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The Public Career Of Lewis Harcourt (first Viscount) 1905-1916

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could do no wrong.[28] His prestige made him invaluable - his effigy even appeared on recruiti' posters - and was to provide the Government protection from an increasingly hostile Parliament and press, critical of its conduct of the war.

That the Government's performance *would* come under fire was not at all apparent initially. In the strangely euphoric atmosphere which characterized the opening days of the war, many soldiers and civilians thought that the conflict would be over within a matter of a few months. Some senior British officials were as optimistic: Sir Archibald Murray, the Chief of Staff of the British Army's Commander-in-Chief Sir John French, estimated a duration of between three to eight months. Churchill's prediction to the Admiralty on 8 August was a one-year war. Kitchener took the more realistic, pessimistic, view that the conflict might last as long as three years. Harcourt himself, according to a letter, believed from the outset that hostilities would continue for at least two years.[29]

Harcourt's 'own' war began at once, even before he returned to London on Monday, 10 August, after a brief visit to Nuneham. He already had to decide what to do about senior staff who were scheduled to return to foreign service, or resume it. Buxton was due to set out for South Africa the Saturday following th e declaration of war on Germany, to take over as Governor-General from Herbert Gladstone. However 'Eddie' Marsh, Churchill's right hand man at the Admiralty, informed Harcourt that the First Lord advised against Buxton's departure - his ship might fall foul of two German cruisers reported to be in the vicinity of Las Palmas. Buxton had a long wait.[30]

Immediately after the declaration of war, Flora Lugard also wrote to Harcourt about the dangers of allowing her husband and his subordinate Sir Hugh Clifford to sail back to Nigeria. Perhaps still angry about Sir Frederick's *faux-pas* in Ireland, the Colonial Secretary coolly replied that he had, in consultation with others, carefully weighed the risks involved before deciding to allow the voyage to proceed.[31] Arriving back at the Colonial Office, Harcourt found that he had to make a vast array of decisions as reports flowed back from Britain's far-flung colonial possessions. The changing war situation on the various colonial fronts had to be constantly monitored and evaluated by the Office staff:

> The Colonial Office has been working day and night ever since August 1st and I do not think my Private Secretary's room has been without an occupant for five minutes since that day ... I am having an easier time than the staff, but with some heavy responsibilities, and it would amuse you to see me as a War Lord annexing all the German Colonies.[32]

This latter comment should not be taken too literally but, perhaps underneath the levity, Harcourt was to some extent romanticizing the Office's - and his own - wartime role. The speech examined below - one of his major war speeches - certainly indicates this. A more serious, and valid, criticism by Cameron Hazlehurst in Politicians at War is that Harcourt should not have stayed in office after falling ill in October 1914. Whereas not resigning over Britain's decision to go to war was defensible, this was carrying clinging to office too far. In early December, Harcourt informed the Governor General of Newfoundland that he had spent most of the previous six weeks in bed to rest his overstrained heart. He was, however, allowed by his doctor to get up for several hours every day, and could attend Cabinets.[33]

From Harcourt's point of view, his absence from the Office for a large part of the day did not actually mean a major change in procedure. The evidence from his staff members like Furse and JCC Davidson, one of his unpaid private secretaries, shows that Harcourt was in any case accustomed to delegating authority to his subordinates. He rarely questioned their judgment on routine matters although according to Davidson 'as was only natural - he often added to instructions which I had sent as I made it a rule to work on a minimum basis'.[34] Harcourt evidently saw nothing incongruous about entrusting such responsibility to a junior official who, by his own admission, did not overwork himself. Nor did Asquith realize how much authority the Colonial Secretary was delegating to his subordinates, although he did know, as did other members of the Cabinet, about Harcourt's poor health. On the contrary, he thought Harcourt ran his department well, so the Colonial Secretary escaped any censure on this score.

The matter over which Harcourt *was* criticised, by Kitchener, was that of foreign contingents arriving in England. When war was declared the Dominions and Colonies at once began to volunteer men and/or material. Few parts of the Empire remained neutral,[35] and this response was grist to the mill of Harcourt's conceptions about the nature of Imperial unity. The speed with which contingents were mustered, particularly by Canada, Australia and Newfoundland, seemed to refute any doubts about Imperial solidarity.[36] The 500 troops from Newfoundland were 'first rate material', mostly 'crack shots', and by November 1914 another 1 000 men had volunteered from that Dominion alone. Actual numbers were unimportant - the first contingent from the Fiji islands was only 56 men;[37] it was the *spirit* which counted.

At one of his speeches at London's central YMCA in late January 1915, Harcourt's theme was the 'kinship' of Empire, which had been welded into an 'impregnable unity' by 'blood and iron'. He then went on to describe the romantic exploits of derring-do performed by the brave defenders of the Empire. He attributed the tales of success to

> the genius of the British race for self-government and good government. We have given proudly and freely the most complete autonomy to our Dominions, and we have reaped a rich harvest. Canada in the past, South Africa in the present, are witness to the fact that confidence is its own reward.

In his discussion of this speech, Cameron Hazlehurst does not give the full text, concentrating on Harcourt's glowing descriptions of the reports he received.[38] It is true, as Hazlehurst comments, that the Colonial Secretary had no experience of the real horrors of war. Since taking up his post in 1910, he had not even left the British Isles. Nor was Harcourt a 'man of action': had he been Home Secretary in place of Churchill in 1911, it is unlikely he would have been as anxious to witness the fiery demise of the anarchists trapped by the police in Sidney Street. But, in context, it can be argued that the speech was not as naive as it seemed.

Harcourt was, after all, a seasoned stateman who had travelled

considerably in his youth. Examined in full, the speech clearly shows Harcourt once again expressing his favourite theme of Imperial unity which, he insisted, only 'ill-informed, blind misguided fools' would deny the reality of. As a war-time speech made to boost morale it did serve some purpose, and was well received in the Dominions. In the Union of South Africa's State archives, which are not otherwise prolific in references to the Colonial Secretary, a copy of the speech was preserved. There was also a generally favourable response from individuals in the Dominions, as well as from their Governments.[39] In short, Hazlehurst paid insufficient attention to the context of the speech.

Harcourt made this speech on behalf of the Victoria League an organization with, initially, an all-female organizing committee. Founded in 1901, the League devoted itself to spreading accurate data about the Dominions among 'all classes' of English society. During World War One it made substantial contributions to the propaganda effort.[40] The wives of prominent politicians belonged to the League - including Selborne, Crewe, the late Alfred Lyttelton and Harcourt. But Harcourt did not support the League simply because his wife was a member of it: he had constantly supported other efforts at Imperial propaganda well before war broke out, in particular the Colonial Office Visual Instruction Committee (COVIC), and had attempted to get the colonies to support it.[41] Yet what was the reality behind this propaganda designed to foster Imperial unity?

Beneath the facade of unity the ethnic and racial tensions which had plagued the Empire before the war continued to manifest themselves. For many years after the Great War it was a well-kept secret that Australian troops were readied to come to the assistance of the Union Government in quelling the rebellion of 1914 in the Union of South Africa. Moreover, at a time when all races in the Empire wished to contribute to the war effort, the Union's Government declared that 'the present war is one which has its origin among the white people of Europe and the Government are anxious to avoid the employment of native citizens in warfare against whites'.[42] Had this attitude been prevalent, it would have facilitated the task of the Central Powers.[43] On Cyprus, the withdrawal of Imperial troops gave rise to fears of a bloodbath between Greek Cypriots and Turks.[44] Propaganda attempted to deny the internecine strife which was, at best, suspended by the Great War.

Harcourt's attitude to the 'peaceful' invasion constituted by the arrival of thousands of foreign troops in the mother country was symptomatic of the ambivalent response of British officialdom. Numerically, the single largest body of troops raised by any part of the Empire was that from India. It sent about 80 000 British and 210 000 Indian officers and men over to the war zones. By the end of the war voluntary recruitment had raised over 800 000 combatants and more than 400 000 non-combatants. As immense was India's monetary contribution,[45] yet this did not rule out racist attitudes to issues like white female nurses tending to Indian wounded at Brighton's convalescent hospitals, and in France.[46]

Many of the foreign troops arriving in England were sent to the south. Tents mushroomed over the windswept vistas of Salisbury Plain, and by the end of the war the Plain had become a vast military complex. The huge camp at Larkhill alone accommodated thousands of troops. At first, the makeshift conditions were hard for the newly-arrived troops. The Canadians arrived before the Australians and New Zealanders, and spent a long time in tents pending the (delayed) construction of huts for them. Harcourt pointed out to the Duke of Connaught, then Canadian Governor-General, that - at Kitchener's insistence - they would not be sent to the Western Front until they had undergone more training.

Discipline was bad and there were reports of 'excessive drinking'.[47] Because of these difficult conditions, it seemed thoughtful of Harcourt to suggest in mid-November 1914 that the Maoris in the contingents on their way to England should rather be sent to the more congenial climes of Egypt or the Sudan. Kitchener understood the Colonial Secretary to mean that this should apply to the other white New Zealanders, as well as the Australian troops. On Monday, 16 November, he told Harcourt prior to a Cabinet meeting that he agreed to have these contingents trained in Egypt until the spring. Harcourt was, in his own words, 'staggered'. He denied having suggested this. Nor, he added, had anyone else at the Colonial Office done so.

Next day he wrote to Kitchener to point out that if this were to be done the motivation should be made clear to the governments of the Dominions concerned. The explanation was to be that the troops were to assist in the defence of Egypt and that once they had been trained, they would definitely be sent to the Western Front to fight alongside the British forces. Provided these conditions were met, Harcourt opined,

he was sure the Egyptian climate and conditions would be better for those contingents than spending the next three months on Salisbury Plain.[48]

Kitchener agreed to the conditions; and Harcourt wrote to Connaught explaining them, regretting that he had been unable to get the Canadians to stop at Egypt as well. In the event, sunny Egypt turned out to be a very expensive luxury for many of the Australians who were later sent to Gallipoli as part of the disastrous Dardanelles operations of 1915.[49] This incident seems puzzling on the face of it: why should Harcourt have been 'staggered' by the suggestion of including the Australians and New Zealanders who were not Maoris for training in Egypt? He had intended the Maoris to go there.

His suggestion to exclude the Maoris in the first place might well have been a reflection of his reluctance to endanger the cosy picture of Imperial unity he consistently fostered and apparently believed. Britain's entry into the war intensified pre-existing xenophobia. Now, because the foe was Germany, much of this anti-alien feeling was directed against Germans, or even those with German-sounding names or connections. Prince Louis Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, found it expedient to change the family name to the more anglicized Mountbatten. Brilliant or not, he was quietly eased out of his post, only one victim of a growing Germanophobia reaching out to all levels of English society.[50]

McKenna, now Home Secretary, was placed in an invidious position. The Post-Master General, Charles Hobhouse, contemptuously noted in his diary after a Cabinet meeti ng on 9 November 1914, that Kitchener wanted as many aliens to be kept out of prison as possible, but wanted to make McKenna responsible for their non-arrest.[51] As Harcourt knew, there was neither rhyme nor reason behind the growing hysteria. Even those who were making a substantial contribution to the war economy were not spared. An appeal was made to McKenna to order the release of Julius Koch, Chief Engineer and General Manager of Olympic Oil and Cake Company Limited.

Koch was essential to the running of the factory which, under his supervision, had been turning out 100 tons of material per day since the beginning of the war, for the manufacture of butter-substitutes. Production came to a complete standstill after Koch's arrest, but - as in so many other cases - McKenna could not intervene.[52] Known 'pro-Germans'

like Harcourt and Haldane also came under attack, particularly for having German chauffeurs. Early in 1915, an Oxfordshire magistrate enquired about Harcourt's German motor man', and his Austrian maid servant.

He explained that there were complaints about this at Abingdon whichwerecausing 'serious trouble'. The Colonial Secretary pointed out that the man was naturalized, and had served him for twelve years. He was also 'doing his bit', driving wounded soldiers to Harcourt's home at Nuneham Park,converted into a place of recuperation. Also, due to the 'extraordinary response' of the local population, his recruitment was unnecessary.[53] Bearing in mi nd the bad feeling against aliens, Harcourt might have wanted to rule out any unpleasant incidents which might put the 'impregnable unity' of the Empire to the test.

The evidence does suggest that Harcourt believed anti-alien feeling could easily broaden into an extremely ugly demonstration of racism. Early in 1915, the Governor of the Leeward Islands suggested using 'coloured' labour to make good the shortage of manpower becoming evident as the war dragged on. T he incredulous tone of the reply from the Colonial Office made it clear that the implementation of this policy would make the 'Chinese slave labour' agitation of 1906 seem like a pleasant interlude by comparison. Senior Clerk FrederickButler was 'amazed' by the suggestion that 'coloured' labour be imported into the United Kingdom from the West Indies or Tropical Africa.

He wrote back that:

> I can conceive of no step which would more surely have the result of putting an absolute stop to the production of munitions of war and to the carrying on of transport and connected services by white workers in the country. It appears to me an absolutely sure specific for terminating the war forthwith, and in favour of Germany. I may say that Mr. Harcourt, to whom I showed your letter, is horrified that such an idea could be entertained.[54]

Harcourt sought to remove all causes of tension between the

troops in England, *ethnic* rather than racial. He ensured that the Newfoundland contingent was not commanded by a Canadian officer as originally planned, and that it was kept separate, and not incorporated piece-meal into the larger Canadian muster. It was easier to avoid offending colonial susceptibilities than to alleviate boredom among the troops on Salisbury Plain. When the Australians reached England they found themselves in the same limbo. One unit objected that it had not come thousands of miles to be kept busy carting gravel in motor lorries![55]

Harcourt replied that he would see what could be done but the War Office was 'very touchy' about any 'civilian' criticism or suggestions about its arrangements, even when made by the Colonial Secretary. Harcourt added that he had already made himself unpopular, 'very troublesome', as he put it, on behalf of the Canadians and

> I expect that I shall be found dead some day on the floor of Kitchener's room and him dancing around my body[56]

Despite his disclaimer about having the power to interfere with the military arrangements of the War Office, this was precisely what Harcourt tried to do. His anxiety to avoid incidents which might arise from importing large numbers of 'coloured' workers or ordinary soldiers into England did not extend to *officers:* as he saw it, they were safe. Harcourt complained to two of his senior officials that Kitchener was 'very angry' with him for wanting to bring the Ceylon contingent to England.

The War Secretary's jibe about sending them to England for 'peace purposes' rankled - it was not, Harcourt noted, as if there were a crisis in Egypt. Moreover the contingent from Ceylon was of the officer class, and this had been an attempt to help the War Office, which was at its 'wits end' to find more junior officers.[57] The Colonial Secretary seemed to have forgotten his own argument to Kitchener, presented only ten days earlier, that one of the *official* reasons for the presence of the foreign contingents in Egypt was to assist in its defence - crisis or not.

They might not hav e openly admitted it, but the preoccupation of British officials about how to cope with the large influx of foreign

- and 'native'-troops into England represented their uneasiness about the disruption of the old social order. War is, if nothing else, a social leveller. One of the very few positive achievements of the Great War was to help break down the artificial barriers between the sexes. Women's tireless efforts in the hospitals and in the factories contributed to this process. Even convinced anti-suffragists like Harcourt had to admit women's claim to the vote would be difficult to deny after the war.[58]

Social attitudes and prejudices do not however change overnight. Refractory racist attitudes were the most persistent. The concern about white females tending Indian wounded illustrated this. The Edwardian period was not so far removed from the Victorian, in which it was almost inconceivable - as Florence Nightingale found out - for women to be nurses at all, let alone tend to soldiers of *other* races. The allusion of Sir Walter Lawrence[59] in March 1915 to the 'perverted behaviour' of English women during the visit of Indian troops for the coronation of George V in 1910 expressed the 'conventional' view of all inter-racial relations before, during and after the Great War. Colour bars were no less real for being implicit.

Although Harcourt had had reason to complain about how 'touchy' the War Office was over what it regarded as interference in the matters under its control, Kitchener and his staff did not have a monopoly on 'touchiness'. Due to the heart trouble which obliged him to rest Harcourt was unable to accompany George V and Kitchener on an inspection tour of the Salisbury Plain camps,[60] but the row over alleged 'leaks' of naval intelligence lasted until long after his convalescence. On 20 October 1914 Harcourt telegraphed his old friend Sir Robert Chalmers about the Admiralty's allegations of leaks of information which could be useful to the Emden. This was a Ger man raider preying on merchant ships in the Indian Ocean area. The Governor of Ceylon vehemently denied that the Emden had been assisted: with three British cruisers available as against twenty-five in the Atlantic, it was not surprising that she would avoid capture except by som e 'happy accident'.[61]

Harcourt scribbled a note to his Permanent Under Secretary:

I must administer some emolument to the injured

> Chalmers! Please send the Ceylon file to me when you receive this so that I may compound the sedative.[62]

However Chalmers was determined not to let the matter rest, and in his next letter asked Harcourt to take it up with Churchill's Intelligence Department. The Colonial Secretary asked the First Lord for some 'expression of regret' which would pacify Chalmers. Churchill maintained that Chalmers had no grievance, although Harcourt pointed out that the allegations had been completely unfounded.

There could, the First Lord wrote, be no question of an apology from his department:

> False information is of course often received and unless it is *prima facie* false it must be investigated.[63]

Harcourt decided to send his correspondence with Churchill to Chalmers to show that he had tried his best, but made a last effort. By now Churchill, like Harcourt, was growing tired of the affair, which had dragged on well into the new year. Not to be outdone in tenacity, he insisted again that he would not admit or imply that Admiralty Intelligence was in the wrong. He did not think so, and therefore he could not say so - surely, he concluded, the Colonial Secretary could allow him to 'bear the burden' of Chalmers' displeasure?[64]

When the Emden was finally brought to bay on 9 November 1914, Chalmers was surprised to note, from the British newspapers, how much larger the raider's exploits had loomed at home than in Ceylon itself, until the Australian vessel Sydney brought in the wounded from the Emden. But he did not forget the 'unpleasant time' he had had in his 'Liliput'; even in his farewell letter to Harcourt after the formation of the coalition government he implicitly referred to the affair:

> I grieve in the matter of your departure as much as I rejoice at the downfall of Winston (Psalm 120 Verse 3).[65]

Despite the considerable 'personal discomfort' this episode cost Harcourt, as he wrote to Churchill, it did not divert his main attention from the progress of the war and, in particular, the development of his ideas about its wider *strategical* implications.

The areas which particularly interested Harcourt were the Pacific and West Africa. In the former war zone, he was not thinking only about the future disposition of German colonies. As noted earlier, he had been annoyed by the refusal of the French to give up their right to introduce foreign labour in the New Hebrides. Only two days after war had broken out, he was writing to Alfred Emmott, his Under Secretary, that

> I hope the result of this war will be a totally new set of conditions in the Pacific, which will enable us to get rid finally of the impossible conditions which the Condominium has imposed.[66]

This did not happen, despite Harcourt's resentment of the French presence on the islands. The Colonial Secretary was also to be disappointed, as will be seen, by the extent of the French share of the West African colonies. In practice, the need for Anglo-French military cooperation overrode all pre-war suspicions - and war plans.[67] In fact, on the very first day after the expiration of the British ultimatum to Germany, the Cabinet appointed a Joint Naval and Military Offensive Subcommittee 'to declare what objectives can be assigned to joint expeditions with a view to produce a definite effect on the result of the war'.[68] Whether Harcourt liked it or not, France was now an active partner in the conquest of German colonies. So was Japan, in the hostilities against Germany in the Pacific.

British naval weakness in the Far East led the Cabinet to accept, albeit reluctantly, that Japanese assistance would be needed. The moot point was the *extent* of the assistance. As it turned out, Cabinet discussion of the issue was made academic when, on 12 August, Grey received a telegram from the British ambassador at Tokyo informing that Japan intended, of her own accord, to declare war on Germany. It was not that Japan *had* to do this in terms of the alliance with Britain, or that Japanese-German relations were bad: domestic political considerations

contributed to the decision.[69]

Japan declared war against Germany on 23 August 1914, and by the end of the year the hostilities in the Far East and the Pacific were effectively over. The Japanese had acquired a whole new string of former German possessions in the Marianas, Marshalls and Caroline groups of islands. The question now was who would retain possesion of the islands after the war. Harcourt hoped that the Australians, who were especially sensitive to a Japanese presence near their shores, would accept a division whereby Japan would occupy the islands north of the equator, and Australia those to the south. He was particularly anxious that the Japanese should not get Yap although the island was not held to be of great strategic significance, despite its potential usefulness to the United States as a cable station.[70]

Churchill was, once again, not swayed by Harcourt's fervour. He noted that no cruiser could be spared for Yap, and 'much inconvenience' would be caused by any changes in naval dispositions. There appeared, he added,

> to be no military reasons which require us to eject the Japanese at this juncture. I do not gather that the Australian Government are pressing us to act. On the contrary, it would seem that you were pressing them. The Admiralty would strongly deprecate any action towards Japan which would appear suspicious or ungracious. We are deriving the greatest benefit from their powerful and gracious aid. They have intimated that the occupation is purely military and devoid of political significance and there I trust we may leave the matter for the present.[71]

Unable to get support from the Admiralty, Harcourt had to do the next best thing to reassure the anxious Australians that Britain and Japan were not secretly dealing behind their backs. Harcourt instructed the British ambassador at Tokyo to round up all references in the Japanese papers to Australia and the islands now captured; he was

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also allowed by Grey to obtain copies of all British and Japanese communications on the subject of the ex-German islands, and these 'essential telegrams' were dispatched to Munro-Ferguson, the Australian Governor-General.[72] In the end, Harcourt's misgivings *were* justified: internal political pressures on the militarists meant that Japan's 'temporary' occupation of the ex-German islands became permanent.[73]

In West Africa, Harcourt came close to behaving like the 'War Lord' he jokingly claimed to be. Togoland was occupied by August, but even while the struggle for the Cameroons raged on, Harcour was asking the opinions of the men on the spot about the value of the ex-German territories. General Dobell, the British military commander in the Cameroons, advised that in a post-war partition of the country (with France)Duala and Victoria should remain in British hands. Possession of one should entai l holding the other - a captured German document prepared by a naval officer testified to Duala's natural defensive resources which, if added to, would make it impregnable. It would be an invaluable naval base.[74]

Not long after the British had taken Duala from the Germans, Harcourt asked Lugard what parts of the Cameroons should go to France - the Colonial Secretary's original idea was to give up all of it, and perhaps get French Dahomey so as to make the Gold Coast and Nigeria a continuous British possession - and Togoland might perhaps be given to France in return for its half of the New Hebrides Condominium.[75] Lugard suggested, in this private correspondence, that Adamawa and the small enclave of German Bornu might be incorporated into Nigeria, but was against the idea of any concessions to the French, because this would, in the eyes of the local peoples, make it seem as if the British had been forced into this, leading them to believe that the French were more powerful.

