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Development Interventions Reconsidered:

USAID in Zimbabwe

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The debate on the role and value of foreign assistance in the United States rarely explores the issue of development impact; rather, the debate is dominated by political considerations. Despite the politics of Unites States foreign assistance, millions of dollars are spent each year in distant countries. Development interventions initiated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) consequently affect the development prospects of recipients of their assistance. This study grew out of a desire to understand the development impact of USAID so that (at the very least) the author's capacity to engage in debates on the importance of foreign assistance could be more informed.

In that sense, the study has been valuable. More importantly however, my research in Zimbabwe reminded me that the development process is extremely complex and difficult. It is rather easy to be a critic of development agencies (especially foreign development agencies) but more difficult to pose thoughtful questions and search for tentative ways forward. I hope that this research shows some movement towards this objective.

There are many people who have played an instrumental role in the development of this dissertation. Dr. Sheila Meintjes has been an exceptional academic advisor. She was thoughtful, patient, critical and supportive. The dissertation is more considered (and better written) as a result of her influence. Professor Peter Delius has also been of great assistance, especially since joining Operation Hunger in 1993 where many of the ideas that were sharpened while in Zimbabwe have since been applied and reconsidered. Many people at the University of the Witwatersrand have offered constructive advise and support during the development of this dissertation, including Glen Adler, Russell Ally, Mark Devenney, Tom Lodge, Stephen Louw, Justine Lucas, Edwin Ritchken, Jonathan and Alf Stadler, Rupert

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While thanks are also extended to Mr. Ted Morse, Ms. Kim Finan and Ms. Patricia Buckles of USAID. It must also be stressed that my interactions with USAID were extremely difficult. Mr. Morse, Ms. Finan and Ms. Buckles were extremely rude and arrogant throughout my time in Zimbabwe, clearly worried about a student conducting independent research on "their" programmes. While it must be accepted that many Staff members at USAID feel "under siege" from Congress, the American public, and the press, it hardly justifies their actions or approach.

Finally, I would not have completed this dissertation if it was not for the constant love, support, critical insights and suggestions I received from Lindsey Breslin.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The impact of development interventions on recipient populations is affected by numerous factors and tensions. Development is a complicated process with unforeseen consequences. This process unfolds in ways not foreseen by donors, the state or the numerous recipients of a particular intervention. This study provides insights into this process by assessing the impact of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) agricultural marketing programme on recipients in Gokwe, a Communal Area of Zimbabwe.

In many respects, the African continent is a development laboratory. To illustrate a fantastic but not completely unreasonable scenario: an African farmer may be affected by any number of development initiatives which are initially beyond her control. The crops that are grown may be determined by the state, a multilateral development bank or a bilateral aid institution. The money required for the production inputs and the price received for the produce could be directly affected by a devaluation scheme devised by the International Monetary Fund. The farmer may be part of a Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) pilot project that requires the household to leave certain parts of the family plot fallow for a year or more. The family diet may be augmented through the parents' involvement in a Food-For-Work scheme. Different domestic and international self-help groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating in the area could have new ideas on better resource management which calls for changes in

the family production process. The international environmental community may condemn the excessive use of wood for fuel consumption and suggest biomass as an alternative. An international donor may offer the eldest son an education sponsored by a good Samaritan in a far off land, and one day, when the rains have failed and the international community has defined the region as a "famine area", the family will be fed international agricultural surpluses until the world determines that the famine has ended.

Yet, research increasingly illustrates the numerous ways in which recipients of development support reshape interventions in ways unforseen by the designers of the programmes. The "Farmer First" movement emerged as a response to the li .ations of "transfer of technology" (tot) initiatives where technologies developed in laboratories and experimental stations under "ideal" conditions failed when applied in a real life context. The primary thrust of the movement was the recognition that farmers throughout the world were active agents of change rather than passive recipients of exogenous development support or influences. Chambers *et. al.* (1989) documented numerous cases of agricultural extension agents and agronomists who developed sophisticated technologies, like potato dryers, only to discover that farmers utilised these systems for other purposes, like maize processing. The end result was not only contrary to the original design but, in many cases, yielded more significant results for the recipients than originally conceived by the technology's designers.[1] Similar results were documented in Bovin and Manger's (1990) study on adaptive strategies

[1] The Farmer First movement has correctly been criticised for neglecting critical issues of power and overemphasising farmers knowledge. The real challenge is to engage in programmes that clarify issues of power and powerlessness, identify differing local opportunities and constraints and demonstrating the roles and responsibilities of different role players - from local residents through exogenous development institutions - in development initiatives. For a further discussion of this see Breslin and Delius (1996), Scoones *et. al.* (1994) and the contributions to ***PLA Notes 24: Critical Reflections from Practice***, 1995.

among pastoralists in the arid regions of Africa.

Long (1989) developed this idea further when exploring the notion of development interfaces. Central to this argument was the notion that development interventions had to be seen as the coming together of different and at times conflictual "world views". The interface between expatriate development bureaucrats, government extension agents and local recipients exposed how different understandings of a particular development programme inevitably shaped the outcome of that particular intervention. To illustrate, an integrated development programme sponsored by USAID in Costa Rica was met with apathy from the supposed beneficiaries as the initiative did not conform to their particular world views. New projects, such as a water supply programme, emerged as a result of the conflicts between local "peasants" and bureaucrats that, in the end, differed dramatically from the original programme (de Vries 1992).[2]

The critical point is to recognise that development interventions are reshaped and reformulated by different recipients of this support based upon a range of complex factors and that development rarely results in entire "communities" progressing forward. Development, in the end, is an uneven process where some people are able to gain from a particular intervention, others may reshape a particular intervention to suit their specific needs while still others may be undermined during the process.

This study is designed to explore these dynamics by examining the foundations and effect of a United States bilateral development assistance programme in the Republic of Zimbabwe. It should be stressed that there are numerous U.S. NGOs, PVOs, semi-

[2] The analysis of different world views by Long *et. al.* (1989 and 1992) would be significantly strengthened if there was a greater appreciation for the diversity of world views that exists within local communities themselves.

autonomous government institutions (such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) and federal government departments (such as the Department of Treasury) who have an impact on the development process but whose activities are beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, the study will concentrate on the development efforts of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The reason for this decision is that USAID is the principle U.S. federal institution whose mission is in the development field.

Foreign assistance is an extremely contentious issue in the United States and elsewhere. United States bilateral foreign assistance has been ambiguously divided between military, security and economic development assistance. Political considerations, based upon perceived U.S. national security, continue to play a significant role in foreign assistance allocations. Many policymakers and businessmen in the U.S. contend that foreign assistance helps protect and maintain U.S. economic interests throughout the world by facilitating the transfer of U.S. goods and services into foreign markets. Critics have questioned the emphasis on U.S. political and economic interests in development policy as American "interests" in many cases are not necessarily consistent with the concerns of the recipient state or populace.[3] These critics argue that foreign assistance has served to undermine indigenous development efforts, making developing nations more dependent and vulnerable to international and environmental forces over which they exercise no control. Research by Fantu Cheru (1989: X) would support such conclusions in Africa, where rural farmers in Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania and the Sudan exclaimed "Please don't develop us" as they were increasingly frustrated by international development efforts that exacerbated rather than improved their condition.

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[3] The notion that there are one universally accepted set of US interests which should be promoted by foreign aid is simplistic.

Unfortunately, much of the debate on foreign assistance has been characterised by sweeping generalisations and narrow political agendas. Importantly, research is increasingly focusing on the impact internationally-funded and supported development programmes have had on recipients of this assistance.[4] Donors and researchers focus their efforts on assessing the impact of development work in particular areas and exploring what their findings mean for future development interventions. Important lessons have been learned and efforts to integrate these lessons into future development planning and policy do occur. One of the main challenges of this study is therefore to explore the impact a particular USAID development intervention had on residents of Gokwe to provide insights into the effectiveness of foreign assistance "on the ground". This study then attempts to build upon the growing body of research that looks at how broad development policy affects recipients (often in differing ways) and what these findings suggest for future U.S. development work.

1.2 The Foreign Assistance Debate

As indicated above, the debate over the merits of United States foreign assistance is characterised by more smoke than fire. The Republican-controlled Senate's Foreign Relations Committee is chaired by Senator Jesse Helms, who is a fierce critic of foreign assistance. Pat Buchanon, whose Republican Presidential primary results can not be easily dismissed, claims that he will abolish all foreign aid if elected. Supporters of Helms and Buchanon contend that U.S. foreign assistance should be invested in middle America and that the money currently allocated is used to bolster institutions hostile to the United States such as the World Bank and United Nations, or governments that do not toe the American line like Zimbabwe. This

[4] Evidence to support this claim is provided below.

constituency argues for the continued centrality of U.S. national security interests in the application of US foreign assistance. The argument of mutual interdependence is closely linked to the position of national security. Proponents of this view contend that foreign aid could be a "win-win" proposition as the interests of poorer countries is similar to those of the United States. Closely linked to this argument is the belief that the United States has a moral obligation to developing countries and that it is not in the long-run interest of the US to have large segments of the global population marginalised and destitute. Finally, there are many critics of bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance who believe that the programmes either further "western" imperialism or are implemented to meet donors', as opposed to recipients', needs. These critics often call for a reformulation of the development funding process that decentralises the responsibility for programme design and implementation to host communities or states. What advocates of each of these positions agree upon is the need to fundamentally transform USAID. Each of these positions will be explored in greater detail below.

Advocates who argue that US foreign assistance should only be considered based upon national security considerations are a powerful part of the aid lobby. This constituency has consistently argued that foreign aid allocations "should be determined exclusively by considerations of national interest" (Riddell 1987: 61). As Riddell (1987: 61) argues, supporters of this position make the case that

> If national-interest criteria lead to the decision that aid should be provided to assist in the relief of poverty or accelerate the pace of development in a poor country - as frequently happens - so much the better; but these would be subsidiary advantages and not the basis upon which the decision to provide the aid was made.

As Sincere (1990: 1) contends, supporters of the national security argument have consistently argued that US foreign aid must be used as a "tool of foreign policy, to promote

economic growth, encourage free enterprise and democracy, and to serve as a weapon in the growing arsenal fighting the encroachment of Communism around the world". The largest disbursements of foreign aid allocations has consistently been targeted at countries like Egypt and Israel whose importance to US national security far outweighs any discussion of the apparent need for development resources in these countries compared with other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

It should however be stressed that those who argue that foreign aid must serve national security interests do not argue for the termination of an assistance programme. Rather, they argue that all aid transfers must clearly demonstrate benefits to the United States. An example of this approach, in the early days of USAID, was Richard Nixon arguing in his 1968 Presidential campaign, "let us remember that the main purpose of American aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves" (cited in Riddell 1987:62). Many in the United States as well as future Presidents remain comfortable with this argument made 26 years ago, although the nature of the debate has increasingly switched from national security being defined in military terms to one that increasingly emphasises American economic interests.[5] Proponents of this view believe that USAID should be dramatically transformed. Most importantly, the underlying assumption of this position is that the "interdependent" nature of the global economy means that the United States is fundamentally affected by events in other parts of the world. Poverty around the globe would, in this view, have negative economic, social, political and environmental consequences for the United States. Development assistance is therefore necessary. Supporters of this view often uncritically link American interests with those of various Third World countries.

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[5] Economic interests have always been important to policymakers but often secondary to broader geo-strategic interests.

A strong proponent of this view is Sincere (1990). Sincere argues that debate on the effect of development assistance - whether funded by the World Bank, USAID or numerous smaller NGOs - is hindered by the lack of effective or critical evaluations of development projects. The evaluations that are conducted are general and serve to confirm that development resources have been expended rather than concentrating on the impact of the particular development intervention on the recipient population. Despite this, US foreign assistance has been poorly conceptualised according to Sincere. He argues (1990: 133) that "development assistance plays a limited if not exacerbating role in the development of Third World countries - countries that were once called 'backward' are now called 'developing'". Sincere concludes that USAID should be fundamentally transformed to promote stronger linkages between American business and emergent Third World entrepreneurs, which would lead to mutual benefits in both America and in the Third World.

Similar arguments were made in 1989 by the Phoenix Group, who argued that

> To be justified, U.S. foreign aid programs must be in the U.S. national interest. This concept is logical and evident. Aid to developing countries does serve U.S. interests. Improving their economies improves their value as trading partners. Aid targeted on their environmental concerns helps our environment. It is also a way to combat global pollution, reduce mass migration of people from one country to another and to help reduce global tensions. (Phoenix Group 1989: 3)

The linkage between American interests and those of the Third World are clear and uncomplicated according to the Phoenix Group. The Phoenix Group concluded that US foreign development aid should be removed from the State Department and instead headed by a Presidential-level council, and "most U.S. aid missions overseas must be replaced by problem-solving, results-oriented, binational task forces" (1989: 3).

An important report that argued for a change in the United States' current approach

to development is ***Development and the National Interest: U.S. Economic Assistance into the 21st Century***, released by former USAID Administrator Alan Woods (USAID 1989). Woods argued that USAID needed to refocus its development strategies to incorporate not only the changing international political and economic climate, but also the views of the people affected by the development process. Woods believed that this was necessary in order to make foreign assistance more effective in meeting the basic needs of marginalized people throughout the world. Woods did not offer any concrete policy recommendations however. Instead, he posed a number of questions which must be reconciled in order to make United States foreign assistance more effective, including a clear definition of the relationship between national interest and development policy, growth and social progress, and the interrelationship between trade, investment and development. The overall thrust of the report was based upon the "interdependence" of the United States and the Third World, and again assumed that the interests of America were consistent with the interests of aid recipients. Similar sentiments were conveyed in the Brandt Report (1980) and appeared a decade later in ***In the U.S. Interest: Resources, Growth, and Security in the Developing World*** (Welsh Brown 1990).

Literature pertaining to the links between foreign assistance and development includes those which argue that the existing of foreign assistance are generally adequate at meeting national interests although they do require modification. One such study is Cassen and Associates' ***Does Aid Work?*** This study highlights both the successes and the magnitude and causes of aid's imperfections. Cassen ***et al.*** (1982: 13) believed that "the great majority of aid succeeds in its developmental objectives". While aid may succeed in this capacity, a limitation of the study was to examine whether aid's objectives were consistent with the needs of the affected populace or the recipient country at that time.

There were a number of critics of this view however. Lord Bauer (1984), for instance, argued that development assistance was not effective in addressing poverty. Bauer was a sharp critic of foreign aid but did not necessarily argue for its complete termination. Nevertheless, many of Bauer's arguments resonated with those who wished to abandon U.S. foreign aid. Bauer argued that foreign aid had, in effect, brought the Third World into existence. As he comments (1984: 40), "the one common characteristic of the Third World is not poverty, stagnation, exploitation, brotherhood or skin colour. It is the receipt of foreign aid". The Third World was a political concept, where nation states vied for larger donations from the richer countries of the "West". Bauer argued that foreign aid allowed governments to pursue policies that undermined development, retarded growth, exacerbated poverty and "enhance the hold of governments over their subjects, and promote the politicization of life" (Bauer 1984: 46).[6]

One of the most vocal advocates of structural changes to the development process in the United States was The Development Group for Alternative Policies (The Development GAP), a non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. The Development GAP was instrumental in reshaping U.S. development policy towards Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa by refocusing development assistance towards the needs of the poor and by increasing local participation in the development process. Their impact on American bilateral assistance to Africa is most evident in their role as the creators of the African Development Foundation. In 1988, three of the Development GAP's founders, Stephen Hellinger, Douglas Hellinger and Fred M. O'Regan published ***Aid For Just Development*** which argued that United States foreign assistance needed to be fundamentally altered if it was to adequately address the

[6] An example used by Bauer was the villigisation programme implemented by President Nyerere of Tanzania during the 1960s and 1970s.

needs of marginalized people throughout the world. Hellinger *et. al.* (1988) believed that foreign assistance would fail unless those affected by development assistance were involved in the conceptualization and implementation of development programmes.

Similar criticisms of the impact of foreign aid were made at the time by Raikes (1988). Raikes analyses the impact of western interventions (predominately European) in Africa's agricultural sectors, demonstrating that it served to marginalize rural communities and consequently increased their vulnerability to crisis situations such as droughts. In opposition to conventional analyses of food deficiency in Africa, Raikes argued that increased imports of food to Africa and the issue of hunger were separate.

> They are often wrongly collapsed into one crisis in which increased imports stem directly from stagnating local food production. This exaggerates the per capita decline in food production and generates technicist policies, whose main, if not sole, aim is to increase aggregate production as rapidly as possible. One major difficulty with this approach is that today's short-term "technical fix" can only too easily add to the problems of tomorrow. Another is that it ignores the vital issue of distribution. (1988: 1)

Raikes showed that seasonal hunger often came at times when no food shortage exists. Raikes did not advocate the termination of food aid for the result of such action would be catastrophic for many communities which must receive such aid in order to survive. Rather, he posited that increased food security for the most vulnerable Africans would only be realized by increases in aggregate food supplies and an improvement in the ability of Africans not only to produce their own food but also to generate incomes which could adequately support the food requirements of the family.[7]

Ferguson (1990) assessed the justifications for a joint World Bank/Canadian

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[7] Also see Sen's (1981) seminal study on poverty and famines and Moyes' (1987) study on the impact of the European Commission's Common Agricultural Policy on the Third World.

International Development Agency (CIDA) agricultural project in Lesotho, arguing that, rather than concentrating one's analysis on what the project attempts to accomplish, one should rather examine what the project actually achieved in a specific context. The study was primarily concerned with exploring how development ideas were generated and administered by development agencies, and how these programmes affected local recipients. What is lacking in Ferguson's study however, is a closer examination of what the people affected by the project actually thought of the project and what alternatives they would propose to ameliorate their tenuous condition.

A more journalistic critique of foreign aid was offered by Hancock (1989), who argued that development assistance is geared towards the interests of Western consultants and businesses, perpetuating Africa's current state of underdevelopment. Offering a wide array of failed development projects to support his thesis, Hancock concluded that foreign assistance is beyond repair, and therefore should be terminated.

