



**UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
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**RE-LIVING LIBERATION WAR MILITIA BASES: VIOLENCE, HISTORY AND
THE MAKING OF POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITIES IN ZIMBABWE**

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Declaration

I Edmore Chitukutuku, declare that '**Re-living Liberation War Militia Bases: Violence and the Making of Political Subjectivities in Zimbabwe**' is my work and that the sources used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. Parts of Chapter 2 and Chapter 7 have been published in an article in the Journal of East African Studies.

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Signature

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10 October 2017

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Cynthia, Dadirai. My parents Mr. Michael and Mrs. Sylvia Chitukutuku, and the entire Chitukutuku family: My sisters, Mrs Shupikai Mawoko, Mrs Memory Kajauchire and their families; and little sister Melody, Rachel Chitukutuku. To my brothers, Leonard, Munyaradzi, Gift, Michael (Jnr) and their families, thank you for your love and support!

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ABSTRACT

In this study, I explore the ways in which legacies of how and where the Zimbabwean liberation war was fought, the landscapes of the struggle, and the violence associated with it were invoked at district and village level by ZANU PF as it sought to instill loyalty, fear and discipline through its supporters and the youth militia. Although they were invoking memories of former guerrilla bases, and the violence often associated with them, the bases set up by ZANU-PF youth militia in 2008 were not established on the actual sites of former guerrilla camps. However, since then, ZANU-PF war veterans in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) have been returning to the actual sites of the 1970s liberation war guerrilla bases in order to teach senior staff the history of the liberation struggle, drawing together former liberation war collaborators or ‘messengers’ who assisted guerrilla fighters during the war, as well as contemporary unemployed ZANU-PF youth. They used these often highly choreographed events to talk about battles during war, to perform liberation songs, and to explain how ancestors assisted them during the struggle. I examine these recent events, and argue that both the establishment of the new militia bases in the post-2000 period, and invocation of the old, former guerrilla bases dating to the *Chimurenga* period are deliberate efforts by ZANU-PF to make violence, geography and landscapes do political/ideological work by forging political subjectivities and loyalties that sustain its rule.

In stressing these continuities between the 1970s guerrilla bases, and their invocation and reproduction in post-2000 Zimbabwe, I am interested in what the base enables and does in terms of the formation of political subjectivities. I aim to show through critical analysis of the political history and local accounts of the second *Chimurenga* why political subjectivity and the base are important in the re-examination of both the history and the literature on this history. The base allows for a sophisticated reading of political subjectivity in that it was the space through which the grand narrative of the liberation struggle hit the ground, entered into people’s homes, and constituted a complex relationship between political education, conscientisation, freedom and violence. The liberation war base was meant to make people inhabit subjectivities characterized by bravery, resistance, and resilience when fighting the might of Rhodesian army. In the post-colonial context, the base served the purpose of annihilating the kind of rebellious subjectivities inhabited during the liberation war and replacing them with those characterized by fear, pretense, and quietude. This substitution explains the subjectivities that exist in the post-independence rural population and reveals the purpose that electoral violence has served in Zimbabwe’s post-independence period, especially through the base. However people have also engaged with these landscapes outside of ZANU-PF politicking and this has produced critical subjectivities where people challenge ZANU-PF dominant narratives.

1 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction: Background and contextualisation

The Republic of Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 after a fifteen-year long liberation war. Studies on Zimbabwe's post-independence violence tend to concentrate on the typologies of political violence (McGregor, 2013; Alexander, 2013; Sachikonye, 2011; Chaumba et al, 2003), with little focus on the ways in which President Robert Mugabe and his political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) produced and 'remade' militia bases, as social and political spaces in which a certain political life was enacted and accentuated. ZANU-PF targeted the youth, who had never participated in the liberation struggle but could appropriate its discourses and practices and deploy them in a 'project' of political violence. This raises questions about how Zimbabwean political subjectivities are produced and constituted across historical periods. This thesis examines the production and reproduction of political subjectivities in contemporary Zimbabwe through an attention to rural youth and social and political spaces of the base.

In examining what constitutes Zimbabwean political subjectivity, the thesis focuses on the past and contemporary political life and sociality of the liberation war bases. The concept of the 'base' evolved during the liberation war and it was an outpost where attacks on Rhodesian forces were planned and executed (Sachikonye 2011). I am conceiving the base as a political space in which the liberation war was organized. The base became a site and a distinctive political form for the organization and framing of a distinct set of practices that involve discipline and punishment, memory-making, the ritual arousal of affect, the enforcement of forms of authority and hierarchy, enacted through recruitment, and training of recruits into routines of doing violence. Paradoxically, even though the 'base' was explicitly intended to serve as a space for the revolutionary transformation, it 'works' in the contemporary moment as a vehicle for recapitulating the past and reproducing - rather than transforming - prior social forms and dispositions. I explore what these bases mean in the imagination of the war veterans, collaborators, ordinary citizens who participated in the war and the "born free" youth militias, tracking how the bases came to produce political subjects

from the 1970s to the 2000s, through the structures themselves as well as through the historical imagination they have enabled.

In this thesis, I take the social life of the bases as a way to explore how people in Bindura South, an electoral constituency in northern Zimbabwe, become entrenched in participating in ZANU-PF projects of political violence. How is it that people are being drawn into a way of seeing the world as one in which they need to align their political commitments, ideals and aspirations to a foundation in the liberation war, and thus with the former liberation war movement and the ruling party, ZANU-PF led by President Robert Mugabe? How is it that people come to identify and belong to this history, that they must fight to defend it, and organize themselves into friends and enemies around this history? How would we understand this highly nationalistic political subjectivity, one that is clear about the demand to eliminate internal enemies and traitors through violence when necessary? What are the techniques or technologies that enable that to happen? Central to my argument is the view that the liberation war base was a locus point and site for transformation during the liberation war and as an idea or space for the reinforcement of the *status quo*. This argument provides a vantage point in which we can begin to understand the politics of the present.

1.1 Zimbabwean Politics of violence

It has been noted that Zimbabwe has a history of violence and its legacies continues in the present. Soon after the attainment of political independence in 1980, President Robert Mugabe deployed soldiers in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces to deal with the supposed threat of dissidents. The 5th Brigade soldiers, a North Korean trained unit was predominantly dominated by the ZANLA forces, an armed wing of the ZANU-PF (Alexander, 1998). The deployed soldiers killed more than 20 000 civilians, and the operation was dubbed *Gukurahundi*, meaning the first rains which wash away the chaff (Sisulu, 1997). The soldiers were viewed as the first rains and the Ndebele people as the chaff. In the post-2000 political and economic crisis, ZANU-PF faced the sternest challenge to its rule. During the 2008 presidential election run off campaign in particular, the ZANU-PF youth had to go about

perpetrating the most horrific and heinous acts of violence on opposition supporters, chanting ZANU-PF slogans, singing the 1970s liberation war songs and using guerrilla methods of torture on their victims. ZANU-PF lost the majority in parliament to the opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and lost in a referendum to amend the constitution (Makumbe 2002). This shook the ZANU-PF officials who stood to lose posts as cabinet ministers and prompted a crisis within the party (LeBas 2006).

The economic crisis in the form of hyper-inflation, deteriorating infrastructure, health system and social support services, high unemployment levels and cash and food shortages as well as corruption by ZANU-PF government officials enhanced the people's desire for political change (Worby 2003; Jones 2010; Hanke 2009). This endeared people to the opposition MDC and enabled them to penetrate ZANU-PF's strongholds and signaled the end of the ZANU-PF era. One of the profound ways that ZANU-PF used to remain in power was through the production of a violent election campaign. The violence of the campaign was sustained by means of the establishment and use of youth militia bases, which deliberately deployed languages, including songs and practices resembling those pioneered during the liberation war of the 1970s. ZANU-PF sought to use the history of the liberation war to make emotional appeals to the people for support and legitimacy as well as to claim that they are the only party able to fulfill the country's independence promises. Therefore the politics surrounding the historiography of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle [*Chimurenga*] intensified greatly with what Ranger (2004) called 'patriotic history', an increasingly narrowed and exclusivist ZANU PF-dominated telling of the war, through which the ruling party effectively marginalised the political opposition.

This politicized historiography was not only about competing narratives of the past, nor was ZANU PF's use of *Chimurenga* legacies limited to questions of legitimacy among the political elite. Rather, legacies of how and where the war was fought, the landscapes of the struggle, and the violence associated with it were invoked at district and village level as ZANU PF sought to instill loyalty, fear and discipline through its supporters and the youth militia. Although they were invoking memories of former guerrilla bases, and the violence often associated with them, the bases set up by ZANU PF youth militia in 2008 were not established on the actual sites of former

guerrilla camps. However, since then, ZANU-PF war veterans in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) have been returning to the actual sites of the 1970s liberation war guerrilla bases in order to teach senior staff the history of the liberation struggle, drawing together former liberation war collaborators¹ or ‘messengers’ who assisted guerrilla fighters during the war - known as *chimbwidos* (female youth) and *mujibas* (male youth) – as well as contemporary unemployed ZANU-PF youth. They used these often highly choreographed events to talk about battles during war, to perform liberation songs, and to explain how ancestors assisted them during the struggle, for example, when they were led to sacred places by spirit mediums where they established bases and hid from Rhodesia forces.

This dissertation examines these recent events, as a means of arguing that both the establishment of the new militia bases in the post-2000 period, and invocation of the old, former guerrilla bases dating to the *Chimurenga* period are deliberate efforts by ZANU-PF to make violence, geography and particular landscapes do political/ideological work by forging political subjectivities and loyalties that sustain its rule. In stressing these continuities between the 1970s guerrilla bases, and their invocation and reproduction in post-2000 Zimbabwe, I am interested in what the base enables and does in terms of the formation of political subjectivities. I aim to show through critical analysis of the political history and local accounts of the second *Chimurenga* why political subjectivity and the base are important in the re-examination of both the history and the literature on this history. The base allows for a sophisticated reading of political subjectivity in that it was the space through which the grand narrative of the liberation struggle hit the ground, entered into people’s homes, and constituted a complex relationship between political education, conscientisation, freedom and violence. The liberation war base was meant to make people inhabit subjectivities characterized by bravery, resistance, and resilience when fighting the might of Rhodesian regime army. In the post-colonial context, the base served the purpose of annihilating the kind of rebellious subjectivities inhabited during the liberation war and replacing them with those characterized by fear, pretense, and quietude. This substitution explains the subjectivities that exist in the

¹ The word ‘collaborator’ in other parts of the world usually connotes someone who collaborates with the enemy or with the former colonial oppressor. This is an English word used in the Zimbabwean

post-independence rural population and reveals the purpose that electoral violence has served in Zimbabwe's post-independence period, especially through the base.

1.2 Justification of the study

This work contributes to a rich field of study on how ZANU-PF has mobilized the history of the liberation war to legitimize its rule and to create loyal political subjectivities among the people. Scholars have shown through intensive debate on the liberation war historiography how ZANU-PF sought to use violence as a source of emotion and legitimacy (Alexander, 1998; LeBas 2006). According to Kriger (1995:139) the liberation war had claimed “an estimated 30 000 to 80 000 lives and had contributed to the liberation from colonial rule, thus making it an important emotional symbol and source of legitimacy for ZANU-PF.” Most literature produced in the early 1980s by Martin and Johnson (1981), Frederikse (1982), Lan (1985), Ranger (1985) and Bhebe (1999) articulated how the liberation war was fought on the ground and how the ZANU's guerrilla military wing Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) managed to fight the glorified Rhodesian army, until the fighting was resolved through negotiations at Lancaster House in 1979. Such work was important not only in providing heroic narratives of nationalism but also in articulating the political and military strategy of ZANU mobilization during the 1970s which is central to this work. Ranger (1985), Manungo (1991), Cliffe et al (1980), Sachikonye (2011), Brickhill (1995) and Kriger (1992) point to guerrillas' use of ‘normative appeals’ such as promises to deal with land shortage in Tribal Trust Lands or native reserves, to end forced labour, to provide good prices and markets for agricultural produce and to end the war as reasons why the people participated in the struggle. They also noted the importance of the role of political education through the *pungwes* in conscientising the people, which were important grassroots organizational framework for the war and the 1980 election victory for ZANU-PF.

Scholars concerned themselves with the experiences of women (Barnes 1993), with the ideology and religion, both traditional and Christian in terms of how they assisted in mobilizing the people and assisting guerrillas and communities against Rhodesian government (Bhebe and Ranger 1995; Bhebe, Chung 2006, Hove's *Bones* 1988, *Ancestors* 1996, Vera's *Nehanda* 1993; Daneel 1995, 1998; Fontein 2006a; Manungo

1991; Kriger 1992) and with need for healing after the war (Schmidt 1997). Other scholars produced work on soldiers and fighting; general accounts of the war or boasts of triumph of the Rhodesian intelligence services, glorifications of the special services, picture books, and white autobiographies (Flower 1987; Reid-Dally 1999; Moorcraft 2012; Stiff 2000). All this work is important in understanding the dynamics, complexities and different dimensions of the liberation war and its impact on communities. This historiography that did not challenge ZANU-PF telling of the liberation war was readily appropriated by ZANU-PF for its hegemonic and regime legitimating purposes as part of its 'patriotic history' narrative (Ranger 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

Patriotic history according to Ranger (2004) is a new form of narrow history, which is biased towards celebrating an exaggerated role played by ZANU-PF in liberating the country, portraying it as the only true legitimate rulers of the post-independent country. At the center of ZANU-PF's patriotic history is the ideology of chimurenga. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that this chimurenga ideology is constantly under 'renewal' to suit the needs of the day, especially in the face of strong political opposition and ZANU-PF's legitimacy crisis. So patriotic history as defined by Ranger (2004: 218) is "a new form of history, which is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition. It is an attempt to reach out to the youth over the heads of their parents and teachers, all of whom are said to have forgotten or betrayed revolutionary values." In this way, ZANU-PF propped itself while systematically downplaying the role played by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its military wing the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) and other nationalists who came before Mugabe were also framed as lesser heroes. It was not given prominence in the liberation war narratives. However, as a token for unity ZAPU's contribution was reintroduced into the dominant narrative but in a thin way.

However, state sponsorship of narrow and fetishized history of the war and debates over memory and commemoration of the liberation struggle through the media, tertiary institutions and patriotic history narratives provoked robust deconstructions of nationalism and heroic narratives of nationalism from leftist scholars who advocated for freedom of political participation and the promotion and protection of basic human rights of citizens such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009); Werbner (1995); Kriger (1992; 1995; 2003); Bull-Christiansen (2004); Ranger (2004); White (2003); Moore (2005); Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009); Mhanda (2011). These scholars' writings sought to include in this historiography the contributions of other liberation

movements such as Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). This was important because these scholars exposed ZANU-PF nationalism as responsible for all the post-colonial problems ranging from authoritarianism, personality cult, commandism, violence and militarism (Kriger 1992; Ranger 2003). In these debates, proponents of 'patriotic history' narrative such as Moyo and Yeros (2003) and Mamdani (2008) and those who criticize it analyse Zimbabwe's nationalism discourse and practices around the figure of Mugabe in what is termed "Mugabeism" (see Ndlovu-Gatheni 2009; 2015). Mugabeism has become a phenomenon "of a constellation of political controversies, political behavior, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have crystallized around Mugabe's political life" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 1141) Mamdani (2008) argues that "Mugabeism" appeals to and benefits the masses in Zimbabwe because it seeks to correct colonial injustices through the land reform. However, this argument has been criticized by leftist scholars who argued that "Mugabeism" is about violence and oppression of those who do not support ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The *Gukurahundi* violence in the 1980s, the brutal suppression of 1998 food riots, the Operation *Murambatsvina* (Restore order) of 2005 and the 2008 political violence is evidence of such oppression (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos 2003; Ranger 2003; Scarnecchia 2006; Alexander 2013; Campbell 2003). These debates on Zimbabwe's liberation war historiography are important because they illuminate the extent of the political crisis in Zimbabwe since the liberation war.

These accounts trace continuities between ZANU-PF's liberation war project in the 1970s and that of the post-2000 through Mugabe himself and through ZANU-PF's control over nationalist historiography and patriotic history. Interestingly, very few scholars have done the work of tracing that continuity in the lives of citizens and in the kind of political subjectivities that have been produced in particular spaces, such as the base which can be traced to the liberation struggle. David Lan's *Guns and Rain* (1985) was one of the few texts that allowed us to see the liberation war from a different angle, closer to the ground. Lan gives an account of the co-operation between peasants and guerillas in Dande in northeastern Zimbabwe during the liberation war. He locates the roots of local rural people's consciousness in the traditional religious order embodied by the spirit mediums that opposed the symbols of the colonial state. Lan argues that as instruments of the ancestors, and of a past

unpolluted by white co-option, spirit mediums chose the guerillas as their legitimate descendants, the sons of the soil, transforming subjectivities and how the war was fought on the ground. Thus these young guerrillas gained meaning and value in peasant eyes. They also acquired the extraordinary influence and force that the mediums wield, a force wild and fierce, unconstrained by the limits of ordinary human existence. Lan suggests that, while many guerillas first evoked the mediums to mobilise and politicize the rural ‘masses’, they soon came to regard the ancestors as their protectors in the bush.

Lan’s work was important in revealing how local culture and traditions are bedrocks of social movements, political subjectivization and resistance. This thesis builds on and develops themes and concerns that Lan opened in his critical work on Zimbabwe. In this work, I attempt to show that ZANU-PF’s use of history for legitimization purposes transcended elitist and academic debates and was battled on the ground with the people. I explore the extent to which ZANU-PF uses this history and its associated violence to mobilise people and to instill certain loyalties to the party. I also explore how people respond to ZANU-PF’s mobilization techniques. Since the liberation war, ZANU-PF has mobilized in the rural areas and in this context the base becomes an important form of telling and disseminating the liberation war history in rural areas.

1.3 Conceptual framework

1.3.1 Political Subjectivity: violence and landscape

Conceptually political subjectivity is part of a longer genealogy of political theory; it is what in the Hegelian-Marxist theory used to be called consciousness. Among historians concerned with political mobilization, political resistance, political agency and political subjectivity came about within the Marxist theoretical apparatus that was organized around the politics of consciousness and false consciousness, which come originally from Hegel. The problem of consciousness is, under what circumstances do people become aware of the shift for invisible conditions of their subjugation and then begin to act on transforming those conditions. Marx spoke of class-consciousness but later on scholars felt that the theory was too rigid and too constraining as a way of

understanding the sources of political action in history. Then an effort to seek language through which to get at how people imagine who they are in relation to the kind of society they want to create or demand, they used the term political subjectivity to define that problem territory.

A political subject could be an explicit political identity or classification with or along an array of possibilities like being a Marxist or a liberal rights activist. Anthropologists are more interested in how people imagine themselves in relation to political goals and social gains. Anthropologists became interested in using the term subjectivity as a way of talking about the ethnographic subject's experience of the world; subjectivity stands for *experience*, which comes from psychology, and which attempts to address how one inhabits the world. So political subjectivity as a subset of subjectivity also refers to inner experience, inner life, the way in which each person encounters the world from his or her own distinct point of view. The central preoccupation of this thesis just like other humanistic studies is to understand how people in different times and places experience the world from their point of view, morally, politically, and cognitively.

The ways in which ZANU-PF uses the base as a space for transformation during the liberation war in the 1970s and as an idea and a space for the reinforcement of the status quo after independence, allows us to examine these practices through the lens of political subjectivity, which I understand to be distinct from, yet closely connected to political violence and the historical landscape of struggle. These concepts allow me to develop a particular reading of subjectivity, that under conditions of political violence, in a dense historical landscape, the subjective becomes a particular kind of vehicle for political life.

ZANU-PF politics has been centered on the production of the friend and the enemy dichotomy to which political action and motive can be reduced. Schmitt (1992 [1932]) argues that politics is the creation/distinguishing of the friend and the enemy. During Zimbabwe's liberation war, ZANU-PF developed a version of nationalism in which new forms of belonging and rights began to be redefined producing what was characterized as ethnic nationalism (Sachikonye 2011, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). This form of nationalism categorized anyone who supported ZANU-PF and its

policies as patriotic and a ‘true Zimbabwean,’ and those who opposed ZANU-PF and its policies as ‘sell-outs’ and ‘imperialist stooge.’ Therefore ZANU-PF provided its subjects with their primary form of belonging with nationalism constituting an ethic of heroic sacrifice that justified violence in the defense of one’s nation against enemies (Sachikonye 2011; Werbner 1998). This is how the friend-enemy dichotomy was constructed in Zimbabwe. My argument is that the base reduces this binary kind of stratification around politics and political subjectivity. The friend-enemy dichotomy implies that those aligned to ZANU-PF are the friends of the state and are free to do what they want, and opposition supporters are the enemies who are the target of ZANU-PF and state violence and discrimination. However, and this is my major intervention, political subjectivity is so much more complex than the friend-enemy dichotomy that is attempted, and there are many ways in which the politics and terror of the base hits the social/community in ways that do all the other kinds of things including fear, silence, rumour, religious practice and memory, all which allows us to understand political subjectivities. So there is a kind of diversification of different kinds of ways of approaching this construction of friend and enemy that the base is trying to create.

Subjectivity is a multifaceted concept. For Rahimi (2015), it is fundamentally political. “It is the mode of being of the subject, that is, precisely what the subject is” (Rahimi, 2015:8). Rahimi argues that, “the notion of political subjectivity widens the scope of politicality to understand the subject itself as political”. In this regard, Rahimi is arguing that the subject is always political. So the personal is political (see Hanisch 1969; 2006). However, subjectivity is also social and is a shared experience. When I talk about political subjectivities, I am drawing attention to the political practices and individual experiences that make people into political subjects, through looking at the constitution of subjectivity by specific historical and political situations, and in turn how these subjects form the larger society (Aretxaga 1997). In this regard, we can understand how both Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and ZANU-PF youth militias and supporters are drawn into participating in violence and at the same time become victims of ZANU-PF violence and politics. Writing in a context of political conflict in Belfast, Northern Ireland, Aretxaga (1997:6) locates Catholic women’s subjectivity in their use of popular forms of resistance against the violence deployed by the Northern Ireland police and the

British Army. Aretxaga makes the point that definite political subjectivity is the bearing down into the subjective realm of historical and political forces. My aim in this thesis is to understand how the “political subjectivity” that I am adopting from Aretxaga as “the bearing down of history into the subjective realm” allows me to focus my analytical attention throughout the thesis upon effects of violence in the more distant and recent pasts on affective states, strategies of identification, and modes of self-representation.

So what makes Aretxaga’s idea of political subjectivity applicable to the understanding of what militia bases do is the way in which historical ideologies of violence and subjectification are reproduced in the present. For Lacan (1977, 50-52) cited in Aretxaga (1997:18) “subjectivity is always grounded in history, history that is as much personal as collective, a history that includes not only conscious narratives but also forgotten episodes and hidden discourses”. Aretxaga argues that this conception of subjectivity is critical for the cultural analysis of politics because it leads us to analyze the discourses, practices and motivations that configure and reproduce particular subjectivities. I intend to explicate how people are negotiating between having to participate in political violence or not. Violence is the very reason why this reading of political subjectivity becomes significant, because it raises the question of the fear, terror, and extraordinarily intense choices that people have to make under these political conditions. It evokes the individual and how they grapple with how they are not going to do this violence, how they are going to escape this violence and how they are going to participate without feeling like they are perpetrators in a vicious way. It is that negotiation that violence invokes in the subject in a very particular way. So this thesis examines these historical ideologies of violence, in particular how they are embedded in the present. Violence is not only about the past, for the present has its own interstices produced in a particular way with particular people.

Mamdani (2001) seeks to analyze the process of decolonization and how complex that is for subjects who are seeking to produce a new political disposition. For Mamdani (2001) it has been difficult to justify post-colonial violence in Africa as rational but “we need to understand it as thinkable” through “historicizing” and “contextualizing” it. I am drawing on those historical moments to describe the contemporary

Zimbabwean condition because they are so fruitful for thinking about political subjectivity, which is significant and particularly useful in thinking about historical moments that involve violence because they evoke the subject in particular ways.

Violence and Subjectivity

Violence as a concept, an attribution, and as a quality related to subjectivity contributes to my argument in that, the base in its materiality, as revoked memory and as a stage that is made real again shapes way in which one thinks of themselves as a political subject and this creates modalities of subjectivity which are capable of exercising violence in a way that exceeds moral boundaries. It does so in such a way that it allows subjects to develop the affective force, the propensity as well as the moral legitimacy to exercise violence on ZANU-PF's political opponents in the post-colonial context of democracy as opposed to the old context that was framed as war. Democracy is supposed to be that situation where violence against political opponents no longer obtains and these political opponents rather battle it out at the ballot box. Therefore ZANU-PF militias imagine themselves to be engaging in legitimate forms of violence against internal enemies. ZANU-PF's ideology from the liberation war has been supported by acts of violence and discipline against those identified as "sellouts" (Sachikonye 2011). This violence transformed these sellouts and other people's attitude towards the guerrilla war. The ZANU-PF's project was not only about violence, it is an ideological project and violence carried with it an ideological message. Riches (1986) define violence as an act of physical hurt, deemed legitimate by the performer and by some witnesses (Riches 1986: 8). He goes on to argue that since the violent act is relatively easily performed and at the same time highly visible and concrete, it is a very different way of transforming the social environment and staging an ideological message before a public audience.

Therefore violence as instrumental and expressive action can be interpreted as a rational strategy of bargaining for power and transforming political dispositions (Riches 1986; Schimdt and Schroder, 2001). This explains why violence has been associated with the ideology of the base. Violence is slippery and it enters the most fundamental features of people's lives, and it shapes people's perceptions of who they are and what they are fighting for across space and time, a continual dynamic that

forges as well as affects identities (Taussig 1987). The fact the violence enacted in 2008 resembled that pioneered during the liberation war was meant to remind people that who they are as a political community is founded in the *chimurenga* ideology and that they have to identify with ZANU-PF and they must fight to defend the party because it is their liberator. Violence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality, that is, force, assault, or infliction of pain. Part of ZANU-PF's ideological use of violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victims. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what give violence its power and meaning (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004; Agamben, 1998).

So what this means is that under conditions of violence, personal life, affective realms and the life choices of ordinary people come to be saturated by larger political formations and that happens with particular intensity when historical moments make politics vicious, violent and intense. In Zimbabwe, historical moments of political violence are always visible and structure the present and the future particularly the values and ideals of the new post-colonial state. Thus the ideals, commitments, aspirations and practices of the liberation struggle have fashioned post-colonial state formation, political choices and participation. Hence the ways in which historical forces come to be borne by subjects becomes an interesting issue for the thesis. Political violence makes that particularly felt because subjects have to negotiate whether or not to participate in violence, whether they can escape violence or not. So there are particular historical conjunctions where politics and subjectivity come into intersection in particularly pernicious ways and the thesis hinges on that connection.

Materiality and subjectivity

One of the ways that we can articulate and analyze political subjectivity as the bearing down of the historical and political forces into the subjective realm affecting personal life, affective realms and life choices of ordinary people is through understanding how they engage with the materiality of the dense historical landscape of the liberation war. The base, one of the core political forms, which produced past and present subjectivities, has an intimate relationship with the material landscape. The material conditions of subjectification are always intertwined with space and place. I concur

with Walsh that the particular site and temporal junctures within which subjects and identities are marked and constructed, where memory as political struggle is waged matter (Walsh 2002:60). On one hand, ZANU-PF tries to harness the affective dimensions of the liberation war bases to reinforce a particular ZANU-PF historiography of the struggle that was targeted at forging particular kinds of '*jambanja*' (violent) political subjectivity (Chaumba, et al 2003; Le Bas 2006) among a generation that did not experience the struggle directly, emboldening a willingness to engage in pro- ZANU-PF violence. They partly succeed in doing this because the liberation war had claimed "an estimated 30 000 to 80 000 lives and had contributed to the liberation from colonial rule, thus making it an important emotional symbol and source of legitimacy for ZANU-PF" (Kriger 1995:139) This material dimension to ZANU-PF mobilization is important to understanding how people feel justified to engage in violence, but also how they engage with the same landscapes that ZANU-PF is using to come up with alternative narratives that defy ZANU-PF narratives and subjective they are trying to constitute.

On the other hand, engaging with materiality and agency of landscapes allows an understanding of how people negotiate engaging in violence or not and how they can escape violence. These choreographed narratives at the bases do not wholly control the Zimbabwean people, but rather they engage with the liberation war landscapes outside of ZANU-PF politicking and this provokes a different response that challenges and resists the ZANU-PF dominant narrative. Thus what the landscape does is not ultimately controlled by human actions, these are 'active' and 'affective' places, beyond the control of ZANU-PF politicking. The salience of legacies of struggle is not just a question of contested meanings or values; or about the selective celebration and silencing of particular past for particular presents. It is about the uneasy metonymic, co-presents of many pasts in the material and immaterial remains of things, lives and people; and their capacity to unsettle, undo, demand and animate contemporary politics, defying stabilization, containment, directionality and narrative closure. Just like violence, the landscape is an active, engaged and lived force that is negotiated within the lives of people. It allows people to find other ways to challenge official ways of remembering the past. This is important in this thesis because it allows us to understand that rural people are not docile or always complicit with ZANU-PF violence. Politics/political subjectivity is a constantly negotiated and

relational project, in which much happens that is not seen or captured by an elite political project or space.

1.4 Chapter Outline

Chapter 2: Revisiting the liberation war base: The rehearsals

This chapter will give a description of the events during the Zimbabwe National Army Staff College's revisiting the liberation struggle events. This chapter is about setting the scene for the way in which the old liberation war base and its related narratives, and performances of war were appropriated by ZANU-PF in its patriotic history narrative discourse. In describing the rehearsal, I focus not only on what people are saying, but also on how the environment of the rehearsal take shape, it is about how people are being positioned in this rehearsal stage that would eventually result in an easy and transparent articulation of what the bases are. I describe much of it as a social act, and how it translates into the main event much of that kind of scene setting and description of how things were unfolding. This is important because it is the chapter that positions us at the base and allows us to understand how the soldiers used narratives, performances and affective identifications to control how people feel about ZANU-PF, the opposition MDC and the whites.

Chapter 3: The liberation war base of the 1970s

This chapter gives an understanding of what the base was in the 1970s and its political and cultural work in how the liberation war was fought. I give a descriptive geography/architecture or structure of the base that helps us to understand the base and how it worked, what it was, and its set up in relation to the village. I put emphasis on political subjectivity, even the constitution of the people, the peasant, and even the guerrilla are categories of political subjectivities and they come from somewhere and they are mobilized in particular ways, and I engage with this. I draw on the different strands of Russian and Chinese history, in understanding how they constituted the political category of the peasant in rural Zimbabwe. I try to understand why Mao becomes more significant than Stalin, because that is the project of ZANU-PF, which

constituted itself around the kind of Maoist political category of the peasant and the guerrilla and the fish-water metaphor that needs to be articulated and explained.

Chapter 4: The army and the base

This chapter is about political moments when the army was sent out to manage ZANU-PF political victory and it is part of the argument about the base, especially the moment running up to the establishment of the 2008 youth militia base. This is when the army was given this mission, which was to identify and crackdown on opposition supporters. In order to understand how this contemporary moment arrived I draw on the history of the military in Zimbabwe and its association with the liberation war base and ZANU-PF and end with how the militia base re-emerges in 2008. This leads to further understanding of the way in which the liberation war base functions in producing certain kinds of relationship between soldiers, civilians and ZANU-PF. I make more emphasis on the base and what it means in the process of this genealogy or transformation of the army from professional to political.

Chapter 5: The post-2000 base

This chapter focuses on the post-2000 Zimbabwean political crisis and how ZANU-PF produced its violent election campaign through the use of 'temporary' youth militia bases, which manifested in political and geographical forms. The violence enacted in 2008 resembled violent tactics pioneered by ZANU guerrillas during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. Thus I reveal the practices of violence enacted from militia bases, which were locally situated in the rural areas of Bindura South. In understanding the continuities and discontinuities of the militia base, across the history of ZANU-PF violence, I consider how the base as a political form becomes a space that summons history in order to address who is legitimated to engage in violence, with what authority and for what reason in the contemporary ZANU-PF violence to ensure its legitimacy in a politically charged 'field'.

Chapter 6: Victimhood

The post-2000 ZANU-PF project was about the production of scared and silent political subjects. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal and engage with what this fear is and what it means to be scared and what that does in terms of the social logic, what that experience does to people in relation to the sense of themselves, their lives, future, and past. So in a way, what this kind of instrumentalised violence does is to silence the deep ambivalences and fear, anger and worry and concern that people are experiencing. I give space to people to speak about that, both perpetrators as well as the people who were harmed, or people who are silenced, for them to be able to articulate what that experience is. I seek to understand how victims and perpetrators respond to the violence and how they survive in this context of intensified surveillance, violence and threats to use violence.

Chapter 7: Materiality, agency and affect of landscapes of violence chapter

This chapter reveals the spaces that people find and use to challenge ZANU-PF's dominant narratives, violence and misrule. In this context the same liberation war bases that ZANU PF deliberately uses to get people to support them ideologically, and also to instill fear in them to comply, can be engaged with and produce different narratives, which potentially threaten the narratives they are enforcing, the legitimacy they are seeking, and the kinds of subjects they are trying to constitute, which is why they spent so long rehearsing the events. In revealing this, I describe an apostolic church vigil that was held on the same site as the ZSC workshop, at the former liberation war main base at Mumurwi Mountain. I invoke it show how people engage with the same landscape outside ZANU-PF politicking and how the affective qualities of the former guerrilla bases can be engaged with and potentially provoke a different response that challenges the ZANU-PF dominant narrative.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

This thesis is an ethnography of Bindura South, a rural electoral constituency in Mashonaland Central province that covers the southern half of Bindura district, and comprises Bindura north and Bindura Urban. Educational and health facilities in this area are in poor condition for an area close to the capital city. There is a high rate of school dropouts and people rely mostly on small-scale subsistence farming, and most

recently on illegal artisanal mining as *makorokoza*² mostly in Shamva, a mining town founded during the colonial era. The Bindura Rural District Council (BRDC) has recently tried to develop various business centers in the district into townships by demarcating areas for residential developments similar to the urban locations. Some people have managed to build decent houses at their homesteads mostly through remittances from working relatives, others got assistance from Habitat for Humanity a humanitarian and Christian organization to construct houses and toilets. Most homesteads maintain grass thatched cooking huts, which are a traditional symbol of rural homesteads. The cooking huts also have cultural significance, they belong to the wife and they are designed to the wife's desired specifications.

Politically Bindura South and Mashonaland central have been integral to the liberation struggle hosting ZANLA guerrillas. The area was significant because it was "the front"; its proximity to the capital made it a bitter site of struggle between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian army. Bindura town hosted the HQ of the Selous Scouts and the Joint Operations Command since most of the ZANLA guerrillas were penetrating the country from Mozambique into central Mashonaland targeting Harare and its vicinity. Consequently Bindura South attracted the activities of the auxiliary forces supporting Bishop Abel Muzorewa who became Prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after the internal settlement. As a result, there were many armed forces fighting in this area at any moment. ZANU-PF has viewed this area as problematic because of the support that some villagers gave to the Rhodesian forces. One informant told me that as recently as 2014 a senior military officer told him that Bindura South has sellouts that support traitors, a perception that was reignited by the ZANU-PF loss in the 2008 elections for the first time since 1980, triggering the violence that followed. Bindura South was not unique in the rural areas to have voted in this way, it was part of a general trend in the 2008 elections.

Doing research is as difficult as the questions one asks; therefore the subjectivity of the anthropologist influences the research process (Tankink and Vysma 2006). I undertook this research as an insider in Bindura South. I am part of the youth and I share most of the experiences of the youth in Bindura South and Zimbabwe in general. My own experiences of ZANU-PF mobilization in 2008 and beyond and

² A local vernacular name referring to illegal miners

those of my fellow youth influenced this study, and they influenced the way in which I approached my field. The research group of youth, women and men actively participate in politics as ZANU-PF and MDC members. At the time of data collection, the participants were aged between 24 and 84 years, with the majority of them being youth in their twenties and mid-thirties. The primary data of this research was gathered between 2013 and 2014; I also added recollections of my personal experiences of the 2008 election violence. I engaged in 'deep hanging out' with participants (Bernard, 2006). I use the term participants instead of informants because participants indicate that the research process is one in which both the researcher and the participant co-constitutes and co-produce the knowledge related to the study (Hall and Callery, 2001; Roberts and Sanders, 2005; Schmidt, 2007).

As an insider, the way my participants related to me was different from the way they would relate to an outsider, especially one who is not Zimbabwean. The main advantage is that gaining entry was never a problem for personal, kith and kin relations made it easy to speak to people. It was easy to engage in political conversations at funerals, beer drinking gatherings and anywhere. I carried out my research in a context of political tension within the ZANU-PF party. The year 2014 is the year visible factionalism was at play and there was a crackdown on those party members accused of aligning with the faction led by former Vice- President Joice Mujuru at national, province and district levels. There was fear of talking against ZANU-PF and President Mugabe because of public purges of those identified as Mujuru supporters and an atmosphere of intimidation and fear pervaded the environment. The other advantage was my capacity to read local cultural ways of speaking about the political situation that would likely have been obscure to an outsider.

The challenge I faced was that of neutrality; I was not expected to be neutral in terms of political positioning and I am supposed to take a position not as researcher but as a member of the community. Failure to identify with ZANU-PF would mean that I was an MDC supporter, and MDC supporters are not welcome at ZANU- PF rallies. When I attended the Zimbabwe Staff College rehearsal on the liberation war historicisation event at Chaka village I had to prove that I was a ZANU-PF youth. I was asked to identify anyone who knows me and can testify that we were ZANU-PF youth. There

were many people who knew me from my village and those closer so that was not a problem. One of the participants had told me not to mention to the soldiers that I was there as a researcher:

You are better off as ZANU-PF youth here, any mention of you trying to understand how ZANU-PF functions will make you look like a spy for the MDC and their sponsors, you can do that somewhere else but not today, these are soldiers. They will be suspicious of where you want to take the information and for what reason. In ZANU-PF we believe that if you are a supporter you don't need to investigate anything you simply need to chant the slogan, "forward with the party". Any attempt to be critical is not welcome (Comrade Enoch 16/10/2010).

When I was confirmed to be a ZANU-PF youth, I was allowed to attend and chanted the slogans and sang the liberation war songs with others. As a 'youth' I helped the women fetch water for the meals they were preparing for the participants and with other small tasks like tying the banners to the trees, etc. The participants I had chosen to be key to this research were fully aware of my research objectives and that is why they told me to attend the ZSC rehearsal and even asked the army driver to pick me up on the road. However it was difficult to state my position as a researcher when attending gatherings such as the ZSC and ZANU-PF rallies, I was there simply to observe in most instances and I had to do follow up interviews based on my observations with participants at their homes, or on our way from rallies. At the ZSC workshop I asked follow up questions on site to those I had already built relationships with. When I identified myself as a ZANU-PF supporter, it was not my intention but I just followed the advice of my participants because I did not want to jeopardise their status or to downplay their fears at the same time, I wanted to observe the rehearsal without much scrutiny being put on me. I have used pseudonyms for most of my participants except for MPs, Senator, and ZNA commanders whose speeches at the gathering were public record.

At home my mother told me to be careful not only for myself but for the family as well. If I were labeled an MDC supporter, the whole family would carry that label. This affected my flexibility as a researcher, so as people positioned themselves, so did I (see Daniel, 1996). My family fears were the same with the fears some members of the community have about criticizing ZANU-PF. However my research is part of many academic works and publications scrutinizing ZANU-PF mobilization

techniques and politics that have been carried out in Zimbabwe since 2000. Some of the people who participated in this research are active ZANU-PF supporters in the youth league and they could have raised a red flag if they felt I was a threat to the party, but since it was not about mobilizing people against ZANU-PF it is not a threat.

The presence of a lot of surveillance in Bindura South affected social trust amongst people and altered our language of communication. It influences silence because of the fear of being punished. Technologies of muting used by the state security agents include rumors of people being punished and the presence of undercover informants at public gatherings. This gives people the idea that someone is watching them even if there isn't any spy present. The power of the state is felt in people's lives: families are affected by violence and it is entrenched in memory, in experiences, in the language that people use. Instead of asking more and more questions I became more and more silent in order not to upset anyone or to be suspected or targeted. In the same process, I never stopped asking questions but I asked in other ways and waited for answers. The more I tried to show who I am the more the suspicious eyes became weak but never disappeared. Ethnographic encounter took shape through constant negotiations in which the participants accepted my double role. However the challenges I faced was that the community had its own ethical code, based on a daily negotiation of the signs of loyalty to the party. I was expected to chant slogans, or at times to wear ZANU-PF party regalia.

2 CHAPTER TWO: Revisiting the liberation war guerrilla bases: Rehearsals and political dramaturgy

2.1 Introduction

In line with the broader dictates of ‘patriotic history’, the ZANU-PF war veterans from the Zimbabwe National Army’s staff college took trainee officers and junior soldiers to meet collaborators, as well as local villagers and youth, to former liberation war guerrilla bases³ in order to inspire them to develop particular kinds of political commitments, ideals, and sentiments of loyalty and sacrifice to ZANU-PF that are founded in the principles of the liberation war. This was largely done through carefully choreographed and controlled narratives of what happened at these bases during the liberation war. Yet the efficacy of these events was also depended in part on affective identification forged through evocative performances in these highly charged places. In revealing this, I describe a significant phenomenon that took place in an area of Bindura South, known as Mumurwi, in order to introduce how ZANU-PF harnessed the affective experiences of places and experiences of the liberation struggle in conjunction with highly charged but also highly tailored narratives, to constitute anti-white and anti-opposition sentiments, and loyalty to ZANU-PF. These events have been done countrywide, and in 2017 the Staff College visited Hwange in Matabeleland North Province, where they met ex-ZIPRA freedom fighters and people who witnessed the liberation war battles against Rhodesian Forces in the area⁴.

On the 22nd October 2014 the Zimbabwe Staff College, a learning institute of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, hosted, organized and led a field learning trip for its members attending the Commanding Staff course Number 27, at the location of the former liberation war guerrilla base in Maema Mountains, Mumurwi in Bindura South. The ZNA staff college was established in 1981. In 1982, it commenced junior and intermediate staff training and by 1986 it undertook a full command and staff

³ These are war bases established by the ZANLA guerrillas during the 1970s war of liberation in the mountains, from where the war was launched.

⁴ This was reported in national newspaper The Chronicle, Zimbabwe, 1 April 2017: Staff College to get First Hand accounts of the liberation war.

course (Alao 1995:111). I did not personally witness the return of the former guerrillas in 2013 when they organized the first workshop, so I visited Comrade Enoch, a ZANU-PF youth, who was also the ward secretary for the youth league. Comrade Enoch is highly literate having attained a General Certificate of Education at Advanced Level at a prestigious High school in Harare. He said that his religious beliefs particularly his Johane Marange apostolic church does not encourage its members to advance much in education with many especially girls only going as far as primary education before being bequeathed to elderly members of the church for marriage. He said men like him are encouraged to engage in self-sustaining projects such as pottery, farming and vending. Johane Marange church has been campaigning for President Mugabe and ZANU-PF during elections. The President has visited the church's national conferences where he was elevated to the levels of Biblical angel Gabriel. This has endeared church adherents like Comrade Enoch to President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Comrade Enoch was 30 years old when I interviewed him in his cooking hut on a rainy and wet day in December 2013 and he already had five children with his wife.

Comrade Enoch recounted that on a hot day in August 2013, former liberation war guerrillas who are teaching at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) visited Mumurwi, a rural area, in Bindura South on a mission to engage people who hosted the ZANU military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas during the liberation war in the 1970s. Lieutenant Colonel Geza, accompanied by Lt. Col Gwanzura, Captain Zveushe and Captain Mbanje, led the military delegation. Comrade Enoch said that it was an emotional moment when these ex-guerrillas met the people who hosted them during the war. He also noted that they specifically asked for certain people, some were deceased but they were happy to see some older women who supported them during the war. Comrade Enoch said that a village head that had been living in Harare during the war tried to claim that he was a *mujiba* during the war by narrating how the war was fought in the area. His story according to the former guerrillas was weak, because it was based on what he had heard not what he had witnessed or experienced. The ex-guerrillas were quick to pick on that, and the fact that they could not remember him made them suspicious. Upon identifying the liberation war *mujibas* (male youth) and *chimbwidos* (female youth), that they wanted to work with, Lieutenant Colonel Geza told them the aim of their visit.

The aim according to, Lieutenant Colonel Geza, was to get accounts of the liberation war battles from the *chimbwidos* and *mujibas* and other villagers who assisted and hosted the guerrillas. He said he sought to teach his students about guerrilla warfare in order to equip them with military skills but also to teach a very particular history of the liberation struggle. This entailed linking the convivial relationship between the people, the spirit mediums and the guerrillas and how that was significant to guerrilla successes. In the past, he had called in former guerrillas (war veterans) in the army to come and give accounts of the liberation war to his students. He said that now he ‘wanted to join the missing link, the messengers and surviving villagers who witnessed the war and hosted the guerrillas so that the students can have a complete version of the liberation war’. Comrade Enoch was selected by the local ward councilor to be the party’s secretary at the event, so that he could take down the accounts of the liberation war events and keep them for the party records, so he was part of the events up to the end.

The 2013 event of ZSC students attending the Commanding Staff course Number 26 was held at a place where the old main liberation war guerrilla base Musana sector was situated at Mumurwi Mountain. Mumurwi Mountain is named after the area and is situated in ward 16. The mountain is officially known as “Lions Head Mountain” because it takes the shape of a male lion lying on its belly with its legs stretched out exactly like the one printed on the lion matches box, a local brand of matches for lighting a fire. This plateau forms the Mumurwi, Chiramba, Harihuru and Maema mountains, which were used by the guerrillas as their bases. The 2014 event, which I observed as part of my fieldwork took three months of preparation to mobilize wartime witnesses, wartime *mujibas* and *chibwidos* and to hold rehearsals so that they could come up with “a coherent story”, according to Lt. Col Geza. These ZNA soldiers choreographed and controlled the accounts told and performances delivered at these events, deciding what history mattered and removing aspects which did not fit the narrative that was being constituted. Since the workshop event was also intended to teach local people and particularly local youth, the history of the liberation struggle and thereby contribute to the ZANU-PF’s dominant historiography of the war, it was open to the public and food was provided on the day of the event.

On Thursday 16 October 2014, the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) held their final rehearsals with the liberation war collaborators and assistants in Chaka village near Maema Mountain in Musana Bindura South constituency. This was the last in a series of monthly meetings from June that year in preparation of a general gathering involving staff college students as part of their curriculum. One of my participants, 84-year-old Mbuya Veronica, asked her grandson to send me a text message informing me about the rehearsals at Maema Mountain the following day. She told me that I should attend because it is a public event. The participants at the rehearsals were notified of the event through text messages by the ZSC organizers. Each village had a representative who would receive the message and then forward it to other participants. On the 16th of October, I woke up in the morning in the company of a colleague and we herded for Maema Mountains. Two kilometers into the journey an army registered Mazda BT 50 single cab passed us, the passengers waved at us and when recognized us they stopped the driver and asked him to carry us. The driver, a young army corporal, told us to jump in at the back of the truck. We quickly jumped in and sat with some old men and women as the vehicle navigated the bumpy dust road. The old men and women were complaining that the truck was uncomfortable and saying that the District Development Fund (DDF) has neglected its road, which had galleys and potholes. We had to hold on to the body of the truck so that we would not be thrown outside. The driver did not seem to care about complaints that people were making at every bump the car made. The army used their vehicles to carry older men and women from their homesteads to the Maema mountains base because they could not walk long distances. One of the most vocal old man pointed out that the dilapidated nature of the road was a representation of the decayed and unbearable state of the economy not only in rural areas but in urban areas as well.

When we arrived at the meeting place, Matanda village at the foot of Maema Mountain, the program coordinators from the ZSC and the former liberation war messengers were already practicing the songs they would sing on the ‘big day’ as they referred to the 22nd of October which was the day of the workshop. Most of the people were wearing ZANU-PF t-shirts, headscarves, caps and wrap overs they received during the 2013 election campaign. This was to show through the use of symbols as part of identification, which is prevalent in Zimbabwean politics that the event was a ZANU-PF gathering. As soon as we jumped off the truck one of the soldiers, a Major,

came and asked us if we were ZANU-PF youth and we said we were. He asked if there were people who knew us who could confirm that we are indeed ZANU-PF youth, many people mostly my research participants and other villagers who knew us said that we were ZANU-PF youths. I was surprised by this interrogation because I had been informed that this was a public gathering. However, my participants had told me that I must not say that I am a researcher because the soldiers were suspicious of ‘spies’ at the event, and this could cause discomfort for me. After the confirmation that we were ZANU-PF youth we were allowed to sit down and observe what was taking place, we were even allowed to ask questions and to talk to the soldiers at the end of the rehearsals during ‘lunch’. This incident also reveals and how people have developed skills to survive by pretending to be ZANU-PF supporters in order to get by. In taking this approach, I was sensitive of the research participants concerns and heeded their warnings so that I do not jeopardize the trust and relationship we had created. It was their field and event and they knew it better and they also had their own personal interests to protect.

More than thirty people attended this rehearsal consisting of former liberation war *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* and elders who hosted the guerrillas during the liberation war in the area. The gathering opened with a prayer to the ancestors of the land for protection throughout the meeting and the events of the ‘big day’ on their land. Comrade Michael Mutondo knelt under a *muzhanje* tree, the tree that is believed to bear the spirits of the ancestors of the land. The men clapped with him while the women simply listened in silence and then closed the prayer with ululations.

We have gathered here as your children of this land including the comrades who you allowed to fight the war of liberation in your land. We are here so that we can teach the history of that war to those who do not know it. We ask you Musana ancestors of the *Mandyirapanze* totem and *mukuvapasi* to allow us to do this work in peace without any hindrance either from the land. Don’t say we did not ask you *mukuvapasi*? (Prayer by Comrade Mutondo, Maema Mountains, 16/10/2014).

After recognizing the ancestors a woman followed with prayer to God asking for the Lord’s help during the proceedings of the day. The recognition of both the traditional religion and Christianity is meant to appeal to believers of both religions, and its significance will be discussed later on. The rehearsal program was guided by a typed

and printed document titled “Maema battles talking points”. It had details of the order of speakers and lead vocalists for different songs, but the list was not conclusive as speakers were shifted or removed depending on their performances. A few women were cooking for the people who were at the rehearsals and the youth sat at the back and were often sent to go and fetch water from a nearby borehole. The sitting arrangement was gendered, women sat together on one side and men sat on the other side with the members of the army who were all men. I made sure that I sat in-between so that I could hear and observe what was happening on both sides.

