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**TROUBLED WATCHDOGS: THE PARADOX OF JOURNALISM IN
CHINESE MEDIA ORGANISATIONS BASED IN AFRICA**

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Africa-China Reporting Project

DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how African journalists negotiate the tension between their understanding of journalism and the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Adopting the Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model and using interviews with African journalists in Kenya and content analysis, I examine this tension within the framework of the relationship between role conception and role performance. China has framed its media expansion into Africa on the premise that it aims to tell the ‘true African story’ to global audiences. This is consistent with China’s Africa policy promising mutuality and equality between China and Africa. However, the findings indicate an African and a Chinese level of gatekeeping and journalistic agency exist within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. These levels often coexist, but they also collide, resulting in Chinese interests and ideas prevailing over those of African journalists, and often in a type of journalism that de-emphasises African belonging and identity.

This study represents an original contribution to the debate on the relationship between role conception and role performance, from a non-western perspective. It demonstrates the ways in which the relationship between role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations in Africa is hinged upon conditional autonomy in relation to the typology of stories. The elements of the hierarchy of influences model are more active when Chinese interests are present in a story than when they are absent. Consequently, the editorial policy of ‘positive reporting’ promoted by Chinese media organisations is more active in the coverage of activities related to China than non-China content.

This thesis enriches the five levels of analysis in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model. This study proposes language as a level of influence straddling media routines and organisation influences, when applied to Chinese media organisations in Africa. This thesis also contributes to the ideologisation debate on Chinese media expansion into Africa. While the debate has been dominantly framed through the Manichean prism of positive or negative, this thesis proposes Chinese media expansion into Africa will result in a hybrid form of journalism professionalisation in which Western and Chinese journalistic traditions co-exist on the continent.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCTV: China Central Television

CDN: China Daily newspaper

XNA: Xinhua News Agency

SACF: Sino-African Cooperation Forum

FOCAC: Forum on China Africa Cooperation

HRW: Human Rights Watch

AI: Amnesty International

ICC: International Criminal Court

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In this study, I examine how African journalists negotiate the tension between their understanding of journalism and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Adopting the Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model as well as interviews and content analysis, I examine this tension within the framework of role conception and role performance.

While China's media expansion is officially targeted at the entire continent, the fact that the three Chinese media organisations under study are headquartered in Nairobi is significant and draws attention to their interaction with the Kenyan media system. In addition, Kenyans comprise the vast majority of African journalists employed by these organisations and it is likely they come to these organisations with journalistic traditions more or less specific to Kenya.

I am therefore interested in the struggles and tensions individual African journalists encounter in articulating their personal understanding of journalism in the context of their roles within Chinese media organisations, and in relation to the dominant libertarian-democratic journalistic traditions in Africa (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956).

Chinese media expansion into Africa has been supported by significant investments from the Chinese government. In 2006, the Africa regional editorial office for the Xinhua News Agency relocated from Paris to Nairobi (Gagliardone 2013, p. 25) and commenced mobile news delivery in 2010. These developments were followed in 2011 by the establishment of China Central Television's (CCTV) first network centre outside China. This network was also headquartered in Nairobi; and the launch of the African edition of Xinhuanet, an online service of the Xinhua News Agency (XNA), followed in 2012 (Umejei, 2013).

Research into Chinese media expansion in Africa can be categorised into three dominant strands – soft power, ideology and media systems, plus representation and perception (Kurlantzick, 2007; Mawdsley 2008; Banda, 2009; Shi, 2013; Wekesa, 2013; Gagliardone, 2013; Wasserman, 2014). Though, journalistic considerations have been generally embedded within these broad categories, much research has not been conducted on the relationship

between role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations operating in Africa. Furthermore, there have been virtually no focused studies upon how African journalists experience and reflect on their roles within China's increasing global media processes.

This study combines the sociology of news production approach as well as studies on professional roles to highlight the professional autonomy African journalists enjoy in carrying out their work in relation to the typology of stories.

1.1 *Chinese media in Africa*

The 'going out' campaign of the Chinese media was launched in response to the Western media's framing of events leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Sun, 2010). Preparation for some of these events resulted in the deaths of several construction workers at the Bird's Nest Stadium, Steven Spielberg protested China's position on Darfur, the Communist Party's campaign to eradicate Falun Gong, and levelled allegations that Chinese media censored the news of the Tibetan riots.

The perceived 'anti-Chinese' coverage of these events in the Western media came to a head on April 9, 2008, when Cable News Network (CNN)'s Situation Room host, Jack Cafferty described Chinese products as "junk" and remarked that "Chinese people were basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years¹." This attracted strong condemnation from the Chinese government and CNN was compelled to issue a public apology². Additionally, Chinese authorities expressed displeasure over what they saw as the Western media's "wilful determination to misunderstand China" on several issues including Tibet and Falun Gong (Sun, 2010, p. 58-59).

Sun (2010) points out, China took away two lessons from the Western media's framing of these events. First, China's rise to prominence as an economic and political power did not result in a more positive view of China in the international community. Rather it has given

¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/world/asia/16cnn.html>

² <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/04/16/cnn-apologizes-after-commentator-calls-china-bunch-goons-and-thugs.html>

vent to a higher level of ‘anxiety or even disapproval’ (Sun, 2010, p. 59). Secondly, China realised it could not rely on the Western media to change its cynical narrative of China. The Chinese concluded it needed to be proactive by pushing Chinese perspectives into the international arena in order to contest the discursive power of the West.

Increasing bilateral trade between China and Africa also provides an important background to China’s media expansion as it has been accompanied by waves of perceived ‘misinformation’ that China was giving aid only to resources-rich countries in Africa (Brautigam, 2009, p. 3). In response, the Chinese government is eager to balance international media coverage of China’s engagement within Africa (Anshan, 2012). In this regard, former Prime minister, Wen Jiabao, urged China to extend its cultural engagement with other countries because “cultural exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people of all countries and an important way to project a country’s image” (Fook, 2010, p. 548-549). In order to achieve its soft power objective, Wen emphasised Chinese media outlets going international would receive funding to enable them ‘present a true picture of China to the World’ (Wu, 2012:6).

While representation and perception may be considered part of soft power, in this study, I use it as a category in relation to my objective of accentuating the role of the media in framing China’s engagement with Africa. I explain below the three dominant categories through which scholars have examined research on Chinese media expansion in Africa.

1.1.1 Soft power

While Nye’s (2004, p. 6) notion of ‘soft power’ privileges appeal and consensus over force and coercion as an approach to public diplomacy, China’s approach to soft power diplomacy includes every aspect of its engagement save for its military power (Fijalkowski, 2011). Kurlantzick (2007) explains China’s launch of its own version of soft power diplomacy in the early 2000s was aimed at rebranding its image in the international media (Kurlantzick, 2007).

China’s soft power diplomacy was officially launched in 2002 at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) with an aim to promote Chinese culture as a means of achieving its national interests (Courmont, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2007). It was adopted as a ‘political strategy’ at the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 (Kurlantzick, 2007; Fook, 2010; Wu, 2012; Courmont, 2013). In an article published in the People’s Daily

newspaper, former prime minister Wen Jiabao urged China to expand its cultural engagement with other countries because “cultural exchanges are an important way to project a country’s image” (Fook, 2010, p. 548-549).

Chinese soft power builds upon its traditional Chinese cultural values of Confucianism which promotes ‘winning hearts’ over force, peace and harmonious co-existence (Wu, 2012; Ronning 2014). Yet, in Africa, China’s soft power diplomacy can be traced to liberation movements benefiting from supplies of communication equipment for ‘ideological warfare’ (Banda, 2009a, p. 345). Banda (2009a, p. 345) contends that what has changed about China’s soft power diplomacy from that time is it being promoted in a “post-Cold war era that necessitates a greater degree of openness, amid ideological suspicions about China’s real intentions in Africa”.

He identifies infrastructural alignment, ideological expurgation and cultural reproduction as the three critical components of China’s soft power diplomacy in Africa. He notes that the first component of Chinese media penetration into the African mediasphere is the ‘hardware’ while the other components function as its ‘software’ (Banda, 2009a, p. 348).

To achieve its objectives, China provides assistance to state-run media organisations, provides content and technologies to friendly countries and partners with African media organisations in the sharing of news and training programmes for journalists (Farah & Mosher, 2010, p. 4). In doing this, China is following a path already established by other countries which have deployed state-owned media to frame their images on global media arena such as France (France 24), Russia (Russia Today), Iran (Press TV) and Qatar (Aljazeera) [Wu, 2012, p. 7].

China’s soft power approach has been described as problematic and “interwoven with discursive struggles over political identity”³ (Hall, 2010, p. 207). Ronning (2014, p. 9, 14) argues the concept of ‘cultural capital’ might be more useful in analysing China’s media relations with Africa, explaining that the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) could better depict China’s soft power diplomacy on the continent.

³ See also (Fijalkowski, 2011; Nye, 2012; Ronning, 2014).

In the same vein, Nye (2012) argues China's soft power is problematic because it is government-led and lacks a civil society component. He contends China's attempt to use "culture and narrative to create soft power" is limiting due their inconsistencies "with domestic realities" (Nye, 2012). He argues elsewhere, that many of the crucial resources central to the success of soft power are "outside the control of governments and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences" (Nye, 2004, p. 1).

Taking this further, Fijalkowski (2011, p. 255) argues, like many others, that the government's role in promoting China's soft power through the media is problematic because of its propagandist orientation which tends to compromise its credibility⁴. It is important also to question how China uses its soft power push in Africa as a strategy to create another hegemonic media presence on the continent. While western media hegemony has resulted in the depiction of Africa as a "continent of darkness, hunger and corruption"⁵, the role of a potentially hegemonic Chinese media in Africa remains uncertain. In this regard, an analysis of how African journalists function within Chinese media organisations in Africa and how these journalists perceive of their roles can offer greater clarity on the operations and motivations of Chinese media expansion into Africa.

1.1.2 Ideology and media systems

Besides rebranding the image of China and reconstructing the narrative of China-Africa relations, Chinese media expansion into Africa has involved the training of African journalists in journalistic ideals differing from the dominant libertarian journalistic tradition on the continent.

Banda (2009a) and Wu (2012) suggest China's media assistance to African countries can be traced to China's emasculation in global geopolitics during the Cold War era. This was a situation that compelled China to seek ideological partners in other parts of the world including Africa. Towards this end, China provided communication gadgets to liberation movements on the continent during struggles for independence (Wu, 2012; Banda, 2009).

⁴ see also Banda, 2009; Farah and Mosher, 2010; Fijalkowski, 2011; Wu, 2012; Shi, 2013; Wasserman, 2014; Ronning, 2014; Banda, 2009

⁵ http://www.rjr.ru.ac.za/rjrpdf/rjr_no20/framing_africa.pdf

China has also provided infrastructural and technical support to almost every country on the African continent especially Zambia, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Gabon, and Angola. In 2003, China donated transmitters to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in 2005, audio-visual equipment and a building were gifted to the National Radio of Guinea. In 2005, it lent Zambia \$14.5million for FM radio transmitters and a new government complex. And in 2006, Kenya reportedly received \$150,000 worth of equipment from CCTV (Wu, 2012, p. 14).

China presents its media assistance as an “instrument of foreign policy, intended to further the aims of both donor and recipient” (Farah & Mosher, 2010, p. 11). However, Banda (2009a, p. 350) contends China’s media infrastructural support has the potential to “align African countries with Chinese technology and technical know-how and consequently make African countries more dependent on China than the West” (Banda, 2009, p. 348). He argues China’s media support for African countries has both negative and positive implications. On the one hand, China equips despotic leaders on the continent with requisite media infrastructure which prolong their stay in power (Banda, 2009, p. 350). Such is the case in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Angola where freedom of the press is seriously limited (Banda, 2009a; Farah & Mosher, 2010; Wu, 2012). On the other hand, there has been increased coverage of China in the African media which could engender closer cultural ties between the Chinese and African cultures (Banda, 2009a, p. 351).

China-Africa media cooperation gained momentum between 2006 and 2007. Beginning at the 2006 FOCAC event in Beijing, Chinese and African journalists convened under the auspices of the Sino-African Cooperation Forum (SACF). Then in 2007, a training programme for French-speaking African journalists was launched at the China Media University (Wu, 2014, p. 3).

Following on these successes, an action plan on media training and exchanges was streamlined and formalised at the 2009 FOCAC event in Sharm El Sheik (Farah and Mosher, 2010: 14; Wu, 2014). This was further consolidated at the fifth FOCAC meeting in 2012 when China proposed a ‘China-Africa Press Exchange Centre’ with a focus on developmental reporting on both sides (Wu, 2014).

In furtherance of China-Africa media relations, China trained more than 1000 African journalists and media professionals through workshops and training camps. There, African journalists are exposed to various aspects of Chinese life – political, economic, social, technological and cultural (Banda, 2009a; Shi, 2015).

According to Banda (2009a, p. 16), these training programmes are used to promote Chinese ideologies and to introduce African journalists to the Chinese media system in ways that may subvert Western journalistic traditions prevailing in Africa (Banda, 2009a, p. 16). It is therefore expedient to investigate how and to what extent these training programmes may have been used to subtly or overtly promote specific Chinese journalistic traditions among African journalists.

1.1.3 Representation and perception

In terms of representation and perception, the international media has often framed China's engagement with Africa in terms portraying China as a colonial power in search of resources on the African continent (Gagliardone, 2013). To this portrayal, the Chinese government is eager to counter international media coverage of China's engagement in and with Africa (Anshan, 2012).

To this end, China has invested more than US\$8.9 billion in the internationalisation of its six major state-controlled media companies (Farah & Mosher, 2010). The first symbolic step in this direction was the relocation of the Xinhua regional editorial office for Africa from Paris to Nairobi in 2006 (Gagliardone, 2013, p. 25). Xinhua next commenced the delivery of news on mobile phones in 2010. In 2011, the China Central Television (CCTV) established its African broadcast hubs in Nairobi, and in 2012, Xinhuanet, an online service of the Xinhua news agency, launched its African edition (Umejei, 2013).

China's media expansion into Africa has been described as attempt to use the media to rebrand its image and construct a new narrative of China on the global stage. As well, this strategy counters the dominant Western portrayal of China as a predator in Africa (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 40).

Mawdsley's (2008) study of British broadsheet newspapers confirms UK newspapers set out to sanitise Western roles in Africa while being critical of China by utilising a biased focus

on China's engagement with Africa (2008, p. 518). She demonstrated UK broadsheet newspapers downplay the positive impact of China's engagement with Africa. Topics downplayed included debt cancellation, investment, commodity price impacts, and support for a greater international voice. Conversely, these same newspapers corroborate problematic issues such as loans to African countries and infrastructure for resources deals (Mawdsley, 2008, p. 518).

This probably explains Shi's (2015) argument that what China is doing through its media engagement with Africa should be seen as a form of 'charm defensive'. In his view, this amounts to defending its image while constructing a new narrative of China-Africa relations. He suggests China's 'charm offensive' will transform into a 'charm defensive' if and when it consolidates its place in Africa through direct engagement with local communities as 'prosumers' and producers in Africa (Shi, 2015, p. 136). By so doing, he argues, Chinese media would have successfully countervailed Western media hegemony in Africa (see also Banda, 2009; Fook, 2010).

1.2 Chinese media organisations in Africa

When China launched its "Go Out" or "Go Global" campaign, it was targeted at pushing Chinese companies to invest abroad (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 88). Wu Yi, the Chinese vice Premier at the time in 2007, remarked the programme was intended to "encourage capable Chinese companies to go out is an important policy of the Chinese Government" (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 88). Consequently, China selected a few corporations to implement its 'go out' policy.

These companies were provided low-interest funding enabling them to compete well internationally. The media was not left out as Chinese media outlets venturing internationally also received funding from the government to 'present a true picture of China to the World' (Wu, 2012, p. 6). Funding was provided to both state-owned media and private media 'going global'.

Between 2009 and 2013, China invested more than US\$8.9 billion into the internationalisation of its major state-run media companies (Farah & Mosher, 2010). Below I describe the institutions that have been the most involved in Africa, including those that are at the centre of this study: CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily newspaper.

1.2.1 Xinhua News Agency

Founded in 1931, the Xinhua News Agency is described as the foremost traditional Chinese government foreign news service (Xin, 2009). It was the first to launch on the African continent in Cairo, Egypt in 1950. In 1986, it incorporated its African operational headquarters in Nairobi where it has two bureaux – the town bureau and the head office bureau (Shi, 2015).

While the town bureau is manned by Africans and headed by a Kenyan, the head office is controlled by a Chinese national. In 2009, Xinhua made a bold impression on the global stage when it co-hosted the World Media Summit in Beijing. This brought together the principal media corporations in the world with 300 representatives from 17 countries (Fook, 2010; Wu, 2012).

Xinhua's evolution from state-funded wire service to commercial-driven entity has been remarkable (Xin, 2009). In 2011, it launched onto the global media scene by opening an office in New York's Time Square. Concurrently, it also mounted an imposing billboard campaign announcing its arrival on the global stage (Wu, 2012; Farah & Mosher, 2010). Xinhua took its internationalisation a notch higher with the announcement of its 24-hour international television news service known as Chinese Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) (Banda, 2009; Fook, 2010).

First, CNC commenced broadcasting from Beijing to the Asia-Pacific regions and a few European countries in January 2010 (Fook, 2010). Subsequently, in July 2010, it launched its worldwide 24-hour English language television service, CNC World (Fook, 2010; Farah & Mosher, 2010; Banda, 2009a). According to the President of Xinhua News Agency, Li Chongjun, the mission of CNC is to "present an international vision with a China perspective and broadcast news reports in a timely way and objectively and be a new source of information for global audiences" (Fook, 2010, p. 553).

The world English service also aims to "influence Africa's emerging markets" (Farah & Mosher, 2010, p. 9). In Africa, CNC is a commercial enterprise brokered through a partnership between South Africa's MIH Cable. This service is owned by the Naspers group and Xinhua (Farah and Mosher, 2010) which has been credited for its success among other state-run Chinese media outfits in Africa (Banda, 2009a).

According to one of the Chinese editors, Xinhua was based in Kenya before China had an embassy in that country. If this is true [despite extensive research, I was not able to find confirmation in existing literature or official documents], considering China's embassy in Kenya was established in 1963, it means Xinhua has had an operational base in Kenya for more fifty years. As of April 2016 when I concluded my fieldwork in Nairobi, Kenya, Xinhua has two offices comprising head office and town bureaux.

The head office serves as Xinhua's sub-Saharan Africa headquarters and it is located on Rose Avenue on *Ngong* road, while the town bureau is on the first floor of Chester House on *Koinange* Street in Nairobi. One senior Chinese journalist stated that Xinhua's African headquarters had been domiciled in the same building for more than thirty years. But she also noted they are on the verge of moving to a new facility within Nairobi. This journalist also told me there are between 70 and 80 local correspondents employed with Xinhua in Kenya.

This is complemented by another 30 Chinese nationals who work in Xinhua's Nairobi office. However, I could not verify these figures independently. I visited the town bureau more than three times and did not during any of those visits find more than six people in the office. Even if we acknowledge journalists are always out on the field looking for stories, the town bureau office of Xinhua is very small. At the most, it could not accommodate more than 10-15 people at a time.

On the other hand, editorial leadership positions are dominantly occupied by Chinese nationals who preside over editorial matters. Even the editors of African descent must still report to a Chinese editor, who is higher in the hierarchical structure. Among the three Chinese media organisations I investigated, Xinhua was the most difficult to access. This could be attributed to the fact the building on which Xinhua is housed is owned by the Chinese government, which necessitates controlled access.

1.2.2 Star Times

Star Times is one of China's privately-owned digital media company operating in Africa (Banda, 2009). Pang Xingxing, chief executive of Star Times, a Beijing-based digital TV solutions provider, responded to the Chinese government "going out" campaign by setting up

shop in Africa in 2002. After five years of operating on the margins of the African digital pay TV market, Star Times made headway in 2007 when it acquired its first license to operate digital TV in Rwanda.

The success of Star Times' operation in Rwanda spurred its expansion in Africa, and it reached about 7 million subscribers with operations in 16 African countries in 2015. Currently, Star Times has three networks covering 900 million people in 45 sub-Saharan countries. It broadcasts programmes via more than 430 channels of which it owns and operates 38 channels.

Star Times' investment in Africa has reached \$500 million with a goal to expand into more countries on the continent. Its African headquarters and operational hub for dubbing and translation of Chinese TV programmes into English covers 26,000 square metres and is due for commissioning in 2017⁶ (ChinAfrica, 2015, p. 46).

Star Times has been described as a model of success for Chinese media expansion into Africa. It reinforces the view that private media organisations are more likely to gain credibility faster than state-led media (Banda, 2009a; Fook, 2010; Wu, 2012). In a bid to consolidate its expansion on the African continent, Star Times recently took equity in South Africa's Top TV (Wassermann, 2014; Shi, 2015). However, Star Times' success in Africa is not without the support of the Chinese government. It received funding through the Beijing-based China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), making possible its foray into Africa in the first place.

1.2.3 China Central Television (CCTV)

China Central Television (CCTV) in Africa evolved from CCTV-4, which was established in 1992 to broadcast mainland programmes to overseas Chinese (Wu, 2012). The establishment of CCTV Africa has its origin in the 2000 launch of an English broadcasting service, CCTV-9 (Wu, 2012). In 2010, Chinese journalists from CCTV-9 were mandated to establish a small operation in Kenya. However, the visit of Li Changchun, the Communist Party's Propaganda Chief to Kenya in April 2011 altered these plans (Gagliardone 2013).

⁶ See China Africa Magazine, Issue 7, Page 46 on Digital Dividend.

After Li's visit, China dispatched a new group of managers and journalists to commence recruitment of local staff to transform CCTV Africa into the first international television operation on African soil (Gagliardone, 2013; Wekesa & Zhang, 2014). Consequently, on 11 January 2012, CCTV Africa was launched to a momentous welcome in Africa (Wu, 2012; Gagliardone, 2013; Wekesa & Zhang, 2014).

CCTV's African operation broadcasts two hours of production time every day from 1300 to 1400 and from 2100 to 2200. There are currently five broadcast programmes running on CCTV Africa – *Africa Live*, a one hour daily news programme; *Talk Africa*, a 30-minute weekly talk show; *Global Business Africa*, a 30-minute business programme; *Match Point*, a 30-minute weekly sports programme and *Faces of Africa*, presenting 30-minute documentaries about African people.

CCTV Africa has two offices within the Kilmani neighbourhood in Nairobi, Kenya. The first comprises newsrooms and offices for journalists and is located on the third and fifth floors of the K-Rep building. Opposite to it, the Applewood Park suites serve as a production base for CCTV Africa.

According to a senior CCTV journalist, there are about 200 people employed by CCTV in Kenya. However, I was not able to verify this figure independently because of limited access to CCTV Africa regional network. As of the time of this research, CCTV Africa was headed by Mr Pang Xinhua, who did everything possible to evade having an interview with me. Although, at the 2015 Africa Media Leaders Forum in Johannesburg we had agreed to meet in Nairobi, it never happened. Xinhua is deputised by Liu Lang, Newton Ndebu and Lulu. While there are several departments, the Chinese and new media departments are separate from all other departments.

1.2.4 China Daily newspaper

In December 2012, the China Daily newspaper, China's leading English-Language newspaper, launched its African edition as a weekly. The aim was to influence African audiences and reach opinion leaders on the continent (Wu, 2012; Wekesa, 2013; Shi, 2015).

Since then, China Daily has been publishing its African edition along with a special supplement of 'African Weekly' publications as well as a magazine called ChinAfrica. The

newspaper is published through a partnership with The Daily Nation printing press in Kenya (Wekesa, 2013). It successfully competes with other established newspapers such as the Daily Nation and The Standard in Kenya and major African cities such as Johannesburg and Lagos (Wekesa, 2013).

China Daily is located on Suite E, 3rd Floor, Tower A, of the Morning Side Office Park on Ngong road. In my estimation, it has the friendliest atmosphere among the three Chinese media organisations. China Daily runs a small operation in Nairobi, Kenya.

In summary, there are four journalists working in the Kenyan bureau of the China Daily. One is a Kenyan freelancer while the remaining three are fulltime members of staff. The remaining three include the managing editor, one Kenyan woman and a male Chinese.

1.2.5 China Radio International (CRI)

China Radio International (CRI) was originally founded in 1941 to target overseas audiences. It commenced broadcasting in English in 1947 (Wu, 2012). It has evolved over the years to become a dominant broadcaster with the establishment of foreign channels in Australia, Mongolia, and the US.

In Africa, CRI has gained traction and garnered wide-reaching listenership and audiences. It has FM stations in five Central and East African cities, with its AM channels reaching more than 10 million listeners in sub-Saharan Africa (Banda, 2009a). In Kenya, Chinese family novellas translated by CRI have garnered widespread appeal cutting across every gamut of society (Banda, 2009a; Wu, 2012). CRI also has its own local radio station in Kenya broadcasting in English, Mandarin and the local Swahili language (Banda, 2009a).

1.3 Background and context of research

In this section, I provide an historical trajectory of China-Africa relations is provided as well as how the relationship between both have impacted economic cooperation and trade in the 21st century.

1.3.1 China-Africa relations

China-Africa relations have their origins in the era of the Ming Dynasty, whose fleet sailed to African countries between 1418 and 1433 under the supervision of Admiral Zheng He (Miller, Vandome & McBrewster, 2009, p. 2). The huge fleet, according to Chinese records, entailed up to 2800 men and sixty-three vessels. Each ship was more than six times larger than the three tiny vessels Columbus used to discover the New World (Brautigam, 2009). In spite of its size, the fleet neither engaged in colonising any African states nor took any slaves. However, it was recorded a giraffe was taken for the admiration of the emperor (Brautigam, 2009, p. 23).

China's engagement with Africa has evolved in the 21st century to include all spheres of human endeavour including trade, investment, culture, media, resources acquisition and infrastructure for resources deals. A colourful event in Beijing in 2000, with over forty-eight African heads of government in attendance, China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This was intended to engender trade, cooperation and bilateral relations with African countries (Brautigam, 2009; Moyo, 2012; Taylor, 2012).

At the 2006 edition of FOCAC, China elevated its relations with Africa to a new level and declared Africa a mutual partner (FOCAC, 2006). Subsequently, at the fifth edition of the meeting in 2012, parties agreed to “open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership” (FOCAC, 2012).

The second FOCAC summit and sixth Ministerial Conference of the Summit were held in Johannesburg, South Africa in December of 2015. Here, China upgraded its relations with Africa from a “strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership” (FOCAC, 2015). This affiliation has seen trade between China and Africa grow

from US\$10.6 billion in 2000 to more than US\$ 200 billion in 2011 (Taylor 2012; Moyo, 2014).

Rivalries and realignments in global geopolitics that have attended China's recent engagements with Africa seem to have been led by responses from the West. The US especially responded to the FOCAC with its US-Africa Leaders' Summit (Wekesa, 2014). Three months after President Xi Jinping visited Africa in 2013, President Barack Obama commenced a tour of Africa aimed at deepening trade relations between the United States and Africa (Wekesa, 2014). This apparent rivalry has resulted in new alliances and the deepening of relations between China and Africa (Kaplinsky et al., 2010).

1.3.2 China-Kenya relations

Kenya established bilateral relations with China two days after it gained independence from Britain on 4 December 1963. It became the fourth country to establish a mission in Nairobi.

There are three distinct phases of evolution in China-Kenya relations over the last five decades (Chege, 2008, p. 20; Patroba, 2012, p. 6). The first phase, under Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta between 1963 and 1977, was marked by hostility and animosity (Patroba, 2012). During this period, allegations of mistrust and diplomatic face-offs were rife between both countries (Chege, 2008, p. 21).

The second phase, under President Daniel Arap Moi, was one of reform in bilateral engagements leading to high-level visits between leaders of both countries and the signing of two economic and technical co-operation agreements (Chege, 2008, p. 22; Patroba, 2012, p. 6).

The third and current phase, under Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta, has witnessed massive Chinese investments in Kenya and the deepening of bilateral engagements on various fronts. These include economic, technological, energy, tourism, health, aviation, media, archaeology and education (Patroba, 2012, p. 6). After Kenyatta emerged as president, the first country he visited was China where a comprehensive cooperation partnership was signed by both countries.

This study pays closer attention to the Kenyan media system because of the close ties between the two countries. Additionally, the Kenyan capital serves as the operational hub for Chinese media organisations in Africa.

1.4 *The Kenyan media system*

In this study, the Kenyan media system is assumed the reference media system because the three Chinese media organisations under focus are based in that country. The Kenyan media system is one of the most advanced and complex in all of Africa (Ochilo, 1993, p. 25; Ismail & Deane, 2008, p. 320). In addition, Kenyans comprises the vast majority of African journalists employed by these organisations. As well, it is likely they come to these organisations with journalistic traditions more or less specific to Kenya.

This is important when measured against the view that context and media system have bearing on journalistic role conception (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, p. 138; Berkowitz, 2011, p. 1). In other words, the fact that the three Chinese media organisations are located in Kenya suggests African journalists may have higher agency considering Kenya has a very robust journalistic tradition (Obonyo, 2011, p. 12). In a different context, where journalistic tradition leans towards the development journalism model such as in Ethiopia or Rwanda, it is anticipated the Chinese journalistic orientation may likely dominate without tensions (Skjerdal, 2011, p. 58).

1.5 *Research questions*

In general, the literature on Chinese media expansion into Africa suggests there may be discrepancies between the libertarian journalistic orientations of African Journalists and the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. The following are therefore the three research questions informing this study:

1. How do African journalists negotiate tensions between role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations that are based in Africa?
2. What are the editorial processes in Chinese media organisations and what are the roles of African journalists in these processes? How much editing do stories produced by African journalist receive? Do African journalists engage in self-censorship in relation to activities concerning Chinese economic and political interests on the African continent?

3. What are the implications of Chinese media expansion into Africa with specific reference to African journalists working in Chinese media?

1.6 Objectives of the research

The research aims at achieving four, interrelated, goals.

1. To examine the professional role conception of African journalists working for Chinese media organisations in Kenya;
2. To compare the role conception of African journalists and the manifest roles in the media content they produce with regard to their reporting of selected events;
3. To investigate how the elements of Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchy of influences model interact with journalistic role conception and role performance in relation to different typologies of stories.
4. To investigate the positions of African journalists in the hierarchy of Chinese media organisations.

1.7 Significance and justification of the study

One major contribution of this thesis is that it combines Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model with theories on role conception and role performance to provide new insights into the contradictions of the practice of globalised journalism, as a type of journalism seeking to combine different journalistic traditions to speak to international audiences. By combining these two different analytical frameworks, this thesis provides a different understanding of the relationship between role conception and role performance, from a non-Western perspective (see Section 8.1 in chapter 8).

On conceptual and methodological terms, this thesis proposes a qualitative approach to the study of the relationship between role conception and role performance differing from the dominant practice of surveying journalists. This study combines semi-structured qualitative interviews with qualitative content analysis in examining the relationship between journalistic role conception and role performance within Chinese media. This approach is particularly suitable for studies of role conception and role performance outside Anglo-American contexts, where extensive research is not available. Further details are found in Chapter 4.

This study draws on four journalistic roles identified from the literature on role conception. These are: watchdog, loyal-facilitator, disseminator and civic roles (Wilhoit, 1991; Kirat, 1998; Ramaprasad, 2001; Mwesige, 2004; Tandoc et al., 2012; Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Ireri, 2015; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015; Carpenter et al., 2015).

1.8 Why four roles?

There are two broad traditions in the study of journalistic roles – the normative and the analytical (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2016). The four roles – watchdog, loyal-facilitator, disseminator and civic roles-in this study are analytical and they have been operationalised in other studies examining the relationship between role conception and role performance (Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Mellado, 2015).

Secondly, the selection of the four roles is based on their usefulness in the analysis of diverse journalistic traditions. The watchdog role of the press, with roots in in Libertarian-democratic traditions, is concerned with providing a check and balance on every level of leadership in society (Norris & Odugbemi, 2008, p. 13; Christians et al., 2009, p. 149). The civic role also has its roots in Libertarian-democracy and seeks to promote the perspective of citizens (Mellado & Dalen, 2014, p. 827).

For its part, the loyal-facilitator role advocates collaboration between journalists and government to protect the interests of the ruling elites. This function resembles the collaborative role of the press which differs from the libertarian journalistic tradition (Christians et al., 2009, p. 127). It is prevalent in developing, transitional and authoritarian countries (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 477) where, as it has been argued there seems to be the need for an alternative to the libertarian-democratic journalistic tradition (Christians et al., 2009).

In its disseminator role, the main concern of the press is to pass information to the public and in the civic role; it encourages public debate and seeks to educate the citizenry on complex issues (Mellado, 2014; Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico, 2015; Mellado & Dalen, 2014). The disseminator role is a defining feature of journalism and is the foundation of journalistic professional practice (Christians et al., 2009, p. 143).

1.9 Roles and News Content

Studies on role conception have been underpinned by the assumption that the way journalists define their work has a bearing on the content produced by them. However, empirical evidence remains inconclusive (Mellado, Hellmueller, & Donsbach, 2017). This has elicited widespread debate in journalism studies between those who argue the way journalists define role has a correlation with the content produced by them (Preston, 2009) and others who contend there is no direct link because of influences mediating journalism within media organisations (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

While role conception operates at an abstract level, role performance involves the actual practice of journalism. It is therefore important to consider both role conceptions and performance in order to “examine journalism as an institution” (Mellado, 2014, p. 1). This is because “journalists’ role performance is an expression of conceived roles” (Tandoc, Hellmueller, & Vos, 2013, p. 541).

This suggests studying the “ideal practice gap can be a new approach to examining freedom in a more concrete way” (Mellado & Dalen, 2014, p. 860). Consequently, studying the relationship between role conception and performance of African journalists would provide an insight into the struggles and tensions they encounter in their practise of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

1.10 Hierarchy of influences

There are influences on journalism which limit the professional autonomy journalists may have in carrying out their work (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Early research on forces mediating the actual practice of journalism has identified various levels of influences including individual, organisation and institutional. Other influences include: small groups, competition, occupational, extra media, legal, ethnicity, spheres of influences, clusters of influences, and distinct domain of perceived influences (Voakes, 1997; Preston, 2009; Hanitzsch et al., 2010; Donsbach 2000; Ettema, Whitney, & Wackman, 1987; Whitney, Randall, & McQuail, 2004; Wasserman & Maweu, 2014b).

While all models of influence on journalism are relevant to this study, the focus will be on the hierarchy of influences model proposed because it identifies “important distinctions between levels of analysis and locates the individual journalists within a web of organisational and ideological constraints” (Reese, 2001, p. 174).

The advantage of this model is that it provides a theoretical basis for studying influences on journalism “based on levels of analysis, operating both separately and in conjunction with each other” (Reese, 2001, p. 178). In other words, the role of the researcher is to determine under “which conditions certain factors are most determinative and how they interact with each other” (Reese, 2001, p. 179).

Ileri’s (2015) study of sources of influence on journalistic autonomy in the Kenyan media concludes organisational forces were the most prominent motivators in deciding which aspects of a story to highlight followed by advertisers. A study of journalists working for the Nation Media Group in Kenya in which the propaganda model is used as an analytical framework, Wasserman and Maweu (2014) identified ethnicity as a sixth filter in the coverage of news stories.

In the same vein, Lee (2004) and Keith (2011) have proposed a reconceptualisation of the hierarchy of influences model to suit the diversity of media experiences. This study, which draws on media experiences outside the Anglo-American context, will demonstrate that the five ‘levels of analysis’ in hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) are inadequate to account for influences on journalism in Chinese media organisations in Africa.

This study seeks to reconceptualise Shoemaker’s and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model by extrapolating the levels of influences in the specific instance of Chinese media organisations in Africa through interviews with African journalists working for the Chinese media in Kenya. An analysis follows in Chapter 7.

1.11 Research methodologies

This section focuses upon the research methodologies adopted in this study. It outlines the epistemological traditions underpinning the study. It also provides a description of and justification for the selected research methods including the sample size, data collection instruments, as well as the data analysis procedures. Ethical considerations are also discussed briefly.

1.12 Research methods

While most other studies examining journalistic role conception have employed survey instruments, this study utilises qualitative methods. I use this methodology because my focus is on how African journalists negotiate the conflict between their understanding of journalism and the practice of journalism in Chinese media organisations in Africa. This choice is in line with Hanitzsch and Reich's (2013, p. 152) observation that "using qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and observations of journalists who work in contexts of greater and smaller professional autonomy elicit the practical consequences of high and low autonomy".

The advantage of qualitative methods adopted in this study is they allow an exploration of "the ways that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals" (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 5). These methods are relevant to the study of journalists because they involve viewing events, actions, norms and values "from the perspective of the people who are being studied" (Bryman, 1988, p. 61).

They therefore enabled me to examine the amount of freedom possessed by African journalists in carrying out their work. By African journalists, the study implies any journalists of African descent other than the Chinese working for the three Chinese state-led media in Kenya. The sampling method used is the purposive technique.

1.13 Data collection instruments

Data was collected through semi-structured interviews of African journalists working for the three Chinese-owned media organisations in Nairobi, Kenya. This was followed by an analysis of media content (audio, video and print) produced by African journalists with regard to the following typology of stories:

1. Diplomatic visits – the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2014;
2. Negative perceptions of China – the arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for cybercrimes in Kenya and an incident of racism at a Chinese restaurant in Kenya;
3. African politics – the trial of President Kenyatta and his deputy at the International Criminal Court [ICC]; and
4. African affairs – the terrorist attack on Garissa University in Kenya.

Further details are found in chapter 6.

These four typologies of stories were purposively selected because they reflect both the ‘upstairs’ and ‘downstairs’ dimensions of China-Africa relations (Park & Alden, 2013). Secondly, they represent the different ways in which China’s nationalist interest shape the international media system through its operation in Africa.

For instance, Li Keqiang’s diplomatic visit was an opportunity for a positive portrayal of China, whereas the restaurant incident and the arrest of Chinese nationals presented negative perceptions of China. I decided to bring these together because of the paucity of media content covering both incidents across the three organisations under consideration. For instance, CCTV did not report the racism incident and the China Daily did not cover the arrest.

By grouping both incidents as instances of negative perception, I am therefore able to examine an incident having representative coverage across the three Chinese media organisations. The trial of President Kenyatta and his deputy at the ICC is an example of an event with both national and international relevance, and one which draws attention to many understandings of the international media space. However, the Garissa University terrorist attack is an example of an African affair of particular relevance to Kenyan-African audiences and one in which China does not have any significant interest at stake.

1.14 Structure of thesis

The thesis is structured into nine chapters as follows:

Chapter1: Introduction

The chapter outlines the study's aims, objectives, and rationale. It discusses the scope of the study and clarifies key concepts, terms and theoretical assumptions underpinning the study. It is comprised of the following sections: introduction to the research study; overview and objectives of the research; research questions; rationale for the study and the problem statement.

Chapter 2: Journalism professionalisation in China and Africa

This chapter discusses the various debates reinforcing journalism professionalisation in China's domestic media as well as the media landscape in Africa. In this chapter, I make a case for the divergent journalistic orientations having emerged in both China and Africa and explain how the fluid state of the African media system makes it susceptible to external manipulation.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework of the study and elaborate on the theories and notions of role conception and role performance as well as the hierarchy of influences model.

Chapter 4: Methodology

The focus of chapter 4 is on the research methods adopted in the study. In this chapter, I make a case for a qualitative approach to the study of the relationship between role conception and role performance outside Anglo-American contexts. It also describes the study's data collection instruments, population size and sampling technique, content analysis, and observations.

Chapter 5: Role conception of African journalists

This chapter presents and discusses the research results and analyses data concerning the role conception of African journalists and how they negotiate the tension between normative expectations and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa

Chapter 6: Role Performance in of African journalists

In this chapter, I present results, discussions and the analysis of data on the relationship between role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations in Africa.

Chapter 7; Influences in Chinese media

In this chapter, the focus shifts to results, discussions and data analysis relating to the five levels of analysis of the Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model.

Chapter 8: Bridging the gap

This chapter explores the interactions of the elements of Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model with role conception and role performance of African journalists within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This chapter is the dénouement of the thesis. It presents a summary of the main findings and original contributions of this thesis to knowledge.

1.15 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a detailed overview of this thesis. It has outlined the contextual and theoretical frameworks of the study. It also describes the significance of the study, research questions, aims and objectives, assumptions and structure of the thesis.

Given that this study examines the relationship between professional role conception and role performance of African journalists working for the Chinese media in Kenya, the next chapter discusses the contextual framework of journalism professionalisation in China and Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

Journalism Professionalisation in Africa and China

2.0 Introduction

The previous chapter presented a detailed introduction to this thesis. This chapter provides an overview of journalism professionalisation in Africa and China. While this study is not meant to strictly compare journalism in China and in Africa, I do make a case for the differing journalistic traditions that have emerged in Chinese and African media. The dominant journalistic orientation in Africa is informed by the colonial legacy of libertarian-democratic ideals. On the contrary, the domestic media in China favour journalism which leans towards the state.

I begin by discussing the evolution of the press in Africa from the colonial era to the post-colonial era as well as the journalistic orientation that have emerged in contemporary Africa. Secondly, I provide an overview of the Kenyan media landscape while paying attention to the fact that the three Chinese media organisations under consideration are based in Nairobi.

I argue the Kenyan media suffers from undue influence of media ownership, whose private interests often override public interests. In the third section, I provide an overview of the media landscape and discuss journalism professionalisation in China. Following (Tong & Sparks, 2009), I argue that reforms in China's domestic media and its commercialisation have resulted in collusion between the market and the state rather than in the reduction of state control. I conclude the chapter by highlighting China's media expansion into Africa has deep-seated implications for journalism professionalisation in Africa.

2.1 *The role of the press in colonial Africa*

The early press in Africa can be traced to the printing presses established by returning slaves from the Americas as well as early missionaries (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 40). Africa's first newspaper was published in 1797 in Egypt. This was followed by another in South Africa in 1800; Sierra Leone in 1801; Liberia (the *Liberia Herald*) in 1826 (set up by returning slaves); and Nigeria (*Iwe Irohin*) in 1859 (Nyamnjoh, 2005).

In order to understand the role of the media in Africa today, it is important to consider its involvement in the anti-colonial struggle (Ndlela, 2009, p. 56)⁷. While the colonial-era press provided a platform for Africans to make their case for the independence of African states, it was perceived to be subversive to colonial authority (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 41)⁸. Colonial authorities therefore enacted stringent legislation to limit the right of Africans to own newspapers and to combat the campaign for independence. Furthermore, they implemented economic sanctions making it difficult for African newspaper publishers to import newsprint (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 41).

While print media took off in 1797, colonial broadcasters only started transmitting to Africa in 1926. This was first accomplished by the French, with the Dutch and British following in 1927. The thrust of these broadcasts were to culturally influence Africans and consolidate colonial power (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 44).

⁷ See also (Oyovbaire 2001; Ansah 1988; Blankson 2007; Tettey 2001; Moehler and Singh 2009; Luka 1991; Bourgault 1995; Kasoma 1996; Banda 2008)

⁸ See also Oyovbaire 2001; Ansah 1988; Skjerdal 2012; Blankson 2007; Kasoma 1996; Banda 2008; Moehler and Singh 2009; Luka 1991; Tettey 2001)

2.2 *The role of the press in post-colonial Africa*

The press in independent Africa suffered a similar fate as the colonial-era press experienced at the hands of colonialists (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Blankson, 2007; Skjerdal, 2012; Kasoma, 1996; Ansah, 1988). While the press in colonial Africa was used to repress Africans, in postcolonial Africa, it served as either “the mouthpiece of the government or was subjected to draconian laws and censorship” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 42).

Taking this further, Banda (2008, p. 92) notes that post-independence African regimes became “preoccupied with the construction of nation-states and the consolidation of political power”. This resulted in the “nationalisation of hitherto privately owned media, and effectively turning them into mouthpieces of the postcolonial state” (Banda, 2008).

Nyamnjoh (2015) argues that Africa’s postcolonial leaders adopted the same repressive ways the colonialists had dealt with the media. They resorted to enacting obnoxious decrees and laws to curtail freedom of the press as well as limit freedom of information. The African media thus evolved in a culture in which political power was used in repressive ways over civil society institutions and the citizenry through legislations curtailing the flow of information and freedom of speech (Blankson, 2007, p. 17).

For example, immediately after independence from Britain in 1964, Malawi passed the Censorship and Control of Entertainments Act which empowered the government to ban any media material it considered critical of the government (Takirambudde, 1995). Similar steps were taken by other African countries with adverse consequences for freedom of information (Blankson, 2007).

However, Blankson (2007, p. 17) points out political instabilities and civil unrest in the new African states also contributed to the adoption of repressive policies against the media. For instance, in the space of 25 years of post-independent Africa, a total of 70 leaders in 29 African nations were deposed through assassinations, coups, and purges. Among 41 independent African countries, only seven accommodated political opposition. Of these, 17 were one-party states, and another 17 were military regimes. There were 20 major wars in 44 countries and 40 successful coups occurred between 1957 and 1981 (Hachten, 1993).

Press freedom remains a crucial issue on the postcolonial African continent. In 2013, the Gambian National Assembly passed the Information and Communication (Amendment) Act. This legislation limits free speech and press freedom and comes with a 15-year jail term and/or a fine of USD 81,000. Similarly, Kenya recently passed a controversial Information and Communications (Amendment) Bill which gives the minister of information power to censor the press (Daniel & Metz, 2011, p. 94).

This situation is complicated by the fact that the State in Africa is often the largest advertiser and often deploys its financial power to manipulate the press (Daniel & Metz, 2011). In 2007, the Kenyan government advised all state agencies to withdraw advertising from the local Standard newspaper. This happened following a report that a government minister had approached criminals from Armenia with a view to having former President Daniel Arap Moi's son murdered (Reporters Without Borders. 2007 quoted in Daniel & Metz, 2011, p. 94). These incidents tend to suggest the media in Africa has yet to shed its colonial legacy.

In post-independence Africa, the press has been transformed from proactive watchdogs of society to "cheerleaders for development efforts" (Bourgault, 1995, p. 173). In this era, notions of journalism such as 'development communication', 'development journalism' were promoted as an alternative to watchdog journalism. Thus, private media organisations were often cajoled to limit their monitorial role of the ruling and economic elites (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 43). In its conceptualisation, development journalism being championed by postcolonial governments in Africa promotes collaboration between the media and government beyond the press watchdog role (Eribo & Jong-Ebot, 1997, p. x).

Fortunately for Africa's new leaders, after independence, most media organisations were state-owned. Therefore, they served the interests of those in power and "were characterised by self-censorship and constrained by the ideology of development journalism" (Tettey, 2001, p. 6).

President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya urged the press to "always seek to coalesce, rather than to isolate the different cultures and aspirations and standards of advancement which make up our new nation" (Wilcox, 1975, p. 26). In the same vein, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah argues through his press aide that journalists should jettison the kind of journalism seeking to

interrogate, but rather adopt one which collaborates with government to engender national development (Hadjor, 1990, p. 22).

Lent (1977) argued in this regard that the early post-independence period required the media to contribute to political stability and national unity. This was done through supporting government ideologies, highlighting positive news and downplaying opposition (Lent 1977, p. 18). Lent argues that “political institutions in developing countries are fragile and any criticism of the government may be interpreted as a challenge to the legitimacy of the government” (1977, p. 18). Therefore, the media should refrain from serving as a watchdog.

Promoters of this view argue the media should serve as agents of government, emphasising that criticising government policies and projects is a “luxury which developing countries cannot afford” (Ansah 1988, p. 11). They argue further that “since the media are vital to the exercise of political power, their use should be closely controlled so that they are not used to propagate views and promote interests that are at variance with those defined by the national leadership” (Ansah, 1988, p. 13).

However, Ansah (1988, p. 8) contends this kind of development journalism “amounts to an enforced or imposed consensus in the name of national development”. This is “clearly at variance with the more enlightened view of development which sees free participation as an essential ingredient”.

He argues that as long as those evils, which were denounced by the press during the struggle for independence continue to exist, and the “press proved to be an effective weapon in fighting against those evils, the press would remain a potent weapon to fight a fresh manifestation of those evils” (Ansah, 1988, p. 14).

He also highlights that in a democratic society, the watchdog role of the media is crucial to public accountability since the “absence of any such mechanism for regular monitoring and evaluating the government’s performance before the bar of public opinion could lead to the government falling into complacency, unresponsiveness, and irresponsibility” (Ansah, 1988, p. 13).

2.2.1 Journalistic roles in contemporary Africa

Liberalisation of the media gained momentum in Africa in the 1990s resulting in the licensing of private broadcasters (Ogola, 2015, p. 93). This was the period when political pluralism and economic liberalisation also gained momentum on the continent (Ogola, 2015; Nyamnjoh, 2005). Since then, there has been a debate on the role of the media in contemporary Africa. Should the media serve as a watchdog which holds leaders to account or as a partner in development with political leaders?

Some have argued the watchdog role of the press is best suited to Africa while others contend a ‘lapdog’ role where the press collaborates with government towards national development is requisite to Africa’s development. While the watchdog role has its roots in libertarian-democratic traditions (Siebert et al., 1956), partnership in the development role has its origins in Asia (Christian et al., 2009; Daniel & Metz, 2011).

Among the many studies examining role conception among African journalists are those by Ramaprasad (2001) in Tanzania, Mwesige (2004) in Uganda, Ngomba (2010) in Cameroun, Kirat (1998) in Algeria, Ireri (2015) in Kenya, De Beer, Malila, Becket and Wasserman (2016) in South Africa.