After further consultation with Dobell and a personal visit to Duala, Lugard confirmed the general's high estimate of the port's value. Moreover, it was already very valuable because the habour works and buildings were largely intact, along with quantities of stores and machinery.[76] The senior naval officer at Duala also opined that it could be an impregnable naval fortress and coaling station, and that allowing it to fall under foreign control would seriously endanger British possessions

in the area and endanger the South African trade route. The arguments by Dobell and Lugard evidently heavily influenced Harcourt's thinking on the future partitions.

He instructed the Governor of the Gold Coast to prepare a memorandum exploring all the possibilities, and Sir Hugh Clifford produced a comprehensive effort, in which he noted that the Cameroons would possibly be more important to the French than Togoland because of its proximity to Lake Tchad. From the British point of view, the acquisition of Dahomey and Togoland would provide Britain with inter-communications between the Gold Coast and Nigeria without passing through foreign territory. This, Clifford estimated, should in the long run reduce the cost of administration by £190 000 per annum. Also, a single customs tariff could be put into operation along a British-controlled coast-line measuring about 700 miles in extent.

This was an attractive prospect, in view of the fact that Togoland or Dahomey were unlikely to pay their way for years because of the higher salaries paid to white and black officials, compared to their French (and formerly) German counterparts. Brief as it was, the Togoland campaign would, Clifford showed Harcourt, cost about £50 000.[77] Harcourt's initiatives on these issues casts doubt once more on Hazlehurst's implied view of him as an 'armchair strategist': the Colonial Secretary was not just indulging in fanciful paper-partitioning but paying close attention to the economics of Imperial post-war readjustments. The fact that Harcourt's memorandum on 'The Spoils', circulated to the Cabinet in March 1915, takes as its starting point the fall of Constantinople should not be overemphasized as an example of how unrealistic his views were.

Harcourt was not the only one in the Cabinet to underestimate the Turkish soldier's capacity to resist.[78] The War Council[79] endorsed the plan to attack Turkey through the Dardenelles, the narrows between Europe and Asia Minor. It was Churchill who advocated a purely naval attempt to force the narrows, and when this failed, the belated landing of troops on the Gallipoli peninsula ran into heavy Turkish opposition. Harcourt's old parliamentary sparring partner Josiah Wedgwood was directly involved in the operations, and wrote on board ship prior to one of the landings that

> So far as I can learn things are going badly here and the attitude is despair of ever forcing the narrows ... the fleet have found the Dardanelles - mines, forts, field howitzers and submerged torpedo tubes - too much for them, and are waiting for the Army. How the Army is ever to help them I cannot puzzle out. It is bad enough to land at all, and the Gallipoli peninsula is a checkboard of wire and trenches ...[80]

The landing on V beach on 26 April 1915 nearly cost Wedgwood his life, and the overall failure of the operations cost Churchill his post, although immediate large-scale troop-landings might have turned a fiasco into a very significant success.[81] To return to 'The Spoils', it should be mentioned that this was the first attempt to outline British war aims in the colonial sphere.[82] Presented to the Cabinet for discussion, 'The Spoils' did not ultimately influence post-war British policy, partly due to its anti-French bias, Harcourt's lack of standing as a strategist,and its essentially speculative nature. Nonetheless, despite its mistakes, particularly about Turkey, the document is of considerable interest. In its wide-ranging discussion of post-war territorial redistribution, 'The Spoils' was not entirely inaccurate. Russia did not get Constantinople, but Japan *did* hang on to her Pacific mandates, and the Union of South Africa certainly proceeded to consolidate its grip on German South West Africa.[83]

Just as Crewe saw part of Mesopotamia as a possible outlet for Indian emigration, so Harcourt envisaged German East Africa fulfilling such a function.[84] Harcourt did not think the British would need - or could usefully occupy - more than a quarter of the Cameroons, while retaining the northern railway with its terminus at Duala,

> the town and harbour of which in enemy hands could easily be made an impregnable and menacing naval base against our West and South African commerce.

France would also have, in addition to the bulk of the Cameroons, joint occupation of Togoland and the Port of Dahomey. In return, it would cede its half of the New Hebrides and - one of Harcourt's old concerns - the

settlement of Jibuti, which, he stated 'controls the mischievous arms traffic to Abyssinia and Central Africa'.[85]

The obvious reason that Harcourt's proposals for West Africa bore a closer resemblance to reality than some of his Near East proposals was his direct involvement in the operations there. Because the Cameroons were not finally subdued by British and French forces until early 1916, the logistics of the operations, and their expense, imposed an unbearable strain on the Office. As the struggle in the Cameroons continued the Office found it could no longer cope, and the War Office took over direct control of the campaign.

Not long before his demotion the would-be 'War Lord' wrote to Dobell admitting that

> We at the Colonial Office had exhausted all our resources in the way of material and personnel and I found it increasingly difficult - indeed practically impossible - to extract from the War Office the men whom you required as Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. I have no doubt that now the War Office are directly responsible that they will do you better in these matters than I have found it possible to do.[86]

The prolongation of the war reduced the Colonial Office's ability to cope with its tasks on a daily basis - irrespective of actual military setbacks, such as at Tanga in East Africa[87] - and its faltering was symptomatic of the wider, ongoing disintegration of the machinery of government itself.

The Cabinet had been badly shaken by the crisis of July/August 1914, which accounts for the ease with which Kitchener had reversed its previous decision not to send the Expeditionary Force to France. Pease and the other pacifists had been made 'miserable beyond measure', as he put it, by the harrowing decision to go to war. Now they were

apparently willing to entrust the conduct of the war to the military experts. As David French shows, Kitchener got the Cabinet to accept a 'nation in arms' strategy, as distinct from previously intended reliance on naval and economic pressure on Germany.[88] The period of Kitchener's greatest ascendancy was from August 1914 to March 1915, by which time his Cabinet influence was on the wane. Even his prestige and influence could not offset the growing pressure on the Government on two fronts.

Firstly, because the war was not going well, and because the Liberal rank and file were becoming uneasy about the Government's handling of 'core' issues like free trade and conscription. The initial feeling of unity which had taken the Liberal Party into the war was beginning to wear thin. A clash of fundamental principles was imminent, in which the Government would have to choose. The choice was between increasingly intrusive, bureacratic measures to ensure more men for industry and the armed forces, and to make production and distribution of munition and supplies more efficient, or support of traditional Liberal values. Harcourt himself was aware of this dilemma as early as September 1914, when Sir Charles Macara, the president of the English Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations, made a plea on behalf of cotton.

Macara wanted the governments of Britain, the United States of America, Egypt and India to coordinate to buy up and store the anticipated surplus of cotton due to the war-time slump in demand from Europe. It must have been doubly unpleasant for Harcourt, knowing the importance of the cotton industry to Lancashire, and being MP for a Lancashire 'cotton' town, to turn down Macara's appeal.[89] Such wholesale State intervention - Macara had estimated the cost of buying up the surplus as between £65 000 000 to £70 000 000 - was not as yet acceptable to the Government in this or other spheres, such as fiscal policy. By the same token, the Dominions were not amenable to a relaxation of their internal fiscal policies. Smuts expressed their general view that a reduction of duty on UK goods, non-competitive or not, would mean an unacceptably high loss of revenue.

Yet, if the Dominions were wedded to protectionist policies, the mother country was not. So when McKenna became Chancellor of the Exchequer after the coalition of May 1915, his September budget intro-

ducing a tax proportional to estimated value of goods on luxury items caused considerable dissension in Liberal ranks. The movement away from free trade via this 33⅓ per cent *ad valorem* tariff was due to the exigencies of war-time finance. But the growing strain on Government was not measured solely via shifts in fiscal policy. As Chris Cook notes in his history of the Liberal Party, the furore over McKenna's Budget was indicative of the even greater conflict to come over conscription. This issue encapsulated a fundamental liberal commitment to the defence of individual rights, and rejection of State encroachment on those rights.

On conscription it was ironical that both the ex-leaders of the Opposition stood firmer against it than the leader of Harcourt's own party was prepared to do in Cabinet. The Colonial Secretary remained implacably opposed to conscription for the reasons cited above, and it was no accident that the subject had featured in his 1913 speeches, so as to counter the last nation-wide 'stump' by Lord Roberts before the war.[90] During the war itself Asquith tried to steer a neutral course to preserve the party's unity, but it was no secret that Churchill, Lloyd George and Haldane were amongst those Cabinet Ministers who favoured conscription as much as Harcourt, Simon and Hobhouse opposed it.

The issue of conscription posed the most serious threat to Liberal unity yet. High ranking Liberals like Chief Whip Percy Illingworth were prepared to oppose conscription at all costs, although in December 1914 he fell ill and never returned to the House of Commons. Like Lloyd George who made powerful speeches to promote recruitment, Harcourt initially hoped to fill the gaps with volunteers. Certainly there was no shortage of them on the outbreak of war - indeed, more than the War Office could cope with.[91] Yet by late 1914 Asquith felt that the limits of this approach were being reached, and despite his own aversion to compulsion ex-Prime Minister Balfour shared this view. Asquith's invitation to Balfour to join the War Council set up in November 1914 was indicative of the dissolving barriers between the two major parties.

The War Council was supposedly a sub-committee of the CID, but effectively came to dominate the conduct of the war.[92] On the Council, as in the Cabinet, Kitchener and Churchill ran the military side of business and Asquith headed this triumvirate. By March 1915 the

Council had been joined by Haldane, Crewe, McKenna, Admiral Wilson and Harcourt. This now made the Council the *real* power in Government, but with most of the Cabinet's most powerful and dynamic members serving on it, Harcourt had even less chance of influencing Government policy. Conscription became a real possibility due to the political crisis. Since the start of the war, the Unionists had allowed the Government to proceed on its business unimpeded. Criticism would have seemed unpatriotic at first.

But by early 1915 the Government's growing inability to keep the war economy functioning smoothly could justify open attack on the grounds of national interests. This, as Cameron Hazlehurst notes, was why the Opposition was in a strong position. But Bonar Law regarded the attack from a purely *party* point of view: he did not want to form a coalition.[93] Yet eventually common interest did drive the two party leaders into coalition. There were several reasons for it. Both faced a challenge from dissident back-bencher s and from more senior members of their parties; the latter consideration as Koss argues, probably weighed more heavily with Law than had hitherto been realized because prior to Asquith's direct approach on 17 May he did recognize that coalition would be pulling the Liberal's chestnuts out of the fire.

Asquith was well aware of this as well. Not only would he be re-establishing his control over the Liberal Party, but also ensure - as the distribution of Cabinet seats did - that the Liberals held the preponderance of senior posts. Asquith did not care about what happened to Labour in terms of the 'new deal'.[94] Coalition would also facilitate a greater degree of State centralization, although Asquith was not prepared to go as far as Lloyd George along this road. As early as 9 November 1914 the Chancellor had referred, in the Commons, to the need for a man of 'push and go' to ensure an uninterrupted supply of munitions. He was actually the man who fitted his own description, although Asquith could hardly guess that Lloyd George's assumption of the newly-created Ministry of Munitions in the coalition formed on 25 May 1915 was in fact to mark an important step on his way to the premiership.

Harcourt's correspondence does not indicate that - unlike McKenna, Runciman and Hobhouse[95] - he suspected a major new political realignment was in the offing. He continued to write to the Chancellor

about routine matters, and their working relations seem to have been no worse - or better, than usual. As 1914 drew to a close, he wrote to Lloyd George to express his strong disapproval of the suggestion to make the financial year correspond with the calendar year. This would force every single British colony and protectorate to alter its finances and accounts, Harcourt objected, invoking (as usual) the authority of his late father:

> I beg you to read carefully the papers which must be on record at the Treasury on this matter. It was considered, or at least discussed, when my father was Chancellor of the Exchequer and I think you will be able to find on record some very strong expressions on the subject by him.[96]

Where the two men did have 'most amiable consultations' was over war finance and in particular the question of Australian war loans, having the common objectives of curbing Australian and other - including British-extravagance.[97]

During the final phase of the pre-coalition period much of Harcourt's attention was focussed on developments in the United States. He hosted visiting Americans, and anxiously monitored the US reactions to the Allied tightening of the naval blockade around Germany. This was due to the change of German maritime strategy, embodied in the announcement on 18 February 1915 that the waters around the British Isles were now a war zone. Now all ships would be sunk on sight. This, in turn, enabled Britain to free itself of the self-imposed shackles which adherence to the Declaration of London since August 1914 constituted. Now Britain declared that all ships suspected of carrying goods to Germany would be intercepted and searched at British ports.

From information gleaned from a correspondent's talks with ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, Harcourt knew that public feeling against President Woodrow Wilson's Democratic administration was due more to inaction over border incidents with Mexico than hostility to the British move. The considerable anti-German sentiment offset the political influence of German-Americans, especially in the mid-West.[98] In one of his letters to the South African Governor-General, Harcourt described his

contribution to the preservation of amicable Anglo-American relations:

> There are a great number of American politicians Senators and pressmen over here just now and I see a good deal of them in order to keep their views as friendly as possible. The fact of May being an American is very useful in this direction.[99]

American visitors both before and after the war certainly enjoyed their stay at Nuneham. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Woodrow Wilson's implacable post-war opponent, and his wife were most impressed. The Senator remarked it was virtually the only place he had seen which he would not wish to change in any way.[100] Another caller was Herbert Croly a friend of Bryce, and the editor of The New Republic, a new weekly journal. When Croly arrived in England, they had a 'very frank' and 'charming' talk, the Colonial Secretary noted, on the understanding that the talk would not be treated as an interview, and not be publicised. It is possible that Harcourt urged closer American commitment to Britain at this and other meetings with American visitors,[101] but his main concern at that time - April 1915 - was to placate American opinion over British abandonment of the Declaration of London.

To the New York correspondent who had suggested the meeting with Croly, Harcourt wrote:

> The use of the word "blockade" in Sir Edward Grey's communication to the Government of the United States seems to have been successful in its object and I think you will be interested to know that it was entirely the result of your conversation with Sir John Simon and me. We reported the gist of it immediately to Sir Edward Grey, with the result that you now know.

Straight concurred that the use of the word 'blockade'

> has really helped to reconcile opinion in this country to measures against which it would otherwise have felt that it must protest, not because of any anti-British feeling, but merely on the

ground of self-respect.[102]

Yet, substantial as Harcourt's contribution to the American acceptance of unrestricted British search on the seas might have been, the really significant factor moulding American public opinion was the sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine on 7 May 1915. Croly had used the great ocean-going liner to reach England only 2 months earlier, and the loss of 1 100 passengers, including American citizens, helped to pave the way for the eventual United States entry into the war on the side of the *Entente* powers.

On 17 May 1915 Asquith sent around a red box to which only Cabinet Ministers had the key, asking for the provisional resignation of each departmental chief and his Under-Secretary. In his explanatory letter to Lord Stanfordham, George V's secretary, the Prime Minister wrote that after 'much reflection and consultation' he had come to the conclusion that for a successful prosecution of the war the Government had to be rebuilt on a broad, non-party basis.[103] The explanation provided to his ministers, also circulated by Asquith in a Cabinet box, was the need for national unity, in the face of a double crisis. These crises were the resignation of Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord on 15 May, and the allegations by Repington in The Times of Wednesday 14 May about a shortage of high-explosive shells.

In fact, the evidence indicates that Asquith had made overtures to Bonar Law about coalition as early as 12 May, aware that within both Cabinet and party the split over policies like conscription and a more centralized control by Government were coming to a head.[104] A coalition government would be able to pursue policies unacceptable to many Liberals, but at the same time a disgruntled Cabinet interpreted Asquith's action in different ways. Much bad feeling was directed at Churchill, who was thought to have provoked the crisis, not only by having led Fisher to resign over the First Sea Lord's handling of the Dardanelles operations, but his involvement i n the intrigue which led to the publication of the Times article about the shell shortage.[105]

Harcourt's view was that it was a ploy by Fisher to try to get

good terms from a Unionist administration. 'I think', he wrote to Esher the Monday after the termination of Britain's last Liberal Government, 'Jacky has triumphed'.[106] The Colonial Secretary decided to await events, although Hobhouse opined in his diary on 20 May that Harcourt would retire at his own request. Certainly Harcourt was in danger of being displaced: as Asquith wrote to Stanfordham on 19 May, Harcourt managed his office well, but was in poor health, and was of no use in the Commons or in the running of the war.[107] Yet Harcourt supported Asquith over issues like conscription, and - if one of his correspondents is to be believed - was popular with Liberals from Cornwall to Orkney,[108] so was not so easy to discard.

By the third of four counts Harcourt was removed from the loser's column and reassigned to the Office of Works. Alfred Emmott, Harcourt's Under-Secretary, wrote to Asquith to protest the possibility of Churchill replacing 'Lulu' as Colonial Secretary, for the sake of the Dominions:

> An office revolt might be the first result. He [Churchill] has neither the temperament nor manners to fit him for the post. I was at the C.O. for two years and a half and I am so convinced of the truth of what I write that I am willing to risk your displeasure rather than remain silent about it.[109]

In fact, Churchill did not get the post he had applied for as far back as 1908, and was relegated to the backwater chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster, a ministerial post without portfolio. Bonar Law got the Colonial Secretaryship, although he had hoped for the Exchequer or the new Ministry of Munitions. In the past, he had already liaised with Harcourt on the eve of Colonial Office debates, when he had led the Opposition's attack,[110] and the post was certainly not beyond his capabilities. Indeed, his biographer states that Asquith might really have believed that Law's abilities did not merit a more important post than this Office. By the same token, if the Office was, at best, of secondary importance in time of war, Harcourt's reshuffle back to Works represented a considerable demotion.

Many correspondents wrote to express their sympathy at the sacrifice he made, but Harcourt regarded the situation philosophically: he had, he wrote to one governor, had a very happy and not unsuccessful four and a half years, and just as a cook could not make an omelette without breaking eggs, so too

> a Prime Minister cannot make a coalition without breaking colleagues, and as the incoming Tories had to be fed with big offices it was natural that mine should be one of them ... I am quite happy at my old place at the Office of Works. I do not propose to show Mr Bonar Law your private and personal papers to me, but have informed him orally of the general trend of affairs in Newfoundland and shall continue to place my knowledge of them at his disposal as a colleague.[111]

According to Harcourt, in another letter to Buxton, he would have been willing to leave the Government altogether, because he did not believe in coalitions, but the Prime Minister had pressed him 'very strongly' not to leave - to remain in the Cabinet to assist him, and 'I could hardly refuse or people might have said that I was not willing to play the game'.[112] Very few remained to 'play the game'. As the Times noted, only six members remained of the Cabinet formed by CB in 1905: Asquith(PM) Sir Edward Grey (unchanged), Crewe (Lord President of the Council), Birrell (Ireland) and Lloyd George (a new Ministry of Munitions). But Liberals still had the upper hand, and were not 'helpless before a solid force of Tories'.[113] Only Balfour (Admiralty) and Austen Chamberlain (India Office) held senior posts.

The Times article concluded with approval that the composition of the new Cabinet reflected the continuity of English political life. The Cabinet underlined the 'value of heredity' containing the sons of Lord Randolph Churchill, Sir William Harcourt, Roundell Palmer, Lord Selborne and Joseph Chamberlain.[114] The Nation was less impressed by the readjustments: it opined that :

> Nothing is added to the ability of the Administration ... and less than nothing to its experience ... politicians are not bits of machinery ... and if members

> of Cabinets fly asunder after long association, they are also united by strong common ties of service, or affection, or principle. If these are lightly severed, [it] do[es] not augur well ... [115].

