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Master's Research Report 2017

CHINA AND JAPAN IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF FOCAC AND TICAD

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Under the Supervision of
Prof Gilbert Khadiagala

Research Report Submitted towards the Award of Master of Arts Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Declaration

I, Lennon Monyae, declare that this research report is my own unaided work except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise. This research report is submitted towards the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations by coursework and research report at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other university.

…….

Lennon Monyae

Signed at …… On the ……..
Day of …… 20…..

Abstract

This dissertation investigates FOCAC and TICAD contributions towards development on the African continent. The research explains the architecture of the latter conference diplomacy institutions. Japan and China are argued to be competing through evidence from the different fields that give foreign assistance to. Jospeh Nye's soft power as theoretical framework will guide the research's understanding of Chinese and Japanese engagements in African development.

The research found that FOCAC outweighed TICAD in financial contributions however TICAD through JICA had more grassroots level contributions. China was seen to be focused on bilateral relations aimed at supporting state-led companies in big infrastructure development. Japan is argued to be more engaging with external actors while supporting African development and in addition, showed more support for the African Union's policies. China has 'win-win' and Japan has 'partnership' both in line with African Pan -African ideals.

Africans are lacking policy and guidelines in dealing with foreign partners and argued to organise themselves and respond to Japanese and Chinese interests collectively. Agenda 2063 that mentions external partners as a source of funding for development is not enough to use a policy. African development policies are seen to have failed previously due to unfulfilled promises from external partners. The research argues that African people should take FOCAC and TICAD as learning spaces and take a leadership role in their own development.

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Abbreviations

ACIRC	**African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises**
AfDB	**African Development Bank**
AFF-SAP	**African Alternative Framework to SAP for Socio- Economic Recovery and Transformation**
ANC	**African National Congress**
APRM	**African Peer Review Mechanism**
AU	**African Union**
AUC	**African Union Commission**
CADFund	**China-Africa Development Fund**
CCP	**Chinese Communist Party**
CCTV	**China Central Television**
CEN-SAD	**Community of Sahel-Saharan States**
CNOOC	**China National Offshore Oil Corporation**
CNPC	**China National Petroleum Corporation**
COMESA	**Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa**
DAC	**Development Assistance Committee**
DRC	**Democratic Republic of the Congo**
EAC	**East African Community**
ECA	**Economic Commission for Africa**
ECCAS	**Economic Community of Central African States**
ECOWAS	**Economic Community of West African States**
EU	**European Union**
EXIM Bank	**Export-Import Bank of China**
FDI	**Foreign Direct Investment**
FOCAC	**Forum on China–Africa Cooperation**
G8	**Group of Eight**

HIPC	**Heavily Indebted Poor Countries**
HIV	**Human Immunodeficiency Virus**
IAFS	**India–Africa Forum Summit**
ICBC	**Industrial and Commercial Bank of China**
IGAD	**Intergovernmental Authority on Development**
IMF	**International Monetary Fund**
JBIC	**Japan Bank for International Cooperation**
JET	**Japan Exchange and Teaching**
JICA	**Japan International Corporation Agency**
JSDF	**Japan Self-Defence Forces**
LPA	**Lagos Plan of Action**
MDG	**Millennium Development Goals**
MITI	**Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan**
MNC	**Multinational Corporation**
MoFA	**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan**
NEPAD	**New Partnership for Africa's Development**
NGO	**Non-Governmental Organization**
OAU	**Organisation of African Unity**
ODA	**Official Development Assistance**
OECD	**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**
OSBP	**One Stop Border Post**
PLA	**Post Lagos Plan of Action**
RECs	**Regional Economic Commission**
SADC	**Southern African Development Community**
SAPs	**Structural Adjustment Programs**
SASAC	**State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council**
SDG	**Sustainable Development Goals**

TB	**Tuberculosis**
TICAD	**Tokyo International Conference on African Development**
UN	**United Nations**
UNDP	**United Nations Development Programme**
UNECA	**United Nations Economic Commission for Africa**
UNESCO	**United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization**
UNMISS	**United Nations Mission in South Sudan**
UNOSAA	**United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa**
UNPAAERD	**United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development**
UNSC	**United Nations Security Council**
USA	**United States of America**
WHO	**World Health Organization**
WTO	**World Trade Organization**

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

The Organisation of African Union (OAU) metamorphosed into the African Union (AU) on the 9th of July 2002, in Durban, South Africa after the adoption of Constitutive Act of African Union[1]. After thirty-nine years of existence with the mandate to end colonialism and midwifing African unity, the organisation needed rejuvenation to spearhead economic development. The organisation established the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) institution as tool for economic rejuvenation after the lost decades of 1980s and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990s[2]. Mazrui argues that the AU's strategy was of re-engagement of African economies with its former colonial powers – divorced from the O.A.U's approach of African political disengagement from its colonial powers[3].

The 21st century has seen remarkable shifts in a political and economic landscape that previously shaped the global world order post -1945. In East Asia, China's global ascendance against the backdrop of an industrialised Japan has resulted in shifts in African political and economic affairs. The 'Look East Policy' policy gained currency in developing the world including Africa as commodity prices surged at the turn of the century.

Japan in 1993 pioneered TICAD as a platform for high-level policy dialogue during the critical years of international aid fatigue[4]. Japan's aim was to refocus international attention back to African development. Around the turn of the century, the renowned British magazine, *The Economist* captured Western perceptions of Africa in 2000 through the '*Hopeless Africa*' story. African contestant difficulties largely due to two decades of unending civil wars, corruption and poor governance on the continent prompted this headline[5].

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[1] OAU, Constitutive Act of African Union, Addis Abba, July 2001.
[2] Lensink, Robert (1996). Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (1st ed.). Longman. ISBN 9780582248861.
[3] Mazrui , A. 2013. Changing The Guard The O.A.U To The AU, Fifty Years Of Change .State University at Binghamton, New York.,U.S A.
[4] Tembo, Fletcher (2008) "Where next for TICAD: Building lasting partnerships", London: Overseas Development Institute
[5] The Economist (2000). Hopeless Africa , http://wwweconomist.com/node/333429, May 11

Japan in 1993 launched the TICAD framework as a vehicle of re-engaging the African States against the background of an international community that had turned its back on African issues. China, on the other hand, was carefully modifying its engagements with African states. The launch of FOCAC as conference diplomacy framework focusing on Africa socio-economic development in 2000 is viewed as an emulation of Japan's TICAD framework.

TICAD and FOCAC present new modalities in which developmental is given. As the landscape of aid provision significantly evolves new practices that diverge from the traditionally accepted norms continue to emerge. Traditionally, Western governments and multilateral organisations have dominated aid provision. It is this dominance that has been challenged by the increased voice and leadership of new actors especially the ones from the global South.

These new actors have brought about new systems which question the relevance of overseas development model. Japan's TICAD and China's FOCAC present the ideal examples that illustrate the above-mentioned arguments. Japan currently provides its assistance within the framework of traditional aid givers such as the United States and the European Union. Japan joined the OECD and played a significant role in strengthening the best practices models of aid provision. On the other hand, China has re-emerged as a significant player that disregards the existing norms and values of aid provision.

The success of "one donor – multiple countries" forums is on the rise on the African continent. Other than China and Japan that hold grant forums with massive media exposure India (Africa- India Forum Summit), South Korea (Africa –Korea Forum), Turkey (Africa-Turkey Cooperation Summit), European states (Joint Africa-EU Strategy) and Arab states (Africa-Arab Forum) are the current working partnerships that the AU recognises.

In the continent's developmental blueprint, Agenda 2063 it reads that, "Africa's strategic partners have made several financial pledges and technical assistance related support packages in trade and investment, industrialization, regional integration, social and sustainable development and peace and security to the AU, RECs and member countries that are yet to be fully leveraged"[6]. Tangible results are already noticeable with both TICAD and FOCAC meeting their pledges and in most cases delivering beyond the agreed targets.

[6] Africa Union Commission , Agenda 2063 : The Africa We Want , http://agenda2063.au.int/.

This dissertation will look at how TICAD and FOCAC function, what they have delivered and areas where they should focus. Other than comparing the FOCAC and TICAD framework, the dissertation will analyse how far the platforms have contributed to African development.

This research focuses only on TICAD and FOCAC as development partners to the African Union. The paper through existing literature aims to illustrate how the two forums function and how they are built up. Through revisiting previous forums, the paper gives an assessment of what both Japan and China have been doing in promoting African development. It is important that note that the research employs a comparative study outlook. It does not make an outright judgement of who is a better partner for African. The paper will aim at finding common positions that FOCAC and TICAD have that can advance the African agenda of a peaceful and developed continent. Out of Agenda 2063, six major thematic areas stand out, these are (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture/ Blue Economy and Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth and Woman).

Background

China and Japan are East Asia's powerhouses with massive interests on the African continent. The Chinese economic catch-up and subsequent surpassing of Japan have resulted in Beijing and Tokyo having competing interests on the continent. These interests are not limited to Africa's vast natural resources but influence in global multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Bank. A good example is a Chinese return to the UN that would not have been possible if it wasn't for the support of the African block[7]. Japan currently is on the forefront of lobbying African states for a possible seat on the UN Security Council. One can, therefore, argue that Africa is a contested space for both East Asia's powerhouses. The AU as the chief representative body of Africa has increased development, combatting poverty and corruption, and ending of Africa's many conflicts high on its agenda.

[7] Adekeye Adebajo (2010) 'The Curse of Berlin, Africa After the Cold War', University of KwaZulu -Natal Press ,pp164.

Africa's economic woes of the 1980s commonly known as 'Africa's lost economic decade' also witnessed endless conflicts[8]. Aid fatigue settled in the 1990s as the Cold War ended. The USA reduced its funding towards aid while Europe resolved to delegate its economic responsibilities to the disciplinary hand of the IMF and World Bank[9]. Against the backdrop of an international community increasingly losing hope in Africa, Japan revamped its Africa policy in 1993 through the launching of the TICAD that Japan conducts a dialogue with collective African leaders on its engagement on the continent.

The African continent was largely ignored by international actors as result of poor implementation of SAPS, aid fatigue and endless civil wars. The creation of TICAD by the government of Japan, therefore, aimed to promote Africa's development, peace and security, through the strengthening of relations between African states through multilateral cooperation and partnership[10]. Japan, therefore, should be credited for bringing African development, peace and security on global platforms after the end of the Cold War. Aid fatigue had resulted in global players turning a blind eye to African issues. From its humble beginning in 1993, TICAD has proved to be a noteworthy platform for improving Japanese –African relations. Today TICAD like setups have mushroomed with all major global economic and political leaders having their own arrangements. TICAD is organised in conjunction with the UN, UNDP, the World Bank and the AU.

The turn of the century was marked by unprecedented economic growth on the African continent. Rapid increases in commodity prices and silencing of guns in African conflicted regions gave rise to the 'Africa Rising' phenomenon. Coincidentally the Chinese economy was leading globally resulting in China holding a more elevated position in global political and economic affairs. The Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) as an institutionalised platform to further Sino-Africa relations provided a platform for the transformation of Sino-Africa relations. Since its inception in 2001, the FOCAC framework has progressed into a notable multilateral institution that shapes Sino-Africa relations beyond states to states level.

[8] African Foreign Policies: Power and Process (co-edited with Terrence Lyons). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, http://www.rienner.com/title/African_Foreign_Policies_Power_and_Process

[9] Ward Warmerdam with Arjan de Haan (2011) The Roles of Aid in Politics: Putting China in Perspective. International Institute of Social Sciences.

[10] Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2016) , Tokyo International Conference of African Development, http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/partnerships/ticad.shtml.

FOCAC and TICAD are exceptional cases because, since their inception, both platforms have significantly evolved to suit African demands. The call for fair trade has resulted in both platforms prioritising trade on the agenda instead of traditional aid provision. The functioning of TICAD and FOCAC are almost similar however Japan and China have different methodologies as far a developmental aid is concerned. Japan is associated with the developed world and abides by OECD standards, while on the other hand, China does not abide the OECD regulations.

Both China and Japan have to be credited for their efforts in redirecting international attention to African development. Having a comparative study of Japanese and Chinese contributions to African development through FOCAC and TICAD is therefore worthwhile in building the International Relations discipline understanding of Chinese and Japanese relations with Africa.

Research Significance

The 21st century has seen the resurgence of non-Western powers in global affairs particularly with the rise of China. Due to East Asian powers (China/Japan) have increased role in international affairs, African Affairs have received unprecedented attention in both China and Japan respective foreign policies. This research is part and parcel of knowledge accumulation in an effort of understanding Chinese and Japanese contributions to African development. The Mo Ibrahim Index[11] of African Governance currently indicates that there has been progressing in governance while the UNECA[12] and UNDP[13] have evidence of increased rule of law, political freedom and steady economic growth. Through the assessments of FOCAC and TICAD frameworks, the research aims to serve as a balance sheet on Chinese and Japanese contributions to African development. Moreover, African leaders and policy makers need to be well informed about Chinese and Japanese interests. This study intends to contribute in International Relations academic work produced by Africans in Asia-African scholarship.

[11] See Mo Ibrahim Foundation, http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/ (accessed on 10/09/2016) .
[12] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2009), *African Governance Report II*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
[13] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013), *African Governance Report III; Elections and the Management of Diversity in Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Main Research Question

How have TICAD and FOCAC contributed to the African Union's development agenda?

Supporting Research Questions

How do TICAD and FOCAC forums function and who are the important players in the respective forums?

What are the distinguishing Chinese and Japanese developmental characteristics in Africa?

Have the FOCAC and TICAD frameworks achieved their planned purpose?

To what extent are FOCAC and TICAD's developmental assistance in line with the AU development agenda?

What are the similarities and differences between TICAD and FOCAC?

What is Africa's contribution to the chairing and planning of FOCAC and TICAD summits?

What are the fields of interests do the FOCAC and TICAD frameworks predominantly focus on?

Methodology

Research methodology is concerned with the process of conducting research. The responsibility rests with the research to choose a suitable approach to the study[14]. This research will be conducted using the comparative study methodology. The research compares what the Japan and China are doing on the African continent in relation to the developmental goals of the AU. Due to the comparative nature of the study, the research will have qualitative analysis.

[14] Brynard , P.A & Hanekom, S.X .2006 . Introduction to research in management fields (2nd Ed) Pretoria : Van Schaik.

Policy outcomes and indicators of development will be utilised to analysing the contributions of FOCAC and TICAD to African development agenda. Data will be collected from institutions that are involved in development in Africa as well as academic papers written about African development. Information from the AU and partner organisations, TICAD and FOCAC documents and other global institutions will be paramount to, therefore, the research will widely use data from mentioned sources. The following organisation's research work and data collection form part of the most used data in this study: NEPAD, The Secretariat of the China Follow-up Committee on the Forum, on China- Africa Cooperation, JICA and MoFA amongst other developmental institutions.

Comparing FOCAC and TICAD contributions to the AU's development agenda will not be an easy task. The first task will be identifying what the continent's development agenda entails. TICAD and FOCAC use different methodologies in offering development assistance; Japan belongs to the OECD which has a codified means of providing developmental assistance while on the other hand, China uses different methods that do not necessarily meet OECD standards. The Chinese, on the other hand, have developed a policy of non-interference in domestic matters. This is, of course, a matter that will not be focused on in this paper. The different methodological starting points as far as Japanese and Chinese engagements are important to highlight before any analysis of FOCAC and TICAD can happen.

Comparative studies are particularly helpful when one seeks to understand of mutual influences. In this case, Japan and China are competing for East Asian powers on the African continent. Their engagements with African states ought to be analysed for the purposes of having a better understanding of Japanese and Chinese foreign policies. The methodology fits my study in that both China and Japan are two powerful Asian states in pursuit of influence on the African continent. Their rivalry makes this case interesting in that one can clearly see what China and Japan are both doing on the continent after going through this study.

Six thematic areas crucial to African development can be summed as (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture/ Blue Economy and Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth and Woman) will be used to analyse Japanese and Chinese contribution to African

development. It is important that these themes are present in the AU's Agenda 2063.In addition, they feature in NEPAD work.

TICAD started in 1993 thus giving it an 8-year head start to FOCAC that commenced in 2001. When analysing both Japan and China involvement, the study will analyse broadly on the previous summits and their outcomes in relation to the thematic areas paramount to African development. This means analysis of the first TICAD and FOCAC will be taken, however, due to the broadness of the frameworks functions the paper will primarily look at the most recent outcome documents in the mentioned specific areas.

African scholars and policy makers can make use of this study to fully understand the frameworks themselves as well as the broader trajectory of Chinese and Japanese foreign policy in Africa. As more states seek to have better relations with African states using the AU as their gateway to bilateral relations, Africans need not be bystanders of multilateral platforms such as Africa-EU, Africa-USA, Africa-Japan, Africa-China, Africa-India, Africa-Arab League of States, Africa-South America, Africa-Turkey, and Africa-Korea partnerships. Exploiting these strategic relationships like TICAD and FOCAC will result in better relations that will promote better economic and diplomatic relations.

Journal articles, newspaper articles, agendas and outcomes of TICAD and FOCAC summits will be used in this research. Information from credible think tanks and developmental organisations will be paramount in this research. Journal articles, newspaper articles, meetings agenda's and outcomes, as well as speeches, will be used to extract valuable information in understanding the works of TICAD and FOCAC in African development.

Hypothesis

The FOCAC and TICAD competing frameworks aimed at complementing both Japanese and Chinese foreign policies in African states. Japan and China are competing for East Asian powers using different mechanisms in their foreign policies to gain soft power.

Dissertation Roadmap

The paper will consist of six chapters. The Chapter One serves as an introductory chapter; Chapter Two will identify the AU development agenda as well as elaborate some of the key developmental institutions ideas about development; Chapter Three will focus on TICAD in explaining how the platform is built up and its key achievements since inception; Chapter Four will pay attention to FOCAC while looking at its functions and its preoccupations; Chapter five will serve as comparative chapter in comparing and contrasting FOCAC and TICAD and Chapter Six will discuss the paper's findings and conclusion .