My own study suggests that the foreign assistance debate would be significantly enhanced by programmes based more clearly on measurable results and tangible benefits to recipients of United States foreign aid. USAID has, since its inception, not been judged by Congress or the American public on whether its programmes have had a tangible impact on recipients of foreign assistance. The "moral argument" for aid, which I believe does resonate with many Americans, would be strengthened if American taxpayers felt that the development prospects of African "basket-cases", for instance, were actually improving.

1.3 Overview of the Study

This study is broken into five further chapters. The following chapter provides a broad overview of the evolution of United States foreign assistance from the Marshal Plan

after World War II through the early years of the Bush administration. Significant emphasis is placed upon the development and subsequent amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which continues to provide the legislative foundations for the United States's foreign assistance programmes. This chapter also provides insights into American foreign assistance targeted at the southern African sub-region during the 1970s. This section not only demonstrates how United States foreign assistance was used as a political toll by different administrations but also places USAID's development programme in Zimbabwe in context.

Chapter three provides an overview of the evolution of agricultural development and marketing in Zimbabwe.[8] The chapter primarily concentrates on how the colonial state used statutory marketing bodies, like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), to provide critical support to small-scale white farmers. The state also needed to ensure that grains produced by African farmers were sold to the statutory bodies, which created opportunities for some African producers to accumulate resources to a far greater extent than other African producers. Most importantly, the chapter provides insights into the nature of grain marketing which is uni-directional. This system, which was perhaps appropriate when the number of Grain Marketing Depots was small and close to city centres, has had dramatic consequences for ***food deficit households*** when the marketing system was extended to ***food deficit*** regions of the country with the financial support of USAID. The chapter also provides insights into the various marketing options historically utilised by African farmers and food deficit households in isolated parts of the country which, it is argued in chapter five, have been

[8] Zimbabwe, like many other countries, has seen the names of places, including the name of the country, change on several occasions throughout history. The names of these places changes throughout the study based upon the time period under discussion. For instance, the capital is referred to as Salisbury until sections dealing with the post-independence period (1980) where the name is changed to Harare.

eroded following the introduction of marketing depots in these isolated areas following independence.

Chapter four is concerned with the design of USAID's agricultural programmes in Zimbabwe following independence. The chapter critiques the assumptions that serve as the foundations for the Commodity Import Programme (CIP), which targeted tractors at "progressive" farmers, and the Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance (ZASA) Programme, designed to extend marketing facilities to "traditional" farmers throughout the country. USAID's assessment of the impact of the CIP are tentatively questioned in this chapter because data from the recipients of the CIP-funded tractors were not interviewed as part of this study. Efforts to interview these farmers proved fruitless as the beneficiaries - white commercial farmers - were understandably reluctant to provide information to the author on how the tractors they received assisted them in shifting their productive base and whether the tractors allowed them to either reduce their labour force or shift their labour force from permanent to seasonal labour.

Chapter five brings the analysis of the programme into the context of Gokwe, an isolated rural area specifically mentioned by the Riddell Commission (1981: 36) as a priority area for the extension of marketing facilities following independence. USAID funded the development of four GMB depots in the area as part of ZASA. Research was conducted in Gokwe between 1992-93 to determine how farmers in the area were effected by the introduction of the grain marketing system in the area. Evidence presented in the chapter strongly suggests that the GMB depots have benefitted a small number of relatively wealthy farmers but as a whole has had a detrimental impact on residents in Gokwe.

Chapter six brings the study together by exploring the foundations of a structural adjustment programme sponsored by USAID that is designed to rectify the problems

associated with the grain marketing system. The chapter also explores USAID's current "re-engineering" efforts designed to make the organisation relevant in the future and undermine efforts in the United States to close the Agency. While the broad re-engineering strategy is welcomed, critical questions are posed about how this process will be implemented given the lessons drawn from the evaluation of the CIP and ZASA.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

2.1 Introduction

The Introduction was concerned with establishing the foundations for this study. As demonstrated, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s mandate is confusing and at times contradictory. This chapter will illustrate this by providing an overview of the evolution of foreign assistance in the United States. This will be followed by a brief overview of the use of foreign aid in the southern African sub-region prior to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. This provides the foundation for a description of Zimbabwe, the United States development programme targeted at the agricultural sector of the country and the impact these programmes had on people in an isolated area of the country to see how the different world views of the actors involved were shaped and re-shaped over the course of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance (ZASA) initiative.

2.2 Evolution of United States Development Assistance

United States post-war bilateral development interventions was always ambiguously conceptualized and contradictory, as discussed in the Introduction.[1] The numerous changes

[1] The first bilateral plan administered by the United States was the "Lend-Lease" programme. Lend-Lease provided military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union to assist in the war effort against the Germany during World War II. The programme was terminated in 1945. United States multilateral development assistance began in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. At the Conference, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now referred to as the World Bank) was created. The Bank's initial goal was to administer private investment in Europe following the culmination of the Second World War. United States influence over Bank policy was clearly evident in its earliest years as the U.S. blocked World

in goals reflected in amendments to the guiding legislation reflected wider geo-political, economic and development trends. An understanding of the critical interaction between these wider forces is therefore critical in order to place this study in context. It should be stressed that the United States' approach to Africa in general, and southern Africa specifically, was determined by its global concern to retain its balance of power against Soviet expansion and influence. The linchpin of this approach was to ensure that European allies could retain their sovereignty, even though this was in sharp contrast to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Consequently, the first large-scale development intervention by the United States was the Marshall Plan. The goals of the Marshall Plan were clear and short-term - to rebuild post-War Europe.

> European reconstruction was always seen as a finite short-term exercise that would end upon the attainment of a clearly defined goal. And, from the beginning, the reconstruction was an obvious success. It did, in fact, end. (USAID 1989: 17)

Europe required the infusion of large amounts of capital to assist in its reconstruction following World War II as Europe already possessed the necessary "management, skilled labor, and...ingrained market instincts" (USAID 1989: 17) due to their developed status. The motives were both humanitarian and strategic. This is clearly reflected in separate speeches given by Secretary of State Marshall.

> If we decide that the United States is unable or unwilling effectively to assist in the reconstruction of Europe, we must accept the consequences of its collapse into the dictatorship of police states...There is no doubt in my mind that the whole world hangs in the balance. (Hamilton 1989: 215)

and

> (the Marshall Plan is a program) not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. (Hamilton 1989: 215)

Bank efforts at facilitating private investment into Eastern Europe.

Following the Second World War, the United States determined that the provision of economic assistance would better ensure stability and U.S. economic interests than the maintenance of a military presence in the region (Rossiter 1985: 15). The provision of U.S. economic assistance was seen as a deterrent against communism, a concept that has largely remained consistent throughout the life of U.S. foreign aid. The administration of the Marshall Plan was undertaken under the guidance of businessmen rather than a specific federal institution. This decision was based on the premise that political considerations would impinge on the timely transfer of inputs to the vital sectors of European industry targeted for rehabilitation. Importantly, subsequent assistance programmes have been administered within numerous federal departments, primarily the Department of State. The intertwining of humanitarian, strategic, security, diplomatic and developmental interests under the rubric of foreign assistance was concretised during this era.

The cost of the Marshall Plan, between the years 1946-1951, was US$181.2 billion (in constant 1989 dollars). Of this total, US$149.9 billion was allocated to Europe, US$30.0 billion to Asia, and US$1.3 billion to Asia, Africa and Latin America (Heginbotham 1988: CRS-16). The assistance was in the form of "dollar credits for imports of industrial goods and services from the United States" (Rossiter 1985: 16). The majority of the assistance consisted of a wide range of commodities aimed at rehabilitating Europe's industrial and agricultural sectors and infrastructure. A small but important part of Marshall Plan assistance to Europe was in the form of military aid. This was primarily aimed at rebuilding allied forces to preserve the uneasy East-West deadlock manifest in Europe. The assistance to Asia was largely concentrated on the Philippines, South Korea and mainland China until the assumption of power by Mao Tse-Tung in 1949. This aid was used as "direct financial commodity support for anti-leftist governments" (Rossiter 1985: 16). The aid to the Middle

East, Africa and Latin America was largely directed towards infrastructure projects.

United States support to Africa was extremely limited during the 1950s. The overriding concern was to support infrastructure projects but not to undermine the colonial powers that still operated throughout Africa at this time. In 1953, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa stated "Let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas... We cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own security" (cited in Clough 1992b: 5). The Assistant Secretary of State for the sub-region noted in 1955 "that American interests in Africa were 'real but limited'" (cited in Herbst 1992: 3).

Foreign assistance was however changing. In 1951, the Mutual Security Act was passed signalling a dramatic shift in Official Development Assistance (ODA) away from Western European countries to East and West Asia. The genesis of the Act was President Truman's "Point Four Program" speech of 1949. The programme envisioned technological transfers to the Third World to facilitate economic growth and development.[2] The overriding concern remained political. The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) was created to respond to 'the deteriorating political situation in the Far East (Hellinger *et. al.* 1988: 15). The annual levels of ODA was halved, from US$14.8 billion, at the end of the Marshall Plan programme, to US$7.6 billion. The countries targeted for assistance were, on the one hand, pursuing the development of their industrial and agricultural sectors. On the other, recipients were viewed as critical buffers against further communist advancement. The links between development and security were consequently preserved. Four programmes that were institutionalized in

[2] For an important critique of the success of technology transfer to the countries of the South, see Smillie 1991.

the foreign assistance process at this stage remain today: security assistance, food and military aid, and development assistance.

First, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) fell under the rubric of security assistance. ESF has historically been used "to advance important security and political objectives" (Nowels 1988: CRS-2). Policy makers still consider ESF to be a flexible programme that can be rapidly employed to address a pressing national security concern. One must recognize the distinction between ESF and military assistance however. Although ESF is considered security assistance, this programme does not entail the transfer of military equipment or personnel to a particular host country. Rather, ESF includes "financing for non-military imports, general budget support, cash transfers, and project aid to support long-term development efforts" (Nowels 1988: CRS-2).

During the 1950s, security assistance was concentrated almost solely on South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan. Security assistance combined the construction of infrastructure with efforts to maintain loyal governments.

> The purchasing power of Security Assistance was used in South Korea and Taiwan to stimulate industrialization and extend infrastructure and services to the agricultural sector. In South Viet Nam, where the government was faced with a threat which was primarily internal rather than external, Security Assistance was used more directly to attempt to increase the control and popularity of the government. (Rossiter 1985: 18)

Food aid became a hallmark of the U.S. foreign aid programme with the passage of Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. The Food-for-Peace programme, as it is labelled, facilitated the disposal of United States agricultural surpluses "accumulated by the federal government under a program of price support" (Rossiter 1985: 19) while at the same time remaining consistent with the broad goals of U.S. diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian impulses. In many respects, the

formalizing of a government-directed food programme was also indicative of the success of the Marshall Plan. European farmers, severely handicapped following the Second World War had reasserted themselves on the international market. P.L. 480, therefore, also served to increase U.S. access to foreign markets by providing countries with an alternative to European foodstuffs. As the International Trade and Development Education Foundation (1985: 5) states, the multifaceted purposes of P.L. 480 food aid remains to

> expand international trade among the United States and friendly nations, to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to dispose of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities, to promote the economic stability of U.S. agriculture, to encourage economic development in developing nations, and to promote the foreign policy of the United States.)

The primary recipient of P.L. 480 entitlements during the 1950s was India. India had emerged as the leading voice of Third World discontent over U.S. policy in Indochina. In an effort to lessen the criticism voiced from the world's largest democracy at the time, the U.S. increased the amount of food aid grants to the Indian state. This programme was easily justified as conditions of abject squalor and pervasive hunger became familiar to the world as a whole. The channelling of aid through the Indian state also helped to lessen the severity of their public attacks on U.S. foreign policy. As will be shown below, a similar strategy was applied by the United States to the Frontline States during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

Direct military aid "has been relatively constant and has been the largest aid category during much of the post-war period." (Heginbotham 1988: CRS-11). The primary recipients of military aid during the 1950s were Greece, Taiwan and South Korea. Military aid allocations peaked in the early 1970s because of Vietnam, and again in 1985 following the successful efforts by the Reagan administration to make military aid a greater part of the assistance pie.

Finally, the emergence of development assistance to developing countries was institutionalized during this era. The main thrust of the programme was targeted at technical and commodity support for the construction of national infrastructure and for agricultural production. Some basic research was also conducted under this programme. The emphasis of the programme remained political. The U.S. sought to maintain economic and political security in a world that was perceived to be slowly moving towards the Soviet sphere of influence as nationalist movements began to emerge throughout the colonized world.

> The major motive of United States development forays into these uncharted waters in the 1950s and 1960s remained anti-communism, a belief that if the standards of living were improved in Asia and Latin America, communism would be a less attractive alternative...There was also an assumption that American aid should be contingent upon the recipient countries' own good faith efforts to foster economic development. (USAID 1989: 18)[3]

This final point is significant. It highlights an approach to development illustrated in the Zimbabwean context that largely relied upon the recipient state's development efforts and accountability to its people. It is also important to note that development assistance and ESF overlapped. Both programs had been administered by USAID since 1961. Both development and ESF projects were operationalized in a similar manner, based upon a particular development approach employed by USAID. The biggest difference between the two programs was that development assistance could be "raided", where funds could be shifted from one country to another without Congressional approval. Security assistance remained concentrated upon countries of immediate strategic and diplomatic importance. It was therefore far more difficult to disrupt the allocation of this type of aid once it had been allocated.

As former European colonies began to gain their formal independence during the

[3] Noteworthy is the absence of Africa from this strategy.

1960s, a re-examination of foreign assistance occurred which served to reshape the direction of U.S. bilateral assistance for the next two decades. The Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Programme commissioned a study by Walter Rostow and Max Milken. The study, entitled "The Objectives of U.S. Economic Assistance Programs", argued that a policy of deterrence against the Soviet Union was, by itself, inadequate to "achieve a world environment favorable to the United States" (Galdi 1988: CRS-11). What was necessary, according to the authors of this study, was the formulation of a comprehensive assistance programme that, if isolated from foreign policy considerations, would facilitate economic growth and constitute an important alternative to communism. While U.S. Policy makers had consistently used such logic to justify the foreign aid programme, its administration was haphazardly organized. What Rostow and Milken were proposing, therefore, was the clearer direction and administration of the foreign aid programme. As Hellinger et. al. (1988: 15) argue, "its authors' top-down development approach and cold war fixation have undoubtedly influenced subsequent legislation to this day". Legislative action on these recommendations, broadly supported by other studies, occurred in 1961.

With the inauguration of President Kennedy came "the first major attempt to define the functions of mili and economic assistance to the Third World" (Rossiter 1985: 15). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 formed the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign aid programme. The Agency for International Development was created and served as the principal institution used by the United States to administer development and security assistance throughout the world, even in the 1990s.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 directed USAID to "encourage...the utilization of engineering and professional services of United States firms...in connection with capital projects financed by funds authorized under the...Act" (Hellinger *et. al.* 1988. 17). It further

authorized that USAID money should be concentrated within the United States Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) community rather than soliciting the assistance of Third World Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This mandate, with its emphasis on U.S. private and public sector intervention in developing regions, facilitated the rise of the "aid lobby" which puts pressure on the federal government for the realization of their specific programmes.

Security assistance during the 1960s was used primarily to support U.S. strategic interests in Indochina. With the culmination of the Korean War, U.S. concern shifted to Vietnam, which had recently gained its independence from France. USAID personnel "fanned out over areas controlled by the government and implemented a wide variety of projects designed to improve living conditions and, hence, loyalty to the government" (Rossiter 1985: 20). In addition, the United States used the proceeds from P.L. 480 food aid to pay the South Vietnamese army, the first use of food aid for military purposes.

Development assistance during the Kennedy administration continued to be utilized in Africa and Latin America to counter perceived communist threats. Development projects were initiated throughout these regions on the continued belief that

> American know-how rather than American purchasing power was the key to solving the Third World's problems...It manifest itself in institutions as diverse as the Peace Corps and the "Green Berets". (The Kennedy administration) also held most strongly to the truism that development per se in the Third World was important to America's long-term economic and strategic self-interest. (Hoben 1989: 255)

USAID's development mandate increased throughout the 1960s as did its interest in Africa during the early part of the decade. Programmes developed under President Kennedy mixed geo-strategic and humanitarian interests. During the 1960 election campaign, Kennedy argued that America had "lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the

needs and aspirations of the African people" (cited in Clough 1992b: 7). Aid to the continent increased from US$110 million to US$519 million between 1958 - 1962 and accounted for eight percent of total U.S. foreign aid (Clough 1992b: 7). In addition, programmes such as the Peace Corps were initiated. The Peace Corps was designed to counter perceived Soviet advances in the Third World and personified the continued linkage of strategic and development strategies of U.S. foreign policy and aid.[4]

Policy makers continued to view export-led agricultural production and research, infrastructure construction, foreign investment and education as prerequisites to the successful alleviation of poverty and misery that television was instrumental in bringing home to millions of Americans on a regular basis. Development programmes were initiated and optimism ran high as many believed that the conditions of poverty endemic in the Third World would soon be eradicated. As Herbst (1992: 7) argues, there existed "a fairly direct causal relationship between the total level of capital investment in a developing country and its overall development". It was believed that transfers of capital and expertise were required. Little attention was paid to the strengthening of human capital during this process. More significant was that programmes with a focus on poverty alleviation were absent (Herbst 1992: 7).

The optimism of the early 1960s was shattered during the Vietnam era however. As the war escalated, it became clear to many that U.S. development and security aid had neither increased the standards of living of the Vietnamese people nor popularized the government. Questions emerged regarding the nature of the U.S. bilateral aid programme as increased transfers of capital and resources had not alleviated the tenuous condition of the affected

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[4] For an overview and assessment of the Peace Corps programme in Cameroon, see Amin 1992.

region. In many respects, the condition of the Third World deteriorated while "leftist" influences were perceived to be increasingly accepted throughout the world. A number of reports surfaced which brought into question U.S. development policy as a result of the growing uncertainty over the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign aid programme.

