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Transformative leadership in Africa: Thabo Mbeki and Africa's development agenda

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CHAPTER ONE:

Never in history have Africans faced a more critical choice. Never in the history of a continent has the world been more challenged to take a stand. With determined political leadership, globalisation offers the prospect of widening frontiers of democracy, rising economic prosperity and the eradication of poverty. But without a new political vision, both in Africa and the rest of the world, Africa faces social, economic, and political marginalisation.

Joint article by President Thabo Mbeki and Prime Minister Tony Blair:
Dare to hope for Africa's Children 13 June 2001

1. Introduction and Background to the study

The debate on the causes of Africa's underdevelopment has offered different explanations for the deplorable state of the continents development. There are scholars whoa argue that Africa's socio-economic malaise finds its roots in the structural adjustment policies and programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank[4]. On the other hand, a growing number of scholars believe that the real impediment to sustained economic growth and development in Africa has more to do with political leadership and the absence of good governance than with economic plans or reforms. These scholars have established a causal relationship between political leadership and economic development, arguing that the two are intimately interrelated, each being a cause and effect of the other. In other words, it has been poor implementation, gross misconduct and corruption on the part of those entrusted with the powers of the state, which have impeded the chances of such plans making any difference[5].

Since it has been suggested that Africa's development crisis is linked to its leadership deficit, Mangu undertakes to explain that the capacity of African leadership ought to be understood to mean "their ability to provide the most basic services expected- the security of the people and prosperity- whose provision justifies their existence"[6]. In that regard, leadership capacity would also include the ability to devise and implement policies of socio-economic development, to create a stable environment for investors, to guarantee property rights, and to provide an efficient bureaucracy and a climate free of corruption. Not only were many African governments unable to provide these basic rights, many of them were actively engaged in criminal activities of their own. 'Politics of the belly, patrimonial politics, corrupt or predatory rule, criminalisation of the state and massive human rights violations are evidence of the capacity of many African

[4] Kennedy, P. Op Cit, pp 200.
[5] Richardson, P. Op Cit, p 2.
[6] Mangu, A. "State Legitimacy and Leadership Development in Africa." http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/AGFVII-Paper2-StateLegitimacy.pdf, pp 3. Accessed 4 August 2009.

governments and their leadership[7]. Two generations of African leadership have been identified, where the first emerged in the 1960s, the period when most African states gained independence from their former colonial powers.

At independence African leaders inherited ill-equipped structures of manpower and ineffective systems designed to exploit Africa's human and material resources as well as maintain Africa's position as a subordinate and dependent region in the international division of labour[8]. Instead of mustering the political autonomy necessary to pursue development, African presidents failed to adopt appropriate institutions and policies to maintain political stability and ensure national development. While this generation of leaders "lacked the required knowledge and experience to govern the modern nation-state"[9], it is important to recognise as Ake (1996) does that national development was never on the agenda in the first place. This is to say, "The ideology of development was exploited as a means for reproducing political hegemony; it received limited attention and served no purpose as a framework for economic transformation. This is not because the leaders were not interested in societal transformation per se, but because their minds were absorbed in the struggle for power and survival"[10].

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that politics became warfare where leaders decided to rule with a culture of impunity as governments were preoccupied with regime security and not the needs of the people. This led to what the Oladele (2009) refers to as democratism "which implies a situation where democratisation did not result in the deepening or expansion of the democratic system, but in the consolidation of authoritarian and military rule"[11]. In essence, governance was carried out in the perception of politics as a zero-sum game; where power was sought and maintained by all

[7] Loc Cit.
[8] Ake, C. Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1996, p 3.
[9] Mohiddin, A. "African leadership: the succeeding generation, challenges and opportunities." 1998 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN007927.pdf, p2. Accessed 14 April 2009.
[10] Ake, C. Op Cit, pp 8.
[11] Oladele, K. "The Leadership Question in Africa." February 2009. http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index2.php? option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=11578, p 1. Accessed 14 April 2009.

means. As a result many governments soon became over-centralised, and this led to single or no- party systems that came to be concentrated in one man, that is the 'Big Man'[12]. Because power and the right to rule were located in a powerful individual applying it for his self-interest, loyal supporters were rewarded and selectively favoured. These 'clients' were expected to mobilise political support for incumbents and refer all decision-making to the patron. The neo-patrimonial systems became particularly prevalent where political power was personal and political positions gave access to economic resources.[13]

Nevertheless, the inherent liabilities of economic management in neo-patrimonial politics produced a slackening of economic growth by the late 1970s, when the converging impact of international price shocks, declining export demand, and the debt overhang yielded economic decline in most African countries. Against the background of poverty and poor economic performance, the misuse of public office or public resources for personal or private gain became the second characteristic of this generation of African leadership. In essence, some African leaders exploited the continent and its people by misallocating resources due to the menace of corrupt practices[14]. Corruption means "an act which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private motives of wealth, power, or status"[15]. In that regard, corruption erodes governmental legitimacy because it interferes with the effective delivery of public goods and services, at the same time, limiting growth because it reduces the amount of public resources, discourages private investments and savings, and impedes the efficient use of government revenue and development assistance funds[16].

[12] Ndulo, M. "The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges of Institution Building," National Black Law Journal. 1998- 2000, p 77.
[13] Wyk van, J. "Political Leaders in Africa: President, Patrons or Profiteers," Occasional Paper Series. Vol 2, No 1, 2007, p 5.
[14] Mohiddin, A. Op Cit p 4.
[15] Lawal, G. "Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for Political and Economic Change," Humanity and Social Sciences Journal. Vol 2, No 1, 2007, p 1.
[16] Loc Cit.

Corruption in Africa is endemic, and is identified as stemming from unrestricted state-power, characteristic of authoritarian regimes where political patronage is a practice [17]. Szeftel (1998) notes that corruption is more pervasive in countries where institutions such as the legislature and judiciary are weak, where the rule of law and adherence to formal rules are not rigorously observed. For that reason, the incredulous nature of corruption in Africa is not indicative of democratic failure, but rather of incomplete development and democratisation[18]. By the late 1980s these circumstances, in which economic hardship was prevalent in most sub-Saharan African states, became the basis for people to express discontent with corruption, political repression, and mismanagement of public resources. Almost instantaneously, a wave of political opposition swept across the African continent, activists and demonstrators in dozens of countries voiced a broad-based repudiation of predatory authoritarian rule. Such events in combination with external pressure by the donour community and international financial institutions, led to the "third wave" of democratisation and political change in the 1990s[19].

As a result, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a new generation of African leaders who emerged to encompass the concept of 'leadership for development'[20]. Since this new breed was driven by the desire to extricate their countries from economic and poor governing conditions, this leadership emerged to place the African society ahead of ideological fanaticism and focused on the formation of alliances aimed at addressing the development needs of their societies. According to Nkomo (2002) the notion of leadership for development is premised on the strong understanding that the African continent is not poor and has much to offer to itself and to the world. Furthermore, such thinking was corroborated and developed by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which "placed a major challenge to Africans to advance

[17] Loc Cit.
[18] Szeftel, M. "Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda," Review of African Political Economy. Vol 25, No 76, June 1998, pp 226.
[19] Mukamunana, R. "Challenges of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): A Case Analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Philosophiae Doctor, PhD, in Public Affairs. University of Pretoria, March 2006, 1. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-05272008-162948/unrestricted/04 Chapter.pdf, p 161. Accessed 24 June 2009
[20] Nkomo, S. "Leadership for Development in a globalised environment," Journal of Public Administration. Vol 37, No 1, November 2002, pp 298.

themselves while at the same time responding to the challenges and inequities posed by globalisation. NEPAD as a vehicle for Africa's development agenda allows and opens up opportunities to develop strategically and integrate the continent in the world system driven by competitiveness"[21].

1.2 Aim:

While it is considered necessary and appropriate that 'leadership for development' is capable of nurturing and promoting African socio-economic development,[22] it is also important to note that if the continent is to recover from its economic malaise, "it needs leaders who are strong and self-confident, creators of great ideas and who are totally committed to Africa's economic recovery."[23] It is against this background that this research report will contribute to these discussions, by establishing a framework within which leadership, and more specifically transformative leadership can be measured and understood to be effective in moving the African continent forward from its current state of crisis, to one of renewal[24]. In this regard, a case study approach will be used to argue that, despite various constraints, former President Thabo Mbeki is a transformative leader, as he aimed to provide the policy foundations which promoted good governance as the best way to effective and positive change in Africa.

1.3 Rationale:

Since the main goal of economic development is to eradicate illiteracy, disease and the elimination of material poverty, the most important mechanism through which political leaders can contribute to economic development is by choosing appropriate policies and programmes, implementing them effectively and by creating and adopting the required

[21] Ibid, pp 299.
[22] Mohiddin, A. Op Cit, p2.
[23] Obasanjo, O, Orville, d' H& African Leadership Forum. Op Cit, pp 2.
[24] Hope, K. "From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Renewal," Africa Affairs. Vol 101, No 404, July 2002, p 388.
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institutions for hastening the pace of development[25]. In this regard, transformative leadership is deemed essential to promote economic development and political stability in Africa because it is this leadership that has the competence to comprehend the threats, challenges, and opportunities of globalisation, as well as the imperatives of good governance[26]. A discussion of former President Mbeki is very appropriate because, his leadership was not only in response to the burgeoning economic crisis in Africa, but that it sought to conceptualise and promote a new culture among Africa's political elite. In analysing Mbeki's leadership, and his Africa policy, which was to improve economic policies and political governance as the basis for enhanced development[27], this report does not seek to hail him as Africa's political messiah, instead it aims to link his vision for Africa to his legacy as one of the founding fathers of African renewal.

1.4 Research Questions:

The research questions in the study are:

- What defines Thabo Mbeki's qualities as a transformative leader?
- What was his contribution to forging a developmental vision, and was it consistent with transformative leadership?
- How did his vision as a national leader influence his continental vision of Nepad?

[25] Thimmaiah, G. "Political leadership and Economic Development in Karnataka." May 2005. http://www.isec.ac.in/Karnataka_G_Thimmaiah_aligned.pdf, p3. Accessed 19 June 2009.
[26] Kennedy, P. Op Cit, p 198.
[27] Gelb, S. "South Africa's role and importance in Africa and for the development of the African Agenda." Economic Development Growth and Equity (EDGE) Institute October 2001, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000577/P467_RSA_role.pdf, p 1. Accessed 2 November 2009

1.5 Methodology:

The methodology used for the study is qualitative, since the study analyses leadership and development in Africa. The data collection will be secondary and material from the University of Witwatersrand library, the South Africa Institute of International Affairs library, policy documents, official statements and speeches, as well as internet resources will be researched in the report.

1.6 Chapterisation:

The study is structured into five chapters.

Chapter 1: explores the historical context of political leadership and socioeconomic development African and outlines the aim and rationale of the report. The research methodology and the research questions are also included in this chapter.

Chapter 2: reviews the literature on political leadership in a effort to determine how political leadership should be understood.

Chapter 3: outlines former President Thabo Mbeki's role in the adoption and implementation of NEPAD, in doing so it tests the hypothesis. It will then proceed to explore the key and essential elements of NEPAD, followed by a brief assessment of the ensuing debates in the wake of the adoption of the development framework.

Chapter 4**:** drawing on chapter two, discusses Mbeki's legacy and relates it to NEPAD and his notion of an African Renaissance

Chapter five: provides a summary and highlights the findings of the research

CHAPTER TWO:

Leadership! Some may think this to be the most simple and basic of concepts, embedded in the law of natural selection that favours the strong and the bold. Yet, it is more than that.

Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Launch of the African Leadership Initiative, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, 13 July 2006

2. Literature Review: Theoretical Constructs of Political Leadership

The study of political leadership has been a popular topic of debate since scholars first recognised the impact leadership has on social systems. It has produced many perspectives and theories where investigative efforts into what epitomises leadership have witnessed significant and distinctive streams of intellectual thought[28]. The current literature is replete with definitions that variously associate leadership with the exercise of power, influence, command, authority, and control. Each major premise about leadership is accurate under certain circumstances, and as a result, there is not a consensus on a specific theory of leadership. Although there are many political leaders at all levels of power, the most important are the heads of states and government due to their pre-eminent positions in terms of control over the authority of a state[29]. The purpose of this section is two-fold, firstly to synthesise the literature on the major approaches to the study of leadership and secondly, make a critical evaluation of these theories by emphasis on conceptual issues, so as not to provide a comprehensive review of the empirical research[30].

2.1 Contingency Theories

There is a certain degree of coherence to this field of study which has allowed scholars to delineate two major definitions, the positional, and the behavioural. As has been noted in scholarly assessments, this distinction is important in the analysis of leadership as it makes the concept broader and more flexible[31]. The model provided by Edinger (1975) suggests when leadership is positionally defined; "it is associated first and foremost with the rights and duties of an officer or status in a hierarchical structure". For instance, it

[28] McFadden, C; Eakin, R; Beck-Frazier, S& McGlone J. "Major approaches to the study of leadership" Academic Exchange Quarterly, 2005. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3325/is_2_9/ai_n29205525/ Accessed 19 June 2009.
[29] Mangu, A. Op Cit, p 8.
[30] Yukl, G. "An evaluation of conceptual weaknesses in transformational and charismatic leadership theories," Leadership Quarterly. Vol 10, Issue 2, 1999, p 286.
[31] Blondel, J. Political Leadership- towards a general analysis. London, SAGE Publications, 1987, p13.

may be attributed to someone in a 'position' of authority or command. When leadership is behaviourally defined, it is identified with persons who shape the actions of other persons[32]. In other words, leadership consists of the ability of one or a few who are at the top to make others do a number of things that they would not or at least might not have done. This definition reinforces the notion that a leader may well be someone who does not occupy a formal position in the group. To restate it in the words of Blondel (1987), "some leaders do not hold top positions in the same way that that some holders of top positions are not leaders."[33]

By far the most comprehensive study undertaken in this field has been the work by Blondel. While examining the leadership process, Blondel stresses that the scope of activities of leadership is directly conditioned by the environment and to the situations faced[34]. In fact, he argues, leadership cannot be dissociated from the environment in which it takes place. When discussing the distinction between behavioural and positional leadership, Blondel refers to the environment, since it determines both the formal positions and effective strength of these positions. That is to say, the specific context of a leader plays a part in relation to the determination of the power of the leader. For example, the means that structure the scope of activity of political leaders is a variety of constitutional and legal arrangements which determine the frontiers between the role of the state in society and the role of the leader within the state. Therefore, the actions of leaders seem almost inextricably linked to the environment in which they occur, which are triggered by the problems that society faces; admittedly these too are related to the environment[35].

