

https://dspace.org/

Trade at Delagoa Bay: the influence of trade on political structures, 1721-1799

Chewins, Linell

2015-09-02
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/18417

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

TRADE AT DELAGOA BAY: THE INFLUENCE OF TRADE ON POLITICAL STRUCTURES, 1721-1799

Linell Chewins
327901



A Dissertation Submitted to the History Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg for the Degree of Masters of Arts by Research Report

February 2015

Previous Page:

The first page of a letter dated June 1726, stating that Walembe, Inthowelle, Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle have the same chief, namely Maatchivulane, NA 4373 f. 587

DECLARATION

I, Linell Chewins, hereby declare that this PhD thesis is original and the result of my own research and writing.

Signature:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If it were not for a phone call from my supervisor asking why I am not doing a Masters, this project would not exist. My thanks goes to Peter Delius who introduced me to the subject of trade between Delagoa Bay and the interior and whose expertise, advice and encouragement guided this work.

I am also grateful to Mucha Musemwa, who displayed interest in my topic, diligently read chapters and encouraged me to refine my arguments. Other people who have been sources of support in writing this thesis are Stacey Sommerdyk, Erika le Roux, and Anita Glintzer. Stacey advised, listened and offered suggestions, and Erika made life at the Cape Archives fun with her enthusiasm for all things historical. And then there is my dear friend Anita, who over pots of flower tea helped explore ideas and spent hours translating reams of documents out of love.

Thank you to the NRF for generously funding this project and everyone in the History department who has expressed interest in this project's progress, cheering me on. I am also indebted to the staff at the Nationaal Argief for their assistance and a special thanks to Carlos from the Archivo Ultramarino who promptly responded to numerous requests for translations.

And finally, thanks to my family. Deepest gratitude belongs to my husband, Mark who has encouraged and supported my going back to university. I have had been motivated and inspired by my daughters, Tamsyn, Hayley, Chelsey and Ashley, who along with Mark have cooked, read, fed me copious cups of tea and offered tissues in moments of heightened anxiety! Thank you to all for making this experience enjoyable.

Table of Contents

Previous Page Reference ii

Declaration iii

Acknowlegements iv

Abbreviations, List of Tables, Maps and Illustrations vi

Introduction **1**

Chapter One

The development of the Ivory Trade, 1544-1703 14

The Development of Dutch interest in Delagoa Bay 22

Chapter Two

The People of Delagoa Bay 35

Trading with the People from the Interior 43

Chapter Three

Trade and Pre-eminence 69

Trade and Control 86

Trade and Conflict 99

Chapter Four

Trade at Delagoa Bay with the English, Austrians and the Whalers, 1757-1799 109

Appendices 145

Bibliography 149

Abbreviations

ARD	Algemeen Rijksargief Depot
EIC	English East India Company
NA	Nationaal Argief, The Hague
CA	Cape Archives, Cape Town
RSEA	Records of Southeastern Africa
VOC	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Companjie

Tables

Percentage of Commodities Exchanged in the Maputo and Nkomati Rivers 123

The minimum numbers of Individually Identified Whalers at Delagoa Bay, 1789-1804 129

Maps

Trade Routes into the Northwest Interior and the Zambezi Network 13

Societies around Delagoa Bay, 1721- 1730 32

De Koninck's Map 34

Possible Locations of Paraotte, Machikosse, Chiremandelle and Inthowelle 41

Trade Routes in the Transvaal 42

Rainfall Map 68

Delagoa Bay and the Southern Interior, late eighteenth century 108

Illustrations

People of the North Side of Delagoa Bay 32

People of the South Aside of Delagoa Bay 33

Junod's Illustration of a Thonga Village 67

Appendix

An Extract from Boteler's *Narrative of a Voyage to Africa and Arabia* 145
An Artist's Impression of a Boat used by Locals, Late Eighteenth Century 146
Slaughtering of An Elephant 148
Journal Entry Noting Chiefs enroute to Sanguano, Chiremandelle, as well as comments by Pangele Inthowisse, 1724 149

Introduction

During the eighteenth century, various groups of Europeans traded at Delagoa Bay, predominantly for ivory. Early on in the century, the ivory exchanged for beads, cloth and brass came from deep in the interior, supplied by visiting traders. Later, while maintaining a presence on the shores of the Bay, Europeans traded deeper into the interior south to the Bay. The ivory trade started in 1544, with the development of the Portuguese trade that continued intermittently over the next 169 years. During the eighteenth century there were four concentrated intervals of trade interspersed with spells of desultory exchange. The focus of this study is on the four periods of relatively intensive trade. These episodes correspond to the permanent VOC trading post that operated for nine years, 1721-1730; an English trade under the command of Edward Chandler, 1758-1768; the Austrian period under William Bolts 1777-1782; and lastly, the second Portuguese period from 1782 that coincided with the whaling boat trade that appeared in the Bay from 1792.[1] In spite of relatively intensive trade during these phases, Europeans remained on the periphery of the societies around the Bay and were even more remote from the inhabitants of the interior.

The Portuguese abandoned the Bay in1703, and eighteen years later the VOC settled a trading post on the high red bluff on the northern shore of the lagoon Espirito Santo. Manned by soldiers, and headed by a succession of expert merchants, the main concern of this establishment was profit-making. The VOC had the long-term aim of expanding business on the East Coast of Africa and with this goal in mind, the Dutch soldiers turned traders, setting about the slow process of building accommodation and a storehouse. In addition to these permanent structures, they planned to develop an extensive garden in order to become self-sufficient with regard to food. However, they did not have a developed strategy for managing interaction with local chiefs other than being friendly, avoiding confrontation and staying neutral during local conflicts. After the Dutch departure in 1730, local chiefs adapted to a constantly changing trade structure, dictated by the type of traders who frequented the Bay over the course of the later eighteenth century.

[1] The Portuguese expelled the Austrians in 1782, and in turn were driven from the Bay by the French in 1796, only to return in 1799.

This thesis explores the reasons for the changes in the nature of trade and analyses its impact on the political and economic structures of the societies involved.

It also examines the identity and location of the Ronga societies at Delagoa Bay, as well as those who arrived from the northwest interior to trade at the coast.[2] It seeks to cast new light on the role of traders from the interior. It distinguishes between the different groups of traders, namely, those from Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle, in addition to exploring the possible location of their territories. It explores the key part played by trade in ivory, gold, tin and copper from these areas. Besides investigating the identity of the traders from the interior, this study analyses the interactions between traders; escalating political competition and changes in political hierarchies at the coast, with reference to gift-giving; and specific commodities. At Delagoa Bay, beads, cloth and brass were accepted in exchange for goods. Some trade articles were more in demand than others and this study considers the factors that determined the demand for a particular article, such as blue beads. It further examines whether or not environmental factors such as drought had an impact on the demand for particular trade goods and patterns of supply and demand in general. By highlighting the role of trade articles that Europeans offered for trade during the century, this study challenges prevailing views concerning the significant changes in the trade structure that occurred during the latter part of the eighteenth century.

The Portuguese Trade on the Zambezi

Trade on the East Coast of Africa has had a long history, starting from at least the first century of the previous millennium. By the seventh century there is evidence of the Indian Ocean trade reaching as far as Chibuene, Mozambique.[3] From 1000 AD, the commercial development of the coast accelerated. Trade in the Indian Ocean patterns of exchange showed significant continuities throughout this period and into the European age. Islamic traders settled on the islands, followed by the Portuguese. Although trade from the interior created great wealth for the rulers of these islands, the hinterlands attached to these isles stayed relatively untouched by

[2] The term Ronga is a linguistic and cultural classification to identify the political units on both sides of the Bay. See Smith, A. Delagoa Bay and the trade of southern Africa in Gray, R. and Birmingham, D. *Pre-Colonial Trade: Essays on Trade inCantral and Eastern Africa before 1900.* London: Oxford University Press, 1970,267

[3] Iliffe, J. Africans: *The History of a Continent.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 53

the foreign traders. This pattern repeated itself during the Portuguese era. Portuguese presence was restricted to limited areas: Sofala, Mozambique Island on the coast and Sena and Tete in the interior. The Portuguese established captaincies at Sena and Tete after an expedition under the aggressive leadership of Francisco Barreto in 1573. Like the Muslim traders before them, the Portuguese limited their trading activities to their settlements along the Zambezi River. They depended on professional traders to extend trade to markets in the interior like the Omani rulers of Zanzibar during the nineteenth century. The Portuguese prazo system developed along the Zambezi River with the goal of extending Portuguese authority along the Zambezi.[4] Although prazos were defined as leased crowned estates of the Portuguese crown, this institution was based on an African institution where colonists "acquired recognition as political chiefs over an African population."[5] The Portuguese participation in this institution was shaped by their limited numbers and their very limited political and military power.

By using limited force, intermarriage and the presentation of gifts, within an unstable political environment, the Portuguese gained some political control over limited areas in the Zambezi in order to conduct trade. In turn, the infiltration of trade along the Zambesi through the prazos provided the Portuguese with increasing access to African polities that became increasingly dependent on trade.[6] Like the Portuguese situated along the Zambesi, the Dutch were confronted by an unstable political environment and this study explores the Dutch approach to the challenge of competing local chiefs, and the role of competition in determining the volume of trade.

Delagoa Bay, 1721- 1799

Contrary to the nature of trade along the Zambesi that occurred from permanent settlements, the Portuguese traded ivory at Delagoa Bay from huts located on the islands Inhaca and Xefina, which limited their influence to the perimeter of the mainland society. In sharp contrast, the Dutch settled on the mainland and VOC policy determined the trade structure for the band of soldiers who manned the post.

[4] Isaacman, A. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution. The Zambesi prazos, 1750-1902.* Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1972, xii. A prazo had an overlord who held privileges, which formerly belonged to a chief; had an African population living in its traditional manner on its historic lands and supported a slave population with diverse origins, loyal to the prazero, and had a contractual relationship with the Portuguese crown.

[5] Isaacman, 17

[6] Isaacman, 22. The prazo institution lasted for 150 years.

This study analyses the nature of trade at Delagoa Bay from 1721, and how it affected the organisation of redistribution of goods among the local chiefs. It investigates how chiefs manipulated trade to gain power and influence and whether the accumulation of trade articles impinged on the political status quo. In addition, it explores the ways in which the permanent presence of VOC employees affected the political structure on the northern bank of the lagoon. Lastly, it poses questions around the reasons for local chiefs' need to control trade, and whether trade contributed to the increase in power of individual chiefs.

Also crucial in understanding the nature of trade is considering environmental factors. The Dutch arrived during a drought and this study explores the influence of this context on the nature of trade and how it affected the demand for exotic trade articles. The disappointing trade of the Dutch period stands in stark contrast to the trading boom of the English and Austrian intervals. But all three groups trading at the Bay were subjected to the same difficulties: hunger, illness and political weakness, which conspired to limit European influence to the coast. The success of Chandler and Bolts's ivory trade poses questions about the causes of accelerated trade and whether, if these periods had been prolonged, trade would have left more significant change on society around Delagoa Bay.

During the eighteenth century, different sets of Europeans arrived to trade and each was associated with a particular source of ivory, either from areas north, northwest or south from the Bay, and this thesis examines reasons for the change in direction of the ivory supply.

Comparative Literature

Delagoa Bay was one link on the East African coast to a wider world of trade, which connected it to the Indian Ocean trade network.

According to Gray and Birmingham, trade along the southeastern coast of Africa introduced new economic values to its societies, developed organised markets, and produced professional traders. This inquiry examines how the inhabitants of the Bay took advantage of the set of circumstances that sprung up around the demand for ivory and other goods, and whether political instability inhibited a wider development of a trade network into the northwest. According to their analysis,

trade in southern Africa was either subsistence-orientated or market-orientated, which in some cases, overlapped. But it was market-orientated trade, with its concomitant development of organised markets and professional traders that is often associated with social and political development and the growth of states.[7] This study examines why trade during the later period contributed to state formation among the Nguni, which factors played a part in the absence of an organised market at the Bay earlier in the century and whether trade transformed the subsistence economy of societies located on the shore.

The East Coast of Africa, long connected to the Islamic world through trade, experienced a stimulus for exchange. Killick questions whether this exchange had been unequal in view of the enormous profits the Swahili trade produced in places like Kilwa, Gede and Shanga.[8] The notion of unequal trade suggests a lack of agency on the part of locals and this thesis investigates not only the way in which profit is interpreted, but also how much control local chiefs had over the process of trade and the profits they made. It further looks at how individual chiefs harnessed the trade process in order to enlarge their following, consolidating chiefdoms.

Alpers calls the Yao long-distance traders the greatest during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century in his article, and connects the rise of Yao chiefs to the slave trade, in spite of the lack of an elaborate administration or a standing army to coerce them into contributing.[9] He suggests that the ritual powers of a chief, connected to rainmaking, were a cohesive element in these chiefdoms. This observation raises the possibility that a similar means of power was in use at Delagoa Bay and poses a question about the role of ritual power in relationships between societies. Also referring to the Yao, Illiffe discusses the expansion of trade routes in response to external demand in *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Here, traders supplied goods for desired prices and middlemen on the coast mediated transactions, while charging substantial fees for their services. The question is whether a similar situation arose

[7] Gray, R. and Birmingham, D. (eds.) *Pre-Colonial Trade: Essays on Trade and Central and Eastern before 1900.* London: Oxford University Press, 1970, 15

[8] Killick, D. 'Agency, dependency and long-distance trade: East Africa and the Islamic world, 700-1500 CE,' in S. Falconer, C. Redman, (eds.) *Politics and Power: Archaeological Perspectives on the Landscapes of Early States*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009

[9] Alpers, E.A. 'Trade, State and Yao Society in the Nineteenth Century' *Journal of African Society*, 10,3, (1969), 405-420

at Delagoa, prompting the expansion of trade routes and the development of a class of middlemen.

The Rozvi Empire's power was based on a monopoly of external trade; however, Mudenge suggests that internal factors – military, religious and administrative organisation – were significant factors in the Rozvi power base.[10] The fact that trade was not restricted to the Rozvi chiefs made trade difficult for the Portuguese to control trade. To rectify this situation, the Portuguese suggested that all traders had to report to the chief's court before proceeding into the interior to trade. Although this never happened, it raises a question about the need to control the traders approaching the coast from the interior, especially as these grew in number.

Trade networks were often founded on the need for an essential commodity. Fagan observes that the Ivuna salt trade network evolved out of such a need, which directly and indirectly connected far-flung communities.[11] The Dutch encountered traders who travelled hundreds of kilometres to transact trade. This investigation examines how the Dutch presence stimulated trade from the northwest, and to what extent the trade networks in this part of the interior expanded.

In his latest article, Harries discusses Delagoa Bay with reference to the increase in the slave trade from southern Mozambique during the late eighteenth century.[12] Although the Dutch traded slaves bound for the Cape, between 1721 and 1730, this number was relatively insignificant, amounting to twenty-five slaves a year.[13]

Historiography

In Southern African historiography, trade has been a much-discussed factor in relation to the development of centralised states, particularly the emergence of the Zulu kingdom. Before 1969, population pressure, climatic change and the "big man" theory were postulated as causes for the ascent of the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo

[10] Mudenge, S.I.G. *A Political History of Munhumutapa, 1400-1902*. Harare: African Publishing Group, 1988
[11] Fagan, B.M. Early trade and raw Materials in South Central Africa in *The Journal of African History*, 10, 1 1969, 1-13
[12] Harries, P. 'Slavery, Indenture and Migrant Labour: maritime immigration from Mozambique to the Cape, c.1780-1880,' *African Studies*, Volume 73, Issue Special Issue: The Making and Changing of Migrant Workers' Worlds (1800-2014), (2014), 323-340
[13] Sleigh, D. *Buiteposte: VOC-buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur*. Pretoria: HAUM, 1993, 715

and later, Shaka.[14] Alan Smith suggested that trade contributed to the "simultaneous consolidation of several chiefdoms in northern Natal."[15] Historians such as Thompson, Gray and Marks have subsequently incorporated the trade theory into their work.[16] In 1978, Hedges developed this perspective further in his thesis, *Trade and Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, and argued that the contraction rather than expansion of trade accounted for political change, contending that a diminishing ivory trade at Delagoa Bay was replaced by a substantial cattle trade. Cattle, unlike ivory, had a high local value and were essential as both a food source and a means to maintain control over reproduction. In order to replace cattle from outside the Mthethwa kingdom, chief Dingiswayo used age sets or amabutho, to raid neighbouring chiefdoms. Raiding had to be increased due to the drought of the early 1800s, which increasingly militarised the *amabutho* under a central political authority. These formidable amabutho were fundamental to unleashing the Mfecane. Delius used the trade theory to support the growing differentiation in wealth and power within and between chiefdoms and the contraction of this trade in explanation for conflict in the southeastern Transvaal.[17] Bonner draws on the same argument in his book, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, as does Wright in his chapter, 'Turbulent Times: political transformations in the North and the East,' published in 2010.[18] It is clear that the argument that the ivory trade theory was critical to state formation, is still pivotal to the debate. This thesis aims to criticise the view that a sizeable cattle trade replaced a diminished ivory trade during the last decade of the eighteenth century into the early nineteenth century and postulates that the contraction of the brass trade played a more significant role in stimulating competition and centralizing political power.

Literature Review

---

[14] Cope, R. Chapter Three: The rise of the Zulu kingdom, the Mfecane, and colonial expansion in *The Years of Conquest: Land and Labour in late nineteenth century South Africa*, Johannesburg: SACHED, 1995

[15] Smith, A. 'The Trade in Delagoa Bay and Nguni politics, 1750- 1935,' in Leonard Thompson, (ed.) *African Societies in southern Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1969, 171

[16] Marks, S. Gray, R. 'Southern Africa and Madagascar,' in Richard Gray, (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4, 1600-1790*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 385-468

[17] Delius, P. *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi polity, the Boers and the British in nieneteenth century Transvaal.* Berkely: Univerity of California Press, 1984.

[18] Bonner, P. *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi state.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Wright, J. 'Turbulent Times: political transformations in the North and the East' in Hamilton, C., Mbenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol.1, From early times to 1885*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010,

The study of trade at Delagoa Bay is hardly a new theme for investigation but aside from Zimba's doctoral thesis published in 1999, the subject has largely been neglected for over forty years. There have been investigations of this theme by Portuguese scholars. Alexandre Lebato published his works, *Historia da Fundacão de Lourenço Marques*, *Historia da Fundacão de Presidio de Lorenço Marques* and *Quartro Estuduos e uma Evacacão Para a Historia*, between 1948 and 1961. The first two focus on the period between 1780 and 1800, when the Portuguese initiated a permanent settlement at the Bay. The four essays contained in *Quartro Estuduos e uma Evacacão Para a Historia* deal with other periods during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. These works have been carefully researched but are exclusively reliant on Portuguese archival sources. Ceatano Montez in his *Descrobimento e Fundacão de Lourenço Marques*, published in 1940, discusses a broader period starting from the sixteenth century and concludes with the early nineteenth century. His work is not always reliable and forms part of the polemic around the claim to Delagoa Bay. In 1948, *Die Argieffjaarboek* published an Afrikaans Master's thesis by Colin Coetzee, *Die Kompanjie se Besetting op Delagoa-Baai*, which contains a narrative of the settlement, and in his doctoral work he expands his research to include English and Portuguese sources. Although the focus of the Portuguese and Afrikaans scholarship differs, both produced studies that focused on the European presence and neglected the nature and role of the societies that occupied the shores of the Bay.

In the seventies, two doctoral studies were completed. Alan Smith's *Struggle for Control of southern Mozambique, 1720-1835*, is a very valuable account, which has a much broader scope than this study. But his second chapter, 'The Dutch Settlement at Delagoa Bay, 1721-1725,' neglects to address five years of Dutch presence and centres on the difficulties the Dutch had in making a success of the trading post. He further provides limited accounts of traders from the interior and treats them as a homogenous group. In 1978, David Hedges examined trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His thesis has a historiographical focus and overlaps with this study in a chapter that discusses the rise of the southern Tsonga kingdom of Mabudu from 1750, which was associated with its control of trade along the coastal lowlands between Delagoa Bay and the northern Nguni.[19] Although the focus of this discussion lies further south

[19] Hedges, D.W. *Trade and Politics in Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries*. PhD, University of London, 1978

from the shores of the Bay, it nonetheless gives valuable insights into the volume and nature of trade related to European trading activities. Benigna Zimba's investigation of gender roles in trade and regional politics in1999 looks at the role of women in food production and its trade. Despite the promise of the title of her doctoral thesis, *Overseas Trade, Regional Politics and gender roles: Southern Mozambique, 1720-1830*, her work concentrates on the period after 1790 and is primarily based on Portuguese archival sources. Other scholars have studied trade on the Mozambican coast in the period. Nancy Hafkin examined the relationship between the Portuguese and the Swahili sheikhs and sultans in relation to the slave trade of northern Mozambique. Diego Zonta traced the sesame seed and peanut trade out of Mozambican ports between 1855 and 1890, namely Mozambique, Ibo, Quelimane and Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, which are all useful in understanding the longevity of some African trade structures and the deep cultural base, as well as the enduring institutions that underpin this cultural base.[20]

Sources

The survey of patterns of trade over the last three decades of the century is mainly based on secondary sources. Some primary sources such as White's *Journal of a Voyage performed in the Lion, Extra Indiaman from Madrasto Columbo and Da Lagoa Bay* published in 1798 and Boteler's *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia, performed in her Majesty's Ships Leven and Barracouta, Volume Two*, 1835 were valuable in gaining insights into the post- Austrian period. Secondary sources, such as Haywood's doctoral thesis *American Whalers in Africa* and the article by Richards and Du Pasquier on bay whaling added to understanding the whaler's trade at the Bay.

The primary subject of this thesis is the nature of relationships between the local chiefs, the incoming traders and the Dutch and how chiefs used trade as a mechanism to reinforce political structures. These relationships are indirectly addressed in Dutch documents held in archives located in Cape Town and The Hague. These documents consist of letters to the Cape and a number of journals written at the trading post and those written on expeditions, recording journeys either overland or along rivers into the interior, as well as the two voyages with the purpose of investigating opportunities at Inhambane. The Dutch letter-writers

[20] Cohen, D.W. *Combing History*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005, 241

concentrated on justifying the reasons for their failure to stimulate trade, reporting on whatever progress they had made and the difficulties attached to it, as well as issues of general housekeeping. These matters included the steady rate of casualties due to illness, altercations with locals, inventory and requisition lists. The employees at the trading post were not anthropologists, and were not always sympathetic towards the local population. Nonetheless, in their letters and journals are nuggets of information that provide significant insights into the relationships dictated by complex social and political structures and complicated by the demands and advantages of a permanent trading post in their midst.

Anthropological scholarship provided a framework within which to understand these structures. Junod's *Life of a South African Tribe, Volumes One and Two* in particular were helpful in understanding the social and political dynamics the Dutch encountered in the eighteenth century. Archaeological and ethnological research aided in sketching an approximate picture of the interior. For ethnological information on the interior, I consulted the research of Van Warmelo and J.D. Krige, among others. The work of archaeologists such as Friede, and Evers and Loubser were useful in attempting to locate the territories of traders approaching the coast.

There are difficulties in using twentieth century ethnographic material in an attempt to illuminate much earlier periods. These are related to methodology. Anthropologists, such as Junod, depended on oral histories to inform their attempts to construct social contexts. Oral histories are of great value but are limited in scope. Junod observed that these are only of value for the previous hundred years. His work aims at documenting a way of life for posterity but tends to generalise cultural and linguistic variations.[21] Even if his classic work, *Life of a South African Tribe, Volumes One and Two,* was written a well over a century later than the period my research covers and moreover romanticises Thonga life, ignoring the social and economic revolution this group underwent at the time, it contains valuable information that might otherwise have been lost and which, if used cautiously, critically and in the context of other historical sources, provides important material. [22]

Theory

[21] Harries, P. 'The anthropologist as historian and liberal: H.A. Junod on the Thonga,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 8,1 Special Issue of Anthropology and History, (1981), 37-50, 41
[22] Ibid

The dates that form the bounds of this study are 1703 and 1799, both of which are connected to Portuguese presence. In 1703 they abandoned Delagoa Bay for almost eighty years, returned after ousting the Austrian company in 1782, and were expelled by the French in 1796 – where after they made a permanent return in 1799 until 1975 and the liberation of Mozambique from colonial rule. During the Portuguese absence from the Bay in the eighteenth century, there were concentrated periods of trade, some more successful than others.

The matter of orthography presents some difficulty in that the Dutch recorded place- and personal names phonetically. I have decided to keep to the Dutch spelling of these for the sake of convenience, as similar spellings persist throughout the century. As far as the naming of groups and people around the Bay are concerned, the use of the designation of Tembe in particular presents a problem. It is consistently used as both the name of the chief and his lineage, during the early Portuguese, and for most of the subsequent Dutch, period. This changes, from 1728 when the Tembe chief was recorded as Madommedom in the Dutch documents, and by the end of the century, the Tembe chief was named Capelle.

Thesis Summary

This thesis is organised into four chapters. Chapter one has two parts. The first explores the inception of the ivory trade by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and shows the factors that determined the success of trade. It also considers the reasons for the Portuguese abandoning the Bay in 1703. The second part traces the Dutch endeavour to explore Delagoa Bay and explains why it took 24 years them to reach a decision to establish a trading post here.

Chapter two concerns itself with ethnographies. I focus on the peoples who occupied the shores of the Bay, their history and how these societies related to each other. I then explore the identity of the traders who arrive at the Bay and attempt to trace the location of their territories. I also examine the interaction between traders from the interior and the people they meet on the way, and with the local chiefs when they reached the Bay.

Chapter three is about the relationship between the chiefs that ruled at the coast and trade. It analyses the importance of trade to a chief with regards to his status, which

influenced his ability to attract and maintain followers. I examine the methods chiefs used to control the distribution of trade goods. I then explore the relationship between conflict and the supply of trade goods connected to the incidence of drought.

The last chapter investigates the factors that contributed to the changing nature of trade with reference to the trading ventures of the English, Austrians and whalers after the Dutch era. It criticises elements of Hedges' explanation for increasing political centralisation during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

This thesis concludes by linking observations in order to explore the role of status, control and conflict in trade to gain a better understanding of the significance of trade at the coast and its influence on political hierarchies in the interior. By examining the nature of change in the ivory trade over the eighteenth century, it attempts to evaluate the role of trade in power relationships and the significance of particular trade articles in political transformation in the southern interior during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.



Trade Routes from Delagoa Bay to the Northwest Interior and the Zambezi Network[23]

[23] This map is based the works of both J.B. de Vaal's and Maggs and F. Balsan, The Ancient maps of the Monomotapa Kingdom *The Geographical Journal*, 136,2 Jun 1970 pp. 243 and 244

Chapter One
The European Interest in trade at Delagoa Bay

The development of the Ivory Trade, 1544-1703

The Portuguese opened up the European ivory trade in the mid-fifteenth century from Delagoa Bay, by taking advantage of the neglect of the trade by the Muslims due to political upheavals. The ivory trade promised to supplement the diminishing gold revenues of Sofala and an annual trip south was instituted. The ivory trade would continue sporadically till the early eighteenth century, and created a demand for exotic goods. The Portuguese traded from islands, from temporary accommodation, collecting ivory around the shores of the Bay. From the 1660s the Portuguese trade diminished, and after a period of intermittent voyages south they abandoned the trade location in 1703.

The Portuguese, under the leadership of Vasco da Gama, rounded the Cape of Good Hope in the late fifteenth century and it was probably this fleet that discovered the existence of Delagoa Bay. Even though its existence was noted on the Cantino map of 1502, this harbour, that is both deep and safe, remained of little interest to their commercial pursuits until Lourenço Marques' arrival in 1544. He was a captain of a ship that participated in the annual ivory voyages to the mouth of the Sabi River.[24] His exploration of the Bay took place on the orders of the Captain of Mozambique, who instructed him to "investigate the two rivers beyond Cape Correntes."[25] His voyage down the Mozambican Channel brought him to Delagoa Bay where he was said to have "discovered" the ivory trade.[26] The details of this discovery remain vague and it is uncertain whether Muslim merchants had previously established a seasonal ivory trade at this location. Lourenço Marques' discovery motivated subsequent and regular voyages to the Bay to trade with the local population.

It is surprising that Delagoa Bay was not regularly visited before the 1540s, as all the outward and homeward journeys for the first twenty-five years after Vasco da

[24] Newitt, M. *A History of Mozambique*. London: Hurst &Company, 2009, 25
[25] Montez, C. *Descobrimento e Fundação de Lourenço Marques, 1500-1900*. Lourenço Marques: Minerva Central-Editora 1948, 19. This date is disputed. Lourenço Marques's trip to Delagoa Bay either occurred in 1544 or 1545.
[26] Montez, *Descobrimento*, 18

Gama's trip took their course through the Mozambican channel.[27] Perhaps this neglect can be understood by the initial commercial focus of Portuguese authority during the early sixteenth century. The primary aim during this time was centered on gaining political control of the northeastern African coast in order to establish a monopoly over the gold trade. In addition to these goals, the Portuguese concentrated on determining the demands of their developing market (which proved to be Indian and not European cloth) and cultivating a network of contacts to ensure the flow of gold to the coast from the interior. So, before their interest in the ivory trade was sparked, the Captains of Sofala and Mozambique focused their attention on defending the Portuguese monopoly of the gold trade. This and their preoccupation with gaining and maintaining access to the Mwene Mutapa mines deep in the interior meant that the exploration of the coast beyond the ports that supplied gold remained far from being a priority.[28] The focus on the northern Mozambican coast and its gold trade forms a partial explanation as to why the Portuguese neglected the southern part of the coast.

The reason for the sudden interest in exploration further south can be attributed to the realisation of the great profits to be had through ivory sales in India. In 1506, the captain of Kilwa reported on the quantity of ivory available between Sofala and Kilwa, the Muslim neglect of the trade and the immense profits to be had in India.[29] The captaincy of Mozambique and Sofala were major appointments by the Portuguese crown and despite a generous salary, allowances and a share in booty gained in military expeditions, captains increasingly participated in private trade.[30] By 1510, the bulk of Portuguese trade was in private hands, particularly those of the Captains of Sofala and Mozambique.[31] In the same period, the gold trade was in decline due to social upheavals in the hinterlands of Kilwa and Sofala and the diminishing returns of the trade were further reduced by royal Portuguese regulations and taxes. The potential profitability of ivory trade motivated the search

[27] Boxer, C.R. (ed.) *The Tragic History of the Sea*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, 8
[28] Europeans perceived Mwene Mutapa, also known as Monomotapa, as a kingdom of fabulous wealth in gold.
[29] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*. London: Hurst &Company, 2009, 25 This neglect was temporary due to the internal strife the Muslim population of Kilwa faced at this time that led to the settlement of Angoche by dissidents, see Newitt, M.D.D. 'The early history of the sultanate of Angoche,' *The Journal of African History*, 13, 3, (1972), 397-406, p. 398
[30] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 26
[31] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 27

for new supplies of ivory. For this purpose, factors, agents of the Captains, were placed at Zanzibar, Mafia, temporarily at Angoche and lastly at Quelimane in 1530.[32]

The exploration of Delagoa Bay was driven by the hope of expanding the trade. The Bay provided an additional ivory market. The investigation of this region came at a time when private Portuguese interest in the unregulated ivory trade had grown since that first report excitedly penned in 1506. At the time of the ivory boom of the mid-sixteenth century, 450 to 500 *bars* of ivory were shipped privately by the captain of Sofala in 1546.[33] Lourenço Marques' voyage to Delagoa Bay was part of this expansion of private wealth based on the ivory market that pushed increasingly south. Perhaps the earlier reports about the large herds of elephant seen around the Bay, in conjunction with the possible arrival of ivory from the south, prompted the Captain of Mozambique's order to investigate the potential supply of ivory at Delagoa Bay.

The extension of ivory trading and elephant hunting moved down the Mozambican coast, which in turn, increased the demand for trade articles such as beads and cloth in the south. What little information there is about the source of trade goods in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries points to the fact that trade flowed to the northern ports from southern Mozambique.[34] In 1560 the Tonga marketed goods at Inhambane and in 1622 a caravan laden with ivory was observed marching north to Sofala.[35] It is possible that the people on the southern bank of the river Espirito Santo participated in a trade network that linked Delagoa Bay with Inhambane and Sofala before the Portuguese arrived there in search of ivory. Manhiça, who resided on the banks of the Nkomati, annually sent some of his people to Inhambane during the dry season to buy hoes, small axes, assegais and beads and on their return, sell these goods to others in the vicinity of the Bay.[36] Although it cannot be said with certainty, it may have been ivory (among other things) that was carried north by Manhiça and the Tonga to exchange beads. If this were the case, the apparent supply

[32] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 25. A factor was a person who acts for another, notably a mercantile or colonial agent
[33] Newitt, M.D.D. 'The early history of the Maravi,' *The Journal of History* 23, 2 (1982), 149. A bar was a Portuguese unit of measurement and measured 247.86 kg on Mozambique Island and 293.76 kg at Sena and Tete.
[34] Smith, A.K. *The Struggle for Control of Southern Mozambique, 1720- 1835.* Ph. D., California, 1970, 314
[35] Ibid. The Tonga were subjects of the ruling Karanga and occupied territory near the bay of Inhambane, see Beach, D.N. The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850. London : Heinemann, 1980. 90. The term "Tonga" refers to any conquered and tributary group, see Isaacman A.F. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution.* Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, 4
[36] Montez, *Descobrimento*, 48

of ivory at Delagoa Bay could have been the impetus for investigating the bay in 1544. The flow of ivory north to Sofala suggests the demand for exotic trade goods that outstripped the fluctuating supply to the Bay at the time.

The increased Portuguese demand for ivory on the northern Mozambican coast led to the expansion of elephant hunting reaching firstly to Delagoa Bay and later, further south as far as St. Lucia. The reports from Lourenço Marques' journey to Delagoa Bay opened up the prospects of an ivory trade with a high profit margin, "[buying ivory] for pennies and sold for cruzados."[37] In search of these easy profits, Portuguese ships were dispatched from either India or Mozambique Island to Delagoa Bay, either on an annual or biannual basis. Overland trade routes from the south were used during the dry winter season, when both the tsetse and malaria risks were reduced and the rivers easily crossed. A ship arrived from the north on the monsoon winds and stayed in the Bay for a period of about four to six months. This period of time was at times extended to a year.[38] The supply of ivory determined the length of the ship's stay and in turn the ivory supply depended on the nature of the relationship between the Portuguese and the surrounding chiefs.

After their first arrival in the Bay, the Portuguese traded with people who met their ships on rafts, preferring to trade from their vessels.[39] This form of trade provided the local communities with a sense of security, keeping strangers at a distance and so their territory and cattle safe. By 1554, trading had migrated to the beach, a move that presented its own problems. The Manchugulo Penisula was the territory of Chief Inhaca, who warned the Portuguese of the belligerent Tembe further west.[40] A warning that proved well-founded as the Tembe continually harassed them and forced them back to their ships, with the purpose of disrupting trade with Inhaca.

This aggressive behavior served to divert trade from Chief Inhaca to Tembe's shores. Dominating trade brought primacy to a chief, a position Inhaca had usurped

---

[37] Montez, *Descobrimento* 22.
[38] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 153
[39] The Portuguese called trading from ships a "primitive trade," see Montez, 46. Almost three hundred years later, the Tsonga had fashioned crude boats, with reed mats sails to cross the Bay. See Boteler, T. *A Narrative of a Voyage to Africa and Arabia performed in Her Majesty's ships Leven and Barracouta, 2 Vol.umes*, London, 1835, Volume 2, 25
[40] Montez, *Descobrimento*, 33. Tembe and Inhaca both occupied the southern shores of the Bay. Inhaca was the forefather of Machavane, whom the Dutch encountered and whose territory included the Machangulo Peninsula. Machavane displayed the same behaviour as Tembe did two hundred years ago, in order to gain preeminence over the old rival.

from Tembe through his commercial interactions with the Portuguese. Inhaca, who had always been protective of the Portuguese, gave them permission to trade from Inhaca Island, ostensibly for their safety. However, this authorisation gave him greater control over access to the Portuguese and their goods. In return for his apparent kindheartedness, he was amply rewarded with cloth and beads. To accommodate the Europeans, huts were erected as shelter, which served both visiting traders and shipwreck survivors.[41] The hapless individuals, who survived the grueling march north towards Mozambique Island along the southeastern shores of Africa were a source of wealth for the chief. In return for providing them with food and accommodation, the chief was generously paid in cloth and beads.[42] The degree to which a chief possessed cloth and beads displayed his preeminence and therefore the goods gained through trade and the ransom of shipwreck survivors advertised Inhaca as the paramount chief in the area. However, Tembe believed this title belonged to him, based on his lineage's claim to be the first people in the land.[43] In response to trade being diverted to Inhaca, Tembe attacked Portuguese traders. In 1554, in reprisal for the constant harassment by Tembe men, the Portuguese under the leadership of Bastião organised an attack on one of their villages close to the coast, killed five men, abducted a handful of wives, and later ransomed them back to the Tembe chief. Exerting power over the local chief brought them the freedom to trade.[44] In 1621, a dispute between the Portuguese and Inhaca made Tembe their principal trading partner.[45]

The initial move to trade from Inhaca Island set a precedent for the way trade was conducted in the future. This island formed a temporary base occupied by the Portuguese traders during their stay in the Bay. The practice of trading from the relative safety of the island by the Portuguese continued until their departure from the Bay in the early eighteenth century, abandoning the area for almost a century. Over a period of a hundred years, they cultivated trading relationships with several chiefs such as Manhica, through whom they received permission to set up bases on the Islands of Xefina and Mariana in the mouth of the Nkomati River. By 1647, the

[41] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 153
[42] Ibid.
[43] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 154
[44] Montez, *Descobrimento*, 46
[45] Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 154

Portuguese had five factories on the islands Xefina and Inhaca.[46] By trading through multiple chiefs the Portuguese not only had the advantage of playing one chief off against another, but they also sustained their ivory supply by sourcing it from different locations around the Bay, as well as from elephant fields further away. It is likely that elephant hunting was organised and planned around these regular fairs, however very little is known or understood about these processes.

