sectors (Johnson 2015: 108).

establishing himself as an advocate for justice and against the corruption Zuma is known for, a position shared by many South Africans.

"On Thursday afternoon, outside this very house, members of parliament were being arrested and assaulted by *your* riot police," continues Maimane. Here, the DA leader is referring to the incidents that transpired some days before this speech was delivered, when protesting members of the DA were shot at with water cannons, harassed and arrested by the police (Jacobs 2015). Maimane projects his voice when describing "*your*" (Zuma's) riot police, using his delivery to point blame at Zuma for what could be referred to as police brutality. This could be linked to how Zuma and Maimane approach the topic of violence differently. Hook and Eagle note that South Africans have become known for what has been called a "culture of violence". This means that in South Africa, "violence is proffered as a normal, legitimate solution to problems" (2002: 180). This is a point reiterated by Malema in the previous chapter, who speaks about how Zuma reacts to those who oppose him. In the South African Police Service here physically assaulting and arresting MPs, the ideology of the typical South African patriarchal system is being implied by Maimane, with Zuma at its head as the patriarch. While South Africa does have a history of violence, Maimane is using this moment as an opportunity to attack Zuma. Thus, in Maimane critiquing this approach, he once again, identifies himself as the "other". He is presents himself as the progressive thinking black man, which opposes the old-school, outdated traditional thinker that is Zuma.

"A few hours later," continues Maimane, "inside this house, our freedom to communicate was violated by an order to jam the telecommunications network". Maimane is commenting on the reported jamming of telecommunication signals during the 2015 SONA (Nicolson 2015), in which communications in and out of Parliament were blocked. This is another example of how Maimane purports himself as the voice of truth – he condemns the hampering of direct communication. Freedom of press is hindered in many African countries and "African journalists operate under some of the most controlled conditions…in order to make them "willing tools" of inept and often corrupt governments" (Jong-Ebot 1997: x). "In young democracies like many African countries journalists are still grappling with government censorship" (Mwita and Franceschi 2010: 55). While South Africa may appear to be one of the more progressive African nations, the incident of signal jamming which took place under a democratic leader reflects negatively on Zuma as a typical African leader who "gags the press" (Jong-Ebot 1997: xi). Maimane criticises Zuma for this. He uses this, an issue that millions of South Africans were appalled by to gain accolade for himself as liberal and open to

communication, but he directly asserts Zuma as a typical African leader. This works to simultaneously present himself as the opposite of Zuma as the forward-thinking leader capable of more progress and growth than Zuma is. “The media [also] have to continue to fight against the silent repression of the press freedom of the world” (Mwita and Franceschi 2010: 164), and therefore, in Maimane asserting his outrage at the signal jamming, he attempts to lure in the support and respect of South African media houses. This, in turn, could help project his “new” kind of blackness to the public.

Maimane then goes on to list another wrong he blames Zuma for, as he speaks about how “armed police officers in plain shirts stormed into the sacred chamber [of the National Assembly] and physically attacked members of this house”. “This,” says Maimane, “was more than an assault on members of Parliament – it was an assault on the very foundations of our democracy”. By calling Parliament a “sacred chamber,” Maimane is saying that what transpires within it is of significance. Hubert notes that “the concept of sacred implies restrictions and prohibitions on human behaviour - [which means that] if something is sacred then certain rules must be observed in relation to it” (Carmichael et al. 1994: 11). Maimane is thus pointing out the importance of following certain rules and regulations within the house of Parliament. The battle for democracy is a long and historically cherished one. South Africa became a democratic state in 1994, and since its democracy is still fairly young, it bears strong emotional relevance for many South Africans. The tragic history of apartheid left many South Africans with tainted identities and difficult pasts, and for many, democracy is the prize they won for their struggles. Thus, in Maimane mentioning that Zuma undermined “the very foundations of democracy,” he does more than denounce him as an undemocratic leader but also strikes the chords of all those who fought to win independence from the apartheid regime. He uses this discourse to undermine the role that the ANC played in struggle history, as he insinuates its leader, Zuma is breaking it down. At the same time, he aims to promote the DA’s role in democracy. This statement is met with resounding applause from the members of Parliament, and as the camera moves its focus from Maimane, EFF MPs are seen cheering him on. Maimane here purports his black identity as one rooted in the struggle and proud of South Africa’s democracy.

