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The inability of peacekeeping to address Rwandan Congolese security dilemma

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Acronyms/ Abbreviations

AFDL: Alliance of democratic forces for the liberation of Congo

AU: the African union

CNDP : Congrés national pour la défense du peuple

DDR: Demobilisation Disarmament and Repatriation

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EU: European Union

FARDC: The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

FDLR: Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

ICGLR: International conference of the great lakes region

JMC: Joint Mission Commission

Kabila the father: President Laurent Desire Kabila (President of DRC: 1997-2001)

Kabila the son: President Joseph Kabila Kabange (2001- 2019)

MONUC: United nations organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUSCO: United nations organization stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

M23: The March 23 Movement

PNC: Police Nationale Congolaise

PKO: Peace Keeping Operations

RDBs: Rapidly Deployable Battalions

RDF: Rwanda Défense Force

RDRC: Rwanda demobilization and reintegration commission

RPA: Rwanda People Army

RPF: Rwandan patriotic front

SADC: the Southern African development community

SRSG: Special representative to the secretary general

SSR : Security sector reform

UN : United Nations

UNFIB : UN Force intervention brigade

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

Part 1

Chapter one: Introductory Chapter

1. Introduction

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the world's longest conflicts after the conflict in Mynamar ever since World War 2. The country has experienced three dictatorships and till now, DRC is in the middle of bloody conflict in the North and South Kivu provinces. A number of factors can be cited as influential to the ongoing violence and conflict in that part of DRC. The Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian soldiers backed Laurent Desire Kabila to end 32 years of Mobutu's dictatorship in the DRC in 1997 and since then, those countries had been participating in the profitable business of resource exploitation in the DRC (Redick, 2009). The war in DRC started in 1996 with the participation of almost 20 different rebel groups who invaded the country's vast jungles, many of these rebels fight each other, whereas others from neighbouring states use the Congolese territory to initiate attacks on their home countries (Ighobor, 2019). Rwanda's implication in the Congo is more complex than that of the other states. During the Rwandan genocide in 1994, as many as 1.1 million Hutus and Tutsis run away from the genocide found refuge in DRC, but the refugees were mixed with those responsible for the genocide which presented a serious menace to Rwanda security (Beswick, 2012). Rwanda's army has been fighting the political-military movement composed of Hutus rebels active in Eastern DRC, the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). The presence of the FDLR in those provinces is challenging as it gives Rwanda an excuse to constantly intervene in Congo because the FDLR pose a problem to civilians in Rwanda and DRC. For the purpose of this study, I will emphasis on the inability of peacekeeping to address the Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma from 2003 to 2014.

Amid mutual disagreements, people in the North and South Kivu remain subjected to insecurity and violent conflicts which they hope will end one day. The question remains why the international community has not yet focused more on addressing cross-border military interference of Rwanda as part of ongoing conflict in the DRC. Thus, this research analyses the effectiveness of peacekeeping initiatives in resolving the extra-state aspect of the conflict in DRC.

1.1 Background

The North and South Kivu provinces are the site of a considerable violent events compared to the rest of the country, the number of violent episodes in those provinces in 2018 had exceeded the number of violent events documented for the year 2017. Matfess (2018) explained that during that year, there have been at least 307 violent protests and events captured in the North Kivu province, causing 795 reported casualties and the year 2018, has recorded 493 violent episodes responsible for 801 reported casualties. The above-mentioned scholar argued that the surge in violence in 2018 was motivated by an increase in the targeting of civilians by community militias and rebel groups. Rwanda's government earned considerable amounts of money from selling arms to rebel groups in DRC. A UN report published in December 2008 brought evidence that countless tonnes of Coltan are still exported to Europe every month and that Rwanda played a direct role in supporting the CNDP. Moreover, illegal smuggling to Rwanda continues to be a common practice. Even though Rwanda possesses small reserves of Coltan within its own boundaries, in 2008 it earned US$19.2 million from Coltan sales, with an increase of profits of 72.1 percent compared to the previous year. The rebel group M23 has become more and more active in North and South Kivu since 2012 and it was named after the region's peace agreement which was signed in 2009 on the 23rd of March (Venugopalan, 2016). The UN investigation panel has said that the M23 was given heavy weapons and help in setting up recruitment by Rwanda. This m23 movement received direct military orders from the chief oof defence staff of Rwanda who also took instructions from the Rwandan Defence minister.

The peacekeeping mission in the DRC is the biggest UN peacekeeping mission (Jett, 2019). While peacekeepers are to protect civilians, there are also legal provisions for them to use violence in the fulfilment of that objective. The longer a conflict in a country, the more difficult it is for peacekeeping to build sustainable and long-lasting peace. UN peace missions in the DRC are not new. The objective of the mission was originally to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces and to retain relationship with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Novosseloff (2019) stated that the Security Council, by its 1925 resolution, wanted to highlight the new phase reached in DRC by changing the name of MONUC to MONUSCO (United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the

Democratic Republic of Congo. This time around, MONUSCO was allowed to use all necessary forces to carry its mandate. The mandate included protection of civilians, human rights defender under imminent threat of physical violence. According to Schneider (2012) the security sector reform, the role of MONUSCO, the post electoral dynamics and conflict over minerals, oil and natural resources, constitute the important issues to the stability of the DRC. According to Streans (2015), in communities affected by conflicts, the population faced imminent risk of escalation of violence. Therefore, the execution of current UN programmes in North and South Kivu might be hampered by the ongoing crisis on the ground. Consequently, instead of working on stabilisation, the mission is facing years of crisis management rather than envisaged positive steps towards long term stabilisation and reconciliation.

According to Schneider (2012), the ICGLR (International Conference on Great Lake Region) originated the talks between DRC and Rwanda, but this initiative was not going to generate a quick solution to the ongoing rise of rebel groups activity in the Eastern part of Congo and the only solution that came out from that those talks was neutral force (reactivate mediation and border verification). Since 1994, the foreign policy of Rwanda in the DRC has been a response to the ongoing presence of Hutu revolutionaries on the DRC territory, most of them have been responsible of the genocide in Rwanda. Firstly, Rwanda attacked DRC in 1996 to disassemble Hutu refugee camps used by the perpetrators of genocide as base to launch attacks in Rwanda (Curtis, 2005). In addition to that, the growing confidence of Rwanda as a regional power and dominance of DRC affairs in the period of interwar added a new dimension to the state's national security interest. The risk of future tension between the DRC and Rwanda remains imminent, the question is not if it will happen but rather when their relationship will further deteriorate.

1.2. Research question and sub questions

The key question of this research remains: how is the UN addressing interstate conflict between DRC and Rwanda? What is the role of neighbouring countries in fuelling conflict in Eastern DRC? What are the limitations of peacekeepers in addressing the Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma?

1.3. Significance of the research

The African continent is the scene of numerous violent conflicts. These endanger human, national and international security and make the desired economic and political integration of the continent difficult. Peace and stability are essential to achieve Africa's development and the goals of Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU) aims to end all wars and violent conflicts on the continent. To this end, it promotes dialogue-based mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. In addition to that, the 2012 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report stated that in DRC children make up the majority of combatants in the civil war and prolonged fighting between militia groups that has claimed over five million lives since 1997 and in the eastern DRC, children as young as six are routinely recruited by militias and taught to kill. It is estimated that 8- to 16-year-old-children make up 60% of combatants in the region. My research is important and relevant in the International Relations field because Rwanda and DRC are important actors in the African Great Lake region. This region is important in Africa as it represents a complex network of economic and political interactions with considerable implications for security, peace and governance (Kanyangara, 2016). Thus, there is a need to look closely at the roots cause, the effects of the security dilemma between those two countries . Furthermore, my research aim would be to analyse the extent to which peacekeeping initiatives is trying to address and resolve the Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma.

My objectives would be:

Explain the security dilemma faced by DRC and Rwanda,

Understand the role of peacekeeping in managing that dilemma,

Explain the role played by neighbouring countries in fuelling the security challenges faced by Rwanda and DRC and the role of SADC in mitigating this situation,

Understand the limitations of any peacekeeping initiative especially in the case of Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma.

2. Methodology

2.1. Methodology orientation

The research method of my thesis is qualitative research method. Scholar such as Bhandari (2020) explained that qualitative research implicates the collection and analysis of non-numerical data to comprehend experience, concepts or opinions this method can also be used to collect in depth insights into a problem or generate new ideas for research. The qualitative research method relies on qualitative data collection and analysis.

2.2. Independent/dependent variables and Operationalization

Scholars such as Dewaele (2012) explained that independent variables (causes) are what we expect will influence dependent variables (outcomes) while a dependent variable is what happens because of the independent variable. In my research, the independent variables are the instruments for conflict resolution used in addressing the cross-border violence between Rwanda and DRC: The peace agreements, Demobilisation, Disarmament and Repatriation (DDR), Protection of Civilians (POC), Stabilisation and Security Sector Reform (SSR), the involvement of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC as well as the three principles of peace keeping operations. The dependent variable is the effectiveness of instruments used in addressing the cross-border violence.

Moreover, the dependent variable (DV) effectiveness of peacekeeping will be measured by the extent to which those instruments have produced outcomes. In addition to that, the DV will also be measured by the scale of violence between Rwanda and DRC. The Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations will be also measured by the number of acts of violence that can be traced back to the DRC and Rwanda tensions. It is important to note that MONUSCO is poorly equipped to deal with DRC-Rwanda politics therefore the peace keeping operations instruments are not always leading to more peace.

2.3. Case selection

My case study is the Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma. Furthermore, my case selection has been guided according to firstly, accessibility as the subject has been widely reported on and written on by various scholars. Secondly, I chose Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma because of its relevance. The topic has been neglected by the literature to some degree and only focused on the intra-state conflict resolution.

2.4. Process tracing and methods of comparison

My research will proof causality between IV and DV using the deductive process tracing. Beach (2017) stated that: "The research method for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case is called process tracing." Scholars such as George and Bennet (2005) explained that simply put, process tracing is a suitable methodology to test theories in a world marked by several interaction effects, where it is tricky to justify the outcomes or consequences in terms of independents variables. In practice, there are various forms of process-tracing. Additionally, there are many ways to do process tracing, George and Bennett (2005) argued that: "there are a variety of ways of doing process-tracing, that ranges from a detailed case-specific study with explicit causal hypotheses to a rather general explanation for a specific." Due to the complexity and duration of the chosen conflict case, it is obvious that the case specific details I s the most relevant method to answer this question.

For the purpose of my research, I will be using explaining-outcome process-tracing which is more a case-centric study instead of a theory-centric study and using the deductive path. The case study chosen provides a puzzling outcome and this because one could expect a certain outcome to occur. Scholars such as De Vries (2017) explained that, given the implications of the mandate of MONUSCO, the ongoing human rights violations in the eastern part of the country, the ineffective implementation of DDR and SSR, the inadequate instruments used to deal with the intra state aspect of the conflict. This is what makes the result of this specific case, puzzling. The puzzling character of the chosen case fits perfectly with the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, given that there is focus on the puzzling result, and not so much with the puzzling inconsistency between different theories.

3. Data collection

To collect data, I will engage in document-based or archival research. Including accessing primary data source documents, written by researchers who had direct access to the information or had first-hand experience on how peacekeeping address the Rwandan and Congolese security dilemma. In addition to that, I will use secondary sources documents such as journal articles, books which analysed the primary sources documents such as interviews or surveys. Furthermore, I will use official documents such as research reports and speech transcripts from the United Nations, Rwandan and Congolese government. I will also use the WITS online library database like Sage, ProQuest, Science direct, Sabinet and Taylor and Francis to only name those. I will also take into consideration the various limitations attached to document-based research as I will enquire the trustworthiness of what is written in the various collected documents for my thesis as some data may not be trustworthy, one-sided perspective and bias. In addition to that, I am finding difficult to choose participant observations and surveys to collect my data because the people I will need information from are people who live in the Eastern part of DRC at the border with Rwanda as they have directly been affected by the security dilemma between the two countries.

4. Data analysis

I will be grouping my data into separate sections to examine it efficiently. I will further use triangulation in order to cross examined the data acquired for my case studies.

