

https://dspace.org/

Organisation and repression in the transition to confrontation: The case of Kagiso, 1985-1986

Seekings, Jeremy

1990-02
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/9880

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW
4.00pm FEBRUARY 1990

Title: Organisation and Repression in the Transition to Confrontation: The Case of Kagiso, 1985-1986.

by: Jeremy Seekings

No. 266

ORGANISATION AND REPRESSION IN THE TRANSITION TO CONFRONTATION: THE CASE OF KAGISO, 1985-1986

Jeremy Seekings

Summary

This paper focusses on the experience of Kagiso, a medium-sized township on the West Rand. Kagiso was one of several major townships - Soweto and Mamelodi were others - which remained relatively 'quiescent' during 1984-85, to erupt into mass protest and violent conflict in 1985-86. An explanation of the development of township politics in Kagiso must take into account the role of regional and national organisations (in particular the UDF) and events, ie precisely those factors which underlie conspiratorial interpretations of 'unrest' in South Africa's townships. This paper seeks to explain how regional factors impacted on local township politics, contributing to the latter's transformation.

In the case of Kagiso, regional factors impacted on township politics through a consumer boycott. The impetus for a boycott came from two related sources: first, from local leaders links with the UDF and the regional consumer boycott initiatives; secondly, from the poorly organised and sporadic militancy of the so-called 'youth'. Without adequate prior organisation in the township, the consumer boycott was initially brutally enforced by the 'youth'. Furthermore, the aims of the boycott were unclear. The boycott was thus potentially very divisive.

In fact, however, the boycott led to the formation of an unprecedented political community in Kagiso, with massive popular support for the 'radical' township organisations. This was largely unintended. Two factors, interacting with each other, contributed to this. First, the organisations responded to the problem of boycott enforcement by disciplining the offenders and instituting a general 'crime-prevention' campaign. Secondly, the state responded to intensified protests (many of which were undoubtedly violent, although limited and directed against property rather than lives) with very brutal repression. The socially-useful activities of the 'radical' organisations combined with the alienating brutality of the police to mobilise residents into an unprecedented, albeit very fragile, political community.

Introduction

Between 1984 and 1986 most of South Africa's black townships experienced chronic and often violent protests and confrontations, and there was rapid growth in popular support for 'progressive' extra-state organisations. Events in remote townships like Lingelethu (Cradock), Tumahole (Parys), Duduza (Nigel), and Bongolethu (Oudtshoorn) were reported on the front page of the national, and even international, press.

The apparent coincidence of protest and confrontation in so many geographically dispersed townships was fertile ground for the proliferation of nation-wide conspiracy analyses [1]. The bottom line of such analyses is that 'waves' of 'unrest' were orchestrated by 'agitators', who were part of a conspiracy based around the (then) banned ANC and SACP. The scale of their claims was not matched, however, by either analytical rigour or empirical content. In particular, they failed to either demonstrate the mechanisms by which the alleged 'wave of unrest' was directed, or explain how and why protests involved different groups of township residents, at different times, and in different activities.

Much recent research has, in contrast to the nation-wide conspiracy analyses, focussed on the specific experiences of individual townships or areas, and has emphasised the importance of locally-specific political dynamics. As most studies focus on individual areas or townships they often do not address the broader question of why similar developments are occurring in diverse places. Implicitly, however, and sometimes explicitly, the coincidence of similar processes is explained primarily in terms of their shared experience of general structural phenomena rather than any overarching organisation. In many townships in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (P.W.V.) region during 1984, for example, widely-shared factors included rent increases, discontent with township councillors, and specific educational grievances.

Townships' experiences of conflict varied considerably, however. Three major P.W.V. townships - Soweto, Kagiso, and Mamelodi - saw little protest or confrontation, at least in comparison with the surrounding townships, until late 1985. The relatively late transition from apparent 'quiescence' to confrontation in these townships requires an analysis with a rather different emphasis. In particular, greater attention has to be paid to the regional or national dynamics, ie precisely those dynamics which underlay conspiracy theories of the nation-wide 'unrest'.

This paper focusses on the experience of Kagiso, a medium-sized township on the West Rand. It seeks to explain how regional factors impacted on local township politics, contributing to the latter's transformation. In particular, I try to show how a consumer boycott (a regional-cum-national initiative) generated organisational responses which combined with brutal state repression to mobilise residents into an unprecedented, albeit fragile, political community.

The primary source for the paper are the affidavits, record and extensive documentary exhibits in a 1986 court case, which involved an application by the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation (KRO) for an interdict restraining the police and SADF, who KRO alleged were engaged in a campaign of brutal harassment of the residents of Kagiso and the nearby township of Munsieville. Legal records, even when as extensive as in this case, cannot provide an adequate picture. They have therefore been supplemented by a series of interviews in 1989-90. There are gaps in the interviewing which must be pointed out. First, my interviews have been with people who have been involved in political organisations, to varying extents, and not with

the proverbial passenger in the Kagiso combi-taxi. Secondly, I have not interviewed members of the police.

Kagiso: Some Background

Kagiso is a medium-sized township south of Krugersdorp on the West Rand. It has been administered together with the older and very much smaller location of Munsieville, north-west of Krugersdorp. In March 1984 their combined official population was over 57,000, of whom almost 50,000 lived in Kagiso. The population was evenly divided between adults and children, and men and women [2]. As of the end of 1984 there were 5,705 houses and sixteen schools (including two secondary schools). Just over half of the houses in Kagiso had been built in the late 1950s and early 1960s. About 300 were built in Kagiso Extension in 1979, and three further schemes were undertaken in 1982-83, comprising over 2,000 houses and including a small luxury development. By 1984-85 housing in Kagiso thus included an unusually high proportion of recently-built houses [3]. This was to have important effects on organisation in the township.

Employment in Kagiso has been dominated by manufacturing enterprises in the immediately neigbouring Chamdor industrial area, and to a lesser extent in the Luipardsvlei area. Unions were slow to organise in this areas, however, and had little impact by 1985. The CUSA/NACTU-affiliated Food and Beverage Workers Union (FBWU) and (from 1983) the UDF-affiliated General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU) organised in some plants.