Some factors influencing the levels of supply, such as local wars, lay beyond Portuguese control. Relationships between societies situated immediately around the southern part of the Bay and further towards the southwest appear to have been unstable during the first Portuguese era. In the event of war between societies, trade routes were closed and travel along these routes prohibited, as in the case of the war of Inhamunda in1519. Those who defied these orders were attacked, killed and robbed of their goods.[47] Trade strictly occurred through a chief, his son or other close male relatives, who controlled access to trade routes through the next level of hierarchy: the headmen over outlying villages, who used cattle herders as lookouts.[48] In this way trade routes over vast areas were monitored and closed, which was severely disruptive to trade. The reasoning behind the closing of trade routes was that it prevented the potential formation of alliances between the visiting traders and enemies. According to one source there was a chief who "never wanted to trade with the Portuguese, fearing if he sent [goods] down from the mountains they would be stolen by his neighbours."[49] The instability of trading alliances that provided traversing rights to one particular party through the territory of another, disrupted trade. This presented a problem when the warring parties were situated between the source and the market, which either dried up the supply to, or limited the expansion of, the ivory market at the Bay. Trade brought quarrels over market share and its concomitant social significance that may have intensified as elephants in the Delagoa Bay region became hunted out. That elephant herds diminished and eventually disappeared from the Bay is evident in the Dutch report of 1721, which laments that they had not seen a single elephant.[50]

---

[46] Junod, H.A *Les BaRonga: étude Ethnographie sur les Indigènes de la Baia de Delagoa*, Neuchatel: Attinger, 1898, 240
[47] RSEA, Vol. 1, 103
[48] Ibid.
[49] Boxer, 74
[50] CA C406 f. 195

From the 1660s, the Portuguese trade voyages to Delagoa Bay diminished and sometimes years would pass by without a trading ship calling at the Bay. This neglect of the Delagoa Bay route may have had to do with the distractions the Portuguese faced to the north. A new and hostile Mutapa called Makwombe came to power and disrupted their core trade in gold.[51] Furthermore, the later campaigns of the 1690s by Changamire, who was called "the fatal enemy of the Portuguese nation," had far-reaching repercussions. Antagonism towards the Portuguese reached as far as Inhambane, where the Tonga repeatedly attacked ships.[52] In response to this state of events, the Portuguese farmed out voyages to Inhambane to the merchant Diu Bania Kalian Velaba, who had no interest in the Delagoa trade.[53] As the success of trade depended on conducting regular fairs, the level of supply dwindled. Beyond these troubles, the elephant population around the Bay declined, requiring ivory to be sourced from further away and as Portuguese visits became more infrequent, the need for importing ivory from the interior decreased.

As profit margins disappeared the incentive to visit Delagoa Bay disappeared. Portuguese interests were also under pressure from the increased presence of legitimate English and French ships in the East Indian Ocean. In response to the added competition, the prince regent opened up commerce to all of his subjects in 1680, on the condition that custom duties were paid on all imports and exports. Within six years seventeen Canarin houses of business opened on Mozambique Island that increased competition for profits.[54] Moreover, the journey to Delagoa Bay became perilous because of increased piratical activities, which reached their zenith in the first half of the eighteenth century in the western waters of the Indian Ocean. In fact, the problem of piracy became so acute that the Portuguese crown laid an official complaint with the English government. These pirates were mostly from English colonies in America, and operated largely from Madagascar.[55] Pressed from all sides, the capital-poor Portuguese tended to keep north of Kilwa, and encouraged the development of ivory trade with the Makua who had access to abundant elephant herds in the region north of the Zambezi. An episode in 1703 proved to be the last

[51] Beach, D.N. *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850: An Outline of Shona History.*Washington D.C.: Heinemann,1980, 132
[52] Beach, 139 and Barendse, R.J. *Arabian Seas, 1700-1763, Vol.ume 1: The Western Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden: BRILL, 2009, 130
[53] Barendse, 130
[54] Canarins were Christian Indian merchants, as opposed to Banyans that were Hindu Indian merchants.
[55] Madagascar served as a haven for over a thousand pirates in the last decade of the seventeenth century, see Bialuschewski, A. Thomas Bowrey's Madagascar manuscript of 1708 in *History in Africa, 34* 2007, p 34

straw when pirates made off with the entire load of Portuguese goods and set their ship alight, adding insult to injury. The Portuguese departure on foot from the Bay marked the end of their regular trade voyages to southern Mozambique and brought the first Lusitanian era at Delagoa Bay to a close.

The Development of Dutch Interest in Delagoa Bay, 1653-1721

When Dutch interest in Delagoa Bay as a possible location for trade first surfaced, the VOC had been successfully participating in the Indian Ocean spice trade for over fifty years.[56] It has been dubbed "indubitably the most successful" trading company of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. [57] It took the Company sixty-eight years of exploration and deliberation between the Cape Political Council and their superiors before settling a trading post, manned by a band of soldiers under the leadership of a merchant, on the northern shore of the Espirito Santo lagoon.

Like the Portuguese before them, the VOC's immediate focus lay in establishing monopoly in the northwestern Indian Ocean. The VOC was formed in 1602 to profit from this trade and their powerful fleet ensured that they were successful in dismantling Portuguese power in the eastern Indian Ocean. With the financial backing of the Dutch Republic, the Company systematically conquered the spice trade in the East.[58] The conquest of the Banda Archipelago brought the monopoly of the nutmeg and mace trade. By 1658 they had taken the cinnamon trade from the Portuguese in Ceylon and by 1667 the clove market had fallen into their hands.[59] During the period of 1635-1690 the VOC's income was greater than its expenditure. Even though it came under some financial pressure in 1700, through the loss of its exclusive silver source in Japan and shrinking financial reserves, the Company continued to expand. During the seventeenth century it financed 1700 ships and in the following century invested in 3000 ships, which operated under the leadership of a board named the Heeren XVII, located in the Netherlands. The Council of Seventeen were the seventeen shareholders who formed the VOC's executive council and when convened, represented six chambers, Amsterdam, Delft, Zeeland, Hoorn, Middelburg and Enkhuizen. The Heeren XVII is hereafter called the Council of Seventeen.

This fleet needed a safe harbour on the east African coast where ships could be repaired and serviced. Mozambique Island had served the Portuguese very well in this regard and the Dutch earmarked it as a strategic port in need of appropriation.

---

[56] The VOC is the abbreviation of *Vereeinigde Oostindische Compagnie*
[57] Diederick, D.Kortlang, J. *Arsip-Arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. Leiden: Brill, 2007, 13
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

The Dutch subsequently tried to dislodge the Portuguese in three separate attempts in 1604, 1607 and 1608. These efforts were ineffective because the fort São Sebastãio proved a great challenge for Dutch patience and perhaps, in the end, their courage.[60] In the last effort launched in 1608, a strong force under Verhoeff managed to break down part of the wall between two bastions but failed to take advantage of this measure of success. The Portuguese historian, Barbuda, commented, not without bias:

> If they were Portuguese they would have stormed [the breach]; but as the Dutch are nothing more than good artillerymen, and beyond this of no account except to be burnt as desperate heretics, they had not the courage to rush the ruin of the wall.[61]

Dutch interest in the Mozambican coast seemed to fade after these failures, only to be resurrected almost half a century later.

In a document named the *Remonstratie* (1650), the authors Janzen and Proot extolled the suitability of the Cape of Good Hope as a refreshment post for Dutch ships on the way to India. The VOC took the advice to heart and instructed the settlement of such a post, under the leadership of Jan van Riebeeck. From 1652, visitors disembarking from ships on the return journey from the Indian Ocean to the Cape supplied information about the East Coast in general and Delagoa Bay in particular. One such a person was a Jesuit priest named Marthinus Martini. Martini stepped off the ship *De Oliphant* in 1653 and at dinner at the Governor's house he enthused about the immense business opportunities at Delagoa Bay and easy profits to be made for "coarse clothing, printed clothes, English linen, red cotton, tobacco, iron, glass beads, little bells and salt".[62] Martini gained Van Riebeeck's trust when he donated all his maps and notes to him, which made him still more receptive to Martini's hyperbole. Van Riebeeck called the priest's exaggerated report of Delagoa Bay a veritable Ophir and an abundant source of ebony and slaves.[63] Voyages and overland expeditions to investigate the "secrets of Africa" were the result.[64] Over the

[60] For a full account of these attempts, RSEA Vol. 8 pp. 428-435
[61] Ibid, 435
[62] Molsbergen, G. *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd*, Vol. 3. Den Haag: Marthinus Nijhof, 1922, 1
[63] Coetzee, 1948, C.G. 'Die Kompanjie se besetting van Delagoabaai,' *Argiefjaarboek vir S.A. Geskiedenis*, (1948), deel 2, 183- 196, 181
[64] RSEA, Vol. 8, 435

next twenty-four years, the attempts to reach Delagoa Bay produced nothing but a litany of failure.[65] For the most part, the lack of success in investigating the East Coast was because it was tacked onto the instructions to complete missions to either Mauritius or Madagascar or both.[66] The Dutch invariably furnished captains and leaders of any expedition with detailed instructions about the goals they needed to accomplish in each case. The added instruction of exploring Delagoa Bay seemed to be one risk too many to take at a time when many enemies lurked at sea.[67] As an example Verburgh, captain of the ship *De Tulp*, stated his reluctance to venture along the East Coast with "soo cleijne skip."[68] The dimensions of the vessel mentioned referred to its firepower rather than its physical size, in this instance judged inadequate to defend itself against a prowling enemy.

The land expeditions sent out by Van Riebeeck to explore the countryside also failed to deliver any results. When Commissioner Vergoens arrived at the Cape in 1657, he raked Van Riebeeck over the coals for wasting manpower on sea voyages (which required at least fifty men per trip), at a time when men were critically needed to develop infrastructure and establish agriculture. Land expeditions alone were certainly the answer, he proclaimed.[69] Again, instructions guiding expeditions contained multiple goals: to discover the Portuguese goldfields and explore Delagoa Bay as well as providing a way of attracting Hottentots to the fortress in the Cape to trade.[70] Men who dared to penetrate the interior beyond fifty miles were offered a reward and an impressive hundred-and-fifty guilders were promised to those who discovered the river Espirito Santo.[71] Despite the lure of gold, the intrepid and enthusiastic parties that had set out returned dejected and demotivated, with no better results than before.[72] After the dispatch of the ship *De Bruijdegom* in 1673, which returned without reaching the Bay, expeditionary sea voyages and overland

[65] For a detailed account of this undertaking, see Coetzee, 1948,
[66] See the instructions to *De Rode Vos* and *De Tulp*, Coetzee, 1948, 183n
[67] Madagascar served as a haven for pirates during the last decade of the seventeenth century, Bialuschewski, A. Thomas Bowrey's Madagascar manuscript of 1708 in *History of Africa*, 2007, 31-42, 34
[68] Coetzee, 1948, 183, "such a small ship."
[69] Coetzee, 1948, 187
[70] Ibid.
[71] A hundred and fifty guilders represented sixteen months work, as soldiers were paid nine guilders per month, see Penn, N. 'Great Escapes: Deserting soldiers during Noodt's Cape Governorship, 1727-1729,' *South African Journal*, 59:1, 171-203, (2007), DOI 10.1080/02582470709464777, 173
[72] To read in more detail about these expeditions, see Theal, G.M. *History of South Africa before 1795*, London: Swan Schonnenschein&Co, 1888, 109-117

journeys for the purpose of investigating Delagoa Bay and surrounds were suspended until the second half of the 1680s.[73]

But towards the end of the seventeenth century, accounts provided by ships' captains and shipwreck survivors of Dutch, English and French nationality about the soil conditions, inhabitants and trade possibilities of the East Coast, renewed interest in this area.[74] Increasing English presence in the Indian Ocean brought English ships to Table Bay as a port for repairs and loading refreshments. Here the Dutch authorities viewed their valuable cargo with envy. One such ship was the *John and Mary* that had allegedly conducted extensive trade at Delagoa Bay and Madagascar in ivory, ambergris and "red earth" and called at the harbour in 1684.[75] Another cargo that attracted attention was that of the *Margaret* that arrived at the Cape in April 1686 with her hull filled with a hundred and eighty slaves.[76] The Political Council particularly coveted this commodity and by 26 July, the *Baren* left the Cape with instructions to investigate Delagoa Bay, but, as before, only after visits to Madagascar and Mauritius. This ship was prevented from accomplishing the latter part of the instructions by stormy seas and the risk of running ashore. Enthusiasm for sea expeditions seemed to flag but an event in October 1687 renewed the interest of authorities at the Cape. A third of the English crew of the *Bonaventura* that ran aground at St. Lucia were rescued on Christmas Day 1686. The ten months spent with locals in and around St. Lucia provided the Cape with valuable details of the area. Their firsthand experience and eyewitness accounts of both Natal and Delagoa Bay were eagerly accepted. Natal was described as fertile, densely populated with an abundant supply of food.[77] Cattle were plentiful and inexpensive: a copper arm ring or neck ring could purchase either a cow or an ox. A copper ring was also enough payment for a barrel of "koorn".[78] Numerous wild game and elephant were to be found and the inhabitants were friendly and willing porters of heavy loads for as little as single copper earring.[79] The information about trade conditions around Delagoa Bay came from Hendrik Witkins, who travelled further north than his

[73] Coetzee, 1948, 193. *De Bruijdegom* was the tenth ship to be sent on this mission. In 1677, there was talk of sending a ship to the East Coast but the discussion never went over into action.
[74] Coetzee, 1948,195
[75] Coetzee, 1948,197. The red earth mentioned possibly refers to red ochre.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Coetzee, 1948, 201
[78] Ibid. A barrel was roughly equal to 250 liters. The word "koorn can be translated as kernels of some type of grain. See INL: Schatkemer van de Nederlandse Taal, http://gtb.inl.nl./iWDB/search?actie=article&wbd=WNT&id=M034987
[79] Ibid.

mates. He announced that trade was disappointing because of Portuguese competition. Witkin cites the reason for their failure to do business at the Bay as the better prices that the Portuguese paid for ivory. It is more likely that the English failed to establish a relationship with locals, by not following the accepted protocol of gaining permission to trade through paying tribute first, a custom the Portuguese were familiar to through over a century's worth of experience. Cattle were scarce and expensive (locals demanded both an arm and a neck ring for an ox), goats and chickens were many and there were no elephants to be seen.[80]

The Cape leadership was excited about the potential of reaching the goldfields of Monomotapa and the ivory trade via Delagoa Bay. But the Council of Seventeen was sceptical. Since the reports given by Marthinus Martini, the Cape had failed to deliver a scrap of evidence of gold, slaves or ivory. Matters that were of more concern to the Board were sources of timber and safe bays that could serve as harbours for Dutch ships. These requests gave Van der Stel and the Political Council at the Cape consent to authorise a voyage with specific instructions to sail to Delagoa Bay. On 19 October 1688, *De Noord* sailed out of Table Bay on this quest and arrived at its destination on 15 November 1688.

This exploration found trading conditions at Delagoa Bay disappointing. Two things determined successful trading in this location: an established relationship with local leadership based on tribute and gift giving, as well as the willingness to pay high prices for scarce goods. The regular English presence at the Bay had secured profitable trading for the local chiefs. The Dutch crew spied on an English ship that they identified as "een lorredraaier" (a smuggler) that had previously gained the friendship and trust from locals.[81] English traders seemed less concerned with profit margins, and were willing and able to offer far more in terms of gifts and goods. Chief Tembe rejected the copper neck ring the Dutch offered for a young boy and instead accepted the English counter-offer of "een pistool, met een snaphaan, mitsgaders ses stukjes lijnwaat ieder van omtrent twaalf ellen lang."[82] Food was expensive too: an ox was priced at ten pieces of Chinese cloth, which the Dutch

[80] Coetzee, 1948, 202
[81] Theal, G.M. 'Die reis na Delagoabaai,' in *Belangrijke Historische Dokumente*, Vol.1. Cape Town, 1896, 3
[82] Coetzee, 1948, 208, "a pistol with a flintlock, together with six pieces of cloth, each of about twelve el long." An *el* is a measure of length and is equal to roughly 692mm. *Twaalf ellen* is equal to about 8 meters.

refused to pay.[83] The inhabitants of the Bay area offered fruit, milk and vegetables for used pieces of cloth, typically swatches of shirts, for food. The ivory trade was negligible, due to a lack of stock. In spite of the high prices of meat and less than friendly trading, the Dutch deemed Delagoa Bay a good location to build a fortress because of its fresh water supplies, and the availability of goats (cattle and sheep were fewer in number), chickens and game, as well as a good supply of timber. Various rivers flowing into the Bay promised contact with the interior and lastly, the deep and safe harbour could accommodate a large fleet. *De Noord* left for Terra Natal on 29 December 1688 after exploring Delagoa Bay for the short period of two weeks, and noticed a stark difference in conditions once they arrived at Port Natal in early January of the next year. Trade here was brisk, done with friendly and polite people who heaped food on them. The Dutch managed to trade ten head of cattle in the month they were there and were astonished at the reasonable prices charged for food: for less than ten beads they could buy either a liter of milk, 6-7 pumpkins, or half a pound of bread. Terra Natal was a land of milk and honey and this abundance was possibly part of the reason why the Dutch were unsuccessful in buying slaves, as slavery thrives in dislocating circumstances of war or poverty. It was reported: "alsoo sij haar kinderen, nog jemand van haare, voor eenigh ding ter weereld souden willen afstaan, beminnende hun onderlingh, met een uijtstekende lievde en toegenegentheijt."[84]

Based on these explorations of November 1688 to February 1689, the captain of *De Noord* returned to Natal in October 1689, with the express purpose of purchasing the territory.[85] Captain Timmerman was instructed to buy Natal with "corallen, cooper, enijserwerk en wesmeer".[86] The transaction was effected for trade goods worth fifty pounds.[87] On its return journey, *De Noord* was lost at Cape St. Francis and with it, the precious deed of sale. This was to the great disappointment of the VOC, which felt "van haar pas verkregen rechte weder beroofd."[88] The next trip to the East Coast was prompted by a lack of timber in the Cape in 1705. The *Postloper* reported a disappointing trip. Having arrived at Natal, the captain enquired after the copy of the deed of sale but the current chief appeared to have a dim memory of the

[83] Theal, 1896, 9
[84] Coetzee, 1948, 212, "as children and adults alike could not be bought for anything in the world, [being] adored by an excellent love and friendly disposition."
[85] The purchase of Delagoa Bay was discussed, but never set out in an instruction, see Coetzee, 1948, 214
[86] Coetzee, 1948, 214, "beads, copper, iron goods and whatever else."
[87] Coetzee, 1948, 215
[88] Ibid, "once again felt robbed of its newly acquired rights."

purchase sixteen years ago and the chief claimed that the document had been buried with his father (who had signed it) along with all his other possessions.[89] All Dutch proof of claim to the territory was lost. The Dutch remained at Port Natal for a month before returning to the Cape, without visiting Delagoa Bay. Exploration of the East Coast appeared to slip from the Cape authorities' agenda until 1708, when another lack of timber motivated a request to the Council of Seventeen for permission to send a ship to Delagoa Bay and Natal. The VOC ignored this appeal. In 1713, the *Bennebroek* was stranded between Natal and East London and three of its crew (out of seventy-seven) who survived the ordeal of walking part of the way back to the Cape were picked up by an English ship that had been trading for ivory along the East Coast with great success. Their ship was filled with three thousand pounds of ivory bartered for beads and copper rings.[90] The *Postloper* was sent out to find the *Bennebroek*. Declaring it lost without trace, it proceeded onto Delagoa Bay, where yet again, trade proved to be disappointing. The chief "Sin Jaco" could not be convinced to trade by any gift, claiming that they had never heard of the Dutch but were familiar with the Portuguese and the English alone. The Dutch managed to acquire three tusks, weighing forty, fifty and sixty pounds respectively. In the end, the demand of twenty copper neck rings for a tusk of forty pounds signaled his unwillingness to trade with them.[91] These experiences over two weeks, confirmed that trade at Delagoa Bay would be of little advantage to the Company. On its way back, the *Postloper* stopped in Port Natal for six weeks, where it engaged in a far more successful ivory trade.

It took the Dutch twenty-four years to settle a trading post at Delagoa Bay. The flurry of excitement produced by Martini's report of promising trade was dampened by the pressing problems required by establishing the new settlement at the Cape. Van Riebeeck faced the two enormous tasks of settlement and exploration that each demanded the same resource: manpower. The dangerous coastline swallowed many ships along with the men on them and sea journeys were planned around those routes that had a reasonable chance to fill ships with profitable and necessary goods to the Cape. The highest concern of the parsimonious VOC was profit. Decisions to explore the coastline were managed from the Netherlands; by a board that required tangible evidence of potential profits that remained less than forthcoming. After the

[89] Coetzee, 1948, 218
[90] Coetzee, 1948, 219
[91] Coetzee, 1948, 220

first Dutch visit to Delagoa Bay, it took a further thirty-three years of gathering information about the Bay and Natal before the VOC would commit to settling a trading post at the former. In light of the glaring contrast between experiences at Delagoa Bay and Natal, it is surprising that the VOC gave permission for establishing a trading post at Delagoa Bay. But in the context of the VOC's policy of expansion, even in the face of financial pressure, the fabled goldfields of Monomotappa may have been sufficient to justify such a venture. Each of the three Dutch encounters with those at the Bay had underscored the lack of economic potential of the area and yet on 19 December 1719, the Council of Seventeen expressly ordered the settlement of a fort at this Bay on the southeastern coast of Africa.

In order to come to a decision to settle a trading post at Delagoa Bay, the VOC appointed a commission to conduct a formal inquiry into the viability of such an undertaking. This committee pronounced that an expedition of men should go about settling a post at "Terra Natal."[92] Natal seemed a logical choice: it promised good trading prospects and was an ideal harbour midway between India and the Cape for the Dutch fleet to dock on the way back from India. The sudden urgency around the decision to occupy the southeastern coast had two sources of anxiety. The possibility that other nations, such as the French and particularly the English would occupy this part of the coastline, further threatening Dutch commercial interests, was a matter of great concern to both the committee and the Company.

Another threat to their monopoly lay in the increasing pleas from the Cape to allow free shipping. This request involved allowing burghers to trade on their own accounts. Successive Governors at the Cape saw this measure as being economically advantageous to its struggling settlement, which was coming under increasing financial pressure. The argument was made that in legalising free shipping and allowing burghers to trade on their own accounts the incentive for the development of markets at individuals' own cost would be created, increasing profits. The VOC, however, clung resolutely to the idea that the monopoly of trade was the only way to financial success. In its view, the possibility of any profit being siphoned off into private pockets threatened the core of their existence. A further possible reason for occupying the southeastern coast and specifically Delagoa Bay was the potential this

[92] Coetzee, 1948, 222

location held for the acquisition of Portuguese assets along the East Coast to the north, such as Sofala, Melinde and Inhambane. In the end, it was the prospective gold riches of Delagoa Bay that swayed the Council of Seventeen to start a settlement at the Bay, rather than in Natal.[93]

In February 1721, orders were given to establish a trading post. The chamber of Amsterdam committed to supplying all the tools and trade goods necessary to set it up. Trade was to be the overriding goal of this settlement. In order to establish a Dutch presence on the southeastern coast of Africa, the Company required a fort at Delagoa Bay, from which expeditions to Natal and the interior could be launched. The assumption was that a permanent settlement at the Bay would be conducive to forging friendly relations with locals, developing trade networks and increasing the supply of goods to the Bay. Their instructions were clear to make every effort to attract locals to engage in trade through polite and friendly conduct, and to avoid violence and anything else that may obstruct good relations.[94] The ships *Gouda* and *Caap* were dispatched from the port of Texel, carrying the newly appointed director of the prospective trading post, other staff and equipment to the Cape, where they arrived on 22 November 1720. Here the future commander of the trading post, Nieuwhof, promptly died and Willem van Taak was chosen to fill his shoes. In order to ensure that trade in the name of the VOC received the highest priority, the instructions to build a fort, organise expeditions to determine the sources of gold and ivory, and not to harm or irritate locals were reiterated. For the sake of decorum, the executive issued Van Taak, as well as the captains of the two ships assigned to the journey, with letters of introduction that contained a serious plea to allow the Dutch free passage in and out of the Bay in order to trade:

> [A]lle koningen, princen, mitsgarders de grootste en aansienlijkste die aldaar ofte elders het hoogte gesag, gebied of authoriteid zoude mogen competeeren, dat zij den voorz. Opperhooft en schipper, schip

[93] Coetzee, 1948, 226. The ambitious goal of exploiting Natal for trade purposes remained in the sights of the VOC as seen in the title of the committee appointed to administrate and organize the trading post at Delagoa Bay: *Heeren Gecommitteerde Bewintheeben en Gevolmagtigdiens van de Vergaderingh der Heeren Seventhien ter Camer Amsterdam tot handel op delagoa Bay en Terra de Natal.*
[94] Coetzee, 1948, 227

> en bijhebbende volk laten varen, havenen uijtgaan en weder inkeren om haare aanbevolene affaires en negotie daar te doen.[95]

The proposed expedition to Delagoa Bay raised great excitement and plenty of volunteers stepped forward to accompany the journey to the African El Dorado; and so, on the morning of 29 March 1721, the ship's company of the *Gouda* and that of the *Zeelandia* sailed into Delagoa Bay.

[95] Coetzee, 1948, 229. "[A]ll kings, princes, those who are the greatest and most noteworthy with the highest authority, to allow the use of the harbour so that the commander, captain and staff may conduct trade there."

Illustrations and Maps



Societies occupying the shores of Delagoa Bay, 1721-1730



Illustration from White's Journal[1]

[1] White, W.M *Journal of a Voyage performed in the* Lion *Extra Indiaman to Madras, to Colombo and to De Lagoa Bay, 1798.* London: John Stockdale, 1800, 38



Illustration from White's Journal[2]

[2] White, 34



De Koninck's Map, 1726[3]

[3] From a photograph in Coetzee's thesis, *Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800.* PhD, Stellenbosch University, 1954

Chapter Two
Ethnographies

The People of Delagoa Bay

When the Dutch arrived at Delagoa Bay, they gradually became acquainted with the dominant lineages that inhabited its shores. These were Tembe, who dominated the southern bank; Bombo (also known as Machaya), who claimed paramountcy over the Mfumo: Maphumbo, Mateke and Matola on the northern bank; and finally, they encountered Manisse, whose domain lay further inland, in the vicinity of Lake Chuali.

In 1730, Jan van de Capelle attempted to compile a history of the settlement of Delagoa Bay.[4] According to oral traditions he collected, the existence of societies of Cherinde and Machaya preceded that of Tembe, Manisse and Mfumo. The last three had originated from Batua. The Dutch describe Baatwa as lying between the Komati and Pongola Rivers based on information given to them by locals. How accurate this information was is unsure because locals were determined to keep the Europeans in the dark about the interior. However, Baatwa is most likely associated with the area of modern-day Swaziland and Batua is probably the region of Butua-Torwa, located in current Zimbabwe.

Van de Capelle commented, "[A]lle hier omstreeks woonende neegers uit Baatwa of Batua afkomstig zijn behalven Cherinde en Machaia," [5] a point that Junod partially agrees with. He identified the origins of most of the "clans," as he called them, to either Zululand or Swaziland. In Van de Capelle's report, the Tembe, after having left Batua, first settled in location above that of Manisse, called WaLunge, along the Nkomati. From here they moved to the uninhabited southern bank of the lagoon and settled under the name of WaInsonke.[6] It appears that when a group moved into a new area, they sometimes assumed a new identity. The Tembe chose WaInsonke.

[4] Van de Capelle sadly neglected to identify his informants.
[5] NA 4373 f. 208, NA4373 f. 834. "[A]ll the local Negros, except Cherinde and Machaia are from Baatwa or Batua." For a full discussion of the location of Batua, see H. von Sicard, Das Reich Butwa-Torwa, *Paideuma*, 13, 1967, pp. 180 -189
[6] This appellation could have been chosen in an attempt to hide their original identity, according to a personal communication with Mucha Musemwa.

The next migration, after that of Tembe, occurred under the leadership of Bombo (also known as Machaya), which included Manisse, together with subordinates named Massingane, Lekondane (Howane), and Makande, a group that came to be collectively known as BaNhondwane. The reason for this was that they came to control Nondwane country, situated on either side of the Nkomati River, stretching north from the coast to Manisse's domain, a hundred kilometres from the coast. It appears that Manisse had split from the Bombo contingent to establish an independent and powerful polity further north and on the eastern bank of the Nkomati, and as the Dutch remarked, "Manisse is de grootste captein aan die zijde."[7]

According to Capelle's informants, Mphumbo's ancestors were the last to migrate from the province of WaMaba in Baatwa. This last wave of migration to the Bay injected a large population into the existing society – "en sterk van volk zijnde" – under the leadership of the three Mfumo brothers, two of whom respectively represented the BheLembe and the WaSeruti of the old country, but abandoned these identities for that of Mfumo.[8] These brothers came to occupy the western coastal stretch between the Nkomati and Matola Rivers, several years after the arrival of the BaNhondwane group and claimed equality with the BaNhondwane, not paying tribute to them. Because of the great number of people they retired to unoccupied land, known as the land of Mfumo, which corresponded to the location they occupied during the Dutch period.[9] This explanation has the ring of a political charter, and the account of the order of arrival at the Bay may have been adapted to promote the Mfumo in the eyes of the Dutch. These lineage groups collectively came to be called the Ronga by outsiders, particularly those from Nassangano, who came to trade from the northeastern interior.[10]

As seen above, by the time Antonio Caldeira and Lourenço Marques sailed into Delagoa Bay in 1554, the Ronga had been settled on its shores for some time.[11] By the end of the sixteenth century, the journals of shipwreck survivors had recorded the presence of several lineage groups that correspond to those encountered by the Dutch in the eighteenth century. Information gathered from the accounts of

[7] NA 4373 f. 205. "Manisse was the greatest chief on this side." By "die zijde" the Dutch mean the northern side of the estuary. Manisse's domain lay on the eastern side of the Nkomati, while Bombo occupied its western bank.
[8] NA 4373 f. 208. "and were strong in numbers."
[9] Ibid.
[10] NA 4373 f. 203ii.
[11] Information about sixteenth century societies in southern Africa is very scanty.

Perestrello (1554), Lavanha (1597) and Diogo Couto (1589) sketches a picture of where the Bay's inhabitants were situated. Portuguese accounts name the Zembe and Nyaka, whose territories stretched south and describe the occupants of the northern shore of Delagoa Bay as the Vumo, Lebombo and Manhica.[12] As the Portuguese trade narrative unfolded, the Inhaca chief's influence was portrayed to reach from the Manchungulo peninsula to almost as far as St. Lucia. Zembe, or the chief of Tembe, had territory that lay east of Inhaca's and extended far to the south. The fact that the Portuguese referred to the southernmost river of the estuary as the Zembe in 1554, attests to the longevity of the Tembe occupation of the southern banks of the river Espirito Santo.[13]

What is remarkable about the territories of these two southern chiefs, Inhaca and Tembe, is their apparent reach. The Dutch claimed that Tembe's land followed over fifty leagues (241 km) of coastline that included the southern bank of the Espirito Santo between the Tembe and Maputo River and reached a hundred leagues (482km) inland, divided into twenty-seven provinces that were administrated by the chief.[14] This claim might be exaggerated, yet the Tembe territory is described as "een groot land."[15] It is doubtful that either Inhaca or Tembe had anything more than a nominal influence over the territory they claimed as theirs. The Dutch never penetrated the hinterland around Delagoa Bay to this degree and certainly never to the south - the suggested dimensions of the purported Tembe kingdom would have been based on hearsay. It is more likely that scattered villages far afield called on the Ronga chiefs as protectors and that the chiefs' influence was felt in terms of tributary demands and raiding rather than administration. Furthermore, in reality the distance between the Tembe and Maputo Rivers is no more than fifty kilometers. It was in the Dutch interest to exaggerate the vastness of this chief's territory, implying vast resources, which added status to their association with Tembe, in order to reassure their superiors of the viability of the new trading post. The long history of this society's existence suggests that the Tembe had a governmental style resistant to centrifugal forces of fission. As mentioned above, Smith claims that the Dutch reported the Tembe chief administrating an area of approximately 116 000

[12] Junod, H.E. 'The condition of the natives of south-east Africa in the sixteenth century, according to early Portuguese documents,' *South African Journal of Science* 10, (1913),137-161, 147.
[13] Boxer and de Brito identify the Zembe as the Tembe river, see Boxer, footnote 1, 182
[14] Smith, A.K. 'The peoples of southern Mozambique: An historical survey,' *The Journal of African History*, 14, 4, (1973), 565-580, 572.The source Smith quotes, is innocent of any reference to political structures or size of the Tembe territory.
[15] NA4373 f. 204. "one large territory."

square kilometers. Even if the notion of administration is exaggerated, the apparent political stability and clear supremacy the Tembe commanded over the southern shores of Delagoa Bay during this period points to a dominant authority in the area. This is evident by the lack of reports of political volatility on the southern bank.

This picture of tranquility is supported by the lack of reports of political instability on the southern bank. But it could also partly be because their place of residence was on the opposite side of the river that created this perception. However, the reports sent to the Political Council at the Cape consistently told of the political stability in the south. Yet the Tembe were not completely isolated from political intrigues, and were often involved in skirmishes, while in alliance to Maphumbo. This alliance provided little political threat to the political stability south of the lagoon as Maphumbo and Tembe directed their assault towards the chiefs on the northern bank. The Machavane were the only other lineage group occupying the southern shore of the Bay, and were driven away in1729 in response to their chief's opposition to Dutch trade.

The stable Tembe landscape was used as a place of refuge for goods and cattle during periods of unrest. At the beginning of the period of unrest in 1726, followers of the lesser chiefs Polanen, Quambe, and Sasane moved tusks to Tembe's side of the river. At the time of trouble some were said to be "sterk besig met vier vrouwen eliphantstanden naar Tembi over te brengen".[16] Maphumbo's subjects followed suit and took their most precious goods to this location – "gelijk ook die van Maphumbo hunne beste goederen daar heenen te brengen."[17] In 1728, Machaya (also known as Bombo) sent cattle for safekeeping to the southern side, when the political situation had become too volatile.[18] Tembe's overlordship was clear to the Europeans, as he was declared "opperhooft" and "die groote captein," making him the unequivocal ruler of the south of the Espirito Santo River. [19]

Opposite Tembe, on the northern bank of the Espirito Santo, lay the villages of the Mfumo. The most prominent Mfumo were Maphumbo, Mateke and Matola. Closest to the coastline lay the large village of Maphumbo and to the west, along the river of

[16] NA ARD 9135 f.74. "working hard with four women to take tusks across to Tembe."
[17] Ibid. "the same counted for those of Maphumbo, who took their best goods over."
[18] NA 4371 f. 331
[19] NA 4373 f. 58. "commander" and " the greatest chief"

the same name, lay that of Matola.[20] To the west of the Matola River, along the coast, extended an uninhabited area, which the Dutch noticed was neither cultivated nor used as pasture, despite being suited to farming. Later, the Dutch would cultivate thatch grass here because the area was a seasonally wet and marshy field and ideally suited to growing reeds.[21] The nearest village to Maphumbo, which lay a short distance away to the northwest, belonged to Mateke. Much further along the coast east of Maphumbo, the Nkomati River flowed into the Bay, and, beyond its mouth, the village of Bombo spread along its western banks, bordering on his neighbour Cherinde. Following the Nkomati's curve to the north, on the far side, beyond Lake Manje, lay the large settlement belonging to Manisse.

The northern bank proved to be politically unstable and prone to military clashes. Between the Matola and Nkomati Rivers, the four chiefs represented political authority: Maphumbo, Matola and Bombo. These chiefs bordered each other and vied for access to trade. Maphumbo and Matola were descendants of Mfumo, while Mateke was affiliated to Bombo, who claimed jurisdiction over all of this area. The political hierarchy on the northern side of the Bay was unclear to the Dutch, who pieced the history of hostilities between chiefs together over time in an attempt to understand the political dynamics that threatened trade at Delagoa Bay. What they discovered was a situation in which an ascendant chief, Mateke, sought to establish himself as paramount over the Mfumo, while at the same time shaking off the shackles of Bombo's claim to tribute. Bombo saw himself as the paramount of the northern bank. This claim was probably based on the authority his ancestors claimed as leaders of the Ndhondwane migration to Delagoa Bay.

De Koninck mapped the relative size of each chief's village in 1726, finding that the villages of Maphumbo and Bombo were the largest on the northern side of the lagoon, among five other smaller chiefs, who fell under Bombo's authority. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, Mateke had earned the title of chief and the tributary rights over Maphumbo's land and had aspirations to the position of paramount chief. This status was partly achieved through services to Bombo in a war against Maphumbo's father (likely the same war that saw them banished to the beach).[22] Mateke seriously challenged Bombo's claim to overlordship from 1726, based on the control over a

[20] Smith, A.K. *The Struggle for Control of Southern Mozambique, 1720- 1835. Ph.D. University of California, 1970,* 31
[21] CA C406 f. 106. Reeds are well-suited to growing in seasonally marshy areas.
[22] NA ARD 9135 f. 71

substantial section of the bead trade.[23] Mateke's open confrontation intensified efforts by other Mfumo chiefs to drive him out. The increase in levels of wealth among a limited section of the population around Delagoa Bay aggravated quarrels, as we shall see below, and sprouted various permutations of alliance that would ultimately disrupt trade around the Bay all together. By 1730, Mateke had proclaimed himself paramount.