5. Conceptual framework

There is no particular theory that explain peacekeeping. For the purpose of my research, I will be using the greed and grievance theory. I will be using a deductive approach, using it this perspective to create an analytical framework. The greed and grievance theory explained that nations with ample natural resources are more susceptible to violent conflict than those without, and that rebel groups are prone to be motivated by control over resources (Ganesan & Vines, 2004). Armed conflict in DRC has been fuelled by neighbouring countries trying to obtain control over lucrative business of resources. According to Venugopalan, (2016), the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, after the conquest of eastern DRC in 1998, with the help of the Congolese army, spent almost a year pillaging valuable resources found in Congo. In

Rwanda and Uganda there are no diamond resources but yet both of these states have been exporters of diamonds from 1997 to 1998, while the exports of diamonds of those two countries doubled from 1998 to 2000, the Congolese exports declined by more than 50 percent. Scholars such as Ganesan and Vines (2004) argued that the dilemma of abusive, countries with abundant natural resources has political and economic dimensions, a long-term solution needs the action by international community, governments and corporations to guarantee greater accountability, increase enforcement of arms embargoes and sanctions states are involved in those abuse.

Before going any further, it is imperative to understand concepts around peacekeeping such as: peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, security and stabilization and protection of civilians. Peacebuilding is a long-term process of encouraging two conflicting parties to resolve their issues and rebuild a good relationship. Furthermore, according to De Coning (2017, p.147), peacekeeping is distinguished by consent, minimum use of force and neutrality meaning that conflicting parties agree to let UN assist with applying a cease fire or peace agreement by treating both parties equally and only use force to protect UN troops and those who are mandated to be protected. The above-mentioned author further explained that peace enforcement can be defined as operations that do not essentially require accord from the host nation or other parties involved in the conflict. In simple words, on one hand peacekeeping is in essence defensive in nature while on the other hand, peace enforcement provides for offensive action. Another important concept to understand is security.

Evaluating congruence involves analysing the actual measures, instruments of a peacekeeping operation across a variety of dimensions like DDR, SSR, POC, etc and examining to what degree they match the ambitions and objectives stated in the mission's strategic documents (Novosseloff, 2019). Moreover, although major advances have been made towards ensuring peace in Congo, the North and South Kivu remain greatly affected by violent conflict. This area is characterized by internal armed conflict, communal violence among local groups, local rebels that take advantage of the insecurities and repeated cross border conflict and the complexes regional conflicts (Mutisi, 2016). In addition to that, rebel groups have control over a large part of the territory and citizens are at the receiving end of the disastrous results of this conflict: sexual violence, extortion, death and exploitation. Scholars such as Owiny (2019) explained that Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, blamed Uganda and Burundi for supporting armed groups active in eastern DRC and threatens to strike back for those rebels' attacks on Rwanda. Furthermore, studying a critical case like the

Congolese and Rwandan security dilemma where conditions keep shifting daily makes this study part of the continuing process of understanding one of the most complex inter-state conflicts in the African Great Lakes region, therefore, conclusions are a contribution to understanding the noticeable reality on the ground.

6. Limitations

The first limitation is I am unable to conduct face to face interviews due to the health context we are currently in. Another limitation is there is still not enough research done on this aspect of the conflict by scholars in general and Congolese authors in particular. Scholars who have been on the field and gather primary information. Thus, a heavily reliance on desktop re research and reports done by the United Nations on the subject.

PART 2: DATA ANALYSIS

CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND HISTORY: DRC AND RWANDA

1 Introduction

The DRC is tremendously wealthy in term of natural resources with nearly all minerals available, however, the country has experienced violent ongoing conflicts especially in the eastern region. DR Congo was foreseen to be one of the best and strongest political and economic powerhouses. It is the second largest country in sub–Saharan Africa and it has the third largest population after Ethiopia and Nigeria. DRC has some of the most fertile soil in Africa and has incomparable hydroelectric potential and the country also possesses many of the most precious and desirable land (Koko, 2013). Yet, the poverty level in the country, lack of infrastructure and other development standards are among the worst in the world. A 2018 World Bank report explained that DRC has the third largest population of poor people globally, which remains widespread and pervasive, and is increasing due to impacts from COVID-19. In 2018, it was estimated that 73% of the Congolese population almost 60 million people, lived on less than $1.90 a day and as such, almost 14% or one out of six people living in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa live in DRC. Rwanda also known as the land of thousand hills, faced genocide in 1994 and since then, much of their security dilemma is focused on preventing that a genocide happens again. This chapter focuses on the background history of DRC and Rwanda. The first part will focus on the first and second Congo war as well as the security dilemma faced by the country. The second part will focus on Rwanda history: the Rwandan genocide which happened in 1994 as well as Rwanda security dilemma.

2. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

In Africa, DRC is the second largest state, bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda in the East, in the North, the Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Central African Republic, in the South Angola and Zambia and in the West, the Atlantic Ocean. Scholars such as Qadir and Khan (2015) explained that the DRC has over 200 ethnic groups and the country has been a victim of ongoing conflicts and violence since colonization by Belgium back in 1885. The above-mentioned scholars emphasize on the fact that in contrary of other colonizers, Belgium chose an iron hand method for exploitation of natural resources. Rubber was the main resource exploited and hot in demand during the industrialization era, Congolese people were forced to work with no rest and those who were violating instructions

were dealt with inhumanely, rape, cutting arms and whipping. The country lost 10 million of its population due to that tyranny. Furthermore, conflict in DRC is rooted in political, ethnical and economic problems. The country is extremely wealthy in term of natural resources with almost all minerals available. Access to mineral is very easy and can be extracted with rudimentary techniques and tools, its mineral wealth is estimated to be of above 23 trillion of dollars and an estimated daily export of minerals worth almost six million of dollars (Qadir & Khan, 2015). The current conflict in DRC started in 1994 after the large inflow of ethnic Hutus in the country, millions flee Rwanda during the genocide.

2.1. Congo war 1

Throughout this first war in DRC the refugee camps in Zaire (DRC old appellation) were full of Hutu refugees who came from Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. Although a large number of refugees returned to their home country, almost 30,000 withdrew within deeper forests in Zaire. Redick (2009) explained that the president of Zaire Mobutu began a campaign of ethnic cleansing after the genocide in Rwanda, to get rid of Tutsi minority present in DRC. The flood of people deteriorated already existing tensions in the eastern provinces and Mobutu provided weapons to various rebel groups in the eastern region of the country (mostly the Nyanga and Hunde people) and authorized that to nourish their emotions by encouraging the cleansing of groups made of Twa, Tutsis and Hutus known as Banyarwanda. Scholars such Rumble (2018) argued that Rwanda with the help of Burundi and Uganda invaded Congo in 1996 because Rwanda was concerned about the lack of commitment from the Congolese government to bring the Hutu responsible for the genocide to justice and protect the Tutsis. This invasion led to a bloody conflict which later become known as the African World War and during this conflict countries like Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe had taken Mobutu's side. In addition to that, the alliance between Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda commonly known as Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and their incursion had hidden motive of gaining control over DRC's mineral resources (Qadir & Khan, 2015).

Beswick (2012) argued that the first involvement of Rwanda in the DRC war was hence a response to two intertwined issues. On one hand, the Tutsi in general and the Rwandan government in particular felt threatened by the presence in DRC of Rwandan refugees mixed with those responsible of the genocide. On the other hand, Mobutu was not able or not

willing to disarm rebel groups and protect the border with Rwanda. In spite of this expression of solidarity between Mobutu and some African leaders, the AFDL strongly supported by Rwanda took over Kinshasa in May 1997 and proclaimed Laurent Desire Kabila as president. The Lusaka Ceasefire was signed in August 1999 putting an end to the conflict immediately and a peace accord arose between DRC and Rwanda in July 2002 followed by an agreement between the eleven prominent Congolese political parties in December 2002 to bind to a official transitional period and the consequent implementation of democracy (Rumble, 2018).

2.2. Congo war 2

The second DR Congo war emerged from similar dynamics to the first but proved to be a much more complex conflict. Life in the DRC was dramatically unstable and since the beginning of the Second Congo Conflict in August 1998 more than 5.4 million people have died, at least 45,000 death per month (Redick, 2009). Additionally, the Congolese were constantly faced with sexual violence, disease, starvation and malnutrition, lack of sanitation and various other social problems. The conflict has reached epic heights and has been dubbed the worst humanitarian crisis of that time.

By the year 2002, an area twenty-seven times the size of Rwanda within DRC was occupied by rebel groups backed by Rwanda. Additionally, during the Second Congo War, the main turning point was the assassination of President Laurent Desire Kabila by his bodyguard and by the succession to the presidency by his son Joseph Kabila who stayed in power in 2012 after the elections in 2006 and 2011 (Beswick, 2012). Rwandan government did not formally withdraw all its forces up until 2003, although there are statements available that showed the Rwandan government has maintained strong economic ties with the eastern region of DRC. It is imperative to mention that military, government representatives and individuals from Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda were guilty of stealing resources from the territory occupied by their troops in DRC and it is even more common for opponents of Rwanda's interventionism to describe those kind of policies as driven mostly by this easy access to mineral resources. Senior members of the Rwandan armed forces would plunder the DRC's mineral reserves, achieving great personal wealth and enriching their homeland. Machperson (2012) explained that Rwandan diamond exports increased from 166 carats in 1998 to 30,500 two years later and in 2000, revenue from coltan – a metal used in the manufacture of

electronic products – was thought to amount to US$ 80-100 million, equivalent to official defence expenditure. A UN panel of experts found that during 1999 and 2000, the RPA made US$250 million in the space of eighteen months.

Koko (2013) argued that the First Congo War that happened between 1996-1997, involved on one hand targeting Hutu refugees and those responsible for the genocide and targeting Congolese of Rwandan descent. The advance of Laurent Desire Kabila AFDL and external allies, the incompetency of the national army and the presence of Rwandan rebel groups caused displacement all over DRC. The Second Congo War from 1998-2003, saw Namibia, Angola , Zambia and the DRC against Uganda, Rwanda and its Congolese partners. As the war progressed, Uganda and Rwanda changed their support to competing Congolese rebel groups and even fought each other in eastern DRC. These changing aspects and numerous local conflicts, such as the one happening in Ituri District, led to further enormous displacements.

2.3. Understanding the Congolese security dilemma

The eastern region in DRC has been in continuous instability due to the ongoing presence of foreign and Congolese rebel groups taking advantage of the lack of power and security in the North and South Kivu, pervasive impunity, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, intercommunal problems and the lack of capacity of the army and the national police to protect civilians effectively, ensure law and order as well as protecting national security (Deshphande, 2016). The ongoing conflict in DRC has been one of the most severe and forgotten nowadays. According to scholars such as Rufanges (2016) almost two million Congolese continue to be displaced as a result of the ongoing violence and insecurity that persist in the Eastern part of the country. Furthermore, the above-mentioned scholar argued that there are 1.6 million of people displaced, nearly half a million of Congolese living in neighbouring states and more than 170,000 refugees from other countries. The government has been incapable to solve the grass roots of the long conflict in the Kivus, failed to be responsible for its citizens and also failed to gain full control over the whole territory. In multi-ethnic states, as it is the case of DRC, ethnic divisions are an open door for easy recruitment of rebels.

In addition to that, lower education results in higher unemployment rates. Unemployment rate in DRC has been very high, literacy rate is continuously declining since the first Congo war (Qadir & Khan, 2015). According to the World Data report (2021) unemployment rate of DRC increased from 2.9 % in 2001 to 5.3 % in 2020 growing at an average annual rate of 3.32%. In countries with abundant resources, internal armed conflict is the main cause of human rights violations across the globe. Scholars such as Ganesan and Vines (2004) explained that the lack of attention on how government mismanage resources and revenues, the negative impact of resources on rebel group behaviour increase chances of conflicts and human rights abuse. In Congo, the control of timber, coltan and diamonds has been a major reason to the ongoing security dilemma.

Moreover, the vast size of the country with nearly 2.4 million of square kilometre and with 9000 km of border lines to defend and bordered by nine countries have been the major obstacles in the attempt to build a nation state. The elites take advantage of the mismanagement and lack of organisation of the national army FARDC to influence it. Several of these power traders work together with the commander in chief to control economically or politically crucial areas, protect a particular ethnic group or collect illegal taxes. Occasionally, according to Kets and De Vires (2014), FARDC have also made illegal agreements with opposing rebel groups such as the FDLR (Rwandan Hutu Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda) rebel movement and over the years, the armed forces have become more fixated towards generating revenue than being operational and effective to secure the entire territory. Moreover, some of DRC's neighbours like Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Angola have also been affected by internal crisis or have been threatened by rebellions that had their headquarters in the DRC.

In addition to that, Congo is the second most violent state in the data set by ACLED when measured by the number of conflict episodes. From January 1997 to December 2008, there were more than 3,300 conflict events during that period, including 2,898 violent events. More than half of those conflicts happened in the North and South Kivu and while those provinces are clearly the most affected region in the country, other parts of the country are also struggling with constant high levels of violence (Cunningham, 2013). Since 1996 the DRC has experienced a succession of wars and lower scale conflicts that have been the cause of more than five million deaths over the 1998-2008 period and an estimated number of 1.7 million internally displaced people (Sekeris, P., De Luca, Maystadt & Ulimwengu, 2013).