The most important civic organisation in Kagiso was the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation (KRO), originally formed in 1981 at about the same time as a number of other civic organisations in the region. The impetus to form KRO came from the general recognition, by several different groups of residents, of the need for a civic organisation. The particular factor that precipitated the formation of KRO in early 1981 was a rumoured rent increase. KRO's social or class character broadly reflected that of the township. The leadership comprised both nationalist-oriented and relatively intellectual individuals, and more civic-oriented. often church-based, people. It included individuals with Charterist and non-Charterist ideological leanings.

Between February 1981 and March 1983 KRO engaged in a series of single-issue campaigns. The more important of these were against rent increases (February/March 1981), Republic Day (May 1981), the building of a new hostel (mid 1981), further rent increases (August 1981), and still further rent increases (October 1982 through to March 1983).

During 1983-84 KRO lapsed into inactivity, broken only by very limited organisation against the elections for a Village Council in November 1983. The main reason for this inactivity was repression, which removed most of the leadership for long periods. But repression only paralysed the organisation because KRO's structures were weak: KRO had focussed too much on single issue campaigns rather than on organisation-building. The KRO constitution provided for the formation of sub-committees, but these were not set up. Even very sympathetic resdents were not drawn into regular organisation. The extension of the township during 1982-1983 posed additional organisational problems which KRO failed to address. KRO's strength was in the older sections, and it failed to broaden its support base much after the 1981 rent campaigns. [4]

Apparent 'Quiescence' 1984 to mid-1985

During 1984-1985 many townships in the P.W.V. experienced protests over rent increases, educational issues, and township councils. During this time there was relatively little protest in Kagiso, less even than in nearby Soweto, or Mamelodi (east of Pretoria). There were probably two related reasons for this. First, whilst Kagiso residents had numerous (and typical) grievances, these lacked the specific foci around which broad mass popular action crystallised or could be mobilised. Thus, whilst the quality of housing, township services, and education was widely seen as unacceptable, there were no rent increases during 1984-1985 to galvanise opposition, and it does not seem that age-limit were strictly enforced in schools.

Secondly, extra-state organisation in the township was still weak, as it slowly revitalised itself after a period of inactivity. This revitalisation during 1984 and early 1985 involved the reorganisation of student and youth structures, and incorporation into regional and national organisation.

Kagiso had had one of the more active COSAS branches during 1979-1981 - although at that time even COSAS strongholds were not particularly strong. But the flight of leading student activists into exile had led to the breakdown of the organisation. The remaining students were strongly advised against militancy by the teachers, many of whom had been among those relatively conservative students who had not participated in boycotts in 1976-78 [5]. The absence of an active COSAS branch during 1984 was an important factor in Kagiso's 'quiescence'. In townships such as Tembisa and Daveyton on the East Rand, COSAS had played a major role in connecting discontented students with protesting students elsewhere, especially from Atteridgeville. In 1984-1985 KRO leaders began to help rebuild student organisation.

At about the same time KRO was drawn into regional and national political organisation. In August 1984 the KRO chairman, Isaac Genu, returned from Robben Island. He had been convicted of membership of the ANC and sentenced to eight years in August 1983, but was later acquitted on appeal in the Supreme Court. Genu became a key figure in the UDF on the West Rand. In October 1984 a UDF West Rand Area Committee was established, including Genu as chairman, with two other KRO committee members as treasurer and secretary [6]. In addition, former Kagiso priest Frank Chikane, who had moved to Soweto in 1982, was a vice-president of the Transvaal UDF from 1983 to 1985. These regional links were strengthened during early 1985, with some KRO leaders well connected to Soweto-based activists involved in planning the celebration of International Youth Year.

The revival of organisation in Kagiso was marked by the holding of a public meeting in November 1984, and a workshop organised with the UDF in December 1984. But township organisation, although revived, remained weak. At a KRO Committee meeting on 3 March 1985 reports were given on two previous 'public' meetings. A women's meeting had taken place 'as scheduled but the attendance was not satisfactory' (according to the minutes); it was recommended that 'Sister Bernard should coopt some women'. A housing seminar had not even taken place 'due to lack of attendance' [7]. This situation continued: in May, 200 people were invited to a workshop to look into the International Youth Year, but only eleven attended. [8]

This organisational weakness was acknowledged by KRO leaders in several remarkably frank self-analyses in early 1985. One such analysis was made

at a KRO Committee meeting in May 1985. It listed KRO's strengths as follows:

1. KRO enjoys support from the residents and this has been proved by attendance at mass meetings;
2. It is obvious that people know of the existence of KRO and that it is in their minds;
3. We don't have a language problem in our area and at committee meetings;
4. KRO has the potential of becoming an effective organisation.

But, under 'weaknesses', it listed the following:

1. Some people do not contribute anything in our meetings;
2. Pamphlets produced to be distributed among our people do not reach their destination;
3. Resolutions taken at mass and committee meetings are not carried out by the committee;
4. We tend to talk too much at meetings but our talking never produce any action and deeds;
5. Some people who attend committee meetings are very irresponsible and do not do their duties;
6. Figure heads in the organisation are seen as the organisation;
7. House meetings do not take place; we seem not to be talking to other people except those that we know. Our duty is to go out to the people.
8. We also need to know each other.

The analysis recommended setting up an office, issueing membership cards, creating different 'departments' and decentralising activities, and reaching out to and organising new people [9]. A second, similar analysis bemoaned the absence of regular social contact between activists and residents, and above all the lack of educational work:

> There is no political hegemony or coherence. The organisation since its launching has been working loosely. There was no political education of the activists at all, let alone of the masses.

This analysis argued that social and educational activities were needed to strengthen KRO. [10]

KRO had failed to build a popular political community in Kagiso, as the above analyses acknowledged. The building of such a community would have required (among other things) involving relatively conservative but prominent or active township residents, and taking up their concerns. In early 1985 one group of such residents in the new, Riverside section, organised into a Riverside Residents Committee. Their grievances were their particularly high rents and the poor quality of construction. The committee viewed the problem as short-term and not 'political', and they sought to resolve it through the Kagiso Council. It was dominated by especially well-educated members of the township 'middle-class', and allegedly had a 'middle-class ideological disposition'. Some of the leaders were wary of KRO (which they possibly saw at the time as being more of a UDF branch than a local civic organisation). KRO seems to have made little attempt to either take up the issues or accomodate the committee (and several leading members could not even recall it when interviewed in 1989). The Riversde Committee fizzled out soon, however. [11]

Most of the new township extensions built in the early 1980s faced similar grievances (resulting from the state insistence that such developments be self-financing), and in several cases these gave rise to similarly short-lived and very localised residents committees, often dominated by people working in management or the professions. Rarely however did the new sections comprise such a high proportion of the township as in Kagiso.