[23] CA C 421 f. 22, CA C 431 f. 27

Maps



Possible Locations of Paraotte, Machikosse, Chiremandelle and Inthowelle



Trade Routes in the Transvaal[1]

[1] This map is based on the work of J.B. de Vaal in Neem uit die Verlede: Die Gekiedenis van die Laeveld en Onstaan van die Krugerwildtuin, U.V de V. Pienaar (ed.) Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 67 and that of Tim Maggs The Mpumalanga Escarpment settlements: some answers, many questions in Five hundred Years Redicovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects Swanepoel, N., Esterhuysen, A., Bonner. (eds.) Jhb: Wits Press, 171

Trading with People from the Interior

For the first two and a half years of the trading post's existence, the Dutch traded exclusively with the local communities situated around Delagoa Bay. However, in August 1723, two men arrived from the deep interior offering gold dust for sale.[2] Others followed these two traders, and originated from different regions beyond the Lebombo. The Dutch dubbed the newcomers *buitelanders*, or foreigners, who came from the territories of Paraotte, Nassangano, Machikosse, Chiremandelle, Inhambane, Maquaqua and Tsouke. These regions introduced to the Dutch, present us with the thorny problem of identifying their locations. The Dutch recorded these place names phonetically, obscuring the African orthography and with it the linguistic link to the whereabouts of these places. My goal is to shed light on the possible locations of Paraotte, Machikosse, Chiremandelle and Inthowelle by evaluating the information gathered by the Dutch during the early eighteenth century, in terms of linguistics, metallurgy and geographical clues.

The reason for the focus on these four places is the significant contribution of their traders to trade at Delagoa Bay. Traders from the Paraotte and Machikosse are especially important because they increased the flow of trade to the coast, which eventually threatened the political balance. Chiremandellean traders were significant because of the copper supply they carried. The area of Nassangano influenced the Delagoa Bay trade network because of its strategic geographical position across principal trade routes converging on Komati Poort, and tended to inhibit the flow of trade towards the south, because of their reluctance to let foreigners pass through their territory to the coast. And lastly, Inthowelle is of significance because of the interest shown by its chief to settle a trading post in his territory.

As we have seen, the most prominent traders from the interior were from places called Paraotte, Machikosse, Chiremandelle and Nassangano. The Dutch spoke of each of these areas as a *landstreek*, meaning area, place, or region. They used the words *landen van*, when referring to Chiremandelle, which can be translated as "region," "lands," "kingdom," "country" or "fields" of Chiremandelle. The language the Dutch used to describe a region as a country or a kingdom reflected a

[2] CA C 415 f. 50

Eurocentric view of territory, reflected by the eighteenth century dynastic and commercial wars that had separated Europe into countries and kingdoms, and came to be defined by a politically autonomous territory distinguished by a particular culture and language. This worldview may be problematic in that this notion of country and fledgling nationality may have influenced the Dutch traders' interpretation of the information about the political nature of societies occupying the interior. In reality, African societies during the eighteenth century were not only hybrid but also porous and overlapping and these societies seldom identified with a territory other than with reference to a place of origin because subjects identified with a chief rather than a territory.[3] This may be due to the mobility of societies that relocated frequently in search of water sources and pasture, or as a result of the fissiparous nature of early African society.

Societies occupying areas of Paraotte, Machikosse, Chiremandelle and Nassangano were most likely located in the area of the Transvaal, which lies between the Limpopo and Vaal Rivers. The region of the Transvaalwas inhabited by heterogeneous groups, rather than those determined by fixed categories of identity. Anthropologists, ethnographers and historians who have tried to reconstruct geographies of power, identity and production of the eighteenth century, such as Junod and Van Warmelo, have relied heavily on oral traditions collected at the earliest in the mid-nineteenth century, which were inevitably shaped and coloured by the major processes of change which had played out in the region over the preceding hundred years.[4] This later collection of information created a distorting lens, which probably obscures as much as it reveals about the patterns of society that existed in the first decades of the eighteenth century. The great advantage of the material gathered by the Dutch at Delagoa Bay is that it predates the social upheaval precipitated by the Nguni invasions of the early nineteenth century . But unfortunately, another powerfully distorting factor is at play. As I will elaborate further below, local and visiting traders who gave information to the Dutch had good reason to lie. After all, they had no reason to give them information that might

[3] Landau, P.

[4] Smith, A. The Trade in Delagoa Bay and Nguni politics, 1750- 1935 in Leonard Thompson, (ed.) *African Societies in southern Africa.* London: Heinemann, 1969, Delius, P. *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi polity, the Boers and the British in nineteenth century Transvaal.* Berkeley: University of California Press, Bonner, P. *Kings, commoners and Concessionaires: The evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi state.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Wright, J. 'Turbulent Times: political transformations in the North and the East,' in Hamilton,C., Mbenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol.1, From early times to 1885.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

lead to the Dutch attempting to bypass them and establish direct links to centers of trade in the interior. As a result the information the Dutch gathered gives us a partial view of the interior from the coast in the early eighteenth century. But these sketchy details do allow us to get a very different sense of the interior to that provided by later traditions, in which the Ndebele, Pedi, Swazi, Venda dominate the landscape as separate homogenous societies, who occupied the Transvaal from the nineteenth century.

Societies who occupied this area participated in a trade network that covered vast distances and some routes reached as far as Sofala, Manhica, Sena and Tete. In order to understand how the trade network related to the north and northwest interior from the southeastern coast, it is important to understand the demand for certain trade goods driven partly by the European market that was supplied by different societies from various locations it is important to establish from where traders came below the Limpopo River.. However, in order to gain a better understanding is a major challenge. The Dutch had at best a nebulous understanding of the eighteenth century interior, and faced the frustrating task of disentangling fact from fiction in a stream of misinformation given to them.

The motivation for misleading the Dutch about the locations that supplied gold and ivory was to remain in control of the redistribution of exotic trade goods, explored below. The local chiefs, like Maphumbo and Mateke, intimidated traders from the northwest into silence about the whereabouts of their territories. Nevertheless, over time, the Dutch formed a general impression that the source of gold and ivory lay to the north and northwest, towards what we know as the Limpopo River and Zimbabwe. These locations hint at the great scale of the trading networks operating throughout southeastern Africa. In order to locate these places for the purpose of this study, it is useful to consider geographical clues and linguistic hints. Other evidence used to ascertain the possible locations of territories mentioned by the Dutch, includes the characteristics of the different societies as represented by the accounts of traders, such as cultivation, mining activities and interaction with Europeans, most notably the Portuguese.

The demands of European trade on the southeastern African coast led to the development of trade routes to and from the interior. From the sixteenth century

onwards, the Portuguese trade on the Zambezi River and Sofala shifted contact between the interior and the wider Indian Ocean trade network further south, a trade connection that would eventually cross the Limpopo River.[5] By the early eighteenth century, the Dutch presence drew traders from Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle, travelling east through Nassangano to their trading post.

Reasons for the Dutch Ignorance about the Interior

The primary interest in a source of gold caused a flurry of excitement when the first unnamed visitors appeared with this metal and ivory from a place they claimed to be Paraotte. This excitement focused unwanted Dutch interest on the interior in the eyes of locals because it potentially jeopardised the local chiefs' hold over the Dutch and their trade. If the Dutch were to move away from the Bay and set up a trading post in the interior, the local chiefs would lose control over the distribution of trade articles to their counterparts inland.[6]

The threat of losing control of trade, or more precisely, the redistribution of goods, motivated the chiefs' policy of supplying misinformation, which the Dutch called "misleijdinge."[7] This strategy included adjusting distances between Delagoa Bay and regions within the interior. These distances were measured in the number of days travelled and "tegenstrydige en wispelteurige rapporten van strandbewoners" frustrated their efforts to pinpoint any location outside of the immediate Bay area.[8] In order to discourage Dutch relocation and expeditions, the distances between places were modified, giving the impression that these were easily accessible from Delagoa,. Initially, any given place was said to be much further away than what was subsequently maintained. For instance, in answer to the question of how far the goldfields of Monomotapa were, informants adjusted the distance from thirty to ten days over the course of their interaction with the Dutch.a period of timeThis circumstance, probably to had to do with discouraging exploration and as well as preventing the possible relocation of the trading post.[9] Keeping the Dutch in Mfumo

[5] How far south is explored below with the discussion of the trade of Paraotte and Chiremandelle.
[6] The political importance of controlling the distribution of trade goods is discussed below.
[7] CA C421 f. 3, letter dated 3 July 1726
[8] According to Punt, day's journey is equal to a distance of 48 to 56 km, Punt, W.H.J. *The First Europeans in the Kruger Park, 1725.* National Parks Board of Trustees: Pretoria, 1975, 27. "The contradictory and inconstant reports of the coast dwellers," NA 4367 f 629
[9] CA C421 f. 33, letter dated 3 July 1726

territory, while controlling access to incoming traders was important for political reasons, considered below.

As we have seen, Paraotte was of particular interest because of the gold dust its traders presented to the Dutch. A frequent visitor from Paraotte was a man named Pangele Inthowisse, headman of a village located in this region.[10] While being cognisant of frequently being lied to, the Dutch trusted Pangele, whose words seemed truthful: "dat nog eenigsints met weinig waarheid vermengt scheen." [11] He seemed trustworthy because his answers stayed consistent under cross-examination. He also happily supplied information about Paraotte, trade with Monomotapa and Sofala. But his initial willingness to divulge details concerning his and other territories soon stopped. Pangele suddenly appeared to have forgotten about Monomotapa, which he referred to as "Blosje." Pangele's sudden lapse in memory was probably due to pressure from local chiefs, in order to limit information supplied to the Dutch. The same strategy is noticeable in Maphumbo's refusal to corroborate details of accounts then in circulation that gold had recently been found at Inthowelle: "daar [Inthowelle] goud beginnt te vallen," and "hoewel hij het op ons vragen eerst ontkendende dog naderhand sijde de waarheijd te zijn."[12]

And because both the local chiefs and those in close proximity to Delagoa Bay were reluctant to see the trading post disappear into the interior, he and other chiefs also discouraged his followers from serving as guides.[13] It is likely that the Nassangano and the Mfumo chiefs had a tacit understanding in containing trading post activities to the coast and it is therefore surprising that, the chiefs at the Bay did not physically restrain the expedition of 1725.

The expedition under the command of Francois de Cuiper and Sgt. Johannes Monna left on 27 June 1725.[14] The intention of the party of thirty-one men was to reach Inthowelle, with the assistance of eight interpreters, and a leader for the ten pack-oxen. They moved in a northwesterly direction and crossed the Crocodile River two weeks later. On the sixteenth day of their journey, and about forty-eight kilometres

---

10 NA 4369 f. 28

11 CA 421 f. 34, CA C421 f. 31, "who seemed to speak with some measure of truth," letter dated 3 July 1726

12 CA 415 f. 67, "gold has recently been found at Inthowelle" " at first he denied it but later confirmed it as truth."

13 CA C415 f.67

14 For a full account of the expedition see the published journal of the journey in Punt, W.H.J. *The First Europeans in the Kruger Park, 1725.* National Parks Board of Trustees: Pretoria, 1975, 45-79

from current day Skukuza, they were attacked, robbed of their trade goods and all their oxen killed. This unfortunate event caused them to turn back towards the coast. The apparent show of support for this venture by local chiefs was probably to keep goodwill between themselves and the Dutch, leaving the violent resistance to their progress to their associates in Nassangano.

Another circumstance kept the Dutch in the dark about the interior. The first visitors from Paraotte were said to speak a strange language unintelligible at the coast, which may have been either Sesotho, Tshivenda or Sekoni. As we shall see later, Paraotte is associated with the region known as Baloadi. The Dutch made use of translators proficient in a degree of Portuguese to communicate with locals and for a while it appeared that the translators could not communicate with these traders, probably under orders of the local chiefs. But the Dutch were not fooled. The Paraotteans' extensive contact with the Portuguese trade network was clearly evident by the cloth they wore, used in exchange for goods at Sofala by the Portuguese. This apparent language barrier between the locals and the Paraotteans initially prevented the Dutch from making enquiries about the whereabouts of this territory, keeping them in the dark.[15] If the traders from Paraotte did in fact speak a language foreign to the locals of Delagoa Bay, it may indicate the development of a relatively new expansion of a trade network toward the coast in which either one, or all of the three groups mentioned above, participated.

In the absence of exposure to a single African language and any detailed understanding of who occupied the interior, the Dutch came to the slow realisation that different labels were assigned to the same people and places, due to a plethora of languages unfamiliar to their ear. Incredulous at the overlap, they report that Gole corresponds to Tsangamere, Okalanga and WaLemba, failing at first to recognise their confusion of person and place.[16] A good example of a typical misidentification based on multiple pronunciations of a word is the Paraotte word for Monomotapa – Blosje. Pangele probably pronounced this word as Balosi by substituting the l-sound for that of r, leading to the Dutch interpretation of Blosie or Blosje. The term Balosi was in reality a corruption of BaRovzi, referring to a specific society rather

[15] CA C416 f. 59
[16] CA C433 f. 75

than a precise location.[17] This line of argument based on linguistics brings us to a possible explanation of the location of Paraotte.

Where was Paraotte?

The linguistic principle explained above is helpful in the attempt to locate the region of Paraotte. In the past, the location of Paraotte has been obscure. In 1933, Paver stated that Paraotte "remains a mystery."[18] The dominant interpretation up till to the present has been to connect Paraotte with Phalaborwa, which is associated with Iron Age iron and copper production. However, using the same set of linguistic parallels laid out above, it is possible to associate Paraotte with an area known as Balaodi, its phonetic equivalent. [19] Futhermore, the area of Baloadi was area occupied by Sotho, Venda and Koni groups during the eighteenth century.

Madan declares that the sounds l and r are interchangeable in Bantu languages.[20] Eiselen goes further and shows other corresponding consonants, forming a phonetic unit, namely consonants p>b, t>d and l>r, following a confirmed linguistic rule. This phonetic unit enables the tracking of one language within another.[21] On this linguistic basis, it seems reasonable to suggest that the word the Ronga rendered as Paraotte correlates with the Sotho term Bolaodi. It is therefore highly likely that these two terms are interchangeable.[22]

The landscape of Paraotte was most likely home to either hybrid or neighbouring groups of Sotho, Koni and Venda speakers.[23] Sometime in the past, Venda absorbed old Sotho societies, supported by oral traditions recalling sections of their people

---

[17] CA C421 f. 16. For a discussion on the linguistic relationship between Blosje and BaRovzi (which he spells Baroswi) see Paver, F.R. Trade and mining in the pre-European Transvaal in *south African Journal of Science,* 30, 1933, 603-611, 606.

[18] Paver, 605

[19] Krige, J.D. Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal,' *Bantu Studies,* 11, (1937), 321-356, 324

[20] Madan, A.C. *Living Speech in Central and South Africa: an Essay Introductory to the Bantu Family of Languages.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911, 24. Balaodi spellt Bolaudi, Bolaudzi, VhaLaudzi, VhaLauti, Loudi and Laudzi

[21] Eiselen, W. 'Die Veraenderung der konsonanten durch ein vorhergehendes in den Bantusprachen,' *Zeitschrif fuer Eingeborene Sprachen*, 14, (1914), 81- 151, 106 and 107

[22] According to Dr. Andrew van der Spuy, Linguistics Department, University of the Witwatersrand, 21 November 2014.

[23] The nature of Sotho and Venda eighteenth century societies are extensively discussed in Hall, S. Farming communities of the second millennium: internal frontiers, identity, continuity and change in Landau, P.S. *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 and Hamilton, C., MBenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa: from early times till 1885, Volume 1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012

leaving for Vendaland.[24] The Venda changed the word Bolaodi to Bolaudzi or Vhalaudzi, obscuring the linguistic link to the word Paraotte.[25]

Because of the assimilation described above, Bolaodi is asserted as the place of origin for the most of southeastern Venda society, and the connection of Venda leaders to Paraotte or Baloadi offers a possible timeframe for their migration the northwards. According to Krige, Tshivulane was a chief of the southeastern Venda, and who, together with his relatives Massia, Tshimbubfe, Komvanye and NeTsianda, was a descendant of Muhovhe who at some point moved from Bolaudzi or Bolaodi, located in the vicinity of Pilgrim's Rest.[26] If this Tshivulane is the same chief referred to as Chiwalane by the Dutch, then this move occurred some time before 1726, as Chiwalane was declared chief of the territory in Inthowelle by at least June 1726.[27] Massia, Tshimbubfe and Tshivulane had hills in the Soutpansberg named after them according to De Vaal's map in *Neem uit die Verlede*, hills which were in close proximity to the elephant breeding grounds and iron mines.[28]

Sections of Bakoni society, which occupied the area between the Komati and Steelpoort Rivers, were also associated with Bolaodi. Although Tshivulane denied all relationship with the Koni, these oral traditions mirror the geographical evidence for the location of Paraotte because the most compelling piece of evidence for Paraotte is the Dutch observation that Manisse's son repeatedly said that the Nkomati River rises in Paraotte, which places a section of this region west of Carolina and in the area known for its Bakoni stone walling.[29]

There is another factor that seems to corroborate Paraotte's location, which is the occurrence of metal deposits in the lower eastern Transvaal area. [30] Reports of gold, copper and tin found in Paraotte suggest that this territory included a vast area, inclusive of Carolina, Phalaborwa and Rooiberg. Visitors to, and traders from this

[24] Krige, 324
[25] Krige, J.D. Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal in *Bantu Studies*, 11, 1937, 321-356, 322
[26] Krige, 324n1
[27] NA 4373 f. 587
[28] Pienaar, U.V de V. (ed.) *Neem uit die Verlede: Die Gekiedenis van die Laeveld en Onstaan van die Krugerwildtuin*, Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 67.
[29] NA 4373 f. 176
[30] The Transvaal is a useful term because it describes a continuous geographical area beyond the Vaal River below the arch of the Limpopo River, over which the trade network stretched. This area corresponds to the current day Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Northwest and Limpopo provinces.

region, asserted the existence of certain metals – gold, copper and tin – in the hills of Paraotte. The Dutch heard with elation about "… het goud in de rivieren en ook in 't gebergte gevonden weird."[31] This statement was one of the main motivations for the failed expedition of 1725, led by De Cuiper and Sergeant Monna into the interior. The Paraottean traders spoke of three gold mines, located in their territory and mined daily, "drie minen in sijn land soude sijn waar dagelijks werde gearbeijd."[32] Friede points out that pre-colonial gold workings have been discovered in the Lydenburg-Pilgrim's Rest and Sabie area, as well as evidence for rich deposits of alluvial gold in the Pilgrim's Rest region.[33] The remains of three mines in the Carolina and Middelburg area cannot with certainty be described as gold mines because both copper and gold ores are found there.[34] Nevertheless, these findings correlate with Pangele's assertions of the existence of gold mining in Paraotte. Despite the apparent richness of these sources, the gold mines appear to have been underexploited, with traders from Paraotte persistently bringing inferior quality gold dust to the trading post. The counterintuitive Dutch tendency to pay high prices for sub-standard gold encouraged this behaviour and it is likely that Paraotteans kept the purest gold for their longstanding Portuguese partners and their agents.

The region of Paraotte was associated with copper mining. Two subjects of Maphumbo, who travelled through Paraotte, told of seeing copper miners hacking ore out of mountains "cappen uijt gebergte" from which neck rings, bangles and beads were fashioned. [35] There is a discontinuous arch of cuprous deposits extending from eastern Botswana to Musina in the Limpopo Valley to Phalaborwa in the Lowveld of the Transvaal and extensive pre-colonial copper mining was carried out in the northern and eastern Transvaal.[36] Copper mining is typically associated with Phalaborwa and Musina but a reef carrying rich copper exists north of Pilgrim's Rest, and in addition to those mentioned around Carolina and Middelburg, confirms the possibility that Paraotte included the region around the confluence of the Sabie and Blyde Rivers, perhaps stretching as far as Middelburg. Some scholars have

[31] CA C 421 f. 16, letter dated 3 July 1726, " gold found in the rivers and mountains."
[32] CA C 422 f. 93, "three mines in their territory, worked daily."
[33] Friede, H.M. Friede, 'Iron mining in the Transvaal ,' *Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, April (1980), 163 and Table II, 162
[34] Friede, 1980, 163
[35] CA C 415 f. 66, "hacked out of mountains"
[36] Herbert, E. W. *Red Gold Of Africa: Copper in Pre-Colonial History and Culture*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, 26

however been convinced that the evidence of extensive copper mining found at Phalaborwa places Paraotte there. Marks and Gray state that it is fairly certain that Paraotte is Phalaborwa.[37] But perhaps the best way to interpret the available evidence is to suggest that the territory of Paraotte included, rather than was limited to, Phalaborwa and encompassed areas to the southwest. Visitors to Paraotte spoke of large quantities of copper, hacked out of mountains and melted down to produce neck rings, bangles and copper beads.[38] Phalaborwa is in close proximity to the Olifants River. According to Mahoemane, on the way to Inthowelle he was told he had entered Paraotte as the party crossed the Olifants River, which places the eastern limits of Paraotte in the vicinity of Phalaborwa.[39] This suggests that Paraottean copper supplies came from the Phalaborwa complex, rather than the Pilgrim's Rest area.

Besides copper, Paraotte was reported to be a source of tin. Before the Machikosse's arrival at the trading post, the traders from Paraotte were the only suppliers of tin ingots.[40] The ancient mines around Rooiberg in the Waterberg district are the only known iron-age tin mines in southern Africa, which leaves this area to be associated with Paraotte. This association infers that Paraotte stretched from the Komati River to Rooiberg.

In an apparent contradictory report, both the regions of Machikosse and Paraotte claimed to have access to tin.[41] Whatever success the Paraotteans had as traders, their fortunes would fade by the later 1720s and the claim that both regions had a source of tin may indicate a change in the political fortunes of Paraotte, hinting that some tin-bearing territory was lost to the Machikosse. The eclipse of Paraottean, and the ascendency of Machikossean trade by 1727, supports this view.[42] The last Paraottean traders appear to have arrived mid-July 1726, and in addition to gold dust, delivered 12 pounds of tin to the Dutch.[43] The traders from Machikosse not only brought tin (one ingot weighed eight pounds) but also great quantities of ivory to the coast – 1700 pounds and 4000 pounds on two respective occasions.[44] And

[37] Gray, R. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 409
[38] CA C415 f. 63
[39] NA 4373 f. 569ii
[40] CA C415 f. 50
[41] Reference for Machikossean tin, C427 f. 17; tin in Paraotte, C 415 f. 50
[42] NA 4373 f. 582, table logging the date of arrival, distances from Delagoa Bay and routes followed by traders.
[43] CA C421f. 36 and CA C422 f. 5
[44] Coetzee, 1948, C.G. *Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800*. PhD, Stellenbosch, 1954.

their two deliveries of tin, one in 1728 and the other in 1729, amounted to 211 and 173 pounds respectively.[45] Machikossean traders came to dominate the trade scene at Delagoa Bay, as they arrived in parties of increasing numbers, swelling to three hundred by 1727.[46] Their access to significant quantities of tin, suggests that Machikosse territory lay further northwest, which contained the current day Rooiberg mines. However, Paver identifies this group with Mashakatsi, a chief of the Maluleke on the eastern side of the Transvaal.[47] The problem with this view is that it is unlikely that a polity lying so far to the east, distant from tin mines and not being situated on a trade route connected to Rooiberg, would have had an influence on the mining, trade, or distribution of tin.

There is, however, another pre-colonial source of tin in southern Africa. Van de Capelle wrote to the Cape, explaining that Machikosse contained alluvial tin: "…they had found tin in the land of Mashicosje along the river beds and that they collected it in baskets…"[48] This source of tin could refer to the rich alluvial deposits of Swaziland, which places Machikosse here, lying next to the territory of Paraotte.[49]

The information the Dutch gathered about these locations is vague and outlines Paraotte or Baloadi as a vast territory that appears to stretch across the Transvaal, from Rooiberg to the Komati Poort area. If the source of tin was in Swaziland, Paraotte emerges as an area confined to the southeastern corner of the Transvaal, stretching from Carolina to the Lebombo Mountains in the east, and Phalaborwa in the north.

The Role of the Nassangano in Trade to the Coast

Whatever political disruptions were taking place in the interior, trade at the Bay continued, albeit with some challenges. Besides the notoriously unreliable Dutch bead supply, the movement of traders, compelled to travel through Komati Poort, met with the significant political barrier of Nassangano, which tended to stifle trade

[45] Sleigh, D. Table of Exports from Delagoa Bay, 711
[46] NA 4371 f. 266
[47] Paver, F.R. 'Trade and mining in the pre-European Transvaal,' *South African Journal of Science*, Vol. 30, (1933), 605
[48] Friede, H.M. 'Tin mining and smelting in the Transvaal during the Iron Age,' *Journal of the south African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy,* (July 1976), 461-470, 461
[49] Friede, 1976, 462

growth. The society of Nassangano can safely be identified as that of Hlanganu.[50] Junod's map shows that Nassangano territory lay to the west of the Lebombo Mountains along the lower section of the Kruger National Park, extending from the Olifants River to beyond the Komati.[51] The north-south orientation of this region meant that it extended across two of the major trade routes to Delagoa Bay. This strategic position gave them an opportunity to halt companies of traders to demand tolls, which were in the eyes of the Dutch extraordinary high: "…gedwongen tot betalen van extraordinaire tolle…"[52] The Nassangano attitude towards visitors from the interior illustrated the fierce competition over scarce exotic trade goods, namely the blue beads the Dutch continually battled to supply. Envious of a limited source of prestige goods, the Nassangano chiefs routinely held up the traders from Paraotte and later those from Machikosse, "veele male…door dit zee wonende schuijn in hunne reise herwaard geempechert werden".[53] The high tolls were probably demanded in the form of ivory that could later be traded for the Nassangano chiefs' account. Distressed traders, deprived of their goods, urgently requested Dutch intervention to release men and chattel from Nassangano chiefs. This interference hampered the ivory trade from the interior, to the great frustration of the Dutch. As increasing numbers of Paraottean and Machikossean traders wanted to pass through Nassangano, no amount of toll or tribute could ensure their passage. In 1728, a party of a hundred Machikosse was refused permission to continue, in spite of offering compensation, because the Nassangano resented the passage of the strangers, saying that they, the Nassangano, could provide the gold dust and ivory the Machikosse had to offer, in addition to copper and tin.[54]

The Nassangano had initially brought the most ivory to the trading post until their supply was overshadowed by that of Paraotte and later that of Machikosse. However, the first Nassangano transaction recorded happened to be in gold and not in ivory. The Nassangano apparently stood in some sort of relationship with Tembe, who unfailingly accompanied traders from Nassangano to the trading post. In August 1724, the first Nassangano trader to arrive at the trading post was a chief

[50] Paver, F.R. 'Trade and mining,' 605. There is a town named Nassangano, which means "meeting place", and is currently the fourth largest town in Swaziland.
[51] Junod, H.A. *The Life of a South African Tribe Vols. 1&2.* New York: University books, 1962 Although Junod's map dates from the 19th century, it appears to be consisted with the information given in Dutch documents.
[52] NA 4373 f.205 "forced to pay extraordinary tolls"
[53] CA C 422 f. 16 "were often halted on their journey by those who live towards the sea."
[54] NA 4371 f.336

named Coupanne. The Dutch claimed him to be the most prominent chief of the Komati Poort area, whose homestead lay approximately a hundred kilometres from the Bay.[55] Wanting to take advantage of the trade in beads at the Bay, Coupanne had previously travelled to a chief named Thowe Sekansje, to purchase some alluvial gold dust in exchange for yellow beads and by his own confession had to travel for seven weeks to do so. [56] This trade trip appears to have been inspired by the substantial profit the Paraotteans made in selling gold to the Dutch the year before. The distance alludes to the possibility of a trip to a Zimbabwean gold fair to purchase gold. In the absence of any other indicators, such as dress or Portuguese loan words (as was the case with Paraottean traders), this shows that Nassangano had little regular and direct contact with the Portuguese gold and ivory trade network. However, this does not mean they did not trade locally. On the contrary, Coupanne shook his head at chiefs like Machavane, who thwarted trade with Europeans. He called this attitude foolish because trading with the Dutch brought a lot more profit than trading with locals, "aan andere inlanders voor viel minder prijs verkoopen".[57] However, the Nassangano were opposed to the idea of the Dutch penetrating the interior and violently repelled the expedition of De Cuiper and Mona in 1725. The Nassangano were in favour of local trade and being strategically situated, could dictate the flow of trade from the interior.

Where was Chiremandelle?

Curiously, those from Chiremandelle were never held up in Nassangano, probably because they were copper traders. As a trade item, copper was not typically nor exclusively associated with European trade, as was ivory. In addition, copper was a highly sought after commodity in Africa. Compared to gold, it is a region relatively poor in copper resources.[58] Copper jewellery – masses of neck, leg and arm rings - indicated wealth and status in African society, an indispensable commodity to the elite. Societies without copper resources appeared to defer to copper miners, as the history of the Musina copper miners illustrates. Copper ore buyers arriving in

[55] CA C 417 f. 74, CA C413 f. 105. For the comment on being the most prominent, see Punt, W.H.J. 'Die verkenning van die Krugerwildtuin deur die Hollandse Oost-Indiese Kompanje, 1725,' in *Koedoe, 1*, (1958) 1-18, 9
[56] CA C 413 f. 105. White people, most likely Portuguese, were reported to visit Thowe Sekansje, which situates his territory in Zimbabwe.
[57] NA ARD 9135 f. 54. " sell to locals at a far lower price."
[58] Herbert, 15

Musina tolerated rude behaviour for the sake of obtaining this precious metal and suffered insults and inhospitality from their hosts.[59] Early in 1725, the Dutch were told that Nassangano had "mountains entirely consisting of copper".[60] Within the same year, this fact was adjusted to Nassangano not having any copper deposits.[61] The Dutch saw this contradiction as evidence of the deceptive nature of locals. However, this report could be an indication of the political turmoil in the interior and that the Nassangano had lost access to copper supplies, possibly at Phalaborwa, to those of the region called Chiremandelle. The Chiremandallean trader named Tsevane Waronge, accompanied by another named Monana, told of a disagreement with Coupanne and that trade no longer occurred between the two societies.[62] Copper traders arrived a total of four times at the Bay during its Dutch occupation, once in November 1724, and twice in 1725, October and December respectively, as well as twice in the first quarter of 1726. The political upheaval that sprung up in early 1726 on the northern bank probably deterred them, a possible explanation for why they avoided the coastal trade after 1726. Delagoa Bay was by no means their only outlet.

People known as Matonga from Inhambane, mentioned above, traded with Manisse. The traders who penetrated the Transvaal as far as the Olifants River could either have been from Inhambane or Sofala and were described as "swarten menschen met lang hair." [63] These traders travelled on donkeys and oxen carrying red, blue and white cloth, as well as mirrors from Sofala, and annually traded with Chiremandelle. Not much more is known about these traders, who could have been of Indian or Arab origin.

The whereabouts of the place called Chiremandelle (following the Dutch transcription) presents a mystery. Punt associates it with Phalaborwa but does not explain why.[64] The Dutch vaguely indicated its location by recording that the traders left in a northwesterly direction only to later turn east, which may have given Punt the idea that Chiremandelle lay around the Phalaborwa area, besides the

[59] Van Warmelo, N,J (ed.) *The o of Musina and the Early History of the Zoutpansberg, Ethnological Publications Vol. 8.* Pretoria: Government Printer, 1940, 83
[60] CA C415 f 56.
[61] CA C417 f 56
[62] CA C419 f. 21
[63] CA C419 f. 20, "dark skinned people with long hair." For a reference for annual visits see CA C 415 f. 65
[64] Punt, W.H.J. *The First Europeans in the Kruger Park, 1725.* National Parks Board of Trustees: Pretoria, 1975, 51n8

obvious connection to the copper trade. Evidence for Chiremandelle being associated with copper-bearing Phalaborwa is the list of rivers the Cuiper expedition were given as a guide to get to this region. The last on the provided list is the Timbavati River, which lies fifty kilometres from Phalaborwa.[65] In light of this information, Chiremandelle appears to have been a small but powerful polity that came to control the mining, smelting and distribution of copper from here. Paver suggests that Chiremandelle corresponds to chief Tshiendeulu of the Soutpansberg.[66] However, if the route to Chiremandelle described by river crossings is at all reliable, then this observation is incorrect, the Soutpansberg lying much further north from the Timbavati River. Paver's interpretation is valid if Tshiendeulu's influence was extended beyond what is currently thought of as Venda territory. But if Tshiendeulu had, at some point, wrested Phalaborwa from Paraotte, Paver's remark may be accurate. The fact that the Dutch referred to "de landen van Chiremandelle" does indicate that Chiremandelle referred to a chief rather than a place, and a less dramatic explanation for the location of chief Chiremandelle's fields is that these were situated in Paraotte. [67]

There is another possible location for Chiremandelle. An informant, named Mongondo Mowi, who claimed to be from Chiremandelle, gave an expanded list of goods found there – gold, tin, silver, ivory and copper. The presence of these goods in the territory of Chiremandelle could mean that it was situated in Zimbabwe, not to the south at Phalaborwa as Punt suggests, but near the Zambezi River.[68] Zimbabwe is known for its tin deposits but its largest tin mine opened in 1934 at Kamativi. Kamativi is situated near substantial copper deposits at the confluence of the Gwayi and Muzola rivers.[69] However, there is no evidence for iron-age excavation of these ores in these locations. As for silver, the Portuguese bought modest amounts of silver mined near Chikova, Zimbabwe, until the end of the seventeenth century. Chikova was also a source of gold.[70] If Chiremandelle were situated in the northern province of Zimabawe in the vicinity of Tete and Chikova, it

[65] Friede, H.M. Iron age mining in the Transvaal in *Journal of the South African Institute for Mining and Metallurgy,* April 1980, 160
[66] Paver, 605
[67] CA C415 f. 62 "lands, "region," "lands," "kingdom," "country" or "fields" fields of Chiremandelle."
[68] Punt changed his mind about the location of Chiremandelle in an article subsequent to his book, locating Chiremandelle in southern Rhodesia as it was then known, based on the list of rivers given to the Cuiper expedition.
[69] Mudenge, S.I.G. *A Political History of Munhumutapa, 1400-1902.* Harare: African Publishing Group, 1988, map, xxi
[70] Mudenge, 267

would shed light on the excuse these traders offered to the Dutch for not bringing goods for sale early 1726. According to them, they had not been back to their region because they were held up in the territory of Kalanga, an area that lay across the Limpopo River.[71] This location would make sense of the assertion by these traders that donkeys and oxen were used to carry trade goods, a scenario that seems to fit the Zambezi trade network where misambadzi-led caravans may have included donkeys, as well as oxen.

Another hint at the possibility that Chiremandelle was situated in northern Zimbabwe is the association between Mutapa Gatsi Rusere's son Chirema and the Dutch transcription Chiremandelle. The Portuguese appointed Chirema as the chief of Chikova in 1614, in response to Rusere's reluctance to divulge the whereabouts of these mines. This linguistic link may be a stretch too far, but the possibility of Chiremandelle being located in Zimbabwe places a question mark over the locations of Paraotte and Machikosse, as well as the methodology of attempting to locate territories based on the incidence of mining.

To locate territories based on the mining activities can be problematic in terms of language use. The Dutch word "voortbragten," used when reporting the products of Chiremandelle, means to produce or to yield.[72] The occurrence of metal found in a certain place does not mean that it had been mined there. In January 1498, Da Gama' company noted that people in Terra Natal owned objects made of iron, copper and tin, none of which were mined in Natal.[73] Yet, the use of the word "voortbragten" seems to indicate that gold, silver tin and copper were mined in Chiremandelle. In the case of Paraotte, there are eyewitness accounts of copper mining in Paraotte. Two of Maphumbo's men claim to have seen copper workings, "veel koper het gesien …inlanders besig met cappen uijt het gebergte, maken hals, armringen en corallen."[74] On the other hand, the Dutch were asking leading questions from Chiremandelleans and rewarding answers with gifts of cloth and beads, and it may be that their informants, including the person who included silver in his list, gave these pleasing answers in order to gain considerable material benefit.

---

[71] According to Mudenge's map, Kalanga was in the vicinity of current day Bulawayo. Map, xxiii. There was another area called Kalanga at this time, lying on the coast in the vicinity of the Limpopo where it enters the sea.
[72] CA C419 f. 19
[73] Meredith, M. *The Fortunes of Africa*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2014, 108
[74] CA C415 f. 63, "saw plenty of copper, hacked out of mountains and locals were fashioning neck, arm rings and beads out of these."

However, the difficulty with locating Chiremandelle in Zimbabwe is the problem of proximity, as Chiremandelle was said to be subject to Inthowelle.

Inthowelle and Signs of Shifts in the Political Landscape

Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle were confirmed to be neighbouring regions, as were the chieftaincies on the northern bank of Delagoa Bay, which fell under the rule of Inthowelle. Inthowelle is generally accepted as the Venda polity, identified by its capital at Dzata with its unique dark stonewalling, mentioned by Mahoemane. Mahoemane declared the capital of chief Inthowelle as Jusathi, built entirely of blue stone:

> de woonplaats van Inthowelle/: alte maal van blaauwe steenen is te same geset… als dat van dier Landaard, wanneer zij nederwaarts stenden te gaan wel horen seggen wij gaan na Jusathi.[75]

These three districts were subject to the rule of Mukale Wasile, chief of Inthowelle. However, Hoemane's account of his travels is seen as controversial. He returned to Delagoa after over a fourteen month absence, without keeping a detailed journal, and gave answers to leading questions with the promise of reward. In his account, he contracted geographical space, placing locations closer to each other, having no incentive to be accurate. But the fact that he describes Dzata gives some credence to his report. The Dutch received vague explanations with the odd detail, that is useful with a broader understanding of geography and history available today, leaving us to conclude that Paraotte, Machihosse, Chiremandelle lay in the eastern Transvaal.

