





Trancik (1986) argues that one of the great pitfalls of urban design and planning in the twentieth century was the intellectual shift in theory and in practice away from real settlements as sources of inspiration. Starting from around the early 1920s (for different social, cultural and even political reasons) designers such as Le Corbusier and others from schools of thought such as functionalism and De Stijl began to draw their inspiration from abstract sources, viewing the city as a piece of art (Trancik, 1986; and Carmona et al, 2003). However as Jacobs (1961) adequately points out, the city can never be a piece of art because it is inherently messy and uncontrollable, easily flowing from one context to the next, refusing to be held within the static confines of a portrait or a sculpture. Trancik thus argues that there are valuable lessons to be recovered from observing real settlements, their workings and shortcomings (Trancik, 1986).

This chapter presents real-world examples of non-programmatic planning. These forms of planning are deeply rooted within the social and political contexts within which they occur and this characteristic is also the reason behind their success and their ability to remain relevant over very long periods of time. Conversely, the failure of modern design and planning to take into account the context within which it occurs and the tendency to only understand urban phenomena in a positivist sense (ignoring the social and political reality) are the main reasons behind the shortcomings of modern plans.



DOWNTOWN TOKYO (RODWIN, 1965: 21)

4.1 TROUBLES WITH THE PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH IN THE REAL WORLD

Before turning focus to real-world examples of non-programmatic approaches to settlement-making, it may be enlightening to consider some of the excesses of the programmatic approach as evidenced in real cities.

In 1965, when Venezuela decided to undertake the ambitious task of building a new town (a world class metropolis that would serve as the country's new capital) Lloyd Rodwin (1965) attempted to outline the challenges that planners working on such a task would face. Rodwin's article serves as an intriguing insight into the workings of the modernist paradigm and its inherent flaws with regard to translating its objectives into real cities. Adhering to the scientific approach that characterised planning work up to his time, Rodwin attempts to quantify the many aspects involved in building a city. What sticks out for him is what he calls the "pre-emption of land for residential purposes by squatters" (Rodwin, 1965: 17), which he recognises as a characteristic of planning big cities in the developing world. He also recognises (and recommends) the state as the means to resolve this phenomenon, which he sees as an economic problem: Economic activity attracts people in large numbers into the city and as a matter of demand and supply housing becomes scarce for those who are of lower incomes and the state must then intervene in order to balance the numbers.

For the modernist paradigm and for the programmatic approach, urban problems are fundamentally about numbers. Rodwin overlooks the extent to which the emergence of informal housing (the small circles in the image above) is actually a political response by people to the political system that is the city - a system that is for the most part created by planning decisions. State intervention, in the form of one-room apartment blocks (the larger circle in the image above), emerges as a second plan that further isolates those people to live within it. Planning needs to be more sensitive to instances where people respond to the plan. Instead of reading their reaction as a matter of demand and supply, (and ultimately a lack of choice) planning must regard choice as a central determinant of where and how people want to live within the city.

The challenge then for the contemporary designer or planner is finding a non-programmatic approach to planning. It is finding a way to harness, as much as possible, all the forces that are acting on a site (rather than excluding them) and directing them towards a specific end. The aim is to somehow abandon the simplistic idea that a city could be directly translated into reality from a designer's drawings or that its form may be dictated by a planner or a law maker or even the state (as conceived by Rodwin, 1965). That being said however the aim is also not to completely forsake the ideal of a planned city or to attempt to shift all the planning authority into the hands of community members through participation or community controlled planning. This paper is sceptical

about the possibility and even the desirability of such a shift. It is argued in this paper that there are certain key elements that a designer can change within an urban settlement that will direct urban development across the entire settlement. This chapter discusses four case studies in order to illustrate how these essential elements of urban form may be determined and how they may be shaped in order to direct urban development.


4.2 CASE STUDY 1: DELOS –RETHINKING THE IDEA OF HARMONY IN THE MAKING OF GREAT URBAN DESIGN

4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

The first case study to be discussed is the ancient Greek city of Delos. Here the paper shows how, even when they correctly look to them for inspiration, urban design scholars tend to view cities outside their own context as utopias where the social, economic and political constraints that face modern city design are assumed not to exist. Rejecting this utopian view and reading ancient cities as places of conflict and difficult social choices is the first step to developing a non-programmatic approach to design.

4.2.2 GROWTH BY ACCRETION – HOW BACON’S HARMONIOUS ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENT HINDERS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF URBAN PLACES

Bacon (1967) suggests that the growth of Delos involved individual buildings being carefully placed in relation to existing buildings. For him it suffices to say that each person who erected a new building must have had an awareness of and a respect for the driving logic of the city. However, Bacon does not define this logic for the reader to understand and he is at risk of assuming a level of social harmony that is impossible in the real world. Bacon's description of Delos' development lacks conflict. Yet it is this conflict (which is an expression of different interests) that is most helpful for reading the forces that shape a place.



