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by

NOREEN HAZEL KAPLAN, B.A. (U.C.T.)

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INTRODUCTION

In formulating aims for the study of history, and for any meaningful investigation of teaching methods and assessment in history, one has to consider what it would be for someone to have learnt history. In examining this, important logical features will emerge as necessary conditions for saying that one has learnt history and that particular activities can count as teaching and testing history.

Educating people suggests developing states of mind which are valuable and which involve some degree of knowledge and understanding. In all subjects, it is assumed that more than the learning of a string of propositions is required. Even if teaching may involve the handing on of information, we surely want pupils to understand that information, not merely repeat it rote-fashion. Questions arise as to what is meant by 'understanding history' and how one would promote such understanding and assess that it has developed. Moreover, merely understanding information would not qualify as learning history. What is required further, is that pupils should at least begin to think historically, that is, in the way distinctive of the discipline, and achieve some style and imagination in so doing.

If we accept that a growth towards formal historical thinking should be the basic objective in teaching history, and pupils are found capable of this, then it follows logically that the means of assessing the pupil's ability and development must be one which is linked to this aim and does in fact test the pupil's progress in historical thinking. Central to all these issues is the clarification of what historical thinking may be.

This dissertation is concerned primarily with an inquiry into the nature of historical thinking. There is some debate as to whether such an inquiry is a matter for philosophical or psychological investigation. This has been considered and, while the contribution made by both fields is acknowledged, the nature of the discipline has been clarified in terms of a logical analysis of the meaning of historical thinking. From this analysis, the significant features of historical thinking emerge. An awareness of these features may serve to clarify

what it is one wants pupils to acquire, in learning history.

Two areas which are related to the aim of promoting the growth of formal historical thinking, in learning history, have been investigated briefly. These are the significance of psychological research into the development of historical thinking in pupils, and the question of assessment in history, in particular the assessment of historical thinking.
While the aim proposed can be justified as educative, on logical grounds, an important psychological factor requires consideration. If the implementation of this aim is to prove worthwhile, it is necessary to consider the limitations of the pupil, and to establish whether formal historical thinking can be initiated, if not attained, at school level. Research into the development of thinking, and in particular thinking in history, has been examined. It would appear that formal thinking in history develops at a late age, significantly later than thinking in the disciplines of science and mathematics, for example. This has important implications for learning history at school, whether the explanation is inherent in the difficult nature of the subject matter or lies in the fact that little effort is made to promote such thinking. The findings of this research are not regarded as conclusive, especially the ages at which different stages of development are said to be reached, for reasons which will be discussed. Thus, one cannot infer from these findings that attempts to promote historical thinking will be beyond the pupil's understanding.

It is clear that, for the realization of this aim, there is a need for more informed methods of teaching and for valid modes of assessment. Both these areas are significant and require further investigation. Some considerations on assessment in history have been submitted. All assessment in history is required to measure how well the objectives of history teaching have been achieved. In this instance, our concern is with the pupil's progress in thinking in history. In determining what may constitute an adequate examination of such progress, a number of factors require consideration. The importance of an understanding of the meaning of historical thinking has been clarified initially. An inquiry has been made into two further areas. Firstly, an investigation has been made of some of the skills and abilities which may be said to constitute historical thinking. An awareness of these historical skills

and abilities would facilitate the examiner in his task of assessing the pupil's ability to think in history. Secondly, an analysis of the kinds of questions which may be said to be a true test of historical skills and abilities, and thus thinking in history, was made. Partly because of the indications of the psychological research mentioned above, and in part, because of the influence of the external examination on every aspect of studying history, the external matriculation examination papers were used for this analysis. The same issues which arise here would apply to internal examinations. In addition to these two areas, some of the other significant issues of assessment which require investigation, have been pointed to.

Finally, in maintaining that the promotion of historical thinking be accepted as a worthwhile objective for the study of history, it is suggested that this should apply at all levels, junior and senior, and is not incompatible with the younger pupil's limited ability, although modifications need to be made on this account.

Chapter I

WHAT IS FORMAL HISTORICAL THINKING?

If we accept that a worthwhile aim in the study of history is the promotion of the development of historical thinking, the question arises as to what constitutes and is distinctive of such thinking.

1. THE LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CLARIFYING THE NATURE OF HISTORY

The area of human knowledge can be regarded as being composed of a number of logically distinct forms of knowledge. The different branches of knowledge into which a curriculum may be divided are defined by their different conceptual structures, particular set of terms and relations. Our understanding of one form of knowledge may depend in part on that of another form of knowledge. One may use a scientific term in history but the term remains scientific, that is, it belongs to the scientific mode of inquiry. Such interrelations indicate only that knowledge in one domain may be necessary to that of another but this does not imply that it is sufficient. There is a logical method and way of thinking which is distinctive of each form of knowledge. Thus, while there is much debate as to what 'historical thinking' means precisely, that such a concept exists and that it differs from 'scientific thinking', for example, is accepted.

Difficulties arise in clarifying what is meant by 'thinking historically'. One problem is the question of whether such clarification is a matter for logical or psychological investigation. It has been suggested that one way in which the criteria of historical thinking could be discovered is by conducting psychological investigations into the thought processes of historians, when doing their job. The main problem which arises is how one would distinguish their thoughts which could be labelled 'historical thinking', from other thoughts.To be able to do so presupposes that one already has a clear idea of what one is looking for, that is, the criteria of historical thinking. Thus it would seem that criteria would have to be established independently of such an investigation.

One could only distinguish different forms of thought by referring to the particular set of terms and relations which each employs. These terms and relations are fully public - that is, they are publicly shared modes of expression and form part of the language we use. Thus one can characterize historical thought by examining firstly the distinctive features of historical explanations. This will involve clarifying the nature of historical explanations of particular events. For example, some features may include colligation, the use of general laws and the evaluation of evidence from sources. Such an analysis would then make empirical studies of the thought sequences of particular historians possible. This is not to say that the outcome of these studies could be predetermined. In seeking to develop historical thinking in a learning situation, one does not aim at a particular sequence of thought. In fact, historical thinking is possibly that which, irrespective of the thought sequences involved, results in propositions which one could consider valid historical accounts and explanations. A necessary condition of historical thought is the recognition of rules that govern the meaningful use of concepts and the validity of propositions, irrespective of the temporal order of the thoughts involved. Thus thinking historically involves thinking in accordance with historical criteria but no particular sequence of thought is implied.

The effective teaching of history necessarily depends on knowing certain features which characterize the discipline. According to Hirst[1], the latter can be established only by a logical analysis of the meaning of 'historical thinking'. Such an analysis would be sufficient as a means of characterizing what one wants pupils to acquire, in structure and content. Hirst explains the structural outlines of what we want children to acquire, conceptually, in a discipline. He does not give details of what is implied in the content or information aspect. In stating educational aims, Hirst considers it necessary to give an account of skills to be mastered, rather than an account of content to be covered. While one can distinguish between the logical structure and information of a discipline, finally one cannot separate them. One cannot speak of learning historical terms and specific relationships between historical propositions, without thereby including the information aspect of history. It is contained in the terms and

propositions referred to. Similarly, that information is established from relevant evidence, by the application of concepts and skills which are characteristic of the structural aspects of history. Thus structure and content are interwoven. Hirst asserts that only with the knowledge of the logical structure and content of the discipline, does empirical evidence in the field, based on this analysis, become relevant. Empirical investigations must necessarily confirm that which is logically true and thus may sometimes be redundant and irrelevant.

Burston recognizes the contributions of critical[2] philosophers of history, such as F.H. Bradley, Oakeshott, Collingwood and more recently Dray, to the understanding of the nature of history. However, he regards the writings of historians as the first and only direct source by which we can reach conclusions about the nature of history. Any assertion about the nature of history is tested in the final analysis as true, if it conforms to what historians in practice do. He maintains that our concern is not with what history ought to be but to clarify what it is. The final test of any conclusion is made by referring to what historians in fact do.3

These two views, stated by Hirst and Burston, are apparently contradictory. If, however, Hirst rejects the suggestion of examining the historian's thoughts and proposes a logical analysis based on historical explanations, these explanations are the writings of historians. Would he not then be clarifying the features of historical thinking, from historical explanations, that is, the writings of historians? This is not to say that Hirst is using a psychological method. He is concerned essentially with the logical structure of what historians do and this is what is important to us, in establishing what it is to know history.

Historians have developed specific conceptual structures in the language and finally it is these structures which distinguish the discipline of history from other disciplines. This would affirm Hirst's view that it is the logical analysis that defines the discipline.

In learning history, one must be initiated into the modes of thinking in history. Because of the nature of the evidence, which affects the structures, once the method is grasped by the learner, he may develop and expand these structures considerably and thus cause us to modify our view of the subject. Hirst's abstract logical analysis does not seem to contradict Burston's assertion, that one can say what the nature of the discipline is, from what historians do. The one compliments the other.

One important problem that arises from Burston's contention, is that historians have different approaches to explanation in history. How does one establish the criteria needed to apply to these different approaches, if one is to say which is more true to the distinctive nature of history? To say that one accepts what 'most' historians do is unsatisfactory. Various centuries have been dominated by modes of thought which are viewed subsequently with criticism. One may say then that historical thinking is an evolving process. There is much controversy among modern historians and philosophers, as to what the nature of facts and explanation in history is. The debate can be discussed and assessed on the basis of certain criteria. How are they arrived at?

Hirst suggests the following points for consideration of what coming to think historically may mean.

> In the first place, such learning involves coming to understand historical propositions, and this in turn involves learning the use of a network of related concepts. It is necessarily the case that any area of knowledge can only be mastered in so far as the use of concepts according to the complex rules that relate them to each other is acquired.
> 4

Further, it would seem that understanding certain terms and concepts presupposes and is dependent upon the prior understanding of other related concepts. For example, the concept of political revolution presupposes the concept of authority. This leads one to conclude that it is logically true to say that, in this sense, an order of priority in the concepts must be recognized.

The question arises as to whether it is a necessary truth about history, as it is about mathematics for example, that there is some ordered sequence to the truths concerned. As the validity of some propositions presupposes the validity of others, this would seem to be so. Only when the logically necessary features of the discipline are examined carefully, can useful empirical investigations be carried out. Such an examination must try to establish in particular, the extent to which learning history involves complying with what can be called rules of logical order.

Phrases such as logical order, logical method and logical organization appear in much of the literature on the logical characteristics of knowledge. Such terms were first used in an educational context by John Dewey. In trying to understand what is meant by 'logical order' it is important to recognize that in history as in any form of knowledge, at least two separate levels of logical relations can be distinguished. At both levels, elements of logical order can arise.

Firstly, there is the network of relations between particular concepts, which make possible the formation of meaningful propositions. When one uses the term 'medieval church' one is speaking of something specific. It does not relate to a building, it is not the same concept of the church in the twentieth century and it cannot be used loosely to refer to any religious institution. Thus, for a term to be used meaningfully, certain rules for its use must be adhered to. At this level, history, and other spheres of knowledge, can be said to have a logical grammar which consists of the rules for the meaningful use of the terms it employs.

Secondly, there is the network of relations between propositions in terms of which valid historical explanations are formed. The logical analysis of historical explanations seeks to clarify what the criteria for valid explanations in this area are. The latter would appear to depend on the progressive establishment of what Hirst calls 'a logical sequence of validated propositions'[5]. An explanation of the causes of the Great Trek, for instance, must rest on a logical sequence

of validated propositions about the development of a mentality and way of life in frontier farming community, of ideas in nineteenth century Europe and Britain, the policy of the British government at the Cape during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and so on.

In summary, logical grammar is implicit in any meaningful statement that belongs to the discipline of history. Acquiring new concepts involves mastering logical grammar and one often relies on concepts one already has. Only some concepts depend on logically prior concepts and this is more true of mathematics and science than history. To learn a new concept is to learn how to use it in relation to others and how to apply it. It is not an all or nothing process; one can learn some of the criteria and be able to build on this partial knowledge.

While attention must be given to some appropriate logical sequence in communicating valid explanations and theories, it would not be true to say that there is only one such logical sequence of the truths in history. Vital to the study of history is the factor of the justification of propositions, explanations and theories. Pupils need to appreciate why these particular elements are true and important and the kind of justification in general which is acceptable in history. Such an appreciation involves the development of some logical sequence appropriate to the subject, that is an ordered body of truths according to the criteria for validating historical explanations. This question of logical sequence arises only when one is concerned with questions of validity and justification. To understand a valid explanation is to recognise a general pattern or logical relations between propositions that satisfy certain criteria. Thus in learning history some logical sequence distinctive of the subject, must be established. This does not imply that the order of learning must temporally follow along logically prescribed lines. As in fitting together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, the elements of an explanation must in the final analysis fit together as if to establish the pattern of the puzzle, though there is no one temporal order in which this has to be achieved.

In deciding what may count as historical thinking, one must examine the nature of the discipline. Such an analysis must include a

consideration of the nature of historical facts, the nature of historical explanations and the question of objectivity in history, amongst other factors. One would thereby be clarifying what methods and skills are characteristic of history and historical thinking. It would appear that both the contributions of critical philosophers, in the form of a logical analysis, and the writings of historians would prove valuable for such clarification.

2. FACTS IN HISTORY

One of the fundamental issues of conflict which has arisen in attempting to say what the nature of history is, is the question of facts in history. Facets of the debate are: What is to count as a historical fact, how is it established and what one does with facts, if anything, for particular activities to be called 'doing history'.

Modern methods of historical investigation date from the late eighteenth century. German historians at the University of Gottingen in Hanover set about accumulating and arranging documents and rectifying defective texts. They aimed at establishing for history a basis of proven and verifiable facts. This idea of 'scientific history' was carried over in future generations. In the 1830's, Leopold von Ranke, of the Prussian Historical School, protested against moralizing history. He viewed the task of the historian as simply to 'show how it really was' (wie es eigentlich gewesen). Meaning in history could only be discovered by a detailed examination of the facts by men trained in the use of objective methods of historical scholarship. To be objective, only that which the documents revealed had actually happened, was to be reported.

This attitude was adopted by German, British and French Historians. A series of great scholars, amongst them Ranke and Mommsen in Germany, Fustel de Coulanges in France and Lord Acton and J.B. Bury in England, taught these techniques of scientific history. The attitude prevailed for three generations and was adopted by the Positivists who were eager to establish that history was a science, consisting of a body

of ascertained facts which were separate from the subject, that is, the historian. Sir George Clark, in the introduction to the second Cambridge Modern History, criticized Acton's assertion that 'ultimate history'[6] could be produced. He maintained that this could not be achieved because knowledge of the past has come down through human minds and a historian's work would be superceded a number of times.[7] Despite this critical attitude to the scientific theory, Clark is quoted in the Listener, as contrasting 'the hard core of facts' in history with the 'surrounding pulp of disreputable interpretation'.[8]

Thus the attitude which prevailed was that it was both possible and desirable to establish a body of 'objective' facts which could 'speak for themselves'. The only task of the historian was to reproduce them. 'One day when Fustel de Coulanges was lecturing on early French institutions, his students suddenly broke into applause. 'Gentlemen', he begged, 'do not applaud. It is not I who speak but history that speaks through me.'[9] Scientific historians laid claim to knowledge of the truth but denied any personal function in determining that knowledge.

The age of objective history was followed by new theories of historical relativism. In America the movement towards pragmatism was led by Charles Beard and Carl Becker.[10] They maintained that objective history could not be written. 'Historical facts , Beard pointed out, are not neatly stored away "awaiting like the Sleeping Beauty of the fairy tale the advent of her bespectacled, seminar-trained deliverer." Carl Becke likewise poured scorn on the notion ..."first because it is impossible to present all the facts, and second because even if you could ... the miserable things wouldn't say anything".'[11]

These traditional views of the nature of history have given rise to the contradictory ideas held by historians today. Some clarification on the debate may be reached by an examination firstly of what historical facts are and how they are established.

'Historical knowledge is a connected, coherent, intelligible form of knowledge about the past'[12] While historical facts are past facts, not all past facts are necessarily historical, rather than archaelogical,

for example. Moreover some facts which are regarded as historical are still present and visible. The term history is usually limited to refer to the human past, that is, to events which concern men and women of the past. There may be tangible relics of their activity, such as the Portuguese padrao presently standing in the foyer of the library at the University of the Witwatersrand. Thus one must distinguish between reminders of the past still present and observable, and the past itself.

Similarly, one must distinguish histor evidence in general from historical facts which are established on the basis of that evidence. Historical evidence is present and observable or no history could be written, as historical knowledge would not exist. A major part of such evidence consists of manuscript sources. Even at the beginning of this century it was widely held by historians that the only worthy source was documents. Today this no longer holds. While documents remain one of the historian's most important sources of information, it is recognized that other important sources of information from which he can extract valuable knowledge may be bone fragments, pots, old buildings or coins, paintings or ancient folk songs and folk tales. All this is historical evidence, raw material of the historian but not the facts of history which he reconstructs on the basis of the evidence.

It would seem possible to regard facts of hist ry as being synonymous with 'events' of history. However, a history is also concerned with ordinary everyday life of people of the past, the term 'events' must be extended to include all human activity. Thus a starting point for describing facts of history may be to say that they include all past activity by people. When one describes an activity one usually includes a statement about the purpose or motive of the person performing the action. One would not say that Napoleon travelled with a group of soldiers into Russia but rather that Napoleon and his army marched on Russia. Collingwood[13] explains this point by describing all human activity as having an outside and an inside. The former is observable, the latter is the thought or intention expressed by the action. Human behaviour in the past has both these features. If history

is concerned with past human activity it is concerned with something which, were it present even, would be only partly observable. We cannot observe men's motives and intentions although we frequently make assertions about them.

Thus an historical event is a past human action or activity and as such is not an object of direct observation - partly because it is past and partly because the intention it expresses must be arrived at by inference rather than by observation, and perceived through one's imagination. In this sense, facts of history differ from those of chemistry, for example. They cannot be presented for direct inspection and examination.

The question arises as to whether the historian has a special way of viewing past human activity or whether his is the only way and thus any past human activity could be regarded as an historical fact. Other studies of past human events, for example, political science and economics, are not necessarily historical treatments of the past. These disciplines require a classification of events into groups or classes, in which the particular event is less than its whole aspect.

Historians claim that this is not their characteristic interest in past events. In history, classes of events are not the special interest, but rather the uniqueness of each individual event. The concern of the historian is to establish where an event differs from anything else, before or since, rather than how it resembles other events. To dra legitimate parallels between events is regarded as a superficial assessment only, as events may be similar but never identical. And upon examination, it is the very distinct nature of events, and their relation to various other associated events, that lies at the centre of historical explanation. Is this sufficient to distinguish historical knowledge from other forms of knowledge?

Professor Oakeshott maintains that the ordinary man usually regards events, such as the Budget or developments in Mozambique, in the light of how they affect him personally. This implies an involved rather than a detached attitude. This is true too of the attitude of

people of the past. Thus to try to recapture their thoughts and reactions, is to recreate a product of an involved attitude. Further, one may view events of the past in the light of their effect on us in the present. The latter Oakeshott regards as unhistorical because it lacks detachment and objectivity.[14]

The scientific school of historiography favoured the view of 'history for its own sake', regardless of any relevance to the present. Facts mattered for their own sake, and (as one critic put it) "all facts are born free and equal", so the whole of the past mattered for its own sake, and to introduce any criterion of later contemporary relevance was to fall into anachronism, like the schoolboy who said that the French spent the eighteenth century getting ready to have the French Revolution.'[15]

It would seem reasonable that living in the present one should have an interest in the past as it affects us in the present, as a means of learning from mistakes and understanding the origins of contemporary issues. Thus, while detachment may be regarded as a characteristic of good and scholarly historical writing and study, it does not follow that a study of history is of no practical use in the present.

German philosophers of the late nineteenth century were the first to challenge the doctrine of the primacy and autonomy of facts in history. Critics of the positivist school maintained that facts needed to be interpreted. This would involve the personality of the historian and thus the present be brought to bear on the past. It is impossible in the final analysis to think or feel about events of the past, exactly as men of the particular age did. Moreover, all events are seen in the light of knowing what eventually transpired. This movement spread to Italy where Benedetto Croce stated that the historians main function was to evaluate rather than to record, and posed the question of how a historian could know what was worth recording unless he evaluated it.[16] By the beginning of the twentieth century, this standpoint had spread to France and Britain and had an important influence on the British philosopher and historian, Collingwood.

Collingwood maintained that the philosophy of history is concerned with the interrelationships between the past and the historian's thought about it - not with either of these in isolation. The reconstruction of the past by the historian, is dependent upon empirical evidence. However, the process of reconstitution is not an objective one and involves the selection and interpretation of facts. Thus, according to Collingwood, facts never exist in a 'pure' form. As they come to us through the mind of the recorder, our concern should be with the historian who established the facts, as well as with the information itself. Secondly, to fulfil such a task the historian requires imaginative understanding into the minds of the people with whom he is dealing. Modern men who have experienced life in a very different mental, moral and physical millet from the Victorian era, would have to rely on their imaginative powers to understand events of that time. Finally, the past it would seem can only be viewed through the eyes of the present and the historian is bound in a sense to his own age. An example of this can be found in the words that he uses. Words such as 'democracy', 'empire', 'war' have contemporary connotations from which, according to Collingwood, he cannot separate them. The historian who selects and interprets events of the human past, belongs essentially to the present.[17]

This view of history holds certain dangers. One is that, in emphasizing the role of the historian in the making of history, this could rule out the possibility of any objectivity in history at all. Thomson states that while the historian must adopt a scholarly approach and is bound by the professional techniques of the discipline, finally he chooses the theme, assesses the relationships between events and makes all decisions about the truth as he sees it.[18] A theory which claims that history is virtually created in the historian's mind,is as untenable as the view that history is an impersonal emanation from compiling masses of disconnected facts. While interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, it does not follow logically that any one interpretation is as good as another. There are commonly held standards of scholarship which determine what can be regarded as 'good' or 'bad' history.

A second danger in Collingwood's hypothesis is the suggestion that the historian necessarily looks at a period of history in the light of his own times and further studies past problems to understand those of the present. The historian has to evaluate the past by trying to understand events in the context of the values, society, and pressures of that period. For a true understanding of history it is necessary to immerse oneself in the past. Such an attempt can be partially, though not wholly, successful. Moreover, it is pragmatic to accept as a criterion for the right interpretation, its suitability to some present purpose. To link the present closely with the past and to explore the past with only the present in mind and for the benefit of the present, incurs certain dangers. If these dangers are exposed and one is made aware of them, they are lessened. One may approach the past with some aspects of the present in mind, without oversimplifying the historical process by looking selectively for contributions to, for example, the political progress in the present. The present is logically the outcome of the past, even though history did not happen specifically to produce the present. This does not validate the common assumption that the only connection between the past and the present is that the past is the origin of the present. One can conceive of other relations between the past and the present. For example, the seventeenth century could be contrasted to the present. Moreover, history is not studied specifically to understand the present and to show how it developed. This would make it difficult to see the real past, as it would be a selected past, namely, that which constitutes the roots of the twentieth century.

Thus three typical features of historical events may be noted. In addition to saying that they are concerned with the human past one may say:- they cannot be observed or inspected directly; as history claims to be an independent body of knowledge obtained by standard methods of scholarly research and argument, it is knowledge studied in detachment and the historian is concerned with the uniqueness of each event.

A search for the truth in the debate on the nature of history is essentially an inquiry into the relationship between historical

evidence and historical facts or events, and between both of these and historical thinking.

We have seen that while historical facts have their origin in sources, no source speaks for itself. Each has to be evaluated and interpreted. One of the highly specialized and technical aspects of the historian's craft, is to reconstruct the human event of the past in history and this is the fact of history. Documents, for example, have to be assessed and interpreted. This may involve straightforward tasks such as determining their authenticity, who produced them, where and why he did so, as part of a general discovery of all that would make it valuable and significant as a source of information about the past. Thus historical evidence is only transformed into historical facts via the human element. This does not imply that they are entirely the construction of the historian s mind. To establish firm facts about the past requires above all, a trained critical faculty and an ability to assess evidence. The role of the historian in establishing the facts of history from historical evidence, makes the scientific view of history seem unrealistic. The very facts which they hope to accumulate, require the skill of the historian to establish them from the evidence. This view is supported by Burston,[19] Carr[20] and Thomson[21], amongst others.

Carr adds a further dimension to the analysis of historical facts. He maintains that the acceptance of a mere fact of the past as a historical fact, turns on a question of interpretation Thus a fact which is considered worthy of mention by a historian and whose interpretation of it as such is supported by other historians as valid and significant, may become a historical fact.[22] Elton finds such a view unacceptable. He maintains that the occurrence of an event makes it a fact even if it is not known to a historian or used by him. If it can be known, that is all that is required to make it an historical fact. Neither interpretation nor general acceptance affects its existence. He regards this as important in refuting the theory that history is what historians write. While historical interpretation and judgement are legitimate activities, the historian's assessment does not affect the independent reality of the event.[23] That there are many unknown facts is not disputed. However, whether one accepts that there are unknown historical facts rests on one's acknowledgement or

otherwise, of the role of the historian as a necessary condition of establishing historical facts from historical evidence.

The debate between Carr and Elton is extended to the question of validity of sources and the possibility of objectivity in historical evidence and facts. Carr points out that recorded facts of ancient and medieval times for instance, are defective not so much because of the gaps in information, but rather because that which exists is generally the picture formed by a small group. For example, in Ancient Greece, fifth century, a small group in the city of Athens was responsible for recording events. During medieval times, the monks were primarily concerned with such a task. Thus our picture of the past is based on information which is pre-selected and predetermined for us by people with a particular view, who thought that the facts supporting that view, were worth preserving.[24] This would obviously not apply to evidence such as pieces of pottery and buildings, but the greater part of our evidence is in the form of written records. 'The history we read', writes Professor Barraclough, 'though based on facts is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgements'.[25] This view is not entirely satisfactory, for reasons which will become apparent in the discussion of the question of objectivity in history.