The continuous presence of uncontrolled militias produces insecurity in DRC. Since the beginning of 2003, a slow progress has been made in reforming the army in the country, the justice system and the police (Bessa, 2014). A number of reports have deplored the army's involvement in sexual abuse, act of violence and illegal collection of taxes along remote aeras, mines sites and markets places. Additionally, clash of identities and ethnic grievances came from the effects of state collapse such as inter elite power struggles, regionalised war, conflicts over resources such as land and natural resources. Besides that, the impact of the neighbouring conflicts and political clashes. Furthermore, scholars such as Williams (2019) emphasized on the fact that the failure to have control over the entire territory or encouraging and tolerating unprofessional security forces or the weakness of traditional dispute mechanisms and a weak government such as in DRC has facilitated the occurrence of nonstate armed conflicts and a great number of those conflicts in Africa turn around the various struggles to secure local livelihood, notably problems linked to livestock, water and land. UN human rights monitors counted more abuses at the hands of the FARDC than rebel groups and Congolese armed forces were the authors of most pf the rapes cases reported across the eastern region in June and July 2011 (Hudson, 2012). One of the obvious things about the Congolese government is that it always failed to give adequate political backing for serious change. Above all, the government did not take any tangible steps to put an end to corruption, ill-discipline and ineffective command structures weakening reform efforts in the security sector. The ongoing crisis in Congo has significantly created disparity in the internal geopolitical setting of the country with impact in the Great Lake Region. This crisis in the DRC shows that the historical patterns at the root of this conflict: as long as the DRC's government is unable to provide basic services, having control over its borders or protect its citizens effectively and as long as militias and rebel groups are able to prosper illegal trade in mineral resources and difficult regional alliances, the eastern region of DRC will continue to be a battlefield and the harmless population will continue to be main victims of this conflict (Koko, 2013).

3. RWANDA

Rwanda extends over 26338 Square Km; it is a land locked country usually called land of thousand hills. There are three major ethnic groups Tutsis constitutes 15% of the population,

Twas only 1% and 84% of the rest is Hutus (Qadir & Khan, 2015). The Hutus have historically been land tillers and Tutsis have been landowners. The conflict which resulted into a genocide in 1994 had its origins in colonial days of Belgium when partition of land was unfairly done between the two main ethnic groups as predominant Hutus were perceived as a lower race. In addition to that, cards system was established, ethnic identity was introduced which created tension among both Hutus and Tutsis. In 1959, a civil war led to the overthrown of the king who had Tutsi origin and in 1962, the independence of Rwanda paved a way for a formation for a new government led by Hutus. It is important to note that the enrolment of combatants based on ethnic origin is frequently an easy undertaking, Rwandan Tutsis had full support from Ugandan Tutsis living in Uganda (Qadir & Khan, 2015). The low education, high unemployment resulted into the mass recruitment of child soldiers in the conflict.

3.1. Rwanda genocide 1994

Africa has seen a genocidal turmoil in 1994 when conflict started in Rwanda and caused huge loss of life and property. The killing of president Habyarimna immediately sparked deathly reprisal killings in Kigali and in other parts of the country. Many Hutu Rwandans believed that the president had been killed by Tutsi insurgents stationed not far from the airport hence Tutsis were identified and systematically killed (Check & Lekaba, 2015). Moderate Hutu, who had supported change in the country, were also targeted. The RPF took advantage of the chaos in the nation order to seize power.

Qadir and Khan (2015) argued that over 0.8 million or 11% of population of Rwanda (women, children and men) lost their lives and over one million people migrated to neighbouring states and displaced internally. Those people basically moved to the East of DRC, in lower quantity in Tanzania and also in Burundi. Scholars such as Beswick (2012) and Rufranges (2016) explained that: “Through the Operation Turquoise, the French created a safe zone in the Southeast of Rwanda that eased the fleeing to the DRC of millions of Rwandans among which were those responsible of the Rwandan genocide.” Even though the majority of the refugees were civilians, they were used by Rwandan armed forces and political leadership who wanted to take the power back in Rwanda. In addition to that the international agencies and the UN were unable to divide perpetrators of genocide who used

the structures of refugee camps to plan, train their forces, planning an armed return to Rwanda from ordinary Hutu (Beswick, 2012). The refugees were perceived by its Hutu leaders as an instrument to seduce the Congolese president, manipulate the international community with the humanitarian aid received to alleviate the crisis and threaten the new government in Kigali.

3.2. Rwanda security dilemma

Much of Rwanda's security reforms post-genocide have concentrated on ensuring that the genocide can never be repeated and the prosecution of individuals responsible for the genocide. Furthermore, major security concerns such as small arms trading, border clashes with Hutu rebels in neighbouring nations, and the ongoing situation in the DRC exercised pressure on the Rwandan National Police (RNP) and the armed forces, challenging their capacity (Centre of governance security report, 2015). Entire units of FAR moved into eastern Congo and re-organised themselves into similar divisions as what had prevailed in Rwanda during the pre-genocide years and the political, ethnic and security challenge in Rwanda was transported to neighbouring Congo (Check & Lekaba, 2015). The huge Hutu population that entered eastern Congo after the genocide upset the ethnic balance in the region and in several areas the Hutu were the majority, which posed a serious security risk to the dwindling Tutsi population. Clashes were reported between the Hutu and Tutsi, as the local population, supported by the Hutu, made life unbearable for the Tutsi, who were blamed for the troubles that the Hutu found themselves in, both in Rwanda and in eastern Congo. Rwanda failed to rid the eastern Congo of the Interahamwe and several Hutu militias, which had received massive military support from the Congolese government. It is reported that more than a million ethnic Hutu were killed during the first Congo war, in what many have termed revenge genocide by the government in Kigali. The second Congo war of 1998 equally led to almost one thousand ethnic Hutu being killed. One of the strategic objectives of the second Congo war was to install a Rwandan proxy in Kinshasa. Scholars such as Lezhnev and Prendergast (2013) argued that for a long time, Rwanda has been involved in eastern DRC economically most of the trade from North and South Kivu in Congo goes through Rwanda due to the inadequate infrastructures within DRC, the distance to the Congo's capital city Kinshasa and the very affordable transportation costs to Rwanda. Till today, the majority of this trade has been illegally done through the smuggling of DRC's tantalum, tungsten and tin. However, one should also not that Rwanda has its own mining industry.

The political uncertainty in bordering states, in addition to almost inexistant borders and unregulated trade mean that there are a lot of loose firearms circulating in Rwanda. These weapons have facilitated armed robberies as well as a succession of grenade strikes that began in the year 2010 (Centre of governance security report, 2015). The presence of Hutu rebel groups and former perpetrators of genocide in the Eastern DRC require a robust military presence from Rwanda, putting pressure on the country's military capability. Furthermore, as only Congolese citizens could exercise political rights, citizenship became important, especially in regions with a high Banyarwandan population. Thus, the fight for political positioning became an important tool used by ethnic Congolese to fight the Banyarwandans. The Rwandans were therefore morally obliged to intervene and help the Banyarwandans. Rwanda's principal interests include what it considers to be an observational security threat posed by the rebel group FDLR, the Hutu extremist militias based in DRC, which has attacked Rwanda four times over the past year (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2013). The FDLR's leaders were some of the alleged perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and they have also received support from elements of the Congolese army. Allegations of RDF involvement in the conflict in the DRC have also created problems for the Government of Rwanda. It is important to note that a joined approach to containing the FDLR therefore requires considering in not only Rwanda's concerns but also Congo's security interests.

4. Conclusion

Due to continuous presence of Congolese and foreign militia groups taking advantage of security and power voids in the east DRC; the illicit exploitation of resources, persistent impunity, and intercommunal problems and the frail capacity of the national police and army to protect civilians efficiently, ensure law and order as well as protecting national security, constituted the main security dilemma in DRC. In addition to that, in Rwanda, the main security reforms post-genocide has concentrated on guaranteeing that the genocide can never be repeated and the prosecution of people responsible for the genocide.

CHAPITER THREE. THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Introduction

As explained in the previous chapter, Rwanda and DRC faced security dilemma that is at the same time separated and linked. To avoid escalation of violence in the region, the UN peace keeping mission presence was necessary. The UN peacekeeping has been operating quite steadily since its creation, apart from major spikes in activity in the year 2003, just before the end of the Second Congo War. The forces also started being supportive to the Congolese army from 2005 and more specifically they were operating in 25 different events in conjunction with the Congolese army in 2006. This chapter focuses on understanding the UN presence in DRC and their mandates through MONUC and MONUSCO.

2. United Nations Peacekeeping

Peacebuilding is necessary for conflict resolution. Scholars such as Redick (2009) defined peacebuilding as efforts to bring the groups together to shift their unfriendly attitudes in order to change their perception of their security requirements, thus making peacekeeping less essential and peace making possible. Another major conflict resolution tool that can be used to avoid violent breakout is Reassurance. This resolution consists of two parties that have similar objectives but a common distrust then they work together to diminish this mistrust through reassurance.

The UN Mission in the DRC began with the creation of MONUC (United Nations organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) to look at the impact of the Lusaka Ceasefire in 1999 and in 2017 it became the largest UN peacebuilding mission with over 21,726 employees, managing a $1.14bn budget and its mandate was extended to incorporate monitoring of elections, overseeing the development of the economy of Congo and the protection of civilians (Rumble, 2018). The UN peacekeeping operation has been operating quite steadily since its creation, apart from major spikes in activity in the year 2003, just before the end of the Second Congo War. The forces also started being supportive to the Congolese army from 2005 and more specifically they were operating in 25 different events in conjunction with the Congolese army in 2006 (Cunningham, 2013). Furthermore,

mandates to build state institutions and protect civilians in a number of the world's very prolonged and extreme crises is a recipe for never ending missions. The lack of sustainable peace-making strategy, even well prepared, well trained and well-resourced peacekeepers face the possibility of treading political water and performing an exercise in damage limitation without a concrete strategy to exit (Williams, 2019).

The recurring conflicts in DRC have cost the Republic its sovereignty to the International Community. The state is supposed to deliver protection and services to its citizens, but this is not the case in the DRC, where the UN and NGOs have assumed these responsibilities and the UN Peacekeeping Mission. Additionally, the public health service has been relegated to the World Health Organisation same applies to the NGOs that have difficulty to cope with Congo's rich natural resources or churches that offer primary education (Check & Lekaba, 2015). This is so because the political incumbent benefits from this whole process. According to Novoselof (2019) there were four main events in the UN Mission lifetime in DRC: firstly, the deployment into the disaster and advanced expansion of the mission; secondly, organisation of the general election in 2006 and the support to the transitional government; the third event was the post transition period that led to a stabilisation mission and the fourth event which was marked by the creation of the FIB to fight M23 and other chosen armed forces.

3. MONUC and its mandate

Established at the end of 1999, MONUC was not the first UN mission in DRC. Novosselof (2019) argued that the UN installed the largest and most costly peacekeeping operation in the 1960s including 19,828 soldiers and civilian personnel at its highest. The above-mentioned scholar also stated that that marked the first time that the secretary general appealed Article 99 of the UN Charter, requesting a Security Council meeting to discuss the concerns over the secessionist tendencies in Katanga and to help DRC to restore public order. The UN became involved again in DRC in the late 1990s under different circumstances referred to by some experts as the first African World War. Furthermore, after the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the DRC and five reginal countries: Rwanda, Namibia,

Uganda and Angola, the security council created through Resolution 1279 (30 N0vember 1999) MONUC (the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC).

The Lusaka Agreement had two key components, political and military. On one hand, the political section of the agreement called for the creation of an inter Congolese dialog with the objective to serve as a forum for a consensus in terms of a transition government and the reinstatement of the state authority while on the other hand, the military section of the agreement called for the immediate ceasefire, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, the removal of foreign militias and the neutralisation of armed forces (Redick, 2009). Besides all the above objectives of the agreement, it also included that all of that needed to be implemented and completed within a time frame of a year. Although the timetable seemed unrealistic, there was an appropriate competition of a number of the items mostly the establishment of the MONUC. Novosselof (2019) argued the approach by the UN to the DRC in the past two decades has been mostly focused on the extension of state authority into remote aeras with limited governance, the traditional state building and the long-term reform processes proposed within the 2002 peace agreement. This method inclines to obscure the numerous power systems among non-state entities, government actors, and informal networks across Congo.