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEK CITY OF DELOS OVER 300 YEARS (MSINGAPHANTSI, 2014 (AFTER BACON, 1967))

In the plans shown on figure Bacon is concerned with the arrangement of the major buildings in Delos over the course of about 300 years. The development of the town has been divided into three phases, showing how over many years new civic buildings were added to the existing arrangement. However, the arrangement is confusing to the reader. Although there is a coherent spatial order in the plans and although an attempt has been made to explain, in terms of time, how the settlement was built, the reader cannot help but read of three plans simultaneously. The final plan shows the structure of Delos after 314 BC. It includes, within it, building works done before that time and so it is inseparable from the other two plans. This plan, because it is completed by the presence of the two earlier plans, is easier to understand. On the other hand the same cannot be said for the first and second plan when they are read individually. The urban form presented by each of the two earlier plans seems impractical. It is difficult to understand how the designers chose¹ the arrangements shown in the plans and – most importantly – how the people of Delos lived within the reality set out by these choices.

The vital difference in the third plan is the inclusion of common buildings, people's homes and their personal space (or maybe even private property). This is what constitutes the urban fabric. By showing this as the setting for the civic buildings, the third plan is actually showing two contrasting spatial logics. Herein lies the conflict needed to explain the urban development process. On the one hand the enormous civic elements form beautiful spaces between them while, on the other hand, the surrounding urban fabric is made up of small buildings and it is tightly meshed with very little open space. It is only when seen in the context of the dense urban fabric that the value of the public open space in the civic centre of the town becomes clear to the observer.

¹Choice is always an essential step in making a plan. The possibility of making choice available to more actors is an important consideration for thinking in non-programmatic terms

4.2.3 SOCIAL CONFLICT AS A KEY DYNAMIC WITHIN URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The absence of context in the first and second plans is the source of confusion. Through this absence these plans also omit a crucial fact from the narrative of urban development – that the city is a social entity. As students of urban development we need to see how people's homes had to make way for the expansion of the civic core of Delos. This was not merely a harmonious evolution of impartial urban elements (although this is not to suggest that it was violent or coercive either). There is conflict but this is not necessarily between social groups, although it usually is. It could be conflict between different demands and limited resources to fulfil them. City planning always involves making a choice that favours one side or the other and this would have been true in Delos as well.

Viewing it in this way brings the experience of Delos closer to our own experience of modern development processes. It might be shocking to discover that the social harmony that we are often eager to accept when looking at contexts outside of our own is an illusion. However this shock can awaken us to the real force that shapes the city – choice – and we can realize the real mandate of urban design, which is to facilitate the process by which a society arrives at such a choice. We must earnestly consider why the people of Delos chose to repeatedly tear down their homes in favour of civic space. Furthermore, and more importantly, we must consider how the conflict-laden process of choosing the urban form of Delos was translated into the harmonious townscape we see in the maps above. Therein lies the genius of the Greek mode of planning.

To help with understanding urban development better and to perhaps move closer to answering the two questions raised here, the next section discusses a case where interests are more clearly expressed in the urban development process. From reading these interests, it is possible to explain how the choices regarding urban development and urban form are made.

4.3 CASE STUDY 2: THE TUILERIES GARDENS—PRIVATE INTEREST AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC SPACE

4.3.1 INTRODUCTION

The second case study discusses the Tuileries Gardens in Paris. In this section of the paper the new and brilliant idea introduced by the plan of the Tuileries Gardens is shown to be deeply rooted in existing patterns of Paris' development. The new plan is shown to be a form of non-programmatic planning that manipulates a few parts of this existing pattern in order to enforce major changes in Paris. Lastly, it is argued in this section that the logic driving the expansion of Paris may not have been much different from that which operates in many modern cities. Growth in Paris had strong ties to economic

interests and property and it occurred within a context of social conflict yet it produced one of the most beautiful networks of public spaces that may be found in modern cities.

4.3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Paris began as a Roman town on the river Seine. Its traditional centre was at a crossing, where two roads – one from the north and the other from the south – met at the river. A Roman aqueduct that stretched southward from the river underpinned a pattern of development that was more intense to the south of the town but the centre of the town remained fixed at the river. The desirability of the river was due to it being a defensible location (Gutkind, 1965). This militaristic mentality can be seen in the location of fortifications on the island in the middle of the river by the Romans.

The trend of fortifications and of important buildings being located close to the river continued in Medieval Paris. Here however, because the city now had a wall, some major buildings were located as far as 60m from the river. However, we can still see the centripetal force of the river in the way that – between 1180 and 1223 – the settlement never expanded beyond 100m from the river (100m is the distance that a man can run in 60 seconds).