According to Ramaprasad (2001), Tanzanian journalists subscribe to both western notions of the watchdog as well as analyst and entertainer. As well, they have adopted the notion of development journalism that promoting the portrayal of positive images of the country, unity among communities, and supports government and national development programmes.

However, Ramaprasad states information and analysis are most important to Tanzanian journalists followed by entertainment and education. Ireri (2015) finds the most important roles for Kenyan journalists is that of disseminator followed by ‘advocate for social change,’ ‘support [of] official policies,’ ‘motivat[ing] people to participate in civic activities’ and ‘watchdog’.

In Algeria, 45 per cent of the journalists believe it is very important to criticise government agencies (Kirat, 1998). For their part, Ugandan journalists value the “western journalistic functions of information, analysis and interpretation and investigation of official claims”

informed by the enduring colonial legacy of libertarian journalistic ideals (Mwesige, 2004, p. 92).

In the same vein, a survey of South African journalists shows that while South African journalists consider the watchdog role of the media as important they also agree it is vital to support the development agenda of government. This suggests serving as a watchdog of society and supporting the development agenda of government are not 'binary opposites' but instead complimentary roles (De Beer et al., 2016, p. 48).

However, Nyamnjoh (2015) contends journalistic roles in Africa extend beyond labelling journalists as watchdogs or lapdogs. He explains journalists are social beings who are seeking "professionalism in a context of competing and conflicting demands" (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 74). This means journalists are part of a race or an ethnicity constituting the communities in which they carry out their work (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 75).

Journalists therefore become "social actors or actresses" located within a specific socio-historical context underpinned by "interconnecting local and global hierarchies" (p. 76). He, however, contends the journalism promoted in Africa is unable to account for the "lived realities and ideas of personhood of the various racial and ethnic individuals as well as communities claiming Africanity" (p. 75).

Nyamnjoh contends the media contribute in compounding the burden of Africans if it "trivialises the collective experiences and memories of Africa and her people by promoting an uncritical and simplistic assumptions about culture, identity and belonging" (p. 76). In other words, journalism is relevant to Africa if it adds value to African personhood and belonging (p. 78).

This suggests any journalism promoting a hierarchy of humanity and human creativity in which African personhood and belonging are downplayed is "bound to be prescriptive, condescending, contrived, caricatured and hardly in tune with the quest by Africans for equality of humanity and for expression, recognition and representations" (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 78).

These comments provide a point of departure for the examination of Chinese media organisations in terms of the extent to which they promote journalism relevant to African

humanity and belonging. Therefore, Nyamnjoh's comments highlight the question of whether or not Chinese media organisations in their attempt to frame win-win and mutuality that inform China-Africa relations include the unique elements of the African personhood Nyamnjoh described. Does the Chinese media narrative of Africa to the global audience reflect issues pertaining to African humanity and identities?

2.3 *Journalism education in Africa*

Journalism education is concerned with teaching students the “norms and processes of news work in order to provide them with the skills they need to succeed within the journalism industries” (Hochheimer, 2011, p. 101). Journalism education is therefore critical to the way journalists understand their professional roles (Deuze, 2006; Kasoma, 2000; Hochheimer, 2001).

As Kasoma (2000, p. 42) observes, “journalism is such an exacting profession that it is not right to expect journalists with little or no education and training to perform well”. Hochheimer (2001, p. 102) argues that for journalism education to be meaningful it has to promote a sense of “connectedness among their students with the worlds from which they came” and the worlds which their audiences inhabit. This is necessary because as, Kasoma (2000, p. 42) argues “journalism is a profession which invariably affects people served by it”.

Furthermore, Deuze (2006) argues that while media systems and journalistic cultures may differ widely, journalism education faces similar challenges all over the world and would benefit from a ‘global’ approach. This is informed by the view that journalism problems are uniform because “whatever the geographic area or socio-political context, journalism educators and media professionals have had to come to terms with the same problems” (Gaunt, 1992, p. 2). Deuze (2006) points out that the nexus between the global and the local could be a meaningful context for all courses and pedagogies in journalism education (Deuze, 2006, p. 27).

Kasoma (2000, p. 42) argues that if journalists are not aware of the impact of their journalistic actions on individuals and society “they would not be prepared to counteract its effect if and when necessary”. In other words, for journalism education to be impactful it

must be tailored to the realities of the community (Hochheimer, 2001, p. 107; De Beer, 2010, p. 217; Deuze, 2006, p. 27).

A major challenge to journalism education in Africa is the quality of journalism schools on the continent. A study conducted by Nordenstreng and Boafo in 1984 concludes only “18 journalism training institutions in Anglophone Africa had training laboratory newspapers but even these were published irregularly as resources for them were reported to be meagre and usually non-recurrent” (Nordenstreng & Boafo, 1984, p. 8).

A recent profiling of journalism schools across Africa sponsored by UNESCO revealed, basic data was obtained for 96 schools while another 92 were unavailable or unresponsive. The profile listed sixty institutions as English language based. Thirty were in Francophone environments (4 of these also being Arabic) and six in Lusophone (Berger, 2007, p. 152). The study also found the majority of African journalism schools lack online presence.

An African Media Development Initiative (AMDI) study of journalism education in Africa suggests non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donor organisations funding media development projects in Africa are yet to come to terms with the practical and cultural conditions of African journalism (McCurdy & Power, 2007, p. 137). This challenge also extends to course materials for journalism and media studies in African universities and institutes (McCurdy & Power, 2007, p. 134).

Most respondents in the AMDI survey complain of the dearth of locally-developed materials (McCurdy & Power, 2007). A respondent from Botswana stated course materials for teaching journalism and media studies at the University of Botswana are Western-oriented and lecturers struggle to contextualise them to suit local realities (p. 134).

De Beer (2010, p. 213) contends in this regard that African journalism is trapped in ‘knowledge colonialism’ where Western academic publishing houses have become so dominant that generations of journalism students in English-speaking Africa have become entrapped in the Western ‘way of doing things’. The over-reliance on Western funding therefore remains a challenge for journalism education in Africa (Banda et al., 2007, p. 168).

Uche (1991, p. 3) states colonial education was used to ensure “the preservation of and continued dependence on their cherished values and ideological inclinations in their former

colonies”. He notes colonial tutelage of media professionals in Africa “devastated any original thought and commitment to a national ideology”. This resulted in the sustenance of Western culture among African media professionals (Uche, 1991, p. 4).

African students who have studied in the Global North returned to Africa with Western values and attitudes (Golding, 1977, p. 295; Uche, 1991, p. 4). For example, Golding (1977) observes that Nigerian broadcast journalists are not only influenced by their training and qualification but also by the Anglo-American values:

The development of professionalism among Nigerian journalists is nothing more than their increasing integration into a community sharing values and standards developed by major Western news media. Via formal training or education, through exposure to the authoritative products of Western media, or from routine dependence on the primary production of the world by European and American media, professionalism is induced in the form of an ideological convergence, a necessary emulation of the objectives and definitions of those foreign media. (Golding, 1977, p. 295)

Furthermore, Uche (1991, p. 5) highlights the “continued geopolitical influence as a hidden agenda in designing the contents and nature of the technical aid schemes and training . . . [as] a crucial factor that has affected the philosophy of media management in most African nations”.

2.4 *The quest to Africanise journalism*

The education of African journalists with Western curricula has resulted in journalism professionalisation that is Anglo-American in orientation and perpetuates the African media system as an appendage of the media system of the Western world (Uche, 1986; Hochheimer, 2001; Deuze, 2006). This is evident in the “shaping of the contents and programmes in the various African national media systems which negate the philosophical base of most developing nations” (Uche, 1991, p. 15).

However, Shaw (2009, p. 505) contends African journalism is not a “direct replica of the Western liberal democracy model that places more premiums on the individual rather than the community”. Similarly, Waisbord (2015, p. 368) argues there is nothing like a single Western model of journalism. However, what is needed is to “carefully peel away layers of traditions in communication research in different settings and avoid conclusions driven by ready-made geocultural labels”.

This suggests simply criticising Western approaches to journalism is not sufficient for the development of an African journalism model. Instead, there is the need for an “open discussion around the need for Africans to develop their own approach to journalism and how this can be done” (McCurdy & Power, 2007, p. 145). To achieve this, Africa must extricate itself from its dependency on Western journalistic models and evolve an African model that reflects realities on the continent. This is important because models are critical to the “execution of a system’s functions within the purview of public policy and interest, where media management is a major public area of interest” (Uche, 1991, p. 4).

A major obstacle to evolving an African journalism tradition is the quest for an acceptable theoretical foundation. This is because the prevailing theories of communication and media studies on the continent do not reflect the realities of the African people (Obonyo, 2011; Uche, 1991; Banda, 2008; Kasoma, 1996; Skjerdal, 2012; Christians, 2004; Hochheimer, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2015; Shaw, 2009; Du Plessis, 2012; Ngomba, 2012b; Mutere, 2012; Asante, 2012; Uwa, 2012).

The debate on the Africanisation of communication theories is mainly between those who suggest there is a need to Africanise communication theories and others, who contend it is difficult to agree on a uniform framework for the continent’s disparate journalistic cultures.

Several scholars⁹ have proposed diverse theoretical frameworks for evolving an African journalism model but the harmonisation of such models remains elusive. The African moral philosophy of *ubuntu* has gained traction among media scholars as a framework for evolving a model for African journalism (Skjerdal, 2012; Mutere, 2012).

The word *ubuntu* comes from the Zulu and Xhosa languages and translates to “a person depends on personal relations with others to exercise, develop and fulfil those capacities that make one a person. Personhood comes as a gift from other persons” (Schutte, 2001, p. 12). According to Christians (2004, p. 235), *Ubuntu* resonates with European communitarianism, and “its liberatory journalism empowers citizens to come to an agreement about social

⁹ For further insights on Africanising media theory see Banda 2008; Kasoma 1996; Skjerdal 2012; Christians 2004; Hochheimer 2001; Nyamnjoh 2015; Shaw 2009; Mutere, 2012; Ngomba, 2012b; Nyamnjoh, 2015; Asante, 2012; Uwa, 2012; Wasserman and De Beer 2004

problems and solutions among themselves rather than depending on the political elite or professional experts”. Obonyo (2011, p. 8), however, contends *Ubuntu* is limited because it represents “only one face of Africa but Africa has many faces”.

For his part, Kasoma (1996, p. 109) proposes the notion of *Afriethics*, which requires journalists to ‘develop a deep sense of right and wrong. This has been criticised for being ‘based on a more romantic reconstruction of the pre-colonial situation and a frozen view of harmony in rural Africa’ (Banda, 2009b, p. 235).

According to Banda (2008, p. 79), African journalism should be underpinned by the application of “the epistemic framework of African political thought to a postcolonial understanding of contemporary African media”. This suggests a model of journalism focusing on intercultural and interpersonal communication that facilitates human communication rather than concentrating on Anglo-American definitions of press freedom (De Beer, 2010, p. 217).

Similarly, Hochheimer (2001, p. 103) proposes what he describes as “journalism of meaning” by which “communities can create their own sense of meaning and purpose through dialogue around issues they find important”. This kind of journalism, Hochheimer explains, involves reintroducing journalists into the world as participants, and not as neutral ‘objective’ observers (p. 103).

While not dismissing Hochheimer, Asante (2012) proposes the ‘ancient Egyptian ideal’ of *maat* as a framework for communication in Africa (Asante, 2012). With this approach, the goal of communication is not to persuade but to serve as a means of solidarity for the common good (Du Plessis, 2012, p. 125). Ngomba (2012b) also proposes a ‘culturally-nested theoretical framework’ for researching political campaign communication. By so doing, as Ngomba argues, African scholars would apply western paradigms of communication in the context of African realities.

Nyamnjoh (2015) takes this further and highlights the need for African journalism to be tailored to the prevailing realities in Africa. Shaw (2009, p. 493) has a different perspective, making reference to the form of pre-colonial African journalism which, in his view, stems from oral discourse where “communication norms are informed by oral tradition and folk

culture with communal storytellers (griots), musicians, poets and dancers playing the role of the modern-day journalist”.

For his part, Tomaselli (2003, p. 427) argues Africa does not have a single culture, suggesting that most of the theoretical frameworks espoused by African scholars differ in terms of their “diverse attitude towards interventionism and cultural essentialism as constituents of journalistic discipline”.

These differences largely account for why reaching a consensus on a harmonised African journalism model remains elusive (Skjerdal, 2012, p. 648). This, Uche (1991, p. 9) argues, points to the notion African media systems lack “political and economic ideological base, upon which to operate, that is indigenous to their environment” making the continent susceptible to the manipulation of “competing external values that seek to dominate and influence the attitudes and minds of the people of Africa” (see also Uche, 1991, p. 11;). This suggests China’s expansion in Africa, which subscribes to a journalism promoting ‘positive reporting’, could impact journalism professionalisation on the African continent.

2.5 Overview of the Kenyan media landscape

With a population of 41 million and a land mass of over 800 000 square kilometres (Chege, 2008; Patroba, 2012; Wan-Ifra, 2013), Kenya is East Africa’s second largest economy according to International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) projections¹⁰ (Chege, 2008; Patroba, 2012; Wan-Ifra, 2013).

Its population comprises 40 tribes and local languages (Wan-Ifra, 2013) including the following major tribes: Kikuyu (22%); Luhya (14%) and Luo (13%) while the national language is Kiswahili (Wan-Ifra, 2013). This ethnic diversity is reflected in Kenya’s political and media space (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011). The mainstream media are often perceived as being aligned with “one or the other side of the political arena” which results in the media being used as “instruments for both political and business interests” (Helander, 2010, p. 532).

¹⁰ <http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Ethiopia-to-overtake-Kenya-as-Eastern-Africas-top-economy/996-3408274-x8dsv4z/>

The Kenyan media suffers from political parallelism and the influence of advertisers. Kenyan journalists are concerned there is more instrumentalisation of the media emerging from the market than the government (Helander, 2010, p. 526). In a study of Kenyan newspapers, Matu and Lubbe (2007) conclude the *Kenyan Times* and the *East African Standard* are biased towards the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Similarly, in a study of journalists working for *Daily Nation* newspaper, Maweu (2014) identifies two major ways in which Kenyan journalists respond to pressures from advertisers. They either kill or reframe the story to favour the advertiser or run the story and face the consequences of management.

This resonates with Helander's survey of Kenyan journalists which finds media owners have influence on content and can influence the direction of the news. This results in a situation in which commercial interests mostly override public interest when both conflate (Wasserman & Maweu, 2014, p. 631).

It therefore suggests the forces mediating journalism in the Kenyan media also originate from outside the media resulting in credibility issues for the media (Helander, 2010, p. 539). This is instructive considering the three Chinese media organisations are state-owned and therefore, it is valid to examine the influence of Chinese government on journalism professionalisation of African journalists working for China's state-led media in Kenya.

2.5.1 Historical overview

The role of Christian missionaries in the emergence of the press in Africa is widely acknowledged (Oyovbaire, 2001). It is the same for Kenya (Ochilo, 1993). The first newspaper in Kenya, the *Taveta Chronicle* was established by Reverend Robert Stegal in 1895 followed by the *Leader* published by the British East Africa Company and the *Uganda Mail* published in Mombasa (Ochilo, 1993). European settlers and Indian migrants in Kenya took a cue from the missionaries by establishing the settlers' press to keep the settlers abreast of developments in their home countries (Hachten, 1971, p. 199).

The early media in Kenya was founded on three focal objectives – providing information for missionaries and settlers; as a tool for sustaining colonial rule; and socialisation among settlers (Ochilo, 1993; Obonyo, 2011; Ireri, 2013). Historically, there are three phases in the evolution of the Kenyan media – the colonial era, post-independence press, and the multi-

party era during which the Kenyan press became diverse and vibrant (Ikeri, 2013; Obonyo, 2011; Ochilo, 1993).

Currently, the Kenyan media can be categorised into three – government owned; privately owned such as the Nation Group and *Standard*; and indigenous magazines and weeklies (Ochilo, 1993, p. 24). The government-owned media are typically used by the ruling government and party for propaganda purposes while the privately-owned media are autonomous with a strong financial capacity. However, the latter are not entirely insulated from governmental intervention. It may take the “form of political representations to the owners” and instrumentality of the judiciary (Ochilo, 1993, p. 24). Indigenous magazines and weeklies are more vulnerable to governmental control because of their weak financial capacity (Ochilo, 1993).

The print media can be divided into four categories – daily newspapers, magazines, regional newspapers and printed sheets. The latter tend to pass for newspapers in urban centres (Obonyo, 2003). There is very limited government presence in the print media except for a few fortnightly propaganda publications (Obonyo, 2011, p. 17). The Kenyan print media comprises six daily newspapers as well as several magazines and weekly publications. The oldest newspaper is the *The Standard* founded in 1902 but the *Daily Nation*, established in 1960 is the country’s leading newspaper (Ochilo, 1993; Wan-Ifra, 2013). However, in audience measurement terms, radio leads while television and newspapers follow consecutively (Wan-Ifra, 2013).

2.5.2 Press freedom in Kenya

Two important developments are responsible for the vibrancy and freedom enjoyed by the Kenyan media today. First, the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991 and secondly, the liberalisation of the media sector at about the same time (Ogola, 2011; Obonyo, 2011). Following these occurrences, Kenya has evolved into something of a ‘beacon of press freedom’ in east Africa and a hub of media innovation (Wan-Ifra, 2013, p. 5).

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) cites Kenya as a reliable destination for exiled journalists because the country serves as a base for 66 journalists from within the African region: “The mainstream Kenyan media has developed [a] reputation for being vibrant and

assertive, and is considered to have contributed significantly to the widening of the democratic space in Kenya” (Wan-Ifra, 2013, p. 12).

However, press freedom in Kenya has recently come under threat from punitive libel laws perceived to be aimed at controlling the media (Ochilo, 1993; Wan-Ifra, 2013). For instance, it has been established the Kenyan government employs underhanded manipulation of the judiciary in quest to stall investigative stories (Helander, 2010, p. 535).

The Kenyan government also has a record of intimidating journalists “through phones calls from the seat of power, jailing or detaining those unwilling to play ball” (Obonyo, 2011, p. 14). The recently passed Information and Communications (Amendment) Bill, which gives the minister of information power to censor the press is a case in point (Bell & Metz, 2011, p. 94).

Although, Kenya boasts a Media Council with a mandate to regulate the media, there is suspicion it is loosely connected to the government which is also the largest advertiser in the country (Helander, 2010, p. 536). For example, in 2007, the Kenyan government advised all state agencies to withdraw advertisements from the local Standard newspaper. This followed a report that ‘a government minister had approached criminals from Armenia with a view to having former President Daniel Arap Moi’s son murdered’ (Reporters without Borders, 2007 quoted in Bell & Metz, 2011).

However, threat to media freedom in Kenya does not only emanate from the government (Obonyo, 2011). There have been instances where journalists have been accused of corruption and compromising professional ethos for profit or due to ethnic biases (Obonyo, 2011, p. 14).

2.5.3 The media system in Kenya

Ileri (2015, p. 4-5) identifies three traditions characterising the Kenyan media system – liberal-commercial, authoritarian-development and advocacy-protest.

The liberal-commercial tradition relates to privately-owned market-driven commercial media mostly acting as a watchdog of the government and disseminator of information. The liberal-commercial tradition gained traction following the return to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s (Ileri, 2015, p. 5).

The authoritarian-development tradition involves collaboration between government and the media in the apparent bid to engender national development. It was dominant during the 24-year reign (1978 to 2002) of former President Daniel Arap Moi (Ileri, 2015).

The advocacy-protest tradition is underpinned by the view that a well-informed and articulate citizenry is fundamental to a thriving democratic society (Ileri, 2015, p. 5).

Obonyo (2011) contends, overall, the Kenyan media system is driven by a commercial logic and a strictly capitalist ownership structure which informs programming and content across television, radio and print.

2.5.4 Media ownership and the Kenyan market structure

The Kenyan media landscape is characterised by cross-ownership and concentrated ownership of media. For instance, the Daily Nation Group, which owns the *Daily Nation* newspaper, the Nation Media Group radio network and the Nation Television (NTV) (Wan-Ifra, 2013).

The Standard Group, owners of the *Standard* newspaper, also owns the KTN TV and Radio Maisha while the Radio Africa Group, owners of Kiss FM and Kiss TV, also owns the *Star* newspaper. Similarly, Royal Media Services, the dominant broadcaster in Kenya, owns Citizen TV and also owns a chain of radio stations across the country (Wan-Ifra, 2013).

This ownership model has resulted in some credibility issues. According to the Kenya Media Programme, a 2011 survey of more than 2000 individuals from eight districts shows only 20% perceive media reports as credible (Wan-Ifra, 2013).

2.5.5 The newspaper market

The Kenyan newspaper sector is also characterised by concentrated ownership with most publications traceable to owners of the two dominant newspapers – *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard* with market shares of 61.8% and 24.4% respectively. The third most influential newspaper with a 7% market share is *The Star* founded in 2007 (Wan-Ifra, 2013).

2.6 *China's media reform in context*

China's ascension to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1992 was a defining moment in the country's attempt at liberalisation and, consequently, reform of the domestic media environment (Zhao, 2003). These reforms began in 1978 and reached its zenith in the mid-1990s (Yuezhi, 2000, p. 582; Zhao, 2003, p. 63). It resulted in the transformation of the Chinese domestic media from being mouthpieces of the party-state to a state capitalist tool (Xu, 2013, p. 72).

Emphasising the phases of reform in the Chinese domestic media, Zhao (2003, p. 61) explains that in the early 2000s, the Chinese ruling Communist party began to consciously promote a "market-oriented development of the more sensitive cultural industries ranging from news operations to video game installations as new sites of economic growth".

This was initially articulated in the Party's proposals for its 10th five-year plan in 2001 and was subsequently adopted at its 16th Party Congress Report in 2002 (Zhao, 2003, p. 61). The consequences of these reforms were the "commercialisation of media operations and the proliferation of media outlets, especially the growth of television as the most popular medium" (Zhao, 2000, p. 581-582).

However, Zhao (2003) contends that while the Chinese media has become globalist in outlook, they remain Chinese in character:

The re-structuring and rationalisation of China's national media system under market logic has predominantly taken the form of bureaucratic monopoly capitalism. Under this system, media organisations under the control of the Party state, which had previously single-mindedly pursued ideological and cultural objectives, are now more or less in line with the capitalist system, assuming the twin objectives of capital accumulation and ideological legitimization (Zhao, 2003, p. 62).

Furthermore, she notes the party-state has been able to "accommodate, incorporate, and contain market-oriented journalism but yet retains its dominant position in a commercialised press system" (Zhao, 2012, p. 9). Therefore, these reforms have created a difficult situation where the media have become subject to two taskmasters – the state and the market (Winfield & Peng 2005, p. 258; Tong, 2011, p. 5; Zhao, 2003, p. 62).

These reforms also exposed the media to the allure of money, giving “media access to those who can afford it, through advertising contracts, sponsorships of specific media content or outright bribes” (Zhao, 1998, p. 52). Despite these transformations, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still seeks to monopolise the media. It maintains a firm grip on all aspects of society especially in “ideological and cultural” areas (Tong, 2011, p. 5). The party-state licenses practicing journalists and issues press cards which may be cancelled or withdrawn at the instance of government officials (Lorentzen, 2014; Tong, 2009; Hadland, 2012).

Traditionally, the Chinese state has always expressed its commitment to regulating the press (Hadland, 2012). To illustrate, from the “13th to the 16th National Party Congresses (1987 to 2002), the CCP has consistently highlighted the significance of ‘supervision by public opinion’ in its main political report” (Feng, 2003, p. 46). The party-state also operates a dual track reporting where journalists also serve as government agents and gather information on domestic problems (Hadland, 2012).

Information that would harm the standing of the CCP is compiled in secret internal reports while news considered safe is published for public consumption (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 412). The CCP has a statute stating the first role of the media is to serve as mouthpieces of the party in the event of conflicting objectives (Feng, 2003, p. 43).

Since the early 2000s, the Chinese media has witnessed an increased offensive on its autonomy (Hadland, 2012, p. 253). While some scholars have attributed this to greater social tension, Lorentzen (2014) argues “the growth of the internet would have created pressures on the regime to make this shift in any case” (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 403).

2.7 *Typology of media in China*

While China’s media can be broadly categorised as official state media and private media, the real state of media ownership is complicated (Zhang & Su, 2012; Zhao, 2012). It is significant to note there are two major categories of journalists in China – those employed by government agencies and institutions, and those who are temporary contract staff (Zhang & Su, 2012). The official mainstream media directly owned and controlled by the government serving as the voice of the party and government are the Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, People’s Daily and China Daily newspaper (Winfield & Peng, 2005, p. 261).

In the print sector, four major categories of newspapers exist – party newspapers, metropolitan newspapers, specialised newspapers, and industrial newspapers. Party newspapers promote the view of the ruling CCP and serve as its official propaganda organ (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 9). There are also two categories of magazines – those serving as an official organ of the ruling CCP and funded by the government and market-oriented magazines (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 10).

In the online sector, there are three broad categories: commercial news websites, websites operated by government departments, and those reproducing news from traditional media such as newspapers and TV stations (Zhang & Su, 2012). Journalists working for commercial websites are not eligible for press cards. This means they are barred from conducting interviews. However, those working for government sites have the right to conduct interviews and publish them directly to the internet (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 10).

In terms of access, the internet is widely accessible in China with a penetration rate of 52.2% with more than 720 million people connected as of 2016¹¹. There are 360 million Chinese on broadband and 277 million others access the internet through smartphones (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 10).

2.8 *Journalism professionalisation in Chinese media*

In this section, I explain the dominant journalistic orientation in China's domestic media which may form part of the journalism professionalisation the Chinese media might promote in Africa.

2.8.1 Self-censorship

In China's domestic media, politically sensitive topics are minefields and reporting them can draw the ire of the CCP and a consequent crackdown on the news media:

The unyielding propaganda commands depict a scenario where news media and journalists are manipulated like mindless puppets by the CCP's propaganda departments. Bans are imposed in newsrooms every day to instruct the news media what to report and how to report [it] (Tong, 2011, p. 5).

¹¹ <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china/>

Zhao (2001) explains this situation is possible because “media performance is dictated by the Chinese Communist Party and shaped by irresponsible and unaccountable Party leaders and their power struggles” (Zhao, 2001, p. 24). Chinese journalists respond to state control and highhandedness by resorting to self-censorship as a “key way of balancing between the power relations that influence the media” (Tong, 2009, p. 593). This means there is often a difference between original reports submitted by journalists to the editorial desk and what is eventually published in the media (Tong, 2009, p. 594).

Tong (2009) explains further that an efficient way of understanding how self-censorship works in a Chinese newsroom is by examining how submitted stories are either included or excluded by journalists. For Lorentz (2014), the Chinese state employs the strategy of partial censorship by permitting “half of the discontent to be reported when discontent is high and all of the discontent to be reported when discontent is low so that citizens see 30% discontent regardless” (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 405). Tong therefore argues, contrary to widely held notions, self-censorship in China has become a potent force for media freedom rather than a threat to it (Tong, 2009, p. 594).

2.8.2 Investigative reporting

Investigative journalism is considered one of the most significant developments in China’s domestic media landscape (Yuezhi, 2000, p. 577). The party-state has allowed a semblance of investigative journalism which it showcases as a testimony to transparency. The central propaganda department (CPD), an extension of the CCP, “frequently permits investigative reporting on a specific topic or incident for a period of time, then it requires reporters to close ranks, writing fewer articles or restricting themselves to approved government talking points” (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 411).

Yuezhi (2000, p. 80) explains the watchdog role of the media in China is promoted by the party-state with the aim to “reassert control over an unruly and dysfunctional bureaucracy and expose elements of bureaucratic capitalism that had become so ruthless that they have threatened the very existence of the bureaucracy itself”.

The state therefore employs the help of journalists to “uncover new types of official malfeasance” even though it often restricts reporting in order to create ambiguity about the

magnitude of corruption (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 411). In this way, Lorentzen (2014, p. 413) argues further, the party-state allows critical reporting as a kind of trade-off because in “order to keep limited media independence from leading to a revolt, the acceptable boundaries of reporting must be adjusted depending on the overall level of social tensions”.

The media are thus permitted to report freely if tensions are low, but they only report on a fraction of the bad news if tensions are high. This ensures, from the perspective of society, the true level of discontent remains unclear, helping to prevent possible revolt (Lorentzen, 2014, p. 405). Consequently, the party-state permits investigative reporting targeting low level officials and solvable social problems but “critiquing the broader political system is much riskier, and criticising the central role of the party is out of the question” (Lorentz, 2014, p. 411).

Therefore, to the extent investigative journalism “exposes safe targets and investigates violations of existing laws and policies; it fulfils the media’s role of being the mouthpieces of both the Party and the people” (Yuezhi, 2000, p. 592).

In this way, watchdog journalism helps to legitimise the political leadership of the party-state (Zhao, 2001, p. 24; Pan & Chan, 2003, p. 668) by redefining the media’s role from the “propagation of explicit political doctrines and the shaping of the people’s mind to the projected image of a compassionate leadership and a state serious about its integrity, efficiency, fairness and accountability to the people” (Yuezhi, 2000, p. 593). The point must be made however, that the rise of the watchdog role has not resulted in a free press which is critical to the relationship between media, state, and society (Zhao, 2001, p. 41; Yuezhi, 2000, p. 589).

2.8.3 Collusion of market and the party-state

The increasing market-orientation of China’s domestic media has not diminished the influence of the state over the media. Rather, it has resulted in collusion between the market and the state (Xu, 2013, p 73; Lorentzen, 2014, p. 412; Zhang & Su, 2012, p.11; Hadland, 2012, p. 255; Tong & Sparks, 2009, p. 342). The partnership of the party line and the market has resulted in the transformation of the Chinese media from operating under totalitarianism to market authoritarianism (Winfield & Peng, 2005, p. 256; Zhao, 2001, p. 21).

Winfield and Peng (2005, p. 258) argue market reforms in the Chinese media have resulted in the Chinese state becoming a market entrepreneur with enormous control of the media. The result is “the voices of China’s popular classes are systematically repressed, marginalised, and contained through the double mechanisms of political control and economic marginalization” (Zhao, 2003, p. 63). Feng (2003, p. 73) explains further that the power exerted by both the party-state and the market results in instrumentalisation of the media in China with adverse impacts on journalism professionalism and organisational norms. In this way, “the absurdity of market entitlement matches the absurdity of political deprivation and the result is an equally absurd pattern of inclusion and exclusion in social communication” (Zhao, 2003, p. 53).

The consciousness of dual inclusion and exclusion finds expression among Chinese journalists who express the view there is a world of difference between professional ideals and reality (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 17). In their survey of Chinese journalists, Zhang & Su (2012) find “more than half of Chinese journalists think that the biggest problem in their work comes from this gap between ideals and realities, and most think it is clearly the largest problem facing the profession” (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 20).

Zhang & Su (2012) therefore, conclude the transformation of the Chinese media from government mouthpiece to market-based orientation has resulted in tension between professional norms and ideals. They highlight that the dual impact of politics and market undermines journalism professionalism. It is therefore expedient to investigate how the tension between the market and party state impact journalism professionalisation among African journalists working for China’s state-led media in Africa.

This is relevant considering that the African media system is in flux (Ngomba, 2012a: Uche, 1991; Obonyo, 2011) and Chinese media “actors have been insisting on a conception that positions the media at the centre of a country’s efforts to build the state, the nation, and guarantee better development prospects” (Gagliardone, 2014, p. 11).

Similarly, in an extensive study of Chinese journalists, Zhang & Su (2012) find TV journalists regard themselves more as “mouthpieces of party and government” than their colleagues from newspapers, news websites and magazines. The study also shows the main

challenges facing Chinese journalists are associated with the discrepancy between professional ideals and reality.

2.9 *The Chinese media system*

The collusion of the market and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is one of the peculiarities of China's state-led capitalism. In this model, described as the 'market-based party organ model' (Zhao, 2008, p. 38), the media do not entirely serve as a tool for state propaganda. It also serves as an agent of development (Pan & Chan, 2000).

This partnership yields a mixed media system resulting in a "media-government relationship that is more complicated than in cases from many countries". It is an affiliation very difficult to classify (Xu, 2013, p. 72). This is because the function of the Chinese domestic media has moved partially toward the 'authoritarian' model to support and advance the policies of the government in power and the 'libertarian' to inform, entertain and sell (Xu, 2013, p. 72).

While Hallin and Mancini's (2004) study on media systems have been praised for its universal relevance, it has been criticised for its tendency to underplay "the importance and history of the media systems in non-western societies such as Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia" (Obijiofor & Hanusch 2011, p. 23).

Furthermore, Zhao (2012) contends the Chinese media system is not compatible with Hallin & Mancini's (2004) comparison of media systems in the developed capitalist democracies of Western Europe and North America. She argues: "to bring in the Chinese media system into a worldwide comparative project is to bring one of the "most dissimilar systems" into the messy picture of non-Western empirical reality" (Zhao, 2012, p. 8). She faults Hallin and Mancini's suggestion that the liberal model is growing throughout the world because China's state-led media has remained resilient in the face of reforms (Zhao, 2012).

She also explains the Chinese media system is one and the same with the Chinese party-state and the media's role is to serve as the mouthpiece of government (Zhao, 2012). Winfield & Peng (2005, p. 265) therefore suggest there is the need to evolve a new theoretical model for the Chinese media in transition taking into account its transformations as well as its political and economic dimensions.

Zhengrong (2007) identifies four major characteristics of the Chinese media system – single ownership, dual system – the contradictory roles of the media in society as well as uncertainties in media policy and media institutions. He points out that while all media in China are state-owned, some areas, such as content production and advertising, are open to private capital. He argues that while the media are mainly used for party propaganda, they are also competitors in the media market. Finally, he concludes the media in China are neither companies nor organisations but government-owned.

2.10 Journalistic roles in contemporary Chinese media

The professional roles of journalists in China's domestic media have often been framed through the bifocal prism of 'mouthpiece or dissent' (Dai, 2013, p. 7). 'Mouthpiece' refers to reporting from party-organ perspectives while 'dissent' refers to reporting that does not tow the party line, and for which journalist often pay dearly.

In the same vein, Pan & Chan (2003, p. 655) emphasise despite reforms in China's media, journalistic roles are informed by party orientation, market orientation or professional orientation. They emphasise professional journalism promotes the disseminator role while party journalism privileges interpretive and advocacy roles.

In a survey of Chinese journalists, Zhang & Su (2012) examine nine journalistic roles among Chinese journalists under three broad categories – political, commercial and professional. Zhang & Su (2012) note the most important role for Chinese journalists is the *wage earner* role followed by *mouthpiece of government and party* and *family provider* roles. The *wage earner* and *family provider* roles are both placed in the economic category while the *mouthpiece* role falls within the political category (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 18).

The study also shows TV journalists regard themselves more as mouthpieces of the party and government than their counterparts in newspapers, news websites and magazines (p. 19). Furthermore, the survey concludes Chinese journalists working under the contract system define their roles as employees of the news media, a vulnerable group in society, information disseminators, and family providers. Government-employed journalists define their roles as humanitarians and messengers of civilisation

Pan and Lu (2003, p. 218) have identified four journalistic discourses of journalism professionalisation in China. These are the party-press, Confucian-intellectual, professionalism and market-economy. Party-press journalists privilege the position of the Chinese Communist party in their reporting. The Confucian intellectual strives to be the conscience of society and voice of the people seeking to enlighten the public about the nation's interests. For their part, the professional journalist promotes professionalism in gathering and reporting issues and providing facts. The market-economist strives to satisfy audience demands (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 219).

Dai however, (2013, p. 7) argues media reforms will blur the line between party journalism and market journalism resulting in a hybrid form of journalism professionalisation in China.

2.11 Chinese media promoting constructive journalism

Constructive journalism is concerned with attracting public attention to societal problem with an aim to providing solution to such problems (Rosen, 1996; Rosen, 1999). Yanqui (2014) emphasises “constructive journalism covers positive and solution-focused news formats, narratives, angles, and styles of debate, within classical reporting, the media report under this journalistic concept empowers the people and information can be used constructively while remaining accurate and critical where necessary” (Yanqui, 2014, p.7). Seligman (2011) identifies five broad themes that inform constructive journalism including positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meanings and accomplishments. Positive emotion is concerned with the role of journalists in highlighting those providing solution to society's problems. Zhang (2014) explains that constructive journalism extends beyond serving as a ‘watchdog’ of society to serving as a member of the society with an aim to inspire responsible engagement.

Scholars have studied Chinese media expansion into Africa through the bi-focal prism of ‘watchdog’ or ‘lapdog’ (Wasserman, 2014; Gagliardone, 2013; Farah and Mosher, 2010; Ngomba, 2012a). However, Yanqui (2014) contends that Chinese media in Africa can be best understood through the lens of constructive journalism. She emphasises that “constructive journalism of China's media covers positive and solution-focused news within classical reporting” (Yanqui, 2014, p. 9). Yanqui (2014) explains further that “what China's media is doing in Africa is to ‘construct’ and ‘reconstruct’ not ‘destruct’”. She points out that the

concept of constructive journalism “differs from the traditional Western journalism approaches where emphasis more on negative reporting”. In other words, Chinese media is providing a different narrative of Africa from the Western media’s framing of Africa as the Dark Continent¹². In order to understand the kind of journalism that Chinese media is promoting in Africa, it is therefore expedient to examine the lived reality of African journalists working in Chinese and the autonomy they enjoy in carrying out their work.

2.12 Chinese journalism versus Anglo-American journalism

The kind of journalism practised in China is skewed towards the state and differs from Anglo-American journalism, which holds the state and those in authority to account (Tong, 2011:4; Winfield & Peng, 2005, p. 256). Gagliardone (2014) argues China’s tendency to privilege relationships with African governments at the expense of the private sector, NGOs, grassroots organizations and the citizenry is state-centric.

He contends “China is supporting in practice a vision of the role of the media in the society which is skewed towards the state” (Gagliardone, 2014, p. 12). This resonates with Winfield and Peng’s (2005, p. 256) argument that “while media commercialisation challenges the current Communist Party orthodoxy by initiating a redistribution of power and interests, the western model of a libertarian-democratic press is hardly a possibility” despite the reforms that have internationalised Chinese media and opened it to investors (Winfield & Peng, 2005, p.256).

There is therefore the possibility China’s state-led media organisations in Africa are also promoting a state-centred media beholden to both the state and the market. This makes it important to examine how African journalists working in Chinese media organisations in Africa negotiate possible tensions between self-understanding of their roles and dominant Chinese journalistic traditions.

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/28/africans-worry-how-africa-portrayed-western-media>

2. 13 Implications of Chinese media for journalism in Africa

The possible impact of Chinese media expansion into the African continent and journalism professionalisation in Africa is the subject of on-going debate. This is because Africa and China have different traditions of journalism. Chinese journalism is characterised by top-down reporting and collaboration between the press and government. The libertarian-democratic tradition promotes a bottom-up/watchdog approach and is dominant in Africa (Umejei & Hall, 2013).

At the first China-Africa Media Cooperation Forum in Nairobi in 2013, Li Guangyuan, then Chinese ambassador to Kenya, provided insight into the kind of journalism China would promote in Africa:

Our media should report China-Africa friendship positively. The traditional friendship between China and Africa is very precious indeed. It deserves thoughtful attention from both sides. It is normal for others to both admire and be suspicious about the current China-Africa relations. But this must not be in the case among the Chinese and African media players. Ours is to nurture greater cooperation, friendship and partnership among our people¹³.

Anton Harber, formerly head of School of Journalism at Wits University in Johannesburg, expresses his concern that Chinese media investment and ownership “brings a kind of top-down style of Chinese journalism and [it] can inhibit the progress we have made in this continent developing an open bottom-up style of investigative journalism” (Umejei & Hall, 2013).

There are also concerns that Chinese media investments could negatively affect the freedom of journalists to perform their professional roles (Keita, 2012; Wasserman, 2013). Banda (2009a, p. 356) actually argues that Chinese media involvement in Africa is part of a grand strategy to promote Chinese culture in the African media space.

While acknowledging China’s media expansion into Africa has implications for journalism professionalisation on the continent, Gagliardone (2013, p. 27-28) argues fears this will lead to the supplanting of Western journalistic models in African are “largely based on

¹³ <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t1100582.htm>

assumptions”. He suggests even though China does not promote its own model of journalism, the outcome of its media expansion into Africa might be the same as that of the West. China is using a different strategy to reach the same goal as the West.

Ngomba (2012a, p. 12) argues differently, stating although sub-Saharan media systems are in flux at the moment, “we are not on the cusp of witnessing a ‘transplantation’ of the Chinese model of media development to sub-Saharan Africa”. He argues further that China’s media engagement with Africa may result in socialising Chinese journalists into the African model of journalism rather than corrupting it. This view however fails to acknowledge the fact Africa does not have an existing single journalism model into which Chinese journalists may be socialised (Skjerdal, 2012, p. 648).

This point is highlighted in a study showing there is no evidence of the influence of Chinese ‘soft power’ on editorial agendas and journalism professionalisation among South African journalists. Wasserman (2014) sent 10 questions to journalists working in print, online, broadcast, and wire services in South Africa. He concluded: “China’s state control of the media and bias towards official views discredit it in the eyes of South African journalists” (Wasserman, 2014, p. 14).

One of the respondents stated “it is way too early to panic about a potential negative influence of Chinese media on South African journalism” (p. 11). Wasserman’s study did not however specify responses of journalists working for the Independent Newspaper Group, in which Chinese investors recently secured 20% equity.

Similarly, Wassermann’s study did not provide insight on the levels of professional autonomy of *Independent* journalists in reporting on issues possibly impacting China’s economic and political interests in South Africa and Africa. This might have provided insight into the possible influences and the circumstances of those influences in Independent newspapers.

For its part, Gagliardone’s (2013, p. 32) study of journalists working for CCTV Africa in Kenya suggests CCTV’s launch on African soil offers the “*latitude to practice and propose different styles of journalism*” (emphasis mine). This implies CCTV is inculcating a Chinese journalism culture offering Africa ‘positive reporting’ with emphasis on collective

achievements, rather than divisive issues. Divisive issues could include political crises; sensational topics; or negative news (Gagliardone, 2013, p. 32). This was acknowledged by one of the African journalists at CCTV:

Kenyan journalists are very Western minded. But working with the Chinese you come to rethink some of the principles of Western journalism such as how you frame a situation. For example, I am more cautious in defining a conflict and I question more who is the offender or the offended. I think twice about how to use the label 'rebel'. And you start asking yourself 'whose narrative is this?' The dominant angle does not necessarily coincide with the truth (Gagliardone, 2013, p. 36).

However, Gagliardone's study has some limitations. First, it did not state what influences caused journalists to rethink the Western journalistic ideal. Secondly, the study was not restricted to African journalists working for CCTV Africa in Kenya. It included journalists from other climes working in CCTV.

This suggests an investigation into the relationship between role conception and role performance of African journalists working for Chinese-owned media in Kenya is important. It will help to understand the kind of journalism professionalisation promoted by China's state-led media among African journalists in particular and Africa in general.

2.14 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the various models of journalism professionalisation in China and Africa. The chapter also outlined the trajectory of reforms in Chinese media and their impact on journalism professionalisation in China, notably in the emergence of two controlling powers – the state and the market. Despite these reforms, the chapter concluded the media in China remains under the firm grip of the party-state.

The chapter also provides a survey of the evolution of media in Africa from the colonial to the post-colonial era, emphasising the absence of a harmonised theoretical framework and a unified media system in Africa (Skjerdal, 2012, p. 648). Specifically, I argue the media system in Africa is in flux and therefore susceptible to the manipulation of "competing external values" (Uche, 1991, p. 11). This suggests journalism professionalisation on the continent could indeed be influenced by China's media expansion into all of Africa.

The next chapter provides the theoretical framework of this study which draws on Shoemaker

and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model. It will be used to examine the forces mediating the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Theoretical framework

3.0 Introduction

This chapter explains the theoretical frameworks which informs this thesis. I begin by theorising the relationship between journalistic role conceptions and the actual performance of journalism. The debate on the relationship between role conception and role performance has been dominantly theorised through the prism of libertarian-democratic journalistic orientation (Hallin, 2017)).

This study extrapolates this debate to account for media experiences outside the Anglo-American sphere. I demonstrate the ways in which this relationship differs within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This is accomplished through a comparative analysis of journalistic role conception of African journalists and the actual performance of journalism in relation to the typology of stories.

These include **African Politics** – President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President Ruto’s trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC); **Negative perception of China** – arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for cyber espionage in Kenya and the *Racist Chinese Restaurant* incident in Nairobi, Kenya; **Diplomatic visits** – the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2013 and **African Affairs** – terrorist attack on Garissa university in 2015. Further details are found in chapters 5 & 6.

Secondly, I explain Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model, which is the main analytical tool of investigation in this study. However, this study seeks to demonstrate the five ‘levels of analysis’ of the hierarchy of influences model are not sufficient to account for the forces mediating journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

The usefulness of a ‘level of analysis’ is determined by its applicability in testing or constructing a theory. It therefore becomes expedient to ‘expand or contract’ the levels of analysis within a specific theoretical framework to account for diverse media experience beyond its organising scheme (Lee, 2004, p. 3). Lee demonstrates this by adopting a multi-

level framework in examining the coverage of North Korea by the U.S and South Korean news media in the context of the two U.S-South Korea presidential summits of 2001 and 2002.

In the same vein, Keith (2011) argues for the reconceptualisation of the ‘levels of analysis’ of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model to account for the interplay between levels of influence on media content. She argues such reconceptualisation would allow for the levels of analysis to be “breached or eliminated” subject to the realities of the dynamics of the media world.

Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model has been deemed US-centric and informed by libertarian-democratic ideals (Keith, 2011). In this chapter, I demonstrate the hierarchy of influences model needs to be enriched to account for forces mediating the relationship between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations that are based in Africa.

This study, therefore, seeks to investigate whether there are other levels of analysis which can be adapted to enrich the hierarchy of influences model in the specific instance of Chinese media organisations based in Africa, through the analysis of interview in chapter 7.

3.1 Roles and news content

This section begins with an introduction centring on the debates about journalism professionalisation – whether it is a profession or not. Significantly, the relationship between journalists and society is informed by the way journalists define their work, which bears on the importance journalists place on their work (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017).

3.1.1 Is journalism a profession?

Sigelman (1973, p. 141) maintains professionals hold dual citizenship which includes commitments to their organisations and to their professions. Sigelman (1973) explains this duality is a catalyst for conflict when organisational and professional standards clash. If they resolve to maintain their professional standards it would lead to organisational conflict. If they kowtow to organisational control, it would lead to a loss of professional ego (Sigelman,

1973, p. 141; Hall, 1967, p. 461). However, reduced professionalism would also result in increased organisational bureaucracy (Hall, 1967, p. 477-478).

For instance, Harold Garfinkel (1967) in his investigation of clinical records concludes there are organisational justifications for bad clinical records. According to him, they reflect the clinic's social organisation. Following Garfinkel, Molotch and Lester (1974) argue "mass media should similarly be viewed as bad clinical records" (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 111).

Greenwood (1957, p. 45) defines professionalism as the view of an "organised group which is constantly interacting with the society that "forms its matrix, which performs its social functions through a network of formal and informal relationships, and which creates its own subculture requiring adjustments to it as a prerequisite for career success".

He identifies five attributes of a profession: systematic theory, authority, community sanction, ethical codes and culture (Greenwood, 1957). If we rely on Greenwood's definition, it suggests journalism is a professional group because they possess all the attributes of a profession.

The debate about whether journalism can be described as a profession, in comparison with medicine and law, occupied a pre-eminent position in early scholarship on professionalism of media workers (Curran, Gurevitch, & Wollacott, 1982, p. 63). While Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 33) acknowledge formal "professional" training has become a feature that defines journalism. However, they also note it is not essential to the practice of journalism because there is not a strong relationship between professionalism and formal training (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 33).

Hence, the professional status of media workers remains contested terrain that is "continually being renegotiated in response to social shifts" (Reese, 2001, p. 175). Therefore, journalists can be considered a "semi-professional" group with a strong professional ideology binding them and giving them some kind of control over their work (Witschge & Nygren, 2009, p. 54-55).

Consequently, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 34) identify what they describe as "three fairly closely related dimensions of journalism" – autonomy, distinct professional norm, and public service orientation. Deuze (2008, p. 16) emphasises the shared occupational ideology among

journalists helps replicate “the dominant self-understanding of journalism” among journalists which allows the profession to remain operationally closed through processes of self-reference and uniformity among journalists.

This perspective resonates with Weaver’s (1998) comparative survey of journalists in 21 countries, which concludes the characteristics of journalists are to a large extent, the same (1998, p. 456). He, however, adds there are no ‘universal occupational standards’ in journalism (Weaver, 1998, p. 468).

This suggests the professional norms of journalists are appropriated and applied in diverse ways by journalists operating in different media systems (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 11). However, Deuze (2005) contends journalism professionalisation can be best revealed in studying how journalists negotiate their core values.

Furthermore, Glasser (1992, p. 134) explains professionalisation implies standardisation and homogeneity and does not account for differences among journalists but for similarity. Standardisation, Larson (1977) explains, is the basis on which a profession creates a distinct identity and requires a special set of skills with an identifiable body of knowledge (Larson, 1977, p. 40).

