

Participatory Development Planning and Democratic Governance

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**Participatory Development Planning and Democratic
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
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Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'P. Wenzel'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

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28th February, 1996

Table of Content

List Of Abbreviations

<u>Abstract</u>	1
<u>1) Introduction</u>	2
1.1) Development Context	2
1.2) Structure Of The Thesis	7
<u>2) Theoretical Perspective And Research Methodology</u>	10
2.1) Research Design	10
2.2) Analytical Framework: Democratisation And Governance	18
2.2.1) Definition Of The Concepts Of Dynamics, Complexity And Diversity	19
2.2.2) Concepts Of Good And Democratic Governance	20
2.2.3) Roleplayers And Modes Of Governance	23
2.2.4) Participatory Democracy And Normative Assumptions	27
2.3) Participation: Meaning And Analytical Concepts	32
2.3.1) Modernisation And Structuralism	33
2.3.2) Definitions Of Participation	38
2.3.2.1) Citizen Participation	41
2.3.2.2) Popular Participation	45
2.3.3) Issues In Participation	48
2.3.3.1) Patterns Of Participation	48
2.3.3.2) Types Of Representativeness	51
2.3.3.3) The Issue Of Process Vs. Product	53
2.3.4) Obstacles To Participation	56
2.3.5) Mechanisms For Citizen And Popular Participation	60
2.3.5.1) Participatory Planning In Advanced Industrialised Countries	60
2.3.5.2) Strengthening Participation And Local Self-Governance In Development	61

<u>3) New National Development Frameworks</u>	67
3.1) The Reconstruction And Development Programme	67
3.2) Technocrats At Work: Guidelines For Development Planning	74
3.3) The Development Facilitation Act	80
3.3.1) Background	80
3.3.2) The New Approach: Managing Integrated Development Planning	82
3.3.2.1) Goal One: Expediting Development	83
3.3.2.2) Goal Two: Future Policy Formulation	83
3.4) The Role Of Provincial Government	85
3.5) Strength And Weaknesses	86
 <u>4) African Populists And New Technocrats: Implementation Of Participatory Development Planning In Gauteng</u>	 90
4.1) South Africa's Forum Experience	91
4.1.1) Historical Background	91
4.1.2) New Paradigms And Politics Of Transition	93
4.1.3) Capacity And Limitations Of Forums	97
4.1.3.1) Internal Structure	97
4.1.3.2) Organisational Power Of Participants As98 Capacity Of Forums	98
4.1.3.3) Political Environment And The Future Of Negotiation Forums	99
4.2) Participation In The Reconstruction And Development Programme: Popular Participation? And For What?	103
4.2.1) Convictions Of Political Actors An Organisational Environment	104
4.2.2) "Go Out And Organise!"	108
4.2.3) The Original Community Development Forum Model: Institutional Perfectionism	109
4.2.3.1) Functions And Powers	109
4.2.3.2) Internal Structure	110
4.2.3.3) Development Forum Projects	111
4.2.4) Successes And Failures In Gauteng	112

4.2.5) Shortcomings Of The Community Development Forum Approach	120
4.2.5.1) Implementation Design And Local Dynamics	121
4.2.5.2) Development Forum - Local Government Relationships: Development Or Conflict?	124
4.2.5.3) Catch-All Design: Structure-led And Multi Issue	127
4.2.5.4) Co-option Of Civil Society?	130
4.3) Provincial Power Politics Defeat Local Development Policy	134
4.3.1) The Bureaucratic Agenda: Provincial Implementation Of The Development Facilitation Act	135
4.3.2) The Latest In Participative Development Planning	138
4.3.3) Participation In Drawing Up Land Development Objectives	141
4.4) Handle Participation With Care: Realism Or Containment?	143
4.4.1) Provincial Level Mechanisms	144
4.4.2) Local Level Mechanisms	146
4.4.3) Existing And Possible Mechanisms: Why Is The Current Practice So Limited?	147
4.5) Governance Trends: An Autonomous State Burdened With An Apathetic Society?	153
<u>5) Research Synthesis</u>	161
5.1) Conclusions	161
5.2) Policy Implications	173
5.3) Outlook: Development And Participatory Democracy In South Africa	182
 <u>Appendices</u>	
Appendix A) List of Interviews	185
Appendix B) Guidelines for Development Planning:	
The Planning Cycle	187
National - Provincial Relations in Planning	188
Development Responsibilities at Provincial Level	189
Interfaces between National and Provincial Levels	190
Appendix C) The Development Facilitation Framework:	
Planning System	191
Project Approval Process	192

Project Approval Process	192
Appendix D) CDF Constitutions:	
Framework for the Constitution of the Jameson Park Development Forum (JPDF)	193
Framework for the Constitution of the Greater Nigel Development Forum (GNDF)	197
Appendix E) Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:	
Networking Committees - A link between Government and Civil Society	202
Functions of the Networking Committees	203
Structure of the Networking Committees	204
Where do LDFs come in?	205
Useful Projects of LDFs	206
The Structure of LDFs and CDFs	207
Functions and Respective Needs of LDFs	208
How should LDFs be linked to the Governmental RDP Structures?	209
A Mandate different from the PWV Economic and Development Forum	211
Structure of the PWV Economic and Development Forum	212
Membership in the PWV Economic and Development Forum	213
Appendix F) CDFs and LDFs in 1995:	
Applications for Project Proposals	214
RDP Structures in Gauteng	215
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model - Annexure 1	216
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model - Annexure 2	217
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model - Annexure 3	218
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model - Annexure 4	219
Core Group Restructuring Workshop (November)	220
Appendix G) Options for Public Service Delivery	223
<u>Bibliography</u>	224

List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ABSA	Amalgamated Bank of South Africa
BLA	Black Local Area
BSA	Business South Africa
CAD	Computer Assisted Design
CASE	Community Agency for Social Enquiry, Johannesburg
CBM	Consultative Business Movement
CBM	Consultative Business Movement
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDC	Community Development Corporation
CDF	Community Development Forum
CDS	Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape
CDT	Community Development Trust
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CEAS	Central Economic Advisory Service
CIM	Computer Integrated Manufacturing
CoCom	Co-ordinating Committee (Pretoria NWC)
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP	Conservative Party
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg
CS	Corporate Services (Gauteng)
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DDPE&W	Department of Development Planning, Environment and Works (Gauteng)
DEAF	Department of Economic Affairs and Finance (Gauteng)
DFA	Development Facilitation Act, 1994
DFB	Development Facilitation Bill
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DIE	German Development Institute
DP	Democratic Party
DPC	Development and Planning Commission

DRC	Development Resources Centre, A Service NGO (Gauteng)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EOI	Export Oriented Industrialisation
ETDPP	Education Training and Development Practitioners Project (GTZ)
FCC	Fiscal and Finance Commission
FEPD	Forum for Effective Planning and Development
ETQA	Education and Training Qualifications Authority
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FF	Freedom Front
FFC	Fiscal and Financial Commission
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEDF	Gauteng Economic and Development Forum (formerly PWV E&DF)
GJMC	Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council
GJTMC	Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council
GNP	Gross National Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GNU	Government of National Unity
GONGO	Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation
GPTMC	Greater Pretoria Transitional Metropolitan Council
GSP&DM	Graduate School of Public and Development Management, WITS
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Co-operation
HRD	Human Resource Development
HSRC	Human Science Research Council
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IDRC	International Development Research Corporation
IDT	Independent Development Trust
IDTT	Inter-Departmental Task Team
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGF	Inter-Governmental Forum
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
JHB	Johannesburg
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
KT	Kagiso Trust
LDF	Local Development Forum

LDO	Land Development Objective
LED	Local Economic Development
LEDF	Local Economic Development Forum
LGNF	Local Government Negotiation Forum
LGTA	Local Government Transition Act, 1993
LRA	Labour Relations Act
LRDP	Local Reconstruction and Development Programme
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MEC	Member of Executive Council (a provincial minister)
MERG	Macro Economic Research Group
MinMEC	Minister - Member of Executive Council
MSS	Metropolitan Substructure
MP	Member of Parliament (National)
MPL	Member of Provincial Legislature
NBI	National Business Initiative
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEF	National Economic Forum
NEM	Normative Economic Model
NGDS	National Growth and Development Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHF	National Housing Forum
NIC	Newly Industrialising Countries
NIEP	National Institute for Economic Policy
NLGNF	National Local Government Negotiation Forum
NP	National Party
NPE	New Political Economy
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NTB	National Training Board
NTSI	National Training Strategy Initiative
NWC	Networking Committee (five sub-regions, Gauteng)
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PANGA	Pretoria NGO Association (Pretoria chapter of NGO Coalition)
PEDLAC	Provincial Economic Development and Labour Council

PLANACT	A Service NGO, Johannesburg
PLP	Presidential Lead Projects
PO	People's Organisation
PPBS	Planning Programming Budgeting, System
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PSA	Public Servants Association
PSC	Public Service Commission / Provincial Service Commission
PTA	Pretoria
PW	Phillip Wenzel
PWW	Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereniging (now Gauteng Province)
PWW E&DF	PWW Economic and Development Forum (now GEDF)
PZ	Planning Zone (Ward level in Greater Pretoria)
PZF	Planning Zone Forum (CDF in Pretoria)
QUAFO	Quasi-Governmental Forum
QUANGO	Quasi-Governmental Non-Governmental Organisation
R&D	Research and Development
RDAC	Regional Development Advisory Commission
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
REDF	Regional Economic and Development Forum
ROI	Rate-of-Return on Investment
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RSC	Regional Service Council
SA	South Africa
SACOB	South African Chamber of Business
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACS	South African Communication Service
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SAQA	South African Qualifications Authority
SBDC	Small Business Development Corporation
SERD	Socio-Economic and Regional Development
SGT	Self Governing Territories
SMME	Small Medium and Micro Sized Enterprises
SWOT	Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Treats Analysis

TLC	Transitional Local Council
TMC	Transitional Metropolitan Council
TNC	Trans-National Corporations
TNDA	Transitional National Development Agency
TNDT	Transitional National Development Trust (same as above)
TPA	Transvaal Provincial Administration
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNISA	University of South Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
Vista I, II	Consultative Conference on Gauteng Government - Civil Society Relationships, June 1994 and July 1995
WAM	White Male Afrikaners
WC	Ward Committee (Greater Pretoria)
WITS	University of the Witwatersrand
WLA	White Local Area
WP	White Paper
ZBB	Zero Based Budgeting

Participatory Development Planning and Democratic Governance

The development of a range of regional and national socio-economic and development forums has been one of the most unusual and facilitating phenomena of the recent system transformation and contemporary South Africa. In light of these experiences, the study covers the initial attempts of the Gauteng provincial government to structure citizen and community participation in the local implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

After reviewing the literature on participation and governance, an analytical framework of good, democratic governance is developed. Special consideration is given to cognitive factors in decision-making.

Thereafter the study examines the political and legal development frameworks of the new Government of National Unity. These policy frameworks form the basis for a thorough analysis of the functioning of 'community' and 'local development forum' approach to community participation in development in the province of Gauteng, South Africa's economic power-house. This approach was pursued during 1994 and the beginning of 1995. After the discarding of this approach - owing to a host of political and bureaucratic reasons - a more technocratic policy initiative for community involvement has been started by the provincial government. Also this latest provincial approach called 'participatory development planning' is investigated.

The study critically analyses these developments; special attention is paid to the danger of the co-option of civil society. The report concludes that the realisation of a truly participatory mode of governance is vital for South Africa's socio-economic and political development, but that there are a number of issues and dangers which need further attention. Policy implications and recommendations are made from a pragmatic and developmental perspective.

"Effective democracy implies and
requires empowered citizens"¹

1) Introduction

The institutional requirements for the strengthening of participation as well as the necessary development policy framework form the core interest of the study. Administrative and political capacity of the government to translate participatory development strategies into practice strongly influence the possible degrees of citizen and community participation as well as self-help in any political system. The study will not only identify and analyse the mechanisms of the decision-making structures of political and administrative organisations in order to identify obstacles and necessary conditions for success, but also in order to be able to provide final strategic recommendations in support of implementing the RDP's participatory development objectives. The purpose of the study is to provide a baseline for the future transformation of state - civil society relationships and development planning processes by examining the content, nature and trends of past and current political and bureaucratic public policy-making and policy management processes the second and third tiers of government. Critical decisions are being made now about political and administrative structures² in South Africa which could have long term implications for the future, regardless of what changes may be made at the national level as a result of the current constitutional negotiations.

1.1) Development Context

The transition to a democratic dispensation in South Africa is unique in comparison to other recently democratising countries owing to the fact that in South Africa there have been both processes of democratisation and legitimisation of state institutions on national as well as local level. However, local government is a mess³. Inter alia, because of the slight phasing, i.e. non-simultaneous negotiations and elections for national and provincial parliaments and local government, problems in

¹African National Congress (ANC), 1994, p. 121.

²To be understood broadly, encompassing organisations, set of rules, laws and procedures.

³The Star, 28/8/1995, p. 10.

regard to the actual implementation of development at local level arose. Also, the historic legitimisation crisis continues owing to massive unaccounted for funds, lack of technical and project management skills and an absence of effective developmental policy formulation mechanisms. This problem situation seems even more severe in the light of the new officially stated approach to policy-making. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) lists integrated, people-driven development⁴ as one of the basic policy principles and locates the community and local government as the major loci of responsibility for the implementation of programmes and projects, i.e. bottom-up development. However, the question of capacity at this level has not been properly addressed⁵, nor are effective strategies in place with regard to related issues, such as inter-governmental co-ordination or local government transformation⁶.

The current South African policy debates as well as basically every policy document, whether from political parties, government or the administration, are characterised by strong emphasis on the participatory manner in which public policies have to be developed. The points of departure are concepts concerning participatory democracy as well as the new policy principles, such as people-driven, bottom-up local economic development, empowerment, etc., derived from the RDP base document. Consultation of and participation by the people has become one of the prime procedural requirements; there has, however, hardly been any clarification on what is actually meant by consultation and participation. Apart from constantly rhetorically stressing the importance of envisaged democratic, participatory and responsive modes of governance, the governments on national and provincial level as well as management and technocratic elites of the South African public service have so far unable to operationalise and implement these concepts. Adding to this lack of clarity and leadership, concepts often referred to, such as 'the people' or 'the community', are ambiguous. Too commonly, they are delineated and referred to in a

⁴ANC, 1994, paragraph (1.3.3), p. 5.

⁵If current poor administration and lack of co-ordination capacity are considered, the question of institutionalising 'new' structures for 'new functions' seems somehow millenarian: "The lack of liaison mechanisms and administrative capacity in the province [and not only there, PWV] leads to delays or even the non-delivery of funds where NGOs are involved in contractual relations with the provinces.", *The Star*, 4/9/1995, p. 11.

⁶Compare the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, Republic of South Africa, 9/ 1994 (i.e. the version presented to parliament on the 21st of September and the 'final' one made for public release, November 1994). Generally speaking, all current South African WPs lack clarity in the operational dimension..

collectivist way as comprising only the 'historically disadvantaged' which led or participated in 'the struggle', excluding other race groups⁷ and interests⁸. Nor does such a conception meet the common definition of resident, i.e. inhabitant of a specific, geographically defined area. Concerning the definitions of civil society and participation one has to acknowledge the influence of political ideologies, e.g. varying belief systems in regard to participation. For example, structuralist / leftist theoretical approaches to participation which would conceptualise it as liberation and empowerment (popular participation)⁹ has different implications for structuring state - civil society relations to a classical or neo-liberal conviction. If this somewhat monistic understanding of democracy¹⁰ is translated into practice, dangers concerning the successful building of one non-racial South African nation might arise in the future because classical liberal ideas of a unitary citizenship, democratic ideals and the notion of equality are altered in a fundamental way. The issue is not the threat to liberal theory, but rather that exclusive conceptions of participation might create the false expectation for those who participate that they are going to benefit in a way others will not. Also, concrete integration of former white local areas and so-called townships may be hindered.

Besides certain exclusive discourses¹¹ and potentially elitist local politics, a broader democratic concern arises. Two basic rationales of this paper need to be made explicit. Firstly, the study assumes that there is not only scope but also necessity for participation at all levels of government and during each stage of the policy and project cycle¹². Not all policy instruments and institutional arrangements

⁷Although potentially controversial in the new non-racial South Africa, the author feels that there is a need to continue to stratify the citizenry along the 'old racial' lines in order to make inequalities and dissimilarities explicit. By black, Africans, Coloured and Indian are meant. Reference to the specific racial group when necessary will be made, but otherwise the more generic term, black, will be employed. In doing so, care will be taken not to view blacks as a homogenous group because clearly political affiliations will vary between and within the respective racial groups.

⁸For these arguments put forward please refer, inter alia, to Chipkin, 1995; Friedman, 1993; Friedman, Reitzes, 1995; Marks, 1995.

⁹Wide parts of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) internalised this political ideology as part of their belief systems. For the concept of belief systems, please note Sabatier's work presented below.

¹⁰Steffani, 1980.

¹¹For the purpose of this thesis the term 'discourse' will be used interchangeably with the term debate; it will be used to mean a "fairly comprehensive and systematically articulated ensemble of specific ways and modes of talking about particular areas of social life either with general institutions, professions and disciplines or with certain general ideological and political positions. They are at once discourse and social practice." Manganyi, Du Toit, 1990, p. 95.

¹²Although talking of policy formulation and implementation in this study, this order shall not imply that the heuristic concept of the paper is based on a separation between these two as distinct phases, because on the one hand the policy frameworks analysed (RDP, DFA) are more frameworks for

result in the attainment of their goals and objectives¹³. The specific set of participatory mechanisms employed determines within a specific given context, inter alia, the legitimacy and sustainability of the mode of governance, and thus strongly influences, both the real policy impact of citizens and communities as well as political legitimacy and socio-economic efficiency / development. Secondly, if the new South African democratic dispensation simply adopts procedural and conventional liberal constitutional, legal and political forms which underpin western systems of government and political thought, an effective democracy which includes the participation on an equal substantive basis of all its citizens will elude South Africa¹⁴.

Progress in terms of implementing the RDP and actual improvements in the delivery of basic needs to the historically disadvantaged have been slow. In regard to the evolving development practice in South Africa it becomes apparent that the first two years of the Government of National Unity (GNU) have been mainly used by the politico-administrative complex to sort out its own capacity problems, e.g. amalgamation of the former provincial and so-called homeland administrations into the new federalist framework according to the Interim Constitution, change management for public sector transformation as well as institution - but only to some degree real capacity - building. The major new legal and administrative / procedural frameworks of development, i.e. corporate strategic and development planning, are either still in the process of their formulation or the national and provincial administrations has only recently begun to translate them into practice. During these recent developments, many organisational and political constraints have been encountered. In spite of all the participatory 'RDP-speak', many officials, both the 'old guard' and new political appointees, have often acted or responded in a way which indicates their underlying statist, top-down and / or welfarist convictions.

change. On the other hand, taking into account that many programmes can only be conducted with assistance / by non-government organisation which are not legally forced to co-operate as hierarchical administrative structures are, the interaction between the formally policy formulating and implementing actors makes an holistic approach advisable, i.e. combining policy formulation and implementation.

¹³The assumptions are based on both practical experience with the implementation of participatory mechanisms as well as the general body of literature concerning policy instruments in the context of social reform programmes. For the first please see Atkinson, 1992. Concerning the latter refer to Le Grand as well as Howet, 1993.

¹⁴Degenaar, 1990, Meintjes, 1995, p. 7.

Participation, defined as taking part in and ownership of development, constitutes a continuous spectrum from consultation to local self-governance and aims at the whole social, economic and political dynamics in the context of empowerment¹⁵. Participation is both a means and an instrument of development. Participation as the subjective and democratisation as the objective aspect of the same situation are closely linked to each other¹⁶. In the new South Africa, although influenced in many instances by hidden agendas and politically predetermined policy outcomes, consultation of the people in regard to the development of new policy frameworks in fact took place widely. However, two areas of concern arise. Firstly, there seems to be a certain bias towards involving national or provincial collective actors. Empowerment of under-resourced groups or strata of society which are not well organised or not organised has not been seriously undertaken. Secondly, the purpose (increased legitimacy in policy making or resource mobilisation for development) and the democratic participation (information dissemination, joint decision-making, citizen's control) are not well defined. In recent development literature the term participation encompasses far more than just the aspect of being consulted¹⁷. In South Africa, real impact on policy development owing to public or popular participation, especially by local level organs of civil society such as community based organisations, has yet to evolve.

The importance for exploring the politics of policy at local and provincial level is obvious. Here, the dynamics in general and specifically participatory mechanisms employed in the first phase of the policy cycle, i.e. during policy formulation and planning, are of special importance, if the new realpolitik is supposed to break effectively with past basically top-down and paternalistic approaches. Not only local dynamics, resulting from the heterogeneity of interests in and between communities, influence outcomes, but the emerging political styles and cultures based on political belief systems, as well as the general dominant policy principles and policy frameworks stimulated in the RDP, the nationally negotiated Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) and the new approach to development planning also play crucial roles. Owing to these complex processes

¹⁵Leffler-Franke, 1994, pp. 6-10.

¹⁶Vilmar, 1986, p. 339.

¹⁷Khadka, 1991; Nuschler, 1987; Tetzlaff, 1992.

with various interconnections, a broad analysis of dominant modes of governance regarding the new format of development planning is crucial for an assessment of democratising trends in South Africa.

1.2) Structure Of The Thesis

The research interest of the thesis consists of two intertwined themes. Firstly, on the basis of a theoretical discussion of the most important concepts concerning the participation debate, the study will assess the policy environment in South Africa using a governance framework. Secondly, the thesis will focus more practically on the provincial government level. Here, Gauteng's policy initiatives for formulating a participatory framework of development planning and realising community participation in the RDP will serve as a case study. Some comparisons with other provinces will be drawn; however, given the peculiarities of each region and the differing approaches to administration, any generalisations from research founded regionally on Gauteng, if possible at all, has to be deduced carefully.

The first chapter will outline, on the basis of South African and international literature, knowledge about best practice in participatory development. After having completed in an introductory way a brief description of the research design employed, important theoretical concepts of the research methodology, i.e. governance as an analytical framework and participation will be identified and presented. Additionally, the study will be sensitive towards underlying belief systems and cognitive developments. The main concepts of participation, such as citizen / public participation, popular participation, community involvement in development, etc., practical mechanisms, conflicting convictions and interpretations and, if translated into practice, their resulting implications for future development success in South Africa will be covered. Out of this discussion, which is informed by additional taxonomies of important related concepts such as inclusivity and representivity, a template for assessing the currently envisaged participative development planning approaches and techniques on national level and in Gauteng will emerge.

Hereafter, the two main empirical chapters' focus will be placed upon listing and exploring the policy environments, as well as actual implementation processes,

of the new South African participative development planning frameworks, differentiated into national and provincial policy initiatives and dynamics. The RDP will serve as the overarching framework of reference regarding development policy objectives. Referring to the RDP's stated goal of democratising the state and South African society¹⁸, the second chapter will ask which general approaches to participatory policy-making have been followed during the first two years after the first democratic elections, or which are envisaged for the near future, within the context of formulating new development planning frameworks. This will entail exploring the policy environment, i.e. actual policies and respective policy instruments concerning the new development framework legislation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) for development. Specifically, the RDP as the broad growth and development strategy, the DFA for quick release of land and fast track development, and the new 'Guidelines for Development Planning'¹⁹ from the Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD), will be analysed.

Chapter three, the second empirical part, will focus on the provincial level. Gauteng's initial community and local development forum (CDF, LDF) approach to participative development planning sought during 1994 by the RDP Commission under MPL Ben Turok, which has been partly abandoned beginning 1995, as well as the more recent policy shift towards focusing on the implementation of the DFA led by the Department of Development Planning Environment and Works (DDPE&W) will be evaluated according to the degree of authentic participation envisaged or realised. Additionally, the envisaged participative development frameworks will be contextualised by briefly discussing the Gauteng Economic and Development Forum (GEDF) as well as other existing mechanisms of citizens involvement such as section 59 and 60 committees on local government level. The political forces at play in the area, i.e. the relevant political parties and other organisations, will be discussed and referred to indirectly when analysing the types of issues which feature strongly in the recent developments.

On the basis of a critical research synthesis of the conceptual and empirical parts, the study will conclude with: firstly, critically highlighting the broad research conclusions and discussing policy implications from a pragmatic, developmental

¹⁸ANC, 1994, chapter 5.

¹⁹RSA, 1995a, 1995b.

perspective; and, secondly, an outlook regarding probable developments in South African development and its future state - civil society relationships. By this specific combination of research objectives, a clear understanding of the dominant patterns of development policy formulation and implementation in this current dynamic and interesting phase will be developed.



2) Theoretical Perspective And Research Methodology

Due to the exploratory, partly conceptual approach of the thesis the section below will briefly clarify the main theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks used. These are, on the one side, the concepts of participation and good, democratic governance; on the other side more cognitive notions, such as the concepts of belief systems / political culture are deemed important. This chapter will commence with a brief explanation of the research design.

2.1) Research Design

The research will be guided by the interest in South Africa's consolidation of democracy and in the actual translation of the participatory philosophy of the RDP into practice, i.e. attention will be paid to the nature of citizen and popular participation as well as participative mechanisms and procedures of public involvement introduced in the process of implementation of the RDP. In this context, the analysis will attempt to incorporate underlying belief systems and political cultures of the actors. This will encompass the theoretical bases, e.g. political participation analysed from a modernisation vs. structuralist tradition perspective as well as underlying liberal / pluralistic, Marxist and elitist democracy theories. Owing to the early stage of the implementation of the RDP a detailed analysis of the impact of participative development planning will prove difficult, if not impossible. Thus the emphasis here will lie on describing and analysing the broader political and social environment in which the implementation of the community development forum approach and the new development planning frameworks takes place in general. The work will not explore the theoretical bases of the legitimacy and legitimation of the new South African dispensation in detail, but rather it will assume that acceptance of the state's moral authority needs to be built and maintained as a result of (a) effective delivery / extension of services (perceived) and (b) inclusive / representative policy-making - and disappearance of corruption, arbitrary and authoritarian behaviour of the state / public service. Concerning the latter one might add that collaborative processes bring political, technical, and values oriented

criteria together in the decision -making process. Inclusive co-operative processes can engender greater satisfaction with the outcome because the process legitimates diverse perspectives. Satisfaction with policy outputs comes from believing that one's views were heard and respected and the conclusion of that process was fair and appropriate. These elements are often summarised as psychological and procedural satisfaction.

The actual techniques of the study, besides being based on policy analysis methodology, employ case study methodology²⁰, such as analysis of policy documents, media and literature and their comparison with international development material, but it is not a comparative study. The dominant modes of analysis, in a rather explorative nature, consist of the basic analytical techniques such as of construction of taxonomies, pattern-matching, explanation-building, etc.

The informational basis of this study broadly consists of three types. Firstly, academic literature of the various policy fields touched on are used as theoretical background for the analytical frameworks of governance, democratisation and planning theory. These books and articles also serve as a point of reference with regard to international development experience. Secondly, the gathering of policy documents from a wide spectrum of actors will form the basis for assembling and constructing the specific policy environment for public and popular participation in South Africa. These documents range from policy issue papers and laws from the national and the Gauteng government, e.g. White Papers concerning the RDP or public sector transformation, the Local Government Transition Act and the Development Facilitation Bill etc., to research / policy documents of government departments and parastatals, such as the DDPE&W or the DBSA. Also various papers from organs of civil society, e.g. reports of development forums and their task teams or commissioned research by NGOs are incorporated. The third component consists of 24 semi-structured qualitative interviews with political and professional key-position holders at local, provincial and national government level as well as with representatives from organs of civil society, plus selected participant observation exercises. Beside fact finding, these serve to gather data about and gain insights into the institutionalisation and functioning of participative development

²⁰Feagin, et. al., 1991; Ragin, Saul, 1992; Yin, 1993, 1994.

planning in Gauteng with special reference to convictions and assumptions of the actors. As will be proven below, many special features of policies as well as some general approaches to development can only be satisfactorily explained by the incorporation of underlying belief systems influencing decision-makers.

Both the research and the comparative analysis of literature regarding citizen and popular participation in the RDP were guided by a theoretical framework developed by Altman, Churchman and Law-Yone²¹. The framework identifies six dimensions for describing, planning and evaluating participation in planning and policy development. The data gathered in this study relates to those six dimensions, namely: (1) the situational context and the subject domain / policy field within which participation takes place, (2) the goals of involvement and participation²² as well as perceived risks, (3) the definitions of participating, (4) the power relationship between government officials and the citizenry as well as the power relations between community organisations and community member, (5) the stages in the decision-making processes where participation occurs as well as the envisaged participatory mechanisms for respective phases in the policy / project cycle of future planning frameworks, and (6) the types and amount of resources invested in involvement and participation²³.

The organisations from which data was gathered and the interviewees can be institutionally grouped into (a) government, (b) parastatals, (c) civil society, and (d) international donors²⁴. Government institutions can be issue-specifically and functionally differentiated into two groups, namely those line departments which are involved in direct delivery and those related to the policy development and implementation of the development forum approach and participative development planning frameworks, both on national and provincial level. The delivery departments are, however, of minor interest to the study. Concerning the latter,

²¹Altman, Churchman, Law-Yone, 1981.

²²As will be defined in below, involvement is used to denote the initiative of the authorities, participation to denote the activity of citizens and communities.

²³Due to the study's focus on future development planning frameworks, this last dimension is in terms of the quantitative amount invested of less importance; nevertheless government attempts to empower community (representatives) to participate in the policy development matters.

²⁴The latter generously assisted in background research. However, most policy document from them cannot be quoted due to them being made available to the author on a confidential basis.

Gauteng's former RDP Commission²⁵, the DDPE&W and the recently established Corporate Strategy the office of the Premier will be focused on provincial level. Concerning the national government and administration, the national RDP Commission in the Office of the President represents the main focus. Representatives of parastatals which were involved in participatory development - during the stage of policy formulation, project appraisal, facilitation or implementation are the second institutional category to elaborate upon. Here, the South African Communication Service (SACS), which assists the Networking Committee / Core Group in Gauteng, and the DBSA are of great importance. Thirdly, organs of civil society are diverse in nature and interests. An explorative approach to data gathering was attempted. Interviewees came from member organisations of CDFs and LDFs, i.e. NGOs, POs, CBOs. Additionally, research service-NGOs, such as PLANACT or the Development Resources Centre (DRC), which had influence during the recent past by advising both civil society as well as government in the field of participatory development and local government, feature high in importance. A third sub-group in civil society to collect information from is the academic / educational sector. Within this context, inter alia, members of the Graduate School of Public and Development Management (GSP&DM), University of the Witwatersrand, and the Institute for African Alternative (IFAA)²⁶, contributed valuable knowledge. The fourth and last subcategory in civil society, and even more crucial to the research were the community development forum co-ordination structures, i.e. the Networking Committee (NWC) as well as its Core Groups (steering committee)²⁷, which have been entrusted by the plenary of the Vista I conference in 1994 to start working practically on the CDF / LDF approach. Finally, a prominent donor which was instrumental in the process of assisting in structuring the development forum approach and project preparation facilities (PPF) is the German, social-democratic oriented Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FES).

²⁵It has been dissolved in the beginning of 1995; the current 'RDP Commission' in Gauteng is a Cabinet Standing Committee.

²⁶Formerly headed by Prof. Ben Turok, the chairperson of the old PWV RDP Commission.

²⁷One might argue that these structures are not solely civil society, incorporating both business and initially government representatives. Their instrumental role in shaping the recent developments as well as their closeness to the Gauteng executive as well as administration, they could also be well grouped under the public realm. In the end, co-opted civil society might be the best term.

After having used the term belief systems already several times it seems necessary to clarify the concepts of belief systems and epistemological communities. Owing to limitations of space and the specific focus of this paper, however, only a sketch of cognitive-oriented notions in policy analysis can be presented below. Besides political culture and preferences of the public and the nature of the programmes or tasks, organisation theory has highlighted the importance of administrative factors such as the ideology of heads of departments and the nature of standard operating procedures or task directives in explaining different implementation outcomes; they can encourage or discourage participation.

The approach is based on Sabatier's perspective of policy formulation and implementation as learning processes within epistemic communities²⁸, i.e. conflicts between different coalitions within one or a few closely related policy field(s) around competing belief-systems (interpretation / definition of problems and solutions). The concept of belief systems is differentiated by Sabatier into three levels according to decreasing degrees of resistance to change in the human psyche²⁹, i.e. (1) the deep normative core, as the totality of normative, ontological, philosophical convictions, (2) the near policy core, consisting of fundamental policy-specific points of view, and (3) the level of secondary aspects, i.e. a multitude of information and data related to specific decisional questions in the very policy field³⁰. Changes of beliefs about appropriate policies, paradigm shifts, etc., take place over long periods of time and can be comprehended as social learning processes. Majone argues that interests and ideas / arguments have formerly been viewed too much as polar concepts, thus regarding the latter purely as justifications of certain vested interests and explaining shifts in policy contents first of all by a changing economic environment, new technologies and institutional factors. In modern, complex societies in which civil society is capable of evaluating public 'justifications', however, 'ideas whose time has come' play a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of policies. He states: "A full account of policy development must also include the 'meta-policy' by which the process is analysed and evaluated. The contents of the meta-policy - conceptualisation, theories, arguments, norms emerge from and develop along with

²⁸Sabatier, 1988, 1991, 1993; Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993.

²⁹Sabatier, Hunter, 1989.

³⁰For the most time, policy learning happens, is accepted or just even possible on the third level.

the practical and professional activities in which policy makers, administrators, judges, experts and advocates engage. Policy development is always accompanied by a parallel process of conceptual development. We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy making solely in terms of power and interests, to the exclusion of debate and argument.³¹

A range of factors influences the extend and nature of participation realised in policy development and programme implementation. Weissert differentiates into (1) the organisational environment, (2) the political setting and local preferences and (3) the task environment concerning the influence of community and personal values on responsiveness of officials³². The first two dimensions cover values, convictions, and respective behaviour. The first dimension includes factors such as office procedures and managerial style, especially to the extend that they affect convenience and respect accorded to the participants, provision of information, the tone in the office, as well as the believes, attitudes, and professional and policy orientations of boundary agents who have direct contact with the population. The second dimension covers the convictions and patterns of behaviour of the communities. Especially important in the implementation of redistributive programmes are the nature of the community and its overall philosophy about the role of government and its responsibility for those in need. Networks of support, i.e. non-profit groups, usually function as transmission belts between the public and the civil realm. Lastly, governmental and community homogeneity is another set of factors, since in the case of homogeneous communities preferences for services are more uniform and conflict is less severe.

The above paragraphs indicate the study's interest in and the existence of an analytical framework for the exploration of cognitive factors in decision-making. In the specific South African context, one characterised by repeatedly stated concern for the establishment of a new legitimate regime, democratic governance and a developmental state, the relevant issues and concrete conceptualisations of value-laden decisions need to be incorporated into the analysis of the policy development and implementation design. Hence, the study will implicitly integrate the concept of

³¹ Majone, 1993, p. 17; see also Kingdon, 1984.

³² Weissert, 1994.

belief systems³³ underlying the new socio-economic policy programmes and community organisation approaches. However, it is not intended to apply this analytical framework explicitly in this study, i.e. to work out the different levels of convictions for each actor³⁴. Practically speaking, the way and nature of discourses and development paradigms and their impact shall be incorporated. Such a thorough analysis will also facilitate the incorporation of 'external' factors such as (shifting) international paradigms or processes of policy learning as possible explanation of policy shifts and why certain instruments have been chosen³⁵.

Given what this study is trying to do, i.e. the intentions of it as stated above, and given how it is organised, the methodology is complex in nature and diverse in approach. In the light of acknowledging the diversity of policy processes and the rapidly changing developments occurring during the recent South African system transformation, which is still continuing, any singular methodological approach is doomed to fail. Ergo, critical multiplism is a response to the inadequacies inherent in any theory. Multiplism is not so much a new methodology as it is a creative synthesis of a broad range of research and analytical practices advocated and used by a cross-section of the policy sciences community. Dunn writes that for critical multiplism, inductive plausibility, not certainty, is the defining characteristic of knowledge³⁶. Reasonably true beliefs are sought in the policy inquiry, not certain or even probabilistic knowledge. Inductive plausibility is not established by enumerating cases which confirm conclusions, but by the identification, evaluation and synthesis, where possible, of rival theories and theorems, perspectives and hypotheses. The methodological rules represent general guidelines for policy analysis and research rather than specific prescriptions for its conduct³⁷. These guidelines span the most important areas of policy analysis, such as: multi-method

³³For the application of arguments, ideas and convictions as factors of policy processes, see Sabatier, 1993; Nullmeier, 1993.

³⁴This term is to be broadly understood including value- and belief systems, social and cultural norms, ideologies and patterns of behaviour of social and cultural groups; it is not limited to the political-administrative system but embraces political traditions, patterns of identification and social integration. Compare Almond, Verba, 1963; Almond, 1974; Reichel, 1981. However, the use of the older concept of political culture as a political analytical framework, will not be considered in this study because of its behaviourist and deterministic linear understanding of development, rather specific characteristics of the political styles / organisational cultures may be utilised for assessing the (implications of the) political and societal surrounding conditions.

³⁵Compare Linder's, 1987, and Perters's, 1989, emphasis on the organisational-cultural context and on traditions of the political system.

³⁶Dunn, 1994, p. 7.

³⁷Dunn, 1986.

research for the observation of policy processes and outcomes; multiple analytic synthesis, also known as meta-analysis, accentuating the collective nature of policy relevant knowledge; multiple stakeholder analysis adding plausibility to the knowledge claims by drawing attention to the diversity of perceptions of individual and groups who participate in policy formulation and implementation; and multiple perspective analysis promoting plausibility by triangulation among competing representations of problems and solutions and by incorporation of potential political, organisational, economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors³⁸.

The specific methodological approach of this study is a combination of policy analysis³⁹ within the framework of a case study. A public policy approach in the specific policy fields is combined for final evaluation of the macro-processes with a modern governance analytical framework which also serves normative evaluation purposes. Thus, one could speak of theoretically well informed policy analysis, which is sensitive to policy processes, as opposed to conducting just pure content analysis. There is no ambition of genuine theory building. The discussed analytical frameworks, adapted to the South African context, are rather employed for taxonomy- and classification-building. Developmental realism and pragmatism enjoy priority over abstract theorising. Generally speaking the level of analysis takes place on the macro- and meso-level. The actual enquiry of local political dynamics, personalities, socio-economic structures and patterns of conflict in specific communities, receives only limited attention. The resulting limitations of the methodology concerning micro-level developments are evident. A deep analysis incorporating all factors which potentially influence local developments is not the objective of the study, nor could it be reasonably achieved in one single research report due to limitations of space and time. The final research synthesis offers both policy analytical aspects, such as analysing developments, highlighting trends and criticising probable dangers, as well as policy implications. The latter are, however, of a more general nature, concerned with the consolidation of South Africa's

³⁸Dunn, 1994, pp. 8-27.

³⁹The explorative and descriptive-explanatory focus of the study, however, shall not imply a lack of sensitivity concerning notions of participatory policy analysis, e.g. Lasswell's well known postulate of policy analysis as a democracy science, or newer calls of the 1980's for involvement of the researches. Its usefulness in terms of gains in insight into policy processes as well as political correctness are however perceived by the author to be outweighed by the resulting difficulties in their practical application during the research process for the envisaged study. Lasswell, 1974.

democracy and her future economic and social development. Clear cut policy recommendations and policy advocacy are avoided. The final section on policy implications rather aims at providing possible directions for future policy and organisational development as well as alternative approaches to public participation and involvement than currently employed in South Africa, which would need to be explored in more detail elsewhere.

2.2) Analytical Framework: Democratisation And Governance

Looking at the larger picture in order to contextualise the general policy environment in which participatory reforms take place, two slightly different but complementary approaches, also based theoretically on the modernisation tradition, can be employed, namely democratisation⁴⁰ and (good) governance. Democratisation, i.e. the analysis and interpretation of the processes of transition to democracy, and governance, a more instrumental approach to politics and the state, may help to identify the possibilities for and limitations on participation in South Africa and the institutional mechanisms that can facilitate the consolidation of the new democratic dispensation in a broader context enabling sustainable development. Concerning the analysis and classification of the national and provincial policy frameworks / policy environment the paper will draw methodologically mainly on the concepts of governance. In the part below, the line of argumentation is split up in order to draw a clear distinction between the theoretical framework and its implications. The first section is devoted to the presentation of the various approaches to and different interpretations of the concepts of governance. In this context the usefulness of governance as an analytical framework is highlighted. A classification of modes of governance is then presented and their specific characteristics are related as well as their occurrence in the new South Africa are discussed. The second section introduces and discusses the values on which 'good democratic governance' is based according to Leftwich. The rationale of this part of the paper is to single out and argue for a realistic understanding and pragmatic implementation of good democratic governance so as to secure public sector

⁴⁰Bretton, 1994; Bretton, Walle, 1994; Chazan, et. al., 1992; Decalo, 1992; Huntington, 1991; Menzel, 1992.

transformation. It will further show the importance of governance to evolving social political and economic interaction among the various strata in South African society. Finally, it shall suffice for the purposes of this study, to indicate the normative surveyor's rod, which will be a combination of the World Bank's concepts of 'good governance' and Leftwich's concept of 'democratic governance'. Here, the underlying normative orientation is that of safeguarding the ongoing democratisation processes of South Africa as well as furthering participatory democratic development.

2.2.1) Definition Of The Concepts Of Dynamics, Complexity And Diversity

The various existing concepts of governance are difficult to define, because, as Kooiman puts it, this is based on "the growing realisation of the complex, dynamic and diverse nature of the world we live in"⁴¹. In this light, it is evident that different people may perceive governance in different ways in different situations. In order to do justice to the formulation a working definition of governance as an analytical framework as well as a normative-prescriptive concept and discuss its implications in its various modes, it is essential to explore the concepts of dynamism, complexity and diversity as espoused by Kooiman in some detail. In his study he asks the question: how can dynamic, complex and diverse social-political systems be governed in a democratic and effective way?⁴² The first answer he provides is that "governing and governance itself [and hence the structuring of the state with its various institutions and their relations with the people respectively] should be dynamic, complex and varied"⁴³. In his opinion this means that fundamental aspects of the physical, natural and social world we live in and which we use are not only in the eyes of the beholder but also belong to the reality out there, whatever our theoretical or applied capacity to understand or to handle them may be.

In Kooiman's words dynamics can be seen as a composition of forces resulting in non-linear or in some exceptional cases also linear cause and effect patterns⁴⁴. He further asserts that in reality dynamics is about systems going from one state or place to

⁴¹Kooiman, 1993, p. 35.

⁴²From an autopoietic system theory perspective, taking the notion that the individual (sub)systems with their very incompatible codes for communication are not able to purposefully interact (Habermas), one ought to ask why and how our organisations work at all.

⁴³Kooiman, 1993, p. 36.

⁴⁴Kooiman, 1993, p. 37.

another: pushed, drawn or in other ways influenced by natural, technological or social forces. Dynamics of social-political systems cannot be understood without an insight in interactions. Dynamics always imply interactions. Interaction is inherently dynamic. Interactions are the primary operationalisations of the dynamic forces in societies. Interactions can be in the form of interferences, interplays and interventions⁴⁵.

Koolman offers three major ways to use complexity in terms of its usefulness for the development of a theory of governance and governability namely: reduction of complexity and selection⁴⁶, structuring⁴⁷ and operationalisation⁴⁸. According to the Luhmann's exposition⁴⁹, complexity does not have to do with the number or variety of subsystems, but with the way they interact. Selecting and ordering interactions is the essence of coping with complexity. The assertion by Simon is that most complex systems have some kind of a hierarchical structure: a structure within a structure within a structure. The La Porte assertion shares the notion that complexity has to do with manifold interactions of many parts within a system.

Diversity as a basic concept has results from the great and growing individualisation, differentiation, specialisation and variety of the modern world. This can take place at different levels, namely at the micro level (individual), the meso level (organisation and management), and the macro level (regions, states).

2.2.2) Concepts Of Good And Democratic Governance

The growing body of literature on governance captures the radical shift in thinking about the nature of the state and its relationship with society. It is a shift from the noun government to the verb governance, from structuralist and institutionalist focuses to relations and processes, and from linearity (in development or change processes) and rationality to inter-dependence and chaos (chaos and catastrophe theories⁵⁰). No single exhaustive definition of governance exists. Governance may be considered a process as opposed to a structure, although it does embody also a structural dimension. The

⁴⁵Concerning a detailed classification of forms of interactions please see: Koolman, 1993, p. 38.

⁴⁶Luhmann, 1970, quoted in: Koolman, 1993, p. 39.

⁴⁷Simon, 1969, quoted in: *ibid.*

⁴⁸La Porte et al., 1975, quoted in: *ibid.*

⁴⁹As Streeter and Schmitter's notion of 'private interest government' referred to in the responsive mode of governance in the text mentioned below shows, Luhmann's introduction of the notion of autopoiesis in the mid-eighties seems to have found its way into this debate.

⁵⁰Landfried, 1992.

dynamism concept described earlier illustrates that the variables making up the socio-political system are by no means static. They continuously interact in an ongoing manner that is dictated by the forces in society. The structural dimension is described by Simon above in his exposition of complexity⁵¹. His argument highlights how these structures relate to each other as parts of a system. The concept of governability is also indicative of the process nature of governance. Governability is defined by Kooiman as the permanent balancing process between governing needs on the one hand and governing capacities on the other. Governing needs are ever changing imposing a continuous need to adjust them to available governing capacity. These continuous activities constitute processes⁵².

From a management perspective it can be related to the structuring of the specific regime type with a view to enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the public realm. In this case Hyden refers to the régime as "not a set of political actors (although régimes are often associated with specific leaders), but rather a set of fundamental rules about the organisation of the public realm"⁵³. The notion of public realm encompasses both state and society and draws the line instead between private and public. What is of interest here is the extent to which there is a civic public realm and how it is being managed and sustained by political actors, some in the state, others in civil society. The World Bank's definition sees good governance as "... the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs."⁵⁴ It features the following as measures of efficiency for the public service: (1) independent juridical system, (2) legal framework to enforce contracts, (3) accountable administration of public funds, (4) independent public auditor responsible to the legislative, (5) respect for law and human rights, and (6) pluralistic institutional structure and free press. These system features can be viewed as largely functional and institutional prerequisites for development. Essentially, Leftwich⁵⁵ describes the meanings for good governance as (a) associated with the World Bank's administrative and managerial term concerned basically with efficiency and effectiveness in running of state structures, particularly pertaining to development issues, and (b) the western government's focus on the political sphere and government administration with

⁵¹In his context there are no implications on the type and nature of interactions such as hierarchical top-down lines of communication and control implied.