The river, because of the crossing, also offered an opportunity for control – the ability to dictate movement. It would have become attractive, for this reason, as a seat of power. A pattern can be seen on the maps, illustrating this attraction of power and authority to the river. Royal buildings, even those of ornamental function such as palaces, are located near the river. This fact, together with the military considerations explained in the preceding paragraph, form part of the basis for the plan to be discussed in this section. Even though the plan itself is often understood to be a civic scheme that created public space; and even though it is often interpreted as having been more about an idea that then became translated into materiality – this paper argues that in reality such a scheme would have been steeped in private interest and would have been based on material conditions existing at that time. It was definitely a powerful idea, as Bacon (1967) contends, but in order for it to be translatable into our own context, it must be understood within the material context within which it was conceived.

4.3.3 THE ESSENTIALS OF URBAN FORM – THE RIVER, MOVEMENT AND STATE


BUILDINGS: THEIR ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARIS

In reviewing the material conditions of Paris over the three hundred years that it took for the plan initiated by the Tuileries Gardens to take shape, we are looking for what may be called the essentials of urban form (Bacon, 1967). The idea is that a settlement, in order to exist and to keep existing in a certain form, that form must fulfil a certain function well enough for people to wish to continue that

form and to continue relating to that form in such a way that the form remains meaningful and effective (Amin, 2006). For instance, the Parisians would have had to have lived within the walls of their city in order for the walls to remain a meaningful means of protection. Those aspects of form that are continuously chosen² by each successive generation become the essentials of urban form for that particular culture.



Paris as a Roman settlement (Bacon, 1967)




Early medieval Paris (Bacon, 1967)

These “essentials” are obviously contextually specific, in time and geographically. The following four urban elements seem to have been the essentials in Paris between 1300 and 1740: (1) the river; (2) the distance from the river; (3) the movement system; and (4) state buildings. The river was important in part because of its shape and its directionality, which were relatively fixed. The distance from the river involved a constant trade-off between safety, density and the cost of expanding the wall. The movement system was (as is the case in modern cities) the main way in which the urban environment would be experienced and accessed. Movement in Paris was also important because of the crossing point, which meant that it had a strong relationship with centrality, control and power. Lastly, state buildings and military installations were very important to Paris because these were actually the main constructions in medieval and renaissance cities, unlike in modern cities where privately financed buildings tower over everything else.

These four elements were the essentials of Paris' urban form and a designer could shape the city by manipulating the relationship of these elements to one another. This is exactly what happened in the 1600s when the Medici Queens began to translate their conception of the Tuileries Gardens into materiality. They created a new arrangement of the essential elements that continued to shape Paris for many years after their initial intervention. This was an idea so powerful that it later informed Baron

Hausmann's grand re-design of Paris. What is imperative to note, however, is that the plan of 1600 does not abandon the four hitherto existing forces but it manipulates them in order to effectively introduce a new idea, a new essential. Four points serve to prove this point. Refer to the accompanying maps. Firstly, note that the Tuileries Gardens remain very close to the river, continuing to respect the directional thrust of the river and the value of proximity to it. Secondly, note that by 1600 the location of the Louvre in the west of the city is complemented by the new Bastille in the east. The location of the gardens in the west is thus fulfilling an existing impulse of expansion along the river. Note that the construction of the gardens is accompanied by the construction of the Tuileries Palace, which is spatially related to the Louvre. The Louvre and the new Palace underpin the gardens. On the eastern edge, the Bastille was also used to underpin a row of trees that, with time, would expand magnificently, encircling the northern half of the city. Thus state buildings are still very important and they are used to reinforce the new design idea rather than being replaced by it. Lastly, note that in the map of the city in 1740 it can be seen how a new crossing has been made over the river, just south of the new Tuileries Palace. This would have encouraged a slight shift in power, by allowing the palace to also become an area where movement may be controlled. Just as had been the case in the embryonic Roman town that preceded Paris, movement (especially across the river) is a key determinant of urban form. Movement is actually at the core of the new essential being introduced by the plan of 1600. The plan integrates movement with landscaping and, as the urban context responds to the beauty of this scheme, it integrates the urban with the countryside, all the while thrusting outward. The gardens are so powerful as a design force that they are the source from which the Champs Elysees springs.

²Choice is again shown as important in the development of cities



AFTER BACON (1967)

4.3.4 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY DESIGN – SEEING THE TUILERIES GARDENS AS AN ENABLING FRAMEWORK

Identifying important material conditions that informed the plan, as has been done in the previous section, helps to provide context for understanding the plan. However we still have not completely answered the questions raised by the earlier discussion of the development of Delos. It is not yet clear why the monarchs who were redesigning Paris decided to do so in the first place, why they decided to create beautiful civic spaces. Was it for the public to enjoy? If that were the case then it is not clear why they, with supreme authority, chose a location outside the city rather than to locate the civic space inside the city, where it would be enjoyed by the most members of the public. If their intention had been to create picturesque gardens in the countryside, outside the city and away from the general public, it is not clear why they did not use their supreme authority as monarchs to prohibit any unwanted development, to prevent urban development from sprawling in the direction of the gardens and consuming the countryside.