Expanding on Larson’s view, Soloski (1997) defines professionalism as a control mechanism employed by news organisations to contain the behaviour of reporters and editors (1997, p. 139). He identifies two related methods of news professionalism controlling the behaviour of journalists, including setting norms and standards of behaviour and determining the professional reward system (1997, p. 142).

However, Soloski’s (1997) view that transorganisational control mechanisms can countervail intra-organisational control mechanisms suffers from generalisations because it is not a possibility in Africa or China where “journalists are decision takers rather than decision makers” (McManus, 1997, p. 5).

In Africa, journalists are at the mercy of owners (Okwuchukwu, 2014) save for owners who, out of personal integrity, decide against direct intervention in the selection of news. However, in authoritarian China, journalists are at the mercy of the party-state (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 105; Zhao, 2012, p. 153).

Scholars have studied journalistic professionalism from diverse perspectives but there is a consensus that any study of professionalism should encompass ‘professional values and professional ideologies’ of journalists (Beam, 1990, p. 1). Tuchman (1972) viewed journalism professionalism as a ‘strategic ritual’ which shields journalists against critics. Zelizer studied it through the prism of an ‘interpretive community’ (Zelizer, 1993, p. 224). For Weaver and Wilhoit, the indicators of journalistic professionalism are “roles, values, and ethics” (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, p. 104). However, for Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman (1976) role conception is an indicator of journalism professionalism (Vos, 2005, p. 3). In this study, role conception is conceptualised as an indicator of journalistic professionalism.

3.1.2 Journalistic Role Conception

The study of role conception has an origin in sociology and social psychology. Role theory has emerged as an area study in sociology and social psychology in the 1920s (Vos, 2005, p. 4). In sociology, role theory explains individuals’ role-related behaviours while in social psychology it is taken as group processes and intergroup relations (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995).

While both traditions emphasise a multi-faceted and dynamic self which mediates the relationship between social structure and individual behaviour (Hogg, Terry & White), this study largely conceptualise role conception as:

role identities are self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions, or self-definitions that people apply to themselves as a consequence of the structural role positions they occupy, and through a process of labelling or self-definition as a member of a particular social category” (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995, p. 256).

Historically, the study of the role of media gained traction in mass communication scholarship in the 1940s. Lasswell (1948) conceptualised three roles for the media – “the surveillance of the environment; correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment and the transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next” (Lasswell, 1984, p. 38).

Following Lasswell, Wright expanded the three roles of media to include entertainment as a fourth role (Wright, 1960, p. 16). However, the conceptualisations of these roles were institutional not individualistic (Vos, 2005).

The study of role conception was a borrowed concept in journalism studies; and its conceptualisation has been used in varied terms. Cohen referred journalistic role conception variously as, “conception the reporter has of his professional task” (p. 25); “reporters formal ideology of the press” (p. 22); “justification of press activity” (p. 33); “classic philosophy or ideology of the press” (p. 23).

For Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman (1976) , it is “newsmen’s conceptions of their functions of the news media in American life and on their beliefs regarding the proper role of the journalist in news gathering” (p. 113); “belief systems”(p. 119); “patterns of beliefs”(p. 120); “value orientation”(p. 122); “professional values”(p. 124); “ideological stances” (p. 126); “pure ideological stances” (p. 131) and “perspectives” (116).

Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) define role conception as “stances” and “orientations” (1986, p. 124) while Soloski and Stark (1977) conceive of it as “viewpoint”, “orientation” (1977, p. 120) and “functional orientation” (1977, p. 121).

3.1.2.1 Role conception or role perception?

The terms role conception and role perception have been used interchangeably in the study of journalistic role conception (Vos, 2005, p. 19). Journalistic role conception is defined as “journalists own formulation of how the journalists ought to function” (Vos, 2005, p. 3). Journalistic role perception refers to the “generalised expectations of society towards their profession, and as actions and beliefs that the professionals see as normatively acceptable – that will influence their behaviour on the job” (Donsbach, 2008, p. 316-317). This suggests both terms conceptually mean the same thing.

In this study, I use the term role conception to mean how journalists understand their roles.

3.1.2.2 Approaches to study of journalistic role conceptions

There are two approaches to the study of journalistic role conception, namely, the analytical and the normative traditions (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2016, p. 2). This study, which examines how African journalists negotiate tensions between role conception and the actual performance of journalism in Chinese media, is located in the analytical tradition.

In this tradition, journalistic role conceptions are operationalised to give meaning to the theoretical meaning of journalistic role conceptions (Vos, 2005, p. 14). The tradition gained prominence in journalism studies with Cohen's (1963, p. 20) landmark study differentiating between journalists, who viewed themselves as either neutral observers or participants in the political process.

Cohen's analysis conceptualised the journalistic role as a function of individual journalists and the media institution (Vos, 2005, p. 14). Following Cohen, Janowitz's (1975, p. 618-619) categorised journalists as "gatekeepers" and "advocates". The "gatekeepers" are those who emphasise objective reporting and non-involvement in the news process. Conversely, the "advocates" think it important to advocate certain values.

In the same vein, Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman(1976) identified the neutral and participant journalistic role conceptions (Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman, 1976, p. 114) which they later referred to as "Whole-Truthers" and "Nothing-but-the-Truthers" (1976, p. 120). As with Cohen's, the two roles are conceptualised as functions of the reporter and the media institution (Vos, 2005, p. 14).

Since these studies, other studies have emerged examining journalistic role conception. In their first study of journalistic role conception, Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) operationalised role conceptions as adversarial, interpretative and disseminator (1986, p. 115). These roles were expanded ten years later in 1996 to include the "populist mobiliser function" (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, p. 140).

The disseminator role is concerned with getting information to the public. The interpretive is concerned with analysis of policies while the adversarial connotes challenging public official and investigative journalism (Reese, 2001). Reese (2001) suggests the disseminator role has gained traction in tune with the trend of "corporate journalism" where emphasis is given to

entertainment news (2001, p. 184). Furthermore, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) emphasise, journalists who define their role as disseminators/neutrals have a differing account of events compared to those who define their roles as interpretive/participants (1996, p. 101).

Similarly, Starck and Soloski (1977) show those who define their roles as neutral wrote stories which were least comprehensive and fair. Correspondingly, those who define their role as between extreme neutral and participant roles wrote the most objective and accurate stories.

In a landmark study of journalists in 31 countries, Weaver and Willnat (2012, p. 544) conclude the “professional roles that most journalists agree on are the importance of reporting objectively and accurately, getting information to the public quickly, and providing analysis of events and issues”. Conversely, it is emphasised there is less agreement on the “importance of being a watchdog on government and providing access for members of the public to express themselves” (Weaver & Willnat, 2012, p. 544).

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s (1956) four models of the press characterising the functions of the press along social and political structures are considered the forerunner of the normative tradition (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 1). The four roles of the press include Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should do (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956).

By this characterisation, journalistic role is conceptualised as a reflection of the system of social control in which the interactions between individuals and institutions are regulated (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). However, the four theories of the press have been criticised for being normative and underpinned by the traditional mass media structures focused on how things should be rather than how things are (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 45).

Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White (2009) conceptualised four normative roles for the press operating in a democracy. These four roles involve four basic activities – discovery, collection, and selection of information, processing it into a news account, providing background and commentary and finally, publication. These were further delineated as monitorial, collaborative, facilitative and radical roles of the press (Christians et al., 2009, p. 125).

On the other hand, several studies suggest variation in journalistic role conception is context-specific (van Dalen, de Vreese, & Albaek 2012; Kocher, 1986; Weaver & Willnat 2012; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). This is informed by the view that journalistic roles are not universal but “adapt to the cultural contexts related to the nation and press system” (Berkowitz, 2011: 1).

This was verified in a survey of journalists in 18 countries. It concluded the watchdog role enjoys widespread acceptance among journalists in Western countries (Hanitzsch et al., 2010, p. 280). However, the study also determined journalists from developing countries and transitional democracies such as Uganda, China show affinity for the interventionist role. That study, however, also noted the political climate in transitional democracies and developing countries force journalists in countries such as China and Uganda to show support of official policies (Hanitzsch et al., 2010, p. 282).

Another comparative survey of Dutch, German, British, Australian and US journalists concluded the following: “Dutch and German journalists do not feel that their most important function is to be a watchdog of the government” (Deuze, 2002, p. 142). He notes a majority of journalists in the Netherlands and Germany define the watchdog role as “pro-people” rather than “anti-government” (Deuze, 2002, p. 142).

Zhu, Weaver, Lo, Chen & Wu in their survey of the comparative role perception among journalists in China, Taiwan and the United States conclude there are political and cultural influences affecting news professionalism (Zhu et al., 1997, p. 86).

On the African side of things, a few studies have examined journalistic role conceptions. Ramaprasad (2001) finds there is a duality of role conceptions among Tanzanian journalists with some journalists, who see themselves as watchdogs also showing affinity for the development role which promotes supporting government and national development programmes (2001, p. 55).

Ramaprasad’s ranking of journalistic roles among Tanzanian journalists concludes the most important role to Tanzanian journalists is the information/analysis dimension, followed by entertainment and educator roles.

In Kenya, the most important role to journalists is the disseminator role followed by ‘advocate for social change’, ‘support of official policies’, ‘motivate people to participate in civic activities, and the ‘watchdog role’ (Ireru, 2016).

In Algeria, 45 per cent of journalists agree it is very important to criticise agencies of government (Kirat, 1998). However, in Uganda, the most important function of journalists is to disseminate information (Mwesige, 2004). In Cameroon, the most important role of political journalists is to inform citizens about political processes (Mgomba, 2010).

Importantly, the journalistic role conception of African journalists has been largely formed through the lens of libertarian journalistic ideals. This is suggestive of tensions and discrepancies when measured against the state-centric and tightly-regulated journalistic roles dominant in Chinese media organisations (Zhang & Su, 2012).

3.1.4 Journalistic Role performance

The origin of journalistic role performance can largely be traced to social psychology and sociology. In both traditions, it is assumed “individuals are motivated to formulate plans and achieve levels of performance or activity that reinforce, support, and confirm their identities” (Burke & Reitzes, 1981, p. 84). In this sense, it suggests the identity of an individual is validated through the actions of that person.

For instance, the prominence of religious identity will be reflected in time spent practicing religious activities (Stryker & Serpe, 1982). Therefore, the salience of donor identity is evinced in commitment to others (Callero, 1985). Additionally, the strength of the mother identity among first-time mothers is reflected in whether or not they will accept the challenges of motherhood and make sacrifices for their children (Nuttbrock & Freudiger 1991).

Burke & Reitzes (1981) state if being “feminine, means being tender and one defines oneself as being feminine, then one must act in ways that will be interpreted by oneself as well as by others as acting “tender” and not acting “tough” (Burke & Reitzes, 1981, p. 90-91). This is further evinced in their study of the impact of identity on performance of 640 college students. Burke and Reitzes (1981, p. 83) conclude that the link between role conception and

role performance is strong (Burke & Reitzes, 1981, p. 91). This suggests watchdog journalists are validated through the media content they have produced (Burke & Reitzes, 2000, p. 198)

The study of journalistic role performance is a recent ferment in journalism studies (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017, p. 3). A few studies have empirically examined journalistic role performance¹⁴. Journalistic role performance seeks to answer questions such as:

What is the relation between what journalists and other believe – or say they believe – about the role of journalism and the actual practice of producing news? To what extent do journalistic role conceptions explain practice and product, impact, and function? In what way do journalists actually carry out their work, the news they produce and the way they interact with other social fields? How do they shape social and political life? (Hallin, 2017, p. xi)

Journalistic role performance has been defined as “the collective outcome of concrete newsroom decisions and different journalistic styles”. However, this is subject to the diverse constraints which mediate the actual practice of journalism (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017, p. 3).

Furthermore, the concept of journalistic role performance examines the relationship between normative ideals of journalism and the actual practice of journalism (Mellado, 2015). Most studies of journalistic role conception have been based upon an assumption that the way journalists define their roles has a bearing on media content. However, empirical evidence remains, at best, incomplete (Mellado, 2015). This has elicited widespread debate about the relationship between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism (Mellado & Dalen, 2014, p. 860). Some maintain how journalists think about themselves has impact on their work (Donsbach 2008; Van Dalen, de Vreese, & Albaek 2012, p. 905; Mellado & Dalen, 2014, p. 860). Others contend the relationship is not automatic considering there are numerous forces mediating the actual practice of journalism (Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Vos, 2005; Preston, 2009).

On the other hand, several studies assert that the gap between role conception and role performance is informed by the institution of journalism. For instance, in a study of Chilean

¹⁴ See for instance, Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015; Mellado & Lagos, 2014

journalists, Mellado and Dalen (2014, p. 859) conclude there is a “significant gap between role conception and performance, particularly for the service, civic and watchdog roles”. There is a larger gap in watchdog role than with other roles. This could be attributed to external factors which mediate the actual practice of journalism (Mellado & Dalen, 2014, p. 863).

Conversely, Scholl & Weischenberg (1998) conclude that while there is a “large gap between the role conception of “explaining complex issues” and the extent to which German journalists put this ideal into practice, both aspects were significantly correlated”(Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998 quoted in Mellado and Dalen, 2014: 860). Other studies have also illustrated the gap between role conception and practice could be attributed to commercial pressures (Preston, 2009, p. 45; Wasserman & Maweu, 2014b, p. 171).

In empirical sense, the gap between role conception and role performance is defined as the “degree of congruency or discrepancy” between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism (Mellado, Hellmueller, & Donsbach, 2017, p. 8).

Mancini (2000), Josephi (2005), Oi, Fukuda, & Sako (2012) and Mwesige (2004) have shown the gap between role conception and performance is greater in transitional democracies and developing countries. Hallin explains that understanding the gap between journalistic role conception and role performance is important for analysis of the forces mediating the actual practice of journalism as well as “differences in the media system and processes of historical change in journalism” (Hallin, 2017: xii).

To rephrase, studying the gap connects the individual journalist to the institutional level of the journalistic field (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). The gap also accounts for the diversity of journalism considering journalistic role conception often differ across journalists and news organisations and involves struggles and negotiations over which role conception will materialise in media content (Hallin, 2017, p. xiv). This suggests examining the journalistic role performance within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa would provide insight into the struggles and tensions over the journalistic roles materialising in news content.

3.1.4.1 Journalistic autonomy

Autonomy is considered to be the credo of journalism practice (McQuail, 1992) and the platform on which the practise of journalism rests because autonomy bestows credibility to journalism (Merrill, 1974): “Freedom is essential to authentic journalism, to creative press systems and to expanding, vigorous and self-assured journalists” (1974, p. 63).

Weaver et al. (2007) define autonomy as the “latitude that a practitioner has in carrying out his or her occupational duties” (Weaver et al., 2007, p. 70). Hence, in order to carry out their professional role to society, reporters and editors must enjoy considerable autonomy in the selection and processing of the news (Soloski, 1997, p. 139). Journalistic autonomy is considered a prominent indicator among the five values marking journalism as a profession. Tampering with it amounts to violating the credo of the journalism profession (Deuze, 2005, p. 446). Autonomy confers legitimacy on the profession of journalism when measured against the view that journalists are held in public trust (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 37; Skovsgaard, 2014, p. 345).

Furthermore, Reich and Hanitzsch (2013) identify two variants of journalists’ autonomy. In the first instance, autonomy denotes the freedom journalists have to do their work within the realm of operational routines. This is evinced in the “extent to which journalists are free to decide on the stories they cover or edit, as well as the selection of story angles, sources, and narrative frames” (2013, p. 136). The second case in point refers to “decision-making structures within the editorial hierarchy” related to the “extent to which journalists can take part and influence decisions that affect their work beyond operative procedures of reporting, editing, and so on” (2013, p. 136).

Reich and Hanitzsch (2013) contend the factors limiting journalistic autonomy stem from varying forces operating at multiple levels, including the organisation, the individual and the society (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013, p.136; Skovsgaard, 2014, p. 355).

For instance, Skovsgaard’s study of Danish journalists revealed the level of professional autonomy among journalists is more dependent on where they work than on gender, experience and education (Skovsgaard, 2014, p. 356).

On the African side, Mwesige's (2004) study of Ugandan journalists shows they "enjoy a modest amount of professional autonomy and freedom" (Mwesige, 2004, p. 79). He contends the threats to independent journalism in developing countries do not arise from the profession itself, but rather, from the ruling class (2004, p. 92). This trend is also the same in China, where the state goes beyond intervention to exert "authoritarian control" over the media (Zhao, 2012, p. 150).

While several studies have examined the freedom of journalists in the editorial process by measuring perceived autonomy, studying the ideal–practice gap is suggestive of a new approach to examining freedom in a more concrete way (Mellado & Humanes, 2012; Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013).

Consequently, journalists require autonomy in order to transform role conceptions into role performance (Mellado, 2015; Tandoc, Hellmueller, & Vos, 2013). One of the most important advantages of journalistic role performance is that it provides insight into the sources of the discrepancy between journalistic role conception and role performance (Hallin, 2017, p. xv). Hence, examining tensions between journalistic role conception and role performance will provide an insight into the forces mediating the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

3.2 Hierarchy of Influences

While the analysis of role conception and role performance provides an insight into the tensions occurring in the practice of journalism, it does little to explain what specifically intervenes in the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In this section, I explain Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model. I begin by tracing the evolution of research in the sociology of news production tradition in the literature on journalism studies. Following this, the five 'levels of analysis' in the hierarchy of influences model will be explained.

3.2.1 Historical foundation

The study of media institutions, their work practices, and their relationships with their socio-political environments marks a shift from the study of media effects in communication research (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 5; Schudson, 2000, p. 24; Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott, 1982, p. 63). Reese and Ballinger (2001, p. 641) note the increase in the amount of research addressing "forces operating at a number of different levels" have emerged, which could be defined as a 'hierarchy of influences'. These forces range from the most micro level, comprising the personal views and roles of journalists to higher levels, such as media routines, media organisations, external pressures, and ideology.

However, this tradition evolved differently in Europe and the US. European media studies focused on the ideological and institutional analyses, while the U.S. privileged the lower levels (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 641). This research tradition, termed 'media sociology,' provides an insight into the relationship between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism within a social context (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 641).

Reese and Ballinger (2001, p. 641-642) trace the origin of studies in the sociology of news production to two early classics: David Manning White's, "The 'Gatekeeper': A Case Study in the Selection of News," and Warren Breed's "Social Control in the Newsroom" (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Reese & Ballinger, 2001).

White's article, which researched gate-keeping in a newspaper, was published in the *Journalism Quarterly* in 1950. Breed's, interpretation, which examined the process through

which news organisations socialise their reporters to adopt organisational policy was published in *Social Forces* in 1955 (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 642). In the *Journalism Quarterly*'s editorial lead introduction, "The Gate Keeper" was described as "one of the first studies of its kind" and it has been reprinted in nine books, including field-defining Wilbur Schramm's "Mass Communication" (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 642).

Among the two studies, "Mr Gates", arguably, has had a greater impact (Reese & Ballinger, 2001). This is evidenced in Schudson's appraisal of Mr Gates. He contends Max Weber wrote of the social standing of the journalist as a political person; Robert Park's research into the generation of news and news itself as a form of knowledge; and Helen MacGill Hughes penned an early study of human interest stories, but the 'gatekeeper' marks the formal study of how news organisations produce news products (Schudson, 1989, p. 264).

The term 'gatekeeper' has its origin in social psychology as developed by Kurt Lewin (Schudson, 1989). The concept, borrowed like numerous other journalistic concepts, has been adopted by many social scientists in journalism studies. These include White (1950) and Gieber (1964).

In the 'gatekeeper' David Manning (1950) studied a wire editor at the Peoria Star, a morning newspaper. Manning kept a record of why the editor chose some stories and discarded others. For a period of one week, 'Mr Gates (as White called him) provided a record of every piece of wire copy including those he rejected as well as the ones he accepted for publication in the newspaper (Schudson, 1989; Reese & Ballinger, 2001).

640 of the 910 reasons given by Mr Gates for selecting stories reporting the same event included lack of space, 'dull writing', 'drags too much', 'propaganda' or 'He's too Red'. As well, stylistic issues accounted for a majority of the 423 reasons given to reject reports of the same event (Schudson, 1989; Reese & Ballinger, 2001). However, by his own admission Mr Gates said his conservative views were responsible for his news decisions. This pointed to subjectivity underpinning his news judgment (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 646; Schudson 1989, p. 265).

In contrast, White's study was contradicted by Walter Gieber's 1956 study of sixteen wire editors in Wisconsin. This study determined that all the wire editors selected news items in

generally the same way. Gieber then concluded mechanical pressures are informed by media routines and professional relations rather than individual journalistic decisions (Schudson, 1989, p. 265).

For Gieber, the organisation and the media institution are superior to individual journalistic role conception (Gieber, 1956). However, Schudson argues that a mechanical approach underestimates the complexity of the process of news production considering news is not selected but constructed (Schudson, 1989, p. 265):

The gatekeeper metaphor described neither this nor the feedback loops in which generators of information for the press anticipate the criteria of the gatekeepers in their efforts to get through the gate, like teenagers trying to figure out how best to talk and look in order to get admitted to X-rated movies or establishments that serve liquor (Schudson, 1989, p. 265-266).

Schudson (1989, p. 266) argues that if the gatekeeper model is ultimately as confused as it is suggestive, it means other approaches might not work. Furthermore, he identifies two broad approaches in the sociology of the news-work tradition – the study of reporter-official relations and the study of the social organisation of newswork. The study of reporter-official relations is concerned with how news sources influences the news while social organisation privileges the news as an organisational product (Schudson, 1989, p. 272).

Reese and Ballinger (2001), however, contend questions of how the news works and in whose interest it operates have dominated studies of the sociology of news production since the 1950s and are still relevant today (Reese & Ballinger, 2001, p. 654).

On the other hand, the sociology of news production approach has been criticised for failing to locate journalistic practices in the larger society (Murdock & Golding, 1997). Murdock and Golding contend it ought to serve as a link between “the ruling ideology and occupational ideologies” (Murdock & Golding 1997, p. 35). They contend it is important to account for the dominant role of the ruling ideology over journalistic agency in the production of news.

3.2.2 Hierarchy of influences approach

There is a consensus among scholars of communication research that the power to shape media content does not reside with media institutions alone (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This is informed by the view that content is a dependent variable which can be influenced by a wide range of factors both within and outside the news organisations (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 11).

Early studies of models of forces mediating the actual performance of journalism identify three basic levels – individual, organisation and institutional (Ettema, Whitney & Wackman et al., 1987; Whitney, Randall & McQuail, 2004). However, recent works studying influences on journalism have been more extensive. Voakes (1997, p. 2) identifies seven forces able to mediate the actual practice of journalism including individual, small group, organisational, competition, occupational, extra-media, and legal.

Donsbach (2000) identifies what he calls “spheres of influences” by differentiating among individual, professional, institutional, and societal perspectives. McQuail (2000) proposes a model of five levels which mediate journalism. These are: individual/role, organisation, medium/industry/institution, society and international levels. Similarly, Preston identifies five clusters of influences on news making – the individual level and professional values; media industry routines including institutional practices and norms; crucial containers-organisational influences; political economy factors and influences on news factors (Preston, 2009, p. 7).

In the same vein, Hanitzsch et al. (2010) identify six distinct domains of perceived influences on media content. These include political influences (government, politicians, censorship), economic influences (profit expectations, advertising, market pressures and audience research), organisational influences (ownership, management, editorial decision making), procedural influences (news routines, deadlines, editorial resources), professional influences (professional conventions, newsroom policies, media laws), and reference groups (competitors, colleagues in other media, audiences, friends and family).

For their parts, Norris and Odugbemi (2008), Christians et al. (2009) and Hellmueller and Mellado (2015) identify factors mediating between journalistic role conceptions and the actual performance of journalism. For Christians et al. (2009, p. 127-128), there are four

dimensions including community, the distribution of power, issues of legitimation and accounting. Norris and Odugbemi (2008, p. 16) identify the state, the market and the profession while Hellmueller and Mellado (2015, p. 3) identify routines, organisational ownership and the political system as forces that mediate between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism.

However, Shoemaker and Reese propose a hierarchical structure of influences on journalism comprised of five interrelated levels. These are: individual, media routines (journalistic practices) organisation (organisational goals, roles, structures, and control), extra-media level (information sources, revenue, social institutions, economic environment, & technology) and ideological level (system-level influences) (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

While all models of influences explicated in this chapter are relevant to this study, I chose Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model. First, the hierarchy of influences model conceptualised by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) is important because it identifies "important distinctions between levels of analysis and locates the individual journalist within a web of organisational and ideological constraints" (Reese, 2001, p. 174).

Secondly, using this model helps link the sociology of news production approach to the study of journalistic role performance. The hierarchy of influences model uses a visualised concentric pattern to explain influences on media content ranging from the micro-level to the macro-level: Individual, routines, organisations, extra-media forces and the ideological level (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

The advantage of the hierarchy of influences model is that it provides a theoretical basis for studying influences on media "based on levels of analysis, which help classify influences operating both separately and in conjunction with each other" (Reese, 2001, p. 178).

Therefore, empirically, the model "suggests that the investigator's task is to determine under which conditions certain factors are most determinative and how they interact with each other" (Reese, 2001, p. 179). Reese (2007) explains that central to the hierarchy of influences model is the interplay between structure and agency (Reese, 2007, p. 36-37).

Alternatively, the hierarchy of influences model has been criticised for being US-centric (Keith, 2011) and for lacking "consistency of the rules for specifying levels and in terms of

the very hierarchical relationships among those levels” (Lee, 2004, p. 2). Similarly, Hertog and McLeod (1995) disagree with Shoemaker and Reese’s model because it discusses ideology as a level of analysis in itself rather than “different definitions of ideology and associated content characteristics that reside at a number of levels”.

On the same track, Reese (2007: 31) argues the hierarchy of influences model cannot account for “all of the complex interrelationships involved in the media”. He questions why the micro level is prioritised over the macro-level (Reese, 2007, p. 37).

3.2.3 Individual level

In the conceptualisation of the hierarchy of influences model, the individual level has the least influence on media content. Shoemaker & Reese (1996) categorised individual influences broadly into three categories. They are:

1. characteristics of individual journalists such as education, personal and professional background;
2. personal attitudes, values and beliefs or personal experiences such as political attitudes or religious beliefs and lastly,
3. professional orientations and role conception of individual journalists as a function of being socialised to their jobs (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 64).

3.2.4 Routine level

The routine level is the second lowest influence in the hierarchy of influences model. It is defined as “those patterned, routinised, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 105). Media routines include journalistic values such as timeliness, proximity, human interest and conflict or controversy as well as objectivity (Ibrahim, 2003, p. 90). Media routines are important to the news product because they affect the social reality portrayed by the media (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 108).

The routine level serves as a bridge between the individual and organisational levels. Taking into account individuals do not enjoy absolute “freedom to act on their beliefs and attitudes...

but must operate within a multitude of limits imposed by technology, time, space and norms” (Reese, 2001, p. 180). Shoemaker & Reese argue routines may be viewed negatively as “constraints on individual agency” but emphasise they are characteristic of all human engagements (Reese, 2001, p. 180).

According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), media organisations are profit-making and operate like any other business searching for a market to consume its product (1996, p. 109). This suggests the media must source and process “raw product” (news, comedy, etc.) from “suppliers” (officials, playwrights) outside the organisation and deliver it to consumers (readers, viewers and listeners)” (1996, p. 109).

In order to satisfy these three stages, media organisations must answer three critical questions: What is acceptable to the consumer (audience)? What is the organisation (media) capable of processing? What raw product is available from suppliers (sources)? These questions are critical to the processing of news and news decisions (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 109).

The process of news selection in the libertarian tradition is informed by news values including prominence/importance, human interest, conflict/controversy, the unusual, timeliness, objectivity and proximity (Allan, 2004, p. 57). However, these values are not the same in Chinese media organisations.

The process of news selection in Chinese media organisations is based on Asian values such as “group orientation, filial piety, hard work and placing community or nation above individuals” (Xiaoge, 2005, p. 2). These news values are underpinned by the desire to “educate, inform, promote or maintain social and political stability, racial harmony as well as assisting with economic development and nation building” (Xu, 2005, p. 91).

So, considering Chinese and Kenyan media are likely to adopt different kinds of news values, it is indicative there may be some form of tension in the gatekeeping process between African and Chinese editors within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

3.2.5 Organisational level

This is concerned with the objectives and policies of news organisations and how power is exercised within it (Reese, 2001; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The organisational level privileges news as an organisational product (Reese, 2001, p. 181). However, organisational processes do not only impact the work of individual journalists but the form and content of the news product (Whitney & Ettema, 2005).

Reese (2007, p. 36) explains “professionalism is a negotiated set of values, worked out to satisfy the organisation’s needs”. This suggests that if news is viewed as the social production of “reality,” [then] on the other hand, it is taken to be the social manufacture of an organisational product, one that can be studied like other manufactured goods” (Schudson, 2002, p. 259)

This resonates with Epstein’s study (1973), which demonstrates that within an organisation, members “modified their own personal values in accordance with the goals of the organisation” (Epstein, 1973, p. xiv). Therefore, the “nature of the media as [a] formal organisation, as routines for getting work done in newsrooms, as career mobility patterns for a group of professionals, as profit-making institutions, all become inextricably and reflexively tied to the content of published news” (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 105).

The view of news being an organisational product enjoys traction in the sociology of news production and political economy traditions (McManus, 1997). Breed’s (1955) landmark survey of 120 journalists at several north-eastern newspapers first pointed out how newsroom culture dictated by management enforced management’s idea of news. Breed concludes reporters were faced with two options: conform or ship out (Breed, 1955). Following Breed, Epstein (1973), Sigal (1973), Sigelman (1973) and Fishman (1980) Powers (1977) and Bantz, McCorkle and Baade (1980), Schlesinger (1978), Tuchman (1978) and Hirsch (1977) effectively came to a similar conclusion that news is an organisational product.

In the same way, recent studies have reinforced the hegemony of organisational influence over journalistic autonomy. Skovsgaard (2014) and Hanitzsch & Mellado (2011) conclude organisational influence limits journalistic autonomy. Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011) explain that political, economic and organisational influences were perceived to be highest in developing countries such as Turkey, China and Uganda (2011, p. 413). Conversely,

Hellmueller and Mellado (2015) emphasise journalistic role conception “may matter more as an organisational outcome than an individual decision over news coverage” (Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015, p. 4).

Alternatively, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) identify three layers of influence within the organisational level. The lowest level comprises writers, reporters and creative staff who gather and package the raw materials. The mid-level is made up of managers, editors, producers, and others who coordinate the process and mediate communication between the bottom and the top of the organisation. The top-level is populated by corporate and news executives who are concerned with policy formulation, budgetary allocation, recruitment, protecting the organisation’s external interests, and when necessary, defending the company’s employees from external interference (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 151).

Chinese media is state-controlled (Zhao, 2012) and the Kenyan media suffers undue influence of “editorial policies, editorial managers, advertising considerations, media owners, and organisational policies” (Ireru, 2015, p. 54). Okech (2008) argues ownership of the Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers in Kenya influenced their coverage of the 2002 presidential election. Consequently, it is worth examining African journalists who come to Chinese media with notions of libertarian journalistic orientations. How do they reconcile tensions arising from their understanding of journalism and the actual practice of journalism within state-regulated and tightly-controlled Chinese media organisations?

3.2.6 Extra-media level

The extra-media level is comprised of influences emanating from outside the media organisation (Reese, 2001, p. 182). This perspective is informed by the view that the power to shape content does not entirely reside with the media but other external forces in society share in it. These outside factors include government controls, advertisers, the marketplace, community relations, technology – the information highway, public relations, influential news sources, interest groups and other media organisations (Reese 2001). It is therefore assumed the “media operate in structured relationships with other institutions that function to shape media content (Reese, 2001, p. 182).

Altschull (1984) emphasises news has always been at the mercy of those who finance it – such as advertisers. This resonates with Turow (1984; 1992) and Bagdikian’s (1992) study of

journalists' power which concludes journalists hold only one of 13 power roles which determine media content. Much of the power to shape news resides far beyond the newsroom – in corporate boardrooms. This suggests the news is a product of compromise “among powerful market-driven influences outside the newsroom” (McManus, 1994, 1995).

Mwesige (2004, p. 92) concurs threats to independent journalism in Uganda emanates from outside media organisations such as the ruling class. For her part, Maweu (2014) finds ethnicity influences the news content of journalists working for the Daily Nation newspaper in Kenya.

On the other hand, Reese (2007) contends globalisation can be analysed under the hierarchy of influences model. This is because “global changes in media ownership, new ways of carrying out gatekeeping across national boundaries, and emerging norms of professionalism all can be located within a level of influence perspective to better sort out the important issues” (2007, p. 41).

Globalisation has resulted in the proliferation of media systems (Cottle, 2000, p. 2) posing “challenges to news media and journalism researchers on how to analyse and define news” (Berglez, 2008, p. 845). Transnational media corporations (TNCs) including Chinese media, Chalaby (2005) emphasises are “challenging boundaries, questioning the principle of territoriality and opening up ‘from within’ the national media” (Chalaby, 2005, p. 32).

However, one of the least discussed components of globalisation is its impact upon the professionalisation of journalism (McPhail, 2006). Media systems and journalistic professionalisation are changing globally under the influence of globalisation (Esser, 2013, p. 115). McPhail (2006, P. 50) contends technicians, engineers, producers, directors, behind-the-scenes personnel, and writers are required for the technical maintenance and operation of an imported communication infrastructure, and they come with technocratic baggage.” These technocrats, McPhail notes, usually are on loan from the industrialised nations or are trained and educated in core nations”. They are exported to the receiving countries “value systems and attitudes associated with Western professionalism about how communication system should be properly run”.

However, Esser (2013, p. 120) explains media systems are not empty containers and journalists or news organisations are not passive receivers of outside stimuli but emphasises the “manners in which they respond are likely to demonstrate valuable information about specific conditions of the media system in question”.

The debate on globalisation’s impact on journalism professionalisation can be broadly divided into two groups: homogenisation (Schiller, 1975, McPhail 2006: Flew, 2007) and hybridity/hybridization (Bhabha, 1994). The first group argues globalisation will result in some form of cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1975). The second group contends it will result in hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) – a mixing of both local and global ideals of journalistic professionalisation. How China’s state-led media will impact the professionalisation of journalism in Africa remains an under researched topic. However, the expansion of Chinese media into Africa is a reality. Whether or not it will result in a homogenised Chinese journalism model or a hybridised form of journalism where Western and Chinese ideals co-exist remains to be seen.

3.2.7 Ideological level

The ideological level is the most powerful ‘level of analysis’ in the hierarchy of influences model. The ideological level is the sum total of all the other levels in the hierarchy of the influences model. This is because “all the processes taking place at lower levels are considered to be working toward an ideologically related pattern of messages and on behalf of the higher power centres in society” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 223).

This level is concerned with “how the media build[s] “consensus and consent” (Hall 1982, p. 86) in the interest of power in society (Reese, 2001, p. 183). Implicitly, this means each of the various levels could result in a particular ideological position:

A critical view would consider the recruitment of journalists, their attitudes and the routines they follow, their organisations’ policy and those organisations’ positions in the larger social structure work to support the status quo. They narrow the range of social discourse and serve to make the media agencies of social control (Reese, 2001, p. 183).

Reese (1990, p. 394) notes “news media play an essential role in maintaining the authority of the political system. In this sense, the media operates within a “larger ideological sphere” particularly in relation to hegemonic processes. Furthermore, Reese (1990, p. 254) explains state-run media in authoritarian political systems such as China serve directly as agents of state social control. In liberal societies such as Kenya, Reese maintains the media undertake diverse roles. They include “cheerleading the established order, alerting the citizenry to flaws in that order, providing a civic forum for political debate, and serving as a battleground among contesting elites”.

Following Reese, Zhao (2012) explains what lies beyond the structural role of the state in shaping the media in China. With regard to ownership, funding and regulation, its ideological role, includes serving as a source of information as well as the “primary definer” of news (Zhao, 2012, p. 150). It therefore suggests the ideological role of Chinese media differs considerably from the Kenyan, where journalism practice is known to enjoy a wide berth of freedom (Obonyo, 2011).

The ideological motivation prompting China’s media expansion into Africa is to counteract the Western media framing of China-Africa relations and evolve a new model of journalism underpinned by ‘positive reporting’ in which the media’s role is to collaborate with government (Banda, 2009a; Farah & Mosher, 2010; Wekesa, 2013; Gagliardone, 2013; Harber, 2013).

This motivation is linked to the geopolitical contest between China and the West – the US and its allies – where China seeks to countervail the dominance of the Anglo-American journalism model in the African mediasphere by exporting its own journalism model to the continent (Farah & Mosher, 2010; Banda, 2009a).

3.3 Path not Taken

In this section, I highlight some theoretical approaches considered in different stages of the research that were eventually not adopted, but can offer alternative angles to look at the phenomena at the centre of this study.

Two other models of news determinants are relevant to the study of influences on journalism – the propaganda model and journalism as a field. The propaganda model, grounded in the political economy tradition, proposes five filters through which news is subordinated to elite interests (Hackett, 2006, p. 10; Allan, 2004, p. 52). The propaganda model, however, has been criticised for limiting journalistic agency and equating journalists with propagandists (Allan, 2004, p. 55-56).

Bourdieu's (1998) concept of the journalistic Field model "moves away from linear causality to emphasise the relative autonomy and coherence of journalism as an institutionalised sphere, functioning in relationship with other homologously structured fields" (Hackett, 2006, p. 10). In this sense, each field is viewed as "a social universe with its own laws of functioning" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 14). It is a "microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms". However, Bourdieu's theorisation of journalism as a field is challenged by the fact journalism has limited professionalism and lacks a distinct boundary (Hackett, 2006, p. 9).

The hierarchy of influences model proposes five levels of influence which mediate journalism within media organisations (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The hierarchy model resembles the propaganda model in that both propose five levels of influence on media content. However, they differ significantly. The propaganda model privileges structure (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), while the hierarchy of influences recognises the agency of individual journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Reese, 2001).

Nevertheless, Hackett (2006) contends all the three models have limitations because they were developed in the Anglo-American context. Each one assumes "journalism operates within entrenched institutional settings, with well-established and relatively stable relationships with mass audiences, and with economic and political institutions" (Hackett, 2006, p. 10).

However, this study is interested in the lived experiences of African journalists and how they negotiate their journalistic agency within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In this sense, the hierarchy model is most suitable for this study because it accounts for journalistic agency and “identifies a broader range of influences in a more open-ended way” (Hackett, 2006, p. 10).

Conversely, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) work on media systems has been celebrated for its global appeal. Yet, it has been criticised for its tendency to underplay “the importance and history of the media systems in non-western societies such as Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia” (Obijiofor and Hanusch 2011: 23).

Similarly, Zhao (2012: 8) contends if Hallin and Mancini’s comparison of media systems, in the developed capitalist democracies of Western Europe and North America is based on a “most similar systems” design (2004b: 6), “to bring in the Chinese media system into a worldwide comparative project is to bring one of the “most dissimilar systems” into the messy picture of non-Western empirical reality”. She argues Hallin and Mancini’s observation of the growing influence of the liberal model throughout the world suffers from hasty generalisation because China’s state-led media has remained resilient in the face of reforms (Zhao, 2012). Granted, the presence of Chinese media organisations in Kenya may be significant. However, it is not going to generate repercussions at the media system level because it is based in Kenya and is subject to the jurisdiction of Kenyan laws and regulation. Consequently the media system theory does not really apply in this instance.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have extensively discussed the two analytical frameworks which inform this thesis. First, I explained the academic debate underpinning the relationship between role conception and role performance within journalism studies. I make a case that the assumption there is significant correlation between how journalists define their work and the media content they produce is not automatic.

Additionally, I have explained the five ‘levels of analysis’ posited in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model. I argued the hierarchy of influences model is deemed

US-centric and informed by libertarian journalistic ideals. This makes it insufficient to account for the forces that mediate the actual practice of journalism within the Chinese media. Further details are found in chapter 7.

I have explained these two different analytical frameworks will inform this study independently. However, Mellado & Dalen (2014, p. 872) emphasise economic, political and organisational factors mediate the actual performance of journalism and account for the gap between journalistic role conception and role performance.

They contend that by examining “role conception and role performance, we can explain how routines, organisational ownership and the political system reinforce or limit a particular normative role of journalists within a particular media system” (Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015, p. 3; Mellado and Dalen (2014, p. 872).

On empirical terms, there is a gap between the sociology of news research and studies on professional roles in literature dealing with journalism studies (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017, p. 5). This suggests linking the two divergent analytical frameworks could offer a new understanding of the relationship between role conception and role performance in relation to the typology of stories. Further details are found in Chapter 8.

In this chapter, I have explained and linked the two major theoretical concepts to inform this thesis. In the next chapter, I explain the methodology used in answering the research questions of this thesis.

CHAPTER FOUR

Research methods and Techniques

4.0 Introductions

Previous chapters have provided the contextual and theoretical frameworks which inform this study. This chapter justifies the methodological choices employed in this thesis to answer the core research questions. Specifically, this chapter explains the instruments of data collection, data analysis and the procedures adopted to ensure the research is conducted within rigorous ethical bounds.

The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between professional role conception and role performance of African journalists working for China's state-led media in Kenya. In order to achieve this, I employed two-phases of data collection and analysis comprising semi-structured interviews with African journalists and content analysis of the media content they produced.

First, I operationalised four roles identified in the literature concerning role conception and role performance (Mellado, 2015; Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Ireri, 2015; Mwesige, 2004; Ramaprasad, 2001): 1) Disseminator; 2) Watchdog; 3) Loyal-facilitator; and 4) Civic (see Table 4.1). This framework was later adopted during interviews with African journalists working in Chinese media (CCTV, Xinhua, China Daily) in Kenya to understand their role definitions and how they negotiate the tension between their role conception and the practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media.

Secondly, I examined the materialisation of these roles in the media content produced by African journalists with respect to the typology of stories: **Diplomatic- visits** – Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2014; **Negative perception of China** – Arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for cybercrime by the Kenyan government and the Chinese Racist Restaurant incident where black Africans were banned from a Chinese restaurant after sunrise in Nairobi, Kenya; **African politics** – trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy at the International Criminal Court (ICC); and **African affairs** – terrorist attack on Garissa University, Kenya.

I begin by making a case for a qualitative approach to the study of the relationship between role conception and role performance outside the Anglo-American context. Next, I discuss data collection and analysis techniques, and finally, concluding remarks are presented.

4.1. A case for qualitative approach to study of role conception and role performance

The tight control and state-centric nature of journalism practice within Chinese media suggests an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. African journalists may not have the freedom to stand up to the Chinese management when it unduly interferes with their work.

For instance, some journalists disclosed their employment contracts are used to bait loyalty among African journalists. In the course of my fieldwork in Nairobi, Kenya, I could perceive tension on the faces of African journalists. They were reluctant to speak about the challenges they face in carrying out their work within Chinese media. This is evident in the responses given by journalists interviewed on the premises of Chinese media organisations compared to those interviewed outside their offices.

Those interviewed away from the workplace were more forthcoming than those interviewed within the Chinese media buildings. For instance, a particular senior editor was required to get approval from the Chinese management before he could speak to me in his office. This situation might not have arisen in the local media. Therefore utilising surveys in such a ‘locked-down’ environment may have limited the nuances in-depth interviews typically add to this research.

On the other hand, adopting a quantitative approach that involves counting headlines, introduction or leads in news article might present a challenge. This is informed by the creative use of ‘reverse inverted reporting’ by African journalists. They use this tactic to circumvent tensions and censorship within the Chinese media. In this approach, the real truth is hidden further down in the article. Further details follow in Chapter 5.

This suggests using qualitative content analysis may represent a more viable approach in analysing media content outside the Anglo-American context. Similarly, Mellado, Hellmueller and Donsbach (2017) and Hallin (2017) have raised concerns about the use of the libertarian methodological approach to examine the relationship between role conception

and role performance as it may limit nuances which may emerge in non-liberal contexts. This suggests a qualitative approach combining interviews and content analysis is more likely to elicit the professional autonomy journalists working in non-liberal contexts enjoy while carrying out their work.

4.2 Qualitative semi-structured interview

Qualitative interviewing is a process resembling conversations between equals but “most of what is said and meant by both interviewer and interviewee emerges jointly in interaction” (Lindlof, 2005, p. 5). In other words, qualitative interviews provide an atmosphere to encourage the interviewee to freely explain their experiences and worldview with respect to a particular subject. Qualitative interviews are aimed at generating responses from the interviewees’ worldview rather than validating the interviewer’s predetermined position (see Lindloff, 1995, p. 185).

The main reason for conducting interviews is to understand people’s views and experiences related to a specific topic. These sessions are intended “to gain expert insight or information, to obtain descriptions of events or scenes that are normally unavailable for observation, to foster trust, to understand a sensitive or intimate relationship, or to analyse certain kinds of discourse” (Lindlof, 1995, p. 5). In this study, I am interested to understand the experiences and perspectives of African journalists working in Chinese media in Africa through their own stories, accounts and explanations (Lindloff & Taylor, 2002, p. 170).

Qualitative interviews provide insight into how interviewees apply their professional skills in “certain areas of their lives, how they negotiate sensitive issues or impasse, how they have made transitions to different stations in life, what specific media texts or styles of media use mean” (Lindloff & Taylor, 2011, p. 167). In this study, I selected a purposive population of former and serving journalists at Chinese Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News Agency (XNA) and China Daily newspaper (CDN). I asked a set of questions with the aim to comprehend their self-understanding of journalism; how they negotiate the tension between normative expectations and the actual practice of journalism; as well as their experience of journalism professionalisation in Chinese media.

This enabled me to gain insight into how African journalists make sense of journalism practice within the Chinese media. Additionally, I sought information about what kind of

professional autonomy they have while carrying out their work. This was accomplished through “the one-to-one conversations of an interview” (Rakow, 2011, p. 417).

There are several kinds of qualitative interviews including in-depth, unstructured, semi-structured, intensive, collaborative and ethnographic (Lindlof, 2005; Hancock, Windridge & Ockleford 2007). In this study, I preferred the qualitative semi-structured interview over structured interviews to ensure flexibility and to accommodate new questions emerging from the interaction between interviewer and interviewee (see Dickey-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p. 316).

Semi-structured in-depth interviews are described as the most widely used interviewing format for qualitative research and “can occur either with an individual or in groups” (Dicicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p. 316). This sort of interview is conducted once involving an individual or group. They may last only 30 minutes or may go on for several hours (Dicicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p. 316). In this study, African journalists working for the three Chinese media organisations in Kenya were interviewed individually. The researcher and interviewee met at an agreed place and each interview lasted between 30 and one hour, forty-five minutes.

This researcher had a predetermined area of inquiry spanning role conception, role performance and professional autonomy, guided by the five ‘levels of analysis’ in Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model. I neither fixed the interview nor did questions follow a pre-set sequence. Framing of the interview questions was informed by the research questions and the analytical frameworks of this study.

The first set of questions (see Appendix 15) centred on the individual level of the hierarchy of influences model as it addresses the relationship between role conception and role performance of African journalists working in Chinese media. In this section, I was interested in how journalists understood their roles and how they negotiate tensions arising from the discrepancies between normative expectations and the actual practice of journalism in Chinese media. In order to achieve this, I operationalised four roles (see Table 4.1) identified from the literature on role conception and role performance (Mellado, 2015; Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Ireri, 2015; Mwesige, 2004; Ramaprasad, 2001).

During the interview sessions in Nairobi, Kenya the four professional roles were read to journalists individually. Next, they were asked to choose the role that best defined their understanding of their journalistic roles. I was also interested to learn if they were able to fully perform these roles working in Chinese media. I asked questions such as: Why are you not able to perform your role identity working in Chinese media? In comparison with the local media, which is more accommodating of your role definition?

The second set of questions provided insight into the editorial processes of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. I was interested in how routines mediate the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations. What is the role of African journalists in the routines within Chinese media?

The third set of questions is concerned with the organisational level of analysis of Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model. In this sense, I was interested in the organisational structure and agency within Chinese media organisations. How does this impact the actual performance of journalism in Chinese media organisations based in Africa? I was guided by questions such as: Do you engage in self-censorship? Working for Chinese media, are there some stories you cannot cover? And, if so, why? What are the levels of gatekeeping in Chinese media organisations?

The fourth set of questions dealt with extra-media influences in Chinese media. These queries were asked to provide insight into the freedom African journalists have in reporting on issues of interest to Chinese government as well as the Communist party and African governments enjoying good relations with China.

I was interested in the forces that mediate the actual practice of journalism when it involves the economic and political interests of the Chinese government and her citizens. Specifically, I was interested in the professional autonomy African journalists have in covering stories possibly negative about China or Chinese citizens or African governments aligned with China. For instance, how do African journalists cover events concerning Chinese and African governments when it is positive or negative?

The fifth set of questions addressed the ideological level of analysis of Shoemaker & Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model. In this section, I was interested in China's quest to

export a journalistic orientation promoting ‘positive reporting’ to Africa and how it impacts journalism professionalisation within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

For example, I asked these questions as though I was gathering information for a news story. Does your organisation give preference to issues positively affecting China-Africa relations rather than negative issues possibly affecting their relations? Does working for the Chinese media have an impact on your libertarian understanding of journalism? The essence of this was to contribute to the academic debate on the ideological motivation of Chinese media expansion into Africa. When measured against the various journalism ideals that have emerged in China and Africa, this is important for the future of journalism professionalisation in Africa

Interview questions pitched to the interviewees were broadly the same as ones asked earlier. However, this time the interviewees were allowed the freedom to express themselves in any way they wished within the confines of this research. Also, I did not take answers at face value. In most instances, I probed for deeper explanations and insights to elicit more details on the subject matter.