Additionally, Blondel states, "the environment structures the activities by establishing some habits which introduce constraints and provide opportunities"[36]. According to him, structural constraints on the scope of activities of leaders stem from the physical size or the economic base of the country or specific conditions in which a nation finds itself at a

[32] Edinger, L.J. "The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership," Comparative Politics. Vol 7, No 2, January 1975, pp 275.
[33] Blondel, J. Op Cit, p15.
[34] Ibid, p 17.
[35] Loc Cit
[36] Ibid, p7.

particular moment. In this way, the environment provides opportunities that oblige the leader to act in particular directions and to concentrate on certain problems. Likewise, leaders may be given a chance to launch initiatives and to push forward some goals that might not be acceptable in other situations or when structural conditions are different. What this implies is, not only do leaders often have to recognise that there may be obstacles to the implementation of their goals, but that goals themselves come to be altered. For instance, a leader may come to power believing that the country should be developed through a socialist system; after a few years, this leader may no longer feel that such a strategy is conductive to growth and development. The assumption made is that leaders may also alter their goals because of pressure from the environment and changing situations[37].

Leach and Wilson (2003) build on Blondel's work by providing a more nuanced distinction between the types of environmental influences on a leader's policies. The authors suggest that *party organisations* and *systems factors* reflect the influence of party politics and in part the extent to which formal power is distributed within national and local parties and the scope and constraints this provides for the leader[38]. By the same token, Hargrove and Owens (2003) explore the *institutional factors* which reflect formal mechanisms such as legal powers, financial levers that can be applied and the framework of organisations within which a leader has to operate. According to the authors institutional powers may strengthen the hand of less skillful politicians if the environment is favourable. And political climates will vary greatly in the degrees to which they are favourable to potentially skillful leadership[39]. Both sets of factors place emphasis in different ways on the significance of position and the rights and constraints associated with the position. Accordingly these factors are important in setting a framework in which leaders develop their roles[40].

[37] Blondel, J. Op Cit, p 85.
[38] Leach, S. &Wilson, D. Local Political Leadership. Bristol, The Policy Press, 2003, p8.
[39] Hargrove, E.C. & Owens, J.E. "Introduction: Political Leadership in Context," Leadership in Context. Hargrove, E& Owens, J (Eds), Georgia, Rowman&Littlefield, Inc, 2003, p 1.
[40] Leach, S. &Wilson, D. Op Cit, p 9.

According to Antonakis and others (2003), the breadth of political leadership cannot be expected to be the same from leader to leader; from country to country therefore, a change in context changes leaders, leadership, and leadership effectiveness[41]. Following from the above, the approach adopted by McFadden and others (2005), focuses on the importance of situational factors that require certain behaviours in order for leaders to be effective[42]. Since effective behaviour is contingent on the situation, contingency theories emphasize that different forms of leadership prove to be the most effective under different conditions. According to Ayman (2004), authoritarian leadership style is effective in periods of crisis but fails to win the minds of followers as it takes decisions and imposes them on the group, expecting group members to put them into effect without questioning them. The democratic leadership style is more adequate in situations that require consensus building as it encourages members to share the decision taking process and becomes the coordinator of group effort rather than decision takers. The laissez-faire leadership style however, is appreciated by the degree of freedom it provides, as the leader does not take charge, he can be perceived as a failure in protracted or thorny organisational problems[43].

As the above discussion demonstrates, the environment structures the situation with which the leader has to cope and from which he or she cannot escape[44]. Similarly, by being part of the environment, the leader is socialised in such a way as not to be able to distinguish him or herself from the environment, this makes the leaders continuously dependent on what the environment proposes, suggests, and even dictates. By and large, the above theorists have illustrated that leadership is a function of the environment and the situation in which leaders find themselves. Thus, leadership is dependent on the

[41] Antonakis, J; Avolio, B & Sivasubramaniam, N. "Context and Leadership: an examination of the nine-factor full- range leadership theory using the multifactor leadership questionnaire," The Leadership Quarterly. Vol 14, 2003, pp 268.
[42] McFadden, C; Eakin, R; Beck-Frazier, S& McGlone J. Op Cit.
[43] Ayman, R. "Situational and Contingency Approaches to leadership," The Nature of Leadership. Antonakis, J; Cianciolo, A& Sternberg, R. (Eds), London, SAGE, 2004, p 150.
[44] Blondel, J. Op Cit, p 18.

situation and must therefore be explained in relation to an understanding of the context, which shapes the behaviour of the actors involved[45].

2.2 Trait Theories

On the other hand, scholars like Kirk and Bolden (2006) have approached the phenomenon of leadership as *attributional*, locating leadership in the personal behaviours and characteristics of the leader[46]. This perspective highlights the notion that traits refer to stable or consistent patterns of behaviour that are relatively immune to situational contingencies. Research using the trait theory attempts to identify specific personal characteristics that explain why certain individuals have the ability to succeed in leadership positions and others do not. Using the concept of leader traits, Antonakis and others have referred to personality, temperaments, dispositions, and abilities, as well as "to any enduring qualities of the individual including physical and demographic attributes as key leader attributes"[47]. An implicit assumption of the trait theory of leadership is that some traits are inborn and ensure leadership potential. According to Wart (2003), leadership cannot be created or promoted; it cannot be taught or learned. In the extreme, this position states that leadership is 'instinctive'. Those who share this view tend to stress the artistry in leadership, as they believe leaders have special qualities and faculties that are not easily transferred or readily acquired[48].

As maintained by Simonton (2001), the concepts of traits is compatible with Thomas Carlyle's belief that "[t]he history of the world is but a biography of Great men.[49]" In its simplest form the Great Man theory stressed the impact on the course of history of charismatic leaders whose appearance cannot be explained or predicted by rigorous

[45] Mathebe, L. Bound By Tradition- The World of Thabo Mbeki. Pretoria, Unisa Press, 2001, p 12.
[46] Kirk, P& Bolden, R. "African Leadership: Insights, Meanings, and Connotations," paper presented at the Leadership and Management Studies in Sub-Sahara Africa Conference, Tanzania, June 2006, http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/cls/research/abstract.php?id=85, p 4. Accessed 19 June 2009.
[47] Antonakis, J; Avolio, B & Sivasubramaniam, N. Op Cit, pp 268.
[48] Wart, van M. "Public Sector Leadership Theory: An Assessment," Public Administration Review. Vol 63, No 2, 2003, pp 217.
[49] Simonton, D.K. "Kings, Queens& Sultans: Empirical Studies of Political Leadership in European Hereditary Monarchies," Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behaviour. Feldman, O& Valenty, L. (Eds) Santa Barbara, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p 102.

analysis of social forces. The theory is supported today by individuals who consider the leadership of a "Great man" to have been transformative. A central theme of the literature on leadership has been the role of initiating as well as hastening the process of change in any society. At best of times, a leadership that can guide, direct and influence a fundamental change is seen as a function of transformative leadership. Rao (2005) defines transformative leadership as the process of pursuing collective goals through the tapping of the motive bases toward the achievement of the intended change[50]. Essentially, leaders carry out the process of change by applying their leadership attributes and in order to be effective, "they should have commitment to the cause or societal goal; they should have perseverance in pursuing societal goals, exhibit strength of character by setting examples and mental toughness to face criticism."[51]

On the view of the "Great Man" theory, Gray and McPherson (2001) highlight the concept of visionary leadership, which involves the creation of a compelling picture of the future. By creating this vision, transformative leadership engineers socio-economic progress by projecting a concrete and coherent vision of the future and thoughtfully setting up the beliefs and institutions instrumental in improving policy and accelerating economic growth strategies[52]. The authors suggest in order to qualify as a transformative leadership in promoting growth of an African economy, a leader would have to be:

a) Motivated to launch his or her country onto an acceptable growth path, that is a sustained increase in per capita GDP at least 4 per cent per annum.
b) Have the qualities that are required to impose his/her development agenda in the face of vested interests[53].

[50] Rao, V. "Understanding Leadership" paper presented at a seminar at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, 28 September2005. http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/events/2005/Seminar_Vinayak_Rao_Paper.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2009.
[51] Thimmaiah, G. "Political leadership and Economic Development in Karnataka." May 2005. http://www.isec.ac.in/Karnataka_G_Thimmaiah_aligned.pdf, p3. Accessed 19 June 2009.
[52] Gray, C. &Mc Pherson, M. "The Leadership Factor in African Policy Reform and Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol 49, No 4, July 2001, pp 707.
[53] Loc Cit.

Secondly, by reviewing the role played by transformative leadership in the implementation of policy reforms, it is then hypothesised that socio-economic development in Africa requires:

1) a visionary leader
2) Presentation of a comprehensive programme of reform.[54]

Drawing from the above, it is possible to discern an ideal type of a strong, visionary, and transformative leader who possesses the traits necessary to contribute to the successful implementation and consolidation of policy reform in Africa. Using the term Coherent Policy Leader (CPL), Wallis (1999) suggests this ideal type of traits appear to derive more from the way these transformative leaders commit themselves to a quest to advance the principles contained in a coherent policy paradigm than from any personally or genetically specific factors[55]. As such, their commitment gives them the tunnel vision required to formulate a clear set of coherent goals. It also gives them the willingness to use their own authority and political skills to overcome and circumvent the resistance to reform generated by interest groups; to lead public opinion by taking firm positions on contentious issues; and to stand before the 'bar of history' and be held to account for their persistence in striving to realise their policy vision.

While this may be the case, Wallis also insists that in any given case, a combination of personal elements and situational factors need to be considered in the study of leadership[56]. Reflecting upon the above, Wallis leads us to the conclusion that situational factors seem to call forth a particular style of leadership that is characterised by its commitment to implement comprehensive reform programmes. Therefore, the need for economic transformation and growth in Africa calls for a transformative leader who combines a sound and logical understanding of the different dimensions of the task "with an awareness of the need to cultivate meaningful solutions to the persistent

[54] Ibid, pp 717.
[55] Wallis, J. "Understanding the Role of Leadership in Economic Policy Reform," World Development. Vol 27, No 1, 1999, p 42.
[56] Ibid, p 41.

underdevelopment of the continent"[57]. With this in mind, the next chapter will test the hypothesis in relation to Thabo Mbeki's vision and commitment in the evolution and eventual adoption of NEPAD. This will be followed by an evaluation of the key elements of NEPAD, and then proceed to assess the ensuing debates regarding NEPAD and its importance to South Africa's Africa policy.

[57] Adamolekun, L. "Political Leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa: from Giants to Dwarfs," International Political Science Review. Vol 19, No 2, April 1988, p 102.

CHAPTER THREE:

The Africa with which we have to deal today is one which is full of new attitudes to old practices and new types of reaction to previously existing systems. The central factor in the African awakening is the emergence of new ideas, strange men, and other ideas.

Address by President Thabo Mbeki at the Inaugural ZK Matthews Memorial Lecture

University of Fort Hare, 12 October 2001

3. Transforming Leadership and African development under NEPAD

3.1 Introduction

Since he took over the presidency from Nelson Mandela in 1999- 2008, Thabo Mbeki made an indelible mark upon Africa through his leadership, which called for an African Renaissance urging the rebirth and renewal of the African continent. While some considered him a revisionist 'can-do' techno-pol who led by articulating a vision[58], his ability to grasp and articulate the most logical course of action are outstanding examples of Mbeki's leadership qualities consistent with transformative leadership[59]. As hypothesised in the literature review, transformative leadership depends on the projection of a strategic vision which presents an ideal and believable future. In other words, leaders should construct 'an imaginary' community, through the skills of rhetoric and skilled communication, that followers feel apart of. Thus Mbeki's projection of an African Renaissance projected a strong sense of strategic purpose and helped to create a sense of a shared community[60]. Drawing from the spirit of a historically grounded pan-Africanism, he too articulated the idea of building a new and progressive Africa, an Africa relieved from the crises of economic marginalisation, internal conflict, and political decay.

Whereas the original pan-Africanists sought the political kingdom, Mbeki cast himself as a neo-pan-Africanist, seeking the economic kingdom for the ailing continent. On that basis, he followed his natural calling to lead the renewal of the continent and dealt mostly with 'big ideas' and 'big issues' like the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies; the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the meetings of the Group of industrialised nations (G8); all of which served as platforms for his diplomatic pursuits as

[58] Gumede, W. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2005, p 58.
[59] Lodge, T. Politics in South Africa- from Mandela to Mbeki. Cape Town, David Philip, 2002, p 266.
[60] Ibid, p 265.

Africa's strongest and most eloquent voice in world politics[61]. In taking the message to the powerful international bodies, he lamented the fact that the financial architecture was working against developing countries. Furthermore, he placed strong emphasis on the need to review the functioning of the IMF and World Bank to make their governance fair and transparent [62]. In essence, Mbeki sought to "change Africa's place in the world economy so that Africa became free of the yoke of the international debt burden, and no longer a supplier of raw materials or an importer of manufactured goods"[63]. Therefore, Mbeki sought to transform African development by providing a framework for Africa to re-emerge as a significant partner in the new world order[64].

