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# Employment, education and attitudes toward immigration: South Africa in comparative perspective

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# CHAPTER 1
# INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

## 1.0 Background

The significance of immigration issues continues to draw attention from numerous disciplines. The difficulty of dealing with immigration issues continues to increase due to the complexity of the nature of immigration. This situation continues to worsen owing to increasing migration numbers spiralling out of control. This can be seen in the statistic that "between 1970 and 2005, the number of international migrants increased from 82 million to 200 million, comprising 3 per cent of the world's population."[1] Schlemmer argues that "immigration issues are hard to tackle because they spread across many areas of public policy, and affect many sensitive interests."[2] Certainly globalisation and continuing interdependency continues to exacerbate the problem of immigration and as such this issue has become a colossal predicament as it affects both the sending as well as the receiving states.

Therefore there is a widespread anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the world. Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser and Wilbur argue that the mere fact that there is an increase in immigrants into a country will lead to "less favourable attitude towards immigrants and immigration."[3] It is therefore for the mere act of migration that would affect the opinion of immigrants no matter the country affected. For instance, United States, South Africa and Kenya are identified as core, semi-periphery and periphery countries respectively. However these countries all have issues of immigrant flows from different states as well as high anti-immigrant sentiment, as revealed in this report, therefore showing widespread nature of anti-immigrant sentiment.

[1] Betts, A., Introduction: Global Migration Governance, http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199600458.pdf, 2010, p.1.
[2] Schlemmer, L., Immigrants in South Africa: Perceptions and reality in Witbank, a medium-sized industrial town, http://www.cde.org.za/attachment_view.php?aa_id=172 May 2006, p.1.
[3] Esses, V. M., Wagner, U., Wold, C., Preiser, M. And Wilbur, C. J. "Perception of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Canada and Germany", in International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol.30, No. 6, 2006, p.654.

As Adepoju argues, "the debate about immigration is no doubt one of the most politically charged policy discourses in the country."[4] Increasing unemployment rates and other economic hardships raise questions as to who is to blame. In low incomes areas, such as townships, immigrants become the scapegoats for local citizens and political leaders who shift the blame to immigrants.[5] Immigrants are seen to flourish at the expense of the local citizens, especially in lower income areas. For instance, Muller argues that "attitude towards immigration are shaped, to a large extent, by its economic consequences for residents of the host country."[6] Similarly, Moller, Munch, Schroll and Skaksen argue that receiving citizens who believe that their wages are being threatened by immigrants would hold negative attitudes towards them.[7]

Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment between social groups differ among states. In terms of employment, an increase in competition for employment resulting from the influx of migrants has a strong potential to lead to negative attitudes towards anti-immigrant sentiment. As Card, Dustmann and Preston suggest, "a simple hypothesis of economic self interest suggests that lower-skilled workers will be opposed to inflows of low-skilled immigration."[8] Competition for unskilled labour is more detrimental to host citizens than competition between skilled migrant and host citizens. This is largely because skilled host citizens are given precedence of employment. Therefore the survey data should show that lower-income host citizens would be more opposed to immigration than higher income citizens. As Card et al. argue "it seems plausible that lower-skilled workers could oppose immigration based on the belief that it will lower their economic opportunities."[9]

[4] Adepoju, A. "Continuing and Changing Configurations of Migrations to and from the Republic of South Africa", in International Migration, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2003, p.4.
[5] Harris, B. "*Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa?*" In Hook, D. and Eagle, G. (eds): Psychopathology and Social Prejudice, University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town, 2002, p.4.
[6] Muller, T., Migration, unemployment and discrimination, http://www.unige.ch/ses/metri/mueller/2000-03.pdf, March 2000, p.1.
[7] Malchow-Moller, N., Munch, J. R., Schroll, S. and Skaksen, J. R. "Attitudes Towards Immigration – Does Economic Self-Interest Matter?" in Working Papers, Vol. 11, 2006, p.2.
[8] Card, D., Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. "Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey", in Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, No.3, 2005, p.6.
[9] Loc cit.

In terms of education, Facchini et al. argue that "the relationship between education and views about immigration actually has little to do with competition for jobs."[10] Therefore, different states should have different anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the increasing labour force leads to the need for higher education levels for job protection. Hence, societies with low levels of education face competition for jobs with unskilled immigrants. Therefore, people with lower levels of employment should have higher anti-immigrant sentiment.

On the other hand, Fisher argues that "attitudes to immigrants and immigration policy appear to be more often driven by perceptions of cultural rather than economic threat."[11] Immigrants are perceived to be a threat to the existing cultural make-up of the state. The 2007 Pew GAP survey questioned interviewees whether they felt that their way of life is changing and would need protection from foreign influence. As expected the survey showed that indeed the perceived 'own way of life' is also a factor that leads to negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in general.

South African anti-immigrant sentiment has continued to worsen. Crush identified high negative anti-immigrant sentiment before the 2008 xenophobic attacks collected by the Southern African Migration Project.[12] Similarly, Adepoju also discusses the hostile attitudes and violence toward immigrants existing even before the 2008 violence. For instance, he argues that, "a growing number of South Africans now regard foreigners from fellow African countries as 'a direct threat to their future economic well-being and as responsible for the troubling rise in violent crime'."[13] Dodson also discussed the negative attitude toward immigrants after the 2008 attacks.[14] Therefore, South Africans' sentiment toward immigrants remains negatively high.

[10] Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M. And Puglisi, R. "Individual attitudes towards immigration: Economic vs. Non-Economic Determinants", in Freeman, G. P., Hansen, R. and Leal, D. L. (eds): Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies, Routledge, New York, 2010, p.3.
[11] Fisher, S. "Attitudes to minorities and the Extreme Right", **http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc/ExtremeRightLecture.pdf**, p.3,
[12] Crush, J. "The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa", in International Migration, Vol. 38, No. 6, 2000, p.107.
[13] Adepoju, A. Op. Cit. p.14.
[14] Dodson, B. Op. Cit.

Numerous scholars have discussed xenophobia as an extreme illustration of the consequence of continuing anti-immigrant sentiment. The 2008 xenophobic attacks are no different. Hicks argues that, "South Africans have developed a tendency to scapegoat immigrants by blaming them for the country's domestic problems."[15] This conclusion emanates from the copious reports of violence against foreigners dating back in the 90s.[16] Moreover, the main issue of concern regarding immigrants is the possible threat of xenophobic violence. In the United States of America, Hispanic immigrants continue to experience "hate violence".[17] In southern Italy more than 900 African immigrants were evacuated following a wave of violence towards those immigrants.[18] Xenophobia, in this case, is an extreme example of the kind of anti-immigrant sentiment that can emerge.

Finally, available research and case studies highlights the notion of anti-immigrant sentiment concentrated among "vulnerable" social groups. For instance, the 2008 xenophobic attacks were concentrated in "disadvantaged" areas however the widespread anti-immigrant sentiment lacks the documentation of anti-immigrant sentiment from the "advantaged" population.

### 1.1 Aim and Rationale of the study

This report is an illustrative attempt to apply a cross-national study comparing levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in different countries, and checking whether those levels differ according to individuals' social standing, defined in terms of education or employment status.

[15] Hicks, T. F. "The Constitution, Aliens Control Act, and Xenophobia: The Struggle to Protect South Africa's Pariah – The Undocumented Immigrant", in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 7. No. 1, Fall 1999, p.394.
[16] Crush, J. "The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa", in Migration Policy Series, No.50, 2008, p.6.
[17] The leadership conference, http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/escalating-violence.html
[18] Calabrian, S. "Violence Forces Evacuation of Hundreds of African Immigrants From Southern Italian Town", http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Violence-Forces-Evacuation-of-Hundreds-of-African-Immigrants--81090117.html, January 2010.

There have not been many significant (if any) attempts for cross-national comparative study to identify variables that would explain individual attitudes towards immigrants and other immigration measures. This research attempts to add to the limited existing literature as well as raise a concern of the importance of studying attitudes towards immigration measures. The main problem is to identify the variables that would explain the varying attitudes towards immigration issues. Both economic and non-economic determinants have been used in this cross-national study. Given the varying levels of education and employment, the study attempted to compare these levels with attitude towards immigration issues.

The increase in the number of organisations dealing with attitudinal surveys highlights the importance of studying attitudes as well as the implications for both policy makers and implementers. Although there is a ready availability of survey data, this data is not effectively utilised. For instance, the question as to what makes South Africa different from other states in terms of immigration preferences so as to lead to the xenophobic attacks of 2008 can be deduced by analysing available data relating to this issue. The implications of the findings of such a report will have significant outcomes for numerous policy makers within various governmental departments.