“Parliament’s constitutional obligation to fearlessly scrutinise and oversee the executive lost all meaning on Thursday night… The brute force of the state won and the hearts of our nation was broken. We knew at that very moment that our democratic order was in grave danger,” says Maimane. It is interesting to note Maimane’s specific choice of words in this quote. Maimane uses words which place himself at the centre of an issue close to the hearts of many

South Africans – democracy. By use of the words "our" when referring to both the "nation" and the "democracy", Maimane takes ownership of these things. He plays on the fact that the "ANC…. ultimately led South Arica to democracy" (Odendaal: xi) by revoking Zuma from his attachment to the struggle and suggests instead that he now retains the democracy and the nation within it. This is further suggested by Maimane's use of the word "we", which implies unity on behalf of Maimane. This is part of a process referred to as interpellation, in which people are called forth to assume their identities as subjects (Fourie 2001: 264). Here, he reiterates his blackness as rooted in the struggle, as has been discussed previously, but also works to establish his black identity as one of the people. He attempts to create a sense of community with himself at the centre.

Maimane then redirects his attention to Zuma and rhetorically asks, "But here's the question: What did you do, Mr President?" He goes on to answer his question and loudly expounds, "You laughed! You laughed while the people of South Africa cried for their beloved country!" Maimane is met with loud cheers from the audience who presumably support his attack. Zuma, for the first time throughout Maimane's speech reacts with laughter. In identifying Zuma's misconduct here, by pointing out his lack of seriousness or accountability for issues of presidential regard, Maimane is asserting Zuma as a figure who should not be taken seriously in politics. He is also raising himself as one who respects politics in this country and thus, its people.

In the same breath, by making direct reference to a quintessential white liberal novel, *Cry the Beloved Country* by Alan Paton, Maimane intensifies his attack on Zuma. The use of this specific novel positions Maimane against apartheid. By Maimane using a popular literary text to make his point, he is also exhibiting his knowledge. This is an aspect of interest as in the sphere of South African politics, certain politicians remain uneducated, including President Zuma. Maimane is thus placing himself on a pedestal as an intellectual who, as has been discussed, has had a formal education. Furthermore, in Maimane choosing this particular literary work, written by a white South African in English, he is asserting that his speech is targeted at a specific audience – white, English-speaking South Africans. As has been previously stated, Maimane acquired his basic education at quality, English-speaking, so-called "white" schools. This already places Maimane at an advantage because he is addressing the predominantly white, English-speaking people who support the DA. Southall notes that for black individuals such as Maimane who attended white schools, their focus was to embrace the schools' values, make white friends, distance themselves from the country's racialised past and

work hard to prove that they were as good as white students (2016: 108). This is important, considering the fact that the emerging black middle class in South Africa is on the steady rise. Erbert notes that the emergence of a black middle-class in South Africa is becoming more tangible and is an undisputed phenomenon. He notes that in 2011, 49.8% of the total middle-class population was made up of black people (2013: 3). This points to the emergence of the black middle class, which Southall points out as eager to assert to a specific model of blackness, uncharacterised by the racialised past of South Africa (Southall 2016:109). Maimane displays this through his presentation of this speech, as he asserts his knowledge. This could be seen as an attempt to affirm himself as educated, and thus, as part of the emerging black middle class. Not only does he boast this "white" education, which our other two case studies, Zuma and Malema lack, Maimane also acquired tertiary education, namely two master's degrees. This plays strongly into how Maimane is received by the public, which is discussed at a later point in this chapter.

To this rather aggressive attack, Maimane adds, "You laughed while trampling Madiba's legacy in the very week that we celebrated 25 years of his release". In the previous paragraph, we see a Maimane that targeted a white, English speaking audience. A large majority of South Africans remain loyal to the ANC – the party which brought an end to apartheid and a simultaneous rise to democracy. This is apparent in the latest national election results, in which the ANC won with 62% of South Africans voting in its favour (News24 2014). For many, the ANC is synonymous with Nelson Mandela. By including the "legacy of Madiba" in his speech and making the point that Zuma has trampled over it, Maimane once again manages to associate himself with the millions of people who are grateful to Nelson Mandela for the democracy South Africa now has. This shows a change in Maimane's presentation, as he moves from addressing the white supporters of the DA to addressing the black supporters of the ANC.

