

The Case of Analytic Philosophy as ‘the Philosophy’ and Its Problem for the Decolonization of the Curriculum

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Abstract

In this research, I shall be examining two related issues. The first issue is about whether the presentation of analytic philosophy as the proper and only method of doing philosophy is justified. The second concerns the problems posed for the decolonization of the philosophy curriculum by this hegemonic and triumphant position of analytic philosophy as “the philosophy.” My motivation for engaging with these issues is to try and make the case for other philosophical traditions and methods, including African philosophy as legitimate and proper philosophical enterprises even when they do not share all or some of the traits and features of analytic philosophy. Success in making this case seems crucial to the project of decolonizing the philosophy curriculum.

Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts, Philosophy, in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university

Dorcus Ramaphala

13th day of November, 2018

To my dearest mother, my rock, whom I owe the success of this paper to.

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Introduction

This paper will look at the question of whether the analytic philosophy's status as *the* proper method of doing philosophy is justified. I will argue that if the claim that analytic philosophy is *the* proper method of doing philosophy is accepted as true, then we might have a problem in the context of decolonizing the philosophy curriculum. I will start by looking at the three most accepted methods of doing philosophy, namely, the analytic, continental and commentary.

In the second section I will argue that there are arguments coming from the analytic camp that seem to deny the legitimacy of these other two methods. I will argue that the antagonistic relationship between analytic and continental philosophy is an indicator of the superiority complex that analytic philosophy has. I will also argue that the commentary philosophy is also a victim as it is often presented as the history of modern philosophy, thus being reduced to something that was once important but not anymore. Thus one can argue that analytic method of doing philosophy sees itself as the only proper method of doing philosophy.

The third section will focus on the question of whether analytic philosophy is indeed the only proper method of doing philosophy. It will start by looking at Jones paper which argues for the ultra-faithful account of philosophy. I will argue that his paper gives us an impression that in order for a style to be recognized as philosophy, it needs to meet the criteria that has been given by the analytic camp. I will then argue that this sort of approach is problematic for the discipline, by looking specifically at African philosophy as the case. Lastly I will look at the objections from the feminist camp against analytic criteria for philosophy.

In the fourth section I will look at African philosophy as one of the methods of doing philosophy. I will look at two styles in the discipline without disregarding that

there are other approaches or styles. One of the two styles is ethno-philosophy and it follows the particularism approach while the other which is referred to as contemporary African philosophy follows the universalism approach to philosophy. I will argue that African philosophy started as ways to prove that African people had philosophy thus were persons in Kantian definition. I will argue that it was not born in a welcoming environment as its philosophical nature was denied. I will locate the source of that denial in colonialism and analytic philosophy's hegemonic status, thus supporting the argument that analytic philosophy is exclusionary.

Following this I will look at the concept of decolonization by arguing that the call for moral and epistemic justice requires the philosophy curriculum to be decolonized. I will distinguish between transformation and decolonization and argue how transformation has short falls. It only scratches the surface and does not bring about the change that is expected. I will look at different approaches to decolonization which are mainly the radical approach which argues for the complete change of the system, the moderate approach which allows a room for Western knowledge and indigenous knowledge to co-exist and lastly, the view that everything is fine as it is and there is no need for decolonization. I will argue that the moderate approach is the one that seems more applicable since it is more constructive than the other two approaches to decolonization. I will argue that we need to decolonize philosophy in order to try to grant justice to the indigenous people. Lastly, I will look at the possibility of African philosophy endorsing Western derived methodologies which might be harmful to its progress and growth.

The sixth section which is also the final section will focus on the possible objections one might come up with after reading my paper and it will also look at the possible responses that will ensure that the main arguments still stand.

I will conclude by arguing that it is of importance that we decolonize the discipline as philosophy is the mother of all disciplines. If decolonization was ever to take place it must start with us. I will argue that if we agree that we must decolonize then we must firstly question and address the analytic philosophy status as the only proper method of doing philosophy. Decolonization cannot be achieved if we do not address that problem.

Section I: Discussions of Analytic, Commentary, Continental Philosophy

Philosophy is one of the disciplines where there is no agreed definition. There is a general perception of how philosophy is supposed to look like. This general view is the one that helps us distinguish philosophical texts from texts which belong to other disciplines such as anthropology or sociology. As such there are many different styles of doing philosophy and there are arguments within the discipline about what comprises as philosophy. Most of philosophers settle for the Socrates definition. Philosophy translates from Greek to the love of wisdom (ukessays 2015). Anything beyond that is still a matter of dispute. Thus it only makes sense that there are different styles of doing philosophy and most of them arguing to be the best style or at most their style being the proper way of doing philosophy.

Due to the unfortunate history of the modern world, most of the well-known and respected styles of doing philosophy originate in the western culture and adopted by the rest of the world. One might argue that these are the effects of colonization. It placed one part of the world in a pedestal while inferiorizing everyone else (Taiwo 1993). Thus in this section I will be looking at the three most respected styles of doing philosophy. Which are analytic, continental and commentary. I will firstly look at what each of them comprises of. I will argue that Analytic philosophy sees itself as *the* proper method of

doing philosophy and sees others as lesser philosophies. I will conclude by arguing that the antagonistic relationship seems to be doing more damage to the discipline rather than paving a way forward for it. Thus if we are to grow the discipline and achieve the ends that we want, analytic philosophy should stop seeing itself as the only proper way of doing philosophy.

Analytic Philosophy

As with the definition of philosophy, there is no general agreement on what is analytic philosophy. It is argued to be ever changing and that is one of the reasons that one cannot pin a definition to it. According to Preston, analytic philosophy started with the revolution of Moore and Russell as they moved from idealism to realism (2018). He argues that since then analytic philosophy has taken so many turns that it is hard to put a definition to it (Preston 2018). One can also argue that the origin of analytic philosophy was facilitated by Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena as it facilitated the discussion about realism and idealism that later developed (Preston 2018).

In this section one will look at different phases of analytic with the hope of getting a general outlook of what the style really comprises of. It is often hard to get to what analytic philosophy really is because majority of the time the meta-philosophical question of analytic philosophy is brought to the table it is often being contrasted with continental philosophy. Thus instead of focusing on what analytic philosophy is, philosophers tend to focus on what distinguishes it from continental philosophy. One example is Jones paper that distinguishes between continental and analytic philosophy. He argues that analytic philosophers typically try to solve fairly delineated philosophical problems by reducing them to their parts and to the relations in which these parts stem

(Jones 2009). He argues that continental philosophers typically address large questions in a synthetic or integrative way and consider particular issues to be parts of the larger unities and as properly understood and dealt with only fitted into those unities (Jones 2009). According to Jones, the typical distinction between the two styles is that Analytic philosophy is concerned with analysis of thought, language, logic, knowledge, mind etc. while continental philosophy is concerned with synthesis of modernity with history, individuals with society and speculations with application (2009). This paper serves an example to show how the metaphysical question of the style is often approached.

I will later try to provide a case for such an approach and how it plays out on the larger scale. Nevertheless, an approach that focuses on the distinction between continental and analytic as a way to provide clarity on the nature of the style is not enough. Thus even if we fail to find the definition, we need to get a clear picture of what the method represents and what makes it different to other styles of doing philosophy.

One can argue that despite the inability to find a definition that everyone agrees within the camp, there is some characteristic that all philosophers agree on. According to Van Niekerk, every analytic philosopher agrees that for any text to be regarded as philosophy it needs to meet the criteria of clarity and rigor (2015). Analytic philosophers denounce obscurity by arguing that a philosopher needs to be clear with every term used properly defined in order to avoid misunderstanding (Van Niekerk 2015). Jones also argues that it needs to be armchair style of philosophizing and if it is too empirical it ceases to be philosophy (2009). Thus one can argue that there might be some unified conception of what doing analytic philosophy ought to look like even if there is no agreed definition

Jones argues that analytic philosophy was born with the Vienna Circle. One of the goals of this circle was the eradication of metaphysics, reclaiming the supremacy of logic in philosophy, linguistic conventionalism and also debunking of Kant's synthetic a priori (Jones 2009). Preston argues that the birth of analytic philosophy was due to the rebellion against Kant and Hegel who were arguing for idealism (2018). Thus the method of analysis seems to be born due to Kant's theory of how we get to know the world. He argued for the idealism approach to our knowledge of the world. Idealism was the belief that even though the world appears to us to be a collection of discrete objects, it is a single indivisible whole whose nature is mental, or spiritual or ideal rather than material (Horstmann and Guyer 2015). Thus even if the objects themselves exist, they are not the way that we perceive them. Kant made a distinction between the objects themselves and to our perceptions of them (Kant 1781). He claimed that we do not have access to the objects themselves but rather our perceptions of them. The observer changes the properties of the observed (Heisenburg's Uncertainty Model) (Woods and Baumgartner 2018). He called this distinction phenomena and noumena (Kant 1781). The phenomena world was argued to be the one that we have access to, the world of our perceptions while the noumena world is the world of the objects in themselves. Objects with disputed properties with questionable existence such as God, may exist in the noumena world (Kant 1781). The only reason that we might not have access to such a world is our faculties. This theory can be argued to not be desirable because it questions our ability to know the things that we assume that we know. If we do not see objects themselves but rather our perceptions of them then it entails that we do not have knowledge about those objects. The acceptance of such a conception of the world might lead us to scepticism about everything we claim to know. The scepticism problem is one of the core reasons that led to its rejection and the birth of realism (Preston 2018).

Realism is the philosophical view that claims that what we see is what we get. There is no difference between our perceptions and objects in themselves as our faculties give us access to the world in itself (Preston 2018). One can argue that the difference between Realism and Idealism is based on how we access the world. Idealism believes that we do not have direct access to the objects in themselves while Realism asserts that we do have access. Thus one believes that our perceptions are not enough to give us knowledge while the other asserts that they are enough.

Moore and Russell did not like this theory and argued for realism that is called common sense or ordinary view of the world (Preston 2018). For them, proposition or meanings were identical to ordinary objects. Contrary to idealism proponent, they argued that what we perceive is the objects themselves (Preston 2018). There is no difference between perception and the objects being perceived. If one perceives a red apple, then the object that he seeing is a red apple (Opposite of the Uncertainty Principle) (Woods and Baumgartner 2018). Unlike Kant there is no difference between the red apple conceived and the red apple on the table. Thus according to this view, what you see is what you get (the properties observed by the observer actually changes). Realism seems to be solving the problem of scepticism because your faculties are argued to be enough to give you knowledge.

According to Jones, the Vienna Circle made a distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths (2009). A priori knowledge is argued to be the knowledge which is gained independently of empirical evidence (Markie 2017). An example of a priori knowledge is the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$. Mathematical propositions are argued to not need any empirical evidence to be known. A posteriori knowledge on the side is argued to be the knowledge which is gained only through empirical evidence (Markie 2017). One must have an experience of such a concept or thing before he can claim to know it.

The variation of color between colors in human beings can be argued to be a posteriori truth. One needs to have come across people with different shades for him to get to that conclusion. The Vienna circle believed in scientism. Scientism is the view that all knowledge is scientific knowledge (Preston 2018). Logical positivism dismissed non-scientific views by declaring them as meaningless (Preston 2018). Thus if it could not be proven by science then it had no value to the discipline. Preston argues that the demise of logical positivism was caused by the fatal flaw in its central view which is the verification theory of meaning. The verification theory of meaning claims that a non-tautological statement has meaning if and only if it can be verified empirically. It rejects cognitively meaningless statements that are mostly found in Metaphysics and Ethics. Thus for something to be philosophical, it needed to be verifiable empirically (Nelson 1954). This view ultimately failed because the principle itself is non-tautological but cannot be verified empirically (Preston 2018). Thus the principle undermined itself as it renders itself meaningless

Jones argues that Wittgenstein added more fuel to the rejection of metaphysics by arguing that analysis of language must mirror the observable nature and nature alone (2009). Metaphysics appealed to the idealism theory as it assumes that there is a world that we do not have access to and tries to make intelligible of such a world (Jones 2009). If the only things that exist are the things that we have access to then metaphysics could not exist. If one is a realist then anything that is intelligible should mirror observable nature or otherwise we are being dragged back into idealism.

