

From Persons of Indian Origin to Overseas Citizen of India: The South African Indian diaspora and India's economic diplomacy



Official Masters Research Thesis

**A research report submitted to the faculty of Humanities University of Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree: Masters of Arts
(International Relations)**

Supervisor: Dilip Menon

By Fatima Moosa (845282)

Declaration of Authorship

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Masters of Art in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Name: Fatima Moosa

Student Number: 845282

Clearance Certificate: Protocol number: INTR2023/08/55

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Fatima Moosa', with a stylized, overlapping flourish at the end.

Signed:

Date: March 01 2024

Abstract

The India diaspora is one of the largest in the world with around 17.9 million people from India and/or of Indian descent living around the world (Challagalla 2018, 3). A large percentage of the diaspora is situated in the Global North and the Middle East. However, South Africa has been noted as having one of the largest Indian diasporic populations (Hofmeyer and Williams 2001,14). The migration of Indian people to South Africa has taken place over different periods. The relationship that exists between the diaspora and the country of origin in the spheres of economic and development diplomacy presents an interesting research topic.

This dissertation will seek to understand what role, if any, the South African Indian diaspora plays in the international political economy of India. In order to understand the relationship between the diaspora and the Indian government, this dissertation will examine the bilateral relationship between South Africa and India from 1994 until 2022. There will be a specific focus on the years 2014 until 2022 with an analysis of the relationship between the South African Indian diaspora and India.

This dissertation will seek to understand whether the diasporic policies and economic diplomacy enacted by the Modi government were directed at the South African Indian diaspora, how they were received by the South African Indian mercantile community and what were the reasons for the foreign policy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my greatest appreciation to the following:

My supervisor, Dilip Menon, for his dedication in helping me to produce a detailed and well-researched piece of work. I am also grateful for his expert guidance and support throughout the process.

The various people I spoke to (formally and informally) for research and who provided valuable insights.

The Department of International Relations for giving me the chance to work on this research project.

The Almighty who has been there from the beginning and made this possible.

Finally, this work is dedicated to my grandparents who made the journey over the oceans from their home, India to a new land, South Africa – almost a hundred years ago.

I am forever grateful.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Chapter One: Introduction	6
What is a diaspora?	7
The idea of diaspora in IR and the politics of the diaspora	8
Aim and Rationale	14
Research Design and Methods	17
Outline of the study	20
Chapter Two: Perspectives on the Indian diaspora and the Government of India's foreign policy	22
The Indian diaspora in SA	22
Historical Analysis:	29
The Indian government's relationship to the diaspora	32
Government of India's foreign policy and diaspora policies shifts from 1994-2020	34
Chapter Three: Economic diplomacy and bilateral relations between India and South Africa	41
Apartheid and the Indian government	41
Economic diplomacy of the Indian government	42
Post-Apartheid relations from 1994 to 2022	47
Bilateral relations between the Indian and South African governments	48
High-Level Committee report on the Diaspora	51
Chapter four: Analysis of the primary data	55
South African Indians as a minority	55
It is purely business	58
Hindutva in South Africa	67
The Hindu-Muslim dynamic of the diaspora	70
GOPIO	71
The Indian Business Forum	72
Speaking of an Indian Diaspora in South Africa	73
Conclusion	76
Bibliography:	81

Chapter One: Introduction

This dissertation looks at the problem of South African Indians and their engagement with the Indian government using the framework of diaspora politics and economic diplomacy. There is a specific focus on South African Indian businesspeople. The dissertation makes the following arguments. Some of the Indian diaspora in South Africa/South Africans Indians as a minority grouping in South Africa are afraid of their position in what they perceive as a changing political and economic landscape in South Africa where they have always been privileged even during apartheid (Desai and Vahed 2021, 11). These fears intersect with the policies from the Indian government which are meant to encourage the Indian diaspora to contribute towards its economy (MEA 2023). These policies appear to provide a pathway for South African Indian businesspeople and people generally, to create ties with the Indian government. However, the Indian government's diaspora policies are ideologically linked with Hindu nationalism/Hindutva propagated by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who have been in power since 2014 (Hall 2019, 139). The ideology of Hindutva which influence the government's policies focus on prioritising the Hindu-majority diaspora communities. These impact the interactions between the Indian government and the Muslim-majority South African Indian business community.

The Indian diaspora is one of the largest in the world with around 17.9 million people from India and/or of Indian descent living around the world (Challagalla 2018, 3); a large percentage of this is situated in the Global North and the Middle East. However, South Africa has been noted as having one of the largest Indian diasporic populations (Hofmeyr and Williams 2001,14) with the community numbering around one million and making up around 3% of the South African population (CGI Durban 2022). The migration of people from India to South Africa has taken place over different periods. The relationship that exists between the diaspora, its country of origin and the host country in the spheres of economic and development diplomacy forms part of the framing of this dissertation's argument. This dissertation will seek to understand what role, if any, the South African Indian diaspora plays in the international political economy of India. In order to understand the relationship between the Indian diaspora in South Africa, the South African government and the Indian government, there is a need to unpack the understanding of diaspora in international relations, the Indian diaspora in South Africa and the shifts in the Indian government's relationship to the diaspora generally and more

specifically in South Africa. Furthermore, this chapter looks at the methodology that will be followed in order to answer the research question. This will lay the foundation for answering the central question in later chapters around the reasons for the diasporic policies of the Indian government – more recently the Modi-led government - directed at the Indian diaspora, and what reception, if any, it received from the South African Indian mercantile community.

What is a diaspora?

The diaspora is not a new political unit by any measure. Diasporas have existed for several centuries in different iterations and with different meanings within the global discourses of politics, history, culture, religion, sociology and for the purpose of this dissertation, international relations. Writing in 2005, Braziel and Mannur (2005, 1) explained that diaspora can perhaps be seen as naming the other which has “historically referred to displaced communities of people who have been dislocated from their native homelands through the movements of migration, immigration, or exile”. It refers to the forced or voluntary movement of a group of people from one nation-state - namely the homeland - to the relocation to another nation-state or community - the host country. The movement of people is a daily occurrence that takes place around the world across natural and man-made borders, across cities and towns, across seas and mountains and legally and illegally regardless of the definition of legality which is being used. While the movement and migration of people is a process which takes place continuously and presents many questions and possible frames of analysis, the interesting phenomenon to study is what takes place after the migration process when the grouping of people migrate to a certain place for whatever circumstances and establish their lives and communities with this taking place over several generations. In its simplest form, this is known as the diaspora. Diasporas have for a long time been conceptualised in relation to the idea of return, meaning the search for a national homeland, a characteristic considered typical of the “classic” diasporas of the globally scattered Jewish and Armenian peoples (Abraham 2020, 73). This idea has been complicated by the formation of new diasporas around the world with communities and groups of people who have no interest or desire to return home but still maintain ties back to the homeland. Jana Evans Braziel writes that “diaspora as a term historically and typically denotes the scattering of people from their homeland into new communities across the globe” (Braziel 2008, 24). There are many different definitions of diaspora, questions around which type of group can claim the term and whether every type of migration can be considered a diasporic grouping, different categories of diaspora and

frameworks for comparing the different categorisations of diasporas. In the past thirty years or so, there has been an increase in the study of diaspora in the field of area studies, ethnic studies and cultural studies (Brazier and Mannur 2005, 2). Brazier and Mannur caution against the use of the term as a “catch-all phrase used to speak of and for all movements (2005, 3). It is important to unpack what is meant by diaspora and how it connects with different ideas of nationalism, migration, politics and the economy.

The idea of diaspora in IR and the politics of the diaspora

There has been a growing focus on the diaspora and the role it plays within the field of International Relations. Within the field of international relations, the nation-state remains the primary mode of analysis. Diasporas complicate the understanding of the nation-state as they relate to transnational communities that exist between two or more nations. The diaspora is an extra-national zone which points beyond the nation-state. Diasporas have emerged as important non-state actors with growing importance in the field of international relations as they challenge the traditions of international relations and state institutions such as citizenship and loyalty. Shain and Barth write that diasporas are sometimes defined as the “paradigmatic Other of the nation-state,” as they are challengers of its traditional boundaries, as transnational transporters of cultures, and as manifestations of “deterritorialized communities (Shain and Barth 2003, 450). They can exert power over the home country and host country. Diaspora refers to people who reside in one country, yet still maintain some sort of identification with their or the ancestors’ country of origin. However, in its current form, diaspora refers to any group of people who are dispersed (Baumann 2000, 313). Once the concept of diaspora was expanded to not only refer to Jewish people, communities, and their experiences, it was used to refer to any processes of dispersion and to relate to many dislocated, deterritorialized communities (Baumann, 2000, 314). Adam McKeown justly notes: “When used in a more adjectival sense, the idea of diaspora can move away from identifying a bounded group, and instead focus on geographically dispersed connections, institutions, and discourses that cannot be readily accounted for from purely local or national framework” (McKeown 1991, 311). This argument means that diaspora should not be seen as a bounded group that only belongs in one place and time. It is about thinking of the idea of diaspora as something which is dynamic and constantly changing and making new meanings for the people who identify as such. Toninato draws on arguments made by Brubaker about diaspora as ‘category of practice’ where the diaspora does not represent a unified, bounded group connected with a specific homeland. She

counters essentialist concepts of diaspora that reify notions of belonging and the “roots” of migrants in places of origin, and argues that, “Diaspora should not be seen as a static notion, but as the result of dynamic process of continuous making and remaking of diaspora with no fixed membership”. (Toninato 2009, 5)

We study the idea of the diaspora as being about the formation of a migrant community in another country that claims citizenship, political and economic rights there while at the same time maintaining some kind of connection with the homeland whether it ranges from a tenuous link with no concrete basis to a strong formalised connection. Writing in 2003, Stéphane Dufoix observed that the word diaspora as part of the vocabulary of the media and journalists, religious communities and the state (Dufoix, 2008, 1) and scholars in the field of migration studies. According to Dufoix (2008, 2-3), the term can be very broad or very narrow which is the reasoning behind his argument for the establishment of a “broader, more complex analytical framework...”. This mirrors Braziel and Mannur’s caution. Until the 1960s, the idea of the diaspora referred to the Jewish and Christian traditions and their diaspora communities. Much of the focus within diaspora studies had initially been on the historic Jewish diaspora and then later people of African origin, Palestinians and the Chinese diaspora (Dufoix 2008, 19). This of course diversified through the ongoing dialogues that have taken place throughout the years and as different scholars broadened the understanding of diaspora and the conceptual models. In a now classic paper, 'The African diaspora: or Africa abroad', (Shepperson 1966), the British historian George Shepperson brought up the concept of the “African diaspora”. This introduced the communities of dispersed people and groups from Sub-Saharan Africa who were forced to be a part of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. It took a while for the concept of the African diaspora to become localised but since the mid-1970s, African scholars and writers started using the term African diaspora deliberately, creating a subdomain within the broader field of African studies. The introduction and take-off of the term within African studies was followed by a “boosted” use of the term in various disciplines of the humanities including international relations (Baumann 2000, 321-322). Many of the earlier international relations scholars of diaspora were of Jewish and Zionist origin because the field of diaspora studies was dominated by the idea of Jewish diaspora. Baumann writes that the broad usage of diaspora became “so to speak, institutionalized with the launching of the high-quality journal *Diaspora* in 1991” (2000, 322). At the launching of the journal, editor Khachig Tölölyan (1996) declared: "We use 'diaspora' provisionally to indicate our belief that the term that once described Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that

includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guestworker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community”. This expansion of the description of diaspora allowed the term to have a broader meaning and be applied to many different communities and many different contexts.

Diasporas have increasingly become a part of international relations theory as the idea of diasporas have diversified and grown. Within the field of international relations, the diaspora serves as a challenge to traditional approaches to foreign policy and acts as an instrument of soft power and strategic value at times. The foreign policy and soft power elements give the diaspora meaning beyond just itself. Pradhan and Mohapatra (2020, 146) write that the role of the diaspora within the liberal tradition within international relations has “asserted that apart from (the nation) state even the non-state actors do play important role in influencing and making the foreign policy of any country”. Furthermore, they say that the diaspora as a non-state actor and cultural institution plays a leading role in the foreign policymaking process of their origin country. This speaks to the idea that migration flows and the creation of these imagined national communities have become a vital part of the global economy. They have real consequences and impacts on the workings of international relations generally and as a result of their effect on international relations, this leads to their importance within the theory. The broadening of diaspora and the subsequent inclusion within international studies capitalised on a zeitgeist where the use of diaspora made it one of the most fashionable terms in academic discourse of the late 20th century writes Baumann (2000, 325). It is for this reason that social scientist Robin Cohen says the field of diaspora studies developed quite fast with everyone wanting to be a part of a diaspora and consequently study it (Cohen 2008, 8). As takes place with academic zeitgeist, the word diaspora became the popular and started being used everywhere and by everyone. This is what led Cohen and Safran amongst others to take up the work of developing typologies to tighten up the semantic boundaries of the word diaspora. Cohen in his work on globalisation, migration and diaspora studies has produced a typology of diasporas. Cohen argues that diaspora studies and therefore the diasporas themselves have gone through four phases (Cohen 2008, 1-2). The first is the classical use of the term Diaspora (usually capitalised) which was confined to the study of the Jewish experience and the victim experience. The second phase which took place in the 1980s was a ‘a metaphoric designation’ to describe seven different categories of people ranging from ‘expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities tout court’ (Safran 1991, 83). It was a term used as self-designation or used to

describe communities. The third phase was marked by social constructionist critiques of 'second phase' theorists. Within the third phase, Cohen says that social constructionists sought to get rid of two building blocks of diasporic thought which was the homeland and ethnic/religious community. This third phase was premised on the idea that in the postmodern world, identities have become deterritorialised and constructed and deconstructed in a flexible and situational way. Responding to this complexity meant that the concepts of diaspora had to be reordered. This speaks to the points made above by Shain and Barth with regards to diaspora being manifestations of deterritorialised communities and McKeown on the idea of diaspora being dynamic. The current and fourth phase of the studies is "marked by a modified reaffirmation of the diasporic idea, including its core elements, common features and ideal types" (Cohen 2008, 1-2).

In his 1997 work, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* which became central to the emergence of diaspora studies, Cohen provided several case studies on a wide range of diasporas. Cohen produced a list of nine common characteristics of a diaspora coupled with a typology that distinguished diasporas according to their primary identity (Dufoix 2008, 23). The primary identities of diasporas that Cohen came up with are "victim", "labour", "imperial", "trade" and "cultural". Cohen says that the typologies that he has proposed are more unambiguous than the history and development of diasporas suggest. Furthermore, Cohen says that some diasporic groups take dual or multiple forms while others change their character over time. While he uses certain diasporas to fit with each of the typologies, Cohen says the cases serve as models and are not meant to preclude other diasporas sharing similar characteristics or to conceal the secondary aspects of any one diaspora. Cohen identifies the Jewish, Palestinian, Irish, African and Armenian diasporas as the principal ones that can be described with the preceding adjective of "victim". The 'victim' diasporas are ones that arose from traumatic dispersal. The second and third identifiers refers to diasporas that could be caused by the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions. Within this identifier, Cohen uses the British and Indian diasporas as examples of labour and imperial. Cohen admits that it would be a stretch to suggest that all groups who migrate internationally in search of work evolve into a diaspora (2008, 57). The importance is the development of a diasporic consciousness where there is evidence of (a) a strong retention of group ties sustained over an extended period (in respect of language, religion, endogamy and cultural norms) (b) a myth of and strong connection to a homeland, and (c) high levels of social exclusion in the destination societies, a labour diaspora can be said to exist. The trade diaspora is made up of merchants

who travelled around the world to buy and sell their goods along the trade routes historically. Cohen uses the Chinese and Lebanese as his models here. For the final identifier, cultural, Cohen actually bends some of the previous rules around the tightening of the term diaspora by, as he puts it himself “loosening the historical meanings of diaspora once more, this time to encompass the construction of these new identities and subjectivities” (Cohen 2008, 130). The cultural identifier speaks to the rise of postmodern views of diaspora in which identities and cultures are no longer fluid. Cohen uses the Caribbean diaspora as a model and explains how the diaspora formed through many other diasporas (trade, imperial and victim) into a new culture and diasporic formation. He further complicated these identities by saying that diasporas generally exhibit several of nine features (Cohen 1997, 179-180). Those features are (1) traumatic dispersal from an original homeland; (2) the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (4) an idealisation of the supposed ancestral home; (5) a return movement; (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies; (8) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries. The Indian diaspora in South Africa can be defined by its primary identifier of labour related to the initial history of indenture in the 19th century. With regards to the characteristics of the diaspora, the second, fourth and sixth have the most relevance. However, that is not to say that the others do not also have some relevance albeit to a lesser degree. The diaspora can serve as a link between the host country and home country through the establishment of economic and political ties. They can act as agents and catalysts of economic development in the countries of origin and play an active role in their host countries.

Diasporas can complicate the field of international relations which continues to and has for a long time focused on the nation-state as the primary actor and mode of analysis within the field of research. Braziel and Mannur write that diasporas force a rethinking of the rubrics of nation and nationalism and offer myriad, dislocated sites of contestation to the “hegemonic, homogenizing forces of globalization” (2005, 3). The diaspora serves as an intra-state and extranational actor which could have massive implications for states, their foreign policies and its interactions with other states. In some instances, diasporas can be examples of the failure of the modern Westphalian nation-states. The idea and system of the Westphalian nation-state is the principle in international relations which was established by the Peace Treaties of Westphalia and Osnabruck, and which established the legal basis of statehood (McGrew 2014,

23-24). At the centre of the agreement was the codification and recognition by European rulers of each other's right to rule their own territories - free from outside interference. This became the doctrine of sovereign statehood over time. As McGrew explains, the Westphalian agreement welded the idea of territoriality with the notion of legitimate sovereign rule (McGrew 2014, 24). This meant that there was no legal authority above the state and no ruler could intervene over another ruler of a sovereign territory. There are many challenges to the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood and the idea that a state is territorially bound such as globalisation and climate change, pandemics and financial systems. Diaspora play a role in the challenging of the system of Westphalian states because it challenges the idea of citizenship and statehood being territorially bound. The movement of people from one state to another and yet maintaining some kind of relation and tie back to the state - however tenuous - challenges the idea of nations being fixed and territorial locations of identity and power because people can move and create new identities which are formed out of connections to the place which they or their ancestors moved from (Sylvester 2014, 192). It forces a rethinking of the very rubrics of nation and nationalism and refigures the relations between citizens and nation-state (Brazier and Mannur 2005, 7). It demonstrates that there are actors besides the state and multinational organisations which can affect and impact on the workings of international relations including the international political economy. The effects of globalisation have caused several shifts in the nation as a political ideal and state form. Writing about the "Black Atlantic" as a transnational space for culture exchange, Gilroy makes an argument about how well-known black individuals have charted diasporic paths across the "Black Atlantic" transnational terrain. Gilroy says that his body of work offers concepts which have a wider applicability and provide alternatives to a nationalist focus. While Gilroy is speaking directly to the black diasporic experience, the argument he makes about the urgent obligation to re-evaluate the significance of the modern nation-state as a political, economic and cultural unit (Gilroy 2005, 54-55) is important. Gilroy says that there is a need to embrace the growing centrality of transnational movement and move beyond the ideas of the purity of cultures which speaks to a relationship between nationality and ethnicity. This refers to the often-racist ideas that dominate European societies in which a person's ethnicity supposedly influences their nationality and vice-versa. Globalisation and diasporic communities show that beings can be considered as citizens of a nation-state and yet still maintain relations to another nation-state. A person's race and culture does not determine their nationality. In the re-evaluation of the nation-state, we can begin to move beyond those narrow classifications of identity and race as well. This has an impact on the role of the diaspora.

While there have been several developments and inclusion of diasporas within the field of international relations as outlined above, there still exist many gaps. While there has been a focus on diasporas made up of several generations of people who are firmly entrenched in the host country so much so that it might be incorrect to even label it as the host country of the diaspora, a lot of this focus has been on diasporas within the so-called Global North. This research gap that exists is important when understanding how groups of people within the so-called Global South identify themselves and how states react to these identifications. It is important to justify the importance of studying diasporas and in particular the above-mentioned diasporic formations within the field of international relations. There is a greater focus on diasporas from the so-called home country. However, the policies being directed from home countries towards diasporas wherever they are situated is not always equally distributed. A hypothesis that can be formulated is through an assumption that the home countries are targeting all of their diasporic communities equally wherever they may be situated in the world. There are levels of engagement with diasporic communities depending on the countries where they are situated whether it is the so-called Global North or Global South, the religious and cultural identities of the members of the diaspora and the economic class that they occupy. The histories and migrations of the diasporic communities to their specific countries also play a role in the way that governments interact with the diasporic communities.