According to Lodge (2002), on the adoption of the Constitution in 1996, he masterfully conveyed in his seminal 'I am an African' speech, one of the most visionary statements to have been delivered by an African leader to date, especially in its inclusive definition of African empowerment: the African Renaissance[65]. In view of Kornegay and Landsberg (1998), the 'I am an African' speech should be considered as the intellectual foundation for the articulation of an African Renaissance[66], where his encapsulation of the idea of the "reawakening" of Africa into a vision of an African Renaissance and a belief that this will "truly be the African Century", drew its inspiration from the conviction that the African Renaissance had begun in the political sphere. To this degree Mbeki asserted that:

> What we have been talking about is the establishment of genuine and stable democracies in Africa, in which the systems of governance will flourish because they derive their authority

[61] Olivier, G. "Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour," International Affairs. Vol 79, No 4, July 2003, p 816.
[62] Ijeoma, E. "NEPAD Leadership: A Comparative analysis of the Roles by Nigeria and South Africa," Journal of Public Administration. Vol 43, No 2, June 2008, pp 153.
[63] Ajulu, R. "Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a Globalising World Economy: The Struggle for the Soul of the Continent," Review of African Political Economy. Vol 28, No 87, March 2001, p 27.
[64] Bongmba, E. "Reflections on Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance," Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol 30, No 2, June 2004, p 292.
[65] Lodge, T. Op Cit, p 248.
[66] Kornegay, F. & Landsberg, C. "Phaphama iAfrika!: The African Renaissance and Corporate South Africa," African Security Review. Vol 7, No 4, 1998. http://www.iss.co.za/asr/7No4/Phapama.html. Accessed 14 May 2009.

> and legitimacy from the will of the people. The way forward must be informed by what is, after all common to all African traditions: that the people shall govern![67]

Accordingly, the philosophical foundations of the African Renaissance marked an important landmark in the set of South Africa's economic relations with the rest of the continent[68]. The South African state, along with its Nigerian, Algerian, and Senegalese counterparts, played a pioneering role in the emergence of NEPAD as the development framework within the African Union (AU). The evolution and eventual adoption by African heads of state of the NEPAD generated many debates around its process, content, as well as relevance for Africa's problems; as such many attempts argued that Mbeki's role in NEPAD served to facilitate the exploitation and penetration of African economies[69]. In addition, numerous reflections emphasised the neoliberal character of the economic strategy underpinning NEPAD and its resemblance to the SAPs of the IMF and the World Bank. Linked to this was the view that President Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance was not grounded in a concrete anti-colonial or anti imperialist tradition; rather it was firmly entrenching a neo-liberal agenda[70].

On the other hand, Gelb (2001) has argued that NEPAD represented the clearest expression thus far of Mbeki's vision for Africa, which was to improve economic and political governance as the basis for enhanced development[71]. Building on Gray and McPherson and Wallis' notion of CPL, this chapter will illustrate that for his part, Mbeki's pioneering role in the presentation of NEPAD, as a comprehensive programme of reform, is indicative of transformative leadership. In doing so, the first section will outline the systemic forces that propelled the adoption and implementation of NEPAD with a broader attempt to characterise the philosophical foundations provided by the

[67] Mbeki, T. Africa the Time Has Come- selected speeches by Thabo Mbeki. Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers, 1998, p 201.
[68] Lesufi, I. "South Africa and the Rest of the Continent: Towards a critique of the Political Economy of Nepad," Current Sociology. Vol 52, No 5, September 2004, p 809.
[69] Loc Cit.
[70] Hattingh, S. "South Africa in Africa: Another Scramble for Africa?" Articles to the African Diamond Workers Network. Vol 3, 2007, Cape Town, International Labour Research, and Information Group, p 1.
[71] Gelb, S. Op Cit, p 1.

African Renaissance. The next section will then explore the key and essential elements of NEPAD, followed by an assessment of the ensuing debates in the wake of its adoption. From there, the chapter will review the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) with the intention of evaluating South Africa's performance in light of the findings. The final part of the chapter will conclude by arguing that as part of his African Renaissance, NEPAD is instrumental in improving policy and accelerating economic growth strategies.

3.2 The African Renaissance

Since late 1999, Mbeki popularised the concept of an African Renaissance officially defined by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 2002 as a "holistic vision aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership, and good governance." Thus, a salient feature of the African Renaissance was the mantra of African solutions to African problems[72]. As the principle driver of the concept of an African Renaissance, Mbeki developed an understanding for his notion of the idea, which he, regarded as neither a policy nor a prescription, but rather as a "description of the coming epoch of Africa's history and of the emerging socio-economic conditions that would bring this epoch about"[73]. Furthermore Louw (2000) asserts, "Such an agenda for an African Renaissance reflected the need to empower African people to deliver themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism and to situate themselves on the global stage as equal and respected contributors to, as well as beneficiaries of, all the achievements of human civilisation"[74].

It would seem therefore that the pinnacle of Mbeki's African Renaissance was informed by an attempt to not only recover the distorted identities of Africans but also articulate

[72] Kagwanja, P. An encumbered regional power? The Capacity Gap in South Africa's Peace Diplomacy in Africa. Democracy and Governance Research Programme Occasional Paper 6, Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Press, 2009, p 5.
[73] Moeletsi Mbeki cited in Louw, A. "The Concept of the African Renaissance as a Force Multiplier to Enhance Lasting Peace and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. October 2000. http://www.africavenir.org/uploads/media/LouwAfricanRenaissanceForceMultiplier_01.pdf, pp 4. Accessed November 18 2009.
[74] Ibid, p 5.

and actualise African identity and consciousness[75]. Mbeki's politics of identity are captured when he says:

> I am an African.
> I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa.
> The dismal shame of poverty, suffering, and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share. The blight on our happiness that derives from this and from our drift to the periphery of the ordering of human affairs leaves us in a persistent shadow of despair. I have seen the destruction of all sense of self-esteem, the consequent striving to be what one is not, simply to acquire some of the benefits which those who had improved themselves as masters had ensured that they enjoy. [76]

Admittedly, Mbeki's proclamation reaffirms the existential conditions of all Africans, which benefit the few while the people are impoverished and the continent is denied the possibility to achieve sustainable development[77]. To this effect, the African Renaissance seeks to restore pride and sense of self- worth, respect and dignity of all Africans, as the first steps in harnessing their potential. By so doing, Mbeki is expressing the need for Africans to determine their own future and how they engage with the forces of globalisation.

While analysts concur that the term and idea of an African Renaissance is part of a long struggle calling for African political renewal and economic regeneration, such as the Lagos Plan of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991, Ajulu (2001) and Ahluwalia (2002) point out that the context in which the debate was taking place was new and posed yet another attempt to fight and challenge the prevailing representations of Africa[78]. In

[75] Bongmba, E. Op Cit, p 295.
[76] Mbeki, T. Op Cit, p 35.
[77] Ibid, p 298.
[78] Ajulu, R. Op Cit, p 27. Ahluwalia, P. "The Struggle for African Identity: Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance," African and Asian Studies. Vol 1, No 4, 2002, p 265.

reference to the context, colonial domination and the Cold War were eradicated; however, the conditions in which the African continent remained in a precarious position still exist, in different sometimes-disguised forms of neo-imperialism, called globalisation. In an effort to unite African countries in their desires for renewal and strengthen their independence in world affairs[79], Mbeki's African Renaissance argued that socio-economic development would be the result of greater integration into the global economic and political system. Simply, he recognised the unequal nature of the process but embraced a pragmatic approach that attempted to change the rules from within[80].

Critical responses to the African Renaissance hinted out that it was a totalising idea that was trying to borrow and transpose a rationale similar to the European Renaissance which was founded on slavery, colonialism, and racism[81]. Implied in such analyses was the assertion that leaders like Mbeki became agents of neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism which continue to exploit African countries. Reservations of a similar manner dismissed the concept as being high on sentiment and low on substance and an escapist ploy meant to distract attention from the real problems facing Africa[82]. A cynical interpretation suggested that Mbeki's African Renaissance was an integral search for presidential status in the post-Mandela era. However, these critics missed the broad vision that aimed at recovering the lost identities of all Africans when they subsumed such a vision under Mbeki's presidential ambitions and power politics. Furthermore, the interpretations of these critics not only limited the vision that Mbeki articulated but missed the historic opportunity that the idea it offered. To avoid being a romantic and idealistic concept as critics claimed, Mbeki's African Renaissance later called for an

[79]Zeleza, PT. "What Happened to the African Renaissance? The Challenges of Development in the 21st Century. 20 November 2008. http://www.zeleza.com/blogging/african-affairs/what-happened-african-renaissance-challenges-development-21st-century-0. Accessed 2 November 2009.
[80] Owusu, F. "Pragmatism and the Gradual Shift from Dependency to Neoliberalism: The World Bank, African Leaders and Development Policy in Africa", World Development Vol 31, No 10, 2003, p 1662.
[81] Cited in Maloka, E. "The South African 'African Renaissance Debate': A Critique." http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol8ns/maloka.pdf, p 2. Accessed 2 November 2009.
[82] Vale, P. & Maseko, S. "Thabo Mbeki, South Africa, and the idea of An African Renaissance, Thabo Mbeki's World- The Politics and Ideology of the South African President. Jacobs, S. & Calland, R. (Eds). Pietermaritzburg**,** University of Natal Press, 2002, p 125.

integrated and coherent policy programme which would provide a framework for African renewal vis-à-vis socio-economic development[83].

3. 3. From the African Renaissance to NEPAD

The initial thread in NEPAD's development came in early 2000 when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mandated Mbeki, former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to investigate how the continent could overcome its economic quagmire. Thus, in the course of collaboration among these leaders, the project became a 'debt mandate' to renegotiate the continent's debt overhang into a broader and more embracing economic recovery plan. As Ikome illustrates, the task of developing a workable plan for the continent was entrusted to South Africa, which explains why Mbeki became the prime mover of the Millennium Recovery Plan (MAP). Accordingly, the philosophical framework for MAP, which was provided by his notion of the African Renaissance, saw the entrenchment of democracy, human rights, good political and economic governance as the most urgent priorities, arguing these as the preconditions for achieving other development goals.[84]

The second thrust was the OMEGA Plan[85] proposed by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. By contrast, this plan identified the development of infrastructure and human resources as well as investment in agriculture as the most important elements of any renewal plan for the continent. It asserted that only after Africans freed themselves from the burden of investment would they have the resources to improve the quality of economic governance[86]. A third was the thread of the Compact for African Recovery initiated as a result of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) by the executive secretary K. Y. Amoako. The UNECA called for a 'Compact with Africa' in terms of which the developed countries would invest the necessary resources through aid,

[83] Bongmba, E. Op Cit, p 297.
[84] Ikome, F. From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa's Development: The Political economy of regional initiatives, Midrand, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), 2007, p 131.
[85] See: http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/Omega.pdf.
[86] Ikome, F. Op Cit, pp 131.

debt relief and market access to give African economies the jump-start needed for their take-off[87]. These three threads were drawn together into the New Africa Initiative (NAI) in 2001, due to the recognition that the plans had the same objective: socio-economic development. At a 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy, the plan presented by African leaders was welcomed and endorsed as the 'Genoa plan for Africa'.

3. 3.1. The New Partnership for Africa's Development

The G8 committed itself to forging a new partnership with Africa in order to address the continent's development issues. In October 2001, a decision was taken by African heads of states to rename the NAI to the New Partnership for Africa's Development as part of the G8's undertaking to forge a new partnership with Africa[88]. Proponents argued that the notion of partnership was both internal and external- first, between African governments and their peoples and, secondly, a partnership between Africa and the developed world[89].

The opening paragraph of the NEPAD document states:

> This *New Partnership for Africa's Development* is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world[90].

[87] Ibid, p 140.
[88] Vale, P. "Thabo Mbeki, South Africa, and the idea of An African Renaissance, Thabo Mbeki's World," in Politics and Ideology of the South African President. Jacobs, S. & Calland, R. (Eds). Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002, p 139.
[89] Ikome, F. Op Cit, p 134.
[90] _____ "The New Partnership for Africa's Development- NEPAD". October 2001. http://www.nepad.org/home/lang/en. Accessed 20 May 2009.

To this degree, NEPAD symbolises the visionary thinking of Africa's leadership on development:

> We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest[91].

Furthermore, its long-term objectives are to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; and to promote the role of women in all activities. More specifically, it aims to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of over 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years as well as ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Development Goals (IDGs), which are[92]:

- To reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015;
- To enroll all children of school age in primary schools by 2015;
- To make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2005;

[91] Paragraph 6.
[92] Paragraph 67.

- To reduce infant and child mortality ratios by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015;
- To reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015;
- To provide access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015;
- To implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005, to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015[93].

Within this general framework, the preconditions for Africa's development captured in five core principles embedded in the NEPAD initiative are:

- The focus on developing productive partnerships with the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations with the objective to improve aid relationships, delivery, and reporting systems.
- The principle of good governance which has been suggested to positively contribute to the achievement of growth and development
- The entrenchment of democracy, along with the complementary need to create a climate of peace and security
- The commitment to sound economic policy-making and maintenance of macroeconomic stability
- Promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration[94].