These considerations seem to suggest that the Medici Queens must have wanted for Paris to explode spectacularly on its western side and they must have wanted to create the Champs Elysees as a new line of force (a new essential element) that would shape the future growth of Paris. It certainly makes more sense to believe that such magnificent development was not an accident but was the result of calculated intentions. Yet, if this is the case, if a greater vision for Paris had already been conceived, one might still ask, why the monarchs did not enforce this vision in its entirety as is often the case with modern development and with modern designs? This is the important lesson that the Tuileries Gardens hold for modern urban design. The lesson is that the challenge for urban design is not really about authority to enforce a plan but it is a matter of nature and time. Even with authority to enforce the plan and to shape the city any way they want, designers must still consider the natural limits to their objectives and they must give time for the forces that drive urban change to improve in their favour. The brilliance of the Medici Queens in their planning is in their ability to conceive a plan that is open enough to accommodate changes that occur more than a century beyond their own lifetimes.

4.3.5 THE CITY AS AN EXTRACTOR OF VALUE – THE LOGIC BEHIND THE GROWTH OF PARIS

To understand the implications of this design process for our modern context we may consider that although the monarchy had authoritative power and they could shape the city any way they wanted, they also had objectives in mind while doing so. If we consider the position of King Henry II,

when Catherine de Medicis built the Tuileries Palace, although he had tax revenues, at the end of the day the king was a property owner. He would have made a lot of money by putting his property to good use. Thus the use of tax revenue (no matter how limitlessly vast the amount may seem to an observer) and the use of state authority to facilitate urban development were still subject to the economic question of costs and returns. The king would have been faced with a question that is common (and perhaps even more intense) amongst all property owners in modern capitalist society. That is having land and wishing to increase its value. It is worth considering as well that, by law, all land really belonged to the king. Yet, even with all the land and all the authority, urban expansion could not be random³. It had to create value. This way, the construction of a defensive wall can be seen as one means of safeguarding value. Furthermore, as a consequence of owning all the land, the king always had more land on the outside of that city that is cheaper and underutilised. If only the king could find a way to expand the city into it, he would be richer. Such is the subjective reasoning that underpins the seemingly impartial expansion of the city. The expansion of the city along the Champs Elysees would have thus made good economic sense. When viewed in this way, the development of Paris is not dissimilar to the rationale of modern urban development processes.

4.3.6 THE CITY AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

New plans, new designs and new urban systems emerge over time, and new urban forms are created, but it is usually as a means to better address the same problems – problems that are inextricably part of the nature of human life. Such was the case in Delos when increasing densities – as the town grew – necessitated increasing the amount of civic space available at its centre. The same natural reasoning was true in 1600 when the French monarchs expanded Paris westward into the countryside. The monarchs were looking for a more efficient way to order their assets and to increase the value of their property. However it was more than that (and this may be where they differ from modern property developers). It needed to be more than the simple calculation of the asset holder's individual objectives in relation to the means they had for fulfilling these objectives (means such as state authority and tax revenue). The complexity of urban systems is often such that in order for a proposed scheme to optimally fulfil the objectives that a designer has, it must also create value for other people.

The city is a system for extracting value but this extraction can only be done as a social process because value is a social construct. This is to say that it is not sufficient for urban development to create buildings or parks in an area. In order for the buildings to have value the owner (even if they are a monarch) must be able to collect some form of rent from them. People must choose his buildings. When viewed this way, the beautiful Tuileries Gardens and their generous public spaces are inseparable from the adjacent buildings. The 1600 plan is a very practical and very valuable scheme.

³ In fact up until 1600 urban expansion was limited by the city wall

It goes beyond creating civic space but goes hand in hand with urban development, developing the land around the Tuileries Gardens, in order to make some kind of return on that investment. The plan is steeped in self interest yet its product is an inclusive, vast network of public space with walkable streets and proper edge conditions. This development process, which was pursued by a despotic political system, produced a space that in many ways is more democratic and more inclusive than the spaces that are created in Johannesburg today, even though contemporary Johannesburg is planned through inclusive participatory processes.

4.4 CASE STUDY 3: STUTTGART 21 - THE POLITICS OF MODERN URBAN

DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC

RESPONSE TO THE PLAN

4.4.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding section has made the curious observation that the autocratic planning of the Tuileries Gardens by the French monarchy resulted in a spatial order that is more democratic and more inclusive than that which is created by democratic participation in Johannesburg today. This is a view shared by McGlynn and Murrain (1994) who argue that many pre-modern cities are more democratic than cities created by modern democratic societies.

