

In 1966, Communist China again donated Algeria \$ 40 million in aid. This amount was not immediately delivered, but in April of the next year, Communist China delivered \$ 10 million in cash to the Algerian government to help it cover foreign change difficulties⁶².

According to a study in 1977, a Chinese built hospital and a china factory were completed, and there were 160 Chinese technical personnel in Algeria, which included medical teams⁶³. It was also reported that, between 1958-1979 Communist China altogether extended aid in the form of more than \$ 150 million and crop, building materials, blankets, medicine, stationery, military equipment, a commercial ship and four transport planes to Algeria.

Aid to Benin (Dahomey)

Communist China established diplomatic relations with Benin in 1964 but diplomatic relationships were severed in 1966. In 1964, this African state was promised economic aid by Communist China, but Communist China cancelled its promise after the suspension of diplomatic ties⁶⁴. Benin reestablished its diplomatic ties with Communist China in 1973. At the end of 1972, Communist China signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation with the African government⁶⁵. By 1977 Communist China had given \$ 44 million credit to Benin.

It was reported that there were 225 Chinese Communists⁶⁶ working on a stadium and agricultural projects by 1978. Before 1980, Communist China had given \$ 44 million credit to Benin. It was Benin's only active Communist economic aid donor.

Aid to Botswana

Communist China's aid to Botswana started very late. In 1976, Peking sent a team to study agricultural projects under an economic agreement for assistance of \$ 3 million⁶⁷. It also delivered small arms, ammunition and anti-aircraft guns, and a few Chinese military personnel accompanied the equipment. These personnel are the only Communist military advisors in this African country. In 1978 Botswana's two year aid relationship with Communist China received a shot in the arm as Peking allocated \$ 16,6 million development credit under a 1976 agreement⁶⁸. In June 1980, an agreement on the dispatch of a Chinese medical team was signed in Gaborone⁶⁹.

Aid to Burundi

Burundi received the only Communist development assistance from Peking in 1972. In that year Communist China gave Burundi a \$ 20 million credit to help it build a hydropower complex and a road. Because of this aid, Burundi could construct the \$ 9,5 million Mugere River hydropower complex. However, the work on the 90 kilometer Bujumbure Rutovo road lagged because of delayed deliveries and Burundi's reluctance to accept a large Chinese workforce⁷⁰.

Aid to the Central African Republic

In September of 1964 Mao extended a credit to the government of the Central African Republic for \$ 4 million and earned diplomatic recognition from this African country⁷¹. Very little of this small promise of aid was drawn between 1964-1965. Then, in 1966, the Central African Republic government was overthrown by Colonel Bokassa. The new government accused Communist China of supporting armed revolt in the country. Colonel Bokassa provided the press with documents and showed them Chinese arms to prove these allegations. He also warned those countries wishing peace not to allow Chinese Communists to stay in their territories⁷². Shortly after the establishment of the new government, diplomatic ties were broken and no aid was delivered from Communist China to the Central African Republic.

Aid to the Congo Republic

In July 1964 Peking offered the government of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) an interest-free loan to the amount of \$ 5,6 million⁷³. The loan was called a development loan but was used by the Brazzaville government to balance its budget. The following month Peking gave a \$ 25,000 grant for refugee relief⁷⁴. In October, the Brazzaville government announced it had received an interest-free loan for approximately \$ 20 million. Whether this was another loan or an increase of the first one is uncertain.

In late 1964 the Soviet Union also offered aid to Brazzaville. This may have induced Peking to give more aid or promptly deliver what it had promised. During 1965 a document was signed for the construction of a textile mill ⁷⁵.

Communist China's major concern during this period was the revolution in the neighbouring Congo (Leopoldville, later Kinshasa). When the revolution began to fizzle out in 1965, Peking wanted to keep it going. In May 1965 a large Chinese arms shipment was seized in Kenya, apparently heading for Brazzaville. Obviously Brazzaville served as a revolutionary base for the other Congo (Kinshasa), the Central African Republic and Chad. In 1967 a radio station, identified as the "Voice of the Congolese Revolution", was constructed with Peking's aid funds and ⁷⁶ provided coverage for a radius of 10000 kilometers. It was reported that Chinese advisers were providing guerilla training to revolutionaries from five nearby countries: Congo (Kinshasa), the central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon and Gabon. In September 1968 Peking delivered a sizable shipment of arms to Angolan revolutionaries based in the Congo Republic ⁷⁷.

In 1968 a military coup was staged with Communist China's support Massamba-Debat was supplanted by Marien Ngouabi and \$ 850000 in aid was delivered by Communist ⁷⁸ China to the new government. In order to stabilize the

Marien Ngouabi government, Peking gave Congo about
⁷⁹
 \$ 2,41 million aid in the following year .

During 1969 a Chinese-built textile mill was completed near Brazzaville and an agreement was concluded
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 whereby Chinese aid would be used to build a shipyard . In 1970 Peking promised to send a medical mission to Brazzaville and agreed on a ship-building project to be financed by Chinese aid. A military agreement was also signed whereby Chinese would provide heavy equipment to
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 the Congo's armed forces . According to a report, up to 1970 Communist China had promised the Congo Republic \$ 25,2 million economic aid, in fact, Peking delivered
⁸²
 more than this amount .

In early 1972 Communist China signed an agreement on military aid to Brazzaville but no details were released
⁸³
 . In October China signed another economic and technical cooperation agreement and provided Brazzaville
⁸⁴
 with \$ 391 000 to build a dam in Bouenza . In July 1973 Peking promised another loan estimated at \$ 20
⁸⁵
 million to \$ 40 million . In February 1975 the Congolese president, Lopez, visited Peking and another economic agreement was signed. This may have concerned earlier
⁸⁶
 aid, or could have included fresh aid . In 1976 Chinese medical workers were dispatched to the Congo Republic and a limestone crushing plant was completed,
⁸⁷
 there with Chinese aid funds . It was reported that there

were Chinese technicians working on a Congolese shipyard in 1977. In May 1977 Chinese officials held talks with their Congolese counterparts on building a "People's Palace" ⁸⁸ .

After 1977 many Congolese delegates visited Communist China. In May 1977 a Congolese military delegation headed by its Minister of Internal Affairs visited Peking. The following year another delegation, led by its president visited Peking. A Chinese military delegation also visited the Congo in June 1978. Finally, Peking promised to extend aid for a shipyard program in that ⁸⁹ year .

Aid to Egypt

Peking first extended aid worth \$ 4,7 million to Egypt in 1956 in the wake of the Suez Crisis. This loan was made in foreign currency and was designed to help the Egyptian government to overcome the shock caused to its economy by the severing of contacts with several Western countries. In October 1964 Peking announced an ⁹⁰ \$ 80 million credit to Egypt . This was an interest-free loan, the repayment was not to begin until 1970. Subsequently Communist China announced that its aid would be used to purchase equipment for building textile mills, sugar refineries, and other light industrial projects. When U.S. food aid was cut off during the year, Peking

also sent 250 000 tons of corn to Egypt. Although a part of the loan was drawn immediately, when the Great Cultural Revolution broke out in China, aid funds were no longer made available to Egypt.

After 1967 Communist China did not offer any further economic aid to Egypt until 1976. In March 1976, when President Sadat had had a dispute with the Soviet Union and requested aid from Communist China, the Peking government took the opportunity to capitalise on the deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt and agreed to supply 30 jet engines and parts for Egyptian Mig fighter planes⁹¹. This aid was in terms of a nonrepayable gift. In April, Cairo reported that Peking had agreed to supply parts for Soviet-equipped factories⁹². In June of the following year, the Egyptian government announced that it had received a shipment of military aid from Communist China in the form of a gift⁹³. In June 1979 Sadat also made reference to Chinese military assistance in a public address. Subsequently he elaborated upon his statement saying that Egypt had received forty Shen-yang F-6 jet fighters (Chinese version of the Mig-19)⁹⁴, noting that four were already in service. He also revealed that negotiations were in progress for forty or fifty more and that Egypt in return had given Peking one Soviet Mig-23, which Communist China had been anxious to attain to strengthen its aircraft manufacturing capability.

Another source noted that Egypt planned to use the Chinese aircraft at an air base south of Cairo to allow its Mig-21 fleet to be deployed closer to the Libyan⁹⁵ border .

In addition to military assistance, Communist China also provided Egypt with economic aid in 1979 in the form of technical cooperation in building a fish farm complex or more than seventy separate nurseries that also raise⁹⁶ ducks and fruit trees . On 5 May 1980, the Vice President of Egypt visited Peking and it was reported that Communist China was prepared to supply aircrafts, tanks and other⁹⁷ weapons to Egypt .

Aid to Ethiopia

When Emperor Haile Selassie visited mainland China in October 1971, he met Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders. His purpose seemed to be to ask for aid. He was promised an \$ 84 million interest-free loan earmarked for the development of agriculture⁹⁸ . Shortly afterwards, Peking signed an agreement promising to purchase \$ 2 million worth of Ethiopian coffee to adjust their trade balance. Peking also promised to send engineers and technicians to assist Ethiopian development⁹⁹ .

During 1972, protocols were signed on several Chinese aid projects: a high way, wells, a veterinary station, and a diesel power station. A number of Chinese study

groups and teams of technicians arrived to survey the work. More Chinese aid flowed into Ethiopia in 1973, but when Haile Selassie was deposed by the army in 1974, Chinese aid was put in cold storage¹⁰⁰. Chinese aid personnel again worked on wells and other water projects in 1976. Peking also sent medical personnel and military aid to Ethiopia in the same year¹⁰¹.

In 1977, Communist China maintained the largest active aid program in Ethiopia. Still operating under the \$ 84 million line of credit of 1971, Communist China continued work on the Waldiya-Woreta road and small electrification projects. It also signed agreements to construct a stadium and textile, porcelain and cement plants¹⁰². Although Peking intended to build another 300 kilometer railroad for Ethiopia in 1974, this project was refused by Ethiopia because the new Ethiopian policy was to lean towards the USSR¹⁰³.

Aid to Guinea

In 1958, Communist China reportedly sent rice-growing experts to Guinea. A year later, when Communist China's ambassador to Morocco visited Guinea, he promised 5 000 tons of rice as a "gift of the Chinese people". It was also rumoured that he agreed to a \$ 500 000 loan at this time. However, Peking first gave official aid to Guinea in 1960, after diplomatic relations had been

established and in conjunction with a treaty of relationship. Peking gave the government of Guinea a \$ 25 million non-interest loan to be drawn immediately and available until 1963. This loan was to be used for sets of equipment, Chinese technicians, technical training, and commodities. Peking agreed to pay for the transportation of Chinese technicians, and it guaranteed that Chinese aid personnel would not live at a level above Guinean technicians and workers. Later in the year, Peking gave Guinea 10 000 tons of rice, apparently as a gift. Peking also invited Guinea to send ten students to study in China at the expense of the Chinese government ¹⁰⁴.

However, Peking was slow in delivering aid to Guinea, by 1964 Peking had promised none projects to Guinea, but only a small cigarette factory and a match factory had been finished. The value of these two projects was estimated at only \$ 3 million. Although aid work continued, at the end of 1965 it was still estimated that only a quarter of Communist China's aid to Guinea had been drawn ¹⁰⁵.