Aim and Rationale

The exact definition of diaspora and its connection with the homeland and the host country is a complicated one with there being no common consensus amongst scholars of international relations. In the next chapter, I focus on the mercantile class within the Indian diaspora in South Africa and an examination of how they interact with the South African and the Indian government. I begin by examining international relations theories around development and economic diplomacy and diasporas as instruments of soft power used by states in their interactions. Thereafter there is a deep analysis of the economic and development diplomacy that exists between India and South Africa historically from 1994 until 2022 alongside the various political changes in India and also contemporarily through their membership in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping. The ways in which the Indian government classified people of the diaspora within the Ministry of External Affairs and how it created deliberate policies to attract the resources of the diaspora is a key element to understanding any further research. Within the classifications are People of Indian Origin

(PIOs) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs), there are cultural and economic entailments and benefits. The BJP's government under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi is another important focus point. Modi's government has actively sought to increase diasporic participation in India through economic and political policies (Shangwe 2021, 28). The reasons for seeking an increase in diasporic participation is related to India's aims of increasing its positioning as a global power. By getting the diaspora more involved and increasing their stakes within India and the Indian government, the diaspora will serve as a mouthpiece in the countries where they are situated. They will be able to lobby and put forward any of the concerns and needs that the Indian government needs to have amplified. At the same time, India has sought to increase its positioning as a global power. There is a greater focus on the skilled professionals who left India to go to the Western and Middle Eastern countries for better opportunities who are considered as the "new diaspora". However, the South-South cooperation which has been a feature of India's foreign policy from its first ever prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru onwards has continued albeit with different intentions (Venkatachalam and King 2001, 2). This cooperation has included prime minister Modi giving an invitation to South African Indians during his 2016 visit saying that: 'A resurgent India awaits you' (Desai and Vahed 2019, 222). Challagalla writes that while Atal Bihari Vajpayee, during the years 1998-2004 was credited for having promoted serious engagement with the Indian diaspora to develop mutually beneficial linkages, the current Prime Minister Modi is getting known for his enthusiasm in expanding those earlier efforts. During several of his trips around the world to the countries where the Indian diaspora is situated since he took office in 2014, Modi has had public pronouncements persuading the diaspora to "contribute to India's growth story" (Challagalla 2018, 1).

The historical Indian diaspora or South African Indians can be seen as firmly rooted economically in South Africa while being connected to and aware of India, writes Sinha (2014, 2). The roots that South African Indians have within South Africa are political and cultural as well. However, there are many policies being pushed by the Indian government that could possibly have some kind of impact on South African Indians. The main policy being pushed by the Indian government, and which is of relevance to the South African Indian community is the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. The OCI card which is being promoted by the government is granted to people who can prove their ancestral heritage links to India (CGI Joburg 2023). The card can be applied for online and the applicant needs to have proof that the applicant's parents or grandparents have Indian nationality or Indian descent such as an Indian

Passport, school leaving certificate, birth certificate, land holding in India, etc. issued by the government of India. Previously Person of Indian Origin (PIO) cards were granted but the PIO converted into an OCI card from 2015. Currently anyone who is considered “Indian” by race in South Africa is considered a PIO within the statistics of the Indian government. This might include South Africans Indians of second, third, fourth and so on generation, newly migrated Indians who have gotten South African citizenship and migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh as well who might mark their race as Indian on the home affairs forms. The OCI card is the only thing that has actual legal policy implications. It was for this reason there is a difference in the numbers from the ministry of external affairs with regards to who is a PIO and who is an OCI. The OCI requires a person to go through a formal process in order to obtain the card. The Modi government in the years 2014 to 2020 influenced by the BJP’s ideology has increasingly adopted a Hindu nationalist ideology. Hall says that Modi’s foreign policy did not differ a lot from his predecessors, but it took on a more ideologically-tinged Hindu nationalist conception of India (Hall 2019, 139). This presence of Hindu nationalist ideology and Hindutva is not just in the Modi government’s foreign policy but can be found in the domestic policy as well. However, it is the Modi government’s foreign policy which is of the most interest. The question arises whether conflict could arise with the predominantly Muslim mercantile South African Indian class in terms of receiving their investment and participation. This will be important in trying to discern whether the foreign policies of the Indian government are successful in gaining support from mercantile South African Indians.

The history and contemporary positioning of South African Indians is a unique case study. There are many areas of study that emerge from the role and impact that South Africans Indians have had in South Africa and in India. Furthermore, this case study is of interest because of the political and economic policies of India, an emerging economic power which has close ties with South Africa. The Indian government has sought to increase its global power through its economic development. However, at the same time, there has been a political shift towards right-wing policies aimed at recreating a “Hindu nation - *rashtra*” (Venkatachalam and King 2021, 13). Given the nature of the South African Indian diaspora and their political history, this might present some tension in the engagements of the Indian government and the South African Indian diaspora. Another important thing that will guide the research is unpacking whether the term Indian diaspora is applicable to the “full range of identities and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa” (Sinha 2014, 2). There is a lack of data on the South African Indian

diaspora and whether they represent this “new” or “old” diaspora and whether they are Indian just by race and if they can even be seen as Indian or South Asian (Sinha 2014, 6).

Research Design and Methods

The research question has been formulated as follows to ask: How effectively developed and implemented was India’s foreign policies towards its diaspora in prompting economic participation from the mercantile class of the South African Indian diaspora between the years 1994 and 2020?

Within the field of international relations, diasporas have emerged as important actors in the application of soft power within foreign policy. Diasporas act as agents of economic development in their countries of origin as well as being active participants in their host country. There has been an increase in non-state actors participating in diplomacy. Traditional definitions of diplomacy concentrated on state actors. However, these traditional definitions have been extended to non-state actors like non-government organisations and civil society organisations (Saner 2006, 93). Part of the research problem being addressed is whether the diaspora and its people could be considered as part of the non-state actors who participate in non-state development diplomacy.

There has been a lot of focus on harnessing India's soft power with the Indian diaspora being a key part of this (Hall 2019, 85). Several Indian prime ministers including Nehru, Vajpayee, Gandhi and Singh have had policies dedicated to the Indian diaspora (M 2023). However, under Modi’s leadership, there was an increased focus from the Indian government towards the Indian diaspora. South Africa and India have had close bilateral relations since 1993 when full diplomatic relations were established between South Africa and India (DIRCO 2023). “South Africa and India enjoy a Strategic Partnership and bilateral relations are anchored in a deep and shared history of friendship and solidarity”, the DIRCO website states (DIRCO 2023). However, with South Africa’s membership in the BRICS formation from 2010, there has been an increase in bilateral relations between the Indian government and the South African government. The working hypothesis is that the increased bilateral relations between India and South Africa has influenced the involvement of the South African Indian diaspora within the economy of India.

As a result of the increase in bilateral relations, there is a focus on the Indian diaspora of South Africa, particularly the mercantile Indian South African class. Modi sought an energetic outreach on the African continent overall with a particular focus on the Indian diaspora in South Africa. The economic and diplomatic relations between the homeland, India and the country of residence, South Africa affected the impact of the diaspora on the foreign relations of the homeland.

Independent Variable: The foreign policy and specific programmes of the Indian government focused on the diaspora is the independent variable of this research proposal. The specific policies and programmes which will form part of the independent variable are the NRI, PIO, and the OCI classifications and the Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme, Pravasi Bharatiya Bhavan, and the Know India Programme to name a few (MEA 2023).

When the Modi government came into power, a significant shift from the Congress-led government was an increased focus on the Indian diaspora and increasing their involvement in the political economy of India. The Congress-led government did focus on the diaspora and its importance in growing the economy of India, however, it was not as extensive and rigorous as the Modi's BJP-led government. This was carried out through policies which gave special status to people from the Indian diaspora. It involved several concessions for investment and tourism. It was built on the 2002 recommendation from a High-Level Committee on Indian diaspora (HLCD) set up by the Indian government to recommend policy options and organisational frameworks to involve NRIs and PIOs and later card-holders of OCIs to accelerate social and economic development in India (Rai 2006, 73). The report was written after the committee which had been appointed travelled around the world for almost 15 months, studying the Indian community abroad, noting its achievements and delving into the problems it faced (India Today 2002). This committee made several recommendations to the Indian parliament. One of the main recommendations was that the Indian government must renew and strengthen linkages of overseas Indians to their place of origin and with each other. Modi's government has subsequently put in place policies which demonstrated India's foreign policy undergoing a "diaspora moment" (Sinha 2014, 4) - continuing with the recommendations from the 2002 report.

Dependent Variable: The dependent variable of this research proposal is the economic participation of the South African Indians and the Indian diaspora in the Indian economy

between the years 2014 and 2022. The indicators of impact to measure economic participation will be the number of South African Indian businesspeople who have invested in the Indian economy; how effective their investments have been; and what was the process of achieving participation in the economy in the form of concessions such as the OCI cards which ensure visa-free travel amongst other benefits even if they are not directly linked to economic benefits. There is variation on the dependent variable as the Indian government's diaspora and foreign policies do not change depending on the involvement or non-involvement of the Indian diaspora and South African Indians towards the Indian economy and industries.

The variables will need to be operationalised. This means a decision will need to be made about empirically measuring the independent and dependent variables of interest to measure the independent variable aligned with the working hypothesis (Panke 2007, 18). Operationalisation is about looking at the best options for capturing the respective elements of the theoretical elements (Panke 2007, 18). The independent variable of the study will be operationalised by looking at the policy documents from the Indian government between the years 2014 and 2022. This will include white papers, parliamentary documents, media articles and policy statements. The variable will be operationalised by focusing on the engagement of the Indian government with the South African government and the Indian diaspora in South Africa in the form of policy and face-to-face engagements, particularly the 2016 and 2018 visit of Modi to South Africa. The dependent variable is operationalised by looking at the economic development strategies and the state of the bilateral relations between India and South Africa and how this affects the impact the diaspora has on India. This will be done through interviews with South African Indian businesspeople, and other persons of interest from the South African Indian community. Additionally, the dependent variable will be measured with the data from the Indian and South African government and Statistics South Africa.

Causality will be proven using process-tracing to gain an understanding of the dynamics that produced the outcomes of the case. To determine the causality between the independent and dependent variables of the research question, a general theory will be found, and this will be used to formulate more specific hypotheses. Process tracing is used as a methodology for single-case studies which this research question deals with. It is used to construct historical and analytical narratives. Process tracing is a method that attempts to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, 206). Process tracing is about finding out the intervening causal mechanisms

and eliminating the processes which have no effect on the outcome. The alternative paths need to be mapped out even if they are not the reason for the outcome. There are several limitations of process-tracing which is that if sufficient data is not found or if it is unavailable, the method will only allow provisional conclusions to be reached (George and Bennett 2005, 222). However, this can be overcome by ensuring the data is available or will become readily available before embarking on the research project. To show causality the following linkages will be made. The linkages will begin with the Indian government and the appointment of prime minister Modi and the BJP-led government in 2014. The second step will be to look at India's foreign and economic policies. The third step will be to look at the Indian government's engagement with the African continent and its bilateral relations with South Africa from 1994 until 2022. The fourth step will be to look at the performance of the policies to see how effective they were in promoting economic participation from the diaspora. Data will be collected to show whether the South African Indian diaspora has contributed to India's economic development. Further data will be collected from the South African Indian mercantile class who have invested in India and the responses they received. This will allow for exploring historical analysis in single case-studies. The research design will be deductive in nature and will engage in theory-testing. It will test the theories around the South-South model of diaspora, diasporic involvement in the politics of its home country and economic diplomacy and whether the diaspora can be seen as a new non-traditional actor involved in development diplomacy.

Outline of the study

Following this chapter, the second chapter focuses on the perspectives of economic diplomacy and diaspora politics. It will focus on the theories around economic and development diplomacy, the Indian diaspora as a tool of soft power and the policy shifts of the BJP-led Indian government with a renewed focus on the Indian diaspora influenced by the BJP's rise to power in 2014. The third chapter will deal with the economic diplomacy and bilateral relations between the Indian and South African governments. It will focus on the bilateral relations between India and South Africa from 1994 until 2022 and how this relationship has evolved with a specific consideration of the differences between the BJP-led and Congress-led governments' foreign policy. Chapter four will analyse the primary data gathered during the research process with reference to the interviews conducted and the data from the government archives. It will look at the period of 2014 until 2022 with the BJP's specific policies towards the diaspora and how the economic diplomacy of India worked and how it was carried out and

the response from the South African Indian mercantile community. Throughout the dissertation, the use of South African Indians and Indian South Africans will be used interchangeably. The exact reasoning for this will be explained in chapter two.

Chapter Two: Perspectives on the Indian diaspora and the Government of India's foreign policy

The theoretical framework and literature of this chapter is rooted in development and economic diplomacy and diasporic studies. There are many ways of studying foreign policy and economic diplomacy as a frame of analysis for diasporic politics. This chapter is concerned with foreign policy rooted in and directed towards the diaspora and will look at the policies enacted by the Indian government towards their diaspora. This includes how they define their diaspora and who they are directing their policies towards. Diplomacy within the field of international relations is multi-faceted and there is a need to unpack the idea around development and diasporic diplomacy. To answer the research question of this dissertation, this chapter will engage with typologies of diasporic roles and interests. Typologies are conceptual tools which are used to simplify and order complex social phenomena (Lehnert 2007, 62). Typologies might not contribute to the development of theory, but they are useful for developing concepts and testing of theories which is what the dissertation hopes to achieve. The argument in this chapter around the changing nature of the Indian diaspora in South Africa is centred around shifting perspectives on the South African Indian diaspora and the Indian government's policies towards its diaspora in general.

The Indian diaspora in SA

According to the Indian ministry of external affairs (MEA 2023) there are 1 500 000 people of Indian origin in South Africa. Something that will be looked at below in more detail but is important to mention at this point is that this number from the Indian government is taken from the statistics provided by the South African government, of people classified racially as Indian. The migration of people from India and the broader Indian subcontinent to South Africa has taken place over different periods from the indentured labour and passenger migrants in the 19th and 20th century to the current migrations of traders and entrepreneurs in the 2000s.

There is a need to problematise the terminology used to describe the group of people who migrated from India to South Africa as well as their descendants. Writing in 1986, former speaker of Parliament, anti-apartheid activist and an Indian South African woman, Frene Ginwala wrote that the terminology applied to minority groups is often "a reflection of how they perceive themselves, or more frequently how the society in which they reside sees them" (Ginwala 1986). Ginwala writes that South Africans who originated from the South Asian

subcontinent have been described in a number of ways for hundreds of years. Some of the terms have been 'British Indians', 'coolies', 'people of Indian origin', 'South African Indians' and 'Indian South Africans'. An important argument that Ginwala makes is that none of the terms used are politically neutral. They all have a political meaning which at the time she was writing were used by the apartheid government to divide “black” in the sense of all the oppressed groups of the country at the time (African, Coloured and Asian) into different nations (Ginwala 1986). The use of the term South African Indian is an assumption that the Indian part of the identity takes primacy of the South African part and that the South African part of the identity is just an added descriptor of the main identity. On the other hand, the use of Indian South Africans aims to place the group of people and their descendants from India firmly within the South African socio-political landscape. It aims to signal that there is the “Indianness” of the identity, but the main identity and loyalty lies with the South African part of the descriptor. In terms of the evolution of the identity and space that Indian South Africans have occupied in the South African socio-political landscape, it is important to trace the origins of acknowledgement of Indians within South African society. For more than a century after the first Indians arrived in South Africa, they were not accepted as part of society, Ginwala writes (1986, 10). There was also a brief time when the government of the time prohibited immigration from India. In the 1950s, in the period just before South Africa became a republic, there was an announcement that in terms of the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act of 1953, there would be a ban on wives from India, thus withdrawing a concession granted to Indians in terms of the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement of 1913 (Vahed 2015, 76). This was done in order to prevent the growth of the Indian population in South Africa. The 1913 Smuts-Gandhi agreement came about after Jan Smuts set up a commission to address the grievances of Indians living in South Africa. From this agreement there was a recognition of Indian marriages and Indians were allowed to move around freely in the Transvaal. This was briefly walked back in 1953. It was then in 1962 which was almost 102 years after Indians first arrived in South Africa, that they were acknowledged as being a part of South Africa (Ginwala 1986, 10). The system applied to Indians was very complicated and had very little coherence. A lot of this was due to the fact that the repatriation of Indians back to India or to another colony of Britain was still seen as the ultimate goal. “Restrictive legislation and custom had failed to coerce Indians into leaving, and it was inevitable that white South Africa would at some stage have had to acknowledge the reality of the permanence of the Indian population,” writes Ginwala (1986, 10). This is an interesting idea because this history of the extreme measures taken by the colonial and apartheid government under the Union and Republic of South Africa to remove

Indians from South Africa by any measure possible has not been kept as part of the consciousness of many Indian South Africans in the present day. This has unconsciously influenced the views of many Indian South Africans and their understanding of their current place in South African society as this history is something that has not been spoken about a lot.

Shifting the focus, the Indian diaspora has increasingly been portrayed by the Indian government as an important strategic asset and the government has increased its attention on the diaspora through specific policies. India is not the only country which has seen an increased focus on the diasporic community. The Chinese government has also shifted their policy towards Chinese people living overseas in the diaspora to help China's economic development and strengthen networks and promote China's image around the world (Liu and van Dongen 2014, 193). However, despite the increase in policies aimed at giving the diaspora more support and increasing links between the Indian government and the diaspora, there have been several failures with policy implementation. In 2022, the standing committee on External Affairs presented its report on *Welfare of Indian Diaspora: Policies/Schemes* ("Committee Reports" 2022). The committee found that the Ministry of External Affairs did not have updated data on the Indian diaspora. Given the absence of the update databases, the welfare schemes and policies towards the diaspora would not be properly implemented. There was also the issue of the services available to the Indian diaspora not being properly publicised meaning the diaspora would not be aware of what services are available to them. This shows that despite the aspirational policies in place, there have been many issues with the implementation.

Diasporas have also emerged as powerful entities since they are recognised as instruments of soft power and as an agent or catalyst of economic development of countries of origin beside their active role in the host countries (Khara 2020, 12). In the 1980s, political scientist Joseph Nye Jr, coined the term soft power. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye 2008, 94). It is the ability to affect the outcome one wants through attraction rather than coercion and payment. The soft power of a country mostly comes from its culture, its political values, and its foreign policy (Nye 2008, 96). Nye writes that in the information age, politics is not about whose military or economy wins, it is about who is seen as more credible (Nye 2008, 100). Diasporas play an important role in this role of portraying their home country in a positive manner around the world. With regards to the Indian diaspora specifically, "they not only help in disseminating Indian culture but have also, on occasion, contributed to promoting our foreign policy goals," (Viswanathan 2019, 134). Soft power might not be a

sufficient condition for achieving foreign policy goals, but it is necessary. For the purpose of this chapter, diaspora is understood as both those people who live out of their homeland temporarily as well as those who have acquired citizenship of their country of residency and have been living there for several generations. Diaspora was a term that was not generally used to describe people from India who migrated to other parts of the world. In the 1990s, the term began to appear more regularly in academic and journalistic writings (Abdul Kalam 2005, 161). Given the history of Indian migration to South Africa first in the form of forced indentured labour and then passenger migrants and recent waves of migration, it is extremely difficult to provide a simplistic definition of the concept of diaspora.

The study of the Indian diaspora was initially dominated by conversations around the cultural dynamics of the diaspora (Jayaram and Atal 2004,11). However, in the early 2000s, there was a shift in the research focus on the Indian diaspora towards the relationship between the Indian state and the diaspora in terms of what the Indian state can do to cultivate the diaspora as a resource for Indian development. The people of the Indian subcontinent have changed into distinct diasporic entities depending on the country which they migrated to as well as the period. This meant that the country or place which the Indian diaspora migrated to and set up communities within, the time period of migration, the political and cultural elements and so on all impacted on the types of entities that were created. Jayaram notes that there is a persistence of several social patterns and cultural elements whose roots and substances can be traced to India (Jayaram and Atal 2004,17). While there might be an overarching bounded identity and persistence of certain behaviours, there has been the formation of dynamic diasporic groupings within different countries and cities. The actual migrants who form part of the diaspora are varied in terms of their regional, religious, caste and economic backgrounds. The data on these factors are an important independent variable for explaining the differences in the given diasporic community.