The third case study looks at a modern development process, Stuttgart 21 and attempts to illustrate how the planning process adopted in contemporary urban development differs from that described in the second case study. One key difference is the role of time, since in modern development large projects usually take less than two decades, which is very short when compared to the three hundred year span of the plan for the Tuileries Gardens. A second difference is the way in which public participation has been institutionalized in modern urban development processes, occurring in a very short interval, as a consultation phase of the project, rather than being allowed to occur incrementally over many years. Notably, as will be shown in the case of Stuttgart, participation in modern planning processes tends to mean talking about or commenting on a plan but it rarely takes the form of producing an alternative plan or physically amending an implemented plan and when these instances occur they are frowned upon.

4.4.2 THE INCEPTION OF STUTTGART 21

In the early 1990s the then German rail company, Deutsche Bahn, was privatised and it embarked on the ambitious planning of 21 projects across the country in order to modernise its rail infrastructure and

to maximise returns on its holdings around stations. These projects would be rolled out over a period of more than fifteen years (Novy and Peters, 2012). This situation is not much different from current position of South Africa's PRASA (the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa). PRASA is currently busy with station upgrades and improvements to its rolling stock in the same way that this had been the case with Deutsche Bahn in the 1990s. Another similarity lies in the fact that, like PRASA, Deutsche Bahn was allowed to operate as a profit oriented business but it remained wholly owned by the state.

Stuttgart 21 was one of the 21 projects planned by Deutsche Bahn. The project was first introduced to the public in 1994 and the primary reason given for its conception was the need to extend an existing high-speed track (the HST), which would run between Mannheim and Ulm via Stuttgart (Novy and Peters, 2012). At the time the structure of Stuttgart's station was a terminus, which meant that trains arriving at the station left in the same direction as they arrived, which would slow down the HST. The initial plan around this was for a route that bypassed Stuttgart's city centre and that would locate the sought-after HST station on a small station on the outskirts of the city but this was rejected by municipal officials and other local elites (Novy and Peters, 2012). Having discussed other alternatives, they preferred the so called 'Heimerl-route', which maintained the regional hegemony of Stuttgart's terminus as the main transport node. In order to pass *through* the Stuttgart terminus, which is located in a narrow valley, the HST would have to pass under it. This required tunnelling and constructing a through-station under the existing terminus. This idea then grew into a proposal to move *all* rail operations underground (freeing up vast amounts of well located land owned by Deutsche Bahn in the process) by adding five more underground tracks: thus the Stuttgart 21 proposal was born.

4.4.3 SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN FROM THE TOP

Based on its inception, the Stuttgart 21 project is similar to the proposal being made in this paper (in the next chapter) for the upgrading of Park Station in Johannesburg. In both cases the strongest impetus for development is the introduction of a high speed rail line (the Gautrain), which is funded by the state and which offers unprecedented levels of access. The rail company in Johannesburg (PRASA) also has a desire to maximise its property holdings. There is also a desire to move rail operations underground, which now lingers in the subconscious of many planning professionals working in Johannesburg – the idea of decking over the railway lines.

In Stuttgart, local politicians and business interests showed their support for the plan early on by rejecting every other alternative and opting for the 'Heimerl-route' although it was more expensive and more contentious. Yet the case of Stuttgart 21 also shows how planning officials (employees of Deutsche Bahn and the City of Stuttgart) also have vested interests, such as improving property values and pursuing certain planning ideals. These interests can easily cling onto the impetus created by the presence of the high speed rail station and thereby insert themselves into the plan. Stuttgart's officials were "excited about the urban and economic development potential that the proposal provided"

and, as is the case in Johannesburg, "the extensive railway lands in its midst had divided Stuttgart's urban core for more than a century" (Novy and Peters, 2012: 131). It is important to note the fact that state officials and planners had already thrown their support behind the plan – even prior to public involvement in the planning – because they "considered Stuttgart 21 a godsend as it was seen as addressing all of the challenges the city was facing – especially the perceived need to maintain and expand the city's position as an economic hub" (Novy and Peters, 2012: 131). The support of city officials for the project is also evident in that, in the late 1990s, when complications with the project's cost and the sluggishness of the real estate sector threatened the feasibility of the project, the City of Stuttgart (in 2001) went ahead and bought 90ha of land from Deutsche Bahn, which the rail company had been unable to sell (ibid). Although city officials purport to be objective (and some may even try earnestly to be objective) it is possible to detect a bias towards economic growth in the thinking of Stuttgart's planners. Furthermore, because of their objective stance, planning professionals may be bad at relating to subjective issues such as aesthetics and heritage especially in cases where people's opinions cannot be swayed by economic logic or by quantitative evidence. This became clear in the case of Stuttgart once the public began to respond to the Stuttgart 21 proposal.