Literature Review

Woods, Kabell, Sagasti & Muwanga argued that there is a silent revolution going on in international development cooperation, with an increasing number of "new" or "emerging" donors quietly offering alternatives to aid- receiving countries[15]. The establishment of FOCAC and TICAD against the backdrop of developmental assistance dominated by Western powers in Africa evidently shows that Asian powers are finding their place in fast changing political and economic African landscape. Research carried out by Stones notes that big donors use aid as a carrot and stick mechanism to sway developing states to support their interests far beyond the United Nations (UN)[16]. On the other hand, Lagerkvist & Johsson (2011) note that the new South-South cooperation, and particularly Asian-African partnerships in various forms, is clearly deepening economic and political relations with African countries, leading to the drawing of geo-economic boundaries and the geopolitical map of Africa. There is no doubt that the re-emergence of China at the turn of the 21st century has enhanced international interests in Africa particularly that of Japan.

Arguments against aid and unbalanced relations between Africa and the western states are not new to International Relations scholarship. Aid has often been thought to be harmful to African development[17].Walter Rodney[18] and Samir Amin[19] are examples of scholars who

[15] Wood, B; Kabell, D; Sagasti, F; Muwanga N(2008), Synthesis Report on the First Phase of the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Copenhagen.
[16] Stone, R. (2010) Buying Influence: Development Aid between the Cold War and the War on Terror. University of Rochester.
[17] Moyo D (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*. The Penguin Group, London.
[18] Walter Rodney (1972), *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. (London: Bogle- L'Ouverture Publications.

provide insightful discussions on unequal development. It is the continued reliance on aid that perpetuates unequal development to some degree. More recently, Dambisa Moyo introduced dead aid concept that diagnosis African stagnant development due to the continued provision of aid. Her thinking framework follows the long-established chain of thought in Dependicia theory which developed after the Prebish-Singer thesis[20]. This argument is well explained by Bubu (1981) who argued that dependence generates a special umbilical cord that ties African economies to the Metropolitan, thereby distorting their traditional economies[21].

There are lot theories in the International Relations discipline that attempt to explain why states provide developmental assistance. The following theoretical discussions have been chosen because they best explain the current debates on Japanese and Chinese engagements with African states. Academic research has shown that reasons behind foreign development assistance differ with a wide range of reasons from pure humanitarian altruism to selfish nationalist interests[22]. Little has been done to understand the phenomenon of developmental aid through organised single donor-multiple recipient platforms like FOCAC, TICAD and IAFS that now increasingly involving trade and business in their agendas.

Marxism and Critical Theory

Lancaster (2008)[23] and Haan (2009)[24] argue that Marxist theories support the thinking framework that places development assistance at the core of preserving capitalist exploitation. Hook (1995) goes as far as calling ODA an instrument of the centre for the purposes of institutionalising the dependency between the centre and the periphery[25]. Japan is implicated in this allegation while on the other hand, China is not a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Schraeder is of the view that ODA maintains

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[19] Samir Amin, *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

[20] Also see Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Beyond borders: Thinking critically about global issues.

[21] Babu, A. M. 1981. African Socialism or Socialist Africa. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

[22] Nuechterlein, DE (1976), 'National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making', British Journal of International Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 246-266.

[23] Lancaster, C (2007), Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

[24] Haan, Ad (2009), How the aid industry works: an introduction to international development, Kumarian Press, Sterling, VA.

[25] Hook, SW (1993), Foreign policy and systematic adaptation: official development assistance strategies of four major donors, 1980-1989.

the North-South division between poor and rich countries so therefore international organisations should be tasked with providing developmental assistance[26].

This thinking framework brings China and Japan as core countries that have interests of exploiting African states. The contributions of TICAD and FOCAC are therefore seen as gimmicks in looting African wealth while mendaciously advancing the development rhetoric. Africa, therefore, remains only as a source of natural resources and market for Japanese and Chinese finished products. In multilateral forums like UN and WTO African states can be viewed as pawns in broader power games between major powers. In sum, this thinking framework places the TICAD and FOCAC frameworks in a zero-sum game where both Japan and China are winners while African states are the biggest losers.

Realism and Neorealism

Realism is anchored by the central idea of state survival in an increasingly anarchical international global system. The maintenance of state power through military power is seen as a prerequisite for subsistence of the state[27]. Mearsheimer a renowned scholar in realist thought supports the superiority of power and security by stating that 'The greater the military advantage one state has over other states[28]. Realists argue that developmental aid should be tied to strategic security.

During the Cold War, most scholars agreed that states provide aid purely out of national security and self-preservation motives. This assumption holds that states in need of aid will be given if they do not offer any significant alliance. Schraeder, McKinlay and Steven Hook are some of the leading researchers supporting this theory. McKinlay concludes that the humanitarian theory, though providing a simple moral relationship between donors and aid, is flawed[29]. Steven Hook argues that foreign aid is given purely out of national interest. In his book, *National Interests and Foreign Aid*, he states that "the fundamental principle of aid giving as 'the price of affluence' has been accepted by nearly all industrialised states, which

[26] Schraeder, PJ, Hook, S.W. and Taylor, B (1998), 'Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows', World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 297-323.
[27] Hollis, M & Smith, S (1990), Explaining and understanding international relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
[28] Mearshimer ,J (2006), The false promise of international institutions, Political Science Department at University of Chicago.
[29] McKinlay, R.D, (1979) *The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970."* Comparative Political Studies 11.4.

have added the fiscal aid institutional components of foreign aid to their diplomatic arsenal"[30].

The neo-realist theory is the most recent theory explaining why states give aid. It is the widely accepted within the International Relations discipline. There is a significant shift from the realist assumption that held national interests as the main reason behind motivations for giving aid. Neo-realist argues that national interests and self-preservation are still crucial however economic interests are the main reason states. This means that donors will give more aid to the countries that have the most to offer them by way of exports, access to raw materials, and industrial competitiveness[31]. Schraeder found that economic interests dominated Japan's motivation, with the top recipients providing essential raw materials for Japanese industry, serving as a potential source of such raw materials, or providing major markets for Japanese products[32].

In short, the neorealist school of thought is a variation of the realist thinking framework. Security and power are safeguarded through the economic power which should be secured through foreign assistance. Economic power goes hand in hand with a substantial budget aimed at foreign assistance. Hook; Schraeder; Wendt provide leading scholarly work that supported the latter argument. Situating TICAD and FOCAC in this framework means that China gives African states more developmental aid for its economic reasons. Its increased economic power also meant increased assistance to African states. The idealist assumption which holds that goodwill forms part of the reason debunks this thinking framework. China, for example, has a long history of friendship with African states dating back the pre-independence era when Beijing supported liberation struggle movements through the provision of arms and finance despite being economically weak.

Constructivism

The end of the Cold War brought remarkable changes to international politics in so doing; it also changed some core assumptions of traditional IR theories. According to (Price & Reus-

[30] Hook, S (1995) , National Interests and Foreign Aid , Rienner Publisher.
[31] Tuman, John P., Craig F. Emmert and Robert E. Sterken (2001) *Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin America: A Test of Competing Theories*. Political Research Quarterly.
[32] Schrader, P (1999), Japan's Quest for Influence in Africa, Current History 98 (628).

Smit, 1998), neorealism was found wanting when explaining some of the occurrences in the global arena[33]. The provision of developmental assistance changed after the world moved from a bipolar setup. Wendt indicates that the main difference between neorealist and constructivists lays in the assumption that for the former the structure of the international relations system is made of material capabilities, whereas for the latter it also includes social relationships[34].Social structures, identity, expectations, self-perception, ideas, values, knowledge and norms are pillars of constructivism.

Constructivism sees foreign aid as a set of norms and ideas that have been constructed by states. It holds that states that are better off than others have the moral obligation to give a helping hand. Humanitarian convictions and moral values are also central to constructivism in that economic and political interests alone cannot sustain the provision of foreign aid. The ODA which Japan plays a central role is an example of how constructivism assumptions can be seen in direct foreign aid policy. China has rejected some of the norms and values enshrined by the ODA. The idea of non-interference remains central in Beijing's foreign policy toolkit. China has been accused of supporting the abuse of human rights. African states like Angola, Zimbabwe and Sudan have close relationships with Beijing and are also major beneficiaries China's aid. On the other hand, Japan refrains from providing foreign aid to African states accused of human rights abuse as per ODA standards.

Soft Power

Nye popularised the concept of soft power a phenomenon in foreign affairs that has bloomed in the post-Cold War era. In the book '*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power'*[35]. Nye argues that when one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called co-optive or soft power. The way big powers have been using aid supports this argument. Global powers and regional powers aid budgets are closely linked with their interests. Japan and China are known to provide more developmental assistance to countries that are rich in natural resources. Nye further argues that a state's soft power is produced by

[33] Price, R & Reus-Smit, C (1998), 'Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 259-294.
[34] Wendt, A (1995), 'Constructing International Politics', International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 71-81.
[35]Nye (1990), *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books.

three resources – culture, foreign policy and political value[36]. Soft power and aid are therefore linked due to wealthy states increased reliance on assistance to win over allies.

Xi Jinping in 2014 declared that China will increase its soft power and give a good Chinese narrative. Japan's soft power has not traditionally been influential in Africa compared to another major, and traditional, partner countries. Japan's foreign policy in Africa has been revolved around the projection of soft power, mainly in the form of developmental assistance through. The re-emergence of Asia in Africa has resulted in China and Japan competing for soft power. Japan's increased interest on the continent to most analysts is a move to counter Chinese growing soft power[37].

Soft power embraces most theoretical explanations to why states provide foreign assistance. To some extent, it acts as an umbrella thinking framework in which different theories can fit in explaining states behaviour when offering aid. The Marxist and Critical Theory fits in the soft power debate in that core states (Japan/China) should develop a relationship with the periphery (African states) for the purposes of benefitting from its natural resources and markets.

This study will be guided by Nye's soft power understanding that argues that political values, culture and foreign policy are central in co-opting states as opposed to hard power in the form of military force and economic sanctions. In this study, soft power supports the hypothesis that China's FOCAC and Japan's TICAD support of the African Union development agenda as means of gaining influence which has economic dividends. The Foreign policy supported by soft power is therefore essential particularly to states competing for interests like Japan and China.

Conclusion

Andrew J Nathan and Robert Ross explained in their book China's New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress that the rising China will not necessarily

[36] Nye Joseph (2004), Soft Power – the means to success in world politics, Public Affairs, New York.
[37] Tiezzi, S., 'Africa: China and Japan's next battleground?', The Diplomat, 15 January 2014, http://thediplomat.com.

become a threat.[38] Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in *Coming Conflict with China*, predicted an inevitable conflict with Asia and even more so with the United States, however, China's foreign policy in the last decades has proven this hypothesis wrong. China has been careful building its soft power without clashing with traditional powerhouses like the United States.

Japan on the hand due its close relations with the USA and the European Union and its rise due to its rapid industrialisation with other Asian Tigers managed to grow soft power in Africa. The soft power, however, has been waning and is challenged by China. Japan is however disadvantaged because of its poor historical relations with African states.

Different theories have been discussed in trying to understand the motivations behind developmental aid to Africa. Soft power argument by Joseph Nye has been chosen as the leading theoretical framework that satisfies China's involvement through FOCAC. The chapter has pointed out that TICAD and FOCAC are both ambitious platform used by Japan and China to help with their relations with African states. Comparative analysis will be the basis of which the research will be conducted. The dissertation will give the reader a clear understanding of what the Japanese and the Chinese are doing on the African continent. A brief historical analysis will be employed for the sake of better understanding China and Japan relationship with Africa before FOCAC and TICAD. The aim of the study is not to give judgement no which actor has been more beneficial to the African continent. The dissertation will take a neutral stance in all six chapters and aim to give fair analysis based on statistics as well as existing policies.

[38] Nathan, Andrew J and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China Search for Security, New York, W.W. Norton, 1997.

Chapter 2: Understanding the African Development Agenda

Introduction

African development is no doubt one of the most researched and discussed the subject in academia and other fields. The continent has been labelled a hopeless continent and rising continent in last 30 years. Poor development on the African continent cannot be divorced from the history of slavery and colonialism that directly affected African progression. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive report on African development strategies that the OAU and subsequently AU implemented since 1963. It is important to understand the historical context of how African people have conceptualised development as well as the programmes they have implemented. China and Japan have shown willingness to assist African development nonetheless it is crucial to interrogate this development, the different actors and policies that have been implemented.

This chapter also situates developmental assistance in African development chronicles. The chapter will be structured as follows: 1); Analysis of African development discourse 2); Key institutions shaping African development 3); Situating development in foreign assistance 4); Agenda 2063 &SDGs 5); Chronology of African Developmental policies 6); Conclusion. The chapter aims to give the reader a synopsis on theoretical discussions, policies and trends in African development. In addition, the chapter will briefly situate TICAD and FOCAC in African development setting.

Theoretical frameworks and discussions around African Development

The history of African development discourse

In his book 'Encountering Development' Arturo Escobar argues that during colonial times the concern about poverty was conditioned by the belief that even if the "native" could be somewhat enlightened by the presence of the coloniser not much could be done about their poverty because their economic development was pointless[39]. This framework changed post - World War II after the establishment of the United Nations an organisation which has been

[39] Escobar Autro, 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, New Jersey: Princetown University Press.

the centre of development discourse. Bretton Woods institutions (IMF/World Bank) have also played a significant role even though they are viewed as less progressive.

Kubaya argues that development is a process of improving people's lives[40]. Kubuya further argues that development should encompass the ability to meet basic needs and to sustain economic growth, alleviation of poverty, the creation of wealth, and economic freedom. Development has recently been inclusive through the inclusion of women status and quality of life necessities in African development. One notable thinking framework is that of 'Freedom as Development' by economist Amartya Sen[41]. Sen his Nobel Prize in Economics winning book claims that free market enhances freedoms. The latter is however contested.

African states were unable to meet the UN's MDGs, this means that substantial amount of catching up to global development is still necessary. Ideas about development change from time to time, however, as far Africa is concerned poverty reduction, creating employment, ending conflicts. In sum, meeting basic human needs is very crucial for African states. People oriented development will empower the human capital that Africa is blessed with; a young population capable of bringing meaningful change on the continent.

Dependecia

The fight over influence between the Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War led to significant changes in developmental assistance to the developing world, particularly in Africa. Left-inclined theories, as opposed to the neoclassical thinking, became popular in newly independent African states. The unequal exchange (Arghiri Emmanuel[42]), structural alliance (Raul Prebisch)[43], dependency (Hans Singer[44] /Fernado Cardos[45]) world systems

[40] Kabuya FI (2007). Economics for African Nations: Principles, Problems and Policies (1st edition). Trafford Publishing Company, Victoria, Canada.
[41] Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as freedom (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press

[42]Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal exchange; A study of the imperialism of trade.
[43] Prebisch, Raúl (1959). "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries". American Economic Review. 49: 251–273.
[44] Singer, Hans (1998) The South Letter (30) "The Terms of Trade Fifty Years Later - Convergence and Divergence.
[45] Carlos A. Martínez-Vela (2003) World Systems Theory, paper prepared for the Research Seminar in Engineering Systems.

theory (Immanuel Wallerstain[46]) are good examples. The latter frameworks have been supported by leading African scholars. The global economic system according to many leading African scholars like Claude Ake, Bade Onimode, Nzongola-Ntalaja, Peter Anyang' N'yongo is rigged in that Africans are at the receiving end of global capitalism. Walter Rodney is another notable scholar that argued that Europe intentionally underdeveloped the African continent through slavery and colonialism.

Neo-patrimonialism

Mkandawire advances the neo-patrimonial framework, whereby Africans should begin taking responsibility for the lack of development[47]. Colins Brobbery argues that neopatrimonialism has extensively been conceptualised to cover, the nature of African state including; the level of authority, power politics, political legitimacy, elections, corruption, nepotism, paternalism, cronyism, privatisation and presidentialism just to mention few of the contemporary rubric of neopatrimonialism concept[48]. The 'big man[49]' syndrome is associated with this set up where leaders often rely on corrupt and undemocratic means of staying in power. Power is maintained through a well organised patron-client relationship amongst the elites. Often, the state becomes the vehicle for self-enrichment through looting of state coffers and aid money. Institutions are systematically eroded often leading decision-making in the hands of very few elites. It is therefore not surprising that having good political institutions and good governance are leading items on the African development agenda gave Africa's track record with authoritarian leaders[50].

[46] Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press.
[47] Thandika Mkandawire (16 October 1998). "Thinking About Developmental States in Africa". African Economic Research Consortium. African Development in the 21st Century. United Nations University.
[48] Colins Adu -Bempah Brobbey (2003), Neopatrimonialism and Democratic Stability in Africa: A case of Ghana's 1992 Redemocratisation, Ghana Institute of Journalism. University of Ghana.
[49] see Meredith, M. (2005). The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York, NY: Public Affairs and Hyden, G. (2006). African Politics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
[50] Rod Alence (2004). Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, Cambridge University Press.

Resource Curse

The resource curse theory gained ground in explaining why African states fail to develop and in some cases collapse. Theorists supporting this line of thought are prone to democratic deficiencies, violent conflict and economic instability due to client and patron nature of politics. Sachs and Warner go as far as arguing that a surprising feature of modern economic growth is that economies with abundant natural resources have tended to grow slower than economies without substantial resources[51]. The resource curse also is known as 'paradox of plenty' is evident in resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola.

Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism was popularised in Africa in the 1980s by Thatcher and Regan free market capitalism[52]. The state takes a limited role in economics while free markets dictate the rule of the game[53]. In Africa, neo-liberalism was introduced through Structural Adjustment Programmes which were forced upon African governments by attaching conditionalities to loans from the IMF and World Bank. A lot of African countries have rejected the call for their economies to be left at the mercy of free markets. Instead, they have attempted to copy the 'East Asian Miracle' or 'Asian Tigers' in carefully planning their economies as well as subsidising their industries[54]. South Africa is a good example of a state that has been trying to emulate the developmental state route. Neo-liberal policies are still cited as the antidote to African developmental problems however African leaders remain adamant on implementing them. An African head of states has openly criticised them, blaming them of the current economic doldrums that African states find themselves in.