To understand the histories of Global Indian Diasporas, Gijbert Oonk's work, *Global Indian Diasporas*, is important. The book was put together after the conference 'The South Asian Diasporas: The Creation of Unfinished Identities in the Modern World' with the support of the Amsterdam-based International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) was held in 2005. Oonk and his colleague Henk Schulte Nordholt discussed the growing concept of migration and found that many scholars tended to focus on their own subject areas. Thus emerged the idea for the conference which brought together experts on the South Asian diaspora and experts on Chinese

and African diaspora as well. The idea was that specialists in the field of the South Asian diasporas would be confronted with ideas and concepts from other regions. The book is important because all the articles in the volume are written by various thinkers dealing with general issues related to the local identity of 'Indian' migrants, including their attitude towards India. Considering that the Indian diaspora can be regarded one of the largest diasporas in the world, the migration of people from India to the rest of the world has taken place over many different generations. One of the biggest markers of the Indian diaspora is its adaptability. "The migration of Asians from one continent to another, where they became a minority, resulted in the development of various strategies of adaptation, with the group adopting new socio-cultural values while maintaining some of their original values" writes Oonk (2007, 67). This connects to the argument made above regarding the distinctiveness of the diasporic entities that were formed all the while with a persistence of social and cultural elements which can be traced back to India. The Indian diaspora cannot be said to have any homogeneous identity considering the different streams of categories of the diaspora, the different places where people migrated from, amongst other reasons. However, there are some common Indian identity features despite those differences which might become significant in the process of identity formation regardless of the outward circumstances. Bhat and Bhaskar (2007, 103) write that "For any Indian or person of South Asian origin, cultural identity forms the core of socio-economic, political and religious life whether they are located in India or in the diaspora elsewhere." Even in trying to unpack the hypothesised uniqueness of the Indian South African experience, it can be seen that there are some shared identities and qualities.

South Africa and India have a long history and strong political and economic ties. Much of the focus of research on the Indian diaspora in South Africa or South African Indians has focused on the experience of indenture and South African Indian literature. While these are important fields of study, there is much that can be inferred from the Indian diaspora in South Africa which needs to be studied. Another lacuna has been the exclusion of Muslims within the Indian diaspora. Typically, the Indian diaspora has been analysed as the Hindu diaspora (Vertovec 2000) with Muslims sometimes even delegated to Pakistan. Considering the group of Indian South Africans being focused on, the majority of this group of people are the descendants and second/third generation of people who migrated from pre-Partition India, it is important to accommodate Muslim Indians within the diasporic imaginings. However, an important question posed by Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff is to ask questions such as which, why and when

people started identifying as an Indian diaspora, and/or when they stopped doing so (2007, 121). This relates to whether people want or should be called the Indian diaspora.

There have been several debates about who or what constitutes a diaspora and whether every migration of a group of people can be considered a diaspora of the home country. This has been outlined above through engagement with the developments within diaspora studies and how social scientists have sought to broaden and tighten the category where necessary. The questions around whether all migrants and their ancestors would want to be considered as a part of a particular diaspora is one that arises and has importance for answering the research question. Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff in their analysis of Muslims of British Indian Descent in Mauritius and Suriname examine the Muslim populations of the two countries and explain that as the loyalties of Muslims towards their countries of residence, especially of Muslim immigrants, are addressed with suspicion, the question arises whether ‘true Muslims’ do not consider themselves first and foremost members of a transnational Muslim community or a de-centred Muslim diaspora (Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff 2009 121). However, the use of the term diaspora as a framing of analysis is used because the question around the diaspora and how it is constituted and whether it considers itself as a diaspora or the “homeland” names itself as such without much input from the actual community is an important question. The focus of the research will be to unpack the idea of a South African Indian diaspora and South African Indians and their relationship with the Indian government and South African government.

An important body of work around South African Indians and the Indian diaspora in South Africa has been put together by Goolam Vahed and Ashwin Desai. Vahed and Desai are South African Indian scholars who have done extensive work on the history and sociology of Indian South Africans - related to a number of different areas. In their 2020 book, *A History of the Present: A Biography of Indian South Africans, 1990-2019*, Vahed and Desai trace the history of Indian South Africans in South Africa through a comprehensive undertaking of all aspects of the lives of Indian South Africans. The authors self-described the book as the “first major study to explore the Indian South African experience since the end of apartheid”. While the primary focus is around the period of a quarter century since the end of apartheid, the book also traces the origins of many Indian South Africans, their place within South African society and the connection or lack thereof with India. The book deals with many themes such as gender, the new elite, religion, work, education, affirmative action, and racial politics. These are all issues which are quite contentious in post-apartheid South Africa. The book is important for

this chapter because the authors use these broad themes to make interventions in debates, and they seek to show that “Indianness” has not stood still and has evolved in many ways. Most importantly, they examine the tensions of being “Indian South African” in an insider and outsider perspective.

It is important to contextualise the South African Indian diaspora within the broader diaspora. According to several scholars on work related to the Indian diaspora including Bhat and Bhaskar, there is a division of the diaspora broadly into four streams of the Indian diaspora. These streams are indentured labourers (considered the old diaspora), skilled labourers to the West (the new), semi-skilled and unskilled to the Gulf and West Asia and finally and more recently, the migration of software engineers and information technicians (Bhat and Bhaskar 2007, 90-93). Even within these broad categories, there is little understanding of the South African Indian diasporic experience. The broad category of indenture does not adequately describe the experience of the group of people who crossed the “kala pani” and came to South Africa to work as indentured labourers on the sugarcane plantations in what was then known as Natal (Desai and Vahed 2019, 19). Furthermore, those four categories do not include the passenger migrants and other streams of migrations of people from India to form part of the diaspora. Vahed and Desai make the point which relates to the uniqueness of the Indian diasporic experience in South Africa and Indian South Africans. Unpacking Indian South Africans and the Indian diaspora in South Africa’s experience means speaking to a “story of a people caught between longing” (Desai and Vahed 2019, 19). It speaks to the forced indentured experience where people crossed the “kala pani” several times - when they first arrived in South Africa, when they returned to India after their indenture ended and then for some it was a journey to return back to South Africa when they found that the place, they had left behind was not once they recognised. Then it was a move from the plantations to the cities in search of a better life and in the case of the passenger migrants it was a move to set up their businesses and find economic opportunities in the cities. Then there were the forced movements from the lives they had built up to racially defined townships during the apartheid era. Then came the post-apartheid moment where they were once again forced to redefine their identity and find their place and belonging.

Historical Analysis:

Shifting the focus towards a historical analysis, South Africa and India have always had a close relationship particularly post-1994 in terms of diplomatic relations based on a shared decolonial history and more recently being part of the BRICS grouping (Sinha 2014, 1). However, even before the post-1994 relations, there have been connections between the two countries with the first group of people from India coming to South Africa as indentured labourers. The majority of South African Indians are descendants of the indentured labourers who arrived between 1890 and 1911 (Bhana and Vahed 2006, 242). They came mostly from the south of India. From the early 1870s, there was a second wave of migration which was made up mostly of entrepreneurs from Gujarat called passenger Indians. Within the migration of the indentured labourers and passenger Indians, many of them became South African citizens during apartheid and following the end of apartheid. By the 1960s, many Indians were South African-born and the understanding of Indianness had a broader meaning which was not linked to India (Bhana and Vahed 2006, 250). Many are known as South African Indians or South African-born Indians. It's important to note from Sinha that while diaspora as a conceptual and analytical tool promotes understanding certain aspects of Indian migrants, it is still not sufficient to comprehend the full range of identities and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa (Sinha 2014, 2).

South Africa and India established bilateral relations in 1994 after the first democratic elections took place in South Africa. Before South Africa's political transition, there were no formal economic ties between the two countries (Hofmeyr and Williams 2001, 15). However, in the years since 1994, there has been an immense growth in trade and commercial ties and linkages in other social arenas beyond the market. The two countries have celebrated an almost thirty-year bilateral relationship. India is South Africa's fifth largest export destination and fourth-largest import origin (ClearIAS 2023). Export from India to South Africa mainly consists of finished products such as mineral products, vehicles, aircraft and vessels, chemicals, machinery, iron and steel products, vegetables, textiles, plastic and rubber, equipment components and precious metal (DIRCO 2023). Imports from South Africa to India are mainly made up of natural resources as South Africa remains largely a miner of minerals, rather than a refiner. The imports from India include mineral products, vehicles, aircraft and vessels, chemicals, machinery, iron and steel products, vegetables, textiles, plastic and rubber, equipment components and precious metal. They have made use of bilateral agreements and

trilateral possibilities opened up by the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) forum and BRICS to strengthen these ties. Several South African companies have invested in India. These include SANLAM [insurance], Life Healthcare [healthcare], Momentum [insurance], Airport Company of South Africa [Mumbai airport], First Rand bank, Old Mutual, SAB Miller [brewery] and NASPERS [e-commerce] amongst others (CGI Cape Town 2023).

Patrick Heller has observed that India and South Africa are considered arguably the most successful cases of democratic consolidation in the development world (Heller 2001, 236). Heller makes the point that both South Africa and India have managed to transition into democracies without any major challenges. They have been successful to a certain degree with their democratic consolidation projects. However, the issue is with the deepening of their democracy. Heller argues that in both “South Africa and India, civil society is increasingly being subordinated to political society and that deliberation is being displaced by power”. This argument by Heller was written in 2001. Almost twenty years later, it is clear to see that this problem is not a fully blown crisis in both of these countries as yet. The democratic processes take place in both countries with regular free and fair elections to a certain extent and there is a functioning of the democratic institutions. However, there is a large disconnect and inability of the citizens, particularly the subaltern class in the respective countries’ societies to engage in political and public life. This affects the diaspora in both ways. For South African Indians, the political situation in South Africa is seen as concerning with the supposed rise of Black nationalism and this guides them seeking closer ties with the Indian government and India. However, the rising Hindu nationalism within the Indian government and society as a whole in India does not open up a space for those connections to be formed especially for non-Hindu Indian South Africans. In the post-apartheid era, there has been a reimagining of the identity of South African Indians and the new diasporic identification can be linked to the creation of a globalised world order (Bhana and Vahed 2005, 252).

The arrival of Modi to the position of prime minister of India impacted the government’s relationship with the diaspora as part of the policy of the BJP to develop “Brand India” and to attract business investment to the country. Between 2014 and 2016, Modi visited various countries which boasted significant Indian diasporas including the United States of America, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. In 2016, he visited South Africa and was warmly received by many in the Indian diaspora and South Africa Indians. While in Johannesburg, he called on the diaspora to become ambassadors of India. He told them that “our common heritage makes

sure we remain connected in hearts and minds”, that they are a part of a flourishing global Indian family, that they have done extremely well for themselves, and at the same time, reassures them that India has not forgotten her children (Challagalla 2018, 7). A business-led event was organised for Modi in Johannesburg called #SAWelcomesModi. During the event, Modi hailed South Africa as the birthplace of Gandhi's politics and Satyagraha. “South Africa transformed Mohandas into Mahatma,” Modi said to massive cheers from the crowds (Quint 2016). Along with invoking the politically intertwined histories of South Africa and India, Modi took the opportunity to pitch the India growth story saying that India is a land of opportunity for those who want to innovate and create, trade and invest. The Indian government aims to portray the connection that Indian people living in the diaspora and their descendants have with India as being about not just about a connection to the homeland and tracing their roots. It is about exploring new avenues and sectors of mutual benefit (Oonk 2007, 19). From the executive summary of the *High-Level Committee Report on the Diaspora* (HLCD), it is mentioned that since independence, overseas Indians have returned to India to seek their roots and explore new avenues and sectors for mutually beneficial interaction (HLC 2001, 11). The report lists these interactions as based on investment, transfer of skills and technology, to philanthropy and charitable works. Furthermore, it states that the opening up of the economy has given rise to a new range of opportunities. This idea of mutual benefit which was pushed for in 2001 and continues to define the Modi administration diasporic policies is an interesting one when considering how mutually beneficial those interactions actually are. This will be unpacked in the following chapters.

These historical ties were strengthened through the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2009 of which both India and South Africa are a part. BRICS is a collective of emerging powers who represent the rebalancing of the global geography of power (Carmody 2013, 2). South Africa has the smallest economy and worst performing growth compared to the other countries, but it was added to the grouping as it served as an entry point to the African continent. This grouping is not the only “South-South” or emerging market partnership between South Africa and India. In 2003, along with Brazil, the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) was created (Carmody 2013, 118). The goal of the BRICS grouping and IBSA at the time was meant to present a possibility of a multipolar world order alongside the dominance of the United States as world superpower (Carmody 2013, 133).

There are many questions around the correctness of the term diaspora when referring to South African Indians. Taking into consideration the fact that many South African Indians do not have any emotional, political or economic ties to India and the modern Indian state, the term still remains useful. It remains useful as it is the term that is used in many government papers from the South African and Indian government. Upon looking through several government press releases and papers, the South African government when speaking to and about its bilateral relations with India, there is usually a mention of the large presence of the Indian diaspora/South African Indians in South Africa.

Through its engagement with South African Indians, the Indian government also uses the term. While the term might not be used as much by the “ordinary” South African Indian, it is a term used at government and policy level. It is also a useful identifier for those working in the business field. For the group of the people referred to as South African Indians or Indian South Africans, this can be based on the precarious nature of their relationship with the South African state - by factors outside of their control or by their own choice. This refers to the current grouping of Indian South Africans. For the initial immigrants to South Africa whether as indentured labourers or as passenger migrants, strong ties existed especially for the passenger migrants. Ginwala writes that contact remained with the village and the community, and they relied on commercial institutions associated with India for their own spheres of life. “Thus, in all spheres of life, the contact and link with India remained” (Ginwala 1986, 7). This contact obviously decreased through time and through the loss of people on both sides: within South Africa and in India as well. However, the efforts of the Indian government through its policies and South African Indian mercantile community through their pursuit of better opportunities creates a new dimension of links.

The Indian government's relationship to the diaspora

The current ruling party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India has made a concentrated effort to engage with its diaspora through different avenues and forums since 2002. This has increased under the current BJP-led government under the leadership of prime minister Modi since 2014. While there has been a focus on a particular type of diaspora mainly those in the West that are considered to be the “new diaspora” and generally upper-middle class Hindus, the effects of the policies of the Indian government are often interpreted and taken up by people who might not be the original recipients of the policy but who feel the policy will

assist them. The nature of the BJP and the party's rise to the position of power within the world's so-called largest democracy is something that needs to be looked at in closer detail. The BJP emerged in the 1980s after merging with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People's Organisation). The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded by Syama Prasad Mukherjee in 1951. Syama Prasad Mukherjee had been a part of Nehru's government but resigned after a fall-out with Nehru over the Liaquat–Nehru Pact. This was a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan in which refugees were allowed to return to dispose of their property; abducted women and looted property were to be returned; forced conversions were unrecognised; and minority rights were confirmed. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded in collaboration with the Hindu nationalist organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and was generally seen as the political arm of the RSS. The BJP coalition first came into power in 1998 and completely changed the narrative of the nation, write Renu and Modi (2017, 918). One of the major changes was around the role of the Indian diaspora in building this new India with the diaspora featuring much more in the plans of the BJP government as compared to previous governments. Azad Essa writes that, "The RSS, having been formed in 1925, "were in government by 1977 and were leading in many areas of public life by the stroke of the new century"" (Essa 2022, 98). To take note of this is to understand that a Hindu nationalist organisation which started off as a fringe volunteer organisation founded with principles of spreading the ideology of Hindutva and Hindu supremacy became part of the mainstream political landscape in India and has only cemented its influence in India and around the world.

Hindutva was the central sustaining ideology of the RSS and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. This ideology played a role in the "reclaiming of the diaspora" as it emerged from a notion of a deterritorialized nation state based on 'Indianness' (Renu and Modi 2017, 917). Renu and Modi (2017, 917) say that this idea was very much in line with the BJP's foundational Hindutva ideology which "asserts that Indians (in practice, Hindus) are those who believe India is their fatherland (pitrubhumi) and holy land (punyabhumi) and call for the creation of a 'Hindu Nation' (Hindu Rashtra)". This ideology shift within the Indian government has increased and become even more pronounced as the years go by in India. Modi is perceived as the Indian prime minister with the most energetic outreach having made over twenty official visits to the African continent (Venkatachalam and King 2021,4). Additionally, Venkatachalam and King (2021, 4) write that foreign aid under Modi has become more mercantilist. This has meant there is a greater interest in building a wealthy and powerful state. Part of the Indian government under the leadership of prime minister Modi's mercantilist policies has included a greater focus

on economic diplomacy which is using foreign policy as a tool to build economic strength domestically. There has also been the deployment of new models of development assistance such as the Lines of Credit (LoC) which is a widely used instrument in development cooperation. Another feature of Modi's mercantilist foreign aid policy is that the decision-making has become centralised in the Office of Prime Minister, Venkatachalam and King explain.

There are a number of actors who have an impact on the diplomacy and foreign policy of India on the African continent and one of those is the Indian diaspora. Foreign policy and diplomacy, as such, are not just activities carried out by the diplomatic corps. Instead, the diaspora community plays a significant role in promoting important bilateral relations (Khara 2020, 13). Part of the foreign policy from the Modi and BJP-led government has been accompanied by a conception of a "boundless civilisational nation" which seeks to expand the definition of Indianness. This can be seen in the country's recent diaspora policy which according to Venkatachalam and King (2021,13) has moved towards recognising People of Indian Origin (PIO) to draw them into a framework of an imagined community of Indianness through the granting of the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). The current large presence of Indians helps India with their presence in those countries. Ajay Dubey writes that: "The presence of Indians in large numbers in South Africa, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Mauritius and several other countries could help in promoting India's trade and commerce with these countries and also in member states of sub-regional grouping" (2003, 114).

Government of India's foreign policy and diaspora policies shifts from 1994-2020

During an examination of any country's foreign policy, it can be noted that the people in charge of the policy and the political ideologies which guide the ruling political elites affect the foreign policy. This is certainly true for India's foreign policy which has been impacted by the people in charge of it as well as the events that have taken place either within or outside of India. Two key leaders - Nehru and Modi - provide an interesting contrast and show the evolution of the foreign policy over the past 75 years. The first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru was firmly in charge of the country's foreign policy and his policy was centred completely on non-alignment and South-South solidarity as he was heavily influenced by India's independence struggles and the decolonisation movements taking place in other

countries of the Global South. India's diaspora policy which is part of its foreign policy has undergone many changes since the formation of the independent, modern Indian state. Nehru had a policy which said that overseas Indians needed to integrate into the societies and communities which they found themselves in. This policy was very hands-off and aimed to distance itself from the overseas Indians with a focus that was inward. Nehru said that any person who would be unable to integrate should return to India. He did not see overseas Indians as belonging to the Indian nation and as such overseas Indians were not a part of India's diplomacy (Modi and Taylor 2017). For Nehru, the idea of citizenship was based on territory (Sutton 2007, 277). He repeatedly told overseas Indians, especially those living in countries in the African continent that they needed to cooperate with Africans and that they needed to forget their Indian nationality. In some instances, there was even an assumption that Indians needed to adjust and subject themselves to African rule. However, something of importance to note related to the South African experience of "overseas Indians" is that while Nehru had these policies that sought to in a way cut relations between India and the overseas Indians, Nehru and the Indian government raised the issue of the plight of South African Indians. On the eve of India's independence, Nehru in 1946 took the decision and was amongst one of the first states to break diplomatic ties with the apartheid government and to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa (Desai 2009, 415). Nehru and the Indian government raised the South African Indian question at the United Nations (UN). This actually led to extensive attacks against Nehru by the apartheid government who called him publicly "just another coolie" Africa (Desai 2009, 415). However, even with the efforts made by Nehru and his government to raise the South African Indian question at the UN, Nehru was not just concerned with the freedom of South African Indians but wanted to extend this to the majority African population - reflecting his overarching South-South solidarity.

Once more, even while taking up the case of Indian South Africans globally, Nehru had a clear message for Indian South Africans: "They were to 'forge an alliance with Africans and could not count on India to defend their (relative) privileges after Independence'" (Desai and Vahed 2019, 50). "Unlike Gandhi, Nehru made strident calls for South African Indians to reject racial and ethnic exclusivity and embrace the African majority in the struggle against White minority rule", writes Vahed (2015, 70). This policy was influenced by Nehru's greater aims of South-South solidarity and was taking place during a period of decolonisation. While Nehru's policies at the time might have seemed correct and important for ensuring South-South solidarity especially in the period of decolonisation, his views were criticised at the time and as the years

have passed by. “In sum, Nehru’s view on overseas Indians was consistently inconsistent. For this, he has been thoroughly criticised both inside and outside the Parliament for his failure to formulate a definite policy vis-à-vis the Overseas Indians” (Pradhan and Mohapatra 2020, 151). For the most part and during his time as prime minister, Nehru was not challenged for his foreign policies except for his policy on China which was criticised by the Congress Party and their political opponents (Hall 2019, 25). However, after his term had ended, the criticism around his leadership has increased as had criticism around his foreign policy. Hall makes the argument that it was Nehru’s China policy which allowed the Hindu Right in India to have a distinctive position on India’s international relations and foreign policy (2019, 26).