Mapping the terrains of the liberation struggle

Major Tauya, from the Civil Military Relations (CMR) department of the ZNA was the one who would speak first, giving an overview of the structure of the liberation war in general through a map orientation. He addressed the gathering in English saying that is how he is going to address the people at the ‘big day’ because the gathering will consist of military students from other countries like Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho. He said that:

During the liberation war, the various areas in Zimbabwe were divided into Provinces or fronts corresponding with the ZANU/ZANLA bases in the provinces of Mozambique. The northern part of Zimbabwe fell under the command of guerrillas from Tete province in Mozambique; Manicaland province in Zimbabwe fell under Manica province in Mozambique. The southern part of Zimbabwe fell under Gaza province. Musana area was advance detachment during the war called Chaminuka sector under Tete province. The guerrillas in the surrounding areas collaborated with each other and the *mujibas* and *chimbwidos*’ work transcended sections and detachments. The reasons of waging guerrilla warfare were because the conventional and confrontational warfare that ZANLA had adopted earlier had proved to be a failure because of the Rhodesian army superiority in terms of weaponry and experience. Most of the Rhodesian army commanders and soldiers had fought in the WW2, Biafra and many other wars in Africa. So they had vast experience in fighting wars as compared to guerrillas most of whom were young men who had never fought any war...In the 1960s the late General Solomon Mujuru was sent by the ZANU high command to Mozambique to study the guerrilla methods of war and understand how FRELIMO under Samora Machel was fighting the Portuguese. Armed with the FRELIMO experience young men and women were sent out to train in different countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Romania, and China among

others, in guerrilla warfare... In 1972 a group of 45 men was sent into the country (Rhodesia) by the ZANLA Commander General Josiah Magama Tongogara on a mobilizing mission. They were politicians who had to mobilise the masses to understand that a war to liberate the country was imminent and they had to support it...The Musana area called Chaminuka sector was under the command of current Air Force of Zimbabwe commander, Air Marshal Perrence Shiri (Major Tauya, narrative at Maema Mountain base, 16/10/2014).

Retelling this history was important to the liberation war messengers because they probably did not know about most of these commanders in the 1970s. This enabled them to connect the names and the people who are all prominent military and political figures in the country. This was also a way of reviving the memory of what the guerrillas' message to the people was during politicization rallies in the 1970s. It is possible that the older generation of supporters and villagers might have forgotten what the guerrillas said to them during the *pungwes* in the 1970s, but had to include this in their narratives at the workshop. Scholars (see Sachikonye 2011; Viriri 2014) note that one of the engaging institutions that emerged during the liberation struggle was the *pungwe*, all night vigils, where the mobilization of morale, politicization of masses and discipline of sell-out were carried out.

According to Major Tauya, the *pungwe* itself was an extension of the liberation war guerrilla base, because nothing happened at the *pungwe* unless it was approved, rehearsed and practiced at the base. The *pungwe* became the front stage performance of the ideas mooted at the base. The dances, songs, slogans, violence and ideas, which were performed at the *pungwe* were first organized and performed at the base. These were transferred to the *pungwe* a site where everyone in a village was present. The *pungwe* became the space to "communicate the aims, the goals and vision of the struggle" (Viriri 2014:5). Even as former guerrillas and liberation war messengers gathered at the Maema base, the gathering resembled the "carnavalesque attributes of *pungwe*" (Viriri 2014:2) in the sense that the event sought to reproduce performances that would remind people of the liberation struggle, so that they would be engulfed by the spirit of the liberation war.

There were many battles fought in Musana sector but the group had to stick to those that best illuminates the purpose of the ZSC learning programme. Three battles were

fought in Musana Sector in 1976 there was the Mumurwi battle, 1977 the Maema battle and 1978 the Chaka battle, fought specifically around the Chaka village area where a guerrilla base was established in Chiramba Mountain. This mountain according to Captain Zveushe was very spiritual and it had many sacred caves some of which could not be seen by everyone. He said many people could go into the mountain and some would see the caves some would not see them. He added that there are voices that one could hear from the caves as they approached it, “voices of people talking like we are doing here and when you get there you don’t see anyone”. A liberation war *mujiba* Comrade Maxwell also added that, “the inside of the caves looked like they were being swept and cleaned from time to time but no one lived there”. Such are the spiritual dimensions of the mountain in which the guerrillas and their messengers based, and the wars fought at this base are referred to as the ‘ancestors’ war’ or *hondo yemidzimu* in ChiShona.

People went through song rehearsals with the soldiers identifying those who are able to lead and sing songs, writing down names in order of events. They would note the person and his/her song and which narrator they would sing for. Everything had to be done in a particular order and within a specific timeframe. Signals (eye signals) would be used to tell someone to sing during a narrative, in order to give the speaker time to take a breath or to recollect their story. Other people on the list to speak on the day were not present on the day of the rehearsal, some were said to be attending funerals. Others had gone to attend the First Lady Grace Mugabe’s rally in Bindura town. These would still be in the programme and the group would use the remaining six days before Wednesday the 22nd of October to polish up their performances and speeches. Lt. Colonel Geza was quiet throughout proceedings and taking down notes, he only responded to questions asked by the ZSC officers conducting the rehearsals. Comrade Zveushe encouraged people to “shine” saying the event will be screened on ZBC TV just like the previous year’s event and the ZSC team “wouldn’t want people to think that the villagers were being forced by the soldiers to do things against their will.” Songs that would boost people’s morale, as those sang at the *pungwes* during the *chimurenga* war were encouraged for this purpose.

2.2 Rehearsing narratives and performances of the liberation war

Major Tauya's narrative was to be followed by a song called "*ndiro ghidi*" meaning only the gun would liberate and rule Zimbabwe. Comrade Getty Nhundu was chosen to lead in that song as others backed her. Captain Zveushe was the next speaker, and his entrance song was *Maruza vapambepfumi* meaning, "You have lost colonizers!" He was going to narrate his experiences of the war from the guerrillas' perspective from the time they arrived in Musana sector up to the first Mumurwi battle in 1977. Captain Zveushe stood up chanted slogans and gave an emotional narrative about the battles and organizing the war. He gave this narrative because he wanted to show the other narrators how they are supposed to tell their stories, with power and conviction. Comrade Maxwell was to be the next speaker because he was also a powerful and forceful speaker who would drive the point home; he was also believed to be knowledgeable about the war from both fronts as he was one of the trusted *mujibas* during the war. At the rehearsals he owned the struggle, he spoke well and with knowledge as well as emotion. He sat in front showing that he was a leader as he was during the war.

Comrade Getty Nhundu, a woman, in her 50s was chosen to narrate the 1976 battle because she witnessed it and was working with the guerrillas and had proved during the rehearsals that she was articulate. Other speakers on the 1976 war were given a few minutes because Comrade Nhundu would have narrated much of that history and their role was to corroborate her narrative. This was part of coming up with a "coherent story"; by making the less articulate corroborate narratives of lead speakers. Comrade Nhundu is a mother of four and grandmother of six; she was only educated up to primary school before the war. She is also a housewife, a subsistence farmer and a fruit and vegetable vendor at the local business center. She argues that this is the life she has known and has sent her children to school from vending. Comrade Nhundu takes pride in the role she played, assisting guerrillas during the liberation struggle leading to independence. Mbuya Phiri was asked to speak about how the guerrillas arrived because she is the one who received and hosted them at her home at a farm compound, and her brother was responsible for taking the guerrillas to the spirit mediums, so Mbuya Phiri's narrative was important in that regard.

Mbuya Phiri is an elderly woman who walks with the aid of two walking sticks. She cannot do much work for herself but relies on remittances from her grand and great grandchildren. She stays with her great grandchildren and has since moved from the farm into the villages at the end of the war. Although at times, she is critical of the economic challenges she has remained loyal to ZANU-PF and says she respects President Mugabe very much. Comrade Irene was chosen to follow Mbuya Phiri's narrative talking about the prohibitions given to the guerrillas by the ancestors when executing the war of liberation. Comrade Irene is 58 years old and she lives with her 27-year grandson and his wife. She is one of the energetic organizers of the ZSC events. Since the 1980s, her family has benefited from government cotton farming programmes and were well known for being master farmers. However, this success was disturbed by the economic decline and lack of support from the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe and the government. Despite this setback, she has remained a successful farmer in her own right. In 2014, she claimed that she supports ZANU-PF because of the sacrifices she has made to the liberation war, and she believed that other parties with no link to the liberation war might not cherish that sacrifice.

Gogo Veronica was to speak about her experiences as she also hosted the guerrillas at her homestead. Gogo Veronica is 84 years old and of fragile health. She was part of the parents who gave logistical support to the guerrillas during the war. She lives with her grandson, his wife and his two children. Her grandson comrade Lovemore is also an active member of ZANU-PF youth league. After that Comrade Maxwell would return and speak again about the 1977 battle at Maema. Comrade Maxwell was the most liked by the ZSC soldiers because he was close to them during the liberation war. He was involved in all the battles fought in Musana sector and was described by Captain Zveushe as an important resource during the war. He was important to the extent that he was refused permission to go and train as a freedom fighter in Mozambique. Other male youth who had satisfied the guerrillas of their commitment to the war were assisted to cross the border to Mozambique and train as guerrillas. This was part of the guerrillas mobilizing for the war. However, Comrade Maxwell regrets this decision because he could not get benefits or recognition similar to that of guerrillas in the post-independent state. His life has not significantly changed for the better. He has remained at the level of a peasant farmer. He has not worked or lived

outside Musana area his life. He has survived by doing work for people at their homesteads, ploughing their fields with his cattle, clearing their land for houses and farming and weeding their fields. He has failed to reap the benefits of what has been termed the “independence dividends” despite owning land in the rural areas. In 2014 he joined the Muslim faith, as a survival strategy he claimed. He said that Muslims give food handouts and assistance that lacks in the Christian churches around and that is why he converted to the religion. He was the ZANU-PF ward chairperson from 2005-2010, and was instrumental in mobilizing during the 2008 election violence.

As is common to other rallies held by war veterans at such places and, for example, during annual Heroes Days celebrations (Kriger 1995; Wernber 1998), stories of guerrilla bravery and of the Rhodesian regime’s cruelty were retold. These were periodically interspersed with performances of liberation songs and party slogans, as well as very specific accounts of individuals and guerrillas who were killed at these sites or during those battles. At the beginning of any narrative, or any interjection ZANU-PF slogans were chanted or liberation songs sung, framing these accounts firmly within a larger ZANU PF imperative and historiography. With fists raised speakers chanted *Pamberi ne ZANU-PF! Pamberi nekubatana! Pamberi nekunzwisisa!* [*Forward with ZANU-PF! Forward with unity! Forward with understanding!*], and were met by responses of *Pamberi!* [*Forward!*]. These opening chants were always followed by a closing *Pasi ne MDC! Pasi na Tsvangirai! Pasi nevatenges!* [*Down with the MDC! (i.e. the opposition parties), Down with Morgan Tsvangirayi! (Leader of the opposition) Down with Sellouts!*], accompanied by fists coming sharply down.

Watching these events I was struck by the camaraderie of these former guerrilla comrades as they coordinated the event, and reminded each other of events during the war and the roles they played 36 years ago. It was tempting to imagine the war surrounding us, as they narrated battles that took place, pointing to the landscape around us. It was also clear that this was a deliberate affect they were trying to create. This was why hosting the events *in situ* mattered. The narratives and performances of songs and slogans were a way of engaging with the landscape and invoking affective identification of the dead as local ‘heroes’ of the liberation war, in order to structure knowledge of the past and landscape, and controlling the manner in which places are

experienced (see Tilley 2012). In these practices what cannot be experienced and remains hidden maybe of equal significance to that which is revealed. The art of showing things may simultaneously be an art of hiding others. The narratives were meant to reveal and shame the Rhodesian forces brutality and at the same moment reveal and celebrate guerrillas and war collaborators – and by extension ZANU PF itself - as heroes, but they also hide other stories, such as those of guerrilla violence against civilians during the liberation war (Kriger 1992).

The six soldiers conducting the rehearsals were friendly but authoritative. Everyone was referred to as ‘comrade’ as a sign of ‘oneness’ and unity with each other, and with what several of the war veterans referred to as the ‘spirit of the liberation war’. An affective atmosphere was deliberately invoked through which these comrades attempted to take themselves and their audience back to the time of the liberation struggle as they sang and danced *chimurenga* songs and chanted war slogans that resonated with well-known memories of all-night wartime vigils, the *pungwes*, through which guerrillas mobilized popular support during the war (Sachikonye 2011; Manungo 1991; Tungamirai 1995 Cauter et al 1980). Framing these deliberate efforts at affective invocation and mobilization in terms of being ‘engulfed by the spirit of the liberation war’ reflected well-known and sometimes inflated accounts of spirit mediums’ support and ‘ancestral guidance’ for the guerrillas during the war (Kriger 1992; Lan 1985; Daneel 1995; Fontein 2006). It was also about creating particular kinds of subjective historical experiences for those too young to have experienced the war itself. My presence at the rehearsal in a group meeting allowed me to witness how they interacted, what they said and what they were not allowed to say. When Mbuya Veronica narrated how the guerrillas arrived at her homestead in 1978 she said:

The guerrillas arrived at my homestead and asked us if we knew them and we said no. They said we are the guerrillas have you ever heard about us, we said we have heard about you. They asked us to make some food for them and we did, then they asked for the village head to come. They asked him to gather people around at our homestead. They asked people to bring food when people brought food they each person was asked to taste their own food first; we all tested our food even if it was raw before giving it to the guerrillas (Gogo Veronica, Maema Mountains, 16/10/2012).

Captain Mbanje then stood up after that narrative because he felt that the old woman was swaying from the expected narrative or would waste time by talking about food and other stuff they were not interested in, he said to her:

Mama, you started talking about the food but that is not what we want people to hear, you should tell them that the comrades came and said we are the sons of the soil who had come to liberate the country and all the other things we taught you about the war. This is what we want the people to hear how we as the guerrillas mobilized and politicized the people, not other small incidents or conflicts (Captain Mbanje, Maema Mountains, 16/10/2014).

This was a way of controlling narrative. The stories people were supposed to tell were that of a remarkable and rosy relationship between the guerrillas and the communities where the war was fought. Controlling narratives sometimes was meant to hide the undesired narrative about the liberation war. I had an opportunity to interview Gogo Veronica after the rehearsal about her narrative. I began by asking her about why she constantly spoke about food and the guerrillas. She told me that the issue of food reminded her of how her husband who is now deceased was heavily beaten by the guerrillas when he had complained that they only wanted “good” food and did not provide anything to the villagers. This narrative would imply that the relationship between the guerrillas and the peasants was not as rosy as they were being asked to portray. On my part, I had noticed that narratives of guerrilla violence on the sell-outs, witches and other villagers were grossly missing from the narratives at the rehearsals. Gogo Veronica said that they were told that this narrative on how sell-outs were punished by guerrillas was not part of the sanitized stories about the liberation struggle to be told. They were not told why but part of what “patriotic history” is all about is to glorify relationships between guerrillas and the people, and the ancestors to seek personal or ZANU-PF party legitimacy.

Singing of liberation war songs was encouraged during the rehearsals because of the effects music has on the people. During the war, many people describe how the songs of the liberation struggle especially aired on *Radio Mozambique* motivated them to go to join the liberation war forces in Mozambique and Zambia. ZANU had an information department in Mozambique headed by the late Vice-President Simon Muzenda and the late popular Chimurenga musician Comrade Chinx Chingaira.

Captain Zveushe told the former liberation war messengers that they should not stop singing because songs are important in raising the spirit of the people during mobilization (see Pongweni, 1985) and this was also part of the same work, he said:

You must never stop singing; before the event begins when the commanders are arriving they must be greeted with songs of the liberation struggle, if they were real commanders they must then be engulfed with the spirit of the war. Some people will come here to say we want to see what they are doing but these songs must transform them; they too must be engulfed with the spirit of the liberation struggle, even those who were not witnesses or participants of the war especially the youth. (Captain Zveushe, Chiramba Mountains, 16 October 2014).

Upon hearing this, two women stood up and imitated a liberation war dance known as “bum jive”, they would shake their bums and hit them together. Captain Zvesuhe applauded them and people clapped hands for them it, for a good performance. “This is how we used to dance during the war,” said Captain Zveushe as he commented on the bum jive and such other performances and their significance, “comrades used to travel in groups of threes and fours carrying a radio so that when they rest they would dance bum jive.” He said such performances are important because they would remind other ex-guerrillas of their experiences of the war and they would be taken back into the war. He went on to say that “at the base guerrillas would put guns against trees like the way those umbrellas” he said pointing to umbrellas resting against the tree trunk. Singing and dancing raised people’s moral motivating them to continue the war.

The songs of the liberation struggle played an important role in evoking ‘the spirit of the liberation war’, while graphic descriptions of death, tortured bodies, blood and terror, sought to incite anti-white, and specifically anti-Rhodesian and anti-British sentiment and resentment. Such experiences were performed through bodily actions, whilst liberation songs and slogans of the past merged with those of the present, and dances popular during the liberation struggle, like ‘bum jive’, were to be performed for the people. Emphasis was placed on identifying specific people killed at the site. As with the war veteran-led community commemorations both at Mumurwi in 2013 and Chiramba in 2014, former guerrillas, messengers and villagers remembered and ‘mourned’ the death of comrades, friends and kin killed at these places during the

war. Sometimes they complained that the dead had not been duly recognized for their sacrifice since independence, mirroring common complaints of state commemoration elsewhere in Zimbabwe (Werbner 1998; Kriger 1995). As they narrated battles fought at these places, war veterans, collaborators and villagers named those they worked with and the relatives they lost during that time. According to Captain Zveushe:

Those who lost their lives did so for the liberation of their country and their blood watered the freedom of the country. They are the heroes and those who survived did so not because of their will but to tell the history of the liberation struggle and protect it (Captain Zveushe Chiramba Mountain base 16/10/2014)

Captain Mbanje said that during the war they did not tell people that someone had died but they said that he was ‘injured in battle’ (*akakuvara*). Now they spoke about those who died and how they died. This was part of affective identifications of the dead in a way that would bring those who are listening to tears. This was supposed to generate an affect of sympathy and anger at the same time from the audience. Captain Mbanje encouraged people to be enthusiastic about telling the history saying, “you are the water and we are the fish, you gave us life and the country was liberated, so you must be happy and proud of that.” He went on to say, “last year we scored goals, and so be happy it’s our celebration.” Here he referred to the ZANU-PF 2013 election campaign slogan called *bhora mughedhi* meaning lets score goals, here he reiterated that they scored goals and won. When the song ‘*Nzira dzemasoja*’ which means ethics of soldiers in war, was being rehearsed people were encouraged not to repeat verses but to sing it once because of time so that they can complete the whole song. Captain Mbanje told the lead vocalist that after every verse, she must sing a chorus, “these are the words we were told by Comrade Mugabe when he was teaching us” emphasizing that the name of President Mugabe should be mentioned as many times as possible. Captain Zveushe told them that they also have to mention the names of living comrades especially those like him who are present with them, when asked to mention names of the assistants and guerrillas they worked with during the war most assistants mentioned those who were dead or those who were not present. He said:

I didn’t hear anyone mention that you worked with Captain Zveushe and Captain Mbanje here with us, this will make us look like we were never here and some of our

colleagues will doubt we are real comrades if the people we worked with don't talk about us (Captain Zveushe, Maema mountains, 16/10/2016).

Everyone laughed to these remarks but agreed that he had a good point, from then people started mentioning them. This was meant to authenticate these soldiers as real liberation war veterans. This is in the context in which there are debates about who is a real war veteran given that there are allegations of people pretending to have fought in the war in order to benefit from that status. In the context of the army itself promotions are accorded on the basis of being liberation war veterans so there is a sense in which these soldiers wanted their 'heroic performances' to be narrated by the villagers, so that they look authentic to their commanders on the day of the workshop so that they can make claims to promotions and other benefits.

Also emphasized was the need to mention the names of those male messengers who were recruited into ZANLA, went to train in Mozambique and returned and worked in the army, the Air Force and other spheres of the public and private sectors. Captain Zveushe said this was important to show the impact of guerrilla political education on the people and that *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* did not just work, as ZANU youth but became ZANLA guerrillas as well. Some were refused to go and train as guerrillas, Comrade Maxwell for instance wanted to go with others to train as a guerrilla in Mozambique but a decision was made by the local guerrillas, that he must stay because he was important and useful to the liberation war as a messenger. Captain Zveushe said, "We asked that he should be tied to a tree so that he won't escape and follow others." Comrade Maxwell concurred and said he was actually tied to a tree by some *mujibas* from Chikwaka area in Mashonaland East province. Mentioning these cases was important because people like Comrade Maxwell would get recognition and respect from local people for their role in the liberation war.

The Maema battle is significantly called *hondo yemidzimu* ancestors' war, because according to narrators who witnessed it as assistants or villagers baboons and osprey eagles fought it. Four war *mujibas* Comrades Mpopoma, Mutondo, and Maxwell rehearsed how they would narrate the battle at the workshop. They took turns to describe their experiences. Comrade Maxwell was the first to narrate because he was eloquent and was close to the action on that particular day because of his close

association with the guerrillas. At these rehearsals liberation war relationships and friendships were at play. People like Comrade Maxwell who were close to the guerrillas were given preference during narratives and even narrated more than one event, he got his name mentioned by these soldiers many times there by making him an important figure during the war. Comrade Maxwell explained that:

In the early hours of the morning around 5 am I saw two helicopters coming from the east herding for the west flying over the guerrilla base. A few moments later we saw a fighter jet called Arumanya coming from the west with the helicopters following and dropping soldiers around the base. At that moment auxiliary forces and selous scouts already surrounded the base. As the jets started bombing and the soldiers and guerrillas started exchanging fire baboons came out of the caves and started running around the base climbing trees and making a lot of noise confusing the soldiers and pilots. The result was that the soldiers and the pilots started firing at the baboons thinking that they were guerrillas, and this allowed guerrillas and many other messengers including myself to hide in the caves. Some managed to escape to safety without being seen. When the battle was over I left the cave and ran away along the mountains to the villages later we returned to the base to take stock of the damage and to our surprise there was no single baboon lying dead anywhere in sight (Narrative by Comrade Maxwell at Maema Mountain rehearsal on 16/10/2014).

The point that no baboon had died during the battle was proof that the ancestors of Musana had sent the baboons to assist them in this battle because it was a surprise attack, and up to now no one really knows what happened to those baboons, said Comrade Maxwell. Captain Zveushe intervened after Comrade Maxwell and said that as guerrillas they had organized to meet at a different place after the battle that is when they would take note of those who could not have made it and know that they had been killed or injured in battle. As for the eagles they showed unseen exploits as narrated in a rehearsal by a liberation war *chimbwido* Comrade Cecilia Bhengu:

The eagles filled the whole sky until it was all black and whenever the jets or soldiers fired from the air into the villages or the base they would gather and form a wreath and catch the fire in the air this prevented a lot of houses from being burnt down in Chaka village and it distracted enemy fire a lot (Narrative by Comrade Cecilia Bhengu at Maema base rehearsal on 16/10/2014).

Captain Zvesuhe said this battle is important because it shows the co-operation between the guerrillas and the ancestors. He said this is important today because people no longer respect the ancestors but they have to know that this country was liberated because of the assistance of the ancestors. Importantly, people needed to know that ZANU-PF was given the mandate to rule the country by the ancestors, which is why the ancestors assisted the guerrillas to win the war. In their narratives the messengers were told to constantly say that “we thank the ancestors for helping us win the war and for allowing president Mugabe to rule”. What is interesting about these stories which take the form of myth is not the truth about whether what they tell happened or not, but it is about the underlying mythical structure of the story (Levi-Strauss (1982). It is about how the ancestors helped in the war

At the end of the rehearsals the liberation war *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* asked Lt Colonel Geza if he could take their grievances to the ZANU-PF leadership. The grievances were that as people who had fought the liberation war they wanted to be recognized and at least benefit from their sacrifice. They demanded to be included in the development projects and to be given loans to start self-help projects. They complained that these loans are only being advanced to the youth and they were being sidelined because they are old and have no education, they cannot write the proposals needed. Lt colonel Geza said that it would be better if they present these demands on their own at the workshop on the 22nd of October to the ZANU-PF and government leadership that will attend. The messengers agreed that Comrade Mutondo who was their leader during the war would present these grievances.

The gathering ended with an announcement by Captain Zveushe that “food would be provided on the ‘big day’ and the MP had pledged to donate a beast for the occasion.” Those present were encouraged to invite and tell as many people as possible of the event. As the sun was about set, food which was thick porridge known locally as *sadza* with beef and vegetables was served as people mingled and shared lighter moments. The army provided cooking oil and mealie-meal the beef, salt, while villagers provide vegetable from their gardens. The rehearsal paved way to the event of the 22nd of October in which the soldiers attending the Commanding Staff Course Number 27, community leaders, Member of Parliament, Senator, the Chief, Zimbabwe Staff college commanders and local people attended.

2.3 Channeling Affect: Narratives of heroes, traitors and liberation war suffering

The purpose of the rehearsals and the workshop was to strengthen ZANU-PF's dominant narrative about the liberation war, that the guerrillas were heroes. It also sought present ZANU-PF as the only party which was responsible for liberating the country and therefore, the only political party that can transform the lives of the people. Affectivities, Navaro-Yashin (2009) argues are projected onto objects, landscapes or things by people who live in their midst and landscapes also channel their own affect. This means that affect is relational. In Bindura South, at the former liberation war guerrilla base at Maema mountain people were affected in relation to stories, narratives, performances and identifications, these channeled affect. On the 22nd of October 2014, the official day of the Zimbabwe Staff college organized workshop, luxury all-terrain vehicles, Toyota Hilux, Ford Rangers, Isuzu KBs, Mitsubishi and a green Zimbabwe Staff College bus carrying trainees attending the field workshop cruised along the Harare-Shamva road and turned into a dust narrow road that connects Munaku village, Matanda village and herded for the foot of Maema and Harihuru (Chiramba) Mountains, sites which housed the guerrilla bases during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. Matanda village is itself important to this event because it was a site of one of the battles. During the liberation struggle the tarred road gave access to the colonial Rhodesian forces to patrol and launch attacks on the guerrillas in that area. As the vehicles passed through the villages, they transported people who were herding to the Mountains for the meeting. At the foot of the Mountains the women selected from all villages in the ward prepared fire and fetched water to prepare food for the people, a stone's throw away men were busy cutting a slaughtered beast into pieces that women would cook. A Kipor generator powered the Public Address (PA) system from an army registered Mazda BT 50 single cab.

At the top of the mountain a group of former *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* entertained a growing crowd of villagers with liberation war songs. The local ward councilor was the Master of ceremonies. He introduced all the important ZANU-PF, government and council officials, the local MP, Senator, Chief Musana, the Headman and village

heads present. These delegates sat in front facing the people who had come to witness. As usual the event was opened with a prayer to God, acknowledgement of ancestors, and the singing of the National Anthem. After that Lieutenant Colonel Geza took over as the head coordinator of the event. All the participants were seated in front close to the PA system. The soldiers who constituted the command staff course number 27 sat at the front row with their tablets and ipads and notebooks. The ZANU-PF youth were in charge of security standing around the people and dignitaries. After the introductions, the former liberation war messengers led the proceedings with a song called “Ndiro ghidi,” “Only the gun”:

Ndiro Gidi Vakomana!	Only the gun comrades!
Richatora Zimbabwe!	Will liberate Zimbabwe!
Richattora Nyika yedu!	Will liberate our land!
Nyika yedu ye Zimbabwe!	Our Land of Zimbabwe!

In Zimbabwe there are many instances after the liberation war in which people had to engage in their own memorialisation of liberation war violence and suffering at local level. One such example is that of Mbuya Dyna, a 76-year-old woman who was not a *chimbwido* but was in the category of parents during the liberation war, preserved the hut that housed the guerrillas, which was a site of Chaka battle. Her homestead just like many others in the country hosted the guerrillas at the period when they moved from bush bases to house bases when they trusted people enough to live among them without the danger of being sold out. Comrade Dyna argued that she has preserved these huts because they remind her of the role she and many other villagers played in the liberation war. They also tell the story of the liberation war to the younger generation in her family and the surrounding homesteads and villages, so that the history of the liberation war does not skip a generation.

These are the scars of the struggle that she is proud to show to anyone. Preserving these buildings is also an attempt by the owner of the homestead to make massacre visible, especially to tell the story of Rhodesian forces brutality on the unarmed masses during the liberation war. The group of soldiers from the Staff College, ZANU-PF and government officials were taken on tour of this homestead. The ZSC visit to these places and allowing people to retell the stories of struggle, suffering and

heroism at these sites transformed them from mere geographical features to monuments and legacies of the liberation struggle. What was narrated at these sites were not only stories of how the war was fought on the ground but also the biographies of these places, the rocks, caves, trees, the eagles and baboons that allowed the guerrillas to hide and fight the colonialists and allowed guerrillas to build relationships with the people during the war. These places together with the people were the ‘water’ that the guerrillas as the ‘fish’ relied on to survive in the war. Fontein (2015) argues that if things have biographies through their entanglement in the social lives of people, political biographies and personal histories too are imbricated, afforded and constrained through the active residues and stuffiness of the past. So the remains and debris of struggle gains attention and is turned into new kinds of ‘heritage.’

These remains and debris of the liberation struggle as well as the provocative narratives of the Chaka village battle were meant to exalt guerrilla bravery and the support they received from the people. At the same time, they exposed the sell-outs during the war, showing how selling out led to loss of many young lives during the war. At the rehearsals narrators were encouraged to argue that the liberation war sell-outs were similar to the MDC supporters in their narratives and in their slogans at the beginning or at the end of the narratives. This was meant to justify using violence on the MDC as fighting of a “new enemy” with the same agenda as the Rhodesian imperialists and liberation war sell-outs. The Chaka battle narratives were also meant to show the Rhodesian soldiers’ brutality and horrendous violence on the guerrillas and the villagers during the war. Narratives of horror and grotesque violence on the guerrillas and villagers were encouraged so that people can understand what it was like during the liberation war. It was meant to show the people the suffering, the bravery and the heroism of those who fought in the war. As rehearsed on prior to this day, Comrade Georgina Nhundu stood up she sang the song called “*Mudzimu woye*” meaning “Our ancestors” which was a plea to the ancestors for help and guidance during the liberation struggle:

Mudzimu woye!	Our ancestors!
Torwarire pai?	Your children are tormented!
Mbuya nehanda chiuya	Grandmother Nehanda, come!

Mudzimu woye!
Titore Zimbabwe!

Our ancestor!
Lets Liberate Zimbabwe!

Her account is a good example of the kind of narratives that were deployed at these war veteran-led training events:

We want to continue holding on to Mbuya Nehanda [a key ancestor in Zimbabwe's struggle], down with those who don't like us. We were cooking at the base when we saw the helicopters coming and starting to bomb and deploy soldiers around this base, we were told to sit under a tree by the soldiers. There was heavy fighting between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian soldiers. Only seven guerrillas died at that battle. When the battle ended we were captured and we were forced into a vehicle together with captured guerrillas. They forced us to carry the bodies of the dead guerrillas into the vehicles. One guerrilla was tormented, the comrade came out of banana trees and he broke his gun because he didn't want a liberation war weapon to be used by Rhodesian soldiers to fight the people. He was immediately captured and he was told by the enemy to say "down with the war!" and he refused to denounce the war of liberation and one of the auxiliaries pierced his eye with a bayonet. He was told that he will die for nothing, and he said to the auxiliary soldier you are the one who will die for nothing because you are fighting for money, but I am fighting for our land, and he chanted a liberation war slogan "Forward with the war!" He said the war will not stop because I am dead, my blood will raise the gun when I am dead, *chimurenga* will continue. His other eye was pierced and he was totally blind, he did not cry he told the auxiliaries to finish him off, as he was already useless, he remained resolute and loyal to the cause of the liberation struggle. He was later shot dead and was taken to where other dead comrades were. We were all forced to carry the bodies of the dead comrades and many of the youth were forced into lorries but me and other two women we were carried in a vehicle with the bodies of the dead comrades, and we were told that you will suffer where we are going. (Comrade G Nhundu, Chiramba Mountains, 22/10/2014).

She paused to let the story sink into the minds of the people before she continued. One of the soldiers close to where I was sitting said in a whisper "and then you hear someone saying vote for the MDC, we kill such people, that will never happen" people looked at him and kept quiet. It was evident that he was talking to himself but reacting to Comrade Nhundu's narrative. Comrade Nhundu continued with her story and explained how she escaped by jumping out of the moving vehicle and later joined other comrades at another hideout base.

I was scared but when I remembered the words of the comrade I became brave, I told myself that if death comes I will accept it with all the parts of my body, did all those who died not want to live? I wanted to run away, I escaped when the soldiers were seating and relaxed in the lorry. I signaled the other youth to escape with me and she said Comrade, you want me to die, then I remembered the comrade telling us that comrade whatever comes to your mind is what you must do. I jumped off the vehicle and ran into the bush I said to myself I want to die with a gun on my back and when I reached a *mukuyu* (baobab) tree I knew I had survived I ran and I reached a base where the guerrillas including comrade *Zvoushe*, comrade *Mbanje*, comrade Madzingi were. I was taken into the house and I gave them all information that seven guerrillas had died at the battle and that all the others had escaped. They asked if any youth had died and I said no youth died, we all survived but some had been captured. They said do the slogan and I said:

Pamberi nekushinga!	Forward with bravery!
Pamberi nehondo!	Forward with the war!
Pasi nembwende!	Down with cowards!

That is how I survived the Chaka battle (Comrade G Nhundu Mmaema mountains 22/10/2014).

These narratives bring out the figure of a war veteran who suffered a lot at the hands of the white colonialists. This image puts afore the bravery of the guerrillas who died and those who are alive. They went through the same suffering but did not sell-out the struggle, they are deserving of the hero status and even more, they can never be thanked enough. Comrade Zveushe and Comrade Mbanje mentioned in the above narrative were the coordinators of the filed workshop and the narrators were following their instructions to mention their names in the narratives. For the messengers, this was an opportunity to tell their community about their heroic performances during the liberation war. With a clenched fist and power in her voice she chanted the slogan:

Pamberi nekushinga!	Forward with bravery!
Nekubatana!	With unity!
Nechimurenga!	With the chimurenga war!
Pasi na Tsvangirai!	Down with Tsvangirai!
Pasi nevanomutevera!	And all his supporters!

Other accounts that were delivered at this event focused on the atrocities committed by the Auxilliary forces of Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa after the Internal settlement of 1978. At the workshop held in October 2014, Comrade Getty Mhanda one of the youth who were captured and were taken to the auxiliary bases at Nyava business Centre narrated her experiences in the hands of these Auxiliary forces fighting with the Rhodesian army. She also referred to guerrilla sellouts working for these forces, which is a common theme in ZANU PF's historiography of the struggle. Comrade Mhanda was told to be as detailed as possible and show the ugliness of the colonialists hearts, in order to give the people the clear picture of what ZANU-PF was up against during the liberation war fighting against and is still against in the contemporary period. She narrated her experience as follows:

When we arrived at Nyava base we were surprised to notice that it was a big auxiliary base bigger than the guerrilla bases with a lot of weaponry, there were many auxiliaries and their supporters at the base and they were eating, singing and dancing denouncing the liberation war and the guerrillas. There we saw some of the rebel guerrillas we had worked with before they betrayed the struggle. We were told to sit away from the others, that was when we saw decomposing bodies of dead guerrillas, they were white with dust and swollen ready to burst and the auxiliaries were still piercing the bodies with bayonets. We wanted to cry but mourning a dead comrade was a serious crime to the auxiliaries. Others wanted us to be killed and buried with these guerrillas but the commanders refused to have us killed but wanted us to go back and tell others what we had seen and that the guerrillas were being killed like flies (Comrade G Mhanda, Chiramba Mountains 22/10/2014).

The areas of Nyava, Chindotwe, Manhenga, Super and Musana were auxiliary territory according to Comrade Zvikupererei. These auxiliaries were ZANLA guerrillas who had betrayed the liberation war and switched to fight for the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Prime Minister of 1978 Bishop Abel Muzorewa and they were called *Pfumo reVanhu* meaning "The People's Spear." In their early days together with the Selous Scouts, they dressed like guerrillas and pretended to be guerrillas and went around terrorizing villagers. This was done to discredit the guerrillas and the war of liberation. Initially, the people lost trust in the guerrillas thinking they were terrorizing them but later on they realized that it was the enemy masquerading to be guerrillas, so people learnt to be careful in their dealings with any of these forces.

Mujibas and *Chimbwidos* and guerrillas informed people of the difference between the operations of the guerrillas and the auxiliary forces. They also alerted people of any guerrilla who had joined the auxiliaries and Rhodesian forces so that people will be aware of them. This point was to be emphasized in order to show the people that selling out started a long time ago and that among us there are people who are also sellouts but are pretending to be ZANU-PF supporters in order to confuse people and discredit the ZANU-PF government. All this was aimed at the opposition MDC, which is accused of working with the ex-Rhodesians and the Western governments especially the British to force ZANU-PF out of power in order to reverse the “gains of the liberation war”, especially the land reform program. She ended with a song called “Zimbabwe ndeyeropa” meaning Zimbabwe was born of blood” as the people sang along:

Zimbabwe ndeye ropa baba!	Zimbabwe was born out of the blood!
Ndeyeropa remadzibaba!	The blood of our fathers!
Zimbabwe ndeye ropa baba!	Zimbabwe was born out of the blood!
Ropa remadzibaba!	The blood of our fathers!

This narrative was particularly provocative. One man sitting next to me at the workshop at Chiramba mountain base said ‘that is why we always vote for ZANU-PF. These whites that back Tsvangirai are cruel, they never liked the blacks’. This illustrates how these events fitted ZANU-PF’s political imperatives, framing MDC as a party which is bent on bringing back colonialism. For others attending, the narratives offered new information of lost family and kin that they had not been aware of before. One young man, Comrade Denda, told me after the event that:

I always had the photos of my sister, Sarudzai who comrade Getty mentioned and I was told that she died during the war at the base because she was a *chimbwido*, but no one had explained to him how she died. It was after graphic and gory details of how she died had been described that for the first time I came to tears and mourned her death and this changed the way I view the liberation war. People shouldn’t die this way even in war especially if they were unarmed civilians the whites were cruel, Down with Rhodesians sponsored MDC and its regime change agenda! (Interview with Comrade Denda 22 October, 2014 Chiramba base).

The identification of the dead, and accounts of their deaths, had important emotional impacts on those present. Families who lost loved ones at these bases cried as suppressed pain was evoked. It was a sad moment. Being at these bases and listening to painful stories of people killed and tortured at these sites reminded some people of the most painful periods of their lives. Many narrators started by remembering those killed, the suffering they went through during the war. The purpose was for those who did not witness the war because they were too young, or not yet born, to start seeing the liberation war in a different perspective. The Senator for Bindura-Shamva constituency Comrade Susan Mavhangira told the youth in her address to emulate the sacrifices made by their fellow youth during the war, to fight for what is theirs and protect the country. This is because they owe it to those who died for the cause of liberation most of whom are their relatives, whom they should not betray. This illustrates how these sanitised narratives, performances and affective identifications were meant to reinforce ZANU-PF's legitimacy, and de-legitimise the political opposition, and the imperialist agendas ZANU PF have long claimed to lay behind it.

These events were therefore about reinforcing a particular ZANU-PF historiography of the struggle that was targeted at forging particular kinds of '*jambanja* (violent) political subjectivity (Chaumba, et al 2003; Le Bas 2006) among a generation who did not experience the struggle directly, emboldening a willingness to engage in pro-ZANU-PF violence. This explains why this young generation was able to take on board the language and practices of the liberation struggle and deploy them in a project of political violence in the 2008 election campaign. The ZANU-PF youth went about perpetrating the most horrific and heinous acts of violence on opposition supporters, singing and chanting liberation war songs and slogans. In doing this, the youth feel that they are participating in the struggle for liberation started by the heroes of the first *chimurenga* led by the 'elevated and mythologized' spirit medium of Mbuya Nehanda (Fontein 2009; Hove 1986; Vera 1993). The youth are also elevated to the level of heroes and leaders of the second *chimurenga* such as President Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, Herbert Chitepo and many others and are promised the war veteran status (Matereke 2011).

The ZANU-PF Senator for Bindura-Shamva constituency Comrade Mavhangira told the people gathered at Maema base in October 2014 that these accounts of the

struggle were meant to prove that “when ZANU-PF says the whites are enemies we are speaking from experience of white man’s brutality on blacks”. Clearly these workshops were part of ZANU PF’s broader political historiographical work through which it attempts to control political space and legitimacy by determining what history matters, and excluding any perceived opposition to its rule from it. In doing this, they were not just engaging with particular, carefully orchestrated narratives of the war, diverse as these may or may not have been, but were also working a range of affective registers through performance, songs, slogans, and especially in close engagement with material landscapes of struggle. Even when it was clear that they may have been achieving the goal of telling the liberation war history and getting the kind of response they wanted from the people, the Senator had the task of addressing the economic issues affecting the people because of the promises for jobs ZANU-PF and development made to the people during the 2013 election campaign.

These places that we see today should be transformed into national monuments that house with bullets like what we have seen in other countries. In June I went to Rwanda on a working visit. Their parliament was a site of the genocide killings so it has bullet holes on it they renovated it but left that part with bullets as a reminder of what happened to their country in history. We should make these areas historical sites where people can come and learn about the history of the liberation war. I want to say to the youth of today, all these collaborators you have seen here were the youth at that time so you should emulate their example and become youth who are united and can move the country’s development forward. To the army I say thank you very much for this event and you must continue remembering us in this area. I know you will go and tell your commanders, we have seen it happening in Murengwe an area where the Air Force of Zimbabwe commander Perrence Shiri passed through one day and he said this the areas I fought the liberation war in and it has these kinds of dilapidated mud schools, and he gave money and resources to develop those schools and we said the elder has remembered that this where he came from. So I know that you will carry this story and tell them that this history need to be preserved why don’t we make this village a modern village, and build good houses for the people, you can build a good house for the woman with that granary where a guerrilla hid aside and preserve the granary as an beacon of history. And those who are responsible for development in this area the D.A is here he will also go and look at these issues (Senator Mavhangira, Maema Mountains 22/10/2014).

Promises of making these places monuments and heritage sites were not enough for those who fought the liberation struggle on the side of the guerrillas and probably for the unemployed youth. The liberation war *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* took this opportunity to air their grievances to the ZANU-PF party and government officials. Their leader Comrade Mutondo stood up and narrated his experiences of the liberation war as they had rehearsed:

One day I was sent to go on a mission with a letter, which contained sensitive information. On my way, I met the Rhodesian soldiers and they captured me. I didn't know what to do with that letter I didn't want them to get hold of that information. I called upon the ancestors of this land, of the gumbo totem. I prayed to them in my heart. I also regretted why I left behind the snuff that is given to all the assistants. The snuff was used when undertaking such missions by the assistants we would smear it on your face and hands and then go, nothing will stop that mission. When was captured I was heavily beaten all my back was torn with lashes and I had flesh cut off with the knife that I carried, they searched my whole body but they could not find the letter. They captured me at night and took me to Bindura, they tied me from a helicopter over the hills at Brickens farm and let me hang from the helicopter as it made patrols and told me to show them the guerrilla bases in the area. I showed them the bases all over those areas, these were not guerrilla bases but auxiliary and selous scouts bases, they took me back to Bindura but the letter I kept it until now and the shirt I wore on that day is the one I am wearing today (Comrade Mutondo, Maema Mountains 22/10/2014).

He showed how they used to hide the letters, he held the collar of his shirt to the public and slowly removed a piece of paper from the hem of the collar, they would cut open the collar and leave a small opening enough to force a small letter in and no one would even see there is something. He said they would also hide letters in the trousers turn up. This is how we used to hide letters because the Rhodesian soldiers thought that information contained in letters would be kept in pockets so they ransacked my pockets stripped me naked but they could not find the letter. This performance was outstanding and captured the appreciation of many people; it proved the bravery and the suffering the messengers went through, making their role more visible and believable. Just like the homestead with bullet holes Comrade Mutondo's shirt showed that the remains and debris of struggle is turned into new kinds of 'heritage', 'museumified' and yet commemorated (Fontein 2015). In line with what

the *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* had agreed Comrade Mutondo made a demand to the leaders saying:

All these assistants worked hard in difficult conditions during the war, everything that has been said by the first one to speak here is true, nothing happened during the war without the assistants leading the way. These people suffered a lot during the war but today we are surprised they are suffering after independence, is there something that can be done for us in terms of projects, and the land. Most of the projects are directed at the youth but us who fought the war, whose stories we tell here are neglected. He said as people clapped hands in agreement and one man said, “you can say that again this is what I was waiting for)” shouted one man (Comrade Mutondo, Maema Mountain, 22/10/2014).

A young man shouted saying *arikudhomoka*, meaning he was getting out of context, but another elderly men responded by saying, “no, he is right we have been neglected for a long time.” Lt. Colonel Geza stood up and said in Chishona *Mwana asingacheme anofira mumbereko*, meaning a child that does not cry dies at his mother’s back), he went on to say:

The former liberation war collaborators have said what is in their hearts, all the representatives are here, the MP, Senator, D.A and others they have heard it themselves, they want land, projects and funds to uplift their lives we hope these will be addressed (Lt. Colonel Geza, Maema Mountains 22/10/2014).

Notably the assistants have complained about being left out in the land reform program, the payouts that were given to the war veterans in 1997 (Kriger 2003) and the monthly stipends former guerrillas continue to receive. They wanted to transform this recognition to a heroes’ status so that they would claim authority and power in the party. They also pointed out that they cannot be ignored or left out in projects that are meant to improve people’s lives. They have complained that those who did not participate in the liberation struggle are getting first preference and recognition hence they are enjoying the national resources while they suffer. They viewed themselves as ‘first class’ citizens in the country with genuine claims to resources than anyone else. That is why they had the courage to stand up and say that they want recognition and reparations as well as access to economic resources, solely as liberation war collaborators. Comrade Mutondo ended by singing a song called “*Vazhinji ne*

vazhinji” meaning “many many people,” a song that reminds people that many people were killed for their love to liberate Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle:

Vazhinji na vazhinji takavafusira!	We buried many people!
Nepamusana pekuda nyika yedu!	Because of their love for their country!
Yakanga yatorwa navapambe pfumi!	Which, had been taken by settlers!
Nehanda komborera! mhuri ye Zimbabwe!	Nehanda bless the people of Zimbabwe!

Comrade Mutondo said this bravery is invoked by their being at the very places where the liberation war was fought. He claimed that it allows them to recall and get angry. The presence at these places invokes the time when they all suffered together, and also invokes the freedom that was at war, which in the end never was. These contestations and demands for recognition at local level feeds into highly politicized contests over commemoration and creation of hero’s status in Zimbabwe (Kriger 1995, Werbner 1995). Away from the base in the village an 84 year Gogo Veronica who received the guerrillas at the farm compound when they arrived in the area echoed the same sentiments saying:

Yes we suffered but what did we get? Nothing, they come here and tell us that it is the whites that are bad, but we are no longer fearful of the whites because they are gone. I fear these guerrillas because they are still here, they also killed people during the war at the bases. When I am at that base I always remember their brutal killings of Mr. Dongo and many others. We also suffered during the war but today they enjoy the results alone in Harare (Gogo Veronica, 27 October 2014)

These examples of some former *chimbwidos* and *mujibas* used the opportunity of the scripted events to point to their grievances about being ignored since independence, and this does not mean that ZANU-PF’s narratives are being challenged, these grievances are very much within the dominant ZANU-PF framework because they justify preferential treatment given to them in allocation of food aid and agricultural inputs as well as positions within the party. However, these alternative stories reveal the different positions that space invokes for different people. In response to the *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* grievances Senator Mavhangira encouraged them to be organized and then speak with one voice, she said:

First of all I want to thank you for this important occasion, it was an eye opener for me. I was in the department of training in Mozambique during the war and we trained the guerrillas who came here to the front to fight so sometimes we never got to hear how the war was fought on the ground. I have learnt a lot today about the liberation war. I have heard that the mujibas and chimbwidos were very important and with narratives they have given I believe so. I didn't know that they faced such dangerous situations during the war, that they would be sent out into the enemy zone an enemy with a gun waiting to kill them and when they come back they come back to a guerrilla who didn't trust them and they had to prove that they were not compromised. This is a difficult thing, so I want to say to the collaborators you must be united and speak with one voice, at the moment it is difficult to assist you because you have two organisations representing you. Come together have one organization and then you can be a powerful force, like what we did as war veterans when we were compensated (Senator Mavhangira, Mumuriwi Mountain 22/10/2014).

At the end of the workshop, when all the people had eaten food prepared for them, the soldiers and all villagers gathered in a tent at the foot of the Maema Mountain. Lieutenant Colonel Geza called upon the representative of the ZSC students Major John Moyo to give a vote of thanks. Major Moyo vowed that the trainees would ensure that they spread the history of the liberation war to other soldiers and the communities they come from. He also stated that they would defend the country by their blood from those who seek to undermine the history and the gains of the liberation war. This was a veiled reference to the opposition MDC-T that is identified as a puppet of the former Rhodesian colonisers and the West.

The gathering ended with the national anthem, *Simudzai mureza wedu we Zimbabwe* and the ZDF war cry: *Zimbabwe inyika yedu tichahidziviria neropa redu*. (Zimbabwe is our country we will protect it with our blood). The vote of thanks by the trainees shows the effect the narratives and performances had on them. This is the effect the organisers wanted them and many others to have about the base, the liberation war. This was the preferred version of history although its possible some of the people left with a negotiated or oppositional view of the historiography. By pledging to support and defend the liberation war and its values, these soldiers are showing their loyalty to the ZANU-PF party, and then making themselves right candidates for promotion and taking over the commanding role in the army. The liberation war is seen as being

synonymous with ZANU-PF, and for ZANU-PF if people understand and disseminate their version of the liberation war history they cannot be a sell-out.

2.4 Conclusion and opening up the debate

This chapter revealed one of the ways in which ZANU-PF war veterans in the ZNA use the liberation war bases of the 1970s to draw young and old people into a way of seeing the world as one they need to develop a set of political commitments, ideals and aspirations so that its clear who they are as a political community is founded in the liberation war and identify with ZANU-PF and that they must fight to defend it and that there are enemies who they must fight to engage in that defence. In the following chapters I am going to propose the reading that experiences, which the pro-ZANU-PF patriotic history narrative tried to close are left open. The youth were not there in the 1970s and yet they are reading the persuasiveness and the authenticity of the patriotic history account. In light of other accounts of evidence and knowledge that they are receiving as something that is didactic; to some extent they enjoy performing obedience but they also enjoy performing the opposite. Under what conditions do the youth political subjectivity in Zimbabwe resist these kinds of form, or continue with these narratives or is there a more of a complicated political subjectivity that is invested in these forms? I go underneath the performance of the subjects, what are the social mechanics of the production of these forms and what kind of political subjectivities are exceeding them, moving around them, circulating them? In the following chapters trace the history of this form, through the base of the liberation struggle, and then in 2008 when the youth militia base was reconstituted here I trace the continuities in forms of violence and creation of subjectivities through the base since the 1970s war, then we come back to the moment when things are complicated where the space of the landscape itself has multiple significations that exceeds the capacity of the ZANU-PF war veterans to define what the base/landscape does.