4.4.4 PUBLIC RESPONSE TO STUTTGART 21

Stuttgart 21 is significant as having been the largest transport planning project in Europe in the last 20 years; and also for sparking the largest resistance to planned intervention in Germany's recent history (Frank and Morgan (2012); and Novy and Peters, 2012). At the peak of the wave of protests against Stuttgart 21, there were some rallies with as many as 100,000 demonstrators (Novy and Peters, 2012: 129). Equally noteworthy is the fact that state officials, who have already been noted above as having had a bias towards the project's implementation, took a forceful stance against public demonstrations. This was made apparent on the day the demolition work was set to begin. To get their way, officials authorised "a massive police crackdown against [the] non-violent demonstrators". It was this overt display of impunity on the part of the state that catapulted Stuttgart 21 to the forefront of German politics at the time, raising heated debates about transparency and accountability with regards to mega-projects. Subsequently, demolition work was hastily halted to begin public mediation talks, which were aired on national television. Eventually it came to be that the matter would be settled by a referendum (Novy and Peters, 2012). By now it was clearly too late for community participation, since the entire country, beyond Stuttgart, was upset.

Disagreement with Stuttgart 21 had not always taken the form of protests. It is also inaccurate to see it as having suddenly erupted in the five years before the referendum, after more than ten years of relative compliance. In fact, Stuttgart 21 faced fierce opposition since its inception in the early 1990s and the best known criticism came in the form of a book by Winfried Wolf titled "*Stuttgart 21 – Hauptbahnhof im Untergrund?*" (Novy and Peters, 2010: 134). In the book Wolf criticises the project along five points: economic feasibility, transport benefits and impacts, environmental cost, historic

preservation and public participation. This critique was an objective, well structured and science based objection to the Stuttgart 21 plan. This is to say that criticism of the plan was not necessarily too subjective, too informal or too far outside planners' normal thinking and procedures for them to engage with it appropriately. Yet, as Novy and Peters (2012) explain, this early criticism was swept aside just as easily in support of the plan.

Public response to Stuttgart 21 also took the form of alternative plans, which is crucial to note as the current paper argues that the purpose of urban design frameworks must be to inspire the production of other plans by members of the public. In the case of Stuttgart 21 the first alternative plan was produced in 1998, four years after the announcement of Stuttgart 21. Named '*Stuttgart 21 mit Kopfbahnhof*' (Stuttgart 21 with terminus), the plan objected to the tunnelling aspect of the original proposal. It accommodated the HSR but, by keeping the terminus, the alternative plan showed that it did not believe that the HSR's mobility was of the highest priority. The alternative plan also disapproved of the manner in which Stuttgart 21 aimed to drive up property prices. Again the alternative plan presented a well structured, conservative (as opposed to open protest) and science based critique that planners would not have had any difficulty engaging with. However, as had been the case with the criticisms raised in Wolf's book, the recommendations of the alternative plan were swept aside (Novy and Peters, 2012).

4.4.5 DRAWING LESSONS FROM STUTTGART 21

Novy and Peters (2012) tend to see the emergence of negative public reaction against Stuttgart 21 as evidence that the plan is inadequate or unjust. They suggest that questions may be raised as to whether Stuttgart 21 was actually a genuine transport project or whether it was actually real estate interests that were disguised as an infrastructure undertaking. They thus argue that Stuttgart 21 was *bad* because it was premised on false intensions or because ulterior motives had managed to insert themselves into it. However this line of thought would mean that no planning efforts, especially at this large scale, could ever be *good*. It would certainly disqualify the Tuileries Gardens as an example of wonderful and inclusive public space. Furthermore, it is almost certain that no planned development can meet this standard because planners cannot separate themselves from their class interests and their economic bias (Davidoff, 1965) and because, as Novy and Peters (2012) also concede, mega projects always tend to catch the eye of political and business elites seeking to profit from them (Molotch, 1976).

Yes Stuttgart 21 was a bad planning exercise; but only inasmuch as public reaction to the plan ended up taking the form of protest; and also because the state and its planners took a repressive approach to this public reaction. However, for the current author, the problem more precisely has to do with the finality of the Stuttgart 21 plan. The public reaction in itself is actually a very good thing and need not have taken the form of protest. In fact it may be said that the manifestation of public reaction as

protest is most likely the result of the finality of the plan. Having expressed their criticism of the plan in other ways throughout the first ten years but to no avail, the public may have realised that they could only influence the plan through a measure as extreme as a referendum and that is why they resorted to protest.

The lesson to be learned from Stuttgart 21 is that public participation need not be limited to state initiated consultations with 'affected parties', which occur at predetermined occasions, at the planners' convenience. Citizen participation is constantly happening from the time of a project's inception, when an individual considers – in the privacy of his own thoughts – how the planners' proposal will affect him. Official plans must be made incrementally over time, allowing the public to amend the plan and for these amendments to be assimilated into future official plans that should be produced sequentially over time. As the process recurs certain elements will begin to emerge repeatedly and these will become fixed in the public unconscious as acceptable possibilities as people become accustomed to their likelihood and as they begin to adapt their own plans around them. These initial fixes will thus be easier to roll out even while the rest of the plan is still being debated and generated. In this way the physical city is composed through a mesh of myriad smaller plans.