The Korry Report, published in 1966, had a particularly strong impact on USAID operations in Africa. It argued that the Africa programmes were a

> scatteration, that is to say, our involvement in hundreds of projects dealing with almost every conceivable activity related to development and at many levels...in 33 countries. (Hoben 1989: 255)

Another critic of USAID was Senator Frank Church (1971) whose insights into the future of foreign aid were significant.

> Never yet...have we considered in full measure the possibility that the failure of aid is not technical and administrative but conceptual and political...(Reactionary regimes) value aid from the United States as a means of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power...American economic aid is commonly used to promote industrialization programs which generate a high level of consumption for the privileged and little, if any, trickle-down benefits for the dispossessed.

Combined with this critique of the effectiveness of United States foreign assistance was the growing recognition that the United States had overestimated the Soviet threat in Africa, and that the "economic and cultural ties binding the continent's fledgling states to Europe proved far more powerful than anything Moscow or Beijing (which also displayed an interest in Africa during the 1960s) could offer" (Clough 1992b: 7).

A new terminology began to emerge in development circles during the latter half of the 1960s. "Rural development", "basic human needs", "growth-with-equity" and "redistribution with growth" all gained credence in development circles, although the impact on development institutions like USAID was initially limited. As Hellinger *et. al.* (1988: 21) argue, "donors still determined what those needs were and the poor remained the `targets'

of their aid". The approach remained versed in export-led strategies, free trade, infrastructure development and the increased accessibility of foreign investment as the means to developmental ends.

It became apparent to Congress during the early 1970s that the programmes supported by USAID had not had the desired effect. As a result, Congress overhauled the U.S. foreign aid programme. The "New Directions" legislation under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 emerged and became the foundation for foreign assistance for the remainder of the decade. Congress stipulated that USAID's development efforts had to be more organized. Future aid programmes were placed under distinct functional accounts. These accounts were: Food and Nutrition; Population Planning and Health; Education and Human Resources; and Select Development Projects. Congress also increased its oversight of the development process through "functional accounting, earmarking, and additional reporting requirements subject(ing) the agency and its missions to micromanagement" (Hoben 1988: 255. Also see Sincere 1990: 52-55). The result of such oversight was considered by many involved with USAID to be devastating from a developmental standpoint.

> Their (USAID's) incentive to understand and address the distinctive, long-term developmental needs of the host country was reduced, as was their incentive to focus on project implementation. In sum, mission staff had to devote an increased amount of their attention to solving USAID's own problems. In this sense, the locus of decision making for development shifted from host country institutions to USAID itself. (Hoben 1988: 256)

The growth of special interests, and their influence over Congressional oversight into the development industry grew substantially following the enactment of the "New Directions" legislation. Aid-tying increased and U.S. businesses used their influence over Congressional leaders to assist them in the procurement process. Projects were designed based on criteria designed in Washington.

> Project advocacy...not only fostered such distortions but also created strong incentives for field staff to "transform" the host countries problems, capabilities and commitments so that they would conform to the current Washington policy climate and review criteria...For this reason, it is not surprising that much of the sensitivity to cultural, social and institutional issues found in USAID Project Papers is filtered out as they are transformed into contracts by Washington-based contract officers. (Hoben 1988: 260-261)

The period also saw a shift in USAID policy towards rural development and training, as stipulated in the New Directions legislation. As will be demonstrated below and in later chapters, this did not necessarily mean that the poor became the direct recipients of aid. Rather, the emphasis on "trickle-down" approaches continued to be pursued. "Progressive" forces within the recipient community remained the primary targets of foreign assistance as they continued to be seen as the dynamic force in the development process.

By the end of the 1970s, Security Assistance allocations had dramatically increased while a subsequent reduction in overall ODA allocations occurred. Israel and Egypt emerged as the largest recipients of U.S. assistance.

> By 1979, when Egypt and Israel were receiving US$1.8 billion in Security Assistance, bilateral Development Assistance programming had fallen to US$1 billion, its lowest level, in real terms, under the Foreign Assistance Act. The ambitious (New Directions) Mandate, it appears, was not receiving comparably ambitious funding. (Rossiter 1985: 23)

The decline in the levels of foreign assistance was the direct result of the termination of the U.S. programme in Indochina, the decline in assistance to Pakistan and India, and the decrease in concern over Cuban influence in the South and Central American regions (Rossiter 1985: 23). The allocation of assistance to countries that represented important foreign policy considerations however increased. This was evident not only in Israel and Egypt, but also in southern Africa, where events following the Portuguese coup in 1974 and the perceived reality of Soviet expansion in the sub-region caused great alarm in the United

States.

Foreign assistance was seen as a significant political tool by the Reagan administration (1980-88) during the 1980s. During the initial years of the Reagan presidency, bilateral foreign assistance and defense spending were high budget priorities. In fact, Reagan shifted American funds away from multilateral development institutions, as it was felt that U.S. interests were better served at the bilateral level. Foreign assistance allocations became concentrated on fewer nations as the emphasis during the Reagan administration was on security and military assistance. By the Fiscal Year 1985 foreign assistance appropriations attained levels in excess of US$19 billion. Seventy-five percent of foreign assistance was allocated to Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, El Salvador, Greece and the Philippines.[5] The Reagan administration also maintained high aid levels to Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan during the early 1980s due to their value as way stations for American troops required in the Middle East.[6] Yet, despite the fact that foreign aid had grown by 88 percent under Reagan, the bulk of this increase came from dramatic increases to security related programmes. Military and ESF assistance were increased by 85 percent and 189 percent respectively (Nowells 1989: CRS-3). During the period 1985-1988, the levels of foreign assistance to Africa actually declined by 55 percent. This decrease in funding levels reflected the limited importance Africa played in the overall U.S. global hierarchy despite the perceived need of the continent's populace. It also reflects the limited nature of U.S. - African relations.

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[5] It is important to stress that Egypt is considered part of the Middle East by U.S. policy makers. Africa is subdivided into three regions - North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa.

[6] The importance of these countries was actually solidified as part of the "Carter Doctrine". In short, President Carter believed that the United States should use military means to protect American interests overseas. This doctrine was applied in the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran.

> The Reagan administration's position was also driven partially by the fact that Africa was becoming less important to the United States. Indeed, although U.S. trade with Africa was always low, it actually declined further in the 1980s. U.S. exports to Africa amounted to 2.7 percent of total U.S. exports and imports from Africa accounted for 5.5 percent of total imports By 1979, exports to Africa accounted for only 1.4 percent of total American exports and imports from Africa for only 3.0 percent of the total value of goods the United States purchased from the rest of the world... Similarly, U.S. investment in Africa is extremely low. In 1990, only .46 percent of total U.S. direct investment abroad was in sub-Saharan Africa. (Herbst 1992: 10-11)

A significant shift in the nature of foreign aid occurred under the Reagan administration however. Following on the heel of the "Berg Report" (World Bank 1981), the United States began to see the problems in Africa in terms of the excessive involvement in the economy of the African state and the limited role and impact of the private sector in the development process. Aid efforts slowly shifted from programme activities into the realm of policy reform. The argument was simple - if one did not get the policy right then development programmes would fail.[7] Reform programmes were still seen in geo-strategic terms, with Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker arguing that "promoting the abandonment of statist and anti-market policies would constitute a major American success and a significant defeat for our adversaries' influence in the third world'." (cited in Herbst 1992: 10). As we shall see below, the United States' programme in Zimbabwe increasingly shifted from marketing expansion to marketing reform.

What came to be known as the "Four Pillars" of development assistance under Reagan materialized in the latter 1980s. These included:

1. Policy Dialogue and Reform

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[7] While there is little doubt that "getting the policy right" is extremely complicated, there is merit in the argument that policy reform is important. For instance, the value of a health intervention can be completely undermined by the failure to promote a cadre of skilled health practitioners in the country, the inability to provide the necessary medical supplies to health points throughout the country and a clear policy on user fees (targeted or un-targeted).

2. Institutional Development - with a focus on decentralizing institutions and encouraging reliance on private and voluntary, rather than public institutions;
3. Technical Transfers - especially in the areas of biomedical research, agriculture and family planning; and
4. Private Sector Focus.[8]

During the later years of the Reagan administration the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) was created. USAID's Africa Desk had argued that African development programmes needed greater flexibility than offered under the functional accounting system developed during the 1970s and modified in the early 1980s (Galdi 1988: CRS-21 and Herbst 1992: 13). According to the enabling legislation, the DFA was designed to help the poor majority of men and women in sub-Saharan Africa to participate in the process of long-term development through economic growth that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant (cited in Herbst 1992: 15).

The DFA removed sub-Saharan Africa from the competition over stagnant security and ESF funding debates. Instead, a lump sum was given to USAID/Africa for "any economic development assistance activities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961" (Heginbotham 1988: CRS-17), although the programme had a strong policy reform component.

Many of the components of the United States' foreign aid programme were subsequently sustained under the Bush administration (1988-92), although the United States began to withdraw support for its traditional allies whose human rights records were no longer so easily tolerated following the demise of the Soviet Union. In what Clough (1992a) refers to as "cynical disengagement", the United States watched as former allies like Somalia,

[8] See Galdi 1988: CRS-11.

Liberia and Zaïre imploded. As Clough (1992a: 193) states,

> the United States (has become) the only superpower in the world. This has caused Africa ... to look to Washington for direction, encouragement, and support... Unfortunately, there is no evidence that President Bush or any of his senior advisors intend to take up the mantle of leadership in Africa.

2.3 The United States in Southern Africa

On 25 April 1974, the Portuguese Movimento das Forcas Armadas (AFM) ended Salazar's rule. General Spinola assumed control of Portugal and the repercussions were felt throughout the world. While the members of the military junta "broadly subscribed to Spinola's vision of autonomous colonies within the broader framework of a greater Lusitania," it readily became apparent that Portugal was no longer able to support its colonial empire (Tamarkin 1990: 10). By July 1974, Spinola agreed to nationalist independence aspirations. Mozambique gained independence in July 1975 while Angola gained its independence later that same year.

Prior to April 1974, the United States' southern Africa policy was based upon Kissinger's National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). NSSM 39 stipulated that U.S. interests were best served through the maintenance of the white minority regimes of southern Africa (South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese-controlled Angola and Mozambique). The United States would thus condemn the racist regimes in diplomatic settings but materially support them if it was deemed necessary for their survival (El-Khawar *et. al.* 1976). A number of policy changes were invoked, allowing the United States to bypass current restrictions on trade with minority regimes in the sub-region. In the case of South Africa, the United States Export-Import Bank

> extended loans to South African parastatals and removed a number of programming checks. Sales of small aircraft were permitted under private

> contract despite clear evidence that these "dual-purpose" exports were being used for counter-insurgency border patrol by "civilian" groups with government approval. (Rossiter 1985: 49)

Portugal's importance to U.S. security was based upon its role in NATO and U.S. access to the Azores air and naval base. The U.S. supplied Portugal with US$100 million in Security Assistance during the final three years of the Salazar regime. Defoliants, helicopters and jumbo jet airlines were purchased by the Portuguese state as "civilian transactions". The Portuguese government...vitiated these justifications (civilian transactions) by pointing in public statements to the usefulness of the jets as troop carriers" (Rossiter 1985: 51).

The clearest manifestation of material support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia was the passage of the "Byrd Amendment" which maintained the chromite trade between the U.S. and Rhodesia. Advocates of this amendment contended that U.S. national security was in jeonardy as the only other suppliers of chromite products were Eastern Bloc nations. The Amendment was in clear violation of United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia.[9]

Following the events in Lisbon, however, U.S. diplomatic and developmental actions in the sub-region changed. In 1975, Kissinger countered Soviet support for the Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola by provi rect financial and military support for both the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Uniao para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) through Zaire and South Africa. The support was in the forms of military assistance and cash grants of US$5 million to the Mobutu regime in Zaire. The U.S. Department of Defense supplied weapons to the armies

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[9] For a detailed study of the events that led to the passage of the "Byrd Amendment", see Lake 1976. Lake later became responsible for U.S. policy towards Rhodesia during the Carter Presidency and is currently President Clinton's National Security Advisor.

of the FNLA, UNITA, Zaïre and South Africa. As Rossiter (1985: 53) argues,

> His (Kissinger's) motivation was more to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the Soviets in the wake of defeat in Indochina than to place a U.S.-backed government in power in Luanda. On its face absurd, this explanation for U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war and the Zaïrian and South African invasions in the autumn of 1975 is supported by nearly very source close to U.S. policy making during the Angolan débâcle.

The United States' Angolan policy came under attack from members of Congress and the South African state following Cuba's successful attacks on the U.S. supported armies. South Africa claimed that the United States had betrayed them while Congress ended the policy in 1976.

These defeats brought about a change in Kissinger's regional tactics. At Lusaka in 1976, Kissinger openly pledged U.S. support for majority rule in Zimbabwe. Kissinger stated that the United States would exert greater pressure on the Smith government through greater diplomatic efforts and would call for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Further, he proposed the establishment of a Zimbabwe Development Fund of US$1 billion, to which the United States would be the major contributor. The "Kissinger Billion"

> was to be used to compensate white farmers during land reform and to aid in the reconstruction in the new nation. As an "inducement" to the front-line states suffering from the economic and military consequence of the Zimbabwean War, he pledged substantial economic assistance and diplomatic support to them in exchange for their cooperation with his efforts to negotiate a settlement. (Rossiter 1985: 55)

Assistance to the Frontline states from 1976-1980 reflected this promise, although the envisioned US$1 billion never materialized in Zimbabwe.

The shift in policy initiated under Kissinger and subtly modified under Carter was the result of numerous factors. First, U.S. actions in Angola largely resulted from a failed Indochina programme and the fear that the Southern African region could fall within the orbit

of the Soviet sphere of influence. Angola, Mozambique, and the leftist orientations of the Zimbabwean guerrilla movements added credence to this belief. Following the Angolan débâcle, however, the U.S. began to appreciate the noticeable erosion of "U.S. influence in the region".[10] U.S. regional support would grow, it was argued, through a policy that called for self-determination in Zimbabwe and economic assistance to the Frontline States. The United States determined that Zambia was the critical link in the entire process. This is clearly evident when one examines the dramatic rise in foreign assistance to Zambia during the latter 1970s.

Before proceeding with an analysis of the nature and levels of foreign assistance to the sub-region during the latter 1970s, a brief examination of the broader policy departures initiated under the Carter administration (1976-80) is necessary. Carter, in contrast to Kissinger, believed that the primary obstacle to a stable Southern African sub-region was South Africa, not the Soviet Union. Carter's appointments of Andrew Young to the United Nations and William Bowder as Ambassador to South Africa strained relations between the two states. Young was an outspoken critic of South Africa in the international arena. Bowder initiated "inter-racial living and social practices at the U.S. embassy that clearly violated South African law" (Rossiter 1985: 61). Furthermore, he led a high-level delegation to the funeral of Steven Biko. Carter also refused to accept a partial solution to the Zimbabwean situation, as he resisted pressure from Congressional leaders to acknowledge the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian settlement between Bishop Muzorewa and Smith.

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[10] This information is contained in the Congressional Research Service's Annual "Congress and Foreign Policy Brief" of 1976. It was hoped that the assistance proposed at Lusaka would limit Soviet influence in the region, identify the United States with African aspirations and encourage the development of a moderate Zimbabwean solution compatible with Western economic and strategic interests. See Congressional Research Service 1976: 179.

This did not result in a shift in regional economic assistance policy however. U.S. assistance to the sub-region, administered by USAID, dramatically escalated from the end of the Kissinger era through the Carter years. In 1976, prior to the Lusaka announcement, U.S. assistance to the sub-region totalled US$28.9 million. This figure rose to US$63.2 million in 1977, US$143.2 million in 1978, and concluding, in 1980, at US$102.7 million. The largest recipient was Zambia. U.S. assistance to the region was largely in the form of goods and services transfers under security and development programs, and humanitarian aid.

Angola received no security or development assistance from USAID due to the strained nature of relations between the U.S. and the MPLA. Disaster assistance, in the form of P.L. 480 Food Aid was administered through "various western and multilateral agencies ...g the needs of Angolan citizens in the aftermath of the civil war in 1976" (Rossiter 1985: 80). The total amount of the food aid programme, from 1977-1981, was US$13.4 million (see USAID *Aid Tables*).

Mozambique's role in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was significant. President Samora Machel repeatedly reiterated that the Zimbabwean and Mozambican struggles were one and the same. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) believed that an independent Zimbabwe was critical of Mozambique's efforts towards dismantling neo-colonial linkages. Mozambique suffered great economic and human losses during the war however. The closing of its Rhodesian border during the 1970s dramatically decreased revenue earned from Mozambique's ports. Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) bases in Mozambique were attacked by Rhodesian forces, causing the loss of life and increased disruptions to food production. The Portuguese exodus of the mid-1970s further devastated the economy. The United States, recognizing Machel's vulnerability, increased levels of foreign assistance to Mozambique during the latter years of the war. In

1976, U.S. aid to Mozambique amounted to US$1.1 million. By 1979, U.S. foreign assistance levels reached US$16.8 million, peaking the following year at US$18.9 million. By 1982, U.S. aid to Mozambique had dropped dramatically to US$0.6 million, reflecting U.S. attitudes towards Mozambique's socialist orientation (USAID *Aid Tables*).

Assistance to Botswana, which had always been considered a moderate state with democratic structures by Western standards, received noticeable increases in foreign assistance during the latter 1970s. Although Botswana's role as a Frontline State was more supportive than material, U.S. aid to the country increased during the period as well. In 1976, USAID funding levels were US$3.8 million. By 1980, U.S. foreign aid had risen to US$19.4 million despite a small decrease between 1978 and 1979 (USAID *Aid Tables*). The projects were primarily administered by USAID under the functional account of Rural Development, but programs were also initiated to improve services in the agricultural, health and governmental sectors.