3.3.2. Evaluating NEPAD

At the core of NEPAD's implementation lies the concept of 'productive partnerships' in which massive injections of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the richer nations

[93] Paragraph 68.
[94] See NEPAD document. http://www.nepad.org/home/lang/en.

would provide the impetus for growth and development[95]. This has drawn criticisms from many commentators who are of the opinion that the alliances NEPAD seeks are the ones responsible for the pillage and plunder in which African states now find themselves. In other words, NEPAD ignores the history of Africa's relationship with these former colonial powers and the realities of the current economic globalisation, which continues to marginalise the continent through the exploitative structure of global capitalism[96]. According to this argument, to continue placing Africa at the mercy of the West will not lead to the socio-economic development NEPAD hopes to bring about, instead this high dependence on donour countries will perpetuate Africa's weakness and increase the power of foreign capital over African economies[97]. Thus, the above trend should not only dispose of the illusion that African countries need more FDI for their economic growth; it also illustrates how FDI inflows into the region expose the limitations of NEPAD.

While Nabudere states that African leaders are going on their knees to beg for investment by creating 'new' KNEEPADS, other analysts have simultaneously argued that NEPAD wears the emperor's new clothes[98]. This assertion is hinged upon the belief that its founding assumptions are based on neoliberal models of the Bretton Woods institutions, which have failed to lift Africa out of its socio-economic decline. These critics claim this presents an internal contradiction between NEPAD'S programmes and initiatives as well as with the continent's development challenges. Contrary to the NEPAD document and the development partners in whom the African leaders place their faith, countries that have liberalised and opened up their markets due to Western pressures have suffered, while those, which closed certain sectors of their economies such as the "Tigers" and

[95] Kamidza, R; Matlosa, K. & Mwanza, A. "The Role of the State in Development in the SADC Region: Does NEPAD Provide a New Paradigm?" Paper Prepared for the International Conference hosted jointly by Third World Network (TWN) and the Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) on "Africa and Development Challenges of the New Millennium", Accra, Ghana, 23 to 26 April 2002. http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/Nepad/matlosa.pdf, p 11. Accessed 3 November 2009.

[96] Nabudere, D. "Towards a New Model of Production- an Alternative to NEPAD." http://www.mpai.ac.ug/images/Against_Top_Down_NEPAD.pdf, p 2. Accessed 18 November 2009.

[97] Jahed, MI. &Kithatu, A. "NEPAD: A Brief five year review," in South African Yearbook of International Affairs (SAIIA) 2006/07. Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2007, p 203.

[98] Melber, H. "NEPAD, Africa and the wider world." Background Paper to a lecture at the African Studies Centre, Leiden/The Netherlands, ASC Seminar Series "Africa and its external relations" 14 October 2004. http://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/paper47565110.pdf, p 6. Accessed 3 November 2009.

China, have shown high levels of economic growth. Since their modernisation, the developed capitalist countries did not open their economies to free trade ’and ‘free competition, instead they engaged in agricultural and industrial protectionism which has meant that inefficient agricultural and industrial producers have not been subject to market pressures and discipline as demanded of weak African economies[99].

Furthermore, critics argued that the vast differences in economic fortunes and capabilities of African states are certain to accentuate the disproportionate distribution of NEPAD’s gains, especially in terms of regional integration[100]. Notwithstanding the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa is more stable and has the fastest growing economy in Africa; consequently, it would be more attractive to investors than other African regions. In addition, critics assumed there would be an asymmetrical distribution of the rewards of NEPAD among Southern African countries since South Africa was assumed to receive a lion’s share of investment. In this way, it was asserted that the unequal distribution of the gains from NEPAD would generate discontent among countries loosing out in FDI and overseas development assistance (ODA) and ultimately fragment the economies of the region, but more importantly compromise regional integration and the regional fraternity envisioned by NEPAD[101].

NEPAD argues that democracy and good governance are preconditions for development. It follows from the above that democracy should reduce the scope of conflict and make good government more likely[102]. In turn, good governance, conceived of as “a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development oriented”[103], should bring about the political stability, the institutional consolidation, and the operation of the rule of law, which are universally seen as the necessary frameworks for investments, which in

[99] Nabudere, D. Op Cit, p 4.
[100] Akokpari, J. “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa,” Nordic Journal of African Studies. Vol 13, No 3, 2004, p251.
[101] Kamidza, R; Matlosa, K, K. & Mwanza, A. Op Cit, p 13.
[102] Chabal, P. “The Quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: Is NEPAD the Answer?” International Affairs. Vol 78, No 3, July 2002, p 455.
[103]Akokpari, J. Op Cit, p249.

turn facilitate economic growth that provides the foundation for development[104]. However, as far as Chabal (2002) is concerned, democracy in its Western form is the outcome of, and not the precondition for, economic development. This point is amply demonstrated in the recent past in East Asia where an authoritarian, but effective state has driven economic growth with single-minded determination, in the process forcing local businessmen to invest in their own country. "It is only when the fruits of development have brought about improvements in the standards of living of the aspiring middle classes, which pressure for greater democracy"[105].

Following the above, the formulation and implementation of NEPAD were scarcely informed by debates, discussions, or even consultation with Africans, this not only exposed a major contradiction in NEPAD's stance on good governance, but also rendered the projects commitment to democracy highly suspicious[106]. As articulated by Nabudere, "it is not clear on what basis the African leaders are able to declare that the NEPAD constitutes a pledge based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction with their own people, when none of the 600 million people of the African continent were ever consulted about this 'new partnership"; in addition he argues that "this kind of leadership cannot claim to be democratic. Nor does its approach reflect any democratic values, which their societies aspire to. The approach still looks upon the African masses as objects of development for which solutions are worked out by the leaders, their foreign experts, and the "development partners"[107]. Drawing on Nabudere, Chabal claims that there is very little reason to believe that the nature of politics in Africa will change simply because of the ambition displayed by NEPAD[108]. Thus, the expectations that had been generated by the "new breed" of African leaders for democracy and economic reform had turned out to be "an illusion."[109]

[104] Chabal, P. Op Cit, p 455.
[105] Loc Cit.
[106] Akokpari, J. Op Cit, p 248.
[107] Nabudere, D. Op Cit, p 6.
[108] Chabal, P. Op Cit, p 448.
[109] Nabudere, D. Op Cit, p 6.

3.3. 3. The African Peer Review Mechanism

Despite the criticism leveled against NEPAD, other scholars have argued that its most innovative feature is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which introduced a fundamental change to governance in Africa. In particular, the countries that accede to the APRM make a commitment to open up their books for review and to drive this process themselves. It is for this reason most observers have often referred to the APRM as the one feature that makes NEPAD different when compared to previous initiatives and plans[110]. The APRM, a democratic institution in its own right, attempts at constructing 'public truth' through discussion amongst professional communities, administrative agencies, and the public. Thus, the main aim of the APRM is to encourage the adherence to adopted policies, principles and proposed practices that enhance economic growth and facilitate transitions to democracy, by identifying capacity gaps and proposing alternative courses of action. The review process, which is done under the auspices of the AU, focuses and tracks progress on four thematic areas: democracy and good governance, economic governance and management corporate governance and socio-economic development[111].

With reference to good political governance, African leaders reaffirmed their commitments to democracy and its core values through the enforcing of the following:

- The rule of law
- The equality of al citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual
- Individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity to the constitution

[110] Mashele, P. "The New Partnership in Africa's Development- Four Years of a Promising Attempt or Hollow Optimism," ISS Paper 125, March 2006, p 8.
[111] Chikwanha, A. "The APRM: A Case Study in democratic institution building." ISS Paper 152, October 2007, pp 1.

- Equality of opportunity for all
- Inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
- Adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments[112].

Secondly the APRM was established as an instrument to ensure that governments adhere to and fulfill the above commitments. According to the base document of the APRM, its primary purpose is to

> " foster the adoption of polices, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building"[113].

3.3. 3. 1. Challenges of the African Peer Review Mechanism

Many question the relationship between NEPAD and the peer review process of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) that is also under the auspices of the AU[114]. Although there is convergence between the objectives of the CSSDCA and NEPAD in the context of the AU, there are particular

[112] Declaration of Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance 2002: paragraph 7. http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/iss/pdfs/oau/DeclGovS235.pdf.
[113] APRM base document 2003: paragraph 3. http://aprm.krazyboyz.co.za/index.php?option=com_aprm_documents&Itemid=32&page=documents-category&cid=25&nid=25&id=25.
[114] Mathoho, M. "An African Peer Review Mechanism: a panacea for Africa's governance challenges?" Policy brief 29. http://www.uneca.org/itca/governance/Documents%5Cpolbrief29.pdf, p 4. Accessed 26 November 2009.

areas of overlap and possible duplication which leave room for ambiguity. The CSSDCA/AU peer review differs from the NEPAD peer review in that it enjoys the support of almost all 53 African states that are members of the AU and believe it is an African-owned programme independent on any external support or mandates, unlike the APRM. Moreover, numerous African leaders are opposed to NEPAD's APRM because the resources for its evolution depend heavily on wealthy nations outside the continent. They are wary that those who pledge and provide support to NEPAD will insist on attaching conditionalities for providing these resources. In essence, they fear that this could result in a donour dictated agenda – rather than an African negotiated agenda driving NEPAD[115].

Notwithstanding the fact that the findings and recommendations of the APRM are non-binding, and implementation not obligatory, there is also scepticism about how far African leaders are prepared to go to pressure their peers to develop a culture that will conform to the standards on good governance, and political and economic cooperation. In particular, critics believe the experience of Mbeki tolerating if not approving the Zimbabwean government's abuse of power came as a major blow to expectations of NEPAD and the APRM. This too reinforced the concern that the peer review exercises would generate into an 'old boys club' where dictators and authoritarian leaders were likely to perceive the APRM's aims and objectives as dangerous to their continued rule[116]. It is for these reasons, among others, that doubts persist about whether the APRM will achieve its objectives of maintaining standards of democracy and political governance. The challenge facing the APRM is that while the soft approach may be the correct strategy, this has done little to change the behaviour of poor leaders or bring them to implement policies that are in line with the APRM's values and principles[117].

Given the challenges confronting the APRM, one can concede that the APRM is indeed a decisive instrument in promoting political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development and accelerated continental economic integration. It came as a

[115] Ibid, p 5.
[116] Ibid, p 10.
[117] Mukamunana, R. Op Cit. p 26

response to governance challenges and problems the continent has experienced since independence and the consequent political instability and poor economic performance. In this context, the APRM is a learning tool through which participating countries can discuss, negotiate, and strategise with their peers about governance and policy orientations[118]. What is more, it gives African civil society the opportunity to evaluate the performance of the governments but also be apart of the policy-making process. This is essential for the consolidation of democratic governance in Africa. Figure 1 illustrates the member states that have acceded to the APRM. Given that submitting to peer review is voluntary, this is indeed a promising indicator that despite the various critiques leveled against the development framework, many of the continent's leaders are in earnest committing to the proposed principles of democracy and good governance[119].

Figure 1: List of African Countries that have acceded to the APRM[120].

Country	**Date of Accession**
Algeria	9 March 2003
Burkino Faso	9 March 2003
Republic of Congo	9 March 2003
Ethiopia	9 March 2003
Ghana	9 March 2003
Kenya	9 March 2003
Cameroon	3 April 2003
Gabon	14 April 2003
Mali	28 May 2003
Mauritius	9 March 2004
Mozambique	9 March 2004
Nigeria	9 March 2004
Rwanda	9 March 2004

[118] Ibid, p 248.
[119] Jahed, MI. &Kithatu, A. Op Cit, p 204.
[120] _____ "Status of Countries." http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp. Accessed 2 November 2009.

Senegal	9 March 2004
South Africa	9 March 2004
Uganda	9 March 2004
Egypt	9 March 2004
Benin	31 March 2003
Malawi	8 July 2004
Lesotho	8 July 2004
Tanzania	8 July 2004
Angola	8 July 2004
Sierra Leone	8 July 2004
Sudan	22 January 2006
Zambia	22 January 2006
Sao Tome	29 January 2007
Principe	29 January 2007
Djibouti	29 July 2007
Mauritania	30 January 2008
Togo	1 July 2008

3.3. 3. 2. The Country Review Report

The process of peer review started in 6 countries namely, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, and Benin. Ghana, Rwanda and Kenya accepted the findings of the APRM report and were in the process of implementing the recommendations of the Country Review Report (CRR), which stated that the largest political and governance problems in the countries was the lack of constitutionalism[121]. In general, constitutionalism refers to a system in which laws restrict governmental powers or at least demarcate its parameters. In many African states, formal and informal systems co-

[121] Turianskyi, Y. "Common African Political Governance Issues: Lessons from six early APRM reports." South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper No 28: Governance and APRM Programme, March 2009.
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/saia_sop_28_turianskyi_20090330_en.pdf, p 17. Accessed 3 November 2009.

exist, manifesting themselves in corruption, lack of accountability, and disregard for the rule of law, nepotism, and authoritarianism. To prevent abuse, a strict system is needed, supported by checks and balances. This is achieved when government is separated into distinct spheres of the executive, legislature, and judiciary, to ensure the separation of powers. The CRR suggested that while these states provided for the separation of powers in their constitutions, these provisions do not necessarily materialise into practice[122].

Mbeki indicated the South Africa's CRR was insightful and commended the Panel of Eminent Persons for their hard work and dedication to the African Peer Review (APR) process. However, he disagreed with some of the statistical underpinnings related to crime, floor-crossing and xenophobia, suggesting the statistics were generated from a weak information base. In particular, he disagreed with the contextualisation of poverty and inequality in paragraph 697 that states "Real per capita income decreased and past socio-economic inequalities have largely remained unchanged[123]". While the nature of poverty and the manner within which it was constructed led some to assume that economic policy making failed, Mbeki admitted that given.

> It is not possible to solve problems that have accumulated over 350 years in the mere 13 years of our democracy. Claims that have been made that this is possible, and that we could have solved the socio-economic problems we inherited, during the short years of our democracy, are obviously incorrect[124].