Harcourt's good relations with his staff were illustrated by their reactions to his departure. Furse, one of the recruiting agents, expressed his regret, as did unpaid secretary JCC Davidson, who offered to follow Harcourt to Works 'quite indifferent to pay and conditions as long as I would be with you'. He added that if Law preferred him to stay on he would comply, provided Senior Clerk Frederick Butler did so because he did not want to serve under an 'outsider'.[116] The faithful Davidson and an assistant subsequently spent months packing and tidying Harcourt's personal records. This included arranging, filing and indexing all minutes and telegrams concerning the negotiations over the revision of the secret treaty of 1898. By February 1916 Davidson announced, somewhat regretfully, that the 'Augean stable' had now been cleaned.[117] Frederick Butler also subsequently wrote to thank Harcourt for the 'great kindness' shown to him and the kind comments about his work, adding that

> You are still 'the chief' when we talk about you, as we often do ... [118]

So the wheel had come full circle. Harcourt was pushing his 'perambulator' once again, to use A.G. Gardiner's phrase, dealing with the same old problems and the new ones posed by 'total' war. One of the very first tasks he had to face - and it was a familiar one - was how to fit in all ministers in the limited office available. As Simon wryly notified him, an 'incidental' result of the coalition was that the Home Secretary had no room. Attorney-General Sir Edward Carson had taken Simon's room, McKenna (now Chancellor) kept his, as did Lloyd George. Harcourt found Simon a room next to McKenna, but noted that the 'difficulties about Ministers' Rooms are very great'.[119]

As time went on, Harcourt's misgivings about the value of a coalition were reinforced. He did, as promised, liase with Law. The latter was pleased that Harcourt agreed to be Chairman of the Committee of the Imperial Bureau of Entomology because of his familiarity with

the Bureau's work.[120] Yet, however well the Cabinet worked together, or tried to, Harcourt commented to a Major Wilson, it seemed 'intensely unpopular in every quarter'. Mor eover, as he wrote to Lord Liverpool, the Unionists were 'of course, lamentably deficient in all knowledge of what took place during the first nine months of the war before they joined us'.[121]

Writing to Buxton, Harcourt noted that the 'experiment' did not seem to have greatly increased confidence in the Government. He complained about 'mischievous and troublesome little cliques' in the Commons. He felt that the loss of an official Opposition was a great justification of the merits of ordinary party government. Nor did he think much of the Dardanelles Committee, the successor of the War Council:

> You well see that we have set up a sort of Junta within the Cabinet to sit more or less continuously to take urgent decisions, though not to deprive the Cabinet as a whole of their responsibility for a share in questions of large policy.[122]

Ultimately, Asquith did not fare better as the leader of a coalition than a single party, and was unable to preserve unity within the Liberal camp. Apart from the *ad valorem* tariff introduced by McKenna which outraged Liberal free trade rs, as noted earlier, the most divisive issue as the year 1915 drew to a close was conscription. Its opponents still hoped to rely on volunteers. As Harcourt put it during a speech at Rawtenstall in mid-May, willing volunteers made fine soldiers.[123] Advocates of conscription like Lloyd George probably would not have disagreed with this, but indiscriminate enlistment played havoc with the manpower needs of industry. For Lloyd George the real usefulness of conscription lay in its capacity to allow the rationalization and disciplining of industrial manpower. Asquith and his supporters did not believe this.

Nor indeed did they accept plans for national centralization of effort on the lines envisaged by the relentless Minister of Munitions. This fundamental split on principle was to prove fatal to Liberal unity.[124] To avoid conscription, and ensure a steady flow of volunteers,

recruiting methods needed to be efficient. As early as November 1914, Harcourt's dissatisfaction with the results of the drive for volunteers led him to suggest to Kitchener that local agents of the two major parties could be given official status as recruiting agents. However Kitchener told Harcourt that any offi[illegible] recruiting agent had to be an Army man.[125] When Lord Derby became Direct[illegible]-General of Recruiting, he listened more sympathetically to Harcourt's proposal. Derby decided to make use of political agents but did not, as Harcourt wanted, give them temporary commissions.

Derby explained that many agents had already enlisted - it would not be fair to allow men who had already done so to serve as privates, while those who remained at home received commissions as officers. Also, were all agents uniformly fit to be given commissions? How would the distinction be made?[126] Acting on Derby's recommendations, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and the Joint Labour Recruiting Committee (chaired by Henderson) sent out forms to all political constituencies. They were asked to canvass, as if they were conducting a general election. Individual MPs, like Harcourt, were mobilized to support the drive in their constituencies.[127]

Harcourt needed little urging to boost the recruiting drive - he had already been doing so for some time, praising the efforts of Lord Derby, coaxing his audiences to put their trust in the Government to fulfill its triple task: control of the seas, enrolment and equipment of men, and the maintenance of a world-wide credit. The second had to be done 'within limits' if the first and last tasks were to be done.[128] The existence of a coalition at least spared Harcourt the worry of thinking about an election. Prior to coalition he had opposed postponement of an election (to have been held by January 1916 at the latest)[129] but had now come around to the view that conscription was too explosive an issue to risk contesting an election on.

Despite the rear-guard action fought by the advocates of voluntary recruitment, the Western Front's maw required ever greater numbers of soldiers. Even the Commons itself had a deserted look, with many MPs on active service - Harcourt's own brother, Robert, was with the Royal Naval Air Service, and was promoted to temporary Lieutenant.[130] Lord Derby's drive for volunteers began in October 1915, but when his scheme

was seen to be failing, plans for conscription went ahead. By Thursday, 28 December 1915, the Cabinet had produced a draft compulsion bill, and there was growing press speculation about who would resign over the issue. Simon and Harcourt were thought to be in the 'will resign' category.[131] In the end the latter stayed, as did McKenna, Birrell, Runciman and Sir Edward Grey.

They were all unenthusiastic about conscription, but Asquith persuaded them, once again, to 'play the game'. Derby's scheme had attempted to satisfy both military and industrial manpower needs by calling up groups, and taking single men first. But there was resentment at the privileged position given to married men, and the lack of response meant that the Military Service Act replaced the voluntary system in January 1916. Harcourt's subsequent speeches show that he still could not accept that the *principles* involved had been given away for good, and he maintained that the majority of the English people *still* opposed conscription. But events had made such a claim ring rather hollow. Journalistic in-fighting raged - Harcourt's friend A.G. Gardiner's crusade against Lloyd George in the Daily News, while the First Commissioner of Works indignantly refuted in public speeches the 'outrageous and scandalous press abuse' directed at the Prime Minister.

Harcourt now had less pressure of work - he could entertain friends on leave from activ e service at Nuneham, devote more time to gardening, and accept trusteeship s, such as that of the National Portrait Gallery.[132] But the strain of office began to tell on less fortunate colleagues. In March 1916 Harcourt had filled in briefly for Runciman at the Board of Trade. In the last week of May Runciman turned up as usual for the first two days, then suffered a complete breakdown. He was ordered to rest for a considerable period. The Times noted that Harcourt was standing in for him and speculated that he would presumably also accompany Bonar Law to Paris for a conference on economic affairs. To one of his correspondents, Harcourt confirmed Runciman's absence

> may, I fear extend to several months. The work is so new to me and therefore at first rather overwhelming that I am not able to go in Runciman's

> place to the Paris Conference but we are sending Crewe instead ... [133]

Despite this brief spell at the Board of Trade, Harcourt's final months in office effectively marked the twilight of his public career. When Birrell resigned after the Easter Rebellion of 1916 it was surmised that Harcourt might replace him, although the Times expressed surprise that there was *any* place for Harcourt in a War Government. [134] Actually H.E.Duke, the future Lord Merrivale, was selected as Birrell's successor, and Harcourt had no intention of embarking on a major new departure even had he been considered for the appointment. By 1916 what limited influence Harcourt had possessed in Cabinet was on the wane, and this was illustrated by his last major [illegible] with Sir Edward Grey over foreign policy. The dispute was over [illegible]-French negotiations over the post-war political boundaries in West Africa.

As Gaddis Smith has pointed out, the disposition of the German colonies in Africa was not one of the British Government's major concerns during the Great War, but did relate to a wider debate over how best to preserve and extend British imperial power and security during the post-war period.[135] Via his attempt to keep Duala in British hands, Harcourt revealed a continuing anti-French bias which placed him outside the 'mainstream' of post-war policy formulation. In this dispute Harcourt did have some sympathizers, but his protests indicated that he believed he should have a greater say in post-war colonial agreements. This the Cabinet was not prepared to allow him since he was no longer at the Colonial Office. But this fact did not dissuade Harcourt, who was infuriated by reports from Lugard that the French were acting on the assumption that they were to take possession of Duala.

Harcourt expressed his 'utter dissent' from the decision to cede Duala taken 'without any consultation or concurrence on my part' in his indignant missive to Asquith. In his very brief note in reply, the Prime Minister pointed out that the Duala arrangement was 'purely provisional', and had been approved by the representatives of the Army and Navy and the Colonial and Foreign Offices.[136] Harcourt was also rebuffed by Grey's equally curt reply to his protest: 'I contend that the French occupation is provisional and that my language is clear'.[137] Harcourt received this note on 28 February, two days after his abortive

appeal to Asquith, and he now decided to appeal to First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Balfour. Harcourt insisted that the port was the finest in the west coast of Africa - 'everyone' who knew about Duala was convinced of this.

It could be made into an impregnable base by its possessers, and should therefore never be allowed to pass out of British control 'lest it should be a standing menance to the whole of our West and South African commerce as well as the Cape route to India'.[138] Harcourt then cited the Prime Minister and Kitchener's statements about the provisional nature of the arrangement, and also directed Balfour's attention to his memorandum prepared in March 1915 on 'The Spoils'. In response to this attempted outflanking movement, Grey circulated a brief note in Cabinet addressed to Aristide Briand, the French premier, informing him of the 'very great opposition ... from colonial circles' to the proposed French occupation of Duala. Although the consensus of Cabinet opinion was to let France have the port, Harcourt persisted.

He drew up a lengthy memorandum on The Cameroons, with attached letters going right back to 1914 concerning the value of Duala. The memorandum set out his o bj ections once more, and asked why the British had not at least got something in return for such a great gift - a share in Togoland, or the French half of the New Hebrides. Harcourt noted also that Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, had stated that the French colonialists in the Government were 'very excited' and that Duala was the only possible port for French Central Africa', and it was clear that Cambon did not see the arrangement as temporary and provisional.[139] Harcourt did not win his forlorn, one-man campaign, because he lacked support in the Cabinet. Supporters like J.C.C.Davidson and Lord Islington lacked influence.

The latter, who had been made Under-Secretary for India shortly after the coalition, remarked that the 'absurd arrangement' about Duala would never have been possible had Harcourt still been at the Colonial Office:

> If Grey is allowed a free hand - like in this instance - he will fritter away all our bargaining powers before the conclusion of the war, and we

> shall find ourselves empty handed in our attempts to secure exchanges etc with our very astute Ally.[140]

Thus Harcourt was not the only one suspicious of France, but he came out of this episode no more successfully than from his previous disagreements with the Foreign Secretary over the nonratification of the revised Anglo-German secret treaty[141] and the use of the term 'Triple Entente' in diplomatic correspondence. Even if he did not realize it, he lacked the weight in policy-making circles to modify Anglo-French colonial agreements.

A far more significant clash of personalities and policies than that between Harcourt and Grey was the growing estrangement of Asquith and Lloyd George. When Lord Kitchener went down with the Hampshire on 5 June 1916,[142] Lloyd George obtained the War Office with a freedom of action which hinted at the growing pressure on Asquith's leadership. Both the Unionists and Lloyd George wanted to reconstruct the government, and after attacks on him in the press, Asquith seems to have lost his nerve. He resigned on 5 December 1916, and subsequently wrote that he had been the victim of 'a well- organized, carefully-engineered conspiracy'. Yet John Grigg has shown that Lloyd George was not as Machiavellian as the toppled Prime Minister suggested.

To some extent Asquith was the author of his own misfortune, insofar as the inflexible stance he took - influenced by McKenna, and the refusal to even consider serving under a reconstructed government led by Lloyd George[143] - precluded reconciliation. Cameron Hazlehurst has referred to Lloyd George's 'unplumbed capacity for swallowing outrages on Liberal tradition',[144] but in the national interest this was as equally necessary as sinking personal differences. It was in this respect that Asquith betrayed his limitations as a war-time leader. Yet Lloyd George's Cabinet opponents, including Grey, McKenna, Runciman, and Harcourt had no intention of serving under Lloyd George either, and felt that they would be able to oppose the usurper more effectively externally than by remaining in office.[145]

Their prior refusal to serve under Bonar Law instead on

6 December, left only a Lloyd George administration as an alternative. On 7 December the Welshman duly became Prime Minister. The ensuing mass exodus by the Asquithian Liberals was an unfortunate consequence, from the Liberal Party's point of view, of the power struggle. The new coalition government which was to hold power until 1922 contained a preponderance of Conservatives. The Asquithians had the edge on intellectual talent, but there was no significant difference in age or social composition between the two Liberal factions. The significant dividing-line was how the war was to be fought,[146] and this clash of principle, combined with personal animosities, was to have a disastrous effect on the post-war Liberal Party.

Although he had resigned, Harcourt was required to keep on signing documents until his successor Alfred Mond took his oath of office the following Thursday, 14 December. On 16 December Harcourt explained to Sir John Maden, the chairman of the Rossendale Liberal Council, why he was resigning his parliamentary seat as well. He reminded Maden that it was just over three years since he had informed the Chairman and Fred Monks, the Liberal agent for Rossendale, in the strictest confidence that he had been medically advised it would be impossible for him to contest another general election or take p art in platform activities. He had hoped to remain MP for Rossendale until the next dissolution, but there were a number of factors which convinced him otherwise. On the advice of the Prime Minister the King had decided to revive the old family peerage and he had decided to accept the offer.[147]

The following Wednesday, 20 December, Harcourt had an audience with the King at Buckingham Palace, and was duly included on the list of five new Liberal peers. After years of vilifying the Second Chamber, he was now part of it. As he wrote to his old acquaintance Munro-Ferguson:

> You will readily understand how much I feel the break with the House of Commons and all my old life and work and friends there.[148]

The congratulations for his peerage and commiserations for giving up his seat poured in. Monks declared it would be one of the worst Christmases

he had ever had.

> Harcourt's private secretary wrote that:
>
> it has been a source of pleasure and pride to me to be privileged to act as your Private Secretary and I deeply regret t he circumstances which have brought about your departure ...

Bonar Law's rather cryptic message read:

> I hardly know whether t he honour to be given to you is altogether a subject of congratulation, but at all events if I am ever to come into conflict with my old colleagues I shall have reason to congratulate myself on your removal from the House of Commons.[149]

POSTSCRIPT : FULL CIRCLE

> It will always be a source of deep satisfaction to me to look back on the great days through which we have lived, the great policies we have fought for and won ...
>
> - Harcourt to Sir John Maden, December 1916

Harcourt spent the rest of the war gleefully anticipating the demise of an administration he described as a 'curious experiment'.[1] His retirement from public office only marked the start of a new phase of his long career of intrigue, since he continued to work behind the scenes to support Asquith. In this sense he was back in his natural, unofficial habitat, but the years of office had left an unmistakable imprint on his political character. The war itself also seems to have taken its toll of his personal liberalism or open-mindedness. By comparison with the indirect call by his old acquaintance Richard van Kühlmann for a negotiated peace,[2] Harcourt fell prey to the general xenophobia, or rather Teutophobia.

He was not seeking re-election when he declared at Rossendale that in 'what remained to him of life' he could not 'imagine having anything to do with a German ever again'.[3] This came oddly from the lips of someone who, along with Haldane, had been identified before the war as one of the Cabinet's 'pro-Germans', or 'a most ardent Germanophile' as Nicolson of the Foreign Office had once complained.[4] If this was a less than impressive change in his attitude to Germans, in another sphere the absence of change was equally negative. He did not really change his attitude to women's suffrage, and would probably have endorsed a letter his old anti-suffragist friend Bryce wrote to an American correspondent about the Reform Act of 1918:

> The whole project of giving votes to the whole body of women has long seemed to many of our most thoughtful minds a capital error.[5]

In other respects, however, Harcourt's tenure of office did broaden his horizons. As Colonial Secretary he became more sympathetic

to the needs for expenditure on Imperial defence and colonial development, even when this threatened to clash with his Gladstonian adherence to 'economy'. While committed to preservation of Imperial unity in terms of his personal conception of the future development of Empire, in practice his broader vision did not necessarily translate itself into *genuinely* Liberal 'native' policy. He com bined pragmatism with Eurocentric tendencies typical of colonial officials of the Edwardian period. In domestic politics his views represented a blend of radicalism and conservatism, with the latter elements predominant as befitted someone who was not one of his party's leading social reformers.

As a landowner and emp loyer he represented an essentially 'Whiggish' element of the Liberal Party which found itself by-passed by rapid social transformation and upheaval. During the 1912 coal strikes he did favour a fair deal for 'the men' against 'the masters', as he put it. And he did try to help the agricultural labourers via the proliferation of smallholdings - at the same time helping the gentry in need of casual labour. But his attitude to reform *per se* was always selective and idiosyncratic. It does not seem that, unlike his antithesis, Lloyd George, he ever really understood workers or their aspirations. Continually worried about Liberal electoral prospects, he feared Labour as a source of upheaval.

Part of the reason that he opposed conscription was not only his objection to it on principle as an infringement of individual liberties, or as detrimental to the economy, but also his concern that this - like any other volatile issue - might lead to serious social unrest:

> I do not think they [Lord Northcliffe and his friends] will succeed ... for if they do I very much fear there would be something like a sudden revolution amongst organized labour, which in this country is very hostile to any form of compulsion.[6]

Radical as some of his views were, as over the House of Lords, in his attitude to Labour Harcourt showed, at best, a paternalism more reminiscent of the previous century.

Convinced that the Liberal Party represented the best guardian of the interests of its society, Harcourt devoted his life to its service. But in the post-war period the Liberals' election results went from bad to worse, due to the growing impo rtance of 'class' politics, and the erosion of religion as a determinant of electoral behaviour.[7] Harcourt witnessed the Liberal Party's post-war electoral set-backs, but not its annihilation at the polls in 1924, because he had died under mysterious circumstances two years earlier.[8] The Labour Party stepped in to fill the vacuum left by the eclipse of Liberalism as a political force.[9] As Peter Clarke has remarked in his succinct survey of Liberalism, it dissipated its intellectual capital, and what was meant for party was bequeathed to mankind.[10] Perhaps if Harcourt could view modern Britain, he would be less certain that the struggle over the 'great policies' had been won. British troops still patrol strife-torn Northern Ireland, despite the grant of independence to the South in 1922.

Harcourt would also be dismayed by aspects of the present Welfare State, the culmination of the New Liberalism. Existing alongside affluence, he would find underdeveloped areas and communities with third-world characteristics hardly reminiscent of a first-world nation.[11] His conception of an Empire bound by 'kinship' bears no resemblance to the presently tenuous links of the Commonwealth nations with the mother country. Colonial office strategy, particularly in Southern Africa, was based on his vision of gradual Dominion absorption of neighbouring territories. But this did not take place. In Southern Rhodesia the white settlers' continued contempt for the metropolitan government achieved its final expression via a unilateral declaration of independence, fifty years after Harcourt's departure from the Colonial Office. By that time, the Office had been incorporated into the Commonwealth Relations Office, which was itself reincorporated into the Foreign Office in 1970.

Whereas the Unionists stressed tariffs as the means of combatting unemployment, Harcourt would see that the thrust of present Conservative policy has been to elevate monetarism into a doctrine, setting curbing of inflation above provision of jobs. Committed to retrenchment, and appalled by the size of the 1914 Budget, Harcourt would find the present levels of expenditure, particularly on defence, in Britain and globally, virtually incomprehensible. He would also find the Old Guard listlessly fighting on for some of the same old causes - temperance in Wales,

and proportional representation in elections. What he would surely find pleasing is the recent beginning of a reversal of the pattern of 'class' politics which has shaped the British electoral landscape for so long.[12] Recovery since 1924 has been slow: only now is the Liberal/SDP alliance beginning to establish itself as a major alternative to the two major parties on the Right and the Left.

APPENDIX ONE

A Note on Sources

There are still several avenues left unexplored for future writers on Lewis Harcourt: the bibliography provided does not purport to be, and is by no means, exhaustive.

Harcourt's work on behalf of the Home Counties Division of the National Liberal Federation during the 1880s still awaits documentation. Also *terra incognita* is how Harcourt helped Liberal leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to victory in the desperate struggle CB waged with the Liberal Imperialists for control of party policy from 1899-1903.

These clandestine activities are mentioned by Alfred Gardiner in Prophets, Priests, and Kings (1908), 308, but Harcourt does not feature prominently in the detailed study of the Liberal Imperialists by Colin Matthew (C.U.P., 1973). The story of this assistance in the defeat of the 'Lib-Imps', also hinted at by Francis Hirst (In the Golden Days (1947), 256), might be very difficult to piece together.

Nor does Harcourt receive any mention in A.K. Russell's book on the Liberal Landslide (David & Charles, 1973). Yet, another tantalizing reference by Gardiner suggests that, in the Home Counties, 'Lulu' made a key contribution to the overwhelming electoral triumph of 1906,(Prophets, 313).