However, sometime during the decade of Dutch presence at Delagoa Bay, the political landscape of the Transvaal appeared to undergo a shift. The last reports of traders on their way from Paraotte occurred in 1726. Pangele Inthowisse reported that forty of his companions had come as far as Nassangano. His fellow traders never arrived at the trading post because they were discouraged by the aggressive behaviour of Matolla, who robbed them of their trade goods. In spite of the risk of rid of goods, Pangele continued to trade since the Dutch usually intervened to restore goods to foreign traders. On this particular occasion, they apprehended the

[75] NA 4373 f. 849, "the residence of Inthowelle, built completely of blue stone, saying when they go there, we are going to Jusathi"

offender, with Maphumbo's consent, and held him in custody until most of the articles were returned.[76] After this incident, traders from Paraotte disappeared from the trading post. Not being new to the difficulties of trading at the coast, it is likely that their disappearance from the trade network and the appearance of a new term, "Beesa", in the documents were related. The change in the use of terminology referring to traders from the northwest alludes to a political change that saw Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle forming one "onderhorige provintie" named Beesa, which no longer fell under the protection of Inthowelle, saying that "de lande van Paraotte en Machikosse 't geen dat meer onder Inthowelle staat in't generaal Beesa genoemd word."[77]

The background to the political shift that appears to have occurred toward the end of the 1720s lies in events fifty years prior to the appearance of Beesa. Somewhere between 1680 and 1700, the Singo established Dzata as their capital.[78] The Singo, who were the last of several invasions of Shona-speakers, arrived on the south side of the Limpopo River as elephant hunters, having left the state of Monomotapa and proceeded to assimilate the Ngano, Mbezi and Lemethu, evolved into the group known today as the Venda. [79] The Mbezi were a society of ironworkers who occupied territory east of the Soutpansberg and partly disintegrated at the arrival of the Singo.[80] The assimilation of the Mbezi by the Venda led to the development of a Venda identity associated with iron mining and industry until well into the nineteenth century, and resulted in the spread of a dense system of trade routes in the Soutpansberg, evident on the trade route map. The Venda traded iron ore, hoes, axes, assegais and knives and it was probably this monopoly in the iron trade that increased their power.[81] It was probably on the basis of this power that Venda rulers demanded tribute, as in the case of Dyambeu, who demanded ten oxen, thirty goats and twenty girls from Mutele as proof of his submission to the Venda chief.[82]

---

[76] NA ARD 9135 f. 90
[77] NA 4373 f, 397ii "a dependent province" and NA 4369 f. 33 "the regions of Paraotte en Machikosse no longer under Inthowelle is named Beesa."
[78] Loubser, J, 58
[79] Van Warmelo, Copper Miners, Chapter 1, 10-32
[80] Loubser, 54
[81] Wessman, R. *The BaWenda of the Spelonken (Transvaal): a contribution toward the psychology and the folklore of African People.* The African World: London, 1908. 29
[82] Van Warmelo, Copper Miners, 24

During the displacement the Singo caused, a section of the Mbezi moved south and became the blacksmiths of the Pedi, who could then claim "we are now our own Mbezi".[83] This development probably led the Pedi to gain a degree of independence from the iron trade and tributary demands of the Soutpansberg because they no longer had to trade for manufactured iron goods. The Venda of the iron trade formed an indispensable part of pre-colonial society not clear and it may be that a growing independence from this trade by the Pedi led to conflict during the early eighteenth century, which in turn saw the emergence of a grouping called Beesa.

During the early eighteenth century, the territory of Inthowelle stretched from the Limpopo to the Olifants River.[84] In 1726, the chief over this area was Mukale Wasile. This chief sent a gift to the Dutch, inviting them to set up a trading post in his territory. He assured them that they would be allowed to build a permanent structure and settle in his territory that was rich in gold, ivory, copper and tin.[85] The Inthowelle chief was willing to trade but feared the threat of robbery the Nassangano posed.[86] In 1730, the Inthowelle chief expressed reluctance to send gold to the Dutch trading post because of the "tussenbewoners," otherwise known as the Nassangano, who would rob his traders.[87] The Venda were connected to trade networks, and had contact with Delagoa Bay, trading to Inhambane or Sofala and the Zambezi River. Contact with European trade, either Dutch or Portuguese, is evident not only from the use of beads but also cloth. Evidence for the use of cloth among the Venda is scarce but Dimbanyika, who settled at Dzata, was praised as "one whose dogs wear cotton tassles in Nzhelele."[88] Dimbanyika and his people entered the Soutpansberg as elephant hunters, and probably traded ivory for cloth, and could have formed part of the trade connection with the Matonga, who traded from Inhambane and Sofala across the Limpopo River. The fact that Inthowelle invited the Dutch to set up a trading post in his territory suggests the existence of a significant ivory trade to the north and east of the Soutpansberg, based on longstanding trade relationships with the Portuguese trade network.

---

[83] Hunt 276
[84] CA 415 f. The land of Nondollo was said to lie along a fast-flowing river and that on the other side of this river lay Inthowelle. Nondollo was probably a chief
[85] NA 4371 f. 270
[86] NA 4373 f. 342
[87] CA C433 f. 27
[88] Van Warmelo, *Copper Miners,* 34.

The Zambezi trade connection in the Transvaal

Pangele Inthowisse and his companions who arrived at Delagoa Bay showed signs of being in contact with the Portuguese trade network. The traders from Paraotte had sophisticated means of conducting exchange evident by the stone weights and scales they carried along on trading journeys.[89] The use of weights and scales stood in contrast to the way chiefs at Delagoa Bay measured an adequate amount of beads for a transaction, relying on a number of bundles given rather than measuring the weight,

> coralen die bij bossen en niet bij pond werden verruilt schelend de een bos met de andere somtijds meer als 3 in gewigt sonder dat daar op gesien word.[90]

They appeared to be seasoned long-distance traders involved in a trade network, driven at the time by the Portuguese supply of cloth and beads. The Dutch verified the contact between Paraotte and the Portuguese by noting their knowledge of Sena, Tete, Manica, Quilemane and Inhambane, which were centers of Portuguese trade. Another clue of their involvement in this trade network was their use of Portuguese words for silver, gold, onion and rice, as well as the *phota* cloth they wore. *Phota* cloth was a strong, checked type of cotton slung around their hips that was typically exchanged for goods at Sofala.[91] Paraotte's lucrative involvement with this longstanding network to the north and its established trade relationships, likely discouraged any greater involvement in the Delagoa Bay route. Paraotte played an important role in the trade networks of the lower eastern Transvaal by connecting it to the Zambesi trade complex. Their skill and knowledge of trade based on their experience with the Portuguese trade mechanisms, promoted their possible hegemony over the trade routes. Paraotteans were familiar with towns associated with Portuguese trade: "wist ook van Manica, Cenne en Tsouke".[92] Their involvement with the trade routes connected to the Portuguese trade on the Zambezi, would have taught them the value of establishing trade networks. The

[89] NA 4367 f. 630.
[90] CA C 406 f. 112, "beads are exchanged by bundle and not per pound, some differing with as much 3 [pounds], without being noticed."
[91] CA C422 f. 5, NA 9135 f. 87 as well as CA C433 f. 62, NA 4369 f. 28
[92] NA 4369 f. 34

experience they gained in negotiating skills would have further strengthened their position as intermediaries.

As a comparison, itinerant traders in Zimbabwe, known as misambadzi, led caravans that carried goods "from village to village until all were sold".[93] The negotiating skills of these traders were remarkable and their expertise in discussing terms determined the success of a trading trip. Being in contact with these men would have transferred skills in completing the arduous and complex trade process to Paraottean traders. Notwithstanding the apparent experience and skill they displayed, it is unlikely that they participated in trade that could compare in scale to that of the misambadzi, who often formed large caravans of people, accompanied by soldiers for protection, to move goods along routes.[94] Pangele told the Dutch that the reason for the small amount of ivory brought to the coast was the great distance and the lack of labour, which implies the lack of participation in large scale trading ventures that included caravans transporting goods over large distances.[95] This information could imply that Pangele's society was organised around the supply of metals rather than ivory for the market and that the demand for blue beads motivated the supply of ivory to the trading post.

Traders and Identity

It appears that far-flung trading networks were dominated by groups whose identities may have been more rooted in regional economies than local cultures or geographies. These groups were categorised by the Dutch according to their own worldview by identifying a cultural group with the region they claimed to have come from. However, identities in the interior were complex and fluid. Chief Hwami's migration gives us an example of how groups split and fused, and in the process created another with a separate identity. This Venda group migrated as far south as the area associated with the Pedi.[96] According to tradition they moved back north under Hwami's direction because it was too cold in their new location. In this process part of a group chose to remain behind, tired of moving around. It is likely

[93] Isaacman A.F. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution.* Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, 77
[94] Ibid.
[95] NA ARD 9135 f. 50
[96] Van Warmlo, *Copper Miners*, 23

that those who were left behind were either absorbed by or merged with the society in that vicinity, adopting an additional identity.

Societies that were ruled by dominant lineages were often composed of diverse groups, which adopted the lifestyle of the dominant group.[97] The Ngomane of Nkapana in the Barberton area provides an example of a change in lifestyle. According to traditions this group claimed Sotho identity during the eighteenth century while living on the escarpment but exchanged it for a Tsonga identity, once they had moved into the Lowveld, which probably called for a way of life determined by a different environment.[98] Occupation often seemed to function as a point of identification. When the Venda crossed the Limpopo, they subjugated groups identified by their line of work: the Ngona and Lembathu, who were identified as ironworkers and the Kwinda as pastoralists.[99]

Identities also fused based on symbiotic relationships as the association between the Lemba and the Venda show. After the Venda entered the Soutpansberg, the area became the centre of the network of trade routes that spread throughout the Transvaal and up towards the Zambezi. The Lemba possibly contributed their experience of itinerant trade to the success of the network, gained through their involvement in the bead and cloth trade with the Portuguese at Sena.[100] The fact that Lemba were appointed as the carriers of the "royal baggage" that consisted of *madi, denga* and *tshikandwa* beads hints at their previous involvement as travelling tradesmen.[101] In return, the Venda rulers, whose men wielded bows and arrows smeared with poison, offered the Lemba protection, as well as carrying their spears (not arrows) in quivers.[102] The Lemba were associated with the Venda but within this grouping, they retained a separate identity based on the male occupation as coppersmiths and the female occupation as potters. The Lemba initially exclusively served Venda rulers as coppersmiths after crossing the Limpopo between 1680 and

[97] Delius, P., Schoeman, M.H. Revisiting Bokoni: populating the stone ruins of the Mpumalanga Escarpment in Swanepoel, N., Esterhuysen, A., Bonner, P.(eds.) *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects.* Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001, 145
[98] Ibid.
[99] Van Warmelo, *Copper Miners,* 23
[100]Stayt, H.A. *The Bavenda.*London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1968 , 27
[101] Van Warmelo, *Copper Miners,* 17
[102] Reference lost

1700.[103] In later years, it is unclear precisely when, the Lemba acquired the name of *mashavi* or trader, at a time when they gained greater independence from the Venda.[104] In the interior, people were often identified by their occupation, which determined their lifestyle.

In contrast, the Dutch identified traders with the region where they were from, which produced an oversimplified perspective of the interior from the coast. WaLemba was often quoted as a region, whereas it probably denoted scattered areas the Lemba occupied. In illustrating the difficulty of identifying locations in the interior based on the identity of people, it is interesting to note that on 21 June 1726, a certain Massia, called a WaLemba in a letter dated June 1730, arrived at the Dutch trading post. The name Massia was also associated with a dominant Venda lineage, as we have seen above. The Dutch unfortunately left no details about their transaction with Massia. But the possibility of Massia simultaneously being identified as Venda and Lemba is significant in the light of how complex identities were within groups.[105] And further, how identity was not necessarily associated with a particular authority over a certain territory or country within set boundaries, as the Dutch imagined.

Pangele Inthowisse, having arrived at the trading post introduced himself to the Dutch as a headman of a village in Paraotte. Two visitors from Delagoa Bay, who travelled through Paraotte, commented on the abundance of cattle, goats as well as the cultivation of pombe and some other unidentified seed:

> [G]een manquement van levensmiddelen als rundenvee, bokken en pombe, nog ander saad bij ons genaamt pijlsaad, sijnde van groote gelyk aan een Kadjang korn, van binnen alsoo meelig… water was mede over al…[106]

---

[103] Loubser, J.N. 'Archaeology and Early Venda History,' *Goodwin Series*, Vol 6, Goodwins Legacy. (June 1989) 54-61 1989,58. CA C433 f.52. For the reference for the Lemba in service of the Venda rulers, see Herbert, 246

[103] Van Warmelo, *Copper Miners,* 63

[104] Van Warmelo, *Copper Miners,* 63. The word *mashavi* also carries the meaning of 'enterprising individual, personal conversation with Mucha Musemwa.

[105] Delius and Schoeman, Revisiting Bokoni, 145

[106] NA 4369 f. 28 and 28ii, "no lack of food provided by cattle, goats, and grains such as pombe, pijlsaad (I have been unable to identify this grain) that is the size of a peanut and floury inside…there was water all over" Kadjang generally meant legume, or else a type of green bean according to the *VOC glossarium* and specifically as peanuts in the INL Schatkamer van de Nederlandsche Taal, http://www.inl.nl/. The closest legume I could find that might be related to "pijlsaad" was arrow peas. The phrase kadjang korn is interesting because "korn" is an antiquated word for "koren" meaning corn, cereal or grain, see INL. Pombe is a seed used to make beer, was most likely sorghum *Sorghum bicolour,* a grain indigenous to Africa.

Pangele's village was therefore part of a vibrant agricultural community. The heartland of this region supported agriculture because it had plenty of water. Besides these grains sowed here, Pangele Inthowisse mentioned growing onions and rice, "daar hij bij een te keenen gaf dat dese mede in sijn land voort quame."[107] It was also a densely populated place, with one homestead upon another, "was het bewoond met negerij op negerij soo verre zij geweest waren."[108] This description matches that of the agricultural Bokoni settlements, known for their cattle-keeping and extensive terrace farming, and which lay a few hundred kilometers from the coast.

Pangele's wider identity was part of a complex agricultural and pastoral society that appears to have included a stratum of traders. He may have been part of a group of traders who acted as middlemen of the tin and gold trade, serving as distributors of the metal and other goods along the northwest trade route between the interior and Delagoa Bay and from the lower Transvaal to Zimbabwe, through the Soutpansberg that was a nexus of trade below the Limpopo River. Therefore, accustomed to trade, Pangele may have initiated a trade connection between Sotho societies and the coast at the appearance of a trading post at the Bay.

The ivory and metals recorded in the Dutch inventories, shipped off to either Batavia or the Cape, were supplied from a northwesterly direction, from across the Lebombo range. The traders who supplied goods to the Bay were the communities of Paraotte, Chiremandelle and Machikosse who occupied different areas within the Transvaal. Those from Paraotte and Chiremandelle were linked to large-scale trade networks, with routes covering vast distances to at least as far as the Zambezi River. Both groups had knowledge of the Portuguese trade and, being situated in the Transvaal, served as intermediaries, connecting the territory below the Limpopo River to the wider Indian Ocean trade network. During the Dutch period at Delagoa Bay, at least one Paraottean, Pangele Inthowisse, initiated a new trade route toward the coast. Because his territory was believed to supply gold, the Dutch were eager to gain direct access to not only the gold, but also the ivory of this area. They were invited to settle a trading post in Inthowelle, which, even if they had considered this impractical suggestion, would have been a failure. Their efforts to

[107] NA 4369 f. 28 and 28ii, "Informed us that these are found in his territory."
[108] CA C421 f. 66, "occupied by homestead upon homestead."

travel into the interior and conduct trade were sure to be halted by the violent resistance by the Nassangano, or the passive aggressive attitude of the chiefs settled on the northern bank of the Espirito Santo.

Descriptions of the interior have in the past been reliant on information gathered from at least the mid-nineteenth century, which accumulated after the political upheaval earlier in the same hundred years and distorted the view of the eighteenth century Transvaal. The information the Dutch gathered is more reliable, being gathered in the same period, but because of the local chiefs' reluctance to see the Europeans abandon the coast for the interior, they deliberately obscured details about locations.

Information about Nassangano, Chiremandelle, Machikosse, Inthowelle and Paraotte has come to light through Dutch interest in the interior. Nassangano straddled the routes to the coast and its inhabitants impeded trade by holding up traders. Chiremandelle was most likely the chief Tshiendeulu whose authority extended over the region of Phalaborwa, which was situated in Paraotte. Because of the reference to alluvial tin occurring in the region of Machikosse, this area probably formed part of current day Swaziland. Inthowelle can be identified with the Venda polity with a high degree of certainty because of its capital at Dzata. Since Baloadi is in all likelihood the phonetic equivalent of Paraotte, it is reasonably certain that Paraotte lay in the southeastern Transvaal. All these regions fell below the arch of the Limpopo, an area that at the time of the Dutch trading post was inhabited by heterogeneous societies. Some of these societies, or groups within these, participated in extensive trade networks, not only within the Transvaal, but also traded to the north as far as Sena, Tete and Sofala as well as to the southeast, to Delagoa Bay.

Illustration and Maps



Drawn by J. Wavre.

Plan of the Thonga village.

1. Hut of the headman's first wife. 2. Headman's private hut. 3. Hut of the headman's second wife. 4. Of the third; 5. Of the fourth. 7 and 8. Huts of the two wives of the headman's younger brother. 9. Wife of third brother. 10. Wife of fourth brother. 11. Headman's son. 12. Headman's nephew. 13. Hut of a stranger. 14. Lao of the boys. 15. Nhangu of the girls. 16. Main entrance. 17. Back gates. 18. Oxen kraal. 19. Goats' kraal. 20. Pigs' kraal. 21. Square of the men (bandla). 22. Square of the village (hubo). 23. Fire-places. 24. Ash-heaps. 25. Tree of the village. 26. Shade-trees of the hubo. 27. Henhouse. 28. Storehouses. 29. Place of jealousy. 30. Tobacco-gardens.

Junod's Illustration of a Nineteenth Century Thonga Village[109]

[109] Junod, H.A. *The Life of a South African Tribe Vol 1*. New York: University books, 1962, 312



Rainfall Map[110]

[110] After Hedges, 33

Chapter Three
Trade and Political Preeminence, Control and Conflict

Trade and Preeminence

When the Dutch sailed into Delagoa Bay that hot week of March 1721, they were unaware of the simmering political tensions on the northern bank of the Espirito Santo and how their intention to establish a trading post on that site would escalate enmity between the chiefs, Maphumbo, Mateke and Bombo. The northern bank had historically been known for its violence and aversion to trade, an attitude that stood in stark contrast to the entrepreneurial Tembe of the south.

As the *Gouda* and the *Caap* lay in the Bay, people approached the Dutch ships to trade food from make-shift vessels and it was clear that some of the Ronga were keen to trade with ships entering the Bay.[1] By the time the Dutch arrived after 167 years of European trade, the Tembe had asserted themselves as the principal traders, operating from the southern shores of the Bay. At first, during the early Portuguese era, 1545-1580, trade had flourished under the powerful chieftaincy of the Tembe. However, during the 1580s a lull in the ivory trade weakened their dominance.[2] This lull was most likely associated with the change from an annual to a biennial Portuguese trading trip to Delagoa Bay, which coincided with the increase in Portuguese shipwrecks along the southeastern coast of Africa.[3] These two factors combined to produce a change in the nature of trade.

During this interlude, chief Inhaca, being situated on the Machangulo peninsula at the time, diverted trade from the dominant Tembe through attracting Portuguese patronage through a show of compassion.[4] Inhaca was ideally located to receive the steady traffic of shipwreck survivors, the first of which was the company of Manuel de Sousa from the ship *São João* (1552). Inhaca cultivated good relationships with the Portuguese by providing hospitality to them. Good relationships made good

[1] CA C406 f. 103, f. 105. The Dutch returned to the ships in the evening due to the "unbearable heat and thirst" they experienced.
[2] Webster, D. 'Tembe-Thonga kinship: the marriage of anthropology and history,' *Cashiers d-Études Africaines*, 26, 104, (1986), 611-632 Hedges, *Trade and Politics* in footnote 3, 613. It is unclear why the ivory trade dried up for a time.
[3] Junod, *Condition of the natives*, p.139. Although the trading voyages were supposed to officially occur once and later, every two years, there often longer gaps between visits to Delagoa Bay.
[4] The titles of Tembe, Inhaca, Mfumo and Manisse are titles of lineage rather than personal names. However, The Portuguese and the Dutch used these to refer to the paramount chief of a lineage group. These titles can be used and be understood as either referring to a group or an individual, depending on the context.

trade and contributed to Inhaca's swelling stores of cloth and beads. From 1552 to 1622 shipwreck survivors of the *São João* (1552), *São Thome* (1589), *São Alberto* (1593) and the *São João Baptista* (1622) all met a chief they called Inhaca, and were "ransomed" with substantial rewards in cloth and beads, in the name of trade relations. It must be remembered that Tembe, Mfumo, Manisse and Inhaca all refer to titles of lineage, rather than personal names. In 1598, Simão Lopes led a caravan bearing cloth, beads and "other things" to Delagoa Bay to ransom some shipwrecked Portuguese under the care of Inhaca.[5] The survivors of the *São João* were ransomed for forty beads each.[6] It is possible that as a result of the compassion shown to survivors, the Portuguese trade ships brought their business to Inhaca as an indication of their gratitude.

The trade directed to Inhaca ensured the growth of his stores of exotic wealth. The control of trade passed into Inhaca's hands, further inflating his status. Because trade articles were viewed as not only accrued capital but also as a mechanism to control and organise people, trade functioned to lend prestige to a leader through the accumulation of exotic goods.[7] Having goods to redistribute attracted subjects and his chieftaincy grew. In this way, Inhaca began to overshadow the paramountcy that the Tembe had claimed.

Tembe's claim to overlordship was based on two things, preeminence and control of trade. The first was founded on the fact that the Tembe were the earliest occupants to inhabit the southern shore, purported to be empty land at the time. The second derived from the control over the internal copper and iron trade prior to 1580, and the subsequent dominance over the ivory trade with the Portuguese from 1544.[8] Inhaca's fortunes waned after a quarrel with the Portuguese during the early 1620s, and when Inhaca fell out of favour with them, Tembe received their patronage. Newitt comments that the diminishing fortunes of this Inhaca's chieftaincy possibly led to its split into the separate chieftaincies of Inhaca and Machavane; however, Ronga societies were in general susceptible to fragmentation due to the segmented nature of lineage structures, which undermined centralised control. It is therefore

[5] Boxer, 99
[6] Newitt, 153
[7] Miller, J. *Way of Death*, London: James Curry Ltd, 1988,43
[8] Newitt, 154

more likely that a succession quarrel, perhaps exacerbated by loss of control over trade, led to the split.[9]

After these events, the Tembe leader became and remained the dominant trading partner with the Portuguese, who traded exclusively with the chief from Xefina Island. This arrangement continued after 1650, when the Portuguese expanded their business to include five collection points around the Bay, including at least seven villages of Manisse further north along the Nkomati.[10] The Portuguese trade with the population on the lower northern bank was slow. The societies who occupied this area were said to be disinterested in participating in trade. This perception is evident in Perestrello's comment made in 1575:

> "…those on the other side of the Bay were not so well disposed [to trade] as they commit all kinds of outrage upon those who go there to trade, as Manoel de Sousa experienced and his whole crew who were lost in the galleon of St. Jean in 1552."[11]

Perestrello's judgement seems to be based on fear rather than fact – Manoel de Sousa was not a trader but a shipwreck survivor, whose party was on their way to Sofala on foot. During a river crossing, Manoel, frazzled by an ordeal lasting months, lost his temper and managed to insult locals. As a result, the chief on the northern side of the lagoon strategically separated the miserable party and robbed them of their goods before killing them. This incident probably entrenched the fear of interacting with seemingly "ferocious savages" that appears to have its origin in an interaction between some Portuguese and locals that occurred in 1510. Dom Francisco d'Almeida and his men were killed in a skirmish on the beach in Table Bay and consequently the Portuguese decided to avoid trade along the coast between Benguela and Delagoa Bay.[12] In 1552, the chief Inhaca warned the Manuel company that his more powerful enemies would rob them across the Bay, although his warnings were more likely motivated by an attempt to preserve all trade for his

[9] Newitt, 154. In 1622, shipwreck survivors identified two Inhacas – Inhaca Sangane, seen as the legitimate heir who lived with his people on the peninsula opposite Inhaca Island, waiting for the usurper Inhaca Maganheira to die so that they may occupy their rightful place on the island, see Boxer, 246.
[10] Junod, Les Baronga, 240 Newitt, *A History*, 154. The Austrians' highly successful trade involved both Tembe and Manisse during the late eighteenth century. Relacoes, 10, 11. A factory is a warehouse.
[11] Bannister, S. *Humane Policy*. London: Thomas George Underwood, 1830, appendix 1, vi.
[12] Theal, G.M. *The Beginning of South African History*. Cape Town: T. Maskew and Miller, 1902, p. 267. The treacherous seas along this part of the coastline were another reason to avoid it.

account rather than out of concern for the Portuguese.[13] In support of the argument that it was the Portuguese who avoided trading with those residing on the northern side of the lagoon, the English captain of the *Little Josiah* mentioned successfully trading with Matola in1693, a chief who was situated on the northern bank.[14] Portuguese reluctance to trade with northerners continued, while maintaining a healthy relationship with Tembe. Through trade, Tembe did profitable business and elevated his society to the most prominent on the shores of Delagoa Bay. The Tembe chiefs actively promoted trade and sought out opportunities to establish business ties with any visitors to the Bay, by making first contact with ships by approaching vessels on rafts and offering fresh food for sale.[15] This became a long-standing strategy to attract business that persisted until the late eighteenth century. Demonstrating this, in 1754, a boat with five occupants not only offered food but also presented a document signed by a Dutch ship's captain declaring that Mangova, who was the Tembe chief at the time, was the greatest and mightiest king in these parts as well as the most distinguished trader in amber and ivory:

> [Z]oo hebbe hem in zyn versoek begunstigen om te attesteeren dat hy die grootste en machtigste koning dezer geweste is, een braaf en oprecht Man en boezemvriend van der Hollanders mistgaders de voornaamste Koopman in Amber en Eliphantstanden.[16]

Another factor in the Tembe's success was based on sustained ability to supply ivory due to the presence of a large number of elephants found in the vicinity of the Bay. The presence of large herds of elephants at the Bay prompted the initial establishment of the Portuguese ivory trade in 1544. A later example of the abundance of ivory found here is Captain Freak's enormous load of 8-10 tons of ivory (which he promptly lost on a rock near Madagascar) at the end of the seventeenth century.[17] The enormous demand for ivory in Europe, the Middle East, India and Asia drastically depleted elephant herds around the immediate Bay area. The dwindling ivory supply played a role in the decision of the authorities on

---

[13] Boxer, 15
[14] Journal of the Little Josiah, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl.A.334 f. 31
[15] Bannister, Appendix 1, viii and Junod, H.E. The condition of the natives of south-east Africa in the sixteenth century, according to early Portuguese documents in *South African Journal of Science* 10, 137-161, 139
[16] Theal. RSEA, vi, 477. "[H]e approved his request by testifying that Mangova [a Tembe chief] was the mightiest and most powerful king of the area, a courageous and honest man and best friend to the Dutch and also the most important merchant of amber and ivory."
[17] Bannister, appendix 1, viii

Mozambique Island to call off regular voyages to Delagoa Bay in 1685. Sporadic Portuguese trade continued thereafter but the intermittent demand stifled the need to expand trade networks further afield, and in the end dried up a substantial supply of ivory to the Bay. This meant that by the time the Dutch arrived at the Bay, ivory was in short supply. The Dutch despondently wrote about the complete absence of elephants at Delagoa Bay, "niemand van onse Europanean een oliphant gesien heeft", and complained that small amounts of ivory came from a long way off, "ver afgelegene plaetsen 40-50 of meer mijlen".[18] The supply of ivory was stagnant by the time of the Dutch arrival. The lack of European traders to the Bay inhibited the importing of ivory from the near interior. By the time the Dutch set up their trading post, the trading Tembe were in need of inshore trading partners, and political intrigues simmered on the northern bank.

Ignorant of the social dynamics at play at Delagoa Bay and characteristically cautious, the Dutch diligently set about investigating the area. They surveyed the Bay, sounding its depths and looking for fresh water on land. Once on shore, they came across the Tembe. Both the Tembe "groten koning," Pembo, and Tembe "captein" Mariamuha promoted a potential trade relationship.[19] The King was formal in his approach. He sent an emissary to assure the Dutch of his desire to trade, while Mariamuha opened up discussions over trade through the sale of a prized ox.[20] But the Dutch let both these golden opportunities slip by. Instead they grew impatient with what they interpreted as the intentional disregard of repeated requests through the king's messenger to meet with Pembo.[21] The perceived rejection of their request to meet at his residence was interpreted as a sign of reluctance to do business. Not wanting to come to a decision before they had considered all the possibilities, the Dutch continued their search around the Bay.

---

[18] CA C406 f 195, "none of us Europeans have seen a single elephant." CA C406 f. 229, " from far away places, more than forty to fifty miles away."

[19] The Dutch differentiated between "koninck" and "captein" on this occasion and it is unsure on what they based their assessment of these. Perhaps these qualifications were based on the size of their respective retinues. Initially they called Maphumbo "king" but this term of respect quickly fell away as familiarity with him increased. The Portuguese termed paramount chiefs, kings, and described their territories as kingdoms, applying a European social standard to African societies. G.M. Theal, *The Beginning of South African History*. Cape Town: T. Maskew and Miller, 1902, p. 89

[20] CA C406 f. 105. A gift was always commensurate with the status of the person given the gift, see B.H. Dicke, Introducing the northern Transvaal voortrekkers in Argief Jaarboek, 1941 Deel I pp.19-177, Cape Times LTD: Cape Town, p. 118.

[21] Ibid.

In spite of their misinterpretation and indecision, the Dutch at least had the foresight to maintain goodwill for future business opportunities and offered the king gifts, which in their view were trinkets. Ultimately, it was the geographical features of the Bay that dictated their failure to partner exclusively with the experienced Tembe chief. The wide intertidal zones featured on the southern bank of the Espirito Santo precluded the mooring of ships close to shore. As the Dutch continued their investigations around the Bay, they found the opposite bank suitable for this purpose. Moving onshore to the sound of a drum, they met a crowd of four hundred armed men. One of these armed men was a runaway Portuguese slave. This person performed the role of an interpreter, who relayed both their intention to trade in peace as well as to settle onshore.[22] After having mollified the excited crowd with gifts of alcohol and snuff, the Dutch entered into negotiations over permission to settle in this location that featured a high bluff, jutting out into the Bay, which provided a good vantage point from which they could monitor their surrounds. The negotiation process impressed the Dutch through its orderly and judicious process, which was peppered with long speeches. Maphumbo, chief over the territory they were interested in, eventually gave them leave to settle on the bluff, on condition that the Dutch would not enslave any of their people and with the promise that his subjects would provide the Europeans with food until they could harvest their own.[23] The contingent of Dutch soldiers and their commander, Van Taak, moved ashore to establish a trading post on the bluff they named Roodehoek.

Previously, the Dutch ship *Noord* found Roodehoek unoccupied in 1688 and were told people owning goats and cattle were to be found further up the coast.[24] It is unsurprising that people would avoid settling in this position. It formed part of a blistering beachfront that had no fresh water and was incapable of supporting agriculture. Sometime towards the end of the intervening forty years, Maphumbo had been banished to the beach by Manisse, probably due to a factional dispute.[25]

---

[22] Theal. RSEA, Vol. 6, 426

[23] NA 4367 f. 107

[24] Theal, *Belanrijke Historische Documenten*, 8. Perestrello reported the presence of the chiefs Rumu, Mina Lebombo and Manyisa in 1554, and it is likely these were the people the fish seller was referring to.

[25] Many of the men who joined the Company were economically desperate men, see Penn, N. 'Great Escapes: Deserting soldiers during Noodt's Cape governorship, 1727-1729,' *South African Historical Journal*, 59:1, (2007), 171-203, DOI: 10.1080/02582470709464777,173. Downloaded January 2015.The trading post employees, who arrived in 1721, consisted of a commander, an ensign, a sergeant, two corporals, a legal expert, two carpenters and twenty-eight soldiers. This group had the company and temporary assistance of the sixty-two crew members of the *Gouda* and the *Caap*, CA 406 f. 116

Theal, RSEA, VI, 435. This event could not have happened too long before the Dutch arrived because they described Maphumbo as a "dese jongen Afrikaan," see CA 411 f. 115

During the negotiations for leave to settle, chief Maphumbo convinced the Dutch to set up camp in his infertile, waterless and virtually uninhabitable territory, arguing that Roodehoek, set on a high bluff, provided a lookout for foreign ships, showing an appreciation of competition among Europeans.[26] This hasty and regrettable decision had a significant impact on the intricate, finely balanced social dynamic of the northern bank.[27]

The insertion of the Dutch into Maphumbo territory exacerbated competition for political position, in which relationships were characterized by competition over political position between the various Mfumo chiefs.[28] One of the causes of political tension was succession. The process of succession potentially further inflamed other dissensions. In principle, succession to the office of chief was uncomplicated. The chief's eldest son had claim to the position of legal heir. However, an additional stipulation complicated matters greatly. This condition demanded that he is crowned after all the younger brothers of the deceased chief had reigned.[29] This principle ensured the preeminent right of the elder branch and the community of property among brothers. The problem crept in when a younger brother had reigned for a long time (because his brother had died young), and having become popular, attempted to appropriate the chieftainship for his own family line. As Junod observed, this led to "conflicts and fighting".[30]

According to the Dutch, the Mfumo system of governance included a form of ranking without any clear hierarchical structure. They found this style of government difficult to conceptualize, as their European understanding of social hierarchy dictated that there be a clear distinction between those of rank and their followers, both being of equal number among the Mfumo: "terwyl den minsten soveel is as de meesten."[31] The Dutch gave little account of political processes outside of what directly affected the state of trade, probably because they could not make much sense of them. Their records reflect conflicts and battles between the main competitors, who were Maphumbo, Mateke and Bombo.

---

[26] Coetzee, 1948, 233
[27] Jacob Bucquoi would later advise greater caution in choosing a location in which to settle, suggesting that newcomers to an area should stay on board ships longer to spy out the land, the people and not to be taken in by kind words and apparent politeness, see Theal, RSEA, vi, 428. One has to wonder whether the impassioned arguments involved exhortations to include Mateke in these deliberations.
[28] NA 4373 f. 379, f. 414, CA C421 f.27
[29] Junod, Life Vol. 1, 410
[30] Junod, Life, Vol. 1, 411
[31] CA C406 f 193, "[there] are as many of the lesser than of the more important."

It may be that the previous conflict, which resulted in Maphumbo's banishment, was due to a succession dispute. The outcome of these hostilities changed his status as an independent chief to that of a tributary chief, responsible to Bombo.[32] Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, Mateke had earned the title of chief and the tributary rights over large tracts of land previously belonging to Maphumbo's father, on condition that he, Mateke, would accept Bombo as paramount chief. The rights over land (or, more accurately, the authority over the people who dwelt on this land) and a newly acquired title inspired Mateke to challenge Bombo for paramount chief. These rewards were ironically given to him in service to Bombo, who claimed the title of master over all. Maphumbo was affirmed as chief over what remained of his father's territory, a dry arid tract of land, on the condition of acknowledging Bombo as his tributary master. This condition added insult to injury as his lineage never paid tribute to anyone before.[33] It is possible that Maphumbo saw the settlement of a trading post as an opportunity to elevate his status and in the process, cast off Bombo's right to tribute.

As we have seen above, trade could serve to trump tradition, and challenge established political hierarchies. Inhaca's rise to prominence depended on controlling trade and forming a relationship with a powerful European ally. The upstart Maphumbo, who was central to a conflict over position on the northern bank, employed these principals to establish his supremacy in Mfumo territory. His first political strategy was to present himself as the paramount chief on this bank to the ignorant Dutch.[34] Maphumbo saw his connection to the Dutch as an opportunity to move out of poverty and into prosperity and position through controlling other chiefs' access to the trading post. Having close contact and control over access to the trading post was an enviable position coveted by other chiefs. Tembe, in the course of time, opened negotiations with the Dutch to relocate to his side of the lagoon, so that he could reap the benefits of their presence within his territory.[35] His offer was declined. By relocating the Dutch would have lost access to Paraottean gold and incurred an undesirable financial burden.[36] Maphumbo recognised the opportunity

[32] NA ARD 9135 f. 72
[33] Ibid.
[34] Theal, RSEA, vi, 435
[35] CA C415 f. 61
[36] The Dutch would lose access to Paraottean gold because Mateke hosted traders from this area, see chapter 3, 71

to elevate his status, which is precisely why he convinced them to set up camp within his land. His satisfaction with the turn of events can be seen in the gift he presented to the trading post, a prized ox. Controlling access between traders and the Dutch displayed a chief's ability to dominate a space and the people who occupied that space. The ability of a chief to control the movement of people through his territory, as well as access to his homestead, determined his level of authority.