4.3 Qualitative content analysis

Hsien and Shannon (2005) identify three approaches to qualitative content analysis including conventional, directed, and summative (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). In this study, I applied directed content analysis because I am interested in investigating the relationship between role conception and role performance drawing on media experiences outside the Anglo-American sphere. I explain the three approaches of qualitative content analysis below.

4.3.1 Conventional content analysis

The conventional content analysis is applied in a study with an aim to describe a phenomenon (Hsien & Shannon, 2005). It is suitable to a research design in which existing theory or research literature is limited (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). The conventional approach to content analysis has the advantage of directly accessing participants’ information. This worked very well because it does not “impose preconceived categories or theoretical perspectives” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279-1280).

However, this approach is narrow in both “theory development and description of the lived experience, because both sampling and analysis procedures make the theoretical relationship between concepts difficult to infer from the findings” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281).

4.3.2 Directed content analysis

This approach to qualitative content analysis aims to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). In this sense, existing theory or research can help focus the research question. Explaining further, Hsien and Shannon (2005) emphasise this approach “can provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281).

One of the advantages of directed content analysis is the use of a predetermined code in which coding can begin immediately. Hence “data that cannot be coded are identified and analysed later to determine if they represent a new category or a subcategory of an existing code” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1282).

Findings from this approach to content analysis could offer supporting and non-supporting evidence for a theory. “The theory or prior research used will guide the discussion of findings while newly identified categories offer a contradictory view of the phenomenon or might further refine, extend, and enrich the theory” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). Similarly, the major advantage of this approach is “existing theory can be supported and extended” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283).

4.3.3 Summative content analysis

This approach to content analysis “starts with identifying and quantifying certain words or content in text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or content” (Hsien & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283-1284). This quantification, Hsien & Shannon (2005) emphasise, “is an attempt not to infer meaning but, rather, to explore usage”. In this approach, “data analysis begins with searches for occurrences of the identified words by hand or by computer” (p. 1285). A major advantage of this approach is that it “can provide basic insights into how words are actually used”. However, “findings from this approach are limited by their inattention to broader meanings present in the data”.

4.4 Target population

This study was conducted in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya. This is informed by the fact Nairobi serves as the operational base of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. The regional headquarters of CCTV, Xinhua, and China Daily newspaper are also located in Nairobi, Kenya (Wasserman, 2013, Wu, 2012, Wekesa, 2014).

4.4.1 Sample selection and size

One attribute of the qualitative tradition is it does not generate data easily generalised to a greater population. In research, the term ‘population’ does not automatically mean people; it can be aggregates of texts, institutions, or anything else being investigated (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 43). A population of interest is dependent on what the researcher is investigating (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 43).

There are two broad categories of sampling techniques: random sampling (probability sampling) and non-random sampling (or non-probability sampling) (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 44). This study is purposive and therefore qualifies as non-random. Random sampling entails “every unit of a population has an equal chance of being selected, while in non-random, it cannot be guaranteed that every unit of a population has an equal chance of being selected” (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 44).

I selected my sample of analysis from a population reckoned to be suitable to address my research objectives. In this study, the population comprises former and present journalists of African descent working for CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily newspaper in Kenya. As well, the media content produced by the journalists in relation to the typology of stories was taken into account.

Purposive sampling involves the deliberate selection of a sample from a suitable population based on the knowledge of the informant (Tongco, 2007, p. 147; Guarte & Barrios, 2007, p. 278). In this sense, I was interested in knowledgeable informants who are able to provide information amenable to my research goals (Tongco, 2007, p. 147).

Purposive sampling enjoys traction among qualitative researchers because it enables flexibility in the selection of knowledgeable experts within the domain of study (Tongco, 2007, p. 147). Snowballing is the non-random sampling technique I have applied in this

study. It relies on the suggestion of participants by initial contacts (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 54).

4.4.1.1 Selection of journalists

The selection of journalists to interview was based on two criteria. First, journalists who were considered for interview were expected to have written a minimum of one story on each of the five selected events. However, this criterion may not apply in the case of line producers and editors who are saddled with editorial leadership.

Second, the selection was comprised of three sets of journalists:

1. early career journalists, who commenced their careers in the Chinese media;
2. mid-career journalists, who began their careers in the local media or elsewhere;
3. and senior journalists holding editorial leadership positions in Chinese media.

Also, former journalists, especially foundation staff of CCTV, who had returned to the local media or moved on to other ventures were sought for their understanding of journalism professionalisation in Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

A total of twenty-nine current and former employees of China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News Agency (XNA) and China Daily newspaper (CDN) were interviewed in Nairobi, Kenya. Among these, only two were Chinese nationals – the African regional bureau chief of Xinhua and the managing editor of China Daily newspaper. A total of fifteen journalists comprising twelve full time journalists and three former CCTV foundation staff journalists were interviewed at CCTV. One full-time reporter, one freelance journalist and the managing editor were interviewed at China Daily while eleven journalists were interviewed at Xinhua. Among the interviewees, twenty-five were tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis while four declined. In those instances, I was required to take hand notes which were later transcribed with other recorded interviews.

The recorded interviews included one Chinese editor, one former CCTV journalist, who left the organisation a few months prior to the interview date, one freelancer and twenty-two full-

time African journalists. The two Chinese journalists, two former employees of CCTV and one full-time employee of CCTV were not asked about their role conceptions. However, their views were sought to validate or contradict views of African journalists as well as to assist in identifying patterns emerging from content analysis.

In all, I was more interested in longer comprehensive interviews than the number of journalists interviewed (Rakow, 2011, p. 420). As well, this researcher negotiated a confidentiality and anonymity agreement. Hence, all responses were coded for identification.

4.4.1.2 Document review

Documents play a central role in researching contemporary communications (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 14). Documents that can be examined include, among others, newspapers, annual reports, correspondence, and minutes of meetings (Stake, 1995, p. 68). In this study, I examined newspaper documents and video content produced by African journalists working for Chinese media organisations in Kenya.

More specifically, I examined stories published in the online edition of three Chinese media organisations including CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and the China Daily newspaper. Articles were selected in respect to the typology of stories: **African affairs**-Garissa attack-terrorist attack on Garissa University in Kenya; **Diplomatic visits**-visit of Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2014; **African politics**-trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy at the International Criminal Court (ICC); **Negative perception of China**-Arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for cybercrime by the Kenyan government and the Chinese Racist Restaurant incident in which black Africans were banned from a Chinese restaurant after sunrise in Nairobi, Kenya.

The period of analysis encompassed all content produced by the three Chinese media organisations covering the five selected events.

1. The terrorist attack on Garissa University was steady news between April 3 2015 when it occurred and when its mastermind was killed in June 2016;
2. The visit of Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2014 was steady news between April and May 2014;

3. The trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy at the International Criminal Court (ICC) was between 2012 and when Vice President William Ruto was acquitted in 2016;
4. The arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for cybercrime was between December 2014 and January 2015; and
5. The Chinese racist restaurant incident remained in the news between March and April 2015.

These stories were downloaded using the online database of the three Chinese media organisations; CCTV, Xinhua, and China Daily. The data was collected using the following keywords/phrases: Garissa University attack; Uhuru Kenyatta's trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Williams Ruto trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Li Keqiang's visit to Kenya in 2014; Chinese racist restaurant; Arrest of Chinese nationals for cybercrime in Kenya. All were search terms used to identify media content relating to the five news events.

In media studies, documentary sources can be used either to "supplement the materials we have collected or as the primary focus of our research" (Deacon et al., 2010: 15). In this study, documents were the secondary source of my research. This was because it was only used to validate the presence or absence of journalistic role conceptions in the content produced by African journalists with respect to the typology of stories mentioned above.

Specifically, in retrieving stories from the database of the three Chinese media organisations, I applied the following steps (Kanyegire, 2007, p. 145):

1. Search for words: Garissa University attack; Uhuru Kenyatta's trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Williams Ruto trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Li Keqiang visit to Kenya in 2014, Chinese racist restaurant; Arrest of Chinese nationals for cybercrime in Kenya
2. Search boundaries: Any document containing the above words
3. Refine my search by Category: China Central Television YouTube Channel, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily newspaper.

4. Sorting options: In reverse chronological order
5. Display options: headline and first few sentences
6. Date: April-September, 2016
7. Go Search (Story listing as per (4))
8. Full-length story: Noted Author's by-line
9. Analysis

4.5 Data analysis

In research using interviews, results are informed by patterns emerging from the data and information provided by participants. They are used to validate the interpretation (Rakow, 2011: 423).

4.5.1 Analysing interviews

First, to examine the role conception of African journalists working for Chinese media in Kenya, the operationalised roles (see Table 1) were read to journalists individually during interview sessions in Nairobi, Kenya. Then the interviewees were asked to choose the role best their self-understanding of journalism.

Furthermore, interview responses were analysed and broadly delineated into three general categories: role conception/role performance of African journalists; editorial processes and self-censorship in Chinese media organisations in Africa; and how African journalists report on events of interest to both Chinese and Kenyan governments.

These categories were further demarcated into five broad themes in line with the five levels of the Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influence model.

1. Responses on role conception and role performance addressed individual level analysis

2. Responses on editorial processes and self-censorship provided insights into how media routines and organisational influences mediate journalism within Chinese media
3. Responses on how African journalists working for Chinese media report events of interest to both Chinese and African governments and the impact of positive reporting provided insight into extra-media and ideological influences on content in Chinese media operating in Africa.

The data was then coded to understand its “constitutive codes and convention” (Deacon et al., 2010, p. 380).

The initial coding technique was applied and observed themes emerging from the data were written down. Moreover, I immersed myself in the recordings to generate observations coded according to the five themes of Shoemaker & Reese (1996) hierarchy of influence model: 1) individual – role conception and role performance, 2) media routines – journalistic practices, 3) organisation – organisational goals, roles, structures and control, 4) Extramedia – information sources, revenue, social institutions, economic environment, and technology, 5) Ideology- system-level influences.

Consequently, drawing on inductive thematic analysis, the interview transcripts were evaluated for recurrence, repetition and forcefulness (See Rakow, 2011, p. 423). In this sense, I was observing for convergence and divergence among African journalists working for Chinese media in Kenya (Rakow, 2011, p. 423).

In this first phase of thematic analysis, I broadly undertook a three-stage analytical process:

1. Immersed myself in the interview recording and carefully reading and re-reading responses recalling the interview questions, research questions, research objectives and discussion topics.
2. Categorisation of convergent and divergent responses under the broad themes of individual, routine, organisation, extramedia and ideology

3. I assigned codes and themes to responses showing convergence and separated those which diverged. I also assigned codes to sub-topics and secondary themes emerging from responses to aid further analysis.

In the second phase of analysis, the identified themes, keywords and categories within each broad theme were further delineated into sub-themes and secondary themes for further interrogation and analysis. In this sense, responses under individual level were further delineated to include role conception, journalists' perception of tension and negotiating tension.

Under role conception are subcategories including loyal-facilitator, disseminator, watchdog, and civic. Responses under this broad theme were analysed separately in chapter 5. This was done because the researcher is interested in examining how African journalists negotiate tensions arising from the discrepancies between the way they understand their roles and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Furthermore, in chapter 6, the result that emerged from the analysis of Chapter 5 formed the basis for the comparative analysis of the relationship between role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Under the broad theme of routine, responses were grouped into one sub-theme: Binary structure and agency. These responses were further delineated and analysed along the following sub-categories: binary agency, binary structure, gatekeeping in Chinese media, No trust for African editors, African editors have no agency, stories killed without explanation, and organisational boundaries.

On the broad theme of organisation, responses were demarcated into sub-themes of censorship, recruitment and language.

On the broad theme of extra-media, responses were delineated into four sub-categories and analysed. These sub-categories include: no advertising, government influence is real, party-press parallelism and Chinese media contravenes the ethos of China-Africa relations.

The broad theme of ideology was delineated into three sub-categories and then analysed. Those sub-categories are: positive reporting, limits of positive reporting and Chinese versus Western journalism models in Africa.

The analysis of interview responses along the five themes outlined above provided the researcher with answers to the three research questions. For example, questions such as how do you define your professional roles? Are you able to perform this role working in Chinese media? If not, why? These queries provided answers as to how African journalists negotiate the tension between normative expectations and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media.

Furthermore, questions such as how often do you propose story ideas? Are such ideas accepted-and if so-do you enjoy freedom to cover it? All speak to influences from media routines on journalism in the newsroom of Chinese media organisations in Africa.

Some other questions were: In reporting news stories, does your organisation give preference to issues that positively affect China-Africa relations over negative issues affecting their relations? Do you experience the influence of Chinese government in the newsroom? How do you view Chinese journalistic orientation? Do you think Chinese journalistic orientation will supplant the dominant western orientation in Africa?

These questions provided insight into organisation, extramedia and ideological influences in Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

4.5.2 Content analysis

The study uses content analysis to examine the presence or absence of the four operationalised roles in media content produced by African journalists working for Chinese media organisations. In several studies, it has been observed content analysis research is helpful in predicting the relationship between role conceptions and role performance (See Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico, 2015; Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Tandoc et al., 2013). In this approach, congruence between role conception and performance suggests conceptions are supported in the content (see Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico, 2015).

4.5.2.1 Unit of analysis

Zhang and Wildemuth (1996) define a unit of analysis as the “basic unit of text to be classified during content analysis” (Zhang & Wildemuth, 1996, p. 5). Unlike quantitative content analysis, which favours word, sentence or paragraph as the unit of analysis, qualitative content analysis privileges themes as the unit of analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 1996, p. 5). Accordingly, a theme could be expressed in the form of a single word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph or an entire document (Zhang & Wildemuth, 1996, p. 5). In this study, I used entire news articles, interviews, features or opinion articles as a unit of analysis.

Roles	Operationalisation
Disseminator:	The journalist represents both sides of the story, provides information to the public; Journalists voice is absent (Mellado 2014; Mellado and Dalen 2014). The Disseminator role includes verifiable content that mainly includes facts presented in an impartial, straightforward style” (Patterson, 2000)
Watchdog	The journalist questions, critiques and denounces. S/he covers conflict, trials and processes, engages in investigative reporting and external research (Mellado, 2015). The watchdog role in media content comprises three characteristics – objectivity, factuality and critical coverage (Jebril, 2013). These indicators reflect the active-neutral dimension central to the watchdog role of journalists (Jebril, 2013: 4).

Loyal-facilitator	The journalist supports institutional activities, promotes national or regional policies, privileges positive images of political or economic elites, and highlights a country's progress. S/he compares a country/region with the rest, may highlight its triumphs, and promote patriotism.
Civic	The journalist seeks to offer a citizen perspective, highlight citizen demand, citizen questions, credibility of citizens, support of citizen movement, educating on duties and rights, background information, information on citizen activities and local impact.

Table 1: Operationalisation of professional roles

4.5.3 Coding procedure

Zhang & Wildemuth (1996, p. 4) explain that adopting coding schemes from previous studies has the “advantage of supporting the accumulation and comparison of research findings across multiple studies”. In order to identify manifest roles in media content, I used three indicators including story purpose, the sources quoted and the presence or absence of the journalist's own voice (see Carpenter et al., 2015, p. 12).

In this study, I have modified the coding scheme adapted from Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico (2015) and Mellado & Dalen (2014) to suit my data set. In order to ensure consistency, I developed a coding manual (see Appendix 14) comprising news reports, story purposes and journalists' voice (Weber, 1990 quoted in Zhang and Wildemuth, 1996, p. 5). Specifically, I took three steps to ensure coding consistency:

1. My coding scheme was tested on a sample of text
2. I coded all text – a total of 183 texts were coded
3. I returned to the text frequently to check for coding consistency
4. Finally, I made conclusions from the coded data: In this instance, I made sense of themes and categories identified from the text and consequently made inferences and relationships between role conception and role performance.

However, to ensure coder reliability, my supervisor ensured inter-coder verification of my coding manual. For instance, where the role that manifests in an article straddles two different roles, I based the categorisation of role performance on the dominant role in a unit of analysis. That is, instead of relying on the headline and lead, I take into consideration the entire article.

Among the stories in this category, two cases are peculiar. In the news story, *Li's Visit Inspires Pioneer Wildlife Protector* published in *China Daily* of 26 May, the headline is very different from its content, which is balanced and presenting both sides of the story. When news stories like this emerge straddling two roles – loyal-facilitator and disseminator roles, I base my judgment on the whole content of the story rather than the headline which is framed through the lens of Chinese government official rhetoric of China-Africa relations.

I categorised this particular story in the disseminator role because it presents both sides of the issue and identified sources in the story. This kind of news reporting can be categorised as the “reverse inverted pyramid form” (See Hallin, 1986, p. 78) or “demotion of lead” (see van Dijk, 1995, p. 14) in which the truth is placed lower in the news report. However, this is also a method employed by African journalists in the negotiation of the tension between normative expectation and role performance in Chinese media. Further details are found in Chapter 5.

4.5.4 Role conception versus role performance

Conforming to Rakow (2011, p. 423) that the researcher may apply statistical analysis including percentages to characterise participants and their responses; I opted to use graphs and tables. I used them to illustrate the relationship between journalistic role conception and the absence or presence of these roles in the content produced by African journalists with respect to the typology of stories identified above. Further details are found in chapter 6.

4.6 Conclusion

The research design I conceptualised to examine the relationship between how journalists define their works and the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media is relevant to the study of role conception and role performance in non-liberal contexts. The strength of this approach is that it provides insight into the tension and the nuances arising from the discrepancies between how journalists conceptualise their roles and the actual practice of journalism within the Chinese media.

In order to achieve this, I had to rely on interviews and qualitative content analysis tailored to suit media experiences outside the Anglo-American orbit. I provided a justification for using the qualitative research design based on the observation that it is more suitable in examining the practical consequences of high and low autonomy of journalists working in difficult media environments (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013). This chapter also outlined in detail how the study was conducted and the data analysis process.

The process from normative expectations to the actual practice of journalism involves tensions and negotiations arising from the discrepancy between the way journalists define their roles and the media content produced by them (Tandoc et al., 2013, p. 540). In the next chapter, I discuss the role conception of African journalists and how they negotiate tensions arising from the discrepancy between their understanding of journalism and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

Role conception of African Journalists Working in Chinese Media

5.0 Introduction

This is the first of four empirical chapters of this thesis. According to the framework adopted in this study, this chapter focuses on the individual level of analysis in the hierarchy of influences model. The remaining four levels are analysed in chapter seven. This chapter focuses on the individual level of analysis because I am interested in how individual African journalists think of themselves as agents while in chapter seven, I look more at the structural constraints on journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Here, I use qualitative interviews in examining the role definition of African journalists and how they negotiate tensions arising from the discrepancies of the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This approach is consistent with Hanitzsch and Reich's suggestion of using qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and observations to provide insight into the challenges faced by journalists who work in the contexts of greater and smaller professional autonomy (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013, p. 152).

The dominant approach to the study of journalistic role conception is by conducting surveys of journalists. This is informed by the Anglo-American tradition which presupposes high levels of journalism professionalisation (Hallin, 2017). Conceptually, this study seeks to expand the study of journalistic role conception to account for media experiences outside the Anglo-American orientation. It employs qualitative interviews to examine how African journalists negotiate the tension between self-understanding of their roles and the practice of journalism in a state-media adhering to non-democratic tenets in which media freedom is limited.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, I analyse qualitative interviews with African journalists to examine their understanding of journalism. Here, I am interested in how they define their roles. Secondly, I analyse qualitative interviews to understand how African journalists make sense of the discrepancies arising from the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In this section,

I am interested in how African journalists who, for the most part, come to Chinese media with a libertarian journalistic orientation make sense of the state-centric and tightly controlled journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings and links to the next chapter comparing role conception and role performance in Chinese media organisations in Africa.

5.1. Conceptualisation and operationalisation

First, to examine the role conception of African journalists working for Chinese media organisations in Africa, I operationalised four roles identified from the literature on role conception and role performance (Ramaprasad, 2001; Mwesige, 2004; Mellado & Dalen, 2014; Mellado, 2015; Ireri, 2015): Disseminator; Watchdog; Loyal-facilitator; and Civic.

The four professional roles were read to journalists individually during interview sessions in Nairobi, Kenya. The participants were then asked to identify the category most congruent with the self-understanding of their role. I further questioned journalists about their self-identification and if they could perform these roles working in Chinese media. Despite some answers emerging during interviews may have already elicited tensions between self-perception and daily routines, I did not further contest the way African journalists referred to themselves. I did this because I had planned to examine self-perceptions against the media content they had produced. More information about this is found in chapter 6.

A total of twenty-nine current and former employees of China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News Agency (XNA) and China Daily newspaper (CDN) were interviewed in Nairobi, Kenya. Among these, only two were Chinese nationals – the African regional bureau chief of Xinhua and the managing editor of the China Daily newspaper.

A total of fifteen journalists comprising twelve full time journalists and three former journalists, who were foundation staff of CCTV were interviewed at CCTV. One full-time reporter, one freelance journalist and the managing editor were interviewed at China Daily while eleven journalists were interviewed at Xinhua. Among the interviewees, twenty-five were tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis while four declined to be recorded. In those instances, I was required to take hand notes which were later transcribed with other recorded interviews. The recorded interviews included twenty-two full-time African journalists, one

Chinese editor, one former CCTV journalist, who left the organisation a few months before the interview date, and one freelancer.

The two Chinese journalists, two former employees of CCTV and one full-time employee of CCTV were not asked about their role conceptions. However, their views were sought to validate or contradict views of African journalists as well as to assist in identifying patterns emerging from content analysis.

Additionally, this researcher negotiated a confidentiality and anonymity agreement with the interviewees. Hence all responses were coded and only codes are reported, rather than interviewee's names.

5.2 Role conception of African journalists working for CCTV, XINHUA and China Daily

Role conception	CDN	XNA	CCTV
Watchdog		5	7
Civic			
Disseminator	1	5	5
Loyal-facilitator	1		

Table 2: Shows professional role conception of African journalists working for Chinese media in Kenya.

Role conception	Cumulative	%
Watchdog	12	50
Civic	0	0
Disseminator	11	45.8
Loyal-Facilitator	1	4.2

Table 3: Shows the cumulative and percentage of role conception of African journalists working for Chinese media in Kenya.

Responses from interviews suggest two roles are predominant among African journalists working for Chinese media organisations based in Africa – watchdog and disseminator (see Table 2). Among the 24 journalists, twelve think of themselves as watchdogs; 11 as disseminators and one as a Loyal-Facilitator. None expressed their affinity for a civic role (see Table 2).

Journalists at CCTV (see Table 2) dominantly think of themselves as watchdogs, whose role is to hold leadership to account at all facets of society (See Christians et al., 2009, p. 149; Norris and Odugbemi, 2008, p. 13) followed by Journalists in Xinhua and China Daily (see Table 2). Journalists at China Daily think of themselves as disseminators and Loyal-Facilitators (see Table 2).

5.2.1 Watchdog

Predominance of the watchdog role among CCTV journalists could stem from the calibre of journalists employed in CCTV at the outset of its operation in Nairobi, Kenya. Significantly, many of these journalists had previously carved a niche for themselves in investigative journalism in the local media and could pass for celebrity journalists in Kenya (see Gagliardone, 2013: 30).

For journalists in this category, their understanding of journalism is buttressed by investigative reporting. One interviewee, in a senior position, was one of several African

journalists headhunted at the launch of CCTV in Kenya. He acknowledged he had been socialised into the watchdog role at the outset of his career in the Kenyan media. He believes it is the only role a journalist should perform:

...You know we tend to be trained at different periods in our journalism careers and you know the training I received at the time I received it, a lot of things have happened in journalism. Journalism is dynamic and just as society changes, journalism and its goals and aspirations also changed. You know the basic idea of informing, entertaining and educating journalists' role is becoming a bit more complex and other factors in society are beginning to shape the way journalists operate. My background is more of investigative reporting, which basically is about holding leaders to account. It is about transparency and accountability and ensuring that people who hold public office are accountable to the people. That for me is the role that I understand as a journalist and that journalists should play (CCTV1)¹⁵.

Other journalists also subscribe to the view that the role of journalists is to hold leaders to account at every level of leadership. One African journalist from Xinhua noted that journalists should hold leaders to account through their work. "You should hold the leadership to account by way of your work and not by doing it as a person. You do it through your work and ask questions and follow up on those questions to get answers" (Xinhua 7).

An entry-level journalist who commenced her journalism career in CCTV thinks the role of a journalist is to serve as a voice of the people and resist manipulation by economic and ruling elites:

...If you are a journalist, you should be a watchdog of the society. We should not allow ourselves to be manipulated by politicians, big business or anyone who holds a huge stake in the media world. We should represent the people because we are the voice of the people. We should report what is happening in the society despite what the politicians have to do. In fact, I think the role of journalists is to hold political leadership, government to account (CCTV2).

¹⁵ Codes are used to protect the identity of interviewees. They are found at the end of every interview quote indicating the name of organisation and order of first appearance.

5.2.2 Chinese watchdogs

Some journalists who think of themselves as watchdogs tended to contest my conceptualisation of the watchdog role. This group of journalists argued it is not possible to function as a western watchdog in Chinese media. While these journalists acknowledged they came to Chinese media with the preconceived notion of libertarian-democratic journalistic orientation, they emphasised that the state-ownership of Chinese media makes it difficult to serve as western watchdogs. A senior African journalist, one of several African journalists headhunted to work for CCTV at its Launch in Kenya, explained that while his background is in investigative journalism, it is a different ball game being a watchdog in the Chinese media:

...I see myself as in a role of oversight in terms of accountability, holding the powersto account at every level of society. When I was on the local side of things that role was different because I have a background as an investigative journalist. So when you are dealing with cases, especially corruption, coming up with evidence, counteracting claims by authorities, whether it was a cover up or whatever, that is more like an oversight role but you also acting as a voice for the people. There is always a gap between authority and the people and whatever dealing happens upstairs, the information does not trickle down. More important, it is not always for the good of people. At times, it is to benefit others unlawfully (CCTV3).

This senior Xinhua journalist said he had to change his libertarian-democratic orientation of watchdog journalism when he moved over to the Chinese media. He emphasised that when he was in the local media, he acted as a watchdog but he has had to adapt this role within the context of Chinese media and must become a Chinese watchdog:

...It depends on the media outlet that you work for... For example, if you work for the local media, your work is to hold the government to account but for us, here at Xinhua, which is also state-owned, you have to balance your story. You must play around with the English language. Sometimes it is very tricky. The main key role is just to inform the public (Xinhua1).

This senior journalist with CCTV noted that working for CCTV shifts one's understanding of watchdog journalism. While he noted he still serves as a watchdog, he explained that Chinese watchdogs, unlike their western counterparts, do not go the extra mile to find out who is responsible. They just leave it there:

...However, within CCTV Africa, that role of serving as a watchdog kind of shifts in a way, because of the nature of stories you are reporting. In CCTV, I mostly cover conflict stories; DRC, rebel wars with the authorities; protests in Egypt, South Sudan, Sudan and in that respect, yes, I still see myself as a voice for the people. For instance, in the conflict area, those reports have been there locally but no one has got it on the global scene and when you are reporting such stories, you[re] probably reporting exclusive stories that you have come across and it may be information that the world is not aware which are unfortunately horrific. In that regard, you do act as a voice for the people. But there are some inhibitions: If you come across some massacre, you report of course, but do you go that extra mile to find out exactly who is responsible or do you wait for somebody else to come up with the burden of proof. So those are some of the challenges you get when working for CCTV (CCTV3).

5.2.3 Loyal-Facilitator role

There have been concerns about the impact of Chinese media training on journalism professionalisation in Africa (see Banda, 2009a). This is informed by the basic tenet of Chinese media training is built upon “party journalism and official journalistic theories or ethics” (Pan & Chan, 2003, p. 660). Therefore, the impact of Chinese media training on African journalists cannot be dismissed.

There is evidence from responses during interviews that Chinese journalism training seems to have an impact on how African journalists understand their roles. For instance, among the 27 African journalists interviewed in Kenya for this study, those who have undergone further journalism training in China seem to have been socialised into the Chinese ideal of journalism. In the Chinese model, the role of the journalist is to collaborate with and defend the interest of government (Christians et al., 2009). A respondent with CDN, who defines his professional role as Loyal-Facilitator, represents this group of journalists:

...I see myself as a person who wishes to inform the public about China, about their role in Africa; what they are doing in Africa because they have really been mistaken to be out here to want to exploit the African state. So I have taken it upon myself to inform that the Chinese out here in Africa are actually doing genuine business. I have done it here visiting Chinese business and projects and making sure it is reported and the advantage I have is the fact that I am a local person talking about the Chinese so when a local person reads my article, he would actually see that what I am saying is true as compared to if it is a Chinese role (China Daily1).

This reinforces the argument that Chinese media training for African journalists are embedded with Chinese ideologies and introduces the Chinese media system which may adversely impact the libertarian-democratic journalistic tradition in Africa (see Banda, 2009a, p. 16; Gagliardone, 2013, p. 27-28; Farah & Mosher, 2010, p. 4).

5.2.4 Disseminator role

The favourable ranking of the disseminator among African journalists in the Chinese media could be attributed to the fact that Chinese media does not welcome investigative journalism. This means journalists who hitherto understood their roles as watchdogs may have to adapt the disseminator roles if they want to remain in Chinese media.

The dominance of this role among African journalists also corroborates Ireri's (2015) study which concludes that serving as a disseminator of information is the most important role of journalists in Kenya. This role also enjoys traction among female African journalists. One of female journalist described her role as a disseminator of information. She emphasised her job is to educate Africans on issues that impact democratic dividends:

...First of all, I believe my role is to educate the population. So many times I feel the population does not truly understand what is going around them and up there in government. And our role is to explain [it] to them because as Africa moves into a more democratic way of thinking, I feel like the only way for Africa to prosper is when its population and its people truly understand what is going [on]. And I feel like that is the biggest part of my work; not just educating Africa but educating the west and other parts of the world about what exactly is going on ground. I guess in my eight or so years in the industry that has been mainly my role. It may change but I have been very much about educating the people (CCTV 4).

Another female journalist with CCTV also thinks of herself as a disseminator of information for the enlightenment of the public:

...I think my role as a journalist is to enlighten the public on issues that affect them directly and make them aware of what is happening in the environment. This could be socially or politically and of course, to inform them also about some new things primarily technology (CCTV 5).

For this female respondent, working for the China Daily means adopting a disseminator role:

...I think my role is to guide the public on the issues that affect [them]; to give them information; to aid them to make informed decisions” (China Daily 2).

The same trend also holds for another female respondent with Xinhua who sees her role as providing an avenue for debate on issues impacting the African people:

...My role is to let people know what is going on and basically touch on issues that you think are affecting the people. Draw a debate and probably try to find solutions and get the relevant bodies involved. Maybe they can offer solutions (Xinhua 2).

Another senior journalist with CCTV also emphasised, his role is to provide information and allow the public to reach their own conclusions:

...I believe my role one is to tell stories and to inform the public. Once I give you that information, I give you the ammunition to make decisions and to questions things. I also believe my role is to call out things that may not be right (CCTV 6).

5.3 Journalists perception of tension

This section highlights how African journalists make sense of their roles within the context of Chinese media organisations and how they negotiate the tensions emerging from the apparent discrepancies of their understanding of journalism. Among African journalists, there seems to be an awareness of the constraints upon journalism within the context of Chinese media. There is a sense that African journalists employed within Chinese media organisations based in Africa are resigned to the fate of knowing the Chinese media is tightly controlled and regulated by the state.

African journalists have observed the Chinese media are not any different from the Chinese government. Some have suggested there is a limit to the professional autonomy journalists enjoy in carrying out their work. There is no better response than the message conveyed by one of the foundation staff members at CCTV that I must come to terms with the fact that the Chinese media is state-owned and its editorial policy state-engineered:

... I would like people who are researching CCTV or any other Chinese media to understand that Chinese media are state media and they operate like other state-owned media whether [it is] in Africa, Europe or America. You know how state-owned media works and you know who shapes the editorial policy of state media.

I think people who are researching on Chinese media come with the notion that Chinese media in Africa are private media. They are not private but state-owned, whose editorial policy are shaped by the policies of the state, just like African government media including the Kenyan government media. For instance, the editorial policy of the state broadcaster here in Kenya is shaped by and directed by the government. So I find it a bit strange that researchers want to know how easy or hard it is work for the Chinese media. What researchers should know is that Chinese media in Africa are not private media but state media and any journalists who have gone through journalism should know how state media operates. You have to operate within the editorial framework of the Chinese state government (CCTV1).

For another CCTV journalist, who defines his role as disseminator, it is always important for journalists to operate within organisational boundaries. He emphasised state-ownership of Chinese media has a bearing on how stories are framed:

...Journalists should be honest, unbiased, balanced and fair. That is the ideal answer. Obviously a lot of that can always happen. It depends on the organisation you work for. For instance, I work for CCTV. It is state-owned, there are going to be some certain slants in certain stories; angles that are pursued more than others. So the role of a journalist is to be fair, balanced and holds leaders to account. But you also have to look at your employers. For instance, in Kenya, there are three strong newspapers with different viewpoints. As a journalist, I may come with certain viewpoint but I might need to refer to my superiors. You need to know your briefing (CCTV7).

One participant, an African journalist, stated that Chinese media organisations are sensitive to the interests of African governments, which means they may not be willing to ruffle feathers on the continent. He attributed this cautious approach to journalism within Chinese media organisations to the operational licenses granted to Chinese by the Kenyan government. All such licencing is based on diplomatic considerations:

...As far as telling stories, we do that but as far as questioning government we have not done so much of that. I understand that they believe it is a government agency so they get their license to operate in countries on diplomatic terms. So they won't come and set up in the country and then crash governance (Xinhua 3).

Some journalists attributed this ‘cautious journalism’ to China’s own interest on the African continent, which may be undermined by critically reporting on African governments. An entry level journalist agreed China’s interest in maintaining buoyant relations with African governments has a bearing on how stories about African governments are framed within Chinese media organisations in Africa:

...I am able to perform the watchdog role working for CCTV, but at times, you know CCTV is a government-owned media and it represents the interest of the Chinese government and as the government they want to have relations with most African governments. We cannot report on that because that will create a bad image for the Chinese government (CCTV2).

Another respondent, who defines his role as a disseminator emphasised that state-ownership of Chinese media undermines critical reporting on African governments:

...Journalism is slightly not the same especially when you are working for Chinese media because this is a government media organisation. So it is quite controlled with regard to your ability to report on government activities (Xinhua 4).

However, some journalists tend to differ with other journalists who think the roles of state-owned media are to serve as mouthpieces of their home governments. For instance, these journalists argued that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA) seem to counteract the stereotype that state-media are instruments of propaganda:

...For instance, sometimes you wonder whether BBC is funded by the British taxpayers because of the way it can take on the British government. I think for all purposes and intents, media should be about putting leaders to account regardless of where those media come from because that is the core objective the media (CCTV1).

5.4 *Negotiating tensions*

African journalists seemed to have developed creative strategies to negotiate tensions emerging from the discrepancies of their understanding of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. One handy strategy is “reverse inverted reporting” (see Hallin, 1986, p. 78) or “demotion of lead” (van Dijk, 1995, p. 14).

This approach to news reporting enables African journalists to hide the truth further down in the news report while promoting a favourable aspect in the introduction. This means stories that would likely have been censored by Chinese editors are able to scale gatekeeping¹⁶. A senior Xinhua journalist explained how this strategy is applied when reporting stories not favourable to Chinese interests on the African continent:

...When reports by multilateral agencies such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) are released, we try to play it down. For example, if amnesty accuses an African government of corruption, first, I will ask the government spokesperson of the country for his reaction, and I will start my reporting form there: [Let's] say [the] Kenyan government denies being corrupt then down in the report I will include that the report came after Amnesty international produced a report (Xinhua 1).

This was also highlighted by a China Daily journalist when asked how he would report on Premier Li Keqiang's visit in a different scenario featuring protests against China's human right records:

I would report it but I will do it tactically. There is a way you can report something that you know it cannot go down well with the editor but they will have it accepted. I will report it like this: Premier Li was here and apart from the state visit he signed this and this agreement with the Kenyan government. They promised that they will have more locals participate in these agreements despite the fact that history has shown that the Chinese prefer to bring their own people to work instead of having locals and the locals did demonstrate when premier Li was heading to state house Nairobi to sign these agreements. I will downplay the human right issue because I know it won't fly. You cannot exactly be impartial when reporting for China Daily and by extension all Chinese media because they are state owned (China Daily 1).

¹⁶ Gatekeeping is a process of news selection within media organisations

Other journalists also mentioned they are aware Chinese media organisations based in Africa are used to facilitate business opportunities for both the Chinese government and private Chinese business interests on the continent. Some journalists alluded to this factor as impeding their ability to serve as watchdogs within Chinese media organisations. Further details are to be found in chapter 7.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that using libertarian approach to study role conception of journalists in non-liberal context is limited. I proposed qualitative interviews are more suited to examining role conception when drawing on media experiences outside the Anglo-American sphere. This chapter also highlighted African journalists are conscious of the state-centric journalism the Chinese media promotes. In this sense, I argued African journalists are likely to adapt their understanding of journalism to the reality of journalism practice within Chinese media.

This chapter also demonstrated the watchdog and disseminator roles rank high among African journalists while the loyal-facilitator role was minimally acknowledged. However, the civic role does not feature among journalistic roles favoured by African journalists working within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

In the next chapter, I examine the materialisation of the role definitions of African journalists in the media content produced by them. In this sense, I examine the presence or absence of roles in media content with respect to the typology of stories. These include: African affairs – Terrorist attack on Garissa University; Diplomatic visit – visit of Li Keqiang to Kenya in 2014; African politics – trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy at the International Criminal Court (ICC); Negative perceptions of China – Arrest of Chinese nationals for cybercrime and the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident.

CHAPTER SIX

Role Performance of African journalists

6.0. Introduction

The previous chapter presented the role definitions of African journalists and how they negotiate tensions emerging from the discrepancies of journalism practice within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of role definitions of African journalists and the materialisation of these roles in the media content produced by them with respect to the typology of stories – African Affairs, Diplomatic visits, Negative perception of China and African politics.

Research into the role conception of journalists has been underpinned by the assumption that how journalists define their roles impact the media content produced by them (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017). However, the debate on the relationship between journalistic role conception and role performance has elicited widespread attention in journalism studies. While some studies argue there is a substantial correlation between roles and media content (Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Stark & Soloski, 1977), others contend the forces of mediation at different levels of media organisations result in gaps between roles and the actual practice of journalism (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Mellado & Dalen, 2014).

However, dominant theorising that informs this debate has been underpinned by media experiences from the Anglo-American tradition: Shoemaker & Reese (1996), Tandoc, Hellmueller, & Vos (2013), Carpenter, Boehmer, & Fico (2015) and Hellmueller & Mellado (2015) in the US, Mellado & Dalen (2014) and Mellado & Lagos (2014) in Chile. This study, therefore, contributes a non-Western perspective to this debate by comparing role conception and role performance within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first examines the manifest roles in media content produced by journalists in relation to the typology of stories and compares it with the role definitions of African journalists within the context of Chinese media

organisations based in Africa. The second section presents a content analysis of media content produced by journalists in relation to the typology of stories.

6.1 Conceptualization of role performance

Roles	Role performance indicators	Source	Journalist opinion
Disseminator	Facts, balanced stories	Sources quoted in stories must be identifiable	No
Watchdog	Information on judicial or administrative processes against individuals or groups of power; interrogating powers; what the ruling and economic elite say or do; questioning individuals or groups by someone other than the journalist; criticising and judging the ruling class; external investigation not carried out by journalist such as judicial administrative, specialised/academic research, among others – but he/she covers the topic extensively	Sources/opinions take a clear stand on what is wrong or right.	Yes and No. Yes when the journalist is reporting an investigative story and no, if the journalist is simply using facts to support an argument.
Loyal-	Supporting institutional activities; supporting	Dominantly framed by government	Yes and No.

facilitator	national policies, positive image of the economic elite, progress/success of the country; comparison to the rest of the world; national triumphs; promotion of the country's image and patriotism.	official sources	Yes, if the journalist includes his/her opinion about issues reported and no, if s/he is reporting a press statement.
Civic-oriented	Citizen perspective-includes the vision of regular or organised citizens, showing how they perceive or are affected by assorted political decisions. Citizen demand includes regular or organised demand or proposals on how different political measures/decisions should be handled; credibility of citizens – the journalist gives credibility to what the citizen perceives or denounces or demand within the news story. Local impact; the news story mentions the impact of certain political decisions on specific communities; the news story provides the citizen with background information in order to	Dominantly framed by citizen sources.	No

	make political decisions – electoral processes, protests, citizen groups, participation/support of political parties; information on citizens’ activities such as campaigns, collective actions, protests, commemorations, demonstrations and protests.		
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Table 4: Code book for content analysis

In order to identify manifest roles in media content, I used three indicators including story purpose, sources quoted and the presence or absence of the journalist’s own voice (See Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico, 2015, p. 12). Furthermore, I modify the coding framework adapted from Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico (2015), Mellado (2015) and Mellado & Dalen (2014) to suit my data set (see Table 4). The unit of analysis is entire news stories, features, editorials, opinions or opinion articles.

In instances where the role materialised actually straddles two different roles in a news article, I based the categorisation of the manifest role upon the dominant role in a unit of analysis. So, rather than relying on the headline and introduction, I base the categorisation of role on the entire article. Among the stories in this category, two cases stand out from the rest. In the news story, *Li’s Visit Inspires Pioneer Wildlife Protector*¹⁷, published in the China Daily of 26 May, the headline differs significantly from the body of the story, which is balanced and fair.

¹⁷ http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/26/content_17541209.htm

Consequently, I categorised this particular story in the disseminator role because it presents both sides of the issue and identified sources in the story. This kind of news reporting derives from the “reverse inverted pyramid form” (See Hallin, 1986, p. 78) or “demotion of lead” (see van Dijk, 1995, p. 14), in which the truth is hidden in the body of the news report. This is just one of the creative strategies used by African journalists to circumvent censorship within the context of Chinese media. For further details, refer to section 5.4 in Chapter five.

Event	Xinhua	CCTV	China Daily
Diplomatic visits	4	2	8
Negative perception	2	1	1
African politics	60	20	2
African Affairs	48	22	13
Total	114	45	24

Table 5: Media content from CCTV, Xinhua and The China Daily.

Roles	Negative perception	Diplomatic visits	African politics	African Affairs
Watch dog			3	1
Loyal-facilitator		2	4	1
Civic				9
Disseminator	1		13	11

Table 6: Manifest roles in CCTV content.

Manifest Roles	Negative perception	Diplomatic visits	African politics	African Affairs
Watchdog				
Loyal-Facilitator	1	7	1	7
Civic			1	2
Disseminator		1		4

Table 7: Manifest roles in The China Daily content.

Manifest Roles	Negative perception	Diplomatic visit	African politics	African Affairs
Watchdog			4	1
Loyal-Facilitator	1	4	33	4
Civic			2	11
Disseminator	1		21	32

Table 8: Manifest roles in news content produced by Xinhua News Agency.

Role performed	CCTV(total)	CDN(total)	XNA(total)
Watchdog	4	0	5
Loyal-Facilitator	7	16	42
Civic	9	3	13
Disseminator	25	5	54

Table 9: Cumulative manifest roles with respect to media organisations.

Manifest roles	CCTV (%)	CDN (%)	XNA (%)
Watchdog	8.8	0	4.4
Loyal-Facilitator	15.5	66.7	36.8
Civic	20.0	12.5	11.4
Disseminator	55.5	20.8	47.4

Table 10: Manifest roles by percentage per media organisation.

Roles	Manifest roles in content (total)	%
Watchdog	9	4.9
Loyal-Facilitator	65	35.5
Civic	25	13.7
Disseminator	84	45.9

Table 11: Cumulative manifest roles by percentage.

Roles	Role performance %	Role conception %
Watchdog	4.9	50.0
Loyal-Facilitator	35.5	4.2
Civic	13.7	0
Disseminator	45.9	45.8

Table 12: Comparison of role performance and role conception by percentage.

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6.1.2 Analysis of manifest roles




Figure 1: A graph depiction of manifest roles in media content by percentage per total content.

A total of 183 (see Table 5) articles were obtained from online editions of The China Daily newspaper, the Xinhua News Agency and CCTV's YouTube Channel. 137 articles were collected from XNA and CDN comprising features and news articles, one photo news piece and one interview. A total of 46 video segments were collected from CCTV, comprising three Talk Africa shows of more than 30 minutes duration, and 43 news items not more than four minutes long.

This study revealed there is a pattern of content sharing among the three Chinese media organisations. This is more evident in the China Daily newspaper which seems to publish

considerable content originating in XNA. This pattern is also evident between XNA and CCTV. The China Daily Africa also appears to share content with China Daily USA.

Content analysis result shows the disseminator role occurred in eighty-five (85) stories. The Loyal-facilitator appeared in sixty-five (65); the watchdog in nine (9) and civic in twenty-five (25) (see Table 9). By percentage, the loyal facilitator role accounts for 35.5 % of manifest roles. The watchdog role showed up in 4.9 % of the selected articles; the disseminator role 45.9 % and the civic role 13.7 % (see Table 11).

For clarity, I delineated manifest roles in media content by graphical representation (see Figure 1). The disseminator role is the most manifested role in the media content. This was followed by the loyal-facilitator and civic roles. The watchdog was the least manifested role.

The two least exhibited roles in the selected Chinese media content were the watchdog and civic roles (see Figure 1). The limited presence of the watchdog role could stem from the controlled autonomy extended to journalists as they must conduct investigative journalism within the context of the Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

However, the active presence of the disseminator role in media content (Figure 1) could be attributed to the adaptation of journalists to the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations. This suggests African journalists, who understand their roles as watchdogs may have been compelled by forces of mediation within the context of Chinese media to readjust their role definition or perhaps, become Chinese watchdogs. Refer to chapter five for further details.




Figure 2: Manifest roles by percentage per media organisation.

The materialisation of roles in media content seemed context-specific among the three Chinese media organisations. For instance, the loyal-facilitator role is more active in China Daily (CDN) (see Table 10 and Figure 2) followed by Xinhua (XNA) (see Table 10 and Figure 2) and lastly, CCTV (see Table 10 and Figure 2). The disseminator role is more active in CCTV followed by Xinhua and China Daily (see Figure 2 and Table 10); the Civic role is more active in CCTV followed by China Daily and Xinhua and the watchdog role is more active in CCTV followed by Xinhua and then, China Daily.

This pattern of role materialisation in media content, suggests African journalists may enjoy greater professional autonomy for the actual performance of journalism within the context of CCTV than Xinhua and China Daily (See Figure 2). It is also anticipated African journalists would possess the same level of professional autonomy within the contexts of China Daily and Xinhua (see Figure 2).

This model of context-specific professional autonomy, suggests Xinhua would provide more positive framing of events involving the Chinese government and Chinese Communist party officials (see Table 8). The China Daily would provide a more positive framing of incidents concerning Chinese citizens in Africa (see Table 7) and CCTV would provide only fairly

nuanced reporting on events in connection with the interests of both the Chinese and African governments.

The actual performance of journalism in relation to the typology of stories across the three Chinese media organisations may seem to be context-specific. However, coverage of the two previously mentioned ‘peculiar incidents’ under the category of negative perceptions of China suggests there is little or no difference in the way Chinese media cover stories affecting Chinese interests.

For instance, the two incidents received limited coverage across the three Chinese media organisations. CCTV censored reporting on the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident (see Table 6) while Xinhua¹⁸ (see Table 8) and China Daily¹⁹ (see Table 7) each published one article covering it (see Table 5) and both were framed through the prism of the official Chinese rhetoric. The same pattern was also exhibited in the coverage of *Arrest of Chinese Nationals*. The China Daily did not publish any article on this incident (see Table 7) while Xinhua²⁰ (see Table 8) and CCTV²¹ (see Table 6) published one news article respectively. Of the 183 articles analysed in this study, only four articles about these two incidents were published. The limited coverage of the two incidents suggests Chinese controlled journalism is compelled by dissent rather than a sense of journalistic enterprise. This also corroborates the observation of African journalists that autonomy they have in carrying out their work is conditional in relation to the typology of stories. For further details, see section 8.1 in chapter 8.

¹⁸ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/26/c_134100689.htm

¹⁹ http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-03/26/content_19921223.htm

²⁰ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2014-12/05/c_133835605.htm

²¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RslMc1p9650>




Figure 3: Role conception versus role performance.

6.1.3 Role conception versus role performance

Comparatively, there is a gap between role conception and role performance within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For instance, 50% of journalists defined their roles as watchdogs. However, the manifest role in media content amounted to just 4.9%. Journalists defining their role as loyal-facilitators clocked in at 4.1% when in reality 35.5% manifested this role in media content. None of the journalists defined their role as civic but it materialised in media content up to 13.7% of manifest roles. Interestingly, 45.8% of journalists defined their role as disseminators and the reality was 45.9% of manifest roles in media content (see Figure 3). This reveals the disseminator role is the most congruent role within the context of Chinese media organisations followed by the civic role. On the other hand, the active materialisation of the loyal-facilitator role in the media content suggests there is high autonomy for journalists who understand their roles as loyal-disseminators within Chinese media. This analysis suggests African journalists identifying

themselves as loyal-facilitators are likely to enjoy the highest level of professional autonomy within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. They are followed by the disseminators, the civics and watchdog journalists who possess the least professional autonomy.