Several collections of private papers may still have additional information to impart on Harcourt's period of office. The Crewe Papers at Cambridge University Library were not consulted. Since Crewe preceded Harcourt at the Colonial Office, these papers would provide more background on the colonial questions Harcourt dealt with.

The Pease Papers at Nuffield College might yield some fresh insights on the role played by Harcourt during the Cabinet meetings held on the eve of the Great War. Unfortunately, Nuffield College Library was closed except to Fellows during the writer's stay at Oxford. However a drastic revision of the conclusions Cameron Hazlehurst and Anthony Morris reach about Harcourt (in Politicians at War (1971) and Radicalism

Against War (1972) respectively) seems unlikely.

A more extensive use of press opinion could be made for comparative purposes, as a sample of opinion on various public issues Harcourt was involved with. Of course any examination of press reaction to his decisions must make due allowance for political bias. A thorough account of the speeches made by Harcourt during his tours of his Lancashire constituency would require extensive perusal of local papers, particularly the Rossendale Express, which might yield an appreciable quantity of untapped material.

Finally, lack of time and space precluded the full use of Colonial Office documents in chapter three. Detailed consideration of all the matters Harcourt coped with would have necessitated the writing of innumerable colonial 'mini' histories on a region-by-region basis, which was obviously not feasible. The Harcourt Papers, microfilmed Colonial Office documents and Hansard have served as the main primary sources, and the notes refer readers to more detailed treatments of certain colonial topics.

APPENDIX TWO

274

Harcourt to Gladstone, 27/02/1914. HAP 444, 274-75.

C

Private & Personal. Feb. 27th 1914.

My dear Herbert,

I have not had time till now to write to you since the debate in the House of Commons on South Africa. I was extremely anxious beforehand as to the speech I had to make, for I was being watched narrowly by a number of different interests.

I managed, I am happy to say, to steer a devious course through these pitfalls and to make a speech which gave general satisfaction in the House of Commons and, I am glad to know, both in South Africa, Australia and other Self-governing Dominions.

Of course I knew that a great deal I was saying would in future be used here as an argument against Irish Home Rule and the impossibility of interfering with any self-governing unit. I warned Asquith of this

before I spoke, but he said " Never mind that, it is your " duty to look after the relations of the Dominions and the " Mother Country and we will take care of ourselves " afterwards on Irish Home Rule. " It is obvious that at some stage or other we shall be asked whether, if Redmond deports Carson and all the Ulster Protestants to Lancashire under Martial Law, the House of Commons will be allowed to say anything on the matter or the British Government able and willing to take any action in regard to it. But my special object was to make a speech to kill the debate and I did so effectively by 8.0 o'clock and, in fact, no other Government speech was necessary before the Division. All the leaders of the Opposition came down to hear me, including Arthur Balfour, but, being satisfied, left the House immediately I had done.

Your Ministers will no doubt know how essential it is that I should never, under any circumstances, allow myself, if it could possibly be avoided, to express any opinion, by way of approval or disapproval, of the domestic administration of the Dominions. Approval in one case would necessarily lead to disapproval in another.

APPENDIX THREE

She set herself to carry out her side of the task by dealing with the Colonial Office officials and, above all, with Harcourt. There took place a series of meetings at her house which must represent a unique relationship between a Colonial Secretary and the wife of a leading governor, one, moreover, with whom he and his staff were at odds. The picture Flora gives of her visitor is full-length, one of a gentleman of the old school, a late Victorian rather than an Edwardian, a Whig rather than a Liberal, highly cultured, dressed in the height of fashion, yet with a suggestion of the old-world in his four-inch collar and rather Mephistophelian moustaches, "a beautiful creature" as one of his former secretaries described him to the writer. He would sit down to luncheon or to tea *à deux* with his beautiful hostess, and then settle his considerable length comfortably into a chair by the fire, gain permission to light his cigarette, and sit there for some two hours or more while they talked or while Flora read, with skilfully disguised omissions, from her husband's letters. "On the whole I managed to pull myself up fairly well when I was galloping along and found myself suddenly landing in things not intended for Secretaries of State! He would have opened his eyes if he could have seen how the story read to him so demurely was embroidered with love-making all round its edges."

Harcourt seemed fascinated: he was quite equal to guessing much that was omitted. When she stopped he would say "Go on! Go on! It is most interesting and I am thrilled with it." "I was careful, of course," she wrote another time, "to expurgate any phrase which I thought might offend and read him what I thought, if I were Secretary of State, it would be good for me to hear as the private opinion of a man of your experience. As the passages recurred again I said 'You are sure you don't mind this frankness,' and he again reassured me. 'No. No, I like it. I esteem it a privilege.' And at the end he said 'You are lucky to have a husband who can write to you like that. You share the whole of his life though he is away from you.'" Maps and photographs were brought out as Lugard's tours were followed. "He was like a nice child (as all the best sort of men are) learning it all and listening with the greatest interest." Sometimes he would suddenly remember he should be in the House and would rush away promising to come back the next day, or the day after, for more.

Perham, M. Lugard: The Years of Authority, 616-617.

APPENDIX FOUR

'Death by Misadventure'

On Saturday, 25 February 1922, The Times reported the death of Viscount Harcourt at age fifty-nine. Over the passage of time the circumstances surrounding this event have been distorted and sensationalized, and it is still unclear how the allegations described below might have contributed to Harcourt's death. According to the official account, the former Colonial Secretary was found dead in bed at 69 Brook Street West, one of the family's London residences. The late Tom Driberg, sometime journalist and ex-Labour MP, had a different version.

In Ruling Passions, a frank discussion of homosexuality, and in particular his own, Driberg referred to an an incident which gave Edward James a certain boyhood notoriety. James was the son of a wealthy landowner, and was educated at Eton and Oxford. According to Driberg:

> When a boy at Eton, James had attracted the amorous attentions of a celebrated Liberal statesman, Sir William Harcourt. This became known to the authorities, and to avoid public scandal, Sir William shot himself on the splendid marble staircase of his own house in Brook Street, near the Savile Club. (Driberg, T. Ruling Passions (1977), 67.).

This story rather devalues the eulogistic postscript by former Labour leader Michael Foot that whenever Driberg 'took a pen in his hand, he became a perfectionist with a nose for every form of fabric[ation] and misleading rhetoric'. Sir William met a far more prosaic end, and, as discussed below, obviously his son is being referred to. Driberg's account appears to be a garbled derivation from an incident in the biography of Edward James. Published soon after Ruling Passions, this biography describes the incident which allegedly drove Harcourt to suicide. Edward James told Philip Purser that:

> A Liberal politician called Lord Harcourt, who was on friendly terms with his [Edward James'] mother ... apparently had a weakness for young boys. One day,

> after his mother and he had spent a weekend at Harcourt's country house and were about to leave, she insisted that he go up and thank their host in his bedroom. Edward descended again hurriedly and on the verge of tears. In the car going home she scolded him for his lack of politeness until finally he blurted out the truth. That [same] evening, says Edward, she ... deliver[ed] a solemn warning against the dangers of evil men, whom she listed as Nero, Heliogobalus, Benvenuto Cellini ... Oscar Wilde and now Lord Harcourt. She also complained so loudly about Harcourt to her friends that the luckless man was disgraced, and eventually met his death in circumstances calling for an inquest. The jury returned a verdict of misadventure.
>
> (Purser, P. Where is He Now? The Extraordinary Worlds of Edward James (1978), 22.)

Purser does not provide a date for the incident, but since James was born in 1907, it would have taken place not long after the Great War. The only person who could verify the details would be James, and according to Purser the wealthy recluse was last known to be somewhere in Mexico. The official account of Harcourt's death does refer to the possibility of suicide, but his wife denied any knowledge of this. However her testimony at the inquest,at Westminster's Coroner's Court on 28 February, does indicate that their relationship had deteriorated.

She stated that since 1919 Harcourt had been in low spirits, and his health was poor. He had to undergo a course of injections for boils, and said that, 'I feel these injections depress my heart very much. It is intermittent'. Unable to sleep well, Harcourt was prescribed a narcotic, bromidia, as a sedative. Mary Harcourt added that when she last saw the bottle, about 15 January 1922, it was half full and her husband did not take the bromidia regularly.

The transcription of the inquest, provided in abridged form below, went on to describe how the Westminster Coroner arrived at his verdict:

Lady Harcourt: At about 11.30 pm [Thursday 23 February] we went up together and parted at his dressing room door. He had slept in his dressing room since 18 months ago when I had a breakdown.

Coroner: He never mentioned suicide?

Lady Harcourt: No.

The valet testified next and stated that he last saw Lord Harcourt alive on Thursday about 6.30pm. He [the valet] called him at 8.00am on Friday morning.

Valet: I found his reading lamp alight. He was in bed apparently sleeping on his back.

Coroner: Where was the bottle?

Valet: On the bedside table. The cork was in and the glass was beside it.

Coroner: Had some fluid been poured into the glass?

Valet: It had.

Coroner: He had not been ill or sick?

Valet: No. He was very peaceful, the bedclothes were not ruffled and there were no signs of a struggle.

Coroner: Would the effect of a narcotic like bromidia be accentuated in the case of a man who had a diseased heart like Lord Harcourt?

Dr Weir [Pathologist at Charing Cross Hospital]: Yes.

Coroner: It would not be a safe thing for him to take at all?

Dr Weir: No, not a wise thing ... In the condition of Lord Harcourt's heart an ordinary dose would to some extent accelerate death.

Coroner: Medical evidence left no doubt that Lord Harcourt's death was accelerated by a dose of bromidia -a fairly well-known narcotic ... Very little was in the bottle when last seen - there was not a fatal dose left. Death would not have taken place if Lord Harcourt had been healthy ... There was not the slightest motive for suicide ... he lived quite happily with his wife, and the idea seems grotesque that he should have taken his life.

Verdict: Died of syncope while suffering from pulmonary oedema, myocarditis and coronary disease, accelerated by a dose of bromidia. Misadventure.

(The Times, 01/03/1922)

The bland official verdict by the coroner at the inquest - there was no jury as Purser states - did not answer some remaining questions. What had Mary Harourt found out which caused her a breakdown, and led to husband and wife sleeping in separate rooms? And even if Harcourt had not taken a fatal dose of the 60-drop prescription, had he *wanted*, in his weak condition, to 'accelerate' his death? However the surviving Harcourts seem to have been generally successful in stifling speculation, assuming there was information to conceal. The funeral was held at Nuneham Park's church the following Wednesday, and Harcourt was buried next to Sir William and five other members of the family, in the vault next to the chapel.

The official memorial service at St. Margaret's, Westminster, held that same day, was attended by several of Harcourt's old Cabinet colleagues like Asquith, Birrell and Buxton. Mary Harcourt outlived her husband by almost forty years, until 7 January 1961, and she was also laid to rest in the family vault. Her son William Edward, the Second Viscount Harcourt, died recently without leaving a male heir to the title. Oxford University took over Nuneham Park not long after World War II, and presently it serves as a business conference centre. Stanton Harcourt manor house itself is still occupied by descendants of the family. Copying of the Harcourt Papers kept at the New Bodleian Library is now authorized by Mr Wynter Bee of Walker, Martineau & Co, a firm of solicitors long associated with the Harcourt family.

NOTES

Place of publication London unless otherwise stated
OUP - Oxford University Press (London)
CUP - Cambridge University Press (London)

INTRODUCTION

1. A.G.Gardiner edited the Liberal Daily News from 1902 to 1919. Lewis Harcourt is included in his collection of character sketches Prophets, Priests and Kings (1908), 307-14.

2. Earle, Sir L. Turn Over the Page (1935), 119-20.

3. Harcourt to Prime Minister Asquith, 16/10/1910. HAP 421, 147-48.

4. According to the First Earl of Crewe in his biography of Lord Rosebery. (2 Vols 1931), II, 469.

5. Von Bülow, Prince. Memoirs 1903-1909 (London/NY 1931), 364 and index; Aitken, Sir W M. Politicians and the War 1914-16 (1928), 26 and index; Aubyn, St Giles. Edward VII Prince and King (1977), 456 and index.

6. David, E.(Ed). Inside Asquith's Cabinet. From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse (1977), 121.

7. The personal journals are closed to scholars from the 1890s onwards. See Appendix One on sources.

8. Jenkins, R. Sir Charles Dilke (1958), 413; Gardiner, op.cit., 307

9. Fitzroy, Sir A. Memoirs, II (n.d.), 486. Fitzroy was then a clerk on the Privy Council. Compare the almost identical comment by Gardiner in Prophets ..., 309: '... most dangerous when he is most suave. The glove was velvet, but the hand within was iron'.

10. Findlay, Sir J.G. The Imperial Conference of 1911 from Within (1912), 12. This is again very similar to Gardiner, ibid: 'Today Mr Harcourt stands out as one of the three men in the Liberal Party to whom all things seem possible' (The other two must have been Lloyd George and Winston Churchill.)

11. Hobhouse Diaries, 121.

12. This is the category in which A.B.Cooke and John Vincent place Harcourt in their book on the political events of 1885-86. The Governing Passion, (Brighton,1974), 137.

13. Lucy, H.W. Later Peeps at Parliament (1905), 277.

14. Asquith, H.H. Fifty Years in Parliament (2 vols 1926), II, 196. In 'Asquith as Prime Minister 1908-1916', EHR 336 (July 1970), 502-31, 508, Cameron Hazlehurst identifies those involved. The 'minister' was, of course, Harcourt. Morley and Churchill complained to Asquith. See also Hobhouse Diaries, 106.

15. Pope-Hennessy, J. Lord Crewe (1955), 172; also Hazlehurst, op. cit., 510 and 512.

16. Benson, E.F. King Edward VII (1933), 276; Keith, A.B. The King and the Imperial Crown (1936), 192.

17. See Murray, A.C. Master and Brother (1945), 40. Although the Vetoists got their way eventually, Murray attributed this as much to party opinion on the subject as to efforts made by individual ministers.

18. Callwell, Major-General Sir C.E. Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, (2 Vols, 1927), I, 106. (Writer's italics.)

19. Morris, A.J.A. Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914 (1972), 390.

20. France was one of the bulwarks against British diplomatic isolation. Britain could not stand by and passively allow Germany to defeat France if it came to a war between them. This was the

message implicit in a major speech made by Lloyd George on 21 July 1911, with the approval of Asquith and Grey.

21. Hazlehurst, op.cit., 512, for Runciman's letter to Harcourt, 24 August 1911. Despite being bypassed by the Mansion House speech by Lloyd George, and the secret CID meeting held on 23 August 1911, the Radicals *did* succeed that same November in getting the Cabinet to agree to avoid any liaison with foreign military planners in future, without prior Cabinet agreement. See Wilson, K. The Policy of the Entente, (C U P, 1985) 27-28.

22. Thorold, A.L. Life of Henry Labouchère (1913), 370. Labouchère, nicknamed 'Labby', was Liberal MP for Northampton from 1880 to 1905. He led the 'extreme' Radical wing in the Commons until his retirement in 1905.

23. Gardiner, op.cit., 309.

24. D.A. Hamer's main theme in Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery (1972) is the 'faddism' which hindered the formulation of a coherent party policy. In Ambitions and Strategies (C U P, 1964) Peter Stansky focuses on the struggle for the leadership of a party debilitated by this lack of unity.

25. Freeden, M. The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (O U P, 1978), 41. See also Emy, H.V. Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892-1914 (C U P, 1973) on 'new' liberal ideology.

26. Gardiner, op.cit., 310.

27. As pointed out by Freeden, op.cit., 28-29 (See II, Socialism in Liberalism, 25-75) and by Sir William's contemporaries.

28. See Sykes, A. on Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-13 (O U P, 1979); on 'efficiency', see Searle, G.R. The Quest

for National Efficiency (Oxford, 1971).

29. Rowland, P. The Last Liberal Governments (2 Vols 1968, 1971), II, 5. Lloyd George maintained that this was one of the ideas Churchill had obtained from him four months earlier.

30. Hobhouse Diaries, 134 on Harcourt's opposition in 1913. In 1915 Harcourt and Sir John Simon, then at the Home Office, objected that conscription 'would bring us to the verge, or over the verge, of revolution'. Asquith, H H. Memories and Reflections (2 Vols 1928), II, 110. In the end, however, it was Simon rather than Harcourt who resigned over conscription. Simon J. Retrospect (1952), 106-108.

31. Fraser, D. The Evolution of the British Welfare State (1973), 152.

32. Preoccupation with land reform as the key to social improvement was the essence of nineteenth century Radicalism, as D.A.Hamer notes in his edition of The Radical Programme [1885] (Brighton, 1971).

Liberals of all persuasions still rallied behind the banner of Richard Cobden (1804-65), the tireless champion of Free Trade. Strongly influenced by Cobden, the Radical MP John Bright (1811-89) advocated a 'Free Land' policy to create a class of yeomen. See also Chapter one, 9-10.

33. Gilbert, B. 'David Lloyd George: The Reform of British landholding and the Budget of 1914', HJ 21 (1978), 117-41.

34. Cregier, D.M. Bounder from Wales (Columbia, 1976)..123. And see Chapter two, 141-147.

35. These attacks appeared in the National Review (1912), 374-9. Cited in Searle, G. 'The Revolt from the Right in Edwardian Britain', in Kennedy, P. and Nicholls, A.(Eds.). Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914

(1981), 25.

36. Taylor, A.J.P. (Ed.) Lloyd George : A Diary, Stevenson, F. (1971), 291; Stevenson, F. The Years that are Past (1967), 215-16.

37. Hyam, R. Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office (1968), 14.

38. Edward VII visited Nuneham as heir-apparent, and subsequently. Cowles, V. Edward VII and his Circle (1956), 157. George V also visited Harcourt there, to accompany him on grouse-shoots.

39. Freeden, op.cit., 141 and 134-45; also, Emy, H.V. 'The Impact of Financial Policy on English Party Politics Before 1914', HJ 15, No 1 (1972), 103-31.

40. Harcourt at Cardiff. The Times, 03/04/1909.

41. Emy, Radicals ..., 236 and 212.

42. Murray, B.K. The People's Budget 1909-10: Lloyd George and Liberal Politics (Oxford, 1980); Blewett, N. The Peers, the Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1910 (1972), 405-6.

43. Hirst, F.W. Gladstone as Financier and Economist (1931), xxii.

44. See Mallet, B. British Budgets 1887-1913 (1913).

45. Harcourt to Chalmers, 04/05/1914. HAP 475, 36.

46. Murray, B.K., op.cit., 307-8; Offer, A. Property and Politics 1870-1914 (C U P, 1981), 230. See Emy, Radicals ..., 227 for Holt's views. There is no evidence to indicate that he and Harcourt collaborated to oppose the 1914 Budget.

47. Searle, G.R. 'The Edwardian Liberal Party and Business', E H R 98, No 386 (Jan. 1983), 28-60.

48. A point made by Emy, Radicals ..., 285. See Butler, D & Freeman, J. British Political Facts 1900-67 (2nd Edition 1968), 152-3 for the by-election results.

49. According to the article by Bentley Gilbert (note 33), the 1914 *débâcle* signified the end of the 'new' Liberals' attempt to use the party as the vehicle of reform. This is debatable.

50. Gardiner, op.cit., 342.

51. Pankhurst, S.E. The Life of Emmeline Pankhurst (1935), 112.

52. Pugh, M. Electoral Reform in War and Peace 1906-18 (1978), 33-35; Hart, M. 'The Liberals, the War and the Franchise', E H R (Oct. 1982) 820-32. In The Edwardians (1975), 259, Paul Thompson points to local election results, which *did* suggest that the women then enfranchised tended to vote Conservative.

53. In his book on The Radical Tradition (1967), Dr Derry demonstrates the ambiguity of this term, and the multi-faceted nature of the 'tradition'. Harcourt's cautious approach to reform also revealed his innate conservatism.

54. Crewe, Rosebery, II, 469.

55. Gardiner, op.cit., 311. George Hackenschmidt was a well-known contemporary 'strong-man'.

56. Ibid., 313.

57. Reverend Nelson to Harcourt, 11/12/1914. HAP 444, 200. Nelson described himself as a 'sincere admirer'. Just how many people 'us' referred to is impossible to estimate.

58. Gardiner, op.cit., 340.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Sir William, knighted in 1873, named his son after an old friend. Two months after Harcourt was born, his mother's stepfather Cornewall Lewis died, and the baby was rechristened as Lewis. Gardiner, A.G. The Life of Sir William Harcourt (2 Vols 1923), I, 118.

2. Gardiner, Harcourt, I,116 and 118.

3. And, as Ted Morgan suggests in Churchill (1983), to vindicate the memory of his father.

4. Jenkins, Dilke, 146.

5. Churchill, R.S. Winston S. Churchill (2 Vols, 1966-67), I (1966), 441.

6. He[illegible]ietta, wife of George Frederick Samuel Robinson (1827-1909), First Marquis of Ripon. Ripon was a city and municipal borough in the West Riding of Yorkshire, to the north of Leeds. The Ripons' country seat was at Studley Royal.

7. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 246, 272-3 and 305-6; Fraser, P. Lord Esher (1973), 10; Jenkins, Dilke, 92-3

8. The new Lady Harcourt was a widow, and a daughter of the American historian John Motley. 'Lulu' maintained the Trans-Atlantic link by also marrying an American bride in 1899.