In other words, the president was arguing that the findings of the APRM ignored South Africa's historical background and overlooked some of the corrective initiatives taking place in the country. Subsequently, his response was misinterpreted as an outright rejection of the CRR and an attempt to discredit the APRM initiative. To some it was particularly unacceptable and disheartening, given his leadership role on the continent

[122] Ibid, pp 3.
[123] South Africa Country Review Report 5. http://www.aprm.org.za/docs/SACountryReviewReport5.pdf. Accessed 2 November 2009.
[124] Address of the President of the African National Congress, Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening Session of the ANC Policy Conference 27 June 2007. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2007/tm0627.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.

and his veneration as the 'last great hope for Africa'[125]. However, in raising concern around the Panel's findings, Mbeki emphasised that the concerns were raised in the spirit of peer review and genuine debate and dialogue in order to strengthen the process[126].

3.4. NEPAD and Foreign Policy in the Mbeki presidency

In his 'State of the Nation' address in February 2007, then President Mbeki reiterated South Africa's commitment to consolidating peace, democracy, and development in Africa and strengthening the peacemaking abilities of continental institutions[127]. The ideological and national agenda driving Mbeki's Africa Policy was the concept of an 'African destiny', as well as the belief that the country's future is inextricably linked to that of the rest of Africa. In essence, Pretoria's engagement in Africa was driven by motives that were complex; ranging from the aspirational, including its desire to export lessons of its own political settlement and transition from apartheid to democracy, to concerns that were more pragmatic, premised on the belief that conflicts in other states could imperil South Africa's own stability and interests. According to Gelb, these considerations helped shape South Africa's policy towards Africa in the sense that it was premised upon promoting better governance across the continent[128]. While NEPAD promoted African-led solutions to the lack of development on the continent, it also influenced Thabo Mbeki's domestic programme at the time.

Mbeki's national agenda sought to redress the imbalances of development and the capacity gaps created by decades of apartheid rule and reintegrate South Africa into the world economy[129]. In addition to the promotion of effective regional integration, South

[125] Motsi, I. "South Africa's Rejection to the APRM Report: Integrity of the APRM in jeopardy?" in Centre for International Political Studies (CIPS). No 33, 2007, http://www.cips.up.ac.za/files/pdf/ebriefing/33-2007_South_Africas_Reaction_to_the_APRM_Report_-_Integrity_of_the_APRM_in_Jeopardy_by_Immaculate_Motsi.pdf p1. Accessed 2 November 2009
[126] President Mbeki responds to the APRM Country Review Report- Statement from the Office of the Presidency, 4 July 2007, http://www.dfa.gove.docs.2007.aprm0705.htm. Accessed 3 November 2009.
[127] Cited in Kagwanja, P. Op Cit, p1.
[128] Gelb, S. Op Cit, p 24.
[129] Ijeoma, E. Op Cit, pp 151.

Africa's national interest centred on the correct responses to the processes of globalisation and addressing its fundamental challenges which included poverty, underdevelopment, and the ever increasing gap between the developed North and developing South[130]. In that regard, his government stressed the necessity for South Africa to reposition itself as a bridge between the South and the North to extract commitments from the North that would accelerate the development and economic growth of Africa and the South. On the basis of being Africa's new growth engine, it was assumed that the onus was on South Africa to mobilise support and the necessary leadership required for the global initiative. Subsequently, academic and policy debates regarding South Africa's role in Africa centred on its role as a regional hegemon.

This debate as discussed by Kagwanja (2009) is founded upon three main premises. The first premise asserts that since South Africa has a huge moral capital deriving from the lessons of its own political transition, it should use this moral power to exert its influence and bring about positive change in those parts of Africa involved in conflict. The second centres on South Africa's comparative military and economic power. In making this point, Kagwanja illustrates that South Africa is possibly, the one country that could provide the engine to pull Africa out of its mire of poverty and desperation. The third premise, derived from selective reading of South Africa's past, asserts that it has always been a hegemonic power. Examples cited of its exercise of hegemony include its use of economic power to pursue narrow self interests in Africa, illustrated by its invasion of Lesotho in 1998, viewed by some as an apartheid-style display of brute force[131]. The hegemony thesis is refuted by analysts who suggest that the Mbeki administration attempted to ensure a far more systematic and holistic approach to Africa, enabling collective action in achieving common goals[132].

An almost similar representation is held by those who argue that while the South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests of profit, market share and the elimination of competition, the South African government is driven by a policy that

[130] Loc Cit.
[131] Kagwanja, P. Op Cit, p 2.
[132] Kagwanja, P. Op Cit, p 3.

reflects the interests of the continent. This conception, as perceived by Lesufi, suffers from a degree of abstractness and detachment from reality[133]. Accordingly, the South African state is "continuing the role of providing a conductive climate for capital accumulation by ensuring that the general economic and technical conditions for accumulation are extended to the rest of the continent." In other words, the South African state has acted in the interests of capital by embracing NEPAD and its neoliberal principles. In this way, profitability is the central organising principle governing its development projects on the continent. Through NEPAD, "the South African state is facilitating the privatisation of state-owned assets, deregulation of various markets as well as the intensification of exploitation on the African continent"[134].

Another perspective is put forward to highlight that South Africa's peace initiatives have focused on resource rich countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and the Ivory Coast where its capital stands to gain very lucrative deals, most notably mining and infrastructure deals[135]. Hattingh accounts for "business executives who accompanied Thabo Mbeki to the DRC in one of his peace missions in 2004, during which a landmark investment deal was signed between the government and a number of South African corporations"[136]. While this analysis ignores that Africa's conflict have been characterised by the resource curse and that peacekeeping and mediation would have to deal with the structural causes of these wars, it does highlight the perceptions that prevail among scholars, practitioners, and civil society actors which are difficult to justify. The fact that specific countries provide the leadership for these initiatives does not imply that they are pursuing a narrow set of interests at the expense of others. Examples suggest similar behaviour in France and Germany which provided strong leadership in the establishment and consolidation of the European Union (EU)[137].

[133] Lesufi, I. Op Cit, p 824.
[134] Ibid, p 827.
[135] Hattingh, S. Op Cit, p 8.
[136] Loc Cit.
[137] Mukamunana, R. Op Cit p 243.

3.5. Conclusion

Notwithstanding these contentions, Mbeki's administration rejected hegemonic ambitions and instead pursued multilateralism in its deliberations with the continent. This approach to African diplomacy points to his awareness of the need for collective action by African leadership to address development on the continent. At a youth forum in 2001 he asserted that NEPAD:

> "Reinforces the process by which the African continent would be able to act together to solve the problems and to respond to the challenges that the continent faces with regard specifically to the matters of poverty and underdevelopment"[138].

NEPAD and the APRM are positive developments as they provide African leaders the potential to directly succeed in fundamentally improving the quality of African governance[139]. According to Taylor, NEPAD's objectives are two-fold; firstly it is about changing the status quo in Africa, and secondly about asking hard questions about African institutions. What is more, NEPAD is also indicative of a constructive development for the continent, rather than continuing to point the blame for the continents social, economic and political ills at the colonial legacy or on a philosophy underpinned by dependency, these leaders engaged the developed world, arguing for a partnership where Africa promises to deliver good governance, while the North promises to deliver greater aid, debt relief and market access. It is for these reasons that it is an important development beyond African borders[140]. Its genesis from the vision of an African Renaissance to a policy paradigm indicates that transformative leadership is essential to the implementation and adoption of a comprehensive policy reform in Africa.

[138] Mbeki, T. Op Cit, p 169.
[139] Gelb, S. Op Cit, p 36.
[140] Taylor, I. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development and the Global Political Economy: Towards the African Century or Another False Start?" http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/Nepad/taylor.pdf, p 4. Accessed 3 November 2009.

Similarly, Mbeki's articulation of a visionary framework of the African Renaissance and his part in the presentation of NEPAD indicates his transformative leadership. In the next chapter, Mbeki's leadership will be analysed in depth in an effort to understand how the principles of the African Renaissance and NEPAD informed his presidential tenure.

CHAPTER FOUR:

A captain has from time to time to be prepared to take an unpopular line. He must have a measure of independence. He cannot *always* be 'one of the boys'. He will have to criticise individuals, or even the whole group, and say things, or insist on activities, that they do not like. He will have to be able to drop senior players from the team. Nevertheless, he must be able to engage with his players, to communicate with them. He cannot keep a glacial distance. Nor is it likely that any captain will be able to keep his team enthusiastic if he is positively and widely disliked by them.

Stephen Gelb, October 2001

4. The Mbeki Legacy

4.1 Introduction

Thabo Mbeki is considered one of the most important leaders of his generation[141] as he articulated vision that embraced the values and principles indicative of a transformative developmental agenda. Like Mbeki, effective transformational leaders are "able to evoke powerful declarations of independence, revolutionary proclamations, momentous statements that go to the core meaning of events and define what is at stake when countries confront the possibilities and threats of great change"[142]. While this research has recognised that the ability to formulate a vision is a requirement of a transformative leader, research conducted by Botha (2004) has argued that it is not enough for leaders to have just a vision; a leader has to translate this vision into reality. In order to translate a vision into reality, it is necessary that leaders have the capacity to apply their attributes in order to be effective and achieve desired goals. Thus, leaders need commitment, perseverance, and courage to face the challenges of taking prudent risks and be willing to put their reputations on line[143]. It is against this criterion that leadership behaviour and styles of leaders, such as Mbeki are measured.

Scholarly and media debates regarding Mbeki's leadership style have often concentrated on his personality describing him as ambiguous, opaque, and manipulative[144]. Added to

[141] Jacobs, S. & Calland, R. (Eds) "Thabo Mbeki: Myth and Context," Thabo Mbeki's World- The Politics and Ideology of the South African President. Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002, p 1.
[142] Botha, H. "An Investigation into the Effectiveness of Leadership in the Administration of HIV/AIDS" Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor in the Department of Business Management at North-West University. October 2004. http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/10394/2378/1/botha_hendrikj.pdf, p 202. Accessed 14 December 2009.
[143] Ibid, p 170.
[144] Ryklief, S. "Does the Emperor really have no clothes? Thabo Mbeki and Ideology," Thabo Mbeki's World- The Politics and Ideology of the South African President. Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, South Africa, 2002, p 105.

that, a range of analysts represented him as "a cruel and retrogressive African nationalist shaped by the need for political power to the exclusion of the interest of those whom he regards as enemies"[145]. In this view, Mbeki was an irrational leader who created the world around him through his personality attributes of manipulation and manoeuvring. While such simplifications and generalisations try to outline Mbeki's leadership style, excessive emphasis on Mbeki's personality does not offer an opportunity to pursue an insightful analysis of his leadership style[146]. In order to fully comprehend Mbeki's leadership, this study locates his leadership in relation to an understanding of the contextual conditions, which have shaped his leadership. As observed in chapter two, the Contingency theory suggests that the scope of activities of leadership is directly conditioned by the environment. Leadership must therefore be explained in relation to an understanding of the context as changes to the environment have an impact on leadership, which itself has to adapt to the situation.

Mbeki's leadership can be understood in relation to institutional tradition of the African National Congress (ANC) struggle against white colonial oppression and its success in achieving democracy in South Africa in 1994. Similarly, Mbeki's African nationalist impulses seen in his notion of the African Renaissance were a response to post-independent Africa's political, economic, and social legacies. The purpose of this chapter is to reflect and discuss Mbeki's legacy as a transformative leader, in doing so, the chapter will argue that his leadership was informed by his vision of the African Renaissance and his quest for African Renewal.

4.2 Mbeki's Social Legacy

Until 2002, when Mbeki formally distanced himself from the AIDS dissidents, his statements regarding the AIDS pandemic, vis-à-vis poverty and nutrition as a cause of immune deficiency and on the dangers of anti- retro viral (ARVs), together with

[145] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, p 71.
[146] Mathekga, R. "The ANC 'Leadership Crisis' and the Age of Populism in Post-apartheid South Africa," African Politics: beyond the third wave of democracy. Pretorius, J. (Ed) Cape Town, Juta, and Company Ltd, 2008, pp 134.

government stalling on the roll-out of Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV, caused widespread disbelief, confusion and outrage[147]. The contention was framed around Mbeki's questioning of the science of AIDS and his support for AIDS denialists who contested the significance of HIV as a necessary cause of AIDS, suggesting, "AIDS merely represented the effects of the opportunistic diseases such as tuberculosis (TB); primarily the consequence of poverty" [148]. That is to say that, the spread of HIV/AIDS is a product of poverty and its offspring, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of medical care and despair, which made people more vulnerable to the chances of contracting HIV/AIDS. More generally, AIDS dissidents maintained that anti-retro viral (ARVs) drugs used to defend the immune system and to prevent transmission of the virus were highly toxic, and promoted the symptoms associated with AIDS[149].

Following the above, the former Health Minister, Dr. Manto Tshabalala- Msimang drew criticism when she advised people with AIDS to preserve their health with a diet of garlic, lemon, African potato and beetroot as opposed to AZT drugs[150]. Against this background, Mbeki raised a range of questions about drug safety and about the role of co-factors such as nutrition and poverty in the manifestation of the disease, among them:

- How a virus can cause a syndrome?
- What it means to be living with HIV/AIDS and what responsibilities government has to citizens with HIV/AIDS
- Why is HIV/AIDS in sub- Saharan Africa heterosexually transmitted while in the Western world it is said to be largely homosexually transmitted[151]?