An example of this is found in the first interaction between the Dutch and the Tembe chief, Pembo, mentioned above. This chief sent a messenger to negotiate with the Dutch, a measure that indicated the level of his prestige. His importance was further accentuated by his evasion of Dutch requests to make their acquaintance at his home, which represented his seat of power.[37] To illustrate the sacrosanct principle of restricted access to the chief's person, the blunder of the newly-installed Portuguese Captain at Mozambique Island in 1627 serves as a good example. Protocol determined that access to the Mutapa be gained by the presentation of a gift called the curua or mouth.[38] The arrival of this gift at the court signaled the assembly of the chief's ambassadors, who travelled to the Captain to collect the annual tribute due to the chief, which consisted of "many rich pieces, silks and cloth of many kinds," an order of events that shored up the status and prestige of the chief by indicating his control to both the Portuguese and his subjects. Captain Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira denied this tradition by sending Jeronimo de Barras to deliver the tribute instead of waiting for the chiefly emissaries to collect it. This faux pas brought about swift action. The chief decreed the execution of not only Jeronimo and his party but also that of all Portuguese in the area.[39] Most of the societies at Delagoa Bay claimed Karanga descent and there is evidence of the curua arriving at Delagoa Bay for chief Matola in 1799.[40] This suggests that at the time of the Dutch settlement, local societies espoused the same values expressed by the Mutapa regarding access of newcomers to the homesteads of chiefs. By situating the trading post on his soil, Maphumbo not only made an astute financial move, but also used it as a way of elevating his status from that of outcast to one of greater importance. In order to properly demonstrate this dynamic, some background is required.

---

[37] CA C406 f. 105 letter
[38] Theal RSEA Vol. 2, 415
[39] Theal, RSEA Vol. 8, 471
[40] Lebato, A. *Historia da Fundacão de Presidio de Lourenço Marques:* 1782-1786 Junta de investigaçoes do Ultramar, 1949, 93

At some point before 1721, Maphumbo was exiled (as result of a conflict between his father and chief Manisse) and consigned to a life of misery and starvation. Maphumbo's subjects were described as dirt poor, always begging for food, sometimes forced to live off the "gedroog spieren van zijn overwonnen vijand".[41] His status, therefore, was one of shame, and he was certainly not the paramount chief as he led the Dutch to believe. This deception infuriated Manisse who declared:

> He [Maphumbo] lives by my mercy. I was victorious over his father – I killed and ate him myself and granted him [Maphumbo] leave to live on the beach, by my grace.[42]

If Maphumbo did not manage to elevate himself somewhat by the association he had with the Dutch, he did inspire hostility in his closest rival, Mateke, who ruled over a village to the northeast of Maphumbo's. The conflict between two Mfumo chiefs grew over the following nine years and ultimately culminated in the deposition of Maphumbo by Mateke.

Initially, Mateke's animosity towards Maphumbo was intensified by the issue of water. As the Dutch soon found out, the beach provided nothing but salty brackish water from the hollows they dug and the closest access to fresh water lay in Mateke's territory, "zijnde in het land van haare vijand."[43] The Dutch, championing Maphumbo, had labeled Mateke his enemy on the basis of their own vested interest: the establishment of a vegetable garden. On account of their water source lying in enemy territory, a guard of a dozen armed men was posted around the spring to secure the safety of the water bearers. Mateke had, predictably, taken offence over not being included in negotiations over the Dutch settlement in the area and the establishment of a garden. To add insult to injury, Mateke had to face an intrusion into his territory of a military nature with the apparent sanction of Maphumbo, whom he regarded as a subject. Mateke was offended by Maphumbo's insubordination and further disenchanted by his attempt to gain illicit use of this key water resource

---

[41] CA 406 f. 117, f. 229, "desiccated muscles of their conquered enemies."
[42] Theal, RSEA, vi, 435. The reference to eating enemies could be to ingesting war-medicine that often included flesh of slain enemies to absorb all their strength so that they were incapable of doing harm. For a fuller discussion of this custom, see H.A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe, Vol.ume 1*, p. 475-477. G. Campbell discusses exocannibalism (the eating of enemies) in 'Eating the Dead in Madagascar,' in *South African Medical Journal, 103,*12 (2013) S Afr Med J 2013; 103 (12 Suppl.1) 1032-1034. DOI: 10.7196/SAMJ.7076
[43] CA C406 f. 108, "was in the land of his enemy."

through the Dutch sentries placed at his spring.[44] In reaction to this slight he dispatched four hundred armed and menacing men, brandishing assegais to intimidate the Dutch, who were labouring in sweltering conditions, trying to salvage seedlings from ants in the scorching heat.[45] They turned to their protector, Maphumbo who, emboldened by the awe the Dutch still inspired among the locals at this point, razed Mateke's village to the ground with the help of six hundred men.[46] The Dutch's access to water and the right to garden was secured and Maphumbo won a strategic skirmish in his quest to elevate himself among the societies of Delagoa Bay.[47] Maphumbo's victory illustrates the power of siding with a relatively powerful European ally to effect political promotion.

Still oblivious to sensitive cultural cues to political standing the Dutch presented Maphumbo with an outfit of clothing. This act further elevated Maphumbo and advertised him as the most prominent person on the northern bank. Maphumbo antagonised Mateke by swaggering around in the fancy set of clothes. The instructions of the VOC dictated that those running the trading post should always be on the lookout for new business opportunities. In this instance, all the "naaktlopende" or naked locals and Maphumbo's enthusiasm for their clothing led the Dutch imagining a booming market for Western clothes.[48] They dressed Maphumbo in a dress and pants made of red cloth, as well as socks and shoes, propped a copper crown embellished with pearls on his head and placed a weapon at his side.[49] Presenting chiefs with suits of clothing was not always market related. Mateke demanded at set of clothing as well, stating he deserved it as a chief and Tembe was offered one in gratitude for allowing the Dutch to fetch water from his territory.[50]

This action might have made business sense to the Dutch, but was evaluated by a completely different set of values in a culture where cloth and clothing

---

[44] CA C406 f 108
[45] CA C406 f.117 The Dutch not only had to contend with the heat and erratic rainfall that plagued the Bay, they were also helpless against "ants that dragged seedlings off".
[46] Ibid. The Dutch's standing in Mfumo society received a serious blow when the pirate George Taylor and his men arrived, and in contrast to their belligerent and drunken behaviour, the Dutch were seen as lily-livered cowards.
[47] CA C406 f 117
[48] CA C406 f. 115
[49] Ibid.
[50] NA 4367 f. 122ii

projected majesty and high status and was not the prerogative of the commoner, let alone someone whose existence rested on the mercy of others. Clothes inspired awe and wonder among locals, illustrated by their response to the newly arrived and uniformed accountant named Lappenberg, whose clothes they touched out of curiosity.[51] Shining gloriously, "gloriensschijnt," in his new garb and inspiring awe in his followers "voor sijne een diepen gesag sal geven," the young Maphumbo provoked his senior male relative, Bombo, who had declared himself as "ruler of the land".[52] This blunder provoked animosity toward the Dutch from Bombo, who viewed Maphumbo's manifest majesty as an insult to his position as paramount chief. Bombo refused to trade ivory with the Dutch for a while, reproaching them for presenting gifts to an underling, rather than to himself.[53] Maphumbo was seen as an inferior who needed to respect political structures. His defiant attitude, along with the prestige of the material gain he had received from the Dutch, partly contributed to the escalation of tensions around trade along the northern bank of Delagoa Bay.

In pursuance of goodwill from their protector, the Dutch initially spent all day in his company. This activity demanded their utmost patience and endurance because of the constant barrage of demands for goods. Yet the demanding of gifts was another arrow in Maphumbo's quiver. Encouraging the Dutch to settle in his territory meant that he as chief had ready access to goods through gift-giving. The direct contact between the Dutch and the local chief ensured a constant flow of presents, a continual supply of presents of clothing, tobacco, pipes and *sopje*.[54] Gift-giving added to a chief's status in that prominent men offered gifts. What the Dutch appraised as appeasement Maphumbo saw as a powerful tool to declare his preeminence.

To reinforce his status, Maphumbo demanded gifts from the Dutch, a practice that the Dutch misunderstood as avarice. The continuous stream of presents demanded by Maphumbo was regarded as a sign of greed or "alles haar gading".[55] The Dutch also lamented the cost of presents, three times more than

[51] CA C406 f. 285
[52] Coetzee, 1948, 1948, 237, CA C406 f. 115. "will give his [subjects] a deep respect [for him]."
[53] Coetzee, 1948, 1948, 237
[54] A sopje was a drink of some form of alcohol.
[55] CA C406 f. 118

what they thought adequate.[56] What they did not understand was the significance of the constant demand for exotic goods. The possession and flow of trade goods to a chief were important indicators of status and served to reinforce the relationship between a chief and his followers. It was therefore self-evident that a chief should control trade.[57] He and his sons, or, at times, some other senior male relative, took an active role in participating in the trade process, an activity that ensured the receiving of gifts.

However, the leverage Maphumbo had as a host reduced drastically from April 1722. Trading with a powerful group such as the English and the ability to negotiate better prices from them enhanced chiefly status. English merchants, who traded under the auspices of the English East India Company or EIC, traded sporadically at Delagoa Bay from the seventeenth century. The other group of English sailors who frequented the waters of the western Indian Ocean comprised pirates. In the autumn of 1722, the pirate George Taylor sailed into the Bay. He and his nine hundred raucous and rum-swilling pirate crews humiliated the Dutch. They violently ransacked their stores, and traded with unrestrained generosity, using company goods. The Dutch lost respect in the eyes of locals after this period; Van de Capelle complained about the lack of cooperation by the locals after this event, citing threats of theft and murder.[58]

Trading with the English

This incident raises an important theme that echoes throughout the eighteenth century: trading with the English. The English were competitors in the ivory market who consistently paid more than the Portuguese and the Dutch. Because of this, chiefs often retained better quality goods until these could be exchanged, not only for higher prices but also under circumstances that brought the highest prestige.

Trading with the English, whether merchants, smugglers or pirates, held the advantage of conducting prestigious shipboard trade with worthy merchants.[59] The English invariably conducted shipboard trade at Delagoa Bay that afforded its chiefs

[56] CA C406 f. 193
[57] Kuper, H. Costume and Identity, *Comparative studies in Society and History*, 15, 3, 1973 348-367
[58] CA C411 f. 12
[59] The Dutch at times reported the docking of smugglers at the Cape, as a sample see Leibrandt, H.C.V. *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope*. Cape Town: W.A. Richard & Sons, 1896, 280, 289, 292

the status-enhancing activity of marketing goods on board a ship: "…inlander gestellt zyn goederen aanboord te willen verkopen."[60] The advantage of shipboard trade was illustrated by the remarkable 10 197 pounds Captain Sharrow of the ship *Northampton* traded over two months in early 1723, at a time when the Dutch were lamenting their slow ivory trade.[61] In contrast, the Dutch were settled onshore, which tended to undermine their power base as they were outnumbered.

The late 1680s had seen a marked increase in English trade at Delagoa Bay, but they were initially disappointed with the trade here, based on the perception that the Portuguese were paying higher prices for ivory, which kept the English from doing successful business. However, their fortunes changed when they behaved aggressively towards the local chiefs, forcing a trading partnership. The Portuguese achieved similar results, as we have seen earlier, when they forcefully countered attacks by the Tembe during the sixteenth century. By engaging in the hostile behaviour of clapping some chiefs in iron on board the *Bauden* and demanding greater quantities of ivory as ransom, Captain Crib earned the English the reputation of bravery and courage, which, in turn, proved to be greatly advantageous to trade.[62] It was more likely fear of the violent and aggressive behaviour of this captain that inspired the willingness to trade. Thereafter, the Portuguese suffered loss of profit, as the English were preferred as trading partners.

Not only had the English proven their mettle as compelling trading partners, the EIC was experiencing a period of growth that would not be exceeded until the 1740s.[63] This meant that the English were in a position to pay better prices. Although the European wars from 1689 impeded its growth, the EIC was under far less financial pressure than the embattled VOC and could afford to offer considerably more in exchange for ivory.

These pirates and smugglers were less concerned with profit margins and traded lavishly with goods acquired without any capital outlay of their own. In 1722, the

[60] CA C411 f. 15. "locals were intent on selling goods on board" The eagerness to trade on board ships is evidence of the absence of a slave trade at Delagoa Bay throughout most of the eighteenth century.
[61] Coetzee, 1948, C.G *Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800.* PhD, Stellenbosch, 1954, 227, and Smith, 1970, 62. It could also be a preference for trading with the English was inspired by their greater willingness to trade firearms for trade articles. Trading weapons did not pose a threat to them in the way it did to the Dutch, who were settled on shore and who wanted to avoid arming the locals who far outnumbered them.
[62] Coetzee, 1948, PhD, 65
[63] Chaudhari, K.N. *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company: 1660-1760.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 15

English pirates were both violent and lavish. The Dutch witnessed with horror the frivolous expenditure of nine hundred pirates who descended on their trading post with utter disregard for sound business principles. The chiefs had little care for discerning the category and legitimacy of European traders and painted all English with the same profitable brush.

The English pirates' violent behaviour made the acquiescent attitude of the Dutch conspicuous. Ordered to behave in a way that would not provoke any ire from locals, the Dutch approached locals with civility, which was regarded as a show of weakness:

> [H]oe grooter ophoopinge van gescenke en beleeftheden, sij coome te ontvangen, hoe grooter onheushededn sij ons weder recompenceere.[64]

After the pirates' departure, Dutch esteem collapsed. Their diminished status minimised Maphumbo's leverage to claim any position of political importance. Mateke tried to assert himself over Maphumbo after belief in the power of the Dutch waned, but due to a military alliance between Maphumbo and Tembe, this task was more challenging than he had thought. The conflict over position and prestige would eventually draw the Tembe, situated across the lagoon, into the fray.

Trading with the Dutch

As trade was important for maintaining a chief's prestige, it was imperative that he or any of his close family be involved with transactions, especially after blue beads entered the market - the significance of these beads are explained later. For the first two months, the Dutch conducted business predominately with locals whom they called *inlanders*. These traders initially appeared in small groups numbering between twelve and sixteen to present their ivory at the fort for exchange, usually undersized tusks (weighing ten pounds on average).[65] The Dutch were puzzled and frustrated by the dynamic governing transactions where the number of traders was disproportionate to the amount of goods, as on the occasion when sixteen men came

[64] CA C422 f. 18, Journal December 1727-February 1728, "[T]he greater our politeness and gifts, the greater impoliteness we are shown."
[65] CA 406 f. 264, CA 410 f. 105. The first foreigners were people from Paraotte who arrived on 19 August 1723 to trade gold, NA 4373 f. 582 fix this footnote

to sell a single tusk that could have been carried by two or three people. What they saw as an overblown process could have reflected a process of chiefly monitoring through multiple participants who reported back to him. Complex processes of negotiation were probably not only about securing a good price but also emphasized status. The process of negotiating the price for these few items often took days with

> een oneijndige getalm willde een groene, de andere blaauwe corallen en een wat anders hebben…ons menige dag sonder iets uijt te voeren.[66]

Local chiefs seldom arrived to trade without companions. For example, Mateke arrived with "eenige inlanders" or some locals to trade.[67] These companions were most likely male relatives. From the trading post's inception, chiefs were the ones recorded as arriving to trade either in the company of male relatives or as having sent these as representatives. On one occasion, Tembe arrived with his cousin, and another entry records Mateke's son as trader.[68] Chiefs kept trade firmly within their sphere of influence not only to maintain their authority and the status it required but also to monopolise trade goods. The Dutch appeared to be ignorant of the importance of the process of transacting a deal and the importance of chiefly participation in negotiations that signified authority and status.[69]

As important as trade was, the accumulation of cattle and people signalled wealth, as in other southern African societies. The function of trade was to elevate the status of a chief in order to attract a greater numbers of followers. At Delagoa Bay, trade was contingent upon a relationship with the chief of a specific lineage group. And when more than one group occupied an area, competition increased for the position of principal trader, which implies competition for subjects. The redistribution of trade goods retained existing subjectsand attracted new ones. By1721, the competition for trade had been long settled on the southern bank and Tembe reigned supreme during the eighteenth century. The northern bank had experienced political upheaval, prior to the advent of the Dutch that resulted in the demotion of the Mfumo chief, Maphumbo. Maphumbo hoped to use the prestige of a close association

---

[66] CA C406 f. 188, " an unending lingering [over goods] one wants green, the other blue beads and another something else…many days we accomplished nothing."
[67] NA 4367 f. 272, Journal March- June 1722
[68] Ibid.
[69] For evidence of Delagoa Bay's chiefs participating in trade, see NA 4367, Dagregister aan Rio de Lagoa, 4 April - 30 SepTember1721, f.107-149.

with the Dutch to assert himself politically. The Dutch were unintentionally caught up in a struggle for power. Not numerous enough to settle a military campaign on his own, Maphumbo used his alliance with the seemingly powerful Dutch to gain a victory over his rival Mateke, an association that lost its usefulness when the Dutch were judged as cowards. In a competitive environment, a trade relationship with Europeans was a mechanism for exerting dominance over competitors, competition which the Dutch unwittingly exacerbated because of their ignorance of specific cultural indicators, which assigned status to important men.

Trade and Control

The Europeans came to Delagoa Bay with profit in mind. The VOC were bent on expanding markets and monopolising these at a time when the company was experiencing increasing economic pressure. The trading post was placed under pressure to produce profit to offset its running costs. The purpose of the trading post was to exchange the ivory, ambergris and gold found on these exotic shores for cloth and other goods regarded as trinkets by the Europeans, such as beads, mirrors and little bells. The goods taken in exchange were loaded onto ships and transported to either the Cape or Batavia, with the aim to eventually translate their cargo into bullion for the VOC. When the Dutch opened their trading post at the Bay, they had to familiarise themselves with the particular rules of engagement that governed the process of exchange around these shores. These rules dictated their approach to negotiating not only the terms of exchange but also, as we shall see later, their place within society. In this environment of ongoing negotiation the Dutch met with situations that they initially misread. Within the system of exchange around the Bay, goods accepted were valued according to a set of social values peculiar to an African paradigm that functioned to reinforce political hierarchies and designate rank. Having control over the flow of trade articles identified an individual as the dominant leader in a territory; competition for this position became more acute as blue glass beads entered the market. Chiefs controlled the flow of articles by permitting access to the trading post. Maphumbo had the greatest control over the movement of beads and other goods, as the trading post was situated in his territory. Chiefs compensated for their lack of control over the distribution of trade articles by capturing the influx of foreign traders. These had to pay tribute in ivory, and at least one chief, Mateke, demanded payment for water.

The movement of traders into a chief's territory was a point of control for a chief. Using the Portuguese as an example, permission to trade in a territory was necessary. Gaining permission involved the payment of gifts to the paramount, either at his court, as in the case of the Mutapa, or to a Captain of the Gates.[1] In this way a chief controlled trade within a territory. This institution of control reinforced his importance as the highest authority, and extended by proxy throughout his territory through the heads of villages under his jurisdiction, who monitored the

[1] RSEA, Vol. 2, 396

flow of news, people and their goods. This function preserved the status and unique social position of a chief and his lineage:

> …[P]ower [is] ultimately derived from resources vested in particular persons who control and are controlled by their relationship to each other and their subjects.[2]

To execute control over the flow of the resources, namely beads and cloth, the movement of traders into a territory was closely observed, and traders from respective areas within the interior were funneled to individual chiefs' villages, through a process that is unclear. Societies did not live in isolation from each other and chiefs along the coast monitored the movement of people within their territory. For example, the Nassangano were announced as being close when they reached Manock (Maphumbo's uncle), whose village was located half a day's journey away.[3]

The protocol dictating that visitors announce themselves at a chief's village controlled the movement of people and goods through a territory. The hierarchy within a village, according to Junod's admittedly colonial view, functioned as follows: A chief was aided by principal councilors in the task of overseeing the administration of his district. Among these principal advisors were special councilors who were appointed to manage matters of commerce with foreigners.[4] These matters were discussed at length in a communal and male-dominated space that Junod called a public square. This social space was central to the chief's village, and that functioned as a meeting point for men who sat in groups, drinking beer under trees while discussing the daily news.[5] It was also the point of contact between the chief and any visitor outside his territory. A stranger would approach the square and sit down at some distance, until he was noticed. Once acknowledged, he formally introduced himself, announcing where he was from and stating his order of business. Once accepted, he and his fellow travellers were welcomed, fed, and given sleeping accommodation.[6] This nineteenth - early twentieth century perspective presented by Junod can be problematic in terms of projecting it backwards, as he had a romanticised view of the Ronga communities he observed. His description of a chief's

---

[2]Kuper, H. 'Costume and Identity,' *Comparative Studies*, 15,3, (1979), 349. Kuper is referring to the Swazi in her article but these principles are evident for the Ronga in the archive.
[3] CA C 421 f. 37
[4] Junod, H.A *Les BaRonga: étude Ethnographie sur les Indigènes de la Baia de Delagoa*, Neuchatel: Attinger, 1898, 150
[5] Ibid, 149
[6] Ibid, 154

village is idealised. But taking into consideration how important trade goods were in attracting and maintaining numbers of subjects, it is conceivable that chiefs needed some form of protocol to govern the movement of people, especially traders from the interior.

It is easy to imagine that groups of travelling traders, laden with ivory, would emerge from the bush and announce themselves in this way. The public square announcement provided an ideal setting for trade goods declared, accessed and taxed, whereby the chief had first right of refusal on goods entering his territory, a portion of which he distributed among his subjects. The distribution of goods to some within the elite functioned to reinforce his pre-eminence within the local political system. It was only in theory that orderly assessment and distribution of goods occurred from one particular chief's village. This description is probably an oversimplified model of distribution of goods and practical in a politically stable territory under a central authority. However, on the northern bank, chiefs were in competition with each other over this privilege. What is certain is that groups of travelling traders did not always or usually report to the paramount chief, but at various chiefs' homesteads, as we will see below. This reality probably reflected the limited power of the paramount, which contributed to destabilising the northern bank. Bombo claimed to be this central authority. This was, of course, a claim which was contested by Mateke, who used trade as a powerful political tool to shore up authority in competition with those who claimed seniority.

Chiefs' subjects also appropriated visiting traders' goods, as they would leave the trading post. For instance, Maphumbo's men took beads from Machikossean traders:

> [E]en snaphaan skoot boven het fort gekomen wanner door de onderdaanen van gedagte Maphumbo van de coraalen welke in betaling van hun tanden ontvangen, hadden berooft hadden.[7]

It is unclear who exactly these subjects were and where they were positioned on the political ladder but it is clear that Maphumbo sanctioned this behaviour, justifying it

[7] NA 4371 f. 255ii, Journal December, 1727, " a a musket shot above the fort, these were robbed by the subjects of Maphumbo of the beads they had received in payment." This behaviour was not a unusual event on the northern bank.

by saying that Machikosseans previously robbed his men in Nassangano.[8] These confiscations occurred at either the arrival or the departure of visiting traders as a device to assert a claim of supremacy through the accumulation of beads. Besides appropriating traders' beads, locals also took ivory from visiting traders, who were then deprived from trading with the Dutch, which ensured beads would go to local chiefs rather than leave the territory.[9] Mateke warned the Nassangano traders against contact with the Dutch, knowing that their tribute would go to Tembe, bolstering his rather than Mateke's authority.[10] The ideal of an orderly trade structure according to political hierarchies was belied by the reality that visitors, in particular those from Paraotte and Machikosse, faced as they traversed the territory of others to trade. Confiscations were interpreted by the Dutch as robbery inspired by jealousies for the "advantages received from Europeans."[11] This type of behaviour displayed power and communicated dominance over a territory, a behaviour that grew in importance when blue beads became available.

The Importance of Blue Beads

The unrelenting demand for blue beads remained a problem to the Dutch, who had difficulty in supplying the precise bead called for in transactions for large pieces of ivory. Considering the obvious importance of dark blue beads to societies around the Bay, it may be that the constant demand for these beads was linked to the environment.

Beads have long been central to the lives of Africans.[12] These were used as adornment and currency, associated with ceremonies and religious cults, and considered charms and amulets.[13] It is highly likely that blue beads in Mfumo were part of fertility and rainfall rituals. The Dutch noticed that the Mfumo wore very few of the beads compared to the amounts they exchanged, a behaviour that implies an alternate use for the glass beads so high in demand on the dry and infertile

[8] Ibid.
[9] CA C 421 f. 36, Letter, 3 July 1726
[10] NA 4367 f. 30
[11] CA C431 f. 27
[12] Dubin, L. in Stine, L., Cabak, M., Groover, M. 'Blue beads as African-American cultural symbols,' *Historical Archaeology*, (1996), 30(3): 49-75, 53
[13] Ibid.

northern bank of Delagoa Bay, suggestive of the protective properties of blue beads against drought.[14]

The East Coast of Africa had been in contact with the Muslim trade for at least a thousand years and their cultural influence left traces in African society. The association between beads and agriculture is an ancient one, and is linked to the advent of agriculture in the Near East.[15] Here, in an unpredictable world, where the spectre of drought always looms, magical thinking played a role in providing security in uncertain situations. Magical thinking is defined as: "creating or invoking extraordinary connections…in order to understand, predict or influence events."[16] The domestication of grains and animals in the Near East produced a special interest in manipulating the fertility of plants, animals and humans. Farmers here went to great lengths to acquire green beads (in an area that contained no green minerals) to influence new growth and the promise of a successful harvest. [17] Green and blue beads are substituted for each other in different societies, possibly because green stones and minerals often vary between the two hues and were associated with luxuriant vegetation and the rain that causes its growth, which seems to be a universally accepted notion.[18]

This idea also governed societies in southern Africa, evident in the demand for blue trade beads. Blue beads were associated with fertility within different societies. In 1731, the *Snuffelaar*'s crew was told that only blue beads were in demand in the periodically dry interior.[19] In Zulu culture, light blue beads indicate ripeness and fertility.[20] The Venda prized small blue beads called "beads of the water," a title which could either refer to the place of their origin (the coast) or possibly to rainwater. As elsewhere in the world, where cultivation occurred in arid and semi-arid areas, the impulse to produce green beads existed in southern Africa. Among

[14] CA C413 f. 67. Dark blue beads were not the only beads traded but were the only beads accepted in payment for gold and ivory.
[15] Mayer, D., Porat, N. 'Green stone beads at the dawn of agriculture,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 105, 25, (June 2008), 8548-8551, 8549
[16] St. James, Y., Handelman, J.A., Taylor, S.F. 'Magical thinking and consumer coping,' *Journal of Consumer Research*, 38,4, (Dec. 2011), 632-649
[17] Mayer, D., Porat, N., 8549. According to Mayer and Porat, the green beads found in Neolithic sites, consisted of one of the following materials: apetite, fluorapatite, malachite, chrysacolla, turquoise, amazonite and serpentine materials, all in various shades of green, see the above mentioned article, 8548.
[18] Budge in Mayer & Porat, 8550
[19] Molsbergen, G. *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd.* S-Gravenhage, 1916, 246
[20] Ibid, 8550

the Tswana people, stone bead factories existed for the creation of serpentine rock beads, outcrops which were associated with well-watered areas and good pasture.[21]

In view of the wide association of blue beads with fertility and rain, the demand for blue beads seems logical in a periodically drought-stricken Delagoa Bay, as protection against dry weather. Like the rest of southern Africa, Delagoa Bay was exposed to the vagaries of the weather patterns related to El Niño.[22] Blue beads, and other blue objects like Chinese porcelain, were used as charms or amulets and "are common items in archaeological assemblages from [African] coastal Islamic sites" and "blue beads, blue buttons…and even pieces of blue pottery are powerful against the evil eye."[23] In West Africa, the colour blue represented spiritual protection. Many African American slave burial sites consistently present blue beads, with no other colour being so uniformly presented.[24] The preponderance of blue beads at these sites suggests that these were regarded as protective objects, to ensure success in a range of aspects of life: journeys, hunting, farming, in addition to warding off evil, and to gain material goods.[25] In West Africa the predominant evil may have been harm from others, as well as sickness, but in southern Africa, the great enemy was drought and famine, due to the unpredictability of rain.

The Dutch arrived in a heat wave that autumn and struggled to cope as they explored the shore during scorching days, choosing to escape to the relative coolness of the ships' decks.[26] After they eventually settled ashore, they continually complained of burning hot days or "by dag brandend heet."[27] In these sweltering conditions, the Dutch endeavoured to plant a garden. The early development of their garden consistently told a tale of drought, filled with complaints to the Cape about the difficulties the cultivators had in propagating seedlings in circumstances of

[21] Harger, H.S. A stone bead industry of the Western Transvaal in *Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa*, 28, 1941, 129-141,132
[22] El Niño is the warming of sea-surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific Ocean which influences atmospheric circulation, and consequently rainfall and temperature in specific areas around the world, including southern Africa, and is associated with drought.
[23] Donley, L. Life in a Swahili Town House reveals the symbolic meaning of spaces and artifact assemblages in *The African Archaeological Review 5*, Papers in honour of J. Desmond Clark, 1987, 181-192, 188
[24] Stine, L. Cabak, M.A., Groover, M. Blue beads as African-American cultural symbols in *Historical Archaeology*, 30, 3, 1996, 49-75, 50
[25] Ibid, 54
[26] CA C406 f.105
[27] CA C406 f.182 letter 11 October 1721, "by day burning hot"

"excessive hitte."[28] By October 1721, Swertner wrote to the Political Council at the Cape about the state of the garden:

> [W]egens die groote droogte van het land en bij gebroke van regen sijnde die grond hier om heen puer gul sandt…onstentenisse van vogt door de excessive hitte verbranden.[29]

In desperation, seedlings were planted under trees, which was of little help, when rains failed in 1721. While locals promised that the rainy season had arrived, Swertner reported in November 1721 that according to their standard, the weather they were experiencing was inconsistent with the term rainy season:

> …den inwoonder heeft ons veel moed gegeven dat de regentijd dagelijkse stond te komen, maer 't schijnd dat een klein buijte off een suer luggen de regentijd by haar maakt, voor ons europianen kan men het geen regentijd off quade mousson agten, want al komt een donkere wolk of buije, so genaeuw is deselve niet over off het is weer brandend heet dat men na luggen snackt en van hitte vesmagten moet.[30]

High temperatures and the lack of rain continued into 1722, when seedlings barely "vingerbreedte of twee" (a finger's breadth or two), above the ground dried up due to the excessive heat and the hope for a garden growing taro, beans and vegetables seemed lost to the ravages of drought.[31]

However, the most compelling piece of evidence for a drought is Maphumbo's sacrifice to invoke rain in December 1722. The late date of this sacrifice is noteworthy. According to Junod, if the spring rain fails, a sacrifice of a black animal is offered to entice the ancestors to send rain.[32] Maphumbo's lineage, like most societies of those around Delagoa Bay claim to have migrated from Kalanga, who had a Mwari rainmaking institution and who had throughout their history had a

---

[28] Ibid. "excessive heat"
[29] CA C 406 f. 190, letter of 11 October 1721, "the great drought in the area and the lack of rain, the earth consists of pure sand… the absence of moisture and excessive heat scorched [seedlings]".
[30] CA C406 f. 270. Locals assured us daily that the rainy season has come, but it seems that one small rainfall or heavy wind means a rainy season to them, to us Europeans this does not constitute a rainy season nor a heavy monsoon, the same is scarcely over, it is so boiling hot that we gasp for our breath and languish in the heat.
[31] CA C407 f. 106
[32] Junod, Vol. 2 293

contingent of high priests to provide propitiation.[33] Appeasement was sought either from Mwari (god) or the territorial spirits of the ancestors who represented the founders of a community, i.e. those of the chief.[34] Maphumbo claimed to be of such a priestly line and alone had the power to invoke either Mwari or the ancestors to make rain:

> [S]cheijnt onder haar een soort priesterlijke geslagt… en die geene die daaruit sijn voortsprongen alleenig moogen offeren en regen konnen voortbrengen.[35]

Not only was he the descendant of a priestly line, it is likely that his totem was the hippopotamus, illustrated by an incident involving the Dutch and hippopotami. Shortly after Maphumbo made this particular sacrifice, he predicted rain, and when it failed to materialise, he blamed the empty skies on the Dutch who had previously shot at the hippopotami in the river. It seems probable that the hippo was the Maphumbo totem, because of his reaction to the Dutch sport.[36]

The reason for his alarm was that harming these creatures would break a taboo incurring the wrath of the ancestors. This infraction on the part of the Dutch was seen as responsible for keeping the rain away. Having the hippo as a totem implied Maphumbo's knowledge and power over the domain of water and rain through his association with the hippo that lived in water.[37] The Dutch failed to see the reason for the anxiety around this event, commenting that they never killed any hippopotami, misunderstanding the import of their actions. A misunderstanding that becomes clear considering their observation that the societies around Delagoa Bay had no concept of the spiritual, saying: "…geene kennisse van god of zijn gebod, leven als de beesten…"[38]

---

[33] Feierman, S. 227 Mans, M. *Centering on African Practice in Musical Arts Production.* Cape Town: African Minds, 2006, 255. Junod states that the Venda and Zulu influenced Tsonga rainmaking practices but taking into account that contact between them and these groups happen later, it is more likely that the Mfumo rainmaking practices held a greater affinity to that of the Kalanga.
[34] Feierman, S., Janzen, J.M. *The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa.* California: University of California Press, 1992, 215
[35] NA 4367 f. 311ii – "it appears that under these exists some priestly line… only descendants from this line, may sacrifice and can bring rain forth"
[36] NA 4367 f. 311ii
[37] Vijfhuizen, C. 'Rain-making, political conflicts and gender images: a case from Mutema chieftaincy in Zimbabwe,' *Zambezia*, xxiv, i, (1997), 31-49, 38
[38] CA C406 f. 193 "…have no knowledge of God nor his commands, living like beasts"

There was better rainfall in1722 and by July 1725 the Dutch proudly announced to their superiors that the garden was producing an increasing amount of vegetables, sufficient to feed the settlement and the ships' crews once a week.[39] The year 1725, coincided with a good, although rare, supply of beads and probably strengthened the magical association between rain and beads.[40] But by 1726, Delagoa Bay was slipping into another dry cycle, which coincided with the escalation of hostilities between the Mfumo chiefs.

The influence of the supply of blue beads on trade and politics

As we have seen, the Dutch trade was caught up in the political struggle at play at the Bay that interfered with the success of their trading post. One obstacle to their success was the obligatory stop at a chief's village by incoming traders. Desperate to contact traders from the interior in order to expand their less than booming business, and smarting at the accusations of neglectful practice, they were often exasperated by the news that visiting traders had come and gone without contacting them.[41] The protocol demanding that all strangers announce themselves to a chief, reinforced the importance of chiefs, while controlling foreign traders' access to the trading post and blue beads.

By keeping foreign traders from reaching the Dutch independently, Maphumbo, Matolle and Mateke controlled contact between the Europeans and incoming traders in order to assert their authority. This tactic powerfully illustrated their authority over Europeans through manipulating the supply of ivory, and was a tool used not only to maintain dominance over them, but also to accumulate as many blue beads as they could.

The first barrel of blue beads arrived in May 1721 and the success of trade hinged on the supply of these beads. [42] When a ship arrived, a messenger was dispatched to inspect the new consignment of beads. If blue bead supply was unacceptable in terms of colour, the chiefs did not bother to bring goods to trade.[43] In addition, ivory was withheld until they saw the ship preparing to leave the Bay (perhaps they thought

[39] CA C430 f. 50
[40] CA C417 f. 7 letter 9 July 1725, which amounted to between seventy and a hundred people.
[41] CA C415 f. 59, the trading post employees were accused of being incompetent and neglectful.
[42] NA 4367 f. 116, Journal, 18 May 1721
[43] CA C433 f. 5

there was a secret stash kept on board).[44] It appears that chiefs thought that the Dutch were deliberately withholding blue beads from them, and to force the Dutch to part with dark blue beads, the chiefs employed their own tactics. Maphumbo banned the sale of cattle to the Dutch until they produced these after the supply had run out in 1721, and as late as 1730, Mateke planned an attack to forcibly take beads from the trading post. His scheme never materialized because Machaia and Matolle refused to assist him, "deesen hadden dit geweijgert, en segt als er geen andere zijn."[45]

The first consignment of beads disappeared into the hands of traders within a week. It is from this point on in the record that complaints about the lack of a suitable assortment of beads appear. Before the fateful arrival of the barrel of blue beads the Dutch reported no problems concerning the type of bead traded not only for goods, but also for labour.[46] The fact that these beads could be exchanged for cattle proves their great worth and explains the increased regularity of trade visits by chiefs.[47] These blue beads would remain in short supply throughout the Dutch era, adding to their prestige value. The documents are replete with urgent requests to the Council of Seventeen to respectfully take heed of the examples sent and supply these in the exact size and colour of beads as shown by the samples. Trade slowed down to almost nothing as the supply of blue beads ran out.[48] Their superiors, in their wisdom, ascribed the samples that proved unsatisfactory to a pernickety market that demanded beads not only of a particular size but also an exact shade of colour. The Dutch were able to exchange only the dark blue variety out of a barrel of assorted blue beads from a subsequent shipment, returning the rest to the Cape.[49] Blue beads could be exchanged for large tusks, while smaller tusks were traded for other goods such as copper rings, small pairs of scissors and little mirrors.[50] Although beads of other colours, such as yellow, were accepted, particularly by Tembe, the demand for these specific beads would increase, especially as traders from Paraotte and Machikosse became regular visitors to the Bay.