It is important to locate the weakness of township organisation within the appropriate structural context, and not to attribute to organisers sole responsibility for the disorganisation. Furthermore, weak organisation, in the sense of formal structures like KRO, was neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for the absence of popular mobilisation and political protest. In the Vaal Triangle, for example, formal organisation was similarly weak, if not weaker. But there the issue of the rent increase generated widespread mobilisation and protest, in which relatvely conservative residents participated alongside more self-consciously political militants. In Kagiso during 1984 there was no such mobilising issue.

In March and April 1985 an issue arose which may have had the potential to mobilise a wide range of residents in protest. The Council had sent out 'final notices' to residents alleging that massive arrears (of as much as R900) had been accumulated, since 1981 in some cases. These notices were not accompanied by any explanation, but a bizarre circular from the Mayor was attached. The circular said: 'Thank you for your loyal support of my council and for keeping Kagiso calm in these troubled times'! The reason behind the 'arrears' seemed to be that rents were increased, and backdated! At public meetings residents called for a boycott of the 'increase', and mandated KRO to represent them to the Council. KRO met with the town clerk, who was intransigent, but the 'arrears' were soon written off and attributed to 'computer error'. [12] This campaign failed, however, to increase popular involvement in other, less urgent, activities. This was clear from the very low attendance at the workshop in May referred to above.

Esclating Violence - Mid to Late 1985

In the second half of 1985, isolated incidents of violent protest began to occur. In the KRO Trial the police rightly emphasised these incidents, and insisted that they had preceded the (undeniable) escalation of repression and resistence in Kagiso and Munsieville at the end of the year. But what they failed to recognise is the qualitative shift between these pre-December incidents and the post-December community resistence. The earlier incidents reflected not a mobilised community but rather just the amorphous phenomenon of 'youth' militancy.

The incidents seem to have begun with a Soweto Day commemoration service, organsed by the UDF Area Committee, and attended by 600-700 people. After the service particular buildings and vehicles were attacked. Two beerhalls and four councillors' shops or houses were attacked, looted or burnt. Twelve people were subsequently charged with public violence; only two of these were older than eighteen. [13]

Various other incidents followed. In late July a bus was stoned, the Kagiso Liquor Store was burnt out, and there was an attempted arson attack on Masupatsela High School. On 1 August a bus was stoned in Munsieville.

Buses were stoned on several ocasions in Kagiso in late August, and a delivery vehicle was burnt out. In September, buses were stoned on three occasions, and the Kagiso Senior Secondary School was petrol-bombed. In early October, a councillor's house was petrol-bombed and on one day seven buses were stoned. Buses were stoned on six further ocasions in late October and November. At the end of November, one house was petrol-bombed and an unsuccessful attempt was made on a second house. [14]

The scale of these incidents should not be exaggerated, however. It seems that the situation could be controlled by local police. Most incidents involved stoning buses, but the bus service was continued, and most of the incidents involved just one bus being stoned. The incidents did not involve a wide range of residents. It seems that the so-called 'youth' were responsible, although there does not appear to be any court or other documentary evidence enabling us to more precisely characterise the participants. Nor was there sustained mobilisation over particular issues. Only in the schools was there any sign of this developing, with students demanding an SRC, the abolition of corporal punishment, and the improvement of the library [15]. Even student protests seem to have been piecemeal and limited.

Underlying these incidents was a process of 'youth' mobilisation. In the early 1980s, KRO had never developed or relied on a mass youth base. According to one activist, 'the youth was very much inactive during campaigns in the community'. In May 1985 KRO records noted of youth organisation that 'there are potentials but lack of organisation is having a role of frustration and confusion' [sic] [16]. During 1985 the youth became increasingly active, and ironically this was in part the result of activities organised by the Kagiso Council. 1985 was International Youth Year, and in Kagiso the Council sought to appropriate the occasion by organising their own youth activities (which initially overshadowed the weak fare offered by KRO). These youths - or to be more precise, students - grew increasingly discontented with the Council, however. When disappointing examination results became known, many rioted, many later got involved in the Youth Congresses. [17]

The identity of the 'youth' remains conceptually as well as empirically unclear. At the time the label was widely used to classify people involved in violent protests (regardless of age) and were not involved in formal or disciplined organisation (in polemical contrast to the 'workers'). Clearly most people engaged in township riots were young, and in fact younger and younger residents became increasingly dominant in such incidents. But it remains very unclear when and where the 'youth' were boycotting students, school dropouts, young workers, or unemployed residents (of varying ages), yet alone what kinds of informal social organisation characterised them. This topic is currently being addressed in a number of other research projects [18], and I regret that I cannot provide clarification of the situation in Kagiso.

KRO dd not respond to the escalation of violence at all decisively. At the time the organisation was becoming increasingly divided over the direction it should take. Some KRO leaders argued that the priority should be mobilising people, taking up national issues in the belief that involvement in national campaigns would lead to local mobilisaton and organisation. Other activists in KRO argued that the priority should be deepening organisation, establishing local committees (possibly at the level of the street) and thus providing the structures for increasing popular participation. It was a mistake, they suggested, to confuse mobilisation

wth organisation, particularly where slightly different constituencies were involved. Some members of the former group accepted in principle the need to deepen organisation, but not in practice. Inevitably, perhaps, the strategic arguments became bound up with personal disputes. The established leadership of KRO increasingly began to caucus without their critics. This division sapped KRO's ability to constructively direct the growing militany of the so-called 'youth', and paved the way for the calling of consumer boycotts. [19]

The Consumer Boycotts - Late 1985

In December 1985 Kagiso experienced its first major political campaign of the mid 1980s, with a consumer boyccott. The boycott was itself a major act of defiance, but more importantly, it set in motion a train of developments which led to the emergence of a radical and defiant political community in Kagiso.

The declaration of a consumer boycott resulted from two, related influences. The first was the regional dimension, with the growth of the UDF on the West Rand, and the declaration of consumer boycotts as a regional political initiative. The second was the local dimension, with the militancy of the 'youth' generating pressures for a more concerted organisational response by the older activists. These two influences were linked through particular individuals. In general, the activists with good regional links were those with some authority among the 'youth'.