From 1966, Guinea's relations with the West worsened, while Sino-Guinean relations improved. This was foreshadowed or accompanied by deteriorating relations between Guinea and its neighbours: the Ivory Coast, Ghana, the Congo (Brazzaville), and Mali. Coups in the latter three countries directly threatened President Touré's left-leaning government and forced him to rely on Peking and aid.

Meanwhile, political instability in Guinea engendered economic problems, food shortages, etc.... In this milieu, several Chinese aid projects were started or were given higher priorities. In January 1967, a hydroelectric station was opened. Subsequently, a dam, a sugar refinery, a unit oil factory, and a steel mill were started. And it was reported that Communist China was providing the government of Guinea with arms, some of which were being used in nearby Ghana¹⁰⁶.

In late 1967 Peking signed an agreement with the governments of Guinea and Mali to build a railroad linking the two countries. This represented a major Chinese commitment to Guinea and an effort to help Touré spread his political influence in the area. Peking may have perceived that Guinea could become a Chinese base for operation in Africa. Since the project was not feasible from the economic point of view, Peking's motives were obviously political. In August of the following year, a Chinese survey team completed its work, but a week later the Mali government was overthrown and the project was scrapped¹⁰⁷.

In October 1969 Peking signed another aid agreement with the government of Guinea promising to assist Guinea in solving its balance of payments problem and its general economic crisis. No details were provided on the conditions or amount of this aid. A few months later it was reported

that Peking had given Guinea \$ 10 million for budgetary support. In March 1970 an agreement was signed whereby China agreed to send medical workers to Guinea. Another pact was signed on economic and technical cooperation in November. Though no aid was mentioned in this agreement, Chinese aid projects were under construction, and the flow of aid from Communist China appeared to have continued uninterrupted. At this time Guinea also received a grant for \$ 1,5 million from Tanzania. Since Tanzania was receiving huge amounts of Chinese aid, this was probably in reality a grant from Peking¹⁰⁸.

In December 1972 an agreement was signed between Peking and Conakry on financial credits. This may have constituted another promise of aid but it was not announced as such. In any case, Chinese aid continued to flow. In 1973 a farm tool plant and some smaller projects were completed. During 1974-1975 other Chinese projects were started and some earlier projects completed¹⁰⁹.

In mid 1976 Guinea received two trawlers from Peking on credit¹¹⁰. The following year Chinese aid personnel handed over some fishing projects on April and in March a radio station called the "Revolutionary Voice of the National United Workers Party" was inaugurated¹¹¹. Peking also promised agricultural and medical aid to Guinea during the year and did some repair work on a

112
hydroelectric project .

Although lots of visits were exchanged between Peking and Guinea after 1977, President Touré also went to Peking in May 1980¹¹³ , no new aid promises were given by Peking during this period (1977-1980). It was perhaps because of Communist China's shortage of capital which was badly needed for its "Four Modernizations".

Aid to Ghana

Ghana was one of the African countries which got independence early. It got independence in 1957 and became a Republic in 1960. In 1960 Communist China established diplomatic relations with this new Republic and invited Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah to Peking and gave him a lavish welcome. Communist China made Nkrumah a promise of \$ 19, 5 million in aid in the form of a non-interest loan repayable over a ten year period beginning in 1971. This aid was to be used to finance sets of equipment, technical training, and Chinese experts. But the agreement did not provide for the drawing of the funds until 1962¹¹⁴ .

After 1962 several Chinese aid projects were started in Ghana. These included some freshwater fisheries, hand-craft industries, rice paddies, and one or two industrial projects. The government of Ghana confirmed that the

projects were effective and helpful to its economic development. Thus in mid-1964 Peking extended another non-interest loan to Ghana to the amount of \$ 22,5 million. This was not the true amount of the loan, however, because the unused portion of the earlier loan was included in this figure ¹¹⁵. Peking also offered Ghana aid to help it finance more guerrilla training camps ¹¹⁶.

When Nkrumah's government was toppled in 1966, Sino-Ghana relations deteriorated until 1972. In February 1972 Peking established its diplomatic ties with Ghana. In September an economic and technical agreement was signed, and in December it was reported that Chinese agricultural teams were in Ghana. It was also known that Peking might respond to a request for assistance on a dam project ¹¹⁷.

The bloodless coup, which brought a Western-oriented government to power in Ghana in July 1978, did not affect Communist China's economic programmes. Communist China, still the most active Communist partner in Ghana, continued work on the \$13 million Afife irrigation project. Chinese technicians arrived to study a glass plan, a sugar plantation, and a refinery — probably under the unused \$ 22,5 million 1964 credit ¹¹⁸. Peking also offered assistance to construct a rice mill and a ceramics factory and completed a spinning mill it had built for a private Ghanaian firm ¹¹⁹.

Aid to Kenya

Communist China's aid to Kenya started in 1964. In May of that year, Home Minister of Kenya, Oginga Odinga, visited Peking after his tour to the Soviet Union and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Peking. This agreement included a provision whereby Peking would extend aid to Kenya in the form of a \$2,8¹²⁰ million cash gift and a \$15 million interest-free loan. The loan was to be used to purchase Chinese goods and industrial equipment. But according to the Kenyan government, the goods which Communist China sold to Kenya were either of such a poor quality as to be unusable or superfluous, because Kenya was already producing them in ample quantities therefore the Kenyan government could not¹²¹ dispose of them.

Perhaps Communist China did plan to use its official connection with the Kenyan government to aid revolution-¹²²aries in Kenya. This alerted Kenyan leaders about Peking's revolutionary activities. Therefore, Communist China's aid did not exert much influence on Kenyan policy. In May 1965 the Kenyan government announced that its police had intercepted a convoy of 75 tons of Chinese weapons. Although Uganda later claimed that these weapons were destined for the Congo through Kenya and Uganda, the Kenya government was still doubtful about¹²³ Peking's intentions. In June 1967 Kenya declared the

Chinese Chargé d'Affairs persona non grata. Subsequently¹²⁴
 Peking was accused of distributing "seditious pamphlets".
 In 1969 and 1970, bomb explosions were reported by Chinese
 officials in or at the Chinese embassy. In these circum-
 stances, no further aid was promised and the aid already
 granted was not used¹²⁵.

Since 1973 Peking has made some moves to restore
 official contacts with the Kenyan government. In 1974
 the Chinese Red Cross made a donation of nearly \$0,5
 million to Kenya¹²⁶. In September 1980 Kenya's President
 visited Communist China and was granted a \$50 million
 interest-free loan to be drawn during the next ten years
 and to be used towards rice growing and the development
 of geothermal projects¹²⁷.

Aid to Liberia

Liberia established diplomatic relations with the
 government of the Republic of China in 1957. It was the
 first black African state which entered into diplomatic
 relations with the Republic of China. In 1961 Liberia
 received aid from the Republic of China. The good re-
 lations between Monrovia and Taipei lasted for 20 years
 until 1977. Then Liberia initiated improved relations
 with Communist countries, and Communist China started
 to extend aid to this country. About 200 Chinese were
 in Liberia working for former Republic of China's sugar
 projects by 1978. During President Tolbert's visit to

mainland China in June 1978, Peking agreed to provide at least \$23 million worth of credits under a 1977 agreement for three radio transmitters, agricultural products, and a stadium. Peking also promised to establish an alcohol plant at the sugar mill it had taken over from the Republic of China in 1977¹²⁸. In 1979 there were 235 Chinese Communist technicians working in the sugar mill and the alcohol plant¹²⁹.

Aid to Madagascar (Malagasy)

Communist China started to extend aid to Madagascar in 1972 when this African country severed diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China and established official ties with Peking. A Communist Chinese loan of \$9 million to the Malagasy Republic was reported to have been made in 1972, but no date was cited and there was no official agreement and no pronouncement from either government¹³⁰. The loan was reportedly for a tourist complex and rice and supplies. Later it was revealed that Communist China agreed to finish a hotel started by South Africa but discontinued this when relations were severed¹³¹. In 1975 Peking gave the Malagasy Republic a \$55 million credit¹³². The details of the commitment were not available, but the building of the all-weather road between Antananarivo and port Tamatave was part of this credit¹³³. It was reported that by 1977 Communist China had begun to work the Antananarivo-Tamatave road,

and that they had completed an agricultural machinery plant at Tulear. Peking also began work on a match factory and an experimental farm and conducted studies for small hydroelectric plants and a pharmaceutical¹³⁴ plant .

Up to 1978, Communist China was still Malagasy's largest Communist donor. However, it moved slowly on major aid projects to show its disapproval of Antananarivo's closer ties with the Soviet Union. A Chinese medical team arrived at midyear to serve at the Chinese-built medical¹³⁵ centre at Vatomandry .

Aid to Mali

Communist China established diplomatic ties with Mali on October 22, 1960. In September 1961 Communist China gave the government of Mali a loan of \$19.4 million. No details were released on the use of this loan, suggesting that some of it may have been intended for the purchase of military equipment. During the following year Chinese technicians were seen in Mali and government officials¹³⁶ commented on the effectiveness of Chinese aid . The first Chinese assistance went mainly for agriculture which required Chinese technicians and gave Peking a presence in the country. In early 1963 another aid pact was reached and Peking agreed to help the Mali National Film Board produce newsreels. A few months later, Peking¹³⁷ promised a textile mill .

During 1965 several Chinese-built projects were completed in Mali, including a textile mill and a cigarette factory¹³⁸. In June 1966 another agreement was signed, and Peking promised \$3 million more to help Mali through a financial crisis¹³⁹. In February 1967, a Chinese-built sugar refinery began to produce. This factory could produce 40 tons of sugar every day¹⁴⁰. In May of the same year, Communist China agreed to extend a \$20 million credit to Mali and Guinea to build the Kanhan-Bamako railroad¹⁴¹, but this project was later scrapped.

Up to 1968 Chinese aid continued to flow into Mali in support of Socialist programs. But President Keita's government was toppled by Moussa Traore at the end of that year. The new government did not maintain such close relations with Communist China as its predecessor. However, the new government adopted a non-alignment policy and asked the Chinese to remain, and some Chinese did stay¹⁴².

In December 1970 another agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed. This agreement promised Mali new aid to build a tea factory and something else. The amount of this credit was about \$87 million¹⁴³. In July 1978 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali visited Peking and signed a trade agreement with Peking. When another team visited Peking in May 1979,

it signed an agreement on technical and economic cooperation with Peking¹⁴⁴. However, most of Peking's commitments to Mali were with regards to agricultural or light industrial projects¹⁴⁵.

Aid to Mauritania

Mauritania is one of the biggest recipients of Communist China's aid in Western Africa. Mauritania gained independence in 1960 and established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. However, it switched its diplomatic recognition to Communist China in 1965. Two years later Peking signed an agreement on trade, cultural and technical cooperation with the government of Mauritania and promised an interest-free loan of \$4 million¹⁴⁶ with a repayment period of 20 years starting in 1976. Under this agreement, a large number of Chinese doctors and nurses were sent to Mauritania. In April 1969 Peking delivered 3 000 tons of grain to Mauritania as aid. In November an agreement was signed to drill wells using Chinese aid¹⁴⁷.

In April 1971 Communist China invited a delegation from Mauritania to Peking, and it was reported that Peking had provided an interest-free loan worth \$20 million¹⁴⁸. According to published documents, a Chinese-built experimental farm in the Rosso region, other irrigation constructions and a hospital were completed before 1972¹⁴⁹.

