

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will introduce the thesis topic and theoretical framework from which it will be analyzed. It gives a brief historical overview of regional organizations in Europe, Asia, the Americas and the Middle East. This is followed by the history of the foundation of the OAU, its limitations and subsequent transformation into the African Union. The chapter also provides the rationale and aim of the study.

1.2 BACKGROUND

The promotion of regional integration through the formation of institutions gained momentum in the early post-independence years of African states and for the world at large in the post World War II years. Before looking at the formation of the main regional institution in Africa, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), a brief overview of regionalism in other parts of the world will provide a background context for the debates around the formation of the OAU and African Union.

1.2.1 European Integration

Integration in Europe started with the end of World War II. For Western European countries one of the main impetuses for integration was to find a way to end the enmity between them that had resulted in World Wars I and II (Dinan, 2005:2). Economic and security were also factors as well as the visions of Europeans such as Jean Monnet and Alcide De Gasperi for a United States of Europe. Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact for common defence and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) for economic relations (Karns & Mingst, 2004:160). In Western Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was formed in 1948 with “strong influence and encouragement from the United States”, to administer its Marshall Plan aid. The US felt that rather

than each country submitting requests for aid, it be administered by an international organization to the participating states (ibid). It was also established to lower trade and currency barriers (Dinan, 2005:2). Western Europeans also formed the Council of Europe in 1949 for the purpose of "safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress" (Council of Europe Statute 2[Art.1] as quoted in Karns & Mingst, 2004:153).

However, six countries (Western European) began a process of deeper integration because they felt that the Council of Europe and OEEC fell short of expectations. They established three institutions; one of them was the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, which together started the integration process that has progressed into the European Union (EU) (Karns & Mingst, 2004:153). The first common policy area that EEC countries agreed on was trade in 1962 and has since progressed to include a common monetary policy and single currency (euro) and the establishment of a common foreign and security policy (Dinan, 2005:4). Starting from 1951 to the Draft Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-2003, the EU integration process has taken over fifty years. It is a combination of federalism and intergovernmentalism and is comprised of the some of the following organs: a European Parliament, elected by voters in member states; the European Council; a Council of Ministers, made up from one government minister per state; and a European Commission, which is the executive body.

1.2.2 Integration in the Americas

The largest regional organization in the Americas is the Organization of American States (OAS) which encompasses both North and South America. Its main organs are the: General Assembly, the Permanent Council and the Secretariat in addition to various specialized committees (Karns & Mingst, 2004:180). Some of the goals of the OAS are to: promote democracy; foster economic and social development; and collective security and defence. The post-Cold War era saw a surge of regional initiatives between just Latin American countries such as Mercosur, the Common Market of the South. As will be seen in the case of African states, regionalism in Latin America came about as a way to deal with growing marginalization from the

world economy; a faster rate of globalization; moves towards democracy and the prevalence of neoliberal market values (ibid:178). Aside from the OAS, there was the creation of NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement). However, the size of the United States and its economic wealth relative to the other member states has resulted in a scenario whereby member states' responses are shaped by its foreign policy (ibid:179).

1.2.3 Asian Integration

Regionalism in Asia struggled to take root. Since many Asian countries were European colonies, once they gained their independence after World War II, they were very attached to their sovereignty and suspicious of "new forms of dependency" (Karns & Mingst, 2004:189). However, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 as a way to minimize the threat of domination by the US and China. Its main principle is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other member states (ibid:191). ASEAN's goal has never been integration, but regional peace and stability.

1.2.4 Middle East Integration

The League of Arab States was created in 1945. It was a way for newly independent Arab states to show their solidarity and "assert themselves against the great powers of the time" (Karns & Mingst, 2004:206). Its main focus has been on the issues of decolonization and support for Palestine against the state of Israel. It is comprised of a council, various committees, a joint defence and economic council and other organs.

1.2.5 The Formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

For Africa, much like in Latin America, economic regionalism was seen as a way to lessen its dependence on former colonial powers and buffer itself against global economic shocks (Ikome, 2007: 33). As one of its ardent promoters, former Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah said, "We must unite or perish, for no single African State is large or powerful enough to stand on its own against the unbridled

imperialist exploitation of her men and resources and the growing complexities of the modern world” (Nkrumah 1963).

The 1963 formation of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) came about as the newly independent African states realized that they would need to work together if they wanted to raise the economic development of their countries and continent as a whole. Having come out of bitter battles for their liberation from colonialism, African states were keen to ensure that colonialism would not happen again. Additionally, as new members of the international system, they wanted to transform their economies so that they would serve the interests of their indigenous populations and not the colonial powers as they were structured to do. This period was also a time of heightened consciousness of the African identity and the Pan-African movement. Pan-Africanism can be defined as “a movement with as its common underlying theme the struggle for a social and political equality and freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination” for the people of African descent, within Africa and in the Diaspora (Murithi 2007: 1). As a result, the formation of the OAU and five of its central tenets were the sum of three related sources: 1) discourses on African identity; 2) how best to achieve the objective of African Unity; and 3) the early phases of decolonization and subsequent membership into the international society (Williams, 2007:262).

Regional integration became one of the main foundations for development in the continent (Qobo, 2007:2). The fifth Pan-African Congress, which was held in the United Kingdom in 1945, was instrumental in the Pan-African movement as it applied to the liberation of African countries. A number of the African leaders within the Pan-African movement became heads of state and leaders within their own countries. However, there was a division amongst Pan-Africanists. Some felt that forming individual states would take them away from the goal of continental unity and wanted the continent to be immediately unified with one government and military, as proposed by Kwame Nkrumah, while others felt that it was necessary to start with individual states and then move towards continental unity. The proponents of a more loose form of integration won. However, in 1963 when the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was formed, its charter spoke to both groups of Pan-Africanists. It called for a transcendence of “ethnic and national differences” *and* for “Respect for

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right for independent existence” (Qobo, 2007:3). There was also an underlying anti-imperialism sentiment in the formation of the OAU.

Economic integration in the form of regional organizations such as the formation of the East African Community (EAC) and the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, known by its French acronym, UDEAC were formed in the late 1960s. The Economic Community of Western States (ECOWAS) was formed in the 1970s as a way to address economic imbalances. Other regions followed thereafter with their own economic trading blocs (Breytenbach, 2002:183).

It is against this backdrop which is rooted in Pan-Africanism, that the roles of South Africa and Libya in the transformation of the OAU to the AU are analyzed. This thesis will provide a conclusion as to whether the actions of South Africa and Libya can be explained as motivated by self-interest, as realism would state, or if it is necessary to factor in the power of ideas and ideologies, as per constructivism, for a complete, comprehensive picture.

1.2.6 The Transformation of the OAU to the AU

The Organization for African Unity (OAU) was borne out of the desire to have a unified Africa that would rise up from the control of colonial powers. It would then begin to realize its true potential and place in the world. The main purpose of the OAU was to ensure that all countries within Africa became liberated from colonialism because imperialism was recognized as being the primary impediment to African Unity (Williams, 2007:264). Another purpose of the OAU was to guarantee that Africans became the owners of their natural resources as well as the economic, social and political development (2007:2) of their countries. Last but not least, the OAU was created to maintain peace, security and protection for the sovereignty of African states.

After thirty years of existence the OAU was increasingly deemed irrelevant. The end of the Cold War changed the world’s international system. The Soviet Union collapsed leaving the USA as the sole superpower. The alliances that the two

superpowers had forged with various African countries in order to fight off each other by proxy also ended. Without the West vying for the allegiances of African countries through economic aid, the economies of many countries in Africa dwindled. One of the main issues for its existence was to fight for the independence of its member states and that had essentially been achieved with the exception of South Africa (Packer & Rukare, 2002:366). In the midst of these changes the OAU remained the same.

A proposal to reform the OAU was presented by Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and in 1999, African leaders came together to discuss how to improve the organization. Reform of the OAU came about through its transformation into a new body called the African Union (AU) in 2001. As stated in the report of the Third Ordinary Session of the Executive Council:

The fundamental challenges, which have taken place in the world, particularly since the 1990's and the continuing deterioration of socio-economic conditions in Africa, as well as current conflict situations, informed the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU). The AU was set up to urgently assist Africa in striking a balance between economic and political agenda of the continent through the acceleration of the processes of the implementation of the Abuja Treaty, which is central to socio-economic development in Africa (African Union, 2003: 38).

A similar division took place as had amongst the early Pan-Africanists between the absolute integrationists and the gradualists. Libya's leader, Gaddafi, put forth his proposal for the immediate creation of a United States of Africa. Gaddafi wanted an organization similar to that of the United States of America while most of the other heads of state, including then president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, were for a more gradual approach that would start with an overhaul of the OAU. Mbeki visualized an organization structured along the lines of the European Union.

The creation of the AU came about as an accommodation of the various proposals and interests that the leaders of South Africa, Libya and Nigeria presented in Sirte,

Libya. Dubbed “the trade union of criminals,” the OAU did not mirror the new identity that these three countries were trying to create for themselves. There was also growing pressure from the international community for African governments “to be seen to conform to transnational norms of liberal democratization and human rights” (Williams, 2007:266). The OAU was not an effective holder of human rights within the continent. Its main principle of non-intervention had prevented it from entering into some of the worst human rights atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide, and violence in the Democratic of the Congo (DRC), Angola and Sudan (Packer & Rukare, 2002:367). The protection of human rights was written into South Africa’s new constitution. As a result, its credibility and image on the world stage as a protector of human rights, appeared to clash with it being a member of the OAU which had a bad reputation for upholding human rights on the African continent.

1.2.6.1 Accommodating the Interests of South Africa, Libya and Nigeria

South Africa was a still a very new democracy when the proposal to reform the OAU was made. Given its smooth and peaceful transition from the gruelling apartheid regime to a democratically elected government, South Africa felt a responsibility to lead the rest of the continent towards democracy, development and good governance. The Department for Foreign Affairs even stated that the “interests of the African continent are central to our foreign policy” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006:7). The international community also looked to South Africa to lead the continent. Central too, to South Africa, was its practice of economic diplomacy in order to “grow the economy faster and create more jobs to address the challenge of poverty eradication” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006:7). However, as Chris Landsberg states, the country’s efforts to promote democracy “encountered many pitfalls, contradictions, and dilemmas” that forced the government to change its approach (Landsberg, 2000:107). This change in approach presented itself when the proposal to transform the OAU was made. According to Thomas Tieku, by pushing for the AU, the ANC government would have a platform from which to pursue its foreign policy objectives (Tieku, 2004:253). The transformation would also give South Africa and other African states the ability to look after each other and promote the ultimate goal of true continental integration.

At the same time, Libya's Muammar Gaddafi had been taking great pains to change his global identity to one that was more diplomatic, albeit still anti-Western, and more Africa-focused versus Arab-league focused. To herald his changed focus, Gaddafi proclaimed that "he has no time to waste with Arabs" (Takeyh, 2009), which points to his focusing on re-identifying himself with the rest of Africa. Gaddafi had attempted to unify the Arab world but had been unsuccessful. Furthermore, it was the countries of Africa, and not those of the Arab world, that stood behind Libya during sanctions imposed on it by the UN and the USA. Gaddafi had always been for a fully unified Africa that had one government and military, much like Kwame Nkrumah had been. The summit to discuss the transformation to the OAU presented an opportunity for Gaddafi to push his United States of Africa agenda.

The interests of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria were for better peace and security measures within the continent. He spent great sums of Nigeria's funds on the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) peace mission in Sierra Leone. Large amounts of Nigeria's funds were spent on such missions that they were becoming wary of such expenditures (Tamura, 2008:24). Obasanjo sought approval for his initiative, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) that would, if adopted, take some of the financial burden off of Nigeria. The CSSDCA would require African Heads of State and Government to recognize that security and human security are inter-related issues (Tieku, 2004: 256). For example, a state that is violating human rights is a threat to the security of the rest of the continent and intervention by the OAU would be necessary. Given the non-interference/respect of sovereignty clause in the OAU charter, if adopted, Obasanjo's CSSDCA would have required a re-writing of the OAU's charter.

The creation of the AU was the best way to accommodate the interests of three of the African continent's mega powers. It was through their consultation with each other and other African Heads of State and Government that they were able to agree upon a course of action, which was to make-over the OAU and create the AU.

1.3 AIM OF THE THESIS

This thesis looks at the roles played by South Africa and Libya in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). South Africa and Libya were selected because they are both highly influential in Africa and very different from each other in leadership, politics, history, economics, languages, location and regional memberships. For each of the two countries, the central questions are: what is the most powerful explanation for their foreign policy actions? Was it to maximize material power as postulated by realism or was it idealism as constructivists claim? Given the different political and leadership styles of each country, which of the two variables, realism or constructivism, stood out more?

1.4 RATIONALE OF THE THESIS

South Africa and Libya represent two poles within the continent and are two of the most powerful countries in Africa. They are polar opposites geographically and politically. Current international relations theories were crafted by studying the interaction of the major powers with each other and their relations with “lesser” powers. In the same way the study of South Africa and Libya’s interactions with each other and the rest of the continent in the transformation of the Organization for African Unity to the African Union can prove instructive on how to understand foreign policy decisions within Africa.

The study of international relations (IR) has tended to utilize the dominant theory of realism. According to realism, the international system is a self-help anarchic system which begets states that act in egoistic, power seeking ways. The identity of actors is therefore provided as a given: egoistic, and is therefore considered exogenous to decision-making (Karns & Mingst, 2004:35).

International relations theories resulted from studying the interplay of the world’s superpowers, namely those located in the West (USA, Britain, France, Germany, etc.) and their relations with each other and the effects of their actions on the lesser powers. As we are learning, what is relevant in the West/North is not necessarily

relevant or applicable in the developing nations of the South. The conception of African politics is that it is based on the acquisition of power “where states view their neighbours as rivals or enemies and common security policies are a rarity if they emerge at all” (Williams, 2007:254).

As will be seen in the upcoming chapters, the speed at which the “Sirte process” moved towards the formation of the African Union is a testament to the desire of African leaders to cooperate and create a better continent. As Tiyanjana Maluwa states:

It is quite remarkable that, notwithstanding their initial differences or misgivings, all African countries quickly proceeded to sign and, with the notable exceptions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar, ratify the Constitutive Act within a period of less than two years following its adoption (Maluwa, 2004:197).

The history of how African states came into being is different than how those in Europe came into existence. Materialistic capabilities in Europe were at the forefront of their relations with each other as they fought against each other for the scarce resource of land. In Africa, however, land was not scarce and its acquisition not the number one priority of its leaders. The would be leaders of African states were interested in their liberation and fought together in solidarity to rid the continent of colonial powers. As a result when they won their independence and formed the OAU, there existed a common bond between them and an identity of Africanism than a sense of antagonism. The identities of the individual leaders were what mattered to each other and to their citizenry. This is not to say that material power was not important. The independent states had to become economically viable to grow and sustain their countries. They were also trying to survive as new members in an international system that did not favour them.

Given that the experience of African states into statehood differed from their European counterparts, on whose experiences the main international relations theories are based on, it would be prudent to explore the roles of identity and ideas in African foreign policy making. As a result, looking at African intra-continental

relations from a non-materialistic centred vantage point should be considered. Understanding the relative influence of ideas, vis-à-vis material power, has important foreign policy implications for future studies of foreign relations and cooperation within Africa.

1.5 KEY RESEARCH QUESTION

Can the impetus of South Africa and Libya to push for the formation of the African Union be fully captured by focusing solely on power and material capabilities?

1.5.1 Related Research Questions

1. What are the objectives of South Africa and Libya's foreign policies?
2. What were the reasons for the formation of a continental organization in Africa?

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Kathryn Sturman, Pan-Africanism was never the norm within the OAU when the actual decisions and declarations are analyzed. The minority who called out for true African unity, Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie and Julius Nyerere, were not supported by the majority of African leaders who were, for the most part, more concerned with the protection of their sovereignty and maintenance of power (Sturman, 2007). With the formation of the AU, it was hoped that by turning the ideals of Pan-Africanism's norms and principles into policy and *practice*, actual change would be seen on the continent (ibid).

South Africa and Libya are both countries with strong identities, interests and ideas that wanted to transform the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and who played key roles in the OAU becoming the African Union (AU). In 2002, the AU was "inaugurated" in Durban, South Africa (Tieku, 2004:249). However, the initial process towards an African Union was initiated by Libya's Muammar al-Gaddafi. In

1999, at the invitation of the Libyan government, the OAU Assembly held an extraordinary session in Sirte, Libya. A draft declaration had been submitted by the Libyan government that would commit African Heads of State and Government to agreeing to create the African Union. This draft declaration was then adopted at the end of the session (Packer & Rukare, 2002: 370).

Whether the desire of South Africa and Libya to create the African Union can be described by realism as purely material and egoistical or whether discursive power and the power of ideas (constructivism) played a role needs to be brought in for a complete picture, is the subject of this research. First it is necessary to look briefly at what the literature says on which variables drove South Africa and Libya to push for the African Union, followed by an overview of realism and constructivism.

1.6.1 South Africa and the African Union

There are different theories behind what motivated South Africa to play such a leading role in the creation of the AU. Some, such as Thomas Kwasi Tieku, believe that it was Thabo Mbeki's commercial and foreign policy interests for South Africa that made it necessary to transform the OAU to the AU (Tieku, 2004: 253). Mbeki understood that the image of leadership in post-colonial Africa was not particularly positive, and that as a newly independent state within the continent, the image of South Africa was now inextricably tied to that of the rest of the continent. According to Tieku, in order for South Africa's new economic initiatives to succeed, such as Mbeki's Growth Empowerment and Redistribution (GEAR) that was aimed at increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) into South Africa, it was necessary to attempt to change the image and identity of the continent as a whole (2004:253). As Mbeki himself said, "none of our countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail" (Mbeki, 1998). Mbeki's coinage of the phrase, 'African Renaissance' was part of his idea to renew or rebirth the identity of the continent. The best place to do that was within the OAU.

Also, as Peter Schraeder points out, given that South Africa is Africa's most industrialized economy with one of the best trained militaries on the continent, South Africa saw itself as a leader and the "embodiment of Africa's future political and

economic potential” (Schraeder, 2001:233). Regional integration was also key as was the desire to have a leadership role in regional organizations. South African foreign policy embraced the concept of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, of which two of the five areas of engagement are, “deepening and sustenance of democracy and the initiation of sustainable economic development” (as quoted in Taylor & Williams, 2001:267). An organization such as the African Union would be the best place to ensure that such goals were met.

Others, such as Pal Ahluwalia, believe that Mbeki was merely continuing the struggle and vision of earlier Pan-Africanists to “fight and challenge the prevailing representations of Africa” (Ahluwalia, 2002: 265). By coining the phrase, ‘African Renaissance,’ Mbeki was fighting against an age old stereotype of what Africa was, is and is to become. Thabo Mbeki believed that if Africa is to restore its dignity it:

... demands that we deal as decisively and as quickly as possible with the perception that as a continent we are condemned forever to depend on the merciful charity which those who are kind are ready to put into our begging bowls (Mbeki, 1998).

As a result, it was Mbeki’s vision for a dignified Africa that informed his outlook and hence, his actions. South Africa’s taking a leading role in the transformation of the OAU has also been seen as fulfilling some sort of ‘social contractual’ agreement in which it is bound to ensure that undemocratic rule and gross human rights violations do not happen within its borders and to work towards the same goal for the rest of the continent (Vale & Maseko, 1998:277). The creation of the AU also helps South Africa in its fulfilment of its foreign policy objectives, such as: the protection of human rights; the attainment of peace in all nations; the use of multilateralism in its interactions with other countries; and economic development in Africa and the developing world.

1.6.2 Libya and the African Union

According to Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya’s foreign policy actions fall into three categories: (1) those in reaction to a perceived regime threat, (2) those in reaction to

a perceived external threat or isolation and (3) policy actions when there is a perceived threat to both the regime and to the state's borders (Deeb, 1991:17). It is perhaps this third category that can be applied to Libya and the AU. When reacting to a perceived external threat or isolation and regime threat, Libya has tended to:

adopt a conciliatory foreign policy behaviour to diffuse the threats, including withdrawal of Libyan military forces from other states, resolution of pending conflicts, and negotiation of new trade and labour agreements with neighbouring countries (Deeb, 1991:17)

This is in line with the literature on Libya's role in the formation of the AU and points to Qaddafi's desire to 'rehabilitate' his image by normalizing his relations with the West, i.e. being conciliatory, and aligning himself with Africa rather than with Arab states (MacLeod, 2006, Tamura, 2008:26). In 1998, a year before the OAU summit in Sirte, Libya, Qaddafi declared that Africans and not Arabs are Libya's real supporters (Huliaras, 2001:5). His statement was grounded on the fact that when the US imposed extended sanctions on Libya in 1993, it was the OAU and not the Arab League that passed a resolution requesting the United Nations (UN) to drop sanctions. However, Asteris Huliaris believes that Qaddafi's renewed interest is more tactical than representative of a structural change in Libya's foreign policy (2001:5). Deeb would most likely agree with Huliaris because according to her analysis, Libya's foreign policy, both under King Idris and Qaddafi, has always been to protect the country from external interference—both militarily and politically—by forming alliances with regional and/or external powers (Deeb, 1991: 189).

It must not be forgotten, as stated earlier, that from the very beginning, Gaddafi was for a more united Africa, with one government and military. His idealism and leadership on the basis of a 'people ideology' led him to fight against imperialist Western powers within the continent. He also fought against African leaders who he felt were in place as a result of their obeisance to the West (whether he was correct or not is a different issue). However, Deeb would state that Gaddafi's use of ideology was part of his foreign policy used to counter 'both real and perceived threats.' The ideologies he drew from were either pan-Arab, pan-Islamic or revolutionary (Deeb, 1991: 189). One might say that Qaddafi has since traded in

pan-Arabism for pan-Africanism. It was the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union that Ray Takeyh believes was the catalyst that started the change in Libya's foreign policies. Libya became exposed to international pressures that once seemed impossible when its fellow counterweight to the USA, the Soviet Union, was intact (Takeyh, 2001:63). The rest of the world, Africa included, was realizing that their actions, or non-actions, had a greater impact in a global/inter-connected economy. And those actions, if un-favourable to the West, had the negative consequence of marginalization from the global economy.

It was perhaps because of Gaddafi's having experienced the wrath of the West during the sanctions imposed on Libya for his supposed hand in the Lockerbie bombings that made him realize that he cannot fight 'Euro-American hegemony' alone (Abdul-Raheem, 2009). In all probability sanctions strengthened his resolve to fight the West's neo-colonialism and imperialism. Gaddafi may have realized that only with a fully unified African continent, i.e. one with a single government, can countries in Africa move from under the thumb of the West and fight for doing things an African way and having "African solutions to African problems." In a speech to students at Oxford University, Gaddafi re-iterated his belief that a "single African market with unified policies of imports and exports will boost the world economy" and will essentially allow Africa to command the respect that it should have (al-Gaddafi, 2007). Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem believes that it was in gratitude to the African continent that supported Gaddafi when the Arab League would not, that led him to hold the extraordinary OAU summit in Sirte, Libya in 1999 where he proposed a United States of Africa (Abdul-Raheem, 2009).

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are several theories of international relations. Most of the international relations theories are off-shoots of the main theories of realism, liberalism and critical theories with the exception of constructivism which is an alternate approach. For example under liberalism there are neoliberal, functionalist and public goods theories. Under realism there are neorealist, rational choice and hegemonic stability theories. Some theories that fall under critical theories are dependency theory, world

systems theory and Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories. However, the researcher decided to use realism and constructivism as the theoretical framework. They were chosen because they represent the opposites of each so a decision was made to use them to benefit from different perspectives. Since the discussion on the OAU/AU is about how states cooperate, what follows is an overview of realism and constructivism's main assumptions—especially as they relate to cooperation.

1.7.1 The Theory of Realism

Realism sees interests as a given and therefore an exogenous variable. The main assumption in realism, as postulated by Hans Morgenthau, the father of realism, is that states are rational and act in power-seeking ways to protect their own interests. The international system is seen to be anarchic and so states must rely on themselves to solve their insecurity by balancing power and deterrence (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 45). States are the unitary actors within the international system and seek their own self-preservation as the very minimum goal and hegemony over the other actors as the highest goal (Deeb, 1991: 2). As a result, realism views cooperation and international institutions as unlikely because states are interested in relative gains. International organizations are also seen as tools to be manipulated by states as they please in their power-maximizing quest. As a result, they do not have any independent effect on the behaviour of states (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 46).

Realism views daily life as a struggle for power, where each state tries to be the most powerful state in the system. International relations is seen as a continuous and “relentless” security competition with the “possibility of war always in the background.” Realism does not believe that genuine peace or a world without competition between states is likely (Mearsheimer, 1994/95:9). Mearsheimer details the five assumptions from which this world view is derived:

1. The international system is anarchic. This means that there is no central authority over the international system that is comprised of independent states.
2. States inherently have some military power that can be used offensively to hurt and possibly destroy each other.

3. States are always suspicious of each other's intentions.
4. States are driven by survival.
5. States are strategic about how they are going to survive in the international system. That is, they are rational. (Mearsheimer, 1995/95:10).

Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, focus on the structure of the international system which they believe is ordered according to the distribution of material capabilities amongst states. States seek to maximize those capabilities which include economic, demographic, and military capabilities as well as natural resources (Deeb, 1991: 2). As with realism, state identities and interests are fixed and exogenous. Neither form of realism focuses on domestic politics, i.e. what is happening inside the state, such as domestic politics and societal actors that can affect state interests and actions. They also do not take at face value the role of ideologies, but see them as being functional and as a tool to attain political goals (Deeb, 1991: 4).