[51] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner (1997) Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, Harvard University.
[52] Ali, A. (1998), 'Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa,' in T.Mkandawire and C.Soludo (eds), African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, Ottawa, IDRC.
[53] Patrick Bond and George Dor (2003) Neoliberalism and Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa, Discussion paper for the Regional Network for Equity in Health in Southern Africa.
[54] Joel Netshitenzhe (2011) South Africa's Developmental Capacity, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.

Chronology of African Developmental Policies

Post-independent Africa through the OAU had its own development plans. The Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty are some examples of the OAU's development policies which analyst argue authentically Africa owned. NEPAD by the AU continues to carry some of the fundamental ideas that have always shaped African discourses. The AU prioritised regionalism when it transitioned from OAU to AU. As a reaction to continued external intervention in African economic agenda's the development policies outlook has been emphasising human centred development with the full participation of African citizens. One can argue that self-reliance, increased intra-Africa trade and regional integration is key features in the AU's policies. These are necessities for meaningful Africa led growth on the continent.

Latin America is where most of Africa development ideas are exported from. Raul Presbish popularised the dependency theory which has shaped African political landscapes. Currently, NEPAD and Agenda 2063 serve as economic developments driving the AU development trajectories. NEPAD's formation in 2001 with a mandate to propel economic co-operation and integration amongst African countries was a positive step towards collective economic development. In addition, one can argue NEPADS's work and the establishment of Agenda 2063 has revitalised African development and furthered African reach into global markets.

Regardless of external interferences in African economic and political governance, African leaders have always have been on the forefront of steering uniquely African development ideas with people centred policies. To some extent, certain policies have been previously crafted to counter external interference. The Lagos Plan of Action, for example, was in response to dependence that had been caused by reliance on foreign powers resulting in poor economic growth and lack of self-sufficiency. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) directed by Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF/World Bank) had forced African states to implement "free market" economic reforms that removed governance from the people and placed it in powerful institutions that prioritised economic returns over ordinary people's wellbeing.

The following are notable homegrown policies that have been fostered by the OAU and AU. It is important to have a chronology of these policies for the purposes of tracing African development route as well as interpret its characteristics.

The Lagos Plan of Action (1980)

The Lagos Plan of Action was an unprecedented move by an African head of states when they assembled in Lagos from the 28th to 29th of 1980 and unanimously adopted the 'Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa, 1980-2000'[55]. This was Africa's pioneering economic summit. Adebayo Adedeji hails it as the Africa's 'Magna Carta'[56] because of it is long-term plan to restructure Africa's socio-economic development. The plan's theoretical and intellectual foundations can be traced to the Monrovia Strategy. The Monrovia Strategy was collaborative work between the OAU and the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in response to African economic crisis of the late 1970s[57]. Recently adopted Agenda 2063 borrows from the 3 strategic visions namely: The Monrovia Strategy; The Lagos Plan of Action and The Final Act of Lagos Plan.

Structural Adjustment Programmes

In 1981, the World Bank and the UNDP sponsored a study titled 'Towards Accelerated Development in Africa' commonly known as the Berg Report[58]. The report diagnosed Africa development problems as primarily internal mismanagement. The report was the basis of SAPs which prescribed that African governments do the following: devalue their national currencies and adopt a floating exchange regime; deregulation of domestic interest's rates; de -control of prices; elimination of subsidies; liberalisation of external trade and financial transfer; privatisation of state-owned enterprises and reduction in size of public spending[59]. It is important to note that not only African states were forced to implement these draconian policies but also the rest of the developing world.

[55] Adebayo Adedeji (1984) The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action for African Development, Text of a paper presented at the ECA/Dalhousie Universityllliversity Conference on the Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Future International Relations: Projections and Implications for Policy-Makers.
[56] Ibid
[57] Adebayo Adedeji, (1983) The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization NISER Distinguished Lecture series, University of Ibadan.
[58] Patrick Bond , (2006) Reconciliation and Economic Reaction : Flaws in South Africa's Elite TransitionTranstion Reconciliation and Economic Reaction. Journal of International Affairs.
[59] Lensink, Robert (1996). Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (1st ed.). Longman.

SAPs have been labelled a form of neo-colonialism which enabled developed states and international institutions to dictate African governance. The main criticism is that the policies were not Africa owned nor were they people oriented. The ECA argued that the SAPs policies were informed by sound econometric principles but failed because the programmes did not resonate with realities on the ground, in that they failed to capture the political, social, economic, cultural and economic conditions of African people. The criticism of SAPs is widespread and well documented on the African continent mainly because the policies unleashed havoc on African people due to the removal of government from the people leading to calamities in health care and education.

Post -Lagos Plan of Action

A number of policies have been implemented on the continental scale since the end of the Cold War. It is crucial to understand that the Cold War had significant benefits for African states who received support from the Soviet Union and the USA as they rivalled in getting influence[60]. After the LPA nothing substantially new was drafted rather they were fine tuning and revising the plans agreed upon in 1980. Pressure from donors and financial institutions resulted in the PLA plans being placed on hold. It's important to note that post LPA policies have increasingly been pro-exogenous and have supported neoliberal policies. A series of policies were implemented and they are as follows:

1. ***Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), UNPAAERD (1986) & AFF-SAP (1989)***
2. ***The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – 1989)***
3. ***The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)***
4. ***The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990)***

[60] Keith Griffen (1991) Foreign Aid after the Cold War, International Institute for Social Studies.

5. *The OAU Re-launching of Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action (1995)*

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development & Agenda 2063

Post-independence African leaders largely subscribed to the dependecia school of thought which characterised the international global economy as hostile to Africa and inherently exploitative. Deep rooted mistrust of global economy resulted in the LPA being adopted at the first ever African economic summit in Lagos. Post-OAU leadership at the AU led by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria's Obasanjo realised that globalisation could be used to African benefit[61]. The organisation was tasked with bringing Africa back into the global economy and assist in creating conditions for the continent to contribute meaningfully in global affairs.

NEPAD is distinguishable due to its five main pillars, they are namely: Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative; Human Resource Development Imitative; Capital Flows Initiative and Market Access Initiative[62]. These pillars support the founding mandate of eradicating poverty and bringing about sustainable growth and development[63]. In addition, the institution is aimed at having a 7 percent GDP growth and to attract $67 million in FDI's annually[64]. The organisation was at the forefront of the UN's MDGS and currently supports SDGs. Some of its core tasks are resource mobilisation, addressing priorities and creating preconditions for development[65]. There are arguments that critic NEPAD and APRM as tools by African governments to meet minimum requirements to access ODA and FDI, debt cancellation from developed states. The institutions are therefore not genuine drivers of development but rather tools used to access foreign aid.

NEPAD has been credited for its practical ways of integrating the continent as opposed to the rhetoric of a United States of Africa without measures of making it a reality. The organisation

[61] Abel Ezeoha & Chibuike Uche (2005), South Africa, NEPAD and the African Renaissance, African Studies Centre Leiden, The Netherlands, ASC Working Paper 64.
[62] NEPAD (2009) The AU/NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF). Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat.
[63] Ibid
[64] NEPAD. (2001) www.nepad.org\2005\doc.php.
[65] NEPAD. Op Cit. 2001, p. 1-5.

has been working closely with the ECA and institution that has been central in producing authentically Africa ideas about development. NEPAD has had the ability to work with different partners through for example its G8-NEPAD partnership, African Development Bank, United Nations and other institutions thereby bringing different stakeholders to African development[66].

What makes NEPAD exceptional is its ability to have an outward looking development trajectories informed by liberal economic policies?. It also strikes the balance by having an emphasis on governance as an antidote to African development woes as opposed to purely economic emphasise. NEPAD has the Africa Peer Review Mechanism as its governance arm dedicated to bringing accountability between African states. To date, the APRM remains Africa's most innovative and ambitious initiative on governance. Since its launch in 2003, the institution has promoted self – and peer assessment of government policies and practices[67]. The APRM core mission is deepening best practices and development of tools and methods by which the deficiencies can be corrected[68]. To date, 37 countries have signed up with 21 having completed APRM Country Review Missions. The organisation is currently undergoing revitalization to align its policies with that of AU's Agenda 2063 and UN 2030 SDGs.

Agenda 2063


The rise of globalisation pushed the African States to re-engage their stance of shunning the world through domestic-oriented policies. African states realised that they were not existing in a vacuum but rather and an increasingly globalised and complex world regardless of the unfortunate history of slavery and colonialization, the continent had to re-engage the global world. The opening words of the document 'The Africa We Want' enchants the gained agency or rather the coming back to the global arena with African terms. The document is an ambitious vision guided by 7 aspirations which are as follows: 1. A prosperous Africa based

[66] Francis Nguendi Ikome (2004)From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD) The Political Economy of African Regional Initiatives. International Relations at the School of the Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand.
[67] The African Peer Review Mechanism (2002), Process and procedures," in African Security Review, Vol. 11.
[68] Khabele Matlosa (2014), Pan-Africanism, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: What Does the Future Hold? , South African Institute of International Affairs.


on inclusive growth and sustainable development; 2. An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance; 3. An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; 4. A peaceful and secure Africa; 5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics; 6. An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and 7. Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.

The economic blueprint incorporates most of Africa's previous policies and reads with optimism. It is supported by a ten-year plan with sets of targets and evaluation mechanisms. It is structured in 6 chapters that not only give the background of African development history but also shows the methods in which the continent will finance and support its plans. The document has been criticised for having unclear means of its financing. Donor/ Partners funding is highlighted as a major financier of the plan despite previous disappointments in funding pledges. It is therefore not a wise move to list external partners as credible funders of this developmental plan.

The following is a chronology of African development policies



The OAU Re-launching of Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action (1995)



Institutions central to African Development

African Development Bank

African Development Bank (AfDB) was established in Khartoum, Sudan in 1963 with a mandate to promote economic and social development[69]. The bank became fully operational in 1963 and is currently based in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivore. Its membership consists of 54 African countries and 26 non-African countries[70]. The bank has been instrumental in the creation of additional developmental institutions such as the Africa Export -Import Bank, Africa Project Development Facility and the Africa Capacity Building Foundation, just to name a few.

The bank has traditionally supported infrastructure projects particularly in areas of power supply, water and sanitation, transport and communication. The bank is currently a leading agency supporting NEPAD and is APRM's strategic partner. The banks voting powers, however, are largely still in foreign powers. The European Union controls 18.756 %, USA controls 9.281 %, Japan control 5.494 while Nigeria controls 9.281, making it the biggest

[69] The African Development Bank: Tenth Replenishment of the African Development Fund, Order 2006" Statutory Instrument 2006 No. 2327.
[70] Ibid

African voting power[71]. The African development bank should be credited for being a leading institution in supporting African development.

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

As the wave for decolonization swept past Africa in the late 1950s, the UN decided to establish the Economic Commission for Africa in 1958. The organisation has been identified as one of the foremost think tanks behind progressive ideas about African development. The organisation was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as one of the 5 regional commissions[72]. It derives its mandate from the UN's Article 55, which calls for the promotion of high standard of living, full employment and conditions for economic and social progress and development[73].

Currently, the ECA covers 7 thematic areas which are Macroeconomic Policy, Regional Integration, Social Development, Natural Resources, Innovation and Technology, Gender and Governance. These are areas that Africa urgently need to target to have meaningful development[74]. Notable leaders at the ECA include Mekki Abbas (founding secretariat) and the renowned Pan-African scholar Adebayo Adedeji. The organisations continue to be the beacon of hope in producing tangible developmental ideas. The inclusion of Gender on its thematic areas is a welcome move on the continent where woman and children remain destitute.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP was established in 1965 by UN member states to facilitate global development for all UN members[75]. The organisation has been publishing the Human Development Report since 1990. The report has been instrumental as a reputable indicator tracking global

[71] Bank Information Centre, USA, (2005, July 27), African Development Bank Retrieved (2017)
[72] ECA: Office of the Executive Secretary
[73] Ibid
[74] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2017) Thematic Areas.
http://www.uneca.org/adfvi/pages/thematic-areas
[75] UNDP (2014), Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development Framework .
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Discussion-Paper--Governance-for-Sustainable-Development.

development. The UNDP online indicates that the organisation aims to eradicate poverty, violence and hunger through assisting African countries in translating their economic growth into long-lasting, inclusive human development. The organisation supports MDGs, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, environmental and energy, and woman empowerment. Work by the UNPD on the African continent shows that the organisation works closely with DAC of the OECD as well as regional institutions and economic communities.

Bretton Wood Institutions

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank were set up in 1944 as a vehicle to drive international economic cooperation. Ideas by Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes were instrumental in its foundation phase. The organisation on the African continent does not enjoy popularity due to the failed Structural Adjustment Programmes. The SAPs are credited for some of the developmental failures that African countries are facing today. The institutions have also been accused of supporting autocratic leaders in developing countries. The financing of Chile's dictatorship and Mobutu's Zaire have often cited as the institution's shortcomings[76]. Some critics go as far as arguing that the two institutions are an extension of Western economic power.

The IMF and the World Bank have initiated the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Debt Forgiveness programmes which have greatly benefited Africa whose countries need debt forgiveness[77]. Conditionalities are still part of the institution's policy. They have been strengthened particularly when it comes to a state's fiscal policy and governance. Both the IMF and World Bank work closely with developmental partners in alleviating poverty. It is important to note that the Bretton Woods institutions have a strong commitment to making profit hence their motives in African development get questioned.

Situating FOCAC & TICAD in African development

[76] Matthew Gilmour (2013), The Pinochet Regime and Chilean Politics, E-International Relations Students.
[77] International Monetary Fund (2016) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Washington D.C.

African states have not graduated from being a recipient of foreign aid after close to 60 years of constant provision. Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Thomas Sankhra and other respected statesman auctioned against dependence on developmental assistance. Given the legacies of slavery and colonial rule, Africa has remained home to some of the poorest states in the world that desperately needed assistance. Poor macroeconomic performances because of draconian International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) resulted in worsening of poverty and underdevelopment of the African continent. They all came in the name of developmental assistance.

The AU's development blueprint as the Agenda 2063 reads is focused on giving African countries autonomy and power as it participates in the global arena. An African block with power and influence will not need aid but business. Increasingly the TICAD and FOCAC frameworks have seen Business Forums being taken seriously on the frameworks meetings. Agreements to increase trade are signed with follow up targets being met in most cases. These ties in with Agenda 2063's strategic partnership ideas as one of the drivers of development. Accessing how the Japanese and Chinese have contributed to the African Union developmental agenda is therefore crucial in understanding their respective relationship with the African Union.

Agenda 2063 seeks to eliminate dependency by midwifing Africa states that are self-sufficient and free from external influence. Critics of Agenda 2063 argue that it is vague and too ambitious while lacking solid funding mechanisms. Regardless of the criticism, Agenda 2063 remains the leading plan of action at the continental level at encompasses overlapping institutional mandates for African developmental agenda. One can argue that UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), World Banks development ideas, as well as other sectoral institutions, are summed in Agenda 2063 making the most updated document encompassing all developmental trajectories. In addition, the development blueprint has a first ten-year implementation plan which was adopted with the overwhelming support of African stated in March 2015.

Developmental aid has been changing over time. The last few decades have witnessed the increased role of new actors. The rise of China has resulted in the global South has a big donor that can identify with the struggles developing countries. Growth in African countries sparking the Africa rising phenomenon has also forced traditional actors to reprioritise African states in their foreign policies. The increasing significance of FOCAC, for example,

has been rivalled with the beefing up of the long established TICAD. Commitments to aid provision and access to funds have been doubled while new practices like hosting of summits on the African continent, prioritisation of the AU in planning and coordination and provision of better accountability measures.

The debates about the effectiveness of development aid have been going on for long. The camp that argues that developmental aid has largely been fruitless because it leads to dependency, corruption and worsening of debt seem to the leading voice. Japan received massive foreign aid injections in post-War 2 eras and China was a reception of aid for long. Today both states are major players in aid provision highlighting the fact that it is possible to graduate from the aid dependency syndrome. Aids, for example, has been fought on the African continent using developmental aid funds with positive results. China has also been making significant strides in big infrastructure development. There is no need to throw the baby with the bathwater as far as aid is concerned. There are terrible outcomes that can be ratified. What is important is finding synergies between African development policies and developmental aid inclination moving African states towards the end goal of self-sustenance.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on Africa's development history and current trends. The evidence shows that African past policies have failed. One of the main reasons why the developmental policies failed is a failure of foreign powers in financing development plans. Dependency as result of constant handouts explains why African states remain the destination of foreign assistance. Other than dependency issues of resource curse and neo-patrimonialism are seen a major complication to African development ambitions.

African states on a regional scale have not been able to successfully implement a developmental policy. External influence has been detrimental as highlighted by undermining of the Lagos Plan and promotion of SAPs. NEPAD which has attempted to balance internal policies and external demands is argued to be a positive step by the AU in finding working solutions to issues faced by African states. Agenda 2063 are praised an ambitious plan that can be achieved if maximum effort is taken in owning the plans and accountability from partners.

A combination of global efforts and African efforts as seen by NEPAD/APRM and Agenda 2063 as well as efforts from partners through FOCAC and TICAD initiatives should move Africa towards its goals of eradicating poverty, reducing unemployment, ending the conflict and having sustainable development. Development assistance has had inconsistencies mainly through corruption and worsening of debt and poverty. Increased actors and refining of the already existing practices promise to bring about new developments. It is these opportunities that African policy makers should take advantage of and leverage them to the needs of the continental development aims.