The intervening years between 1947 where the government of India largely excluded the diaspora from its foreign policy to the early 2000s where the diaspora became very much an important part of India’s foreign policy can be bracketed into different periods. Abraham frames it as the “foreign policy practices that first created and then revised territorial boundaries within the global Indian nation over the last century” (2020, 74). As has been discussed above, after independence and during the government of Nehru, there was an exclusion of the diaspora and an attempt to territorialise India. This was part of the South-South solidarity on the surface. However, Abraham (2020, 75) says that “turning away from the diaspora, in other words, was part of a larger process by which India’s borders were “hardened” to conform to the norm of the territorially bound nation-state”. This means that part of India’s efforts to consolidate its state after Partition and Independence seemed to require a strict adherence to Westphalian standards of the nation-state with sovereign, territorial borders. According to Abraham, a defining event of the bracketing of the diaspora from territorial India which defined the country’s foreign policy between 1947 and 1990 could be seen in India’s response to the political and humanitarian crisis that erupted in Uganda in 1972 (2020, 75). In 1972, the Ugandan president Idi Amin ordered the expulsion of around 40 000 of the country’s Indian minority - giving them 90 days to leave the country. While the Indian government under the leadership of Indira Gandhi at the time condemned Amin’s actions along with many countries around the world, the Indian government did not take any actions to protect or bring the Indians from Uganda to India. The Indian government waited for the British to resolve the problem and essentially said that the displaced overseas Indians had no right of return (Abraham 2020, 76). Therefore, in the period between 1947 and the 1990s/2000s, there was an exclusion of the diaspora from foreign policy and very little interactions between the Indian government and the diaspora. This changed in the 1990s with a revision of the territorial boundaries due to the

demands of neoliberal globalisation. India's economy was in a bad state and the country began to "open up" its economy which led to an increasing interaction with the outside world including the Indian diaspora. The Singhvi Committee which produced the High-Level Committee Report on the Indian diaspora in the early 2000s led this turnaround in the policy. Abraham makes some important observations of this moment in India's foreign policy which relates to the bigger question of this dissertation. Abraham says that with the appointment of the Singhvi Committee, India explicitly sought to emulate China's experience by taking advantage of the financial resources of its overseas residents (2020, 77). The policy shift on the surface seems to indicate a push towards economic benefits. However, there is another way to see this policy shift. With the Ugandan case and the case of the many Indians in the diaspora situated in the Global South, they were assumed to be of lower-caste and working-class origins. During the 1990s, there had been the migration of many Indians to the so-called Global North and to developed countries and were assumed to be educated male, middle-class, and upper-caste people (Abraham 2020, 77-78). In the subsequent chapters, it can be seen that the Indian government pays a lot more attention to its diaspora which can be found in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom as opposed to those in the African continent. This implies a class and caste element. It is as Abraham classifies "Diaspora is foreign policy as a class-caste boundary" (Abraham 2020, 78). This shows that while the Indian government likely moved to prioritising the diaspora due to the need for economic benefits, the prioritising was done at that time due to the specificity of the type of diaspora.

In 1998, the Indian government formally introduced the People of Indian Origin (PIO) card. This served to bring about a shift in attitudes towards the diaspora from the Indian government. Renu and Modi (2017, 917) write that the old Nehruvian view on 'Overseas Indians' was replaced by a new discourse on 'People of Indian Origin'. The formalisation of the PIO was preceded by the inauguration of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) into the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. This was followed by the High-Level Committee on the Indian diaspora (HLCID). In 2015, OCI cards were issued with the PIO and OCI card holders merged under one category OCI in 2015 (Challagalla 2018). The pertinent aspect of India's diaspora and foreign policy is how these policies have developed under the leadership of Modi. Writing in a brief for Observer Research Foundation, Challagalla makes an argument that "In general, the Congress has been happy to cut its ties with those who have left the country; the BJP tends to nurture those very ties" (2018, 2). From the actions of the Modi government since they came into power, it is clear to see that the BJP have paid more attention to the diaspora. However, it

is not some altruistic policy from the BJP government and prime minister - it is an economically and politically motivated decision to secure their national interests and global positioning. However, before Modi came into power, the Prime Minister of India was Manmohan Singh who was from the Congress Party. It is important to understand the continuities in the policies between different governments even if the parties are ideologically different. There were changes in the way that the different governments approached the diaspora but for the most, in the past twenty years since the High-Level Committee Report was released, there has been a focused approach towards the diaspora. One of the important Congress-era policies, under the leadership of Singh, was the announcement in 2005 that the Congress-led governments had made the decision to allow dual citizenship to all overseas Indians who had left India after 1950 to settle abroad, if their home nations allowed dual citizenship (Ashraf 2005, 33). During the announcement which took place during the third Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indian Day), Singh said, “India needs US \$150 billion in investment in its infrastructure and that investment by dual Indian citizens could help fulfil that need [...] We are committed to make it attractive for you to invest in India” (Ashraf 2005, 33). Once more it is clear to see that the developed world, especially countries like the United States were always the top priority for the Indian government. This law is no longer in existence and any person who wishes to become an Indian citizen needs to give up any other citizenship they hold. The current OCI card is now the policy that gives diaspora/overseas Indians a lot of the powers of citizenship without being a full citizen of India. As Ashraf wrote in 2005 during the Congress-era leadership of the Indian government, “The Indian Diaspora, now defining the overseas Indian community, has become very special to India. Whether it was the BJP-led government that took the initiative, or the present Congress-led government that is passing it, the Indian Diaspora is being seen as an important element in pursuing Indian foreign policy goals of playing greater role in the international system” (Ashraf 2005, 34). From this, it can be seen that while Singh and the Congress Party might not have been as aggressive as the current Modi administration in pursuing the diaspora, they did see the value in the diaspora and understand its importance for India.

Hall writes that in order to understand what he terms as “Modi’s reinvention of Indian foreign policy”, there is a need to understand three particular things. Those are Modi’s character; his political thought’ and how it converges or diverges from the thinking of the broader Hindu nationalist movement, and especially to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in particular, which he joined as a boy; and lastly his style of leadership and governance (Hall 2019, 61).

While Modi's rise to prime minister was temporarily affected by the events that took place in Gujarat, he managed to overcome these events by "reinventing" his political methods in something that Hall has termed "Moditva" (Hall 2019, 75). In 2002, the Gujarat Riots/Violence took place which was a three-day period of inter-communal violence in the state which Modi was the Chief Minister of at the time. Thousands were killed and even more were injured and went missing during the riots which was sparked by the burning of a train full of Hindu nationalists in Godhra - accidentally or deliberately - by local Muslims. In response, communal rioting spread across the state. Modi's leadership was widely criticised, and he was "accused of doing too little to stop the rioting and to protect Muslim communities in particular. Some even suggested that his government had ordered the police not to intervene during the violence and not to investigate crimes in its aftermath" (Hall 2019, 3). Besides the responses and criticism from people within the BJP and the opposition, Congress, Modi also received international criticism when he was refused a visa to visit the US in 2005. His support amongst his base in Gujarat remained and only increased after the events of 2002 as the supporters saw Modi as a man of the people through Moditva which as Hall writes, aimed to replace the "old-fashioned and stale Hindutva" which did not fit in with the desires of ordinary Indians. Instead Moditva was aimed at the ordinary people - the *aam aadmi* or the common man. Kaur writes that the *aam aadmi* was the "site of the fabrication of the new political subject, the one who remains uncorrupted, the symbol of unblemished and uncompromised intellectual merit and moral purity" (Kaur 2020, 321). This figure which appeared in the early 2000s in the campaigning of the Congress Party and *India Shining* campaign found the most traction and impact during Modi's *Acche Din* (Good Times) campaign in the 2014 general elections. Modi managed to appeal to people beyond his political base in the 2014 elections "as one of the people battling the corrupt elite, the one who would restore moral and material progress to India" (Kaur 2020, 321). The policy orientations towards Indian diaspora are as much about politics as about economics (Gangopadhyay 2005, 115). This is because the recommendations from the 2002 HLCD report were about ensuring the diaspora felt included in India's policies which in turn meant that the diaspora with substantial financial clout would look favourably at India and invest in the country. The term "Moditva" did survive Modi's move from Chief Minister in Gujarat to the Prime Minister in New Delhi, despite the efforts of some Hindu nationalists to promote it, writes Hall (2019, 77). However, the core elements of the political style that Modi had developed during his time as Chief Minister, in the period after the 2002 riots and his campaign to become prime minister remained once he was the leader of the "world's largest democracy".

To conclude this chapter, it was understood that the diaspora as a concept within international relations has undergone many different shifts and changes and there is no single understanding of who makes up the diaspora even though there are some criteria diasporas need to fulfil. The concept of diaspora has been used to refer to the South African Indian community because this is a term used by many theorists within the field of international relations and more importantly by the Indian government in policy documents. Through the understanding of the historical context of the development of the diaspora within South Africa, the main takeaway is that the South African Indian diaspora has a very disconnected relationship to India due to the historical development. The exploration of the development of India's foreign policy and diasporic policy shows that the leadership and ideology of the political party in charge of the government leads to different shifts in policy. This leads to a focus on the bilateral relations between South Africa and India and how this relationship has changed in the present which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter Three: Economic diplomacy and bilateral relations between India and South Africa

The third chapter deals with the economic diplomacy and bilateral relations between the Indian and South African governments. It focuses on the bilateral relations between India and South Africa from 1994 until 2022 and how this relationship evolved. Ever since diplomatic ties were established between South Africa and India in 1994, a close relationship has existed between the two countries. However, the change in leadership in India has affected the language use. This chapter will include a specific consideration of the differences between the BJP-led and Congress-led governments' foreign policy towards South Africa and towards its diaspora. The central argument being made is that there has been an evolution of the Indian government's relationship with the diaspora from the Congress-led government to the current BJP-led. However, both of the parties have been influenced by the 2002 High-Level Committee Report on the diaspora which will be discussed in detail.

Apartheid and the Indian government

South African Indians historically maintained strong ties with India during the pre-apartheid and post-apartheid years. However, the ties with India were greatly impacted as a result of apartheid. During the early years of apartheid, the Indian government under the leadership of Nehru boycotted the apartheid South African government in all sectors and fields. India was one of the first countries to boycott the apartheid South African state. This was influenced by Nehru's political leanings. "India recognised that we in South Africa were not only fighting for our just rights but also to preserve the national honour and dignity of all Indians A mighty India is arising and will allow no country to trifle with her sons and daughters in other countries," Nehru said. While the boycott was an important move towards pressurising the apartheid government, it had the unintended consequence of cutting off all contact of Indian South Africans with India (Goolam and Vahed 2019, 211) - the effect of which can be felt until the present. From the above quote from Nehru, it can be seen that his standpoint was influenced by his belief that the anti-apartheid movement would benefit South African Indians so the decision from the Indian government was not completely altruistic. However, it is important to note that Nehru was not just interested in the "freedom" of South African Indians. He wanted to extend it to the majority African population in a reflection of his internationalist politics (Vahed 2015, 69). In the 1950s, the apartheid government even blamed Nehru for the anti-apartheid movement's actions against the apartheid government such as the Defiance

Campaign - claiming that Nehru had initiated it. India's support of the anti-apartheid movement went beyond just words. The Indian government was involved in resolutions at the United Nations General in the 1960s which requested member-states to impose certain sanctions against the apartheid government. Vahed says that India took concrete steps such as stopping South African vessels from entering Indian seaports and prohibiting Indian ships from going to South Africa (2015, 790). Additionally, the Indian government did not allow South African planes to land at Indian airports or to fly over India. There was also a boycott of South African goods by the Indian government. These actions were supported and appreciated by the anti-apartheid movement and the South African Indians who were all suffering under the apartheid system. In 1967, the Indian government accorded formal diplomatic recognition to the African National Congress (Biswas 2015, 288).

In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February and in August, he made a visit to India. Vahed writes that this was an affirmation of the historic links between India and South Africa (2015, 80). Mandela visited India several times on state visits during his tenure as the first democratically elected president of the republic of South Africa. This relationship has strengthened even after Mandela's presidency came to an end even though the paradigm has changed from the idea of South-South solidarity as both India and South Africa have moved towards more neo-liberal economic and political policies.

Economic diplomacy of the Indian government

Development diplomacy is a new form of interaction between state actors which fits into the international stage amongst changing geopolitical realities. India as an emerging and rapidly growing global power serves as a distinctive and important site of contemporary development (Gulrajani, Mawdsley, and Roychoudhury 2020,8). Most of the focus of diaspora governmentality literature focuses on skilled expatriates but middle-class diasporic subjects who have concerns around economic development of the home country are a significant focus (Dickinson 2015, 3). "Therefore, articulations that draw on Indian diasporic connections as a base for consolidating future economic outcomes are deeply embedded in the historical intersectionality of race and class in South Africa," writes Dickinson on the role that Consulate General in South Africa plays in fostering relations between the diaspora and the "homeland" (Dickinson 2015, 9).

Under Modi's leadership, there has been a greater focus on economic diplomacy directed at the African continent (Venkatachalam and King 2021, 5) based on new models of development which value more commercial public-private partnerships. India's economic diplomacy is based on the use of "smart power" which combines hard power and soft power to integrate economic diplomacy at the centre of the country's foreign policy (Venkatachalam and King 2021, 186). Modi has visited South Africa and other African countries on many occasions and has declared Africa to be at the top of India's priorities along with enhanced development cooperation in several sectors (Venkatachalam and King 2021, 1).

The previous administration under the Congress Party and Manmohan Singh had many interactions with the African continent and the various governments and leaderships. Under Singh's administration, there were some continuities with the current administration, in that China's growing presence on the continent prompted a reaction from India. Prime Minister Singh described Africa in 2011 as a "major growth pole of the world" and sought to strengthen its economic ties with the continent and importantly emerge "from the shadow of rival China's influence in the area" (Al Jazeera 2011). This was done through offering financial assistance to help the continent. India saw the African continent as providing important opportunities for new investment sites and new export markets (Modi and Taylor 2017, 912) with India being Africa's fourth largest national trading partner with a joint report from the African Export-Import (Afrexim) Bank and Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India showing that trade between Africa and India has increased more than eight-fold from USD 7.2 billion in 2001 to USD 59.9 billion in 2017 (Shangwe 2021, 32). One of the major ways in which India provides financial assistance to the continent is through lines of credit (LoCs) (Shangwe 2021, 33). India does not use traditional donor-recipient channels in which to engage and cooperate with African countries. Instead, India mainly uses development partnership assistance schemes; one of which is the LoCs. The LoCs target specific projects identified by the government of India and are facilitated through the EXIM Bank of India. These cooperation and investments from the government of India began in the 1960s as an effort to engage in inclusive development cooperation with countries of the global South. It was about creating a model and structure which would stand in contrast to the dominant Western foreign aid models of the time (Mukhopadhyay 2022, 3). As India's economy began to grow from the 1960s onwards, the country made the shift from being a recipient of aid to a contributor to development cooperation. While India's immediate neighbourhood of countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal receive the most attention, the government of India extends a large portion of the

LoCs to countries within the African continent such as Tanzania, Mauritius, Mozambique and Sudan amongst others. South Africa is not a recipient of LoCs. Working for the ORF which is a New Delhi-based centre-right think tank with a lot of influence over Indian foreign policy (Essa 2023, 67), Mukhopadhyay (2022, 20) writes that the India has performed fairly well in using the LoCs as a continuation of the South-South cooperation legacy. In a brief comparison of the interactions of the Modi administration as opposed to the Singh administration, it can be seen that the principles of South-South solidarity still remained a part of the Singh's administration's commitment (Taylor 2012, 782). However, already in 2011, India's diplomatic strategy was no longer "fundamentally grounded in an idealism predicated on South-South solidarity", writes Taylor. Instead, it could be seen that the underpinnings of Modi's policies were already taking root in that the focus was much more on the importance of national interests (Taylor 2012, 783). However, there was certainly a greater interest in non-alignment and rhetorical notions of South-South commonality during the Singh administration than can be found during the current Modi administration. South-South cooperation might remain important at the surface of the Modi's administration's rhetoric and policies, but it is underpinned by national interests.

India has a complicated identity in many senses and while a complicated and contradictory identity can be seen as a problem to overcome, for India, they are embracing this identity. As Gulrajani, Mawdsley, and Roychoudhury write: "India has a complex identity: a middle-income country with a colonial past and persistently high rates of domestic poverty and inequality, an increasingly attractive destination of foreign capital, and an ODA recipient that is simultaneously a practitioner of South-South cooperation" (Gulrajani, Mawdsley, and Roychoudhury 2020, 16). India is a country with extremely high levels of inequality and yet the government is working to change that image and present the country as the best investment bet of the international community. They are accomplishing this through invoking an identity which first became associated with the country after independence which was of being the leader of South-South solidarity. India is embarking on building its case for a leadership role as a "non-Western great power capable of building development coalitions across the South" (Gulrajani, Mawdsley, and Roychoudhury 2020, 16). India wants to play both roles: being a new superpower and building its relations with the Western world while still keeping the so-called Global South relations intact through BRICS and other such engagements. This complex history and present of India in all its contradictions presents many challenges and questions - some of which Ravinder Kaur outlines.

In her book, *Brand New Nation: Capitalist Dreams and Nationalist Designs in Twenty-First-Century India*, Ravinder Kaur (2020) outlines the steps and campaigns that India embarked upon in order to transform itself into an attractive investment destination. Kaur uses the framing of “brand nations” which is the idea that nations, in this case India, packaged themselves as attractive investment destinations in the global market. The work of being a “brand nation” emerges from developments around the self-publicity of the nation as an attractive investment destination that invites global capital (Kaur 2020, 77). For India, this marked a shift from its colonial past where it was the commodity that was sold without any agency. Now India and its government are actively asking for investment from the world including their former colonisers and imperialists. It is an act of seemingly taking control over the image of India and creating a new future for the country - one in which its past does not matter and all that really is of importance is its identity as one of the world’s fastest growing economies.

Kaur’s arguments are important in light of the fact that arguments made in 2013 by the book *Reimagining India: Unlocking the Potential of Asia's Next Superpower* was edited by global management consulting company, McKinsey & Company. The book which seemed to advocate directly for this exact project of turning India into a “brand new nation” featured several contributors - most of them heavily invested in industrialisation and economic development (Chandler and Adil Zainulbhai 2013). Anand Mahindra, the chairperson of the Mahindra Group, one of the fastest growing automotive companies based in Mumbai, was one of the book’s contributors. He argued for movement towards a uniquely Indian growth model. He says the best way to propel the economy forward might be to encourage the different parts of the country to go their own way (Mahindra 2013, 47). He says that India is a diverse country which cannot be seen as a single unified and coherent entity. Furthermore, Mahindra says that companies look at tax policies and labour costs amongst other things when they are looking to locate factories. The companies are not looking at “some mythical ‘India’ visible only at Davos”, Mahindra says (2013, 47-48). Mahindra says that there should be a celebration of difference yet at the same time, is arguing that some states are just doing it better than others.

This is interesting because the whole project of India at platforms and forums such as Davos was to create a mythical India. As Kaur argues, it was about exploring the “third world” as a new frontier of capitalist expansion and self-publicising the Indian nation as an attractive investment to its former colonial masters. Through the different campaigns and the Incredible

India displays at Davos and the marketing campaigns around the country as a whole, there was a deliberate transformation into a certain mythical idea of the Indian nation. More than that, there was a deliberate move towards a certain kind of politics that the capitalist and business class sought from the government. It was about mixing different contradictions together and remaking history. The McKinsey & Company book was supposedly not the product of a McKinsey organisational ideology. In the foreword of the book, it is written that contributors were given the space to express themselves without censor or influence (Chandler and Adil Zainulbhai 2013, 13). Yet, there is a clear narrative being created in the book where there is a need for a certain kind of economic development led by the capitalist class with the government “setting the rules of the game” and then stepping back (Mahindra 2013, 50).

India’s past was one of cheap labour and being a commodity in order to make the colonial enterprise more profitable. With its “rebranding” through various different campaigns, India wanted to change the narrative. It conjured up similar images that were used during the colonial enterprise but “the difference was that this time it was India actively asking the investors to turn around and take a look at the opportunities it offered” (Kaur 2020, 84). It went beyond just this changing of the narrative. The actions taken through the rebranding of India and the arguments being raised by the various thinkers in the McKinsey & Company book were around this idea that the world needs India to be a success and that this would be a reclamation of its past glory and would benefit the entire world. It is also centred on the argument that India would be the country to steer the world towards a new world order as it moves towards becoming an emerging global power.