3 CHAPTER THREE: The 1970s liberation war guerrilla base and the creation of ZANU subjectivities

3.1 Introduction: the constitution of the liberation war base

The ZNA visit at Maema base in 2014 shows how the narratives, performances and the affective qualities of the 1970s liberation war base have been appropriated by ZANU-PF in its project of forging particular political subjectivities, in order to sustain the status quo. In this chapter, I trace the evolution, function and significance of the base in the 1970s liberation war to understand how it was used as a space for transformation during the liberation war. This allows us to understand its appropriation as an idea and space for the reinforcement of the status quo. The base was used as a space for persuasion and coercion both during the war and after. Persuasion included: political education that guerrillas gave to the people, the use of ancestors, and drawing on the materiality of the scared landscape. Coercion consists of the use of violence or the threat to use violence on those who did not support the guerrillas. It also encapsulates the killing of sellouts, witches and civil servants aligned to the Rhodesian government. This shaped the relationship between ZANU-PF and the rural people in post-colonial Zimbabwe for a long time. I begin by discussing how the base was in transforming people's political dispositions during the liberation war.

When the liberation war came to our area here in Musana, we were scared to death; we did not believe in these guerrillas we thought they were terrorists. This is what we were told by the Rhodesian soldiers. We could not believe that a few men walking on foot, with tattered clothes and one gun each could defeat the military might of Rhodesia. But the close relationship with the guerrillas changed all this, at the base were made to understand the importance of the liberation war, that it was only us who could liberate the country. We saw the guns at a close range and even held them and this empowered us. We were taught the history of our country from the coming of the whites by the guerrillas' commissar and why they had to fight and why they needed our support. We also witnessed the power of the ancestors as we lived with huge snakes and other dangerous animals in the caves but they did not harm us. With this and more information we went into the villages with the guerrillas

and mobilized the people to support the war. We even sniffed out sellouts and brought them before the people where they were either beaten up or killed. At times we also killed the sellouts, and we were proud to do so in order to win the war. Everyday when I look at those mountains where the bases were established, I remember everything about the war, they are not just mountains to me; they are a symbol of our history of the liberation war. I am proud to be part of the history of the liberation struggle and I will defend it even today (Interview with a liberation war messenger comrade Mutondo September 2014).

The extract reveals the narrative of Comrade Mutondo, a former liberation war guerrilla messenger, shows the significance of the establishment and presence of the guerrilla bases in mobilizing of the people's support and changing the people's political perceptions during the 1970s liberation war. The guerrilla bases as shown were not only geophysical spaces of past activities but are "historical, social, cultural, imagined and epistemologically diagramed spaces that provide ground for political subjectivities" (Mignolo 2000a). Describing through oral ethnography and a collection of thick description of these places and what they mean from people who inhabited them, I show that the guerrilla base was the platform through which, the grand narrative of the liberation struggle hit the ground into people's homes, and had a much more complex relationship between political education, conscientisation, freedom and violence. It transformed people to inhabit subjectivities characterized by bravery, resistance, and resilience when fighting the might of the Rhodesian Regime Army. At the same time the violence associated with it enabled the development of subjectivities characterized by fear, pretense, and quietude. Walsh argues that, it is in these spatialities of geopolitical location that boundaries are formed, negotiated, and transgressed, power and politics played out, it is here that diverse knowledge is generated, produced and distributed (Walsh, 2002: 60).

Captain Zveushe is a former ZANU liberation war guerrilla who is now attached to the Zimbabwe National Army. His chimurenga name was Jealous Chiundura Mabhunu, but ended up being called Zvikupererei Vatengesesi, meaning 'stop selling out'. He was given that name because the guerrillas were troubled by many sell-outs during the war. Captain Zveushe left Zimbabwe in 1975 from Biriviri High school in Masvingo province where he was a boarder and went to Tanzania and trained in as a ZANLA guerrilla at Mgagao, he was part of the last group to train in Mgagao. Their

commander was the late Agrippa Mbeu the ZDF Commander General Constantino Chiwenga was the Political Commissar. After training, he joined Chaminuka sectors in Tete province, together with other guerrillas they entered into Nyahwi area across the border with Mozambique and from there to Chesa, Madzviva and then into Musana where he fought the war from 1976 up to 1979.

Captain Zveushe said that the Rhodesian forces defeated with ease the first group of ZANLA cadres, who fought colonialists in Musana area in Bindura South, because these cadres did not seek the support of the people and the ancestors of the land. In response to these shortcomings the, ZANU leadership revised its strategy and sent ZANLA fighters to learn guerrilla tactics from FRELIMO a liberation movement fighting for Mozambique's independence from the Portuguese. FRELIMO had long developed and implemented a successful guerrilla war, which led to their victory against the Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. ZANU started sending new groups that had trained with FRELIMO in Mozambique to Zimbabwe to continue the guerrilla war Captain Zveushe and others came to continue the liberation struggle in Musana sector reinforcing the previous group that had been defeated in the early 1970s. Captain Zveushe reveals how they first approached the ancestors and local people for assistance to fight the war and how this helped them in establishing guerrilla bases in the area. He revealed this in a narrative at Maema Mountains:

When we arrived at a farm compound at the foot of the Mumurwi Mountain we asked the foreman to take us to the mediums of this land, so that we could ask for assistance to fight the White man. We were taken to see *Sekuru* Gan'a the medium of the Royal ancestor Nyamukasa of the Gumbo ruling clan. It is here that we were allowed to find sanctuary and establish 'bush bases' in the sacred mountains and caves that could only be accessed by Chiefs and the *Mhondoro* (royal ancestors) mediums. There are caves that cannot be seen by anyone but they exist, one person can walk around but will never see them and another one who has the blessing of the ancestors can see them and inhabit them without any problem (Captain Zveushe Maema Mountains 16/10/2014).

The extract above reveals the constitution of the liberation war base, as one that is physical and also one that transcends materiality into metaphysical. Interestingly, the caves were physically organized and categorized: for example there was a cave,

which was used as a 'bush hospital', others were used as a storeroom for ammunition and food, open spaces were used for preparing and cooking. Troop medics trained in Mozambique manned the bush hospital; this was different from the storeroom for ammunition and food, which was manned by any appointed guerilla. However, women had gendered roles: these duties were household chores that are predominantly allocated to women in the home, including cooking, sewing clothes and washing dishes. In this way the base became a 'home' to those who inhabited it. It was not only a place of violence, it is where people shared their aspirations, dreams and what they wanted to become in an independent Zimbabwe. In addition, these young women, known as *chimbwidos*, ZANU female youth, acted as messengers, mediating information from one base to the other. This was somehow different to the role of young male messengers, known as *mujibas* who went on to spy in enemy zones, and to do sentry duties, i.e. guarding and manning the base. Thus the base is a physical space where strategies and raids to the Rhodesian outposts would be organized and launched.

The liberation war base goes beyond the political and the social, which the guerrillas sought to establish, but importantly it was also spiritual. One could not just establish or locate the base on his will or desire, but there were local actors involved in establishing the wartime base. This reveals that bases were not only 'secretive' (see also ZNA file S3011/4-5,8), but also sacred. As Captain Zveushe revealed, the leading commander had to mediate in leading guerillas to see and speak to the spirit medium of the Royal ancestor. So there are at least two mediators in locating the base: the commander and the spirit medium of the royal ancestor who would then speak to the ancestors of the land. This reveals that the liberation war base was not just physical but it was the spirituality of the base, which constituted it. The ancestors were strategic in the process of mobilizing the people to support the war through their mediums, but their call for support was not just a verbal one, they also used different signs and powers, which manifested through nature to show that the war was just and legitimate. After realizing the influence and power of the ancestors in mobilizing people the Rhodesian government tried to use their own chiefs and mediums to dissuade people from supporting the war claiming that the ancestors were not happy with the spilling of blood (Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Sithole 1988).

The guerrilla bases were established outside the villages in the mountains where they could not be easily located by the Rhodesian security forces, but also at places where the guerrillas and their youth 'runners' (aides) would be able to see what is happening around them so as to detect enemy movement. Only guerrillas and the ZANU youth, the *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* knew the location of the bases. These youth were not supposed to tell anyone even their close relatives about the location of the base; they swore not to reveal the location of the base to the Rhodesian soldiers when captured or tortured. They could not leave the base as they wished, but only when assigned certain duties outside the base. At any given time it had to be known where they were by the guerrilla base commanders and everyone had to be accounted for each day. Any guerrilla or youth who was captured was not allowed to join the others until all measures had been taken to verify that they had not been compromised. Guerrillas believed that those captured would eventually be killed or forced to work with the enemy to expose them. When a captured guerrilla escapes and returns to the base they would be held in detention, and were interrogated by section commanders. They would not be allowed access to weaponry and if they fail to explain convincingly how they escaped they could be killed.

The guerrillas followed a strict code of conduct given to them by their ZANU leadership during training and those given to them by the ancestors in the area they fought known as 'taboos'. The taboos prohibited guerrillas from having sexual relations during the war. Women who were on their menstrual cycle were not permitted at the base or to come into contact with the guerrillas. When a *chimbwido* was on her menses, she would not cook or do anything and often they would be sent back to the village. Guerrillas were not supposed to kill wild animals in the bush because some wild animals were sent to protect and direct them by the ancestors. Captain Zveushe said that an Antelope represented *Nyamukasa*, the Royal ancestor of Musana so whenever they saw it they would kneel clap hands and praise it as a way of acknowledging her presence. It was the duty of the senior commander at the base to appease the ancestors each day, and to pray for their protection. Harmony among guerrillas was encouraged and physical disciplining of guerrillas who misbehave was discouraged. Captain Zveushe said that family ancestors from each guerrilla, *chimbwido* and *mujiba* worked with the territorial ancestors in the areas they operated in to protect them. He argued that insulting or beating up an individual guerrilla

would potentially anger their ancestors who would end up letting that person die and this would be a loss to the struggle.

3.2 The political context of the 1970s and the rise of African nationalism

The colonial period was marred by extreme oppression of the black population through legislated segregation, such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which demarcated land into “Native” or Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) for Africans and “European” for whites. Often the native areas were dry, rocky and unproductive lands, while the European areas were fertile and arable land (Goebel 2005). The Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and various separation laws severely reduced rural agriculture, landholding rights and livestock for blacks in Rhodesia (Sachikonye 2011). This affected black people’s livelihoods as subsistence farming was reduced. For black peasant farmers, the African reserves became an insufficient base for subsistence, a symbol for racial injustice, and the focus for a rallying cry for nationalist resistance (Goebel 2005; Bourdillon 1987; Cheater 1990; Moyana 2000; Bhebe and Ranger 1995). The colonial government introduced many taxes such as hut tax and dog tax. This was meant to make people’s lives difficult and thereby forcing them to work in farms and mines, a process known as *chibharo* where able bodied men were rounded up and forced into white owned farms (Onselen 1976; Raftopolous and Yoshikuni 1999). The land question became the biggest issue during the liberation struggle among Africans. Protests by the working class in cities, the 1948 general strike in Bulawayo and the industrial action in Salisbury were brutally crushed by the colonial British South African Police (BSAP) (Moorcraft 2012). Working conditions in factories, farms and mines were deplorable and they resulted in many deaths (Raftopolous and Yoshikuni 1999).

The growth of African Nationalism in the 1950s was a response to a shift to uncompromising white supremacy under the leadership of Sir Edgar Whitehead, Sir Winston Field and Ian Smith (Moorcraft 2012; Coltart 2016). The removal in 1958 of the moderate Sir Garfield Todd government that was sympathetic to African nationalism heralded the shift to white supremacy and extremism hostile to Rhodesian nationalist independence aspirations. Todd and his wife Grace introduced reforms

aimed at improving black people's education through investing in black schools and ensuring that every black child of school going age goes to primary school, they also doubled the number of primary schools and provided grants to mission schools to provide secondary education and pre-university courses for children (Coltart 2016; West 2002). Todd also made progress toward extending political rights to black Rhodesians by expanding the voting franchise system that existed in Rhodesia so that an African with ten years of schooling could vote and he also increased the African wage. Todd allowed multiracial trade unions thereby undercutting white nationalist dominance in the unions. He sought to increase the number of blacks eligible to vote from 2 percent to 16 percent of the electorate by lowering property and educational qualification required, however this was rejected and these policies were seen as dangerously radical by most whites and that sealed his fate (Coltart 2016).

In 1958, Todd was removed and replaced by Sir Edgar Whitehead who pursued a policy of "partnership" premised on an acceptance that blacks would play an increasing role in the national affairs, including politics, in the future (Coltart 2016; Moorcraft and McLaughlin 1982). Whitehead predicted that in fifteen years time blacks would become majority voters, however blacks rejected this, and tensions and mistrust grew. In 1959, the government declared a state of emergency and arrested many black nationalists and banned nationalist parties. Blacks demanded the one-man one vote for all but this and many other concessions were rejected by the Rhodesian parliament. As dissent grew, Whitehead enacted new legislation to deal with African rebellion, the egregious Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) was introduced in 1960 which was used to crush democracy for decades. The Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold resigned in the wake of this legislation protesting that it "outrages almost every basic human right, and is, in addition, an unwarranted invasion of the executive of the sphere of the courts" (Coltart 2016). LOMA gave the government "sweeping powers for the control of the political opposition and draconian penalties for politically motivated crimes" (Moorcraft and McLaughlin 1982:26)

In 1961, a constitutional conference was held between the ruling United Federal Party (UFP), Black Nationalist parties and white opposition parties to decide on the political issues in the country. Joshua Nkomo leading the National Democratic Party (NDP) wanted universal suffrage, a one-man one-vote policy but the white parties wanted

voting qualifications to be tightened to exclude more blacks (Coltart 2016). A referendum was held and was adopted on 24 July 1961. Other white parties opposed the referendum and its proposals to expand the political rights to blacks. Whitehead continued his policy of attacking black nationalists and he banned the NDP, and the nationalists responded by forming a new party, which for the first time bore what was then for whites an emotive and radical name- Zimbabwe (Coltart 2016:17). They called the party the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 1962 the right white opposition parties formed a coalition opposition party the Rhodesian Front (RF). Whitehead and the UFP bolstered by the referendum victory prepared a general election confident of winning support from blacks and moderate whites. They pressed ahead with policies and measures to liberalize Rhodesia.

The UFP held a congress in November 1962 with one third of the members being blacks and promised wide-ranging progressive reforms including ending racial discrimination, repealing the Land Apportionment Act and expanded the franchise to include all "certain responsible, civilized and educated groups" of all races (Coltart 2016:18). ZAPU opposed these promises and Joshua Nkomo encouraged blacks not to participate in the elections. ZAPU fermented violence in black townships and both blacks and whites lived in fear. The ZAPU central committee permitted Nkomo to start acquiring arms from Egypt for the armed struggle. The RF exploited the fear of nationalist violence and racial integration among whites, and blacks were becoming critical of the UFP. The result was that the UFP lost the December 1962 elections to the RF led by Sir Winston Field, who was later blamed for failing secure independence of Rhodesia from the Federation and from the British, he was removed from office and was replaced by a more militant and white supremacist Ian Smith. The RF victory was a triumph over appeasement and for nationalist because it defined the battleground easily.

In April 1963, the executive of the banned ZAPU went into exile to Tanganyika now Tanzania. Among them were Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (Coltart 2016). Within the nationalist movements tensions were emerging and there were some who accused Nkomo of indecision and weakness arguing that he was reluctant to wage an armed struggle. Nkomo openly criticised and dismissed the members of ZAPU executive who were opposed to him. These

members broke away from ZAPU and formed a new political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on 8 August 1963 at Enos Nkala's house in Highfields, Salisbury, ZANU's Founding president was Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, and Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, Herbert Chitepo and Nkala were part of the executive (Martin and Johnson 1981). Although its policies were similar to those of ZAPU, the new party had stronger socialist leanings. Therefore ZANU would turn out to be far more militant than ZAPU (Coltart 2016; Astrow 1983). Both the Rhodesian Front and ZANU extremes were increasingly resolved to allow violence to prevail. It also marked the beginning of deep and often violent divisions within the nationalist movement. ZANU was unequivocally committed to armed struggle and its first group of five guerrillas, which included Emmerson Mnangagwa, left for training in China on 22 September 1963 (Coltart 2016; Martin and Johnson 1981). This in turn introduced a further dynamic, with China supporting ZANU and the Soviet Union supporting ZAPU.

The year 1963 also saw the end of the Federation of Rhodesian and Nyasaland, and the British government announced that Nyasaland would be able to secede from the Federation, which was a further blow to moderates within the UFP (Coltart 2016). When the RF came into office the restriction orders imposed on nationalist leaders were lifted, but at the same time the RF announced that it would use the courts to deal with breaches of law and order, and imposed mandatory death sentences for relatively trivial offences, the "Hanging Bill" (Moorcraft and McLaughlin 1981). Another was a permanent ban on Sunday political meetings, which traditionally was the main day for nationalist meetings. The new laws became weapons in the hands of the RF and nationalist leaders were regularly brought before court for alleged infractions of increasingly repressive legislation. This policy was later abandoned and the RF resorted to restrictions without trial. Powers of restriction in terms of the Law and Order Maintenance Act were extended to 90 days and then to one year and later to five years (Coltart 2016; Martin and Johnson 1981). Greater powers were introduced to control gatherings and prison sentences dramatically increased for a variety of "subversive offences". Smith used these new powers on 16 April 1964, restricting Nkomo and other nationalist leaders to Gonakudzingwa, a desolate, uncomfortably hot outpost near the Mozambique border.

After Nkomo's restriction riots broke out in Salisbury and Bulawayo; houses were stoned, cars overturned and incidents of arson rocketed. On 4 July 1964, ZANU guerrillas group known as the "Crocodile Gang" led by William Ndangana set up a roadblock and killed a white man of Afrikaans descent named Petros Oberholtzer in the Chimanimani farming area of eastern Zimbabwe (Coltart 2016:22). Terror in African townships increased and nationalist parties and newspapers not loyal to the RF were banned (White 2015; Coltart 2016). The RF also made some policy decisions, which greatly exacerbated tensions. In particular, reversing some of the progressive education policies introduced by Garfield Todd. It cut back on spending on African education, and teacher enrolment decreased; then it introduced school fees for the first time, substantial sums for poor black workers, causing a decline "in the numbers of black children attending school. There was a sense among black Rhodesians that this was a deliberate policy, similar to the apartheid Bantu Education policies to emasculate African education. Nationalists exploited public anger and urban schools became the center of struggle. Schools were boycotted, some were burnt down, teachers were assaulted and their cars set alight. At one stage in the year, African school enrolment in Salisbury schools fell "from 20,000 to a few hundred" (Barber 1967:207). This policy had a more deleterious effect on the way the RF was viewed by black people.

In 1965, the RF increased the drive for independence, and at 11 am on 11 November 1965, Armistice Day, during the traditional two minutes' silence to remember the fallen in the two World Wars, the Rhodesian cabinet gathered around Smith as he signed the Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Coltart 2016; White 2015; Moorcraft 2012). The declaration was modeled on the American declaration but omitted two key phrases, that "all men are created equal" and the "consent of the governed" (Coltart 2016:24). The timing was made to emphasise the sacrifices that Rhodesians had made for Britain. Attached to the declaration was an amended version of the 1961 constitution, severing all ties to the British and creating a separate Rhodesian monarchy (making Elizabeth II "Queen of Rhodesia", a title which she never took up) (Coltart 2016: 25).

The civil service, military and police were progressively purged of people who opposed UDI and replaced with those who supported UDI and the RF (Coltart

2016:87) Most nationalist leaders were in detention or prison when UDI was declared; they interpreted it as a stark reminder that there was no prospect of a negotiated settlement. Both ZAPU and ZANU met separately to formulate and expedite military strategies. The ZANU leadership issued the Sikombela Declaration (named after the detention camp where most were held), which authorized the chairman Herbert Chitepo to establish War Council to be known as Dare ReChimurenga. In April 1966, four groups of guerrillas crossed over the Zambezi into Rhodesia. Two of the groups were arrested soon after crossing over but the others avoided detection for a while. On 28 April 1966 the Battle of Sinoia (now called Chinhoyi) was fought. The Rhodesian Air Force and police wiped out the entire guerrilla group, but for ZANU the battle was significant in that it marked the beginning of the Liberation Struggle or Second Chimurenga.

3.3 Making of the guerrilla nationalist subjectivity and the war strategy

The guerrillas who were an important component in the execution of the liberation war were coming from this background of oppression and fear instilled by the Rhodesian government. They were part of the peasants and workers so there was need to transform their thinking about the war. As the nationalist movements transformed into guerrilla movements there was need to transform the recruits into effective guerrillas. Support for the war was sought especially from the Eastern bloc during the Cold War. ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo received technical, financial and material support from Russia since their aim was to build a conventional army. Russia emphasized on the importance of a strong and effective army and use of superior weapons in winning a war and this was important to ZAPU. ZANU's support was given mostly by communist states such as China, Romania, Russia and many other African countries that were independent then. ZANU adopted the Marxist/Leninist ideology and adopted the teachings of China Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse Tung into their politicization and education project. The first thing was to politicize and reorient the guerrillas on the Marxist and Maoist ideology so that they could understand the direction ZANU was moving. This is what they were supposed to teach the masses in Zimbabwe as part of the liberation struggle. Mhanda (2011) noted that the making of the "people's soldiers" as he called the guerillas followed the

Chinese indoctrination model, which emphasized the importance of political education. He claimed that it was important to first raise the political consciousness of the trainees so they could fully appreciate the purpose of their training, which was to fight the enemy. Mhanda (2011) argued that the most important question in any revolutionary struggle is the ability to distinguish friend from foe. He went on to argue that:

This would enable the fighters to mobilise and win over to their side all those forces that were not in the enemy camp, divorce and alienate from the enemy all those they could not win over, and finally isolate the hardcore enemy (Mhanda 2011:20).

This was one of the reasons for the establishment of the guerrilla base within the rural areas. The distinction between enemy and friend is what politics is eventually about and is the characteristic of the political according to Schmitt (1974)'s thesis on "the political". This eventually shaped the nature of Zimbabwean politics during the liberation war and in post-colonial context. The base comprised of three dimensions in the execution of the liberation war: the political, psychological and the military, each of which characterize insurgency (Monick, 1981:12). In line with the political dimension of insurgency which refers to the expansionist strategic programme, which is based on systematic programme of infiltration of the body politic, with the ultimate objective of corrosion of the political, social-economic fabric of society under attack, ZANLA's strategy was to attack government infrastructure targeting African council offices, stores, cattle dips as 'soft targets'. In essence, ZANLA strategy became "a combination of evasion, attenuation, subversion and politicization" (Evans 1981:6). After losing many guerrilla fighters in the early battles in Musana sector and many other places the ZANU leadership saw the importance of and followed the communist doctrine, which states para-military attacks against government forces must not be initiated until a viable power base has been firmly established within the society under attack (Mugabe 1983[1978]). With the militarization phase this power base is expressed as a covert underground political force. Hence within the ZANU insurgent movement there was a dual structure as both a guerrilla force (ZANLA) and an underground political movement (ZANU). This was the trend with guerrilla forces worldwide, in Malaya during the communist insurgency (1948-60) there were an overt armed force, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the ethnic base of

which was Chinese, and an underground political force, the Min Yuen. In Yugoslavia (1941-5) the corresponding institutions were the National Liberation Army and the National Liberation Committee (Monick 1981:12). Zimbabwe history lessons constituted much of the guerrilla politicization syllabus.

Look at the history we had to use. Our history seemed to start with missionaries coming because they felt like that they wanted to save the people from ignorance, from paganism, and things like that. Already giving that kind of background when you are still young it will make you think that there is something wrong with your past. And then they taught us about Rhodes, who decided to settle some whites in Zimbabwe to make it part of the British Empire to fulfill his 'cape to Cairo' dream. When they look at the very first liberation war waged by our people they call them rebellions. That already gives stigma of illegality- that people were rebelling against legal forces. These kinds of textbooks deal with our past history as something deplorable and then they give us this glittering history of Europe. They have these voyages of discovery, brave people like Vasco da Gama and so on. So you have these two contrasting histories: one, which is full of progress and justice and so on, and ours, which at best we must forget (Ropa Rinopfuka, ZANU Research Unit, cited in Frederikse 1982)

The aim of such teachings was to remove the inferiority complex that the Africans in Rhodesia had during that time, to make them proud of their own history, culture and past heroes. It was to make them see the fault in the narrative of the colonial education and the whole system. This in turn would strengthen their resolve in fighting for a just system in which their history and culture would be recognized as important.

When the guerrilla war was launched the ZANLA commanders had a duty of making sure that the guerrillas understood the importance of the people in the war. The mantra of fish and water worked if it was made practical. Captain Zveushe said that his detachment commander when he arrived in Musana sector was called Comrade Nzarambiri, it was his *nom de guerre* given to him by their Chief Instructor Comrade Mark Dube in Mgagao, Tanzania. *Nzarambiri* means 'double hunger.' According to Captain Zveushe it was so because the guerrillas lacked enough food during their training in exile, and they were told that they will suffer from hunger when they come back home as liberation war fighters until they can persuade the people to provide

them with food and other material support. This required a good and close co-operation between the people and the guerrillas a task that was not easy but necessary. The guerrillas had to learn that it was not only their guns that would win the war but their relations with the people. Captain Zveushe described how Comrade Nzarambiri and his colleagues suffered because of their lack of support from the people:

Comrade Nzarambiri and other comrades arrived here in Musana and entered this area through Mumurwi Mountain and fought the wars that will be described here, they told us that they faced the whites and they lost the war because the whites had helicopters, and jets. They also faced resistance from local leaders, the District Administrators worked for the whites, the Chiefs worked for the whites, the police worked for the whites, the Agricultural extension officers worked for the whites, they were civil servants and they would go and report any guerrilla activity to the colonial government. When the guerrillas called for a meeting with the people to educate people about the war, those civil servants would be there, seated among the people to take information and report to the colonial government. Secondly we had whites who were in the farms around us, for example Brickens, who owned a farm just near us here. That one must have had been a general, he terrorized us, in a short period of time, jets would come and terrorize us. We had put ourselves in the lion's den, but our *povo* helped us, you see this road we used, the one from Harare it gave easy access to the area for the soldiers to patrol and go back to Harare everyday (Captain Zveushe, Maema mountains 16/10/2014).

One of the reasons why the people were reporting guerrilla activities was because of fear of punishment from the Rhodesian authorities for protecting “terrorists”. In Bindura, just 20 kilometers from where bases had been established there was a Selous scouts camp, across the mountains to the east there was Joko-Mutoko army camp, so guerrillas were surrounded by Rhodesian fire power. Captain Zveushe said that they survived some battles because the area is mountainous, and dense forest, which provided cover for them. This itself was not enough, in order to end the hunger the guerrillas had to mobilize, politicize and work with the local people in order to win the war. The guerrilla subjectivity continued to be shaped by experiences of war inside Zimbabwe, over and above what they had been taught in training.

The guerrillas normally operated in sections of at least ten men comprising of a commander, political commissar, security officer, medical officer, logistics officer

and three to five cadres. Standard section equipment was an RPG launcher or 60mm mortar, a light machine gun, with the rest armed with varied weapons depending on their supply state. Once inside Rhodesia guerrillas began operations from base camps cited near friendly villages or *povo* camps. *Povo* is a Portuguese word used by FRELIMO to denote “the masses” and borrowed by guerrillas (Moore 2005). Whereas some scholars have argued that elsewhere the population of the *povo* camp consisted of Africans freed or abducted from Protected Villages or populations moved from established kraal sites, which guerrillas called “liberated zones” (Moorcraft 2012:72; Evans 1981) in Bindura South guerrilla bases were set up in mountains close to established villages but were secret. The people were however referred to as the *povo* and they provided guerrillas with food, clothing, intelligence on security forces movements and moral support, generally they acted as the guerrillas’ ‘tail’ (Moorcraft 2012:72). This perception or role of the people as the tail of the guerrillas shaped the nature of relations between guerrillas and civilian population in the war and in post-independence Zimbabwe. In independent Zimbabwe the people have always come second or last to the war veterans and soldiers in the ZNA who have taken over the role of the guerrillas as protectors of the people and the state. The *povo* in the eyes of the ZANLA guerrillas had little knowledge about politics and needed to be educated, politicized and to be led, following Mao’s guerrilla ideology and strategy. According to Captain Zveushe, the difference between the Russians and Chinese in strategy was that the Russians emphasized that the weapons were superior and would bring victory but for the Chinese the focus was the people.

3.4 Materiality of liberation war bases

The establishment of the bases within the sacred and ancestral landscapes allowed the guerrillas to use this spiritual aspect to mobilise people to support them ideologically and this was an autochthonous religious practice the guerrillas were engaging in. The political work of the ancestors and spirit mediums was to legitimize the presence of the guerrillas and the liberation war to the people. This was important since the ancestors were the givers of life and owners of the land had the authority to allow guerrillas to fight in their territory if the cause of the war was justifiable and legitimate (Lan 1985). The ZANLA guerrillas were deliberately trying to harness the

affective dimensions of the landscape both material and immaterial to do political work, reinforce particular historical narratives (that they are the bones of Nehanda who have risen to fight colonialism), particular kinds of legitimacy for themselves, and fashioning or to create particular kinds of political subjectivities for instance peasants who are loyal to ZANU and ZANLA.

These beliefs allowed the people in Bindura South to embrace the liberation war in its entirety because it had the blessings of the ancestors. The guerrillas argued that ancestors gave them authority to organise people and to spill blood, killing sell-outs and witches in a process in which authority was transferred from colonial chiefs to the ancestors and eventually to the guerrillas (Schmidt 1997; Lan 1985). The ancestors were not only significant in legitimizing the presence of the guerrillas and the liberation war (Brickhill 1995, Cate 1983, Ranger 1985, Tungamirai 1995, Manungo 1991, Lan 1985; Fry 1985), but they were also very significant in the way the war was fought on the ground (Fontein 2009).

It shows the important role the ancestors are believed to have played in the way in which the war was fought on the ground. ZANU-PF war veterans are still propping up these ‘convivial’ relations in localized contestations over legitimacy, authority and the land (Fontein 2009). These events allowed the guerrillas to capture the material and immaterial dimensions of the landscapes experientially and discursively to do the political work of reinforcing them as the ‘the bones of Nehanda’. These events defied the attempts by the Rhodesian government to capture the spirituality of the liberation war by using ‘colonised Chiefs and spirit mediums to denounce guerrillas’ (Lan 1985). They defied colonial narratives and allowed people to believe that the ancestors supported the just cause of the war. This allowed for the creation of political subjectivities in rural people that were loyal to and fearful of ZANU-PF.

3.5 The base as a source of mobilization and transformation: *Pungwe*

Pungwe is a Shona word, which means *overnight/ all night vigils* often conducted, at the headman’s house for the purpose of mobilizing and ‘educating’ the people for war. In this regard, guerrillas worked with the existing local traditional leadership of

village heads to mobilise people to participate in the *pungwes*. During the *pungwes*, songs and slogans were employed for morale, denigrating the Rhodesian white government and their local allies (the sellouts). These songs conveyed different messages, for example, comrade Zveushe noted that the song called *Ndiro gidhi* meaning ‘Only the gun will liberate Zimbabwe’ emphasized the ZANU message that it is only the armed struggle that will liberate Zimbabwe. Other songs included the one called *Smith*, which reminded the Prime Minister Ian Smith that the guerrillas fighting in the bush are not terrorists but they are children fighting for their country. Other songs like *vazhinji ne vazhinji* meaning ‘many many people’ reminded the people gathered at the *pungwe* that there were many people who are dying everyday during the war because they love their country, many people relate this loss of life with various battles fought at the Mumurwi, Maema and Chaka bases. Older people and the *mujibas* had to go and collect the remains of the guerrillas and their messengers who died at these bases after every battle. These songs and experiences gave people the resolve to fight, Comrade Maxwell said he and other *mujibas* wanted to go and receive guerrilla training in Mozambique but were stopped by the guerrillas because their services were needed in the area. Through these songs and popular appeals to the people’s suffering at the hands of the colonial regime the ZANU guerrillas won many hearts and minds of the people, transforming the peasant subjectivity. For *mujibas* like comrade Mutondo these songs at the bases and *pungwes* taught them to be brave, to fight, to survive and to mobilise the people for the war.

The guerrilla base as the center of power and organization in different areas inside Zimbabwe got its political authority and mandate from the ZANU leadership in Mozambique. The ZANU leadership operated from exile because the Rhodesian government had banned all political parties and imprisoned some of the leaders (Coltart 2016). The guerrillas spoke the language of their political and military leaders. Thus, the people were taught about the ZANU party and its hierarchy, the ZANLA military wing and the reasons for waging the *chimurenga* war. This was meant to make people understand the liberation war as ‘their war’, and for them to give logistical support to the guerrillas. This was an important aspect of the politicization mission. It was in the interest of the ZANU guerrillas to ensure that all the people in the areas they fought became absolute ZANU supporters. ZANU guerrillas faced serious threats from Rhodesia’s superior and sophisticated media,

which portrayed them as terrorists (Fredreskse 1981). In this context it was important for people to accept and inhabit political subjectivity that would ensure that they were one with the ZANU guerrillas and together they developed ways of communication and fighting that surpassed and subverted those of the Rhodesian security services with the belief that “none but ourselves” will liberate Zimbabwe (Frederikse 1981).

The ZANU Central Committee, and the DARE (War Council) informed and influenced guerrilla strategies, methods and ideologies during mobilization of the people in rural areas. In 1978 ZANU President Robert Mugabe noted that:

The ZANU Central Committee and the DARE had jointly adopted a double strategy. Firstly, an intensified systematic recruitment campaign had to be mounted with due haste so as to build up the army and save the revolution. Secondly the masses of Zimbabwe needed to be purposefully mobilized and oriented towards the acceptance of Chimurenga as their only salvation. ZANLA is the savior of the people of Zimbabwe (Mugabe 1983[1978]: 4).

In order to effectively mobilise people, ZANLA guerrillas needed the base and its related practices to convince people that only ZANLA was their ‘savior’. In the same process, the people were seen as the core for the success of the liberation war. In his 1980 speech to the people of Zimbabwe, Mugabe noted that incorporating the people into the liberation war and in the structures of ZANLA was important. Mugabe said:

ZANU did not only rely on military power but also on the political strength of our conscientised broad masses and this ensured that they would ultimately be superior to and victorious” over the whites. Where they relied merely on bullets we relied on a combination of bullets and the hearts and minds of the people. Where they concentrated, massacred and tortured the people we liberated, organized, and politicized the people, giving them the correct line of the struggle as we brought power to them in their liberated zones. Soon, we galvanized them fully behind the struggle and the party, transforming them into active revolutionary participants (Mugabe 1983:4).

The base provided a key site for this politicization that Robert Mugabe was speaking about as the main aspect in the execution of the liberation war. This put the people at the center of the war, forging new identities and Zimbabwean political subjectivities.

In order to ‘galvanize’ the people fully behind the party and the war and to ‘transform’ them into ‘active revolutionary participants’, the ZANU guerrillas had to inculcate a new liberation ideology with the people as front-runners of the struggle. The realization was that people could not fully embrace ZANU ideology or the ZANU way if they did not participate in the war, as Mugabe said:

Soon we established the perfect identity between the People and the Party, so that our Party, ZANU would be inseparable from the people and the people inseparable from the party that was the significance of turning 1978 into The Year of the People. Our task of that year was principally to consolidate the party by basing it upon the only solid foundation it should have- the people. Proceeding from the Year of the People in 1978 we entered 1979, which was significantly called, ‘The year of the People’s Storm’, with a determination to utilize the power of the people in reinforcing and complementing the dazzling operations of our ZANLA forces. To sharpen mass action we trained several militia units and armed them for both offensive defensive actions, while the youth among the mass population in various areas became a specialized dependable force to whom we assigned numerous military and political tasks. The people were the revolutionary waters without which the elusive ZANLA fish would not have been able to swim (Mugabe 1980:9).

ZANU created party structures in rural areas, which the people administered as part of the way in which the people identified with the party, not only during the war but also beyond the liberation war. These party structures reported to the ZANLA guerrillas at the base and their main role was to mobilise material resources such as clothes and food for the guerrillas as well as mobilizing support. They also became the eyes and ears of the guerrillas on the ground reporting Rhodesian soldiers activities and movements. The correct line of the struggle referred to by Mugabe was that, as noted by liberation war veteran Comrade Zveushe “guerrillas were the sons of the soil who had come to liberate the country from colonial oppression with a gun.” It was important for the ZANU guerrillas to counter Rhodesian propaganda, which demonized them as terrorists, rapists and murderers. The guerrillas taught the people the song called *Nzira dzemasoja* meaning *pathways of soldiers/ethics discipline of soldiers*:

There are ways of revolutionary soldiers in behaving.
Obey all orders.

Speak politely to the people.

We must not take things from our masses.

Return everything captured from the enemy.

Pay fairly for what you buy.

Don't take liberties with women, don't ill treat captives of war.

Don't hit people too severely.

These are the words said by the people of ZANU teaching us.

These are the words said by Chairman Mao when teaching us

This strict ethical code was given to the guerrillas by the ZANU leadership to avoid alienating the local supporters (see Moorcraft 2012). Local people admitted that the guerrillas followed these ethics. Mbuya Vivian said that she used to brew traditional beer known as *ndari*, which she sold to the rural, and farm communities for a living. She noted that guerrillas sent their messenger with money to buy the beer. Never on one day did they demand it for free; if they didn't have money they would take it on credit and pay later. She related an incident in which the local boys deceived her to get beer for free pretending to be guerrilla messengers and when guerrillas found out these boys were beaten and ordered to pay her. This endeared the guerrillas to the people.

ZANU entrenched the liberation war into the lives of the people making them a source for guerrillas' survival (see Reid-dally, 1999; Flower, 1986). Therefore the guerrilla bases became the new source of belonging and social and political support. This allowed the guerrillas to create a militia from the youth to spearhead the liberation war. In this instance the people became an extension of the ZANLA guerrilla forces and actively participated in the war on the side of ZANU. I illustrate this point with reference to the guerrillas' concept of "house basing" and how the masses actively participated in the guerrilla battles. I narrate the events of the *chaka battle*, which took place at *chaka* village in 1979.

3.6 Base tactics and participation

The bases were established in the villages at the homesteads selected by the guerrillas. Selection was based on political loyalty as well as security considerations. Usually houses that were close to the mountains were chosen. One of the participants, Captain Mbanje notes that this form of basing was a strategy to deceive the Rhodesian forces. It was difficult for the Rhodesian forces to differentiate between ordinary villagers and guerrillas since most of the guerrillas were very young at the time. One of the bases, the *Chaka* base was established at the household of headman *Chaka* in *Chaka* village in Bindura South in 1978. Captain Zveushe noted that the battle at Chaka was fought after a Comrade Max had rebelled with the whole group he was commanding and they went to Nyava and Super areas in Bindura South and joined auxiliary forces fighting against the guerrillas. They are believed to have sold out the guerrilla bases. The Chaka battle was gruesome as guerrillas and the villagers were ambushed and after being overwhelmed by enemy fire guerrillas wore women clothes to disguise themselves and escape. Comrade Mbanje said Rhodesian soldiers could not recognize guerrillas as they looked like innocent young boys or girls. Like the fish in water, the guerrillas were slippery and their tactics of deceiving their enemy had worked well, enhancing the belief that guerrillas could disappear. Such was the significance of using the people as their cover. The Chaka homestead has visible bullet holes from this 1978 battle. Establishing bases in people's villages and households made people active participants in the war and making them see that only ZANU is their savior, at the same time this made ZANU leaders realize the extent of the power of the people. In his 1979 New Year message to the people of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe noted that:

Our war has transformed into a People's War. Let us therefore, demonstrate the People's force this year. Let the people's fury break into a revolutionary storm that will engulf and sweep the enemy completely from our land. Let every settler city, town or village, let every farm or homestead, every enemy post, work or hiding place be hit by the fury of the *People's Storm*. The People's Storm must come with thunder, heavy rain and irresistible blasting gusts that will ransack the enemy strongholds. Let us call this therefore The Year of the People's Storm- *Gore re Gukurahundi*. Let us proceed from The Year of the People to The Year of the People's Storm and straight through to victory and the creation of a nation based on People's power. The People are power; the people are the revolutionary storm- *simba revanhu igukurahundi*. (Mugabe 1983[1979] :4).

Thus an attack on the base by the Rhodesian forces confirmed the significance of what they had been made to believe, that the base was the soul of the war. The ZANU youth, *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* were transformed into ZANU militia and pseudo guerrillas because of the work they did and became ZANU loyalists. These youth were taught some guerrilla tactics of war such as taking cover during battles, and how to use guns for self-defence. Therefore the enlisting of the youth as militias to serve ZANU-PF efforts to remain in power can thus be traced to ZANU's liberation war strategy. Initially people supported guerrillas out of fear but as the war intensified the people fully transformed into active revolutionary participants, through provision of moral and material support to the guerrillas.

President Mugabe's reference to the term *gukurahundi* and its characteristics during the war showed the highly intolerant character of ZANU. For ZANU it was only their victory that could be accepted and everyone else standing in their way including the other revolutionary and liberation war movements such as ZAPU were chaff and needed to be "hit by the fury of the People's Storm." This was a strong indication of what was to come as ZANU unleashed the *gukurahundi* storm (violence) on the ZAPU strongholds in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s, killing thousands of people. Anyone who opposed ZANU, even in a context of democracy became an enemy of 'the people'. This allows us to understand the dynamics of the relationship between ZANU and the people during the liberation struggle and in post-independence period. During the war when the people did not willingly provide food, the guerrillas forcefully demanded it. As will be discussed later, during the post-colonial period when people did not willingly vote for ZANU-PF, the party used violence to force them.

However, during the liberation war people supported the guerrillas because the base as a political form of mobilizing support enabled the establishment of a complex but remarkable relationship between the people, the ancestors and the guerrillas in a context of war. The people owned and participated in the war because it sort to liberate them from colonial oppression and it gave them space to imagine a different and better future for themselves and generations to come. For young people who experienced life at the base, Comrade Mutondo reveals that:

The base was our life because it represented freedom, it was the lifeline of the war, and it was where the ancestors, people and the guerrillas converged and together waged the war of independence against our oppressors. This is where we learnt about the war and about the importance of our country and majority rule. We were empowered to believe in ourselves. At the base, we were taught to identify the enemy and how to deal with them. We were the eyes and ears of the comrades during the war (Comrade Mutondo, Matanda village, Bindura South, 10/12/2013).

The base was not just a physical space it was a representation of the future aspirations of the people. The indoctrination that the guerrillas gave the people was seen as empowerment by the ZANU youth, which went further into spying and identifying the enemy and using violence as a way of dealing with them. This turned the people into subjects who were capable of perpetrating or engaging in violence beyond the known moral ethics in their respective villages. Comrade Mutondo said:

At the base we fell in love with the country, some people called us spies, yes, but we were not spies or murderers we simply protected our country and fought for its liberation. It was a difficult time for everyone, we didn't enjoy spying on our parents and relatives or killing people but it was the price of the war, these were methods of war (Comrade Mutondo, Matanda village, Bindura South, 10/12/2013).

In this instance the country *nyika* in Chishona language was made a subject, which can be loved. The violence and atrocities committed by the ZANU youth and the guerrillas were subsequently justified as being part of the necessary 'love' for the liberation of the country. For Comrade Mutondo, the acts of violence they committed were shaped by the volatile situation of the war, to them the violence against sellouts was moral and just. The indoctrination and political education of the ZANU guerrillas had worked in making the people participants in the war and creating a militia to strengthen the guerrillas:

At the base we learnt about ZANU the party and ZANLA the army, we learnt to live the ZANU way and the ways of the liberation war soldiers. When the Mumurwi base was attacked by Smith's soldiers in 1978, I wanted to run back grab a gun and fight back. I wanted to protect the base because its fall meant the fall of the struggle. I think the guerrilla spirit possessed me; it was worth risking my life for the struggle (Comrade Mutondo, Matanda village, Bindura South, 10/12/2013)

These semi-trained youths became the militias as ZANU had intended; therefore their active involvement meant that the objective to make them see ZANU and *chimurenga* as their only source of hope had been archived. They identified with the party and the struggle and fought hard to protect it. Even though youth messengers like Comrade Mutondo had not received formal military training, the guerrillas taught them how to use guns in case of emergency situations like ambush and attacks. They saw themselves as ‘guerrillas’ with similar expertise when it comes to fighting the war. At the base said Comrade Mutondo “we sang for our country, we prayed for our country, we cried for our country”, he argued that because of these experiences they viewed people who did not show such passion as sellouts who deserved to be disciplined and even killed. This language of selling out and betrayal indoctrinated in the youth led to a surge in violence and violent ways of disciplining guerrillas, messengers and the villagers who were identified as sell-outs. It is important to talk about the violence at and through the guerrilla base.

3.7 The base as a source of discipline and punishment

Discipline and punishment are inherent in soldiers operations. So the base is not only for political mobilization and ‘morale’ boosting but it also served as a space where the guerrillas enacted discipline and punishment, which in some cases was perceived as violence on the people. This violence took different forms: sniffing/spying within the guerrillas themselves and identifying enemies among the public, and of inflicting public trials, and killings to those identified as ‘enemies’, ‘informers’ or ‘sell-outs’ (Schmidt 1997). In the base, spying was popular and in many cases it was intentional. Mazarire (2011) pointed out that in a situation where ‘saboteurs’ were caught-out, beatings were instituted. Guerrilla-to-guerrilla violence was also rampant during the liberation war. Captain Zveushe said that during the war there are guerrillas who disobeyed orders and broke the local ancestors’ taboos and they had to be disciplined. This disciplining happened at the base outside the view of the public. There were some guerrillas who were captured by the Rhodesian security forces and they managed to escape. When they returned to the base they were tortured during interrogations because it was believed that they might have been turned into

Rhodesian spies so that they won't be killed. The guerrillas believed that it was impossible to escape the Rhodesian forces when captured.

The security details known as the *Seguranza* from the ZANU guerrilla security unit were responsible for sniffing out would be enemies and traitors among the guerrillas (see Mazarire 2011). The ZANU youth were spying on the villagers, thus people who were absent from the *pungwes*, or who failed to provide resources such as food to guerrillas or were alleged to be sell-outs were liable to be beaten with heavy sticks or any available equipment said Comrade Mutondo (also see Sachikonye 2011; Schmidt 1997; Kriger 1992; Lan 1985). Mhanda (2011) argues that this violence was very common and sometimes it was very personal to settle scores beyond the war agenda. Chung (2006) maintains that, it was at the bases where the high command would maintain their grip on young guerrillas.

Kriger (1992) argued that politicization did not work in developing peasant consciousness and support for the liberation war. She argues that peasants supported guerrillas because of guerrilla coercion and violence. Accounts by both guerrillas and local people show that guerrillas resorted to violence as a way of countering Rhodesian Forces and state violence. The Rhodesian colonial government threatened people with violence if they supported guerrillas. Therefore, people were afraid of the soldiers than guerrillas, and guerrillas had to use violence to show people that they were equally dangerous. Violence was also used on categories of the people that were very unlikely to support the guerrillas such as civil servants who worked as government spies and were messengers who carried and disseminated Rhodesian government threats to the people.

Prominent sell outs who spied for the Rhodesian forces were killed in public to prove to the people that Rhodesian soldiers could not protect them and as a warning to others of what would befall sell-outs I interviewed, Mbuya Chigwedere, a woman in her late 60s at her homestead in Bindura South. She was one of the women who witnessed and participated in the liberation war in the 1970s as a parent providing food and other resources to the guerrillas. After independence in 1980 she has been an active member of ZANU-PF and served as ward chairperson and district committee member on several occasions. In the interview in her cooking hut in the evening as

she peeled her maize harvest she, revealed that she remembered a song guerrillas sang before killing a sell-out called *Pfumo re ZANU* from a moment when Dongo her neighbor was killed by the guerrillas for selling out:

Sithole takauraya nepfumo reZANU!	Sithole we killed with ZANU spear
Mavhunga takauraya nepfumo reZANU!	Mavhunga we killed with the ZANU spear
Magiji takuraya nepfumo reZANU!	Magiji we killed with the ZANU spear

Mbuya Chigwedere said Dongo was a retired civil servant who had connections to the Rhodesian security forces; he was their main spy in the area and during curfews he would walk freely. They bought him a car and he was quite well off compared to many rural peasants at that time. After the interview I visited his homestead and it still had the old houses he had built for his family: a four roomed house built with cement blocks and asbestos sheets roofing, including a big cement water tank for irrigation in the fields and an old pump engine that was not working anymore. This was quite a good life in a rural area in the 1970s. His children and grandchildren have not developed the homestead further except for new paint. Mbuya Chigwedere argued that all this ‘luxury’ was rewards for his work as a sellout. On the day he was killed Mbuya Chigwedere said this about the song above:

Whenever that song was sung it sounded the end of someone’s life, they would tell you that we would kill you, *tinokupunza*, if you hear them say, *pasi newe*, (down with you) you are a real enemy to them. This is the song they sang for Dongo and he was gone (Mbuya Chigwedere, Bindura South, 11/04/2015).

Dongo was killed after the 1976 Mumurwi battle in which the Rhodesian soldiers ambushed the guerrillas. He was identified as the person who had sold out the location of the base. One guerrilla Comrade Sando had said that he saw Dongo in a Rhodesian helicopter pointing at all the bases, Mbuya Chigwedere quoted Sando as having said to the people during Dongo’s short trial at the time, “Dongo was not sold out by villagers I saw him in a chopper which was flying low pointing at the location of our bases.” Comrade Sando had claimed that he does not know how Dongo got to know of those locations. He also said they didn’t move from the base as they had anticipated a ground raid which they were prepared for and not an air raid. In this

instance songs were important medium for denouncing, and legitimizing killing sell-outs as necessary if the war was to be won, Comrade Mbanje argued that:

We had to threaten the people with the violence so that they could come and listen to us. It was important to discipline sell-outs because that would discourage people from selling out. We had an advantage because we lived within or close to the people and we incorporated the youth into our structures as ZANU youth (Comrade Mbanje 16/10/2014).