Malawi and Lesotho received very little U.S. assistance. In the case of Malawi, the decision was based on the large presence of other bilateral donor agency programs in the country. Lesotho's main programme during this period was USAID's supervised construction of the Southern Perimeter Road, and a number of grants to PVOs working in the country. Swaziland's foreign aid levels rose dramatically during this period as money was provided to agricultural research and extension projects within the multi-donor Rural Development Area programme. The aim of the programme was to purchase expatriate land to be converted to small-scale holdings.

The increase in U.S. assistance to Zambia was remarkable. Of all the Frontline States, Zambia's economic condition was the most desperate during the latter years of the Rhodesian war. The price of copper had plummeted during the 1970s. Zambia's ability to maintain

exports were severely curtailed by Mozambique's decision to close its border to Rhodesia. Tanzania's Dar es Salaam port was too small to absorb Zambia's exports. Shortages ensued as Zambia was largely isolated. Zambia's vulnerability to outside assistance was high. In 1976, Zambia received US$0.1 million in U.S. foreign assistance. In 1977 however, the Zambian government received US$25.6 million under a CIP programme, whose total cost at the end of 1981 was US$145 million. Zambia's peak level of U.S. foreign aid was in 1980, when it received US$46.4 million (USAID *Aid Tables*). The CIP programme was aimed at increasing the agricultural productivity of Zambian farmers through the importation of fertilizers from the United States. The government was allowed to use the local currency generated from this programme as it saw fit. This programme must also be seen in the light of other foreign aid programmes initiated by countries, such as Britain, who had a vested interest in reaching an acceptable settlement to the Zimbabwean conflict. Overall, Zambia received US$1462.1 million from other overseas bilateral and multilateral agencies from the years 1976 through 1980 (Rossiter 1985: 100). Yet, in 1975, Zambia had received no financial support from these same sources.

What should be evident from the above discussion is the multi-faceted nature of the U.S. assistance programme. What is important to highlight is that the nature of USAID programmes followed a similar pattern even though the decisions on foreign assistance funding were based on wider geo-political concerns. As will be shown below, USAID programmes in Zimbabwe were consistent with this model. U.S. allocation levels to Zimbabwe dropped dramatically after 1985, as Table 2.1 demonstrates.

Table 2.1: USAID Foreign Assistance to Zimbabwe	
Year	**Amount**
1980	20,900,000
1981	27,800,000
1982	75,100,000
1983	64,100,000
1984	47,900,000
1985	50,700,000
1986	13,000,000
1987	5,700,000
1988	5,000,000
1989	5,000,000
1990	5,000,000
1991	5,000,000
Total	**327,200,000**
Source: United States Agency for International Development, *AID Tables*.	

The significant decreases in assistance after 1985 are the result of a relatively minor incident involving former President Carter and two events at the United Nations. One was the Zimbabwean condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and the other was the refusal of Zimbabwe to support a resolution rebuking the Soviet Union for its hostile actions against Korean Airlines Flight 007. Following these events, USAID funding was terminated for the remainder of 1986. When asked why U.S. assistance was revived in 1987, USAID's officer in charge of the Zimbabwe Mission replied "because they got nice".[11] The amount of assistance never reached previous levels as illustrated in Table 2.1 above.

[11] Interview, Kimberly Finan, USAID Office of Southern African Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 July 1990.

2.4 Conclusion

This section provided an overview of the evolution of United States development assistance both internationally and in the southern African sub-region. It demonstrated that policy and programmes were shaped by a range of geo-strategic and humanitarian interests that shifted over time and between Presidencies. The next chapter presents an overview of Zimbabwe with a specific emphasis on the evolution of agriculture and maize marketing. The intention is to begin linking USAID's broader programmes and shifts, highlighted in this chapter, with the realities of colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. We can then begin to establish the specific nature and impact of USAID's programmes in the country.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

Development programmes are implemented within a particular social, political, economic and historical context. The Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance Programme (ZASA) was located within a dynamic agricultural setting, shaped by years of struggle and change. This chapter explores Zimbabwe's agricultural setting and thus establishes the foundations for an evaluation of the ZASA Programme. In particular, the chapter explores the evolution of grain marketing in Zimbabwe as the USAID programme was primarily designed to increase the agricultural contribution of smallholders to the national economy. The method through which this would be accomplished was, as discussed earlier, to extend the grain marketing system to areas of the country historically neglected by the previous settler regimes.

3.2 Agricultural Transformations in Southern Rhodesia

Government control over marketing in Southern Rhodesia was initiated during the Great Depression of the 1930s. While the events that precipitated the passage of the Maize Control Act of 1931 are beyond the scope of this study, a brief historical overview provides the context for understanding the evolution of maize marketing in Zimbabwe.[1]

[1] The historical literature on Zimbabwe is vast. Of particular importance to this study are Beach 1977; Cheater 1984; Iliffe 1990; Kosmin 1977; Mosley 1983; Moyana 1984;

Settler agricultural expansion in Southern Rhodesia proceeded slowly as the colony's initial concerns lay in the development of a "Second Rand". Interest in farming was nominal among early settlers, and land was held as a speculative asset by different mining interests. As the dreams of a "Second Rand" diminished, however, settlers and the British South Africa Company became more concerned with agricultural production. By 1921, the number of whites engaged in farming exceeded that of any other productive or administrative occupation in the colony (Phimister 1988: 100). African producers, who were primarily responsible for the supply of food crops to the young colony, came to be perceived as a threat to European settlers who began to engage actively in farming. Agricultural prices were highly volatile, and calls to protect European agriculture from African competition gained strength. Over time, the foundations of African production were eroded by the settler state. Mechanisms employed against African cultivators included a plethora of taxes[2] and increased efforts to move African producers into isolated Native Reserves.[3] The ability of African producers to maintain the "peasant option"[4] was increasingly undermined, forcing

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Mumbengegwi 1986; Palmer 1977a and 1977b; Phimister 1977 and 1988; van Onselen 1976; Weinrich 1975; and Yudelman 1964.

[2] An abridged list of taxes and fees includes the Hut Tax (doubled in 1904); Poll Tax (introduced in 1905); the Private Locations Ordinance of 1908; the Kaffir Beer Ordinance of 1912; numerous rents that had to be paid to the Chartered Company for those occupying unalienated land; Grazing Fees (1912); a Dog Tax (1912); and compulsory dipping fees for cattle (1914).

[3] The first Native Reserves were established in 1894 by the British South Africa Company. Initially located in remote and inhospitable areas in north-west Matabeleland, the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves were regarded by the Ndebele as "*cemeteries* not homes" (Phimister 1988: 65). The forced removal of Africans from European-designated land continued into the 1970s, although the context for these removals differed from that of the earlier removals (see Riddell 1980: 7).

[4] According to Ranger (1985), the peasant option refers to the ability of African producers to sustain their agricultural livelihood as an alternative to being drawn into the larger wage economies of Southern Africa. See also Hyden 1983 for a discussion on the "exit option"

many to engage in the larger economy as migrant labourers.

The process of dislocation was by no means uniform, however. As many have argued, these processes affected different African communities, and different strata within those communities, in numerous ways (see Mosley 1983; Phimister 1988; and Ranger 1985). The white farming community was equally stratified, with small-scale farmers cultivating holdings of between 80-160 hectares coexisting with larger individual and company holdings of well over 40,000 hectares (Phimister 1988: 125). These complex and interactive forces served to impede the process of African accumulation in Southern Rhodesia at the time of the Great Depression. From 1923, the shift from Company to Responsible Government,[5] while increasingly influenced by the white agricultural community, had not immediately led to the direct involvement of the state in issues of agricultural production and marketing. African farmers still produced maize for the internal market, but the terms of these purchases, and the state's role in both production and marketing were to change dramatically with the onset of the Great Depression.

3.3 The Evolution of Grain Marketing in Rhodesia

The Maize Control Act of 1931 was passed in response to the agricultural crisis caused by the Great Depression. The Act dramatically increased the State's direct role in Southern Rhodesia's agricultural system. The government could not withstand settler pressure to engage directly in agricultural marketing and production as the export price of

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for peasants in rural Tanzania.

[5] Established in 1923, "Responsible Government" involved the transfer of power within the colony from the British South Africa Company to a Parliamentary system under the control of the settler community and tied more closely to Great Britain.

maize fell from 11s. per bag in 1930 to 3s.4d. by April 1931 (Iliffe 1990: 84; and Palmer 1977b: 240). Production in the colony exceeded local demand which in turn served to further depress prices.

The Maize Control Board, established under the Act, became the sole buying and export agent in the colony, although the Board's original jurisdiction was limited to Mashonaland and the Midlands. Maize was transferred from Control Boards to urban centres for processing. At one level, the Act and the 1934 Amendments to the original legislation, ensured the survival of the white agricultural community by guaranteeing high producer prices for their maize. It accomplished this through centralised marketing, which provided white farmers with a guaranteed market and high producer price for their agricultural goods. At another, more important level, the legislation served to strengthen local capital, in the form of small-scale white farmers, vis-a-vis both large-scale and African producers (see Phimister 1988: 174; and Yudelman 1964: 179). The overt subsidization of local capital was accomplished through the establishment of a two-tiered pricing and quota system.

Maize purchased under the newly established Maize Control Board was priced under either a "local pool" or an "export pool". The former was 30 - 50 percent higher than the world price, while maize purchased under the "export pool" was considerably lower (Yudelman 1964: 179). Quotas for marketed maize were established in order to administer the pricing scheme. Individual European small-scale farmers were allocated a quota of 80 percent of their marketed maize under the "local pool" in order to bolster their vulnerable condition. Large-scale European interests received a quota of 20 percent of their maize under the "local pool", the remaining 80 percent being priced under the "export pool". African producers who could deliver their maize *directly* to the Control Board would receive the higher "local pool" price on 20 percent of their maize, the remaining 80 percent being

priced under the "export pool". The majority of African farmers who had, in the end, to sell their maize to approved buyers in the more isolated regions of Mashonaland and Midlands only received the "export" price for their maize.

The effect of this legislation on African producers was significant although uneven. Of greatest consequence to most African producers were new restrictions on trade promulgated under the Acts. African producers who had previously sold their surplus crops at the highest price offered in city centres, on outlying farms and at mines were now restricted under the new law. Surplus stocks had to be sold either to the Maize Control Board or to approved traders. Traders subtracted transport fees, the costs of maize bags, and a handling fee from the guaranteed price. The final price received by African producers, once all these factors were accounted for, was nominal. African cultivators became more dependent on local traders as the latter solidified their position as the primary source of cash and credit in outlying areas, although many traders preferred to trade in kind rather than in cash. Many African producers were forced to sell their maize to traders in order to meet the numerous cash needs of the household. Often, maize supplies earmarked for household consumption would be sold, only to be repurchased at the end of the year as household supplies were exhausted. Naturally, traders resold their maize stocks at inflated prices. The Native Commissioner of Ndanga noted that traders were purchasing maize at 5s. after the maize had been harvested and reselling it at the end of the year for 17s. as households finished their stocks (Iliffe 1990: 86). As Mosley (1983: 44) puts it, the Act "not only reduced the price they received but also increased their vulnerability to sharp commercial practices". Between 1934 and 1939, producer prices paid to African maize growers vacillated between 1s.6d. and 6s.6d., while the European farming sector received prices that averaged over 8s. per bag (Phimister 1988: 185).

An important point to stress pertains to the role of African maize producers in the larger Southern Rhodesian economy after the passage of the Maize Control Acts. The ability of the state to subsidise small-scale white farmers, through the quota and pricing scheme established under the Acts, was contingent upon the continued delivery of African produced maize to Maize Control Board depots. One way to ensure continued deliveries of African maize to Board depots was to allow for a small percentage of those deliveries to be classified under the higher priced "local pool". *Without* this supply of maize, the government would have been unable to subsidise white farmers without incurring losses, and Southern Rhodesia's ability to export maize would have become less certain over time. As Ranger (1985: 67) argues, the state had "to ensure that the tattered goose that laid the golden egg of subsidy for white farming was not killed off in the process".

While it is undeniable that these measures fundamentally undermined the ability of African cultivators to reproduce themselves, it is equally apparent that some African growers were able to sustain themselves under this discriminatory system. Differentiation among African smallholders accelerated as those who could deliver directly to the Maize Control Board received higher prices for their maize and did not have to bear the direct costs associated with selling to isolated traders. Those who could secure direct access to Maize Control Board depots were able to sustain their livelihoods to a far greater degree than those who were more dependent on approved buyers. Farmers in the more isolated regions of the country, like Gokwe in the mid-1960s and 1970s, continued to sell through official marketing channels, even though the costs associated with such sales were high. The contribution of African producers to Southern Rhodesia's overall stockpile of maize remained small compared to that contributed by white farmers however. Much of this related to Maize Control Board access, low prices, and transport costs, but an equally important reason was

that many African producers activated and maintained a *wider* marketing network, especially in regions neglected by the official marketing system.

Between the late 1930s and the period of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965, other important changes occurred in the Southern Rhodesian countryside. A number of modifications to the Maize Control Acts were passed.[6] The two-tiered pricing system was officially amalgamated in 1944. In 1949, a ten percent African Development Fund levy on the value of all grain sales from African areas was imposed, further undermining the viability of the more vulnerable African producers and effectively re-established a two-tiered pricing system. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) assumed the responsibilities of the Maize Control Board in 1950. In addition to maize, the GMB became responsible for the marketing of a wider variety of crops including beans, rapoko, sorghum, millet and, a year later, groundnuts (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 9). In 1957 the GMB expanded its coverage to include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but this dissolved with the Central African Federation in 1963.

Rhodesia's UDI from Great Britain further modified the agricultural marketing structure of the economy. Sanctions initiated against Rhodesia, though imperfect (see Lake 1976), forced the economy to become more inward-oriented. State control over the economy increased in an effort to mitigate the effects of Rhodesia's growing isolation. Food crops that could be produced in the country were favoured while export commodities such as tobacco were discouraged. In 1965, 57.2 percent of the total value of European agricultural output was concentrated in tobacco production, with small percentages being

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[6] The Maize Control Act of 1940 was replaced by the Grain Marketing Act of 1950, which was subsequently replaced by the Grain Marketing Act of 1957. These Acts merely transferred control of marketing between various government bodies but did not dramatically alter the nature of marketing in Southern Rhodesia.

registered for maize and sugar. Production of crops such as wheat, cotton, soya-beans and coffee were negligible. By 1979, white agricultural production was more evenly distributed between all these crops, although tobacco remained the most important commodity (Shopo 1987: 198).

In 1966, the Grain Marketing Act was passed, and significantly, the Act remains in operation today. The legislation subdivided the country into two categories, Zone A and Zone B. The former included urban centres, commercial farms and some Purchase Areas of Rhodesia.[7] Controlled products grown in Zone A areas had to be sold to the Grain Marketing Board, and could not be transported out of the designated area without the consent of the GMB. Farmers residing in the Tribal Trust Lands[8] were subsumed under the Zone B category. Zone B farmers could sell their agricultural commodities within these areas without restriction, but could not transport their crops into or through a Zone A area. Crops that entered a Zone A area would have to be sold to the GMB (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 10). As before, grain sold to the GMB were transported to urban centres for processing. The processed foods were then resold in cities and within the immediate vicinity. The cost of urban-refined foodstuffs was, despite subsidies, significantly greater than the original price procured by rural farmers (Mosley 1987).

The principal effect of the Act was to reinforce the role of centralised marketing in

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[7] Purchase Areas were created under the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Freehold leases were offered to African farmers who wished to move out of the increasingly crowded Reserves. The intention was to officially prohibit the sale of European designated land to Africans, thus completing, at least legislatively, the segregationist aspirations of many Southern Rhodesians. Purchase Areas were often designated as a buffer zone between Reserves and European areas in order to protect the latter from potential encroachments on their farms. Purchase Area farmers largely constitute the small-scale commercial farming community in Zimbabwe.

[8] Reserves were renamed Tribal Trust Lands in 1963.

the Rhodesian economy. The Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), created in 1967, assumed overall responsibility for the pricing and marketing of all controlled products The various marketing boards were thereafter required to purchase all produce delivered to them, thereby ensuring a buyer for the commercial farming sector. Prior to UDI, the total value of agricultural output procured through statutory marketing authorities was approximately 35 percent; by 1973 the figure had increased to approximately 77 percent (Mosley 1987: 215; Shopo 1987: 203-4).

As indicated above, wealthier African producers who resided in close proximity to the newly established marketing depots continued to sell surplus stocks of maize, and later, other agricultural commodities, to the statutory bodies. For farmers who were neglected and remote from marketing depots and areas where grain depots were later, after 1980, funded by USAID, matters were somewhat different. Between the passage of the Maize Control Acts and independence, wealthier African producers in these more isolated Tribal Trust Lands continued to activate marketing arrangements that enabled many farmers to better maintain the peasant option.[9] The principal market for many surplus producers were deficit households, missions and shop owners (Riddell 1981: 36), while the GMB served only as a secondary market for most farmers in more isolated regions of the country. Excess stocks *above* local market requirements were sold to statutory authorities despite the barriers instituted against African farmers. This has led some, like Iliffe to suggest that a greater degree of food security was apparent in the past.

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[9] Master farmers were designated by the state in order to promote a class of advanced farmers within the Reserves. These farmers received technical training, tended to have larger land holdings than their neighbours and received preferential access to loans and water facilities. As a result, agricultural output far outstripped their neighbours in the Reserves and contributed to further differentiation within these areas.

> Whereas early colonial famines centred where the European impact was least, later colonial scarcity concentrated where the European impact was greatest. (Illife 1990: 79)

Iliffe contends that pre-capitalist dearth was replaced by capitalist scarcity in Rhodesia, concluding that the threat of starvation was reduced "because the European economy had acquired greater capacity to relieve stress, thanks to surplus grain production, controlled marketing and better transport" (1990: 88).