9. Lewis Harcourt to William Gladstone, 06/09/1897. WGP 44526, 76-77.

10. See Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 336 and 386-7. 'H.S.' - Home Secretary.

11. Harcourt was the subject of a lobby picture by Harry Furniss, one of the best black-and-white artists of the day, who regularly contributed humorous drawings to the major illustrated papers.

'Spy' was the pseudonym of the English artist and caricaturist Sir Leslie Ward.

12. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 506.

13. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 88.

14. See introduction of Southgate, D., The Passing of the Whigs 1832-86 (1962).

15. Southgate, op.cit., Chapter one.

16. Cook, C. A Short History of the Liberal Party 1900-1976 (1976), 2.

17. Southgate, op.cit., 417.

18. Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846-91), Irish Nationalist leader. Undisputed leader of the Irish Home Rulers in the Commons from 1879 onwards.

19. Slesser, Sir H. A History of the Liberal Party (1944), 116.

20. Fraser, P. Joseph Chamberlain (1966), 90.

21. The inept record included the fiasco at Majuba Hill in February 1881, where Colley's forces were routed by the Boers, and the fatally tardy relief of the besieged Gordon at Khartoum in January 1885.

22. Hamer, D.A. (Ed.) The [illegible]al Programme [1885] (Brighton, Sussex 1972), 261-3, and [illegible]y, R. Joseph Chamberlain (OUP 1981), 96-7 and 105-6.

23. See Murphy, J. Church, State and Schools in Britain 1800-1970 (1971), 49-75; below, 67-68.

24. Bright was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the Cabinet Gladstone formed in 1880. But this venerable Radical leader resigned in July 1882 over the British bombardment of

Alexandria.

25. Eldest sons succeeded to estates on the understanding that they and their children would settle the estates in turn. Succession necessarily entailed that the property could not be bequeathed freely. These inalienable English estates thus stayed intact for generation after generation.

26. Hamer, The Radical Programme, 104.

27. Chapter two, 116 and 118.

29. Emy, 'The Impact of Financial Policy ...', 107.

28. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 541.

30. Gladstone was to celebrate his seventy-fifth birthday on 29 December 1885.

31. See Pelling, H. Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain (1968), 3.

32. Offer, Property and Politics, 354.

33. Offer, op.cit., Chapter 12 on the impact of Henry George in Britain.

34. Hamer, The Radical Programme, 55.

35. Cooke, A.B. and Vincent, J. The Governing Passion (Brighton, Sussex 1974).

36. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 550; Hamer, D A. Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery (1972), 111.

37. As Herbert Gladstone intended. The Leeds Mercury and The Standard announced that the G O M was intending a plan which provided for 'the establishment of a parliament in Dublin for dealing with

purely Irish affairs.' See Hamer, Liberal Politics, 113-16.

38. The general election of December 1885 saw 333 Liberals returned, against 251 Conservatives. The difference was 82, and 86 Parnellites had been voted in.

39. Hamer, Liberal Politics, 229.

40. Cooke and Vincent, op.cit., 353.

41. Barker, M. Gladstone and Radicalism(Brighton,1974), 170 & 173.

42. See below, 29-30.

43. Wolf, L. Life of Ripon, (2 Vols, 1921), I, 185; Spender, J A. A Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, (2 Vols, 1923), I, 100-1; Wilson, J. A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, (1973), 164. Sir William won his case.

44. Hamer, Liberal Politics, 124.

45. Hind, R.J. Henry Labouchère and the Empire 1880-1905 (1972), 238.

46. On the development of the 'obstruction' theory see Hamer, Liberal Politics, 128-35.

47. Cooke and Vincent, op.cit., 56.

48. Chamberlain, A. Down the Years (1935), 29; Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 4.

49. Hurst, M. Joseph Chamberlain and Liberal Reunion London/Toronto (1967). Sir William was furious with Labouchère for not wanting to repair the rift. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 24.

50. Hurst, op.cit., 139.

51. Ibid., 152, 254; Letters of Lord Acton to Gladstone (1913), 179.

52. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 32.

53. Ibid., 35. On Nonconformist demands, see below.

54. Fraser, P. Chamberlain (1966), 136. For Chamberlain, it was now just a question of how to announce the end of the negotiations. Hurst, op.cit., 289-90 and 298; and for Sir William's account of the talks, see 387-99.

55. Elliot, A.D. The Life of George Joachim Goschen, (2 Vols 1911), II, 116-17; Hurst, op.cit., 282.

56. In 1907 Robert Spence Watson, who was one of the NLF's presidents, published a history of the federation.On the NLF's relations with the Liberal Party, see Koss, S. Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (1975), and Bebbington, D.W. The Nonconformist Conscience (1982).

57. After the National Free Church Council held in 1892 they preferred to be known as Free Churchmen, but henceforth they will always be referred to as Nonconformists for the sake of clarity.

58. Much later, Home Counties Division secretary William Allard congratulated Harcourt on the tenth anniversary of his now-flourishing 'child'. But Allard did not mention an *exact* date in his letter. Allard to Harcourt, 20/07/1897. HAP 421, 97-8.

59. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 136-7.

60. Harcourt to Rosebery, including reply, dated 10/04/1889. HAP 430, 20-23.

61. Ibid., 16-18. Rosebery to Harcourt.

62. Although Sir William had bowed to him! After Parnell was cleared of the fraudulent attack made via The Times in 1887, the GOM and Sir William bowed to him in the Commons. Parnell ignored the gesture. Lyons, F.S.L. Charles Stewart Parnell (1977),

510-11 and 163.

63. Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism, 201.

64. Morgan, K.O. The Age of Lloyd George (1970), 113-14.

65. Barker, op.cit., 159-60.

66. Schnadhorst suffered a breakdown in the summer of 1889 and spent some months convalescing in South Africa. (Fortunately for him, Sir William did not find out about his even worse *faux-pas* in February 1891. He accepted £5 000 from Rhodes for party funds in return for a promise to persuade Gladstone not to allow Britain to 'scuttle out' of Egypt. The Times, 12/10/1901, 8.)

67. Hamer, Liberal Politics, 144.

68. As observed by Edward Hamilton, one of William Gladstone's former secretaries. Hamer, op.cit., 150.

69. Due to the reaction of certain interests to the foreign erection of tariff barriers. But at this time protectionists, or 'Fair Traders' were in a minority. See Brown, B.H. The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain 1881-1895 (New York, 1943).

70. Offer, A. Property and Politics 1870-1914 (C U P, 1981) Chapter 11 on the strength of the agrarian lobby.

71. On his obstructionism, see Barker, op.cit., 170-74. There are biographies by A.L.Thorold (1913) and Hesketh Pearson (1936).

72. Hamer, op.cit., 227.

73. Barker, op.cit., 175.

74. Yet Sir William's own pet reforms - like Local Option as a solution to the drink problem - were in their own way no less 'faddist'.

75. See Matthew, H.C.G. The Liberal Imperialists (OUP, 1973), 3-36 on the founding and development of the 'Lib Imp' wing of the Liberal Party. Its core members were Haldane, Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Arthur Acland and Ronald Munro-Ferguson.

76. Pugh, M. The Making of Modern British Politics (1982), 98; Matthew, op.cit., 13; and on the NLF as a force for Liberal unity, Bernstein G.L. 'Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Imperialists', JBS, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1983), 105-24.

77. The Archbishop was the son of the Reverend William Vernon Harcourt, the Canon of York, who was in turn the son of the first Lord Vernon. It was when the Reverend Vernon succeeeded to the property of the last Earl Harcourt in 1831 that Harcourt was added to the family name.

78. Batey, M.L. Nuneham Courtenay. (OUP booklet 1979), 9-11.

79. The fifth Earl Spencer was a leading advocate of Home Rule, who twice came close to becoming Liberal Prime Minister.

80. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 491; II, 132-35. (To build Malwood eventually cost far more than the £5 000 Sir William had allowed for, but he felt that he had made a good investment.

81. Lascelles, G.[?] to Harcourt, 13/02/1891. HAP 430,42.

82. Childers, S.(Lt-Col). Life of Hugh C.E.Childers (2 Vols 1901), II, 288.

83. Gardiner, Harcourt, II 172-74. It is interesting to note that there was something of a tradition of anti-feminism among Radical leaders, including Bright and Labouchère.

84. Cited in The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel (1931), 128. Apparently Gladstone's wife disliked 'Jumbo'. Crewe, Rosebery, I, 169.

85. Brett, M.V. The Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher 1870-1930. I, (1934), 181.

86. Wilson, CB, 171.

87. C B to Harcourt, 16/08/1892 HAP 431, 39-40; Hobart to Harcourt, 20/08/1892, Ibid, 49.

88. See Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 180; Pearson, H. Labby (1936), 260-61; Hind, op.cit., 11.

89. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 179. (Though, as noted earlier, Gladstone had not 'pledged' himself to the programme, as distinct from reform.)

90. Blatant corruption had been done away with, but anomalies remained. See Clarke, P. F. 'Electoral Sociology of Modern Britain', History 57 (1972), 31-55; also Blewett, N. 'The Franchise in the United Kingdom 1885-1914' Past and Present No 32 (Dec 1965), 27-56.

91. Apolitical registrars to be used nation-wide, drawing a public salary. Existing law held that householders had to wait twelve months to qualify for residence franchise. In the case of the plural vote, the Liberals' demands were summed up by the catchwords 'one man, one vote.' Barker, op.cit., 211-13.

92. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 130. Harcourt ended up supporting the 'suspensory veto' scheme advocated by C B

93. Matthew, op.cit., 127. (Speech by Asquith in 1897.)

94. On the 'Lib-Imp' proposals for the promotion of 'national efficiency', ibid, 224-64.

95. Ronaldshay, Earl. The Life of Lord Curzon, I, 305; Crewe, Rosebery, I, 329; Grey, Twenty-Five Years (2 vols, 1925) I, xxix - Sir William invited him over for dinner.

96. As pointed out in Spender, J.A. A Short History of Our Times (1934), 29.

97. Perham, M. Lugard: The Years of Adventure (1956), 405-6.

98. Matthew, op.cit., 159-60.

99. Gardiner, Harcourt, I, 509.

100. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 585-6

101. Findlay, The Imperial Conference of 1911 from Within (1912), 12; White,W. The Inner Life of the House of Commons (2 vols, 1904), II, 174.

102. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 15/10/1907. HAP 647, 239. (Harcourt was to speak at Dewsbury on 7 November).

103. Marion Bryce to Harcourt, 17/11/1892. HAP 431, 72-3. (Harcourt was then convalescing after another bout of illness, according to a note addressed to him two days after he received this letter.)

104. Crewe, Rosebery, II, 415. The ceremony was held on 30 January 1893.

105. Allard to Harcourt, 08/02/1893. HAP 421, 2.

106. O'Brien,T.H. Milner (1979), 79.

107. It was Sydney Buxton, then Colonial Under-Secretary. See above, page 10, note 29.

108. Marlowe,J. Milner - Apostle of Empire (1975), 22

109. Allard to Harcourt, 22/02/1893. HAP 421, 4.

110. Barker, op.cit., 243-5.

111. Allard to Harcourt, 07/09/1893. HAP 421, 22.

112. Mackenzie, W.J.M.& Grove,J.W. Central Administration in Britain (1957), 180.

113. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 241-2.

114. Ibid., 244-53.

115. Harcourt to Herbert Gladstone, 18/01/1894. HAP 432, 11-12.

116. Entry in Brett's journal, dated 14/01/1894. Esher, Journals and Letters, I, 177-8.

117. Esher, op.cit., 168, 173.

118. James, R.R. Rosebery (1963), 302.

119. Ibid, 303; Stansky, op.cit., 54-5; Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 226-8. On Morley's stance, Koss, S. 'Morley in the Middle', EHR 82 (1967), 553-61.

120. Morley, J. Recollections (2 vols 1917), II, 16.

121. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 263.

122. James, Rosebery, 318.

123. Barker, op.cit., 249; Stansky, op.cit., 85.

124. Edward Hamilton noted in his diary on 6 March that she had tearfully complained about Rosebery's unfair treatment of her husband. James, Rosebery, 335.

125. Crewe, Rosebery, II, 513.

126. Who told the press that Rosebery had been wearing a costume of the Royal Archers. 'Such conduct', the irate Foreign Secretary concluded, 'requires no comment.' Rosebery to Harcourt, 12/05/1893. HAP 431, 155. (The Imperial Institute at South Kensington was set up to further the use of the commercial and industrial resources of the Empire.)

127. James, Rosebery, 300.

128. Although it was only as MP for a constituency with strong pro-temperance feeling that Harcourt was to come directly to grips with the licensing reform controversy. See Chapter Two, 133.

129. See Bebbington, The Nonconformist Conscience, 48-49 and Barker, op.cit, 251 on the 'Gothenburg' system. Its attractiveness for supporters was that a municipality's control over its own drink outlets

would eliminate the profit motive, and hence limit supply.

130. Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 21/03 and 29/03/1894. HAP 432, 46 and 52.

131. Gardiner, Prophets, Priests and Kings (1908), 308.

132. Harcourt to William Gladstone, 26/04/1894. WGP 44518, 198-99; and see Barker, op.cit., 250-51.

133. West, Sir A. Recollections (1899), 442-43.

134. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 283.

135. For the Rosebery-Harcourt correspondence over the 1894 Budget see: Crewe, Rosebery, II, 465-5; Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 287; James, Rosebery, 340-6; Stansky, op.cit., 130-5.

136. Harcourt at Rochester (Kent), 17/12/1909. The Times, 18/12/1909, 8.

137. Emy, 'The Impact of Financial Policy ...', 108.

138. Hirst, F.W. In the Golden Days (1947), 220.

139. Zebel, S.H. Balfour (1973), 82. Balfour was then leader of the Opposition in the Commons, subordinate to Lord Salisbury.

140. O'Brien, Milner, 118. On the struggle over the 1894 Budget, see Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 291-301.

141. However the Queen saw the Budget as a measure likely to 'destroy well tried, valued and necessary institutions for the sole purpose of flattering useless Radicals'. An anxious Rosebery realized that, despite her personal sympathy for him, she did not like a ministry which produced such 'revolutionary' measures. See James, Rosebery, 335.

142. O'Brien, op.cit., 118.

143. Due to the growth of national expenditure. Cited in Emy, 'Impact of Financial Policy ...', 109.

144. Harcourt to Sir Charles Linnotte, 17/07/1894. HAP 432, 99-100.

145. Hyde to Allard 14/08/1894; Allard to Harcourt 15/08/1894, in HAP 421, 46 and 44.

146. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 308-9.

147. Mallet, Sir C. Herbert Gladstone : A Memoir (1932), 151.

148. Herbert Gladstone to Harcourt, 14/12/1894. HAP 432, 159-60.

149. They housed the Boards of Education, Trade, Local Government and the Office of Works itself. See Mackenzie and Grove, op cit, 180. Harcourt's involvement with the problems of Works thus preceded his official appointment as First Commissioner in 1905.

150. Stansky, op.cit., 104.

151. Harcourt to Lloyd George, 29/10/1894; Lloyd George to Harcourt in HAP 439, 156 and 158-59. Lloyd George's informant was the Welsh back-bencher D.A. Thomas.

152. Lloyd George to Harcourt, 09/11/1894; Harcourt to Lloyd George, 10/11/1894. HAP, 439, 160-61.

153. See Rowland,P. Lloyd George (1975), 104-07.

154. Asquith, Fifty Years of Parliament, I, 203.

155. Stansky, op.cit., 153 and 144-46 on the by-election trend.

156. Entry dated 05/03/1895. Esher, Journals and Letters, I, 184.

157. Cook, op.cit., 29; Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 372-3.

158. The main interests represented at Derby were industrial, and local workers tended to vote Liberal. As Martin Pugh suggests, a build-up of local Conservative strength prior to the election, and the issues, help explain the sole Liberal setback there in 1895. Pugh, M.

The Tories and the People 1880-1935 (1985), 116.

159. Telegram from Hudson to Harcourt, 14/07/1895. HAP 433, 111.

160. According to Joseph Chamberlain, because it attempted to 'deprive' liquor traders of their livelihood without giving them compensation. Chamberlain at Birmingham, The Times, 15/10/1901. As seen earlier, Chamberlain had his own views on the reform of liquor trade regulations.

161. Hamer, Liberal Politics, Chapter nine.

162. Douglas, R. The History of the Liberal Party 1895-1970 (1971), 18.

163. The Fabian Society, the Land Restoration League, the United Kingdom Alliance, the Home Rule Union, the Liberation Society, and 'various' other Labour unions and 'sectional' societies.

164. Memorandum as to suggested developments of the Work of Liberal Organization by W. Thompson. HAP 421, 52-8.

165. Hudson to Harcourt, 06//2/1894. HAP 432, 31. Hudson to Harcourt, 10/02/1894, thanking him for his hospitality and inviting 'Lulu' and Sir William for breakfast at the Pier Hotel the following Thursday, as guests of the NLF. Ibid, 35-6.

166. Allard to Harcourt, 31/10/1895. HAP 421, 65.

167. Curzon to Harcourt, 19/08/1896. HAP 431, 60-1. Inverlochy Castle was in Inverness-shire, near Fort William.

168. Massingham edited the Daily Chronicle from 1895-99, and The Nation from 1907-23.

169. See Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 414-5 and Stansky, op.cit., 210; on the correspondence between Sir William and Massingham, see Havighurst, A. Radical Journalist : H.W.Massingham (CUP, 1974); see also Koss, S. The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain. The Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill, North Carolina 1981), 371.

170. Heyck, T.W. 'Home Rule, Radicalism and the Liberal Party, 1886-1895', 89 in JBS Vol 13 No 2 (1974), 66-91.

171. Douglas, op.cit., 19.

172. After his defeat at Derby Sir William was re-elected to the Commons via his clear-cut majority at West Monmouth on 23 July 1895.

173. See Massingham, 90 and James, Rosebery, 391-4.

174. Allard to Harcourt, 10/10/1896. HAP 421, 78-9.

175. Henry Fowler, Secretary for India in the ousted Liberal Government, was an opponent of 'programme' politics. Eventually he opposed Home Rule as well.

176. See Lord Rosebery's Speeches (1896), 461-2; Stansky, op.cit., 214.

177. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 418.

178. Stansky, op.cit., 227.

179. Ibid.

180. James, Rosebery, 393.

181. On press opinion of Sir William's prospects as party leader see Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 421 and Stansky, op.cit., 223-4.

182. See the account by Elizabeth Longford (née Pakenham) in Jameson's Raid (London, 1960/Johannesburg 1982 edition).

183. George Wyndham, one of the Unionist members of the Committee, recalled being bored by a 'long and pompous harangue' by Sir William. Amery, L.S. My Political Life (2 Vols 1953), I, 60. It is unlikely that this was the only 'harangue'.

184. Galbraith, J.S. 'The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid', 149 and 153-4 in JBS Vol 10 No 1 (Nov 1970), 145-61;

Longford, op.cit., 283, attributed the outcome to 'an act of national solidarity'; 'Harcourt', Sydney Buxton wrote to Ripon in July 1897, '... has been completely sold by Joe'. Cited in Benyon,J. Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg 1980), 254.

185. Longford, op.cit., 273.

186. Gross,F. Rhodes in Africa (1956), 356-7.

187. Wilson, CB, 273-4; Stansky, op.cit., 247.

188. Herbert Louis Samuel (1870-1963), 1st Viscount. Samuel was Honorary Secretary of the Home Counties Liberal Federation 1897-1901, and was later one of Harcourt's ministerial colleagues.

189. Samuel to Harcourt, 22/02/1897. HAP 435, 17-18.

190. Murray to Harcourt, 09/02/1897. Ibid, 15-16.

191. Guillemard to Harcourt, 03/09/1897. Ibid, 63-64. The post was the commissionership of Internal Revenue, to which Bernard Mallet in fact had a prior claim.

192. Stansky, op.cit., 234.

193. McKenna became a prominent member of the last Liberal Governments. For a biography see McKenna, S. Reginald McKenna 1863-1943 (1948).

194. McKenna to Harcourt, 10/02/1898. HAP 436, 22-3. In the Commons McKenna himself actually sat on the front bench under the gangway. He saw this intermediate seating position as 'an outward sign' of freedom - a freedom, he informed Harcourt,he wished to retain in voting as well.

195. While arranging one of his meetings with Massingham, Harcourt noted that he was moving to a permanent London residence on 14 January. They would have a 'quiet talk' after he had settled in. Harcourt to Massingham, 05/01/1897. HAP 435, 2-3. The following January

Harcourt in fact fell seriously ill, so it was not much of a celebration.

196. Mary Burns to Lady Harcourt, 14/11/1898. HAP 647, 6. Malwood was 'home' (later replaced by Nuneham), as distinct from Harcourt's 'business' residence in London.

197. Stansky, op.cit, 263-4.

198. See Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 472-75 for the text of the letters, and 476 for press reaction.

199. Stansky, op.cit, 276.

200. Spender, CB, I, 214.

201. Stansky, op.cit, 254.

202. James, Rosebery, 388. In February Rosebery had held a reception for his daughters and had invited Sir William and his wife, but not 'Lulu'. They declined the invitation.

203. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 478. Despite Sir William's imagery, his son was not, in fact, prepared to battle heavy odds to try to reach Parliament. See below 70-71.