The position of the modern historian has been affected, states Carr, by the view of the nineteenth and early twentieth century historians, who produced a mass of dry histories which were merely an accumulation of hard facts meant to be the basis of history and believed to speak for themselves. This was linked to an emphasis on documents in support of their facts. No insight was shown into the reality that documents, as they are written by human beings, fundamentally portray what the writer thought had happened, would happen or even what he wanted readers to think he thought - not necessarily to deceive historians, but rather contemporaries.[26]

Elton maintains that one of the most important tasks of the researcher in his attempt to establish reliable information, is to distinguish between evidence produced selfconsciously, for the attention of others, and that produced in the normal run of events.

The latter is only valuable if the historian can establish that it was not produced to deceive someone else.[27] Thus, while documents are essential to historians, they do not constitute historical facts. Such a source only has significance for the study of history after historians have worked on it and deciphered it.

An example of this in South African history, comes to mind. Piet Retief's Manefesto, published in the Grahamstown Journal 1837, is often quoted and presented as an able summary of the reasons why the Trekkers left the Cape. For the Positivists, the establishment of this as a genuine document, would be sufficient reason to present it as embodying the established and 'objective' facts which account for the Trek. Surely the role of the historian is to assess it critically. This could bring to the fore that Piet Retief was one of the more sophisticated members of the Trekkers. As a participant in the movement he was far from objective, and may well have been trying to present the case of the Trekkers in the most favourable light possible - or to justify their actions. Such skepticism may lead the historian to pose certain questions and to compare the document with other records, such as private diaries which were not written self-consciously for publication. He could seek contradictions and use further sources, in his search for the truth. A more thorough examination of the Manefest raise certain doubts as to its value as a true exposition of es of the Trek. Thus the validity of accumulating and presenting sources as such, as a collection of objective and reliable facts, is questionable.

Elton expresses faith that the historian, trained to a critical skepticism is generally able to detect the bias of his sources. Moreover, he assumes that there is usually a rational explanation for any event and that this can be discovered. For these reasons he refutes the skepticism shown by many. '...a great deal of history, simple and basic as well as more complex, is knowable and known beyond the doubt of anyone qualified to judge. In another very large sector, the proper techniques of the trained professional established further secure knowledge.'[28] On the problem of the historian's involvement, by selection and assessment of facts, being a denial of the existence

of an ultimate standard, independent of the historian, Elton states that no absolute standard can exist. However, he qualifies this ... 'but once again it must be added that the trained and experienced mind comes so close to one that on the, as it were, Newtonian level of the universe historical truth is ascertainable.'[29]

Thus Elton, while he acknowledges the role of the historian in establishing historical facts and recognizes the potential obstacles to objectivity, has such faith in the scholarly ability and honesty of the historian that he regards it as within the realms of possibility to establish historical truth analagous to that of scientific truth. This seems to imply that 'ultimate' history can be written. This cannot be the case. Changing modes of thought in the contemporary world affect the way in which we view past events, what is to be regarded as important and what is not. True, in addition to subsequent developments and further evidence, leads to a reassessment and a modification of past histories. This does not necessarily mean that older works are less reliable or scholarly, but rather that they are restricted by the intellectual limits of the age in which they were written and the information available then. Thus there will always be new histories written. This does not necessarily limit historical scholarship, as long as the work remains true to the nature of historical thinking, which, I have asserted, is an evolving process.

The relationship between historical evidence and historical facts can be seen to be dependent on the historian, as well as the evidence, though historical facts are not the creation of his mind. There are certain principles of historical scholarship to be conformed to. Possibly the relationship between the historian and his facts can be described as follows. In his role of establishing historical facts from historical evidence, it is the historian's duty to see that his facts are accurate. However, this is only one aspect of his task. He must use all known or knowable, relevant facts in his assessment. This in no way implies that interpretation must be eliminated from his study. Neither the extreme view of history as a compilation of facts nor the theory of history as a creation of the

historian's mind, carries weight on its own. Some balance must be achieved. The process of thinking and writing in history involves an interaction between moulding of facts to interpretation and interpretation to facts. One may view these processes as equally important. The historian may initially select facts and interpret them. This interpretation he holds with an open mind. In the process of working with his facts and interpretation, modification of both takes place. In this way he hopes to progress from one hypothesis to another. There is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts.[30] Historical thinking may be characterized in this instance, as that of the historian interacting with the evidence, and historical facts which emerge, in a way particular to the discipline.

3. EXPLANATION IN HISTORY

The problems of explanation, and of causation and consequences, remain the most profound which any historian has to tackle. The core of historical thinking is the question of explanation in history. This process involves the problem of relationships between events and is one by which the historian explains why and how events happened.

The significance of explanation in the study of history dates as far back as Herodotus, the father of history. In the opening of his work, he defined his purpose as: to preserve a knowledge of the deeds of the Greeks and the barbarians, 'and in particular, beyond everything else, to give the cause of their fighting one another.'[31] Although this view was not held consistently thereafter, in the eighteenth century when the foundations of modern historiography were being laid, Montesquieu in his 'Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Rise and Decline', took as his starting point the principles that 'there are general causes, moral or physical, which operate in every monarchy, raise it, maintain it, or overthrow it' and that 'all that occurs is subject to these causes'.[32] Since then, historians and philosophers of history have attempted to organize past human activity by discovering the causes of historical events.

(a) The Pattern of Historical Explanations

The question arises as to whether there is a general pattern of explanation which is typical of historical explanations and characteristic of historical thinking. Philosophers have put forward three theories of the current nature of explanation in history. Firstly there are those who maintain that the historian's concern with the uniqueness of events preclude any grouping or associating of events. Secondly, exactly the opposite theory is put forward - that while the historian maintains that he is giving an individual explanation of the uniqueness of an event, he does so by unconscious reference to general or 'covering' laws. Thirdly, a group of thinkers maintain that limited numbers of events are grouped by the historian if they can be viewed as part of the same movement or policy.

The first theory is associated with the idealist philosophers such as Collingwood and Oakeshott. It would seem logical that if historians claim to be elucidating the uniqueness of an event, their explanation of each event must also be in unique terms. Professor Oakeshott has written that a historian 'accounts for change by means of a full account of change'.[33] This implies that a full narrative account of the change which produced the event, is required rather than the 'causes' in the usual sense of the word. No single factor or group of factors can properly be designated a 'cause'. I shall discuss this point in detail later. For the idealists, no revolution, for example, can be explained in terms of general characteristics of revolutions. Statements such as the fact that the political conditions in pre-revolutionary Russia 1917 would make peaceful change unlikely, may seem sound but would be regarded as unhistorical by the idealist philosophers.

The second view is associated with a group including Sir Karl Popper, Professor G.C. Hempel and Mr Patrick Gardiner. It states that historical explanations are made by referring to covering laws. They would regard a study of the revolution in Russia 1917, in which questions were posed first about the nature of revolutions, as quite

proper. They maintain that that is what historians do implicitly. The view is popularly held by philosophers and has certain points in its favour. For example, there are many things which one can say about revolutions in general which, when applied to the explanation of a particular revolution, could prove a useful guide to knowing what to look for.

Marxist theory stresses the role of economic factors in society, in influencing and determining the forms and behaviour of the political organization[34]. With this hypothesis in mind, historians have found new evidence. That is, they have found new evidence under the guidance of general laws in political, social and economic theory. The covering law theorists maintain that historians always work with a hypothesis in mind and that the same hypothesis determines the historian's explanation of what he finds. This does not allow for the fact that the historian, as distinct from the propagandist, will be forced to modify his hypothesis or postulate an alternative, in the light of the evidence.

The third theory of historical explanation is stated by Professor W.H. Walsh. He maintains that historical events are concerned with human actions and this behaviour is to be explained essentially in terms of the intentions or motives behind it. A single intention or policy may be expressed in a series of actions. Should two or more events be inspired by the same intentions, it is possible to associate them. Thus the historian may begin his explanation of an event by saying that it is to be seen as part of a general movement which was taking place at the time.[35]

For example, Napoleon's Russian Campaign 1812, might be explained initially with reference to his general policy of enforcing the Continental System and reference may be made to other attempts to enforce the system, for instance the Peninsular War. This would serve to make the individual action more intelligible. Similarly, the revolution in France 1848 may be grouped with revolutions elsewhere in Europe in 1848, and with nationalist movements in Europe 1820 and 1830. The grouping of events under appropriate movements is known as 'colligation'.

In assessing these three theories, the first question which arises is whether they are in fact as mutually exclusive as their adherents may claim. In considering the two extremes, namely the unique explanation of a unique event and an explanation which is dependent on general laws, one could say that it would seem possible for an historian to use general laws, without this being a denial of his intention to establish something other than a general law. General laws of many sciences may be used to establish something unique. For example, the general principles of engineering may be employed in the building of a bridge which is unique. The use of general laws as hypotheses does not imply that the unique characteristics of an event could not be sought and a unique explanation be given. Much seems to depend on the purpose in using these general laws. For example, one may examine a particular revolution in the light of the general characteristics of revolutions, with the purpose of establishing the extent to which it was unique, and thus identifying it.

If the covering-law theory is regarded as a full account of historical explanation, then the historian must proceed as the scientist does. Then any exception to the general law is a matter of major significance. It may be sufficient to overthrow the law, unless special circumstances can be ascribed to account for the exception. This is the most significant weakness of the covering-law theory.

There is a tendency to deny the historian's dependency on general laws. However, it is argued that history as a type of thought, makes use of psychological laws of behavio r and sociological laws concerned with groups - for example, population laws. This argument does not imply that it is the historian's purpose to prove or disprove any law, establish new ones or overthrow old ones and least of all that he should be concerned that a particular general law does not assist in explaining a particular event. The latter is the vital difference in procedure between the historian and the scientist. Do historians in fact make use of general views of human

nature in explaining particular events? If so, it would imply the use of covering laws in explanation. Burston compares the historian's interpretation of people's motives to that of a court procedure in England, where the prosecution is required to establish that an illegal action was not only committed but intended. He cites three differences in the task of the historian in trying to establish an unobservable intention or motive in human actions. Firstly, the historian is under no compulsion to arrive at a conclusive decision, he may present possible hypotheses and conclude that he does not know. Secondly, the historian's concern is not with the specialized circumstances of a suspected crime but with human nature in general. Finally, the historians study allows him a fuller knowledge of the character and previous career of the person. If he is faced with two contradictory statements on an event, his decision as to where the truth lies will depend partly on his knowledge of the characters. This implies that usually in history, we take people as we find them and general views of human nature do not play a significant role in our interpretation.[36]

However, commonsense determines that unless he ignores situations or aspects thereof, which have repeated themselves, part of an historian's explanation may be in terms of covering laws, even if this is not the main part or the typical pattern of historical explanations. It would seem unreasonable to explain all aspects of the French Revolution except the fact that it was a revolution and, by implication, the aspects which it has in common with other revolutions. Thus covering laws may provide a basis for formulating hypotheses to aid the explanation of a particular event. They are not the principles of historical explanation.

Holloway quotes examples from the writings of established academic historians, to indicate that historians do give explanations in terms of generalizations. Three of his examples are cited here:

> (2) If it is conceded that George III came to the throne with some vague ideas of 'policy' a comparison shows that these were the ideas of his father and grandfather, the typical policies of Leicester House.[37]

> (3) Since 1867 the importance of the individual Member of Parliament has declined.
>
> 38

> (7) There is still no substitute for human company, and people will find human company in towns as long as they seek it there: that has always been the town's greatest attraction.
>
> 39

Holloway comments that the first passage quoted (2) is significant as the historian goes out of his way to emphasize parallels, rather than the individuality of the persons, ideas or events. Number (3) is a generalization asserting the existence of a trend or tendency. Finally, number (7) he regards as such a sweeping statement that it may even be difficult to say what it means or validate it.[40]

His assessment of these statements is sound, and that some historians use or are primarily interested in generalizations, is not contested. However, the question arises as to whether we would call such explanations true to the nature of historical explanations - and be justified in saying that they constitute historical thinking. Further, his generalization that historians 'are not primarily interested in uniqueness and particularity',[41] cannot stand on the basis of a few examples, simply because they are taken from writings of reputable historians. One may quote instances where this does not hold true. Two such examples are:

> (1) Yet it cannot be denied that the nations of Europe and the Americas were swept, from about 1770 onwards, by a series of revolutions which all have something in common, at least in their basic ideas. The trouble is that they operated in such different societies that Palmer's attempt to write their history as that of a single revolution cannot do other than effect a distortion of their separate histories.
>
> 42

> (2) Most of the Voortrekkers were derived from the Colonial Trekker community of semi-nomadic pastoral farmers (pp.208-13). It was their trekboer mode of life that made it possible for them to become Voortrekkers. ... Nevertheless, the Voortrekkers were

> a new and distinct phenomenon. The Trekboer movement was ... an unco-ordinated movement of families and small family groups, who had no overwhelming grievances against the Cape Government ... On the other hand, the Great Trek was an organized migration of several thousand people. Above all, the Voortrekkers were determined to become a 'free and independent people' in a 'free and independent state'.
> 43

Cobban's account (1) speaks for itself, as an attempt to invalidate a theory which explains the revolutions in Europe and America in terms of general laws, without recognizing their unique aspects. Thompson (2) makes a clear distinction between the trekboer movement and the Great Trek. He recognizes the ways in which they are connected and proceeds to indicate how they differ, to make the point that the Great Trek was not merely a continuation of the trekboer movement.

These two examples may serve as a counter to Holloway's categorical assertion that historians are not primarily interested in the uniqueness of events, despite their claims to the contrary. However, in the final analysis so small a sample is no more reliable than the material which he cited as the basis for his premise.

The alternative to the covering-law theory of historical explanations is that of a unique explanation of a unique event. This theory requires qualification. Were an event truly unique in every respect, it would not be possible to recognize it, know it or describe it. We know things in terms of our experience and describe them in terms of similar things, the latter often as a means of perceiving their uniqueness. The language one uses to communicate an explanation, would appear to involve words which refer implicitly to similarities between the particular event and others. Carr maintains that the very use of language commits the historian to generalization. A war of ancient times was very different from a war of the twentieth century, and both were in essence unique. Yet the historian refers to them both as wars, even if he proceeds to elucidate their differences.[44] Perry's reply to this assertion

would be to the effect that the historian does use general terms freely. He cites 'revolution' as an example, but the same would hold true for 'war'. While using such terms, the historian is enquiring into how a particular war is dissimilar to all other wars. Any general meaning, such as 'violent conflict' is only a class name, but does not itself explain or justify anything.[45] Other 'classificatory' generalizations which are built into the historical language are verbs such as 'to colonize' and 'to annexe'. It is a necessary condition of doing history to be able to understand such concepts and use these terms. Carr's point would seem valid. However one proceeds to use such a term, it is initially a general concept, and it is only our common use of concepts and language that makes it possible for us to communicate on anything other than a rudimentary level.

It would seem not only possible for an historian to note what an event has in common with other events, while remaining intent on explaining it in terms of its uniqueness, but a necessary step, initially, to demonstrating its particularity. This would imply that the historian's task is to explain the whole event, in terms of both its unique aspects, which it necessarily has and those in which it was not unique. If this interpretation of the historian's role is valid, then the covering-law theory and theory of the uniqueness of events are not mutually exclusive accounts of the nature of historical explanations, and each contains a measure of truth.

The third theory, that of Professor Walsh, is essentially one of how events are associated together. Thus some principle of generalization is involved and in regard to any particular event, some abstraction. It is significant that this is a different kind of generalization from that involved in the covering-law theory. According to Professor Walsh, the historian does not make 'open-class' generalizations, which refer to all events and can be invalidated by producing one exception within the class. He does make closed class generalizations - that is, limited to a particular group of events. Thus it is not sufficient to demonstrate that there has been generalization and abstraction in historical explanations.

One must distinguish which type of generalization has been used, to establish whether or not covering law techniques of explanation are involved.[46]

The account given by Professor Walsh approximates most closely to the actual practice of historians. While the historian is concerned primarily with the individuality of events, he invariably does demonstrate general lines of policy which affect more than one event. This grouping is in terms of events which express similar intentions, designs or purposes. The association helps to illuminate them. Professor Walsh has not suggested that the process of colligation of events is the whole task of the historian in explaining any given event, but only part of it. Unique aspects of the event are the focus of the study.

One may add that the process of generalizing is in itself an act of abstraction. One abstracts all the similar features from explanations of a series of events. The rest is omitted. It is this omission which renders colligation an incomplete explanation of any event. Moreover, it can never be the explanation of the individuality of an event. Thus while the effects of Ordinance Fifty (1828) may be seen as contributing to the dissatisfaction of the farmers on the Eastern Frontier, this leaves unexplained the full nature and significance of the event - that is, the passing of Ordinance Fifty.

Similarly, abstraction is in one sense of the word, bound to generalizations. This is because most events are the activity of groups of people, rather than individuals. However, the event is not described in terms of each individual's actions. Generalizations are made about the motives, intentions and actions of every individual who took part. For example, one may say something like, 'The Prussian forces fought well'. This is not an account of each soldier's actions, but a general statement about the performance of the group as a whole. It would seem that some form of generalization occurs in history, whenever we go beyond the purposes and actions of one man. Even in describing the actions of one man, generalizations are made. We do not describe in minute detail what he does or each intention implied by each of his actions, we generalize and hypothesize here as

well. However, all such generalizations must follow the facts; the generalization is not imposed upon them. The generalizations may be sound, even if exceptions exist, as long as they are true in the main and not held rigidly.

Perry describes the process of historical explanations as the following:Historians start by considering ways in which an event to be explained, forms part of a class of events. Some attempt may be made to cover all the hypotheses, conventions, laws and generalizations under which an event can be classified. They then proceed to discard systematically all generalizations, in their search for the uniqueness of the event. They may allow that an event is in part, a type. However, various laws are used as part of a process and are not necessarily part of the end-product.[47] To include an event in many generalizations and then point out how it does not fit them perfectly, is to identify it very specifically and as a whole.

(b) Causation in History

Is a historical explanation always causal? Carr maintains that the historian always asks the question, 'why?'.[48] However, some writers speak of 'explanation', 'interpretation' or 'the logic of events', rather than use the word 'cause' The causal approach is rejected by some, in favour of the functional approach, that is, 'how' it happened rather than 'why' it happened. The question 'what happened?' allows a number of relationships of which the causal relationship is only one.

Firstly, the problems which have arisen with the word 'cause' require investigation. They have resulted in much misunderstanding among philosophers of history. In science, if we say that A is a cause of B, we mean that if A is present, B must follow and that whenever B occurs, A must have preceded. This implies a recurrent situation. If philosophers accept the scientific meaning of the word 'cause' as the only intelligible meaning, this could account for the acceptance of the covering-law theory of historical explanation, by

some philosophers. It would follow that the historian's constant reference to causes implies the existence of some covering law and also of recurrent situations. Further, it would be logical and proper to talk of something being inevitable because of the presence of such a causal factor.

The idealists, such as Professor Oakeshott, deny that to talk of 'causes' is any part of the historian's task. Such a denial is based on the acceptance of the assumption that if causes are discussed, they must be meant in the scientific sense. Burston suggests that the term 'cause' may have a more general meaning than the scientific one. We speak of catching a cold because we got wet, without necessarily implying that whenever we get wet we shall inevitably catch a cold. Having caught a cold, we examine why and how this has happened. Such an inquiry into the particular causes of a particular event, is essentially a historical one.[49]

The first characteristic of the historian's approach to causation is that he deals in a multiplicity of causes, not one single cause. In considering the causes of a revolution, he may cite a random number of causes. This leads to another aspect of the debate on causation in history. The balance between seeing an event as part of a movement and in its own individual rights, raises an important problem. Is it part of the historian's task to distinguish between the fundamental and immediate causes of an event? The fundamental causes are those usually associated with the general movement; the immediate factors, those causes which explain the individual event, why it happened when it did - in essence, the factors precipitating the event. One could consider, for example, the 1830 Revolts in France. The fundamental causes are those associated with the national crises in Europe at the time, the immediate causes include the accession to the throne in 1824 of the Ultra-Royalist King Charles X, a censorship of the press, monetary compensation to nobles for losses of land, appointment of an Ultra-Royalist Prime Minister and the Ordinance of St Cloud issued 1830.

If one accepts that one can speak of real or fundamental causes, this seems to imply that the event, or something similar, would have happened at some time, if not at that particular moment. Such an hypothesis would be considered unhistorical by Professor Oakeshott. To imply that something was inevitable is to move towards the 'might have been'. He maintains that the historian is concerned with what did in fact happen, not what might have happened. He would also probably accept the corollary that no single cause was more significant than another. A full account of the causes will be embodied in a full account of the context in which the event took place. The idealist, insistent on the uniqueness of the event, regards the word 'cause' as misplaced, in dealing with historical thinking and explanation.[50] Further, to create some hierarchy of causes, seeing some as part of a general movement, is to deny the essential uniqueness of the event.

If we accept that the term 'cause' may be used in a general, rather than scientific sense, we do not mean by 'causes' in history what a scientist means when using the word. We can then talk quite acceptably of causes, and of fundamental and immediate causes, without necessarily asserting that an event was inevitable. Carr maintains that 'The true historian, confronted with this list of causes of his own compilation, would feel a professional compulsion to reduce it to order, to establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to one another, perhaps to decide which cause or which category of causes should be regarded 'in the last resort' or 'in the final analysis' (favourite phrases of historians) as the ultimate cause, the cause of all causes.[51]

Basically the issue is not one of the 'historian's compulsion' but comes down to an earlier one: whether the historian is concerned only with the uniqueness of an event, or with the whole event, of which some aspects are necessarily unique. If he is concerned with the whole event, he will wish to ascribe a variety of causes and to distinguish fundamental from more immediate factors. Moreover, part of his task would seem to be to evaluate the relative importance of different factors in producing an event. If one considers the reasons why the Frankfurt Assembly failed to establish a united Germany in 1848, it is of significance that Frederick William IV refused the crown of such a

union. However, it can hardly be regarded as a major cause, when compared to other obstacles in the way of German unification - such as the dilemma over the inclusion of the Austrian Germans. For an understanding of this event, a necessary part of the explanation must be the relative importance of different factors. Bu-ston states, 'I should therefore deny that in asserting that any factor was the real and fundamental cause of an event, I am asserting that it was inevitable.'[52] Possibly the most one could ascribe to an assertion on the fundamental causes of an event, is that unless circumstances changed, the event or something similar, seemed inevitable.[53] When assessing an event as a whole and in its unique aspects, there would seem nothing contradictory or unhistorical in distinguishing between fundamental and immediate c

The question of causation and its possible link with inevitability, is related to the debate on determinism. A full exposition of this subject would be necessary to discuss its role in history. This cannot be undertaken in a dissertation of this nature. Thus some mention of the debate will be made, though it will be based on tentative assumptions of what determinism may be.

Carr holds determinism to be 'the belief that everything that happened has a cause or causes, and could not have happened differently unless something in the cause or causes had also been different.'[54] Our understanding of human behaviour in ordinary life is surely based on the assumption that everything has a cause and that in principle these causes are ascertainable. J. Rueff suggests that the Law of Causality, far from being imposed upon us by the world is possibly the easiest way of adapting ourselves to the world.[55]

The philosophies of Hegel and Marx, for example, were considered determinist and have been criticized strongly since the 1930's. Amongst such critics were Professor Karl Popper and Sir Isaiah Berlin. The latter found the philosophies of Hegel and Marx objectionable, on the grounds that explanations of human actions in causal terms, imply a denial of free will. These motives are regarded as external forces acting on the will. His followers point also to the role of

accident in history. There is no reason to suppose that one has to choose between determinism and moral responsibility. All human actions may be both free and determined, in the sense of having causes.[56]

The historian, like the ordinary man, may believe that human actions have causes which can be ascertained. If he believes this and regards it as his special function to investigate these causes, it does not follow that he rejects the concept of free will - unless he believed that voluntary actions have no cause, which is untenable. There is no contradiction in saying that voluntary actions have causes, in addition to being free. In assessing Hitler's actions in Germany and in world affairs in the 1930's, one may elucidate a number of factors which can be regarded as some of the causes of these actions. This does not imply that the events were inevitable or that one thereby justifies them. In fact A.J.P. Taylor's interpretation of Hitler as, virtually, the victim of circumstances, has been severely criticized by academic historians.[57] If there are instances where historians speak of an occurrence as 'inevitable', they usually mean, and it would be more accurate to say, 'extremely probable'. One can only say that something was inevitable in history, in the formal sense that, for it to have happened differently, the antecedent events would have had to be different.

Another aspect of determinism is the isolation of one aspect of the whole event and belief that this determines all else. An example of this is the 'materialist conception of history'. The doctrine has developed mainly from the work of Karl Marx. He states, 'The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness.'[58] The doctrine has come to be held as the view that the economic structure of society determines the laws, ideas and religious beliefs of society, although Marx uses the word 'conditions', rather than 'determines'. This has enabled Engels to write that neither he nor Marx

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asserted that the economic element was the only determining one, but rather that which, in the final analysis, determined history. Thus it is not entirely legitimate to interpret Marxism as the embodiment of the materialist or determinist view of historical causation. The latter was propounded more thoroughly by his contemporary, Ludwig Feuerbach.

Of necessity, as the historian can only work with a limited number of factors, his procedure involves the isolation and identification of some specified causes. This can result in the distortion of events through the exaggeration of some events and neglect of others. Part of the historian's skill lies in his ability to preserve the balance between various elements, in his search for the truth. If a number of aspects are isolated and examined systematically, with the intention of investigating and, if necessary, eliminating various possible modes of inquiry, this would be a valid way of proceeding with historical research. However, to isolate one strand from the whole process of historical change, consciously, and present it as the determinant of the whole pattern, is not a search for the truth and can hardly be part of the historical attitude.