The UDF had not, during 1983-84, been particularly strong or active in the Transvaal. During this time the UDF had concentrated on its campaigns against the Koornhof Bills and the Tricameral Parliament, culminating in its campaigns against elections to the Houses of Representatives and Delegates in August 1984. These campaings, of course, were concentrated in 'coloured' and indian areas, most of which were in the Cape and Natal respectively. The Million Signatures Campaign was not a success in the Transvaal. The UDF was characterised by what has been called 'roadshow-style mobilisation' [20]. During 1984-1984 the UDF largely neglected those issues which were at the centre of township politics in the 'black' townships of the P.W.V.. A planned national conference of civic organisations was repeatedly postponed, and the UDF head office, in Johannesburg, was taken by surprise by the Vaal Uprising!

During late 1984, and particularly 1985, however, the UDF presence and strength in P.W.V. townships increased rapidly. Civic organisations which had previously stood at a distance from the UDF, most obviously the Soweto Civic Association, affiliated. New affiliates sprung up in diverse townships. Important events (starting with the November 1984 regional stay-away) and campaigns were organised by key UDF affiliates in conjunction with other organisations. These developments were reflected in the UDF's theme for 1985: 'From Protest to Challenge, Mobilisation to Organisation', and the broadening base for the Transvaal UDF was reflected in the new Regional Executive Committee elected at the Transvaal AGM in March.

The main reason for the increasing strength of the UDF was simply the widespread mobilisation, protest, and local organisational development in individual townships from mid 1984. In the P.W.V., this fed into identification with and support for the UDF. However, some regional leaders called for a broadening and escalation of protests and campaigns,

at a faster rate than the developing organisational capacity of local-level structures. A key tactic which such regional leaders sought to deploy was the consumer boycott.

The tactic of the consumer boycott had its recent origins in the early 1980s in product- or firm-specific boycotts in support of striking workers. In mid 1985 a new form of consumer boycott was developed in the Eastern Cape: blanket boycotts of businesses owned by whites and black 'collaborators'. Whereas the previous boycotts had generally been organised around workplace issues, the 1985 boycotts were organised around an ambiguous combination of long-term and national political issues, on the one hand, and local and immediate (generally non-workplace) issues on the other. Boycott organisers were often motivated by an exaggerated belief in the national political efficacy of boycotts. [21]

Outside of the Eastern Cape there was often a serious lack of organisational planning and preparation for the boycotts, and the boycotts therefore gave rise to a number of grave political problems. In both Johannesburg and Pretoria, consumer boycotts called in August 1985 were primarily organised at the local level by the so-called 'youth' - meaning those younger township residents who 'supervised' the boycott at bus and taxi ranks and in the township's streets, enforcing compliance. The term 'comtsotsi' seems to have come into use at about this time. The press tended to exaggerate the frequency of forced oil-drinking and grocery confiscation, but there were without doubt too many such incidents.

Underlying both the enthusiasm for consumer boycotts and the organisational problems was the militancy of the so-called 'youth'. All over the country large numbers of young residents were drawn into direct action against the state, but without apparent organisational discipline or ideological coherence. In Kagiso, KRO had a 'youth department' which served as a youth congress until the Munsieville and Kagiso Youth Congresses (MuYCO and KaYCO) were independently established in late 1985. In late 1985 KaYCO allegedly had about seven hundred signed-up members, and MuYCO about three hundred. But the structures of the Youth Department and Youth Congresses only provided for minimal organisational disipline, and many 'youths' were not even nominal members of these structures. [22]

In Kagiso, the call for a consumer boycott was first made in August 1985. It seems that this call fell flat, and the boycott never really took off. As a KRO leader later admitted, 'we shouldn't have tried to do it; it was the wrong way to do it' [23]. In December a new consumer boycott, from 9 to 31 December, was announced at a series of public meetings. [24]

The consumer boycott in Kagiso and Munsieville was clearly part of a regional campaign. The consumer boyott tactic 'was spreading like a prairie fire' (as one activist put it) [25]. The Witwatersrand and Pretoria consumer boycotts were to begin again around 8 December. A leading KRO activist, Sister Bernard Ncube, had herself spoken at the funeral of victims of the Mamelodi Massacre, where she called on mothers to support boycotts: 'The consumer boycott is the only weapon with which to fight evil structures that take people's lives.' [26]

A Krugersdorp Consumer Boycott Committee (KCBC) was formed. This comprised about forty people from KRO, the Women's Organisation (KWO), the African Chamber of Commerce (Kafcoc), the youth congresses, and even AZAPO and AZANYU. The KCBC was concerned with 'publicity, education, and organising house-to-house calls to explain to people what the consumer boycott was all about'. [27]

There was some opposition to the calling of a consumer boycott even in December. Although the details are disputed, it seems that one group of activists argued that there had been inadequate prior preparation. They claim that they refused to support the call.

> Some of the guys felt it was not yet time to call a consumer boycott. Let us call a meeting and educate the people. They were not anti-boycott as such. It was the approach, the manner of introducing the boycott.

The critics also argued that the boycott should involve concrete and realistic demands, rather than grand national ones [28]. KCBC leaders, however, claim that there was extensive prior organisation, and that the so-called critics had in fact expressed support [29]. I remain unconvined, however. Whether or not there was prior criticism, the boycott did lead to major organisational problems. For one thing, if KRO lacked good grass-roots organisation, the KCBC was even more isolated from Kagiso residents. The critics within KRO were excluded from the KCBC. Furthermore (these critics allege) township businessmen, whose cooperation was obviously sought by the KCBC, ended up almost running the boycott. [30]

Coercion and Division: problems with the boycott and organisational responses

In the first week of the consumer boycott there was widespread harassment of people who had briken the boycott by shopping in town. According to KRO secretary and KCBC spokesman, Laurence Ntlokoa:

> ... at the beginning a whole lot of people who did not belong to any particular organisation and who had not called the boycott itself, started intimidating people, confiscating people's parcels and that type of problem. And we have realised this about two days after that things were not going right. [31]

And KRO chairman Joe Makgotlho admitted:

> During the couse of the first week after the commencement of the said boycott, there was harassment, intimidation, and generally unruly behaviour by youths, acting against adults whom they believed to be breaking the boycott. [32]

A number of non-activist township residents gave evidence on this intimidation in court. A 42 year-old nursing assistant from Munsieville was herself the victim of a search. She was asked why she had supported the boycott:

> It is because one day, whilst I was from town, I was in a taxi. Some boys searched my bag, saying they were looking for things that were bought in town and that they did not want us to buy in town... I was afraid of them, because if they find you have bought some items in town, they destroy them. They throw them all over the show.