While Preston argues that it was the manner and idiom of Moore's philosophizing that inspired the analytic movement instead of his argument for realism (2018). Moore rejected the system building or making grand syntheses and preferred to focus on narrowly defined philosophical problem held in isolation (Preston 2018). Many

philosophers saw him as endorsing linguistic approach to philosophy thus the beginning of the rebellion against traditional philosophy on the grand scale. He argued that common sense view of the world is built into the terms of our ordinary use of language thus when we endorse idealism we accept that common sense is false and thus disqualify the very medium in which we express ourselves. So we either speak equivocally or nonsensically (Preston 2018). Thus the task of the philosopher is not to question the truth of common sense propositions but to provide their correct analysis or explanations. Moore's use of the term analysis is the source of the name analytic philosophy. The Moorean analysis was taken to be a matter of rephrasing some common sense propositions so as to yield greater insight into already clear and unquestionable meaning (Preston 2018)

Wittgenstein argued that language had no universally correct structure. He claimed that there was no such a thing as an ideal language as each language system is like a game that functions according to its own rules (Preston 2018). According to Wittgenstein, language is an intrinsically social phenomenon, thus it cannot be studied in the abstract (Preston 2018).

Van Niekerk chooses a different route as he looks at this question with the regards of African philosophy. He argues that analytic philosophy was once regarded as committed to verification and ordinary use of language and this was held by the Vienna Circle (2015). As I have argued previously, the approach to philosophy was logical and fields such as metaphysics were rejected as philosophy. He then argues that analytic philosophy is seen to be having a procedural focus nowadays. There is a preference for prioritizing certain types of questions or objects of analysis. Such preferences are inherited from logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy as the method focuses on testing coherence, validity and truth of specific propositional claims (Van

Niekerk 2015). The second characteristic that Van Niekerk argues for is the ordinary use of language (2015).

He argues that analytic philosophy focuses on formulating and reformulating propositions in ordinary language, in a way that turns a meaning to be as a little as possible. He claims that analytic philosophy is committed to clarity and always rejects obscurity. The third characteristic that he focuses on is what he calls parsimonious explanation (Van Niekerk 2015). He argues that questions of value, metaphysics and epistemology should be treated as distinct, if they are related issues in order to avoid multiplying explanatory entities unnecessary (Van Niekerk 2015).

Analytic philosophy went through many faces and that makes it hard to pin out what it really entails. One can conclude that the style is more concerned with universal truths and that leads it to always seek the best way to achieve that aim. The move from scientific truths to language analysis shows us that the style is more concerned with finding concepts that can be applied universally

Continental philosophy

Similar to analytic philosophy, continental philosophy does not have an accepted definition. One can argue that from its birth, the only way that philosophers have attempted to describe it was to distinguish it from what we have called analytic philosophy. Thus most of the papers that focus on the metaphilosophical question of continental philosophy have to often defend it from analytic philosophy or the paper is analytic and its role is to attack its philosophical nature. The examples of such articles are: Chase and Reynolds 2012, Critchley 1997, Simons 2001. One can argue that the metaphilosophical question of continental philosophy does not exist outside of the antagonistic relationship it has with analytic philosophy.

This section will try to find an accepted view of the continental style by looking at nature of it and the aims of philosophers in the style. It will argue that contrary to analytic philosophy, the style is recognizes that most of the things we regard as knowledge is relative and embraces the subjective point of view.

It is often hard to pin point what the style is about because the work is often attributed to a certain philosopher. Even when the modern continental philosopher writes, he often appeals to a certain philosopher, example may be being Derrida (Critchley 1997). Each of these philosophers have their own different styles of doing their work and what seems to be the unifying point might be their focus. The differentiation within the style is one of the reasons that sometimes settle for the de facto definition. The de facto definition is the definition that focuses on the point of origin rather than what it is all about (Critchley 2001).

Continental philosophy is argued to have born in Europe hence the name continental (Critchley 2001). This definition is de facto because it reduces continental philosophy to a certain place in the world, mainly Europe. According to Critchley, such a characterisation is confused because there are many continental schools outside of Europe (2001). There are continental schools in America and the discipline has also found a home in continents such Africa. So what is continental philosophy? Critchley points out that the name continental is a geographical term that points out to something that occurs in a particular place, namely the European continent (2001). Thus continental philosophy is often regarded as a philosophical tradition that originated from Europe. This is also not entirely true because some of the earlier continental philosophers were outside of the European continent. Critchley argues that the conflation of philosophical tradition with political geography leads to ideological stereotyping and distortion that can be found in labels which only seek to widen the gulf

between philosophical traditions and block the possibility of a dialogue. It means that continental philosophy is reduced to the philosophy of the Europeans and that often means the views are seen as unable to move past their origins.

“Although there is no consensus on the precise origin of the concept of Continental philosophy as a professional self-description, it would seem that it does not arise as a description of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in philosophy before the 1970s. It is clear that this happened in the USA before Britain, where the first postgraduate courses in Continental philosophy were offered at the Universities of Essex and Warwick in the early 1980s, although undergraduate courses in Continental philosophy were available at Warwick from the mid-1970s. In the American context, and to a lesser extent in Britain, the term 'Continental philosophy' replaced the earlier formulations 'Phenomenology or phenomenology and Existential philosophy' (Critchley 2001)

Therefore, continental philosophy is a professional self-description that overlays a prior and more pernicious cultural opposition between the “British” or the ‘Anglo-American’ and the ‘continental’ (Critchley 2001). The de facto definition of continental philosophy reduces it to a certain place thus being something that cannot be done outside of that place seems to be misleading or wrong (Critchley 2001). There are philosophers from the continent who are not judged as belonging to the continental school and philosophers from outside the continent who are judged as belonging to the school. Critchley argues that one can find more continental philosophy schools outside of the continent than inside (2001). Thus de facto definition cannot give us a proper idea of what is continental philosophy.

Critchley argues that continental philosophy rejects the view that natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena

(2001). This is contrast to the Vienna circle view of the world. On the contrary, it argues that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand conditions of intelligibility (Critchley 2001). One can argue that they mean that the scientific world fails to capture every sense of the society. The social aspects should not be explained in a mechanical manner that the scientific approach does. The society can be argued to be too complex for such an explanation.

Critchley claims that continental philosophy argues that philosophical text cannot be divorced from textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence (2001). Every philosophical thought came into existence because of a certain event in the philosopher's environment (Critchley 2001). Let us take a look at Thomas Hobbes book, the Leviathan. He wrote that people should be obedient to the ruler and should never dissent unless their lives are threatened (Lloyd and Sreedhar 2014). One can argue that his social contract theory was influenced by the killing of kings during the English civil war (Lloyd and Sreedhar 2014). One can argue that theories are responses to the societal problems or happenings thus they can never be divorced from the society or the context that they were founded in.

According to Critchley, philosophy in the continental tradition can be seen as a set of texts. He argues that the texts make up a kind of documentary archive of philosophical problems with a distinct relation to their context and our own and marketed by strong consciousness of history (Critchley 2001). He argues that we use different resources in the archive at different times, depending on different problems we are confronted with and seeking to think through. He claims that philosophical problems do not fall from the sky, ready-made and they cannot be treated as elements of some historical fantasy. It sees human experience as a contingent network of history, culture and society, therefore the proponents of the tradition demand things to be

obscure (Critchley 2001). If human experience is a contingent recreation then it can be created in other ways. (Critchley 2001) Critchley argues that continental philosophy is a means to criticize the present, to promote a reflective awareness as the present as being in crises (2001).

Jones argues that continental philosophy is sometimes argued to be a style of philosophy that is concerned with synthesis. He argues that it can be regarded as the synthesis of modernity with history, individuals with society, and speculations with application (Jones 2009). He recognises that even though these types of definitions are helpful in understanding the larger picture, they can be overgeneralizations (Jones 2009).

Peruzzi argues that continental philosophy may have begun with Hegel's backlash against Kant's separation of the noumena from the phenomenal (2007). Kant believed that nothing outside of the idea could be known (Peruzzi 2007). Many continental philosophers of the 20th century drew inspiration from him. He became the precursor of the traditional continental emphasis on grand overarching narratives and the inclusion of everything into philosophy quest (Peruzzi 2007).

Heidegger describes philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology, placing Being in an elite philosophical category because it pertains to every entity (Chase and Reynolds 2012). According to Heidegger, Being is what determines beings as beings (Wheeler 2018). He argued that *being* precedes knowledge and that phenomena must be studied prior to any logical categorization or interpretation. He sees *being* to be something that is not dependent of our world experiences, thus altered by them. In contrast being is something that you always have and its characteristics are unchanging (Wheeler 2018). While Sartre on the other hand popularised phenomenological ontology with how he described existentialism. It contradicted with Heidegger concept

of being as he argued that consciousness does not make sense by itself. It needs to be aware of objects for it to rise (Chase and Reynolds 2012). Thus such arguments has had decisive effects on continental thought up to present (Chase and Reynolds 2012). He argues that human ontology is united in its complete subjectivity, that we are what we choose and what we experience. The move is from totalizing project to firm individualism. These are one of the most influential philosophers in the continental style. They argue for different approaches to society. The only thing that unifies them is the ability to recognize that society shapes how the events turn out and the solutions should be found in the society itself rather than in nature (Chase and Reynolds 2012).

Commentary philosophy

As we have seen from the two previous sections, styles such as analytic philosophy focus on critiquing the author and trying to see whether the author's argument is justified. The commentary style of doing philosophy seems to be contrary to those characteristics. According to Futter, the commentary method entails that one should read in a way that is prerogative to judge that the author has made a mistake (Futter 2015). Thus this method seeks to find the truth in philosophical texts and that entails seeing the author as the authority. This section will investigate what it means to claim that a philosophical style is commentary and what are its impacts to the reader.

Futter argues that the genre of commentary is strongly associated with a style of reading that is governed by an attitude of textual deference or the principle of authority (2015). He defines textual deference or the principle of authority as a position where the commentator does not see himself as equal to the authentic author (Futter 2015). The authentic author is defined or described the person who writes the texts and has more knowledge on the subject matter than the commentator. Thus the authentic

author is more knowledgeable about the subject matter than the commentator (Futter 2015). The authentic author is the commentator's epistemic superior. Since the commentator sought to learn from one of those who know and in order to acquire that knowledge, he must appeal to the principle of authority. According to the principle of textual deference or the principle of authority, the authentic author could neither be mistaken, nor contradict himself, nor develop his arguments poorly, nor disagree with any other authentic author (Futter 2015). Thus the authentic author is the ultimate source of knowledge that the commentator must learn from (Futter 2015). One can argue that the authentic author is painted as the fountain of knowledge that the commentator must drink from. So the authentic author must be nothing other than the expert in the field. Futter claims that the experts do not disagree fundamentally on the core subjects.