As it will be pointed out, there is a consistent pessimistic public opinion about immigration. Government departments can use the data to counter the effects of the negative attitudes toward immigration measures. If the majority of the populace feel that the borders are too porous and that immigrants are doing more harm than good, then corrective immigration policy changes will assure the people that something is being done. By identifying anti-immigrant sentiment of the different social groups more effective measures can be employed to counter these sentiments.

## 1.2 Research Questions

This research uses cross-national survey data to measure anti-immigrant sentiment against employment and education levels. South Africa is the main case study and therefore requires research questions that articulate the main research areas. The following research questions also form the analysis chapters of this study. These specific questions cover the general areas discussed in this study.

Are South Africans more anti-immigrant in aggregate than citizens in other countries?

Are “disadvantaged” South Africans more anti-immigrant than “advantaged” South Africans? How does the difference in South Africa compare with other countries?

How different are South Africa’s anti-immigrant sentiments, as experienced before and after the 2008 xenophobic attacks?

### 1.3 Conceptual framework

The nature and extent of the impact of immigration is largely dependent on the demographic and characteristics of the immigrants. There are different categories of immigrants. By “immigrants” this research means both illegal and legal foreign workers moving into a foreign country for employment, be it formal or informal employment.

There are two main independent variables in this study, employment and education. Employment represents the main economic determinant of attitude towards immigration preferences applied in this research. Other different economic determinants have been used to illustrate the different patterns in the relationship between employment and attitudes toward immigration preferences. Employment as the main economic determinant is derived from the Pew GAP survey data. Education as the main non-economic variable is also derived from the Pew GAP survey data. Other independent non-economic variables are life expectancy and ethnic fractionalisation. The two sets of independent variables cover both economic and non-economic determinants which are argued to affect immigration preferences.

Immigration attitudes or preferences come from the Pew GAP survey and the 2008 Afrobarometer survey. The first immigration preference is that of attitude towards immigrants themselves. The second is that of attitude towards immigration. The third is that of attitude towards the perceived need for stricter restrictions of entry. The fourth is that of the need for protection from foreign influence. The fifth is that of attitude towards whether the traditional way of life is changing or remaining strong. The final immigration measure is that of attitude towards how big a problem conflict between ethnic/racial/nationality/religious/tribal groups is.

## 1.4 Limitations

Since this research depends on survey data, a cross-national comparison might prove difficult for two reasons. First, there are vast differences amongst states in the social structures found in these states. For instance, what could be termed low income in a developed country could be termed high income in another. Similarly, education levels do vary amongst states as more developed states tend to have higher levels of educated population and therefore data might be compromised during re-coding to fit the cross-national comparisons.

## 1.5 Research Design and Methodology

This research employs both qualitative and quantitative analysis using survey data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project of 2007 survey and the 2008 Afrobarometer survey to illustrate differences in relationships between anti-immigrant sentiment and economic and non-economic variables. The qualitative part of the research discusses the xenophobic attacks that occurred in South Africa in 2008. This is a purely qualitative analysis that creates the basis for this research.

**(a)** Pew GAP Survey

"The *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project* conducts public opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people's assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day."[19] With certain variations in the range of questions, the surveys are done in countries around the world.[20] The survey used in this study was released in 2007 and was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews "under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International."[21] "All surveys are based on national samples except in Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, South Africa, and Venezuela where the samples were disproportionately or exclusively urban."[22]

[19] **http://www.pewglobal.org/about/**, June, 2012.
[20] Loc cit.
[21] Loc cit.
[22] Loc cit.

The sample size and field dates were as follows:

| Country | Sample Size | Field Dates |
|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 800 | April 13-23, 2007 |
| Bangladesh | 1000 | April 11-30, 2007 |
| Bolivia | 834 | April 14- May 1, 2007 |
| Brazil | 1000 | April 12-May 5, 2007 |
| Bulgaria | 500 | April 13-May 7, 2007 |
| Canada | 1004 | April 16-26, 2007 |
| Chile | 800 | April 18-27, 2007 |
| China | 3142 | April 20-30, 2007 |
| Czech Republic | 900 | April 11-May 4, 2007 |
| Egypt | 1000 | April 9- May 7, 2007 |
| Ethiopia | 710 | April 27- May 7, 2007 |
| France | 1004 | April 13-18, 2007 |
| Germany | 1000 | April 16-30, 2007 |
| Ghana | 707 | April 25-May 3, 2007 |
| Great Britain | 1002 | April 21 - May 6, 2007 |
| India | 2043 | April 20- May 17, 2007 |
| Indonesia | 1008 | April 18-28, 2007 |
| Israel | 900 | April 20- May 11, 2007 |
| Italy | 501 | April 18- May 23, 2007 |
| Ivory Coast | 700 | April 12-16, 2007 |
| Japan | 762 | April 6- May 23, 2007 |
| Jordan | 1000 | April 9- May 7, 2007 |
| Kenya | 1000 | April 20-30, 2007 |
| Kuwait | 500 | April 15- May 10, 2007 |
| Lebanon | 1000 | April 9- May 7, 2007 |
| Malaysia | 700 | April 13- May 9, 2007 |
| Mali | 700 | April 7-18, 2007 |
| Mexico | 828 | April 13-27, 2007 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Morocco | 1000 | April 20- May 10, 2007 |
| Nigeria | 1128 | April 23- May 29, 2007 |
| Pakistan | 2008 | April 18 - May 10, 2007 |
| Palestinian Territories | 808 | April 21-30, 2007 |
| Peru | 800 | April 13-29, 2007 |
| Poland | 504 | April 12-26, 2007 |
| Russia | 1002 | April 10-24, 2007 |
| Senegal | 700 | April 14-19, 2009 |
| Slovakia | 900 | April 11- May 6, 2007 |
| South Africa | 1000 | April 20- May 20, 2007 |
| South Korea | 718 | April 7-24, 2007 |
| Spain | 500 | April 18- May 15, 2007 |
| Sweden | 1000 | April 18- May 9, 2007 |
| Tanzania | 704 | April 21- May 14, 2007 |
| Turkey | 971 | April 10- May 3, 2007 |
| Uganda | 2026 | April 15-24, 2007 |
| Ukraine | 1122 | April 13-24, 2007 |
| United States | 500 | April 23- May 6, 2007 |
| Venezuela | 803 | April 22- May 21, 2007 |

**(b)** Afrobarometer survey

"The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa."[23] The surveys are done in 20 African states, repeated on a regular cycle.[24] The Afrobarometer survey data used in this research was only done in South Africa as it measured attitudes towards the 2008 xenophobic attacks.

Technical Survey Information

Sample size: 2400 of 18 years or older

Dates of fieldwork: 27 October to 23 November 2008

[23] http://www.afrobarometer.org/

[24] Loc cit.

## 1.5 Chapter Breakdown

**Chapter 2: Literature Review and 2008 xenophobic attacks**

This chapter creates the basis for this report by identifying and discussing the 2008 xenophobic attacks that occurred in South Africa. This chapter highlights two of the most discussed causes of the attacks: high unemployment levels and a large, uneducated population.

**Chapter 3: Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: South Africa in Comparative Perspective**

This Chapter employed a comparative analysis of South Africa and 46 other states in the Pew GAP survey. This chapter concludes that although there is a high level of anti-immigrant sentiment through all 47 states, anti-immigrant and immigration sentiment in South Africa is considerably high compared to that of other states. The chapter also shows positive association displayed between the anti-immigration measures, thus providing some measure of validity to the survey data.

**Chapter 4: Social disadvantage and anti-immigrant sentiment: South Africa in comparative perspective**

This section compares the differences between low-level system variables and high-level system variables relative to anti-immigrant sentiment. This chapter concludes by stating that there is no significant difference between the two levels.

**Chapter 5: How does anti-immigrant sentiment compare before and after the xenophobic attacks?**

This chapter highlights the continuing high level of anti-immigrant sentiment, even after the xenophobic attacks.

**Chapter 6: Conclusion**

This chapter summarises the main findings of the research.

# CHAPTER 2

## Perspectives on Anti-Immigrant sentiment

### 2.0 Introduction

The main purpose of this study is to apply a cross-national study comparing levels if anti-immigrant sentiment in different countries, and checking whether those levels differ according to individuals' social standing, defined in terms of education or employment status. The following review aims to identify existing literature related to cross-national anti-immigrant sentiment study as the dependent variable and education and employment levels as independent variables. Since the data used in this study is secondary data, the research design and methodology that was employed by the two survey groups will be demonstrated.