Another important reason why the threat of absolute starvation in more remote areas could have been less than in areas more directly affected by official marketing structures, overlooked by Iliffe, is that the overwhelming proportion of isolated regions' agricultural crops *remained in those particular areas*. Centralised marketing and the sale of urban-refined foodstuffs occurred within a relatively small portion of Rhodesia. Gokwe, for instance, was inaccessible during much of the year because of impassable roads. Surplus households sold their agricultural goods locally because markets for agricultural commodities were clearly available; only afterwards were grains and oilseeds sold to the GMB and private interests outside the area.[10] In the process, wealthier farmers were able to accumulate, mills were established to process food grains and differentiation within these areas occurred.

This is not to argue that food security was always ensured in areas neglected by the official marketing system. Outright crop failure due to drought continued to threaten the survival of those in the more isolated areas of pre-independent Zimbabwe. For example, food had to be imported into the Sabi Valley region during the 1930s due to crop failures, forcing African producers to cull their herds in order to purchase maize meal (Moyana 1984: 117). Instead, consumers residing in areas with limited official marketing opportunities were able

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[10] Most of this information was gleaned from informal interviews with elders from Njelele and during discussions with AGRITEX officials.

to survive periods of reduced output through inter-household exchange arrangements that had been secured in those regions over time. In contrast, consumers who lived in regions that were more involved in the official marketing system became more dependent on higher priced urban-refined meal to meet household food requirements

Evidence to support these claims begin with Yudelman's (1964) study of African production in Southern Rhodesia. Between 1948-58, enormous disparities between African production and sales to statutory bodies existed according to the GMB's records, reproduced in the Table 3.1 on the following page. The data demonstrates that only a small percentage of African maize was being sold to the Grain Marketing Board during this 14 year period. In 1956/7, 34 per cent of the estimated maize produced by African farmers was sold to the GMB, but this was somewhat unusual. The range of sales fluctuated between 16-25 per cent during this period, with the 1956/7 year being an anomaly.[11] Despite the potential inaccuracies in Southern Rhodesian calculations of African production, the figures are telling - the overwhelming majority of maize produced by African cultivators was not sold to the GMB.

[11] African production estimates were not recorded in official GMB publications after 1962/3, as the government no longer supplied data on the sales of grains to the statutory body for political and strategic reasons. The declining trend in African maize sales to the GMB is nevertheless clear.

Table 3.1: African Maize Production and Sales to Statutory Marketing Boards in Southern Rhodesia, 1948-58		
Year	**Maize Production (bags)**	**Maize Sales (bags)**
1948	1,671,000	82,000
1949	1,487,000	121,000
1950	1,835,000	124,000
1951	1,278,000	203,000
1952	1,973,000	688,000
1953	2,787,000	898,000
1954	3,129,000	875,000
1955	2,796,000	700,000
1956	3,926,000	1,385,000
1957	3,363,000	933,000
1958	2,847,000	533,000
Source: Yudelman 1964: 248		

During the last ten years of the civil war (1965-1979) the percentage of maize sales to the GMB by African producers declined significantly because of the disruptions caused by the war and the withholding of grains from official marketing facilities by large segments of the African community (see A. Thompson 1988: 192-5). Given the degree of differentiation apparent within the broader African community, it can be assumed that wealthier farmers were predominantly responsible for the greatest share of both production and sale figures. The data contained in the *Grain Marketing Board Annual Reports*, and reproduced by Yudelman, fails to show what was happening to the unaccounted surpluses. This is the subject to which we now turn.

Despite efforts by the state to limit the marketing opportunities available to African cultivators, trade within and between designated Tribal Trust Lands occurred. African

farmers, especially master farmers who consistently achieved grain surpluses above the immediate requirements of the household, preferred to sell their surplus stocks in the immediate vicinity rather than to the GMB, although, again, sales through official marketing channels did occur. Yudelman (1964: 181-4) discusses the development of a "second market" in Tribal Trust Lands, concluding that the increased incidence of "illegal" sales resulted from the differential prices received by Africans under the discriminatory marketing system. As a result of such discrimination, alternative marketing channels continued to be activated.

Missions offered a viable market for African produce as they required a regular supply of grains in order to feed their boarders (Cheater 1984, Yudelman 1964 and Weinrich 1975). As will be demonstrated below, the retail price for maize increased dramatically after the imposition of centralised marketing. By purchasing directly from African farmers, missions could mitigate the increasing cost of purchased food. The benefit to African farmers was also apparent. In isolated areas, the price received for grains traded through buyers was extremely low due to transport costs, handling and bag fees and the African Development Fund levy. Missions paid higher prices to African producers than both local traders or approved buyers. Further, the levy on African-produced grains, imposed in 1949 and not removed until 1979, could be avoided.

Another market for African producers were white farmers themselves. Under pressure from the white community, the pre-UDI state liberalized its trading scheme to allow African producers to sell directly to white farmer-consumers, although the latter subsequently paid a "rake-off" tax to the GMB (Mosley 1983: 46). This allowed white farmers to purchase lower cost maize for their labour force from African cultivators while simultaneously selling their maize at higher prices to the GMB (Phimister 1988: 187).

As Weinrich (1975: 102-4) demonstrates, the most common market for African were deficit African households. In Karangaland

> Of all surplus millet produced 92.1 per cent is sold directly to the people, and so is 71.4 per cent of all maize, 66.7 per cent of all groundbeans, 60 per cent of groundnuts and 21.4 per cent of all sorghum. (Weinrich 1975: 103)[12]

Purchase Area farmers sold approximately 38 percent of their crops to deficit communities within Tribal Trust Lands as well, despite the restrictions on such trade promulgated under the Grain Marketing Act of 1966 (Weinrich 1975: 193). During the 1960s, Purchase Area farmers in Msengezi utilized alternative marketing arrangements with other farmers, as well as shops and schools. By 1973, one Purchase Area household was selling 300 gallons of peanut butter, produced from damaged groundnuts, to two boarding schools in the region, guaranteeing the family $630 per annum (Cheater 1984: 43). Another household was able to sell approximately one-th[illegible] of their crops and cattle on the "internal market" (Cheater 1984: 102).

Farmers who sold their surplus crops to households within the immediate vicinity benefitted from selling later in the year as deficit households terminated their stocks prior to the forthcoming harvest. Prices offered through either approved buyers, cooperatives or a central depot were uniform throughout the year.[13] In contrast, farmers could secure larger profits if they withheld their stocks and sold to households in the area when shortages

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[12] Karangaland was one of the most populous regions in Rhodesia, situated in the administrative districts of Midlands and Victoria.

[13] African producers received the same basic price for their grains, depending on grade, once the "local" and "export" pools were officially amalgamated in 1944. The *final* price received from approved buyers differed after 1955 when the traders' handling margins were made flexible based upon the distance to a central depot (Mosley 1983: 61). Farmers often complained that their grains were graded at the lowest possible standard which increased their distrust of traders operating on behalf of the official marketing body (Phimister 1988: 188). See Yudelman (1964: 187-9) for a discussion of cooperatives, which were confined to the Purchase Areas.

increased. Internal trade between surplus producers and food deficit households contributed to growing disparities between classes within the Tribal Trust Lands. Many master farmers reinvested their earnings into improved agricultural inputs, such as ploughs and to a lesser degree fertilisers. Grinding mills were purchased and some diversified their agricultural base by opening local stores. Surpluses were also used to further political aims within the Tribal Trust Lands.

> The extensive sale of surplus crops within Tribal Trust Lands has created fixed selling and buying patterns. Some subcheifdoms or neighbourhoods sell their surpluses of one crop to members of another subcheifdom or neighbourhood who lack this particular crop, and poorer communities depend on the surpluses of richer communities... most master farmers have a permanent clientele and trading patterns that cut across political allegiances. (Weinrich 1975: 104)

During periods of scarcity, the importance of surplus stocks remaining in the area was magnified. In Shiri-Ngara and Shoko, the decline in agricultural output during drought years was dramatic. During an average year, 40 percent of the crops cultivated by master farmers were sold to missions and deficit households within the Tribal Trust Lands. Poorer cultivators sold 12 percent of their output in the area as well. Productivity for both groups declined during the 1966-7 drought, but master farmers were still able to sell 14.1 percent of their total output, while other cultivators sold 5.9 percent of their crops in the area. Ten out of the 19 master farmers surveyed in these areas purchased food, while 106 of the remaining 144 poor households needed to purchase food. Food secured from within the area enabled deficit households to survive at a cost significantly lower than if they had been required to purchase urban-refined meal through local traders (Weinrich 1975: 98-101).

Poorer households secured food from surplus growers in a number of ways. Men and women who earned wages in town, on mines or European farms could use their incomes to

purchase food from surplus households in the Tribal Trust Lands.[14] Many poorer households would provide labour during planting or harvesting periods in return for food at later dates (Cheater 1984: 63-79). Many poorer families also became indebted to wealthier households in order to secure access to food during deficit periods.

In Gokwe, informal interviews with AGRITEX officials and elders indicates that food security was also better ensured through exchanges between surplus and deficit households. Surplus producers had a viable market in the local area as many families were unable to consistently produce enough food for household consumption. Cash transactions and labour exchanges were the principal means by which deficit households were able to secure food during periods of shortfall. Poorer households could assist surplus families in the harvesting of maize, sunflower, groundnuts and cotton in exchange for food. These families received 2-3 bags of maize per hectare, depending upon the crop harvested. Once the local options were exhausted, surplus producers would transport their remaining stocks to Kadoma or KweKwe for sale to the GMB. Another important source of income for Gokwe cultivators were direct sales of sunflower to Lever Brothers of Harare and United Soap in Bulawayo. Sales to these private companies, as well as cash transactions in the area and remittances from family members engaged in the wider political economy of southern Africa, were critical sources of accumulation for farmers in Gokwe. This income enabled some to diversify their economic activities into areas such as transport and milling. Although USAID was later to assume the contrary, these transactions demonstrate that producers in neglected areas were

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[14] Weinrich (1975: 60) demonstrates that 14 percent of all women in the Karangaland survey area were regularly absent from the Tribal Trust Land. They either accompanied their husband or secured employment on European farms or as domestic servants. For a discussion of the degree and importance of female wage labour in the post-independent Zimbabwean household economy, see Adams 1991.

involved in a wider pre-independence Zimbabwean economy. Importantly, no interviewee in Gokwe who was consistently unable to produce enough food for the family could identify a year in which the household lacked adequate food prior to independence, a point that will be elaborated upon in later Chapters.[15]

The sale of surplus agricultural commodities outside official marketing channels helped offset the costs associated with the purchase of urban-processed foodstuffs as the retail price for maize increased dramatically after the imposition of centralized marketing. Grain delivered to the GMB was sold to the millers, who in turn resold the maize at an increased cost. As Mosley (1987: 218) demonstrates in Table 3.2 on the following page, the price received by African producers for their unprocessed maize was between 24-43 percent below the final selling price, depending on whether an African producer was able to deliver directly to the GMB or not. By purchasing directly from African farmers, missions, deficit households and white farmers could mitigate the increasing cost of purchased food.

Mosley (1987) argues that the excessive costs associated with the purchase of maize meal contributed to food insecurity in urban areas such as Salisbury. He concludes that this evidence suggests that Bates's (1981) argument that African governments maintain low consumer prices in order to appease urban constituents is inaccurate in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean context. In fact, Mosley argues that the opposite is more accurate as producers continue to be effectively subsidised at the expense of urban consumers. Skalnes (1989) concurs with Mosley, arguing that workers and urban consumers bore the brunt of Zimbabwe's bias towards producers.

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[15] Archival material from Gokwe, following the eradication of tsetse fly from the area, is not presently available. The author is therefore dependent upon oral testimony.

Table 3.2: Southern Rhodesia Price Structure for Maize, 1962-3		
	s,d	s,d
1.) Guaranteed price to African producer selling to trader in Reserve	-	12,0
2.) Transport Levy	7,0	-
3.) Trader's Handling Margin (maximum permissable)	3,0	-
4.) Guaranteed price to African producer delivering direct to the GMB (1+2+3)	-	22,0
5.) African Development Fund Levy	3,0	-
6.) Guaranteed price to European producer (4+5)	-	25,0
7.) GMB Handling Margin	16,9	-
8.) Price of a bag of grain to miller (6+7)	-	41,9
9.) Miller's permissible margin	5,10	-
10.) Price of a bag of maize meal to retailer ((8+9)	-	47,7
11.) Retailer's permissible margin	2,9	-
12.) Gross retail price of a bag of maize meal (10 11)	50,4	-
13.) Subsidy on retail price	4,0	-
14.) Retail price of a bag of maize meal (12 - 13)	-	46,4
Source: Mosley 1987: 218		

What both Skalnes and Mosley fail to recognize is that Zimbabwean smallholders were also net purchasers of food. It must be remembered that grains have historically been siphoned out of rural areas into the major urban centres through the GMB. The introduction of a unidirectional marketing system that exported grains from rural areas to urban centres was particularly damaging if alternative sources of food were not available or the processed goods that re-entered the area were beyond the means of vulnerable households. By increasing the scope and operations of the GMB under a system that continued to extract grains from rural areas without ensuring that these areas were capable of securing food at a

reasonable cost, USAID and the government directly increased the vulnerability of deficit households living in areas of USAID-funded depots. As will be shown in the following chapter, the result of this intervention was especially devastating in 1992 as maize supplied to this depot had been removed from the area at a time when alternative supplies were simply not available.

3.4 Grain Marketing in Post-Independence Zimbabwe

At independence, the Zimbabwean government inherited a marketing system that had been overwhelmingly geared towards the protection and support of the white farming sector. African producers were subjected to numerous taxes and restrictions used by the state to support this sector. Although small segments of the African farming populace were able to minimise the losses incurred under such a system, it is clear that the discriminatory aspects of Rhodesian society hindered the majority's ability to accumulate adequate resources to enhance their condition vis-a-vis their white counterparts. The government thus embarked on a grain marketing depot extension programme with the financial support of USAID. The African Development Fund levy was terminated, and the producer price of maize increased by 41 percent immediately after independence (Mlambo 1989: 246). The response was overwhelming as African producers began selling their grains to the statutory body.

Numerous factors contributed to the dramatic increases in African sales to statutory marketing bodies, in addition to greater access to depots and higher producer prices. Areas previously ravaged by war, like Gokwe, benefitted from the stability of the new order. Crops could be planted without the fear of these crops being destroyed in the cross-fire of the civil war. Households in areas such as Mangwende and Chibi established new holdings and replanted previously abandoned fields (Rohrbach 1988: 311). Seed and fertilizer packages

were distributed free of charge to resettlement farmers, while improved seed varieties were made readily available to farmers in outlying areas. Agricultural extension agents began concentrating their efforts on Communal Areas.[16] Sunflower and millet, crops predominantly grown by African farmers, were included as controlled crops in 1983 and 1984 respectiv ly.[17] The improved prices offered were further incentive to sell, and the initial two years of independence were characterised by above average rains. Areas which produced small surpluses contributed to the Communal Area aggregate total, although the principal beneficiaries of the expanded depot network continued to be farmers located in Mashonaland Central. Another important point to stress is that, after independence, it was initially cheaper for farmers to sell their maize to the GMB and purchase subsidized urban-refined meal than to withhold stocks for household consumption and pay local grinding fees (see Table 3.3 on the following page). Stanning and Muir estimate that close to 200 rural grinding mills closed during this period resulting from the proliferation of subsidized meal in many areas of rural Zimbabwe (cited in Blackie 1987).

Important aspects of the marketing structure did not change after the final Grain Marketing Act passed under the Smith regime. Grains purchased by the GMB cc inued to filter out of rural areas to the urban centres of Zimbabwe. The overwhelming majority of grains purchased by the GMB continued to be transported to urban centres and sold to large-scale private millers. For example, in 1988/9, commercial millers in urban areas received 543,000 tons of grain from the GMB out of a total of 676,000 tons procured by the statutory body (*Grain Marketing Board Annual Report 1989*: 6). The remaining grain is delivered

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[16] Tribal Trust Lands were renamed Communal Areas in 1982.

[17] Millet (mhunga and rapoko) were decontrolled by the Southern Rhodesian authorities in 1963.

Table 3.3: Producer and Selling Prices in Zimbabwe, 1979-1992

	1979a	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Producer Price														
Maize*	5,50	7,73	10,90	10,90	10,90	12,73	16,37	16,37	16,37	17,70	19,55	20,45	20,45	55,00
Sunflower	-	-	-	-	255	285	320	340	390	430	455	505	580	995
Seed Cotton	36	50	50	50	55,50	65,50	73,50	73,50	78,50	86	110,5	135	262	262
Grain Marketing Board Selling Price (Z$/91 kg bag)														
Maize**	5,73	8,01	20,46	12,46	14,00	16,09	21,73	20,18	20,18	23,19	25,82	27,73	32,70	67,00
Controlled Retail Price (Z$/90 kg bag)* **														
Roller Meal	7,36	7,92	7,92	12,77	18,30	21,98	27,99	31,91	31,91	31,91	45,55@	45,55	55,30	99,53@
Straight-Run	7,79	10,64	15,37	17,82	20,27	22,76	30,20	30,70	30,70	30,70	34,11@	38,74	50,36	137,65@
Sup-Refined	-	-	-	25,18	28,74	32,50	40,57	41,37	41,37	41,37	49,30@	65,55	75,00	202,59@

Notes: a - 1 April 1979 - 31 March 1980; * - Maize = Z$/91 kg bag, Sunflower is Grade AA and Seed Cotton is Grade B, cents/kg; ** - selling price changed during the year in 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988 and 1989. The higher price is indicated in the table; *** - Only Straight-Run Meal can be purchased in a 90 kg bag. Roller Meal and Super-Refined Meal prices were based on the purchase of one 50 kg bag and two 20 kg bags, @ - indicates that the controlled prices changed during the year. The last price is therefore given as this price was most relevant to deficit households

Sources: *Grain Marketing Board Annual Report*, various years; *Cotton Marketing Board*, and *Government of Zimbabwe Control of Goods Order*, various years

to the Department of Social Welfare, stockfeeders, poultry producers, brewers and Christian Care who are also located in the urban centres of Zimbabwe.[18]

The assumption that African cultivators produced enough maize to feed the household remained pervasive in the Zimbabwean psyche, but, as demonstrated above, it was somewhat misguided. In addition, the government had maintained the inherited policies of pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing. Pan-seasonal pricing meant that farmers received the same price at depots for their commodities throughout the agricultural year. The main effect of this policy was to discourage farmers from storing their surplus agricultural commodities, and subsequently passes storage costs onto the respective marketing body. Pan-territorial pricing referred to the practice of offering a single depot price to producers throughout Zimbabwe, regardless of distance from the depot to the centre of the marketing system. Farmers in more remote regions of the country were effectively subsidised by more centrally-located producers, as the latter bore the transport costs of the former.