The principle of authority entails reading in conformity. It is a hermeneutical rule that disallows the attribution of authorial error (Futter 2015). Thus instead of arguing that the author is mistaken, the commentator has to assume that he is missing something. Since the authentic author and the commentator are not on the same epistemic level, he is not qualified to attribute any authorial error. Thus the commentator must ask himself if he is not missing anything rather than to argue that the authentic author is wrong (Futter 2015). To attribute any error would put the commentator and the authentic author on the same epistemic level. Let us look at an example that could clarify why the attribution of authorial error could be problematic. Let us imagine a first year student arguing with their professor about Kant's moral theory. The professor has spent most of his career studying Kant and has really thought about his position and often changing it as he scrutinized the theory further. So the professor is the authentic author about Kant moral theory. On the other hand it's the

student's first semester in the university and he is only been studying Kant for few weeks. One would argue that the student is the one in error and is not equipped enough to have a debate with his professor. The student must have missed something and that is why there is a disagreement. Instead of just dismissing the professor's point the student must go back and read further and see what he might have missed. Thus the principle of authority is grounded on an assumption of authorial knowledge.

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According to Futter, commentary philosophy is the practice of philosophy that has the primary mode of caring for the soul (2016). The transformative power of the text is a function of what readers think they must do in response to it. It is a genre, conceived as an organizing principle governing reader's expectations of what the text requires of them (Futter 2016). Futter argues that the principle of authority can be understood as imposing on the reader a distinctive set of expectations that promote the care of the self (2016). There are two basic psychological modes of textual orientation that can be distinguished. The state of attachment, which is a textual orientation which the reader takes herself to be required to assess the epistemic credentials of the claims being made (Futter 2016). Secondly, the state of detachment is an orientation in which the reader takes herself to be required not to assess the epistemic credentials of the claims being made (Futter 2016). Philosophy as the care of the soul can only be practiced from a perspective of detachment (Futter 2016). Practice of philosophy requires self-consciousness which requires detachment. The primary function of a platonic dialogue is the transformation of the reader's character (Futter 2016).

In conclusion, commentary was founded on the assumption that the truth has been given in the masters texts. It is characterised by an inegalitarian epistemic relations between the reader and author. It is a matter of reading in conformity with a principle of authority, a hermeneutical rule disallowing the attribution of error to the text. To read in conformity with the principle of authority is to exclude the possibility of authorial error.

The style of reading associated with the genre of commentary can be detached, self-conscious and transformative. The transformative rationale for the principle of authority can be glimpsed in circumstances of textual resistance, textual resistance refers to particular obstacles that prevent the commentator from understanding the

meaning of the texts that he seek to understand. When the commentator has failed to understand the text he is not permitted to discard the point, holding his author to have been saying nothing clear or true. Textual resistance blocks passive acceptance of the teachings of authoritative text while the principle of authority prevents the commentator from actively rejecting the resistant text as unworthy of consideration and credence. The principle of authority transforms textual resistance into psychological detachment as the commentator must abandon the attached attitude.

Section II: The Question of Superiority or not Amongst the Different Styles

If we look at the previous section one can gather that one of the reasons that the discipline finds it hard to define itself is because of the different styles. These styles have different approaches to doing philosophy, thus they define the discipline in a way that suits those aims. They are slight differences on their focus. Analytic philosophy seems to be trying to get to the ultimate knowledge hence it focuses on concepts that can be applied universally and prefers armchair philosophizing over empirical stuff (Jones 2001). One can argue that continental philosophy focuses on societal emancipation and that is why it argues that philosophy cannot be divorced from society that it stems from. It recognizes being abstract does not necessarily lead us to the truth as the truth is not absolute (Critchley 2007). Commentary philosophy on the other hand claims to advocate for the care of self by arguing principle of authority. It claims that the truth is found in the master's text and for one to reach it they must appeal to the principle of authority. The impartial search for the truth ultimately leads to the care of the self (Futter 2015).

One can argue that most of these styles are well defined and their focus is clear. Contention only arises when one of them sees itself as more legitimate than the others.

This problem can be seen with the relationship between analytic and continental. I have mentioned that the majority of the papers dealing with the meta- philosophical question of the continental style focus on defending it against the antagonistic analytic philosophy. Commentary on the other hand, it is just viewed and lectured in the universities as part of the history of modern philosophy. Thus one can argue that analytic philosophy sees itself as the only proper method of doing modern philosophy.

Analytic philosophy forms its critique against other styles not for being philosophical but rather for not employing the characteristics that it cherishes (). One can argue that this is an unfair trade-off that further reinforces my above claim that it sees itself as the only legitimate method of doing philosophy while other philosophies are subordinate to it and in order to be recognized, they must adopt its characteristics.

This behaviour can be argued to be detrimental to the discipline as a whole. As with the case of African philosophy, we will later see that such an attitude has negative impacts on the growth of other styles. They spend most of their time trying to assert their legitimacy instead of focusing on what is important, which is to philosophize. One can argue that with the case of continental philosophy, it is mostly found and respected in departments such as sociology instead of the philosophy department (Critchley 2007). Philosophy fails to give it the recognition and the respect it deserves while foreign departments cherish it. This means that we are slowly losing touch with the society and reality if what we reject as philosophers seems to correspond to the realities of the people. Secondly, when we reduce commentary philosophy to the history of modern philosophy, we claim that it does not have much significance in the modern world. We reduce it to something that has existed, served its purpose and now we must move away from. We fail to see that it can still play a role in shaping modern societies.

What we call old can be useful in helping us solve the problems that we face as modern society.

In conclusion, they are different styles of doing philosophy. Their approaches seem to be tackling society issues in different manners. If philosophy is about solving human affairs by being critical then we should all agree that all of the above styles fall under the umbrella of philosophy. The problem only arises when one of them sees itself as superior to the others. This problem seems to be taking us back rather than helping us achieve a much greater good. Thus this section has problematized the issue of analytic philosophy seeing itself as the only proper method of doing philosophy. It has argued that such an approach is harmful to the discipline itself. Thus it would be much better if we do away with such behaviour.

Section III: Is Analytic Philosophy the only Proper Method of Doing Philosophy?

The previous section touched on the issue of the analytic philosophy's hegemonic status over other styles. It has argued that such an approach is detrimental to the discipline and if we are to grow it, we need to do away with that kind of approach. This chapter aims to go deeper into the problem. It will firstly look at the arguments given by the analytic camp that might lead one to believe that it sees itself as the only proper method of doing philosophy.

Regarding that it will look at Jones paper arguing for ultra-faithfulness, which is a stance that believes that philosophy should be universal (Jones 2001). It will argue that the assumption that philosophy should be universal is the foundation of the rejection of other styles. It will argue that what they argue to be universal is just the analytic method of doing philosophy. Thus the staunch universalism approach is the foundation of the rejection of the legitimacy of other styles of doing philosophy; it will then look at

the objections from the feminist camp. They argue that analytic philosophy is built on abstract individualism and value neutral objectivism that cannot be achieved.

On the other hand Eze argues against the universalism approach given by Jones. He claims that such an approach fails to see subjectivity of the philosopher and how it plays out in the work that they do (Eze 2001). I will conclude the chapter by arguing that in order for the discipline to flourish we need to recognise the cultural in the universal. Such recognition will foster some sort of respect between styles and facilitate an environment that is healthier for philosophizing.

Universalism as the core concept of doing philosophy

According to Jones, philosophical claims are necessarily characterised by their universal scope (2001). He claims that when philosophers talk about human beings they are not dealing with the questions about particular types of human beings but about all human beings (Jones 2001). Thus for a theory to be philosophical it needs to encompass all human beings. The moment it fails to do so it consequently fails to be philosophical. If one writes a paper about the effects of race and use African American people as a case the people will cease to be philosophical as it focuses on a certain race of people rather than every race. This example goes together with his claim that philosophy may concern itself with culture in general but it cannot concern itself with a particular culture. Thus a philosophical text must be relevant to all persons no matter where they are from (Jones 2001).

Jones argues that philosophy is an intellectual endeavour that takes place from the armchair (2001). This means that philosophy should not deal with empirical stuff as that would make it lose its universal scope. According to Jones, philosophy is a mental activity in which the philosopher tries to wash themselves away of any subjective

reasoning in order to achieve the kind of reasoning that is applicable to every human being (2001). Thus if philosophy is empirical then it becomes subjective to a particular context thus fails being philosophy.

He then claims that philosophy progresses by writing to and for each other (Jones 2001). For a thought to be regarded as philosophy it must be in a form of writing. This means that a dialogue or a discussion between people, even if it meets the previous criteria will fail to be philosophical as it is not a written text. The discussion cannot move beyond that space and be engaged by other people unlike written texts. That might be one of the reasons that he claims that one of the main criteria for philosophy is writing. Thus he believes that if philosophy were to be otherwise then its methodology would tend towards the more empirical and it would no longer be what is considered as philosophy (Jones 2001).

Features of Universalist notion of philosophy 1, is an inquiry into conceptual, abstract and non dogmatic questions which are universal. 2, it has a methodology which involves adversarial approach- critical, logical, systematic and rigorous analysis. 3, it involves the ideas of individuals as opposed to a fold or collective system of thought. 3, it requires a writing tradition in that ideas are preserved and exchanged in books and journals (Eze 2001)

The problems with the analytic universalism stance

Jones paper has represented a theory of analytic philosophy that does not allow for subjectivity or empirical analysis. He has argued that anything that encompasses that is not philosophy. This section will look at the problem posed by such a definition or approach to philosophy on the discipline as a whole. It will argue that such an approach is exclusionary and represent only the view from a certain type of people. It will also

argue that if philosophy becomes completely abstract, it will fail to address most of societal issues, thus it would render itself useless to the society as a whole. It will do so by looking at the feminists critiques of analytic philosophy. This will further reinforce the argument that the ultra-faithful approach to philosophy only represents the views of the white male counterpart in the discipline thus oppressive. Lastly it use African philosophy as an example to argue that such an approach to philosophy excludes other styles and renders analytic philosophy as the only proper method of doing philosophy. I will conclude the section by arguing that the acceptance of analytic method as the only legitimate way of doing philosophy will lead to the discipline being detached from the society and ultimately fail in its venture.

The universalism stance of analytic philosophy reinforcing its legitimacy as the only method of doing philosophy: African philosophy as a case

According to Emmanuel Eze, analytic philosophers believe that philosophy is universal and it cannot be narrowed or contextualized by modifiers such as African, Indian or German (2001). They claim that one may practice philosophy of ethnic or national cultures but philosophy itself cannot be reduced by the ethnic or cultural limitations. They argue that the essence of philosophy in the analytic tradition is just analysis (Eze 2001). Thus philosophy transcends division of cultures, nation or country. Eze claims that the ultra faithful camp in the analytic field argues that philosophy can analyse anything without itself becoming just one entity among, and on the same ontological level as many things analysed (2001). They claim that the history of philosophy is the history of analytic philosophy. This view reinforces the argument that was presented by Jones earlier on. Eze recognizes the representation of philosophy by Jones represents the analytic camp rather than philosophy as a whole. Jones argued for the view to be

true of all philosophies regardless of which style it falls under (Jones 2001). The assumption reinforces the claim that for something to be respected as philosophy it must mirror analytic or be rejected. This section will focus on the rejection of African philosophy. It will argue that such a rejection was premised on the claim that it did not appeal to the philosophical characteristics which have already been argued to stem from analytic.

The ultra faithful argue that African philosophy is non-existent because there is only one, universal discipline of philosophy which has been argued to mirror analytic philosophy (Eze 2001). As we would later see in the next chapter, African philosophy is premised on the assumption that philosophy can have particular aspects (Wiredu 2006). It believes that some philosophical beliefs can apply to only one group of people. This follows from the assumption that philosophy has cultural aspects to it thus philosophical beliefs about a certain thing are bound to differ from one culture to the next. This belief clashes with what Jones has argued to be philosophy, hence the rejection.

The Universalists' conception of formal philosophy captures only the contemporary analytic tradition of western philosophy that derives essentially from the critical and analytic approach of science (Preston 2018). It excludes the methods of doing philosophy before Kant and Hegel (Preston 2018). If we are to accept the Universalist conception of philosophy then we are forced to accept the implication that everything before the Vienna circle conception of philosophy is not good enough to be regarded as philosophy. We have to accept that genuine philosophy only began with the birth of analytic philosophy. One can see that such a conception of philosophy should be false. It denies its parents and siblings. Such a son cannot be good for society.