6.1.4. Analysis of content

This section provides insight into the categorisation of manifest roles with respect to the typology of stories – diplomatic visits, negative perception of China, African politics and African affairs.

6.1.4.1 Diplomatic visits

The visit of Li Keqiang's to Africa was dominantly framed through the prism of China as a partner for Africa's development (see Kurlantzick, 2007; Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2012). This narrative is underscored by official Chinese rhetoric promoting China as an economic model of success African countries can emulate to achieve economic growth and development (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 56). It is also informed by South-South Cooperation, whose goal is to encourage partnership for development among developing countries²². For instance, in all 14 articles on Li Keqiang's visit; the loyal-facilitator role was present in thirteen articles while the disseminator role²³ appeared only once.

In China Daily's coverage, the loyal-facilitator role was manifest in seven articles and the disseminator role in only one (see Table 7). The one article taking on the disseminator role seemed an isolated occurrence because it straddled two roles – loyal-facilitator and disseminator, and was eventually categorised as a disseminator, based on the parameters set by the coding framework explained above. In Xinhua, the loyal-facilitator role was manifested in four articles (see Appendix 7) and one news item on CCTV (see Appendix 5). The dominance of the Loyal-facilitator role in the coverage of Li Keqiang reinforces the view

²² https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/south_2658.jsp

²³ http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/26/content_17541209.htm

that Chinese media is state-centric and suffers from a high level of party-press parallelism (See Zhao, 2012).

In the news report, *China, Kenya pledge to boost comprehensive cooperative partnership* published in The China Daily newspaper of 11 May, 2014 the article promotes the official Chinese rhetoric employed in framing China-Africa relations by the Chinese:

China will continue to support Kenya particularly in the implementation of major flagship projects under Kenya's vision 2030 development blueprint as well as encourage Chinese financial institutions and enterprises to invest in Kenya and facilitate greater access for Kenyan products into the Chinese market.

The sentence 'China will continue to support Kenya particularly in the implementation of major flagship projects under Kenya's Vision 2030 development' speaks to the pivotal role of China in Kenya's developmental agenda. The Kenya Vision 2030 is a developmental plan aiming to transform Kenya into an industrialised middle income country by 2030. Strategically, the report frames China as being central to the realisation of this goal²⁴.

Other phrases such as 'encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in Kenya' and 'facilitate greater access for Kenyan products into Chinese market' also speak to the importance of China to the Kenyan economy. For instance, the use of the verb 'to invest' suggests Chinese business enterprises will pour capital into Kenya to help keep the Kenyan economy buoyant. 'Continuing, to facilitate greater access for Kenyan products' corroborates the idea of Kenyan manufactures having access to the gargantuan Chinese market²⁵.

On the other hand, the framing of the article also tends to counteract the perceived role of China in illegal trade in ivory. This is achieved by emphasising that 'the two leaders also reiterated their shared commitment to combat poaching and illegal trade in ivory and agreed to strengthen cooperation in forestry and wildlife protection'. However, the article was silent on the allegation that Chinese nationals are behind the thriving illegal trade of ivory on the African continent.

²⁴ For further details on Kenya vision 2030 see www.vision2030.go.ke/about-vision-2030/

²⁵ <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/09/09/population-and-the-challenge-of-chinese-growth/>

The international fund for Animal Welfare identifies China as a dominant force in illegal trade in ivory globally²⁶. The word ‘combat’ speaks to fight against any illegality which in this case is the unlawful trade in ivory. It suggests China will partner with Kenya to combat the menace ravaging elephant population in Kenya and other African countries. The framing of this report is an attempt to countervail the western media narrative of China’s role in the illegal trade of ivory and wildlife poaching on the African continent. A specific instance was during President Xi Jinping’s maiden tour of Africa in 2013. At the time, the BBC reported that Chinese officials travelling with the Chinese president on the trip bought ivory from Tanzania²⁷.

The China Daily newspaper further illustrated this contra-narrative of China’s role in the illegal trade in ivory in the story of Zhuo Qiang, a Chinese conservative, who runs the Mara Conservation Fund in Kenya. The news article, *Li’s Visit Inspires Chinese Wildlife Protector* was published in the China Daily newspaper on 26 May. Zhuo is epitomised as being reflective of China’s desire to help the African continent contain illegal trade in ivory and wildlife poaching.

Zhuo was quoted saying when he started out, many Africans doubted his sincerity suspecting that his aim might be advancing wildlife poaching and the illegal trade in ivory. “Distrust, doubt, and scrutiny were initially some of the most common reactions to my efforts”, said Zhuo. “Many still thought that Chinese were more likely to eat and kill wild animals than protect them.”

The report was embellished with a quote from Premier Li, who affirmed the Chinese government is in support of collective efforts to stop illegal trade in ivory and wildlife poaching on the African continent: “[The] Chinese government has taken and will continue to take legal steps to seriously deal with cases of illegal trade in ivory and wildlife poaching”.

²⁶

<http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Ivory%20Market%20in%20China%20China%20ivory%20trade%20survey%20report%20-%202006.pdf>

²⁷ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29929423>

Zhuo's story promotes a counter-narrative framing China as a partner with African countries in the campaign against wildlife poaching and the illegal trade in ivory. However, words Zhuo used such as 'distrust', 'doubts', and 'scrutiny' describe how Kenyans viewed his enterprise and casts doubts over the sincerity of China's gesture to help African countries end the illegal trade in ivory and wildlife poaching.

Another news article in Xinhua of 7 May, 2014 *Premier's visit to open new chapter in Sino-Kenya relations* re-echoed the official Chinese rhetoric which promotes the view Premier Li's visits represents an opportunity for Africa and China to partner towards economic and infrastructural development. This is evident in the introduction of the story which states 'Kenya is set to open a new era of cooperation with China when Premier Li Keqiang visits the country on Friday, a senior government official said Tuesday'. The news article emanated from an interview with Karanja Kibicho, Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The official Chinese rhetoric of China-Africa relations was validated in the lead of the news article. Karanja Kibicho was quoted saying 'China is a rapidly growing economy and as a country, we have identified where our priorities are by involving strategic partners like China to develop infrastructure, industries, and commerce.'

The phrase 'rapidly growing' speaks to the official Chinese rhetoric promoting the Chinese economic model as a viable alternative to the Western model. In this direction, there have been initiatives such as South-South cooperation where countries on the same economic pedestal might find help in other developing countries such as China rather than the US and its allies.²⁸

²⁸ http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/south_2658.jsp

6.1.4.2 Negative perception of China

A total of four articles were published in the negative perception category across the three Chinese media organisations. This is certainly marginal considering 183 articles were analysed for content.

Only two articles were published about the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident – one in The China Daily and one in Xinhua. Articles covering this incident were dominantly framed by Chinese officials and excluded local voices. The loyal-facilitator role was manifest in each of the articles published in The China Daily (see Appendix 2) and Xinhua (see Appendix 9). In the news article, *Equal treatment for customers in Kenya, China's embassy says*²⁹ The China Daily newspaper regurgitated a press statement issued by the Chinese embassy in Kenya without adding an alternative voice. The lead of this news article differs significantly from the body of the story. The lead seems to cast doubts on the veracity of the incident:

A Kenyan newspaper on Monday reported that a Chinese restaurant in the country's capital, Nairobi, refused to serve Africans after 5 pm. The restaurant was quoted as saying that it did that out of security concerns. The incident has triggered criticism from local communities saying the restaurant should treat customers equally.

Using the phrase that “a Kenyan newspaper reported” instead of delving directly into the story suggests that the incident might not be true. It was framed as an allegation by a local newspaper against a Chinese restaurant in Kenya. However, the lead of the same news article presented a different version by owning up to the incident. A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Kenya was quoted in the lead of the report, expressing regrets over the incident which suggests it actually did happen:

The Chinese Embassy in Kenya expresses deep and sincere regrets over the recent spat over customer treatment between a privately-owned Chinese restaurant and Kenyan patrons. On behalf of the Embassy, I declare that the conduct reported was wrong and unbecoming. It has caused unnecessary, yet avoidable, misunderstandings and threatened to jeopardize the mutual trust and friendship between the Chinese and Kenyan people. Following this tiff, the Embassy has thus far raised its concerns and reprimanded the owner of the restaurant. Much as the restaurant has in recent days suffered an armed

²⁹ http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-03/26/content_19921223.htm

robbery, the management of the Chinese restaurant ought to have taken thoughtful measures that would not result into what has been construed to be selective admission of certain persons.

The concluding part of the news article also differs from the introduction:

Should anyone encounter something that would lead to strife between the people of China and Kenya, do not hesitate to inform us for we are keen on creating a conducive environment of amiable co-existence between the people of China and Kenyans. Our ultimate goal is to enhance our friendship and promote cooperation between our two peoples. We are therefore ready and willing to listen and ensure that nothing dents the thriving relationship between the people of China and the people of Kenya.

The framing of this report suggests the lead should have been the last thing to appear in the report but the major part of the report – which was the Chinese Embassy statement – was hidden below the lead while the substance is buried deep down in the report. It is evident that while the Chinese Embassy acknowledged it was wrong to deny Africans access to the restaurant, they are very much interested in the thriving of their business in Kenya.

The words ‘ultimate goal’ suggests beyond the discrimination against Africans, China is interested in ensuring its political and economic interests on the continent thrive in an atmosphere of harmonious co-existence. This is inferred in the sentence “enhance our friendship and promote our cooperation”, suggesting China values its friendship with Africa because it is beneficial to its economic interests.

Another news article published on 25 March, 2015 in Xinhua, *Spat over restaurant's customer treatment not to affect Sino-Kenyan ties: embassy*³⁰ placed greater emphasis on the viability of China-Kenya relations in the introduction instead of the incident:

The recent spat over customer treatment between a privately-owned Chinese restaurant and Kenyan patrons will not dent the thriving Sino-Kenyan relations, the Chinese embassy in Kenya said Thursday...

The intro was then followed by a press statement from the Chinese Embassy in Kenya reaffirming the racist incident would not undermine China-Kenya relations:

³⁰ .http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/26/c_134100689.htm

It has caused unnecessary, yet avoidable, misunderstandings, and threatened to jeopardize the mutual trust and friendship between the Chinese and Kenyan people," said Mao, adding that [as] much as the restaurant has in recent days suffered an armed robbery, the management of the Chinese restaurant ought to have taken thoughtful measures that would not result into what has been construed to be selective admission of certain persons.

Here, both reports acknowledged the racist incident in the Chinese restaurant was wrong. However, they excluded the voices of the Africans, which would have made it a fair and balanced news story. The phrase "unnecessary, yet avoidable misunderstandings" suggests the racist incident may not matter much to the Chinese government because, in their view, it could have been avoided by the restaurant managers and the African journalists. This was validated by the sentence "the restaurant has in recent days suffered an armed robbery attack" suggesting that denying access to black Africans after 5:00 pm was a way to avoid another armed robbery. Implicit in this statement is that the Chinese Embassy was suggesting Africans who were denied access should accept it as an official policy of the restaurant.

Yet, CCTV's coverage of this racist incident was more of damage control than it was a work of journalism. First, CCTV did not cover the incident and did not broadcast any report regarding the incident. Instead, it produced a public relations spin of the incident in which it sought to douse the racist aspect of the altercation to minimise any negative it could have on the thriving Chinese restaurant business in Kenya. In the news report titled, *Chinese cuisines gains popularity among Kenyans*³¹, CCTV celebrated Chinese cuisine for gaining wide acceptance among Kenyans and serving as an alternative to Western food.

In the case of the arrest of Chinese nationals for cybercrime, two articles were published across the three Chinese media organisations. One was broadcast on CCTV (see Appendix 4) and the other in Xinhua (see Appendix 8). Disseminator roles were manifested in both articles and this may stem from the fact both media organisations shared the content.

³¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs42V-nbv4Y>

The news item broadcast on CCTV on 4 December 2014, *Kenya Arrests 77 Chinese in Internet Hacking Case*³², presented balanced perspectives on the incident. The intro of the news article suggests the Chinese nationals were arrested on suspicion of running a cyber-crime. They were not caught in the act by the Kenyan authorities:

The Chinese nationals were discovered in this five bedroom house situated in Runda, one of Nairobi's plush neighbourhoods. Police had gone to investigate a fire incident which claimed the life of a Chinese when they found the group huddled in a room that had what they described as sophisticated communication... several telephone headsets, computers linked to high speed internet and monitors wire product. Kenyan authorities believe the suspects were running a cyber-command centre which they say is capable of disrupting communication systems in the country, intercept ATM transactions and internet fraud.

The article presented the views two officials of the Kenyan government – Ndegwa Muhoro, Director, Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and Fred Matiangi, Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Information Technology and Communication (ICT). Both maintained the suspects were criminals:

Muhoro said: We have two suspects whom we have charged before court and about 76 whom we applied for custody from the court to allow us [to] investigate this matter.

Matiangwa said: What has been going on here is actually a cyber-command centre and a huge criminal gang that is running a cyber-crime framework here.

The concluding part of the news article presented the Chinese Embassy perspective which argued that based on their poor comprehension of Chinese language, grammar and calligraphy it would be impossible for the suspects to be involved in cyber-crime as though a good grasp of the English language is a determinant for committing cyber-crime:

The Chinese embassy in Nairobi says that the group likely belong to a telecommunication fraud group: a statement reads based on consular visits by Chinese consular officials that most of the 77 are not well educated. Their communication[s] have many Chinese grammar and calligraphy mistakes, let alone speak or write in English. It indicates that the suspects do not have the capacity to engage in cyber-

³² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RslMc1p9650>

crimes or high security hacks based on their characteristics such as threatening the *Mpesa* network, ATM accounts or security networks.

The position of the Chinese Embassy contradicts the Kenyan government, which insisted the Chinese nationals were running a cyber-crime command capable of disrupting the internet system in the country. However, the report presented both the Kenyan and the Chinese government's views on the incident which created the impression of fair and balanced journalism.

In the news article, *China says 77 nationals arrested in Kenya probably involve telecom fraud*³³ published in Xinhua, the introduction presented the Chinese Embassy's position that the 77 Chinese nationals might have been involved in telecommunication fraud: "The 77 Chinese nationals arrested in Kenya over the past few days might have been involved in telecommunications fraud, China's Foreign Ministry said on Friday." In the lead of the news article, Hua Chunying, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman was quoted saying: "As Kenya's long-term friend, China supports the country in fighting against all forms of crime. The case is under investigation at the moment. Initial results show that this probably is a case of telecommunication fraud." The news article concluded by emphasising the "police in Kenya say they have arrested 77 Chinese nationals who were allegedly running an elaborate money laundering and Internet fraud scheme from multiple houses".

Unlike CCTV, the Xinhua report only quoted the Chinese government source and did not report the Kenyan government side of it. The word "might" depict uncertainty, which suggests the Kenyan government might have wrongly accused the Chinese nationals of espionage.

6.1.4.3 African politics

Articles published on the trial of Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta and vice president William Ruto at the International Criminal Court (ICC) garnered much text considering the

³³ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2014-12/05/c_133835605.htm

trial spanned more than seven years. However, only articles from 2012 to 2016 were analysed for this study.

In the entire corpus of 183 articles, the watchdog role was manifest in only nine articles and seven of these were in respect of the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. For Xinhua³⁴, of the four articles where the watchdog role was manifested, three originated in relation to the trial in The Hague and one was in connection with the visit of the UN deputy chief to Nairobi, Kenya (see Appendix 10).

The news article of 26 October 2013, *Kenya's Ruto must attend most Trial at ICC*, presented an ICC ruling against Ruto's appeal to be excused from the ICC trial. The introduction of the article emphasised that 'Kenya's Deputy President William Ruto is obliged to attend most of his trial on charges of crimes against humanity, was ruled by the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague on Friday'.

This point is further explicated in the news article which stressed that 'Ruto can only be excused from being present on a case by case basis, emphasising that 'the absence of an accused person from trial is permissible under exceptional circumstances if the accused has explicitly waived his right to be present at trial'.

In the concluding part of the news article, the journalist provided background information about the Kenyan election violence of 2007 which resulted in the arraignment of Kenyatta and Ruto at The Hague. The word 'obliged' suggests coercion was applied on William Ruto. This therefore could be interpreted to mean Ruto would not be accorded the privilege of his status as a Kenyan Vice President and he would not be allowed leave of absences from his trial at The Hague.

³⁴ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-12/04/c_127274839.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-10/28/c_132838563.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-10/02/c_132768947.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-10/26/c_132831557.htm

In the same vein, the three articles in CCTV³⁵ in which watchdog roles were manifest also originated in The Hague (see Appendix 3). The framing of the news article of 12 January 2016, '*Hague prosecutors press on with Kenya case after witnesses pull out*', suggests William Ruto has lost the opportunity to challenge prosecution at The Hague. In the introduction of the report, the CCTV reporter emphasised the ICC prosecutor said there is enough evidence to prosecute William Ruto even though 'Lawyers for Vice President Ruto had wanted judges to throw out the crimes against humanity charges against him due to the withdrawal of the last six crucial witnesses but prosecutor, Anton Steynberg, says enough evidence remains to convict him'.

The CCTV reporter concluded the report emphasising that Kenyan Journalist Sam was being charged alongside William Ruto for promoting hate crime resulting in the Kenyan election violence of 2007.

The clause 'enough evidence remains to convict Ruto' suggests that despite the withdrawal of key witnesses for the ICC prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto, there is enough evidence to convict him of hate crime. Consequently, the presence of watchdog roles in these news stories could have been influenced by context considering that the ICC is based at The Hague, in the Netherlands, which is a Western democracy.

However, reports originating in Kenya were dominantly framed by government sources and showed sympathy to the cause of Uhuru and Ruto. The two reports produced by the China Daily newspaper fall into the loyal-facilitator³⁶ and civic³⁷ categories. In the report, *China Backs Kenya on Trial of State leaders* published on 19 November 2013, the paper copiously reported the view of the Chinese government. The lead of the news article seems to affirm China's foreign policy of non-interference which argues the internal affairs of African countries should be devoid of external intervention:

³⁵ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90SK_DhYwb4, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr64RQ-n2ig>, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPQexQuh3aw>

³⁶ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/19/content_17116654.htm

³⁷ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-01/16/content_14453455.htm

China said on Tuesday it will continue to back Kenya and the African Union (AU) after the UN Security Council denied a delay of the trials of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto

China's foreign policy of non-interference (see Taylor, 2012) was further embellished with the statement of Hong Lei, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Lei was reported to have expressed "deep regret" that the United Nations Security Council failed to adopt draft resolution proceedings against the trial of Kenyatta and Ruto:

The request of Kenya and AU to defer the invitation extended to both leaders to appear before the ICC is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, conducive to regional peace, security, and stability, and shows the most basic respect to the state leaders elected by the Kenyan people.

The phrase "deep regret" is suggestive of the view the UN is interfering in the internal affairs of the Kenyan government, which goes against China's principle of non-interference (see Kurlantzick, 2007).

The second report in The China Daily newspaper is among a few reports in which the civic role was present. In the features story, '*Tension grips Kenya's Rift Valley*', published on 16 January, 2012 the newspaper presented the views of residents of the rift valley. This was the epicentre of the ethnic clash in the aftermath of the disputed election of 2007. The report was dominantly framed through the lens of ordinary citizens in the region, who were sceptical of the impact the ICC ruling may have on the region:

Most non-Kalenjin communities are anxiously awaiting the ICC ruling with some fearing a recurrence of the violence if the charges against [the] Ocampo six are confirmed. Observers warn that unless the ICC processing is not managed well, the recurrence of the violence is imminent. The groups note that government has not done enough to prepare Kenyans on the eventual outcome of the ICC.

The article uses such words and phrases as "anxiously"; "fearing a recurrence", "recurrence of violence is imminent" to spread fear there might be a return to violence if the *Ocampo Six* were convicted. While the voices quoted in the article are those of citizens resident in those areas, the story was framed to create the impression that convicting the Ocampo six could result in another round of violence in the region and they were eventually freed for lack of evidence against them.

CCTV published a total of 20 reports on the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto at the International criminal Court at The Hague. Two of the reports were on Talk Africa, a 30-minute weekly talk show anchored by Beatrice Marshall who discusses current affairs in Africa on the CCTV Africa³⁸ platform. The other eighteen (18) were news reports either conducted at the venue of the court proceedings at The Hague or in Kenya.

In the first report on the Talk Africa show titled '*Is the International Criminal Court anti-Africa?*'³⁹. In the introduction of the show, Marshall set the stage for the debate on the implication of South Africa exiting the ICC and what it may portend for justice on the African continent:

44 African nations are signatories to the Rome Statute more than any other continent but the number of African voices critical of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is steadily increasing. It has been called anti-African, accused of losing direction and now South Africa has announced their intention to pull out completely. So if one nation goes will the rest of the continent follow suit and what will be the implication on African justice post-ICC?

The one fitting word to capture Marshall's introduction is prescient. Since this report, more African countries have announced their exit from the ICC⁴⁰. The introduction was followed by diverse views of Africans on the ICC's mode of operation. First, the report commenced from South Africa, where the view of the ruling ANC was sought and then to the spokesperson of the African Union (AU) before it was thrown open to a panel of three drawn from Johannesburg, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya and Washington DC, United States of America.

While the interviews with the spokespersons of the ANC and AU were critical of Africa's participation in the ICC, the panellists presented a balanced view of the workings of the ICC. The position of South Africa's National Congress (ANC) on the ICC is underlined by the

³⁸ <http://english.cntv.cn/lm/talkafrica/>

³⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fL4xnp1jUw>

⁴⁰ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gambia-latest-african-country-deciding-to-pull-out-of-international-criminal-court/2016/10/26/7f54d068-c4ca-440f-848f-e211ba29dc34_story.html

dispute emerging from the non-arrest of Sudanese President Al-Hassan Bashir when he attended the African Union (AU) Summit in South Africa⁴¹ in 2015. Keith Khoza, spokesperson of the African National Congress (ANC) argued that the ICC had been structured to undermine independence among African governments and advance imperialist agenda on the continent ‘that it does not look like it is interested in resolving conflicts but it has been used as a tool to change governments in Africa. We see double standards in how ICC operates’. Similarly, Jacob Enoh Eben, spokesperson for the African Union (AU) Commission maintained there is an inherent partiality in the operation of the ICC:

The AU member states have actually expressed their indignation regarding the way in which some of the member states or leaders of Africa have been treated by the ICC and the AU chairperson has the opportunity to voice out clearly the double standard nature that the ICC has been treating issues of international justice concerning the African continent.

The word ‘indignation’ suggests resentment and ‘double standards’ points to the preference for one system over another. This suggests African leaders are unfairly treated by the ICC in comparison with their counterparts from other parts of the world. The members of the panel included Dr David Matbanja in Nairobi, Michael Liu in Washington DC and Wayne Ncube in Johannesburg, South Africa. While Matbanja was against the ICC for not living up to its role to pursue international justice in Africa, Ncube condemned the move by the ANC to opt out of the ICC. On the other hand, Liu agreed the ICC has problems but disagreed that it has lost direction.

The second report on the Talk Africa show, *ICC vs. Africa*⁴², was a celebration of the withdrawal of charges preferred against President Uhuru Kenyatta by the ICC for lack of evidence. This was evident in the introduction by Beatrice Marshall:

Kenya fought the alleged crimes against humanity charges facing its president at the International Criminal Court on at least four fronts. On a bilateral level, at the very initial stages of President Kenyatta’s case, Kenya went on a diplomatic charm offensive across the continent and this involved Kenya’s top leadership and diplomats engaging the African Union and African leaders on the dangers

⁴¹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33269126>

⁴² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MP11jpN5QuQ>

the ICC posed to African sovereignty. The African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa became a major theatre where the continent fought what it viewed as a racist court targeting Africans. On various heated sessions of its seating African leaders made far-reaching pronouncements and declarations on The Hague-based court. Ambassador Macharia Kamau, the Kenyan permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) wrote to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) asking it to terminate the ICC cases against President Kenyatta. Now, Kenya appealed to both the UN and the ICC regarding the admissibility of the case. The Kenyan case [was] prominently featured during last years' assembly of state parties on rules of procedure and evidence. Kenya also managed to push for a new rule number 134 which allowed for excusal of seating heads of state and other government office holders from continuous presence during the trial. At the height of the agitation against the cases facing the Kenyan President at the court, the AU became a huge stage in the battle against the court African leaders termed racist and biased and out to embarrass and humiliate the continent. So when Kenyatta's case dramatically collapsed last week for lack evidence to prosecute it, Africans felt vindicated.

In the one minute and forty second introduction, Marshall used words and phrases suggesting partisanship to qualify the ICC. These included "racists (twice)", "embarrass and humiliate the African continent"; "biased; lack of evidence to prosecute Kenyatta"; "posed danger to African sovereignty". The framing of the introduction suggests the ICC is not fair to Africans and the African continent – which the ICC's aim is to undermine the leadership in Africa.

On the other hand, Marshall used words and phrases that suggest valorisation to qualify Kenya – 'charm offensive'; 'bilateral level'; 'fought the alleged crime against humanity', 'managed to push a new rule'. This framing suggests the ICC was biased against President Kenyatta and the Kenyan government and her people had to deploy all available resources, both diplomatic and political, to counteract it. Thus, by so doing, the Kenyan government was able to push through a new rule in the statute of the ICC. This speaks to triumph of the Kenyan spirit and its leadership against the ICC.

The opening montage featured President Kenyatta in a celebratory mood over his acquittal at the ICC. 'I am very excited', he then proclaimed in a victory message to the Kenyan citizenry. This was followed by a brief interview with Amina Mohammed, Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs in which she promoted the view the ICC should change the rules to suit African countries. She was corroborated by Louise Mushikiwabo, Foreign Minister of Rwanda, who emphasised the African continent is 'looking for respect for Africa in the exercise of international justice'. In the same vein, President Yoweri Museveni of

Uganda was also featured promoting an anti-colonial rhetoric. He said the ‘ICC is very shallow’ and ‘operates with predetermined ideology’.

The two-man panel comprised Peter Kagwanja and James Mambolew, spent the first 10 minutes of the show condemning the ICC and celebrating the withdrawal of charges preferred against President Kenyatta. Peter Kagwanja, a leading scholar of political science and international relations described the trial of Uhuru at the ICC as a charade:

I think the ICC case against Kenyatta generally is a good classic case of the travesty or tragedy as in the roman history... tragedy because there was a lot of bravado on the part of the prosecutor who said he had a watertight case but now with this public acknowledgement and admittance that they did not have evidence, why did they drag the Kenyan president through this four years if they did not have evidence? Is the President not entitled to claim justice after his name has been dragged through the mud? In fact, it is not just a tragedy but travesty of justice.

For his part, James Mambolew, an advocate of the Kenyan High Court buttresses this view stressing that ‘I would want to say that this is a travesty against Uhuru Kenyatta, the victims and the African continent.’

The phrases in the first report – ‘very shallow’, ‘operates with predetermined ideology’ speak to the post-colonial narrative in which African leaders argue Africa is still being undermined by colonial powers despite being independent states (See Mbembe, 2015). In the second report, the sentence, ‘a good classic case of travesty and tragedy as in the Roman Empire’ suggests President Kenyatta was being victimised because he is an African President.

This view is anchored on the argument that if the ICC does not have powers to prosecute leaders from the West it ought not to have the authority to prosecute African leaders. In the second panel, the word “travesty” was used to reinforce his argument Kenyatta and Ruto’s trial was an imperialist agenda. The word travesty is suggestive of false representation, partiality meaning the ICC had falsely accused Kenyatta and Ruto in their trial at The Hague.

6.1.4.4 African affairs

The occurrence of the terrorist attack on Garissa University garnered more text than other events, running from the time of the attack on 2 April 2015 to its one year anniversary in

2016. The coverage of this incident within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa was more nuanced than the other stories.

There is a sense African journalists enjoyed higher autonomy in the actual performance of journalism regarding the Garissa attack than they had on other stories. This level of professional autonomy might have been informed by the nature of the event considering Chinese interest was not at stake. Therefore, African journalists were allowed more freedom to perform their roles within the context of Chinese media in reporting this incident. This suggests Chinese media organisations relied more on competence and skill for the coverage of this incident since they were interested in good journalism. Coverage of the Garissa University attack seemed to pour cold water on the Chinese media's much vaunted editorial policy of 'positive reporting' in Africa. However, this could also be attributed to conditional autonomy existing within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. See further details in chapter 8.

In the 83 articles on the Garissa University attack, the watchdog role was manifest in only two⁴³; disseminator role in forty-seven; civic role in twenty-two, and loyal-facilitator role in twelve (see Appendixes 11, 12, and 13). The materialisation of roles in media content was context-specific across the three media organisations.

For instance, the loyal-facilitator was the most prevalent manifest role at the China Daily, followed by disseminator and civic roles. The disseminator role was the most predominant manifest role in CCTV followed by civic; loyal-facilitator and watchdog roles. The disseminator was the most ubiquitous of the manifest roles in Xinhua followed by civic, loyal-facilitator and the watchdog roles.

I observed news article about the US and its allies were framed positively in the case of the Garissa university attack. In the news article of 3 April 2015, *US Condemns terrorist attack in Kenya, offers assistance*⁴⁴, Xinhua framed the US as playing a positive role to help Kenya

⁴³ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/24/c_134182523.htm,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnwAb3zdLNg>

⁴⁴ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/03/c_134120750.htm

contain terrorism. This was contained in the lead of the news article that “the United States condemns “in the strongest terms” the terrorist attack in a university in eastern Kenya and is providing assistance to the Kenyan government, the White House said on Thursday”.

This narrative was validated with the statement of White House spokesman, Josh Earnest that ‘we extend our deep condolences to the families and loved ones of all those killed in this heinous attack, which reportedly included the targeting of Christian students’. The lead of the article provided background information on the Garissa University attack:

Gunmen stormed into Garissa University College before dawn Thursday, shooting students and taking hostages in a terrorist attack that has left 147 people dead, according to Kenyan officials. In addition, 79 people were injured and four terrorists shot dead in an exchange of gunfire between Kenyan soldiers and the attackers, according to Joseph Nkaissery, Interior Cabinet secretary of Kenya.

The conclusion of the report emphasised “the United States will continue to partner with the Kenyan government as well as with others in the region to take on the terrorist group al-Shabaab”. The phrase, “continue to partner with the Kenyan government” suggests there is an on-going partnership between the United States of America and the Kenyan government, and the US vows to sustain its pledge to defeat terrorism in the region. Therefore, the partnership between Kenya and China is not exclusive. The US offers an alternative partnership in the fight against terrorism.

In another news report, *Western countries vow to help Kenya combat extremism*⁴⁵ published on 3 April 2014, Xinhua presented a wholly Western perspective on the terrorist attack on Garissa University. In the report, envoys from Germany, Britain and the United States of America expressed their solidarity with the people of Kenya. While it is expected envoys of foreign countries would show solidarity with their host country, it is not incumbent on the Chinese media to publish their press statements. In other words, by publishing a positive view of the US and its allies on the Garissa terrorist attack, the Chinese media has demonstrated it can accommodate diverse voices.

⁴⁵ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/03/c_134120672.htm

However, despite the apparently higher degree of freedom enjoyed by journalists who covered the attack, it is important to point out the event could have been framed through different lenses, for example through the prism of historical marginalisation of Somali Kenyans. As Nyamnjoh highlighted, ethnicity and belonging represent an essential component of the identity of the African journalist, but they rarely find visible expression in news reporting (Nyamnjoh, 2010). The case of the Garissa attack, as reported by Chinese media, was no exception.

The institutionalised marginalisation of Somali Kenyans has origin in the 1989 citizenship screening exercise organised by the Kenyan government (Lochery, 2012, p. 1). The sidelining occurred when some Somali Kenyans considered to be Kenyans were issued citizenship cards while others were declared unfit for Kenyan citizenship and deported (Lochery, 2012, p. 2). The exercise created disaffection among Somali Kenyans and opened them up to terrorists appeal. Consequently, experts have cautioned that terrorist activities in the north eastern region of Kenya would continue unless there is adequate strategy to address the entrenched marginalisation of ethnic Somalis⁴⁶. This situation is further complicated by the Kenyan government's attempt to frame the activities of Al-Shabaab through the prism of ethnicity instead of addressing its primary cause – the marginalisation of ethnic Somalis.⁴⁷

For instance, in the 83 articles about the Garissa University terrorist attack, there was no reference to the historical marginalisation of ethnic Somalis as a factor of terrorism in north eastern Kenya. Instead, the movement of Kenyan soldiers into Somalia was framed as the cause of terrorism in the region. This framing was evident in the news feature *Kenya's Garissa makes headlines for wrong reasons*⁴⁸, published in Xinhua on 13 April 2015. This was highlighted in the headline of the news article, which emphasised that 'Kenya's border county of Garissa is making headlines for all the wrong reasons following the recent terror attack at a local college which was orchestrated by Al-Shabaab militants'.

⁴⁶ http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1323685/marginalisation-mismanagement-provoked-kenya-massacre

⁴⁷ http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2015/aug/100947/the_cry_of_kenyan_somalis_is_anyone_listening.aspx

⁴⁸ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/13/c_134144453.htm

However, in the lead, the journalists emphasised the terrorism in Kenya's northeast gained traction when Kenyan troops moved into Somalia in 2011:

It all started in late 2011 when the government decided to send its troops to Somalia to pursue the Al-Qaida linked terror group after a series of attacks and kidnappings targeting tourists on the coastal towns. Following the move which saw Kenyan troops secure huge swathes of land of war-torn Somalia, previously under Al-Shabaab, the terror group vowed to carry out retaliatory attacks inside Kenya.

In the remainder of the story, there was no mention of the historical marginalisation of Somalis in Kenya being one of the causes for the unrest in Kenya's northeast region. While the movement of Kenyan troops into Somalia may be a reason, it does not account for the 1998 bombing of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya⁴⁹ because Al-Shabaab was only formed in 2006. This suggests it is not entirely true that the movement of Kenyan soldiers into Somali territory is responsible for terrorism in the region.

Implicitly, in backgrounding the coverage of terrorist attack on Garissa University, the three Chinese media organisations excluded the ethnic marginalisation of Somalis in Kenya in their articles. Other media, instead, allowed a different – more in-depth – type of reporting. That was the case for Mohammed Adow, a Kenyan-Somali journalist reporting for Aljazeera. While Adow's reporting of the events in Garissa was also largely fact-based, Aljazeera also allowed him to run a feature story that offered a much broader picture of the historical marginalisation of ethnic Somali Kenyan. His documentary - "Not yet Kenyan"⁵⁰ - is unlikely it would have been broadcast on CCTV, which has tended to eschew all references to ethnicity in Africa.

Conversely, CCTV's Talk Africa produced a feature-length TV episode on the Garissa attack titled, "After the Garissa Attack"⁵¹. The show commenced with a broadcast of the speech of President Uhuru Kenyatta reassuring Kenyans the terrorists who attacked Garissa must not be allowed to go scot-free. An introduction by Beatrice Marshall followed next:

⁴⁹ <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings>

⁵⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QeagOhyABXU>

⁵¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqPRgBUn8rg>

That was Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta addressing the nation in the wake of last week's deadly attack in Garissa and as the country is forced to band together in mourning, Kenyans have again raised their concerns over how security threats are being dealt with. Can Al-Shabaab be contained and what would life be in Kenya after Garissa?

Furthermore, Marshall provided historical background to terrorism in Kenya but nowhere did she mention historical marginalisation of ethnic Somalis as a factor:

Now, to get some context around what is happening in Kenya, we first have to look at its neighbour. Somalia is a broken state still unmanned. The instability within its borders has made it a perfect breeding ground for terrorists. For many years warlords held sway in parts of the country murdering and pillaging. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) briefly captured and controlled Somalia's capital, Mogadishu; exit ICU, enter Al-Shabaab. But you may ask what has all this got to do with Kenya? Well, Kenya happens to share an 800 kilometre border with Somalia, one that is porous and poorly manned. The upshot of this is that the instability in Somalia easily spills into Kenya in the shape of surging refugee population. The UNCHR put the number of Somali refugee in Kenya at 462, 970. But that did not quite seem to bother Kenya until the Al-Shabaab militants emerged from the ashes of the ICU in 2006 and morphed into a deadly insurgency. Exploiting bad expanse border, Al-Shabaab launched a series of insurgencies into Kenya, kidnapping, killing and maiming. By the time the Kenyan Defence Force moved into Somalia in October of 2011 to pursue the militants, Kenya's tourism sector was already badly hit. The decision by Kenya to keep booth on the ground in Somalia remains a very controversial matter.

When compared to Adow's report, the ways in which Marshall framed the event suggests that Aljazeera, despite being a state-operated media, has given greater agency to African journalists to adopt different, more locally rooted, frames for their reporting. There is no doubt such a story would offend the Kenyan government and in no way does it strengthen the relationship between Qatar and Kenya. Still, Adow was allowed to report all sides of the story.

6.2 Conclusion

The transition from role conception to actual performance of journalism is fraught with tensions and negotiations (See Preston, 2009, p. 45). This is informed by the normative nature of role conception which is mediated by forces within and external to media organisations (See Mellado & Dalen, 2014). In other words, there is a struggle "over control and autonomy" which may result in a gap between journalists' understanding of their roles and the actual performance of journalism (See Tandoc et al., 2013, p. 540).

This is evident in the comparative analysis of role conception and role performance of African journalists. Undoubtedly there is a gap between how journalists define their roles and the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

This chapter has determined the loyal-facilitator and watchdog roles account for the widest gap between role conception and role performance on both ends of the spectrum (see Table 12 and Figure 3). For instance, only one journalist defined his role as loyal-facilitator which is the most manifest role in media content (see Figure 3). On the other hand, the watchdog role is the most favoured by journalists but it is the least manifested role in media content (See Figure 3). This suggests African journalists who define their roles as loyal-facilitators are likely to enjoy higher professional autonomy while watchdog journalists tend to have less professional autonomy to perform actual journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. The higher professional autonomy loyal-facilitator journalists enjoy within Chinese media organisations based in Africa is suggestive of the ‘lapdog’ role characterising journalistic practice in China’s domestic media landscape (see Norris & Odugbemi, 2008; Zhao, 2008). The downplay of the watchdog in manifest roles could be attributed to forces mediating journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Contrariwise, the disseminator and civic roles show more congruence between role conception and role performance than the other roles (Figure 3). The disseminator role is the most congruent and this could be attributed to the view that the role of journalists to provide information to the public remains valid even within Chinese media organisations based in Africa (Christians et al., 2009, p. 143). This finding also correlates with Ileri’s (2015) survey of Kenyan journalists which concludes the most important role to Kenyan journalists is to provide information.

The importance of analysing role conception and role performance is that it “enables us to explain how organisational ownership and the political system reinforce or limit a particular normative role of journalists within a particular media system” (Hellmueller and Mellado, 2015: 3). This is because a comparison of role conception and role performance points to “how journalists meet the demand of the organisation and a specific society, and how they

integrate those into their individual understanding of professional roles” (Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015: 8).

In the next chapter, I examine these mediating forces influencing the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media in Africa. Consequently, I employ Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model as an analytical tool to examine these forces and their impacts.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Influences in Chinese media

7.0 Introduction

The two previous empirical chapters presented a comparative analysis of journalistic role conception and role performance of African journalists. It also established there is a gap between African journalists' understanding of their roles and the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

The gap between role conception and role performance is a consequence of forces of mediation – both internal and external to media organisations (Christians et al., 2009, p. 120). Journalistic role performance is better explained when examined within the social contexts shaping the relationships between role conception and the actual performance of journalism (Hallin, 2017).

In this chapter, I examine the forces mediating the relationship between journalistic role conception and the actual practice of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This chapter uses the hierarchy of influences model developed by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) as an analytical tool in examining the forces of mediation within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Scholars (Keith, 2011; Lee, 2004) have proposed enriching the hierarchy of influences model to account for diverse media experiences outside the Anglo-American sphere. In this chapter, I demonstrate the elements identified by Shoemaker & Reese, in their 1996 model really are not sufficient to account for the forces mediating journalism in Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

I make a case for also including language (English/Chinese) as a force intervening in the editorial routines and newsroom culture within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In the enriched hierarchy of influences model which I propose, language is conceptualised as an additional 'level of influence' straddling routines and organisation levels of influences in the specific instance of Chinese media organisations in Africa.

I also illustrate the contradiction of China's promise to frame a narrative of an Africa informed by mutuality and equality of China-Africa relations using the kind of journalism promoted by Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

In this chapter, I do not discuss the individual level of influence of Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model because it has already been examined in Chapter five. This is informed by the conceptualisation of this thesis which assumes role conception to account for individual journalistic orientations, values and training of African journalists. Full details are found in chapter five.

However, I do return to the individual level of analysis in chapter 8 when I discuss the interactions of the elements of the hierarchy of influences model with role conception and role performance in relation to the typology of stories. This chapter focuses on the remaining four levels of analysis, namely, routines, organisational, extra-media, and ideological influences.

This chapter uses an in-depth thematic analysis of the remaining four broad themes which inform the interview questions. The four themes are media routines (journalistic practices); organisation (organisational goals, roles, structures, and control); extra-media level (information sources, revenue, social institutions, economic environment, and technology) and ideological level (system-level influences). The media routines level analyses the impact of work practices on content produced by African journalists working for Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

At the organisational level, the study analyses the impact of organisational goals, roles, structures, and control of media content produced by journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). While routines structure the roles of journalists, the organisation level of influence comprises routines and social relations among individuals within an organisational structure (Reese, 2001, p. 181).

At the extra-media level, it is assumed the power to shape content does not entirely reside with media organisations but from outside such as advertisers, governments, social organisations, sources, public relations, influential news sources and even other media organisations (Reese, 2001, p. 182).

The ideological level analysis is concerned with how media's content is influenced by the dynamics of power in the larger society (Reese, 2001, p. 183). In other words, the previous four levels of influences all work together for the achievement of a larger social interest which could be either Chinese or African (Reese, 2001, p. 183). Hence, the recruitment of journalists, their attitudes, the routines they follow and their organisational policy are all geared towards the achievement of a larger social interest (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Reese, 2001).




Figure 4: Concentric representation of hierarchy of influences.




Figure 5: A reconceptualised hierarchy of influences model.

7.1 Routine influences

Shoemaker & Reese (1996) define media routines as the repetitive practices and forms journalists apply to do their work (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 105). Therefore, the content produced by journalists is a product of media routines (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Routines are vital in the hierarchy of influences because they impact the social reality constructed by the media (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 108).

This is consistent with the view that the organisational, practical and other mundane features of newswork support a particular way of framing events which could fundamentally alter them (Altheide, 1976, p. 24). In this instance, embedded routines in Chinese media organisations based in Africa could shape the media content produced by African journalists.

7.1.1 Overlapping structure and agency

Responses from interviews suggest two kinds of structure and agency exist within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This is evinced in the two levels of organisational structure – Beijing, China and Nairobi, Kenya and the two levels of journalistic agency – Chinese and African. In both organisational structure and journalistic agency, the Chinese levels are hegemonic over the African. One CCTV journalist lamented that CCTV Africa should be left to Africans and not controlled from Beijing:

...Sometimes on our part as Africa, we have worked on our round off for the stories of the day and maybe there is something [of a] major event happening in Beijing, you will find that they will overlook the round down; every preparation that we have made and cover what happened in China, which at some point is very unfair. They should not determine what goes out there; this is Africa and they are here to cover Africa (CCTV2).

This seems to also reflect in the categories of stories African journalists are likely able to cover within Chinese media organisations. Some stories are supposedly the exclusive preserve of Chinese journalists. Another China Daily journalist explained there are some categories of stories he is not allowed to cover:

As I said earlier, the Chinese want to have their own but if you can get a bit close to them, they can give you a benefit of the doubt. But for sure, there are some articles that I have not been given

permission to write but they are given to a Chinese because they believe that he will promote their interest (China Daily 1).

While this cannot be termed racism, it seems to feed into China's 'exceptionalism'⁵² in its relation with Africa (see Alden & Large, 2010, p. 28).

7.1.1.1 Overlapping Structure

There are two editorial conferences in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. One involves the management of Chinese media organisations and African journalists and the other is transnational between the Chinese management and their colleagues in Beijing, China. The transnational conference is facilitated through social media platforms such as Skype and video chat, depending on the convenience.

Editorial conferences in Nairobi, Kenya do not hold final authorisation on certain stories having bearing on the Chinese government's economic and political interests on the African continent. Stories in this category are filtered by officials in Beijing, China. For further details see chapter 8, Section 8.1.

The motivation for the two editorial conferences is to ensure officials in Beijing are kept abreast of developments in Africa. But perhaps more importantly, these meetings inform Beijing of the content produced by African journalists, to ensure it does not offend Chinese interests on the continent.

For example, The China Daily holds two editorial conferences on Wednesdays and Fridays every week. The local version occurs on Wednesday in its Nairobi office. At this meeting, journalists propose story ideas. During the Friday transnational meeting in Beijing, story ideas proposed during the Wednesday meetings in Africa are either approved or rejected. African journalists say these editorial routines task their patience, stressing that the Chinese management likes to comment on every story and give directives on which to publish or discard. The case of The China Daily is particularly peculiar considering it is printed in

⁵² According to Alden and Large (2010, P. 28) China's exceptionalism' is understood as a normative modality of engagement seeking to structure relations. Though they may remain asymmetrical in economic content, they are nonetheless characterised as equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing – mutual respect and political equality

Nairobi, Kenya. However, the Chinese managing editor of The China Daily explained the reason they must send their story pitches to Beijing for final authorisation before publication is:

...We have our own editorial conferences for some of the story ideas and we send our ideas to Beijing to approve because they are in charge of [this] publication. So they will get a bigger editorial meeting in Beijing and may generate a few story ideas for us to do (China Daily 3).

At Xinhua, the pattern of editorial conference is similar to what happens at The China Daily. There are also two editorial conferences held daily between the Kenyan headquarters and officials in Beijing. The Chinese regional bureau chief of Xinhua explained the reason for holding morning editorial conferences with colleagues in Beijing is to report to them and get feedback on the reception of stories originating in Africa among the Chinese audience:

...Yes, we hold an editorial meeting every morning with the headquarters in Beijing, China and we discuss every day. We need to report and they need to give us some feedback as to know how the story is received in China. The meeting is conducted via video chat or Skype as the case may arise (Xinhua 5).

However, African journalists are excluded from these transnational editorial conferences. At Xinhua, one of its most senior African editors is not kept in the know of such transnational editorial conferences. He is informed only if it involves an issue critical to Chinese interests on the African continent:

...Unless it is a bigger issue, that is when China is involved but if it is normal, we hold meetings with our boss and then he can forward to China. Unless there are visitors coming or something that needs our attention and also him, then we can be at the same meeting (Xinhua 1).

There is an ambiguity between the views of the African editor and the bureau chief, who mentioned she holds editorial conference with officials in Beijing every morning dealing with developments in Africa. This suggests he might have been excluded from these transnational editorial conferences because it is strictly a Chinese affair. While the same pattern of dual editorial conferences is evident in CCTV, a senior African editor said informing colleagues in Beijing of news stories selected for broadcast in Africa is mere formality. He emphasised it is a tradition at CCTV because of content sharing with its sister channels in the US and Beijing.

Similarly, African journalists do not participate in this editorial conference – not even the senior African editors:

...We just inform the authorities in Beijing. ...During this editorial conference, we are represented by the managing editor. We just share by way of email with our colleagues in Beijing. Every Wednesday, we have an editorial conference among ourselves in Nairobi, Beijing, and Washington where we have another Bureau. They share stories that they have.

If we have any requirements from them, maybe it is in New York, we may be interested or it is happening in Beijing and it touches in Africa, we will certainly be interested. Maybe there are stories happening in Africa that Beijing and Washington are keen on; [then,] we will share with them.

So that is what we do. We share with them. They share with us what they have. Apparently, when we have done these stories, sometimes we also share with those stories that we have done in Africa (CCTV 8).

7.1.1.2 Overlapping journalistic agency

African journalists also mentioned they have limited agency when it comes to contributing to editorial decisions. Sigelman (1973) identifies such editorial conferences as a mechanism for the socialisation of journalists. However, this does seem to be the case in Chinese media because it is formulaic.

This is how these meetings work: the managing director presents selected stories to the conference and permits one or two persons to speak before announcing the final verdict. It is devoid of the robust debate or exchange of ideas preceding the selection of news stories during editorial conferences in the libertarian journalistic tradition. This senior African journalist explained the format of these editorial conferences is strange to him compared to his experience in the local media:

...You know, in an editorial conference, when I was working in the local media, it is usually characterise by very robust discussion. Very combative until people come to agreement but here, it is very formal when you do things. Things are very systematic; so and so present. We listen and we take one comment and we pass the decisions. So, it is not the hustle and bustle, not the robust kind of newsroom you are used to. Everything rests on the shoulder of the managing editor, anything he decides works through (CCTV1).

Analysis of responses to interviews suggest the routines embedded within Chinese media organisations based in Africa serve as control mechanisms to filter stories that possibly offend Chinese interests on the African continent (See Reese, 2001, p. 181). This is consistent with Sigelman's observation – there is sufficient mechanism within the system of control to enable management to censor journalistic performance (Sigelman, 1973, p. 148).