An important change to the overall marketing system deserves mention however. In 1976-77 the Rhodesian government had introduced pre-planting prices in an effort to increase agricultural output during what turned out to be the final phases of the liberation war. At independence, the Zimbabwean government reverted back to the traditional practice of setting prices *after* producers had planted crops for that year (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 78). Pre-harvest prices, usually announced as late as April, remained the norm until 1993, despite the Government's assertion that "the timing of announcement of producer prices [will be] early enough to influence production in the year in which they operate"

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[18] See ***Grain Marketing Board Annual Report 1991***, page 26, Figure One, for a breakdown of GMB sales between 1980-91.

(Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 69).[19]

The government's rationale for pre-harvest as opposed to pre-planting prices was clear. With the extension of depots and their role as residual purchaser, the government was vulnerable to large influxes of grains. The government preferred to assess potential production levels ***before*** announcing the price it would guarantee in order to protect itself from large pay-outs to grain producers. Prices were therefore partially determined by what the government believed it could afford to pay. This policy limited the flexibility available to farmers, especially those in the Communal Areas who remained undercapitalized and unable to alter their productive base in any given year. As a result, decisions on production in areas well served by commercially-refined foodstuffs were based more often on labour availability than producer price as the latter were not announced until five months after farmers had planted their crops. In contrast, production decisions in areas poorly served by urban-refined foodstuffs were often based on perceived household food requirements rather than on what would secure the highest return.

In his study of state autonomy in Zimbabwe, Herbst (1990) demonstrated that the state enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in the setting of agricultural prices. The government was lobbied by different agricultural interests, such as the Commercial Farmers Union and the (then) Zimbabwe National Farmers Union, but its pricing decisions were consistently made independently of these interests. Herbst argues that the effect of lobbying campaigns in relation to the setting of producer prices was significantly enhanced if issues related to "peasant welfare" were emphasized, and that the state had demonstrated its responsiveness to African smallholders by setting high producer prices for predominantly

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[19] Farmers begin planting crops such as maize in November or six months before the price for maize will be set. Wheat, which is a winter crop, is not affected.

African-grown mhunga, rapoko and sorghum.

Herbst's study does not go far enough in analysing the effects of government decisions on peasant welfare. In particular, the impact of controlled retail prices of urban-processed meal on rural households needs analysis. The perception that rural households' food security was ensured was wholly inaccurate. In fact, for many deficit households in semi-arid regions of the country, the producer price was irrelevant as they were consistently unable to sell to the GMB. Instead, the retail price of maize was of far greater significance. Additionally, because many areas of the country were poorly served by urban-refined meal, cropping decisions were often based upon perceived household food needs. Households in more vulnerable regions, such as parts of Gokwe, devoted disproportionately large areas of their land to maize, instead of cotton, sunflower and groundnut, which were higher-valued cash crops and more suited to the environment, because of the limited availability of urban-refined foodstuffs in the area. Survey data from Njelele found that 91 percent of the respondents devoted more land to food crops, due to the distributional problems evident in Zimbabwe, than to higher-valued crops. This was especially detrimental to poorer households who, though they possess adequate labour for higher-valued crops, instead decided for good reasons to grow high-risk food crops. It also meant that, because maize was both a cash crop and a food crop, poorer maize-producing households would often sell their limited maize supplies to meet short-term cash needs at the expense of household food security.

This was the setting for USAID's ZASA programme in the early 1980s. Instead of encouraging farmers to diversify their productive bases, USAID developed a programme that, in effect, reduced marketing options and exacerbated the outflow of maize from grain deficit regions of the country. USAID also demonstrated an interest in the producer prices

established by the Zimbabwean government. It was shown in previous chapters that the United States viewed the construction of depots under ZASA as an important entry point into the Zimbabwean policy decision-making process. C. Thompson (1991: 117-28) documents numerous examples of USAID efforts to reduce maize output in Zimbabwe on the premise that a democratic South Africa should be seen as the primary source of food for the sub-region. USAID therefore believed that producer prices should be reduced in order to dissuade farmers from producing maize. The impact of such pressure on Zimbabwean pricing decisions is uncertain given Herbst's findings. Moreover, these pronouncements occurred as the United States terminated its aid programme to Zimbabwe, thus reducing the United States' leverage over Zimbabwean policy.[20] What such pressure does suggest is, at the very least, a lack of coordination with the ZASA development effort to enhance smallholder incomes that USAID had been funding for the previous five years.

As a result of these numerous tensions, the initial euphoria over high producer prices after independence waned as the Government's ability to maintain such prices diminished. Producer prices were stagnant between 1981 and 1984, and again between 1985 and 1988 (see Table 3.3). Furthermore, the real value of maize declined precipitously from the early 1980s (Mlambo *et. al.* 1991: 64). As a result, farmers with greater financial, productive and land resources shifted their productive base away from maize into export crops such as tobacco and horticulture.[21] More importantly, as Table 3.3 indicates, the disparity between

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[20] The United States suspended its assistance programmes to Zimbabwe in 1986 due to the famed "Carter incident" and certain objectionable votes in the United Nations against U.S. positions.

[21] In 1986, the government established a two-tiered pricing structure that discriminated against commercial farmers similar to the one established by the Southern Rhodesian government following the passage of the Maize Control Act of 1931. This system was eventually modified but the action further undermined large-scale commercial farmers' confidence in the state and


producer prices, GMB selling prices and controlled retail prices rose dramatically from the early 1980s. Since 1985, controlled retail prices of maize meal were 80-200 percent greater than producer prices although rural households rarely purchased basic commodities at the government-established price. Household vulnerability to food shortages was therefore exacerbated by both high prices and the extraction of food crops from recently established depots in outlying areas of the country. Surplus grains that historically remained in the vicinity were instead sold to the GMB in an effort by farmers to meet short-term cash needs brought about by changes in the wider political economy of Zimbabwe. Noteworthy in this respect was the extension of health facilities and schools to outlying areas, which clearly increased the cash requirements of the household at a time when real agricultural prices were declining and off-farm income was decreasing. Other important costs included those related to agricultural production, such as seed, fertilizer, and transport. As a result of these changes and the extraction of food from rural areas, the ability of rural consumers to ensure access to low-cost foodstuffs became more tenuous.

Increased dependence on urban-refined foodstuffs by rural consumers since independence became apparent. Chisvo *et al.* (1990: 122) estimated that 50 percent of households in Natural Regions IV and V were net purchasers of grain, and evidence suggests that the percentages of commercially-refined meal purchases increased as the year progressed. Over 100,000 tonnes of commercially-processed maize was now consumed, per annum, in rural areas (Chisvo *et. al.* 1990: 122). Research carried out in Mberengwa, Runde and Shurugwe during 1990 found that 38 percent of households surveyed depleted their stocks by December 1989. As a result, they were forced to purchase urban-manufactured

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further strengthened their desire to diversify into uncontrolled crops such as tobacco and horticultural products.

maize meal and accept drought relief as local maize was unavailable in the area (Jayne *et. al.* 1990: 43). According to the Grain Marketing Board, 211,663 bags of maize (91 kgs) were removed from the three depots used by farmers in these areas - Charandura, Gweru and Tongogara - during this period. Both Charandura and Tongogara are USAID-funded grain depots, constructed in 1988.



Despite the increasing importance of subsidized meal in the household diet, the supply of commercially-refined maize is uncertain in the more isolated regions of Zimbabwe, especially during periods of country-wide scarcity. Outlying areas are often neglected despite the fact that much of the grain processed by commercial millers originated in these particular areas. As the map above illustrates, the country's food distribution network is limited to accessible areas on main roads and in towns. The decline in the availability of locally produced foodstuffs had a particularly damaging impact on deficit households in these areas who had historically secured food through inter-household networks established prior to the construction of the local depot. One such area in which this occurred is Gokwe and its outlying districts.

CHAPTER FOUR

USAID AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

The linkage between land and agricultural development in Zimbabwe is apparent yet politically explosive. At independence, the new government inherited an agricultural sector that had been overwhelmingly geared towards the advancement of the white farming community, largely at the expense of the black farming population. White farmers had forcibly secured access to approximately half of the agriculturally productive land during the colonial era though they were small in numbers. Black farmers were forced into more marginal and increasingly overpopulated Reserves. Landlessness in the Tribal Trust Lands had reached crisis proportions by 1980 (see Riddell 1981: 58), and agricultural feasibility for many smallholders was tenuous. The liberation war offered the hope that the pressing questions of uneven access to land and, relatedly, agricultural viability would be rectified.

The negotiated settlement to the "Rhodesian problem" at Lancaster House in 1979 deadlocked over the question of land reform and compensation. Tensions surrounded this issue from the start of the negotiations. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) had largely rallied support for their challenge to the government of Ian Smith on the issue of land redistribution. White Rhodesians were understandably concerned about a new dispensation that would facilitate the transfer of white-controlled land to the black population. The question of compensation remained at the forefront of negotiations, despite the pledge of financial support for ZANU and ZAPU's land redistribution plans by Great Britain. The

stalled negotiations were given a timely lifeline by the United States. While the U.S. commitment towards the financing of land redistribution was vague, it nonetheless served to pacify concerns on both sides. As Nkomo stated, "if the U.S. had not stepped in it would have been very difficult to move on this question", concluding that the U.S. and British pledges towards financial support for compensation "go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question" (cited in Davidow 1990: 65).

Unfortunately, the United States' pledge towards financing Zimbabwe's land redistribution initiatives never materialized. As Kinsey (1983: 104) notes, Great Britain's "aid programme is the only existing one with a land-purchase component... and other donors seem unenthusiastic about buying out white farmers". This was confirmed by USAID's former Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer,[1] and USAID's Chief Project Development and Implementation Support Officer in Zimbabwe, who argued in a correspondence to the author that U.S. support for Zimbabwean land redistribution was "news to [her]".[2] Instead, the United States Agency for International Development initiated a development programme in 1982 designed to revive the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe. USAID's strategy was predicated upon a particular interpretation of the nature, history and problems affecting the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe which established the parameters for the designed development intervention. This chapter provides an overview of USAID's strategy. The chapter will also offer an initial analysis of the implications of USAID's intervention, concentrating upon the Commodity Import Programme (CIP) which facilitated the importation of agricultural machinery targeted at the large-scale commercial farming

[1] Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, 28 October 1992.

[2] Interview, Ms. P. Buckles, 19 August 1992, and subsequent correspondence.

sector. The following chapter will examine USAID's Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance (ZASA) programme, which was directed primarily at Zimbabwean smallholders through funds generated from the CIP.

As will be demonstrated below, the ramifications of the CIP were profound. USAID's programme served to exacerbate the racial differences that characterized the pre-independent Zimbabwean condition. Instead of meeting its financial obligations towards land reform, the United States designed a programme which recapitalized white commercial farmers. This occurred at a time when the Zimbabwean government was not only trying to redress the land question but also attempting to rectify the agricultural differences that served as the foundation of Zimbabwe's agricultural inheritance. Equally important, however, was that USAID's efforts to influence Zimbabwe's development path through the importation of agricultural machinery backfired. By recapitalizing large-scale commercial farmers, USAID's intervention enhanced the sector's options. The unintended consequence of the programme was that, instead of maintaining their contribution to the nation's food supply, white farmers re-engaged in tobacco production which allowed Zimbabwe to overtake the United States in unprocessed tobacco exports. This, as will be shown below, was fundamentally antithetical to USAID's intentions in Zimbabwe.

4.2 USAID and the Agricultural Sector of Zimbabwe

Development interventions are shaped by numerous factors. As discussed earlier, bilateral development institutions such as USAID must design programmes that meet certain political, economic and humanitarian criteria established by powerful interests at home. This can include the geo-strategic interests of the state, the financial concerns of domestic manufacturers, and the humanitarian considerations of the populace. At times, these interests

can conflict, as in the case of relief efforts to Ethiopia in the mid-1980s. At other times, they may seemingly converge, as in the case of Somalia in 1993.

At another level, however, development programmes must be legitimized within the recipient country, as Ferguson (1990) has demonstrated in the case of Lesotho. The complex dynamics that serve to shape development interventions at a broad level are in turn fused into policy and activated in the recipient country, despite the potential contradictions that may emerge. The language employed by donors is therefore critical. The condition of a country, and the problems to be addressed, are articulated by donors in an effort to justify the terms of their proposed engagement. Questions may be raised about a development programme once an effort is made to contextualize how a donor constructs a particular situation into which it will intervene.

United States interests in Zimbabwe stemmed from the perception that a secure Zimbabwe was essential for regional economic and political stability. Zimbabwe's geo-strategic importance to the U.S. is limited, as the country has no strategic deep sea ports or raw materials required by U.S. industry. Zimbabwe's non-aligned policy served, in the early 1980s, to placate fears that another liberation movement in southern Africa had fallen into the "Soviet orbit". Despite this, the U.S. was concerned about Zimbabwe's professed socialist agenda.[3]

But economic, as well as political, considerations did play a role in USAID's regional strategy. An examination of USAID southern African regional documents, conducted by Hanlon (1991) revealed the underlying goals of U.S. development interventions in the region. The United States was primarily concerned with maintaining U.S. access to southern Africa's

[3] see Hanlon (1991) for a discussion of U.S. efforts to move Mozambique away from its professed socialist agenda.

raw material base while emphasizing private sector development. Moreover, USAID believed that southern Africa "offers a largely untapped market for U.S. goods and services" (cited in Hanlon 1991: 49).[4] Consistent with USAID policy elsewhere, U.S. domestic considerations augmented the controversial political agenda of the United States on the sub-continent. These goals were broadly pursued through the Four Pillars of development policy institutionalized under the Reagan administration. USAID interventions, under the Four Pillars framework, would concentrate on policy dialogue and reform; development efforts designed to ***decentralize*** institutions and encourage greater reliance on private and voluntary organizations rather than the public sector; technical transfers; and a focus on private sector development (Galdi 1988: CRS-17). As will be shown below, USAID's agricultural programme in Zimbabwe initially adhered to many, but not all, of the Four Pillars principles.

United States objectives in Zimbabwe are defined in USAID's ***Country Development Strategy Statement*** (1985: 44) in compassionate terms:

> With its pivotal geographic position in southern Africa, its extensive infrastructure and largely private productive capacity, its proven ability to produce food surpluses and its fragile multi-racial socio-political structure, continued and significant U.S. assistance is justified. The overriding U.S. objective is to see Zimbabwe work - to see the country succeed.

The United States' development strategy in Zimbabwe adhered to three specific principles. First, U.S. development efforts were designed with the intention of maintaining the productive base of the country, which offered the best opportunity for "long-term growth, employment and social development". Second, the United States hoped to "guide Zimbabwe towards a successful post-independence model" by influencing the structure of Zimbabwe's mixed economy. Finally, Zimbabwe was perceived to be a "successful multi-racial political

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[4] For a similar breakdown of U.S. political and economic objectives in Zaire, see Gran (1983: 63).

model" that had particular relevance to South Africa. The country offered "an alternative to failed Marxist economies in Africa" and an example of a successful agricultural model that "can set policy examples for Zimbabwe's neighbours and also assist general food security throughout the southern tier of the continent" (USAID 1985: 44).

The underlying premise guiding USAID's development programme was the belief that the Zimbabwean economy was characterized by a sharp dualism. The dual economy model, as articulated by USAID (1982a and 1982b) in their ***Program Assistance Approval Document*** (PAAD), posited the existence of two separate, unequal and non-interactive sub-sectors within the larger national economy. According to USAID, the "modern economy" contributed overwhelmingly to Zimbabwe's economic viability, producing "95 percent of GDP, probably 98 percent of domestic savings, probably 95 percent or more of tax revenues, and 97 percent of export earnings" (USAID 1982b: D-2). This sector was diversified, utilized modern technology and was characterised by a high degree of labour specialization.

The foundation for the "modern economy" was the commercial farming community. Even though Zimbabwean agriculture followed manufacturing in its overall contribution to national GDP, its importance to the economy is essential. Zimbabwe's domestic food requirements were largely secured from commercial farmers. The commercial farming sector contributed disproportionately to the overall economy's health, accounting "for nearly all the wage employment (in the agricultural sector) and produc[ing] about 70 percent of total [sectoral] output and 90 percent of marketed production" (USAID 1982b: 10-11). The sector was characterized by high yields, a sound infrastructure and was governed by capitalist principles. Commercial farms were privately-owned, efficient and mechanized. Production figures varied, but commercial farmers "produce at levels comparable to those achieved in North America" (USAID 1982b: A-1).

Coexisting with this sector was the "traditional economy", concentrated in agriculture, informal manufacturing and service activities (USAID 1982b: D-2). Traditional agriculture, practised in the Purchase Areas and Communal Lands was "generally characterized by low yields, low levels of technology, low levels of purchased inputs and a deteriorating natural resource base" (USAID 1982b: 11). The poverty of this sector stemmed from inadequate inputs, poorer land and limited marketing opportunities available to smallholders. As USAID (1982b: 8) maintained, "to remove the causes of poverty is to enlarge agricultural productivity". Differences between the defined sub-sectors were "based on land holdings and tenure system" (USAID 1982b: A-1), while the "two economies are as different as the tractor and the hoe" (USAID 1982b: D-2).