⁵²Kooiman, 1993, p. 43.

⁵³Hyden, 1993, p. 7.

⁵⁴Landell-Mills, Serageldin, 1991, pp. 14-17; Leftwich, 1993, p. 610.

⁵⁵Leftwich, 1993.

a concomitant insistence on competitive pluralist democratic politics in the context of their political conditioning of development co-operation.

Partly opposed to this instrumentalist definition of the World Bank, Leftwich puts forward his conception of democratic governance and argues that governance has essentially three main components or levels⁵⁶:

1. Broad systematic view: whereby it is wider than government which is conventionally defined as a formal institutional structure and a location of authoritative decision-making in the modern state. It is a looser and viser distribution of both internal and external political and economic power whereby the rules by which the distributive and productive life of society is governed (wide governance, new world order);
2. Political Viewpoint: whereby it can be seen as a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and juridical powers; it normally involves a pluralist polity with regularly elected political representatives (most western governments);
3. Narrow administrative view: an efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to design and implement - in co-operation with other actors - appropriate public policies and to manage the public sector (World Bank).

Additionally to the above mentioned aspects concerning the process nature and the use of governance as an analytical tool, the dimension of state - civil society relationships, i.e. between the organs of the state and those of civil society need to be investigated. According to Kooiman "one can see a shift from a unilateral [government or society separately, PWI] to an interactionist focus [government with society, PWI]"⁵⁷. In the same text he also mentions that the growing realisation of interdependencies may lie behind such efforts. The nature of the relationship between actors within a governance framework is reciprocal. The public gives political leaders legitimate power (authority) in return for effective performance of governmental duties. Moreover, should political leaders prove unable or unwilling to perform such services, the public has the right to withdraw its allegiance and stop obeying⁵⁸. According to Kooiman "[t]he shift seems to

⁵⁶ Leftwich, 1993, p. 611.

⁵⁷ Kooiman, 1993, p. 35.

⁵⁸ Hyden, 1993, p. 10.

be away from 'one way steering and control' to 'two or multi-way designs' in which (dis)qualities of social-political systems and their governance are viewed from the perspective of the recognition of mutual needs and capacities.⁵⁹ The concept of governance, obviously implying partnerships between the different actors, is a modern progressive approach to governing, as opposed to the old, traditional Weberian 'rational bureaucratic' model. There, the organisational set-up of the state and the relative position of the citizenry, i.e. the nature of the relationships between the governing and the governed were that of master-servant, superior-subordinate or other authoritarian, power and duty oriented relationships bearing similar characteristics. In a historical perspective, the demise of monarchies and centrally planned socio-political forms of governments around the globe as well as the recent paradigm shift in the democratic, pluralistic and neo-corporatist or libertarian, regimes towards new innovative and participatory forms of governance, are all pointers to the international appeal of this post-modern approach.

2.2.3) Roleplayers And Modes Of Governance

There are a myriad of individual and corporate actors at play within the civil public realm. For illustrative reasons they can be divided into two broad categories, namely the organs of the state and those of civil society⁶⁰.

ORGANS OF THE STATE	RELATIONSHIP	ORGANS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
- Legislative - Executive - Judiciary	- Co-operation, facilitation - complementarity - consultation when regulation - self-regulation	- political parties - interest groups - business and other formations

⁵⁹Koolman, 1993, p. 37.

⁶⁰The examples in the table do not constitute an exhaustive list. Concerning a discussion of the values underlying the assumption of the normative-prescriptive model of good democratic governance, please refer to the next paragraph.

Jorgensen highlights four modes of governance⁶¹. Firstly, he mentions the hierarchical state, wherein the roles of citizens are that of being a voter and a subject. It is the classical parliamentary model of most Western European states and structures its public administration along the rationalistic prescriptions of Weber with his altruistic assumptions about the civil servants and politicians. The present South African Interim Constitution with its rather defensive individualistic Human Rights (first generation) falls into this category. It is characterised by the constitutional rules for elections, parliament and government.

The second mode he highlights is that of the autonomous state where the role of public organisations is that of safeguarding of rights and moral and professional values. The South African public service - hardly controllable by politicians nor accountable to the public at large - fits into this category. It is dominated by white, male, Afrikaans speaking persons with a strong Christian or Calvinist orientation.

The third mode is that of the negotiating state. This is to some degree the evolving situation in South Africa where citizens affiliate into competitive interest organisations such as employers associations and trade unions to articulate their views in various forums with the intention of influencing policy decisions. This scenario was clearly demonstrated during the constitutional negotiations in Kempton Park and can be traced in the new Labour Relations Act.

The fourth mode is called the responsive state. This one can broadly be differentiated into two strands. The first one follows the market rigorous prescriptions of libertarian / neo-conservative thought⁶². The second resembles in its participatory version the aspirations of the RDP which sets out to achieve meeting basic needs, developing national human resources, building the economy and to democratise of the state and its institutions. It is called the self-governing state and is rooted in rather leftist schools of thought⁶³.

⁶¹ Jorgenson, 1993, pp. 219-225.

⁶² However this paper will not concentrate on these notions. For an overview of libertarian politics in South Africa, Sinkins, 1986.

⁶³ But with the end of the Cold War or say Gingrich's take over of the American legislative, this need not necessarily be the case. The old one-dimensional political 'right' - 'left' distinction becomes less rigid categorising.

Modes of Governance.⁶⁴

MODES OF GOVERNANCE	ROLES OF PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS	ROLES OF CITIZENRY	MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL
HIERARCHICAL STATE	Neutral implementation on the basis of political preferences	Voter and subject	'Comptrol' hierarchy, rules
AUTONOMOUS STATE	The safeguarding of rights and moral professional values	Legally protected, guided and socialised individual	Peer group control, socialisation, institutional rivalry
NEGOTIATING STATE	Mediator in corporate structures	Member of interest organisations	Negotiations, countervailing powers
RESPONSIVE: SUPERMARKET STATE	Act as a business firm	Consumer	Competition
RESPONSIVE: SERVICE STATE	Act as a listening monopoly	Client	Dialogue
RESPONSIVE: SELF-GOVERNING STATE	Setting frames for self-governing	Citizen, co-producer	Self-regulation

⁶⁴ Jorgenson, 1993, p. 221. The table has been slightly amended in order to pay tribute to the specific South African situation.

MODES OF GOVERNANCE	NORMATIVE BASIS	ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT	SA EQUIVALENT (if applicable)
HIERARCHICAL STATE	Political loyalty, 'the will of the people'	Parliament, cabinet parental department, ministry of finance, general audit bureau	present Interim Constitution with emphasis on first generation Human Rights
AUTONOMOUS STATE	Legality, moral and professional standards	Professional associations, non-economic interest groups, 'duplicate organisations' in other countries	old public administration of NP regime
NEGOTIATING STATE	Consensus and compromise, political stability	Industrial interest organisations, labour market organisations, employee organisations	corporatist, to some degree pluralist organised policy-fields
RESPONSIVE: SUPERMARKET STATE	Efficiency	Competitors	neo-conservative / libertarian reform proposals (especially of the eighties: "lean state")
RESPONSIVE: SERVICE STATE	Service	none (perhaps user groups)	see above
RESPONSIVE: SELF-GOVERNING STATE	Self-regulation (private interest government)	civil society	participatory ideology of the RDP

Hyden presented an alternative taxonomy where governance is classified by regime types⁶⁵. He puts forward a libertarian regime, with individuals seeing themselves as independent actors. In the communitarian regime, traditional bonds and community loyalties influence patterns of social behaviour. Primary social organisations are important. Community values are encouraged. In the corporatist regime, there is negotiation between interested organisations. The status of each

⁶⁵Hyden, 1983, pp. 8-23.

group is recognised. In statist regime, resource allocation is in the hands of the state and not the market.

When trying to relate theory, i.e. the concept of governance, with its different modes of governance, in reality it becomes obvious that there can be no single mode in its pure form. The institutional structures as well as procedural regulations of modern states, South Africa being no exception, combine different philosophies and approaches to running the public sector and governing, or better to regulate and deal with (often in crisis mode), the national affairs. The situation, comparing macro- with micro-level, is not considerably different. Individuals also do not make use of only one single approach in managing their own lives.

In summary, four basic positions in the discourse on governance exists⁶⁶. The first is the instrumentalist and prescriptive World Bank definition of good governance based on the classical liberal democratic model of the state. The second approach is less concerned with efficient and effective state action but rather focuses on state - civil relationships. It demands co-operation and facilitation from the state, which is believed to lead to empowerment of the society. The third position, ideal-typically put forward by Leftwich, is more critical in nature. It is argued that governance can be regarded as a normative ideological tool of western industrialised countries justifying structural adjustment programmes (SAP) and globalisation and capitalism in general. Finally, Hyden's somehow state-centric approach focused on the management of 'regime structures' revolves around the relations within the 'civil public realm' (in policy-making) in the light of ever increasing dynamic and complexity of societal relations. Building of legitimacy by reciprocal relationships of trust and accountability are the cornerstones of social integration.

2.2.4) Participatory Democracy And Normative Assumptions

There are various assumptions which underlie the new international (developmental) paradigms of good and democratic governance, which serves as the normative point of reference in this paper. The list of underlying values starts

⁶⁶Swilling, Monteiro, 1995, p. 5.

with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁶⁷. Freedom of information and expression, freedom of association, openness and the right to information for the people are crucial as well. Political accountability and bureaucratic accountability and responsibility⁶⁸ are also important. Transparency is a critical dimension of accountability, i.e. if the public wants to have access to governmental information, it should not be denied. Public agencies and officials need to be monitored. A sound judicial system, a predelection to rule of law, is important as well. Honest law enforcement agencies are required, as is affordable court administration. The various constituent elements all require increased capacity since people and institutions have to be equipped with appropriate skills to carry out their functions. Leftwich⁶⁹ recommends that the economically marginalised should be brought into productive economic activity. However, Lodge⁷⁰ expresses the opinion that constitutions are better confined to what governments in relatively poor countries can guarantee, such as human rights, freedom of speech, association and belief, racial equality etc. He recommends that second and third generation rights, those involving socio-economic resources and are based on groups, should be left out, on the grounds that it is not realistic to try to implement them in the given socio-economic situation of South Africa. If government has to focus on second and third generation human rights which have been entrenched in the constitution, it may soon become overloaded, or due to becoming accustomed to not fulfilling the constitutional obligations, in the worst case start to disregard the individual political human rights too. These arguments show that the underlying values and assumptions of human dignity and political freedom cannot be ignored when dealing with democratic governance.

After having discussed the normative concept of good democratic governance, the last aspect of this part will deal with the prospects of implementing forms of participatory democracy in South Africa. Generally speaking, it can be implemented within certain limits. People see participatory democracy in divergent

⁶⁷ Lendell-Mills, Seralgeldin, 1991, pp. 14-17. The World Bank can be regarded as that institution which initially introduced the concept of governance, although with an specific administrative focus, 1989.

⁶⁸ Latib, 1995.

⁶⁹ Leftwich, 1993, p. 620.

⁷⁰ Lodge, 1995, p. 7.

ways. Jorgensen⁷¹, when dealing with modes of governance, mentions the hierarchical state, where elected parliamentarians are viewed as 'the architects of society'. A neutral bureaucracy is required. The state just governs society on the basis of political preferences. In an autonomous state, the state has the predominant function to safeguard values. However, public organisations are not neutral. The negotiating state mediates and to some degree arbitrates between different social interests brought forward by pressure groups. It reproduces and develops patterns facilitating stability. The responsive state responds to 'here and now' demands of citizens.

A selective combination of points from modes of governance may help in arriving at a view that will represent good governance. From a South African perspective, Cranko and Wooldridge⁷² come out with a broad understanding of governance when they contend that the role of political leadership in governance is that of managing the relationship between the government and civil society. A component will be the shift from a 'bureaucratic administration' to a 'representative administration'. If good democratic governance refers to working with and listening to the citizenry in order to manage public resources and respond to the needs and expectations of citizens as individuals, interest groups and the society as a whole, thus it involves active co-operation and ongoing engagement in the process of policy formulation and implementation between politicians, senior public management, front-line workers and the members of communities. It has to be ensured that state structures enable the public to exercise a meaningful say, that the workforce of the public sector responds to citizen's, and that politicians are not taking over leadership roles and are not reduced to rubber stamping tomes of proposals written by technical experts with own agendas. Governance as a process of facilitating and ensuring the delivery of goods and services through the management of social power and power relations thus includes a means of maintaining social stability and well being through deepening democracy. The key concepts of governance processes are dialogue and delivery which, if properly structured, contribute to people-centred development⁷³. The role of the state in such a kind of participatory governance would be a facilitative

⁷¹Jorgenson, 1993, p. 220.

⁷²Cranko, Wooldridge, 1995.

⁷³DBSA, 1994a, 1994b; Korton, 1984; Korton, Klauss, 1984.

one; interaction of all relevant parties in problem solving and conflict management is required.

Esman⁷⁴, contends that the government as service provider, should attempt to determine objectively what the population wants. The public is the prospective customer. Instead of unilaterally setting the terms and conditions of public services, government bureaucracies should adapt services to the expressed needs and preferences of the public. The government ought to reach out, attempt to sell or extend services instead of the public claiming services. The government has a proactive role of encouraging potential consumers to avail themselves of services. Esman shows that in participatory democracy, the public will not be dissatisfied because public administrators will be acting in accordance with the needs of people and not their own wishes. Government should get information from the public and adapt services accordingly (social marketing). The danger in Esman's approach is that if people discover that their input has not been considered but others, they might revolt⁷⁵. However, Landell-Mills and Serageldin emphasise that lack of capacity, specifically in African states, may limit public authorities to fulfil their responsibilities even when fully committed to building the nation. There is no guarantee that demands can be satisfied.

The view of World Bank is more administrative in focus and instrumental in nature. Landell-Mills and Serageldin say that the state plays an indispensable and potentially creative role in establishing the environment for activity. The role of the state can therefore not be ignored in involving people throughout the production process. The government needs to show real willingness to engage people. Leftwich is more inclined towards highlighting the political side when dealing with participatory democracy. Reconciliation of both aspects is constantly necessary in a participatory democracy. Leadership and guidelines from the government are needed. However, at the same time, the administration should implement what is

⁷⁴Esman, 1991, p. 20.

⁷⁵As already happened in the New South Africa, e.g. note the statement of the Public Servants' Association (PSA) that "...nobody can make unilateral decisions on the matter..." of (government proposed) cuts in pension benefits; SANCO prepared to oppose the government's 'brutal' methods to deal with rent, service and bond defaulters, while COSATU, meanwhile, prepared a national strike, rejected the governments right to initiate commercialisation and privatisation of certain state assets without its consent. WITS students too have been arguing with the vice-chancellor to set up a forum where the transformation of the university can be negotiated and accelerated.

politically decided without independent bureaucratic agendas. Hence, a combination of the World Bank's and Leftwich's approaches seems imperative.

With the hierarchical state based on top-down implemented decisions, the responsive state having the bottom up approach, a combination of the two, although still very abstract in nature, could be the basis. This could create a climate for participatory democracy. Jorgensen's modes of governance and Hyden's regime types, both incorporating indicative elements and normatively founded strategies to employ, can form a basis for realising good governance. Jorgensen's hierarchical approach has some elements of Hyden's statist regime, with the top-down approach. This may not be healthy for participatory democracy. Jorgensen's responsive state and Hyden's libertarian regime may cause the population to come to the conclusion that their demands are binding for the state regardless of financial and administrative capacity. Bringing together the two extremes in the two paragraphs above might make the idea of participatory democracy possible. The ruled and the rulers have to co-operate on all political level⁷⁶.

In summary, good governance with its administrative focus includes: (1) bureaucratic accountability, i.e. an accountable administration, transparency, an efficient public service, and capacity and institution building of the public administration; (2) political accountability, i.e. an independent public auditor and social marketing; and (3) rule of law, i.e. substantive human rights, an independent judicial system, free press and freedom of information, and freedom of association⁷⁷. Democratic governance additionally implies and requires: (1) pluralistic institutional structures, i.e. multi-party democracy with an effective opposition; (2) participatory democracy, i.e. strengthening civil organisations; and (3) economic, social and political empowerment of the people. Hyden's statement shall conclude this chapter on governance: "... the more regime management is characterised by the qualities associated with the governance realm, the more it generates legitimacy for the political system and the more, therefore, people will participate in the public realm with enthusiasm."⁷⁸

⁷⁶From a rational choice perspective, bargaining-theory might shed more light on synergy effects of co-operative attitudes, compare Osborne, Rubinstein, 1990; Scharpf, 1989.

⁷⁷World Bank, 1994.

⁷⁸Hyden 1993, p. 12.

2.3) Participation: Meaning And Analytical Concepts

This study is premised on the central assumption that participation in its different forms is integrally linked to governance. In practise this involves simultaneously inter- and intra-governmental co-ordination as well as co-operative state - civil society relations, since for development to be successful, both civil society and the state need to be strong; there needs to be facilitation and conflict resolution in and between both⁷⁹.

For advocates of citizen participation in decision-making, "... (1) democratization of choices involving resource allocation, (2) decentralisation of service systems management, (3) deprofessionalisation of bureaucratic judgements that affect the lives of residents, and (4) demystification of design and investment decisions"⁸⁰ are synonymous code words. Within the context of decentralisation of government functions, Gasper offers (1) deconcentration, i.e. the handing over of administrative authority to lower territorial levels of government (local or field administration), (2) devolution, i.e. the creation or strengthening of sub-national government, on a legal basis (federalism), (3) delegation, i.e. the transfer of managerial authority for specifically defined functions (parastatals), and (4) privatisation, the transfer of government responsibility to the private or non-profit sector⁸¹. The section below will not explicitly deal with all these various concepts. It will not open the Pandora's box of the federalism / regionalism and the nationalisation / privatisation debates in South Africa, nor will the complex questions around altering inter-governmental, i.e. whether to strengthen local governments vis-à-vis the provincial or national level, or whether rather to sub-contract, etc., be covered, because issues around decentralisation are limited to what can be done within governmental structures⁸²; this study is rather concerned with the structures that stand between government and the individual. More general underlying notions of state theory will be discussed in order to highlight different perspectives of participation in government and development. The main aim is to develop a clear

⁷⁹Christianson, 1995, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁰Illich, Alinsky and Kotler, cited in: Susskind, Elliott, 1983, p. 3.

⁸¹Gasper, 1991a, p. 9.

⁸²Berger, Neuhaus, 1977, p.7.

understanding of the possible and actual patterns of participation, which can take the form of paternalism, conflict or coproduction⁸³. After having completed this, practical techniques and mechanisms will be presented in order to further citizen and community participation on local level.

The section below discusses with two sets of theories. Firstly, theoretical approaches to participation will be presented. Conceptualisations derived from structuralist, i.e. popular participation, and from modernisation theories, i.e. public and citizen participation or involvement, will be compared. Secondly, the chapter will conclude with a taxonomy of representativeness, indicating how the currently common South African practice, which rather attempts to achieve inclusiveness of stakeholder organisations, is flawed. Lastly, it will offer practical sets of participatory mechanisms from international best practice. By this, it is hoped to contribute in a pragmatic way to the unfortunately still too theoretical and abstract South African debates.

2.3.1) Modernisation And Structuralism

The two specific theoretical traditions of state theory and its relations with civil society⁸⁴, namely structuralism and modernisation theory⁸⁵, have already been mentioned, although not yet discussed. The paragraphs below will briefly do so, giving some indications as to the theoretical backgrounds of the different political and ideological convictions which can also be found in South Africa's political society today⁸⁶.

Concepts do not just emerge from nowhere. They have a historical and material basis, and the understanding of these is vital before one can appreciate their relevance to our times and to the practical development work on the ground. The point of departure is the concepts of political power and state power. Underlying to them is the modern doctrine of (national) sovereignty⁸⁷. Pérez defines sovereignty

⁸³Susskind, Elliott, 1983, pp. 3-31.

⁸⁴Booth, 1979; Weiner, Huntington, 1987.

⁸⁵Associated theories of democracy are the concepts of participatory and representative democracy. Stadler, 1995.

⁸⁶For a chronological framework of the evolution of political participation, see Higgott, 1986; Randall, Theobald, 1985.

⁸⁷Hall, 1984.

as "... a conceptualisation of social life that assumes the centrality of the state as an autonomous territorial and symbolic arena. ... With the emergence of the sovereign state, politics became a struggle over the distribution of power within the boundaries of a legally established sovereign territory."⁸⁸ Marxist as well as pluralist theories assume political power to be concentrated within national boundaries⁸⁹. State power is defined as "the capacity of the state to formulate and execute public policies vis-à-vis domestic political and social forces."⁹⁰ Whereas Marxists employ class analysis, putting their emphasis on the producing working class, pluralists differentiate into competing interest groups.

Modernisation theory in its different versions, focusing either more on economic growth or more on political and social development, regards modernity as represented by the historical developments from the seventeenth to the twentieth century in Western Europe as an evolutionary normative concept of, the effective path leading to, and final goal of social, economic and political development. Additionally, staying within Eurocentric conceptualisations of political power, the state and civil society, sovereignty and citizenship, an autonomous⁹¹ state and the capacity of this state to formulate public policies vis-a-vis domestic pressures is assumed. Participation from this perspective is seen as a process of democratising the forms and usage of (political) state power. The concrete study of such (historically extending) processes conceptualised in social science literature either as democratisation, focusing on transitional processes and necessary requirements for sustaining democratic regimes, or more recently as governance which "identif[ies] the institutional mechanisms that can facilitate the consolidation of democracy in developing countries."⁹²

During the 1950s and 1960s, modernisation was predominantly equated with economic growth. Two crucial assumptions, which later turned out to be false,

⁸⁸ Pérez, 1993, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Held, 1989, pp. 56-78, quoted in Pérez, 1993, p. 3.

⁹⁰ Pérez, 1993, p. 3.

⁹¹ The concentration of political power within spatial and political - national - boundaries, given by the respective inhabitants, lays the basis for the understanding of state autonomy, i.e. the state rests within the nation and is capable of 'internally' determining itself (according to the will of the people). Note: this broad conceptualisation differs from the category of the autonomous, i.e. unresponsive, elitist, closed-shop, state as employed in the analytical framework of governance in the further parts of this paper.

⁹² Pérez, 1993, p. 9.

morally legitimated such a conception. Firstly, uneven economic growth (intended focus on modern sector, i.e. urban bias), was assumed to trickle via the markets down to all parts of the society. Secondly, it was reasoned that the promotion of economic development would simultaneously facilitate western rational and democratic values. During the second development decade the naiveté in those assumption became obvious with the emergence of authoritarian and partly totalitarian 'developmental' regimes; however, the statist and elitist paradigm remained reasonably intact⁹³. The above situation is structured similarly by Tandon into the concepts of (a) development as growth, and (b) development as welfare⁹⁴. The strongly material and linear concept of development as growth is rooted in capitalist mode of production and seen in terms of increasing gross national or domestic products (GNP, GDP) as well as higher and more sophisticated levels of technological application (industrialisation); following the demographic model, this would go hand in hand with declining population (growth). It is the development model followed by basically all western and independent African governments as well as by the old South African regime and will, assuredly, be followed by the GNU too.

However, there is an inherent tendency in capitalism towards concentration of wealth and power with only limited trickle down effects. The state, whether more laissez faire or social democrat, intervenes to modify economic and social policy in order to address the unevenness of the growth characteristic of capitalism and to promote equitable living conditions for the whole population. This is what gave rise to the second concept - that of development as welfare. Development in this sense is measured in terms of the quality of life with more emphasis put on equality⁹⁵. Historically this concept arose out of social democratic or socialist struggles during the first half of this century. The social democratic solution of a mixed economy has also been influential in approaches to development. The 1970s were characterised by a somewhat pessimistic reversal of those assumptions and policies. Modernisation theory started to put the primacy on political development. This shift went along with development theory and policy emphasising basic needs and

⁹³Mosley, Harrigan, Toye, 1991.

⁹⁴Tandon, 1991, pp. 1-5.

⁹⁵For different concepts of justice and equality and equity see: Gasper, 1991b; Frederickson, 1994; Rawls, 1971; Walzer, 1983; Young, 1990.

poverty eradication prior to industrial development in the general approach (growth with equity). The primary thrust of all development efforts was still growth, however, the social cost of the growth model has been acknowledged⁹⁵. Minor changes in development policy occurred, such as an emphasis on export orientation instead of import substitution industrialisation (ISI), reducing the urban bias by better agricultural prices, etc. Owing to a host of internal and external reasons this strategy failed as well. Towards the close of the 1980s nobody was talking about equity any more, the goal was unattainable. The 1980s and 1990s saw partly a continuation of this societal development approach, while in the context of structural adjustment new emphasis was placed on economic growth and market mechanisms, and equality has been replaced for by the vulnerable. Underlying all these approaches to development is the belief that this specific western conceptualisation of modernity, based on values such as universalism, rationalism, achievement, future orientation and social trust⁹⁷, is universally desirable and replicable in different social and cultural settings.

In contrast to modernisation approaches, structuralist development theory, although also based on western enlightenment (philosophical) notions puts forward different policy implications. The structuralist tradition⁹⁸ conceptualises participation, both in economic as well as in social and political terms, as liberation and empowerment. As an alternative concept of development, 'peripheral capitalism' (1950s), and in a more refined way, dependency theories (1960s and 1970s) questioned the possibility of repeating western style development paths, its Eurocentrist assumptions as well as concrete international political and economic inequalities. More recent neo-Marxist concepts (1970s onwards) do away with or at least qualify the strict political and economic determinism inherent in development theory based on the modernisation tradition, and put forward a different sort of determinism, based on external western or global forces. Hence, repeatability of western development patterns is negated, adequate state capacity is not taken for granted - although envisaged for the socialist project. (Neo-) Marxists see the central issue of popular participation as power and resource (re)distribution between

⁹⁵ In the context of SAPs the terms 'social dimension of adjustment' or 'adjustment with a human face' were coined. Cornia, Jolly, Steward, 1988; Ribe, Carvalho, 1990.

⁹⁷ Nun, 1991, p. 6, cited in Pérez, 1993, p. 6.

⁹⁸ Pérez, 1993, pp. 11-14.

different classes in society. Another new left theoretical strand is that dealing with social movements (since mid-1979s) and their (unconventional) forms of direct action⁹⁹. In general, structuralist notions of development and participation have a twofold aim. Firstly, political development requires the breaking of relations of external / international dependency within which peripheral states operate, i.e. old discussion about a new world order. Secondly, internal to societies, popular, revolutionary, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist processes aimed at breaking unequal class relations have to lead to liberating and empowering the marginalised. This conceptualisation of (political) participation as empowerment and liberation is clearly reflected in the work of United Nations institutions since the end of the 1970s. Here, participation is defined as "... the organisation of efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control."¹⁰⁰, i.e. the aim is to redistribute state power, both at micro- and macro-level. In summary, the different structuralist versions reject possibility of western-like patterns of state - society relations and assume that dependency can be overcome by people's mobilisation, their (self-)empowerment and the 'nationalisation of the state'¹⁰¹.

Besides dependency theory, the participation approach has other intellectual influences as well. Participation actually is a part-substitute of the concept of conscientisation, which was firstly introduced by Paulo Freire. Its aim is to achieve power and not just growth for the grassroots. "Participation has to be conceived as an active process where the initiatives are taken by the people themselves guided by their own thinking, and using means and processes [institutions and mechanisms, PW] over which they can exert effective control. The people decide, act and reflect on their actions as conscious subjects. This concept has to be distinguished from passive participation which only involves people in actions that have been thought out or designed by others and controlled by other."¹⁰²

Such underlying conceptualisations have to be kept in mind in order to understand the 'ideological' disposition and motivation of political actors, since the features of the South African political culture might be ambivalently interpreted,

⁹⁹Wignaraja, 1993.

¹⁰⁰Pearse, Stiefel, 1979, p. 8, quoted in Pérez, 1993, p. 13.

¹⁰¹Pérez, 1993, p. 14.

¹⁰²Tillikaratna, 1987, p. 9.

either positively as participatory elements of an envisaged responsive state or as a process of the statist system co-opting the private civil realm with negative implications for its independence¹⁰³. Hence, the question whether or not the participatory RDP-rhetoric will just be symbolic politics¹⁰⁴ / delivery is crucial. However, a precise explanatory approach, i.e. to assess the importance of the specific above-mentioned theoretical notions in terms of direction and degree as factors in politics, would seem to overstretch the focus and limitations of the research.

2.3.2) Definitions Of Participation

The complexity of modern societies is placing severe limitations on the classical Greek conception of democracy, where ideally the populace controlled the rulers. The actuality of popular control seems today to be an increasingly unrealistic standard. It follows almost naturally that in any reasonably large system, with a high degree of functional specialisation, elitism is inevitable. In this century, (democratic) government by an elite has been recognised as a necessary product of the process of modernisation that makes government itself a specialised functional subsystem. A further trend in post-industrialised societies is the (unstoppable) transfer of political power from the legislature and executive to technocratic institutions, the locus of which lies outside the political realm, which is not to say they are not political in nature. The problem with the above trends is that power to govern cannot be separated from power to abuse. Political power entails the choice to act for or against the public interest (whatever it is perceived to be). It is in the knowledge of this that a serious search has to take place for mechanisms at all level in which a large, mostly apathetic society can keep checks and balances, assist as well as oppose, those who yield power.

Historically, public participation in administrative decision-making has been caught between competing political justifications. On the one hand, progressive

¹⁰³Wide parts of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) internalised this political ideology as part of their belief systems. For a comparison of just some policy documents representing the intellectual roots such as the ANC's Freedom Charter of 1955, compare also Lodge, 1983; Steytler, 1991; Swilling, Monteiro, 1995; or concerning economic policy the Macro Economic Research Group (MERG), 1993.

¹⁰⁴Edelman, 1990; Sarcinelli, 1987a, 1987b; Hirschman, 1991.

theories of government emphasised the technical calculation of the public interest, e.g. by societal utility functions based on neo-classical economic theory or rational choice approaches. This could only be done by experts, thus public involvement in agency work has been seen not to be necessary. On the other hand, more recent pluralist theories advocated administrative procedures that require public participation, on the assumption that participation would be equal and effective for all groups and that opportunity for participation, and by itself, would produce legitimate policy in the public interest. As Shapiro succinctly puts it, pluralists agreed that "... the true test of rationality of a government policy is not its substance but whether or not it is the product of groups interacting with one another and with government."¹⁰⁵

A large number of possible (political) reasons for participation exists, which correspond, as will be shown below, with different degrees of influence 'granted' to external players. Goals and objectives encompass¹⁰⁶:

1. Collection of information, specifically under difficult conditions such as in townships and squatter camps;
2. Dissemination of information, which seems only useful if employed precluding another participation exercise, because if practised as an end in itself it is merely little more than public relations;
3. Consultation with no obligation resting on officialdom to incorporate expressed opinions into the final plan or policy and little empowerment effects for society;
4. Mediation between interests in civil society, which basically attempts to structure and regulate conflicts and thus helps avoiding potentially more dangerous constellations;
5. Delusion of opposition, especially by creating legitimation and understanding of the problem and interest structure with an eye on future implementation; and
6. Envisaged incorporation of societal interests into policy-making, by the establishment of partnerships on a temporary or permanent basis, e.g. corporatism. Empowerment is less an issue here since all players need to be organisational and politically strong enough to participate in such arrangements.

The definition and analysis of participation is a complex and formidable task, which is additionally burdened with emotional connotations. As already shown in the

¹⁰⁵ Shapiro, 1982, quoted in: Matheny, Williams, 1991, p. 326.

¹⁰⁶ The taxonomy is based on Christianson, 1995, pp. 6-12.

last paragraphs there are generally speaking two broad understandings, namely the collectivist liberation oriented strand of popular participation (in development), and the more individualist public participation often associated with political activism in western industrialised countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Collorary terms for the latter are citizen involvement, citizen participation, public involvement or political participation¹⁰⁷. Kweit differentiates along similar lines according to the structure of participation, i.e. collectivist and individualist models of public interest and participation¹⁰⁸, and secondly according to their level of impact of participation, i.e. impact of participation on individual level (citizen attitudes), impact of participation at societal level (power redistribution), and impact of public involvement on administrative level (policy impact)¹⁰⁹. Friedman, from a historical perspective on planning, differentiates more incrementalist into social reform, social learning, and social mediation as categories of planning for change¹¹⁰. In western liberal democracies participation in planning and decision-making is usually a response to failures of responsive democracy; the aim is to bridge the gap between elected representatives and officialdom on the one side and citizens and communities on the other, thus deepening democracy. In developing countries, a different set of objectives traditionally led to the call for (popular) participation, namely firstly, to increase the sustainability by a sense of ownership and thus commitment of development projects and programmes. Also the supplementation of meagre resources of the state falls into this objective. Secondly, the nature of the problem, i.e. poverty as the root cause and simultaneous and immense needs of many or even all basic services. Thirdly, distinct connotations of the concepts civil society and community, especially in Africa, lead to approaches more collective and less pluralist-lobbyist in nature¹¹¹. Although similar mechanisms might be employed successfully for both the categories, the historical development and underlying motivation differs sharply. Function and structure should follow strategy; inappropriate match of goals and mechanisms can easily lead to undesired

¹⁰⁷ Without going too much into detail, one might distinguish into two normative dimension. The first sees participation as an individual right and thus stresses the person, the second, e.g. political participation, rather stresses the state in the participatory relationship. Langton, 1973, pp. 20-21.

¹⁰⁸ Kweit, 1981, pp. 44-62.

¹⁰⁹ Kweit, 1981, pp. 82-103.

¹¹⁰ Friedman, 1987.

¹¹¹ For a brief discussion of concerned issues such as community solidarity and apathy, see: Christenson, 1995.

outcomes for one or more parties, disillusionment with the participation process or the state in general as well as opposition and sabotage in the worst case.

2.3.2.1) Citizen Participation

Langton lists three developments that had a profound impact on democratic theory and practice and which gave rise to citizen participation, namely¹¹².

1. The civil rights movement with its emphasis on maximum feasible participation of minorities and the poor;
2. The substantial growth of the public interest movement with their demands for openness, access and accountability of the government; and
3. A movement among public sector agencies to inform citizens better and involve them in planning and decision-making.

As a result of the above societal developments, government agencies established participation and conflict resolution policies, regulations, procedures and units; since then a certain self-fuelled dynamic led to increasing public demands and legal requirements for participation. Obviously, as empirical studies show, reality is less egalitarian than envisaged; members of the educated middle class tend to have greater impact than, say, the poor¹¹³. Nevertheless, the number of regulations requiring public involvement and the policy fields covered has swollen to an impressive size in all advanced industrialised western countries over the last three decades.

The reasons and underlying values of the public (i.e. for taking part in or demanding), as well as of government and the administration (i.e. allowing or stimulating), participation can be diverse. On one side of the spectrum is the aspect of deepening democracy, of gaining (direct) democratic control over public institutions, thus serving as check and balance to politicians. This can take place both with positive as well as negative perceptions and citizens' attitudes towards the politico-administrative complex. On the other side citizen participation can be exclusively defined in terms of assisting and supporting administrative decision-making in government to the exclusion of instances in which citizens seek to exert

¹¹²He analyses the United States of America; the experience in other western democracy differs however little, one could only speak of a few years of time delay. Langton, 1973, p. 14.

¹¹³Compare: Coulter, 1988; Edwards, 1978; Sharp, 1988.

influence and achieve real power or self-governance. This perspective often characterises token attempts of public institutions with the focus of reducing conflicts during later implementation.

The key is the realisation that participation is initiated and controlled by two sources, citizens and the government / state. Therefore, the two general types to differentiate are citizen-initiated and government-initiated participation, which follows the well known bottom-up and top-down dichotomy. However, this does not clarify the origins (of government-initiated) or the levels of participation (i.e. legislature or administrative institutions). Nor are the questions answered whether participation is legally required to be allowed / enforced or whether discretion on the parts of the state and the population exists. On the basis of the above discussed distinctions between citizen participation and other related terms, a typology can be developed. The above mentioned set of variables leads Langton to categories into four types¹¹⁴:

1. Citizen action, which is initiated and controlled by civil society for self-determined purposes (lobbying, policy advocacy, protest, etc.).
2. Citizen involvement, which initiated and controlled by the government or the administration in order to gain or improve support for decisions (public hearings, consultation with advisory committees, attitudinal survey, etc.).
3. Electoral participation, which is government initiated and controlled, but also a right of citizens.
4. Obligatory participation, which involves mandatory response from the citizenry (paying taxes, military conscription).

Before elaborating on the second major category of participation, i.e. popular participation, the various possible activities, motivations for and degrees of impact of participation make the presentation of another typology advisable. Here, the motivation and degrees of public involvement go hand in hand. Below, four different classifications will be presented and finally integrated in to a handy set of levels of shared decision-making between the government and civil society. The first taxonomy lists seven categories of public involvement in ascending order¹¹⁵:

¹¹⁴Langton, 1973, p. 21. For brief practical side step, looking at the South African dominant modes of participation, one finds that this taxonomy fits only partly. Please compare the figure in the final chapter (5) Conclusions. Also, it will become obvious there may be more modes of participation possible.

¹¹⁵Praxis, 1988, p. 6.

influence and achieve real power or self-governance. This perspective often characterises token attempts of public institutions with the focus of reducing conflicts during later implementation.

The key is the realisation that participation is initiated and controlled by two sources, citizens and the government / state. Therefore, the two general types to differentiate are citizen-initiated and government-initiated participation, which follows the well known bottom-up and top-down dichotomy. However, this does not clarify the origins (of government-initiated) or the levels of participation (i.e. legislature or administrative institutions). Nor are the questions answered whether participation is legally required to be allowed / enforced or whether discretion on the parts of the state and the population exists. On the basis of the above discussed distinctions between citizen participation and other related terms, a typology can be developed. The above mentioned set of variables leads Langton to categories into four types¹¹⁴:

1. Citizen action, which is initiated and controlled by civil society for self-determined purposes (lobbying, policy advocacy, protest, etc.).
2. Citizen involvement, which initiated and controlled by the government or the administration in order to gain or improve support for decisions (public hearings, consultation with advisory committees, attitudinal survey, etc.).
3. Electoral participation, which is government initiated and controlled, but also a right of citizens.
4. Obligatory participation, which involves mandatory response from the citizenry (paying taxes, military conscription).

Before elaborating on the second major category of participation, i.e. popular participation, the various possible activities, motivations for and degrees of impact of participation make the presentation of another typology advisable. Here, the motivation and degrees of public involvement go hand in hand. Below, four different classifications will be presented and finally integrated in to a handy set of levels of shared decision-making between the government and civil society. The first taxonomy lists seven categories of public involvement in ascending order¹¹⁵:



¹¹⁴Langton, 1973, p. 21. For brief practical side step, looking at the South African dominant modes of participation, one finds that this taxonomy fits only partly. Please compare the figure in the final chapter (5) Conclusions. Also, it will become obvious there may be more modes of participation possible.

¹¹⁵Praxis, 1988, p. 6.

1. **Persuasion:** the use of public involvement techniques illegitimate endeavours to change attitudes without raising public expectations of participating in planning.
2. **Education:** the use of information dissemination and general instruction to create an awareness of programmes and issues.
3. **Information Feedback:** the distribution, by the authority, of information on a policy planning situation on which the authority has a stated position and the request for public feedback on the situation.
4. **Consultation:** the use of formal dialogue between authorities and citizens or organs of civil society based on prior established mutually accepted objectives.
5. **Joint Planning:** shared decision-making in which the public is represented on departmental planning committees and is given voting and decision-making authority. Often, issues are geographically specific and comprehensible by local participants; alternatively there is a preparation phase for the technical empowerment of participants.
6. **Delegated Authority:** the transfer of responsibility, normally associated with the authority, to the public or other levels of government possessing the necessary expertise and capacity.
7. **Self Determination:** the undertaking of the planning process by the public directly. If financial support is additionally given, a certain indirect influence may arise out of regulations, i.e. financial accountability to the donor.

Potapchuk offers a somewhat different taxonomy of levels of shared decision-making, on the basis of Arnstein's and Connor's 'ladders of citizen participation'¹¹⁶. For heuristic purposes these rankings will be briefly presented in order to prepare an understanding of a chart linking citizen participation to the level of shared decision-making which will be presented further below (chapter 4).

¹¹⁶ Arnstein, 1969, and Connor, 1988, presented in Potapchuk, 1987, p. 15.

Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen ParticipationConnor's Ladder of Citizen Participation

Based on the two figures presented above, Potapchuk distinguishes between five different levels of shared decision-making. On the one side of the spectrum, the government decides, on the other end the government delegates decision-making authority to organs of civil society. In between, government may consult individuals or representative groups and then decide or may decide jointly with consulted representative groups. From a community organisation perspective¹¹⁷ however, all these attempts fall short of comprehending the diversity of both direct and representative as well as individual and collective forms of participation. Arnstein distinguishes between degrees of non-participation (conflict), tokenism (paternalism), and citizen power (coproduction)¹¹⁸. The strongest degree of power sharing, citizen control, refers, like Conner's differentiation, into general public and leader oriented activities of litigation, mediation and joint planning, to a set of elites

¹¹⁷ Cochran, 1989; Muller, 1994, Rothman, Tropman, WY.

¹¹⁸ Please compare the analytical framework presented in the next chapter (2.3.3) Patterns Of Participation And Issues Of Representativeness.

among probably the majority of the have-not citizens. If involvement programmes for the general public fail, the decision-making reverts to the elites. This dichotomy of social power seems to be common sense. However, it fails to capture the importance of the need for support from the broader community, community leaders and local government officials necessary for major sustainable community development initiatives. Neither of the above ladders reaches to the recently emerged new broad-base forms of participation to build community vision and structure strategic development plans.

Last but not least, the question of who should participate arises. For the purposes of this chapter it shall suffice to note that participation can be based, firstly, on a geographical locality (e.g. residents groups or communities), or secondly, it may be in terms of some shared interest or activity (such as women or sport groups), or thirdly, the basis for participation may be functional or service oriented (such as individuals and groups concerned with say housing or welfare services). In reality, usually a combination of the above is found. In terms of the continuity of participation, the whole range from ad hoc formation of groups as a response to a threat (to the status quo) to long-standing collaborative relationships with government agencies is possible.

2.3.2.2) Popular Participation

In contrast to the above concepts of citizen participation, popular participation equates both the right to and the learning process in participation as empowerment and liberation. The different forms of participation apply predominantly in the context of policy development, not to be confused with participation in development in the actual implementation (assisted, mutual, etc. self-help), on which the structuralist initiatives have put special emphasis too. From a societal power and social learning perspective, Tandon distinguishes participation into four categories, namely: (1) participation as mobilisation for production, (2) participation as decision-making for democratic rule, (3) participation as other-empowerment (power abnegation), and (4) participation as self-empowerment (power seizure)¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁹Tandon, 1991, p. 6.

The first concept, participation as mobilisation is as old as history, i.e. slaves were mobilised to build pyramids or colonial ruler mobilised the natives to construct roads, ditches and prisons with free labour. In post-colonial Africa, this concept has been applied in the name of socialism to mobilise the peasantry, e.g. into Tanzania's concept 'Ujamaa' villages or Kenya's 'Harambee' idealistically envisaged to strengthen local self-help (on a national scale) by activating all human resources for the village's or the nation's development¹²⁰. Also, resettlement programmes or food-for-work schemes mean simply the provision or extraction of labour (and sometimes financial resources) from the poor.

The second concept of participation in decision-making corresponds somewhat to the social democratic variant of development as growth with equity. The objective is reforming the system - or just making it more efficient or less conflictual - without yielding its essence. Often, in decision-making at various levels of the state and its administration, a concession is made to the democratic principle that the people have to have participated only in order to give legitimacy to a plan or project. If participation takes the form of decentralisation or devolution, i.e. strengthening local government, history teaches that one has to be careful about the (central) government's intentions. There has been no case in Africa's recent history in which decentralisation has meant genuine participation by the grassroots in determining their destiny. Policies that really matter were always determined from the top, or alternatively, responsibility was devolved downwards without corresponding technical and financial powers thus making it a farce¹²¹. The concept of worker participation serves often only legitimisation purposes without transferring real management power¹²².

The concepts of participation have already been co-opted into the vocabulary of the national and international (development) establishments. The term participation has begun to lose credibility, at least among left intellectuals during the latter part of the 1980s; a new concept began to gain currency, namely

¹²⁰This study will not get into detailed criticising of underlying political agendas, e.g. that self-help only served to reduce the government's responsibility to properly invest in rural development, thus allowing it to carry on with their elitist resource allocation and control policy.

¹²¹This criticism applies from a grassroots perspective; if the aim is to broaden the echelons of decision-makers from a narrow elite to also include members of middle classes, then participation in decision-making may well serve its function, although one ought to speak here rather of co-optation.

¹²²Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 1994.

empowerment of the people¹²³. The third and the fourth concepts, participation as empowerment, arise out of struggles against those who have economic and political power, e.g. 'class struggles' of the working people, participation in political struggles for liberation and independence from colonial rule. Based on Freire's concept of conscientisation, it means popular "struggle at all levels against economic, cultural and political domination."¹²⁴ It is argued that the objective of participation is not simply to ensure that people at the grassroots are involved in their own decision-making, because these are subject to manipulation, but that such participation must lead furthermore to their empowerment. Within this context, the third concept of participation as other-empowerment may easily become patronising, because here empowerment is undertaken at the behest of the powerful who pretend to transfer power from themselves to the grassroots. The disadvantaged do not take power, they are given it, which is improbable, since reality tells us that rulers voluntarily only 'empower' the under-dogs to the extent that it suits their interests, or co-opt some of them into the system to forestall worse things happening¹²⁵. Ideally, participation as self-empowerment as an exercise of (collective) will on the part of the disempowered will lead to increased participation. Such a philosophy is often claimed to be followed by NGOs. However, the emphasis placed on them during the last decade within the context of a distinctive NGO model of development based on empowerment often boils down to a matter of adopting correct technical or organisational (prescriptive) approaches from and for experts¹²⁶. What happens after the people have seized power is, of course, another issue, as the 'restorations' of post-Napoleonic France and the recent happenings in Eastern Europe and China show.

Generally speaking, there is a clear developmental focus within more structuralist concepts. Liberation and empowerment are based on the presupposition that popular participation, e.g. either by mobilising popular forces (state initiated) or

¹²³ Craig, Mayo, 1995.