The biggest projects Peking had offered were a deepwater port and a road crossing Mauritania. After his tour to mainland China in 1974, President Daddah disclosed that Communist China had promised to build a deepwater port and a 500 mile road for Mauritania¹⁵⁰. In 1976 the Chinese government signed minutes of talks with the Mauritania government to build the deepwater port¹⁵¹, which could bring as many as 3 000 Chinese technicians into the country¹⁵². In 1977 Peking sent several delegations to Mauritania to study aid programmes, including rice and tea farms, and cement, milk and fruit juice factories¹⁵³.

In November 1978 the Chinese-built Nouakchott power plant opened with a great fanfare. The power plant covered about 25 percent of the city's needs and eliminated the former daily power failures. The long-awaited \$55 million Nouakchott deepwater port — one of Communist China's largest current projects in the Third World — was also under construction from this year¹⁵⁴. At the end of 1979 Peking handed over a hospital to the Mauritanian government¹⁵⁵. President Heydalla visited Peking in May 1980, but no new aid was promised by Peking¹⁵⁶.

Aid to Mauritius

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A loan worth \$31.6 million was announced shortly after the visit. It was reported that this aid would be for building an airport. There was speculation that Peking lacked the technology for this airport, and there was some adverse reaction to the Chinese demand that its goods be sold locally to pay for part of the project¹⁵⁷.

The construction of the airport had not been started even by 1978 because of the near tripling of the originally estimated cost. Since Peking's \$30 million offer had been made, inflation had pushed estimated costs into the \$70-100 million range, which raised doubts about the airport project¹⁵⁸.

Aid to Nigeria

Nigeria established diplomatic ties with Peking on 10 February, 1971. In November, Communist China signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and a trade pact with the government of Nigeria. Three months later the Chinese press mentioned sending agricultural socialists to Nigeria. Later Nigerian sources reported that there were development projects in Nigeria being built jointly by Communist China and Nigeria; Chinese technicians were also mentioned. This suggested that the earlier economic agreement contained a provision for aid, but no official announcement had been made to confirm this¹⁵⁹.

Aid to Rwanda

In May 1972 Communist China reached an economic and technical agreement, including aid, with the government of Rwanda, and a protocol to this agreement was signed in October. It was later reported that an interest-free loan worth \$22 million was given, and that Chinese credits were to be used for the construction of a road linking Rwanda and Tanzania and a cement factory¹⁶⁰.

In June 1978 Rwanda and Communist China signed a new economic and technical agreement calling for feasibility studies on a hospital, sport stadium, flour mill, and ceramic plant. The projects required additional credits as funds from the \$22 million agreement of 1972 were nearly exhausted. Communist China also opened an economic and trade exhibit in Kigali in July. That was the first foreign exhibit ever staged in Rwanda¹⁶¹.

Aid to Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone established diplomatic relations with Communist China on July 29, 1971, while Communist China made an economic commitment to Sierra Leone for the first time. It promised Sierra Leone a \$20 million loan in subsequent months¹⁶². In the next year, additional agreements were signed, including a protocol on the construction of a sports stadium and two bridges. Chinese medical teams were observed in Sierra Leone. It was reported that in

1976 the Kamibisa bridge, a sugar refinery, an executive building, a power plant and sports stadium as well as nine agricultural stations were completed under Peking's aid programmes¹⁶³. American research indicated that by 1978 Communist China was the most important foreign aid donor to Sierra Leone with a \$40 million credit agreement¹⁶⁴.

Aid to Somalia

Peking probably extended some unofficial aid to Somalia in 1961. There were reports at that time that Peking had sent a grant of \$130 000 in medical supplies and had extended technical assistance in building a radio station. The first official aid, however, was granted in August 1963. That was a \$3 million grant to help Somalia balance its budget, plus an \$12 million interest-free loan. The loan was designated for building a national hall and buying Chinese products. However, it may have been intended for other things, including¹⁶⁵ a road, technical assistance and weapons.

In late 1967 Peking negotiated the development of some rice and tobacco farms with the Somalian government. Chinese technicians arrived in Somalia at this time, and in March 1968 a Chinese aid team completed a theatre. Other teams were working on an electric station. Medical¹⁶⁶ teams and labourers were also seen.

In June 1971 Communist China signed another economic and technical cooperation agreement with Somalia and provided a \$110 million loan to Somalia for the building of two roads, one of them 1400 kilometers in length¹⁶⁷. This was one of Peking's largest aid donations up to that time, and it was one of Peking's biggest road building enterprises. It also promised to link Somalia¹⁶⁸ to Tanzania, where Chinese interests were growing.

In July 1973 Communist China further agreed to provide Somalia with emergency supplementary free economic aid¹⁶⁹. By 1976 Chinese aid had included a stadium and a hospital. In that year a 970 kilometer long road was opened to traffic¹⁷⁰. In 1977 Chinese technicians and workers completed the hospital and in October they turned over a 228 kilometer long highway to Somalia.¹⁷¹ The 30 000 seat stadium was completed in November.

In April 1978, President Siad traveled to Peking to deliver in person a request for emergency military and economic assistance. Communist China offered training and technical assistance but only nominal amounts of military hardware¹⁷². Peking also promised to provide Somalia with technicians for projects abandoned by the Soviets. While not completely filling the gap left by the departure of the 1 000 Soviet and East European technicians, Communist China maintained its 3 000 man presence of the year before and agreed to

provide \$18 million in aid to finish abandoned Soviet
¹⁷³ projects . On 23 April, 1980, Somalia concluded a
¹⁷⁴ Trade Agreement with Communist China .

Aid to Sudan

Communist China's first economic aid to Sudan was extended in 1966. In that year Peking provided Sudan
¹⁷⁵ with \$2 million to build a hotel . In June 1970 a Sudan delegation, headed by its financial minister, visited Peking and upon its return home announced that Peking had promised a loan of £14,5 million (about \$40 million) for the purchase of textiles, farm equipment and fertilizer, as well as road construction and other
¹⁷⁶ projects . In October 1971 Peking made a promise of aid to Sudan after a failed coup initiated by the Sudan Communist Party with the cooperation of the Soviet Union. This aid took the form of a loan for \$35 million specified to be used for the construction of another highway. Two months later a Sudanese military delegation visited Communist China and a military aid agreement was reached. However, this may have been part of the October loan. Subsequently it was reported that Peking had given the Sudan government eight Mig fighter planes and enough
¹⁷⁷ tanks to supply an armoured division .

In December 1972 Peking signed another agreement with Sudan. This agreement was for \$40,2 million in the form
¹⁷⁸ of a loan . The funds were earmarked for various projects,

including a textile and yarn factory, an agricultural machinery and equipment project, fisheries, workshops for boat repairs, and a cold storage plant. This brought Chinese aid commitments to Sudan to a total of \$115 million.

In May 1976 a Chinese-built Friendship Hall was completed¹⁷⁹. In 1977 Peking made an offer of military aid in the wake of the Soviet departure from Sudan¹⁸⁰. It is uncertain whether Peking actually made deliveries. However, in addition to this promise, Chinese technicians and workers completed the 600 kilometer Wed Medani-Gedaref road and a 1 157 meter long bridge¹⁸¹. After that, Peking accelerated activities on agricultural and transportation projects and promised more assistance to Sudan's island fisheries and a textile plant¹⁸². Meanwhile, Chinese geologists and medical workers were also working in the Sudan¹⁸³.

By 1978 Communist China was till Sudan's most effective Communist donor. Chinese technicians completed the second stage of the Hasabaisa textile mill in June and began preparations for a clothing factory associated with the plant. Chinese fisheries development projects at An-Nubah lake, being financed under a previous agreement, were also nearing completion. Assistance included 40 fishing boats and two cold storage plants¹⁸⁴. In 1980, when the vice President of Sudan visited Peking, another

loan was promised by Peking, but the details of this
¹⁸⁵
 loan were not available .

Aid to Tanzania

Before Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the state of Tanzania, Communist China had given aid to both. In February 1964 Peking granted Zanzibar a loan of \$0,5 million ¹⁸⁶ . This gift was intended to ingratiate the Chinese with the Zanzibar regime, fostering the stability of Zanzibar. Chinese engineers began working on a road in Zanzibar at that time. Possibly that the aid funds went for that. In June, Peking extended another loan to Zanzibar for \$14 million designated for project aid. In May of the same year, Peking also made a small grant of \$ 10 000 to Tanganyika. It was labeled ¹⁸⁷ non-repayable, but the use was not specified .

In mid-1964, when the union of the two states took place, Peking announced aid promises to Tanzania in the form of a \$2,8 million gift and a \$42 million loan. This loan was interest-free and repayable over a twenty year period. Mentioned in the aid announcement, were a textile mill, a farm implements factory, an agricultural research station, a broadcasting station, a painting factory, and an irrigation system, as well as weapons ¹⁸⁸ and military training .

In January 1965 a protocol relating to the 1964 loan¹⁸⁹ on economic and technical cooperation was signed , and subsequently Peking dispatched several agricultural teams to Tanzania. A few months later, Communist China¹⁹⁰ delivered forty trucks for project assistance In June of that year, Chou En-lai visited Tanzania and initiated talks on the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad which was to cost more than \$400 million.

On March 22, 1966, Peking made a donation of \$ 840 000 intended for the extention of the Dar es Salaam¹⁹¹ University . Three months later, Peking sent four patrol boats to Tanzania and offered aid in the form of¹⁹² a \$2,8 million gift and a \$5,6 million loan . In July, it was announced that the Sino-Tanzania Maritime Transport Joint Stock Company had been founded. Peking provided \$2,1 million in the form of a loan for Tanzania's share of the company. In subsequent months, more Chinese aid projects were completed and others were started.

The Tanzania-Zambia Railroad is the largest and most important foreign aid project Peking has undertaken in Africa. This project cost over \$400 million. If the money Communist China has spent on repairing the line is taken into account, the total amount increases to \$800¹⁹³ million .

In 1967 Communist China, Tanzania and Zambia signed an agreement according to which Peking was to finance and construct the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad at a cost of about \$400 million. The project involved the construction of a 1 160 mile railroad from the Zambia copperfield to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

The idea of a rail link between Tanzania and Zambia was first considered in the British colonial era. One of the earliest surveys for the rail link was commissioned by the British Colonial Office in 1952, but no decision was forthcoming on the survey¹⁹⁴. The possible implementation of the project was seriously considered after the independence of Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1964) and the "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" of Rhodesia (1965). The project originated from several considerations. Firstly, by 1964 the vast majority of the African colonies had been granted independence by the European powers. However, it soon became clear that the white minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese were not going to follow the patterns of "Africa for the Africans", and the major Western powers were not inclined to put pressure on them. Both Tanzania and Zambia were dedicated to the liberation of all Africa. They were confronted with the difficult question of how to combat the new situation, both to preserve their newly won political independence and to promote Africa's total liberation.

Secondly, having been under British rule, both countries had been dependent upon and integrated into economic systems dominated by their rulers. Independence left them with little or nothing of the institution and resources they needed. They had to reorient their economic system and they viewed the achievement of economic independence as one of their foremost goals. Zambian leaders realized that the political and economic independence of their country would be compromised if Zambia continued to transport its goods through Rhodesia to the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques in Portuguese Mozambique. From Tanzania's viewpoint, the reorientation of Zambia's economic linkages would strengthen Zambia, and therefore strengthen the forces of Africa freedom.