It is important to understand that MONUC was given the charge of all these tasks without the capacity to use military force. The lack of this capacity would prove to be tremendously unfavourable to the operation because MONUC did not have any way to implement the Lusaka Agreement as there was almost no enforcement of the treaty, there were a lot of violations of it. Many analysts have noted that the period between 2003-2006 has been the most effective period for MONUC as its mandate was in alignment with the political process, it objective and exist strategy were clear and the strategy to hand over a sovereign nation. The security council decided in Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003), after the signing of Pretoria Agreement, that MONUC should be involved by contributing to the security of Congolese institutions and government officials. The DRC was consistently troubled between 2002-2006 by clashes between different sections of the FARDC, including armed forces supported by Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. MONUC alone could not control the clashes, so the Congolese international allies decided to form the EUSEC (EU Mission on Security Sector Reform in Congo) through which a team of specialists in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was sent to help improve the Congolese national army (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2013). Rwanda's direct interference in DRC at times and its intermittent support for rebel

groups in the east of DRC have been central drivers of ongoing conflict. The role of peacekeeping has been especially relevant in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where rebel and militia groups have a history of roaming across porous borders and engaging in armed conflict (Beardsley, 2011). The evolution of conflict in the eastern part of the DRC is a case in point. MONUC was called to monitor on and around the bordering lakes, take steps to disarm and repatriate foreign combatants, discourage cross-border movements and coordinate with the peacekeeping mission in Burundi (ONUB). After some success in reducing conflict in the eastern region, violence once again increased, with the CNDP and FDLR as critical belligerents in North Kivu province.

4. MONUSCO and its mandate

According to Novoselof (2019), after the celebration of DRC 50th independence anniversary and under the pressure from the government which wanted to show that it did not need any more external help, a discussion started on a way to reduce the presence of MONUC and envisaging a prominent transition. Some analysts thought that the president Joseph Kabila wanted to show off his muscles to limit the political space taken by MONUC. The security council allowed the withdrawal of almost 2,000 troops through resolution 1925 (30 May 2010) and renamed MONUC to MONUSCO on the 1 July 2010 with the S standing for Stabilisation. The change of name and a new mandate were meant to specify that a return to normal was here even though it was not the true reflection of what was happening on the ground and the accent should be put on the DRC led initiative to stabilise the state territorial and institutional space. In 2013 March 28th the decision of the resolution 2098 to deploy the UNFIB (UN Force Intervention Brigade) to perform offensive operations against all rebel groups was an approach taken to manage militias that continued to use violence in eastern DRC (Rumble, 2018). The UNFIB was made of militaries from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa. The primary objective was to put all efforts into the reduction of instability caused by numerous armed groups in North and South Kivu and the second main objective was to highlight the need for stabilisation and stability through new approaches of islands of stability, which had proven to be totally ineffective and was put aside after its departure.

The UNFIB concept was based on an innovative idea proposed at a ministerial level conference, ICGLR (the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region), the goal was

to establish a neutral international force to help get rid of FDLR, M23 and all other armed groups. The goal was to create a regional parallel force but as many security council members were against financing such force through peacekeeping measured contribution, the UNFIB became an element of MONUSCO, filling the long-lasting void of lack of capacity to react rapidly and effectively. The UN did not also want a similar force operating alongside MONUSCO. It was meant to be an important element to the political process of the PSCF and ensure that regional players are involved in the solution to address the lack of stability caused by militias. The UNFIB has a distinct mandate from the rest of the MONUSCO soldiers but is still under the command of MONUSCO's Force Commander. Its mandate is, either jointly with the FARDC or unilaterally and forcefully, to disarm selected armed forces especially the ADF, FDLR, the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) and M23. The UNFIB comprises three infantry groups: one special force, one artillery and reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma North Kivu. It has in total 2,826 armed forces from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa.

Although MONUSCO has a mandate to carry out independent operations when necessary, in practice MONUSCO has tremendously conducted its neutralisation operations in support of the Congolese national army, in alignment with the idea that peacekeeping mission supports the host country. However, due to the various abuse and human rights violations of FARDC, this support was seen by many NGOs and Congolese communities as either a way to control the army's abusive behaviour or align the MONUSCO too closely with the government of Joseph Kabila. Stimson (2016) argued that the UNFIB transformation plan was to decrease MONUSCO military footprint. UNFIB will start to close corporation and operate provisionally on consultation with the mission, the UN team in the country, Congolese authorities as well as work on sound analysis. Static divisions will be implanted into smaller area near borders with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda as needed to respond to situations. Scholars such as Deshphande (2016) argued that the UN had two fundamentally contradictory mandates between MONUSCO and UNFIB, this results in misunderstanding, impediment and sometimes chaos in implementation . The limitations of what can be done and by whom are distorted and open to analysis. In a rapidly changing dynamics and a hostile environment such conceptual misunderstanding is superfluous and unjustified as the subsequent effects at tactical and operational levels get further exaggerated. Existing research highlights that UN peacekeepers can ease communication, alleviate uncertainty, and build trust between belligerents because of their function as impartial third-party arbiters, but the

creation of UNFIB to address cross border violence made it seemed like the UN picked a side. Furthermore, two completely different set of reactions to the same situation demonstrate the difference in employment culture and philosophy.

CHAPITER FOUR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Complexity of the security dilemma

Several African states are volatile with the exception of few countries. There are various correlations tensions. Until early 1990s, it was speculated that economic and social grievances were the root cause of conflicts. There is a strong correlation between youth unemployment, lack of education and conflicts and economically poor states are more prone to conflicts. When a state has faced hostility in the past there is a likelihood of recurrence of violence and strong possibility of repetition of the phenomenon. It is believed that unemployment triggers participation in insurgencies, prompts people to join violent gangs, drives people to extremism, and that it is the primary reason behind domestic violence. Analysts have agreed that one of the factors fuelling the growth of armed militia in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the lack of alternatives for millions of young people faced with an estimated 95 percent unemployment rate. Scholars such as Qadir and Khan (2015) explained that in mid 90s, the assertion that the root causes of conflicts are economic and social grievances was tested by Collier and partners promoting conflict are rooted in greed theory loot seeking rather than grievance theory justice seeking by armed groups. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have transformed the resource war hypothesis into the greed theory advocating predominance of greed as leading cause of conflict contrary to the previous understanding of grievances. African conflicts are continuous with variety of changing causes and periods of violence. Africa is multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual continent having irregular spatial and social development. In addition to that, the roots of these conflicts are wide ranging having roots engrained in political, economic, ethnic and identity crisis having violence as shared denominator with no stable solutions (Qadir & Khan, 2015).

However, since 2010 Africa has witnessed some disturbing upward conflict trends. Williams (2019) explained that there have been major setbacks in the failure of state-based armed conflicts and deliberate campaigns of violence against civilians, environmental and religious factors have considerably played a role in numerous armed conflicts; a dramatic increase in the levels of popular protests across Africa; besides, there has been a rise in the utilisation of suicide bombings and spontaneous explosive device attacks. The above-mentioned author stated that international efforts to respond to some of these developments by deploying more

strong and militarized forms of peace interventions and operations have met with at best only limited success. To better grasp the usual insecurity in the eastern region, it is important to take in account the neo-patrimonial nature of the Congolese society and state. In neo-patrimonial organisations, each member of society, from high to low, belongs to mutually co-operative social networks, which are mostly formed around geographical, ethnic, socio-economic and professional (Kets & De Vires, 2014). These networks are essential for people to make a living because they need contacts to access jobs, capital and other economic opportunities in either formal or informal sectors.

There are several players involved in the conflict in DRC. Local actors include the government and armed groups, while external actors including the DRC's neighbours, some representatives of the international community and multinational corporations (MNC). Aside of forests and lands, Congo also has a wide range of mineral resources such as diamonds, tin, coltan, gold and copper (Mutisi, 2016). The abundance of natural resource in DRC has led the country to be battlefield over the control and ownership of these resources. Today, armed conflicts occurred in two separate worlds. On one hand, those armed conflicts that occur on the borders or outside of the society of states, fought for reasons other than acquiring state power by a range of nonstate actors including tribes, clans, various type of armed forces and warlord groups and on the other hand, there are those rooted in the African state system that involve governments and their contestants, fought primarily over access to state power. Mutisi (2016) argued that a UN Development programme report in 2014 noted various challenges affecting DRC due to poor governance on political, economic, administrative security and judicial levels. Furthermore, the social proportions of the DRC conflict are embodied in the manipulation of identity issues by various leaders, principally around nationality laws and citizenship, joined with the politics of instrumentalization and exclusion of ethnicity and the Congolese identity. The issue of challenged citizenship in Congo, particularly of those people of Rwandan origin, partially contributed to the ongoing conflict in the Kivu region.

Moreover, Beswick (2012) argued that, even though Rwanda is till dependent on aid, the country is a proud state and the RPF was not convinced by the extent to which the international community is committed to ensure peace and security in that region. In addition to that, the failure of MONUC and then MONUSCO have only reinforced the scepticism and sense of self dependence in Rwanda. Besides, among the top 10 providers of soldiers to UN peacekeeping, Rwanda is there and mainly operating in Darfur. Therefore, condemning

Rwanda for its interference in east DRC could put this in jeopardize and making UN relationship with Rwanda politically more complex than just a situation where it can be decided to whether or not cut aid. Furthermore, Hovil (2011) argued that tensions between Congolese and Rwandan refugees revolved around divided constructions of identity, mobilized and manipulated by those pursuing more power. Over decades, these cracks have been interpreted as ethnically aligned armed groups, violent fights over access to resources land, decades of conflict and displacement. Durable solutions for refugees will remain uncertain until the root causes of conflict are addressed.

2. Greed and Grievance theory

The important resources control by government and the revenues derived from those resources go together with the widespread corruption, weak rule of law, culture of impunity and the unbalanced redistribution of public resources. Those factors usually lead to governments with lack of accountability power that often commit human rights abuses and lengthy armed conflicts. In addition to that, in countries with abundant resources, governments are corrupt, unaccountable and abusive and often if not most of the times mismanage the economy (Ganesan & Vines, 2004). The presence of mineral resources especially coveted resources such as oil, opens the way foreign governments deal with countries rich in resources and armed groups. For over 10 years, companies in industrialized countries have purchased Coltan despite war and lawlessness in the DRC, and they became profitable sources of foreign currency for a multitude of state and non-state actors, including rebel forces, Rwandan and Ugandan governments (and their armies), licensed companies and poor communities with no employment opportunities. In order to maintain cordial relations with those providing commodities, states may overlook human rights abuses and poor governance of those providers. In some scenarios they may be involved in the conflict directly or through proxies to secure those natural resources. The economic potential of eastern DRC was revealed to Rwanda during the first war and the government had very good reasons to believe that the result of its exploitative business was certain (Cassimon, et al., 2012).

The greed approach focuses on the ruling group and the conflict that arises when a contending party wants a cut over the control and profit of natural resources, their bounded

rationality viewed as benefits from the appropriation of resources and the need of a source of financial viability, resources that could come from oil, diamonds, sympathetic diasporas or even illegal drugs (Sanchez, 2020). On the other side grievance are a consequence of perceived depletion of revenues. What the studies have showed is that inequality plays an important role only when the differences are between discrete groups. Scholars such as Pizzolo (2020) argued that the fundamental distinction between the two arguments of the greed versus grievance debate lies in the kind of deprivation perceived by the population. The perception of a vertical inequality compels rebels to act in order to obtain self-interested material gain, such as raw materials, valuable resources or economic assets. The perception of a horizontal inequality leads rebels to act over issues of identity, in order to obtain a specific socio-political asset or to fill the gap given by a lack of political rights or status due to ethnic and religious cleavages in society.

3. Greed and Grievance theory in relation to the security dilemma between DRC and Rwanda

The resulting power struggles combined with the weakness of the Congolese state provoked conflict and political turmoil in the country. The war in the DRC has reached a level of complexity to the point that it has been renamed the "African World War," having involved eight African nations and 25 rebel groups and caused the highest death toll since World War II. Today in Congo, armed groups supporting by neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda among other governments have cruelly exploited DRC's natural resources and, in some instances, repatriated them in their countries. Over three million people have died indirectly or directly due to war since 1998 and almost all the authors to this complex and difficult conflict have been responsible of systematic and gross abuses. The current conflict in Congo has had a huge negative impact on the overall stability of the Great Lakes region. The collapse of the government institutions made it possible for Lilliputian nations such as Rwanda and Uganda to impose leaders in Congo, invade, loot and occupy the territory of the vast Congo (Check & Lekaba, 2015). This can be linked to the regime of the former dictator Mobutu and if it was not for that dictatorship and corrupt regime, Rwanda could have been saved from the 1994 genocide by DRC. Congolese authorities and UN analysts say Rwandan's past involvement in DRC have been driven by economic interests as well as security concerns. Now Rwanda has one of the best equipped armies in Africa and has not been affected by any attack from Hutu rebels in DRC. Furthermore, the Hutu rebel FDLR group located in eastern DRC

believed to count 15,000 ten years ago has been decreased to less than 3,000 combatants. Past reports by the UN have recognized profitable trafficking rackets transporting to Rwanda tin, coltan, tungsten and gold. At the peak of war in 1999, profits from mineral resources contributed almost $320 million to Rwandan's defence budget (Hogg, 2012).

