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ALTERNATIVES TO INVOLUNTARY  
RESETTLEMENT: MAKING AN  
ARGUMENT FOR *IN SITU* MULTI-STOREY  
SOCIAL HOUSING IN MAPUTO.

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# **Alternatives to involuntary resettlement: making an argument for *in situ* multi-storey social housing in Maputo.**

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**A Research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Built Environment in Housing.**

**Johannesburg, April 2018**

## DECLARATION

I, Márcia Andreia Cristino de Oliveira, declare that this Research Report is my own unaided work being submitted for the degree of Master of the Built Environment in Housing in Housing at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I have not previously in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signed:

4<sup>th</sup> April, 2018

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## ABSTRACT

Resettlement has been a common worldwide practice in development projects criticised for promoting difficult living conditions, raising ‘new poverty’ (Cernea, 2003), causing involuntary segregation and contributing to the exclusion of the right to the city (Jorge, 2016 and Melo, 2015).

The last five years, during the implementation of urban infrastructure projects in Maputo, more than 5500 individuals were relocated (Jorge, 2016 and PROMAPUTO, 2017.) Such urban investments benefit mostly an upper middle class and impair the lower social classes, drawing them to areas far from the urban centre (Jenkins, 2001 and Jorge, 2016). Maputo also faces the constraint of lack of vacant land for housing within its administrative boundaries (PROMAPUTO, 2017). In this context, it is urgent to introduce a new resettlement approach, which may promote better outcomes, help to reorganise the territory in integrated and sustainable ways, and allow a greater right to the city to all its citizens.

Three key concepts that are analysed in the context of Maputo are involuntary resettlement, social housing, and the right to the city, including land management. The report is guided by the main question: Could multi-storey social housing construction *in situ*, offer an alternative to involuntary resettlement operations in Maputo? Applied research, based on qualitative methods for data collection (interviews and a focus group), is used to analyse three case studies of resettlement undertaken within the ProMaputo programme.

This research report aims, firstly, to contribute to promoting other forms of resettlement procedures in Maputo as well as the development of a policy that gives people a choice, and distinguishes different approaches to resettlement. It also aims to raise awareness among stakeholders about the need to develop multi-storey social housing near the city centre as an alternative to relocation elsewhere and to identify the characteristics of such houses, which can promote the right to the city as well as the implementation of the national housing policy. The report intends to find that depending on the characteristics of *in situ* multi-storey social housing, it can be an effective solution for accomplishing these aims, and that the affected population can be equal beneficiaries in urban interventions.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|           |                                                          |                                                                      |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AMAI      | Mozambican Environmental Impact Assessment Association   | <i>Associação Moçambicana de Avaliação do Impacto Ambiental</i>      |
| BR        | Republic Newspaper                                       | Boletim da Republica                                                 |
| CMM       | Maputo Municipal Council                                 | <i>Conselho Municipal de Maputo</i>                                  |
| DUAT      | The Right to Use Land                                    | Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra                             |
| FFH       | FFH - Housing Development Fund                           | <i>Fundo Fomento Habitação</i>                                       |
| MITADER   | Ministry of Land Environment and Rural Development       | <i>Ministério da Terra, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Rural</i>         |
| MOPHRH    | Ministry of Public Works and Housing and Water Resources | <i>Ministério das Obras Publicas e Habitação e Recursos Hídricos</i> |
| RAP       | Resettlement Action Plan                                 | <i>Plano de Acção de Reassentamento</i>                              |
| PEUMM     | Urban Structure Plan of the Municipality of Maputo       | Plano de Estrutura Urbana do Município de Maputo                     |
| PROMAPUTO | Maputo Municipal Development Programme                   | <i>Programa de Desenvolvimento Municipal do Município de Maputo</i>  |

|     |                             |                                      |
|-----|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| UEM | Eduardo Mondlane University | <i>Universidade Eduardo Mondlane</i> |
| WB  | World Bank                  | <i>Banco Mundial</i>                 |

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION



Figure 1: Aerial photograph of Maputo Informal City. Source: [www.casasmelhoradas.com](http://www.casasmelhoradas.com)

## 1.0 Introduction and background

The resettlement of large numbers of individuals and families due to development projects is a common worldwide practice. A great number of theorists have developed research in order to understand whether affected populations have been able to restore or improve their living conditions after being subjected to **resettlement operations** (Cernea, 2003, Pedro 2011). Despite the existence of international (e.g. World Bank) and national policies on the subject, it seems that such operations are mainly based on the principle of compensation, which “fails to capture the full costs of dislocation and reestablishment, thus **allowing ‘new poverty’**” (Cernea, 2003:40). Resettlement operations can also give rise to the problem of **involuntary segregation** (Jorge and Melo, 2014, citing Cavalcanti, 2009), where individuals are obliged to move from well-located land, towards the outskirts of the city, which also contributes to increasing **exclusion of the right to the city** (Jorge and Melo, 2014, citing Lefebvre, 1968). Such processes have taken place in Maputo, the focus city of this research.

### 1.1 Problem statement and rationale

In Maputo, over the last 10 years, urbanisation has intensified through the implementation of important infrastructure projects for the development of the city, such as: i) the Catembe bridge – crosses Maputo bay, linking Maputo city to Catembe; ii) the Circular Road, — a ring belt around the city; and also by the infrastructure of the PROMAPUTO programme (CMM, 2017). PROMAPUTO is a ten-year programme co-financed by the World Bank (WB), the Mozambican Government and the Maputo Municipal Council (CMM). Within the scope of PROMAPUTO, the major urbanisation works were [1] the requalification of Julius Nyerere Avenue, one of the main roads of Maputo [2] the interventions on the requalification of informal settlements, such Chamanculo C and [3] the improvement of George Dimitrov neighbourhood (*ibid.*). Together, these projects relocated more than 1700 families (approximately 9350 individuals), that is, 72 families relocated in the scope of ProMaputo and the remaining families to the great infrastructure projects (Machava 2016, and CMM, 2017). In accordance with Mozambican resettlement regulations, each family resettled from urban land, has the right to be relocated to a piece of land, not less than 800m<sup>2</sup> in an urban area (BR, 2012, article 18). These procedures entail a great exercise in land management. Despite the fact that land in Mozambique was nationalised after independence (Law from 1979 and 1997)(BR, 1979 and BR, 1997), which could be a good tool for exercising land management oriented towards social inclusion, urban investments are benefiting mostly an upper middle class and impairing the low-income social classes by drawing them to areas far from urban centres (Jenkins, 2001, Jorge, 2016 and Melo 2015,). Beyond this problem, Maputo is also facing the constraint of not having more vacant land available for housing zoning within its administrative boundaries (CMM, 2017). In light of this, it is my understanding that Maputo is reaching a point where it is an urgent necessity to introduce a new resettlement approach: one that would work towards better outcomes and help reorganising the territory in integrated and sustainable ways, and which would allow for a greater right to the city.

For the last four years, I have been involved in the coordination of resettlement operations in the CMM where relocation is a common practice. In some countries, such as South Africa, Brazil and Chile, other forms of resettlement operations are being used/tested, in order to avoid poverty increase, intensification of social exclusion, damage to the means of subsistence and the creation of new informal settlements. These issues are defended by Cernea (2003) as permissible in order to safeguard the resettlement processes. Social housing in well located land became a tool with which to resolve relocation and the unavailability of land with basic infrastructure on the city’s peripheries, which in turn contributed to promoting social inclusion, and facilitating land management as well as promoting the right to the city to all its citizens.

## 1.2 Aim

This research, firstly, intends to contribute towards defining other forms of resettlement procedures in Maputo in the context of resettlement associated with urban projects with external funders or donors, which entail a different context and opportunity, in relation to resettlement caused by natural disasters (floods), or resettlement in rural areas.

In Mozambique, the regulation of resettlement procedures was approved in 2012. This document provides guidelines for resettlement procedures. However, it does not mention other issues, such as the calculation of compensation for the allocation of assets, which require the consultation of other documents in relation to general rights, expropriations and land rights, among others (CMM, 2017). For that reason, secondly, this research intends to contribute towards the standardisation and development of a policy that clarifies the procedures, distinguishes the different approaches for rural and urban resettlement and gives affected people the opportunity to choose their futures.

Thirdly, I expect to raise awareness among stakeholders, from the public and private sectors, as well as international agencies and communities, about the need to develop social housing near to the city centre or in areas subject to investment in urbanisation projects, through the construction of multi-storey buildings, which could contribute to greater inclusion, sustainability, and the right to the city. As such, the fourth aim of the research is to define the characteristics of multi-storey social housing, which can promote the right to the city and accelerate the implementation of the national housing policy.

## 1.3 Research question and hypothesis

The research is guided by the main question:

To what extent does *in situ* multi-storey social housing construction offer an alternative to involuntary resettlement operations in Maputo?

### Subquestions:

Are the stakeholders of resettlement operations receptive and able to adopt a different approach in resettlements, as well as to transform them to more cost-effective solutions?

What are the characteristics of multi-storey social housing which can promote the right to the city?

Are the affected communities receptive to living in multi-storey buildings?

The conducive line of this research is based on the hypothesis that the construction of multi-storey *in situ* social housing *in situ* is an effective cost alternative to the relocation of people under resettlement operations in Maputo, which can promote the right to the city and accelerate the restoration of their livelihoods as well as allowing for the improvement of their living conditions (habitat).

## 1.4 Research methods

This is an empirical study in which I use an applied research methodology (Sarantakos, 2005). My intention is to bring alternative solutions to the current problem of community relocation in the involuntary resettlement operations practiced within the urbanisation and urban requalification programme in the PROMAPUTO context. The three involuntary resettlements undertaken in the PROMAPUTO programme are the case study for this hypothesis. I used qualitative methods in data



collection exclusively. I started by analysing secondary data, while primary data was gathered mainly through open-ended interviews and a focus group session. A total of 15 members of the resettled communities were interviewed. The families' selection criteria, were: i) diversity of age groups; ii) individuals from the community with critical opinions; and iii) willingness to participate in the research. The focus group session was done with one of the affected communities, (with which I have a privileged relationship, having worked together from 2013 to 2016), and involved six community participants. This session led the research to a range of ideas (brought by community) that brought together the fundamental principles, needs and characteristics of social housing construction in multiple floors for the informal settlements. Considering that this was the only community that was not relocated, we had a favourable and open environment for the development of ideas for *in situ in situ* housing construction. Another 12 interviews were conducted with key informants within the private and public sectors and NGOs. These include: the team leader of the PROMAPUTO project by the WB, two technicians from the Maputo City Council, one from the urban planning department, and the other from the environmental management department. One social worker was involved during the resettlement process. Other interviews were held with other public institutions, namely the Urbanisation and Housing Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOPH) as well as the Ministry of Land and Rural Development (MITADER). Also interviewed were two former politicians, a Deputy Minister of MOPH and Minister of MOPH, two members of the board of directors of the Faculty of Architecture of *Eduardo Mondlane* University, one of the founders of the private project *Casa Minha*, and an entrepreneur of an investment company in Maputo (see annex. table nº 1). I also developed a cost-benefit analysis of resettlement relocation processes versus *in situ* resettlement in order to understand which procedures delivered the best approach and were most successful in terms of creating better social impact in relation to spent financial resources.

### 1.5 Theoretical/conceptual framework

The research theme requires the deepening of three interrelated key concepts within its theoretical analysis. The three concepts will be analysed by taking into consideration international best practices in Brazil, South Africa and Chile, which I hope will be relatable to the Mozambican reality given their cultural diversity.

The first concept focuses on understanding involuntary resettlement operations. I took into consideration the i) different type of resettlements – rural versus urban; those from investment and urbanisation operations, which entail a different opportunity for the affected people; and those arising from natural causes, the that have the characteristics of emergency and should receive immediate attention; ii) the different approaches throughout history – financial compensation systems, relocation processes, *in situ* construction, and projects accompanied by local social development; iii) the national law and international policies which govern these interventions – in particular the WB's social and environmental safeguards policy and the Mozambican laws and its regulations.

The second concept is social housing – understanding the evolution of this phenomenon over time, as well as the main associated critiques and constraints arising from international solutions. Within the local national context, I also analyse the housing strategy and policy approved in 2011, in order to understand the reasons for its weak implementation over the last six years.

The third concept delve into the already much explored concept of right to the city. My aim is not to exhaust the subject, but rather to acquire a deeper insight, which will allow me to reflect on what solutions can be adopted in order to promote the citizens of Maputo's access to this right. Furthermore, this concept is analysed in close relation to the problematics of land management in Maputo, from the municipal management perspective, given that land is one of the resources for promoting social housing.




Figure 2 – Conceptual framework. Source: by author.

## 1.6 Ethical concerns and limitations

The fact that I have been directly involved in the implementation of these three projects and have access to all relevant information, places me in an ambiguous ethical position in relation to the extent to which I can share information in this academic report. However, the internal evaluation report of ProMaputo is one of my main data sources, which has been made public. My deep involvement with these projects over the last four years may also influence my analysis and thinking. However, I believe that I was able to step away from an implementation position and be open to new findings. Having previously worked with some of the communities involved, there was the risk of being associated with the previous urbanisation project and creating misunderstandings about the purpose of this research report. Nonetheless, I introduced the project research and intentions very clearly, leaving no margin for misunderstanding.

My main limitations were: firstly, the difficulty in finding the community relocated in 2011. However, after several visits to the neighbourhood and with the support of the secretary of the neighbourhood it was possible to find some of those families; secondly, some of the interviews scheduled with key informants did not take place as they refused to be interviewed and others never responded to the request. As such, I had to replace some of the previously identified stakeholders with others of equal importance for this report. Thirdly, in the focus group session with the community there was some difficulty on the part of the community to respond concretely to exercises 2 and 3 due to their lack of vision and experience in relation to what may be the experiences and changes in habits of their families in living in a multi-storey building. However, I think that the entire process and the analysis of participants' behaviours, made it possible to perceive their priorities and fears about hypothetical living in a multi-storey building.

## CHAPTER II

### THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESETTLEMENT, SOCIAL HOUSING AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY



Figure 3: Photo of drainage ditch to be rehabilitated in the neighbourhood of Chamanculo C – Maputo. Source: by author, 2015.

## 2.0 Introduction:

In this chapter, through selected literature which embodies my research theme, I intend to establish a conversation between resettlement, social housing and the right to the city, looking at ways in which these topics interrelate. Such conversation is linked to the context of my case study, which is the city of Maputo.

The reading on **Resettlement** explores the global context, excavating the consequences of resettlement operations, followed by a policy analysis and critique of the international policy of the World Bank Group and the Mozambican national policy on resettlement. I conclude this subheading by presenting a reflection on the different causes and resettlement procedures in relation to the housing products, which result from resettlement operations.

In the **Social Housing** topic, I also start by presenting the overall context oriented towards developing countries. This is followed by an analysis of the type of housing products supplied by the state and the different levels of state intervention. The different social housing typologies will also be presented in relation to the resettlement's outcomes, where I introduce and justify the typology of social housing that is proposed in this research for future resettlement operations to be undertaken in Maputo. In the last subheading, I make a brief reference to the social housing supply in Maputo, presenting the context of my argument. This subject will be further elaborated in the third chapter.

The last topic delves into the concept of the **Right to the City**, analysing three dimensions: Access to Services, Participation and Appropriation. In the development of these three dimensions, I attempt to link each to the previous topics, as well as to the context of Maputo. The conclusion of this chapter summarises the interrelation between the three topics, and the importance of their integration in the production of social housing.

## 2.1 Resettlement context

In analysing involuntary resettlement, it is important to clarify the meaning of these words. According to the WB policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards, involuntary resettlement is a procedure which entails "displacement or loss of housing, loss of or access to property (timely or permanent, partial or total loss of property), loss of income or means of survival and loss of access to natural resources and their uses", where the affected person has no option to remain or continue to use the area and its resources (World Bank 2017: unpaginated). The Mozambican national policy adopts the same term, with a more positive connotation: "resettlement is aimed at boosting the socio-economic development of the country and ensuring that the affected population has a better quality of life, social equity, taking into account the sustainability of physical, environmental, social and economic aspects." (BR, 2012:324). Many authors prefer to use the word displacement instead of resettlement. In any case, displacement entails dislocation and dislocation is exposed as some kind of dispossession (Hammar, 2014). In this report, I adopt the term resettlement, used by both the WB and the national regulations, co-founders of the PROMAPUTO programme.

All kinds of resettlement caused by development projects, natural disasters, wars or persecution can lead to impoverishment, intensification of social exclusion, damages to the means of subsistence and the creation of new informal settlements, as mentioned by Cernea (2003). According to Clark (2000:1), referring to the World Bank) in 1994, more than 10 million people were displaced annually by development projects. It can be assumed that currently this number has risen in proportion to the urbanisation process's exponential growth, especially in developing countries. The "refugees of development" (Pedro, 2011) are the most vulnerable group, because they do not have an agency to protect them and defend their rights (Pedro, 2011 citing Cernea 2003). Those rights live in the hands

of projects donors, developers and governments. Pedro (2011) uses the expression “refugees from development” to characterise the people who are displaced by the implementation of investment projects located in Moatize (North of Mozambique).

One of the main concerns of the researchers regarding resettlement operations is whether the affected populations have been able to restore or improve their living conditions after being subjected to resettlement operations (Cernea, 2003, Pedro 2011). According to Cernea (1995), there are eight processes in involuntary resettlement which lead to impoverishment: 1) the risk of losing the land which is the livelihood foundation (produce farming, economic activities, daily activities, etc.); 2) joblessness, especially in urban resettlement; 3) homelessness, usually temporarily, yet which can also turn into permanent situations; 4) marginalisation, which occurs to individuals who lose their economic power, which in turn causes a reversion in their societal statuses; 5) increased morbidity as a result of stress and trauma related to the relocation process, which in turn contributes to health vulnerability; 6) food insecurity, especially during relocation; 7) “loss of access to common property” and; 8) social disarticulation, which occurs even if the resettlement implementation process was carried out properly, representing the loss of networks, social capital and kinship bonds that sustain them in critical times. In this regard, Clark (2000) adds that community fabric and the informal web of social networks is the only insurance poor people have (*ibid.*). Jorge (2016) also highlights that the resettlement implies starting a new life, usually far from the urban centre. From a less visited point of view, the author Hammar, in the African context, focuses her understanding about the economy of displacements by raising the question, “what (more) does displacement produce?” (Hammar, 2014:25). She raises attention to displacement paradoxes, which include the contradictions between: “the simultaneities of dislocation and confinement, order and disorder, loss and gain, impossibility and opportunity, rupture and chronicity, distance and proximity, nothingness and hope, destruction and creativity” (*ibid*:25).

### **2.1.1 Resettlement policies critiques**

According to Clark (2000:1), around 2000, more than 3.2 million people are facing displacement as a result of active WB Projects, which provide loans to developing countries, supposedly with the mission of poverty alleviation. In 1980, the group developed their first policy on involuntary resettlement, in order to mitigate undesirable outcomes and avoid disrupting the life of those affected by their financed projects. This policy - OP.412 – has since been the subject of several reviews (in 1994 and 2013) and critiques (Cernea, 1995).

The WB policy on involuntary resettlement defends that it does not substitute each country’s national policy on the subject. Instead, it is to be considered as an incentive for countries to develop their own policies (World Bank, 2013). Mozambique followed that incentive by approving, in 2012, the Regulation on the resettlement processes caused by economic activities as an urgent answer to the mega development projects that were occurring in the north of Mozambique and were resulting in the relocation of thousands of individuals (Jorge, 2016). Based on the WB policy principles, the Mozambican government felt the need to defend the rights of displaced individuals and saw resettlement as a driving force for economic and social development in the country, as well as an opportunity to develop and improve the living conditions of affected populations (BR, 2012).