---

[44] NA 4367 f. 115ii
[45] NA 4373 f. 414 Letter, 2 May 1730. "these refused him, saying there were not any more [beads]"For the reference to Maphumbo's ban on the sale of cattle, see NA 4367 f. 117ii
[46] Labour at the fort was predominantly provided by women and children who gladly accepted any kind of bead for their work CA 406 f. 264
[47] NA 4371 f. 256, before the advent of blue beads the identity of people who arrived in groups to trade were not mentioned, see the journal of April to September 1721, NA 4371
[48] NA 4368 f. 354
[49] CA C413 f. 82, Letter 22 August 1724
[50] NA 4367 f. 232 Journal, March – April 1722

Traders who came from outside the immediate area to do business placed an extra demand on the blue bead trade. To control the flow of beads, chiefs Mateke, Maphumbo and Tembe hosted each a specific group of traders. Tembe hosted those from Nassangano, Maphumbo received the Machikosse, and Mateke welcomed those from Paraotte, in an arrangement to secure a portion of scarce blue beads through the demand of tribute from their guests. It could be that the Nassangano and Tembe based their trade relationship on alliances forged through marriage but it is unclear how the Paraotteans and the Machikosse were allocated to Mateke and Maphumbo. However, as a result, the largest tusks came to belong to Mapumbo, Mateke, Manisse, and Tembe.

The Dutch had the hopes of accessing better quality goods through the newcomers to the coast, but much to their disappointment, these continued the custom of selling smaller tusks to them. These *buitelanders* arrived in smaller sets of ones and twos, and after having followed protocol that dictated declaring themselves at a chief's village first, proceeded to sell the larger tusks to chiefs.[51] Frustrated by this state of affairs, the Dutch challenged this course of action and accused the leaders of purposely thwarting them in trade. This accusation was vehemently denied and accompanied by placating assurances that traders from afar only brought small tusks to trade, a standard response which evoked the following peevish comment:

> …nogtans wisten wij weten zeer wel dat genoemde uijtlanders groter tanden hadden gebragt.[52]

In order to counteract the best goods going to chiefs, the Dutch tried binding both Maphumbo and Mateke to their promise to bring traders to them through the signing of contracts. But the two leaders only partially adhered to the stipulations of these agreements. In fact, Mateke proposed a condition that the Dutch bring any local or foreign traders to him.[53] Although the various chiefs around the Bay allowed traders from the interior through to the trading post to do business, the despondent Dutch noted that a mere trickle of mostly smaller pieces of ivory reached their fort

[51] CA C415 f. 62
[52] CA C415 f. 62. " although we know that foreigners had brought larger tusks."
[53] CA C413 f. 112

for exchange.[54] Chiefs, then, did not merely act as middlemen between the incoming traders and European traders; they were in control of trade that passed through their territory. Negotiations over the acquisition of larger tusks signified the status and prestige of the chief, and keeping these back for prestigious trade partners and the specific variety of blue glass beads were imperative to maintain or gain prestige, by having the best items to sell.

The institution of hosting traders provided the Dutch with two points of irritation. It determined not only which group from the interior would receive trade goods, but also the quality of goods the Dutch would receive. They frequently complained about the bad quality (predominately small tusks) as well as the small quantity of ivory offered. In spite of the inferior quality of goods, the Dutch consistently traded these goods for good reasons. The first was to reflect transactions in their account book, and the other was to encourage the supply of ivory and gold.[55] The element that controlled the quality of ivory on offer was the availability of dark blue glass beads. These beads were in short supply most of the time, and thinking that the Dutch purposefully withheld these from them, chiefs tried to force the Dutch to give out blue beads, as we have seen above.

As the numbers of traders from Paraotte and Machikosse increased from 1724, the demand for blue beads grew. In addition to ivory, traders from Nassangano and Paraotte occasionally brought small quantities of inferior quality gold in addition to ivory to trade.[56] Gold earned very high prices based on Dutch desperation for this metal. They capitulated to excessive demands, which in their view potentially attracted greater numbers of traders to the Bay. Paraottean traders trading gold significantly increased Mateke's bead supply, to the point where he requested a large wooden chest (designed to keep wine bottles) from the Dutch.[57] The flow of gold and foreigners or *buijtelanders* had increased significantly by 1724. This was due to the Dutch having, for a limited period, a good supply of the desired kind of blue beads, coupled with their tendency to overpay, drawing *buijtelanders* to the coast. The supply of small blue beads periodically improved but quickly sold out.

[54] CA C415 f. 60
[55] CA 406 f. 196
[56] The Nassangano brought gold once, those from Paraotte were responsible for the rest
[57] CA C415 f. 59. This chest was called a *kelder*, designed with partitions to hold wine bottles.

The need to gain and control access to incoming and outgoing goods resulted in the struggle for dominance becoming more common, which destabilised the political landscape. Chiefs attempted to drive away other chiefs who held up the flow of traders. Cherinde, a lesser chief north of Bombo, obstructed trade by arresting traders and keeping them from contacting other chiefs, in order to complete his own transaction for beads. This behaviour prompted Bombo, Maphumbo and Mateke to request Dutch assistance in driving Cherinde away.[58] Besides the habit of chiefs holding up traders to demand tribute before they travelled onwards, the appropriation of beads became more frequent because of the increasing demand and the chronic shortage. For example, Matola took goods from the Nassangano, who were travelling to their host Tembe and the Nassangano in turn appropriated goods from his subjects who went trading for ivory in Nassangano.[59] As the demand for beads grew, chiefs overlooked the tacit understanding that each had a supply of ivory from a specific group and took ivory from another's supplier, to increase their beads income, which contributed to the destabilisation of the northern bank.

Chiefs established control by establishing rules of engagement for both the Dutch and traders who came from the interior. As the sought-after blue bead supply fluctuated, along with increasing demand, the area became politically destabilised through acts of appropriation. The possession of trade goods was an important feature to indicate high status, and indicated authority over aspects of trade. These included receiving gifts in return for a chief's goodwill and permission to trade, demanding tribute and tolls from incoming traders, and controlling the quality of goods traded to Europeans. The shortage of blue beads, along with the increase of foreign traders, encouraged military measures in order to dominate the territory from the beginning of 1726, which led to the increasing destabilisation of the territory of Mfumo. A pattern of forming alliances to drive away those who threatened others' access to trade prevailed until the end of the Dutch era at Delagoa Bay.

[58] CA C417 f. 14, 9 July 1725. The Dutch preferred to stay neutral, preferring to promote negotiation.
[59] CA C421 f. 21

Trade and Conflict

Because Mateke had captured the Paraottean gold and ivory market by 1726, his blue bead store had grown. The ownership of these beads symbolised his capacity to wield authority over foreign traders, and attracted subjects from other chiefs. Dominance over the northern bank was the real issue of power and the ownership of beads played a role in maintaining this authority. The submissive attitude of foreign traders further underpinned Mateke's position.

The acquiescence of foreign traders to Mateke's demands manifested his power. Paraotteans had to pay an exorbitant tribute both in the goods they brought, as well as in the beads they had received from the Dutch. Moreover they were obligated to make use of a mandatory water-collecting service.[1] The chief's wives were mandated to fetch pots of water for all visitors and for this service demanded the payment of two to three strings of beads per pot of water. These strings of beads became the property of his wives and their growing splendour advertised his power. These benefits acquired through trade augmented Mateke's recent advancement of becoming a chief, who could command tribute from a formerly independent Maphumbo, as we have seen above.

Both Maphumbo and Mateke used the advantage of trade to enhance their status in the eyes of subject chiefs in order to shake off Bombo's shackles. Maphumbo managed to accrue status by virtue of the location of the trading post in his territory to offset his diminished power, power that was further eroded by Mateke's subsequent actions. Mateke had brought some of Maphumbo's subjects' villages under his authority and over two to three years, between 1723 and 1724, gradually annexed parts of Bombo's territory. This territorial expansion is significant because it corresponds to the period during which gold first entered the Bay. The beads Mateke acquired through the Paraottean trade were part of his emergence as overlord. Due to his control over Paraottean traders, he gained the resources required to increase his coercive power. He had secured these traders under his authority and power, while controlling their access to the Dutch trading post. Having control over the gold suppliers accelerated his accumulation of exotic goods, which, in addition to the newly acquired title of chief, emboldened him to promote

[1] NA 4373 f. 396

himself by exerting his authority over others. This included usurping some of Maphumbo's subjects, while luring some of Bombo's followers into his fold. As Mateke's authority grew, he was able to place pressure from 1724 on some of Maphumbo's subjects, including Polanen, Quambe, and Savane, for tribute.[2] Maphumbo was incapable of defending his claims to tribute from these villages. In addition to usurping authority from Maphumbo, Mateke's influence caused some of Bombo's subjects to desert him as chief and pledge allegiance to Mateke.[3] In April 1726, Makuyo's village chose to pledge allegiance to Mateke and was accepted by him as his subjects, despite prior allegiance to Bombo. In response, Bombo, in alliance with Matola, drove the rebellious Makuyo away, burning his village to the ground and confiscating goods and cattle. Maphumbo lent his assistance against Bombo in this skirmish that left eight people dead.[4] This skirmish formed part of the escalation of hostilities that occurred from February 1726, which happened to coincide with a dry cycle. This correlation implies a greater demand for blue beads, perpetually in shortage, which, as we have seen above, possibly played a role in rainmaking rituals to alleviate drought.

The clash between Mateke and Bombo polarized the Bay. Tembe and Cherinde supported Mateke against Bombo, Matola and Manisse. The Dutch remarked that "…soo dat het geheele land hierom tegenwoordig in onderlinge oneenigheid is." [5] The Dutch, anxious about the detrimental influence war would have on trade, tried to convince Bombo to follow a diplomatic route, "te siene of de saak in de minnekonde bijleggen." [6]Bombo refused, replying that it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, revealing who held the upper hand. In this society, when a primary authority was being challenged, negotiation had no place. In 1726, the arrogance of youth coupled with new wealth and status were the "principaal reden" for the Mateke ambitions against Bombo, "een oud en afgeleeft man."[7]

Accumulating subjects was a primary goal of chiefs as the number of cattle and subjects denoted not only a chief's wealth but also his position in the political hierarchy. It was this same goal that Mateke aspired to and his pretensions became

[2] NA 9135 f. 74
[3] NA 9135 f. 67
[4] Ibid.
[5] NA 9135 f. 68, "presently the entire countryside is in mutual dissension"
[6] NA 9135 f. 66, " to see if he could settle this matter amicably"
[7] CA C 421 f. 22, CA C 431 f. 27, NA 9135 f. 72, "main reasons" "an old and decrepit man"

evident from February 1726, when he seriously challenged Bombo's claim to paramountcy by absorbing some of his subjects. The wealth in beads Mateke displayed attracted a greater following to him and hostilities again ensued when more followers of Bombo, also named Machaya, defected to Mateke.[8] This intolerable situation led to an attack by Machaya, who with a company of men attacked the villages of those in rebellion and burnt these down. His advance was inexorable and Mateke had to surrender. Realising his political blunder, Mateke sent a peace offering of ten oxen, a number of women, and a musket to Machaya, a show of submission that came too late. In a humiliating gesture, Machaya sent these goods back, along with the admonition that Mateke should move away. Mateke obliged and took shelter with a chief called Mambe. Mateke's bid for overall power was unsuccessful due to the deception of Maphumbo, who, in the end, reneged on his promise of military support to Mateke, choosing to assist Machaya instead.[9] Maphumbo had secretly come to an agreement with Machaya that in return for his military support, Maphumbo would be given Mateke's territory.[10] This miscalculation on the part of Mateke led to the stripping of his title, with the condition that he would either move away with his subjects or cede his village to one of Machaya's sons, while relinquishing all claim to future territory or authority.

Despite the apparent importance of trade in gaining wealth in beads and cloth, it was a means to an end – the subjugation of people and the acquisition of cattle. The aftermath of the hostilities demonstrated the centrality of cattle to the political sphere of these trading societies. During the conflict, cattle were abandoned and rounded up by Maphumbo, and, after an uneasy peace ensued, one of Machaya's sons appeared at Maphumbo's village to divide the spoils between the allies. The allocation of cattle through one of his sons was Machaya's prerogative, not only as victor, but also as paramount. The judicious assignment of cattle to his various supporters affirmed their rank and status within the social hierarchy on the northern bank, while entrenching the paramount's domination. In addition to the centrality of cattle in the Mfumo society, trade played a significant role in establishing supremacy by providing opportunities for control over people, and, in so doing, augmenting authority. However, to the Dutch, the attack on Mateke was justified in

[8] At this point in the archive the Dutch switch to using the name Machaya instead of Bombo, why is unsure.
[9] NA ARD 9135 f. 75
[10] NA 9135 f.73

defence of open trade, which Mateke frustrated by his constant prevention of traders from reaching the trading post.

Further, he was perceived as being a "bad subject", on the basis that he desired more land despite having received a fertile portion.[11] In the analysis of these statements, the frustration of Machaya comes to light because he, as paramount, had the right of first refusal from traders as well as the right to tribute from those living on the territory Mateke desired. Therefore, it was not so much the fact that traders were prevented from reaching the Dutch that provoked Bombo's ire, but rather that he was being deprived of tribute, a deprivation that compromised his status as overlord. Mateke had managed to lay claim to what belonged to Bombo by virtue of trade. Trade had brought foreigners into the area, and these foreigners were brought under Mateke's submission, increasing his wealth in blue beads. Mateke desired more people under his authority and an increase in tribute, in his view commensurate with his new level of power. This capacity to bend strangers and locals to his will by extorting tribute and payments from them, elevated Mateke's status and presented him as a powerful leader and protector, a leader who could exert dominance over weaker chiefs, and a protector attracting followers under his aegis. After the humiliating defeat, Mateke would bide his time. In due course, as levels of wealth among a limited section of the population rose, and quarrels intensified, he would again assert himself in the political arena.

The ensuing quarrels sprouted various permutations of alliance that would ultimately disrupt trade around the Bay altogether, and after a series of skirmishes between 1727 and 1730, Mateke would emerge as the triumphant paramount. But before his ultimate triumph, the society at the Bay went through a series of trade cycles. A trade cycle represented the opportunity for a chief to host traders. The host chief's wealth and prominence increased after each such cycle, in the process threatening any another lineage that laid claim to ultimate rule. In August 1727, the Dutch reported that the gold traders from Paraotte and Walembe had arrived in "sterke getalle" and represented a cause for conflict. [12]

[11] NA ARD 9135 f. 77
[12] CA C424 f. 89, letter dated 7 August 1727, "strong numbers".[12]

The arrival of greater numbers of foreign traders was significant in light of the assertion made by Machaya's delegation that trade would reopen and be freely directed toward the trading post. Mateke was accused of obstructing trade by preventing the passage of traders. It is likely Machaya, and other chiefs, engaged in political posturing in order to control the flow of ivory and gold trade. This is evident by the scale of cattle raiding occurring on the north bank in mid-1727. During this period Matola, Maphumbo, Machaya, and Tembe robbed each other in displays of dominance. The stealing of cattle from one another was the first sign of a quarrel. As the Dutch put it, "…zijnde altoos wanneer in strijt sijn't eerste dat den een van den anderen komt rooven."[13] The stealing of cattle was used as a disciplinary measure, and, in this particular context, denoted the disapproval of the importance a particular chief was gaining.[14] In the first half of 1728, it was Maphumbo who challenged Machaya. With the help of Tembe, Maphumbo set all the huts in his territory alight and took his cattle as loot.[15]

Rainmaking and Military Alliances

The relationship between Maphumbo and Tembe seems an unlikely one, Maphumbo being a Mfumo and clearly unrelated to Tembe. However, Maphumbo and Tembe were linked through Maphumbo's status as priest, capable of making rain.[16] As noted previously, Maphumbo's a priestly line and had the power to evoke either Mwari or the ancestors to make rain and from the Dutch account it appears that Maphumbo was the only one in the territory to have claim to rainmaking power.

It was probably Maphumbo's ability to conjure rain that formed the bases of the military alliance between Maphumbo and the agricultural Tembe. Being the predominant cultivators around the Bay, Tembe were dependent on the rainmaking abilities of Maphumbo. The Tembe regularly paddled across the lagoon to trade food with the Mfumo and were the primary suppliers of vegetables (and chickens) to the Dutch. Compared to the northern bank, the fertile land on the opposite bank produced a relative cornucopia of produce: sweet potatoes, beans, bananas, pineapples and sugar cane sold, not only to the Dutch, but also to the subjects of

[13] CA C431 f. 10, letter dated 22 October 1729, "whenvever there is a conflict, the first thing that happens is the robbing of each other's cattle."
[14] CA C 431 f. 5, letter dated 22 October 1729. Mateke raided Maphumbo's cattle as a sign of disapproval of Maphumbo's continued sale of cattle to the Dutch, see CA C413 f.81
[15] CA C427 f. 48, 11 August 1728. "…in each instance of a quarrel, it is the first thing that the one steals from the other." Those "driven away" clearly returned to challenge their attackers.
[16] NA 4367 f. 311ii

Maphumbo and Matola.[17] The cause for this bounty was probably linked to the incidence of a twenty per cent higher rainfall in a narrow band of land labeled "Koninck's Vlackte" on De Konink's map of 1726, which formed a valley and fell within Tembe's territory.[18] It may be that the Tembe perceived the naturally occurring higher rainfall on his side of the Bay as a result of Maphumbo's priestly duties, and dependant on rain for a successful harvest, place him under obligation to support Maphumbo militarily.

Vijfhuizen's research into the connection between drought and political authority, power and control in Zimbabwe gives insight into this likely relationship.[19] Her research shows how a co-dependent relationship sprang up between two groups, the Mutema and the Musikavanhu, based on rainmaking. Maphumbo was reportedly an outcast and rebel of Tembe: "…een opworpeling en rebel van Tembi".[20] This fragmentary sentence in the Dutch journal of 1721 is the only hint at the fact that the Maphumbo and the Tembe may have had a prior kinship relationship and suggests that conflict between the two had existed previously. According to Vijfhuizen, the ancestors keep rain away when conflict exists between chiefs of a particular chieftaincy, that is, chiefs who are related to each other.[21] In order to ensure good rains, conflicts need to be resolved between parties that they may worship together.[22] Supporting Maphumbo in a military endeavour would have been evidence of peace between the two clans, and promised good rains. Maphumbo's perceived rainmaking abilities were of great importance to Tembe and formed the basis of their military alliance.

The Nature of Warfare and Mateke's Victory

Dominance and authority amongst the societies of Delagoa Bay did not necessarily translate into dominance over a specific demarcated territory but rather dominance of subjects who occupied it. Conquest amounted to the acquisition of an opponent's people and cattle, rather than exerting authority over territory. Warfare during the early eighteenth century among the Ronga amounted to driving their opponents away. The Dutch used the term "verjaag" to describe this type of warfare, which

[17] NA 4373 f. 411
[18] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, map, 33
[19] Vijfhuizen, 31
[20] NA ARD 9135 f. 108, "an outcast and rebel of Tembe's"
[21] Vijfhuizen, 31
[22] During a famine in 1777, relatives Mpanielle, Mabudu, Ndumu and Mahulule gathered together to worship Mangova, see Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 144

corresponds to what Hedges calls "a circumscribed level of clan warfare entailing the use of light weaponry and little destruction".[23] Victory in these conflicts meant that the offending group was chased from its village. The leader and his subjects fled to that of a sympathiser or ally, while the attackers burnt the abandoned village to the ground. In time, the defeated chief canvassed the support of others, and, with their help, reciprocated the damage to the village of the chief he had an issue with, returning to his homestead afterwards. After delivering this measure of punishment to Machaya, trade flourished afterwards under the then dominant Maphumbo, who hosted increasing numbers of Machikosse.

In March 1728, three hundred of these traders, who carried gold, tin, copper, and ivory, were detained in Nassangano, and, in May, fifty to sixty of them arrived after having been delayed by chief Sasano, in the vicinity of the fort.[24] The success of trade during this period is evident in the satisfied Dutch, who recorded an unequalled amount of 4000 pounds of ivory traded in the month of December 1728 alone. However, by April 1729, the cycle of challenging a chief who had become dominant through trade repeated itself. Machaya, Mambe, Matola and Mateke had gathered their forces against Maphumbo, and, on 1 May 1729, Maphumbo and his subjects fled "sak en pak" to the southern bank, taking refuge with Tembe.[25] This turn of events gave Mateke the opportunity to assert his authority. With Maphumbo out of the power equation, he first drove Machaya, then Matola, and finally Mambe, away, declaring himself paramount in October 1729, and gained the monopoly on trade on the northern bank.[26]

Newly installed as the dominant chief, Mateke sought to assert his dominance over the Dutch trading post, which was now under his authority. On 5 April 1730, he declared a dance, compulsory for all, except the Dutch, to attend. At this dance he announced that he was ending the trade of chickens and other victuals to the post, as well as the supply of labour under pain of death. This implied a limit on the Tembe provisions traded to the Dutch, and extended Mateke's authority across the lagoon. If Tembe's subjects should arrive to trade, they would be attacked.[27] This heavy-handed threat caused the Dutch to mobilise, and they increased the guard at the

[23] " …drive off." Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 75
[24] NA 4371 f. 267
[25] CA C431 f.10, "with everything"
[26] NA 4373 f. 51
[27] NA 4373 f. 411

bazaar they kept. During the ensuing talks it transpired that Mateke felt hard done by. He judged his gifts and tribute to be inadequate, complaining that he was given less than alcohol, tobacco, pipes, and tribute for wood than Maphumbo had been given as chief.[28] Furthermore, his subjects had complained to him that they were given bad beads and smaller pieces of cloth compared to what had been given to Maphumbo's followers. Lastly, it was his perception that the Dutch owed him a debt in tribute for the right of living on his land, and the grievances about that precipitated his combative behaviour.

The Dutch argued that they had already paid for the land, insisting that they would not pay for the same thing twice. Their uncharacteristically defiant attitude can be explained by the fact that by mid-1730, plans were already afoot to abandon Delagoa Bay. Hence, the accusation of selling items for bad beads was dismissed nonchalantly, with the Dutch saying, "…die zijn goed niet wil verkopen, moet het houden".[29] Mateke may have been less bold in his demands if he knew that the Dutch were planning to leave. Mateke's argument displays three sources of power linked to trade goods: These created the ability to bargain on behalf of his subjects as leader and presented Mateke as protector, worthy of gifts and tribute, all of which identified him as the most powerful chief in the area.

From the Dutch point of view, the wars that led to Mateke's triumph were unnecessary. They interpreted these conflicts as hostilities purely for the sake of glory and the desire to be master over all (as if European wars did not have these goals). They viewed the battles as uncalled for, mainly because of the disruption they caused to trade, without considering how important establishing dominion was to the chiefs around the Bay. Along with controlling the flow of goods, and the accumulation of cattle and subjects, a show of strength was necessary to underpin authority. The point of these conflicts was not capturing territory and defending it against the defeated, but the demonstration of power, indicating, in turn, which leader was most worthy of being subject to. The power exerted over incoming traders and their goods formed part of this demonstration, which was advantageous in a play for power but detrimental to trade.

[28] NA 4373 f. 413
[29] Ibid."Those who do not want to sell their goods, should keep them."

As late as the end of 1729, the Dutch were increasingly agitated by the state of events and felt compelled to broker peace between the parties.[30] But participating in peace negotiations was viewed as a weakness, and involvement with these undermined a chief's power. Maphumbo and Tembe were therefore not amenable to their efforts to negotiate peace, and, by May 1730, it was the full and swollen rivers alone that prevented these two allies from seeking revenge. As the Dutch remarked, "[D]oor de sterkte afwateringh en diepte der rivieren tot nog toe belet worden."[31] By this stage, trade seemed to be set aside, "agter de hand schijnen te stellen". [32] Trade trickled to a halt because local chiefs, preoccupied with war, refrained from visiting the trading post. Their disputes also discouraged the arrival of any *buijtelanders*, who had little incentive to brave a hostile environment, without the guarantee of receiving the beads they desired. As a result, trade had become secondary to the display of dominance by 1730.

The presence of European traders proved to be a weapon in the arsenal of the chiefs in the area. By accumulating beads, cloth, and ivory they were able to increase their status and prestige, while promoting themselves over others. The sought-after circumstance of locating European traders in a territory reinforced a chief's authority. As we have seen, in the sixteenth century Inhaca used trade, or more specifically, his affiliation with Portuguese traders, as an avenue to promote his lineage group over that of Tembe. But the association with European traders became more significant as these moved ashore. The trading post became a symbol of chiefly power through the constant stream of gifts to Maphumbo and later Mateke and was a stage for demonstrating power through negotiation: negotiating access to goods, the price and quality of trade articles sold. The presence of the trading post on the main land increased competition between contenders for the position of paramount and resulted in a cycle of hostilities that culminated in Mateke's victory and dominion of the northern bank by 1730.

[30] NA 4373 f. 58
[31] NA 4373 f.17, "because of the strong flowing rivers and the depth of these prohibited [attack]"
[32] Ibid. "seemed to be set aside"

Map



Delagoa Bay and Southern Interior during the Late Eighteenth Century[33]

[33] After Hedges, 136

Chapter Four

Trade at Delagoa Bay with the English, Austrians and the Whalers, 1757-1799

Historians concerned with the development of state formation have given trade a fundamental role in the development of centralised states with great military capacity, culminating in the emergence of the Zulu kingdom and its historiography. This trend started in 1969, when Alan Smith proposed that trade, rather than population pressure, climatic change and the big man theory, was a factor in the "simultaneous consolidation of several chiefdoms in northern Natal."[1] Other historians subsequently incorporated the trade theory into their work.[2] Hedges' thesis, *Trade and Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, completed in 1978, draws on Slater, who saw the origins of centralised political authority in the increased ivory trade from 1750, which progressively incorporated the chiefdoms of the northern Nguni in exchanging commodities with Europeans.[3] Bonner, (1982), Delius (1984) and much more recently, Wright in 2010, all drew on the trade theory to explain political transformations in the societies they worked on.[4]

Hedges modifies the trade theory by suggesting that a cattle trade replaced the ivory trade during the late eighteenth century. This in turn created a greater need for labour, resulting in harnessing regiment age sets, fashioned into amabutho, for hunting elephant to supply the market with ivory. Hedges further claims that when the ivory trade declined by the end of the eighteenth century, a cattle trade replaced it based on whalers' need for fresh meat. He further argues that the change in supplying a valueless trade article with one that played an intrinsic role in the social and political lives of these chiefdoms necessitated the perpetuation and expansion of centralised authority to harness labour to maintain the export of a commodity of

---

[1] Smith, A. 'The Trade in Delagoa Bay and Nguni politics, 1750- 1935,' in Leonard Thompson, (ed.) *African Societies in southern Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1969, 171

[2] Marks, S. Gray, R. 'Southern Africa and Madagascar,' in Richard Gray, (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4, 1600-1790*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1975, 385-468

[3] Slater, H. *Transitions in the Political Economy of South East Africa before 1840*. PhD, University of Sussex, 1976.

[4] Delius, P. *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi polity, the Boers and the British in nineteenth century Transvaal*. Berkeley: Univerity of California Press, 1984. Bonner, P. *Kings, commoners and Concessionaires: The evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Wright, J. Turbulent Times: politicaltransformations in the North and the East in Hamilton, C., Mbenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol.1, From early times to 1885*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

high value, namely cattle.[5] The amabutho, previously employed to hunt, were subsequently employed to raid cattle, bringing about the beginnings of conflict that escalated as trade at Delagoa Bay dwindled. There are some problems with this analysis, one of which is that a trade in cattle replaced the ivory trade. Another is a degree of disregard of the notion of trade as the prerogative of chiefs to maintain political support and in parallel to this, the important role brass played in bolstering the prestige of chiefs. And finally, Hedges overstates the cattle trade to the Bay in the last decade of the century. This chapter aims to contribute to the debate about the interplay between trade and political centralisation in the region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

The characteristic feature of trade during most of the eighteenth century is that of its sporadic nature, maintained ever since the establishment of the Portuguese ivory trade in the sixteenth century. This situation changed during the English and Austrian periods of trade, when trade goods were supplied on a far more regular basis because of the participation in trade activity by the country trade.[6] Three elements contributed to a greater level of ivory supply: the limited political interference by Europeans, the ample supply of a specific trade article and the mobilisation of labour.

After having traded at the Bay for nine years, the Dutch officially left in 1730, leaving it on the periphery of European trade along the East Coast of Africa. After the Dutch departure, the Political Council at the Cape commissioned two consecutive trade voyages to re-investigate the commercial potential of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane, the first in 1731 and the next the following year. Only that of 1731 succeeded. Otherwise, during the later first half of the eighteenth century, Delagoa Bay was a destination for smugglers and private enterprise. It became a successful trading venue for the English country trade through the merchant Edward Chandler, followed by a brief and highly prosperous period under the leadership of William Bolts.[7] The predominantly English intervals, falling between 1758-1768 and 1777-1782, coincided with a ready supply and generous payment for sought

[5] Hedges, *Trade and Politics* 198

[6] The country trade refers to the coastal trade in Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and occasionally the East Coast of Africa, conducted by privately owned merchant vessels. Anne Bulley discusses the Bombay country trade in her book called the *Bombay Country Ships, 1790-1833*. Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000

after trade goods, which drew people from far north and south of Delagoa Bay, producing spikes in trade during the closing decades of the eighteenth century. The booming ivory business came to an end when the Portuguese once more asserted their authority over the Bay and reduced the volume of the ivory trade. The return of the Portuguese loosely coincided with the growth of whaling in southern African waters. The ivory trade lost its status of being the mainstay of trade in the Bay and was replaced by a victualising trade demanded by the whalemen.

The Dutch Departure

The writing was on the wall for the Dutch trading post by 1729. The primary reason for business coming to a halt was the series of conflicts between the Mfumo that had erupted from early1726, and which created an unstable commercial environment. The risk to trade became too high, and *buijtelanders*, afraid of banditry that formed part of the hostilities between chiefs, stayed away. But even before the ivory and metal trade dried up, business was, in the view of the Dutch, excruciatingly slow and was the reason for their dubbing their trading post with its nickname – "Fort Lijdsaamheid", which means patience and long-suffering. This name encapsulated the frustrations of protracted negotiations that resulted in a trickle of goods. The Dutch approach to trade in combination with local business practice thwarted Dutch commercial objectives of expanding markets and generating profit. The chiefs' business methodology fulfilled a prevailing social code, which necessitated a show of dominance through istic warfare.[8] Drawn out periods of conflict caused trade to come to a standstill. And without the hope of penetrating the interior to expand other commercial opportunities, Dutch optimism faded. The high demands placed on a shrinking number of staff, debilitated by a continual onslaught of malaria, proved to be a tall order.

When the Dutch arrived in 1721, two thirds of their men perished in no fewer than six weeks.[9] Overall, the Company lost 490 out of the 620 men sent to Delagoa Bay over the period 1721-1730.[10] Morale at the post was dipping low and more mutiny threatened. In August 1728, it came to light that:

[8] Light weaponry and little destruction was characteristic of istic warfare, aimed at settling local disputes between lineages, Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 74-75.
[9] RSEA, Volume 6, 427
[10] Sleigh, D. *Die Buiteposte* Pretoria: HAUM, 1993,706

> [E]en groote samerottinge enconspiratie, wegloopinge, meeneminge en wat verders konde voortbrengen, voor hande was, die geene welke soude komen te wijgeren om meede te gaan, ofte zig te weerstelden, soude om den hals gebragt werden.[11]

The negligible profits and reports of mutinous trading post staff convinced the Governor at the Cape, P.G. Noodt, of the disadvantage of continuing the trading post at Delagoa Bay. His successor, Jan de la Fontaine, implemented his resolution to close the trading post.[12] Prior to this decision, Jan van de Capelle's letter, dated 11 June 1730, had contained a litany of frustrations as well as a request for an armed force to subdue the locals in order to place all commercial activity firmly in the hands of the Dutch.[13] Unwilling to go to this expense, De la Fontaine dispatched three ships with the purpose of closing down the trading post. By December 1730, the buildings had been broken down and materials in demand at the Cape salvaged, the company's books closed and all goods and personnel transferred to the *Zeepost*, *Snuffelaar* and *Feijnenoord*. The voyage south ended at Table Bay in January 1731. Not having lost all hope in making some profit from the Bay and possibly Inhambane, as noted above, the Political Council at the Cape authorised two journeys north, only the first one being successful.[14]

This success was probably due to the change in the nature of trading, moving from negotiating on the mainland to conducting shipboard trade that eliminated political complications on the mainland. The relative success of trade by the crew of the *Snuffelaar* and the *Zeepost* at the end of 1731, stands in stark contrast with the uphill battle of that of the trading post. While settled on the mainland, the Dutch complained regularly about the inferior quality of tusks that were offered for barter. These were generally small, and seldom weighed over twenty pounds each. However, when a company of Dutch arrived back in the Bay under the leadership of Jan van de Capelle, the trend of offering small tusks changed. Initially, for the first two weeks at anchor, the chiefs Maphumbo, Mateke and Tembe or their respective representatives followed the old pattern of selling small tusks.[15] At the end of this

---

[11] Coetzee, C.C. *Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800.* PhD, Stellenbosch, 1954, 245, "[T]here were conspiracies and plots of desertions, theft and more afoot, and those who refused to participate or resisted, would be murdered."
[12] Sleigh, 715
[13] Ibid.
[14] The second voyage failed because of bad weather and the ships never reached Delagoa Bay.
[15] A Letter of JVC to the governor at the Cape signed 17 Feb1732, in RSEA Vol. 1, 467-506

period, assured of the Dutch's temporary stay, the weight of tusks had increased significantly, often weighing as much as fifty pounds each. Sellers frequently offered even larger tusks but because they did not have blue and yellow beads, the Dutch failed to exchange these:

> [H]adde mooije Eliphandstanden eijder men omt: 60 lb swaar, dog wilden niet verkopen als voor blaauwe en geele corrallen.[16]

Nevertheless, the crew acquired 2658 pounds of ivory over nine weeks at the Bay, a significant amount compared to the average of 6000 pounds ivory collected per year during the lifespan of the trading post.[17] Shipboard trade had influenced the rate of trade, increasing the frequency of transactions as well as the volume of trade.

The increased volume in trade was probably in part because it was advantageous to chiefs, who were "gestellt zyn goederen aan boord willen te verkopen".[18] This activity was restricted to chiefs and their close male relatives, who often spent the day on board drinking some form of alcohol, eating and smoking tobacco as part of the negotiation process,

> [D]ese gasten kosten ons nog vrij wat aracq, toebacq en pijpen bleeven deese middag bij ons om haar buiken te vullen.[19]

Chiefs accompanied by their retinues also traded eggs, milk and fruit on board, and only left the ship after having eaten their fill and being generously supplied with drink, tobacco and pipes.[20] Eating, drinking and smoking constituted an important part of negotiations, without which chiefs would refuse to do business. The *Snuffelaar* dispensed of 56 and a half pounds of tobacco, five "gros" of pipes, and 408 cans of araq to smooth over negotiations during the nine weeks of business.[21]

---

[16]RSEA, Vol. 1 492 "had beautiful tusks, each about 60 pounds, though wouldn't sell other than for blue and yellow beads"
[17] The Dutch also traded forty slaves, so few the chiefs said because there had been little war, as well as 316 pounds of tin, ibid, 495
[18] CA C 411 f. 15. " …set on selling their goods on board."
[19] Ibid, 498 "these guests cost us aracq, tobacco and pipes and stayed this afternoon to fill their bellies." Araq is an alcoholic drink made from dates. A gros is a term of measurement.
[20] RSEA, Vol. 1 Letter, 1732, 486 and 487
[21] RSEA Vol. 1 Letter, 1732, 502

Another advantage to shipboard trade lay in minimising competition between local chiefs. A ship's decks were considered neutral ground, while a settlement on the mainland fell under the jurisdiction of one particular chief in whose territory the trading post lay. The Dutch, while settled on the mainland, had a dual status. On the one hand they were regarded as subjects, and on the other, as a valuable means to prestigious access to trade goods, specifically blue beads and coveted gifts, especially of tobacco, pipes and alcohol as we have seen above. The level of gift-giving played an important role in enhancing and expressing a chief's rank, which increased competition among chiefs, who carefully monitored gift-giving to others.[22] Moreover, permanently settled traders were accumulators of cattle and ivory, and so potentially stood in direct competition to chiefs in terms of ranking. On board a ship, these political issues evaporated. In the less complicated political environment on board a ship, chiefs often conducted trade in the presence of each other. There was no need to assert authority on board ships and we find that during this period Tembe, Maphumbo and Mateke on occasion traded and socialised with the Dutch simultaneously; a situation was unheard of during trading post days when chiefs consistently traded independently of each other. Competition increased as the trading post became more entrenched and some chiefs were perceived to have gained more advantage through contact with the Dutch.

Shipboard trading also diffused the matter of potential political interference. The permanent European presence upset the power balance by attracting undue numbers of foreigners into the territory, as we have seen above. Shipboard trade afforded chiefs the opportunity to enhance their status without having to confront any political complications. Dealing on board a ship added to the status of a chief. Trading on board for cloth and beads at first remained the exclusive preserve of chiefs and any of their close male relatives but on the southern shore of Delagoa, this privilege extended to a powerful master attendant, called the King of the Water, by the end of the eighteenth century.[23] This important official was in the employ of the Tembe chief, and whose duties and role in maintaining the political hierarchy will be discussed below.