People's narratives of their encounters with the guerrillas show that guerrilla violence was not targeted at sell outs only as noted by Manungo (1991) and Lan (1985). People who encountered guerrillas in the bush either looking for firewood or wild vegetables or herding cattle were threatened that their lips would be cut if they tell people about them. This shows that the guerrilla strategy was violence and intimidation and everyone was deemed a sell out until proven innocent. Even though their role was that of liberators and saviours, violence on the villagers was rampant and was as brutal as that of Rhodesian forces (Sachikonye 2011). *Mbuya Vivian*, another witness and participant of the liberation struggle in the 1970s said that she was affected by the war and she was even beaten up by the *mujibhas* (male guerrilla messengers). "Why did they beat you?" I inquired:

If the guerrillas identified you as a sell-out you were beaten, if soldiers come and ask you where the guerrillas are and you say you don't know they would beat you saying you know where the terrorists are. If you did not go to the base you would be beaten by the *mujibas*, asking why are you not coming to the base whom do you support? Livestock would just be taken from your homestead by the *mujibas* to feed the guerrillas, and you didn't question that (interview with Mbuya Vivian, 20/04/ 2015).

This bifurcation of politics during the liberation war portrays the difficult position the peasants or the *povo* were in. This predicament was compounded by the fact that the Auxiliaries and other Rhodesian security forces such as the Selous Scouts and Rhodesian military auxiliary forces operated as 'fake guerrillas' with their own 'bases' in areas of Nyava, Chindotwe, Manhenga, Super and Musana in Bindura rural district, according to Comrade Zveushe (see, Reid-Dally 2009; Ranger 1985; Moorcraft and Mclaughlin 1982)). These were rebel and 'tamed' guerrillas who

fought for the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa. They dressed like guerrillas and pretended to be guerrillas and went around terrorizing villagers (Baxter 2011). This was done to discredit the guerrillas and the war of liberation. Initially the people lost trust in the guerrillas thinking they were terrorizing them but later on they realized that it was the 'enemy' masquerading as guerrillas, so people learnt to be careful in their dealings with any of these forces (White 1981).

As a result, people needed not only to be flexible but also to be conversant enough to tell these false guerrillas, the Rhodesian soldiers and ZANU guerrillas what they wanted to hear, this required people to understand the language of all these antagonists, their signs and codes and the way they operated. The people pretended to support the armed group that was present at a particular time (see Worby 1998 and Ranger 1985). At the same time they had to devise ways to understand both sides so as to avoid being deceived and being punished for supporting the wrong group. They had to develop the figure of the detective. This work of detection is the work of political subjectivity and it defines rural Zimbabwean existence. Here I argue that the political subjectivity that was constituted during the 1970s liberation war produced a certain kind of detective within the people, a politics of detection, a politics of pretense, and a politics of fear and quietude.

According to many people including Mbuya Chigwedere, even people who were very loyal to guerrillas sold them out when they were faced with the possibility of death. When the Rhodesian soldiers suspected that people were working with guerrillas they used torture to force confessions and information out of these people. So people were forced to sell out or to pretend to support the Rhodesian soldiers against the guerrillas. This is the predicament that many rural youth faced in the 2008 violence where they were forced to engage in pro-ZANU-PF violence against opposition supporters. The youth were threatened with torture or death if they did not participate in ZANU-PF's violent election campaign in 2008. There is continuity in the bifurcation of politics from the 1970s liberation war into the post-2000. Asked how they were able to detect who was a guerrilla and who was an impersonator Mbuya Chigwedere said that having lived with the guerrillas allowed them to distinguish the real from the fake ones. Guerrillas did not seek a luxury and easy life but their impersonators did. She said:

We were able to distinguish between guerrillas, auxiliaries, and selous scouts, because auxiliaries camped in schools near major roads where they could easily be found. When grilled on this during meetings with villagers at the school they said that, the soldiers feared us, showing that they thought that people were foolish. Real guerrillas lived inside villages, in granaries where they would not be found. Guerrillas had dirty clothes and old guns but the auxiliaries and selous scouts had clean clothes and big guns. Sometimes we gave them food that guerrillas would not eat, like okra and intestines and they ate and we knew that they were fake guerrillas. At times they refused our food something, which guerrillas would not do (Mbuya Chigwedere 11/2014).

Apart from having to host the different fighting forces, the people were forced to celebrate the murder of the sellouts against their will and most of them have lived with these painful memories and fear since that time. As Mbuya Vivian went on to say about one instance of the killing of a sellout:

When Mr. Dongo was killed we were told to gather at his house, as he was being killed we were told to sing and we sang, we were told to laugh and we laughed... “*kekekeke*” (*she imitated a sad laughter*) we were told to dance and we danced (Mbuya Chigwedere 11/2014).

These killings happened more often as a way of warning the people against selling out the guerrillas to the Rhodesian authorities, but it became a practice that defined the purpose of the bases. People speak a lot about the murders committed by the guerrillas and how they also forced people and relatives to kill their kin who were accused of being sellouts. Mbuya Chigwedere noted that when their relative called Luckson, who was a spy for the Rhodesian forces was captured by the *mujibas*, his brother ran away on the pretense of going to the river for fishing but he left saying, *ndingamupondeswe*, meaning “I will be forced to kill him.”

Mbuya Chigwedere argued that only a few *pungwes* were held without a ‘sellout’ being beaten up or killed. This was a reflection of the realities of the war especially concerning guerrilla violence and the adverse effects it has had on people’s post-colonial political participation. Guerrilla violence left people traumatized and living in fear of the guerrillas turned veterans and soldiers to this period. As Kriger (1992)

noted the authoritarian nature of the post-colonial state and the party with the peasantry in the 1980s and the post-2000 can be explained as a legacy of the coercive guerrilla-peasant relations during the war. For Kriger, this legacy is responsible for the passive character of post-war peasant politics in Zimbabwe. The public killing of sellouts, and coercion of people to provide support to the guerrillas changed people's views of the guerrillas, as Mbuya Chigwedere noted:

When the guerrillas came looking for Dongo who they believed had sold out the Mumurwi base they were as fierce as lions, their faces changed and you couldn't look at them in their eyes. They changed from being the 'boys' as we called them to being wild animals. That day, the war took a different turn, some people even absconded to the city and only came back after independence, and people started to give moral and material support to the guerrillas without fail because they had seen the atrocities the guerrillas were capable of. (Mbuya Chigwedere 20/04/2015)

It is this kind of transformation of the environment that the guerrillas were seeking to achieve by conducting these public executions and beatings. This heavily tilted the people's 'support' in favour of the guerrillas who lived within the people and the people had more reason to be afraid of them. The violence transformed people from scared subjects of Rhodesian army, to brave and resilient chimurenga supporters. For the guerrillas the use of violence was to show the masses that they could be as brutal as the Rhodesian forces but then at the same time offering them freedom. This gives a view of violence as instrumental and expressive action. However the adverse effects of this violence are not recognized, it is instead celebrated as acts of heroism against enemies of the liberation.

The 1980 elections and violence

During the ceasefire in 1979 and the period leading to the 1980 elections a large contingent of ZANLA commissars did not go into the assembly points but remained in the ZANU bases and continuing with their mobilization work in the villages making it abundantly clear to the Shona peasantry that they could vote for only one man, Robert Mugabe because he is the only man who has the ability to stop the war (Moorcraft 2012; Muzondidya 2009). Mbuya Chigwedere recounted that when the Rhodesian soldiers drove their trucks around villages in 1979 announcing that the war

was over, the people did not believe them. She said they thought it was a trick to “ambush” them. The people asked the Rhodesian soldiers to bring Comrade Mao from Bindura as “proof of ceasefire”. Comrade Mao was a known and feared guerrilla in the area and he was said to be close to the ZANU President Robert Mugabe. Mbuya Chigwedere said that they only believed that the war was over when they saw Comrade Mao in a truck with the Rhodesian soldiers. She said that Comrade Mao and many other guerrillas did not go away, but they returned to the bases in the Mountains and came back to the villages to continue mobilizing and educating people on how to vote. They continue to do it as ZANU-PF mobilisers in rural areas, and this shows continuities in post colonial Zimbabwe. She went further and said that the Mukurwi Mountain where the main guerrilla base was sited stood as a conical tower watching over them, and they believed that the ancestors who had allowed the guerrillas to camp in that sacred mountain were watching over them and how they will vote. The mountain and the bases they haboured worked as Bentham’s panopticon tower for surveillance (Foucault 1975), even though in this case the surveillance was imaginary. This imagination was made possible by the violence and suffering the people had suffered at the hands of the guerrillas during the war. Lord Soames took it a bit further declaring that:

You must remember that this is Africa. It isn’t Little Puddleton-on-the Marsh, and they [black African] behave differently here. They think nothing of sticking poles up each other’s whatnot, and doing filthy, beastly things to each other. It does happen, I’m afraid. It’s a very wild an [African] election.

In the 1980 election, 2, 702,275 men and women voted. Nkomo’s ZAPU won twenty seats in their Matabeleland nucleus, Bishop Muzorewa, won only three seats, while Mugabe’s ZANU won the other fifty-seven seats (Moorcraft 2012:86). It bears to say that despite massive intimidation by ZANLA, Mugabe had won overwhelmingly because of the popular support the liberation war he had waged from the peasants, and the belief instilled in the peasants by the guerrillas that only he could stop the war and bring peace to the war ravaged nation. In short, he had not needed the ZANLA thuggery to procure his victory. As early as 1976 Mugabe had said:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which produces the vote, should remain its

security officer - its guarantor. The people's vote and the people's guns are inseparable twins.

In the beginning, Mugabe's popularity was so overwhelming that force was not required. It has been argued that misrule undermined his electoral base and as real opposition emerged, Mugabe never deviated from his original credo that guns and votes were inseparable twins. Misrule and real opposition did not force Mugabe to use brutal military force, it was rather his unquenched desire to create a one party state with him as the life president that forced him to create a war machine to eradicate all forms of opposition and alternative voice beginning with the Fifth Brigade in the early 1980s. Even when the idea of a one party state was abandoned in principle the army and ZANU PF youth brigades continued to make it clear to the people all over Zimbabwe that they could vote for only one man, Robert Mugabe.

3.8 Conclusion

These guerrillas ability to organize through the base won them popular support during the war and proved crucial to ZANU-PF's election victory in 1980 (Cliffe et al 1980, Kriger 1992), their alliances with the spirit mediums and ancestors was also instrumental in the recruitment of young men and women into ZANLA to Mozambique, changing people's subjectivities toward the war and in establishing their legitimacy as 'sons of the soil' who had come to liberate the land from white colonialists (Tungamirai 1995; Manungo 1991; Brickhill 1995). The grassroots organizational frameworks, which were so crucial were a product of the period of the liberation struggle in the rural areas (Caute 1983; Pongweni 1985) of which the chief vehicle was the base which gave the guerrillas close proximity to the people and the ability to launch the *pungwes* between civilians and guerrillas at the 'bases' (Cliffe, et.al 1980; Kriger 1992; Tungamirai 1995; Sachikonye 2011). The organizational framework provided by the base structure allowed ZANU-PF to mobilise effectively for the 1980 elections.

The ZNA narratives reflected the official patriotic history narrative of the liberation war that glorified the heroic ZANLA sacrifices, which did not portray the realities of war. Guerilla violence was glorified as heroic and was for purposes of killing sellouts

and witches who wanted to derail the independence of the country. This version of history neglected the role-played by ZAPU and others. I do not remember a narrative that acknowledged other liberation war movements at the ZNA event, all the narratives related to ZANU, ZANLA and Mugabe. This is regardless of the fact that Joshua Nkomo the ZAPU leader was popular in all parts of the country including Mashonaland because he is viewed as the father of the revolution. He was named Father Zimbabwe and *chibwechitedza*, meaning a slippery stone, he also had a slogan *Kwese kwese* Joshua Nkomo meaning Everywhere Joshua Nkomo is popular, which was popular in Mashonaland. This shows that the way in which the history of the liberation war is told has not significantly changed, decades after the unity accord.

4 CHAPTER FOUR: The Zimbabwe National Army: political subjectivities of the base

4.1 Introduction

One of the most important institutions to emerge from the liberation war was the base. As we have seen in the last chapter, ZANU guerrillas needed to establish the legitimacy of their presence and of the liberation war in areas they fought because they had no prior contacts in those areas. The base was the core element for the enacting of that legitimacy. ZANU guerrillas' ability to organise and mobilise the people to support the war was a result of their ability to establish bases within close proximity to the people, as well as to get the legitimacy of the ancestors as 'sons of the soil' who had come to liberate the country with the guns. The ZANU guerrillas' legitimacy was further strengthened by their ability to establish bases in scared landscapes. This allowed them to harness the material and affective dimensions of the people's religious beliefs and culture to coalesce people around the liberation war. As noted before, the base was the platform through which the liberation war narrative hit the people's homes through political education, conscientisation, and violence, and it allowed people to directly and indirectly participate in the liberation war. The base was used as a space for transformation during the liberation war. People were transformed from scared peasants to active participants in the liberation war who were aware of their existence as political subjects and had to fight for their political and economic freedom.

However, ZANU-PF's relationship with the people changed as the post-colonial context demanded that they re-establish their legitimacy in a context of democracy. ZANU-PF desired a one-party state with no political opposition, but that failed as people favored a multi-party democracy. Therefore ZANU-PF turned to violence and coercion in order to assert its authority over the people and opposition political parties. A former guerrilla assistant, Comrade Mutondo said, "ZANU-PF was no longer the fish that relied on the people to survive but they became a Hippopotamus, which can survive outside the waters". ZANU-PF relied on the army for political survival, and the military also relied on the party's patronage system to survive.

Therefore, the Zimbabwe National Army has been central in organizing and perpetrating state sponsored political violence against ZANU-PF opponents in the post-colonial context.

In this chapter, I am making an argument about the relationship between the ZANU-PF party and the Zimbabwe military. This relationship was based on liberation war alliances and in the post-colonial era the base became a primary site for this articulation. The reason why the army was taken to former guerrilla bases such as Maema base where emotive stories about the liberation war are recounted is to produce and sustain key structural and subjective relations between the military and the ZANU-PF party. These relationalities and subjectivities that can be traced to the liberation war are re-constellating in the post-colonial period through the political history of the army and the base animates that constellation. I am going to trace this history and its complexity through the figure of the soldier, exploring how that Zimbabwean subject mutated over time, in order to understand what happened in 2008. I am looking at the transformation of the army and particular subjectivities of the soldier in relation to how they position their views on politics and violence.

I trace and discuss political moments when the army was sent out to manage ZANU-PF political victory from 1980 through violence and intimidation. I look closely at moments that the army physically established bases resembling those used during the liberation war, either as indoctrination centers, where they simply appropriated the languages and narratives of the liberation war, or as centers for perpetration of violence, or both. It is part of the argument about the political and cultural work of the base in the making of contemporary Zimbabwean political subjectivities. This is especially important in understanding the moment running up to the establishment of the 2008 youth militia base, when the army was given the mission to identify, and crackdown on opposition supporters. I draw on the desire to professionalize the military in 1980 in order to stay with the problem of subjectivity. I am interested in understanding the kind of political subject that emerged through the transformation of the army, such that it could be deployed for political violence. How did the professionalized soldier become the crucial player in Zimbabwe's political violence?

The base as a space for the articulation of ZANU-PF and military relationship and the transformation of the soldiers

The base was used as a space for transformation during the war and in the post-colonial context it was appropriated as an idea and space for the reinforcement of ZANU-PF rule. The narratives, performances and affective identifications of the fallen and living veterans that I described at the beginning of Chapter 2 draw the soldiers into seeing the world as one in which they require to develop a set of political commitments, ideals and aspirations so that it's clear who they are as a political community is founded in the liberation war and identify with ZANU-PF which they must defend, and that there are enemies which they must fight in that defence. The base was productive of this highly nationalistic subjectivity that is clear about the demand to eliminate internal enemies and traitors through violence where necessary. In fact, it was at the base that the distinction between the friend and enemy was made, where heroes were celebrated and sellouts were identified and punished. The base as an idea and a place invoke and glorifies the practices of the past struggle and motivates the soldiers to mobilize people to support and vote for ZANU-PF, as part of the sacrifice. This was evident in a speech given by the representative of the ZSC students Major John Moyo at Maema base. He said:

At this moment I ask for permission on behalf of the Commandant of the Zimbabwe Staff College Brigadier General Augustine Chipwere, his second in command Chief Instructor, Colonel Joel Muzvidziwa, and the next in command representing the Air Force of Zimbabwe, Wing Commander Jaya, our lecturers, the staff body and all the students attending the Commanding Staff course Number 27. Your Highness Chief Musana, give me this opportunity to thank you for allowing us to come into your area, to learn the history of the liberation of the country. Our course is given to those who are leaders (commanders), it is our pleasure to know this history, to know that our country was not given to us on a silver platter, but it was fought for by ZANU-PF led by our President Comrade Robert Mugabe, and we will protect the country's liberation well. I thank you again your Highness for preserving those areas where the battles were fought so that we can come and learn our history and we can have evidence that the history of the struggle is not just a story but it is the truth. I ask you to continue with your good heart and hospitality so that those who will come after us will also be welcome and will be given access to the witnesses of these battles freely so that

everyone can be satisfied that the country was liberated by the gun. I want to thank you your Highness and all those you lead and all those who reside in this area and those who have given narratives who witnessed the battles and the war. We promise you that we will use all this information well in our line of work, and we will never allow Zimbabwe to be a colony again. We will not allow modern day sell-outs to rule this country (Major John Moyo, ZNA staff college student, Maema Mountain 22/10/2014).

The gathering ended with the national anthem, and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) war cry: *Zimbabwe inyika yedu tichahidziviria neropa redu* meaning “Zimbabwe is our country we will protect it with our blood”. It was clear that by promising to protect the country with their blood, after carefully listening to narratives of guerrillas’ sacrifices during the liberation war. The soldiers felt that they are taking part in an important historical process which began with the heroes of the first *chimurenga* led by the spirit medium of Nehanda, followed by the second *chimurenga* (armed struggle) fought by the ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas. In order to create and strengthen the relationship between the party and the army, the base functioned to sustain a host of political figures such as *povo*, urban civilians and sellouts. These relationalities and subjectivities are important in making the friend-enemy distinction, which is productive of the justification for the army and the figure of the soldier. In this context military is portrayed as protectors of the liberation struggle and therefore purveyors of legitimate violence, ZANU-PF party as a liberator and rightful inheritor of the state, which the military and the *povo* must identify with and defend.

The political category of the *povo* gained traction during the liberation war and was mainly used by the guerrillas to refer to the rural people. During the liberation war, (and during FRELIMO’s struggle against the Portuguese), the *povo* –in contrast to the urban working class - were regarded as the most likely bearers of revolutionary consciousness and therefore friends of ZANU-PF. The urban civilians were believed to constitute a larger part of the opposition MDC party supporters, and were regarded as one who needed commanding, politicization and direction, and in most cases were suspected of being sell-outs, similar to those who sold out during the liberation war and deserved to be punished.

4.2 The figure of the veteran and the construction of the ZNA

In order to strengthen liberation war alliances and loyalties between ZANU-PF and the military, the Zimbabwe National Army was constructed and articulated through the political figure of the veteran. The base is significant because it reinvigorates the figure of the war veteran and puts it back into the lives of the soldiers. The new Zimbabwe National Army members needed to acquire political commitments, ideals and characteristics of ZANU-PF veteran, which are loyalty, patriotism, discipline, and bravery to be able to defend the interests of Zimbabwe. The figure of the veteran was institutionalized through the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), a body representing the interests and welfare of the liberation war veterans formed in 1989. Through the ZNLWVA, war veterans adopted the status of the vanguard of the ZANU-PF party capable of disciplining it and holding it to account, and as the party or Mugabe's militia to be unleashed when the party faces a crisis (Mazarire 2013:81; McCandless 2011; McGregor 2002). The membership of the ZNLWVA consists of retired and serving members of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF). This has strengthened the ZNLWVA as a paramilitary force and has given them access to military rifles and AK 47 rifles during campaign periods, which they use to coerce people to vote for ZANU-PF (see Williamsen 2010).

The war veteran in Zimbabwe's political and social imagination is an important figure and symbol of patriotism. Kriger (2003) argued that the new political order in post-independence Zimbabwe was constructed through the prism of veterans of the liberation struggle. ZANU-PF used ZANLA and ZIPRA veterans to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers after independence (Kriger 2003:194). ZANU-PF's symbolic appeals to the war originated in its need to build power and legitimacy following the grim legacy of the Lancaster house peace settlement. Within Zimbabwe's liberation war movements those who were members of the liberation war political or military movements are recognized as war veterans. Therefore war veterans form the nucleus of the party. However there are many other members of the ZNA who were recruited after independence who are not war veterans. These need to demonstrate patriotism, loyalty and obedience to ZANU-PF so that they can be trusted to defend the party's ideology. It is these characteristics and virtues of war veterans that were desirable in the construction of the figure of the

post-colonial ZNA soldier. Several ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas who fought in the country's liberation struggle such as Secretary General Victor Matemadanda, and spokesperson Douglas Mahiya have been branded as 'fake' war veterans when they did not show obedience and loyalty to President Mugabe as the Commander-in-Chief of the ZDF as expected of trained soldiers. The youth who have proven their loyalty to President Mugabe and ZANU-PF have been promised or given this war veteran status (Materike 2011). The base is a key site for the production and practice of this war veteran ideology and characteristics.

Captain Zveushe a ZNA soldier and a war veteran who had fought the liberation war in Musana sector and his military colleagues embodied this significant figure of the veteran. The fact that many war veterans in the ZNA were still identifying with the ZANU-PF ideals of the liberation war meant that they had not wavered or betrayed the values of the struggle. As they narrated their experiences during the war and directed the proceedings of the ZSC programme at Maema Mountain former guerrilla base in 2014, they inspired the commitments, ideals and aspirations of the liberation war into the ZANU-PF youth and junior ZNA soldiers. He was clad in a camouflaged military uniform with sleeves rolled up above the elbows and black barrette donned with a metal silver ZNA badge with a Zimbabwe bird laying on top of crossed sword holding firm to a laurel wreath. With a clenched fist and power in his voice Captain Zveushe chanted the slogan:

Pamberi nekushinga!	Forward with bravery!
Nekubatana!	With unity!
Nechimurenga!	With the chimurenga war!
Pasi na Tsvangirai!	Down with Tsvangirai!
Pasi nevanomutevera!	And all his supporters!

The anti-opposition slogan by Captain Zveushe and other war veterans symbolized a 'war cry' associated with war veterans and ZANU-PF supporters referring to what they call an ongoing 'war' against the regime change agenda funded by Rhodesian colonialists fronted by the opposition MDC. There is a sense in which what the militia base does is not only to remind ZANU-PF of a 'glorious' liberation war when they fought of colonialism but it is also mobilized to fight of a new set of threats that are

simultaneously characterized as the political opposition and also as the “imperial regime change agenda”. The base becomes a core element for the re-enactment of patriotic history in Zimbabwe with the defence forces as the torchbearers. Violence comes in at the point when they have to mobilize the history of the base as a tool to legitimate fighting of the opposition and the imperial agenda, which is so effectively identified and articulated by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Proponents of patriotic history are not only defending ZANU-PF against an opposition, they are careful to associate that opposition with an imperial agenda, which in fact was the subject of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. A struggle that was in itself violent, and so for the veterans there is nothing wrong in seeing the opposition as the target of similar violence that was meted out on the imperialist and the militia base is in that story because the target of ZANU-PF violence is defined as the same in the colonial and post-colonial time.

In 1997 President Mugabe gave in to the war veterans demand for compensation. The War victims compensation Fund was created under an act of parliament and war veterans were paid out ZW\$ 50,000 (US\$4000) in compensation (Kriger 2003). The extra ordinary character of the then ZNLWVA chairperson Chenjerai Hunzvi known as ‘Hitler’ ensured that the War veterans are recognized as a reserve force under the ZDF and in 2014 President Mugabe created a Ministry responsible for the welfare of the War Veterans. This gave the impression that war veterans and those who uphold the ideals, values and commitments of the liberation war were the only ones capable of defending the country against its enemies. This motivated the young soldiers to acquire and perform loyalty to ZANU-PF through chanting liberation war slogans, songs and performing violence against the opposition. In order to strengthen their position in the decolonization process, the war veterans were at the fore of the fast track land reform program. During this period they invaded white owned farms arguing that they were reversing colonial legacies in ownership of land and fulfilling the promises of the liberation war (Rutherford 2010). President Mugabe provided military and legislative muscle to the farm invasions (Moore 2005). This strengthened the relationship between ZANU-PF, war veterans and the military.

In the next section, I examine key aspects of the formation of the ZNA at the time of Independence in 1980. Then I review developments in the role of the army over the

35 years since independence, asking how, for whom, to what extent, and for how long the “legitimacy” of the army’s use of force against civilians was sustained by the figure of veteran and the base as a site of practice. And how did that set up a context for understanding not only the emergence of a particular subjectivity but also civil-military relations as a whole in the contemporary moment. The pro-ZANU-PF and anti-opposition sentiments that developed within the ZANLA guerrillas during the liberation war were reified and acculturated into the ZNA during the post-colonial period through the appropriation and use of the base as a site of practice and as an idea and memory. This is critical in understanding why the army disavowed its distance from the political and instead to quite suddenly embrace the political explicitly as its own vocation. The post-2000 period is peculiar because that is when the explicit political language started being used in public by the military, and the friend-enemy distinction was the justification for the involvement of the army in politics.

Politicization, integration, violence and the formation of the ZNA

The post-colonial context defined by the Lancaster House Constitution constructed democracy as that situation where violence against political opponents must no longer obtain and these political opponents should rather battle it out at the ballot box. However ZANU-PF had envisioned the post-colonial context as one in which they would be dominant and create a one-party state. The Lancaster house negotiated settlement recognized the rights of all people regardless of race to equally participate in politics and reserved twenty seats for whites in parliament and allowed white soldiers to remain in the army (Moorcraft 2012). The agreement protected white businesses and ownership of land. This was regarded as a grim legacy of the settlement and ZANU sought to secure its hegemony through the strength of an effective and highly political army, which followed its ideology. Among the many provisions of the Lancaster House agreement was the professionalization of the army. This included integrating the Rhodesian, ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas into one Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Professionalization was meant to create an efficient, effective and largely apolitical army, one that would not rely on past political leanings, but would protect all citizens equally.

In line with the desire for professionalism the role of the military is well defined in the constitution of Zimbabwe. Sections 208, 211 and 218 of the constitution, which governs the operations of the security forces, forbid the military from participating in partisan politics and interfering in electoral affairs. Section 211, Sub-section 3 states that “the defence forces must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons and be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to civilian authority as established by the nation’s supreme law”. Section 208, sub-section 2 stipulates that it is illegal for the security sector to be partisan and to further the interests of a political party. It reads in part:

Neither the security services nor any of their members may in the exercise of their functions act in a partisan manner, further the interest of any political party or cause, prejudice the lawful interests of any and that serving members of the security services must not be active members or office bearers of any political party or organization.

Huntington (1957)’s work on military professionalism offers a framework through which to understand Zimbabwe’s constitutional framing on the conduct and operations of the security services in a democratic state. Huntington (1957:11) proposed that for the military to be regarded as professional it should be under civilian control and this entails that it should be a politically neutral profession, isolated from society and concerned with efficient achievement of victory without regard to nonmilitary considerations. However, ZANU-PF desired a politically conscious army. Janowitz (1960) proposed that the army be a politically sensitive profession integrated with the society and concerned with the restrained use of force to achieve viable international relations. Janowitz’s emphasis on professionalism reflected the dominant pragmatic tradition stressing the adaptation of officer corps to civilian control as the more desired form to meet the challenges of civil-military relations in the post- Vietnam war period (Larson 1974). It is from this framework that the British were drawing in trying to constitute the Zimbabwean military along professional lines so that there will be peace and reconciliation after many years of fighting. So if work on the army was supposed to produce professional soldiers from the colonial ones, then how did they come to be deployed as ZANU-PF violent

cadres, and how did that definition of professional soldier get perverted into violence that went under the name of legitimacy?

Much of this debate on professionalism and the effectiveness of the army takes the military such as the Zimbabwe National Army as if it is a nicely bound institution with rules of recruitment, training and operations and that it is separate from the wider state and that it is an independent entity. As we shall see through the political history of the ZNA, the army drafts in organizations such as youth militias and war veterans to do the “dirty work” of hammering internal ZANU-PF opposition and such “supplemental” organizations have the effect of *highlighting* the formal coherence, normativity and legitimacy of the regular army.

In the post-independence period, soldiers just like ordinary citizens had to negotiate whether to participate in violence or not. The figure of the soldier can be read in that historical moment as they grappled with how they would configure themselves in relation to violence. I trace amongst the ordinary soldiers who were liberation fighters, how they grappled with the demand that they refigure themselves as professionals - that they literally engage in forgetting earlier enmities and divisions in terms of race and political parties and that they become invested in being professional soldiers. How does professionalization mean that they could excuse themselves from participating in violence (or not), or negotiate between the violence of the past and the violence of the present in a way that just allows them to be seen as purveyors of legitimate violence, even when there is more that's going on? Professionalization under ZANU-PF became a manner of political socialization. In other words, soldiers were deemed professional if they supported and defended ZANU-PF ideologies, policies and rule, but were considered rogue and unprofessional when they engaged in opposition politics.

1979 Ceasefire and Assembly Points: towards a professional army

At the end of the liberation war, the fighting armies were called to the assembly points and the question was who is going to make the new army for the new Zimbabwe. 22,000 guerrillas were cooped up in seventeen assembly points and of these, over 16,500 were ZANLA (Moorcraft 2012:85). This happened at the moment

of the coming back of the British for the last time as the colonial power in 1979. Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith had declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1964 making Rhodesia an independent settler colony (Flower 1986). The British were happy to come back in and monitor the transition to independence beginning with the constitutional negotiations at Lancaster House in the UK. The issues at stake were to come up with a multi-racial society that would be an example of racial coexistence to South Africa and the rest of the African continent. There was also need to bring together rival ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla armies to work together and avoid civil war as was happening in some African states after independence (Moorcraft 2012).

The ceasefire period was a crucial moment because what I call “political subjectivity” - what it is and what it was to become in post-colonial Zimbabwe - was very much at stake. The ceasefire and integration of guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces into the ZNA was done under the assumption that by being disarmed and integrated into the ZNA their subjectivity has been transformed to the point where there is some guarantee that they won’t exercise violence illegally against other citizens. In the context of liberation war from the point of view of Rhodesian forces and the guerrillas, the other side were not criminals who should only be arrested and tried but enemies who should be killed, or tortured first for information and then killed (McLaughlin and Moorcraft 1982). It was a moment of danger and extreme volatility. There was a lot of hatred between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces, but they had to refigure themselves as legitimate purveyors of violence and loyal citizens who no longer believed that it is okay when they feel unhappy to pick up guns and go to war again. That moment of extreme tension is what characterizes any transition from war to peace, whether civil, or anticolonial war anywhere in the world especially when fighters are being demobilized in the sense that some are not taken into the armed forces. In relation to the larger problem of political subjectivity and violence, there are these key moments where the question of whether or not the new political subject in this new moment is capable of disposing of violence or not becomes important. So much of what this thesis is about is trying to account for how it was possible, especially around 2008, to take ordinary young men who had not had that prior experience of being guerrillas and draw them into imagining themselves as

political subjects entitled to and obligated to dispose of violence against enemies internally.

Lord Soames was made Governor of Rhodesia to oversee the transition, specifically the implementation of the ceasefire and the elections. When the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas were in the assembly points the Rhodesians were itching to wipe them out but Lord Soames and Rhodesian commander Peter Walls maintained a tight leash. Several assassination attempts on Mugabe complicated this transition and heightened tension ahead of the 1980 elections. These events raised the question about betrayal and trust: ZANU as the eventual winner of the 1980 elections was seized with the question of how they were going to identify the friend and the enemy, that question was already ever present because it had been there during the liberation struggle itself. In fact what I draw attention to is the fact that ZANLA guerrilla bases are the places where that determination of who is the friend, who is the enemy, who is the traitor, and who is a sellout was made.

The coming of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in 1981 was a desire by Britain to train a proper post-colonial professional army and helping to integrate the former military enemies into one ZNA. The blacks dominated ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas, and whites dominated the Rhodesian forces (Chung, 2006 Alao, 1995; 2012). The ZNA is the primary unit within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), which includes the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Within the ZDF are elite groups such as the One Commando paragroup Presidential Guards, and Special Air Service and infantry brigades and battalions (Matchaba-Hove 2006). The President appoints the commanders of the ZDF, ZNA, and the AFZ. The ZNA at its inception was largely viewed as a professional force considering that it absorbed within its ranks former Rhodesian forces and recruited on the basis of qualifications rather than political loyalty under the BMATT (Young 1997). General Peter Walls, Colonel Lionel Dyck and many other white commanders who agreed to serve a new black led government after independence, embodied the idea of professionalism.

According to Alao (1995) BMATT was to assist in the integration exercise and the standardization of the army. In 1982 the BMATT became involved in the

establishment of Basic Training Centre for the ZNA at Inkomo Barracks. The center was responsible for the training of ZNA officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), who in turn were to form the nucleus of the training organization at unit level. By August 1983 the center had trained 12,400 ZNA members. The BMATT trained the Tank and Armoured Regiments and training of officers at the Zimbabwe Military Academy in Gweru and the ZSC in Harare; infantry brigade and Battalion training at the Battallion School in Nyanga; and advising ZNA in training logistics and many other areas. The establishment of the Zimbabwe Staff College and the Zimbabwe Military Academy learning and research institutions of the army was a desire to create a professional army that is highly skilled and meets universal standards of a professional army.

Conflict and violence at integration: the development of client-patron relationship

The bringing together of three different armies with different ideologies was not without its challenges. The biggest challenge came from the ruling ZANU-PF that sought to create an army that is loyal to the party to give military weight to its desire to propagate a one party state. ZANU-PF commanders and politicians questioned the concept of professionalism that sought to create an army that is devoid of political engagement. Chief Air Marshal and one of the liberation war ZANLA commanders Josiah Tungamirai argued that it is difficult to have an army that is apolitical considering that the current political leadership of the country and the military commanders worked closely during the liberation struggle (Tungamirai 1995). He argued that the army could become apolitical when the current generation of military leaders and political commanders has passed on, the then Minister for State security and Chairperson of the Joint Operations Committee (JOC) Emerson Mnangagwa and Lt General Mujuru concurred. The client-patron relationship in the army dates back to the period of the making of the ZNA in the early 1980s (Alexander 1998), when former ZIPRA liberation war veterans deserted the army because they were being abused and ill-treated by the ZANLA forces loyal to Mugabe. These purges began at the assembly points around the country with the fatal one being at Entumbane assembly point in Bulawayo, fuelled by Enos Nkala, Mugabe's minister who had insulted ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo. More than fifty-five people were killed and more than 400 injured in fighting, which went on for two days (Moorcraft 2012:100).

After General Walls was dismissed for mistrusting Mugabe many white soldiers resigned, and the army was left with those perceived to be patriotic to ZANU-PF in the top echelon.

The BMATT's desire to create an apolitical army was altered. In the 1980s Lt General Solomon Mujuru, known during the liberation war by his *nom de guerre*, "Rex Nhongo" called for a 'highly efficient, well-disciplined and effective political army' (Moorcraft 2012:94). Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa concurred and argued that an apolitical army would lead to 'undesirable and total confusion' (Moorcraft 2012:94). This led the tradition of a political army that has continued into the contemporary with the army openly showing allegiance to ZANU-PF, and therefore taking part in violently suppressing any form of opposition to ZANU-PF (Maringira 2015). ZANU-PF continued as a "symbiotic party" in the post-colonial context, having a symbiotic relationship with the army (Kolkowitz and Korbonski 1982). During a radio address on the 24th of February 1978 after the return from the Malta constitutional conference Mugabe asserted that:

Total power must transfer to the people of Zimbabwe through their revolutionary leadership. Power transfer required that both political and military instruments be jointly placed in our hands. Our army remains the bulwark of our political power. If the vote is the product of the gun, then the gun, which has created it, must continue to protect and serve it. Guns and votes are inseparable partners. Accordingly we insist that the enemy forces must go out and our forces take over...we must remove the bad policemen and only keep the good as defined by us (Mugabe 1983[1978]: 98-101).

ZANU-PF's victory and power was guaranteed by the army and not by democratic institutions and the universal suffrage that had put them in power in 1980. This conforms to the thinking of political leaders at the time of the formation of the ZNA and this has shaped the character of the ZNA. In 1981, Mnangagwa argued that the army was taught to support and propound government policies, which are policies and ideologies of ZANU-PF (Tendi, 2013:836). Since 1980, the military commanders who were from ZANLA General Solomon Mujuru and Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai sat in the ZANU central committee and subsequently the ZANU-PF commissariat department was staffed by ex-soldiers (Mazarire, 2013). This allowed

for the propagation of ZANU-PF ideology in the ZNA. This active participation of the Generals in politics meant that there was to be no separation of the army from the party as the ZNA continues to tie new recruits to the history of the liberation war and instill party loyalty. The army's loyalty to ZANU-PF saw the army engage in violence against ZANU-PF opponents early on in the 1980s in support of the ZANU-PF one party state ideology, starting with Gukurahundi.

4.3 The political leanings of the ZNA

Operation Gukurahundi 1982- 1987: crushing dissent and building a political army

Operation Gukurahundi was one of the instances in which the army tried to negotiate between the violence of the past and the violence of the present in a way that treats them as purveyors of legitimate violence, as a professional army would. They had to justify engaging in violence against political opponents through associating them with imperialist destabilization agendas. Before *Operation Gukurahundi* the opposition PF-ZAPU was accused by ZANU-PF of trying to overthrow a democratic government through sponsoring dissidents with the help of apartheid South African government. In this way PF-ZAPU was regarded as a security threat and this warranted the intervention of the army. It is through this framing of the political opposition as opponents of the state by ZANU-PF that both the army as a whole and the individual soldiers began to see themselves otherwise. This is when they begin to believe that the enemies against the state are now within and that they have no choice but in order to realize the mission of fulfilling the promise of the liberation struggle they have to take a political position to protect the state.

This narrative was given a form of credibility by the blowing up of the Air Force jets at the Thornhill Air base in Gweru and the discovery of the arms cache at a ZAPU owned farm in the Midlands province and the identification of former ZIPRA guerrillas as the dissidents in 1982. This resulted in accusations and counter accusations of sabotage and mistrust between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU leading to the infamous *Operation Gukurahundi* by the Fifth Brigade. *Gukurahundi* which became

the Fifth Brigade emblem was a liberation war ZANU code name for an operation *Gore regukurahundi* (the year of the people's storm) that was supposed to clear all 'dirt' standing in ZANU's way to victory (Mugabe 1983; Tungamirai 1995). This operation could not go on in 1979 because of the ceasefire and Lancaster House negotiations, which led to a constitution and eventually elections. As an opposition with equal liberation war credentials and claims ZAPU clearly posed a threat to ZANU-PF monopoly on power and liberation war ideology and was opposed to Mugabe's one-party state policy.

The Fifth Brigade, a highly political brigade loyal to ZANU-PF and composed mainly of Shona-speaking former ZANLA cadres and commanded by Air Marshal Perrence Shiri, used the name *Gukurahundi* (the storm) and this meant that they used brutal force and violence against perceived and real enemies in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s. *Gukurahundi* rains are violent, heavy and torrential; they sometimes leave a trail of massive destruction, gullies and scars on the earth. Such has been the nature of military led ZANU-PF violence on the lives of the people; Machakanja (2010) has argued that the *Gukurahundi* violence left permanent scars in the lives of people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces, brutally killing an estimated 20 000 civilians (CCJP 1998). The Fifth Brigade according to the then Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Robert Mugabe was to be used "solely to deal with dissidents and any other troubles in the country" (Stiff 2000:93). Mugabe drew form North Korean loyalty in establishing the Fifth Brigade which was trained by North Korean instructors at a secret camp (Alexander 1998; Ndlovu-Gtsheni 2003; Moorcraft 2012). ZANU-PF wanted, according to Mugabe, "one arm of the army to have a political orientation which stems from our philosophy as ZANU-PF" (Stiff 2000:93).

During *Operation Gukurahundi* the Fifth Brigade, used ZANLA liberation war methods such as *pungwes* (Alaxander 1998; CCJP), and forced the population to sing ZANLA liberation war songs denouncing ZAPU and its leader Joshua Nkomo (Alexander 1998). The liberation war *pungwe* was an extension of the guerrilla bases, and was the space where the active politicization, indoctrination and conscientisation of the people into what was called the ZANU way was done. This was done through the teaching of ZANU political ideology and philosophy of war, as well as the singing

of ZANU songs and chanting of ZANU slogans. During the operation *Gukurahundi* the Fifth Brigade soldiers and the ZANU-PF youth established the base with structures resembling those adopted during the liberation war. It was at these bases where the massacres were planned and the ZANU-PF youth brigades brought information about the dissidents' helpers and sympathizers in the communities.

The *Gukurahundi* campaign took the form of the ZANU liberation war guerrilla strategy. It is evident that it was meant to politicize the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the "ZANU way." By the end of the *Gukurahundi* campaign ZANU-PF ideology and violent practices had infiltrated most of the country. The idea here was to perpetuate and spread the ZANU-PF *Chimurenga* ideology and the 1970s subjectivities and loyalty instilled in people in Mashonaland provinces to the Matabeleland provinces. The ZANU guerrillas did not penetrate much of Matabeleland provinces during the war, and these provinces remained ZAPU strongholds. The Fifth Brigade, the Central Intelligence Organization, PISI, ZANU-PF Youth brigades, ZNA and the Zimbabwe Republic Police's Support Unit were involved in the *Gukurahundi*. The first four units were the most brutal. The ZNA and the police were more professional and at times protected the civilians (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; CCJP; LRF). This was a tension between the soldiers themselves and how they viewed violence at that time. For the ZNA and the police being professional meant that they needed to protect civilians from unnecessary violence. At the same time they were required to obey orders and treat people as dissidents. It is at these moments that violence heightens one's self-awareness as a political subjectivity.

The *Gukurahundi* was a moment of violence in which ZANU sought to launch another *Chimurenga* war and reorient the people in the ZANU way. This allowed them to instill a certain kind of fear-based loyalty to ZANU-PF within the people of Matabeleland. Of course ZANU-PF has relied on fear to control the people's political will, and the army is instrumental in achieving this fear. The *Gukurahundi* campaign had devastating implications on the civil-military relations in Matabeleland and in Zimbabwe in general, it undermined the military image and credibility among civilians. People fear a repeat of the 1980s *Gukurahundi* violence and as such they vote for ZANU-PF because they associate the violence not only with the military but also with the ruling ZANU-PF party. This is because the military makes it clear they

are working for ZANU-PF. Ndlovu-Gathseni called this compliance “fatalistic and helpless.” It works in maintaining ZANU-PF’s hold on power. The Gukurahundi ended with a Unity Accord signed between ZANU and ZAPU with the parties merging into one political party called ZANU-PF.

The Unity Accord of 1987

On December 22, 1987, ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU signed the Unity Accord a peace agreement that ended the *Gukurahundi* campaign and its related massacres. However the agreement was a far cry from a peace and reconciliation agreement, it was in all essence a political agreement meant to end the violence and not to deal with the impact of that violence on the people’s lives. It did not address issues of reparations or recognition of the violence that had taken place. The atrocities were swept under the carpet and people were not allowed to talk about them in public. The state security agents have on several occasions banned the commemoration of *Gukurahundi* victims, the state especially ZANU-PF have never recognized that it happened. Even though the violence ended in the region and relative peace returned, the violence left dangerous remnants on the landscapes which need to be dealt with, that is why organizations like the Mafela Trust have conducted exhumations and reburials of the victims of the *Gukurahundi* violence, a process of bringing closure to the people and to cleanse the land of the spirit of bad death that haunts the landscape. The presence of mass graves on the landscapes makes it difficult for people to reconcile especially with those who killed their relatives.

The Unity Accord was an affirmation of ZANU-PF’s hold on power and had nothing to do with the people who suffered violence. Politicians were concerned about letting off the hook all those who had participated in violence especially on the side of the security forces (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003). These were granted amnesty and the truth about what happened was not to come out. Politicians including Mugabe and those who were in ZAPU have avoided talking about the *Gukurahundi* violence on the grounds that it will open old wounds and should remain a closed chapter. Maybe this was a deliberate attempt by ZANU-PF to create violence that they would go back to and invoking people’s memories. Recently in 2016, Mugabe warned the War Veterans who were speaking out against his misrule that they were becoming

dissidents and he would deal with them in the way he dealt with the dissidents in the 1980s. The failure of the Unity Accord to bring to account those perpetrators of human rights abuses ensured that people in the whole country lived in fear of what ZANU-PF can do and use the *Gukurahundi* atrocities as an example. The loyalty that ZAPU leaders and their followers gave to Mugabe has been about pretense, and fear to challenge or to speak out. What the Unity accord did was to allow for a culture of impunity within the security services. Mugabe pardoned those involved including the dissidents who had surrendered, ZAPU leaders and the security and armed forces who murdered people under a blanket amnesty. As such the Matabeleland region perception is dominated by fear, mistrust, suspicion, alienation, exclusion, and long lasting bitterness (Werbner 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000).

This fear is also true of people in Mashonaland; fear was visible during the Staff College's rehearsal on the 16th of October 2014, when *Gukurahundi* was mentioned. An elderly woman Mbuya Vaida advised people that there is a possibility of heavy rains because of the rainmaking ceremony, which was underway. She knelt down under the tree she was sitting and said:

Excuse me organisers. I just want to let you know that the beer brewed for the rainmaking ceremony is being drunk today to mark the end of the ceremony and heavy rains are expected as per norm, that the ceremony is closed with rains from the ancestors (Mbuya Vaida Maema Mountains, 16/10/2014).

Some people looked at her in disapproval showing her that they did not believe in what she was saying. People knew of the rainmaking ceremony *chipwa* (in Chishona), which was concluding that day. The Chief had asked every household to contribute US\$1 and a plate of mealie-meal for the ceremony. Two hours after the woman had raised this issues heavy dark clouds began gathering in the sky and people became uneasy at the thought of having to be delayed by the rains. One woman said in whisper "if it rains it's good because the *Gukurahundi* rains had taken time to come." Others around her looked at her as if she had said something taboo, of course she had, the word *Gukurahundi*. Even though it was the right word to use to describe the rains, she had used it at a wrong time in front of the soldiers. The

soldiers did not hear this conversation as they deliberated on how to finalise the program and the woman made sure they didn't hear her. Even though Comrade Vaida was not referring to the *Gukurahundi* violence, its mention brought feelings of uneasiness within the people. Comrade Chakanetsa a former liberation war guerrilla argued during a separate interview at his homestead that it is now more difficult for them to call the *Gukurahundi* rains by that name because it reminds them of the darkest period in Zimbabwe's history:

We are now calling it *a gumha rutsva* (meaning rain that cleans burnt chaff, more or less the same meaning but different words). *Gukurahundi* always makes us feel complicity in the atrocities committed in Matabeleland, using the word sounds like condoning that violence so people don't use it anymore. The president himself has said it's a chapter which should be closed because it opens old wounds so talking about it looks like we are blaming the president for it. It gets people in trouble with the state security agents (Comrade Chakanetsa, November 2014).

Even though the state tries with its might to silence the atrocities of the *Gukurahundi* massacres and the actions of the Fifth Brigade, just like the landscape itself as the *Gukurahundi* rains pour every year it brings out the darkness that people feel inside them about the ZNA's Fifth Brigade brutality in Mashonaland. The brutality of *Gukurahundi* is often associated with the post-2000 violence by people in Mashonaland. This also works to ZANU-PF's advantage in that it reminds people of ZANU-PF and military brutality to any opposition. After the Unity accord and the merging of PF-ZAPU into ZANU to form ZANU-PF it has never been business as usual. ZANU-PF mobilized the liberation war veterans to continue politicizing the people in the ZANU-PF liberation ideology.

The DRC intervention, economic crisis and military intervention in politics

The DRC campaign was a moment of violence in which the army was constituted differently to fund the country's drying coffers after the hefty payouts to the war veterans in 1997. It was also a moment in which the army was used to soak up unemployed youths. According to Shearer (1999), Kabila admitted that the DRC government paid the costs for the Zimbabwean army from "the bills, the material for planes, pay troops salaries in hard currency, for transport, ammunitions" (Shearer

1999:98). Laurent Kabila challenged and defeated long time Zaire dictator, Mr Mobutu Sese Seko. When he faced threats from rebels, Laurent Kabila asked the Zimbabwean army under SADC to be deployed to protect Mbujimayi diamond claims in DRC and this is what gave interest to military leadership. The state-owned ZNA Company the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), which was created in 1984 (Alao 1995), army commanders and politicians benefited from mining concessions and other business deals through mostly corrupt and underhand deals.

Soldiers who were deployed in the DRC that I interviewed confirmed that they indeed received salaries in US\$ while in Congo. One of them, Corporal Hondo, said that at one point he lost a US\$100 bill and he was deeply hurt to the extent that it affected his commitment for some time. Some of these soldiers boast of having acquired properties like houses and cars through the money they earned in the DRC. At the same time military companies such as the ZDI, then headed by the now Minister of War Veterans Retired Colonel Tshinga-Dube, made joint venture projects in which Zimbabwean goods and military equipment could be sold with immediate payment. Other private companies owned by military commanders and ZANU-PF officials and government ministers were established and quickly started business in the DRC.

Corporal Hondo only managed 3 Ordinary level passes. He went to Rutope secondary school, a local school that was poorly resourced. The school did not have enough science laboratories and has not produced more than one percent pass rate at 'O' level. Many children drop out of school, and those who finish 'O' Levels either fail or do not proceed to 'A' level or to tertiary education. Corporal Hondo said that he survived by digging wells and pits for toilets for villagers before joining the army. It was not easy to survive in this context, as many people do not have money to employ people, they prefer doing some of these jobs for themselves. During the rainy season, he went and worked as a casual/contract worker at a commercial farm, a form of labour called *marikicho*. A white farmer known by a local name Magobo owns the farm. Sometimes together with other young people they hired out their labour to a horticultural farm along the Harare-Shamva road. At times, he could hire out the cattle he inherited from his late father to till the land for those who do not possess cattle for a fee. This is how most of the youth earn a living in the area.

He said that just like many other young people in his situation, he had lost any hope of being formally employed. He said that his uncle who worked in a government ministry encouraged him to travel to Bulawayo for the ZNA recruitment in 1999. He made the long journey to Bulawayo Llewellyn Recruit Training centre for selection. For him, the physical selection was not a problem as he was fit, he attributed this to the lifestyle his rural upbringing had exposed him to. During this time, the army was more interested in recruiting many young people to fight in the DRC war so physical fitness was prioritized ahead of educational qualifications and political loyalties. Immediately after completing a six months infantry training, Corporal Hondo was deployed to fight in the DRC war until 2002 when he returned to Zimbabwe.