[147] Fassin, D. & Schneider, H. "The Politics of AIDS in South Africa: Beyond the Controversies," British Medical Journal. Vol 326, No 7387, March 2003, p 495.
[148] Poku, N. "Poverty, Debt, and Africa's HIV Crisis," International Affairs. Vol 78, No 3, 2002, p 534.
[149] Lodge, T. Op Cit, p 255.
[150] Gumede, W. Op Cit, p 210.
[151] Cullinan, K. "Dissident President? Thabo Mbeki, Critical discourse analysis and the struggle to define HIV and AIDS in South Africa 1998-2003." Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Masters in Arts in Culture, Communication and Media Studies, Durban 2003. http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za/docs/Cullinan.pdf, pp 4. Accessed 15 December 2009.

It ought to be clear from the above that Mbeki's policy on HIV/AIDS was based on the premise that HIV causes AIDS[152]. This view is evident in his address to the International AIDS Conference in Durban 2000, when he acknowledged:

> "We remain convinced of the need for us to better understand the essence of what would constitute a comprehensive response in a context such as ours which is characterised by the high levels of poverty and disease"[153].

4.2.1 Mbeki's Response to HIV/AIDS

Scholars and activists alike engaged in debates that tried to explain Mbeki's apparent embrace of the dissident doctrines. One strand, as suggested by Natrass[154], followed Gumede's view that the strength of his personal beliefs was important. Gumede describes Mbeki as an intellectual at heart who was sincere in his support for the 'dissident' position: "He stoically believes that he is a modern-day Copernicus who will ultimately be vindicated, even if posthumously"[155]. Alternative explanations addressed the issue by going as far as suggesting that "Mbeki's hypersensitivity to criticism, especially where he believes there is a racist dimension to the comment, and his suspicions, concerning the pharmaceutical industry, the media, and conspiracies aimed at him and his government, made it particularly difficult for him to deal effectively with AIDS". Moreover, "As time passes, Mbeki comes more and more to bear the hallmarks of the classic tragic hero, a man so driven by a vision that, combined with a fatal dose of hubris, he is unable to heed the warnings all around him, and destroys himself"[156].

[152] Roberts, R. Fit to Govern- the Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki. Johannesburg, Science, Technology, Education (STE) Publishers, 2007, p 180.
[153] Mbeki, T. Op Cit, p 52.
[154] Natrass, N. "AIDS Policy in Post Apartheid South Africa." July 2005. http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/apartheid/apartheid_part1/nattrass.pdf, p 8. Accessed 18 December 2009.
[155] Gumede, W. Op Cit, p 198.
[156] Van der Vliet, V. cited in Natrass, N. Op Cit, p 10.

Other analysts adopted a less psychological perspective, pointing instead to a different set of explanations when examining how Mbeki responded to HIV/AIDS. For example Cullinan (2003) based her argument on Contingency theories suggesting that the context is particularly important, both in terms of South Africa's new democracy and in terms of the promotion of the African Renaissance as a key theme of Mbeki's government[157]. On that basis, others have maintained that, as a visionary leader, championing the cause of African rebirth, Mbeki sought to recast the image of Africa in positive terms, and to strengthen Africa's capacity to address its own problems. Thus, as Natrass (2005) accurately demonstrates, the conventional approach to AIDS would have undermined Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' in two ways[158]. Firstly by appearing to judge Africans negatively for the fact that AIDS spread so rapidly and pointing to the African origins of the AIDS epidemic and to the sexual promiscuity that underpinned its spread. In consequence, Mbeki's denialism, defined as a persistent refusal to acknowledge mounting empirical evidence[159] was indeed a response to the discourse around African sexuality as inherently diseased. In other words, it represented a reaction to racist ideas about Africans and AIDS.[160]

An example of Mbeki's reaction to the conventional view to HIV/AIDS came in an address at the Inaugural Z.K. Matthews Memorial Lecture at the University of Fort Hare when he stated unequivocally:

> "And thus does it happen that others who consider themselves to be our leaders take to the streets carrying their placards, to demand that because we are germ carriers, and human beings of a lower order that cannot subject its passions to reason, we must perforce adopt strange opinions, to save a depraved and diseased people from perishing from self-inflicted disease.

[157] Cullinan, K. Op Cit, p 7.
[158] Natrass, N. Op Cit, p 12.
[159] Pottinger, B. The Mbeki Legacy. Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2008, pp 62.
[160] Cullinan, K. Op Cit, pp 1.

> Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust"[161].

Secondly, by adopting the conventional approach to AIDS, Mbeki would have placed Africa in the demeaning position of having to rely on Western biomedical advances, to combat the pandemic[162]. Accordingly, Mbeki rejected Western science because he not only believed it was racist but that it is impossible to ascribe Western experiences on African reality. For instance Mbeki wrote to the world leaders in April 2000 and argued, "It is obvious that whatever lessons we have to and may draw from the West about the grave issues of HIV/AIDS, would be absurd and illogical"[163]. Consequently, an attempt at finding African solutions for African problems was Virodene, a chemical treatment affiliated with researchers from Pretoria University, who claimed that it reversed the terminal cases of AIDS. However, it was later shown by an independent panel that Virodene contained dimethylformadide, a toxic industrial solvent used in dry cleaning. It is possible to suggest, as Cullinan does that the Virodene incident which alerted Mbeki to the potential toxicity of drugs in general and HIV treatments in particular, could have led him to question the role of pharmaceutical companies in addressing HIV/AIDS, and this too could have led him to consider the theories propagated by AIDS dissidents[164].

Needless to say, reactions to Mbeki's views hardened into resistance campaigns involving lobbying, protest marches led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which was supported by a wide-range of civil society organisations, most notably Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), religious organisations, health professionals, and HIV/AIDS scientists backed by international organisations such as

[161] Address by President Thabo Mbeki at the Inaugural Z.K. Matthews Memorial Lecture. University of Fort Hare, 12 October 2001. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/Mbeki/2001/tm1012.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.
[162] Natrass, N. Op Cit, p 12.
[163] Letter by President Mbeki to World Leaders on AIDS in Africa. April 2000 http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/mbeki.shtml. Accessed 14 December 2009.
[164] Cullinan, K. Op Cit, p82.

Oxfam and others[165]. Faced with growing internal dissention and a civil disobedience, the cabinet announced in October 2003 that the government would be rolling out highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) in the public health sector. One month after the Cabinet decision on antiretroviral treatment, the government released its 'Operational Plan' to have 54,004 people on treatment by March 2004. However, it was only from late 2004 and into 2005 that the rollout gathered pace[166]. Since then, like many other developing countries, South Africa has increasingly channelled funds into AIDS programmes albeit at the cost of poverty alleviation and development[167].

It is widely acknowledged that HIV/AIDS increasingly threatens the foundations of human and economic development, by undermining health, education, life expectancies, and standards of living of many South Africans[168]. Losses already recorded on all these fronts make the pandemic a catastrophe that has an unprecedented impact on the economy and society because it kills adults in the prime of their working and parenting lives. Since 2000, HIV/AIDS has been responsible for over 50 per cent of deaths among 15 to 49 year olds[169]. By the same estimates, the disease threatens to eliminate 20 per cent of the workforce in the most affected regions of South Africa. However, the challenge lies in how to achieve an effective response to the pandemic under conditions where it is destructive to the capacities essential for the response, namely, killing the most economically productive members of the continents people[170]. While calls for responsive leadership that generates policy responses to HIV/AIDS are well founded, there is yet little evidence that ARV treatment programmes run by governments automatically lead to reduced HIV infection rates, as illustrated in Figure 2[171].

[165] Cullinan, K. Op Cit, p 69.
[166] Natrass, N. Op Cit, p 15.
[167] Gumede, W. Op Cit, p 210.
[168] Boone, C. & Batsell, J. "Politics, AIDS in Africa: Research Agendas in Political Science and International Relations," Africa Today. Vol 48, No 2, 2001, p 4.
[169] South Africa is the country with the largest number of infections in the world, with an estimated 5.5 million [4.9 million– 6.1 million] people living with HIV. UNAIDS. "Sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS epidemic update Regional Summary." March 2008, p 3. http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/JC1526_epibriefs_subsaharanafrica_en.pdf. Accessed 14 December 2009.
[170] Poku, N. Op Cit, p 546.
[171] Roberts, R. Op Cit, p 182.




Figure 2: National HIV prevalence trends among antenatal clinic attendees, South Africa, 1990 to 2007[172].

Be that as it may, the failure of Mbeki and his team to embrace the conventional approach to AIDS and his so called identification with dissident science undermined his leadership and stood as one of the blackest marks against his presidency[173]. For the most part, it can be argued that Mbeki's inquiry into these alternative theories simply sought to include in the debate voices that the AIDS drug- fundamentalists disliked, defamed, and would rather have excluded from discourse on a major matter of public policy in a democracy. As maintained by Mathebe "like all pragmatists, he did not believe in the 'dominant' views, subsequently, he was motivated to seek new insights on the epidemic"[174]. Nonetheless, Mbeki's sin was to reject a drug-based intellectual protectionism in favour of free exchange of ideas on the proper solution to the AIDS pandemic. Unfortunately, when scholars, practitioners, and analysts alike assess Mbeki's social legacy, it is likely that they will ignore the fact that Mbeki's leadership fostered debate to ensure policy rogour. Simply put,

[172] National Department of Health "Report: The National HIV and Syphilis Prevalence Survey South Africa 2008." September 2008, p 6. http://www.health-e.org.za/uploaded/7226d25d7b9991b253f9c5487fed196b.pdf.Accessed 14 December 2009.
[173] Lodge, T. Op Cit, p 255.
[174] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, p 176.

they will ignore the fact that Mbeki's approach to HIV/AIDS was not only good governance, but that it also embraced democratic policy formulation[175].

4.3 Mbeki's Political Legacy

After HIV/AIDS, few issues provoked much controversy for Thabo Mbeki as his approach to the embattled regime of President Robert Mugabe[176]. For most observers, Mbeki's Zimbabwe approach seemed to contradict the essence of the African Renaissance, which charged,

> "We must rebel against the tyrants and dictators, those who seek to corrupt our societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people"[177].

Instead of a move forward into new forms of politics, the Zimbabwe crisis highlighted the reversion of the sort of politics which the concept condemned[178]. In essence, it was assumed that by backing the regime, Mbeki compromised the goals of his vision for continental renewal. Following Mathebe, this section argues that Mbeki's mobilisation of power or the public condemnation of Mugabe could not have achieved the maintenance of the rule-of-law and the preservation of human rights in Zimbabwe because such an approach would not maintain long-lasting peace and stability in Southern Africa[179].

4.3.1 The leadership deficit in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's economic crisis started because of macroeconomic mismanagement and a corrupt clientelistic system, which led to the collapse of the economy in November

[175] Roberts, R. Op Cit, p 195.
[176] Freeman, L. "South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy: Unraveling the Contradiction," Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies. Vol 23, No 2, May 2005, p 147.
[177] Mbeki, T. Op Cit, p 300.
[178] Freeman, L. Op Cit, p 166.
[179] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, pp 178.

1997[180] and in turn stimulated the rise of a political opposition Party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai. The opposition won a first victory over the governing Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party when the new constitution, intended to extend President Mugabe's powers, was rejected in a February 2000 referendum. As Mugabe's resource base was considerably weakened, he was no longer able to mobilise political support in his neo-patrimonial system of governance, subsequently turned to undemocratic, illegal, and increasingly violent means to preserve power. With the help of the "war veterans", Mugabe started a land reform programme aimed at reallocating land owned by white farmers to black peasants. Undoubtedly, the violent land reform and the breakdown of democracy and of the rule of law exacerbated the economic and political crisis[181].

The British government, Zimbabwe's former settler colony, reacted by imposing smart sanctions on the inner circle of Mugabe's regime. However, this move did little to deter Mugabe and his war veterans as they went a step further by invading more than 40 white owned farms in May 2000[182]. Subsequently, Mugabe was criticised by the West and the MDC who argued that the questions of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law were central to the crisis 'in which the country is foundering'. In their view, the land reform on which government embarked was less an attempt to right the historical wrongs than an opportunistic attempt to regain popular favour and maintain political power in the most serious challenge to its power[183]. Despite the failure of their own response to the crisis, the West turned their attention to South Africa, the direct neighbour and regional leader, which it viewed as the key to the crisis. However, unlike the West, President Mbeki did not apply sanctions against Zimbabwe, but instead chose a strategy of constructive engagement[184].

[180] Adelmann, M. "Quiet Diplomacy: The Reasons behind Mbeki's Zimbabwe Policy," Africa Spectrum, Vol 39, No 2, 2004, p 250.
[181] Loc Cit.
[182] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, p 178.
[183] Freeman, L. Op Cit, pp 148.
[184] Adelmann, M. Op Cit, p 251.

4.3. 2 Mbeki's Policy towards Zimbabwe

Mbeki reacted to the land crisis by posing himself as a non-partisan dealmaker. He undertook the task of engaging the British authorities and Mugabe in a series of behind-the-scenes diplomatic talks[185]. In his view, the objective of solving the problem needed to be pursued in a way that would encourage the maintenance of peace and stability in Zimbabwe and the Southern African region. He also engaged regional leaders such as Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae of Botswana and Sam Nujoma of Namibia in an effort to ensure Mugabe would honour his own undertakings that there would be free and fair elections in 2002. As Mathebe indicates, because the nature of diplomacy is a secretive exercise, his private engagements with Britain, Zimbabwe and other African leaders never entered into the public domain. As a result, an impression was created that Mbeki was remaining silent in the face of Mugabe's brutality and his flouting of the rule of law. Mbeki's policy towards Zimbabwe, referred to as 'quiet diplomacy', was severely criticised as some suggested it gave the general impression of acquiescence[186].