### 2.1 Research related to the main study

The influx of foreign populations into a host state, as previously suggested, is argued to increase social, economic and political challenges. For South Africa this is no different. Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser and Wilbur argue that the mere fact that there is an increase in immigrants into a country will lead to "less favourable attitude towards immigrants and immigration."[25] Therefore receiving nations should be more anti-immigrant in sentiment than sending states. Moller, Munch, Schroll and Skaksen's research used attitudinal data to explain 'cross-country differences in attitudes towards immigration' in 15 European nations.[26] Their research "revealed considerable variation in average attitudes towards immigration across the EU countries."[27] Adepoju argues that there is a common anti-immigrant sentiment in Africa, let alone South Africa.[28] Similarly, other researches on national anti-immigrant sentiment have also concluded that there is a rise in the level of anti-immigrant sentiment. Pietsch and Marotta (2009) argued the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in Australia, Zapata-Barrero and De Witte (2007) discussed the high anti-immigrant sentiment in Spain.[29]

[25] Esses, V. M., Wagner, U., Wold, C., Preiser, M. And Wilbur, C. J. Op. Cit. p.654.
[26] Malchow-Moller, N., Munch, J. R., Schroll, S. and Skaksen, J. R. "Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Attitudes Towards Immigration in the EU-15", in Springer, Vol.91, August 2008.
[27] Ibid. p.376.
[28] Adepoju, A. Op. Cit. p.13.
[29] Pietsch, J. And Marotta, V. "Bauman, strangerhood and attitudes towards immigrants among the Australian population" in Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45. No. 2, 2009. And Zapata-Barrero, R. And De Witte, N. "The Spanish Governance of EU borders: Normative Questions", in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12. No. 1, 2007.

However, anti-immigrant sentiments, according to the literature, differ along social lines. Several scholars have discussed relationships between anti-immigrant sentiment and economic and non-economic variables. For instance, Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi discuss both economic and non-economic determinants of individual attitude towards immigration.[30] Education and income were amongst the determinants analysed in this research. In 2007 a standing committee for social sciences at the University of Dublin proposed a study on "cross-national and multi-level analysis of attitudes to immigrants and immigration in contemporary Europe."[31] This research was designed as an "explanatory attempt to apply a new cross-national research strategy to the problem of how system-level variables interact with individual perceptions, attitudes and attributes to influence attitude towards immigration."[32] However, this was an internal research effort and therefore no results were published.

Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser and Wilbur argue that the mere fact that there is an increase in immigrants into a country will lead to "less favourable attitude towards immigrants and immigration."[33] This increase in competition for employment that results from the influx of migrants has a strong potential to lead to negative attitudes towards immigration measures. As Curd, Dustmann and Preston suggest, "a simple hypothesis of economic self interest suggests that lower-skilled workers will be opposed to inflows of low-skilled immigration."[34] Similarly, as Card et al. argue, "it seems plausible that lower-skilled workers could oppose immigration based on the belief that it will lower their economic opportunities."[35] The increasing labour force leads to the need for higher education levels for job protection. Hence, societies with low levels of education face competition for jobs with unskilled immigrants. However, Facchini et al. argue that "the relationship between education and views about immigration actually has little to do with competition for jobs."[36]

However, some researchers have shown relationships between anti-immigrant sentiments and employment and education level. For instance, Moller et al. argue that low level employed

[30] Fachini, G., Mayda, A. M., and Puglisi, R. Op. Cit. p.22.
[31] Jusko, K. L., Sinnot, R. and Nezi, R. Op. Cit.
[32] Ibid. p.8.
[33] Esses, V. M., Wagner, U., Wold, C., Preiser, M. And Wilbur, C. J. Op. Cit. p.654.
[34] Loc cit.
[35] Loc cit.
[36] Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M. And Puglisi, R. Op cit. p.3.

and educated people tend to be more negative towards immigration and vice versa.[37] Facchini et al. argued for a positive correlation between individual level of education and attitude toward immigration in countries receiving unskilled migrants.[38] On the other hand, they argued that, in terms of education, the relationship is rather negatively correlated in skilled receiving countries.[39]

The comparison between employment and education as economic and non-economic determinants respectively, this research shows that both economic and non-economic determinants to anti-immigrant sentiment can influence attitude towards immigrants and immigration.

Meyers discusses two important approaches of immigration policies that can also be discussed as approaches of attitude towards immigration measures.[40] These are the Marxist and "national identity" approaches.[41] The Marxist approach can be used to discuss how economic determinants and class-based political rulings shape attitudes towards immigration.[42] Following this view, the influx of immigrants, especially legal immigrants, is seen as a tool by the ruling class to control wage demands from host citizens by increasing the working force, thereby leading to lower wages through competition for employment.[43] This approach accordingly hypothesises that people with lower incomes would tend to hold more anti-immigrant sentiment that those with higher incomes. Similarly, Meyers argues that the Marxist approach predicts a short term correlation between the economic cycle and immigration policies of the state.[44] When the economy is experiencing economic hardships, such as fluctuating unemployment rates, it acts through immigration policies to try to reverse immigration.[45]

"The 'national identity' approach highlights historical experiences, cultural idioms and social conflicts that have shaped past and current immigration [sentiments]."[46] This approach

[37] Malchow-Moller, N., Munch, J. R., Schroll, S. and Skaksen, J. R. Op. Cit. p.379.
[38] Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M. And Puglisi, R. Op cit. p.3.
[39] Loc cit.
[40] Meyers, E. Op. Cit. p.1245.
[41] Ibid. p.1245.
[42] Ibid. p.1247
[43] Ibid. p.1248
[44] Ibid. p.1246
[45] Ibid. p.1248
[46] Ibid. p.1247

explores the importance of historical events that have shaped a state's attitudes immigration. Accordingly, states that have experienced debilitating events linked to immigration should also coincide with those with high mean scores of attitude towards immigration preferences. Similarly, events that occur related to immigration, xenophobia for example, are discussed as tools for strengthening national identities, thus leading to higher anti-immigrant sentiments.

### 2.2 Research related to xenophobia

This section discusses xenophobia is South Africa as an extreme example of the kind of anti-immigrant sentiment that could emerge.

Emergent anti-immigrant sentiment poses an extreme case of xenophobic violence. This is further worsened by deteriorating conditions within states. Economic determinants have received the most support from researchers as the main variable affecting immigration measures that have the capacity to lead to xenophobic attacks or other adverse consequences of immigration. In South Africa, as Posel argues, "a distinguishing characteristic of the post-Apartheid labour market, therefore, has been very high and rising rates of joblessness. Under these circumstances, immigrants are easy targets to blame for growing unemployment in the country."[47] Posel for instance argues that increasing numbers of immigrants and increasing unemployment rates fuel xenophobia.[48] However, Adepoju, while discussing the "context of migration and immigration dynamics in South Africa", he identified the problems of immigration resulting from worsening employment and education levels.[49]

Anti-immigrant sentiment coupled with deteriorating conditions could lead to xenophobic attacks. However, some states do have a longer history in regards to anti-immigrant sentiment. These states could have a higher probability of attacks than other states. For instance, South Africa has a recorded trend in regards to anti-immigrant sentiment. Dodson argues that "there has in reality been long-standing and well-documented hostility toward African immigrants in South Africa."[50] For instance, Harris and even Valji discuss

[47] Loc cit.
[48] Posel, D. "Have Migration Patterns in post-Apartheid South Africa Changed?" in Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, Vol. 15, 2003, p.5.
[49] Adepoju, A. Op. Cit. p.4, 5
[50] Loc cit.

xenophobic attacks prior to the 2008 attacks.[51] Even though South Africa became a democracy in 1994, there are records of xenophobic attacks dating from as early as December 1994 when foreigner's properties were destroyed.[52] In 1998 "two Senegalese and a Mozambican were thrown from a train by a group of individuals returning from a rally organised by a group blaming foreigners for the levels of unemployment, crime, and even the spread of AIDS."[53] There were 7 different xenophobic killings in 2000.[54] This trend therefore shows that "the rise of popular sentiments of intolerance amongst all sectors of South African society has occurred over a relatively short period of time."[55] Crush furthermore argues that it is indeed observed that South Africans are highly antagonistic and intolerant towards immigrants.[56]