Having made the decision that the railroad was crucial and indispensable to the further political and economic independence of these countries, and also essential for liberation movements, Tanzania and Zambia requested credit from the traditional sources. They appealed first to the World Bank in 1963, but were rejected on the grounds that the project was economically unsound¹⁹⁶. Their appeals to the United Nations (1964), the Soviet (1964), and an Anglo-Canadian consortium in 1966 were rejected or unanswered despite the fact that an Anglo-Canadian survey concluded that the railroad¹⁹⁷ would be economically sound and feasible.

After the Western countries had refused to finance the project, Communist China offered to undertake the project. This happened during Tanzanian President Nyerere's visit to Peking in February 1965. They immediately sent a team to do the preliminary survey work in August ¹⁹⁸. Although Zambia originally hesitated to accept Peking's offer, it soon agreed to accept the Chinese project after Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence in November 1965 which made Zambia fear that Rhodesia and the Portuguese would cut off its traffic to the sea entirely. So the agreement on the building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad was signed in Peking on September 5, 1967.

Communist China's motives to help Tanzania and Zambia construct this railroad were based on several considerations. The first consideration was the strategic importance of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. Communist China's support of liberation movements in the 1960s was not successful. One reason for its failure, was the long distance between China and Africa. Transportation was also a problem for Communist China, wishing to deliver aid to inland countries. By the late 1960s, most African countries had gained independence, but Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa were still under white control. Therefore these areas were the targets of Chinese revolutionary activities. If Peking could build a railroad linking Tanzania and Zambia, it was

convenient for it to support liberation movements in these areas. The second reason was that the project might be seen as a proof of Peking's commitment to the African countries. Appeals to Western countries and the Soviet Union for the construction of this railroad had been rejected. If Communist China could help Tanzania and Zambia build the railroad, it would not only demonstrate Peking's genuine commitment to help the poor Third World, but it would also provide Peking with an excuse to attack the Western and Soviet aid as ill-intended. The third reason for Peking to assist this project, was that China wanted to show the world, especially the Third World, Communist China's technological and financial capability in competing with the Soviet Union and the West.

On April 8, 1968, three subsidiary agreements on payment, transport and working conditions of the Chinese railroad workers and technicians, and the survey and design of the railroad, were signed in Dar es Salaam¹⁹⁹. At the same time a team of three hundred Chinese experts arrived in Tanzania and the survey of the route was immediately started. 600 Chinese technicians had joined the surveying work and the task was completed by the end of 1969. The final agreement on the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad was signed in July 1970 and work immediately began on the construction of the 2000 kilometers of track from the Indian Ocean to the Copper Belt.

A \$400 million interest-free loan was provided. The loan would be repayable over thirty years, after a ten year period of grace, which meant that repayments would be due between the years 1981 and 2000. One of the principles of Chinese aid was that the time limit for repayment would be extended in cases when the recipients could not afford the repayments. The most striking feature of the actual building of the railroad was the size of the labour force involved—up to 45 000 Africans and 15 000 Chinese. This was totally different from Western financed projects which generally use a small number of foreign technicians, making greater use of expensive equipment and sophisticated technology ²⁰⁰.

In October 1970 Communist China sent a delegation headed by Fon I and Kao Lu to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Railroad. Both Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda made speeches praising Communist China's generous aid ²⁰¹. After the inauguration ceremony, the Chinese technicians divided into teams and started laying rails from both ends: Dar es Salaam and Mbimba (both in Tanzania). In November 1971 it was announced that the first 313 miles of track had been laid and that trains were running on this part of the line, carrying construction equipment and supplies ²⁰².

In 1972, attention was focussed on the completion,

of the most difficult section of the rail link in Tanzania, between Mlimba and Makambako (where the railroad climbs the escarpment from the Kilombero Valley into the southern highlands). During the same year, Rhodesia again closed its border with Zambia to cut off the infiltration of guerrilla troops operating from Zambia. Thus Zambia had to seek another route for the export of its copper. This incident made the building of the railroad more urgent. The Mbiba-Makambako section was completed in early 1973, with the most difficult part having been finished in October 1972²⁰³. Communist China called the completion of the section a great victory. In an editorial The People's Daily commented: "It has powerfully revealed that the iron will of the Tanzanian, Zambian and Chinese people to construct the railroad can overcome any difficulties and win any kind of victory²⁰⁴". In January 1973 copper ore from Zambia was transported on the part of the rail that was finished to the coast of Tanzania. Thus the railroad was proving its worth: it gave Zambia an outlet to the sea without going through one of the white-controlled countries to the south²⁰⁵.

The Tanzania-Zambia Railroad crossed into Zambia on August 25, 1973. The rail link had reached the half-way point. From that point, the construction was proceeding well. (This project was finished ahead of schedule).

By July 1976 the whole line was in operation. In July, an impressive delegation, led by Chinese Vice-premier Sun Chien, visited Zambia for the formal handing over of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. The handing over ceremony was attended by the heads of Botswana, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia.

Further Peking aid was extended when the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad was under process. During 1967-1968 projects of various kinds were started or continued: rural roads, two teachers' colleges, a police training academy, fisheries, poultry breeding stations, a dam, a stadium, an art institute, etc.

In 1969-1970 more new projects were undertaken. These include a radio broadcasting station, a shoe factory, another textile mill, irrigation projects, medical assistance, etc.

During 1972-1973 Chinese aid continued to pour into Tanzania. In March, 1974, Peking extended another interest-free loan to Tanzania worth \$75 million, designated for the development of coal and iron mines in the South. Tanzania, at the time, was hit by currency revaluations and by increases in the price of oil. Drought also hit this country and fifty thousand people were reported

suffering from famine in April 1974. In addition, Tanzania's agricultural production declined as a result of collective farming. Peking's aid was aimed at helping the Tanzania government resolve all of these problems .

In 1976 a variety of projects were under construction or completed, among them several medical and agricultural programmes, a pharmaceutical factory, mining projects and a gift of sports equipment .

The Chinese medical workers and agricultural aid team in Tanzania were busy throughout 1977. In October, Chinese aid personnel headed over a state farm. Chinese technicians also maintained the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad and trained Tanzanian workers to take over this function . In 1978 there were 1 000 Chinese technicians working in Tanzania on agricultural and mining projects .

Tanzania is also one of the biggest recipients of Communist China's military aid. According to a Reuter report, Communist China first sent a big quantity of ammunition to Dar es Salaam in September 1964. The minister of State of Tanzania, Lawi Sizaona, disclosed that this ammunition was a part of \$4,2 million Chinese military aid and that Communist China would send seven military officers to train the Tanzanian army . In 1968, Peking also delivered some missiles to Dar es Salaam to counter Rhodesian and South African reconnaissance

aircrafts²¹³ .

In 1970 military representatives from Tanzania visited Peking, and an agreement on military assistance was signed. Shortly afterwards, it was reported that the Chinese had started the construction of a naval base in Tanzania. In July, a Chinese-built military hospital opened in Dar es Salaam. Chinese military aid at this juncture, helped counter the threat of Portuguese troops in Mozambique as well as intimidation from Rhodesia and South Africa²¹⁴ .

In early 1971 Peking sent more military aid to Tanzania: two 100-ton patrol boats, sixteen tanks, twenty-four field guns, one hundred military trucks, and large quantities of jeeps, mortars and small arms. In April 1972 the head of the Tanzanian Defense Forces announced that an air base was under construction eight miles west of Dar es Salaam. This base was being built with Chinese assistance and would be equipped with at least one squadron of Chinese-built Mig fighters in 1973. Three hundred Tanzanian pilots were in mainland China at this time receiving training²¹⁵ . Research indicates that between 1964-1979 Communist China had trained 1 025 Tanzanian military personnel²¹⁶ .

It was reported that from 1969 all Tanzanian soldiers

were trained by Communist China. It was estimated that there were 200 Chinese military advisers in Tanzania to train the Tanzanian army²¹⁷. The publication, Strategic Balance, also mentioned that the 14 600 strong Tanzanian Army were in possession of 34 Chinese made T-59 and T-62 tanks and a number of Chinese 122 mm and 120 mm²¹⁸ artillery pieces, and anti-aircraft guns.

Aid to Togo

When Togo gained independence in April 1960, Chou En-lai immediately sent a telegram congratulating it. However, Togo did not show interest in Communist China until 1971 when the American government was actively negotiating with the Communists²¹⁹. In September 1972 the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Peking and signed an economic and technical agreement as well as establishing diplomatic relations with the Peking regime. Later it was disclosed that Peking had promised an interest-free²²⁰ loan worth \$45 million to Togo. In June the next year, a protocol on dispatching a Chinese medical team was signed²²¹. From 1978 Communist China began the construction of a \$ 6 million dam and irrigation complex on the Sio River under the 1972 agreement²²².

Aid to Tunisia

Tunisia established diplomatic ties with Communist China in 1964, but the relations between these two countries were not stable because of President Habib Bourguiba's

dislike of Chinese neo-imperialism²²³. The relations finally broke down in 1967 when the Great Cultural Revolution was in progress. Following the revolution, Peking sent several delegations to visit Tunisia and promised Tunisia economic and technical assistance²²⁴. These two countries reestablished their diplomatic ties at the end of 1971. In August 1972, Peking signed an agreement and promised \$40 million to the government of Tunisia²²⁵.

In 1977 Tunisia was granted both military and economic aid by Peking, and received both. In February Communist China and Tunisia exchanged letters concerning a \$15,7 million Chinese credit for building a canal²²⁶. In May the Chinese ambassador to Tunisia presented two military patrol boats as a "gift to the Tunisian People". In September a contract was signed on the construction of the canal and a transportation project and \$57 million in credit added to the \$40 million promised in 1972²²⁷. This \$57 million included the \$15,7 million of February. And in 1978 Peking sent technicians to begin the construction of the Medjerda-Cap Bon Canal²²⁸. In the following year the ministers of Trade and Culture were invited to visit and sign a trade agreement and a cultural agreement with Communist China²²⁹.

Aid to Uganda

Communist China had trade relations with Uganda as early as 1950. Before Uganda became an independent country, its premier visited Peking in 1960 and was promised a \$25 million loan²³⁰, but this loan was not drawn. In April 1965, when President Milton Obote visited Peking, China offered him \$15 million in aid in the form of a \$3 million grant and a \$12 million interest-free loan²³¹. Half the loan was given in convertible currency, the other half in goods and services from Communist China. This aid was also perhaps intended to arm, train and supply Watusi refugees who were sent to Rwanda and Burundi to start a guerrilla movement²³². As the Obote government was weak economically and people were not satisfied with it, there was an insurrection in Uganda in 1964, which had to be put down by the army with the assistance of British troops. Communist China's assistance may have been intended to strengthen Obote's position.

Obote's government was overthrown in 1971 after a coup d'état led by Idi Amin. Later a large quantity of Chinese-made ammunition was discovered in President Obote's residence²³³. It was also reported that Chinese soldiers were involved in guerrilla war against the Amin government²³⁴. Therefore the relations between Communist China and Uganda deteriorated. In 1973, when relations between these two countries improved somewhat, Peking

began to implement its aid promises and started several projects, but no new aid promises were made²³⁵.