¹²⁴ Tandon, 1991, p. 7.

¹²⁵ It is interesting to note that the concept of other-empowerment is the basic self-legitimising rationale presented by the new South African elites. Both interviewees from a community organisation background, as well as own practical experience of the author (GSP&DM, MM/FT class) strengthen this paternalism within the historically disadvantaged - or has anyone heard an already fairly empowered community leader ever reason that the members of his / her community have to empower themselves against him / her?

¹²⁶ Wuyts, Mackintosh, Hewitt, 1992, pp. 117-146.

more recently through new social movements' independent efforts¹²⁷, can achieve a radical redistribution of state power and thus overcome current internal societal and international dependent relationships, the former being conceived as externally influenced by the state's dependency on the West / transnational corporations (TNC). This is not to say that the more individualist and western concepts of citizen participation are development unfriendly, as the next part will show. Modernisation and structuralist approaches simply differ in terms of their scope, form and final objective. By defining and describing essential elements and determining major values and distinguishing different types of participation, a modest attempt has been made to establish a framework for clearer understanding of the phenomenon of citizen and popular participation. Concerning the questions whether participation is an appropriate end in itself, the study has both assumed and spoken in of favour using adequate direct and representative mechanisms for deepening democracy. However, the question of appropriate limits to participation have not yet been considered. Below, a less conceptual and definitional, but rather pragmatic, approach will be taken in order to highlight both real obstacles to and possibilities for furthering participatory democracy in the South African political and socio-cultural context.

2.3.3) Issues In Participation

2.3.3.1) Patterns Of Participation

Christianson draws a general distinction between the two categories empowerment and conflict management. The first is a developmental objective¹²⁸. Reasons include skills and knowledge transfer through participation, achievement of a match between needs and delivered products and services, as well as legitimisation of development policies and increases in effectiveness. The second category, conflict management, spans a continuum from incorporation of interest (with sanction power) on the one extreme in order to defuse opposition by bringing it into the process. At the opposite extreme, selective or eclectic co-option of interests groups,

¹²⁷ Western support for CBOs and NGOs within the context of development co-operation falls squarely between the above mentioned two paradigms due to their often authentic independence of the state and their partly system transformation agenda on the one side, but their not necessary collectivist and system transformative orientation. Friedman, 1992.

¹²⁸ Christianson, 1995, pp. 2-3.

not as players but as clients, may enlarge the space for government by buying others off. The most developmental form of participation as conflict management is where government acts as a mediator and potential arbitrator¹²⁹.

Susskind and Elliott offer three distinct patterns of participation¹³⁰, namely (1) paternalism in which government decision-making is highly centralised and citizen participation is either discouraged or closely managed by officials, (2) conflict in which centralised decision-making is dominant, but in which citizens or communities struggle openly over control over certain resource allocation or policy decisions from elected or appointed officials. Conflict leads either to the fragmentation of political power, and thus sustained confrontation, or to acceptance by public officials of the need to adjust relationships between them and citizens, and (3) coproduction in which decisions are made through face-to-face negotiations between decision-makers and residents / community representatives claiming a major stake in a particular decision. These three patterns need not be phases or a continuum of a learning and empowerment process.

In the first case, participation is viewed as a supplement to, but not as a replacement of representative democratic decision-making. Paternalism describes the dominance of government and administration officials in controlling when and how citizens, consumers or communities voice their concerns, but it need not necessarily be repressive in nature. Indeed, it may lead (intentionally) to the politicisation of segments of the population or provide time for their own organisation and independent needs prioritisation. In the case of a conflictual pattern of participation, mechanisms employed by action groups may consist of petitions, demonstrations, court action or the influence of political parties and as well if no accepted forums or other channels of communication through which citizens feel they can effectively express their opposition exist, possibly to unconventional and non-traditional means such as civil disobedience or even violence. Confrontation itself is not bad. It may serve to mobilise communities around issues, increase their successes, and possibly also to sustain the momentum of the movement. Susskind and Elliott observe that an increase in the flow of information between officials and citizens frequently only sharpens existing conflicts between groups with competing

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³⁰ Susskind, Elliott, 1983, pp. 5-15.

interests. Participatory mechanisms and techniques may sometimes be used to manage or vitiate conflicts, but direct participation by self-proclaimed stakeholders may be unacceptable to officials who feel that it is their duty to weigh and balance the demands of diverse interests. Often, conflict is not intentionally planned, but results out of events. It can also be deliberately employed as a short term tactic or long term strategy. Self-evidently, the underlying problem is firstly a lack of trust and thus willingness to co-operate between the state and communities, and secondly heterogeneous interests in communities (and the administration) itself. The fault may not lie solely on the side of government, but from a liberal perspective, i.e. defence of civil rights and deepening of democracy, it is primarily the responsibility of government to change such patterns of bad unresponsive governance.

The third pattern of participation, coproduction (constructive co-operation), is not often found although it represents the best from of interaction. It requires that all parties accept not only the legitimacy of each other's involvement in the process of deciding but also the possibility that residents, consumers and organs of civil society might share responsibility (along with government) for the management of development. Coproduction is most likely to occur when decision-making has been formally decentralised¹³¹, which additionally served in many western cities to off-load certain costs and responsibilities of previously centrally managed public services and thereby relieving overloaded municipal budgets¹³². Coproduction is not without problems and tensions will always remain, because citizens will try to resist co-option often associated with paternalism, while officials will continue to (have to) balance willingness to negotiate with responsibility to work in behalf of the 'common interest' (aggregated utility / welfare function). Long term resident satisfaction is frequently linked to high levels of coproduction, specifically in the planning phase of development¹³³ since it optimises the power sharing citizens seek with enforced accountability of both parties owing to their shared responsibility. Ideally, the latter is checked not just by officials but also by the community (imperative mandate of community representatives). The Gauteng case study will show that all patterns existed at one stage or another. However, it will also become evident that not all

¹³¹ Skisskind Elliott 1983 p 13

necessary steps have been taken by the government to assist in or enable communities to participate.

Finally below three aspects will be discussed. Firstly, distinctions regarding different kinds of representativeness and their implications seem necessary; secondly, the differences between a process and product orientation will be analysed; and thirdly the question concerning the relationship between participation and development will be covered. As will become evident in the following empirical chapters of the study, sensitivity towards community heterogeneity (and community organisational politicking) is unfortunately both underdeveloped in the South African representative vs. inclusiveness discourse as well as in community development practice.

2.3.3.2) Types Of Representativeness

The first issue relates to the dimension of the definition of participation. It asks whether anyone can represent anybody else. Hutcheson differentiates into two forms of representativeness, namely social representation and opinion representation¹³⁴. He writes that classical studies of participation¹³⁵ have documented differences in socio-economic status between participants and non-participants, and that examinations of the demographic composition of citizen participation mechanisms are usually consistent with those findings. But not just demographic differences - usually participants have a higher level of education and income, urbanites are over-represented, etc. These trends in the way different strata of society make use of participative mechanisms. Beyond these, characteristic differences in opinions, i.e. attitudinal differences, values, preferences and perceptions exist. Latting distinguishes into three types of representation, each denoting a different definition of representativeness¹³⁶. (1) Socio-political representativeness implies formal authorisation by a constituency of the representatives' right to act on its behalf. (2) Modal or demographic representativeness refers to the extent to which individuals and those whom they purport to represent share the same race, gender, socio-economic status, residency or other characteristic. (3) Technical representatives are

advocates of a particular group or viewpoint or are experts possessing specialised skills or knowledge. Demographic and technical representatives can be sought by any group. However, only an actual constituency may authorise an individual to act as its socio-political representative. The contrast between demographic and socio-political representation can be further clarified by reference to the style of representation, i.e. trustee, delegate or ombudsman¹³⁷. Trustees function as independent agents, whereas delegates ought to respond to their constituents and put forth their views. Thus, from a literature review it would appear that (citizen) participation does not automatically lead to consistently representing the public perceptions and preferences.

Churchman develops four distinct categories of possible, i.e. legitimate, representation, namely¹³⁸: (1) formal representation by elections or appointments, (2) legitimate representation because demographic and attitudinal characteristics are similar between communities and their leaders, (3) symbolic representation which is legitimated by the representative being an object of identification by others, and (4) substantive representation, i.e. when the representative acts in the interest of his / her constituency. The last term however is defined more rigorously by Petersen, who states that representation can only be labelled substantive if the representative is oriented towards the interests of his / her constituency, and is also able to influence policies accordingly¹³⁹. The implications of these differences become more obvious, if one considers that in the historical context of the South African struggle, leaders always claimed to represent the interests of the oppressed, but have hardly been questioned about their demographic or attitudinal 'ability' to do so. Thus, having realised the various difficulties in attaining (all of) the different kinds of representativeness, and above and beyond the procedural question as to whether or not representation has been attained, there is another interesting one. Namely: can the various goals of involvement and participation be achieved by representatives, is direct participation not the better option in the first place?

A number of higher order goals can be identified, e.g. to further democratic values and practices, to achieve planning attuned to the needs and preferences of

the communities, to train and educate the public and further self-empowerment, to bring about personal / attitudinal, societal, and political change as well as to support legitimacy for planning and to improve the quality of the policy output¹⁴⁰. In principle all of the above goals can be achieved for those who participate actively. However, except furthering the first democratic value through representation, the attainment of the rest seems doubtful. There may be some direct benefits through the increase in community activity. Indirect benefits may result from the education and personal change among leader. The goals concerning policies that fit the needs of non-participants and legitimation might be achieved if the representation is substantively good. However, attempting to initiate attitudinal and behaviour change among the broad public by processes based only upon representation cannot work. But on the whole, it seems clear that one benefits most, and in some ways only, through direct participation. This conclusion has implications for the structure of the involvement and participation processes to be initiated by government or CBOs and NGOs, and for the participatory techniques to be used. This does not mean that a purely representative participatory process is inadvisable or worthless, but it is limited to the goals it can achieve.

2.3.3.3) The Issue Of Process Vs. Product

This issue relates to the goals of participation and asks whether process or product goals of involvement and participation are the more important to focus on. In the list of the five higher order goals in the above paragraph only the goals related to attuning planning decisions to citizen preferences and to building support and legitimacy are product oriented, because their main concern is with the content of the decisions taken. The other goals are process oriented, concerning themselves with how those decisions are arrived at. Different stakeholders with different backgrounds tend to deem one or the other type of goal more central, e.g. planners tend to focus on being responsive to public preferences, while public managers tend to highlight building legitimacy for public policies (both a product goal). Political scientists value furthering democracy and societal education more; community organisers or psychologists will probably focus on social and individual change

(process goals). Last but not least, in all likelihood, the end product is the most important focus from the point of residents. This has been empirically verified by ranking citizen choices¹⁴¹. Comparing (technical) impact of public participation in urban renewal programmes in different countries, with residents influencing the process in a limited way, as a general judgement one can conclude that the resultant plans are not significantly or in essence different from what the plans would have resulted had the residents not participated¹⁴², because participants are generally able to influence or promote issues that are important to them, but also tend to go along with professional opinions. If one looks at recent South African development debates, one realises that they are somewhat uncritically dominated by a few major themes. Construction of housing and job creation are repeatedly stressed by (or in the name of) the people, but issues and hard choices such as road, rail, or communication infrastructure receive no real popular attention. Concerning housing, the governmental (technocratic) decisions are hardly questioned¹⁴³, nor is the relative importance of housing vs. say productivity in the service sector, etc., raised. Thus the South African experience also seems to support the judgement that difference in emphasis but not in basic structure occurs if participation exists. Citizens nevertheless generally perceive the participatory aspect as very important and are more likely to support those processes in which they have been involved. This then argues for the relative importance of the process. On the other hand, in view of the conclusions with regard to the representativeness issue that indicated that most of the goals are only achieved for active participants, one could argue that since the process affects only a small active group, the more important factor is the product, which has the potential for affecting more people. Since we lack objective criteria for evaluating whether the situation that results from a participatory process is better or worse than that of a non-participatory one, and since citizen satisfaction is not a direct function of the quality of the situation, but is also influenced by the feeling of competence and control, one has to conclude that the process of participation is critical also for the achievement, both the perceived (legitimation)

¹⁴¹Cole, 1974, quoted in: Churchman, 1984, p. 195.

and real one because of public mobilisation (resource mobilisation) for the undertaking of product oriented goals.

The relationship of product and process goals of participation as well as legitimisation and mobilisation functions leads us to the last issue, namely what comes first participation or development. One could also refine the question and ask whether the community is the master or the client¹⁴⁴. Advocates of 'development from below', such as David Korton, put forward assertions such as: that state intervention has been largely counterproductive; that (central) governments are inefficient; that it is the mobilisation of local resources and the enhancement of local popular power by building and strengthening their social power that matters; that the people know best and are more responsive to local leadership than to the government, and that most of these social learning processes are of a self-taught nature. Development from below is seen as a people-centred process, within which decentralisation and participatory modes of governance are emphasised, as against bureaucratic forms of management. Development is seen as a bottom up process. The role of the bureaucracy is primarily to listen to the people. Werlin's literature review of empirical studies of development, on the other hand, leads to "[i]nstead to an almost mythical image of the benign, united, knowledgeable community that is exploited and undermined by the bureaucracy, ... [to] poverty of poor communities resulting from their ignorance, disunity, ethnocentricity, authoritarianism, corruption and ineptitude."¹⁴⁵ It seems that owing to the limited capabilities and small radius of trust in other actors, oppressed groups are seldom willing to take sufficient risks to break their bonds of captivity. The more impoverished the community, the more it needs outside assistance. Thus, the community control literature seems to underestimate the importance not only of outside intervention but also of state leadership and organisation in promoting development. Generalising about the reasons for successful national development programmes, Paul presents the following conclusion¹⁴⁶:

- Strategic interventions are needed to energise public demand and response;

¹⁴⁴The following paragraph is based on Werlin, 1989.

¹⁴⁵Werlin, 1989, p. 100.

- Community participation is following from, rather than leading to, development programmes;
- Decentralisation is not automatically provided, it has to be earned, following effective performance;
- Both staff and beneficiaries must be carefully trained.

Concepts such as decentralisation, bottom up development, learning by doing, etc., are very attractive and supported by the top down approach to development, but they are thoroughly discredited by hard experience, because development from below requires assistance from above, using combinations of hard and soft political instruments, tight and loose bureaucratic control and forms of centralisation and decentralisation. The solution is not less bureaucracy or more transfer of power to lower levels, but better bureaucracy and more complementary community development.

2.3.4) Obstacles To Participation

How to strengthen participation as an instrument to integrate the excluded into development? The difficulties which arise in real life are important. To identify them is essential in order to confront them. The magnitude and depth of South Africa's poverty, especially affecting women and children and rural dwellers, tends to create a reality that goes beyond just poverty. Broad sectors of the population find themselves in a situation of 'exclusion'. They exist outside the market, production, and education, on the fringe of virtually all organised society¹⁴⁷. In such conditions, participation appears to be absolutely fundamental. It is one of the few real possibilities for trying to attack not just poverty but complete social exclusion. Although this study deals with participation in government, the key obstacles to participation listed below take this holistic approach, because a state of being economically and socially empowered is a prime requirement for actual engagement in participative exercises. Not just legal and institutional aspects will be highlighted, but also structural ones.

Some constraints are structural and arise from social trends such as population growth, urban bias in living standards, juvenile unemployment, etc. Poverty as well as the specific negative impacts of South Africa's historic migrant labour system, harmed and continue to destroy the social fabric. One very central institution, the family, i.e. the principle force behind socialisation and protection and the basic unit of participation, is being destroyed. This has repercussions on, amongst other things, the growth in the number of street children, drug abuse and crime. Another structural obstacle lies in 'economic poverty' of parts of the population. This will hopefully be reversed in the future, although realistically speaking it will take decades¹⁴⁸.

Before a practical list of management related issues can be presented, one underlying issue concerning perceptions of power needs to be clarified. Power is at the heart of all conflicts. Local government officials often think that if they share power, they are limiting their ability to act. This would be hypothetically correct if all power would be centralised within local government. Power, however, is shared among a number of key actors, such as business, CBOs, citizens, etc. The specific South African past has shown that in fact local (and provincial) governments are unable to successfully act unilaterally on many issues. Thus, working with organs of civil society to develop a joint agreement is not power sharing, but rather is sharing authority in recognition of the power these groups already hold. This as well as the list of institutional and management obstacles to efficient and effective participation reinforce the necessity to view (collaborative) state - civil society interaction as a positive sum game. The obstacles mentioned so far focused on participants. From the side of the government or the administration, limited willingness to allow and strengthen participation exists as well. This may have a number of reasons. Firstly, full consideration of the nature and purposes may not take place, and it may simply be assumed that problems of participation are only technical in nature. When the political and normative implications are realised at a later stage, conflict within departments and between departments and politicians as well as citizens is sure to come. This danger is reinforced in the South African context by two factors: namely, planners' general lack of essential political and negotiation skills in dealing with the

public, and the conservative perception of technocrats as well as politicians that participation tends to lengthen the duration of their projects. The second aspect may be true for the actual time needed to complete the planning phase, however, time savings during implementation as well as greater sustainability are overlooked.

Added to these negative structural obstacles to participation is a series of institutional and management factors in the implementation of processes oriented toward making the population participate both in the policy development and its implementation¹⁴⁹.

- The bureaucratic structures charged with implementing participation generally have a quite rigid vertical internal organisation which is additionally characterised by lateral functional and geographical fragmentation. Such pyramidal hierarchies based on traditional management models, (have to) stick closely to norms and routines, which sometimes are emphasised to the point that fulfilment of procedural details takes priority over substantial developmental or effectiveness considerations. Participation requires almost the opposite, i.e. flexibility, capacity for horizontal dialogue and action in the public service, and the replacement of rigid norms with ad hoc interpretations of problems. This gap between the management profile of public administrations and the requirements that participation demands does not only leads to communication problems and limitations for public action, but also to pessimism on the part of society.
- Often, the 'real needs' of the community are not really 'heard'. However, letting the community members decide without mediation and arbitration mechanisms will often not lead to developmentally sensible needs prioritisation¹⁵⁰.
- The role community leaders play is fundamental, i.e. they can break apathy of the people, lend credibility to participatory initiatives as well as act as channels of communication. Here a working balance has to be found between their recognition and incorporation by the administration on the one side and by not offering them too much power and thus relegating community members or even other unrepresented groups to a secondary position, because their social and opinion representivity¹⁵¹ will obviously not be achieved by inclusivity of organised

¹⁴⁹The list is based on Kliksberg, 1995, p. 2-4.

¹⁵⁰Compare chapter four on the community development forum approach as well as the envisaged way of formulating local development objectives (LDO) within the DFA framework of the DDPE&W.

¹⁵¹Hutcheson, 1984.

interests. Owing to the heterogeneity in community interests, this would seriously limit the impact of participation.

- Without doubt, implementation success increase the more social actors can identify with the development project or programme (ownership), because they have been part of the planning, decision-making, and implementation processes. This requires measures of empowerment and capacity building on the micro-level. Hence, measures that support poverty alleviating economic, social and political frame conditions are vital. Educational methods employed in programmes intended to prepare communities for participation - if such programmes exist in the first place - often run counter to their objectives, e.g. by having an authoritarian slant that inhibits free exchange or the expression of latent doubt. It will also not suffice if they solely concentrate on skills training for implementation, but do not target social or political empowerment. This might not necessarily be the fault of the public agency, but can result as well from NGOs and CBOs which are more interested in inward capacity building or which follow other agendas.
- Another major obstacle is the commonly held belief that participation reduces efficiency or unnecessarily slows down implementation¹⁵². This idea is held without empirical basis; practical experience shows that although the planning process might be more complex, but not automatically longer, barriers to implementation are reduced¹⁵³. Thus, besides putting potentially false efficiency considerations against democratic procedures, effectiveness (i.e. if the project will have to be altered or stopped during implementation) is not considered.
- The risk of corruption is a problem which must be confronted head-on. If the community feels as though they may simply be used by those who stand to benefit personally from the project, or if it is not framed within a real strategy of self-sustainability, the community will be reluctant to participate. In order to stimulate participation, it is essential to guarantee effective social control over the management of the project or programme and to ensure transparency. The

¹⁵²There was not one single interviewee - although everyone was positive to ('adequate') participation - which did not express the perceived paradox between due participatory processes and efficient delivery.

¹⁵³In fact many decisions cannot be made without prior consultation and / or consent from all stakeholders, e.g. decisions concerning location of toxic waste sites. Matheny, Williams, 1991.

incorporation of a CBO leader by a government department or a CBO and NGO by a private developer will not suffice.

- The general relations between CBOs, NGOs and the state have to be co-operative. Their difficulties with each other strongly affects the attitudes of community members with regard to participation, since they may feel immersed in conflicts whose logic is foreign to them and beyond their control.

The structural causes of poverty in the country / region, along with the institutional factors just mentioned, are some of the principle concrete obstacles which explain why, despite the broad consensus regarding its necessity, participation is often not functioning smoothly.

2.3.5) Mechanisms For Citizen And Popular Participation

Experiments in participatory planning and other collaborative processes over the last decades, both in advanced industrialised countries as well as in developmental contexts, have matured into an identified and documented set of tools that can be tailored to specific situations and barriers. These tools provide powerful structures for conflict resolution and consensus building. Many forms of participation prove to be effective, their efficacy depends as much upon intent as on design. Atkinson argues that international insights into past experience falls into two very distinct categories, viz. the literature on participatory democracy emanating from the north, and the literature on public participation in development which focuses on third world cities¹⁵⁴. The two chapters below will focus on participation in planning. Community involvement in the management of development programmes and projects will not be covered.

2.3.5.1) Participatory Planning In Advanced Industrialised Countries

The techniques of participation presented below, following Fagence's distinction¹⁵⁵, are differentiated into 'conventional' methods with a rather low level of

impact on the decisions taken, and 'innovative' methods enabling citizens' community groups to yield a higher level of impact and control.

- **Information dissemination:** Public Notice Columns (passive) in the media to encourage written or oral submissions to government planning initiative; Mass Publicity Programmes (active) including media campaigns, exhibitions, brochures, as well as public meeting, lectures and training programmes, discussions with politicians and administrative officials, etc.; Drop-in Centres (inter-active) both for offering information (e.g. library, published agenda and minutes of planning and council meetings, discussions, etc.) as well as for serving to collect feedback from citizens.
- **Public Enquiry System:** allows interested parties to submit their opinions to specially constituted tribunals and public hearing. However, these tend to be rule driven and often dominated by interest groups and local branches of political parties.
- **Social Marketing:** focus groups and questionnaire (mail, telephone¹⁵⁶) surveys are the only methods for the government and the administration to establish statistically representative data on public opinion.
- **Referenda:** allow all enfranchised to express an opinion, however, this technique is best suited to a single issue. Experience in Austria and Switzerland has shown that the danger exists that the issue is taken over by large pressure groups by domination of the exact phrasing of the questions.
- **Open door policy of the administration** involves the encouragement of citizens to visit local (project) offices any time on a walk-in basis.

2.3.5.2) Strengthening Participation And Local Self-Governance In Development

Over the last decade there has been increasing international consensus among roleplayers and stakeholders in development about goals and means. Poverty alleviation has become the central objective, with participation and self-help its founding principles¹⁵⁷. The emphasis placed on the participatory element

¹⁵⁶With the currently still racially and class distortions in the distribution of telephone connections this seems not to work in South Africa, at least in rural areas and former BLA areas.

¹⁵⁷Leffler-Franke, 1994, p. 6.

represents the new aspect in the concept of poverty alleviation. Sustainable development, including structural adjustment in the public and the private sector, seems unthinkable without building societal consensus, which can be understood as an interactive process of consultation and dialogue between all political and social actors. If participation is comprehended as a change and action oriented concept, it becomes obvious that both social integration as well as conflict components have to be combined. Within the local context, the most intriguing question is to what extent party politics can be integrated with the process of community development¹⁵⁸. On the one hand, the rigidity of political behaviour within a party system fosters sectarianism, at the local level as well. The division generated by party politics disintegrates community solidarity although every day issues at community level often do not fall along rigid party lines. On the other side, political organisations become sterile if they are deprived of a foundation in civil society. The strength of political parties - and there still needs to be further development in South Africa in this respect - is derived from the degree of their organic linkage with the communities at grassroots level. Political parties, as central institutions of a democratic political system, need that linkage for their sustenance¹⁵⁹. This conflict in structuring local development structures and state - civil society relations will become more obvious when dealing with development forums in chapter four.

Innovative methods of public participation offer more impact on decision-making to active participants, both in plan- or policy-generating exercises, which often includes educational elements to participants¹⁶⁰. In order to be effective, the process has to aim at making planning real and immediate for local participants. This can be achieved by emphasising (1) contextual diversity, which assumes that planning processes and organisations must vary to fit different local conditions; (2) self-organisation, which encourages groups to organise themselves to achieve what they want rather than waiting to be organised by government; (3) extended doorstep planning, which is designed to mobilise participants around a very small scale physical improvement; (4) coproduction contracts, which are formal agreements between (local) government and citizen action groups spelling out the

¹⁵⁸In the South African context note that party politics are partly linked to ethnic dynamics.

¹⁵⁹Halfani, 1994, p. 165.

¹⁶⁰Atkinson, 1992, pp. 21-24.

responsibilities of all the parties in the development process; and (5) give-and-take planning, in which CBOs develop plans by exchanging and commenting on documents (nominal group technique)¹⁶¹.

- **Public Hearing Model:** planning, policy adoption and implementation is conducted by the state, which offers the opportunity for interested parties to express their opinion. This can range from large congresses to merely a few telephone interviews.
- **Citizen Advisory Committees:** several institutional arrangements are possible in which citizens are called together to represent the ideas and attitudes of their interest groups or communities. In Citizen Review Boards decision-making power is delegated to selected or appointed citizen representatives to decide about alternative plans to implement. In Neighbourhood Planning Councils they serve in an advisory function to local government (planning units) in order to identify relevant local problems as well as to formulate goals and priorities.
- **Joint Planning Committees or citizen representation on public policy-making bodies:** elected or appointed representatives which give recommendations. There must be reasonable and credible assurance from officialdom that inputs are taken seriously.
- **Negotiation Forums:** sectoral forums present arrangements for conflict management and policy development. However, they may create co-ordination problems with other sectors and easily become power bases for individuals or certain organisations which raise doubts about democratic equality of the vote. Generalist or multi-issue forums, such as the fourth chamber on NEDLAC or LDFs and CDFs, appear on the surface to offer the best participatory mechanism. However, difficulties of the aggregation or prioritisation of interests are bound to arise as well as the general question of how to enforce agreements binding the constituencies. Tripartite or corporatist forums, comprising labour, business and the state, with the latter often acting as *primus inter pares*, are often exclusive to societal weaker interests. Here, vertical linkages run via the interest groups' (peak organisations) subordinate regional and local structures.
- **Community Technical Assistance:** this covers several techniques by which interest groups are given professional assistance in developing alternative plans

or objections to (local) government proposals. Technical assistance is very important, especially for poorer, disadvantaged communities since it is these groups which lack knowledge, resources, and political power. In Advocacy Planning groups employ professional assistance with their own funds and therefore have a client - professional relationship. Direct funding to communities is made available by government and this enables them to employ professionals. If technical assistance is provided by the local authority itself, it may utilise planning aid agents / community development officers as educators and facilitators or catalysts. The danger exists that this leads to a new form of co-optation. A viable alternative is to subcontract these functions to NGOs.

- Conferences and workshops: intensive meeting around a detailed agenda of problems, issues and alternatives, with the objective of obtaining a comprehensive analysis.
- The Delphi method: a means for combining a diverse group of experts or knowledgeable lay people which avoids group dynamic shortcomings of round table discussions, such as psychological inhibitions and bandwagon effects. Questionnaires are used to derive preliminary responses which are then anonymously distributed to other participants in several rounds, each time feedback is communicated back to the panel for consideration. At the end of the exercise, a group opinion can be statistically established without having pressured participants to arrive at a consensus¹⁶².
- The Nominal Group method: a form of brainstorming in which participants work parallel on similar issues without interacting. All the individual ideas are presented and debated in the plenary and thereafter individual scores of other's ideas are secretly taken, leading to a broad and creative set of opinions and reasonably true assumptions with respective aggregated scores. The process has the advantage of equalising the participants, avoiding emotional and group pressure to conform, and producing a high volume of innovative ideas.
- Charette: is a technique which facilitates the establishment of co-operative working relationship between a community, local government officials and planners in a learning environment. It usually consists of five phases which are

¹⁶²In spite of its various advantages, this effective technique is hardly used in South Africa. The only organisation currently making use of it the a research project (ETDPP) for the National Training Board.

accomplished during a period of a few weeks with daily sessions, i.e. formation of a steering committee of local residents, familiarisation with situation and problem perceptio of participants, problem structuring and policy option generation in working groups making use of professionals' knowledge, public presentation of working group reports, feedback and scrutiny, integration of diverse reports and presentation to government as a community (development) plan. The strength in this method lies in combining public participation, both individual and collective, with achieving technical feasibility and realism.

- **Blue Ribbon Panel:** a task force which includes both administrative officials as well as community representatives and which concentrates on one issue. It should represent a diversity of interests, with full time salaried administrative staff, own executive, etc. If open communication is sought and the government / administration recognises it as the de facto planning organ effective resolution of conflicts can be achieved.
- **Community Development Corporations (CDC) and Trusts (CDT):** formally established CBOs, which pursue certain revenue generating strategies in order to enable the community to expedite their own social, economic and physical development. Often it follows local economic development (LED) logic of partnerships between government, business, the community (and labour).

Participation is surely not a new concept, but its value as a necessary precondition has increased. While participation was basically conceptualised as involvement of target groups in implementation during the first three development decades, in the recent development discourse this has been enlarged to mean not only involvement, but incorporates ownership as well. Involvement and ownership represents a continuum from consultation to control. However, euphemistically overexaggeration of the developmental core principles of participation and self-help is questionable, they are no panacea for all problems. The World Bank consultant Picciotto highlights the following dangerous trends in the participation debate¹⁶³:

- Participation is an end in itself - goal achievement is neglected;
- The more participation the better - it degenerates to a formality;

¹⁶³ "Just as fertile soil attracts pest, new policy insights generate myths.", Picciotto, 1992, p. 2.

- The larger the group of the involved the better - group dynamic tendencies of bureaucratisation are ignored and not seen in an efficiency framework;
- Participation makes control unnecessary - the opposite is true, participation requires facilitation and control;
- Local decision-making processes are participative - subordination of social groups in regions with traditional hierarchies is common and works counter to participative decision-making processes.

These doubts highlight that participation is not a quick-fix solution. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. It can create politically highly competitive situations. However, it seems to be the crucial element which can set free synergy effects by interactively linking organisations and the state on micro-, meso-, and macro-level. As already mentioned, it does not suffice to explain only conceptual implementation strategies for participation in development (as most international development agencies do). Additionally, it is important to look at the possible functions of participation during different stages of the policy cycle¹⁶⁴ within the specific context of the country or region. Four important functions of participation can be singled out, i.e. firstly, creation of legitimacy and legitimisation (acceptance), secondly, increasing effectiveness and efficiency of state actions by mobilisation of local resources, thirdly, strengthening functions of control and regulation, and finally initiating societal learning processes¹⁶⁵. These specific functions are not influenced only by the current state of the policy or project cycle, but also by the specific function participation is given in the various policy fields, e.g. on the macro-level and within the different sector policies. Below, the empirical part of this study will thus attempt to explain on the basis of societal and organisational patterns the forms of participation, with their respective functions, which prevail(ed) in which policy field, and on which level, during which stage. By this, one should be able to deduce which forms of participation are context specifically appropriate for certain participative policy-making processes.

¹⁶⁴Historically concepts of policy cycles were developed on the basis of Easton's input-output-model of policy, differentiating into the phases input-conversion-output-implementation-impact. Easton, 1965. However, phase-models concentrating on (state) actions of control were only introduced during the eighties. See Brewer, De Leon, 1983; Pappi, 1987; Prittwitz, 1990; Skok, 1995. For a discussion regarding the specific South African setting, see: Coning, 1995a.

¹⁶⁵Jeffler-Franke, 1994, pp. 19, 68.

3) New National Development Frameworks

The new policy frameworks and legislative initiative described below need to be seen in terms of the ongoing macro-economic reforms initiated by the GNU. One essential element of this is deregulation and the opening up of as much activity as possible to market forces including the public sector. During the 1980s the degree of state intervention had reached a stage where there was a wide array of individual ad hoc interventions, which even contradicted each other to some degree. Productive activities became oriented to these interventions, and thus unable to address themselves to development pragmatically. The huge developmental needs of South Africa require more developmental approaches to public policy and policy development.

This chapter will highlight three main initiatives on national level, which bear strong influence on the provinces. Firstly, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) will be presented as the overarching development vision of the new South Africa. Its policy principles and main programmes set the parameters for provincial development strategies. Secondly, the 'Guidelines for Development Planning', currently in the policy formulation stage, are of importance for the understanding of the third empirical chapter, because the work recommends specific approaches and techniques to development planning. The sequence, management of and techniques employed in planning processes has a major impact on the degree of participation and empowerment realised. Thirdly, the Development Facilitation Act (DFA), is a piece of legislation designed to undo in one sweep the great number of still existing racial legislative frameworks concerning development administration and planning, especially on local level. As will be shown in the next chapter, provincial administrations are currently busy to implement the Act. This involves the establishment of different new institutions as well as the drafting of provincial regulations, some of them defining approaches to public participation.

3.1) The Reconstruction And Development Programme

Historically, the RDP was initiated as a strategy paper by the Council of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1993. It was subsequently adopted, after wide

consultation within the Alliance (ANC, COSATU, SACP), as the party platform of the ANC for the 1994 elections. All in all, it was formulated through a long consultative process incorporating opinions and concerns from various stakeholders, mainly from the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) organisations. However, it has to be noted that certain values and broad policy objectives included in this document are not new, but can be traced back to the Freedom Charter and the general liberation thinking in the organisations which now form the Alliance. It represents an integrated programme, based on the recognition of the needs (but possibly overestimating existing capacities) of the people, to provide peace and security, development and democratisation. After the ANC's election victory that made it the dominant political party in the GNU, the developmental principles of this vision were translated into government policies, involving various players in the formulation again¹⁶⁶. The first national RDP White Paper¹⁶⁷, which was the culmination of this process, is the government strategy for the fundamental transformation of government and the renewal of society - a much more co-operative and egalitarian one with a new legitimate state and a public administration both sensitive to their actions concerning equality and equity. This policy framework addresses firstly the role of the government, the public and other stakeholders in socio-economic development and secondly the strategy of government for efficient, transparent and accountable management of public resources, long-term strategic planning, capacity and consensus building¹⁶⁸. Catering for basic needs of the people and the creation of an environment for a growing and stable economy through a new framework of governance, are the general goals of the RDP.

The RDP is founded on six inter-related principles which make up the political and economic philosophy that underlies the whole RDP:¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Once in government, the use of and influence by private consultants and the bureaucratic interests seems to have increased significantly over the last year.

¹⁶⁷ Obviously the process of drafting drafts will continue right through to the concrete implementation. Note the process from the RDP 'Green Papers', i.e. the discussion documents for the White Papers (WP) on Reconstruction and Development on national as well as provincial level referring to the ANC-RDP as the 'base document', RSA 1994a, 1994b. Also the inputs from other parties of the government of national unity (GNU) and 'independent' research institutions such as the Macro Economic Research Group (MERG), now renamed the National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP), and parastatals participate in the ongoing process. NIEP, 1994; DBSA, 1994a, as well as their RDP 'quantification exercise', 1994b; Kentridge, 1993; and Interview, Niewkerk, DBSA.

¹⁶⁸ RSA 1994c, p. 5.

¹⁶⁹ ANC, 1994. The numbers in brackets represent the numeration of the paragraphs in the RDP base document.

1. *An integrated and sustainable programme*: "... to bring together strategies to harness all ... resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be sustained into the future, ... implemented at national, provincial and local levels by government, parastatals and organisations within civil society..." (1.3.2);
2. *A people-driven process*: "... development is not about delivery of goods to a passive citizenry, [but] about active involvement and growing empowerment." (1.3.3);
3. *Peace and security for all*: "... establish security forces that reflect the national and gender character of [the] country. Such forces must be non-partisan, professional, and uphold the constitution and human rights. The juridical system must ... provide fairness and equality for all before the law." (1.3.4);
4. *Nation-building*: "... not perpetuate the separation of [the] society into 'first world' and a third world ... disguised way of preserving apartheid." (1.3.5);
5. *Link reconstruction and development*: "... integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme. ... If growth is defined as an increase in output, then it is of course a basic goal. However, where that growth occurs, how sustainable is it, how it is distributed, the degree to which it contributes to building long-term productive capacity and human resource development ... are crucial questions ..." (1.3.6);
6. *Democratisation of South Africa*: "... fundamental changes in the way that policy is made and programmes are implemented. ... the people affected must participate in decision-making. Democratisation must ... transform both the state and civil society. ... not confined to periodic elections, ... active process enabling everyone to contribute to reconstruction and development." (1.3.7);

The RDP base document states that it "is an integrated, coherent, socio-economic policy framework"¹⁷⁰. It is integrated in the sense that it attempts to incorporate all goals and objectives into a general wave of transformation eradicating the entire apartheid legacy. However, as recent governmental policy shifts towards increased emphasis on growth indicate, the 'integrated' approach somehow masks the reality that hard political and strategic choices will have to be made about priorities in the face of constraints on delivery as well as about the

¹⁷⁰ANC, 1994, p. 1.

broad strategy of how to balance or 'integrate' economic growth and development / basic needs.

The above-mentioned principles are supposed to be achieved by five integrated meta-programmes which basically have aspirative programme-character¹⁷¹, namely:

1. *Meeting basic needs*: "... jobs, land, housing, water, electricity telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare." (1.4.2);
2. *Human resource development (HRD)*: "[t]he underlying approach of these [sub-]programmes is that education and training should be available to all from cradle to grave. ... an equal role for women in every aspect of [the] economy and society. ... reversing youth marginalisation ... empowering youth, and allowing them to reach their full potential." (1.4.4);
3. *Building the economy*: "... mining, manufacturing, agriculture, commerce, financial services and infrastructure as an engine of the economy can be build on. ... But so far they have not benefited all [the] people." (1.4.12);
4. *Democratising the state and society*: "[d]emocratisation is integral to the RDP. [To mobilise resources]" (1.4.19); "In linking democracy, development and a people-centred approach, ... paving the way for a new democratic order." (1.4.20);
5. *Implementing the RDP*: "[t]o implement and co-ordinate the RDP will require the establishment of effective RDP structures ..." (1.4.21);

Comparable to the Bill of Rights' aim of introducing substantive rather than just formal human rights¹⁷², the RDP aims at fundamentally transforming relationships within the economic sector as well as those between the state and civil society. The challenge is to further social relations which enable all people to effectively choose and control their lives. It is envisaged that society takes the leading role and responsibility for their own development in the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development¹⁷³.

¹⁷¹For taxonomies of policy programmes, see: Blankenburg, Krautkrämer, in: Mayntz, 1980, here: p. 139. Compare contributions in Héritier, 1980, 1993.

¹⁷²Amato, 1994; Legal Resources Centre, 1994; Rautenbach, Malherbe, 1994.

¹⁷³RSA 1994c, p. 1.

During 1995 certain policy changes on the national level became apparent. On the one side, the predominant basic needs focus of the base document lost relative importance vis-à-vis the economic growth goal. This went along with extending the time span from initially 5 to 25 years. Thus the RDP became more of a national development vision and less a service delivery / basic needs development programme. However, its welfarist / statist underlying approach to development as well as the specific concept of basic needs is still hardly clarified. Balancing these developments, roughly speaking 20 presidential lead projects (PLP, managed by the national RDP Office) have been initiated during the first year as some sort of fast track delivery to historically disadvantaged communities.

On provincial level, 3-5 year development plans (called 'development perspectives') have just been completed intly. In Gauteng, the Department of Economic Affairs and Finance (DEAF) as well as the Department of Development Planning, Environment and Works (DDPE&W) are the main governmental players involved. Here, many problems have surfaced recently, such as a lack of policy analysis and policy management capacity on provincial level aggregated by the partly painstaking integration process¹⁷⁴ as well as personnel changes, delays in the implementation of the complicated business plan format for development project applications, necessary legal and procedural changes in the nature of (participative) development planning, etc.

In addition to the RDP viewed as South Africa's societal development vision¹⁷⁵ for the next decades, it is necessary to place it in the context of the new frameworks for sector policies emerging from the line departments, i.e. the various White papers, and particularly the one on public sector transformation¹⁷⁶. A brief informative interjection seems advisable here. Apart from the responsive governance rhetoric concerning the reformation and transformation of the South African civil service, the actual processes initiated and actions taken have so far not been very participatory in the sense of involvement of employees and / or the broad public. To be fair, there

¹⁷⁴In the case of Gauteng, which took over most of the former Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), the administrative amalgamation seemed to have been less of a problem than in provinces which had to integrate the former so-called homelands and Self Governing Territories (SGT).

¹⁷⁵Compare other countries development visions such as Malaysia's Wawasan (vision) 2020 or, concerning public sector reform / transformation, Canada's Public Service 2000. Such an undertaking, however, depends not only on the formulation of such a vision, but 'requires' a somewhat collectivist inspirable political culture and the population's willingness to buy into it.

¹⁷⁶RSA, 1995b.

has been much negotiation with trade unions (PSA, COSATU, etc.), often behind closed doors. The national parliamentary standing committee has also received opinions and representations concerning the diverse issues related to the transformation of the public service, but all these steps basically centred around (internal) power politics on the one side or were focused on general policy (principle) development. During the last two years or so specific participatory processes aimed at involving the approximately one and a half million public servants directly (e.g. in round tables¹⁷⁷), or promoting public feedback mechanism, such as one stop service / information centres, etc., have not been embarked upon. Thus when it boils down to actual change management, the ancient regime's organisational culture continues.

It is repeatedly stated that the RDP is not supposed to be an add-on programme; that actual delivery has to be carried out by the various national and provincial line ministries / departments which are unfortunately to a large degree still the old Apartheid institutions with their developmentally unfriendly organisational culture. The financing of the bulk of the RDP's costs shall basically be achieved by reprioritisation and saving in the 'normal' budget. Thus, the crucial challenge is to link (development) planning with the budgetary process on all tiers of government, called 'policy budgets' and demanded - but not clearly operationalised - by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) and the Interim Constitution. Aside from the general reviews of the structure and functions of the public service, internal reviews of each ministry, department and office, an aggressive affirmative programme, etc., contained in the White Paper it seems largely rooted in the classical / bureaucratic view of organisations. Only the proposed changes in the Public Service Commission (PSC), which is identified as the main transformation agency, have a systems view of organisations. On the policy (content) level, the new Urban Development Strategy¹⁷⁸ including the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework as well as the Rural Development Strategy¹⁷⁹, the Urban Renewal projects (managed by the Department of National Housing) and the municipal Rehabilitation and Extension programme

¹⁷⁷ Compare the more sophisticated techniques employed by large corporations such as AT&T, Time, 15/1/1996.

¹⁷⁸ RSA, 1995c.

¹⁷⁹ RSA, 1995d.

(managed by the Department of Constitutional Affairs) will be the major policy initiatives.

Many key issues that will have to be resolved in reaching agreement around a growth and development strategy, both nationally as well as in the provinces, are still strongly contested. These are (1) the relative importance and emphasis placed on economic growth vis-à-vis societal development; (2) the 'hard choices' to be made concerning the actual growth path, i.e. strategies around the spatial location of industries (growth corridors, etc.), clusters and sectors to be supported¹⁸⁰; (3) investment priorities of public and private sector stakeholders; and lastly (4) the nature and extent of the envisaged developmental partnerships, especially the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government and their respective policy instruments, i.e. tax breaks, grants, state procurement policy, etc. The recent emphasis placed nationally on growth leads to even more critical questions, e.g. the strong attention that the concept of local economic development (LED)¹⁸¹ received in the urban development working groups of the national RDP¹⁸² - with a certain resulting focus on infrastructure investment on local level¹⁸³ - invites questioning of the relative importance given since 1995 by the national RDP / government to other supply side measures such as investment in research and development (R&D), SMME support, HRD, etc. Will the development of South Africa's human resources be (relatively) neglected vis-à-vis roads and houses (because the latter are faster to implement and more visible)? Unfortunately, presently it seems that basically only rapidly implementable projects are initiated without due macro-economic modelling or critical deliberation about the possible impact of alternative development investments. Last but not least, this ad hoc focus on projects during 1994 and 1995 - with debatable project management capacity (building) - is at least partly biased against proper programme co-ordination. If this trend continues lost development impact due to poor administration and the lack of programme integration will most probably result.

¹⁸⁰ Coleman, 1995, p. 52.

¹⁸¹ See for example: OECD, 1990; SANCO, 1995; Tomlinson, 1994; Urban Foundation, 1994.

¹⁸² Involved as one of the leading players in the formulation of the Urban Development Strategy; RSA, 1995c.

¹⁸³ To some degree surprisingly, the more than twenty years old concepts of 'growth centres' and 'development corridors', e.g. Johannesburg -Nelspruit-Maputo, and 'growth centres' have been dug up recently during the September 1995 Bosberaad, Cape Town.

3.2) Technocrats At Work: Guidelines For Development Planning

The RDP, although initially an Alliance party platform, has developed remarkably into a national consensus. During the last two years, it has been further refined into more concrete policies as expressed in the various Green and White Papers. This process culminated in the framework for 'Growth and Development Strategy', agreed upon in the inter-governmental forum (IGF), comprising all national Ministers, provincial Premiers and key MECs, on the 29th November 1995¹⁸⁴. Moreover, on the provincial level, economic and development policies have already been or are in the process of being finalised. Not only are the policies new, but so too is the whole government system in South Africa. The Interim Constitution provides a quasi-federal framework for many functions (Schedule 6), inter alia, for regional planning and development. The Fiscal and Finance Commission (FCC) is going to recommend the provision of block grants to the provinces breaking with many aspects of past departmentalist practices. This may open the way for 'policy budgets', i.e. the linking of the planning and budgeting processes in a developmental way. Provincial governments have begun the institutionalisation of provincial economic and development planning, as well as strategic corporate planning and to some degree policy management. How to translate this into planning practice, however, is still hotly debated. No decision has been made on which of the various different approaches ranging from zero-based budgeting (ZBB) and planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS)¹⁸⁵, to more conventional development planning frameworks, to use.