Moreover, the mining firms in DRC included both legitimate and illegal mining firms and players across the globe and the two main powers involved in the eastern DRC are France and USA (Bessa, 2014). Since both powers have tactical interest in rare metals, they cannot remain indifferent as to who has state power in different states of the Great Lakes region. Despite the economic falls of the state and its political instability, Congo is still appealing to mining conglomerates because of its abundant wealth in natural resources and comparatively high mineral stock of cobalt, gold and copper which is among the greatest in the globe.

Furthermore, although major advances have been made in order to secure peace in Congo, the eastern region remains drastically affected by ongoing conflict. This area is characterized by communal violence and internal armed conflict among rebels, community security groups or local armed groups which take advantage of the merging of cross border rebellions and regional conflict complexes. In addition to that, rebel groups control the majority of the region and civilians are the victims of the consequences of the conflict: sexual violence, extortion, death and exploitation (Mutisi, 2016). Hudson (2012) argued that the Congolese population continues, directly or indirectly, suffer at the hands of rebel groups. It is estimated that 1.7 million Congolese are displaced internally in DRC, most in the region affected by conflict driven from their homes by fear of various militias. Numerous explanations have been given to understand the ongoing conflict in DRC, including competition of land, natural resources, politics of exclusion, economic of violence, weak state capacity, absence of rule of law, impunity for serious human rights, external interference as well as limited territorial coverage.

CHAPTER FIVE

Rwanda and DRC security dilemma from 2003 to 2014

1 Introduction

Zvobgo (2012) explained that: “Laurent Desire Kabila failed to accommodate internal democratic militaries that had struggled against Mobutu for a long time, and was also unable to combine, reconcile and respond to numerous interests in the alliance that conquered the Mobutu regime and brought the AFDL into power.” In addition to that, Kabila's inability to respond to these interests negatively impacted his relations with neighbouring states and internal groups attacks and armed incursions into Rwanda became the Hutu guerrilla regular conduct. This chapter focuses on Rwanda and DRC security dilemma from 2003 to 2014 including Congo and Rwanda political relationship, Rwanda involvement in DRC, the FDLR period as well as the M23 period.

2. Political relationship DRC/Rwanda

Rwanda and the DRC border is fairly short and includes several barriers to the large-scale movement of people and goods. The total border is 217km which includes 89km through waters of the lake Kivu and almost 60km in the northern region is difficult to traverse and very mountainous terrain. Those characteristics have produced blockages for the moment of people and goods. Scholars such Bedford (2019) stated that generally, Congolese side shows inconsistent economic regulation, weak state authority and bigger opportunities for employment and the Rwandan side is characterized by heavy regulation both social and economic, strong centralized political authority, physical security and a relative lack of employment prospects. In the wake of independence, post-colonial Rwanda and Congo relations were marked by this battle to control the ethnic Rwandese in eastern Congo. Because most of the ethnic Rwandese in eastern Congo were Tutsi, the Hutu-dominated post-colonial government in Rwanda paid very little attention to their wellbeing, even though the Mobutu regime in Congo had denied them Congolese citizenship because the Tutsi where commonly referred to as the ‘invented tribe’ (Check & Lekaba, 2015). The 1994 genocide and the first and second Congolese wars have been essential in shaping this relationship. The presence of series of alliances and the quasi-absence of the state in the Congo has altered what seems to be a local situation into a situation at the regional and continental level.

Kabila's inability to respond to these interests negatively impacted his relations with neighbouring states and internal groups attacks and armed incursions into Rwanda became the Hutu guerrilla regular conduct. These led to an outbreak of violence along the border between Hutu armed groups and the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) based in eastern Congo. In retribution, Rwanda supported Kabila the father in 1996 to protect its border from these assaults (Zvobgo, 2012). The end of Rwanda and Laurent Desire Kabila's relations came in 1998 when the AFDL leadership slowly distance itself from Rwanda to build for itself a domestic political power base. The Rwandan government preoccupy by its border security, in turn, push it to support Congolese rebels.

The invasion of Congo by Rwanda drove Hutu refugees back into Rwanda and murdered those who fled west. Rwandan forces then walked more than a thousand miles to Kinshasa the capital city to help Laurent Kabila drove out President Mobutu Sese Seko. Afterwards, Laurent Kabila decided to send Rwandan soldiers that helped him overthrow Mobutu's regime back in Rwanda. In return to this decision, Rwanda's government ended its alliance with a previous ally and install a new leader in the neighbouring country and when Uganda and Rwanda invaded Congo in 1998,a number of African armies stood to protect them (Koko, 2013). The war brought seven different armies into the Congolese territory supporting either the rebellion (Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda) or the Congolese government (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Chad).

A more concrete method to manage the resource wealth of DRC must also include Rwandan's economic interests in trade land and natural resources. To illustrate, Rwanda is dependent on the minerals trade in the region to reduce its trade shortfall. Rwanda has a local mining sector but, conditions in Congo has also motivated actors to avoid the formal economy and take part pf illegal cross border trade and such trade increases the chances of smugglers and upsurges conflict (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2013). To successfully address these complex security and economic issues and pushing for institutional reform in Congo needs players to be engaged on both side of the Rwandan and Congolese border. DRC's government promised to eliminate Rwandan rebel groups but even though the government had the intention to do so, DRC is too vast and the government is too weak to take control over those militias in the deep forests in the eastern region. The Rwandan government took upon itself and started setting and supplying its own armed forces in eastern DRC. Furthermore, the current threat of Rwanda armed groups return in Congo has not helped in improving the stability in the area. Paul Kagame, the Rwandan president has threatened to

send Rwandan forces back in North and South Kivu if the Congolese government fail to repatriate and disarm the FDLR Hutu responsible for the 1994 genocide (Sweet, 2020). Rwandan government has accused the international community with MONUC of failing to assist in disarming these Hutu rebel groups.

3. Rwanda involvement in DRC

Furthermore, Beswick (2012) argued that the main cause of Rwanda's involvement in Congo is the bad experience which is defined by Rwanda government's method to both foreign and domestic policy: the 1994 genocide. Additionally, the situation of the refugees is complicated by continuous repatriation of Rwandans living in Congo. A number of those refugees have been for all if not the majority of their lives living in DRC and only have the tittle of refugees because if the discrimination they faced from their host country. Moreover, in 2001-2002, local coltan miners were evicted out of the market when Rwanda used its own labour forces under the form of prisoners coming from Rwandan jails. In September 2002, after Rwanda officially withdrew its forces from the DRC because of the discreet but immense international pression, Rwandans changed their strategies and found alternative allies in Congo, sponsoring independent armed groups to consolidate its long-lasting influence in the eastern region and make the most out of the Kivu provinces (Cassimon *et al.*, 2012).

Besides, Rwanda kept a clandestine military presence in Congo even after its formal withdrawal. After the end of the Second Congo war, Rwandan government continued to face accusations of involvement in Congo and offering support to Tutsi armed groups in the region. The unrevealed part of October 2003 UN Panel's report revealed and contained very sensitive information on players involved in the exploitation of Congolese natural resources and their role in continuing the conflict. The revelations showed that the continuous presence of Rwanda's army in Congo continued to ship arms and ammunitions to the eastern region, exerted command, provided training and supported North Kivu governor's armed groups (Cassimon, *et al.*, 2012). Tensions between DRC and Rwanda arose over the ongoing support by Rwanda to armed groups active in the eastern region, especially the CNDP led by Tutsi and rising competition over control and access of important natural resources. By signing the November 2007 Nairobi agreement, Congolese government vowed to disarm the FDLR

(Carayannis, 2009). This has not been done and its even carry on its collaboration with Hutu armed forces over profitable mining interests after signing the Nairobi agreement.

The high economic growth of Rwanda can be attributed to its political control over the eastern DRC. Although economic growth has been supported by substantial rise in exports a noticeable change in the structure of export goods has recently been observed (Takeuchi, 2011). In addition to that, before the civil war, Rwanda's exports consisted mainly of tea and coffee, but after the war mineral resources became the most import exports in the country. The entire value added of coltan, diamond and gold looted in Congo by Rwanda reached the total of 6.1 % of Rwanda's GDP and 146 % of its official military spending (Cassimon, *et al.*, 2012). Kigali's economy which is mostly separated from the rest of Rwandan economy, mostly depended on mineral resources and other extraction in Congo as well as international ais. Furthermore, scholars such as Cassimon, *et al.*(2012) explained that plundering the east region of DRC not only allowed Rwandan government to give a boost to their military budget in a way that was hidden to the donor community but also attracted much desired domestic elite loyalty. The above-mentioned author talked about the economisation of conflict a process whereby conflicts are gradually reoriented from their original objectives, in the case of Rwanda: securing its borders, towards profit, and through which conflict actors take advantage progressively on the economic prospects that war opens up. These mineral resources were with undoubtably extracted in the eastern Congo, then shipped to and exported from Rwanda, this shift in the export structure was a clear outcome of Rwandan military intervention in the eastern region of DRC (Takeuchi, 2011).

In addition to that, Hogg (2012) argued that regional analysts, UN experts and Congolese leaders show that a small but military strong neighbour Rwanda was the brain behind the latest rebellion to test if Kinshasa still had hold over the eastern region. A number of publications and reports have shown in detail Rwanda's role in the Congo wars, highlighting security and economic interests as the principal motives for Rwanda's support to rebel groups located in Congo. Since the end of the second Congo war, Rwanda has been playing an important role in North and South Kivu. A group of UN experts examined the extent to which the regional arms embargo drawn by the UN for all non-government armed groups was respected since 2005 (Bessa, 2014). Two distinct high-profile events relate to insurgences by the M23, former Congolese army forces and the CNDP under Laurent Nkunda's leadership (Beswick, 2012).

4. FDLR presence in DRC

After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda besides the two million Rwandans who found refuge in DRC there were also the members of the ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) as well as other rebel groups which belonged mostly to the Hutu responsible for the genocide. Scholars such as Rufranges (2016) stated that this caused its reforming with the goal to perpetrate attacks in Rwanda. This rebel group was named ALIR (Armee de Liberation du Rwanda) and they were recruiting young Congolese by force or voluntarily in the eastern region and started launching its military attacks against Rwanda. ALIR merged with other Hutu armed forces in 2000 which already had their base in the capital city Kinshasa and formed what was later known as FDLR (Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda). The FDLR had lobbies and a support network in various countries in the African continent, North America and Europe. The main objective of this militia was to overthrow the Rwandan government, promote political dialogue, democracy and most importantly, the respect for fundamental liberties in Rwanda's society. The FDLR includes some Hutus who fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Its presence in Congo has long been used by Kigali as a pretext for intervening. Scholars such as Beardsley argued that peacekeepers actually enable armed groups to achieve their objectives with less restraint, for instance, peacekeeping operations could help protect insurgent groups either intentionally or unintentionally. Mills and McNamee (2009) explained that UN peacekeepers in the wake of the Rwandan genocide helped protect the perpetrators of the genocide from being brought to justice and enabled them to become a source of conflict in eastern DRC. On the other hand, peacekeepers might drastically shift the balance of power in favour of neighbouring government forces and create windows of vulnerability for rapid conflict escalation. If peacekeepers prevent transnational insurgencies from moving across borders to supply and support areas controlled by them or their allies, then government forces in neighbouring areas might become more aggressive in challenging the status quo so as to take advantage of the restrictions on transnational movement and support.

Furthermore, this militia has been able to maintain relationships of cohabitation and protection of local population even though this relationship has also shifted towards authoritarianism and the submission of civilian protection, victim of constant abuses, human

rights violations, pillages, forced recruitment and pillages. Today, a main part of FDLR financial resources ae coming from the commercialization of products from mining spaces that the rebel group own in the eastern provinces as well as taxes and the sale of crops such as cannabis and palm oil (Rufranges, 2016). In addition to that, the Congolese government put in place two generals in charge of jointed attacks against the FDLR armed forces who were identified as unbearable because of previous accusations of terrible human rights violations. Consequently, MONUSCO cancelled the operation. The Congolese government claimed to be insulted by the peacekeeping mission's prying with its military arrangements and suspended synchronised operations with MONUSCO.