7.1.2 Gatekeeping in Chinese media organisations

Gatekeeping⁵³ in the libertarian-democratic tradition is premised on 'news values' such as prominence/importance; human interest, conflict/controversy, the unusual, timeliness and proximity (Allan 2004, p. 57). However, as highlighted by Xiagoe (2005), in the Chinese media, it is more likely that a different type of 'news value' promoting group orientation, filial piety, hard work and placing community or nation above individuals, will be at work (See Xiaoge, 2005, p. 2). This is consistent with the view that news values may not be universal, especially in the context of professionally produced variations found in and across different news forms (See Cottle, 2000, p. 21).

Responses from interviewees also suggest there are two levels of gatekeeping in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. There is the African level of gatekeeping occupied by African editors and the Chinese level inhabited by Chinese editors. The Chinese level of gatekeeping can be further divided into two sections comprising Chinese editors based in Kenya and their colleagues in Beijing, who have final authorisation on certain story categories. Chinese editors man the final level of gatekeeping while African editors are on the second tier. A senior African editor with CCTV explained the two levels of gatekeeping existing within Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...I would say there are at least two levels of gatekeeping. There is the African level of gatekeeping, which is the second level and the final level of gatekeeping is the Chinese. There is freedom to suggest

⁵³ Gatekeeping is the process of selecting or rejecting news items within media organisations. For further details see (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009).

stories and how they should be done but again, there is a final gatekeeping which is the Chinese that will decide on which stories are going to be handled and how. I would say I am on the second tier of gatekeeping (CCTV6).

This African editor with Xinhua said his role is merely to collate stories from reporters and send them to the Chinese editors who, are invested with the authority to serve as gatekeepers:

...They can monitor the story because what I do is write a story, and submit to them and they will judge it. They will do the final gatekeeping and if they are not satisfied with the story, they will pay the reporter but they will kill it (Xinhua 1).

Analyses of responses suggest the dual gatekeeping within Chinese media organisations based in Africa is to ensure stories selected for publication do not offend China's economic or political interests on the African continent (See Breed 1955, p. 327). This reinforces the view that editorial policy provides the latitude for media organisations to influence and prioritise stories considered newsworthy (See Reese 2001, p. 181).

7.1.3 African dictators are safe

A major concern about Chinese media expansion into Africa is it may provide a bulwark for African dictators to consolidate their hold on power (see Banda, 2009). Significantly, this seems to be the case with Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Interview data suggests Chinese media organisations do not critically engage with African dictators, especially when such a leader enjoys a buoyant relationship with China. For instance, African journalists mentioned the coverage of Presidents Al-Bashir of Sudan and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe within Chinese media organisations based in Africa was tightly-controlled. African journalists observed gatekeeping of stories originating in Sudan and Zimbabwe are approved at the highest level of editorial management in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In fact, African journalists are cautioned intermittently to scrutinise stories concerning these dictators. A senior African editor with CCTV explained the Chinese control over stories concerning African dictators:

...Sometimes you will be told be very careful about stories coming out of Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Sudan... Sometimes it will change and sometimes they will be no instructions at all. So it is really like in and out situation (CCTV6).

This senior editor with CCTV said it is not possible to criticise Mugabe because China thinks he has been overtly maligned in Western media:

...For instance, we cannot go flat out and criticise Mugabe. Why? Because Mugabe has been the punching bag for the west and the Chinese, not that they endorse what he is doing, but the reason is that they won't want to be following the bandwagon, they will be on Mugabe's side.

So for that reason, you cannot do a story that is heavily critical of him. You can do a story that talks about the policies and how it is affecting the people but you cannot go flat out and throw jabs at Mugabe the way the BBC will go out and throw jabs at him because we don't want to confront the system (CCTV 9).

President Al-Bashir of Sudan also enjoys similar immunity in the Chinese media:

...When it comes to Sudan and Al-Bashir, I think it is one of them that we would have liked to cover the other side of Al-Bashir, the atrocities, and stuff but I realise that when we do that story we tend to take the government position, which I realise is not journalistic. And so for such stories, if you are going to take the government position you better not do it (CCTV9).

7.1.4 No trust for African editors

Journalists also spoke about the two levels of gatekeeping existing within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This is informed by the suspicion among the Chinese management that African editors, if allowed editorial independence, might approve stories that could adversely affect Chinese interests on the African continent. This China Daily journalist emphasised the Chinese do not trust African journalists enough to manage their newspapers in Africa:

...The way the Chinese operate is very different; they want to have their own person to be here. Yes, I have been trained by the Chinese but my boss is Chinese and he does not really understand [what is happening] here and how the local media operates in Kenya. But he has to be here because the communist party says he must be here. There is no trust that Africans can run their newspapers here and that is why they have to bring their own people (China Daily 1).

This senior Xinhua journalist observed he has never reported to an African boss. It has always been the Chinese who are put at the helm of affairs:

I think the Chinese society is a hierarchical society and they respect it. We have that hierarchical order at the Chinese level. At the African level, sometimes in a department, we all don't report to the same boss; everybody reports to their bosses and their bosses report to his own boss. For some of us who are in our individual departments we either choose if we want someone to represent us but since I came here six years ago, I have never reported to any Africa on any matter that I want sorted out (Xinhua 3).

Consequently, this senior CCTV editor advised it is important for the Chinese management to trust African editors:

...So it is important for them to trust the African reporters more because we know the continent and we understand what your policies are and we can treat stories the way you want them to be treated but not necessarily killing stories for the sake of it (CCTV6).

This suggests Chinese editors have higher agency than their African counterparts within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For instance, African journalists mentioned Chinese editors have the capacity to deploy reports on reporting assignments but their African counterparts cannot do so.

This inequality between Chinese and African editors seems to compound the bureaucracy involved in deploying reporters to journalistic assignments. For instance, there are approximately four stages to getting approval before journalists are assigned to cover events. In CCTV, the desk editor, the desk director, the managing editor and the bureau chief have to sign off before approval is granted. This African journalist explained the four stages of approval in CCTV:

...Finding all these four people is pretty difficult. Finding my section head is pretty straight forward; managing editor and desk director are normally around but getting the bureau chief to respond can take a while but it happens. It just means that you have to plan for those delays in mind. Like African Development Bank week is starting on 31 March; if I am going to get that sorted then I have to start today (March 22, 2016). Do the budget, talk to the guys in HR and get bookings available and approval from the guys in the chain and get the form set up (CCTV10).

This bureaucratic challenge means CCTV journalists sometimes arrive to cover events already reported on by other media organisations:

...News is about a quick response to events but because of bureaucracy and the process of authorisation, Burundi can light up and we won't go there until in two days' time. The reason is the bureaucracy in decision making and authorisation. In a newsroom set up, a news editor can mobilise and deploy reporters but not here at CCTV. You cannot do so because Beijing must give [the] go ahead; [they must] authorise before you deploy reporters. The Chinese have to adapt to the fundamentals of journalism if they want to compete. The bureaucracy is something else and this affects the process of deploying reporters to cover events (CCTV1).

However, journalists on the sports desk of CCTV do not have to go through the four stages of approval because they cover 'high autonomy' stories within Chinese media organisations. Full details can be found in chapter 8, section 8.1. This African sports desk journalist on CCTV explained he has yet to experience bureaucratic bottlenecks in the course of his work:

...For sports no, we deal with our own here but yes for other people especially if it is a government issue. They will have to come to seek approval. For the most part, it is approved but for the most part, it is just a procedure to know what is happening. We seek approval only when it concerns government and then you must seek clearance from the highest level of editorial leadership (CCTV7).

Some senior African editors in Xinhua claim that they could assign reporters to cover events were counteracted by reporters under their direct supervision. This reporter, under the direct supervision of an African editor, employed at Xinhua, explained only Chinese editors are invested with authority to assign reporters' journalistic assignments:

...The Chinese editors are the ones who have the power to allocate assignments to reporters to cover stories. If the video editor does a story, for instance, he will bring it to the Chinese bosses, who will decide whether it will be used or not but he cannot assign a reporter to a cover a story without the authorisation of the Chinese bosses. That does not happen here (Xinhua 6).

However, this respondent, who had worked for global media in the West, before transiting to CCTV, disagreed saying there isn't any difference in planning the reporting of assignments in Western and Chinese media:

...I would say it is pretty much the same. If we wanted to go do a story when I was at Bloomberg. We pitch it and get a mail and to do it but if it involves a lot of money, it has to go through the boss. I have, to be honest; I have not seen much difference. Moreover, CCTV has been on the ground for some four years now. ...I do think they came with a mind-set of the way of doing things but they met something on the ground and they are adapting (CCTV4).

While the above respondent said there is no difference in the process of planning the reporting of assignments in Western and Chinese media, her immediate boss said in comparison with the local media, he lacks the capacity to assign reporters on journalistic assignments at CCTV.

The analysis of interview data suggests there is strong organisational control in Chinese media organisations based in Africa aimed at the satisfaction China's interest. Significantly, there are overlapping organisational structural and journalistic agency issues within Chinese media organisations when it comes to Chinese and African evaluation.

This is demonstrated in the asymmetric gatekeeping process between Chinese and African editors. In both instances, Chinese levels are hegemonic over the African. This seems to suggest the structure of work in Chinese media organisations based in Africa is organised around a series of deadlines and controls. This attends to making pivotal the satisfaction of China's economic and political interests in Africa (see Schlesinger 1978, p. 109).

7.1.5 Organisational boundaries

Reese (2001, p. 182) emphasises self-censorship is manifested when a journalist anticipates organisational boundaries and power. This is observed within Chinese media organisations based in Africa, where African journalists are conscious of the constraints on journalism.

African journalists stated that in pitching stories, they take organisational boundaries into consideration. The account of a former CCTV journalist highlights the limited professional autonomy African journalists are allowed in carrying out their work and how they creatively use self-censorship to negotiate journalism practice within the Chinese media:

...Yes, I learned self-censorship. I will even imitate them as I am preparing something for [the] news. In my view, you are turned into a puppet. You are turned into a sycophant. Everything, before you even think of the news value, you think of the Chinese reception whether they would take it or not? At least, in local media, you can give something outrageous and it could pass because they are not too many factors on it but for them. It is will the boss accept it. You would even fear to go and tell the boss because you could go anytime because contracts have been withdrawn without notice (CCTV11).

This African journalist with China Daily said it is possible to do any kind of story but it must be within the editorial policy; that it is acceptable to the Chinese management:

...Within the periphery of the editorial policy, you have every freedom to actually just tackle it in any way. You can do so from the challenges on the issue you have proposed. You can actually look at the solutions but outside the editorial policy, it is impossible to do any story (China Daily 2).

However, there are some African journalists who think self-censorship in Chinese media organisations based in Africa is not any different from what obtains in the local Kenyan media, where journalists are cautious of the boundary between journalism and ownership. This senior Xinhua journalist explained what others describe as self-censorship is really just the rules and regulations governing every media organisation:

...When I worked with the Citizen television, a local TV station, there were rules; in-house rules and these are the in-house rules here. In any organisation, you work by the rules. And the rules here is that you know the Chinese interests in Africa has been outlined. You know how to go about certain issues. You know the conflict that is between China and Japan and so when these stories come, you have to be very meticulous with them (Xinhua 7).

The analysis of the interview data suggests self-censorship has become a creative strategy used by African journalists to balance and circumvent the influence of mediation forces within Chinese media organisations based in Africa (Tong, 2009, p. 593). However, while self-censorship may be promoted as a strategy to imbue journalists with agency “the fact that it results to either suppressing or ignoring some stories to protect” Chinese interests raise ethical issues (See Maweu 2013, p. 202).

7.2 Organisational influence

This section analyses the impact of organisational goals, roles, structures, and control on media content produced by journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) emphasise the organisation must socialise individual workers to their routines and enforce them while handling situations not covered by the routines. While they note the question of control is problematic, they nonetheless add that owners of media organisations have the power to dictate the direction of media content (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 169-170).

In this instance, Chinese media organisations based in Africa promote ‘positive reporting’ as editorial policy. The idea of ‘positive reporting’ has its origin in China’s attempt at framing an alternative narrative of China-Africa relations which differs from Western media framing

of its engagement with Africa. This policy is firmly rooted in the Chinese media system. Therein, the media serve as the mouthpiece of government (See Zhao, 2012). The domestic media in China are expected to positively frame government related activities even when it contravenes widely-held journalistic ethos (See Zhao, 2012). Consequently, there is an attempt to socialise African journalists working within Chinese media organisations based in Africa into ‘positive reporting’.

This can be inferred from the response of this senior African editor with CCTV, who emphasised sending stories which have been selected in Africa to Beijing for filtering does not translate to censorship. He is also among the few participants interviewed within the premises of Chinese media in Nairobi, Kenya (See chapter 5):

... You will acknowledge that there are benchmarks. You will acknowledge that it is not necessarily an issue of control but it is an issue of in-house consultation. Normally, what we do is every Thursday of the week, we have stories that we have lined up for the coming week including pitches that I, as a planning editor, have come up with and the contributions from correspondents from all over Africa. We put them together in a document and we meet here and we discuss those stories.

Do they warrant us going all the way to cover? Do they warrant better treatment from what I have put on paper? Are there new angles to that story that I can pursue? I give you an example very briefly: We were discussing the other – the story of Child marriage in Africa. It started with a proposal in Zimbabwe that the Zimbabwean authority is thinking of enforcing a law whereby a child cannot be married until she is 18. This arises from cases of child marriages and we said if could develop this story to include the entire Africa, not Zimbabwe alone. From that Zimbabwe pitch, we have now said we want to do stories across Africa and we want to look at this story from various perspectives – Why is this culture so deeply rooted and we want to ask a very hard questions – what is the man’s role in all these because unless we tackle the side of the men, then you may not resolve this issue (CCTV 8).

The view of this senior African editor is informed by his socialisation into the ideas of Chinese journalistic orientation (See Breed, 1955; Sigelman, 1973).

7.2. 1 Censorship

One of the concerns raised about Chinese media’s expansion into Africa is the widespread censorship in the Chinese domestic media (See Gagliardone, 2013, p. 34). A recurring question has been whether Chinese media organisations in Africa will replicate censorship in Africa or will it adapt to the dominant libertarian ethos in the African media space? Interview

responses suggest the operations of Chinese media organisations based in Africa mirror China's domestic media. This senior African journalist with Xinhua explained how censorship is done through revision of journalists copy:

...At my level, I may not know what the government wants, but it is something that I have seen in a number of instances where a report about pro-democracy, if you write [about] pro-democracy protesters, it will be changed to rebels or anti-government rioters. If you write something like elections were rigged; it could change or most of the time, that whole area will be erased. They will say we were not there. How do we know it was rigged? Then if you write about corruption, it will depend on which country is involved. Our reporting tends to lean towards the Chinese government position, which I think is not any different from other media organisations, which align their reporting to what their government is projecting (Xinhua 3).

This kind of revision to news stories can alter the entire thrust of the piece and change its meaning (See Sigelman, 1973, p. 145). Contrary to subtle censorship in the libertarian media, censorship is open and direct in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. African journalists observed they are handed strict guidelines on reporting the news and when they are conducting high profile interviews. This African journalist from CCTV narrated his experience during an interview session with a former African President:

...The one that I can cite was in Abuja after the Chibok girls were abducted in April 2014. We were in Abuja on 1 May and I was asked to conduct an interview with [the] former President of Nigeria. The instructions for that interview were to essentially stick to the script, and not to offend the powers that be, which is extremely irritating because you have got, on one hand, the Chibok parents, who clearly felt the government had done nothing to bring back their daughters and here you are with the person in charge and you cannot ask those questions because someone in management believes that if you ask those questions, you will be offending the government. That essentially makes it quite clear what you can and cannot do at CCTV (CCTV10).

Another CCTV journalist advised that Chinese media should allow journalists the freedom to cover stories relevant to the African audience:

...I think everything narrows down to freedom to report and to realising that this is Africa, not China. I think the management should just let every journalist here report what is African and what is relevant to the African audience not what they think is best (CCTV 2).

7.2.2 Censorship without explanation

African journalists observed there is no explanation for the rejection of their stories. Some of the journalists explained they would prefer to know the reasons for rejection explained to them so they don't pursue such stories in future. An African journalist from Xinhua explained his experience of how stories are 'killed' without an explanation:

...The way the stories are 'killed', you are not told where the problem was and why the story was 'killed' because at times, it is better for you to be told and then you don't repeat the same mistake. If it is something they don't want covered so that you know and you don't waste your time going again to similar function (Xinhua 6).

This African journalist with China Daily explained it can be painful for stories to be rejected without an explanation after one has spent time researching and conducting such stories:

...Out of all the stories I have done with them, they have rejected about 10 and I don't get reasons for rejections. As a journalist, there are some stories that you know and believe that you have done so well. Sometimes you must have spent about three weeks researching a story and yet your story is not published. It is quite painful. The reasons I have got sometimes is that we have decided to change the way we approach this issue or we are going to do a big story and we will add your story as part of it but that eventually does not happen (China Daily 1).

Among the interviewees, this is the only respondent to claim none of her stories has been rejected since 2012 when she started working for CCTV in Kenya:

...Almost six years now working for CCTV, no story of mine has ever been rejected on account that you cannot do that because of one, two, three, four...No, I have never experienced that. And I think that is the difference because, in the local media, there was a lot of rejection especially if it was not political because for local media that is what sells. That is what they will tell. But also remember for us – CCTV – we don't rely on advertising so for us, it is not this is what sells. It is more of this is what need to be told. It is more of this is what is happening and people need to be aware of this. So, I have not had [any of] my stories being killed because it does not sit well with the politically correct with the administration (CCTV5).

Perhaps, her stories have never been rejected because they fall in the category of stories allowed high autonomy within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For further details see section 8.1 in Chapter 8.

Equally, there is a consensus among African journalists across the three media organisations that censorship is considered the biggest challenge to the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations in Africa. For instance, African journalists across the three media organisations who believed this researcher had a covert relationship with the Chinese management pleaded with me to extend their suggestions to Chinese management for increased flexibility to conduct in-depth journalism.

These journalists emphasised such a gesture has become necessary if they are to strive favourably against the competition. This senior CCTV journalist advised the Chinese media to take a cue from Western media and improve on its editorial content:

...The editorial policy should be a bit flexible. It should also be robust, and give us latitude and space to explore further and wide. Let us do in-depth stories and investigative stories. Let's highlight the ills coming out of this continent more robustly. We should not hide it. If something bad is happening on the continent, we should not deny it. We should also improve on standard and editorial content; [it] should be at par with what you find at Bloomberg, AFP, CNN and the like (CCTV1).

For this respondent, Chinese media organisations should do more stories critical of African leaders. He emphasised reporting positively about African leaders won't bring about the much needed democratic dividends to Africa. He estimated one of the most viable approaches to make African leaders deliver the dividend of democracy to the people is to critically engage with them. He advised Chinese media organisations based in Africa can endear themselves to the African people by reporting things that matter to them:

...I will ask them to realign more with the people and for the reporting to be more open. They tend to say they are objective because they are not criticizing the government but I think African governments must be criticised to change. We have seen this criticism in various international media houses help to change the narrative on the ground and I don't believe just praising the African governments will endear them to the people because the government doesn't read newspapers. It is the people that read newspapers. So I think they will need to endear themselves more to the people by reporting things that matter to the people (Xinhua 3).

A significant difference between censorship in Chinese and Western media is that the ownership in western media relies on editors who have been socialised by long exposure to make the right decisions. Conversely, the management of Chinese media organisations are

not comfortable that African editors would make the right decisions (See Schlesinger, 1978, p. 109).

7.2.3 Recruitment

Sigelman (1973, p. 136) emphasises selective recruitment and socialisation are used to inculcate certain attitudes among employees. Therefore, the process of recruitment and socialisation are used to maintain the ‘organisational myth’ (Sigelman, 1973, p. 140). This is also an observable pattern within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Except in a few instances, where the Chinese management head-hunted local journalists, African journalists first indicated their interests to work in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Instances where African journalists were head-hunted happened at the outset of the launch of CCTV Africa, when the Chinese management sought star reporters to commence its broadcast on the African continent.

For instance, interview responses suggest the recruitment of journalists across the three media organisations is not likely to follow a competitive process. This senior journalist with Xinhua explained how he was recruited:

...I have been working here for over 6 years. I was already working in the media and had interactions with Xinhua. So when there was a vacancy, I was informed and went for the interview but the position was not advertised (Xinhua 7).

This Xinhua journalist also said he got recruited to work for Xinhua through a Chinese contact:

...I used to work for an Arabic based station; so while I was still on my work, there was a time we went to cover story in town and I met with the Chinese lady and we bonded and became good friends. So, when my contract ended in the other station, I contacted her and luckily they were opening a new TV station in Africa and I was recruited (Xinhua 11).

7.3 Extra-media influences

Extra-media forces in Chinese media organisations based in Africa primarily come from the Chinese and African governments that have friendly relations. For more details see section 8.1 in chapter 8. This is consistent with Xi Jinping's statement about the primary role of the media to promote the interests of the Chinese Communist Party over public interest.⁵⁴ This Xinhua journalist emphasised their work is entirely influenced by the Chinese government:

...Our work is entirely influenced by the Chinese government. There are stories or reports that touch on the Chinese government and the local government. You have to really pay attention to do such [a] story. I am not saying they will come here and tell me what to do. Actually, [I] just choose what I want to do to and if I think that a story is not accurate, [then] I will not work on it (Xinhua 10).

The state regulation of Chinese media organisations based in Africa also informs the journalism practiced within Chinese media:

...I would say and this also applies to CCTV. It is mainly skewed towards China; everything to do with China is what will be reported. They don't have a broad view, for example of Kenya. They will want to start the newspaper with the cover article that President Xi Jinping was somewhere instead of having a cover story that will be attractive because people buy headlines. That is not [the way it is] in Kenya. If you look at CCTV before the news actually starts, it is China, and China and people don't want that. So [the] majority of people will prefer to buy another newspaper or watch something else (China Daily 1).

Chinese media organisations based in Africa also tread cautiously towards African governments even if they seem to be on the wrong side of the law. This Xinhua journalist explained that individual African governments wield a lot of influence over Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...Individual governments from Africa seem to have a lot of influence because government officials will always be accorded certain kind of respects. They will be given some space to explain themselves

⁵⁴ http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/world/asia/china-media-policy-xi-jinping.html?_r=0

even if they made mistakes. I think we tend to try to cover it up. It is like we are an apologist to some extent because we will not highlight such mistakes. However, that influence is dependent [upon] how close those governments are to the Chinese government (Xinhua 3).

7.3.1 No advertising

A peculiar feature of Chinese media organisations based in Africa is that they do not rely on advertising revenue. This is an observable pattern in the three media organisations and this may account for the enormous influence the Chinese government has on editorial content within these organisations. This African journalist said The China Daily has yet to start collecting advertising after four years of operating in Africa:

...At the moment we are yet to start commissioning advertisers... We are still in the control of the content on what really fits the African continent. So we are yet to agree to take advertisements (China Daily 2).

Some journalists hold the view the downplaying of advertising revenue in Chinese media organisations based in Africa may underscore a hidden agenda to China's media role on the continent. This senior African journalist with CCTV contended that media organisations all over the world rely on advertising revenue but wondered why Chinese media organisations are different:

...Let me ask you what media house in this world does not advertise? Like the basic source of revenue in every media organisation is advertising. So when you find a media house that is self-sufficient you believe it must be crazy; the money is coming from somewhere. Someone needs to ask themselves why these people are here (CCTV11).

Even content produced by Xinhua is distributed free to the local media in Kenya and other African countries. This should be raising concerns there could be more than what meets the eye to China's media expansion into Africa. This senior African editor with Xinhua said he is yet to ascertain the agenda of Chinese media expansion into Africa:

...Even these stories we publish are given free of charge to the local media. I don't know what they are after. There was a day I asked the director and he said even he does not know. But our stories are now being used in the local media (Xinhua 1).

Some African journalists at CCTV think there is something uncanny about Chinese media operation in Africa. For instance, they expressed the concern that CCTV has yet to conduct

an audience survey since it commenced broadcast operation in Africa in 2012. This is unsettling when measured against the fact China is listed as one of ten most high tech countries in the world.⁵⁵ In fact, they are also very perplexed that the pressure they have mounted on the management to conduct an audience survey has come to naught:

...So the things that I have been used to doing as local journalists, such as audience surveys, to know who is watching you; what information are they getting from you that they cannot get elsewhere and which area of your programme they prefer are things that cannot happen in CCTV.

We have spent the last three years asking management to conduct a survey of the people that watch us across Africa but management turns it down. And CCTV does not see itself as a business and it does not see itself as a data-driven organisation because we don't do any audience research. So on what basis are decisions based?

Take for instance; we know one of our main carriers is DSTV; the main markets for DSTV in Africa include Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya etc. For a long time, we have correspondents in Southern Africa but we did not have in Nigeria. Nigeria was not properly covered until last year and now we have three correspondents. The fact that it took that long to get to a point to get correspondents who work, who deliver in Nigeria, for me, just does not make sense. It is your biggest market; it is huge (CCTV10).

7.3.2 Chinese media as business tool

Responses from the interviews suggest Chinese media organisations based in Africa could be geared towards promoting and protecting larger Chinese economic and political interests on the African continent. For instance, African journalists mentioned one of the objectives of Chinese media organisations in Africa is to serve as a tool for negotiating business opportunities for both the Chinese government and private Chinese business interests.

These journalists emphasised China is using its media organisations in Africa to further China's economic interests on the African continent rather than the pursuit of the public good. This senior African journalist offered an insight into how China deploys its media in Africa to negotiate business deals:

⁵⁵ <http://www.thetoptens.com/high-tech-countries/>

...Let's take for instance if they are commissioning the pipeline between Kenya and Uganda. CCTV will go there with a delegation comprising the managing editor, bureau chief, and many others. At the end of the event, they will meet the President from Uganda and ask for business. So it is mostly to further the business interests of the Chinese people that CCTV does in Africa (CCTV 12).

For this respondent with Xinhua, Chinese media does not want to ruffle feathers because it is interested in exploring business opportunities on the continent:

...You see Xinhua is a state-owned media and Xinhua as a media organisation and the Chinese government there is not very much of a difference. And you know the Chinese government wants to make an inroad into Kenya and Africa and so how they portray themselves is very important for them. They do not just want to rub shoulders the wrong way (Xinhua 10).

This ex-CCTV journalist noted China is using its 'positive reporting' journalism to charm African political and business elites in order to safeguard its economic and political interests on the African continent:

...The Chinese are in Africa to do business so the deliberate positive angle is a way of charming the continents as friends of the continent. This will remain as long as it serves their (Chinese) interests. It is a type of business model. Coverage is done with their business interests in mind (CCTV15).

This senior African journalist brings a morality perspective to bear on the operations of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. He questioned the underlying motive for Chinese media expansion into Africa, if not to protect China's economic interest. He uses President Barack Obama's analogy of China's infrastructural development in Africa when he visited Kenya in 2015 to emphasise his point:

...Anywhere they have an economic interest they do not interfere. Issues of morality bring a lot of morality questions into play: are they there just for the money or honestly. There is something interesting President Obama said when he visited Nairobi Kenya, that if all these nice roads and railways China is building in Africa are all heading to the ports, then it leads to Shanghai and it is a fact. Look at the Thika road, it leads to the port. Everything leads to the port of every country. Look at the roads the Chinese government is building in Kenya; my kids will pay for it (CCTV11).

For this China Daily journalist, Chinese media is a tool for propaganda geared towards serving the interests of China in Africa:

...Chinese media is aimed at promoting Chinese propaganda. I have gone for job interviews with local media establishments here in Nairobi, Kenya and the first question I have been asked is that you are just a local media promoting Chinese propaganda.

So I tell them no, not really that they could have a look at the articles that I have published and see if it is promoting Chinese propaganda but they don't read the paper.

This has happened to me. I was carrying the latest edition: they looked at the newspaper and said written by who: first page, was written by a Chinese, second page, a Chinese and third page, myself and they said if this is an African edition, why is it that every person writing here is a Chinese (CCTV1).

7.3.3 Government influence is real

The heavy hand of the Chinese government tends to reflect in every facet of operation of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In Kenya, the influence of the Chinese government comes in the form of regular briefing by China's ambassador to Kenya, who Chinese media organisations based in Africa defer to in editorial and political matters. For instance, matters involving the Chinese Communist Party receive premium attention in Africa-based Chinese media. This African journalist with The China Daily explained events involving the Communist party are given priority media coverage:

...For example, if you have three events happening [on] the same day, the news editor will tell me you have to cover this and will not cover this, and even if you cover it, and some else covers something they think is more important to them, especially something to do with the Communist party, that is what will go to press and not this other one (China Daily 1).

For this respondent, there is no difference between Chinese media organisations and the Chinese government:

...It is as a government could be; it is as Chinese as Chinese could be. We must realise we are not blind to the fact that China is a controlled country. So you understand, of course, most of your senior editors are from China. Even the filtering you can tell is controlled from Beijing. And so they are ideas that you do not expect to fly right away. There are ideas you do not even expect to fly at all. There are

things you know will take a long time to be done because of bureaucratic procedures [and] because there are things that must be approved from Beijing. I guess you must learn to work with that (CCTV4).

However, there are a few African journalists who said they have never felt the influence of the Chinese government in the newsroom. However, a senior African editor at CCTV acknowledged there are instances when events originating from Beijing are given preferences over events in Africa. He was among a very few journalists interviewed within a media centre premises in Nairobi, Kenya:

...I have never felt it because my focus is basically on matters that concern Africa. There are instances we must be open about this that is being held in Beijing that involves African leaders and all that everything is coming from there and they tell us what they have. That the Chinese government has a major broadcast on Africa and if that happens, we give way. But I think I will be lying if I told you that I have ever felt the influence of the Chinese government directly (CCTV8).

From analysis of interview data, it is suggestive the influences of Chinese and African governments shape the selection of news stories within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In other words, African journalists are caught between satisfying the demands of the Chinese Communist Party and the interests of African governments on good terms with China. This reinforces the state-centric journalism being promoted by Chinese media organisations in Africa (see Gagliardone, 2014).

7.3.4 Party-press parallelism

The party-press parallelism which features prominently in China's domestic media is also manifested in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For instance, journalists observed there are two sets of Chinese journalists in the newsrooms of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. They are those of the Central Propaganda Unit (CPU) of the Chinese Communist Party as well as professional Chinese journalists who are non-members of the Communist Party.

African journalists emphasise journalists of the CPU membership wield enormous power in the decision-making process, even if they are of a lower rank in the hierarchical structure. According to African journalists there are three hierarchical structures in the newsroom. At

the highest level are the Chinese journalists of CPU membership, followed by non-member Chinese journalists. And lastly, Africa journalists occupy the lowest rung of the ladder.

This senior African journalist with CCTV explained the hierarchical structures in Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...We have two sets of Chinese journalists in the newsroom: Chinese people from the Central Propaganda Unit masquerading as journalists and Chinese civil servants, who are actually trained journalists. While the Chinese civil servants are trained and professional journalists, journalists from the Chinese Communist Party call the shots...Their decisions are final and they watch over the civil servant journalists from China (CCTV1).

Journalists also mentioned there is some form of power play between Chinese journalists who are members of the Communist Party and non-member Chinese journalists. African Journalists pointed out Chinese journalists in the Communist Party structure call the shots in all matters pertaining to the operations of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For instance, there is an editorial conference every Wednesday and it is exclusive to Chinese journalists who are members of the Communist party. African journalists and Chinese journalists who are non-members of the Communist party are not welcomed. Journalists describe the conference as very strategic where important decisions affecting the operations of the Chinese media organisations are conducted. The deputy bureau chief of CCTV, a Chinese, who is not of the Communist Party structure, is not welcome to attend this conference. A senior African journalist with CCTV explained the power dynamics underscoring party-press parallelism in Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...The deputy bureau chief of CCTV in Nairobi can call the shots professionally but he does not participate in the Wednesday meeting which is strictly for members of the Communist party. It is at that meeting that a lot of important decisions are taken which means that if you're not present you cannot function. He is not a member and he is basically an outsider. No African journalist attends this meeting and most times, work has to stop during the meeting (CCTV 12).

African journalists also observed the power dynamic between Chinese journalist members of the Communist Party and non-members seems to account for the censorship of some stories. This senior editor with CCTV explained how the power play between Chinese journalists impacts editorial decisions:

...Yes, there is a power play between communist party members and non-members and that is why you find that some of those gatekeepers cannot make some decisions because of this dynamics. The ones that have been deployed here are not so open that they are CPU guys but the way they act and respond to some stories you will realise that there is something fishy about these people and there is something fishy when this other one is not on duty. That really happens and you will find out that some decisions are just shut down because the person who is supposed to make the decision is not sure how it is going to be taken up in Beijing once it is broadcast here (CCTV6).

This respondent from Xinhua said Chinese journalists think their role in Africa is to speak on behalf of the Chinese Communist party:

...One thing that I have noticed is that most of the workers here, especially those from China are members of the Chinese Communist party and some of them believe they are here, literally, to speak on behalf of the Chinese government and to hear staff on behalf of the Chinese government and I will say that there is a heavy hand of the Chinese government (Xinhua 3).

However, a senior editor with Xinhua emphasised that while it may be true there are CPU members in the newsrooms, there is no proof they monitor the activities of African journalists:

...Yes, they are Chinese journalists from the Communist party of China but they don't monitor us. Since I started working for Xinhua, nobody has ever called me to answer a question but they can monitor the stories. They can monitor the story because what I do is write a story, and submit to them and they will judge it (Xinhua 1).

African journalists also mentioned that stories concerning the Chinese communist Party are treated with caution because they are considered very important to the Chinese government. This Xinhua journalist explained stories concerning activities of the Communist party are given exclusive attention:

...Sometimes, there are stories that touch on the communist party, you don't mess with such stories, that is a no go area, no go zone. But other stories like business stories, development stories, you can make changes to it (Xinhua 10).

On the other hand, when it comes to remuneration, Chinese media organisations do not seem to value hierarchical structure. This senior Xinhua journalist said there are some reporters who earn more pay than he does despite being ahead of them in the organisational structure:

...I am the oldest in the Nairobi bureau... In terms of payment, they don't follow hierarchy... You can find a reporter earning more than the editor but they are very friendly. They don't value this hierarchy – even if you call somebody your boss they will say I am not your boss (Xinhua 1).

From analysis of interview data, it is suggestive there is a dual-track of reporting within Chinese media organisations based in Africa in which journalists serve as both professionals and government agents. In this instance, any information possibly harmful to the CCP's standing is compiled into secret internal reports while those considered to be safe will be published for public consumption (See Lorentzen, 2014, p. 412). In the same vein, it is evident “China is supporting in practice, a vision of the role of the media in society that is skewed towards the state” (see Gagliardone, 2014, p. 12).

7.4. Ideological influences

The ideological level is a sum total of all the other levels in the hierarchy of influences model. Consequently, activities at the lower levels are aimed at achieving the ideological agenda of a larger social interest (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 223).

7.4.1 Positive reporting

In section 7.3, I discussed ‘positive reporting’ through the lens of editorial motivation. In this section, I will discuss it within the framework of the ideologisation debate on Chinese media expansion into Africa. One of the motivators for the expansion of Chinese media into Africa is to counteract Western media framing of China-Africa relations and to promote a new paradigm of reporting underpinned by ‘positive reporting’.

This motivation is, however, linked to a larger social interest of exporting a journalistic orientation whose role is to collaborate with the government rather than hold leadership to account. More importantly, the quest by China is seen through a larger social prism of a geopolitical contest between China and the West-led by US and its allies.

This bipolar geopolitical contest is also evident in the operations of Chinese media organisations based in Africa, whose aim is to supplant the Western journalistic orientation

currently dominant on the African continent (See Kurlantzick, 2007; Banda, 2009; Harber, 2013; Farah & Mosher, 2010). The Chinese regional bureau chief for one of Chinese media organisations in Kenya explained the motive of Chinese media expansion into Africa:

...We report the positive side. That is what we focus, including the local politics and economy. We just don't want to highlight the bad side. You know sometimes the Western media, they just want to use some bad story, [they] may distort the truth story to make it more catchy but that is not what we do. We want to report it more objectively. There is enough bad news in the world already. But in a country like Somalia, we report the positive side of Somalia. I have interviewed the president for more than seven times. Like the economy is returning to normal and the security is improving (Xinhua 5).

In order to achieve this ambition, Chinese media organisations in Africa promote a journalism professionalisation that leans towards the state. This can be deduced from the editorial decision-making process, recruitment, routines, organisational structure and goal as well as the newsroom culture of African journalists working in Chinese media in Kenya.

Therefore, China is interested in exporting a paradigm of journalism-positive reporting which is different from the dominant libertarian journalistic orientation in Africa. This senior editor with Xinhua said the goal of the Chinese media is to replace the western model of journalism in Africa:

...So the Chinese bosses want all activities in Africa to be reported positively and they want to replace the Western model of journalism with their own model. So they are trying to paint Africa in a very positive way (Xinhua 1).

This senior journalist with CCTV explained the Chinese media focus is on positive reporting more than the negative:

...I think for them, they tend to focus on the positives more... I think they favour that a lot. When you hear the Chinese leader say we are a third world country just like Africa, I believe they tend to take that seriously. So you find they have this kind of favouritism almost, I would say. So you are more likely to do a positive story and it is approved in a flash... like you pitch for a positive story and it is approved swiftly for them. I think this is what Chinese journalism is all about. It is about bringing out the positives first...

Yes, there are conflicts to be talked about but the positives almost compete, evenly, if not more when compared to negative stories. They tend to lean more towards the positives and I guess when you look

at things politically, [it] is hinged on the kind of interaction they have with Africa. You know when the Chinese president says Africa is our brother, it almost reflects in the journalism (CCTV5).

However, there are some African journalists who think positive reporting is not entirely a bad idea for the African continent when measured against the magnitude of negative reporting the continent has received in the past. This senior journalist with CCTV said positive stories are good for Africa:

...Unfortunately, in the world that we are living at the moment, bad news sells and that is the way it has always been. That is what draws people to the screen and to the social media. I think positive stories are very important, especially on the African continent because there is a very negative perception of the continent and this tag, 'the third world' does not help either.

However, I also believe that you should not deliberately ignore negative stories just for positive because you can cover all the positive stories yet put aside people [who] are dying from disease; war and you cannot ignore that. I mean, that is one of the reasons I said as journalists, you are also a voice for the voiceless. Somebody has got to tell the world what is going on and provide the information (CCTV3).

However, other journalists disagree about Africa needing positive reporting because, in their views, African leaders are more responsive to criticism than propaganda. This senior journalist with Xinhua said the only way for the media to bring about change in Africa is by highlighting the ills of leadership on the continent:

...They tend to say they are objective because they are not criticising the government but I think African governments must be criticised to change. We have seen this criticism in various international media houses help to change the narrative on the ground and I don't believe just praising the African governments will endear them to the people because the government doesn't read newspapers. It is the people that read newspapers. So I think they will need to endear themselves more to the people by reporting things that matter to the people (Xinhua 3).

7.4.1.1 Limits of positive reporting

However, there is a limit to positive reporting in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. African journalists have observed there seems to be a limit to positive reporting when covering the activities of the US, the UK, and Japanese governments. The gatekeeping on stories concerning these governments seems to be more critical than other stories. This senior journalist with Xinhua explained that even if such a story is newsworthy, it would almost be ‘killed’ by the Chinese editors:

...For example, if you want to report on [the] US, German[y], Japan, we cannot report about what they do positively because they will think we are a state media and we are doing public relations for them. The story might be very interesting. For example, the US donated a certain amount of money for peacekeeping in Africa. Another editor might see it as PR and China carrying a PR for another country, they don't like it (CCTV11).

However, this view may not entirely hold in the coverage of conflicts or terrorist activities in Africa. This is demonstrated in the coverage of the terrorist attack on Garissa University in north eastern Kenya. For further explanation, refer to chapter six.

7.4.2 Chinese media Contravenes ethos of China-Africa relations

The exceptionalism that features in China-Africa relations, which frames China's engagement with Africa as political equals, while sustaining asymmetric economic relations is evident in the kind of journalism Chinese media organisations promote about Africa.

China frames its media expansion into Africa as offering a positive view of Africa on the world stage. This is informed by China's Africa policy which promotes equality, win-win and mutual respect between the culture and values of the African people and China (See Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). This was also emphasised by the managing editor of The China Daily newspaper who stated the Chinese media seeks to frame a true picture of Africa to the global audience:

...We try to tell a different story; to present a balanced and more actual African story to the Chinese audience. We try to present the true picture of Africa to the world. We also try to bring a different angle to representing Africa; a bridge kind of role for understanding China-Africa relations (China Daily 3).

Therefore, it is anticipated Chinese media organisations based in Africa would follow through with its commitment to promote a narrative of Africa encompassing the African personhood and agency. This is important because to be African is beyond mere categorisation:

...It is to be a social actor or actress enmeshed in a particular context that has been and continues to be shaped by a history of connections and disconnections informed by interconnecting local and global hierarchies (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 76).

Therefore, a narrative of Africa devoid of its belonging; ethnicity, religion, nationality and class cannot be a true representation of Africa⁵⁶. This suggests a journalism that downplays the African personhood and belonging is “hardly in tune with the quest by Africans for equality of humanity and for expression, recognition and representation” (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 78). This is corroborated by Maweu’s (2014) study of journalists at the Daily Nation newspaper in Kenya, which concludes ethnicity is a major ‘filter’ of news in Kenyan newsrooms (Maweu, 2014, p. ii). The fact Chinese media organisations based in Africa promote an editorial policy downplaying the African personhood and belonging is suggestive of an exceptionalism that undermines the tenets of China-Africa relations. This senior African journalist lamented African journalists were disappointed they could not cover the visitation of the Pope to Kenya in 2015:

...Imagine the Pope came here and we could not cover it. It was a field day here for the international media but we could not cover it (CCTV 1).

Even when the Pope features in sports events such as football, which enjoys high autonomy in Chinese media, such stories are censored. An African journalist with CCTV explained one of the stories he wrote about the Pope meeting a football team in South America was censored:

⁵⁶ http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1979_reith5.pdf

...We are not allowed to cover the Pope but that boils down to an internal religious belief. I remembered once we did a story on the Pope, just something from the wires, about the Pope meeting a football team in South America , it just did not run (CCTV7).

Another Xinhua journalist said that as part of recruitment orientation, they were cautioned to forget about reporting on religion and ethnicity:

...There are some areas that are no-go zones... There are some areas that they don't want to be covered. For example they don't want us to write articles to do with religious issues, Christianity or ethnicity and they told us that we should forget anything about God (Xinhua 9).

The same treatment meted out to the Pope is also extended to Muslims. The Chinese Communist Party promotes state atheism and subscribes to the communist ideology which holds 'that religion is the opium of the people'⁵⁷ . Consequently, Chinese media organisations apply this Communist ideology in the coverage of Africa which undermines the Chinese media's promise to promote an African narrative of Africa on the global media stage. This speaks to the challenge of African journalism catering to the realities of the African society. This dissonance between journalism practice and the reality of African society will result in a professional and ethical dilemma for African journalists (Nyamnjoh, 2015, p. 37).

7.4.3 Clash of journalistic titans

There have been debates on the impact of Chinese media expansion into Africa on journalism professionalisation in and on the African continent. This debate is broadly framed through Manichean lens of positive or negative (Farah & Mosher, 2010; Harber, 2012; Ngomba, 2012; Gagliardone, 2013; Wekesa, 2013; Wasserman, 2014). For example, Wekesa (2013, p. 71) argues increased contact between the Chinese and African media will provide a different way of approaching Chinese issues and topics from a model where African content producers receive information from Western or Chinese sources. However, he adds the impact of Chinese media expansion would be remote, based upon the colonial legacy of libertarian journalistic orientation in Africa.

⁵⁷ <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm>

In the same vein, Gagliardone (2013, p. 35-36) contends China's ability to entrench its own journalism model will emerge out of negotiations with other models of journalism on the African continent.

However, not much consideration has been given to what may become of the journalistic orientation of African journalists who have been socialised in Chinese media in the event they exit to work in the local media. A critical question to ask is if their socialisation into Chinese media might impact their journalistic orientations. Responses from interviews suggest some African journalists are keen on keeping the journalistic orientation they have acquired in Chinese media while others would prefer to uphold the libertarian journalistic orientation. However, a significant trend has emerged from the interview responses. This suggests early career journalists, who commenced their journalistic career in the Chinese media, are willing to uphold Chinese journalistic ideals when they transit to the local media space. One early career journalist at CCTV said she would like to continue with positive reporting:

...I would want to continue with positive reporting but also given what is exact. What I have been taught in the university is not far much from what I am doing now. Both can work together but the positive reporting is what I believe journalism needs to adopt now (CCTV2).

Another Xinhua journalist said while he would like to return to the libertarian journalistic orientation, he believes the Chinese model is also good:

...If I leave here, actually I will want to follow the other way – [the] Western model but I still believe the Chinese model is a good system but we need to put more structures. Like, we should be able to enjoy freedom to work as journalists (Xinhua 2).

Some senior African editors, who said they would like to continue with Chinese journalistic orientations even if they were to exit to the local media is significant. For this senior Xinhua African journalist, the Chinese journalism model is better than the libertarian journalistic orientation:

...I think the Chinese journalism culture is better because it is developmental. The Western journalism is more confrontational and basically, does not give facts (Xinhua 1).

This CCTV journalist said the Chinese media has not had any impact on his libertarian journalistic orientation and would continue to uphold the Western journalistic orientation if he leaves CCTV:

...Well, it is a journalism that is government-centred. I see a lot of similarity between the Chinese journalism and the Kenyan government journalism. It involves a lot of hierarchy. You need to consult a lot but fortunately, it has not impacted me. I understand from their end, especially people who really cover politics and stuff but it has not really affected me (CCTV7).

However, a senior editor with CCTV said there is a place for ‘positive reporting’ in the African media system:

...I will be a better person because one of the reasons I agreed to work with Chinese media, which was completely new to me, was to see this new thinking. I used to cover positive stories. After CCTV, I believe there is a place for positive stories because if you are going to inform the public you must give them all the information including the good, bad and the ugly (CCTV9).

This senior African editor, who has worked for both the BBC and the local media emphasised the kind of journalistic orientation that would emerge on the African continent would be a blend of the Western and the Chinese:

...What African journalism is going to be in is a blend of both. One, because Africa has moved and the Chinese model thrives on stiffening and not releasing everything out there. So it is like partial control but I think the Africans have evolved. Even as a professional, you would want to be more freely divorced of economic and commercial interests. Then, at the same time, the global environment changes.

There is also some kind of African patriotism that is getting into journalism in the sense that you are looking at a situation that as we do that value addition, as we criticise, we also look at the situation of how best we can make the environment better. That is why I say there is going to be a blend of both-Chinese and Western journalism professionalisation. I am convinced that a blend of both will probably work better for the continent as it tries to find its position in the global order (CCTV6).

Analysis of the interviews suggests Chinese media expansion into Africa will result in a hybrid journalistic orientation where Chinese and Western journalistic orientations co-exist.

7.5 Language as a level of influence

This section discusses the mediating influence of language (English/Chinese) on the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Responses during interviews suggest a language barrier for both the English and Chinese languages mediate journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

African journalists mentioned the impact of language manifests in the newsroom culture and the editorial content produced by them. For instance, there is minimal social interaction between Chinese journalists and their African colleagues in the newsrooms of all three Chinese media organisations. This results in a form of segregation.

I have demonstrated in the analysis of media routines level of influence (see section 7.1); there is an overlapping structure and agency existing within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Responses from interviews suggest this asymmetric structure and agency within Chinese media organisations is informed by the language barrier between Chinese journalists and their African counterparts. For instance, Xinhua has two bureaus in Kenya – head office and the town office. My observation at the town office shows there is a seamless blend among African journalists but interactions at head office was at best, drab. The explanation for this disparity could be attributed to the composition of staff at both bureaus. The town office is shared among African journalists and the head office is made up of both African and Chinese journalists.

This senior journalist with CCTV explained there is a language barrier affecting social interaction in the newsrooms of Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...There is a language barrier and it makes things tough. I do see that sometimes things don't move fast because of the language barrier. I think the Chinese traditionally like to keep to themselves. They like to work in their own organisation but they are neither negative nor are they racist. They are just like that and we have accepted it (CCTV4).

An African journalist with CCTV explained the difference in language means there is minimal interaction between African and Chinese journalists:

...In CCTV, social interaction is different but I came to learn that it is because in local media we were a team of strictly Kenyans. So we have the same culture, we understand one another but the Chinese culture is totally different. So you will notice it is very quiet in here. Sometimes it gets almost depressingly quiet. I realised that sometimes the way we do things as Africans is the opposite of how they do things and that is because of different cultures, I think (CCTV 5).

This African journalist narrated how language barrier between her and a Chinese colleague cost CCTV a live broadcast at an African Development Bank Meeting in the Ivory Coast:

...Not me directly but indirectly, it does impact me sometimes. For instance, last week we were in Abidjan and we were filming a live broadcast and we had a problem with our satellite. So they could not pick me up and unfortunately they realised that the man who could solve it did not speak English. So we ended up not doing our live broadcast because they would have to find someone who could communicate better with the technicians back home here in Nairobi. Of course, it does impact us in some negative ways but because they made an effort to hire so many locals is... ultimately, I would say 70% of the staff is locals (CCTV4).

This African journalist also mentioned the language barrier slows down work because of the lack of communication between African and Chinese journalists:

...You feel like language is a barrier because the English language is not the first language for them. To them, the English language is not the first language, and the problem with a learned language if you are going to use it as the official language, unless you learned [it] very well, chances of misunderstanding is very high.