On the 11th of May 2008 a spark of xenophobic attacks in Alexandra, a Johannesburg township, set off a wave of similar attacks across South Africa.[57] Foreign nationals were targeted and their houses and businesses destroyed by angry South African citizens.[58] All major cities experienced these attacks, totalling 135 communities nationwide.[59] This catastrophe recorded 62 deaths, 670 people injured, properties looted or destroyed and tens of thousands of people displaced.[60]

Although these attacks were met with horror from the public and international community, Dodson notes that the shock as expressed by the leaders was perplexing.[61] This is largely because the 2008 xenophobic attacks were not the first of their kind in South Africa. Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh argue that "South Africa is a highly xenophobic society, which

[51] Harris, B. "A Foreign Experience: Violence, crime and xenophobia during South Africa's transition", in Violence and Transition, Vol. 5, August 2005.
[52] Ibid. p.3.
[53] Valji p. Op. Cit.
[54] Loc cit.
[55] Loc Cit.
[56] Crush, J. Op. Cit. p.105.
[57] Ibid. p.79.
[58] Ibid. p.68
[59] Loc cit.
[60] Kamwimbi, T., Banaszak, K., Khan, S., Morgan, J., Nadori, A. And Ives, A., Violation of Human Rights of Disadvantaged and Vulnerable Refugees, http://www.volunteer-human-rights.org/downloads/violation-of-human-rights-of-disadvantaged-and-vulnerable-refugees.pdf, 2010.
[61] Dodson, B. "Locating xenophobia: Debate, discourse and everyday experience in Cape Town, South Africa", in Africa Today, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2010, p.3.

out of fear of foreigners, does not naturally value the human rights of non-nationals."[62] Although this seems rather severe the numerous cases mentioned earlier paints this picture.

However, immigration researchers like Neocosmos argue that the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa had little to do with poverty or unemployment.[63] In other words, he accentuates the point that poverty and employment only explain "powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators" but not the decision to attack people based on their nationalities.[64] However, Neocosmos underestimates the psychological explanation of group conflict whereby the out-group is targeted due to the simple reason of being perceived to be different from the in-group.[65] Most importantly, frustration that is derived from blocked goals, for instance employment, leads to aggression such as xenophobic attacks.[66] In psychology it is argued that attitudes influence thoughts even though this is not always played out overtly.[67] Similarly, attitudes tend to be better predictors of behaviour.[68] It follows that a state with a record of negative attitude towards immigrants has a high likelihood of experiencing that attitude turning into overt violent behaviour.

According to Crush, "South African immigration discourse, with its relentless attack on illegal alien and illegal immigrants, still presents a homogenizing view of all non-citizens in the country."[69] There is a generalised view of all immigrants being unwanted and therefore the implications of immigration are also directed towards all immigrants.[70] Similarly, the reasons for attacking foreigners can also be generalised. As suggested earlier, "one of the most common explanations for xenophobia—both locally and globally—is the sense that non-nationals are a threat to citizens' access to employment, grants, and social services."[71] However, Landau et al. do not agree with this view, stating that "in a country in which over 40% of the population is unemployed, it is perhaps inevitable that there will be resentment

[62] Landau, L. B., Ramjathan-Keogh, K. And Singh, G. "Xenophobia in South Africa and Problems Related to it", in Forced Migration Working Paper Series, No.3, November 2004, p.3.
[63] Cosmos, N. Op. Cit. p.586.
[64] Loc cit.
[65] Taylor, D. M. And Moghaddam, F. M.: Theories of Intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives, Praeger, New York, 1994.
[66] Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H. And Sears, R. R.: Frustration and aggression, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939.
[67] Loc cit.
[68] Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. "The Influence of Attitudes on Behaviour", in Albarracin, D., Johnson, B. T. And Zanna, M. P. (eds): The Handbook of Attitudes, Erlbaum, New Jersey, 2005.
[69] Crush, J. Op. Cit. p.118.
[70] Landau, L. B., Ramjathan-Keogh, K. And Singh, G. Op. Cit. p.6.
[71] Harris, B. Op. Cit.

against any group that has the potential to either fill jobs or push down the price of labour for those who are working."[72] With a high unemployment rate the percentage of people who are uneducated is also assumed to be very high. These two variables, education and employment, should therefore explain the negative attitude towards immigration measures. All these effects are explained by Harris's scapegoating hypothesis of xenophobia.[73] Harris argues that given the social and economic hardships of host citizens such as inadequate housing, unemployment and poverty, foreign citizens are seen as the easiest targets.[74] Therefore, the worsening of domestic conditions merged with recurring anti-immigrant sentiment exacerbated violent behaviour towards immigrants.

Although most implications have an economic background, non-economic implications also carry a lot of weight. The main implication of immigration is that of competition for employment, resulting in lower wages for low skilled workers by increasing the number of the working force. This results to what Massey et al. refer to as increased income relative deprivation which results in ill feelings toward immigrants. The most serious consequence of immigration, as discussed in this research, is that of xenophobia. South Africa's track record when it comes to xenophobic attacks suggests an early development of hatred towards foreigners. The 2008 xenophobic attacks confirm the possibility of attitudes transforming into action.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the implications of immigration transcend economic rationales. Although most implications have an economic background, non-economic implications also carry a lot of weight. The main implication of immigration is that of competition for employment, resulting in lower wages for low skilled workers by increasing the number of the working force. This results to what Massey et al. refer to as increased income relative deprivation which results in ill feelings toward immigrants. The most serious consequence of immigration, as discussed in this research, is that of xenophobia. South Africa's track record when it comes to xenophobic attacks suggests an early development of hatred towards foreigners. The 2008 xenophobic attacks confirm the possibility of attitudes transforming into action. It follows from this that the availability of survey data should be examined and the results used by both policy makers and implementers to prevent future

[72] Landau, L. B., Ramjathan-Keogh, K. And Singh, G. Op. Cit. p.6.
[73] Harris, B. Op. Cit.
[74] Loc cit.

attacks against immigrants. The 2008 xenophobic hot spots were "disadvantaged" areas. Therefore, the following chapters will identify and differentiate between anti-immigrant sentiments in "advantaged" and "disadvantaged" areas.

### 2.3 Gap in the literature

In the available literature concerning issues with immigration in South Africa, only a few have actually tried to identify the relationship between the anti-immigrant sentiment and employment and education levels. Therefore by illustrating the significance (if any) and relationship between employment and education level and anti-immigrant sentiment, this report will add to the gap in the existing literature.

As Sinclair suggests, research on South Africa's migration since the mid-1990s has looked at immigration issues only from a general consensus.[75] However, there is also a lack of integration between qualitative and quantitative analyses of the relationship between attitude towards immigration and economic and non-economic variables. This research will therefore add a quantitative analysis to identify any variations in the 'general consensus' of South Africans towards immigration dynamics.

### 2.4 Case study

This research uses the South African 2008 xenophobic attacks as the basis for this study. This section discusses the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Two main issues are highlighted here: given that xenophobia was concentrated in socially disadvantaged areas as discussed by scholars; will the survey data reveal any major differences in sentiment between disadvantaged and advantaged respondents?

[75] Sinclair, M. R., "Community, identity and gender in migrant societies of southern Africa: emerging epistemological challenges", in International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, 1998, p.339.

# CHAPTER 3:
# Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: South Africa in Comparative Perspective

## 3.0 Introduction

This chapter aims to compare overall levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa with levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in other surveyed countries. The data will show that anti-immigrant and immigration sentiment in South Africa is relatively high compared to that of other states. The 2007 Pew survey has a total of 6 measures of anti-immigration sentiment. The first three are fairly "direct" measures whereas the last three are more "indirect" in that they do not ask specifically about immigrants or immigration. These measures provide descriptive inferences on the differences and similarities towards anti-immigrant sentiments in South Africa as compared to other states. The chapter concludes that South Africans are more anti-immigrant in aggregate than people in most other states.

## 3.1 Measures of anti-immigrant sentiment

On average, states have a propensity to be more negative than positive towards immigration preferences as it will be indicated. In the 2007 Pew GAP survey six questions fall under immigration preferences. These are: attitudes towards immigrants, immigration, restrictions and control of entry, protection from foreign influence, how the traditional way of life is being affected by foreign influence and conflict between groups. The data from these questions illustrate the negativity towards immigration preferences.

### Direct measures

#### Immigration measure 1: Influence of immigrants on your country

The first direct immigration measure is that of anti-immigrant sentiment. The survey question was as follows:

> "As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in **[survey country]**.
>
> "Is the influence of (read name of organization) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in **[survey country]**?*" (Unread responses: "Don't know"; "Refused").*

The above question directly pertains to the long-standing issue of immigrants. The question necessitated the consideration of attitudes toward the influence of immigrants in the surveyed

states relative to the socio-economic and political situation that existed during the period of the survey. The following figure illustrates the results of the discussed anti-immigrant sentiment with a pooled mean of 57% after recoding the responses. It portrays a negative perception of immigrants that runs throughout most states.