A discussion of the various possible approaches to linking planning with the budgeting cycle would expand the focus of the study unreasonably. Rather, the currently most dominant planning framework debated in South Africa¹⁸⁶ will be presented with special reference to its participatory nature. This will serve to put the DDPE&W's 'participatory development planning' framework, discussed in the next empirical chapter in conjunction with the provincial implementation of the DFA, into the broader planning context.

¹⁸⁴Swilling, Cashdan, Morojele, 1995, p. 1.

¹⁸⁵For a discussion of these and other approaches, see: Akhalwaya, 1995; Zimmermeier, 1995.

¹⁸⁶The new planning framework envisaged, not the old Apartheid, unfortunately still practised, departmentalist approach which does not link planning and budgeting.

At the moment, the most influential piece of thinking are the 'Guidelines for Development Planning'¹⁸⁷ from the Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD). This inter-governmental body comprises the Minister of Land Affairs, the Minister without Portfolio, the Minister of Housing, the nine provincial MECs for development planning, and representatives from national departments responsible for aspects of economic, environment or development planning¹⁸⁸. It draws heavily on technical assistance from the DBSA¹⁸⁹.

Development planning is defined extremely normatively and broadly as "[a] participatory process to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographical areas and across the population, in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and marginalised."¹⁹⁰

The integration of development planning - historically a combination of physical or spatial planning, macro-economic and sectoral planning as well as integrated social / human resource development in developing countries¹⁹¹ - and the budgeting process it is envisaged will be achieved by zero-based budgeting and by changing the current strong emphasis on vertical budget planning (departmentalism) through function committees¹⁹². Interdepartmental task teams (IDTT) and co-ordination of policy processes by the RDP are additional mechanisms for (horizontal) inter-departmental integration¹⁹³, e.g. to meaningfully co-ordinate plans and implementation of departments responsible for transport, housing and water etc. Here, the problem arises that some functions are concurrently performed (granted by the Interim Constitution, Schedule 6) by national and provincial governments, while other responsibilities fall under the national level alone¹⁹⁴.

¹⁸⁷RSA, 1995a, 1995b.

¹⁸⁸FEPD, 1995, p. 2.

¹⁸⁹Interview, Arkwright, DBSA.

¹⁹⁰RSA, 1995b, p. 7.

¹⁹¹Caiden, Wildavsky, 1980; Helmsing, Wekwete, 1990; Todaro, 1989; Tomlinson, 1993; Wekwete, Rambanapasi, 1994.

¹⁹²RSA, 1995b, p. 4.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹⁴For an account of the current state of financial planning and co-ordination practice, see: Hunter, 1995.

The point of departure of the 'Guidelines for Development Planning' is the alignment of the first two tiers of government through the development of common basic definitions and steps of a planning (policy / project) cycle¹⁹⁵. The bottom line, acknowledging different conditions and needs in the provinces, is an agreement on definitions, outputs, and timing within an annual cycle. Conceptually, the planning cycle suggested can be seen as a series of steps, starting from information collection and needs analysis, through strategic planning (SWOT analysis and visioning), to policy development (both broad strategies and individual programmes and projects), budgeting, and finally implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Co-ordination is achieved vertically between tiers of government (MinMECs, IGF), and laterally between line departments (IDTT). Thus, the definition of development planning by the FEPD integrates strategic planning with operational planning.

The planning cycle can be differentiated into four basic components, namely¹⁹⁶:

1. The development perspective: this phase comprises the collection of information, an analysis of the current situation and the formulation of a realistic development vision with the identification of key development issues. Individual aspects to include are socio-economic and demographic profiles of the province, settlement patterns, economic activities and trends, and assessment of past development programmes and their impact, a broad skills audit comprising the public as well as the private sector, a SWOT analysis, and the identification of issues and policy principles for the development of a medium-term growth and development vision for the province.
2. The development strategy: here, policy-makers establish a sound set of proposals on how development should proceed. Objectives are prioritised and respective strategies for implementation developed. The following sequence of events is suggested¹⁹⁷: key development issues are expressed as problems or opportunity statements, then transformed into objectives and efficient and feasible solutions are sought. Thereafter, prioritisation of quantified objectives serves as the basis for the development of broad departmentally cross-cutting

¹⁹⁵Note the graphs and tables in the appendix.

¹⁹⁶RSA, 1995b, pp. 12-14.

¹⁹⁷The planning methodology follows the logical framework approach, also called goal oriented planning, i.e. in a broad sense management by objectives.

programmes. This involves a stakeholder and participation analysis as well as a costing exercise.

3. **Programming and budgeting:** the above meta-programmes are operationalised by individual departments into concrete programmes of action and / individual projects. Programming involves both defining concrete actions as well as their adequate sequencing and definition of responsibilities for implementation, maintenance and monitoring. Budgeting is thereafter the process of allocation of required financial resources for programmes and projects.
4. **Monitoring and review:** this is an ongoing activity and is concerned with monitoring development in accordance with key performance indicators (KPI). Performance can be evaluated in comparison with progress against plans, expenditure against budget, and contribution to cross-cutting KPIs such as HRD, job creation etc.

A number of tools and techniques employed during the different stages in the planning cycle are identified by the FEPD, namely¹⁹⁸:

- Economic analysis, e.g. cost effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis in order to maximise economic growth and job creation;
- Spatial planning, which involves town and regional planning, its integration with transport policy etc.;
- Expenditure planning, especially the medium-term expenditure framework generated by the MERG, in order to ensure the process will not result in unrealisable wish lists;
- Policy management (managed formulation), i.e. link visions with sectoral strategies and identify policy gaps; and
- Performance monitoring and evaluation; both output measures, which monitor quantitative delivery, and outcomes measures, which monitor the development impact are envisaged.

The primary goal of development planning is to strategically follow a critical path rather than to strive for comprehensive blue prints. As a tool for assisting decision-making, besides from describing a minimum set of outputs, development planning should also facilitate comparison between the work of different departments

¹⁹⁸RSA, 1995b, pp. 9-11.

and tiers of government, support logical, goal oriented planning (i.e. outputs at one stage support the subsequent ones), and be similar in basic structure in order to achieve overall consistency in planning.

The documents spell out key functions in the planning process and links them to levels of government. Firstly, the management of the process needs to be placed at the highest political and administrative levels. Secondly, the technical integration of the inputs needs to be conducted by stakeholders with adequate policy analysis and evaluation capacity. Thirdly, due to the fact that line departments have their own strategic planning processes, they inform the planning process and are also subsequently guided by its results. Fourthly, mobilisation of stakeholders falls mainly into the concrete delivery tasks of line departments. Lastly, it is recommended that monitoring and evaluation be conducted by an external player who is not part of the decision-making group.

In general, this framework is very technical in approach. The method is generally management by objectives (and administrative procedures). In fact it has been developed for the public sector in the first place. However, concerning public participation, there are a few characteristics worth mentioning. The documents acknowledge that participation is vital to ensure development plans reflect people's needs and priorities. Four principles are spelled out which should guide participation in planning¹⁹⁹. Firstly, each tier of government is obliged to take responsibility for its own participatory processes. On national level NEDLAC is specifically mentioned. Secondly, focused and targeted participation is understood as participation in needs analysis and prioritisation for the planning process (which is thus more of an involvement nature than genuine participation). Interestingly, the document does not envisage participation at later stages in the planning cycle. Additionally it warns explicitly against the establishment of civil society structures independent of government for the performance of needs analyses. Thirdly, it is stated that participation must enhance not hamper development. It concludes that elected officials must take clear and firm decisions after consultation which should not be unnecessarily protracted by participation. Finally, it is stipulated that participation on

¹⁹⁹ Following the nature of the document, this issue is defined only very broadly. By far more operationalised criteria have to be developed for the actual programme and project design (departmental level).

local level should not be restricted to planning only, but that people are involved as far as possible in implementation and monitoring.

Comparing the theoretical frameworks for participation in the last chapter with the above four 'participation' principles, many critical questions arise. Development seems to be defined as welfare and physical infrastructure to be delivered by the state. However, what about private initiative, what about joint ventures and partnerships? The only concrete institutional arrangement mentioned is NEDLAC, a corporatist body. However, corporatist partnerships depend on commitment of peak organisations and their power to bind their constituencies. Weaker interests usually are either excluded or *cor nue* to stay powerless²⁰⁰. What about empowerment principles? Participation is reduced to consultation for only the first stage in the planning cycle and the lowest category of influence, i.e. mere information gathering. With the above developed ladders of participation in mind one should rather speak of a government which is trying to be professional in a sense of first informing itself before deciding. Participation is definitely the wrong term. The last aspect creating headaches is the fact that participation is perceived as slowing down (top-down) government delivery of goods and services. As will be discussed at the end of the next chapter, this conviction is definitely counterproductive to development. Only the last of the four principles does not limit the scope and degree of participation envisaged. However, keeping the documents warning against independent civil society planning bodies in mind, the doubt arises if this national document does not simply defer the 'problem of participation' to a lower level. As will be argued in the next chapter, it seems in fact to be an existing pattern in South Africa of both the old guard and the new political and administrative top decision-makers to limit participation on their own level and declaring lower tiers to be responsible for genuine participation, which of course they truly support. However, if all higher levels determine the local or just even the community level to be the locus for participation - following popular participation rationales one might also just speak of unpaid labour for top-down development projects - the new South African state will continue to be as paternalistic and unparticipatory as the old one has been for far too long.

²⁰⁰ Christianson, 1995.

3.3) The Development Facilitation Act

With the focus on facilitating development, the DFA is one of the major national policy initiatives. It is one piece of legislation which aims at speeding up development, specifically in the field of housing, by the easing of restrictions concerning the release of state land and by making the administration and granting of (private) development plans less bureaucratic. It is going to provide the legal and regulatory framework for the implementation of the RDP. Premised on the notion that development must take place in an integrated and holistic manner, the DFA will have a fundamental impact on spatial structures, settlement patterns, resource allocation and development dynamics in the provinces.

The section below will firstly describe the reasons, i.e. problems and delays resulting from the fragmented, rigorous and racially based legal frameworks of the old Apartheid era, which lead to the need for formulating one overarching development facilitation framework. Thereafter, the main thrusts and respective implications of the DFA will be presented. This will allow us to develop a firm content basis for comprehending the second part, dealing with the implementation of the DFA on provincial level, in the following chapter which analyses Gauteng's DFA implementation processes, i.e. the DDPE&W hiccoughs in formulating 'provincial regulations'.

3.3.1) Background

The origins of the DFA date back to the day before the April 1994 election when the RDP was drafted. Jay Naidoo called together planners for working out the planning mechanisms to implement it. The Provincial Town Planning Ordinances of the old four provincial administrations were seen as the main challenge, because of their overly bureaucratic and almost exclusive focus on spatial planning without having clear links to development planning²⁰¹. Altogether there were 23 different laws operating in different parts of the country for land release and development²⁰².

²⁰¹ Shiceka, 1995a, p 2.

²⁰² The more important are: Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991; Black Communities Development Act, 1984; Less Formal Township Establishment Act, 1991; Physical Planning Act, 1967; Physical Planning Act, 1991; Transvaal Town-planning and Townships Ordinance No. 15, 1986, etc.; DDPE&W, 1994a

Regional and sectoral development planning had not been integrated meaningfully. Town planning, as it was called during the 1980s, was decentralised down to local government level, while regional planning was centralised at national level. The old provincial administrations had to implement central government's regional policy; the DBSA played a key role in fitting the so-called homelands into the regional 'separate development' policy, the Apartheid ideology influenced industrial decentralisation strategy of the 1960s to 1980s. This politically informed separation of planning responsibilities separated local from regional development priorities and thus created severe tensions between the first and the third tier of government²⁰³. Additionally, the old government's urban bias led to the neglect of rural development planning; development in rural areas was determined by agricultural policy with respect to white farming areas, and by regional development policies with respect to homeland areas. This legalistic fragmentation, administrative over-complexity, and the partly racially informed content of the national and provincials acts and proclamations caused delays of up to three years in getting approvals for development applications and gave communities only limited access to these procedures²⁰⁴. Existing legislation, made up of an aggregation of historically accumulated individual statutes directed to a wide and frequently uncoordinated range of single-purpose objectives, is lacking in important aspects such as land use and the environmental impact of (under)development.

After the election, the national Housing Ministry took over the development of the Development Facilitation Bill²⁰⁵ and manipulated it in order to serve its need. This narrow focus was subsequently rejected by the Ministry of Regional and Land Affairs which gazetted the DFB²⁰⁶. Currently, both these ministries are responsible. The Provinces have played an increasingly important role since the end of 1994. Inter alia, the then PWV Development Planning Department's suggestions to change the DFB from its original housing focus to a planning law were readily accepted by national level²⁰⁷. However, neither the general issue, i.e. fast-track land release (for

²⁰³ Shiceka, 1994, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ DDPE&W, 1995a, p.1-2.

²⁰⁵ RSA, 1994b.

²⁰⁶ RSA, 1994c.

²⁰⁷ Shiceka, 1994, p. 9; DDPE&W, 1995a, p. 1. The development planning system incorporated into the GNU's first piece of development legislation was based on the DDPE&W's document entitled 'Towards a Development Planning and Environmental Management System for the PWV', of which draft 3 has been approved by the PWV Cabinet. DDPE&W, 1994b, 1994c.

housing), nor the bill itself have been properly discussed in public. As the reality has shown, local governments and organs of civil society, at least in Gauteng, have been totally unaware of the policy implications of the DFA up to late 1995²⁰⁸, i.e. at a time when the provinces were already working heavy in its provincial implementation.

3.3.2) The New Approach: Managing Integrated Development Planning

The DFA was enacted to provide a simpler, faster and more guided development administration. It is designed to²⁰⁹:

- provide a common approach to development planning that can be used in all places of the country;
- reorient the spatial patterns, i.e. the urban sprawl and racial separation of the typical 'Apartheid city'²¹⁰;
- fast track land developments for RDP delivery; and
- facilitate future policy development in the field of land / spatial development.

The two main objectives of the DFA are to expedite development by reducing the required time for decision-making, and to facilitate future oriented policy formulation. With this act, it is intended to move away from past government planning approaches which consisted of drawing up prescriptive blue prints towards facilitative and more flexible approaches to development planning. Planning authority is also more decentralised by laying down that each local authority in consultation with organs of civil society develops its own 'vision for development', i.e. stating clearly issues and targets and designing its development policies, as well as a 'business strategy' of how it intends to achieve the stated vision. Thus, the DFA decentralises planning responsibility allowing for local opportunities and locally fast tracking of development initiatives, emphasises participation on local level, and finally attempts to cater for promoting development which is not narrowly defined as just spatial plans.

²⁰⁸Interviews: Benjamin, Core Group; Dauskardt, DDPE&W; Ngonyama, CoCom, Pretorius, PANGA.

²⁰⁹The following part is based on two DDPE&W briefing documents about the DFA in relation to Gauteng, both are dated from October 1995, as well as the gazetted DFA, RSA, 1995c.

²¹⁰PLANACT, 1992; Swilling, et. al., 1991.

3.3.2.1) Goal One: Expediting Development

On national level a 'Development and Planning Commission' (DPC) shall be established in order to advise the minister and also the Premiers and / or the MECs responsible for regional planning (schedule 6 function). The commission shall consist of one nominated representative from each province, as well as up to three nationally appointed representatives from different sectors and up to three selected by community based groups and other organs of civil society. Provincial level planning commissions may also be set up to develop policy and mechanisms for rationalising planning processes and procedures.

The provinces have the responsibility to establish 'development tribunals' to arbitrate (land) development disputes in accordance with standardised legal procedures. These bodies are designed to make decisions on proposed developments as rapidly as possible, in order to avoid developers and local authorities having to wait long before they get permission to develop a piece of land. The decisions of the tribunal have to be guided by official policies, i.e. guidelines according to which it can decide whether to approve a development or not taking nationally stated policy principles in the act into account. Last but not least the objective of fast tracking development is also facilitated by letting people obtain 'initial ownership' of land on which they have applied for development sooner than was possible in the past.

3.3.2.2) Goal Two: Future Policy Formulation

For the achievement of the second objective of the DFA a basic set of general development principles is provided in the first chapter. These normative guidelines call for development to promote integration, i.e. linking social, economic, institutional and physical aspects of development; ensure environmental sustainability; catering for all areas in South Africa, e.g. urban and rural, formal and informal settlements, etc.; promote the location of residence and employment opportunities in close proximity to each other, i.e. discourage urban sprawl and contribute to more compact cities and towns; provide for a diverse mix of land uses and optimising the use of

existing resources including land, bulk infrastructure, transportation and social facilities; and to seek active participation by the members of communities.

The mechanism in order to achieve this demands that each local authority must develop a strategy for development, called land development objectives (LDO)²¹¹. These performance criteria have to include the following aspects²¹²:

- the access and standards of services to be provided for land developed;
- the objectives or goals for urban and rural growth in the area of jurisdiction, including: integration of low income communities into the area / district, measures for environmental preservation, transportation planning, provision of bulk infrastructure, overall density of settlements in the area, inter-governmental co-ordination between local authorities, approach and instruments of land control, use of natural resources;
- the development strategy, stating clearly how other sectors such as business, developers, or the community will be involved, how access to development finance will be provided, the institutional arrangements for administration of land development;
- the quantum or amount of development intended in the area, e.g. the number of houses, sites or other facilities that are desired, the mode of provision (upgrading, new development, etc.), and the rate of delivery or construction; and
- potentially a environment impact assessment (EIA).

Local governments are responsible for drawing up the LDO, but the act lays down that they do so in consultation with all other stakeholders in their area. The MEC responsible for planning will have concurrent authority with the local governments in setting performance criteria; if a local government does not set these, the MEC may do so on its behalf after which these criteria are binding. Note the two concepts of 'in consultation with', which can be regarded as joint decision-making (but not necessarily consensus as a decision-making modus), and 'after consultation', which represents a mere information dissemination obligation, used in

²¹¹ Although a certain bias towards infrastructure investments will most probably remain in reality, the term is slightly misleading. National intention is that LDOs are rather understood as development objectives in general, not exclusively focusing on land development. Interview, Molol, RDP Office.

²¹² Other policy principles as well as issues may be identified by the MEC and proclaimed in the Provincial Gazette by the Premier of the province. Obviously, the provincial regulations have to be consistent with the national development principles.

the context of the relationship between the President and the two Deputy Presidents by the Interim Constitution of 1993²¹³. De jure, both these concepts do only refer to the spirit of Government of National Unity, substantive impact on policy or qualified majorities / actual veto powers can not be assumed. In this context, a certain 'maturation' process took place in the ANC's policies; the longer it has been in government on all tiers, the more often it has been stressed that democratically elected local government is the development implementor concerning the RDP, and the final decision-maker concerning the setting of LDOs.

3.4) The Role Of Provincial Government

The DFA lays two main roles for provincial government in the implementation, namely institutionally, to set up a tribunal system²¹⁴, and on the policy side, to draw up provincial regulations on how each local authority area must prepare its LDOs. The DFA provides only general guidelines as to the content of the provincial regulations. Relating to LDOs, the province must state:

- exactly how LDOs must be developed, what they have to look at, what maps to include, etc.;
- for what time period LDOs should be prepared, probably five years, and when local authorities have to have completed this task;
- the specific requirements for participation of local stakeholders with the local authority²¹⁵; and
- the mechanisms for ensuring inter-governmental co-ordination with other local governments.

This is a difficult task, because the guidelines must meet the needs of a range of different interests, such as the DFA, provincial government, local authorities, and all local stakeholders. When LDOs have been prepared on local level, they have to be submitted to the provincial MEC for approval. The province has to ensure that these deal adequately with the issues of land development, are in line with other

²¹³Amato, 1994.

²¹⁴Compare the graph in the appendix concerning the DFA project approval Process.

²¹⁵Concerning the developments in and politicking around (local) participation in Gauteng, please see the second part of chapter four discussing the recent developments in Gauteng, especially the initiatives of the DDPE&W.

local areas and the provincial and national guidelines, and ensure due procedure has been followed. In overview, the DFA provides only general guidelines for the drafting of provincial regulations, the content of LDOs, and the process for their preparation. the detailed content and process has to be developed and agreed upon provincially and locally. The DDPE&W in Gauteng has also started in 1994 to develop and implement a new town planning system with the formulation of the Development Planning and Environment Act²¹⁶.

A new structure will additionally be created, namely the provincial 'Development and Planning Commission', although no budget has been allocated for this yet²¹⁷. The DPC will comprise 24 people nominated by the Premier-In-Executive Council on the recommendation of the MEC responsible for planning. The DFA provides a detailed framework for who these people should be, the function of the DC and how it will be resourced. In essence the DPC shall review the entire structure and functioning of the planning system.

In summary, the DFA shall provide an integrated development planning system that will empower and align line departments that are responsible for sector-based delivery. In particular the performance criteria (LDOs) will generate objectives and targets from the bottom up that provincial level departments can aggregate into province wide targets and objectives. If captured in a constantly updated management information system, this may provide an extremely powerful planning instrument²¹⁸.

3.5) Strength And Weaknesses

Below the strengths and the weaknesses of the DFA in conjunction with respective provincial actions will be discussed. One will realise that nearly every (potential) strength, if not properly implemented and managed on provincial and local level, may solve existing shortcomings in terms of unsatisfactory citizen and community participation partially.

²¹⁶Business Day, 13/7/1994.

²¹⁷Personal communication, Swilling.

²¹⁸Not just the next paragraph on strength and weaknesses of the DFA, but also the empirical part in the next chapter will definitely raise questions about the assumption that the local level can or will in fact generate accepted and adequate needs identification and prioritisation.

On the positive side one can firstly note that the DFA provides a fairly clear set of developmental principles that links spatial planning to social, economic and environmental planning. In regard to Gauteng, these principles may serve well as a point of departure for a strategic development framework²¹⁹. In practice, however, most local (economic) development projects tend to be biased towards visible physical development²²⁰. In the specific South African context this is reinforced further by the fact that basically all planners on local level, and many on provincial, are trained as town planners or architects²²¹. Whether the stated objectives of the DFA will be effectively realised on local level will depend on the foresight of local actors and the nature of local government - community relations.

Secondly, with the establishment of national and provincial development planning commissions some sort of a strategic policy unit may be created that increases the limited but strongly needed policy analysis and formulation capacity in government²²².

Thirdly, the conflict resolution and arbitration mechanism of provincial development tribunals is vital in light of the heterogeneity of interests on the community and regional level. However, within this context, it ought to be critically noted that on the one side, most conflicts will arise and for the sake of development should also be solved at local level. Thus, if there were functional dispute resolution mechanisms have to be developed - this however, is not yet achieved, nor really properly addressed²²³, because one tribunal on provincial level, subdivided into the six subregions of Gauteng, e.g. using the boundaries as the Regional Service Councils (RSC)²²⁴, is probably too centralised.

Fourthly, the regulation that local governments have to develop LDOs means that the authorities have to commit themselves to a set of objectives as the basis for implementation planning. This approach is radically different to the past, which was

²¹⁹The real question is how this will be formulated in practice; compare the next chapter, especially the role of the provincial economic and development forum (GEDF).

²²⁰Compare for example the regulations concerning aspects to be covered in LDOs, especially the 'examples' given with regard to defining the quantum, in the paragraph above. For the American and British experience, see Judd, Parkinson, 1990; Squires, 1989.

²²¹Interview, Arkwright, DBSA.

²²²Heymans, et. al., 1995.

²²³Compare the next chapter of Gauteng's development forum approach.

²²⁴Initially it was discussed whether to use the RSCs as an organisational basis, this idea however has been discarded. DDPE&W, 1994d, p. 7.

incremental in nature, and has proven to have considerable merit in other parts of the world²²⁵. However, the task of alignment between local LDOs and the provincial development framework has currently not been successfully achieved in Gauteng. Generally speaking, political dynamics on provincial level and institutional arrangements between these two tiers of government have hindered local government's proper representation²²⁶.

Fifthly, apart from the fact that it took the GNU more than one and a half years of drafting an overarching development framework repealing the various old planning laws, the implementation on provincial and local level will require substantial time and resources. The decision-making procedures that centre around the tribunal are more complex due to their increased responsiveness in comparison to what was prescribed in the old Township and Town-planning Ordinances. Over the next few years the Townships Board will have to be restructured to merge into the organisational basis of the provincial tribunal²²⁷. Additionally, all stakeholders with the provincial government playing a primary role have to invest in the building of capacity at local government level and within civil society to make the system work, which will only then facilitate and encourage the development process.

Finally from a more substantive developmental perspective, the DFA could trigger the release of well-located public land for housing and other development projects, but since few of the South African poor will be able to buy this land at current market prices, additional measures will be needed to make it affordable for the target groups, to avoid developers' speculation, etc.²²⁸. Real development in a poverty alleviating sense is not guaranteed with the DFA.

After this brief discussion of the DFA, this study will now turn to shed empirical light on the actual political and developmental processes that took place during the roughly speaking first two years of the GNU within the context of

²²⁵ Shiceka, 1995a, pp. 4.

²²⁶ For example, neither local authorities nor community organisations are part of the envisaged 'strategic centre' - some sort of networking / policy design and process management arrangement between the enabling department in Gauteng - initiated by the Department of Corporate Services. Interview, Cranko, Corporate Services.

²²⁷ The Transvaal Townships Board came into being in 1913 as a direct result of legislation pertaining to township development and changes in land use. The functions have changed considerably during the years. Today the Board plays a democratic, although not transparent, role in the orderly development of towns, cities and communities. The name is misleading, since in the recent past catered for WLA. Rosmarin, 1994; DDPE&W, 1994d, 1994e, 1994f.

²²⁸ Mail & Guardian, 26/1-1/2/1996.

community participation in the RDP. The question concerning participation in the DFA, i.e. only on local level in the formulation of LDOs, will be analysed in the second part of the chapter below in which Gauteng will form the basis of a macro case study.

4) African Populists And New Technocrats: Implementation Of Participatory Development Planning In Gauteng

This chapter will describe and analyse Gauteng's attempts to find suitable strategies and structures for giving substance to the participatory policy principles stated in the RDP during 1994 and 1995. The research interest focuses on the approaches to and outcomes of structuring the interaction between the state, i.e. provincial and local governments, with organs of civil society and the citizenry at large. In the case of Gauteng, two complex and inter-connected policy processes took place which will be separately described and analysed in a chronological order. These are firstly the community and local development forum (CDF, LDF) approach pursued by the former PWV / Gauteng RDP Commission headed by the MPL Ben Turok during 1994 and the beginning of 1995. Tokyo Sexwale's, the Premier of Gauteng, initiated the government-driven organisation of civil society into CDFs and LDFs for community participation in the RDP at the Vista I conference in mid 1994. It resulted in the establishment of CDFs and LDFs as RDP civil society structures by Ben Turok and his aides. Secondly, after Turok was politically ousted owing to a host of reasons which will be mentioned below, the disbanding of the commission and handing over respective competencies to the DDPE&W and the Department of Economic Affairs and Finances (DEAF), the provincial process of implementation of the DFA by the DDPE&W will be focused upon. The DDPE&W is responsible for the development and implementation of a new integrated development planning approach for the province, the DEAF focuses on working out economic and development policy content and restructuring the Gauteng Economic and Development Forum, which probably will emerge as some sort of a provincial economic, labour and development council (PEDLAC) as a concomitant to the national neo-corporatist body (NEDLAC). Basically the DDPE&W took over the responsibility for the continuation of the CDF strategy in the beginning of 1995. In many ways this led to a radical shift in the province's approach to community participation on local government level, both in regard to the provincial government's priorities as well as the nature of state - civil society relations. Before this study will assess the development strategies and political dynamics, it is however necessary to

briefly elaborate on the broader context of negotiation and development forums in South Africa during the last couple of years. The general experience of negotiations which took place since 1990 on all levels and in all sectors in South Africa did influence Gauteng's approaches by having deeply embedded normative convictions about the nature and particularly about structures of participation in government and society.

4.1) South Africa's Forum Experience

4.1.1) Historical Background

A current trend in South Africa is the institutionalisation of structures²²⁹ and policy-making processes concerning the economy and its industrialisation that resemble neo-corporatist arrangements²³⁰ such as NEDLAC²³¹ and as reflected by the new Labour Relations Act (LRA)²³². This corporatistic trend has already been discussed and predicted many times; its way is said to have been paved by another, closely related development, namely the emergence of various negotiating forums²³³, especially in the field of development. The 'culture of negotiations'²³⁴ had already begun in the early eighties, following the Cape of Good Hope Conference, which introduced the concept of 'development regions' and development by region. It also led to the establishment of the Regional Development Advisory Councils²³⁵, although

²²⁹Broadly understood to encompass organisations, set of rules, laws and procedures.

²³⁰Other terms used, usually with no distinct difference in meaning in the South African context, are social contract and social compact. Internationally, neo-corporatism may be described as a formal agreement between the state, labour and capital. These three actors are directly represented within an institutionalised framework of tripartite bargaining forums. The primary policy focus is on economic policy, especially wages and prices policy. Key elements of the social contract include the creation of a forum for consultation and negotiation of macro-economic policy; sectoral forums for particular industries often with a structural adjustment focus; the institutionalisation of a forums / structures for efficient resolution of industrial conflict; legislation to protect workers and their rights and minimum wage legislation to secure labour's compliance. See: Vally, 1992, pp. 3-4.

²³¹Established by a merger between the National Economic Forum (NEF) and the Manpower Commission of the Department of Labour.

²³²In comparison to the economic focus of corporatism, somehow similar proposals have been put forward for the political arena over the last three decades under the term of consociationalism. For an introduction specifically related to the South African situation, please compare: Lijphart, 1985; Moodley, 1986; Southall, 1983.

²³³See Shubane, Shaw, 1993, chapter 3.

²³⁴Schillinger, 1994a.

²³⁵Nine development regions of the DBSA; these institutional structures were to facilitate interaction between the private sector / community and the public sector on regional development issues. National, regional and district structures were established to complete a hierarchical pattern along with sectoral standing committees at regional level.

its structures hardly got off the ground. By the second half of the eighties only the Northern and Eastern Transvaal had adopted multi-sectoral development strategies. The real meteoric rise of forums came with CODESA²³⁶ and the Kempton Park talks²³⁷. There have also been various sectoral and issue-based forums on national, regional and local level since 1990²³⁸. While the inclusiveness of participants in most of these bodies certainly increased the legitimacy of South Africa's 'negotiated revolution'²³⁹, this process is not without its negative trade-offs.

The focus of this part is twofold, on the one side a critical analysis of the structure and possible future developments of forums is attempted, highlighting inter alia the participatory role of civil society in policy-making. In the past, the main objective as well as reason for their proliferation can be seen as an attempt by formerly excluded, largely black, organisations to gain entry to policy-making arenas, 'exploiting' the former South African governments moral illegitimacy and practical inability to govern unilaterally. "The view, prevalent before 1990, that policies could be made outside the state and that those were as important as policies that were made within the state, gave way to a view that policies needed to be made from within the state. It is for this reason that people began to contest the right of the state to make policies without the representation of a far broader range of interests."²⁴⁰

Historically, the focus of negotiation forums was on participation in policy-formulation. Activities geared towards possible implementation of development programmes and projects were rejected by most forums in the past. However, these characteristics are in contrast to the objectives of the (Gauteng government's former) concept of LDF as RDP civil society structures geared towards serving in implementation, which foresees a far more structured and uniform approach to community participation in development²⁴¹. The focus of this paper is not to describe the work or the implications of the endlessly long list of established forums nor to

²³⁶Convention for a Democratic South Africa.

²³⁷Multi-Party Negotiation Process which finally led to the agreement on the Constitutional Principles and Interim Constitution with its Bill of Rights by the majority of South African political parties in 1993.

²³⁸There is hardly anything published on the theory of Forums in South Africa; most publications deal with the work and achievements of individual forums in a descriptive way, e.g. Patel, 1993; Harber, Ludman, 1994.

²³⁹Adam, Harf, 1993.

²⁴⁰Shubane, 1994, p. 21.

²⁴¹The differences of objectives comparing the concept of local development forums (LDF) as RDP civil society structures geared towards implementation will be contrasted below.

assess and discuss their achievements concerning constitutional development or new macro-economics strategies, rather it will be attempted to sketch out the practical foundations on which forums rest. Hence, the socio-political processes that enabled forums to arise, at which specific place in time and in the form that they did, shall be analysed. Additionally an attempt will be made to shed light on the practical capacity and limitations of forums determined, *inter alia*, by their styles of decision-finding such as consensus or as a South African speciality 'sufficient consensus', their composition as well as other structural aspects such as institutional capacity or attitude of the individual parties involved. This paper, however, does not attempt to explore the interrelated debate around social contracts²⁴², because it would raise for consideration a whole range of issues including the role and nature of the three main actors, that is the state, the trade unions and employers associations, the future of the welfare state²⁴³, etc. Finally, it has to be stated that many questions will be unanswered since on the one hand there hardly exists anything like theorems on this topic not to speak of a theory of forums and on the other hand 'final' RDP implementation structures are not properly established yet. The roles and responsibilities of organs of civil society in the context of development have not evolved uniformly.

4.1.2) New Paradigms And Politics Of Transition

This chapter will describe the constituting elements of development oriented forums. The focus lies on their internal structures, working procedures and their potential capacity and limitations. But first of all a brief classification of the existing forums in South Africa will be given. They can be understood as both institutions or structures as well as processes and events. Shaw and Shubane²⁴⁴ distinguish forums by the tier of government on which they operate, i.e. national, provincial and local level. National level forums tended to be sector- or issue-specific such as the

²⁴² Compare Schillinger, 1994b. Concerning the wealth of literature on neo-corporatism, especially those focused on South African, over the last two decades: Compare: Friedman, 1991; Holdt, 1992; Maree, 1993; Pierce, 1993.

²⁴³ Although it should be noted that in the past welfare provision was limited in South Africa to a minority of the population. It is unlikely that enough resources will exist in future to expand the scope and the quality of services.

²⁴⁴ Shaw, Shubane 1994, pp. 1-2.

economy, housing, health, education etc.²⁴⁵, thus being more technical than political in nature²⁴⁶. Regional forums crystallised basically around two issues / functions, namely the bringing together of major political and economic actors in the region to debate firstly political or regional constitutional issues and secondly regional economic and development issues. The majority of forums sprung up at local level, their work concentrated on negotiating settlements to rent and service charge boycotts, the establishment of local structures of the National Peace Accord as well as more general issues such as local government transformation and development. Thus local forums have been intrinsically political in nature, questioning the legitimacy of the Black Local Authorities (WLA), imposed by the apartheid provincial administration. An additional characteristic that can be used to tell forums apart is the political and financial weight certain issues carry with them, e.g. economic development as opposed to tourism. Also the question of the period of time of relevance of certain issues serves as a further distinction, e.g. the LGNF were only necessary for a limited period, macro-economic and development policies will continue to be a major and highly contested policy-field - compare for example the recent merger of the National Manpower Commission and the National Economic Forum to become NEDLAC.

However, the question whether proliferation of forums is a response to the continuing crisis as well as progress of democratisation, or whether they have been created purely for their own sake, as gatekeepers of development funds - having the mushrooming of NGOs in South Africa in mind - is difficult to answer. Nevertheless, the specific historical circumstances of South Africa's transition to democracy can be regarded as the single most important set of factors which gave rise to the establishment of about 230 forums shortly before the elections in 1994 out of which some 40 are national forums²⁴⁷. Some scholars regard forums as an extension of the negotiation process down to grass-roots issues and grass-roots participation²⁴⁸. With the government unbanning formerly proscribed organisations and indicating

²⁴⁵An exception to this is the Youth Forum which focuses on a social group rather than a sector specific or economic endeavour. Shubane, 1994, p. 22.

²⁴⁶Without going into detail, it needs to be enquired whether this division is appropriate; note for example that there is not rural development forum with an integrative approach, rather the issues affecting rural development are dealt with in different sectoral forums as well as the one on drought.

²⁴⁷Rasethaba, 1994, pp. 116, 118.

²⁴⁸Schillinger, 1994, foreword.

willingness to negotiate about the abolition of Apartheid the first precondition for the emergence of forums, namely the open articulation of interests of the black majority, was fulfilled. The immense dynamic of transition led to a pragmatic change in the liberation strategy in a way which made institutions such as forums a strategic necessity rather than an unacceptable compromise. From the point of view of political groups representing the disenfranchised, forums served to prevent the NP from using public resources to bolster its electoral popularity, taking decisions alone and prevent unilateral restructuring thus presenting the new government with a fait accompli, i.e. the role of a watchdog²⁴⁹. Additionally they might have been seen as a means of exposing future political representatives of the liberation movements organisations to policy processes thus preparing them for the anticipated role in government. This not only holds for political parties such as the ANC but also for union federations.

The NP-led government was ambivalent about forums, initially denouncing them as interim government by stealth²⁵⁰. It always emphasised the rejection of allowing them to have formal powers which have a binding impact on government; but from the emergence of the constitutional negotiations the NP government was not able to rule against them or without their consent as the debacle for the government with the attempted imposition of value added tax in 1991 exemplifies.

Besides the two main protagonists other stakeholders also helped with the emergence of forums. Parastatals such as Eskom regarded this development as a chance of depoliticising electricity supply and the questions concerning the ending of rent and service boycotts; organised business saw the long-term necessity for co-operation with labour, thus establishing negotiation and dispute settling mechanisms; the latter as well as labour additionally recognised participation in macro-economic policy-making as being in their own interests and as vital for achieving a new growth path for South Africa. But ideological motivations mattered as well. Here, one functional aspect needs to be highlighted. The NP regime remained in power, retaining sole control over the state machinery and policy implementation while at the same time there was an absence of mutually acceptable institutions to accommodate the new entrants into the political sector created a great

²⁴⁹Shubane, Shaw, 1994, p. 3.

²⁵⁰Ibid.

need to defuse the tensions. Forums may be interpreted as the structures which closed the institutional gap created by the contradictory strategy of the old government, i.e. its intentions to change and its reluctance to introduce institutional change or devolution of power. One might cynically add that many forums fulfilled the function of talking change; the often made claim that forums are mere 'talk-shops', while actually slowing down the rate of change, is to some degree true. Whether the forums impact on deradicalising the former radicals of the liberation movement should be seen as positive or negative is another question.

The question of legitimacy, or more accurately the former government's lack thereof, has already been covered. Another factor besides the above mentioned immediate political exigencies for the rise of forums lies in the paradigmatic shifts of international as well as domestic stakeholder's understanding of democracy and development in general. Concerning the latter South African development agencies such as the DBSA or the IDT shifted their definition of development towards it being a process which is about people rather than the provision of goods or the extension of services or physical structures. They also recognised the need for beneficiaries to enjoy a say in development. Forums were regarded as a means of positioning the targeted groups or communities at the centre of development and hence by allowing community participating in design and implementation of development projects support sustainability of them²⁵¹. It seems highly likely that forums will continue to be regarded as an integral part of this new development strategy, although their roles and functions are still disputed. Funding them as a contribution to a viable, participatory development approach will become less an issue than the severe financial standing of many South African NGOs. Parallel to this was as arising new international discourse which put strong emphasis on notions of implementing or strengthening participatory democracy by a vibrant and capable civil society which also had impact on the liberation movement's ideology. These trends were reinforcing the utilisation of forums. However, a note of caution should be sounded in respect to the inclusiveness vs. representativeness debate. It has often been claimed that forums promote inclusiveness. While in general forums may aim to be as inclusive as possible, this usually implies in reality inclusiveness of organised interests - but not those groups or interests not organised or without bargaining /

²⁵¹ Shubane, Shaw, op. cit., p. 8.

sanctioning power - around a specific issue only²⁵². Nevertheless, the trend of inclusion of private interests and NGOs in the policy process is by itself potentially democratising, since it may include important sections of the population which might not otherwise be represented by political parties and established (national) pressure groups in the present political and administrative system. Whether the policy outcomes are more democratic in general remains to be seen. A representative party-political system as well as limited spectrum civil society participation are bound to fall short of idealistic notions of participatory democratic theory.

4.1.3) Capacity And Limitations Of Forums

4.1.3.1) Internal Structure

Membership of forums tend to include organised business, on local or community level, as well as individual entrepreneurs, organised labour, the governing authority, political parties, community-based organisations and consultants and experts without constituencies. In reality this usually implies inclusiveness of role-players in a specific policy field. Generally speaking, forums formally comprise a plenary, some sort of standing committee or working committee structure and (ad hoc) task groups to deal with specific issues as they arise²⁵³. Most forums co-ordinate their work through a steering committee / core group as well as base themselves on a secretariat, which can be dominating if captured and provided for by one party. However, the question of where the real work is done, i.e. where the actual decisions are made and where the power of defining problems and potential approaches rests, might be quite different from the formal structure or the membership of the plenary / executive committee. In reality much of the work and debate takes place in working and task groups where highly skilled people from powerful interest groups examine policy alternatives. It is at this level that policy options are generated. While all parties may be participating in principle, the technical nature of the issues often means that sectoral experts and consultants, i.e. 'expertise' in the form of studies commissioned (in the worst case by powerful parties

²⁵² Additionally, the danger of some member organisations of forums behaving as 'gate-keepers' ought not to be neglected. This realisation is strongly present recent in South African debates and partly leads to increased suspicion about 'independent' co-ordination structures of civil society. Interviews, Dauskardt, DDPE&W, and Benjamin, Core Group.

²⁵³ Botha, 1994, p. 17.

or individuals), rather than political representatives significantly influence the decision-making process. In a highly politicised and polarised environment, this need not be destructive to the legitimacy of forums and their policy-making, since consultants - the degree of their presence often being criticised when compared to often occurred underrepresentation of Africans and women in particular - may support facilitation. Hence, it is obvious that a working balance has to be found between (political) representativeness in the decision-making process (and prior to that of the participants themselves, the notion of constituency based representativeness of the self-declared representatives of the people such as NGOs, Civics,...etc.)²⁵⁴ and an appropriate level of scientific rationality and technical professional sm.

If multipartism is a key feature of forums - tripartism is one in many forums which deal in a broad sense with the world of work - than this has important influences on the way they work. Not all unions are able to match the institutional capacity and resource base of employers' associations; in contrast to many 'home-grown' forums at local level the former are rather able to bind their constituencies.

4.1.3.2) Organisational Power Of Participants As Capacity Of Forums

The strategic question concerning capacity of forums is highlighted in the literature in the context of the achievements of forums as well as concerning their future. Generally speaking a distinction between two dimensions seems necessary. First, direct institutional factors such as the size and resource base of forums itself matter. Funding by whom, the quantity of logistics and access to information on technical issues as well as opponents' positions, set in relation to the challenges of the stated objectives, determine the quality of policy outputs as well as the capacity of forums to influence the corresponding outcomes. Second, the (limited) capacity of participants itself has a crucial impact on the forums efficiency and effectiveness.

²⁵⁴The recently more often emphasised need to utilise various criteria for membership, e.g. compare NEDLAC or LDFs, highlight this circumstance. However, one might cynical argue too that no matter the (constituency based) mandate of the myriad of NGOs they represent institutional capacity and thus, from a performance perspective, it is advisable to make use of them. Obviously, this notion does not take into account the question of the possible erosion of the sole power resting with the parliament, i.e. in this context local government, due to its democratic election. Which might not be such a problem as long as the functions of social integration and co-ordination are appropriately performed.

The perception concerning pros and cons of the spread of capacity between the individual actors differs greatly among the South African scholars. While some fear the domination of forums by a few or even one dominating party (business, ANC aligned groupings and / or the government), others, based on the notion that a proactive champion is necessary, describe this as a positive characteristic. Obviously research capacity, access to information and bargaining power is heavily weighted towards established interests²⁵⁵. The power of forums depends also on who (individual personalities) sits on them, who is feared most, funded most etc. However, exceptions justify the rule: the Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber did not conform to this generalisation²⁵⁶. Additionally, one has also to acknowledge the empowerment component for disadvantaged groups owing to their participation and hereby gained insights into the workings of the administrative and political systems. Finally, it should be remarked that required capacity ought to be measured against the task to be fulfilled, from facilitation of dialogue and policy-formulation to serving as testing grounds for acceptance concerning future government policies and monitoring; also it ought to be asked whether there is one 'inherently predetermined' role forums should take.

4.1.3.3) Political Environment And The Future Of Negotiation Forums

The expectations of scholars concerning the future of forums can be grouped into three dominant positions: The first, seeing forums as a special device during the transition, argue that once the new democratic elected government has taken over the utility of forums will end. This notion is clearly based on classical liberal democratic theory that assumes the government to be the institution with the greatest capacity to represent the full spread of interests²⁵⁷. The second position favours the institutionalisation of forums as statutory government advisory bodies²⁵⁸. Besides legal recognition in legislation, forums can be told apart by their degree of autonomy in policy-formulation and impact on government policies and by their composition as well as the procedure to determine their membership. There is need

²⁵⁵ There are exceptions to this however: e.g. compare COSATU's access to the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) and the NIEP vis-a-vis other union federations. Shubane, Shaw, 1993, p. 15.

²⁵⁶ Swilling, Boya, 1995.

²⁵⁷ Shaw, Shubane, 1993, pp. 21-22.

²⁵⁸ Godsell, quoted in : Shubane, Shaw, 1993, p. 21.

to overhaul the old governmental advisory system in any case²⁵⁹. But dual representation might arise as a problem. If statutory bodies are created to increase participation; civil society would still be in a position to form forums, but their decisions would carry little weight and they would in effect be pressure groups. Last but not least one should also not be idealistic about the organisational culture of public administration; no matter how liberal the initiating authority, statutory structures will tend to exclude the societal weaker interests as well as those thought to be inconsequential or adversarial in position²⁶⁰. The third view advocates forums as a platform for civil society, which have a 'right' to participate in policy-making processes. This notion is based on the principles of the RDP, assuming that participation by organised non-governmental groups is essential to a functioning democracy. Once again there may be different institutional settings. Forums might be mere officially recognised channels of communication from civil society to the state, or might just be described as networks (policy-coalitions) positioned between the hierarchical and exchange (market) mode of co-ordination²⁶¹, i.e. between the CBO and NGO community and the state. Sabatier's work suggests that if different advocacy coalitions have access to a minimum of technical resources and if fairly depoliticised forums exist which force competing interests groups to address each other's positions, then more adequate analyses of the nature of the problems as well as better understanding of policy impacts will emerge over time and result in change²⁶². The above mentioned three possible developments are slightly differently presented by Heymans who lists the three options of totally independent forums, state-funded independent forums and state-funded statutory forums²⁶³. At the end of the day, besides the various underlying assumptions and theories, one has to acknowledge that the existence of forums after the transition and their relationship to the state will be decided politically. The duration of the transition will definitely go on for quite some time, and forums seem to be in South Africa to stay - the question is in which format.