We need to distinguish between the ideal conception of philosophy and the real philosophy. The ideal does not reflect the real nature of philosophy.

The universal conception of philosophy is ideal because we do need concepts that can apply everywhere in the world and timeless in nature. As much as that is desired, we have to admit that philosophy is different in real life. The concept of individualism is a perfect example regarding this distinction. The concept of an individual will be defined differently by a philosopher from the western countries such as the US as they assume that an individual can be able to isolate himself from the community (Menkiti 1984). One can argue that they argue for such a freedom, while a philosopher from Africa will see an individual as something that cannot be isolated from their community as the community is the one that creates the individual (Menkiti 1984). The two are different conceptions of an individual that are influenced by the society that one finds themselves in. Thus it will be flawed to argue that one concept can mean the same thing in all parts of the world without importation of ideas which has enabled such an assumption that analytic philosophers hold.

The paradigm case for the Universalists is the western philosophical approach, especially of the analytic tradition. The assumption that philosophy has to be universal further proves that analytic philosophy sees itself as the proper method of doing philosophy. The Universalist seems to be vouching for only one way of doing philosophy. That way is analytic and Western derived (Mweshi 2016). One can argue that such a belief has colonial prejudice. I use the term colonial prejudice to refer to a certain approach to knowledge which is linear and favours one group of people over the rest while exported as the ultimate way of doing things (Mweshi 2016). Thus the Universalist approach has a colonial prejudice because it assumes that there is only one proper way of doing philosophy and that way is analytic and western (Mweshi 2016).

This further subordinates everything else that does not fall in line with their conception of philosophy. One can argue that such an approach to doing philosophy is detrimental and goes against the very fundamental of what philosophy is. A philosophical enquiry cannot be linear as it would fail to capture the heart of the problem. The Universalist rejects the stance of the particularisms as well as their conception of philosophy by arguing that it presents philosophy as dogmatic on the other hand and collectivist on the other (Eze 2001). Thus the Universalist conception of universal philosophy is therefore purely individualistic. This reinforces the idea that some of the Universalist ideas are particular and cannot be comprehended by people from other cultures. Thus we cannot have only one approach to doing philosophy. It defeats the purpose of the discipline itself by narrowing it down to certain problems that may only affect certain group of people.

Reason is argued to be universal human trait by Immanuel Kant (Williams 2017). He claims that we should be able to have universal moral rules due to that. What is wrong in one part of the world should also be wrong in another because we all share reason (Williams 2017). I argue that contrary to Kant reason does not entail that human beings should come to the same conclusions. The assertion just means that every human being should be able to think rationally and come to the best conclusion regarding the situation that they are facing. The environment that they are in influences the type of solutions that they end up coming with. This ability is the one that has made human beings to survive in the different environments that they find themselves. Thus reason can be universal but that does not mean that human beings have universal concepts. If that was the case then there should not be any disagreements between them.

A priori concepts are the only ones that can be applied universally (McGinn 1975). The equation $2+2$ will always equal to 4 no matter which universe one finds them in. Such concepts are not affected by the environment or the time that one finds themselves in (McGinn 1975). If we are going to argue that philosophy should be universal then we must bite the bullet and argue that philosophy's foundation should be a priori concepts. This kind of conception of philosophy still allows a room for particularism. If we argue that only a priori concepts are universal then the moment we move from that everything else a posteriori thus particular. So the absolute universal nature that some of the analytic philosophers argue for is still unattainable.

The rationality and rigor underlying formal philosophy derive in large part from the fact that it lacks dogmatism (Eze 2001). The universal rationality of method of formal philosophy entails that it is not relative to culture. It is rather false to argue that universal rationality is divorced from culture when the theory itself is derived from a certain culture. (Eze 2001) The Universalists often assume that we can divorce ourselves from the influences of society and be purely abstract (Jones 2001). This assumption is flawed as it fails to see that our choice of focus and the approach that we take is often influenced by the culture that we come from. Western philosophers believe that philosophy should be individualistic because they come from a culture that assumes that an individual can detach themselves from the society that they come from. This is contrast to African philosophers who argue that philosophy can be communal as they are from a culture that sees an individual as an entity that is tied to a community and cannot detach itself from it.

The feminist critique of analytic philosophy

Feminist philosophers have questioned the hegemonic culture of the analytic style. They argue that it is often oppressive and detrimental to the field as it shuts out many voices that counter popular way of doing philosophy. According to them, analytic philosophy is based on values that are masculine (Garry 2017). It is committed to pure objectivity and value neutrality, and uses an unlocated, disembodied, disinterested, autonomous reasoned, knower and agent (Garry2017). Thus such values are argued to be oppressive to the previously marginalized groups, example being the women, people of colour and the disabled (Garry 2017). Thus such values can be argued to represent white male commentators.

Allison Jaggar criticised abstract individualism and other concepts of modern liberal political theory (Garry 2017). She claimed that the concept of abstract individuals refers to the assumption that the essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently of any particular social context (Garry 2017). Thus analytic philosophy fails to see the influence of the social context on that individual. It aims to appeal to everyone and thus overlooks anything that has a social context because the moment the individual is not abstract then such a theory cannot be applicable universally (Garry 2017). It fails to recognise that the abstract individual cannot exist in real life because the society is the one that determine or facilitate how one turns out to be (Garry 2017). The social impact of the individual cannot go unnoticed or be ignored. An individual is a social being thus cannot be abstract in a way that analytic philosophers seek him to be (Garry 2017). The social context of a person determines the kind of ethics that will appeal to them, whether it is the acceptance of such ethics or the rejection of them all depends on what the society

views as right or wrong. He builds his beliefs from what has already been established (Skinnerian Operant Conditioning).

The second assumption that analytic philosophers hold is that rationality is instrumental, value neutral and detached. This assumption stems from the Kant argument on rationality. Rationality seems to be something that is universal and is not affected by the social spaces that one find himself in (Garry 2017). They assume that one should be able to cease being a societal being when the time comes for them to be rational. Then it means that one is not being rational if their argument has emotions or influenced by their culture or society (Garry 2017). The rational being that is advocated by this view is unattainable and can only be advocated on papers. Thus one can argue that analytic philosophy is far removed from the society. They have their ideal way of thinking that is not applicable to the real world thus exclusionary (Garry 2017).

Such a critique can be applied to Jones argument. One can argue that the abstract nature of this type of philosophy may be the reason that it is hard to deal with questions of racism or sexism adequately. This is one of the reasons that have led to theories advocating for colour blindness without realizing that it perpetuates the racism rather than helping to eradicate it. There are societal problems that cannot be solved or be adequately explained from the abstract point of view. Such problems require the subjective point of view or the subjective approach as they are not experienced by the entire human race. Unless we are ready to accept that philosophy will never be able to deal with some of the important human issues then we should not accept such an approach to be the blue print of doing philosophy. This would reinforce the idea that philosophy is useless to the society. Therefore Jones claim put philosophy in a really uncomfortable situation.

Sandra Harding criticized the value free objectivity. She argued that the research perpetuates values of the researcher (Garry 2017). The analytic philosophers fail to see that their point of view of the world is closely tied to the research. The philosopher chooses a certain topic because he is trying to convince the world of his point of view. Even if we try to show the possible objections against whatever argument that we bring across; there is a natural impulse to defend the view we have because that was our original aim. This is one of the reasons that we find philosophers and researchers reluctant to let go of their original point of view even when faced with enormous criticism. Let us take an example of Metz theory of Ubuntu (Metz 2007) It was widely criticised by African philosophers that it was white- washing Ubuntu. Ramose argued that Metz presented the liberal version of Ubuntu that is more rights orientated when it should be more communitarian (Ramose 2007). Metz still went on to defend it head on. He wrote two more responses to the critiques, failing to understand why there was uproar against his theory (Metz 2007). One can argue that Metz intended to make the Ubuntu theory appealing to the West and that is the reason that it had more libertarian values than the communitarian values that it is expected to have. If he were to agree defeat then it would have meant that he would have to accept that his values are not applicable to the Ubuntu way of life. According to Harding, the assumption that we can have value free objectivity is politically and morally regressive (Garry 2017).

Harding argues that such an assumption is linked to other implausible views such as the belief that only false beliefs have social causes while true beliefs have natural ones (Garry 2017). This means that social causes lead us to false beliefs and we need to detach ourselves from them in order to get to the truth. True beliefs must have natural causes because they cannot be otherwise. The only true beliefs that we end up with are for example $1+1=2$ (Garry 2017). There could not have been any other answer,

in every universe. Yet this means that we can only know things that are not politically or morally important to us as human beings. The true beliefs that have natural causes are the ones that are not directly linked to the social life and that means that they are not as important as the beliefs that have social causes. This type of belief or way of doing philosophy fails to recognize that one can have true beliefs that are derived from natural causes but completely useless on our normal everyday lives and also what we call natural causes also stems from an assumption that may have social causes. So the distinction between the two is rather artificial and made to be true by the social beliefs that we already hold. Harding claims that the consequence of holding such belief is ultimately that the ideal agent must create and constantly police the borders of the gulf, between himself as the subject and the object of the research (Garry 2017). The borders are artificial because they have been created by the agent (Garry 2017). Thus such borders are bound to fail as they can always be redefined by the researcher or overlooked in order to suit their project.

According to Jones, if a philosophical text must be relevant to every human being then it entails that abstract theories that are philosophical must be applicable to every person no matter which culture they are from (Jones 20017). Lorraine code criticized analytic philosophy for the use of a moral epistemic individual who is abstract, generalised and disengaged. She claimed that analytic philosophy is the tradition that is more concerned with what the ideal agent or knower would do rather than the real one (Garry 2017). She argued that a more adequate characterization of knowing must be applicable to a broad range of examples in the lives of real people (Garry 2017). Let us take for an example the theory of rights and individualism. It claims that individual rights must thrive over the needs of the community (Wenar 2008). We must protect the individual rights even at the expense of the society as a whole. Since such a

philosophical assumption is argued to be universal it must make sense to everyone despite of where they find themselves in the world. Yet such an argument clashes with the African outlook of the world that sees a person as communal. The communal view argues that the good of the community comes before the right of the individual (Menkiti 1984). Such a view of the world does not argue for rights but rather that what is good for the community is good for the individual thus it does not separate the individual and the community. This communal view is often characterised as African but the argument is not just for African but everyone. Thus if abstraction should lead us to the ultimate truth for everyone then the above example shows that it fails to do exactly that.

This section had focused on questioning the analytic philosophy universalism stance that implicitly puts it on the pedestal. I have looked at the paper by Jones that argues that for anything to be regarded as philosophy it needs to be universal, abstract and in written form. I have argued that such a criteria for philosophy is mainly analytic and it subordinates and excludes other styles of doing philosophy. In doing so, I used the denial of African philosophy as example. I concluded the section by looking at objections against the criteria that come from the feminist camp.

Section IV: What is African Philosophy?

I have previously touched a bit on African philosophy. I argued that it is a philosophy that has been questioned and rejected. The question that should be in our minds should be on the nature of such a style of doing philosophy. This section will look at the history of African philosophy as a way to try to find a definition or a face that one can recognise. It will firstly look at the two camps within the styles and argue that what distinguishes them is how they approach philosophical questions. One represents the beliefs of a

certain group of people while other tries to move beyond that by thinking critically about such beliefs and if they are applicable.