Chapter 3: China in Africa: An analysis of FOCAC in African Development

Introduction

This chapter is aimed at showcasing what the FOCAC framework has achieved in progressing the AU's development agenda. It will first outline the major contributions of China at the AU. Emphasis will be given in showing how FOCAC operates and the major stakeholders involved. In hindsight of the previous FOCAC meetings, the chapter will look at China's contributions to the following thematic areas: as (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture and Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth and Woman). In addition, the chapter will specifically look at what China has done to aid the AU capacity building, a necessity for development policies dispersion. The roadmap of this chapter clearly indicates the goal of investigating how far China has contributed to Africa's development agenda.

The building of soft power is the theoretical explanation of why FOCAC has been prioritised as China's developmental assistance arm to Africa. Through huge infrastructure, soft loans and favourable trade deals, Beijing has gradually built up its soft power in Africa. This chapter will illustrate Nye's argument that the ability to attract and co-opt rather than hard power is working for China in Africa.

China's soft power is driven by nationalism ideology from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The past two decades have witnessed the gradual rise of Chinese soft power. In Africa, China has expanded her economic interest in Africa by means of mutual development and investment, economic cooperation and trade. Relations between African states have been strengthened largely due to Beijing's aid packages and diplomatic cooperation.

Hu Jintao, the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group President and Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General noted the need for China to increase her influence when he said,

"that the increase of China's international status and influence depends both on hard power, such the economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as on soft power, such as culture[78]. Given the heavy criticism of China's of breaking international agreed standards of human rights, it is fitting for Beijing to build her influence globally. Building soft power is a way to advance China's domestic and international agenda, to guard Beijing against criticism, and to boost the country's international standing[79].

This chapter will discuss China's relations with Africa through the FOCAC framework. It will argue that China has deliberately focused its energies to increase soft power in Africa. Africa, traditionally Europe's is now a contested region with China, Japan, European Union and other rising powers.

Since the 1980s China has displayed a significant rise to power because of the opening process and accelerated economic growth.[80] Subsequently, China's quest to grow its influence in Africa fits in Beijing's broader global peaceful rise.

China -Africa Relations: A close look at historical background

In 2006, the Chinese government declared that China will '…unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa'[81]. The formalising of the Sino-Africa relations in a post -1945 global world order is preceded by a rich history dating back to the Han Density (206 B. C. – A. D. 220). Since the establishment of China by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, warm relations between the people of China and African people have been maintained. Chinese support for African independence and the establishment through financing, training and supporting of African liberation struggle movements was instrumental in the decolonization of Africa[82]. In

[78] Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October,15,2017.
[79] Hooghe Ingrid, The limits of China's soft power in Europe, Beijing's public diplomacy puzzle, Netherland Institute of International Relations, page 4, January 2010.
[80] Contessi, N., Experiments in Soft Balancing: China-led Multilateralism in Africa and the Arab World, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol 3, issue 4, 2009, page 404-434.
[81] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People's Republic of China, *China's African Policy*, 2006, (accessed 9th of September 2016) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.
[82] Taylor, I. 2000. The Ambiguous Commitment: The People's Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa.*Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 18(1): 91-106.

the Post-colonial Africa, China/Africa relations can be characterised as having vibrant cooperative interdependence. The Forum for China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established in 2001 is the embodiment of the vibrancy. Scholars have argued that the relationship is a true reflection of the Bandung Spirit and the epitome of South -South cooperation.

Over the past two decades, China's relationship with the African continent has exponentially grown. China's fast-paced industrialisation a result of the "Reform and Opening Up" policies spearhead by Deng Xiaoping brought about successful economic policies under the banner of "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". African States relations with China were strengthening during the Cold War particularly through the solidarity stance Beijing took during the liberation struggle. China and Africa have a shared history of conquest and imperialism. In addition, they also share a common history of glorious past with Africa being the home of modern day civilisation and China's glorious dynasties and groundbreaking discoveries like gunpowder, compass, papermaking and iron and steel melting. Shelton notes that Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged Sino-Africa relations by pointing out that 'as early as the 1950s and 1960s, China and Africa fought side by side in the historic struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony and worked side by side in the hard endeavour to revive our respective economies[83].

Over the past few decades, China has been the developmental partner in assisting Africa to industrialise. As an underdeveloped state in the early 1970s, China offered a helping hand to Africa by sponsoring the construction of the TAZARA railway linking up the landlocked Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam[84]. It is important to note that Beijing's foreign policy has been consistent since the 1950s with policies of no political strings and non-interference of domestic affairs as its cardinal pillars. The policy of non-interference has been attractive to African states who suffered the most during the Cold War's proxy wars and remain vulnerable to regime changes sponsored by the Western States. African states responded to Beijing's all weather friendship by overwhelmingly supporting China's return to the United Nations. Of the 76 states voting in favour of Beijing, 26 of them were African. The

[83] Garth Shelton, Funeka Yazini April, Li Anshan , FOCAC 2015 A New Beginning For China-Africa Relations. Africa Institute of South Africa.

[84] Jamie Monson, Freedom Railway, How a Chinese development project changed lives and livehoods in Tanzania , Indiana U.P.2008.

appreciation of the support noted by Chairman Mao who clearly stated that 'it was the black African friends that carried us back in'[85].

The new African Union's headquarters worth $200 million in total built by the Chinese government is yet another powerful tribute to China-Africa relations. China's foreign policy towards Africa since 1950s is as follows: (i) 1950s -1970s were marked by the 'Eight Principles of Foreign and Technical Aid.' 800 projects consisting of fisheries, transport, agriculture, textiles communications, hydro-dams, education and energy were completed[86]. (ii) 1970s-1980s were highlighted by the construction of the TAZARA railway and logistical as well as financial support for liberation struggle movements on the continent. (iii) The 1980s -1990s are regarded as the 'golden era of China-Africa relations since 1949'[87]. Bilateral head of states exchanges and increased investments were witnessed between China and Africa. The African diplomatic community including presidents and prime ministers supported China during the trying times of the 'Tiananmen incident' in 1989. (iv) 1990s-2000s resulted in improved cooperation after African states suffered from an economic decline in the 1980s. The 1980s also commonly known as 'the lost decade' is remembered by numerous civil wars, negative effects of structural adjustment programmes and Western aid fatigue. China was at the time going through massive economic changes resulting in a situation where Africa needed China and China need Africa thereby fostering a symbiotic relationship.

FOCAC has massive potential to become a sustainable platform to sustain Sino-Africa relations into the 21st century. As the African Union (AU) advances its Agenda 2063 policy shaped by key pillars of good governance, increased economic growth and on the other hand China is realising its "Two Centenary Goals" aimed at building a prosperous society by 2021, simultaneously with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Concurrently, as the AU aspires to industrialise and have a modern and peaceful Africa by 2063, China plans to have an affluent, strong, civilised and harmonious modern society by 2049. Although

[85] Weng Ming, 'Linxing Dianjiang: Qiao first led a mission to the UN General Assembly', Fu Hao, Li Tongcheng, eds. *Jingtian Weidi:* Diplomats at the UN, Beijing: China Overseas Chinese Publishing House, 1995, p. 9.

[86] Huang Zequan, 'Fifty Years of China-African Friendly Cooperation,' Centre for African Studies, Peking University, ed. China and Africa, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000, p.45.

[87] Li Anshan, Liu Haifang, Zeng Aiping and He Weping , FOCAC Twelve Years Later , Peking University of International Studies.

geographically not all of Africa is part of China's ambitious, 'Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road', engaging Africa at large.

It is paramount for the AU's development policies to align themselves with the broader Chinese global developmental vision[88]. While analysing policy one can clearly see that Beijing's domestic policy and global foreign policy trajectories are aligned with Africa's regional policy framework. The FOCAC's achievements within a short period of 15 years are therefore important to reflect in order usher in sustainable future engagements.

In sum, Sino-Africa relations are characterised by solidarity in shared ideology and political aspirations. China and African states have rallied together to defeat colonialism and are embarking on developing agendas aimed at empowering their people. Ebberson, editor of the awards winning journal, *Debate* narrated the Sino-Africa relations by saying,

> "China's approaches Africa with what has been called the complete approach the complete package. Technical expertise that includes their own skilled workers, a persuasive line about also having been victims of colonialism, influence at the UN and money in the form of big soft loans that have no strings attached, make a seductive combination".

The FOCAC institution has therefore been used to extend China's foreign policy through attractive means like solidarity in multilateral institutions and aid in forms of much-needed loans and investments. China's interests are characterised by Xi Jiping as 'Soft Rise', Africans bearing in mind that no one except themselves will emancipate themselves from poverty and underdevelopment should understand what China's interests are and how they can manage them without losing out.

China's role in FOCAC

FOCAC is a multilateral cooperation institution with various stakeholders from the both the African and Chinese sides. China has 27 member agencies whereas African states have more

[88] Human Sciences Research Council , One Belt One Road and a prosperous Africa . 2015 http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/events/events/obor (accessed 14th September 2016).

than 5 levels of institutions participating in policy-making and implementation[89]. The following are the key agencies and their responsibilities from the Chinese side:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages FOCAC and the overall policy and implementation. Political affairs at FOCAC are spearheaded by this ministry, therefore Chinese embassies and consulates throughout Africa play a central role in the functioning of this ministry[90].

The Ministry of Commerce handles issues related to trade, investment and training within the FOCAC framework[91]. Wang Cheng'and noted that the ministry plays an important role in planning and implementing economic and aid projects, including facilitating public bidding by Chinese companies on aid projects, making policy to support Chinese companies in enhancing trade and investment in Africa, and taking charge of aid projects, such as building schools, hospitals, anti-malaria centres and agricultural demonstration centres and training African professionals[92]. In addition, the ministry also serves as an important link between the Chinese Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office in Africa and African governments.

The Ministry of Finance is crucial in financing the activities within the FOCAC framework. Budgetary issues and supervision of FOCAC's activities are closely monitored by the ministry.

The FOCAC Follow –up Action Committee plays a central role in coordinating all the 27 agencies from the Chinese side. The committee is led by the Chinese State Council and operates per the Chinese national system[93].The follow-up committee is open to other government ministries with the Chinese government.

The structures mentioned above are the core agencies central to the functioning of FOCAC from the Chinese side. In addition to the latter, several Chinese financial institutions have been involved in the running of the framework. These include the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) which is at the forefront of construction projects and selective

[89] Zhang, Z., 2009. *Sino-African Co-operation in Infrastructure ConstructionUnder the FOCAC Framework*, in Liu, *op. cit*., pp.225-239

[90] The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow –up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Achievements Of The Forum On China- Africa Cooperation Over The Past 15 Years .2016.

[91] Li Anshan, Lui Haifang, Pan Huaqiong,Zeng Aiping and He Wengping 2012. Achievements, Challenges and The Way Forward, The Nordic Africa Institute, Discussion Paper 74.

[92] Wang Cheng'an, former general-direction of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, secretary-general of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, 27 December 2010, Peking University.

[93]

investments. The China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) is a leading institution in funding agriculture projects, infrastructure and manufacturing. The China Developing Bank plays important special loans to Africa's small and medium enterprises. Shelton, Funeka, April, and Anshan in their comprehensive book on FOCAC illustrated the importance of Chinese financial institutions by pointing out that the China Development Bank and Ex-Im Bank combined are currently providing more loans to Africa than World Bank[94]. These institutions are growing in popularity in most African states against the backdrop of heavy criticism of the World Bank's predatory lending policies towards African states.

Other Chinese agencies involved in the FOCAC framework are as follows:

Information Office of the State Council, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Land and Resources, National Development and Reform Commission, International Department of CPC Central Committee, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Industry and Information, Bank of China People's Bank of China, National Tourism Administration, State Administration of Taxation, General Administration of Customs, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Chinese Communist Youth League and Beijing Municipal Government.

One can argue that the Chinese side of the FOCAC framework is well organised and shows great commitment to Sino-Africa relations. The successes of the FOCAC framework is therefore not a miracle but expected outcomes given the hard work that they have been doing.

Africa's role in FOCAC

The African side of the FOCAC framework is relatively smaller as compared to the Chinese counterpart. Unlike the Chinese counterparts, the African side lacks a clear and centralised front. Other than the lack of clear leadership from the African sub-regional and regional organisations, the lack of centralised and unified front is largely due to the nature of an Africa with 54 countries. The African Diplomatic Corps is one of the most important structures due

[94] Garth Shelton, Funeka Yazini April, Li Anshan , FOCAC 2015 A New Beginning For China-Africa Relations. Africa Institute of South Africa.

to continuous access to the Chinese Follow- up Committee. African governments involved in the FOCAC framework have representatives at the African Diplomatic Corps thereby allowing information and decision to trickle down to respective governments.

Senior government officials from individual African countries play a prominent role in liaising their respective governments with the FOCAC framework. In 2005, the first Chinese – Africa Senior Office (SOM) meeting was held in Beijing[95]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of different African states are also crucial stakeholders in the FOCAC framework. Issues regarding political issues are discussed for the purposes of reaching common positions in global multilateral organisations, particularly within the UN. Issues relating to climate change and sustainable development goals (SDGs) have previously been on agendas between respective African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOCAC.

The African Union (AU) the foremost institution in African development is a late comer to FOCAC. The continental organisation previously used to get involved in FOCAC involved with observer status but as of FOCAC VI in Johannesburg, it became a fully participating member. NEPAD serves as the AU's technical arm in mobilising political will and giving suggestions within the FOCAC institution. For example, the FOCAC Action Plan (2007-2009) indicated the importance of AU, sub-regional and regional financial institutions. It noted that cooperation between FOCAC and NEPAD was essential for the advancement of Africa's regional integration[96]. The AU in 2011 received $ 4 million for the purposes of organising training workshops for AU officials on crucial topics such as public governance, diplomacy, terrorism and poverty reduction[97]. Countries like Ethiopia and South Africa have over the years managed to establish their own follow-up institutions which have played important roles in accessing their respective state's progress.

From FOCAC I to FOCAC VI

[95] Interview with Fantahun H. Michael, AU senior official and FOCAC projects coordinator, 21 September 2009, AU headquarters.
[96] Hellen Adogo (2016), China in Africa: Hindering or Helping Regional Integration? The Univeristy of Johannesburg.
[97] Lammich ,G .(2014) . China's Impact on Capacity Building in the African Union. Paper presented at the workshop: South-South Development Cooperation Chances and Challenges for the International Aid Architecture, September 26-27, Heidelberg.

Different reasons have been brought forward to why FOCAC was established. Taylor argues that Beijing after being isolated the West realised that in the post-Tiananmen era, allies and sympathisers could be won over using aid[98]. Foreign Minister Quan Qichen tour of 14 African states between June 1989 and June 1992 is portrayed by Taylor as desperate attempt to win over African States alliance. This narrative is flawed because historically since the founding of the People's Republic of China, there has been a high-level exchange between African states and China. Anshan pointed to China's own sensitivity over the Western competition in Africa and the urgency of building a permanent cooperation mechanism prompted the Chinese government to accept the African suggestion to establish FOCAC. Regardless of the different speculated reasons to why FOCAC was established framework signalled a milestone in Sino- Africa relations.

(Information sourced from The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of Forum on China -Africa Cooperation[99])

FOCAC 1: Beijing

The first FOCAC was held in October 2000 in Beijing. On top of the agenda were two major areas namely; how to promote and establish a just and equitable new international order, and to further strengthen co-operation between China and Africa on social and economic development. The Beijing Declaration and the Programme of Cooperation on Economic and Social Development were the two main policy documents formulated at the forum. Debt cancellation provisions worth RMB 10 billion were signed. China also pledged to support African states with skills development through the provision of scholarships and training of

[98] Ian Taylor, China in Africa, China's Africa Policy in Historical Perspective, AISA.
[99] The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of Forum on China -Africa Cooperation.

experts.

FOCAC 2: Addis Ababa

The second Forum was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-16 December 2003. The main agenda of the meeting was to review the implementation of the two policy documents formulated in Beijing. The Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) was adopted with plans to increase cooperation on political and international issues. For the first time, African and Chinese business interested parties converged through the China –Africa Business Conference. Important agreements were reached concerning trade and diplomatic relations. China agreed to a traffic free entrance of African goods in China. The African Human Resources Development Fund was set up with aims of training young Africans, particularly in scarce skills sectors. Cultural exchange was high on the agenda resulting in the China-Africa Youth Carnival and Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa being agreed to for the sake of better people to people diplomacy.

FOCAC 3: Strategic Partnership in Beijing

The government of China released its White Paper on 'China's African Policy' in 2006. This was an important step towards China officially formulating its own policy guidelines in its endeavours with Africa. President Jintao while visiting Nigeria in April 2006 ushered in the concept of 'a new strategic partnership'. One can argue that the Sino- Africa relations were upgraded by this announcement. Central to this strategic partnership was the consolidation of African and Chinese interests in political, economic, cultural and security fields and international affairs. Out of the strategic partnership, China- Africa relations were expected to have characteristics of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and win-win basis. The 3rd FOCAC was held in Beijing from 3rd to 5th of December. $ US 5 billion of concessionary loans were offered to African states. In addition, a China-Africa Development Fund was established to support Chinese investments in Africa.

FOCAC 4: Sharm el- Sheikh

The 4th FOCAC was held in Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh on the 8th to 9th of November 2009. The meeting reviewed the commitments made at the 3rd Beijing forum. At the 4th forum, the Sharm el-Sheikh declaration was established with an action plan for 2010 to 2012. Other than the occasional rolling out of interest-free loans, China committed to providing $1 billion for African small and medium-sized businesses. The meeting was highlighted by Beijing's

commitment to building clean and renewable energy on the African continent. China pledged to train 20 000 professionals in various fields, particularly scarce skills sector for the next 3 years.
FOCAC 5: Beijing The 5th FOCAC was hosted by China in Beijing on the 19th and 20th of July,2012. Two major African concerns were stressed at the forum. African desires to meet the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the development of an African Standby Force. Beijing committed to assisting Africa with the two. In addition, $ 20 billion in open credit lines were opened for Africa. The traditional scholarships, training of professionals and people to people exchanges were high on the agenda.
FOCAC 6: Johannesburg The 6th FOCAC was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. The relationship between China and Africa was upgraded to a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership'. The Johannesburg Action Plan consisted of 10-point cooperation plus which include employment, food, clothing and healthcare amongst other things. China took the occasion to launch its second paper on China-Africa foreign policy. US$60 billion was pledged to FOCAC work particularly infrastructure development.