The main critiques of the WB policy have been associated with the principle of compensation, which “fails to capture the full costs of dislocation and reestablishment, thus allowing ‘new poverty’” (Cernea, 2003:40). Compensation cannot rightly measure and quantify “capital loss”, as social assets cannot be converted into money. Therefore, it has been used as a “remedy” that does not prevent or solve the impoverishment of people (*ibid.*). Nogami (2002-3) and Clark (2000) also affirm that the methodology used to evaluate the compensation cost is not adequate. Adding to that, poor financial analysis of resettlement results in further under-financing (Cernea, 2003). Another critique is that, especially in



urban infrastructure projects that are externally funded, there is a greater distance between the beneficiaries of the built infrastructure and those affected by them, as mentioned by Nogami (2002-3). According to this author, “sharing project benefits is not just a way to gain acceptance of displacement [...] it provides an opportunity to do resettlement better” (*ibid.*:103). This presents a clear opportunity for the definition of a different approach to resettlement operations which are a result of such kinds of projects. Investment should proportionally benefit both categories – beneficiaries and the affected community. In this way, we could begin to attempt to eradicate the duality between the benefited and the benighted. Moreover, projects financed by the World Bank would be more aligned with their internal vision: “protecting the environment and the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people [...]” (Hamed, 2013:2), instead of “deny[ing] the right to persons who make the most difficult sacrifices in the name of development” (Clark, 2000:3). Cernea (2003) also highlights that “finance catch up” is unaddressed (*ibid.*:42). This means that people are not benefitting financially from the natural growth that communities experience during project implementation in comparison to the block development caused by the resettlement operation.

As a former technician in the implementation of the Maputo Municipal Development Programme (PROMAPUTO) financed by the WB, my perception is that, since its policy was designed to serve the diverse realities of different countries where its development projects are implemented, it gives rise to different interpretations due to lack specificity. In the PROMPAUTO resettlement policy framework (2010), it is specified that WB credit cannot be used to pay compensation costs directly to the population (CMM, 2010). This means that the calculated and disbursed compensation values are left in the hands of the central government and municipalities. On the one hand, this mechanism avoids corruption. On the other, it leaves populations more vulnerable to the will of politicians and programmes’ managers.

With regard to the national policy, the main critiques are associated with the omission of the “Principle of Avoiding and Minimizing Resettlements” (Human Rights Watch, 2012: unpaginated). It has also been argued that “the decree did not benefit from an adequate consultation with the main actors”, and “excluded safeguards related to access to health care, community participation, consultation, and land” (*ibid.*). Jorge (2016) refers to the unfair compensation costs, especially when losses are total and families have to be relocated to neighbourhoods in the periphery, and to the unclear criteria of the evaluation process. Additionally, Melo (2015), mentions that:

*“..., this policy has not translated into best practices, which tend to be aggravated by real estate dynamics and increasing infrastructure, as exemplified by complaints against resettlement, mainly as a result of road infrastructure projects such as the Maputo Circular and Av. Júlio Nyerere, being pointed out: incoordination and slowness, lack of information and negotiation, “false promises”, distance and lack of conditions of the resettlement site.”*

Melo (2015:136)

There is also a poor distinction between urban and rural resettlement methodologies and approaches. In weighing this legal instrument together with the regulation on the Expropriation Process for Territorial Planning (Ministerial Diploma nº 181/2010, de 3 November) (BR, 2010a), it is clear that both were created in relation to the context of the mineral resources exploitation boom of coal and gas in the north of Mozambique (Jorge, 2016), which is mainly a rural environment. As such, the national policy probably lacked knowledge and experience of urban resettlements, which began to intensify in 2013 with the implementation of urban infrastructure projects such as the construction of the Catembe Bridge (2013), the Circular Road (2015), and with the PROMAPUTO in 2016. Considering that resettlement projects are one of the main sources of top-down low-cost housing supply in Maputo (Melo, 2017), I will add that this policy is insufficiently integrated with the national housing policy

approved one year prior (2011). At present, in a context that is marked by different resettlement characteristics and demands, the regulation on resettlement is under revision by the MITADER.

### 2.1.2 Causes of resettlement, procedures and outcomes

In general, the major causes for resettlement are associated with mega development projects (e.g.: dams, exploitation of natural resources, such as gas, coal), natural disasters (e.g.: floods and cyclones), and urban renewal and infrastructure. In parallel, there are differences in the resettlement outcomes if they occur in urban or rural areas, since the resettled communities have very different needs. The outcomes of the resettlements, besides depending on their causes and geographical contexts, also vary according to the agents involved in the resettlement process, which can be the government, private companies, donors, public institutions and individuals from the community. Taking Mozambique as an example, several different resettlement processes and outcomes can be pointed out.

In Tete province, two major resettlement programs were carried out in rural context as a result of the exploitation of the Moatise and Benga mines (Pedro, 2011 and Oxfam, 2015). Both projects were implemented by private sector companies, namely Vale (Brazilian company) in the case of Moatize, and Riversdale (later purchased by Rio Tinto, then sold three years later to International Coal Ventures Limited - ICVL) in the Benga case. In the case of Moatize, about 1000 families were relocated and in Benga 736 families (*ibid.*) In both cases, families received a house with better conditions than the house they had before and public infrastructure, such as schools and health centres were built in the new locations. However, the main concerns were related to means of subsistence:

*“The farming land we received is red, not black like we had before. I tried to grow corn and it died. Sorghum also failed.... I am not that satisfied. What I can say is, what is a house without food? I cannot eat my house,” said Maria C.” (Samer Muscati/Human Rights Watch, 2012:unpaginated)*

Both projects’ Resettlement Action Plans (RAP), which is an instrument required by WB policy, were designed before the national Regulation on the Resettlement Process Resulting from Economic Activities<sup>1</sup> was released. The new location was chosen by the government and the RAPs had to be approved by the government (Pedro, 2011 and Oxfam, 2015).



Figure 4 - Photo of a new house in the Benga Resettlement. Source: By Raquel Nobre (2017).



Figure 5 - Photo of a new house resettlement in Moatise. Source: Pedro (2011).

The floods that occurred in 2000 had drastic consequences for a vast number of families in Central and Southern Mozambique, including in Maputo. In this city, the families resettled in Matendene, for example, came from at least three neighbourhoods closest to the city centre. The process was led by the CMM with the support of the NGO CARE, and other members of the civil society. The resettlement

<sup>1</sup> Regulamento sobre o processo de reassentamento resultante de actividades económicas – Translation by author



encompassed various ways by which to mitigate the negative impacts of floods, such as: (1) allocations of plots with different levels of infrastructure, where low-cost houses were also sometimes supplied; (2) in some cases, provision of financial compensation; (3) in others, transportation of goods and of the affected families to the new relocation areas; and/or (4) distribution of construction materials (Melo, 2015). According to Jorge (2016), this kind of resettlement programme tends to turn to assistance in the form of action plans, and there is a greater tendency for non-financial compensation. Undesirable outcomes such as allocation of houses to families who were not affected by floods also occurred (Melo, 2015). This process is further analysed by Melo (2015) and Jorge (2016).

In the case of urban renewal and infrastructure in Maputo (the PROMAPUTO program), the families affected by the rehabilitation of Julius Nyerere Avenue, in 2010 and in 2015, received plots in the Albasine neighbourhood, located in the outskirts of the city centre, together with financial compensation for physical losses (PROMAPUTO - Evaluation Report, 2017). As for the families affected by the requalification of the Chamanculo C neighbourhood in 2016, in addition to receiving an average 450 m<sup>2</sup> plot located in the same hosted neighbourhood (Albasine) and financial compensation, also received a small project with the typologies of houses to be built, which they were not obliged to follow. In this case, infrastructure such as a water tank, water supply to each house, public lighting, an electricity box per house and a waste collection container for daily collection was also installed. One of the motives that might have contributed to this change is the fact that during the Chamanculo C process external consultants were hired to coordinate and integrate the project, while the Julius Nyerere project was implemented by the team of the CMM alone. This subject will be developed in more detail in Chapter IV.

In infrastructure projects such the construction of the Catembe Bridge and the Circular road, the outcomes were identical to the Julius Nyerere case (land plot plus financial compensation). However, the previous resettlement plan of Catembe bridge intended to resettle part of the population in four-storey buildings located in a new neighbourhood (CMM, 2014a). This, however, never materialised. This subject will also be elaborated on in Chapter IV, since it dialogues directly with the outcomes my research project advocates for.

In summary, the literature on resettlements highlights, firstly, that resettlement can cause impoverishment (Cernea, 1995, 2003, Clark 2000, Jorge, 2016, Melo, 2015, Nogani, 2003). Secondly, the international and national policies certainly help to guide projects' implementation. Nonetheless, these need to be subjected to continuous refining and adaptation, taking into account each country's specific economic development. Thirdly, despite policy and regulation on the subject, the outcomes are diverse, and what influences the outcomes is the distinction between the causes of each resettlement project's implementation, their location – rural or urban – as well as the type of agents which lead the project – e.g. private sector versus public sector, donors versus local budgeting, municipality teams versus external consultants. It is equally important to mention that resettlement projects which deliver new housing are often a form of housing provision to the low-income population, which links such processes to the theme of social housing.

## 2.2 Social Housing context

Social housing is widely known as housing produced by state agencies or non-profit organisations for low and middle-income individuals, or with particular needs. However, public housing is also being used in similar connotation, though strictly financed through public funds (Oxford Dictionary: unpaginated). In Brazil, the term Housing of Social Interest (HIS) is most commonly used to define social housing solutions for the low-income population (Tique, 2007). However, in South Africa, social housing, despite being a product provided by the public sector in partnership with agencies certified by the government, exclusively defines affordable rental as housing on well-located land (Erwin, 2017). In Mozambique, the objective of the Direction of Urbanisation and Public Works, described in the

Organic Statute of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOHP) approved in 2010 (BR, 2010), is to promote and support programmes of social housing construction, aligned with the Fund for Housing Development (FFH)<sup>2</sup>, whose mission is also to promote the construction of real estate for social housing (BR, 1995). However, the National Policy and Strategy for Housing approved one year later, does not use the term social housing. It refers to adequate housing instead, meaning:

*“Having a roof, a private place, sufficient space, physical accessibility, security, basic infrastructure (water, electricity and sanitation), education and other facilities, social and respect for identity”.* (BR, 2011:265)

This seems to demonstrate a misalignment between institutions, although the implicit message is the same: it is important that the state finds solutions to house people of low income. In this research report, the term social housing is used for housing solutions for low-income individuals, promoted by the state or through private-public partnership. Housing for low-income individuals promoted by the private sector only fits into the category of affordable housing.

Rapid urbanisation in developing countries has not been accompanied by proportional economic growth and industrialisation. For that reason, “contemporary urbanization is characterised by poverty, at both levels, governments and households” (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017:1, citing Jenkins *et al.* 2007). Housing has been considered an indicator to measure poverty, but also a cause of poverty (Chirisa, and Matamanda, 2016) and “has long been a key policy mechanism for responding to urbanisation and urban policy” (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017:2). Local governments in Africa face major constraints in terms of staff capacity and financial resources. They also face major challenges in fulfilling their role in the management of their affairs by having to serve the interests of varied spheres (individual, public, private and political) (Chirisa, and Matamanda, 2016). It can be assumed that pressure on local governments pressure to respond and intervene will intensify in the coming years, given that, according to UN predictions, 40% of the population living in urban areas will increase to 56% in African cities by 2050 (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017:1, referring to UN 2014).

The global urban agenda of international agencies, such as UN-Habitat, now places housing as a means of urban poverty solution, and as a way of promoting more inclusive cities (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017). In Habitat I (1976), the main concern was “raising awareness of urbanisation and poverty” (*ibid.*:2) and the promotion of aid-self-help housing (Huchzermeyer, presentation ARPL7004, 2016). Twenty years later, the focus was on “prioritising policy action and promoting housing as a human right” (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017:2), calling for application of partnerships, diversification of methodologies, and more involvement of local government, as mentioned by Huchzermeyer (2016). Last year, Habitat III evolved towards a wider view, beyond the importance of services and housing provision, towards the need to advocate for the right to the city.

### **2.2.1 State housing as a social investment**

Society has shifted from a metaphysical perspective to a “state of rational and scientific knowledge” towards a scientific approach through the method of observation (Barnet, 1988:17 referring to Comte).

There are a number of forms of housing products provided by the state (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017), ranging from housing policy for the urban poor, site and services, informal settlements upgrading, land titling, social housing to mass construction of new houses (*ibid.*).

The main debate on the evolution of state housing provision started in 1950, with the inputs of architect Turner (1972), who defended state-aided self-help housing as a solution to solving rapid urbanisation in developing countries. Turner raised the concept of “housing as a verb” (1972),

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<sup>2</sup> Fundo para o Fomento da Habitação (FFH) – Translation by author

advocating for the understanding of housing as an unending activity, a process in which acknowledging the needs and priorities of individuals becomes an important asset. At this time, his contribution influenced the international approach and the WB agenda. From 1970-1980, the WB spent US\$ 211 million in 55 countries on site and services as well as slum upgrading for site and services provision (Huchzermeyer, presentation ARPL7004, 2016). In Mozambique, site and services delivered were mainly as a result of resettlement operations caused by natural disasters and urban renewals, instead of being a political and governmental will to answer housing needs (Melo, 2017).

Informal settlements' upgrading started gaining influence in 1990, specially in Latin American (Lemanski *et al.*, 2017). "Surveys of informal areas started to be included in cities' maps. More recently, popular representation of informality, like the *Favela* tour in Brazil and the *Slumdog Millionaire* movie in Mumbai, became "icons of urban informality" (Huchzermeyer, 2011:75). "This change of vision of informality as a city's ghost, to rather become an urban icon, was not adopted by all governments" (Oliveira, 2016:4). For example, South Africa adopted the concept of zero tolerance, eradication and elimination of informal settlements until late (Huchzermeyer, 2011)<sup>3</sup>. In Mozambique, slum clearance has not been adopted, partly influenced by the principles regarding land management adopted in 1979, when state nationalised the land after independence, arguing that the "use of land is a right of the Mozambican people" (BR, 1997:1). The nationalisation of land is a principle that still remains in the Land Law currently in force. Between 2013 and 2016, under the PROMAPUTO, two neighbourhoods close to Maputo's city centre were upgraded – Georg Dimitrov and Chamanculo C. These upgrading interventions were a pilot project, which was meant to serve as a model to be implemented in other neighbourhoods and to be scaled to national level.

The importance of providing secure land tenure was raised by Hernando de Soto, in 2000 (Gilbert, 2012 and Lemanski *et al.*, 2017), associated with the possibility of using property as a way to obtain a bank loan, and adding the fact that having a formal physical address creates a great impact in poverty reduction among the most disadvantaged communities. International agencies started also to make changes to their policies and adopting programmes of Land Tenure Regularisation. In Mozambique, the first programme of land tenure regularisation was launched in 2010, in the centre and north of the country, under the programme "*Acesso Seguro à Terra*" founded by Millenium Challenge Account, whereby 198 000 plots were regularised (CMM, 2013), and the second programme was launched, in Maputo, under the PROMAPUTO where 30 800 plots were regularised in nine neighbourhoods of Maputo city between 2012 to 2016 (CMM, 2017).

In many countries massive housing production has been a consequence of slum upgrading, slum eradication and urban renewal. To improve the lives of more than one billion slum dwellers, land acquisition and resettlement are required (Roquet *et al.* 2017). To ensure that the development of urban projects is not constrained by the resettlement and land acquisition, projects have to ensure that the affected individuals "become equal partners in the development process and to benefit as much from the programs as the other residents who share the urban space with them" (*ibid.* 2017:4). According to the WB, in reference to urban resettlement cases such as Daravi in India, Kibera in Kenya, and Errahma in Morocco, urban resettlement "becomes a development opportunity for those who are affected by the process of urban development" (Roquet *et al.* 2017:4).

Housing supply by the state may also be associated with middle class groups. In Angola, mass multi-storey housing supplied by the state is starting to emerge under the concept of building satellite cities on the peripheries of Luanda city (Buire, 2017), targeting this socioeconomic group. One of the most paradigmatic examples, Kilamba City, is located 30km from the city centre (*ibid.*). In Mozambique, this type of housing is scarce, and led by the private sector and the state. These initiatives also target middle-income classes and are located around 10km to 20km from the city center (Melo, 2015).

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<sup>3</sup> In 2004, a slum upgrading programme was introduced in the South African housing policy

#### Railway – Transport project

##### Mumbai - India

Public investment + international donors:  
50 m2 apartment  
In the city centre  
Slum dwellers



Figure 6 – Photo of resettlement in multi-storey buildings in Mumbai. Source: Roquet, *et al.*, 2017.

#### Programme Ville Sans Bidonville

##### Errahma - Morocco

Public investment + international donors:  
Slum dwellers



Figure 7 - Photo of resettlement in multi-storey buildings in Morocco. Source: World Bank group 2014

#### Housing development Program

##### Balderas- Ethiopia

Public investment + cities alliance  
Low-income people  
Slum dwellers



Figure 8 – Photo of public housing in Ethiopia. Source: World Bank group 2014.

In this report, I focus my research on social housing products which are provided by the state (with either state or donor funding) or by public-private partnerships, targeting low-income individuals who are the most vulnerable to resettlement operations.



Figure 9 – Photo of Casa Jovem - Maputo. Source: by author 2017.



Figure 10 - Photo of Kilamba city – Angola. Source: by Choé Buire 2015.

### 2.2.2 Social Housing Typologies

Social housing is a complex objective to achieve. This requires a multi-disciplinary approach to adequately give effect to it in integrated ways considering its diverse dimensions: social, physical, environmental and economic. It is essential to understand the cultural context and the needs of the individuals who will inhabit the space; it has to be creative in order to provide solutions restricted by low budgets; where land location plays an important role in achieving a successful response; etc. Therefore, housing typologies are expressed worldwide in different forms.

Mass multi-storey buildings are also a solution to resettle dwellers from slums, as in the case of Kibera or Dharavi, in Kenya and Mumbai respectively (Roquet *et al.* 2017). In Brazil, the “Favela Bairro Upgrading Programme” developed collective multi-storey buildings of four floors to resettle dwellers inside the favela fabric (Wakely and Riley 2010, and Jauregui: undated). In South Africa, single family units are the most used since 1994, known as RDP houses (Reconstruction Development Project), subsidised and delivery by the South African government (Kira, 2017). In Chile, incremental single family units are the typology that has been subsidised the most by the government since the 80s. Incremental housing is based on the principle of reducing the housing cost and the construction area by recognising



that low-income families are able to build and extend their houses incrementally, according to their available resources and needs (Wakely and Riley 2010) – an argument previously raised in the 70s the by architect Turner (1972).

In the last decade, incremental housing has started to receive more attention worldwide “for their successful incremental expansion design for multi-storey housing” (Vargas, 2014: unpaginated). Also, because “traditional approaches of building instant housing are too costly, socially disruptive, often culturally inappropriate and overtax scarce administrative resources” (Goethert, 2010:23). Incremental projects are not new. They were also introduced in the 1970s with “site and services/core house projects” (*ibid*: 24). However, the failure associated with that type of project at that time, according to Goethert (2010) and Wakely and Riley (2010), was related to erroneous evaluation projects which occurred only two to three years after project implementation, which were then two decades later considered a success (*ibid*.). More recently, the award of the 2016 Pritzker Prize to the Chilean architect Alejandro Aravena for his work that addresses housing in low-income communities through the incremental approach and participatory design (Fig. 12), may also have served as an encouragement to governments and developers to work towards this approach.



Figure 11 – Photo Rocinha Favela urbanisation through *in situ* social housing – Rio de Janeiro. Source: by Jorge Mario Jauregui.



Figure 12 - Photo of Quinta Monroy – incremental housing in Chile. Source: Teamcaramelo, 2015.

In Mozambique, the top-down low-cost housing supply in Maputo is numerically small. This is mainly a result of resettlement processes under which new houses are usually supplied far from previous locations, as a result of: firstly, urban renewal and road infrastructure interventions; and, secondly, natural disasters (Melo, 2017). This initially tends to result in a decrease of income generation opportunities; poor access to social and economic networks; and loss of goods (*ibid*.). However, the main low cost housing stock in Maputo is produced by self-help housing as a result of site and services provided in an incremental system, or not. In both cases the houses produced are known as “*casas evolutivas*”<sup>1</sup> (Tique, 2007).