A further source of conflict in causation is the theory that history is largely a chapter of accidents. A series of events is determined by chance coincidences and attributable to very casual and often trivial causes. This has been dubbed the 'Cleopatra's Nose' theory of history: Had Cleopatra's nose been ugly, Anthony would not ha have been infatuated by her beauty and the outcome of the Battle of Actium would have been different.[59]

Carr suggests that the recent widespread emphasis on the role of chance in history is due partly to the uncertainty which set in during the twentieth century and became marked after 1914. When historical events do not seem to favour a nation, theorists stress the role of chance or accident in history. 'The view that examination results are all a lottery will always be popular among those who have been placed in the third class'.[60] This may throw light on the reasons for the theory's popularity but does not dispose of it.

The role of chance in history exists but is exaggerated by those who are interested to stress its importance. These so-called accidents in history represent, in a sense, a separate sequence of cause and effect, one which interrupts the sequence with which the historian is primarily concerned. They do not serve to deny the existence of causes in history. Cleopatra's beauty was itself a cause of Anthony's infatuation. To explain historical events in terms of chance is to oversimplify and give a superficial explanation of a complex process. The shape of Cleopatra's nose was a fact of history, an accident which modified the course of history in some way. However, in so far as it was accidental, it does not enter into any rational interpretation of history or into the historian's hierarchy of significant causes. Although it had results, it is irrelevant for the past and the present. Further, it makes no sense as a general proposition to say that generals lose battles because of their infatuation with beautiful queens. Historians are concerned with the interplay of a number of factors such as ideas, personality, conditions and events which can help to explain the process of historical change. The relative significance of one or more causes, is the essence of his interpretation.

In the final analysis, even if such an event could be interpreted as significant, it is pointless to speculate on the ways in which the course of history might have been different. If any significant element of history were different, it follows logically that nothing thereafter would have been quite the same. The possible interaction of all other elements in the situation is incalculable. Historians are concerned with the truth about what did happen.

4. OBJECTIVITY

Earlier I have maintained that in history one cannot separate the historian from the discipline, as some philosophers of history have proposed. However, some clarification is required on the process of interaction and interrelationship between them, in order to establish what objectivity in history may mean. We have seen that

historical facts cannot be an objective body of knowledge. They are established by historians, who can only apply their scholarship to achieve a degree of objectivity. Thus, further discussion of objectivity in history is concerned with the relationship between the facts and the historian's interpretation thereof.

In rejecting the scientific theory of history, the relativists asserted three things of significance to the question of objectivity in history. Firstly, they maintained that one could not separate the historian from the establishment of historical facts. Secondly, they saw the role of the historian as one of selecting, arranging and interpreting facts, rather than merely recording them. Finally and most significant for this discussion, they maintained that the historian could not separate himself from his interpretation. Beard stated that the historian is not "a disembodied spirit", "a perfect and polished mind" but rather "a creature of time, place, circumstance, interests, predilections, culture".[61] Beard declared that,

"no historian can describe the past as it actually was ... every historian's work - that is, his selection of facts, his emphasis, his omissions, his organization, his method of presentation - bears a relation to his own personality and the age and circumstances in which he lives."[61]

Elton accepts this view largely. He sees as true, in the main, that what the historian is, affects his writing and that every generation rewrites history from its own point of view. He maintains that the historian's personality enables him to see the facts in a different light.[62] This standpoint, if taken to its logical conclusion does not allow for the influence of the facts on the historian and his interpretation. Nor does it allow for new evidence and subsequent developments of events, as factors necessitating the rewriting of history. While Elton adds that if it does not conform to rules of historical method, it is unacceptable, whether it is conscious or unconscious bias, this leaves us no clearer as to what these limitations on the historian are.

To say that a statement is biased, is to imply logically that the unbiased true statement is known and can be demonstrated. Only

under such circumstances can we maintain that bias exists. The ultimate example of conscious bias is the historian who deliberately sets out to construct an argument in line with his own prejudices. The most commonplace example of this, is propaganda inspired by national feelings. It is not bias to comment favourably on one's own country, if this assertion is true, according to the facts. Similarly, credit must be given to other countries when it is due.

The establishment of historical facts and historical explanations are concerned with the intentions and motives which inspired the event. Is there then a tendency to interpret one's own country in such a way that one's own motives appear more worthy than those of the foreigner? If it is not a true assessment of the foreigner, it usually involves a generalization, such as 'Germans are militaristic by nature'. The implications of such a statement would be carried over and prejudice our view of a particular event. That such judgements are made and that such history is written, cannot be disputed. What has to be established is whether this is unavoidably part of the nature of historical explanations. Thomson cites an example of national bias, the British and Spanish accounts of the Armada. 'If anyone doubts whether British accounts of the Armada may not be entirely valid and true, let him look at Spanish accounts which make no mention of Sir Francis Drake and sometimes none of the English, but make much of the untimely storm.' [63] Thus, merely through selection, omission and emphasis, bias can be effective. A point of interest which emerges, is that Thomson himself seems to suggest that the establishment of bias in Spanish accounts should cancel out or justify any doubts about the validity of English writings on the Armada, although they are separate issues and may both be wanting.

Some important historical events breed their own form of prejudice and bias. French historians may differ in many ways but, in the main, agree that 'contemporary history' dates from 1789 and that the revolution was a major landmark in the history of modern Europe. Gaetano Salvemini has pointed out that they tend to personify the Revolution and speak of 'it' as having proclaimed the

Rights of Man, for instance. Professor Alfred Cobban in his 'Myth of the French Revolution' has raised the question of whether 'it' ever happened and if so, exactly when it began and ended and what in fact 'it' had accomplished. He challenged the concept that change necessarily implies progress and the belief in this instance that the Revolution was a triumph for the middle classes rather than the conservative landowning classes, large and small. If the latter is valid, the Revolution can be seen as contributing to the economic backwardness of France in the nineteenth century, rather than her progress. [64]

Thus bias results not only from the conscious or unconscious selection and omission of data, frequently in line with national prejudices, but also because generalizations are made about the nature and consequences of major events, in an oversimplified fashion. It is a difficult and complex task to formulate a seemingly simple yet safe generalization.

National feelings are only one type of emotion which can affect historical writing. The influence of any emotion or feeling on historical explanations may be said to indicate prejudice. One must refine this statement. There are circumstances which make it acceptable to decide an issue on the basis of prejudice. If, for example, I am to work with someone, it is relevant to my decision to appoint someone I personally like. Naturally this is not an historical decision. However, the significance of prejudice is not just the influence of certain attitudes on our judgements and thus, discussion but rather the influence of irrelevant emotion on our thinking. Personal self interest or national loyalty would constitute examples of emotions irrelevant to our thinking in history - or possibly, one could say that the absence of such influences is relevant and necessary to our search for the truth. The essence of the historical attitude is to be on the alert for such errors and determined to avoid or eradicate them.

This brings us to the question of whether objectivity in historical interpretation is possible, and for some, whether it is even desirable. Elton maintains that 'historians' personalities

and private views are a fact of life, like the weather[65] and are not worth the amount of concern given them as they cannot be eliminated. He states further that they should not be eliminated. He maintains that the historian who believes that he has removed himself from his work is not only wrong but has probably produced something dull rather than unbiased. While we would not support a conscious effort at bias, Elton sees no special need for the historian (to) consciously try to remove himself from his writing. He views the historian's intellect as more significant.[66]

Thomson agrees that the historian's person is inevitably projected into his work. He maintains that it is false to believe that behind all biased historical writing lies the possibility of a completely objective version. The historian chooses his theme, method of approach and such like in accordance with his own outlook, interests and circumstances. Thomson differs from Elton on the important point of what the historian should aim at. He states, 'If prejudice is inevitable, and if it comes from "the spirit of the age" as well as from more individual inclinations, it should perhaps be welcomed and made use of ... The battle against his own prejudices can be invigorating for the historian, and an aid to him in his battle to find the truth.'[67] Unlike Elton, Thomson believes that the historian in his search for the truth, should attempt to overcome the influence which his prejudices may have on his writing.

If one accepts that objectivity in history is a worthwhile and intrinsic aim of the discipline and that even if in the final analysis, the historian may not be able to'get away from himself', he should attempt to overcome the obstacles in the way of impartial judgement, the question arises as to how this could be achieved - and what would constitute such objectivity.

The attitude that 'there is always a lot to be said on both sides' and so 'the truth must lie somewhere midway between the two extremes' is an escape, says Thomson. Dr Kitson Clark regards such an attitude as intellectual cowardice.[68] Surely this is a confusion of the terms 'objectivity' and 'middle path'. It may be said that

truth does not lie at either extreme, without this necessarily implying that it lies in the middle. If, for instance, one assesses the actions of statesmen prior to the outbreak of a war and tries to assess where responsibility for the war lies, one may recognize actions or errors, on both sides, which contributed to the conflict. It does not follow that when weighing the situation in the balance, one will find them equal. Responsibility may be assigned in different ways and to different degrees, for events which transpired. Similarly in an assessment of the Great Trek, one may say that it is viewed at the one extreme with high emotion, as the attempts of a nation to gain its independence from an oppressive government and, at the other extreme, is viewed with bitter criticism. The truth surely lies at neither extreme. Credit can be given for the physical hardships faced and overcome by the Trekkers. On the other hand, it did not result in the establishment of a just and stable society. Is such an assessment an instance of 'intellectual cowardice' or a 'middle road' because an attempt is made to acknowledge both sides? This would seem a more real attempt to see the historical event as a whole.

These examples bring to the fore the need for the historian to have some standard of significance[69] and some definition of what yardsticks he is using in his interpretation. While it is necessary for him to think 'freely' in assessing accepted truths, for that thinking to be effective, it must submit to the limitations imposed by the principles of historical method. The standard of significance employed by the historian is his standard of objectivity too and enables him to differentiate between the significant and accidental in his assessment of the relevant facts. Naturally such an assessment is made with reference to the end in view, the specific question the historian has set himself the task of answering. The relativist theory that one interpretation is as good as another or that every interpretation can be said to be true in its own time and place, is unacceptable. There are limitations placed on the historian if it can be said that he is in fact, 'doing history'.

The concept of absolute truth is not appropriate to the discipline of history. As the situation evolves, so subsequent events may throw a different light on events and interpretations of the past. The historian who criticizes the work of a colleague seldom rejects it as entirely false but rather as inadequate, misleading or possibly one-sided. The simplest historical statements only may be validated as absolutely true or false. If there is no absolute truth of the past, what is meant by praising a historian for practising his craft well, or being more objective than another?

Clearly, we are not simply commending him for getting his facts right. We are saying something about his selection of facts and how he arranges them in terms of relevance to the topic. This is the same as saying that he has applied the right standard of significance. To achieve the degree of objectivity required for scholarly historical writing, a historian must be able to rise above the limitations placed on him by his own situation in society and in history. To do so would require in the first instance, the recognition of his involvement and the ways in which it could affect his interpretation. With this insight and conscious effort, the problem could be overcome to some extent, though realistically, total objectivity would remain beyond his reach.

This is in no way an attempt to support Acton's view of 'ultimate history'. Historical interpretation is an evolutionary process. The greatest advances in knowledge and understanding come from continual intellectual questioning of even the best established wisdom, as long as adequate facts and logical argument are used successfully. However, the work of some historians may be considered more worthwhile than that of others, in terms of being more true to the nature of the discipline. On these grounds they may also have more of this objective quality and prove more durable. Thus, while total objectivity in history may be unattainable, there are means of striving towards this goal. Indeed Marc Bloch may be accurate in referring to the historian's task as a craft.[70]

A further question in the debate on objectivity relates to that of moral judgements. Can such judgements be regarded as a facet of

historical thinking? Professor Butterfield is possibly the staunchest proponent of the view that it is not the role of the historian to make moral judgements and that to allow them to enter into his interpretation, is contrary to historical inquiry. He acknowledges that such judgements are found in historical writing and regards them as harmless, as long as they do not form an integral part of the interpretation. The most significant argument given by those who hold this attitude, is that it is impossible to reach agreement on what standards should be applied for such judgements. The criteria for moral judgements would seem relative to the historian, rather than the discipline.[71]

It is clear that moral judgements are employed by reputable historians. The following examples serve to illustrate the point.

1) Janssens and de Mist recognized the inadequacy of institutions at Cape Town. Their reforms of the High Court were of capital importance. By making it independent of the executive and making a seat on the bench dependent upon thorough legal training they laid the basis for the especially brilliant role which the judiciary has played in South African history.[72]

2) But it meant much that the Hottentots were brought inside the law, however heartless that law might be.[73] (on Caledon's Code of 1809)

3) Their egalitarian sentiment certainly made them blind if not indifferent, to the effects of their success upon the mind of a people in whom social habits and religious conviction were so fused that to attack the one was to offend the other. ... Posterity rightly acclaimed Ordinance 50 as a liberal and constructive measure ...[74]
(on the philanthropists and Ordinance Fifty)

4) For I think that at the back of all his twists and turns, all his ups and downs, he held close in his mind and warm in his heart the will to be great and the wish to do good: and that he must be judged, if at all, by the ends he tried to win more than by the means he took to win them ... by the love of his friends, the faith he shared with the crowd, and the care he showed for the poor. By these he should he judged, not by the wrong ways in which, now and then, he tried to win his ends[75] (on Louis Napoleon III)

While there is little controversy that such attitudes do impede objective interpretations of past events, it is clearly difficult to eradicate them. One problem lies in the language used by historians. Although certain terms may be regarded as embodying historical concepts, history does not have a language separate from that in use everyday. One uses historical terms but one does not write in 'historical language'. How could one describe past human activity appropriately, in a neutral, technical language? 'Linguistic analysis substantiates the view that many ordinary words which we use descriptively carry also an evaluative and a moral meaning'.[76] Some examples of political labels include: 'conservative', 'radical', 'fascist', 'liberty', 'wise statesmanship' and 'devious negotiations'. While the historian may not be making moral judgements consciously, the moral implication is included in the use of such words and phrases. Thus it seems that it would be difficult to remove moral evaluation from historical writing when ordinary language is used.

A further contention is that in his explanation and interpretation, the historian selects what he judges to be the relevant causes of events. In so doing, he may make value judgements and sometimes moral judgements. An answer to this is possibly the same as to the general problems of objectivity. The historian must be aware of these dangers and as such, attempt to overcome them. This may be easier to apply in his explanation than in his use of language. In his attempt to overcome the problem, the historian has to have some idea of what he is trying to attain. A distinction is drawn between propaganda and reasonable assessment. This debate revolves essentially around judgements, which would indicate that there are general criteria for settling such disputes.

Some of the criteria are the following:
Firstly, in every aspect of history, assessments must be related to evidence. Moral judgements are an addition, often irrelevant, to the facts. Secondly, clear personal bias in moral judgements would make the judgement unacceptable. It may be judgement without evidence or prior to examining the evidence. A third point is that the situation and what was possible at the time of the event, must influence the

assessment. Finally, the question has arisen as to whether historians judge past actions in relation to the standards of the past or the present. Clearly the historian's judgement can only be fair if it is related to the values of the period, the context of the actual situation and its possibilities. This would be in keeping with the historical attitude that the historian should immerse himself in the past, to understand it. A judgement which meets all these criteria will still include the basic outlook and principles of the historian. He is required to rise above the purely personal. If one allows for moral judgements in history, they must at least conform to the criteria mentioned above.

Thus while total objectivity in history may be unattainable, there are means of striving towards this goal. Whether conscious or unconscious, bias cannot be regarded as merely inevitable. A search for objectivity in history is intrinsic to the nature of the discipline.

5. HISTORY AND THE FUTURE

The positivists, led by Auguste Comte, believed that the principles and methods of scientific investigation should be applied to all branches of knowledge. Like Marx, they divided history into phases, each denoting 'progress' over those preceding and all eventuating in social harmony. Thus the element of prediction of the future was included in such philosophies of history. A definite direction, sometimes destination, for the movements of historical change was postulated. These patterns were apparently deduced logically from insights gained in their study of the past.

Any connection which may exist between the past and the future does not imply that education in history should include training in soothesaying. Professional historians made no such claim to a prophecizing function in history. This was made by some philosophers. The 'historical attitude' to such claims is sceptical, as they presuppose the ability to foretell what combinations of circumstances will next occur and the consequences which will follow. It is a

difficult task to assess accurately significant factors which led to past events and exactly what resulted from them. How much more difficult it is, to deal with the undefined future.

6. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

The suggestion that the historian is involved with the past and future as well as the past and present, leads to a consideration of contemporary history - its nature and its place, if any, in traditional history.

Contemporary history is not a development of the twentieth century. Herodotus, Thucydides and Julius Caesar all wrote the history of their respective times. In the sense of the term meaning a historian who records the events of his own time, they can be regarded as contemporary historians. However, since the 1930's, more attention has been riveted on contemporary history than ever before. This study is often linked with world history. The Depression of 1929-32 affected men on every continent. It emphasized, as had the First World War, the growing interdependence of mankind. This awareness was heightened by the Second World War. Attempts at international co-operation, in the form of the League of Nations and its associated organizations after 1919, and United Nations 1945, were a manefestation of this realization.

Moreover, a new attitude to world problems is developing. Until 1914, for example, it was believed that objective economic laws determined the economy of men and nations. Since the Depression, the study of economics has changed. Slumps and unemployment are regarded as man-made and some governments claim to know how to control or correct them. The attitude has changed from one of laissez-faire to one of planning. Similar processes are taking place in other fields.

Men have now come to see further uses in historical study. There is the desire for greater knowledge about the nature of modern society, about other nations and international relations, in a wider

sense than previous study of formal diplomacy and war. A firm basis of intelligent understanding and knowledge of recent events is regarded as a prerequisite for political decisions. The emergence during the twentieth century of the Asiatic powers as world powers, the newly independent African States and changing balance of power since the Second World War, has accentuated the global aspect of international relations and increased the sense of urgency in studying contemporary history as a means of dealing effectively with the present.

In clarifying the nature of contemporary history and the respects in which it may differ from traditional history, one is in essence inquiring into whether historical thinking and the principles of historical scholarship can be applied in the writing and studying of contemporary history.

Firstly, there is the question of definition. Can one define where traditional history ends and contemporary history begins? Some may define it as the point at which present problems first developed. More commonly, it is regarded as the period through which the historian has lived. One may thus regard the meaning of the term as having some flexibility. For the purposes of discussion the more usual definition will be used. Contemporary history will be regarded as the recording by historians of a period through which they have lived, rather than, as in traditional history, the recreation of a past beyond living memory, which can only be imagined rather than recalled. What remains an open question, is how far back one must go to explain this contemporary world, for such an explanation may clearly lie partly beyond the scope of living memory.

On this basis, two clear points of difference between contemporary and traditional history emerge. The historian of the past is in a position to write with some detachment from the events and he is able to write with hindsight, knowing what followed the events he is studying. A further difference is that of evidence.

The first criticism of the contemporary historian then, is that he lacks detachment. Some maintain that all historical writing is effected by the attitudes of the historian. Even if this is so, there is an aspect of detachment denied the contemporary historian, though not the traditional historian, in that the former is a participator rather than detached spectator, in events of which he is writing. Thus it is asserted that the contemporary historian will be especially prone to the influence of prejudice in different forms and it is more likely that bias will affect his writing. The problem then is one of prejudice as opposed to a greater degree of impartiality. One must examine the kinds of prejudice likely to affect someone writing of his own time, and assess their significance.

The first point which requires clarification is that this is not part of the general discussion on objectivity in history. It can be assumed that any factors which may limit the historian's ability to formulate an objective account of history of the past, would apply to his account of contemporary history. We are concerned here with any additional and distinctive ways in which the contemporary historian may be prone to partiality and prejudice.

Secondly, we must be clear on the meaning of the term 'prejudice' as it was asserted that the historian's lack of detachment automatically implied prejudice. In the general discussion of objectivity in history, it was maintained that prejudice manifested itself in the influence of attitudes, specifically those which reflect emotions such as national feelings, on a historian's judgement. It was stated further that, to achieve objectivity it was necessary for the historian to have an awareness of these obstacles and consciously apply himself to overcome them. Such a procedure would, theoretically, seem possible for both the contemporary and traditional historian.

When we say that the contemporary historian is not detached from his own age, this is a physical reality. He lives in that age and can recall personally the events which he discusses. To say that for this

reason he cannot be impartial is to infer more than lack of physical detachment, in the term 'detachment'. It then includes an attitude of mind. This is the crux of the matter, to what extent contemporary historians, as compared with historians of the past, can view their subject with a detached frame of mind.

Amongst the more important factors which could prove obstacles to an impartial study of the present, would be personal interest and group loyalty. Personal interest would be, for example, the support of a particular political party because its tax policy may favour one. This is the lesser 'evil', if only because it could be detected easily. The greater difficulty lies with political beliefs, irrationally held and not necessarily relevent to any explanation of current events. Group loyalty, such as national feelings, would colour almost any account of a recent international crisis and it would take some time for any participant to view such events from anything other than a national standpoint.

How does this compare with the historian of the past? The first source of bias mentioned, personal self interest, would hardly apply in the sense of the example given. One may, however, write to vindicate the reputation of someone in the past. Current political views, which may be influenced by self interest, could affect the writing of history of the past. Marxists, for example, hold a theory of social evolution on which they base explanations of the past and present, and predict the future. True historical scholarship rises above this kind of bias. Much the same may be said of the nationalist bias in history of the past. While such studies exist, the best historical scholarship is free of it.

In addition to examining the circumstances likely to colour one's vision, one must examine the circumstances which would motivate one to make a genuine effort to reach the truth. Such an inquiry reveals that there are strong incentives for the contemporary historian to avoid prejudice. Firstly, he is concerned to show that a study of the present can be impartial and scholarly, in order to have such history accepted as a serious body of knowledge. Moreover,

there is great enthusiasm to study the present as a guide to practical action. It is considered within one's interests to know precisely where the truth lies, for such a guide to be effective.

Historians of the past are equally motivated to achieve objectivity, so that their studies may withstand criticism on the basis of criteria for historical scholarship. Discussion and debate amongst historians presupposes a common set of standards as to what constitutes evidence, logical deduction and proof. Similar discussion takes place amongst serious scholars of contemporary history. This genuine search for the truth is indicative of the desire for objectivity in studying the past and the present.

A further criticism of contemporary historians which is related to detachment, is that of evidence. While the contemporary historian is witness to the events he assesses, the historian of the past is dependent on eye-witness accounts of others, which he subjects to critical and independent scrutiny. On the one hand the contemporary historian has the advantage of being in a position to experience and capture the public mood, without relying on his imagination. On the other hand, as he is a part of the experience, it is not possible for him to assess his recollections independently of them. Other accounts which exist and differ, may well be unacceptable to him, as he is likely to be convinced in his personal experience. However, the fact that he is, in a sense, writing to an informed audience may provide an incentive for him to validate his personal recollections as truly representative of the public mood.

Thus it would seem that the lack of detachment in the contemporary historian does not present insoluble problems or make objectivity unattainable, to the extent that it is attainable for any historian. While there are additional dangers of partiality in contemporary writing, there are also very real incentives to avoid them.

The second main criticism levelled against the contemporary historian is that, unlike the historian who writes of the past, he

cannot write with hindsight. The disadvantage of not knowing what follows the events he assesses, is present to a significant degree in all contemporary history. While something is known of the results of the Second World War, twenty-odd years are hardly sufficient to provide an historian's perspective.

In what ways is knowledge of subsequent developments significant in historical writing? If intentions and motives of statesmen, for example, are to be assessed, a deeper analysis can be made when the consequences of their actions are known. It is important to note, however, that it does not necessarily follow that purposes are fulfilled or all results, intended. In fact, knowledge of consequences can aid the historian most in providing a guide to the kinds of questions he should ask, in order to discover the real intentions behind the actions. For example, knowing the effects of the Ems telegram, one is prompted to initiate an inquiry into Bismarck's intentions in sending it.

Thus the historian's involvement in 'what' happened, is 'why' it happened. To what extent does he rely on knowledge of subsequent events for such an explanation? If he is explaining an event in its uniqueness only, this factor does not seem of great significance. However, in explanation by means of colligation and an assessment of the importance of an event, the traditional historian is very dependent on his knowledge of later events.

There seems little doubt that the contemporary history follows the same pattern of historical explanation as the traditional historian. While not many problems are encountered by him in elucidating an event in its uniqueness, when faced with the task of seeing an event as part of a movement, difficulties arise. Professor Walsh first put forward colligation of events as a typical historical procedure in explanation, and his illustration of this was from contemporary history, namely, the stages of Hitler's aggression before the war. Nevertheless, problems are encountered in such explanations. Contemporary historians tend to depend on general laws which are used, by implication, to predict.

A historian writing in 1936, who interpreted Hitler's invasion of the Rhineland as an early step in a consistent policy of aggression and expansion, would be seeing the event as associated with other events. He would be viewing it as part of a movement and as such, a prediction about future events is implied even if it is not stated. The kinds of questions asked are often of a type to which no certain answers can be given. Similar types of questions would not even be asked by historians of the past, as they would be in possession of such knowledge. Many of the questions are orientated to what will happen in the future. A contemporary historian may set himself the task of answering a question such as, 'Is Communism essentially the same wherever it may be found, and therefore may all communist countries be expected to develop along broadly the same lines? Or are local national differences of tradition and economy more potent forces which would predicate differing lines of development in different countries?'[77] It would seem that some assumptions about the future are required, if the present is to be understood and such a study used as a guide to action. That action is invariably taken with the future in mind. Not knowing the results of the events studied, the contemporary historian is forced to some extent to make conjectures about the future course of events, if an event is explained as part of a movement or policy, and associated by a colligatory process with other events, unless the historian is writing at the end of such a movement. That which he has to assume, for his explanation, is known to the traditional historian.