President Xi Jinping reemphasized China's commitment to the strategic partnership in his widely published book '*The Governance of China'*, by stating that,

> 'China will continue to expand investment and financing cooperation with Africa, follow through on the commitment of providing a $20 billion credit line to Africa from 2013 to 2015, implement the partnership on transnational and trans-regional infrastructure development, enhance mutually beneficial cooperation in agriculture and manufacturing, and help Africa exploit its wealth of resources, and achieve independent and sustainable development[100] '

The Sino-Africa economics activities with the guidance of FOCAC framework have stimulated and attracted other actors that traditionally did not have interests in Africa. Middle

[100] Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd, China.

Eastern and Asian countries that previously paid little attention to African states have recently increased their presence on the continent. Africans now have the luxury of having options on who to relate with. Traditionally former British colonies looked to 10 Downing Street for technical assistance as well as for trade; former French colonies looked to Paris for political and trade relations however the advent of a fast-developing China has given African states alternatives.

FOCAC Achievements

FOCAC has achieved success in cross-sector areas ranging from peace and security to cultural exchanges. China is well known for its heavy investment in African large scale infrastructure. FOCAC's main achievements are therefore visible and tangible like the opening of the new railway route from Addis Ababa to the Red Sea port city of Djibouti to the Mombasa –Nairobi Railway in Kenya. China has been credited for meeting its targets and promises within the FOCAC framework and in most cases exceeding its promises. FOCAC achievements have impacted Africa positively and ought to be celebrated.

Regional Integration and Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure development is the key that unlocks the bottlenecks of underdevelopment on the African continent. Abuka explains that "problems with roads, railways, ports, air transport, energy, telecommunications and other infrastructure" hinders economic growth and development in Africa[101]. One of China's earliest infrastructure development projects on the African continent was the construction of the TAZARA railway aimed at linking up the landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian Dar es Salaam port. Beijing's spirit of building grant infrastructure still exists and remains its hallmark as far as developmental assistance is concerned. The number of successful infrastructure projects that China has developed on the continent is countless. It is important to note that China does not only sponsor hard infrastructure projects but has also contributed heavily in Africa's Information and Communication Industry. Chinese companies like Huawei Technologies and ZTE

(Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation) are active in more than 50 African countries thereby literally connecting Africa[102].

At the last FOCAC VI, China pledged to provide Africa with $35 billion, aimed at supporting the construction of more than 400 projects in African countries[103]. The latter buttresses China's commitment to developing African infrastructure. The African Union Agenda 2063 aims to have an industrialised Africa in the next three decades. As a symbol of solidarity, China built the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa worth over $ 200 million[104].

All FOCAC Action Plans since 2004 have placed an emphasis on regional integration advancement through infrastructure development[105]. The FOCAC, Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) specified support for infrastructure projects to improve transport for landlocked African countries and encourage Chinese enterprise to undertake infrastructure development. FOCAC, Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) raised the importance of regional organisations, particularly the AU, regional and sub-regional financial organisations[106]. In FOCAC, Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), again Beijing recommitted its support for regional organisations placing an emphasis on capacity building[107]. The 5th FOCAC prioritised the AU and its organ institutions. The Beijing Declaration of 2012 states that China through FOCAC,

"Strengthen cooperation with the AU and sub -regional organisations, take joint measures to promote African solidarity, harmony and strength through unity and support measures for African regional integration and sustainable development efforts through the AU/NEPAD mechanisms[108]"

Over 14 regional bodies exist on the African continent, of which 8 are officially recognised by the AU. These are SADC, COMESA, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, AMU and EAC. The 8 recognised AU regional bodies have received support from FOCAC that trickles

[102] Peter Brown, China's phone firms help Africa go mobile. 2009 Asia Times .www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KK18Cb01.html (Accessed 03 October 2016).
[103] Ibid
[104] Bayoumy ,Y. (2012). Glitzy new AU headquarters of China -Africa ties. http://www.reuters .com /article /ozatp-africa-china -idAFJOE8OSOOK20120129.
[105] FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). (2004). Forum on China -Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006).
[106] FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). (2006). Forum on China -Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009).
[107] FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). (2009). Forum on China -Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2010-2013).
[108] FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). (2012). Forum on China -Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015).

down through the AU's organ institutions like NEPAD, APRM and Pan -African Parliament. Studies have shown that overlapping membership, lack of infrastructure, tariff and non-tariff barriers and lack of financial resources to implement mandates are some of the core factors hindering regional integration. African states role in FOCAC has been characterised as having no clear mandate and direction something that the AU as the foremost regional organisation can use to marshal all the regional organisations that it officially recognises to have policies and action plans that emulate AU's development agenda's. In that way, Africa can have a solid front when engaging China while at the same time advancing its regional cooperation.

Human Capital Development

Human resources form part of the fundamental backbone of a functioning state and continent. As AU embarks on its Agenda 2063 developmental plan it needs to prioritise human capital development as a prerequisite for sustainable growth. Investments in health and education have been hailed as the foremost sectors in human capital development. Ashan and April argue that that empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security are critical components of human capital development.

African governments are under a lot of pressure to address the lack of human resource development on the continent. The lack of well-trained public servants has contributed significantly to poor service delivery thus delaying developmental aspirations of African people. China through the FOCAC framework established the African Human Resources Development Fund in 2000. The fund has grown significantly covering the costs of funding 10,000 personnel in various fields from 2004 to 2006. China -Africa Joint Research and Exchange Program was launched in 2010, it conducts more than 100 cooperation programs and sponsored academic exchanges involving more than 1000 Chinese and African scholars.

Education plays an important role in the development and sending African students abroad to get skills is necessary for the achievement of Agenda 2063. In 2009, various personal were trained in China ranging from 1,500 principals and teachers and agricultural experts. The launch of China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership in 2009 and sponsoring of over 100 African post-doctoral fellows showed Beijing's commitment to human capital development. In 2013, more than 33 000 African students were studying in China with 7300

having received Chinese government scholarships. 26 000 students were self-sponsoring indicating an increase of African students choosing China over Europe where most African scholars generally get educated. This development is positive because Africans can be vested with educations from different regions of the world.

Judging from the first FOCAC 1 to FOCAC VI, one can argue the number of scholarship and resources made available for education have exponentially increased. The commitment to the development of African human resource is overwhelming. The latter is rooted in China's belief that only Africans themselves have the keys to unlock shackles of underdevelopment. This maxim of self-help is necessary for Africa to speed up its development pace.

The Ebola crisis assistance that African states were given by China during the August 2014 speaks to Chinese rhetoric of an 'all weather friendship'. The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow–up Committee of the FOCAC notes that the Chinese government took the lead in providing the largest medical aid overseas in history, spearheading the international community's efforts to help African countries fight Ebola epidemic and showcasing the profound friendship between China and Africa[109]. Since 2000, Beijing has dispatched 7,600 medical professionals to African countries and built 68 hospitals. The Brightness Action campaign is a flagship campaign that has received admiration in the 42 African countries it is currently involved in[110]. Elderly African citizens have been receiving the gift of sight through free cataract surgeries provided by Chinese doctors. Initiatives aimed at supporting Africa health care systems keep African health systems afloat. The reduction of funding through neo-liberal policies has resulted in basic services like health care being privatised resulting in unnecessary loss of human life. Provisions within the FOCAC framework to aid the health care systems of African states, therefore, go a long way in saving human life.

Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security

Xuejun argues that China has advocated for Africa at the UN Security Council and remains the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UNSC,

[109] Ibid
[110] Zheng Yang, Chinese eye doctors restore vision in Africa and Asia, January 2006. http://www.chinafrica.cn/China/201512/t20151225_800045321.html. (Accessed 02 October 2016).

with more than 3000 peacekeepers involved in 16 peacekeeping missions in Africa[111]. After the escalation of Somali Pirates in the Gulf of Aden, China has constantly protected the waters resulting in protection of ships crossing the troubled waters from 2009 to April 2015. Over 6000 foreign ships have been escorted by the Chinese navy thereby making the Gulf of Aden a safer shipping route. The AU's goal of silencing guns and realising a conflict-free Africa by 2030 as enshrined in Vision 2020 can be achieved through close partnership with China through the FOCAC framework[112].

Chinese aid within the FOCAC framework will be paramount in realising the full operation of the African Standby Force urgently needed to deal with conflict on the African continent. At the Johannesburg FOCAC VI, Beijing will provide $100 million to support the establishment of the long-awaited African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), South Africa's recent initiative within the AU[113].

Key contributes include the launch of the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC for the enhancement of peace and security issues. China has previously deployed peacekeepers and election observers in Mali, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The contributions of China to African peace and security have been outstanding and have room for improvement. China can, for example, assist in the goal of silencing guns. The rise of extremists groups in the Sahel and Horn of Africa is are potential areas of cooperation.

China's commitment to non-interference in African domestic politics has resulted in little attention being paid to governance issues. APRM a good governance institution that promotes democracy has received little support from China since its launch. FOCAC remains a platform for African states to collaborate with China in ways of maintaining global peace and security.

Agriculture and Environment

[111] Tian Xuejun. (2008) A New Era for China- Africa Relations, The Thinker Quarter 2-Volume 68.
[112] The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future, ACCORD, 2014,.Durban, South Africa.
[113] Chris Alden & Elizabeth Sidiropolous (2015) Adept negotiations needed by Africa at FOCAC. http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/adept-negotiations-needed-by-africa-at-focac (accessed 10 January 2017).

Given the realities of climate change, African countries are regularly affected by drought and floods resulting in food security being threatened. To date, China has dispatched over 20, 000 agricultural experts[114]. Moreover, more than 55,000 scholarships for programmes in China and training for special skills have been provided to Africans particularly the youth[115]. Africa has vast agricultural land that can feed its people and cater for external demands if managed and maintained properly. The growing Chinese middle class will also depend heavily on African produce thereby creating jobs and opportunities for Africans.

China has 6% of world's fresh water and 9% of world's arable land nut manages to feed 20% of world's population. Africa has more arable land than China but can barely feed its population. Africans should seize the opportunity presented by the Chinese government's zero -tariff policy for certain African products. The Chinese government has encouraged agricultural businesses to invest in African countries like Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, and Malawi and a result, local food crops and cash crops have seen significant boosts increasing local employment and foreign exchange revenue. African agricultural exports to China particularly sesame, hemp, silk, cotton and oil seeds demanded by the Chinese booming middle class should be increased for the African agricultural sector to become competitive on international markets.

Concerns have been raised about China's contribution to continued African environmental degradation. These concerns are warranted given China's own issues with pollution at home. China's is the second largest oil consumer and the world's largest importer of tropical wood. Criticism of China's operations in Africa have largely been from the western government, companies, financial institutions and intergovernmental organisations. Adjustments have been made by Chinese companies to comply with local rules and regulations. On behalf of the Chinese government, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) currently supervises more than 150 companies involved in natural resources extraction, including Sinopec, CNOOC and CNPC.

China's own domestic strict rules have resulted in companies emulating home guideline in their foreign missions. The commitment to clean energy illustrated by the increase in Hydro Dams and Solar plants show that China is evolving its record in environment protection

[114] Ibid -thinker

[115] The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow –up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation , Achievements Of The Forum On China- Africa Cooperation Over The Past 15 Years .2016.

policies. African states have the obligation to protect their environments, therefore, they should bargain for strict rules of engagement when Chinese companies. FOCAC is the right platform to push these bargains collectively.

Private Sector

FOCAC achieved remarkable strides in driving economic growth on the African continent. In 2004, the volume of China-Africa trade skyrocketed to $US 222 billion, 21 times that of 2000. Special economic and trade cooperation zones have been built in Ethiopia, Egypt, Zambia and Nigeria. One can argue that China is creating other 'Shenzhen Special Economic Zones' on the continent. The government of China has also increasingly supported Chinese companies investing in Africa.

Least developed countries with diplomatic ties with China are afforded a zero tariff to 97 percent of their exports to China. Angola is one of Africa's fasted growing economies; its economic performance must be credited to Chinese investments concentrated in this oil producing country. FOCAC trade and investment practices have challenged orthodox practices thereby producing wonders like making post-civil war states like Angola and Mozambique some of the best performing states in the world. The Johannesburg Action Plan and Johannesburg Declaration adopted at the FOCAC Johannesburg Summit indicate the need for increased trade and investment.

African countries have responded to China's new investment capacity with incentives to attract capital. China has strengthened this trend with new investments in Africa, for example, in South Africa in October 2007, China's largest bank, the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bought a 20 percent stake in Standard Bank for $ 5.5 billion. This was the largest single FDI transaction in South Africa's history and set the stage for increased Chinese FDI flows to the African continent. Given that technology transfers, skills transfer and job creation usually accompany FDI, Africa can work towards increasing Chinese capital flows.

FOCAC must be credited for FDI's coming from China. FDI's come with technology transfer, skills transfer, job creation and capital flows that African states urgently need. In 2014, the stock of China's non-financial direct investment in Africa had totalled over $ 30 billion, more than 60 times the amount in 2000. Tencent, one of China's top Internet

companies currently holds $66 billion worth of shares in South Africa's MIG. The increase in investments in African private sector is paramount for job creation and skills development a necessity in African markets.

As labour costs increase in China, companies are looking to relocate. African states are burdened by high levels unemployment and slow economic growth. The creation of Industrial Zones by Chinese companies in Ethiopia such as the Eastern Industry Zone, China-Egypt Suez Economic Cooperation Zone, Zambia- China Economic & Trade Zone should be emulated for African industries to get meaningful boosts and increase production capacity. The Two Centenary Goal and Silk Road development strategies should be used by African countries to leverage more private sector contributions from China. Currently, government to government cooperation and investments dominate the relationship a characteristic that can change given mutual efforts from both sides.

Social and Cultural Development

In promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges initiatives like the China –Africa Cultural Cooperation Partnership and Exchange Plan and China –Africa People-to-People Friendship Action has resulted in increased exchanges between African and Chinese people. In addition, more than 46 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms have been established in Africa[116]. The first Confucius Institute in Africa was opened at the University of Nairobi in 2015. In April 2015, South Africa become the first African government to introduce Mandrin as a second additional language. The spreading of Mandrin is a good example of how China aims to assert its soft power in Africa. Having African speak Mandrin makes it easy for Africans to understand the Chinese better as well as improve people to people relations.

African tourist destinations have increasingly become a popular destination for Chinese travellers. Contact between Chinese and African people is crucial in boosting African business as well dismissing stereotypes developed due to lack of contact. It is important for the FOCAC framework to let the relationship between African people and Chinese people reach the grassroots of both Chinese and African people. To date, Chinese cultural centres

[116] Ibid.

have been set up in Mauritius, Benin, Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania. FOCAC should prioritise exposing Chinese people to African cultures for more mutual learning to be facilitated.

Woman empowerment is central to all-inclusive development on the African continent, given the history of marginalisation of an African woman. Discourse on China-Africa relations has been slacking in promoting woman empowerment particularly a woman as decision makers. The current 2016-2018 Johannesburg Action Plan has three commitments to woman and children empowerment. These are gender equity, employment and self -development and poverty reduction. The education of girls should take centre stage in these commitments and contributions but unfortunately, minimum efforts have been taken an issue that FOCAC should resolve urgently.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed China's contribution to the FOCAC framework. The institutional set up of FOCAC has been explained giving detailed information of what role China plays in FOCAC. Six thematic areas were covered in summing up Beijing's contribution to African development. Since the establishment of a formalised institution, China's foreign policy towards Africa is fully developed given that two foreign policy papers have been published, one in 2006 and the most recent in 2015 at the Johannesburg Summit.

Regrettably, African states remain unorganised and lack serious policy understanding of their interest in Sino-Africa relations. Reverting to SDGs and Agenda 2063 policy documents that have been used to relate to most external partners is not helpful. Africa needs a China paper that will guide the African Union and sub-regional organisations in engaging and managing Beijing, particularly at institutions of bargaining like FOCAC. The Africa developmental agenda also needs to prioritise the FOCAC framework by building common positions through agreed policies at sub-regional and regional institutions with the end goal of harmonising all African states towards a sustainable relationship with Beijing.

The length of each thematic area reporting and analysis speaks volumes to the degree of contribution. China does well in huge infrastructure development projects. Hard infrastructure like railway, roads, airport, ports and dam constructions throughout Africa have been given a facelift since increased relations with China. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya for example now have fast-speed trains through their cooperation with China. Areas of

environment protection and empowerment remain a glitch in Sino- Africa relations. Little has been done and surely the relations can further be strengthened through better cooperation.

The Sino- Africa relations given all the documents analysed increasingly push for mutual and win-win relations. Africa is winning through increased investments in infrastructure development and access to lines of credit and loans. African states have failed to take the opportunity of having Beijing on one table as a perfect advantage for collective bargaining. Due to the weakness of the African camp, Beijing has been dominating the FOCAC framework. The AU, for example, was only admitted as an organising institution in 2011 having been occupying observer status since the inception of FOCAC. This means the African block primary responsibility for development, peace and integration aspiration of African people was not a formal structure of FOCAC and had no say on the FOCAC agenda. Nonetheless, given its 17 years' history, the organisation has made strides in many aspects and promises to bring better relations between China and African states.

This chapter has illustrated that soft power is important for states that are developing like China. As they look for new markets and new allies they need to attract other states to their policies. China's non-interference policy means that it can gradually build up its soft power arsenal without clashing with the West and other traditional powers with interests on the African continent. Through the spreading of Mandrin, for example, China is slowly but surely co-opting Africans into their Chinese ways of life which make it easy for trade and people to people relations. Critics have labelled it neo-colonialism however with African governments free to make their own choices, it is difficult to blame China of imperial dominance on the African continent.