This segment of Maimane's speech as outlined by News24 then ends with Maimane saying, "Honourable President, we will never ever forgive you for what you did on that day". Maimane uses sarcasm in addressing Zuma as "Honourable President" again, after he clearly asserted that he did not believe him to be honourable. This works in his favour as it still showing that he is paying homage to the structures and conventions of Parliament. He then notes that "we" will never forgive Zuma, but neglects to identify who the "we" actually refers to. In not clearly stating who he represents in this address, Maimane indirectly invites the support of others who may agree with him.

Article Analysis

Having unpacked the various discourses of blackness found in the video of Maimane's SONA 2015 speech, I now move on to discussing the discourses featured in the article alongside the video. The article was posted by News24 on the day of the speech, 17 February 2015. It does not have the name of a particular journalist as its author, which suggests that the article was put together by a number of News24 media workers.

The article begins with the headline, "WATCH: 5 moments Mmusi Maimane burned Zuma" in which a great deal of bias is evident. From the onset, the journalists who constructed this article did so with a one-sided view. This can be seen in their suggestion that Zuma was "burned" by Maimane. The writers insinuate, through a carefully calculated choice of words, a certain attitude towards the topic at hand. To say that Maimane "burned" Zuma is of course not literal, but rather, a brazen comment on just how powerful Maimane's attack was on the president. The writers employ the colloquial term "burn", which refers to disparaging a person by pointing out their flaws. Maimane is immediately identified as the dominant figure in this address. The use of this term instead of the more formal "criticise" which means the same thing also signifies Maimane's blackness as youthful, especially when compared to other MPs who are much older.

The article begins by noting that Maimane "minced no words" as he addressed Zuma. This means is Maimane openly and unapologetically launched his attack on Zuma, unfettered by what the outcome might be. To "mince no words" means to clearly and directly speak without the worry of offending anyone. The article is thus making the claim that Maimane shows no remorse or hesitance in his calling out of Zuma on his various misconduct. It declares then, that this "mincing of no words" was the precursor to Maimane's "scathing attack" on Zuma. The word "scathing" is defined as a "witheringly scornful and severely critical" (Oxford Dictionary 2017) incident. The authors thus directly point out the ferocity with which Maimane carried out his attack on Zuma. As the article progresses, the authors mention how Maimane "tore" into Zuma's State of the Nation Address. Once again, the choice of words here points to Maimane's brutal and unrepentant assault of words on President Zuma. However, it must be noted that his tone and presentation remained collected, as has been discussed in the video analysis.

Before outlining the five so-called "moments that Mmusi Maimane burned Zuma", the article refers to them as the most "prominent jabs" that Maimane struck at the president. "Jabs" refer

to the hits that are struck during a fight. In using the word "jabs", the writers are evoking images of a physical fight between Maimane and Zuma. This reiterates the brutality of Maimane's speech, pointing to the notion of a battle between him and Zuma. The authors' choice of words create a certain kind of imagery – that of war. This also identifies these two politicians as contenders within the same league – one of power. Horne notes that "because politics and war have been the activities of men more than women they are specially suited to exploring the historical nature of masculinity" (Dudink et al. 2004: 22). He elaborates noting that such "war and politics have formed a classic locus for the self-definition of male actors who have seen themselves as bearing power, wielding force, and incarnating authority" (Dudink et al. 2004: 22). From these definitions, a nod is given to both politicians as distinctly masculine, implying they are able to declare war on one another. This suggests their masculinities as powerful, forceful and potentially dangerous. However, the writers distinctly point to Maimane as the one who throws the jabs, which asserts him as the more powerful contender. The writers then refer to the ways in which this speech became a trending topic in South Africa, by noting that these "jabs" have "caught the attention of the country", before they use five direct quotes to expand on Maimane's attack on Zuma. These quotes are all listed without commentary and have been discussed in detail in the analysis of the video above.