In the DRC, Corporal Hondo said that they fought the war under difficult conditions; they lacked food, and other necessary supplies. He said they were angry at their commanders whom they blamed for making money from diamonds at their expense (see Maringira 2015). ZANU-PF rule was under severe threat from the opposition MDC since 2002. The DRC war was productive of soldiers who were angry and discontented. In order to divert this anger to internal enemies, Corporal Hondo said that the army took them to liberation war camps/bases at Mkhushi and Tembwe in Zambia and at Chimoio in Mozambique as part of reorienting them in the ZANU-PF ideology. They were also taken to the first ZANLA base in Zimbabwe, which was established in 1973 at Nemukoma in Mt Darwin beyond Mavuradonha Range. Here they were indoctrinated into ZANU-PF's version of patriotic history and were taught that by defending ZANU-PF they were fulfilling the desires of the departed heroes of the liberation war who were buried at some of these sites in mass graves. The base created him into a ZANU-PF loyalist and when he was deployed to deal with opposition supporters he felt justified to engage in violence in the name of protecting ZANU-PF which in his opinion is the only liberator and rightful inheritor of the state. He and many other soldiers had developed commitments and ideals that who they are as a political community is founded in the liberation war and that they belonged to ZANU-PF.

Of interest is that these soldiers who fought in the DRC admit that their wartime experiences, the horrors of war and having to kill in battle and surviving under harsh conditions, hardened them to violence:

We saw people die, our friends our enemies and civilians, it was bad but there was nothing we could do, we had to survive. At that time, we realised that anything could happen to us, so the money we got, sometimes we spent it recklessly as if there is no tomorrow. We decided to survive and enjoy for the day. When we got back to Zimbabwe, we were not properly debriefed; in most cases we were given leave to go to our families, as if that would make us cope. After that, we came back to political violence, when the MDC and ZANU-PF were fighting, we were deployed into the streets. We used our DRC anger to deal with civilians in the streets of Zimbabwe's urban areas (Corporal Hondo, November 2015).

The DRC war heightened the subjectivity of violence within the soldiers because it exposed them to the violence of war, and upon redeployment in Zimbabwe they could not differentiate the Zimbabwean civilians protesting against deteriorating economic conditions and the Rebels they fought in the DRC. The soldiers were also bitter because the war they had fought was not recognized at home. They came back to protest against their involvement in the DRC. Although they believe that they should not have been deployed in the DRC, they wanted to be recognized as having fought a war and get medals like those who fought in the liberation struggle. This made them angry with the civilian population. The DRC experiences of violence fed into the political violence that was experienced at home with devastating consequences for the army, the opposition and democracy in Zimbabwe. As Maringira (2015) noted there were many desertions from the army in the post-2000 period on political grounds.

4.4 Military partisan participation in political violence

The rise of the MDC, post-2000 violence and military regeneration

After having defeated PF-ZAPU a strong opposition with liberation credentials through the *Gukurahundi* violence, the post-2000 is another moment in which both the army as a whole and the individual soldiers began to see themselves as political. This is when they began to believe that the enemies against the state are now within and that they have no choice but in order to realize the mission of fulfilling the promise of the liberation struggle they have to take a political position to protect the state. I show from the position of the generals and the ordinary soldiers how they

engage in that defense, and how the base as a place of transformation and violence is reenacted. One of the interesting questions that I draw out here has to do with generational issues, it is about how the military regenerates and reproduces itself in the post-2000 crisis. The war veterans association is an entity of those who are not active in the military but through laying claim to having sacrificed for the country they become significant and they reappear at the same time when there is the emergence of the born free generation, which was critical to ZANU-PF.

At the turn of the century, there had been 10 years of Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) and crisis in the economy and its tough constraints on employment and expenditure by government (Mlambo 1993), and the land had not been distributed. There was a whole generation a volatile youth who were not clear about what is happening and ZANU-PF had to ensure that these youths don't become a dangerous political force. The solution on one hand was to give the war veterans who had been the nucleus of the liberation war free rein to resurrect the idea of the sacrifice. This idea was invoked through the 1997 pay offs to the war veterans for their sacrifice during the liberation war. The payments were a huge gamble that got the government into financial trouble (Kriger 2003).

The leaders of a vibrant workers union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), led by Morgan Tsvangirai, formed the MDC in 1999. On its formation the MDC represented the interests of the workers, academics and civil society and had a huge presence in the urban areas and appealed to the unemployed urban youths. In the 2000 parliamentary elections the MDC won most urban constituencies and overall lost to ZANU-PF by only five seats. The MDC together with its allies, a national student body the Zimbabwe National Association of Students Union (Zinasu), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) a constitutional and human rights organization successfully campaigned for a 'NO VOTE' in a national referendum in February 2000, on the proposed new constitution which sought to replace the 1979 Lancaster House negotiated constitution (Makumbe 2002). The MDC's strong performance in the June 2000 parliamentary elections, where they won 57 of the 120 contested seats propelled ZANU-PF into a crisis and the party's leadership instituted a witch-hunt to establish control of the urban areas through violence (LeBas 2006).

After a strong MDC performance during the 2000 elections, the stakes were so high that the ZANU-PF government allowed the army to be the instrument of the redistribution of the land, which ‘politicized’ the army in a way (Moore 2005). What was evident in the 2000 election is that urban dwellers especially the youth had lost faith in ZANU-PF. The ZANU-PF government responded by introducing a National Youth Training Service program (NYTS) in 2001 led by the late Minister for Gender, Youth, and Employment, Border Gezi. The youth training programme was a condition for entering tertiary teacher training colleges, technical colleges, the civil service and the security forces. This was a move by the state to make the youth choose ZANU-PF if they wanted to have a career in the civil service at a time when the private sector was closing down due to economic hardships and lack of foreign investment. The Presidential scholarship program was also started for the NYTS graduates to study at universities in South Africa. It was at this time that the army once again became the soaking sponge for unemployment in the country and youths loyal to ZANU-PF were rewarded by being recruited into the ZDF.

4.5 Recruitment into and serving in the ZNA in post-2000: Obedience and subordination within the army

The post-2000s crisis saw the army became more politicized and heavily partisan (Willensen 2010). The liberation war relationships began to be the new standards for measuring the competence of the members of the army. There was a heavy ZANU-PF political patronage both in serving members of the army and in the recruitment exercise. The recruitment of the born free generation was designed to continue with political allegiance exclusive to ZANU-PF among the soldiers. So the way in which the army recruited is in post-2000 follows the phenomenon that the ‘vanguard of the party guided the gun’ (Mazarire 2011). The ZANU-PF youth who perpetrated violence are celebrated by being employed in the army and that enhances their desire to commit political violence in search for further recognition. Recruitment into the ZNA after the withdrawal from the DRC war was part of patronage politics in which ZANU-PF war veterans’ relatives were incorporated into the army as part of rewarding these former liberation war fighters for their role in the struggle.

A soldier recruited into the army in 2012, Private Joyce, reiterated what I had observed during the recruitment exercise in Bindura where thousands of jobless youths seeking employment in the army were told to produce proof that their parents or guardians were members of the War Veterans Association, the ZNA, Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) or Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services (ZPCS). Some of the youths brought letters written by their ZANU-PF branch or ward chairpersons testifying that they were active members of the party and should be given a chance. Those without proof were dismissed without being given an opportunity to prove themselves. Private Joyce said that the tests they were made to write as part of the recruitment process were highly political. She said, “there were questions on what we think about president Mugabe and the land reform, and what we thought about the MDC.” She said that during an oral interview she was asked what she thinks about the MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai. In her response she said, “I told them that I don’t know who Tsvangirai was”. It was during the period when Morgan Tsvangirai was the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe during the Government of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU-PF and two MDC parties from 2009 to 2013. This is what the soldiers wanted to hear, that people should only recognize president Mugabe and for one to claim that they didn’t know Morgan Tsvangirai was the biggest scorn and humiliation the Prime Minister would get.

At the Bindura recruitment centre, I spoke to one dejected young man who had been told that he had failed the test. His father was a respected war veteran; the recruiting officer came to explain to him why they had failed his son. The reason was the way he had responded to the question on who was good between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, he had answered that Tsvangirai was good. His father was visibly angry because this was a disgrace to him as a war veteran. He claimed that he had guided him on how to respond to these politically related questions and told him not to praise Tsvangirai. He was frustrated to the extent that he did not allow his son into his car and even threatened to kick him out of his home. Such is the politicization of the recruitment into the ZNA in post-2000. Politicization of the army brought problems in terms of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

I was introduced to Private Joyce by Private Gift, her colleague in the army whom I had known since 2012. Private Gift was recruited in the same manner as Private Joyce

and he had the same experiences of recruitment. However they trained in different places. Private Joyce was trained in Bulawayo while private Gift was trained in Rusape. Private Gift's father is a war veteran and he required his children to be loyal to ZANU-PF. He did this by making it a point to teach them the liberation war history as he had experienced it. This is the reason why ZANU-PF was interested in recruiting children of war veterans into the security services. Their socialization into ZANU-PF loyalty began at home. Private Gift had failed his secondary education dismally, not even managing to pass a single subject. Just like Corporal Hondo he survived by doing menial jobs in the farms and by selling vegetables he produced in his garden at the local business centre. Like Corporal Hondo he was disgruntled by the ZANU-PF led government's inability to provide jobs and turning around the economy. He said that in 2008 he wanted the MDC to win and rule because he believed that they understood the plight of the youth. In 2012 with the influence of his father he was recruited into the ZNA. He joined the army for money and survival and not out of loyalty for both ZANU-PF and the country.

Private Gift's group was taken to ZANLA liberation war bases outside the country to forge particular kind of political subjectivity and loyalty to the ruling ZANU-PF party. The army has been the backbone of ZANU-PF rule since 1980 because it has absorbed most of the ZANLA war veterans in its ranks after independence. These war veterans in the ZNA have used violence and mobilized the pro-ZANU-PF patriotic history narrative to consolidate, strengthen and legitimize ZANU-PF's continued rule. The army's duty is to serve ZANU-PF first, then the state and the people (Tendi, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). According to army Private Gift Mhosva a soldier in the ZNA who was part of the 2011 ZNA's basic army training recruits training at Tsanzaguru battle camp in Rusape, Manicaland province in eastern Zimbabwe revealed during an interview in July 2012 that the trainees under his group were taken to Chimoio mass grave in Mozambique where the remains of unknown liberation war fighters and civilian refugees are interred in a mass grave.

Our instructors told us that the trip was part of our history lectures that were part of the training programme, and they were meant to give us evidence that what we are taught about the liberation war is not fictional but a reality. The commanders told us that, 'the trenches which we teach you to dig, are used in real warfare', and we saw

trenches in Chimoio and our instructors told us that these trenches were dug while bullets were firing. We were supposed to sleep in those trenches that were dug during the liberation war by the veterans some of whom died in those trenches (Private Gift Mhosva, Bindura South, July 2012)

In 1977, the Rhodesian army attacked Chimoio refugee camp in Mozambique and killed over a thousand mostly unarmed young men and women, including children, women and the elderly who were refugees (Mtisi et al 2009). The Chimoio massacre has been used by ZANU-PF as evidence of Rhodesia government brutality and as a sign of sacrifice by Zimbabwean people who decided to go out and support the war. The horrors suffered by the victims of the Chimoio massacre have been used as a rhetorical weapon by ZANU-PF to show the brutalities of the colonial regime and discredit the MDC, which is accused of fronting the interests of former white Rhodesians who carried out these massacres on liberation war fighters and refugees (Matereke 2011).

Private Mhosva recalled that when they arrived at the site, and were busy digging trenches for their drills one of the army recruits was unexpectedly possessed by the spirit of a dead veteran and he went into a spiritual trance and started speaking in the voice of the deceased veteran. The spirit of the deceased asked those present to tell his relatives to come and take his spirit home for reburial he told them who he was, where he comes from, how he came to Chimoio and how he had died during the war. This experience radically changed Private Mhosva's perception towards not only the liberation war but also ZANU-PF. He said he now understands why only those who fought for the liberation of the country must continue to rule.

The ZNA commanders harness the affective material and immaterial dimensions of these former liberation war bases to reinforce particular historical narratives and to create particular kinds of political subjectivities. The net effect is the reproduction of soldiers who are loyal to and who support the ZANU-PF party ideologically. What we understand here is that ZANU PF is legitimized by unseen though often believed or experienced liberation spirits. These spirits that animate these landscapes of violence and make demands on the living gives this landscape agency. Private Mhosva said that the instructors took the recruit soldier who they had with them back to Mutare

army base at 3 Brigade and they located the family of the deceased for purposes of spiritual repatriation, a ceremony to take his spirit back home. Even though this incident shows that the landscape is active and was beyond their control they tried to claim it.

By reviving memories of the liberation struggle in the population especially in the youth ZANU-PF wanted them to see that they are not isolated, and being used, or that the *Third Chimurenga* is not a political gimmick meant to consolidate their hold on power but that what they were doing is not just violence and racism against white farmers but they were continuing with the struggle started by the heroes of the First *Chimurenga* of the 1890s, and the Second *Chimurenga* of the 1960s. Given the impact the Chimoio experience had on this young soldier, there is a sense in which ZANU-PF war veterans in the ZNA continue to use narratives, the material remains (guerrilla bases), performances, songs and spirits to make the liberation war a source of emotion and national identity. ‘Patriotic history’ (Ranger, 2004) is in part about creating a history of the liberation war that is exclusively ZANU-PF, which they can then return to, and re-create in the future, evoking people’s memories deliberately.

Taking the soldiers and the villagers back to the places of liberation war bases and re-establishing the post-2000 militia bases resembling those of the liberation struggle was a way of reshaping the relationship between the military and the ZANU-PF party through the landscape. These places of past liberation war violence have been used to make emotional claims in the people’s imagination, and rethink the liberation war sacrifice of ZANU-PF guerrillas. This transformed soldiers from caring only for money to having a relationship with ZANU-PF as a party they can die defending. The loyalty that Major John Moyo and his colleagues emotionally pledged after affective narratives and performances are reflective of what happens at many of these gatherings. Therefore the recruits had an association with the base at the moment of entrance in the army, or even way before that if they went through the NYTS, or if they are socialized to acquire war veteran characteristics by their parents at home.

The base is productive of the figure of the soldier, as one who is obedient and loyal to ZANU-PF. More significantly the base creates the *jambanja* kind of soldiers, as ones who are willing to engage in uncontrollable violence in defence of ZANU-PF. This

explains why they go around chanting pro-ZANU-PF slogans and beating up perceived opposition supporters. Even in interaction with members of their families, Private Gift said that he does not want to hear them say bad things about the government and President Mugabe. He now accepts that the economic crisis is a result of sanctions and that everyone has to stand with the president. This is a major shift from the time when he claimed that the economic challenges were a result of misrule. Even his friends desist from attacking the government in his presence.

The problem of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe is based on the military seeing itself as having an obligation to serve ZANU-PF first and then the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). The military does not see the civilian population as important in the way the country is governed. Instead of protecting society and upholding people's democratic political choices, the army desires to enforce civilian submission to their authority. The use of the term *povo* by soldiers referring to civilians shows how the military thinks of the population. *Povo* is Portuguese word meaning people but is used to mean impoverished peasants who survive on primitive means mostly subsistence farming (see Moore 2005). After independence, the military in Zimbabwe is taught that it is of high importance in preserving the interests of the people and is encouraged to intervene in politics. Thus soldiers recruited in the army in the post-colonial period spend most of their time being taught political history and philosophy and being taken around liberation war bases and this promotes the development of political interest and efficacy and in turn encourages political participation.

The ZNA developed what Perlmutter (1969) calls "political leanings" that were based on liberation war alliances with ZANU-PF. The ZANU-PF government uses this to promote soldiers thereby instilling partisanship in the servicemen. Since recruitment of new soldiers is also done on political lines those joining the army in the post-2000 period have done so knowing very well that they were supposed to belong to and defend the interests of the ruling ZANU-PF party. They did not join a professional army but they joined a partisan political army, hence they rely on their capacity to demonstrate their partisan political leanings as means of arguing for their promotion up the ranks. Even though they are sometimes fed up with the system, most of them were saying that they are resigned to the system insofar as they signed up for it and therefore agreed to its terms. The ZNA claims that it is a professional entity but

actions on the ground points to a very politically biased institution. The post-colonial state led by ZANU-PF saw its survival as guarded and guaranteed by the muscle of an efficient and effective political army, which had to be highly partisan. In this regard, the army was turned into a ZANU-PF private security apparatus, and not a people's army.

Post-2000 crisis: Obedience and subordination within the army

As the economy began to bite after the post-2000 economic crisis, junior soldiers who did not have benefits and access to resources and political muscle to make ends meet lost commitment to ZANU-PF and discipline began to decline (Maringira 2015). The junior soldiers had lost the basic moral codes that soldiers believed in and for which they will sacrifice; this is an important aspect of commitment (Reuven Gal 1985). Some soldiers started to support the opposition and the army moved in to establish obedience within the soldiers. Kolkowicz and Korbonski (1982) have argued that one of the reasons the military engages in coups is the failure by politicians to manage the economy of the country. In Zimbabwe, despite few sporadic incidents of dissent in the army, the army generally maintained their support for ZANU-PF under conditions of economic decline. Maringira (2013) argues that the conditions in the barracks drastically changed after 2000, the soldiers' food rations were drastically reduced as the country suffered from budgetary constraints. A soldier that I spoke to noted that food crisis is so serious that they are often sent home on leave. He thus said:

We are required to go on a two week off every month so that we don't hang around the barracks when there is not enough food for us. Food is strictly for those on duty, and in many cases we get to eat beans and cabbages, which we resent so much. At one time there were rumors that we will only be paid for the days we are on duty (Lance Corporal Hondo, Bindura South).

Under these conditions dissent was inevitable, those soldiers accused of supporting the MDC were court martialed, most of those found 'guilty' were sent to detention barracks, dismissed or they deserted (Maringira, 2015). Private Joyce noted that:

MDC and Tsvangirai became dangerous names; no one wanted to be associated with them because they meant trouble. The military intelligence is on the lookout for those

who support the opposition. It's not that we don't like the MDC but we are scared of the consequences. These are hard times we don't want to be dismissed from work or to be detained and tortured. Our families will suffer. We are protecting our jobs by supporting ZANU-PF. So if we are told to beat up MDC supporters we will. There is nothing we can do (Interview with Private Joyce).

The army commanders used violence to instill discipline within the army, and deter any attempt by the soldiers to support the opposition political parties. Private Joyce said that the soldiers are commandeered to ZANU-PF meetings and rallies. They are ordered to buy ZANU-PF party membership cards and to wear ZANU-PF t-shirts and campaign for ZANU-PF. During elections, soldiers have said that they vote in full view of their battalion commanders at the barracks, their votes are not secret. They cannot vote outside the barracks because towards every election the army is on standby and every soldier will be at the barracks. For Reuven Gal, military obedience is initiated by fear and punishment during the early phases of socialization into military life. Military personnel are controlled through their fear of negative sanctions. Reuven Gal (1985:554) argues, "Even when the legitimacy of an organizational goal is questionable, if behavior is motivated by obedience, well-indoctrinated soldiers will continue to comply even though orders are debatable." So the political violence soldiers perpetrate is to protect their jobs and themselves from harm.

4.6 The army and post-2000 violence

The late 1990s and the early 2000s saw the increase in organized mass job actions by the labour movements, opposition political parties and civil society to pressure the government to fix the economy and to protect property and human rights. The army took over the role of community policing from the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), and deployed soldiers in the suburbs in urban areas to complement the Youth brigades that were deployed in rural areas. The army was essential to this task because they had been politicized to defend ZANU-PF as a liberation war movement and to believe that the opposition political party members are the internal enemies they had to fight in that defense. A former soldier Hondo who was deployed at 5 Brigade in Kwekwe

at the height of these political struggles said that they were called up to assist the police in bringing order against the civilians. Corporal Hondo said:

We were told that we were supposed to get our passes and go on our two-week off, but the *povo* out there who are behaving like barbarians have ensured that we go on standby. We were told that if we want to take our leave and enjoy with our families we should go and deal with these civilians once and for all, the sooner we do it the better for us (Corporal Hondo Bindura South, 22/10/2014).

In this regard the military commanders identified the civilian population as the enemies, because they were accusing them of working with the enemies of ZANU-PF and the state, which is the opposition. In 2002 the then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe went on national television and radio ZBC to proclaim the army's support for ZANU-PF presidential candidate and Commander-in-Chief of the ZDF President Robert Mugabe. He introduced the concept of a "strait jacket" meaning that any occupant of the State House has to be a liberation war veteran. He thus said:

We wish to make it clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty.

This statement by General Zvinavashe was a response to what the military termed external and internal threats to the gains of the liberation struggle. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) the nationalist and military alliance has defined politics in terms of a straitjacket that only fits those with nationalist and military background. Here the military claimed to be informed by societal imperatives to protect the Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs. In this context the opposition MDC and its supporters who were mostly urban voters then was defined as pursuing an imperialist agenda thereby threatening the very existence of Zimbabwe's sovereignty. Most urban voters were identified as belonging to the opposition MDC and therefore as

enemies of ZANU-PF and the state. Major General Douglas Nyikayaramba reflected this when he referred to the MDC leader and the then Prime Minister Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai as a security threat in public:

Morgan Tsvangirai doesn't pose a political threat in any way in Zimbabwe, but is a major security threat; He takes instructions from the foreigners who seek to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Daydreamers who want to reverse the gains of our liberation struggle.

These highly charged political statements by the military Generals in the post-2000 are a reflection of their political views and allegiances. These are views perpetuated by War Veterans serving in the ZNA. After 2000 the young soldiers were made to see people as their enemies and were encouraged to beat them up, as Corporal Hondo noted:

We saw the people as our enemies; angrily we armed ourselves with rubber bullets and went into the streets to face an unarmed enemy who apparently had angered us by denying us our long awaited leave and special time with our families. We have been brainwashed to view the opposition as the enemy of the state, and we were told that as the army we are the protectors of the state, we are the state, so the opposition and their followers are our enemies. For most of us who were coming from the DRC war we were still possessed by the spirit of war we cared for no one so we were very brutal in our dealing with the civilians we actually viewed them as enemy soldiers in war (Corporal Hondo, Maema Mountain base, Bindura South, 22/10/2014).

This is evident that the soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that MDC-T supporters and pro-democracy activists were enemies of the state (see Ndlovu-Gatheni, 2009; Chitiyo 2009) In this context these urban opposition supporters and activists became dispensable. Such is the meaning of the urban *povo* or civilians to the military in the post-2000 context. In politics and as much in the academia there is a long debate around whether in Zimbabwe the urban working class (vs the peasantry) can be understood as possessing “revolutionary consciousness” (Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999). The rural *povo* used to be celebrated as the repository of a kind of natural nationalist consciousness, and therefore as the people most likely to support the liberation war effort in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Military violence on opposition supporters was meant to reorient the urban working class, to make them

aware that who they are as political community derives from the sacrifices of the liberation struggle and ZANU-PF. During these operations, the army would engage in random beatings, and torturing of civilians even for no apparent reason. They would shut down bars, shops and would stop and search private and public vehicles. They indiscriminately tortured men and women. At one time, Corporal Hondo said that they made a woman do press up in the road in full view of her husband and children for driving through a red traffic light, he added that:

We did not care whether one's wife, husband or children were present we disciplined ignorance. In fact that dehumanizing experience is what we wanted to achieve, to prove who was more powerful, them or the state (Corporal Hondo, Maema mountain base, Bindura South, 22/10/2014)

This behavior exhibited by these young soldiers comes from the way they are trained, and as the challenge to ZANU-PF and Mugabe's rule grew so did the army involvement in political violence. Corporal Hondo said during 2008 presidential elections they were on standby on a state of emergency and they would go out on a road run every morning singing the song that denounced the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai:

Zvinondibhowa!	It annoys me!
Zvinondifizura!	It infuriates me!
Kuseri kwa Mogan kune Mabhunhu!	That Morgan is backed by whites!

The songs and slogans showed the pro-ZANU-PF politicization of the army in the model of the North Korean loyalty, which President Mugabe admired and appropriated when he visited the North Korean republic in the early 1980s. Soldiers are encouraged to openly support ZANU-PF but are brought before court marshal and tortured if they are suspected of supporting the opposition (Maringira 2015).

At the turn of the 2000 soldiers were sent to train the youth under the National Youth Training Service (Rupiya, 2011), this is where the relationship between the youth and the army developed leading to the military playing a leading role in the creation of the youth militia bases in 2008. The army was deployed to distribute agricultural inputs to new farmers. This was known as Operation *Maguta/Inala*, meaning 'your belly is

full/your hunger has been sated'. Since the turn of 2000 and the growth of a political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe the army had operated as an arm of government through its involvement in the quasi-fiscal operations funded by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at the height of the crisis. These operations included operation Maguta/Inala, Basic Commodities Supply Scheme Initiative (Baccossi) and agricultural mechanization programs.

This allowed military surveillance on the rural population; members of the military intelligence were deployed to these posts. They worked with ZANU-PF structures to identify perceived MDC supporters; these were denied food aid and other assistance and were targeted during violent campaigns. The youth were encouraged to participate in violence because it is what defines a soldier; they were promised jobs in the army if they could prove through extreme violence that they can defend the party and the state. Thus the army subverted democratic processes by undermining free and fair elections through intimidating the electorate and ensuring that Mugabe's one party state is achieved in principle, in a context of a multi-party democracy.

MDC's overwhelming success in the March 28 2008 elections stunned president Mugabe and shocked the military junta. Before the elections several high-ranking military officials had said they would not serve anyone other than Mugabe. The Joint Operations Command (JOC), the military politiburo, took over the ZANU-PF campaign and unleashed a reign of terror forcing people to vote for Robert Mugabe. There are several statements claiming that Mugabe may have been willing to go after the 28 March 2008 election defeat but the military leaders would not let him go for several reasons, the major among them being the fear to lose their positions and face prosecutions for their role in subverting democracy and the *Gukurahundi* massacres of the 1980s (Masunungure 2009; Tendi 2013; Williamson 2010). It is believed that the army generals struck a deal guaranteeing Mugabe's re-election. What took place during the 2008 presidential election run-off is what Williamson (2010) called a 'military coup by stealth'. The deal was to beat the MDC into submission and to insulate Mugabe's power and consequently spare the generals' hides from prosecution. To achieve this, end they waged a campaign "of attacks exceeding anything seen previously during Zimbabwe's long history of electoral violence" (Williamson 2010). Over a very short period of time, in less than three months the

ZANU-PF militias under the command and guidance of 200 senior army officers battered the MDC and its structures into near oblivion (Masunungure 2015). At least eighty-five people were officially reported killed, 1300 tortured, and 35 000 displaced or left without homes because their homes were burned down, not only did the army generals ignite the fire but they fueled it as well as arming ‘militias’ and war veterans with weapons such as “AK 47s, handguns and rifles” (Williamson 2010). ZANU-PF elections are a continuation of war by other means and opponents have to be decimated (Muzondidya 2009).

4.7 Conclusion

The post-2000 period was animated by massive military involvement in politics and politically motivated violence. This required massive indoctrination of soldiers in ZANU-PF propaganda, as well as deploying soldiers to train youth militias in the NYST camps popularly known as Border Gezi camps. The military also participated in establishing and commandeering youth militia bases in 2008. Since the formation of the MDC as a strong opposition party to challenge ZANU-PF’s long rule, the army has played a significant role in suppressing the opposition voices within Zimbabwe. The soldierly ideal of ‘professionalism’ post-1980 was transmuted into the ideal of being a ZANU-PF party loyalist, one that could be effectively demonstrated through one’s willingness to ruthlessly attack the ‘enemy within’.

5 CHAPTER FIVE: Post-2000 Militia Bases as sources of political subjectivities

5.1 Introduction

The post-2000 was a period that Zimbabweans rose against ZANU-PF and president Mugabe's misrule by trying to vote them out of power. In the March 2008 elections, the MDC-T presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai had managed to get only above 47% of the vote, thereby falling short of the 50+1% required by law to win the presidency, forcing a presidential run-off election (Raftopolous 2009:229). The ZANU-PF candidate and post-independence president Robert Mugabe won only 43% of the presidential vote, with the MDC parties winning the majority parliamentary seats and local council polls. In Bindura South, the ruling ZANU-PF lost heavily in the council, parliamentary and presidential polls.

On the back of these results, ZANU-PF faced prospects of a real defeat in the presidential election run off. This attempt was met with stern resistance by ZANU-PF which faced a political, economic and legitimacy crisis. ZANU-PF produced violent elections basically forcing citizens to vote for them. One of the profound ways in which President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF produced its violent election campaign was through the use of 'temporary' youth militia bases, which manifested in political and geographical forms. The violence enacted by bearing resemblance to tactics pioneered during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. I am interested in revealing how political subjectivities and political violence was reified and reproduced through militia bases. Thus I reveal the practices of violence enacted from militia bases, which were locally situated in the rural areas of Bindura South.

In understanding the continuities and discontinuities of the militia base, across the history of ZANU-PF violence, I consider how the post-2000 militia base as a political form becomes a space that summons the history of the liberation struggle in order to address who is legitimated to engage in violence, with what authority and for what reason in the contemporary ZANU-PF violence to ensure its legitimacy in a politically charged 'field'. Former guerrillas use claims to having been given the authority by the ancestors during the liberation war. Following this they carry with them this ideology to kill enemies (including Rhodesian soldiers), sell-outs within and

outside the ZANU-PF party. Thus by using this claim they figure themselves as legitimate candidates to spill the blood of perceived enemies as they did during the liberation war.

The violence produced at the militia base was about the production of scared and silent voters. It seeks to produce in people the kind of subjectivity that goes to the booth to vote in order to produce legitimacy. What does it mean to have violence in order to produce an election that looks credible even as nobody trusts the results? It is an ambivalence that is in the perpetrators accounts when they talk about how this operates, Comrade Victor a ZANU-PF youth said:

When I went to the base in 2008 and was ordered to beat up people, I couldn't believe what I was doing but I did it, I didn't want to vote for ZANU-PF and I did not vote for them in the first election but through meting out and witnessing gross violence I decided to vote for ZANU-PF and to avoid this violence happening to me in future I will always be a ZANU-PF cadre (Comrade Victor, a ZANU-PF youth, interview on 20/12/2013).

In post-colonial Zimbabwe, elections are an important form of legitimation as the constitution states that the power to govern derives from the people, through elections. Legitimacy according to Weber is supposed to create and maintain domination or "authority" through obedience "based on the most diverse motives of compliance" ranging from "simple habituation" to "rational calculation of advantage" therefore implying 'minimum voluntary compliance' (Weber 1978:212). Weber conceived of legitimacy as the chance to attain acceptance for certain commands or a general political order from a given group of persons, and he argues that every system must attempt to establish and to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy. Through elections, which are an act of law, citizens give their right to violence and to govern to the state. Rousseau argues in *The Social Contract* that "since no man has natural authority over his fellows, and since Might can produce no Right, the only foundation left for legitimate authority in human societies is Agreement" (Rousseau 1947[1762]:246). In this agreement people surrender their freedom to the state in return for protection, the belief being that the state brings order and justice, since the state of humanity is a state of war (Hobbes 1985[1651]).

The system Hobbes, Rousseau and Weber depict is not one without risks and alternatives. State protection and order is not a given it depends on “skill and choice” (Jones 2005)- choosing to give up freedom in order to gain protection and order, skillfully electing a sovereign who will maintain that order and gives that protection for a general good. Choice and agreement as outlined by these three theorists is largely presupposed. There is a broad understanding of the scope, orientation and content of legitimate authority. However, my question is what happens if this sort of general agreement is not in evidence? What happens if the key potential outcomes of an act are not certain or are subject to manipulation by the sovereign? What if normatively expected outcomes no longer materialise? These are the theoretical issues that I address in order to adequately and empirically capture the cultural and political work the militia bases do in legitimising ZANU-PF rule and constituting Zimbabwean political subjectivities.

I seek to understand what elections are as a social form and how to read them in more complicated social terms. After beating up people and parading their wounds before the public at rallies, ZANU-PF says “we will see where you vote, when you stand in the queue we will see”, people don’t know if that is true, but then ZANU-PF officials say “you don’t need to know how we will know but we will know, look at people who have rebelled they have been maimed or killed or disappeared.” I draw on some of the abstract conclusions about what is at work here and how it works in terms of formation of critical subjectivity and the way in which the rural people are politicized and made to participate in violence and how these performances underpins these political subjectivities.

5.2 The Militia Base and the reification of violence

Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, elections have been held under conditions of violence and intimidation sponsored by the ruling ZANU-PF party. For years, since its formation in 1999 the MDC had not been allowed to penetrate the rural areas, which had been regarded as ZANU-PF strongholds. The local chiefs made sure that any attempt by the MDC to mobilise support in their areas was thwarted. This was done through threats to banish those seen attending MDC rallies or possessing MDC

regalia. However the general elections of March 2008, which upset ZANU-PF's twenty-eight year monopoly on power, were held in an environment of peace and political tolerance in which intimidation was minimal. This was a result of the agreement made between ZANU-PF and the MDC under SADC guidelines on free and fair elections to reform the electoral process allowing for peaceful elections. It was a period that people expressed their political opinions without fear of victimisation. This was ultimately proved in the poll results, in which ZANU-PF lost the parliamentary election for the first time since 1980. But behind all of this is a tension between the formalities of electoral democracy ('the pen') and the violence of anti-colonial struggle ('the gun'). I try to understand the efficacy of visibly discrediting the former by deploying the latter. This is perhaps why it is useful for ZANU-PF to go through with the ritual of democracy and then desecrate it with violence. What is running through so much of this chapter is the tension between the pen and the gun, electoral democracy and the violence that is necessary for and evidence for an authentic and legitimate anti-colonial struggle, which is almost eternal.

There is a contradiction or ambivalence that it is precisely at the moment of elections, which is the classic form of democracy that this terror is unleashed and there is something about the project of legitimacy that is more complex. President Robert Mugabe during the 2008 Presidential election run-off campaign in Shamva district in Mashonaland Central province, warned that, "the gun will lead the ballot" and if ZANU-PF loses the election they will "go back to the 'trenches' and fight to get back the country" arguing that the MDC is "a puppet of our former colonizers' being used to reverse the gains of the struggle and the land reform." There is something contradictory, it is as though one has to continuously show the relationship between the two, or the tension between the pen and the gun. In order to say in the end we are going to show that the pen actually stands for the continuity of colonial domination. ZANU-PF has to continually put this example on the table that is contradictory at its levels but show that ultimately it is the gun that will win because we live in a perpetual time of anti-colonial struggle.

Elections are important for legitimating any government. The Zimbabwean constitution says that the mandate to govern and rule derives from the people, and this

is done through elections, that are credible, free and fair. ZANU-PF has contended that Zimbabwe is a democracy because they have held elections when they are due and according to the constitutional provisions. ZANU-PF has claimed that it is constitutionally elected government and can only be removed from power by the people through elections as dictated by the constitution and electoral laws and not by other means. ZANU-PF has over the years appointed officials loyal to the party to head the ZEC. In 2008 a ZANU war veteran, Retired Brigadier-General Justice George Chiweshe who has since been appointed as the Judge President of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, chaired the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). ZEC has been staffed with members of the security services loyal to the ruling ZANU-PF and this has made the commission partial and biased. In this context, elections become a social and political act of legitimation, they are a tool for confirming ZANU-PF rule, while denying other political actors fairness and a level political environment.

What was evident during the pre-election campaign and the election results of March 2008 was that the liberation war credentials and history that ZANU-PF had relied on to win elections had missed a generation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011). After years of economic recession and political repression, people were no longer satisfied with the liberation war narrative that was not backed by economic progress and related freedoms. The withdrawal of the repressive violence apparatus was also evident in the results; previously in the elections of 2000, 2002, and 2005 ZANU-PF had deployed youth militias, war veterans and security forces to intimidate people into voting for the party (Machakanja 2010). In the March 2008 elections, the ZANU-PF gaze seemed a distant to the people and they sought to use the opportunity to dislodge the liberation war movement.

What pushed people to abandon ZANU-PF, the party that had liberated the country from colonialism were a complex of issues, but the severely declining economy was the major factor. Since the adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990s the Zimbabwean economy has been on gradual decline, coupled with decisions to send the Zimbabwean army to the DRC war (Moorcraft 2012) and paying out the liberation war veterans for wartime disabilities (Kriger 2003), all of this was not budgeted for. The economic crisis intensified after the

implementation of the controversial and violent land reform program from 2000 (Chaumba et al 2003), hyperinflation reached close to ninety sextillion percent and all non-cash transactions ceased to operate and banks ran out of cash and the Reserve Bank had printed a single one hundred trillion dollar note (Hanke 2008). Unemployment rose to unprecedented levels, the economy and the Zimbabwean currency was effectively dead by 2008 and people had started to unofficially trade with the South African Rand and the United States dollar (Jones 2010a), coupled with devastating effects of HIV and AIDS and other communicable diseases (Worby 2003) people were rejecting this state of affairs.

In order to understand the loss of ZANU-PF legitimacy, one must look at the causes of economic deterioration that began at the beginning of the 1990s. Since assuming leadership in 1980 Mugabe's government had implemented sound socialist policies, which improved access to free education, health and service delivery to the country's once marginalized African communities. However, the government could not sustain these socialist policies and turned to the IMF for financial support. The IMF urged drastic economic, social and political transformation, in particular the adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1989 (Mlambo 1997). Through these measures the government was forced to reduce the civil service through retrenchments and privatization of critical service sectors. The economy began to decline and after the controversial land reforms, and economic sanctions imposed by the United States, UK, EU and the Bretton Woods institutions the situation worsened (Moore 2005). This created conditions for the rise of a strong opposition party the MDC. The MDC had a huge following among urban workers, and student unions, it remained unrecognized in the rural areas, which were ZANU-PF strongholds because of the liberation war experience, and many rural peasants had benefited from the land reform program. However, the economic conditions leading to the 2008 elections created dissent and rage in all people including those in the rural areas, and the idea of ZANU-PF as the liberator began to fade away, and a simplistic legitimization strategy was no longer acceptable.

ZANU-PF viewed the formation of the MDC and the imposition of sanctions and travel restrictions on ZANU-PF leaders, its companies and military officials by the US, UK and the EU as an attack on the country's sovereignty and interference into

domestic affairs by the international community. To ZANU-PF this was a declaration of war by former imperialist powers (Tendi 2013). ZANU-PF argues that these measures were punishment for implementing the land reforms, which corrected colonial imbalances in the ownership of the means of production (Moore 2005). ZANU-PF blamed the economic hardships on these sanctions, which they argued were called for by the MDC to effect regime change. These statements are meant to make people's anger turn to the MDC and not the ZANU-PF government, but people were refusing to accept it. Due to the environment provided by the SADC led electoral reforms demonstrations of courage became socially valued again, as they had been during the liberation war. People were determined to decide and shape their destiny through voting ZANU-PF out of power. For the first time, scenes never seen in rural areas of citizens thronging MDC rallies clad in the party's red regalia and openly saying 'Mugabe must go' were witnessed. Political subjectivity is being fashioned in relation to the social and economic context.

5.3 Going back to trenches of the liberation war in 2008

As the people prepared for the presidential election-run off, ZANU-PF feared a massive defeat at the hands of the MDC. ZANU-PF moved to reclaim the rural vote through establishing youth militia bases where violence was planned. In April 2008 before the presidential election results were announced ZANU-PF started mobilizing people. In a ward in Bindura South the village heads' messengers went around homesteads summoning people to a ZANU-PF rally at Rutope business Centre popularly known as *Musiwa* ordering everyone to attend. The rally was to be addressed by ZANU-PF deputy national spokesperson and the then Provincial Governor for Mashonaland Central Province the late Ephraim Masawi. It is important here to highlight the *sabhuku* predicament. The village heads are known in Chishona as *sabhuku* ("keeper of the book"). They are the custodians of the village tax-register; his authority is mapped to territory and social relations but not always through kinship (Moore 2005:172). During the colonial period the *sabhuku*'s role was that of tax collection, labour discipline, and they acted as colonial liaisons between colonial ranchers and administrators. After independence the ruling ZANU-PF continued to use the *sabhuku* in these roles but most significantly for political mobilization. The

sabhuku was given the responsibility to force his people to vote for ZANU-PF. So *sabhuku* had the power to force everyone. The post-colonial ZANU-PF discipline and government imposed force on rural subjects. A *sabhuku*'s power became subordinate to this repressive force. In this context, village heads did not chose or refuse rather they became folded into the same apparatus deployed to mobilise people to vote for ZANU-PF.

It was not unusual for the governor to address a rally in the ward. He was no stranger to most people. He sometimes would come for a drink at a local hotel at the business centre, and had addressed many campaign rallies before the elections. But this time people wondered what he had come to tell them since the result for the Presidential poll had not yet been announced. Bindura South Constituency in particular and Mashonaland Central Province in general had been a ZANU-PF 'stronghold' and no single parliamentary seat had been lost by ZANU-PF since 1980. It was in the March 2008, harmonized polls that two constituencies in the Province were won by the opposition MDC party including Bindura South. The site for the rally was at the centre of the ward and many people had to walk from far and wide to be there, even shops and bars had to be closed for people to attend. This site would later on turn to host the militia bases, and would have the most militant youth who went around the constituency and district perpetrating the most heinous and horrific violence.

The following morning scores of people, including myself and even those known to be MDC supporters made their way to the business centre anxious to hear what the governor would say. Elders begin every political gathering by acknowledging the ancestors of the land they dwell on, by clapping (*kusvitsamaoko*) to the Chief who was represented by the Headman. One of the elders started clapping hands, saying, "Eeh, Mukuvapasi, Madyira" the headman's praise name, the headman replied by saying "Takateerera" ("I am listening" [giving him the go ahead to greet him]). "Tisu vana venyu takavata, vegona" [we are your children, we humble ourselves before you, [he went on amid claps of hands by everyone at the meeting.] "Tinokutendai nekusadeura ropa," meaning we thank you for not spilling blood in your area. This related to the peaceful March elections, since elections had become consistent with violence. In a whisper the security aid to the governor who was standing behind me and other men, said, "kana vanhu vakatengesa rinodeuka" (if people sell-out, blood

will be spilled), most of the men who heard his statement just turned their heads, looked at him and looked down, this spelled the mood of the rally, the governor had not come with kind words. Among the governor's delegation were young men and women in army uniform, who also addressed the people after the governor. In his speech at the rally in April 2008, which I attended, the Governor did not waste time or mince his words. He told the people straight that he was disappointed by the way they had betrayed the "Party and the struggle" (*kutengesa musangano*). He announced that a presidential election run-off election was imminent and "this should be the last time that you vote the way you did in March," he said angrily. He gave an example of a dog, saying:

ZANU-PF is like a dog with a bone on its mouth and if one tries to take it, we look the other side to avoid them. If you continue trying to take the bone from our mouth we come directly at you and cut off that hand which tries to take the bone from our mouth. That is what will happen if MDC try to take away the power that we have, to rule this country. Anyone of you including those who are not here who voted for the MDC or who support the MDC should repent and come back to ZANU-PF before we come and look for you, you will not like the consequences. Let this be last time I give this warning, next time you will see that the gun is mightier than the pen (Comrade E. Masawi, Governor Mashonaland Central, Rutope Bindura South, April 2008, from Comrade Enoch's notes).

This speech was full of violence and vengeance. It also indirectly referred to the cutting off of MDC supporters' hands, through a practice that became known as long or short sleeve. This practice was borrowed from the Sierra Leone civil war where it was a weapon of war (Richards 1996) Almost everyone became an enemy of ZANU-PF; people were referred to as sell-outs and ZANU-PF was showing no intention of ceding power, like a dog with a bone they were willing to fight to the bitter end and that they did. After the governor a young lady in an army uniform took the floor and blamed the youths for voting for the MDC arguing that the youths were "buying into the empty promises given by the MDC, when the MDC has not done any single thing for them." She encouraged the youths to take advantage of ZANU-PF's empowerment and indigenization policies and programmes to economically better their lives and not wait for some people to come and give them food aid for free, at the expense of their independence. She said:

What can MDC do for you? They are puppets of the West. They are selling the country to the whites, so it is our duty as the youths to defend our hard won independence. Look at me I am in the army defending our sovereignty (*kuzvitonga kwedu*), do you not admire me, huh! You should also work hard on the land and also join the army, police and work for your country and earn your own money, don't wait for someone to come and give you things for free, there is nothing for free, its aid for freedom. They will take away your freedom. We want you to organise yourselves and apply for funds for projects from the government and improve your lives (Private Sarah, Rutope April 2008, from Comrade Enoch's notes).

This rally signaled the beginning of the June 27 2008 Presidential election run-off in Bindura South constituency. It was preceded by ZANU-PF cell and branch organisational meetings and 'witch-hunt' rallies in which perceived MDC supporters were identified and beaten in public if they did not voluntarily surrender MDC membership cards and regalia which they had. Youths were appointed to several party positions in the branches so that they work with the District and provincial structures in strengthening the party ahead of the presidential run-off election and beyond. I in particular was nominated for the position of deputy secretary for information and publicity. I excused myself saying I won't be staying long because of work commitments in Masvingo a town more than four hundred kilometres away. Most local people agreed with me saying it would be better if I work for the party from where I reside and registered to vote. At the beginning of May as things began to heat up and violence was more pronounced I left for Harare, a decision I regret up to now. I wish I had stayed to witness the events that followed first hand, but then it meant I would have been force-marched to the base and ordered to participate in the violence. It was at these meetings that youths were organized. A base was created from which they would operate. The campaign slogan for ZANU-PF for the run-off elections was:

June 27!	On June 27!
VaMugabe muoffice	Mr Mugabe in the Office
VaMugabe mu Office	Mr Mugabe in the office
June 27!	On 27 June!

At the succeeding branch and ward rallies held from April to June 2008, the ZANU-PF War veterans and the military went around in Mitsubishi trucks carrying AK 47

rifles to launch a violent campaign to reorient and force people to vote for president Robert Mugabe in the presidential election run-off. I later learnt that these vehicles were acquired by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) or were taken from government departments. During this period, government ceased to function as all resources were channeled towards campaigning for President Mugabe. Militia bases manned by the youth and commanded by the ex-guerrillas, retired and serving members of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS), and Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) were set up to stir the violent campaign and remind people of the revolutionary party's ability to use violence. They started a process of witch-hunt, which sought to identify those who had supported and voted for the MDC. Most of the youth were mobilized largely by force into these bases where acts of violence against those perceived to be MDC supporters were planned and launched. From these bases, the youth would organize political meetings or rallies with the people in all branches in each ward. At these rallies people were told to identify MDC supporters. Most of those identified as MDC supporters were beaten and humiliated in public by the youth.

At the rallies I attended in April 2008, officials used people regarded as *bona fide* ZANU-PF supporters to identify perceived or known MDC supporters among the people. They would call out names of the people they saw wearing MDC regalia, or attending MDC rallies or openly announced their support for the MDC. If one was identified they would be asked to denounce their MDC membership, most people out of fear denied that they ever supported the MDC or that they owned any MDC regalia. These 'sellouts' were asked to line-up giving their backs to the public and one of the leaders would silently stand behind each person as a sign to the people that they should show by raising their hands quietly if the person was ever involved with the MDC. If less than three people would raise hands for someone they would give the person the benefit of the doubt and would not blacklist them. But it was not the case in all wards; in other wards one hand was good enough to confirm one as an MDC supporter. At one branch meeting old women were beaten up for supporting the MDC, more so because according to the war veterans, the elderly as people who suffered to liberate the country were supposed to pass on the history of the liberation war to their children and grandchildren. They were accused of betraying the party more than the youth who did not witness the brutality of the colonial regime. One

such old woman Mbuya Danda cried when people said they saw her grandchild with MDC fliers, t-shirts and flag. She cried arguing that she cannot control her grandchildren because they are grown-ups. But one of the war veterans silenced her arguing that she must not have allowed that boy to stay in her house, to bring enemy regalia in her house, she was therefore found guilty by association, they judged.

Most people looked away as she was lashed with a sjambok, but everyone was ordered to look up by the 'commanding officer' to see the example of what happens to sell-outs. Another elderly woman, Mbuya Frank was beaten for having been seen talking to the MDC winning councilor, she argued that he was her relative and she was just congratulating him. She went on to beg for mercy and said that she never stopped supporting ZANU-PF; she even wanted to bring papers, which show that she was a beneficiary of the late First Lady Sally Mugabe's housing schemes in the early 1990s. She was also beaten up for associating with the MDC official. The accused were forced to stand and chant ZANU-PF slogans subjecting them to party and community scrutiny. The accused elderly men and women failed to chant the ZANU-PF slogan, shaking and trembling with fear they chanted "*Pamberi ne ZANU-PF, pasi ne ZANU-PF*" meaning "forward with ZANU-PF, down with ZANU-PF". These elderly men and women were accused of failing to protect the gains of the liberation struggle:

We can understand if it's these born free youth who are selling out because they do not know the war, but it is painful to see you old men and women whom we were with in the trenches during the liberation war voting for the opposition. You should be the ones to rebuke these kids, and tell them what these whites are like. But you chose to support them, how then can we blame the youths who did not see oppression. Anyway we want the youth to experience what it was like in the bush. You will take back the victory from the MDC; you will make sure that no one ever votes for the MDC again (Comrade Mabhunzwa Muchapera, Nyamadzawo village April 2008).

The place where the branch meeting was held was in the middle of the villages and gave a good view of the Mukurwi Mountains, which housed guerrilla bases during the liberation struggle. This allowed the ZANU-PF War Veterans to use them, as a point of reference when talking about their liberation sacrifices, invoking the

memories of the liberation struggle to give credence to ZANU-PF liberation narrative while demeaning the opposition MDC. They conjured war memories of the battles fought at the guerrilla bases and in villages. Vividly pointing to the mountains Comrade Mabhunhu Muchapera reminded the people that “we lived in these mountains (*mumakomo*), sacred caves (*muninga*), and we fought the war even in the rivers (*munzizi*) in this land (*nyika*) of (Chief) Musana,” he implored the people not to betray the ancestors of Musana who protected them, and the many comrades who died in those places, some of whom were never found by voting for “people who ran away from the war” (referring to MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai). He said:

Their bones will rise and they are turning in their graves right now because of what you have done. Their wrath will befall you, what will they say about us, their fellow comrades who fought with them in the chimurenga. We are not even done with taking back the land and you now want to reverse this by voting for puppets of the whites to come into power. To tell you the truth the soil will get angry, especially for you who are close to the bases we used during the liberation war. This place was special place, you helped us win this war, your ancestors supported us remarkably, but now you want to sell-out because of food, what is food? During the liberation war we could sleep for many days without food or water, we drank our own urine to survive. Now because you lack cooking oil and bread you want to sell out, that is white man’s food. We are ready to go back to the bush, we will go back to the trenches, and we are trained soldiers. You think because we are old we can’t fight, have you forgotten what we did, how we won the liberation war? (Comrade Mabhunhu Muchapera, Nyamadzawo village April 2008).