India has taken many steps over the past few years towards becoming that superpower and every accomplishment the country makes seems to be an affirmation of the idea that the world needs India to be a success. In September 2023, as the BRICS Summit was taking place in Johannesburg, South Africa, attended by prime minister Modi, India successfully launched the Aditya-L1 spacecraft. While this achievement took place in a period outside of the time given for this dissertation, it is included due to the statements made by prime minister Modi on the launch of the spacecraft. The spacecraft took off on board a satellite launch vehicle from the Sriharikota space centre in southern India on a mission to study the sun. The achievement was hailed by many global leaders around the world including Modi’s fellow BRICS leaders who congratulated him on the achievement. During his speech at the closing of the summit, Modi welcomed the congratulations that had been received from everyone at the summit and around

the world. He said: “Yesterday evening, India achieved a soft landing on the southern pole of the Moon with its Chandrayaan mission. This achievement is a significant milestone, not only for India but also for the entire global scientific community. In the area where India had set its target, no previous attempt had ever been made, and this endeavour has been successful. So, science has been able to take us to a very difficult terrain” (MEA 2023). In his speech, Modi specifically refers to the idea that the achievement was not just a milestone for India but for the entire global scientific community. This achievement which is one of many made by the Indian government and other related industries over the years can be seen in two ways. It is the idea that India is an emerging global power that can compete with China within the Asian region but also with the West globally. It is about showing the world that India is an attractive investment to the world. More than that it is a signal that India does not need the world and that it is able to invent and make huge technological strides on their own. The second reason for highlighting this event is that these achievements confirm that the thinking of Hindu nationalists that India/Bharat, as many Hindu nationalists call, it was a country with a rich and proud history. This had been damaged by outside forces and now the country is overcoming the past. Its current success is a reclamation of India’s past glory and will allow India to take its rightful place as the country to steer the world towards a new global order.

Post-Apartheid relations from 1994 to 2022

A major basis point for this research is that South Africa and India share a strong connection - politically, economically, culturally and through the diaspora. This connection extends far back into both countries' histories. Every January 9, the Indian government celebrates *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* (PBD) or Overseas Indian Day. It is a day observed by the Republic of India and is meant to commemorate the return of Mahatma Gandhi from South Africa to Mumbai, India on January 9, 1915, as announced by then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The day was first celebrated in 2003 after the release of the HLCd. The symbolic celebration of the day is that it marks the contribution of the overseas Indian community towards the development of India. The day is meant to signify and remember the contributions of Non-Resident Indians and People of Indian Origin to the welfare and development of the nation. While the day is connected to the diaspora and is celebrated in India, it is another instance of the deep connections that exist between South Africa and India. No matter how contested Gandhi’s history is now in South Africa and other places on the African continent, his impact in South Africa and his eventual return to India means this connection is permanently captured in history

(Maduna 2015). In 2003, at the first ever PBD celebrations in New Delhi, members of the Indian diaspora are awarded for their achievements in life and contribution to civil society, government, business, sciences, various professions and philanthropic causes, anti-apartheid activist and writer, Fatima Meer became the first South African Indian recipient of the award in the field of public affairs. During the acceptance of the award, Meer however, categorically rejected the term 'Indian diasporic' as a prefix to a South African national identity and she said that since Indian immigrants in South Africa had struggled hard and long for acceptance, South African should be their primary identity (Ganesh 2010, 27). In 2016, when prime minister Modi came to South Africa on a state visit, he paid tribute to Gandhi by retracing Gandhi's famous train journey. In 1983, Gandhi, a young lawyer at the time, was taking a train to Pretoria. He was asked to move to a third-class compartment because of his race and when he refused, Gandhi was evicted from the train. This was said to be the birthplace of Gandhi's ideology of passive resistance. Modi boarded the train at Pentrich railway station and reached Pietermaritzburg during that 2016 visit where he also signed several bilateral treaties with then president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma (NDTV 2016). That 2016 visit of Modi's which has been referenced several times in this dissertation was a pivotal moment in bilateral relations between South Africa and India. Besides the extensive engagements that Modi had with the Indian diaspora in South Africa during that visit, it was Modi's first visit to mainland Africa. The visit also marked the first prime ministerial visit from India to South Africa since then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived in 2013 for the G20 summit in Durban.

Bilateral relations between the Indian and South African governments

South Africa remains an important and attractive trade market for India even if the benefits are skewed towards South Africa due to the stronger economy of India and the slowing economy that South Africa has been experiencing. In terms of the numbers that provide an overview of India and South Africa's trade and economic relations, for the 2022-2023 financial year, India's exports to South Africa were \$8, 474. 42 million and India's imports from South Africa were \$10, 397, 83 million. There has been an increase of \$1, 821. 25 million in year-on-year growth from the previous financial year of 2021-2022. There are many different items that South Africa exports to India and the five main exports are as follows: mineral fuels and oils and products of their distillation, pulp of wood and other fibrous materials, ores slag and ash, iron and steel and salt, sulphur, earths and stone. Indian companies in South Africa have a large

presence. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) India Business Forum (IBF) currently represents many member companies in South Africa. The CII IBF is a forum that supports and assists Indian investors and businessmen operating in South Africa. The forum is currently led by Praveer Tripathi who oversees the various activities and workings of the forum. According to the data from the IBF, there are currently more than 150 Indian companies in South Africa in many different industries from pharmaceuticals, automobiles, Information Technology (IT) sector, mining, infrastructure and renewable energy. Some of those companies include Cipla, TATA, Mahindra, Millennium Technologies, Jindal, Larsen & Toubro and Tata Power. Several of these companies do not just operate with the South African market in terms of import and export but actively participate through having manufacturing facilities in the country. Importantly, Indian companies from the banking sector such as State Bank of India (SBI), Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) and Bank of India (BOI) used to operate in South Africa but have since shut down or withdrawn operations from the country. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there has been the signing of several agreements in the years 2022-2023. The number of opportunities available in South Africa for Indian companies make the country an attractive place to invest and establish themselves within. However, there are several challenges in the country for Indian companies operating in South Africa. Mr Tripathi explained some of those challenges during an interview in August 2023 in Johannesburg. Those challenges include the slow and bureaucratic process to secure work permits and visas, there is also the issue of safety and security in South Africa and the lack of direct flights between India and South Africa.

Diplomatic and bilateral relations between South Africa and India were established in 1994 with the election of South Africa's first democratically elected government. In 1997, at the Red Fort in New Delhi, South Africa and India signed the Red Fort Declaration on Strategic Partnership by the then prime minister Deve Gowda and Nelson Mandela. This was an important partnership which set the parameters for the relationship between the two countries. On the occasion of the signing of the declaration, Mandela said: "Guided by the Delhi Declaration which we are about to sign, let us all, Indian and South African, African and Asian, work together to realise the ideals of the visionaries who gathered here half a century ago; great men and women who chose the world as the theatre of their operations, and thus helped to equip us for the challenges we face" (Mandela 1997). One of the great visionaries that Mandela has been referring to was Nehru and he said they would be tested to see how their actions would "improve the lives of those whom Nehru referred to as the common man or woman, in our own

countries and everywhere”. Those words were spoken about a leader who was expected to change the course of history in South Africa, and he was speaking about a leader who had been given a similar mantle in India. Given the current political situations in both the countries and how both leaders’ legacies have been questioned and redefined, seeing the words spoken by Mandela provides a whole new perspective.

The 1997 partnership was reaffirmed in the Tshwane Declaration in October 2006. The Tshwane Declaration was about reaffirming the strategic partnership between South Africa and India. It was signed in 2006 to commemorate the centenary of the launch of Satyagraha. The partnership was signed in the spirit of the Red Fort Declaration and had been cemented in state visits that took place in the intervening years by President Thabo Mbeki in 2003 to India and the visit to South Africa by President APJ Abdul Kalam in September 2004. It was supposed to be seen as a reaffirmation of the two countries to a global order of peace, equality and justice. In the speeches that were given by the presidents and prime ministers of South Africa and India respectively during the signing of those partnerships, they often invoked Nehru, Gandhi, Mandela, Desmond Tutu and so on - paying tribute to the principles of truth, non-violence and self-sacrifice (Mbeki 2006). While the political leanings in South Africa have remained the same with the African National Congress still in power on the surface, the political atmosphere in India has changed dramatically in the past ten years of India and South Africa’s relationship. There has been a huge shift in the political positions of the government with the current BJP-led government no longer putting as much weight on Nehru and Nehruvian ideals especially with those related to foreign policy and policies and attitudes towards the diaspora (Modi and Taylor 2017, 917). This has not really affected the relationship between India and South Africa especially when looking at economic relations. However, it has unquestionably affected the language used in statements and the kinds of values that are highlighted.

There have been many state-level visits between India and South Africa with the president and prime minister visiting each other’s countries. Both countries have taken a lot of pride in the relationship they have and the widening of the bilateral relationship (DIRCO 2019). There have been many strategic partnerships between the countries; one of the most recent being the Three-Year Strategic Programme of Cooperation (2019-2021). Beyond the state level bilateral relations, South Africa and India work together in the international sphere on many multilateral forums like BRICS and IBSA. Both multilateral forums are meant to help develop the developing countries and to challenge the Western domination of the economic system. Biswas

(2015, 289) writes that IBSA was meant to be a forum to facilitate trade and investment among the developing countries while BRICS was about challenging the domination of the industrial countries of the west in industrial and financial governance. Despite the close bilateral ties between the countries and their connections through multilateral forums, Biswas says that the relationship between India and South Africa has yet to reach its potential in terms of what both countries can achieve together and in terms of ensuring that both countries benefit greatly from bilateral and multilateral relations with each other.

The COVID-19 pandemic provided several opportunities for the countries to cooperate with each other with India and South Africa worked together to ask the World Trade Organisation to temporarily suspend intellectual property rights so that COVID-19 vaccines and other new technologies could be accessible for poor countries (Usher 2020). The two countries championed this cause because of the meaningful repercussions for many developing countries around the world in their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

High-Level Committee report on the Diaspora

The High-Level Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Dr. L.M Singhvi. Dr Singhvi was an Indian jurist, parliamentarian and diplomat. He became involved in politics as an opponent of the radical social agenda championed by Prime Minister Nehru. In 1997, after a long tenure as the High Commissioner to the UK, he formally joined the BJP. As a member of parliament, he served as the Chairman of the High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, and he was instrumental in implementing the Vajpayee government's outreach to the Indian diaspora. Dr Singhvi was mandated to make an in-depth study of the problems and difficulties, the hopes and expectations of the overseas Indian communities (High Commission of India 2019). The report was submitted to then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2002. The committee recommended the formation of a planning organisation to look after the affairs of Overseas Indians and Vajpayee decided to institute a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs to deal with affairs related to Overseas Indians (High Commission of India 2019).

The High-Level Committee report which was commissioned by the Indian government in 2001 has been referenced several times earlier. However, there is a need to look at the report's recommendations in closer detail. The report was handed over to the then prime minister on January 8, 2002 (MEA 2002). The primary hope was that the observations and conclusions of

the committee would assist in “laying the foundations for a sound framework of policy and approach and for a mutually beneficial and incremental interaction between India and her Diaspora”. The report was put together with speaking to overseas Indians and the use of case studies and empirical data according to the Ministry of External Affairs. The report was structured in five parts. The first part contained the letter of transmission of the report to the government of India by the committee chairman; the orders of the Ministry of External Affairs setting up the committee describing its terms of reference; the foreword; the executive summary and the acknowledgements. The second part of the report is a detailed examination of the genesis and particular circumstances of the Indian Diaspora in selected countries and regions. This second section concluded with a global perspective of other Diasporas and the nature and extent of their interaction with their countries of origin. The third part of the report contained the three Interim Reports that were submitted by the Committee to the Government of India preliminarily a few months before the final report was submitted and accepted by the prime minister. Those reports included the fee reduction in the PIO Card Scheme, celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas on January 9 each year and the institution of the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards. The fourth part of the report contained the detailed examination and recommendations on major Diaspora issues in the fields of Consular and related matters, Culture, Economic Development, Investment, International Trade, Industry, Tourism, Education, Health, Media, Science and Technology and Philanthropy. In this part of the report, issues such as dual citizenship and the creation of a single window dedicated organisation to interact with the diaspora were also dealt with.

The full report is no longer available on the internet and unfortunately could not be obtained during the research process. The report focuses on three strands of Indian migration. The first is the labour migration after the abolishment of slavery by the British colonial powers, then it was the migration of skilled labourers to the developed countries of the West, and finally, semi-skilled and skilled labourers to the Gulf countries. Keeping in mind that the report was produced in 2001-2002, a lot of the dynamics of migration have changed. However, it is important to look at the report’s recommendations as these continue to be used in policy formation by the Indian government until the present time. An important element of the report is that it mentions that the majority of Indians would not have wanted to migrate and would have preferred to stay in India. The report says that they only left India for economic reasons and not because of any political, social and ethnic factors. The report noted that this grouping wanted to “payback” to their mother country but due to an unresponsive policy and

implementation environment, they were unable to do so. Therefore, the report proposed a new policy framework which would create an environment which allows India to “leverage these invaluable human resources”. The committee decided that there needed to be an overhaul of the bureaucratic procedures in order to remove unnecessary obstacles standing in the way of using those resources in the best possible way. The report included a geographical survey of the diaspora. There is a special focus on South Africa as well. Interestingly enough the report notes that the policy of differential treatment from the apartheid government opened up a pathway of economic prosperity for the Indian community which opened up the gap between the Indian community and the indigenous African community. The report also notes that it was generally believed that a huge number of PIOs voted for the white dominated parties in the first democratic election of 1994 and 1999 and said that the challenge was to remove the misperceptions of the community and join the mainstream in nation-building. The report noted the tensions that existed between the Indian and African communities in 2001. These tensions persist and have amplified in ways and will be unpacked later when analysing the primary data.

The report emphasises taking inspiration from the Israeli experience in dealing with the diaspora. The committee felt that while the historical experiences and contexts are very different, they felt that the contribution of the diaspora to Israel in the economic, political and cultural spheres contained important lessons for India. An example mentioned was the activities of Jewish lobbies outside Israel, particularly in the United States Congress, their extensive fund-raising abilities, large-scale funding for the scientific and technological development of Israel, their global networks which link Jewish associations and organisations worldwide as well as with the State of Israel. The report also mentioned that the scheme of Israel Bonds, issued by the Government of Israel, to strengthen the national economy and infrastructure, could be adopted in the Indian context. These were all things of interest mentioned in the report and have been adopted albeit in different forms by the Indian government in the policies towards the diaspora. There is a strong Indian lobby in the United States of America government and through groupings like Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) and other groupings which ties to Hindu nationalist groupings who ensure the interests of India are put forward on an international stage (Naik 2021). These diaspora groupings also strengthen the domestic economy of India through their international activities. The report recommended the changing of the PIO card scheme to lower the fees and to help facilitate the re-acquisition of Indian citizenship by senior citizens who are PIO card holders but intend to spend the remainder of their lives in India. The committee believed that

the implementation of the recommendations would result in opening of a new chapter in India's relationship with its diaspora. Once again this is something which will be examined during the analysis of the primary data. Another event that was put together after the report was released was PBD Day which was meant to do the two things as discussed above.

To conclude this chapter, the High-Level Committee Report on the Diaspora is an important report that guided the engagements that the Indian government - both the Congress-led and BJP-led - have had with the diaspora over the past couple of years. The report was meant for the government of India at the time as well as subsequent governments to provide guidelines of engagement with the diaspora. There were many reasons that the government of India pushed for this greater engagement with the diaspora but one of the main reasons was the economic benefits that the diaspora could provide for the government in the form of reparations and investment opportunities. The BJP-led government with Modi at the helm has been pushing India towards becoming a powerhouse and the diaspora is seen as a key figure in that. South Africa and India have a close diplomatic and bilateral relationship which is mostly based on economic benefits rather than political positioning. This means that regardless of who is in charge of each country, the shared histories are always invoked but the economic ties are the dominating factor. This leads to the final chapter which is an analysis of interviews conducted with several key figures from the Indian diaspora and an analysis of the research question.

Chapter Four: Analysis of the primary data

Looking back at the period of 2014 to 2022 with the BJP's specific policies towards the diaspora and how the economic diplomacy of India worked and how it was carried out and the response from the South African Indian mercantile community is key to understanding the overall interactions between government and community as a whole. There are various aspects to the diplomacy and the relationships of the South African Indian community as a whole and the mercantile community in particular that need to be unpacked. Interviews from various actors within the South African Indian business and mercantile community provide valuable insights into how this relationship is seen and has developed and how this development has taken place. This chapter will argue that the perceived concerns of the South African Indian diaspora around Black Nationalism pale in comparison to the actual danger of Hindutva in India.

South African Indians as a minority

During the 1994 first ever democratic elections that took place in South Africa, many Indian South Africans voted in a way that was a surprise to many including former president Nelson Mandela. Having faced the oppression and inequality of the apartheid system albeit to a much less degree than Black and Coloured South Africans, the assumption would not have been incorrect that they would have voted for the African National Congress. However, a high percentage of Indian South Africans voted for the National Party. There were many reasons for this, writes Desai and Vahed (2021, 12-12) which could have contributed to a type of melancholia and anxiety of the future and their place within South African society. The nature of the voting system in 1994 makes it difficult to know the exact statistics around how Indian South Africans voted in the election. However, Padayachee (1999, 394-395) writes that an analysis of the 1994 election results in the overwhelmingly Indian electoral district of Chatsworth showed immense Indian support for the National Party with 64% of the Indians in that district voted for the National Party at national level. The African National Congress only received 25% of the vote in the voting district. Again, a full analysis is not available and there might have been different voting patterns in the middle-class 'Indian suburbs', but the African National Congress did not receive a lot of the Indian votes. These results were not received well at all by the ANC leadership and Nelson Mandela. After the elections, Mandela is quoted as saying: "In the Indian and Coloured areas you found as much as 70 per cent of the population voted against an African government. They decided to vote to be part of a minority and not the

majority, they decided to be part of a past which has divided us, created conflict, hostility, instead of being part of the future... (Desai, 1996). Desai and Vahed (2019, 12-13) write that despite the messages from Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) highlighting the efforts of people of Indian origin in the liberation struggle, many Indians did not vote for the ANC. Seelan Achary, the ANC chairperson of Ward 48 in Phoenix and of the Shree Mariamman Temple in Mount Edgecombe, in an interview with Vahed said: "Today, Indian people talk about Mandela as if he was God himself, I mean we all worshipped the man, he was a great man, the fact that he's compared to Gandhi makes it even better ... However, when Mandela stood as president, the Indian community gave him the biggest whacking of his life, they voted for the National Party, you know the embarrassment for us [ANC members]" (Desai and Vahed 2019, 12-13). In the years following that first democratic elections, many Indian South Africans have firmly become a part of the political and economic elite in South Africa. Many of the anti-apartheid activists of Indian origin were part of the parliament of Mandela and successive presidents. However, those fears amongst the 'common people' which emerged in the period of the early to mid 1990s seem to have remained very much a part of the South African Indian community. A perceived rising black nationalism from the third largest political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters headed by Julius Malema and groups like Black First Land First have seemed to cause some of these fears to re-emerge and gain traction in the 2000s. In a few of the interviews conducted for the research – both formally and informally - this was a concern that seemed to arise. Whether these concerns are genuine or whether they are racially motivated in any way is not something that can be understood completely as that would require an entirely separate dissertation. One of the recent events that has caused panic and fear amongst some aspects of the South African Indian community was the 2021 July Unrest that took place. The July Unrest/Shutdown of 2021 was a pivotal moment in South Africa's recent history. It was a wave of civil unrest that took place in KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng from July 9 until 18. The unrest had been sparked by the sentencing and subsequent imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma for contempt of court. There were also many other reasons including rising inequality, poverty and criminality. Along with the massive destruction of property, halting of economic activity in those two provinces and loss of lives, it caused a flaring up of racial tensions in parts of KwaZulu Natal - in particular Phoenix, a former sugarcane estate and Indian township. Members of the Phoenix community embarked on vigilante activity to reportedly protect their business and properties (Majola 2023). However, in the course of the nine days, 34 people were killed in the area in what became known as the Phoenix massacre. This caused serious racial tensions amongst the Indian and

Black South Africans in the area. Even though the “Phoenix Massacre” only occurred in that community and had largely been perpetuated by the Indian South Africans in the community, it caused fears for many Indian South Africans across the country and spoke to a historical memory of the events that took place in 1949. In 1949, there were race riots that took place in Durban, KwaZulu Natal. Some people have called it the 1949 Riots and others the Durban Riots (Appasamy 2021). The events of 1949 were sparked by a fight between a Black news-seller called Madondo and Indian shopkeeper called Basnath. The outbreak of violence spread throughout Durban and spread throughout the city. The tensions between the two communities were exacerbated by the state and the police. Writing in *Africa Is a Country*, Youlendree Appasamy (2021) says that the year 1949 is a useful starting point not in comparison to the events of July 2021 because the two events are completely different but as a lesson in how a middleman minority, or a “buffer race” as Mahmood Mamdani puts it, are often most easily accessible targets of economic frustration, due to proximity. It is about understanding how white supremacy and colonialism worked so well to divide communities that had differing histories and levels of oppression but were being made to see each other as different. There have been several times where riots and acts of violence have erupted between the Black and Indian communities. There were many dynamics that exist between the Black and Indian community and one of those which persists and had a huge role to play in the Phoenix massacre was the “sense of Indian South African racial superiority, built on apartheid logics and class position is one of the reasons this continues” (Appasamy 2021). Another aspect is that due the persistence of the otherness for the Indian community, the community have fostered a sense of insularity, this has undermined the efforts of Black and Indian anti-apartheid and grassroots community activism to heal the ruptures between these two groups (Appasamy 2021). Desai and Vahed write that the “move into racially bounded group areas was instrumental in advancing some Indians economically” (2021, 11). The Group Areas Act which aimed to ensure the total separation of the so-called races during apartheid helped create work opportunities for Indians which provided access to pensions and security of tenure for Indians. It was all these events and incidents which are important to understand in the context of the concerns and anxieties that the Indian community as a minority in South Africa have as whole and what is driving some of their concerns and behaviours.