Comment Analysis

Having explored the discourses of blackness as presented by Maimane himself, as well as the media who acknowledge his presentation, I now move on to another important element of this study–- the comments.

The comments began with many expressing their support and admiration for Maimane. Some, such as Sean Wolf "wish[ed] he (Maimane) was the president!!!!" and others complimented his speech in general, with, "Well said". Some even used Maimane's words to address him, calling him the "Honourable Maimane" who made them "very proud" (Janine Filmer). These comments express praise for Maimane in his capacity as a leader, for the way he speaks. They all assert their support for Maimane. However, there were comments which offered more detail. One such comment came from a user named Babalaas Witblitz, who immediately suggests, "Fellow South Africans, look at this Maimane speak. Look at how he conducts himself. He is a million times the man that Zuma wishes he can be" – a comment which complies with Maimane's assertion of himself as opposing to Zuma, which has been discussed above. This is a claim further backed up by commenters such as Robert Coughlan who says the speech was

“Brutally, yet eloquently put” and Wilweet who commented on Maimane being “well spoken”. Comments like these were reiterated several times by members of the public such as Jane Webster, who wrote that Maimane was “articulate”, and Elsa Kruger who said that Maimane was “word perfect”. These comments illustrate Maimane being well received by members of the public in a particularly white way, in that they associate speaking a certain way with whiteness. Their commenting that he speaks well positions him as intelligent in a way that they can understand. However, the view of many was captured by Jonathon Paul Marais who wrote that Maimane had the “right words” and “speaks better than (whatever that teagirl's name was)”. The “tea girl” referred to here is former DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko. The term was given to Mazibuko by EFF leader Julius Malema, who insulted her by calling her the “tea girl” who worked under the “madam”, that is Helen Zille (Letlaka 2015: 39). The use of this term is extremely important here, as it points to the racist undertones that this commenter displays. Despite complimenting Maimane noting that he had the “right words”, commenter Marais points to the racist ideology that black people, no matter their political standing, will always be viewed as beneath white people. The commenter implies that Maimane has the “right words” instead of acknowledging him as right. These comments point to Maimane being received in having a black identity which conforms to white ideals.

This is a fascinating point of interest which directly links to the aspect of blackness. Obadare and Willems note that “the South African urbanscape remain[s] largely split into two strains: the ‘well-spoken’ private school educated ‘coconut’, and the ‘black accented’ sibling” (2014: 161). With the above comments hugely centring their focus around how “well-spoken” Maimane is, it is clear to see that his educational background plays into how he presents himself, and thus, how he is received by the public. Maimane’s accent is far more inclined towards the typical “white” accent in South Africa. This is uncommon within the realm of black South African politicians, such as Zuma or Malema, who usually boast strong “black” accents. In Maimane subscribing to this so-called white accent, he aligns himself once again with the presumed white audience he is targeting. This is well received by white commenters who openly accept and repeat the racist ideas regarding accent as a marker for intellect.

Another theme which links to the above in the comments section is regarding Maimane’s education. Many commenters paid attention to the fact that Maimane is educated, with some using it to tackle Zuma’s incomplete education, such as Kevin Lowings who wrote that his education was worth “More than a standard 6 thats for sure”. Commenter Zack Evans, wrote “I see a young go getter with good moral ethics and above all lets not forget..an education”.

However, as has been discussed in the section unpacking the video part of this text, Maimane largely uses his education to his advantage – as a tool to attract the white minority of South Africa.

Many commenters such as Stanton Moonshine Oosthuizen claimed that, "As a white South African I will vote for any black man or woman who has the best intentions for all people of our beloved land. Colour doesn't and shouldn't matter". Ansell writes that "Colour-blindness allows whites to claim the moral high ground of being 'beyond race'" (2014: 44), but this is not always the reality, and so such comments cannot be viewed at face value. Certain commenters openly showed that support still stems largely from a racial standpoint, such as Tristan MacLennan who wrote, "I think I have just heard the voice of our next black president, and I am very pleased!" Here, Maimane is referred to specifically as black, as a precursor to the commenter being pleased. What this points to is the idea that a black president is not usually one who pleases white people. Another commenter, Zack Evans shares this sentiment, writing "I'd be proud to have him as a president. I would.. and im a white boy". This can be developed upon through an idea posed by Pierce, that "white people are still surprised if black people are smart" (2012: 100).