[22] NA 4373 f. 413. Mateke was aware of the gifts Maphumbo received.
[23] White, W.M. *Journal of a voyage performed in the Lion, Extra Indiaman, from Madras and Colombo to De Lagoa Bay in the year 1798*, London: John Stockdale, 1800, 50

The chronicles of the Dutch trading post illustrated how the permanent presence of European traders, outlined previously, affected the commercial climate, stunting rather than stimulating trade. The business model instituted by the Portuguese, based on the monsoon seasons, dictating an annual trade visit at the most, prompted the piecemeal method of gathering goods. The gradual accumulation of trade articles for European consumption helped to control the influx of people from the interior, who were perceived to be a threat the political balance.[24] Sporadic European visits to the Bay then, proved more satisfactory to chiefs than supplying a demanding permanent settlement, situated in a complex political environment. The absence of a permanent settlement of Europeans at Delagoa did not mean trade did not take place. It was more likely that during the first half of the eighteenth century, traders were Dutch.[25] The *Hector* had entered the Bay in 1754, captained by Harmze, who signed a testimonial presented to the English crew of the *Lion Extra* in 1798. It declared Mangova, the Tembe chief who had died some thirty years ago, as the greatest and most powerful chief in the area and the **best friend of the Dutch**, which suggests some Dutch traffic in the Bay from at least 1754.[26] As already discussed, supplying a steady and increasing stream of trade articles was a goal traders on its northern shore were not keen on accomplishing for what they saw as paltry payment for their goods. Falling into local patterns of accumulation, private traders arrived once a year, collecting trade articles at hand.

A long absence of European ships decreased the flow of ivory into the Bay area, there being no demand. During the fifteen years after the official Dutch departure, there appears to have been no trade in Delagoa Bay. In 1747, local chiefs, eager for trade to resume, dispatched a message to Inhambane, requesting the Portuguese to reinstate their annual trade voyage.[27] That same year, an English warship, the *Kent*, sailed into the Bay and it was perhaps the threat of the English naval presence that delayed the Portuguese response to this appeal by eight years, stretching the disruption to trade to a period of twenty-three years. This disruption explains how the *Hector* could deplete what would have been a relatively small ivory store. When the governor at Inhambane eventually dispatched a ship to Delagoa, the trade

[24] This has been explained earlier, NA 4373 f. 326
[25] Not to neglect the growing presence of the French and the existence of Portuguese traders
[26] Emphasis mine. Smith identifies Mangova as Nwangobe, 169. When traders were predominately Portuguese, the contemporary Tembe chief, Capelle, called himself "é muito amigo da Naçao portuguesa," "a great friend of the Portuguese nation." Father Francisco Thereza's letter in Montez, 164
[27] Smith, 157

voyage failed because the Portuguese were clearly out of touch with the situation at the Bay, sending cloth rather than beads to trade. The disappointing outcome of this voyage discouraged any further official Portuguese attempts to trade, in spite of the success of a priest, Father Santa Maria, who reaped the benefit of ivory being available in anticipation of a regular Portuguese trade visit.[28]

The trade in the second half of the century continued the previous intermittent pattern of trade with one exception: the enormous volume of ivory traded during the brief English and Austrian periods. The English were next to frequent Delagoa Bay. Merchants, such as Chandler, benefitted from the English East India Company or EIC policy to move away from mercantilism, not only sanctioning but also harnessing the strength of private trade. The EIC allowed their employees to engage in legitimate private transactions, called the country trade.[29] The English country trade was a factor that contributed to the decline of the VOC and the ascendancy of the EIC during the first half of the eighteenth century. Country ships came to dominate English maritime trade, whose coastal trade was invaluable to the Company by providing it with ready cash to pay for its annual tea order from China. The EIC formally permitted their servants to conduct private trade, making them stakeholders in the company as a whole.[30] Traders were free to explore coasts and take advantage of trade within the terms of their licences.[31]

Edward Chandler, captain of a country ship, not only had the command of experienced men at sea but also an official licence to exploit the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay. Not much is known about Chandler, who because of his success became the bane of the Portuguese and ironically perished while attempting to aid a Portuguese ship stranded off the coast of Sofala.[32] From at least 1756, his ships and Indian commercial agents under his leadership were trading in the Bay.[33] In 1756, Chandler was probably on an exploratory voyage, and it is likely that his trading started in earnest only from 1758. In 1756, the crew of the *Doddington*, wrecked at Algoa Bay, arrived in St. Lucia on 29 March of the same year, in a vessel they had built, named the *Happy Deliverance*. Here they saw men from Delagoa Bay trading

[28] For more detail about the priest's visit see Smith 158
[29] The country trade provided the EIC with ready cash in order to pay in specie for their annual tea order
[30] Bulley, vii
[31] Bulley, 3
[32] Smith, 162
[33] Smith, 161

ambergris and ivory.[34] It could be that the men from Delagoa travelled south to meet up with itinerant Indian agents, such as those employed by Chandler, who followed the East Coast pattern of sailing along the coast in small vessels to collect merchandise from designated points. Chandler set up a trade depot as a collection point and used small vessels (at times as many as twelve) to sail up major rivers and their tributaries to collect ivory.[35] This method minimised the cost of transport and neutralised fighting sparked by groups of carriers traversing territory belonging to coastal chiefs. It also lowered the risk of these traders being robbed during succession wars, such as those of the Tembe that raged from the 1760s after the death of Mangova.[36] The English success at Delagoa Bay can be attributed not only to the procedure of collecting ivory at various points along the coast and the interior, but also their generous payments in better trading goods. Being able to pay more was based on growing English financial strength within the Indian Ocean trading network. Their willingness to trade firearms to local chiefs, due to their detachment from the local political scene, also contributed to their success. Edward Chandler died in1768, bringing the highly successful Chandler period of ten years to an end. For the next nine years Delagoa Bay remained part of a brisk country trade.[37]

The Austrian Company and the Ivory Trade

In 1777, another set of Europeans casttheir sights on organised profitmaking under the auspices of an Austrian company and the leadership of the tenacious and intrepid William Bolts. The fleeting success of the Austrian company over five years, coincided with a series of dry cycles, which formed a prelude to a drought known as Mahlatule, as well as existing sophisticated trade networks operating north from Delagoa Bay.

William Bolts was a successful servant of the EIC, who after accumulating a fortune of 90 000 pounds in six years, defied the civil and military authorities in Bengal and ruined an ex-governor by litigation.[38] Bolts was arrested on 23 September 1768 and

[34] Bannister, xxxvii. The *Naarstigheid* was anchored in Delagoa Bay for twenty-six months
[35] Smith, 163, The Dutch saw the benefits of using this method but were unable to acquire an adequate number of small vessels to trade as successfully as the English did.
[36] Smith, 170
[37] Meisterle, S. 'Country trade unter kaiserlicher Flagge: William Bolts und die zweite oesterreichische Ostindienkompanie in *Zeitschrift fuer Weltgeschichte*,' Interdisziplinaere Perspektiven 9, (2008), heft 2, 63-87
[38] Hallward, N.L. *William Bolts: A Dutch Adeventurer under John Company*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920, 3

deported to England seven days later because of his amoral and unscrupulous business dealings. Having lost his wealth, he vowed to disgrace the EIC, which he attempted to do in his two-part volume, *Considerations on Indian Affairs.*[39] His next objective was to regain the sizable fortune he had lost and set about setting up his own trading company. His commercial goals coincided with that of Habsburg monarchy councillors, who wanted to develop Trieste as the largest seaport in their domain, in response to the Vienna Treaty of 1731 that prohibited Austrian expeditions to Asia from the Low Countries.[40] By 1775, Bolts had obtained Austrian citizenship, the rank of colonel and permission to engage in direct trade between the East (India, Persia and China) and their Adriatic seaports as the head of the Trieste Asiatic Company or TAC. It is unclear whether Bolts strategically chose Delagoa Bay as a way station or whether the decision was due to happenstance.[41] In March 1777, his ship ran aground on the sandbank in the entrance to the Bay and it took twelve days to offload and repair the damage, giving Bolts time to assess the economic potential of Delagoa Bay.

What he saw was a territory devoid of any permanent European presence, with potential profits for the taking. He spent the next four months here, laying out ambitious plans for a post: the cultivation of indigo, coffee, pepper, wheat, orange trees, coconut palms and opium, as well as the settlement of two hundred Austrians who would require the services of tailors, millers, master builders, carpenters, a doctor and a priest under the administration of a governor and three clerks.[42] Part of the plan was to build two forts and a settlement on Inhaca Island. Bolts left the Bay in the winter of 1777, leaving the Austrian commander, André Pollet, accompanied by ten men, in charge of the settlement on behalf of the company.

Before his departure, in May 1777, he signed individual contracts with three chiefs, the Tembe chief Mohari Capelle, and Mfumo chiefs, Matola and Bilene. These contracts secured land in perpetuity for the Austrian flag, claimed free passage for Austrian agents across chiefs' territory, and the surrender of fugitives and

---

[39] Smith, 166
[40] Wanner, M. *William Bolts and Societé Imperiale Asiatique de Trieste*, http://usd.ff.cuni.cz/?q=system/files/wanner_2.pdf, 58
[41] Wanner, 64 and Carlson, S.H. *Trade and Dependency: studies in the expansion of Europe.* Uppsala, Almqvist& Wiksell International, 1984, 147, and Pollack-Parnau, F. *Eine österreichische-ostindische Handelscompagnie 1775-1785: in Beitrag zur österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II.* Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1927, 39 states that settling Austrians on African soil had not been Bolts's plan.
[42] Ibid. These requests were ignored by the Austrian government.

appropriate punishment of crimes committed against each other. His insight into the dynamics into supply and demand is noticeable in one of the contract stipulations. Unlike the Dutch and the Portuguese before them, he placed limited restrictions on the local chiefs trading with other nations. Chiefs agreed to meet the Austrian demand first, where after they were allowed to do business with any other European traders, a policy that not only provided the trading post an income from port duties payable by any ship other than Austrian, but also stimulated trade. With the promise of steady provision of acceptable trade goods at the demanded prices, chiefs were able to attract ivory in extraordinary amounts from the interior.

Although the contracts of all three chiefs were similar, that of Matola differed. Matola had, since the Dutch departure, gained supremacy over the northern bank. His contract contained two additional clauses – firstly he promised to cede his suzerainty over Mfumo to the Austrians, placing the northern bank "entirely under the protection" of the Company, and secondly, in the event of war, to keep trade routes open.[43] These two clauses were part of an attempt to keep access to the trade routes from the north and northwest open, which suggests that Bolts expected ivory from these directions.[44] The clauses also indicate that Bolts was aware of the trade networks operating in the north and that he planned to establish direct contact with the ivory trade fair at Zumbo and the slave fair at Inhambane, diverting these networks to Delagoa Bay.[45]

The bulk of the ivory trade came from territory well to the south of the Bay. It is possible that the demand Chandler created, along with the copious amounts of brass supplied, which was perpetuated by the Austrians, inspired the mobilisation of regiment age sets into amabutho. The amabutho probably provided the labour needed to supply the Bay with great quantities of ivory. Although the European trade base was situated on Inhaca Island, the trade hub along the Bay's shores had come to include a section along the Maputo River within the interior and involved the northern Nguni, introducing a new direction to the supply of ivory since the Dutch occupation when ivory arrived predominantly from a northwesterly

[43] Smith, 178
[44] Carlson claims the Dutch ivory supply came from the south, but provides no evidence for this assertion. See Carlson, S.H. *Trade and Dependency: Studies in the expansion of Europe.* Uppsala: Almqvist& Wiksell, 1984, 146
[45] Carlson, 152

direction.[46] The northern Nguni, which included the Ndandwe, Ngwane and Mthethwa, formed political alliances with chiefs Mabudu and Mapanielle not only to control trade further along the Maputo River, but also to "secure communications with the Nguni".[47] Operating outside of Delagoa Bay, the Nguni were well-organised and capable of delivering vast quantities of ivory to the upper reaches of the Maputo River through the amabutho in response to the ample quantities of brass. Both the English and Austrians paid in brass, beads and cloth. The Austrians traded with Mangova's brothers, Mbudu and Mpanielle, whose territories stretched south, toward the northern Nguni.[48] Mbudu had established a trade relationship with this group, and exchanged European metals and cloth for cattle, sheep shields and mats.[49] The immense supply of ivory stands in contrast to the trickle of ivory the Dutch collected. The Dutch were told that the reason for the small volume of ivory supplied to the coast was "dat veel en groote Eliphantstanden in hun land waaren [Paraotte] de verheijd van d' weg waaren deselve te swaar om te dragen," which suggests that Paraotte had no way of organising large scale labour at the time.[50]

During the five year Austrian stint in East Africa, the export of ivory, compared to that of the Dutch, increased significantly.[51] The average weight of Austrian exports alone amounted to 75 000 pounds per annum.[52] According to Hedges, this enormous growth in trade was due not only to competition among the Europeans but also the use of longboats to collect ivory along rivers.[53] The longboats had the advantage of carrying several tons of freight, were defensible and dispersed transactions over a larger area, disposing of effective political control over trade.[54] The only navigable river from the Bay deep into the interior (besides the Nkomati flowing north) is the Maputo River. It is likely that both the English and the Austrians used longboats; Edward Chandler used small vessels to sail up the Maputo, as mentioned above. The

[46] Bolts uses this term in a letter to Pollet, see below
[47] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 141, Bolts to Pollet, footnote 50
[48] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 145
[49] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 142
[50] RSEA, Vol. 1 Excerpt of the Dutch Diary dated 29 Dec 1725, 420. " many heavy tusks were available in the country but because of the distance were too heavy to carry."
[51] Smith, 190
[52] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 129
[53] Ibid, 130.
[54] Ibid, 131. Not that the Austrian trade was without its challenges. The trading post was settled during a famine, malaria remained a problem, as did political complications with coastal chiefs who saw the Austrians as subjects. For a broader discussion on these issues, see Smith, 182-184

entire Maputo River is navigable; how far up the river they went is unclear. But as the Mabudu were the intermediaries between the Nguni and the Europeans and this chiefdom's southern borders lay towards the Mkuze River, over a hundred kilometres from Delagoa Bay, it could mean that the Europeans traded this deep into the interior. Brass, almost as popular as beads for exchange, was in high demand along this river.[55]

There had always been a thirst for copper in Africa. The Portuguese found an "insatiable market for copperwares" in West Africa during the first half of the sixteenth century.[56] During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Royal African Company sold 198.26 tons of copperware and 320 tons of brassware into West Africa.[57] Initially, the copperware trade failed at Sofala in East Africa, because the Portuguese assumed that the market here would demand the same type of copper goods as there had been on the West African coast. The English, however, had success in trading in copper and brass at Delagoa Bay, and the Dutch traded copper bangles for ivory during the early stages of their trading post.[58] However, the people in the immediate Delagoa Bay did not appear to have any great demand for Dutch copper, possibly because their need for this trade article in the quality they wanted was supplied from the interior. The Dutch found that blue glass beads, rather than the copperware the VOC supplied, were the trade articles of choice.[59]

Further south, down the coast in Terra Natal, copper and later brass had a significant role in designating rank within the small chiefdoms of the early Nguni-speaking people.[60] Early observers noted the importance of dress and ornaments to distinguish rank. In a hierarchical society such as that of the Nguni, objects such as beads and metal jewellery along with the dressed skins created a visual reminder of the status and prestige of the elite. The amount of metal, particularly copper used ornamentally, increased as the contact between the Nguni and Europeans grew. In the sixteenth century, the use of this metal was modest – Lavanha noticed that the kings and chiefs "where the land of Natal begins wore a copper earring in their left

[55] The Dutch also traded with what they called "koper," although less successfully than the English;, their copper goods were on occasion thrown aside with derision at the Bay, CA C406 f. 113
[56] Herbert, E.W. *Red Gold of Africa: Copper in Precolonial History and Culture.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, 126
[57] Herbert, 134
[58] NA 4367 f. 109
[59] Ibid, Tembe demanded either 60 pounds of copper arm rings or 300 pounds of beads per a small tusk
[60] Kennedy, C.G. 'The use of brass in the Zulu kingdom,' *African Arts*, 24, 3 Special Issue: Memorial to Arnold Rubin, Part II, July, (1991), 50-55 + 94-96, 51

ear,".[61] By the nineteenth century, the Nguni elite, both male and female, wore a significant number of ornaments. Chiefs wore flat neck rings, while men and women of high rank wore neck rings made up out of one or more brass rings. Chiefs' wives had solid brass balls threaded onto a string and worn around their necks and small cast-brass buttons or studs decorated their skin garments.[62] Later, by the mid-nineteenth century, warriors and regiments of girls were wearing brass among other decorations that was perhaps a reflection of the emerging strength of the Zulu nation.[63] During the late nineteenth century, flexible, twisted and plaited brass wire was fashioned into rings to adorn the wrists, upper arms and calf of the leg.[64]

The great value the Nguni attached to brass ornaments is evident in the relationship between the chief and brass workers. Unlike the secretive blacksmiths, brass workers were summoned to the chief's homestead to fashion armbands, where they would be put up until the task had been completed. What is more telling regarding the prestige of brass work is the fact that, unlike the blacksmiths who "might occasionally" be presented with gifts of cattle, brass workers "used to be rewarded with cattle for their pains".[65]

By the late seventeenth century, British copper and brass dominated markets worldwide due to regulatory and technological developments, as well as the decline in Swedish copper mining. It is therefore likely that Chandler too traded in brass, having easy access to inexpensive supplies of British (and Indian) brass goods.[66] The flood of brassware into Delagoa Bay drew ivory traders from the south and it is likely that the ready supply of brass, which was shinier than copper, more flexible and workable cold, led to the mobilisation of labour through the amabutho among the northern Nguni, to supply ivory for its exchange. With cheap access to brass, the English, and therefore the Austrians, through Bolt's English contacts, were able to develop an extensive brass trade along the Maputo River, an area that became the principal source of ivory between 1777 and 1782.

[61] Kennedy, 52. Lavanha wrote the account of the shipwreck of Santo Alberto in 1593.
[62] For a more elaborate discussion of Zulu ornaments see Carolee Kennedy's article, 50
[63] Kennedy, 52 and 53
[64] Kennedy, 50
[65] Kennedy, 51
[66] Ibid, 133

More than half of the Austrian trade also occurred along the Maputo River and the success of their ivory trade to the south depended on good relations with the Nguni chiefdoms, whose brass trade made up thirty percent of the sample inventories drawn up by the Austrian station commander.[67] The influx of brass into northern Nguni territory was in all likelihood a reason for the emergence of the Ngwane, Ndwandwe and Mthethwa states during the late eighteenth century, with the Ndwandwe in closest proximity to the Mabudu-Mapanielle exchange point along the Maputo River.[68] The emergency of Ndwandwe chiefly power in the eighteenth century may in part have had to do with the brass trade. Trade was the domain of a chief and the stream of brass into northern Nguni territory would have strengthened the position of chiefs, not only through the process of exchange but also through the greater use of brass to signify their status as political leaders and attract followers. The greater influx of brass and the need to control the redistribution of this trade article probably led to the rise of Ndwandwe power centres along the Mkuze and Pongola Rivers.

	Maputo River	Nkomati River
Beads	44.4%	43.4%
Brass	30.4%	2.5%
Cloth	23.3%	51.4%

Percentage of Commodities Exchanged in the Maputo and the Nkomati Rivers, 1777-1782.[69]

[67] Ibid, 134
[68] Hedges thinks that the emergence of Ndwandwe chiefly power occurred "much earlier" than 1780-1810 it may be that their rise had to do with the Chandler ivory trade. Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 158.
[69] After Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 134

After the Portuguese expelled the Austrians in 1782, and asserted their authority over the Bay, the ivory trade diminished in volume compared to the Austrian period. It experienced a brief recovery in 1789 but never reached the heights it had during the Austrian period. Monopolistic business strategies, the goal of accumulating personal wealth by its governors, the inability to pay prices the English and Austrians introduced, as well as the level of political interference the Portuguese brought to the area, all conspired together to stifle the ivory trade.[70] The significance of the Portuguese ivory trade, which prevented any other Europeans from trading in the Bay and included paying less for ivory, lies in the diminished brass supply to the south. The Ndwandwe probably absorbed the trickle of brass that flowed south, cutting off the brass supply to the Mthethwa. Therefore, the shrinking brass and copper trade most likely formed a pressing motive for the conflict among the northern Nguni. This conflict served to funnel the dwindling brass trade towards one group, the Mthetwa, which led to the rise of Shaka and the emergence of the Zulu kingdom.

Brass articles were popular among societies to the far south of Delagoa Bay but along the Nkomati River during the period, 1777-1782, black cloth was the commodity desired the most. The demand for specific trade goods at the Bay depended on the needs of those who delivered goods to Europeans for sale. Beads remained the most popular commodity on both shores of the Bay and the Maputo River trade. Blue cloth was in demand on the southern bank, second to beads. While the Maputo River trade supplied the most ivory, a supply of tusks also appeared from the north, probably from the vicinity of Inhambane, sold along the Nkomati River. Trade along this river was in the hands of Machaya, who dominated the lower reaches of the river, while the Manisse lineage group controlled trade further north along its banks.[71] Manisse had a longstanding trade relationship with the Tonga from Inhambane and it is likely that these men were responsible for the ivory supply to the northern bank. Jan van de Capelle spoke of men arriving from Inhambane to trade with Manisse, Bombo and Tembe in 1723.[72]

---

[70] For a fuller discussion of the latter Portuguese period, see Smith, chapter 6 and Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 145-146

[71] The domains of these two groups have been established previously, see …

[72] Theal, Vol.1 411, Letter to the Cape, 3 August 1723

The interesting aspect of trade along the Nkomati River is the trade article in demand for the exchange of ivory. As in the south, beads made up a significant portion of trade but during the Austrian era, black cloth exceeded the bead demand by eight percent, forming more than half of the inventory.[73] The Austrians liberally provided black cloth, and its popularity was probably due to deepening drought cycles, evident from the spring of 1777 and explained below.[74] According to Father Amaro de St. Thomas, two to three ships would supply black cloth to the Bay.[75] This volume of supply might be over-exaggerated; however, the involvement of the country trade could have increased the volume of trade at the Bay. Nevertheless, it is certain that large quantities of black cloth were supplied to its northern shore, as each ship carried five tons of merchandise. Trade was conducted along the Nkomati only as far as Magude for most of the year because of the low water level that diminished to two feet after the rainy season had abated.[76]

The dry cycles of the last quarter of the eighteenth century that intensified into the Mahlatule could have been the reason for the preference and enormous demand for black cloth. The southern region of Mozambique, comprising the present-day provinces of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo, are and were prone to drought.[77] This circumstance is due to the climatic condition known as El Niño Southern Oscillation that has occurred with varying degrees of influence over the weather in Mozambique, every two to seven years from 1877.[78] The dry period of 1777, which led to a famine, formed part of drought cycles that preceded the Mahlatule that raged from 1794 through to 1802, and affected the southeastern coast as far north as Malawi.[79] While cloth signified the status and prestige of the wearer as well as indicating rank, the point of interest here is not the cloth itself, but the specific demand for colour of cloth in exchange for ivory. Between 1777 and 1781, the demand for black cloth increased dramatically, and seems to point to an attempt to manage drought.

---

[73] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 134
[74] Hedges, *Trade and Politics* mentions a famine in 1777, 144.
[75] Junod, *Les BaRonga*, 241
[76] Ibid.
[77] Masters, L., Duff, L. *Overcoming Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation Implementation in southern Africa.* African Books Collective, 2011
[78] Aragon, M., Barreto, A., Epstein, P.R. 'Drought and Health Implications in Mozambique,' *Medicine and Global Survival*, 5, 1, (January, 1998), 42-49, 43. El Nino is an irregularly occurring and complex series of climatic changes that include the upwelling of deep cold water in the equatorial Pacific and disrupts weather patterns of the East Coast shores of Africa.
[79] Newitt, 254

Droughts in southern Africa were and are managed in various ways, one of which was to observe all the prescribed taboos for a society, keeping favour with the ancestors.[80] In the event of displeasing the ancestors, in some societies, an animal sacrifice along with an offering of cloth to entities, i.e. Mwari, or the ancestors or water spirits, were given in acts of appeasement. The Venda and Shona both followed this practice.[81] The important element in sacrifices was the black colour of the animal (either bovine, sheep or goat). Black was a colour associated with rain, based on the black rainclouds it invoked. For this reason, black animals were slaughtered to appease angry ancestors who kept rain back in punishment, a practice found among the Venda, Shona, Lobedu, Tswana, Pedi, Tsonga and the Ndzunza-Ndebele.[82] Among the Zulu, the colour black in terms of rainmaking featured in other ways, such as using black rain medicine and keeping the grass around homesteads of the key persons in the rainmaking process burnt black.[83] While practices varied, it is safe to say that black was considered by all of these societies as a colour symbolic of rainclouds.

The demand for black cloth by traders north of Delagoa Bay continued after the Portuguese expelled the Austrian company from Delagoa Bay in 1782. By this year, the rains had been restored, evident by the fact that the Portuguese were able to buy all the food they wanted. This was in contrast to the Austrians who complained of starvation during their stay, which coincided with a period of drought. It may be that a perceived magical connection between black cloth and the restoration of rain developed due to the coincidental supply of black cloth during a period when rain was restored. There was another brief respite from drought in the early nineteenth century, before drought returned in 1817. In 1812, the governor at Inhambane reported that black cloth had become the currency there, used to purchase food.[84] The incidence of drought influenced the demand of certain goods in exchange for ivory. There is no doubt about the enormous volume and success of trade during the Austrian period at Delagoa Bay, which was linked to the copious supply of specific trade articles, such as brass demanded to the south of Delagoa Bay and black cloth by societies from the north.

---

[80] Schoeman, M.H. *Clouding Power? Rain-Controlled Space, Landscapes amd Ideology in Shashe-Limpopo State Formation.* PhD. University of the Witwatersrand, 2007, chapter v, 51
[81] Schoeman, 51, 56
[82] The Nzundza- Ndebele offered the intestines of a black ox rather than the entire animal in a sacrifice for rain.
[83] Schoeman, 69
[84] Smith, 336

Whalers at Delagoa Bay

After the Portuguese expelled the Austrians, who in turn were removed by the French in 1796, they returned in 1799 to a changed market. By the end of the century, Delagoa Bay had become a well-established food bazaar. The ivory trade slowed down to relatively small transactions because the new set of interlopers, French, American and English whalers, whose trade focused on replenishing food supplies, rather than that of ivory. The Portuguese continued an ivory trade but not at the prices the English and Austrians had paid. Whalers, while waiting for the whaling season to start, traded some ivory. Their main focus was whaling and these men did not demand the same quantity of ivory turning it into a sideline trade. The extra profit from the sale of ivory, as well as cheap provisions, were additional advantages to whale crews exploiting the whale fields of Delagoa Bay.[85]

The first British and American whalers entered southern African waters by at least 1785, in search of the Southern Right whale. Whalers were guaranteed of a good cargo because of the large number of female whales that sought sheltered bays in which to calve and suckle their young. The advantages Delagoa Bay held were the opportunity to whale in a capacious bay, with a foreshore for slaughtering and a provisions trade. The priority of whalers after securing a gam of whales was the purchase of provisions, especially vegetables and produce.[86]

The prime concern of whalers during the whaling season was the hunting and slaughtering of whales, to harvest bone and fat. The fat had to be boiled down to oil in order to be shipped back in barrels to Britain or America. Being such a labour-intensive activity, whalers had little time for anything else, other than eating, scribbling a few notes in the ship's journal and finding a girl or two.[87] White commented that the whalers were so consumed by their task that they never had the time to draw up a map of the Bay. Because whalers represented mainly a provisions trade, their presence changed the commercial focus from ivory to food. This trade

[85] Wray, P. Martin, K.R. 'Historical Whaling Records from the Western Indian Ocean,' *Reports of the International Whaling Commission* (Special Issue 5), (1983), 213-241, 216

[86] Whalers frequenting the western Indian Ocean, preferred stopping at St. Augustine's Bay at Madagascar, Ajuon (one of the Comoro Islands) and Mahé (one of the Seychelle Islands), while Islands were preferred as a stop over to minimize desertions, these three locations also provided ample fresh food and good water, see Haywood, chapter three.

[87] White, 22

was a thorn in the flesh to the Portuguese, who were unable to control or prevent it, but it brought the Tembe chiefs great prestige.

The first whaling ships recorded at the Bay were two French ships that lay at anchor in 1789. Whalers represented the majority of trade during the period of 1789-1804, during which a hundred and twenty whale ships visited Delagoa Bay, most of which were British.[88]

According to Booth, the prime hunting season in South African waters lasted from late September to mid-December, and if a full load had not been achieved, ships would linger until March.[89] The peak season for both sperm and right whaling at Delagoa Bay was June and July.[90] However, White stated that Southern Right whales were hunted at Delagoa Bay from June until September.[91] Taking White's observation into account, the whaling season at Delagoa Bay was at least sixteen weeks long. The whaling season possibly stretched to twenty-four weeks, if November and December were included, and created a considerable demand on the food supply. During the period of 1796 to 1804, the greatest number of whaling ships in a given year at anchor in the Bay was twelve (see table below), and with a crew of between sixteen and thirty-six men each meant that in some years 192 to 432 stomachs needed to be filled.

[88] Richards, R. Du Pasquier, T. 'Bay Whaling off southern Africa, c. 1785-1805,' *South African Journal of Marine Science*, 8:1, (1989), 231-250, DOI: 10.2989/02577618909504564, 233
[89] Booth, A.R. 'American Whalers in South African Waters,' *South African journal of Economics*, 32, 4, (December 1964), 278-282, 280
[90] Wray and Martin, 215
[91] White, 22

Year	Number of Whalers
1789	2
1790	4
1791	9
1792	10
1793	12
1794	5
1795	10
1796	12
1798	4
1799	7
1800	1
1801	4
1802	12
1803	12
1804	5

The Minimum of Numbers of Individually Identified Whalers at Delagoa Bay, 1789-1804[92]

[92] After Richards and Du Pasquier, 233

An account of a whaling ship at the Azores, which according to Haywood represents the type of shopping needed for the crew, reads as follows:

110 bushels of potatoes
85 lbs. of beef
fish
65 dozen eggs
55 pumpkins
apples
2 pigs
300 lbs. of onions [93]

Another list of provisions bought at Madagascar (one of the main destinations for whalers), where its chief King Baba gained a great deal of power through the food trade, indicates needs as:

10 bushels of beans
1 bullock
12 sheep
100 fowls
300 turpins
1200 pumpkins
A few bunches of bananas
6 bottles of milk per day for fourteen days [94]

The type of commodity whalers were prepared to spend on food increased the status of the chief who supplied the meat and vegetable trade. Previously, strips of white cloth were exchanged for vegetables, milk and eggs. Whalers were willing to pay cloth, brass and beads for food.[95] Because they desired a considerable amount of vegetables, multiplied over a period of up to six months, the fresh produce trade translated into a meaningful profit for the Tembe chief and justified an increase in

[93] Haywood, 32. I am not sure what is meant by turpin. Did the author of this list mean turnips? Or could it be a reference to terrapins?
[94] Ibid, 93
[95] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 149

production. By 1793, food production had been expanded to meet the demands of the food trade as well as local needs.[96] Onions were a whalers' favourite and Tembe cultivated these in large quantities. The Tembe chief became the onion king of Delagoa Bay: "King Sllanghelley richy, very richy man, too much richy e ab plainty ohnyong."[97] This increase in production represents the innovative attitude of the successive Tembe chiefs, who adapted to the changing demand that moved from ivory to provisions in order to gain prestigious goods.

By the late eighteenth century, Delagoa Bay had become primarily a refreshment station, and remained so well into the nineteenth century.[98] The Tembe had provisioned ships from the beginning of the 1700s, and were naturally the group to maintain and expand this dominance over the food trade when whalers started to frequent the Bay. Providing refreshment to ships' crews was hardly a new activity. However, an important shift had taken place since the beginning of the century. Before the advent of whaling, this task fell to ordinary people, but by the whaling era, providing meat and vegetables, particularly onions, became the domain of the Tembe chief, ruling on the southern side of the Bay.[99] By 1798, the King of the Water managed the sale of food on behalf of the chief.[100] Tembe territory traditionally supplied food to sailors and approached ships in vessels filled with edibles, which they initially exchanged for scraps of cloth. The Mfumo situated on the northern shore were known for a lack of cultivation, and their reliance on meat, even the "gedroogte spiere van hun vijande," for sustenance.[101] The sandy soil found here was one of the factors that led to this circumstance. Cultivation on the northern bank, except for the Dutch effort to establish a Company garden, was an activity that the Mfumo consistently avoided throughout the eighteenth century.[102] The Tembe side of Delagoa Bay was well suited to agriculture, having dark fertile soil and a higher rainfall than that of the opposite bank.[103] The change in the predominant

---

[96] Ibid, 151
[97] Boteler, T. *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa, Arabia*, 2 Vol.s. London, 1835, 45. The Dutch probably introduced the onions to these shores, who complained of the lack of "potelspyse," onions, carrots and potatoes as ingredients for a stew, CA C406 f. 117
[98] Zimba, BdJ. L.M.L. *Overseas trade, Regional Politics and Gender Roles: Southern Mozambique, ca. 1720 to ca.1830.* PhD, University of Michigan, 1999, chapter 3, 161-173.
[99] White, W.M *Journal of a Voyage performed in the* Lion *Extra Indiaman to Madras, to Colombo and to De Lagoa Bay, 1798.* London: John Stockdale, 1800, 47
[100] The King of the Water's duties are discussed below
[101] CA C406 f. 117, "the dried flesh of their enemies," a cynical observation of a disillusioned employee of the VOC, visiting the trading post in 1721.
[102] The Dutch pointed the lack of non-cultivation out in 1720, see CA C406 f. 117 and White repeated the observation, 52
[103] Ibid. For figures on rainfall see the map in Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 33

demand from ivory to provisions, due to the needs of new customers, prompted the Tembe chief to assert his authority over the refreshment business.

Whaling ships represented the only regular traffic to the Bay from 1789, visiting for up to six months or twenty-six weeks a year. Not the most scrupulous of men, the whalers did not suffer the intimidation of the Portuguese, whose governor preferred to sell provisions at five times the price demanded by the chiefs, as the Dutch ship the *Perle* found out in 1787. Haywood described the average whaler on shore as follows:

> His pent up emotions were released and he was abusive, violent and drunk and he interspersed these with large amounts of sex and thievery.[104]

Those of Tembe had their own strategy to direct trade away from the Portuguese. By at least 1798, they had appointed a master attendant called the King of the Water to ensure command over the foodstuffs trade. He served as an intermediary between the chief and the Europeans, and his task was to be on the lookout for ships and approached these to offer the opportunity to trade. The importance of the refreshment trade is apparent in the high status this individual attained. The King of the Water was almost as powerful as his overlord and manifest in the numerous cattle he owned.[105] The then Tembe chief, known as Capelle, was a shrewd entrepreneur, who had successfully adapted to the change in demand. His attendant's principal duty was to inform the chief of ships arriving in the Bay, in order to capture each ship for his account. That there was competition from other chiefs to sell provisions to ships was patent to White, who said:

> Capelle is very jealous if you carry on communications with other chiefs. Sometimes it is necessary to, if he does not supply you with what you want, to say that such and such a chief has offered to supply you ….he would rather distress himself than that any of the other chiefs should get any of your blue cloth.[106]

But what White interpreted as competition was actually the paramount chief's way of upholding his authority within his territory. The chief acquired the blue cloth not

---

[104] Haywood, C.N. *American Whalers in Africa.* PhD, Boston University, 1968, 2
[105] White, 50
[106] Ibid, 42. During the latter part of the century, blue "dungaree" was used for buying food.

only because of commercial value, but because owning it reinforced his position as paramount. There were thirteen other chiefs on Capelle's side of the estuary, all of whom owed him tribute, in his capacity as the supreme authority.[107] Capelle reinforced his position by distributing exotic goods like cloth to them. It was his sole privilege to acquire exotic goods to distribute among his important subjects. The flow of tribute to the chief and gifts to the elite mirrored the gift-giving Europeans had to participate in prior to a trade transaction. This was a form of respect and was an essential part of acknowledging the position of parties within an agreement, being either that between European traders and chiefs, or that between subjects and chiefs. The story of Muhadane clearly illustrates that cloth was a symbol of power.[108] In the 1790s, after having hoarded food during a famine, became deeply unpopular. As a result, his brother replaced him as chief. Muhadane approached the Portuguese commander for assistance in reclaiming his position. The governor De Matos obliged, supplying him with trading cloth to impress his former subjects. Muhadane once again had a following. These anecdotes show that the right to tribute and the distribution of exotic goods underpinned a chief's political authority. The King of the Water played a principal role in reinforcing Capelle's supremacy. In so doing, his position successfully maintained the political hierarchy on the southern shore by funnelling all trade to Capelle.

This attendant was of service to the chief from at least 1784.[109] During the Portuguese period between 1781 and 1796, Capelle was the one to board a ship, receive gifts and negotiate a price. In the all-important process of gift exchange, the Europeans presented cloth (in 1784, the Portuguese gave expensive black cloth) and liquor and were in turn given a bullock.[110] Only then did the services of the King of the Water come into play. By 1798, it was he who boarded the ship for negotiations, after the chief's arrival at his house near the landing, where the two of them settled on prices.[111] After the customary exchange of gifts, the King of the Water accompanied Europeans onshore. This responsibility reinforced the chief's ranking, and his growing power, which allowed his authority to be wielded by proxy. The King of the Water's powerful position can be seen in White's comment, a passenger

[107] White, 41
[108] Smith, 215
[109] Montez, C. *Descrobimento e Fundacão de Lourenzo Marquez, 1550-1800.* Lourenço Marques: Minerva Central-Editora, Apendix 1, 165. Father Francisco St. Thereza mentions him in a letter dated 1784. He calls him "Comisario de'aquelles," who was a subject of chief Capelle and in charge of the boats used to go out to meet ships.
[110] Montez, 165
[111] Montez, 165

aboard the *Lion*, who remarked, "keep on good terms with him, and you can get everything that is to be procured here," which suggests that the King of the Water mediated all trade.[112] The extension of the Tembe chief's authority through this attendant points to the growing importance of his lineage through the booming ivory trade during the Austrian period. His authority continued to grow at a time when the refreshment trade had replaced ivory as the main source of business.