²⁵⁹ Compare Jayendra Naidoo's devastating critique, 1994., pp. 60-61.

²⁶⁰ Gabriels, 1994, pp. 88-92; Walters, 1994, p. 96. The RDP Office has specifically advised against this move recently. Christianson, 1995, p. 14.

²⁶¹ Mayntz, 1993, pp. 39-56.

²⁶² Sabatier, 1987, pp. 649-692.

²⁶³ Heymans, 1994a, pp. 4-6.

Generally speaking, the role of the state in development lies, following the new participatory paradigm of good democratic governance, in laying broad policy parameters rather than in implementing projects and thus the new government will probably therefore avail resources, including funding, to organs of civil society who are in many respects better placed to implement projects²⁶⁴. From a conservative position, but not only held by conservatives, it may be argued that the state opening itself for private interests can have devastating effects for public welfare. This seems in our context clearly over-exaggerated. The real issue is not whether it is dangerous vs. it is necessary - the latter is clearly the case - but how much influence, by whom and due to what procedure should be possible. Obviously, the future ability of the new government to carry out development initiatives on its own will clearly influence its attitude to forums. Conversely, the critical attitudes of the population towards the government of unity (of politicians) might motivate a heightened demand for more participative rights.

Criticism concerning the practical achievements of forums in the last couple of years are manifold. Firstly, most forums are criticised for being non-representative, not just by those who feel left out; also the lack of representation of interests which have no 'voice' has been repeatedly mentioned²⁶⁵. There also seems to be a concern that by and large the people on the ground hardly know what is actually negotiated, thus the likelihood of the participating organisations binding their constituencies easily is reduced. Lastly, besides the point of there simply being too many forums, strong calls for rationalisation are commonly voiced, there are also two structural limitations inherent in any forum. First, without attempting to explore all the implications of certain styles of decision-making, e.g. consensus, qualified majorities, procedures of deadlock-breaking mechanism etc., it may be generalised that

²⁶⁴ However, the idealistic rhetoric about NGOs doing everything better than arthritic state bureaucracies is highly questionable, especially taking the proliferation of them during the eighties into account; the South African NGO jungle clearly lacks co-ordination and possibly accountability too. In any case, this out-sourcing does not preclude the government from its full responsibility to account, rather this approach may be justified by the responsibility to strengthen civil society.

²⁶⁵ In this context all the classical arguments concerning the different power of interests brought forward against pluralism apply too. But the danger of certain groups being totally ignored (unemployed, or the so-called unemployable) is by far greater in corporatist structured forums dealing with the world of work such as the NEF or the National Manpower Commission (NMC), because the institutional structure is designed to have only the umbrella organisations or associations of labour and capital represented. Cynically speaking, the attempt of other stakeholders in society to participate too, following corporatist thinking of the old modernist type, has to be perceived as an attack on the system itself.

negotiations are time consuming - the more participants the longer it takes to reach solutions²⁶⁶. In fact any process of outside consultation on policy issues will inevitably slow down the implementation of policies and programmes. But it may increase the development performance in the medium- to long-term since firstly, costly faults and resistance to implementation may be avoided, are lessened and secondly, this might simply be the price to be paid for establishing and maintaining social stability. Second, when assessing the democratising achievements of forums, one has to quite bluntly deny any increase in direct democratic procedures. Forums have succeeded in broadening the actor base for policy development. However, in most instances this meant rather the bringing in of extra sets or pools of leaders - not constituencies themselves - thus replacing or broadening a given white elite by black cadres. This criticism shall not belittle or deny the incredible role forums played in building necessary capacity of the new elite to govern.

Thus, rationalisation, inter alia to fight the funding crisis²⁶⁷, improved co-ordination²⁶⁸ as well as institutionalisation of inclusive membership criteria and efficiency in conflict-resolution are necessary key developments for the work of forums in the future. Here, the government as well as business (and labour) have a responsibility concerning capacity-building at two possible levels. The first is directly related to the internal functioning of forums themselves, the second is the diverse and fragmented NGO community in South Africa²⁶⁹. By putting a focus on the latter one may be reducing the danger that forums become co-operative mechanisms between elites²⁷⁰. Indeed, this is recognised as a key element in the new

²⁶⁶ Compare for example: Scharpf, 1988 and 1993.

²⁶⁷ Botha, 1994, p. 19.

²⁶⁸ Which is not supposed to mean to manage the whole processes centrally. Co-ordination could / should be undertaken outside of government - if forums are supposed to be ...ore than pure advisory bodies -, since this arena probably works best if it is left undisturbed, and all groups compete for whatever it is that they want following pluralistic reasoning of spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and competitive interaction of the various individual as well as corporate actors in society, placing faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces. Defined in this way by: Schmitter, 1974, p. 97.

²⁶⁹ But it is not just civil society which needs technical, managerial and idealistic support (by the state and the donor community), but also the South African administration, although huge as it is with more than one million employees, needs to undergo capacity building and institutional strengthening exercises. Capacity-building as a key component in giving civil society the ability to participate will also tremendously benefit the public sector by reducing its workload due to increased self-regulation of civil society following Streek / Schmitter's notion of 'private interest government' influenced by Luhmann's introduction of the notion of autopoiesis into systems theory in the mid-eighties. Streek, Schmitter, 1985.

²⁷⁰ Heymans, 1994b, p. 69.

development strategy of South Africa. Pluralism would be served if mechanisms and procedures are institutionalised in such a way as to give individual and corporate actors in civil society access to the state and its institutions.

4.2) Participation In The Reconstruction And Development Programme:

Popular Participation? And For What?

Below the study will attempt to link the above mentioned concept(s) of forums as policy-making structures of civil society (during a period of transition) to the Gauteng's initial concept of CDFs and LDFs as local RDP implementing and legitimising agents²⁷¹. Since mid-1994 the Gauteng RDP Commission translated their plan into practice to set a structure - horizontally placed between government at local and provincial level and development agents of the broader civil society - of development forums²⁷². This was motivated by the realisation that with the local government elections only scheduled in November 1995, there is need to start implementing development programmes and projects at local level as soon as possible. As developed in the national RDP office at the end of 1994²⁷³, provincial governments are to set up a kind of 'reciprocal hierarchical structure'²⁷⁴. In theory, it consists of five levels, i.e. at community (CDF), local (LDF), district, regional and provincial level parallel to government structures²⁷⁵.

The structure of the following part is as follows: After briefly elaborating on motivations for introducing this concept in Gauteng, the paper will describe the features of this specific concept in its initial form in detail. Then it will continue with highlighting actual positive and negative experience in the province during the last year as well as analysing possible factors. Having completed this part on the initial

²⁷¹This part is based on various planning and policy documents from the PWV / Gauteng and the Eastern Transvaal / Mpumalanga RDP Commissions as well as from some NGOs, given to the author on a confidential basis during 1994-95.

²⁷²Interestingly, various persons involved in the implementation of the RDP, both on provincial and national level claimed in the interviews to have independently developed this concept. It seems that in South Africa the idea of hierarchical representative pyramid-like structures is part of generally held belief systems about how to structure organisation.

²⁷³Interview, Hundsdoerfer, ETDPP / National RDP.

²⁷⁴Favoured as a concepts by Bendor, Mookherjee, 1987. For the Mexican experience with this type of community organisation, see: Jimenez, 1988.

²⁷⁵The equivalent from Mpumalanga is called development councils, i.e. Community Development Councils, Local Development Councils, District Development Councils, and Regional Development Councils which the final reciprocal hierarchical level being the province. RDP Planning Forum Commission, 1995.

CDF approach of the former RDP Commission, the second part of this chapter will contrast this approach with the participatory development planning framework of the Department of Development Planning. Here, the approach followed is pragmatic, i.e. the paper will not ask whether the RDP needs forums, but enquire why the Turok's RDP Commission believed it needed what they set up? Last but not least it ought to be noted that one has to clearly differentiate between the 'old' forums as mechanisms of the struggle and the Gauteng government's CDF approach to systematically structuring civil society's role in policy and other strategic decision-making processes and eventually project implementation.

4.2.1) Convictions Of Political Actors An Organisational Environment

The period shortly after the April 1994 election was full of enthusiasm and a momentum of starting everything afresh. The RDP was taken by most newly elected politicians both as a set of developmental measures and tasks to achieve as well as a normative guideline of how to approach development. It was regarded as a 'people's document'. Critical debate about whether everything could be achieved (at the same time), about internal contradictions in the base document as well as potential constraints, such as resistance in the public service or (potential resource) conflicts in society, was basically non-existent. During this developmental gold-rush, everything seemed promising, easy. Development along the new policy principles of the RDP simply had to be initiated. It was during this first half year after the election that most provincial players (in all provinces) started to set up RDP structures and initiate (talk about) development initiatives. Unfortunately, there was no national guidance, no uniform standards and most of all no financial and administrative control / co-ordination mechanisms in place which could guide those efforts meaningfully. Pragmatic realism of the diverse hurdles to change and development seemed as yet not to prevail. Understandingly, this was not just influenced by the euphoria of South Africa's transition, but by the inexperience of many of the new elites in developmental issues and public policy management and their political socialisation as well.

The institutionalisation of consultation and of accountability of government to society was a measure of high importance for the newly elected politicians, because

the bureaucracy was perceived to be still "... controlled by the white Afrikaner minority and the police and army ... effectively run by the same people who ran them before. ... [P]rogressive politicians must find the power to drive national democracy forward."²⁷⁶ Community development forums were designed as instruments for strengthening the weaker interests and the oppressed.

In the PWV / Gauteng, different departments started their own initiatives in a fairly unco-ordinated manner²⁷⁷. All sectors of the civil service were trapped in uncertainty about the transformation about to come and had to cope with the difficult task of reorganising the bits and pieces inherited from the former TPA. The DEAF started to develop an economic policy documents, the DDPE&W initiated reviews of (development) planning legislation and Ben Turok's RDP Commission in the Office of the Premier, i.e. ex officio member of the cabinet, developed a provincial RDP programme²⁷⁸.

The popular rhetoric in the RDP base document, coupled with popular / populist approaches found its way into the structuring of the role of the state and communities in development and state - civil society relationships. Popular participation in development followed Turok's (and those who share his) logic of collectively mobilising the historically disadvantaged communities. Four steps were regarded necessary for that²⁷⁹. Firstly, the 'real need' needed to be identified, and secondly, prioritised. This should be done by the communities themselves. Thirdly, a community skills audit needs to be conducted in order to give substance to local content in development work. Finally, simply the best way to implement and deliver (by and for the people) needed to be determined. Concerning the questions of who has the power / responsibility to implement development on local level, Turok attempted to find a middle way within the continuum ranging from government to civil society²⁸⁰. On the one side of the spectrum the delivery is carried out solely by the state, i.e. national, provincial and foremost local government. On the other side, civil

²⁷⁶Gauteng Government, WY, p. 1.

²⁷⁷This is even more crucial if one considers that the actual sectoral responsibilities of the MEC emerged in Gauteng 'by accident'. Only on the morning of the day the provincial cabinet was to declare its ten departments the divisions were negotiated between the top politician in about half an hour! Personal communication with GSP&DM staff.

²⁷⁸RDP Commission, 1964a.

²⁷⁹Interview, Turok, MP.

²⁸⁰Interview, Turok, MP.

society does the job alone. Both modes are advocated in South Africa. Each side supports its own role, e.g. the recent emphasis of the national and provincial government on the role of (local) government in the implementation of the RDP or the earlier suggestions from CDFs and LDFs to be the final policy makers with representative from local authorities only attending meeting *ex officio*²⁸¹. It becomes evident that in the belated systems of Turok and the former RDP Commission the definition of civil society, following leftist convictions, is reduced to communities and their organisations²⁸². This, however, excludes the private sector and the vital role it can play in development. The debate is still unresolved in theory. In practice, however, limitations in organisational capacity of all actors tend to favour the statist mode²⁸³.

Turok's logic rests on two crucial - unspoken and unfortunately false - assumptions, namely that firstly the communities are firstly able to determine and prioritise their needs (and not just undifferentiated wants) 'objectively'; and secondly, that there are in fact sufficient skills in the community for implementation, which considering the legacy of decades or even centuries of oppression is highly doubtful. These characteristics resemble the typical approaches of popular participation in development. Reinforcing this somehow simplistic view was the provincial problem analysis embedded in RDP Commissions draft document²⁸⁴. Although it was accepted that redistribution of wealth from the haves to the have-nots alone would not suffice to eradicate the legacy of Apartheid²⁸⁵, the root cause of underdevelopment was seen in the past racial Apartheid policies. No mention of

²⁸¹ It must be recognised that, despite the capacity problems of government outlined in this study, local governments have far greater capacity to deliver than local community organisations. But communities have built up a wealth of experience. There seems to be a danger of ignoring this capacity by all the currently offered (government) policy frameworks and thus not realising a maximisation of local resources for development by establishing complimentary arrangements.

²⁸² For the different definitions, see: Theoria, 1993.

²⁸³ An Interjectory remark on power relations and empowerment: This study criticised the at best secondary role empowerment plays as an objective in structuring participatory processes in the implementation of the RDP and the DFA. It argues that unequal power relations surface in a negative or empowerment retardatory way in basically all processes researched. This shall however not negate that empowerment through participation in planning and negotiation processes - no matter how skewed and one sided they may be - take place. A marginal analysis might conclude that the marginal rate of empowerment of dominated participants is relatively larger than the increase of power for the dominant parties. However, this study places the emphasis on analysing the broad trends and absolute relationships comparing stated objectives with practice, and criticising (poor) approaches to dealing with inequalities.

²⁸⁴ Which clearly follows earlier publications of Turok, e.g. 1993a, 1993b, 1993c.

²⁸⁵ RDP Commission, 1994, p.1.

more structural problems other developing countries all over the world, especially middle income and mainly primary commodity exporting countries, experience is made. Quick delivery of basic needs by the state was the envisaged strategy for social, political and economic empowerment²⁸⁶. However, besides the animosities between the RDP Commission and the DEAF about who is responsible for economic and development policy-making in the province, it ought to be mentioned that there was already more disagreement between the main political players about the future development policy of Gauteng, namely between Turok and his focus on poor communities and the Premier who wanted to see the focus on the development of the whole provincial economy²⁸⁷.

Underlying assumptions and perceptions of this specific approach to community organisation rests - beside the notion that the RDP is not solely a government policy initiative, but a programme of society as a whole - on a number of political assumptions²⁸⁸:

- Local authorities, officially the most important implementing body of development in South Africa, have a different role from CDFs and LDFs.
- The past interim local government structures and procedures are not sufficiently democratic, transparent and accountable. Even after the November 1995 local government elections local authorities may continue to stick to old (Apartheid) bureaucratic behaviour and therefore need to be counterbalanced by an organised civil society.
- Development efforts on local and community level ought not to be delayed due to the unsynchronical phasing of national and local government elections in the South African transition.
- The existing CBOs (and NGOs) will not be able to assist the government adequately in the implementation of the RDP.
- The (governmentally driven) newly formed development forums and their representatives will themselves be legitimate, democratic accountable, inclusive and participatory.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²⁸⁷ Interview, Turok, MP.

²⁸⁸ Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMCC), 1995, pp. 1-2.

4.2.2) "Go Out And Organise!"

The step from the above logic to attempting to mobilise the communities with a 'plan to rebuild the townships' - meant as a signal that the RDP is people's development and not just growth²⁸⁹ - was just a small one and subsequently took place in mid 1994 with the Vista I conference²⁹⁰. Officially, the call aimed at all (historically disadvantaged) communities to organise in development forums was put forward by the Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale at the conference. Civil society organisations were approached by government representatives with a view to establishing structures to represent these organisations - the conference was predominantly attended by ANC and SANCO representatives from the former, so-called townships - in the RDP. The mission was to ensure that communities would have a say in the identification, prioritisation and implementation of RDP projects in their respective communities²⁹¹.

In summary, the outcome of this first conference on state - civil society relationships in development in the province led to the establishment of a co-ordination body, the RDP Core Group, and the setting up of LDFs and CDFs during the following year. The mandate for the concept of CDFs and LDFs has been given by the Premier in his speech during Vista I. The Head of the RDP Commission, located in the Premiers office, Ben Turok, as well as by diverse local communities in consultative community, sectoral and regional workshops resulting from the initial call at the conference in July 1994. One main strategic reason for pushing this concept so fast probably lies in the fact that the implementation of the RDP on local and communal level was perceived not to have started due to the various hiccoughs and delays on local government level with the election more than a year after the national ones. Thus meaningful and legitimate development efforts on and from local government level were realistically envisaged only after the new local governments have been elected and have slowly starting to function, thus waiting one year for the practical project implementations. Another more fundamental reason might be a general perception within the ANC / Alliance that NGOs, co-ordinated by forums,

²⁸⁹ Interview, Turok, MP.

²⁹⁰ The name derives from the first venue, namely the Vista University which is located in different former BLAs, i.e. parts of Soweto.

²⁹¹ This perception was shared by participants. Interview, Pretorius, PANGO; RDP Core Group, 1995a, p. 15.

could be legitimate and experienced vehicles to assist the state with its limited development capacity.

However, on community level many problems emerged due to the fact that the actual role and functions as well as responsibilities of the forums were hardly defined. This problem was soon to be reinforced by rivalry and politicking on political level.

4.2.3) The Original Community Development Forum Model: Institutional Perfectionism

4.2.3.1) Functions And Powers

In 1994 / 1995, the envisaged functions of LDFs were to (1) ensure participation and a people-driven process as well as to democratise at the local level, i.e. two of the five RDP principles; (2) to support information and education on local level on RDP policies, RDP structures, local government structures and development concepts and sectoral policies and programmes; (3) active consultation on the implementation of the RDP at local level; (4) implementation of the RDP in terms of management of specific projects - to be carried out by Community Development Forums too - and (5) Capacity-building, i.e. to enable civil society to exert influence as an individual development actor thus furthering participation. Here capacity building is planned to focus on LDF operations such as communication, projects and funds management, administration, organisation of meeting and workshops and planning.

Assistance in setting up of CDFs and LDFs as well as respective co-ordination is supposed to be achieved on provincial level by the RDP Core Groups (assisted by the South African Communications Service, SACS), consisting of various NGO and business representatives, the provincial and national RDP Commissions, SANCO and the ANC, and in regard to the Gauteng's subregions²⁹² by the Networking Committees (NWC). The NWC / Core Group's mission statement (Gauteng) is to preserve the integrity and independence of civil society in the RDP process and ensure the active role of civil society in development based on the

²⁹² East Rand, North East Rand, Central Wits, West Rand, Vaal and Pretoria. The Pretoria NWC calls itself RDP Co-ordination Committee (GoCom)

principles of the RDP. It can be described as a loose formation and interim structure of government (which pulled out later) and organs of civil society (voluntary membership) for a time span of 12 - 18 month with the limited mandate to get the CDFs and LDFs off the ground and working.

The corresponding powers to the above listed functions of CDFs and LDFs are²⁹³:

Participation: own constitution and control of procedures;

1. Information: to request information on local and provincial level from government structures; to approach organisations for information in the name of the LDF;
2. Consultation: to submit inputs by prescribed dates on topics / issues to government structures; to be entitled to get motivated government response on inputs;
3. Implementation: in the guidelines for appropriate projects to plan, to manage and initiate projects (various forms of technical, administrative and financial support may be provided by provincial RDP structures such as the Project Preparation Facility, PPF); to raise funds independently and access funds from government;
4. Capacity Building: to conduct courses, workshops, etc.

A certain overlap with the classical (powers and) functions of local government is generated, thus the question concerning CDF and LDF - local government relationships arises²⁹⁴. While this will probably be the case it is not automatically destructive, since a multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional approach may also mobilise more resources than local government and top-down dispersed RDP money could.

4.2.3.2) Internal Structure

How are CDFs and LDFs structured? A CDF / LDF consists of a plenary, called a community forum, as well as a community trust which is in charge of financial matters. A local development officer, one for each LDF, assists in administrative and community organisation work. Members of LDFs may consist of

²⁹³RDP Core Group, 1994, pp. 7-11.

²⁹⁴For better visualisation of the structure of CDFs and LDFs in relation to other (governmental) RDP structures and organs of civil society, please compare the appendix.

the following: civics, labour, political parties, business church organisations, residents, NGOs, CBOs, as well as special representation from women and youth. The rules / criteria concerning membership to be applied were theoretically twofold. Firstly, members should represent sections of the community on a continuing basis, hence organisations have to prove membership, e.g. by providing a list of their activities. Individuals may be elected at public meetings onto the LDF committee. Secondly, in this context the term continuously is defined to denote regularly submitting proof of representativeness, e.g. by providing membership lists. Inputs as well as practical implementation can / shall be 'delegated' (if applicable) to community development forums. But these two criteria are controversial in regard to their practical application, namely how should they be defined practically, do membership lists which the applying organisations produce suffice or should they additionally have a constitution? Additionally the question remained as to what will happen with the already existing community development structures. All in all there seemed no perfect way to ensure 'real' inclusiveness.

Completing the brief introduction to the structure of LDFs, two more features need to be listed, namely: (1) The local development officer's functions, which are to administrate, organise and communicate, keeping contact inter alia with the NWC and the provincial RDP commission as well as liaising with local government in general and concerning specific projects. His salary was supposed to be provided for out of the Participation or the RDP-Fund. (2) The community trust's responsibilities are to administer all funds, encourage the private sector to contribute and keep up the principles of transparency, affirmative action and development of human resources by open tenders, to provide input on affirmative action decisions as well as by continuous training and regarding itself as a capacity building institution.

4.2.3.3) Development Forum Projects

As a general rule CDFs and LDFs ought not engage in projects which require other projects to be completed, i.e. by local government²⁹⁵. A standard project assessment / appraisal (business plan) should be undertaken before projects are

²⁹⁵RDP Core Group, 1994, p. 12.

started. Procedural programming by national and provincial governments for projects funded from the RDP, including rules, guidelines and criteria for community participation, financial sustainability, social accountability as well as standards of efficiency and integratedness, apply²⁹⁶. Any proposed LDF project should be reported to the provincial or national RDP Commission via the NWC and the Core Group, the former have the final responsibility for the assessment and ratification of the projects. Apparently a very long bureaucratic procedure which worked bottom-up for development initiatives but top down, right from central government or from provincial level, for decisions! As a general rule for gaining flexibility, it was stipulated that the types of projects the LDFs engage in should be determined by the experience of the respective LDF as well as by the infrastructure and resources available to the community²⁹⁷. Projects which might be taken up in conjunction with local government comprise old age homes, health facilities, services as adult education, programmes for the disabled and youth as well as recreational services / facilities²⁹⁸.

4.2.4) Successes And Failures In Gauteng

The practical record of communities following the RDP Commission's call to organise themselves in development forums is quite mixed in the different subregions of Gauteng²⁹⁹. As will become evident below, the problems resulting from the lack of clearly spelling out the envisaged characteristics of forums - the above described model has never been disseminated broadly in the original format - still continue. The failure to define what functions and powers forums are supposed to have, who is at the table, who convenes, what issues are on the table, what decision-making process is being used, whether there is a mediator or facilitator, who pays what, etc., has had both positive and negative impacts on micro-level. On the negative side, confusion, reduced motivation and power struggles within and

²⁹⁶The application format is the so-called 'business plan'. The last year showed that this format is too difficult to work out for NGOs and communities, supposed to be assisted by provincial based project preparation facilities (PPF), as well as to time consuming to administer - in the national RDP Office alone more than 7000 business plan are stockpiling!

²⁹⁷See appendices concerning possible projects of LDFs as well as where LDFs come into the policy- or project-cycle.

²⁹⁸Please compare the appendices 'Useful Projects for LDFs' and 'Where Do LDFs come in?'.
²⁹⁹For the slightly more successful experience of Mpumalanga, compare Walker, 1995.

between community representatives and their organisations resulted. On the positive side, this lack of direction created space for innovation and in successful cases for locally adequate solutions. In general, more guidance from the beginning would have probably solved many difficulties in the setting up and workings of development forums³⁰⁰. Cynically speaking however, if the RDP Commission / Core Group would have done so, this would have possibly not allowed the space necessary for the success story of Pretoria to emerge, due to the rather structuralist-representative focus of the main political provincial actors in the former RDP Commission³⁰¹.

Due to the specific focus and approach of the chosen research methodology, which generally approaches the issues at question from a meso-level with only a small amount of time being dedicated to actually enquiring about local political dynamics, personalities, socio-economic structures and patterns of conflict in specific communities, and the resulting limitations in terms of generalisability, this section will only highlight the stark differences in approach, policies, policy instruments and success in an already aggregated form in the province³⁰². This section will differentiate the practical experience of the community development forum approach into two broad categories. On the one side one finds Johannesburg, Vaal, the West and the East Rand. These subregions tend to generally follow the ideal-typical model as described above. The RDP is regarded as the saviour and little emphasis is placed on own resource generation or the inclusion of white areas. Disputes in communities lead to a generally high level of competition for RDP funds and a low degree of innovative behaviour. In contrast to this adaptive approach to implementation, the Pretoria subregion and especially its regional co-ordination structure, called RDP Co-ordination Committee (CoCom), has been more innovative. Emphasis was placed more distinctively on local economic development (LED) strategies and thus own community and private sector resource generation, a more direct (electoral) approach to selecting representative / CDF members, and more

³⁰⁰ In this context, it may be allowed to sarcastically ask why civil society did not pro-actively define their own position in the first place. Here, SANCO as a provincial co-ordination structure is perceived belonging to the quasi-statal establishment.

³⁰¹ Interviews, Turok, MP; Ngonyama, CoCom.

³⁰² Only a micro-level approach, i.e. research in-and about individual communities, would allow the degree of detail necessary for a thorough analysis incorporating all factors which might have influenced the past developments.

autonomy from the provincial government. Lastly, concerning Pretoria, one has to note that the process was heavily driven by the metropolitan council.

Before the actual experience of the establishment of the new development forums in Gauteng can be described, the implications of the above mentioned belief systems as well as the socio-economic structure the province ought to be noted. Firstly, in the post-election system of local governance there will have to be a niche (created) for CDFs and LDFs without them becoming appendages to formal local authorities and without being co-opted while at the same time avoiding duplication of development activities. Secondly, the envisaged RDP community structures needed to be established and functioning effectively in a relative short period, which in turn was strongly dependent on the existing organisational capacity of mainly CBOs in the communities³⁰³ as well as a low level of conflict with existing community organisations and NGOs, or with democratically elected representatives of a community or geographical area. Finally, in order for this approach to work, this structure-led activism must not be constrained by scarce or competed resources.

By the end of 1995 about 100 CDFs and another 15 LDFs had been established in Gauteng³⁰⁴. The status quo with respect to the establishment of CDFs and LDFs and their envisaged nature and modus operandi in Greater Johannesburg can be described as an official pragmatic acceptance of their still continuing non-status after a long period of uncertainty about the TMC's policies³⁰⁵. About 30 LDFs and CDFs had been 'permanently' and / or established for the interim in the Wits Central subregion³⁰⁶. Besides the general problems of resourcing the forums as well as dealing with the generally present problem of (interim) TLC or TMC members' perceiving these new structures as a threat, the Johannesburg City Council described the process of establishing the forum already from the beginning as cumbersome and a one which "does not necessarily include the 'affected communities, but rather the community with the most voice."³⁰⁷ The East Rand with a

³⁰³ Note that exactly the opposite, i.e. lack in development capacity / orientation, was one of the founding assumption of the whole approach in the first place!

³⁰⁴ RDP Core Group, 1995b, p. 1.

³⁰⁵ GJTMC, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c. A later document put CDFs and LDFs into one category with to be established local economic development forums (LEDf), an indication of a certain policy shift for the Johannesburg TMC. GJMC, 1995, p. 6.

³⁰⁶ RDP Core Group, 1995a, pp. 11-14.

³⁰⁷ GJTMC, 1994, pp. 14-15. The commitment is there: "While government of the people, that is direct participative democracy, is not practicable, something as close is desirable. This is government "with"

slightly smaller number of established forums has had the specific problem of getting the co-ordination with the Katorus PLP as well as severe community conflicts straight³⁰⁸. This area, comprising three local authorities has so far been excluded from the drive to set up CDFs³⁰⁹. The Vaal subregion established their NWC on the 4th March 1995. So far 15 CDFs have been established. However, this region is the one with most conflict between CDFs and community organisations, due to the fact that SANCO strongly opposed the new structure. Underlying this is SANCO's perception and uneasiness with the government approaching communities directly, thus 'by-passing' SANCO structures, which is factually not the case, since most forums basically consist of organisational representatives, with civics generally incorporating the strongest position. On the contrary, one could rather advise the government, having the general attitude of inward capacity building of CBOs and NGOs and gravity train expectations in mind, to do so, to actively involve community members directly and by-pass organisations of which many do not really have a better history in terms of accountability and development orientation towards their constituencies than the former Apartheid regime towards whites. Only by the end of that year, a formal mediation process with the involvement of the DDPE&W could reach a productive agreement and bring SANCO into the structures as a player³¹⁰. The West Rand has also formed about 15 CDFs and LDFs, some called 'Local RDP Commissions' or 'Development Compacts'. The huge differences in the experience of the establishment process may speak for all subregions. On the one hand, CDFs and a LDF have been successfully established in Carltonville, which was effectively assisted by the local TLC. On the other hand, the situation in Krugersdorp presents itself as a complete opposite. Here, the TLC perceived itself as the sole custodian of the development process and up to now refused to recognise the CDFs and LDFs.

Without going into details of political and development dynamics at local level, the above regions, with the one or other local exception, have followed the unspecified prescriptions of the Core Group and Turok's RDP Commission, i.e. structure-led establishment of generalist forums with the expectation to formulate

the people or representative democracy with the widest and deepest possible community participation

...". GJTCM, 1995c, p. 2.

³⁰⁸For a detailed analysis of the specific conflictual situation in the East Rand, refer to Shaw, 1995.

³⁰⁹RDP Core Group, 1995a, p. 16.

³¹⁰Interview, Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

and implement RDP projects. Alternative institutional arrangements, such as Section 21 companies or Community Development Corporations, whether following corporatist or more inclusive rationales, were seldom chosen³¹¹. There has also been no strong thrust on the part of TLCs or TMCs to make systematic use of Section 59 or Section 60 committees, i.e. public hearing / advisory mechanisms for the local government council. Apart from the design of the whole approach and partly corresponding logistical bottlenecks the general experience shows that all sectors of society can be the source for the stalling of the development forum establishment process. The success of the designed strategy depends on broad co-operation in a generally conflictual setting. If only one main stakeholder did not participate success might not be achieved³¹². Local governments may refuse to 'recognise' forums (in the light of missing criteria or binding legislation) and thus inhibit the envisaged communication link between organs of civil society and the state. CBOs, or rather 'their' federation may do the same and thus 'stealing' legitimacy by reducing inclusiveness. Private Developers might also dominate forums for their own profit interests. All of that in fact did happen at some stage - McMurphy is verified again³¹³. Bluntly speaking, the future of most of these forum will be an advisory role in the local implementation of the DFA as discussed in the next sections. Without own resources, their sustainability is generally questionable, as is their likely development impact.

In contrast to the above passive patterns of implementing the development forum approach, Pretoria seems to have gone a more independent and innovative way. First of all care was taken by the members of the CoCom that the RDP was no longer perceived as a government handout, nor that CDFs and LDFs were understood by the communities and their organisations to be implementing agencies, but serve only as advisory bodies to local and provincial government³¹⁴. Although the initial response was an Alliance workshop in Rustenburg during the

³¹¹ This however, is bound to change since the new policy directives from the DDPE&W / Core Group stipulate that LDFs, as co-ordination structures between CDFs and NWCs / Core Group, become Section 21 (non-profit) companies.

³¹² An exception might be private businesses due to their (political) distance to community dynamics. However, as will be shown below, lacking (financial) support from this sector jeopardises the financial sustainability of the forums as well as to some degree meaningful local economic development initiatives.

³¹³ McMurphy stated that if something can fail or go wrong, it will happen some time or the other - usually in a situation where it is expected least.

³¹⁴ RDP Core Group, 1995a, p. 18-19. Interview, Ngonyama, CoCom.

second half of 1994, another one was organised soon in August 1994 in Zithabisene in order to get all or at least most of the other players on board as well³¹⁶. More or less, this did in fact happen, although some SANCO officials (as individuals) left the CoCom at a later stage as they believed development should be SANCO-driven rather than people-driven³¹⁶. About a dozen CDFs and LDFs are working by now. Private sector support from a host of companies, specifically banks, is exceptionally high. Another special characteristic is the close working relationship between the newly established RDP structures and the Pretoria (Transitional) Metropolitan Council. The latter's commitment of more than R 600,000 right from an early stage can be partly explained by the fact that members of the CoCom (secretariat) served in the TMC.

Greater Pretoria also took more initiative in clarifying conflictual issues, such as development and networking of principles and criteria to be applied in the recognition process of CDFs and LDFs³¹⁷, or making use of local government Section 59 and 60 Committees³¹⁸. Emphasis was specifically placed on own fund-raising of CDFs³¹⁹. A more systematic approach to the integration of planning and community / private sector participation was taken by building on existing development plans, i.e. the former RSC's Regional Structural Plan with all its old Apartheid flaws was used as a basis, and by clearly stating that "physical development belongs in the hands of the private sector..."³²⁰. Private sector mobilisation was also attempted pro-actively to ensure, e.g. by specifically designing forums for developers, financial institutions on metro level³²¹. In general, these activities combine the structure-led multi-issue approach to development forums from the RDP Commission with selected policies of a local economic development strategy, which range from the promotion of tourism, to SMME support, and the promotion of export opportunities within the sub-Saharan Africa region and beyond³²².

³¹⁶Pretoria CoCom, 1994a.

³¹⁶RDP Core Group, 1995a, p. 18.

³¹⁷Pretoria CoCom, 1994b, 1995a, p. 6, 15.

³¹⁸Pretoria CoCom, 1995b, p. 4.

³¹⁹Pretoria CoCom, 1995a, p. 6. Also the local tendering process has been addressed pro-actively with a special focus on SMME support and the promotion of local value added industrial / manufacturing investment. Greater Pretoria Transitional Metropolitan Council (GPTMC), 1995a.

³²⁰GPTMC, 1995b, p. 3.

³²¹Ibid., p. 4.

³²²GPTMC, 1995c. Chapter three specifically focuses on LED as a cornerstone of the ... , chapter four deals with the synthesis of LED and RDP components into a holistic approach for Greater

The future model envisaged in Pretoria differs distinctly from the rest of Gauteng. Apart from the by now obligatory, DFA / provincial regulations participation in setting land development objectives in collaboration with local governments, CDFs and LDFs will have a more structured and future oriented role in development. This model is unique to Gauteng with other subregions knowing but not really taking cognisance of it³²³. Pretoria's model centres around land-use planning. Co-ordination and facilitation between the metro level (GPMC), local government level (three MSSs), and down to planning zones (Ward level) is sought. Key factors identified are public participation, applicable legislation and implementation of plans and projects³²⁴. The main elements of the model are as follows³²⁵:

1. Planning Zones (PZ) on Ward level;
2. Planning Zone Forums (PZF), i.e. CDFs;
3. Substructure Development Forums, i.e. LDFs;
4. Substructure organisations, such as the local councils and executives, section 60 Committees for town planning matters, and line departments;
5. Metropolitan forums;
6. Metropolitan organisations, including the council, standing committees and line departments; and
7. provincial and national government.

Suffice it to say that no final decision has been made regarding the adoption of the above described model - different scenarios taking provincial policy shifts and developments into consideration, including the discarding all existing CDFs and LDFs in the province, exist. However, the above model in combination with the recognition of existing CDFs and LDFs as Substructure Forums (Section 60 Committee) and as PZF, is most likely³²⁶.

The above model differs in a number of aspects. Firstly, in respect to its highly hierarchical structure, comparable to the development forum approach in

Pretoria. Although other TMCs also produced a vision, e.g. Johannesburg 2020, none is so clear about the (local) economic development goal.

³²³Interview, Benjamin, Core Group, Personal Communication, Swilling, GSP&DM.

³²⁴GPTMC, 1995b, p. 8.

³²⁵*ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

³²⁶Scenario 1: Continue with the current policy framework. Scenario 2: Establishment of Planning Zone Forums. Scenario 3: Establishment of Planning Zones for Greater Pretoria, but recognition and support of CDFs as the consultative civil society structures in these zones. Pretoria CoCom, 1995a, pp. 9-15.

Mpumalanga, another organisational layer is planned at the TMC level. Secondly, in respect to its emphasis on lateral and vertical linkages with the TMC and MSSs, one realises the strong government orientation. Development planning forums are not conceptualised as relay station for RDP business plans, but rather as advisory bodies for the local authority - a less populist, more administrative focus, but nevertheless very pragmatic and realistic. Thirdly, the fact of defining the geographical area of CDFs to correspond to the boundaries of wards is unique in Gauteng.

Their functions are also more clearly spelled in the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area out than in the rest of Gauteng. In essence they are³²⁷: consultative / advisory bodies to MSSs which are formal Section 60 type of committee status to ensure viability and permanency and receive technical assistance from line departments, meeting places for residents and government, i.e. the chair could be the elected councillor, providers of information, providers of inputs for setting up of LDOs. Another interesting characteristic is their envisaged open and direct democratic nature, i.e. all residents may attend with representatives from community organisations not necessarily being the dominant players. The last aspect interestingly corresponds to past practice in the subregion in the way that, in at least some CDFs, community members were elected from the audience in direct elections. This stands in stark contrast to the practice, i.e. each stakeholder category is given a number of seats, in the rest of the province. Similar features are envisaged for LDFs which are statutory and consist of twenty members each from CDFs, MSSs, business, labour, and political parties³²⁸.

The above community RDP structures are complemented by government units, such as a statutory RDP Commission of five members (two from the TMC, one each from the MSSs) under the auspices of the (proposed) 'Department of Economic Affairs and RDP' at TMC level, and statutory Ward Committees (WC) established for each of the roughly speaking 30 council wards in Greater Pretoria under joint

³²⁷ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³²⁸ Compare the four appendices on the Pretoria model.

chairmanship of one local government councillor and one person nominated by civil society in the ward³²⁹.

The next section will not specifically discuss the pros and cons of local economic development strategies as opposed to the initial CDF approach. Many aspects of LED strategies can probably be employed meaningfully as individual tools in any given situation. Rather due to the focus of the study, the section below will focus more inherently on the different types of problems associated with the Gauteng development forum approach. Fortunately, although still underdeveloped, the South African development debate seems to pay more attention to LED in the recent past³³⁰.

4.2.5) Shortcomings Of The Community Development Forum Approach

Before the study ventures into analysing the various problems and inconsistencies of the community development forum approach, some general observations about the implementation experience ought to be made here. Firstly, structures have been set up without ensuring political willingness of all player on provincial level to participate and without consensus on their role, functions, composition and mandate. Secondly, perceptions and expectations have been created in organised civil society that these structures would take responsibility for implementation with associated management of funds (gravy train?) and reduced responsibility of local authorities. Thirdly, the design of lateral and vertical linkages with local and provincial governments and line departments has not been properly devised. Thus, one of the core functions and the most important objective of the new approach, namely creating a participatory government - society interface, is bound to fail in reality and creating unnecessary tensions. This fact has to be seen in conjunction with the fact that forums themselves and the approach in general have not been discussed in a strategic way including all potential stakeholders. Therefore, the internal dynamics within civil society have neither been directly addressed nor

³²⁹Pretoria CoCom, 1995a, pp. 3-5. NGOs and education institutions may be accorded observer status on application.

³³⁰Besides the international literature on LED cited elsewhere in this study, please note Mayekiso, 1996, for a leftist perspective.

incorporated. Many other individual aspects which lead to the at least partly counter-productive impact of the approach will be discussed in detail below.

4.2.5.1) Implementation Design And Local Dynamics

Concerning the Gauteng government's approach to development forums, which were supposed to evolve into some sort of RDP implementation mechanism, a number of problems arose right from the beginning: weaknesses of the design and implementation strategy which clearly encouraged conflict in participatory development as well as perceptions which do not augur well for progressive partnerships in development. As has already been pointed out, although existing forums seek to intervene in policy, there was a reluctance to get involved in direct delivery as (negotiation) forums³³¹. Rather, their member's organisations ought to take over implementation functions. Another problem was the structure, composition and orientation of existing forums. On National level, regional economic and development forums, some of them currently in the process of being merged with the old Apartheid regional development advisory committees (RDAC)³³², historically focused on a broad range of issues. Their impact on economic development has been limited. Additionally, during the last years of transition, there has been a shift of focus at local level away from the nascent development issues to local government negotiation structures. For example national as well as local negotiation forums were expected to develop the future constitutional / institutional structures³³³. Sector policies were made in usually issue specific national forums. In contrast to this level, the home-grown local development forums, consisting of a great number of NGOs and CBOs which legitimised themselves during the 1980s by either fulfilling service functions which would ordinarily be accomplished by local government or by leading the anti-Apartheid struggle in the townships, hardly focusing sectorally and experienced more functional problems mainly due to local political dynamics and their multi-issue approach.

³³¹ Of course, after some time a distinction may be drawn between implementation activities and getting focusing on questions concerning implementing the recommended policies; nevertheless this is not implementation. Compare: Schubane, 1994, p. 20.

³³² Jacobs, 1994, p. 53.

³³³ Shaw, 1994, p. 22-24.

Thus, in general there were no suitable forums existing on community level in Gauteng which could fulfil the functions envisaged by the Gauteng RDP Commission. They had to be created from scratch. This, however, proved to be a Pandora's box due to two reasons. Firstly, the way in which the RDP Commission / Core Group went to communities and sold their concept created both unrealistic expectations - e.g. about jobs in CDFs and LDFs - as well as suspicion among NGOs which still remembered the unfortunate role of the South African Communication Service (SACS) as the Apartheid propaganda machinery selling the new (still racial) provincial and local government model to black township dwellers since 1983. Secondly, due to the heterogeneity of interests and available resources in poor areas, prospects about development finance created local tensions which surfaced as well in the actual work of CDFs and LDFs. Development is by definition unequal treatment (resource allocation). Especially in the Vaal subregion³³⁴, but not only there, various stakeholders either decided not to join or set up 'rival' CDFs or boycott the existing ones. Additionally, this concept was perceived by conservatives as an 'Alliance thing'. In general, conflicts within and between communities, aggregated by political competition during the run up to the local government elections, resulted not only in the discreditation of this approach to community organisation among communities and their organisations, but as well in the concept becoming somehow useless for the Gauteng Provincial Administration, especially the DDPE&W, as legitimate channels of communication and participation.

One further aspect needs to be raised in this context, namely the varying political cultures of different racial / social groups and the relative impact of different strategies for mobilising them. The anti-apartheid struggle had an important impact on creating solidarity within black communities³³⁵. Especially during the last two decades, collective action led to a politicisation within many disadvantaged communities. Concerning the existing political system, expressions of negation and hostility, as well as strategies of disobedience and sabotage prevailed. Concerning social life, without overlooking individual rationalist behaviour, self-help featured high. This political culture (of protest) stands in stark contrast to the attitudes and

³³⁴Interview, Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

³³⁵Marks, 1995. Unfortunately a uniform notion of community also evolved, or was at least strengthened, during this time. Chipkin, 1995.

patterns of behaviour of whites. From interviews and preliminary comments as well as the history of (white) local level politics one can conclude that whites in South Africa have generally been passive, subject citizens. Their involvement in politics has seldom gone beyond the ballot box. Even participation on the electoral level has been low. The relationship between white communities and their local councils is formal and distant. At the risk of simplifying things, one can assert that the political culture of white South Africa has been and still is one of general ignorance and apathy³³⁶. Consideration of involvement in local politics takes predominantly place around specific issues, such as deterioration in service provision or any land use pattern that affects the value of white owned land. As subject citizens, whites seem to generally have an orientation toward the output structure of government. The lack of white involvement can potentially be ascribed to the sense of impotence that pervades the white community, whose political masters no longer hold reins of power. Thus, despite functional economic linkages, two quite distinct civil societies have emerged independently over the past³³⁷.

The above political cultures imply differences in how individuals and communities can be mobilised for development. Strategies and institutional arrangements for participation and involvement in decision-making and implementation need to take cognisance of this. Apart from the fact that the RDP Commission / Core Group's community development forum approach was basically not targeted at white communities, a fact which does not look good in the light of a necessary mobilisation of all strata of society if South Africa wants to address her huge developmental needs, the initial approach also did not allow for meaningful involvement of white communities. This is reflected in reality; there are hardly any CDFs / LDFs in former White Local Authorities (WLA). In contrast to this pattern, the more LED inspired approach followed in the Pretoria CoCom are more conducive to activating all residents. It was realised right from the beginning that RDP Fund hand out will not be enough and that communities thus have to seek funds on their own or at least match them³³⁸. Although the dominance of Alliance representatives in the forums and CoCom, there was a clear commitment to continue to stay open for other

³³⁶ Randall, 1995a, 1995b.

³³⁷ Atkinson, 1991, pp. 22-23.

³³⁸ Interview, Ngonyama, CoCom.

parties and organisations. Close working relationships between nominated / elected councillors in the Pretoria TMC and the CoCom (some councillors having previously worked for the latter), as well as more emphasis on local (economic) development allowed for and led to an approach to community forums which was more resource generating, especially from the private sector, than achieved in the Johannesburg, West Rand and East Rand³³⁹. Also, due to the more localised ward-based planning zone forum (PZF) structure, more direct interaction between councillors and PZFs (CDFs) can be expected than in other areas of Gauteng.

The radical policy shift of the Gauteng government and its administration will be discussed later. Before doing so a number of specific strategic and policy aspects remain to be criticised, apart from the above mentioned general shortcomings in its problem analysis and implementation processes. Up to now, the Gauteng government has as yet not dealt with the following issues: (a) identification and quantification of the resources to the sustainability and efficient management of CDFs and LDFs; and (b) definition of scope, limitations and roles vis-à-vis existing development and community organisations and interests³⁴⁰. All in all, the provincial government's initiative to date appears centralised, prescriptive and top-down. Even the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council stated that it "... contradicts the spirit and purpose of the envisaged process itself as well as of envisaged structures and their functions."³⁴¹

4.2.5.2) Development Forum - Local Government Relationships: Development Or Conflict?