Figure 3.1: Immigrants are a bad influence in this country

In 41 of the 47 surveyed countries, more than half of respondents agreed that immigrants have a bad influence. South Africans constitute the highest average proportion of anti-immigrant sentiment of the 47 surveyed states with a proportion of 76% followed by Italy with a proportion of 71%. This makes South Africa the most anti-immigrant state compared to the other surveyed states.

The high pooled mean therefore indicates that there is a general tendency of blaming immigrants for various economic and social problems. Why this is the case remains debatable. However, there is no clear division between developed and developing states in terms of proportions of anti-immigrant sentiments. However, five African states happen to be among the ten highest proportions of anti-immigrant sentiment.

### Immigration preference 2: Opinion towards immigration

The second direct immigration measure is that of anti-immigration sentiment. The survey question was as follows:

> **"**Now I am going to read you a list of things that may be problems in our country. As I read each one, please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all."
>
> "Immigration"

The above question also directly pertains to the deep-rooted issue of immigration. Interviewees were asked for attitudinal responses regarding the issue of immigration.

From the data 44 of the 47 surveyed countries agreed that immigration is a problem. This portrays a negative perception of immigration that also runs across 44 of 47 states. The following figure illustrates the negative attitude towards immigration with a pooled average of 64%, which is very high considering different states have different immigration laws, policies and restrictions of immigrants.




Figure 3.2: Immigration is a problem

Interestingly, only one of the top ten proportion scores of attitude towards immigration is an African country, which is South Africa, compared to the 5 measures of anti-immigrant sentiment. The rest are Italy, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, the United States of America, Spain, Bolivia, Great Britain, India and Mexico. Italy, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, the United States, Spain and Great Britain are states known for their anti-immigration sentiments. In regard to this immigration preference, South Africa has the third highest proportion of anti-immigration sentiment.

### Immigration measure 3: State should restrict and control entry of people into the country more than it does

The third direct immigration measure is that of further restrictions and control of entry of immigrants. The survey question was as follows:

> "As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it."
>
> *"*We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now."

The above question directly concerns the issue of immigration. The question inquires about the satisfaction of the interviewees concerning the entry of foreign nationals into the respective states.

The data shows that 46 of the 47 surveyed countries agreed that their state should further restrict and control entry of immigrants. This meant that the interviewees were not satisfied with the current restrictions and control of entry and expressed concerns for tighter restrictions and control of immigrants. Six of the ten highest proportion score for this immigration measure are African states. The following figure illustrates the negative attitude toward restrictions and control of entry of immigrants with a pooled average of 72%.




Figure 3.3: State should restrict and control entry of people into the country more than it does

Except for South Korea and the Palestinian Territories, respondents in the other 45 surveyed states expressed sentiment that they would like to see tighter restrictions and control of entry of people into their countries with proportional averages of above 60%. With regard to this measure South Africa has the third highest proportion of people agreeing that its needs stricter restrictions and control of entry.

There are more developing states in the top half and more developed states in the bottom half of the diagram, meaning that developing states were less satisfied with their restrictions and control of entry than developed states.

**Indirect measures**

### (i) Immigration measure 4: Way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence

The first indirect immigration measure concerns the need to protect the perceived 'own' way of life against foreign influence. The survey question was as follows;

> **"**As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it.*"*
>
> **"**Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence."

Although this question does not directly pertain to immigration it does however concern an aspect of immigration. Given that states do prevent excessive foreign interference by controlling it through conditions for legal documentations for businesses as well as people, this survey question highlights the importance of this measure.

From the 47 surveyed states, when asked whether their way of life should be protected from foreign influence, 46 countries agreed that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. When comparing the 6 immigrations measures, this measure had the highest pooled mean of 74%. An average of 74% of the people interviewed agreed that their way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence. Once again 6 of the 10 highest mean scores for this immigration measure happen to be African states. The following figure illustrates the attitude toward protection from foreign influence with a pooled average of 74%.




Figure 3.4: Way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence

Once again, 6 of the top 10 highest proportions of respondents in states who think that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence are African states. South Africa was ninth in this immigration preference. Except for Sweden and Germany, the other 45 surveyed states expressed sentiments for the need for protection against foreign influence with proportional averages of above 60%.

A reference to figure 3.5 shows that there are more developing states in the top half and more developed states in the bottom half of the diagram, meaning that, on average, developing states expressed the need for protection from foreign influence more than the developed states.

**Immigration measure 5: Traditional way of life remains strong**

The second indirect immigration measure concerns attitude toward changes of traditional way of life. The survey question was as follows;

> **"**Which of these comes closer to your view? Our traditional way of life is getting lost, OR our traditional way of life remains strong."

Change in the traditional way of life is an immigration measure regarding changes arising from foreign customs and influences. The importance of this measure is to prompt an analysis as to whether those with attitudes supporting protection against foreign influence and anti-immigrant sentiment would also agree that their way of life is being affected. It is argued that "inflows of groups with a different religion, language, or culture may be perceived as undermining existing institutions and threatening the way of life and social status of current residents."[76] Therefore there should be a high proportion toward this measure of way of life being changed. Although people are very opinionated concerning immigrants, immigration, the need for stricter restrictions and protection from foreign influence, the surveyed states nevertheless still feel that their traditional way of life remains strong.

The following diagram illustrates state proportional averages for attitude toward the changing of the traditional way of life. The pooled mean of 77% suggests that fewer people agree with this statement that the previously discussed measures. Therefore, despite their strong anti-immigrant and immigration sentiments, states continue to heavily believe that their traditional way of life still remains strong.

[76] Card, D., Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. "Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey", in Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Vol.3, No.5, 2005, p.9.




Figure 3.5: Traditional way of life remains strong

The figure above shows strong opinion towards own culture remaining strong, although most of these states were strongly negative regarding immigration, immigrants, protection from foreign influence and the need for more restrictions and control of immigrants. The pooled average of 77% highlights the positive opinion toward the strength of own state's culture and its invulnerability from foreign interference. Every state, despite their anti-immigrant and anti-immigration sentiment and desire for the need of protection from foreign influence, still thought that their way of life remains strong.

### Immigration measure 6: Problem of conflict between ethnic/racial/ nationality/religious/tribal groups

The third indirect immigration measure pertains to the problem of conflict between ethnic/racial/nationality/religious/tribal groups in the surveyed states. The survey question was as follows:

> "Now I am going to read you a list of things that may be problems in our country. As I read each one, please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all."
>
> "Conflict between (ethnic/racial/nationality/religious/tribal) groups."

This indirect immigration measure is that of attitude towards how big a problem conflict is between ethnic/racial/nationality/religious/tribal groups within the surveyed states. 45 of 46 countries agreed that conflict within their states is a problem. These states have a proportional average of more than 50%. In regard to this immigration preference South Africans were asked how big the problem of conflict between nationalities is and 68% agreed that it is a problem.




Figure 3.6: Problem of conflict between ethnic/racial/nationality/religious/tribal groups

68% of South African interviewees agreed that group conflict is a problem. However, when comparing states that have been affected by this type of conflict, then it is seen that South Africa's average is quite minimal as it lies 30$^{th}$ in the proportion average score.

### 3.2 Anti-immigrant sentiment: SA in comparative perspective

The following section will, firstly, attempt to show the association among the 6 immigration measures used in this chapter and then, secondly, discuss the implications of the findings of the immigration measures. The correlations analysis determines the contribution to the understanding of the behaviour of immigration.

#### (i) Associations and correlations

The following correlation matrix table is a cross-national correlation of the country-level proportion of the "direct" measures.

The first table shows positive correlation among the three direct immigration measures. The migrants' measure against the immigration and restriction measures shows a strong positive association of 0.52 and 0.56 respectively. Immigration measure against the restriction measure also show a positive association but at a lower degree of 0.33. This is the lowest of the association among the three measures. The strongest is that between migrants' measure and restriction measure of 0.56.

| | migrants | immigration | Restrictions |
|---|---|---|---|
| migrants | 1.00 | 0.52 | 0.56 |
| immigration | 0.52 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
| Restrictions | 0.56 | 0.33 | 1.00 |

Figure 3.7 Table showing matrix of correlation

The following correlation matrix table represents a cross-national correlation of the country-level proportion of the "indirect" measures excluding China (China has no data on conflict between groups).

| | Protection | Way of Life | Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protection | 1.00 | 0.16 | 0.09 |
| Way of Life | 0.16 | 1.00 | 0.08 |
| Conflict | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.00 |

Figure 3.8 Table showing matrix of correlation

The above table shows positive correlation among the three "indirect" immigration measures. However, these correlations are weak.