The second facet in which the historian of the past seems dependent on knowledge of subsequent developments, is an assessment of the importance of an event. As historians must select events in terms of significance, a value judgement is involved. The question arises as to whether the contemporary historian uses the same basis for his judgement, as the traditional historian. The latter tends to regard as important those events which have far-reaching or long-term effects and thus relies heavily on his knowledge of what followed them. This the contemporary historian is not in a position to do. Thus it seems inevitable that his judgements are dependent on a process of prediction. Should he cite Africa as a trouble centre of the world, he is referring to likely developments in the future. It is in the light of this hypo-

thesis that he selects his facts and assesses the importance of his events. The generalizations which he makes are criticized as not being true to the nature of historical thinking.

In the final analysis, Burston maintains that it would be true to say that in the main, the contemporary historian's explanations are based on assumptions about the future. These assumptions are hypotheses, they cannot be certainties. The contemporary historian can only make provisional judgements that an event is important and should be emphasized. Thus contemporary history is essentially provisional in character. As long as it is viewed as such, it has a real and distinctive contribution to make to our thinking.[78] Unlike other studies of contemporary events, such as politics, sociology and economics, contemporary history seeks an explanation of all aspects which caused the event to happen when and as it did.

7. ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY IN HISTORICAL THINKING

It was asserted initially that knowledge may be divided into fields of study and that the distinction between them lay fundamentally in the thinking and methodology which was characteristic of the discipline, rather than in the body of the information. Not everyone who writes about the human past, is an historian. Only if certain criteria are adhered to can this be said to be so. One such field which has had an impact on the study of history, is that of specialized economics. There are ways in which the study of economics may increase historical understanding.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, emphasis in history lay in constitutional and political events and interpretations of the past. In the development of economic history, difficulties are encountered in trying to transpose economic models on history. This accounts largely for the differences between the economic and general historians.

However, the influence of economic history on general history has been beneficial in at least three ways. Firstly, traditional historians were forced to reconsider their conventional interpretation

of history in almost purely political and constitutional terms. Evidence revealed that economic factors contributed to political conditions. For instance, it was argued that as a large number of the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were merchants, stockholders or speculators in land, their economic interests influenced their political attitudes. Their predilection for federalism could have been to ensure protection, by a strong central government, of their property rights. Similar questions were posed by British historians, in particular L.B. Namier. Eighteenth century England was re-examined in the light of who became members of parliament, what interests they shared a group and how personal interests affected political behaviour. This remains a valuable technique in the attempt to achieve fuller historical understanding.

The second effect of this increased concern with economic developments was that it modified the tendency of dividing history into fairly rigid periods. Economic developments could hardly be fitted chronologically, exactly into the same divisions as historical periods. Moreover, in economics there is less influence on exact dates, as the knowledge and effects of, for example, the invention of machinery, may only have significant practical implications some time after the specific date of invention. Similarly, in history causes and effects of an event are not necessarily confined to the specific date of the event. The more flexible time scale of economic history led to new lines of thought in political and constitutional history.

Finally, if used with discretion, the techniques and facilities of statisticians may be useful in establishing valid figures, counting and quantifying. This is made possible and worthwhile by the relatively recent methods of acquiring reliable statistics. To be of value to the historian, accuracy of the figures and facts alone is insufficient, the interpretation must be accurate too. With these provisos in mind, the historian can benefit from making realistic use of such data.

There are two significant areas of difference in the nature of explanation in history and economics. Firstly, the historian examines all aspects of the event and explains it as a whole; the economist singles out a particular aspect for explanation. Secondly, while the historian makes use of generalizations, his concern finally is with the uniqueness of an event. The economist seeks to establish general laws and explains events in terms of these laws. Thus history and economics may be mutually beneficial by suggesting new techniques, insights and approaches to fuller understanding of events, but each retains its distinct character.

Can the same statement be made of social history, in relation to sociology and history? It has been suggested by Holloway that 'Sociologist and historian must become one.'[79] By this he implies that historian and sociologist need to be trained personally in the other respective discipline, in order to do sociology or history truly effectively.

Historians employ their own vague social categories, such as 'peasants', 'workers', 'middle class', 'nobility'. Much of their thinking may have been bound to these imprecise categories. Sociologists in turn, had inadequate and rigid patterns of history, as part of their discipline. During the early twentieth century, sociology was not sufficiently established within itself, to be of real benefit to other disciplines. These factors were among many which made co-operation between history and sociology difficult. Moreover, the formulation of theories and the reliance on generalizations were regarded with suspicion by the historian.

When sociology developed along more empirical and experimental lines, although the gap between the disciplines may have widened, it was then regarded as potentially beneficial to a study of social history. For example, it was demonstrated that social information could be used skillfully to understand the behaviour of men in society. The importance of occupational groups was specially relevant to the writers of social history.

Nevertheless, many historians do not readily accept the sociological approach. They are influenced not only by its early tendency

to vague pattern-making but also by the attempts of many social theorists to justify sociology's existence as a science. This has led to a search for certain basic laws. There seems no good reason to believe that knowledge of society can be integrated in terms of simple principles and laws, as can knowledge of nature and the universe. This is the most significant obstacle to worthwhile co-operation between sociologist and historian, in social history.

A further problem lies in the content of much of social history. To provide an account, such as G.M.Trevelyan's 'Illustrated English Social History', of the life and pursuits of society, seen from above, and try to imagine precisely what the masses did in any age, is to ask a question which available evidence is not equipped to answer.[80] Trevelyan in his introduction states, 'The generalizations which are the stock-in-trade of the social historian, must necessarily be based on a small number of particular instances, which are assumed to be typical, but which cannot be the whole of the complicated truth.'[81] A common alternative to Trevelyan's kind of social history was the description of everyday life - housing, furnishings, dress, amusements and such like. While this has a certain fascination and interest, it does not rank high in terms of intellectual content. Sociologists offer research in the form of public opinion polls, for example. While these have some value for the historian, he includes in his interpretation intangible elements which cannot be measured. Thus public opinion polls can never prove sufficient as an indication of social opinion. Patient and scholarly research of a more clearly defined nature, into distinct categories of people over a limited period, can provide new and worthwhile historical evidence. This is not to say that the nature and emphasis in historical scholarship has not been influenced in any way by these disciplines. In Africa, where there is a paucity of historical documents for the pre-history period, we are forced to use oral evidence, archaelogical remains and so on. As a result, a more flexible interdisciplinary approach to African History has emerged.

Much of the content aspect of history and sociology may overlap. Sociologists may trace the development of trade union movements throughout the world. This is a study of past human activity. However,

the sociologist would then proceed to extract the features common to each movement, in an attempt to formulate some generalizations. The historian on the other hand may start by explaining an event in general terms, but would proceed to identify it as a unique event.

Thus, as is true of economics, sociology has a contribution to make to historical understanding. However, the historians account is of the event as a whole, and includes an examination of political, economic and social factors, amongst others. An even more significant difference lies in the historian's concern with the uniqueness of an event, rather than the establishment of general laws.

In summary, the nature of history may be said to be distinguished by the modes of thought which characterize the discipline. Formal historical thinking implies particular ways of establishing, explaining and interpreting historical information. Secondary sources are established from evidence of past human activity, or primary sources, which the historian must recognize as relevant to history. Specific historical terms are included in this information and thinking in history implies the ability to understand and apply these terms, although in the main the historian makes use of ordinary language in his explanation. Explanation in history requires an appreciation of what the human past was like and an assessment of the causes and consequences of human actions. Both the general and the essentially unique aspects of an event are explained, and the historian must attempt to be impartial in his interpretation. Contemporary history and other disciplines have had an impact on the study of history but the latter especially remain distinct from traditional history, in certain significant respects.

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Chapter II

THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO HISTORY

It has been asserted that the development of historical thinking should be the aim of a study of history. In the previous chapter, an explanation of what is implied in thinking in history has been given. This raises the question of the extent to which it is possible to realize such an aim in studying history at school level. Is it realistic to attempt to initiate the growth of historical thinking in school children? Are there logical or psychological factors which would suggest that there are limitations in the situation, or that this is not possible at all?

An increasing amount of research is being done into how children think in history. It is directed, in particular at establishing whether there are sequential stages in the development of historical thinking, what the criteria of these stages may be and the approximate age at which each stage us reached. While this specialist field must be examined, it is necessary to consider briefly the research on which it is based. Questions arise as to the validity of this research, whether its findings can be applied legitimately to research into children's thinking in history and the extent to which the findings of the latter may be regarded as reliable.

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING

The basic contribution in the field of the development of children's thinking is the work of the Swiss psychologist, biologist and epistomologist, Jean Piaget. Since the 1920's he has investigated the processes involved in the thinking of children and adolescents. Piaget's early training as a biologist and zoologist is seen in his initial assumption that, at any level, development is a process of adaptation to the environment. This adaptation involves two inter-related processes viz., assimilation and accommodation. On a cognitive level, assimilation is 'taking in' information from the environment, without necessarily comprehending it. This explains why children who do not understand certain abstract concepts may 'know' them to repeat, yet not be able to

apply them intelligibly. Accommodation occurs when one's existing thinking skills grapple with the new data and are thus modified. The imbalance between one's thinking skills and the environment is called equilibration by Piaget.

Piaget found, generally, that children of the same age group tend to make the same mistakes. Moreover, certain types of thinking were characteristic of certain stages, each being progressively interdependent. He concluded that while the overall intelligence tested by I.Q. Tests is related to the quantitative measure of a child's intelligence, that is, bright or less bright and so on, there is a qualitative difference in intelligence. He put forward the controversial view that there are certain sequential stages of development in children's thinking.

While various sub-stages are described, only three main stages need be distinguished here, namely:

1. The pre-operational stage (until ± 7 years
2. The concrete operational stage (7 - 11 years)
3. The formal operational stage (11 years onwards)

The pre-operational stage is characterized initially by intuitive thinking. Concept formation does not occur until later, although conceptual development is taking place from about two years onwards. For example, while the child knows that the moon is round and that a ball is round, no concept of 'roundness' can be extracted and applied to new factors in the environment. Concepts are regarded as essentially mental constructs involving the establishment of higher order structures with perceptual and verbal elements. One cannot give a child a concept. He has to construct it himself, one can only aid its formation. Further, at the pre-operational stage, mental activity is unstable, fleeting and discontinuous. The child relies on perception of that which he sees immediately. His thinking is ego-centric, lacks organization and centres on one aspect of the situation at a time, which makes for an inability to handle a number of concepts at one time.

In summary, the child is not capable of systematic thinking, of making a connection between events in a logical and calculated manner. The solution to problems is largely intuitive as the child does not see individual stages as the interrelated parts of a whole situation, and relate one to the other. According to Piaget, this level of thinking

remains characteristic of children until about seven or eight years of age.

As a child's thinking develops to the stage of concrete operational thinking it is no longer dominated by perception. He learns ways of organizing the information that his environment gives him. His thinking is more stable and he has the ability to see flaws in his own arguments, to move mentally to someone else's standpoint and 'reversability' occurs. For example, if given a number of different shaped containers and two beakers of liquid,the same size and shape, he can now recognize that the liquid of the one, poured into a different looking container, remains the same amount of liquid. This brings out two important characteristics of operational thought. One is what Piaget terms 'reversability', that is, the child can trace his own thought patterns. In so doing, the quantities or numbers involved remain the same. This is called 'conservation'.

The child shows that he can classify material, that is, find a common criterion and select examples of it - select the same colour buttons, grade them in terms of size and so on. The mental processes of classifying and seriating are of prime importance in the handling of a great deal of material in various fields of knowledge. These processes are necessary for the making of generalizations The child can also recognize the idea of a hierarchy. This is not related to the concept of authority, here. One has, for instance, a hierarchy of delimited geographical areas in South Africa: the whole country, the provinces, the towns, the suburbs, and so on.

Speech is acquired at the pre-operational stage but much language is used intuitively without necessarily understanding the concepts underlying the verbal symbols. Concept terms are a necessary part of concept formation but are not sufficient. Adults often fail to realize that a child may use verbal terms without necessarily understanding them. Concepts which can be perceived directly, such as 'colour', are easier to grasp than 'kinship, for example. As more concept terms are acquired by the child and more mental processes develop,so he is able to handle information more effectively and this develops during the concrete operational stage.

Thinking at this stage has greater stability, is reversible, less egocentric, uses a variety of organizing principles, such as generalization.

However, thinking is limited to the immediate evidence available to solve the problem and is centred on the concrete world of sense experience. Reasoning is similarly limited to that which is available as first-hand experience and possibilities outside of that cannot be envisaged. While he can distinguish various categories, the child finds difficulty in combining categories and establishing possible relations between them. These difficulties, especially the problem of understanding concepts which are not observable directly, are very significant for history and will be dealt with later.

Formal operational thinking, which becomes increasingly common from twelve years onwards, implies formal logic. A number of processes absent at the previous stage, are evident. Reasoning goes beyond the immediate and concrete information available. Possibilities can be envisaged without direct physical handling of the information. The child can operate on propositions and abstractions for which there is no necessary physical counterpart. He is able to reflect critically on his own thought and reject or accept certain possibilities. He can formulate hypotheses make logical deductions and explain his systematic approach. This thinking can be seen as a detached and reflective process, free from centring. Many possible relationships can be postulated and any one feature can be compared with others, and the relationships between them envisaged.

The above analysis may be helpful when considering all aspects of the learning situation of the child,as long as one's conception of these stages is not over-rigid. In recognizing the differences in the nature of thinking at different stages,one can define objectives in teaching, plan a syllabus, prepare and conduct a lesson and assess the material and skills learnt, in terms of realistic expectations of the child.

Criticism has been levelled against Piaget's research. Hamlyn maintains that some conclusions reached by Piaget are a statement of the obvious (sequential development of thinking) and others deal with questions which, like the above, are a matter for philosophical rather than psychological concern (acquisition of concepts). He criticizes Piaget for his purely cognitive approach which fails to take into account the affective and attitudinal development and socio-cultural background of the child. Further, he suggests that Piaget's use of biological terms is confusing.

Briefly, Hamlyn states that questions such as what is meant by saying

that someone has learnt something, are logical rather than psyohological questions and the concepts involved require clarification. Learning a langauge or technique and more especially a discipline, involves knowledge and the acquisition of particular skills. This requires understanding and appreciation of the subject, its principles and their interrelations. That understanding presupposes the acquisition and use of concepts. This is furdamental to understanding a subject.

Hamlyn deals with two main points. One is that there is a tendency to regard the subjects into which knowledge is divided, as block entities. On this basis a subject is thought to exist independently and education is aimed at bringing the learner into confrontation with it. These erroneous assumptions give rise to the question of whether to concentrate on those parts of the subject which seem logically prior to others or those which are psychologically easiest to grasp. Hamlyn maintains that the question of what is easiest to grasp is a philosophical rather than a psychological question.

The second point is connected to the above. To say that understanding a subject implies that its principles are grasped, is not to say that a pupil is required to state relevant general propositions only. Unless the pupil can apply these principles, one cannot say that understanding has developed. To foster this understanding one would have to present pieces of information and refer to the principles. There is no value in concentrating on either information or principles, alone. It would seem that a balance is required between an understanding of principles in general and their application to particular cases. Would there be any value in presenting children with principles of set theory if they are unable to appreciate what it is for something to be set? This is relevant for any discussion of Piaget's stages, especially for the distinction between concrete and abstract operations.

Hamlyn discusses these two points in further detail. For the purpose of this discussion, I shall not elaborate on the question of regarding subjects as block entities or that of logical priority in a subject, which Hamlyn regects.[1] The rejection of logical priority, could lead one to conclude that only psychological structures are significant for learning. This would

imply that the educationalist should proceed by establishing, empirically, what the easiest parts are and start from there - on the assumption that no one can learn the difficult until the easy is mastered. Hamlyn suggests that such a deduction is too quick and that easiness and difficulty are not necessarily psychological questions. Individual differences and conditions conducive to learning are psychological matters. This is not as clearly true for the question of why one subject or part of a subject is more difficult than another. This may be accounted for by the fact that a subject is more abstract, demands a knowledge of skills, procedures or ways of thinking not demanded by another. Abstractness and complexity are very important. The generalization, that people find the abstract and complicated more difficult to understand than the specific, is not just a psychological generalization. Could a man find the abstract easier to grasp than the concrete, and the complicated easier than the simple? This would not make sense. Thus, what appears to be a psychological generalization, embodies a necessary truth. This, in turn, implies that abstractness and complexity are criteria of difficulty. One could then say, the more abstract the subject, the more difficult. If X is normally found more difficult than Y, it must be more abstract or complicated, depending on the kinds of difficulties reported. The word 'normally' means 'in normal conditions', as distinct from the word 'generally'. This idea of what is normal provides the link between what something is and how it appears to people. If it were possible to say that a man found the complicated more difficult than the simple, this would be a special case, reflecting certain qualities of mind. It would not be grounds for denying that the complicated is normally more difficult for people, than the simple. Thus complexity and abstractness are criteria of difficulty and that people find them difficult, is not just a psychological generalization.

This raises again the question of whether there are priorities in learning which are more than psychological concerns. They may be epistemological or logical questions. In the growth of knowledge, certain facts must be known, to understand others, and certain things done before others. A thorough knowledge and understanding of a subject and the relationships presupposed in it, is a prerequisite of such decisions. This is not a psychological matter. Hamlyn illustrates this with an example from Piaget's 'conservation studies' which are concerned with the child's

understanding of general principles such as conservation of matter, size and weight. Results of such studies indicate that children of a certain age do not always appreciate such principles and may apply them inconsistently. Moreover, they do not come to accept them all at the same time. Piaget's approach seems to be based on the expectation that they should do so. These studies may be said to be concerned with the child's understanding of elementary physics. Hamlyn suggests that the notions involved in these concepts, and relationships between them, are more complicated than others. For example, the notion of volume is more complicated than that of depth, as it introduces another dimension.

In addition, it is hardly surprising that children encounter difficulties at a certain stage of development, in seeing the liquid in the jar experiment,mentioned earlier in the work of Piaget. In both jars the object is the same; and yet it is different in terms of its depth.This raises a further point of criticism of Piaget's work. He has underemphasized the role of social influence in establishing the 'right' view of things. Similar factors apply to the role of language development. The ease with which the child may come to see the proper relationships between volume and depth, for instance, and the identity of the object, will depend on the extent to which he is subject to particular social influences and on his ability to formulate the relationships verbally.

Hamlyn's second main point is linked to what it is to have and to acquire a concept. The former has been explained as a knowledge of general principles and an ability to apply them in relevant instances. One does not acquire a concept by assessing a number of particular things and seeing what they have in common. This would imply a knowledge of the criteria one should look for. Thus, one may speak of applying concepts to things, rather than abstracting them from things. We have the concept when we are able to see a range of things as falling under the concept, and know what it is that makes them instances.

Mention has been made of the necessity to establish a balance between principles and instances. Piaget alludes to these points 'although in his case they receive a strange biological dress'.[2] He uses the notions of accommodation and assimilation, and the balance to be achieved between these processes. This implies that our knowledge of objects is determined partly by these objects and partly by how we regard them. This

can be equated with Hamlyn's statement about the relationship between concepts and instances. There are two ways in which Hamlyn regards the use of these biological ideas as misleading. Firstly, to suggest that perception and acquisition of knowledge generally involve accommodation and assimilation is to suggest that there is a mutual modification of subject and object. This may hold true for biology but there is not a reciprocal causal relationship between the concept and the object in the growth of knowledge. Secondly, this biological model suggests that a balance is to be attained between something about the individual, which is subjective, namely the concept - and something about the world, which is objective, namely the object. However, the individual does not decide what is to count as an instance. This is bound up with the general objective or intersubjective aspect of all knowledge. Thus one cannot view the growth of knowledge, as Piaget does, as being an interaction between individual and environment. Social, interpersonal factors have a role to play. This biological model further rules out the role of social factors in Piaget's concept of thought and undermines the objectivity of knowledge. Knowledge and concepts are social ideas and learning can only be seen from a social point of view.

Finally, as the concrete and particular is more obvious than the abstract and general, it is hardly surprising that Piaget's stage of concrete operations should precede that of abstract operations. The individuals experience is initially with the concrete. As experience widens and becomes more intersubjective, so it becomes more general and abstract. This would suggest not only an observable natural transition in the development of human thinking, but a necessary principle. If such development takes place at all, it can only be in that order, if normal human children are involved. This can be established by reflection on what one knows about the nature of human development and learning.

What does require empirical investigation, is the question of when the child passes from one general stage to another, whether children do so at more or less the same age and what effects different cultural and genetic backgrounds may have on the general development of children.[3]

Both Piaget and Hamlyn, by psychological and logical analyses, recognize the sequential development of thinking. Piaget has attempted to determine

the ages at which these stages may develop and the criteria of thinking at each stage. Research has been done into the development of thinking in history, based on Piaget's work. His research activities have come to focus increasingly on the growth of the child's understanding of the basic concepts of science, mathematics and similar disciplines. The question arises as to whether the conclusions of Piaget and his co-workers, based on largely physical and mathematical experiments, hold true for the discipline of history.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING IN HISTORY

Various experiments have been carried out in this field, on the assumption that there are different levels of conceptual development in thinking in history. Criteria, analagous to those used by Piaget, have been devised for use on historical material. Basically, the aims of research into the child's development of thinking in history have been twofold: Firstly, to establish whether stages of development in historical thinking can be traced and secondly, if this is the case,to try to establish the ages at which such development takes place. This has obvious implications for all aspects of teaching and testing in history.

(a) Research into General Aspects of Historical Thinking:

Professor E. A. Peel has drawn up criteria of thinking in history at different stages, to make possible an analysis of children's responses to historical material. Much of the work in the field has been based on his criteria and they include the following:-

Pre-occupational thinking: Answers may be tautological, illogical,are perceptually dominated, and show failure to grasp the essential features of the problem. There is little sense of cause and effect.

Concrete operational thinking: Some understanding is shown. A single plausible cause may be given. Events are related as described in the passage, with no reference to ideas and experience acquired beforehand.

Formal operational thinking: The growth of formal thought involves changes from partial and circumstantial observations to comprehensive judgement. When a person is capable of not only describing an event but also explaining it in terms of independent and pre-existing concepts, we may say that he understands it. Formal historical thinking includes the imagining of several possible explanations and the selection from these

of the right one or more, to account for a particular problem. This calls for evaluation of the possibilities against the information. Tentative hypotheses are set up, the appropriate ideas selected and those which are irrelevant, eliminated. Finally, deductive reasoning and inference from assumed hypotheses must be made in relation to the data of the problem.[4]

The following is an illustration of Peel's experimental work. Children of different ages were told the simple story of Alfred and the cakes, and then asked 'Could Alfred cook?'

Pre-operational thinking:

'Yes' (Why?) - 'Because he was king' (Can every king cook?)
'No' (Why could Alfred cook?) 'Because he could fight'

The response ignores the evidence in the passage and the conclusions are neither logical nor related.

Concrete operational thirking:

'I shouldn't think so - at least not very well. He didn't pay attention to the cakes. If he had been a cook he might have known they'd be done'.

This answer is based only on the evidence in the story and does not take into account any other possibilities. As he considers what may be expected of a good cook, he may be approaching the further stage of thinking.

Formal operational thinking:

'I don't know, because if anyone could cook and had something on his mind, he might still forget the cakes.'

Here the child considers a logical possibility not included in the evidence given and one which made it impossible for him to make a definite generalization.

Peel sees a significant development during adolescence from what he labels 'describer' to 'explainer' thinking. 'Describer' thinking implies that the child can relate parts of the problem or question to each other in such a way that the conclusion is dominated by the immediate data given. 'Explainer' thinking, however, involves the inclusion of knowledge outside of the immediate information, in solving

the problem. It involves deductive thinking. This distinction comes to the fore in the example given, of Alfred and the cakes, and is similar to Piaget's distinction between concrete and formal operational thinking.[5]

As long as they are not applied too rigidly , studies of the developing thought processes of children, in learning,provide a useful framework for the teacher in assessing the level of his pupil's thinking. There may be significant variations in the age at which pupils characteristically think at any particular level. Moreover, research into the development of thinking in history has indicated that there is a discrepancy between ages at which formal thinking in history develops,and those stated by Piaget.

R.N. Hallam has carried out studies based on Piaget's criteria, to assess the answers of 100 pupils aged 11 to 16 years, on three historical passages, namely: 'Mary Tudor', 'The Norman Conquest of England' and 'The Civil Wars in Ireland'.[6] These were selected from a number of historical passages, as the passages which gave a wide range of answers. Each pupil answered thirty questions in all, ten on each passage. All the answers on each passage were used in the main statistical analyses but Hallam quotes only the answers to individual questions.
From the investigation, two facts emerged. Firstly, the types of replies noted by Piaget in younger children were apparent in secondary school pupils' answers to questions on history. According to Piaget, these children, of 11 years and older, should have reached the level of formal operational thinking. The level of the children's reasoning was lower than expected and the concrete operational stage (beginning at 7 years, according to Piaget) was not reached until the chronological age of 12. Similarly, the formal operational stage was only reached at the chronological age of 16:2 to 16:6 years.

The following criteria and examples illustrate Hallam's assessment of the operational level of children's answers.[7]

At the pre-operational level children's responses were characterized by not relating the question to the information provided, isolated centring on one feature only and moving from one element to another, without considering all the factors involved. An illustration of this is a child's answer to the question 'Was William a cruel man?' Influenced by a passing reference to the Domesday Survey, the child concluded that

William was a cruel man as 'it was twenty years before he sent around to see how the country was. Anyone who really cared for the country would have sent around before then '

At the concrete operational level of thinking, children were able to give an organized answer but it was limited to what was immediately apparent in the text. This stage was not reached until twelve years.