Importantly, USAID did recognize that differences within the defined sub-sectors were evident. Contrary to the perception of a homogenous commercial sector portrayed in the original ***Program Assistance Approval Document's*** body, USAID indicated in the Appendices that less than 30 percent of commercial farmers contributed approximately 80 percent of the productive sector's output (USAID 1982b: A-1). "Traditional" producers were equally stratified. While acknowledging the complexity of Zimbabwe's socio-economic situation, USAID simplified its model as a basis for its intervention.

> While each of these different areas has some unique and distinct features, and probably deserves separate treatment, to reduce complexity this description generally uses only smallholder and commercial categories, the smallholder category including both the African Purchase farmers and the communal land farmers (USAID 1982b: A-1).

USAID maintained that an appropriate strategy must seek to redress the disparity between the two sub-sectors. Zimbabwe's agricultural successes largely resulted from the dynamic nature of the commercial sector that had to be sustained while subsistence-based smallholders needed to be more fully integrated into the national economy. Efforts to

enhance smallholder output and increase on-farm income "does not require major policy changes but only refinements and resources" (USAID 1982b: 2). Consequently, a strategy was devised that sought to improve the condition of smallholders while maintaining the vibrancy of the commercial sector.

> An expansion in both sub-sectors, and the more efficient use of currently under-utilized land and labor resources leading to higher productivity, is a cornerstone and requisite of the (government's) "growth with equity" objective. The issue is how to continue supporting and encouraging output from the large-scale commercial sector while also stimulating increased output and productivity in the densely populated smallholder areas. The pragmatic answer is to expand existing institutions and, as needed, to develop new institutions in order to enable reasonable access to required inputs and services by both commercial and communal farmers (USAID 1982b: 11).

The programmes designed by USAID to address the perceived constraints to agricultural development in Zimbabwean were the CIP and ZASA. The Zimbabwean CIP was aimed at infusing the "productive private sector" with the necessary inputs "to provide a firm basis for sustained poverty alleviation, development and growth". Consistent with Zimbabwean aspirations, such inputs would "preserve and maintain the productive structure and general infrastructure of the Zimbabwean economy". The decision to allocate agricultural equipment to commercial farmers was well-founded according to USAID, as the "target group, however, has historically been the larger, private commercial farmer whose interest has been in achieving high production output" (USAID 1982b: 8). ZASA was designed to assist Government of Zimbabwe initiatives targeted primarily, but not exclusively, at smallholders in the neglected areas of the country (USAID 1982b: 11-12). The principal goals of ZASA were to increase smallholder output, incomes, and resource management through improved access to agricultural inputs and markets. USAID argued that such an approach would serve to reduce the gap between commercial farmers and smallholders (Cohen *et. al.* 1986: 3). The cost of the joint programme was set at US$62 million.

The U.S. initiative operated in two phases. First, US$37 million worth of tractors, combine harvesters, spare parts and other U.S. manufactured goods were imported into Zimbabwe from the United States. This initial intervention accounted for the CIP component of USAID's agricultural strategy. Operationally, a CIP consisted of the transfer of foreign exchange from the donor to the recipient government in the form of a loan or grants. The Zimbabwe CIP was in the form of a grant. The foreign exchange was then used to purchase pre-determined commodities from the donor country. Afterwards, the goods were allocated to retail outlets which were responsible for the sale of these commodities to specific buyers within a pre-defined target group. As stipulated in the Zimbabwean CIP arrangement, "a minimum of 80 percent of the funds had to be channelled through the private sector" (USAID 1982b: 5-6). In the case of Zimbabwe, the agricultural machinery was earmarked for established retailers and subsequently targeted at large-scale commercial food producers.

Second, the local currency generated from CIP sales was used by the recipient government to finance other, pre-arranged, development initiatives. The counterpart funds generated from the sales of agricultural equipment under the CIP were subsequently used to fund ZASA, which "in effect, enabled each USAID dollar to work twice" (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 2). Seven constraint areas identified by the Zimbabwean government and USAID were targeted for assistance. These were agricultural research, extension, credit, marketing and input supply, land and water use, agricultural manpower training, and policy planning. U.S. financial aid was used to construct grain, cotton and dairy marketing points in areas previously neglected by former governments. Irrigation schemes were financed, agricultural research and extension efforts supported, credit schemes for cotton producers devised, and funding for human resource development, through the University of Zimbabwe, subsidized. Nine conditions were attached to ZASA, including a provision pertaining to land resettlement

(USAID 1982a: 2). USAID (1982b: 20) maintained that a comprehensive resettlement programme would "deprive the communal lands of needed investment".[5] The Agency therefore clarified its position on land redistribution.

> It is suggested that any USAID support in the resettlement area be primarily indirect via budget support to the constraint areas previously identified... Beyond indirect support, very limited budgetary support might be allocated for training and study tours aimed at improving staff capability to plan and evaluate settlement activities (USAID 1982b: 20-21).

A number of important procedural differences between ZASA and the CIP are evident. In sharp contrast to the CIP, ZASA initiatives were widely distributed as opposed to directly allocated to a specific constituency or target group. As USAID's ***Impact Evaluation*** stated, development efforts financed by ZASA

> went to a total of 84 sub-projects sponsored by 18 different agencies from the ministries and individual agencies responsible for finance, agriculture, resettlement, cooperatives, education, environment, water resources, education. forestry, and facilitated the production and marketing of grain, cotton, coffee, livestock, and dairy products (Odell *et. al.*: 6).

Another important difference is that ZASA funds were channelled through the government as opposed to the transfer of CIP goods through the private sector. Finally, CIP funds were dispersed first. As a result, agricultural efforts funded by ZASA had to wait until the CIP equipment was purchased in Zimbabwe and the counterpart funds transferred to the government through the Federal Reserve. This caused delays in the implementation of ZASA.

> By August 1983 approximately US$7.4 million in CIP funds had been allocated, yet only about Z$1 million in local currency has been generated,

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[5] While this is undoubtedly true, it could also be argued that the ability of smallholders to enhance their condition is contingent upon access to better land which was forcibly taken from the them during the pre-independence era. Rectifying this historical policy was, again, the cornerstone of the liberation struggle. Moyo (1986: 181) cogently argues that the construction of marketing facilities in Communal Areas by USAID was done to defuse the "land question".

> since local currency payments are not made until the commodities are shipped (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 46).

As stated earlier, a complicated series of economic and political factors shaped the dynamics of USAID interventions. Consistent with U.S. development mandates and restrictions, USAID development efforts were designed to further U.S. domestic concerns. Support for the United States economy occurred at a number of levels. More generally, Congressional legislation certified that United States goods must be transported on U.S. vessels, that restrictions on procurement of U.S. goods must be ensured, and that "if PL-480 wheat is imported, recipient-country exports of corn and rice are prohibited" (Riddell 1987: 209).

More tangibly, and in the specific context of Zimbabwe, the benefits accruing to U.S. agricultural manufacturers were clear, as the CIP procurement "will be restricted to the U.S. only" (USAID 1982a: 2). The procurement of goods under the CIP had to be restricted to the United States because,

> If free-sourcing were allowed, importers' bargaining power would be greater and a substantial part of the new machinery would be imported from sources other than the United States (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 47).

The wisdom of the restriction on procurement was readily apparent as the programme "financed 75 percent of U.S. imports in Zimbabwe" (USAID 1987a: 3). "Aid tying" does come at a price to recipients, however, as they are obligated to purchase goods that may be more expensive than if free-sourcing were allowed. Riddell (1987: 209) found that the United States CIP to Zimbabwe was 10-20 percent more costly than if buyers had the freedom to choose less expensive options. The United States also used the CIP to gain access to the Zimbabwean agricultural equipment market, which was dominated by European interests, and to rescue faltering U.S. manufacturers. A large portion of CIP-procured

agricultural machines were produced by Allis-Chalmers, an American company that was facing significant financial trouble during the early-1980s. As the Managing Director of Bain Farm Equipment Company (BFEC), a private retail company in Zimbabwe targeted for CIP assistance, related,

> USAID provided BFEC with Allis-Chalmers tractors and combine harvesters in an effort to save the company in the United States. We did not even need the tractors as we had a good relationship with Fiat. One day a USAID representative came in and told us that we could no longer sell Fiat tractors if we wanted to retain our relationship with the United States. We refused as Fiat tractors are better suited to the environment here and trade between Italy and Zimbabwe is well established and more efficient.[6]

In the end, Allis-Chalmers was not salvaged by U.S. foreign assistance and the company was eventually purchased by Deutz of West Germany.

While the intention to assist U.S. manufacturers through foreign aid to Zimbabwe was clearly evident, ZASA and the CIP were also designed to assist the Zimbabwean agricultural community without threatening U.S. agricultural interests. ZASA was conceived as a "controlled resource transfer" which stipulated that U.S. interventions could in no way assist the recipient state or sector to challenge United States trade in that particular field. As stated in a USAID Authorization Document (1988: 4), USAID's programme in Zimbabwe

> will not have a demonstrable impact on agricultural exports that might compete with U.S. exports, much less cause harm to U.S. exporters in contravention of restrictions contained in the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution.

USAID assessed Zimbabwe's agricultural capabilities and juxtaposed their findings with the United States' agricultural base to determine what initiatives could, and could not, be funded. Development efforts to enhance the output of cotton, through the expansion of agricultural extension, credit and marketing facilities, was allowed as there were "qualitative

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[6] Interview, Mr. R.G. Hampton, 13 August 1992.

differences between U.S. and Zimbabwean cotton" (USAID 1988: 29). Likewise, Zimbabwe's white maize and oilseeds did not constitute a threat to American farmers. Tobacco would not be supported however. As USAID clearly states, "the only crop which competes directly with the U.S. international markets at a significant level is tobacco. USAID will not support the production of this crop" (USAID 1988: 30). Consequently, CIP agricultural equipment was targeted at commercial food producers so that they could maintain their contributions to the national food supply without threatening U.S. domestic interests.

In claiming success for this intervention, USAID was able to demonstrate that U.S. foreign assistance was used towards the purchase of American goods and services through the CIP. The Agency also contended that the funding for development initiatives in Zimbabwe did not threaten U.S. economic interests. Finally, the U.S. drew upon the notion of "mutual interest" by illustrating how the CIP made critical contributions to Zimbabwe, the private sector and the United States by maximizing "trade advantages for the U.S. while responding fully to the requirements of the Zimbabwean economy" (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 38).

USAID assessments asserted that the CIP was critically important to both Zimbabwe and the country's private sector. Many private firms in Zimbabwe would have gone bankrupt had it not been for the U.S. CIP. Zimbabwean "firms stated during the course of the survey that their productive levels would have dropped 30 to 50 percent if they had not received allocations under the CIP" (USAID 1987: 3). During the height of the CIP in 1984, the programme was "responsible for 3.8 percent of GDP and approximately 5 percent of total employment". The ending of this programme, due to the termination of foreign assistance to Zimbabwe in 1986, "will result in a 0.5 percent reduction in GDP and an additional reduction in ***productive*** employment for 8 thousand people", while "[w]ithout the CIP, U.S.

exports to Zimbabwe will decline" (Cohen *et. al.* 1986: ii, own emphasis).

Despite delays in procurement and shipping, the importation of CIP agricultural equipment had a profound impact on the commercial farming community, according to USAID's ***Impact Evaluation*** of the CIP and ZASA (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 37-57). The equipment served a critical need as the age of agricultural machinery in the country would have been well beyond their normal economic life-span without the CIP. Commercial farmers, protected under the Lancaster House Constitution, were given added security by the United States through the CIP (USAID 1982b: 7). Minimum wage legislation and restrictions on firing redundant labour, promulgated under the new Administration, created a greater demand for capital-intensive, as opposed to labour-intensive, technologies.[7] The CIP met this demand. The CIP also allowed commercial farmers to bring underutilized land into production.

> By breaking bottlenecks and putting repaired and new equipment in the field, [the CIP] has increased the area, all other things being equal, that commercial farmers are able to dedicate to crop production and more intensive livestock activities such as dairy operations. (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 50).

Finally, USAID recognized that agricultural employment in the commercial farming community had fallen by 20 percent since independence. While the importation of capital-intensive equipment would appear to have exacerbated this situation, Odell *et. al.* (1991: 50) claim that USAID's programme had a positive effect on employment.

> The CIP program has worked against this trend and has had a positive impact on employment despite the highly mechanized and capital-intensive nature of commercial agriculture... Because of the strong linkages of commercial agriculture with the industrial and processing sectors, increased production

[7] The 1980 Minimum Wages Act established higher standardized wages for employees in all sectors of the economy. The Employment Act of 1980 addressed the issues of collective bargaining and the rights of workers in the country. In addition, farmers had to petition the Ministry of Agriculture for exemptions from firing agricultural employees.

generates further employment in these sectors.

USAID also claimed that ZASA had been a resounding success, despite small problems of implementation. The combination of CIP-procured combines and funding for irrigation under ZASA ensured that "more than 90 percent of the nation's demand for wheat" was met (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 107, 50). The programme "contributed to this extension of [marketing facilities] to the communal areas and was, in part, responsible for the substantial increase in maize production and to the phenomenal increase in cotton production among communal area farmers" (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 51).[8] Heartwater research, funded by ZASA through the University of Florida, "has almost achieved the development of a vaccine for controlling one of the most serious tick-borne diseases" (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 62). Despite minor problems, USAID and the programme's evaluators considered ZASA and the CIP to be effective ways of disbursing U.S. foreign aid.

4.3 Questions about Design and Implementation

In evaluating the impact of the CIP and ZASA, one must examine the programme at a number of levels. First, an analysis of the conceptual framework that serves to justify the intervention is required. This is necessary in order to understand the shortcomings in the design of the programme and its outcome. Second, one must critically assess the impact this intervention has had on Zimbabwe. How far did USAID address the inherent problems faced by the agricultural sector? What changes were effected and what impact did they have? Can one argue, as USAID did, that the gap between "commercial" producers and "traditional" farmers was reduced with the assistance of ZASA and the CIP? These questions are

[8] These claims will be more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter.

explored here and in the following chapter.

USAID's intervention was premised on the assumption that the direct allocation of U.S. equipment to the more productive sector of the Zimbabwean economy would yield the greatest developmental results. This policy, consistent with the basic tenets of the Reagan Administration's "trickle down" approach to economic development, is controversial. Critics of USAID often argued that the development agency's interventions served to sharpen class distinctions to the detriment of poorer segments of the population, as programmes were targeted at wealthy members of a particular community (see Horowitz 1986; Mosley 1986; and Rau 1991). Thompson's (1991) study of agricultural production in southern Africa claimed that USAID policy in Zimbabwe had, among other things, sought to create a class of master farmers at the expense of African peasants in the country. This policy was pursued, she argues, by targeting support at better-endowed farmers whose production techniques "yield per acre, not per cost input" (1991: 118). Output may have increased, but the problems of access to food experienced by vulnerable members of society could be exacerbated. This policy required large tracts of land, improved seeds and secure tenure. In addition, such an approach could be of significant importance to U.S. manufacturers as farmers in Africa became dependent upon U.S. inputs for agricultural production.[9]

Whether one agrees with trickle down economics or the theory's critics, there is a significant philosophical issue that must be addressed in the context of Zimbabwe. Many observers of Zimbabwe characterised the Zimbabwean condition in terms of its inherited dualism (Mumbengegwi 1986; Parsons *et. al.* 1977; Stoneman 1981; Zinyema 1992). Like USAID, the Zimbabwean government's 1982 ***Transitional National Development Plan***

[9] Thompson's hypothesis, based upon USAID policy positions, could have been sharpened by an analysis of USAID's CIP in Zimbabwe.

(TNDP) and "Growth with Equity" (1981) document also employed a dual economy model. Few would contradict USAID's assessment of the importance of the commercial sector in the national economy. Yet, in sharp contrast to USAID's characterization of a non-interactive socio-economic condition in Zimbabwe, observers of Zimbabwe as well as the state saw the two economic systems as interdependent. Indeed, the success of the one was seen as causing the poverty of the other (see Republic of Zimbabwe 1981a and 1982). In "Growth with Equity" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981a) it was maintained that the disparities apparent in the Zimbabwean economy were the result of the racist policies of former Rhodesian governments, and that the privileged socio-economic condition of whites in the country was the direct result of such policies. President Mugabe argued in the "Forward" to the TNDP that the "wealth, education, health, skills and welfare of the bourgeois class, by antithesis, translates themselves into the poverty, ignorance, disease, absence of skills and welfare, on the part of the peasants and workers" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982; i). The TNDP claimed that, while the gap between the two sub-sectors facilitated a "modern" and "peasant" sector, the two were linked.

> The two sectors, however, are not functionally separate and of particular importance is that the one, the modern sector, has historically fed on the other. This exploitation has resulted in gross income and wealth (particularly land) inequalities, especially between the black majority and the white minority (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 17).

Aspects of the Government's argument were exaggerated, but it would be extremely difficult to deny that the policies pursued by the Rhodesians were not overtly discriminatory. Rhodesian history is replete with evidence that demonstrates how Rhodesian policy served to enhance the condition of the whites while simultaneously attempting to undermine the

position of the African populace.[10] The effects of these policies, especially in relation to land, agriculture, housing, credit, education and labour, often had unintended consequences and were by no means implemented evenly across the African spectrum, as previously demonstrated. Some Africans were able to accumulate despite the restrictions placed upon them by the Rhodesian state (see, for example, Cheater 1984; and Phimister 1988b). Yet policies were consistently pursued with the expressed intention of promoting the small population of whites over the African majority, regardless of the inconsistencies and the examples of African accumulation in Rhodesia. The substance of Zimbabwe's contemporary problems, where the creation of an dual economy which tried to impose race rather than class as its distinguishing criteria, was the legacy of the Rhodesian past. To alter this relationship required a substantial transformation. In this context, USAID's interventions exacerbated some of the dualistic aspects of Zimbabwe.