For instance, you find situations whereby your immediate supervisor is trying to tell you something like the boss said the story you [wrote] did not have all the elements it is supposed to have. But this simple statement will turn out as if your work is being challenged because of the way they frame the English language... They will put the English phrases in a way that turns out very harsh (CCTV 13).

African journalists also observed a poor understanding of the English language among Chinese editors is also reflected in the editing of their stories. This respondent with Xinhua explained that sometimes what comes of their article differs significantly from their original copy:

...Language is a big barrier. More so, most of them are not good speakers of the English language and it is a big barrier to us... It affects even our stories; the editing sometimes what comes out is totally different from what [it] is supposed to be (Xinhua8).

Some journalists suggested the language barrier also accounts for why some reports are censored by the Chinese editors. They lack a good grasp of the English language. This African journalist with Xinhua explained this happens often and the next day the same story is published by the competition:

...Most of the stories are just killed for just no reason. ...They are very good stories. The next day you [see] such stories in VOA, Reuters but they just kill it because they don't understand the English language (Xinhua 9).

One journalist pointed out that editing stories filed by African reporters presents a challenge to Chinese editors:

...Then another problem is the editing. Some of them are greenhorns. They have just come to Africa the other day. They have very bad English and they don't understand what is right to do (Xinhua8).

Analysis of interview data suggests that the English language plays a central mediating role in the operations of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Poor understanding of English among Chinese journalists has an adverse impact on the content produced by African journalists and limits social interactions between African and Chinese journalists. This reinforces Wekesa's suggestions that the language question remain a critical element in Chinese media expansion into Africa (See Wekesa, 2013: 76).

7.5.1 Segregation in covering events

Some African journalists observed they could not recall instances when they have covered journalistic assignments with their Chinese colleagues. They suggest this is a development informed by the language barrier existing within the Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This seems to suggest an overlapping structure and agency also manifests in

journalistic assignments where African journalists and their Chinese counterparts are unlikely to cover events together. This African journalist with CCTV explained in instances when an African and a Chinese journalist are scheduled to cover the same assignment in another country, they are unlikely to board the same flight:

...There is a very limited interaction between the Chinese journalists and some [of] us black Africans. Extremely little unless we are both covering the same story in some other country. Even in that instance, we will not travel together. We will not be on the same plane and we will not stay in the same location (CCTV 13).

Another respondent from CCTV added:

...No, we don't cover events with our Chinese colleagues. For instance, I am going to do an interview with the managing director of Total in Kenya and I will not have a Chinese colleague at that event and for most of the events that I have done. That is always how it has been (CCTV 10).

This senior African editor with Xinhua explained they don't interact with their Chinese colleagues because of the language barrier:

...No, we don't interact with our Chinese colleagues. We just write differently because of the language barrier. It rarely happens for us and our Chinese colleagues to cover events together. You know, when they want you to take them somewhere, they don't know very well but then it is you who will write the story...They don't do anything. So to them, it is just like they are going out to expose themselves. Mainly what we do is to go out alone and we only file stories to them (Xinhua 1).

The analysis of interview data suggests that besides the five levels of influences on journalism in Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model, it is important to include language as a key level of influence as in the case of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In fact, there is need to enrich the hierarchy of influences model to account for media experiences beyond the Anglo-American space. In this instance, I propose language as a level of influence to account for media experiences within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the forces mediating journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. I extended the scholarship on the hierarchy of influences by emphasising also how the language barrier between the English-speaking African journalists and their Chinese counterparts constitutes a force that mediates the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Furthermore, I concluded the asymmetric structure and agency existing within Chinese media organisations based in Africa results in the privileging of a journalism that downplays the African personhood and belonging. This binary structure and agency is also suggestive of the dual-track reporting inherent in China's domestic media landscape. In China, journalists report for both the Communist Party and the public. Therefore, events able to even potentially hurt the standing of the Party-State are compiled into secret memos (see Lorentz, 2014; Hadland, 2012).

I also proposed China's media expansion into Africa has an ideological motivation to it. This could be best explained through the prism of a new world order⁵⁸ in which there is a 'clash of civilisations'⁵⁹ between China and the US and its allies for the dominance of global politics. China's ambition to promote its own journalistic orientation in Africa is exhibited in the uniformity of journalism across Chinese media organisations based in Africa (See Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 139-140). Contrary to China's journalistic ambition in Africa, its media expansion into Africa would not displace the dominant libertarian journalistic orientation in Africa. Rather, it would result in a hybrid journalism professionalisation in which Western and Chinese journalistic orientations co-exists on the African continent.

This chapter proposed language as a mediating factor within the context of Chinese media organisations. In this next chapter, I explore how the elements of the hierarchy of influences model interact with journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism in

⁵⁸ <http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/asia/item/21025-china-staking-claim-in-the-new-world-order>

⁵⁹ For further details on Clash of civilisations see Huntington (1997: 22)

relation to the typology of stories – African Affairs, Diplomatic visits, African politics and the Garissa University attack.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bridging the gap

8.0 Introduction

The previous chapters have analysed role conception and role performance and Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model. These analytical frameworks were used to highlight different aspects of how African journalists operate within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

Conceptually, several studies have pointed out there are various factors mediating between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism⁶⁰. However, there have been very few efforts to analyse how different types of influences intervene in mediating between how journalist perceive of their role and how they actually perform (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017). As a result, there is a gap between studies in the sociology of news production and studies on professional roles conceptions in journalism studies literature (Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach, 2017, p. 5). In this chapter, I seek to contribute to bridging this gap by linking the interactions of the elements of Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model with journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

I begin by examining the relationship between role conception and the actual performance of journalism in relation to the typology of stories. Next, I proceed to explore the interactions of role conception and role performance as well as the elements of the hierarchy of influences model in relation to the typology of stories.

⁶⁰ Norris and Odugbemi (2008) identify the state, the market and the profession while Christians et al. (2009) identify four dimensions – community, distribution of power, issues of legitimation and accountability. Hellmueller and Mellado (2015) identify routines, organisational ownership and the political system

8.1 Conditional autonomy

The comparison between the responses to interviews and analysis of news stories suggest different elements of the hierarchy of influences model play a greater or lesser role according to the type of stories journalists are working on. Expressed another way, the professional autonomy African journalists possess to select and process news stories varies with the kind of story being reported.

According to African journalists, they enjoy high autonomy when Chinese interests are absent in a story and low autonomy when it is present. For instance, there is low autonomy for covering stories pertaining to African governments having good relations with China. Such news pieces would include Chinese political and economic interests on the African continent, human rights and democracy.

Conversely, there is high autonomy when covering stories concerning development issues, terrorism, diseases – outbreak of diseases such as Ebola, sports, culture, environment and conflicts. A former planning editor for CCTV in Nairobi, Kenya explained the relationship between professional autonomy and the typology of stories:

...I was the planning editor for the Chinese department. So I gave so many ideas – anything cultural passed; the pygmies in [the] Congo; the people living in the forest in Cameroon or [the] Masai culture or Nigerian food will pass. But anything to do with the economy will be scrutinised. In fact, they hated politics except elections and for reasons only they can explain (CCTV11).

This respondent with CCTV said there is high autonomy in reporting sporting activities in Chinese media organisations based in Africa:

...There are obviously some stories you can't touch. But in our desk, I believe I have pretty much free rein to cover what we want to cover. If a coach gets fired, you still have to go in and get sensitive information sometimes. I think I do and the reason is because I cover sports (CCTV7).

This award-winning investigative journalist with CCTV observed it is challenging to do investigative reporting concerning African governments friendly with China:

...Chinese entrance into Africa has been for a number of decades and it is huge and is now Africa's largest trading partner. They are providing the resources while taking resources out as well. It is now a pro-quid-quo. So it is very difficult to do certain stories that touch negatively against certain governments that are considered very friendly with China, especially investigative stories. You cannot do any investigative stories for whatever reason. You just cannot go closer (CCTV 3).

This journalist with Xinhua mentioned they are not allowed to cover human rights stories, which in his opinion, is one of the differences between Chinese and Western media:

...I would also want to be frank. They don't want us to report on human right issues. Such stories never see the light of the day. Those are some of the glaring differences that we noticed between working for Western media and Chinese media (Xinhua 9).

Another Xinhua journalist explained Chinese media organisations based in Africa are cautious about offending perceived allies and powerful interests on the African continent:

...In journalism for you to sometimes do an objective story, you have to be ready to get dirty but the kind of business that Xinhua does, does not allow it to get into issues of corruption in Africa, or Kenya. They would rather play safe and report about development, famine and issues like Ebola but stay away from the politics and issues that might bring them into trouble with the local government (Xinhua 3).

The analysis of interview data suggests the relationship between journalistic role conception and the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa is informed by conditional autonomy. There is high autonomy when Chinese interest is absent in a story and low when it is present.

In the next section, I explain how the elements of the hierarchy of influences model mediate the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa in relation to the typology of stories.

8.2 Conceptualisation

The graph below was developed to clarify how the various elements in the hierarchy of influence model intervene according to different types of stories. There are two interlinked vertical circles in relation to the typology of stories (see Figure 6): One vertical circle is atop and another below.

The vertical circle atop contains the active elements of the hierarchy of influences model while the one beneath contains inactive elements. These elements include Individual, routines, organisations, extra-media and Ideology levels in the hierarchy of influence model. These elements mediate between African journalists' understanding of their role and the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa, with respect to the typology of stories. In the same graph, there are also two interlinked horizontal circles with respect to the typology of stories – one to the left and the other to the right. The circle to the left represents the role conceptions of African journalists and the one to the right the manifest roles emerging after being mediated by the elements of the hierarchy of influences model, according to different typologies of stories.

These role conceptions include watchdog, loyal-facilitator, civic and disseminator roles and the typology of stories are the four *African Affairs*, *African Politics*, *Diplomatic Visit* and *Negative Perception of China*. The implication of the graph is that for a particular role to manifest in media content it have been mediated by the elements of the hierahcy of influences model. This suggests that how journalists conceive of their role may not materialise the same way in media content.




Figure 6: Interactions of the elements of hierarchy of influences, role conception and role performance in relation to the typology of stories.

8.3 Diplomatic visits

In the coverage of diplomatic visits within African-based Chinese media organisations, three elements of the hierarchy of influences model emerged as the most significant. In this instance, the ideology, extra-media and organisation elements mediate the actual performance of journalism. When officials of the Chinese government or high ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party are visiting Africa, this is where the editorial policy of ‘positive reporting’ is widely upheld. This suggests even if there are discrepancies between African

journalists' understanding of their roles and the actual performance of journalism, they are left with limited space for negotiation. In this instance, even the most ambitious African journalist takes on a more pliable identity. The extra-media and ideology elements are external while the organisation element is internal. The other two elements of the hierarchy of influences model are inactive in this case and are located in the inactive circle (see Figure 6).

An example of the mediating influence of the extra-media and ideological elements in framing diplomatic visits can be gleaned from the visit of Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the standing Committee of China's National People's Congress to Kenya during March, 2016. African Journalists observed a broken projector that had been out of use for more than one year was hurriedly repaired to ensure his visit got premium coverage. This senior journalist with CCTV provides an account of what transpired before the visit of the head of Chinese Communist Party parliament to Kenya in March 2016:

...Even equipment failures take over a year to get sorted out. If a camera falls apart in a local media station, it would not take a year to get it fixed. In CCTV, a projector is been dead for over a year. It was only revived two weeks ago. And I find that it was linked to the visit of the head of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhang Dejiang. It cannot be a coincidence. The fact that he was visiting and it was fixed shows that it was because of his visitation. We have been on it for the past one year complaining that we need to get it fixed but nothing happened until the visitation of this guy (CCTV 10).

Therefore, it is evident the intensity of the mediating elements of the hierarchy of influences model may vary in relation to the coverage of diplomatic visits. This is inferred from the content analysis of stories produced across the three Chinese media on the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to Kenya (see Tables 5). For example, in Xinhua and CCTV, the extra-media element would be the most prominent followed by ideological and organisation elements. However, at The China Daily, the order of intensity is different. The organisation element becomes the most active followed by the extra-media and ideology elements.

This suggests African journalists who define their roles as loyal-facilitators would enjoy high autonomy in covering stories pertaining to diplomatic visits in Xinhua and CCTV. Conversely, in the same situation, China Daily journalists who define their roles as loyal-facilitators and disseminators would more likely to enjoy high autonomy. The variation at

The China Daily could be attributed to the fact there are only two African journalists working there, which may inform closer monitoring and enhanced organisational influence.

8.4 Negative perception of China

When stories negatively portraying China break in Africa, the extra media element appears to be the most relevant in deciding whether and how a story is covered. The intensity of the extra-media element is followed by the organisation and ideology elements. The other two elements are inactive and are located in the lower circle (see Figure 6).

The extra-media element is experienced in the form of intervention by the Chinese embassy as evinced in the case of the *Chinese Racists Restaurant* and the arrest of Chinese nationals in Kenya. A senior African journalist with CCTV explained the reason why they could not cover stories portraying China in negative light was because such stories conflicted with Chinese interests:

...The reason we did not cover it probably was because it was clashing with certain Chinese interests. It is not just the Chinese restaurant, there is a group of Chinese nationals who were arrested and are going through a court process. Although the Chinese media have not covered it but the Chinese embassy has come out at some point to talk about (CCTV1).

Besides, the five elements in the hierarchy of influences model, language also mediate the actual performance of journalism in the coverage of stories portraying China in negative light on the African continent. For instance, this senior editor with Xinhua explained he could not cover the arrest of Chinese nationals for cyber-crime because of language barrier:

...For me, two things are critical to covering it. One thing I learnt, they were speaking Chinese, they were not fluent in the English language and so the language barrier could not allow me to cover that story. Then, the interest of the people I work for. They cannot allow me to cover it.

Okay, it can be covered but not on my level but from our Chinese senior bosses. They still need a senior approval to be able to cover it. On my level, I can cover stories that are local or African based

that are not very complicated. For stories that touch on Chinese government and negative publicity on other governments, [then] I just leave [it] to my bosses. They will have to approve it (Xinhua 11).

A senior journalist with CCTV explained the management of CCTV had already declared the 77 Chinese nationals innocent before the Kenyan government concluded their investigation into the incident:

..I was in the editorial meeting with the bureau chief and the first thing he said was that these guys were innocent so why would you as a journalist take sides. These guys have been arrested by the government of Kenya. The agencies responsible have carried out enough investigation. So as a journalist you are not supposed to take sides (CCTV 11).

This respondent with Xinhua said they do not cover issues which conflict with China-Kenyan relations. This could account for why Xinhua merely reproduced a press statement produced by the Chinese embassy as a news report:

...We don't cover such [news] because it is an issue that is in a conflict between the Kenyan government and the Chinese government. So Xinhua will not cover that. They will let the local media cover that and they will talk about such issues as a conflict in Somalia and Boko Haram and other matters (Xinhua 3).

This also reinforces the state-centric journalism Chinese media organisations based in Africa are promoting on the continent (see Gagliardone, 2014).

As well, African journalists mentioned the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident was discussed as a story idea at the highest level of editorial leadership but it was vetoed by the Chinese management on the basis it did not add any journalistic value. However, this African journalist with Xinhua explained they adopted a damage control approach to the coverage of the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident:

...We did a story, sort of damage control, we interviewed Kenyans working for Chinese restaurants for their views on working for restaurants. Surprisingly, these Kenyans were content working in a Chinese restaurant because they felt that they have been trained and exposed to so many things for all those years they have worked in Chinese restaurants. Let me say, that incident was an isolated one and it did not stray Sino-Kenyan relations. However, we did not cover it specifically (Xinhua 4).

For this respondent, who works for Xinhua, the *Chinese Racist Restaurant* incident was merely sensationalised by the local media to provoke Kenyans against Chinese interests in the country:

...We did not cover it because I thought it was one of those things that go against our interest here in the country. From what I gathered, it was just some selfish interests from other quarters trying to provoke Kenyans against Chinese interests. Somebody went to the restaurant and felt dissatisfied and decided to, as they say, provoke thought among Kenyans and when it got into the social media it blew up the whole society.

But for me what I gathered, as a good journalist, I went out there and looked at the facts. What I was being told of that incident; in fact, it was being told by a journalist. It was not factual so I thought of not covering that story because all angles were not covered. When something happens here in Kenya, probably from a foreigner and it gets on the social media, everybody thinks this guy is a racist who are out to oppress Africans (Xinhua 11).

However, when I probed further to learn if reporting on the incident was censored, he became defensive and explained it could be covered only by senior Chinese colleagues: “Okay, it can be covered but not on my level but from our Chinese senior bosses”(Xinhua 11). This also reinforces the view a dual-track reporting system exists within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. Further details are found in chapter seven.

Then again, this China Daily journalist said he proposed it as a study idea but it was not approved by his Chinese boss. However, he acknowledged that even if it had been accepted, The China Daily would have framed the story through a different lens from the local media:

...I suggested the story to my boss but he said I should wait first; let’s watch first how things play out. Meanwhile, before that I have already done stories about Chinese restaurants which were very positive because I was actually looking at what the Chinese restaurants are doing here in the hospitality field.

So I want to believe that I was stopped from doing that story because I have done a familiar story. If we wanted to cover that story in China Daily, we would cover it from a different lens. That there is a Chinese restaurant, that sells this and this and they have their rules and policy that sometimes they don’t allow black people beyond a certain time. We would not cover from view that there was a problem with the Chinese restaurant that they discriminate against certain races. Our coverage will be very different from the lens through which the local media covered the incident (China Daily 1).

It is also observed in the coverage of stories portraying China in negative light; the elements mediating the actual performance of journalism may emerge differently across the three Chinese media organisations based in Africa. For instance, the extra-media element is likely to be most prominent in The China Daily (see Table 7). In Xinhua the extra-media and language elements are more likely to be active (see Table 8). And, at CCTV, the organisation and extra-media elements would be more likely to come into play (see Table 6).

This suggests African journalists who define their roles as loyal-facilitators are more apt to enjoy high autonomy within The China Daily and Xinhua to perform actual journalism. And although they would be covering the same event, CCTV journalists who define their roles as disseminators would most likely enjoy very high autonomy.

8.5 African politics

When covering African politics, the extra-media, organisation and individual elements of the hierarchy of influences model mediate the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. The other two elements emerged as less relevant (see Figure 6).

Here, the extra-media element is the primary mediating force followed by the organisation and individual elements. For instance, let's look at the trial coverage of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto at the ICC. Some form of tension is suggested between the individual and the organisation elements of the hierarchy of influences model but the organisation element is hegemonic.

However, the extra-media element is functional subject to the relationship between an African country and China. If China has good relations with an African country, the extra-media element appears more active than the organisation and individual elements. But when China does not have an advantageous connection with an African country, the organisation element is hegemonic. One respondent with Xinhua said there was the heavy hand of China on the coverage of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President Ruto's trial at the ICC. In this instance, China played the role of a big brother to Kenya:

...There was such a heavy hand of China in that case; had China not intervened in the UN Security Council either by threatening to try to veto the ICC; there was shuttle diplomacy where China was seen as the big brother for Kenya in terms of defending Kenya and even Chinese government foreign ministry issues a statement saying that sovereign countries should be left to sort their own issues. I remember that same time Uhuru Kenyatta went to China and got one of the biggest foreign aid that this country ever received at a single moment. In fact, it was a state visit. I will say that the cases were always covered from the Chinese perspective. What China thought was good (Xinhua 3).

This African journalist with The China Daily explained it is easier to cover business stories without any form intervention from management. The same is not true for stories such as the trial of Uhuru Kenyatta at the ICC:

...It is easy when you are looking at business news; what is happening to a company; why it is making it and why it [is] losing. So it is a simple role that I actually find easy. The framework is that it has to be positive and it must not be negative about the relations between China and Africa and Kenya (China Daily 2).

However, in the coverage of African politics, the elements mediating the actual performance of journalism are also likely to emerge differently across the three Chinese media organisations based in Africa. At CCTV, the individual element will be more active followed by the organisation element. The extra-media element of the hierarchy of influences model would be more active in Xinhua followed by the organisation and the individual elements while the extra-media element would be more prevalent at The China Daily (see Table 7), followed by the organisation element.

This suggests African journalists who define their roles as disseminators would enjoy higher autonomy to cover African politics at CCTV (see Table 6) followed by loyal-facilitators and watchdog journalists. At The China Daily (see Table 7), journalists defining their roles as loyal-facilitators may enjoy higher autonomy followed by civic journalists. In Xinhua (see Table 8) journalists, who see themselves as loyal-facilitators are more likely to enjoy higher autonomy followed by, disseminators, watchdogs and lastly, civic journalists.

8.6 African Affairs

When it comes to the coverage of African affairs in which Chinese interests may be absent, the organisation element is the most likely to mediate the actual performance of journalism followed by the individual element. For instance, in the coverage of the terrorist attack on

Garissa University, Chinese media organisations based in Africa deployed skilled war reporters, who could provide exclusive insights into the incident. The organisation element was majorly responsible for the editing of stories filed from the scene of the attack in Garissa. This seems to suggest African journalists were offered some level of freedom in the coverage of Garissa University attack with minimal censorship. For further details, refer to Chapter Six. This African journalist who covered the terrorist attack at Garissa University for CCTV said he did not perceive any form of revision on the reports he filed on the incident:

...For the Garissa attack, we ran it without interference whatsoever. I was allowed freehand to report as I deemed fit and I cannot remember any report that I sent on [the] Garissa university attack that was censored or dropped (CCTV 14).

A senior journalist with CCTV said it is possible to report on terrorist activities without interference from the Chinese management. However, the situation may not be the same when covering issues affecting the Kenyan government:

...As we are based here in Nairobi and Kenya and China have got very buoyant bilateral relations, of course certain things may happen here that are worth reporting but we would want to report it based on the relations between China and Kenya. While we would report about an Al-Shabaab attack in west gate or north eastern Kenya without interference, we prefer that if they are issues touching on the state of government of Kenya, that those issues gets articulated more than other voices (CCTV1).

Despite the level of freedom African journalists enjoyed in the coverage of the terrorist attack on Garissa University there is sense critical background information which could have provided more insight into the emergence of terrorism in the region was downplayed. Specifically, there was no mention of the marginalisation of ethnic Somalis in Kenya. This is considered an historical factor in the growth of terrorism in Kenya's north eastern region. Nevertheless, this information was left out of the Garissa University attack coverage. As a matter of fact, none of the 83 articles covering the Garissa University attack referred to the historical marginalisation of ethnic Somalis in Kenya as a contributing factor to terrorism in the region. For further details, please refer to chapter six.

Perhaps, the watchdog role would have manifested in more articles if journalists had been allowed the freedom to do more in-depth reporting of the Garissa University attack. This gap is highlighted also by the exclusion of the ethnicity factor in the coverage of Garissa University terrorist attack. This kind of reporting reinforces the view of African journalists

that the Chinese media is averse to reporting on conflicts rooted on ethnicity or other related factors. The elements of the hierarchy of influences model mediating the actual performance of journalism across all three Chinese media organisations, and in the case of African affairs, are likely to be similar.

The organisation and individual elements are likely to mediate the actual performance of journalism when it comes to the coverage of African affairs. The organisation element is likely to be the most operational element followed by the individual element. This suggests African journalists who define their roles as disseminators are more likely to enjoy higher professional autonomy when reporting on African affairs stories. They are next followed by the civics, the loyal-facilitators and watchdog journalists within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

8.7 Troubled watchdogs

The dissonance between role conception and the actual performance of journalism may likely result in some form of anxiety among journalists. This may be the case of African journalists who understand their roles as watchdogs within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This senior African journalist observed that it is frustrating that he could not conduct investigative reporting in Chinese media but emphasised that he, as others, is faced with one option which is either to shape in or ship out:

...Sure, it is frustrating. First, I think journalism is the worst paid profession but having said that, in my heart, I am a journalist because that is where my heart is. At this particular moment in time, it is frustrating, yes but you have to live with it. It is not like I am going to start my own station and do things differently.

So I have to follow the editorial policy and like you said earlier, every media house has its own policy; and you sign on to it. I am sure that as a journalist you will realise that there are certain things you do not agree within that editorial policy .So you have a choice, walk out, change from within or follow through and just try and live up to that mantle as much as you can within the perimeters set for you (CCTV 3).

For this senior African journalist at CCTV, the frustration comes from the fact the process of decision making is not as robust as in local media:

...At times, it is frustrating because once that decision-making process is stifling... I find it stifling as a journalist because I would want to express myself. As much as I understand that this is the editorial policy, sometimes you get the feeling that they don't trust you to be able to treat a story, however, critical it is, in a way that will not be as critical as presumed. And just because they don't want to dare, you find a situation whereby a story everybody has gone to town with but you don't have it (CCTV1).

This Xinhua journalist emphasised the greatest challenge in working for Chinese media organisations is the limited freedom for journalists to carry out their work:

...The Biggest challenge is not being able to air your views as the way you would have wanted them aired and especially when you are covering events and functions. This is because as much as you would have wanted to air your views, there are limitations to what you can say and what you can report and there is nothing you can do about it because that is the policy and you must respect the policy if you want to remain on the job (Xinhua7).

However, the frustration some journalists face because of limited autonomy to function in a particular role seems to be cushioned by the attractive incentives the Chinese media has to offer. Some of these perks include attractive salaries and adventure, which for the most-part, the local media may not afford. An African journalist with CCTV explained the international exposure CCTV offers with regard to coverage of events mitigate the frustration possibly emerging from not being able to practice investigative journalism:

...Sometimes it is frustrating. It is partly frustrating especially when you want to pursue an investigative story and you cannot do so. The way management put[s] it, we are not interested in investigative stories. Also, you have the advantage to cover some stories you could not cover if you were in the local media.

For instance, in 2013, we went for the African Development Bank's Annual Meeting and this one was in Morocco, which you know it is a pain in the ass to get to because you literally spend one day traveling. You have three routes: Cairo, Europe, and Dubai. So we fly from Dubai across all Africa to Morocco and then Marrakesh.

But the fact that you were able to go for an event like that where presidents, policy makers are present and were able to interview on pressing issues on the continent is useful. The fact that they are willing to fund such stories is useful. So I tend to focus more on that now, that I know that investigative reporting is off the table and it gives you leeway to visit places and interview people I never thought I could before. So it is a mixed bite (CCTV 10).

8.8 Locals don't trust Chinese media

African journalists mentioned that locals do not trust Chinese media. This China Daily journalist recounted an unsavoury experience he encountered during a job interview with a local newspaper in Kenya. He emphasised that the local media establishment views Chinese media organisations as propaganda tools:

...I have gone for job interviews with local media establishments here in Nairobi, Kenya and the first question I have been asked is that you are just a local media promoting Chinese propaganda. So I tell them no, not really that they could have a look at the articles that I have published and see if it is promoting Chinese propaganda but they don't read the paper. This has happened to me; I was carrying the latest edition: they looked at the newspaper and said written by who?: first page, was written by a Chinese, second page, by another Chinese and third page, myself and they said if this is an African edition, why is it that every person writing here is a Chinese (China Daily 1).

He further emphasised that the greatest of working for Chinese media organisations in Kenya is that both the locals and the politicians are sceptical about Chinese media. For instance, he disclosed he had to disguise the media organisation he works for to be able to access to top government functionaries. He said the reason is many Kenyans are still suspicious of China's media ambition in Africa.

... I have come to understand that it is actually difficult to access these government officials but If I came from the standard newspaper, thank God I still have my badge, they will be willing to speak to me. They will ask if you are a journalist with which media house and when you say China Daily, they will not like to talk to you but if I say I work for the standard, thank God I still have my badge, they will speak to me and give me the information I require. So I tell them I work for standard newspaper but I want ask this information for China Daily and I get my information swiftly. So I stand a better chance being black and a local asking question for publication in Chinese media but the main problem is that people are still not sure about the Chinese (China Daily 1).

According to the journalist above, there is still a lot of suspicion about the Chinese operations in Africa in general which has adversely impacted the trust for Chinese media. This fear is also very pronounced within the political leadership. He gave an instance in 2014 when a delegation of Kenyan MPs visited China and were still sceptical about what the Chinese are up to:

...In 2014, there was a delegation of Kenyan MPS who attended a trade fair in China; I met them and spoke to them including the deputy speaker of our parliament and she said we are here to represent the government but we are not so sure about our engagement with China that is why we have come to know exactly the Chinese ideas and what they want to do for us, first hand (China Daily 1).

Even the regional bureau chief for Xinhua in Kenya acknowledged that the most challenging thing for Xinhua is outreach to the locals. She emphasised that Xinhua needs to make more effort to get the locals to consume its news:

...I think the most challenging part for us is still the outreach of our news; As a Chinese media, even if we have been based here a long time, Kenyans speak English and they believe in Christianity, these are things you cannot change overnight. Even if the economic cooperation between the two sides is very good, but deep rooted, I think Kenyan people are still influenced by the Western culture because it used to be a colony of the West. So sometimes we need to make more efforts to understand each other (CCTV1).

Another Xinhua journalist emphasised that Chinese media organisations have a lot of work to do before its products gain traction in Africa.

...They have a lot to do. The kind of Journalism Chinese do is too controlled for Africa for the sake of journalism. So they need to first, get out of China and get in Africa. And African journalism is largely western. So they need to learn that kind of journalism; to be aggressive; to be able to face issues without fear of being discriminated and to know that if you do a story, it is a story and it does not interfere with your business as far as you have facts. They need to stop controlling the media; There has been a lot of improvement even in our work but they still need to do more; they need to set themselves free (Xinhua 3).

However, one of the senior African editors at Xinhua said the local media in Kenya are beginning to use Xinhua news stories.

...Two years ago, there was an internal memo I got from the Daily Nation in which the management was asking reporters why they were using our stories when their own reporters can cover such stories. There is an improvement these days in the usage of our stories (Xinhua 4).

This CCTV journalist also acknowledges that it would take some time before the locals embrace CCTV as their source of news. While he emphasised that some people consume

CCTV he noted that it has been difficult getting Kenyans to become regular consumers of CCTV:

...the hard sell has been positive reporting because there was a time the management of CCTV sat down and said, we don't want it all to be negative reporting and there have been a lot of fights here about why is all about Burundi been the negative side? Why not the positive side? However, viewers are not foolish; if you really push positivity all the time, they are going to ask something happened the other day why not bring it and if it is always hard news all the time, people will ask for something positive. I think with time, it will become embraced. Surprising here in Kenya, the feedback here in Kenya seems to suggest that people do enjoy our station but the problem is to get them to be regular viewers that are the problem. (CCTV8).

The analysis of interview data suggests that despite China's huge investment in the expansion of its media organisations into Africa, it is yet to gain traction with African consumers.

8.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I was able to bridge the gap existing between research into the sociology of news production and studies on professional roles. By linking the interactions of the elements of the hierarchy of influences model with journalistic role conception and role performance this study has provided an insight into the complexity of journalism practice within the Chinese media and how African journalists negotiate it. Therefore, it suggests African journalists enjoy conditional autonomy in carrying out their work within the Chinese media.

The elements of the hierarchy of influences model are activated subject to the presence or absence of Chinese interests. African journalists are likely to be allowed limited autonomy in instances when Chinese interests are present and high autonomy when it is absent in a story. This suggests there are minimal discrepancies in the actual performance of journalism when Chinese interests are absent than when they are present. This seems to suggest the editorial policy of 'positive reporting' promoted by Chinese media organisations based in Africa are more dynamic in the coverage of Chinese interests than in coverage of African interests.

In the next chapter, I present the conclusion of this thesis and its contribution to the accumulated knowledge.

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CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

The expansion of Chinese media into Africa has elicited widespread concerns about its impact on journalism professionalisation on the African continent. These fears are not unfounded when measured against the role of China's state-led media. President Xi Jinping recently reaffirmed the most important role of the Chinese media is to speak for the government and the Chinese Communist Party:

All the work by the party's media must reflect the party's will, safeguard the party's authority, and safeguard the party's unity. They must love the party, protect the party, and closely align themselves with the party leadership in thought, politics and action⁶¹.

This suggests Chinese media organisations promote state-centric and tightly regulated journalism in which journalistic autonomy and freedom of the press are considered secondary to the interest of the party-state. Given the fact democracy is still taking root in Africa, concerns have been raised about whether and how China's influence will affect this fragile process.

The majority of academic research on Chinese media expansion into Africa has sought to answer this question by focusing on the macro-politics of what China's coming into Africa would mean for other transnational media corporations on the African continent⁶². Some debates in this strand have focused upon the impact of Chinese media on the representation of

⁶¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/19/xi-jinping-tours-chinas-top-state-media-outlets-to-boost-loyalty>

⁶² See Shubo Li (2017), *Covering Ebola: a comparative analysis of CCTV*. See also Marsh (2016), *Mixed messages, partial pictures? Discourses*

under construction in CCTV's *Africa Live* compared with the BBC Africa's *Talk Africa* and Al Jazeera English's *Inside Story*

Africa in Western media⁶³, the rise of China's state-led media in the African mediasphere⁶⁴ as well as the geopolitics of China's media expansion into Africa⁶⁵.

On the other hand, a few studies have focused on the micro aspect of Chinese media. In this strand, the work of Gagliardone (2013), the more recent works of Marsh (2016) and Lefkowitz (2017) are relevant. However, these studies have been limited to CCTV. This thesis is the first to extrapolate research in this strand to China Daily and Xinhua.

This study is informed by the desire to provide an original account of the lived experiences of African journalists and how they negotiate their understanding of journalism within the context of Chinese media organisations based in Africa. In order to achieve this goal, I have combined two analytical frameworks to examine different aspects of Africa-based Chinese media organisations. First, I used insights from the sociology of news production tradition to examine the constraints on journalism within the Chinese media. In particular, I adopted Shoemaker and Reese's (2006) hierarchy of influences model to investigate the forces mediating the actual performance of journalism within the context of Chinese media (see Chapter 7).

Secondly, I used the notions of role conception and role performance to examine the relationship between the way journalists define their work and its bearing on content produced by them (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Studies on professional roles have been underpinned by the assumption that how journalists define their work has a bearing on the content they produce but empirical evidence suggests this relationship is neither linear nor straightforward⁶⁶.

⁶³ See Zhang and Matingwina (2016), A new representation for Africa? The use of constructive journalism in the narration of Ebola by China Daily and BBC.

⁶⁴ See Wu (2012), the rise of China's state-led media dynasty in Africa.

⁶⁵ See Lefkowitz (2017), Chinese media, Kenyan lives: An ethnographic inquiry into CCTV Africa's head offices
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5890c864ebbd1a33c539387d/1485883493360/kenya+v4.pdf>, especially chapter 2

⁶⁶ For further readings see Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach (2017), Hallin (2017)

This has elicited a widespread academic debate between those who agree there is significant correlation between how journalists understand their work and the content they produce and others who contend there are forces which mediate the actual performance of journalism within media organisations⁶⁷.

By combining these two analytical frameworks and through extensive fieldwork in Kenya, including interviews with journalists working for the three different Chinese media organisations, I was able to present a vivid account of how African journalists negotiate their understanding of journalism within global media (see Chapter 8).

First, I present a brief summary of the findings before proceeding to elaborate on its theoretical and methodological contributions to the knowledge.

9.1. Overlapping structure and agency

Despite China's pretences of being a developing country, it is not in the same league with Africa. This means there is an asymmetric power relation between China and the many countries of Africa. This cannot be dismissed in the analysis of China-Africa relations. The relation between China and Africa is best captured in the words of former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who described it as the "most unequal" of "equal relationships".⁶⁸ When measured against recent developments in China-Africa relations, Nyerere's postulation remains relevant. For instance, trade between Africa and China has remained lopsided in favour of China (Taylor, 2012). The same pattern of trade existing between the West and Africa has emerged between China and Africa. China takes raw material from Africa and exports finished goods to the continent⁶⁹.

This asymmetry has resulted in the agitation for the insertion of African agency in China-Africa relations⁷⁰. One topic downplayed in the academic literature on China's media

⁶⁷ See Mellado (2015); Mellado & Dalen (2014); Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach (2017)

⁶⁸ For Nyerere's statement see <http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2013/08/nigeria-chinese-soft-power/>

⁶⁹ See opinion article by Sanusi Lamido, Nigeria's former Central Bank Governor on China's lopsided trade with Africa, <https://www.ft.com/content/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0>

⁷⁰ See Carlos Lopes (2016) REINSERTING AFRICAN AGENCY INTO SINO-AFRICA RELATIONS

expansion into Africa is the place of power relations in Africa-based Chinese media organisations.

In this thesis, I offered empirical evidence suggesting there are two levels of organisational structure and journalistic agency within Chinese media organisations based in Africa (see Chapter 7). As well, there are two editorial conferences in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. One involves the management of Chinese media organisations and African journalists in Nairobi and the other is transnational between the Chinese management and their colleagues in Beijing.

The transnational conference is facilitated through social media platforms such as Skype and video chat, depending on which is more convenient. The editorial conferences in Nairobi do not hold final authorisation on certain stories having any bearing on the Chinese government's economic and political interests on the African continent. This category of news stories are filtered by officials in Beijing.

There is also an African level of gatekeeping occupied by African editors. However, for most news stories, this level in the hierarchy has little decision-making authority. The seat of power is always occupied by Chinese editors. Similarly, African journalists have limited agency in making inputs to editorial decisions. In both organisational structure and journalistic agency, all Chinese have dominance over the African. Even African journalists higher up in the hierarchy are also affected by this asymmetry. The common view of most African editors and correspondents is the management of Chinese media does not trust African editors to handle stories the same way Chinese editors do.

9.2. Professional autonomy

A primary concerns raised by practitioners and scholars is Chinese media organisations in Africa may mirror China's domestic media in terms of journalistic autonomy. This apprehension is not misplaced.

In this thesis, I was able to provide empirical evidence suggesting professional autonomy is a major challenge in Chinese media organisations based in Africa (see Chapter 8). The limited autonomy African journalists have in carrying out their work within Chinese media is

supported by studies pointing out state-owned media are more likely to limit autonomy to journalists than private and public media (see Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013, p. 147).

As well, I was also able to establish professional autonomy extended to African journalists in carrying out their work differs across the three Chinese media organisations (CCTV, Xinhua, and China Daily). In contrast to the conclusions of other studies which argue newspaper journalists enjoy greater autonomy than TV journalists (Skovsgaard, 2014; Zhang & Su, 2012). I established that CCTV journalists are allowed more professional autonomy among Chinese media organisations based in Africa.

African journalists working in CCTV enjoy higher levels of professional autonomy than those working for Xinhua and The China Daily (see Figure 2). This difference might be informed by the status of CCTV journalists, who are considered star reporters compared with their counterparts in Xinhua and The China Daily.

9.3 Role conception versus role performance

In terms of comparative analysis of role conception and role performance within Africa-based Chinese media organisations, the gap in the watchdog role is the greatest (see Figure 3). The wide gap revealed in the watchdog role is consistent with Mellado & Dalen's (2014, p. 872) survey of Chilean journalists. They concluded, among Chilean journalists⁷¹, the gap between professional role and practice is widest for watchdog and civic roles. Empirical evidence also suggests the wide gap in the watchdog role results in some form of distress among African journalists who understand their roles as watchdogs. This resonates with the Zhang and Su (2012) study of Chinese journalists. It concluded Chinese journalists think the biggest problem they face in their work "comes from this gap between ideals and realities, and most think it is clearly the largest problem facing the profession" (Zhang & Su, 2012, p. 20).

The materialisation of the disseminator role (see Figure 3) as the most congruent role in media content correlates with other studies on role conception of African journalists (see Ireri, 2015; Mwesige, 2004). Specifically, it resonates with Ireri's (2015) survey of Kenyan

⁷¹ This result correlates with other studies exploring the relationship between role conception and role performance. See Tandoc, Hellmueller, & Vos, 2013; Hellmueller & Claudia, 2015; Carpenter, Boehmer, & Fico, 2015; Mwesige, 2004.

journalists, which concluded by highlighting the most important role Kenyan journalists' value is to serve as disseminators of information.

It is the loyal-facilitator role, however, that emerged as the most manifest role in media content in Chinese media organisations in Africa (see Figure 3). This suggests African journalists who define their roles as loyal-facilitators are likely to enjoy higher professional autonomy than others, who understand their roles as watchdogs, disseminators and civics within Chinese media. This seems to mirror the lapdog role of Chinese journalists in China's domestic media whose roles lean towards collaborating with government to achieve national development (See Xiaoge, 2005; 2009; Zhao, 2008, 2012; Hadland, 2012).

9.4 Negotiating tensions in Chinese media

One creative strategy called “reverse inverted pyramid reporting” is used by African journalists to evade censorship within Chinese media organisations based in Africa (see Hallin, 1986, p. 78). This tactic is also what Van Dijk calls “demotion of lead” (see Van Dijk, 1995, p. 14). In this approach to news reporting, journalists use the introduction to conceal the truth which is often hidden further down in the report.

In this study, I provided empirical evidence suggesting issues bordering on human rights, democracy and corruption are considered secondary within Chinese media organisations in Africa. Therefore, African journalists apply reverse inverted pyramid reporting or demotion of lead in covering stories of this nature. See section 5.4 in chapter 5.

9.5 Trust for Chinese media low

China has invested hugely into the expansion of media into the African continent. Between 2009 and 2013, China invested more than US\$8.9 billion into the internationalisation of its major state-run media companies (Farah & Mosher, 2010). However, despite this massive investment in its global media expansion, Chinese media organisations are yet to gain traction with African consumers.

In this study, I provided empirical evidence suggesting that Chinese media organisations do not enjoy the same traction with African consumers as the Western media organisations. Further details can be found in section 8.8 of chapter 8. However, the Chinese leadership are

hopeful that in due time its media would gain a foot hold on the African continent. When this would happen remains within the realm of anticipation.

9.6 Theoretical and methodological contributions.

In this thesis, I have drawn upon eclectic academic literature spanning China-Africa relations, African studies, sociology of news production, and professional roles. I have also systematically elaborated on the literature throughout this thesis. Such diverse academic literature enabled me to make original theoretical and empirical contributions to the knowledge. First, I begin by highlighting some of the most significant contribution of this thesis to journalism studies and next, to the mediasphere of China-Africa relations.

Mellado, Hellmueller & Donsbach (2017) emphasise the existing gap between the sociology of news production research and studies on professional roles have adversely impacted advances in communication research:

The lack of articulation between research in sociology of news production and studies on professional roles has brought about different problems, preventing the appearance of theoretical and methodological approaches capable of stretching and articulating the progress that has been made by research on the communication field (Mellado, Hellmueller, & Donsbach, 2017, p. 5).

One significant contribution of this thesis is I was able to create a bridge for this gap by linking the interactions of the elements of Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy of influences model with journalistic role conception and role performance within Chinese media organisations based in Africa (see Figure 6). By connecting these two analytical frameworks, I was able to illustrate the discrepancies between African journalists' understanding of journalism and the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media. This informs a different understanding of the relationship between role conception and role performance from a non-Western perspective.

This thesis established that the professional autonomy African journalists enjoy in carrying out their work within Chinese media is conditional in relation to the typology of stories. The elements of Shoemaker and Reese (1996) hierarchy of influences model are more active when Chinese interests are present in a story than when they are absent. This indicates

African journalists are likely to have limited professional autonomy in covering activities related to China and higher autonomy in covering non-China activities. This also suggests that the editorial policy of ‘positive reporting’ promoted by the Chinese media in Africa is likely to come into play when covering activities related to China than Africa.

China’s Africa policy is premised on mutuality and equality between China and Africa but the relationship between them has been anything but mutual. Trade between Africa and China has remained lopsided in favour of China (Taylor, 2012). The same pattern of trade that existed between the West and Africa has emerged between China and Africa. China takes raw material from Africa and exports finished goods to the continent⁷². In the same vein, China has framed its media expansion into Africa on the basis of its relations with the African continent to tell the ‘story of Africa’ to the global audience. This presupposes a narrative of Africa different from Western media’s ‘othering’ of Africa as a bastion of disease, poverty and primitivism⁷³. In this thesis, I have highlighted the challenges facing African journalists in covering issues pertaining to their ethnicity and religious identity. I used as examples the reporting of the Pope’s visit to Kenya as well as the coverage of terrorist attack on the Garissa University to reinforce the concern of African journalists that Chinese media promote journalism that de-emphasise religious and ethnic issues relating to Africa and her people (see Chapters 6 and 7).

To be African means to be a “social actor or actress” located within a socio-historical context (Nyamnjoh, 2010: 76). In other words, a ‘story of Africa’⁷⁴ which does not encompass the ethnicity, nationality, and religious identities of Africa amounts to a misrepresentation of Africa⁷⁵. This suggests the Chinese media organisations based in Africa seem to embrace a style of journalism that downplays the African conception of humanity and belonging when framing the story of Africa for global audiences. While advocates of constructive journalism promote it as a journalism that explore solutions (Yanqui, 2014; Zhang and Matingwina,

⁷² <https://www.ft.com/content/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0>

⁷³ <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/chavis98.html>

⁷⁴ <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t1100582.htm>

⁷⁵ http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1979_reith5.pdf

2016), empirical evidence suggests that the journalism that obtains in Chinese media organisations based in Africa does not amount to constructive journalism. This is because Chinese media organisations privileges Chinese hegemony while downplaying the peculiarities of the African society.

The influence of language has been marginally acknowledged in the academic literature on the Chinese media expansion into Africa. The language question was loosely highlighted by Wekesa as part of “important issues that could be pursued in later academic ventures” (Wekesa, 2013, p. 76). Since the time Wekesa made this suggestion, there yet remains a major academic engagement related to the question of language in Chinese media organisations based in Africa. One of the arguments emerging from the application of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model in reference to the Chinese media is – it is not sufficient to account for the forces that mediate the actual practice of journalism within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. I was able to establish the language barrier existing between the predominantly English-speaking African journalists and their Chinese counterparts constitutes a force that mediates the actual performance of journalism within the context of the Chinese media in Africa. What this suggests is the hierarchy of influences model should be expanded to include language as a level of analysis in the case of Chinese media organisations currently operating in Africa (see Chapter 7).

I then proposed Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model should be reconceptualised to include language as a sixth ‘level of analysis’ to be located between the routines and organisations levels of analysis. Other studies (Keith 2011; Lee, 2004) have also argued for the reconceptualisation of the model but as yet, there isn’t any proposing language as a ‘level of analysis’.

To treat the dominant role of China in global geopolitics with levity would amount to an injustice of China’s rise on the global stage. While journalism professionalisation has been predominantly informed by libertarian-democratic ideals, China wants its own fair share of journalism professionalisation exported to the world and Africa represents a viable learning curve for this endeavour. This means China’s media expansion into Africa is underpinned by an ideological motivation about promoting Chinese journalistic orientation which is different

from the libertarian ideal. The fact media systems in Africa lack an ideological base leaves the continent susceptible to China's influence.

The debate on the ideological motivation of China's media expansion into Africa has attracted widespread attention among scholars and practitioners of journalism. The debate has been dominantly framed through the bifocal prism of positive or negative. Scholars (Farah & Mosher, 2010; Verhoeven & Gagliardone, 2012; Ngomba, 2012a; Gagliardone, 2013; Harber, 2013; Wekesa, 2013; Wasserman, 2014) have expressed diverse views on the implication of Chinese media expansion into Africa and its influence upon journalism professionalisation on the African continent.

Farah and Mosher (2010) contend the aim of China's media expansion is to move journalism away from the watchdog role towards a lapdog role:

As part of its efforts to do this, the Chinese government seeks to fundamentally reshape much of the world's media in its own image, away from a watchdog stance toward the government to one where the government's interests are the paramount concern in deciding what to disseminate (Farah & Mosher, 2010, p. 4).

This has been counteracted by Ngomba (2012a) who argues Africa is not yet on the cusp of embracing a China model of journalism:

Politically speaking, taken together, sub-Saharan Africa is currently a bit too open (at least compared to China) for it to harbour the type of media system that exists currently in China. Beyond the lack of financial and material wherewithal to both develop and control the media as the Communist Party does in China, African governments are caught up with unceasing domestic demands for more freedom and international (mostly, if not entirely, Western pressure) for the entrenchment of liberal democracy to the extent that 'going the China way' will obviously be perceived within and out of Africa as moving several steps behind (Ngomba, 2012a, p. 62).

These two strands, however, have downplayed how exposure of African journalists to Chinese media as well as their socialisation into it may affect their journalistic orientation. In this study, I was able to provide empirical evidence suggesting Chinese media expansion into Africa might not displace the dominant libertarian journalistic orientation in Africa. However, it could result in a hybrid African journalism professionalisation in which Western and Chinese journalistic orientations coexist. This is an original contribution to the ideologisation debate on the Chinese media expansion into Africa.

9.6.1 Methodological contribution

Hallin (2017) emphasises the dominant methodological approach to the study of journalistic role conception has been based on the libertarian-democratic tradition. In this tradition, the use of surveys to examine journalistic role conception is predominant:

The long-standing practice of studying journalism around the world by doing surveys of journalists' role conceptions, for example, rests implicitly on a model of the media derived from Western systems with high levels of journalistic professionalism (Hallin, 2017, p. xv).