204. Gardiner, op.cit, 507.

205. Eg. 'The Noble Bachelor' in Doyle, Sir A.C. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (1892), 186.

> There will soon be a call for protection in the marriage market, for the present free-trade principle appears to tell heavily against our home product. One by one the management of the noble houses of Great Britain is passing into the lands of our fair cousins across the Atlantic (The Morning Post).

206. Esher, Journals and Letters, I, 236.

207. Spender, CB, I, 309.

208. Especially useful are Duminy, A.H. Sir Alfred Milner and the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (Natal University Press Monograph, 1976) and The Capitalists and the Outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (Natal U. Press Monograph, 1977). Apart from the biographies already cited in the text, other sources on this issue include: Halperin,V. Lord Milner and the Empire (1965); Le May, G.H.L. British Supremacy in South Africa 1899-1907. (Oxford, 1965), especially chapter 1; Garson, N. 'British Imperialism and the coming of the Anglo-Boer War', SAJE (1962); Porter, A. 'Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-99', HJ (1973) ; Stokes, E. 'Milnerism, HJ (1962).

209. Wilson, CB, 301.

210. For analysis of the pro-Boers, see Koss, S.(Ed). The pro-Boers The Anatomy of an Antiwar Movement (Chicago/London, 1973); Auld, J.W. 'The Liberal Pro-Boers', JBS, vol 14 no 2. (1975), 78- 99.

211. Kaarsholm, P. 'The South African War and the Response of the International Socialist Community to Imperialism between 1896 and 1908', 1-26 (UCT, 1986), 5. Western Cape Roots and Realities Seminar Paper.

212. Eg. CB at Booth in October 1901, during a speaking-tour of the West of England. The Times, 26/10/1901, 8.

213. See 'Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism 1899-1903', by R.D.Jacobson in JBS vol 13, no 1 (1973), 83-107; also p. 32 above.

214. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 496-97.

215. Price, R. An Imperial War and the British Working Class (London/Toronto, 1972), 29.

216. Stead, W.T. 'How the British Government Caused the War', in Review of Reviews (Oct 1899), 329-33, cited in Caldwell, T.C. (Ed) The Anglo-Boer War (Boston, 1965), 47; Stead, W.T. Our New Rulers (1906), 83.

217. Harcourt to CB, 01/06/1899. CBP 41219,121.

218. CB to Sir William, 21/10/1900. Spender, CB, I, 297.

219. See Price, op.cit, note 215.

220. Gladstone to Harcourt, 17/10/1900. HAP 436, 198-9.

221. This was the nick-name Sir William and Morley gave to the Roseberians. If Rosebery was the figurehead of the 'Lib-Imps', then Robert Perks was the driving force at the organizational level. Perks, a wealthy solicitor, once in partnership with Sir Henry Fowler, represented Louth in the Commons. See Matthew, op.cit, 49-50.

222. Sir William to Hirst, 04/08/1900. Hirst, op.cit, 219.

223. Cited in Wilson, CB, 402.

224. Matthew, op.cit, 56-57 and 61.

225. The Harcourts' relations with the Welshman had improved since 1894. Lloyd George had been suspended from the Commons for a week in 1896 for arguing over what he called the 'nonsensical' clauses of the Government's Agricultural Rates Bill. Sir William congratulated him on his stance. Malcolm, T. David Lloyd George The Official Biography (1948), 117-18.

226. Jacobson, 'Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism', 94.

227. Herbert Paul to Harcourt, 19/01/1901. HAP 436, 207.

228. Matthew, op.cit, 61-62.

229. Bernstein, 'CB and the Liberal Imperialists', 108. (Note 75).

230. Extract from Haldane to Milner, 22/12/1900. Headlam, C. (Ed) The Milner Papers (2 Vols 1933), II, 186.

231. Shortly after the NLF elections the Harcourts - 'Lulu' and Mary - set off for the continent, accompanied by their baby daughter, born the previous March. They spent some months wandering around the Mediterranean.

232. Eg. CB at the Albert Hall, 25/10/1901:

> the Liberal Party has always been a party of freedom of thought and action, linking men of diverse opinions and particular questions. We do not suffer; on the contrary, we necessarily gain from this diversity. (The Times, 26/10/1901, 8)

233. As 'fit to lead a party as any are of those who do duty before the shop of a vendor of snuff'. Wilson, CB, 293.

234. Harcourt to CB, 14/12/1901. CBP 41220, 10-11.

235. Price, op.cit, 232-5.

236. Sir William to CB, 23/12/1901. CBP 41220, 17-18.

237. Bernstein, op.cit, 115-17.

238. Such as the League of Liberals against Aggression and Militarists formed in early 1900. By 1901, this League claimed to have organized 500 local meetings. Price, op.cit, 37-38. On the Liberal League, see Matthew, op.cit, chapter three.

239. CB to Ripon, 07/11/1900. Spender, CB, I, 302.

240. Harcourt to CB, 09/03/1902. CBP 41220, 58-9.

241. Hamer, Liberal Politics ..., 277.

242. Eg. Mackay, R.F. Balfour Intellectual Statesman (1985), 71.

243. Koss, Nonconformity ..., 39; Hamer, op.cit, 311. On how the Non-conformists reacted, see Murphy, J. Church, State and Schools (1971), Chapter 6 and Bebbington, op.cit, Chapter 7.

244. 'Our best friends are leaving us by scores and hundreds', he wrote, 'and they will not come back'. Fraser, Chamberlain, 233.

245. Dutton,D. Austen Chamberlain.Gentleman in Politics(1985),29.

246. The 'Whole-Hoggers' or Chamberlainites accepted the proposal of preferential tariffs completely; the 'Little-Piggers' opted for Balfour's compromise policy of retaliation which involved no general tariff or preferential scheme, and was explained in his Economic Notes on Insular Free Trade, published in September 1903; the 'Free Fooders led by Devonshire, rejected any restriction on free trade. See Rempel, R.A. Unionists Divided (1972) on the latter faction.

247. Harcourt to Sir William, 31/05/1903. Hamer, Liberal Politics ... , 313.

248. Matthew, op.cit, 102; Spender, CB, II, 97.

249. Sykes, Tariff Reform in British Politics, 65-6; Morgan, Churchill, 182-83.

250. CB to Harcourt, 27/12/1903. HAP 437, 61.

251. Poirier, P. The Advent of the Labour Party (1958), 147-8, 154-5.

252. Eg. Allard to Harcourt, 07/10/1897 about the forthcoming meeting of the National Conference of Railway Servants. HAP 421,101.

253. Arnold Morley (then Chief Whip) to Harcourt, 30/12/1891 about the difficulties in getting constituencies for ten to twelve 'distinct representatives' of Labour. Morley concluded by hoping that the ruffled feelings of the 'discontented' (including Ripon) would be smoothed by 'judgement and conciliation'. HAP 430, 99-100.

254. See Thompson, P. Socialists,Liberals and Labour - The Struggle for London 1885-1914 (1967).

255. Matthew, op.cit, 128-29.

256. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 36.

257. Pugh, M. The Tories and the People 1880-1935, 242; see also Pelling, H. Social Geography of British Elections 1885-1910 (1967), 263.

258. L. Zimmerman to Harcourt, 21/09/1903. HAP 437, 41.

259. Clarke, P.F. Lancashire and the New Liberalism (CUP, 1971), 238.

260. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 560; Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 23/01/1904. HAP 647, 124. He was scheduled to speak on two evenings the following week.

261. Harcourt at Rossendale, 11/03/1904. The Times, 12/03/1904,12.

262. The Times, 09/03/1904.

263. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 13/03/1904. HAP 647, 126.

264. The Times, 16/03 and 18/03/1904. 'We had a most happy day', Sir William wrote to his sister Emily. 'The dearest hope of my life was fulfilled. The House was crowded on both sides and both equally cheered the rising and setting sun'. Gardiner, Harcourt, II, 567.

265. Review of Reviews XXIX, no 172 (April 1904), 316.

266. Cited in Rempel, Unionists Divided, 67.

267. Speech on land policy by CB, 27/01/1904. Liberal Magazine Vol 12 (1904), 46-47.

268. Herbert Gladstone at Leeds, 06/11/1905. The Times, 07/11/1905.

The reference was to reform of registration laws and the curtailment of plural voting.

269. Address by Buxton to constituents at Millwall. The Times, 07/10/1905.

270. Rosebery in Cornwall, The Times 27/11/1905.

271. Sir Robert Reid at Peterborough. The Times, 21/11/1905; Asquith at Leven, on the Firth of Forth, ibid, 13/13/1905.

272. According to Harcourt's calculations, the amount set aside in the Sinking Fund for debt redemption should have been £9 000 000 instead of £6 500 000. Harcourt to Spender, 11/05/1903, in SPP 46391, 112-13.

273. 'Once pay a member for his votes collectively' he declared, and he will very soon make a market for his individual votes'. The Unionists cited this declaration in their 1892 campaign guide. Pugh, op.cit, 18. By contrast, his son always supported this reform.

274. According to this decision by the Law Lords the Taff Vale Railway company received £23 000 in damages from the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. The ruling threatened the financial independence of the trade unions by making them liable in future for payment of damages and/or losses suffered by employers due to their members' activities. The Government's failure to pass remedial legislation alienated even hitherto staunchly pro-Unionist workers.

275. See Richardson, P. Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal (1982), esp. 5-6; Russell, A.K. Liberal Landslide (1973), 196-198.

276. The Act has been described as 'a moderate and progressive measure', remaining the basis of public house regulations in Britain to the present. Zebel, Balfour, 121-2. Nonetheless, Nonconformist temperance organizations were opposed to what they considered over generous compensation to publicans whose licenses were not renewed.

277. Sir Charles Dilke at Nottingham. The Times, 04/11/1905.

278. Amery, J. Chamberlain, V, (1969), 233; testimony from Unionist

candidates on the eve of by-elections, cited in Rempel, op cit, 121.

279. Gollin, A. Balfour's Burden (1965), 270-74; Mackay, Balfour, 195-226.

280. See The Times, 08/01/1904, 7; Rowland, Lloyd George, 174. This was one of the friendliest occasions on which Harcourt and Lloyd George met. Lloyd George was being honoured for his scathing anti-Government speeches, and Harcourt described him as 'the brightest ornament of the Celtic fringe'.

281. Crook to Harcourt, 18/05/1904. HAP 437, 76.

282. 'You little know what a strain that last Wednesday's dinner at Berkeley Square was', Tweedmouth added. Tweedmouth to Harcourt, 15/07/1904. HAP 437, 82-3.

283. Churchill, opening a bazaar at Manchester. The Times, 03/10/1904.

284. Review of Reviews XXX (Nov. 1904), 464. Annual Register (1905), 31; Monthly Review XVII (Oct - Dec 1904), 27.

285. Harcourt to CB, 07/10/1904. CBP 41220, 173.

286. Crook to Harcourt, 25/11/1904. HAP 437, 112.

287. The farms and holdings included Shifford, Cogges - now the site of a farm museum - some 500 acres at north Hinksey, and Northmoor. Nuneham Park was well-timbered, and a herd of about 300 fallow deer grazed in its 1 200 acres, which extended along the banks of the Isis, or Upper Thames.

288. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 01/08/1905. HAP 647, 174-5.

289. Harcourt to Sinclair (1st Baron Pentland), 19/09/1919. CBP 41252, 139.

290. CB to Harcourt, 20/02/1905, in HAP 438.

291. In a speech on 25 November 1905 at Bodmin in Cornwall, Rosebery violently rejected the possibility of his serving under the 'flag' of Home Rule. Balfour had suspected that such quarrels would afflict the Liberals. According to Herbert Gladstone, after this 'monstrous outbreak' by Rosebery he received letters of inquiry from all over the country reporting 'disturbed minds', but none more so, as CB saw it, then Rosebery himself. 'Is R clean off his head?' he asked. Cited in Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 7.

CHAPTER TWO

1. They believed he was 'one of the reserve forces of the Liberal Party'. Stead, Our New Rulers (1906), 69.

2. Pall Mall Magazine (Sept 1905), 382.

3. Harcourt's suggestion for Chief Whip was R.J. Price, a Liberal MP from Norfolk whom he thought 'would do very well'. Harcourt to CB, 21/11/1905. CBP 41220, 186.

4. McKenna, S. Reginald McKenna (1948), 23.

5. Harcourt to CB, 03/01/1907. CBP 41220, 205-6.

6. See Bramsted, E.K.& Melhuish, K.J.(Eds). Western Liberalism (1978), 442 - 452 on Radicalism as an aspect of English Liberalism; also, introduction, note 53.

7. For this long letter from Harcourt to CB, 27/11/1905, see CBP 41220, 187-92.

8. A few hours after his appointment, CB telegraphed Lord Cromer, the administrator of Egypt, but Cromer declined the offer.

9. Harcourt to Sinclair, 07/12/1905. CBP 41220, 194.

10. Wilson, CB, 443.

11. Although the Unionist Monthly Review dismissed the Liberal claim that this was a 'Ministry of All the Talents' as 'obviously mere party leader-writing'. Monthly Review, vol 23 (May 1906), 3, in McNeill, R. 'Parliament and Parties', 1-20.

12. Morris, A.J.A. Radicalism Against War, 295.

13. Stead commented that it looked like a 'job'. Wilson, CB, 460.

14. At that time Sir Charles Dilke was the doyen of the Radicals, but CB had a low opinion of him. Dilke's career had been blighted by a divorce scandal in 1886, and he had voted against CB in the infamous 'Cordite' vote of 1895. He was completely excluded.

15. '[E]ach would, I think, be satisfied, McK would do all the detailed work very well. Winston would be the best man to meet Joe's attacks on Elgin's policy'. Harcourt to Sinclair, 08/12/1905. CBP 41230, 95. On 9 December Churchill was in fact offered the choice of either of those positions, and opted for the 'small, humble task', as he put it,of Under-Secretary to Elgin.

16. Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics (2 Vols 1927), I, 131.

17. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 11/12/1905. HAP 647, 194.

18. Stead, Our New Rulers, 83.

19. Earle joined Harcourt at Works as his principal private secretary - perhaps an appointment which was also described as a 'job'.

20. Eg. Harcourt-Buxton correspondence in August 1908, over the latter's remarks over how long it had taken Works to build a post office at Warrington (in HAP 453). The preceding paragraphs are based on Mackenzie & Grove, op.cit, 288 and Earle, Turn Over the Page, 214 and 229-30.

21. Russell, A.K. Liberal Landslide (1973), 51-52; Blewett, N. 'Free

Fooders, Balfourites, Whole-Hoggers, Factionalism within the Unionist Party, 1906-10', HJ XI (1968), 95-124.

22. The manifesto consisted primarily of an attack on Unionist policy and a reiteration of traditional legislative goals coupled with amorphous references to needed social reforms. See Craig, F.W.S. British General Election Manifestos 1900-1974 (1975), 10-13.

23. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism, 7.

24. Harcourt at Radcliffe (Lancashire). The Times, 13/12/1907.

25. Harnetty , P. 'The India Cotton Duties Controversy 1894-6', EHR Vol 77 No 305 (1962), 648-702.

26. Russell, op.cit, 173; Pelling, Social Geography ..., 243.

27. Pugh, The Tories and the People, 123-25.

28. Clarke, op.cit, 268.

29. Review of Reviews, XXXIII (Feb 1906), 110; Hap 647, 198 & 200.

30. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 11/01/1906. HAP 647, 199.

31. Letters by Mary Harcourt dated 11/01 and 13/01/1906. HAP 647, 200-01. Russell, op.cit, 33 on the Irish vote.

32. See McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book of All Elections 1832-1918. Vincent, J & Stenton, M. (Brighton, 1971. 8th Ed).

33. Mackay, Balfour, 227; for a complete analysis, Russell, op.cit.

34. Russell, op.cit, 200- 04.

35. Williams, C.R. 'The Welsh Religious Revival, 1904-05', British Journal of Sociology, 3, (1952), 242-59. Yet this apparently impregnably entrenched Liberalism did not survive the post-Great War years - See Morgan, K.O. 'The New Liberalism and the Challenge of Labour: The Welsh Experience, 1885-1829' in Brown, K.D. Essays in

Anti-Labour History (1974), 159-82.

36. Herbert Gladstone to CB, 21/01/1906. Cook, C. A Short History of the Liberal Party (1976), 43.

37. Dilke to Harcourt, 16/02/1906. HAP 439, 28-30. Prospective recruits had to agree to cooperate with Labour leader Keir Hardie or Irish Nationalist leader John Redmond.

38. Chamberlain, A. Politics from Inside, 198.

39. J.G.Taylor to Harcourt, 25/07/1906; Harcourt to Taylor, 26/071-06. HAP 439, 90 & 94.

40 BPD, Vol 166, 624 (03/12/1906). Cited in Blewett,N. The Peers, the Parties and the People (1972), 357.

41. It is still not clear if the pro-Unionist ratio among plural voters was as much as four to one. See Pugh,M. Electoral Reform in War and Peace 1906-1918 (1972), 31.

42. Nineteenth Century (Nov 1905), 838-52 on 'Redistribution'.

43. The Liberals denounced Balfour's scheme as political 'gerrymandering' or manipulation. The nick-name stuck, although the expression actually derived from a shady episode in Massachusetts, USA, involving a governor Gerry.

44. Address by Gerald Balfour to the Peers Conservative Association. The Times, 07/10/1905.

45. Including Balfour of Burleigh, former Secretary for Scotland, Lord Cromer, Sir Edward Clarke, Sir Henry Kimber and Sir William Anson, MP for Oxford.

46. In fact, as Pugh notes, the Society was symptomatic of a wide dissatisfaction with the existing system of representation, and represented part of a wider debate. Pugh, Electoral Reform , 5 & 12.

47. Balfour lost his Manchester seat during the election, and was re-elected on 27 February as a member for the City, the high-finance district of central London.

48. A few days later, Mary Harcourt wrote that:

> Lulu is being overwhelmed with congratulations on his speech on Wednesday by political friends and foes alike. He was very nervous before but said that once he stood at the box his nervousness all disappeared ... I hope he may get his [Works] Estimates taken before the Second Reading of his Bill for there will be so much debating on the former.

Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 06/05/1906. HAP 647, 205-6. (Written during a visit to Blenheim.) For the description of Harcourt's maiden speech, Annual Register (1906), 110.

49. BPD (1906), Vol 157, 187.

50. Pugh, Electoral Reform ..., 31.

51. As Colonial Under-Secretary, Churchill argued in favour of this for a representative assembly in the Transvaal. Pelling, H. Winston Churchill (1974), 95.

52. Eg. Excerpt from Unionist Morning Post of 15/03/1906, that in theory the University seats gave parliamentary representation to men 'peculiarly qualified intellectually to take broad views'. Cited in Liberal Magazine (April 1906), 196.

53. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 23/05/1906. HAP 647, 213.

54. John Ward (Stoke-on-Trent)was one of the few members of the 'progressive alliance' to mention this aspect, saying that it was the 'only proper permanent solution'. BPD (1906) Vol 157, 255-6.

55. The Times, 15/05/1906, 9.

56. The Times, 18/10/1906, 9.

57. The Times, 11/12/1906; The Spectator, 27/10/1906, 605-6 and 08/12/1906, 914-15.

58. BPD (1906) Vol 166, 1511. For Beauchamp's speech and the debate over the Bill see ibid, 1487-88 and 1489-1519.

59. Oxford Times, 15/12/1906, 10. Evidently the writer expected the the 'judgement' to be in favour of the Second Chamber.

60. Liberal Magazine (Jan 1907), 749.

61. This constituency was in Leicestershire South. The growing numbers of pro-Liberal industrial workers there had countered the pro-Unionist trend in the rural areas and the upper-class Leicester suburbs, tipping the electoral balance there in the Government's favour. See Pelling, Social Geography ..., 221.

62. The Times, 20/12/1906.

63. During an NLF Meeting at Plymouth.

64. An entire file in box 453 of the Harcourt Papers is filled with correspondence to Lord Onslow, chief of the House of Lords Offices Committee, on the subject of space in the House of Lords being made available to Commons' MPs. Harcourt also resented the Committee's cross-examination about the lift he had installed in the Second Chamber for use by crippled or elderly peers. The Committee insisted on additional staff for the lift. As Harcourt noted:

> The matter is now out of my hands. I have made the lift for the Peers and if they do not choose to use it I cannot force them to do so though I think it is extremely hard on Ripon [his old friend was now 78] and a few others who are in

> dire need of it. I think I should hesitate for a very long time before I assent to any further improvements or alterations which the Peers may ask me to carry out in their part of the Palace of Westminster.

Harcourt to Knollys (Edward VII's private Secretary), 07/12/1906. HAP 453, 314-15. The correspondence between Harcourt, Onslow, Cholmondeley (Lord Great Chamberlain) and Knollys is also in HAP 453.

65. Harcourt also put a stop to an external nuisance : sometimes manure-laden barges passed near the terrace, with dire olfactory consequences!

66. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 23/05/1906. HAP 647, 213.

67. On the new system see the Monthly Review Vol 25 (Oct-Dec 1906), 71-75.

68. Harcourt tried to get representatives of the firm and trade unions to reach agreement in conference, but nothing was settled. See BPD (1906), Vol 159, 370; Vol 163, 1087.