In summary, from the social housing literature it is important to highlight the increasing need for social housing development, especially in developing countries, due to rapid urbanisation, which has not been accompanied by industrialisation. Secondly, in developing countries, governments tend to have and provide scarce human and financial resources towards housing investment. For that reason, in

Mozambique, the existent housing products are mainly a result of displacement from infrastructure construction, urban renewal or natural disasters. It is evident that governments do not have the capacity to provide solutions to a wider number of people needing housing in urban areas, especially to the low-income groups, who constitute the majority of urban inhabitants in most African contexts. Thirdly, the social investment programmes promoted by the state have been evolving over the years to several typologies ranging from self-help housing programmes, to site and services, slum upgrading or informal settlement upgrading, secure land tenure and also massive housing production and incremental housing. There is not a recommended recipe, but to my perception an incremental approach is still a social housing typology that allows maximising the number of beneficiaries with a low budget, allowing a housing extension approach in accordance with the available resources and needs of families over time. However, an incremental approach in land located far from the urban centres has been largely criticised since it restricts communities in maintaining the level of their previous living conditions and contributes to their impoverishment. Fourthly, social housing is a complex product which touches various disciplines and requires integration from diverse stakeholders and society actors, especially when it comes to the participation of the beneficiary communities. This links to the next topic, the right to the city.

### **2.3 The right to the city**

The last subject selected for literature review is the concept of the right to the city. This concept was formulated in 1968 by Lefebvre, a French philosopher. Since then, the concept has been explored by many authors and lately also adopted in the agendas of international agencies (Jorge, 2016 and Lemanski *et al.*, 2017). In the context of my research theme, taking into account the foregoing literature review on resettlement and social housing, it has become clear that both tend to neglect the right to the city in their implementation processes and outcomes. Resettlement operations, especially those caused by urban investments, entail “a process of displacement [...] [which] lie at the core of urbanisation under capitalism” (Harvey, 2008: 34). This process mostly benefits an upper middle class and impairing the low-income social classes by drawing them to areas far from the urban centre (Jenkins, 2001), excluding individuals to “the right to physically access, occupy, and use urban space” (Purcell, 2003: 103). In referring to the Maputo context, Melo (2017) takes up the same train of thought, stating that state top-down housing supply is mainly caused by displacement from urban renewal and natural disasters, which subsequently tends to “promote gentrification processes and exclude the urban poor” (2017:41).

#### **2.3.1 Dimensions of the right to city**

The right to the city entails different dimensions. Usually, the need to access services is the dimension that residents tend to associate with this concept. According to Jorge (2016), referring to the Mozambican context, residents and municipal technicians usually perceive the right to the city as being able to be near the urban centre and the opportunity to access basic infrastructure, such as public water supply and electricity, as well as collective transport systems, commercial spaces and public equipment. However, Harvey says that, “[t]he right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey, 2018: 23). This process of change entails appropriation, which is another dimension that is advocated by Lefebvre (Melo, 2017).

Melo (2017), in the context of Maputo, associates the top-down housing supply with Lefebvre’s “habitat imposed from above”, which in a capitalist mode of production usually tends to relate to “dwelling machines” located in distant peripheries (Melo, 2017, referring to Lefebvre, 2003: 81). Huchzermeyer (2013), also citing Lefebvre, says that “mass housing provides freedom [...] [and] should be granted to each individual” (Huchzermeyer, 2013: 5, citing Lefebvre), which, to my understanding, is associated with the fact that in this way low-income people have access to a safe habitat and,



therefore, shelter ceases to be a concern and a main problem for these families, and they are provided with freedom to invest in other areas and problematics of their lives. Yet, according to this same author, “massification” may also result in ignoring or forgetting the rights of the individual (*ibid.*). Such mass housing tends to have the characteristics of dormitories (Melo, 2017 and Huchzermeyer, 2013 citing Lefebvre), which neglect important features of urban life. It represents a loss of living the rhythms and dynamics of everyday life, and weakening the power of creativity, which is directly linked with “appropriation of the production of space” (Melo, 2017:45). Although the location of housing supply plays an important role in relation to the access to service, adequate social housing typology is also essential to allow the right to the city to its residents. People have to be able to be part of the space and recognise it as their space of living. It has to reflect their culture, their roots, their habits and their needs. Appropriation, in relation to the social housing typologies mentioned on previous headings, tends therefore to be more reflected in the incremental housing typology, since appropriation of the living space is made in an incremental way according to the growing needs of households and their available resources. Appropriation is not only “the right to occupy already-produced urban space, it is also the right to produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants” (Purcell, 2002:103).

Another dimension encompassed by the right to the city is participation, which is also closely related to the appropriation one.

“Participation means inhabitants increasingly coming to manage the production of urban space themselves. As they engage in real and active participation, their own collective power is revealed to them, and they increasingly understand themselves as capable stewards of urban and its collective life” (Purcell, 2013:150).

Lefebvre advocates for *autogestion* in all life dimensions, meaning that people are in charge of decision making. They play a collective managing role rather than waiting for state management (Purcell:2013). “Inhabitants contribute directly to all decisions that produce urban space in their city” (Purcell, 2002: 102); “establishing democratic management over its urban deployment” (Harvey, 2008: 37).

In the context of Maputo, an experience of such collective decision-making started in 2008 through the participatory budgeting programme at district level, financed by the WB. Nonetheless, this did not have a great impact in the city (Jorge 2016, citing Nylén 2014). The requalification of Marcelino dos Santos Avenue in Maputo, is an example of participatory budgeting (*ibid.*). However, in many resettlement operations undertaken in Maputo, community participation was not handled properly. Affected communities did not have the option or right to choose their future place of abode (Melo, 2015 and Jorge 2016). Within the dominant neoliberal economy, the state's mission is to create a good business environment: “State and its institutions are reconfigured, tending to favour private interest to the detriment of the public” (Melo, 2015:15, referring to other authors), therefore encouraging social exclusion (Jorge, 2016).

Another form of participation, which is directly linked to housing supply, is participatory design. According to the Chilean architect Aravena, participatory design is key to successful social housing responses (Aravena, 2014). People gain voice, gain collective power and are responsible for the outcome, which also contributes to a faster appropriation of the living space, and the promotion of a feeling of inclusiveness. I thus argue that participatory design fulfils the need to produce social housing through adequate design, and may contribute to mitigating the negative aspects associated with mass housing.

In summary, what I have highlighted in this section is that the right to the city is a collective right, which should be accessed by all, and experienced in three dimensions, namely access to urban services and resources, appropriation of the urban space, and participation. At present, the guidelines established

by international agencies increasingly advocate and promote some of the dimensions associated with the right to the city. Participation, it is argued by international agencies, is a way of producing the right outcomes regarding urban investments, such as slum upgrading, urban renewal, resettlement operations or housing supply. Community participation and participatory design have been advocated as key to successful interventions, especially when it involves the urban poor. In the upgrading of neighbourhoods, in state housing supply, or even in social development activities, decisions should be made in accordance with the will and the needs of its inhabitants. It is believed that when participation takes place appropriation is a natural consequence as people identify themselves with the project and/or decisions. Consequently, the outcome is a collective, inclusive and wished-for product.

## 2.4 Conclusion

Urban renewal and urban infrastructure construction usually tend to displace people. The resettlement operations that are part of these projects can intensify social exclusion and damage livelihoods, which can lead to impoverishment (Cernea, 2003). Policies on resettlement operations have been developed by international agencies, such as the WB, and national governments in an attempt to mitigate the negative impacts that resettlement can have on people. In the case of Maputo, there is a misalignment between the national resettlement policy and the national housing policy, which in turn does not contribute to better outcomes.

A great part of social housing, or state housing supply, is usually an outcome of resettlement operations, which can have different typologies depending on the country and the available resources. Mass housing supply has been used to accommodate the affected people from slum upgrading programmes. However, the mass housing typology tends to exclude people from the right to city by their peripheral location, and by its dormitory characteristics. Instead, incremental housing typology has gained more tract due to the fact that governments do not have the capacity to respond to the increasing demand for adequate housing, especially in the contexts of rapid urbanisation. The level of success of this typology tends to increase if land location is chosen by the beneficiaries, and includes participatory design. Social housing on well-located land, with access to urban services and resources, including participatory design and shared responsibility in decisions regarding residents' future living spaces, promotes appropriation of the new spaces of living, which in turn contributes to the right to city.

This chapter demonstrates the interdependent relationship between the three topics related to this report, namely resettlement, social housing and the right to the city. Resettlement tends to produce social housing products that neglect the right to the city of the affected resettled communities, due to aspects such as the distant location of the new settlements, and the top-down procedures in management and design of the housing supplied. In Maputo, where financial resources are scarce, and main state housing supply comes from resettlement operations, programmes of social housing provision become hard to implement. Considering that urban development projects or urban renewal projects usually entail resettlement operations, this research proposal is developed in terms of the argument that these projects constitute an opportunity to promote the development of *in situ* social housing. They may also allow the convergence of national and international agendas aimed at poverty alleviation by benefiting the most vulnerable communities (affected communities) and, in this way, also contribute towards achieving inclusive cities; cities which promote citizens' participation in the production of urban spaces and thus towards achieving the right to the city to all.

## CHAPTER III

### RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS, LAND MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL HOUSING IN THE CONTEXT OF MAPUTO



Figure 13 – Aerial photo of Polana Caniço A neighbourhood - Maputo. Source: Casa Minha.com

### 3.0 Introduction:

Based on the reflections of the second chapter on the general panorama concerning the topics on resettlement, social housing and the right to the city, this chapter focuses on understanding the context/background of Maputo city where the resettlements — the case studies — undertaken in terms of the PROMAPUTO was implemented. In order to help the reader understand the context of the case studies, I begin the chapter by highlighting some particularities of the Maputo economy and urban context.

Starting with land management, in order to understand how land is managed in Maputo, and what the critiques and constraints associated with that process are. The second topic consists of an overview of the content and objectives of PROMAPUTO, which will help the reader to place the resettlement operation being studied within the context of PROMAPUTO. I further elaborate on the three resettlement operations undertaken as a result of the three major urban works of PROMAPUTO, and finalise with a synthesis of the differences in processes and results between the three resettlement operations.

In the last topic I will explore the subject of social housing in Maputo, firstly by understanding what kind of social housing products exist in Maputo; secondly, in the sequence of the scarcity of social housing products, I highlight what the impediments to the implementation of the housing policy in Maputo are. In the last subheading, I reflect on the housing products which arose as a result of the PROMAPUTO, and I give examples of the few cases of private investment in *in situ* multi-storey housing. This chapter ends with a synthesis of the Maputo context and the PROMAPUTO, and raises some questions to be developed in the next chapter.

### 3.1 Land management

#### 3.1.1 Mozambique and Maputo - synthesis of the historical and urban contexts

Mozambique has long been considered one of the poorest countries in the world, always dependent on international aid (Jenkins, 2000). However, the discovery of natural gas in the last decade turned Mozambique into an attractive country for investment. It is estimated that by 2025 Mozambique will have the “largest LNG (liquefied natural gas) plant” (Bradford and Puri, 2015: unpaginated). The discovery and exploitation of natural resources has promoted a few years of rapid economic growth but in 2016 the discovery of a hidden public debt worth \$US 2,2 billion led to a depreciation of the country’s currency (the Metical), which put the country in a crisis situation, generating some retraction and distrust among donors and foreign investors (FMI, 2016). Mozambique continues to be a country with huge development potential, but the high level of corruption and bad governance are critical factors mitigating against generating investor confidence and raising the country to a stable and evolving situation (CMI, 2016).

Shortly after independence from the Portuguese colonisers in 1975, the country entered a devastating civil war that lasted 16 years (Jenkins, 2000 and UNHABITAT, 2010). During and after the war (1976 - 1992), cities, and especially the capital, Maputo, suffered great urban pressure generated by the migration of people seeking safety, opportunities, employment and access to services, such as education and health. Many of these internal migrants settled in informal settlements (*ibid.*). The 2007 national census reported that 70% of the Maputo city territory is occupied by informal settlements (known by other names in different countries, for example, as slums in English speaking countries, *bidonville* in French speaking countries, and *Favela* as used in Brazil. Informal settlements usually have a negative connotation, and are associated with opposition to the formal legal sphere, where occupation and ownership is beyond the regulatory mechanisms established by law (Melo, 2015



referring to Huchzermeyer, 2006b; Laguerre, 1994; Myers, 2011). According to Laguerre (1994), the concept of informal in the African context was adopted “during the colonial era, [when] the colonialists imposed on the natives a new legal system, thereby making the natives’ legal system ‘informal’ ” (Melo, 2015:45 referring to Laguerre, 1994, p.13).

Jenkins (2004), following the same line of thought, add that in Mozambique the formal system was inherited from the colonising regime without revision by government since they benefited an elite. The author also argued that the dichotomy between formal and informal concepts is reductive, since the simple definitions of formal versus informal does not portray the dynamics of the Mozambican context, since informal mechanisms often offer some legitimacy because they provide a sense of security, and because informality also operate inside formal system. In the neighbouring country Tanzania, the informal concept has a connotation associated with the lack of influence of the public sector's formal planning and development (Burra, 2004).

This report does not aim to deepen the existent dichotomy between the concepts of formal versus informal, but intends to clarify the reason for their adoption. In the same line of thought, where previously the concept of resettlements was used instead of displacement, the same intention applies to the informal concept, by arguing that since, informal was adopted early in the elaboration of the Mozambican City Structures Plans, it is a concept which is understandable and used in all the Mozambican contexts – academically, societally and politically. In Maputo, the informal settlements are usually divided In Maputo, the Informal settlements in Maputo are usually divided in two categories, namely the planned, which means that the area or neighbourhood is ordered but do not have regularised occupation; and the not officially planned, characterised by spontaneous occupation, usually associated with disorder (see fig. 17). The majority of the low-income population lives in these informal settlements (CMM, 2016). These informal settlements in Maputo are usually characterised by poor basic infrastructure supply, such as water, sanitation, electricity, solid waste collection, and drainage network.

Most of these settlements have not gone through a formal process to acquire a property or DUAT title – the document granted by the municipality that assigns the right to land use (CMM, 2016). In 1990 and in 1997, the approval of the Constitution and Land Law, respectively, granted the right to the Mozambican people to occupy its land. Land in Mozambique was nationalised in 1979 in terms of the argument that the “use of land is a right of the Mozambican people” (BR, 1979: 1). So, by law, the land could not be sold, alienated or mortgaged (*ibid.*). At the same time, in 1976, the state governed by the Frelimo party, decided to nationalise the housing stock inherited from the colonial era (Barros *et al.*, 2013 referring to the Decree-Law nº 5/1976, in Raposo 2007). Despite the large areas of informal settlements in Maputo, slum clearance has not been adopted, in part influenced by the social principles of land management, which still remains in force under the current Land Law.

Maputo is still characterised by a “dualistic structure”, with a rich town and a poor town, “Where the rich town [is] characterised by tall buildings and a poor town characterised by small houses” (Barros *et al.*, 2013: 74 referring to Jenkins 2000a), mainly of ground floor level. Despite the fact that there are several initiatives for urbanisation and different interventions for residential condominiums destined for the higher income classes, along the coastal strip and on the northern boundary, and the middle class housing projects are located only in the expansion areas of the city (Jorge and Melo, 2014), such as the Casa Jovem and the Zimpeto complex, this kind of physical duality structure inside the city persists and is associated with unclear hierarchies of land rights attribution has been the result of several critiques regarding the land management system, as developed in the next section.






Figure 14 – Photo of Radisson Towers. – Rio de Janeiro.  
Source: Maputo city images – facebook.



Figure 15 - Maputo city aerial photo - by author 2012.




Figure 16 - Satellite image of Maputo's informal settlements. Source: CMM, 2016

### 3.1.2 Critiques on the land management process

Over the last two decades the instruments of land management have been strengthened with the approval of a new national land policy, followed by the Land Act, the Land Act Regulation and the Regulation of Urban Land (Jorge, 2016). In addition to the new regulations, other land management instruments were developed, such as the Maputo City Structure Plan (PEUMM), and 20 partial urbanisation plans (PPU)<sup>4</sup>, as well as an intervention methodologies manual for informal settlements and land regularisation procedures, under the PROMAPUTO (CMM, 2017). However, despite the improvement of regulatory instruments, the land management processes have been the object of diverse critiques.

According to Jenkins (2001), land management and land market have been dominated by the particular needs of some individuals with economic and political power, while urban and social concerns have been left to a second plan. The author argues that “[it] has to be oriented towards a society-driven urban development policy”, instead of “state-or-market-driven policy” (Jenkins, 2001:646). According to Barros *et al.* (2013), in a government which depends on international aid, the management of public services tend to be characterised as a situation “where individuals seek to derive their own personal benefits from their position to the detriment of the public interest” (Barros *et al.*, 2013: 82). Jorge (2016), referring to other authors, asserted that “Frelimo assumes today an authoritarian and undemocratic contour, with implications for compliance with the principle of equal access and use of land” (Jorge, 2016: 131). Public interests are subordinated to private interests (*ibid.*)

According to the constitution, the right to use land should be free of charge; however, a high rate of taxes are applied (Anjo, 2011). At the end of 2014, the Maputo Municipal Council (CMM), under the PROMAPUTO and within the scope of the Massive Regularisation Programme of DUATs (RMD), planned to review the Posture on the Right to Use of Urban Land (DUAT) approved in 2003 (Resolution 115 / AM / 03 of October 30). The baseline study identified that in the outskirts of the city the capacity for residents to pay the DUATs is low, and therefore there was the need to revise the rates in order to attend the availability and capacity for the DUAT payment. As we can see on table 1, the main changes in the proposal, combined the criteria related to the level of urbanisation/infrastructure and the location (central and peripheral zones). There is a marked decline in the cost of basic urbanisation from 75Mt/m<sup>2</sup> to 6,225 MT/m<sup>2</sup>, and the introduction of an intermediate level of urbanisation (CMM, 2014). This exercise demonstrates, on the part of the municipality of Maputo, an interest in adjusting according to the needs of the population, with the aim of providing a service to the community in the certainty that it will be paid for and generate income for the municipal finances.

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<sup>4</sup> - In 2009: PPU Maguanine A, B e C; PPU Ferroviário, Laulane, Mahotas e 3 de Fevereiro; PPU Zimpeto; PPU Albasine (1 bairro); In 2011: Em 2011: PPU Maxaquene A; PP Maguiguana in Costa do Sol neighbourhood; 2012: Em 2012: PPU KaTembe (Inguide, Chali, Chamissava and Incassane neighbourhood's); In 2013: PPU Costa do Sol; PPU 25 de Junho A; In 2014: PPU de Xipamanine; PPU de Chamanculo D; Em 2015: PPU Baixa; PPU Marginal; PPU Polana Caniço A e B; In 2016: PPU George Dimitrov (only 100ha of the 400ha) and PPU Malhazine (CMM,2017).



|                 | PREVIOUS SITUATION      |                            | PROPOSAL               |                           |                       |
|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
|                 | SOCIAL FIELD            |                            |                        |                           |                       |
|                 | 250 MT/m <sup>2</sup>   |                            | 250 MT/m <sup>2</sup>  |                           |                       |
| Central zone    | With Infrastructure (A) | Without Infrastructure (B) | Basic Urbanisation     | Intermediate urbanisation | Urbanisation Complete |
|                 | 100%                    | 75%                        | 80%                    | 90%                       | 100%                  |
|                 | 250 MT/m <sup>2</sup>   | 187,5 MT/m <sup>2</sup>    | 200 MT/m <sup>2</sup>  | 225 MT/m <sup>2</sup>     | 250 MT/m <sup>2</sup> |
| Peripheral zone | With Infrastructure (A) | Without Infrastructure (B) | Basic Urbanisation     | Intermediate urbanisation | Urbanisation Complete |
|                 | 30%                     | 5%                         | 2.5%                   | 30%                       | 50%                   |
|                 | 75 MT/m <sup>2</sup>    | 12,5 MT/m <sup>2</sup>     | 6,25 MT/m <sup>2</sup> | 75 MT/m <sup>2</sup>      | 125 MT/m <sup>2</sup> |

Table 1: Proposal for DUAT rate changes. Source: CMM, 2014.