Another offshoot of realism is Hegemonic Stability Theory. It answers the question of how an open world economy is established and sustained. Essentially it is a discussion on the relationship between power and economic behaviour (Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998:661). It is based on the assertion that an open market economy cannot be sustained without a dominant economy (Karns & Mingst, 2004:49). It is sustained when a dominant state has "control over raw materials, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods" (Keohane as quoted in Karns & Mingst, 2004:49). An example of this is when the United States created the Bretton Woods institutions after World War II. The hegemonic state has to be big enough so that it can gain from the public good more than it costs to supply it. As Snidal states, in order for this to be true, the assumptions are that the presence of the dominant state leads to greater stability in the international system and the second assumption is that the stability benefits "all" states in the system, specifically the smaller ones (Snidal, 1985:582).

1.7.2 The Theory of Constructivism

The literature on the role of ideas and identity in international relations is quite vast and varied. Some proponents of mainstream IR theories (namely neoliberal institutionalists) may concede that ideas and/or beliefs do play some part in IR theory¹; however, ideas and the construction of identities are at the heart of constructivist theory. There are two main forms of constructivism: conventional and critical. The main difference between the two is that conventional constructivism seeks to uncover identities in order to ascertain how they will translate into certain actions, while critical constructivism seeks to discover identities in order to go back and determine how those identities were formed and why (Hopf, 1998:183).

Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, share some of the same assumptions of realism mentioned above. Wendt states that the notions of self-help and power are institutions created through intersubjective understandings. Whereas realism sees the international system, or structure, as being composed of the distribution of material capabilities, constructivists believe that it is also made up of social relationships and are therefore social structures. According to Wendt, “social structures consist of shared knowledge, practices and material resources” and are partially defined by “shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge” (Wendt, 1995:74). A structure can be one of trust or distrust depending on the intersubjective understandings of the states. To constructivists, anarchy is what states make of it. To say that the international system is anarchic says nothing. What matters are the identities and interests that states have when they interact with each other and the resultant impacts of the latter on the former (Wendt, 1994:388). Constructivists believe that realism’s emphasis on material capabilities as power, mean and explain nothing. It is only the shared understanding of states that give material capabilities meaning. Wendt gives the example of British nuclear capabilities presenting a different social understanding than Soviet nuclear capabilities to the USA (Wendt,

¹ Neo-liberal institutionalists do admit that ideas may play a role in international relations, especially with the assistance of regimes. For more on this, read, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye’s *Power and Interdependence* (1997) and Sterling-Folker, J. (2000). Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. *International Studies Quarterly*, 44, pp. 97-119.

1994:389). This was because the understanding between the USA and Britain was one of trust which was not the case between the USA and the Soviet Union.

1.8 ASSUMPTIONS OF REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

1.8.1 Realism

1. States are guided by their desire to optimize their material power;
2. States act in a rational way to protect own interests;
3. States are the primary actors in the international system;
4. States exist in an anarchic international system; and
5. Based on assumptions 1 and 2, state interests are a given and are therefore considered exogenous to interaction.

1.8.2 Constructivism

1. State identity and interests are socially constructed and therefore variable;
2. Discursive power and that of ideas are important;
3. States are principal actors in the international system;
4. Anarchy means nothing if identity of states is not taken into consideration, i.e. as Wendt states, “an anarchy of friends is different from an anarchy of enemies” (Wendt, 1994: 388); and
5. Based on assumptions 1 and 2, state interests are considered endogenous to interaction.

As mentioned earlier, both South Africa and Libya have and are undergoing identity changes due to changes in ideologies. Ideational changes may in turn affect state interests and their interaction with other states. So by keeping interests fixed, important aspects of why states act the way they do may be missed. However, if according to realism states act in a self-interested manner to maximize material power, the changing identities of South Africa and Libya do not matter; which is why neo/realism does not bother to look into the state, i.e. into the domestic/societal

happenings. Regardless of what is happening internally, decisions to cooperate or not are based on what relative gains can be made towards achieving more power. It is within this theoretical framework that this thesis is examined. Given Africa's past of the following: subjugation by colonial powers; the negative identity that has been imparted to it and continues to be imparted to it by the West; and the ideological backgrounds of South Africa and Libya, any analysis of these two country's foreign policy actions must take into account the power of ideas. Within this thesis ideas are defined within the Constructivist approach. To do otherwise would result in an incomplete picture of what motivated South Africa and Libya to create the African Union.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The two main research methods commonly used are qualitative and quantitative. A decision has been made to use the qualitative methods for the purpose of this study. Qualitative methods are those that utilize non-numeric information such as document analysis and interviews with the aim of getting a complete and detailed description. The advantages of qualitative research allow for the exploration of how and why events occur and enable a more descriptive analysis of phenomena. The disadvantages of qualitative research are that hypotheses are not easily testable or reproducible in different settings. Results are also more easily influenced by the researcher's personal bias.

This thesis utilized primary and secondary sources to ascertain the ideas and interests and hence, foreign policy actions, of South Africa and Libya. Secondary sources included, but were not limited to: newspaper reports, journal articles, bibliographies of key persons and books. These readings were analyzed within the theoretical frameworks of realism and constructivism. The results were used to conclude whether South Africa and Libya's roles in the formation of the AU were based on the power of ideas or the power of national self-interest.

Sources used in the analysis of South Africa and Libya's foreign policies are:

The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) website

Speech transcripts from the African National Congress website

Speech transcripts from Muammar al-Gaddafi's official website

Transcripts from the African Union website

Official OAU/AU documentation such as summits, protocols and treaties

The South African Press Association (SAPA) website (IOL)

Primary sources using key informant interviews were used. Key informants are people who have in depth knowledge about a particular issue area. Key informants were chosen from within the South African and Libyan foreign policy structures. The following were interviewed:

<i>HE, Dr. Alzubedi</i>	<i>Libyan Ambassador to South Africa (1996-)</i>
<i>Chris Landsberg</i>	<i>South African Foreign Policy Expert and Head of Department, International Relations, University of Johannesburg</i>
<i>Aziz Pahad</i>	<i>Former South African Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister (1994-2008)</i>
<i>Dr. Franklin Sonn</i>	<i>First South African Ambassador to the USA (1994-1999)</i>

1.9.1 Limitations

A possible limitation to this study is the elimination of Nigeria, which was the other key actor in the formation of the African Union from the OAU. However, the author sought to include the contributions of Nigeria throughout the study without focusing on it directly. This decision was based on the fact that South Africa and Libya present more of a polarity to each other than do either South Africa and Nigeria or Nigeria and Libya and would give a broader idea of the spectrum of foreign policies in the continent.

Another limitation to this study arose from an inability to interview key figures from both South Africa and Libya who were directly involved in the transformation of the

OAU to the AU. Given their high profiles, securing an interview with them was a challenge. A second limitation was the availability of government documents from Libya that put in concrete terms what exactly its foreign policy objectives are, especially as they relate to Africa.

1.9.2 Ethical Considerations

Given the nature of the study, there are no ethical considerations. Interviewees were fully aware of what their interviews were being used for and consented to their insight being used within this research. Recorded interviews were done so with the full consent of the interviewees.

1.10 CONCLUSION

The study of South Africa and Libya in the formation of the African Union is an important study on what factors African states take into consideration most when dealing with each other. Realism posits that it is material concerns, those of economics and military might that states are most interested in and strive to increase. According to the tenets of realism, states are in a constant state of suspicion of each other and are interested in being the strongest power. As a result of this suspicion, there is the continual threat of war and mistrust within the international system as states try to gauge the intent of their counterparts.

The very fact that African nations came together to form the OAU and then transform it into the AU, is evidence that realism by itself does not account for the full motivations of intra-African relations. As will be seen in the following chapters, even though materialistic concerns were part of South Africa and Libya's push to transform the OAU, at the heart of their actions were the original pan-Africanist ideals: to rid the continent of imperialism, to forge a common African identity, to change the negative perception of Africa and, of course, to see the entire continent prosper economically, socially and culturally.

CHAPTER 2

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND LIBYA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the foreign policy-making frameworks of South Africa and Libya and the evolution of their foreign policies towards Africa. It is divided into five sections. The first section gives a broad definition of foreign policy. The second section looks at foreign policy-making in both democracies and non-democracies. The third section looks at foreign policy-making in South Africa, a brief overview of its Africa foreign policy during Apartheid and a more in depth examination of its post-Apartheid Africa foreign policy—particularly during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. The fourth section provides an overview of the general framework of foreign policy-making in Libya and how its Africa foreign policy has evolved. The final section provides a conclusion and analysis of the chapter.

2.2 DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is generally defined in terms of a state's national interest. National is defined as "the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world" (Nye, 1999:23). William Zartman deepens this definition of national interest by saying that it is the "search for security of the national 'self.'" He emphasizes that it is "*national*--not class, regional or party, and is *interests*--not whims, sentiments or accidents" (Zartman, 1966:47). Theories of foreign policy are different from theories of international relations in that they seek to explain the behaviour of individual states as opposed to the pattern of outcomes of state interactions (Rose, 1998:145). However, there is some overlap.

2.2.1 Foreign Policy-making in Democracies

The determining factors for foreign policy differs between the various schools of international relations theories. Realism argues that a state's foreign policy decisions are influenced first and foremost by systemic factors, i.e. the state's position in the structure of world politics. This structure is determined by the relative material power capabilities of states vis-à-vis the rest of the international system. National interest in realism is also the same across states—to maximize power (economic and militaristic) in order to ensure their survival. Domestic level determinants such as non-governmental organizations or special interest groups are not considered as impacting foreign policy decision-making. On the other side of the spectrum, liberal theories of international relations and constructivism allow for domestic variables to have an impact on foreign policy decisions, especially on whether or not to cooperate with each other in shared issue areas within the frameworks of international institutions and regimes. Constructivism in particular allows for the analyses of states' historical backgrounds, ideologies and identities in the formation of foreign policy.

The debate is therefore reduced to whether foreign policy decisions of states are influenced by external factors in the international system or if they are influenced by domestic factors. As Robert Putnam states, the debate is quite pointless because the answer is clearly “both, sometimes” and the resultant questions should then be “when and how?” (Putnam,1988:427). States' foreign policies are generally informed by their domestic policies and are instruments to accomplish interests within their territory. A key impact on foreign policy is domestic politics as played out by special interest groups, legislators, social classes and not just governmental executives and institutional frameworks (ibid: 432). However neoclassical realists,² while acknowledging the importance of domestic variables, place them second in relation to systemic pressures. They believe that in the long-run, states' foreign policies can only be applied up to the limits imposed on them by their ranking within the international system (Rose, 1998:151).

² Neoclassical Realism is a term created by Gideon Rose to explain realists that are theorists but also agree that domestic variables play a role.

In Africa, national interest has tended to take a back seat to ideology and personal interest as foreign policy criteria. Ideology, namely Pan-Africanism, as a mobilizing tool was used by leaders in the struggle for independence from colonial powers. After independence was won, the newly independent states continued to use ideology and slogans in the complex task of nation-building and these have continued to be used by leaders in their articulation of foreign policy. Sub-national interests have also been a hindrance to the formulation of national criteria (Zartman, 1966:47). However, not just in Africa, but in the world in general, the making of foreign policy has become increasingly complex with the end of the Cold War, effects of globalization and the influx of transnational actors. Globalization has also had an effect on power. Power, as defined by economic and military strength, also known as 'hard power,' is having to contend more and more with 'soft power,'—"the ability to attract through cultural and ideological appeal" (Nye, 1999:24).

The institutional framework of foreign policy making in democracies tends to be one of consultation. In the USA, for instance, foreign policy decisions are made by the president in consultation with various advisors who are themselves the heads of certain departments. Such departments include: the Departments of Defence, Commerce, Energy, Agriculture, Labour and Justice. However, his main advisor is the The Secretary of State, or Foreign Affairs Minister.

2.2.2 Foreign policy making in non-democracies

The crafting of foreign policy in non-democracies is considerably different from that of democracies. Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann state that foreign policy is the result of both internal and external factors that are filtered through one of three possible decision-making categories:

1. Predominant Leader – A single leader has the power to make the choice and stifle opposition.
2. Single Group – A set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, collectively select a course of action in face-to-face interaction and obtain compliance.

3. Multiple Autonomous Actors – The necessary actors are separate individuals, groups or coalitions which, if some or all concur, can act for the government, but no one body can decide and force compliance on the others nor are they members of any overarching authoritative body (Hermann & Hermann, 1989:5).

These three decision-making units fall into two categories: those that are self-contained and those that are externally influenceable. The self-contained are less constrained by their environments and therefore, make more extreme foreign policy decisions. Hermann and Hermann describe the self-contained as minimalist or “assertive, highly committed actions” whose strong convictions lead them to withhold or commit extensive resources (Hermann & Hermann, 1989:14). The externally influenceable decision units will take into consideration the possible reactions of other governments to their foreign policy decisions and review information at hand prior to making a decision.

According to Hermann and Hermann, some states use all three categories at some point. The decision-making units that most fit a non-democracy though, are the predominant leader and single group categories. The formulation of foreign policy in the case of a predominant leader is likely to be a direct result of the leader’s ideologies, strong world view, and perception of foreign affairs and the “conception” of his country in the world (Hermann & Hermann, 1989:6). South Africa may be categorized as using both the predominant leader and single group externally influenced decision units, whereas Libya would most likely fall into the predominant, self-contained leader category.

2.3 FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Prior to 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy was framed by the ideology of apartheid; and its sole focus was not to promote the national interest of the majority as is commonly assumed to be the case by governments, but to “... maintain and stabilize white minority rule” (Southall, 1984:222). Between 1989 and 1994, South African foreign policy changed to a “New Diplomacy” that utilized more soft-diplomacy

versus the hard and militaristic one it had been accustomed to. It still maintained its idea of being the dominant regional power, but it did so using economic co-operation and diplomacy (Evans, 1996:256). The main difference between the 'New Diplomacy' and the old was the re-conception of what the national interest was, or rather, whom it encompassed. It now made an effort to include groups other than those of the white establishment (ibid:257).

The end of apartheid meant that the African National Congress (ANC), which was the new ruling party, had to rethink its foreign policy and adapt it to the post Cold War era. It also meant moving from liberation politics, where the person of Nelson Mandela was the primary foreign policy tool (Evans, 1996:258), to one that mirrored the New Diplomacy but with greater emphasis on regional co-operation (259). As Peter J. Schraeder states, South African foreign policy underwent restructuring in three areas: (1) the military, (2) the foreign policy institution (namely the creation of a Department of Foreign Affairs), and (3) to make Africa central in its foreign policy as embodied in the notion of an *African Renaissance*. This aims to strengthen the practice of democracy and strive for economic liberalization within the African continent (Schraeder, 2001:232-233).

South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy-making is based on a national interest that is fully inclusive of all South African citizens. It is motivated by its domestic policy and framed by the following Strategic Priorities as outlined by the Department of Foreign Affairs:

1. Consolidation of the African Agenda;
2. Strengthening of South-South Co-operation;
3. Strengthening of North-South Dialogue/Co-operation;
4. Participating in the Global System of Governance; and
5. Strengthening of Political Economic Relations with other nations of the world (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

The foreign policy is also based on not only improving South Africa's development, but that of Africa and the global South as well. The Department of Foreign Affairs states that South Africa "shall continue to build bridges between people and nations,

initiating dialogue and helping to set and assert a developmental agenda in all multilateral fora” (DFA Strategic Plan, 2006-2009:4). A developmental foreign policy is based on the assumption that when working in concert, South Africa and its partners in the global South have a lot of manoeuvrability to influence international policy and developmental debates (Landsberg, 2005:725).

2.3.1 General Framework

The six pillars on which South Africa’s foreign policy stands are those that were first articulated by former president Nelson Mandela. The pillars are as follows:

1. The centrality of humans rights;
2. The promotion of democracy worldwide;
3. Justice and respect for international law as a guide for International Relations
4. Peace as a goal for all nations and the use of effective measures and regimes to end conflict;
5. The concerns and interests of Africa need to be reflected in foreign policy choices; and
6. Economic development should be based on increasing regional and international economic cooperation.

Foreign policy during Nelson Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999) was understandably in a state of flux. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in 1994 and was comprised of the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the party of the apartheid regime, the National Party (NP). However, the National Party eventually withdrew from the GNU in 1996 when the most recent constitution was re-written. As Evans states, the “post revolutionary fervour associated with liberation policies resulted in normative and theoretical confusion about proper foreign policy goals and objectives” (Evans, 1999:624). This was further compounded by the various government institutions that were vying for a say in the formulation of the foreign policy agenda. There were competing demands that said that the foreign policy should be socialist, idealist and Afro-centrist while other constituencies called for a foreign policy that placed relations with the West as primary (Evans, 1996:623).

However, it was the ANC's broad principles of foreign policy that were adopted by government.

2.3.2 Institutional Landscape of Foreign Policy-making

The new department of foreign affairs, under the then former Director General Jackie Selebie, conducted a series of workshops aimed at producing a comprehensive foreign policy and the institutional framework within which foreign policy should be implemented. The process included not only the newly integrated Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), but also parliamentary structures like the Portfolio Committee and the ANC (Pahad 2009). The constitution, however, provided the roadmap that was to be followed in foreign policy decision-making. The South African constitution of 1983 was replaced by a transitional constitution in 1993 which in turn was replaced by a final constitution in 1996 (Henwood, 1997). The 1993 Constitution stated that the President, in consultation with the Executive Deputy-Presidents, was in charge of developing the nation's foreign policy. All international agreements needed to be ratified by Parliament (ibid). The Constitution of 1996 emphasizes the importance of the President in the formulation of foreign policy (Schraeder, 2001:236). Unlike the 1993 version, the President does not require the ratification of international agreements that are not technical, administrative or executive in nature (Henwood, 1997).

Foreign Affairs gives political content to the issues that specialists in other departments do because "no single issue does not have a broader political context" (Pahad 2009). As a result, foreign policy is formulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs.³ It does so in consultation with the key domestic departments of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Health, the Treasury and Environmental Affairs (Pahad 2009). For example, policy regarding peacekeeping is formulated by the DFA in consultation with the Defence department, but the actual implementation of said policies would be done by Defence since the DFA does not have troops. In the same way economic development policies are formulated by the DFA in

³ Was originally called the Department of Foreign affairs (DFA), but was changed to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in April 2009 with the election of President Jacob Zuma as president.

consultation with the Treasury and the DTI, but are then implemented by those departments.

2.3.3 Foreign Policy Making Under Mandela and Mbeki

Given South Africa's peaceful transition into democracy coupled with the leadership of Mandela, and his personal and "moral authority" (Hughes, 2004:15) foreign policy decisions during Mandela's era tended to be a mirror image of his statements. Since his statements so often translated immediately into policy, Mandela was often criticized for acting unilaterally. As a result, the roles of the DFA, Cabinet and Parliament were 'overshadowed' during his tenure and South African foreign policy decisions came to be seen as being crafted solely by the Office of the President (Alden & le Pere, 2004:285). A much oft cited example of Mandela taking foreign policy into his own hands without consulting the DFA or other relevant governmental departments, was his decision that South Africa would cancel Namibia's debt. This was done while on a visit to Namibia (Venter, 2001:164). He also unilaterally criticized Nigeria for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and called for sanctions to be imposed on that country by the international community. According to Andrew Cooper, the ANC-led government had been involved in quiet diplomacy and engagement with the Nigerian government prior to Mandela's call for sanctions (Cooper, 1998). South Africa also unilaterally moved into Lesotho in 1998 (Southall, 1984:4).

Cooper, however, attributed Mandela's use of personal diplomacy to being at the heart of South Africa's external validation strategy, given the high regard and esteem with which he is viewed by the world. When he speaks, the world listens and as a result, the nation's external validation strategy has "built-in credibility" (Cooper, 1998). This credibility was necessary because the newly independent South Africa had been "occupying the moral high ground" and showing the world that it was leading a progressive order in the continent and in the world (Cooper, 1998).

Mbeki was also criticized for making foreign policy decisions without consulting other key players within the institutional foreign policy making apparatus, thus making it an "elite-driven, bureaucratic process" (Venter, 164). Tim Hughes attributes this in part

to the role that Mbeki had while in exile during apartheid as the head of the ANC's international desk, and also to his wanting to be seen as a "states person of global standing" (Hughes, 2004:46). Mbeki's desire to centralize control was seen by others as toeing the very fine line between trying to create efficiency and being authoritarian (Venter, 165). The Office of the President grew from a staff of 27 under Mandela to 337 under Mbeki (Hughes, 2004:16). Besides the Presidency, the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) plays a key role in the formulation of policy. The unit is served by five chief directorates (reflective of the Director General clusters). The two most important ones are: the International Relations, Peace and Security cluster, and the Economic cluster (Hughes, 2004:17). Also of importance is the National Executive Committee (NEC) sub-committee on International Relations. This committee coordinates the ANC's foreign policy interests and representation from: the Presidency; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Parliament; the tripartate alliance and other key stakeholders. It also ensures coordination of the above departments as well as the study group on foreign Affairs and the ANC's position within the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PCFA) (Hughes, 2004:29).

The foreign policy outlook under Mbeki was decidedly multilateral and he sought to strengthen the institutional foundation of South African foreign policy. It was the unfolding of the African Renaissance and its use as a policy instrument that served to "confirm the consolidation of foreign policy in Mbeki's hands." As Vale and Maseko state, the appreciation of the place of the African Renaissance in South African foreign policy cannot be considered without considering Mbeki's goals for South Africa (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 284).

2.3.3.1 A Better South Africa, A Better Africa, A Better World

Under Mbeki, foreign policy was driven by the slogan: A better South Africa, A better Africa, A better world. This was espoused in the vision of an African Renaissance. According to former Deputy Foreign Affairs minister, Aziz Pahad, the ANC understood that South Africa could not better itself without the help of the rest of the continent and the rest of the world. "We quickly understood that you can't divorce the three factors" (Pahad 2009). In fact it is stated in the Department of Foreign Affairs strategic plan that, "we will continue to focus on economic diplomacy as we

aim for prosperity for South Africa's people, for the continent as a whole as well as a better life for all nations of the world" (DFA, Strategic Plan 2006-2009:4).

To this end, by 1999 South Africa had diplomatic relations with 178 countries out of 186 countries world-wide. It maintains 94 missions abroad and non-resident representation in 73 countries. Of the 53 countries in Africa, South Africa has official relations with 49 and offices in 24 of these countries. It maintains 13 missions in Asia. There are diplomatic relations with all of the countries in the Middle East, the Americas and Europe. It maintains non-resident diplomatic relations with 11 of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community. In order to accomplish the task of representation, the structure at the DFA's head office features five divisions or 'branches': Africa; Asia and the Middle East; Americas and Europe. This includes Multilateral Affairs and Administration (le Pere, n.d.:9).

A better South Africa, according to Mandela's vision, was one where all South Africans regardless of race, ethnicity or gender could fully assert their human worth (Mandela, 1998:86). This could not be achieved without increasing their material wealth. Because domestic policy is intricately tied to foreign policy, the Mbeki administration placed great emphasis on wealth creation and human security as domestic policies to be pursued. In the same way that Mandela understood that his vision of a better South Africa could not be realized until South Africa could participate fully in world affairs and policies were developed to re-introduce South Africa as a "responsible global citizen" (Mandela, 1998:87), so did Mbeki's administration.

When getting ready to negotiate South Africa's freedom, Mandela wrote from prison, "No freedom without redistribution" (as quoted in Klein, 2007:249). The apartheid regime left the majority of South Africans marginalized economically and educationally. As a result, they were not only unable to achieve decent standards of living, but unable to compete with the rest of the world. Post-apartheid South Africa had a huge responsibility to transform this inequity within the nation to fit Mandela's dream of a society where people of all races, sexes and religions could reach their full potential. It had to establish itself domestically by fulfilling its promises to the populace of redistribution wealth, land and better service delivery in a host of areas.

To meet this responsibility would require that the economy grow to expand so that the budgets previously set for the minority could encompass the majority.

Related to this was the fact that South Africa had to reinvent its identity and reinstate itself in the southern Africa region as a stabilizing force, versus the destabilizing nature of the apartheid regime. This stabilizing force had to reach Africa as a whole without seeming like a hegemon. At the same time, in wanting to be identified as an African nation, South Africa did not want to be allocated the same stigma associated with much of the African continent, namely, that of economic mismanagement, corruption and ethnic or tribal conflict. South Africa also had to reinstate itself in the international system as a truly African nation and global citizen that participates fully in global affairs. This put the new government of South Africa into a challenging position. As a result, the ANC government has been criticized for the way in which it went about fulfilling these foreign policy objectives. The Mandela and then Mbeki governments chose to take the same route as their fellow African states at the time of their independence from colonialism. The neo-liberal route, often termed the “Washington Consensus” was strongly pushed by Mbeki under Mandela’s presidency and then under his own despite the negative effects of trade liberalization in the rest of the continent. Two programmes were created to achieve economic equity and attract foreign investment: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR).

The RDP was essentially an economic equalizer policy meant to address the socio-economic inequalities created by the apartheid regime. The Department of Foreign Affairs used the RDP as a framework (Henwood, 1997) because it was seen as representative of the vision for a new South Africa and a tool with which to achieve the transformation. According to the GNU, the RDP framework would ensure that the country:

- develops strong and stable democratic institutions and practices; characterised by representativeness and participation;
- becomes a fully democratic and non-racial society;

- becomes a prosperous society, having embarked upon a sustainable and environmentally friendly growth and development path; and
- addresses the moral and ethical development of society (ANC, 1994).