Secondly, I will look at question that was touched on about its legitimacy. I will argue that one of the reasons that it was rejected was racist and colonial. The second reason serves as the heart of this paper. We will see that African philosophy was rejected for not employing the analytic method characteristics that requires philosophy to be universal and as Jones argues, written. Lastly, I will argue against the objections presented against the style by claiming that the Universalist approach is not the only way to philosophy and for most of the objections to stand we need to accept the analysis method hegemonic status.

I have used ethno philosophy and contemporary African philosophy in favor of other styles because of the scope of the paper. Secondly, the rejection of the African philosophy is often premised on the particularism aspects of it that is often the crux of the debate between ethno-philosophy and contemporary African philosophy. Thus the two approaches to African philosophy seem to be the best for the argument that I want to put forward.

Wiredu argues that ethno-philosophy can be traced back to Father Tempels. (2006) Father Tempels was a Belgian missionary who wrote a book called Bantu Philosophy (Wiredu 2006). This is often regarded as the first philosophical text that deals with the thoughts of the African people. According to Wiredu, despite its incoherencies and its problems that may be because it was written by someone clueless about the African people ways of thinking thus bound to misrepresent them (2006). Nevertheless, the book was trying to prove to the western world that African people have a coherent rational thought. This was a reaction to the hegemonic belief that the Europeans held about African people. They believed that Africans were primitive and

could not have coherent rational thoughts thus lacked any philosophy (Wiredu 2006). Philosophers argue that the foundation of any philosophical thought is rationality. Thus the African people were not rational there did not have philosophy. Such beliefs reinforced and facilitated slavery and the colonization of black people. Immanuel Kant claimed that for one to be a person they need to be rational and denying that the African people had philosophy meant that their rationality was denied, which is to deny their personhood thus reinforcing their oppression (Wiredu 2006). Bantu philosophy was a way of proving that African people do have a coherent way of thinking which makes them rational. There are many criticism leveled against the work but we have to acknowledge its role in what is to be later called African philosophy. It seems to be stemming from the work or the style that is influenced by that work (Wiredu 2006).

One of the characteristics of ethno-philosophy is that the philosophers go back into their communities to find the philosophy of that specific community. Such philosophy is not attributed to any individual but rather to the whole community or a tribe (Wiredu 2006). This often led to a misunderstanding that can be attributed to Paulin hountondjie (Hountondjie 1973). In his book, *African Philosophy, Myth and Reality*, Hountondjie argued that there could not be African philosophy because its communal thought and philosophy was the work of individuals (Hountondjie 1973). He misunderstood the fact that what we call communal thought is the thought of individuals that was later adopted by the community. Something that is communal can be argued to be something that belongs to the whole community. It means that such a thing can not be ascribed to a certain individual. In this context, communal thought can be argued to be the kind of philosophy that belongs to the whole community.

Community refers to a group of people who share certain ideas and may live close or far from each other. Therefore African philosophy starts as a thought of individuals and

become communal as it is adopted by the community. This often happens after a long process of deliberation and refinement. It means that communal thought can be more philosophical because the people get to engage with the thought before can be accepted. The bits that people disagree with can be replaced by a better version of them. Thus philosophy as a communal project may have had its own advantages.

Ethno-philosophy can be argued to be the first attempts to decolonize the field and the minds of the colonized. It attempted to decolonize the field by doing philosophy in a way that is different from the traditionally accepted methods. One can argue that this attempt is one of the reasons that it was denied as philosophy. The decolonial aspects of African ethno-philosophy will be discussed later in the paper and will look at some of the reasons that African philosophy is still disputed and how that is connected to the colonial view of the African.

According to Wiredu, the contemporary work in African philosophy has some un-avoided comparative character (Wiredu 2006). It often involves comparing African thought to the already established western hegemonic thought. Wiredu argues that this attitude is because most of it belongs to both the African and the western tradition as most of these philosophers are trained in the western paradigm (2006). He argues that this comparative character is problematic because of its colonial history (Wiredu 2006). If we talk about personhood in African philosophy we must also mention how it is often viewed in the western philosophical culture. Contemporary African philosophers often compare between the two cultures and that puts them under the pressure of having to argue that the African conception is better and why.

On the other hand, Bello makes a distinction between the Particularist and Universalist approach to African philosophy. The distinction can fall between the questions of whether philosophy should deal with universal concepts or it can be

relative to culture or region and grounded on human experience. So the particularist must be arguing for the cultural relativity of philosophy while Universalists argue for the opposite (Bello 2006). Bello argues that the particularist assert that African philosophy should be concerned with philosophical investigations having a special relevance to Africa (2006). They argue that philosophy is not African unless it deals with specifically African theme, topic or problem (Bello 2006). So if we are going to have African philosophy it must deal with issues that are more pressing to the continent. One example of such a philosophy would a paper dealing with the question of whether female mutilation is moral. Such a paper would be culturally relevant to the continent because it deals with the issue that is pressing in the continent. It is still a philosophical paper because it deals with the question of morality. Particularists assert that philosophy is the criticism of the ideas we live by thus it should be concerned with African problems in order to be regarded as African (Bello 2006). Thus such a topic would be a good paper for the particularist as it would be doing exactly what they believe philosophy should do.

According to Bello, the Universalists accept that it is important to engage in a serious study of African culture and philosophical heritage (2006). Yet they argue that such study should be critical and reconstructive in order to qualify as philosophy. They assert that contemporary African philosophers should attempt to appropriate any modern resources of philosophical insights that are not already exploited in our culture (Bello 2006). He argues that the insistence on criticism and reconstruction is to make efforts of contemporary African philosophy truly philosophical. He claims that all philosophizing involves assertion, explanation, and justification and anything less than that will be less philosophy (Bello 2006).

African philosophy works with the beliefs that have already been accepted whether it is contemporary or ethno-philosophy. It does not believe that questions and answers can fall from the tree. It stems from the belief that what has been will always be (). The questions that we are faced now even the older generation must have been faced with such. Therefore philosophical questions will always be intertwined with the beliefs of the community (). The philosopher is first exposed to the beliefs of the community that he is in. the process of questioning such beliefs is what makes him a philosopher. African philosophy takes the beliefs of the communities and investigates them further. It recognizes that we are not isolated beings but rather we are who we are because of our communities thus the truth can be found by looking at the thought of our respective communities. It should be noted that this characteristics are not special to African philosophy as they can be found in other styles such as continental. They are just more prevalent and asserted in African philosophy.

Appiah argues that African traditional cultures seem to justify their beliefs only by the fact that they are supported by the authority of the tradition (Wiredu 2006). Even when authorities are cited, they are not cited blindly in the west formal philosophy. He seems to be arguing that African tradition cultures are dogmatic about their views. It entails that authority should not be challenged thus whatever assertion that are fundamental to the culture cannot be questioned. One can argue that this belief is flawed as that would mean that African societies are static about their beliefs. If they were static about their beliefs it would mean that even if a custom that premises on some belief would be kept even if it were harmful to the community. It would mean that there is no way forward and that also reinforces the idea that African people needed the European colonisers to save them from doom since they are not allowed to question their beliefs. Secondly, Appiah's argument entails that African people fail to think for

themselves. One could argue that it questions the rationality of the people. If he claims that authorities are cited blindly then it either means that they cannot critically look at the belief before accepting it.

In this section I have looked at the method of African philosophy. I have argued that there are two approaches to the style which is ethno-philosophy and contemporary African philosophy. I looked at the question of its legitimacy as philosophy and argued that the denial of the style is premised on the claim that it is not like analytic philosophy or the Western philosophy.

Section V: Transformation, Decolonization and the Quest for Justice

The last section touched a bit on the concept of decolonization. One can argue that it is a concept that is often misused and misunderstood thus often rejected on that basis. This section will focus on the question of decolonization and will argue that we cannot decolonize if we accept the analytic method hegemonic status. I will firstly look at the concept of transformation that had its “hey day” with the birth of democracy in South Africa. I will argue that transformation attempted to solve the problem but experience has taught us it can be easily misused thus fail solve the problems that were created by colonization and apartheid. I will then argue that the best approach to the problem of the colonial curriculum is decolonization. I distinguish between three approaches to decolonization and argue that the moderate account seems to be better equipped to address the issue. I will then focus on the question that must be burning in the reader’s mind, the question of why we need to decolonize philosophy. The last part of this section will question African philosophy and argue that it will be flawed to assume that it is immune to colonisation, thus if we are to properly decolonize we need question aspects of it that has roots in colonization. I will conclude by arguing that the philosophy

discipline cannot continue to exist under the facet of value neutrality which leads to the assumption that it is immune to colonial influence and racial prejudice.

Transformation: its successes and limits

Recent protests about the fees and the colonial structures of the university institutions in South Africa have sparked questions within academic spaces. The universities have been asking themselves the question of how best we can transform our universities in a way that is inclusive to the previously marginalized groups. Such questions include the issue of the representation of the women and people of colour in the spaces of power in the universities and most importantly the curriculum. The question of the transformation of the curriculum is most important because as I will later argue, we do an injustice to the previously marginalised students if the university curriculum does not correspond to their experiences. It is like they are an outsider looking into a globe and they fail to get in because it is too foreign to them.

The attempts to transform the curriculum can be seen in several of our departments, from seeking to employ more black academics to the inclusion of some of the knowledge content from previously marginalised groups such as African philosophy. I will look at the question of transformation? Whether it does the justice that the previously marginalised students seek or whether the way its applied now only change things on the face level and leave the fundamental problems of colonization unshaken. I will argue that transformation is not good enough as it can be used to masks the problems instead of solving it. We need a fundamental change which dismantles the system rather than mask it. I will argue that the moderate account of decolonization is better equipped to this job.

Etieyibo argues that transformation refers to changes geared towards some form of diversity in a particular environment or context or changes undertaken in order to bring into the status quo some other previously marginalised groups (2016).

Transformation seems to be about inclusion of previously marginalised groups into the system that is already in place.

Curriculum transformation is about undermining “knowledge hegemony” thus it refers to the incorporation of insights, ideas, information, experiences, practices, worldviews and perspectives into the programme of studies (Etieyibo 2016).

Disciplines such as African philosophy that were previously not included in the curriculum get to be incorporated together with the styles of philosophies that have always been there. The student is no longer exposed to knowledge paradigms from one part of the world but to a diversity of ideas and can be able to critique the status quo or move away from it.

If we argue that we need to transform the university curriculum then we claiming that there must be an inclusion of previously disadvantaged modes of knowledge. In the context of this paper, it means that we must include other modes of philosophies such as African or Chinese philosophy in the curriculum. Transformation would also entail that there must be representation when it comes to staff. It means that the university would have to put more people of color in the places of power. One example is the University of the Witwatersrand efforts to put more black people as heads of departments. So transformation of the curriculum means that we do not teach western philosophy only in the university and the student is not just exposed to one race of academics.

Etieyibo argues that we are obliged to Africanize philosophy curriculum as a way to prevent wronging the African people by committing testimonial and hermeneutical

injustice against them as that will prevent us from enhancing the autonomy of the Africans and maximizing utility (2016). He uses Miranda Fricker's epistemic injustice argument. Fricker argues that epistemic injustice happens when someone is wronged in virtue of their capacity as a knower. She argues that testimonial injustice is committed when one gives a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word. She argues that hermeneutic injustice is the form of injustice experienced by individuals or groups who do not possess shared social resources or linguistic tools to make sense of their particular experience (Etieyibo 2016). These individuals are not only excluded from the sphere of meaning-making but they also might be less inclined to believe in their testimony. She argues that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are committed against individuals and groups when the curriculum is neither representative enough of their perspectives and experiences, nor robustly speak to them (Etieyibo 2016). Etieyibo argues that a non-Africanized philosophy curriculum undermines the ability of Africans to make sense of the world because of the power relations and structural prejudice in the context of knowledge production as well as its exclusion from the curriculum (Etieyibo 2006).