The fact that the land sale market is unregulated, offers fewer guarantees, especially in the informal market, which in turn makes a mockery of the system. Individuals are at the mercy of market speculation, which discourages residents from completing the regularisation process (Mazzolini, 2017). This practice is also to be found at local government level. The secretary of the neighbourhood and the heads<sup>5</sup> of blocks, are often responsible for land distribution and, in many cases, also act as land brokers (Melo, 2015, referring to Tique, 2009). The CMM has been trying to combat this practice through sensitisation and training.

Another critique is related to the long and unclear bureaucratic processes and the weak institutional capacity of municipalities (Anjo, 2011), which is partly responsible for the extremely slow and complex process of gaining access to land and of registration of housing (Mazzolin, 2017). In this context, the PROMAPUTO has tried to promote the simplification of the steps required to obtain the Right to Use the Land (DUAT) and to register property, having proposed in 2016 the revision of the DUAT posture<sup>6</sup>. Article 58 of this posture revision proposal refers to the treatment of applications for the right to use and benefit from land received from 1 September 1998 until 31 December 2001. It defines that those cases shall be submitted for the deliberations of the Municipal Council in a proportion of 2/3 of the cases for deliberation at home sessions, beginning with the requests of the earliest date (CMM, 2014). This should mean that a maximum of three cases will be solved per week. This obviously justifies the criticism regarding the length of time and weak municipal capacity to respond to requests. It's also in terms of this argument that in the definition of the monitoring indicators of PROMAPUTO the reduction of time for the DUAT attribution has been defined as a complementary key programme indicator. The Land tenure programme under PROMAPUTO started from a baseline of 150 days in 2011, and finalised in 2017 with an average of 40 days. However, this exercise is applicable only for DUAT regularisation and not for DUAT attribution, since available land is now scarce in Maputo (CMM, 2017). "The population in Maputo far exceeds the available land, leading to great land pressures, rapid land degradation, soil erosion, and increased vulnerability to disaster" (UNHABITAT, 2010: 19).

The dysfunctionalities of territorial land management and planning are also due to the fact that there is a vast number of institutions and actors that interact in the management of territory, such as MINAG (Ministry of Agriculture), DINOTER (National Directorate for Territorial Planning and Resettlements), MITADER (Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development). Other actors are the municipalities, district secretariats, and community leaders. "These institutions are part of a system that includes both formal and informal steps, widely recognized and rooted in the process of access to land. The lack of

<sup>5</sup> - In Maputo, the neighbourhoods are managed by local governance structures, constituted by the secretary of the neighbourhood and the block chiefs of the neighbourhoods. These last ones are under the authority of the secretary of the district, and the secretary of the district, in turn, reports to the councilman of the municipal district.

<sup>6</sup> - Posture on the Right to Use and Use of the Soil, attached to this Resolution of which it is an integral part - Resolution 115 / AM / 2003, of October 30, submitted for CMM approval and later to the municipal assembly in 2016.

coordination between them, and the overlapping responsibilities between municipal and provincial authorities leads to dysfunctional planning, which results in blurred and overlapping responsibilities among them" (Mazolinni, 2017).

In the last decade, Maputo has been the subject of structural urban interventions, such as the Catembe bridge across Maputo bay, linking Maputo city to Catembe by road, as well as the Circular Road which is the first ring belt around the city, and aims to improve the flow of traffic inside and around the city. These urban investments, mainly promoted in partnerships between municipalities and government with external private partners, are creating disparities among social classes, as they benefit mostly the upper social classes directly that already have the appropriate means with which to make use of such infrastructure. However, low-income residents also benefit from this since public transport also has created new routes, and reaches more sites more easily. On the other hand, Municipality and Governments, by using the power of public expropriation, are dragging the poorest social class to the outskirts of the city through resettlement operations. Communities see themselves being forced to move to more distant areas where the municipality assigned alternative plots (Jorge, 2016 and Melo, 2015 and Anjo, 2011). The case study of this report will be looking into this problematic with regard to the resettlement operations, which took place within the PROMAPUTO program.

### 3.2 Resettlement operations under the Maputo Municipal Development Programme's PROMAPUTO

#### 3.2.1 PROMAPUTO's context

In order to contextualise my case study, it is key to understand what the scope of the programme was where the resettlement actions are embedded, and that they were a result of the major urban interventions that occurred in Phase II. The PROMAPUTO is a ten-year programme which started in 2006, lasted until 2015 and was then extended to 2017. It is divided in two phases and was funded by the WB (\$US 30 million for Phase I and \$US 50 million for Phase II, for a total of \$US 80 million), the Central government (\$US 15 million), and the WB together with the Maputo Municipality (\$US 40 million). The Development Objective of PROMAPUTO is to improve the supply priority municipal services to the citizens and promote their sustainability, as well as strengthen the institutional and financial municipal capacity.

The programme was structured in five components with the following objectives:

| Component                                         | Objectives                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Component A:<br/>Institutional Development</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organisational development</li> <li>• Staff training and human resources management</li> <li>• Transparency of CMM plans, Reports and Report Card</li> <li>• Anti-corruption actions</li> <li>• District focus for the planning and management of selected services</li> <li>• Increase in the number and quality of Public Private Partnerships (PPP)</li> </ul> |
| <b>Component B:<br/>Financial Sustainability</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased collection of the Municipal Property Tax (IPRA) through revaluation of properties</li> <li>• Tax Campaigns and Effective Implementation of SIGEF</li> <li>• Introduction of medium-term expenditure framework</li> <li>• Consolidation a single Procurement unit</li> </ul>                                                                             |
| <b>Component C:<br/>Urban Planning</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase coverage of local urban plans</li> <li>• Attribution of title deeds in <u>peri-urban</u> areas</li> <li>• Improving informal settlements</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

|                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Component D:<br/>Urban Infrastructure<br/>Investment and<br/>Maintenance</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehabilitation of Av. Julius Nyerere</li> <li>• Improvement of roads and secondary drainage</li> <li>• Increased maintenance of dirt roads in <u>peri-urban</u> areas</li> </ul>                                                                                         |
| <b>Component E: Metropolitan<br/>Development</b>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improvement of quality and collection coverage of Urban Solid Waste (RSU)</li> <li>• Sustainable cost recovery of MSW collection services</li> <li>• Preparation for the closure of the MSW deposition site</li> <li>• Elaboration/implementation of the plan</li> </ul> |

Table 2: Table with the description of objectives of each component. Source: Translated from CMM (2017: 6).

The three infrastructure urban works were implemented in terms of components C and D. In terms of Component D the first phase of the rehabilitation of Av. Julius Nyerere (June 2015 to June 2016) was completed. This is one of the main avenues, and crosses the city from South to North. In terms of Component C, the paving works of Av. Amaral Matos and drainage in the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood were performed (July 2015 to July 2017), as well as the upgrading works of the George Dimitrov Neighbourhood (May 2015 to August 2016). This is illustrated on the map below.



Figure 17 – Location map of the intervention areas of the urbanisation projects of the PROMAPUTO and respective resettlement area. Source: Google Earth. Image edited by author, 2017.

- Administrative limit of Maputo city
- - - Maputo City Urban Centre
- Intervention areas of the urbanisation projects under the PROMAPUTO program.
- Resettlement site : Albasine neighbourhood's:
  - 10 km away from site intervention A
  - 14 km away from site intervention B
- A - Requalification of Julius Nyerere Avenue.
- B - Requalification of Chamanculo C neighbourhood's.
- C - Requalification of George Dimitrov neighbourhood's.



While I will not describe in detail the urban interventions carried out under the PROMAPUTO, it is important to understand their nature in order to comprehend the respective resettlement processes carried out in each of them.

The first phase of the rehabilitation of Julius Nyerere Avenue was one of the main works developed under the PROMAPUTO. An extension of four kilometres was rehabilitated, including the rehabilitation of the *Praça do destacamento feminino* - Square of the Female Detachment. In addition to the original design project, emergency drainage works were needed in order to ensure the stabilisation of the slopes along the Avenue. This project allowed the reduction of travel time between this Square and the *Praça dos Combatentes*, Combatants Square, from 45 minutes (2011) to 7 minutes. This infrastructure provided more options to enter and exit the City and increased the real estate value along the road (CMM, 2017).

The upgrading intervention of informal settlements in the neighbourhood of Chamanculo C consisted of solving flooding and drainage issues. One of the main roads in the neighbourhood was paved, the drainage canal that crosses the uppermost district to the lowest elevation was rehabilitated and a new drainage ditch was built to relieve the pressure of the water that was collected in the main drainage canal. In addition to this intervention, a septic tank was built for the residents, adjacent to the central drainage canal, so as to avoid draining the sewage into the storm drainage ditch (CMM, 2017).

The upgrading project for the neighbourhood of George Dimitrov (physical, social and environmental) is the result of what was learnt from as well as the applicability of the steps prescribed in the methodological manual of intervention in informal settlements, also produced under PROMAPUTO. This intervention involved the preparation and implementation of several preliminary studies. The priority works in this neighbourhood, selected by its own community, were to address: 1) the access to the neighbourhood through paving; 2) the flooding of the primary school and the informal soccer field; 3) the drainage problems along the roads; 4) the problem of lack of security through the implementation of lighting, and 5) the environmental issues, through the introduction of a waste collection route inside the neighbourhood (CMM, 2017).




Table 3: Synthesis of the three interventions illustrated by way of maps. Source: Based on CMM 2010a, 2015 and 2015b), edited by author.

### 3.2.2 PROMAPUTO resettlements operations

Within the scope of the PROMAPUTO, as outlined in Chapter II, a resettlement policy framework was developed, which defines and guides the resettlement actions of the programme. In addition to having to follow the guidelines of the environmental and social safeguards policy of the WB, the programme is obliged to also follow the national resettlement policy.

### 3.2.3 Julius Nyerere resettlement plan

The Julius Nyerere Avenue studies started in 2010. The CMM contracted a consultant for the preparation of the environment impact study and the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) (CMM, 2017a). The RAP identified a total of 63 families affected by the interventions, of which 43 would be affected in totality (loss of property and land) and the others would be only partially affected (piece of land and/or a part of the infrastructure). The buildings affected were of low quality, made of cement blocks and sand, reed and covered with zinc plates and other precarious materials; none of the constructions obeyed the basic rules of construction and their owners did not have registration documents in the CMM (CMM, 2010a). The families surveyed, most of them had incomes, one part of which came from informal commerce and the other consisted of minimum wages, since most of the members of the working families were security guards or night guards (*ibid.*). According to the field survey carried out by the consultant hired by the municipality - GEO, the average area of the dwellings varied between 17 m<sup>2</sup> and 36 m<sup>2</sup> and the maximum area of the plots was 150 m<sup>2</sup> (*ibid.*). Of the 43 houses visited, 39 had latrines. Other families shared their neighbours' latrines to meet their needs. Of the total number of families surveyed, six had a tap in the yard and the remaining households collected water from their neighbours. Only 13 had electricity and the rest were not connected to the electricity grid.

The main concern presented by the community during the 1<sup>st</sup> public hearing was related to:

- . Location where they would be resettled.
- . When they would be moved.
- . Who would build the new dwellings.
- . When, and how they would be compensated financially.
- . When would begin the rehabilitation works (*ibid.*).

The delay in the execution of the work led the CMM to make several revisions of the executive project and, consequently, of additional works. Therefore, it became necessary in the last two years (2015-2017) to make several revisions of the initial RAP in order to include new families later installed on the roadside embankments that were at risk of collapsing, and also to respond to aspects related to environmental and social safeguards policies. Those revisions of the RAP were done by the CMM internal team. This addendum to the RAP also included newly affected families from the complementary drainage works and the emergency works of Ravina III (not foreseen in the original project). The implementation of this addendum to the RAP, also included the relocation of 199 informal vendors located at the end of the Julius Nyerere Avenue to the requalified Mucoreano market in order to guarantee improved working conditions for them.

| Year | Number of families affected                                        | Nº/families received new plot - DUAT | Nº of families /received financial compensation | Resettlement location                                     |
|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 2010 | 63 Families located at the edge of the slopes                      | 43                                   | 63                                              | Albasine Neighbourhood – 10 km far from previous location |
| 2015 | 15 Families located at the edge of the slopes (new constructions)  | 7                                    | 15                                              | Chiango Neighbourhood - 10 km far from previous location  |
| 2016 | 18 Families located at the edge of the slopes at <u>Ravina III</u> | 0                                    | 18                                              | NA                                                        |
| 2016 | 5 Families with infrastructure overlapping sidewalks               | 0                                    | 5                                               | NA                                                        |
| 2017 | 1 Family affected by the floods 16.01.2017                         | 1                                    | 1                                               | Unknown                                                   |
| 2017 | 199 vendors                                                        | NA                                   | NA                                              | <u>Mucoreano</u> Market – 300 m from previous location    |

Table nº 4: Synthesis of the resettlement process of the Julius Nyerere project, (CMM, 2017). Edited by author. Note: Not applicable (NA) - Families received financial compensation for the partial loss of dwelling infrastructures, but they were not resettled.

The Julius Nyerere Avenue rehabilitation project was implemented by internal council members only – no external technicians were hired.



Figure 18: Map of the area of influence of the Julius Nyerere Avenue rehabilitation project. Source: CMM, 2010a.



### 3.2.4 Chamanculo C resettlement plan

The studies and the intervention at the social level in Chamanculo C neighbourhood started in 2012, funded by the Italian Cooperation, the Brazilian Cooperation and Cities Alliance. However, the construction work only began in 2015. The paving work (1500 meters) of Amaral Matos Avenue – one of the main avenues of the neighbourhood connected to the National Road 1, which links the north and south of the country – was funded by the WB, and the rehabilitation of the central drainage was funded by the Italian Cooperation.

The municipality contracted a consultant to carry out the Environmental Impact Studies (WB funds) and the respective RAPs (Cities Alliance funds). The Chamanculo C project was managed by a team of external consultants. The CMM hired five technicians. The engineering project design was developed by the internal team of the infrastructure department (CMM, 2016 and 2017).

The implementation of the pavement project of Av. Amaral Matos and reconstruction of the existing drainage ditch in Chamanculo C not only included the relocation of existent public infrastructures of electricity, communications and water but also affected the dwellings of the population residing in the neighbourhood, through the displacement of fences, houses and tents in a total of 57 partial affectations and the displacement of 17 families to Chiango, in Albasine.



Figure 19 – Chamanculo satellite image superimposed on the drainage ditch plan (CMM,2015b).

The partially affected families (thought the demolition of fences, walls, toilets etc.) were compensated through the construction of new walls, aligned according to the new road layout. The families that were resettled 14km away, in addition to financial compensation, also received a plot of about 450 m<sup>2</sup>, with the respective Title of Use of Land (DUAT) (CMM, 2016a and 2017).

Since the resettlement site did not have the conditions described in the WB's social and environmental safeguards policy, the WB finalised the implementation of additional infrastructure at the resettlement satellite, such as the construction of water tanks and their domestic pipeline, installation of electricity and public lighting and the daily collection of solid waste. The RAP was carried out between July 2014 and February 2015 and the families were resettled in the Albasine District in March 2015.



Figure 20 - Water supply system and the machinery room on the resettlement site. Source: CMM, 2016a.



Figure 21 – Water tap in the yard of a resettled family. Source: CMM, 2016a.



Figure 22 - Electric system and public lighting on the resettlement site. Source: CMM, 2016a.



Figure 23 - Self-construction housing of a resettled family. Source: CMM, 2016a.

### 3.2.5 George Dimitrov Resettlement Plan

The studies for the requalification of informal settlements in George Dimitrov started in the middle of 2013, and the site works in April 2015. Due to the fact that the project had to be finalised (developed and implemented) within two years, the choice of works, taking into account this limited timeframe, purposefully did not lead to physical resettlement of people, a collective decision taken with the community and the implementing team. The selected priority works for this community were the introduction of a drainage system, paved access to the neighbourhood, the improvement of the primary school, which flooded in the rainy season, and the requalification of a public space through the introduction of a playground and a community centre.

Although there was no physical resettlement, a resettlement plan was drawn up by a consultant in order to identify and estimate the area and number of families affected by the construction of the one-way access road within a 2.1 km stretch.






Figure 24: Satellite image indicating the level of affectation. Source: CMM, 2015.


In total, 23 items of infrastructure (such as walls, bathrooms, kitchens and septic tanks, included in the builder's contract) were affected and 186 vendors were temporarily relocated within the intervention area. The compensation mechanisms implemented were: (1) the reconstruction of the infrastructure affected, (2) and monetary compensation for the demolition of fruit trees (CMM, 2015 and 2017). For the implementation of this project, the CMM contracted consultants who carried out all the necessary studies as well as hiring two external technicians to coordinate the implementation project.



Figure 25: Photo of rebuilt walls after the new road boundaries were established in G.Dimitrov Neighbourhood. Source: By author, 2016.

### 3.2.6 Summary of PROMAPUTO resettlements operations

In summary, the three resettlements gave rise to different results, as we can see in the graphic 1. The families resettled in 2012 and 2015 in the rehabilitation project of Julius Nyerere in addition to financial compensation received a plot title (DUAT) 10 km away from their place of origin. These plots did not have water or electricity. The last families to be resettled in 2017 were not given a DUAT but rather higher monetary compensation – above the value established by the law – since the resettlement was carried out by a private investor. This was due to the fact that the WB had refused the resettlement site proposed by the municipality, as this did not meet the necessary conditions (land infrastructure - access to land, water and electricity). According to the ProMaputo evaluation report (CMM, 2017), Maputo lacks infra-structured land to accommodate more resettlements. In the Chamanculo C intervention, despite the initial budget for the resettlement of families, the funder later demanded complementary actions to improve housing conditions in the resettlement site. The WB requested and financed the: i) high water tanks and the domestic water supply system installation; ii) built the PT for the electric energy supply and public lighting in the neighbourhood; and iii) gave to the community some prototype housing plans to facilitate self-construction. In George Dimitrov, the option of resettling people was discarded from the beginning, in order to ensure the highest degree of community ownership and satisfaction, and to meet the project's timescale.



Graphic 1 - Resettlement operations under the PROMAPUTO. Link between the duration of project implementation, type of resettlement operation and number of families relocated in each intervention. Source: by author.

Considering that the three projects were guided by the same policies (the Regulation on the Resettlement Process Resulting from Economic Activities<sup>7</sup> and WB Operational Manual OP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement), and implemented by the same institution (CMM), this raises the question: what are the facts and reasons that led to different outcomes within the same programme? The national Regulation on the Resettlement Process Resulting from Economic Activities, in article 16, describes the six stages of how resettlement should be done: i) a plot with land title and access to basic infrastructure (access, sanitation, water, electricity) or a 70m<sup>2</sup> three bedroom house; ii) the houses should be built with conventional materials; iii) during construction the destruction of the vegetation should be prevented; iv) the new host areas should guarantee subsistence activities or define programmes to generate income; v) the resettlement process should be followed by the construction of roads, water supply, sanitation, electricity, and guarantee access to health, education, culture,

<sup>7</sup> - Regulamento sobre o Processo de Reassentamento Resultante de Actividades Económicas – Translation by author.



sports, and community gathering; and lastly, vi) should ensure that there are areas for agricultural practice and livestock (BR, 2012). Neither of the two resettlements described above included all the conditions established by law. The same occurs in relation to the WB operation manual on Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) (World Bank, 2013). According to this manual, land-based strategies, should be a preferable style of delivery, however, when land is not available, “non-land-based options” [...] “should provide in addition to cash compensation”, [...] “opportunities for employment or self-employment” (WB, 2013: unpaginated). The WB made no objection with regard to both PARs of Chamanculo C and Julius Nyerere in both 2015 and 2016 to proceeding with the implementation. The last five families resettled in 2017 from Ravina III at the Julius Nyerere rehabilitation project only received financial compensation and did not benefit from any other additional measures. Once the programme was completed the CMM proceeded with resettlement implementation without the need for approval from the funder. These situations evidence a mismatch between what is foreseen in existing policies and resettlement practices in which the will and level of awareness of leaders and borrowers’ agencies tend to be more influential. This led me to conclude that the outcomes of resettlements are not a result of policies but, actually, a consequence on the awareness and will of the leaders of the implementation and the borrowers’ agencies. At the end of resettlement operations, it is incredibly difficult to measure the quality of the housing products. Those five displaced families who received cash compensation (level 1) at present cannot be traced, and as such it is not possible to confirm if they were actually able to restore their living conditions. The analysis of the resettlements outcomes will be explored in the next chapter, using the data collected from the field work.