One of the structural / institutional problems with this concept lies in its establishment of duplicated and parallel structures to local government. This holds for both policy development as well as implementation. Firstly, concerning the former, taking the still existing old and at least partly adversarial organisational

³³⁹ Pretoria West, a predominately white middle class residential area, sold scratch card in collaboration with ABSA and raised during 1995 more than R 50.000, which they invested in their area for the benefit of the few black (poor) spots. Other innovative LED strategies followed consisted of longer term oriented establishment of Local Development Corporations or Trusts. Although this is not exclusive to Pretoria, most CDFs in Gauteng rather wait for the provincial government to supply development finance.

³⁴⁰ Apart from participation in the drafting of LDOs for the DFA.

³⁴¹ GJTMC, 1995a, p. 2.

cultures into account, policy-making structures in local government - the council as well as administrative units - are at least partly challenged in their autonomy and legitimacy. From a responsive and participatory governance perspective, this need not be the case, however, organisational change is slower than one would like and in reality many local governments did feel at least uneasy about the prospect of having state initiated development forums. Secondly, a certain institutional duplication concerning the local government - civil society interface arises, e.g. with Section 59 and 60 Committees³⁴². Additionally, there the development forum approach represents an integrated but externally closed set of RDP structures. The envisaged set of RDP development forums' working areas overlap with existing sectoral or issue specific forums on all three tiers of government, but there has not been any arrangements spelt out in regard to necessary co-ordination. Thus, additionally the danger of conflict or at least lack of co-ordination between RDP forums and the other negotiation structures arises.

The questions concerning implementation powers and functions of CDFs and LDFs have never been addressed nor resolved. In the initial euphoric phase implementation of development local projects was definitely envisaged. This was subsequently watered down to joint implementation with local government and more recently all major government actors, e.g. the national RDP Office, provincial department. CBOs³⁴³ were also emphasising the role of democratically elected local government as the final decision-maker. This lack of clarity and repeated conflicting statements led to further confusion and disillusionment with the concept, especially from CBOs and NGOs which had initially hoped to be able to command a vast part of the RDP resources.

Deepening institutional confusion resulted from the ambiguity of the initial concept regarding the integration of existing forums on local level with the new envisaged structure. Taking into account that there were by far more local / community structures in existence in 1994 than there were local government entities and hence corresponding LDFs, the crucial point is how to match and integrate them without harming the existing institutional and human capacity of civil society, as well

³⁴²Please compare section (4.4.2) Local Level Mechanisms.

³⁴³SANCO was stressing that rather local governments than forums should implement development. 'Obviously', his favoured choice was that this is done by CBOs themselves. Interview, Phahlane, SANCO.

as not totally upsetting local governments. Possible actions to co-ordinate / manage these overlaps and potential resource and status conflicts may be by introducing (a) resource people in the RDP development Forums at each level who co-ordinate with the respective government structures, and (b) provincial / departmental forums for civil society consultation and liaison roles with the RDP structures. Parts of the functions of the networking committees (NWC) and the envisaged local development officer were of exactly that nature. Unfortunately, the establishment of CDFs and LDFs in reality was by far more simplistic. Basically Turok's RDP Commission and the Core Group and NWCs went out to the communities and initiated their establishment. How stakeholders were actually identified - in the light of a lack of guidelines for ensuring inclusivity and representativity - is unknown; it can be assumed that the COSATU, SANCO and the ANC did enjoy some sort of a head start. The emergence of resulting tensions and mistrust of other roleplayers was just a question of time.

Criteria for membership are as vital as financial mechanisms of control in order to guarantee political accountability to the community as well as financial accountability to the administration. But which pattern actually will evolve was and still is not clear yet. Whether one favours interest-based representation (maybe more technical in nature but nevertheless legitimate) or constituency-based representation (ability to mandate on a geographical basis) inclusivity will never be achieved perfectly. Unorganised groupings such as the unemployed or illegal immigrant, as well as professional bodies should also be represented in their own right. The question is how will this be achieved? And what about committed individuals? Another strategic question which ought to be incorporated, but is unfortunately not, is the composition of future CDFs and LDFs in regard to the balance of influence between labour and business, who have a distinct advantage in terms of resources, and other development organisations, who generally do not have the capacity to formulate or run coherent policies and programmes alone. Hence, a focus on developing the capacity of the smaller member organisations and the more marginalised communities is advisable. This crucial aspect of levelling the playing field between forum members has unfortunately never been voiced by any stakeholder or roleplayer. The only attempt in that direction was the initiative,

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resulting from the NGO Summit in 1994, to create NGO Coalitions and CBO Networks on provincial and national level³⁴⁴.

4.2.5.3) Catch-All Design: Structure-led And Multi Issue

The criticism already brought forward related to the way the RDP Commission and the Core Group set up forums leads us to one fundamental strategic concern. The whole concept is based on the notion that once communities, or their elected or self-declared representatives, organise themselves the main bottlenecks to making development happen are solved. The developmental objective and functions were hardly specified. The well known RDP rhetoric did not help since it was not operationalised by the government and administration. Due to the national and provincial governments' and administrations' own slow change counterparts or operational guidelines were missing as well. Best practice in public and private sector management and organisational development, such as strategic management, management by objectives etc., however, emphasise the prior definition and delineation of one's own goals and strategies. Consequently, Gauteng's structure-led approach resulted in a vast number of structures being set up with no internal strategic focus³⁴⁵, which did not concretely further development during the last year. A strategy-led approach, specifying first the goals and objectives and then orientating the structure to this, would most probably have far better served developmental needs of Gauteng in general as well as the communities. Time and effort has been unnecessarily and more or less unproductively spent. Momentum and commitment resulting from the initial euphoria after the 1994 elections was also lost due to the subsequent uncertainty about the future of existing CDFs and LDFs³⁴⁶. As will be shown in the second part of this chapter, this issue is still not resolved. Taking into account that CDFs and LDFs embody locally powerful interests, more conflict can be foreseen.

Another strategic concern arises with the envisaged working areas of CDFs and LDFs. Generally speaking they have the mandate to deal with all development

³⁴⁴ Naidoo, 1994b; The Star, 19/8/1994.

³⁴⁵ For illustration of the unfocused internal structure of CDFs, note the draft statutes of the Greater Nigel and the Jameson Park Development Forums in the appendix.

³⁴⁶ Interviews, Pretorius, PANGA; Ngonyama, PTA CoCom; Mogole, DRC.

issues arising within their geographical area. This multi issue approach, as nice and easy as it theoretically sounds, is not without difficulties for two sets of reasons. Firstly, remembering the general functioning of forums with their steering committees, working groups etc., the organisational and especially technical capacity required by a forum built in such a way is immense in comparison to the existing skills and human resources in disadvantaged communities. For example, are there town planners, master artisans or at least experienced skilled workers, for each and every trade in townships which are additionally able and willing to spend considerable time in meeting. Even if yes, the danger exists that owing to the fact that many lack understanding of the working procedures and requirements of bureaucracies at different levels of government, may result in them being steamrolled by powerful organised interests, such as officials from the administration or commercial developers. Will they make a difference to what is planned and implemented somewhere else in a bureaucratic and professional way? The problem analysis of Ben Turok and his convictions about interests and available human resources in communities which have been neglected and oppressed for centuries - with quite some impact - as well as corresponding strategies of community organisation seem to be idealist at best. The various levels of structural and institutional obstacles to participation outlined in the second chapter seem not to have been taken into detailed consideration. However, these belief systems do well in hinting at, if not explaining, the specific strategies and policies chosen during the former RDP Commission's work in Gauteng.

Secondly, international empirical research and common-sense suggests that most commitment and policy impact in participatory exercises will be found among those who are directly (materially) affected. The size and composition of such groups will differ according to the specific issue. Hence, if the objective is to effect most policy advocacy impact coupled with most empowerment, participative development mechanisms should be structured radically differently. They ought to be less representative and potentially elitist in nature by directly involving affected citizens according to the issues and problems in an ad hoc way. They ought to be less structural and more empowering by better catering for social learning processes³⁴⁷ of

³⁴⁷Various schools exists in this regard. Generally speaking, Alinsky, Freire, Macuse, Habermas, Althusser and Poulantzas can be grouped under social mobilisation; Etzioni, Lindblom and Dunn

the people and not predominantly of their historical disadvantaged local elites which are already empowered enough to serve in various committees and working groups. Obviously, community participation needs continuity, thus relying only on ad hoc formations will not suffice. But it seems that this can be realised by a flexible community empowerment / policy advocacy / resource unit, located either in local government or civil society, which assists citizens and communities in their problems but which not necessarily speaks in behalf of them. Various institutional arrangements are thinkable which would fulfil stated objectives without resembling the unfortunate mix of being state initiated (partly by discredited organisations, e.g. SACS), structure-led, representative and multi issue in nature.

To conclude, the list of inherent strategic problems with the development forum concept, the last but most important question to ask is what can participation be good for and for what was it envisaged to be utilised. During the recent system transformation participation of groups previously excluded mainly served to legitimise the process and its outcome - and by that to make the whole transition possible in the first place. This conception of participation for legitimation has a right in its own. In a practical developmental context, one simply has to consider that it is necessary to satisfy all groups with sanctioning power, i.e. which could and would stall say a development project. The many failures during the last decades, either abandoned projects during their implementation or due to lacking sustainability, shows that good development practice, i.e. participative project management, involvement of target groups and local influentials has been learned the hard way. By now it has become a prime procedural requirement in international development co-operation. This is, however, only one side of the coin. At the international level, various public and private donors emphasis democracy and participatory development, seeking thereby to promote an enabling environment for economic and political development. Regardless of additional factors in actor motivation, increased local initiative and new social and economic resources shall be generated. If managed efficiently, this can result in improved governance. In a developmental context, a second reason for allowing and stimulating participation is to mobilise resources, both in the form of cheap labour as well as direct financial contributions

by target groups. Obviously, commitment and a sense of ownership by the involved parties will be greater if they not only participated in the formulation of needs and priorities, but contribute themselves to the realisation of the measure. Additionally, the increased amount of resources available due to collaborative effects enlarges either the scope or the number of initiatives. In South Africa the tendency to perceive participation only in the limited first sense still dominates belief systems of most actors³⁴⁸. Basically two years after the first fairly fair and fairly free democratic elections and the adoption of the RDP as the base document for government policy there is surprisingly still no public debate about the actual motivations and possible development impacts of public and popular participation. A similar disappointing situation concerning awareness and the degree of sophistication of discussions is also given for more technical aspects regarding the incorporation of communities into development projects, e.g. which mechanisms to use to stimulate which participatory processes with which stakeholder during which phase of the project cycle etc.³⁴⁹.

4.2.5.4) Co-option Of Civil Society?

The former RDP Commission's approach to participation clearly incorporates only the limited version of popular participation as legitimisation, which can result at best only in reduced conflict during the implementation stage of projects - if consensus has been reached before. Additional collaborative effects as given in LED partnerships are unlikely to be achieved. Related and underlying to this concept of participation are implicit, but deducible, assumptions about the role of

³⁴⁸All interviewees were specifically asked about their conceptualisations of and motivations for participation. Only two, Dauskardt, DDPE&W and Ngonyama, CoCom, were sensitive and positive towards the notion of community participation for resource mobilisation; the former due to perceived financial limitations of the state and the latter convinced by the LED approach to CDFs and LDFs. The rest described the optimal role of development forums as check and balances to local governments, still full of white male Afrikaners (VAM), or as aides to local government for prioritisation. SANCO had a more distinct class analysis as their basis and thus set them equal to mechanisms forgiving substance to popular empowerment and popular franchise.

³⁴⁹Interview Arkwright, DBSA. To be fair, most literature, especially RDP related policy documents or publications from organisations as UNECA, is also quite vague on this issue. Generally, it is demanded to include everybody in everything, a not very helpful advice. Compare UNECA's series on studies in participatory development, no 1 - 4; or OAU, 1990. Regarding the South African context one has to simply realise that the chapters on 'implementation' of the RDP base document as well as the divergent white papers basically just state that the mentioned goals will be implemented, hardly any reference is made to the crucial questions of when, where, by whom, how much and how.

communities and the role of the state in the development process. Regarding the latter, it is assumed that the capacity, the willingness and homogeneity, i.e. 'the Community', is out there and just waits for government finance. If one may narrow it down like this, the uncovered problem analysis - lack of resources - appears to be simplistic. Concerning the role of the state in development - neutral resource allocation - one realises a typical welfarist conviction.

It has already been stated that this concept was perceived by many roleplayers as an Alliance-driven initiative. This perception is not hypothetical, the Core Groups is dominated by ANC / SANCO representatives / interests³⁵⁰ and most CDFs and LDFs were set up in formerly historically disadvantaged communities. Another aspect worth mentioning is that many of the newly created development forums were formed around existing negotiation forums and local peace structures. Often ANC and SANCO branches took the initiative, broadening their scope of work and renaming them 'development forums'. This leads to the 'people-driven' development process becoming a "heavily politicised scramble for patronage by contending local elites."³⁵¹ Exceptions to the rule obviously exist, Pretoria's successful initiatives, following LED rationales and leading to the establishment of small development trusts also in white areas, are a case in point. However, as the above described initial and partly still existing Gauteng RDP structure indicates, it is prone to top down processes of control. Here, Pretoria is no exception. Although LED strategies are followed - with positive development impact - the legitimisation aspect features predominantly. One could speak of another category, namely legitimisation for resources mobilisation, as opposed to legitimisation of policy, that favour the private sector.

The above claims need to be given substance. Firstly, the principle of self-organisation by civil society has not been followed; instead the government went out to initiate the organisation of civil society development structures in a structure-led

³⁵⁰ Apart from the fact that the Vista II conference has been postponed twice on request by the Gauteng government which shows that at least development oriented organs of civil society are not yet powerful and independent enough but rather depends on government goodwill, an additionally interesting light on the real channels and direction of flows of information and commands is shed by the comment from a RDP Core Group member, who openly states that the outcome of the process towards Vista III, i.e. DDPE&W briefing CDFs / LDFs and other players on the DFA and the setting of LDOs, will be the Alliance (compromise) position arrived at between their top provincial people (secretaries). Interview, Benjamin, Core Group.

³⁵¹ Lodge, 1995b, p. 10.

approach. It was the former Gauteng RDP Commission, assisted by the Core Group and SACS, which told the communities where, when, why and how to organise! Secondly, although it may look like a bottom up structure, this was not so in reality. The pyramidal-representative, reciprocal hierarchical organisational structure was never driven, both in terms of policy content as well as process management, by CDFs and LDFs. On the contrary, they appointed members of their six NWCs, but these in turn relied on the 'leading' input from the Core Group. This top down influence was not necessarily an inherent institutional-structural problem, communities might have had the possibility to put forward countervailing power to the RDP Core Group. This however did not happen. CDFs and LDFs waited for guidance from higher structures - from their 'leader'. In fact the Core Group's (and the provincial government's) weakness in terms of leadership, e.g. to provide criteria for membership and accountability of CDFs and LDFs, or draft statutes, etc., has been heavily criticised by organs of civil society. From the perspective of an independent and capacitated civil realm this seems quite strange. Another example is the dominance of the DDPE&W via the Core Group in the way the agenda (suited to the needs of the provincial government, not CDFs and LDFs) has been set for the VISTA II conference in July 1995. Thus, one might speak of co-optation of civil society, either by the provincial government's attempt or by default from the side of NGOs / CBOs and the citizenry at large. The reason, besides a general welfarist / statist / structuralist approach to development in South African politics, has to be blamed on both, the new political class for failing to sufficiently reform the statist Apartheid system as well as on popular beliefs and behaviour. The role of the new South African state in development is predominant vis-à-vis other players. The interviews generally suggest that the most active and influential groups of the politico-administrative complex are firstly the executive - not the party or its members as often attempted to make believed when stressing the imperative mandate of congress resolutions -, and secondly senior management of the administration with its wide ranging discretion³⁵².

Last but not least, if it was not envisaged for CDFs and LDFs to generate resources themselves, who was supposed to finance them, and more generally, what

³⁵² This is not so surprising if one considers the enormous brain drain from party and progressive NGO ranks into government during the last two years.

are the objective realities in which development finance flows in South Africa. Most financial flows occur within government through line function departments, often from national to provincial to local governments. Although there is certain funding for local communities directly from higher tiers of government, this is minimal. The information from the Core Group as well as Greater Johannesburg and Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Councils suggests that logistical support ought to be given to CDFs / LDFs mainly by local governments (not compulsory); this happened so far in many but not all cases. Additional grants could be secured from the metropolitan councils, the government RDP structures and the private sector, e.g. developers. The system that CDFs prepare business plans which will then be forwarded via the RDP forum structure to the provincial and national RDP offices indicates that the actual financial impact of CDFs would have only covered provincial and national RDP funds. This excludes however most of the locally available finance³⁵³, i.e. the local government budgets, over which CDFs and LDFs will have no say. A parallel funding process to the local authorities' one is established and thus the local governments budgetary processes and funding allocations are allowed to go largely unchallenged, which could lead to a division of the allocation and lack of responsibility towards the poorer communities on the part of the local authority³⁵⁴. Whether there will be leverage for reprioritisation of local government spending patterns - as envisaged for example by the national RDP Fund in regard to national and provincial line ministries - by matching grants, is not clear. Hence, the real impact of the development forum structures in terms of development finance spent on local level as well as on its democratisation is limited to RDP handouts from higher tiers of government. Community participation is redundant if there continues to be a lack of transformation within the state. The critical logjam is the slow transformation of the state with only little resources being unlocked outside the state. From this perspective, one cannot seriously speak of CDFs and LDFs as a tool speeding up local transformation, popular government, nor of people having a real say in the RDP.

³⁵³ Interview, Evans, PLANACT.

³⁵⁴ PLANACT, 1995, p. 5.

4.3) Provincial Power Politics Defeat Local Development Policy

Whatever the specific shortcoming of the community and local development forum approach in Gauteng may be, those who developed and initiated it were not given a chance for correction. By the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995, a series of internal and external reasons led the provincial government to enforce a radical break with the policies of the (former) RDP Commission. Initially, as far as LDFs are concerned, the development planning department was responsible for establishing the regulatory framework in terms of regulations issued under the DFA, while the RDP Commission was supposed to play a role in the facilitation and establishment of the forums in a way that assists the local stakeholders in setting up LDFs and developing performance criteria.³⁵⁵ With the dismantling of the RDP Commission the DDPE&W took on an unwanted responsibility for co-operation with the Core Group and the established CDFs and LDFs. All in all, the establishment of RDP structures in the province have caused a great deal of confusion. Ben Turok's RDP Commission in the Office of the Gauteng Premier has been dissolved, most staff is integrated into the newly established policy / strategic management unit Corporate Services³⁵⁶. The Gauteng Cabinet has established a new 'RDP Commission', which is a Cabinet Sub-committee. This political structure is responsible for monitoring and evaluating development policy formulation and implementation, and in particular for inter-sectoral co-ordination and integration of the work through inter-departmental teams, whilst the line departments are responsible for delivery³⁵⁷. It is not responsible for delivery³⁵⁸.

The recent developments from about the beginning / mid 1995 concerning the Gauteng government's efforts to fulfil its promises on participatory, responsive governance were workshopped together with community organisations at the Vista II conference in July 1995. Initially the conference was planned as a report back from government on the implementation of the RDP and for final decision- or policy-making concerning the structuring of participatory development planning in the province. Besides the in-house turf battles between provincial politicians and the

³⁵⁵ DDPE&W, 1994.

³⁵⁶ Interview, Cranko, Corporate Services.

³⁵⁷ RDP Commission, 1995a, p. 1.

³⁵⁸ For explanatory reasons, compare the two figures on RDP structures in the Gauteng and the new funding application process in the appendix with the above described old CDF / LDF development project processes.

shortcomings of the development forum approach becoming drastically apparent mentioned above, another major problem inhibited government to follow this initial agenda, namely it lacked concrete, operationalisable policies on the issues regarding future state - civil society relationships. The general 'RDP-speak' of transparency, accountability, etc., did and still does not help very much when reality calls for practical legal, procedural and administrative policies. This situation was reinforced by conflicts between the ANC, whose representative in cabinet were still trying to get hold and control of their departments - and unfortunately, but not really surprisingly, started to get overwhelmed by old organisational cultures and thus into narrow sectoral thinking and behaviour as well - and SANCO, which partly saw CDFs and LDFs as a threat to their organisational hegemony in the townships. Thus cynically speaking, in the beginning of 1995, the DDPE&W's nationally imposed responsibility on implementing the DFA must have been seen as a god-send justification for turning the Vista II agenda towards the needs of the provincial government, especially those of the development planning department.

The paragraphs below will briefly outline the broad policy dynamics and developments and then the subsequent sections will revert back to an analysis of the approaches to and the nature of the envisaged 'participatory development planning' approach of the DDPE&W. Back to the Vista process!

4.3.1) The Bureaucratic Agenda: Provincial Implementation Of The Development Facilitation Act

On short notice, basically on the morning of the Vista II conference³⁵⁹, many LDF and CDF representatives actually learned about the real agenda and were factually 'assigned' the task - prepared by the Networking Committee's Core Group in behalf of the DDPE&W / government - of discussing the structuring civil society participation in the formulation of LDOs, as stipulated in the DFA. This however, does not seem to automatically translate into a truly participatory mode of governance. For the purpose of providing background information one has to note that much suspicion already prevailed due to the widespread discontent with the

³⁵⁹ The author has been an invited observer to the conference and joint working group 'Red Two' the afternoon.

initial work of the Gauteng RDP commission³⁶⁰, which has been somewhat populist and elitist in approach and which resulted in a partly co-optation of organs of civil society. NGOs argued as well against the commission setting up some of the roughly speaking 90 CDFs and 20 LDFs in existence at that time, which was perceived as overlooking existing CBOs and NGOs. Additional criticism put forward in regard to the approach is that the initial system of community participation has been structured, i.e. the main initial efforts were geared to setting up LDF / CDF structures in PWV / Gauteng. The role and functions, powers and implementation strategy of these forums were, however, not properly specified, which led to uncertainty among its members and subsequently to discontent. Empowerment of civil society was not regarded as complete by (the state) setting up community development structures and then giving them a limited say in voicing needs³⁶¹. The conference went well in the sense that no one really revolted, as usual for group dynamics in large, somewhat anonymous meetings. Two resolutions, pre-prepared by the Core Group in behalf of the DDPE&W, were passed, namely³⁶²:

Recommendation 1:

Provincial Government take [s] the responsibility for establishing a team at provincial level which will include Provincial and Local Government and civil society including RDP core group / CDFs and LDFs and other civil society stakeholders. The limited work of this team will be to run a process leading up to end September 1995 which will:

- A. Brief community organisations and Local Government, in detail, on DFA and LDOs in particular.
- B. Discuss in more detail the interaction between Government, Local and Provincial and civil society on the process of preparing LDOs.
- C. Determine with the same participants what is required to enable effective participation in preparation of LDOs.

Recommendation 2:

³⁶⁰ At that time still handled by the MPL Ben Turok, now transferred to the national parliament in Cape Town. Interview, Pretorius, PANGA.

³⁶¹ Discussions with representative at the Vista II conference.

³⁶² Interestingly the conference report has been compiled and printed by the DDPE&W, not the Core Group. RDP Core Group, 1995a.

The Team established under Resolution 1 will present Vista 3 a detailed document regarding land development objectives and the involvement of development forums, which provides clarity about their structure, composition and accreditation of these forums.

Hence, another 'consultative phase' of going back to the communities and preparing a civil society perspective was introduced. In reality, the last months of 1995 were rather just used by the DDPE&W to brief them on the DFA³⁶³ - the result is obvious: the provincial perspective of the DFA has been presented and local participation in the setting of LDOs explained. All in all, community organisations and development forums now start to work within the hardly discussed framework which limits their role to being consulted by local government, which by definition falls short of joint decision-making, not to mention citizen control or self-determination. A second implication of the shift of the agenda of Vista II has been that the initially envisaged clarification process of the roles and functions of forums in the actual development process - not policy formulation of local performance indicators and (land) development objectives - did not take place³⁶⁴. None of the options of future developmental roles of LDFs (CDFs are not discussed) raised by the Core Group for the Vista II Conference, initially planned for April 1995, have thus been discussed³⁶⁵. Absent is the discussion of genuine local civil society - provincial governmental participatory interaction. Gone is the government's obligation to report back about their lack of development successes during the first 18 month³⁶⁶. Absent a mass consultative process - extending the life of the Core Group (whose mandate was initially supposed to end with the Vista II conference)³⁶⁷, governmental setting up an exclusive team to work out what has been stalled by government in the first place - what a great participatory and transparent solution, what an incredible responsibility-

³⁶³ Interviews, Benjamin, Core Group; Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

³⁶⁴ Compare the initial planning and briefing documents for Vista II: RDP Commission, 1995b; RDP Core Group, 1995c.

³⁶⁵ Option 1: LDF as a negotiation body on behalf of CDFs; Option 2: LDFs as networking and monitoring forums; Option 3: Formal advisory link with local government; and Option 4: Local economic and development forum. RDP Core Group, 1995c, pp. 10-11. The briefing documents for the two later dates, after the conference has been postponed twice on Gauteng government request, already have the DFA focus. RDP Core Group, 1995d, 1995e.

³⁶⁶ Whatever the reasons might be, starting from the delays caused by the local government elections, etc.

³⁶⁷ Compare the report for the restructuring of the Core Group in the appendix.

taking by government, and so wonderfully participatory, responsive and empowering governance processes.

Concerning the content outcome of the LDO setting process, at best a broad spectrum of wish-lists will most probably be forwarded to local government, at worst, local influentials and both economic and political elites may hijack such structures³⁶⁸. International experience suggests that in the long run such an approach often led to disillusionment and (political) apathy³⁶⁹ - not an acceptable vision for consolidating South Africa's democratic regime.

4.3.2) The Latest in Participative Development Planning

In South Africa, there are currently three processes worth mentioning in regard to development planning. The first is the above discussed work of the FEPD. The second discussed in this section revolves around the concept of participatory development planning, developed by the DDPE&W and first presented to the Gauteng development fraternity during the Vista II conference. Lastly, during 1995 the national RDP Office tended to move many aspects of spatial, economic and social planning, budgeting, inter-sectoral co-ordination, etc., into the development planning departments realm of responsibility³⁷⁰.

Shiceka, the MEC for development planning in Gauteng, refers to participatory development planning as "an inclusive process of integrated forward planning at the local and provincial level."³⁷¹ For him, development must be planned and implemented in a way that achieves three objectives, namely: (a) maximum alignment between different sectoral policies, (b) co-operative governance between provincial and local government, and (c) clearly defined institutionalised forms of participation for civil society formations³⁷².

³⁶⁸ Compare Friedman, 1993; Atkinson, 1991, Eler, 1985.

³⁶⁹ Compare other failed African experience (in co-opting civil society) in this regard; for the case of Zimbabwe, see for example Helmsing, Gasper, et. al., 1991.

³⁷⁰ Interview, Dauskardt, DDPE&W. The newest term for this used in RDP speak is 'medium-term expenditure framework'. However, one rather more clarifying term to use would be corporate planning. In any case one of the most important issues the South African administration has to solve developmentally is the integration of (economic, social) planning with budgeting. During the first two budgetary cycles of the GNU this has so far not been attempted or successfully accomplished.

³⁷¹ Shiceka, 1995c, p. 6.

³⁷² Ibid.

The DDPE&W's input document on participative development planning, presented at the Vista II conference, starts with the assertion that the energy, effort and time invested in CDFs and LDFs so far must not be lost³⁷³, although it is this department in the first place which doubted their usefulness in the development process. The government's role and policy principles in participative development planning are described as firstly the political responsibility to implement participative development planning and "... ensure maximum and effective participation of civil society in planning of development..."³⁷⁴. Secondly, the planning process must promote equity and enjoy broad support. Within this context, provincial government is rather seen as setting the broad policy parameters and legislative frameworks; local authorities are dealing more specifically with issues such as the demarcation of planning zones, preparation of planning workshops and the implementation of provincial regulations³⁷⁵.

Based on the by now thirty years old concept of development planning, which can be described as the integration of physical or spatial planning, macro- and sectoral economic and financial planning, and strategic planning, the DDPE&W developed the concept further by adding a participatory component, which is laid out in its basic format in the following section. Sector planning is defined as mainly an administrative set of tasks, conducted by the various departments of provincial government in co-operation with local governments. Here, the participatory component is making use of single issue forums, such as housing, policing etc., linked to line departments.

The primary focus of the DDPE&W participative development planning framework is the setting up of LDOs on local government level and from a provincial perspective the rapid implementation of the DFA. Therefore, the DDPE&W defines CDFs and LDFs unilaterally and without prior consultation "... not as standing structures or organisations with offices, with executive capacity (staff), with a constitution and with budgets [but as] a regular meeting place ... not be allowed to take political responsibility or authority away from democratically elected government ..."³⁷⁶. The realisation that genuine participation with an empowerment objective

³⁷³ DDPE&W, 1995d, p. 1.

³⁷⁴ *ibid.*

³⁷⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 4.

depends on sharing power with the participants / people / communities and thus, by definition, leads to the taking over of certain responsibilities from elected or appointed officials seems to be overlooked. However, political power in the governance realm is no zero-sum game. Devolution, decentralisation, self-regulation, etc., can empower both the state and civil society; considering limited resources and largely inadequate capacities in both sectors it seems to be rather a necessity than a threat to (local) government. This obviously requires a lot of capacity building for civil society formations as a precondition for success. Such capacity building initiative in line with the RDP principles of people-driven development, however, are as yet hardly conducted.

In summary, the role of civil society in the 'participatory' development planning process is one of a provider of information for internal administrative planning and inter-governmental co-ordination. It will become even more obvious, that the DDPE&W's conception of participation is very limited (which for a government department is not really surprising). It reduces participation to involvement in only one phase of the policy cycle. It defines the role and functions of the existing civil society RDP structures solely as meeting places, which is premised on the view that forums should not be formalised or institutionalised other than in the process of preparing and monitoring LDOs in a consultative, but still government-driven, planning process. This however, is the most limited option presented by the Leader of the Gauteng Parliament during Vista II³⁷⁷. Other possible options include:

- The structure-based approach with the recognition of the existing structures with all the problems and benefits, i.e. the status quo.
- Forums as structured loci and channels of communication and government - society interface, with the focus of empowerment and capacity building of organisations of civil society. Here, forums need to be formalised and institutionalised, but only as channels of communication, policy dialogue and for participation in development planning.
- Forums as government-driven planning mechanism, which involves their structures institutionalisation with the purpose of bringing community leaders into the planning process and the different levels of local government.

³⁷⁷ Mashatile, 1995.

4.3.3) Participation In Drawing Up Land Development Objectives

Concerning the formulation of local performance criteria / land development objectives, the establishment of participatory processes is suggested³⁷⁸ in the national DFA. In regard to the respective provincial interpretation of this, older policy statements in Gauteng assumed that LDFs will negotiate the content, scope and application of the performance criteria in order to have them integrated into a local reconstruction and development programme (LRDP). This would then be adopted by the LDF and recommended to the local government body concerned for approval³⁷⁹. In short, the primary task of LDFs relates to the operationalisation of the chapter of the DFA on local performance measures and the formulation of LRDPs. Opposed to the envisaged approach in 1994 and the beginning of 1995, the latest DDPE&W briefing documents do not even mention LDFs any more³⁸⁰. Interestingly, the 'older' version of the DDPE&W DFA briefing document, handed out to the public until November 1995 does deal with CDFs / LDFs as mandatory for stakeholders to participate in the setting of LDOs. In contrast to this, the new version handed to the author by the DDPE&W in December makes no mention of CDFs / LDFs whatsoever, but therefore specifically lists, besides communities, also 'the general public' as a new category to participate³⁸¹. It also specifies more clearly the DFA's policy implications for the provincial government in developing the provincial regulations for the local processes of LDO setting, explains the purpose of participation from a quite legal perspective, but does not elaborate on its consultative work with the Core Group in relation to the envisaged Vista III / development planning conference in the beginning of 1996.

The newest and probably most administratively or bureaucratically oriented modes of community participation in setting LDOs is conceptualised by the development planning department as follows³⁸². LDOs shall be a development strategy. The public and interested stakeholders, i.e. communities, women's groups, business, labour, property owners, health groups, NGOs, the general public, and others, have to be involved in it and agree to it, otherwise the provincial government

³⁷⁸ However, these need not follow Gauteng's approach of CDFs / LDFs as discussed in the empirical chapter below.

³⁷⁹ DDPE&W, 1995a, p. 6-7.

³⁸⁰ DDPE&W, 1995c.

³⁸¹ Compare DDPE&W, 1995b, p. 9; with 1995c, pp. 9, 19.

³⁸² Ibid., pp. 8-24.

will not approve the LDOs. Here, the DFA indicates that consultation ought to take place with "members of the public and interested bodies". Hence, participation should therefore be seen to include the public in general, as well as sectors of civil society. The reason given is that "if participation does not take place, local area's LDOs will not be widely supported..."³⁸³; this line of argumentation clearly follows the above discussed legitimisation motivation.

The need for mechanisms for ensuring that stakeholders involved are truly representative and that their positions are mandated, i.e. socio-political representation along formal lines (and thus implicitly excluding concerned individuals), are acknowledged, but also not spelled out or discussed. Only accreditation of representativeness, i.e. that critical issue stalking CDFs and LDFs in Gauteng since more than a year by now, is suggested.

Concerning the question as to what geographical scale participation ought to take place, the document suggests the level at which LDOs have to be formulated, i.e. metropolitan or sub-structure, and hence the level LDFs are currently positioned. However, it asks, whether and how lower level can / ought to be accommodated. Generally speaking, this position reflects the current compromise within the Alliance, to 'abolish' CDFs and use LDFs only as a mechanism for co-ordination and negotiations³⁸⁴.

Due to the substantial differences in and between local conditions and capacity, the DDPE&W seems to favour laying out principles and allow local areas to design their own model rather than define a specific model for participation³⁸⁵. The following vehicles that could be used for participation include:

- ad hoc local multi-sectoral forums to set LDOs which disband when the LDOs have been set³⁸⁶;

³⁸³ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁸⁴ Interview, Phahlane, SANCO.

³⁸⁵ DDPE&W, 1995c, pp. 10-11, 22; and interview, Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

³⁸⁶ There seems to be a tendency in South Africa of higher levels stimulating the creation of new structures on lower levels, e.g. note the local government negotiation process on local level - 'enforced' upon local player by the national Local Government Negotiation Forum (NLGNF) and the nationally agreed Local Government Negotiation Act (LGTA), thus distracting local stakeholders from development work and keeping them busy for at least a year in 'constitutional' negotiation in LGNFs. In contrast to this, Rich, as well as Adler and Blake point out that long term institutionalised structures provide vehicles through which communities can mobilise without having to begin the organisation process from scratch each time a challenge arises. Rich, 1986; Adler, Blake, 1990. Concerning the local government negotiation process, see: Cloete, 1995; Heymans, 1994c; McIntosh, 1995; RSA, 1993c; Swilling, Cobbett, 1991; Swilling, et. al., 1992; Woodridge, 1993.

- local multi-sectoral and multi-issue forums focusing on a range of growth and development issues (i.e. LDFs), within which a working group deals with LDOs;
- local Section 59 or 60 Committees, which allow citizens and professionals to give evidence in sectoral committees of local authorities;
- public hearing; and
- other advisory or decision-making committees and structures.

The degree of participation and control envisaged is not clearly spelled out in the document, it only states that the provincial regulations will need to clearly indicate whether participation is to obtain advice and information, to consult on important issues, or to make decisions jointly³⁸⁷. The same 'openness' also prevails in terms of in regard to the stages of the LDO setting process at which participation should take place. What the final outcome in terms of the degree and quality of participation realised will be can not be determined yet, because on the one hand, it was said that the consultative process between Vista II and Vista III / development planning conference out to allow for participation in the formulation of provincial regulations, and the latest DDPE&W briefing document of the DFA asks local authorities and local stakeholders to submit their proposals on how participation in LDOs should be structured. On the other hand, interviews indicate that this process actually consisted only of the DDPE&W briefing CDFs / LDFs and other stakeholders on the DFA, and as argued within the context of resolution two of the Vista II conference, the actual (management of the) policy formulation will take place in a small exclusive team³⁸⁸. Hence, it seems possible, if not probable, that the provincial regulations will be overwhelmingly negotiated between more powerful players at provincial level with 'community consultation' only serving to effect increased legitimisation.

4.4) Handle Participation With Care: Realism Or Containment?

After having described and critically analysed the two main Gauteng government initiatives in structuring state - civil society relations in regard to

³⁸⁷ For your information, the working group the author joined at the Vista II conference called for joint-decision making between local authorities and organs of civil society (which has however not been forwarded in this way by the rapporteur, a provincial RDP co-ordinator, in the plenary).

³⁸⁸ Interviews, Benjamin, Core Group; Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

community participation in the RDP, this section serves to outline the big picture concerning participatory governance in Gauteng. Both the former RDP commission's development forum approach as well as the DDPE&W's participatory development planning framework only attempt to involve limited strata of organised civil society and existing interest groups, mainly on local level. However, there are other mechanisms for public involvement and professionals giving advice already practised on local as well as provincial level. The provincial overview in this section will include inter-departmental co-ordination mechanisms for heuristic purposes as well³⁸⁹.

4.4.1) Provincial Level Mechanisms

From the perspective of the DDPE&W a number of mechanisms exist for structuring policy-making and specifically the implementation of the DFA in a more participatory direction³⁹⁰. Firstly, on provincial level one finds - besides various sectoral forums linked to line departments such as housing, community policing, health, and education, which fulfil advisory functions comparable to the old statutory advisory councils and have been somewhat government-initiated.³⁹¹ - the Gauteng Economic and Development Forum, GEDF, formerly called PWV E&DF, which is currently restructured under the auspices or leadership of the DEAF. The GEDF may serve in the future to bring together regional players with a stake in social and economic development of Gauteng. Its role is to³⁹²:

- promote and encourage the growth and development of the region;

³⁸⁹Due to limitations of time and space, a detailed discussion of Gauteng's public sector transformation will be omitted. Generally speaking, most attempts to reorganise and re-engineer the provincial civil service for giving substance to the RDP's call for integratedness during the last two years had an inter- and intra-governmental focus. Cynically, one might argue that bureaucratic co-ordination has seems to have been chosen as an alternative to public participation. GSP&DM lectures on Gauteng's Corporate Strategy, Cranko, 26/7/1995, and on RDP related national - provincial relationships, Cashdan, 1/8/1995: Interview, Cranko, Corporate Services.

³⁹⁰The section below is predominantly based on the interview with Dauskardt, DDPE&W, but critically incorporates other's opinions and experiences as well.

³⁹¹Inter alia due to their sectoral focus and them resembling somehow 'old' (statutory) advisory councils in their form of membership, i.e. representative organisations and professional bodies, they will not be discussed in detail in this study. The reader may easily deduce their functioning from the Introductory part of this chapter on negotiation forums. This section rather aims to draw a macro picture of public participation with regard to cross-sectoral co-ordination and citizen participation in policy making; the more lobbyist types of participation, although interesting and important, cannot be dealt with adequately to limitations of scope and space.

³⁹²PWV E&DF, 1994, p. 3. Compare also the graphs in the appendix for its initial structure and membership.

- act as an advisory body to government on issues of economic and development policy;
- act as a facilitator and link between civil society and government; and to
- act as an evaluator / monitor on an ongoing and or hoc basis of the effects of development initiatives through which new needs, priorities as well as changes in policy or method of implementation can be identified.

The members consist of the government, business, labour and certain community representatives, which applies to the plenary, the steering committee as well as functional working groups. Administrative costs are provided by the government, other costs incurred by the forum will be borne by the delegates. In the near future, this overarching forum shall achieve broad provincial level compacts, i.e. working out a provincial strategic development framework in accordance with the principles of the DFA, and a regional economic strategy in co-operation with the DEAF³⁹³, the MEC mandated by the cabinet the 'manage' the forum³⁹⁴. It will be probably transformed into a sort of PEDLAC. Thus, it is highly likely that public participation in it will concentrate on policy formulation and resemble neo-corporatist patterns. However, tripartite forums have little role at provincial level, since most deals will be made at national level between the peak organisations. Such a forum would be meaningless in that there is a lack of capacity to impose reached agreements on lower level structures. This however is partly a danger, since on the one hand, there are not many macro-economic issues to decide on at provincial level while at the same time the organisational structure of business and trade union federations extend further up to peak structures on national level. On the other hand, compliance with nationally agreed corporatist compromises is impossible, if provinces or regions are allowed to make their own deals.

Secondly, more focused on the implementation of the DFA, the DDPE&W is leading two participatory components. On the one side, this is the above discussed participatory process of setting LDOs. On the other side, a provincial planning forum, comprising the DDPE&W as well as all players from local authorities involved in planning, serves as a transmission belt between these two tiers of government.

³⁹³ Note also the politicking in 1994 around Ben Turok's former RDP Commission's PWV RDP policy paper vs. the DEAF's PWV economic policy paper described above.

³⁹⁴ Shiceka, 1994, p. 7.

Additionally, bilateral collaboration exists between the department and major roleplayers, such as business, labour and NGOs / CBOs. Currently, the main vehicle through which such two way communication is supported is the National Business Initiative (NBI). The DDPE&W attempts to bring the various players up to the speed of what is happening as well as to receive submissions concerning their positions on how to shape the provincial DFA regulations. Unfortunately due to the flux of the current developments, no satisfactory account of the relative impacts of the various players / mechanisms can be made.

The DDPE&W hopes that the consultative development planning conference planned for the beginning of 1996 will bring clarity and progress concerning the structuring of the setting of LDOs. The DDPE&W rather likes to call it consultative development planning conference than Vista III, because the former implies less concrete but nevertheless necessary resolution of future state - civil society relationships in development and thus less pressure on government to explain itself on the remaining issues outstanding and its performance. All community organisations who participated in the two Vista conferences will be present, but a great deal of other actors in the province will also be included.

In summary, the economic focused work of the GEDF / DEAF and development planning focus of the DFA / DDPE&W open the possibility of integrating growth and development policy with proper planning. This is mainly operationalised by numerous inter-governmental co-ordinating structures which operate at political and official level. However, in the light of such a state-centric approach the danger continues to exist that certain issues such as participation or, say, environmental sustainability, maybe not taken seriously enough.

4.4.2) Local Level Mechanisms

Concerning participatory mechanisms on local government level, a comparable state-led picture emerges. The whole CDF / LDF saga has been described, but the final outcome in terms of their future real impact is not clear yet. Apart from these 'civil society' structures, other administrative public participation and involvement vehicles exist. Local government ordinances allow for the establishment of Section 59 and 60 Committees. These are committees which allow

professionals to submit their opinion or advise on a sectoral basis. At the moment they still serve to allow for mainly professional input into local government decision-making, e.g. by professional bodies, commercial developers, etc., and rather excluding more popular forms of participation. However, if properly managed and opened up to the broad public / community organisations as in the case of Pretoria elaborated upon above, this type of institution has potential to democratise local governance if coupled with responsive and accountable behaviour of the local authority. But due to the diversity of local circumstances it is almost impossible to 'prescribe' this model uniformly as the local administrative vehicle for increased participation. As the literature review in the second chapter and the table below indicate, a host of other possible mechanisms exists, specially for the local and communal level; they are unfortunately hardly discussed nor practised in South Africa

4.4.3) Existing And Possible Mechanisms: Why Is The Current Practice So Limited?

In summary, a set of different techniques of public participation is currently employed in Gauteng. The chart below categorises citizen and popular participation models and techniques by how they correspond to the levels of shared decision-making and the audience they serve. Special reference is paid to the participation of the general public. Both mechanisms used in South Africa (underlined) as well as alternative ones derived from the international literature review in the theoretical chapter of this study are listed. The importance of early involvement of a broad range of actors is evident, e.g. Fischer and Brown's acronym ACBD, Always Consult Before Deciding, holds³⁹⁵: The rationale is that the broader the audience (community members, community organisations), the more effective conflicts can be genuinely solved.

³⁹⁵Fischer, Brown, 1988.

Linking Participation Techniques to Levels of Shared Decision-making³⁹⁸

LEVELS OF SHARED DECISION-MAKING	ELITE PROCESSES	COMMUNITY-WIDE PROCESSES	ELITE / COMMUNITY PROCESSES
Government decides	Secret elite / lobbying deals	N / A	N / A
Government consults with individuals and then decides	- Lobbying (e.g. in parliament³⁹⁷) - Private consultants - Section 59 Committees (Local Government internal)	<u>Public Hearings / written and oral comments</u> (e.g. Constitutional Assembly) - Polls and surveys - Hotlines	N / A
Government consults with representative groups and then decides	- Blue Ribbon panels / (dept.) <u>statutory advisory committees</u> - Charettes, Delphi and nominal group method <u>Policy advocacy</u> (certain NGO / CBO component³⁹⁸)	- Neighbourhood meetings - Citizen advisory groups (Section 60 Committees) - Focus groups (social marketing)	- Community based working groups³⁹⁹ - CDFs / LDFs currently

³⁹⁶ This chart is based on Potapchuk, 1990, p. 17. It has been amended to include models of popular participation. The techniques underlined denote South African practice of involvement and participation of the broader community, the rest denotes 'normal' information, consultation, and lobbying practice.

³⁹⁷ Mail & Guardian, 4-10/8/1995a, 4-10/8/1995b.

³⁹⁸ For example note the policy advocacy work certain service groups, such as the Development Resources Centre or PLANACT. Interview, Harding, DRC.

³⁹⁹ During the end 1980s and early 1990s various local authorities and provincial administrations negotiated with civics concerning rent and service boycotts.

• Government consults with representative groups and decides jointly	• Mediation • <u>Negotiation forums</u> (CODESA or national and provincial sectoral forums, e.g. GEDF, NEDLAC)	• CDFs / LDFs (initially envisaged)	• Large scale participatory development planning (<u>maybe CDFs / LDFs in the future</u>) • Regulatory negotiations (with professional bodies)
• Government delegates decisions to others	• Privatisation of public decision-making	• Neighbourhood councils • CDFs (initially envisaged) • <u>Community development trusts</u>	• N / A

The discussion of the national development policy frameworks in chapter three as well as the above table highlight a peculiar discrepancy between national (legislative) and provincial (government / administration) practices. Whereas on the level of policy development the Alliance concerning the RDP and the Constitutional Assembly practised a very broad, grassroots including process of consultation, the two other initiatives, i.e. DFA and the new Guidelines for Development Planning from the FEPPD, have not been publicly discussed, but result from technocratic, inter-governmental processes. The content of these meta-policies as well as the stage in the policy cycle may explain the differences. Thus, one might reason that if fundamental, value-laden issues arise, there is a better chance of community wide participatory processes than in the case of policies which are more administrative or legal in nature. However, this need not be the case if proper training and education of concerned parties would be undertaken or supported by government. On provincial level, the situation points even more clearly to limits of willingness to participation. Here, the issue has interestingly been less defined as policy development, but more practically in terms of how to structure community participation in development.