4.5 CASE STUDY 4: PORTLAND'S CENTRAL CITY PLAN OF 1988 –

THE EPITOME OF PARTICIPATION

4.5.1 INTRODUCTION

Having explored a case study where public response lay outside state planning, occurring naturally, the paper now turns its attention to planning in the City of Portland, where public participation is made an integral part of the state's planning from the onset. Portland's participatory model has received much acclaim (Punter, 1996) and, insofar as Johannesburg aspires to institutionalise participation in the form of the Integrated Development Planning process, then Portland is a useful case study to illustrate how such a model manages to be successful in a real city. However, this paper only discusses Portland as a cautionary, rather than an ideal model.

The case of Portland serves to highlight the massive planning capacity required in order to carry out such an approach to planning. Significant efforts have also been made in Portland to ensure that neighbourhood associations are empowered to have their own autonomous planning capacity to meaningfully participate in the City's processes and even challenge it where necessary. Finally, the Portland model only produces a plan that is a broad stroke guide to development in the city. The particulars of each project – especially one as contentious as Stuttgart 21 – would still need to be opened for discussion on a case by case basis.

4.5.2 STRUCTURE OF PORTLAND'S PLANNING PROCESS

The City of Portland, Oregon, in the United States is renowned for having one of the best examples of the application of participatory planning within an urban design exercise. Portland's Central City plan of 1988 and the urban design guidelines contained in the plan have been hailed as great achievements in terms of urban design and they have been replicated widely in other places (Punter, 1999). The City's commitment to community participation in its planning is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that in 1999 the City spent 70% of its budget on meetings and consultations. One of the most important places where the City spends this portion of the budget is the funding of neighbourhood associations (*ibid*). This concern with encouraging planning activity at the community level is one of the key ways in which Portland's approach to planning differs from the approach taken in the planning of Stuttgart 21. From the onset, Portland officials want community input in the planning and, in fact, organising the community is one of the first steps of the planning process and in many cases it happens even before the agenda of the plan has been determined (City of Portland, 1988). Portland's Central City plan was initiated in 1984 and it was completed in two phases. The process began with the nomination of 15 citizens who would form the *Citizen Steering Committee*. The committee was directed by council to 'study a broad array of issues and to ask the public to assist them in identifying significant issues' (City of Portland, 1988: 11). The citizens were thus charged with setting the agenda of the planning process. The steering committee consulted almost 10,000 citizens (out of a population of around 500,000) and on the basis of their contributions a first draft of the goals was written in the form of a document titled *First Draft Goals and Policies*, which marked the end of the first phase (*ibid*). While planning in the first phase was concerned with determining the problems and setting goals, in the second phase the process focused on finding possible solutions to the problems and suggesting implementation strategies (*ibid*).

The participants in the planning process were organised into five tiers. The *City Council*, having initiated the process, occupied the first tier (City of Portland, 1988). Funding, planning expertise and legal authority are concentrated within this tier, as is often the case, but in Portland the council was used as a means of distributing these powers to the other tiers as needed in order to facilitate their participation in the planning process.

The *Citizen Steering Committee* made up the second tier and it served as the main decision making body, while the City provided support through finance and human resources (City of Portland, 1988).

The third tier was made up of members of the public who served in a series of *Advisory Committees*, which were formed and disbanded continuously throughout the planning process. These committees helped to gather information and input from the community in the first phase of planning. (City of Portland, 1988)

When planning went into the second phase about 120 members of the public were enlisted to serve on additional committees called *Functional Advisory Committees*. The functional committees focused on key issues such as economic development, housing or transportation and made recommendations for policies regarding these issues. Within each issue they were charged with (1) making amendments to the vision and goals set in the first phase; (2) recommending what areas needed to be researched; (3) making recommendations about land use changes; and (4) suggesting strategies for implementing the policies they came up with (City of Portland, 1988).

The last tier was made up of *Neighbourhood Associations* (City of Portland, 1988). Their presence is critical in balancing out the power relationships inherent in the planning structure. Every other tier except for the neighbourhood associations is appointed by the City, even if indirectly. The other tiers are also fully funded by the City. Critically, while the City does fund neighbourhood associations, thereby encouraging their emergence in the first place, some legal steps have been taken to increase their financial independence. Firstly, they are emancipated to seek out other sources of funding and secondly they are granted tax exempt status. Lastly, a contractual agreement between the City and the associations allows neighbourhood associations to employ planning experts from the City (Punter, 1999).