By 1996 it became evident that the RDP was not sufficient by itself to transform the economic and social inequalities of apartheid and needed to be reworked. The reworked framework came in the form of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme; a five-year macroeconomic program. The government emphasized that GEAR was not meant to take away from the RDP framework, but reinforce it. GEAR was aimed at deficit reduction and tight monetary policy. This is used to control inflation, stabilize the economy and allow the markets to determine the exchange rates (Elkhafif, 2003:3). GEAR also aimed at liberalizing trade to stimulate growth and investment (Weeks, 1999:795-6). The creation of jobs was seen as key to reducing inequalities. By correcting the structural weaknesses in the economy through a revision of market-based policy, it was believed that GEAR could create the necessary environment for substantial job creation (Umrabulo, 1997).

Pretoria hoped that the adoption of GEAR, which was tight on monetary policy, would show the rest of the world that its emphasis on “fiscal prudence” would send clear signals of “its importance as an essential element of sound economic policy management, particularly given the impact of global conditions on national economies” (ANC, 54). It was a formidable undertaking in light of, as mentioned earlier, the huge inequalities fostered by the apartheid regime. The implementation of a budget reduction when substantial budget increases were needed to provide goods and services to the majority of the population who were previously not budgeted for would be a challenge.

Perhaps more under Mbeki than under Mandela was the sense that Mbeki did not consult enough with key stakeholders such as special interest groups within the business community and those within the ANC such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in the formulation of foreign policy. There were also divisions within government along the lines of those that were more socialist, favouring state intervention and the direct redistribution of resources through the nationalization of industry. Then there were those for the liberalization of the

economy and minimal state intervention in the economy (Cooper, 1998). As mentioned earlier, the government opted for more liberal economic controls as evidenced by the RDP, but more so by GEAR. This according to Cooper was based on the acceptance by the ANC government that if it is going to be part of the globalizing and global international system, it would have to work within the confines of its pressures. Therefore, government policy has been to engage the forces of the globalized economy and international system first in order to mitigate any negative effects they may have on the domestic economy (Cooper, 1998).

Pretoria's efforts to show itself as a responsible global citizen and at the same time attempt to reduce inequalities domestically, both through its liberal economic policies, were seemingly in conflict with the state's foreign policy objectives at large. In fact Pretoria was, and has continued to be, criticized for having a seemingly duplicitous foreign policy, i.e. being an advocate for the developing South and Africa in particular, yet dancing to the tune of the superpowers in the North. For example, the GNU felt that it needed the validation of the IMF and World Bank in order to access international financial markets. Both the IMF and the World Bank have long mostly negative histories in Africa, and are known for their structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were prescribed for the continent's newly independent states. States had to follow the SAPs in order to access financing to grow their nations. The literature on the destructiveness of SAPs is large and will not be covered here. However, it was in the same spirit of other African nations that the ANC government went to the IMF and the World Bank, despite the fact that the IMF had been very supportive of the apartheid regime, lending it US\$2 billion at the height of global denouncements of apartheid (Bond, 2002:11). The World Bank's involvement in South Africa was more along the lines of advice. Its most noted advice was given in the formation of GEAR.

The failing reforms that the RDP and later GEAR sought to put in place were in an effort to undo the negative aspects of the negotiations and settlement between the ANC and the National Party. The settlement favoured the elites of the apartheid regime, allowing them to retain control of the economy while letting the ANC's face be on the political front. As a result, the ANC government was forced to toe the line with regard to its economic policy-making and follow a liberal economic model of

trade liberalization, the same that the apartheid regime followed. Under the terms of the settlement, for example, efforts to create jobs through the subsidization of factories was not possible because the ANC had signed on to GATT, the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under which the subsidizing of auto plants and textiles factories was illegal.

Service delivery in the form of housing and electricity was made more difficult by the fact that a good portion of the ANC government's budget was servicing the debt "quietly" passed on by the apartheid government (Klein, 2007:256). Reducing wage disparities through an increase of the minimum wage could not happen because the new government had signed an \$850 million deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that promised "wage restraint" (Klein, 2007:257). As Naomi Klein further states, to break or change any of the agreements with the multilateral institutions would send signals that the nation was untrustworthy which would precipitate capital flight and lead to currency devaluations (ibid).

2.3.4 Policy Towards Africa: Apartheid

During the 1981-1989 segment of the apartheid regime, South Africa's foreign policy was offensive dominant. States that are offensive dominant are ones which adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in order to take advantage of new opportunities and avert new dangers (Van Evera, 1984:62). As a result, South Africa's Africa foreign policy, especially towards its neighbours in the Southern Africa region, was one of regional destabilization, hostility and the infliction of itself as a non-benevolent hegemon. It was able to achieve the role of hegemon due to its strong economic and military status relative to its neighbouring countries.

The two main factors that led to such a foreign policy were the decolonization of other African states and the resultant rule by black majorities which the apartheid regime feared would influence the majority in South Africa. The other factor, given the Cold War, was the threat of communism. South Africa, like the US, perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to its status quo. It believed the Soviet Union was the cause of Communism globally, and that in Africa it would eventually result in an attack on South African soil (Beri, 1998). Behind the Communist threat lay the real

fear: that increased Communist activity could lead to a challenging of the apartheid regime by aiding a revolution by black South Africans.

As Vale and Maseko outline, South Africa during the apartheid era also saw itself as a leader in the rest of the continent. This leadership vision started with then Prime Minister, Jan Smuts' call for South Africa to take its rightful place in Pan-African development and in the shaping of its policies (Vale & Maseko, 1998:274). Smuts calculated that if the rest of Africa was on a fairly equal playing field as South Africa, it would provide a huge market for South Africa's products. Apartheid South Africa was willing to lend its military capabilities to less endowed African states, which in turn would reward South Africa's markets (Ibid:275). The thread of an African leadership with themes of an African destiny and modernization, cropped up over the apartheid years. Africa's leaders always felt that South Africa could be part of on an African revolution, but in order to do so it would have to abandon apartheid (Ibid).

2.3.5 Policy Towards Africa: Post-Apartheid

In contrast, South Africa's policy towards Africa in the post-apartheid era (1994 onwards) is based on the following three principles:

- Strengthening Africa's multilateral institutions continentally and regionally through the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC);
- Supporting the implementation of Africa's socioeconomic development programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); and
- Strengthening bilateral political and socio-economic relations by way of effective structures for dialogue and co-operation (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

Analyses of South Africa's foreign policy towards the rest of the continent essentially revolve around what sort of power it will exercise: hegemonic hard power, or the soft power of discourse and diplomacy (Kagwanja, 2006: 160). When apartheid ended, South Africa was admitted into both the regional organizations of the OAU and SADC. If Mandela was criticized for acting unilaterally within the SADC region and

the continent as a whole, then Mbeki was criticized for stretching South Africa too far in his attempts to act multilaterally and for the country to be seen as a regional and continental team player and not a hegemon.

South Africa was keen on reversing the negative impact that the former apartheid regime had on the southern Africa region through peacekeeping efforts and the strengthening of the regional economy in concert with the SADC organ. Particular emphasis was given to the protection of human rights, peace and stability through the non-violent resolution of conflicts and the integration of African economies into a globalizing world—essentially the promotion of liberal economic policies. South Africa's Africa foreign policy is also largely based on the notion of an African Renaissance that suggests five areas of engagement: (1) the encouragement of cultural exchange; (2) the emancipation of the African woman from patriarchy; (3) the mobilization of youth; (4) the broadening, deepening and sustenance of democracy; and (5) the initiation of sustainable economic development (Taylor & Williams, 2001:267).

The concept of an African Renaissance was used as an alliance and unity forging tool by then Deputy President Mbeki. It was the first step towards alliance building because it revived the dream and ideals of pan-Africanism not just in Africa, but within the African Diaspora. It also resonated well with the international community in the West as it signalled that South Africa was taking a continental lead as they had hoped it would and perhaps steer it in a neo-liberal direction. This would serve South Africa well as an advocate for the continent and promoter of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). However, South Africa made it very clear to the West from the onset that it would build alliances with any state that fell into the framework of its foreign policy principles and national interest and not be dictated to by the West. To this end the ANC recommitted itself, as the government and not just the liberation party, to have alliances with those states that had supported it during the struggle. Such states were Libya, Cuba, Syria and Iran, just to name a few. Incidentally some of those states, like Libya, had a less than stellar human rights record or democratic practices—issues that go against what South Africa seeks to uphold domestically and internationally. Yet in the case of Libya for

instance, it was important for South Africa to maintain good relations with one of the continent's major actors and rivals for the leadership of the continent.

The call for an African Renaissance was really the call for a change in the way Africa was viewed by the West, and as a result, treated. As articulated by Thabo Mbeki, the African Renaissance draws mainly from the Africanist perspective whose primary objective is to lay to rest the image of Africa as “the dark continent,” that lacks history, culture, intelligence and the ability to rule itself (Hultman, 1992:225). To this end, South Africa's African foreign policy was and is driven by the desire to restore the dignity of the people of Africa. Mbeki believed that this meant dealing decisively and as quickly as possible with the perception that Africa is condemned forever to depend on the merciful charity which those who are kind are ready to put into its begging bowls (Mbeki, 1998). Mandela, but to a larger extent, Mbeki, fought to change the negative perception of Africa by the rest of the world, namely that of endemic poverty, war, and bad leadership.

In order for there to be renewal, the feeling Africans have of being marginalized from what is happening in their countries, the continent and the world, will need to be addressed in order to “blunt the anger” that people in Africa and the world over, feel in the emerging international system that reinforce “global apartheid” (Vale & Maseko, 1998:281). Vale and Maseko go on to state that in order for a renaissance to truly be achieved, it must involve an understanding of human relations that go beyond the domestic and international politics of race and simultaneously recognize human worth and the diversity of cultural values. To accomplish this, the renaissance must “represent both discipline and liberation” (ibid:281).

With regards to liberation, in his speech to the United Nations University (UNU), Mbeki stated that what the African continent aspires to is genuine liberation. In order to achieve liberation, the following points must be in place:

1. An end to practices that create the view in the eyes of the rest of the world that Africans are incapable of establishing and maintaining good systems of governance;
2. An end to military coups and undemocratically elected governments

3. An end to one party states as they do not represent stable systems of governance that serve the interests of the people;
4. The recognition that there is not one standard of democracy that will fit every country and therefore not try to impose a particular form of democracy but one that will empower the people and allow them to fulfil their destinies. (Mbeki, 1998).

South African leaders who had been the last to be liberated from colonial rule had an opportunity to see what had and had not worked in the continent and hopefully not make some of the same mistakes that other African heads of state had made. South Africa saw itself as being in a position to point out where other African states had gone wrong and wanted to help them fix those areas. For South Africa, this took the form of the African Renaissance, a rebirth of Africa, which was articulated by Thabo Mbeki.

Mbeki believed that the Renaissance should start in South Africa, and would in itself be an “expression of the African Renaissance” through the country’s own commitment to strengthening democracy; increasing economic development; halting the spread of HIV/AIDS; protecting the environment; empowering women and the end to racism (Mbeki, 1998). In essence, South Africa put itself up as an example, not only to Africa, but to the world as to what the rest of the continent can and should become. It was quite aware of the expectations by the rest of the world for it to be not only an example but a leader for the rest of Africa. In this endeavour, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki worked tirelessly. Mbeki understood that South Africa could not meet its domestic needs in isolation if the rest of the continent was not developing due to poor governance, mismanagement of resources, or caught up in various conflicts. As he said in a speech to the United Nations University, African states recognize that, “...none of our countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail” (Mbeki UN speech). South Africa, therefore, appointed itself as executor and leader of the African Renaissance in the continent. By taking the lead in Africa to bring about the liberation mentioned above, South Africa hoped to help change the negative perception of Africa. While the African Renaissance serves as the vision for the

liberation of the continent, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the plan of action and provides the discipline through which to realize the vision.

Despite there being a new government in South Africa, the country's ambitious foreign policy for the continent was viewed with some scepticism—especially since it was the new kid on the block. As Peter Kagwanja discusses, it was perceived to be acting not out of “notions of philanthropy” but strategic interests to increase economic wealth through investment (Kagwanja, 2006: 30). This is in line with realist thought that South Africa, given its economic wealth, would adopt an imperialist foreign policy. Bahman Fozouni states it this way:

The direction of a foreign policy pursued by any state is determined by whether or not the level of influence exercised by the state in its natural geopolitical sphere is commensurate with the state's power position relative to the other states. Thus, given its relative capability, if a state is geopolitically *under-extended* in influence level, it will inexorably adopt an imperialist foreign policy in order to optimize its power (Fozouni, 1995:481).

In spite of this realist injunction and pressure from the international community for South Africa to take a more forceful stance, South Africa consistently sought to utilize quiet diplomacy over military brawn, and fought against being seen as an imperialist power.

It is also aware of its somewhat delicate position in Africa. As the last to receive its independence, it essentially had the whole continent in the form of the OAU behind it in its fight for independence. To some extent, the new South African government was indebted to the rest of the continent—in particular those countries that were especially vocal and supportive of the ANC. Former South African ambassador to the US, Franklin Sonn, said that South Africa disappointed a lot of other countries in the sense that they thought South Africa would be more sympathetic to their own ideological aspirations or ideological legacy, given that it was emerging from a liberation philosophy and history. South Africa had to maintain to a degree the relationships of those that helped it fight for its liberation. At the same time it had to

“ensure that the world viewed it as a modern insightful country, able to blend with the rest of the world and at the same time deliver on the interests of those whom they consider to be their partners” (Sonn, 2009). The Mbeki government was immediately confronted with this balancing act. There was the post-war reconstruction of Angola, shaky peace agreements in the Congo and Burundi, and mounting tension in Zimbabwe. Coupled with the lack of commitment of some of SADC’s key heads of state to democracy and human rights, the new government’s Africa foreign policy was immediately put to the test (Alden & le Pere, 2004:289).

Foreign policy under Mbeki was a direct reflection of his world outlook. Mbeki was well aware of the poor socio-economic state of most African countries. He understood that they were in that position in part due to bad governance and mismanagement of state resources, but also due to the low positions they had in the international system and its pressures that further marginalized them. Mbeki was not content to make yet another call for African unity in the traditional pan-African sense and leave it at that, because ideology only unites so far. African states do not need to just unify, they need sound policies. Unity without sound policies and institutions in place is a recipe for chaos. As a result there needed to be a foundation on which to build unity in the different areas such as: political, economic and cultural.

When Mbeki was challenging the multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council on behalf of the Global South, he was a realist and played according to power politics (Landsberg, 2009). When demanding the transformation of the global economic order, he drew from within the Marxist camp from Dependency Theory and World-System Theory. As one of the key architects of NEPAD, Mbeki’s Marxist leanings came through. Marxist theories generally look at the interaction between capitalistic modes of production, social relations and power in the international system. The structure of the international system is said to be like a pyramid with those who control the means of production at the top, i.e. developed countries, with those who produce at the bottom, i.e. developing nations. Those at the top are able to wield their economic power over those at the bottom, creating the uneven economic development that we see in the international system. Variants of Marxist theory believe that international organizations are tools used by the power in their

exploitation of the weak or poor states and therefore exacerbate unequal development.

Neither Mandela nor Mbeki were able to please all camps. On the economic front, South Africa chose to protect its interests and in turn received a public reprimand from Mugabe during a SADC economic summit in 1996 in Cape Town, for expecting the region to accept its goods, but not opening up its own doors to the goods from the region. On the human rights side, South Africa opted to protect its African interests. And for that Mbeki has been criticized for his quiet diplomacy regarding Zimbabwe. However, as Kagwanja states, Mbeki used quiet diplomacy to deal with the “undercurrents of African solidarity.” To do otherwise would mean risking isolation within SADC and even the AU, given Mugabe’s popularity amongst many African leaders (Kagwanja, 2006:166).

2.4 FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN LIBYA

2.4.1 General Framework

Since 1969 Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been the Head of State for Libya and controlled its foreign policy. Mary-Jane Deeb categorizes Libya’s spheres of foreign policy into five levels. The first level is North Africa--the Maghreb countries (besides Libya) of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania; Niger, Mali and Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia. At this level foreign policy is based on national interests. The second level is the Arab world where Arab nationalist ideology is central in foreign policy making. The third level is the Islamic world which includes states in levels one and two, other countries in Africa and some in Asia. Foreign policy in this level consists of Islamic ideology. The fourth level consists of the Third World at large: countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia that are not Arab or Muslim. In this category foreign policy is generally revolutionary in nature or what Deeb calls “revolutionary socialism”. The fifth and final level is comprised of the industrialized states—those in the West and East. Qaddafi’s foreign policy towards these states has been a mixture of “pragmatism and ideological fervour” (Deeb, 1991:9).

2.4.2 Institutional Landscape of Foreign Policy-making

Libya's institutional foreign policy-making landscape is best understood in light of its political landscape. Libya's regime is based on Gaddafi's ideological framework which is articulated in his *Green Book*. He sees capitalism as being exploitative and communism as being godless. Therefore, neither are suitable for his country (Ogunbadejo, 1983:155). Libya's official name tells a lot about its politics. It is officially called the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whereby wealth is distributed throughout society, unlike in capitalist or communist societies. The renaming of Libya occurred in 1977 when the Revolutionary Command Council was abolished and power was placed in a People's Congress. Gaddafi used his oil wealth to create a welfare system that made available all the basic necessities of food, clothing and housing. That Gaddafi made good on his grand scheme for the Libyan population meant that he was able to maintain power without accountability (Ogunbadejo, 1983:155).

Also abolished were traditional forms of government—offices of the Cabinet, Ministers and Directors, and institutions. The People's Congress had a General Secretariat with secretaries for various functions such as Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and Labour (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:19). Gaddafi is essentially the head and has the final say of this structure. As such, there does not exist a process of consultation with regards to the formulation of foreign policy. It is limited to a small group of elites around Gaddafi whom he controls (Deeb, 1991:13). As Deeb states, the People's Congress and various committees set up under Gaddafi were tools to mobilize the Libyan populace in support of Gaddafi's regime and its policies. Domestic institutions and special interest groups that tend to have bearings on the foreign policy making of the nation are not permitted to have views that differ with Gaddafi's (Deeb, 1991:5).

2.4.3 Policy Towards Africa

Libya's foreign policy towards Africa has been in line with its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial position (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:53). It can be divided into two phases: the 1970s and 1980s where it was very militaristic and revolutionary in support of

liberation struggles and anti-colonialism, and the second phase of the 1990s where Libya sought regional cooperation and the promotion of peace and stability through conflict resolution (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:54).

Like many oil producing states of the Arab world, Libya is a rentier state, i.e. able to generate revenue without taxing its populace. Since rentier states are not using money from taxation, they do not feel the need to be accountable to their populaces for decisions made regarding the country such as the execution of foreign policy. Libya's use of oil as its main foreign policy tool has been dubbed "check-book diplomacy." Oil is intricately linked to the state's security functions (Martinez, 2007:133) and has been used as a means to execute its military interventions within Africa.

From 1969 when Gaddafi first took power in Libya, his main interests were regime survival and the protection of Libya's territory from external threats. In order to survive, Gaddafi sought alliances with fellow North-African countries as well as Arab nations in the rest of Africa and the world. During the late 1960s through the 1980s Libya had a military presence in several Africa countries such as Chad, Sudan and Mali and supported multiple liberation and opposition movements across the continent.

Libya's Africa foreign policy changed in the 1990s. Like the rest of the continent, it had to adjust its foreign policies to a post-Cold War period and adapt to a faster rate of globalization. As Ray Takeyh states, while the rest of the states in the non-aligned bloc were turning their attention to securing their position in the new phase of the globalized economy, Qaddafi found that he could no longer maintain his rigid revolutionary stance. Libya's interference in the affairs of other African countries coupled with the UN sanctions imposed on the country in 1992 on top of the sanctions already in place from the 1980s imposed by the US, were causing him to be isolated (Takeyh, 2001:64). The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in particular, meant that Libya had lost its buffer and counter-weight to the forces of US imperialism and was now subject to the same systemic pressures of other developing countries in a uni-polar international system. Oil, though still a strategic foreign policy tool, was not enough of a shield against sanctions in the new

world order. The sanctions were pinching the Libyan purse which caused serious problems domestically, and coupled with the declining price of oil, affected the country's ability to influence Africa (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:54).

As a result Gaddafi saw the need for regional integration and cooperation and took a more pro-Africa stance. His Africa foreign policy has been aimed at creating regional stability and cooperation through conflict resolution and the creation of regional blocs. Libya has also sought to foster closer economic ties with key African states in the hopes of not being seen as a "sponsor of African insurgency," but as a "sponsor of Africa's economic revival" (Solomon, 2005:478). Libya's resources have been used to try and broker peace in continental conflicts such as those in Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone and Togo (Tamura, 2008:21). His "check-book" diplomacy was used significantly to exert pressure on various economically stranded governments to gain support for his desire to foster regional cooperation (Tamura, 2008:20), which is the foundation for continental unity of which he is a proponent. Gaddafi started the regional economic community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) which is headquartered in Tripoli and now has 28 member countries. Africa in general has stood by Muammar Gaddafi when Arab leaders would not. This was especially the case during the Lockerbie period when the OAU defied sanctions on Libya and later when Nelson Mandela assisted in the resolution of the affair. Gaddafi's Africa foreign policy is currently aimed at the rapid creation of a United States of Africa.

2.5 ANALYSIS

The analysis of the foreign policies of developing nations has tended to be generalized by the experience of those countries that have had "flamboyant" or radical leaders and therefore becomes an analysis of why leaders act in ways that seem irrational (Franklin B. Weinstein as quoted in Deeb, 1991:14). Yet as Deeb notes, the foreign policies of African states is generally based on the fact that they are 'weak, poor, and dependent' even though they want to be just the opposite.

This chapter showed that both South Africa and Libya changed their destabilizing foreign policies towards Africa to ones that help unite rather than divide the

continent. South Africa went so far as to state that at the core of its foreign policy objectives is the African continent. Libya denounced pan-Arabism in favour of pan-Africanism. These moves were based in part on being able to achieve certain economic objectives domestically, but also as a reflection of their feelings of indebtedness to the continent. The entire African continent had stood behind South Africa in solidarity to rid the country of apartheid. In turn, South Africa felt that it needed to show its commitment to the rest of the continent. Libya, on the other hand, felt indebted to the continent because it had stood behind it during USA and United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions during the Lockerbie period. African nations, through the OAU, defied these sanctions and bans in an act of solidarity with Libya when its fellow Arab nations did nothing to assist. For this, and Mandela's assistance in particular, Libya felt indebted to the continent.

South Africa, through Mandela and Mbeki, fought to change the negative perception that the rest of the world, the West in particular, has of Africa and Africans. Mbeki's Africanist ideological underpinnings were exposed in his promotion of the notion of Africa working towards an 'African Renaissance.' In fighting against negative perceptions and the imperialistic tendencies that came with them, South Africa and Libya constantly defied realism by pursuing aggressive foreign policies. Given their low positions in the international system as developing countries, realism would put a similarly low limit on what they could accomplish through their foreign policies. Mandela set the bar for South Africa when he defied the USA and said that just because the USA was not friends with countries like Libya and Cuba, did not mean that they were by default South Africa's enemies.

2.6 CONCLUSION

As we have seen from this chapter, foreign policy is defined as the state's national interest. The national interest is best described as a "national self." According to realism, a state's main fixed interest is: to increase economic and military power. As a result, it is considered exogenous to foreign policy decision-making. What does have a direct bearing on foreign policy decisions, however, are the systemic pressures of the international system. A state can only pursue its foreign policy

objectives to the extent that it is ranked in the international system. That is, a state that is not powerful and therefore not ranked highly in the international system will not be able to pursue a very ambitious foreign policy. Realism also does not see non-state actors, such as special interest groups and non-governmental organizations, as having an impact on a state's foreign policy decisions.

Constructivism sees interests as endogenous to foreign policy making. Interests are not fixed according to realism and as a result will impact on what foreign policy decisions states make. Interests are determined in large part by a state's historical background and ideologies. These will have an impact on what foreign policy choices a state will make. Though states remain the primary actors in the international system, special interest groups and non-governmental actors such as civil society have an effect on what foreign policy decisions states will make.

Foreign policy in democracies is made in consultation with other governmental departments, such as in South Africa. However in non-democracies such as Libya⁴ this is not usually the case. Libya is also a rentier state which means it derives its source of income from a good and not from the people. So it does not have to be accountable to the people for its decisions domestically or internationally because it is not using their money to pursue its various policies.

South Africa used its 'moral' authority acquired as a result of its remarkable transition to democracy to increase whatever limits the international system put on its ability to pursue a certain level of foreign policy. Libya did the same by way of its vast oil wealth that was being eyed by the West. The next chapter discusses South Africa and Libya's roles in the formation of the African Union.

⁴ Libya considers itself a democracy because the people 'rule.' However, in the traditional or Western sense of a democracy whereby there are multi-party elections and the people have a choice in leadership, Libya does not count as a democracy.

CHAPTER 3

SOUTH AFRICA AND LIBYA IN THE FORMATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

South Africa and Libya have had reputations of being 'pariah' states (Takeyh, 2001:63; Schraeder, 2001) as a result of aggressive and self-serving foreign policies. South Africa earned such a reputation during the apartheid years, which later coincided with the Cold War era. It destabilized the region around it by using its military and economic might unilaterally. Libya, during the Cold War period, used its military and economic might in Northern Africa to achieve its hegemonic end-goal. Both countries now have different foreign policies and aspirations for the continent of Africa.