The case study of Gauteng has shown that it is this level where community and political conflicts have most sanction power or negative impact. Within this

context it became evident that policy outcomes are not only the results of technical choices among alternatives but also the outcome of the interaction of different bureaucratic and political groups with different interests and political power. Taking the long-term vision-character of the RDP's general objectives as well as a necessary long term perspective of development into account, it can be argued that the 'real' formulation takes place as a process of interpretation by the various actors during implementation⁴⁰⁰. Hence, it is the process of implementation and not the policy development phase that constitutes the most important focus of political and especially bureaucratic competition. Assuming that the capacity and willingness of public institutions and voluntary development organisations to formulate and implement policies that address the problems of the most disadvantaged social groups is limited by the economic, political, organisational and administrative environment and strongly dependent on the ability and capacity of the interest groups themselves to influence the decision-making processes by a variety of mechanisms of political representation / articulation, inclusive political representation and broad political participation (coupled with responsive and accountable state structures) are prerequisites for economic, social and political empowerment of the historically disadvantaged as a means for economic growth and political development. Creating possibilities and procedures for participation by the broad community, the earlier in the policy cycle the better, must not only be given as a chance to voice concerns during the policy formulation stage, but ideally ought to transfer power to influence, control and evaluate implementation processes as well. In Gauteng, this has not been the case. In Gauteng, either the initial 'progressive' approaches following popular participation rationales were watered down to mere consultation, or provincial government / Alliance internal turf battles took place over policy management (design perspective⁴⁰¹), not allowing for genuine participatory development processes.

A further issue needs to be raised in order to put the DDPE&W perspective on community participation in the RDP into context. The study contended that sustainable development is based on a two-stage process of public involvement. Citizen or public participation deals only with the first, or redistributive, stage. The

⁴⁰⁰ Compare JHB's with PTA's approach to community development forums.

⁴⁰¹ Ingram, Schneider, 1988.

second stage of the process goes beyond (education and subsequent) participation in planning and the setting of LDOs. It involves (the prospect of) legitimate operation or implementation of development programmes and projects once local development strategies are agreed upon, i.e. participative management based on community control. The strong emphasis placed by all tiers of government of it, specifically local authorities, being the implementor of development, casts some doubt on this notion. Although various guidelines and criteria exist in RDP project funding requirements, these foci, besides their bias towards policy formulation are based on legitimisation rationales, rather than on local content and skills training components within demanded labour intensive schemes. This situation is also reflected in the lack or at least marginality of public discourse on the issue of capacity building in the communities for project and financial management. The table above indicates that the currently employed forms of public participation and involvement in Gauteng / South Africa are quite limited. It is surprising that with all the RDP hype during the last years there is hardly any (public) discussion about other or more mechanisms for participation. It seems that the populace somehow simply waits for and adapts to respective provincial and national government initiatives. In contrast to widely stated policy objectives, such as accountability, transparency and participatory approaches, the leaders then 'surprisingly' decide to limit public participation and corresponding impact, especially from ordinary people, to the local level and to the first stages of the planning cycle, i.e. needs identification and prioritisation.

Generally speaking the obvious challenge for structuring public participation in decision-making is twofold: Firstly, how to construct a form of co-operation / constructive tension which does not impede on good governance, and secondly, how to structure co-ordination that does not impede on the independence of civil society. The 'traditional' advisory role of forums or participation in policy-making in general is considered insufficient for the future by large parts of civil society. Concerning citizen's preferences, one comes to realise that something far more substantial has to be offered by the state to the organs of civil society in order for them to become satisfied partners. Regarding the second dimension of this, i.e. the key issue of restructuring the management of the broader city-wide resources, the current mismatch between activism and needs expression on local level by civics and other broad representative bodies and the actual management and implementation

responsibility entrusted with a still far too 'rational administration' needs to be resolved⁴⁰². This has certain limits too. The government cannot allow its powers to be usurped by private actors, e.g. before it can take any decision, a forum must reach (sufficient) consensus first. "We cannot create a process of democracy, elect a government, take away all its powers, and give it back to ourselves in some committee where some leaders sit - a far more unaccountable process."⁴⁰³

Another danger concerning the new emerging development approach is that besides all the rhetoric it may predominantly focus on (visible) economic growth, possibly ranking societal development secondary and neglecting the integration of development efforts. Although the study contended that LED strategies in Pretoria resulted in more success and potential development impact, from a macro-perspective there are also dangers involved with a too distinct economic (growth) focus. If the ANC or the GNU regards itself along statist and welfarist lines of thought as the central agency to drive development on its own, supported by civil society, initiative and autonomy of the latter might be unnecessarily lost. Concerning the internal structuring of LDFs and CDFs, it suffices to note here that criteria for membership as well as financial mechanisms of control are still not clearly spelled out yet and are still controversial. Uncertainty concerning national and provincial approaches to participative development planning is also not removed. Broadly speaking, the new approaches to planning and policies for citizens and community involvement are still based on old sectoral economic, regional and town planning methodologies with an inherent spatial urban bias. Change was so far rather incremental, if rapid. More radical breaks with past practices are needed. This, however, shall not imply that everything new is good, that creating more civil power vis-à-vis the state, and potentially constructive conflicts between local government and local community structures, might not backfire, i.e. overloading the state. However, prescribing a state-centred structure, implementing it in a clumsy way, stopping it for mainly party political reasons and coming forward with another framework developed by and suiting the state will most probably lead - when the rest of the initial post-election momentum and the currently still existing idealism

⁴⁰² FLANACT, 1995, pp. 2-5.

⁴⁰³ Naidoo, 1994a, p. 61.

regarding development potential will have turned into realism - to disillusionment and apathy.

4.5) Governance Trends: An Autonomous State Burdened With An Apathetic Society?

The above deliberations about national and provincial policy-making processes and policies throw up many questions concerning the trends in the type and quality of governance in the new South Africa. Is there good governance, democratic governance? Can one speak of an emerging participatory democracy in South Africa and in its provinces? What is the nature of the state? Is there substance to the whole participatory RDP rhetoric, and if not, why not?

The CDF / LDF saga in Gauteng and the new development planning approach highlight certain trends in the role of the state in development in South Africa. This inductive approach is justified because of the highly interconnected nature of governance processes between the various levels, i.e. between national meta-policies and issues of governance at sub-national levels⁴⁰⁴. In contrast to popular rhetoric and belief, neither organs of civil society, such as NGOs, CBOs or development forums, nor the Alliance drive development. Society, apart from continuing existing racial splits, at large has not been able to seriously initiate or influence development during the last year. Apathy, passiveness and dependence on guidance and to a lesser degree on resources from the government inhibited genuine emancipation from old Apartheid paternalistic patterns of behaviour (intransparent, top-down, non-participatory). On local level, ANC, SANCO and unions have so far only participated as a cheerful but critical audience for provincial and national level leaders. The true power in policy development was based so far in the top echelons of the political and administrative systems, which as the many failures with regard to community participation in the RDP prove themselves lack adequate (policy making-) capacity. Specifically the fact that the government made policy shifts were not publicly criticised by local branches of the respective organisations seems to be a negative indication for future civil society self-empowerment.

⁴⁰⁴For this argument, see Swilling, Montefiro, 1995.

McDell-Mills and Serageldin from the World Bank would probably support the recent developments in South Africa since their narrow administrative-instrumentalist conception of good governance basically resembles a western liberal democratic system - professionalism in the administrative system and representative democratic mechanisms within the public political realm. The criticism put forward in this study regarding state - civil society relations, i.e. unparticipatory public policy-making, state dominance in policy management, etc., lie outside their focus.

Leftwich, apart from generally supporting democratic majority⁴⁰⁵ rule and the end of Apartheid, would rather label the above discussed politicking around community participation in the RDP and respective participatory development planning approaches an example of symbolic politics by capitalists. Old and new political and administrative elites hold grassroots organisations and the citizenry at large at random by eclectically offering a range of avenues of limited public involvement or consultation to gain legitimacy, but not allowing or enabling (self-) empowerment in the process. Turf battles and internal elite bargaining on high levels dominates policy-making processes. Genuine and effective participation by people and civic organisations, by definition implying the limitation or reduction of state power, is not 'granted'. But why is it so, why are there no strong outcries from the civil realm for more voice? Why does homo politicus appear to be so unpolitical? And can this situation be explained from within a governance perspective.

Based on the analytical and normative framework presented in the second chapter, the first two years of the GNU and the Gauteng provincial government can definitely not be classified a participatory democracy. The state seems neither to be a (neutral) negotiating one, nor a responsive, self-governing one in nature. Concerning the former, there have been a few elements of neo-corporatism, such as NEDLAC. In regard to the latter, some aspects of self-governance are practised, e.g. in the standard setting processes regarding the implementation of the National Qualifications Framework (NQF)⁴⁰⁶. But all in all, the case study of Gauteng should have painfully made clear that true self-governance has not been granted to civil

⁴⁰⁵Strictly speaking the current five year period of the GNU is not majority rule but rather resembles a one party dominated, partly consociationalist model.

⁴⁰⁶Note for example the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) / National Training Board (NTB) envisaging the possibility of creating Education and Training Qualification Authorities (ETQA) under the to be established South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) which can be run by the sectors themselves. RSA, 1994e; GSP&DM, 1995.

organisations or local authorities. Otherwise, local governments would not face a continuing financial crisis and be dependent on provincial / national grants. Otherwise, there would not be a mass dying of NGOs, but organisations of the civil realm would be actively 'used' by a non-welfarist, non-statist state to implement development. Such an approach, although still reflected in a lot of the RDP talk, has been continuously diluted during the last year and replaced by state led and implemented development.

Generally speaking, the state - especially the executive and top management of the civil service - dominates the agenda setting, policy initiation and design, and policy process management, at least in the few policy fields researched in this study. Hence, strong elements of Kooiman's hierarchical and autonomous forms of the state prevail⁴⁰⁷. The hierarchical mode of governance seems to prevail in the political system, especially in parliament and cabinet. Additionally the autonomous mode of the public service seems to continue to exist and function well from the 'old' Apartheid days. The administration is so far autonomous as it is in many policy fields and arenas currently the only structure or organisation with sufficient policy analysis capability and implementation capacity - although from a birds view still insufficient relative to South Africa's huge developmental needs - which can get the policies of the new government started. It makes active use of this dominant position, and if one considers the feeble attempts to build the capacity of organs of civil society it does not seem that the administration or the government really want to change the status quo. Most other players, whether political parties, community organisations or NGOs either lack professional human resources or simply do not have adequate implementation capacity at hand.

Of the other two categories of Jorgenson's taxonomy not discussed yet⁴⁰⁸, the supermarket state does obviously not apply; the public sector transformation has by far not succeeded or developed that far in order to reorient the civil service from its Weberian hierarchical, technocratic structure and approach. Nor are deeply embedded social democratic, socialist and communist beliefs of most new political representatives facilitative to an entrepreneurial, business like (minimal) state. The

⁴⁰⁷ As will be discussed in the last chapter, these modes, strongly based on western pluralist thinking may not bring political and social stability in a society as deeply divided and plural (not pluralist) in nature as South Africa's.

⁴⁰⁸ Compare the table in the second chapter on modes of governance.

same arguments partly apply in regard to the service state. There might be a great number of conceptions about the South African population. The citizenry may be regarded by politicians and officials as disadvantaged victims of Apartheid, as an oppressed working class which needs to be educated about their objective interests, or simply as a dull and apathic mass of potential voters who are easy to buy in. But they are definitely not regarded as clients which are to be offered choices about public goods and services. True dialogue (with impact) between the public and the civil realm is rather underdeveloped. The only limiting aspect to the negative evaluation concerning this mode is the fact that surprisingly many politicians in fact still try to act developmentally and implement respective policies. But whether this is truly believed and followed or just an outflow of decades of old liberation ideology and empowerment rhetoric which will be soon replaced by a straight forward kleptocracy remains to be seen.

The above evaluation based on Landell-Mills and Serageldin's concepts as well as on Kooiman's taxonomy is somewhat unsatisfactory. Without recurring to often too behaviourist concepts of political culture one cannot explain the strange or at least peculiar South African governance mix:

- envisaged and proclaimed civil empowerment with the dominant conceptualisation of it by all elites as (paternalistic) other-empowerment;
- an envisaged public sector transformation towards a responsive and co-operative state by a simultaneously desired welfarist, liberal democratic state, which in practice actually limits participation to narrow forms of consultation or just even information dissemination during the initial stages of the policy cycle;
- pro-active popular mobilisation of the historically disadvantaged, which however seem to have a large amount of trust in and an incredibly loyalty to their leaders and often passively wait for leaders to lead them and for the RDP to deliver;
- a continuing reliance on a representative-hierarchical, collectivist-structuralist approach to organisational development à la United Democratic Front (UDF) while concurrently calling for flexibility and capacity to be developed and retained on the lowest level;
- development theoretically conceptualised as political, social and economic empowerment of the citizenry, while most efforts during the first one and a half years are devoted to internal public sector reorganisation and reformation (but

not transformation yet), with NGOs dying and civil society left in the dark concerning (the government's wishes and views on) their role in politics and development, etc.

Staying within the conceptions of governance a third approach, not discussed in detail in the second chapter, might assist in explaining the situation from a theoretical perspective. Hyden's work is more informed from a political science background. For him "[g]overnance ... is the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm. In this definition regime and governance structure is the same, and structures ... are rule-based. Legitimacy is the dependent variable produced by effective governance..."⁴⁰⁹. Hyden positions the government approach between methodological individualism with its stress on incrementalist change, and structuralist approaches according to which change is possible only revolutionary interventions⁴¹⁰. His basic actor dimensions of the governance concept are on the one side power, i.e. coercion, and exchange, referring to mutually rewarding and beneficial relationships. On the other side, the two concepts of reciprocity and authority need to be brought in as intermediates. The former differs from exchange in that it lacks discreteness and is based on continuous relationships with fundamentally important expectations about behaviour. The latter means legitimate power, voluntary acceptance of asymmetrical relationships and self-regulation⁴¹¹. Hyden differentiates structures into primordial, i.e. traditional or God-given, and man-made ones. "While, as societies develop, man-made civic structures become necessary to transcend the limitations of community, there is always the risk that leaders using such structures fail to respond to rank-and-file members. As consensus about the validity of basic norms can no longer be taken for granted, trust is insufficient to sustain effective social action. ... If compliance and trust are hallmarks of God-given structures, innovation and accountability may be best described as the two sides of man-made structures. ... [T]rust and accountability constitute intermediate stations on a continuum between compliance and innovation ..." ⁴¹² for the structural dimensions of the governance concept.

⁴⁰⁹Hyden, 1993, p. 7.

⁴¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

⁴¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

The individual psychological and political sociological elements put forward by Hyden offer some further going theoretical framework which can reasonably be used for explanation and theory building within the South African situation. Firstly, concerning trust, there seems to be a high degree of trust and loyalty within African (traditional) cultures towards leaders⁴¹³, giving the ruling elites space to act, legitimacy and stability, which in the light of their actions they do not really deserve (any more)⁴¹⁴. Swilling and Monteiro argue that local negotiation processes during the last six or so years have been the main catalysts for this building of trust and to some degree as a factor for stimulating accountability⁴¹⁵. Secondly, concerning reciprocity, there is definitely more space for stakeholder organisations from all strata of society than in the old regime. Theoretically, at least, they have voice. Some sort of developmental accountability will definitely be ensured by the various checks and balances build into the new South African political system, e.g. Parliamentary scrutiny, ombudsman / public protector, code of ethics for both MPs / MPLs and civil servants, etc. Also, there will be most probably indirectly enforced accountability by numerous strong (but organisationally often weak) organs of civil society, although the chances for an effective formal opposition seem dim in the current South African political and social landscape.

Looking at the 'participation experience' as a whole and shining the empirical spotlight on the discourse of the liberation movement, e.g. participatory development, empowerment of civil society, partnerships, etc., however, one has to simply acknowledge that there are constellations of - unfortunately often simplistic or not well thought through - discourses which up to now have had no impact in reality on institutional arrangements. The old parliamentary, administrative and executive lobbying channels continue to work for those with resources and organisational capacity while the ordinary citizen will most likely continued to be alienated from the establishment. In spite of the discourse and the assumed (by the author) and stated (by elected politicians and officials) participatory-responsive belief systems of

⁴¹³This is not to say or presume that modern structures are superior to their ascriptive or traditional counterparts, as unfortunately done in earlier (behaviourist) political science and development literature.

⁴¹⁴On the positive side one has to note that space for manoeuvre is necessary for any government. If such space is lacking, any government will find it extremely difficult to formulate long-term developmental policies which by definition sacrifice some short-term consumption.

⁴¹⁵Swilling, Monteiro, 1995, pp. 20-24.

political actors, the (re)construction of political regimes on urban / provincial level in the new South Africa are rather authoritarian in nature⁴¹⁶. The knitting together of the new political regime(s), comprising elements of the previous political elites plus the new entrants from the liberation and community organisation movements, is not yet completed. It is these new elite regimes which have to deliver to the poor as well as avoid a too high degree of redistribution annoying the old privileged strata of society in order to consolidate their hold on political power⁴¹⁷. Selected aspects of how they do so have been presented in this study. Both this study as well as diverse criticism⁴¹⁸ and new emerging oppositions⁴¹⁹ provide evidence that the new political elite, once having been dependent on broad grassroots support from their constituencies, are closing down avenues of access to public policy-making⁴²⁰. Swilling and Monteiro argue that local urban governance in South Africa can adopt both participatory as well as quite authoritarian practices. Rousseauian arguments of the (ANC) knowing the 'volunté generale' and the diverse statements of similar quality from CBOs about them representing the community perfectly give rise to quite worrying scenarios for the future⁴²¹. From a governance perspective, trust and reciprocity that enabled as well as developed further during the negotiated revolution in the recent South African past are currently under strain. If enough social glue and legitimacy survive the momentary processes of power consolidation, the chance for institutionalisation of participatory modes of governance is good. This may be supported by a condition which has up to now only received negative comment in this study, namely the lack of developmental delivery capacity of the state. If

⁴¹⁶ Considering that during the struggle to be labelled an 'individualist' in townships, i.e. not to stick to the collective parole, could be physically dangerous for the accused, may even justify to assume certain totalitarian traits. Marks, 1995.

⁴¹⁷ Swilling, Monteiro, 1995, p. 21.

⁴¹⁸ CBOs have criticised the Masakhane Campaign, basically designed to end rent service charge boycotts, for being heavy-handed by the state; trade unions nationally and on company level striking against unilateral decision concerning the currently state-driven commercialisation and privatisation of parastatals, etc.

⁴¹⁹ Note for example the emergence of new, independent CBOs not aligned to SANCO / ANC. Mail & Guardian, 16-22/2/1996a. Also the repeated expressions of angst from various white and black political parties and NGOs regarding the lack of effective opposition in the national assembly and basically all provincial parliaments.

⁴²⁰ Compare for example the 'dying' of the ANC's 'people's forums' already shortly after the elections; the immediate close down of the LG-IFs (which could have been productively used for continuing local government transformation) once TMCs / TLCs were established; newly elected local councillors refusing to give up leadership positions in their CBOs in contradiction to earlier policy statements, thus consolidation political control over both local government and civil society; and so forth.

⁴²¹ For a critical assessment of the congress tradition, see: Glaser 1989a, 1989b, 1990; and a commentary on him FitzGerald, WY. Regarding CBOs and 'their community', refer to: Chipkin, 1995; Friedman, 1993, 1994; Friedman, Reitzes, 1995; and Shubane, Madiba, 1992.

government incapacity persists the new regime may well be pushed to continue and potentially even increase genuinely participatory partnerships with civil society⁴²². Fortunately, a certain kind of societal awakening after the failure of the ANC to deliver on all election promises ("jobs, jobs, jobs") or those of the NP's ("no one will be worse off"⁴²³) seems to take place⁴²⁴. If this trend continues as well, there might be even a chance of organs of civil society demanding more say in decision-making than just being offered state-driven participatory processes.

⁴²²Swilling, Montelro, 1995, p. 22.

⁴²³The same being stated by the German conservative party (CDU) before the first elections after unification with many people naively believing it for the first one to two years as well as well.

⁴²⁴Chamey, 1995.

5) Research Synthesis

5.1) Conclusions

The policy study has shown that the potential for participation exists on various levels and that the possibilities are widely distributed during all stages of the policy cycle in the various policy fields. Also, focused external assistance to target groups and organisations from the civil realm in order to create the necessary conditions for engagement can mobilise not just legitimisation but self-help and commitment. It becomes obvious that due to the specific situation in South Africa, i.e. ongoing system reformation and transformation and consolidation regarding the political and administrative sectors on the one side ambivalently coupled with reorganisation and partly dissolution of the non-governmental sector, strengthening of participation and local initiative crucially depend on decentral capacity building which does not favour specific sectors. The reorientation of foreign development co-operation towards the government - although easily understandable - combined with the administrations emphasis on getting their own house in order first was not helpful, if not outright detrimental for South Africa's societal transformation as envisaged in the RDP. Although first steps concerning the strengthening of CBOs and NGOs have been initiated with the TNDT from the government side as well as a slow but nevertheless positive change towards developmental orientations from within organs of civil society, the organisational and financial bottlenecks basically still exist⁴²⁵.

Additionally, the government's bias in their work to undo the Apartheid legacy during the last two years towards getting the policy framework right first, but somehow neglecting the modernisation of its systems which practically just recently started to appear as a bottleneck. It is highly probable that this neglect or failure will prove a more limiting factor to development than necessary in the light of scarce resources.

⁴²⁵ There will be another couple of month passing - about one and a half years after the idea has been networked - before the TNDT will be able to disperse money, while international donors continue to flock, and partly rightly so, to the South African government. Mail & Guardian, 26/1-1/2/1996. TNDA, 1995, PANGO, 1995.

The prominent influence of societal consensus building processes is a second aspect the case study has highlighted. Specially, Pretoria with its more facilitating LED oriented approach to structuring community participation in the RDP has indicated, if not proven, how future participatory process could be structured successfully if one sticks to South Africa's particular forum approach. In general, forums have ensured information transfer and fulfilled legitimisation functions during the last couple of years; mass organisations have benefited from access to the technical base from which other actors work, established groups and the administration have greater appreciation of the political and to some degree bureaucratic considerations driving political arenas. Thus one might ascribe a depoliticising effort (and function?) to forums during South Africa's negotiated transition. The future of forums is often predicted to be a local form of developmental corporatism, the transformation of NEF and the Manpower Commission into NEDLAC is a case in point⁴²⁶. If the answer to the question whether forums will be necessary after legitimate and representative government structures are in place at all three tiers is yes, then a debate about the roles, shapes and numbers of forums has to take place in South Africa more strategically; if the answer is no, they still should not be annulled for as long as they do not act as gate-keepers and actively destabilise development efforts. The government (or the development oriented sections thereof) would do good in not solely explicitly and imperatively 'offering' their favoured structural / functional models, i.e. a mostly neo-corporatistic NEDLAC at national level, a somewhat bureaucracy driven (spatial) development planning framework on provincial level and a by now politically removed vertical structured set of government-initiated, quasi-governmental forums (QUAFO)⁴²⁷ geared towards fulfilling legitimisation functions. Whether the implementation of these concepts will lead to the co-option of civil society is not clear yet. Whether authentic participation will be realised is also doubtful. Obviously, the government is not the only actor to blame. In regard to policy development there is clearly a double political culture heritage, both in terms of a continuing rigid, rule driven administrative organisational

⁴²⁶ However it has to be taken note of that in the fourth - and from the perception of the author the least influential - chamber concerned with development policy, civil society is institutionally represented vis-a-vis the state, labour and capital. This represents a certain departure from 'old' corporatism which was based on the dominance of the three main actors and a consequential exclusion of the rest of civil society.

⁴²⁷ Borrowing from the term governmental organised NGO (GONGO) and the Canadian version of it (QUANGO).

culture in the public sector as well as a certain reliance of the population on their 'leader that will do' in civil society, both white and black.

Concerning the actual implementation processes one has to acknowledge that all stakeholders continue to attempt to dominate, i.e. SANCO by claiming to be the only legitimate organisation to speak for and work in communities, NGOs by their continued inclination towards inward capacity building acting as (financial) intermediaries, the state and the new political elites by their state-driven and often too top down attitudes to development⁴²⁸.

In contrast to the characteristics of the 'old' forums the RDP concept of CDFs and LDFs represents a somehow different approach to policy-making and the structuring of state - civil society relationships. But legitimacy based on democratic elections is one thing, legitimisation by development performance, the typical welfare state notion, is another. Even if policy-making and implementation powers are decentralised or privatised, government must still be accountable to the population at large, it must be held accountable by the people without any institution between them, because in a democratic polity, elected representative government is supposed to be a single, broad-based democratic organisation which is capable of aggregating and mediating conflicting societal demands in a distinct way⁴²⁹. It seems too early to condemn 'progressive' popular approaches to governance in the context of the implementation of the RDP, although individual policy initiatives might seriously lack strategic vision as shown with the development forum approach as initially implemented in Gauteng, specifically in the Vaal and Johannesburg subregions.

Concerning the continuing ambivalent relationship between CDFs / LDFs and local government, one strategic question not elaborated upon yet is that of the distribution of capacity building (assistance). It has been argued critically that LDFs could lead to local government losing potential future capacity building opportunity. This might in fact be the case, but the proper question ought to ask for that implementation-mix which yields the maximum absolute decentralised capacity

⁴²⁸ Repeated remarks along the line of "We will bulldoze the shacks [illegal squatter camps, PW] and make development..." were voiced by Gauteng top management (top five levels from Director to Director General), both the 'old' and the new 'progressive' civil servants, during a recent training course at the GSP&DM.

⁴²⁹ Shubane, 1994, pp. 24-25.

building. Since the 1994 election most state efforts went into institution building and reorganisation of the public service itself. The recent criticism of NGOs and CBOs targeted at the government in order to receive more assistance from the state has already lead to a slight shift with the establishment of the (Transitional) National Development Agency / Trust, the NGO Coalition and the CBO Network. For public sector transformations as well as the establishment of the civil society RDP implementation structures, the main objective must not be the creation of governmental control and implementation capacity, but the strengthening of strategic-developmental competency, both in the public and private realm. Ideally, strategies of horizontal and vertical decentralisation to the local level, and channels of communication and co-ordination may support this approach.

More important in the context of civil society participation is that these state-centred efforts need to be complemented by capacity building of the organs of civil society. Whether pouring resources into CDFs and LDFs build and strengthen institutional and human capacity of organs of civil society in the best possible way is doubtful, because if all efforts and effects are added up this might create potentially less development capacity than a more direct approach, i.e. assisting their member organisations or community members directly. Obviously, such resource allocation can only be pushed if local government has its systems right. Capacity for problem-solving at local level is seriously lacking, both in the public and the private sector.

The Gauteng case study has shown that all three patterns of participation, i.e. paternalism, conflict and coproduction, existed at one stage or another over the last two years. Interestingly, paternalism - provincial (party) political agendas while no real financial influence was granted / envisaged - has been initially disguised in popular rhetoric of community empowerment by the former RDP Commission, and later in the form necessary bureaucratic accountability by the DDPE&W. Conflict, even more interestingly, was less present between government officials and community representatives, but more of a problem between community organisations and NGOs within specific communities. Astonishingly, the 'will' of the residents has never been enquired directly; claims by (to be fair, partly mandated) community organisations' representatives were and are more or less taken at face value⁴³⁰.

⁴³⁰ An aspect ought to be mentioned here in a brief side step, namely that this situation can only be unreliably be explained with a certain kind of 'we follow what (our) leaders say' attitude / culture.

Another interpretation of this circumstance might be that there is less paternalism from government but rather from CBOs and NGOs towards the community members themselves⁴³¹. The technocratic justification for the policy shift away from CDFs and LDFs towards participative development planning / DFA were exactly these internal community conflicts (or better conflicts between their organisations or their organisations' leaders) which rendered the whole community RDP structure inoperable to the provincial administration. However, it also became evident that not all necessary have steps been taken by the government to assist in or enable communities to participate. Not in terms of adequate institution and capacity building for CDF and LDF member organisations, nor in terms of direct education and training to individual residents. One exception might be the Masakhane Campaign - however, the dominant message 'to stop rent and service charge boycotts'⁴³² seems not very empowering. Coproduction might be seen in the work between the member organisations of the Alliance regarding policy development of a broad general nature. This can however more easily be explained in terms of elite bargaining, since the second criterion for coproduction is shared responsibility by communities. This has so far not been happening within the context of the new participatory development planning framework. Mandela called for 'make development happen where we stay'⁴³³, but more practically interpreted, this is rather a call for self-initiative than for developing co-operative citizen attitudes to local government and true local self-governance.

Generally speaking, the most telling aspect of the various hiccoughs with implementing a participatory democracy lies in the fact that nobody seriously attempts to do so. Everybody talks about it; thinking institutionally, nobody really knows what to do; but all 'participate' in it. The reasons behind the behaviour and policy shifts of the politico-administrative systems are not less cynical. The former Gauteng RDP Commissioner Ben Turok clearly believes in the need to mobilise and

Generally speaking this is human, but it seems to the author that such behaviour is more commonplace in South Africa than say Germany. This seems not just to apply to African culture, but as well to whites.

⁴³¹ Obviously, be careful with generalisation. This shall not imply that all CBOs and NGOs are paternalistic, nor that they inhibit community development, the contrary is generally true. However, criticism towards the style of these organisations seems justified. More participative (observation) research could be helpful for shedding light on the claim, and potentially for the organisations themselves as well.

⁴³² Masakhane, 1995.

⁴³³ Local government election poster, ANC.

the (other-)empowerment of communities, he surely trusts in the communities to make development happen⁴³⁴, but he does so without even having conducted needs prioritisation, a contested terrain all over the world. The perceived need to fast track development during the first year of the GNU - with local development being seriously hindered by the ongoing negotiations and legitimisation crisis of local authorities - can be easily interpreted as determined mainly by politics within and between political parties. Furthermore, his policy initiatives were not stalled by other Gauteng politicians because of a realisation of the critical issues and dangers outlined in this study above. Personally, he was ousted because of others being envious and fearful of him consolidating himself as 'Mr. RDP' in the province⁴³⁵. Institutionally, his commission has been criticised for claiming or stealing other departments' responsibilities, e.g. aspects of economic policy from the DEAF and co-ordination functions from the DDPE&W. As discussed above, the DDPE&W took over the responsibility for handling the CDF / LDF saga. From their perspective, unfortunately, they cannot close them down right away, mainly for political reasons⁴³⁶. But their ever diminishing role for the future becomes apparent. Again, the reason(s) for this do not lie in their design or structural flaws, but result from administrative agendas. Firstly, the DDPE&W sees itself pressed to implement the DFA, and secondly, community internal conflicts render the existing development forums basically inoperable for their statist and technocratic development planning responsibilities - only in the third place or even at a lower order may lie true concerns for participatory democracy. Thus, it took only about a year for progressive politicians to consolidate themselves in their line departments - forgetting everything concerning integrated development, cross-departmental co-ordination, etc. - and starting territorial, sectoral fights.

Concerning integrated and participatory development planning, the DFA and the work of the FEPD are positive points of departure. In the past, physical land-use planning was the primary concern of planners. This has been possible because the socio-economic policy framework was set by the skewed and growth retardatory logic of Apartheid. All that planners needed to do was to accept that framework and

⁴³⁴ Interview, Turok, MP.

⁴³⁵ Interviews, Dauskardt, DDPE&W; Phahlane, SANCO.

⁴³⁶ Interviews, Benjamin, Core Group, and Dauskardt, DDPE&W.

work out land use schemes. This has now changed by calling for its integration with other forms of planning, i.e. macro-economic and sectoral as well as social. However, at this stage development planning is still more rhetoric than a real approach with detailed content. On the one side, the little importance paid to the aspect of sustaining the environment has already been criticised. On the other hand, a number of indicators point to more dangers in South Africa's current development legislation and frameworks. Firstly, as briefly elaborated in the third and fourth chapter, the Guidelines for Development Planning' developed by the FEPA (which is strongly influenced by the DBSA professionals⁴³⁷), still include a physical planning bias. Secondly, a somewhat comparable bias towards housing, only 'officially' removed from the DFA recently, is still embedded in different aspects of the law. Thirdly, international literature indicates that LED approaches can be said to specifically focus on infrastructure investment. Fourthly, in comparison to the core piece of the new Urban Development Strategy of South Africa⁴³⁸, i.e. the multi-billion Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework⁴³⁹, other aspects such as human resource development, small scale farmers support, etc., seem to be rather neglected. The aspects above hint at a certain (continuation of an) urban / infrastructure bias in development policy. If this current bias will have significant impact, it is - besides negative consequences for South Africa's overall development - likely that increasing participation in planning and implementation (not just in voicing wish lists, the so-called needs analysis and prioritisation) will not be regarded as very important by key decision-makers. This is because of the technical nature of the policy field and the above argued relationship between policy fields / phases in the policy cycles with the nature of participation.

Another problem perceived as central to the issue of furthering participation by many actors, namely the perceived tension between delivery and consultation. The first, it is argued, cannot be delayed due to the (myth of) ever growing expectations and frustrations of the people⁴⁴⁰. It is feared that by bringing in forums

⁴³⁷ Interview, Arkwright, DBSA.

⁴³⁸ RSA, 1995d.

⁴³⁹ RSA, 1995i.

⁴⁴⁰ Various interviewees, especially from an administrative background, stated that they felt being trapped in this dilemma. The DDPE&W writes: "A critical issue is that while participation is essential, local areas cannot afford to have delivery stalled by problems and delays with participation.", 1995c, p. 8 (emphasis by PW). That the expectations of the people are by far more realistic than argued with

('old' negotiation as well the new RDP forums) the process of delivery will even be further delayed. This situation is made even more complex by having to resolve the question around increasing accountability, both of the state and organs of civil society, e.g. LDFs ought to be accountable to whom for the funds, to whom for their political and development decisions, which procedures and structures will cater for that, who will control them, etc.? And on the other side, if they would be allowed to act as implementing bodies, which politician or government department could then take credit for the resulting development? This widely held attitude and perspective unfortunately overlooks a series of benefits of development. In South Africa it seems not widely realised yet that although a technocratic planning process might be conducted faster without public participation - no comment about the quality of decisions which are taken unilaterally -, in a democracy with rule of law and legal channels often challenging government decisions, tension, conflict or outright sabotage will slow down the whole process during the implementation phase. In fact, the literature review of advanced western industrialised countries has shown that without adequate involvement, participation and mediating structures, certain development projects, such as power plants, waste sites, new highway, etc., will never be realised at all, which is from a macro-economic / societal aggregated utility function not acceptable. Additionally, such a pessimistic perspective about participation also overlooks the positive impact of being involved on the individual level, i.e. citizen attitudes. The criticised conviction as well as the above mentioned (lacking participatory) administrative practices seem not encouraging development and self-empowerment⁴⁴¹. The consequential loss in initiative, courage and reciprocal trust can not be underestimated. Also the way the debates about community participation blocking RDP delivery is led, is skewed. The new elites see their legitimisation in danger if they / the state cannot deliver in a welfarist manner. Participation is said to slow down the probably most retardatory approach to development, i.e. 'more of the same' in the old paternalist top-down statist fashion. Where has the empowerment objective of participation gone lost in this debate? And


by many CBOs, NGOs and politicians, however, is beautifully shown in CPS's empirical study about community development expectations, Chamey, 1995.

⁴⁴¹Except maybe in a radical sense, i.e. if at a later stage the whole establishment is forcefully rejected (à la Alinsky and Freire) by individuals and communities. Good for empowerment, but that such a situation does not lead to development should have been intelligibly been proven by Apartheid.

is it participation which slows delivery down, or does the real cause rather lie in the unparticipatory formulation of a flawed concept? From the above analysis, it becomes evident that the root cause is not more participation, but the dysfunctional design, or a lack of proper design, of state - society interfaces.

In the chapter on participation Langton's taxonomy of types of citizen participation has been presented. He proposed (1) citizen action (initiated and controlled by civil society), (2) citizen involvement (initiated and controlled by the government or the administration), (3) electoral participation, and (4) obligatory participation. From the characteristics of the modes of governance found in South Africa, as well as from the practical experience of implementing the RDP on community level during the recent two years, it seems helpful to amend this classification as well as to pinpoint to other possible general forms of participation not yet discussed. The figure below will illustrate channels of participation from a more liberal point of view. Some require a certain societal and government attitude change towards the roles and responsibilities of the state and of civil society in development away from statist and welfarist notions⁴⁴².

⁴⁴²Although potentially influential, the policy-making role of the juridical system, especially constitutional courts, will be neglected. Obviously, undue action of the state should, and by now can, be contested in (constitutional) courts and potentially combated by civil disobedience as a (second) last resort (to rebellion).



Ad (1) Electoral Participation

Political parties which are situated somewhat part of the civil realm and between it and the state, as well as legislative / executive systems enable the individual citizen to make his preferences heard, both by voting for political parties in elections as well as by participation in party structures. Specifically the latter way of participation seems to be - although broad political mobilisations in society - underdeveloped. One unfortunate limiting factor is the partly ethnic mobilisation and voting patterns along party political structures⁴⁴³.

Ad (2) Citizen Participation

The minimalist version of institutionalised participatory mechanisms within a classical representative democratic framework is an open door attitude / policy by the administration, maybe coupled with a system of advisory bodies, purely seeking inputs (pluralism), especially in the context of planning. This view which basically rejects direct democratic forms of participation, e.g. referendums, by issue specific or sectoral organs of civil society is still more or less dominant in the South African

⁴⁴³In this context a differentiation has to be drawn between plural and pluralistic societies, South Africa clearly falling into the first category in which 'horizontal' societal cleavages do not overlap others but coincide with each other 'vertically', thus reinforcing instability. Hanf, Weiland, Vierdag, 1978, pp. 7-8.

public service as well as characterises the attitudes of most whites towards local politics⁴⁴⁴. As the many uncertainties within the context of implementing the DFA have shown, there is still much to be improved in South Africa. This does not only include legal and developmental policy frameworks but specifically research and development of new participatory techniques, such as rapid participatory appraisal⁴⁴⁵, participatory needs analysis by the administration or by government (social marketing), more progressive approaches to facilitation and mediation of community conflicts, etc.

Ad (3) Public Involvement or a special South African Forum Model

A specific characteristic of the South African negotiated transition was negotiating forums. Initially agreed to by the progressive movement as instruments to stop the NP regime from unilateral decision-making, some of them became truly 'direct-representative' (for certain organs of civil society) democratic arenas for policy development. Today a selection of NGOs and CBO federations exert considerable influence in policy-formulation on provincial and national level, mainly due to their networks and policy analysis capacity. However, a practical role (coupled with responsibility) in implementation has up to now been either rejected by forums or they failed in such tasks due to a host of reasons. In practice this approach is essentially about co-ordination between public officials and community representatives and NGOs with the role of the executive often being unclear. Such structures proved most effective when dealing with 'everyday bread and butter issues'. However, critics mainly from the far disillusioned left as well as from a liberal background might regard this as a ploy by government to co-opt unduly the intelligencia of civil society. It is obvious that in the long run there needs to be institution and capacity building not just for state - civil society co-ordination mechanisms but for each respective sphere itself with a clear political commitment to allow and assist self-empowerment by the people and not just of their often self-declared representatives.

⁴⁴⁴Atkinson, 1991.

⁴⁴⁵Fernandes, Tandon, 1981; Feuerstein, 1986; Pratt, Loizes, 1992.

Ad (4) Citizen Action

The New Right (libertarians, not conservatives) as well as the radical left are proponents of a truly independent civil realm⁴⁴⁶. 'Policy guerrillas'⁴⁴⁷ of civil society such as service NGOs which specialise on advocacy, potentially truly independent forums, voluntary development associations, grass-roots development organisations, etc. - as barricades of popular participation - conduct own policy work and respective policy advocacy / implementation totally independent from - although not neutral towards - the state. The unlucky history of the 'African state's reaction' to independent organs of civil society teaches the lesson that civil and political must fight. Whether the whole RDP rhetoric will actually lead to a development friendly co-operative coexistence between South African NGOs and CBOs and the state is not clear yet⁴⁴⁸. However, more radical and autonomous behaviour in the civil public realm is necessary in any case to fight the current dangerous trend of the dominant governing party conceding constitutional and legal autonomy (of local government), but increasing political control via the political (party) system⁴⁴⁹.

Ad (5) Open Legislature

Finally, to be presented with a small question mark, are participatory mechanisms which directly link the legislature with (organisations from) civil society. The current participatory constitution-making process by the South African Constitutional Assembly, as well as for example the idea of giving the general public speaking rights in parliamentary standing committee meetings could develop to a fifth, internationally not really practised or recognised participatory mode of governance⁴⁵⁰ which breaks with the currently still uneven influence of the (established) lobbyists vis-à-vis not-for-profit policy advocacy groups⁴⁵¹. Obviously, not just questions of capacity and teething the legislature relative to the executive, but also ones

⁴⁴⁶The author feels that whether such a thing is possible at all is highly debatable. However, such convictions are not limited to political radicals; in regard to independent institutions the notion of a private sphere, which is not just regarded as comprising the individual or the family, is prominent already in classical liberal political theory.

⁴⁴⁷Inspired by Mark Swilling during a lecture, GSP&DM, 7/8/1995.

⁴⁴⁸Compare the fierce debates around the envisaged NGO Bill, interestingly formulated largely by the DRC. See also their problem analysis: DRC, 1995b.

⁴⁴⁹Swilling, Monteiro, 1995, p. 53. Concerning the constitutional aspect of checks and balances within the context of the largest party being within striking distance of a two-thirds majority, see Mail & Guardian, 16-22/2/1996b.

⁴⁵⁰Gross, Schneier, 1993; Rohansen, WY; Olson, Mezey, 1991.

⁴⁵¹Reflexively speaking, exceptions justify generalisations: the recent policies of the Hanekom's Ministry for Land were dominantly formulated by NGOs.

concerning democratic equality, will arise. As shown concerning the various possible participatory planning techniques not yet tried out in South Africa, much more could be done to shift the currently rather representative forms of a political democracy towards a participatory one.

5.2) Policy Implications

How does all the above relate to the task of developing and practising innovative and efficient modes of governance in the future dispensation of South Africa? From a pluralist perspective it seems advisable, if not crucial, for the future of participatory democratic governance in South Africa to intervene firmly in this respect. The NGO community and CBO and local government representatives need a stronger say in future policy-making at both provincial and national level. But in order to accomplish this, the diverse and fragmented NGO and CBO community in South Africa need to organise and to build developmental capacity. Capacity building of the non-profit organisations will need to be a key element in the new development strategy of South Africa⁴⁵² if the participatory philosophy of the Reconstruction and Development Programme is to be implemented. Multi-stakeholder advocacy⁴⁵³ will be served best if mechanisms and procedures are institutionalised in such a way as to give individual and corporate actors in civil society access to the state and its institutions in regulated, equitable but all possible ways.

The challenges are obvious and demanding at the same time. A holistic transformation of the South African public sector, introducing, developing and deepening efficiency, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, responsiveness, etc., while at the same time increasing services, i.e. 'more-of-the-same', to the historically disadvantaged communities has to be simultaneously accomplished in order to establish new participatory democratic state - civil society relations. These objectives will only be translated into practice by efficiently strengthening a wide

⁴⁵² Obviously it is not just civil society which needs technical, managerial and idealistic support (by the state and the donor community). The South African administration, although huge as it is with more than one million employees, needs to undergo capacity building and institutional strengthening exercises.

⁴⁵³ Please refer to De Coning, 1995b, for multiple advocacy in policy management. The author is grateful for the various challenging and clarifying debates.

array of organs of civil society, empowering them to participate constructively in policy-making as well as implementation. This presupposes a willingness and commitment by government structures to 'share power', not just with rival political parties or already aligned CBOs, but with the population at large. The historical notion of the state being the sole centre of legitimate power, perpetuates hierarchical top-down control-based modes of administration⁴⁵⁴. In today's complex, diverse and interdependent world this is no longer true. Good democratic governance, hence responsive and participatory state - society interaction, is a prerequisite for the continuation of the South African democratisation processes: Corporatism if applied strongly in South Africa might serve the function of reinforcing the hegemony of the state as the guardian of civil peace and as the arbiter of all social conflict⁴⁵⁵, mostly material resource conflicts. The danger lies not in having a strong, pro-active state, but results from a (too) dominant position of the state vis-a-vis the other corporate actors which could lead to the co-option of certain segments / elites of society with the worst case scenario being authoritarian state - civil society relations. Many questions remain, various alternative policies will compete and the future transitional processes may still seem unclear, but there is necessity to 'commence the continuation' of the road to freedom. Following O'Donnell's notion of two consecutive democratic transformations⁴⁵⁶ - the first being the transformation to a democratically elected government - the second still has to be strived for in South Africa, namely the transformation to a democratic regime.

Participation is nothing magical. The core principle consists of a constant process of dialogue on and between all level:

- A societal dialogue and consensus building requires adequate legal and political frame conditions;
- Participation presupposes the possibility, opportunity and capacity of social actors;
- The participative element has to be part of, i.e. inherent to, the development programmes and projects. It must not be a passive a posteriori measure, but

⁴⁵⁴Following Max Weber's model of the rational bureaucracy, which in turn is based on the concept of "Zweckrationalität" (purposefully oriented rationality) and "Verantwortungsethik" (ethic of responsibility) as the prime indicator of modernity.

⁴⁵⁵Vally, 1992, p. 75.

⁴⁵⁶O'Donnell, 1978, pp. 3-38.

should actively enable genuine impact on individual, societal and administrative level;

- Participation requires reorganisation and reorientation of planning and decision-making processes on all three tiers of government.