Here the liberation war veterans are drawing on the emotive materiality of the base. The post-2000 youth militia bases were sited on completely different places than the 1970s guerrilla bases, and yet they still made references to them. This linguistic and narrative links makes them do the same things in terms of affect. Singing of the liberation war songs and slogans as well as performances of violence similar to that which the guerrillas used during the war was meant to engulf the youth with the spirit of war. Therefore transforming their political dispositions. Songs have these effects...however having to perform violence on their relatives and communities traumatizes the youth. The election campaign was about going back to the trenches as President Mugabe put at a rally in Shamva some 20 kilometers away. As one of the war veterans put it at the rally the spirit of the liberation war had repossessed them,

they were eager to go back to the bush, they were only waiting for their commander-in-chief President Mugabe to give them the orders. The trenches, which came to be known as the bases, were established from mid-April 2008 to the end of June 2008 in the bushes within the escarpment of the business centers. I spoke to three youth who were part of these bases in three different wards of Bindura South. They are Comrade Kenny, Comrade Ziso, and Comrade Charles. After the ZANU-PF victory in 2013 speech was suddenly less controlled, people felt they have had a heavy burden lifted of their shoulders, the campaign period was intense with people reliving the horror of 2008. As the economy began to disintegrate again a brief window of honesty opened between fears of violence not realized and expectations of employment not met.

The base I focused on was located at Rutope business centre, this location was strategic in the sense that it allowed the youth and their leaders to solicit for logistical support from the businesses people, according to Comrade Kenny. Business owners were asked to provide food, beer and other implements for the sustenance of the youths at the base. The location close to businesses allowed the youth to take-over the role of the police to implement food and other commodities price controls effected by the government. The business center is at the heart of the people's daily needs in terms of food and other daily necessities; it allowed the youth to control people's lives. During the day, the youth conducted rallies at different branches in various wards of the constituency, where various forms of discipline and torture such as those detailed above would be meted out to people as an example to others. The youth mounted roadblocks along main roads asking people for ZANU-PF membership cards and punishing public transport operators who overcharged commuters during the RBZ imposed price control regime. At night they patrolled the villages imposing illegal curfews from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. They also hunted down MDC supporters that would have refused to denounce their support to the opposition and drag them to the base where they were severely punished. It is at night where these youth would burn down opposition supporters' homes. When there was an important visitor, an MP, ZANU official or military commanders to the base, the youth would not go out but would wait to be addressed by the official.

There was a lot of indoctrination of youth in liberation war ideology hence the youth went around perpetrating the most heinous and horrific acts of violence on opposition

supporters, chanting ZANU-PF slogans and singing the 1970s liberation war songs and using guerrilla-like methods of torture on their victims. Thus, the re-incarnation of the base after 2000 ignited liberation war memories with the related trauma and fears. In its renewed form, the base served as a 're-indoctrination center and a place where political deviants were re-educated' (Sachikonye 2011). It is here that military command type, all night singing, beating and torture of 'sell-outs' happened (see Sachikonye 2011). Materials and food for the maintenance of the base was either extorted from opposition supporters or provided by ZANU PF officials or the State. Since 2000 former provincial governors for Mashonaland Central province the late Border Gezi, the late Elliot Manyika and the late Ephraim Masawi sponsored the youth in various acts of violence and mobilization of support for ZANU-PF. Comrade Ziso said that:

At one time comrade Masawi hired a lorry and asked the youth at the base to be transported to his home area of Mupandira in the district. He gave orders to beat up everyone to us except for his grandmother. We went there, house to house and beat up everyone, the young, and the old indiscriminately (Comrade Ziso Bindura South 22/04/2014).

Unlike the liberation war, bases which were set up primarily as indoctrination and political education centers, the post-2000 bases were for the use of violence against opposition supporters reminding people of ZANU-PF's ability to enact violence, and to legitimize that violence. However, in 2008 the bases were not only used as places where torture or physical injury were inflicted, as has been the case in the past, the bases were primarily used as meeting places where perpetrators of violence, and those applying other forms of control and terror, plan and co-ordinate operations. These bases worked in a symbiotic relationship with the deployment of other instruments of power both formal and informal. Most of the bases received instructions from sitting ZANU-PF MPs, Senators, or losing MPs, they liaised with the ZANU-PF local councilors or senior party member or traditional leaders in order to plan or co-ordinate the various activities of the bases, which were then implemented by ZANU-PF Youth Militia who were usually resourced by the MP either directly or through the MP providing or access to the resource. Apart from organizing violence, the youth were indoctrinated in pro-Mugabe and ZANU-PF propaganda. They were taught to march

or *toyi-toyi* as the ex-guerrillas did during their training in the 1970s. They were taught to sing liberation war songs, especially those that praised President Mugabe, *Nzira dzemasoja* (ethics of soldiers) and *Ndiro Gidi* (It's the gun).

Ndiro gidi vakomana	Only the gun, comrades
Haiwaiwa, richatonga Zimbabwe	Will liberate Zimbabwe
Richatonga nyika yedu	Will liberate our land
Nyika yedu ye Zimbabwe	Our land of Zimbabwe

This liberation war song emphasized on the importance of continuing with the armed struggle declaring that, it is only the gun that will liberate Zimbabwe from colonialism. In 2008 and beyond such songs became highly popularized during the much-touted third chimurenga 'war of the land' which began with the violent land reforms in 2000. The difference was that this time around the gun was replaced with other forms of torture such as public beatings and humiliations, murders, abductions and disappearances of white commercial farmers and opposition leaders and supporters. The idea of such songs in post-2000 period was to create continuity between the violence with that of the liberation war in a process of legitimization. Thus the base has been used by ZANU-PF to remind people of their ability to use violence since this is what they did from the liberation struggle up to now. This invocation of continuity with the past was a key technique of intimidation ("just as we did during the liberation war, so shall we do now"). So the production of memory—whether accurate or not-- becomes an instrument, a weapon in itself.

Slogans such as:

Pamberi nehondo ye chimurenga!	Forward with the war of liberation!
Pamberi ne ZANU-PF!	Forward with ZANU-PF!
Pasi nevarungu!	Down with white people!
Pasi nevarungu vatema!	Down with black whites! (meaning MDC)

Such slogans were meant to sustain an ideology that sought to legitimize disciplining opposition supporters (Sachikonye 2011). According to Comrade Ziso the youth would go to the homesteads of those identified MDC supporters at night in an operation code named *Chinyavada* (Scorpion). In this operation Comrade Ziso

pointed out that, one of the youths would knock at the door and when the targeted person opens he or she would be thoroughly beaten in complete silence by the youth, after which they would tell their victim that when people ask him what had happened he must tell them that he was beaten by *zvinhu zveusiku* meaning (ghosts) or was bitten by a 'scorpion'. In one of these operations one old woman who had refused to come to the ZANU-PF branch meetings and denounce her support for the MDC had refused to open her door and the youth broke it down. One of her neighbors who had fingered her as an MDC supporter was told to go into the house and drag her outside. He was hesitant at first but was threatened with heavy beatings upon which he complied and dragged the half-naked woman outside where she was thoroughly beaten with sticks and kicks. As she moaned in pain she was told to come to the public meeting the next day and surrender her MDC material or they would pay her a night visit again. She complied and surrendered and 'repented' to ZANU-PF.

Comrade Ziso spoke casually about this incident at his homestead in a one-on-one interview. He emphasised to me that I should make sure that his identity would not be revealed. He was wary of what will happen if the CIO in particular reads what he says about the party, but still he decided to talk. As we spoke he continued checking if nobody was coming, he did not want people to overhear our conversation. He said people here are overzealous they can go around saying damaging things. It was difficult for the people to discuss these things in public because they knew that the chiefs as ZANU-PF officials are known don't want to be implicated in these acts of violence. He told me that if he didn't know me from some time back he wouldn't have opened up about these issues. He said they are always wary about being spied upon. He said that:

We were told that what happens at the base remains at the base, and that we were part of the security system so we must keep secrets. Whoever was not at the base is not supposed to know what happened there (Comrade Ziso, 22/04/2014).

I also learnt not to talk about these issues in public and to protect my participants. Now and again I had to emphasise that I will protect the identities of my participants and that the ethics committee of the University binds me to confidentiality. In another instance according to Comrade Ziso the youth went to the homestead of a well-known

MDC-T youth and dragged him out of the house in broad daylight. The MDC-T youth had vowed not to attend any ZANU-PF meetings under any circumstances.

They started beating him at his home and along the way to the meeting place about a kilometer away. We beat him with barbed wire, electricity cables, sticks and poles until he was covered in his own blood. People gathered at the branch meeting were shocked at this brutality, I could see it in their eyes that they were shocked but would not dare say it. We told them to sing, dance and denounce the MDC leadership and supporters as the beatings continued (Comrade Ziso, 22/04/2014).

The people were told that this is what happens to ‘sell outs’ and people were told not to assist him, Comrade Ziso said. When his family members took him to the nearby clinic the staff refused to attend to him arguing that they were told not to use state resources on ‘sell outs’. They feared that they would also be perceived as MDC supporters. Such violence transformed the political environment and staged an ideological message before the people, not to sellout ZANU-PF.

In the most remote areas of the district in the areas of Muchapondwa and Musana, where I went in search of information on the 2008 violence, the most gruesome violence was inflicted on opposition supporters according to Comrade Charles. I spoke to Comrade Charles in 2014 soon after a youth led demonstration against a ZANU-PF councilor from ward 16 who was accused of corruption. He was leading the demonstration. Comrade Charles said he was a Rastafarian and this was visible from his regalia of black, red and green colors and the weed he was always smoking during our conversation. He said that when the youth were let loose as the elections drew near MDC supporters were not only beaten but also mutilated and decimated:

In some cases people were told to choose between what was termed a ‘short sleeve’ and a ‘long sleeve’ or ‘lip service.’ A long sleeve was when a person had their palm chopped off from the wrist and a short sleeve was when a person’s hand was cut from the elbow. People had their fingers cut off, scalded with boiled water. In other cases people reported that the youth would take iron rods and place them in the fire until they were hot red, they would then be used in all forms of torture including forcing victims to hold them with both hands. In some cases they were inserted into male anus and female private parts. These forms of torture happened at the youth militia bases away from the view of the public, and were undertaken by security forces from

the intelligence he claimed because they were regarded as extreme and the people upon whom they were inflicted were regarded as hardliners (Comrade Charles, Musana Bindura South, 13/01/2015).

He said that only a few of the youths who could stomach witnessing and participating in this violence were involved. For himself, he said he wanted to be as close as possible to the system. He argued that this paid off because he was selected to become a youth officer to manage party and government development projects in his ward. It was a way of denying victims humanity, showing them that they were lesser humans and deserved to be seen as such. Mutilating hands and cutting off lips was done because according to Comrade Charles it is the hands and mouth that their victims used to show their allegiance to the MDC, so they were taking that away from them.

The open palm is a symbol of the two MDC parties. This was a way of silencing these individuals in a painful way, and it was also a visible message to society that they must only use their bodies to support ZANU-PF. It was a way of showing the people that the militias and ZANU-PF party have total control and ownership of people's bodies. This was to remind the victims and other people of the consequences of 'dissent'. These dehumanized victims would be allowed back into the villages so that their mutilated bodies will be a physical reminder of what happens to those who sell-out. The result of this were massive 'relocations' by tortured victims, most of them relocated to other parts of the country especially urban areas where they sought refuge and medical assistance from the MDC-T party and civil society. Mujere et al (2017) argue that such incidents of violence obstruct lives, futures and opportunities for the youth and the community because they lose their ability to be productive and proactive.

I walked around with Comrade Charles, hoping to meet any of the victims of such torture and he showed me the deserted homesteads, now ruins known as *matongo* in Shona of some of the people who had relocated with their families. He said the youth in collaboration with the village heads wanted to sell these stands to other people but the Chief stopped them saying that the victims or their children might come later in life and that they had been punished enough. Other villagers and relatives of these victims argued that the reason why they relocated was because the scars were a

symbol of an outcast. Apart from the fact that they did not want to stay closer to those who mutilated them they did not want to be living examples of ZANU-PF's ability to use violence and therefore deter future rebellions. It is this kind of violence that the ZANU-PF party had denied they perpetrated even as they were going on, choosing to blame the MDC for the wave of violence saying that they were only retaliating in self defence (Masunungure 2009).

Even as I spoke to other villagers and relatives of these victims in the presence or absence of Comrade Charles, they did not want to be drawn into the details of the 2008 period. As I learnt later on Comrade Charles apart from being a youth officer, also worked as 'spy' for the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). He keeps record of people's political activities using it to decide who can be afforded access to government food aid and agricultural resources and inputs. What this meant was that people did not want to speak out about the violence they suffered or witnessed for fear of such victimization. So I also learnt not to ask people many questions, instead I resorted to attend rallies and meetings and at times engage in methods, like eavesdropping on conversations in public spaces. Even Comrade Charles told me after finishing one of his many weed smokes that the reason why he smokes weed is because of the 'trauma' of the violent torture of 'sellouts' he had seen and done during that period. He said it's not easy to forget and the deserted homesteads are a constant reminder of that period. During this time, I engaged in what Nordstrom (1997:81) calls "listening to silence" that is listening to what people do not say than what is actually said, and in many contexts survival depends on giving the right answers in the right contexts.

The violence of 2008 has produced a 'pathetic figure' of the subjects according to Mamdani, who live in fear and have no political choice and will. Many people of Bindura South have noted this and say that was the reason they voted for ZANU-PF in 2013 elections. In this instance, violence can be interpreted as an instrumentally rational strategy of bargaining for power (Schmidt and Schroder 2001), and sending an ideological message to an audience (Riches 1986). Apart from understanding violence in terms of its physicality- force, assault, or infliction of pain, violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, identity, sense of worth or value of the victim. These social and cultural dimensions of violence are what give violence its

power and meaning (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004). To the perpetrators the violence was formative, it shaped the kinds of people they became after the elections, as Comrade Ziso explained:

We were very scared; we did things that we don't want to repeat, things we did not think we could do. It is like we were possessed with some spirit. At first we were hesitant but we ended up dancing to the tune of violence. We then reflected on what we did and what it means even for us. We could not risk these kinds of atrocious acts happening to us, it was either them or us. We never uttered the word MDC again; we trained ourselves to forever praise ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. What we had seen and done made us different people ZANU-PF people. We had thought that the run off would give us a chance to politically destroy ZANU-PF since there would only be two competitors, we didn't know that we would end up being ZANU-PF youths. I for one will be a ZANU-PF youth for as long as it takes. I will learn the history of the liberation war and the party and memorise it by heart. I will worship ZANU-PF. It is better than to die and lose everything, for what? For an MDC that will forget about me, No!- interview with Comrade Ziso, 22/04/2014

It is this pathetic figure of subjects who surrender their political will and life to the party that ZANU-PF violence sought and managed to produce in both the victims and perpetrators. ZANU-PF violence was not only about winning an election it was about creating subjects who will in future submit their hearts, minds and bodies to the party becoming party pathfinders and defenders, the *Chimurenga* masses. These people would give unquestionable loyalty and be willing to kill for ZANU-PF.

On the other hand the youth viewed this violence differently. For Comrade Charles, Comrade Ziso and many other youths participating in the post-2000 violence, which is linked to the glorious struggle of the past, is to reclaim an identity history has denied them, that of being heroes of a struggle against 'colonialism'. Just like the heroes of the liberation struggle the youth were told to imagine themselves as bearers of the tradition of resistance that goes back to the first Chimurenga led by Mbuya Nehanda and the second Chimurenga led by President Mugabe and late vice-president Joshua Nkomo, a more robust imagination about the self as a warrior and a war veteran. They viewed themselves as being new heroes born out of the *Third Chimurenga* (see Matereke 2011).

The political role of the youth in the post-2000 context was to protect the country's sovereignty and safeguarding the gains of the liberation struggle, especially the land reform programme, which according to ZANU-PF was a target for reversal by the West. Linking the militia bases to the past anti-colonial struggles was an attempt to make it "an important symbolic source of emotion among the people" (Kriger 1995). Thus the militia bases of post-2000 appropriated the experiences, memories and performances of guerrillas and the people in the liberation war bases of the 1970s. In this sense violence became 'formative;' it shaped the youths' perceptions of who they are and what they are fighting for across space and time, a continual dynamic that builds as well as affects identities (Taussig 1987; Feldman, 1991). Comrade Ziso used the history of events that occurred at the liberation war bases to prove the authenticity of a former ZNA presidential guards officer who claimed to be a war veteran publicly displaying a bullet scar on his left side and claimed to have been shot by the Rhodesian soldiers during the war. He wanted to command the militia bases in the wards. Comrade Ziso used information contained in a 'green book' from the Ministry of information, about the liberation war battles in Bindura district, the real names, and nom de guerre of guerrilla commanders and those who died during these battles to test the authenticity of Comrade Gwanzura's claim, Comrade Ziso said:

I asked him where the liberation war guerrilla bases were established and the names of the comrades who died at those bases. When he failed to answer these questions he was humiliated but then he used his position as a former soldier to command the militia base, no one dared challenge the authority of a former soldier since the army took over the election campaign. He ended up appointing me as second in command at the base as a way of silencing me, that is how I got to become the youth chairperson for the ward and into the youth district committee (Comrade Ziso, Bindura South 22/04/2014).

The history of the liberation struggle is a powerful tool in ZANU-PF politics in the contemporary Zimbabwe. He argues that knowing this history is a sign of patriotism and dedication to those who died during the liberation war, and it inspires him to defend the sovereignty of the country and to continue with the struggle they started. Sacrifice and martyrdom pervades claims to heroism and the scar is used as authentic 'evidence' of one's suffering and martyrdom; and the list of the dead martyrs invokes affect and action and it legitimizes fighting of imperialist agenda. Thus the militia

bases of the third Chimurenga summoned the ‘authority’ ancestors gave to the ZANLA guerrillas to spill the blood in the liberation war to recover lost lands (Lan 1985; Schmidt 1997). It was yoked to the post-2000 ‘war of the land.’ Mugabe became the sovereign power, the ‘Alpha and Omega’ (Tendi, 2008) who decides who lives and who dies; by flexing the statutory instrument entitled “presidential powers” he asserted sovereignty by amending the constitution by decree. Worby (2003:78) argues that if “the debate over Zimbabwe’s modernity cannot be easily disentangled from Mugabe’s persistent preoccupation with the question of sovereignty, neither can it be separated from the question of how the management of life (what Foucault (1990[1979]) called ‘biopolitics’, and Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’) become central to projects of governance.” Drawing from this Foucauldian analysis of ‘biopolitic’, to understand a post-colonial African state, citizens are subjugated under an oppressive regime in which surveillance is instituted both in the private and public life (see also Mc Gregor, 2013). In 2014, the then Minister of Presidential Affairs Didymus Mutasa enunciated that, ‘the state is watching people even in their bedrooms’.

5.4 Going to the polls to vote

During this period of violence and witch-hunt, primary and secondary school teachers were targeted without being asked to plead or state their loyalty, businesses and churches were asked to state their loyalty to the party. Church gatherings and prayer meetings ceased. ZANU-PF feared that these could be mobilization centres for the opposition. Businesses were under surveillance and under siege because of the price controls instituted by the government as prices of basic commodities rose beyond affordability. Businesses bought goods through the black market and sold them at high prices to the people at their shops. Most times these goods were seized and looted by the youth who either distributed to the people present or gave them to their relatives. The businesses were accused of conniving with the opposition to create shortages so that people can turn against the ZANU-PF government. Thus, during the independence celebrations at Gwanzura stadium in Harare on 18 April 2008 Mugabe said that the March vote was a protest vote, and he warned people against voting for the MDC in the presidential election runoff.

Teachers who had been working with the ZEC as polling officers in elections were accused of helping the MDC to steal the vote; they were accused of not being patriotic. The ZANU-PF government accused the teachers of being MDC agents claiming that they stuffed ballots in favour of the MDC. During the presidential election run off campaign teachers were targeted and most of them had to flee to urban areas. As this narrative gained traction at a rally Mr Tomana who was a headmaster at Mumurwi primary school was asked to produce a ZANU-PF membership card, reached for his pocket and ‘mistakenly’ produced both the ZANU-PF and the MDC membership cards all in his name. This attracted the wrath of the youth and they beat him brutally with anything they could find and left him for dead, and people were told not to assist him. He was left in the heat of the sun. When he regained consciousness friends took him to the hospital at night but the nurses refused to treat him saying they had been ordered not to use state resources on traitors. On Election Day, Mr Tomana said that he feigned illiteracy so that a ZANU-PF youth member could ‘assist’ him to vote and be certain that he did not vote for the MDC. This strategy was used by many people who had been accused of supporting the MDC, they all wanted to ‘prove’ their loyalty to ZANU-PF. During the presidential election run off teachers were told that they would not be polling agents and the ZEC led by Retired Brigadier General George Chiweshe recruited members of the security services as polling officers. One such polling officer Inspector Sabau from the ZRP told me that he was ordered by his District Commanding officer to go to ZEC and assist in the voting process as an election agent:

When I got to the ZEC offices there were other polling officers there and others were still coming. Most of them were from the army, the police and the prison service. I knew some of them personally but some were strangers to me. We were briefed individually at our stations that our mission was to spy on the ZEC officials and to take control of the counting process, and ensure that president Mugabe wins. We were told that we didn’t have to know each other’s names or history we had to focus on the mission at hand. When we travelled to the polling stations in different constituencies we did not talk much with each other, we did not trust each other, we were spies and we were scared because we could say wrong things. The election process was tense and people were very, very scared, it was visible. We were relieved when at our polling station the results were in favour of president Mugabe (Retired Inspector Ndoro, Bindura South, 07/01/2015).

The inspector's interview shows that the election was tense, and scary the trauma that people had suffered during the campaign period was visible and people wanted this to be over. Comrade Ziso said that during that time it was better to be alive and hungry than to be killed, he said that it was better for them to scavenge for food and other resources they needed to survive as long as they had peace. At the rallies, ZANU-PF had been telling them that they would see and know who they vote for. The people didn't know how they would know but they believed that they would know:

We were told that each village head must queue with his people, and that he should make sure that everyone is there to vote. They said we want to see which village would sell out and they claimed that they would know. They also told us that we should write down our ballot paper serial numbers and give them to the ZANU-PF youth outside the polling station so that they would match them with the ballot papers to see who voted for the MDC. We believed that they would know, before the election they said that their 'people' would be taking down the names of the people who voted and would know by the sequence who we voted for (Comrade Ziso, 22/04/2014).

The pre-election violence had succeeded in creating the figure of the subject that goes to the booth to vote with confusion and fear. Most of the citizens in this research say that this fear was visible in the people's everyday lives because people became more silent about politics, they became miserable, withdrawn and even on the day of voting people didn't talk to each other they just queued voted and went home quietly. Two days after the election run off Justice George Chiweshe proclaimed president Mugabe as the winner with over 90% of the vote. When the results were announced people say they were relieved that president Mugabe had 'won' and they would not have to go through the violence again. Robert Mugabe was sworn in as the president of the Republic of Zimbabwe in a subdued ceremony held at the State House in Harare and attended by a long-time ally Joseph Kabila the president of the DRC. The swearing in ceremony lacked the pomp and glamour fun fare associated with it since 1980. ZANU-PF used violence to produce an election that looked 'credible' even as nobody trusted the results. The African Union (AU) and the SADC election observer missions said that the elections were free and fair. They based their observations on urban areas, which were largely peaceful, as well as their visits to some rural areas on the

polling day, and the polling day was very peaceful indeed. The queues and order of the people and the fact that there was no notable incident of violence or fraud was good enough to give ZANU-PF regional and continental endorsement. The AU and SADC ignored the opposition's argument that its supporters and officials were being killed in the rural areas. Most of them did not go into the rural areas where ZANU-PF unleashed violence. ZANU-PF had managed to return executive power and they negotiated Government of National Unity (GNU) with the two MDC parties through a Global Political Agreement (GPA) facilitated by SADC through South African President Thabo Mbeki and his successor President Kgalema Motlante (Raftopoulos 2013).

The GNU and the MDC failures

When the MDC went into government in 2008 we thought that they would be able to deal with those who beat us up and killed people during the elections. But they still said that they did not have real executive power and ZANU-PF was standing in their way. We felt that they ignored and abandoned the people who had suffered a lot for them. They went into government and enjoyed the nice cars and big houses and police protection, while ZANU-PF militias continued harassing and traumatizing us in the rural areas (Interview with Joseph, MDC Youth, October 2014, Bindura South).

The above interview by an MDC-T youth in Bindura South highlighted one of what the people saw as the failures of the two MDC formations during the period of the GNU. I will highlight some of the failures and the power struggles within the MDC and how they strengthened the position of ZANU-PF and enabled a continuation of the legacies of the youth militia bases and violence.

On 15 September 2008, Zimbabwe's main political parties based on the March election results entered into a Global Political Agreement (GPA), which gave birth to the Government of national Unity (GNU). This was necessitated by the fact that ZANU-PF, which had executive power, did not have a Parliamentary majority to be able to pass laws. So a coalition government would enable the parliament to vote together to pass laws that will govern the country. The GNU was not only about a coalition in parliament but was also about sharing power in government. Therefore

the GPA created posts of Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers to accommodate the leaders of the two MDC formations in the executive of the GNU. MDC-T President Morgan Tsvangirai became the Prime Minister and was in charge of the supervising cabinet ministers in the implementation of government policy. The smaller MDCT-N President Prof. Authur Mutambara became the Deputy Prime Minister, and MDC-T Vice-President Ms Thokozani Khupe became the second Deputy Prime Minister. Cabinet Ministries were shared among the three political parties but ZANU-PF retained control of security ministries, while MDC-T controlled the Ministry of Finance, and the shared the Ministry of Home Affairs which had co-Ministers from ZANU-PF and MDC-T.

The Media and Human Rights Commission was created to ensure the protection of the freedom of expression, association, and political participation (Dziva et al 2013). The Organ for Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (OHRI) was created and was supposed to deal with all issues of human rights abuses and pre and post-independence political violence (Eppel 2013). This gave hope of seeing justice to those who had suffered abuses at the hands of ZANU-PF since 1980. However ZANU-PF used all the resources at their disposal to delay the appointment and operationalization of these commissions. The President had the authority to appoint commissioners to these institutions. The MDC formations did not have the power to force for the formation of these organs. By the end of the GNU, the OHRI had not managed to even go out and get the views of the people on how they wanted healing and reconciliation to be administered. People expected the MDC to push for justice, healing and reconciliation since some of the leaders had also suffered violence at the hands of ZANU-PF. The failure by the MDC to ensure the operationalization of the OHRI weakened its appeal sincerity to the people.

The MDC's major mistake was also its failure to push for electoral reforms, which would have ensured a level playing ground and the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in Zimbabwe. The MDC started pushing for electoral reforms when they realized that the tenure of the GNU was coming to an end in 2012. ZANU-PF resisted these reforms together with Security sectors reforms and media reforms arguing that they were part of the western supported regime change agenda. The MDC failure to reform the Judiciary enabled a pro-ZANU-PF Constitutional Court to rule in favour of

ZANU-PF on when to hold the 2013 elections, without electoral reforms. Basically during the GNU the MDC only managed to get ministerial positions but with no real power to reform government, as the *status quo* remained. However, the MDC managed to play an important role in the Constitutional making process, which ushered in a new progressive constitution in 2013. The MDC also managed to stabilize the economy during the GNU and giving confidence to investors and to Zimbabweans that a different future is possible. However, the reports of MDC councilors' involvement in corruption in local councils they ran weakened their fight against ZANU-PF, as ZANU-PF was quick to point to their own ills, therefore making them look no better.

The failures by the MDC to reform government, security sector and the media was evident during the constitutional making process and the run up to the 2013 elections, as ZANU-PF continued to use militias and the military to force people to vote for them. In the following section I give a detailed about how ZANU-PF continued using the legacies of the June 2008 militia violence during the constitutional making process and election campaign.

5.5 '27 June 2008' and its legacies of violence

During the 2010 constitutional outreach programme by the Constitution Parliament Committee (COPAC) in Harare, war veterans led by their chairman Jabulani Sibanda and Joseph Chinotimba disrupted the meetings and hurled insults at the Speaker of parliament, significantly the sang a song called '*Zvikaramba toita zva June*' (Mazarire 2013: 82) meaning if it doesn't go our way we will repeat what happened in June. During the same period in Bindura South ZANU-PF youth and war veterans and the security services launched Operation *Chimumumu* (Operation deaf and dumb. Villagers were told how not to answer questions from the COPAC team but leaders who would speak on behalf of the community were chosen. These were trusted war veterans and ZANU-PF youth, and people were told to second and support anything said by these war veterans and youths. The content was rehearsed and people were threatened with a repeat of the 2008 violence should they say anything contrary to what they were told. The fear of a repeat of the heinous 2008-election violence guided

people's participation in politics; it enhanced quietude, silence, fear and pretense among the people. The 27 June 2008 presidential election run-off violence enabled ZANU-PF to hold on to power and gave them time to strategize. ZANU-PF did not want to take chances and allow people to make important decisions about the way the country is governed after the 2008 'loss', a former liberation war guerrilla Comrade Mabhunu Muchapera said:

The mistake that we did after independence is that we assumed that the rural people were with us in this struggle because they had fought with us during the liberation war. The liberation war gained popular support from the people because as guerrillas we lived among the people so they understood our mission. In 2008 because of poverty and hunger people decided to dine with the enemy, so we had to come back to the people and remind them who their enemy was. The enemy that had incapacitated the government through economic sanctions is the MDC and the white Rhodesians. During the liberation war if one eats with the enemy we used to kill, so in the case of 2008, we had to show them that we did not tolerate people who work with the enemy no matter how difficult the situation is. (Interview with Comrade Mabhunu Muchapera, former liberation war guerrilla, October 2014.)

This statement and strategy has echoes of Karl Schmitt's thesis on what 'politics' is ultimately about: the friend/enemy distinction, and also an old theme in ZANU –PF discourse around loyalty and traitors/sell-outs. ZANU-PF had to remind Zimbabweans of their ability to use violence to consolidate their hold on power. They had to reorient and re-politicise the people by re-enacting the 'bases' where the youth and the rural people were told that their enemy was MDC supporters and they were supposed to deal violently with the enemy. During this time, violence was made naked and real as it was inflicted on victims at public meetings, in full view of everyone. Violence shaped and defined the way people make their political choices. Violence was inculcated in the people's everyday lives and they had to practice it and live with its consequences. At the same time people could only avoid it, by pretending to support ZANU-PF. Most of the older generation of participants I interviewed argued that in the 2008 presidential election run-off and in the 2013 general election that ensured a majority victory for ZANU-PF, they voted to stop the war. The use of violence and terror against MDC supporters from 2008 afterwards persuaded people that their only choice was to vote for ZANU-PF

Since the 2008 violence the youth continued mobilizing support for ZANU-PF by going around ward, villages and districts reminding people that if ZANU-PF loses they would unleash the 2008 violence and even worse. The youth went on a witch-hunt identifying 'rebel' wards and Trojan Gold Mine workers and people refused to 'repent' to the ruling party after the 2008 presidential election run off violence with an intention to intimidate them to vote for ZANU-PF in the 2013 election. This has been the norm during every election period since the year 2000. One youth narrated the events as follows:

We were ferried in a lorry at one time and went to Nyava ward because it had been identified as rebellious, we went there and held several meetings with the people, we asked them to identify those associated with the MDC, there were a few who 'repented' and surrendered their MDC regalia at the rallies. However many MDC supporters did not come so we went out to their houses and warned them that if the MDC wins as in 2008 we definitely will decent upon the ward with a heavy hand, with extreme violence even deadlier than that of 2008, we told them we would recreate the bases in their ward and teach them that ZANU-PF is a party of blood. (Interview with Comrade Ziso, ZANU-PF youth, 22, April 2014).

So people were told to 'vote wisely' or they would face the consequences of selling out and the threat to recreate the bases in their ward. Even though, the 2013 elections were held in a largely 'peaceful' environment compared to those of 2008 presidential run-off election, threats, intimidation and fear pervades the population and heavily influenced the way people voted. In the larger national narrative the war veterans led by their patron President Robert Mugabe have vowed that they will not allow anyone with no liberation war credentials rule Zimbabwe, if that happens they will go back to the 'trenches' of the liberation struggle and fight for the country again. Tsvangirai is regarded, as having no legitimacy because he's not a war veteran, has no guerrilla credentials. Violence was a way of re-orienting the people, like Stalin they were saying, "if you don't like the way people vote change the people, not the government" (Moorcraft 2012:106). The 2008 election violence was meant to reorient the people and reorient it did because in 2013 people voted in fear and endorsed ZANU-PF to rule for another five years.

The violence of 2008 was so severe that the aftershocks were still being felt across the country five years on. The opposition MDC refused to have another election in June

arguing that the mention of an election in June brought back the memories of the terror and fear that preceded the June 27 2008 elections in the country. The 2008 violence left scars that will take long to heal in Zimbabwe and the fact that the violence has been unacknowledged means that it will always be painfully remembered with every election to come. Even as people look forward to 2018 elections they are hoping that the aged and frail president would be long dead by then to allow for a different context and environment. Factionalism within the ruling party with hardliners led by Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa expected to take over, hopes of peaceful elections that reflect on the will of the people remain uncertain. Mnangagwa was the state security minister and he presided over the infamous *gukurahundi* violence in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s. He is also believed to be the mastermind of the 2008 violence and has the backing of the security forces.

After ZANU-PF victory in the 2013 elections the economy started to decline with companies closing down and liquidity crunch after the July 31 2013 elections reversing the gains made during the time of the inclusive government from 2009-2013. During that period, the economy had started getting off the ground through the dollarization of the economy and subsequently the introduction of a multi-currency regime. The promises made during the election campaign through the Zimbabwe Agenda for Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET)⁵ programme to revive the economy by creating 2 million jobs, resolving the power shortage, etc. seem impossible to fulfill since the economy has begun to decline again. Neighbouring countries led by South Africa and Mozambique began tightening their immigration regulations and many people were facing deportation back home, the ruling party is faced with a huge challenge ahead of 2018. The government cannot raise the US\$27 billion required to implement the ZIMASSET program for the five years from 2013 to 2018, civil servants salaries remain paltry and there is discontent in the country. A local party leader within the youth league Comrade Ziso said that the party has two options ahead of 2018 elections:

The first option is for the party and government to work hard and ensure that the economy is revived and the promises made to the people during the past election are

⁵ ZIMASSET is an economic blueprint devised by ZANU-PF as a 2013 election manifesto to revive the economy and then as a policy paper to guide economic revival after the elections

fulfilled. The government should ensure that people are working again and receive a living wage other than surviving on the economy of hustling *kukiya-kiya* if they do not want a repeat of the 2008 election defeat, which looks very possible because the situation is not looking good. Another option is to prepare for a violent campaign; especially in rural areas where it is easy to use such methods as most rural areas are far from the media. Mobilizing youths and soldiers will be very necessary for the project of violence to succeed. If the current economic difficulties continue to choke the government it will be better to channel the few resources available to the youth and the army to campaign for the party in the next election than to try and distribute the scarce financial resources to everyone, which is impossible. (Interview with Comrade Ziso, ZANU-PF youth leader, 22/04/2014.)

He also spoke about factionalism in the party saying that it is imminent that Mugabe won't be run for the presidency in 2018 and it is likely that Mnangagwa faction backed by the army will prevail in the battle to succeed Mugabe. In Bindura South, in-fighting has already started with people positioning themselves ahead of the 2018 vote. It is a mission to save the party from a possible repeat of 2008 defeat and for individual self-glorification by members and upward mobility within the party. Some members are already complaining about broken party promises and are positioning themselves within party factions.

5.6 Conclusion

Although there were many similar aspects of the liberation bases and ideologies incorporated in the most recent violence in 2008, the violence of 2008 happened in a completely different social, economic, political and historical context from that of the liberation war. Allowing former liberation war guerrillas and the army to take over ZANU-PF's campaign resulted in recourse to terror and the recruitment or coercion of youth. They both coarsened and misused guerrilla traditions from the liberation war. ZANU's strategy has been to mobilize support in rural areas during the liberation war and the post 2000 elections. Illegitimate violence survives as one of the legacies of the liberation war. Brickhill (1995) argues that 'complicity in silence allows Rhodesian terror and guerrilla terror to meet in darkness and mate' producing *gukurahundi* violence, [as well as the post-2000 violence] as a legacy of liberation war. The re-establishment of the base and the practices of the base reifies violence, they make violence real, not only real for a few moments but real in people's lives because

violence is enacted in people's lives by people that are known and seen everyday. People are not free to talk about it because the context is still dominated by those who perpetrated violence. In their everyday life, the youth and war veterans reminded people of their ability to use violence once the party's dominance is under threat as in 2008. This is done so that violence becomes the people's life, the fear that they will be beaten up if they do not vote for ZANU-PF.

There is more to understanding the figure of the youth and the reasons they participate in violence in post-colonial Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF youth in post-colonial Zimbabwe are encouraged to emulate the sacrifices made by the guerrillas during the liberation struggle, most of whom were teenagers of school going age when they went to train and fought as guerrillas. They are expected to know the history of the liberation struggle and engage in all forms of violence in the name of protecting the gains of the liberation struggle. Violence and the history of the liberation struggle, known as *Chimurenga* have come to shape the identity of the ZANU-PF youth in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The militia bases and violence of the *Third Chimurenga* enabled the youth to speak the same language with the former liberation war fighters, the language of fighting for the sovereignty of the country. In this instance they are made to believe that they are continuing with the struggle started by the heroes of the first and second *Chimurenga*, the 'war of the land' was thus significantly dubbed third Chimurenga with the youth as it's 'heroes.'

6 CHAPTER SIX: Violence, Volition and Victimhood

6.1 Introduction

The post-2000 ZANU-PF project was about the production of scared and silent political subjects. I reveal and engage with what this fear is and what it means to be scared and what that experience is to the people in relation to the sense of themselves, their lives, future, and past. So in way what this kind of instrumentalized violence does is to silence the deep ambivalences and fear, anger and worry and concern that people are experiencing. I give space to people to speak about that, both perpetrators as well as the people who were harmed, or people who are silenced, for them to be able to articulate what that experience is. I argue here that the violence that happened in post-2000 Zimbabwe was complex in nature. It was complex in the sense that although it was systematic from those who organized it from Harare (Masunungure 2015), on the ground it caught ordinary people, especially the youth, up in its work as both perpetrators and victims. Other than the promise of material rewards, and the fear of being punished, what else could have motivated the youth to participate so fervently in the electoral violence of 2008? The answers point to the yearning for recognition. Instead of being recognized and rewarded for defending the interests of the party the youth were instead victimized by the party in the bases and in the villages as they were strictly under surveillance.

6.2 Scars of recognition: valuation of violence and sacrifice

Comrade Donald is, in his mid-thirties, married and has a daughter. He holds a diploma in mechanical engineering but has been living with his mother at his parents' homestead because he does not have a job. He relies on remittances sent by his sister who works for a humanitarian organization in Denmark and a brother who owns businesses in South Africa for his basic needs. He is an active member of the ZANU-PF youth league having been deputy youth league chairperson at ward level and District committee member up to 2015 when he decided to concentrate on his projects. Recently in 2016, he was constructing pigsties for his piggery projects and he faced bureaucratic red tape from the state's environmental regulation body, the

Environmental Management Authority (EMA) and Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA). He went ahead without permission arguing that he deserves to do what he wanted because he participated in the *Third Chimurenga* to save the country from recolonisation. In an interview, I had with him at his homestead he said:

I was the youngest prisoner of the *Third Chimurenga* in the whole province. The police arrested us in 2001 when we invaded a farm in Matepatepa and spend many weeks in prison. I was 17 years old then. If you are not a strong member of the party who takes part in party projects you can apply for youth loans but you won't get them. If you have a good project proposal it can be stolen and given to someone else (Comrade Donald, ZANU-PF youth member, Bindura south, 13/01/2016).

By referring to the time he spent in prison, comrade Donald is using his scars of the struggle to claim recognition and equate himself to those who fought against colonialism in the 1970s liberation war. He had this to say:

2008 was the year the country was nearly recolonized by the Rhodesians who are fronted by the MDC. As the youth who are loyal to the party we could not stand by and watch, so we intervened and ensured that we claim back the country so we are the heroes of this generation, we are the war veterans of the *Third Chimurenga* (Comrade Donald, ZANU-PF youth member, Bindura south, 13/01/2016).

The *Third Chimurenga* enabled the youth to speak the same language with the former liberation war fighters, the language of fighting for the sovereignty of the country. The violence that the youth engage in is portrayed not as useless violence but is equated to the war of liberation, the difference being that in this instance the youth are protecting the liberation that was brought by the liberation war. In this instance the youth believe that they are continuing with the struggle started by the heroes of the *First* and *Second Chimurenga*, the 'war of the land' was thus significantly dubbed *Third Chimurenga* with the youth as it's heroes. Claiming the war veteran status is a way that youth use to try and justify and give value to the 2008 violence and to claim something out of it.

The desire to use these titles as a form of political capital in a context where survival depends on patronage has allowed the youth to continue with these narratives of the liberation war. For them, these are political subjectivities that allow them to be at the

level of war veterans, which they cannot just have because they were too young, but now to be exalted to that capacity allows them to access what history denies them in terms of status and also in terms of claiming economic benefits. For instance, Comrade Ziso who led the youth was allocated a farm in Mt Darwin, a privilege reserved for the liberation war veterans. For the youth, participating in violence that is linked to the glorious struggle of the past is to reclaim an identity history has denied them, that of being heroes of a struggle against colonialism. ZANU-PF entangles the youth into the history and achievements of the liberation war heroes, through invoking liberation war history, through National Youth Service training camps (NYS), and most recently, militia bases, in which the youth are promised war veteran status (Materike 2011).

The idea of mobilizing the youth into militia bases resembling those of the liberation war is to instill in them the idea that they are taking part in an important historical process which began with the heroes of the *First Chimurenga* led by the spirit medium of Nehanda, followed by the *Second Chimurenga* (armed struggle) fought by the bones of Nehanda. The *Third Chimurenga* (economic struggle) was linked to the heroes of the *First* and *Second Chimurenga* thereby becoming “an important symbolic source of emotion among the people” (Kriger 1995). Thus the militia bases of post-2000 appropriated the experiences, memories and performances of guerrillas and the people in the liberation war bases of the 1970s. It allowed the youth to develop commitments that who they are as a political community is founded within the liberation war. They have come to identify with that to the extent that they feel they belong to it and must defend it against internal enemies. For these youth, their sense of who they are as fighters is based on the lineage of identity relating to the liberation war.

This yearning to identify with the liberation fighters of the earlier *Chimurenga*, was cruelly frustrated – they were effectively used and then discarded, only to suffer the humiliation of others who called them *kubikira magandanga* meaning cooking for the comrades. After the formation of the inclusive government on 15 September 2008 under the SADC brokered GPA, just like South Africa’s border war (Gibson 2011), the 2008 violence became imbued with notions about ethics and morality that differ from the time of the violence. During the 2008 violence, the MDC supporters and

some of the youth who ended up at the ZANU-PF bases were regarded as ‘sell-outs’ who had betrayed the struggle and the party and deserved to be reoriented. The ZANU-PF youth militias were equated to the heroes of the *First* and *Second Chimurenga*. However, after the violence as people looked at healing and possible reconciliation the violence was viewed as unjust and immoral even by ZANU-PF itself. In this case, the youth were ‘hung to dry’ as they did not know how to seek help with regard to trauma, or to claim the jobs they had been promised as incentives to participate in the violence. The argument here is that the ‘value’ placed on the violence the youth perpetrated was considered to be less than that of the violence perpetrated by their seniors during the liberation war. This meant they were deprived of the rewards they might otherwise have expected to reap from having performed their loyalty to the party in this fashion. The argument is about generational seniority, rank, status and the exchange value of violence and sacrifice. This enabled the youth to be left in the open by their bosses, vulnerable and prone to all forms of attacks including witchcraft and without psychological help.

Comrade Ziso who was allocated a farm by the Mashonaland central youth league executive member only identified as Ratidzai. Ratidzai was fired from ZANU-PF after he was accused of belonging to the rebellious Joice Mujuru-led gamatoto faction in 2014. A war veteran and member of the ZANU-PF central committee told Comrade Ziso at one ZANU-PF meeting in February 2015, that the war veterans fought for the land he is claiming to own during the liberation struggle and not the born free youth. The state security agents from the president’s office interrogated him on how he managed to own a farm at his age, suspecting corrupt factional dealings. He said when he tried to tell them that it was reward for leading the youth during the 2008 elections, the agents said that was not a good enough reason. This meant that the violence of 2008 was lesser in value to the guerrilla violence of the 1970s liberation war. The veterans of the liberation war freely and openly talk about their war experiences, their exploits and even the violence they meted on the people. This violence was regarded as necessary for the war to be executed (Manungo 1991; Schmidt 2007; Lan 1985).

During the 2014 ZANU-PF national youth congress in Harare, President Robert Mugabe told hundreds of ZANU-PF youth that the youth must not compete with

elders in the party for top positions they should always know that the elders have ‘scars’ from the country’s liberation struggle. The First Lady and Secretary for ZANU-PF’s Women’s League Grace Mugabe during her ‘thank you rallies’ said that the war veterans should be taken care of by the state because of their role in the liberation struggle, and the government has since created a ministry of war veterans to look into their welfare. It is these scars of recognition that the youth yearn for through participating in patriotic violence. It is these scars that youth like Comrade Donald try to prove through narratives of incarceration and violence. Unlike the 1970s war veterans, the post-2000 ZANU-PF youth are not regarded as important in this way and the ‘war’ they fought in 2008 is not recognized at all no matter how much they try to bring it up.

Although the violence of 2008 was necessary to keep ZANU-PF in power, silencing the youth was significant in a number of ways it kept the youth in their place. It does not allow them to publicly compete for the war veteran status on the basis of having violently subdued the opposition in 2008 and beyond. Some youth though a few have been rewarded for their role in crushing the opposition in 2008, but the ZANU-PF officials were careful to select those who they believe have been loyal to the party before the 29 March 2008 elections. Those who did not get anything are ‘mocked’ by other youths at places such as the *chibhenji* or in other various interactions by referring to them as those *vakabikira magandanga* an expression, which means those who cooked for the comrades. This refers to those who assisted the guerrillas during the liberation through providing material support. Food in the Shona context is the most recognized form of binding relations and recognizing a stranger, therefore there is also a saying “*hukama igasva hunozadziswa nekudya*” meaning that kin relations are strengthened by feasting, literary a process of consummation of relations. Those who assisted the guerrillas have never been recognized for their efforts over the years, all forms of recognition including distribution of farms, plots, financial compensation and good jobs went to the guerrillas. Their assistants the *mujibas* and the *chimbwidos* and the parents have become worse off regarding their well-being in hardening economic conditions. It is because of this lack of recognition of the liberation war assistants that the general understanding within the community is that ‘those who cook for the comrades’ never get anything.

As the youth continue to suffer after the 2008 violence most of them despise the role they have played in ‘cooking for the comrades’, and therefore allude to any service to ZANU-PF as *kubikira magandanga* because there is no recognition that comes out of it. Therefore *kubikira magandanga* has connotations of being used and dumped while the ZANU-PF officials reap the rewards thereof. This is also a form of gendered humiliation that is directed at male youth, that they played a ‘female’ role, cooking, for ‘real men/warriors.’ Apart from *kubikira magandanga* “the class of 2008” as the ZANU-PF militias are also referred to by their colleagues who prefer to use English in their jest, they are referred to as ‘comrades’ specifically because during that period they called each other comrades, just like the class of the 1970s. For the youth who maintain autonomy of thought being called comrade means you are a puppet, or a lackey. These cynical abstractions and ways of teasing and telling form political subjectivities. These subtle political conversations show that the political landscape is deeply unsettling and unsettled all the time. What these categories do is that they allow youths to say that they were victims and equate themselves to the youth of the 1970s who at some point were coerced into assisting guerrillas as well as killing alleged sell-outs and witches (see Schmidt 1997).

It is clear that this violence has value only during the three months it was needed by the party leadership to decimate the opposition into oblivion. When it was over and ZANU-PF had gained control of the country that violence and the youth became valueless. The youth are not highly regarded as the war veterans of the 1970s because they had to be forced to go to the bases and fight for a ZANU-PF victory. As some war veterans and the *mujibas* the youth of the past said, “today’s youth are interested in who can offer them a good life but as for us we remain steadfast in our support of ZANU-PF regardless of the situation.” This desire for recognition among the youth who participated in the 2008 violence either through coercion or willingly is striking. Those who were loyal ZANU-PF supporters like Comrade Ziso, wanted recognition for their sacrifices to the party, a sort of sharing the spoils of victory. Those who were coerced to the bases like Comrade Victor whom I will discuss later wanted recognition as a form of compensation for suffering, just in the same manner that the harmed opposition supporters would demand reparations for the suffering they went through. This desire for recognition and the fact that it was frustrated highlights victimhood on the part of most of the youths who participated in the 2008 violence.

This leads me to my next discussion on how the ZANU-PF youth militias were victimized by the soldiers and the war veterans who commanded them at the bases in 2008.

6.3 The *chibhenji*: social and political socialities

One of the most interesting phenomena that I came across during my fieldwork was the metaphor of the bench, locally known by the youth as *chibhenji* in Chishona, which is the English derivative of the *bench*. However, it does not mean that there is a bench to sit on but it is a place where the youth gather to discuss trending issues in their villages. This is equivalent of the Street corner society studied by Chicago school of thought sociologists (Whyte-Foote 2012). This *chibhenji* was located at the junction or intersection of the main Harare-Shamva road and two dust roads that connect four villages. The bench is just a social space created by the male youth when they meet for ‘leisure’ and what they call catching up. Any political party does not control it, and political parties including ZANU-PF are not immune to scrutiny at these spaces. One youth told me that this bench is similar to the Supreme court’s *Full bench*, the bench resembles the whole justice system, it is where social, political, economic issues, people and their scandals are discussed, investigated, prosecuted, tried, defended, judged and sentenced. Here the youth discuss and investigate people’s source of wealth, livelihood projects, love affairs, relationships and sex scandals, and political ambitions of local people. Villages that are close together have their own ‘bench’, usually located on the roadside. The times that I sat at the bench, I have heard villagers’ private lives being scrutinized and unmasked. Such investigation skills have been useful in keeping the youth informed about the developments in their neighborhood. Anything that happens even in the middle of the night or even what local people do in Harare which is hundreds of kilometers away does not elude the bench.