The two main direct anti-immigration measures demonstrate the first positive association. By plotting anti-immigrant sentiments and anti-immigration sentiment the graph shows a strong positive association between the two dependent variables as seen in the figure below, therefore proving a concurrent validity between the two measures. The second diagram illustrates the positive relationship between anti-immigration sentiment and attitude toward restriction of immigrants.




Figure 3.9

As the first graph illustrates, anti-immigrant sentiment is positively associated with negative attitudes towards immigration. If the masses feel that there is a problem with immigration there is definitely a problem with immigrants in the country and vice versa. The second graph also demonstrates a positive relationship between anti-immigration sentiment and attitude toward stricter restrictions of immigrants. Therefore, theoretically, implementing policies for stricter restrictions and control of entry should improve attitudes towards immigrants.

The first graph shows a strong positive relationship between attitude toward need for protection against foreign influence and the need for further restrictions and control of immigrants. The second graph shows a positive association between attitude toward traditional way of life remaining strong and the need for protection against foreign influence.




Figure 3.10

The graphs above simply demonstrate that the feeling for a need for protection from foreign influence is positively associated with attitude toward the need for more restrictions and control of immigrants and traditional way of life remaining strong.

The following graphs show a positive association between anti-immigration and anti-immigrants sentiment and attitude towards conflict being a problem for the states.




Figure 3.11

The following correlation matrix table represents a cross-national correlation of the country-level proportion of all 6 measures, “indirect” and “direct”, excluding China (China has no data on conflict between groups).

| | Immigration | Migrants | Restriction | Protection | Way of life | Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Immigration | 1.001 | 0.51 | 0.56 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.24 |
| Migrants | 0.50 | 1.00 | 0.29 | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.55 |
| Restriction | 0.56 | 0.29 | 1.00 | 0.51 | 0.17 | 0.23 |
| Protection | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.51 | 1.00 | 0.16 | 0.09 |
| Way of life | 0.04 | -0.07 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 1.00 | 0.08 |
| Conflict | 0.24 | 0.55 | 0.23 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.00 |

Figure 3.12 Table showing matrix of correlation of all measure

The above correlation matrix shows both positive and negative correlations. Immigration, restriction and conflict measures show only positive association with the other measures. However, migrant, protection and way of life measures have negative associations with other measures.

### 3.3 Aggregate immigration measure

The aggregate measure of the immigration preferences is merely an averaging of the figures from the 6 previously discussed immigration preferences. This aggregate identifies a value that describes an overall anti-immigration sentiment that firstly strengthens the reason to choose anti-immigration sentiment for this study, and secondly warrants selecting South Africa as the main case study. The overall value demonstrates the anti-immigration sentiment that spans across the surveyed states. The diagram below illustrates the aggregate immigration measure with a mean score of 69% indicating high anti-immigration sentiment across all states.




Figure 3.13: Aggregate measure

As a pooled average South Africa has the third highest average after Italy with 80%, Ivory Coast with 79% and then South Africa with 78%. Excluding Italians and Ivorians, South Africans are more anti-immigrant in aggregate than those of other states. At the other end of the scale, Sweden has the lowest aggregate of 55%, which demonstrates the range in intensity of the anti-immigration sentiments expressed by these surveyed states. The aggregated values also highlights the negativity of African states toward immigration issues, placing five African states in the top ten. These are, in descending order, Ivory Coast, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. There are more developing states in the top half and more developed states in the bottom half of the diagram. Therefore, this points to the conclusion that developing states are more prone to anti-immigrant sentiments than developed states.

### (ii) Implication of the findings

At first glance no clear conclusion can be made from the anti-migrant sentiment tables (Figures 3.1-3.6). However, states with the highest proportion of people agreeing that immigrants were a bad influence in their countries have had issues with xenophobia. South Africa has the highest proportion of people agreeing that immigrants are a bad influence. South Africa has a history with xenophobia, which is argued to have started worsening soon after its 1994 democratic transition.[77] The most recent xenophobic attacks have demonstrated South Africa's problems with immigrants. Italy has been discussed as a xenophobic hotspot by numerous academics. In 2010 almost 1000 immigrants were evacuated from Southern Italy due to xenophobic attacks.[78] In 2009 the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano argued that xenophobia posed a danger for Italy.[79] Lolashvili highlights the nature of xenophobia in the Czech Republic.[80] These examples certainly confirm the importance of the available data as well as pointing to the benefits which further study will provide by filling in the gap within this research topic.

However, this does not mean that states at the bottom of the table do not have cases of xenophobia. For instance, Kuwait has been accused of being xenophobic to "stateless communities" by a United States Department head.[81] However, states at the top order of the table happen to be states with continuing trends of high forms of anti-immigrant sentiments than states at the bottom order of the table.

[77] Hicks, T. F. Op. Cit. p.395.
[78] Calabrian, S., Violence Forces Evacuation of Hundreds of African Immigrants From Southern Italian Town, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Violence-Forces-Evacuation-of-Hundreds-of-African-Immigrants--81090117.html, January 2010.
[79] Povoledo, E., Xenophobia Threatens Italy, President Warns, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/world/europe/15iht-italy.html, 14 May 2009.
[80] Lolashvili, E., The Nature of Czech Xenophobia, http://www.new-presence.com/Analysis/the-nature-of-czech-xenophobia.html, 12 May 2012.
[81] Robinson, D. M. Combating Xenophobia, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2012/185054.htm, 01 June 2012.

### 3.4 Conclusion

First and foremost, the rationale for using South Africa as the main case study of this research is justified by the findings of this chapter. Anti-immigration sentiment appears to run throughout the 47 surveyed states. The aggregate immigration score of 69% highlights this high anti-immigration sentiment. However, some states exhibit substantial levels of anti-immigration sentiment.

The positive associations displayed between the anti-immigration measures provide a measure of validity to the survey data. These associations indicate that an increase in one measure will concomitantly lead to positive increase in the other measures. Therefore, it can be very easy for anti-immigration sentiment to worsen since an increase of negative attitude in one of the measures usually results in the worsening of the other sentiments.

Given that South Africa on average has high proportions of anti-immigrant sentiments, the next chapters will provide descriptive inferences comparing the "disadvantaged" South Africans and "advantaged" South Africans in terms of immigration preferences.

# CHAPTER 4:

# Social disadvantage and anti-immigrant sentiment: South Africa in comparative perspective

## 4.0 Introduction

This section compares the differences between levels of employment and education relative to anti-immigration measures. The first part examines the differences between "disadvantaged" and "advantaged" South Africans concerning anti-immigrant sentiment. This section identifies the proportion difference between employment and education levels and anti-immigration measures. The second part compares the proportion differences of employment and education levels to the direct immigration measures of the 47 surveyed states. This chapter concludes by stating that there are merely a few significant differences between employment and education and anti-immigration measures of certain states.

## 4.1 Are "disadvantaged" South Africans more anti-immigrant than "advantaged" South Africans?

It is important to identify South Africa's proportion differences between employment and education and the direct anti-immigration measures. The following section uses mosaic plots to illustrate the differences between high level variables and low level variables. This section also confirms the relatively small significance of the different education and employment levels against anti-immigrant measures.

The following mosaic plots are that of anti-immigration sentiment against levels of education and employment.




Figure 4.1.0: Anti-immigration sentiment and levels of education

d =-0.01.

Therefore, South Africans with lower levels of education are 1% more likely to say that immigration is not a problem. On the other hand, South Africans with higher levels of education are 1% more likely to say that immigration is a problem.




Figure 4.1.1: Anti-immigration sentiment and levels of employment

d = 0.01.

South Africans with higher levels of employment are 1% more likely to say that immigration is not a problem. On the other hand, South Africans with lower levels of employment are 1% more likely to say that immigration is a problem.

The following mosaic plots are that of anti-immigrant sentiment against levels of education and employment.




Figure 4.1.2: Anti-migrant sentiment and levels of education

d = 0

South Africans with lower levels of education and higher levels of education have the same likelihood of saying that immigrants are a good influence or bad influence in the country.




Figure 4.1.3: Anti-migrant sentiment and levels of employment

d = 0

South Africans with lower levels of education and higher levels of education have the same likelihood of saying that immigrants are a good influence or bad influence in the country.