The boycott had been supported, she said, 'because of fear'. However, she herself had never seen or heard of anyone being forced to eat groceries, and she had never actually seen any purchases being destroyed [33].

Another 42 year-old from Munsieville gave a contrasting picture, however. She asserted that 'we are not afraid of the "comrades"', and denied (despite persistent cross-examination) that there had been any systematic intimidation. She explained popular support for the boycott in terms of widespread hostility to Krugersdorp's white residents. A possible explanation of this witness's dismissal of intimidation is that it only occurred during the first week of the boycott. Later, and particularly with escalating repression, there emerged alternative reasons for enthusiastically supporting the boycott. [34]

There were also reports of intimidation in the press. On 13 December the Star quoted another 'Kagiso resident':

> Youths as young as fourteen stop taxis and private cars coming from town. They destroy groceries found in the vehicles and in some cases assault those who refuse to hand over their goods. Where in the world have you seen youths as young as twelve making decisions? Can one expect any direction from such youths? [35]

As this last quotes illustrates, the brutal enforcement of compliance with the boycott was politically divisive. Such a situation was not confined to Kagiso. In Alexandra, for example, the over-zealous enforcement of consumer boycotts was one of the grievances which residents increasingly voiced during April and May 1986.

KRO/KCBC leaders expressed unhappiness with the intimidation in the first week. According to Ntlokoa, they had to do something 'because it was a problem for us as well [as for the victims] because it was not our idea of a consumer boycott' [36]. One KRO committee member (Bongani Dlamini) saw youths searching through a woman's parcels, and intervened. The woman said she had not known about the boycott as she was not from Kagiso. According to Dlamini:

> Then I told the youths, I said to them, come, this is not the way to operate. Leave her, let her have her things, because you should teach people the reason of not buying in town, rather than destroying the things they have already purchased. [37]

The boycott organisers called a meeting with the youth congresses. According to Ntlokoa, the meeting 'really gave this problem a brainstorm and we realised that the problem here was really caused by criminal elements who were trying to take advantage of the situation by confiscating people's goods' [38].

KRO decided to run a 'crime-prevention' campaign. Initially this was aimed at people violently enforcing the boycott, 'to give these people manners' [39]. The KCBC stated that violence against boycott-breakers would not be tolerated, and disassociated itself from

> ... hooliganism and criminal behaviour perpetrated by people claiming to be our members enforcing and monitoring the boycott ... If unruly elements do not stop their irresponsible actions, they shall be dealt with thoroughly.
>
> On Friday evening we received information that some hooligans were now using the name of the committee for their own ends. We apprehended the people responsible and reeducated them about the need for an orderly and not a violent consumer boycott. On

> Saturday we again received information that some criminal elements had hijacked taxis. The group was apprehended and owners of the taxis were called to identify them. They apologised and were also reeducated. We warn that if unruly elements do not stop their irresponsible actions, they shall be dealt with thoroughly. [40]

According to a KCBC statement, progressive vigilante groups had been set up 'to root out criminal elements who intimidate and rob motorists, shebeen owners and taxi-drivers in the name of the struggle', and such 'criminals' had already been punished and lectured, and cash and goods recovered. [41]

In their public statements the KCBC attributed the violence to 'hooligans', 'criminal elements' outside of the progressive organisations. In practice the distinction between members and non-members, and between members and 'hooligans' was never so clear. The disciplining applied to members and non-members. Only in so far as the violence was not intended by the KCBC leaders, were all the so-called hooligans acting outside of the township organisations. In interviews, a KCBC leader said that there had been a lack of clarity about the aims of the boycott [42]. This allowed militant residents the opportunity to brutally enforce the boycott and at the same time genuinely believe that they were doing so in the name of the struggle.

A second strand to the crime-prevention campaign was raids on shebeens and the confiscation of dangerous weapons. KRO and youth congress members

> would go into shebeens in particular, because that seemed to be the main problem area, and would confront whoever was in the house and explain to them that knives were dangerous weapons and that anybody who had come there, had come to enjoy themselves, and they must put knives on the table, and usually there would be an education as to why it is not necessary for people to kill each other, stab each other. And people would volunteer to put those knives on the table. [43]

The police later found a large collection of these knives in a raid on the Catholic convent in Kagiso.

The anti-crime campaign was widely seen to be a big success in terms of reducing crime in the township. It would also seem to have been successful in reducing the violent enforcement of the boycott. According to Ntlokoa, the campaign 'eliminated the menace of the so-called comrade tsotsis', and they 'collected hundreds of knives from these imposters' [44]. Another resident recalls that 'it was the first time we recorded an incident-free festive season' [45]. The campaign led to more extensive involvement in popular justice, which I shall discuss below.

What is pertinent to emphasise here is the effect of the crime-prevention campaign on township politics. Inadequate organisation had led to widespread violent enforcement of the consumer boycott, which would have generated massive animosities had it been allowed to continue unchecked. The crime-prevention campaign not only halted the political damage already done, but also constituted an extension of the socially-useful role of the progressive organisations in Kagiso, providing for more sustained and widespread political support and mobilisation, and the forging of an active political community.

Further Boycotts and State Repression

In January the consumer boycott was extended and a bus boycott was called. A variety of reasons for these were given on different occasions, but there seems to be consensus that the reasons were a combination of local-immediate and national issues. Among the latter were the unbanning of COSAS, the lifting of the State of Emergency, and the unbanning of Winnie Mandela. Very specific demands were made of the local bus company, Greyhound Bus Lines (GBL). These included demands that GBL provided free transport for school-children and pensioners on pay-out day, and ploughed back some of its profits ino the community. Two further reasons were widely given for the extension of the boycott to cover GBL: the company had refused to help transport mourners at a political funeral in December, and police and vigilantes had used GBL buses in some of their raids in the townships. [46]

The combination of issues seems to have reflected a recognition that national political slogans were rather divorced from the issues that many residents saw as immediately pressing. A popular boycott required the raising of at least some popular grievances. At the same time, popular support for the boycotts was clearly growing, and coercion played a diminishing role in their continuation [47]. A major factor in this was the escalation of brutal state respression.