Aid to Zaire

The first Peking aid to Zaire was made in 1973. In January of that year, Peking promised Zaire a \$100 million interest-free loan for the development of agriculture²³⁶.

On 24 November 1973, Peking established diplomatic relations with Zaire. Two months later, it was reported that Chinese advisers in Zaire were helping to train troops for war in Angola²³⁷. In November 1975 Peking sent engineers and technicians to manage and control a People's Palace in Kinshasa²³⁸.

Peking's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ho Yin, visited Kinshasa in July 1976. Two months later (19 October) Peking promised to build a 8 000 seat stadium for Zaire²³⁹.

In March 1977 Peking signed a pact with Zaire and promised Zaire a sugar plant. In the same month, when the Shaba war erupted, Peking immediately expressed its willingness to support Mobuto government and accused the Soviets of involvement in the war. It was reported that Peking soon delivered large consignments of light weapons to Zaire²⁴⁰, Peking's ambassador conveyed Peking's support to Mobuto on 20 May. On June 3, Peking's

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Huang Hua, arrived at Kinshasa to discuss the matter of cooperation between Peking and Zaire. He emphasized that the Shaba War was the result of a Soviet plot to control Zaire. It was clear that Peking's support of Zaire was a dig at the Soviet Union.

In June 1977 a Chinese delegation arrived at Kinshasa and promised to give Zaire 20 tanks and several patrol boats²⁴¹. On December 18, 1979, another agreement was signed. According to this agreement, Peking promised to help Zaire to grow rice and vegetables.

In February 1980, the Zaire News Agency reported that Peking had trained amphibious corps for Zaire²⁴². In March of the same year, a culture cooperation agreement²⁴³ was signed in Peking.

Aid to Zambia

The first Chinese aid to Zambia was extended in early 1964 in the form of a \$0,5 million grant, probably to win recognition or to influence Zambia's position in the Afro-Asian Conference²⁴⁴. In 1967 the first official aid agreement was signed whereby Peking offered a \$16,8 million interest-free loan to Zambia²⁴⁵. The date suggests that it was given to help Zambia through budgetary difficulties, following the crisis in Rhodesia which interrupted Zambia's export trade, but this loan was not immediately used.

Then, in February 1969, it was reported that Peking had agreed to build a 254 mile road in Zambia with the funds of the 1967 loan. Chinese technicians arrived in October, and work on the road started shortly afterwards²⁴⁶.

After construction had begun on the road in 1969, Peking began to provide another aid to Zambia, including technical assistance to build two radio transmitters. Simultaneously work began on the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. In July 1973 Communist China extended a new loan worth \$10 million to Zambia, but no further details were available on the loan²⁴⁷. In February 1974 the Zambia government negotiated another loan with Peking which provided credits totalling \$51 million. The purpose of this aid was apparently to bolster Zambian economy in view of the failure of its tobacco crop that year and the drastic drop in copper prices during the same year²⁴⁸.

In 1976, Zambia received further Chinese technical assistance for mining and various other projects after the completion of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad²⁴⁹. Later, at the request of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad authority, Chinese personnel were brought back to Zambia in 1978 to operate the line because local personnel failed at the job. Chinese also continued its assistance to agriculture and mining under the \$51 million credits of 1974²⁵⁰.

The President of Zambia, Kaunda, visited Peking in April, 1980 and signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement with Communist China on April 11.

Aid to Revolutionary Movements

Communist China's support of revolutionary movements in Black African countries, which attempt to overthrow the existing non-communist governments, began with the aid to the Union des Populations der Camerounaise. The leaders of this extreme left-wing Cameroun political party visited Peking in 1958 and obtained Chinese approval and promises of aid ²⁵¹.

With the coming of independence to the former Belgian Congo (later Zaire) in 1960, Communist Chinese efforts in the field of subversion remained, for a time, largely concentrated upon that country, which Chinese leaders apparently viewed as the key to central and Southern Africa. Chinese Communist leaders repeatedly addressed their visitors from the Congo, stressing that the liberation of the Congo could not be achieved through the sympathy of the colonialist, but only by armed struggle ²⁵². The People's Daily indicated that the independence of the Belgian Congo did not mean that the West would leave that country, nor did it mean that the people of the Congo had finished their revolutionary mission. The editorial insisted that independence meant continued armed struggle ²⁵³ against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

Peking's support of Congolese revolutionary movements was later confirmed by Zaire's President Joseph Mobutu on February 28, 1973. Zaire recognized Communist China in 1972. Later President Mobutu visited Peking. After his tour to Peking, Mobutu disclosed that Mao Tse-tung had told him that Communist China had spent much money and given many weapons in assisting guerrilla troops²⁵⁴ to topple his anti-communist regime .

Other Chinese subversive operations in central Africa in the early 1960s included those in Burundi. After the assassination of the prime minister of Burundi in 1965, a young cultural attaché who was defected from the Chinese Communist Embassy, disclosed that the Chinese were planning to support a revolt across the Burundi border by the left-winger, M. Gaston Soumialot, against the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was also reported that the Chinese were involved in the assassination of the Premier of Burundi. These revelations led to the closing of the Chinese Embassy in Burundi and the expulsion of Chinese diplomatic staff in January 1965²⁵⁵ .

A Chinese agent active in Burundi was Kao Liang, a leading correspondent of the New China News Agency, and its chief African correspondent. He was believed to have bribed Rwandan refugees of the Tutsi tribe in Burundi in 1962 and to have given them money with the aim of building up a pro-Chinese faction among them. The Rwandan

government later claimed that the Chinese had taken part in training Tutsis who attacked their territory in 1963 and early 1964²⁵⁶ .

In 1964 an attempt was made by the Sawaba party to overthrow the government of the Niger Republic. The President, Mr. Hamani Diori, said after the attempt that the rebels were organized, financed and led by Communist China and that the weapons used in the attempt had been bought with Chinese money which had been deposited in banks in Brussels, Geneva and Accra²⁵⁷ . Later the President said that Communist China "gives ideological and military training to nations of other countries and assists them financially to create subversion"²⁵⁸ .

Tanzania was the major center of Communist China's clandestine activities in East Africa. A report indicated that the island of Pemba was a major guerrilla training base where large quantities of ammunition were stored. The guerrilla trainees from other African countries in the 1960s were trained by the Chinese on this Tanzanian island and were then sent back to their own countries to carry out revolutionary activities²⁵⁹ .

Kao Liang was the Chinese instructor in this area. He was first based in Dar es Salaam in 1961. His official post was head of the New China News Agency, but in many ways he lived like a diplomat and made frequent visits to other African countries outside Tanzania. He became a

notable figure amongst the pro-Chinese faction in Dar es Salaam and was described as being a "key figure" in Communist China's diplomatic activities in the capital and as a "go-between for the diplomats and their Africa contacts²⁶⁰". He also kept in close touch with political exiles from Southern Africa as well as with local politicians. According to Ian Greig, Kao Liang was involved in the Chinese backed revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964, and he himself assisted in the planning and arranging of material backing for the revolt²⁶¹.

In 1965 Communist China's policy in Africa suffered from a series of major setbacks, partly because of the rising alarm by African governments concerning Chinese activities. Serious allegations were made that the Chinese ambassador in Dar es Salaam had been involved in attempts to overthrow the Prime Minister of Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda²⁶². On May 20, the Kenyan government intercepted 70 tons of Chinese-made ammunition. On June 1, President Jomo Kenyatta warned his people to be alert to the danger from Communist China²⁶³. Wang Derming, the correspondent of the New China News Agency in Nairobi, was expelled by Kenya due to the allegation that he was involved in an abortive coup in July²⁶⁴.

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In 1961 six Africans returning to the Cameroun were arrested. They were sent back from Communist China to Africa carrying orders for the guerrillas of the Communist-backed Union des Populations Camerounaise which had been involved in armed revolt in the French Cameroun since 1959. These six Africans said they had attended a military engineering college near Peking and were given a 10 week course in guerrilla warfare at that college²⁶⁵.

According to a June 1964 report circulated by the International Press Service, a number of young Africans were trained in guerrilla warfare at special training centers in Harbin, Nanking and other locations in North-East China. Students were said to come from Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cameroun and the Congo(Kinshasa)²⁶⁶.

A number of Southern Africa liberation movements have received training in China. One member of the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union(ZANU) described his 12 months training in Shanghai during 1968-1969. He had a course on the use of small arms, explosives and ambush techniques, and lessons on how to approach and politicize the local population in the countryside²⁶⁷. After the organization had come to power in the newly independent Zimbabwe in 1981, its leader Mugabe, disclosed that he had received much assistance from Communist China. The assistance included money, goods, weapons and guerrilla training for his army²⁶⁸. He also attributed the success

of Zimbabwe's revolutionary struggle to Communist China's
 aid²⁶⁹ . Mugabe himself also received guerrilla training²⁷⁰
 in Communist China in 1970 .

Arms supply is another form of Communist China's aid to African revolutionary movements. Chinese arms were first found in the hands of insurgents in Africa in the late 1950s in Cameroun. Subsequently, a mission from the Algerian FLN visited Peking in 1959 and apparently was successful in securing a credit valued at about \$ 10 million for the purchase of arms and other equipment. Chinese arms were also exported to the Congo, Rhodesian guerrillas, Frelimo and Coremo of Mozambique, the PAC of South Africa and SWANU of South West Africa in very considerable quantities. Many of the weapons were Chinese copies of Soviet designed carbines, machine-guns, sub-machine-guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers and land mines²⁷¹ .

Communist China had been supporting Angolan liberation movements from 1960 onwards. It was reported that Communist China supplied large quantities of canons and tanks to the FNLA²⁷² (Frente Nacional Para a Libertacao de Angola), one of Angolan revolutionary movements. The leader of the FNLA also claimed that his army had been trained by Chinese²⁷³ . In August 1975, Communist China sent 250 military advisers to Zaire where the FNLA was

based to train FNLA troops. The aim of Communist China's aid to the FNLA was to avoid Angola falling into the hands of the Soviet Union. When the outcome was favourable to another movement the MPLA (the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), backed by the Soviet Union, Peking diverted its aid to the third party UNITA (the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). In February 1978, Peking supplied arms to UNITA for the purpose of sabotaging the MPLA government. All the arms were delivered to UNITA through Zaire and Zambia, whilst some Chinese military advisers were seen working in the
274
UNITA base .

Footnote

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2. Ibid
3. Ibid. p. 16
4. Intelligence Digest, no. 198. May 1955, pp.13-14
5. They are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.
6. People's Daily, July 2, 1954
7. The anti-Communist ones are: Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Ceylon, South Vietnam, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Gold Coast, Sudan, Liberia.
The twelve neutral countries are: Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nepal, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia.
The two communist countries are: Communist China and North Vietnam.
8. "Chou En-lai's Speech before the Full Political Committee of the Bandung Conference" Documents on China's Relations with South and South East Asia. (ed.) by G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private, 1964) pp. 13-16
9. Time and Tide vol. 36 no. 18 April 30. 1955 p. 549
10. Chou En-lai's Speech before the Full Political Committee of the Bandung Conference" op.cit. pp. 13-16
11. Ibid. pp. 16-21
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28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. People's Daily, November 5, 1956
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CHAPTER FIVE

An Appraisal of Communist China's Aid to Africa

The evaluation of a foreign policy should incorporate two aspects: (1) the achievements of the policy, (2) the constraints of, and challenges to, the policy. Analysis of the former aspect gives a picture of what the policy has achieved in connection with its goals. The latter aspect defines the restraints in implementing this policy and allows for prediction of the future course of the policy.