### 3.3 Social housing in Maputo

The national Housing policy and Strategy<sup>8</sup> was approved in 2011. Jenkins and Tique mention a housing policy referring back to 1992, (Melo, 2015) and CAHF (2016), in their annual report, also mention the first national housing policy of 1992 that has never been approved. However, the Republic Newsletter<sup>9</sup>, published in June 2011, which approved the national Housing Policy and Strategy, does not mention or make any reference to any previous policy. In this report, the housing policy refers to the Housing Policy approved in 2011.

In Mozambique, the housing sector is managed by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and Water resources<sup>10</sup> (MOPHRH), through two governmental organisations with specific housing mandates: the National Direction of Housing and Urbanisation (DNHU)<sup>11</sup> and the Fund for Housing Development (FFH)<sup>12</sup> (CAHF, 2016). DNHU is responsible for the development of the housing policy as well as combating the related political and institutional obstacles encountered in the implementation of the policy (*ibid.*). Meanwhile, the FFH is the state’s implementing agency which seeks to increase the country’s housing stock and meet its housing deficit. At present this is done through private-public partnerships. The FFH was created in 1995 through decree no. 24/1995, with the intention of promoting housing programmes, especially for the low-income population and young qualified technicians through governmental budgeting which would be based on the sale of state properties (Tique, 2007). However, in 2010, the FFH changed its target group towards a wider market in terms of the argument that the middle class also lacked adequate housing, and that with the income raised from housing product sales they could promote low-income housing. FFH also became financially autonomous by focusing on developing public-private partnerships instead of waiting for the strained

<sup>8</sup> - Política e Estratégia de Habitação – Translation by author

<sup>9</sup> - Boletim da República (BR) - Translation by author

<sup>10</sup> - Ministério das Obras Publicas e Habitação e Recursos Hídricos (MOPHRH) - Translation by author

<sup>11</sup> - Direção Nacional de Habitação e Urbanização” (DNHU) - Translation by author

<sup>12</sup> - Fundo Fomento Habitação (FFH) - Translation by author

state budget (Tique, 2007 and Melo, 2015). However, at present Mozambique has a backlog of 2 million housing units (CAHF, 2016, citing FFH).

With regard to the issue of housing for the most underprivileged populations, and the difficulties in responding to existing needs at this level, two aspects that will be developed in the following subheading stand out: on the one hand policies and impediments to their implementation and, on the other, the practices of these institutions.

### **3.3.1 Impediments to the implementation of the housing policy with regard to housing for lower-income groups**

The national housing policy and strategy is a wide document which defines the principals to promote and create the access to housing for all social groups. "The main objective of the housing strategy is to progressively increase the quantity and quality of housing through the use of locally available resources and the capacity building of the various stakeholders in the sector" (BR, 2011: 265). With regard to housing promotion for low-income people, the policy also encourages and supports self-help construction. FFH, as the implementation agency, has the responsibility to implement it through two approaches: 1) by giving land with adequate infrastructure; and, 2) by promoting strategies that will help reduce the cost of construction materials (Mazzolini, 2017). The policy also makes recommendations, such as the need to align with inter-sectorial policies and participation of different sectors of society; calling for the promotion of local building materials and identification of financial resources (Melo, 2015). However, despite the approval of the national housing policy and strategy, the country has not seen relevant action towards its implementation, perhaps due to the fact that the policy and strategy is a non-operational document, which does not identify the means necessary for its implementation.

On 5 April 2017, the MOHP, in partnership with UN Habitat, promoted a workshop to: (1) give visibility to the existent policy and foster debate among new actors about the implementation process; (2) identify and find solutions towards helping and promoting policy implementation; and (3) identify institutional and financial strategic implementation lines which could accelerate housing policy implementation (Mazzolini, 2017.). According to the results of the workshop, the biggest impediment to the implementation of the housing policy is to be found at political level. According to the FFH president, the main constraint that the FFH faces in realising its mission is the fact that housing policy has not been part of the political agenda. In his view, if there is no political engagement there will be no proper support from other entities to boost implementation. "For example, the CMM, which is the entity that is responsible to attribute land titles, does not feel the pressure to provide well located land to the FFH, since they haven't received a clear mission in that direction by the government" (Workshop Communication, April, 2017). This links to the same constraints relating to land allocation in resettlement operations. Low-income individuals are not considered a priority in the allocation of land; instead, they are continually being removed to the outskirts of the city in favour of private investors. The lack of basic infrastructure in land allocated to social housing also contributes to raising the cost of urbanisation. However, if both policies (housing and resettlement) were aligned, resettlement operations could then be seen as a tool with which to achieve and contribute to increasing social housing. As mentioned by Mazzolini (2017), the resettlement policy does not include any concern for the improvement of housing conditions. In fact, resettlement is responsible for worsening already difficult living conditions among low-income households, and the national housing policy does not show concern for or engagement with changing that outcome (*ibid.*). This lack of coordination between institutions is one of the aspects that compromises the implementation of both policies.

Beyond this constraint, others limitations were also identified and characterized in three different groups: firstly, the constraints at supply level; secondly, the constraints at demand level; and thirdly, the constraints on the residents during the construction cycle.

| <b>Constraints to policy implementation at three levels</b>                    |                                                                                                                                                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Supply level</b>                                                            |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1                                                                              | Difficulty in obtaining services and financial means;                                                                                                |
| 2                                                                              | Rising cost of building materials (in particular, the unregulated increase in the price of cement), many of which are imported (paint, tiles, etc.); |
| 3                                                                              | Lack of basic infrastructure which, in many cases, needs to be provided by the construction company, leading to a large initial price increase;      |
| 4                                                                              | Bureaucratic limitations, due to long and costly processes; and,                                                                                     |
| 5                                                                              | Limited availability of financing (lack of diversification of financing options) and high interest rates.                                            |
| <b>Constraints at demand level</b>                                             |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1                                                                              | Low eligibility for credit;                                                                                                                          |
| 2                                                                              | Costs related to access to land;                                                                                                                     |
| 3                                                                              | Construction costs (both formal, informal and self-construction);                                                                                    |
| 4                                                                              | Costs to obtain permission for construction and property registration (estimates for 2013: 8.7% of the total value of the property);                 |
| 5                                                                              | The absence of tax exemption for the purchase or rental of social housing units;                                                                     |
| 6                                                                              | The lack of rental options in housing projects; and,                                                                                                 |
| 7                                                                              | Limitations (deadlines) in microfinancing offers.                                                                                                    |
| <b>Main limitations encountered by the residents during self-construction:</b> |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1                                                                              | Increasing price of building materials, such as sand and cement;                                                                                     |
| 2                                                                              | Obstacles related to land and other bureaucratic processes;                                                                                          |
| 3                                                                              | Lack of adequate access to the area required for the transportation of building materials; and,                                                      |
| 4                                                                              | Lack of basic infrastructure.                                                                                                                        |

Table 5: Constraints to policy implementation at three levels. Source: Translation from Mazzolini, 2017, presentation.

At a programmatic level, the massive regularisation of land tenure and the informal settlements upgrading programme in general do not include strategies of housing promotion or housing improvement (Mazzolini, 2017). In PROMAPUTO, although there is no budget allocated for housing, it is expected that the Land Tenure programme, which provides the inhabitants with access to secure land, will give them motivation to improve and invest in their dwellings.

### 3.3.2 Social housing products in Maputo

The FFH, from 1996 to 2004, funded 1 021 houses, and the delivery of 7 488 plots throughout the country (CAHF, 2013). The government's strategy was to service 300 000 plots of land and build 100 000 houses between 2010 and 2014. However, according to CAHF's annual report (2016), the state only delivered 1 922 houses. In the current five-year plan (2015 – 2019), the government decreased their target to 35 000 houses, of which 50% is to be achieved by self-construction, 30% by the private sector, and only 20% by the government. Of these 35 000 units, only 5% will be fully subsidised (CAHF, 2016).

In Maputo, Vila Olímpica is a recent social housing development promoted by the FFH through public-private partnerships targeting individuals between the ages of 21 to 45 with an indebtedness capacity,

with households of no more than five people and who have not benefited from the sale of state property (Opais, 2011). This is an urbanisation project consisting of 1088 apartments, located in Zimpeto, a neighbourhood 17 km away from the city centre (Mota Engil, 2011). The price of a minimum standard house of two or three rooms ranges between \$US 850 and 1 000 per month (50,000 to 60,000 MZN)<sup>13</sup> (Mazzolini, 2016:66). “Considering that the minimum salary in the country is equal to 72 USD, (4,300 MZN) and that highly-qualified professionals or graduates earn between 15,000-30,000 MZN (250 USD to 500 USD), such an offer cannot satisfy the greatest part of the housing demand” (*ibid.*: 66). This example of public housing is similar to the private investment of Casa Jovem, launched in 2010, which is being developed by a partnership between the Chissano Foundation and the company Imox (youtube, 2011). Casa Jovem is a housing urbanisation project targeting people under 40 years of age, with apartment sale prices varying from \$US47 000 (2.820.000 Mzn) (1 room house) to \$US130 000 (7.800.000 Mzn)<sup>14</sup> (a 3-room apartment), 10 km away from the city centre. This project is beyond the economic reach of most Mozambicans (CAHF, 2016).



Figure 26 – Vila Olímpica – Zimpeto -Maputo.  
Source: Mota Engil - 2011



Figure 27 - Casa Jovem - Costa do Sol -Maputo.  
Source: By author - 2017

As such, the lower income societal groups end up failing to access affordable housing except by means of compensation as a result of expropriations by the public sector in the context of resettlements due to urbanisation and infrastructure works. As mentioned by Melo (2017), “top-down or state-driven housing supply” in Maputo is numerically small (2017:41) and is mainly a result of displacement/relocation processes caused, firstly, by urban renewal and road infrastructure interventions, and, secondly, by natural calamities and disasters. These usually result in the provision of plots, sometimes also including a new house distant from their previous location; decrease of income generating opportunities; poor access to social and economic networks; and loss of assets (*ibid.*). According to the national regulation and WB policy, resettlements should be a mechanism and an opportunity to help improving the life of those affected by such operations. However, resettlement, especially when led by the state, does not translate these aims into reality, as illustrated by PROMAPUTO resettlement examples described above, or others mentioned by Jorge (2016) and Melo (2015).

Other experiments at a private level are bringing different forms of low-cost housing supply to the market. Casa Minha [My House] is an incremental housing experience promoted by a private agency which envisions providing “a transformative solution to the challenge of Urban Expansion in Maputo” (casaminha, 2016: unpaginated). This pilot project is located very near to Julius Nyerere Avenue. A single-family plot is converted into two to three--storey homes, with quality finishes, in an incremental approach, without displacements and by promoting community participation. Any family living in the

<sup>13</sup> - Mazzolini (2016) used a conversion rate of 1USD/60 Mzn

<sup>14</sup> Conversion rate of 1Usd/60Mzn



project area is welcome to join the project if they wish to do so. The family that makes their residential plot available receives such a house with access to all the basic services, such as electricity, piped water, septic tank, as well as a small space in the yard and a balcony that could later be used to extend the dwelling if necessary (personal communication, 2017). The second house is semi-detached and is intended for sale at a price of \$US 50 000 (3.000.000 MZN<sup>15</sup>). The income from the sales allows the developer to pay for all construction costs and to still profit from the investment. This project, in addition to improving the living conditions of the family that makes their plot available, also aligns the plot's limits in accordance with the urbanisation plan approved for the neighbourhood, which may facilitate access to the plot. In addition, this provides a solution to improve informal settlements without displacing people to the outskirts of the city. This increases housing density through height construction, in an organised manner and with adequate infrastructure (*ibid.*).



Figure 28 – Aerial photo - *Minha casa- Polana Caniço A - Maputo*. Source: <https://www.casaminha.co>



Figure 29 – Photo of pilot project - *Minha casa- Polana caniço A - Maputo*. Source: <https://www.casaminha.co>

This project has a significant advantage over the two projects mentioned previously. Although it presents a similar cost to the ones practiced in those projects, the new dwelling is located in one of the central neighbourhoods of the city of Maputo and still manages to offer a typology of family unit housing which is evolutionary and built with good quality materials. It is interesting to note that this intervention is only 300 m away from the resettlement operations undertaken in Julius Nyerere Avenue. This leads me to the question that if the private sector can develop *in situ* social housing in multi-storey buildings with the intention of making a profit, how is it that the public sector with the advantage of not having to generate revenue is failing to do so?

Another interesting project that looks at urban densities in Maputo is the project *Casas Melhoradas* [Improved Houses] launched through international cooperation between Architects Without Borders of Denmark, the Mozambican NGO – *Estamos*, the Faculty of Architecture and Physical Planning of Eduardo Mondlane University, and The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, School of Architecture (see Project *Casas Melhoradas* website). This project argues that it is necessary to counter the low-density growth on the outskirts of the city, since it increases the costs of necessary infrastructure in these new zones. This also contribute to reducing the mobility of people caused by the distance factor and increase transport costs. In order to promote a more sustainable urban development it is necessary to increase urban density (*ibid.*). The experimental project started in 2014 and by 2016 had evolved into different typologies, according to table below.

<sup>15</sup> Exchange rate of 1USD / 60MZN

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| <p>Phase 1 – 2014<br/>                     Location - Maxaquene C<br/>                     Size: 15 m<sup>2</sup> – Single floor<br/>                     Budget: \$US3 000 (180.000 MZN)<br/>                     Materials:<br/>                     local sustainable wood.<br/>                     Recycled bottle caps old tires – used on prefabricated point foundations.<br/>                     Construction price of \$US 200/m<sup>2</sup></p> | <p>Phase 2 - 2015<br/>                     Location: Maxaquene A<br/>                     Size: 60 m<sup>2</sup> – 3-floors<br/>                     Budget: \$US15 000 (900.000 MZN) (including electricity, water and septic tank).<br/>                     Materials:<br/>                     local sustainable wood;<br/>                     suspended plywood ceiling containing insulation foil and mosquito netting on ceiling;<br/>                     Construction price of \$US250/m<sup>2</sup></p> | <p>Phase 3 - 2016<br/>                     Polana Caniço<br/>                     Size: 30 m<sup>2</sup> – 2<sup>nd</sup> floor new construction<br/>                     Budget: \$US 8 000 (480.000 MZN) (including electricity).<br/>                     Materials:<br/>                     Concrete structure was added to the ground floor<br/>                     First floor in timber construction. (timber beans and slabs, locally produced)<br/>                     Construction price of \$US266/m<sup>2</sup></p> |

Table 6 - Synthesis of the experimental prototypes of the *Casas Melhoradas* project. Source: <http://casasmelhoradas.com>, edit by author. Note: Exchange rate of 1USD / 60MZN

It can be seen that the construction prices of a local materials production project vary between \$US200 and 270 per square meter. This experience also shows that the costs of housing production can be reduced to values much lower than those practiced in the market. The issue of housing production costs will be further elaborated on in the next chapter.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The current land management system operating in Maputo could be an opportunity, but is currently a challenge for the development of social housing in the country, since personal and private interests are clearly put first at the expense of public needs and those of the poorer strata of society. Resettlements are the main cause of the need for state housing supply in Maputo. However, these operations usually do not translate into upgrading the quality of life of those affected. The resettlement operations undertaken through the PROMAPUTO programme, despite following the same guidelines and policies, resulted in different outcomes. However, the example of the private sector – *Minha casa*, and the experimental project of *Casas Melhoradas* – show a new and promising direction with regard to the social housing development sector.

## CHAPTER IV

### STAKEHOLDERS' VOICE REGARDING RESETTLEMENT ACTIONS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCESS SOCIAL HOUSING



Figure 30: Photo of a House in Chamanculo C - Maputo. Source: By author, 2017



## 4.0 Introduction

This chapter's focus is on the stakeholders' views and opinions of the resettlements that have taken place in the context of PROMAPUTO. A total of 11 key interviewees were interviewed from the Public and Private-sector institutions, NGO, Donors (World Bank), private investors, Former politicians and Academic institution, ranging in age from 40 to 65. Only one interviewee is female. Also, 15 communities' members from the neighbourhood that were objects of the PROMAPUTO requalification intervention (Polana Caniço A, Chamanculo C, Albasine, George Dimitrov), and the respective resettled communities were interviewed. Interviewees' ages ranged from 22 years to 72 years, half of whom were women. In the neighbourhood where requalification did not cause any resettlement, a focus group session was held with six community members, where one of the interviewees was female, (profile details of the interviewees in Annex 1).

I start by exposing the mismatches between policies, practices and voices of those involved in the PROMAPUTO resettlements analysed in this research, tackling the subject of policy revision and regulations, the procedures and the different perceptions of resettlement outcomes (this links to Chapter II, regarding policy revision). Secondly, I elaborate on the subject of land management, presenting the duality between a social dream that became an activity which favours individuals with greater political and economic power. Thirdly, I deepen the controversy between the will to continue to develop resettlements that do not generate benefits to the stakeholders (public sector, investor and community), and the fear of moving towards adopting *in situ* resettlement through social housing. Under the fourth subheading, I present a cost benefit analysis, comparing a relocation and an *in situ* resettlement operation, in order to encourage a change in approach. Lastly, I finalise the chapter by bringing the experience of a focus group session, where beyond highlighting some of the features of a collective housing design presented by some community members, I argue that participation is the key to the success of *in situ* resettlement, and for the promotion of social housing in Maputo.

### 4.1 The mismatches between policies, practices and voices of those involved in the PROMAPUTO resettlements

#### 4.1.1 Policies and legislation

As mentioned in the literature review and context chapters, the PROMAPUTO programme updated its Resettlement Policy Framework in 2010 in preparation for planned urbanisation and informal settlements upgrading projects in its following phase (CMM, 2010). Such revision aimed also to support the analysis of the impacts of urbanisation projects and to implement resettlement plans in accordance with the premises of the WB, and following the guidelines set out by Mozambican law. However, at that time the regulation of the resettlement of economic activities was not yet in force, as this was approved only in 2012. The instruments guiding resettlement operations were dispersed in 11 different laws and regulations such: Mozambican Constitution (2004) articles 271 and 281 (BR, 2004); the Land Law, no. 19/1997 (BR,1997); National Land Policy (Council of Ministers Resolution no. 10/95) (BR, 1995a), the Land Law Regulations (Decree 66/98) (BR, 1998); the Urban land use planning decree (77/2006)(BR, 2006); the Decree 15/2000 (BR, 2000); Municipal Framework Law no. 2/97; Municipal Finance Law no. 11/97; the Territorial Planning Law no. 19/2007; the regulations of the Territorial Planning Law (Decree no. 23 / 2008), mainly articles 70 and 72; the Family Law no. 10/2004, and the regulations on Environmental Impact Evaluation (Decree no. 45/2004). In 2012, the approval of the regulation on resettlement processes resulting from economic activities, Decree no. 31/2012 (BR, 2012), failed to solve the existent distribution of information related to resettlement activities. After three years of practice under Decree no. 31/2012, a team comprised of representatives of the WB and MICOA (Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Action, currently MITADER – Ministry of the Earth, Environment and Rural Development) felt the need to produce a document which,



*“intended to provide the Government of Mozambique with practical inputs and advice for assessing the current application of these laws in the design and execution of development operations in the country, any areas in potential need of gap-filling or improvement, and opportunities for either clarifying, strengthening or amending the existing legislation in the near future, or designing new regulation that better addresses the current Government’s needs” (WB, 2015:7).*

In November of 2016, the Mozambican Environmental Impact Assessment Association (AMAI),<sup>16</sup> and MITADER organised the first national meeting about resettlement activities. In 2017, MITADER launched a bid for the revision of the regulation policy. Considering this an opportunity for my fieldwork I asked my interviewees what they would consider to be important to be reflected in the new regulation. The different answers obtained reflected the interests of each institution/organisation/sector they represented.