The previous chapter defined foreign policy as being a state's national interest and what that interest is based on. In South Africa, foreign policy is informed by its domestic policy and is guided by the vision of "a better South Africa in a better Africa in a better world" (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006:7). Given the challenges of economic and political marginalization of Africa, South Africa's foreign policy is based on: the centrality of the African continent; the centrality of human rights to international relations; the promotion of democracy as the only solution to pervasive issues of humankind; respect for international law; continual striving for peace; multilateralism; and regionalism as the way towards economic development (ibid).

Libya's foreign policy is based on maintaining its independence (i.e. fighting imperialism and domination), African unity and the resistance of domination. Its Africa foreign policy in particular is to promote trade, cultural exchange and to eradicate poverty and disease (Alzubedi, 2009). Both South Africa and Libya feel some indebtedness to the countries of the African continent. South Africa was aided by the OAU during apartheid and Libya was supported by the organization during sanctions imposed on it by the UN and USA.

This chapter looks at the competing foreign policies of the two countries in the formation of the African Union. The premise of this chapter is that although the two nations were motivated by a similar vision and goal-- the unification of Africa and its liberation from conflict and economic marginalization—they were diametrically opposed in their approach to African unity. Each country felt called to lead the continent's re-birth but went about it in different ways and had different justifications for their rationales. The chapter examines the approaches that South Africa and Libya initiated to affect the processes of change, such as how security is viewed in the OAU/AU, including the strategic alliances they built with other African nations. It looks at the roles the two nations played in key OAU summits leading up to the formation of the AU, the drafting of the Constitutive Act and the resulting compromises.

This chapter is broken down into three sections. The first examines the debates and problems about the OAU. The second section dissects the making of the AU and the contributions of South Africa and Libya between 1999 and 2002. The third section presents a conclusion and analysis.

3.2 DEBATES AND PROBLEMS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

The OAU was established in 1963 and was the result of a Pan-African dream that African leaders and freedom fighters such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Haile Sellasie of Ethiopia, amongst others, dreamt for the continent of Africa (Murithi, 2007:2). The main purpose of the OAU was to ensure that all countries within Africa became liberated from colonialism; and that Africa and Africans became the owners of their natural resources and the economic, social and political development of their countries (ibid:2). The Purposes of the OAU as outlined in the OAU charter Article II were as follows:

- b. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
- c. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

- d. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence
- e. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
- f. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (DIRCO: 2004).

Despite not liking the arbitrary manner of the division of Africa, the newly independent states jealously guarded their borders and their right to non-interference by other states. As a result, the OAU came to be founded on the principle of state sovereignty and the absolute protection of that sovereignty as indicated in its Principles, Article III of the charter:

- The sovereign equality of all Member States.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
- Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States.
- Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
- Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Also key in the formation of the OAU was the desire that the organization be an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. However, since the OAU's inception, there had been thirteen African conflicts that had warranted notable interventions by the OAU, yet only five resulted in some form of peacekeeping mission by the organization (African Union). Perhaps this should not have come as much of a surprise. Peace and security was not actually mentioned as one of the Purposes of the OAU, but was mentioned later in Article XIX where member states "pledge to settle all disputes amongst themselves by peaceful means" (Touval, 1967:105). The organization's stance on non-interference was a

point of contention by some member states. The Organization's principle of non-intervention prevented it from entering into such human rights atrocities as the Rwandan genocide and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola and Sudan (Packer & Rukare, 2002:367). As Williams states, the OAU was willing to condemn the abuses of European "minority" regimes in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), but remained silent on abuses by African regimes. It was "willing to promote human rights, but not protect them" (Williams, 2007: 268).

The end of the Cold War and a faster rate of globalization based on technological advances heralded a change in the international system. The end of the Cold War marked the end of the bipolar international system. The Soviet Union was dissolved, leaving the USA the world's sole superpower. The end of the Cold War also marked the end of many African nations' source of aid, be it economic or militaristic, that was given to them by one or the other super powers in exchange for their alliance and cooperation. As a result, and compounded by globalization, the economies of many African countries dwindled while instances of conflict rose.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the major focus of the OAU had been on decolonization, namely of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. As a result it was unable to pay sufficient attention to two of the biggest challenges humanity faced: underdevelopment and poverty eradication (Pahad, 2009). By the time the Southern Africa region had become liberated and apartheid defeated, the challenges of the times demanded that there be a re-examination of the prevailing institutional framework. The end of the Cold War created a paradigm shift as Eastern Europe collapsed and the Berlin Wall came down. What it did not create were the dividends that Africa had thought it would: increasing peace levels, a greater focus on development and bringing Africa back into the mainstream of international relations politically and economically (Pahad, 2009). Increasing globalization through technological advances in Information Technology (IT) further marginalized Africa.

The 1990 declaration by the OAU Heads of State and Government noted the changes in East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation and the movement

of states towards regional integration and the establishment of economic trading blocs. They felt that these changes should “guide Africa’s collective thinking about the challenges and options before her in the 1990s and beyond in view of the real threat of marginalization of our continent.” (AHG/Decl. 1(XXVI)) It was against this backdrop of a post Cold War environment that African leaders made attempts to restructure the OAU. This was done specifically in the areas of peace and human security and economic development and their interrelationship.

3.2.1 The Cairo Declaration

The 1993 OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt marked the thirtieth anniversary of the OAU. The African Heads of State and Government (AHG) used the opportunity to reflect on the past thirty years since the organization’s inception and plan for the future. It was decided that given the changes in the international system, there needed to be a close link between development, democracy, security and stability as the “ideal formula for fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa. This would eventually lead to a decent life, progress, and social justice.” The Heads of State and Government believed that such a formula would enable them to eventually solve the “acute socio-economic and political problems facing the African continent” (Cairo, 1993: AHG/Decl.1 (XXIX)).

The 1993 summit resulted in the declaration by the Heads of State and Government on the “Establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution” (Cairo, 1993: AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX)). The Mechanism’s main function was to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In situations where conflict had already occurred, the Mechanism was to assume peace-making and peace-building functions in order to assist in their resolution. A special fund was to be created to finance exclusively the peace-making and peace-building initiatives of the Mechanism. The Mechanism was to work closely with African regional and sub-regional organizations and the United Nations (UN) and be headed by the Central Organ (Cairo, 1993: AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX)) of the African Union.

Even though the AHG recognized that the UN was the final authority for dealing with peace and security issues internationally and those internally that threatened the

regional stability in Africa, they believed that the OAU should take primary ownership of its own problems, especially in the area of peace and stability. Since the financial state of the OAU was poor, it would require external assistance in cases where conflict had escalated to violence. As a result, the emphasis was on conflict prevention so as to eliminate the need for “complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations,” as would be required once a conflict was already underway. Member states would find this difficult to finance (Cairo, 1993: AHG/DECL.3(XXIX)). Hence the Early Warning System (EWS) was established within the Mechanism to assist the organization in preventative diplomacy measures.

Changes in the way the OAU saw human rights was seen in the drafting of the 1995 protocol in Cape Town for the establishment of a human rights court that would be able to uphold the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) better than the Commission of the same title. The protocol was adopted in 1998 by the Assembly and enforced in 2003 (Sturman, 2007).

3.2.2 The Abuja Treaty

In relation to economic development and integration of the continent’s economies, the OAU Heads of State and Government adopted what came to be known as the Abuja Treaty of which the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) was a key component. The principles, objectives and strategies of the AEC were first decided upon in 1976 in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (Khamis, 2008:29). The AEC was created to “ensure the economic, social and cultural integration of the African continent” (AHG/Res.205 (XXVII)). It called for the coordination of efforts by African governments through regional economic communities (RECs) to ensure the effective management overall economic matters and the socio-economic development of Africa. The AEC Treaty entered into force in May 1994 and the OAU became known as the OAU/AEC as it operated on the basis of the OAU charter and the AEC treaty (OAU Profile, 2). It would have an implementation process to be completed in six stages and over thirty-four years (African Economic Community). The six stages of the AEC are worth noting:

- STAGE 1: Strengthening existing RECs and creating new ones where needed (5 years);
- STAGE 2: Stabilisation of tariff and other barriers to regional trade and the strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the field of trade, agriculture, finance, transport and communication, industry and energy, as well as coordination and harmonisation of the activities of the RECs (8 years);
- STAGE 3: Establishment of a free trade area and a Customs Union at the level of each REC (10 years);
- STAGE 4: Coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among RECs, with a view to establishing a Continental Customs Union (2 years);
- STAGE 5: Establishment of an African Common Market and the adoption of common policies (4 years); and
- STAGE 6: Integration of all sectors, establishment of an African Central Bank and a single African currency, setting up of an African Economic and Monetary Union and creating and electing the first Pan-African Parliament (5 years).

The main policy-making organ of the AEC was the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which was key to ensuring the establishment of the AEC and the implementation of its objectives. To this end it was responsible for the preparation of “policies, programmes and strategies for cooperation in the socio-economic field, as well as the coordination, evaluation and harmonisation of activities and issues in this field” (DFA, 2004). A protocol that sought to bring the RECs under the cover of the AEC was passed in 1998. The main RECs that were in place at that time and are now the “pillars” within the African Union were: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

3.2.3 Problems with Implementation

The Cairo Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management was based on the overall framework of the OAU's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and respect of their sovereignty. Key, however, was that it was to "function on the basis of the consent and the co-operation of the parties to a conflict," as stated in paragraph fourteen of the declaration (Cairo, 1993: AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX)). As a result there were some conflicts that were never discussed by the Central Organ of the Mechanism because either the member state did not request the intervention of the Mechanism or consent was not received by all parties to a conflict as was the case in Somalia (Kioko, 2003: 814).

The Kampala document eventually resulted in the Kampala Declaration. The declaration was an agreement in theory to explore the prospect of integrating the CSSDCA framework at the OAU summit to be held in Abuja that same year (Tieku, 2004:31). However, due to opposition by the leaders of Libya, Sudan and Kenya, the CSSDCA was not adopted at the Abuja summit. As Tieku asserts, the three leaders kept at bay discussions on the document and on human security. After a "watered down" version was adopted in Cairo in 1993, former president Nelson Mandela pressed for human security discussions in 1994 by asking OAU leaders to empower the OAU "to protect African people and to prevent African governments from abusing the sovereignty of states" (Mandela, 1994 as quoted in Tieku, 2004:31).

The Committee on the Review of the (OAU) Charter, which was established in 1979, was directed by the Heads of State and Government to align the OAU charter with the AEC treaty. The Protocol on Relations Between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities was initiated to facilitate the political aspects of the integration process. It had the same legal force as the Abuja Treaty and was a vital part of the OAU charter. However, the legalities of the protocol as part of the OAU charter were still being formalized. This created problems as the protocol linked the regional economic communities to the AEC but was not able to link them to the OAU as was originally planned (Khamis, 2008:42-43). Given that the OAU charter was never harmonized with the AEC/Abuja Treaty, regional

economic communities did not have a direct connection with the OAU. Furthermore, not all regional economic communities took part in the signing of the protocol in 1998 (which had taken six years to complete). The RECs that did not participate in the signing were the Union of Maghreb States (UMA), which was not interested, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) which had only just been established in the same year (Khamis, 2008:42-43).

The Lagos Plan of Action, adopted in Lagos, Nigeria in 1980, had called for a recommitment to establish the African Economic Community by the year 2000. It stated that throughout the 1980s, leaders were to effectively strengthen regional economic communities in the five regions of Africa through the coordination of activities and sectoral integration. As Khamis states, plans for integration were not successfully implemented, which delayed the drafting of the treaty and the entire project (Khamis, 2008:31). So at the time of its signing it was still not complete as it did not have several complementary protocols attached (Khamis, 2008:29).

One of the problems towards effective implementation of the AEC treaty was a lack of well defined strategies for economic development at the national level. This then carried into the regional level with the RECs. Added to this was the fact that many countries were members of at least two RECs which complicated the advancement of the various stages of the AEC. For example, out of fifty-three African states, only seven belong to just one REC (Udombana, 2002). State membership in more than one REC diminished the effectiveness of the RECs and hindered the implementation of the first three stages of the AEC treaty. For example, stage three calls for the establishment of a free trade and customs union at the level of each REC. The benefits of a regional customs union are eliminated when states can claim exceptions.

Stage two of the AEC that called for the harmonization of REC efforts and closer cooperation between the OAU/AEC and RECs did not succeed. African countries ignored agreements and commitments agreed to under the Abuja Treaty opting instead to act on their own instead of in their RECs. One example was the signing of the 'Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of GATT' in April 1994. Thirty-five member states signed the agreement without reflecting on the Abuja

Treaty. It was later noted by the Council of Ministers that the signing of the Uruguay Round clashed with the objectives of the AEC—especially at the customs level where the AEC was to adopt a Common External Tariff against non-AEC member countries. The Uruguay Round would call for a reduction or elimination of such tariffs. There were other such instances of member states entering into such incongruous agreements which posed barriers to the realization of the AEC (Khamis, 2008:223). As Udombana states, “the inability of African states to effectively integrate, coupled with bad governance, has resulted in a record of economic and political performance that compares very unfavourably with the rest of the developed world.” This has been an impediment that has affected the mobilization of the continent’s resources to encourage growth and development (Udombana, 2002).

Since the OAU charter and the AEC treaty were never harmonized, they each followed different paths that were not necessarily complimentary or beneficial towards the goal of African unity. The AEC tended to be allotted issues of socio-economic integration while the OAU dealt with political matters, neither of which should be or are mutually exclusive. Further, because of the lack of harmonization between the AEC and the OAU, the AEC and its organs functioned under the system of the OAU which had already been considered ineffective and resulted in the formation of the AEC in the first instance (Khamis, 2008:221).

By 1996 the tone at the thirty-second OAU summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon was one of complete frustration by the heads of state and government with the slow rate of integration and seeming inability for the continent to pull itself out of the quagmire of underdevelopment. They noted in paragraph two of the Yaoundé Declaration “...at the close of the 20th century, that of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed and the most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are concerned.” They made a resolution to create the conditions that would enable the continent to take on the challenges it faced or jeopardize its future indefinitely (Yaoundé, 1996: AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII)). It was from this vantage point that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi suggested a summit to discuss how to restructure the OAU to suit Africa’s current needs.

3.3 THE MAKING OF THE AFRICAN UNION: LIBYA AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1999-2002

3.3.1 Alliance Building

In 1998, a year prior to Libya's proposal to host an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, South Africa started appealing in earnest to African leaders to institutionalize democratic norms and put an end to conflict and the violation of human rights. South Africa also started rallying support for the concept of an African Renaissance that would spearhead the renewal of the continent. At an African Renaissance conference in Johannesburg, Thabo Mbeki reiterated Mandela's call for conflict resolution in African societies through the establishment of mechanisms that would ensure their peaceful end as well as ensure that the scramble for scarce resources did not result in conflict or the violation of human rights. Mbeki stressed the need for democratic norms as an "essential requirement for this social movement" (Mbeki, 1998). It was a major step in the formation of alliances within Africa because it revived the dream and ideals of pan-Africanism not just in Africa, but within the African Diaspora.

In order to rally support of its agenda from other African states, the Department of Foreign Affairs consulted with the OAU secretariat to modify the agendas of summit meetings to allow for the African heads of state and government to discuss the goal of an African Renaissance. It was also able to persuade the Secretariat to hold a forum on the African Renaissance (Landsberg, 2000:118). In a speech to the OAU Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Nelson Mandela called for leaders to treat peace and stability on the African continent as a mutual challenge. On human rights, he said that sovereignty must not be used as a shield to prevent intervention by the rest of the continent into states behind whose "sovereign borders people are being slaughtered" (Mandela, 1998). South Africa also led a debate on economic policy with the hopes of modernizing the continent's economies in line with global trends and demands (Fabricius, 1999). Former South African Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad was quoted as stating that the summit was vital to forging a universal African position on global economic issues (Fabricius, 1999). South Africa also proposed a mechanism that would hasten the implementation of the AEC, which had mainly remained a theoretical construct.

Having had a successful transition to democratic rule, South Africa had in effect “captured the imagination of the world” (Pahad, 2009). And as the newest member of the OAU, this meant that South Africa was legally bound to the rules of conduct of the organization, which in the areas of human rights and conflict resolution, did not mesh very well with South Africa’s constitution. As a result of its position as the strongest economy in the continent, South Africa could not avoid giving special attention to the African agenda, of which one part would be the transformation of the OAU. This resonated well with the international community in the West as it signalled that South Africa was taking a continental lead as they had hoped it would and perhaps steer the continent in a neo-liberal direction. It would also serve South Africa well as advocate for the continent and future promoter of NEPAD. South Africa forged alliances with Namibia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Lesotho using “economic bilateral instruments” as a means to consolidate and foster greater economic cooperation (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006:13).

It was around this same time that Gaddafi also started forging alliances within Africa. The Algiers summit was to be Gaddafi’s first OAU summit meeting since 1977. This did not mean that Libya had been silent in Africa. During the 29th anniversary celebrations of the Libyan al-Fateh Revolution in 1998, Gaddafi made it clear in a speech to those gathered that he would present a proposal in accordance with the OAU charter for a unified Africa (Khamis, 2008:79). In the speech, he stated that he would call for an extra-ordinary session of the OAU to accomplish this. By this time Gaddafi had already taken the leadership of North Africa into his hands by forming the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), with Tripoli as its headquarters. Libya’s influence on the continent was especially evident in the consistent position taken by the OAU to lobby the UN Security Council on Libya’s behalf regarding the Lockerbie situation, which it did from 1997 onwards (Sturman, 2003).

Gaddafi used his power to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea and also between the Islamic government and the opposition in Sudan. He convened a CEN-SAD meeting to discuss the civil war in the DRC and funded 1,000-1,500 troops from Chad to assist Kabila’s government and contributed troops to monitor a peace accord (Ronen, 2002: 67). Through his check book diplomacy aid was extended to

Ethiopia, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Takeyh, 2001:67). Gaddafi also ensured Mugabe's support by financially sustaining Mugabe's 2001 campaign to boost his bid for the 2002 elections by giving his party, ZANU-PF, US\$900, 000. This was done despite a legal ban on foreign funding of political parties in Zimbabwe (Gumede, 2005:184). He also donated US\$360 million to help mitigate Zimbabwe's fuel crisis (ibid). Gaddafi knew that Mugabe was a major figure not just in the SADC (Southern African Development Community) region as Southern Africa's "elder statesman," but in the continent as well and would be worth having him as an ally.

In a general campaign to get more African support, Libya also proclaimed publicly that Africans and not Arabs were Libya's real supporters. The Libyan state owned "Voice of the Arab World" became the "Voice of Africa" (Huliaras, 2001:5). This led to Libya's 1999 proposal in Sirte, Libya which was probably one of the most obvious attempts to re/build alliances. Libya offered to host the OAU summit in Sirte to discuss how to transform the organization. The summit would be convened mainly at his cost. He also paid the arrears of eleven states, most of them in CEN-SAD so that they could participate fully in the voting processes for a United States of Africa. It is rather unlikely that the transformation of the OAU to the AU would have happened so quickly without Gaddafi pushing for the process and financing it.

3.3.2 Initial Proposal to Reform the OAU

At the July 1999 OAU summit in Algiers, Algeria, the Heads of State and Government reiterated the need to implement the African Economic Community as stipulated under the Abuja Treaty. They believed that its establishment would "help consolidate the efforts being deployed by our countries to revive and develop their economies and to address the major problems facing Africa..." The Heads of State and Government also noted that they would need the assistance of the entire international community, but, assistance based on a relationship that was different from the prevailing one that marginalized the continent. To this end the Algiers Declaration stated that:

“...we reaffirm our readiness and willingness to promote, with all our partners, a genuine partnership devoid of any selfish calculations for influence; a partnership that respects the unity of the continent and aims at the development of Africa, rather than using it as a mere reservoir of raw materials and market for manufactured goods; a partnership that enables Africa to achieve its integration, ensure its development for the benefit of its peoples and occupy its rightful place on the international scene for the mutual and inclusive benefit of the International Community as a whole.”

This statement would eventually be the basis for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that Mbeki would champion. However, at this time Mbeki also spoke to leaders on what must be done to achieve the objectives of the AEC and respond to the challenges of globalization. He reiterated Mandela's call for good governance, referencing the 1999 Human Development Report on this subject. The report stated that governance is a “framework of rules, institutions and established practices that set limits and give incentives for the behaviour of individuals, organizations and firms. Without strong governance, the dangers of global conflicts could be a reality of the 21st century...” (as quoted in Mbeki speech, Mbeki, 1999). Mbeki told the AHG that they needed to look at the OAU's institutions in relation to the Abuja Treaty and ensure that they were consistent at the national, bilateral, regional, continental and global levels. Key institutions to be reviewed would be the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank. Mbeki also proposed that mechanisms be put in place to implement the AEC which would ensure that it reports directly to the OAU heads of state (Fabricius, 1999).

It was then that an opportunity to discuss reforming the OAU was presented by Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi proposed that an extraordinary summit be held in Sirte, Libya later that same year in September to discuss “the ways and means of strengthening our continental Organization to make it more effective so as to keep pace with the political, economic and social developments taking place within and outside our continent” (Sirte, 1999: EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, Pg.1). Given the issues of harmonizing the OAU/AEC and the lack of integration between the regional economic communities, and in light of the

continent's increasing marginalization, African leaders saw the benefits in Gaddafi's proposition. They felt that it would be an alternative option that might review the entire strategy of implementing the AEC towards the amalgamation and unity on the continent (Khamis, 2008:65). As a result, the OAU Assembly accepted his invitation without any hesitation (Tieku, 2004: 260).

3.4 FROM THE OAU TO THE AU

At the Sirte summit Gaddafi surprised the convened Heads of State and Government by proposing a United States of Africa, as it was not on the agenda. Gaddafi's proposal at the 1999 Sirte summit came as a surprise to those who had not heard his speech the previous year at the 29th celebrations of the Al-Fateh revolution in Libya. His proposal was that the United States of Africa would have a single president with a five-year term of office who would speak for the whole continent; a pan-African parliament; a single military force and a common currency. Gaddafi's rationale for a US of Africa was captured best in a speech he gave to students at Oxford University:

Currently, there are 50 states, each with its own currency, central bank and distinct economic system. This makes us of no consequence. What is the combined value of the economies of Malawi and Guinea-Bissau in relation to the major blocks? How could a giant like the EU, US, China or Japan waste its time in negotiation with a delegation from Gambia that wishes to buy ten cars? If a representative of the whole African market comes along with an offer to import half a million cars, the situation becomes totally different. ...The fragmentation of Africa does not serve the world economy or the major markets (Gaddafi, 2007).

He later went on to say, "I hope that the major players and the whole world would understand this fact. I hope they will help Africa to achieve its unity and to establish the United States of Africa. This will contribute to world peace, security and stability. It will bring huge benefits to the world economy and to China and America" (Gaddafi, 2007).

Gaddafi firmly believed that the division of Africa that occurred at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 had created unviable states. While South Africa and its allies agreed with this, they did not agree that the solution was to immediately do away with all borders and create a single African entity. They were not in opposition to a more politically and economically united African continent, but to the timing and type of its formation. They argued that historical experiences had shown that a concept of a single African entity could not simply be imposed from the top, but that there were numerous conditions that needed to be put in place first. While South Africa and its allies believed that unity was a process that must be based on objective realities, they also felt that the process should be fast-tracked (Pahad, 2009). South Africa believed that the OAU and its organs should be strengthened first rather than replacing the entire organization with a new institution.

To this end South Africa put forward for discussion two proposals: one stating that the OAU review its resolutions to see if they had been implemented and the other to review the organization's treaties to see if they had been acted on (Louw, 2000). Mbeki noted that once the Heads of State and Government saw the work that needed to be done, they realized that African unity cannot be come by in one giant step but needed to be achieved "step by step" (ibid). South Africa felt that the AU should look more like the European Union where member states retained their identity. The AU would also then work closely with the North. However, in a sentiment that Libya would continue to reiterate and push in the years following the creation of the AU, Gaddafi rejected the EU model of regionalization stating that for over one hundred years the call for unity had been a call for a United States of Africa patterned on the federated states of the United States of America (Sturman, 2005). South Africa, along with other African states, reiterated their calls for a more gradual approach that would start with the harmonization of the RECs as stipulated in the AEC treaty, thus ensuring that there was unity at the regional level first. South Africa believed that unless there was a sense of cohesion and unity at the base, it could not be expected that there would be unity at the top. Unity at the base required, amongst other factors, that there be an end to the pervasive conflicts in the continent which were impeding growth and development.

3.4.1 Drafting of the Constitutive Act

The drafting of the AU Constitutive Act occurred between 1999 at the initial summit in Sirte and the 2000 summit in Lome. The Constitutive Act was formed keeping in mind the short-comings of the OAU, such as its response mechanisms to conflict, the redefinition of security to encompass human security and its link to the socio-economic development on the continent. The majority of the continental leaders agreed that the new union should look more like the European Union model than the federation of states Libya had proposed. Libya and its allies called for unity that would go beyond economic unity and encompass political unity. As Khadiagala states, this division was evidence of a three-decades old rift between those African states who were for continentalism and those for sub-regionalism, and is substantiated by the coexistence of the OAU and sub-regional economic communities (Khadiagala, 2008:11). Ultimately, as was the case in the founding of the OAU, those advocating for a gradualist approach to integration had their way. However, in this case the end agreement still managed to accommodate to an extent those wanting faster integration. The Heads of State and Government agreed that the new union would be configured along the lines of the AEC and that the stages outlined in the Abuja Treaty should be accelerated through a shortening of the implementation periods (Kioko, 2003: 811).