PART I

The Achievements of Communist China's Aid to Africa

The degree of success of a policy in achieving predetermined goals can be measured by its influence on other countries. According to Alvin Z. Rubinstein, the meaning of influence is: when A affects B through direct or indirect means, the conduct of B serves the interest of A¹. The evaluation of the achievements of Communist China's aid policy must examine the African countries' response.

Peking's foremost goal in extending aid to African countries was to purchase diplomatic recognition².

The success of this is the first measure in assessing the aid policy.

An examination of the extension of diplomatic recognition by African states demonstrates that Communist China's aid policy has been very successful. Communist China currently has established diplomatic relations with most African countries. Before 1956 no African countries accorded diplomatic recognition to Communist China. By 1964, only eight years after Peking began extending aid to Africa, Communist China had been recognized by nineteen African countries. In 1980, among the fifty-three independent African countries, forty-five have accorded diplomatic recognition to Communist China. Although aid was not the only reason for African countries' decision to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, it is obvious that it contributed to this course of action since most of these countries are poor and unstable, and desperately in need of foreign aid. Since all forty-five African states which had diplomatic relations with Peking in 1980 were all Communist China's aid recipients (see Table 5-1) the inference can be made that there exists a correlation between Communist China's aid and the extension of diplomatic recognition.

Egypt was the first African state that received aid from Communist China and in return granted diplomatic recognition. On January 22, 1955, Communist China and

Egypt signed their first three-year Trade Agreement which was in fact economic assistance to help Egypt through its difficulties arising from the boycott by Western countries to purchase Egyptian cotton. In May of the following year, Egypt established formal relations with Communist China. This was viewed as a reward for Chinese economic assistance. Two months later, when the Suez Canal Crisis erupted, Communist China extended its first formal aid to Egypt.

Morocco was the second case. In 1958 Peking pledged aid to Morocco, and at the end of that year, Morocco established diplomatic ties with Communist China. The same also applied to the Central African Republic which, after having received an aid promise from Peking, switched its recognition from the Republic of China to Communist China in 1964³.

Communist China's diplomatic relations with Mozambique and Zimbabwe are also products of its aid policy. Communist China had for many years granted military and other aid to "Front for the Liberation of Mozambique", before it overthrew the Portuguese colonial rule in 1974⁴. Immediately after independence, Mozambique rendered diplomatic recognition to Communist China. Robert Mugabe of "Zimbabwe African National Union" received Communist China's aid from as early as 1960s.

Table 5-1

Dates of Diplomatic Recognition and The Dates of Initial Chinese Aid

COUNTRY	DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION	INITIAL CHINESES AID
Algeria	July 3, 1962	November 1958
Benin	November 12, 1964	1964
Botswana	March 25, 1974	1976
Burundi	December 21, 1963	January 6, 1972
Cameroon	March 26, 1971	August 17, 1972
Cape Verde	April 25, 1976	1977
Central African	September 29, 1964	September 29, 1964
Chad	November 28, 1972	September 20, 1973
Comoros	November 13, 1975	1976
Congo	February 22, 1964	July 1, 1964
Djibouti	January 8, 1979	
Egypt	May 30, 1956	November 10, 1956
Equatorial Guinea	October 15, 1979	January 22, 1971
Ethiopia	November 24, 1970	October 9, 1971
Gabon	March 5, 1974	1973
Gambia	December 14, 1974	1976
Ghana	July 5, 1960	August 18, 1961
Guinea	October 4, 1959	September 13, 1960
Guinea-Bissau	March 15, 1974	1976
Kenya	December 14, 1963	May 10, 1964
Liberia	February 21, 1977	1977
Libya	August 9, 1978	1978
Madagascar	November 6, 1972	1972
Mali	October 22, 1960	September 22, 1961
Mauritania	July 22, 1965	February 16, 1967
Mauritius	April 15, 1972	August 9, 1972
Morocco	November 1, 1958	1958
Mozambique	June 25, 1975	March 1975
Niger	July 20, 1974	1974
Nigeria	February 10, 1971	November 3, 1972
Rwanda	November 12, 1971	May 13, 1972
Sao Tome Principle	July 2, 1975	1975
Senegal	December 7, 1971	November 23, 1973
Seychelles	June 30, 1976	1978
Siera Leone	July 29, 1971	July 30, 1971
Somalia	December 16, 1960	August 9, 1963
Sudan	December 1, 1958	August 12, 1970
Tanzania	December 11, 1963	February 21, 1964
Togo	September 26, 1972	September 19, 1972
Tunisia	January 10, 1964	August 27, 1972
Uganda	October 18, 1962	April 21, 1965
Upper Volta	September 15, 1973	September 8, 1973
Zaire	November 24, 1972	January 14, 1973
Zambia	December 25, 1964	January 1964
Zimbabwe	April 18, 1980 ²	

Note: (1) Peking established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika on December 9, 1961, and with Zanziba on December 11, 1963

(2) Peking aided the Rhodesian Revolutionary movement from 1960s

After Mugabe had come into power in 1980, his ZANU government immediately established diplomatic relations with Peking. The same kind of thing also happened in Algeria in 1962.

If aid was not the prerequisite of recognition - giving, it was then a reward of it. The early two cases are Guinea and Ghana. The former recognized Communist China in October 1959, and the latter in July 1960. Not long after, they received Chinese aid in September and August 1960, respectively.

Similar cases happened in the 1970s. Benin resumed diplomatic relations with Peking in 1972 and the result was four interest-free loans from Peking. In the case of Burundi, the exchange of diplomats in 1971 was followed by an economic and trade agreement which provided for a \$20 million credit. In 1972 Chad and Communist China established diplomatic relations, in the following year Chad was granted a loan of \$45 million. Equatorial Guinea established diplomatic relations with Communist China in 1970, and signed a series of economic and trade agreements with Peking in 1971. In 1972, shortly after diplomatic relations were established between Communist China and

Madagascar, Communist China made a gift of 10,000 tons of rice and provided an interest-free loan of \$8 million to Madagascar. After diplomatic relations were established with Niger in 1974, Peking granted an interest-free loan of \$48 million. Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone established diplomatic relations with Communist China in 1971. Economic and technical cooperation agreements soon followed: with Sierra Leone in 1971 and with Rwanda in 1972. Senegal received a credit of \$45 million in 1973⁵. However, the most salient examples concerning the linkage between aid and diplomatic recognition are the cases of Ethiopia and Zaire. Despite their reputation as the most anti-Chinese countries, Ethiopia and Zaire established diplomatic relations with Communist China in 1970 and 1972, respectively. Both have negotiated a number of aid and trade agreement with Peking since⁶.

Another aim of Communist China's aid to Africa was to secure U.N. membership. Peking eventually succeeded on the so-called "Question of Representation of China" in 1971. In 1956, only two African countries supported Communist China in the voting on the "Question of the Representation of China" while four voted for the Republic of China. After Peking started to extend aid to Africa, more and more African countries gave their support to Communist China. In 1965 among the forty-nine countries which voted in favour of Peking, there were twenty African countries. Although this number declined in the following

years, it increased again from 1969. In 1971, there were twenty-five African countries voted for Communist China, meanwhile only fifteen voted for the Republic of China (see Table 5-2) That same year Communist China successfully entered the United Nations and supplanted the Republic of China as a permanent member of the Security Council. Peking's aid obviously made the difference .

Table 5-2

Records of U.N. voting on the Question of Representation of China

	for R.O.C.	for Communist China
1956	47 (4) ^a	24 (2)
1957	47 (3)	27 (4)
1958	44 (3)	29 (3)
1959	44 (2)	29 (4)
1960	42 (2)	34 (6)
1961	48 (9)	36 (8)
1962	56 (17)	42 (13)
1963	57 _b (16)	41 (11)
1964	-- _b	--
1965	56 (12)	49 (20)
1966	57 (16)	46 (16)
1967	58 (19)	45 (15)
1968	58 (20)	44 (14)
1969	56 (21)	48 (18)
1970	49 (18)	51 (18)
1971	35 (15)	76 (25)

Sources: The Year Book of the United Nations, 1956-1971

Note: (a) African Countries in bracket

(b) No voting on this question in this year

Besides diplomatic recognition and U.N. membership, aid has also been used to help expand Communist China's general influence in Africa. Communist China has always portrayed itself as the leader of the Third World, because it needs the echoes of the Third World countries to add

weight to its views and policies. Success on this purpose is limited because of various challenges and constraints. However, Peking's generous aid has earned some favourable responses from African countries.

The Eight Principles of Communist China's aid have been widely welcomed and applauded by African recipients. Based on the Eight Principles, terms for repayment of loans are always generous. Usually loans from the Western nations carry an average interest rate of three percent or more, the Soviet loans, 2,5 percent⁸, but Communist China's loans to African countries are, as a rule, interest free. Further, the recipient countries enjoy a six to ten year period of grace before they start to repay the loans. Communist China also provides long-term loans, some are as long as thirty years. These favourable terms are appreciated by African leaders. For instance, Mali President Moussa Traore told Chou En-lai in 1973 that:

China's disinterested assistance, based on the eight principles which you set forth during your visit to Bamako in 1964 and concretized and supplemented by the Chinese delegation to the Conference of the UNCTAD held in Santiago, Chile, is all the more appreciated because we are in a world dominated by the egoism and

hegemonic desire of the imperialist big powers, who impose their will on international trade, resulting in the constant deterioration of trading terms to the detriment of the developing countries¹⁰ ".

"In the name of the Malian people, I wish to convey through you our thanks to the Chinese people for this cooperation which is suited to our commerce and is assuredly always effective. I am glad to point out in particular China's participation in the execution of the Three-Year Development Plan which we worked out within the framework of our policy of economic and financial rehabilitation The aid and assistance made available by your country to developing countries are also generous and disinterested¹¹ ".

When President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone visited Communist China in November 1973, he also expressed his gratitude to Peking. He said

"..... the great assistance we have received and we are receiving from the government and people of this great Republic. We also want to thank you for the invaluable help you have been giving

to our brothers and sisters in other parts
of the continent of Africa ¹² ".

Another feature of Communist China's aid policy is that its personnel are hard working and willing to work under the same conditions as the local workers. Unlike Western aid personnel, who involve themselves mainly in planning and supervising, Chinese engineers take part in the various phases of every project. This has made a good impression on African people ¹³. The following excerpts from comments made by an African leader and reporters illustrate this,

(1) Tanzania's President Nyerere commented that "the example of hard work and selfless service, which is being provided by the Chinese comrades who are acting as technicians and teachers on the railway, may be of equal importance for Tanzania's future development ¹⁴ ".

(2) Paul Bertnetel wrote in an article: "The Chinese method and concept of relations with African states are in many ways an example for others. Their method is based on three main criteria: Efficiency, equality, speed; their aid always goes to a well-defined project ¹⁵ ".

(3) In November 1971 Anthony Delius said in an article: "Though they are aware of the growing strength of China,

the Africans do not see her as a musclebound Great Power..¹⁶ "

From these comments we can doubtless discern that Communist China's aid has contributed to increasing its reputation in Africa, which helped to strengthen Peking's position on the African continent.