Throughout the period when synchronised operations were put on hold, both the FARDC and MONUSCO tried to carry on operations against rebel groups separately from each other but each with limited success. The main challenge faced by MONUSCO soldiers was cultural and language barriers that weakened intelligence gathering. The mission also faced obstacles politically as a result of certain events like the Beni's massacres when FARDC insisted they should attend to that. The Congolese national army struggled with logistics, incapable to afford suitable weapons or ways of transportation to militaries, as well as long-term and operational planning. This lack of collaboration during this period made it obvious that the FARDC did not have the necessary ability to fight rebel groups such as ADF without the support of MONUSCO (Novoselof, 2019). The joint FARDC/MONUC military actions was seen as a vicious circle of violence and concluded that the conflict could only be resolved in a political and diplomatic way, especially the regional and economical link with the neighbouring country Rwanda and exploitation of and traffic in natural resources as a means to finance the conflict. Nonetheless, it is first and foremost the DRC government's responsibility to protect civilians, but the authorities fail to address this issue (Reynaert, 2012).

In the meantime, rebel groups took advantage of the situation between MONUSCO and FARDC to secure bases. Especially the rebel group Mai Mai which took the opportunity to protect their communities and themselves from the FDLR and ADF. Adding on to that, the FARDC used some of these Mai Mai armed forces as substitutions to help them in the battle against the FDLR, notwithstanding the fact that the FARDC had also asked the help of FDLR to serve as substitutes in war against other rebel groups (Stimson, 2016). The Congolese army

took advantage of the lack of cooperation between them and MONUSCO to commit abuses against locals, plundering them for forced labour, water, transportation and food. This was a challenging moment for peacebuilding mission in Congo. Although the headquarters of FDLR have been destroyed and its illegal mineral resource trade interrupted, a number of FDLR soldiers remain in Congo even if Rwanda has claimed victory and withdrawn the majority of its soldiers (Carayannis, 2009). Even if a small security gap has been addressed with the arrest of FDLR leader Laurent Nkunda and the short-term disturbance of his militia, the question of long-term regional and international engagement supporting a sustainable political process to bring back state authority throughout the DRC remains open. The UNFIB's intervention has resulted in a partial neutralisation of the FDLR. These cumulative processes of securing the DRC have given a sense of optimism to that government – to the extent that in March 2015, the government called upon MONUSCO to begin withdrawing its peacekeeping troops from the country, citing the reason that the DRC is "ready to assume the responsibility of securing its state (Mutisi, 2016).

5. M23 period

One of the main Congolese armed forces, after the signature of the 2002-2003 peace agreements, made of militia of Rwanda and Congolese Tutsi population joined the national transitional government. Nonetheless, some of this community keep feeling excluded politically and they created the CNDP (Congrés National pour la Défense du Peuple) in 2006 led by Laurent Nkunda with the objective to protect and defend the Banyarwanda community and guarantee its political representation in the Congolese institutions and its recognition as part of Congolese citizens (Rufranges, 2016). In addition to that, the CNDP was also the defender and representative of the rights of Congolese population which found refuge in Rwanda. As mentioned in the previous chapter the past involvement in DRC indirect or direct using proxies and military forces reinforced security concerns and connections based on resource to the region, has brought the country to the issue with the M23 (Beswick, 2012). In 2012, the M23 was founded by predominantly Tutsi members of the CNDP, the Rwandan government and military command were enabling, supplying and supporting M23 rebels (United Nations 2012). This militia has been led and armed by Rwandan forces who often

crossed into Congo and it is the successor to other Tutsi militias in the region with close ties to Rwanda.

In addition to that, the emergence of the M23 group, that refers to the date 23 March 2009 of the treaty negotiated by former presidents of Tanzania and Nigeria specially between the Congolese government and CNDP (Novoselof, 2019). The rebellion escalated rapidly into an established insurrection supported by Uganda and Rwanda. The dangers of destabilisation, on the regional and local levels, the humiliation generated by the seizure of Goma in November 2012, under the FARDC and MONUSCO's eyes, led to a remobilisation of international and regional actors around Congo's situation. An entire economy was developed around the territories controlled by CNDP in eastern DRC, tolls on roads, bank accounts in Rwanda filled by Rwandan exiles, control over the profitable trade of charcoal, cattle ranching and land purchases, front corporations as well as the control of major Rwanda, Uganda and Congo customs post. In addition to that, the money in this resource rich region flows through Rwanda.

According to the News Bank report (2012) there were members of the Rwandan military and government who have had telephonic or personal contact with CNDP and the report explained in detail the supply of uniforms and weapons by the Rwandan government to armed groups. Consequently, it is hard to imagine what other proof is needed to show the interference of Rwanda with militias based in eastern DRC. In spite of Rwanda's denials two states friends of Kigali, Sweden and Netherlands, instantly stopped part of their budget support and powerful voices in the UK advised that Rwanda's main bilateral donor should follow suit and in January 2009, Rwanda ended its support to Nkunda, whom they arrested, and engaged in a joint operation with the FARDC to counteract its former ally, the CNDP (Cassimon, *et al.*, 2012). Even though Rwanda continues to offer underground support to rebel movements in Kivu provinces, this shift showed that the cost of the crime had become too heavy, an assessment that prompted Rwanda to reverse the option.

Nevertheless, in 2012 Kigali took the risk get involved again in supporting the new Congolese armed group M23. This movement took his name from the peace agreement signed in 2009 between the CNDP armed group and the government, combining them into the national army. Even if Rwanda again refused to admit any wrongdoing, numerous reports

showed that it recruited, trained, armed and transported armed troops, deployed sections of its army to assist M23, and violated the UN arms restriction and sanctions regime (Cassimon *et al.,* 2012). According to Cunningham (2013) 46% of M23 activities targeted civilians while violence against civilians constituted only 6% of CNDP conflict activities. These figures seemed to show the important shift in method between M23 and CNDP. Furthermore, for both groups, most of the battle activities did not involve any changes in territorial control, this showed that for both groups the creation of disorder and widespread violence was a strategic goal in itself. Moreover, the M23 claimed to promote federalism in DRC and fight the discrimination faced by the Banyarwanda community.

Scholars such as Rufranges (2016) explained that in December 2013, the M23, which accused the Congolese government of failing to honour a 2009 peace deal, was fighting the Congolese army and a UN intervention brigade near the Rwandan border. the M23 challenged the FARDC which was defeated thanks to the involvement of an UN offensive intervention brigade outside of the peacekeeping mission mandate. The M23 was weakened by MONUSCO's effective support to FARDC offensive operations around Goma by its internal disharmony, and by reduced Rwandan support due to the pressure of a number of donors states the UK, Netherlands, Germany and US and states of the region, particularly South Africa and Tanzania (Novoseloff, 2019). The UNFIB was initially successful, as the M23 collapsed as a major force in 2013, even if some of its veterans now appear to be active with other armed outfits. Nevertheless, after the defeat in 2013, many of the M23 soldiers found themselves refugees in Rwanda and Uganda because the attempts at repatriation and amnesty have failed, they can reactivate at any time.

6. Conclusion

The sustainability of the new Rwandan and Congolese relationship is yet to be established. Insecurity in the eastern region remains very great. Mlitary operations provoked deadly attacks on blue helmets and intensified violence in the eastern region. Inaccurate assumptions about the nature of security threats contribute to these failures. Military approaches define threats as emanating from armed actors outside of the state who can be targeted with force, but corrupt networks within the national army also contribute to violence and support armed groups (Sweet, 2019).

The cross-infiltration of rebels and state politics created intelligence gaps regarding the conflict that risk turning UN efforts against themselves. The conflict demands a new approach with more sophisticated intelligence capabilities, an expanded role for civilian branches of UN missions in operational decision-making, and reengagement with political channels to deescalate violence. There is a developing argument among Congolese analysts that the efforts to put an end to the ongoing violence in DRC have overlooked politics and specifically Rwanda's real interests in that region. Thus, there is a crucial need for a complete political framework that would address the main issue in these conflicts Rwandan Congolese's relationship which has not been entirely addressed in peace settlements in Congo and which would strengthen local reconciliation attempts (Carayannis, 2009).

CHAPITER SIX

Addressing the cross-border violence between Rwanda and DRC

1.Introduction

African nations have consequently shift from the notion of non-involvement towards agreeing to the principle of non-indifference, which means that intervention in an intrastate conflict is acceptable when gross violations such as genocide, crimes and war crimes against humanity are taking place. Experts and donors have gradually viewed conflict in Congo as a mean for powerful actors to maintain or obtain commercial advantages, often due to control over trading activities and the exploitation of natural resources. The peacebuilding process in DRC has been complicated by the absence of properly functioning judicial system, ethnic militias and constant insecurity (Bessa, 2014). This led to a propagation and trading of light weapons and small arms a dynamic against which supporters have deployed substantial financing to address through the DDR and SSR initiatives. This chapiter focuses on addressing cross border violence between Rwanda and DRC through peace agreements, protection of civilians, Demobilisation disarmament and repatriation, the Security sector reform, the involvement of SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

2. Cross border violence

Can peacekeeping missions prevent conflict contagion across state borders? The diffusion of conflict has emerged as an important problem in studies of international security, but not much is understood about how the problem can be reduced. After 1990, in Africa, more particularly in the Great Lakes region, both the state and privatised security have become a common phenomenon in maintaining peace. Scholars such as Check and Lekaba (2015) explained that, in the context of peacekeeping interventions, the international community considers democratisation and state building, including security sector reform, to be key to stabilising societies in theory. In practice however, this is usually not the norm. Most countries emerging from conflict and fragile states privatise large parts of their military and security services. Therefore, warlords, militia, and self-appointed vigilante groups are frequently being used to perform the security functions traditionally performed by the state. In regard of DRC and Rwanda security dilemma, both forms of state security apparatus have been used. Rwanda has strengthened its traditional state security apparatus to deal with the enormous security challenges posed by rebel movements operating in the eastern DRC. Violent perpetrators, armed groups and militias may just stay inactive for a few months after

an intervention to avoid drawing further international attention to the community (Smidt, 2019).

Laurent Nkunda, an experienced person of the precious Congo Wars, launched in 2006 a Tutsi uprising in North Kivu under the name of CNDP. The revolution ended in January 2008 with the signature of a general agreement between DRC's government and a number of armed groups as well as the CNDP and followed by a secret agreement between Kagame and Joseph Kabila in January 2009 (Novoselof, 2019). The agreement signed in 2009 resulted in planning and carrying out combined military operations MONUC-Rwanda-DRC against the FDLR forces. MONUC found itself in a tricky place having to help the Congolese army in its open-ended military actions, some aspects of which resulted in serious violations of human rights. The Mission confronted a dilemma while dealing with the insecurity in the eastern part of DRC partly created by the government it was meant to support. In the areas under state's control, Congolese army became the major threat to the local communities that MONUC was trying to protect. In the meantime, the local communities were caught up between the rebel group and the undisciplined FARDC resulting in the displacement of million. The region became deeply militarized and rebel groups expanded and took control over large parts of Kivu region.

Rwanda has privatised some of these functions to militia groups, especially M23, which has been used carefully to defend Rwanda's border with the DRC and to fight the FDLR rebel group, which has been fighting the government of Rwanda. Besides, President Kagame of Rwanda has never hidden his determination to intervene in the eastern Congo if the security of Rwanda is threatened. The DRC, on the other hand, has also engaged the services of the FDLR, to protect her border with Rwanda; and other militia groups, such as Mai-Mai, to fight M23 and other rebel groups opposing the government in Kinshasa. The fact that both governments use state institutions and private militias to further their selfish interests in the region is concerning. In addition to that, armed groups remain in the DRC because they are useful for the host government and some of its neighbours. Indeed, regional politics and violence are heavily tied together in the east, with rebel groups, supported by Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, crossing borders quite easily, triggering tensions to run high between the Rwanda and DRC at time (Novosseloff, 2019).

Furthermore, failed SSR and DDR programmes where the lack of action and the failure of the Congolese government particularly to deliver on their responsibility in the execution of these

programmes have led to abandonments and disarmed soldiers re-integrating the rebel groups. Schoolars such as Reynaert (2012) explained that it should be noted that the eastern Congolese conflict has a regional dimension as it involves different neighbour countries, with essentially Rwanda holding one of the keys to the solution, on one hand. In particular the international community should use their influence to put pressure on Kigali, since it has great influence in the Great Lakes Region. On the other hand, however, if Congolese authorities are not willing to start working on Security Sector Reform, armed groups will continue to pose a threat to civilians and the country's natural resources will remain exploited.