Chapter 4: Japan in Africa: An analysis of TICAD in African Development.

Introduction

This chapter will focus on Japan- Africa relations while paying to emphasise on the TICAD framework. The main purpose of this chapter is to take a balance sheet approach is accessing Japan's contributions to African development. A historical outlook will be given to see how Japan foreign policy has evolved from Post WW2, The Cold War and its trajectories after the launch of TICAD in 1993. Through tracing the outcomes of TICAD events and MoFA's contributions through JICA, one can identify the overall contribution of TICAD towards the African Union's developmental agenda.

This chapter will argue that Japan-Africa relations remain weak while still only limited to business. The chapter will argue that traditional Japanese soft power in Africa is waning. The historical aspect of Japan not supporting liberation struggle movements and in South Africa being aligned with the apartheid regime is one factor. The rise of China in African business landscape has also affected Japan-China relations. Nonetheless, through TICAD, Japan - Africa relations have been improved. The AU and its agencies have taken central space in the TICAD process something that ought to be celebrated.

Six thematic areas consisting of as (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture and Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth and Woman); These will be discussed while identifying Japan's role in advancing African developmental goals. The end goal is to identify how the TICAD process works and understanding Japan's role in African development.

This chapter will be guided by Joseph Nye's conceptualisation of soft power. Although Nye coined the term, other scholars have built on it through the support of the framework and outright criticism. For instance, some thinkers argue that soft power is effective and, it sometimes reinforces or interferes with hard power, but in most cases, soft power does not depend on hard power. Nye's improved definition defines soft power as the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive

attraction for the purposes of obtaining preferred outcomes[117]. This chapter will argue that Japan's foreign policy for Africa is built upon the foundation of soft power, however, China's increased presence has resulted in its subsequent decline.

Japan -Africa Relations: Historical Background

The TICAD framework was launched in 1993 as a platform for the Japanese government to extend its foreign policy towards African states through cooperation with the United Nations, World Bank, and the UN Development Programme. The primary objective was to help develop Africa and promote peace and security. International relations experts also argue that the establishment of TICAD was an attempt by Japan to find relevance on the African continent after years of neglect and in some instances, support for colonial powers. TICAD summits were hosted every five years in Tokyo however for the first time TICAD VI was hosted in Kenya. At the TICAD VI in August 2016, both Japan and African leaders agreed to meet after 3 years.

Traditionally, Africa did not hold a special place in Japanese foreign relations. South Africa is an exception, having granted the Japanese community special privilege of being 'Honorary Whites' in the 1930s and the duration of apartheid. Japan has traditionally seen Africa as a European backyard, therefore, resulting in Tokyo directing its efforts to trade with minimum political interference[118]. Egypt and South Africa were the pioneering African countries to establish close trade ties with Japan. In the 1930s disparities emerged between Japan and European states as result of Japans decision to switch wool exports from Australia to South Africa.

The colonial mentality, heavily influenced by 'scientific racist' ideas of the early 20th century which were widespread among white people were exported to Japan. Japan's views of Africans were in no way different from the backwards and uncivilised perceptions held by Europeans colonisers. Japan was generally hostile towards liberation struggle movements during the wave of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Anti-colonial movements received no support, for example in 1982 the African National Congress (ANC) was described by MoFa as a terrorist organisation[119]. The latter was a betrayal of the Afro-Asia

[117] Nye, Joseph Jr. (2011) "The Future of Power" Public Affairs, New York.
[118] Morikawa, Jun (1997), Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy ,London: Hurst & Co.
[119] Osada, Masako. (2002). Sanctions and Honary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa.

Conference of 1955 commonly known as the Bandung Conference. Japan's alliance with the USA and lack of support for the African liberation cause be viewed as a divergence from the Bandung Spirit.

In the 1960s, industrialisation was picked up the pace in Japan after successful initiatives by the Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry (MITI)[120]. Both MITI and MoFA increased their efforts towards Africa relations resulting in close relations with Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Zaire was strategic to Tokyo due to its possession of cobalt a mineral central to Japan's high-tech industries. Japan's fast industrialisation, hailed the 'developmental state is popular subject is development studies. It is celebrated on the African continent because it is a living example that a war wretched state can rise from its poverty and become a leading global powerhouse. It is no surprise that the 'developmental state' thesis is still something that African states aim to emulate as part of their drive towards industrialisation.

The 1970s saw Japan extend its foreign policy initiatives to Uganda. Japan, found it challenging to trade with Francophone parts of Africa. In addition, the 1970s oil shocks further heightened Japan's interests on the Africa continent. Realpolitik swayed Japan to reconsider its Africa policy to one that is more engaging given the vast natural resources Africa possess. A short supply of natural resources given Japan's momentum towards industrialisation would be catastrophic. Japan's foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s are viewed as moves to contain European domination on the African continent.

Phases in Japan -Africa relations

Japan- Africa relations if properly analysed show five distinct phases. These phases are part and parcel of what most analysts argue to be Japan's reactive foreign policy towards African states. Pre-1990s were generally marked by poor engagement and little attention paid to African issues. As earlier mentioned, South Africa was the exception with some political and economic ties dating back as far as the early 1930s.

[120] Jang-Sup Shin (2002) The East Asian Industrialization in the Gerschenkronian Mirror: Catching-up Strategies and Institutional Transition, National University of Singapore.

The first phase, between 1954 and 1973 witnessed Tokyo increasingly preoccupied with Asian issues[121]. Japan gave negligible foreign assistance to Africa as it efforts were focused on Asian matters where to some extent it led as a regional power.

1974-80 marked Japan's second phase primarily influenced by commodity price shocks. Oil prices skyrocketed and Japan was forced to pay closer attention to African states primarily oil producing countries[122]. Bilateral aid was a choice of engagement as Japan expanded her interests from not only oil but also strategic minerals.

The years between 1980 and 1988 period witnessed a heightened Japanese interest in Africa. One can argue that this phase was instrumental to the pioneering of TICAD. Sato argues that Japanese aid during this period characterised as "becoming more globalised and expanded in absolute terms."[123] The good economic performance in the 1980s placed it under international pressure to give aid against the backdrop of increases in its trade surplus. Africa became the biggest beneficiary receiving up to 15% of Japanese ODA.

The fourth phase, between 1989 and 2000 saw Japan become a top global aid donor. Japan established the TICAD conference diplomacy in 1993, pioneering a wave of interests in African development and peace and security post- Cold War. Japan unprecedently started engaging African states multilaterally and showed a willingness to support developmental projects as well as peace and security initiatives.

The current phase, the fifth one, started in 2001. Japan has been reforming its aid diplomacy due to international developments. China is indeed a factor in the changes. Japan has been on the forefront of reforming the ODA system through the adoption of the ODA Charter amongst other things. In addition, Japan has been encouraging African countries to support NEPAD and APRM. Agenda 2063 and SDGs have been on the forefront of Japan's dispersion of its aid regime.

In 2008, Japan established the Japan International Cooperation Agency with the support of its Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Prime Minister Abe can, therefore, be credited for the emergence of a more stable Japan- Africa foreign policy. This is against the backdrop of Japanese engagement being 'reactive' towards Africa. The current engagement is

[121] Sato, Makoto, 'An historical analysis of Japan's aid policy in Africa', in Howard P. Lehman (ed) Japan and Africa: Globalization and foreign aid in the 21st century (London: Routledge, 2010).
[122] Ibid
[123] Ibid

the theme of "true partnership". There is a wave of the language of "beneficiation" in Japan's approach; this is encouraging given African's need to own its development process.

Why TICAD?

The wave of decolonization swept past Africa with most African states independent as of 1990. The launch of TICAD in 1993 can be viewed as a strategic move by Japan to reshape its Japan-Africa policy. Japan decided to become an altruist donor of aid to Africa[124]. In my view, this was a desperate attempt to improve its image and recover from bad relations given the history of Tokyo's close relationship with racist and colonialist regimes. The interest of African states voting in favour of Japan attaining a seat on the UN Security Council and countering China's re-emerge are examples of Tokyo's interests on the continent. TICAD started before FOCAC and since the advent of FOCAC, it has distinguished itself, mainly focusing on human rights and anti-corruption activities.

Mensah argues that Japan's development cooperation with Africa have been informed to some extent by its membership of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), the country has developed its own unique approach to advance its economic interests and take advantage of the economic opportunities afforded by Africa's incorporation into the global market[125].

Japan has a fast developing neighbour whose economic growth and military strength has burgeoned in the last two decades. China is on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) while Japan relies on its strategic allies, the EU and USA for support when it comes to global political issues. Japan has been seeking UNSC without significant backing from the African block. China's ascendancy to the UNSC relied heavily on the African block's voting constituency. In my analysis, Japan seeks to emulate China's example of getting a seat on the prestigious UN body through support from the African block. TICAD's work can, therefore, be an instrument in appeasing African states to support Japan's interests.

[124] Furuoka, Fumitaka (2009) "Main Characteristics of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) Flows." Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA).

[125] Chaldeans Mensah (2014), China and Japan in Africa: Globalization and New Norms of Development Assistance and Cooperation, Paper prepared for the 23rd World Congress of Political Science Montreal, Quebec.

Organisations central to TICAD

The Government of Japan, The African Union Commission (AUC), The World Bank, The Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSSA) and The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the five co-organisers of TICAD. The following is a brief description of the role each of the co-organisers play at the TICAD:

Government of Japan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan is the leading organiser of TICAD. The Information on the Foreign Minister, State Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers for Foreign Affairs are some of the instrumental offices from the Japan government that plan and coordinate with Japan's embassies, consulates and permanent missions in African states to organise TICAD.[126]MoFA coordinates with the Ministry of Finance and agencies like JICA, UNDP, Japan Bank International Cooperation for African Investment (JBIC). The ministry is, therefore, a focal point for the running of TICAD.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established in 2003 by the Japanese government as a tool to aid the government's international cooperation, boost global economic development, and bring stability in developing regions. Since its inception, JICA participates at TICAD conferences through hosting side events with public and private sectors, civil society and academia. Through JICA, the Japanese government can dispatch experts in different sectors particularly, health and education to train and assist African states. JICA is essentially Japan's agents on the ground in touch with the realities of African development. As of 2014, JICA had 29 country offices on the African continent[127]. These include offices in countries affected by war like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of

[126] Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter (2003)." *Government of Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Economic Co-operation Bureau*.
[127]JICA (2014) Region and Specific Activities and Initiatives https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2016/c8h0vm0000aj21oz-att/2016_19.pdf (accessed 12 February 2017).

Congo. They, therefore, play a crucial role in pinpointing the real challenges and opportunities that TICAD can work with.

The African Union Commission (AUC)

The Commission is responsible for executive functions with the following portfolios: Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources; Science and Technology; and Economic Affairs. The Mission of the AUC at the TICAD reads, "An efficient and value-adding institution driving the African integration and development process in close collaboration with the African Union States, the Regional Economic Communities and African citizens"[128]. Based on its mandate and responsibilities the AUC is the chief presentative of the African continent and its people at the TICAD. The AUC was on the forefront of the hosting of follow-up meetings by the TICAD Follow-Up in Botswana, 2010 in Tanzania, 2011 in Senegal, 2012 in Morocco and 2014 in Cameroon.

Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSSA)

OSSA is tasked with engaging the private sector and civil society in the TICAD process. Currently, the organisation closely monitors the implementation of the Yokohama Action Plan 2013-2017 an outcome document of the TICAD V. In 2014, OSSA together with Japan, UNDP Bank and AUC organised the first ministerial meeting of the TICAD V in Yaoundé, Cameroon. OSSA has the mandate to follow on TICAD's commitment to "Consolidating Peace, Stability, Democracy and Good Governance". Japan's contributions to the Sahel Region, for example, are results of OSSA follow up work within the TICAD framework.

The Word Bank

The World Bank has been a key sponsor of TICAD's commitments to African development. For example, at the TICAD VI the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and

[128] Office of The Special Advisor for Africa (2015)

Malaria (Global Fund) committed to invest $24 billion in Africa for the next three years[129]. The World Bank also brings external financial institutions and powerful organisations like the G5 to contribute substantially towards TICAD goals.

United Nations Development Programme

The UNDP goal in serving as a co-organizer of the TICAD is to accelerate sustainable human development in Africa[130]. Their partnership with TICAD has assisted in consolidating peace, advancement of democratic governance and bolster human security on the continent. They consult closely with civil society and public sector in finding ways of advancing socio-economic development on the continent. The United Nations has a lot of experience in the work that TICAD does, therefore their presence in the co-organising of TICAD brings value to the framework.

Japan's ODA policy

Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has in many ways become Tokyo's main foreign policy tool, utilised as a form of investment, a confidence-building measure, a solution for bilateral problems, a manifestation of economic power and global leadership, and as a tool for buying power and influence in various international organisations[131].

Japan adheres to international principles enshrined in the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness. TICAD's work is therefore guided by ownership, alignment harmonisation, managing of results and mutual accountability which make the five pillars of OECD -DAC policy. UN programmes like the MDGs and now SDGs are part and parcel of the broader

[129] Gleneagles Interim Compliance Report July 8, 2005, to January 1, 2006. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2005compliance_interim/2005_g8compliance_interim_r.pdf (accessed 12 February 2017).
[130] TICAD V: Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 1-3 June. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/events/2013/may/TICAD.html?page=8&centerparsys_successstorylisting_start=4 (12 February 2017).
[131] Kawai, Masahiro and Shinji Takagi. "Japan's Official Development Assistance: Recent Issues and Future Directions." *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, 2001.
Leni Wild, Lisa Denney, Alina Rocha Menocal, and Matthew Geddes (2011), Infroming the Future of Japan's ODA : Japan's ODA within an African Context, Overseas Development Institute.

goals that members of OECD and DAC aim to achieve when giving aid. Governance issues have also been closely aligned to Japan's developmental assistance dispensation. Considering the rise of non-traditional actors like China, India, Brazil, South Korea there has been a challenge to the policies that Japan adheres to.

TICAD I to TICAD VI

TICAD has diverse stakeholder that include developmental organisations, regional organisations, donor nations, the private sector and civil society organisations. Since it was established, the TICAD framework has hosted summit-level conferences every five years; however, as of TICAD VI in Nairobi, the conference will be hosted every three years. TICAD has evolved into a global framework that facilitates African development within the two decades of its existence. Since its inception, the themes of "ownership" and "partnership" have taken centre stage at the TICAD.

The following extract is a compilation of statics gathered from the TICAD official website (https://ticad6.net/***)***

TICAD I (1993): Tokyo
The conference was a pioneering set up for conference diplomacy in African development in the era of post- Cold War. Japan pledged 75 billion over the period of five years in financing African political and economic reforms[132].The opening TICAD took priority in reversing the decline of development assistance for Africa following the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that the Cold War resulted in little attention being given to Africa development by external actors resulting in a sharp decline in foreign assistance. To a certain degree, foreign actors had "aid fatigue'. Participants at the TICAD 1 adopted the 'Tokyo Declaration on African Development'. Amongst other things, the conference resulted in Japan and its co-organisers reaffirming political and economic reforms in Africa, boosting of private sector development, regional cooperation and development, and the harnessing of Asian experience for the benefits of African development.
TICAD II (1998): Tokyo
Poverty reduction was the highlight of the second TICAD conference. African development challenges, African regional integration, the participation of Africa in the global economy were the

[132] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017) http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ .

highlights of the conference. TICAD II adopted the 'Tokyo Agenda for Action' which gave a holistic outline of the relationship that Japan and African states aimed to establish. In addition, shared goals and objectives plus guidelines for actions to taken by Africa and its partners were adopted. The theme of "ownership" which emphasised dual partnership between Africa and the international community was accepted as a point of departure by participants. These participants included 23 Head of states and government, 90 ministerial delegates, Cahir of AU Commission, 20 Heads of International and Regional Organisations. Japan pledged $ 1 billion over the next five years towards the African socio-economic development[133]. Japan pledged 90 billion yen of grant aid, promised to build educational facilities for 2 million African children and improve living conditions of 15 million African[134].

TICAD III (2003): Tokyo

The third conference was held in Tokyo, Japan on the 29th- 3rd of September 2003. It was attended by 89 countries, 47 0rgnaisations and 1000 participants. The transformation of OAU into AU changed the agenda of TICAD III meeting. The newly established AU tasked NEPAD as the instrument for spearheading development on the African continent. AU decision to take a developmental route resulted in the third conference making clear indications that TICAD would support NEPAD. Japan's support of NEPAD as a blueprint for peace and socio-economic growth and development was instrumental in boosting the newly established AU. In addition, it cancelled $ 3 billion to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and other eligible African states. The conference also marked the 10th anniversary since its inception in 1993. From the meeting, a 10th Anniversary Declaration document reemphasised the renewed commitment to African development and took priority with issues of human security.

TICAD IV (2008): Yokohama

The fourth conference was held in Yokohama, Japan from the 28th to 30th May 2008. The fourth TICAD was held against the backdrop of the popularisation of the UN MDGs. TICAD IV addressed three main areas: 1) Ensuring "human security and achievement of MDGs; 2) Boosting economic growth; 3) Addressing of environmental issues and climate change. TICAD IV was attended by 3000 delegates including 41 African heads of states. The latter showed overwhelming support of the framework by Africa people. Out of the conference, the Yokohama Action Plan was adopted, it outlined ways of following up on TICAD promises. The TICAD Follow- Up Mechanism

[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid

was introduced to track and monitor the implementation of the agreed targets. The inception of the TICAD Follow-Up Mechanism resulted in African leaders meeting annually for the TICAD Ministerial Follow- up meetings.