Contrary to expected results, transformation does not seem to be a threat to the status quo in a way that is satisfactory. When we transform we just diversify the system or in this instance the curriculum but the epistemic discrepancies stay. We include indigenous philosophy in a department that is historically European and believes that western knowledge is epistemic superior; the inclusion would not be fruitful as the relationship between the two philosophies would be unequal. One can argue that Transformation does not deal with the problem that normally arises where one mode of knowledge is regarded as inferior when compared to other modes of knowledge. It assumes that mere inclusion of indigenous knowledge will solve the problem of the

inferiority complex that it attained due to hundred years of the attempt to decimate them. There is a problem with the attempt to transform because it fails to see that western knowledge will always be regarded as superior while the indigenous knowledge as inferior. Mere inclusion does not solve that problem. It just sugarcoat it and make it look like we have achieved something when its shadows are still lurking, haunting the people who it was supposed to emancipate. It is harder to argue for lack of proper representation if the head of department is black as it is assumed that such a move should be enough to bring change the student is seeking.

Let us take an example of African philosophy in our universities. They have recently introduced it with transformation in mind but one can argue that it exists behind the shadow of the western philosophy which is regarded as the *true* philosophy. It is often judged with the lenses of western philosophy and students are often only introduced to it for only a semester. Thus one can argue that it is treated as an insignificant alternative. If transformation was working African philosophy would be taught hand in hand with the already established western philosophy. If we teach ethical theories, we would not only focus on the western theories but also incorporate African philosophy theories. This should be done in a way that makes the two approaches equal. Yet the proponents of transformation would be happy with the former and not see any problems. So one can argue that its inclusion in the curriculum did not remove its inferiority complex, it just hides it while perpetuating the colonial prejudices.

One can argue that transformation may do more harm than help the situation since it can be easily misused. If African philosophy is represented as the insignificant alternative, it opens a room for prejudices that reinforces the skewed beliefs against it. If students are taught western philosophy 90% of their degree and the rest is African

philosophy. They are most likely to believe that western philosophy is the proper way of doing philosophy. They might be resistant to African philosophy because it is different to what they regard as philosophy already. So it seems like African philosophy would be seen as inadequate to be regarded as philosophy.

The question of decolonization

Hunt et al argue that there are four approaches to decolonization. The first one is what they call the “awesome space”. They argue that this space upholds the maxim that assumes that we have never been happier, healthier, or wealthier and any problems are minor and can be addressed by expanding the existing system or making it more efficient (Hunt et al 2015). This view perceives critical analysis as distracting and damaging obstacles to the improvement of the underdeveloped subjects.

Hunt et al argue that colonialism is closely embedded or linked to modernity. They argue that modernity is often associated with everything positive and the notions of university. They argue that the modernity shine is often articulated in ways that hide its shadow or the fact that the very existence of the shining side requires the imposition of systematic violence on others (Hunt et al 2015). They define coloniality as a system that defines the organization and dissemination of epistemic, material and aesthetic resources in ways that reproduces modernity’s imperial project (Hunt et al 2015). Modern grammar is rooted in taken for granted metaphysical principles and supports deep investments in shine of progress, autonomy, innocence and engineered futures. Mignolo argues that modernity’s shadow of coloniality is both hidden face of modernity and the condition of its possibility (Alcoff 2007).

The second approach is what they call the “soft reform space”. They argue that it focuses on inclusion that is mobilized through personal and institutional

transformation. It perceives inequalities as resulting from the failure of people or institutions to identify and integrate diverse individual needs and perspectives within a naturalized and normalized modern framework that itself is beyond critique or visibility (Hunt et al 2015). It fails to acknowledge that the debate is skewed from the outset on the side of those who determine the terms of the conversation, who speaks, when and what is intelligible, comfortable and desirable(Hunt et al 2015) . One can argue that transformation falls under this approach with the assumption that we can just move knowledge paradigms around and solve the pressing problem epistemic inferiority and superiority between western knowledge and indigenous knowledge.

The third approach that they focus on is what they call the “Radical reform space”. This approach recognizes epistemological dominance. It allows for the recognition of how unequal relations of knowledge production result in severely uneven distribution of resources, labor and symbolic value. They have strong normative position that seeks to fix mechanism that produce inequalities (Hunt et al 2005, 27).

One can argue that this approach is in line with Fanons conception of decolonization. He argues that decolonization is replacing a certain species of men with another (Fanon 1963). If we decolonise then the first should be last and the last should be first (Fanon 1963). Thus decolonization on the academic sphere will mean that we should replace a certain type of knowledge that originate from a certain type of people, mainly Europeans or the western world or the previous colonisers; with the knowledge that is derived from the previously marginalised groups. The previously marginalised term in this paper will be used to refer to the group of people that were previously colonised, the descendants of the slaves or in the nutshell people who are not of European ancestry. So if we going to decolonise the philosophy curriculum in Fanon terms then we have to replace western philosophy, regardless of the style, analytic,

continental or Hellenistic with the philosophy that has been derived from the previously marginalised groups. Since this paper will be focusing on African philosophy, decolonization would mean replacing western derived philosophy with African philosophy. Our universities cease regarding western philosophy as the benchmark of philosophy and it becomes subordinate to African philosophy. He argues that the proof of success lies in the whole social structure being changed from bottom up (Fanon 1963).

Decolonization of the curriculum will only be successful if western canons are completely replaced by canons from the previously marginalized groups (Fanon 1963). Thus we cannot have some parts of western philosophy still hegemonic and argue that we have decolonized.

The radical conception of decolonization is not immune to problems. One can argue that indigenous knowledge does not reside in pristine fashion outside of the influences of other knowledge. Bodies of knowledge continually influence each other, demonstrating the dynamism of all knowledge systems (Hunt et al 2015). Thus it would be flawed to argue that we should adopt the indigenous knowledge as pure as they were and forget that as time passed they might have been influenced by other knowledge deriving from other cultures. So we have to accept that we can never have pure indigenous knowledge and that is one of the reason that Fanon version of decolonization cannot work. It fails to see this dynamism.

Decolonization is a process and it is not necessarily easy to achieve. We cannot create new ways of living by reversing technological advancement and going back to old formulas (Tuck and Wayne 2012). If we are to decolonize we must do it in a way that is not harmful to the society's advancement. Anyone who argues that we should get rid of everything that we have achieved so far in the name of decolonization has a wrong

conception of decolonization. Decolonization seeks to remove western knowledge from the ivory towers with the hope that the inclusion of indigenous knowledge will solve problems that the western knowledge is failing at (Tuck and Wayne 2012). Thus decolonization seeks to further advance our societies by providing new ways of approaching problems and that does not entail the decimation of every colonial legacy that seem to be working for society as a whole just because it is colonial.

One can argue that this might be one of the reasons why we need to decolonise. The exclusion of indigenous knowledge from the academic space leaves unchallenged spaces for the (re)colonisation of knowledges and cultures in local environments and contexts (Hall and Tandon 2017). There is the lack of dynamism that is needed and that will eventually be detrimental to society as a whole.

Decolonization of the curriculum involves a process of change that does not necessary involve destroying western knowledge but in decentring it or deterritorialising it (Hall and Tandon 2017). As I had argued earlier, colonization had put western knowledge on a pedestal with the ability to christen something as either knowledge or not. Everything else was subordinate to it and did not have a voice unless it was given by western knowledge. One can argue that western knowledge was given a role of an authority in the realm of knowledge; a big brother that everyone has to look up to (Hall and Tandon 2017). If we are to decolonize then we must remove it from the pedestal. We need to remove its superiority complex and put it on the same realm as every mode of knowledge. It means that we take away its status as the authority that everyone has to appeal to. The authority mentality is closely embedded in colonialism. It saw everything that is different from it as lesser and must make a way for it to flourish. Thus decolonization is more interested in making the playfield level for all the players to ensure that the game is fair.

According to Wolff, decolonizing the curricula does not mean to replace western philosophical content with the African philosophy content because the entire social institution construction of the curricula is part of the colonial heritage (Wolff 2016). Such action would fall into the category of the radical version of decolonization. As I had argued before the radical version cannot work because we would be forced to get rid of the concept of the university institution as Wolff argues as it has colonial roots. Wolff argues that decolonization should entail the abolition of parts of the colonial heritage (Wolff 2016).

This goes in line with the last approach proposed by Hunt et al which they have coined “beyond reform space”. Unlike the last one, it recognizes the ontological dominance. It connects different dimensions of oppression and rejects the idea that mere addition of other ways of knowing will ultimately change the system (Hunt 2015). It argues that the incorporation of multiple ways of knowing through strategies of equity, access and voice recognition, representation on redistribution, does not change the ontological dominance. They recognize the limits of even the most radical transformation that do not disrupt the underlying modern system and its grammars and logic (Hunt et al 2015).

Decolonising the curriculum has to incorporate rethinking the term curriculum itself (Hunt et al 2015). Le grange argues that the dominant idea of curriculum used in universities across the world is based on the factory model of education developed by Frank Taylor (Le grange 2016). The model is assumed that it is one size fit all. This assumption is based on the belief that all institutions deal with the same challenges all across the globe and also on the idea of an ideal student (Le grange 2016). As such it fails to see challenges that arise due to the environment and the student location. The failure of the model is often seen as the failure of the student inability to adapt. One can

argue that this is part of the colonial thinking that rationality is universal and that entails that we should be able to deal with problems the same way. It fails to the effects of the environment (Le grange 2016). Le grange argues that alternative ways of viewing the curriculum outcome-based approach used in South African higher education is therefore necessary.

Decolonisation of the curriculum must involve liberating thought from the fetters of the Cartesian duality; 'I think therefore I am'. Decolonised curriculum is evidenced by the shift from the arrogant 'I' to the humble 'T' (Le grange 2016). The oneness of the self and other humans as a microcosm of the oneness of the self and the cosmos provides impetus for becoming's that are caring towards other human and more-than-human world. The decolonised curriculum is based on the 4Rs central to an emergent indigenous paradigm. The 4Rs are: relational accountability, Respectful representation, reciprocal appropriation and right and regulation.

Why do we need to decolonize?

Fanon argues that the thing which has been colonized becomes a man during the same process which it frees itself (Fanon 1963). The colonised is not a man but a thing, his rationality has been denied thus his personhood. The only way that the colonized can become a man is to decolonise. Thus a black man's personhood can only be attained by the complete change of the system. The complete justice for the oppressed is the attainment of personhood. The oppressed cannot be persons if they still exist under the subjugation of power in any context. If the oppressor still controls their economy, education etc., then they cannot be persons. So in order for them to be persons they have to take back the power that they lost during colonialism. One can argue that for the oppressed to be persons their ontological being has to be accepted and respected. Thus

justice for the colonised can only be achieved through the process of decolonization. We need to change the system entirely for the colonised to get full justice.

It is often argued that there is no need to decolonize. Such people argue that decolonization will only take us back rather than give us anything that will build our society in a better way. Such argument normally surfaces when South Africans talk about the issue of land. People often argue that returning land to the indigenous owners of it will cause more harm to the country than to help it. What they fail to understand is that returning land to the indigenous people would be a form of justice. The argument for the return of the land is premised on the claim that the white people took the land forcefully from the black people and we cannot talk about a way forward if such an injustice is not addressed. One can argue that decolonization is also premised on such an argument. In order to build a better society for our children we need remedy historical injustices. We can only do that by decolonizing. Thus decolonization equals justice and justice equals a happier society.