Following the above, the first cluster of arguments evolved around the line that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy was just a fig-leave for his support of Mugabe - silent diplomacy as silent approval[187]. This criticism falls in line with similar arguments that the ANC's pledge to democracy and good governance was only lip service. In a stronger version of this argument, the ANC was accused of ideologically supporting Mugabe's undemocratic policies as a future model for South Africa impending Land Reform Programme. A second, weaker version claimed "Mbeki's manner of dealing with Mugabe stemmed from his ill-judged aversion to support any criticisms of a fellow African head-of state, for fear

[185] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, pp 180.
[186] Graham, V. "How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999-2006," African Security Review. Vol 15, No 4, 2006, pp 116.
[187] Adelmann, M. Op Cit, p 251.

of being seen to side with the racist Western viewpoints"[188]. A third assumption linked to the second was put forward to suggest that Mbeki was bound to Mugabe by history and the liberation struggle. While it is true that the ANC and ZANU-PF fought for liberation, the claim of "blood chains" between the respective governments is not only weak but is also empirically invalid, because Mugabe did not fight the liberation struggle as an ally of the ANC, which was historically closer to Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of the late Joshua Nkomo[189].

In response to the criticism against its constructive approach to Zimbabwe, Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma insisted that quiet diplomacy was an inherently African form of foreign relations, suggesting, "If your neighbour's house is on fire, you don't slap the child who started it. You help them put out the fire. This is the African way"[190]. Added to that the president asserted:

> Our own experience as a movement tells us unequivocally, that no lasting solution to the challenges that face Zimbabwe can be found, unless that solution comes from the people of Zimbabwe themselves. It tells us that no Zimbabweans with any pride in their country, and respect for themselves, will accept that another should determine their destiny.
>
> We remain convinced that the people of Zimbabwe must decide their future, together with their entire leadership. For our part, we will never treat Zimbabwe as the tenth province of South Africa[191].

By 2005, the situation deteriorated into a further crisis when parliamentary elections in which Mugabe's ZANU-PF won, took place against a background of human rights violations, political repression, and growing economic hardship. Due to widespread voter intimidation, the MDC dismissed the election as fraudulent, citing political manipulation

[188] Pottinger, B. Op Cit, p 63.
[189] Robert, R. Op Cit, p 172.
[190] Citied in Graham, V. Op Cit, p 120.
[191] Mbeki, T. "The people of Zimbabwe must decide their own future," ANC Today. Vol 3, No 18, May 2003.

of electoral results. In 2007, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandated Mbeki to mediate between the competing factions in Zimbabwe to hold the 2008 elections in conditions of reasonable fairness. After the 2008 presidential elections, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai secured a 47.9 per cent against 43.2 per cent for Mugabe[192]. As a result of being weakened, Mugabe and his hard-line supporters launched a country wide campaign of violence and intimidation, warranting a run-off. Amid the violence and intimidation as well as human rights violations, the MDC was forced to withdraw from the presidential run-off elections. Subsequently, Mugabe declared victory.

By late July 2008, Mbeki negotiated between the parties with the aim of brokering a transitional power sharing agreement, the aim of which was to establish a Government of National Unity (GNU)[193]. In September of the same year, the two parties signed an agreement officially known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which was meant to address governance and leadership crisis in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the question of establishing political stability in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa had been one of the central concerns of Mbeki's leadership and his presidency[194]. He was aware that the preservation of the rule-of- law and human rights in Africa was among the high-ranking goals of the African renaissance. As maintained by Mathebe, the former president believed that if this goal was to have any practical significance, it ought to address peace, security, and stability in the region. For that reason, Mbeki's engagement with Mugabe hinged on the idea that "the means towards security and development in the region were to be sought through negotiation and diplomatic dialogue"[195].

4.4 Mbeki's Economic Legacy

In 1994 the Mandela-led government adopted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an integrated policy platform centred on a vision and framework for

[192] International Crisis Group "Zimbabwe". http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1233. Accessed 4 January 2010
[193] Pottinger, B. Op Cit, p 307.
[194] Mathebe, L. Op Cit, pp 182.
[195] Ibid, pp 184.

democratic transformation of the economy and society[196]. However by 1995, disappointment arose about the RDP's growth and employment impact and government came to the view that a macroeconomic stimulus was necessary. As such in June 1996, RDP was superseded by the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, in which Mbeki was the principle author. Essentially, the GEAR policy was a conservative, macroeconomic plan that aimed to reduce the budget deficit, increase growth rates, lower inflation, reduce trade tariffs, stabilise the currency and create jobs. Like RDP it also represented the fundamental restructuring of the economy to eliminate its conspicuous pro-white and pro-rich orientation, and to restructure it in such a way that its orientation could become pro-black and pro-poor[197]. As Deputy President, Mbeki observed:

> "South Africa is a country of two nations.
>
> One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication, and other infrastructure. Members of this nation have the possibility to exercise their right to equal opportunity, the development opportunities to which the Constitution of 1993 committed our country.
>
> The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication, and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity, with that right being equal within this black nation only to the extent that it is equally incapable of realisation.

[196] Padaychee, V. "The South African Economy in 1994-2004," Social Research. Vol 72, No 3, 2005, p 553.
[197] Terreblanche, S. "The Developmental state in South Africa: the Difficult road ahead," State of the Nation- South Africa 2008. Kagwanja, P. & Kondo, K. (Eds) Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council Press (HSRC), 2009, p 107.

> This reality of two nations, underwritten by the perpetuation of the racial, gender and spatial disparities born of a very long period of colonial and apartheid white minority domination, constitutes the material base which reinforces the notion that, indeed, we are not one nation, but two nations"[198].

An interpretation of the above statement emphasises that due to modern global developments, coupled with the historical system of apartheid, black South Africans occupy a minority position in the South African economy. The extensive discriminatory government rules and regulations of apartheid prevented market forces from remunerating and allocating the skills of black people effectively. In other words the extensive government regulatory framework obstructed the market from operating effectively[199]. Therefore the underlying premise of Mbeki's macroeconomic policy GEAR, held that growth could promoted by freeing the private sector from the distorted racist logic and constraints of the apartheid era. The essential need to remove all vestiges of state-imposed and racially based economic order extended into the creation of a black bourgeoisie which would be the vanguard of black integration into the economic mainstream[200].

4.4.1 Black Economic Empowerment

As an instrument for blacks to use to enter the economy through funding from government, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme was created with the intention of creating a trickle down effect that would de-racialise the country by providing new work for blacks in the formerly white-dominated economy[201]. In an address to the Black Management Forum in 1999, Mbeki affirmed:

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[198] Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the opening of the Debate in the national assembly, on 'reconciliation and nation-building'. May 29, 1998. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/sp980529.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.

[199] ___"Black Economic Empowerment," July 2008. http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/bee.htm. Accessed 14 December 2009.

[200] Padaychee, V. Op Cit, p 556.

[201] Klippenstein, C. "Leadership and the ANC: The Thabo Mbeki Era in South Africa. June 2009. A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

> "As part of our continuing struggle to wipe out the legacy of racism, we must work to ensure that there emerges a black bourgeoisie, whose presence within our economy and society will be part of the process of the de-racialisation of the economy and society"[202].

Furthermore, in his 'State of the Nation' Address in 2003 he confirmed:

> "As we approach, the end of the first decade of our new democracy the need for an economic transformation that brings about effective and significant black economic empowerment becomes more pressing. We believe that it is in the interests of all citizens that we succeed in this endeavour. Through a far-sighted partnership between all sectors of our society we can ensure a stable and growing economy that erases the inequities of the past and draws us all - irrespective of our race, sex or creed - into a more prosperous and equitable future"[203].

The BEE strategy was an important policy instrument aimed at broadening the economic base of the country and stimulating economic growth and creating employment. This reflected the government's approach of situating it within the context of a broader national empowerment strategy. To this end, it intended to bring about significant increases in the number of black people who manage, own, and control the country's economy[204]. What is more, Mbeki's strategy for transforming South Africa's economy was influenced by the Malaysian example, because it too had an economy that was dominated by racially defined elite. It managed to grow from being as poor as Haiti in the 1950s to boasting a GDP per capita of $9 700 in 2004. Malaysia did this in part by enacting a group of laws through Affirmative Action that targeted and encouraged the

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the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Studies University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon,. http://library2.usask.ca/theses/available/etd-07102009-120812/unrestricted/Thesis1.pdf, p 34. Accessed 3 November 2009.

[202] Speech at the Annual Conference of the Black Managers Forum" November 1999. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1999/tm1120.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.

[203] "State of the Nation" of the President of South Africa: Thabo Mbeki February 2003. http://www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/2003/tm0214.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.

[204] ___"Black Economic Empowerment" July 2008. http: //www .southafrica .info/business/ trends/ empowerment/ bee.htm. Accessed 22 December 2009.

emergence of a class of ethnic Malaysian businesspeople[205]. However, the difference between South Africa and Malaysia is that the former's policy of BEE was not affirmative action; instead it was a growth strategy that targeted the economy's weakest point: inequality[206].

4.4.2 Challenges of Black Economic Empowerment

Even though BEE was founded upon principles that can be generally accepted, it created a system in which the general goal of reducing South Africa's income inequality between the races was not realised; rather such deals aggravated it. In this connection, BEE created a very small super-rich class of blacks who are continually 'empowered' with lucrative economic deals by virtue of their political connections to the ruling elite. As a result, the unhealthy connection between the black business elite and government has reduced accessibility to empowerment for the wider population. Klippenstein (2009) argues, "With only a few gaining, the vast rank, and file have received nothing; their lot in life has not improved at all. Unemployment rates remain the same, service delivery is still slow and halting"[207]. Subsequently, government has been unsuccessful in reducing poverty meaningfully and enhancing economic growth through its redistribution policy. It seems the state is rather divorced from people's daily struggles concerning itself with the technical management of capitalist economy and ensuring the steady flow of investment capital for the benefit of national and international capital[208].

In addition, critics have dismissed BEE as simple nepotistic and patronage accumulation where the outcome of BEE has emerged to create a network of clients to retain power[209]. According to Pottinger, "both the ANC and Big Business* had vested interests in BEE,

[205] Herbst, J. "Mbeki's South Africa," Foreign Affairs. Vol 84, No 6, November/ December 2005, p 102.
[206] ___"Black Economic Empowerment" July 2008.
http ://www .southafrica .info/business/ trends/ empowerment/ bee.htm. Accessed 22 December 2009.
[207] Klippenstein, C. Op Cit, p 66.
[208] Simutanyi, N. "The state and economic development in Africa: Challenges for post-apartheid South Africa. October 2006. http://www.ecsecc.org/files/publications/120307134319.pdf , p 5 Accessed 24 December 2009.
[209] Klippenstein, C. Op Cit, p 37
* For a detailed discussion of this see Moeletsi Mbeki: "The De-Industrialisation of South Africa" in Architects of Poverty- Why African Capitalism needs changing. Johannesburg, Picador Africa, 2009

because a black middle class who would act as a buffer against popular revolt and support Mbeki as a dependent political class"[210]. In addition, there is also apprehension about 'fronting' in which blacks only lend their faces to white companies so that these companies can satisfy the requirements for government tenders. According to Gumede, once they have joined the mainly white middle class, they furthermore tend to forget the plight of the struggling masses they used to belong to and claim that the poor are responsible for their own predicament[211]. As maintained by Klippenstein, "the informalisation of politics is the desired state of Africa's political elite because it meshes better with the relationship between the political elite (patrons) and the ANC rank and file (clients)". In this view, South Africa is showing increasing signs of patrimonial logic, which may prove disastrous for good governance[212].

Furthermore, other arguments against BEE claim that it breaches economic principles by artificially endeavouring to determine ownership levels on a racial and gender basis[213]. Similarly, others have criticised BEE as being 'reverse racism' and a shortsighted approach that is perpetuating racial identities by its preoccupation with racial quotas, thus, Whites, and to a lesser degree Coloureds and Indians, feeling discriminated against[214]. To this effect, it introduces race rather than merit and expertise as a key factor in the appointment of management and other staff. Some have even suggested that government is shifting to companies social responsibilities that should be addressed by the government. However, the strongest and most insightful criticism leveled against BEE attributed the skills shortage among its short comings. A number of analysts have argued that the 'brain drain' or the loss of skilled professionals is a real obstacle to

[210] Pottinger, B. Op Cit, p 214.
[211] Cited in Kenworthy, C. "Bikoism or Mbekism- the role of Black Consciousness in Mbeki's South Africa." Maters thesis submitted to Roskilde University. June 2007. http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/2630/1/Bikoism%20or%20Mbekism%20(thesis).pdf, p 79. Accessed 24 December 2009.
[212] Klippenstein, C. Op Cit, p 37.
[213] Kwinda, B. "Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment." Research Report for the Centre of Rhetoric Studies, University of Cape Town. September 2008. http://www.rhetoricafrica.org/PDF/Research%20Report%20BEE.pdf, p 25. Accessed 24 December 2009.
[214] Kenworthy, C. Op Cit, pp 79.

economic growth and that the biggest constraint upon doing business in the country is the shortage of skilled personnel[215].

4.4.3 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment

In order to create a larger number of beneficiaries from BEE, Mbeki's government introduced the "broad-based" empowerment strategy in 2003 which had the following objectives, namely:

- Increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
- Increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
- Promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity;
- Empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and
- Promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment[216].

Drawing on Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) framework, the government then introduced the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South

[215] Kwinda, B. Op Cit, p 25.
[216] Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 Section 1. http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68031. Accessed 22 December 2009

Africa (AsgiSA) programme in 2006 which also pointed to economic development and shared growth. Like BBBEE, AsgiSA, aims to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014, covers macroeconomic issues, skills and education development and second economy initiatives. Government believes in the supportive initiatives of ASGISA to ensure that BBBEE succeeds in creating economic opportunities for the poor and marginalised. In his 2008 'State of the Nation' address Thabo Mbeki introduced the Apex priorities[217] which can be viewed as supportive structures of BEE, and aimed at curbing unemployment and poverty.