Some of the youth who comprise the bench spend most of their time at *mushikashika* in Harare. *Mushikashika* is an illegal urban transport system operating in urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe; it employs many youth from urban and rural areas. It is part of what Jones (2010) calls *kukiya-kiya* economy. A number of youths in Bindura

South have acquired driving licenses so that they drive private cars as part of *mushikashika* or public transport as a form of survival. Most people have argued that the transport system is one of the viable industries in the country but has been besieged by the national police, as well as council police. These youth do their own investigations on trending issues back in the villages, if they can be traced back to Harare and bring them to the bench. These sorts of investigations are part of killing time, when the business is off peak or when they cannot travel because of police blitz on their illegal *mushikashika* business.

Some of the deep personal issues about or related to political violence have been discussed at the bench. I have heard that the current MP for Bindura South is not a war veteran but is said to have been a train operator during the liberation war. He is accused of transporting Rhodesian soldiers to their mission of fighting ZANLA guerrillas in Bindura. This story came out, as people were frustrated that the MP had not fulfilled his campaign promises and they wanted someone else for the next elections. After every ZANU-PF political meeting or rally, the youth gather at the bench to carry out what they call a “post-mortem analysis” of the rally and its implications in their lives. When these youths are doing these investigations they are not doing them for the benefit of any political party, it is part of killing time, but because people involved belong to political parties this information ends up in political offices. Local ZANU-PF officials have used information generated in this way against people, at the same time people have been warned about impending danger and political persecution as a result of information disseminated at the bench. As a researcher, I have also benefited a lot from such information in my work. It is at the bench that stories of political violence related suffering by the perpetrators of violence emerged during my fieldwork. The private lives of the people involved and how they performed violence were also discussed here as people spoke about the impending 2018 elections and possible violence.

People’s ability to talk about the 2008 violence in the space such as the bench, which is an open public space, would give an idea of people who are exercising freedom of expression. What I show in this chapter is that ZANU-PF does not silence talks and discussions about the political violence they organize. It is to their advantage to have people talk about this violence. The way people talk about this violence at the ‘bench’

and at other places such as ZANU-PF rallies is in such a way that they will be reminding each other of the dangers of opposing ZANU-PF, making the threat to go back to the base. That is a threat to reconstitute the state of exception, outside of democracy, which everyone has stored in their memory, which they are told that if the conditions required, ZANU-PF already has a form that they can remake when they want. The youth are seen as ready to go back to the bases and unleash devastating violence surpassing that of the liberation war or of 2008. In this context, there is an absence of limitation to engage in excess if required in which nobody will be safe. This is the view that goes around and it enhances quietude, resignation, and fear.

What ZANU-PF silences in this space is coming up with ways in which people can be resilient to ZANU-PF violence or making the citizen bold in the midst of this violence. That is why the opposition, civil society and even researchers are viewed with suspicion by ZANU-PF. At times, any attempt to talk about violence is viewed as an attempt to try and come up with ways to oppose ZANU-PF and people quickly walk away. Constant reminders about violence do not give people space to devise ways to cope with their experiences of devastating violence. Coping itself suggest that people have overcome the effects of violence and might suggest resilience to it and this is what ZANU-PF does not want to happen, as this might increase defiance. For ZANU-PF, people must live in perpetual fear of violence. Silence as a communicative act (Sheriff 2000), may not always signal a lack of knowledge about an issue, it may be an adaptation to power by less powerful groups on the premise that those with power are able to silence any views divergent from their own. Keeping silent also prevents the more powerful from knowing what the less powerful are thinking. In this sense, therefore, silence may be relative in that there is a louder dominant ideology that causes other ideologies to be silent as power plays a role in what is remembered collectively or what is silenced (Brockmeier, 2002).

6.4 The fear to be harmed: ZANU-PF youth militias as victims of violence

One of the youth who I got to know because of the bench is Comrade Victor. He is one of the youth described by many people at the bench as having shown overenthusiasm in beating up MDC supporters during the June 2008 presidential election run-off violence. The youth I spoke to encouraged me to talk to him because they described his actions as resembling those of a person possessed by a spirit of violence. His close friend had told me that at one time Comrade Victor did beat up someone identified as an MDC supporter until his body and clothes were soaked in sweat. At one point, I was told that he did beat up an old man in his late 70s then for having been found in possession of an MDC party membership card. He had charged at the helpless old man and asked him why he was selling out at his old age as he relentlessly lashed him much to the disgruntlement of many people who could not do anything. Many vividly remember Comrade Victor's 'exploits' in dealing with MDC supporters and argued that those memories are what will be told about him in a long time whenever the 2008 violence is mentioned.

I visited him at his homestead across Mudotwe River about 300 meters from the main Harare- Shamva road. He seemed relaxed about talking about his role during the 2008 election violence, downplaying his role saying he "only did what he was instructed to do and nothing more." He said that his actions were no different from those of the other youth who manned the bases because they all beat up people. He denied that any spirit ever possessed him at any given time during the 2008 violence period. He indicated that he was conscious of his actions all the time arguing that if he had been possessed then everyone was possessed. In trying to understand his personal character in relation to violence, I was told by many of his childhood peers, neighbors and relatives that Comrade Victor has always been a violent person since childhood. ZANU-PF therefore harnessed his violent past to their advantage. His peers told me that he "organized fights between others when they herded cattle and he would beat up the loser at the end. He even went as far as organizing fights for bulls, he was so scary that even bulls obeyed him and he would beat up who came with the defeated bull," said one of his childhood friends at the bench. He picked up fights with communities in Mashonaland East province across Mubvinzi River on the other side; whenever he crossed the river he had an unimaginable ability to woo violence. One day his friends told me that he was chased by a group of men with fierce dogs and he jumped into the crocodile infested Mubvinzi River and his friends had to throw stones

on his sides when he was swimming to scare away the crocodiles from him. Comrade Victor did not deny these accounts saying it was part of growing up, even though some of the accounts happened when he was grown up.

He admitted that his obsession with violence landed him into trouble with the law in 2007, when he was arrested by the police for beating up an old man with an iron rod and broke his ribs after a quarrel over the ownership of a barbed wire fence. He was sentenced to six months in prison but the sentence was reduced when his uncle who was a member of the police, negotiated a community service sentence, which he served at a local primary school. His exposure to violence since childhood probably affected the way he performed violence during the 2008 election violence. “The thought of nearly having to spend six months in prison scares me, I hear the conditions are very bad in there, so I vowed that I will never be involved in a fight again with anyone for whatever reason.” He told me in an interview, “I don’t want to go to prison I am reformed” he said.

Giving his account of the 2008 election violence, he said that he is one of those people who supported the MDC during the harmonized elections held in February 2008. He had not voluntarily joined the ZANU-PF youth who went into the bases. He said he had believed that ZANU-PF and president Mugabe had lost and were on their way out of power, which he was eagerly looking forward to. One day he washed his MDC T-shirts and put them on the washing line preparing for possible celebrations of an MDC victory. By that time ZANU-PF had started mobilizing youth for a ‘possible’ presidential election run off. Hours later his friend came to warn him that the ZANU-PF youth were coming to beat him because they had been informed that he had hung MDC t-shirts on his washing line. He quickly removed those t-shirts and replaced them with the ZANU-PF t-shirts. This was a coping strategy in rural areas used by most people, he said; they were careful to keep ZANU-PF regalia in case they would need it and this included party membership cards. When the youth arrived at his homestead they were surprised to find ZANU-PF t-shirts on the line. They, however, warned him against boycotting coming to the base because it was a sign that he was an MDC supporter and was good enough to warrant punishment and the wrath of the youth. From that day, Comrade Victor started going to the youth base at Rutope business center.

I did not want to beat up people, at first I always played it safe, not too forward not too behind, just in the middle. But then my test of loyalty came. One day, I was asked to beat up someone I know, my aunt's husband who was identified as having been an MDC member. I went and looked for a small stick one that probably wouldn't make a child cry. The youth base commander told me that I was joking and that I was taking them for a ride. He sent someone to look for what they call an effective tool for disciplinary purposes. The person brought a small log, my victim was told to step aside and I was told to lie down in a prone position, tears rolled down my cheeks before anything had happened, I was being punished for playing games. I was thoroughly beaten and for days I couldn't sit properly. After the beating I was told to beat up my victim and because I was both scared and angry I beat him up mercilessly until he couldn't cry anymore. I think the beating I was given brought out the cruelty in me. That is how I started beating up MDC supporters seriously and ruthlessly, because it was either they or I, and I couldn't stand another humiliation like that (Comrade Victor Bindura South 11/2014).

Here we see shifting affiliations or assertion of membership, after the 2008 violence many youths had to shift from identifying as MDC members. They had to go and look for ZANU-PF party membership cards, and learn recent ZANU-PF slogans among other things because of fear. In this context the question of wearing regalia is a way of deflecting the question of where one's allegiance is. This fear leads us to a complex discussion of volition, which allows us to understand perpetrators as victims of the violence they took part in. Comrade Victor narrated his own experience of such violence at the base:

One day we were told that we are not going to be deployed to the wards, we had a visitor. In the afternoon a high-ranking soldier came to address us. He blamed us for being too lenient in our discharge of duty. He queried why we had not yet killed anyone in our area. He called me to the front and he gave me a strong slap on my cheek, I fell to the ground, and I struggled to stand up. He said he will beat up everyone next time if he we don't kill. This is not the only time we were beaten up; we were intimidated, verbally abused and physically beaten by the base commanders and soldiers. We could not report this because the police were also afraid to intervene (Comrade Victor).

Comrade Victor's account of the violence, humiliation and torture that ZANU-PF youth suffered in the 'militia' bases shows the complexity of the violence of 2008.

Many youths like Comrade Victor argue that they did not have any choice but it is difficult to understand. They claim that the subjectivity that was on display in 2008, through acts that are profoundly violent and inhuman. They took part in it but not of their own volition but it was a position they had to inhabit because they had to protect themselves or they would have been killed.

It is difficult to think of the 'ZANU-PF youth militias' as victims in Zimbabwe's political violence since they have been at the core of perpetrating this violence against opposition. Much focus is given on unpacking the devastating consequences of the violence the 'militias' inflicted on others with less regard to their experiences and what 'motivated' them to perpetrate violence. In the Zimbabwean context, the ZANU-PF youth 'militias' are regarded as perpetrators who willingly violated people in support of dictators for personal gain (Alexander, 2003; McGregor, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Le Bas, 2006; Chitiyo, 2009; Muzondidya, 2009; Moorcraft, 2012; Lindgren 2003; Masunungure 2009). This one sided understanding of youth violence leads to continued silences about the abuses and violence the youth 'militias' suffer during this violence and will have profound effects on the way in which working through these episodes of violence and delivering justice and reconciliation is carried out in Zimbabwean communities (Bamu 2009).

I explain and give an articulation of how people are living in this context and it is more complex than just being on the side of ZANU-PF. It is about people trying to position themselves, to say I know that people know what I did but how do I transform myself and show that I am virtuous. As Comrade Victor's case shows most of these young people who are now regarded as 'ZANU-PF militias' are very much victims of the same violence they inflicted on others. A victim by definition is someone who has suffered, sometimes willingly, sometimes not, as a result of forces more powerful than themselves. Thus suffering, power relations and choice are central to how we understand who is, and who is not a victim (Strobl (2010b). I deal with the issue of choice, showing the extent to which the ZANU-PF militias had made or had not made a choice in relation to what happened to them.

The difference between the ZANU-PF youth victims and the MDC-T victims is the side they 'decided' to experience the violence from. The ZANU-PF youth militias

constituted largely of a group that ‘decided’ to ‘repent’ and ‘surrender’ their loyalty to the MDC as a way of avoiding becoming victims of ZANU-PF violence, while their practices of violence targeted those MDC supporters who decided to defy calls to surrender and ‘rejoin’ ZANU-PF. These ‘ZANU-PF militias’ found themselves in a difficult position before, during and after the violence. After the February elections, they were force-marched to meetings and bases by armed ZANU-PF war veterans and the army officers, at the bases they were physically assaulted and called names and humiliated and at the same time they were ordered to go and humiliate the MDC supporters in the same way.

After the election violence, the police engaged in Operation *Makatumwa nani?* (Who sent you to commit violence?) During this short operation, the police arrested a number of youth for having committed various crimes such as stock theft and vandalism of property during the campaign period. These youths were later released without being formally charged. The arrests were meant to silence the youth from claiming heroism by making them aware that the violence they had engaged in was a crime at law. This was also a way of claiming back authority by the police, which had been largely reduced to onlookers during the campaign period. Silencing them protected those high-ranking military, ZANU-PF and government officials from being held responsible by the youth to fulfill the promises for jobs they made to them at the bases. Just like Comrade Victor’s account most of the youth I interviewed narrated ‘horrors’ of verbal abuse and physical and mental torture they were subjected to by the military officers and the war veterans at the base. One of the youths who participated in the 2008 base Comrade Lovemore said:

We were promised that we will be recruited into the National army after the elections, so we had to prove that we were capable soldiers who would defend the country and the ZANU-PF party even if it means killing our parents and relatives (Comrade Lovemore, Bindura South, 04/04/2014).

Comrade Lovemore said that the idea of having to beat up his parents deeply troubled him so much because he could not live with that. He once thought of committing suicide, also feared that if that happens he would commit *ngozi* that would haunt and wipe out his family lineage. Just like how the *mujibas* of the 1970s war killed their

kith and kin, the ZANU-PF youth militias of the post-2000 violence also punished their kith and kin. In a chilling account of youth torture at the base Comrade Lovemore told me that soldiers at their base at Super business centre also victimized them. He recounted a day when they were visited by a senior army officer who wanted to check on the progress that was being made in re-orienting the people ahead of the elections. His first question at the base was how many people have died in this area. When he heard that no one was killed by the youth, he was very angry and blamed the leaders for not understanding what was at stake in this election. The youth stood in a line and at attention as soldiers at a parade would do. The senior army officer just called Comrade Lovemore and asked him if he was scared to kill, when he said “yes he was scared of killing”, the army officer gave him a heavy slap in the face and he fell to the ground, other youth were ordered to beat him up, which they did, then the soldier said:

What kind of soldiers are you going to be if you cannot kill, you think war is a joke, this is war comrades, if ZANU-PF loses you are to blame, you are here to show the people out there that this is war and in a war people die, these are the people who voted for the MDC, if we had such *mujibas* during the war we would have been totally wiped out by Smith’s soldiers (Comrade Lovemore, 04/04/2014).

The youth are called unpatriotic and at the same time they are asked to do the dirty work of politics (Jones 2005). This produces a pathetic figure of the youth who are disoriented and disenfranchised. The idea of viewing youth who were associated with the violence at the bases as perpetrators was heavily challenged by a parent, Comrade Jessie who argued that they ordered their sons and daughters to go to the bases as a way of avoiding being labelled as MDC supporters and to avoid the violence. The parents were themselves blamed by ZANU-PF officials and war veterans at the various meetings held in 2008 for allowing their children to support the MDC. In some instances, parents were also blamed for allowing their children from urban areas to corrupt them by telling them to vote for the MDC. Comrade Jessie had this to say:

Our children did what they did because of the situation; no one was safe in 2008. We had to make choices for our children, I had to tell my youngest son who was 19 years old that if he wanted to continue living in my house, eating my food he must go to the base. I did this because I wanted to protect him because they were visiting

youths at their homes at night beating them up for not going to the base. If you allow your son to go to town where it was relatively peaceful, you would be blamed and have your house burnt down or even get beaten for doing that. It was a difficult time, I had my two goats taken away and slaughtered for the youth at the base because I was labeled as an MDC supporter and yet I had my son at the base participating in these brutal acts. It is what it is (Comrade Jessie, Bindura South, 02/05/2015).

How then does one separate victim from perpetrator in this case? The ambiguity of victimhood is so puzzling in this context. Regardless of these contradictions the youth suffered from the consequences of inflicting violence on their community in many ways.

6.5 ZANU-PF Youth as victims of witchcraft related suffering

After being exposed to violence by the war veterans and soldiers in the bases and having their yearning for recognition frustrated by the ZANU-PF party, the youth also suffered from ‘witchcraft related revenge’ from their victims. I spoke to two women who claimed to have been victims of revenge witchcraft. I heard their stories being told several times at the bench. They claimed that the people they beat up in 2008 at the bases and rallies used juju to hold back their futures. Comrade Mandebvu, is a short stocky woman who has a hoarse voice and a beard, that is where she got the name Mandebvu which means ‘the one with beard.’ She is married but she complains that since the 2008 campaigns she has been experiencing marital problems, in the form of domestic violence from her husband, something she never experienced before that. She said:

The MDC women whom we beat at the base have bewitched me, but it was not my fault we were ordered to do so and they know it. One of the women told me that I will never have peace in my home because of what I had done to her, she promised that she will make sure of it. At that time I did not take this seriously but as it happened that conversation came back to me. I believe this is the cause of my problem (Comrade Mandebvu, Bundura South, 09/06/2015).

In contexts of violence people believe that the spirit of the dead will come back as *ngozi*, avenging spirits that hold back the future and these could to be appeased

(Mujere, Sagiya and Fontein, 2017). In this context this is different the living and not the dead are coming back to torment and hold back the future of their abusers. The problem with witchcraft is that it cannot be appeased, because confronting a person even for purposes of asking for forgiveness means accusing one of practicing witchcraft. Among the Shona and according to the Zimbabwean Constitution accusing someone of witchcraft is a serious offence (Bourdillon 1982, Gelfand 1973, Mittlebeeler 1975). Another young woman, Comrade Emma, who is in her mid-thirties and is still single blames this status on MDC supporters she claims have cast a bad spell on her, she also claims that:

I was told by a group of women at the river when I had gone to wash my clothes that I will never get married and if that is to happen I will have to go far and wide and find powerful healers and prophets to exorcise the curse. They said I had humiliated them by making them lie down and beating them in public. I tried to explain to them that this is what we were ordered to do at the bases but they seemed to have so much hatred. I am thinking of moving from this area maybe go as far as South Africa and start a new life. I have even given up on getting married (Comrade Emma, Bindura South, 19/06/2015).

This emotional suffering happens in the lives of these young women and is not recognized as victimhood. When people talk about these ZANU-PF youths, they claim that they deserve the suffering they are going through, because of what they did. One man asked, “How can these girls get married after what they did? They did not behave like women. They were scary. Even us the men at the base we were scared of these ladies they were brutal, especially to the other ladies.” Another respondent said that witchcraft was people’s only way of wreaking revenge on their perpetrators and if it works the better it will deter them and others from doing this again (See Mvundura 2014). Fontein (2009:377) noted that during *Operation Murambatsvina* residents were rumoured to be deploying witchcraft to exact revenge on the officials and police who were demolishing their backyard houses. Therefore witchcraft constitutes one aspect of a broader moral economy.

Apart from some of the youth being subjected to spiritual warfare of witchcraft by their victims, some of the youth militias embodied the pain of the consequences of the violence they meted on their neighbours. Contrary to common sentiments that these

youth ‘militias’ are heartless, the youth suffered from the trauma of seeing their victims die and leave families behind. I attended a funeral of an active MDC member Mr George who succumbed to violence related ailments. He had co-ordinated the MDC campaign in 2008 February elections; he had openly defied ZANU-PF’s threats during the presidential election run-off campaign. He was dragged from his house and was severely assaulted with unidentified weapons, after that he had spent three months in a Harare hospital being treated of these wounds. He had suffered a burst bladder and had an artificial tube inserted to help him relieve himself. When he died I spoke to comrade Victor on the rumour that this man had died because of the violence and torture he suffered during the violence of 2008. He said that he is very aware that he had died because of that assault:

The way we worked on him was not good at all, some wanted to kill him but we decided that we did not want his blood on our hands. It was mob beating, it was not controlled we hit him anywhere without care for his life. We never thought he would survive for this long. I was personally relieved to see him alive and be able to fend for his family. His death though haunts me. Now I see his young kids in primary school having to go to school without shoes and with torn uniform, sometimes the mother has to go and work at the school because she cannot raise the fees. But when the father was alive he could work for his kids. He had bought a truck, which he hired out to people around the area, although people argued that it is MDC money he used to buy the truck, but he could fend for his family. After he died the wife employed a driver who abused the truck and now it has broken down and it is parked. It is traumatizing to see that these kids might not even finish school because I participated in the violence that killed their father. This you cannot tell anyone but you suffer silently (Comrade Victor, 12/08/2014).

This emotional response by Comrade Victor a ‘perpetrator’ to the death of their victim is touching. It shows how the youth are haunted by the consequences of the violence which they face everyday. It tells a story of suffering that is oppressed and is tucked away from the public space. Similar tales of ‘hauntings’ emerge from the 1970s liberation war *mujibas* and guerrillas but their violence and suffering is recognized and afforded space in the public memory making it easy for them to seek reparations and professional help. Kapteijns et al (2010) argue that in a context in which people are forced to ‘forget’ the violence they experienced or witnessed and repress their pain, this pain re-emerges as physical pain. When people have been

unable to articulate their experiences of violence as a result of being silenced by the state or by the community or as a result of the non-narratability of atrocities – these experiences are embodied.

These narratives are not in any sense a way of working through violence or coming to terms with the trauma of violence but in a context with lack of state or institutional support they intensify fear and feelings of hopelessness for the citizens. The end of election violence and the formation of the GNU did not give people space to work through memories of violence, but the 2008 loss to the MDC prompted ZANU-PF to intensify surveillance and threats to harm those who oppose them. The following section describes and understands these threats and surveillance showing why the ZANU-PF youth are afraid of confronting ZANU-PF leaders to fulfill their promises despite being used and dumped by the party.

6.6 Political technologies of control and surveillance: Stalking subjectivities

“ZANU-PF is not just a political party here in the rural areas, it is a way of life. It permeates everyday life. People live, breath, eat and sleep ZANU-PF.” - ZANU-PF branch chairman, Musana Bindura South 2014.

This statement by a ZANU-PF official shows how the party views its relationship with the rural people and how they control and seek to dominate the rural areas as their strongholds. Politics goes beyond election campaigns to include mobilization of people everyday. This is significant for ZANU-PF since they aim to exclude the opposition and pro-democracy activists from the rural space. People are always wary about the ZANU-PF gaze in their lives. The way in which ZANU-PF permeates everyday life and maintains control of their desired subjectivities is through deploying techniques of surveillance in doing the work of detecting who a sellout is. Here I describe the purge of the ‘gamatox’ factionalists within ZANU-PF through the mini trials held at Bindura and how they inform discussions about fear and violence at spaces and places like the bench. All those suspected of belonging to the faction were categorized as sellouts of the struggle and were to be punished. The youth who

fervently engaged in violence on behalf of ZANU-PF are also put under the gaze, as they are not trusted. As one war veteran put it at Maema Mountains in 2014:

During the war, I was straight like Soroboni the Gwanda road, we had problems but we did not forsake our party. Today I am still a ZANU-PF member. But the youth are not loyal they follow whoever promises them a good life. That is why in 2008 they had to be forced to go to the bases.

As Jones (2005) noted youth are called unpatriotic and at the same time they are called to do the dirty work of politics, being used and discarded. Surveillance and instilling fear in the youth was a result of the acknowledgement by ZANU-PF that when people begin to doubt that who they are as a community is founded in the liberation war and ZANU-PF and that they need to defend it, that belief must be forced on them, and its acceptance must be monitored. That is people need to be reminded often that they all must belong to ZANU-PF. The youth had believed that participating in ZANU-PF violence would give them some form of protection but ZANU-PF officials did not trust them and subjected them to surveillance. Members of ZANU-PF were not immune to violence, abuse, surveillance and victimization. This was evident during the factional fights and purges of party officials belonging to the former Vice-president Joice Mujuru faction that was accused of plotting to illegally unseat President Robert Mugabe.

In 2014, the nation was alerted to an alleged plot by the then Vice-President Dr Joice Teurairopa Mujuru to remove President Mugabe from power. The First Lady Grace Mugabe revealed this information during her “meet the people” rallies held across the country. Mujuru was accused of leading a faction and influencing the election of people from her faction into provincial executives. The aim was for these members to nominate Mujuru as a presidential candidate for the party, challenging Mugabe ahead of the ZANU-PF national elective congress in December of 2014. Mujuru and her “allies” including former state security minister Nicholas Goche were accused of hiring a ‘hit man’ from Israel to assassinate Mugabe. Another Mujuru close ally Rugare Gumbo was allegedly recorded saying that they wanted Mugabe to be assassinated the Kabila style. This referred to the way the late DRC President Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard in 1998. Kabila was a close

ally of President Mugabe. This was meant to give credibility to the ‘hit man’ case. However, Mujuru and her ‘allies’ denied all these allegations and dared those with evidence to bring it forward. Despite these serious allegations, which amounted to treason none of the accused have been arrested or brought before the courts of law. Between December 2014 and mid-2015, Mujuru and those associated with her were expelled from ZANU-PF. Mujuru was replaced by Justice minister Emmerson Mnangagwa as Vice-President.

The factional fight started with Mugabe accusing the then Information Minister Professor Jonathan Moyo of being a counter-revolutionary who had been recruiting ZANU-PF enemies as editors at state-owned media conglomerate Zimpapers. Mugabe claimed at a burial of national liberation war hero, Nathan Shamuyarira on the 7th of October 2014 that the party had been infiltrated. One of the editors Edmund Kudzayi was accused of being behind the faceless Facebook character known as Baba Jukwa who leaked confidential party secrets on social media (Mare 2016). Moyo was accused of working with these people to destroy the party from within. Mugabe likened the party to grain that had been attacked by grain weevils that bore into the seed rendering it inedible saying he would speedily deal with them to save the party from total collapse. Back in June 2014, in a statement that gave birth to the terminology of “Gamatox” in Zimbabwean politics, Minister for State Security in the President’s office Didymus Mutasa a close Mujuru ally, described Moyo as a weevil and openly castigated Mnangagwa’s political ambitions. They were weevils that needed to be fumigated with Gamatox, a pesticide, said an angry Mutasa. From then on Mujuru’s faction, to whom Mutasa belonged, became known as the “Gamatox Faction.”

The purging of those associated with the ‘gamatox’ went down to the provinces, districts and wards, branches and cells. A ward councilor in Bindura South was accused of being a gamatox, because he had campaigned for one Ratidzai for the provincial youth chairperson’s post and also attended former Vice-President Joice Mujuru’s graduation party in Mt. Darwin. Ordinary people who had received maize seed and fertilisers in December 2014 were accused of being the councilor’s cronies hence they were accused of belonging to the gamatox faction. At this juncture, people ceased to be accused of belonging to the MDC but now belonged to the gamatox

faction. This demonstrates that ZANU-PF believed that they were in firm control of the people's will and had totally annihilated the MDC. Their struggle was now to control factionalism and division within the party. The ZANU-PF slogan did change from, "*Pasi ne MDC*" [Down with the MDC] to "*Pasi ne Gamatox/Mai Mujuru*" [Down with Joice Mujuru].

The ZANU-PF Mashonaland Central provincial executive called a meeting to decide whether the councilor must be expelled from the party. The meeting resembled a trial where those with evidence against the councilor's factional activities testified before members of the provincial executive and people from the ward. A sizeable number of people from all the villages in the ward came to the meeting. Village heads and the headman also attended and sat with the ZANU-PF ward committee at the high table. The trial is one of the ways that ZANU-PF keeps people in the rural areas wary of the gaze and makes them believe that they are being watched everyday by ZANU-PF spies. Here details of the councilor's movements and meetings were revealed by ZANU-PF youth who claim to work with the partisan state security and intelligence services. Speaker after speaker blamed accused and castigated the councilor for belonging to a faction that wanted to 'kill' the president. On his part, the councilor denied these accusations and argued that he associated with Joice Mujuru and others when they were members of the party and that he was not aware that they were plotting to remove the president from power.

One of the war veterans and member of the ZANU-PF Central committee Comrade Mataruse stood up and told the councilor that he was playing with fire by saying that the president is now too old and he should step down. He pointed at the councilor and visibly angry and shaking he admonished:

Comrade at your age and as you are, how do you say such rubbish about the president, are you sure? If you say he is old you are referring to us the war veterans we are old yes, but we are strong. The president runs up and down the airplane stairs (*people laughed at this while others were surprised because it reminded them of the president's fall at the airport three weeks earlier*). You were campaigning for Ratidzai who said 'I will not be ruled by an old man (kachembere). You also went to Joice Mujuru's graduation party you were seen there. If we were in a certain period and time (of violence) you would have been in a different place (dead).

This shows ZANU-PF's use of meticulous surveillance, which means that detailed knowledge about people's life is collected and used against them. This introduces all-pervading suspicion in the lives of the people. This forces people to pretend to support ZANU-PF even if they do not want to. This pretense is evident in the way in which people castigate other members of ZANU-PF for letting down President Mugabe through corruption and lying to the people, but skirting around directly accusing Mugabe himself. It is taboo to say things against the president within ZANU-PF.

The ZANU-PF provincial secretary for security in Mashonaland central province told the people that those who wished to cause war and conflict in the country to displace the president were unfortunate because three quarters of the war veterans who fought in the liberation war are still alive and are willing to defend the country at all costs. He warned the people against thinking about any war, as they will never win against president Mugabe. He argued that president Mugabe being the Commander-In-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces has the entire arsenal in the country and the soldiers on his side. In this instance, it is Mugabe and his allies in ZANU-PF who are allowed to remind people of the war and to tell the people that they can go back to war if they lose elections. Because they have the soldiers and the weapons, but no one else is allowed to even think about removing them from power through democratic elections which are a constitutional means.

In the middle of speeches and testimonies against the councilor, there were two war veterans who were holding their side conversations. On our way from the meeting one of the youth told me that the two war veterans were planning to beat up the councilor and the ward youth chairperson for undermining the authority of the president. He said they were asking some youth at the back to "bring the stove". This statement was popular with the ZANU-PF youth during the 2008 election run off violence where they would make victims seat on a hot plate stove and burn their buttocks, said one of the youth. It is also synonymous with the base as a 'hot plate' or as one of the youth referred to it a "blast furnace", where hard nuts are roasted. Invoking this period of violence controls the way people behave as a way of discipline and subjection.

“What is a gamatox?” Asked one war veteran when he stood up. “It is herbicide” people responded. “What do you use it for?” He asked again. “To kill cockroaches and weevils”, people responded. “So are we cockroaches?” He asked, “that we need gamatox to terminate us?” He went on to point out that this once happened during the liberation war when some of the high-ranking members of ZANU rebelled against Mugabe and sold out:

I was one of the members present at Chimoio at that time and we arrested them and detained them in underground jails dungeons where their skin colour had changed to pale when they came out because of lack of sunlight. Selling out is dangerous because it leads to loss of life, of those selling out and those being sold out. My warning is that do not to follow the gamatox (Comrade Mahozha, Rutpe centre, Bindura South, 2014).

This constant reminder by war veterans of how they ill-treated sell-outs during the liberation war means that violence of that period is endemic to them and they do not take lightly sell-outs. Part of the fear the youth who perpetrated violence in 2008 and before that have is being labeled as sell-outs therefore becoming exposed to retributive violence. Once you are labelled a sell-out anything can happen to you, anyone can do anything to you, the militias, the police, the army or the CIO operatives. People have disappeared without trace so no one wants to be a victim of that. The political and everyday life in Bindura South is pervaded by an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. This is heightened by the presence of ‘state spies’ who hang out at business centers and visit people suspected of selling out. At one instance, four men and women believed to be CIO officers driving a black Mercedes Benz arrived at the Rutope business centre at the height of the factional wars in ZANU-PF and asked to see the ward councilor who was being accused of being a member of the rebellious gamatox faction. He was taken away and was not seen for almost a week and when he returned he did not talk about his ‘ordeal’ with these men to anyone. His silence strengthens ZANU-PF’s effort to rule by instilling fear. Rumours that he was tortured and perceptions about the power of the state over people’s lives instill fear in the people and reminds them that they are being watched every time.

After the meeting people were afraid of associating with the councilor. Doing so would make them appear as sympathizers of those traitors. Conversations by many youth were about discouraging each other from opposing ZANU-PF. After the meeting we sat at the bench and one of the youths said, “Guys ZANU-PF has many strategies of making us vote for them. Let them rule. When they are tired, then we will take over from there”. Another one said “talking about rebelling and supporting the MDC or the gamatox is exciting when we are alone here but in reality we will mess our pants” he said to the laughter of everyone but he had said what was in the minds of everyone and there was a feeling of despair and resignation among the group. One of the youth Comrade John carried on and said:

As for me you can call me all sorts of names coward, a woman or whatever but I am not getting involved in opposition politics, I will just remain as I am with my poverty, good luck to those who want another Chimurenga. ZANU-PF knows all your plans and you will die before you even implement one. Look at this councilor he thought he was clever but every detail of his life was being exposed things they say in private (Comrade John, Bindura South 2014).

Individuals police their own conduct to avoid trouble, principally because they believe that they are under surveillance. Using Bentham’s idea of the Panopticon Foucault (1995 [1975]) argues that it uses instruments of coercion but more importantly it employs subjects as agents of their own control. It introduces self-control as a means of regulating subjects’ behavior. They make rational choices in the circumstances choosing what is good for self-preservation. The fear of what might happen to them if they fail to conform obliges them to conform. If a villager has not suffered any sanctions before, it very likely that they have seen a fellow villager suffering the consequences of non-conformity, or they have actively participated in punishing those accused of dissent. Comrade John said in an interview:

My man in 2008 I was beaten, thrashed and tortured by the young Turks in Denda. I saw a woman being burnt with a plastic, you know that it’s terrible when you were being asked to produce a transfer letter in your country, it not a joke (Comrade John, Bindura South, 2014).

During the 2008 presidential election run-off elections, the ZANU-PF officials and the youth militias often asked people to produce transfer letters from areas they were coming from to prove that they were ZANU-PF supporters and that they were not running away from the bases. This was also to guard against journalists or opposition or civil society activists who might be on a mission to ‘spy’ and document acts of violence and the activities of the ZANU-PF and the security forces. There are people most probably part of the youth militias at the bases who leaked such information to the media. Online tabloids such as the www.Zimbabweituation.com and www.Zimeye.com carried detailed lists of senior military and security services personnel who were involved in organizing and manning the militia bases across the country’s provinces.

One of the ways in which ZANU-PF controls people’s lives is to get their hands dirty and dripping blood through engaging in various forms of violence and use that against them. People who have killed for ZANU-PF including the youth find it difficult to leave ZANU-PF. In most cases, they are trapped because of the fear of retribution from victims should there be regime change. This explains why ZANU-PF is not interested in resolving periods of past violence. The post 2000 violence has thus played an important role in expanding ZANU-PF’s support base. The war veterans fear that the demise of the liberation movement will undermine their contribution to the liberation of the country and a non-liberation movement would not give them the recognition they deserve especially after their post-2000 role in subverting democracy in the country. In this regard, it is in their interests to keep ZANU-PF in power as it looks after their interests. For the youths, there is fear of the uncertain, the unknown in the future, after their role in aiding ZANU-PF’s prolonged stay in power through violence and undermining institutions of democracy. Comrade Lovemore said:

The people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces have not forgotten the Gukurahundi violence of the 1980s. How can people forget about 2008 so soon; they are waiting for their time to revenge (Comrade Lovemore Bindura South, 28/10/2014)

The youth therefore find ‘refuge’ in a continued ZANU-PF rule because they evade prosecution. These youths feel that it is going to be difficult for them to argue that they killed against their own will. They gave examples of what is happening to the

members of the Zimbabwe People First party, now National People's Party (NPP) led by Joyce Mujuru and those who were expelled from ZANU-PF in 2014 and 2015 on allegations of plotting against President Mugabe:

Those people who are in the gamatox party of Joyce Mujuru are finding it difficult to convince people that they are not as evil because of their role during their tenure in ZANU-PF. People always ask them why they did not speak against Mugabe when they were still in ZANU-PF? Why did they not resign if they did not agree with how ZANU-PF was doing things? Why wait to be expelled and then start talking? This is the same dilemma we will be in, people will ask us why we did not expose those who sent and forced us to perpetrate violence, why wait for when they are no longer in power? (Comrade Victor, 2015)

There is a possibility in which this uncertainty plays in the hands of ZANU-PF officials who become guarantors of protection. The youth are also justified in their fear of victimization by their party colleagues considering the violence they inflicted on the opposition members. As one soldier once said, "it is easy for a person who has never seen the destructive capacity of a gun to ask for war, but for a soldier who has been to war a toy gun can make him run." The youth who have witnessed and participated in gory violence would not dare become enemies of the violent system. This fear and disenfranchised life of victims of ZANU-PF violence is seen through the experiences of the MDC supporters. The MDC supporters have been subjected to horrific violence, community isolation, and systematic surveillance and have been denied basic rights and existence as citizens of Zimbabwe. Their lives have been made 'bare life'. They have become according to Agamben those who can be killed but cannot be sacrificed. The entire idiom of sacrifice is what underpins the social stature and moral value that is attributed to 'heroes of the liberation war'. An MDC official Timothy in the area said that being labeled a sell-out by ZANU-PF in this country means that your right to live is taken away from you:

Anyone in ZANU-PF can do whatever they want with you, the youth militias, the CIO, the army and the police can detain and interrogate you as they desire, no one will hold them accountable. We witnessed this in 2008 and in other cases since then. People who have protested against ZANU-PF and Mugabe have been labeled as sell-outs, Itai Dzamara the Occupy Africa Unity Square activist has disappeared without a trace and it's almost a year now and nothing is being said about him. He is

being labeled an opportunist who faked or staged his abduction (Timothy, Bindura South 05/01/2016).

Timothy referred to the abduction of an activist Itai Dzamara who started a movement known as the Occupy Africa Unity Square. Africa Unity Square is a park in Harare CBD opposite the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Itai Dzamara often held posters with messages that told Mugabe to go because he had failed Zimbabweans. It is said that on the afternoon of 8 March 2015, unidentified men abducted him from a barbershop in Glenview high-density suburb of Harare and he was never seen again. It is believed that the abductors are state security agents because the state had to be 'forced' by a court ruling to investigate his disappearance and a cabinet Minister Jonathan Moyo told British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Hard Talk's Simon Shucker that Dzamara's disappearance is not special because people go missing everyday around the world (www.bbcAfrica.com). There are many other MDC-T activists, supporters and officials who have been killed and buried in shallow graves, while many others were tortured by state security agents and ZANU-PF youth (see Fontein 2006). ZANU-PF has always documented names of people who support and attend MDC-T rallies and meetings and use them to exclude these people access to food aid, agricultural inputs from the government and other social welfare programs. This explains why most rural people inhabit the figure of the detective in order to position themselves well within the political landscape and evade punishment.

6.7 The Emergence of Critical subjectivities among the youth

I chose the concepts of volition and victimhood to bear on this chapter so that I can complicate the aggressive status of the perpetrators in the bases. I do not only describe young people's violence at the base but also how young people are making other choices, such as moving to towns or to South Africa so that they can partially refuse being deployed in violence. I therefore argued that they are not simply perpetrators they were pushed into that through particular routes and interventions made by ZANU-PF party. There is a desire to lead a normal, peaceful life among the youths and the community as a whole. This section shows that even if the youth were caught up in ZANU-PF violence as both perpetrators and victims, they have agency and they exercise it in refusing being deployed for further political violence. These attempts

might not succeed and violence might still happen because ZANU-PF can mobilize other people to take part in violence, but these attempts at avoiding being deployed for violence means that rural youth are not always complicit with ZANU-PF violence, but they are caught up in its work as both perpetrators and victims. This allows us to explore other ways and spaces that youth use to challenge ZANU-PF dominant narrative.

A young lady who was part of the ZANU-PF youth at the base in 2008 Comrade Emma went to South Africa because she feared that she had stripped herself of her dignity as a woman by participating in dehumanizing masculine violence. She quickly applied for a passport and left for Port Elizabeth in South Africa to work as a maid. Part of her arguments for leaving was that it was difficult for her to face the community after the violence. She said that no man in the community would marry her after this and she is better off somewhere. She left towards 2013 elections because she did not want to be part of ZANU-PF violence as a perpetrator. I spoke to her in 2016 when she returned from South Africa after her parents asked relatives to force her to come back home. Their reason was that since she could not find decent work it is better for her to come back home. Family relatives said that a prophet from an apostolic church had told them that she was working as a ‘prostitute’ not as a maid and the family must bring her back before she dies of AIDS.

When I spoke to her about these rumors she simply said she had to do what she had to do to survive and that she will go back regardless of what they think. She said that she is surprised that her family is ashamed of her being a prostitute, but they are not bothered about her being a ZANU-PF thug terrorizing the community. She said that she was done with that life of being used by politicians for nothing, in fact she said, “how do they know that I was not a prostitute for the commanders at the base?” she was open and frank in her response to my questions, and she went on to say, “ and you are also thinking that I am a prostitute because I am exhibiting an I don’t care attitude” she laughed and went on to say that, “think whatever you want, I don’t care, I want to be free, from my parents, community and ZANU-PF”. She exhibited the behavior that boys at the ‘bench’ referred to as arrogant; they said *mudhinhiwe*, meaning that she is bigheaded. They attributed this to the “prostitution lifestyle” she was leading in Mzansi. The ‘bench’ concurred that this is what prostitutes do; they do

not care about anything or anyone, even their lives. In this narrative, Comrade Tracy is bravely challenging ZANU-PF's use of violence and its leaders' abuse of girls and women in their bases. By migrating to South Africa and engaging in precarious modes of survival she is refusing to allow her body to be used for political ends. Prostitution allows her to use her body in ways she can control and financially benefit from it. At the same time like many other young Zimbabweans is escaping the poverty and lack of opportunities in Zimbabwe as well as being deployed as a ZANU-PF agent of violence.

Comrade Enoch, the ZANU-PF ward youth secretary, has also left the country for South Africa. For him, the tragedy was more than just participating in ZANU-PF violence and not having a job. He lost his wife and daughter to malaria in the space of a week. According to him, this was due to the fact that his church doctrine did not allow him or his family members to seek medical help. Instead, they rely on the assistance of their church leaders' prayers and interventions. He married a young woman from church, but later 'divorced' her as he made the great trek down South. Before, he left for South Africa he had stopped going to church and said he had quit politics. He had started drinking alcohol and frequenting the bottle stores at the business center. He was deranged and always blamed the church for his loss. At one point, he said maybe this was punishment for the ZANU-PF sins. I spoke to him over the phone in South Africa and he was bitter at both the Johane Marange apostolic church and ZANU-PF. He blamed both for killing people and destroying futures. He said he left because the place has sad memories and that he never wants to be associated with both the church and ZANU-PF. He reiterated that it would be difficult for him to challenge ZANU-PF as an individual but the best thing was to leave so that he won't be deployed for violence in the future. In saying this Comrade Enoch was challenging both the ZANU-PF narrative and use of violence and the broken promises of freedom and prosperity as well as the 'evil' relationship between ZANU-PF and the Johane Marange apostolic church. The Johane Marange apostolic church openly professes its support for ZANU-PF and president Mugabe equating him to the biblical angel Gabriel.

These are not the only young people who are migrating away as a means of avoiding being deployed for ZANU-PF violence many have moved to cities and towns in

Zimbabwe, and this movement mostly happens during periods running up to elections. There are thousands of Zimbabwean youth who have escaped to South Africa and work in restaurants, construction industry and some are in universities undertaking studies all as a way of running away from ZANU-PF. This means that there are ways, which many young people are finding of escaping ZANU-PF rule at the same time opening up spaces in the diaspora to challenge the dominant ZANU-PF narrative and what they see as misrule and dictatorship. In my conversations with Zimbabwean university students in South Africa for the past three years most of these young people declare that they will not go back to Zimbabwe as long as Mugabe is still the president. This is particularly because they do not believe that he can turn the economy around and offer them opportunities. In essence, they refuse to serve an authoritarian regime that can take away their rights at any time. They do not believe that the ZANU-PF government is for the youth and women.

This does not only happen in the diaspora or in Zimbabwe's towns and cities but also in rural areas people find ways to challenge ZANU-PF's dominant narratives and coercive politics. The apostolic church is one of the spaces available to the people. As the next chapter will show, the apostolic church's relationship with the landscape of liberation war violence, which is used by ZANU-PF to try and legitimize their rule and create loyalty within the youth, provides ways of challenging that same narrative.

6.8 Conclusion

This state of affairs in Bindura South where people believed that they are always under surveillance affected me as a researcher. People are always doing the work of self-regulation as well the work of detection of who is on their side and who could be a spy. Older people are always asking their grandchildren about what is happening 'out there in the world'. It's like they are not part of that world but they are, they don't have access to the news and information, they are cut off from the mainstream media. For instance Gogo Veronica asked one of her grandchildren who was chatting on WhatsApp what people were saying out there. She said to him, "You are always looking at your phone, what are people saying about politics? We want to know so that we don't say the wrong things at their meetings." When I first approached her for

an interview in 2013 she interrogated me, she wanted to know who I was, what I wanted to know, why I wanted to know that, what I will do with that information, who will read it... she asked me many questions. She said:

You know what my grandchild I am doing this because I want to know what to say to you, there are people who are used to spy on us here, we hear that people have been taken by the 'boys' we don't know how they know what people are talking about in their house. For you its better because you came and told me you want to know about my liberation war experience, these others don't come to us straight they listen in through windows and doors when we talk around the fire in our homes at night (Gogo Veronica, Bindura South, 03/12/2013).

These are nearly the same questions others asked me, the fear of saying “wrong things” to the “wrong person.” The youth secretary, Comrade Enoch, went to the ward councilor to ask for permission to participate in my research and he was told what to say and what not to tell me. This information was relayed to me by another youth who is close to him. Comrade Enoch had asked me to put my questions to him in writing and he would respond in writing, I was not surprised, at first he gave me little information in his written response but as time went on he allowed me to interview him after establishing that I was an academic not a spy from the other ZANU-PF faction or CIO. This fascinated me and at the same time I felt exposed to these secret discussions they were having about me. I felt that I could also be accused of being anyone and anything and that could mean danger for me. I also appropriated this figure of the detective in my fieldwork. I started to revise my questions, thinking about ways of asking that might not be offending or suspicious. I started to choose who to talk to and who not to ask. I understood what it means to live under these conditions of surveillance and uncertainty. For the youth who had sacrificed themselves to defend ZANU-PF at the bases in 2008, living under these conditions was depressing and scary at the same time. They were treated like the internal enemies they so fervently fought. This led to the formation of critical subjectivities, which emerged strongly when these youth and other members of the community engaged with the landscapes of liberation war violence during an all-night church vigil.

It can be said that the state has abandoned the youth it previously relied on extensively for its political work. This does not bode well for the future of Zimbabwe. There are a lot of emotions at play towards the state - fear, but also anger, resentment, feeling let down and neglected. When these youth are neglected they become critical of ZANU-PF's agenda, they start using the space provided for by other social institutions such as the church to criticise and refuse the liberation war narrative. They no longer refer to themselves as comrades or as ZANU-PF youth as they did during the violence, but they refer to themselves as *vapostori* or as *madzibaba*, and *madzimai*, or in worst scenarios as prostitute.

7 CHAPTER SEVEN: Dissenting voices: Materiality, agency and affect of landscapes of violence

7.1 Introduction

ZANU-PF deliberately uses the old guerrilla liberation war bases, to get people to support them ideologically, but also to instill fear in them to comply. I have discussed how ZANU-PF through the war veterans in the ZNA take the soldiers, unemployed rural youth, villagers and the liberation war *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* to these old guerrilla bases to make them talk about how the liberation war was fought. This is part of a process in which they try to harness the affective qualities of these particular sacred landscapes, experientially and discursively, in order to reinforce particular historical narratives, create particular kinds of sentiments, loyalty, and legitimacy, and particular kinds of subjectivities, and indeed disciplined subjects. However, what landscapes do is ultimately not simply determined by human thought or action. There is something excessive which lies beyond their attempts at harnessing it for their own purposes, which potentially threatens the narratives they are enforcing, the legitimacy they are seeking, and the kinds of subjects they are trying to constitute, which is why they spent so long rehearsing the events. The excessivity of the materiality of the landscape means that political efforts to stabilize meaning and affect inevitably fall short, and the landscape itself exude affects that provoke different responses that challenges ZANU-PF dominant narratives.

In revealing this, I describe an apostolic church vigil that was held on the same site as the ZSC workshop, at the former liberation war main base at *Mumurwi* Mountain. I attended this prayer vigil, and I invoke it show how people engage with the same landscape outside ZANU-PF politicking and how the affective qualities of the former guerrilla bases can be engaged with and potentially provoke a different response that challenges ZANU-PF dominant narrative. ZANU-PF may on one level be working with such geography and landscapes deliberately, but there is always more going on outside of its control and view, memory is not all that's going on, I am looking at how "the landscape fights back"! These are 'active' and 'affective' places, beyond the

control of ZANU-PF politicking. I argue that such engagements with the landscape of liberation war violence outside ZANU-PF politicking, leads to the formation or the revealing of critical subjectivities within the youth and the older citizens.

7.2 Formation of Critical subjectivities: Engaging with the landscape of violence

On a Saturday night, we set out to Mumurwi Mountain for a prayer vigil. This prayer vigil was held at the same site of the liberation war base and the ZSC workshop in 2013. The group consisted of eleven men, five women and six children. Five were young men who are members of the ZANU-PF youth wing and who constituted a group of militias at the ZANU-PF bases during the 2008 election violence, and attended the ZNA workshops at the Mumurwi and Maema bases in 2013 and 2014. Many of the youth who were or are actively involved with ZANU-PF have turned to the apostolic church for spiritual healing. This explains my interest in using the apostolic churches as part of my field sites. The Mumurwi Mountain and its caves offered safe hiding places for ZANLA guerrillas, which their opponents had no knowledge of. It was also close to commercial farms and native reserves where people could easily be mobilized. Importantly, it allowed the ZANLA guerrillas to harness the affective dimensions of the landscape both material and immaterial to do political work, reinforce particular historical and mythical narratives (that they are the bones of Nehanda who have risen to fight colonialism and that they had supernatural powers which enables them to disappear into thin air), particular kinds of legitimacy for themselves, and fashioning particular kinds of political subjectivities, for instance, peasants who were political loyal to ZANU-PF.

The mountain has spiritual connections with those who believe in worship and praising God. From Friday to Sunday the mountain is a hive of activity with members from different apostolic sects competing for places to pray. Different congregations wearing different garments and regalia spend an average of a night to three nights camped in the mountain to worship. These apostolic members believe in the power of the wilderness, especially those inhabited by spirits of the dead or the ancestors. Hence, the mountains become their ultimate choice. Some of the apostolic sects members say

that they have been praying in these Mountains since the early 1990s, but they didn't know that some of the exact caves and spaces they used were in fact used as liberation war bases in the 1970s war. However, after the ZNA staff college visited this place and held a historicisation workshop in 2013 apostolic church members started to engage with these places as liberation war landscapes and this enabled them to talk about politics in religious terms.