3. Peace agreements to address cross border violence

DRC has been a site of ongoing attempts at conflict resolution since its independence in 1960. A number of peace process and conflict interferences have been done in Congo including diplomatic and political efforts resulting in negotiations between, peacekeeping interventions, stabilisation missions and warring parties (Mutisi, 2016). Moreover, two peace agreements were signed in July 2002 by Ugandan, Rwandan and Congolese governments providing for the two states to withdraw their troops out of the eastern region of DRC. These peace agreements opened a way for the adoption of political pluralism and leading to the 2006 elections which somehow reinforced the legitimacy of central government and national institutions. The Lusaka agreement called for the imminent stop of all hostilities within the next twenty-four hours of its ratification. By intimidating action, it meant not only military reinforcements and attacks but all kind of hostile propaganda including important emphasis in the area where hate speech has provoked violence resulting in disaster (Carayannis, 2009). Besides, the Lusaka agreement called for the removal of all foreign militaries from the nation, disarming foreign militia groups in the Congo and the exchange of captives and hostages of war. It also called for the formation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of representatives of the fighters, each with veto power.

The cooperation, security and peace framework for the DRC and the region was signed on the 24th of February by the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Angola, South Africa, Burundi, DRC, South Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda (Bawaba, 2014). The accord seeks to restore and maintain peace in the region, especially in the eastern DRC.

It also aims to put an end to the insecurities using holistic method that addresses the complexity of the root causes of the conflicts in the area. Mutisi (2016) explained that another peace deal was signed in January 2008 between the rebel groups and Congolese government which paved the way for the 2011 elections. The 2013 regional pack on peace and security, the peace, cooperation and security framework for the DRC was ratified by 11 nations and vowed to build stability addressing the main cause of conflicts and foster trust between neighbouring country. The peacekeeping efforts have been able to reduce some direct forms of violence and reduction of hostilities. Ban Ki-moon, the secretary general engaged in a regionally driven political initiative in 2013 and the UN negotiated PSCF (Peace and Security Cooperation Framework) was ratified by all states in the region, the ICGLR (International Coonference of the Great Lakes Region), the AU (African Union) and the SADC (Southern African Development Community). Scholars such as Bessa (2014) argued that the peace procedure and efforts of reintegration and demobilisation have not decreased the number of militias who have appeared during the two Congolese War. Most of the areas in the Kivu provinces in the East of the country remained in the hands of non-state armed groups such as the Rwandan Hutu force FDLR and others armed groups linked to Rwanda and Uganda.

4. Protection of Civilians

In some of the world's most intense and ongoing crises, mandate to build state institutions and protect civilians is a recipe for the deployment of never-ending missions. In the absence of a practical peace-making strategy even a well prepared, well trained and well-resourced peacekeepers face the eventuality of treading political water and conducting an exercise in damage limitation without a concrete strategy to exist. (Williams, 2019). In addition to that, the keys of stability method instituted under Kobler, the special representative to the secretary general (SRSG) had many imperfections, nevertheless, it attempted to locate military operations against rebel groups inside a broader stabilization plan. The mission was supposed to coordinate with Congolese security sector, as rebel groups were defeated in the region, to maintain a presence to prevent the return of these militias and support the implementation of the governance structures that could strengthen the community's resilience against them.

Furthermore, MONUSCO has recently started a new initiative to incorporate its stabilisation efforts and POC (Protection of civilians) in the effort to avoid some of the shortfalls of the

islands of stability method. There is huge evidence that much of the insecurity in the eastern part of DRC is connected to criminal networks operating in illicit exploitation of mineral and other natural resources (Stimson, 2016). It is imperative to stress that the political strategy of MONUSCO also involves the analysis of criminal activity that fuels rebel group violent attacks in the eastern region. These initiatives will be crucial to ensure that the mission works with a coherent political strategy and that its activities can be sustained and can pave the way towards a possible exist strategy. In spite of a number of examples demonstrating that MONUSCO has been protecting populations in need where it is deployed, there are also examples that contradict this and show significant failures by the mission to achieve this core objective. Scholars such as Novosseloff (2019) explained that the UNOIOS (UN office for internal oversight services) 2014 report highlighted that the MONUSCO's POC only attended with either political or military response to 26% of incidents reported during 2010-2013. Nonetheless, this is a little higher than the UN's average during the same period.

Moreover, ethnic Tutsi has been trampled upon by both the colonial and post-colonial governments in Congo. One important aspect of this scenario is the citizenship question of ethnic Tutsis in eastern Congo. This particular debate has not been resolved by several post-colonial Congolese governments. This situation, according to scholars such as Check and Lekaba (2015) should be considered as a matter of urgency by the Congolese government and the African Union (AU) as well as the UN should offer assistance to the country to carry on this task. In addition to that, the above-mentioned scholars emphasized on the fact that, the 1981 citizenship decree, which gave Congolese citizenship to anyone whose parents were born in the Congo, should be revisited and as is the international norm, citizenship should be granted to all people born in the Congo, whether they are refugees or not. The geographic limitations of MONUSCO have restricted its ability to tackle ongoing and emerging threats in most of the parts of the eastern region of DRC. Even within the possibility of its operations and actions, the capacity to carry out protection has been depending not only on the efficiency of the police and military components but as well as the capacity of its civilian dimension to reach remote areas.

Beardsley (2011) emphasized on the fact that beside securing borders, peacekeepers can also prevent conflict from spreading by reducing refugee flows and facilitating repatriation and resettlement. When effective at securing post conflict environments, peacekeepers will enable

displaced persons to return to their homes and prevent non-combatants from becoming vulnerable to further hostilities. With fewer displaced persons, refugee flows will be diminished, which means that there will be less disruptive pressure in neighbouring polities. It is important to note that, civilian protection is first and foremost the responsibility of the government in charge. However, the DRC government refuses to assume any responsibility regarding security sector reform, which is essential when it comes to protection civilians. Scholars such as Reynaert (2012) argued that currently effective national army and police are almost non-existent due to several reasons. Firstly, the above-mentioned author stated that in general the government does not pay its soldiers or salaries are retained due to a deficiency in the chain of payments. Consequently, soldiers start misbehaving and even desert the army. Secondly, the government does not provide training or education for FARDC elements. Instead, training and education of a certain number of battalions is financed by the UN and the EU. Lastly, since there is no effective vetting mechanism, human rights violators are not deprived of their ranks and are rarely punished for their acts. Thus, impunity reigns. DDR is an important peacebuilding tool that can encourage reconciliation, support the rule of law and improve civilian's protection.

5. Demobilisation Disarmament and Repatriation (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The DDR and SSR processes strategically aimed at reducing on one side the relations between ex-combatants, army forces and the community and on the other side economic, ethnic and political interests. Due to the great risk associated with those processes and the likelihood that funds may be abused and linked to human rights violations, donors have been reluctant to commit major funds and embark on ambitious initiatives in this particular sector. The DDR and SSR processes rely greatly on external support. According to Bessa (2014) an estimated of 40,000 warriors still awaited DDR compared to the primary estimation of 240,000 combatants that needed demobilisation in 2007, almost 80,000 combatants seemed to be not benefited from the DDR process. The most probable explanation is that rebel groups made either false declarations or incorrect estimation of their troops. Moreover, the majority of the DDR and SSR processes in DRC were design and implemented as emergency responses that is why they did not include long term planning or sustainable criteria. This

was typically caused by funding mechanisms but could affect the process that demanded a better long-term perspective. Rwanda's involvement in DRC was a response to the national threat posed by armed Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC. Takeuchi (2011) argued that the results of those processes were rather mixed. On one side, the initiative dismantled armed refugee camps successfully in the area, resulting in a major return of Hutu refugees to Rwanda; the subsequent military interference in Eastern Congo allowed Rwanda to create political order beyond its frontiers. The above-mentioned scholar added that, on the other side, major rebel groups continued their illegal activities in DRC and have remained in the area as FDLR.

5.1. Addressing the DDR in DRC and Rwanda

In the DRC, the DDR programmes were started after the ratification of the first Lusaka agreement in 1999 and later on after the signing in Pretoria on the 17th of December 2002 of all-inclusive and global Peace Agreement. The two national DDR initiatives, from 2004 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2012 both failed to deliver on what it was expected from them. MONUSCO reported that almost 5,000 ex rebels were demilitarized between 2008-2012 with 2,600 receiving supports from the programmes it was in charge. In 2002, over 32,000 foreign ex rebels and their families, mostly ex FDLR have been repatriated to Rwanda. Not long ago, after long delays and negotiations with Uganda and Rwanda government , MONUSCO and the office of the special envoy for the Great Lakes Region made considerable progress with M23 and FDLR repatriation (Novosseloff, 2019).

The withdrawing and departing of ex rebels have been ineffectively managed, representing a significant challenge for the over peace process in the DRC. Ex rebels are blocked in transit camps and reintegration centres for a long time under critical conditions. This encourages ex rebels to reintegrate armed groups which unfortunately create a vicious cycle. In addition to that, the propagation of armed groups in the DRC mirrors the restraint opportunities of young men, who find more advantageous to join rebel groups and this point to the challenges of DDR procedures that have followed the signing of most of the peace deals since 1999 (Mutisi, 2016). Rather than bringing back peace and demilitarize rebel groups, the Congolese government reward armed groups and further made it difficult to end insecurity in the region. The Amani talks introduced a rational for war and mobilisation in Eastern DRC by offering

compensation to armed groups leaders in exchange for demilitarization (Bessa, 2014). A compensation mechanism as a demilitarization incentive, became an incentive to create, or pretend to control, violent militias. Dissatisfaction with reintegration processes has often been complemented by the remobilisation and re-arming of troops, and a decline into conflict and violence. Kets and De Vires (2014) stated that, the two previous programmes, DDR I and II, did not achieve the initially set purposes as expected. Both programmes were created to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate thousands of ex rebels, as well as to repatriate foreign fighters. It was hoped that through these processes, peace and security could be strengthened and many armed rebel groups neutralised. They did not attain any stability in the eastern Congo due to misuse of funds, poor governance, wrongful implementation of DDR policies, lack of political will and the reintegration of former war criminals into the national army.

Scholars such as Takeuchi (2011) argued that processes involving demobilizing and reintegrating ex rebels have been carried out under the support of RDRC (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission). The programs targeted not only combatants supported by government like RDF or RPA but also rebel groups linked to the previous regime like ex FAR and other rebel groups active in the DRC. The centre of governance security 2015 report stated that, DDR program in Rwanda aimed to demilitarized up to 5,500 fighters including almost 500 child soldiers and there was an additional demilitarization of 4,000 members of the Rwandan Defence forces. The demobilization and reintegration instruments in the second stage carried out between December 2001 and December 2008 were well planned and the implementation of the program was applauded by many (Takeuchi, 2011). In 2002, the size of Rwanda's armed forces grew after the end of the civil war, as they included ex-FAR soldiers, and reached a maximum size of 80,000; the armed forces have since continued to shrink, to the level of 35,000 in 2008 (Takeuchi, 2011). This rapid decrease is strong evidence of the program's effectiveness. Soldiers in the armed groups were active in the eastern DRC: their numbers were recently assessed at around 6,000. Even though their repatriation has been seen as a major factor in stabilizing this region, their numbers remained virtually unchanged for numerous years (Takeuchi, 2011). Furthermore, the low participation rate for demobilization of the ex-soldiers clearly indicated voluntary repatriation was unsuccessful, therefore making the reconciliation questionable. This was not because the RDRC program was unpopular but because the rebel groups have continued to fight: they have not yet stopped their violent attacks.

5.2. Security sector reform (SSR)

It is a major priority for the UN to support national authorities to build an accountable and effective security sector. SSR is an important element of conflict prevention, peacebuilding agendas and stabilization. It is also the starting point for and consequence of good governance (Ebo & Powell, 2010). In Congo, the SSR was established the support of MONUSCO and a range of international actors to secure the formation of professional FARDC and PNC controlled by civilians (Novosseloff, 2019). Nonetheless, one of the central problems for the mission has been the Congolese have been unable to take ownership of the SSR procedure. The UN was given a coordinating role in SSR between 2008 and 2014 but there has never been any approval from the Congolese authorities and by all its bilateral allies.