Formal operational thinking was reached when a child was able to realise a number of links, to envisage all possible explanations and establish their validity by logical analysis. Hypotheses were postulated and confirmed or negated by the data. For example, pupils who had read the passage on the Norman Conquest of England were asked the question, 'Was William a cruel man?' One pupil started his answer with an hypothesis: 'It depends what you call cruel. If the definition of cruel is to ...'[8] and was able to balance a number of variables in a historical context.

Ann Holding has initiated research into this field, in a South African context.[9] She used a sample group of 94 pupils from Roosevelt High School Johannesburg. Twenty pupils from Form I to IV and fourteen Form V pupils, ranging from 11 to 17 years, were tested. Two extracts,and questions relating to them, were presented to the group. The one was headed 'Archaeology in History', the other 'The Retief Massacre in Natal'. The findings,based on the latter, have been investigated. Examples of questions set on this include:-

1. Was Dingaan a cruel man?
   a) (i) Yes (ii) Why do you think this?
   b) (i) No (ii) Why do you think this?
   c) (i) I'm not sure (ii) Why not?
3. Why do you think Dingaan wanted to kill the boers?
4. Was it right to carry out such a drastic punishment?
   a) (i) Yes (ii) Why do you think this?
   b) (i) No (ii) Why do you think this?
   c) (i) I'm not sure. (ii) What makes you unsure?

5. Can you think of anything else he could have done?

(a) (i) Yes (ii) Such as?

(b) (i) No (ii) Why not?

(Numbers 4 and 5 were assessed together.)[10]

The answers were assessed according to Hallam's criteria.[11] A separate graph showing these assessments was plotted for each question. The pupils were divided into two groups, namely, 13.2 years to 15.5 years and 15.6 to 18.2 years. In the first group, many pupils were found to be at the pre-operational stage and others at the beginning of the concrete operational stage. In the second group, one quarter were found to be at the beginning of the concrete operational stage, one third at the middle of the concrete operational stage and one quarter at the upper stage of concrete operational thinking. So few had reached the formal operational level that they did not prove significant, statistically.[12]

In assessing these conclusions one must bear in mind that a relatively small sample, at one school only, was used. Thus the findings are related to a small group, probably from a limited socio-cultural section of the population. A further point is that the age groups were imposed on the findings, rather than deduced from them. This makes it difficult to say at what age concrete and formal operational thinking was reached.

With these limitations in mind, two observations may be made from these findings. It is clear from this study that operational thinking in history develops at a later age than Piaget's findings, from experiments using physical and mathematical material, would suggest. Moreover, while this can be held very tentatively only, it would appear that South African pupils reached these stages of operational thinking at a later age than pupils tested in England, for example. The work of Peel and Hallam, which has been investigated in this chapter may be referred to. Further investigations into the development of historical thinking in South African schoolchildren is an urgent research need.

The general conclusion of research into children's thinking in history is that a developmental sequence can be discerned, but it is significantly later emerging in history than in other areas. The substance of Peel and Hallam's findings is supported by S. Stones. While relying on Peel's criteria for evaluating answers, she used a method of testing similar

to William and concluded that abstract and explanatory thinking in history became characteristic only at the age of 15 years and above.[13] Further studies would seem to confirm these findings. Reasons for this discrepancy will be dealt with when research into the development of language and time concepts has been investigated.

(b) Language and the Development of Historical Thinking


The use of language and the understanding of terms, is a significant problem in studying history. There are specific historical terms, ranging from words such as 'serf' to more difficult abstractions, like 'feudalism'. Many terms, such as 'king' and 'church'are part of everyday language but may have a different connotation in a historical context. The meaning which words had in the past may have changed significantly over time and this could lead to confusion. As mentioned before, knowledge of verbal symbols used is not necessarily an indication that the corresponding concept has been assimilated fully.

Charlton carried out research into the misunderstanding of concepts. One hundred grammar school pupils, average age 14 years 10 months, were presented with thirty concepts which occurred frequently in their textbook. While more than 80% claimed to know the meanings, further examination revealed that meanings were often imperfectly understood.[14]

The conclusion that there is discrepancy between the findings of Piaget and those revealed by experiments on conceptual understanding, using historical material, is supported by Coltham's analysis of the understanding of historical terms. She selected six terms from history, namely, 'King', 'early man', 'invasion', 'ruler', 'trade' and 'subject' and presented them to junior pupils from 9 to 11 years (chronological age). The mental age ranged from 8 to 16 years and thus different levels of understanding, which related to Piaget's sequence of development, could be identified. The term 'King' was interpreted by children with a mental age of 12 as being related to pomp and ceremony. By 13 years 1 month, the association with power was established. Only at 16 years was it comprehended that there were kings who had little power and that their position could change with time. Coltham found that thinking at a pre-operational level predominated. Only two terms were described typically

at the concrete level. Concrete thinking was not typical of the 7 - 11 year group, as stated by Piaget.[15]

Wood, in research related to Piaget's stages, arrived at a similar general conclusion. He analysed the answers of some 1200 students aged from 8 to 21, to questions on specific concepts which involved a social relationship. These concepts included wages, rent, parliament and so on. The criterion of formal thinking was the ability to demonstrate an understanding of the essential relationships within the concept, that they were reciprocal and that they could be changed. For example, a full appreciation of the concept 'wages' would link 'wages' with 'employee', the latter with 'work', 'work' with 'employer' and the latter with 'wages'.



At junior school level (under 13 years), the characteristic response was a highly personalized and concrete one. On 'rent' for example, it was said that the rent woman came on Friday. Although the answers became progressively generalized as the age level increased, they were still perceptually dominated. At 15 years, the majority of responses were not classifiable as formal thought.[16] Thus, both Wood and Coltham conclude that, while the development of historical thinking follows Piaget's stages, the child's understanding of concepts in history develops more slowly.

A more recent study by De Silva examines the understanding of historical concepts. Five are from economic history (for example, 'depression' and 'taxation') and five from political history (for example, 'nationalism' and 'laissez faire'). These concepts were presented to children in a contextual setting through a passage and series of sentences, each of which gave a different aspect of the meaning. Responses were graded with reference to Peel's general categories of thinking. There was a progressive development to explanatory thinking, that is formal thinking, with age. Only at this final stage were the concepts fully understood. De Silva suggests that there is a significant dividing line in this respect between the ages of 14 and 15.[17]

Thus, 'research into children's conceptual understanding in history indicates that it is significantly limited until at least the fourth year of secondary school and possibly later.'[18] In the South African context, this would refer to children of approximately 17 years old.

(c) Time and the Development of Historical Thinking

A further area of significance in history teaching is how the child's concept of time relates to aspects of historical time. Most of the important work on this subject has been summarized by G. Jahoda.[19] He maintains that before 5 years the child is confused by time and space. 'The past is a mixture of isolated fact and fancy, dictated by the impulse of the moment ...'[20] rather than chronological sequence. At about 5 years the concepts of earlier and later events emerge, and the past can be structured into a succession of events. Further organization of thought depends on the understanding of conventional time divisions and develops later than the appropriate verbal symbols. Thus the words 'year', 'month', 'day' may be learnt long before they are understood.

This ordering of earlier and later events only stabilizes in the child at about the age of seven. There is general agreement that only at seven years does the child master basic temporal concepts, for example years and their sub-divisions, [illegible] and 'clock time'. Buck's studies, in particular, indicate a rel[illegible] between the intellectual level and the development of concepts [illegible]cluding temporal concepts.[21] A further consideration is the development of an understanding of number, for example 365 days in a year, a year is divided into 12 months, and so on. The ordering of events at 7 years is still dominated by direct experience and concrete illustrations.

One of the early studies into the difficulties encountered by children in acquiring conceptions of time and history, was that of Oakden and Sturt.[22] It was confirmed, in the main, twenty five years later by Bradley.[23] An illustration of their work is the following. Children were presented with the following problem: Robin Hood lived in 1187 (a) Would your mother be alive then? (b) Would your grandmother? On the basis of Bradley's criterion of 75 per cent success indicating reasonable grasp by any given age group, both researches concluded that (a) is not correctly understood before 7 years, and (b) not before nine years. No allowance was made for lucky guessing. 'It would appear

that children's time perspective before the age of about nine years is very shallow, becoming nebulous beyond the span of one or two generations. ... It was not until eleven that more than three-quarters of the children understood the basic implications of historical dates.[24]

Jahoda maintains that subsequent research in various countries has confirmed the main conclusions of Oakden and Sturt, 'in particular the view that somewhere around the age of eleven tends to be a turning point in the development of concepts of historical time; it is only after that age, for instance, that the past becomes differentiated into various historical periods'[25] (historical dates, periods, ages and so on).

Only 50% of 13 year olds tested showed an understanding of abstract time. Flickenger & Rehage support this in their summary of research available and suggest that full understanding of time words and dates is not reached until 16 years.[26]

Pistor's experiments suggest that an increase in historical understanding is not due to formal teaching only, but results more from mental maturation and increasing general experience, but 'in the absence of other confirmation, such a finding must be treated with some reservation.'[28] Vikainen taught a class of 11 year olds, giving a clear, chronological presentation of historical events. He also attempted to stimulate the children's interest in measuring historical time. Two classes acted as control. After a year the experimental group proved superior in their performance on problems involving time, memory and mathematical time conception. On the historical material, their average performance was slightly superior.[29] This indicates that one cannot deny the importance of teaching methods, in fostering a growth in historical understanding. it may be possible with the right methods for teachers to improve their pupils' understanding in history. This will be referred to later.

Thus, research into the child's understanding of abstract time suggests that it may develop fully, as late as 16 years. This seems to be linked to the findings of research into other areas of conceptual development in history. Furthermore, as is true of other relevant terms, words relating to time may be used, without this being an indication that the concepts implied are understood.

The distinctive nature of history has been clarified. From the research into the development of children's thinking in history, it would seem that history is a particularly difficulty discipline for pupils to master. Some account for the later development of historical thinking must be given.

Firstly, evidence of past human activity may be available for irspection, but the past itself is not. Past events have to be reconstructed from this evidence, by the historian. A significant difference between the material used in Piaget's experiments and historical material is that, in the former, the child is handling concrete materials. Because history is a study of the past and because of the abstract nature of its content, the latter cannot be perceived or experienced directly. Direct experience of material has been shown to be significant in the development of concrete, and thus formal, operational thinking.

A second difficulty lies in the fact that pupils are required to make assumptions about the intentions implied in actions. Intentions can never be observed directly and this creates difficulties of the nature described above. Moreover, history is concerned primarily with the actions of adults. In describing and explaining these actions, pupils are required to make assumptions about the intentions of the adults involved. This involves making fairly sophisticated judgements and presupposes some understanding of the adult mind. Such understanding is largely beyond their ability and experience.

Thirdly, history is a highly verbal discipline. Understanding and explanation in history imply a knowledge of historical terms. This in turn is dependent on the acquisition of certain concepts, which may only develop at a later stage. Notions of 'power', 'justice' and 'the state', for example, are both abstract and complex. Even some terms which seem to be within the pupil's vocabulary, are not very useful unless their meaning is extended. For instance, if 'law' is understood only in the context of 'you must obey the law', there is no reason to presume that a pupil would understand the concept of 'the rule of law'.

Moreover, the kind of language needed to handle the evidence is often of a propositional and deductive nature. Pupils are required to analyse, evaluate and synthesize the material. Such procedures involve highly developed thought processes which, together with the language used, are characteristic of formal operational thinking. This development, in turn, is linked to emotional, moral, socio-cultural and intellectual factors.

Finally, there is the question of time concepts. Children, as well as adults, face difficulties in understanding the vast scale which constitutes historical time. The notion of time is a mental concept which is naturally used as an organizing principle, in the study of the past. A problem arises because of the difference between our personal experience of time and our use of it to relate events which do not fall within that experience.

These particular difficulties are related to the nature of the discipline and may in part explain the latter development of historical thinking.

In summary, S.K. Stones concluded that in learning history children "exhibit levels of reasoning intuitive, concrete and formal, as described by Peel in his "Psychology of intelligence" and that these levels are exhibited in fairly well defined age ranges."[30] An investigation of general research in this area supports the above, while stressing that the age ranges differ from those stated by Piaget. The concrete and formal operational stages of thinking in history may develop as late as 13 years and 16 years, respectively, compared to Piaget's findings of 7 years and 11 years in his work based on physical and mathematical experiments.

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL THINKING

In assessing the significance of the research into children's thinking in history, one must bear in mind two important points raised by Donald Thompson.[31]

The first is concerned with its attachment to general structures of thinking, in particular those stated by Piaget, the second, with what it is actually testing. If one starts an inquiry with Piaget's pattern

of thinking, as described, and then applies it to historical material and evaluates the responses in terms of criteria applicable to the general pattern, one may be forcing the analysis of historical thinking into a framework which does not meet the particular requirements of the discipline. In some of the research mentioned above, the type of questions asked and criteria used to evaluate responses may be related to the general scheme of thinking rather than the special requirements of history.

A reliable test is essential, if such research is to prove valuable to educationalists. It is worth considering ways in which the problems mentioned above could be overcome and the outlines, given by Thompson, for a valid test of how children think in history. 'The first and vital stage in research into how children think in history should be a careful examination of what is meant by historical thinking.'[32] This should determine the kinds of tests which might be devised and they should cover a wide range of responses. The criteria of Piaget and Peel could provide a guide for analysing and classifying responses, in addition to criteria specifically related to history.

Thompson illustrates this point with an example from his own research. He states that one may assume that the ability to put oneself in the position of an individual, or groups, of the past, is accepted as an important general element in historical thinking. It is a means of understanding why people acted as they did. Children were presented with a brief background to William I's situation in 1086, followed by a slightly modified section of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which deals specifically with the Domesday Survey. The question, 'Why did William have the survey carried out?' was posed. To discover William's reasons, it is necessary to put oneself in his position. One can establish from the answers how well his position is understood and how this relates to inferring his motives. The wide range of answers obtained were classifiable as follows: misunderstanding or tautology; straight repetition of the information, rather than an attempt to say why William might want this information; motives were suggested although there was no given evidence for these, and a lack of an intelligent appreciation of his position was shown. The highest level of response considered why he might have wanted the information and

revealed a real understanding of his position. Such answers included the fact that he was a relatively new king, that he wanted to check that he was not being cheated of his full revenues and that he wanted to establish who the powerful men in the country were, in terms of how much land they owned. Thompsons analysis may be linked with Piaget and Peel's categories. Answers which merely stated the information which William sought, indicated concrete or describer thinking. Those which postulated his reasons for seeking the information, were regarded as thinking at a formal or explanatory level. These categories were helpful in devising criteria which, in the final analysis, had to be related to historical thinking, and in evaluating the extent to which the pupil was able to think himself into William's position and relate this to William's reasons for initiating the survey. Research of this nature may help to suggest the stage at which pupils are capable of undertaking this kind of imaginative, intellectual activity. An awareness of the level of understaking needed and the opportunities within the learning situation, would prove a useful guide to the teacher. Similar studies into all aspects of historical thinking would promote teaching which is appropriate to the child's level of understanding and may encourage its improvement.

Thompson's second point is concerned with whether the research findings indicate what the children have achieved, or what they are capable of. This raises the question of the extent to which teaching methods and the learning situation can influence the rate of intellectual development. The work of Vikainen has been mentioned in this regard. M. Stones has attempted to show the effect of different teaching methods on pupils' understanding. She used a unit of programmed instruction to teach the definitions of, and relationships between, the important concepts introduced in her historical material. This formed part of her research into the ability of adolescents to think in abstract terms about historical material. The level of her responses was significantly improved.[33] This suggests that thinking in history may be improved by relevant teaching methods. Inhelder and Piaget comment that the beginning of the formal stage 'may be, beyond the neurological factors, a product of a progressive acceleration of individual development under the influence of education'.[34] However, there are reservations as to the

advantages to be had in accelerating these stages beyond a certain measure.

There is a need for further research into the development of historical thinking. From the research which has been investigated, one may conclude that the ability of the pupil is so limited that it would be unrealistic to aim at developing historical thinking, at school level. However, as the field is relatively new, there is insufficient experimental work on which to base broad generalizations. Moreover, the only work which is related to South African conditions specifically, is the Topic Report submitted by Ann Holding.[35] The validity of Piaget's research, which is the foundation of research into the development of historical thinking, has been questioned and the limitations of its use for research on historical material, pointed out. Finally, it may be possible to improve the level of historical thinking gradually, by pertinent teaching methods.

These reservations lead one to conclude that the findings of research, into children's thinking in history, can be held tentatively only. Therefore one cannot accept as final, that approximately 13 and 16 years are the ages at which concrete and formal operational thinking, respectively, develop. Thus the basic objective of a study of history should be to develop gradually improving levels of historical thinking, determined finally by the limitations of the pupil.

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Chapter III

ASSESSMENT IN HISTORY

Assessment in history refers to procedures which measure the extent to which the objectives of history teaching have been attained. They are determined by one's objectives and the latter must be clarified initially, if one is to discuss the adequacy of different ways of assessment. It has been asserted that objectives for history teaching must not be reduced to mastery of content. The development of skills implied in historical thinking should be our primary concern. Linked to this objective in teaching, is the area of assessment. The criterion for progress in history should not be how much factual information has been absorbed, but rather the extent to which more developed levels of historical thinking have been achieved. Thus the internal and formal external examinations must be orientated to assess the pupil's progress in historical thinking.

A full inquiry into what would constitute a valid examination of thinking in history, would necessitate the investigation of a number of variables. This inquiry is concerned primarily with the nature of historical skills and abilities, and with questions which may be said to test such skills - and thus historical thinking. Other factors which require consideration, if one is to say that an examination is an adequate test of thinking in history, will be mentioned later.

A thorough understanding of the nature of the discipline is a prerequisite of formulating and conducting an examination in history. In a previous chapter an attempt has been made to analyse and clarify the criteria characteristic of historical thinking. Some awareness of the skills and abilities which are implied in such thinking would assist the examiner in formulating questions and assessing the answers given and, for the purposes of an inquiry such as this, assessing the validity of the questions as a test of historical thinking.

1. THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL SKILLS AND ABILITIES AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON QUESTIONS WHICH TEST SUCH SKILLS

While the field is still relatively new, attempts have been made to analyse the skills and abilities which constitute historical thinking. Jeanette Coltham, in 'Educational Objectives for the Study of History'[1] has included an analysis and explanation of these skills, amongst other objectives suggested for the teaching of history. It is significant to note that no single analysis necessarily includes all the skills implied in thinking in history. Moreover, while one can make tentative suggestions as to what historical thinking may consist in, this is not to deny that there may be some overlap between the categories stated. Thus one may say that the skills mentioned can be distinguished, rather than separated. Bearing in mind the limitations of such analyses, they may prove useful as a guide in the testing situation.

The following is a resume of the analysis of skills and abilities, based on the work of Jeanette Coltham, which was used in the investigation (See Appendix for detailed analysis).

A. SKILLS AND ABILITIES WHICH MAY BE SAID TO CONSTITUTE HISTORICAL THINKING

1. Vocabulary: As history is a highly verbal discipline an understanding of its terminology is essential.

2. Comprehension: The general understanding, on a fairly superficial basis, of new material, makes possible an indepth inquiry involving further skills and abilities.

3. Analysis: The whole is separated into its component parts. This makes possible an even deeper level of comprehension. Division of the material into its elements enables one to understand the particularity of the material and appraise it critically. Hypotheses may be set up as to the possible nature(s) of the component parts.

4. Extrapolation: That which is understood is used to formulate further possibilities, ideas or hypotheses arising out of the evidence, even if not present therein. For example, 'Knowing that this is so, it is possible that ...' This differs from sheer fantasizing as one has to be realistic and rational in suggesting possibilities and probabilities.

5. Synthesis: This literally means the building up of separate elements into a connected whole. It involves some form of organization based on decisions.

6. Judgement and Evaluation: This implies the use of a frame of reference; a conscious comparison is made between the features of the material and the criterion(a). In analysing material, judgements are made as to the relevance of material, its authenticity and the use of bias.

B. CERTAIN FURTHER SKILLS MAY BE NECESSARY IN APPLYING HISTORICAL THINKING UNDER EXAMINATION CONDITIONS

1. Memorization: The ability to memorize is necessary in most examination situations, unless the test is an open-book one. There are certain types of questions, even in the former type of examination, where the memory factor can be minimized; for example, presentation of material to be used, in the form of a diagram, map, interpretive passage, etc. While the ability to recall is not a special skill in thinking in history, it must be acknowledged that even in an open-book examination or interpretive exercise, some retention of information is necessary to apply skills involved in an in-depth study.

2. Reference Skills: These are needed for use, in particular though not exclusively on secondary source material. Historians rely largely on secondary sources, as do pupils, in reading around the topic to be explained. Their significance for a history examination would be indirect - Evidence of relevant extra reading and research would presuppose these skills. The latter facilitate explanation in history, rather than go to make up an intrinsic feature of thinking in the particular discipline.

3. Translation: This involves an extension of the comprehension of material by the translation of it from one form to another, for example, from a diagram or map into verbal material.

4. Communication Skills: The ability to communicate a product of historical study is necessary in almost all enterprises. For examination purposes, whether oral or written, this is essential. However, the skills involved are not peculiar to the products of historical study.

Three points should be mentioned. Firstly, the selection of relevant data is an important ability. It has not been mentioned separately, as it may be regarded as part of 'analysis'. Secondly, the information aspect of history is significant and may be considered an important objective in testing. However, it is not included in this analysis as it is not regarded as a skill or ability. Naturally the ability to analyse, synthesize and so on, implies knowledge of these skills. Thus all the skills and abilities in Coltham's analysis, in addition to information, are subsumed under the heading of knowledge. The concern of this analysis is with that aspect of knowledge which relates to the use of historical skills.

Thirdly, while the importance of the ability to project oneself into past situations is acknowledged by Coltham, art of historical imagination, she does not include it in her analysis of skills and abilities. An understanding of historical time and an ability to put oneself in the position of people in the past, are significant, although they have not been listed separately here. The former is implied to some extent in 'vocabulary', the correct use of words such as 'decade', 'era' and so on, and in a chronological account given in an explanation. The latter is implied in 'judgement and evaluation', assessing the actions of people in accordance with values and other aspects of the period under discussion.

It is often maintained, and with some justification, that the nature of the external examination determines the pattern of school examinations and the whole approach to teaching - particularly at the senior level. Thus not only is assessment linked to the objective of developing historical thinking, it can play a role in determining the fulfilment of such an objective. Primarily for these reasons, the external matriculation examinations were chosen as the basis of this inquiry.

An analysis of questions from external examination papers was undertaken in an attempt to clarify the extent to which the questions could be regarded as a test of historical skills. The material presented for analysis consisted of all the questions on the Joint Matriculation Board examination paper November/December 1973 and the essay questions on the Transvaal Education Department (U.E.C.) examination papers, December 1973. Further selected questions from the J.M.B. and T.E.D.

(U.E.C.) examination papers, 1970 to 1973 were submitted. (Appendix) While a full psychological investigation could not be undertaken in this dissertation, eight experienced history teachers assisted in the assessment, as a means of establishing conclusions based on some agreement. Included in this group were Professor A.N.Boyce (Rector of the Johannesburg College of Education) and Mr G. Viglieno (Senior Lecturer In History,Johannesburg College of Education,and J.M.B.examiner), both experts in the field. Each participant was provided with an analysis of skills and abilities based on the work of Jeanette Coltham, and the material mentioned. A grid on which the questions were to be listed and relevant skills to be indicated with a tick, was provided. Professor Boyce and Mr Viglieno found it necessary to devise a five-point scale on the basis of which they could indicate the extent to which each skill acknowledged,was tested by the question. A complete analysis of the quantitative findings, is included in the Appendix.

It may be valuable to point to a few examples which illustrate some interesting features which emerged from this analysis. For the purposes of discussion, 'agreement' will refer to four assessments, of thesix submitted on the J.M.B. and T.E.D. December 1973 questions, and five of the eight assessments on the selected questions. (Two participants did not submit assessments on the 1973 examination papers.)

a) There was no question on which all agreed on the skills which were being tested. Neither was there general agreement that any one question tested all the skills mentioned in the analysis. However, it was agreed that one question, No.11 alternative, J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1973, tested all the skills of historical thinking (A) and all other skills mentioned (B), except for reference skills which may be apparent in answers, rather than questions which are set specifically on the syllabus.

This question reads:-

> Study the following two cartoons carefully. They illustrate several important developments which occurred between South Africa and her neighbours.
>
> (a) Using the cartoons, state what developments they represent. (20)
>
> (b) Explain why these developments took place and indicate how successful the South African government's policy was. (50) (70

(See Appendix for cartoons in J.M.B. examination paper, page 9).
All agreed that the question was a test of vocabulary, comprehension, synthesis, memorization and communication skills; most agreed that analysis, extrapolation, judgement and evaluation and translation skills were tested.

b) Questions which tested five of the skills of historical thinking included:-

J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1973 - No.6 alternative, No.7 alternative, No.8 alternative, No.9, No.10, No.10 alternative, No.12, No.12 alternative.

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) General History Dec.1973: No. 5B

and further questions on the J.M.B. papers 1970-1972.

Two examples of these questions are:-

J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1971. No.5:

Pearl Harbour resolved in an hour the dilemma the American people had faced since 1939. Since 1939 the United States had been a limited belligerent, but the Rooseveltian policy of partial participation did not of itself lead to final involvement in the war. The United States, as in 1917, was neither forced nor manoeuvred into war, it entered the Second World War because it could not stay out. (The Growth of the U.S.A., Part 2 by L.B.Nye and J.E.Morpurgo)

(a) Explain the dilemma of the American people in 1939. (25)

(b) What was 'the Rooseveltian policy of partial participation? (30)

(c) Do you agree that the United States 'entered the Second World War because it could not stay out'? (15) (70)

It was agreed that this question tested vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation - and memorization and communication skills.

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) General History Dec.1973, No. 5B:

'The U.S.A. was forced into the First World War, but joined the Second World War of its own free will.'
Discuss this statement. (40)

The skills tested by this question were vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation - and memorization and communication skills.