Le grange argues that decolonization is a necessary response to first and second generation colonialism, neo-colonialism and neoliberalism (2016) He argues that the first generation colonialism was the conquering of the physical spaces and the bodies of the colonised. The first generation of colonialism entails events such as slavery and the occupation of the colonized lands. They colonised the states by enslaving its people and looting its resources by imposing their own laws. The second generation of colonialism was the colonization of the mind through disciplines such as education, science, economics and law (Le grange 2016). The colonised were taught to wash away their cultures, knowledge and way of life for the western ones. They way taught that their way of life was inferior and full of superstitions thus in order to be regarded as rational

they had to adopt western ways. The schools taught them that to be rational was to be civilised and to be civilised was to adopt the western way of life.

The system was successful because it gave the people incentives. They received more respect and recognition from the colonisers than their uncivilised brothers. It seems like they got closer to personhood thus more people were keen to wash away their ways of living for the western ones (Le grange 2016). Neo-colonialism relates to the achievement of technical independence by a country that is still under the influence of ex colony or newly developed superpowers. France ex colonies are a good example of Neo-colonialism especially the Democratic Republic of Congo. One can argue that France is still has a good influence in the decision making of the state even though it is argued to have left the state (). Another example of Neo-colonialism is the influence that the western countries over African states. Weak states that are often former colonies always have to succumb to the demands made by the superpowers with the fear that they might be sanctioned against or worse attacked if they disagree with the superpower states. Iraqi war serves as a good example. The argument that the United State had to import democracy to the people of Iraq is premised on the argument that a state has to exist according to the western rules of statehood or it must be of use to the state in power otherwise it is prone to attack by such states (Beetham 2009). Thus the invasion in Iraq is the perfect example of neo-colonialism as the US did not have any problem with the regime until it seemed to go against it.

Le grange argues that the first and second generation colonialism resulted in the denigration and decimation of indigenous knowledge (Le grange 2016). Santos refers to the decimation of knowledge as an epistemicide. He defines epistemicide as the erasure of knowledge (Hall and Tandon 2017). According to him, the unequal exchange among cultures has always implied the death of knowledge of the subordinated culture. The

knowledge and cultures from the colonisers were sold to the colonized as civilised and the colonised cultures as uncivilised and sometimes inhuman (Hall and Tandon 2017). This led to the colonised people stripping away and detaching themselves from their culture in favour of the one that was offered or force fed by their colonisers. One can argue that the same applies to the indigenous knowledge of the colonised people. What they regarded as knowledge was argued to be superstition and unintelligible by their colonisers. Therefore in their quest to be respected as full persons they had to strip themselves away from everything that made the coloniser to question their rationality.

Fanon argues that the colonized is always trying to be a person and he adopts everything that is esteemed by his colonisers and discards everything that might be obstacle to get there (Fanon 1963). This ultimately led to the death of knowledge of the subordinated since even they distance themselves from it. One could also argue that it means that the knowledge of the colonized people did not have a chance to develop. The only time that people ever gave attention to it was when its legitimacy was being questioned. This lead to its ultimate death thus paving a way to western hegemonic culture that is taking place.

According to Santos, South African universities have adopted western models of academic organization which largely excluded and decimated the knowledge of colonised people (Hall and Tandon 2017). The preservation of colonial academic organisation was also done under the guise of academic freedom and institutional autonomy (Hall and Tandon 2017). This leads to utter rejection of anything that is different from what they are used to. The institutional autonomy means that it's only the institutions that has the right to question what the students are taught and how. This may be one of the reasons that we have universities that are western based in African countries. The only thing African about these institutions is the location that

they are in while everything else is European. Etieyibo makes a distinction between a university in Africa and an African university (2016). He argues that we have universities in Africa instead of African universities (Etieyibo 2016). The institutions argue for the continuation with the European methodologies by claiming that their standards will fall if they try to change and include something different (Etieyibo 2016). In the context of the paper, this refers to African indigenous knowledge in their curriculum. Thus they argue that it's better for the education to be European so that it could be recognized and respected internationally by other countries.

Does philosophy need to be decolonized?

The Universalist nature of philosophy as argued by the analytic philosophers entails that philosophy should be immune to colonization and racial prejudice. If philosophy by its very nature must be relevant to every human being then it cannot have any racial prejudice or have any colonization aspects as that would stem from the particular. Since proper philosophy cannot and should have such prejudices then there is no need to decolonize it. The concept of decolonization itself is foreign to the field because its acceptance leads to the acceptance of the particular in the discipline. I will argue the earlier chapters have shown that such a conception of philosophy is flawed. Then I will show that since the universal has an implicit relationship with the particular, philosophy is not immune to the problem of colonization. I will argue that the rejection of African philosophy is one of the reasons that we need to start thinking of the colonial prejudices that the field has. I will then conclude by arguing that the philosophy curriculum needs to be decolonised in order to mirror the realities of the students from the previously marginalized background. Teaching them only western philosophy which is grounded on the concepts that are foreign to them leads to an injustice.

The Universalist approach to philosophy argues that any philosophical text must deal with the problems that applicable to every human being. Every human being must be able to relate to the problems and the solutions proposed, whether they accept the conclusions or not. If we accept that philosophy is universal then we are bound to accept that there is no need to decolonize philosophy. If there is no need to decolonize philosophy then this whole project is useless and not worth the time invested in.

Earlier, some arguments were provided against the absolute universalism stance of analytic philosophy and philosophy as a whole. It argued it is impossible to achieve absolute abstractness and universalism as philosophical concepts are influenced by the cultural experiences that the philosophers come from. The universal is not divorced from the particular. They are intertwined and it is flawed for the ultra-faithful to assume that we can have something that is strictly universal. One can argue philosophical questions do not fall from the sky, ready made but rather they are the consequent of the societal experiences. Thus if we accept this view, the absolute universalism stance becomes flawed and that opens a room for the talk of decolonization.

The conception of philosophy that has been accepted widely is western. It does not matter which style of philosophy a department follows, majority if not every philosophy department in the world are western philosophy orientated. We need to recognize that, it is that case due to colonization and the epistemicide that took place. To decolonize philosophy in one way entails recognizing that there are styles of doing philosophy outside of the western culture. Such recognition comes with respect that facilitates a healthy dialogue between different styles of doing philosophy.

The rejection of African philosophy is based on the assumption that it needs to mirror the already established methods of doing philosophy which I have already argued to be western. Such assumption puts African philosophy in the position of a

subordinate. The decolonization project aims to eradicate the superiority and subordination relationship between indigenous knowledge and western knowledge. Thus we need to decolonize philosophy because the analytic style of doing philosophy implicitly reinforces the colonial agenda by subordinating African philosophy.

In conclusion, we can only argue that philosophy does not need to be decolonised if we accept the analytic method hegemonic status that entails universalism. That approach still does not save the person who does not believe in decolonization because as I have argued, philosophy is only immune to decolonization if it is absolutely universal but I have shown that that is impossible due to the implicit nature of the particular in the universal. I have also argued if we do not decolonize we endorse western philosophy as the proper method of doing philosophy and accept the rejection of previously marginalised styles of doing philosophy such as African philosophy. In conclusion, philosophy needs to be decolonized in order to open a room for new ideas that could lead to the solutions to problems that we have been faced with for decades.

Decolonising African philosophy

African philosophy was first introduced on the analytic sphere as the first African philosophers were from the style. Its first role was to show that African people were not as primitive as the coloniser claimed. The first African philosophers were trying to prove that African philosophy existed thus the African people had philosophy and that meant that they qualified to be regarded as persons in the Kantian definition. Kant argued that a person is a rational being; a rational being is an end in himself and cannot or should not be used as a means to an end (Williams 2017). The denial of African philosophy facilitated the use of African people as means to an end. Since they were not

persons the colonisers could own them and use them while denying their humanity. Thus the introduction of African philosophy was a challenge to the system and that is one of the reasons that it was met with hostility. If one is to accept that there is African philosophy then they must accept the African as a person, a rational being who has the equal footing with his master or the coloniser. It meant that the rights and privileges that were granted to the master would also be granted to the slave. There was no rational reason to keep on treating the African as a mere means to an end as that would have established that they were an end in themselves.

Traditional African philosophy was christened folk philosophy or ethno-philosophy because of the way it was conducted. The African philosophers who were trained in western philosophy went back to their communities to try and extract the philosophical thought of those people (Wiredu 2009). An African philosopher here means black or philosophers who are from the African descendent or philosophers who are originally from the African continent. These philosophers tried to show that the people from the continent beliefs were rational and coherent. They argued that even though the thought was communal it was still philosophical.

Traditional African philosophy was introduced in an already established field which viewed philosophy as something that is done by individuals and can never be conceived as something that could be found in a community. It is because of this reason that many western philosophers attacked the communal base of the philosophy. Western philosopher in this context can be defined as a philosopher that follows the doctrines and methods of doing philosophy that are derived in western culture. This definition is a bit tricky because almost all of African philosophers were trained in the western philosophy methodology. The distinction that we can use here may be that western philosophers believe that the best methods of doing philosophers can only be

found in the culture that they have been taught in. On the contrary, African philosophers were able to use their training to see beyond the method that they have been trained. Therefore western philosophers viewed African philosophy as just views or beliefs that are found in a community. Hountondjie who was an African born western philosopher argued that philosophy had to be individualistic (Wiredu 2009). He argued that communal beliefs could not be dogmatic since they belong to the society and accepted by the people in the community without critical assessment.

One can argue that the assertion that western philosopher held against African traditional philosophy failed to see that there is no such a thing a communal thought. What is later accepted as a communal thought must have come from an individual and later accepted by the community after thinking about it (Wiredu 2009). Thus the communal thought was once an individual thought that got adopted by the community. I argue that the members must have really thought about the coherence of the thought or idea before accepting because their faculties. Thus it is really misleading to call traditional African philosophy communal as there is no such a thing that is born out of a community. A community is made up of individuals and those individuals are the ones who come up with these philosophical thoughts that are later adopted. Since it is communal it means that the beliefs or the theories are refined first before they are accepted. The process of scrutinizing an idea before it is accepted is one of things that one could argue makes the communal thought philosophical. It means that if we are to decolonise we need to first accept that the way we do African philosophy is not free from colonization. African philosophy as it stands works within the western philosophical culture. The most accepted one so far is the analytic way of doing African philosophy. There is also the African philosophy that has is continental. When we argue for the decolonization of philosophy, it means that we must firstly accept that the way

we do African philosophy is colonized. One can argue that this is because all of the African philosophers have been trained in the western culture or methodology of doing philosophy. A philosopher who has been trained in the analytic style will probably do African philosophy in an analytic way just like a philosopher who has been trained in the continental style or way will do African philosophy in a continental way. If we are to decolonise we must recognize this discrepancies. We must accept that the way we do African philosophy is colonised. This is not to say that it is wrong to do African philosophy in the western culture but rather that we should question the effects of colonisation in the way we do philosophy even when it is not western. As much as it comes with advantages we must admit that there might be disadvantages that will be detrimental to the growth of the African philosophy method.

African philosophy has spent most of its time defending its legitimacy and comparing itself to the already established western philosophy. The first African philosophers focused on whether there is such a thing such as African philosophy and if there was how it relates to the already established philosophies. As much one might argue that we have long passed that era, one can explicitly see that they still affect the field. It's like a ghost that always shows up when we least expect it. One can argue that this is due to the colonial influence in it. If we are to do African philosophy in an analytic style then we must adhere to all its characteristics and the problem arises when we try to modify those characteristics in order to suit our African philosophy aims. Such modifications are the ones that lead to the questioning of African philosophy. African philosophy looks like it is the diluted version of the western philosophy or that it is going through stages that western philosophy has already passed thus an infant in the field. This may be one of the reasons that philosophers outside of the style find it easy to question it and even deny its existence.