There is also a strong sense of Maimane as the "coconut". This is expressed by commenters such as El Professori, who wrote that "[M]aimane is a lost course [who] ran away from us [black people] to get lost, he will never be accepted by whites and now blacks view him with contempt" and Msaint Nzuza who said, "Well done 2 [to] madam Zille [yo]u prepared dat [that] speech well". These are commenters which refer to Maimane as the lapdog of the DA which, at the time of the speech was headed by Helen Zille. Since then, much has changed in the DA which resulted in Maimane being made the party's new leader. In 2016, Reuters explored the ways in which Maimane was viewed by the South African public, which resulted in him being called a "coconut", the "puppet of a white elitist movement" and the leader of a party which now encourages "black Boers" (Brock 2015). These comments agree with the findings by Reuters as they assert Maimane as the "Coconut" or the "Oreo" of South African politics. The "coconut" or "Oreo" is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang as a "subservient black person" (2010: 376). However, these terms come with contestation. "The white center of the coconut seed is a metaphor for a black person who has internalized 'white culture' or 'white values'", explains Stadler (2008: 343). It is evident to see from the comments noted above that Maimane has been criticised for being a "coconut". Thus, El Professori's comment noted above

points to Maimane as belonging neither to the white people it claims he tries to be like, nor to the black people he is seen to have come from. It criticises Maimane as trying to be white even though he is black but being accepted by neither. The comment made by Nzuza suggests Maimane as a lap dog of the white party he represents. It suggests that Maimane's intellect is as a result of his dependence on then party leader, Helen Zille. While he comports himself during his speech as confident and was praised above for "speaking well", commenters are unable to move past him as the lesser of Zille. This implies that Maimane's black identity is received as still dependent on whiteness.

This is echoed by other commenters such as Kyle Wright [who] notes that "Zille should step down and let [Maimane] be the face of the DA…[to] shake the apartheid stigma 90% of the ANC voters. Not that she isnt competent, just that the rest of the country is too blind too look past her age+color combination" (2015). This suggests that South Africans are still largely influenced by race. Black South Africans do not often subscribe to the idea of a party that is led by a white person (Dlanga 2011), given the legacy of apartheid that haunts the nation. However, more important here is the comment that Maimane should become "the face of the DA". This implies that the DA will remain a white party, with Maimane at the front, to console the worries of black voters. In the months following this debate and subsequently, this article and video, Maimane went on to become the leader of the Democratic Alliance. However, due to the time lapse between this event and the present, many commenters echoed the argument that previous DA leader Zille was hindering the DA's progression. One such commenter is Real Ist who agrees with Wright, noted above, claiming that if the DA was to "Give the voters a competent African person things will change very quickly" (2015). By suggesting that a "competent" black person is needed, Real Ist is, in essence, implying that black people are generally incompetent. This underlying racist ideology then plays into the overlying theme that the DA needs a black person who can attract the black masses to the party. Once that is done, Real Ist is implying that the DA can continue to run the party in the best, and ultimately, whitest way. The suggestion of Maimane as the puppet of the white DA is here being made, as has been made by many other MPs and media houses alike in the past (Williems 2014). Despite Maimane denying these claims on many occasions (Williems 2014), the comments here point to Maimane's black identity being received as one dominated and skewed by whiteness.

But it is imperative to note another viewpoint – that Maimane is also praised for keeping the arena of politics in the hands of the black man. "South Africa will never again have a white

leader of the opposition, and that is a good thing", writes Victor Kotze. This is advocating for the idea that in the hands of any white man, South Africa would fall into the pit of apartheid once again. However, there were those who disregarded Maimane's poise and eloquence in light of what could be referred to as his "coconut" behaviours, as has been previously discussed. "Maimane is a lost course, pre european ex African. zuma is our embodiment", wrote El Professori. This comment plays on both sides of the black versus white framework, as it suggests that Maimane has failed on both ends. In Maimane being black but ascribing to what could be referred to as "white tendencies", he has lost the support of the black people, and yet, he is still not accepted by whites who cannot see beyond his colour. There were comments that followed, however, that dealt first and foremost with the progress Maimane could bring, which seemed to largely disregard race, such as that of commenter Mitch Brooks who expressed his faith in Maimane as he wrote, "The day this man becomes president will be of such great significance to our democracy and the international community". However, this points to Maimane's comporting himself as the "other" kind of black as positive. In him portraying himself as proto-white, he is viewed as a means of saving South Africa from its current regime of black leaders. Maimane's blackness is once again received as largely influenced by whiteness here.