There was only one question which, it was agreed, did not test any of the skills of historical thinking. This was question 8B, T.E.D.(U.E.C.) South African History Dec.1973 :-

Write an essay on the first admission, arrival and settling of Indians in South Africa. 1855-1910. (40)

(See Appendix for cartoons in J.M.B. examination paper, page 9).
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>
> (c) Do you agree that the United States 'entered the Second World War because it could not stay out'? (15) (70)

It was agreed that this question tested vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation - and memorization and communication skills.

T.E.D. (U .C.) General Hi ory Dec.1973, No. 5B:

> 'The U.S.A. was forced into the First World War, but joined the Second World War of its own free will.'
> Discuss this stat ment. (40)

The skills tested by this question were vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation - and memorization and communication skills.

There was only one question which, it was agreed, did not test any of the skills of historical thinking. This was question 8B, T.E.D.(U.E.C.) South African History Dec.1973 :-

> Write an essay on the first admission, arrival and settling of Indians in South Africa. 1855-1910. (40)

All agreed that this question tested only memorization and communication skills.

Questions which tested only one of the skills of historical thinking included :-

> T.E.D.(U.E.C.) South African History, Dec.1973, No. 2B (Synthesis); No. 4B (Synthesis); No. 5B (Vocabulary); No. 7B (Vocabulary).
>
> T.E.D.(U.E.C.) General History Dec.1973 No. 6B (Vocabulary) and further questions on the T.E.D. papers 1970 and 1971.

These questions were found to be a test of memorization and communication skills.

(d) A further point of interest lies in a comparison of questions set on the same section of work. Where possible, an example will be given of one question which was considered a searching test of historical thinking and one which fails to test such skills and abilities. My concern here is specifically with the historical skills tested. Thus only these skills will be referred to. This is not to say that the questions did not test other skills mentioned under Section B in the analysis (Appendix). In fact, the questions which failed to test thinking in history may be criticized as being primarily a test of recall of information and communication skills, rather than historical ability.

(i) The Great Trek

J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1973 No. 7 alternative:

> The course of the Great Trek was affected by three main factors: the qualities of the Voortrekkers as individuals and as a community; the environment (both geographical and human) into which they migrated and the reactions of the British Government and its local representatives.'
>
> Discuss the above statement with reference to the course of the Great Trek from 1836 to 1854. (This is an overview essay. Concentrate on the main aspects and support your general conclusions with a few well-chosen examples.) (70)

Vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation are tested by the question.

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) Dec.1971 (South African History) 1B

Discuss the settlement of the Voortrekkers in Natal up to December 16th, 1838. (40)

Vocabulary and synthesis are the only historical skills tested.

(ii) Civics

J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1971 - No. 9 Alternative

'In the modern democratic state a national legislative, elected by and responsible to the people, is an indispensable part of democratic machinery.'

C. Rodee: Introduction to Politics.

(a) How is the Republic's national legislature elected? (25)

(b) Why do you think that 'a national legislature elected by and responsible to the people' is an indispensable part of democratic machinery? (5)

(c) In what ways is the South African national legislature responsible to the people? (10)

(d) What are the functions of the South African national legislature? (30) (70)

It was agreed that only vocabulary and comprehension were tested. My own assessment was that while further historical skills were tested by (b) and (c), these sections formed a minor part of the question and these skills, analysis and judgement and evaluation, were not characteristic of the question.

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) South African History Dec.1970, No. 6B

Describe the following:

(a) The election of the State President. (10)

(b) The functions of the State President. (10)

(c) How a law is made by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. (20) (40)

Vocabulary only is tested by this question.

(iii) The French Revolution

J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1970, No. 1

Discuss the nature of the reforms demanded by the people of France in 1789. (70)

Vocabulary, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation are tested by the question.

T.E.D.(U.E.C.) General History, Dec.1973, No. 1B

Give a concise account of what was achieved permanently by the French Revolution in Europe and also indicate how it affected South Africa. (40)

Vocabulary, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation are tested.

T.E.D.(U.E.C.) General History Dec.1970, No. 1B

Discuss the political causes of the French Revolution. (40)

Vocabulary and synthesis are tested.

(iv) Unification of Italy

J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971, No. 2

To what extent did Napoleon III retard or promote the unification of Italy? (70)

Vocabulary, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation are tested.

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) General History Dec.1971, No. 2B

Discuss the steps towards the unification of Italy from the establishment of the Kingdom of North Italy, April 1860, up to the completion of the unification in 1870. (40)

Only synthesis is tested.

(v) United Nations Organization

J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971, No. 6

Read the following two passages and then answer the questions which follow.

> 'Meanwhile an event of more encouraging significance had been taking place in San Francisco where on 26 June 1945, fifty-one founder members signed the international treaty which three months later brought into being the United Nations. This was the culminating act in a series of declarations and conferences ... in which the Western allies either alone or in company with the Soviet Union had formulated the aims for which they were fighting, the nature of the peace they sought to establish and the means whereby the peace and stability of themselves and the world at large was to be assured.'
>
> 'Since 1945: Aspects of Contemporary World History' edited by J.L. Henderson.

'The United Nations perfectly embodies in institutional form the tragic paradox of our age: it has become indispensable before it has become effective.'

H.G.Nicholas, 'United Nations'. An Article in 'Encounter', February 1962.

(a) Explain briefly the origins of the United Nations. (15)

(b) State three important aims of the United Nations. (15)

(c) Explain three basic principles on which the United Nations bases its decisions in the pursuit of its aims. (15)

(d) In an essay of not more than one page in your answer book, discuss the point of view expressed in the second passage above (the important words have been underlined). (25)(70)

Vocabulary, comprehension, synthesis and judgement and evaluation are tested by the question.

T.E.D.(U.E.C.) General History Dec.1970, No. 8B

Describe the composition and functions of the various organs of the U.N.O. (40)

Vocabulary and synthesis are tested by the question.

(e) Special reference needs to be made to those questions based on the use of cartoons, maps and interpretive passages. Some of these have been mentioned above as illustrations of more general observations.

Cartoons

Question No. 11 alternative, based on cartoons, J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1973 has been referred to in (1). The two other questions of this nature, included in the material, are No.8 alternative, J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971 and No.5 alternative,J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1970. It was agreed that both tested vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation. In addition, the former tested reference skills, memorization, translation and communication skills; the latter, memorization, translation and communication skills.

The success of these questions does not lie in the fact that cartoons are used. The choice of cartoons, and most important, the kinds of questions related to them, determine the validity of the question as a whole.

Maps

Of the three questions cited, which related to maps, No.4 alternative J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1973 was considered the most searching test of historical and other skills, namely, vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and judgement and evaluation -memorization, translation and communication skills. It was agreed that No.4 on the same examination paper tests vocabulary, comprehension and analysis - memorization, translation and communication skills. Question No.8, J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971 was considered a test of vocabulary, analysis, synthesis judgement and evaluation - memorization and communication skills. It is

significant that only in three of the eight assessments was this question regarded as a test of translation skills. The latter are significant for questions of this type. Four of the teachers who assessed the question commented to the effect that it could be answered independently of the map. Possibly the map was intended as a memory aid. In addition to this criticism, I queried the reference of the quotation, for the question. The latter, I thought, could stand on its own, without map or quotation.

Interpretative exercises

One of the more successful questions based on the use of an interpretative passage, was No.2 alternative J.M.B.Nov./Dec.1973. This question quoted below, may be compared with those mentioned in Section D,on the Unification of Italy.

> 'The last time that I opened this parliament (was) in the midst of the travails of Italy and dangers to the State.... In a very short space of time an invasion has been repelled; Lombardy has been freed... and Central Italy has been delivered, thanks to the remarkable courage of its inhabitants; and today the representatives of right and the hopes of the nation are assembled about me.
>
> We owe many benefits to a generous ally, to the bravery of his soldiers as well as of ours, to the self-sacrifice of the volunteers, and to the harmony of the various peoples ...
>
> Out of gratitude to our ally for the services she has rendered to Italy ... some sacrifice was necessary... . I have agreed to a treaty providing for the reunion of Savoy and the district of Nice to France.
>
> We still have many difficulties to overcome, but sustained by public opinion and by the love of the people, I will not permit any right or liberty to be infringed or diminished... and should the ecclesiastical authority resort to spiritual arms in support of its temporal interests, I will... find strength to maintain civil liberty and my authority, for the exercise of which I owe an account only to God and to my people...'
>
> Address to the Turin Parliament by Victor Emmanuel II, 2nd April,1860.

Questions:

(a) What does the extract tell you about the government of the Kingdom of North Italy? (10)

(b) What 'invasion had been repelled'? Why [illegible]s invasion occurred? (10)

(c) How had Lombardy been freed? (10)

(d) How had Central Italy 'been delivered by the remarkable courage of its inhabitants'? (10)

(e) Who was Italy's generous ally'? Why did she assist Italy in her struggle? (10)

(f) What services had this ally 'rendered to Italy'? (10)

(g) 'We still have many difficulties to overcome ...' What do you think Victor Emmanuel was referring to? (10) (70)

This question was regarded as a test of vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and extrapolation - as well as memorization and communication skills.

Question No.3 alternative J.M.B.Nov./Dec.1973 reads:

Lord Balfour declared at the Imperial Conference of 1926 that:

> 'The mother country (Britain) and the Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations'.

Questions

(a)	Who were the Dominions in 1926?	(5)	
(b)	How had the Dominions become autonomous during the nineteenth century?	(15)	
(c)	The Balfour Declaration defined the new relationship between Britain and her Dominions. What were the main characteristics of the 'old' relationship that existed between Britain and her Dominions?	(10)	
(d)	What circumstances had led Britain to grant Dominion status to some of her territories overseas?	(40)	(70)

It was agreed that the skills tested by this question are vocabulary and comprehension; memorization and communication skills.

Question No.6, J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971, has been mentioned under Section E. Some comment on it as an interpretive passage are necessary. The first three sections, (a), (b) and (c) can be answered independently of the passages quoted. Moreover, they do not seem to require the use of the historical skills which, it was agreed, the question tests. Only section (d), worth 25 marks, relates to a passage and requires the use of these skills.

Further interpretive exercises, included in the material selected, are J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1973, No.2 (vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, memorization and communication skills) and No.3 (vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and synthesis; memorization and communication skills). J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971, Nos. 5, 6 and 9 alternative, have been referred to elsewhere.

It is apparent therefore that an interpretive exercise may be a true test of historical thinking. However, to qualify as a successful interpretive exercise, questions must refer to and require interpretation of aspects in, or related to, the passage. Further, such questions must test the use of historical skills and abilities.

Statistical Tables

The only question included which makes use of statistical tables, is J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1971 No.12. This reads :-

> Using the statistical tables (No.1 - 4) comment on some of the changes that have occurred in the economic position of the Coloured and Asian peoples in South Africa since 1936 (See attached tables).

Comprehension, analysis and synthesis were tested, as well as memorization, translation and communication skills.

(f) Some comment is required on the use of the word 'discuss'. A question which is framed around the word 'discuss' suggests that more than a mere descriptive account is required in the answer. Credit may often be given to questions which seem to imply discussion. Such an example is:

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) General History Dec. 1973.

'Discuss Stalin's economic programme from 1928 to 1953' (40)

It was agreed that this question tested vocabulary - memorization and communication skills only. The word 'discuss' is surely misleading here. It is not possible to discuss a policy, for instance, without this being directed in some way. For example, one may discuss a policy 'in the light of ...','in terms of ....','as a means of ...' Unless this is required and specified, far from testing historical skills, such a question may serve to confuse the brighter child initiated into ways of thinking in history.

Consider the following examples:-

T.E.D. (U.E.C.) South African History, 1970, No. 6B

Describe the following:-

(a) The election of the State President. (10)

(b) The functions of the State President. (10)

(c) How a law is made by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. (20)(40)

and

T.E.D.(U.E.C.) South African History Dec.1973, No. 5B

(a) Discuss the present-day manner of the election and composition of the House of Assembly of the Republic of South Africa. (25)

(b) Discuss the various stages through which a Bill has to pass in the House of Assembly. (15)(40)

Despite the use of the words 'describe' and 'discuss', the skills tested by these questions are the same. By analysis, it was agreed that they both test vocabulary; memorization and communication skills. If one is required to relate a series of events intelligibly, only, then the word 'describe' is more appropriate.

J.M.B. Nov./Dec. 1970, No. 7 alternative

Describe the part played by Andries Pretorius in South African history. (70)

This question tested synthesis and judgement and evaluation; and memorization and communication skills. A further skill, which on my assessment is tested by the question, is analysis.

Possibly 'discuss' should have been used here, as the question implies an assessment of his role and his significance in South African history.

J.M.B. Nov./Dec.1973 No. 6 alternative

'In the history of most revolutions the first rapture of success has been followed by long hard years of gloom and strain.'

Discuss this statement with reference to the problems faced by the newly independent African states. (70)

It was agreed that this question tests vocabulary, comprehension analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation as well as memorization and communication skills. The answer to such a question must include an analysis of the problem referred to and some debate or discussion, involving an evaluation of the extent to which these problems may render the statement valid, for the instance cited. Thus the word 'discuss' is used correctly in this question.

(g) Objective Testing

Selected Short Questions, T.E [illegible] J.E.C.) Dec.1973 (Both papers)

All who assessed these questions agreed that memorization was tested by all of them. There was no agreement that any other skill was tested. For example:-

South African History IA No. 1

Because of the revocation of the (1) in 1685, the French Huguenots fled from France.

General History IA, No. 1

In France the 'tithe' was a hateful tax which had to be paid to the (1).

South African History 5A, No.1 (which item fits the heading which precedes it).

The Administrator of a province is appointed by

(a) Parliament
(b) the State President
(c) the Executive Committee
(d) the Senate.

General History 6A, No.9 (which item does not fit heading)

The Central Powers

(a) Germany
(b) Austria
(c) Italy
(d) Turkey

These questions were worth one mark each.

2. COMMENTS ON OBJECTIVE TEACHING

These results should not lead one to conclude that objective testing and short question tests must necessarily be a test of memory only. In the series 'Handbooks on Objective Te ting' edited by H.G. Macintosh[2], the strengths and limitations of objective tests are listed. There is nothing in the four limitations tabulated to suggest that objective tests cannot be used to test historical skills:-

1. An objective test cannot test written expression or the ability to develop an argument.
2. An objective test can all too easily test only factual recall.
3. An objective test may encourage candidates to guess the answers.
4. An objective test is difficult ... to construct. [3]

Advise is given on how to construct an objective test of specified abilities based on a classification of educational objectives, similar to the analysis of skills used in this assessment.

It has been stated that 'Taking an objective test is simply pointing. It calls for the least effort of the mind above that of keeping awake: recognition.'[4] The following examples are taken from the above-mentioned publication, in an attempt to present objective items which are a more searching test of histo ical skills and in addition test the pupil's understanding and memorization of information. The analysis

of skills tested by these questions, was done by the researcher only.

No. 1. Which of the following existed in Germany in 1789 but not in 1815?

A. The Holy Roman Empire

B. The state of Bavaria

C. The rule of Hanover by the British King

D. The German Confederation.

(comprehension, vocabulary, analysis, synthesis and memorization.)

No.13. In which of the following years were Alsace and Lorraine part of Germany?

I. 1789
II. 1815
III. 1871
IV. 1941

A I and II only
B II and III only
C I and IV only
D III and IV only

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and memorization.)

No.15. Which of the following statements about Napoleon I is a fact and not an opinion?

A. He was the greatest man to rule France in the 19th century.

B. His domestic policy was popular with most of the French middle classes.

C. He was inferior as a general to the Duke of Wellington.

D. He succeeded in selling French territory to the U.S.A.

(vocabulary, judgement and evaluation and memorization.)

No. 23. Which statement is true of both the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Versailles conference (1919)?

A. Russia attended as a victorious nation.

B. The right of peoples to self-determination was a major consideration.

C. The majority of the delegates were responsible to elected governments at home.

D. The major defeated country had to agree to military occupation of part of its territory.

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis and memorization.)

No.24. Study the following genealogical table of a European ruling family in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Ruler A (murdered)

Ruler B

Ruler C

Ruler D (assassinated)

Ruler E

Ruler F (executed)

The table represents the

A Bonapartes
B Bourbons
C Hapsburgs
D Romanovs

(comprehension, analysis, synthesis and memorization and translation skills.)

No.42. 'A model family man, under the influence of his foreign wife, tried and executed by revolutionaries.'

To which ruler does this description best apply?

A King Louis XVI
B Emperor Napoleon III
C Czar Nicholas II
D Mussolini

(analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation and memorization skills.)

No.44. Which of the following statements is true of BOTH Napoleon I and Hitler?

A. They succeeded in conquering Egypt.

B. They absorbed Austria within their Empires.

C. They owed their rise to political power to their military achievements.

D. They concluded treaties of friendship with Russia.

(analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation and memorization skills.)

No.60. The sentence below has blank spaces, each blank indicating that a word or phrase has been omitted. Beneath the sentence are four sets of words or phrases. Choose the set which when inserted in the sentence makes it historically correct.

The overthrow of _____ was partially due to his _____ in that he refused to accept _____ and attempted to _____

A. Napoleon I .... foreign policy .... the defeat of 1812 ..... invade Russia.

B. Charles X .... repressive policy ... political reform ... limit the power of Parliament.

C. Louis Philippe ... own misfortune ... limitation of his power ... flee the country.

D. Napoleon III ... incompetence ... superiority of Bismarck ... attack Austria.

(analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation, memorization and reference skills.)

This imaginary conversation is concerned with the role of the State. Base your answers to the next 4 items upon the conversation and your knowledge of history.

Speaker 1. My country was founded upon the principle of freedom and this includes freedom from interference by the State. No government has any right to tell citizens what to do with their own property.

Speaker 2. Freedom is an excuse for self-indulgence and so it should be curbed and individual rights surrendered for the good of all the people. A citizen reaches his full development only through submission to the state.

Speaker 3. if the people acting through the state owned all the means of production, distribution and exchange they could share out the country's wealth more fairly. At the moment the rich control of the country and there is no real freedom.

Speaker 4. There is a case for the state controlling some of the main industries but not all. It is quite possible to have an economy combining freedom and state control in order to obtain the best of both worlds.

No. 67. The speaker most likely to be a Fascist is

A. Speaker 1
B. Speaker 2
C. Speaker 3
D. Speaker 4

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and synthesis.)

No. 68. The speaker most likely to be a Communist is

A. Speaker 1
B. Speaker 2
C. Speaker 3
D. Speaker 4

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis and synthesis.)

No. 69. Which nationality is Speaker 1 most likely to be?

A. American
B. British
C. German
D. Russian

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, judgement and evaluation and memorization.)

No. 70. Which speaker would be most likely to opposed a planned economy?

A. Speaker 1
B. Speaker 2
C. Speaker 3
D. Speaker 4

(vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, judgement and evaluation, memorization .)



Punch cartoon Nov. 12th, 1870

This cartoon formed part of four pieces of Stimulus Material presented. It is referred to as S.M.A. Other questions, linking all four pieces of Stimulus Material, were set.

One question based on this cartoon was:-

4. The cartoonist in S.M.A. is depicting a scene which
   - A. shows France being justly punished by Germany.
   - B. indicates that Germany has superior weapons to France.
   - C. shows France at the mercy of Germany.
   - D. indicates the reasons for French defeat.

(comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation memorization, reference and translation skills.)


Stimulus Material F.

'It is not only our Army that marches to its objective, 44 million Italians march with that Army, all united and alert. Let others try to commit the blackest injustice, taking away Italy's place in the sun. When, in 1915, Italy united her fate with the Allies, how many promises were made? To fight the common victory Italy brought her supreme contribution of 670,000 dead, 480,000 disabled and more than a million wounded. When we went to the table of that odious peace they gave us only the crumbs of the Colonial booty.'

Speech of Mussolini, Wednesday, 2nd October, 1935.
'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', 1935

One question based on this passage was:-

12. Which of the following diagrams represents the correct proportion as between dead, disabled and wounded in the casualties suffered by Italy in the First World War (S.M.F.)?



A Diagram 1
B Diagram 2
C Diagram 3
D Diagram 4

(comprehension, analysis and translation skills)

In addition to the multiple-choice type questions, illustrated by the above examples, there are imaginative and searching questions of a different nature, which may be used as part of a short question section of an examination. A few examples from Booth, 'History Betrayed'[5], are cited below.

3. Suppose you had landed with the Duke of Normandy in England in 1066 and later had been transported by time machine to the year 1750 in England, list below four striking changes you might have noticed, for example in the living conditions, the countryside or society. Underline the one change you consider to be most significant and write a sentence explaining your choice.

(analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation and memorization.)

5. We use the word REVOLUTION to describe:

   (i) the events of 1789-1794 in France;


   (ii) the English industrial development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

   What features common to both these periods allow us to describe them as revolution? Answer in not more than two sentences.

((vocabulary, comprehension, analysis, synthesis and memorization.)

7. The table below shows the periods during which industrialisation has been taking place in six major countries. On the dotted lines to the right of the table fill in the four most appropriate countries from the list of five which follows. Two have been entered for you.

Communist China, Germany, France, Russia, U.S.A.



(comprehension, analysis, synthesis, judgement and evaluation, memorization, chronology).

One advantage which objective tests have over essay type questions is that a wide range of information may be tested. However, an important aspect of a study of history, namely communication skills, is not assessed in objective testing.

3. CONCLUSION

An understanding of the meaning of historical thinking is essential for determining and measuring the criteria of attainment in history. From this analysis some idea may be gained of the skills and abilities implied in thinking in history and attention has been drawn to the need for careful consideration in the setting of questions.

Questions which are a searching test of historical thinking and skills are necessary, but not sufficient for an examination to be regarded as a valid assessment of the learner's development in history. There are other factors which need to be investigated.

Firstly, an assessment of the memoranda used is necessary. It must be established that the answers for which the pupils are given credit do in fact require the use of the abilities which the question appears to test, logically.

Secondly, some questions are only an apparent test of the interpretive abilities of the pupils. The fault does not necessarily lie with the question per se. Such an interpretation is presented frequently in the textbook. Thus it may be memorized and reproduced. Moreover, teachers may present analyses of the material and these are memorized by the pupils. Under these circumstances a valid question no longer serves to test the pupil's ability in thinking, but rather memorization. It would appear that the onus lies with the examiner to avoid asking a question which can be answered merely by memorizing the textbook. It would be more difficult to establish precisely the work done by teachers in each classroom. However, the problem of pupils reproducing teachers' interpretations can be overcome largely if the examiner avoids the repetition of the same questions This would make it difficult for teachers to predict examination questions and present model answers to pupils.

A further area which requires investigation is that of the assessment and evaluation of answers. For an examination as a whole to count as a true test of the pupil's historical ability, the assessment of answers must reflect that this is what is being examined. This is possibly one of the most difficult areas to clarify. On what basis does one allot marks for various aspects of a question? What allocation of marks could one give for structural and information aspects of the question, especially when it is unclear as to the extent to which one can in fact separate them? Does one distinguish between marks allowed for information, from those allowed for relevant and able application of this information? How does one define the various aspects of evaluation, in such a way that the role of individual differences of markers, is minimized?

While the difficulties encountered in evaluating historical ability have not been resolved by this inquiry, it may have served to point to the complexity of the task of assessing historical thinking and the need for examiners to come to recognize this.

A full inquiry into assessment in history is required. This should be based on an understanding of the nature of history and the skills implied in historical thinking. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to distinguish these skills and the kinds of questions which may be said to test the use of historical skills. This should be followed by a full investigation of other factors, some of which have been mentioned, implied in the application of such questions in an examination situation. It would then be possible to say what a true test of the pupil's development in historical thinking may consist in.

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3. Ibid. pp vi-vii.

4. Barzun, J. 'House of Intellect', p 139, in A.N.Boyce TEACHING STORY in South African Schools, p 137. (... & Co. Ltd, 1968).

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CONCLUSION

For the effective study of history it is necessary to define our objectives. The question arises as to what the essential elements in a historical education are. There is a tendency in history teaching to ask of children that they simply master an increasing body of factual information, rather than achieve more advanced levels of thinking An inquiry into the nature of history has indicated that by logical analysis, the discipline is distinguished by the modes of thinking and inquiry which are characteristic of it. These conceptual structures are implied in the content of history and in the explanation of that content, thus structure and content in history are interwoven. While we may have a number of objectives for the study of history, basic to these should be the improvement of the pupil's level of thinking in history.
The debate should not be whether the development of historical thinking should be the aim of a study of history but rather, if this is distinctive of the discipline, how to resolve the problems which arise in attempting to realise this aim. These may include the intrinsic difficulties of the subject matter, the limited ability of the pupils, the need for appropriate teaching methods and for valid modes of assessment. A clear understanding of the meaning of formal historical thinking, is vital for research into all these areas.

Formal historical thinking may be said to imply a distinct way of establishing, explaining and interpreting historical information. Primary sources, or evidence of the human past, are used for establishing secondary sources. They form the basis of historical facts, which are established by the historian. In explanation of the event as a whole, its general and essentially unique aspects, the historian's role is one of seeking causes, arranging them in some order of relevance and assessing the significance of the event in the light of further developments. In

every aspect of th g in history the historian is required to recognize the obstacle to objectivity and to strive towards impartiality. He must be able to understand and apply historical terms which are specific, although in the main he makes use of ordinary language. Contemporary history does not preclude historical thinking but the absence of hindsight denies the contemporary historian the opportunity of fulfilling an important historical function, namely that of evaluating the long-term significance of an event. An attempt to do so lends itself to predictions about the future. Economics and, to some extent, sociology have worthwhile contributions to make to thinking and understanding in history, although in history there is not the same dependency on or search for general laws.