Finally, since the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad is the biggest project Peking has ever undertaken in Africa, it is worthwhile to examine in more detail its significance and the achievements that Communist China has gained. This can be seen in four aspects: (1) As reflected in its Tanzania-Zambia Railroad plan, Peking has always emphasized equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and commitment to the economic development in its foreign policies toward all small and underdeveloped countries. Its help in building the much-needed railroad is perceived by many Africans as a realization of its commitment. Thus Communist China is regarded as a real friend in Africa.¹⁷

(2) The railroad plan shows that Communist China's support for African national liberation movements is not rhetoric but substantiated by action. As mentioned before, one of the considerations for Communist China to build the railroad was to facilitate its delivery of aid for liberation movements in land-locked countries. Another consideration was to help Tanzania to extend its support to the revolutionary organizations via the railroad,

considering that Tanzania has been acting as a long time supporter of African liberation and armed struggles¹⁸.

This goes to indicate that Communist China is a real supporter of revolutionary movements. This in return helps draw support from Third World countries for Peking's advocacy of World Revolution. (3) The railroad represents a psychological triumph for Communist China. The West, with its technological advantage, had several times rejected the railroad project. The success of this railroad built by Chinese-African cooperation symbolized an end to the absolute superiority and dominance of the West in technology, and gave the impression that the economic and technological development of Communist China was

rather advanced¹⁹. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania once remarked: "Perhaps the Western countries are too sophisticated in every way for us to draw much inspiration from their techniquesWhen my young men go over and see an advanced production technique in the West they are not really impressed or stirred but when they see more easily applicable experiments in China ...

Then these young people come back with glowing eyes and hearts²⁰". (4) Last but not least, Communist China's

development model — self-reliance — has been accepted by the Tanzanian leaders as the model of their development. The Tanzanian leaders view the philosophy of self-reliance as an important element in the establishment of self-confidence among the people of Tanzania. With self-reliance in mind, they believe that they are able to

shoulder and solve problems by relying first on Tanzania's resources and ingenuity. The request for external assistance is only made when it is absolutely necessary²¹.

It is reported that Africans once said that "Once Chinese friendspass on to us the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance....this spirit is the most precious treasure"²². This is a big success Peking achieved by building the Tanzania-Zambia . Railroad.

PART II

Constraints of Communist China's Aid to Africa

In carrying out an aid policy, the donor country must first of all have a strong economic base. However, Communist China lacks the capability to support its aid programmes²³. This constitutes a major constraint on its aid policy.

Since the inception of Chinese Communist regime in October 1949, the Communist Chinese economy has been in a bad state. When the Chinese Communist Party came to power, it also took over the ancient Chinese economic traditions. The traditional economy bore the marks of a backward and stagnant economy caught in a vicious circle of poverty²⁴. China had the biggest population in the world; the high population pressure upon arable land resources²⁵ led to a continuous fragmentation of land holding. The structure of the population, in general, was a young population with a high proportion of children, so the ratio of consumers to producers was comparatively high. Its farmland resources were severely limited.

Communist China's economic situation did not successfully improve largely because of a series of mis-guided projects. In 1950 regulations were promulgated requiring private industry to work only on approved plans and projects.

The purpose of these regulations was to put all private factories under government control. This policy only led to the stalemate of private industry. Shortly thereafter, Peking started the movement of Five-Antis (anti-bribery of public servants; anti-tax dodgers; anti-stealing state property; anti-cheating on government contracts; anti-stealing economic information) in 1952. Most private industries came under severe attack and the private industrial sector further declined in 1952-53²⁶.

During the first Five-Year-Plan (1953-57), Communist China's economic policy was to follow the Soviet economic model. With Soviet assistance, Communist China's economy developed rapidly and relatively modest inputs yielded sizable increments in output²⁷. Nevertheless the achievements of the period were destroyed once the policy of the "Three Red Flags" was proposed in 1958. This policy included "Great Leap Forward", "Gross Line" and "People's Communes". Mao Tse-tung called on the Chinese people to mobilize and build backyard steel furnaces based on primitive methods. This movement caused a big recession²⁸ in China's agriculture, industry and foreign trade.

A more serious blow on Communist China's economy was the "Great Cultural Revolution". The movement attracted all Chinese efforts to the political struggle and left no energy for building up the economy.

The Great Cultural Revolution brought Communist China's economy to the edge of bankruptcy until 1976²⁹. The plight of Communist China's economy was later disclosed by Kwa Kuo-feng, the new party leader following Mao's death. He publicly stated at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978 that the atrocities committed by the "Gang of Four" had pushed the economy of mainland China to the brink of collapse. He pointed out that of the 980 million population 800 million were engaged in agriculture, but that more than 100 million peasants were suffering from a shortage of food³⁰. Wang Ping-chien, Minister of Finance, disclosed in 1980 that a big deficit existed in China. According to his statement, there was a \$ 11,37 billion deficit in 1979³¹.

The effect of Communist China's economic plight on its aid policy to Africa had two facets: Firstly, the quantity of its aid was limited; secondly, the quality was poor. In the early 1970s, in order to join the community of nations, Communist China had to shelve its domestic constructions while mounting a massive economic aid to Africa³². Even in doing so, Communist China still could not supply a large amount of aid to Africa. Communist China's chief delegate to the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua, openly confessed to this in his speech to the General Assembly in October 1972, just one year after Peking had entered the U.N. He said that "our capabilities

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in this respect are limited and the aid we can give is not much"³³. Under these circumstances, Communist China had to restructure some of its aid projects by selling products to the recipient countries to help develop its own economy by increasing trade. This generally produced adverse effects on the economy of the recipient countries. Guy Arnold comments as follows:

"A major drawback to Chinese aid has been its demand that recipients should meet local costs by the sale of Chinese goods. There have also been criticisms of both the quality and type of goods on offer, some bring what might be termed 'make-weight' and of no real use to the recipient countries. Moreover, if a developing country such as Tanzania is obliged to accept and put on the market simple goods (which it could manufacture itself), this is an inhibiting factor to both local producers and neighbouring African countries who could³⁴ also supply the market"

The backwardness in science and technology constitutes yet another constraint on Communist China's aid policy to Africa. The slow progress in science and technology was a result of doctrinaire ideology. During the initial years of Communist rule, the Soviet Union served as a

model of China's development in these areas. Peking sought to develop heavy industry as the basis for technological and scientific development. A large proportion of state funds was allocated for scientific and technological research, which was several-fold³⁵ compared to the past. However, Peking's anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideology caused Communist China to rely exclusively upon the Soviet Union, and to eschew anything from Western countries. The defects of this policy were soon to be seen when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was the only source of books, technology and other aid, while in 1960, this source dried off, and thus left Communist China's scientific and technological development in a critical state.

Political movements also proved detrimental to Communist China's development and progress in science and technology. In 1956 Chinese Communist Party staged the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" to encourage the people to criticize government's mis-management. When scholars and scientists criticized all aspects of the party, which was beyond its tolerance line, the party launched a large-scale purge on these scientists and scholars in retaliation³⁶. Nevertheless the effects of this purge were insignificant compared to the havoc created by the "Great Cultural Revolution": colleges and research institutes were closed down, and scientists were ridiculed

or sent to the countryside to engage in labour work. Consequently, from 1966 to 1972, almost no students graduated from Universities or institutions of higher learning³⁷.

Furthermore, research and development were hampered by pervasive hostility to experts and theoretical studies. The deleterious results were highlighted years later by a Chinese newspaper:

"Under the revolutionary slogan of
'dismantling temples to drive away the gods'
about 10,000 scientific and technical personnel
in Liaoning Province alone were forced to
settle down with their families in the
countryside college graduates
were instead appointed as buyers, sales
workers, custodians, typists, cooks, etc....
Some specializing in rocketry were assigned
as doorkeepers. Remote control specialists³⁸
were turned into butchers" .

These factors have caused Communist China to fall far behind the two superpowers and other second-ranking powers (such as Canada, France, West Germany, Japan and U.K.) in science and technology. Therefore it is characteristic of Peking's African aid policy that most projects are labour intensive programmes. Even in the industrial

sector, these programmes mainly relate to the construction of textile and food factories, including sugar, palm and groundnut oil refineries, which require only basic technology. Frequently, Peking failed to satisfy the needs of African countries. This was noted by Guy Arnold, when he observed that "without a high degree of readily exportable technology of its own, China is at a disadvantage in attempting to provide aid for sophisticated countries such as Egypt and Algeria"³⁹. In the field of military aid, Communist China can only provide small quantities, or unsophisticated types, of equipment. Communist China's military aid to the guerrilla forces of various liberation movements in Southern Africa and to a few rebel groups in independent African states, including the Congo, Cameroon and Kenya, has only had a nuisance value from a military standpoint⁴⁰. The backwardness of Communist China's science and technology places Communist China in a strikingly disadvantageous position when Western countries and the Soviet Union join the competition in aiding Africa.

PART III

Challenges to Communist China's Aid to Africa

Peking's aid activities in Africa confronted three kinds of challenges: African nationalism; Soviet competition; and Western activities in Africa.

When the Second World War ended in 1945, there were only four independent states in Africa — Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa. As anti-colonial nationalism was predominant among the African people at the time, the call for decolonisation was strong and persistent. During the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963, a special resolution on "decolonization" was adopted, condemning the "forcible imposition" of colonial and settler rule as a "flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned" and calling upon colonial regimes to take immediate steps toward⁴¹ the granting of independence to African people. Furthermore, at the Fifth Summit Conference of the East and Central African States held on April 14-19, 1969 in Lusaka, a Manifesto was adopted reaffirming the African⁴² states' belief in the right of self-determination.

African nationalism has exerted a dual influences

on African countries: Internally it makes African states regard unity, stability, independence and economic development as their main interests⁴³; externally, it induces the African leaders to adopt a non-alignment policy.

Since African states' internal concerns are to develop their own economy and to strengthen internal unity and stability, they tend to evaluate Communist China's aid programmes in the light of their own needs. They are not prepared to sacrifice their national interests to appease aid donors. Nyerere once claimed that if foreign aid was detrimental to recipients' freedom to pursue their own aspirations, it should be rejected. He said:

"How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to these governments and companies a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that⁴⁴ we cannot".

However, Communist China's aid to Africa is politically motivated. When it tried to export revolutionary doctrines to Africa in the late 1960s, it inevitably encountered serious setbacks. As Tansky has observed:

"African, in particular, began to attack Chinese activities, many have become concerned

over frequent references from Peking to the 'excellent revolutionary prospects' in Africa as well as Chinese support for dissident African movements. Several African countries severed relations with the P.R.C., others expelled Chinese personnel for dealing with⁴⁵ opposition elements "

Africans not only refused Chinese involvement in their internal affairs, but were also alarmed at the inflow of Chinese goods. Because of poor economic capacity, Peking has been compelled to push sales of their own goods as a way to implement its aid programmes. This inevitably hurt the industrial growth of the recipient nations. Some African States expressed their displeasure about the sale of Chinese goods and inclined to doubt Chinese Communist⁴⁶ assertions of aid without strings attached .