TICAD V (2013): Yokohama

The fifth conference was held in Yokohama, Japan from the 1st -3rd of June 2013. The conference was attended by 45000 participants which included 51 heads of states and government, 72 international and regional organisations, representatives from NGOs and Civil Society[135]. The event marked the 20th anniversary of TICAD. Japan pledged 3.2 trillion yen in public-private initiatives and 1.4 trillion yen in official developmental assistance. The conference also included discussion on reform of the UN Security Council where Japan and Africa want urgent fair representation. On the African side, it marked the 50th anniversary of the OAU, the predecessor of the AU. The theme of the conference was "Hand in Hand with a more Dynamic Africa", speaking of the initial ideas of 'partnership' and 'ownership' that the TICAD framework adheres to. The agenda was based on three key areas: 1); Robust and Sustainable Economy 2; Inclusive and Resilient Society and 3); Peace and Security.

TICAD VI (2016): Nairobi

The TICAD VI was held on in Kenya, Nairobi for the first time since the establishment of TICAD. 32 African heads of states, 18 000 participants including representatives of international and regional organisations. The conference was held under the theme 'Advancing Africa's Sustainable Development agenda: TICAD Partnership for Shared Prosperity'. On the agenda were 1); Promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialisation 2); Promoting Resilient Health for Quality of life and 3); Promoting Social Stability for Shared Prosperity. Within the three themes covered at the conference, boosting of economic growth, acceleration of infrastructure and capacity development, empowering farmers, peace and security, inclusive growth and democracy and good government were some of the major topics covered. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement for climate change took centre stage at the conference. The conference reaffirmed Japan's commitment to Agenda 2063 and its First 10 Year Implementation Plan, NEPAD initiatives and regional integration.

Thematic Areas

[135] Ibid.

Peace and Security

Peace and security have always been on TICAD's agenda since its inception. For example, at the TICAD V in 2013, Japan allocated $ 26 million to support initiatives for stabilising the Sahel Region. The government of Japan further pledged $36 billion over 5 years towards African improvement of infrastructure, human resources development based on the Africa ownership and partnership ideas[136]. Japan has been assisting in peacebuilding in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Mozambique. In addition, TICAD initiatives have given direct support to self-efforts of regional organisations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Japan Self Defence Force (JSFD) is currently working with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of Sudan (UNMISS). The contributions to African preventative diplomacy and negotiation, nation building and peacebuilding is outstanding.

Investment and Trade

Japan's has ownership and partnership with African states. Japan has various companies operating in Africa particularly in the motor industry. Toyota, for example, has some of its plants in South Africa thus contributing to creating and skills transfer. Credit has to be given to Japan for raising awareness about African investment and trade opportunities post- 1993 after the international community has increasingly marginalised the continent. At the TICAD VI, Japan pledged to invest $20 billion through its private sector in African markets. Japan's overall direct investment in Africa totalled $1.24 billion in 2015[137]. Over the past twenty-three years, Japanese investments and trade have increased steadily showing signs of suitability.

Human Resource Development

[136] Ibid.

[137] SABC (2016). Japan pledges $30 bln for infrastructure development in Africa. http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/0fc45e804e047632ba88bb5173dc1eac/Japan-pledges-$30-bln-for-infrastructure-development-in-Africa (Accessed 12 February 2017).

Japan champions human -centred development mainly through skills transfer and education of African people. Currently, the Abe initiative is a flagship scholarship initiative that has been fully funding and giving work opportunities to African youth in Japan. In addition, the initiative plans to train 30 000 engineers by 2018 to support African infrastructure development[138]. Improvements in basic education through the successful implementation of the "Basic Education for Growth Initiative" and support for teacher training through UNESCO are some of the examples of Japan's contributions[139].

Infrastructure Development

Japan has a special relationship with the African Development Bank (AfDB) through the financing of infrastructure development on the African continent. Examples of successful finance big infrastructure development projects are the Bujagali hydropower in Uganda, the Sahanivotry hydropower in Madagascar, the Lekki toll road in Nigeria and the Takoradi II gas-fired plant in Ghana[140]. Egypt is benefiting from Japan through a $ 451 million loan to build a state of the art Grand Egypt Museum which will boost her tourism industry[141]. One factor that makes Japanese infrastructure development projects in Africa noticeable is their durability.

As already argued, lack of infrastructure contributes massively to slow development of African states. Most African countries are landlocked compounded with poor aviation and road and rail infrastructure. The lack of mobility means that farmers cannot trade their produce and investors will be deterred to place resources in bottlenecks of these regions. The arbitrary borders of African states also make it impossible for the movement of people and goods.

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[138] Africa Renewal (2016). Africa welcomes new trade initiatives with Japanese investors,http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/africa-welcomes-new-trade-initiatives-japanese-investors. (Accessed 12 February 2017).

[139] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Begin : Basic Education For Growth Initiative, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/education3.html . (Accessed 12 February 2017).

[140] African Development Bank Group. Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa: EPSA Initiative .https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/enhanced-private-sector-assistance-for-africa-epsa-initiative/. (Accessed 12 February 2017).

[141] Cairo Scene. http://www.cairoscene.com/BusinessAndPolitics/Japan-to-Loan-Egypt-451-Million-for-Grand-Egyptian-Museum-Construction .(13 February 2017).

Japan launched the 'One Stop Border Post' (OSBP) initiative with the support of NEPAD and AfDP to tackle the problem of poor roads and ports in Africa. When the initiative is finished, problems with border procedures such as customs, immigration and vehicle will be eliminated. In Southern Africa, the Chirundu One Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe is a flagship success story[142]. The construction of a new bridge and electronic equipment and training of staff has eased up the busy border. The initiative will go a long way in making African transport corridors better and reduce the cost of transporting people and goods.

Public Health

As part of its commitment to the achievement of MDGs, Japan through TICAD initiated various public health projects with the help of the World Bank[143]. Africa benefits from the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility which was recently launched by Japan and the World Bank Group. The fight against Malaria, TB, and prevention and treatment of HIV has been Japan's main efforts. At the TICAD VI, $ 24 billion was committed by Japan in collaboration with the World Bank and the Global Fund[144].

Japan has also been a leader in supporting women, particularly in reproductive health. Japan has a Japan Trust Fund for HIV and reproductive health that has allocated funds to programmes in Kenya, Lesotho, Rwanda, Ghana, Swaziland and Senegal[145]. Japan works closely with the World Health Organisation (WHO) in its public health initiatives.

Food Security

[142] Bokaba August Maluleka. The complexity of One-Stop Border Crossing for SADC, http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8279/19%20Maluleka.pdf?sequence=1 . (Accessed 13 February 2017).
[143] The World Bank. World Bank Group Launches Groundbreaking Financing Facility to Protect Poorest Countries against Pandemics . (Accessed 13 February 2017).
[144] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The Nairobi Declaration, https://ticad6.net/. (Accessed 13 February 2017).
[145] Ibid.

As Africa's population grows, the demand for food will also increase. By 2050, the African sub-Sahara population growth is expected to reach 2 billion[146]. Climate change has greatly affected food production with many states failing to produce enough food to feed their populations. Japan has been supporting the Food and Agriculture Organisation through sending its skilled workers to help boost African farmer's productivity. In addition, new methods of planting and growing rice have been taught to Africans from experts in Japan. In 2013, Japan committed to supporting African rice production through $32 billion through the Coalition for Rice Development (Card) initiative[147]. Over the last 25 years, the proportion of African facing hunger decreased from 28 to 20 percent despite the growing population. Africa needs TICAD to place more support in ending hunger on the continent.

Political and Cultural Exchanges

Political relations between African states and Japan are not strong largely because of the historical relations between Japan and African states because of Japanese history of sidelining African quest for independence. Japan, for example, failed to support international pressure to end apartheid in South Africa. Bilateral visiting of heads of states between Japan and most African states are limited, however, Prime Minister Abe managed to visit Mozambique, Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivore in 2014, thus showing signs of improvement or rather the willingness of Japan to better political relations[148].

Cultural exchanges between Japan and African states are in the form of sports particularly the famous martial arts like Karate. In addition, Japanese embassies have the Japan Exchange and Training (JET) programme that promotes language learning and fosters understanding between Japanese communities and African communities. The cultural exchanges remain small and one would that there is room for improvement from both sides.

[146] Word Population Prospects (2015).The Word Populations Prospects 2015 Revision .United Nations, New York.
[147] JICA. Agriculture and Rural Development https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/agricultural/card.html (Accessed 13 February 2017).
[148] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.Prime Minister Visit to Africa.(outlines and outcomes) http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page18e_000042.html (Accessed 13 February 2017).

Towards a Sustainable TICAD

TICAD's brings about various institutions including the co-organiser World Bank, OSSA, UNDP and AUC to the table. The latter is one of TICAD's positive characteristic. Not only are Japans efforts be channelled at TICAD but other countries and organisations are afforded the platform to engage Africans in development matters. As the TICAD fast approaches its 25th anniversary in 2018, one can argue that the framework has achieved a lot. Its inception has resulted in other countries like Turkey, India, and South Korea who traditionally did not pay attention to African matters to start engaging Africans on development under similar conference diplomacy set ups.

People to People Diplomacy between Africans and Japanese people remain weak and needs improvement. The decision to host the TICAD VI in Nairobi was an important step towards true 'ownership' and fair 'partnership' the characteristics of Tokyo's engagement with African states. Trade and investment alone will not result in long-lasting relationships between Japanese people and African people. Leaders from both sides need to set up and show engagement on the political and cultural side of the TICAD platform.

Japan presence in African media and academia is limited. Although Japan engages in positive activities on the African continent, its activities barely receive media attention. Coverage of TICAD activities is low as compared to FOCAC. One would argue that this has resulted in few Japanese people and African people knowing exactly what Japan has been doing on the continent. The planning and coordinating of TICAD already show positive signs of transparency through the involvement of diverse institutions including the AUC and OSSA.

As African states find their way into the global economy, Japan should be a destination of African exports. The relationship has evolved from Japan importing African raw materials to Japan importing value-added products. How are Africans going to meaningfully contribute to the global economy if they remain producers of raw materials? As the age of industrialisation reaches the digital age, Africans has a lot to learn from Japanese in areas of advanced technology. These lessons can be used to meet some of the aspirations of the AU's Agenda 2063.

Conclusion

TICAD has achieved a lot within its two decades of existence. There are a lot of areas to improve as well as success stories to celebrate. This chapter has managed to explain the structures of TICAD and how it functions. It has identified the key actors within the structure and explained their functions.

A substantial portion of the chapter focused on the thematic areas (infrastructure development, public health, peace and security, food security, trade and investment and human resource development). Japan was seen to have been strong in supporting peace and security initiatives as well as human development projects. Infrastructure development initiatives are not a grand as its counterpart China however, they are strategic like the 'One Stop Border Post'.

The area of political and cultural exchange is currently lacking given the vibrancy of TICAD. Japan and African government can do more in making sure people to people diplomacy are improved, and one way is to increase contact between Japanese and African people. Organisations such as JICA and Japanese embassies in African countries can do much more to bring Japanese food, culture and language to Africa people. In return, Africans should also get a platform to showcase the diverse African cultures to Japanese people.

The general participation of African institutions at the TICAD is positive with the AUC and OSSA being co-organisers and leaders in follow-up mechanisms. This means that Africans can decide what kind of help they need from Japan. The level of transparency and commitment to African development by the TICAD initiative should be welcomed. As Africa chases its Agenda 2063 and SGDs the TICAD platform will be instrumental in the realisation of the benchmarked goals.

Japan's soft power has been used for co-optive means of persuading African states to support its interests particularly in international organisations and multilateral organisations such as the UN. The hosting of TICAD on Africa soil was a positive move towards giving African people ownership of the developmental process that TICAD comes with. The challenge that Japan and African states face is reaching grassroots African people and make them aware of the fast-evolving relationship that exists between Japanese and African people. African and Japanese people should not be bystanders to opportunities that are presented by TICAD.

Chapter 5: TICAD vs. FOCAC: A Comparative Analysis

Introduction

Japan's Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are two special- conference diplomacy frameworks that have been on the forefront of Japanese and Chinese foreign policy and developmental efforts to African states. The focus of this chapter is to have a comparative analysis of TICAD and FOCAC. Synergies between TICAD and FOCAC can be used by Africans to draw maximum gains from the two frameworks. African development remains a necessity if African states want to contribute meaningfully to the global economy.

It should be noted that Chinese and Japanese engagements with African are different from the traditional European approaches and to some extent have defied the old patterns of developmental assistance. Mensah notes that one of the unifying features of the recent forays of China and Japan into Africa is the willingness of both countries to reject the long-held narrative of Africa as a basket case - a region beset by conflict, poverty and tepid results from Western-led development cooperation in the post-independence period[149]. The latter is profound given the Pan-African zeal enshrined in the African development agenda.

TICAD and FOCAC are central to understanding the nature of Japanese and Chinese contributions to uplifting Africa as both special conference diplomacy frameworks represent the epitome of Sino-Japanese developmental engagement with African states and the AU. The AU stands as the voice of Africa, the sole representative of the continent's leadership and is, therefore, the place to consult as far as African development is concerned. The chapter is compared how Japan and China contribute to the previously discussed thematic areas covered in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. These thematic areas have been identified as areas crucial to African development as enshrined in Agenda 2063 and to a certain extent in NEPAD and the new Sustainable Development Goals.

[149] Chaldeans Mensah (2014) China and Japan in Africa: Globalization and New Norms of Development Assistance and Cooperation, 23rd World Congress of Political Science Montreal, Quebec.

Are China and Japan competing?

There is no doubt that Japan and China are competing on the African continent. According to Tiezze[150], there are competing perspectives on the nature of this rivalry, with both disavowals of its existence and confirmation that it represents another phase of the mistrust and economic competition between two states. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from the Japanese side has shown unprecedented interest in Africa with a new assertive foreign policy. China's interests in Africa are nothing new and have historical references however its recent rise has also seen renewed engagements. China has shown signs of strong commitment to its economic, political, security and ideological interests while engaging African countries. The 'One Belt, One Road' and 'One China' policies, for example, is a good reference point. On the other hand, Japan has been credited with focusing on its economic interests mainly support of Japanese firms on the African continent.

Japan's overall direct investment with Africa totalled $1.24 billion in 2014 while China's investment in a small African in land size and population, Equatorial Guinea in 2015 totalled $ 2 billion[151]. China's total trade with Africa stands at $179 billion in comparison with Japan's $ 24 billion[152]. China totally dwarfs Japan when it comes to trade and investment on the African continent. Numbers alone, however, do not paint the full picture. Africans do not need only huge investments; they require the ability to develop on their own and to gain skills something Japan has been championing. This is not to say China does not invest in African skills development and human resources but issues like Chinese workers coming to African states to work on large scale Chinese projects are non-existent in Japanese projects.

Chinese companies have the advantage of being state-backed and having less restrictive standards when abiding by international rules and regulation. Japanese companies, on the other hand, operate from a country that is very strict when it comes to meeting international rules and regulation. Consequently, Chinese MNCs get an upper hand in African markets. Chinese companies are using smart moves like merging with already established Western MNCs giving them not only the advantage of being a 'latecomer' in already opened

[150] Tiezzi, Shannon (2014) Africa: China and Japan's next battleground? The Diplomat 15(1): 1-5. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/africa-china-and-japans-nextbattleground/ (Accessed on 20 February 2017).
[151] Brookings, (2016) Rising Sino-Japanese Competition in Africa. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/08/31/rising-sino-japanese-competition-in-africa/. (accessed 13 February 2017).
[152] Ibid.

markets[153]. The latter is something that Japanese MNCs did not have. Prime Minister Abe's increased investments in Japanese MNC's market share in Africa as illustrated by the increased injection of resources into African private sector at the TICAD VI in Nairobi can be viewed as countering move to the dominant Chinese investments in Africa.

Generally, Japan's Africa policy is seen in the context of traditional North-South relations due to Japan's membership of the OECD/DAC. Japan's unquestioned solid aid record as the world's top ODA donor by 1995, and its advancement of the G8 'Africa Agenda' places Japan in the camp of traditional Western donors that have the disadvantage of being 'imposing' given the history of SAPs on the African continent[154]. The latter works against Japan since Western aid although well received, is often scorned upon by African people.

China, on the other hand, comes armed with the notion of shared history. It goes as follows: China has an unfortunate history of national disasters and colonialism inflicted by a common perpetrator Western states compounded by a brutal occupation by Japan; China was a poor as Africa a few decades ago; China supported African liberation movements; China assisted Africa with aid even when it was poor. This is in comparison with Japan seen as a coloniser itself that has a tainted history of not supporting Africa liberation and to some extent ignoring the call for the end of apartheid in South Africa. With these compelling arguments, China although often accused of building poor infrastructure, poor working conditions and negotiating unfair trade deals strong arms Japanese political interests on the continent. Political support for 'One China' policy is overwhelming on the African continent and China successfully reclaimed its position on the UNSC through the backing of Africa states support. The latter is contrary to Japanese poor support for UN reform and quest for a UNSC seat.

In addition, to the historical attachment that China uses to court African states, it has embarked on new strategies of winning support. China refrains from getting involved in African internal political affairs 'non-interference' policy. This has led to Beijing having warm relations with democratic and non-democratic states in Africa. Beijing is often criticised for supporting internationally pariah labelled states like Zimbabwe and Sudan. The

[153] Chris Alden (2007) China in Africa, International African Institute of Royal African Society and the Social Sciences Research Council, London.
[154] Furuoka, Fumitaka (2009) "Main Characteristics of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) Flows." Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA).

political and economic support defeats the Japanese principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration that suspends assistance to despot governments.

Japan has been supporting African financial architecture through investments in the African Developmental Bank (ADfB) where it holds shares. The bank has been instrumental is financing infrastructure development projects in Africa. In addition, Japan brings African issues to global multilateral institutions like the G8 and World Bank and Paris Donor Clubs where it holds significant influence. TICAD, for example, has the UNDP and World Bank as some of its co-organisers showing willingness to bring the African voice to the international arena. China, on the other hand, has been on the forefront of transforming the international financial architecture through the establishment of the BRICS development bank. Non - traditional actors in developmental assistance like South Africa, India and Brazil are teaming up to change the rules of the game. South-South cooperation, as opposed to North-South relations, is the compelling maxim the BRICs where China to some extent takes a leadership role. Japan has often emphasised South-South co-operation however its alliance with Western powers brings mixed signals to African states who are with China determined to see increased South- South cooperation in the spirit of Bandung.