The team leader of the PROMAPUTO from the WB group (key interviewee no. 1) highlighted several recommendations, which emerged from lessons learnt in the resettlement undertaken by the PROMAPUTO programme, including: i) to regularise land prior to the implementation of the infrastructure, so that the population benefits from the added value to the land once urbanised, avoiding land from being captured by the developer; ii) to incorporate a separate chapter for rural and urban resettlements, since it deals with different problems; iii) to revise the minimum plot size specified in the regulation - 800 m<sup>2</sup> of land in urban areas – as it does not make any applicable sense; iv) to clarify the level of infrastructure that should be implemented at the hosted resettlement area and to be clear about fines for those who do not enforce the regulation; v) to guarantee socio-economic support for the first six months of occupation in the new place; vi) to present three scenarios of resettlement impacts in environmental impact studies - scenario of non-resettlement, scenario of resettlement and the actual recurrent scenario, namely- resettlement without restrictions. According to what was perceived, these different scenarios mentioned by the interviewee correspond to different levels of impacts on the communities. The idea is to give implementation agencies and donors better data to evaluate with regard to the pros and cons in the three resettlement options studied; and vii) to review the compensation calculations, since families have to be compensated based on market value, by calculating the land value of each neighbourhood based on the value reported in the SISA<sup>17</sup> transaction of real estate.

When posing the same question to public sector institutions, the answers had a different focus. An interviewee of the National Direction of Urbanisation and Housing (DNUH)(key interview no. 7) said that it was important to categorise resettlements – to differentiate the resettlements which were the result of private and public investments – claiming that the processes should follow different parameters. It was argued that a process of social interest should be exempt from licensing, and the number of public consultations should decrease. An interviewee from the Maputo Municipal Council (CMM) (key interviewee no. 5) mentioned that the policy only covers large investment projects and, as such, regulations do not cover minor cases; and should be more detailed – “In the CMM, we adapt. That’s why we also use the policies of the WB”. A holistic vision is presented by a consultant from MITADER (key interviewee no. 9). He stated that resettlements are new to Mozambique, and people don’t understand yet that these are not physical but rather social operations, arguing that “what makes resettlements fall apart are the intangible aspects, those difficult to calculate and understand”. He also added that a rural resettlement is far more complex than an urban resettlement, given that

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<sup>16</sup> AMAI - Associação Moçambicana de Avaliação do Impacto Ambiental - Translation by author

<sup>17</sup> SISA is the tax rate of 2% (two percent) and focuses on the value declared for the purpose of purchase and sale or on the net asset value of the building, whichever is higher (GLM, 2013).

rural communities are more vulnerable and less educated, and therefore have more difficulties in understanding change and the consequences of resettling. From his perspective, in order to improve resettlement outcomes the following actions should be taken: i) to revise the regulation in alignment with all laws and regulations, with a view to have a single document which sets out resettlement regulations; ii) to create a methodology manual to guide implementation; iii) to build institutional capacity through the training of staff; iv) to improve monitoring and evaluation of processes; and v) to create a team of specialists to help the government, in the short and medium term to implement and help understand the new procedures.

On the one hand, the recommendations of the WB interviewee seem to reflect concerns about the living conditions of the resettled people, which is aligned with the WB's mission of poverty reduction; as well as about the need to differentiate procedures according to the type of resettlements (urban *versus* rural) and to overcome legislative limitations (not sufficiently comprehensive and detailed). On the other hand, the interviewees from the CMM and DNUH did not express concerns with regard to communities. It creates the impression that their main concerns were about the different procedures for private and public resettlements and the types of resettlements, which in turn, result in better facilitated work implementation for the agency. Further to this, the consultant from MITADER presents a rather macro level view in reflecting on their responsibility for the subject. The answers indicate that the WB interviewee was more concerned about urban resettlements, while MITADER one was more focused on rural resettlements, given that the current regulation fits in better within the rural category. This calls for the need to integrate all visions, from those who regulate to those who defend the population's well-being and those who are responsible for implementing resettlement.

#### 4.1.2 Procedures and results

Regarding the PROMAPUTO resettlement outcomes, looking at a practical level, the perception between stakeholders also differs. The WB interviewee (key Interviewee no. 1) says that they have not received any complaints from the resettled community so far and that he does not know if people improved their living conditions after resettling:

*"Scientifically it would be necessary to do a post-occupation analysis to see if people actually increased their quality of life. However, people have been given a larger plot, living in durable housing today, with access to basic infrastructure, and neighbourhoods which are gradually being consolidated."* (key Interviewee no. 1).

In turn, the Director of CMM's Resettlement Department argues that monitoring surveys were done:

*"In all the monitoring surveys that were conducted, people said that their quality of life has improved. People lived in small areas, in the form of agglomerates, without sanitation conditions. They used community latrines. While in the new resettlement areas, people are more satisfied because they have larger plots, where they can have small vegetable gardens. Economic conditions also tend to improve. Being in a zone of expansion, they have greater opportunities of employment in the construction sector (blocks, carpentry). There are more job opportunities. While in the city centre, there is a lot of competition and as such people live off more from informal trade."* (key interviewee no. 5).

However, the resettled families interviewed in Albasine, expressed their discontentment in the increase of costs related to transport, due to their current distance to the city, and basic services, as well as by the loss of job and income generation opportunities.

*"It's a very distant zone. I spend a lot of money on 'chapas' [informal transport]. There [in Chamanculo] I was close to everything, work, school and here, no longer."* (young male interviewee no. 10, in Chiango).

*"Positive is the fact that I came to an area with space. Negative, is the distance. I cannot go to work; I don't have the money to pay for all the many commuting connections"* (old male interviewee no. 12, in Chiango).

*"I like the area and I got space. But I'm missing business opportunities. In Chamanculo I had that. Here there's no business and water is very expensive"* (35-year-old female interviewee no. 10, in Chiango).

In Chiango (an area of Albasine neighbourhood), the area that hosts the resettled families since 2015, the WB financed the basic infrastructure installation, such as the water tank supply, public lighting and electricity. However, as we could hear, the price of public water in that neighbourhood is 50 Meticaís per m<sup>3</sup>, which is quite expensive as compared to the city's price of 35 Meticaís per m<sup>3</sup>. Some of the interviewees in this neighbourhood prefer to use a well instead of the water tap installed on their plot. The public water is only used for drinking and cooking. However, in Albasine, where families were resettled in 2011, public water has not yet been installed. An electricity transformation station was installed in 2014 next to the resettlement area, but home connections had to be made at the residents own cost.

It seems clear that although living conditions related to housing and living space have increased after resettlement, other aspects related to job and income generation opportunities, basic services and facilities have decreased. Another interviewee in Albasine, when asked if his living conditions had increased after resettling, said:

*"Living conditions have not improved. The area I have to live in is good, but my children do not study in good conditions because I do not have electrical power. The feeding of the children is very important to go to school with health. I do not have a fixed job that guarantees a permanent salary"* (interviewee no. 13, in Albasine).

The female interviewee in the same neighbourhood said that conditions have improved a little, because they have the hospital and bus stop close to home now. However, the market is too far, and she does not have business opportunities. In the previous neighbourhood, she used to sell coal. Both the communities, resettled in 2015 and in 2011, face a similar problem of lack of job opportunities, which clearly compromises the residents' livelihoods. When asked how many times a day she eats, this same woman answered two times, and third meal is only cooked when she has the resources to do so.



Figure 31 and 32. Photos of new houses in the Albasine neighbourhood (families resettled in 2011). Source: By author, October 2017.

In addition to the resettlement outcomes, it is also important to address the procedures that lead to resettlement, as these will also be the subject of study in the new policy revision. There is a noticeable difference between the procedures followed in 2011 and 2015. For those resettled in 2011, according to the field work, families had one meeting one year before the resettlement operation began. They received compensation of 10 000 Meticaís and families were taken to plots in Albasine without any basic infrastructure. *“It was a bush, with nothing. We had to live in the open, while building a shelter”* (interview no. 12, in Albasine). People were dumped on these plots with their belongings and building materials in municipal trucks. *“The municipality came at 12pm to take us to the new plot. We packed our stuff and left on that same day”* (interviewee no. 15, in Albasine). It has not been clarified if the affected families received their compensation before or after resettlement. However, it is clear that they did not have the time to prepare a shelter in the new area prior to arrival. When we asked a local interviewee what she would recommend to improve the resettlement process, she answered:

*“The Municipality should not treat people badly. Should give a fair value for compensation and take them out in an organised way, by making the field available prior to our arrival, because we arrived there without ever being there before.”* (interviewee no. 14, in Albasine).

Another interviewee in the same neighbourhood said that: *“The municipality should ensure that there is water in the plot and that the DUAT is provided to the families.”* (interviewee no. 15, in Albasine).

In the resettlement that occurred in 2015 procedures were improved. The families said that they were well-informed about how the resettlement process would take place. Practically all families received compensation amounts three months prior to the resettlement date, which allowed them to build a small facility (room) prior to the day of their arrival. However, according to the sociologist from the Municipality of Maputo who tackled this process, at least five families did not receive the amount of compensation a priori, which was similar as in the case of Albasine. The families reached their plots without having any shelter to stay in. When asking the selected interviewees in this neighbourhood what advice they had for the municipality to improve resettlements operations, they answered in different ways. Interviewee no. 10, said: *“The municipality should create basic conditions before resettlement, i.e.: having water and electrical power”*. The WB financed the basic infrastructure only after noticing its absence on visiting the project. It took them a further year to make basic infrastructures available to each plot.

Another interviewee complained about a different constraint. He said: *“The availability of the land must be done a priori and very clearly. On the day we came to know the new place, there was a lot of confusion with the hosting community, which led to land conflicts.”* (interviewee no. 11, in Chiango). When discussing such constraint with the municipality’s sociologist, she argued that in fact, at the beginning, the hosting community did not want to receive newcomers. They thought the land belonged to them, even though they were not in possession of any official documentation. In the end, the municipality thought that they were able to solve this problem through negotiations. Nonetheless, according to the sociologist, even today there still is a young man who has not yet received his plot in the hosting community due to this land conflict. When asking the sociologist why two resettlements carried out by the same institution and the same funding body had such differing outcomes, she argued that the municipality learned from the first resettlement process and that in the second resettlement, the CMM hired a team of social sciences consultants who accompanied and supported the resettled families before and during the resettlement process. Nevertheless, she thinks there is still need for improvement in with regard to the internal procedures of the municipality.



## 4.2 Resistance to *in situ* resettlement

### 4.2.1 From dream to practice – in fact, land [does not] belong to the people

In 1997, land was nationalised in terms of the argument that “land use is a right of all Mozambican people” (BR, 1997: 15). The reasoning behind this action was the will to restore the right that had been stolen to the Mozambican people by the Portuguese colonisers. Some of the interviewees that were actively involved during the first years of independence said that the act of nationalising land “was an emotional act, with the will to do social justice” (Key interviewee no. 2), under the slogan “*the land is ours.*” (*ibid.*) A former politician said that:

*“after independence, it was expected that Frelimo would free the land and men. It came by political means and then we did not think about the economic consequences”* (key interviewee no. 11).

This argument suggests that the consequences of land nationalisation were not thoroughly thought through. A former Deputy Minister of Public Works also agreed that the reason behind the land nationalisation

*“was to organize the land in the sense of providing the city dwellers with better living conditions. The main action was the withdrawal of land from the businesses of those who had power and instead to attribute it to the state, to give it the ability to organize the land, and the needs of urban centres, defining the PUEMM infrastructure plans. In doing so, racial and economic segregation, as well as the land, ceased to be at the hands of businesses. But that's exactly where it fell. This great input that was given to politics and economics was wasted, for the land was passed on in favour of the interest of private individuals who negotiate it for even higher values”* (key interview no. 8).

The dream of giving back the land to its people, under the management of the public sector, was either an impractical aspiration or misrepresented along its path. According to a former Ministry of Public Works official, land belonging to the state “*should favour the development of Maputo. But in fact, it does not. It is difficult to guarantee the transparency of the land. It would be better if it were in someone's hands. This situation requires a vast capacity to manage, control and evaluate and we are not in position to do so*” (key interview no. 11).

The Land Law (1997) and the Law Regulation (1998) did not define the criterion for land allocation. In 2006, the Regulation of Urban Land (2006/08) was approved in order to better regulate the Land Law in urban areas. Five modalities were defined for the attribution of land use, such as: “grant award; lottery; public auction; private negotiation; good faith occupation” (translated from article 24, 2006: 57). However, criteria to allocate land were not established. Interviewees have a similar perception, that land allocation is intrinsically linked to power and economic factors. According to a professor from the architecture faculty, “money in the pocket is the strongest criteria” (key interviewee no. 6). The director of the same faculty suggested that there are three criteria:

- “1<sup>st</sup> Who is this person, and what power does he/she have?
- 2<sup>nd</sup> How much money does this person have?
- 3<sup>rd</sup> What does it mean to me? [person managing land]”

*Around the world, the criteria are to buy land. Our law does not allow it, since land belongs to the state; but its use is tradable. However, the value of the land is hidden and who enjoys it are those who are associated with the power of the land”*(key interviewee no. 2).

Such answers confirm the arguments put forward by Jenkins, Melo and Jorge, mentioned in chapter II and III: land management is a “state-or-market-driven policy” (Jenkins, 2001:646), subordinated to private interest (Jorge, 2016) and it does not always promote social equity (Melo, 2015). When asking a private investment company what the modality is that they use for acquiring land in Maputo for their development projects, the interviewee said that he prefers to look for land used by private entities. “We avoid negotiating with the state to avoid taking the risk of being associated to corrupt deals” (key interviewee no. 12). It seems that the biggest beneficiaries of land ownership are those who have control over land management. This clearly leaves out the people with the least access to economic and political power.

The Maputo City Urban Structure Plan (PEUMM, 2008) raises the problem of the so-called “informal settlements” as a priority and recommends avoiding the resettlement of families. However, the PROMAPUTO program did not follow the recommendation of PEUMM, as 73 families were relocated to the outskirts of the city. When asked whether the program followed the directives of PEUMM, the PROMAPUTO WB team leader answered that resettlement is done only in last instance, saying that:

*“PROMAPUTO has avoided resettlements, both because of economic factors (because it becomes costly) and because of political factors, since populations do not want to be resettled.”* (Key interviewee no. 1).

A municipal technician from the Urban Planning and Environment municipal department shared that there is a paradox between what is described in the plan and what has been practiced in recent years:

*“There is a contradiction between this goal (established in PEUMM) and what has been happening in the last six years. The Plan refers to the need to avoid relocation, but in practice the infrastructure development project always requires the need for resettlement. And the municipality faces the lack of infrastructure land available with basic services to allocate to affected families. There is an increasing tendency to resettlement, associated with the rise of construction of infrastructure or equipment of collective interest.”* (key interviewee no. 4).

This has led me to the question: should this directive by the PEUMM be reviewed or should it be maintained? According to the interviewee from the Urbanisation and Housing Department, “if it was prescribed, it is because the means were seen to be fulfilled. Or perhaps, they do not know how to do it?” (key interviewee, no. 7). “It is not perceived that there is an action to avoid the relocation of families. I think there is a will, but there is no solution” (key interviewee no. 3). Moreover, looking at the problem of land scarcity, families are enlivened with the opportunity of having secure tenure in a larger plot of approximately 350 m<sup>2</sup>. Looking at the Chamanculo resettlements, approximately 6000 m<sup>2</sup> of land were allocated to the 17 families in the new hosted area. However, it would have been possible to use only one-third of this land area by producing *in situ* multi-storey social housing.

With regard to secure tenure, a deputy director responsible for the Department of Land Management in the CMM said that the “advantage to these families is the opportunity to have land tenure assured”. However, when listening to the opinions and feelings of the families resettled in Albasine in 2011 and 2015, discontentment was expressed because of the fact that they have not yet received their DUATs. One of the families resettled in 2011 in Albasine, also said that they had already made a complaint directly to the president of the municipality, and that he consequently went to visit them, but nothing happened after that. To date, they still do not have DUATs. This resistance to DUAT attribution could indicate, on the one hand, that somewhere in the process the regularisation process fell flat and further alerts us to the fact that proper monitoring and field supervision or post-resettling procedures are not taking place. On the other hand, it could also reflect a fear of losing control of land management.

Simultaneously, the Albasine PPU (2010) does not define areas for social housing or low-income people, which is contrary to the guidelines prescribed in the PEUMM. However, Polana Caniço A and B PPUs, which are the neighbourhoods where people have been displaced, define that 60% of the housing area prescribe in the PPU should be allocated for social housing typology (CMM, 2015a – article 31), a guideline that should encourage *in situ* resettlement. However, not wanting to lose land value to low-income population groups is probably also one of the reasons that inhibits *resettlement in situ* and promotes moving low-incomes to less valued areas and land. This leads us to the next subheading, where I explore the relationship between the causes and the willingness to adopt versus not to adopt an alternative process of resettlement, which would allow individuals to remain in their own neighbourhoods.

#### **4.2.2 The controversy between stakeholders' will and practice in adopting *in situ* resettlements**

Among stakeholders there is the feeling and understanding that the process of relocation causes harm in one way or another to those involved in the process. For the state, one of the critical factors is the economic one. It becomes increasingly costly to compensate families. Over the last few years these in turn have started to understand the subject of state expropriation, and seek to defend themselves from this vulnerable situation while at the same time viewing the situation as an opportunity. According to the former Deputy Minister of Public Works:

*"In the circular project, the cost of resettlement amounts million of dollars and was paid by the state ... it is enough to know that in one place a project will be born, the next day it will be full of people. The state has no ability to curb this influx of people to these places. People are ready to receive reimbursements. The communities are more organized than the CMM. The communities are much more ahead of the municipality"* (key interviewee no. 8).

Those relocated far from the city face various problems, some of which was mentioned in the first subheading, i.e., obtaining family income due to high transportation costs, the lack of job opportunities in their new areas; loss of communal identity and rupture of existing social assets, among others. An elderly man relocated from Chamanculo stated that despite having a better house now, he had better living conditions before. *"Here I cannot make money because there is no market and there is no movement for business"* (community interview no. 12). Another elderly male Interviewee in George Dimitrov, when asked whether he would choose to be relocated, in the event of a new urbanisation project, answered: *"I prefer to stay, because I've made my life here and I have all my friends and family close"* (community interviewee no. 1).

It is clear that communities that live in older neighbourhoods, such Chamanculo, as well as those old people with strong and older community links prefer to remain in their neighbourhoods because of their family roots and community links. On the other hand, families living in more recent neighbourhoods, such as the neighbourhood of Polana Caniço A, do not mind being relocated to another neighbourhood (community interview no. 9).

For the funders, in this case the WB, the difficulty of finding infrastructural land near the resettlement site is a constraint, because the negative impacts of driving people away from the urban centre are outcomes to be avoided, as outlined in their own social and environmental safeguarding policy. So, who benefits from this practice? Why have other alternatives not been adopted yet? Looking again to the PROMAPUTO resettlement experiences, would it have been possible to choose *in situ* resettlement instead of resettlement? The WB team leader answered this question, contradicting his own first answer when he said that the PROMAPUTO avoided relocation:

*"Yes. There is no need to make such wide roads. Chamanculo is an example of it with a 12m wide road, and so is Julius Nyerere. It has a 6m wide central whose function I'm unsure of."* (key interviewee no. 1)

The Deputy Director of Urban Planning and Environment Municipal department answered the same question:

*"It could be. But it was necessary to study densification in residential areas. Provide temporary income solutions to accommodate the family affected by the project, and the family affected by the increase in density. But this implicates costs. There are costs that are currently not possible to support"* (key interviewee no. 4).