One can argue that the African philosophy that is done in a continental style is more contested than western philosophy that is continental. The rejection comes in both ways; it is contested for being continental and for being African. The earlier chapter has dealt with the question of the legitimacy of other styles of doing philosophy. It has shown that in the light of analytic philosophy seeing itself as the only proper method of doing philosophy styles such as continental are often questioned and rejected. This hostility was argued to be detrimental to the field itself. Thus it is safe to argue that African philosophy that is done outside of the analytic style stands more chance of its legitimacy being denied. It will be rejected for being African as there is the belief that philosophy is universal and should not be subjected to quantifiers such as African or Chinese. It will also be rejected for being continental. Thus African philosophy that is for example continental suffers a double blow. If we are to decolonise we need to look at such blows and not just assume that doing African philosophy in a western methodology will always give us good results.

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philosophy that follows a style other analytic, for example continental, suffers a double blow. If we are to decolonise we need to look at such blows and not just assume that doing African philosophy in a western methodology will always give us good results.

One can argue that African philosophy has a chance to grow and flourish if it sheds of the colonial mentality of accepting that one must conform to the already available western styles of doing philosophy. It makes it easy for other styles to question its authenticity if we still see them as the blue print that we must copy. It is as if there is a blueprint of philosophy and we are just trying to add our own flavour. Therefore one can argue that African philosophy will fail to exist outside of this blueprint and I am sure that African philosophers would agree that such a mentality is colonial. African philosophers must recognise and accept that they are the products of western philosophy and that will always reflect on their work but that does not mean that it's the blueprint of philosophy. It is on the same realm as African philosophy thus they should stop feeling bounded by the western philosophy rules. Otherwise we must accept that African philosophy must be subordinate to western philosophy but that would mean that we have already failed and there is no way we can decolonize the field. Colonization entails that everything western is superior while everything else is inferior and regarding western philosophy as the blueprint ultimately leads us to that conclusion. Thus if we want decolonize African philosophy must start questioning its relationship with western philosophy. Whether it sees itself as an equal or whether it is looking up to western philosophy as a big brother that it needs to copy.

The denial of traditional African philosophy can be argued to be as a reason of not appealing to any western style of doing philosophy. One can argue that this is because contemporary philosophy is inherently western and if one was to argue that they are doing philosophy they must appeal to the rules that are already established and

familiar. If we want to do African philosophy that does not conform to that then we should call it something else rather than philosophy. We should have our own separate department. Anything that is known as philosophy should appeal to the already established framework from the western styles. This means that it's not philosophy if it does not have western influence. This critique fails to recognise that what we call philosophy today is radically different to what was known as philosophy in ancient times. Secondly, it also fails to recognise that what is regarded as Greek philosophy has been argued to have its origins in Africa even though it has acquired a European nature throughout the years. So what is philosophy is not static and is forever evolving, by restricting the term philosophy to the already established style and denying anything that does not look like that fails to do justice to the discipline itself. African traditional philosophy seeks to find philosophies of African people by going back to the communities and representing the thoughts in a manner that is not too critical. It tries to explain what the people mean by that thought. Thus it works rigorously inside the thought system rather than trying to prove whether the thought is right or wrong. One of the examples of this is the Yoruba conception of destiny (Gbadegesin 2004). The philosophers writing on that often try to understand what the concept of destiny entails and means rather than question whether it's correct to believe in the concept of destiny which is the analytic approach to the question (Gbadegesin 2004). One can object by arguing that the former approach takes for granted whether the truth of the concept of destiny while the latter recognizes that we need to establish whether it is coherent to believe in destiny before we can even talk about what it then entails. The reply to such an objection would be that the study of African traditional philosophy do both of that. It respects the communal view by taking for granted the truthfulness of the fundamental premise that the thought relies on because it assumes that the people who came up with

that thought have already dealt with that and moves to the issue of trying to understand what the people mean by the thought. This approach works much better because they already have a definition of what they mean, in this instance destiny. Destiny becomes something that one is born with and cannot be altered. A philosopher is only left with the problem of the consequences of accepting such a concept in a society. Thus the existence of destiny becomes a metaphysical question that we cannot accept or deny because we cannot prove it. So such an approach cuts short the problem of trying to define a concept. Which is the main problem of analytic philosophy, trying to define concepts and we fail to move past that and deal with the more meaty stuff.

Transformation has the shortfall of not recognising the above problem. It just says that we should have African philosophy in the curriculum but fails to see the colonisation aspects of that the one that is accepted and the one that is discarded as lesser philosophy. It often fails to see the fact that even that African philosophy exists in the shadow of the western philosophy in our departments. It is the inferior version that is only put in place in order to please the black students that are complaining that the curriculum fails to mirror their lives. So transformation brings about change on the face and makes the oppressed feel like things are better when the fundamental problems are still lurking in the shadows. So when we do not talk about the western influence in African philosophy, the problem keeps perpetuating itself and we lose the initial battle.

Section VI: Objections and Responses

I have argued that analytic philosophy sees itself as *the* only proper method of doing philosophy. It does so by arguing for the universal conception of philosophy that prides its characteristics and rejects anything that looks different to it. I have shown that such a view of philosophy is oppressive to other styles of doing philosophy and used

continental and commentary philosophy as examples. I later showed that African philosophy suffers a double blow for being from a different and marginalized culture and for also being different to analytic philosophy. I went to argue that we need to decolonize the philosophy discipline and the curriculum in order to achieve epistemic justice to the previously marginalized people. I have shown that the decolonization project will almost impossible be if we accept the analytic philosophy's hegemonic status. Thus in order to decolonize we must start by questioning such a status.

This section will evaluate the arguments that I have presented and will question their adequacy and validity. It will do so by looking at the possible objections against the claims that I have put forward. One of possible objection will focus on the argument that claims that decolonization might mean regression. It will argue that theories from the previously marginalized groups were not developed due to colonization and their inclusion might mean that we should go back in time. Secondly, the definition of analytic philosophy that is being represented is not held by all analytic philosophers and some aspects of it have been revised thus this paper is a historical thesis. I will then look at the responses against the above objections and conclude that the arguments presented on my paper are still relevant and deserve attention especially if we are interested in the decolonization project.

As much as it is understandable that we need to decolonize in order to grant justice to the people who were previously colonized, there might be a higher price to pay for that. One can argue that African philosophy has not developed. As we have seen in the earlier chapter that the reason might be its preoccupation with proving that it is a proper method of doing philosophy. This nevertheless does not change that it is still preoccupied with issues that contemporary philosophy has long passed. This might be the reason that it is often compared to folk philosophy rather than professional

philosophy. African philosophy can be argued to be more than anthropological than philosophical. If we are to recognize African philosophy as philosophy, we might be forced to alter our definition of philosophy or the way that we assume philosophy must look like. This might be harmful to the discipline rather than build it in a sustainable manner. If we argue that African philosophy should have the same recognition as western philosophy or contemporary professional philosophy and be taught hand in hand with it then we face the problem getting stuck instead of progressing.

Decolonization should propose a healthy way to move forward for the discipline and not propose ways that ultimately lead to regression. Thus we should not sacrifice epistemic progression in the name of decolonization.

One can argue that the paper seems to be addressing historical issues that have been dealt with. The conception of analytic philosophy that it uses has long been abandoned. One can also argue that the question of whether African philosophy exist or not is something that has been settled a decade ago. Thus the core assumption of the paper focuses on issues that have been solved and this paper ignores the current approach to analytic philosophy that has a healthier relationship with other philosophies compared to what has been argued. The Universalist conception of philosophy does not necessarily mean that styles of philosophy must mirror analytic philosophy. It rather argues that for a text to be philosophical it needs to be able to apply to every human being. It should be written for human beings in general rather than a specific group of people. Therefore the whole paper is based on flawed and settled arguments

One can respond to the above criticism by arguing that what has been referred to as the particular conception of philosophy does the same thing as the universal conception of philosophy. The Akan concept of a person may be a belief that was

derived from the Akan community yet it does not say that the concept only applies to the Akan people. When they say that a person is xyz, they refer to every human being breathing. It seems like the distinction between the particular and the universal needs more clarification then. If what makes a philosophical belief is its applicability to the human race in general then African philosophy is universal.

Secondly, the paper is not a historical thesis because such behaviour is not completely eradicated. The questioning of African philosophy may not be as explicit as before but that does not mean that it has ceased. It rather exists in a form of comparing it to the western philosophies. Thus what has changed is the manner of the rejection.

Therefore one can argue the arguments brought forward by the paper are still relevant. They are not easily dismissed because even if we argue that African philosophy has been accepted as a proper method of doing philosophy, it is still not seen as developed enough to be on the same level as western philosophy.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to make a case for African philosophy by problematizing the analytic method status as the only proper way of doing philosophy. One of the main premises is the claim that if we fail to adequately addresses the problem that this status gives us, we will not be able to decolonize. I have argued that we cannot turn a blind eye to the project of decolonization as it aims to address the epistemic injustices that were caused by colonization. I have addressed the problems that my argument might face and came to conclusion that such objections were not good enough to make us abandon this great project.

The first section focused on the three most accepted methods of doing philosophy. These methods are analytic, continental and commentary. I have tried to

explain the history of each of the styles and how one might characterise each of them. I have also recognized that the majority of the time that the metaphilosophical question is addressed in both analytic and continental, it is often to distinguish between the two. The comparison is not a friendly one because, it is either one has to defend itself or the other is asserting its superiority. This served as a good introduction to the next section that focused on the superiority problem.

The second section in the paper focused on the problem caused by the superiority complex that analytic philosophy has over other styles of philosophy. One of the argument claims that the antagonistic relationship between analytic and continental gives us a good reason to believe that it sees itself as the only proper method of doing philosophy. I also went to argue that such behaviour can be seen also with the relationship with commentary philosophy. It is often presented as the history of modern philosophy which reduces it to something that has been and has lost its relevance. I concluded the section by remarking that such a relationship is not healthy for the discipline and needs to be addressed.

The third section deals further with the question of analytic style as the proper method of doing philosophy. It locates the problem in the assumption that philosophy should be universal, abstract and exist in a form of writing. The section looked at a paper by Jones who is an analytic philosopher arguing for a position he calls ultra-faithful. The paper assumes that such characteristics should be true in order for anything to be called philosophy regardless of which camp they are from. This further asserts the argument that for anything to be respected as philosophy, it must mirror the analytic method. I went on to look at the problem that is caused by the universalism stance on other methods of doing philosophy, looking specifically at African philosophy

as a case. Lastly, I looked at the objections from the feminist camp against the definition of philosophy that Jones has presented.

The fourth section looked African philosophy as a style of doing philosophy. The section began by focusing on the two different approaches to the style. The style is broken into ethno-philosophy which is argued to be following the particularism approach to philosophy and the contemporary philosophy approach which argued to be following the universalism approach to philosophy. I argued that ethno-philosophy started as one of the ways to prove that Africans had philosophy thus was persons. I also looked at its denial and recognized two things that led to it. I focused firstly on the coloniser and the colonized relationship. The recognition of African philosophy entailed the recognition of Africans as full persons. Secondly, the analytic philosophy hegemonic status which made philosophers who are trained in that style to reject African philosophy for not following the characteristics of philosophy those they know.

The fifth section dealt with the issue of the decolonization of the curriculum. I distinguished between transformation and decolonization. I argued that transformation is not well equipped to deal with the problem of the colonisation legacy thus we need to decolonize. I looked at the four approaches to decolonization and settled for the moderate account as it allowed for styles in the discipline to work together and also be on the same epistemic level. I looked at the question that touches on the importance of decolonization and argued that the indigenous people can never get justice if we do not decolonize. I went to address the question of whether philosophy needs to be decolonized and argued that since philosophy is affected by human experience then it was not immune to the effects of colonization. Lastly, I investigated the possibility of African philosophy having elements of colonial heritage that might hamper it from progressing.

The sixth and the final section focused on the objection against the whole paper and concluded that the objections were not strong enough to make us abandon the decolonization project.

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