69. The text of the clause is given in HAP 456, 107.

70. Several boxes in the Harcourt Papers are devoted to the subject of Works Estimates, but this is the province of the financial historian and will not be dealt with.

71. McDonnell to Harcourt, 02/10/1906. HAP 453, 15.

72. Although substantial sums were spent on Edinburgh Castle in fire prevention precautions, and improving sanitary conditions for the occupants. £3 645 were added to the 1908 Estimates for repairs to Carnarvon and Stirling Castles. HAP 456, 104.

73. This site has been plagued by vandals for so long - then and now - that it might in future be barred except to *bona fide* researchers.

74. Lord Jersey to Harcourt, 22/09/1906; Harcourt reply telegram, HAP

439, 114 & 116-17. Jersey persisted: 'You bear', he wrote, 'the historic name of a family which has done much to make its [the county's] annals'. Jersey to Harcourt, 26/09/1906, ibid, 119-20. Assured that his role would be essentially a token one, Harcourt capitulated on receipt of the second request.

75. Although Harcourt was in complete control of the building, McDonnell thought it better to advise Haldane that invitations to the press would be issued for 15 November. McDonnell to Harcourt, 15/10/1906. HAP 453, 16.

76. Harcourt to Fisher, 13/12/1906. FIP 3/2, 67. (The New Admiralty buildings were next to St James's Park.)

77. A survey of those battleships is provided in War Machine (1986) Vol 11, No 131, 2613-15.

78. Harcourt at the Hippodrome, Bury, 06/01/1906. Reported in The Times, 08/01/1906.

79. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 87-88 on the domestic legislation; on the shaping of the Transvaal constitution, Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 98-177.

80. Ponsonby to Harcourt, 15/12/1906. HAP 439, 126.

81. And that the official announcement could be expected within the next few days. See The Times, 29/01/1907 & 10/01/1907.

82. Harcourt to CB, 09/01/1907. CBP 41220, 211.

83. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, from Hatfield 26/12/1906. HAP 647, 227.

84. Morley wanted CB's friend T.R.Buchanan to be transfered from the War Office. In the end he had to settle for Charles Hobhouse as Under-Secretary, and the latter found Morley 'very frigid' at first. Hobhouse Diaries, 56. When Asquith reconstructed the Government in April 1908 Morley did get Buchanan.

85. Written 'at Christmas' by Runciman to Harcourt. HAP 439, 127-30.

86. Rowland, op.cit, 109; Wilson, CB, 590.

87. An inversion of Lord Randolph Churchill's description of William Gladstone as 'an old man in a hurry' over Home Rule.

88. Harcourt to CB, 03/01/1907. CBP 41220, 201-2 & 205-6.

89. In May 1907 the Cabinet had agreed on Ripon's plan for a system of joint conferences between both Houses to settle disputes. CB considered this too cumbersome, and devised an alternative 'suspensory veto' plan which Harcourt supported. See Weston, C C. 'The Liberal Leadership and the Lords' Veto 1907-1910', HJ XI, 3 (1968), 508-37 and below, 155.

90. The Times, 09/03/1907, 12.

91. Austen Chamberlain to Harcourt, 21/02/1907. HAP 439,

92. Note by Lyttelton, 25/02/1907. Ibid, 150. The nick-name derived from Haldane's well-known fondness for German culture, and particularly its philosophers.

93. Harcourt at Bacup. The Times, 15/04/1907.

94. Morris, A.J.A. The Scaremongers (1984), 228.

95. Zebel, Balfour, 116.

96. Morris, op.cit, chapter 16 on the Unionist press and the conscription issue. Strachey told Roberts it was undesirable to make national service a party matter - Ibid, 229.

97. Morris, op.cit, 226.

98. Apart from CB these were Grey, Haldane, Tweedmouth and Ripon. The issue is examined in Coogan, J.W. & Coogan P.F. 'The British

Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1905-1914: Who Knew What and When did He Know It?' in JBS Vol 24 No 1 (Jan 1985), 110-131.

99. Ibid, 115-16.

100. Wilson,K. The Policy of the Entente, 32; Morris, Radicalism Against War, 32 & 95-96.

101. See document in HAP 439, 05/12/1906; Harcourt to CB 29/01/1907, CBP 41220, 215.

102. Harcourt to Holroyd, 19/07/1907; Holroyd to Harcourt, 21/08/1907; Harcourt to Alfred Mond, 09/10/1907; Harcourt to Holroyd, 11/02/1908. Respectively, HAP 456: 31, 44, 87 & 91.

103. McDonnell to Harcourt, 30/08/1906. HAP 439, 105; Sir Hugh Gilzean-Read to Harcourt, 16/02/1907; Harcourt to Gilzean-Read, 19/02/1907. HAP 455, 62 & 69.

104. Gilzean-Read to Harcourt, 09/05/1908. HAP 455, 92-3.

105. The portrait was by H.J.Stock of the Royal Institute of Water-colour Painters. See Cicely Leveson-Gower (wife of George Leveson-Gower, chairman of the executive committee of the federation) to Harcourt re the award, 28/03/1906 and 04/04/1906, HAP 439, 56-57 & 62-63. A few months later Lord Carrington, president of the federation, made the presentation at the federation's offices at 42 Parliament Street. The Times, 31/07/1906, 10.

106. See CB to Knollys 25/03/1907, two days after the Cabinet adoption of the Ripon plan. Weston, 'The Liberal Leadership and the Lords' Veto ...', 515.

107. Harcourt to CB, 23/03/1907. CBP 41220, 216-17.

108. The Times, 28/03/1907.

109. Harcourt to CB, 03/01/1907. CBP 41220, 201-2.

110. Murray, The People's Budget, 55.

111. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 02/05/1907. HAP 647, 233 (written from Hotel Ritz, Paris).

112. This Bill was directed at alleviating the urban overcrowding in Scotland. See Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 114.

113. Eg. Yorkshire Post, 24/01/1907, cited in Liberal Magazine.

114. Offer, Property and Politics, 356-57.

115. Liberal Magazine (Dec 1904), 706.

116. Lord Carrington at the Hotel Cecil, London. The Times, 09/03/1907.

117. Offer, op.cit, 358.

118. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 02/06/1907. HAP 647, 234.

119. The difference was that the Board was empowered to use compulsion if necessary, a step which the 1905 Committee had balked at.

120. The Parish Councils, which Harcourt believed had a better grasp of local conditions. In terms of the 1887 Allotments Act rural district councils and parish councils had had joint responsibility but now the rural councils were dispensed with.

121. This enabled such land to be hired out on its value as *agricultural* land, without taking into account its prospective value for other uses - and for which a higher rent could be charged.

122. His son William Edward, who became the Second Viscount Harcourt, was born in 1908. Edward VII was godfather, by proxy.

123. That is, since the county councils would assist in the creation of small holdings which he, and other landowners, could not afford to set up on their own. BPD (1907) Vol 174, 1377-88 for the full text

of Harcourt's speech.

124. On the slow but steady decline of the gentry, and the increasing neglect of estates, see Thom[illegible], F.M.L. English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (Lon[illegible]n/ Toronto, 1963), 316-26 *passim* and 342-43.

125. Letter by H.B.M.Buchanan in The Spectator, 02/01/1909, 11-13.

126. Douglas, R. Land, People & Politics : A History of the Land Question in the United Kingdom, 1878-1952 (1976), 103.

127. Harcourt to the editor of The Times, 26/10/1909. HAP 421, 130-131.

128. Douglas, op.cit, 139.

129. Wedgwood feared that urban ratepayers would bear the brunt of failure if the Bill was unsuccessful.

130. The Spectator, 01/06/1907, 850.

131. Ibid, 31/08/1907, 278.

132. Douglas, op.cit, 122.

133. Thompson, English Landed Society, 64.

134. Douglas, op.cit, 140; Wilson, CB, 599-601.

135. BPD (1907) Vol 144, 1421-3 and 1423-8.

136. Liberal Magazine (July 1907), 378-79.

137. Liberal Magazine (September 1907), 505-06; The Spectator, 31/08/1907, 278 for Unionist comment.

138. Harcourt to Burns, 28/08/1907. BUP 46299, 335. The Bill also had opposition from some land taxers like Wedgwood and Edwin Montagu. At one stage it was not expected to have an easy passage. Carring-

ton to Ripon, 02/04/1907. Douglas, op cit, 139 and 151. For the amendments to the Bill, Liberal Magazine (Sept 1907), 510-11. On the implementation of the Bill, below, 133-34.

139. The point is made by Colin Cross in The Liberals in Power (1963), 58.

140. The Times, 29/10/1907.

141. Reverend Lines to Harcourt, 29/10/1907. HAP 439, 218.

142. Archbishop Davidson to Harcourt, 30/10/1907. Ibid, 180-81.

143. Harcourt to Archbishop Davidson, 31/10/1907. Ibid, 182-83 for the text of Davidson's letter, The Times, 30/08/1907.

144. The WSPU felt that to publicise the issue of women's suffrage it was necessary to enlist the support of leading politicians. This is why Christabel Pankhurst interrupted one of Churchill's free trade meeting's in 1904. The disruption of Sir Edward Grey's meeting in October 1905, and the Albert Hall demonstration, were just two of the better-known incidents in the new militant phase of the WSPU's campaign. The now systematic heckling of Liberal speakers proceeded - correctly - on the assumption that the Liberals would shortly be victorious in the elections.

145. Prompting this satirical entry in Punch (1913): 'Underwriters at Lloyds are now open to insure golf courses against damage by suffragettes. The premium is equivalent to 2 per cent, the rate being quoted for all 18 holes at £1 back for 12 months, underwriters to pay any claims for damage to each green up to £50'. Cited in Rooke, P. Women's Rights (1972), 106. These acid-pouring activities were directed against courses that Liberal ministers like Lloyd George were known to use.

146. See Chapter three, 230-31. The NUWSS was comprised largely of middle-class women. Initially, the WSPU was heavily dependent on the Independent Labour Party and sought to recruit working-class women.

147. Edward VII was also opposed to women's suffrage. Early in 1907 a women's enfranchisement bill was introduced by Dickinson, a Liberal back-bencher,and it was read a second time on 8 March. His bill was talked out next day, to the relief of the King, who wrote to CB on 29 March:

> I rejoice to see that you 'put your foot down' regarding the Channel tunnel ... I only wish you could have done the same regarding female suffrage.

Cited in Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 113.

148. Harrison B. Separate Spheres (1977), 98; Appendix Four, 'Death by Misadventure', on Harcourt's alleged homosexuality.

149. Balfour did not try to derive political capital from the Government's response to the subsequent escalation of suffragette militancy. For example, his assurances to Home Secretary Herbert Gladstone in 1908 that he did not wish to embarrass the Government over Sylvia Pankhurst's complaints about the treatment of her mother in Holloway Prison.

150. See Rosen, A. Rise Up, Women! (1974), 88-89, 92 and Chapter Seven on 'The Split'.

151. Manson to Harcourt, 27/10/1907. HAP 439, 216-217.

152. The Times, 29/10/1907. Despite the number of women workers in Rossendale, as noted earlier, this claim may have been an overstatement.

153. W omen protested ... so vigorously and in such numbers that the[Haslingden] meeting was broken up'. Pankhurst,S. The Suffragette.The History of the Women's Militant Suffrage Movement 1905 - 1910 (1911), 178.

154. See The Times, 29/10/1907 & 01/11/1907.

155. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 14/12/1907. HAP 647, 244-5; The Times, 13/12/1907.

156. In his speech Harcourt gave an overview of the political situation, reported in The Times, 14/12/1907.

157. Grayson refused to join the Labour Party, although the ILP was impressed by his dynamism and sought him as its leader. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I 124; Grayson's victory only served to exacerbate tensions within the 'Labour Alliance' - see Marquard, D. Ramsay MacDonald (1977), 106-07.

158. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 44. (Although Labour's share of the total poll decreased by 8%, this was a four-way contest, which included the Irish Nationalists).

159. Cited in Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, 89.

160. See Russell op.cit, 33 on the Liberal negotiations with the Nationalists prior to the 1906 general election.

161. Harcourt addressing the annual meeting of the Rossendale Liberal Council. The Times, 18/10/1906.

162. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 142.

163. Asquith at Leven, Firth of Forth, 12/12/1905. The Times, 13/10/1905.

164. Figures given in HAP 440,58.

165. As Selborne had ascertained via inquiries made by Sir Fr[illegible] Lascelles, then British Ambassador in Berlin. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, 70; Kennedy, P. 'The Development of German Naval Operations Plans Against England 1896-1914' in Kennedy, P. (Ed.) The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914 (1979), 171-98.

166. See Steiner, Z. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (CUP, 1969).

167. Though this did not necessarily make Senior Clerk Eyre Crowe's memorandum 'anti-German', as reputed. Wilson, op.cit, 101.

168. Wilson, op.cit, chapter six on 'The Invention of Germany'.

169. Steinberg, J. 'The Copenhagen Complex', JCH Vol 1 No 3 (1966), 23-46.

170. Robertson was Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, and George Lambert was Civil Lord of the Admiralty.

171. Harcourt to CB, 31/12/1907. CBP 41220, 221-4. Harcourt was anxious not to miss the coming Cabinet meetings in January 'which will I suppose in some ways be critical'.

172. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 125.

173. Balfour did not want the Government to be defeated over this issue - the disregard of his instructions was indicative of his waning influence within the Unionist Party.

174. Esher Journals, II, 281-84. (Entry dated 07/02/1908).

175. Harcourt to CB, 06/04/1908. CBP 41220, 227.

176. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism, 191.

177. By then the second Viscount Esher.

178. Esher Journals, II, 278.

179. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 139.

180. Morris, The Scaremongers, 171; on Lloyd George's commitment to national defence, see Fry, M.G. Lloyd George and Foreign Policy. (London/Montreal, 1977).

181. CB said, according to McKenna, 'I suppose we ought to include him'. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 19.

182. In 1907 Masterman had been the co-author with W B Hodgson *et al* of To Colonise England : a plea for a policy. Offer, op.cit, 356.

183. Hobhouse Diaries, 73.

184. Harcourt, perhaps because of his cooperation!, was highly praised and described as 'sure of promotion' in the future although preferring then to remain at Works. The 'leaks' in the Daily Chronicle were spread over three days' reports. Grigg, J. Lloyd George, The People's Champion (1978), 134-8.

185. Esher Journals, II, 303. (Journal entry dated 10/04/1908).

186. Although stating his conviction that constitutionally the resignation of a Prime Minister put an end to a government. Harcourt to Asquith, 04/04/1908. ASP, 11, 38.

187. Harcourt to Asquith, 10/10/1908. Ibid, 65. (The 'races across Europe' referred to Asquith's quick trip to France for his formal audience with the King, then at Biarritz. He left on 6 April and was back in London by the evening of the 10th.)

188. This latter Bill was introduced on 27 February, and became as controversial as the Education Act had been in 1906. Insofar as it set a time-limit on compensation to license-holders, and did not regard compensation as a right owed to owners of public houses, it was based on the Minority Report of the Peel Commission of 1899. See Fahey, D.M. 'Temperance and the Liberal Party - Lord Peel's Report, 1899', JBS Vol 10, No 2 (May 1971), 132-59.

189. Note by Treasury official Mark Sturgis to Harcourt, 17/01/1908. HAP 421, 119.

190. Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, 51. According to the 1908 Annual Register imports declined by 8.2% and exports by 11.5%. See also Sayers, R.S. A History of Economic Changes in England 1880-1939 (OUP, 1967), 41.

191. This Liberal fear was nothing new. Chamberlain's energetic urban campaign in 1903 had created the possibility of working-class defections to the protectionists - particularly in London. See Harris, J. Unemployment and Politics (OUP, 1972), 215.

192. Harcourt at the annual meeting of the Northern Liberal Federation, at the Palace Theatre, Newcastle. The Times, 01/10/1908.

193. The Times, 29/06/1908, 10.

194. Harcourt at Crawshawbooth, Rossendale. The Times, 03/10/1908, 10; Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, 142.

195. O'Day, A. The Edwardian Age (1979), 70.

196. Lord Carrington at Reading's town hall, 27/03/1908. The Times 28/03/1908, 6.

197. Offer, op.cit, 359.

198. Ibid, 359-60; Emy, 'The Impact of Financial Policy ...', 123.

199. Hobhouse Diaries, introduction, 6.

200. Esher Journals, II, 321. (Journal entry, 06/06/1908.)

201. Arguing that when taxes were imposed on commodities consumed by vitually every family in the country - tea, coffee, sugar, beer and tobacco - there was no such thing as non-contributory. A scheme financed out of public funds was thus as much a contributory scheme as one financed directly by contributions arranged on the German or other basis. (In one German scheme, workmen paid into a fund).

202. Eg. Harcourt to Ramsay MacDonald, 29/06/1908 in BPD (1908), Vol 191, 409-10 that paupers could *not* be dealt with in the report of the Commission. On the eve of the Third Reading debate, Asquith asked Harcourt to say a few words: 'Quite a short speech will suffice'. Asquith to Harcourt, 08/07/1908, HAP 421. The Bill was duly passed and approved by the peers on 30 July. It became operative on 1 January 1909.

203. Sommer, D. Haldane of Cloan (1960), 214; Rowland, Last Liberal

Governments, I, 195-97; Spiers,E.M. Haldane : An Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980), 65-72.

204. McKenna to Harcourt, 28/11/1907. HAP 439, 236-7. Compare McKenna to Garvin, 28/05/1908: 'I mean to be in every sense Minister for the Navy and ... I am to be as stiff as was Mr Cobden himself in my desire to maintain the unconditional supremacy of the navy'. MAP 3/13, 44.

205. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 147. The Estimates for 1909/10 were £35 242 700, an increase of £2 923 200. Note by McKenna, dated 08/12/1908 in ASP 21, 14.

206. The Unionist press apparatus is described in Morris, The Scaremongers.

207. Loreburn at the Cobden Club, Oxford. The Times, 04/12/1905.

208. Harcourt at Bacup, 16/01/1908. Liberal Magazine (1908), 4.

209. Harcourt at Crawshawbooth. The Times, 03/10/1908.

210. Prince von Bülow, Memoirs 1903-1909 (London/N.Y., 1931), 364.

211. Harcourt at Glasgow, The Times 21/11/1908. 'To build fewer ships then necessary was folly' - Harcourt at Manchester. The Times, 08/05/1909.

212. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, 8.

213. Spender & Asquith, Life of H. H.Asquith, I, 254.

214. Gwynne, editor of The Standard, to Sandars, 30/03/1909 on the potential of the naval/defence question as a vote-winner. Blewett, op. cit, 52.

215. Published in 1903, this best-seller concerned the discovery of a German plot to invade Britain. See Hynes,S. The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton, New Jersey, 1968), 32-49 passim, for a discussion of this literature. But not all writings were bellicose or alarmist. See Weinroth, H. 'Norman Angell's Great Illusion' in HJ 17, 3 (1974) 551-74, for an influential example of pacifist literature.

216. Marder, A.J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (5 Vols, OUP 1961-70), I (1961), 167.

217. Chamberlain, Politics From Inside, 135; Zebel, Balfour, 156-7.

218. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905 (1940), 486.

219. He denied that an 'instalment policy' would deceive the public or the Liberal Party: 'prepared to be shocked at a programme of 6, they will be horrified at what every one will realize is a programme of 8 ...' CAB 37/98, No 37 (24/02/1909).

220. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 154 & 164-66.

221. Blewett, op.cit, 52.

222. Weinroth, H.S. 'The British Radicals and the Balance of Power 1902-1914', HJ, vol 13, 4 (1970), 653-82, esp. 662-64.

223. Thomas Gibson-Bowles to Harcourt, 06/03/1909. HAP 441, 26-7.

224. Rowland, Lloyd George, 215.

225. Murray, The People's Budget, 150 and Chapter VI for a detailed analysis of the Budget's passage through the Cabinet.

226. Emy, 'The Impact of Financial Policy ... ', 119.

227. Murray, op.cit, 151.

228. The list ran as follows: [1906] Education Act, 'wrecked'; Plural Voting Bill, 'rejected'; Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 'mutilated'; Agricultural Holdings Act, 'mutilated'; Town Tenants (Ireland) Act, 'mutilated'; Aliens Bill, 'rejected'; [1907] Scottish Small Landowners Bill, 'had to be withdrawn'; Scottish Land Values Bill, 'rejected'; Irish Evicted Tenants Act, 'mutilated'. [1908] Scottish Small Landholders Bill, 'rejected'; Scottish Land Values Bill, 'wrecked'; Licensing Bill, 'rejected'; Coal Mines (Eight Hours) Act, 'mutilated'. Liberal Year Book (1909), 183-95.

229. See Murray, "The Politics of the 'People's Budget'", HJ, Vol 16, 3 (1973), 555-570; Murray, The People's Budget, 117-121.

230 Owen,F. Tempestuous Journey (1954), 172.

231. Thring to Harcourt, 23/02/1909. HAP 510, 19.

232. Thring to Harcourt, 26/02/1909. HAP 439, 21. He added that there were 'two very imperfect ideas of a Frankfurt tax in the last two clauses' but had yet to work out the Death Duty and Corporation clauses.

233. The Committee included Crewe, Loreburne, Haldane, McKenna, Buxton and the Chancellor. Assistants included Hobhouse, Robson (Attorney-General) and Alexander Ure (Solicitor-General for Scotland). Murray, The People's Budget, 131.