TICAD vs. FOCAC: What do China and Japan have to offer?

Japan and China have both developed high-profile conference diplomacy (TICAD versus FOCAC) designed to woo African leaders with soft power, often with an emphasis on new forms of development assistance backed by long-term financial commitment. TICAD and FOCAC as frameworks for conference diplomacy have contributed to the generation of new development ideas and in addition, have injected fresh approaches to the traditional development rational. The drive to secure natural resources is central to both Japanese and Chinese interest on the continent. African development and strategic alliance seem to come secondary given interests are shown by both China and Japan to acquire African natural resources. The latter brings into question the interests of both countries in honestly developing Africa. Nonetheless, it is important to understand areas where China and Japan offer similar developmental approaches and where they differ. The similarities and differences between TICAD and FOCAC are also for African states to know how to engage

Japan and China in the conference diplomacy setups, particularly when negotiating issues that are relevant to African development like trade deals.

Jian argues that critics charge China with pursuing a narrow mercantilist policy on the continent for pure economic benefits without human or environmental concerns[155]. These sentiments are part and parcel of attacks by threatened parties who see the increased trade and diplomatic ties as a danger to the established status quo. The advent of CCTV in Nairobi and Johannesburg is welcomed in balancing the media propaganda that is anti-Chinese. The FOCAC framework should, therefore, invest more in people to people diplomacy and give more attention to media. Africans on the grassroots do not know what the Chinese are doing for Africa. In 2012, anti- Chinese riots broke out after wage disputes in Zambia resulting in the death of a Chinese coal mine manager[156]. Sino –pessimists interpreted this incident as a sign of African not welcoming Chinese presence on the continent. Statistics show that while anti-Chinese sentiments are still widespread they are gradually decreasing due to increased contact and trade. As argued earlier, people to people diplomacy is crucial in breaking the barriers created by stereotypes. The FOCAC framework is currently investing heavily in people to people diplomacy through exposing Africans to Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes, cultural exchanges and youth festivals; this break cultural and language barriers that at times cause misunderstandings.

Japan, on the other hand, has poor publicity about its works on the continent. The advent of FOCAC brought TICAD on the limelight. Japanese aid has been building schools, drilling wells and treating the sick in grassroots communities in Africa for a long time. This is opposed to Chinese aid that has brought in Chinese nationals as economic immigrants. The rise of 'Chinatowns' in African cities has often brought discontentment from African shop owners who compete with Chinese shop owners. Japan does not have its citizens in small businesses like the Chinese do. The cultural diplomacy and people to people diplomacy of Japan are limited to activities hosted by JICA and Japanese consulates and embassies often in martial arts and youth exchange programmes.

[155] Wenran Jiang. 2006. China's Booming Energy Ties With Africa , IASA .
[156] Seifudein Adem,2016. China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa, Routledge.

The Structural differences of TICAD and FOCAC

Knowing the make-up of the institution, the parties involved and who runs the agenda is crucial in comprehending TICAD and FOCAC. For starters, both Japan and China take leadership within the set up of the conferences with financial backing for organising and sponsoring of the projects. China's FOCAC has fewer co-organisers with the AUC only getting admitted as a co-organiser recently. On the other hand, Japan's, TICAD has multiple actors as co-organisers and has brought African support strongly since its inception. To a certain degree, China is secretive and lacks transparency when it comes to the operations of FOCAC. The FOCAC documents are difficult to obtain while TICAD has some level of transparency and openness.

The participation of civil society is strong within TICAD. As indicated in previous chapters, often long lists of delegates from different sectors attending as well as contributing to TICAD deliberations. Civil society is prioritised and plays and important role in the work of TICAD. China is government to government oriented and gives little attention to civil society. The differences in how civil society is treated by TICAD and FOCAC is one stark difference between the institutions.

China engages in government to government grant infrastructure development projects in most African countries. Due to Chinese investments, there have been extensive improvements in airports, fast railway, airports, power plants and roads in most African countries. Countries like Angola, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have had their infrastructure revamped by Chinese assistance. Japan is also involved in these projects and tends to focus on clean energy projects particularly hydro dams. Japanese projects although not as a grand as Chinese have developed a reputation for being durable. The 'One Stop Border Post' for example has been helping African movement of people and goods do not cost Japan much, however, it's strategic in opening the bottlenecks of transport problems in various regions on the continent.

Peace and Security are areas where both China and Japan perform well. China has however been accused of supporting rogue regimes. Often these regimes have poor records on democratic ideals and human rights an area Japan does not compromise when engaging African states. The issue of governance is a point of divergence for TICAD and FOCAC. While TICAD emphasises good governance ideas like fair elections and benchmarks for

governance with institutions like the APRM getting support from TICAD. FOCAC has supported the AU mostly with technical assistance like building and servicing of the AU headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia.

Both FOCAC and TICAD human resource development contribution contribute to thousands of Africans skills transfer and training. TICAD prides itself with the Abe Initiative that has sponsored scholarships and secured working experience for Africans in Japan prestigious industries. In addition, it has been producing engineers aimed at supporting African infrastructure development. China provides scholarships to all African states that have relations with Beijing. New developments show that more African students are opting to study in China on self-sponsorship as relations between China and Japan increase.

Food security has been on the agenda of both TICAD and FOCAC since their inception. Both Japan and China have previously sent their farmers to work hand in hand with African farmers. Africa because of its vast landmass and sources of freshwater has potential to not only feed its people but also export to the global market as food demands increase. Food security is affected by peace and security because most African food shortages problems are not a result of natural causes but a result of the conflict. Climate change has contributed to the food shortages also, therefore, African states need to liaison with both Japan and China to find solutions to these issues.

The main similarities of TICAD and FOCAC

Both Japan and China offer traditional forms of developmental assistance in the forms of concessional loans, debt relief and technical assistance. What is interesting about both Japan and China is the increase in investment and trade that comes with developmental assistance. It is no secret that both states see massive potential in African markets.

China, Japan and another non-traditional donor, Republic of Korea meet periodically under a diplomatic process called the Trilateral Policy Consultation on Foreign Policy to discuss potential ways of cooperating on their respective policies to Africa. From Asian powers, this remains a perfect opportunity to collaborate and work for hand in hand. In this way, TICAD and FOCAC can find common ground and avoid direct confrontation. Africans can also take the opportunity to voice out their needs and ways they can cooperate with both parties. It is

crucial to note that African are prioritising investment and trade over mere handouts that come in the form of donor assistance. Agenda 2063 stipulates that dependency must be rooted out resulting in a self-reliant Africa.

FOCAC and TICAD support of the African Union

The AUC is part of the co-organising team of both FOCAC and TICAD. Although in both cases their inception came at a later stage it is important to note that both frameworks have some African representatives. With the AU focusing more on trade over aid it is important to have AU to help African countries get investors. Regional issues that are well vested with AU can be sorted out at these conferences. In short, the AU work with Japan and China is an opportunity for Africans to consolidate themselves to speak one voice.

Japan has been a key supporter of NEPAD. During TICAD conferences, Japan leaders voice out their support for the agency. During TICAD IV, Japan declared financial support for the NEPAD-OECD African Investment Initiative. FOCAC also has been instrumental in endorsing NEPAD and sees priority areas of China-African relations as consistent with those of NEPAD, particularly in agriculture, infrastructure, construction and human resources. A good example is the NEPAD Agency signing a Memorandum of Understanding with China's Ministry of Agriculture to address underlying constraints in Africa's agriculture while strengthening cooperation in that sector.

Issues of democracy, good governance, and human rights are complicated when the AU engages China at the FOCAC. China's human rights record is questionable and remains committed to the policy of non-interference in African states domestic politics. AU principles are bound to clash with Beijing's interests. China has however started showing commitment to stability in African states with the Sudan and South Sudan mediation as an example. Japan has no major conflict of interests with the AU, so it can only improve its relations with the Commission.

Conclusion

The Japanese are pioneers and were far ahead in conference diplomacy as compared to China that started FOCAC in 2001. China followed Japan's footsteps and launched FOCAC a similar framework to TICAD. China and Japan constant renewed efforts of linking their respective foreign policy with development assistance and trade and investment should be welcomed. The UN, EU, World Bank, the custodians of old donor practices can take their involvement in the TICAD process to find innovative ways of engaging Africans.

Unlike TICAD, which brings in major development partners into the dialogue, FOCAC places centrality on China's relationship with Africa, particularly its bilateral relations within the context of the multilateral forum. This move is not sustainable because government to government relations cannot solve all issues. NGOs and civil society have proven their ability to reach grassroots societies and should, therefore, be used in engaging ways in which Chinese people and African people can genuinely establish a true win-win relationship.

Self-reliance, partnership, ownership, win-win and South-South cooperation should remain central pillars guiding African relations with both Japan and China. The TICAD and FOCAC present the African continent with an opportunity to influence change in how foreign powers relate to African states. Africans should no longer accept being empty basket cases but a continent full of potential.

This chapter has managed to compare TICAD and FOCAC contributions to African development. Drawing from chapter three and four findings of what Japan and China focus on in their engagements with Africa, one can see that there is competition. They all are interested in similar areas. China due to its economic dominance is providing Africans with more assistance nearly in all fields. Japan, however, has strategic areas like peace and security where it performs better than China. The AU as a central body that co-hosts the TICAD and FOCAC has the onus to show more seriousness particularly at the FOCAC where it is new as co-organiser. It needs to tell Japan and China what it wants, control the pace of the relations and most importantly keep African interests first.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations

The research achieved the 5 main objectives: 1) argue that soft power is the driver of Japanese and Chinese engagement with Africa through TICAD and FOCAC conference diplomacy 2) Identify the African development agenda; 3) explain the TICAD and FOCAC frameworks and their contributions to African development; 4) Give a comparative analysis of TICAD and FOCAC engagements with Africa; 5) Gave recommendations to African states based on the observations.

What I have learnt from the study is that the language of the donor is fast evolving. The AU and its organ institutions are refraining from using the term 'donor' and increasingly using the term 'partner'. This change is informed by changes of placing business and trade ahead of donations by developed countries. The AU Agenda 2063 explicitly mentions 'strategic partners' as some of the pool of funders for the developmental plan. In my view, this is an important step towards moving away from handouts to a more self-reliant continent that is depended on its own resources.

The AU needs to have policies of engagement with dealing with both China and Japan. As things stand a comprehensive policy does not exist. The lack of a plan of action means that African countries have no clear guidelines of engaging both China and Japan. At the FOCAC and TICAD level, an umbrella policy can be created that African states can use in their own bilateral relationships with both states. In that way, fair and consistent deals can be drawn up when China and Japan engage African states. The policy documents should be underpinned by Pan -African ideals and driven by African interest at the core. 'Beneficiation' as the Japanese call value addition and 'Win-Win' should not be compromised. No African natural resource should leave African shores without adding value to African lives through job creation and skills development.

Soft Power

Theoretical framework & hypothesis

Theories are not static but fluid, therefore, the theories in International Relations can borrow from each other from time to time. They lose their relevance at times. Soft power as far as

explaining the emergence of conference diplomacy settings by Japan and China is a compelling argument. Nye's soft power which falls under the realism school of thought seems to fit the conference diplomacy that Japan and China have established through FOCAC and TICAD. Acquiring influence drives both powers interests in foreign assistance on the African continent. The International Relations realm in inherently a contested space, therefore, Japan and China competition for influence on the continent is nothing new.

Nye's conceptualisation of soft power can be argued to be correct in Chinese and Japanese engagements with Africa through FOCAC and TICAD. As African states continue to pursue developmental policies that can uproot their ordinary people from poverty they need to take advantage of Chinese and Japanese interests in getting maximum support for their policies. In the end, however true meaningful development will not come from Beijing or Tokyo but rather from the consistent efforts of African people to create a better future for themselves.

The hypothesis that holds that FOCAC and TICAD are competing frameworks aimed at complementing both Japanese and Chinese foreign policies in African states. In addition, Japan and China are competing for East Asian powers using different mechanisms in their foreign policies to gain soft power is correct. The competition is visible is different fields. Proving soft power is a difficult task however given the type of research conducted one can argue that the research has successfully proved that Japan and China are competing for soft power on the African continent.

Japan-Africa relations are poorly researched within African academia. There is a need for more academics to give the subject attention. TICAD and FOCAC have been heightened by media coverage, however, there is a need for more holistic research in the following fields associated with TICAD and FOCAC: 1) How Japan and China engagements have influenced civil society in Africa; 2) There is need to look at follow up documents and see whether resources are channelled into the correct sectors; 3) Women and youth development through TICAD and FOCAC engagements should be researched ;4) TICAD and FOCAC Action plans at every conference need to studied and analysed;5) Through research academia should actively influence the AU to develop policies for engaging all external partners.

Policy Recommendations: What the AU should be doing at FOCAC and TICAD

The following are suggestions on how the AU can play a more prominent role at the TICAD and FOCAC:

- Africa needs policies for a regional and sub-regional level in dealing with Japan and China.
- African broader development strategies like the Agenda 2063 and other NEPAD policies should be implemented with engagements at TICAD and FOCAC in mind
- Xenophobic attacks on Chinese nationals in Zambia are a result of poor planning and uncontrolled migration of Chinese people. African government should educate their people about the relationship between Asian powers and Africa. In this case, Chinese Confucius Institutes can be used. Japan and African states should improve people to people and cultural diplomacy.
- Grassroots constituencies should benefit from the growing relationship. The sentiment that foreigners are taking small business from Africans can be countered if the TICAD and FOCAC frameworks benefit more than just elites in African states.
- A fair balance in the 'partnership' and 'win-win' relationship is needed. As things stand Africans are exporting natural resources in return for access to loans and infrastructure development. 'Win-win' and 'Partnership' should in the form of fair trade, not diplomatic façade.
- Globalisation is not a zero-sum game, Africa should seize the opportunity presented by Asian states to take a leadership role in globalisation given the rise of anti-globalization forces in Europe.
- There is power in numbers, therefore the African States should negotiate with a stronger arm through negotiating collectively.
- Use Chinese and Japanese companies launch African enterprises at a global scale. Government to government deals of the Chinese can be used to strengthen state-owned enterprises and support for infant industries. Japan is strong with private companies this should be used to support African private companies.

The Way Forward for TICAD and FOCAC

China needs Africa's raw materials to sustainment its modernisation and economic reforms and on the other hand, Africa needs Chinese investments mainly hard infrastructure investment to industrialise. The global commodity price index rose with the rapid demand for natural resources from the industrialising China. It is no secret that these prices are subjected to booms and bursts, therefore, African states should learn from history that diversification of their sources of income is important.

African states should understand that there are long lasting consequences if African states do not invest their gains from the surge prices of natural resources. Natural resources will deplete leaving African states state coffers empty. It is crucial for African states to diversify their economies as well as promote value chain addition to maximally benefit from their resources. The FOCAC and TICAD framework should, therefore, be an institution for sharing practices and learning from each other.

Currently, global power structures are unbalanced in a way that has heavily disadvantaged African states. The lack of a permanent UNSC member from Africa and other developing states of the global South shows why reforms in global multilateral institutions are necessary. The call for reforms of the Security Council is of uppermost importance to African states, therefore Beijing should support Africa's appeal for fair representation. China and Japan are also needed to bring the African voice at institutions like the G20 and World Trade Organisations. The lack of fair representation in important institutions like the UNSC, G20, and WTO is a crisis for African states. Japan's quest to getting a seat on the UNSC should go hand in hand with African representation on the prestigious body.

Africa's long-term development should a priority. While short-term gains through increased trade have been witnessed, Africans should start looking at how the Sino-Africa and Japanese-Africa relations can have long lasting benefits. Beijing's and Tokyo's willingness to enter troubled countries traditionally shunned by the Western world is something that Africa should be built upon in repairing deindustrialised states like Zimbabwe and war-torn states like Somalia and South-Sudan. China's investments in post-civil war Angola have produced remarkable results. Angola features in the top 10 developing countries in the world largely due to its increase in oil exports directed China.

The textile industry in most African states has been destroying as most clothing is imported from China. Rising labour costs in China means that manufacturing in all sectors will move. Africa needs to be ready to take the opportunity to create jobs and industries for its

unemployed and poor-performing industries. There is an urgent need to diversify the trade relationship that African states have with China. The exportation of unfinished products like minerals is unsustainable. Africa should tap into sustainable industries like tourism as there is demand from China with much Chinese middle class starting to explore the world. The technological age upon us is an opportunity for Africans to learn from the Japanese.

The FOCAC framework has matured over the last 16 years and with its coming to age, wide consultation, joint development and common development has become part and parcel of the institution. The Bandung spirit that shapes the South –South relations is visible in the FOCAC framework. The framework has achieved remarkable achievement within the shortest period and ought to be celebrated. There is room for improvement in most of the frameworks activities however its current activities welcomed. As the Johannesburg Action Plan is being implemented, there are no doubts that targets agreed will be met given that China has honoured its past pledges. The enthusiasm in African states to engage China are a positive sign that Africans will not be bystanders to the growing evolving relationship that China has with Africa. In conclusion, I foresee a long-lasting relationship that is sustainable between African states and China given that mutual respect and win-win cooperation remain the backbone of the FOCAC framework.

Japan has been hosting the TICAD framework for more than two decades now. Japan has had a successful developmental state approach which worked well. TICAD has brought about opportunities that have benefited Africa greatly. As the framework grows given the competition from China and other non-traditional donors, Africans should be ready to work with a renewed Japan policy in Africa. There are many lessons to be learnt from Japan as far as development is concerned.

In conclusion, one can argue that truly sustainable development for African people will not come from Japan or China. It will be through the hard work and determination of African themselves. As Africans embark on achieving the Agenda 2063 vision, they should keep the Pan-African spirit alive. African solutions for African problems should remain a compelling maxim for African development quest.

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