South Africa advocated for the inclusion of language in the Constitutive Act that would speak to human rights, conflict resolution, gender equality, good governance and accountability as vehicles for economic growth and the alleviation of poverty. Given that these were the same issues it was tackling on the domestic front, it made sense for it to champion them in international institutions as it would be easier to tackle them within the context of a worldwide move to do the same (Williams, 2000:87). Nigeria, one of South Africa's key allies, proposed reforms that would change how African states saw peacekeeping and human rights issues. These reforms were in line with the CSSDCA framework. The implication of the reform package, which was adopted by the AU at the Durban summit in 2002, was that security all over Africa was a responsibility of all member states. It argued that states could not seek protection behind their sovereignty if they were posing a security threat to the rest of the continent (Tieku, 2004:256). As a result, South

Africa was one of the main voices calling for the Peace and Security Council, strengthening of the AU Commission, the African Court of Human and People's Rights, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) (Landsberg, 2005:746). The ECOSOC under the OAU charter was the main organ responsible for the implementation of the AEC treaty and was to become the ECOSOCC under the AU. It was to be responsible for the engagement of civil society on continental governance processes. South Africa had been very vocal on the review of the AEC treaty, which placed RECs and sub-regional economic communities (SECs), as the primary building blocks for economic integration (Landsberg, 2006:5).

One of the main debates in the drafting of the Constitutive Act of the AU was on the issue of intervention in member states, i.e. when to intervene and under what conditions. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report made the case that it was the responsibility of modern states to protect their populations, and that when they were unable or unwilling to do so, it then became the collective responsibility of international society to override that state's sovereignty (Williams, 2007: 275). The report provided the basis for the OAU's subsequent decision which stated that member nations could not intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of another. However, the Union could, as decided by the Assembly, when there were gross violations of human rights such as genocide and crimes against humanity (AU Constitutive Act, Article 4).

3.4.2 Lome, Togo, 2000

The Heads of State and Government approved the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lome, Togo in July 2000 which would eventually have seventeen main institutions through which the AU would pursue its objectives. The most important being: the African Heads of State and Government (AHSG), the Executive Council, the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), a ten-member Commission, the fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan-African Court of Justice (PAC), the Economic, Social and Cultural Councils (ECOSOCC), the African Central Bank, the Investment Bank and the Monetary Fund (Tieku, 2004:250).

Through the Lome Declaration, they committed themselves to “defending and promoting Africa’s interests within the context of the African Union” with the aim of making the continent more united, prosperous and stronger” (Lome, 2000: AHG/Decl.2 (XXXVI)). The Declaration also emphasized faster integration through “dynamic cooperation among the Regional Economic Communities” and the “enhancement of intra and inter-regional trade” but not through the formation of a Union Government (ibid). The language was not what those states that were advocating for full continental integration, namely Libya and its allies had hoped for, and they were highly unsatisfied with the language of the Constitutive Act.

The AHG called for the Secretary General to hold a meeting of parliamentarians to examine the Draft Protocol to the treaty establishing the AEC in relation to the Pan African Parliament (PAP). South Africa’s parliament took the lead on the formation of the PAP by pushing to finalize the Protocol and mobilizing an early signature and ratification (Cilliers, 2004). It hosted a four-day assembly of African parliamentarians to discuss its establishment. Part of the discussion was to review a draft protocol on its location, function and powers (IOL, 2000).

Libya and South Africa both lobbied to have the PAP, the largest and most prestigious organ of the Constitutive Act, situated in their respective countries. Libya eventually withdrew its bid however, perhaps because the general consensus was that it would not be an appropriate seat for the parliament as it did not have a parliament of its own and thus would not be able to manage the organ. The final protocol on the PAP fell short of what Libya had in mind for the organ. Libya had envisioned a PAP with more power. The PAP that was to be created would only have an advisory role. In an expression of his dismay, Gaddafi boycotted the end of the OAU summit (IOL, 2000).

The previous year in Algiers, the Heads of State and Government declared the year 2000 as the Year of Peace, Security and Solidarity in Africa at the suggestion of one of South Africa’s main allies, Nigeria’s Obasanjo. Obasanjo called for Africa’s leaders to no longer accept unconstitutional changes in government, such as by coups. What resulted was a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration approving the framework it

laid out. The CSSDCA had its origins in Kampala, Uganda when 1991 African leaders, members of the community and other groups gathered to discuss a proposal to launch a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa. Later that same year in Abuja, Nigeria, the OAU Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers discussed the Kampala document. They acknowledged that the lack of peace and security on the continent was impeding the progress of socio-economic development that the OAU charter had hoped to achieve.

The Kampala document provided a framework for addressing the problems of security and stability in Africa by stating that the two were inextricably linked. It stated that without security, there could be no stability; and a lack of security in any African state affected the whole continent. It also sought to address the issues of governance in the continent (Obasanjo, 1991: 88). The CSSDCA was comprised of four principles and policy measures: security, stability, development and cooperation, that were to be adhered to by all participating member states. In essence it provided a framework for peer review for the African Union (Cilliers, 2002:15). One of the points in the CSSDCA that would stand out in the formation of the African Union was the emphasis on seeking African solutions to African problems.

South Africa's hand in the shaping of the good governance discourse within the OAU/AU was very evident (Le Pere, 2004: 292). Mbeki called for:

1. An end to practices that create the view in the eyes of the rest of the world that Africans are incapable of establishing and maintaining good systems of governance;
2. An end to military coups and undemocratically elected governments
3. An end to one party states as they do not represent stable systems of governance that serve the interests of the people; and
4. The recognition that there is not one standard of democracy that will fit every country and to therefore not try to impose a particular form of democracy but one that will empower the people and allow them to fulfil their destinies (Mbeki, 1998).

Consequently the Heads of State and Government adopted a framework for an OAU response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government in the belief that the OAU charter needed a solid foundation with which to promote democracy and democratic institutions in Africa (Lome, 2000: AHG/Decl. 5(XXXVI)). Libya and its allies, such as Zimbabwe, lobbied to have the language on democracy diluted to accommodate their forms of rule. They were successful to a degree because unconstitutional changes of government do not only come about through military coups. Fraudulent elections and the re-writing of constitutions by the ruling party to alter the democratic spirit of “retiring gracefully from office” have been common in contemporary African politics such as in Zimbabwe, Chad and Uganda (Williams, 2007:274). Yet the 2000 Declaration does not place these fraudulent practices under the umbrella of unconstitutional changes to government thus avoiding the prickly issue of ensuing elections that are neither free nor fair. The compromising language of the framework sidesteps this issue by making the point that it will not support regimes that do not surrender power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections (Williams, 2007:275).

3.4.3 Lusaka Summit, July 2001

The Heads of State and Government at the 2001 summit in Lusaka, Zambia officially declared a one year transition period from the OAU to the AU and created a roadmap for its implementation. The Secretary General was mandated to work with member states on the Draft Rules of Procedure of the key organs of the AU, namely, the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Commission and the Permanent Representatives Committee, and what their powers would be. In addition, the Secretariat was mandated to get recommendations from member states on the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the incorporation of the Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Management as an AU organ and how best a relationship between the RECs and the AU should be forged (Lusaka, 2001: AHG/Decl.1(XXXVII)).

They further recalled the endorsement of the work done by the leaders of South Africa, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt on the “Revival and Development of Africa” (Lusaka, 2001: AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII)). The five leaders had consolidated two

programmes, MAP and the OMEGA plans into the New African Initiative (NAI). At the 5th Extraordinary Session of the OAU in March, 2001 in Sirte, Libya, President Obasanjo made a presentation on MAP and President Wade of Senegal made a presentation on his OMEGA plan. It was decided that since the two programmes were complimentary, they should be combined into one programme. By July 2001, the four heads of state presented the New African Initiative: Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme and the Omega Plan (NAI) to the OAU Heads of State in Lusaka, Zambia. The initiative included a vision for Africa, a statement of the problems faced by the continent and a programme of action for their resolution and a means to accomplish the vision. The NAI was later renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

3.4.4 South Africa and Libya's Actions

South Africa was the pioneer of NEPAD because it sought to address two of the main problems inherent in the implementation of the AEC treaty, i.e. a lack of well-defined economic strategies at the national level and establishing a better connection between the RECs and the OAU/AU. The member states of the RECs did not have a standardized framework within which to formulate sound economic policies at the domestic level which resulted in problems at the regional level. NEPAD will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. However, in brief, NEPAD was created to be the framework for economic development on the continent. As stated in the NEPAD document, its focus would be on:

[R]ationalising the institutional framework for economic integration, by identifying common projects compatible with integrated country and regional development programmes, and on the harmonisation of economic and investment policies and practices. There needs to be co-ordination of national sector policies and effective monitoring of regional decisions created to address the current challenges facing Africa, such as poverty, marginalization and underdevelopment (NEPAD:12).

It aimed to address economic challenges through principles of good governance as a prerequisite for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic

development; African ownership and leadership; and forging a new relationship between Africa and the developed world (Department of Foreign Affairs). To this end, the adoption of NEPAD by the heads of state was also noted to be a step towards their “commitment to the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the African Union” (Lusaka, 2001: AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII), Page 2). Libya felt that NEPAD was another programme with which to impose Western style democracy on Africa which would interfere with the religions and traditions of the continent (IOL, 2002). He was also opposed to the role that former colonial powers would have in NEPAD, saying that the international community was welcome to assist but must not try to impose its will on the African continent (IOL, 2002).

South Africa, Libya and their allies further sought to influence the Secretariat on the issues for which it was mandated. The issues were mainly the form and powers of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, and the powers of key organs such as the Executive Council, the Commission and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). South Africa argued for the ten member commission group to be elected after six months, but was eventually overruled by those countries arguing for elections to occur after twelve months. It also proposed that the ECOSOCC be comprised of a number of representatives from each REC. There would be at least one member coming from a country that has a functioning legal trade union movement that would keep civil society across the region informed and involved (Schoeman, 2003:17). The ECOSOCC, which was given the majority of the attention at the Lusaka summit as with the PAP, was meant to foster greater involvement by civil society and government in the member states in the decisions of the AU (Sturman & Cilliers, 2003:71).

3.4.5 Durban, South Africa, 2002

The African Union was officially launched in Durban, South Africa in July of 2002. The outcomes of the summit were: the launch of key structures of the AU; the adoption of a protocol relating to the establishment of a Peace and Security Council (PSC); decision by the Assembly to strengthen the role of the AU in election monitoring and observation; Assembly approval on issues relating to security,

stability, development and cooperation as outlined within the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); and the approval of NEPAD's Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and related documents (Cilliers, 2002:1).

The Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) had language that was highly reflective of the CSSDCA that Nigeria championed. It would be supported by "Panel of the Wise," an advisory body, who are respected representatives from each African region, a Continental Early Warning System, and an African Standby Force (Protocol Establishing the PSC, Article 2). Its aims are to: promote peace and stability on the continent; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; combat and prevent terrorism; develop a common defence policy for the union; and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law (ibid, Article 3). The PSC aims to be present on the ground whenever a peace operation is needed and will work alone or in conjunction with RECs, and other organizations such as the UN (Murithi, 2007:4).

At this summit, Libya presented two sets of proposals that would amend the Constitutive Act. The first set had to do with amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU. The second set related to the establishment of a single African Army—a proposal Gaddafi had tabled before. As highlighted by Cilliers, the proposed amendments to the Constitutive Act were as follows:

1. Ability for the Chairperson of the Assembly to call extraordinary meetings of the Assembly without a requisite two-thirds approval;
2. The Chairpersonship should be for one year or more;
3. The Executive Council should be able to meet at the request of its Chairperson or the request of any member of the Council upon approval by a simple majority, i.e. not by the requisite two-thirds majority; and
4. The deletion of Article 31 that allows for a member to withdraw their membership from the African Union, therefore effectively making it impossible for a member to rescind their membership (Cilliers, 2002:4).

Libya re-submitted a draft resolution on the Establishment of an African army. Libya had submitted it earlier in the year during an impromptu appearance at a ministerial conference (Maluwa, 2004:210). The Army was to provide for and consist of “a single joint command of staff, to “[secure] peace and stability, avert the outbreak of any internal armed dispute and [safeguard] the sovereignty, security and safety of the Union” (Maluwa, 2004:210) and guard against external threats. The Assembly would determine the size of the Army and its positioning and the Army would use the AU's insignia (Cilliers, 2002:12). Part of Libya's rationale for an African Army was to counter the practices of some member states to allow foreign troops on to their territories to use as military bases (Maluwa, 2004:220).

Mbeki who was the chairperson of the summit, prevented the proposals from being discussed on the grounds that because they had not been submitted and distributed in advance of the summit, could not be considered as per the stipulation of the Amendments to Articles of the Constitutive Act. They were, therefore, deferred first to the Executive Council for examination and then submitted to the Assembly to be considered during an extraordinary session in six months time (Cilliers, 2002:4). The convened heads of state were also worried that Libya's calls for amendments of the Constitutive Act of the African Union at the same time that the Union was being launched would have dampened the air of expectancy and excitement surrounding the occasion.

South Africa and its allies such as Nigeria did not feel it was necessary to hold an extraordinary summit for the sole purpose of discussing Libya's proposals. However, women's groups at the summit demanded that gender insensitive language within the Constitutive Act be changed to reflect the contributions of women in African unity. Since one of the pillars of South Africa's constitution was to “make real advances in the struggle for the genuine and all-round emancipation of women” (Mbeki, 1998), South Africa felt that women's issues were extremely important. As a result, they agreed to hold an extraordinary summit to discuss these issues and make the necessary amendments to the Constitutive Act. Nigeria agreed to the extraordinary summit in the hopes that it could table its proposal to have the Peace and Security Council as an organ of the AU (Tieku, 2004:264).

The Assembly requested South African president, Mbeki, the chairperson, to establish a group of experts to discuss the viability of a common African defence and security force and make recommendations to the Assembly by their next ordinary session. The discussions on Libya's proposal revolved around the fact that a single African army presupposed the continent being a single African entity as well as issues of cost and employment (Cilliers, 2002:12). The results of the expert's meeting were considered by the Executive Council. The proposal was deferred again by the Assembly pending further consultations by the AU Commission with all stakeholders including Ministers responsible for defence and security. Libya's proposal, like other proposals submitted by the country, was adopted but not without first being watered down to reflect less binding language. The decision which was finally adopted by the Assembly in 2004, while acknowledging Libya's contribution and proposal, stressed "the need for a common African defence and security," which was quite different from a single continental army (Maputo, 2003: ASS/AU/Dec.13 (II), Pg.1). The reasons given by the Executive Council were that:

... while underlining the fact that the idea of establishing a single army was sound as a vision for the future, noted that the conditions for its immediate concretization did not yet exist. In its view, the establishment of a single army should result from a higher level of integration of the Continent (Sirte, 2004: Ext/EX.CL/Def. & Sec/Concl. (IV)).

On the form of NEPAD, Gaddafi proposed that its Implementation Committee be comprised of a total of twenty representatives from within the continent's five regions (four from each region). Mbeki had originally planned for fifteen (three from each region). The proposal was accepted with the knowledge that two of the four additional representatives were likely to be Gaddafi himself from northern Africa and President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya representing eastern Africa. This decision was seen as being potentially disastrous for NEPAD's credibility in its quest to fight for democratic governance, credibility, and sound institutions. The adherence to democracy and good governance through transparent and accountable institutions in the countries of Gaddafi and Moi under their leadership had not been commendable. Gaddafi was quoted as saying that Africa had its own style of governance and

culture; and speaking of the West, went on to say that Africans are not children that need to be taught how to govern (Fabricius, 2002).

Libya reiterated the above sentiments in relation to the Declaration Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. On election monitoring, Libya made the proposition that non-Africans should be forbidden to monitor and observe elections in Africa because the electoral practices in the continent differed from those elsewhere. The proposition was not accepted by other countries with some explicitly stating that external election monitors would benefit democracy on the continent (Cilliers, 2002:15).

3.5 ANALYSIS

3.5.1 Realist and Constructivist Takes on the AU

The transformation of the OAU to the AU provides an interesting case study on not just cooperation, but cooperation between African states which are considered part of the developing world. Traditional theories of international relations (IR), and discussions on whether or not and under what conditions states would cooperate, were based on the interplay of states in the so called developed world. These states were those that are now considered part of the G8 such as the USA, France, Germany and Britain. The aim of this thesis is to analyze whether the roles of South Africa and Libya in the formation of the African union can be adequately explained by a traditional IR theory such as realism, or if another theory such as constructivism needs to be brought in to provide a complete picture.

Realist theories are generally sceptical of cooperation and believe that it is unlikely. When it does occur, however, it is just another means for states to manipulate their power relations and exit when they feel that there is no utility left in membership. According Hans Morgenthau, international organizations are tools of states that can be used to increase or decrease their power. They have no effect on the basic characteristics of the international system because they reflect the “basic power distribution of states and are no more than the sum of their member states.” So if

international organizations are as strong as the sum of their member states, then powerful states will shape their institutions in a way that they can maintain their share of world power (Karns & Mingst, 2004:46). Essentially, powerful states form powerful institutions and weak states have weak institutions, thus leaving the structure of the international system unaltered. The powerful states still get to dictate policies that are in their favour and marginalize the weak states.

According to Paul D. Williams, realism is ill-equipped to explain the security culture in neo-patrimonial states, such as those within Africa, and their impact on national security policies. Its emphasis on the distribution of material capabilities and power does not take into account the importance of the continent's cultural dimensions (Williams, 2007: 255). Constructivism, on the other hand, does take culture into consideration and the role of ideas. It looks at the dominant norms that shape interests and govern behaviour and how they in turn influence actors. International organizations provide a forum for discourse, and it is through discourse that understandings in various issues areas can potentially be altered. Admittedly, however, international organizations can also be dysfunctional and conflictual, working against the interests of members (Karns & Mingst, 2004:52). According to constructivism, sovereignty is the most important institution in international society because it determines the identity of states.

The change of the OAU to the AU signified a regime change. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1982:185). He breaks down the definition further by stating that, "principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice" (Ibid). The regime of the OAU changed because the norms and principles by which it operated were changed. The main norm that changed was that of non-intervention. Whereas the OAU did not allow for intervention by member states under any conditions, the AU does allow for the intervention in member states when the circumstances are deemed 'grave' and based on agreement by the General Assembly. The grave circumstances cited are

war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. And the main principle that changed was the emphasis on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent. The AU Charter also added another norm—the norm on unconstitutional changes of governments as stated in Article 4p of the Charter.

Within constructivism, discursive power is considered just as important as material power (Hopf, 1998: 177), and through it humans can change the world (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 50). Emanuel Adler sums it up well when he says:

“...the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps the most subtle and most effective form of power” (Adler, 1997: 336).

Alexander Wendt argues against the neorealist assumption of self-help and power being the result of structure, i.e. the anarchic nature of the system, but posits that they are societal constructs (Wendt, 1992: 394-5). He is not opposed to the Waltzian view of structure, but argues that it is not the distribution of capabilities that are important within a system, but the ‘distribution of knowledge,’ which boils down to the distribution of identities and how states react to another’s identity (Wendt, 1992: 397, 403).

State identities and interests are believed to be socially constructed, i.e. dependent on the historical, cultural, political and social context and are seen as endogenous to the system and therefore variable (Hopf, 1998: 176; Wendt, 1994: 387). Identity and the social understandings of a particular identity are what drive state behaviour and actions. A state’s identity may elicit different reactions from state to state. Structure, as defined by neo-realists, is part of [state] identity and does not exist outside of it (Wendt, 1992: 399). State identities are fluid and are seen as dependent variables subject to factors within the domestic realm, systemic or otherwise (Wendt, 1992: 424) and can be redefined (Wendt, 1992: 392). Alexander Wendt goes further to divide state identities into two categories: corporate and social. The corporate identity is the ‘we’ identity, the shared beliefs, which generate four interests:

1. Physical security, including its differentiation from other actors;
2. Ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities;
3. Recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force; and
4. Development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level (Wendt, 1994:385).

The commonality represented in the 'we' identity flows from the notion of intersubjectivity, which exists as a result of social communication and not only "constrains or empowers actors" but "define[s] their social reality" (Adler, 1997: 327). Social identity is defined as "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others" (Wendt, 1994: 385). How a state satisfies its corporate interests depends on its social identity, i.e. how it defines itself in relation to the 'other.' Therefore states have various identities and therefore varied interests (Hopf, 1998: 199) and will cooperate or not cooperate with other states based on their understanding of the Other's identity in the international system (Hopf, 1998: 193).

3.5.1.1 What This Means in the Context of the Formation of the AU

South Africa and Libya were both undergoing identity transformations around the time when Libya made the proposition to transform the OAU. South Africa had been constrained by its recent history and was only starting to break free of the constrictions of its apartheid identity, especially on issues of political economy (Williams, 2000:76). Libya too was attempting to loosen the bonds of its identity as a staunch revolutionary and supporter of terrorism. They each wanted to shed themselves of their negative identities as continental pariahs that had been attached to them in previous years and be seen as leaders who could take the continent to higher levels of socio-economic development. New identities, i.e. how they were perceived by the international system, were necessary in order for them to fulfil their corporate identities—which in essence were their foreign policy objectives. Translated into realism terms, South Africa and Libya needed to assert their power in the continent in order to ensure their material viability. Survival, according to

realism, is a state's only interest and does not change. Identity is not important either. What matters is a state's position in the international structure as determined by their material capabilities.

Since realists believe that international organizations are merely a reflection of the distribution of power in the world and are "based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers" (Mearsheimer, 1995:7), realism would posit that South Africa and Libya, as two of the continent's strongest powers, sought to transform the OAU as a way to increase their material power (economic and military). As Khadiagala and Lyons note, African foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century still coalesces around and is dominated by weak states trying to survive. Foreign policy "reflects the continual attempts by elites to manage threats to domestic security and insulate their decision-making from untoward external manipulation" (Khadiagala & Lyons, 2001:7).

This would support Libya's push for a single African Army and proposals to amend the AU Constitutive Act to include language that spoke to restraining countries' treaties or alliances with foreign military powers. During the Cold War, the superpowers established multiple military bases on the continent in countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia (Maluwa, 2004: 220). The end of the Cold War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union left Libya completely exposed to the American imperialist superpower. Gaddafi believed that the USA used the Lockerbie dispute as a way to delegitimize his leadership (Ronen, 2002:61).

Despite Libya's slightly more diplomatic approach to countering imperialism through the use of soft diplomacy as opposed to brute military strength, it was still very wary of imperialistic and neo-colonial tendencies by the industrialized nations of the North. By arguing for essentially anti-West language, which was adopted and called for "restraint by any Member State from entering into any treaty or alliance that is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Union," Libya was ensuring its survival and protection from potentially meddlesome Western powers. According to Gaddafi, in order to fight the re-colonization of Africa by Western and Eastern powers, it was necessary for Africa to unite immediately, militarily, politically and economically. As Solomon and Swart state, "The Great Socialist People's Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya was built on a presumption of military power....the political and military realms have been intimately intertwined” (Solomon & Swart, 2005:472). The use of military force was presumed to be a key foreign policy tool. This trait overflowed into Gaddafi’s continued call for Africa to have a unified military force.


It was for this reason that Gaddafi’s initial proposal in Sirte was for a United States of Africa (USAf), that is the removal of all boundaries for the establishment of a single country that has one leader, a single military force and minister of trade. According to realism, international organizations have no independent effect on the structure of the international system that is determined by material power. Gaddafi understood that forming an African Union would not alter the economically disadvantaged position of African countries nor earn them any bargaining power with the rich and industrialized nations of the world. His rationale was that the 53 countries of Africa would become 53 united states of Africa, speaking with one voice on matters such as trade and debt and resulting in the continent being one of the most powerful regions in the world. And of course, Libya, as an oil producer, would see an exponential growth in its economy. In the “grim picture” of world politics that realism paints, the world is depicted as a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other.” Each state endeavours to be the most powerful actor in the system and at the same time ensure that no other state achieves that superior position (Mearsheimer, 1994:9). Libya envisioned itself as being in a superior position.

In the case of South Africa, Tiekou asserts that South Africa’s move to reform the OAU was at the “core” of the ANC’s attempts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the country by improving the continent’s image (Tiekou, 2004:253)—a move that would help the country’s economic survival. To this end, Mbeki tirelessly advocated for language in the Constitutive Act that would speak to good governance, and the promotion of peace and democracy. Realism further states that South Africa’s promotion of neo-liberal economic policies, as presented through NEPAD that call for trade liberalization and good governance is a way to gain broader market access within the continent. South Africa’s emphasis on regional economic communities as the building blocks towards greater continental unification, have also

provided South Africa with an opening to pursue its economic foreign policy within SADC.