The following mosaic plots are that of attitude towards restriction against levels of education and employment.




Figure 4.1.4: Attitude toward restriction and levels of education

d= -0.01.

South Africans with lower levels of education are 1% more likely to agree that the country needs to restrict and control entry of people into the country more than it does. On the other hand, South Africans with higher levels of education are 0.1% more likely to disagree with this sentiment.




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Figure 4.1.5: Attitude toward restriction and levels of employment

d= 0.01

South Africans with higher levels of employment are 1% more likely to agree that the country needs to restrict and control entry of people into the country more than it does. On the other hand, South Africans with lower levels of employment are 1% more likely to disagree with this sentiment.

Although the following anti-immigrant measure is not a direct measure, it does however show an unusual level of anti-immigrant sentiment. The question for the following mosaic

plot questioned the severity of conflict between tribal or ethnic and national identities. In other words, it questioned the severity of xenophobic attacks. There were a high number of respondents of both high and low levels of education who thought that this conflict was not a problem.




Figure 4.1.6: Attitude toward conflict and levels of education

d= 0

The proportional difference also shows how small the differences between people with high levels and low levels of education are in regard to attitudes toward conflict. South Africans with low levels of education and higher levels of education have the same likelihood of agreeing with either sentiment.




Figure 4.1.7: Attitude toward conflict and levels of education

d= 0

In regard to employment levels, South Africans with lower levels of employment and higher levels of employment have the same likelihood of agreeing with either sentiment.

**Conclusion**

The mosaic plots used above confirm that there are a few to no significant differences between low level variables and high level variables. However the difference of proportions in the results indicates higher probabilities for not rejecting the null hypotheses of no difference. In conclusion, South Africans with low level of employment are more likely to think that immigration is a problem and that immigrants are a bad influence. However, South

Africans with high level of employment are more likely to think that the country needs more restrictions. South Africans with high level of education are more likely to think that immigration is a problem and that immigrants are a bad influence. However South Africans are with low level of education are more likely to think that the country needs more restrictions. Therefore, South Africans with low level employment and high level education are more anti-immigrant in sentiment than South Africans with high level employment status and low level education status.

## 4.2 How does the difference in S.A compare with other countries?

The following section compares the proportional differences between employment and education levels to the direct immigration measures. As indicated earlier the proportion difference, in this case, measures the association between the education and employment level and immigration measures. This section employs dotcharts to graphically show respective country's confidence intervals or "d" with dots. The previous "d" on South Africa was graphically shown using mosaic plots. This main idea of "d" is to show how far from zero "d" has to be confident that the differences are just due to sampling error. The dotchart is vertically divided with an abline passing 0. The "d" appearing on the right side of the dotchart implies that the "true" difference would fall under respondents with higher levels of education or employment and the left side implies that the "true" difference would fall under respondents with lower levels of education or employment.

The following is a proportional difference table between anti-immigrant sentiment and education levels. The null hypothesis is that people with lower levels of education are more anti-immigrant in sentiment that those with high levels of education.




**Figure 4.2.1 Proportion difference in anti-immigrant sentiment against education levels**

Figure 4.2.1 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis as zero falls within the 90% confidence interval. However, there are states with significant proportional differences whereby the "true" difference falls under respondents with higher levels of education holding higher anti-immigrant sentiment, thus allowing for the rejection of the null hypothesis. These states are Chile, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Great Britain, Jordan, Mexico, the United States of America and Costa Rica. On the other hand, states with significant proportional differences, whereby the "true" d will fall under the respondents with lower levels of education holding higher anti-immigrant sentiment, are Nigeria, Senegal,

Ethiopia and Ghana. These states with only positive or only negative confidence intervals indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected.

The following is a proportional difference table between anti-immigrant sentiment and employment levels.




**Figure 4.2.2 Proportion difference in anti-immigrant sentiment against employment levels**

Figure 4.2.2 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis since the confidence interval contains zero with 90% confidence interval. The states with significant proportional differences, whereby the “true” d would fall under respondents with higher levels of employment holding higher anti-immigrant sentiment, are Poland and Ghana. On the other hand, states whereby the "true" d would fall in the population of respondents with lower level of employment holding higher anti-immigrant sentiment are the United States of America, Lebanon, France and Canada.

The following is a proportional difference table between anti-immigration sentiment and education levels.




**Figure 4.2.3 Proportion difference in anti-immigration sentiment against education levels**

Figure 4.2.3 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis as the expected “true” d includes confidence interval of zero. However, the states with significant proportional differences, whereby the expected “true” d for the population will fall under respondents with higher levels of education holding higher anti-immigration sentiment, are Morocco, Mali, Bangladesh and China. On the other hand, states whereby the expected "true" d for the population could fall in the population of respondents with lower levels of employment holding higher anti-immigrant sentiment are Nigeria, the United States of America, Israel, Sweden, Great Britain, South Korea, Germany and France.

The following is a proportional difference table between anti-immigration sentiment and employment levels.




**Figure 4.2.4 Proportion difference in anti-immigration sentiment against employment levels**

Figure 4.2.4 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis as the expected "true" d of the confidence interval includes zero. However, the states with significant proportional differences whereby the expected "true" d for the population that would fall under

respondents with higher levels of employment holding higher anti-immigration sentiment are the the United States, France and India. On the other hand, states whereby the expected "true" d for the population is expected to fall in the population of respondents with lower levels of employment holding higher anti-immigration sentiment are Pakistan, Japan, Chile, Morocco and Uganda.

The following is a proportional difference table between immigrant restriction sentiment and education levels.




**Figure 4.2.5 Proportion difference in restriction of entry against education levels**

Figure 4.2.5 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis as the confidence interval of the expected “true” d includes zero. Nevertheless, the states with significant proportional differences, whereby the expected “true” d for the population would fall under respondents

with higher levels of education holding higher immigrant restriction sentiment, are Germany, Canada, South Korea, France, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Chile, the United States of America, Poland, Nigeria, Italy and India. However there are no states whereby the "true" d would fall under a population with lower levels of education holding higher immigrant restriction sentiment.

The following is a proportional difference table between immigrant restriction sentiment and employment levels.




**Figure 4.2.6 Proportion difference in restriction of entry against employment levels**

Figure 4.2.6 illustrates that, at 90% confidence interval, proportional differences for many states are not significant enough to reject the null hypothesis as the confidence interval includes zero. The only state with a significant proportional difference whereby the expected "true" d for the population will fall under respondents with higher levels of employment is Ghana. On the other hand, states whereby the expected confidence interval for the population

could fall in the population of respondents with lower levels of employment holding higher immigrant restriction sentiment are Jordan, Sweden, the United States, Canada, France, Egypt, Ethiopia and Bulgaria.

### 4.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, although the proportion difference tables do not show common trends between education and employment levels and anti-immigration measures, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the confidence interval includes zero. The data however confirms significant proportion differences in a few states. In some states, given the 90% confidence level, the confidence intervals are either only positive or only negative and can therefore result in the null hypothesis being rejected. In conclusion, the proportional difference tables indicate that the differences are no significant enough to reject the null hypothesis of no difference.

## CHAPTER 5:

## South African attitudes towards immigrants before and the xenophobic violence of 2008

### 5.0 Introduction

The extent of immigration and the responses to it in South Africa, given the different levels of education and employment, is a very important area for research study.[82] Because South Africa was identified as one of the most negatively opinionated states towards immigration measures before the 2008 attacks, it is important to compare the previously discussed data to that arising from the post-xenophobic violence. On average, states tend to be very opinionated towards immigration measures, but not many states have experienced the backlash to immigration going as far as nation-wide mass violence against immigrants. Therefore, the following chapter aims to highlight the continuing anti-immigrant sentiment even after the attacks.

The previously used data in this study captured high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment before the 2008 xenophobic attacks. The Afrobarometer data used in this chapter was collected after the attacks therefore giving it an excellent position to compare anti-immigrant data before and after the xenophobic attacks. There were reports that the xenophobic attacks could have been prevented when rumours of the predictable attacks started circulating.[83] Available survey data could have been used to hypothesise the likelihood of xenophobic attacks in South Africa given the high levels of anti-immigrant sentiments. For instance, the 2007 Pew GAP survey data on South Africa showed extreme anti-immigrant sentiment. When asked whether immigration is a problem in the country, 523 responded that it was a very big problem, 278 people said that was it a moderately big problem and 134 people said that it was a small problem. A total of 1000 people were interviewed thus making the percentage of people who thought that immigration was a problem 80%. The importance of a value like this is to raise concerns about immigration issues in the country and also a concern for policy makers.