In this thesis, I have used semi-structured interviews and qualitative content analysis in examining the relationship between how journalists define their work and the content produced by them within Chinese media organisations based in Africa. This methodological approach is informed by the limited journalistic autonomy within Chinese media and the creative use of 'reverse inverted pyramid reporting' style by African journalists to negotiate journalism practice within Chinese media (see Chapter 4). This suggests an approach combining in-depth interviews with qualitative content analysis is suited to the study of the relationship between role conception and role performance outside Anglo-American contexts. This is a new methodological approach to the study of the relationship between journalistic role conception and role performance. These conceptual and methodological tools contribute to broadening media theory and advancing the quest to De-Westernise media studies (See Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

9.7 Limitations of study

First, the contributions of this study are not meant to generalise but to account for Chinese media organisations already based in Africa. This study was specifically related to China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News Agency and The China Daily newspapers. Though China Radio International (CRI) was not part of this study, it is assumed the findings of this study are applicable to all China's state-led media organisations based in Africa.

Alternatively, gaining access to Chinese media organisations in Kenya is what I consider the most significant challenge I have encountered in the course of this research in Nairobi, Kenya. The situation was complicated by the attitude of some African journalists who were sceptical of speaking with a researcher. However, I do count myself fortunate to have persisted long enough to meet a manager of one of the Chinese media organisations in Kenya.

This turned out to be an enormous stroke of luck since she was very helpful with gaining access.

This thesis provides a point of departure for other researchers to empirically examine the professional autonomy African journalists possess in carrying out their work within the contexts of other state-led media organisations based in Africa. For example, researchers might explore the professional autonomy African journalists enjoy in covering stories of interests to the home governments of other state-led media organisations also based in Africa. Specifically, Aljazeera, Russia Today or Press TV, are relevant for this kind of study.

This thesis can also offer the tool to other researchers to comparatively examine journalistic autonomy in Chinese media organisations based in the United States of America as well as Africa. I did not explore this aspect of Chinese media because I am specifically interested in Africa. However, this looks incredibly interesting for further exploration. Or perhaps, researchers could explore comparative analysis of journalistic autonomy in the Chinese media and Russia Today and/ or Aljazeera. This would also be an interesting case for further investigation.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Coding Scheme for China Daily Coverage of Visit of Li Keqiang

China Daily newspaper

News reports	Story purpose	Sources	Journalists voice	Role performance
China, Kenya pledge to boost comprehensive partnership	Celebrating the benefits China-Kenya partnership	Premier Li Keqiang and President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Chinese Premier says Kenyan Visit Fruitful	Celebrating the benefits China-Kenya relations	Premier Li and Vice President Ruto	No	Loyal-Facilitator
China seeks to balance trade: premier says in Kenya	Celebrating the benefits of China-Kenya relations	President Kenyatta, Premier Li, Mithika Mwenda, an activist and Karanja Kibicho, Kenya's	No	Loyal-Facilitator

		principal secretary of foreign affairs and international trade		
Li's visit inspires pioneer Chinese wildlife protector	Highlights issues of wildlife poaching and illegal trade in ivory	Premier li, Zhuo Qiang, a Chinese conservator; Iain Douglas-Hamilton, an English conservator and Michael Gachanja, a Kenyan conservator; Achim Steiner, UNEP representative	No	Disseminator
Rail Finance deal signed with Kenya	Celebrating national triumph/development	A citizen voice, President Kenyatta, Premier Li, Zhao Jian, A Chinese scholar	Yes	Loyal-Facilitator
Chinese Premier visit African Branch	Photo celebration of Premier Li's visit	pictorial	No	Loyal-Facilitator

of CCTV in Kenya				
China, Africa to Keep extending economic cooperation: experts	Celebrating the benefit of China-Africa relations	Li, Guanghui, vice president of the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation and Yao Guimei, researcher at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Chinese cut big African Air Deal	Benefits of Premier Li's visit to Kenya	Daniel Chen, president of Hainan Airlines Group, North America LLC, Anwar Majid Hussein, Chairman of Astral Aviation, Japheth Kisilu, Chief executive of Consolidated bank, Wang Xiaoyong,	No	Loyal-Facilitator

		secretary-general of China-Africa Business Council		
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Appendix 2: Coding Scheme for China Daily Coverage of Chinese racist Restaurant

Report	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Equal Treatment for Customers in Kenya, China's embassy says	Dismisses report on the incident as biased and causing a tiff in Kenyan-china relations	Mao Yizong, Spokesperson of Chinese embassy in Nairobi, Kenya	No	Loyal-Facilitator

Appendix 3: coding scheme for China daily newspaper on the coverage of Uhuru and Ruto trial at the ICC

Reports	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
China backs Kenya on trial of state leaders	Presenting a Chinese government view on the trial of Uhuru and Ruto as	Hong lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman	No	Loyal-Facilitator

	amounting to interference in the internal affairs of Kenya			
Tension Grips Kenya's Rift Valley	Citizen concerns with regard to outcome of ICC trial of Ocampo six	Citizens Stephen Bondutich, John Seii, an unnamed political observer, Wanyama Musiambu, Eldoret regional Commissioner of Police in Kenya	No	Civic

CCTV

Appendix 4: Coding scheme on CCTV coverage of Arrest of 77 Chinese nationals

Report	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Kenya Arrests	Facts and fair	Ndegwa	No	Disseminator

77 Chinese in Internet Hacking case	reporting	Muhori, Director, DCI; Fred Matiangi, Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for ICT and Chinese embassy official statement		
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Appendix 5: Coding scheme for CCTV coverage of Premier Li's visit to the station in Nairobi, Kenya.

Report	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Chinese Premier Signs major infrastructure Deal with Kenya	Celebrating the benefits of Premier Li to Kenya	Premier Li and President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Chinese Premier Visits CCTV Africa	Celebrating CCTV Africa as providing a	Premier Li	No	Loyal-Facilitator

	better alternative of Africa by Africans			
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Appendix 6: CCTV coverage of the trial of President Kenyatta and Vice President Ruto

Reports	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
ICC to review Kenya's lack of cooperation in Kenyatta's case	Judicial judgment at President Kenyatta	Presiding Judge Silvia Fernandez	No	Watchdog
Kenyans celebrate ICC ruling on deputy president	Fair, balanced reporting that presented all side to the crisis	President Uhuru Kenyatta, Citizen major Kirwa and Wilfred Nderitu, representative for the victims in the violence	No	Disseminator
. Kenya's Ruto wins ICC appeal against using recanted testimonies	Fair , balanced reporting	Judge Pistor Hofmanski, ICC Judge and Brenda Wardle, a legal Analyst based in Johannesburg	No	Disseminator
Appeals judges rule key witness testimony as	Fair, balanced judgment on	Nil	No	Disseminator

inadmissible in Kenyan ICC case	judicial decision			
Court Adjourns Ruto's case	Fair, balanced reporting on judicial pronouncement in Ruto's case	Ruto's Karim Khan, defence lawyer, Maria Kamara, ICC outreach coordinator	No	Disseminator
Judges to decide Whether to continue with Ruto's case	Fair, balanced	Tom Maliati, an analyst from Write International Justice Monitor	No	Disseminator
ICC Drops Kenyan President Charges	Fair, balanced with all sides to the debate represented	Statements by Steven and ICC were read on the judgement	No	Disseminator
Hague prosecutors press on with Kenya case after witnesses pull out	Presented prosecution perspective	Anton Steynberg, Prosecution lawyer	No	Watchdog
Kenya ICC mistrial: Case	Balanced and fair reporting	William Ruto, Vice president	No	Disseminator

collapsed because I am innocent-Ruto	with all sides represented	of Kenya and Fatou Bensouda, ICC prosecutor		
Kenya calls for more respect for African states by ICC	Balanced and fair reporting with all sides represented	Amina Mohammed, Kenyan's cabinet Foreign Secretary and Nicoll Figatamaga of No Peace Without Jeace	No	Disseminator
African leaders at the A.U. Adopt proposal to pull out of ICC	Reported from the perspective of African leaders asking for ICC to respect African leaders	Vincent Mmehiele, AU Legal counsel	No	Loyal-Facilitator
AU not impressed with how ICC has been handling African cases	Reported from the perspective of AU's perspective	Nil	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyan leaders threaten to pull	Report presented views on both	Aden Duale, Kenyan	No	Disseminator

country from Rome Statute	side of the trial of Kenyan leaders at the Hague	parliament Majority leaders, Netsanet Belay of Amnesty International		
Large Kenyan delegation to attend ICC State Parties Assembly	Report is balanced and fair	Quoted sources for support and against the trial of Kenyatta at the Hague	No	Disseminator
Kenyatta's Homecoming	One-sided reporting in the suspension of charges against Kenyatta	President Kenyatta, two Kenyan citizens promoting the view that the president was innocent from the outset	Yes	Loyal-Facilitator
ICC Chief prosecutor lodges request for Kenyan DP to be barred from talks	Report on judgement against Kenyatta	Fatou Bensouda was quoted by the presenter. Donald Rabala an analyst was	No	Watchdog
Kenya President	Balanced and	Defense lawyer;	No	Disseminator

Appears at the ICC	fair reporting	two supporters of the president spoke		
ICC 'reprieve' for Kenyan president	Fair and balanced reporting	Statement of Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor at ICC was read	No	Disseminator
Is the international Criminal Court anti-Africa?	Reporting underpinned by postcolonial discourse	Keith Khoza, spokesperson of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Jacob Enoh Eben, spokesperson for the African Union (AU), three analysts including The members of the panel included Dr David Matbanja in Nairobi, Michael Liu in Washington and Wayne Ncube in Johannesburg, South Africa	No	Disseminator

ICC vs. Africa	Celebrating discharge of charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta at the ICC	President Kenyatta, Amina Mohammed, Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Louise Mushikiwabo, Foreign Minister of Rwanda, President Yoweri Museveni and two analysts; Uganda, Peter Kagwanja, a leading scholar of political science and international relations and James Mambolew, an advocate of the Kenyan High Court	No	Loyal-Facilitator
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XINHUA NEWS AGENCY

Appendix 7: XNA coverage of Premier Li's visit to Kenya in 2014.

Report	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Chinese premiers' visit to open new chapter in Sino-Kenya relations	Benefits of Premier Li's visit	Karanja Kichibo, Kenya's Foreign Affairs and International Trade Principal Secretary	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya says Chinese premier's visit crucial to east Africa	Benefits of Premier Li's visit to Kenya in particular and east Africa in general	President Kenyatta	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya says Chinese premier's visit to cement cooperation, partnership	Celebrating benefits of Premier Li's visit and its impact on China-Kenya relations	Kenya's Foreign Ministry	No	Loyal-facilitator

Kenyan conservationists expect cooperation with China on green agenda	Celebrating benefits of Premier Li's visit	Isaac Kalua, Chairman of Kenya water Towers Agency and Green-Africa Foundation, Mithika Mwenda, coordinator, Pan-Africa Climate Justice Alliance,; and Carole Kariuki, CEO of Mortgage Company	No	Loyal-Facilitator
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Appendix 8: Xinhua news agency coverage of Arrest of 77 Chinese nationals

Report	Story purpose	Sources	Journalists voice	Role performed
China says 77 nationals arrested in Kenya probably involve in telecom fraud	Fair and balanced reporting	Hua Chunying, Spokeswoman for China's Foreign Ministry	No	Disseminator

Appendix 9: Coding scheme for XNA coverage of Chinese Racist Restaurant incident

Report	Story purpose	sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Spat over restaurant's customer treatment not to affect Sino-Kenyan ties: embassy	Chinese government perspective on the incident	Mao Yizang, spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in Kenya	No	Loyal-Facilitator

Appendix 10: Coding on XNA's coverage of the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and vice President Ruto trial at the ICC

Report/news	Story purpose	Sources	Journalist voice	Role performed
Ghanaian minister urges ICC to drop	Bias against ICC trial of President	Dr Dominic Ayine, Deputy Attorney-General and Minister	No	Loyal-Facilitator

bias against African leaders	Kenyatta and Vice, Ruto	of Justice of Ghana		
Namibia's cabinet says country must leave ICC	Bias against ICC trial of President Kenyatta and Ruto	Tjekero Tweya, information minister of Namibia, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyan leader hits at ICC over post-election chaos	Bias against ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya pledges more cooperation with ICC	Africa concerns about the ICC trial of its leaders must be addressed	President Uhuru Kenyatta and Sidiki Kaba, President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	No	Loyal-Facilitator
ICC deplores lack of cooperation in pursuit of suspects	The challenges of lack cooperation by member states with the ICC Statute	Fati Bensouda, ICC Chief prosecutor, Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, ICC president,	No	Disseminator

Kenya vows push for creation of African court of justice	Bias against the ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	President Uhuru Kenyatta, Amina Mohammed, Cabinet Secretary or Foreign Affairs	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya Push for overhaul of Rome statute at AU Summit	Bias Against the ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	Amina Mohammed, Cabinet Secretary or Foreign Affairs	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Ugandan leader threaten to spearhead mass walkout of Africa from ICC	Bias against the ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Africa focus: East Africa's bloc urges speedy end of ICC cases for Kenya	Counteracted a bias view against the ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	Mahboub Maalim, executive secretary, inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD); Fati Bensouda, ICC Chief Prosecutor	No	Disseminator
Africa focus: Kenya experts laud withdrawal of Kenyatta's case by the ICC	Celebration of withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta by the ICC	Patrick Maluki, diplomatic scholar, Joshua Kivuva, political scientist at University of Nairobi, Kenya and	No	Loyal-Facilitator

		Stephen Ndegwa, a political and social commentator		
Kenyan leader buoyant after ICC drops charges	Celebration of the ICC withdrawal of charges against President Kenyatta	President Uhuru Kenyatta; Amina Mohammed, Foreign Cabinet Secretary, Senator Kipchumba Murkomen, a serving senator in Kenya's parliament	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Mixed reactions as ICC drop charges against Kenyan president	Citizen's view on the ICC withdrawal of charges against President Kenyatta	Rosemary Muthoni, Peter Mwaura, Isaiah Omolo, Irene Akoth, all Kenyan citizens across the country	No	Civic
ICC sets deadline to finalize Kenyatta case	Reporting on a judicial judgement against President Kenyatta	Fati Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor	No	Watchdog
Kenyan leader welcomed after returning from ICC	A balanced reporting on the withdrawal of charges against President Kenyatta by the	President Uhuru Kenyatta, Steven Kay, Uhuru's defence lawyer, Benjamin Gumpert, ICC prosecution lawyer	No	Disseminator

	ICC			
Kenyatta asks for termination of case at ICC	A balanced reporting on proceedings at the ICC	Steven Kay, Kenya's lawyer, Fatou Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor	No	Disseminator
IGAD says trial of Kenya's leader to weaken fight against Al-shabaab	Bias against the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta	Mahboub Maalim, Executive Secretary of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD), Wainaina Ndung'u, executive director international Centre for Policy and Conflict	No	Disseminator
ICC prosecutor asks for adjournment of Kenyatta trial	Report on the indefinite adjournment of charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta by the ICC	Fati Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor	No	Disseminator
ICC postpones Kenyatta trial again	Reporting on the postponement of commencement of trial of	Fati Bensouda was quoted	No	Disseminator

	President Kenyatta			
Decision time for ICC as Kenyan President Kenyatta arrives	Reporting on trial proceedings in the ICC trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta	Fadi El Abdallah, ICC spokesperson	No	Disseminator
Kenyan leader to attend ICC status conference	Reporting presented President Kenyatta's views on why he is attending the ICC hearing at the Hague was to prove his innocence	President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Loyal- Facilitator
ICC prosecutors urge Kenyan gov't to disclose financial records	Fair reporting on ICC proceedings	Benjamin Gumpert, prosecution lawyer; President Kenya's defence lawyer was quoted	No	Disseminator
China backs Kenya on trial of state leaders	China's government perspective expressing	Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry spokesperson	No	Loyal- Facilitator

	concern over the trial of President Kenyatta at the ICC			
UN rejects Kenya bid to delay international trial of leaders	A balanced reporting UN's rejection of Kenya's request to delay prosecution of President Kenyatta	Ambassador Macharia Kamau, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Takeda Ajemu, Ethiopian Ambassador to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant British ambassador to the UN, Liu Jieyi, Chinese ambassador to the UN	No	Disseminator
China regrets security council failure to defer ICC trials of Kenyan leaders	Reinforcing China's view on non-interference in the affairs of African states	Liu Jieyi, China's permanent representative to the United Nations	No	Loyal-Facilitator
UN Security Council fails to delay ICC trials of Kenyan	Balanced reporting on UN Security council voting on the application by	Ambassadors Tekeda Alemu of Ethiopia, Agshin Mehdiyev of Azerbaijan, Mark Lyall Grant of	No	Disseminator

leaders	African countries to delay trial of Uhuru an Ruto at the Hague	Britain, Eugene Richard Gasana of Rwanda, Vitaly Churkin of Russia, Liu Jieyi of China and Samantha Power of the US		
Sitting African leaders should not be tried: Zuma	A postcolonial perspective on the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta at the ICC	President Jacob Zuma of South Africa	No	Loyal-Facilitator
China calls for positive response to please from Africa on Kenyan leaders trial	Reinforcing China's view on non-interference in the affairs of African states	Liu Jieyi, China's permanent representative to the United Nations	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Un deputy chief says not to discuss Kenyatta case	Reporting in decision on President Uhuru Kenyatta	Jan Eliasson, deputy secretary-general of the United Nations	No	Watchdog
Kenya's Ruto must attend most of trial at ICC	Reporting on a judicial decision against Kenya's vice president William Ruto	ICC statement on the judgement was quoted	No	Watchdog

ICC trial to shape Kenya's regional politics, diplomacy	A balanced analysis on the impact of ICC trial of President Kenyatta	Martin Nguru, diplomacy scholar, Anita Kiamba, international relations expert, Deputy President William Ruto	No	Disseminator
Kenya denies lobbying Africa to boycott C'wealth summit	Kenya's government refutation of a report by a local newspaper	Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Local newspaper report	No	Disseminator
Rwandan leader critical of ICC for selective justice	A postcolonial narrative on ICC trial of African leaders	President Paul Kagame of Rwanda	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya says AU set to seek UNSC nod to suspend Kenyatta trial	Kenyan government view on the bid to suspend Kenyatta's trial through the AU	Amina Mohammed, Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya's deputy president back to Netherlands despite Au plea	A pan Africanist view	Vice President William Ruto and AU resolution statement	No	Loyal-Facilitator

African political parties support Kenya for pulling out of ICC	A Pan Africanist perspective on the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and vice, Ruto at the ICC	Council of African political parties	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyan deputy president off to Netherlands for ICC trial	Kenyan government view on the trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto at the ICC	President Kenyatta and Vice, Ruto	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyan deputy President William Ruto heads to ICC	A balanced view on the commencement of trial of vice president William Ruto	Fatou Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor, President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Disseminator
Kenyan leaders vow to continue cooperating with ICC	Kenyan government view on the trial of President Kenyatta and vice president, Ruto	Maoah Esipisu, presidential spokesperson,	No	Loyal-Facilitator
China calls on	Reinforcing	Hong Lei,	No	Loyal-

ICC to heed pleas from Africa on Kenyan leaders' trials	China's perspective on respective for internal affairs of African states	spokesperson of China's Foreign Ministry		Facilitator
Kenyan president to skip Un General Assembly while VP at ICC	Kenyan government perspective on the impact of ICC trial on state matters	President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Loyal-Facilitator
ICC issues arrest warrant Kenyan citizen	Fair reporting n judicial decision against Deputy President William Ruto	Cuno Tarfusser, ICC judge	No	Watchdog
AU to decide on Africa's participation in ICC: SA FM	A pan Africanist view on the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta and vice, Ruto	Matie Nkoana-Mashabane, South African International Relations and Cooperation Minister	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya says not behind AU pulling out from ICC	Framing a pan Africanist view on the trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta	Amina Mohammed, Cabinet secretary for Foreign Affairs	No	Loyal-Facilitator

Mozambican leader views for domestic jurisdiction over ICC	A pan Africanist view on the ICC trial of African leaders	Armando Emilio Guebuza, Mozambican Presidnet	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Ethiopia slams ICC for “unfair” treatment of Africa	A pan Africanist view on the ICC trial of African leaders	Tedros Adhanom, Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, AU chairperson	No	Loyal-Facilitator
AU: Kenyan President should not attend ICC trial	A pan Africanist view on the trial of president Uhuru Kenyatta and vice, Ruto, at the ICC	AU summit outcome	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya says AU ready to chart own destiny, lauds support over ICC	A pan Africanist view on the trial of President Kenyatta and Vice, Ruto at the ICC	President Uhuru Kenyatta, AU chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was quoted	No	Loyal-Facilitator
South Africa backs AU decision on ICC: Zuma	A pan Africanist view on the trial of African leaders at the ICC	President Jacob Zuma of South Africa	No	Loyal-Facilitator

Gambian leader calls for reconciliation of commission over ICC	A pan Africanist view on the trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto at the ICC	Yahya Jammeh, President of the Gambia	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyan lawmakers vote to withdraw from ICC	A balanced view on the debate for the withdrawal of Kenya from the ICC	Aden Duale, Parliamentarian Majority leader of Kenyan parliament, The coalition for Reforms and Democracy(CORD)	No	Disseminator
African political parties say ICC is targeted at African leaders	A pan Africanist view on the ICC trial of African leaders	Nafie Ali, secretary-general of the Council of African Political Parties	No	Loyal-Facilitator
ICC postpones Kenyatta trial to November this year	A fair reporting of the proceeding of the ICC trial of President Kenyatta and vice, Ruto		No	Disseminator
African leaders slam ICC “race-hunt” in	A pan Africanist view on the trial of	AU chairman, Hailemariam Desalegn/prime	No	Loyal-Facilitator

Africa	African leaders by the ICC	minister of Ethiopia, Ramtane Lamamra, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security		
Cleared Kenyan ICC suspect faults court's investigation process	A fair view on the ICC judicial process	Francis Muthaura, Kenya's former head of Public Service, Karim Khan, defence lawyer, Fatou Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor was quoted in the report	No	Disseminator
ICC drops charges against co-accused of Kenya's president-elect Kenyatta	A balanced reporting on the judgement of the ICC	Fatou Bensouda, ICC chief prosecutor	No	Disseminator
Kenya to seek clarify from US over stand on ICC suspects	A balanced reporting on the candidature of Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2013 presidential election	Francis Kimemia, Kenya's head of Public Service, Johnie Carson, US Envoy for Africa, Etienne De Poncins, France Ambassador to Kenya	No	Disseminator
Clinton's Kenya ICC cases	Citizens' perspective on Hillary	Salaton Kamau, a pharmacist, Alfred Were, a student at	No	Civic

comments dismissed	Clinton's comment on the Kenyan presidential election that brought President Uhuru and Ruto to office	United States International University(USIU), vice President William Ruto, then a candidate with Uhuru was quoted in the r		
Kenya says ICC suspects to stay in office until appeal exhausted	A balanced perspective on the process to commencement of ICC trial	Githu Muigai, Kenya's Attorney-General, Catherine Ashton, European Union High Representative to Kenya	No	Disseminator
Kenyan leaders say ICC cases won't affect government services	A balanced reporting on the impact of ICC trial of President Uhuru and Vice Ruto on governance and the ruling Jubilee coalition	Vice president Ruto, President Uhuru Kenyatta, Adams Oloo, political analyst, Mutahi Ngunyi, political analyst	No	Disseminator
Kenya regrets UNSC move on not deferring cases	Kenyan government perspective on the UNSC rejection of its	Kenyan Foreign Ministry	No	Loyal-Facilitator

at ICC	bid to defer trial of President Uhuru and vice, Ruto at the ICC			
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Coding of Garissa attacks

Appendix 11: Coding Scheme for China Daily Coverage of Garissa attack

News reports	Story purpose	Sources	Journalists voice	Role performed
Kenyan students mourned at Beijing	Ordinary Kenyans in solidarity with Kenyans after the Garissa attack	Justina Wahu, an ordinary Kenyan working in Beijing; Shadow Li, a tour operator; and Beatrice Maosori, secretary of Kenyan Students Association in China	No	Civic
Tourism feels effects of security fears	The story hides under Garissa attack to promote	Hillary Siele, general manager of Nanchang Hotel in	No	Loyal-Facilitator

	Chinese hotel and hospitality businesses in Kenya	Nairobi; Shadow Li, a Beijing-based tour operator; Troy Yue, general manager of the Eastland Hotel;		
Chinese show support for Garissa victims	Chinese expressing solidarity with victims of Garissa attack	Liu Xianfa, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya; Richard Mibey, Vice-Chancellor of Moi University; Gao Wei, vice-chairman of the Kenya Overseas Chinese Association; Huang Jinhui, a Chinese living in Kenya	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Tour firms resolute despite terrorist threat	Promotes a positive view of Kenyan tourism market despite the impact of	Shadow Li, general manager of Polaris Safari & Tours; Muriithi Ndegwa,	No	Loyal-Facilitator

	terrorism	managing director of the Kenya Tourist Board; Liu Fa, a tour operator from Beijing		
Kenya bombed two al Shabaab camps in Somalia	Presents a Kenyan government reassurance that is hitting terrorists	Kenyan defence Forces sources	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Minister: Nation will resist terror	Promotes a Kenyan government view reassuring of its readiness to fight terrorism	Joseph Nkaissery, Kenya's minister of interior	No	Loyal-facilitator
24 students in hospital after terrorist attack on Kenyan university	Update on the Garissa attack	Taiwan based Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation quoted in the report; Christopher Kibiwott, medical doctor at Kenyatta	No	Civic

		National Hospital		
Survivors from Kenyan university attack sent back home	Reports on victims of Garissa attack	Njenga Miiri, Garissa County Commissioner; Nathif Jama, Garissa county governor	No	Disseminator
Kenya launches manhunt for suspect behind university attack	One-sided view on the suspect of Garissa attack	Joseph Boinett, police chief	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Dozens killed in Kenyan university attack	A balanced reporting on Garissa attack	Adan Dulae, Kenya's Majority Leader of National Assembly; Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) was quoted; Al-Shabaab was quoted; W.M. Wahome, University of Nairobi Chief Security Officer	No	Disseminator
Death toll rises to 147 in Kenya	Update on the casualty	Joseph Nkaissery,	No	Disseminator

university attack	recorded in Garissa attack; report was from a press briefing	Kenya's interior minister; Joseph Boinet, Kenyan police chief		
One attacker nabbed at Kenya university siege, 280 rescued	Promotes a government view on its response to Garissa attack	Joseph Nkaissery, Kenya's minister of interior	No	Loyal-Facilitator
At least 2 killed, 4 injured in Kenyan college attack	Initial reporting in the Garissa attack	Kenya's National Disaster Operations Centre was quoted; Hamza Yusuf, a student; Ismail Abdikadir, an activist	No	Disseminator

Appendix 12: Coding Scheme for China Central television Coverage of Garissa attack

News reports	Story purpose	Sources	Journalists voice	Role performed
EXCLUSIVE: Inside Garissa University after Terror Attack	Exclusive report that features inside of Garissa university	No	No	Watchdog
Kenyans remember deadly Al- Shabaab attack at Garissa University	An emotional account of citizens view on life at Garissa university one year after the attack	Robert Machyo, lecturer; Ahmed Warfa, Principal of Garissa University; Mohat Murhamud, student; Zainab Mohammed, student	No	Civic
Plaque mounted in honour of 148 killed in the Garissa attack in	A marathon in memorial of Garissa attack	Farah Ali, Garissa resident; Aden Duale, leader of	No	Civic

Kenya	one year after	Kenyan national Assembly from Garissa; Khadija Mohammed, Counsellor of Garissa University; Ali Bashir, teacher to one of the attackers; Hassan Kiptoo, teacher to the attacker and Peter Wekesa, one of the survivors of the Garissa attack who participated in the marathon		
Kenya: Five men to be arraigned in Court over Garissa University attack	Reporting on the trial of five men accused of conspiring to commit the terrorist act on Garissa University yet again	No	No	Disseminator
Kenya marks sombre	Memorial of one	No	No	Disseminator

anniversary of Garissa massacre	of Garissa attack			
Kenya Garissa attack vigil: Students, families and friends gather for memorial	Vigil in one year memorial of Garissa attack	Ismail Abdi , student; Sam Were , student	No	Civic
Father awaits news of son in Garissa University Attacks	An emotional account of a father in search of one the students of Garissa university	The father-no name	No	Civic
Uganda's: Police Arrest Four Suspected Of Links With Kenya's Garissa Attack	Arrest of suspects in connection with the Garissa attacks	Polly Namaye, Deputy Spokesperson of the Ugandan Police	No	Disseminator
Kenyan Security forces kill two terrorists in Garissa Attacks	Reporting in Garissa attack	Eric Wekesa, student	No	Civic
How the Garissa Attack Unfolded	Reporting in the Garissa attack	No	No	Disseminator

World Leaders Condemn Garissa Attack	World leaders showing solidarity with Kenya in the aftermath of Garissa attack	Banki Moon, Un Secretary general	No	Disseminator
Victims of Garissa Attack arrive at Kenyatta Hospital	Reporting on Garissa attack victims	Lily Koros Tara, Chief Executive officer, Jomo Kenyatta Specialist Hospital; Jackstone Kweyu, Dean of Garissa University ; Red Cross international was quoted	No	Disseminator
Relatives of Garissa Attack Victims begin Identifying Bodies	Reporting on the victims of Garissa attack	James Muli, a relative of one of the victims	No	Civic
Students of Kenyan University attacked my al- Shabaab return	Reporting on Garissa University one year after 5the attack	No	No	Disseminator

to class				
Talk Africa: After Garissa Attack	AfricaLive feature on Garissa attack	President Jomo Kenyatta, Joseph Nkaissery, Kenya's minister of interior; James Muli, a relative of one of the victims; Aden Duale, Leader of the Kenyan national Assembly; Boniface Nwangi, organiser of vigil for the victims of Garissa; Richard Tutah, security expert, Mohamed Hirmoge, CCTV Somalia correspondent and Raila Odinga, former prime minister of Kenya	No	Disseminator

Garissa Attack Aftermath: Alleged Al-Shabaab Financiers Come Forward	Reporting on the aftermath of Garissa attack	Chesoni, right activist	No	Disseminator
Kenyan students return months after attack on University	Reporting on the opening of Garissa University	Ibrahim Adow, student; Abdulrahman hamo, dean of Garissa University and Isaac Mohammed Noor, registrar, Garissa university	No	Disseminator
Uganda University Students Demonstrate Against Terrorism	Ugandan students expressing solidarity with Kenyan students	David Baala, Mekere Guild President; Sharifah Birunge, Deputy Premier, Makerere University and Julius Ngera, Representative of Kenyan High Commission in Uganda	No	Civic

Kenyan Somalis March Against Al-Shabaab	Kenyan Muslims demonstrating Al-Shabaab and showing solidarity with the Kenyan government	Ibrahim Ali, Nairobi Resident; Ali Mohammed, Nairobi Resident	No	Civic
China donates 67,000 US Dollars to educate Garissa attack survivors	China's support for Kenya in the face of the attack on Garissa University- features Chinese official rhetoric as a friend of Africa	Liu Xianfa, China's ambassador to Kenya; Richard Mibey, Moi University Chancellor and Professor Mbari, Moi University Chairman	No	Loyal-facilitator
Recap: Al-Shabaab gunmen killed 148 in 2 April 2015 siege	Reporting on Garissa attack	President William Ruto was quoted in the report	No	Disseminator
Kenya Garissa aftermath: Nationwide blood drive to assist the	Reporting on citizens' effort at blood donation to victims of	Three un-named citizens and Daniel Karani, a teacher who had taught in Garissa	No	Civic

wounded	Garissa attack			

Appendix 13: Coding Scheme for Xinhua News Agency Coverage of Garissa attack

News report	Story type	Sources	Journalists voice	Role performed
Kenya's Garissa university to reopen after April terrorist attack	One-sided report on attempts by government to reopen Garissa University two weeks after attack	William Ruto, Kenyan Vice President	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya's Garissa University attack mastermind killed in S. Somalia: police	Confirmation of the death of the mastermind of Garissa attack	Joseph Boinnet, Kenyan Police Chief	No	Disseminator
Spotlight:	One year	Aden Duale,	No	Loyal-

Security tight as Kenya marks 1st anniversary after varsity attack	anniversary of Garissa attack; no diverse views	leader of Kenya's national parliament		Facilitator
Feature: Kenyan students hope terror-hit varsity will reclaim lost glory	Garissa University expressing hope on the future of their university	Abdi Mohamed, Fredrick Owino, Munira Abdullahi-students and Ahmed Warfa, Principal of Garissa University	No	Civic
Kenya's university set for memorial for terror attack victims	Preparations for Garissa university memorial	Ahmed Warfa, principal of Garissa University	No	Disseminator
Feature: Joy as terror-hit Kenyan university reopens after massacre	Reopening of Garissa University nine months after terror attack	Ali Bashir, English lecturer; Hussein Salat, Garissa youth Chairman; Ann Njoki, a Garissa resident; Mohamud Saleh, North-eastern Regional Coordinator;	No	Civic

		Ahmed Warfa, Principal Garissa University		
Kenyan varsity lines up events to mark 1st anniversary since terror attack	One year memorial of Garissa attack	Abdiaziz Mohamed, member of African Talent and Change Foundation; Ahmed Warfa, principal Garissa University	No	Disseminator
Feature: Grief still haunts families one year after Kenya's Garissa attack	One year memorial of Garissa attack	Samuel Ochiel, leader of parents who lost their children in Garissa attack; Milcah Wangechi, lost her grandson in Garissa attack; Francis Wawire, lost his cousin	No	Civic
Britain asks Kenya for evidence on NGO's terror links	A balanced report on the accusation of Haki Africa Foundation as sponsors of	Stephen Burns, head of communication at the British High Commission in Kenya; Hussein	No	Disseminator

	terrorism	Khalid, Haki Africa executive director		
Kenya launches probe over Garissa terror attack	Reporting on Kenya's government probe of Garissa attack	Joseph Nkaiserry, Kenya's Interior Cabinet Secretary	No	Disseminator
Africa Focus: Why does Al Shabaab target Kenya?	Reporting on why Al-Shabaab attacks Kenya	No	No	Disseminator
Spotlight: Kenyan massacre probe underscores home-grown terror threat	Reporting on the probe of Garissa attack	Mwenda Njoka, Interior Ministry spokesman	No	Disseminator
Kenya arrests two suspects over Garissa attack	Arrest of two suspected sponsors of Garissa University attack	Prosecutor Duncan Ondimu, Kenyan prosecutor	No	Disseminator
Feature: Kenya's Garissa college deserted after Al-Shabaab	Reporting on the impact of terrorist attack on Garissa	Cheruiyot Benjamin, a survivor of Garissa attack; security guards at	No	Watchdog

attack	university	Garissa University; Hukka Wario, The University Council chairman; Ibrahim Mohamed, a shop owners opposite Garissa University		
Kenya to grill 86 persons, entities over terrorism links	Investigation on Garissa attack	Joseph Boinett, Kenya's Police Chief	No	Disseminator
AU calls for renewed efforts to address escalated terrorist attacks in Africa	African Union Expresses concern over rising terrorist activities in Africa	AU official position quoted in the report	No	Disseminator
Kenyan leaders launch hotline to help nab terrorists	A one-sided reporting aid to victims of Garissa attack Kenyan	Aden Duale, majority leader of Kenyan national parliament	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenya's Garissa makes headlines for wrong	Reporting on how residents and natives can	Ann Njoki, resident of Garissa; Paul	No	Civic

reasons	help end terrorist activities in Garissa	Chege, chairman of the Garissa open air market;		
One Kenya university attacker identified as son of local official	Reporting on Garissa attack suspects	Mwenda Njoka, spokesman of Kenya's Ministry of Interior;		
Kenyan churches tighten security after Al-Shabaab kills 148 university students	Aftermath of Garissa attack	Ibrahim Makunyi, a priest	No	Civic
Regional education suffers after deadly Kenya university assault	Citizens' view on the impact of Garissa attack on education	Anderson Miwira, a survivor of Garissa attack; Ibrahim Atosh, Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) at Garissa County; Natfhif Jama, Garissa County Governor; Naisha Mahamoud, a	No	Civic

		student; Kiriimi Kaberia, a primary school teacher in Garissa; Jackson Wachira, a Garissa resident; Richard Tuna, a security expert		
Kenya vows to publicize names of terrorists, financiers of Al-Shabaab	Political leaders in Garissa country threat to publicise names of suspects in Garissa attack	Aden Duale, Majority leader of Kenyan national parliament	No	Loyal-Facilitator
Kenyans donate blood for Garissa terror victims	Citizens' aid to victims of Garissa attack	Fred Majiwa, St John's Ambulance Communications Manager;	No	Civic
UN Security Council "outraged" by deadly terror attack on Kenyan university	Un security expressing disgust at the Garissa attack	Quoted copiously from a UNSC statement	No	Disseminator
Norwegian PM condemns	Norwegian PM condemning	Erna Solberg, Norwegian Prime	No	Disseminator

deadly attack in Kenya	Garissa attack	Minister; Joseph Nkaissery, Kenya's Interior Minister was quoted in the report		
Obama expresses support for Kenya following "heinous" terrorist attack	Obama expressing solidarity with the Kenyan government in the face of Garissa attack	President Barack Obama	No	Disseminator
Somali militant group Al-Shabaab warns Kenya of further attacks	Terrorist group, Al-Shabaab cautions Kenya of further attacks	The report quoted copiously from a statement issued by Al-Shabaab	No	Disseminator
Garissa University students narrate chilling encounter with terrorists	Student survivors narrating experiences of attacks in Garissa University	Maureen Manyego; Auma Geoffrey, both students of Garissa University	No	Civic
Ghana mourns Kenyan university attack	Ghanaian government expressing solidarity with	Ghana's Minister Edward Omana Boamah, for Communications;	No	Dissemination

	Kenya over Garissa attack			
Terror attack dulls Kenya's efforts to revive tourism	The impact of Garissa attack on Kenyan tourism	President Uhuru Kenyatta; British government quoted; said Henry Wandera, economics lecturer; Sandra Rweke, Tourist analyst	No	Disseminator
Kenyan president declares 3 days of national mourning following Garissa terror attack	Kenyan government action in the aftermath of Garissa attack	President Uhuru Kenyatta	No	Disseminator
Perpetrators of Kenya attack must be brought to justice: UN chief	UN Secretary General reacting to the Garissa attack	Stephane Dujarric, UN spokesman;	No	Disseminator
Nigerian party condemns terrorist attack at Kenyan university	Nigerian ruling political party expressing solidarity with the Kenyan	Nigeria's All Progressive Congress (APC) quoted copiously in the report	No	Disseminator

	government			
Feature: Confusion clouds north Kenyan town after attack killing 147	Citizens' in a state of confusion in the aftermath of the Garissa attack	Amina Mohamed, a resident of Nairobi; Amed Abdi, a Nairobi resident; Idriss Ali, a local student in Garissa town	No	Civic
Kenyan Muslim leaders condemn university attack	Muslims in Kenyan show solidarity with Christians in condemning Garissa attack	Abdullah Salat, Chairman of Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Garissa branch	No	Disseminator
Feature: Pain for families for with missing students in Kenya attack	Citizens' view on missing family members	Sanuti Barasa Waswa and Rosina Nafuna Wanda family; Maureen Oduor, a friend of a survivor; the report quoted an emotional sms by one of the female victims to her boyfriend before life was snuffed out of	No	Civic

		her		
S. Africa strongly condemns terrorist attack in Kenya	South African government expressing solidarity with the people of Kenyan over Garissa attack	President Jacob Zuma	No	Disseminator
AU strongly condemns attack on Kenya university	African Union condemning Garissa attack	Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the AU Commission	No	Disseminator
Feature: Grief grips Kenya as terror attack dampens Easter mood	Kenyans expressing fears over the Easter celebration after Garissa attack	Frida Anjeche, Jane Kariuki- parents of Garissa University students; President Uhuru Kenyatta; Patrick Gathara, a political commentator	No	Civic
News Analysis: Terrorism threatens stability, hampers	Experts view on the impact of terrorists activities after Garissa attacks	Richard Tuta, a security expert; Professor Edward Kisiangani, a	No	Disseminator

economic growth in Kenya: experts		social scientist; Mwenda M'mbijjiwe, a security expert		
Spotlight: Heinous terrorist attack on Kenya's university kills 147, injures 79	Reporting on Garissa attack death toll	Joseph Nkaissey, Kenyan Interior Minister; Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary-General; Robert Godec, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya; Friedo Sielemann, German Deputy-Ambassador to Kenya; Christian Turner, British High Commissioner to Kenya	No	Disseminator
Chinese ambassador condemns terrorist attack on Kenyan university	China's ambassador to Kenyan expressing solidarity with the Kenyan government	Liu Xianfa, Chinese ambassador to Kenya	No	Disseminator

Kenya government says university operation in Garissa is over	Kenyan government reaction to Garissa attack	Joseph Nkaissery, Kenyan Interior	No	Disseminator
U.S. condemns terrorist attack in Kenya, offers assistance	US government expressing solidarity with the Kenyan government	Josh Earnest, White House spokesman	No	Disseminator
Western countries vow to help Kenya combat extremism	Western government expressing solidarity with the Kenyan government	Robert Godec, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya; Friedo Sielemann, German Deputy-Ambassador to Kenya; Christian Turner, British High Commissioner to Kenya	No	Disseminator
Kenya beefs up security along border with Somalia after attack	Kenyan government response to Garissa attack	Presidnet Uhuru Kenyatta; Joseph Boinett, Kenyan Police Chief	No	Disseminator
Unknown gunmen storm Kenyan college,	Reporting on the Garissa attack	No	No	Disseminator

hold hostages				
Kenyan official: Security forces to flush out gunmen from hijacked campus	Reporting on Garissa attack	Joseph Boinett, Kenyan police chief; Dabaso Jillo, Kenya Red Cross official	No	Disseminator

Appendix 14: Code book

Roles	Role performance indicators	Source	Journalist opinion
Disseminator	Facts, balanced stories	Sources quoted in stories must be identifiable	No
Watchdog	Information on judicial or administrative processes against individuals or groups of power; interrogating powers; what the ruling and economical elite say or do; questioning individuals or groups by someone other than the journalist; criticizing and	Sources/opinions must take definite stand on what is wrong or right	Yes and No. Yes when the journalists is reporting an investigative story and no, if the journalists is reporting on facts

	judging the ruling class; external investigation not carried out by the journalist such as judicial administrative, specialised/academic research, among others-but that he/she covers extensively		
Loyal-facilitator	Supporting institutional activities; supporting national policies, positive image of the economic elite, progress/ success of the country, comparison to the rest of the world; national triumphs , promotion of country's image and patriotism	Dominantly framed by government officials sources	Yes and No. Yes, if it is the journalists opinion and no, if he is reporting a press statement
Civic-oriented	Citizen perspective- includes the vision of regular or organised citizen, showing how they perceive or are affected by different	Dominantly framed by citizen sources	no

	political decisions; citizen demand includes regular or organized demand or proposals on how different political measures/decisions should be handled; credibility on citizen- the journalists gives credibility to what the citizen perceive or denounce or demand within the news story; local impact; the news story mentions the impact of certain political decisions on specific communities; the news story provides the citizen with background information in order to make political decisions(electoral processes, protests, citizen groups, participation/support of political parties; information on		
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	citizens activities such as campaigns, collective actions, protests, commemorations, demonstrations and protests		
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
Appendix 15: Sample of semi-structured interview

1. How do you define your professional role as a journalist?
 - a. Should a journalist exclude or include value-judgement in reporting news stories?
 - b. Do you think it is the role of a journalist to hold those in power to account?
 - C. do you think it is the role of a journalist to collaborate with government to promote national progress?
 - d. Do you think it is the role of a journalist to provide information to the public that will aid them to reach decisions that will impact their lives?
 - e. Do you think it is the role of a journalist to provide entertainment to the public; sensationalise news and highlight private life scandal?
 - f. Do you think it is the role of a journalist to educate the public on complex issues and encourage public debates?
2. To what extent do journalistic routine influences affect the performance of this role?
3. To what extent do organisational influences affect your performance of this role?
4. To what extent do extra-media factors (ethnicity, advertisers, government) affect your performance of this role?

5. To what extent does Ubuntu or Confucianism philosophy influences affect your performance of this role?
6. The Chinese racist restaurant scandal was widely celebrated by the Kenyan media. If you were still working for your former employer would you cover it? Would you also cover the arrest of 77 Chinese nationals for espionage for the Kenyan Government?
7. Why do you think your organisation did not cover it?
8. But your organisation covered the visit of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang to Kenya?
9. In reporting news stories, does your organisation give preference to issues that positively affect China-Kenya relations over negative issues that affect their relations?
10. As a journalist, are there stories that you cannot cover for your organisation and why?
11. In the event that you go ahead and cover such story what happens to it-do you have to edit it to suit your organisation?
12. How often do you propose story ideas? Are such ideas accepted-and if so- do you enjoy the freedom to cover it?
13. Do you entertain ethical partiality in covering news that involves Chinese or Kenyan government in respect of patriotism?

Appendix 16: Research clearance permit

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT: MR. EMEKA LUCKY UMEJEI of UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, 9, 8th Avenue-2109 Johannesburg, has been permitted to conduct research in Nairobi County on the topic: ROLE CONCEPTION TO ROLE PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF AFRICAN JOURNALISTS WORKING FOR CHINA'S CENTRAL TELEVISION, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY AND CHINA DAILY NEWSPAPER IN KENYA for the period ending: 24th November, 2016 Applicant's Signature	 Permit No : NACOSTI/P/15/52270/86777 Date Of Issue : 2nd December, 2015 Fee Received : ksh 4000  Director General National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation
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Appendix 17: Research authorisation



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349, 310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: secretary@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref: No. **NACOSTI/P/15/52270/8677**

Date:

2nd December, 2015


Emeka Lucky Umejei
University of the Witwatersrand
SOUTH AFRICA.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Role conception to role performance: A study of African Journalists working for China’s Central Television, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily Newspaper in Kenya,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for a period ending **24th November, 2016.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.


DR. S. K. LANGAT, OGW
FOR: DIRECTOR GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.





THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY

Graduate School of Media and
Communications

November 5, 2015

Dear Emeka Umejei,

RE: FIELDWORK FOR PHD

I am delighted to invite you to The Aga Khan University Graduate School of Media and Communications to undertake fieldwork in Kenya as part of your PhD project investigating *Role Conception To Role Performance: A Study of African Journalists Working for China's Central Television, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily Newspaper in Kenya*.

During your stay in Nairobi, AKU-GSMC will provide you with a work desk, access to Wi-Fi [in the office] and study support related to your project. If you require assistance with housing, please let us know. Whilst accommodation will be your responsibility, we can assist you with access to a variety of housing options at discounted rates.

During your visit you will be expected to maintain appropriate insurance coverage for yourself and be responsible for yourself at all times while attending, being involved in or traveling to and from any field trip. You will assume all risks related your fieldwork and accept full responsibility for any loss or injury suffered during your project.

Prior to your visit, please forward the following:

- A copy of your fieldwork plan.
- A copy of the human research ethics application as approved by university.
- Milestone confirmation that your project has been approved.
- Documentation from your university supporting your fieldwork plan.
- Proof of relevant insurance cover.

Please let me know if you require additional information.

Kind regards

Rhonda Breit
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Graduate School of Media and Communications
Aga Khan University

Nine (9) West Building, 7th Floor, Mkungu Close, Off Parklands Road
P.O. Box 30270 - 00100 G.P.O., Nairobi, Kenya
Telephone: +254 20 374 0062/63, 0731 888 055 / 0719 231 530
Email: info.gsmc@aku.edu; Website: www.aku.edu

China Daily Newspaper

VISIT OF PREMIER Li KEQIANG

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CHINA RACIST RESTAURANT INCIDENT

1. http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-03/26/content_19921223.htm

PRESIDENT UHURU KENYATTA AND WILLIAM RUTO ICC TRIAL

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ARREST OF 77 CHINESE NATIONALS

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Glossary

Definition of key concepts

In this section, I explain the meaning of operational meaning of dominant concepts as it applies to this research. It is important to point out that the meaning I adopt for this concept is specific to this research.

Cross-media ownership: This is the ownership of several media outfits by a few organisations in the same media landscape. In this study, this refers to the dominance of the Kenyan newspaper market by the Daily nation Standard newspapers group (Wan-Ifran, 2013)

Censorship: The suppression of media content that may be harmful or sensitive to China's political and economic interests in Africa

Self-censorship: In this study, self-censorship is understood as when journalists exercise control over boundaries between what they understand as journalistic and organisational interests to avoid repercussion from the leadership of Chinese media organisations in Africa.

Sociology of news: In this study, sociology of news tradition is understood as an approach that examines the constraints on journalism in Chinese media organisations in Africa (Schudson 2002: 251; Cottle 2000: 28).

Marketization: This process is one in which the production and dissemination of media products dictated by free market dynamics of supply and demand (McManus, 2009)

Commercialisation: This is the use of the market mechanism to drive media production and dissemination in China (Zhao, 2003).

Globalization: In this study, globalization is defined as the transnational flow of cultural artefacts from one country to another (Thissu 2007: 19). Specifically, the expansion of Chinese media into Africa represents this transnational flow of cultural artefacts.

Role conception: In this study, role conception is understood as journalists understanding of their professional roles (Burke and Reitzes, 1981: 84; Christians et al. 2009: 119; Wells, 1978: 198 quoted in Burke and Reitzes, 1981: 84). This means the role that journalists identify themselves with (Striker and Burke, 2000: 289; Weaver et al

Role performance: In this study, role performance is the manifest role in media content produced by journalists with respect to specific events (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Mellado and Dalen, 2004; Mellado, 2014; Hellmueller and Mellado; 2015; carpenter et al., 2015)