Constructivists would see the OAU as an institution created through the institutionalization of certain norms such as state sovereignty, equality of members, non-intervention by member states, anti-imperialism and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Williams, 2007:261). Norms become institutionalized and internalized through a process of norm socialization. Williams' diagram (Figure 1) depicting this process in African international society is instructive:

Figure 1: Institutionalization of norms in African International Society



(Williams, 2007:260)

South Africa and Libya were what Williams would call “norm entrepreneurs” in that they each tried to build acceptance for their respective proposed norms to be written into the AU Constitutive Act. Although constructivism does not discount material

power, it places the same or greater emphasis on power as defined by the ability of actors to influence discourse on certain issues areas. Even though intersubjective structures are difficult to change, new identities (such as South Africa and Libya) with enough power to create new discourse can change them (Hopf, 1998:180). To do so necessarily requires the economic and military “wherewithal to sustain institutions necessary for the formalized reproduction of social practices” (Hopf, 1998:179). This will be further demonstrated in the next chapter in the way that South Africa and Libya consistently deployed their militaries and used their economic resources towards forms of peacekeeping that were in line with their foreign policy objectives.

South Africa was most vocal in building acceptance for norms within the OAU/AU that would speak to the unconstitutional changes of government and a holistic definition of security to encompass human security as achieved through socio-economic development, peace and good governance. South Africa felt it was important to advocate for such norms because as Williams states, norms “help shape actors’ identities and preferences by setting standards of legitimate conduct. This, in turn, helps to define the range of appropriate options by imbuing certain activities with negative moral and political connotations.” They promote certain types of action, but they do not determine behaviour (Williams, 2007: 258). What Mbeki wanted to achieve through the AU was a gradual shift in the identities of member states towards good governance and democracy. This in turn would change the identity of the continent as a whole. Since South Africa’s identity was linked to that of the OAU/AU, a negative perception of the organization, which equated to a negative view of the continent, would translate into a negative perception of South Africa. Given the neo-liberal economic policies of the country and the reliance on FDI, how investors perceived South Africa would determine whether or not they would put their money into the country.

Mbeki spoke about the negative image the world has of Africa saying that the entire continent fought for South Africa’s liberation so that it could “build a society of which all Africa would be proud because it would address also the wrong and negative view of an Africa that is historically destined to fail” (Mbeki, 1998). With regards to the problem the continent has of attracting FDI, Mbeki felt that it was attributable in part to “the persistence of particular images in people’s minds about the negative things

about the continent. I think, in part, it is to do with a tendency to look at Africa as one whole. So that if something goes wrong in South Africa, people further afield do not say; "Something has gone wrong in South Africa"; they say, "Something has gone wrong in Africa" (Mbeki, 1998). At the same time, however, a positive identity of the continent would increase FDI to other African countries as well—not just South Africa. If South Africa's actions were purely realist, where states are concerned about relative gains in relations to others, then it would have been pre-occupied with other African countries gaining more economic power than it. It would, therefore, not be concerned about improving the identity of other African states. If anything, the worse the rest of the continent looked, the better it would make South Africa look, thus making it one of the sole destinations of FDI.

Whereas South Africa was seemingly more concerned with changing Africa's identity to match Western standards of "good identity" (in part to ensure funding that was contingent on such an identity), Libya aimed for a uniquely African identity and way of governance. This was evidenced by the country's negative reaction to NEPAD and its resistance to language being put into the Constitutive Act that spoke to human rights and election monitoring by non-Africans. What Libya wanted was a fully united Africa that would be powerful enough to make the rules and not have to succumb to the pressures of the West. One of Libya's proposals to the Constitutive Act was to make it impossible for members to renounce their membership. Gaddafi's argument was that if member states are committed to the goal of stronger political unity and integration, they should not create an organization that permits them to cause division by withdrawing from it (Murithi, 2004:229). Realists believe that once states feel they have extracted whatever benefits they needed from an organization, they leave it. By advocating for the provision that would disallow states to withdraw their membership, Libya acted in a non-realist manner. If Libya's motivation towards forming the AU was just to gain more power and then exit, Gaddafi would not have proposed such an amendment to the Constitutive Act.

3.6 CONCLUSION

If realism alone is used to explain why South Africa and Libya worked so hard to transform the OAU to the AU, then it could be said that the two countries were motivated by egoistic self-interest and used the organization as a way to accomplish their respective materialistic goals. As two of the continent's most powerful countries, they managed to cooperate with each other despite their different approaches to African unity. Realists would state that this is because "states form alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them." States will also enter into a regional agreement when the benefits of economic cooperation outweigh the probability of security losses.

Gaddafi saw hosting the summit on the transformation of the OAU to the AU as an opportunity to bring Libya out of the isolation it had been feeling as a result of sanctions, and to signify its normalizing of diplomatic relations with the world. According to Tieku, besides wanting to take the credit for the re-launch of such an initiative (which would help his revised image), Gaddafi's invitation to host the extraordinary OAU summit in Sirte, Libya was to signify his renewed commitment to Pan-Africanism and to Africa as a whole (Tieku, 2004:261). It also provided Libya with a forum from which to push for the immediate creation of a United States of Africa.

South Africa pushed for the transformation of the OAU for similar reasons to Libya. The OAU/AU provided the best platform from which to signify its new approach to and vision for the continent. Neither South Africa nor Libya's actions can be described from a strictly realist position because at the very basest level, their actions in the transformation of the OAU to the AU were about redefining identity and interest. South Africa's history imbued it with a feeling of indebtedness to the rest of the continent for the sacrifices it made towards the achievement of its liberation from apartheid. As William Gumede states, Mbeki was "determined that South Africa be seen as speaking on behalf of the developing world and in empathy with other victims of oppression" (Gumede, 2005:202). Mbeki felt it "vital to keep South Africa on the map and at the forefront of international consciousness" and was intent on proving Afro-pessimists wrong (ibid). By keeping itself constantly visible through

championing the causes of the oppressed, South Africa was entrenching its new post-apartheid identity as a responsible global citizen into the international system with the hopes that a positive image of the country would ultimately lead to more foreign investment.

This chapter has detailed the often competing ideas that South Africa and Libya had for African unity as encompassed in the transformation of the OAU to the AU. South Africa and its allies were for a gradual approach to full political and economic unification of the continent that started at the regional level. Libya and its allies wanted full economic and political integration immediately. In line with its foreign policy objectives, South Africa wanted the AU Constitutive Act to reflect the values which it stood for of human rights, democracy and peace. Conversely, Libya wanted the Constitutive Act to reflect its own foreign policy goals of being able to resist domination (as through a single African military) and the promotion of trade through a single African trade ministry. Libya and its allies resisted language in the Constitutive Act that would jeopardize their particular styles of leadership.

Notwithstanding these differences, South Africa and Libya were able to reach compromises that led to the formation of the African Union.

CHAPTER 4

AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND LIBYA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter the roles of South Africa and Libya in the formation of the African Union were analyzed. Each country had exhibited actions that were consistent with the tenets of realism and constructivism. The transformation of the OAU to the AU was not just a name change, but a change in the regime because certain norms changed. Norms are “standards of right and wrong and proscribe certain activities and legitimate others” (Williams, 2007:258). Given their great material power relative to other African countries, South Africa and Libya were able to be “norm entrepreneurs.” That is, they were able to use their economic and militaristic resources to influence discourse on certain issue areas that were of importance to them. Each country, especially Libya, hosted numerous summits at a great cost (both ordinary and extraordinary) to push for inclusion in the Constitutive Act, certain norms that were important to them. The best example of this was Libya’s initial proposal and offer to host the 1999 summit in Sirte that started the whole process of a regime change.

South Africa wanted to use the AU to promote democracy, human rights and peace in the entire continent. These norms were consistent with its foreign policy objectives. If AU member states adopted them, it would help to change the negative identity that was associated with Africa and its leadership. This would in turn help attract much needed FDI to the continent as a whole, but to South Africa in particular. Libya sought to change how the AU saw security: not the all encompassing definition of security that South Africa and Nigeria advocated for that would include human security, but the creation of a single African Army. The Army would be used for peacekeeping missions, but also to protect AU member states from invasion by imperialistic powers. Both countries sought to change the discourse of non-interference that had allowed the continent to stand by while

unspeakable crimes against humanity happened within the sovereign borders of certain member states.

South Africa and Libya have differing views on how best to address the challenges as identified by the OAU/AU facing the African continent since the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the 1990 OAU Summit of the African Heads of State and Government (AHG) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leaders addressed the report by the Secretary General on “The Fundamental Changes taking place in the World and their Implications for Africa: Proposals for an African Response.” The report sought to speak to and provide possible solutions for the “real threat of marginalization” in the continent as a result of the end of the Cold War and new partnerships and economic blocks being formed in the West and East. Earlier efforts that had started to address the changing world dynamics were: the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in Lagos for the economic development of Africa up to 2000, Nigeria in 1980; Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and the African Common Position on Africa’s External Debt Crisis. The convened AHG lamented that despite these initiatives to “arrest and reverse the steady decline in Africa’s economic performance” and the “strong political commitment to them” it had not been possible to lay a solid foundation for the self-sustained development of Africa’s countries (AHG./Decl.1(XXVI)).

From 1999 onwards, South Africa and Libya became the continent’s main promoters of two different approaches on how to improve the continent’s economic relations vis-à-vis the rest of the world with an eye towards closing the gap between it and the industrialized nations. Their approaches to the continent’s economic revival drew heavily from their respective Africa foreign policies. In order for socio-economic development to be sustainable, each country agreed that there needed to be an end to conflict on the continent. South Africa promoted NEPAD while Libya promoted a United States of Africa. While their approaches to conflict resolution may have been different, they both contributed considerable resources towards ending the various conflicts within the continent.

This chapter looks in greater detail at NEPAD and the United States of Africa (USAf) as promoted by Mbeki and Gaddafi respectively. In the promotion of these two

paradigms, South Africa and Libya continued to be norm entrepreneurs within the continent using their country's resources in an effort to change discourse. This chapter also looks at how South Africa and Libya responded to some key conflicts within the continent, namely Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. The chapter then analyses the rationales behind NEPAD and the USAf and South Africa and Libya's visions on interventions in Africa in light of the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

4.1.1 Background

South Africa saw its own economic development tied to the rest of the continent which it in turn saw as tied to the rest of the world. To this end its economic policies for itself and the continent were based on the notion of having partnerships that were mutually beneficial with not just the global South but the industrialized nations of the North. This understanding led to South Africa's foreign policy being premised on the centrality of human rights, the promotion of democracy, multilateralism and the understanding that "economic development depends on growing regional and international economic integration and co-operation in an interdependent world" (DFA, 2006-09).

As discussed in chapter two, Libya's Africa foreign policy during the Cold War was mainly in response to the imperialistic powers in the West. As a result, in its quest to remove Western imperialism from the continent, it supported liberation movements, secessionists and terrorists not just in Africa, but in other parts of the South through the provision of arms and financial assistance. In Africa, Libya's radicalism extended to the funding of groups in opposition to leaders that were pro-Western and often alternated between factions in the same country. By the mid-1990s, Libya was facing domestic pressures that were cause for reform. Sanctions combined with state mismanagement had caused oil production to drop by one third since the end of the 1970s, while over the same period the population grew to over 5.5 million (Werenfels, 2008:7). As a rentier state, this meant that there were more Libyans who were looking for a share of the dwindling oil revenues. By the late 1990s, as unemployment increased and the standards of living fell, the domestic climate in

Libya became increasingly volatile. Support for militant Islamists grew and there were attempts to overthrow Gaddafi (Werenfels, 2008:8).

In the midst of rising unrest in Libya, there was a debate between the pragmatists and hardliners in Gaddafi's regime. The pragmatists called for structural economic reforms and the need for international investments to ensure its political and economic stability while the hardliners called for Libya to maintain its radical stance against the West (Takeyh, 2001:66). Around 1998, Gaddafi eventually chose to listen to the pragmatists. His focus on African solidarity came as the result of his feeling betrayed by the Arab league. Gaddafi felt immensely let down when the Arab league complied fully with UN sanctions against Libya when they were first imposed, and did not stand behind the country in pan-Arab solidarity in what it believed to be another instance of persecution by the imperialistic West (Ronen, 2001:1). Instead, it was Sub-Saharan Africa that stood behind him, which also led him to revive calls for pan-Africanism as a way to deal with Africa's unfavourable position in the international system. Inasmuch as South Africa recognized that its own developmental success was tied to the rest of the continent, so did Libya. Libya's Africa foreign policy is now based on forging economic ties with the rest of the continent to aid in its own economic renewal.

South Africa believed the answer to the continent's marginalization and poor development lay in its ability to form sound institutions, eliminate corrupt leadership and subscribe to liberal economic values. This was espoused in the vision of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). For Libya the answer lay in the continent's immediate and full economic and political unification and the ability for it to speak as one voice on issues such as trade and defence as a United States of Africa (USAf). What follows is an account of the evolution of NEPAD and the USAf and how each country promoted their respective economic agendas for the continent through the African Union and their sub-regional organizations—namely SADC and CEN-SAD.

4.2 NEPAD AND THE UNITED STATES OF AFRICA (USAF)

South Africa was a strong proponent of neo-liberal economic policies as the way to create and redistribute wealth within the country after the effects of apartheid, and to make the economy more competitive globally. One of its foreign policy pillars was the promotion of democracy within Africa and the world at large. The framework that NEPAD presents has a lot of the same elements of the framework that South Africa used for its own economy. In the early years after the end of apartheid, the South African government adopted GEAR, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme, as the framework for the country's economic development. GEAR aimed not to shelter South Africa from the potentially harmful forces of globalization by disengaging it from the world economy, but to create an economy that would minimize any of globalization's negative impacts (Williams, 2000: 77).

Globalization is essentially the widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness of social, political and economic activities, such that decisions and actions of individuals in one region of the world can have an effect on individuals in a completely different part of the world (Held, 1999:16). It is often blamed for increasing inequalities between the developed North and developing South.

NEPAD, therefore sought to accomplish on a continental level what GEAR hoped to achieve at the domestic level within South Africa. However, in order for GEAR to work, the basic requirements were an effective state that invested in infrastructure, basic social services and peace and security (ibid). These conditions were adopted into the NEPAD framework.

NEPAD is based on the perspective that Africa's poor economic development is not a result of globalization, per se, but because of the continent's marginalization from globalization and its inability to interact effectively with it. The cause of Africa's marginalization, according to NEPAD's architects, is attributed to "the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, the working of the international economic system and the inadequacies of and shortcomings in the policies pursued by many countries in the post-independence era" (NEPAD, 2001:4). It draws mainly from the liberal economic school which advocates trade liberalization and the opening of domestic markets to the global market. Understanding the negative effects of trade liberalization

has had on African economies before, NEPAD seeks to strengthen domestic economies and institutions to create an environment that is conducive to the investment it hopes to attract. It also emphasizes regional economic linkages as a means to make investment more attractive, as risk would be diversified within a region. In addition, each country is required to establish certain criteria first to enable it to engage meaningfully in the globalization process and not be marginalized because of it.

Unlike the NEPAD's neo-liberal economic solution for the continent's economic development, Libya's solution falls between capitalism and communism and is a call for economic, social and political revolution on a world scale. Instead of piece-meal integration through regional economic communities, the solution lies in the immediate full economic and political integration of the continent. The United States of Africa (USAf) as espoused by Gaddafi is a mixture of his own ideology, as detailed in his *Green Book* as the Third Universal Theory, and the ideals of early pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah who advocated for full political and economic integration of the continent. The revolution is meant to restructure the world in such a way that those in the developing world have greater autonomy. Perhaps more importantly, it aims to enhance and consolidate the national interests of Libya within the international system (Ogunbadejo, 1983:156).

The USAf places the full blame of Africa's malaise at the foot of former colonialists and their continued imperialistic interference in Africa. Gaddafi's radical anti-West/imperialism stance came about as a result of the bitter battle for independence Libya fought for from its various colonial powers. As Ray Takeyh states, it also convinced him of the "inequity of the international order," and that "Tripoli should be unfettered by international conventions and rules." Instead Gaddafi felt Libya should be a liberator of the Third World and help transform its institutions (Takeyh, 2001:63). Gaddafi has continued to remind Western governments of their historical role in the impoverishment of Africa through colonialism and their continued roles through unfair trade and migration policies. He often "sounds the alarm" against the new colonialism and scramble for Africa's resources by the USA and China in particular. He likened the new scramble to colonialism, but also to a battle between two great powers, much like the Cold War, and not without the same negative effects

on the African continent (Gaddafi, 2007). Libyan ambassador to South Africa, Alzubedi emphasized this stance stating that time is not in Africa's favour to move slowly on continental unification as some African states within the AU advocate should happen. He went on to say that African states are worried about losing their sovereignty, yet they are still dependent on others (West) for survival. It is a necessity for Africa to be one economic bloc in order to be competitive with the rest of the world which is already in blocs (Alzubedi, 2009).

Whereas the USAf is a continuation of the call for continental unity that was fervently espoused by former Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, NEPAD is a continuation of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Abuja Treaty. In July of 1980, the OAU instituted the LPA. The LPA was meant to breathe new life into economic regionalism and signified another step in African integration efforts (Gwaradzimba, 1993:51). The LPA sought to reduce Africa's dependence on the industrialized nations of the North and make them less susceptible to global economic shocks. Its process of internal trade liberalization was meant to reduce the vulnerability created by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and imbalanced terms of trade. The SAPs advocated trade liberalization on a global level, which ultimately made the developing countries of Africa more vulnerable to global economic shocks.

In essence, the LPA was to liberate Africa from economic colonization. Despite political decolonization, African countries found themselves bound to producing and exporting primary goods and minerals to the industrialized North who decided the price and the quantity of goods being let into their markets. They also did not own the factors or institutions of production and distribution (Ikome, 2007:83). The LPA proposed a shift from the production of primary goods to semi-finished and finished goods to be traded within Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The Abuja Treaty, as discussed in the previous chapter, was signed in 1991 and established the African Economic Community (AEC), a supranational authority that would enforce compliance and punish cheaters. The Treaty heralded a move towards liberal economics and emphasized the roles of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Ikome, 2007:91). More importantly it called for institutional reform of the various RECs.

As discussed in the previous chapter, in 1999 Libya presented a proposal for a United States of Africa in Sirte. The USAf would be the once off solution to the issue of continental integration that the LPA and Abuja Treaty tried to achieve. It would be a federation of states modelled for the most part on the United States of America. It would have a seat of government located in one of the 53 states (Gaddafi suggested Tripoli), with a single military, a president with a five-year term (Gaddafi offered to be the first), a single foreign ministry and ministry of trade. The USAf would be the solution to war and underdevelopment on the continent because for one, it would eliminate borders and hence conflicts that are a result of border disputes. It would enable the continent to engage with multilateral institutions with one voice.

At the same OAU summit that Libya presented the USAf, a mandate was given to presidents Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria to start a dialogue with Africa's creditors on the cancelation of Africa's debt. The two presidents along with president Obasanjo of Nigeria were also asked, at a conference of the G-77 and those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), to convey the concerns of the South to the G-8 and Bretton Woods institutions. A correlation between the mandates of the three presidents, Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo, was seen and they were asked to create a programme for the regeneration of Africa. This programme would be different from other development initiatives in that it would be based on what African leaders thought was best for their countries versus what the donors of the West and industrialized countries thought was best for the continent. It was initially called the Millennium Partnership for the Recovery of Africa Programme (MAP). MAP was considered a Marshall Plan for Africa. The original Marshall Plan was used by the USA to lift post-war Europe out of "economic and social despair" (Okumu, 2002:237). In the case of MAP, those same countries would do the same for African countries by providing financial support to bring them to an acceptable level of development.

At the 5th Extraordinary Session of the OAU in March, 2001 in Sirte, President Obasanjo made a presentation on MAP and President Wade of Senegal made a presentation on his OMEGA plan. It was determined that since the two programmes were complimentary, they should be combined into one programme. At the 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia the Assembly adopted the New African Initiative: Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme and the

Omega Plan (NAI). The initiative included a vision for Africa, a statement of the problems faced by the continent and a programme of action for their resolution and a means to accomplish the vision. It was unanimously accepted and later became known as NEPAD.

NEPAD's objectives for the continent are the eradication of poverty, sustainable growth and development, the reduction of Africa's marginalization in the globalization process and its integration into the global economy in a way that is beneficial to the continent. It is a "new framework of interaction with the rest of the world" and multilateral organizations "set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny" (NEPAD, 2001:11). It based its prospect of future success on three areas that have changed: (1) a new phase of globalization, (2) an increase in the number of democratically elected leaders, and (3) the reshaped international order as a result of the end of the Cold War (DIRCO, 2001).

With South Africa as the main promoter of the NEPAD framework, its structure unsurprisingly mirrored South Africa's belief that democracy begets peace. South Africa is a proponent of the Liberal Democratic Peace theory which says that democratic states are peaceful states and do not wage war with other democracies (Karns & Mingst, 2004:36). Neo-liberalism emphasizes the importance of cooperation through international institutions given the interconnectedness of states. States that interact continually with each other will choose to cooperate and form international institutions because they know that they will be interacting with each other in the future. International institutions provide a 'guaranteed framework for interactions and a context for bargaining' (Ibid:39). Institutions also help to provide transparency and monitor state behaviour.

The main target of South Africa's democratization policy has been other African states (Landsberg, 2000:108). The neo-liberal stance of Mbeki on economic development and democracy and his outspoken condemnation of illiberal and undemocratic regimes, given the somewhat dismal record in those areas in the continent, did not bode well with some African states (Tieku, 2004:254). To Mbeki the African renewal was a call to rebel against tyrants and dictators "who seek to

corrupt our societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people” and a call to “wage war against poverty, ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa” (Mbeki, 1998). The undemocratic regimes in the continent viewed South Africa’s democratization canon as a threat to their survival (Landsberg, 2000:109).

At least on one occasion Gaddafi stated that democracy just does not work in Africa. In a speech to African intellectuals on African identity and cultural revolution, Gaddafi said:

Elections bring us no stability, and no benefits, and pluralism is a mere formality which is a fulfilment of the instruction of the World Bank, the WTO, the IMF, the EU and the US. They all demand the establishment of pluralism as a condition for the provision of aid and loans (Gaddafi, 2005).

Libya and its allies were not entirely supportive of NEPAD given their unfavourable records of democracy and human rights in their own countries. One of the criticisms of NEPAD, and Mbeki as the most visible president to sell the programme, was that it was setting the continent up for exploitation again by the West, but this time at the continent’s request. Gaddafi, who has been the autocratic leader at the helm of Libya since he led the undemocratic removal of King Idris in 1967, has not been able to build a solid power base and acquire the legitimacy to govern unchallenged (Deeb, 1991:188). Gaddafi has always felt that Libya was vulnerable to external interference and has sought to protect the country through alliances with regional and/or external powers and the use of coercion to retain power (Deeb, 1991:189).

Gaddafi believes that this phase of elections and pluralism has led to Africa’s fourth phase of instability: rebellions. The first two stages were colonialism and military coups d’états, with a short-lived period of liberation in between that ended when colonialism decided to replace the liberation leaders with “its own lackeys” (Gaddafi, 2005). Gaddafi argues that what is needed is stability in the political leadership. If a leader is good, there should not be a limit placed on his rule. He advocates for power to be controlled by the masses and popular congresses and committees—much like the Libyan Jamahiriya is structured. There also needs to be an authority that is not connected to the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government,

but is available for consultation. The authority can be a king, queen or permanent president “as was the case in Africa in the initial phase after independence” (Gaddafi, 2005). He stated his preference for a non-Western imposed style of rule rather than a western model that would likely result in the dilution of Africa’s already established customs (IOL, 2002).

To this end, one of the arguments against NEPAD was that it was building off of democracy as it currently was on the continent without taking into consideration whether “multiparty elections” had indeed amounted “to enhanced democratic accountability” (Chabal, 2002: 454). What has happened in actuality is captured best in what Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o called “paper parties” when he was describing the plethora of political parties in Kenya. “These paper parties,” he says, “may in the end negate the very democracy which enabled their birth. A country needs stable political parties with clear mechanisms for change of leadership within them” (Thiong’o, 2007). In only a few instances has a ‘democratic’ regime change actually resulted in actual systemic change and successfully reduced neo-patrimonialism (Chabal, 2002:456). It was believed, therefore, that democracy as practised on the continent would create a shaky foundation for the future of Africa’s development. Patrick Chabal argues against the prevailing view that multiparty elections came about as a result of pressure from the masses for change. Rather, he argues, pluralism came about because it was a condition set forth by multilateral lending institutions (Chabal, 2002:456). If states did not hold elections, they would not get the aid they needed. It is for perhaps this reason that Gaddafi felt that working on pluralistic models in African states was a pointless exercise and that states should rather just unify as a federation of states.

While Gaddafi was outspoken about NEPAD, so too was Mbeki about the prospects of a USAf happening any time soon. Mbeki said that he would not join Gaddafi’s army and that South Africa would be led by decisions that were already taken on the formation of the AU which did not “visualize the continent as a single state.” Nor could he “imagine we would want to take a position that there should be one army” (as quoted in the Mercury News, 2002). On the issue of a single Pan-African Parliament as advocated by Gaddafi, Mbeki reiterated the point that it was not going to be a single African parliament that had sovereign power over all AU member

states (ibid). Then Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma further reiterated this point stating that an African parliament is possible but the continent was not yet ready for it. The same sentiment was stated in relation to a USAf. "We must take steps to get there, but we are not yet ready to go into the United States of Africa" (as quoted by IOL).

At the AU summit in Sirte, in July 2005, Gaddafi once again raised the issue of forming a USAf. He warned that the AU would fail in the same way that the OAU did if it did not move towards full unification (Gaddafi as quoted in Sturman, 2007). In response to this, South Africa and several other African states have disagreed with Libya. South Africa in particular believes that bad policies at the domestic level have been the stumbling block towards effective integration and development in Africa. By forming RECs but ignoring the state of their domestic economies, African leaders "hoped to achieve at the continental level what they had failed to do on the domestic level, namely economic development through a combination of sound policies" (Qobo, 2007). To this end, Gaddafi's leadership and desire to lead a united Africa that is economically strong, has caused critics to look closer at the state of domestic affairs of his own country. His credibility in leading a new Africa is weak given the marginalization of the majority of Libya's own populace, its lack of basic infrastructure and transparent institutions.