Something of importance to problematise is that Indian South Africans were “placed above” indigenous African Black people historically and some of those sentiments remain till the current day. When Indians - forced indentured labourers and passenger migrants - came to

South Africa, there was a linking of their struggles within South Africa to the broader decolonisation and nationalist movement in India. It was one of the reasons why Nehru went to the United Nations to fight for the recognition of the rights of Indians living in South Africa. Nehru did not want to accept the Indians back to India, but he did want to ensure they had some sort of rights under the oppressive government that was in power at the time. The British colonial government could not be seen to be giving equality to Indians in South Africa, but the Indians in South Africa were placed above the indigenous Africans. The white colonial and apartheid government needed to ensure that racial and economic separation continued. However, the Indian indentured labourers and passenger migrants had international leverage, unlike the indigenous African people (Ginwala 1986, 7). This took place through the efforts of Gandhi at first and later by Nehru and various political and economic groupings in India. This type of superiority that was given to Indians in South Africa has remained with many Indian South Africans especially in how they view their place within South African society and their connection to India. There is an argument being made that a supposed rising Black Nationalism in South Africa will threaten the position of South African Indians in South Africa and they will need to have plans in place. First these concerns are mostly of the mercantile business class and people of a higher economic class who have at their disposal the means to be able to emigrate and fortify their position through whatever means necessary. Secondly, the application for the OCI cards presupposes that India will be the place they can emigrate to and build a new life there if the situation in South Africa causes it. However, the perceived threat of Black Nationalism in South Africa is just that: perceived as of now. In India however, there is a very real Hindu nationalism rooted in the society which is a threat to anyone not considered Hindu.

It is purely business

The Indian government's policies aimed at the diaspora are meant to invoke an emotional connection between the members of the diaspora towards the Indian government and India as a whole. This emotional connection would incentivise the diaspora and its members to want to form lasting connections with one of those ways being in the form of economic investments and engagements in India. Emotional connections and a link to India and its history is not usually the reason when South African Indians invest and form economic relations with either the Indian government or businesses. This sentiment emerged in several interviews, conducted with South African Indians and Indian people involved in business, where it was expressed,

that Indian South Africans might not do business or have economic relations with the Indian government and Indian organisations based on any emotional affinity and attachment with India. Instead, those relationships were purely economic and business-related. However, the relationship that is being pursued by some Indian South Africans with India in terms of opting to sign up for OCI cards is related to building a relationship with India in case the space that Indian South Africans occupy in the South African political, economic and social landscape is minimised and threatened. From sentiments expressed in interviews, there is a hope that by creating ties with the Indian government, the South African government will take notice of it and additionally, the South African Indian community will have a secondary plan in a manner of speaking. This means that if there is an increase in the precarity of the position of Indian South Africans in the years to come and there is an increasing danger to their place within the society, by cultivating and developing their relationship with India, this will be able to ensure they have an alternative plan in place. Even if it will not work out that the Indian South Africans will be able to emigrate to India which is a very unlikely possibility, it is about having that backup from the Indian government in a very different scenario from the way the Nehru government dealt with the Indian South Africans in the 1940s and 50s.

However, these assumptions of creating these connections comes in contact with several issues. The first one is that the application of the OCI is something that is not accessible for everyone. Applying for the OCI card is financially and logistically inaccessible for many South African Indians. To start a new OCI application, it would cost R5025. In order to convert a PIO to OCI, it would cost R1865 and if an OCI card is lost, stolen or damaged, the cost is R1865. The OCI Card cannot be automatically transferred from parent to child/minor as there is a limitation of facility up to fourth generations. The final approval for an application is carried out by the Ministry in Delhi. For a person who is an OCI card holder, this lifts the need for any visa requirements to visit India. However, the visa application process, which for South Africa is an electronic visa process, is not as rigorous as the process of OCI status. The requirements for an OCI card are not simple and require a fair amount of investment. In order to apply for an OCI card, applicants need the general paperwork required such as photographs, birth certificates, proof of residence and passport copies. However, one of the major requirements is proof of the applicant or parents/grandparents having Indian nationality/Indian descent. This could include an Indian passport, school leaving certificate, birth certificate, land holding in India, issued by the government of India. In cases where the applicant's father/grandfather or great grandfather arrived in South Africa by Ship, the consulate general advises the applicant

to seek the help of the department of archives in South Africa. A copy of the naturalisation certificate is also required. This proof of the applicant or parents/grandparents having Indian nationality/Indian descent is not something that is easily accessible. However, this is one of the ways the consulate general and the Indian government differentiate between PIO and OCI. Since, they use the statistics from Stats SA around Indian people in South Africa, this number includes people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin who are classified as Indian within the South African census. The OCI card application includes that requirement because it means a person of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin cannot claim OCI status. With regards to this proof, it is not as easily accessible because there are many South African Indians who have no ties at all or tenuous ties at best with their ancestry in India. This is especially true with regards to the descendants of indentured labourers because many of the indentured labourers did not arrive in South Africa with proper paperwork. They might have also given false information in order to board the ship for South Africa meaning the information would not be considered valid. Their names might have been captured incorrectly by authorities and a simple spelling issue could cause huge issues in the documentation process. For a person to find out this information, they might be required to make a trip to India which once more is not accessible for everyone. Another element that makes getting the OCI card difficult is that the name of villages in India where people's ancestors might have come from have changed during the Partition of India. Therefore, even though the person and their ancestors might have come from what is considered the Republic of India, the name of villages might have changed making it difficult to go to India and find the exact village and the documentation required to complete the OCI form. The administration issues required to complete the form often cause a lot of difficulties. The OCI card also works on an individual basis. This means that within a couple, each partner has to claim on the strength of their own parents/grandparents. They cannot claim the status on behalf of their partner. The OCI card does not entitle cardholders to undertake any missionary/religious work, mountaineering and research work without the permission of the government of India.

During an interview with a South African woman of Indian origin (known as R) who has worked in several sectors of business and government in September 2023 in Pretoria, R said that the OCI card does make it easy to travel to India, especially if a person is a frequent visitor to India, whether for business or pleasure. However, she said even applying for a visa to India from South Africa is easy and can be achieved online with a few clicks. With regards to the question of providing ease of investment for Indian South Africans, R said that the OCI card

gives holders the opportunity to invest in India and fly to the country whenever the holder wishes. “You're treated with the benefits of as though you're a citizen of India. The only rights that you don't have are voting rights. So, it's very much like having a permanent resident card,” R said. She says while the process of getting the card might be a lot of work, those that go through the process and actually get the card will see the benefit and reward of getting the card as it really opens up the door to do a lot of things. R said it gives people a lot of the benefits of living in India without having to live in India and gives holders hassle-free access to the market.

There is also the premise of the OCI cards and what sort of benefits it actually provides to people who apply for it and are successful applicants. The benefits do not extend to any sort of citizenship or political rights. However, there has been a definite increase in the number of OCI card applications. From the CGI Johannesburg's Annual Report 2022 (information supplied) which covers the Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North-West and Limpopo jurisdictions, there are approximately 100 000 NRIs and 300 000 PIOs. The numbers for the PIOs are taken from the statistics provided by Stats SA regarding the number of people in the racial category of Indian. In the year 2022, there were 413 applications processed for OCI applications. This increase has been noted by the Consulate General and other actors. There are numerous reasons as to why there has been an increase in the number of applications. It could be attributed to an increased focus on the South African Indian population by the Indian government. However, there is another reason linked to the position (perceived or otherwise) of South African Indians as minorities within the South African landscape. Amongst the mercantile class, there is a fear about the changing political landscape in South Africa. This is causing an increase in the application for OCI cards. The Indian government is well aware of these fears and wants to facilitate people in finding their roots and making those connections with India. The surge in the OCI card applications could be related to what can be termed push-and-pull factors meaning there are some factors that are pulling the South African Indians towards creating those connections with India and there are factors that are pushing South African Indians away from South Africa to build those connections. The push factor is the supposed rising black nationalism in South Africa and the pull factors are firstly the emotional and cultural and familial connections South African Indians have with India and secondly the rising India narrative. In an interview conducted in September 2023 via an online platform, Premeshin Naidoo, a South African Indian man working in the banking sector in South Africa, said that the OCI cards applications allow for exploring connections to India and exploring heritage. However, Naidoo said the process used to be much easier to get OCI status. It is now a much

more complicated process, and it is a sentimental process rather than any administrative benefit. This means that the OCI card which is the primary diasporic policy available for South African Indians from the Indian government does not really allow for anything more than a sentimental connection to India, rather than any administrative and economic benefit. One of the reasons could be that the South African Indian community has not built any concrete ties with India resulting from the apartheid system and the need to be firmly integrated into South African society. While there can be tendency to compare the South African Indian experience to the experience of Indian-Americans in the United States, there is no need to go so far. There are several examples closer to home so to speak. The experience of South African Indians can be seen in opposition to Indian communities in countries like Kenya and Mauritius who have close ties with the Indian government and their families in India. Naidoo says that before even dealing with the experiences of the Indian diaspora in the United States and Singapore, he said he deals with a lot of Kenyan companies in his work and is able to see that many of the companies are ran by second and third generation Kenyan Indians who have managed to keep ties with their families in India. Naidoo said in his experience, the Indians in East Africa have managed to take advantage of their links to India in a way that South African Indians have been unable to. However, this is due to vastly different circumstances from South African Indians. Naidoo said that many of the Indian people who emigrated to Kenya went as businesspeople, they were educated and went with capital which allowed for maintaining of those familial ties with India. For South African Indians, this is completely different as there might be people whose ancestors come from North India and have connections with one or two family members. However, for people whose ancestors have come from South India, they might not even have that tenuous connection as their ancestors would have come as indentured labourers and might have had certain issues with documentation (as has been discussed above).

Another difference between South African Indians and other people in the Indian diaspora in other parts of the world is the issue of remittances. Remittances is the money that is sent back to people “back home” and is a common feature of many diaspora communities. However, amongst the South African Indian communities especially the second and third generation Indians, this is not a very common phenomenon. Amongst new immigrants, there is a more common occurrence where money is sent back to villages and families in India. However, because many second and third generation South African Indians do not have any family in India, there is no consistent flow of remittances. The only investments that take place is the

building of wells, boreholes and places of worship in the villages and areas where South African Indians trace their ancestry to (Desai 1996).

Another assumption is that the Indian government would be interested in the connection to South African Indians and if the situation necessitated their intervention they would want to intervene. The year 2016 marked the first visit of prime minister Modi to South Africa. Modi's visit to South Africa was met with a raucous welcome from the South African government but more importantly from the Indian diaspora and South African Indians. There were many debates that took place around Modi's visit and whether or not he should be welcomed. "The rapturous reception that Modi received from thousands of Indians was a sign of their attachment to 'Mother India' on the one hand but also of their own unease about their place in the new South Africa (Vahed 2017, 123). The tensions which arose from his visit between those who welcomed and those who called for a boycott could be put down to religious and ethnic differences but that is too simplistic an explanation. After all, the *#SALovesModi* welcoming committee was made up of both Muslims and Hindus. However, with regards to the tensions that existed in the fears of South African Indians and their place within South African society, India could be seen as a place which represented and provided "a sense of belonging even as the idea of 'going back' permanently is never on the cards" (Desai and Vahed 2021, 2217-228).

Akhtar Thokan is a South African Indian businessperson based in Johannesburg, South Africa. Significantly Thokan was part of the organising committee for the *#SAWelcomesModi* event which took place in 2016 in Johannesburg. During the run-up to the event, Thokan and the others who were part of the committee - in particular the Muslim organisers - were criticised for being part of such an event. The welcoming committee for the event included Thokan, Raman Dhawan, the late Sayed Mia who represented business interests and a spiritual leader, Mukesh Patel. In an article published at the time in a local newspaper, *Muslim Views*, the event and the organisers including Thokan were criticised for putting on such an event and celebrating Prime Minister Modi. Mahmood Sanglay, the CEO of *Muslim Views*, criticised the visit and questioned why all those who welcomed him did not question the Prime Minister and the "blood on his hands" (Sanglay 2016). He also criticised the former MEC for transport in Gauteng and an anti-apartheid activist, Ismail Vadi and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation. During that visit anti-apartheid activist and South African Indian, Ahmed Kathrada met with Modi. The picture commemorating this meeting hangs in the Consulate General office in

Johannesburg. Sanglay said the businesspeople involved in the event would probably cite their business interests as their reason for being on the committee, but he did say that doing business with the Indian government and the Modi administration would not automatically mean that they are endorsing Modi the politician. Sanglay ended his piece saying that “It is most uncomfortable to speak this truth encumbered by corporate and political interests. Ask Thokan and Vadi” (Sanglay 2016). According to Thokan in an interview conducted in August 2023, there were many reasons why the event was organised, and such a welcome was given to the prime minister. According to Thokan, there was a feeling at the time which had been growing that Indians were being targeted and for that reason it was felt that there needed to be a “backbone” in case something happened. Creating those ties with the Indian prime minister and the Indian government was also to serve as a signal to the South African government that the community had the support of the Indian government. Thokan explained the event was actually put together by members of the mercantile class from the new Indian diaspora who had come to South Africa who had close ties to India and the BJP government. Thokan got involved in the welcoming committee through his position with the Congress of Business and Economics (CBE). The CBE which was initially called the TIC Business and Economics Group was formed by the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) in the late 1980s as an “activist business group”. The organisation ceased operations in 2006 and was re-established in 2013. The organisation is meant to be for the welfare and interest of the Indian community. They were invited to be a part of the delegation that welcomed Prime Minister Modi and Thokan was asked by the organisation’s president to be the CBE’s representative at the meeting to organise the delegation. Even though Thokan faced criticism for his decision, he does believe that it was important to create those connections with the Indian government and India because of India’s role as a “powerhouse” in the world at the moment but largely due to the fears of the direction South Africa is going in and what that will mean for the South African Indian community.

With regards to the question of whether India and the Indian government would be interested in giving extra attention to the South African Indian business community, Thokan said the business world and the political world are too different and that the business world will always remain the business world. Thokan said he does not see it happening wherein the Indian government would prioritise the South African Indian government just because they have a shared link and heritage to India.

For many South Africans currently, India is seen as the land of their ancestors rather than their own (Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff 2009, 136). This is important in thinking around the idea of de-diasporisation which speaks to the idea that while all diasporas are formed through migration, not all migrations lend themselves to the formation of diasporic identities. Therefore, when speaking about an Indian diaspora in South Africa and whether there are connections with the Indian government especially with regards to economic links, it might prove even more complicated because the idea of an Indian diaspora in South Africa might not exist any longer. It definitely does not exist in the traditional way of understanding how a diaspora works and in particular the ways in which Indian diasporas work in other places around the world. We can look at the case study of Mauritius and Suriname and their Indian diasporas and how they did or did not maintain a connection with India depending on their particular situations. The experiences of the Indian diaspora in South Africa lies between the experiences and histories of the Mauritius and Suriname case studies. These two case studies provide contrasting experiences of how the Indian diasporas interact with India and the Indian government depending on the context of their migration and the circumstances within their host country. Mauritius is an island country off the coast of the African continent while Suriname is a small country in South America. Both countries have similar experiences in that their current Indian populations are the descendants of indentured labourers who went to work in those countries - in a similar manner to the experiences of indentured labourers who came to South Africa. Over 700 000 thousand Indians migrated to Mauritius, South Africa, Reunion Island, Seychelles and the East African region during the time period 1829-1924 (Kadekar, 2005). Most of this number of migrants consisted of those who came as indentured labourers. However, as has been shown in the South African case study, the opportunities available on the continent have meant that there have been continuous streams of migration from India to different parts of the African continent. The Indian diaspora on the African continent vary in size and history. Gupta has created four categories within which to divide the Indian Diaspora in Africa according to the size of its presence. These four categories are (1) Substantial Strength (2) Dominant Strength (3) Minimal Strength and (4) Marginal Strength (Gupta R.K, 2013). South Africa and its Indian diaspora fall under the substantial strength category in that this category refers to countries in which Indian communities have a population of more than 1 000 000 people. Reunion Island is a country that is also included in this category. South Africa's Indian diasporic population constitutes around 3% of the population. The dominant strength category refers to countries where the Indian communities make a majority in terms of total population of the country. Mauritius is the only country not only in Africa but in the entire globe which

could be included in this category (Jain, Tripathi, and Katiyar 2017). The Indian diaspora in Mauritius is a unique case study as they constitute an overwhelming majority - nearly 70% of the total population and they were among first permanent settlers in the island. In Suriname on the other hand, the Indian diaspora does not constitute the majority of the population. However, along with the Afro-Surinamese, also known as Creoles, People of Indian origin or PIOs, in Suriname commonly known as Hindustanis, form the dominant communities (Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2007, 132). The one major difference between the Mauritius and Suriname experience as described by Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff, which is relevant, is that religious and ethnic differences have caused different pathways in both countries. In Mauritius, religious differences have led to the construction of distinct ethno-religious communities and “a process of diasporisation among Hindus and of ‘de-diasporisation’ among Muslims (Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2007, 132). Meanwhile in Suriname, this has not taken place and instead it has led to the formation of one Hindustani diasporic community. What this means is that in Mauritius from the beginning of the period of indentured labour in the late 1800s and early 1900s, those who arrived were not a homogenous group. There were those identified as Muslims and those who identified as Hindus. Legally, they went under a single category of Indo-Mauritian until 1962. Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2007, 125) explain that they have analysed the period from around 1910 onwards in order to explain why in 1962, certain Muslims claimed a separate identity based on religion rather than region of origin and they conclude that the split in the Indo- Mauritian community on the basis of religion was the result of the interaction between local processes in Mauritius and the 1947 partition of British India, perceived as a process with no clear beginning or end. Therefore, it was a case of the external political happenings in the homeland which had an impact on the relations between the two groupings, but it also displayed that the groupings were firmly situated in the society they were living in because the domestic proceedings had an impact as well. With regards to the above concepts of diasporisation and de-diasporisation, Bal and Kerkhoff found through interviews that Hindu Indo-Mauritians have been aided by the Indian government and had begun reactivating ties with India. Subsequently, the Muslims have begun to abandon this common Indo-Mauritian identity and the idea and connection to India as their homeland. They have begun to replace this homeland with Mauritius and are not really a part of the diaspora. While there have been religious differences between Hindus and Muslims, for the most part the Hindus and Muslims have been united, even forming political formations together to run for representation within Suriname with very little connection to India (Bal and Kerkhoff 2017, 139). It can be seen how South Africa lies in between these two case studies. The Indian diaspora or South African Indians do not have

huge divisions between them and there are no calls for de-diasporisation from any grouping within the larger South African Indian community. South African Indians are minorities within South Africa but fully participate in South African society even if the community is a little isolationist at times. South African Indian Muslims still maintain emotional ties to India over Pakistan such as supporting India over Pakistan in cricket matches. This is as a result of the migration of Indian South Africans mainly taking place before Partition.