According to professor Tique, PEUMM's recommendations to avoid relocations are not fulfilled, due to two factors:

*"Firstly, because of the inability to organize financial and technical resources to carry out on-site resettlements. And secondly, because the projects are conceived and implemented within very short time frames. There is no room for planning"* (key interviewee no. 2).

The reply of the Deputy Minister of Public Works continues the same line of thought:

*"There was a bad initial habit of resettlement, taking people and dropping them anywhere. Now the situation has changed. When we ask the CMM if there's land for relocation, they respond, yes, no problem. But do they have land with basic infrastructures? No. When the construction works begin, there is no time for anything. "We dumped people as if it were merchandise." There is a lack of accountability of the state itself and the municipalities. It is usually assumed that this process is easy to carry out"* (key interviewee no. 8).

Therefore, it is believed that a resettlement which entails relocation to peripheral areas has become a practice to be questioned. The methodology adopted seemed to work when there were fewer projects. Today, stakeholders see the need to change this practice but there is resistance at different levels: firstly, it is believed that *in situ* resettlement will be more expensive; secondly, it is believed that there is a lack of technical capacity to do so – to which can eventually be added a lack of determination and fear of being a pioneer; thirdly, the lack of planning of the resettlements simultaneously in conjunction with the urbanisation plans hinders *in situ* resettlement, since resettlement is understood to be a consequence/externality of urbanisation; it's not thought through before, because it does not have the same degree of importance as the urbanisation itself. Fourthly, *in situ* resettlement is likely to require greater efforts from technical and social points of view. In order to better understand the factors that lead to the non-adoption of *in situ* resettlement, the next subheading explores a cost-benefit analysis.

#### **4.3 Cost-benefit analysis: relocations versus *in situ* operations**

In order to develop a cost-benefit analysis exercise, I used as a basis for comparison the resettlement in Chamanculo C, where 17 families were displaced to Albasine – 14 km away. The analysis focuses only on the cost associated with the resettlement process. All costs of project development, studies and human resources have not been accounted for because in any other urbanisation project which includes resettlement, I assumed that it will always be necessary to have a design team and a social team which provide support to the community, from the beginning phase of field study to the resettlement phase.



The table below represents the activities costs, according to the time they took to be implemented, including: costs associated with the displacement of the families and their respective compensations amounts; costs of investment to create basic conditions in the new host areas, including installation of electrical networks and public lighting, installation of a raised water tank and construction of the new Albasine market. Some activities, such as the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) preparation, despite being a study, were placed on the table to help envision the timeframes between the completion of the study and the rehousing of people.

| Resettlement costs table in Albasine (Chiango)         |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|------------------------------|
| Activities developed                                   | 2014 |     | 2015 |     |     |     | 2016 |     |                              |
|                                                        | 3rd  | 4th | 1st  | 2nd | 3rd | 4th | 1st  | 2nd | 3rd 4th                      |
| Compensation                                           |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| RAP preparation                                        |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| 17 compensated families                                |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Displacement of families and their goods               |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Sub total                                              |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     | 188.938 USD<br>5.705.921 MZN |
| Construction of basic infrastructure                   |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Installation of PT and medium voltage network          |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Low voltage network execution                          |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Opening of water holes and domestic supply             |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Construction of fence walls for the PT and water holes |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Public lightening installation                         |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Residential power connections                          |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Construction of the Albasine market                    |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Waste collection                                       |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     |                              |
| Sub total                                              |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     | 254 298 USD                  |
| Total Cost                                             |      |     |      |     |     |     |      |     | 443.236 USD<br>10.653.622 MT |

Table 7 – Table of the costs of resettlement at Chiango. Source: author based on CMM, 2016a. Note: The USD numbers were converted in accordance with the exchange rate of the contract signature date (see annex 2).

As showed in the table above, families were relocated in the first quarter of 2015, but the provision of basic services only started in the third quarter of the same year and was concluded in the second quarter of 2016. This means that families had been living on their plot for more than one year without access to water or electricity.

A total amount of \$US188.938,00 was spent on financial compensation, for the payment of lost property. The formula used by the consultant hired by the municipality for calculating the compensation is prescribed in the Diploma Ministerial no. 181/2010, on the directive on the expropriation process for the purposes of territorial planning. In this document, the infrastructure covered is classified with the terminology "social housing", whose basic value of calculation established is 7,500.00 MT/m<sup>2</sup> and may vary in accordance with the following coefficients (CMM, 2015b and 2016a). As an example, the following table presents a compensation calculation of an affected dwelling in Chamanculo C. The family was compensated for the loss of a 70m<sup>2</sup> house and a 6m<sup>2</sup> balcony for a total amount of 301.638,39 Mt (\$US 9.988,03 exchange rate according to the source (2015b) at 30.02). This can be calculated as \$US131/m<sup>2</sup> (9.988,03 USD / 76 m<sup>2</sup>).

|              | Built area (m <sup>2</sup> ) | New property value (Vn) | Property depreciation (mt) | Current property value | MZN               | USD (30.20)     |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| House        | 70                           | 361.463                 | 72.220                     | 289.242                |                   |                 |
| Veranda      | 6                            | 15.491                  | 3.095                      | 12.396,10              |                   |                 |
| <b>Total</b> |                              |                         |                            |                        | <b>301.638,39</b> | <b>9.988,03</b> |

Table 8 - Table of the compensation calculation for a dwelling property lost in Chamanculo C. Source: CMM, 2015b.

According to Mazzolini (2017), referring to PEUMM (2008), the construction costs for self-construction at the time ranged from 200 and 300 USD/m<sup>2</sup> to between \$US500 and \$US800/m<sup>2</sup> for construction by a contractor. With the increasing prices of building materials, such as sand and cement, today compensation of \$US132/m<sup>2</sup> is beyond the market price. According to the Casa Minha project, in 2016 a small 65m<sup>2</sup> building with three storeys cost \$US20 000 (this does not include either the land price or management fees); which corresponds to \$US 307/m<sup>2</sup>. As such, the formula used to calculate the compensation costs prescribed in the Diploma Ministerial no. 181/2010 on the directive on expropriation, is a far cry from allowing families to build a finished house.



Figures 33 and 34. Photo of new houses – Community interview in Chiango. Source: By author, October 2017.



Figure 35 and 36. Photo of new houses – Community interview in Chiango. Source: By author, October 2017.

Looking at the services costs, according to the RAP implementation report, in 2014, the families who were resettled in Chamanculo averaged a monthly household income of 4,872.00 MTS, with average monthly expenses of 4,161.00 MTS (including food, transportation, water, electricity and hygiene products). However, in the new location (Chiango), the public water services and transport costs are much higher (see table 8).

| Increased service costs    |                                                                                                                                                 |                                  |                                                                                                         |                                 |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Services                   | Before (in Chamanculo)                                                                                                                          |                                  | After (in Albasine)                                                                                     |                                 |
|                            | Justification                                                                                                                                   | Costs per Month                  | Justification                                                                                           | Cost per month                  |
| <b>Transport</b>           | No need - because they worked in the neighbourhood or in walking distance from their home. They usually took a "chapa" in emergency situations. | 0                                | They need to take 2 to 3 connections to reach the urban centre. Each connection costs 9 MTS (0,15 USD). | 13 to 20 USD<br>792 to 1188 MZN |
| <b>Water</b>               | They used to spend between 200 a 250 MTS per month.                                                                                             | 3,3 to 4,1 USD<br>200 to 250 MZN | The cost per m <sup>2</sup> is 42% more expensive in this neighbourhood than in the city centre.        | 10 to 13 USD<br>600 to 800 MZN  |
| <b>Total cost increase</b> |                                                                                                                                                 |                                  | 19,8 to 28,9 USD                                                                                        | 1192<br>to 1738 MZN             |

Table 9 – Comparison between basic service cost before and after resettlement. Source: Information obtained during the field interviews. The exchange rate used refers to the month in which the interview took place - October 2017 at 1USD/60MZN).

This means that in the relocation area they had an increase of between 29% and 42% in their monthly expenses. For this reason, some of the interviewees mentioned only using water from their wells. Others use piped water exclusively for cooking and drinking in an attempt to control water expenses.



Figure 37 – Photo of Albasine's new market. Source: CMM, 2016a.

In addition to these quantifiable costs, it is possible to identify unquantifiable costs that also affect the life of the resettled families. The table below represents the intangibles cost as it were gathered during the conversations with the interviews:



Figure 38 - Water tank and fence wall. Source: By author, October 2017



Figure 39 – Photo of Public lighting. Source: By author, October 2017



|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | <b>Households breakdown:</b> One family in Chamanculo had children studying at the local high school. In the new host neighbourhood, the secondary school is far, obliging the children to use transport to go to the school. For this reason, the family decided to leave their children with a relative in another neighbourhood, where the school is near the home (key interviewee no. 10). |
| 2 | <b>Loss of social assets:</b> Loss of the closeness with their friends; kin relationships that offer support, specially in critical times; and the trust in neighbours (key interviewee no. 12).                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 3 | <b>Loss of job opportunities:</b> Because they are far from the urban centre (key interviewee no. 12 and 13).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 4 | <b>Loss of business opportunities:</b> The new neighbourhood has no movement and, as such, is not conducive to informal trade activities (key interviewee no. 10 and 12).                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 5 | <b>Reduction of the time for work and leisure in the city:</b> In order to not miss their transport, resettled individuals now have to go back home earlier (key interviewee no. 11).                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

Table 10 – List of intangibles cost identified by the community. Source: by author.

Although they are not quantifiable aspects, they are determinant when it comes to individuals' well-being. When not taken into account, they contribute towards individuals' further poverty. These intangible aspects reflect two of the processes in resettlement which lead to impoverishment, an argument defended by Cernea, namely joblessness and social disarticulation. In this regard, Clark (2000) emphasises the fact that social networks and kinship bonds sustain individuals in critical times, and are the only insurance poor people have.

Beyond tangible and intangible costs, it is also necessary to look at the positive and negative impacts of the relocation process to the outskirts of the city. The following table summarises the benefits and negative aspects presented in degree of importance by the community of Chiango during field interviews.

| Relocation to the outskirts of the city |                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Benefits                                |                                                                                                                        |
| 1                                       | Better housing conditions – Bigger house, better construction materials and more living space (interior and exterior). |
| 2                                       | No floods on the plot                                                                                                  |
| 3                                       | No fight with neighbours (they have enough space).                                                                     |
| 4                                       | Available land on the plot for growing a vegetable garden                                                              |
| Negative aspects                        |                                                                                                                        |
| 1                                       | Lack of job and business opportunities                                                                                 |
| 2                                       | High transport costs                                                                                                   |
| 3                                       | High cost of water service                                                                                             |
| 4                                       | Lack of secure tenure - interviewees complained that they had not yet receive the DUAT                                 |
| 5                                       | Lack of movement in the neighbourhood                                                                                  |
| 6                                       | Far from the urban centre – it takes to 2 hours to commute.                                                            |
| 7                                       | Far from the market                                                                                                    |
| 8                                       | Secondary school far from Chiango settlement                                                                           |

Table nº 11 – Description of the benefits and negative aspects identified by the interviewees of Chiango and Albasine during the fieldwork.



In summary, this cost-benefit analysis leads me to believe that the negative impacts on the resettled community are far greater than the benefits generated by resettlement. This is mainly due to the following factors: firstly, the compensation amount prescribed by law does not allow for the building of a house in accordance with market values; secondly, the distance to the city centre is one of the major factors that generates a negative impact on the community, especially the increase in livelihood cost (namely due to transport and water), as well as the reduction in access to employment and business opportunities, and; thirdly, loss of identity, especially elderly individuals, who miss their place of everyday conviviality. There are social and family ties and feelings that are broken permanently, and those are immeasurable.

Would *in situ* resettlement reduce the negative impacts, intangible costs and financial costs? In order to answer this question, I present below, following the exercise above, an estimate for an *in situ* resettlement by using the following premises:

- Guarantee a minimum of 70m<sup>2</sup> of living area per family, in accordance with the resettlement regulation (total of 1190m<sup>2</sup> - 70 m<sup>2</sup> x 17 families - of building area). In Chamanculo, the 17 families were living in total area of 675m<sup>2</sup> (COWI, 2015).
- Convert the 1190m<sup>2</sup> of building area into a three-storey building.
- Using the reference price of the Casa Minha Project (307 USD/m<sup>2</sup>), including an increasing of 20% for administration and management fees – 370 USD/m<sup>2</sup>.
- It does not take land value in consideration, as it was not considered in the previous exercise but somehow was included in the intangible costs/benefits.

The estimated total investment in construction comes to \$US440.300,00 (1190m<sup>2</sup> x 370/m<sup>2</sup>), which includes all basic services, given that Chamanculo already has public lighting and public water supply. Compensation costs would also not be needed, as families would receive an apartment in the same location. However, one needs to factor in the cost of renting a temporary house while building the new *in situ* site, or install prefabricated units to house families during the construction period.

In the 2015 resettlement in Julius Nyerere, families received 4000 MZN per month for renting a temporary space in the neighbourhood (CMM, 2017a). If we considered an increment of 20%, due to the continuing increase in house rental prices, it can be estimated that a family would have to pay 4800 MZN per month over for 9 months. In total, the outlay would come to 734.400,00 MZN (\$US12 180 – exchange rate as at 15 October 2017 of a Mozambican bank (\$US60,22) for temporary accommodation.

In summary, the total cost of *in situ* resettlement can be summarised as follows:

| Activities                     | Description | Estimated cost | Currency |
|--------------------------------|-------------|----------------|----------|
| Housing construction           | 1190 m2     | 440.300,00     | USD      |
| Temporary accommodation rental | 9 months    | 12.180,00      | USD      |
| Subtotal                       |             | 442.480,00     | USD      |
| Contingencies                  | 10%         | 45.248,00      | USD      |

Table 12 – Summary of the costs associated with *in situ* resettlement. Source: by author.

Looking at the expectation of probable cost increases for families, it is necessary to predict the cost of collective maintenance. In 2014, I was paying an amount of 500 MTS in maintenance costs, in a ten-storey building where we lived in an apartment, a building which housed a further 40 families. This amount included payment for three guards, the maintenance of the lift and cleaning. Considering that a small building does not require a lift, we could maintain the cost of 300 to 500 MTS. This would amount to a collective saving of 5100 to 8500 MTS per month for cleaning and maintenance, at an increase of 300 to 500 MTS in monthly expenses per household. Looking at the impact on an *in situ*

resettlement from the community's point of view, the table below presents the benefits versus the negative impacts:

| Relocation to the outskirts of the city |                                                                                                                       |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Benefits                                |                                                                                                                       |
| 1                                       | Better housing conditions - Bigger house, better construction materials and more living space interior and exterior). |
| 2                                       | No floods in the plot                                                                                                 |
| 3                                       | No fighting with neighbours (they have enough space).                                                                 |
| 4                                       | Available land on the plot, for growing a vegetable garden                                                            |
| Negative aspects                        |                                                                                                                       |
| 1                                       | Lack of job and business opportunities                                                                                |
| 2                                       | High transport costs                                                                                                  |
| 3                                       | High cost of water service                                                                                            |
| 4                                       | Lack of secure tenure – interviewees complained that they had not yet received the DUAT                               |
| 5                                       | Lack of movement in the neighbourhood                                                                                 |
| 6                                       | Far from the urban centre – it takes 2 hours to commute.                                                              |
| 7                                       | Far from the market                                                                                                   |
| 8                                       | Secondary school far from Chiango settlement                                                                          |

Table 13 – Description of the possible benefits and negative aspects of an *in situ* resettlement. Source: by author.

There are also other intangible costs not mentioned by the community, which must be taken into account, namely:

1. Decreased space for housing extension: the impossibility of constructing new annexes in accordance with the capacities of the families and/or in terms of the growth of the household;
2. Promotion of gentrification: The possibility of this new building attracting families with greater income, encouraging families of lower income to sell their houses and move to more distant areas / districts.

In summary, comparing the financial costs as well as the intangible costs of both processes, relocation versus *in situ* resettlement, based on the exercises above, I estimate that *in situ* resettlement would cost only 54.492,00 USD – (12%) more than the relocation process to more peripheral areas. However, it's important to note that land occupation in a resettlement in these areas implies the use of approximately 6000 m<sup>2</sup> of land (350 m<sup>2</sup> of plot per family), while an *in situ* resettlement in a three storey building may reduce the required land area by a quarter (about 2000 m<sup>2</sup>, inclusive of areas intended for outdoor spaces). Furthermore, the intangible costs of relocation cause greater negative impacts on the livelihoods of families due to lack of employment, job opportunities and social ruptures, which are difficult to mitigate. With those intangibles such gentrification could be minimised through awareness campaigns and the monitoring of families during the resettlement process, and the negative impacts related to the configuration of private spaces, and exterior spaces could be solved through a process of participatory design. This subject is developed in the next subheading.

#### 4.4 The characteristics of multi-storey social housing in Maputo

As mentioned under the previous subheading, multi-storey social housing in Maputo also can generate some negative impacts. This is perhaps due to the fact that these communities live in a transition from rural to urban daily habits (key interviewees no. 2 and no. 9). The table below resumes the predicted undesirable outcomes (intangible costs and negative impacts) in such kinds of housing, and develops a hypothetical solution.

| Mitigation of possible unwanted outcomes of collective housing buildings |                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intangible costs                                                         |                                                                   | Solutions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1                                                                        | Reduction of the space of privacy                                 | Develop together with the residents an internal regulation of use and maintenance of the building, in order to avoid conflicts between the building residents.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 2                                                                        | Loss of individual exterior area                                  | Each family could have a private exterior space (rooftop, veranda or small garden).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 3                                                                        | Decreased space for housing extension                             | Provide in each apartment an area allocated for the future extension of the dwelling. In the project Minha Casa this area corresponds to a porch area or the terrace.                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 4                                                                        | Possible promotion of gentrification                              | In DUAT attribution, include a clause which determines that the property cannot be sold in the first three years after acquisition. And an awareness campaign that informs families about the implications of living away from the city, and of the property market prices in case of sale. In this way, families are well informed about the consequences of their choices. |
| 5                                                                        | Loss of vegetable gardens                                         | Each family could have a rooftop vegetable garden such as the affordable housing projects of the AFHCO company in Johannesburg.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Negative aspects                                                         |                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 1                                                                        | Increased monthly expenditure for building maintenance            | After receiving a better and finished house, the cost of maintenance is lowered in the costs destined to improve the dwellings (plasters, finishes etc.).                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 2                                                                        | The need to use staircase (concern raised by elderly individuals) | Old people could be allocated ground floor level apartments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

Table 14 – Mitigation of possible unwanted outcomes of collective housing buildings. Source: by author.

In addition to the undesirable outcomes shared by communities, it is also important to understand what the features would be that communities would like to import from their current lifestyle to a collective way of living. According to Aravena, as mentioned in the literature review chapter, the success of social housing products is dependent on the practical application of participatory design. In line with this argument, during the fieldwork a focal group section was developed among the community of George Dimitrov in order to capture their understanding and vision in relation to the following subjects:

- 1<sup>st</sup> To understand the relationships between spaces and activities on the plot;
- 2<sup>nd</sup> To know what the main characteristics of importing to a multi-family living space would be;
- 3<sup>rd</sup> How to organise six families on the same plot.

The first exercise was carried out together with six participants, ages varying from 22 to 76 years, where five were men and one was a woman. The attributes perceived as important to the exterior spaces were: a reception area for visitors; that space guarantees an extra source of income generation such as a stall or an extra room; and includes space for the garage. The car, as an expensive asset and liability, should be protected carefully. Other activities, such as cooking and personal hygiene are done outside the house, in these cases not for cultural reasons but for lack of financial resources.