In December, ie the first month of the boycott, repression remained relatively limited. Amidst widespread detentions of boycott-related leaders in the region in mid December (including Jabu Ngwenya, chief spokesperson for the Soweto CBC), fourteen KRO and KAYCO members were detained, but these did not include the major leaders. The shooting dead by police of a 34 year-old man who had allegedly been involved in enforcing the boycott, and a few incidents of white vigilantes beating up residents in Krugersdorp and Kagiso served, however, to generate increased support for the boycott of white shops.

Repression escalated rapidly in early 1986. On 15 January a meeting of Tsonga-speakers in Tsakane section was broken up by police. The meeting had been called to discuss Tsonga-language schools, and most of the people in attendance were elderly and conservative. But the meeting was convened by a former councillor, and was to be addressed by KRO leader Dlamini about the consumer and bus boycotts. Such police action radicalised small sections of the more passive and conservative township population.

In an attempt to break the bus boycott, the police and army manned roadblocks at the entrance to Kagiso, and searched taxis and private vehicles:

> They would go through the car with a fine toothbrush to see whether it had any mistake, the lights were working; people were taken off and they checked papers; and this delayed, one taxi would take about twenty to thirty minutes and the next one that comes along the same thing happenned; if it was wrong they just put it on the side and impounded it, and the buses were standing just next to the roadblock; ... people were really stranded ... because they were just stopped there, and they, some ... were actually forced into those buses. The private cars, they were only allowed one driver in a private car, they didn't allow passengers at all. [48]

According to the police, 204 admission of guilt fines were paid during January and February, indicating the scale of the clampdown. [49]

Newspapers corroborated the above account of harassment, and reported that police dispersed 'youths' who were ordering queues at taxi ranks. Several Kagiso leaders were detained, and mass meetings were broken up. Police and SADF used increasing force in their activities. In late January a shop assistant was shot during a police raid on a supermarket. Five other residents were killed during the month. One, a 14 year-old girl, was shot at a students' meeting. KRO leaders had addressed the meeting, and tried to persuade the students to return to school and organise SRCs, rather than just 'lousing'. Thirty heavily-armed police arrived, swore at Sister Bernard and Ntlokoa, fired teargas into the hall and sjambokked students as they escaped through windows. The meeting, the police said, had been illegal. [50]

The escalating brutality of repression led to KRO leaders bringing an urgent court application for an interdict restraining the police and army. The application was launched on 13 February. In his founding affidavit for the application, Makgothlo said that:

> ... members of the Police and the Defence Forces have regularly and consistently been committing and continue to commit acts of violence and harassment towards members of the communities of these townships, and their private and communal property.

The security forces' conduct, he claimed, 'displays a disturbing disregard for law and order' [51]. The police and SADF submitted answering affidavits, claiming that security force operations were entirely warranted by the escalating unrest in Kagiso and Munsieville, and the case went to court. Considerable evidence was brought testifying to police and SADF brutality before the court case was interrupted when the applicants (the KRO leaders) were detained - by the police! The case had to be postponed, and was never resumed and concluded. This curtailment of the case suggests that the police had little confidence that they would be exonerated by the court.

Massive and brutal repression caused outrage in the townships. The evidence in the KRO Trial of residents who had never before been involved in political organisations, testifies to the hostility which resulted from witnessing incidents of police brutality. Residents became more sympathetic to and supportive of protests, especially the consumer and bus boycotts, which were seen as hitting the real perpetrators of violence in the township. As one middle-aged woman said in court (under cross-examination by the police lawyer):

> How do people buy from white shops whilst these white people are mishandling us... In other words, what I mean is, they come into the location, shoot at people, shoot at us with teargas, kill our children, and then still we have to use our own money for them, that is for the whites. [52]

KRO leaders agree that, without the massive state repression, the consumer boycott would probably have been divisive; the repression helped to forge the necessary solidarity [53]. The second factor in forging heightened solidarity was the constructive response of KRO and other township organisations. The crime-prevention campaign - discussed above - was the first activity of this kind. That campaign combined with the intensified

repression by the state, which itself led to hostility and alienation from state structures, to provide the space for the development of extra-state courts in the township. These were to be epitomise the new relationship of township organisations with the broader community, indicating both the strengths and the limits to that relationship.

The Forging of a Political Community: The case of 'people's courts'

The crime-prevention campaign led to further involvement in popular justice. Whilst initially the campaign had been concerned with the specific problem of countering the boycott-enforcement problem, this itself could not be easily distinguished from a broader project of general crime-prevention. Such a project was very clearly socially useful. As Ntlokoa grandly put it, they became involved in 'making the life of the people more bearable, because the problem of criminals was a real problem that affected everybody and people could not walk at night'. [54]

In mid-January a 'Disciplinary Committee' (DC) was set up, initially as a forum for disciplining young people caught in the crime-prevention campaign. The DC was later identified by the police as a 'people's court', although it never applied that term to itself. Their emphasis was on re-education, and corporal punishment was limited (and subject to the approval of parents or other family members). The DC was chaired by KRO executive member Dlamini, and its other members were also young activists in their 20s. [55]

About three weeks after the DC had been set up, Dlamini resigned as chairperson at a meeting with older residents. Numerous residents had been urged the DC to extend its role beyond cases arising out of the crime-prevention campaign, and in particular to mediate in domestic and other petty disputes. Dlamini felt that he was not old enough to preside over such cases. At the meeting older residents volunteered to take over the 'court' - the new chairperson was a 54 year-old - and it became involved in civil and family disputes. [56]

One case dealt with by the court concerned a local builder accused of using too little cement when he built a stoep for a woman.

> ... the stoep was cracking and then that man said [that he] felt like not repairing the stoep, and then the DC asked him, told him, you know, in a manner, look, you are the one who built the stoep. So, now, if it is cracking, it means you did not mix well from the cements and the likes. So, you have to fix it. And then he saw ... that it really is true, because he is the one who was making the stoep.