The SSR depends essentially on the political willingness of the host country government to make it work and it is never led by global community only supported by it. Stimson (2016) argued that several reasons can explain how the government in the DRC have not successfully develop its security sector reform. Many consider that it is voluntary effort to block the FARDC from turn out to be strong enough and pose a menace to the then administration's strong hold on power. Others also suppose that is it mostly due to the shortage of supplies, worsen lately by the downfall of the price of metals. The mere fact that MONUSCO has been available to help fill cracks in DRC security capability when security problems jeopardised the Congolese government, for example during the uprise of the M23 armed group, played a part as well. In spite of the essential role that SSR played in the sustainable success of so many other operations, it is not given primary place within the mission. A number of mission personnel stated that SSR is seen as a sensitive topic and that the host country government often seems offended at the idea that it may be in need of some support to improve its security sector from the international community. Nevertheless, this sensitivity is not general; numerous mission personnel said that the government has demonstrated a vow to improve the liability within the FARDC for children enrolment (which now happens rarely) and sexual violence which many think is dropping over time thanks to improved liability actions. Furthermore, Novosseloff (2019) argued that MONUSCO assisted the police in DRC, encouraged inclusive SSR, reform the national army and improved efficiency, accountability, training, sustainability, effectiveness and vetting and any assistance offered by the UN, only for combined missions, should be planned together,

performed and conditional on suitable oversight and inspection, failing which that support should be suspended.

However, the UN mission has restricted abilities to assist SSR but its improvement on children enrolment and sexual violence concerns demonstrates that the use of political pressure can be necessary to carry out SSR programmes. MONUSCO should focus on other important SSR problems such as command structures, vetting, rotation and responsibility for the interference in crime activity and human rights harms in its diplomatic commitment with the state's administration. The sponsor community should complete these political efforts with revised engagement on SSR to enable a viable exit for MONUSCO (Stimson, 2016). In addition to that, the Kabila's government preferred a mutual partnership for SSR and want MONUSCO to play significant role in coordinating SSR efforts. Moreover, the SSR programmes were influenced negatively by the ongoing competition and lack of coordination among contributors, and there has been no contract among donors over the role to be given to the UN in this area, in spite of the ongoing call from the Security Council that MONUSCO should play a coordinative role (Novosseloff, 2019). In addition to the recent budget cuts and ongoing financial pressure meant that the operation had to change its position. It had to close down some centres, and this meant that it lost some of its initial warning and response abilities in the eastern Congo. Even though Rwanda is still extremely dependent on outside support for its security sector reforms, it has maintained a great deal of local ownership over those reforms. This is largely due to the continuing tension between the Rwandan government, and the international community that is still held responsible for failing to prevent the 1994 genocide (Centre of governance security report, 2015). Several of the reforms have improved the capacity of the Rwandan security sector. Scholars such as Beardsley (2011) argued that securing borders can decrease the ability of transnational insurgencies to move to other areas where they destabilize intrastate relations or become a source of tension between states. It can also prevent contagion to new interstate and intrastate conflict nearby by restricting the flow of arms and other rebel support in and out of conflict areas.

6. The involvement of SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

SADC involvements maintaining stability and peace in DR Congo have been much significant and continuous. Its involvement in the conflict have started from the interference of the region's bloc and Southern Africa eagerness to ally to the intervention of states outside the region like South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe among many others (Mutisi, 2016). The participation of SADC in these negotiation procedures showed a major political willingness by the administrators of this regional structure to once and for all put an end to the political issues in Eastern Congo. The country's vast mineral resources and its demographics put it at the centre of becoming an economic powerhouse in that region. It was meant to play a similar job of Nigeria in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is supposed to mediate conflicts and empower its neighbouring states economically and politically.

The re-emergence of non-state actors and the asymmetric nature of attacks against state institutions in the Great Lakes region is of particular concern to AU and sub-regional organisations. Even though the operation and the UN secretariat have requested regional organisations to be involved like SADC, ICGLR and the AU, in the process to find and maintain peace, and although there was a good coordination between regional players and the UN when the UNFIB was established, the ongoing assistance given by other countries in the region to militias in the eastern region has mostly undermined the execution of MONUSCO's mandate (Novosseloff, 2019). Though regional involvement has become less apparent over time, changing positions of regional players have been a source of insecurities in DRC. This ongoing issue is worsened by the fragility of Congolese government. Nowadays, the regime in power main priority seems to be the stabilisation of the state's borders lines as well as preventing a rise in refugees and Rwanda particularly does not want to be seen as a plunderer.

The mutual assistance offered by other countries in the region to illicit militia in Congo has been weakening the execution of MONUSCO's mandate. Within security council none of the P5 states want to put their strategic or national forces into resolving the insecurity in the DRC. Scholar such as Mutisi (2016) argued that SADC's role in bringing security in the Congolese territory has been successful to certain extent, for the first time in many years, the country has not been held captive by armed forces with major ties to neighbouring countries,

even if they are still in the country. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned author emphasized on the fact that in spite of those early successes, the UNFIB has not fully been able to demilitarise the FDLR. This can be attributed to a size of this rebel group and the fact that it is deeply merged with local communities, more spread out and located in areas which are not easily accessible. Though the ICGLR, AU and SADC are willing to lead operations in eastern Congo, the reality faced by those groups is that they rely on external assistance to organize resources and conduct the security and peace agenda.

7. The three principles of Peace keeping Operations

Kaembeli (2020) outlined the three basic principles of the UN in peacekeeping operations: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. They are inter-twined their applications need to be understood in order to apply them to the peacekeeping operations effectively. According to the United Nations firstly, UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Secondly, impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate and lastly, UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

The gap between the expectations of the populations and what they actually see from peacekeepers keeps growing. In addition to that, it seems U.N. peacekeeping missions have reached a deadlock, peacekeepers originally supposed to be deployed in environments where there is a peace to keep are now sent into civil war alongside counterterrorism missions and are tasked with peace-enforcement missions incompatible with their core principles (Salaun, 2019). In the case of DRC, the M23 movement was eventually dismantled on November 5, 2013, following a raid conducted by a military formation called the U.N. Force Intervention Brigade. The rebellion had disastrous repercussions on the peacekeepers' reputation in the as they became associated with the fiasco of the Congolese army in the eyes of the population. It is hard to imagine how a population that suffered from such atrocities could understand that

peacekeepers are deployed for reinstating state authority throughout the country when the state itself behaves as an enemy of its people. The creation of the UNFIB during the M23 crisis represents a milestone in this evolution, as peacekeepers became officially allowed and, indeed, encouraged to take the initiative in the use of force. By doing so, the UN mission had already demonstrated where it stood in the conflict; this marked a deviation from the traditional requirement of peacekeeping operations, to treat all parties to the conflict even-handedly (Kasembeli, 2020). It created difficulty especially when trying to bring the actors to the negotiating table; furthermore, the Government might not take the negotiations so seriously when the UN is already fighting for or with them against the rebels. This consequently led the mandate to be one of taking sides, in as much as the rebel groups were party to violent conflict against civilians, MONUSCO's support of the government in fighting these groups did not put into account that the government "might" also fall in the same category.

8. Conclusion

For numerous reasons, the DDR programmes have not reached their expectations. According to Bessa (2014) the reasons for this is firstly, the limitations on long term view on different livelihoods for ex rebels and their relatives. Secondly, the lack of progress to deal with the concerns of the population and structural causes of conflict. Lastly, there is a shortage in the current transitional justice systems that keep on encouraging rebelliousness between communities and initiating re-mobilisation of ethnic militia and a small security issue can lead to serious consequences. Furthermore, success or effectiveness of the UNFIB would only be measured if DRC was peaceful today, there are approximately 36 militia groups in Eastern DRC who are still running operations, and the UN PKO in DRC does not have the political will from other countries to see this through because of the length the mission might take and how expensive the operation will be (Kasembeli, 2020). There is a reason as to why these principles were put in place and they need to be adhered to so that the UN PKOs can have credibility, trust and the support from the local population in establishing their mandate.

In addition to that, there are steps that can be taken in order to address the security dilemma between Rwanda and DRC. Firstly, an immediate ceasefire to be monitored by MONUSCO; the end of foreign support to armed groups, particularly an end to Rwandan support of M23

by expanding international sanctions if needed, implementation of the joint mechanism for border verification. In addition to that addressing the disarmament and demobilization of M23 and the reassessment of the 23 March 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the government is needed. Besides, the UN should also sanction all entities or individuals responsible for supporting the M23. These measures are part of a conflict management approach but it will not prevent the repetition of another crisis in the eastern part of DRC in the next couple of years.

CHAPTER SEVEN

General conclusion and final comments

1. Conclusion

Throughout this paper it has been demonstrated that Rwanda has maintained an underground presence in the DRC even after the country was supposed to withdraw all its troops in September 2002. When Rwanda supported the leader Laurent Nkunda of Congolese armed group CNDP in August 2008, the Congolese government accused Rwanda of being behind that security issue. The critical question of how to address the issues have not been properly contemplated. Tutsi has been trampled upon by both the colonial and post-colonial governments in Congo and this has created a situation in which more than a million ethnic Tutsis have been left without proper civil documents since independence. The post-genocide Rwandan government has taken it upon itself to make sure that such injustices are rectified, and this explains why they support any militia or rebel movement that strives to better the lives of ethnic Tutsis in eastern Congo. The political willingness for cooperation and peace will improve only when the DRC and Rwanda start working together on common security issues and investing financially in the regional economic integration and encouraging reforms on institutions in DRC (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2013). Mixing a mining sector free of conflict and develop infrastructure in DRC with Rwanda's appeal for potential venture capital could instigate a process of transformation.

To answer the questions asked in chapter one, firstly UN peacekeepers efforts to address cross border violence do not reduce violence but rather displace violence to neighbouring departments or temporally delay communal violence. Violent perpetrators, armed groups and militias may just stay inactive for a few months after an intervention to avoid drawing further international attention to the community (Smidt, 2019). This has been proven with M23 armed group, which has been defeated in 2012 by jointed actions of UNFIB and FARDC, however violence erupted again from the same armed group in 2022. One may note that armed conflict can spread with and without peacekeeping. At the most general level, one might expect that peacekeepers will reduce the extent to which neighbouring intrastate and interstate conflicts increase the risk of either intrastate or interstate conflicts. Secondly, when neighbouring conflict spreads because of transnational or externally supported insurgencies, the neighbouring conflict is most likely to be intrastate in nature because any transnational insurgents are likely to be tied to nearby domestic security problems. Moreover, refugee problems should be most severe in intrastate conflict, as displaced persons in interstate conflict can still typically lean on their own government for shelter.

The conflict in the Kivus provinces does not only have a political, but also an economical dimension: The Eastern DRC is a mineral rich region, systematically targeted by armed groups as they exploit natural resources and transport them over the Congolese border, generating profit and financing the war, which keeps the conflict going. Furthermore, the only way to prevent another crisis to occur is to force the Congolese government to implement the peace framework defined in 2008 and to force the Rwanda government to end its policy of control by proxies in Eastern Congo. For a long-term conflict resolution, there is already a peace framework - the problem being the non-implementation of this peace framework.

2. Recommendations

A primary means by which peacekeepers can prevent such contagion is through securing borders, either directly in the provision of security and monitoring forces or indirectly in strengthening the force projection capacities of the central and regional governments. Such a

function of peacekeeping can dovetail with security sector reform (Beardsley, 2011). There is a need for the UN to learn from previous experiences, especially from states that have experience international SSR assistance to improve its abilities to enable national ownership of SSR from the beginning of SSR planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Rwanda security should be guaranteed by the international community and given necessary support to maintain that security. In addition to that, the international community should move away from the guilt syndrome from the fact that it did not intervene during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This should not justify the blindness by the international community of the human rights violations and mass killings committed in the eastern part of DRC by Rwanda. Congo should put in place a respected and republican army capable of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo. The Congolese government should also be seen to have a keen interest in the security and stability of its neighbours, by facilitating dialogue between the FDLR and the Rwandan government. Rwanda's attempt at militarily defeating the FDLR should be discouraged, as it could create more systemic problems, rather than find a lasting solution to the security threat posed by the FDLR. The Congolese government cannot do all these by itself: it needs the assistance of African multilateral organisations in assisting the government in building credible institutions and developing capable human capacity, promoting democracy and respect for human rights and protecting fundamental freedoms. With the implementation of these minimal security issues, the Great Lakes could eventually see sustainable peace.

3. Limitations of the findings

There has been continuous debate among major databases over what must be considered as indicator of armed conflict, whether to count nonviolent events or only episodes that lead to death. Another issue is the difficulty to regroup comprehensive and accurate information about violent conflict in Africa as most of them happen in very remote areas. Though the analytic community researching on those issues has developed its capacity to index episodes by involving field research, local reporters can be dangerous and complicated, media companies cannot report on all conflict and international and nongovernmental organisations are not present everywhere in Africa nor local government are able to give accurate data because a number of them do not have effective and stable administrations to collect and

archive those data. Williams (2019) argued that it is idealistic to assume that peacekeeping mission deployment in a state can effectively take care of regionalized pressures, transnational players or internationalising processes and institutions from the traffic of light weapons and small arms to the propaganda of radical ideologies that disturb dynamics in their theatre of operations.

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