Hindutva in South Africa

Hindutva is the ideology guiding many of the BJP-led government's policies and interactions with the Indian population. Both informally and formally, the Hindutva ideology has become the dominating ideology. It can be seen as a type of Hindu consciousness and a political Hinduism, and it can also be seen as Hindu nationalist ideology that is seeking to re-create the image of India. Hall writes that "Hindu nationalist ideology began to emerge between about 1870 and 1920" (Hall 2019, 44). It emerged as a response to what Hall summarises under four challenges. It emerged as a fully-developed ideology in the 1920s under the term Hindutva (Hall 2019, 47). While there is clearly an increase in Hindu nationalism and Hindutva in India in recent years, the ideology is not a new occurrence in India's socio-political landscape. Hindutva forces have been present in India since before the country's independence with the RSS which was founded in 1925 and they went on to create many other right-wing organisations. The main change has been the increase in their electoral appeal (Kaul 2017, 3) which is most evident in the Modi era. Even though there were previous BJP-led governments, the party was mostly seen as a communal party with a Hindu support base. Once Modi came into power, this changed because of the combination of nationalism and neoliberalism. Kaul (2017, 4) makes the argument that liberalisation and right-wing nationalism (Hindutva) arrived together in the 1990s but have often been placed by commentators as two separate forces with their own economic and social trajectories respectively. The one is seen as an economic policy and the other is seen as identity politics. However, that is not the case - the two are not separate at all but are in fact deeply intertwined. When understanding the use of the campaigns such as the *aam aadmi* or the common man (discussed in chapter three) employed by the BJP in the lead-up to the 2014 election wherein Modi was elected, it was clearly achieved through the combination of neoliberal policies and Hindu nationalism. Kaul explains that within the Indian context, it can be seen that the neoliberal reforms eroded the power of the state which required a resort to "nationalism of the religious kind in order to define a strong cultural identity in the

midst of much drastic transformation of the landscape” (2017, 4-5). Nationalism and neoliberalism appear separate but in fact they are in a relationship with each other. The narratives which have been created by “Modi-led BJP provides a narrative of development and Hindutva which is constantly reinforced through every possible medium, speech, performance” (Kaul 2017, 10). One of the ways this narrative is reinforced is through the diaspora and the ways in which Modi and the BJP government interact with them. According to Goolam and Vahed (2019, 178), this Hindu consciousness began to emerge in the 1990s in response to the rise of India as a global power. Referring to Thapar’s work (1989, 210) wherein he stated that central to Hindutva is the idea that “an identifiable “Hindu community” and structured religion have existed from time immemorial’. It is also centred on the idea that the golden age of Hindu civilisation had been destroyed by British colonisation and Muslim invasions and needs to be reclaimed through a transformation back into a Hindu *Rashtra*. Goolam and Vahed (2019, 178) reference Mukta (1995, 15)’s work in showing that the Hindutva ideology and organisations have been transported to many diaspora communities over the past three decades. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), founded in 1964, are transnational in their reach and central to spreading the Hindutva ideology (Goolam and Vahed 2019, 178). There are branches of the VHP present in South Africa and which aims to see India become a Hindu state “once more”. Understanding the role of Hindutva is a pivotal one to understanding the Indian diaspora especially in places where the Indian government is increasingly focused on the diaspora like the United States of America. It has been argued by several scholars that the support of NRIs, particularly from the United States of America, has been key to the spread of “an Indian diasporic consciousness centred around Hindutva”.

One important element around the influence of Hindutva within South Africa is the argument brought up by Singh (2003) and Lal (2018) amongst others that Indian communities in South Africa are viewed as having liberated themselves from the caste system. When conceptualising and speaking about the Indian diaspora, there is an understanding of shared cultural experiences but also vastly different lived experiences within the different countries that diaspora finds itself in depending on the historical, political, social and economic contexts. One of those differences is that of caste which is a big issue in India and would require a lot of work to unpack. Caste in India according to Raj, a Christian missionary writing in the 1980s (1985, 10) has four roots which are racial, occupational and economic, migrational and religious. It is a system of dividing people into different groups depending on a person’s community or lineage by creating hierarchies. It brings together the race - colour of a person’s skin, the type of work

they do, where they came from and what branch of religion, they follow to decide a person's place in society and what sort of work they should do and what role they would be allowed to play in society. In India, caste is a huge factor in people's lives and the main way it differs from caste systems that might exist in other countries is that it heavily invested and influenced within the sanctions of the Hindu religion which prevents upper-caste people from interacting with lower-caste people in a number of different situations (Olcott 1944, 648). The influence of Hinduism is very central to the caste system in India. Lal writes that Indian communities in South Africa, Fiji and Trinidad and other countries with experiences of indentured labour are viewed as having liberated themselves from "caste tyranny, a process that, it is sometimes argued, commenced on the boat" (Lal, 2018, 25). He then asks the question, that if there is no Hinduism without caste, how should the Hinduism in the diaspora that emerged from the experience and religiosity of indentured labourers be characterised. The HLCD report acknowledged that the indentured diaspora practised a form of Hinduism which did not follow some of the traditions and customs from India including *jaati* (caste) and dowry amongst others. This is all relevant when addressing the question of Hindutva in South Africa. Hinduism and Hindutva are not the same things as a point of initial clarification. Hinduism is a religion and Hindutva is a political ideology. However, Hindutva claims that its ideology comes from Hinduism and its beliefs like caste so perhaps the lessening influence of caste within the South African Hindu community affects the way the community would interact with the Hindutva ideology and Hindu nationalism. A direct link cannot be drawn but this does present an important argument. Traditional divisions of caste and class divisions were less relevant to Indians in South Africa because the majority of migrants to South Africa were indentured labourers who were drawn disproportionately from Tamil Nadu (Singh 2003, 8). For those from the lower castes, there would be little to gain from maintaining those caste distinctions and maintaining a system which discriminated against them especially as they were put in another system which discriminated - first through forced indenture and then the apartheid system. For the rest of the migrants, even if they came from a high caste and would have wanted to maintain the caste distinctions, they would not have an opportunity to do so because of the colonial system and later apartheid system which existed in South Africa and forced races together through the Group Areas Act. Within communities, these caste distinctions might still hold power in terms of who is allowed to marry and so on, but their power is far diminished from the way in which caste operates in India.

The Hindu-Muslim dynamic of the diaspora

Within India, the dominant political ideology is being guided by advocating for the establishment of a Hindu nation or Hindu rashtra (Modi and Taylor 2017, 918). The idea of the diaspora has been reclaimed by the political elites made up of BJP politicians and it is based on the idea that the Indian nation exists wherever the diaspora does (Modi and Taylor 2017, 918). These ideas come from the BJP's foundational Hindutva ideology "which inter alia asserts that Indians (in practice, Hindus) are those who believe India is their fatherland (pitribhumi) and holy land (punyabhumi) and call for the creation of a 'Hindu Nation' (Hindu Rashtra)" writes Modi and Taylor (2017, 918). This is being actively pursued by Hindu nationalists under the Hindutva ideology within the general public, civil society and more importantly through the BJP-led government. It operates with many assumptions and ideas but one of the assumptions is that India is a Hindu country and needs to be returned to that pure uncorrupted state. Extending that assumption is the belief that Muslims should be living in Pakistan or elsewhere and need to be completely removed and eradicated from India. While not comparable but still weighty, within diaspora studies and many of the literature looked at in this dissertation from Oonk, Cohen et al, there is a conflation that takes place where any reference to the Indian diaspora largely refers to the people who make up the diaspora as being Hindu so by extension it is seen as a Hindu diaspora. This thinking within the field of international relations could possibly be used by Hindu nationalists to provide further evidence for their cause as academia has been co-opted at times by those in power to fit their agenda. An important question raised by Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2007, 120) is whether all migrants and their ancestors would want to be a part of the Indian diaspora. A further question could be added to that question which is while the official definition of the Indian diaspora provided by the government of India does not assign any religious, ethnic or caste basis to the diaspora, this does not automatically mean that the government of India does not have certain people and groupings in mind when they were defining the Indian diaspora at first and thereafter actively calling out for participation from the diaspora. This can be seen in their interactions and concentrations on certain regions and diasporic groups over others.

Commenting on the relationship between Hindus and Muslims, Aktar Thokan said there has never been any big problems between the two religious' communities in South Africa. Thokan said the Indians in South Africa - whether Hindu or Muslims have always worked together and did things together. During the Group Areas Act, the so-called Indian areas and townships were

made up of Indian people of different religious and cultural groups. Thokan said the Hindu and Muslim people lived together in each other's home as a community.

“So, till today, I would say there is a very strong bond between Hindus and Muslims, although, since a certain amount of things happened in the past, maybe 20 years or so, there has been this friction between extremists in each group [...] whether it's in Muslims or Hindus. I don't believe this big issue about differences. We identify as Indians.” Something that Thokan and others have mentioned informally is that the tensions might arise over time and be influenced by what is happening in India but that for the moment, the relationship between Indian Hindus and Muslims in South Africa remain at ease. This is evidenced by the Indian business forums found in the country which feature both Indian Hindu and Muslims. In many of the so-called former Indian areas around the country, especially in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal, Hindu and Muslim Indians live together with temples and mosques situated in the same area without any major issues. However, tensions within both communities and a clash of ideals and values regarding religious practises and the impact of globalisation could change this (Desai and Vahed 2021, 180). One of the major sources of tension within the Hindu community is the growth of Hindu consciousness in the form of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva which is often found in many diaspora communities. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) are two organisations which were founded to spread the Hindutva ideology. Desai and Vahed write that Krish Gokool, a trustee of the Somtseu Road Temple and the 1860 Heritage Centre in Durban, is a founding member of the VHP in South Africa who wants ‘to see India become a Hindu state’ and to this end, started a chapter of the organisation called ‘Friends of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]’. However, he does not want the violent tactics that are sometimes evident in India to be replicated in South Africa (Desai and Vahed 2021, 179). However, despite the efforts of these organisations, they have not been successful in winning over the mass of Hindus in South Africa (Desai and Vahed 2021, 179). This could change as prime minister Modi consolidates his power in India with a third term as prime minister, how successful the expansion of Hindutva beyond the West is and what the political situation in South Africa looks like after the 2024 national elections.

GOPIO

There have been several organisations formed over the years with the purpose of advancing and pursuing the agenda of the Indian diaspora. One such organisation is GOPIO. It was

founded at the First Global Convention of People of Indian Origin in New York in 1989. On the organisation's website, it explains that its initial thrust was fighting human rights violations of people of Indian origin. The website goes on to explain that while this has improved, human rights violations continue to be a major issue for PIOs living outside India. The South African branch of GOPIO was formed by Krish Gokool in Durban in 1996 with limited support (Desai and Vahed 2020, 215). The current leadership of the organisation is Roger Latchman, a businessman based in Johannesburg. Latchman was sworn in during the organisation's election in 2023 (GOPIO 2023). Latchman's official title is the International Coordinator for Africa. Indian-American, Lal Motwani was elected as its president for 2023-2024. Motwani had been a member of the organisation from GOPIO's inception in 1989. GOPIO received a lot of support from the BJP government but preceded the BJP's power in existence. The organisation along with the Indian Diaspora Council are meant to pursue the agenda of the Indian diaspora. However, GOPIO has a limited presence and support in South Africa. According to Desai and Vahed, they have attracted the support of the business classes in South Africa but do not have the same prominence and influence as in countries such as Australia and the USA (2021, 215). Desai and Vahed say this might be because some Indian South Africans might feel being part of GOPIO will be seen as "unpatriotic" with the environment of perceived growing Black and African nationalism. Some academics and activists such as Brij Maharaj, an academic at the University of KwaZulu-Natal has also expressed the concern that the organisation's ties to the Hindu right will create divisions along religious lines amongst Indians in South Africa (Desai and Vahed 2021, 215). GOPIO has a much more of a public profile in South Africa as opposed to the Indian Diaspora Council but both organisations do not really have a foothold in South Africa.

The Indian Business Forum

While the Gupta family and their illegal activities in South Africa was not focused on in this dissertation, there is a need to mention them. The impact of the Gupta family and their activities was definitely felt by the South African government, politicians and the people of South Africa. From the continuous loadshedding to the destruction of many state-owned enterprises and the overall capture of the South African state, their impact is unfortunately still being felt. There was another group of actors who were impacted by the actions of the Gupta family and their associates and that was the Non-Resident Indian businesspeople operating in South Africa. According to Praveer Tripathi, president of the CII Indian Business Forum even though he did

not forthrightly mention the Guptas, the Indian business community in South Africa faced huge reputational damage as a result of the actions of “one bad apple”. There were also concerns from South African Indians that the illegal activities of the Gupta family and their associates (of which many were South African Indian) might negatively impact their position in South African society. Writing for Vanity Fair in 2019, novelist and writer Karan Mahajan (2019) says for him the Guptas’ scandal seemed to have inflamed racial tensions with Indian South Africans being seen as representative of the Guptas especially for the people who were victimised by the Guptas’ corruption. On August 31, 2003, an interview was conducted with Tripathi. Tripathi said that the Business Forum was set up by the government of India to establish business forums as a form of soft diplomacy in various countries around the world. It was not set up as a formal forum during the early 2000s until the 2010s and it rather operated as an amalgamation of different industry heads until the auspices of the Consul General and the High Commissioner of India in South Africa. The forum went through some tough times until it was revived towards the end of 2017 and the forum became more formalised with fully democratic structures in place. After the forum was re-instituted, a conference was held in April 2018 which brought together the forum and its members, the Indian government, the South African government and the South African business community. Tripathi has hopes for the future of creating an umbrella of forums including the India Business Forum and the various forums which are made up of South African Indians and other forums to create widespread. This is because the Forum does assist with facilitating South African business - not necessarily only South African Indians but South African business generally - with accessing partners and business in India. Through the idea of an umbrella of forums, the cooperation can work towards being more successful. It is one of the platforms that exist which seeks to create connections between business and government in South Africa and India.

Speaking of an Indian Diaspora in South Africa

During the hosting of cultural and economic events at the Consulate General and High Commissioner of South Africa, there is little distinction between South African Indians and the Indian diaspora. They are considered under the blanket term of the Indian diaspora. However, this could not be further from the experience when it comes to economic transactions and trade. In terms of the policies from the Indian government aimed at the diaspora especially in a South African context, the main identifier of who is a recipient of the policies is based on having direct linkages to the Indian government and more importantly the type of identification

card the person is carrying. Emotionally, members of the diaspora are considered to be any person who is Indian or of Indian descent and heritage. However, this is certainly not the case when it comes to economic and business trade for South African Indians. In the process of doing trade and business with the Indian government and business, South African Indians are not considered Indian and are therefore not eligible for any concessions. The diasporic policies from the Indian government are aimed towards generational Indians born in India and who have direct links to India. This is in contrast to the United States of America where the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has cultivated a strong relationship with the Indian Americans diaspora. This is of course linked to the United States' hegemonic role within the international system. The diaspora in the United States is more connected to the political systems within the United States and those connections mean they can influence the United States politically and by extension, they can have a huge influence on dealings of the United States with other countries and India in particular. India's growth can be facilitated by the Indian diaspora in the United States. In the United States, there are many heads of industry who are Indian-American, and they maintain their ties to India. This allows for that strong connection to India and for developing a stronger connection between India and the United States. India sees the focusing and concentration of the Indian diaspora in the United States as a very beneficial endeavour. Within the Global North, Modi and the BJP government have had engagements with the Indian diaspora in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia to name a few. Through those engagements, there have been direct interactions with the Indian diaspora who are of Indian descent and heritage instead of having direct links to India and/or carrying an Indian identification card. The Indian diaspora in the United States of America also advocate and lobby the government and other organisations to put forward their demands. This type of advocacy and lobbying is not really much of a phenomenon in the South African Indian community and in particular the mercantile community. Even if it does take place, the impact of it is very limited.

During an interview in September 2023 in Pretoria, R said that this history between South Africa and India has caused the countries to share a very strategic relationship from an economic, social and political view. The historical linkages between the two countries from the indentured labourers who were brought to South Africa to Mahatma Gandhi who came to South Africa have created these close relations. However, R said no country would establish an office in another country if it was not for strategic reasons. Those historical linkages will always remain between the countries but now from an economic perspective, there has been

an increase in trade and investment and tourism between India and South Africa. R said that the importance of this relationship can be seen through the number of visits of the leadership of both countries and the number of Indian-based companies and Indian citizens who have come to South Africa for tourist and business purposes in a diversity of sectors. Importantly, related to the question of the impact of the Indian diaspora and South African Indians on economic relations between India and South Africa, R said she does not think this necessarily has anything to do with the diaspora and rather that can be related to the opening up of economies and the various reforms that Prime Minister Modi has introduced in India.

To conclude this chapter, chapter four looked at what it means for South African Indians to be a minority and what effect this has on how they view themselves and how they are viewed within South African society. This affects their interaction with the South African and Indian government. There is a perception around a growing Black Nationalism in South Africa which makes certain South African Indians fearful of their place in South Africa as a minority. However, the perceived threat of Black Nationalism is nothing in reality when compared to the actual Hindu Nationalism which is very much part of Indian society at the moment. This does not, however, affect the way that South African Indian businesspeople of any religious group view economic relations with India. It is just a matter of business relations. In terms of Hindu Nationalism and Hindutva in South Africa, there have been several attempts to transplant the ideology to South Africa but for now it has not taken off in any major way. Finally, any connection between India and South Africa is for strategic reasons and there is very little to suggest that the South African Indian community affects relations between India and South Africa.

Conclusion

The South African Indian community is an established community which is part of the South African political, cultural and historical landscape. Despite its minority status, the members of its community can be seen as full citizens of South Africa - enjoying all of the benefits of being South African. However, even with the given and full recognition of their status as South African citizens, there remains a connection with the land of their ancestors, India - regardless of how tenuous this connection is. The South African Indian community is a part of the global Indian diaspora - even if it differs from its identification with the diaspora from other members of the diaspora, even those based in the African continent. The main question being asked in this dissertation is whether Indian South Africans have responded to the diasporic policies from the Indian government and what role South African Indians play, if any, in the Indian economy. However, in the course of the research process, another important question has emerged and has been answered throughout the process. This is around the question of whether Indian South Africans are considered part of the Indian diaspora or consider themselves as part of the Indian diaspora. While the South African Indian population is considered as making up the largest population of Indians outside of India, this does not translate self-evidently into the South African Indian population being part of the Indian diaspora. There were two important aspects to consider: which is whether the South African Indian consider themselves part of the diaspora and whether the Indian government considers them part of the diaspora and pays special attention to them. While the Indian government may speak to South African Indians and organise events for them, they often speak to them as South African first and then of Indian descent and heritage second. This could be seen in Modi's 2016 speech in Johannesburg. "There are, of course, no clear metrics for measuring foreign policy success" writes Hall (2019, 154). The same argument can be extended when measuring the success of India's foreign policy and its diaspora policy. A few metrics of success have been discussed in the dissertation primarily around economic success of these policies. However, a policy which exists on paper is very different from how the policy plays out in reality. There is often a massive gap that exists between the policy in theory as opposed to the actual workings on the policy on the ground and the way governments, institutions and the people the policies are directed at react to these policies.

In chapter one, it was seen that in order to understand the relationship between the Indian diaspora in South Africa, the South African government and the Indian government, there was

a need to unpack the understanding of diaspora in international relations, the Indian diaspora in South Africa and the shifts in the Indian government's relationship to the diaspora generally and more specifically in South Africa. The term diaspora has undergone many changes and these changes have allowed the term to be applied to a broader category of people including the Indian diaspora in general but in South Africa, more specifically. The HLCD report which is spoken about in detail in chapter three is the defining piece of government work which led to the shift in the Indian government's relationship with its diaspora. It could be seen that it was this report that had impacted many of the policies that are currently in place from the Indian government. Chapter two showed through the use of the theoretical framework and literature of development and economic diplomacy and diasporic studies that there are many ways of studying foreign policy and economic diplomacy as a framing of analysis for diasporic politics. By looking at the policies enacted by the Indian government towards their diaspora, including how they define their diaspora and who they direct their policies towards, it was seen that diplomacy within the field of international relations is multi-faceted. There are new actors emerging who are changing the arena of diplomacy. Diasporic actors play an important role as new diplomatic actors. However, the role that the diaspora and its members play as diplomatic actors is reliant on the input of the home country and how much effort they require. The diaspora as a concept within international relations has undergone many different shifts and changes and there is no single understanding of who makes up the diaspora even though there are some criteria diasporas need to fulfil. The concept of diaspora has been used to refer to the South African Indian community because this is a term used by many theorists within the field of international relations and more importantly by the Indian government in policy documents. Understanding the historical context of the development of the diaspora within South Africa as well as relations between India and South Africa is important as it shows how bilateral relations between South Africa and India came to be what they are today and the role that the diaspora played. Finally, with the exploration of the government of India's foreign policy, it leads to the point of unpacking the current bilateral relations between India and South Africa in closer detail and how this relationship has changed in the present. South Africa and India's economic relationship is not impacted by rising Hindutva consciousness in India because it is a relationship based on economic benefits rather than any political or emotional basis. In chapter three, the HLCD report was unpacked. This was an important report which was commissioned by the BJP-led government and provided guidelines for the policies and engagements with the diaspora going forward from 2002 in a more targeted manner. It provided the Indian government and the policy-makers with an overview of the diaspora, the issues facing it and

what it required from the diaspora towards the government and vice-versa. This report was not only used by the government at the time but also subsequent Congress and BJP governments. Directly linked to the research question, it was seen that while there were many reasons that the government of India has pushed for greater engagement with the diaspora, one of the main reasons was the economic benefits that the diaspora could provide. Under the current leadership of prime minister Modi, this has increased as the current government has been pushing India towards becoming a powerhouse and the diaspora is seen as a key figure in that. The fourth and final chapter analysed the primary data collected in order to link the research question together with the theoretical literature that had been collected. South African Indians are a minority and there is a perception amongst the community around a growing Black Nationalism in South Africa which makes certain South African Indians fearful of their place in South Africa as a minority. However, the perceived threat of Black Nationalism is nothing in reality when compared to the actual Hindu Nationalism which is very much part of Indian society at the moment. This does not, however, affect the way that South African Indian businesspeople of any religious group view economic relations with India. It is just a matter of business relations. The connection between India and South Africa is for strategic reasons and there is very little to suggest that the South African Indian community affects relations between India and South Africa.