It is important to recognise that effective transformation of the South African economy cannot occur in the short-term as argued by Mbeki at the Opening Session of the ANC Policy Conference in June 2007:

> All of us know, and our movement and government have made it a point constantly to remind all our people that we still have a long way to go before we achieve one of the central goals of the national democratic revolution, the realisation of a better life for all our people, on a sustainable basis. In this regard, we have pointed to the challenge posed by unacceptably high levels of structural unemployment, persisting endemic poverty, and underdevelopment that affects many of our urban and rural areas[218].

Despite the high levels of unemployment amongst the unskilled population and the subsequent rise in violent crime Pottinger admits, "The South Africa bequeathed to us by Mbeki and his administration has moved forward progressively, in some respects they have performed miracles"[219]. During Mbeki's tenure growth has been robust, the

[217] "State of the Nation Address" of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki: Joint Sitting of Parliament. 8 February 2008 http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08020811021001.htm. Accessed 22 December 2009

[218] Address of the President of the African National Congress, Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening Session of the ANC Policy Conference 27 June 2007. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2007/tm0627.html. Accessed 14 December 2009.

[219] Pottinger, B. Op Cit, p 4.

economy grew at an average rate of 4, 5 per annum as Figure 2 illustrates and achieved a budget surplus.




Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth in South Africa 1999-2007[220].

BEE has been at the economic centre of Mbeki's African Renaissance through which a black bourgeoisie would be nurtured into becoming one of the key forces of catch-up African Renaissance capitalism[221]. Although BEE has been fraught with many challenges and constraints, it was identified as a means to redress historical economic imbalances in which meaningful participation of black people in the economy was essential to African regeneration.

4.5 Conclusion

As President of South Africa, Mbeki has two major achievements[222]. Firstly, he presided over the transformation of the South African economy through black economic empowerment, whilst encouraging the reappointment of wealth, income, and opportunity

[220] ___ "South Africa- economy overview." August 2008. http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/econoverview.htm. Accessed 14 December 2009
[221] Satgar, V. "Thabo Mbeki and the South African Communist Party," Thabo Mbeki's World- The Politics and Ideology of the South African President. Pietermarizburg, University of Natal Press, 2002, p 168.
[222] Chitiyo, K. "Thabo Mbeki: The End of an Era." http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C48D907F938CFC/. Accessed 14 December 2009.

between a traditional wealth holding class and a wealth seeking one. Under Mbeki's leadership, the ANC achieved a great deal of success in balancing the conflicting prerogatives of a capitalist market economy, and a welfare state. His administration's redistributive polices embarked on a massive programme of social relief and used the social grant system as the means to transfer income to the poor immediately and swiftly. Thus, social security became the major poverty alleviation measure within the developmental welfare system[223].

Secondly, he then provided the leadership necessary for the championing of NEPAD which achieved his goal of positioning South Africa as a major player in the global economy and continental development institutions. In that regard, one of his greatest foreign policy achievements was undoubtedly the reshaping of the OAU into a modernised AU. He relentlessly pursued his vision of a successful and modernised continent. The driving vision behind his domestic and foreign policies was to challenge the stereotypical view of Africans as incapable of managing their own affairs[224]. His mission was to build the values and outcomes that would signal that Africa had come of age in the international spheres and could indeed claim its place in global affairs. It was his intention to negotiate better deals for the people of Africa in economic and trade terms. To restate in the words of Pottinger, "it was a daunting and courageous vision, and his determination in tackling it should never be underestimated"[225]. However, to others his legacy will be remembered for his judgment on HIV/AIDS, his refusal to take a strong and moral position on President Mugabe, unemployment, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and crime[226].

To some, Mbeki will be remembered as a cold, aloof, and too distant president who coordinated all departments under his office, which had an adverse effect of centralising power in the president's office. While one may be of the opinion that the broader aims and objectives of Mbeki's management were well intended; namely to ensure better

[223] Gray, M. "The Progress of Social Development in South Africa," in International Journal of Social Welfare. Vol 15, No 1, p 563.
[224] Pottinger, B. Op Cit, p 299
[225] Loc Cit.
[226] Ibid, p 3.

coordination and swift implementation of government policy, detractors argued that his presidency, termed the imperial presidency had deep implications for democratic governance[227]. Accordingly, policy-making in his presidency was limited to loyalists who adhered to his centrist agenda while those who resisted his policy direction were sidelined. A selective example of his centrist leadership style cites the way in which NEPAD was constructed. According to Klippenstein, it was never developed along normal policy-making channels because "few in the ANC were aware of the plan and still few were let in on its development, possibly due to Mbeki's paranoia that it would be watered down"[228].

However his consolidation of government administration under a single office does not necessarily explain his plummeting popularity and the mounting criticisms and apparent mutiny from within the ANC. Mathekga (2008) argues that the implementation of Third Way policies may explain the mounting criticisms against Mbeki, which essentially cast his leadership style as centrist, non-responsive and illiberal[229]. The shift from the RDP to GEAR and later on to AsgiSA sent shockwaves throughout the ANC and its leftist constituencies such as its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU [230]. As a result, Mbeki was regarded as aloof to the issues of the poor and working people. Thus, the impasse over macroeconomic policy and anger over Mbeki's leadership style and ideology developed into full revolt against him and led the ANC National Executive Committee's decision to recall Mbeki from his office. Despite the indignity of being recalled by his party amid unsubstantiated claims, he left the office in a dignified manner rather than hold on to power. Thabo Mbeki's resignation not only created a new image for the continent, but also sent a powerful message across Africa by setting a benchmark for African democracy[231].

[227] Mathekga, R. Op Cit, p 132.
[228] Klippenstein, C. Op Cit, p 30
[229] Mathekga, R. Op Cit, p 132.
[230] Klippenstein C. Op Cit, p 25
[231] Ajibade, T. "The Beauty in Thabo Mbeki's Resignation" 25 September 2008 http://allafrica.com/stories/200809250468.html Accessed 14 December 2009

CHAPTER FIVE:

To hold a responsible position in an under-developed country is to know that in the end everything depends on the education of the masses, opening their minds, awakening them, and allowing the birth of their intelligence. What it means is to try, relentlessly and passionately, to teach the masses that everything depends on them; that if we stagnate it is their responsibility, and that if we go forward it is due to them too, that there is no such thing as a demiurge, that there is no famous man who will take the responsibility for everything, but that the demiurge is the people themselves and the magic hands are finally only the hands of the people.

Frantz Fanon, The Pitfalls of National Consciousness in the Wretched of the Earth

5. Summary and Findings of Study

Africa's precarious position lies in the fact that its leadership was unsuccessful in providing strategic vision and effective governance conductive to development and growth. Instead, governance in Africa has been marked by authoritarianism, military and corrupt regimes which failed to adopt appropriate institutions and policies that can maintain political stability and ensure national development. The practice has led to the development of leadership that undermines state capacity to deliver its basic functions, such as security, food, shelter, and health care to its people[232]. Various assertions have been propagated by scholars and practitioners who emphasise democracy and good governance as they provide an enabling environment conductive to sustainable development and growth in Africa. While the poverty of African leadership accounts for a large part of African economic decline, one cannot ignore the exogenous factors that have contributed in the process. These factors are linked to globalisation, which has brought more benefits to the richer developed countries than to the poorer developing countries[233].

Scholars have argued that as an instrument of neo-liberal development agenda, globalisation will further marginalise the African economies. For instance "Not only has its economic growth lagged behind other economies, Africa's share of world exports and imports declined drastically by 1997 to a mere 2 per cent, and its share of global flows of foreign investments has fallen sharply, not to mention the fact that many economies on the continent remain heavily indebted. Yet economies in sub-Saharan Africa are deeply integrated into world trade, even if predominantly still as exporters of primary products"[234]. Therefore, by defining the context in which African leaders have to operate, globalisation's challenges, and opportunities require a particular style of leadership that has the necessary attributes to steer African development. This research indicated in chapter two, that leadership cannot be dissociated from the environment in which it occurs as it dictates its

[232] Mukamunana, R. Op Cit p 268
[233] Gelb, S. Op Cit, p 9.
[234] Ajulu, R. Op Cit, p 30.

scope and activities. Thus, the leadership attributes required during the post-independence phase differ from those required in the 21st century. Similarly, African leadership in the 21st century ought to epitomise Nkomo's notion of 'leadership for development", as it is "grounded in a methodology which leads to the outputs and outcomes of development being sustainable"[235].

Furthermore, it was then hypothesised that in order to improve policy which would steer socio-economic progress, a CPL leader with the necessary traits was required to formulate a clear set of coherent policy goals. Such a leader is classified as a transformative leader as he is able to project a concrete and coherent vision and able to present a comprehensive policy. With reference to the projection of a visionary framework, the African Renaissance as articulated by former president Thabo Mbeki provided the foundation for the renewal process of South Africa and the African continent. It advocated African solutions to African problems, disapproving of what it is seen as the neo-colonial 'begging bowl' policies of the past and present that rely to heavily on outside, mainly Western, aid, and assistance[236]. Subsequently, Mbeki's visionary framework can be lauded for having taken on the challenge of giving Africa a face of hope. Similarly, it has been suggested that if the initiative were to reach its full potential; it could make a huge difference to the whole continent[237].

Finally, the presentation of NEPAD indicates that he was an effective leader who was able to translate his vision into a reality. As a vehicle of transforming African development NEPAD, demonstrates that African leaders have deeply engaged in the complex question of how Africa can be developed and how governments must be managed best to meet that objective[238]. For instance, the NEPAD document illustrates:

> In part, Africa's inability to harness the process of globalisation is a result of structural impediments to growth and development in the form

[235] Nkomo, S. Op Cit, p 297.
[236] Kenworthy, C. Op Cit, p 72.
[237] Ramphele, Mamphela Cited in Kenworthy, C. Op Cit, p 72.
[238] Herbert, R. "Implementing NEPAD: A Critical Assessment," African Report: Assessing the New Partnership http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/africa_report/ch5_herbert_e.pdf , pp 93. Accessed 9 November 2009.

> of resource outflows and unfavourable terms of trade. At the same time, we recognise that failures of political and economic leadership in many African countries impede the effective mobilisation and utilisation of scarce resources into productive areas of activity in order to attract and facilitate domestic and foreign investment.[239]

Critical responses have argued that NEPAD ignores the history of Africa's relationship with the developed countries which continue to perpetuate Africa's weakness and increase the power of foreign capital over African economies"[240]. That is to say, the noble goals of NEPAD may be undermined by the global power relations that it serves to restructure. What is more, these observers have argued that NEPAD serves the interest of externally oriented factions within the globalisation context; therefore the leaders promoting NEPAD are seen as key representatives of globalisation[241]. According to Fanon, "The national middle class discovers its historic mission: it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neocolonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner"[242]. Drawing from the above, Bond asserts that NEPAD is consistent with compradorism, when local elites act in close collaboration with hostile international forces whose interests stand directly opposed to African constituencies[243].

While its ability to end decades of underdevelopment and marginalisation of the continent is doubtful, though not unattainable[244], it is worth mentioning that since its inception and adoption, developed countries have taken remarkable actions in support of

[239] Paragraph 34.
[240] Jahed, MI. &Kithatu, A. Op Cit, p 203.
[241] Taylor, I. Op Cit, p 4.
[242] Fanon, F. The Wretched of the Earth. London, Penguin Books, 1963, p 122.
[243] Bond, P. "Nepad, Governance, and African Economics: Is Thabo Mbeki Breaking or Shining the Chains of Global Apartheid?" http://www.tni.org//archives/globcrisis-docs/bond.pdf, p 1.accessed 9 November 2009.
[244] Owusu, F. Op Cit, pp 1669.

NEPAD objectives. In areas such as conflict resolution, the AU has received a sizeable amount of support from the G-8 in areas such as Peace and Security Institutions and operations, expertise, equipment, training and logistics and finance[245]. As a result of the partnership with the developed countries, the numbers of conflicts in Africa continue to decrease. Furthermore, successful elections and peaceful changes in leadership in Mozambique, Malawi, Rwanda, and Namibia, have improved the dynamics of governance in Africa. Additionally, the APR process has allowed non-state actors to actively participate in governance and development in their countries by evaluating the performance of their governments and actively taking part in the policy-making process to formulate proposals that promote democratic governance and sustainable development[246].

Development refers to an outcome of policies, programmes which are directed in the improvement of people's lives. It follows that it, should be informed by viewing people as the object of development, providing them with human security, broadly conceived of as freedom from want or fear[247]. This research has provided a framework of conceptualising development in Africa as requiring transformative leadership, which understands that commitment to democracy and people centred form of governance must characterise the modus operandi of development[248]. In response to the historical context of African development, Mbeki's African Renaissance and NEPAD sought to inspire the peoples of Africa in a spirited and collective effort to confront the persistence of negative images which portray Africa as a continent unable to solve its problems. His leadership provided a reinvigorating direction to Africa by laying a strong and positive foundation for Africa and its future leadership. It challenged the unhealthy and damaging perceptions, arguing that they would continue to mislead the rest of the world and cause

[245] NEPAD Annual Report 2003/ 2004, http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/165.pdf, p47. Accessed 19 November 2009.
[246] Mukamunana, R & Kuye, J. "Revisiting the African Peer Review Mechanism: The Case for Leadership and Good Governance in Africa," Journal of Public Administration. Vol 40, No 4.1, December 2005, pp 592.
[247] King, G. & Murray, C. "Rethinking Human Security," Political Science Quarterly. Vol 116, No 4.2001, p 590.
[248] Nkomo, S. Op Cit, p 297.

Africans, to doubt their abilities and thus undermine their roles as agents of change for an alternative future for Africa[249].

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