Figure 40 - First focal group exercise – relationship between spaces and activities on the plot. Source: By author, October 2017




Figure 41 - Second focal group exercise – main features of living spaces to import to a collective building. Source: By author, October 2017

On enquiring in detail what the important features of their spaces and the habits are that they would like to have guaranteed in the new collective housing building, the answers were varied, and reflected individual life experiences and ways of being in society. An elderly man requested to have a space for a small vegetable garden and to be accommodated on the ground floor level because he was too old to climb the stairs. A young girl said that what was more important for her was to have an outside space for leisure. A middle-aged man requested to have a garage for his car and the possibility to expand his house in the future. A well-respected member of the community requested to have an individual outdoor space for leisure and an outdoor toilet for visitors, which reflects the need to maintain privacy while having visitors. A young man requested to have four rooms and an exterior space that could be a veranda. All six participants actually expressed those characteristics that they think are not possible to have in a multi-storey building.

The main objective of the third exercise was to observe the reactions and behaviours of the participants in the creation of their own solutions. Each participant received a Styrofoam board that corresponded to the collective plot area and 12 Styrofoam cubes. Every two cubes corresponded to the family of each participant (see pictures 42, 43 and 44). Initially, I noticed some difficulty in understanding the exercise (to organise the six families on the same plot). I then noticed a lack of confidence and little conviction of being able to produce the model. The least confident participant was the elderly man, and the most determined participant was the 22-year-old woman. She confidently explained the solution produced, by saying that the family of the elderly man should be accommodated on the ground floor of the house. All of them should have a private garden, as well as a collective space (see picture no 44).




Figure 42, 43 and 44: Third focal group exercise – how to organise six families on the same plot. Source: By author, October 2017



A different perspective / view of gender did not come to the fore in the different kinds of interviews (keys interviews; community interviews, and focus group section), but taking into account that the only gender-balanced sample was the interviews with the community, this argument is merely indicative.

During the interview with the sociologist I asked her what she did with regard to individuals' fear and lack of confidence in participating:

*"We have a tradition here that has hampered the beginning of community participation. The fact that there were control structures, where people were controlled by a governing body of society, for everything they did. This has barred any kind of initiative and will that the community may have. Wishes that are not my neighbours' and my bosses' are not my own wishes. In Chamanculo, when we wanted to listen to people individually ... the answers were always in the direction of requesting the answer of the block chief. There has been a need to sensitize the community to understand that needs are different from family to family, and that participation is important. Participation can determine the success of the project"* (key interview no. 10).

This last statement reinforced one of the dimensions of the right to the city – *autogestion* – advocated by Lefebvre (Purcell, 2013). People should be active in the decision making on the production of urban space (*ibid.*). At the decision level, whether undertaking relocation or not, how and what alternatives are in place, the affected population is also never involved in the process but is merely informed, and even then not always in a timely manner. These situations reflect the absence of the right to the city. Participation is not merely about giving information or obtaining feedback from the community. It requires community engagement, in which voices, needs and ideas clearly influence the outcome. The fact that community members work as partners in city making allows for democratic management of the urban space (Harvey, 2008). This process, besides allowing for a natural appropriation during the creation phase, also allows community ownership of the results obtained, and continuous participation in the evolution and management of the created product.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

In summary, it is noteworthy that the guidelines governing resettlement processes in Mozambique are dispersed across a number of documents, laws, policies, strategies and regulations, making it difficult to read and comprehend the subject holistically in a unified way. In addition, the regulation presents several shortcomings raised by the various stakeholders. As such, it is clearly necessary to revise the regulations in order to create a single document that integrates all aspects and interrelations that are related to the matter.

Fieldwork also indicates that despite the outcomes of resettlement being objective, different stakeholders have different opinions on the quality of life improvements of resettled families. In the field it was found that several families improved their living conditions with regard to housing and living space characteristics, but did not improve their quality of life due to an increase in the cost of living, some elements of which relate to the physical distance from the place of origin, which also results in lack of employment opportunities, and the intangible costs such as the rupture of social assets (etc.), hindering the households' subsistence.

The sense of social justice that underpinned the process of nationalisation of land after 25 years of independence has resulted in land management that tends to benefit those with economic and political power to the detriment of the poorer classes. This argument is in the same line of argument of the authors Jenkin (2001), Jorge (2016), and Melo (2015). We could witness from fieldwork surveys that families resettled in 2011 and in 2015 have not yet received their DUAT. This unfulfilled promise

by the CMM leads one to believe that this entity (CMM) does not want to pass on control of land and its value to the low-income people.

At the same time, although stakeholders somehow acknowledge that resettlements in peripheral areas are difficult processes, which hamper families from re-establishing their livelihoods, they continue to rely on this model. The *in situ* resettlement in housing buildings of two to three storeys is seen as a process to be adopted as a form of improving land management in the municipality of Maputo. However, there is some fear for applying this approach to resettlements.

The cost benefit analysis shows that an *in situ* resettlement turns out to be only 12% more costly compared to a reallocation process. However, it entails much lower intangible costs, which can be mitigated. Communities that live in older neighbourhoods, as well as those with older family / community links, prefer to stay in their neighbourhoods because of their family roots and community links. While families living in more recent neighbourhoods, such as the neighbourhood of Polana Caniço A, prefer to be relocated to another neighbourhood. The biggest fear of families living in apartments is that of losing both their private space and outer spaces. However, I argue that design through community participation could resolve those fears, and bring about an integrated solution that could be appropriated and cared for by the beneficiaries.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

*"The most difficult project that can be given to any one of us is low-cost housing in peripheral districts, for those who cannot even afford to pay taxes. This shows the real creative capacity, the most difficult aesthetic sensibility, the most profound constructive science. That's where being creative becomes a moral imperative."*

(Forjaz, 2004: unpaginated, translated by author)

## 5.1 Reflection on the results in the light of theory

Cernea's argument (1999 and 2003) that resettlements tend to impoverish people and cause constraints for the affected people in restoring their livelihoods, is reflected in the resettlement cases undertaken within PROMAPUTO, and explored in this research project. The families who previously lived in the central districts of Maputo city (Polana Caniço A) and have been resettled in Albasine in 2011 (10 km from the original location), currently remain without access to water or electrical power on their plots. They have been resettled on empty plots with no access to basic infrastructure. The families who previously lived in Chamanculo C, located in the city centre and who have been resettled in the Albasine in 2015 (14 km from original location), despite agreeing that they do have better housing conditions and more space on their plots, are struggling to generate a monthly income, due to the distance from the urban centre, which in turns increases transport costs and decreases their access to job opportunities. The individuals who previously lived in well-located land did not need to use transport on a daily basis, and had access to the city services. This condition also sustains Melo (2015) and Jorge's (2016) arguments that this kind of process tends to promote segregation and contributes to the exclusion of people from the right to the city, in the form of access to services, job opportunities, and leisure. Those who have been relocated become city visitants, no longer part of the city.

A few families with greater negotiating capacity nonetheless have taken advantage of the resettlements. For these families, the resettlement became an opportunity rather than a loss, which is in line with the main objective of the resettlement objective, namely to boost the socio-economic development of the country (BR, 2012). My research found through fieldwork that such cases are rare as the poorest affected individuals became even more vulnerable, while the less vulnerable saw resettlement as an opportunity. Similarly, Hammar (2014) argues that displacement is paradoxical, as it can either cause loss or gains, difficulties or opportunities.

Despite laws, regulations and policies, resettlement procedures related to the analysed case studies are still far from following best practices (Melo, 2015). The intangible costs expressed by the affected communities, such as household breakdown, loss of social assets, loss of job opportunities and its devastating consequences, and reduction of available time for work and leisure in the city, are financially immeasurable. This goes hand in hand with Cernea's (2003) argument that the principle of compensation is in fact a remedy that fails to capture the intangible costs. Moreover, financial compensation for lost property described in the law of expropriation (approximately 132 USD/m<sup>2</sup>), when compared to the current market cost of construction (*Casa Minha* project – 350 USD/m<sup>2</sup> and *Casas Melhoradas* from 200 to 266 USD/m<sup>2</sup>) is absolutely beyond market prices and does not allow individuals to restore their livelihoods or complete housing works of 70 m<sup>2</sup> as stipulated by law.

Methods and procedures during resettlement are also a critical factor raised in this report. Regarding the 2011 resettlement process, families complained about the lack of communication and information during the process. These families were resettled on bush-type plots, with no access to water or electricity. This type of procedure should be called eviction, rather than resettlement and is at odds with the right to the city. Furthermore, families were seduced by the idea of having access to secure land tenure. The national policy is primarily based on a guarantee made to the resettled communities of access to secure land tenure, but up to the date of the survey (October, 2017), the families had not yet received the DUAT. This reminds of Melo's (2015) statement on the delivery of "false promises". The non-delivery of DUATs may be related to the lack of follow-up activities performed by the field teams, which leads to forgetfulness. It may also demonstrate an unwillingness on the part of the CMM to lose control of the land to people of lesser resources.

If in areas farthest from the city centre there is resistance in granting DUATs to low-income people in well-located areas where the value of the land is higher, the case is even more pronounced. This might



well be one of the reasons why *in situ* resettlement has not yet been tested, together with the fear of initiating a new process which is deemed to be costly and laborious. Keeping in mind the scarcity of land within the municipality of Maputo, and knowing that resettlement operations to the outskirts of the city tend to allocate 300m<sup>2</sup> to 400 m<sup>2</sup> plots per family, *in situ* resettlements could reduce this land occupation to one-third by housing densification into two and three-storey buildings.

It is also important to highlight that in Mozambique the main source of state housing provision for low-income individuals takes place through resettlement operations triggered by infrastructure construction, urban renewal or natural disasters (Melo, 2015). Usually, outcomes are diverse, influenced by the specific locations, which determine the type of resettlement (rural vs. urban), and the type of agents that lead the project – e.g. private sector versus public sector, donors versus local budgeting, municipality teams versus external consultants. These resettlement operations tend to produce social housing products that neglect the right to the city of the affected resettled communities, due to the distant location of the new settlements, and the top-down procedures in management and design of the housing supplied. Although resettlements are the largest producers of social housing products in Mozambique, the regulation launched in 2012 is not linked to the National Housing Policy and Strategy launched in the previous year. This lack of integration does not contribute to better outcomes.

Despite knowing that the Mozambican government does not have the capacity to provide housing solutions to a wider range of people in urban areas, especially lower-income groups who constitute the majority of urban inhabitants, experiences in low-cost housing in Maputo city centre by both the private sector (*Casa Minha*) and the cooperation sector (*Casas Melhoradas*) have shown that it is possible to develop housing for low-income people in the city centre at much reduced cost. These projects evolve in terms of the concept of incremental housing, allow people to participate during construction and take part in the decision-making. Taking into account Purcell's reflection (2013), these facts contribute to a better appropriation of the built environment and thus provide better access to the right of the city.

The cost-benefit analysis exercise was essential to understand that *in situ* resettlement is not substantially more expensive when compared to a resettlement on the outskirts of the city. By using Chamanculo C resettlement costs as a basis for comparison, it was verified that an *in situ* resettlement for the same 17 families would only be 12% more expensive (54.492,00 USD). However, the intangible costs and negative effects of resettlement on the periphery are substantially bigger than *in situ* resettlement. It was also found that the intangible costs of *in situ* resettlement, such as gentrification, could be mitigated through information and participatory preventive actions, while the intangible costs of resettlement on the periphery are the main causes of families' inability to restore livelihoods. Clark (2000) argues that social fabric is the most important asset of low-income people living in informal settlements. Following these ideas, it is important to bear in mind that, especially for older individuals, the loss of social and affective bonds with the community of origin are an engine for instilling morbidity and sadness among resettled individuals.

According to the fieldwork results, the stakeholders of resettlement operations – such as the private sector, the public sector, the funders, the community itself and the investors, agree that resettlements that have taken place so far, are unsustainable, extending the horizontal occupation of scarce land, and creating tense relations and distrust among affected people and implementing agencies. *In situ* resettlements would be the solution to improve land management by the densification of intervention areas and enabling all citizens to benefit from the new urban structures and access to the right to the city.

Field-research has allowed me to understand that communities are naturally changing from rural cultural habits, where activities such as cooking and personal hygiene are carried out outside the

dwelling, towards more urban cultural habits where the integration of these activities in the interior of the house are conditioned only by the lack of economic resources. The greatest fears of communities in living in two to threestorey buildings are associated with the loss of private outdoor space and the loss of privacy. However, I subscribe to Aravena's argument (2014), that participatory design is the main key to producing successful social housing, where the role of the community is not that of mere spectator who is informed punctually about the progress of the project, but that of main actor in defining solutions for their own living spaces.

## 5.2 Recommendations

Below are some recommendations, in a table format, which are a result of this research work, and may hopefully be useful for future projects related to resettlement operations, or even within the scope of policy revisions associated with the theme of this research.

| Field of action                                                  | Recommendations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Law, policies and regulation                                     | <p>Within the ongoing review of the resettlement regulation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• differentiate rural and urban procedures and outcomes;</li> <li>• revise the compensation formula for the loss of assets;</li> <li>• articulate the regulation with other national policies;</li> <li>• integrate/compile all law directives regarding resettlement operations in one single document;</li> <li>• interconnect resettlement products as opportunities to develop social housing products; and</li> <li>• make the submission of RAP mandatory, including an <i>in situ</i> resettlement solution, in the process of obtaining the Environmental license.</li> </ul> |
| Resettlement procedures (communication, information, engagement) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create a field office cabinet to allow for daily, fluid communication with the affected communities;</li> <li>• Give options to the affected people (<i>in situ</i> versus periphery resettlement), by explaining the implications (negative and positive impacts) of the different choices;</li> <li>• involve the affected communities in participatory decision making processes; and</li> <li>• provide monitoring for a further six months post occupation.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Land management                                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Define in PPUs clear areas for social housing and measures to prevent future eventual gentrification processes;</li> <li>• Approve urbanisation plans in terms of the inclusion of a RAP that considers <i>in situ</i> resettlement for low-income communities currently residing in areas, covered by the plan area; and</li> <li>• Attribute DUAT titles prior to resettlement.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Social Housing products                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community participatory design in the production of social housing to be mandatory; and</li> <li>• Promote and disseminate low-cost technologies among small builders in the neighbourhoods, using <i>Casas Melhoradas</i> and <i>Minha Casa</i> as examples.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Budgeting                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include six months of post occupation monitoring in the budget; and</li> <li>• Visit the hosting areas <i>a priori</i> to budget allocation in order to include budget for lacking basic infrastructure.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

|          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Practice | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Launch a pilot project of <i>in situ</i> resettlement in order to confirm and monitor the costs;</li> <li>• Have an external supervisory team; and</li> <li>• Apply sanctions/penalties to the entities that do not make sure the hosting areas have the conditions prescribed in the approved RAP.</li> </ul> |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Table 15 – Final recommendations

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## ANNEX 1:

### 1.1 List of community interviewees

| George Dimitrov Community                          |                   | Age | Gender |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----|--------|
| 01                                                 | Interviewee no 1  | 72  | Male   |
| 02                                                 | Interviewee no 2  | 45  | Female |
| 03                                                 | Interviewee no 3  | 52  | Female |
| Chamanculo Community                               |                   |     |        |
| 04                                                 | Interviewee no 4  | 35  | Female |
| 05                                                 | Interviewee no 5  | 38  | Female |
| 06                                                 | Interviewee no 6  | 75  | Male   |
| Polana Caniço A Community                          |                   |     |        |
| 07                                                 | Interviewee no 7  | 29  | Male   |
| 08                                                 | Interviewee no 8  | 25  | Female |
| 09                                                 | Interviewee no 9  | 22  | Male   |
| Chiango, in Albasine Community (resettled in 2015) |                   |     |        |
| 10                                                 | Interviewee no 10 | 32  | Female |
| 11                                                 | Interviewee no 11 | 24  | Male   |
| 12                                                 | Interviewee no 12 | 55  | Male   |
| Albasine community (resettled in 2011)             |                   |     |        |
| 13                                                 | Interviewee no 13 | 55  | Male   |
| 14                                                 | Interviewee no 14 | 40  | Female |
| 15                                                 | Interviewee no 15 | 45  | Male   |

### 1.2 List of key interviewees

| Sector             | Organisation                                                  | Interviews                                    | Interviewee no |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Founders           | World Bank                                                    | PROMAPUTO Team Leader                         | 01             |
| Public sector      | Conselho Municipal de Maputo (CMM)                            | Directorate of Urban Planning and Environment | 04             |
|                    |                                                               | Department of Environmental Management        | 05<br>10       |
|                    | Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER) | Consultant                                    | 09             |
|                    | Direção Nacional de Urbanização e Habitação (DNUH)            | Director                                      | 07             |
| Academic           | Faculdade de Arquitectura e Planeamento Físico (FAPF)         | Faculty Director                              | 02             |
| Former politicians | Ministry of Public Works and Housing                          | Deputy Minister of Public Works               | 08             |
|                    |                                                               | Minister of Public Works                      | 11             |
| Private sector     | Minha Casa                                                    | Director                                      | 03             |
| NGOs               | Kaya clinic                                                   | Director of the Kaya Clinic Project           | 06             |
| Investor           | International Investment Company                              | Chief Executive Officer                       | 12             |

### 1.3 List of focal groups participant's session

| Nº | Participants              | Block no | Age | Gender |
|----|---------------------------|----------|-----|--------|
| 01 | Participant no 1          | 35       | 22  | Female |
| 02 | Participant no 2          | 29       | 43  | Male   |
| 03 | Participant no 3          | 33       | 57  | Male   |
| 04 | Participant no 4          | 25       | 42  | Male   |
| 05 | Participant no 5          | 25       | 67  | Male   |
| 06 | Participant no 6          | 25       | 76  | Male   |
| 07 | Facilitator - sociologist |          | 40  | Female |

## ANNEX 2:

### 2.1 Currency exchange rate table:

| Description of the activity                            | Month and year | Bank and date of exchange rate    | Exchange rate |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| 17 compensated families                                | 2014           | Source: CMM, 2015                 | 1USD/30,2 MZN |
| Installation of PT and medium voltage network          | September 2015 | Banco BCI on 24/09/2015           | 1USD/40,06MZN |
| Low voltage network execution                          | September 2015 | Banco BCI on 24/09/2015           | 1USD/40,06MZN |
| Opening of water holes and domestic supply             | October 2015   | Banco de Moçambique on 30/10/2015 | 1USD/42,11MZN |
|                                                        | April 2016     | Banco de Moçambique on 04/04/2016 | 1USD/51,99MZN |
| Construction of fence walls for the PT and water holes | September 2016 | Banco de Moçambique on 26/10/2016 | 1USD/78,04MZN |
| Public lighting installation                           | September 2015 | Banco BCI on 24/09/2015           | 1USD/40,06MZN |
| Residential power connections                          | September 2015 | Banco BCI on 24/09/2015           | 1USD/40,06MZN |
| Construction of the Albasine market                    | August 2015    | Banco BCI on 08/21/2015           | 1USD/39,83MZN |

**ANNEX III – Clearance Certificate**

**SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING  
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE**

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**CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE**

**PROTOCOL NUMBER: SOAP061/06/2017**

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**PROJECT TITLE:** Alternatives to involuntary resettlement: making an argument for in situ multi-storey social housing in Maputo

**INVESTIGATOR/S:** Marcia Andreia Cristino de Oliveira (Student no #1471459)

**SCHOOL:** Architecture and Planning

**DEGREE PROGRAMME:** Master of Built Environment (MBE)

**DATE CONSIDERED:** 31 August 2017

**EXPIRY DATE:** 31 August 2018

**DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE:** APPROVED

**CHAIRPERSON**

(Professor Daniel Irurah)

**DATE:** 05-09-2017

cc: Supervisor/s: Vanessa Melo

**DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATORS**

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to endure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee.

**Signature**

**Date**