The main measurement of the receptiveness of the diaspora policies from the government of India used in this study was the number of OCI card applications from South African Indians. While there was no method to accurately problematise the exact categories of people who applied for the OCI card status, this was used as the measurement of receptiveness as it was the main policy that is known and used by some South African Indians to engage with India and the Indian government. There is no definite evidence to show whether South African Indian businesspeople are increasing their economic engagement with the Indian government and India. However, there has been an increase in the number of OCI applications from South Africans which can be taken as an indicator that applicants are interested in creating ties with India and the Indian government. Those reasons might differ, and it would require an entirely different study in order to find out the reasons from each and every OCI applicant as to their reasons for applying for the card and greater access into the application process. However, there has been an increase in the OCI card application and one of the reasons for this has been that South African Indians are a minority in South Africa and there is a concern which was relayed in formal and informal conversations about their position in South African society -

some South African Indians are afraid of their position. A key reason is that despite being a part of South African society, South African Indians are still a minority and “With the exception of Mauritius (where they are in the majority), Indians have constituted a vulnerable ethnic minority in their country of adoption, and have been ‘sandwiched’ between the dominant colonial ruling class and the indigenous majority, and subsequent generations were often regarded as aliens in the land of their birth” (Maharaj 2018, 33). There are rising feelings of vulnerability from some sectors of South African Indians despite the positions of privilege they manage to occupy in opposition to much of the indigenous majority. There is also a lack of political leadership aimed at dealing with the concerns of the South African Indian community as was discussed above and this may have caused the possibility and reality of Indians in South Africa “being politically marginalised in the post-apartheid era” (Maharaj 2018, 36). It is for this reason that South African Indians want to create a connection to India.

However, South African Indians are considered as South African first by India and the Indian government as opposed to any other relationship. There is no real economic relationship from the Indian government towards South African Indians. The rising Hindutva and Hindu nationalism in India mean that the Indian government has a very specific focus for the diaspora that it is focusing on, and the South African Indian diaspora does not form a part of that focus. With regards to the South African Indian business community, their interactions with India and the Indian government are business-focused. It can be seen as business is business. While the political concerns arising out of India and their solidarity with the Muslims in India might exist, it does not cross over from their social and personal lives into the business. The policies of the Indian government did not cause an increase in participation from the South African Indian business community and the policies were not targeted at South African Indians. While Indian South Africans are increasingly identifying and trying connections with India, it is more about the changes happening in South Africa as opposed to any work being done by the Indian government. This study raises further questions as to how effect will the 2024 elections in South Africa and India and possible leadership changes have on the South African Indian community and the business community, in particular, and what are the implications of domestic policies in the host country for the Indian diasporas as a whole. To conclude, due to the uniqueness of the case study of the South African Indian community, it will be difficult to transplant these findings into another study. However, it does provide a basis for understanding the ways diasporic communities evolve and change depending on their contexts, their political

situations and the responses from their home country, in this case South Africa, and their diasporic homeland, India.

Bibliography:

Abdul Kalam, Mohammed. 2014. Indian Model of Managing Diaspora (Non-Resident Indians) in *Potentials and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora*. Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute and Germany, Hanns Seidel Foundation. (pp. 160-173).

Abraham, Itty. 2020. *How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Adil, Zainulbhai and Chandler, Clay. 2013. *Reimagining India: Unlocking the Potential of Asia's next Superpower*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Al Jazeera. 2011. "India to Strengthen Trade Ties with Africa." www.aljazeera.com. May 25, 2011. Accessed October 15, 2023.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2011/5/24/india-to-strengthen-trade-ties-with-africa>.

Appasamy, Youlendree. 2021. "You Came Here on a Fucking Boat." Africasacountry.com. November 17, 2021. Accessed November 11, 2023.

<https://africasacountry.com/2021/11/you-came-here-on-a-fucking-boat>.

Ashraf, Fahmida. 2005. "Indian Diaspora: Projecting India's Image." *Strategic Studies* 25 (1): 33–48. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45242565>.

Bal, Ellen and Sinha-Kerkhoff, Kathinka. 2007. Separated by the Partition? Muslims of British Indian Descent in Mauritius and Suriname in *Global Indian Diasporas: Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory*. Amsterdam Univ. Press.

Baumann, Martin. 2000. "Diasporas: Genealogies of Semantics and Transcultural Comparison." *Numen* 47 (3): 313–37. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156852700511577>.

Bhana, Surendra and Vahed, Goolam. 2007. *South Africa: Africa and the Indian Ocean* in The Encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora edited by Brij Lal. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bhat, Chandrashekhar and Bhaskar, T.L.S. 2007. Contextualising Diasporic Identity: Implications of Time and Space on Telugu Immigrants in *Global Indian Diasporas: Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory*. Amsterdam Univ. Press.

Biswas, Aparajita. 2015. "India-Africa Relations: Evolving Past to a Promising Future." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 10 (3): 284–99. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45341049>.

Brazier, Jana Evans and Mannur, Anita, eds. 2005. *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*. Oxford (United Kingdom): Blackwell.

Brazier, Jana Evans. 2008. *Diaspora an Introduction*. Malden, Mass. Blackwell.

CGI Durban. 2022. "Consulate General of India, Durban, South Africa: India - South Africa Relations." www.cgidurban.gov.in. January 22, 2022. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://www.cgidurban.gov.in/page/india-south-africa-relations/>.

Cape Town, CGI. 2023. "Consulate General of India, Cape Town, South Africa: India-South Africa Bilateral Economic Engagement." www.capetown.gov.in. Accessed October 15, 2023. <https://www.cgicapetown.gov.in/page/brief/#:~:text=Several%20South%20African%20companies%20have>.

Carmody, Padraig. 2013. *The Rise of the BRICS in Africa: The Geopolitics of South-South Relations*. London, Zed Books.

Challagalla, Shreya. 2018. *The diaspora and India's growth story* in the Observer Research Foundation. Accessed May 15, 2023. CID: 20.500.12592/snf372.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global Diasporas*. Routledge.

Cohen, Robin. 2008. *Global Diasporas*. London: Routledge.

Committee Reports. 2022. *PRS Legislative Research*. Accessed May 20, 2023.

<https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/welfare-of-indian-diaspora-policies-and-schemes#:~:text=Policy%20for%20 diaspora%3A%20The%20 Ministry.>

Desai, Ashwin. 1996, *Arise Ye Coolies: Apartheid and the Indians 1960-1995*, Impact Africa Publishing, Johannesburg.

Desai, Ashwin, and Goolam Vahed. 2019. *A History of the Present*. Oxford University Press.

Desai, Niranjana. 2009. "India and Africa." *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 65 (4): 413–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097492840906500409>.

DIRCO. 2019. "India-South Africa Joint Statement/Joint Communiqué of the State Visit of President Cyril Ramaphosa to India – DIRCO." <https://www.dirco.gov.za/>. January 25, 2019. Accessed November 5, 2023.

<https://www.dirco.gov.za/india-south-africa-joint-statement-joint-communique-of-the-state-visit-of-president-cyril-ramaphosa-to-india/>.

DIRCO. 2023. "Bilateral Relations of India – DIRCO." Accessed November 5, 2023. <https://www.dirco.gov.za/bilateral-relations/>.

Dickinson, Jen. 2012. "Decolonising the Diaspora: Neo-Colonial Performances of Indian History in East Africa." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 37 (4): 609–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00496.x>.

Dubey, Ajay, ed. 2003. *Indian Diaspora: Global Identity*. Delhi: Kalinga Publications.

Dufoix, Stéphane. 2008. *Diasporas*. Berkeley: University Of California Press.

Essa, Azad. 2022. *Hostile Homelands*. Pluto Press.

Ganesh, Kamala. 2010. "Beyond Historical Origins: Negotiating Tamilness in South Africa." *Journal of Social Sciences* 25 (1-3): 25–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09718923.2010.11892863>.

- Gangopadhyay, Aparajita. 2005. "India's Policy towards Its Diaspora: Continuity and Change." *India Quarterly* 61 (4): 93–122. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45073362>.
- George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gilroy, Paul. 2005. The Black Atlantic as a Counterculture of Modernity in *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*. Oxford (United Kingdom): Blackwell.
- Ginwala, Frene. 1986. *Indian South Africans (Minority Rights Group Report No. 34)*. London: Minority Rights Group.
- GOPIO. 2023. "Global Organization of People of Indian Origin." <http://www.gopio.net/NEW%20TEAM%20TAKES%20OVER%20THE%20MANTLE%20F%20GOPIO%20%20INTERNATIONAL.pdf>. 2023. Accessed October 21, 2023. <http://www.gopio.net/>.
- Gulrajani, Nilima, Emma Mawdsley, and Supriya Roychoudhury. 2020. "The New Development Diplomacy in Middle-Income Countries: The Changing Role of Traditional Donors in India." *ODI*. Accessed September 19, 2023. https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/the_new_development_v5.pdf.
- Gupta R.K. 'Indian Diaspora as a Non-State Actor in Promotion of India-Africa Partnership' *Journal of Social and Political Studies*, Vol. IV (1), June 2013 pp. 135-148.
- Hall, Ian. 2019. *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
- Heller, Patrick, 2001. Democratic Deepening in India and South Africa in *South Africa and India: Shaping the Global South*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- High Level Committee [HLC] Report. 2001. *Report on the Indian Diaspora*.
- High Commission of India. 2019. "High Commission of India, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: Diaspora." www.hcipo.gov.in. 2019. Accessed November 22, 2023.

<https://www.hcipo.gov.in/page/diaspora/>.

Hofmeyer, Isabel and Williams, Michelle. 2001. South Africa–India: Historical Connections, Cultural Circulations and Socio- political Comparisons in *South Africa and India: Shaping the Global South*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Jain, Amit Kumar, Upendra Nabh Tripathi, and Vinita Katiyar. 2017. “An Overview on Indian Diaspora in Africa.” *Educational Quest- an International Journal of Education and Applied Social Sciences* 8 (1): 17. <https://doi.org/10.5958/2230-7311.2017.00003.4>.

Jayaram, Narayana, and Yogesh Atal. 2004. *The Indian Diaspora*. Sage Publications Limited.

Kadekar, Laxmi Narayan. 2005. *Global Indian Diaspora: An Overview*. Research Monograph Hyderabad: Department of Sociology, University of Hyderabad.

Kaur, Ravinder. 2020. *Brand New Nation: Capitalist Dreams and Nationalist Designs in Twenty-First Century India*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Kaul, Nitasha. 2017. “Rise of the Political Right in India: Hindutva-Development Mix, Modi Myth, and Dualities.” *Journal of Labor and Society* 20 (4): 523–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/wusa.12318>.

Khara, Dr. Nabin Kumar. 2020. “Diaspora and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective.” *International Journal of Political Science* 6 (4). <https://doi.org/10.20431/2454-9452.0604002>.

Lal, Vinay. 2018. Indian servitude in the British empire in *Routledge Handbook of the Indian Diaspora*. Edited by Radha Sarma Hedge and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Lehnert, Matthia. 2007. “Typologies in Social Inquiry” in *Research design in political science: how to practice what they preach*. Edited by Gschwend & Schimmelfennig. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Liu, Dr. Hong and van Dongen, Elsa. 2014. *The Chinese Model of Diaspora Management in*

Potentials and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora. Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute and Germany, Hanns Seidel Foundation.

M, Dr. Mahalingam. 2023. "India's Diaspora Policy and Foreign Policy: An Overview." Grfdt.com. Accessed May 23, 2023.
<https://grfdt.com/PublicationDetails.aspx?Type=Articles&TabId=30>.

Maduna, Lizeka. 2015. "Retelling Gandhi's Story: Was He a Racist?" The Daily Vox. October 6, 2015. Accessed November 15, 2023.
<https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/retelling-gandhis-story-was-he-a-racist/>.

Mahajan, Karan. 2019. "How the Gupta Brothers Hijacked South Africa Using Bribes instead of Bullets." Vanity Fair. March 3, 2019. Accessed November 11, 2023.
<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/03/how-the-gupta-brothers-hijacked-south-africa-corruption-bribes>.

Maharaj, Brij. 2018. Race, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Indian Diaspora in in *Routledge Handbook of the Indian Diaspora*. Edited by Radha Sarma Hedge and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Mahindra, Anand. 2013. "Towards a Uniquely Indian Growth Model" in *Reimagining India: Unlocking the Potential of Asia's next Superpower*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Mandela, Nelson. 1997. "Nelson Mandela - Speeches - Address by President Nelson Mandela at Civic Reception at the Red Fort, Delhi - India." www.mandela.gov.za. March 28, 1997. Accessed October 22, 2023.
http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1997/970328_indiareception.htm.

Mbeki, Thabo. 2006. "T Mbeki and M Singh on Tshwane Declaration Partnership between South Africa and India | South African Government." www.gov.za. October 6, 2006. Accessed October 22, 2023.
<https://www.gov.za/t-mbeki-and-m-singh-tshwane-declaration-partnership-between-south-africa-and-india>.

McKeown, Adam. 1999. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58 (2): 306-337.

McGrew, Anthony. 2014. *Globalization of World Politics*. 6th ed. Oxford University Press.

MEA: Diaspora Engagement. 2023. Mea.gov.in. Accessed May 16, 2023.

<https://www.mea.gov.in/diaspora-engagement.htm>.

Majola, Nokulunga. 2023. "Two Years after Phoenix Violence, Anger at Government Inaction." GroundUp News. July 26, 2023. Accessed October 11, 2023.

<https://www.groundup.org.za/article/july-2021-unrest-two-years-later-families-and-community-hold-commemorate-victims/>

MEA. 2023. "English Translation of Prime Minister's Statement on BRICS Expansion." www.mea.gov.in. August 24, 2023. Accessed October 11, 2023.

[https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37031/English translation of Prime Ministers Statement on BRICS Expansion](https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37031/English%20translation%20of%20Prime%20Ministers%20Statement%20on%20BRICS%20Expansion)

MEA. 2002. "In a Major Initiative, the Government of India Had Set up a High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, in September 2000 under the Chairmanship of Dr. L M Singhvi, MP." Ministry of External Affairs. January 2002. Accessed September 15, 2023.

<https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/12631/In+a+major+initiative+the+Government+of+India+had+set+up+a+High+Level+Committee+on+the+Indian+Diaspora+in+September+2000+under+the+Chairmanship+of+Dr+L+M+Singhvi+MP>

Modi, Renu, and Ian Taylor. 2017. "The Indian Diaspora in Africa: The Commodification of Hindu Rashtra." *Globalizations* 14 (6): 911–29.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1287451>.

Mukhopadhyay Abhijit. 2022. "India's Lines of Credit, Development Cooperation, and G20 Presidency: A Primer". *ORF Issue Brief No. 599*. Observer Research Foundation.

Naik, Raqib Hameed. 2021. "Hindu Right-Wing Groups in US Got \$833,000 of Federal COVID Fund." www.aljazeera.com. April 21, 2021. Accessed November 2, 2023.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/2/hindu-right-wing-groups-in-us-got-833000-of-federal-covid-fund>.

NDTV. 2016. "Visit to South Africa a Pilgrimage for Me: PM Modi." [NDTV.com](http://www.ndtv.com). July 9, 2016. Accessed October 16, 2023.
<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/visit-to-south-africa-a-pilgrimage-for-me-pm-modi-142964>

Nye, Joseph S. 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March): 94–109.

Olcott, Mason. 1944. "The Caste System of India." *American Sociological Review* 9 (6): 648–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2085128>.

Oonk, Gijsbert. 2007. *Global Indian Diasporas: Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory*. Amsterdam Univ. Press.

Panke, Diana. 2007. "Detecting Puzzles and Selecting Good Research Questions" in *Research Design and Method Selection. Making Good Choices in the Social Sciences*. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage.

Padayachee, Vishnu. 1999. "Struggle, Collaboration and Democracy: The 'Indian Community' in South Africa, 1860-1999." *Economic and Political Weekly* 34 (7): 393–95.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4407648>.

Papasotiriou, Haralampos. 2000. *Diaspora kai Ethniki Stratigiki* [Diaspora and National Strategy]. Athens: Ellinika Grammata.

Pradhan, Ramakrushna, and Mohapatra Atanu. 2020. "India's Diaspora Policy: Evidence of Soft Power Diplomacy under Modi." *South Asian Diaspora*. 12:2, 145-161. January 1–17.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19438192.2020.1712792>.

Quint, The. 2016. "The Quint: PM Modi Addresses the Indian Diaspora in Johannesburg." [www.youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeAzaXny3FI). July 9, 2016. Accessed June 11, 2023.
<https://youtu.be/FmAzaXny3FI?si=cog6eGa3RjaSKaUz>.

Rai, Rajesh. 2007. *The Age of Globalisation in The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Raj, Ebenezer Sunder. 1985. "The Origins of the Caste System." *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies* 2 (2): 10–14.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/026537888500200204>.

Safran, William. 1991. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1 (1): 83–99.
<https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0004>.

Saner, Raymond. 2006. *Development diplomacy by non-state actors in multi-stakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities*. Malta, Diplo.

Sanglay, Mahmood. 2016. "The Indian with Blood on His Hands." *Muslim Views*, July 2016.

Shain, Yossi, and Aharon Barth. 2003. "Diasporas and International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 57 (3): 449–79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303573015>.

Shangwe, Muhidin. 2021. *India's Soft Power in East Africa in India's Development Diplomacy and Soft Power in Africa*. Suffolk, James Currey.

Shepperson, George. 1966. "The African Diaspora—or the African Abroad". *Africa Forum: A Quarterly Journal of African Affairs*.

Singh, Gurharpal. 2003. Introduction in *Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora*. Edited by Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh, and Steven Vertovec. Routledge.

Singh, Ruchi. 2022. "Origin of World's Largest Migrant Population, India Seeks to Leverage Immigration." *Migrationpolicy.org*. March 7, 2022. Accessed August 15, 2023.

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indiamigration-country-profile>.

Sinha, Bobby Luthra. 2014. “Social Movements of the Historical Indian Diaspora in South Africa: Binding the ‘Home’ and ‘Homeland’ Creatively?” *Diaspora Studies* 7 (1): 1–17.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2013.871888>.

Sutton, Deborah. 2007. “‘Divided and Uncertain Loyalties.’” *Interventions* 9 (2): 276–88.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698010701409194>.

Sylvester, Christine. 2014. *Globalization of World Politics*. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Ian. 2012. “India’s Rise in Africa.” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 88 (4): 779–98. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23255618>.

Team, ClearIAS. “India-South Africa Relations.” *ClearIAS*, January 28, 2023. Accessed July 14, 2023.

<https://www.clearias.com/india-south-africa-relations/#india-south-africa-bilateral-trade-and-investment>.

Tölölyan, Khachig. 1996. “Rethinking Diaspora(S): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment.” *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 5 (1): 3–36.

<https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1996.0000>

Toninato, Paola. 2009. “The Making of Gypsy Diasporas.” *Translocations: Migration and Social Change*. Accessed September 22, 2023.

https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/library-document/making-gypsy-diaspora_en

Usher, Ann Danaiya. 2020. “South Africa and India Push for COVID-19 Patents Ban.” *The Lancet* 396 (10265): 1790–91. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736\(20\)32581-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)32581-2).

Vahed, Goolam. 2017. ‘The Past in the Present: Writing the South African Gandhi’. *Journal of Labor and Society* 20 (1): 107–27.

Vahed, Goolam. 2015. 'Nehru is "just another coolie": India and South Africa at the United Nations, 1946-1955' in *Conceptualising the Roles of China and India in Africa: History, Contemporary Realities and Future Scenarios*. Special issue of *Alternation Journal*, 15.

Venkatachalam, Meera and King, Kenneth. 2021. Introduction in *India's Development Diplomacy and Soft Power in Africa*. Suffolk, James Currey.

Vertovec, Steven. 2000. *The Hindu diaspora Comparative patterns*. London and New York: Routledge.

Viswanathan, H. H. S. 2019. "India's Soft Power Diplomacy: Capturing Hearts and Minds." *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 14 (2): 129–36. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4863671>