Besides vegetables, a fresh meat market, particularly for beef, developed. The King of the Water sold cattle on behalf of the chief and once the abovementioned formalities had been dispensed with, he was willing to sell one or two per day to the *Lion*.[113] It was this cattle trade that Hedges asserts to have replaced the ivory trade after 1799: "a sharp decline in the ivory trade [replaced] by a trade in cattle."[114] He further suggests that the raiding for cattle to be sold as fresh meat, led to state formation under Shaka because:

> …the protection and acquisition of cattle by the amabutho of goods – metal and cattle…these forces underlay the early nineteenth century conflict and the emergence of Tsaka's Zulu Kingdom…[115]

There are three problems with this view. The first is that until 1804, the ivory trade remained, although somewhat diminished, significant. The second is the timing of a great number of whaling ships frequenting the Bay.[116] The third problem is connected to the capacity of whalers to consume a great number of cattle.

The Portuguese continued the ivory trade after the expulsion of the Austrians in 1782, and although they paid lower prices and were officially absent for three years after the French destroyed their fort in 1796, the ivory trade remained significant in terms of supplying imported goods to the northern Nguni. The English maintained an ivory trade between the Bay and India, in spite of Portuguese objections to their activities. Despite prohibiting trade "on pain of confiscation", the Portuguese were too weak to prevent the English from trading.[117] Like the English, the Portuguese

---

[112] Ibid, 59
[113] White, 50
[114] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 12
[115] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 198-199
[116] Richards and Du Pasquier, 233
[117] Carlson, 155

traded ivory for Indian brass, cotton and bangles, and thus a significant amount of metal continued to flow south until 1804.[118]

In the year 1802-1803, the Bombay council's statistics show that the trade from Mozambique Island had the value of 81 255 rupees and 40 percent of this amount, that is, 32 600 rupees, were supplied from Delagoa Bay.[119] The trade fell to half in the following year, a decrease that coincided with the start of the Napoleonic Wars. Twelve years later, the imports to Surat were valued at 21 775 rupees from Mozambique Island that could have included a portion from Delagoa Bay.[120] This amount represents 26 percent of the income calculated in 1802-1803. The ivory trade therefore continued throughout the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century, supplying brass and other goods to chiefdoms of the Nguni, albeit at a reduced rate.

Wray and Martin assert that there "…the Indian Ocean might have undergone a whaling boom in 1800, were it not for the world military situation…".[121] But the Napoleonic Wars diminished the number of whaling ships to the Indian Ocean due to fears of being captured by the enemy or pressed into the Royal Navy's service. Even before 1805, during the French-English War of 1793-1799, the London whaling fleet went from "upwards of 90 sail" to twenty-five. This reduction does not reflect southern African waters, which saw an increase in the number of ships calling at Delagoa Bay, compared to the period before 1793. In 1805, the number of whaling ships to Delagoa reduced drastically. Between1805 and 1812, only two American whaling ships docked at Delagoa Bay. It may be that a number of English whalers arrived to trade. The evidence for British trade during is less clear, in part because, "English captains did not bother to obtain legally required, but completely unenforceable, licences to 'trade' here."[122] Even taking this into account, it appears that the whaling traffic disappeared to almost nothing between 1805 and 1812. It was only eighteen years after the Napoleonic Wars (1803- 1815) that whaling increased dramatically in the Indian Ocean in general.[123] The timing of large numbers of whalers to Delagoa Bay does not coincide with the political disruptions

[118] Carlson, 154
[119] Ibid.
[120] Carlson, 155
[121] Wray and Martin, 214
[122] Richards and Du Pasquier, 245
[123] Wray and Martin, 214

among the Nguni groups during the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century, leading to the rise of Shaka.

Hedges uses White's comment that the *Lion* purchased one to two head of cattle per day to argue that a trade in cattle replaced the ivory trade.[124] Based on this comment, by his calculation, hundred to two hundred cattle were supplied per ship per year. However, the *Lion* was an East Indiaman, a trade ship, with a crew of over a hundred men, while a whaling crew numbered between sixteen and thirty-six. In this particular year, there is a record of only four whalers visiting the Bay.[125] Over the whaling era of twenty years, 1785-1805, a hundred and twenty whaling ships officially used Delagoa Bay as a base, which means that an average of six ships per year were in need of provisions. It is doubtful if even a larger crew of thirty-six men, consumed by the task of hunting and slaughtering whales, as well as boiling blubber down to saleable oil, could consume a head or two of cattle a day. Further, the two Dutch ships, the *Snuffelaar* and the *Zeepost*, each had a crew of forty-six and forty-seven respectively and according to Van de Capelle's records bought "1 koebeest tot verversing van het volk" weekly.[126]

The Dutch commented on the relatively small numbers of cattle available at the Bay in 1721, saying that cattle were "niet extraordinari abundant," referring to the northern bank.[127] And although Tembe territory was not suited to raising cattle, the sale of cattle to the Dutch occurred regularly. Tembe chiefs sold cattle for beads, cloth and copper bangles.[128] In 1723, Kowombo Tembe offered to sell cattle to the trading post.[129] And in 1723, the Dutch purchased a total of twenty-eight head of cattle on a particular occasion.[130] Tembe paid a fine of twenty head of cattle in compensation for the Dutch reed field that was burnt down.[131] Considering the willingness to part with cattle even though Tembe territory was not suited to cattle farming and in view of the importance of cattle within African society, it appears that the Tembe had an existing source of cattle to supplement their herds. It is highly likely that a trade in cattle had always existed with Nguni groups to the

[124] White, 50
[125] Richards and Du Pasquier, 233. White reports that there were six whaling ships in the Bay in 1798.
[126] Theal, RSEA, Vol. 1 Letter 16 Feb 1732. " 1 cow as refreshment to the men."
[127] NA 4368 f. 32 Letter signed Swertner, 5 June 1721. "not extraordinarily abundant."
[128] NA 4367 f. 320ii
[129] Ibid.
[130] NA 4371 f. 257
[131] NA 4371 f. 133

south and accounts for the King of the Water having "a great number of cattle". It may be that the demand in the latter half of each year, for hundreds of cattle during the whaling season, placed great enough pressure on its supply to warrant extra importation of these from the south. As we have seen above, the demand for meat was significant between 1793 and 1799, and after the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) when whaling in the Indian Ocean increased dramatically.[132] The demand for fresh beef appeared to increase even more from the 1820s onward, bringing increasing numbers of cattle on the hoof to the Bay. Tembe supplements his cattle supply from an area southwest of Mabudu in the 1820s; in December 1823 porters brought cattle from that direction, and a Portuguese source tells of the Tembe dependency on the Nguni for cattle sold to Europeans in 1834.[133] Although whalers created a demand for fresh beef at the Bay, the cattle trade did not approach the proportions of the ivory trade until the second decade of the nineteenth century. It seems likely therefore that Hedges has overstated the cattle trade during the whaling era of the early nineteenth century.

The eighteenth century witnessed significant changes in the trade structure at Delagoa Bay. After the boom period of the English and Austrian ivory trade, whaling ships were responsible for the demand to shift from ivory to provisions. The trade by whalers ashore during this period was significant because of the prestigious articles they were willing to exchange for beef and vegetables, and drew the provisions market into the domain of the Tembe chief. And although whalers did trade a quantity of ivory, the volume of the ivory trade fell significantly. This circumstance diminished the flow of brass into the interior, a circumstance that formed an important motive for conflict that resulted in the rise of Shaka and the emergence of the Zulu kingdom.

[132] Wray and Martin, 214
[133] Hedges, *Trade and Politics*, 152

Conclusion

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, trade at Delagoa Bay was contingent on the relationship with a chief of a specific lineage group. The presence of European traders proved to be a weapon in the arsenal of a chief's to announce his paramount position within the local political hierarchy. Through the accumulation of beads, cloth, and ivory they were able to increase their status and prestige and to elevate themselves above others. But the association with European traders became more significant when they moved ashore. The trading post became a symbol of chiefly power within a territory seen by the constant stream of gifts to Maphumbo. It was a stage for demonstrating power through negotiating the price and quality of the ivory sold. The presence of the trade post on the mainland increased competition between contenders for the position of paramount chief and resulted in a cycle of hostilities that culminated in Mateke's victory and domination of the northern bank by 1730.

By the time the VOC arrived, the Bay had been a trading venue for almost two hundred years, during which the Portuguese annually sent a trading vessel to collect ivory from collection points around the Bay. Later, the voyages were reduced to a biennial circuit; however, in reality there were often long gaps in between trading voyages. The Portuguese trade supplied a somewhat random flow of exotic goods, most importantly beads and cloth to chiefs who competed for the position of principal trader. As the principal trader, a chief bolstered his authority and status in order to attract more subjects. During the sixteenth century Inhaca used trade, or more specifically, his affiliation with Portuguese traders, as an avenue to promote his position above that of Tembe. However, after Inhaca fell out with the Portuguese, Tembe became their principal trading partner. And even though trade with the Portuguese was sporadic, the Tembe rose to prominence through the accumulation of trade articles and became the most powerful polity on the southern bank of the Bay. By 1721, the competition for trade had been long been settled on the southern bank and the Tembe reigned supreme during the eighteenth century.

With the advent of the VOC trading post, trading articles were somewhat more readily available. The trading post situated on the northern bank gave the Mfumo chiefs the opportunity to reshuffle the political hierarchy, which had recently been

adjusted by placing Maphumbo on the bottom rung. Shortly before the Dutch arrived, Maphumbo had been exiled to an inhospitable stretch of land. This circumstance was a result of hostilities that led to the death of his father and the loss of Maphumbo territory. This area lacked a fresh water supply, was hot and infertile and Maphumbo lived there through the mercy of Manisse, who had been responsible for his father's death. The Dutch settled their trading post in Maphumbo's territory. This state of affairs brought him certain privileges and promoted him politically. The political advantage lay in the Dutch being potentially powerful military allies, a commonly held view that aided Maphumbo in a successful challenge of Mateke. Another advantage of having the Dutch in his domain was the flow of gifts that went to Maphumbo, signifying his importance above others on the northern bank. Chiefs therefore used trade, not to expand business, but as a political tool to gain more influence and the ability to accrue true wealth – people as subjects.

Maphumbo posed a military challenge to Mateke's political manoeuvring. Mateke increasingly extended his authority not only over his peers, but also over the paramount Bombo, in order to pursue an ambition to become the overlord of the northern bank. This conflict drew the Tembe, situated on the southern bank, into the conflict on account of Maphumbo's military weakness. Not strong enough to settle a military campaign on his own, Maphumbo initially used his alliance with the seemingly powerful Dutch to gain a victory over his rival Mateke. After the Dutch had fallen from grace, when nine hundred pirates, under the leadership of George Taylor, revealed them as being militarily ineffective, Maphumbo's reliance on Tembe became more acute. Competition between chiefs escalated as blue beads entered the market.

The Dutch supply of blue beads increased the competition for political pre-eminence. Blue beads were supplied to an insatiable market, and became central to the rivalry for power. The fact that blue beads were asked for daily and were the only article accepted for large tusks and taken in payment for cattle, points to the enormous value these beads had within this society. It is likely that blue beads were important to agricultural success. The fact that blue beads were used for a purpose other than purely personal decoration supports this view. The Dutch noticed that very few people on the northern shore wore beads but failed to report what other use these served. Blue beads possibly played a role in controlling rain and this element may

have been significant in supporting the unpopular but powerful rain priest, Maphumbo.

Maphumbo was a pretender to the position of paramount and barely tolerated by Mateke and Bombo. The belief in his ability to intercede on behalf of the surrounding communities for rain may have been vital in protecting him from more active local animosity. Maphumbo claimed to be a priest, who offered sacrifices to appease angry ancestors. With the availability of rain-producing blue beads came the opportunity to discard the dependency on a young upstart. In this context, the exchange of ivory became a means to a political end, which was to gain blue beads in order to achieve freedom from a reliance on Maphumbo's intercessory powers, a point that will be developed below.

After 1726, when the northern bank became militarily destabilised, Maphumbo's reliance on Tembe's military help increased and it is likely that this association was rooted in a supernatural connection between cultivation and ancestral propitiation. The cultivating Tembe depended on the priestly intercession of Maphumbo to ensure rain, because Delagoa Bay was prone to dry cycles that often deepened into drought, which could lead to famine. There is evidence of three droughts during the eighteenth century, one during the Dutch period, the other in 1777 and lastly the well-known Mathlatule drought at the close of the century. Maphumbo, however, was persona non grata among the Mfumo and probably tolerated only for his influence in the spiritual realm. The blue beads the Dutch imported to southeastern Africa brought an opportunity to rid the northern bank from Maphumbo's influence because the ownership of these promised protection against the vagaries of the weather. It is likely that the ownership of these blue beads symbolically elevated a chief as one who was a worthy leader because they bolstered perceived control over the environment.

A store of ivory denoted the status of a chief. The control over the direction of trade was imperative. Chiefs corralled traders into their homesteads in order to gain tribute from them in beads and large tusks. The ivory gathered reinforced a chief's authority and prestige at the expense of the other leaders within a territory. Larger tusks were retained as tribute, and were a powerful symbol and source of power and skilled leadership. As the sought-after blue bead supply fluctuated, and the demand

for them increased, Mfumo territory became militarily destabilised. Chiefs condoned the appropriation of goods in order to accrue the greater number of beads, which resulted in the growing incidence of skirmishes, which undermined trade.

A key advantage of trade was the acquisition of blue beads. Shortly after the arrival of the Dutch, and with the appearance of gold and ivory traders from Paraotte, Mateke instituted a policy of expansion. Through hosting the Paraottean gold suppliers, he accumulated beads through demands of tribute and enforcing a water service onto Paraotteans. The water service demanded two strings of beads for every pot of water. By enlarging his stores of beads, he showed himself as a chief worthy to adhere to, symbolically able to his people protect from the vagaries of the weather, and so attracted subjects of other chiefs.

Although trade articles were important in establishing and maintaining political hierarchies, this system did not benefit from a proliferation of traders from Paraotte and Machikosse to the Bay. Mateke discouraged the contact between the Nassangano and the Dutch who paid tribute to Tembe. Mateke was disinclined to encourage greater numbers of Paraotteans, arguing that greater numbers of foreigners would dilute his powerbase and remove the leverage he had to levy the amount of tribute he had in the past. This attitude towards commercial enterprise clashed with the objectives of the Dutch, who wanted to see the expansion of markets, rather than their containment.

In spite of local opposition, an increasing number of foreign traders flooded towards the coast towards the end of the Dutch period, attracted by the blue and other coloured beads supplied by the Dutch. The supply of beads, and to some extent that of cloth, drew traders across the Lebombo range from a northwesterly direction. Traders from the interior carried ivory, gold, copper and tin to the coast. The Dutch, who were intent on turning a profit and minding their own business, were unintentionally caught up in a power struggle. In the turbulent environment of competition over trade, a trade relationship with Europeans became a mechanism for exerting dominance over competitors. The Dutch unwittingly promoted competition because of their ignorance of cultural indicators, like the wearing of cloth and owning of beads, both of which assigned status to important men.

The traders who arrived from the interior came from Paraotte, Machikosse and Chiremandelle, territories that lay within the southeastern Transvaal. There is evidence that those from Paraotte and Chiremandelle were linked to large-scale trade networks, with routes covering vast distances at least as far as the Zambezi River. Both groups had knowledge of the Portuguese trade and being situated in the Transvaal and served as intermediaries, connecting the territory below the Limpopo River to the wider Indian Ocean trade network. During the Dutch period at Delagoa Bay, at least one Paraottean, Pangele Inthowisse, initiated a new trade route toward the coast. Because his territory was believed to supply gold, the Dutch were eager to gain direct access to not only the gold, but also the ivory of this area. After failing to reconnoitre the interior, the Dutch relied on Hoemane's report to add to their sketchy idea of the interior because their efforts to travel into the interior had been previously halted by either passive aggressive attitude of the chiefs settled on the northern bank of the Espirito Santo or violent resistance in Nassangano. This person accompanied a group of Machikosse on their return trip home and travelled for over a year within the interior before returning to Delagoa Bay. Through Hoemane the Dutch were invited to settle a trading post in Inthowelle. The reason for the reluctance to see the Dutch disappear into the interior was related to the removal of the centre of trade from the coast. In the event of such a circumstance, the chiefs around the Bay and those situated in Komati Poort, who control access to trade, would lose control over the flow of trade goods that played an important role in maintaining and extending the authority of individual chiefs.

The consecutive trade ventures of the Dutch, English and Portuguese exploited trade at the Bay. Each group introduced a different element to trade around the Bay, requiring the local chiefs to adapt to change. The Portuguese initially instituted a trade system based on the monsoon seasons and dictated an annual rhythm of trade supplying ivory to the coast from the interior to temporary traders. The closing of the Dutch trading post in 1730 returned the Bay to a period of shipboard trade. This style of trade minimised competition among chiefs and, compared to the level of business conducted at the trading post, increased the volume of trade. The Dutch, like the Portuguese, followed mercantile business principles that inhibited rather than increased trade.

After the departure of the VOC from Delagoa Bay in 1730, trade continued intermittently until two focused periods of trade dominated by the English. Edward Chandler spearheaded the first, and the second occurred through an Austrian company, Trieste Asiatic Company, under the leadership of an English trader, William Bolts. These two initiatives came after a hiatus of over two decades. Their espousal of a more free market and the introduction of substantial quantities of brass to the southern side of the Bay played a key part in their impact. From 1757, Edward Chandler, a country ship trader, was responsible for a flourishing ivory trade until his death in 1768. From 1777 the Austrian company pushed black cloth into the trade networks north of the Bay, brass to the south and was responsible for an unprecedented spike in the ivory trade until 1782.

This latter year saw the return of the Portuguese to the Bay, which slowed trade to a degree. Although their inability to keep up with the high prices the English and Austrians had consistently paid before diminished the flow of brass into the interior, a significant ivory trade continued. From 1789, whaling started at Delagoa Bay. Whalers had a different set of priorities as traders. Not particularly interested in the ivory trade but in need of provisions, they were willing to pay a premium for food in brass and iron. Whalers did not comply with the Portuguese demand that they purchase all goods through them and did business directly with Tembe, which reinforced the Tembe chief's authority. The growth of this authority manifested in his ability to extend it by proxy through the King of the Water. Capelle promoted this position to the post of lookout, the incumbent of which had a vested interest in capturing the trade for the chief's account. The entrepreneurial Tembe chief played a key role in the most significant change of all at Delagoa Bay– by adapting to the market and supplying provisions.

This study has made new contributions to southeastern African historiography with regards to the role of environment, the location of Paraotte and the Mfecane debate. It has established a link between a particular trade article and the environment. It shows how the competition for the acquisition for blue beads not only increased a chief's powerbase and the ability to attract followers, playing a role in an attempt to restructure the political hierarchy on the northern bank, but also correlates with the incidence of drought. The demand for black cloth from traders supplying ivory from the north also appears to have a connection to drought. The capacity for certain

trade articles to effect political and social change, around Delagoa Bay and beyond, particularly with reference to drought, is a subject that requires further research.

As far as the location of Paraotte and its neighbouring territories of Machikosse and Chiremandelle are concerned, this study has drawn on contemporary evidence to locate these in the southeastern Transvaal – an insight which should have considerable significance for debates around the nature and trajectory of political and economic change in the region in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

It has demonstrated that contrary to the Hedges theory, which states that the ivory trade was replaced by a trade in cattle, the ivory trade continued, although at a diminished rate, into the nineteenth century with its concomitant flow of brass south. And lastly, that the cattle trade between Delagoa Bay and Nguni groups did not become significant until the 1820s. This observation implies that cattle raiding and protection by the amabutho was not the force that underlay the early nineteenth century but rather that it was the competition over the diminished brass trade that motivated conflict and may have contributed to the processes of political centralisation that culminated in the emergence of the Zulu kingdom.

Appendix

An Extract from Boteler's *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia, 25-26*

The boat (for they have no canoes) that brought the natives on board was of the rudest and most uncouth construction that can be well imagined. In shape it resembled a broad wedge, the two largest sides being slightly convex ; and it was formed of clumsy misshapen planks, at tached together by means of the ligneous fibres of flexible shrubs. These, independently of that use, embraced a quantity of reeds, which served to close the wide seams between the planks. The seats projected through the sides upwards of half a foot; and the prow was formed by a large log of wood, the continuation of which below served for the keel. The top of this was elevated a little above the line of the boat's gunwale, and was surmounted by a rudely- carved ball, which in one instance was fashioned out into a ludicrous representation of the human countenance. The oars consisted of long staves, having a flat piece of board shaped like the spade on cards ; and the sail was composed of three or four heavy mats sewed together : this they had no idea of managing, unless before the wind, or at all events nearly so. Even then, and in fact when only using their oars, they showed an awkwardness in managing their boats almost incredible when it is considered what practice they must have. The arrival of the first was quickly followed by that of several more, some of which were laden with poultry, vegetables, and other articles for sale; but by far the greatest number with women, or, as they are termed by the Delagoa people when conversing with the English, queens.



Artist's Impression of a Boat used at Delagoa Bay by Locals, Late Eighteenth Century



Slaughtering of an Elephant[1]

[1] Bull, B. *Safari: A Chronicle of an Adventure.* London: Viking, 1988, 25



A Journal Entry noting the Chiefs enroute to Sanguano and Chiremandelle, as well as comments by Pangele Inthowisse, 1724[2]

[2] NA 4373 f. 583

Bibliography

Manuscript Sources

Cape Archives, Cape Town
Incoming Letters C406 - C433
Appendices C737 - C745

Nationaal Archief, The Hague
NA 4367- NA 4373
NA ARD 9135

Bodleian Library, Oxford
Journal of the ship, *Little Josiah*, MS Rawl.A.334

Huntington Library, San Marino
Journal of the ship, *Northampton*, Medieval and British Manuscripts, Stowe Collection, ST 9

Unpublished Theses

Coetzee, C.G *Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800.* PhD, Stellenbosch University, 1954.

Hafkin, N.J. *Trade, Politics and Society in Northern Mozambique, c.1753-1913.* PhD, Boston University, 1973

Haywood, C.N. *American Whalers and Africa.* PhD. Boston University Graduate School, 1967

Hedges, D.W. *Trade and Politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteen and Nineteenth Centuries*, PhD, University of London, 1978

Mtetwa, A.H. *History of Uteve under the Muene Mutapa Rulers 1480-1834: a re-evaluation.* Ph.D. Northwestern University, 1984

Schoeman, M.H. *Clouding Power? Rain-Controlled Space, Landscapes amd Ideology in Shashe-Limpopo State Formation.* PhD. University of the Witwatersrand, 2007

Smith, A.K. *The Struggle for Control of Southern Mozambique, 1720- 1835. Ph.D. University of California*, 1970

Zimba, BdJ. L.M.L. *Overseas trade, Regional Politics and Gender Roles: Southern Mozambique, ca. 1720 to ca.1830.* PhD, University of Michigan, 1999

Published Sources
Select Books

Abu-Lughod, J.L. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989

Alpers, E.A. 'Trade, State and Yao Society in the Nineteenth Century,' *Journal of African Society*, 10,3, (1969), 405-420

Alpers, E.A. *Ivory & Slaves in East Central Africa: changing Patterns of International Trade to the Later Nineteenth Century.* London: Heinemann, 1975

Aragon, M., Barreto, A., Epstein, P.R. 'Drought and Health Implications in Mozambique' *Medicine and Global Survival*, 5, 1, (January 1998), 42-49

Axelson, E. *Early Portuguese Explorers of Southern Africa.* Johannesburg: Ernest Oppenheimer Institute for Portuguese Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1982

Ballard, C. 'Drought and economic distress: South Africa in the 1800s,' *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17, (1986), 359-378

Barendse, R.J. *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean of the Seventh Century.* London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002

Barendse, R.J. *Arabian Seas, 1700-1763, Volume 1: The Western Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century.* Leiden: BRILL, 2009

Bannister, S. *Humane Policy.* London: Thomas George Underwood, 1830.

Beach, D.N. *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850: An Outline of Shona History.* London: Heinemann, 1980

Beach, D.N. The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850. London: Heinemann, 1980

Beachey, R.W. 'The East African ivory trade in the nineteenth century,' *The Journal of African History, 8, 2* (1967), 269-290

Beuster, C. 'An extract from a report on the people of the Vawenda,' *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft zur Erdkunde*, Vol. 14, (1879), 236-240

Bialuschewski, A. 'Thomas Bowrey's Madagascar manuscript of 1708,'*History of Africa*, 34, (2007), 31-42

Bhila, H.H.K. *Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: the Manyika and their Portuguese.* Salisbury: Longman, 1982

Bonner, P. *Kings, commoners and Concessionaires: The evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi state.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Booth, A.R. 'American Whalers in South African Waters,' *South African journal of Economics*, 32, 4, (December 1964), 278-282

Boxer, C.R. (ed.) *The Tragic history of the Sea, 1589-1622*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, London, 2001

Boteler, T. *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa, Arabia*, 2 Vols. London, 1835

Bradley, R.S. and Jones, P.D. *Climate since 1500 A.D.* Psychology Press, 1995

Bull, B. *Safari: A Chronicle of an Adventure.* London: Viking, 1988

Bulley, A. *Bombay Country Ships, 1790-1833*. Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000
Carlson, S.H. *Trade and Dependency: studies in the expansion of Europe*. Uppsala, Almqvist& Wiksell International, 1984

Campbell, G. Eating the Dead in Madagascar in *South African Medical Journal, 103,*12 (2013) S Afr Med J 2013; 103 (12 Suppl.1) 1032-1034. DOI: 10.7196/SAMJ.

Carlson, S.H. *Trade and Dependency: Studies in the expansion of Europe*. Uppsala: Almqvist& Wiksell, 1984

Coetzee, C.G. Die Kompanjie se besetting van Delagoabaai in *Argiefjaarboek vir S.A. Geskiedenis, 1948*, deel 2.

Chaudhari, K.N. *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company: 1660-1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978

Diederick, D. Kortlang, J. *Arsip-Arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. Leiden: Brill, 2007

Delius, P. *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, The Boers and The British in the Nineteenth Century Transvaal*. Berkley: University of Los Angeles, 1984.

Delius, P., Schoeman, M.H. Revisiting Bokoni: populating the stone ruins of the Mapumalnga Escarpment in Swanepoel, N., Esterhuysen, A., Bonner, P. (eds.) *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001

Delius, P., Maggs, T., Schoeman, A. *Forgotten world: The Stone-Walled Settlements of the Mpumalanga Escarpment*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014

Donley, L. Life in a Swahili Town House reveals the symbolic meaning of spaces and artifact assemblages in *The African Archaeological Review* 5, Papers in honour of J. Desmond Clark, 1987, 181-192

Dubin, L. in Stine, L., Cabak, M., Groover, M. Blue beads as African-American cultural symbols, Historical Archaeology, 1996, 30(3): 49-75

Elblom, A., Gillson, L., Notelid, M. A Historical ecology of the Limpopo and Kruger National Parks and the lower Limpopo valley in *Journal of Archaeology and Ancient History*, 1, 2011

Elblom, A., Bjorg, S. Paleohydrology of Lake Nhaucati (southern Mozambique) ~ 400 AD to Present, DOI 10.1007/s10933-008-9218-2

Elkiss, T.H. 'Kilwa Kisiwani: the rise of an East African city-state,' *African Studies Review, 16*, 1, (April 1973), 119-130

Eiselen, W. "Die Veraenderung der konsonanten durch ein vorhergehendes in den Bantusprachen,' *Zeitschrift fuer Eingeborene Sprachen*, 14, (1914), 81- 151

Fagan, B.M. 'Early trade and raw Materials in South Central Africa,' *The Journal of African History*, 10, 1, (1969), 1-13

Feierman, S., Janzen, J.M. *The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa.* California: University of California Press, 1992

Feierman, S., Mans, M. *Centering on African Practice in Musical Arts Production.* Cape Town: African Minds, 2006

Friede, H.M. 'Tin mining and smelting in the Transvaal during the Iron Age,' *Journal of the south African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, (July 1976), 461-470

Friede, H.M. Friede, 'Iron mining in the Transvaal,' *Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, (April 1980), 156-165

Gray, R. and Birmingham, D. (eds.) *Pre-Colonial Trade: Essays on Trade and Central and Eastern before 1900.* London: Oxford University Press, 1970

Hallward, N.L. *William Bolts: A Dutch Adeventurer under John Company.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920

Hamilton, C., Mbenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol.1, From early times to 1885.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Harger, H.S. 'A stone bead industry of the Western Transvaal,' *Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa*, 28, (1941), 129-141

Harries, P. 'The Anthropologist As Historian and Liberal: H-A. Junod and the Thonga,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 8, 1, Special Issue on Anthropology and History (1981), 37-50

Harries, P. 'Slavery, Indenture and Migrant Labour: maritime immigration from Mozambique to the Cape, c.1780-1880,' *African Studies* 73,3, Special Issue, The Making and Changing of Migrant Workers' Worlds (1800-2014), 2014, 323-340

Herbert, E.W. *Red Gold of Africa: Copper in Pre-colonial History and Culture.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984

Iliffe, J. *A Modern History of Tanganyika.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979

Iliffe, J. *Africans: A History of A Continent.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996

Isaacman A.F. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambesi prazos, 1750-1902.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972

Junod, H.A. *The Life of a South African Tribe Vols. 1&2.* New York: University books, 1962

Junod, H.A *Les BaRonga: étude Ethnographie sur les Indigènes de la Baia de Delagoa,* Neuchatel: Attinger, 1898

Junod, H.A. 'The condition of the natives of South-East Africa in the sixteenth century, according to early Portuguese documents,' *South African Journal of Science* 10, (1913), 137-161

Kennedy, CG. 'The use of brass in the Zulu kingdom,' *African Arts*, 24, 3 Special Issue: Memorial to Arnold Rubin, Part II, 9July 1991), 50-55 + 94-96

Killick, D. 'Agency, dependency and long distance trade : East Africa and the Islamic World', ca.700-1500 in S Falconer and C Redman (ed.) *Politics and Power: Archaeological Perspectives on Landscapes in Early States.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009

Klapwijk, M. Minute glass beads from the northern Transvaal, South Africa, *The South African Archaeological Bulletin*, 46, 153, (Jan, 1991), 34 -37.

Kooijmans, M; Oosterling, J.E. *VOC- glossarium : verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* Den Haag : Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000.

Krige, J.D. Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal in *Bantu Studies*, 11, 1937, 321-356

Kuper, H. 'Costume and Identity,' *Comparative studies in Society and History*, 15, 3, (1973)

Lebato, A. *Historia da Fundacão de Presidio de Lourenço Marques: 1782-1786.* Junta de investigaçoes do Ultramar, 1949

Leibrandt, H.C.V. *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope.* Cape Town: W.A. Richard & Sons, 1896

Loubser, J.N. 'Archaeology and Early Venda History,' *Goodwin Series*, Vol. 6, Goodwins Legacy. (June 1989), 54-61 1989

Maasch, K. A., et al, 'A 2000-Year Context for Modern Climate Change,' *Geografiska Annaler. Series A, Physical Geography*, Vol. 87, No. 1, Special Issue: Climate Change and Variability (2005), 7-15

Mans, M. *Centering on African Practice in Musical Arts Production.* Cape Town: African Minds, 2006

Marks, S. Gray, R. 'Southern Africa and Madagascar,' Richard Gray, (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4, 1600-1790.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 385-468

Mayer, D., Porat, N. 'Green stone beads at the dawn of agriculture,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 105, 25, (June 2008), 8548-8551, 8549

Miller, J. *Way of Death*, London: James Curry Ltd, 1988

Montez, C. *Descobrimento e Fundação de Lourenço Marques, 1500-1900.*Minerva Central-Editora: Lourenço Marques, 1948

Molsbergen, G. *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd*, Vol. 3. Den Haag: Marthinus Nijhof, 1922

Meisterle, S. 'Country trade unter kaiserlicher Flagge: William Bolts und die zweite oesterreichische Ostindienkompanie,' *Zeitschrift fuer Weltgeschichte*, Interdisziplinaere Perspektiven 9, (2008), heft 2, 63-87

Meredith, M. *The Fortunes of Africa*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2014

Mudenge, S.I.G. *A Political History of Munhumutapa, 1400-1902.* Harare: African Publishing Group, 1988

Newitt, M.D.D. 'The early history of the Sultanate of Angoche,' *The Journal of African History, 13, 3,* (1972), 397-406

Newitt, M.D.D. 'The early history of the Maravi,' *The Journal of History* 23, 2, (1982), 148-167

Newitt, M.D.D. 'Mozambique Island: The rise and decline of an East African Coastal City, 1500-1700,' *Portuguese studies, 20,* (2004), 21-37

Newitt, M. *A History of Mozambique.* Hurst and Company: London, 2009

Paver, F.R. 'Trade and mining in the pre-European Transvaal,' *South African Journal of Science*, 30, (October 1933), 603-611

Penn, N. 'Great escapes: deserting soldiers during Noodt's Cape governorship, 1727-1729,' *South African Historical Journal*, 59:1, (2007),171-203, DOI: 10.1080/02582470709464777

Pienaar, U. De V., et al. *Neem uit die Verlede: Die geskiedenis van die Laeveld en ontstaan van die Krugerwildtuin.* Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2007

Pollack-Parnau, F. *Eine österreichische-ostindische Handelscompagnie 1775- 1785: in Beitrag zur österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II.* Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1927

Punt, W.H.J. *The First Europeans in the Kruger Park, 1725.* National Parks Board of Trustees: Pretoria, 1975

Punt, W.H.J. 'Die verkenning van die Krugerwildtuin deur die Hollandse Oost-Indiese Kompanje, 1725,' *Koedoe, 1*, (1958), 1-18

Richards, R., Du Pasquier, T. 'Bay Whaling off southern Africa, c. 1785-1805,' *South African Journal of Marine Science*, 8:1, (1989) 231-250, DOI: 10.2989/02577618909504564

Sharp, J. S. 'The Roots and Development of Volkekunde in South Africa,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 8, 1, Special Issue on Anthropology and History, (1981), 16-36

Sheriff, A. *Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar*. Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1987

Slater, H. *Transitions in the Political Economy of South East Africa before 1840*. PhD, University of Sussex, 1976.

Sleigh, D. *Buiteposte: VOC-buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur*. Pretoria: HAUM, 1993

Smith, A. 'Delagoa Bay and the trade of southern Africa,' in Gray, R. and Brmingham, D. *Pre-Colonial Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969

Smith, A.K. 'The peoples of southern Mozambique: An historical survey,' *The Journal of African History*, 14, 4, (1973), 565-580

Smith, J., Lee-Throp, J., Hall, M. 'Climate change and Agropastoralist settlement in the Shashe-Limpopo River basin, southern Africa: AD 880 to 1700,' *The South African Archeological Bulletin*, 62, (2007), 186,

Stapel, F.W. Hubert Hugo in *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde van Nederlansch-Indië, 86*, 3de/4de Afl, 1930, 615-635

Stayt, H.A. *The Bavenda*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1968

Stine, L., Cabak, M., Groover, M. 'Blue beads as African-American cultural symbols,' *Historical Archaeology*, (1996), 30(3): 49-75

St. James, Y., Handelman, J.A., Taylor, S.F. "Magical thinking and consumer coping,' *Journal of Consumer Research*, 38,4, (Dec. 2011) , 632-649

Theal, G.M. *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, volumes 1-9

Theal, G.M. *History of South Africa before 1795*, London: Swan Schonnenschein & Co, 1888

Theal, G.M. *The Beginning of South African History*. Cape Town: T. Maskew and Miller, 1902

Thompson, L. *A History of South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990

Theal, G. M. Reis na Delagoa Baai in *Belangrijke Historische Documenten versameld in de Kaap Kolonie en Elders, No. 2*. Van der Sandt De Villiers & Co: Kaapstad, 1896

Ylvisaker, M. 'The ivory trade in the Lamu area, 1600-1870,' *Studies in History, Trade and Society on the Eastern Coast of Africa*, (1982), 221-231

Van Warmelo, N.J (ed.) *The Copper Miners of Musina and the Early History of the Zoutpansberg, Ethnological Publications Vol. 8*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1940

Vijfhuizen, C. 'Rain-making, political conflicts and gender images: a case from Mutema chieftaincy in Zimbabwe,' *Zambezia*, xxiv, i, (1997), 31-49

Wanner, M. *William Bolts and Societé Imperiale Asiatique de Trieste*, http://usd.ff.cuni.cz/?q=system/files/wanner_2.pdf, downloaded September 2014

Webster, D. 'Tembe-Thonga kinship: the marriage of anthropology and history,' *Cashiers d-Études Africaines*, 26, 104, (1986), 11-632

Wray, P. Martin, K.R. 'Historical Whaling Records from the Western Indian Ocean,' *Reports of the International Whaling Commission* (Special Issue 5), (1983), 213-241

Wright, J. 'Turbulent Times: political transformations in the North and the East,' in Hamilton, C., Mbenga, B.K., Ross, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol.1, From early times to 1885*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Wessman, R. *The BaWenda of the Spelonken (Transvaal): a contribution toward the psychology and the folklore of African People*. The African World: London, 1908

White, W.M *Journal of a Voyage performed in the* Lion *Extra Indiaman to Madras, to Colombo and to De Lagoa Bay, 1798*. London: John Stockdale, 1800

Worden, N. 'New approaches to VOC history in South Africa,' *South African Historical Journal*, 59:1, (2007), 3-18, DOI: 10.1080/02582470709464770

Von Sicard, H. Das Reich Butwa-Torwa, *Paideuma*, 13, 1967, 180 -189