However, under pressure from Gaddafi, the Assembly at the 2005 AU summit did agree that the ultimate goal of the AU was towards the formation of a US of Africa. A committee was set up to draft recommendations on a US of Africa. Eventually the AU Commission created an advisory board named, the "Study on an AU government towards the United States of Africa," (Qobo, 2007). However, his proposals for the establishment of the following AU posts were rejected: a Minister of Transport and Communications, Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Minister of Foreign Trade. He also proposed the cancellation of customs tariffs between the states of the AU and the harmonization of customs tariffs between its members and the rest of the world (Hugo, 2007), which were not accepted either.

When Gaddafi proposed a United States of Africa again at the 2007 AU summit, it was widely refused on the basis that the unity of Africa should start first at the

regional level and proceed upwards. The general consensus of the AU Heads of State and Government was that, “We reiterate our earlier decision on the rationalization and strengthening of the regional economic communities and the harmonization of their activities so as to lead to the creation of an African common market,” (The New Vision, 2007). At this response, Gaddafi stormed out of the meeting.

The aspirations that South Africa and Libya have for the continent, as encompassed in NEPAD and the USAf, respectively, have been viewed with scepticism by other African leaders. South Africa made it its business to promote democracy and peace on the continent, but to do so multilaterally and act in consultation with other states. However, the motivations behind South Africa's Africa foreign policy were questioned despite it making it clear that the democratization of Africa was in its own interest and linked to its own socio-economic success (Landsberg, 2000:118). The anger generated by some countries as a result of Mbeki's forceful promotion of liberal norms earned South Africa the accusation of being little more than a lackey of the West (Tieku, 2004:254).

South Africa sought to dispel regional and continental fears that it would act in a hegemonic way. It strove to build regional and continental alliances in its endeavour to democratize the continent and bring about institutional reform through consultation with other African states—either bilaterally or multilaterally through SADC and the AU. It was through NEPAD that South Africa sought to create a new partnership with the developed countries and multilateral institutions. The following principles formed the basis of the desired relationship:

- African leadership and responsibility for the development of the continent;
- Binding commitments by developed countries and multilateral institutions to an agreed set of obligations with accompanying milestones and time-frames; and
- Agreement on the objectives and programme of action (Mbeki as quoted in Landsberg, 2009:43).

By using its favoured position in the eyes of the West within multilateral institutions, South Africa advocated for Africa having a greater say in those organizations. In doing so it tried to show the rest of the continent that it had its best interests at heart and gain their trust (Landsberg, 2000:119). South Africa also hoped that some of the benefits of NEPAD, such as increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid, would help sway leaders to adopt and participate in the framework—especially those governments that were authoritarian and anti-democratic (Alden & le Pere, 2004:295).

Besides being opposed to governance measures, Gaddafi questioned NEPAD in ways best articulated by Trevor Ngwane of the Anti-Privatisation Forum. He had nine critiques of NEPAD of which three are most relevant to Gaddafi's position. Firstly, the historical relationship between Africa and Europe has been one of colonized and coloniser. Therefore the prevailing discourse of NEPAD being a 'partnership' is false and misleading. Gaddafi has called NEPAD a project for the "former colonizers and racists" (as quoted in Solomon & Swart, 2005:480). One of NEPAD's key pillars is African ownership, yet it relies heaviest for the bulk of its funding from outside of Africa as opposed to working to have it internally generated. On this point Libya has been especially vocal because Gaddafi believes that the main problem is that "capitalist countries don't want our continent to develop. They intend to keep Africa as it is, in order to extract its raw materials" (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:54). Secondly, NEPAD is based on neo-liberal economic policies which have not served the continent well in the past, but that have in fact increased unemployment. Thirdly, NEPAD essentially creates the conditions for the further exploitation of Africa's resources (as quoted in Hughes, 2004:97).

A year prior to the 1999 summit in Sirte, Gaddafi created CEN-SAD as a regional replacement for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which was largely not in operation, with Tripoli as its headquarters. In this way he stamped his "authority and patronage" over the regional body as another platform for his African policy. Despite its lack of commitment to uphold democracy, human rights or good governance, key pillars of the AU charter, it was automatically considered to be one of the five regional pillars of African integration and an implementing agency of NEPAD (Sturman, 2003). Gaddafi used CEN-SAD to garner support for his USAf agenda as

many of its members were states that benefitted from Libya's largesse and aid in the past. Libya knew that the end of the Cold War left a lot of African states weak financially. With its end came a one-fifth drop in aid to African states by OECD countries (Huliaras, 2001:14). Libya's vast oil wealth made it a natural destination for many states seeking aid. Libya used this to its advantage to buy influence within the continent. Libya also used its regional economic community CEN-SAD and the AU to push its USAf agenda, although it did not utilize those forums in a consultative manner but in the authoritarian mode Gaddafi was used to using within his own country. With twenty-eight members now part of CEN-SAD it is widely believed that it is Gaddafi's 'fast-track AU' to the USAf (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:59).

NEPAD was to be fully integrated into the AU as the "framework" for which the AU would address the "various socio-economic problems that have marginalized Africa in the global polity" (African Union, 2003:38). Gaddafi had been wary of NEPAD not just because of its major funding base, the West, but also because the NEPAD initiative was not integrated into the AU from the very beginning (Alzubedi, 2009). It seemed to be almost completely autonomous of the AU with its separate secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, not in Addis Ababa at AU headquarters. In 2002, the UN Secretary General gave NEPAD the label of being the general framework for international cooperation with Africa. This allowed Mbeki to state unchallenged that NEPAD "had emerged as the de facto political-economic point of reference in Africa's interaction with the outside world" (Melber, 2007). With the limelight suddenly shining on NEPAD and South Africa, heads of state within the AU, especially Gaddafi, felt that NEPAD was taking the focus away from the AU—the mother organization under which NEPAD would be housed (Ikome, 2007:138). However, Gaddafi's concerns may have had more to do with the attention being taken away from him and his role in the transformation of the AU. In actuality, South African officials and the main promoters of NEPAD wanted to keep it apart from the emergent AU administratively because it feared that its association with Gaddafi would hamper funding from the G8 countries who did not view Libya in a favourable light.

Part of the NEPAD framework is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM stemmed from the need to ensure that the "policies and practices of

participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards” (NEPAD, 2003:2). It focuses on four areas: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development (Gottschalk & Schmidt, 2004:152). It is not unlike the CSSDCA which also has a peer review mechanism. However, NEPAD’s peer review mechanism is voluntary whereas the mechanism encompassed within the CSSDCA is not. As outlined by Cilliers, the purpose of the APRM is to:

1. Enhance African ownership of its development agenda;
2. Identify, evaluate and disseminate best practices;
3. Monitor progress towards agreed goals;
4. Use peer review to enhance adoption and implementation of best practices; and
5. Identify deficiencies and capacity gaps and recommend approaches to address these issues (Cilliers, 2002:17).

South Africa struggled to reconcile its push for democracy and good governance as embedded in NEPAD and its related quest to promote peace and stability on the continent through conflict resolution. Some of the regional alliances that South Africa needed were not necessarily democratic states. Zimbabwe, for instance, posed a continuous challenge to the credibility of NEPAD and South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. Within SADC, Zimbabwe is a regional rival of South Africa and is its largest trading partner. And prior to South Africa’s entry into SADC, Zimbabwe had been the region’s main economic powerhouse. It was instrumental in the region in being able to lessen its economic reliance on South Africa and leading the protest against the apartheid regime.

4.3 CONVERGENT AND DIVERGENT FOREIGN POLICIES

4.3.1 Zimbabwe

Particularly during Mbeki's presidency, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe created internal cleavages in Zimbabwe with his increasingly revolutionary ideology when he decided to forcefully take farmland away from white farmers. This move created a negative spill-over effect into the region with South Africa bearing the brunt of the impact. The AU requested South Africa to lead a SADC team to mediate the situation. Human rights violations and non-adherence to democratic processes in Zimbabwe were the key areas that the SADC team was appointed to mediate. South Africa was faced with balancing its moral obligation to Zimbabwe as a supporter of the liberation struggle, adhering to its foreign policy objectives such as the promotion of democracy and to human rights and its credibility in selling the NEPAD framework to funding from the West. South Africa at the same time had to protect its own economic interests and ability to make good on its promises to its populace. In its leadership capacity of the SADC team, South Africa opted and insisted on using soft diplomacy to deal with Mugabe. The use of soft diplomacy versus military force was consistent with its foreign policy objectives in relation to the handling of conflicts. The international community heavily criticized South Africa's use of diplomacy because it wanted a more assertive approach. Despite the criticisms, South Africa was immovable in its stance as the best way and means of modifying Mugabe's behaviour.

Incidentally at the same time that NEPAD was being adopted at the July 2001 OAU/AU summit in Lusaka, a draft declaration was passed by the Council of Ministers in response to Zimbabwe and Britain on the land issue titled, "Draft Decision on the Land Question in Zimbabwe." The draft decision was harsh in tone as it noted that the inequitable distribution of land in favour of the British had always been at the heart of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. It acknowledged President Robert Mugabe's forceful taking of land from white farmers as a "fast track resettlement programme" and an achievement despite "severe resource restraints." It further called on Britain to honour its end of the Lancaster Agreement and not

divert attention away from it by focusing on “extraneous political issues” i.e. Mugabe’s refusal to cede control of government (CM/Decl.46 (LXXIV)).

In light of the changes that were being discussed on the formation of the African Union and its Constitutive Act, South Africa felt that such a decision would not be in line with what the new Union was hoping to achieve. South Africa and its allies wanted the new Union to shed itself of the perception that it was a dictators’ club, lenient on corruption and undemocratic. The decision adopted by the AHG on Britain was modified and therefore in line with the language of the new Union on the linkage between peace and development. It “reaffirmed that the land issue is central to ensuring durable peace, stability and economic development in Zimbabwe” and called on Britain to honour its agreement with Zimbabwe (Smith, 2001).

Libya, on the other hand, voiced its support for the fast track land policy of Mugabe and praised him for his patience and resilience in dealing with the British. Gaddafi told Mugabe that the whole of Africa was behind him. He also said that Africa’s land is not for bargaining, and what was taken by force would be taken back by force. He called on Europe to compensate not just Zimbabwe for the land taken by nineteenth century white settlers, but the entire continent of Africa (IOL, 2001). In the same time period, Libya invested in large-scale farms in Zimbabwe for the purpose of producing cash crops and fruit for their market and in return supplying the country with fuel. Gaddafi also publicly pledged to do everything in his power to ensure Mugabe’s re-election (IOL, 2001). His financial assistance towards Mugabe’s 2002 elections undermined South Africa’s attempts to modify Mugabe’s behaviour (Kagwanja, 2006:44).

Zimbabwe’s hasty militaristic move into the DRC, combined with its “fast track” land reclamation process, put a severe strain on its economy. Both South Africa and Libya gave Zimbabwe financial assistance, R800 million and R600 million, respectively, to enable it to purchase electricity and fuel and also to alleviate its currency shortage. Most of Zimbabwe’s resources were going to pay for its troops in the DRC. Despite whatever leadership divisions the DRC conflict may have caused within SADC, it was under the mediation of South African leaders that The Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord was signed in Pretoria in December 2002 and

endorsed in Sun City in April 2003 (Kabemba, 2006:152). From that point onwards, Mbeki fought to keep the agreement alive through intensive preventative diplomacy.

4.3.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

South Africa led the way in establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) within the AU, becoming one of its first members (2002-2005). As the first chair of the AU (2002-2003), South Africa was able to tackle new and existing conflicts in the continent in light of the revised stance of the AU towards peacekeeping and human security, and in line with its own similar foreign policy objectives. Under the umbrella of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), South Africa took a leading role in the resolution of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Ivory Coast, Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe, to name a few. South Africa's approach to conflict resolution differed from that of Libya's. Whereas Libya did not hesitate to send its military to prop up governments or forcefully remove them, South Africa's foreign policy relied primarily on engaging warring factions in dialogue. The use of military force was a last resort and would only be sent within a multilateral context and under the auspices of a regional or continental body. In the case of the DRC, and according to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the criteria for South Africa's participation in the peace processes had not been met. Those criteria were that there needed to be a "clear international mandate, sufficient means, a domestic mandate and budget, volunteerism, clear entry and exit criteria, regional cooperation, and foreign assistance" (as quoted in Taylor & Williams, 2001:282). The stability of the DRC was crucial to the development of the rest of the continent (Kabemba, 2006:152), especially to the stability of SADC member states, which South Africa joined in 1994.

South Africa was initially reluctant to be drawn in militarily into the DRC given its "ill-advised" military intervention into Lesotho in 1998 (Venter, 2001:163). It believed that the conflict in the DRC was civil and should be resolved by negotiations. President Mugabe (then Chairman of SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security) sidestepped this stance by moving into the DRC under the auspices of a SADC force (Khadiagala G. M., 2001:144) without consulting the other members. This caused a leadership division within SADC. Besides Zimbabwe, the countries

that formed the SADC force were Angola and Namibia. They accused South Africa of not being a neutral force due in part to arms sales to Rwanda and Uganda, but mainly because South Africa did condemn the initial foray of those two countries into the DRC (Taylor & Williams, 2001:281). These allegations hindered South Africa's ability to negotiate a settlement in the DRC. According to Taylor and Williams, Pretoria's efforts in the DRC were "effectively eclipsed by Libya's success in gaining widespread support for a "neutral force." Yet the origins of such an "effective" and "neutral" force were unclear (Taylor & Williams, 2001:281).

Despite the initial disagreements within SADC on how to handle the conflict in the DRC, South Africa ended up spearheading the effort. As the strongest power within the region, it was seen as the natural choice to lead a UN or multinational peacekeeping effort in the DRC (Pienaar, 1999). Besides not having a clear mandate, South Africa's reluctance to enter into the DRC militaristically stemmed from the fact that its military was not trained in peacekeeping. Furthermore, the conflict in the DRC would require "the deployment of thousands of peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces" (Pienaar, 1999). To this end South Africa and SADC appealed to the UN Security Council to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire.

Libya's decisions on where to assist in peacekeeping are largely influenced by its main foreign policy objective: to rid the continent of imperialistic tendencies. As a result, Libya was keen to lend its military to conflict areas where it seemed that conflict was a result of Western and Eastern meddling in order to extract valuable resources. Even though changes in the international system may have moderated Gaddafi's radicalness, it did nothing to diminish his stance against imperialism or desire to lead the liberation of Africa from its grasp. This is in line with William Zartman and A.G. Kluge's analysis of Libya's foreign policy. They state that Gaddafi may alter his tactics when necessary, but that does not necessarily mean that his goals have changed (Zartman & Kluge, 1991).

Libya, for its part, pushed for peace efforts in the Horn of Africa, the DRC and Sudan (St. John, 2008:99) usually through the utilization of his military. Between 2002 and 2003, Libya gave military backing to the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of

Congo) leader and former Vice President, Jean Pierre Bemba of the DRC, and President Angé Felix Patassé of the Central African Republic (Sturman, 2003). Bemba ran against current DRC president, Laurent Kabila and lost. However, it was Libya that played a key role in getting the various internal factions in the DRC to resume discussions with an eye towards reconciliation and also hosted an Africa “mini-summit” in Darfur (Otman & Karlberg, 2007:55).

4.3.3 Sudan

In July of 2003, the AU decided to establish a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Ministerial Committee on the Sudan to be chaired by South Africa. In June 2004, South African experts, along with the AU Commission to the Sudan, went to Sudan to conduct a preliminary assessment of the needs of that country. As of January 2010, the AU Ministerial Committee was still in action and visited Sudan to “reinvigorate its work as called for by the Tripoli Plan of Action of 31 August 2009” ahead of elections in 2010 (DIRCO, 2010). Libya has also played a key role in the mediation efforts in Sudan. Gaddafi took the lead in trying to broker a peace agreement between Chad and Sudan as a result of border clashes between the two countries (Georgy, 2007). He was successful in getting a peace accord signed; however, it did not last long once disagreements resumed between Chad and Sudan.

The South African presidency was very outspoken on the indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Sudanese President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, and its issuance of a warrant for his arrest. South Africa, like the majority of the AU, believed that the ICC’s warrant undermined the initiatives of the AU to bring peace to the Darfur region. This was a particularly tough decision for South Africa given that it had ratified the ICC’s founding Rome Statute. On March 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for Bashir’s arrest. In the same year, Gaddafi, in his position as chairperson and a strong opponent of Western interference in Sudan, pushed for the convened heads of state at the July AU summit in Sirte not to agree with the ICC’s decision. By forcing the issue at this particular summit, the key agenda item, to boost agriculture and food production in the continent, was overshadowed (Fabricius, 2009). The previous year

in 2008 the ICC indicted Bashir. The AU had asked the UN Security Council to bring into play Article 16 of the ICC statute to suspend its indictment for a year. It had come at a time that could throw off track the progress and positive peace work being done by the AU in Sudan. The lack of response from the UN Security Council led the AU to set up a commission headed by Mbeki.

In the case of Sudan, South Africa and Libya were in agreement on the need to remove imperialistic tendencies and meddling in the internal affairs of African states. In a speech to Oxford students, Gaddafi bluntly told them that the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan was made worse by the presence of the international community and the internationalization of the conflict in that region. He said:

When a crisis is internationalized, the political and military rebel leaders become celebrities. They talk, and the world listens. They appear to be leaders defending the cause of oppressed and marginalized people. This is another temptation to prolong the conflict. Once resolved they will lose their celebrity status. Therefore, I believe that in a situation like Darfur, and in similar situations, the solution is to leave the place and its people alone. They will be able to solve their own problems. It is not really an impossible problem to solve. What has made it dangerous and complex is the interference by outside forces (Gaddafi, 2007).

He criticized the USA for entering Africa under the pretext of tending to human rights violations and assisting the continent with governance and democracy issues when it was in violation of those same points itself. "It trumpets human rights and democracy despite the fact that democracy does not exist in America or elsewhere. It talks of good governance, while in reality there is no such thing. It interferes in each and every aspect of internal affairs" (Gaddafi, 2007). Mbeki also maintained his stance on African Solutions for African Problems as outlined in the formulation of NEPAD. In his 2009 report to the AU, Mbeki stated that, "The resolution of the conflict in Darfur has to be brought about by the Sudanese people themselves and cannot be imposed from outside," (South Africa Info, 2009).

4.4 ANALYSIS

4.4.1 South Africa

According to constructivism, one major aspect of power is the ability to reproduce and police intersubjective reality (Hopf, 1998:180). Institutions that are constructs of Western powers or that have Western powers at the head, i.e. the wealthiest nations, are able to reproduce and police intersubjective reality because they have the resources to do so. NEPAD was created as an attempt to redefine a particular intersubjective reality that saw Africa as poor and beggars. As mentioned in chapter two, Mbeki sought to remove the perception from the West's mind that Africa was condemned forever to depend on charity from others.

Constructivism states that actors produce their own constraints through ordinary practice (Hopf, 1998: 180). This can therefore be understood to mean that through the continued practice of bad governance, African states reproduced an identity of lacking the ability to govern and constrained themselves in the world structure with this negative identity. For it is by habitualization that identities are solidified. Even though not *all* African states may have practiced poor governance, the tendency of the international community to have an image of Africa as one land mass, and which places all countries within the continent under the same umbrella. In order to help dispel the bad governance image, NEPAD instituted the African Peer Review Mechanism that would get African leaders to own the development agendas of their states rather than appearing to be waiting for handouts with their "begging bowls".

Those who dismiss South Africa's foreign policy as being purely realist are mistaken. As Nathan notes, South Africa's foreign policy "embraces an ambitious continental and global agenda that has idealist, internationalist and emancipatory tendencies," which is in part a result of South Africa's historical liberation struggle and position in the continent (Nathan, 2005:362). South Africa, namely, during the Mbeki era, adapted strands from various international theories in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. In dealing with Zimbabwe, a long time ally of the ANC in the fight against the apartheid regime, we saw the use of constructivism and the importance of taking into consideration the historical context of Zimbabwe and how that has

shaped Mugabe's worldview, his identity and actions. It was also necessary to take into consideration Mugabe's stature as an "elder" statesman and the African culture of respect regarding elders (regardless of the correct or incorrect position of the elder).

South Africa's use of 'quiet diplomacy' was viewed by critics as a move consistent with realism in that South Africa sought to ensure the economic viability of one of its main export destinations, and hence cement its own economic stability. South Africa appeared to be upholding the sacrosanct policy of non-intervention and state sovereignty, characteristic of the OAU, and not forcefully addressing the human rights violations and disregard for democratic governance in Zimbabwe. As a result, it seemed that South Africa was choosing to protect its position within the regional and continental structure that could have been disrupted if it used its military might. South Africa's financial assistance of R800 million to Zimbabwe did not help South Africa's image as promoter of human rights and democracy.

However, the realist approach does not explain why South Africa chose to go against what seemed to be the popular position of the North, namely, the US, Britain and other members of the G8 for the use of hard power against Zimbabwe. The members of the G8 were the same countries that South Africa sought validation from, not to mention funding for initiatives such as NEPAD. In essence, South Africa put its external validation strategy on the line in the handling of Zimbabwe. Realism would point out South Africa's low position in the international system and that its actions would be dictated in large part by the pressures imparted on it by the more powerful countries. Yet South Africa chose to act in a multilateral context using soft diplomacy versus hard power as stipulated in its foreign policy and according to AU principles.

South Africa took a multi-dimensional approach to fulfilling its domestic needs. It did this by working to fulfil its foreign policy objectives in a multilateral context. The one foreign policy objective that stands out, perhaps because without it all else would be in vain, is the creation and maintenance of peace. South Africa fought for peace in the continent, but especially in the SADC region. It understood the futility of striving for economic development and prosperity in an atmosphere that does not have

peace and the good governance to maintain it. Further, South Africa understood that it could not and would not be able to enjoy its own peace and economic prosperity if those around it were underdeveloped and in a state of constant conflict. If that were the case, South Africa would become a security state trying to ward off the less fortunate from destroying what it had built.

4.4.2 Libya

The formation of the AU was an opportunity for Libya to be one step closer to the formation of a United States of Africa. Libya understood that it would be highly unlikely that any individual African nation (including itself) would be able to dramatically change its position in the international system by itself. In the international system, the lesser powers find themselves in a subordinate position to the major world powers. Because of their share of world power, the powerful states are able to make decisions that are in their best interest yet usually to the detriment of lesser, weaker powers. As a result, Gaddafi's push for a USAf can be seen as an effort to get African states to balance against what he perceives to be an economic threat to Africa's survival by the main world powers. His constant calls for a single African military and single minister of trade were essentially calls to increase power according to how realists define it: as being economic and military. Gaddafi's vision for a United States of Africa is best articulated in his own words:

The United States of Africa would emerge as a solid political and economic bloc which, although intrinsically rich in population and natural resources, has been undermined by "a capitalist veto." In my view Africa isn't a poor continent at all. It may not have any money to spend, but it has resources in the shape of raw materials. The main problem was that capitalist countries don't want our continent to develop. They intend to keep Africa as it is, in order to extract its raw materials (as quoted in Otman & Karlberg, 2007:54).

In fighting for a USAf, Gaddafi was well aware of the continent's riches, such as those in the DRC. The DRC is the richest country in the continent in terms of its resources yet is one of the poorest developmentally and has been continually mired in war. The war has been fuelled in large part by Western and Eastern powers

interested in extracting some of the country's many minerals. If there was one minister of trade for the entire continent, such pillaging of the continent's resources would not happen.

Both South Africa and Libya strove for continental unity within their worldviews, historical experiences and need to keep their domestic economies alive. South Africa, though insisting on African solutions to African problems, leaned more towards Western models of governance and economic development. NEPAD was to rely heavily on funding from G8 countries to provide the much needed FDI into African countries to fund infrastructure development and improve the continent's ICT levels. It promoted neo-liberal economic policies of greater trade liberalization. This framework for development was to be different than any other in that it was to operate on the basis of a "partnership" of equal footing between Africa and the donor countries, unlike in the past when donor nations simply prescribed cookie-cutter type policies, relevant or not to the particular country, as conditions for funding.

Libya also insisted on African solutions to African problems. However, Gaddafi could not conceive of there being a true partnership between Africa and its former colonial powers. According to Gaddafi,

A partnership means that we share everything as partners. When you speak of partnership while you are rich and I am poor, it means that I must share your wealth. This is what partnership is about. Is this the meaning of the partnership proposed to North African countries? If so, fine let us become partners and share everything (al-Gaddafi, 2006).

In stating this, Gaddafi knew that the West does not indeed want a "true" partnership with Africa as it would compromise their position in the international system. This goes back to Gaddafi's statement where he said that the West wants to keep Africa poor developmentally so that it can continue to extract the valuable resources within the continent.

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has looked at the different views that South Africa and Libya have towards achieving continental unity and socio-economic prosperity. South Africa believed unity started at the state and regional level through the promotion of neo-liberal economic policies, democracy and good governance. This vision was championed through NEPAD, the framework for Africa's economic development and partnership with the industrialized countries of the North. Through NEPAD African states would not remove themselves from the world market, but would be able to engage effectively with it as a result of sound policies. The APRM would ensure that states were in compliance with the agreed upon standards in areas such as political governance and fiscal management. It would help states where they were falling short in those areas. Although Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal were key in formulating NEPAD, it was Mbeki that was constantly trying to sell the idea to the major funding nations of the G8 and gain support for it within Africa.