Such an analysis serves to clarify the practice of historians. An important issue which arises is whether the aim of developing historical thinking at school level is compatible with the limitations of the pupil. While there is no systematic body of knowledge to validate these findings, recently an increasing amount of research has been done on the development of children's thinking in history. This work is based mainly on Piaget's analysis of stages in the development of logical thought.[1] These were devised from experiments using mathematical and physical material. The significant stages for research on school children are those of pre-operational and operational thought. Piaget recognizes a distinction in operational thinking, between the concrete and formal levels, reached at 7 years and 12 years respectively. Research on how children think in history may be divided broadly into two categories: how they reason and think on historical material of a general nature; and their understanding of historical concepts, in particular language and time concepts. The criteria used by Piaget have been modified, largely by Peel[2] and Hallam[3], to suit the needs of historical material and thinking. From this research it appears that thinking in history is late developing and later than thinking in disciplines such as science and mathematics. Concrete operational thinking in history may develop as late as 13 years and formal operational thinking at the age of about 16 years. This may lead us to conclude that the limitations of pupils preclude the possibility of initiating and promoting progress in historical thinking at school level. However, these findings are

not regarded as final. There is much controversy over Piaget's work, which forms the basis of this research. Hamlyn's criticisms in this regard, based on a logical approach to the development of thinking, reveal certain weaknesses in Piaget's analysis. Two further issues lead one to question the validity of research into the development of historical thinking.

Firstly, it is important that the analysis of historical thinking is not adapted to fit into a framework, such as Piaget's analysis, which does not necessarily meet its particular requirements. The questions asked and criteria used to evaluate the responses do not always meet the needs of history. Thompson suggests that, with a clear understanding of the meaning of historical thinking, tests might be devised to suit the particular requirements of the discipline and thus reflect more accurately the level of historical ability reached. The answers may be analysed and categorized according to special criteria, as well as those of Piaget and Peel. He has attempted to put this into effect in his research.[4]

Secondly, it is strongly debated as to whether it is possible to accelerate the growth of children's logical thinking. Can the learning situation be arranged so as to stimulate the development of thought processes. Some research in this area indicates that this is in fact possible. Related to this more general point is De Silva's tentative suggestion that 'the evidence statistically analysed is indicative of the crucial role of the 14th year which may be taken to mark the transition from immature comprehension'.[5] Thus the years 13-16 may be regarded as crucial for developing explanatory thinking. While the ages suggested by the present body of knowledge are questioned, for the reasons suggested, De Silva's research brings to the fore the need to initiate and stimulate thinking, before the age when it may be safely realised. This emphasizes the importance of appropriate methods of teaching and assessment, in attaining higher levels of thinking.

Existing knowledge may prove a useful guide in all aspects of the learning situation, as long as the age limits suggested are not held too rigidly. Only one study has been made on the development of historical thinking in a small group of South African pupils, from a particular cultural and socio-economic group. Further research into all these areas is needed, for a more realistic indication of schoolchildren's limitations in historical thinking.

The importance of appropriate teaching methods has been mentioned. Linked to this is the area of assessment. While the conclusions of psychological research have been questioned above, one may make a tentative assumption that there will be little dispute, on the grounds of pupils' limitations, that at least in the final years at high school the concern of a study of history must be with the pupil's ability in historical thinking. Partly for this reason and because of the influence of the external examination on all aspects of teaching, the external matriculation papers were chosen as the basis of an inquiry into some aspects of assessment in history.

As modes of assessment are required to measure how well the objectives of history teaching have been achieved, it is necessary at the outset to define one's objectives clearly. Only then can the adequacy of different modes of assessment be debated. Our concern is with evaluation of historical thinking and the issues to be considered, if an examination is to be regarde as an adequate assessment of historical ability. Basic to such an investigation is an understanding of historical thinking. Attempts have been made to give some definition to the skills and abilities implied in such thinking. An investigation of Coltham's analysis of skills and abilities indicates that it is possible to distinguish historical skills and abilities, although they are not necessarily separable.[6] Broadly, they may include the ability to understand and use historical terms, to select and analyse historical information, to understand and assess the causes and consequences of past human actions, to see the relationship between separate elements as parts of a total historical situation, to evaluate and make inferences, and so on. It may prove interesting to compare this analysis with the criteria for historical thinking used in psychological research. There should be some correlation between these, if they truly reflect the skills and abilities implied in history thinking.

With Coltham's analysis in mind, an inquiry into the kinds of questions which are a searching test of historical thinking was made. It would appear that different kinds of questions, such as essays, interpretive exercises, the use of maps and statistical tables and multiple-choice

type questions, may all be a valid means of assessing historical ability. Essays may be descriptive, analytical or imaginative. If they are descriptive they may be testing selective recall of information only. More ingenuity and careful consideration is required on the part of the examiner to set essays which demand that information be used in a critical and relevant way. Essays can require that the candidate think out the implication of the question, understand the relationship between events and develop an analysis which may require the evaluation of a number of factors. These features may characterize all of the abovementioned kinds of questions to some extent. When a map, interpretive exercise or cartoon, for instance, is used it is important that the questions set are related to the material given, in addition to being a searching test of historical skills and abilities.

Although multiple-choice type questions do not usually test the ability to develop a sustained argument, they need not necessarily be a test of memorization only. Examples have been given of multiple-choice questions and short questions which do test skills of analysis, synthesis, vocabulary and so on, within the limitations of such questions. One advantage of multiple-choice type questions may be that it is possible to test a wide range of historical information. However, they do not test communication skills, which are essential for both a study of history and the practice of historians, although not a characteristic of historical thinking.

It would seem that the kind of question set is of less importance, in determining its value as a test of historical thinking, than its content. All of the kinds of questions referred to in this inquiry may be used to test some, if not all, of the abilities pointed to.

Questions which are a searching test of historical ability are necessary but not sufficient for an examination to be a valid assessment of historical thinking. The scope of this dissertation does not allow for more than some lines of thought on other aspects of this complex task. It is important that the question set is not familiar to the pupil, or the answers given may be those of the teacher or the author of the textbook and the question will have tested memorization only. Marking memoranda must demand that the requirements of

the question set, are met. Credit must be given for that which each question purports to test. An awareness of some criteria for measuring historical thinking is necessary, in addition to reliable marking and standardization procedures. The same basic issues which arose in this investigation would apply to all formal assessment in history, including internal examinations and evaluation at a more junior level. The latter would require some modification, while still remaining a valid test of historical ability.

Finally, in maintaining that the advancement of historical thinking be accepted as the basic objective for the study of history, it is recommended that this should apply from the early years of school. This is not to deny the significance or the pupil's limited ability. It is essential to take this into account, if anything is to be achieved. Such an aim need not be incompatible with the pupil's limited ability. Philosophical and psychological research may be used as a guide in implementing this aim. One must accept that sensory knowledge precedes cognitive, concrete precedes the abstract and descriptive ability develops before analytical ability. With these limitations in mind, each of these stages, namely, sensory, concrete and descriptive, may be used in ways which are to some extent historical. An awareness of the difficulties involved is necessary and some simplification is required. Both teaching and assessment in history must be orientated to meet these needs. In this way one may establish a far better foundation for the development of historical thinking. If such an aim is accepted and practised in all aspects of a study of history, it may be that higher levels of achievement can be attained than existing research suggests.

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105 Mitchell Place
46 Mitchell Street
BEREA
Johannesburg

2nd December,1974

Dear

Enclosed is the material for the assessment with which you have agreed to help me.

SECTION I - an analysis of skills considered relevant to historical thinking and history examinations.

SECTION II - grid on which skills are listed and questions are to be entered. This is to be used for your analysis and only this section need to be returned.

SECTION III- relevant examination papers. Please use this material in the following way -

SECTION I

Please enter any skills not included, which you consider relevant, in the columns provided in Section II. The explanation of the terms used to denote various skills is an attempt to ensure that each assessment is an evaluation of the same type of ability. If there is any feature of this explanation with which you disagree, please make mention of it and any suggestion as to how this could be corrected would be appreciated.

SECTION II

Bearing Section I in mind, please refer to the selected material (Section III). On the grid provision is made for the entry of the question number, examination paper, examiner and moderator. Next to the appropriate data, would you place a tick in the column(s) denoting the particular skill(s) you think is being tested.

SECTION III

This includes the following material for analysis -

1. J.M.B. Nov/Dec 1973 examination paper - all 12 questions.
2. T.E.D.(U.E.C.) Nov/Dec 1973 examination paper (S.A. and General History) - all 16 essay questions.
3. T.E.D.(U.E.C.) Nov/Dec 1973 examination paper short questions S.A. and General, as indicated.
4. Questions selected from -

   J.M.B. Nov/Dec 1970, 1971, 1972 examination papers
   T.E.D.(U.E.C.) Nov/Dec 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 (Supp.) examination papers.

Many thanks for your co-operation. Should you have any queries, my telephone number is 44 0440. I would appreciate it if I could have your analysis by the end of the first week in January, i.e. 3rd January,1975.

Yours sincerely,

FORMAL HISTORICAL THINKING TO BE ENCOURAGED AS A WORTH WHILE OBJECTIVE IN THE STUDYING OF HISTORY IN HIGH SCHOOLS.

DO THE T.E.D. AND J.M.B. MATRICULATION EXAMINATIONS TEST HISTORICAL THINKING?

SECTION I

A. BREAKDOWN OF SKILLS AND ABILITIES WHICH MAY BE SAID TO CONSTITUTE HISTORICAL THINKING:-

1. Vocabulary
2. Comprehensive
3. Analysis
4. Extrapolation
5. Synthesis
6. Judgement and Evaluation

B. CERTAIN FURTHER SKILLS AND ABILITIES MAY BE NECESSARY IN APPLYING HISTORICAL THINKING, ESPECIALLY UNDER EXAMINATION CONDITIONS

THESE INCLUDE:-

1. Memorization
2. Reference skills
3. Translation
4. Communication skills.

Briefly, the terms listed on Page One are thought to convey the following:-

A1. VOCABULARY

As history is a highly verbal discipline, an understanding of its terminology is essential. The concepts involved in terms vary in difficulty according to their concreteness or abstractness an how closely they are related to the learners personal experience.

-ability to distinguish between general use of certain words and use of same, with historical meaning e.g. church, revolution
-ability to un erstand specific terms e.g. feudalism, Renaissance
-ability to understand time and historic time e.g. decade
-ability to understand names depicting temporal period e.g. medieval
-ability to connect and use terms related to specific period e.g. Discovery of gold Transvaal/Uitlanders
-ability to use correct terminology in describing ways in which material is handled e.g. bias, consistency.

2. COMPREHENSION

The general understanding, on a fairly superficial basis, of new material, makes possible an indepth inquiry involving further skills

-ability to give the gist of material read
-ability to describe significant feature(s)
-ability to select that which is interesting and puzzling about material
-ability to formulate questions arising out of these factors

3. ANALYSIS

i.e. separating a whole into its component parts. This makes possible an even deeper level of comprehension. Division of the material into its elements enables one to understand the particularity of the material and appraise it critically. Hypotheses may be set up as to the possible nature(s) of the component parts.

-ability to name and describe the separate parts
-ability to identify any inconsistency between two or more pieces of evidence or secondary source material

-ability to identify bias, point of view and value judgement
-ability to state criterion (criteria), yardsticks used in analysis
-ability to state similarities and differences between two pieces of material
-ability to recognize nature of connecting links or lack of logical connection in an argument.

4. EXTRAPOLATION

That which is understood is used to formulate further possibilities, ideas or hypotheses arising out of the evidence even if not present in the evidence e.g. "Knowing that this is so, it is possible that..." This differs from sheer fantasizing as one has to be realistic and rational in suggesting possibilities and probabilities.
-ability to frame a reasonable hypothesis
-ability to suggest reasonable propositions to fill a gap in the evidence
-ability to make tenable inferences after examining a piece of evidence.

5. SYNTHESIS

This literally means the building up of separate elements into a connected whole. It involves some form of organization based on decisions.
-ability to use connecting links between the elements
-ability to use an organizing principle to connect the elements principle could be causal, temporal etc.
-ability to assimilate elements new to learner, into organized body of knowledge
-ability to select and use relevant material
-ability to create a product which is 'whole'.

6. JUDGEMENT AND EVALUATION

This implies the use of a frame of reference; a conscious comparison is made between the features of the material and criterion(ia). In analysing the material, judgements are made as to the relevance of material, its authenticity and the use of bias
-ability to use appropriate criteria in evaluating material
-ability to evaluate several possible interpretations of material
-ability to connect clearly the criterion(a) and judgement and to substantiate the judgement by referring to the criteria
-ability to differentiate between values of today and those of period under discussion
-ability to interpret material in accordance with values of period under discussion

-ability to argue a conclusion and reject possible conclusion, giving reasons
-ability to avoid dogmatic judgements and rather the exercise of caution and acknowledgement of doubt in interpreting material.

B1. MEMORIZATION

The ability to memorize is necessary in most examination situations unless the test is an open-book one. There are certain types of questions, even in the former type of examination, where the memory factor can be minimized, e.g. presentation of material to be used, in the form of a diagram, map, interpretive passage etc. I have included this skill in this section as it is not a special skill in thinking in history, but it must be acknowledged that even in an open-book examination or interpretive exercise, some retention of information is necessary to apply skills involved in an in-depth study.
-ability to recall accurately names, terminology and information specific to topic studied
-ability to recall some dates attached to events and vice versa
-ability to recall procedures for collecting, handling and assessing evidence.

2. REFERENCE SKILLS

These are needed for use, in particular though not exclusively, on secondary source material. Historians rely largely on secondary sources, as do pupils, in reading around the topic to be explained. Their significance for a history examination would be indirect, i.e. evidence of relevant extra reading and research would presuppose these skills. While the application of certain skills included in (A) Historical thinking may require research and thus reference skills, the latter facilitate such a study rather than go to make up an intrinsic feature of thinking in the particular discipline
-ability to use alphabetic system, index and contents headings
-ability to use main types of reference books

3. TRANSLATION

This involves an extension of the comprehension of material by the translation of it from one form to another.
-ability to translate verbal material to a diagram or map
-ability to translate a diagram or map into verbal material.

4. COMMUNICATION SKILLS

The ability to communicate a product of historical study is necessary in most enterprises. In oral or written work in history this would apply. For examination purposes this is essential. However, the skills involved are not peculiar to the products of historical study.

-ability to narrate well and handle words so that the meaning is immediately clear
-ability to organise prose so that a train of thought can be followed easily
-ability to present an argument logically
-ability to select and present most approriate form for presenting outcome of inquiry.

The above analysis is based on the work of Jeanette Coltham, 'Educational Objectives for the Study of History', in "Teaching History" No. 35, 1971.

SECTION II

ANALYSIS OF SKILLS TESTED IN HISTORY EXAMINATION QUESTIONS SELECTED FROM JMB AND TED MATRICULATION EXAMINATION PAPERS 1970-1973

QUESTION NUMBER	EXAMINATION PAPER EXAMINER AND MODERATOR	A : HISTORICAL THINKING								B : OTHER						FURTHER COMMENTS
		1	2	3	4	5	6			1	2	3	4			
		Vocabulary	Comprehension	Analysis	Extrapolation	Synthesis	Judgment and Evaluation			Reference Skills	Memorisation	Translation	Communication Skills			
1	J.M.B., Nov/Dec 1973 Mr E.G.Viglieno, Prof.N.G.Garson															
2																

SvV D.27 (10 pp.)

JOINT MATRICULATION BOARD
GEMEENSKAPLIKE MATRIKULASIERAAD

MATRICULATION EXAMINATION, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER, 1973
MATRIKULASIE-EKSAMEN, NOVEMBER/DESEMBER 1973

HISTORY
(350 Marks)

(Time/Tyd: 3 Hours/Uur)

Examiner: Mr E.G. Viglieno, B.A. (Hons)
Moderator: Prof. N.G. Garson, M.A.

Answer FIVE questions choosing TWO from Section A and TWO from Section B. Number your questions correctly and clearly. Accurate and adequate factual knowledge is essential; equally important is the ability to use relevant information in answering the questions. You should realise that the information presented in the form of source extracts, sketch maps, cartoons, graphs and the like, are intended to help you answer the question. It is also suggested that you spend about five minutes reading the question of your choice and thirty minutes answering it. Remember that it is the quality of your answer rather than its length that counts.

SECTION A

1. 'Napoleon has remained a great and controversial historical figure. To some historians he furthered the work of the French Revolution; to others he destroyed the work of the Revolution.' Which view would you support? Give reasons for your answer. (70)

OR

Did the Vienna Settlement of 1815 restore the Old Order or not? Give reasons for your answer. (70)

2. Read the following extract carefully and then answer the questions which follow.

'Taking as a pretence the interests of Germany, the enemies of the fatherland have raised the standard of revolt ... [and are] in open rebellion against the legal government ... [They are trying] to overturn the order of things established by both divine and human sanction. In so serious and dangerous a crisis I am moved to publicly address a word to my people.

I was not able to return a favourable reply to the offer of a crown on the part of the German National Assembly, because the Assembly was not the right, without the consent of the German governments, to bestow the crown which they tendered to me, and, moreover, because they offered the crown upon condition that I would accept a constitution which could not be reconciled with the rights and safety of the German States.

... A party now dominates the Assembly which is in league with the terrorists. While they urge the unity of Germany as a pretence, they are really ... kindling a war against monarchy; but if monarchy were overthrown it would carry with it the blessings of law, liberty and property.

... While such crimes have put an end to the hope that the Frankfurt Assembly can bring about German unity, I have ... never lost hope. My Government has taken up with the more important German States the work on the German Constitution begun by the Frankfurt Assembly.'

Address to My People: Frederick William IV,
25th May, 1849.

Questions:

(a) Who had 'raised the standard of revolt' in Germany in 1848? Were they 'the enemies of the fatherland' as Frederick William branded them? (10)

P.T.O./

(b) What were the objects of those who met at Frankfurt? (15)

(c) Why did the National Assembly offer the crown to Frederick William? What crown was offered to him? (15)

(d) Why would acceptance of this crown have endangered 'the rights and safety of the German States'? (5)

(e) What does the extract reveal about Frederick William's attitude to German unity and the Liberal cause? How far was he really interested in German unity? (10)

(f) What scheme for German unity did Frederick William's government take up 'with the more important German States'? What was the outcome of this Prussian scheme? (15) (70

OR

Read the following extract carefully and then answer the questions which follow.

'The last time that I opened this parliament [was] in the midst of the travails of Italy and dangers to the State .... In a very short space of time an invasion has been repelled; Lombardy has been freed ... and Central Italy has been delivered, thanks to the remarkable courage of its inhabitants; And today the representatives of right and the hopes of the nation are assembled about me.

We owe many benefits to a generous ally, to the bravery of his soldiers as well as of ours, to the self-sacrifice of the volunteers, and to the harmony of the various peoples....

Out of gratitude to our ally for the services she has rendered to Italy ... some sacrifice was necessary .... I have agreed to a treaty providing for the reunion of Savoy and the district of Nice to France.

We still have many difficulties to overcome, but sustained by public opinion and by the love of the people, I will not permit any right or liberty to be infringed or diminished ... and should the ecclesiastical authority resort to spiritual arms in support of its temporal interests, I will ... find strength to maintain civil liberty and my authority, for the exercise of which I owe an account only to God and to my people ....'

Address to the Turin Parliament by Victor Emmanuel II,
2nd April, 1860.

Questions:

(a) What does the extract tell you about the government of the Kingdom of North Italy? (10)

(b) What 'invasion had been repelled'? Why had this invasion occurred? (10)

(c) How had Lombardy been freed? (10)

(d) How had Central Italy 'been delivered by the remarkable courage of its inhabitants'? (10)

(e) Who was Italy's generous ally'? Why did she assist Italy in her struggle? (10)

(f) What services had this ally 'rendered to Italy'? (10)

(g) 'We still have many difficulties to overcome ...' What do you think Victor Emanuel was referring to? (10) (70)

3. Read the following brief description of political conditions in Britain before the passing of the Great Reform Act (1832):

'At the outbreak of the French Revolution, Britain had the most liberal form of government in Europe .... Yet although it was based on rule by the monarchy and an elected Parliament, the government was only in a limited sense democratic.

The British Parliament consisted of an Upper House (House of Lords) and a Lower House (House of Commons). The Upper House, composed of Lords nominated for life by the King, was very aristocratic and conservative and represented the landed aristocracy and the Church. Even the Lower House was not representative of all classes of the nation. The franchise was very limited and barely half a million male adults had the vote out of a population of 14 million. Furthermore, the seats in the Commons were very unevenly distributed over the country. Many of the large new towns which had grown up ... had no share in the government of the country. On the other hand a few great families had a large control of parliamentary seats on account of 'pocket boroughs' which they possessed .... It was said that of the 658 members returned to Parliament 424 were nominated either by the government agents or by private individuals .... The government of Britain thus rested in the hands of the land-

P.T.O./

owing aristocracy organised into two large political parties - the Tories and the Whigs.'

Bearing the above extract in mind, explain how the British parliamentary system had changed by 1928? (70)

OR

Lord Balfour declared at the Imperial Conference of 1926 that:

'The mother country [Britain] and the Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.'

Questions:

(a) Who were the Dominions in 1926? (5)

(b) How had the Dominions become autonomous during the nineteenth century? (15)


(c) The Balfour Declaration defined the new relationship between Britain and her Dominions. What were the main characteristics of the 'old' relationship that existed between Britain and her Dominions? (10)

(d) What circumstances had led Britain to grant Dominion status to some of her territories overseas? (40) (70)

4. Study the following maps carefully and then answer the questions which follow.



MAP 1.



MAP 2. The Partition of AFRICA



MAP 3.

From: R. Oliver & J. Fage: A Short History of Africa.
R.M. Rayner: A Concise History of Europe.
D. Thomson: Europe since Napoleon.

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Questions:

(a) What does Map 1 tell you about the European penetration of Africa in the 1870's? (10)

(b) Why was European penetration limited to the areas shown on Map 1? (10)

(c) What does Map 2 tell you about the European penetration of Africa by 1914? (15)

(d) State the factors that account for the situation as shown on Map 2. (15)

(e) What does Map 3 tell you about the lines of political pressure in Africa in about 1898? (10)

(f) What results did these lines of political pressure bring about? (10) (70)

OR

Study the following maps carefully and then answer the questions which follow.



MAP 1

From: D. Williams: An outline of World History.



MAP 2.

From: D. Richards: A History of Modern Europe.

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Questions:

(a) What does Map 1 tell you about Europe in 1914? (30)

(b) Comparing Maps 1 and 2 what territorial changes did the First World War bring about in Europe? (20)

(c) 'We arrived [at Versailles] determined that a Peace of justice and wisdom should be negotiated: we left it conscious that the Treaties imposed upon our enemies were neither just nor wise ...' (Harold Nicolson)

What arrangements made by the Treaty of Versailles with regard to Germany confirm Harold Nicolson's observation? (20) (70)

5. 'Out of the confusion created by the First World War came an almost universal yearning for new outlooks, new political and social systems, and new manners. The most radical resolution of these longings occurred in Russia, when in 1917 a splinter political party captured power and created a new society.'

What were the main characteristics of the new society created in Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1924? (70)

OR

'My object is simple. I want to make Italy great, respected and feared.' Mussolini.

How did Mussolini go about trying to achieve his object in the period 1922 to 1939 and with what success? (70)

6. 'The fate of Japan, when finally defeated, was decided by the Allied leaders when they met in Potsdam in Germany. Here they agreed that militarism must be stamped out in Japan and an attempt must be made to introduce a more democratic form of government.'

Show how these two decisions were carried out in Japan in the period 1945 to 1952. (70)

OR

'In the history of most revolutions the first rapture of success has been followed by long hard years of gloom and strain.'

Discuss this statement with reference to the problems faced by the newly independent African states. (70)

SECTION B

7. 'The Dutch East India Company had at first no intention of colonising South Africa; but circumstances turned the provision station into a settlement and the settlement into an expanding colony.'

S. Neumark: The South African Frontier.

Discuss the circumstances in the period 1652 to 1795 which 'turned the provision station into a settlement and the settlement into an expanding colony'. (70)

OR

'The course of the Great Trek was affected by three main factors: the qualities of the Voortrekkers as individuals and as a community; the environment [both geographical and human] into which they migrated and the reactions of the British Government and its local representatives.'

Discuss the above statement with reference to the course of the Great Trek from 1836 to 1854. (This is an overview essay. Concentrate on the main aspects and support your general conclusions with a few well-chosen examples.) (70)

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8. Study the following table carefully.

THE DIAMOND FIELDS DISPUTES

Claimant	Area Claimed	Reasons Advanced	Outcome
Nicholas Waterboer (David Arnot)	Campbell Lands east and west of Vaal River.	Land from Kheis to Ramah undisputed: D'Urban's Treaty of 1834. Vetberg Line drawn up in 1865. Cornelis Kok ceded all Campbell Lands to Adam Kok. Adam Kok sold his Philippolis reserve, but *not* Campbell Lands, to O F S. Waterboer claimed Cornelis Kok had been his vassal.	Claim to whole of Griqualand recognized.
O F S. (Brand)	Campbell Lands east of Vaal West of Vaal	Lands east of Vaal had been part of Orange River Sovereignty, and had been ruled by British. Grants of land given by British Government. The same land were abandoned to O F S by Bloemfontein Convention 1854. Claim of O F S was also based on occupation: the O F S had ruled the area. Claim based on Adam Kok's questionable deed of sale. Brand willing to submit matter to arbitration.	Claims rejected. Western boundary to be Platberg-David's Graf-Ramah
Korana, [illegible] and Batlapin (Theodor Pama)	Land west of Platberg-Vaal-Maquassi line. Vaal-Harts Area.	The tribe had always occupied the land	Keate Award line, i.e. line from Mariico to Maquassi to Platberg
S.A. Republic (M. W. Pretorius)	Vaal-Harts Area.	The territory was within the western boundaries of the Republic. Territory north of the Vaal had been ceded by Sand River Convention, 1852. Pretorius attempted to include the area in the Transvaal by proclamation in 1876. Potgieter had conquered the territory [illegible]	Claim rejected. Western boundary at Maquassi.