4.5.3 DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE PORTLAND EXPERIENCE – THE DESIRABILITY OF THE PORTLAND MODEL

Having established the very participatory nature of the Portland approach to planning, the next logical step seems to be to evaluate the product that this planning has yielded for Portland to assess the goodness of participation. However, such an assessment may not be appropriate because, in Portland, the true test of the viability of any proposal seems to be whether or not it is supported by the citizens. The Portland system may be said to be a *communitarian model*, where participation is seen to be good for its own sake. In such a model, the benefits from a process that is controlled and directed by citizens are seen to outweigh the benefits of the end product of a less participatory process, regardless of the utility of that end product. For this reason this discussion of Portland's approach concludes instead by assessing the model's applicability in Johannesburg. The question to be asked is whether it would be possible to roll out the Portland model out in Johannesburg as extensively as it has been done in Portland? If the answer is in the negative, if the application of this approach would not improve the inclusiveness of Johannesburg's planning processes, then it is not desirable since the widening of public participation is the only criterion on which the merits of a communitarian approach may be determined.

That being said, it is possible to question however if a city such as Johannesburg, which is battered by poverty, should in fact use 70% of its budget to hold meetings (as has been the case in Portland) in

order to discuss what to do with the remaining 30%. A city in the developing world may just have many more problems to consider in its budget allocations, than simply increasing participation. Briffault (2006) argues that traditionally the role of municipalities in the United States has been to protect property and to enhance its value through the provision of services. In contrast South Africa's constitution defines municipalities as "developmental" local government, ascribing to them a catalytic role as drivers of development. This role has often been translated in Johannesburg into big projects such as the BRT or housing schemes or inner city regeneration. It is very difficult to imagine a case where enough funding is diverted from such projects and allocated to matching the standards of the Portland participation model.

In Johannesburg there is also the question of who to consult during participation. The fact that Portland's 1988 plan managed to receive input from almost 10,000 of its citizens is astounding but this was out of a population of 500,000 people (only 20%). The population of Johannesburg on the other hand is estimated between 4mil. and 7mil. (Depending on how widely one defines the extent of the metro). Participation at the same scale would require consulting at least 800,000 people and doing so on a more contested budget than that of a city like Portland. Specifically with regards to Johannesburg's CBD, high rates of immigration and the fact that the area is still in a state of transition makes it difficult to identify a community around which participation may be galvanized. In Portland, grassroots community participation is facilitated through *neighbourhood associations* which are partially resourced by the state. It seems unlikely though that the City of Johannesburg would have the same ability to support community oriented neighbourhood associations because of its budget constraints. Even if such support was available there is still the question of finding someone willing to participate in long term planning. Sandercock (1997) has argued that such contexts of diversity as is to be found in Johannesburg's inner city, where many residents only have a transient interest in the area, often render communicative planning ineffective.

Lastly, Johannesburg already employs participatory planning in the creation of its IDP (integrated development plan) yet these have widely been regarded by critics as little more than consultation, tokenism or manipulation. Scholars such as Lipietz (2004) have been very critical to the redevelopment of places in the CBD, such as Newtown for instance, on the grounds of their failure to facilitate inclusive planning, even though such redevelopment would have been envisioned in the IDP.

In the case of Portland and in the case of Johannesburg's IDP, public participation is compressed into a short space of time. The four/five year cycle of the plans means that the production of alternative plans by the public would generally occur outside of the time frames of official planning cycles and would consequently be left out of the plan. In the case of Stuttgart 21 the first alternative to the plan took four years to produce. It may well be possible to argue that in the case of Stuttgart 21 it was only necessary to produce an alternative because the official plan was flawed, tainted by power, or none

participatory. In which case, one might say that the public does not need to produce an alternative to the IDP or to a plan produced by the Portland model. However this is exactly what Healey (2006) warns about: the hasty translation of the plan (and whatever power relations are inherent within it) into a reality that is so concrete and so rapid that there is no room for the user to negotiate changes at a later stage.

4.6 CONCLUSION

While Stuttgart 21 illustrates the excesses of expert driven planning, it also illustrates the natural inclination of people to make their own plans about the cities in which they live – what Bacon (1967) calls *democratic feedback*. It also demonstrates the time aspect that is a critical part of how this feedback occurs. On the other hand, while the Portland model is correctly endorsed as an approach that brings people closer to planning, its application may also be seen to represent a move to further consolidate the production of the urban environment as the monopoly of the planning professions and the state. People can plan the city but only insofar as they align themselves with the state and only if they can line up their schedules with the state's rigid planning cycles. Possibly because of political cycles, there is a desire within the state (or at least a tendency) to reduce the planning of a city into five year intervals. Similarly, possibly as a need to legitimise their professions and to successfully market planning services, planning professionals and their clients tend to focus on the production of a plan rather than facilitating an open ended planning process where they must wait for an inspired public to voluntarily submit plans.

This paper proposes that in order to break away from this mode of planning urban designers must take heed of Healey's call to always view their own plans as incomplete. They must see the purpose of their plans as only to inspire development rather than to dictate it. The planning must create an opportunity for people to respond to urban design frameworks in a variety of ways. In the next chapter, the paper presents its design proposal, which serves to show how an incomplete framework ought to look. None of the ideas shown on the framework are fixed but they aim to synthesize the various forces acting on the site and to challenge and inspire and even incentivise people into becoming interested in development around the study area.