The DC decided that it was his responsibility [57]. Many cases concerned family rows. Marital disputes were common, as were parent-child disputes. According to one Munsieville resident:

> My mother once took a complaint to [the court] about my younger sister. [Four unarmed comrades] came to the house and called my mother and my younger sister. They then said to my mother, will you please tell us the story you told us before about your daughter, so that she must hear what you were complaining about. The complaint was that my sister had got a child and she is

> neglecting the child. She would go about in the township, leaving the child alone at home. Then [my sister] said yes, what my mother said was correct. And then she said the reason why she was doing this was because the father to that child resides at Kagiso and the father would come and take her along to Kagiso and bring her back late. They said to her, she should see to it that she does not do that again, because if she did that again, they would not come again to talk to her, they would come and discipline her and give her a hiding on her haunches. [58]

Other non-activists gave similar accounts. According to a 42-year-old woman, the court was 'a committee which corrects people of their faults or of their mistakes... It appeared as though it was a good committee which was good for our children' [59]. A former Kagiso Councillor witnessed a court session where an old man was reprimanded for beating his wife, and warned that he would be 'dealt with' if he did it again. [60]

The DC in Kagiso and Munsieville thus developed into a 'people's court' of the type that was common in townships [61]. It was concerned with civil and family disputes, enjoyed considerable popular support, and was presided over by older residents, many of whom came from the churches. The court was popular because it was both practical, in the sense of being functional, and was very loosely accountable (at least in comparison with the state courts). KRO attracted support as a result of its involvement in the courts.

The courts were not without their critics, however. Criticisms focussed on questions of court procedure, and particularly on the prevalence of corporal punishment and overly-summary proceedings. Some of the participants in the courts were allegedly former 'blackjacks' (ie municipal policemen) and former criminals, including even rapists. The courts were sometimes 'overindulgent', and biased in favour of the complainants. [62]

Conclusion: The Fragility of the Political Community

The combination of brutal state repression and constructive initiatives on the part of radical township organisations generated a broad political community. Without very extensve interviewing it is impossible to say quite how broad this community was - an obvious question is whether or how much it extended across the post-1981 extensions to the township. The available evidence does suggest, however, that the community was wiidespread.

The concept of 'community' is widely overused in disussions of township politics. If spatial fetishism is avoided, 'communities' can only exist in terms of the consciousness of their members. Few townships, or even parts of townships, comprise communities in any active sense. Within townships there certainly are particular communities - religious, social, sometimes work-based, and sometimes political - but these are generally limited to particular spheres of activity, involving different (but overlapping) fractions of the townships' populations.

The forging of active political communities (or mass movements) was a key feature of politics in many townships in the early 1980s. The issues of rents, township development, education, and local government - ie issues that had a real local importance - were the key buildng blocks of these political communities. Primarily national political concerns, whilst

undoubtedly very important to township residents, did not serve as mobilising factors in the construction of local political communities.

The experience of Kagiso in late 1985 shows how a concern wth national political campaigns can, in particular circumstances, be very damaging to the construction of a political community. A major goal of the national and regional consumer boycotts was to mobilise township residents, but the particular manner in which boycotts were sometimes enforced (as in Kagiso) had an initially counter-productve effect. It is possible that a coercively-enforced consumer boycott could achieve other goals (pressurising white traders, for example), but even this is doubtful as it is unlikely that boycotts could be maintained for suffiently long without consderable legitimacy.

A political community was forged in Kagiso in spite of the initial manner of organising the boycott. State repression generated a certain amount of solidarity in the township, and (more specifically) intense hostility to the essentially white 'system', particularly the police but also white traders in Krugersdorp. Local repression thus made an intially non-local and divisive boycott campaign into a locally important campaign of protest and defiance. The involvement of radical township organisations in routine township dispute settlement, although not unproblematic, helped to reinforce the radical orientation of the emergent political community [63]. The apparently widespread popular enthusiasm for the consumer and bus boycotts, and for KRO generally, in early 1986 reflected this radical political community.

The reproducton of political communities - perhaps more so than other types of community - remains contingent on the surrounding conditions. There is nothing immutable about such communities. In Kagiso, brutal repression was the key factor in forging the community, and the very success of KRO in restraining the police (as a result of the publicity, as no formal court order was ever granted) undermined the continued importance of this factor. Lacking solid organisational structures, the combination of the detention of leaders (which reduced the possibility of new initiatives), township development, and a the continued threat of repression led to popular demobilisation. The boycotts dragged on with little fresh impetus. The bus service was finally withdrawn from Kagiso, and the consumer boycott petered out. With the repression of the 'peoples' courts' and whatever organisational discipline there had been, and the diminishing immediate importance of political adversaries, many of the comrades of 1985-86 became the tsotsis of the late 1980s.

The failure of KRO to resolve (or even debate) the organisational disputes of 1985 can now be seen as a key failure [64]. Former KRO activists acknowledge at least some of the problems of 1985-1986. The leading activist at the time now recognises that politics was too leader-oriented and too issue-oriented even during 1985-1986. Issues and campaigns were identified with particular leaders: their detention therefore led to organisational paralysis [65]. The political community of early 1986 was fragile, and, we can see with the benefit of hindsight, short-lived.

Footnotes

Note that my interviews have been numbered chronologically; I have not used and referenced all my interviews in this paper.