In order to structure the transmission belts and channels of communication between the articulation of interests up to their manifestation on governmental level effectively, focal points have to be installed on the political level⁴⁵⁷. These have practically function as strategic cores for co-ordination, decision-finding and societal consensus building; they have to be involved in the formulation of approaches and strategies (compare the envisaged 'strategic centre' between the enabling departments and the Premiers Office / Corporate Services in Gauteng). Within this context, support and strengthening of local institutions and community structures by decentralisation and devolution is only one side. More important is the development and establishment of new participation mechanisms for improving the frame conditions regarding independent civil society efforts and poverty eradication. The inclusion of societal actors into the different processes on the various levels of intervention, however, leads to different actors being active in different processes. It is important to note that not only 'strategic groups'⁴⁵⁸ will be included in consensus finding processes. Passive social sanctioning power has generally been underestimated⁴⁵⁹. The way and nature of the discussed policy development processes - as well as the policy outcomes - rather indicates that specifically in the phase of policy formulation strategic groups ought to be excluded from direct influence on policy design and process management as well as the drafting and planning processes, i.e. a stage in the policy cycle in which their social and political power can stall broadly representative societal consensus building, a priori. The current somewhat simplistic South African formula of inclusiveness, i.e. inclusiveness in terms of organised interests such as business, labour, civics and the state - which as demonstrated in the case of community development forums in Gauteng often boils down to only certain organisations, e.g. SANCO affiliates (but not other civics), the

⁴⁵⁷ Leffler-Franke, 1994, p. 68.

⁴⁵⁸ Concerning the hermeneutic concept of 'Strategic And Conflict-Able Groups' (SKOG), see: Evers, Schiel, 1988; Vennwald, 1990; Schubert, Tetzlaff, Vennwald, 1994. For a similar method of 'micro-and macro-political mapping' and 'political-resource mapping' of USAID, please refer to In regard to the latter, see, USAID, 1992a, 1992b.

⁴⁵⁹ For DBSA's experience, see: Clercq, 1994.

ANC (but not IFP or NP, DP, CP, or FF), etc. - is not sufficient. Active and passive blockage of implementation processes by such groups can be avoided, if the translation of development strategies into practice is designed as, and linked to, a continuous process of dialogue and exchange which allows situational and flexible adaptation of individual parts of programmes and projects. Certain critical questions ought to be asked more openly in order to define the appropriate roles, responsibilities and limits of the different institutional arrangements for participation, i.e. which forum will produce consensus, which technique will produce a good decision, what structures and organisational forms will produce a plan that may be implemented quickly, etc.⁴⁶⁰. Although lacking sustainability and the causes of failure as well as new developmental paradigms are increasingly internationally shared - and well formulated in the RDP - practical realisation by the South African public service as well as by many politicians and community activists seems to have been rather limited to paying lip-service during the last years. This is not to say that there have been no improvements, the opposite is true, however, by far more could be done speedier to translate the RDP's vision into reality.

Apart from the host of possible measures to stimulate participatory state - civil society relationships, the problem of seriously lacking problem-solving capacity, especially at local level, has to be addressed. Concerning local governments, seven areas of difficulty can be identified, namely⁴⁶¹:

1. Lack of technical and managerial manpower;
2. Insufficient expertise in formulating and implementing development plan (LDO);
3. Poor communication networks;
4. Unresponsive leadership and / or administration;
5. Inadequate financial, material and human resources;
6. Lack of a culture of transparency and accountability;
7. Potential destabilisation resulting from government provincial intrusion, over-centralisation and statutory laws placing needless parameters on local self-governance.

A series of measures aimed at coping with these problems would have to commence with getting the policy environment right - as is currently happening - but

⁴⁶⁰ Potapchuk, WY, p. 343.

⁴⁶¹ Rothchild, 1994, p. 6.

should not stop short of also getting the systems of (local) government and parastatals right, including clear and unambiguous local development strategies, a system of internal performance audits, impartially appointed conflict resolution institutions such as the ombudsman and the development tribune (but not just at provincial level), and efforts to ensure professional, businesslike management by attracting and retaining properly qualified staff. Using a overly technical approach to resource control may reinforce polarisation. The general perception is that resources are either controlled by central or by local government, although the Interim Constitution strengthening the position of the provincial tier, while the RDP claims that local government is the main implementation agency. For good democratic governance the process of resource allocation must not acquire the character of conflict, as is currently happening between the national and provincial and between provincial and local government. A more organic approach to effective (local self-) governance entails evolving an integrated, community based approach to resource management. This involves better demarcation of the range of functions, specifically between the second and the third tier, that can be handed at every level and then creating management capacity and assigning areas of resource control at that level, commensurate with the assigned function. Such best practice would break with the current situation in which responsibilities and functions are allocated on basically political reasons, but all levels lack either management and / or implementation capacity and the development implications of the specific allocations are not really analysed vis-à-vis existing capacities. It is appropriate to reiterate here that this does not imply discarding or even weakening the central institutions of the state. A strong democracy implies a strong and capable state. Current South African 'partnership' discussions point to a promising direction, although many critical issues around accountability, efficiency and sustainability and governance in general, still need to be dissolved for achieving truly effective and developmental partnerships⁴⁶².

The role of local authorities must also change dramatically away from concentrating only on provision of basic services and land-use control to actively participating in, influencing, and stimulating all communities' basic political, economic, infrastructure, and education elements towards ensuring the quality of life

⁴⁶²For a critical discussion linking these issues with the development forum approach, see Morris, 1995.

and local economic development. The wellspring for all this progress is economic vitality, i.e. resources that expand to meet the vast and continuously growing needs, businesses that prosper, and citizens who see the community develop. Certain strategic aspects of LED approaches to development have already been discussed. LED is not new to South Africa, during the old regime, certain LED strategies have been employed in connection with the regional industrial development policy. The recent emphasis placed on it by the national RDP Office is a good sign, because development is not only a national or regional issue but also a urban one. National and provincial macro policies will not be able to solve South Africa's huge developmental needs in the near future; local players can effectively support development efforts by getting directly involved in economic policy.

The traditional LED initiatives in Europe and the United States placed emphasis on 'selling' the town or city through⁴⁶³: marketing; provision of indirect incentives to outside investors, such as preferential rates for municipal services; direct incentives in the form of land, infrastructure and finance on favourable terms; and active recruitment or retention of specific industries or companies.

Newer approaches during the last two decades concentrated more on promoting development from within by ensuring that the specific local conditions were used in an optimal way. Techniques employed encompass: enterprise boards, accountable to elected officials and geared towards providing direct capital investment for especially local manufacturing industries through share holding and long-term loans; local development corporations, whose work is mainly sponsored by public sector finance and which concentrate on encouraging entrepreneurial approaches to local development; out-sourcing and privatisation as a means of increasing the provision of services and decreasing the pressure on local government budgets; public-private partnerships by formal agreements around development and economic growth; export processing zones attracting investment and promoting technological skills transfers; and by the establishment of science and technology parks as well as industrial districts / estates⁴⁶⁴.

⁴⁶³The section below is based on GPTMC, 1995c, section 3 and 4.

⁴⁶⁴On a lower level of sophistication, 'hives' established by the SBDC for SMMEs have been very successful in South Africa in the recent past.

Obviously, not all of the above instruments will necessarily work in a specific local setting, but a mix of the approaches can be selectively assembled for different LED strategies. The Pretoria Metropolitan Council identifies seven distinct integrated LED strategies⁴⁶⁵:

1. Enhancing job-linking capacity by campaigns to employ local people and assistance in placement.
2. Fostering local entrepreneurs and indigenous development by 'one stop shop' services or 'fast track processing units' for planning geared to serve existing and potential entrepreneurs, SMME support, business competitions and special finance schemes, and by generally supporting self-employment and competitiveness.
3. Generating of new ideas, possibility thinking and community involvement, by local skills audits / registers, economic development ideas banks, local development officers and committees and task forces for LED.
4. Attracting new industries, businesses, settlers and all other type of resources by lobbying government funding and international development aid, publicity campaign and information provision to potential investors, and developing the city in general as a 'centre of excellence'.
5. Strengthening of the existing business base by training and business related continuing education programmes, local business support networks and schemes, promotion of export culture practices, development of international links, and by initiation of retired businessmen and women to act as mentors.
6. Purging leaks in the local economy by 'buy local' campaigns, promotion of local businesses and support for local import substitution, local tendering concessions for local businesses (including the informal sector), local agency arrangements for government and corporations, and the formation of business networks.
7. Enhancing the attractiveness to visitors, both tourists and businessmen, by downtown or mainstreet development, preparation of comprehensive tourism strategies, creation of community image strategies, development of congress and exhibition centres, and marketing.

⁴⁶⁵ GPTMC, 1995c, section 3.

One specific concept deserves special attention. 'Civic entrepreneurship' is a broad approach to LED which may well guide future actions, it seeks to⁴⁶⁸:

- join revenue and resource consciousness with expenditure management;
- create the capacity to meet community needs through innovation, co-operation and combining rather than duplicating efforts to use all available community resources, human and fiscal, wisely and effectively;
- offer choices and options consistent with community needs and preferences rather than single best solution generated by the administration;
- identify needs and wants and form a consensus on community priorities;
- address the community as multi-faceted and explore diverse options of delivery;
- reformat public leadership thinking away from tactical quick fixes and annual (incremental) priorities to a strategic perspective that identifies community goals and initiates those productive changes and long range strategies essential to the attainment of those goals; and
- see tax money as too precious and politically expensive to fund anything but essential core services necessary for public safety, infrastructure maintenance, and personal survival, because many of the growing demands are want driven, discretionary, or cost hand-offs from private sector choices. Responses to these demands should be fee based or funded from non-tax community resources. This would serve enhancement of job creation through a positive impact on local economic development (LED), e.g. by promoting localised subcontracting, increased use of existing near-by training facilities, etc. Hence, this approach would be well aligned to South Africa's new development strategy and supports the emphasis placed on LED by the Masakhane campaign. The RDP needs to give with taking, and take with giving.

With regard to the relationship of participation and LED strategies, a number of issues need to be raised. First of all, there must be alignment between the regional / local development strategy, based on key policies such as job creation and HRD, and LED mechanisms. Secondly, new approaches to government - business relations require proper capacity building from the local authority, specifically in the field of managing contracts. Thirdly, participation and thus synergy

⁴⁶⁸ Neu, 1991, pp. 5-6; see also Osborne, Gaebler, 1993.

of all stakeholders is important. Additionally community participation ought not to be restricted to only one or few stages in the policy / planning / project cycle. Within this context, popular participation rationales of mobilising community members as cheap or even unpaid labour seems less promising than agreeing on and providing a coherent set of incentives and effective local (developmental) governance. Owing to widespread poverty and the legacy of the South African past, this will often entail massive empowerment efforts as a necessary preparation of communities and businesses.

Here, as well as concerning the establishment of the RDP implementation structures and the transformation of the public service in general, the main objective must not be creation of governmental or state control capacity, but the strengthening of strategic-developmental competency, i.e. situational, institutional forms of problem-solving, both within the state as well as of organs of civil society. Ideally, strategies of horizontal and vertical decentralisation - not just of responsibilities but also of corresponding administrative and financial capacity - and the establishment of channels of communication and co-ordination support these forms of devolution of currently centrally and provincial held political and administrative power. More important in the context of civil society participation is that these state-centred efforts need to be complemented by capacity building of organs of civil society. Only then can increased development performance, due to participation of the people, e.g. community self-help, individual initiative and effort, etc., lead to better legitimisation (impact of participation on individual level, i.e. citizens attitudes⁴⁶⁷) and effectiveness (impact of participation on macro-level, i.e. development performance⁴⁶⁸) of the development programmes induced by a higher degree of acceptance of state policy and its actions. However, the opposite, i.e. overload of the state with individual interests, may also be regarded as a concrete danger⁴⁶⁹. Participating in, and ownership of, the development processes is being complemented by building potential countervailing social power, i.e. checks and balances on local level, through civil society by creating transparency and social learning processes, so that the four core functions of participation on macro-, meso- and micro-level can be

⁴⁶⁷ Differentiation drawn from Kweit, Kweit, 1980 and Kweit, 1981.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ Hyden, 1983.

achieved, i.e. creation of legitimacy and legitimation, increasing effectiveness and efficiency of political control, strengthening functions of control and regulation, and initiating societal learning processes⁴⁷⁰.

5.3) Outlook: Development And Participatory Democracy In South Africa

The debate on the involvement of civil society in policy-making and development in South Africa is still unresolved, both on local as well as provincial / national level. Neither the RDP nor the national RDP White Paper does specify an elaborate model. NEDLAC has not been helpful for establishing corporatist partnerships on local or communal level. Thus several potential arrangements, such as a total separation of civil society and government, the representation of government structures in civil society or the other way around, or an active interactionist model, are discussed widely. In this context, all roleplayers theoretically support the organisation of civil society to achieve its participation (or at least just their personal / own organisational ends). Unfortunately there are no commonly shared or publicised concepts by, or effective coalitions in, civil society concerning this complex topic. There is only one common feature concerning South African approaches to community organisation. Unfortunately, they resemble the hierarchical, pyramid-like structure as practised formerly in the UDF, in political parties or as described in the development forum approach. Negative effects are the drawing up of capable leadership away from the local level into higher structures as well as the basically inherent static and inflexibility. Alternative decentralised forms of organisation are hard to find in South Africa.

Confronting the obstacles to participation implies laying an entirely new groundwork for relations between the state, NGOs, CBOs, and poor communities. All actors can and must play a very relevant role within the new framework of people-centred development. The state must continue and in some respects start fulfilling its basic functions in the area of promoting growth, at the same time maintaining macro-economic equilibrium and equity, modernising its social institutions and management, and catalysing the enormous necessary social reforms. The NGOs must emphasise the importance of their actions in strengthening the communities'

⁴⁷⁰Leffler-Franke, 1994, pp. 19, 68.


abilities to organise themselves and articulate their needs. Within this context, CBOs, even if developmentally transformed, will not be enough. Along Asian examples, people's organisations (PO), such as those of homeless or landless, must be established in order to 'fight' South Africa's legacy of establishing 'top-up' organisations using geographical representation⁴⁷¹. This will allow an increase in their real influence and their ability to negotiate. The communities must increase their ability to participate as well as to initiate self-help. This is best done by the act of participation and by demanding even more participation, so that together the three actors involve in networks that maximise the best that each one has to offer. The point of departure must be the eradication of structural causes of poverty in order to enable a self-fuelled dynamic process of self-empowerment and development.

Lastly, participatory processes and structures which facilitate collaboration help to build a stronger democracy by democratising decision-making. As planners hopefully assist to shape the civic culture in their communities, they thereby influence the expectations and norms members of the public internalise and use in their day-to-day interaction with local government. A positive, open and co-operative civic culture will help promote constructive community decisions-making and thus increase the quality of development strategies and policies.. However, the culture of citizen and popular participation in communities where citizens have been suppressed and outmanoeuvred for decades changes slowly. Community based organisations in South Africa are well schooled in adversarial strategies for blocking, delaying, and disrupting processes, but often only have limited skills in negotiation and problem solving, and building working relationships. Collaborative processes, with genuine participation on all levels as the basis, can help citizens and communities as a whole be effective participants through training, education, and role-modelling.

It has to be noted that strengthening of participation and local self-governance will only be successful, if poverty alleviation by both traditional and modern elements, as well as true decentralisation takes place. The first condition is self-obvious, the second insofar, as the general development forum approach as well as the subsequent DFA initiative were 'suggested', if not outright imposed, in a top

⁴⁷¹DRC, 1995a.

down fashion from provincial government (in its vain to implement central government frameworks). The case study on Gauteng teaches that if local social actors do not initiate and develop the policy together with higher (governmental) levels, important resources such as time and motivation can and will easily be lost. The good will from communities and their organisations was there, but they clearly lacked control. It is too early to claim Gauteng's new DDPE&W led VISTA III / Development Planning Conference approach will fail. However, one can surely assert that authentic participation does currently not take place. Thus the interesting question remains, whether half-hearted, poorly structured participation in the policy development of the provincial participatory development planning approach will lead to a participatory framework for the future. Let's hope, advocate and see!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P. Wenzel'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large 'P' and a long, sweeping underline.

Yours sincerely

Appendices

Appendix A) List of Interviews

- Andersson, G., Executive Director, Development Resources Centre, Johannesburg, 7/11/1995.
- Arkwright, D., Senior Specialist: Development Planning Division, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, 25/10/1995.
- Beer, D., Town Clerk, Sabie, 3/5/1994, 4/5/1994.
- Benjamin, P., Secretariat, RDP-Core Group, Gauteng, Johannesburg, 5/10/1995, 16/10/1995, 21/1/1996.
- Cranko, P., Chief Director: Corporate Strategy, Corporate Services, Gauteng Provincial Administration, Johannesburg, 26/10/1995.
- Dangor, Z., Manager Advocacy Development, Development Resources Centre, Johannesburg, 3/11/1995.
- Duaskardt, R., Director: Policy Development and Information, Department of Development Planning Environment and Works, Gauteng Provincial Administration, Johannesburg, 11/12/1995.
- Evans, J., Community Organiser, PLANACT, Johannesburg, 27/10/1995.
- Harding, T., Research Department, Development Resources Centre, Johannesburg, 13/10/1995.
- Harrison, K., Research Assistant, Institute for African Alternatives, Johannesburg, 16/10/1995.
- Heymans, C., Head of Division: Development Planning, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, 18/10/1995.
- Hundsdörfer, H. V., Director: Education Training and Development Practitioners Project (GTZ), former Advisor to the Department Local Economic Development and Planning, National RDP Office, Johannesburg, 3/10/1995.
- Martin, F., Town Councillor, responsible for implementation of SERD, Witbank, 17/4/1994, 19/4/1994.
- Mogole, T., Senior Community Development Worker, Development Resources Centre, Johannesburg, 7/11/1995.

Moloi, P., Director: Chief Directorate Local Economic Development and Planning, National RDP Office, Pretoria, 18/10/1995.

Musa, S., Local Government Specialist, PLANACT, Johannesburg, 14/10/1995.

Ngonyama, J., Chairperson, RDP Co-ordination Committee, Pretoria, 27/10/1995.

Niewkerk, L. K. v., Senior Policy Analyst, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, 20/1/1995.

Phahlane, F., Head of Department: Democratisation and Building the Economy, South African National Civics Organisation, Gauteng Region, Johannesburg, 20/10/1995.

Pretorius, L. v., Director: Project Manna and Member of Gauteng NGO-Coalition, Pretoria, 10/10/1995.

Turok, B., Member of Parliament (Cape Town), former PWV RDP-Commissioner, Johannesburg, 9/10/1995.

Wooldridge, D., Lecturer, Graduate School of Public and Development Management (GSP&DM), Johannesburg, 4/10/1995.


Participant Observation

Development Resources Centre / Department of Development Planning Environment and Works, Gauteng Provincial Administration: The Challenges facing Local Government, Breakfast Briefing Seminar, Johannesburg, 8/12/1995.

NGO-Forum for Pretoria (PANGO): Second Constituting Meeting, jointly organised with the Pretoria RDP Co-ordination Committee, Pretoria, 25/10/1995.

RDP Core Group / Department of Development Planning, Gauteng Provincial Administration: VISTA II Conference, Witwatersrand Technikon, Johannesburg, 29/7/1995.

Yeoville Development Forum, Meeting, Johannesburg, 25/10/1995.

Appendix B)**Guidelines for Development Planning:
The Planning Cycle**

Source: FEPD, 1995b, p. 12.

**Guidelines for Development Planning:
National - Provincial Relations in Planning**

FUNCTIONAL ROLES	POTENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
* Political leadership * Strategic alignment	National and Provincial Cabinets
* Leadership of inter-governmental planning processes * Agreement on substantive items * Resolution of disputes	Inter-governmental Forum (Premiers & key Ministers)
* Allocation of resources between provinces * Integration of budget process into development planning	Finance and Fiscal Commission
* Management of inter-governmental planning process * Appropriate institutional arrangements * Resolution of turf issues	Technical Intergovernmental Committee (Directors General)
* "builds the road": establishment of common approaches to development planning * Integration of provincial strategies	Forum for Effective Planning and Development (MECs)
* Technical advice regarding development planning system	Development Planning Commission
* Administration and technical integration of development plans	FEPD Technical Committee
* Sectoral intergovernmental relations and planning	MinMECs on sectoral, economic financial issues
* General support and coordination of the process throughout government	National and Provincial RDP offices


Source: FEPD, 1995b, p. 19-20.

**Guidelines for Development Planning:
Development Responsibilities at Provincial Level**


FUNCTIONAL ROLES	POTENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
* Political leadership * Strategic alignment with the RDP	Premier/Cabinet
* Overall responsibility for management of process * Dispute resolution * Ensuring execution of line department responsibilities	DG/IDC
* Sectoral planning (strategic and operational)	Line departments
* Socio-economic analysis and generation of broad strategy options * Technical support to process of integration	Specialised units (eg. Economic Affairs and/or Development Planning)
* Stakeholder mobilisation and capacity building * Monitoring of progress against agreed upon strategies, programmes and budgets	Specialised units (eg. RDP, Development Facilitation Unit and/or PPF)

Source: FEPD, 1995b, p. 18.

Guidelines for Development Planning: Interfaces between National and Provincial Levels




Source: FEPD, 1995b, p. 20.

Appendix C)**The Development Facilitation Framework:
Planning System**

Source: IFAA, 1995b, p. 10.

The Development Facilitation Framework:
Project Approval Process

Tribunal's decision is final:
it can approve, reject or modify



Source: IFAA, 1995b, p. 11.

Appendix D)**CDFs Constitutions:****Framework for the Constitution of the Jameson Park Development Forum (JPDF)****1. NAME:**

The organisation shall be known as the "Jameson Park Development forum" (JPDF).

2. VISION:

The JPDF will be a community development forum and established to create a climate in which interested parties can co-operate to identify, mobilise, maximize and utilize suitable resources in order to improve the quality of life of all people in the Jameson Park area.

3. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY:

The area of responsibility, which will be known as Jameson Park, is defined as including: Jameson Park, Kaydale, Spaarwater, Brinkman Farm, Fourteen and Vaaldam.

4. MISSION:

- 4.1 Set up structures to facilitate participation of all stakeholders.*
- 4.2 Embark on awareness campaign and membership drive.*
- 4.3 Monitor and audit existing resources and projects, including planned projects.*
- 4.4 Perform needs analyses and project research as well as impact assessment.*
- 4.5 Prioritize needs and allocate available resources and manage existing resources.*
- 4.6 Mobilize new resources and launch new community projects.*
- 4.7 Promote peace, harmony and stability in the area.*
- 4.8 Promote, co-ordinate and effect programmes in keeping with RDP criteria.*
- 4.9 To act as a watchdog regarding the running of the area of responsibility by the greater Nigel Transitional Local Council, during the transitional period and afterwards.*

5. STRUCTURE:

The forum will comprise the following sub-structures:

5.1 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The forum will be managed by an executive committee which will consist of the following democratically elected officials:

- (a) Chairperson
- (b) Treasurer
- (c) Secretary
- (d) Projects co-ordinator (X2)

5.2 SUBSTRUCTURES THAT WILL BE FORMED AS PROJECTS EMERGE:

These include such sub-structures as feeding schemes, health, education, self-help, etc. Such projects shall be under the responsibility of the projects co-ordinator who shall in turn be responsible for establishing managerial committees for each project through democratic elections and acting as liaison between the project committee and the executive committee.

6. OPERATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

- 6.1 Executive committee shall meet at least twice a month.
- 6.2 Chairperson and Projects co-ordinators will be responsible to arrange meeting of sub-committees at least monthly.
- 6.3 Projects co-ordinators will be responsible to report projects at monthly executive committee meetings.
- 6.4 Minutes will be kept of proceedings at all meetings and distributed to committee members within one week of the meeting date. Minutes must be approved at committee meetings.
- 6.5 Minutes will be available to all interested parties.
- 6.6 An operating budget must be drafted annually and approved by the executive committee.
- 6.7 Signing authority, as approved by executive committee, shall be with chairperson and treasurer.
- 6.8 The forum shall attempt to reach consensus in all matters. Only when all avenues have been exhausted, will the chairperson be entitled to call for a vote.

7. QUORUM:

- 7.1 A quorum shall be constituted by 4 members of executive committee.
- 7.2 Disputed issues will be decided on a majority vote.
- 7.3 In a deadlock situation, a re-vote must take place. If after such re-vote the deadlock remains unbroken, the chairperson shall have a casting vote.

8. ELECTION PROCEDURE

- 8.1 Officials shall be elected democratically by a majority vote at the annual general meeting of members.
- 8.2 Officials shall be elected for a term not exceeding one year with the provision that all of the officials in office shall vacate their positions annually. Such officials shall be eligible for re-election.
- 8.3 Officials who have served consecutive two year terms shall not be eligible for re-election.

9. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

- 9.1 The constitution shall be formally adopted by members attending a general meeting of the forum.
- 9.2 Amendments to the constitution must be approved by at least 75% of members present at a general meeting. Notice of such proposed changes must be given in writing at least 7 days before the meeting.
- 9.3 Proposals made in writing shall accompany meeting notices and agendas.

10. CODE OF CONDUCT

- 10.1 The organisation is inclusive and will not endorse or promote the policy of any individual political party or grouping.
- 10.2 Members will conduct themselves in a professional and courteous manner, and concentrate their efforts on promoting the goals of the forum.
- 10.3 Membership is for contribution, not for affiliation. It is therefore imperative that members take an active and enthusiastic interest in and participate in the activities of the forum.

10.4 The following behaviour can lead to disciplinary action:

- (a) inter - organisational conflict;**
- (b) personal attacks, insults or slurring;**
- (c) politically rooted conflict;**
- (d) dishonesty, fraud, theft or misrepresentation for personal gain.**

10.5 Transgression will be investigated by the executive committee whose decision will be final and binding.

10.6 Disagreements and grievances may be referred to mediation.

10.7 All cases of fraud, theft or dishonesty for personal gain must be prosecuted.

11. FUNDING

An annual contribution fee of R30-00 (payable in 3 instalments of R10-00) must be paid. This should cover administration costs of the forum.

Source: JPDF, 1995.

Framework for the Constitution of the Greater Nigel Development Forum (GNDF)

1. NAME

The organisation shall be known as the "Greater Nigel Development Forum" (GNDF).

2. VISION

The greater Nigel Development Forum will be a totally independent forum established to create a climate in which interested parties can co-operate to identify, mobilise, maximise and utilise suitable resources in order to improve the quality of life of all people in the greater Nigel area.

3. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The area of responsibility, which will be known as the Greater Nigel Area, is defined as including, but not limited to, Nigel, Duduza, Alra Park, Mckenzieville, Spaarwater, Dunnottar, Marievale, Sharon Park and Jameson Park municipal areas.

4. MISSION

- 3.1 Set up structures to facilitate participation of all stakeholders.
- 3.2 Embark on awareness campaign and membership drive.
- 3.3 Auditing existing resources and projects.
- 3.4 Perform needs analysis and project research as well as impact assessment.
- 3.5 Prioritise needs and allocate available resources. Manage existing projects.
- 3.6 Mobilise new resources and launch new community projects.
- 3.7 Promote peace, harmony and stability in the area.
- 3.8 Promote, coordinate and effect programmes in keeping with RDP program.

5. STRUCTURE

The forum will comprise the following sub structures :

5.1 The Steering Committee

The forum will be managed by a Steering Committee which will consist of the following democratically elected officials :

- (a) Chairman
- (b) Vice-chairman
- (c) Treasurer who must be suitably qualified and experienced
- (d) Administrator
- (e) Chairmen of Community Development Forums
- (f) Chairman of the Community Trust
- (g) Members of the project subcommittee

5.2 Community Development Forums

Each community listed in the area of responsibility (paragraph 2) will establish a development forum to identify and manage projects in that specific community.

In the interim phase, a sub-committee will be appointed by the Steering Committee to facilitate the establishment of the individual community forums.

Community forums will determine their own structures based on the number of ministries they identify.

A chairman will be democratically elected at the first formal meeting of the ~~forum and will~~ automatically be a member of the Steering Committee.

5.3 Community Trust

The community trust will be responsible for management of funds received for and funds allocated to community projects in accordance with guidelines and procedures supplied by the Provincial RDP and the Steering Committee.

The Trust will comprise :

- (a) Chairman who will be appointed by the Steering Committee. The chairman will be in possession of a suitable qualification and belong to a recognised professional organisation with an accepted code of ethics, minimum Chartered Accountant (SA).
- (b) Two (2) members appointed by the Steering Committee from the GNDF.
- (c) Two (2) members appointed by the Transitional Local Government.

5.4 Projects Sub-committee

The projects sub-committee shall consist of a minimum of three (3) members democratically elected at the first forum meeting of the Greater Nigel Development Forum.

The tasks of the projects sub-committee shall be :

- (a) To design conformance criteria for approval by the Provincial RDP
- (b) To develop procedures and guidelines for preparation of community projects
- (c) To screen project proposals before submission to the Steering Committee and to make recommendations to the Steering Committee on such proposals.

6. MEMBERSHIP

Membership will be as follows:

- 6.1 Two representatives of any business operating within the defined area of responsibility.
- 6.2 Two representatives of any other organisation i.e. CBO, NGO, Parastatal organisations, Political Parties or any other organisation approved by the Steering Committee.
- 6.3 Membership of unaffiliated individuals must be approved by the Steering Committee.
- 6.4 Membership can only be terminated or declined by a 80% majority vote at a full sitting of the Steering Committee.
- 6.5 Representatives of Government organisations may be coopted when the specific need is identified and will have observer status at any forum meeting.

7. FUNDING

Initially a budget of projected requirements will be prepared and the Provincial RDP will be approached for allocation from available funds. Thereafter the Forum will be responsible for raising its own funds to cover any shortfall by obtaining contributions from members and through fund raising projects.

8. CODE OF CONDUCT

- 8.1 The organisation is inclusive and will not endorse or promote the policy of any individual political party or grouping.
- 8.2 Members will conduct themselves in a professional and courteous manner and concentrate their efforts on promoting the goals of the forum.
- 8.3 Membership is for contribution and not for affiliation. It is therefore imperative that members take an active and enthusiastic interest in and participate in the activities of the Forum.

The following behaviour could lead to disciplinary action :

- (a) Inter organisational conflict
 - (b) Personal attacks, insults or slurring
 - (c) Politically rooted cor
 - (d) Dishonesty, fraud, theft or misrepresentation for personal gain
- 8.4 Transgressions will be investigated by the Steering Committee whose decision will be final and binding.
 - 8.5 Disagreements and grievances may be referred to mediation.
 - 8.6 All cases of fraud, theft or dishonesty for personal gain must be prosecuted.

9. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

- 9.1 Steering Committee shall meet at least monthly.
- 9.2 Chairpersons will be responsible to arrange meetings of subcommittees at least monthly.
- 9.3 Chairpersons of the subcommittees will be required to report on projects at monthly Steering Committee meetings.
- 9.4 Minutes will be kept of proceedings at all meetings and distributed to committee members within 1 (one) week of the meeting date. Minutes must be approved at committee meetings.
- 9.5 Minutes will be available to all interested parties.
- 9.6 An operating budget must be drafted annually and approved by the Steering Committee.

- 9.7 Signing authority will be agreed and formally approved by the Steering Committee.
- 9.8 The Administrator must register the forum with the PWV RDP.
- 9.9 The forum shall attempt to reach consensus in all matters. Only when all other avenues have been exhausted, will the chairman be entitled to call for a vote.
- 9.10 The Steering Committee shall approve the guidelines and procedures to be followed by the Community Trust and Project sub-committee.

10. QUORUM

- 10.1 50% plus 1 member will constitute a quorum.
- 10.2 Disputed issues will be decided on a majority vote.
- 10.3 In a deadlock situation, a revote must take place. If after such revote the deadlock remains unbroken, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.

11. ELECTION PROCEDURE


- 11.1 Officials shall be elected democratically by a majority vote at the Annual General Meeting of members.
- 11.2 Officials shall be elected for a term not exceeding two (2) years with the proviso that 50% of officials in office shall vacate their positions annually. Such officials shall be eligible for re-election.
- 11.3 Officials who have served (?) consecutive two years terms shall not be eligible for re-election.

12. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

- 12.1 The Constitution shall be formally adopted by members attending a General Meeting of the forum.
- 12.2 Amendments to the Constitution must be approved by at least 75% of members present at a General Meeting. Notice of such proposed changes must be given in writing at least 7 days before the meeting.
- 12.3 Proposals made in writing shall accompany meeting notices and agendas.

Appendix E)**Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:
Networking Committees - A link between Government and
Civil Society**

- A loose and informal interim structure
- A voluntary membership
- A time span limited to 12 - 18 months
- A limited mandate: Get the Local Development Forums off the ground and working



Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 44.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Functions of the Networking Committees

Implementation management is not all the NWC does: The three dimensions of consultation, implementation and conflict management

- The role of the Core Group of the NWC is to

- (a) Design the NWC and
- (b) Process the NWC so that the structures starts working immediately


Besides these, the Core Group starts working on the "normal" functions and tasks of the NC

- The functions of the Networking Committee (NWC) will be

Consultation	Implementation Management	Conflict Management
- Secure the input of civil society structures - Strengthen civil society	- Audit of local resources - Funds' Management: Allocation and control - Project Selection - Project Management - Evaluation - Capacity Building: business and organisational skills, infrastructure, communication, understanding policy	- Address practical needs of communities struggling with the establishment of LDFs - Develop a mediation approach and use of communities' experiences in resolving conflicts

Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 48.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Structure of the Networking Committees



Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 49.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Where do LDFs come in?

State/Type of the project	Local Govt. Projects	President's Office Projects	Provincial RDP Commission Projects	LDF Projects: Self-funded Projects	LDF Projects: NGO/Donor Projects	Public Works Projects
Initiate project	Local/metro govt., PWV govt. departments, RDP Commission, LDFs	President's Office	RDP Commission, NWC	LDFs	LDFs, NGOs, Donors	National level
Plan/design project	PWV govt. departments and local/metro govt.	President's Office in coordination with national and provincial ministries	RDP Commission in coordination with NWC	LDFs (can involve experts)	LDFs and NGOs, Donors	Department PWV Planning and Environment Ministry
Consult on project	Local/metro govt., LDFs, RDP Commission	National ministries	PWV govt. departments, LDFs	Local/metro govt., RDP Commission, NWC	Local/metro govt., RDP Commission, NWC	LDFs, Local Planning Fora, RDP Commission, NWC
Fund project	National, provincial, local/metro govt. funding	President's Office	Provincial RDP budget	self-funded: LDFs	External funds	National budget
Decide on project	PWV govt. departments	President's Office	RDP Commission	LDFs	LDFs	National level
Manage/implement project	Local/metro govt.	President's Office	Civil Society Consortiums	LDFs	LDFs	Provincial level, local/metro govt.
Evaluate project	PWV govt. departments and local/metro govt. in coordination with LDFs, RDP Commission	President's Office and Minister without Portfolio (RDP)	RDP Commission and Civil Society Consortium	LDFs	LDFs in coordination with NGOs, Donors	PWV govt. in coordination with local/metro govt., LDFs and RDP Commission


Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 14.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Useful Projects of LDFs

Addressing local issues	Capacity building programs	Job creation projects	Community service projects	Education/
Violence Crime Vandalism Child-abuse Drugs Environmental issues	Administrative skills Development skills Physical planning skills Workshop/conference/meeting skills Management Funds management Conflict management Report writing Negotiation Legal aspects: Contracts etc. Business skills Technical skills Public relation skills	SMME development SME development Small scale industries Cottage industries Coops Urban agriculture: self help production Labour intensive programs Sub contracting	Sports facilities Sports events Crèches Tree planting Park maintenance Township beautification Township cleaning awareness campaigns Life skills Welfare projects Self help skills Counseling services: Drugs, personal problems etc. Career information Protection of public assets	ABE Adult education Trainers Technical Business Formal education Literacy training Education support for scholars: tuition Bursary schemes

Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 13.

**Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:
The Structure of LDFs and CDFs**



Source: RDP Core Group, 1994b, p. 12.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Functions and Respective Needs of LDFs

Information and education: The LDF does	This implies needs for
- Inform and educate on the local level on: * RDP policies * RDP structures * Government structures ie local government * Development concepts and sectional policies and programmes ie housing, infrastructure, planning, education...	- Communication strategy of the respective LDF - Communication strategy on regional/ provincial level - Information for local LDFs: * flow * services


Consultation: The LDF does	This implies needs for
- consults actively on implementation of the RDP at the local level * takes part in respective structures if they exist * pressurises government to establish such structures * works with respective civil society structures and organisations * Ensures the development of civil society concepts on RDP processes	- access to up to date information on government policies and delivery - disciplined process in terms of time frames for LDF and Local Government inputs - inputs in general on the provincial/ regional levels

Implementation: The LDF does	This implies needs for
- Implement specific RDP projects	- project planning and management - funds: to be raised by the LDFs?, to be granted by government?, to be granted by foreign donors? - funds managed by a community trust? - co-ordination process: What does Loc Govt do? And what is done by LDFs?

Capacity building: The LDF does	This implies needs for
- build capacity on how to operate as an effective LDF * action-oriented communication * project and funds management * administration * organisation: meetings, etc. * planning * conceptualise inputs	- general strategy for all LDFs: - ensured local delivery by NWC - formulating a training plan by each LDF


Source: RDP Core Group, 1994b, p. 8-9.

**Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:
How should LDFs be linked to the Governmental RDP
Structures?**




Source: RDP Core Group, 1994b, p. 14.

**Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:
A Mandate different from the PWV Economic and
Development Forum**




Source: RDP Core Group, 1994a, p. 47.

Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach: Structure of the PWV Economic and Development Forum




Source: GSP&DM, 1995.

**Gauteng RDP Commission Development Forum Approach:
Membership in the PWV Economic and Development Forum**



Source: GSP&DM, 1995.

Appendix F)**CDFs and LDFs in 1995:
Applications for Project Proposals**


Clarification on the above:

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE : Committee mandated by the Commission to assess and evaluate business plans from departments and to report to the Commission.

RDP COMMISSION : Special Cabinet Subcommittee, headed by MEC for Economic Affairs and Finance.

Source: RDP Commission, 1995a, p. 11.

CDFs and LDFs in 1995: RDP Structures in Gauteng




(THE TEN LINE DEPARTMENTS: EACH WITH A PROGRAMME MANAGER AND AN RDP COORDINATOR)

1. Develop Project proposals and business plans for RDP programmes
2. Implement RDP programmes, projects and campaigns

Source: RDP Commission, 1995a, p. 10.

**CDFs and LDFs in 1995:
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model**


CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN METRO AND SUBSTRUCTURES



Source: GPTMC, 1995b, Annexure 1.


CDFs and LDFs in 1995:
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model

SUGGESTED SUBSTRUCTURE CO-ORDINATING MODEL



Source: GPTMC, 1995b, Annexure 2.

CDFs and LDFs in 1995: Pretoria's Planning Forum Model



NOTES: A.

Information/needs of a PZ and Substructure-wide nature would be fed into the Substructure decision-making process through the PZFs (line Departments, Section 60 type Committee, Exco, Council).

The Substructure is responsible for the setting of LDOs in terms of the Development Facilitation Act (DFA). The LDOs would be based on inputs i.e., from the PZFs. The Substructure Council would include such LDOs in its 5 year long term programme. Such LDOs would also be submitted to the Metro Council for inclusion in the Metro 5 year long term programme for submission to Province in terms of the DFA. The Substructure would determine local priorities and produce appropriate development plans for the PZs.

- B. Information/needs of a Metro-wide nature could be submitted by the Substructure, or by the PZF to the Metro Council, the relevant Metropolitan Forums and Substructure Development Forums.
- C. Information/needs identified by Metropolitan Forums could be exchanged between such Forums.
- D. Information/needs generated and identified by the Metro Forums could be submitted to Metro Council (relevant Standing Committees). Where appropriate there would be contact with the Substructures.
- E. Information/needs generated and identified by the Substructure Development Forums could be submitted to the applicable/relevant Metro Standing Committee, Metro Forum, Substructure or PZF.

Source: GPTMC, 1995b, Annexure 3.

**CDFs and LDFs in 1995:
Pretoria's Planning Forum Model**

THE LAND-USE PLANNING AND CONTROL PROCESS

HIERARCHY OF ACTION	RESPONSI- BILITY	CO-ORDINATION	WORKING METHOD	APPROVAL
Regional Structure Plan	Metro	Co-ordination with State, Province, Sub- structures, Public participation	Metro Technical Committee	Metro Council
Metropoli- tan Struc- ture Plan	Metro	Co-ordination with State, Province, Sub- structures, Public par- ticipation	Metro Technical Committee	Metro Council
Substruc- ture Struc- ture Plan	Substruc- ture with Metro inputs	Co-ordination with Metro and other Sub- structures Public par- ticipation	Substruc- ture City Planning Department Metro Technical Committee	Substruc- ture Council
Local Guide-line and Action Plans	Substruc- ture with Metro inputs	Substructure Public par- ticipation Planning Zone Forum	Substruc- ture City Planning Department Metro Technical Committee	Substruc- ture Council
Development Planning (issues which pro- mote the development process)	Substruc- ture with Metro inputs	Substructure Public par- ticipation Planning Zone Forums	Substruc- ture Planning Zone In- formation Office	Substruc- ture Council
Applica- tions	Substruc- ture	Substructure Public par- ticipation	Substruc- ture City Planning Department	Substruc- ture Council

Source: GPTMC, 1995b, Annexure 4.

**CDFs and LDFs in 1995:
Core Group Restructuring Workshop (November)**

Core Group aim and objectives

Aim: To create an enabling environment for Community Development Initiatives in Gauteng

Objectives:

- To offer support services to Community Development Initiatives
- To network on behalf of these CDI with all levels of government; business, NGOs and others
- To develop and agree policy on CDFs

Key role:

- The key role of the Core Group is to bring together different organisations for community development:
- Community Organisations / Civil Society
 - Government (all levels)
 - Business

Proposed model

Plenary: Inclusive of all main parties. Meets every 6 weeks/2 months. Formal reporting, policy forum. Networking.

Action group: Smaller management committee, like existing Core Group - 6 Networking Committees, key others (NGOs, business, SACS). Meets every 2 - 3 weeks.

Secretariat: Implementors of CG policy. Probably 3 people. Answers to the Action Group.

Task Teams: Set up by secretariat. Information task team (led by SACS); Policy Task Team and Capacity Building Task Team.

CDFs and LDFs would be involved in the 6 Networking Committees, and through them would have a controlling majority of the action group.

Way Forward

- Write up workshop ideas and circulate
- Discuss ideas with CDFs through roadshow this year
- Set up Task Teams early next year.
- Organise first plenary next year (part of Vista 3?)
- Set up a Section 21
- Full formal legal form to wait til next year: formalised as a network.

CDFs do not work directly at that level - they are organisations of the already empowered. The CG can not itself be a mass mobiliser, but through accreditation can work for representivity of CDFs.

- DO CG accreditation of CDFs to ensure representivity
- DO Awareness / conscientization training for CDFs - not as gatekeepers but for stimulation / empowerment of communities. Workshops on development Ideas (e.g. Community Wheel)
- DO CG continues consultation on LDOs/DFA; putting pressure on DDPE&W, but the main focus is on Local Government
- DO CG negotiates with DD. &W, LG on "structure" for CDFs to fit into. CG to be proactive / creative in advocating CDFs, a model for development

Policy development must be a major role for the CG, which should be better now with legitimate local government. CDFs are not a threat to LG.

- DO Guidelines for Networking Committees also need to be developed.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

- FAC CG calls others to help (esp IMSSA).

The Core Group must continue working primarily with CDFs and LDFs, but can support other CBOs. It should facilitate local development with all parties. There are different situations in different areas. We should work with all Community Development Initiatives (any CBO working for development).

Role of SACS

The Core Group must maintain its active link with SACS. SACS has been very important and offered great service to the Core Group.

The Secretariat should move out of SACS. SACS should be central to RDP communications, and should lead the CG Communication / Information Task Team. The CG should support the change process internal to SACS.

Acronym list

CB	Capacity Building
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDF	Community Development Forum
DDPE&W	Department of Development Planning, Environment & Works
DFA	Development Facilitation Act
LG	Local Government
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

Core Group roles

(DO - things the CG should do itself

FAC - things the CG should facilitate

NB: there is an acronym at the end, if you are unsure of all the jargon)

INFORMATION

DO CG finds what information exists useful to CDFs.

FAC Ask specific question to info providers for communities (e.g. DRC)

DO "Market" info to CDFs, link them with info providers

FAC Making info accessible - meetings (not just paper)

FAC Dealing with issues of literacy and language

DO CG Peer-to-peer info/experience sharing. CG (with SACS) a communication conduit

RESOURCING

Local govt seen as main potential provider of office-type resources.

DO CG persuades / negotiates with LG to provide these resources.

DO Lobby LG (+ others, especially business) to provide venues, offices

Ensure that this does not make CDF dependent on LG.

FAC Link CDFs to "human resources", experienced people - Universities, NGOs; e.g. for capacity building, planning, proposal writing

FAC Link CDFs with businesses (Social Responsibility Funds)

DO At Provincial level talk to NBI etc

FAC Support direct business - community link at local level

CAPACITY BUILDING

DO CG has role of bringing together NGOs to support CDFs. Coordination of CB efforts. Developing information on CB resources.

POLICY

DO CG major role in clarifying role of CDFs, and with other CBOs.

DO Draft principles for accreditation; formal accreditation to be done by other (probably Local Government)

Overall the aim is to support the most disempowered in the communities.

Appendix G)**Options for Public Service Delivery**

Function	Public delivery					outcontracting to intermediary organisations		privatised delivery	community organised delivery (self help)
	Government Department	traditional	commercial	service	management	leasing	concession		
ownership of assets	public				public (majority)		public (majority)	private (>50%)	private or common
Planning & regulation & policies	internal to government	by parent ministry			parent ministry or separate public authority		public authority in negotiation with private operator	none or public authority	none or public authority
Capital financing	government budget	subsidies + loans			market based financing	public	private operator	private	private (collective action)
Current financing	government budget	mainly subsidies			mainly internal revenues		private operator	private (with targeted subsidies)	privately administered
Operation & Maintenance	government		public enterprises	private operator tasks	private operator		private operator	private	self help/private
Collection of tariffs revenues	government	gov't or public enterpr.			public enterprise		private operator	private	self help/private

Other characteristic aspects	Public delivery					outcontracting to intermediary organisations		privatised delivery	community organised delivery (self help)
	Government Department	traditional	commercial	service	management	leasing	concession		
Managerial authority	government				public enterprise		private operator	private	CBO/ private
Bearer of risk	government				public enterprise		private operator	private	CBO/private
basis for operating result	not applicable				fixed fee for the services rendered		based on results, of fee paid to government for use of existing assets	net privately determined	privately determined
typical duration		no time limit		less than 5 years	approx 3-5 years	5-10 years	10-30 years	no limit	no limit

Source: Helmsing, GSP&DM Lecture, 1995.

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