234. On this Lloyd George proposed that persons liable to payment of income tax on gross rental value of real property - Schedule A - would be able to deduct from the land tax the sum payable under Schedule A. This would avoid 'double taxation'.

235. CAB 37/97, No 10 (28/01/09), esp. letter B. The letters were provided to the Committee five days before the Cabinet Circular. The identity of the writers is provided in Murray, op.cit, 132.

236. CAB 37/97, No 16, reply by Lloyd George, remarking that 'large sums must be raised by this Budget for the financing of proposals which must inevitably relieve agricultural land of a large share of the burdens now imposed on it for the maintenance of the poor'.

237. Provided that this did not exceed a sum equal to 1d in the pound on the whole rent received by the interest. Any excess would be carried to the *next* senior interest,subject to the same proviso, and so on. For the text of Harcourt's memorandum, see HAP 439, 4-18, esp. 10-11 and 13-15.

238. Murray, The People's Budget, 154.

239. Harcourt estimated the cost of implementation of the proposals as

£100 000:

Drawing up a kind of 'Domesday book'	-	£10 000
Payment of assessors, surveyers and tax collectors	-	70 000
Payment of valuers who would have to be permanent Inland Revenue officials	-	20 000

For 1909/10 the estimated revenue would be £350 000 for the capital value taxes and £50 000 for the land taxes. Liberal Magazine Vol 17 No 188 (May 1909), 231.

240. Murray, op.cit, 296 and 298-99.

241. Ibid, 154.

242. Harcourt to Asquith, 12/04/1909. ASP 28. And for Harcourt's table of calculations, ibid, 138.

243. Crewe to Harcourt, 09/04/1909. HAP 510,62.

244. Asquith to Harcourt, 14/04/1909. Ibid, 64-65.

245. Lloyd George to Harcourt, 16/04/1909. Ibid, 70-71.

246. Murray, op.cit, 149.

247. The 1894 scale or that recommended by a Select Committee of 1906 which advocated the introduction of supertax.

248. In 1894, according to Milner, over 8 000 of the 10 000 whose incomes ranged from £5 000 to over £100 000 fell within the £5-10 000 category. So eventhen Harcourt's scheme would have meant great loss of revenue.

249. Murray, op.cit, 159-60.

250. Welby to Harcourt, 29/04/1909 ('Forgive me', he added, but the old Gladstonian was only expressing the same reservations as Harcourt). HAP 44, 38-39.

251. In his editorial St Loe Strachey maintained that the Budget had failed to meet 'in a statesmanlike and comprehensive spirit the great financial crisis caused by the imposition of old age pensions' ... 'by far the worst proposals are those connected with the taxation of land values ... if a particular kind of property is singled out and especially taxed, unfairness must be the result' - a poorer man might also own 'undeveloped' land. The Spectator, 01/05/09, 688-689.

252. Mallet, British Budgets, 304-5.

253. The recovery of the USA from the worst effects of its 1907 financial collapse had a 'ripple' effect: the renewal of export orders from America marked the first signs of the improvement in Britain. Sayers, A History of Economic Changes..., 41.

254. The impact of the speech was such that initially some Unionists believed further opposition to the budget would be hopeless. Garvin was amongst the first on the Unionist side to urge a *positive* alternative programme in reply. For the text see The Annual Register (1909), 181.

255. J.A.Pease to Harcourt, 29/06/1909; Harcourt to Pease, 30/06/1909. HAP 439, 80-81 and 83. Pease was then Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. He was promoted to the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in February 1910.

256. The Times, 21/08/1909, 8.

257. BPD (1909), Vol 10, 354. (Harcourt said that he was in contact with Inland Revenue about the provision of office accommodation for the new surveying staff to be appointed in terms of the Finance Bill.)

258. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, 64-65. Chamberlain Snr. was absent. On 17 July 1906 'Joe' had been paralysed by a stroke. From then on he lost control of the tariff reform movement, which adopted an increasingly protectionist emphasis.

259. Harcourt at a free trade conference at Oxford. The Times, 14/10/1909, 8c. The meeting was to set up a branch of the Free Trade Union for

Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire. Harcourt had helped found the Union, and raised thousands of pounds in contributions for it.

260. At Birmingham's Bingley Hall on 22 September 1909 Balfour finally committed himself fully to the Chamberlainites' cause. An open letter from 'Joe' Chamberlain was read out, urging the peers to reject this 'last effort of free trade finance to find a substitute for Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference and which is avowedly intended to destroy the Tariff Reform movement'. The Times, 23/09/1909, 7. For a full examination of the Unionist calculations see Murray, B.K. "The Unionist leaders and the rejection of the 'People's Budget'", SAHJ No 8 (Nov 1976), 84-103.

261 Gollin, The Observer and J L Garvin 1908-1914 (OUP, 1960), 110-11; Murray, The People's Budget, 213-214.

262 Murray estimated a deficit of 30 or 40 millions, which could only be met by borrowing.

263. See CAB 37/100, 125. 'Rejection of Finance Bill', 09/09/1909, (Harcourt), 4pp; 07/09/1909 'Sir G Murray's Memorandum on 'Possible Rejection of the Finance Bill by the House of Lords', (Harcourt) 3pp.

264. Murray, The People's Budget, 195-6.

265. Austen Chamberlain noted that the Government's objective was 'to tide over till January, so as to get an appeal on the new register. They have not had a good time on the Licensing clauses'. Politics from Inside, 182 (Sept 1909). In his memorandum of 29 September, Churchill stressed also the need to avoid a 'stale' register and any lengthy period between rejection and polling.

266. In accordance with the suggestion devised by Courtenay Ilbert, the clerk of the Commons, and presented to the Cabinet in mid-November. Harcourt approved this emergency, extra-legal collection of taxes advocated by Ilbert.

267. CAB 37/100 No. 130 'Suggested Procedure in the Event of the Rejection or Suspension of the Finance Bill in the House of Lords', 22/09/1909. (Harcourt) 2pp. Copy kept in HAP 441, 72-73.

268. On the grounds that special legislation amounted to a tacit admission that the Commons did not have absolute control over financial legislation. Murray, op.cit, 226 and 228.

269. Redmond to Harcourt, 27/11/1909. HAP 441, 136.

270. Gollin, op.cit, 117.

271. Milner to Lansdowne, 02/11/1909. Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People, 98.

272. Eg. Esher, who was never enthusiastic about tariff reform. Fraser, Esher, 208; initially, Lloyd George found it hard to believe the peers would reject the Budget. Murray, The People's Budget, 194.

273. Harcourt at Rawtenstall. The Times, 06/12/1909,

274. Aldcroft, D.H.(Ed). The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition 1875-1914 (1968), 121 in Tyson, R.E. 'The Cotton Industry', 100-127.

275. Eg. Churchill at Waterloo Town Hall near Liverpool on 3 December; at Manchester on 6 December ; at Liverpool on 8 December. Respectively: The Times, 04/12/1909, 9; 07/12/1909, 7; 09/12/1909, 7.

276. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism, 377-78.

277. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 243.

278. Harcourt at Rochester, Kent,. The Times, 18/12/1909, 8.

279. Harcourt did not believe that three conferences were necessary, but saw 'no harm in them'. Harcourt to CB, 24/06/1907, CBP 41220, 218, cited in Weston, 'The Liberal Leadership in the Lords' Veto', 517.

280. Special conference on 'The House of Lords and Liberal legislation' held by members of the Rossendale Liberal Council. Harcourt's speech reported in The Times, 08/02/1909, 10c.

281. See note 278 above.

282. For the text of the Liberal and Unionist manifestos, Craig, British General Election Manifestos, 21-22 and 15-19 respectively.

283. Speech by Harcourt in support of F.G.Hindle's candidature for Darwen. The Times, 05/01/1910, 7d.

284. Estimates of attendance varied between 250 - 500 000.

285. In March 1909 Churchill was struck with a riding-crop; Lloyd George had a forcible feedi ng tube flung in his face; a bottle was thrown into Asquith's car, as he stepped out of it to enter a meeting. Pankhurst, S. The Suffragette Movement (London/New York/Toronto, 1931), 328-29.

286. Imprisoned suffragettes who went on hunger-strike were forcibly fed via tubes.

287. Pankhurst, op.cit, 329.

288. Craig, op.cit, 20.

289. Blewett, op.cit, 400, cited in Murray, The People's Budget, 257.

290. McKibbin, R. The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924 (1974), xiv; Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections, 418.

291. Pedder, D.C. 'Intensive Electioneering' in The Contemporary Review No 97 (Jan-June 1910), 273-80.

292. Blewett, op.cit, 377.

293. Harcourt to Asquith, 26/01/1910. ASP 12, 77.

294. Harcourt to Asquith, ibid.

295. Nash to Asquith, 15/12/1909. ASP 23, 58-60. Nash had taken over as CB's private secretary in January 1908 when Arthur Ponsonby, one of Harcourt's old contacts, had resigned to go into politics. Nash stayed on as Asquith's private secretary. (Ponsonby became MP for Stirling Burghs, Scotland, winning the contest for the seat convincingly. See Harcourt to Ponsonby, 05/01/1908 POP 656, 16-17; also congratulatory note from Harcourt to Ponsonby, 23/05/1908, ibid, 179.)

296. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 281.

297. Harcourt to Asquith, 07/02/1910 on the 'essential' need to get guarantees from the King. ASP 12, 114.

298. Murray, The People's Budget, 264.

299. Murray, op.cit, 266-67 and 277.

300. Harcourt to Asquith, 14/04/1910. ASP 23,96.

301. Murray, op.cit, 286.

302. Harcourt to Asquith, 09/05/1910. ASP 12, 136. (George V's accession was proclaimed on this same date.)

303. Harcourt to Asquith, 29/05/1910. ASP 12, 145.

304. Weston, op.cit, 523 and 534. On the conference, see also Jenkins,R. Mr Balfour's Poodle(1954),149-72.

305. The suggestion came fro m Lloyd George in August, and interested his Unionist confidants F.E.Smith and Bonar Law. Yet, as Austen Chamberlain pointed out when he found out, internal opposition on both sides made the plan impractical. Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 313-16.

306. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, 71.

307. Harcourt was referring at the time to the possibility of the

Government breaking up over the Navy Estimates for 1910/11, which Lloyd George had said in one of his speeches might be £30 000 000. Harcourt did not think this split would occur though. Harcourt to Asquith 26/01/1910. ASP 12, 77.

308. See Murray, The People's Budget, Chapter 11.

309. After the rebuff by the electorate in January 1910, Unionist press support, in particular, ebbed away with surprising speed.

CHAPTER THREE

1. For example, Joseph Chamberlain. When he became Colonial Secretary in 1895 even his zest for w ork flagged under the burden of administrative minutae. Kubicek, R. Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office (Durham, 1968), 23 and 66.

2. When Asquith decided to install Crewe in place of the efficient, unflamboyant Elgin in 1908 it was not because of the former's great knowledge of colonial matters. Similarly, when the Prime Minister asked Crewe to replace Morley at the India Office, he wrote: '... if you are willing to undertake it, who is then to succeed you at the C.O. - *I know of no one*'. Pope-Hennessey J. Crewe (1955), 86. Eventually he chose the 47 year old First Commissioner of Works, who had had to 'wait his turn' and was now in line for promotion.

3. Hyam examines the watershed period 1905-08 in Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office (1968). The phrase quoted was that used by Alfred Lyttelton, the last of the Unionist Colonial Secretaries before the Great War.

4. Mansergh, N. The Commonwealth Experience (1969), 161.

5. See eg. Gross,J.A. 'The Colonial Office and the Dominions Before 1914' in JCPS Vol 4 (1966), 134-48.

6. See Nimocks, W. Milner's Young Men. The 'Kindergarten' in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (Duke University 1968/London 1970) esp. chapters 9, 11 and 12. The federation movement had lost its impetus since

the 1870s and the Round Table was an attempt to revive it.

7. Speech by Harcourt at the Guildhall, on the occasion of the return of the Duke of Connaught from his 2 880 km tour of the Union of South Africa. The Times, 31/01/1911.

8. See below, 178-80. Joseph Chamberlain had also made an appeal for solidarity in 1899 - between the 'Teutonic' race and the two great branches, America and British, of the 'Anglo-Saxon' race, which would be a 'still more potent influence in the future of the world'. Joll, J. Europe since 1870 (1983), 96-97.

9. Eg. Hyam, op.cit, 277; Egerton,H.E. British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century (1922), 54.

10. The average tenure up to mid-century was about two years. Amery stayed on just a week longer than Harcourt: from 7 November 1924 to 8 June 1929. Parkinson,Sir C. The Colonial Office from Within, 1909-1945 (1947), 16.

11. Such as the eviction of the Australian Governor-General from his residence, and the turmoil i n South Africa, as described below.

12. Mansergh, op.cit, 161.

13. Mary Harcourt to Lady Harcourt, 03/11/1910. HAP 648, 44.

14. Harcourt to Lucas, 02/1 0/1911. HAP 463, 262.

15. Hyam, op.cit, 4; no less than 190 Government gazettes and newspapers were published for the authorities of the six major zones: North American, Australian, West Indian, Mediterranean, African and Eastern.

16. Parkinson, op.cit, 30.

17. Furse provides an 'inside' view of the Office and its staff in Aucuparius : Recollections of a Recruiting Officer (OUP, 1962); for a full breakdown of staff, see also Parkinson, op.cit.

18. Furse, op.cit, 30.

19. Ibid.

20. Carland,J.M. The Colonial Office and Nigeria 1898-1914 (Stanford/ London 1985), 11.

21. Harcourt to Asquith, 04/11/1910. HAP 421, 155.

22. Hopwood was to be assigned to the Development Commission and the Chancellor turned down Harcourt's request on 31 December 1910. Harcourt at once despatched another note to Asquith, pleading to be helped out of the 'almost intolerable' position caused by the loss of Hopwood. Harcourt to Asquith, 31/12/1910, Ibid, 160-61. Asquith to Harcourt, 05/01/1911 and subsequent communication; see also Grigg, J. Lloyd George:The People's Champion (1978), 101.

23. Geary, W.M. Nigeria under British Rule (1927), 310.

24. Parkinson, op.cit, 34 and 142.

25. Unlike Dr. Wilhelm Solf, the German Colonial Secretary, See Gifford P. & Louis W.R. (Eds). Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven, 1967). 455-77 on Solf's West African tour.

26. Below, 189 and 215.

27. As in the case of the deportation of Galbraith Cole from East Africa, on Harcourt's order, for shooting an African:

> I could only conclude from your telegram of the 5th of September that you were anxious to dissociate yourself, so far as it was within your power to do so, from the measure which had been taken.

Harcourt to Sir Percy Girouard (Governor East African Protectorate), 24/10/1911. HAP 483, 88.

28. Harcourt to Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott, 12/12/1912. HAP 481, 7:

'You will find the task lighter as time goes on and as you become familiar with the questions to be dealt with and the conditions surrounding your new administration'. Note by Harcourt to Hartman Just and Sir John Anderson, 18/02/1913:

> What am I to say to this poor fellow who is breaking down under an eight hour day? Bring him home and make his Secy. of State as a rest cure ... Ibid, 8.

29. Sir Walter Davidson to Harcourt, 07/08/1912; Harcourt to Davidson, 31/08/1912; Davidson to Harcourt, 10/03/1913. HAP 477, 8-10.

30. Harcourt to Asquith, 16/10/1910. HAP 421, 147.

31. Harcourt was also aware of the expense involved. Earle wrote to him about the guests accompanying the delegates. There had been, he complained, the 'grossest abuse' of this hospitality in the past:

> I believe the last bill for this Conference and putting these gentlemen and their wives up amounted to over £8 000 and in 1902 it was considerably more! They have champagne on tap from 9am!!

Earle wanted the line to be drawn at wives of officials, with only the wives of premiers to be entertained at Government expense. Earle to Harcourt, 13/01/1911. HAP 467, 94-95.

32. Kendle,J.E. The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911 (1967), 47.

33. Suggested Reconstruction of the Colonial Office (Harcourt), 8pp, 22/04/1911. CAB 37/106 No.52.

34. Ibid.

35. The principal points on the agenda were: the constitution of future Imperial conferences; Imperial consultation on treaties; naturalization; migration; treatment of British Indians in the Dominions; cable communications; the uniform treatment of British shipping; the creation of a Royal Commission to investigate the natural resources

and trade of the Empire.

36. During the subsequent visit in summer by representatives of the Dominion Parliaments for the coronation of George V, the pace was more leisurely, with much sight seeing. See D'Egville, H. Parliaments of the Empire (1912).

37. Findlay, Sir J.G. The Imperial Conference of 1911 from Within (1912), 11-12.

38. Maxse complained bitterly about an appointment which was 'an affront to the Mother country' and an 'outrage to the Dominions beyond the seas'. Annual meeting of the Tariff Reform League, held at Manchester. The Times, 09/11/1910.

39. Eg. Gladstone to Harcourt, 25/06/1911 on the 'general result' which seemed to be 'excellent'. HAP 484, 167.

40. Harcourt to Islington (Governor-General of New Zealand), 14/05/1912. HAP 489, 245.

41. Harcourt to Islington, 24/08/1911: '... most helpful throughout and of whom I formed a high intellectual opinion'. HAP 489, 226-27.

42. Kendle, op.cit, 165-68 and 179-83. In the case of Ward's proposal, Lyttelton had presented a similar scheme in 1905, but had been overruled. Hyam, op.cit, 330-32.

43. The Nation, 17/06/1911 and 24/06/1911. (The proposal, Burns advised Harcourt, should be 'advanced tentatively and with some caution'. Burns to Harcourt, 07/06/1911 BUP 46302, 37.)

44. The Nation, 24/06/1911, 457.

45. Harcourt to Smuts, 15/05/1917. SMP 200, 172; Ingham, K. Smuts (London/Unb., 1986), 93. Smuts was staying at the Savoy Hotel.

46. Egerton, op.cit, 449-50, regarded this resolution as so important that he quoted it in full.

47. Harcourt to Lord Albert Grey (Canadian Governor-General), 17/08/1911. HAP 483, 305.

48. The Declaration of London was the result of a conference of eight sea powers held in 1909 to clarify international maritime laws of 'right of search' and seizure of contraband in wartime. See Rowland, Last Liberal Governments, I, 40-41.

49. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet set up by the Unionists in 1895. See Kendle, op.cit, 186.

50. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, 27.

51. Ibid, 32.

52. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 43.

53. CID paper 66-6, 6 in ASP 132, 30.

54. Including visits, such as that of the Japanese cruiser Ikoma. Telegram from Vice-Admiral Saito to McKenna, thanking the First Lord for the hospitality shown to crew members of the Ikoma, 15/08/1910. MAP 15, 60.

55. MPA Hankey to Harcourt, 04/07/1912. HAP 511, 44.

56. Memorandum from Hankey to Harcourt, 08/06/1912. Ibid, 78-81; also ibid, 67-68 for Hankey's covering letter on the summary of the proposals for the representation of the Dominions on the CID.

57. For instance the squabble over the sending of one ship to patrol the Somaliland coast. See below, 209.

58. Hamilton,K.A. 'Great Britain and France, 1911-1914', 328 in Hinsley, F.H.(Ed.) British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (CUP, 1977).

59. Ibid, 330-31; Williamson,S.R. The Politics of Grand Strategy Cambridge (Mass.) 1969), 204-83 on The Mediterranean and the Entente, 1912.

60. In New Zealand, the First Lord's appeal in May 1912 for Imperial solidarity was compared to this speech. The Times, 22/05/1912. The upshot was that the battle-cruiser New Zealand was rerouted from the China station, and put at the disposal of the Admiralty in the North Sea.

61. See below, 204-05.

62. Asquith had guessed that the 1911 election would not seriously impair Anglo-Canadian relations. Asquith to Harcourt, 25/09/1911. HAP 421, 178.

63. CD No.6560, Dominions No 13, despatched on 10/12/1912. 'Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies as to the Representation of the self-governing Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence'. The despatch was printed, and issued in January 1913. A copy is kept in HAP 504, 56-57.

64. Kendle, op.cit, 213-214. In effect, the Dominions wanted the best of both worlds - not to be obliged to go to war with Britain, and have a greater say in foreign policy. Ibid, 194.

65. Namely, that a Minister, possibly without porfolio, should reside in London for 6-8 months of the year. The experiment might be made permanent if satisfactory. Duke of Connaught to Harcourt, 11/03/1914. HAP 462, 6. Harcourt urged Asquith to agree: '... they are following the suggestions which we made to Laurier at the Imperial Conference, to Borden in 1912,and to all the Dominions by a subsequent despatch of mine'. Harcourt thought the Minister intended was George Perley '... a very good fellow [but] not an intellectual high-flyer'. Harcourt to Asquith, 13/03/1914. Ibid, 5. Perley was duly appointed, but attended only one meeting before war broke out. See also Keith,A.B. The Dominions as Sovereign States (1938), 282.

66. A more detailed treatment of this topic is provided in Grant, D.C. The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence 1870-1914. Baltimore, 1965.

67. Churchill to Harcourt, 29/01/1912. HAP 468, 119-20.

68. Harcourt to Churchill, 01/02/1912. Ibid, 121.

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