After going through routine processes such as 'confession of sins' and opening prayer we went up the Mountain to a cave in which we spend the night. The practice of confession of sins known as *kubvuma/kureurura* in Chishona was particularly interesting. Every adult had to stand up in front of the whole congregation and ask God to forgive him/her of sins committed during the day or days before. At the same time, people stated their life wishes and desires to God. Most people asked for protection from political violence, and witchcraft related suffering and that they be granted economic prosperity. It is not just a coincidence that the members of apostolic churches would go to the same places that spirit mediums, traditional healers and political parties would go to consult and appease their dead. In a way, this is a continuation of the practices of worship that "kept alive relations among ancestors, inhabitants, and spirits" (Moore 2005:233).

Upon reaching the cave, we sang the song called *Ishe taungana* meaning 'Lord we have assembled,' and people prayed for the Lord to anoint the place as a place of worship and for protection throughout the night. This desire to transform the place into a place of worship is an attempt to cleanse the place of dangerous remnants of violence or evil spirits, rehabilitating the place so that those who want to pray can use it normally. After the prayer, we started singing a song called *Mweya Mutsvene wa Mwari* meaning the 'Holy Spirit of the Lord,' a song that summoned the Holy spirit to the place. The women who had children looked for comfortable places to lay their children and for them to sleep later on. The songs were meant to put people before the presence of the Lord and also to call for His presence at the prayer vigil. After a series of serious prayer and singing, people started feeling tired and sleepy and indeed some were sleeping. At around 1 O'clock in the morning, one of the prophets (*munzwi wemweya*), Madzibaba Joel, a tall thin man started singing loudly and chanting unknown and inaudible tongues/language, shaking his body, his eyes open wide as if

he was in a spiritual trance. He asked people to wake up and pray, saying that it had been revealed to him in a vision that the evil spirits, of the liberation war dead and others, that inhabit the area had visited the cave because apparently the prayers had disturbed and unsettled them.

Hallelujah to you apostles! The spirits that dwell in this place has visited us. I have seen in a vision the skeletons of people who died in this mountain roaming around this cave trying to come to the exact place that we are, trying to cause 'confusion' and asking why we are disturbing them. They died here and they are saying this is their place they want us to leave. But we are children of God we cannot be defeated by the dead; our God and the Holy Spirit will conquer all evil. Let's pray until we defeat them. Wake all those who are sleeping, we did not come here to sleep! (Madzibaba Joel, Mumurwi Mountain, November 2013).

Even though no one except the prophet had seen the evil spirits, people took the prophecy seriously, because the prophet was highly regarded, because people claimed that his previous prophecies had come to pass proving that he was a prophet of God. After that there was ceaseless praying and singing. Women and men ran around the place chanting unknown tongues, falling down on the ground. One woman performed a spiritual practice what is known as *kuhaka* a spiritual practice where one captures the evil spirit into their body so as to exorcise it. After ceaseless commands to these spirit to talk, they did not say a word, after about two hours, they just said "we are going" and the woman came out of the trance. It is then that the prophet confirmed that the unsettled spirits of the mountain had left the place, proving the victory of prayer.

Jules-Rosette (1980:1) argues that these trance behaviors and practices must be analyzed with reference to the capacity of the audience to hear and interpret them as consensually significant messages. Through invoking the dead, who the prophet interpreted as "the liberation war dead," which members had to engage with during the prayer and as citizens who are active participants in politics, the prayer vigil introduces a broader consideration of how the remnants of the liberation war past that are present in the landscape as ghost or spirits are 'active' and 'affective' in varying ways that materialize, constrain, enable and structure different discourses and practices that challenge ZANU-PF's attempts to capture this geographical space and use it to create subjects loyal to the party. This provides a context for the discussion of

how the landscape is affective beyond the dictates of human action. After church in the morning people took time to talk about these spirits and the liberation and what this experience mean. There is a relationship between “religious speaking, hearership and membership” that is critical to understanding how these “practices are generative of symbolic expressions that are subsequently shared to and are interpreted by the whole group” (Jules-Rosette 1980:2). This allows congregates to share political messages in religious terms.

This means is that the landscape itself is generative of all kinds of problems, for anyone who uses it. There is a problem for the apostolic churches because they seek the idea of the garden and the open space which has to do with their own theology (Jules-Rosette 1979), the problem is that their own theology is endangered by the blood of the ancestors which they do not interpret as being legitimate, what happens in these caves presents a kind of problems for them. For the chiefs who rule the area they have to deal with the presence of ancestral spirits, and that requires a delicate relationship between chiefs and mediums. The ZANU guerrillas had another set of problems in that when they wanted to spill blood into the landscape, the dead ancestors presented a problem for them, they abhorred blood (Lan 985). The current ZANU-PF regime refer to the landscape as a site of struggle and heroism, and they try and control it to create narrative closure and for the churches when they make this alliance with ZANU-PF the landscape presents them with difficulties they encounter unsettled spirits of the war dead making demands on the living. The problems that emerge in this moment help me to make the theoretical argument about excess, affect and agency of the material landscapes.

7.3 Landscape, materiality and affect/agency

There are particular ways in which the place configures a profound relationship with the people. Landscape is important because it brings together the physical, and the cultural, the mental, and the material, through phenomenological experience of one’s relationship with their surroundings (Arnason et al, 2015). My argument is that what landscapes do is ultimately not simply determined by human thought or action. There is something excessive which lies beyond ZANU-PF’s attempts at harnessing it for

their own purposes, which creates critical subjectivities is situated within major anthropological debates on the agency of the landscapes and things. The debates have been on whether the landscape is affective mainly because of the way people engage with it, imaginatively, discursively and experientially, for instance, does its 'agency' derive from human 'agency' or landscapes/objects/stuff are affective beyond the dictates of human action, in and of itself in some way. According to Tilley (2012:15), "landscape anthropologically refers to the richly nuanced contextual surroundings in which people move and think and dwell in opposition to notions of landscapes as scenery or as environment and topography'. At once both 'experienced through the body' (Tilley, 2004:28) and yet socially constructed and imbued with symbols and meanings, landscapes represent the outcome of power laden political processes (Walsh 2002:50). Landscape is therefore not simply a blank slate on which people impose ideas, or the backdrop to human action. It is "more than just the surface properties of land...it involves relations between people, animals, and plants - ultimately between beings and ways of being - in a variety of locales" (Arnason et al 2012:ix). This suggests we need to think about how landscapes are not just 'done to' but are active in shaping thoughts, actions and social relations.

Affect is the energy that objects, landscapes and things exude on the people through subjective experience, arousing sentiments, emotions or feelings within and beyond dominant narratives (Navaro-Yashin 2009). They are what Navaro-Yashin (2009) uses the concept of melancholia to refer to a state of mental depression, deep and inescapable sadness and unease. Melancholic interiority reflects people's condition, feeling or inner state of being. Navaro-Yashin regarded this melancholy not only as the inner worlds of the informants, but also as the mark of the energy or affect discharged on them by the dwellings and environments they live in; for instance, when apostolic church congregates gathered at the former liberation war guerrilla base to pray say, "This place feels unsettling and depressing," referring to the caves haunted by unhappy spirits of the dead comrades not returned home since independence who are suffering, referred to locally as *kutambudzika* in the wilderness. They were naming the feeling that their environment inflicted on them, the affect generated by space and the non-human environment.

The landscapes exude an affect of suffering and a violent political struggle that is never ending from the liberation war of the 1970s to the post-2000 political and economic turmoil. Even ghosts and spirits are immaterial but they possess people and objects and animate landscapes and this landscape discharges the affect of struggle and suffering. At the same time, those who engage with these former liberation war bases put these landscapes into “discourse, symbolize them, interpret them, politicize them, understand them, project their subject conflict onto them, remember them, try to forget them, historicize them and so on” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009:15). Like Navaro-Yashin, I also observed that the subjectivity of my participants were shaped by or entangled in the landscape of liberation war and post-2000 struggle and suffering surrounding them. They expressed suffering interiorities; they put their misery into discourse by talking about suffering and struggle at the same time expressing sentiments that are anti-white and anti-violence. Here suffering and struggle is mediated through non-human landscapes. Therefore we can speak, in such instances and historical circumstances of landscapes of struggle and suffering, places which exude an affect of suffering, an environment or atmosphere, which discharges such an affect.

Recent theoretical debates around materiality offer different ways of thinking about how things and landscapes can be said to have agency and affect. Fontein (2009, 2010, 2011) has used Gell (1998) Latour (1999) and Ingold (2007) to explore how in Zimbabwe things and landscape, and human remains in particular, are active both as indices of the deferred or ‘abducted’ agency of human actors (Gell 1998) – particularly spirits of the dead - and as non-human actants (Latour 1999) and transforming materials (Ingold 2007) bound up in complex networks of meaning and action. Following Gell in particular, we can talk of the ‘agency’ of landscapes deriving from ancestral spirits said to guard over sacred mountains and caves, and control the rain (Fontein 2016). In Zimbabwe’s social and political imagination, the landscape is animated by the dead as spirit subjects making demands on the living, thus for war veterans and local people the ‘soil’ as the landscape is referred to can take different forms “from evocative descriptions of war veterans as *vana vevhu* (sons of the soil), to assertions that *ivhu rakatsamwa* (the soil is angry) or *ivhu rinopfuka* (the soil will arise) at the perceived failures of people from protecting the ZANU-PF as the party installed by the ancestors (see Fontein 2011:713). Ancestors create social

obligations between the living and the landscape, and can cause drought, disease and hunger and economic strife. Here the agency of sacred places derives ultimately from the intentionality of the spirits which people must respond to.

There are many well-known stories of ancestral spirits, working through spirit mediums, guiding guerrilla fighters during the war, and allowing them to establish bases in sacred caves and mountains (Lan 1985; Fontein 2006). If ancestors make demands on the living in order to provide rain, prevent drought, and look after the well-being of their descendants, then the unsettled spirits of people killed in the war are often said to haunt the living, and particular places, as troubling *ngozi* spirits (Fontein 2009, 2010). Both ancestors and the unsettled war dead are therefore spirit subjects that make demands on the living through the affective materialities of landscape, creating a myriad of personal, kin and political loyalties through their affective presence. As the war was fought these bases often transformed into sites of struggle, violence and death, further animating the landscape with the intermingling, polluting substances of bodies and blood, making them dangerous in ways closer to Latour's notion of actants caught up in hybrid networks, and Ingold's emphasis on the affordances of materials (Fontein 2010). These violent pasts therefore produced active and affective landscapes both through spirits said to haunt them, and through the problematic transference of dangerous bodily substances (Fontein 2010), making these places active and affective in different ways at the same time. These different kinds of material traces and dangerous spirit encounters with the dead are intertwined and mutually dependent. Together they illustrate how Zimbabwe's liberation war continues to have a complex active and affective presence across its landscapes.

To illustrate this claim, a former Liberation war guerrilla messenger 66-year old Comrade Sorobanga said that they are driven by liberation war dead to fight off forces of neo-colonialism represented by the MDC parties. Comrade Sorobanga said that he takes inspiration and self-control by going to the places they based during the war during difficult times:

In 2007 and 2008 when things were really tough in terms of the economy I was nearly broken, I nearly denounced ZANU-PF, I wanted to go and join the MDC. Before I took that decision I told my grandchildren that I wanted to go and herd the

cattle myself to relieve them, but my aim was to go to the base, were my fellow comrades *chimbwidos* and *mujibas* died during a raid by Smith's army. I sat there the whole day reliving the promises we made to each other never to sell out under any circumstance. I felt the presence of these comrades; I think I heard their voices encouraging me to soldier on for their sake. When I remembered their suffering and how they died and all the blood and dead bodies I saw here I changed my mind I realized that our independence and their sacrifice was greater than the food promised by the MDC (Interview Comrade Sorobanga, Kanyowa village, 01/11/2014).

It is this understanding that make these places active and at times dangerous and gives them the ability to influence people's political choices within and beyond ZANU-PF politicking. Comrade Sorobanga said that for him the spirit of his dead Comrades do not haunt him but instead they are with him always. He said during the liberation war, when a comrade was dying they always promised to be with each other in the spirit and that they will meet again after the other's death when they are all ancestors in the spiritual world. He argues that their death cannot be classified as bad death; they died for the liberation of this country. He continued:

Since their desire to liberate the country was realized they are at peace and it is only the living that can make them turn in their graves by reversing the gains of independence by voting for the opposition that is backed by the former Rhodesian colonizers. Death was not a bad thing during the war; it was the ultimate sacrifice for the country that guerrillas accepted. We even had a song called *Vanhu vese ve Africa* (All the people of Africa), which was a call for people in Africa to rise and defeat the settlers. In that song we sang a chorus, which says, *if death comes today, I will receive it with all my body*. (Comrade Sorobanga, 01/11/2014)

The blood, spirit and bodies of the dead turn into soil they give agency to the land, therefore locally people always refer to the land as having the spiritual agency, it talks, it can see, it can hear, it can be angered, and it can be made happy by the living. In justifying consulting the dead to make political choices about the future of the country, Comrade Sorobanga says during the war they discussed the future together and shared the same values and aspirations. Now that his colleagues are in the 'spiritual world' they can see what he cannot see. They have a better understanding of the future and if there is anything wrong with ZANU-PF they will let him and other

surviving comrades know. He said he is always assured that all will be well, “even in churches prophets say that all will be well at the end; it is a painful process we must go through,” he added. The dead remained active within this landscape and their agency was not obliterated by independence and the surviving war veterans feel obliged to finish the work of the dead by fighting of agents of neo- colonialism.

If the landscape and places (e.g. graves, pools, rivers, caves or ruins) on it do things, then obviously creating militia camps, where violence takes place, can leave dangerous active remnants and traces in the landscape which have to be dealt with. This is why since 2008; one does come across accounts of headman and spirit mediums, and chiefs leading ‘cleansing ceremonies’ which are sometimes focused on dealing with the dangerous places where militia violence took place (Fontein 2009). There is a sense in which ZANU PF’s violence was in part about creating such dangerous landscapes of violence, which they can then return and re-create in the future, evoking people’s memories deliberately. By creating bases of political violence, which necessitated the spilling of blood, an act abhorred by the ancestors (Lan 1985), ZANU-PF creates dangerous places on the land, which has an impact on people’s survival, sense of security and relations with ancestors, who are protectors of life (Werbner 1991, Lan 1985). Because people are so keen on preventing the spilling of blood and angering ancestors and God they are drawn into an uncomfortable relationship in which they would then have to support and maintain ZANU-PF’s hold on power. In this sense, ZANU PF deliberately uses the old guerrilla liberation war bases, and issues of *ngozi* to both get people to support them ideologically, but also to instill fear in them to comply.

It was these kinds of affective qualities of landscape that war veterans were trying to harness for ZANU PF’s political purposes during the training events held at former guerrilla bases in Bindura South in 2013 and 2014. Through narratives, performances and affective identification with the dead killed at the bases, war veterans organizing these events tried to channel the affective qualities of landscape for their political purposes. Yet the fact that they needed to control the workshop, and spent a considerable effort rehearsing the events beforehand, suggests that they were aware of limits of their control. There is a sense that what landscapes do is not simply dependent on beliefs in ancestors, spirits or avenging ‘*ngozi*’ spirits, or the political

will of those who may seek to utilise it; that the ‘agency’ of landscape is not simply dependent on deferred or abducted human agency as Gell (1998) posited, but has something to do with the way that “the substance which they comprise continue to be swept up in circulations of the surrounding media that alternately portend their dissolution or- characteristically with animate beings- ensure their regeneration” (Ingold, 2007:12). In other words, it is through the material entanglements of landscapes with the social and political lives of people that they become active and do things (Hodder 2012). We can consider, for instance, how particular material features of landscape, such as the caves, trees and rocks, afforded the constitution of guerrilla bases in the first place, and therefore made possible the political narratives and practices subsequently associated with them. Yet in the end, as Pinney identifies, such entanglements are as often marked with disjunction and incoherence as they could be said to be smooth and coherent. There is excessivity to the material world – the ‘alterity (or “torque”) of materiality’ that necessarily “can never be encompassed by linguistic-philosophical closure” (Pinney 2005:266, 270). In other words, the very stuff of landscape and things is always more than can be ‘assimilated to a disembodied “linguistic-philosophical closure”, “culture” or “history”’, and it is this excessivity which delineates the limits of control. It is because of this excessivity of the material that war veterans’ effort to channel the affective qualities of Zimbabwe’s liberation landscapes for ZANU PF’s political purposes was necessarily limited. The political and social potentialities of landscape always exceeds attempts to stabilize, channel and direct; there always alternative possibilities.

7.4 The Excessivity of the Landscape

In this context, the emergence of spirits of the liberation war dead through visions and dreams and bodily possession allowed people to talk about politics in religious terms. This experience became a matter of discussion in the morning after the prayer vigil as people sat down in the sun before preparing to go home. People showed fear of these spirits thus they hoped that prayer could ‘defeat’ them. In these discussions, people depended on different kind of narrators and narratives of the liberation war. It was not the patriotic history narrative or the choreographed narratives and performances of the former collaborators at the ZNA workshop but it was the bible, which offered them the

narrative with which to understand their condition. They were not forced to accept the common ZANU-PF narrative, which claims that economic sanctions imposed by the opposition MDC and its Western allies are making their lives miserable (see Moore 2005). They argue that the dead guerrillas are turning in their graves because of the corruption prevalent in the ruling ZANU-PF party and government.

The narratives of what happened during the war at the bases were not different from those at the workshop organized by the ZNA but the responses were different. These remains of the liberation war dead evoked the narrative of liberation; suffering and post-colonial oppression among the church congregates. People critically questioned this notion of liberation, asking and reflecting on whether the promises of the liberation war have been achieved in post-independence Zimbabwe. People critically engaged with this in relation to their present economic, social and political conditions. Most of the people claimed that they are ‘poor,’ being subsistence farmers; they rely on unreliable politicized government handouts of agricultural inputs to carry out their farming. Madzimai Jessica a subsistence farmer and member of the apostolic church decried corruption in government, she said:

If they had known that they were fighting for nothing they wouldn’t have sacrificed their lives. They fought for Mugabe and his cronies to eat and enjoy the wealth of the country alone, after that they are left in the bush. Their comrades didn’t even inform their families that they had died here so that they can come and take their spirits home to rest with their ancestors. Everyone is suffering, we are all suffering, we spend days sitting in the burning sun for a 2kg of maize seed and after that the promised fertilizer doesn’t come how are we supposed to farm and feed our families. Is this the independence they fought for? How can they even rest when all this corruption is going on? They should go and torment these ministers in Harare (Madzimai Jessica, Mumurwi, mountain prayer vigil, November 2013).

Most of them argued that they have become poorer each day because of the economic conditions in the country and this is not what these liberation war heroes fought for. They are in church because they are seeking to overcome these challenges by turning to God. The events at the church vigil are not rehearsed or choreographed, people are not ‘engulfed’ with the spirit of the liberation war through *Chimurenga* songs and affective performances and identifications of the dead. It is through the intentionality

of the liberation war dead who make themselves present through spiritual practices such as trances, visions and dreams that gives these places agency, but also their entanglement in stories as well as social and political lives of people that they provoke questions about what liberation is in the moment.

The Bible readily offers similar narratives of suffering, oppression and liberation that apostolic members draw upon in understanding their conditions. Following Navaro-Yashin (2011), these are melancholic places because they exude affect of melancholy in the people, which is evident through the use of language of suffering, oppression and liberation. The people do not feel sorry for those who suffered because of the Rhodesian forces brutality but they feel sorry for them because they fought for a new kind of oppression and that their kin and comrades are still suffering years after independence. Congregates felt sad for themselves and their conditions because they have not realized the gains of independence. At the ZNA workshops, ZANU-PF was presenting itself as the only party that is able to provide people with political freedom and economic independence using the ‘evidence’ of sacrifice by the guerrillas against colonial brutality thereby trying to make people both sympathetic and loyal to the party, however this claim is not persuasive to the congregates.

Various members of the apostolic sects who pray in the mountains concur that the mountain is haunted by what they termed *mweya yetsvina* (evil spirits) of the dead, who terrorize them during prayers. Even though, they say that winning the ‘power battle’ against the evil spirits gets them closer to God spiritually, some of them speak about the scary experiences of seeing walking skeletons through visions and dreams, hearing footstep sounds and ‘seeing’ body-less hands that throw away the firewood in the darkness of the wilderness. Prophets speak about how they have visions of the dead asking them to tell their relatives to bury them at their homes. The ZANU-PF through the ZNA try to harness the affective qualities of these particular former guerrilla bases, phenomenologically experientially and discursively, in order to reinforce anti-white and anti-opposition sentiments, indebtedness and loyalty to ZANU-PF, and indeed disciplined subjects.

The church is a space people turn to for healing in the aftermath of violence and conflict in society but often, as in this case, it provides for a different affective

experience with the landscape of liberation war violence and structures different responses. Being at a church allows people to talk about politics in religious terms (Chitando 2002a, Engelke 2007), for instance instead of praising President Mugabe as a hero they liken Mugabe to the Egyptian Pharaoh who terrorized Israelites in the Bible. At the same time, they liken the MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai to the Biblical Moses who was sent by God to deliver them from the Pharaoh's Egypt to Canaan, the land of milk and honey. This narrative threatens the narrative ZANU-PF is enforcing, the legitimacy they are seeking, and the kind of subjects they are trying to constitute.

7.5 The Church and Politics in Zimbabwe

There is a photograph and a video circulating within the mainstream and social media of an aged and fragile Robert Mugabe in white robes holding a long 'Holy' stick of the covenant called *Hakirosi yesungano* in Chishona at the Johane Marange apostolic church annual conference in Marange Manicaland province in Eastern Zimbabwe. This marked a shift in the spiritual dimension of the *Third Chimurenga*. Christianity has readily replaced traditional ways of worship. In rural areas, independent apostolic churches like Johane Marange and Johane Masowe are widespread. Rural areas are ZANU-PF's power base or strongholds and during the 1960s and 70s most people followed traditional religion with ancestral worship through consulting spirit mediums and healers being the main methods. In order to get the people to support the war and to legitimize it, guerrillas had to approach spirit mediums for assistance, not only in understanding the terrain but also in mobilizing people and it worked (Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Manungo 1991; Sachikonye 2011). However, many people shifted from traditional worship to Christianity, discarding ancestors and their mediums labeling them as 'evil spirits' the significance of ancestors dropped and Christianity rose.

It is unusual for the apostolic churches to criticize or to provide space for criticizing ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. The apostolic churches and other churches have been co-opted by ZANU-PF as part of its mobilization strategy. Pro-ZANU-PF Apostolic Churches Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) was created to oversee this process. Mugabe and his lieutenants started attending apostolic church gatherings.

Apostolic Churches Bishops began mobilizing their members to vote for ZANU-PF during elections. Pentecostal churches led by a ZANU-PF ardent follower Reverend Obadiah Musindo and Reverend Wutaunashe have also been at the forefront of campaigning and legitimizing Mugabe's rule as divine. After ZANU-PF's win in the 2013 elections Rev Wutaunashe said, "God was giving Mugabe another chance to fulfill the promises of the liberation struggle." The state rewards church leaders who openly support them with media coverage and economic and business opportunities, through helping them establish housing schemes. The ZANU-PF government through the then Vice-President Joice Mujuru donated housing stands to the ACCZ affiliated churches in Bindura and elsewhere across the country to be sold at low prices to members of those churches in acts of patronage.

Members of apostolic churches gather at national political events such as independence and heroes' celebrations showing their support for the party and the President. They elevate him to the levels of biblical figures such as Moses leading Israelites out of Egypt to Canaan. These churches do not question the party's use of violence but encourage their members to support ZANU-PF. They encourage members to support the ruling party. They teach that it is God who appoints leaders and it is only God who can remove them at his will, and no one must stand in God's will. Through these messages democracy is rendered irrelevant. During an interview with the state broadcaster, ACCZ president Bishop Johannes Ndanga said:

God gave Zimbabwe to the black people and whites have no place or say in it. The president is an emissary sent by God to correct the injustices of the past caused by colonialism. It is God's will for Him to rule.

This discourse has fuelled violence against white commercial farmers and the opposition that is always labeled as puppets of the whites. Church leaders and politicians use such language alike as they work together in a political project that shapes violence and subjection of the people. As Madzibaba Thomas claimed at the prayer vigil, "the church and politics are the same, the only difference is that in church you confess your own sins and in politics your sins are confessed by your opponents." The politicians and ZANU-PF gloss over their misrule, bad governance and poor human rights practices by trying to give it biblical relevance in eyes of the

people using the church. This then diverts people's attention from the real issues to do with democracy, freedoms and human rights and focuses on moral issues and an imaginary enemy.

A common example that is put forward to show that the president is a God-fearing leader in his unwavering stance on legalizing homosexuality in the country. He has labeled homosexuals "worse than dogs and pigs", arguing that it is un-African and unchristian. To church leaders and traditionalists who fervently preach against homosexuality, this is a sign that he is God sent leader who will keep the land Holy. This has encouraged police and public violence against gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe. Political violence and injustice is couched in liberation terms, as re affirming indigenusness, addressing colonial imbalances and keeping the land holy. Most churches have been condoning ZANU-PF violence through openly supporting the party's violent policies. During the liberation struggle churches stood up against any form of violence and abuse against the people by either the colonial regime or the guerrilla movements themselves (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995).

At a church service of Vadzidzi apostolic church ahead of the 2013 elections, a woman stood up in a trance chanting unknown tongues and later said she had a message from God and the message was that, "we should all vote for ZANU-PF, so that President Mugabe continues to rule, and if you die as an MDC supporter you won't see the Kingdom of Heaven." This shows that the ZANU-PF intimidation machine hasn't only functioned on the political stage but also on many other layers of society such as religion, which would otherwise be kept out of the reach of politics and propaganda. Churches have become very important to politics in Zimbabwe since they command a large following in rural areas. In this era of 'prophecy' people look up to the "men of God" to deliver them from all sorts of problems and they follow their teachings religiously. Another Mudzidzi warned people against offending the spirits of the dead comrades through voting for the opposition,

Do not raise the spirit of the dead that is why there was war in 2008. When the blood of Jesus was spilled on the cross it redeemed the whole world there is no other blood that was spilled for the same purpose again. That is what the blood of the comrades

who died during the liberation did, it when it was spilled it freed the country there is no other blood that will free the country again.

These statements entangle the dead, the spirit, and the blood to the land (*nyika*). The blood liberated the land. But crucially, it links this to Jesus' sacrifice and spilling blood on the Cross. The action of voting invokes the reactions of the dead in different ways, voting for opposition political parties that are linked to the colonisers invokes the anger of the dead comrades and takes us into an understanding of how the landscaped is experienced by the people. During the liberation struggle, people claim to have been led by the ancestors through animals and different signs in the bush to avoid death or danger. Today people speak of strange things happening in the landscapes that housed the guerrilla bases, be it cattle herders, development agencies, hunters and gatherers or Christians praying. These experiences highlight issues to do with resolution of places of liberation war violence through traditional rituals that appease the souls of the departed people on both sides of the war. Resolution is also through voting for the parties they were aligned to during the struggle. The prayer vigil at Mumurwi Mountain was going against these teachings showing that there is excessivity to experience and engagement with liberation war remains that defies categorization into certain narratives. A former member of the Vadzidzi church said in an interview at his homestead in 2013:

I left this church because it teaches the hatred, hate language against white farmers and MDC supporters they supported the brutal killings of white farmers and MDC supporters. It's a shame...a church is supposed to be preaching love and peace. A church as a body of Christ we have to preach God's Kingdom and not Mugabe's propaganda. Madzibaba Wimbo is lost, we hear that he is the brother to the Police Commissioner General Chihuri, but we will meet on judgment day. I wouldn't be surprised if the CIO infiltrated the church.

Prophet Wimbo was abducted by a faction of ZANU-PF aligned to Vice President Mnangagwa, in an attempt to force him to 'anoint' Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor. Early in 2017 President Mugabe personally tried to mediate between Wimbo and his abductors to no avail. The media reported that Wimbo prophesized that Mugabe's successor will have a foreign name and non of the current aspirants will succeed him. There is a well-publicized moment in which the Johane Marange

Apostolic church hosted President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, during their annual congress ahead of the 2013 elections. In this church conference broadcast on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation television Main news, congregates sang a song called ‘Achatonga Africa yese’ meaning “He will rule the whole of Africa”. After the song the church leader praised the President, comparing him to biblical angel Gabriel. He said to his congregates in front of the president:

Gabriel is the Supreme; He carries the blood of Jesus, Happiness to you all. There is nowhere we will abandon him, because in ZANU-PF we say Forward with Comrade R.G. Mugabe and you all say forward. But who is Gabriel? Isn't he the President? For him to be given the name Gabriel was there no other names? He is someone who is anointed even by Mbuya Nehanda that he should rule the country. Not the ones who are coming up these days. Which church has many ZANU-PF party chairmen, it is this one, because they know that it is the party's church and even when it comes to soccer, it is the party very soon it will be scored. Forward with ZANU-PF, forward with our land reforms, Down with those who do not listen!

Here, the Church leader was politicizing the people telling them to vote for ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections. In the message, there was a prediction of a ZANU-PF victory in the election when he referred to scoring a goal very soon. This was one of the ZANU-PF's slogans during the 2013 election campaign. These prophecies and references to the anointing of Mbuya Nehanda at a church gathering seeks to legitimize Mugabe's rule in a country that believes so much in the voice of prophecy. Spirit mediums have also added their voices to the unending prophecies by making claims to predictions made by mediums way before the war of liberation ended in the 1970s. For example, an elderly man in the village, Comrade George tells a story of such a prediction in the late 1970s towards the end of the war. He said:

As the war was nearing the end before the ceasefire of 1979, a medium in Uzumba-Maramba pfungwe called a gathering of elders and traditional leaders from surrounding areas to deliver a message from the ancestors about the impending independence. The message was that the war would end soon and a new black leader would emerge, and that he wore spectacles. The main point was that he would rule until he dies it would not be easy to remove him from power. To demonstrate the truth in his message the medium asked one of us to dig a small hole in the ground, and then called a small boy to place a small stick into the hole. After that he asked each and every one of us to the elders to remove the stick.

Failure to do so will prove the accurateness of his message, but if it were removed then the incoming first black ruler would be removed from the presidency during his lifetime. We were surprised that even the strongest of men present failed to remove a stick placed in a shallow hole by a child, with snort on his nose. We were puzzled but we didn't care it was the will of the ancestors and we were happy we will have independence eventually and a black rule that will do the will of the people (Comrade George, Bindura South, 18/12/2013).

This was a sign of what was to come and according to Comrade George, the people interpreted it to mean that he must die in office and anyone trying to remove him from office was going against the will of the ancestors. No one knows if it was the will of the ancestors or it was a simple prediction of how things would happen in the future. All these narratives are given space in the national media as part of the patriotic history narrative, in which the church assists the state media institutions, schools and the party to disseminate pro-ZANU-PF propaganda. In all these prophecies by Christian leaders and prophets and traditional spirit mediums, the guerrillas and ZANU-PF and president Mugabe are portrayed as heroes and the ideal leaders of the country, but the landscape is saturated with evidence of guerrilla and ZANU-PF violence. The youth are evaluating the legitimacy of these accounts in light of their everyday struggles that according to Madzibaba Thomas “are a result of ZANU-PF misrule”, and he challenged these pro-ZANU-PF narratives by questioning “how God and the ancestors can anoint such cruel and corrupt leaders, and be happy with how they have destroyed lives.” As Lan (1985) noted the ancestors abhor the spilling of blood as it contaminates the land.

7.6 Affordances, agency and affective qualities of the landscape

The post-2000 context has been animated by horrific acts of violence by ZANU-PF and yet the party has closed down space for healing, perpetrators and victims have no public space to talk about their experiences of violence as it tarnishes the image of the party (Bamu 2009). Many African independent churches have offered space where people work through these experiences of violence through confessions and spiritual healing and in these churches feelings of trust and solidarity are restored (see Tankik 2007; Chitando and Togarasei 2010). What is apparent at these prayer vigils is that congregates and their leaders are not using the rhetoric used by church leaders in

public spaces in which they claim that President Mugabe is ordained by God to rule and urge people to pray for him instead of criticizing his leadership (Engelke 2007). This rhetoric discourages members from challenging political leaders and their decisions.

When people are talking about the spirits of the 1970s liberation war dead, other spirits especially those of the post-2000 violence suddenly materialize through memories of traumatic experiences in which victims of that violence are also haunting perpetrators. Stories suddenly link to other stories of ZANU-PF violence in post-independence Zimbabwe especially the *Gukurahundi* violence of the 1980s. One of the ZANU-PF youth who is now a member of the apostolic church Madzibaba Shaddy argued that if he was forced to participate in violence like what happened in 2008, he would relocate to urban areas, to South Africa or anywhere safe. He went on to say:

ZANU-PF wanted to bring ngozi to our families by encouraging us to kill people in the name of protecting our independence. In 2008 I didn't understand this I was so involved in the ZANU-PF campaign I didn't care but since I started coming to church and encountering these spirits in the Mountain, I now know that people don't just die and go, their spirit remains alive and will haunt the whole family into extinction. Politicians will not use me again, at the base we were there yes but I didn't listen to what they were saying (Madzibaba Shaddy, Mumurwi mountain November 2013).

This points to excessivity of experience and here of the immaterial/material, which defies ZANU-PF efforts to control knowledge and direct experience to create its kind of political subjectivity. The dominant ZANU-PF narrative is challenged in the way these apostolic members talk about resolution of past violence or appeasing the spirits of the dead. The church brings up the dangerousness of violence as it leaves dangerous remnants that need to be dealt with. What this does is that it shames violence, a tool that ZANU-PF has relied on to hold onto power. While ZANU-PF narrative claims that the spirits can be appeased through voting for ZANU-PF or being loyal to ZANU-PF. Church members who engage with this landscape outside ZANU-PF politicking criticize ZANU-PF's perceived betrayal of the promises of the liberation war through corruption and practices of misrule. The narratives used by

church members in these criticisms are shaped by their affective experiences of what the landscape gives them through visions and dreams, which is the skeletons, ghosts, and death. Madzibaba Israel draws on this saying:

ZANU-PF is as scary as the skeletons we see in our visions and dreams and the party died with those heroes who perished at these bases. And that is what the country is coming to; it is becoming a skeleton and a ghost of its former self. Look at the economy and the way people live here in the rural areas. Those spirits might also be warning us about ZANU-PF, that it used them and deserted them. They should have done repatriation rituals to return the spirit back to their ancestors. The way they abandoned these heroes is the way they abandon their supporters after election victory. They give each other fertile land, companies, big houses and luxury cars because they are war veterans. What about us, is it a crime that we are not war veterans? That is why we say we should liberate ourselves from these people and become our own war veterans and heroes. We should stand up just like they did in their own time (Madzibaba Israel, Mumurwi Mountain November 2013).

These narratives by the youth feed into the narratives of opposition MDC-T who have long claimed that ZANU-PF has diverted from the promises of the liberation war. On April 18 2014, Zimbabwe celebrated 34 years of independence from colonialism. At the National sports stadium in Harare, an Army Chaplain opened the proceedings through prayer and a word of God from the Bible. At Rutope business center in Bindura South, the national anthem marked proceedings and people dutifully clapped the authority of the headman a representative of the Chief. At the same time church organizations present were acknowledged, recognizing freedom of worship. However, the turnout was low compared to previous years of the inclusive government when tensions between the two main parties in the coalition government were high. During those five years attending these celebrations was forced and it was a sign of patriotism and loyalty not only to the nation but also to the party that claimed to have played the 'only' important role in bringing about that freedom. The low turnout was attributed to clash of events; annual Easter holidays coincided with Independence Day. Good Friday, which is the most important to Christians as the day Jesus died to redeem their sins, was on the 18th of April.

In Harare, the army Chaplain General and President Mugabe claimed that this coincidence was a blessing to the party and the nation. At Rutope Business center, a

local secondary school headmaster read the president's speech, and for the first time in five years a councilor was present at the official local independence celebrations. In 2008, an opposition MDC-T candidate won the ward council seat in the local district council. ZANU-PF losing candidate and local leadership refused to recognize him as the ward councilor. He was excluded from official ward council business and at most meetings the losing ZANU-PF candidate stood in for him and later the aspiring ZANU-PF candidate for the council seat in the ward took over. The result was that national celebrations that are supposed to be inclusive as the "national thing" as ZANU-PF members called it became the "party thing" where only ZANU-PF supporters were welcome. It became a place where hate language against the opposition was preached. As a result MDC-T supporters organized their independence celebrations at a separate venue in the middle of the business center about one hundred meters from the police post where the official ward gathering was organized. The MDC-T supporters argued that:

We recognize the sacrifices made by the sons and daughters who left their jobs, education, families and everything they had, to fight for the liberation of the country and some of them died during the war. We all have family members who fought the war, the fact that we belong to the opposition does not mean that we do not recognize the importance of the war we are Zimbabweans. We simply oppose the way ZANU-PF has betrayed the promises of the struggle and made it a personal sacrifice. They have destroyed the country and they kill the people they claim to have liberated (Mr Chamisa, MDC local chairperson, Bindura South, 18/04/2014).

This is how Independence Day was celebrated at Rutope ward in Bindura South since 2008. For the MDC-T supporters, it was also an opportunity for a party gathering. They cooked their own food bought drinks through donations from local businesses. They held small talks between themselves about the future of the party and the state of affairs in the country. I asked them about the prospects and hope for change after the 2013 election loss to ZANU-PF, their leader Mr. Chamisa had this to say:

We will never give up the struggle for change and democracy in this country. ZANU-PF's stolen election last year (2013) is meaningless because they cannot steal or fool the economic challenges the country is facing. We will continue to

mobilize people for the 2018 elections. People voted out of fear of a repeat of the 2008 violence coupled with rigging of elections (Mr. Chamisa, Rutope, Bindura South, 18/04/2014).

There were very old men in their late 60s and 70s at the MDC-T gathering. They caught my attention because the MDC-T is recognized as a youthful party or a party for the young, disgruntled and urban intellectuals. Apparently one of these elders was a well-known former ZANU liberation war veteran, Comrade Hondoyauya (meaning the war has come). He claimed that he was left out of the payment of gratuities in 1997 because he was sick and could not attend the vetting exercises. At this time he was very frail, and he died in 2015. ZANU-PF provincial officials funded his funeral, as a way of compensating for letting him down. These old men said they were disgruntled about how the ruling party reneged from the path of the liberation struggle. He spoke about the *Gukurahundi* violence in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s as well as the post 2000 election violence as signs that the party had refused to recognize multi-party democracy and one-man one vote. He argued that “it was the worst form of oppression people of this nation suffered, not even during the Smith regime did we experience this, and in fact life was better.” Mr. Chamisa spoke about selective distribution of national economic resources on ZANU-PF party lines, he said:

Failure to recognized that during the war we all suffered together, we fought the war on different fronts; some of us were assistants to the guerrillas. Even people who lived in towns donated clothes to the guerrillas so every family fought the war, so there is no need to elevate others as more important when it comes to the history of the war and access to economic resources. People who voted for ZANU-PF during the 2013 elections did so out of fear of violence of 2008 because the youth continued intimidating people ahead of the 2013 elections (Mr. Chamisa, 18/04/2014).

Even though they were few, these MDC-T supporters showed no fear of retributive punishment by the ruling party youth even though the ZANU-PF youth leader Comrade Ziso claimed that he had his people monitoring the situation there. This did not dampen the resolve of these opposition supporters from publicly speaking against President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Engaging with landscapes of liberation war

violence outside ZANU-PF politicking allows the youth and others to feed into this language and acts of resistance that challenge the dormant ZANU-PF ideology. Although, ZANU PF has deliberately attempted to direct such material legacies of the struggle to its political ends, the excessivity of affective experiences at these places are not ultimately limited by ZANU-PF control, allowing room for other histories, other phenomenological experiences, and other uses for these highly charged places and landscapes of violence.

7.7 Conclusion

The landscape affords and shapes discourse by providing people the ‘images’ and ‘figures’ with which to structure speech and rhetoric about that nature of ZANU-PF rule and the state of the country. This shows that the landscape and the remains of the liberation war violence are ‘active’ and ‘affective’. This points to how the affective qualities of that particular former liberation war guerrilla base, can be engaged with and potentially provoke an entirely different kind of response, than that desired by ZANU PF. The youth who did not witness the liberation war because they were not yet born read the persuasiveness and the authenticity of the patriotic history account, in light of other accounts of evidence and other knowledge that they are receiving as something that is didactic. To some extent they enjoy performing obedience but they also enjoy performing the opposite through criticizing the ZANU-PF narrative. This has everything to do with their rejection of the liberation war narrative, arguing that it is not enough, and that it is not their narrative. It is under these conditions of suffering that the youth political subjectivity in Zimbabwe resists these kinds of narratives. Even if ZANU-PF commandeers the churches to themselves, the churches are struggling because of this volatility. This goal (idea) of constituting a pure political subject who is a participant in larger ZANU-PF politics is impossible, it cannot be done.

8 CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion

This thesis is about what an anthropologist can do to deepen what is fairly an institutionalized official conversation about propaganda and political consciousness. Through a historical ethnography of the base, I have managed to draw on how the Zimbabwean political subjectivity is reproduced and constituted within particular spaces of the past but also of the present. The liberation war constitutes an important and unforgettable period in the lives of the people of Zimbabwe in general and Bindura South in particular. People are entangled in the events of the war, with many families having contributed their sons and daughters to the struggle for independence. Some have contributed as heroes and heroines but some have been villains, whose stories are shamed and can never be told in public. Importantly, the liberation war is a source of emotion, legitimacy, belonging and ultimately boldness and inspiration to fight oppression. In studying continuities and discontinuities in a single political form, *the militia base*, across the history of ZANU-PF mobilization, the research argues that the base was the political form through which the liberation war narrative hit the ground into the people's homes and had a complex relationship between political mobilization, consciousness and violence. The re-enactment of the base in the post-2000 with its related trauma and violence, evoked subjectivities that are on display in the contemporary moment that of fear, pretense, quietude and detection.

As I have shown in this thesis, I use the 2008 election in Bindura south to dispute this view of rural people. I argued that the reason why the MDC won a majority in parliament in 2008 and nearly won the presidency was the fact that rural people on whom ZANU-PF usually rely had shifted allegiance to the MDC. The voting pattern in urban areas, which were MDC strongholds since 2000 had never shifted, ZANU-PF lost more in rural areas. This was because of the conditions created by the SADC electoral reforms and against using their politics of detection rural people realized that this was an opportunity for them to effect leadership change in the country. The violence they suffered after that election ahead of the presidential election run-off changed their views of the MDC and their political subjectivity. Most rural people, I spoke to said that the MDC and the international community failed to protect their vote and allowed ZANU-PF to murder, maim and torture many people in rural areas

with impunity. Some were not happy with the fact that the MDC had to go into bed with ZANU-PF during the GNU from 2010-2013; they viewed this as a betrayal. So for them the 2013 vote was about avoiding violence from ZANU-PF but was at the same time a protest vote against the MDC's failure to protect them. In essence, it's not smartphones or remittances that rural Zimbabweans want but a system that can assure them that their vote and their bodies and resources will be protected from political violence. They are aware of the economic challenges they face, the corruption of ZANU-PF officials and they want to get rid of them as much as urban dwellers and diasporas do but their environment and their reality is different they are still doing the work of trying to figure out their realist relationship with ZANU-PF at every moment.

Since 2008, the rural Zimbabweans have been taking back their country through the ballot, which was made possible by the bravery, resilience and determination some of them had shown during the liberation struggle. It was those memories, which made them believe that it is possible, that if they could defeat Rhodesia with its might in the 1970s how could they not defeat ZANU-PF through the ballot. The 2008 defeat of ZANU-PF alerted them to the fact that they needed to put in place a system of surveillance and the means to diagnose who is doing the work of selling out by supporting the opposition. Among many other means of surveillance that included use of traditional leaders, spying on MDC rallies and meetings, turning citizens into ZANU-PF and security services' informants against their neighbors and relatives, they involved formulations like "we are watching you" and the threat to go back to the base, and the youth were seen as ready to go back to the bases and unleash devastating violence surpassing that of the liberation war or of 2008. That is a threat to reconstitute the state of exception, outside democracy, which everyone has stored in their memory, which they are told that if the conditions required ZANU-PF can remake the base and the violence associated with it when they want. And there is an absence of limitation to engage in excess if required in which nobody will be safe. The ZNA becomes instrumental in these moments of violence in which they organized the youth into the militia bases, indoctrinating them in liberation war and ZANU-PF propaganda then send them on a mission to deliver ZANU-PF victory through violence. I have argued that the role of the army since independence has been

to cow people into silence reinforcing the subjectivities of fear, silence and resignation.

It is not only violence but through revisiting the old liberation war guerrilla base the ZANU-PF war veterans serving in the ZNA uses choreographed narratives, performances, and affective identifications of the dead to entangle the local people in an inalienable relationship with the landscape, ancestors and the liberation war dead. This is done to make landscape and geography do the political work of forging particular subjectivities and loyalties. In this, they succeeded in a way because narratives of Rhodesian security forces brutality on guerrillas and their assistants managed to evoke anger toward the white people and opposition by those who did not witness the liberation war because they were young or were not born.

These choreographed narratives, performances and affective identifications were meant to reinforce ZANU PF's legitimacy, and de-legitimise the political opposition, and the imperialist agendas ZANU PF have long claimed to lay behind it. I have shown how the evocation of a version of the past, along with the sacrifices of its heroes and betrayals of its traitors is then literally drawn into the voices and bodies of youth forced to go to the bases, through song and through the obligation to enact violence. I also argued that people engage with the same places of liberation war violence outside of ZANU-PF politicking and provoking different responses. But because what the materiality of the landscape do is ultimately not simply determined by human thought or action, there is something excessive which lies beyond their attempts at harnessing it for their own purposes, which potentially threatens the narratives they are enforcing, the legitimacy they are seeking, and the kinds of subjects they are trying to constitute, which is why they spent so long rehearsing the events.

In revealing this, I described an apostolic church vigil that was held on the same site as the ZSC workshop, at the former liberation war main base at Mumurwi Mountain. I attended this prayer vigil, and I used it to demonstrate how people engage with the same landscape outside ZANU-PF politicking and how the affective qualities of the former guerrilla bases can be engaged with and potentially provoke a different response that challenges ZANU-PF dominant narrative. ZANU PF may on one level be working with such geography and landscapes deliberately, but there is always more

going on outside of its control and view, and it was crucial to engage with this, because memory is not all that's going on, these are 'active' and 'affective' places, beyond the control of ZANU-PF politicking. The salience of legacies of struggle is not just a question of contested meanings or values; or about the selective celebration and silencing of particular past for particular presents. It is about the uneasy metonymic, co-presence of many pasts in the material and immaterial remains of things, lives and people; and their capacity to unsettle, undo, demand and animate contemporary politics, defying stabilization, containment, directionality and narrative closure.

Amid the 'silence', I have been able to highlight the social, political and religious spaces that people use to speak about their daily lives. ZANU-PF does not silence people from speaking about violence but what is silenced is talking about how to deal with the violence. The opposition parties' attempts to strengthening people to be defiant, bold and resilient to ZANU-PF violence and that regime change can be achieved is what is silenced in the public sphere. Violence is produced so that it is visible and it serves as a warning to those who seek to defy ZANU-PF rule. At the rallies and the base ZANU-PF officials talk about violence a lot, especially their ability to use violence to force people to comply, this is meant to sustain the subjectivities of fear and helplessness within the people.

At fourth street commuter rank in Harare's central business district, I boarded a 15 seater Toyota Hiace, these different brand of commuter omnibus are known as 'kombis' after the VW kombis which were the first to hit the roads in Zimbabwe. When the kombi was loaded and full, the driver went east instead of north the direction of Bindura South, he told the passengers that he was going to Msasa industrial and residential area to refuel apparently that is where service stations with cheaper fuel are located, the ones in the CBD were expensive. As we passed through the ghost, rusty and dilapidated industrial area we were reminded that this was once the hub of a thriving industry. The roads are full of potholes and during the rainy season it gets worse as the roads get flooded because the drainage system is blocked and the driver was playing Thomas Mapfumo's song called *Mamvemve* which says that "the country you fought so hard for has now turned into rags". Of course the country resembled the rags, nothing was intact it was falling apart with each passing day. From Msasa, the driver headed north passing through the posh suburbs of

Highlands, Grange, and Glen Lorne the inequalities within society become apparent. As the Kombi passed through the last toll gate and turned left into the Harare-Shamva road, the track that was playing from the Thomas Mapfumo collection was *Pfumvu paruzevha*, which means suffering in the reserves. This song speaks about the suffering that rural people went through during the liberation war:

You are blessed to have houses that have peace
You are blessed you are able to cook and eat
You are blessed you have money in your pockets
You are blessed you drive cars
You are blessed you stay in town
You are blessed you are still healthy and fit
Look at the suffering in reserves
Did you hear that granny disappeared?
Did you hear that grandpa ran away?
Did you hear that farming has ceased?
Did you hear that cattle are dead?
Did you hear that it no longer rains?
Did you hear that homes were burnt down?
Did you hear that mother was killed?
Did you hear that our father ran away?
Did you hear that our brother was abducted?
They suffered in the reserves
You are blessed to have somewhere to sleep
You are blessed to have something to eat
Behold the suffering in the reserves

There was silence in the kombi as this song was played; one would think we were heading straight into the suffering that Thomas Mapfumo was describing in his song. It was years after the war that brought this kind of suffering for rural people, but successive election violence hasn't made the situation any better. People in rural areas were still suffering albeit at a different level. Homes were tortured, livestock was killed, people were abducted, grandmothers and grandfathers were beaten up, and the youth ran away to other countries. Years after independence *pfumvu* (suffering) is still

being experienced *paruzevha* (in the rural areas). Mapfumo's song spoke about the different conditions that obtained between the rural and urban areas during the liberation war. The urban areas were relatively peaceful and safe zones in which people went about their daily lives with no disturbance from the war of liberation that was raging in the rural areas. Apart from Operation Murambatsvina of 2005, the same different conditions exist in the post 2000 context. The intimacy in rural existence makes it difficult for people to break the coercion and surveillance cycle. People in rural areas do not have the luxury of protesting like those in towns because ZANU-PF has given up on winning in urban areas and have put their focus in the rural areas where they vow not to lose at all costs. It is easy for the pro-democracy movements and opposition parties to hold demonstrations and protests in urban areas, and the only tool rural people can use to protest and demonstrate their frustration at the ZANU-PF government is the ballot. Between elections they have to feign pretense and live in quietude for the sake of their peace, and clandestinely do the work of detection figuring out if the time is right to vote for a different party.

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