Maimane has also been compared to Obama. Commenter Jeff Rich Horn used the comparison to express his doubt in Maimane, warning South Africans against him. "Don't get carried away about him just because of a speech. Obama also made good speeches and see how treacherous he is," he wrote. While this comment is overtly viewing Maimane negatively, it is also covertly suggesting that black people, regardless of their political standing or location are incapable of ruling in a fair and just way. However, others saw the similarities between Maimane and Obama in a positive way. Moss Joe wrote that Maimane's "eloquence and respect" which "decimated" Zuma reminded him of Obama, and Wilweet spoke about him being "well-spoken [and] well educated", aspects which have been previously outlined in this chapter.

Maimane was also praised by commenters for uniting the black and white divisions in South Africa. Commenter ShoSho, for example, notes that "It wasn't six months ago...where white or black people refused to agree on what's right or wrong. There was a black side and there was a white side". He describes Maimane as a man who brought resolve to the tensions between whites and blacks in South Africa. He makes the point that much has changed, but now commenters, and thus, the South African public, are starting to see eye to eye. "We now hear

each other clearer, we acknowledge the other viewpoint", writes ShoSho. Many other commenters share this sentiment, acknowledging Maimane as a "the guy who will take South Africa and Africa forward" (Shange), "youthful, energetic and intelligent" (SA Sister) and "trustworthy" (Mthethwa). Maimane was even referred to as the one who "echoed [the] worries, concerns and deep disappointment for what the Giggling One did to our democracy" (Sliver), which points to Maimane representing the concerns of South Africans, which are being blamed on Zuma. This is reiterated by commenter Fourie, who wrote "I truly believe Maimane listens to every sane South Africans private conversations! He took the words straight out of all of our mouths!" Much admiration was shown for how Maimane supposedly united races, such as the comments which support Maimane as "loved by so many in this country. Black, white, for every colour and creed who seeks the good of this country" (Ilze Stoltz). These comments hold Maimane in high regard as they claim that he is seen to reunite South Africans. But these are opinions and thus are points of contestation, for South Africans still remain largely disconnected when it comes to agreeing on a specific idea of what a leader should be – particularly in racial terms. Ansell explains that the colour-blindness referred to here "represents a race-conscious act to stall further the transformation of the racial order in the direction of greater and more substantive equality…[and] the achievement of a colour-blind society is therefore premature… and serves to foreclose colour-conscious policy approaches needed to act against racial hierarchy" (2013: 44-45). What this ideology seeks to do is ultimately keep white rule in power by suggesting that colour has nothing to do with it. Commenters like this consciously or subconsciously choose a black leader who is guided and influenced by whiteness and subscribe to him. This serves to cater to their ideals, all while making them appear as non-racial.

Conclusion

Overall, after analysing the video, the article and the comments posted about the speech delivered by now-DA leader, Mmusi Maimane, it is clear that he draws on a very different form of blackness than Zuma and Malema. Maimane displayed a sense of conformity with Western traditions within Parliament, as he dressed in a suit and tie. By means of this appropriateness, Maimane showed that he "belonged" in Parliament. This positioned Maimane as having a black identity which subscribes to white practices, more so because he was then part of what has been called a "white party" (Piombo and Nijzink 2005: 133) Maimane's spoken words played a vital role in this section. By discussing Zuma in negative terms,