When asked about the influence of immigrants in the country, 425 people said that their influence was very bad, 307 claimed that their influence was somewhat bad, 178 claimed that it was somewhat good and 39 claimed that it was very good. Accordingly, 73% of

[82] Posel, D. Op. Cit., p.1.
[83] Nyar, A., What Happened?: Narrative of the May 2008 Xenophobic Violence, http://www.s-and-t.co.za/downloads/2010/xenophobia/synthesis/4_What_happened.pdf, July 2010, p.2.

interviewed South Africans thought that immigrants have a very bad influence in terms of how things were going in the country.

43.1% of the people completely agreed that South Africa's way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence. 57.4% of the people interviewed claimed that South Africa should restrict and control entry of people into the country more than they already are. Similarly, 76% of South Africans believed that their traditional way of life was getting lost. However, only 26.2% of those interviewed thought that conflict between ethnic and nationality groups was a big problem in the country.

### 5.1 Survey data after the attacks

After the 2008 xenophobic attacks a survey was done in South Africa by Afrobarometer asking 5 immigration measure questions.

Immigration measure 1

This measure, although different from the previous study, is a direct immigration measure that enquires about trust of immigrants. The question was as follows:

> "How much do you trust each of the following types of people: And what about foreigners living here in South Africa?"

Variable Label: Trust foreigners living here in South Africa




**Figure 5.0: Trust towards immigrants**

The above bar graph illustrates opinions towards the trust of foreign nationals in South Africa. 59% of those interviewed responded that they do not trust foreign nationals at all. It is important for policy makers to understand the importance of trust in immigrants in South Africa. For instance, the process of reintegration of immigrants into the conflict areas in 2008 did not weigh its importance. A peaceful living environment will be difficult to achieve if there are people within that community who are not trusted. Rebuilding trust between foreign nationals and host citizens should have been the first step towards the reintegration of the cast-away foreigners. 59% is definitely a relevant number in regard to reintegration.

Immigration measure 2

The second measure, also different from the previous study, is a direct immigration measure of tolerance towards immigration. The question was as follows

> "How about people from other countries coming to South Africa? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?"

Variable Label: How govt. deals with people from other countries to South Africa




**Figure 5.1: Tolerance towards immigration**

The above graph and table illustrate the intolerant attitude towards immigration. The interviewees displayed a feeling for stricter restrictions of foreign nationals. The above results are not that different from the previously discussed conclusion of a general negative attitude towards immigration laws. Therefore it is important to ascertain what the attitudes would be towards the presence of foreign nationals in the country.

Immigration measure 3

This measure, although different from the previous study, is a direct immigration measure that enquires about tolerance towards deportation. The question was as follows;

> "How about people from other countries who are presently living in South Africa? Who, if anyone, do you think the government should send back to their own countries?"

Variable Label: Who should govt. send back to their own countries?




**Figure 5.3: Tolerance towards deportation**

21% of the people interviewed responded that all foreign nationals in South Africa should be deported, which is 5% more than those who responded that only criminal offenders should be deported.

Immigration preference 4

The fourth measure is that of attitudes towards the management of immigration by President Mbeki's administration. The question was as follows;

> "How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling immigration."

Variable Label: Handling/managing immigration




**Figure 5.4: Mbeki's management of immigration**

About 69% of the people interviewed thought that the management of immigration by the Mbeki administration was bad. As previously suggested, state institutions are also to blame for the negative effects caused by immigration. In the 2008 survey the Mbeki administration was also blamed for failing to control and manage immigration, as well as dealing inadequately with the xenophobic attacks. According to Dodson, President Mbeki's stance on Zimbabwe contributed to the influx of Zimbabwean immigrants into South Africa, as well as

the subsequent victimization of those immigrants.[84] Similarly, Crush highlights President Mbeki's failure to involve the poor in the economic boom that was observed after independence which consequently denied the opportunity to immigrants to share in this boom.[85]

[84] Dodson, B. Op. Cit. p.8.
[85] Crush, J. Op. Cit. p.14.

Immigration preference 4

The fifth immigration measure measured the likelihood of action being taken by citizens against foreigners moving into their neighbourhood.

> Question: How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here from other countries in Africa from: Moving into your neighbourhood?

Variable Label: Prevent immigrants from moving into your neighbourhood




**Figure 5.5 Likelihood of action against neighbours**

33% responded that they would likely take action against foreign nationals for moving into their neighbourhood. 60% responded that they would likely not take action.

**Proportional Difference**

The following mosaic plots illustrate proportion differences between trust towards immigrants and 2 levels of education and employment.




**d= -0.69** **d=0**

**Figure 5.6 Trust toward immigrants against education and employment levels**

There is a fair possibility that people from both employment levels might say that they either trust or do not trust immigrants. However, 83% of uneducated and educated people responded that they do not trust immigrants. Similarly, there is a 69% likelihood of people with higher levels of employment saying that they do not trust immigrants. However, 85% and 84% of people with lower levels of education and higher levels of education respectively said they do not trust immigrants.

The following mosaic plots and tables illustrate proportion differences between tolerance towards immigration and levels of education and employment.




**d=-0.03** **d=-0.02**

**Figure 5.7 Tolerance towards immigration against employment and education levels**

People with lower level of education are a 3% more likely to say that the state should prohibit people from entering the country. However, 85% and 88% of uneducated and educated people respectively responded that the state should prohibit people from entering the country. People with lower levels of employment are also 2% more likely to say that the government should prohibit people from entering the country. 86% and 88% of unemployed and employed people respectively might respond that the government should prohibit people from entering the country.

The following mosaic plots illustrate proportion differences between attitude towards the management of immigration by the Mbeki administration and levels of education and employment.




**d=-0.05** **d=-0.08**

**Figure 5.8 Attitudes toward management of immigration by Mbeki's Administration**

People with lower levels of education are a 7% more likely to say that the Mbeki administration badly managed immigration. 67% and 72% of people with low and high levels of education thought that the Mbeki administration badly managed immigration. People with lower levels of employment are 8%more likely to say that the Mbeki Administration badly managed immigration. 66% and 74% of unemployed and employed people respectively said that the Mbeki administration badly managed immigration.

The following mosaic plots illustrate proportion differences between attitude towards the likelihood of action against foreigners for moving into a South African community and levels of education and employment.




**d=-0.01** **d=-0.01**

**Figure 5.9 Likelihood of action against foreign neighbours**

People with both lower levels of education and employment are 1% more likely to say that there is a likelihood of taking action against foreigners moving into a South African society. 16% and 15% of people with lower levels of education and employment respectively agreed that there is a likelihood that they would take action against foreigners for moving into their neighbourhood. Similarly, 17% and 16% of people with lower levels of education and employment agreed that there is a likelihood of action being taken against foreigners moving into a South African society.

## 5.2 Conclusion

South Africa's history and continuing intolerance towards immigrants is thus clearly demonstrated, given the similarities between the 2007 survey and 2008 survey. The 2008 data also shows insignificant difference between anti-immigrant sentiment and levels of education and employment. However, the high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment streams across the two survey results. Similarly, anti-immigrant sentiment is roughly equally widespread among "advantaged" and "disadvantaged" South Africans.

# CHAPTER 6

## 6.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, the negative consequences surrounding immigration indicate a global problem yet different states are affected differently. This study focussed on anti-immigrant sentiments and more specifically on how anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa compares with the rest of the world. After surveying the existing literature regarding immigration, this study has aimed to fill the gap in the research rather than to concentrate on the controversy within the research. The study established an existence of widespread levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. These anti-immigrant sentiments have been argued to differ not only across nations but across social and economic classes. However, this research found that the differences are rather insignificant.

The first step was identifying and comparing overall levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa with levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in other surveyed countries. Therefore, identifying and analysing the differences between levels of education and employment and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Cross national analysis highlighted important points. Firstly, the proportion differences in South Africa do not show significant differences between levels of education and employment and anti-immigrant sentiment. Thus the results of difference of proportions indicate higher probabilities of not rejecting the null hypotheses of no difference. This is because of the confidence intervals contains zero. Therefore is no significant difference between the anti-immigrant sentiment and levels of education and employment. However, the level of anti-immigrant sentiment remained widespread.

In conclusion, levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa are quite high compared with other countries throughout the world. Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa are similar among socially disadvantaged and more socially advantaged individuals. Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa remained high after the xenophobic violence of 2008.

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