1. See, for example, SAP Bragadier (now General) Herman Stadler's evidence in trials such as State_vs_Mayekiso_and_others, State_vs_Zwane and_others.
2. Official figures from Hansard; such official estimates generally understated the population.
3. Since 1986 Kagiso has been visibly transformed with massive housing schemes.
4. Interview with two former KRO activists, Kagiso, 30 December 1989 (henceforth interview 12).
5. Ibid.
6. Interview with former KRO senior official, Johannesburg, 8 November 1989 (henceforth interview 8).
7. Minutes of KRO Committee meeting, 3 March 1985 (Krugersdorp_Residents Organisation_and_four_others_versus_the_Minister_of_Law_and_Order and_two_others [henceforth KRO_Trial], Respondents' documents [henceforth RD] pp 66-67).
8. Minutes of IYCC workshop, 25 May 1985 (KRO_Trial, Respondents' documents pp 66-67. Also interview wth former KRO/KCRC leader, Kagiso, 19 December 1989 (henceforth interview 10).
9. 'An analysis of the Krugersdorp Residents Organsation made at a committee meeting held on the 8 May 1985' (hand-written document, KRO_Trial, RD pp 40.1-40.3).
10. 'Analysis of KRO' (undated hand-written document, KRO_Trial, RD pp 81-84).
11. Interview with three former KRO activists, Kagiso, 2 January 1990 (henceforth interview 13); also interview 10, City_Press 18 Nov 1984; Rand_Daily_Mail 24 Jan 1985.
12. KRO_Trial, RD pp 71-75, AD pp 60.1-60.2; Sowetan, 9,18 and 19 April 1985; Star, 17 and 18 April, 1985. It is probable that this was (for once) a genuine case of computer error.
13. KRO_Trial, evidence of Dlamini, p 1,020 ff; Star, 2 July 1985; evidence etc in State_vs_Moname_and_others.
14. S.A.P., 'Skedule van onlusteroopvalle sedert Junie 1985', KRO_Trial, RD pp 104-117; ; also Star, 17 September, 7 October 1985.
15. Star, 17 September 1985.
16. KRO_Trial, RD pp 76-7.
17. Interview 13.
18. Charles Carter's doctoral research on youth politics in Alexandra promises to clarify our understanding. I am involved in researching this issue in some East Rand townships. Lizo Ngcokota's UCT Honours dissertation (1989) provides some ideas on youth cultures in Guguletu.
19. Interview 12.
20. The phrase is Jo-Anne Collinge's, in 'The United Demoratic Front', in South_African_Review_3 (1986), p 257.
21. On consumer boycotts, see: Obery and Jochelson, 'Consumer Boycotts', in Work_in_Progress no 39 (October 1985), pp 9-30; White, 'Towards a Assesment of the Strategic Value of the Consumer Boycotts', South_African_Labour_Bulletin vol 11 no 5 (May 1986); Seekings, 'Workers and the Politics of Consumer Boycotts', South African_Labour_Bulletin vol 11 no 6 (June/July 1986). An outline of many boycotts is provided in Political_Conflict_in_South Africa (Durban: Indicator Project, 1988).
22. Ntlokoa, evidence in KRO_Trial, pp 270-85; also interviews with former KRO/KCRC leader, Johannesburg, 8 November 1989 (henceforth

interview 7) and members of MuYCO and KRO, Johannesburg, January 1990 (henceforth interview 14). There is some confusion as to when the Youth Congresses were formed, but it seems likely that MuYCO was formed first, in December 1985, and KaYCO later, possibly in early 1986 - interview 14, and interview with former Kagiso activst, Johannesburg (henceforth interview 6).

23. Interviews 7 and 14. There is some confusion about this August boycott. One generally reliable interviewee [intervew 13] thought that it had lasted for a couple of weeks, with some coercion, but I think he is confusing this with the second boycott (in December).
24. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence pp 528 and ???; Dlamini evidence, pp 988-1,002; interiew 7.
25. Interview 13. Laurence Ntlokoa, the primary boycott leader, denied this in court - evidence to KRO_Trial, pp 339-41.
26. Star, 4 Dec 1985.
27. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence p 198.
28. Interview 13.
29. Interviews 6, 7.
30. Interview 13.
31. KRO_Trial, evidence, pp 48-9.
32. KRO_Trial, affidavit.
33. KRO_Trial, evidence of Francina Molane, pp 1,473-6.
34. KRO_Trial, evidence of Elizabeth Molefe, pp 1,742, 1,776. See below also.
35. Star, 13 Dec 1985. See also Star, 11 Dec 1985; Business_Day, 12 Dec 1985.
36. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, p 197. See also the KCBC denials that intimidation had been planned: Star, 9 Jan 1986: KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, pp 186-9; interview 7.
37. KRO_Trial, Dlamini evidence, pp 974-5.
38. KRO_Trial, evidence, pp 48-9, 176-8.
39. Interview 7.
40. Star, 18 Dec 1985.
41. Business_Day, 18 Dec 1985.
42. Interview 7.
43. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, p 136; also see Tsholetsane evidence, p 1,588.
44. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, p 53ff; also see Dlamini evidence, pp 969-987.
45. Interview 13.
46. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, pp 61-2, 222-3, 762ff; Star, 7 Jan 1986; Sowetan, 14 Jan 1986.
47. This is attested to even by critics of the intitial boycott.
48. KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, p 95; also see Dhlamini evidence, pp 1,281-9.
49. KRO_Trial, evidence, pp 680-1; but see Makgothlo's affidavit where he says that the Krugersdorp City Council stopped the prosecutions after being approached by the local Taxi Association,.
50. Star, 16 Jan, 21 Jan; Sowetan, 5 Feb 1986 (all cited in SAIRR/1986, p 203; Star, 4 Feb 1986; KRO_Trial, Ntlokoa evidence, pp 75-90; Dlamini evidence, pp 862, 1,041-89; Ntlokoa and Dlamini affidavits; evidence and affidavit of Phyllis Xhali. The police said they had to be heavily-armed because of the attack on police on a mine in Bekkersdal the previous week, when two white policemen from Krugersdorp had been killed. It seems likely that the death of those two policemen was a major factor in the brutality with which Kagiso and Munsieville were subsequently policed. The police denied swearing at Sister Bernard.
51. KRO_Trial, Makgothlo's founding affidavit, pp 17,35.

52. KBO_Trial, evidence of Elizabeth Molefe, pp 1,742, 1,776.
53. Interview 7.
54. KBO_Trial, evidence of Ntlokoa.
55. KBO_Trial, Dlamini evidence, pp 927ff.
56. KBO_Trial, Dlamini evidence, pp 940-53; Ntlokoa evidence, pp 143-157. Other leaders of the new DC were also elderly: see ages of the accused in State_vs_Ncube_and_13_others, case number 41/3199/87, in the Magistrate's Court for the Regional Division of the Southern Transvaal, held at Johannesburg.
57. KBO_Trial, Dlamini evidence, pp 948-9.
58. KBO_Trial, Edwin Motsowaye evidence, pp 1,809-14.
59. KBO_Trial, Elizabeth Molefe evidence, pp 1,742-52.
60. KBO_Trial, Mabasa evidence, pp 1,915-17.
61. See Seekings, 'People's Courts and Popular Politics', in South_African Review_5 (1989).6
62. Interviews 6, 12, 13.
63. See Seekings 'People's Courts' for a general discussion.
64. Interview 13.
65. Interview 10.