Maimane established a sense of authority which allowed him to assert himself against Zuma – he called Zuma out on his flaws, which in turn implied that he does not possess those flaws. Maimane's analysis pointed to him attracting the support of those who subscribe to the DA's political agendas. He aimed to assert his blackness as opposing to Zuma's. Maimane criticised various events that had transpired under Zuma's presidency. In so doing, Maimane brought to focus Zuma's problematic way of handling issues of importance, but more importantly, suggested himself as a solution to these problems. He thus portrayed himself as one who is progressive in his thinking in that he denounces violence, encourages open press and supports freedom. Maimane also brought to the forefront the lack of respect that Zuma had for the political sphere, which suggested that he had this respect. Maimane's education was put on display, which enabled him in establishing himself as part of the emerging black middle-class. Speaking about how Zuma trampled on Madiba's legacy, Maimane placed himself in a position of solidarity with Nelson Mandela – who is considered an icon within South African history, both by black and white people. Maimane ended by showing solidarity not only with his supporters, but with others who shared the same standpoint with regards to Zuma by means of the word "we". Overall, this section pointed to Maimane's black identity as comfortably rooted in Western ideas, progressive, democratic and respectful of tradition.

The article, however, established an alternate tone for Maimane from the onset. It employed specific words to paint Maimane as aggressive and harsh, while comporting him as the younger black politician in the story.

In the comment section, much praise was given for Maimane for a number of reasons. This included praise for Maimane's accent and education. Maimane was also positioned in a sense of non-belonging as a "coconut". Directly linked to the notion of this, Maimane was also compared to former president of the USA, Obama, who too has been referred to as a coconut. Maimane was both praised and criticised for this. However, Maimane's race was also discussed positively when he was referred to as the bridging gap between black and white people. This was done through his being black yet comporting himself in a way which complies with being white. In this regard, he was praised for being post racial. Commenters also suggested that Maimane become leader of the DA (which he was not at the time of this publication), to be the black face of the white party. This was problematic as it negated Maimane's capacity to run the party, but instead suggested him solely as the black façade of a white party. Maimane was well-received by white people which pointed to the notion of colour-blindness.

Throughout this analysis, Maimane presented himself as a leader who differs from Zuma in almost every regard. He positioned himself as opposing Zuma when it came to the way he dealt with and discussed matters of national importance, which portrayed Maimane as the contrary. Maimane used his "coconut" characteristics, to comport himself as likeable to both white people, more than black people in South Africa. In the article, Maimane was displayed positively by means of the words employed. His general comportment was discussed as being dominant. The comments section received Maimane well. He was largely praised for an array of aspects and he was insinuated as a leader who could bring progression to South Africa. Maimane ultimately presented a black identity that implied him as a forward-thinking, progressive, educated man, which worked simultaneously to establish him as more inclined with the white system of doing things. This, in turn, portrayed Maimane's blackness as significantly influenced by whiteness. Despite his attempts to signify his allegiance to the nation, the struggle and ultimately appeal to black South Africans, comments showed that he was received alternatively. He was condemned for being the face of a white party and his blackness was thus received as overshadowed by whiteness.

In finality, this study effectively accomplished what it set out to achieve: each politician enacted divulging, unique and undefinable black identities. It asserted the claim of blackness as a concept which cannot be a priori, but is instead, fluid and continually reinventing itself. This study proved that in the realm of South African politics, many contesting tropes of blackness exist. By means of three case studies of integral importance in the South African political landscape, a range of notably different black identities were made lucid. It explored a variety of blacknesses, ranging from those which are portrayed as traditional to progressive, including those which assert authority, and involving those which establish the "other", to name a few. This study has thus deduced that blackness is a concept which is open-ended and can be portrayed in various ways. It further understood that these flexible displays of blackness can be interpreted in a number of ways, both by the press and the public. This project has thus enabled further research to be done without placing limitations on blackness. It hopes to reiterate the notion of blackness as unlimited in its true essence. It serves to prove that blackness cannot be defined or placed within strict confines, but instead, is a concept which is open to change and is ever-evolving.

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APPENDICES

URLs for case study videos:

ZUMA: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zuma-mocks-opposition-while-calling-for-respect-20150527

MALEMA: https://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/WATCH-you-have-lost-control-of-the-country-Malema-to-Zuma-20150417

MAIMANE: https://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/WATCH-5-moments-Mmusi-Maimane-burned-Zuma-20150217