From A.N. Boyce: Europe and South Africa.

(a) With the aid of the above table explain why there was a diamond field dispute in the 1870's between Great Britain and the Boer Republics. (45)

(b) How was the dispute settled? (25) (70)

OR

Study the following map carefully.



RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

From: A.N. Boyce: Europe and South Africa.

(a) What does the map tell you about the railway development which occurred in South Africa during the nineteenth century? (20)

(b) Would you agree that the Delagoa Bay railway line influenced South African politics in the period 1866 to 1899? Give reasons for your answers. (50) (70)

P.T.O./

9. 'A comparison of government in the Cape Colony and the Boer Republics in the late 1850's shows that the latter were far more democratic.' Do you agree? Give reasons for your answer. (70)

OR

'In 1910 the British at last attained their primary goal in South Africa, for the South Africa Act united the territories occupied by white people into a British Dominion.' What circumstances in South Africa between 1902 and 1910 enabled the British goal to be achieved? (70)

10. In his book South Africa: Government & Politics, Dennis Worrall makes the point that the enduring issues of South African politics since 1910 are race relations; the country's constitutional status; and the nature of South African nationhood.

How far did these three issues affect the development of political parties in South Africa during the period 1910 to 1939? (70)

OR

In his South Africa and the Modern World, Jack Spence makes the point that the main issues in South Africa's foreign policy since 1945 have been the search for status in the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations; the maintenance of friendly relations with other African territories; and South Africa's membership of international organisations.

Comment on each of these aspects of South Africa's foreign policy. (70)

11. Study the following two cartoons carefully. They illustrate several important political developments which occurred in British Central Africa (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland) in the years after the Second World War.

(a) Using the cartoons, state what political developments they represent. (20)
(b) Explain why these developments took place in British Central Africa. (50) (70)



From: D.M. Low: The Fearful Fifties.

P.T.O./



BUTLER: 'How would you like to be done, sir? Soft, medium, or well done?'

From: The Leyden Book of Cartoons (1963).

OR

Study the following two cartoons carefully. They illustrate several important developments which occurred between South Africa and her neighbours.

(a) Using the cartoons, state what developments they represent. (20)

(b) Explain why these developments took place and indicate how successful the South African government's policy was. (50) (70)

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From: Connolly Cartoons.

P.T.O./

12. What effects did the presence of white settlers have on African societies in South Africa during the nineteenth century? (This is an overview essay. Concentrate on the main aspects and support your general conclusions with a few well-chosen examples.) (70)

OR

Explain how the South African government's policy of separate development has affected the position of the Coloured People. (70)

Selected Questions

J.M.B. Nov/Dec 1972. Examiner : Mr E.G. Viglieno
Moderator: Professor N.G. Garson

SECTION A

5. The following is a summary of Hitler's moves 1934-1939.

1933 - Hitler made Chancellor of Germany.
1934 - 5 Germany begins to rearm.
1936. (March) - German troops move into the Rhineland area.
1938 (October) - Pact made between Germany and Italy.
1938 (March) German occupation of Austria in support of Austrian Nazis.
1938 (September) German occupation of part of Czechoslovakia. in support of Sudeten Germans.
1939 (March) German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia.
(August) Pact between Russians and Germans
(September) German attack upon Poland launched.

Show clearly why and how these moves led to the outbreak of the Second World War. (70)

OR

5.alt. Show how the westernization of Japan influenced her foreign policy from 1894 to 1939.

SECTION B

7. The Great Trek has been interpreted in many different ways. Here are six statements about the Great Trek. Read each carefully.

(a) Prof.W.M.MacMillan labelled the Great Trek "the great disaster of South African history".

(b) Prof.E.A.Walker saw it as 'the central event in the history of European man in Southern Africa" and as "that long series of flights from the oncoming ... British ..."

(c) Prof.L.Fouche described it as "fundamentally a desperate protest against equality between black and white."

(d) Prof.C. de Kiewiet stated that "the Great Trek represented a decision to give up the frontal attack (on the Bantu tribes) and undertake an outflanking movement ... The Great Trek indissolubly linked the future of all South Africa with the Boer race."

(e) Dr D.F.Malan remarked that if 'the foundations for an independent South African nationhood were gradually laid in the (18th Century) Cape Colony ... then the Voortrekkers with their struggles and suffering and their great achievement built on them and practised that independent nationhood ..."

(f) Prof.C.F.J. Muller says that the Great Trek was basically a rebellion against the British."

Write a short comment on each statement explaining what you think it means by relating it to your study of the Great Trek. (70)

OR

7.alt. Why did Britain in her reaction to the Great Trek annex and keep Natal (1843) but annex and later abandon the Orange River Sovereignty? (70)

8 "I attach to the annexation (of the Transvaal) the greatest importance. It solves a legion of difficult questions; it relieves us from many real and pressing dangers and it puts us as regards (South) African politics in a position more favourable than any which we have as yet occupied."

What conditions in the Transvaal and South Africa do you think Lord Carnarvon had in mind when he wrote the above letter to Disraeli in October 1876? (70)

OR

8.alt. Outline the part played by Paul Kruger in Transvaal and South African affairs in the period 1885 to 1899. (70)

J. M. B. Nov/Dec 1971. Examiner: Mr E.G.Viglieno
Moderator: Professor N.G.Garson

SECTION A

2. To what extent did Napoleon III retard or promote the unification of Italy? (70)

OR

2.alt. Explain how Bismarck succeeded in eliminating Austrian influence from the German States. (70)

3. (a) Explain the origin and aims of the Chartist Movement. (20)

(b) Show how most of these aims had been realised by 1918. (50) (70)

5. "Pearl Harbour resolved in an hour the dilemma the American people had faced since 1939. Since 1939 the United States had been a limited belligerent, but the Rooseveltian policy of partial participation did not of itself lead to final involvement in the war. The United States, as in 1917, was neither forced nor manoeuvered into war, it entered the Second World War because it could not stay out "(The Growth of the U.S.A. Part 2 by R.B. and J.E.Morpurgo)";

(a) Explain the dilemma of the American people in 1939. (25)

(b) What was "the Rooseveltian policy of partial participation"? (30)

(c) Do you agree that the United States "entered the Second World War because it could not stay out"? (15) (70)

6. Read the following two passages and then answer the questions which follow.

"Meanwhile an event of more encouraging significance had been taking place in San Francisco where on 26 June 1945, fifty-one founder members signed the international treaty which three months later brought into being the United Nations. This was the culminating act in a series of declarations and conferences ... in which the Western allies either alone or in company with the Soviet Union had formulated the aims for which they were fighting, the nature of the peace they sought to establish and the means whereby the peace and stability of themselves and the world at large was to be assured."

"Since 1945: Aspects of Contemporary World History" edited by J.L. Henderson.

"The United Nations perfectly embodies in instituti nal form the tragic paradox of our age: <u>it has become indispensable before it has become effective</u>.

H.G. Nicholas, "United Nations", An Article in "Encounter". February 1962.

(a) Explain briefly the origins of the United Nations. (15)

(b) State three important aims of the United Nations. (15)

(c) Explain three basic principles on which the United Nations bases its decisions in the pursuit of its aims. (15)

(d) In an essay of not more than one page in your answer book, discuss the point of view expressed in the second passage above (the important words have been underlined). (25) (70)

SECTION B

8.alt. Both alternative questions to be assessed. (Questions, map and cartoon attached). (70)

9.alt. "In the modern democratic state a national legislature, elected by and responsible to the people, is an indispensable part of democratic machinery."

<u>C. Rodee : Introduction to Politics</u>.

(a) How is the Republic's national Legislation elected? (25)

(b) Why do you think that 'a national legislature elected by and responsible to the people' is an indispensable part of democratic machinery? (5)

(c) In what ways is the South African national legislature responsible to the people? (10)

(d) What are the functions of the South African national legislature? (30) (70)

12. Using the statistical tables (No. 1 - 4) comment on some of the changes that have occurred in the economic positions of the Coloured and Asian peoples in South Africa since 1936. (See attached tables) (70)

J. M. B. Nov/Dec 1970. Examiner: Mr A. N. Boyce
Moderator: Mr J. H. Homan

SECTION A

1. Discuss the nature of the reforms demanded by the people of France in 1789. (70)

2. Discuss the problems facing Bismarck in the unification of Germany and explain how he solved these problems. (70)

3. Six political cartoons by the famous cartoonist David Low have been provided. Comment on these cartoons in an essay on the problems confronting the League of Nations 1919 to 1936. You will be given special credit if you show that you are able to interpret the problems indicated by the cartoonist. (see attached sheets for the six cartoons). (70)

SECTION B

7. Read the following extract from a history of South Africa and then answer the question which follows :

"The British policy of trying to control the Voortrekkers, which had started with the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act and culminated with the annexation of the Orange River Sovereignty, had failed. It had failed because laws enacted by the Parliament at Westminster and annexations proclaimed by a peripatetic* high commissioner could not be translated into a systematic power structure without a financial commitment which no British Government was willing to make. In the process of failure the pendulum had swung right over from a treaty system which was designed to protect Africans and other non-white people from disruption by turbulent British subjects, to a convention system which amounted to a British alliance with independent white communities, who were assured the right to acquire ammunition supplies, against their non-white neighbours, who were denied that right."

(*peripatetic means moving from place to place in the course of duty or itinerant.)

Write an essay on the attitude of the British Government towards the Voortrekkers in the interior from 1836 to 1854, paying special attention to the words underlined in the passage. Your essay should show how British policy changed during this period of time. (70)


OR

7.alt. Describe the part played by Andries Pretorius in South African history. (70)

6. "All the conditions of South African politics have been altered by the recent discovery of diamonds (1870)."

E. Fairfield of the British Colonial Office.

How did the discovery of diamonds alter the conditions of South African politics, especially the relations between the British Government and the two Boer Republics, in the period 1870-1876? Use the accompanying map to aid you in answering the question. (You do not have to hand in the map.) (70)



THE DIAMOND-FIELDS DISPUTES

OR

Batt

(a) Comment on the historical significance of the enclosed cartoons:

- Napoleon of Africa: (15)
- Say Suzerain: (15)

(b) What effect did the mineral discoveries of the 1880's have on the customs and railways policies of the South African states and colonies (1886-1910)? (40) (70)

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Section B

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QUESTION 8. (ALTERNATIVE)

"THE NAPOLEON OF AFRICA."



"THE NAPOLEON OF AFRICA." IS IT HIS MOSCOW.

Recent affairs in the Transvaal have cast a shadow over Mr. Cecil Rhodes' Some people think that Krugersdorp will prove to have been his Moscow.

FROM:

V.C. MALHERBE:

WHAT THEY SAID:

ISTORICAL DOCUMENTS:

1795-1910

XXVII—"SAY 'BUZZARD'!"



British Suzerainty, Chamberlain and Kruger. Carruthers Gould cartoon

P.T.O./

12.12.1971 E 36
Section 8

QUESTION 12: STATISTICAL TABLES: NO's 1-4

TABLE 1: ASIAN & COLOURED POPULATION

Year:	Asians:	Coloureds:	% of total population:	
			Asians:	Coloureds:
1936:	220,000	770,000	2.4%	7.9%
1960:	477,000	1,509,000	3.0%	9.4%

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ASIANS & COLOUREDS BY PROVINCE

Province:	Asians:		Coloureds:	
	1936	1960	1936	1960
Cape	11,000	18,000	682,000	1,330,000
Natal	184,000	395,000	19,000	45,000
Transvaal	25,000	64,000	51,000	108,000
O.F.S.	29	7	18,000	26,000

TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ASIANS & COLOUREDS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS

Year:	Asians:	Coloureds:
1936	66%	54%
1960	83%	68%

TABLE 4: OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASIANS & COLOUREDS OVER 15 YEARS EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE

Occupation:	Asians:		Coloureds:	
	1936	1960	1936	1960
1. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing	27.3%	8.0%	34.3%	21.6%
2. Mining	1.5%	0.0%	1.1%	1.7%
3. Industry	15.2%	28.0%	16.1%	25.5%
4. Commerce & Finance	25.8%	21.6%	5.0%	7.1%
5. Transport & Communication	3.0%	3.2%	3.9%	3.1%
6. Services	19.7%	17.6%	31.8%	25.6%
7. Unemployed	7.6%	21.6%	7.9%	16.4%
TOTAL	± 100%	± 100%	± 100%	± 100%

Statistics taken from: Union Statistics for Fifty Years: 1910-1960

FOR QUESTION 5 (ALTERNATIVE) / VIR VRAAG 5 (ALTERNATIEF)

1.



March/Maart 15
1928

TICKLING THEM THROUGH THE CRACKS
Kielie hulle deur die krake.


2.



December/Desember 29,
1928

THIS LOOKS VERY MUCH LIKE THE SPOT WE STARTED FROM
"Dit lyk darem baie na die plek waarvandaan ons begin het".

3.



October/Oktober 2,
1933

"WELL - WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT NOW!"
"Wel - wat gaan julle nou daaromtrent doen?"



4.

DOORMAT / Doormat

January/Januarie 19, 1933

Dis nie billik om van ons te verwag om tierhokke te herstel nie. Dis te gevaar lik!



5.

SAFETY FIRST / Veiligheid eerste

May/Mei 1, 1935



6.

SELFPORTRAIT / Selfportret

February/Februarie 15,

TRANSVAAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

UNIVERSITY ENTRANCE EXAMINATION DECEMBER 1973

ESSAY QUESTIONS

SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

1B (a) Determine the significance of the stockfarmer in the history of South Africa. (20)

(b) To what extent did the 1820 British Settlers contribute towards the economic development of the Cape Colony? (20) (40)

2B Discuss the part played by A.H.Potgieter in breaking the power of the Matabele and the settlement of the Voortrekkers in the interior up to 1845. (40)

3B Discuss the part played by President J.H.Brand in the diamond fields dispute (1868-1876). (40)

4B Discuss the Transvaal's struggle to find an outlet to the sea through St Lucia Bay and Kosi Bay, and (sic) how Britain succeeded in preventing this. (40)

5B (a) Discuss the present-day manner of the election and composition of the House of Assembly of the Republic of South Africa. (25)

(b) Discuss the various stages through which a Bill has to pass in the House of Assembly. (15) (40)

6B (a) What was Britain's sttitude in 1910 about the transfer of the Protectorates to the Union Government? How was this problem solved by the National Convention? (12)

(b) Discuss the attempts made by General Hertzog and Dr Malan to incorporate the Protectorates in the Union in terms of the South African Act, 1924-1954. (28) (40)

7B Discuss Shepstone's Bantu policy of indirect control, and indicate how he governed the Bantu in Natal between 1845 and 1876. (40)

8B Write an essay on the first admission, arrival and setting of Indians in South Africa, 1855-1910. (40)

GENERAL HISTORY

1B Give a concise account of what was achieved permanently by the French Revolution in Europe and also indicate how it affected South Africa. (40)

2B "Prussian power and German unity". How and to what extent had Bismarck succeeded in reaching this goal by 1866? (40)

3B Write an essay on the conflict between factory owner and the worker during the Industrial Revolution and indicate how it eventually culminated in a political victory for the workers in the passing of the Third Reform Act in 1884.

4B (a) Give an account of the circumstances which led to lord Durham's being sent to Canada. (20)

(b) What was the significance of the Durham report for Canada and British colonial policy? (20) (40)

5B "The U.S.A. was forced into the First World War, but joined the Second World War of its own free will". Discuss this statement. (40)

6B Discuss Stalin's economic programme from 1928 to 1953. (40)

7B Show how the system of political alliances (1873-1907) contributed to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. (40)

8B Write an essay on the administrative, economic, social and political problems which the African States encountered after independence. (40)

SHORT QUESTIONS T.E.D. 1973 (worth one mark each)

S.A. 1A No. 1. "Because of the revocation of the (1) in 1685, the French Huguenots fled from France".

S.A. 3A No. 2. "(2) led a deputation of woman to ask Henry Cloete to repeal the annexation of Natal".

S.A. 5A No. 9 (which item fits the heading which precedes it?)

"The Administrator of a Province is appointed by

(a) Parliament
(b) the State President
(c) the Executive Committee
(d) the Senate"

S.A. 7A No.12 (which item fits the heading which precedes it?)

"Indians were accepted as a permanent section of the population of South Africa by the government of

(a) Dr Malan
(b) Adv Strydom
(c) Dr Verwoerd
(d) Adv Vorster"

Gen. 1A No. 1 "In France the 'tithe' was a hateful tax which had to be paid to the (1)"

Gen. 3A No.7 "Already in the 19th Century (7) advocated that women should be given the vote".

Gen. 6A No. 9 (which item does not fit heading)

"The Central Powers

(a) Germany
(b) Austria
(c) Italy
(d) Turkey"

Gen. 7A No.9 (which item does not fit heading)

"Members of the Triple Alliance 1882

(a) France
(b) Germany
(c) Austria
(d) Italy"

Selected Questions

T.E.D. Dec 1972 (S.A.) Examiner: P. R. Steyn

3B How did the Basuto troubles influence the relations between Britain and the Orange Free State between 1854 and 1869? (40)

6B Discuss the composition, powers and functions of the Provincial Government. (40)

7B Why did the British Government introduce the Treaty State System 1836-1846? Which treaties were concluded and what were the reasons for failure? (40)

T.E.D. Dec 1972 (Gen) Examiner: P.R.Steyn

3B Discuss the democratic reforms in the British Parliamentary System between 1858 and 1918. (40)

5B Discuss the factors which involved the U.S.A. in the Second World War. (40)

T.E.D. (Supplementary) (S. A.) 1973 Examiner: P.R.Steyn

8B Discuss the immigration of Indians to Natal and their spreading over the rest of South Africa. (40)

T.E.D. Dec 1971 (S.A.) Examiner: P.R. Steyn

1B Discuss the settlement of the Voortrekkers in Natal up to December 16th, 1838. (40)

T.E.D. Dec 1971 (Gen) Examiner: P.R.Steyn

2B Discuss the steps towards the unification of Italy from the establishment of the Kingdom of North Italy, April 1860, up to the completion of the unification in 1870. (40)

6B Describe Japanese expansion on the Asian Continent from 1894 to 1904. (40)

7B Briefly describe the German foreign policy under Hitler from 1933 to 1939 and indicate why the League of Nations was powerless to stop German aggression. (40)

T.E.D. Dec 1970 (South African History) Examiner: P.R.Steyn

3B Discuss the British Policy regarding the Voortrekkers in Natal from the Napier proclamation 1838 up to the annexation of Natal in 1842. (40)

6B Describe the following:

(a) The election of the State President (10)

(b) The functions of the State President (10)

(c) How a law is made by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. (20) (40)

8B Write an essay on the origin of the Coloured people and the formation of separate Coloured groups. (40)

T.E.D. Dec 1970 (General History) Examiner: P.R.Steyn

1B Discuss the polit[illegible] causes of the French Revolutic (40)

2B Explain how Bismarck succeeded in eliminating Austrian influence from the German States between 1863 and 1866. (40)

8B Describe the composition and functions of the various organs of the U.N.O. (40)

ANALYSIS OF SKILLS AND ABILITIES TESTED IN HISTORY EXAMINATION QUESTIONS SELECTED FROM J.M.B. & T.E.D. MATRICULATION EXAMINATION PAPERS 1970-1973

ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENTS

QUESTION NUMBER	EXAMINATION PAPER	A: HISTORICAL THINKING						B: OTHER				
		1 Vocabulary	2 Comprehension	3 Analysis	4 Extrapolation	5 Synthesis	6 Judgment & Evaluation	1 Reference Skills	2 Memorization	3 Translation	4 Communication Skills	
	JMB NOV/DEC 1973											6 Assessments were omitted on the 1973 examination papers.
1	"	5	3	5	2	5	6	2	6	1	6	
1 alt	"	4	3	5	1	4	6	1	6	0	5	
2	"	6	6	5	3	2	3	2	6	2	5	
2 alt	"	6	6	6	4	2	3	2	6	2	5	
3	"	4	6	5	1	6	3	2	6	1	6	
3 alt	"	6	6	3	2	3	3	2	6	2	6	
4	"	4	5	6	2	2	2	3	6	5	6	
4 alt	"	4	4	6	2	4	6	3	5	5	5	
5	"	4	5	6	1	4	2	3	5	0	5	
5 alt	"	3	3	6	1	4	5	3	5	1	5	
6	"	6	5	4	1	5	1	1	5	0	5	
6 alt	"	6	5	6	2	5	4	1	6	1	5	
7	"	6	5	4	1	5	2	-	6	0	5	
7 alt	"	6	6	6	1	6	4	2	6	4	5	
8	"	4	5	4	2	5	2	2	5	5	5	
8 alt	"	4	5	6	2	5	5	2	6	5	6	
9	"	6	5	6	2	5	6	2	6	1	6	
9 alt	"	6	6	6	1	5	3	1	6	1	5	
10	"	6	5	6	2	5	4	2	6	1	6	
10 alt	"	6	6	4	2	5	4	2	6	1	6	
11	"	6	6	5	3	4	2	2	6	5	6	
11 alt	"	6	6	4	4	6	4	2	6	5	6	
12	"	4	4	5	1	4	4	2	6	1	6	
12 alt	"	6	4	6	1	5	5	1	6	1	6	8 Assessments submitted
Selected questions	JMB.NOV/DEC 1972											2 participants omitted this question
5	"	6	4	6	1	7	7	2	7	2	8	
5 alt	"	5	2	6	1	6	5	1	6	0	6	
7	"	8	8	6	3	5	5	2	7	3	8	
7 alt	"	7	3	7	1	6	3	2	8	0	8	
8	"	7	5	7	2	7	4	1	8	1	8	
8 alt	"	5	3	4	1	7	2	1	8	0	8	
2	JMB.NOV/DEC 1971	7	3	6	1	7	7	1	8	0	8	
2 alt	"	5	2	7	1	7	3	1	8	0	8	
3	"	7	2	5	1	6	2	1	8	0	8	
5	"	7	6	6	1	6	7	2	7	2	7	
6	"	7	6	4	2	5	6	3	8	3	8	
8	"	6	3	6	3	7	6	3	8	7	8	
8 alt	"	6	8	6	2	6	5	5	8	0	8	
9 alt	"	6	2	3	1	3	4	1	7	7	6	
12	"	3	6	7	4	6	3	3	7	7	8	
1	JMB.NOV/DEC 1970	7	3	6	1	7	5	1	8	0	8	
2	"	7	3	7	1	6	4	1	8	0	8	
5	"	7	5	6	1	6	5	3	7	0	8	
7	"	8	7	7	3	3	4	2	7	1	8	
7 alt	"	8	2	7	3	1	4	1	6	1	6	

QUESTION NUMBER	EXAMINATION PAPER	A:HISTORICAL THINKING						B: OTHER				
Essay Questions		1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	
	TED (UEC)											
1B	SA HIST											6 Assessmentgs
1B	.1973	4	3	5	1	4	5	1	6	0	5	submitted on
2B	"	2	2	3	1	4	1	1	6	0	6	the 1973 ex-
3B	"	2	2	4	1	5	4	1	6	0	5	amination
4B	"	3	2	3	1	5	1	1	6	0	5	paper
5B	"	6	2	2	0	2	0	0	6	0	6	
6B	"	5	2	4	2	5	1	1	6	1	6	
7B	"	5	2	1	2	3	0	1	4	0	5	one omitted
8B	"	2	1	2	1	2	0	1	6	0	6	
	TED (UEC)											
	GEN.HISTORY											
1B	DEC.1973	5	2	6	2	4	3	1	6	0	6	
2B	"	4	4	5	1	5	3	2	6	0	6	
3B	"	6	3	4	1	3	1	1	6	0	6	
4B	"	4	1	4	1	4	1	1	6	0	6	
5B	"	4	4	6	1	5	5	1	6	0	6	
6B	"	4	2	3	1	3	2	1	6	0	6	
7B	"	5	3	4	1	4	3	1	6	0	6	
8B	"	4	2	3	1	4	2	1	6	0	4	
	Selected Short Questions											
	TED (UEC) S.A.HISTORY											
1A 1;	DEC.1973	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	8 Assessments
3A 2	"	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	submitted on
5A 9	"	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	selected question
7A 12	"	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	
	GEN.HISTORY											
1A 1	DEC.1973	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	
3A 7	"	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	one omitted
6A 9	"	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	
7A 9	"	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	
3B	DEC.1972	5	2	6	1	7	1	1	8	0	8	
6B	"	6	2	2	1	4	1	1	8	0	8	
7B	"	5	2	5	1	4	4	1	8	0	8	
	GENERAL HISTORY											
3B	DEC.1972	7	2	3	1	5	1	1	8	0	8	
5B	"	5	2	5	1	4	1	1	7	0	7	one omitted
	SA HISTORY SUPP.											
8B	1973	5	1	1	1	6	1	1	8	0	8	
	SA HISTORY											
1B	DEC .1971	5	2	2	1	5	1	1	8	0	8	
	GENERAL HISTORY											
2B	DEC..1971	5	2	3	1	7	1	1	8	0	8	
6B	"	5	1	2	1	4	0	1	8	0	8	
7B	"	5	2	6	1	6	4	1	8	0	8	
	SA HISTORY											
3B	DEC.1970	4	2	6	1	6	1	1	8	0	7	
6B	"	7	2	3	0	3	0	0	8	0	7	
8B	"	5	1	3	1	4	1	1	8	0	7	
	GENERAL HISTORY											
1B	DEC.1970	6	2	3	1	6	1	1	8	0	8	
2B	"	5	2	4	1	7	1	1	8	0	8	
8B	"	5	2	2	0	5	1	1	8	0	8	

Selected Questions

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