South Africa sought to address the imbalances in the international order and their impact on Africa through a developmental approach. Such an approach would be a foundation for domestic success, i.e. creating an atmosphere in the continent for economic growth and development by starting with the smallest units, namely states. Part of the creation of NEPAD was to do away with imperialist and Western interference in the affairs of African states as it had proved detrimental in the past. NEPAD, therefore, advocated African solutions to African problems. It used its membership in the AU, SADC and various international organizations as its vehicles to achieve these goals, as well as to advocate for an improved lot for Africa and the developing South in general.

Libya felt that the immediate political and economic unification of African countries was necessary in order to successfully combat the negative effects of globalization. Gaddafi advocated for such a unification starting at the 1999 summit in Sirte. He believed that if, at the very least, Africa spoke with one voice on issues of trade and was unified in defence, that would be a good start towards Africa assuming a much higher position in the international system. As a result, he called for a single minister of trade for the continent and a single African military to protect the continent from

external threats of aggression. Even though most of Gaddafī's proposals that related to a United States of Africa were toned down considerably or rejected altogether, Gaddafī did not renege on his offers to put Libya's resources (his military in particular) at the disposal of the entire continent.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter looked at two of the main ways in which South Africa and Libya sought to address the unification of Africa and its growing marginalization in the international system. South Africa and Libya agree that Africa's marginalization is a result of the legacy of colonialism, the change in the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War, and the increasing rate of globalization. Where the two countries diverged was in regards to what role African leaders have had in the marginalization of the continent and what the best steps are to lift the continent up. South Africa was an ardent promoter and key architect in the NEPAD to be adopted as the continent's economic development framework as well as the peer review mechanism. Libya advocated for unity through the creation of a union government and different key union ministries.

This chapter suggests a way forward based on the two approaches to continental unity and economic development advocated by South Africa and Libya. It first summarizes the previous chapters and then based on the analyses so far, answers the thesis questions posed in chapter one section 1.3. and 1.4.1. The thesis questions in 1.3. were: what is the most powerful explanation for their foreign policy actions? Was it to maximize material power as postulated by realism or was it idealism as constructivists claim? Given the different political and leadership styles of each country, which of the two variables, realism or constructivism, stood out more? In section 1.4.1 the questions were: What are the objectives of South Africa and Libya's foreign policies? What have been the reasons for the formation of a continental organization?

This chapter also answers the supporting research questions of: What are the objectives of South Africa and Libya's foreign policies? What were the reasons for the formation of a continental organization in Africa?

5.2 SUMMARY

This thesis has sought to answer the question of whether material or ideological considerations best describe the impetus of South Africa and Libya to transform the OAU. In order to do so, two related research questions were posed and their answers summarized here as from the previous chapters. The questions are: What have been the reasons for the formation of a continental organization? What are the objectives of South Africa and Libya's foreign policies?

5.2.1 What were the reasons for the formation of a continental organization in Africa?

In chapter one, section 1.2.1, we saw that the decision to form the OAU in 1963 was a result of the newly independent African states deciding to work together to raise the level of their economic development. The prominence of regional integration in the form of multilateral institutions grew in the post World War II years. The OAU was formed not just to raise the collective development of the continent, but also to ensure that imperialism on the scale of colonialism did not happen again. It was also formed to help fight for the independence of other African states that were still under the grip of colonial governments. Eventually, with the creation of regional economic communities, regionalism was viewed as a supplement to national economic development policies (Ikome, 2007:34). As was seen in chapter three, changes in the international system called for changes in the continental body.

The increased marginalization of Africa in the post-Cold War era led African leaders to reconsider the functionality of the OAU. The 1990s, were therefore, a time when African leaders tried to improve the developmental state of the continent through regional initiatives and the OAU. As discussed in chapters three and four, one of the main regional initiatives was the Lagos Plan of Action which established the African Economic Community (AEC). The AEC was to strengthen cooperation between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within the five regions of Africa and lessen the continent's dependence on the West. Unfortunately this did not materialize due to poor design and unwillingness for states to cede their authority to a regional

institution. States also wanted immediate results in the economic growth of their economies. At this stage, cooperation in Africa mirrored realism's view.

According to realism, cooperation rarely works because states are unwilling to cede some of their sovereignty to a supranational authority or they are suspicious of other states. Two barriers to international cooperation for realists are "state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievement of gains." Stephen Krasner identifies four interests that states have that are affected by the international system: (1) political power, (2) aggregate national income, (3) economic growth, and (4) social stability. These four interests are what states are concerned others may increase in, should they cooperate with each other. As Krasner states, the relationship between the aforementioned interests and cooperation is potential economic power. And power, according to realism (be it economic, political, military), is what states seek to maximize. African states were faced with the choice of receiving instant financial inputs in the form of loans from the Bretton Woods institutions and waiting with for the benefits of regional cooperation that would accrue slowly. The loans from the Bretton Woods institutions were also largely incompatible with the promotion of collective self-reliance through regionalism (Ikome, 2007:88-9). Despite following a seemingly realist trajectory, African leaders were able to come together in 1999 to discuss how to improve the OAU and actually implement the reforms two years later.

African leaders knew that the OAU was not suitable to lead the continent in the direction that would help solve some of the issues plaguing it. The Cold War had ended. The world had entered into a new era of globalization accelerated by innovations in technology and communication. There was the advent of MNCs and intra-firm trade and subsidies that gave the North an unfair advantage over the South. The struggle by African countries for their liberation from colonial powers finally ended with the democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. However, while the continent had political freedom, it still found itself mired in conflicts over resources and struggling for economic independence. As Tieku notes, even though African leaders understood that the OAU needed to change structurally, knowledge of the aforementioned normative factors was not sufficient to transform the OAU. It did, however, make leaders receptive to the idea of a new institution (Tieku,

2004:252). The true catalysts for change came in the form of the individual interests of South Africa and Libya.

5.2.2 What are the Objectives of South Africa and Libya's Foreign Policies?

Given the relatively small sizes of South Africa and Libya in the international system, as defined by their economies, realism would dictate that the projection of their foreign policies would be greatly limited. However, because of South Africa's extremely ambitious foreign policy, it has been said to be "punching above its weight" (Dlamini, 2004:5). The same has been said about Libya. Tripoli has pursued an "extraordinarily ambitious foreign policy" leading it to be called a "small state with a big foreign policy" (Solomon & Swart, 2005:471). Chapter two demonstrated that a state's foreign policy is defined in terms of its national interest. According to the tenets of realism, the interests of states do not change and all states have the same interests. Those interests are to maximize power and security, where power is measured in terms of economic wealth, military strength and capabilities. An alternative definition of power is captured by constructivism. Constructivism acknowledges realism's form of power but states that it is not the only form. Power is also the ability to change the discourse in a particular issue area, and hence norms. Related to this is the constructivist's understanding of what factors have an impact on the formulation of foreign policy. A state's historical background, the ideologies of the leader and non-governmental organizations all have a bearing on a state's foreign policy decisions.

South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy is realist but is executed using a constructivist framework. It seeks survival through the enhancement of its economy within the framework of the non-realist confirming tenets and ideology of the African Renaissance. The African Renaissance, as a framework for foreign policy, speaks to all the interests in the ruling ANC party. It captures those in the government who are Africanists as well as those for whom modernisation through liberal economic policies is important. With its roots in the ideology of pan-Africanism, part of the formulation of the African Renaissance concept is to help change the negative image of Africa through discourse. According to Ahluwalia, the call for an African Renaissance was a necessary call "to ensure Africa's participation in the highly

globalized world. It is aimed at ending the marginalisation of Africa whilst at the same time staking a claim for the recognition of Africa's progress and development in cultural, economic, social and political spheres" (Ahluwalia, 2002:273). South Africa's foreign policy "punches above its weight" in the sense that it is not only aimed at improving the lives of South Africans, but the lives of all Africans and the world at large. It aims to do this through the pursuit of democracy, human rights and good governance, which in conjunction with the African Renaissance, forms its foreign policy framework. The "consolidation of the African agenda" is South Africa's top objective given the primacy of Africa in South Africa's foreign policy. It also aims to strengthen political economic relations with the rest of the world.

South Africa operates within a multilateral framework in consultation and cooperation with other states. It has stated clearly that it pursues a developmental foreign policy, which it does in partnership with other countries of the Global South to change the discourse on development debates within the international system. The current discourse on development is based on the assumption that the international system is "an integrated capitalist system where market forces reign supreme, punishing countries which did not obey the unwritten code of sound fiscal, monetary and labor-market policies" (Landsberg, 2005:725). By challenging this assumption, South Africa hopes to increase the "manoeuvrability" of developing nations within the international system (ibid).

In the area of peace and security, South Africa upholds realist tenets of self-help and security, but these are also based within the broader framework of the non-realist ideology of an African Renaissance. South Africa's main mantra is that it cannot succeed if the states around it and the world at large are not succeeding. To this end, South Africa worked to bring an end to conflicts such as in Sudan, the DRC and Zimbabwe and helped to develop states such as Mozambique in its region and the rest of the continent. Rather than building up a military to defend itself from intruders, South Africa has opted to ensure that there is peace around it. The absence of peace would surely impact on its own peace and security. By refusing to use military might to force changes, South Africa opted instead to use soft power--that of dialogue and negotiation.

Libya's foreign policy is ambitious because it is a combination of Gaddafi's regional ambitions and ideological conviction (Solomon & Swart, 2005:471) that is anti-Western imperialism and generally anti-capitalism. The primary objectives of its foreign policy are to maintain its independence, resist domination and promote trade and African unity (Alzubedi, 2009). Libya's foreign policy has been called ambitious, primarily based on the nature of its foreign policies that led up to US/UN sanctions. As discussed in chapter 2, Libya pursued anti-Western imperialism and its own independence through the support of various regimes within the continent using its oil riches and "checkbook" diplomacy. However, Gaddafi's militancy has not changed, nor has his mode (military and checkbook diplomacy). His vision for African unity is central. Whereas before, his vision for Arab unity was central.

5.3 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION

- A) What is the most powerful explanation for South Africa and Libya's foreign policy decisions to form the AU? Was it to maximize material power as postulated by realism or was it idealism as constructivists claim?

The transformation of the OAU to the AU has been considered one of the "most puzzling events in interstate cooperation in contemporary Africa" (Tieku, 2004:249). This is because when one looks back at Africa's lack of success with regional initiatives, the continent seemed most closely aligned with realism's rather pessimistic predictions on cooperation. What chapter three demonstrated, however, was African states coming together to ensure that their continent progressed along a sure path to development. South Africa and Libya played crucial roles in moving the process along as a result of their regional and continental power and resources. Both countries spent considerable sums of money at various stages during the transformation process. Libya hosted the initial extraordinary summit while South Africa hosted the inaugural summit. Each country hosted or provided substantial funding to various summits or meetings that furthered their agendas of either a USAf in the case of Libya or NEPAD in the case of South Africa. While Libya hosted extraordinary summits to push for the USAf, South Africa hosted other sessions

relevant to the formation of the Constitutive Act and the AU's various organs such as the Pan-African Parliament and the Peace and Security Council.

What motivates states is not as linear as simply stating that the underlying interests are based only on state survival and the accumulation of power and wealth. Nor is it as simple as pointing to ideology, historical or culture as motivating factors. As seen in the case of South Africa and Libya, their motivations were not purely one or the other in the formation of the African Union. The reasons for their push for the formation of the AU are captured best in their foreign policy objectives, especially their Africa foreign policies. This is because their foreign policy objectives were crafted mainly within the context of several factors: their historical backgrounds, their cultures and the needs of their domestic economies.

5.3.1 South Africa's Motivation to Form the AU

South Africa's history includes an extended period of colonization in the form of apartheid, and the brutality of that regime. Within that history is the role that the entire continent and a considerable portion of the world played in ending the repressive regime. This imparted on South Africa a sense of moral obligation to give back to the continent and to the world, in particular to the South for its support. In addition, since South Africa was the last to receive its independence and was a relatively new democracy with only fifteen years under its belt, it had not lost the zeal of liberation politics and the excitement of Pan-Africanism. These sentiments are reflected in South Africa's foreign policy. As stated in a foreign affairs document, "Our task in strengthening the bonds that connect us to the rest of the world is to assist us in nurturing conditions of permanent peace and enduring stability." This will then allow South Africa's citizens to be able to better themselves and "enhance their interactions and exchange with their neighbours and those on the other side of the globe" (DFA, Strategic Plan 2006-2009:4)

These values are, therefore, what South Africa pushed for in the formation of the African Union. On peacekeeping, South Africa pushed for the norm of intervention which would allow the AU to intervene in a state in which gross human rights violations were taking place. It consistently called for a re-visitation of the Abuja

Treaty to determine where in the stages of the AEC implementation process the OAU/AU was. South Africa believed that the best way for Africa to improve its position in the world economy and rid itself of underdevelopment was through the effective coordination of policies at the regional level.

South Africa clearly states that the platforms from which it will achieve its socio-economic and conflict resolution goals for the continent are SADC, the AU and NEPAD (DFA, Strategic Plan, 2006-2009). NEPAD was not only a call to democratic rule and good governance, but also a call for the restoration and preservation of African culture and heritage within the continent. It was also part of Mbeki's effort to restore and preserve the dignity that he felt the West did not see in Africa. To this end, in 2001 the South African Presidency under Mbeki, in partnership with the Department of Arts and Culture, agreed to help the Malian government and took the lead in the restoration and preservation of the Timbuktu Manuscripts, called "Operation Timbuktu." The project was the first of NEPAD's cultural projects and part of its socio-economic revitalization (South Africa Info, 2009).

South Africa's push for the formation of the African Union appears to be based more on the power of ideology. This is not to say that it was not interested in maximizing its economic power. All states must maximize economic power otherwise they will ultimately fail and not be able to provide on their domestic mandates to the people who placed them in power. However, South Africa's underlying motivation, in the power of ideology, was a desire to change the way Africa is viewed by the rest of the world by restoring it to some of its pre-colonial glory. Further, as Nelson Mandela said, "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that brought ruin to its various parts" (as quoted in Alden & Soko, 2005:370).

This all required a fundamental shift in how African leaders viewed themselves. As Mbeki said, "Unless we are able to answer the question "Who were we?" we will not be able to answer the question "What shall we be?" (Mbeki,1998). To this end Mbeki employed the ideology of an African Renaissance to remind Africans, but primarily their leaders of their rich pre-colonial history. In this history there were good leaders and sound institutions. The transformation of the African Union was a multilateral

way for South Africa to promote good leadership, human security and frameworks for economic development. As a result, South Africa was a “norm entrepreneur” for these values within the AU.

South Africa also believed that it could, in partnership with other like-minded countries, change not just the continent, but the world to be a more equitable and peaceful place. Again doing so from the position of a multilateral organization would have more weight than as a single country. Through the AU, South Africa was able to lobby some of the major multilateral institutions in the world for better recognition within them. Through the AU, South Africa lobbied for more seats on the UN Security council, for better trade policies with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and for debt cancellation by the Bretton Woods institutions.

5.3.2 Libya’s Motivation to Form the AU

As mentioned previously, Libya also felt indebted to the African continent for standing by it during UN sanctions when the Arab world did not. Libya translated its revolutionary zeal that had previously been used in both positive and negative ways on the continent, to push for the reformation of the OAU. To a certain extent, Libya’s push for the formation of the African Union can be attributed to realist motivations.

Perhaps more than South Africa, Libya had a lot more to gain from changing its identity. After all, Libya had been called a pariah, a rogue and terrorist state and Gaddafi labelled “the mad dog of Tripoli.” South Africa had only been called a pariah and that was under a different regime. It was also understood by the world that the policies of South Africa during apartheid were made by a repressive minority regime and not the African National Congress (ANC), the majority chosen one. Then there was the noble, almost saintly figure of Nelson Mandela that presented a firm break with the previous regime and injected the country with a certain moral authority. In the case of Libya, there was no other regime for Gaddafi to distance himself from. He was the leader when the regime was called a pariah and a terrorist state. As a result, Libya had a lot more work to do

Realizing at a domestic level what the rest of Africa already had on a continental level, Gaddafi saw that his regime could not continue as it was and hope to survive in the post-Cold War international system. The US/UN sanctions imposed on Libya had the desired effect of bringing about a change in the country's radical foreign policy. To this end, realism held true in that the international system's ability to restrict the capacity of a country to pursue its foreign policy is inversely related to that country's position in the system. Given Libya's low ranking position in comparison to the countries in the West that hold some of the highest rankings, the international system was able to exert a lot of restrictive pressure on Libya's foreign policy.

This relationship between the pressures of the international system and a country's ranking, helped fuel Gaddafi's revolutionary stance and formed the greater part of his motivation to strive for a union government of Africa. Africa's ranking would rise considerably if it was considered one single entity and spoke as such instead of the fragmented voices it presented currently. The other part that formed his motivation for a united government of Africa was his desire to lead the entire continent according to the same ideology that he leads Libya. As mentioned earlier, Gaddafi's ideology as explained in his *Green Book* is a call for a revolution that will give developing countries more autonomy in the international system. As Ogunbadejo says, it is indeed Gaddafi's ability to repeatedly articulate and execute such militant policies that has kept Libya among the most visible states in the world (Ogunbadejo, 1983:156).

When Ogunbadejo wrote about Libya in 1983, Gaddafi was still militantly for Arab unity to protect the Arabs from enemies. Since then, however, Gaddafi has given up on Arab unity and has transferred that same zeal to African unity. Much of what Ogunbadejo wrote about Gaddafi's impatience with the slow pace of Arab unity applies today to his impatience with African unity. In the same way that Gaddafi saw a visionary role for himself as "the Arab leader and his country the base for promoting whatever adventurist policies may be necessary to achieve the much desired unity," (ibid), so does he see himself as the leader of African unity. According to Solomon and Swart, "The African Union presented Libya with a prime platform from which to project his foreign policy objectives towards the rest of the

African continent and presented Colonel Gaddafi with the perfect vehicle from which to further his continental ambitions” (Solomon & Swart, 2005:479).

In Libya’s case, the quest for power as per realism can be seen as the overarching motivation for Libya’s push to transform the OAU into the AU. As Gaddafi rightly understood, if Africa could speak as one voice on issues of trade and foreign policy, its ranking in the international system would rise exponentially. Africa may be a poor continent economically, but it is exceptionally rich resource-wise. Gaddafi equated the conflicts in countries such as the DRC and Sudan as being the result of Western imperialism and greed for the resources inherent in those countries. Sudan’s oil reserves are eyed by many oil-hungry nations in the international system. The DRC is rich in numerous resources such as coltan that is used in “every modern industry known to mankind” (Sharife, 2008:26). These are just two resource rich countries out of the entire continent. Libya’s Gaddafi believed that if trade was placed under one minister for the entire continent, and the pillaging of the continent’s resources was halted, the economic wealth of the continent would increase rapidly. It was Libya’s hope to be at the helm of such a new African country, which would be extremely powerful.

Libya’s motivations were not based only on the acquisition of power. Ideological concerns did play a part. Gaddafi has firmly associated Libya with Africa and the Pan-African movement. He sees himself as pushing forward the dream that Nkrumah had almost fifty years ago. However, he has no illusions about partnering with the West for the continent’s development. Gaddafi sees the West as being motivated by the maximization of material capabilities at all costs and it therefore does not, will not, and will never have any desire to actually help Africa develop economically. This would result in a challenge to their economic wealth and the viability of their own economies.

5.4 CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to answer the question of what factors stood out in South Africa and Libya’s quest to transform the OAU to the AU. Were they motivated

primarily by material concerns or did ideological concerns also factor in? To this, the answer was that both material and ideological factors came into play. In South Africa's case, it was motivated more by having a platform from which to change the discourse on Africa and the global South. Libya was motivated by being able to promote a United States of Africa which, if it had come into existence, would increase Libya's material power in the international system.

This thesis also showed that though important, states are not driven solely by material power or by suspicion of each other. The formation of the African Union is evidence that African states do want to cooperate. The basis of their cooperation is not just to improve the economic gains of their individual states, but is based on a solidarity due to a shared history, Pan-African ideals and a genuine desire to seek their own African solutions to African problems without being dictated to by the West.

5.4.1 The Way Forward

Charting a way forward often requires looking back at what has already happened to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated and stumbling blocks are avoided. In the almost fifty years since African states started to gain their independence and founded the OAU, the economic development of many African nations has not progressed as rapidly as they would have hoped. External factors can be blamed for this such as: trying to recover from the legacies of colonialism; the use of the continent to fight the West's Cold War by proxy; and the lending practices of Bretton Wood's institutions and their Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). These often did more harm than good. These were combined with the forces of an international system that make it very challenging for countries in the periphery to move towards the core. However, there are also internal factors that have contributed to a slower than desired pace of development: the mismanagement of whatever funds did pass through the state; the use of the same institutional set up that the colonial powers had that were to their own benefit and not to the indigenous populace; and a neo-patrimonial and style of leadership. All these factors combined to slow down the pace of development in Africa.

Care must be taken, however, in attempting to make a linear comparison between the pace of development in Africa and that of the West. Development within Africa is taking place under different conditions than it did in the West. The historical context of African countries is also different and so are the norms and values. Both Mbeki and Gaddafi sought reforms of the OAU based on Western models of integration. Mbeki wanted the AU to resemble the European Union while Gaddafi wanted the AU to resemble the federated states of the United States of America. While policymakers must make use of the various models and modes of doing things from around the world that have worked well, they must also take note of the challenges that those models encountered. The European model of integration took over fifty years and is still a work in progress. The United States of America took over two-hundred years to reach what is seen today and is also still a work in progress.

Prescriptions for the continent must not take place in a vacuum, as if Africa has no history as British historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper once said about Africa. Trevor-Roper said on African history that “at the present there is none; only the history of Europeans in Africa.” Mbeki and Gaddafi fought to dispel the idea of African history having started with the arrival of the Europeans. On occasion Mbeki reminded audiences of “works of art in South Africa that are a thousand years old.” There are also the “architectural monuments represented by the giant sculptured stones of Aksum in Ethiopia; the Egyptian sphinxes and pyramids; the Tunisian city of Carthage, and the Zimbabwe ruins, as well as the legacy of the ancient universities of Alexandria of Egypt, Fez of Morocco...” (Mbeki,1998). While Gaddafi reminded audiences that religions such as Christianity existed in Africa before the arrival of the Europeans. So both leaders were well aware of where the African continent has come from. However, both looked at Western models without perhaps studying the incremental steps that the Europeans and the Americans had to take. This is not to say that African integration, whether it follows an EU model or a USA model, needs to take another fifty or two-hundred years. African nations can learn from the challenges and errors that the West has made and move towards integration faster based within their own shared histories.

Regionalism must not be viewed as “a form of escapism from real challenges at the domestic level” nor must policy makers “escape the reality that domestic successes

precede continental successes” (Qobo, 2007). Indeed, a combination of what South Africa and Libya fought for can be utilized to improve the development of the African continent. South Africa fought to improve the socio-economic development of the continent by starting at the level of the RECs. Libya’s stance was for the promotion of a unity government with one minister of trade and foreign affairs and one military for the whole continent of Africa. However, a combination of each vision would mean that at each regional level there would be a mini United States of Africa. In this way, for example, the SADC region would fully harmonize its trade policies and speak with one voice when negotiating trade with other African regions, and more importantly so with the industrialized nations. For example, a country like Malawi, that has just discovered a large deposit of uranium, would not negotiate mining contracts with external countries on its own, but through the SADC organ. This would result in SADC countries being able to leverage the resources in their region to gain, at a good rate, the resources they do not have. The issue of countries belonging to more than one REC would also have to be rectified.

5.5 THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

It has almost been one year (February 2010 at time of writing) since Jacob Zuma took over the South African presidency. The question many have been asking is whether Zuma will carry the foreign policy mantle with the same vigour that Mandela, or more so, Mbeki did. It is still too early to tell. However, what few signs there are show that Zuma will uphold South Africa’s foreign policy goals, objectives and stances as articulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

President Zuma has taken a warmer approach to countries such as Angola in an effort to revitalize relationships that may have been less amicable under Mandela and Mbeki. As discussed in chapter four, disagreements on the approach to take in the war in the DRC created some rifts between the member states of SADC. This rift was evident between South Africa and the troika of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Zuma’s attempt to project a more approachable South Africa was evidenced in part by his changing the name of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

The constant theme that comes up and that motivates Gaddafi is an almost blinding push for greater African unification in the formation of a US of Africa. In his inaugural speech to the AU in February 2009, he said, "I shall continue to insist that our sovereign countries work to achieve the United States of Africa." At the same summit, after 7relentless pushing by Gaddafi, it was unanimously agreed that the AU Commission would be transformed into an AU Authority, with the ultimate goal of establishing a Union Government of Africa. However, leaders remained divided on whether the transformation proposed under the AU Authority would be that different from the current administrative structure. Despite the division, Gaddafi refused to accept the outcomes of the Executive Council in a June 2009 meeting convened to discuss the financial consequences and size of the proposed AU Authority. He wanted the Council of Ministers to propose to the Heads of State that the AU Commission be transformed immediately. The following month at the AU summit, Gaddafi pushed through the establishment of the African Defence Council and the African Agency for the Protection of Territorial and Economic Waters of African countries without allowing any debate.

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