When a large number of African states gained their independence in 1960s, they found themselves in a world cleft into two antagonistic blocs — the West and the East. Although these new countries desperately needed outside aid to build modern economy and give their⁴⁷ people a good life , they feared that economic aid from the West or the East might be accompanied by political influence. Most African leaders chose not to be tied to either of the two power blocs, instead they adopted

a policy of non-alignment. Dr.Nkrumah explained his attitude in 1958 as follows

"when we in Africa survey the industrial and the military power concentrated behind two powers in the Cold War, we know that no military or strategic act of ours could make one jot of difference to this balance of power, while our involvement might draw us into areas of conflict which so far have not spread below the Sahara ...
48
We do not wish to be involved" .

In Dr. Kkrumah's mind, the policy of non-alignment is "freedom to judge issues on their merits, and to substitute peaceful settlement of all disputes for
49
violence and war" . Nyerere also interpreted the concept of non-alignment as

"A statement by a particular country that it will determine its policies for itself according to its own judgement about its needs and the merits of the case. It is thus a refusal to be party to any permanent diplomatic or military identification with the Great Powers; it is a refusal to take part in any alliances or to allow any military
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base by the Great Powers of the World " .

The policy of non-alignment was eventually accepted⁵¹ as a principle of the OAU in 1963 . Under this principle African countries belong to neither the Communist nor the Western bloc, they thus have the benefit of raising their stature to earn political benefit and economic aid from all quarters. Most African countries are lukewarm towards the Chinese Communist call for anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism, to avoiding siding with Peking and offending other powers. With regard to the quarrel between Communist China and the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority of African nations try to remain strictly⁵² neutral . They can feel the heat of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which has been carried into their own soil, and the increasing pressures to take sides. They resist this as long and as fully as possible. The basic theme underlying African policies is still the principle of "Africa⁵³ for African" . This certainly contributes to Communist China's failure to implant its influence in Africa to the extent it wishes.

Soviet competition is the second challenge to Peking's African aid policy. When Communist China began to step into Africa, the Soviet Union also started to shift from⁵⁴ a continental-based strategy to a global one . Soviet objective in Africa has been to infiltrate Communism into the continent as well as pursue the leadership of it. This objective is to all intents and purposes in conflict

with Peking's aim. Soviet competition not only curbs the influence of Communist China in Africa, but also brings to the fore the Chinese shortfall of resources and technology.

The Soviet contact with Africa also started in the mid 1950s. Before 1950s, African leaders, whether of independent countries or liberation movements, were predominantly Nationalists, whereas the number of Communists was negligibly small⁵⁵. At that time the Soviet policy was to shun cooperation with bourgeois Nationalists, therefore it made almost no overtures to Africa. However, after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet attitude towards the bourgeois-dominated nationalist movements underwent a transformation, hence a more flexible attitude towards Africa slowly came into existence⁵⁶. At first, the Soviet Union differentiated African capitalists into two groups: "Comprador Bourgeoisie" and "National bourgeoisie". The latter, which was composed of those who wanted to further their own interests at the expense of the colonialists⁵⁷, was considered by the Soviet as consistent with the interests of the Soviet Union bent on eroding the hold of Western colonialists. The view has heard that the USSR should pay more attention to the objective results of national bourgeois actions⁵⁸ than to the subjective ideas that motivated them. With the understanding of African situation and the

intention to undermine the West, the Soviet Union paid increased attention to the African national bourgeoisie's campaign for independence.

In 1957 the Soviet Union successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile and a satellite. The launching bolstered Soviet confidence that it could compete effectively with the Western bloc and led to a more aggressive policy towards Africa⁵⁹. When Guinea gained independence in 1958, Soviet President Voroshilov immediately responded to the new opportunity for influence. He described the independence as "an important step on the path to the liberation of Africa from the colonial yoke"⁶⁰ and gave Guinea a trade credit of up to \$ 300,000⁶¹ in February 1959. In late summer the Soviet Union⁶² further promised Guinea \$ 35 million of aid.

In the period of the first half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union concentrated particularly on the radical countries such as Ghana, Guinea and Mali. At first, the Soviet Union realized that these radical countries were more willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union, and that their radical measures were to the benefit of the Soviet Union⁶³. But developments later revealed that the radical leaders were not necessarily always pro-Soviet, and the instability of their leadership put Soviet interest in a precarious position. For example, Guinea, while maintaining

friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, expelled the first Soviet ambassador in 1961 because his intervention in Guinea's domestic affairs⁶⁴. The Soviet relations with Ghana and Mali deteriorated when new military governments came to power after overthrowing Kwame Nkrumah and Modibo Keita, respectively. Affected by these reverses, Moscow gradually adopted a more conventional and pragmatic policy toward Africa in the mid 1960s. From the mid 1960s on, the Soviet leaders paid little attention to any theoretical analysis of the African situation and were concerned mainly with the strategic and economic interests of the Soviet Union⁶⁵.

Since the fall of Khrushchev the Soviet leaders have proceeded cautiously in their relations with African states. However, they have seldom missed any opportunity to pursue their advantage when they could do so without risk⁶⁶. In the mid 1970s, the international and African situation became favourable for the Soviet Union. Based on opportunism, the Soviet Union seized this favourable opportunity to act aggressively in Africa. Three aspects⁶⁷ account for the favourable situation for the Soviet Union: Firstly, Soviet military strength has grown rapidly since the 1970s; secondly, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 revived isolationist tendencies in the United States, thus enabling Soviet authorities to ingratiate themselves with the liberation movements at a very low cost and at virtually

no risk to themselves; thirdly, the African countries began to develop a realistic approach to diplomatic relations, realizing that some of these relations could benefit them materially, and in this Soviet Union could easily win friends in Africa by extending aid to them.

To check and curb the influence of Communist China in Africa was one of the objectives of Soviet aggressive policy during this period⁶⁸. The Soviet intervention in Angola exemplified this new policy approach. Initially, there was some opposition to the intervention in Angola by elements in the Soviet Defence and Foreign Ministries on grounds that it threatened detente with the West and might turn out to be too expensive. But in view of increasing Chinese support for the FNLA, the Soviets finally decided to increase its assistance to the MPLA⁶⁹ in the autumn of 1974.

Economic aid initially was the main aspect of Soviet Union's Africa policy. As the Soviets are able to deliver substantial quantities of aid and eager to capitalize on the advantage they have over the Chinese in this respect, they emphasized the scale of their economic assistance operations which could help transform the economic fabric of the African countries⁷⁰. Soviet commentators stressed the large amount of economic assistance which the USSR furnished African states compared

with the small quantity the Chinese had thus far dispensed. The Kremlin's mouthpiece persisted in contrasting the gross amount of Soviet foreign aid with the limited dimensions of the corresponding Chinese effort⁷¹.

Communist China lacks the resources to compete with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1979, Moscow extended economic aid to Africa amounting to 5555 million dollars compared to Peking's 2910 million dollars⁷².

In the area of aid personnel, the Soviet Union is also far ahead of Communist China. By 1965, the total number of Soviet technicians to the whole Africa was 2590, and the Chinese 2615, but by 1970 the number of Soviet technicians increased to 13090 whereas the Chinese only to 10255⁷³. It is also useful to look at the figures of African students studying in USSR and Communist China. By 1965, the figures were 5065 and 275, respectively. In 1970, the former increased to 6870 while the latter decreased sharply to zero. In 1975 the number was 9590 for the Soviet Union and 70 for the Communist China. The difference in 1979 was further widened by 14690 to 240⁷⁴.

From the mid-70s onwards, the Soviet Union began to resort to military means in order to achieve its objectives in Africa and it employed military aid as an instrument to erode Chinese Communist influence⁷⁵. In this field, Communist China was even weaker than in that of economic

assistance because of its backwardness in technical and scientific development. Between 1954 and 1979 the Soviet Union extended a total amount of \$ 15.59 billion military assistance to Africa whereas Communist China⁷⁶ extended less than \$ 1,1 billion . \$ 1,1 billion was the total amount of military aid Communist China extended to all under-developed countries. During the 26-year period from 1954 to 1979, the USSR trained 20,000 military personnel from various African states, which was more than seven times the number of 2720 trained by Communist China⁷⁷ .

Besides directly competing with China the Soviet Union also verbally attacked Chinese aid minimizing its effectiveness. The Soviet Union claimed that China had only assisted the African countries in establishing small industrial enterprises and a few schools, bridges and motor roads, contending that the African countries had derived no benefit in search of increasing their own industrial capacity and in pursuit of liberating themselves from economic exploitation by "monopoly capitalism"⁷⁸ . Even major Chinese technical projects have not escaped harsh criticism. The Tanzania-Zambia Railroad is an example. The Soviets questioned the soundness of the whole scheme and queried whether China really intended to help the African people or just pave⁷⁹ the way in order to occupy the two countries involved .

The Eight Principles of Communist China's aid policy have also come under fire. Under the Eight Principles, Chinese specialists were required to work under the same condition as their Africa counterparts, not enjoying any special treatment. This has won the Communist China considerable sympathy in Africa. But the Russians still criticized it by saying:

"The given principle has no practical economic significance for the developing countries. On the contrary, by idealizing a low standard of living, it has disrupting effect on their economy, for it causes an outflow of highly qualified cadres from the country. The main aim of this principle lies in the desire to slander the work, the way of life of the specialists from the USSR and the other socialist countries, and undermine the economic cooperation between the developing countries and the socialist commonwealth in general ⁸⁰ ".

Furthermore, the Russians assailed Communist China for blatant use of foreign aid for political purposes. The list of charges was long: employing the mechanism of economic assistance to exert political pressure; rendered economic aid with the sole aim of putting the countries of Africa under Peking's influence; making

the implementation of such help conditional on the attitude and behaviour of the recipient governments; creating — by building roads and industrial enterprises, supplying arms and sending in Chinese specialists — strongpoints for itself in Africa; tying offers of aid to the demand that the prospective beneficiary publicly⁸¹ denounce the Soviet Union. The charges were undoubtedly calculated to reduce the effectiveness of Peking's aid in pursuit of its political aims.

Western activities in African form another challenge to Peking's aid venture in Africa. Though the newly-independent African countries at first wanted to shake off all ties with their former colonial masters, they could not alter the effects, the institutions and legacies left behind by the former colonial powers. In spite of formal independence, Western influence continued⁸² to prevail in Africa to a considerable degree. Furthermore, the African states were at such a low stage of technical and economic development that they could hardly move forward without receiving some form of aid from the West. Therefore after gaining independence, African leaders, with very few exceptions, acted pragmatically and maintained diplomatic and economic ties with the former imperial powers. Numerous bilateral treaties providing for technical, economic and even military assistance were accordingly signed in the⁸³ aftermath of independence.

On the other hand, although colonialist countries were forced to grant independence to their colonies in the face of surging nationalism, they still hoped to maintain a certain degree of their interests by keeping a hold in the political and economic fields of their ex-colonies⁸⁴. Moreover, since the containment of Communism during the Cold War was a worldwide campaign, the Western countries were wary of Communist infiltration into Africa. They made every effort to prevent Africa from turning into another Eastern Europe. Aid unavoidably was employed as a means to augment relations between the West and African states. The amount of Western aid was certainly impressive. According to one study, by 1979 three quarters of all aid delivered to Africa came from the West⁸⁶. It thus far surpassed the amount from Communist China. In the context of impeding Communist advances into Africa, Western activities have naturally constituted a challenge to, and constraint on, Peking's African aid policy.

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