USAID attempted to introduce a statically conceptualized programme into a dynamic and contradictory situation. Zimbabwe's "dual economy" was the product of a historical process which, in the final analysis, USAID reinforced through the targeting of agricultural machinery at those who benefitted from the previous system. Even Mr. David Hasluck, Director of the Commercial Farmers' Union and the recipient of a United States CIP-funded tractor, believed that "politically, this is a very questionable programme".[11]

USAID's analysis of the Zimbabwean agricultural sector was made in such a way as to disguise its racial underpinnings. The issue of ra. , continues to define the Zimbabwean condition, yet was noticeably disguised in USAID's original Project Authorization Document.

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[10] see, for example, Mosley 1983; Moyana 1984; Palmer 1987a; Phimister 1988b; Ranger 1985; Shopo 1987; C. Thompson 1991; Weiner *et. al.* 1985 and Weinrich 1975.

[11] Interview, 20 August 1992.

USAID used the terms "commercial" and "traditional" or "smallholder" to set the parameters of their intervention rather than "black" and "white". USAID's analysis of the historical endowment of Zimbabwe masked these complications and was, at the very least, disingenuous. When USAID used racial terms in the PAAD, they were applied passively, as in "African Purchase Lands", "black farmer", or "African majority" although the latter was never linked to any concept of a white minority which dominated the "productive" sector. Indeed, the term "white" was applied only once, in relation to fears about a new political dispensation (USAID 1982b: 7). USAID simply alluded to the racial situation in Zimbabwe, through concepts such as "multi-racial", but preferred a race-free paradigm to justify their intervention. USAID's programme could, in effect, have been applied to any African country characterized by highly skewed income differentials. Such a model evades a consideration of the racially structured basis of the Zimbabwean economy. To argue, as USAID did, that the principal difference between "commercial" producers and "traditional" farmers was based on differing tenure systems and land holdings was to negate the history of a racially exclusive settler economy. Most significantly, agricultural machinery targeted at "commercial" producers in the early 1980s could only serve to further entrench the white farming community's position in the Zimbabwean economy, at a time when the government was trying to redress this historically specific imbalance. In effect, USAID reinforced a historical pattern of support for white farmers over black in Zimbabwe.

There appear to be two possible ways to interpret the decision by the United States to recapitalize the white farming community at independence. On the one hand, critics could argue that the U.S. had historically supported white regimes in the sub-region. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's early initiatives in southern Africa were based upon the belief that U.S. interests were best served through the maintenance of the white regimes of

Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese-controlled Mozambique and Angola (see El-Khawar *et. al.* 1976; and Rossiter 1985). The policy of "Constructive Engagement" was largely perceived by activists and lobbying groups around the world as evidence of U.S. support for the apartheid regime of South Africa.[12] Critics could also point to U.S. development policy towards land and the CIP in Zimbabwe. Figures on underutilized land among white farmers at independence varied, but there was little doubt that a good deal of land was available for resettlement in 1980.[13] It could therefore be argued that the decision to protect white landowners in Zimbabwe, through constitutional proposals enshrined at the Lancaster House Conference, coupled with the U.S. programme to recapitalize white farmers instead of meeting its previous pledges towards land redistribution, offers another example of racism in U.S. policy.

But USAID programmes based upon the importation of agricultural equipment were not unique to Zimbabwe. Neighbouring Mozambique was the recipient of United States manufactured tractors under a USAID programme, although Hanlon (1991: 94) argues that this undermined the production of farm equipment by Mozambique's Agro-Alfa. Nor is the United States the only donor that imported agricultural machinery to Zimbabwe. The former Minister of Planning and D[illegible]nent, Bernard Chidzero, highlighted Zimbabwe's need for tractors at ZIMCORD by stating that

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[12] Perhaps the most vocal critic of U.S. policy towards South Africa was TransAfrica in the United States.

[13] Research conducted by Moyo and Weiner found that only 34 percent of commercial land in the Mashonaland Provinces was productively used by white commercial farmers (cited in Moyo 1986: 173). The University of Rhodesia, in conjunction with the Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Development Authority, estimated that approximately 60 percent of white farm land was not fully utilized (cited in Riddell 1980: 5). A 1986 World Bank study found that only 549,000 out of 3.5 million hectares of arable large-scale commercial farm land was in production (cited in Loewenson 1992: 59).

> Our agriculture ensures food self-sufficiency and is an important source of foreign exchange, but faces some problems in terms of replacement of equipment (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981b: 50).

France pledged tractors at ZIMCORD (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981b: 69) while the Swedish Co-Operative Centre donated 30 tractors to the Zimbabwe Co-Operative Drought Rehabilitation Programme in 1992 (*The Daily Gazette*, 12 December 1992). Africa is predominantly agriculturally based, and agricultural equipment is therefore necessary. Such an argument enhanced the United States' belief in "mutual interest", as American manufacturers and African producers were both assisted through USAID's programmes. USAID's purpose was to exploit these potential opportunities for U.S. manufacturers, regardless of the limitations of the Agency's assessment of the situation into which it would intervene. Finally, USAID could assert that, in the case of Zimbabwe, "traditional" farmers were unable to use such machinery effectively, as their land holdings were too small and their production techniques too rudimentary to efficiently utilize mechanized equipment. Support for this argument was found at the Bain Farm Equipment Company, where the Managing Director stated emphatically that only white farmers could receive CIP equipment. He concluded by stating that "our natives do not know how to operate them [tractors and combines]".[14]

This latter argument was spurious however, and could only be sustained through USAID's simplistic dual economy model. "Traditional" smallholders had been using mechanized agricultural equipment, and had engaged in capitalist agricultural production, for decades. Investments in agricultural machinery, such as tractors, featured prominently in studies of black farming in pre-independent Zimbabwe (see, for example Cheater 1984;

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[14] Interview, Mr. R.G. Hampton, 13 August 1992.

Weinrich 1975; and Yudelman 1964). In a study of Karangaland conducted during the 1960s, Weinrich (1975: 81) argued that no master farmer in the Tribal Trust Land owned a tractor, "but some progressive master farmers hired a tractor from nearby missions". In the 1970s, wealthy farmers in Gokwe invested in tractors and one farmer leased his tractor in 1992 to households in the area and the local Village Development Committee (VIDCO).[15] The primary "constraint" faced by most smallholders was limited access to credit for capital investments. The often tenuous condition of smallholders was exacerbated during the war, as many wealthier African farmers had their agricultural equipment destroyed. The Riddell Commission (1981: 58) found that some communities had lost 70 percent of their draught power during the liberation struggle. Households that depended upon cattle for draught power were further handicapped at independence due to the poor condition of their remaining herds. Delays in planting were inevitable. Tractors could have contributed to the alleviation of this significant problem.

The demand for mechanized equipment was especially evident among Purchase Area farmers. As discussed in the previous chapter, Purchase Areas were established under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The Act sub-divided the country into European, Native and Unreserved Areas, although the latter was quite small. European-controlled areas, while disproportionately large given the community's relative population, consisted of the best agricultural land in the country. Africans were forced into the Native Reserves, which at independence had an estimated carrying capacity of 325,000 farming families but a population of approximately 780,000 (Riddell 1981: 147). Following the passage of the Land Apportionment Act, a small section of African-designated lands were classified as

[15] Interview 17, 19 May 1992.

Purchase Areas. Originally designed as a buffer between "European" and "African" land, Purchase Areas evolved into a viable alternative for wealthier black farmers who wished to leave the increasingly overcrowded Reserves. In the end, black farmers could acquire title to land instead of remaining under communal tenure arrangements in the Reserves. Purchase Areas were dissolved under the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977, although "each of the 66 former Purchase Lands has in fact retained its own territorial boundaries, name and social identity" (Cheater 1984: x).

The Riddell Commission (1981: 149-50) argued that Purchase Area farmers were generally more inefficient than peasant producers. Cheater disagreed, claiming that the numerically small Purchase Area farmers accounted for one-third of the goods marketed by African producers. She concluded that

> It is therefore quite clear that Purchase Land farmers use their resources on average some thirty times more productively than communal producers use theirs and these figures refute the implication that the majority of Purchase Land farmers are little better than communal cultivators (Cheater 1984: 11).

Weinrich, who conducted extensive research on African farmers during the 1960s, asserted that Purchase Area farmers did not utilize land as efficiently as many Tribal Trust Land farmers due to labour shortages on the former. Significantly,

> Labour shortage could often be overcome by mechanization. Tractor ploughing could overcome the bottleneck at the ploughing season, and combine harvesters could reduce labour requirements at harvesting time. All around mechanization, however, requires a great deal of capital. At present, no individual peasant farmer is capable of raising so much money, nor have any of them sufficient land to make full use of such machinery. Yet if several farmer owners clubbed together, more machinery might be bought (Weinrich 1975: 202).

By the 1970s, numerous Purchase Area farmers had acquired sufficient land for mechanized expansion. Cheater's (1984) study of Msengezi Purchase Area demonstrated how farmers who adhered to the "modern idiom of accumulation" had not only diversified their productive

base but had also begun to mechanize their production processes. Fifty-four farmers in Msengezi, or 16 percent of the total community population, owned tractors and disc-ploughs, while three farmers owned more than one tractor (Cheater 1984: 82). Her case study of "Mr. Mandhla" demonstrates how some farmers had become more dependent upon capital-intensive production, not only for their own farms, but also as an important source of accumulation through leasing this equipment to other farmers in the area (Cheater 1984: 106-7).

Purchase Area farmers were generally under-funded however, and, as mentioned earlier, had limited access to credit for capital equipment due to restrictions placed on them by the Rhodesian authorities. African farmers had acquired agricultural machinery, and tractors, although the demand for such inputs remained high. Cheater (1984: 178) contended that minimum wage legislation would adversely affect Purchase Area farmers unless they secured access to agricultural machinery to replace the labour they would inevitably lose, stemming from their inability to sustain an adequate labour force at a minimum wage. She concluded that Purchase Area farmers were caught between peasants, who received preferential treatment from the post-independent Zimbabwean government, and commercial producers who were able to sustain themselves given their stronger economic foundations.

Consequently, U.S. interests in blunting Zimbabwe's rhetorical leanings towards socialism, as well as the land question, could have been better served through an agricultural machinery programme that targeted African freeholders *instead of* commercial producers. USAID had a well known preference for titled landholders, and was, in the 1990s, advocating ownership of land over communally-based forms of tenure in many parts of Africa. Purchase Area farmers would therefore appear to have been prime targets for USAID's CIP in Zimbabwe, as they were titled landholders, under-capitalized and threatened by recently-

enacted minimum wage legislation. African farmers who had purchased land in former European-designated areas, which was legalized in 1979, faced significant difficulties during the early 1980s. These farmers were especially vulnerable at independence as squatters and former liberation fighters increasingly encroached on tenured farms (Phimister 1988a: 12). Riddell (1980: 12) argued that "over 90 percent of registered African farmers were facing bankruptcy and some hundreds of African Purchase Land farms lay vacant". By directly assisting a viable class of tenured farmers, whose interests regarding land and agricultural production would in many respects have coincided with USAID's conception of "advanced farmers", USAID could have furthered its agenda while assisting a sector of the black community that desperately required the services of agricultural machinery.

As demonstrated above, USAID was aware of the existence of Purchase Area farmers, although the Agency decided to subsume them under the broad category of "traditional" farmers. The recognition of these differences did not serve to alter USAID's programme however. The development programme was guided and sustained by USAID's oversimplified dual economy model despite evidence which suggests that this model was inappropriate, and that sections of the "traditional" community could have utilized CIP equipment. USAID's former Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer believed that the inability of African producers to acquire U.S.-funded equipment was the biggest problem with the CIP.[16] No mechanisms were established to allow capital-poor black farmers access to this equipment despite the obvious demand and USAID's awareness that "traditional" producers could not gain access to the medium and long-term loans necessary for mechanized expansion (USAID 1982b: 19). In the end, only ***one*** black farmer was able

[16] Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, 28 October 1992.

to purchase a CIP tractor - Gary Magadzire, Chairman of the Zimbabwe Farmers Union and an extremely influential individual in Zimbabwe's farming community. One could argue that the outcome of USAID programmes recapitalized white farmers at the expense of a potentially successful smallholder farming class. USAID might respond that Congressional regulations were partially to blame, as the Agency needed rapidly to disperse its allotted funds in order to confirm its ability to spend the designated monies in a short time-frame. The Agency could also have claimed that the ability to fund ZASA was contingent upon the quick sale of CIP equipment. Agricultural machinery allocated to black farmers through cumbersome credit procedures would have further delayed the implementation of ZASA. Either way, significant reservations regarding programme design and implementation are warranted.

Before proceeding with an assessment of the CIP, important questions remain in relation to USAID's emphasis on the private sector. USAID alleged that U.S. and Government of Zimbabwe objectives, as articulated through the CIP, were in harmony. The Government's first priority, according to USAID, was to maintain "economic prosperity by stimulating the private sector to expand production, create additional employment and increase exports" (USAID 1982b: 7). USAID then claimed that,

> In the near term, the Government of Zimbabwe must instill a feeling of confidence in two separate constituencies: the commercial and business community, both domestic and foreign, and the African majority, both small-holders and wage earners (USAID 1982b: D-7-8).

There is little evidence to support this view, which misrepresented Zimbabwe's priorities. In fact, the newly-elected government thought the complete opposite. Rhetorically, Zimbabwe professed a socialist ideology that advocated the primacy of the state over the private sector in the economy. Members of government saw the state's role as

primarily transformative, viewing the private sector with great suspicion. This stemmed from the pervasive influence of foreign (especially South African) interests within the private sector, the perception that the state could redress past grievances inherited from the Rhodesian authorities, and from concerns over the absence of any real African representation in the private sector. By 1987, the government of Zimbabwe's reservations did not appear to have influenced USAID.

> Established businesses were familiar with the system and thus able to easily take advantage of the CIP. The historical basis upon which foreign exchange allocations are awarded ***does discourage new entrants to the system.*** Since the primary objective of the CIP was to facilitate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy, ***the decision to work the program through the existing system was well taken*** (USAID 1987: 4, emphasis added).

USAID's 1992 structural adjustment effort seemed to recognize this, as the Agency highlighted with concern the "negative perception of the private sector" held by the Zimbabwean government (USAID 1991: 50).

4.4 Impact of the CIP

As was shown earlier, USAID-funded agricultural machinery was targeted at, and received by, large-scale commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Tractors and combines enhanced the confidence of white farmers at a time when they felt threatened by the settlement achieved at Lancaster House. The agricultural machinery was intended to be used by commercial grain producers in order to maintain the nation's food supply. United States interests were therefore served through the allocation of tractors to grain producers. It was believed that this would limit Zimbabwe's expansion into tobacco production.

Ironically, this aspect of USAID's strategy appears to have failed, as USAID-funded tractors were overwhelmingly allocated to tobacco farmers. This occurred because USAID

had little control over the sale of agricultural equipment by the private sector. Commercial retailers enjoyed much more flexibility in the allocation of goods than the government. As Odell *et. al.* (1991: 40) state, "[t]here were very few restrictions on what the CIP funds could be used for". This was corroborated by the Managing Director of BFEC who admitted that, although the tractors were provided for sale to large-scale food producers, all of the tractors had been sold to farmers who primarily produced tobacco.[17]

The post-independence era in Zimbabwe saw a dramatic transformation in the role played by white commercial farmers in the national economy. It appears that the U.S.-funded CIP assisted white farmers in this process of change. In many respects, white farmers reverted back to the export-oriented production practices more characteristic of the pre-Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) era than either the UDI (1965-79) or the initial post-independent periods. Sanctions initiated against Rhodesia following UDI, though imperfect, had forced the economy to become more inward-oriented. State control over the economy increased in an effort to mitigate the effects of Rhodesia's growing isolation. Crops that could be produced, utilized and processed in the country were favoured while export commodities, such as tobacco, were discouraged. This shift in production was secured through a combination of incentives and disincentives offered to the farming community. Price incentives for maize, wheat, cotton and soya beans were complemented by generous credit schemes for commercial producers (see Stoneman 1981: 139). In contrast, marketing quotas and restrictions on the total amount of land that could be devoted to tobacco production were enforced by the Rhodesian authorities. Tobacco, which accounted for 80

[17] Interview, Mr. R.G. Hampton, 13 August 1992. It should be noted that commercial farmers in Zimbabwe produce a wide variety of crops. The point being made is that commercial farmers whose primary productive activity is tobacco received the U.S.-funded tractors despite U.S. concerns over Zimbabwean tobacco exports.

percent of the value of commercial agricultural output in 1965, declined to only 28 percent by 1969 (Mumbengegwi 1986: 206-7). By the end of UDI, only 11.1 percent of white farm land was devoted to tobacco, while 39.6 percent was allocated to maize and 13 percent to cotton (Moyo 1986: 179).

Changes in agricultural production forced on commercial farmers by the exigencies of a war economy were, since independence, relieved. Despite early incentives to maize producers, and adequate rains during the initial years of independence, the lure of food production waned. The government of Zimbabwe froze the producer price offered for maize between 1982 and 1984, and again between 1985 and 1988. These measures, while consistent with Zimbabwe's stabilisation programme of 1982/3 (Friedmann 1992: 381), were on the surface inconsistent with USAID's conditions pertaining to price stimuli under ZASA. Yet USAID policy towards maize producer prices had changed in the mid-1980s. As Thompson (1991: 117-28) demonstrates, USAID exerted pressure on the government to lower the producer price of maize in an effort to reduce maize output in Zimbabwe. The policy was premised on the notion that a democratic South Africa should be responsible for the maize supplies in the sub-region. USAID (1985: 46) maintained that policy dialogue with the government had been effective in relation to producer prices, a point which would add credence to Thompson's claims. The actual impact of U.S. pressure on Zimbabwean pricing decisions is uncertain however, despite the decline in the real maize producer price throughout the 1980s. United States leverage over Zimbabwe was reduced during this period due to the termination of USAID assistance to the country in 1986. Furthermore, Herbst's (1990) findings in relation to state autonomy and agricultural producer prices merits added caution with regard to the assertion that donor pressure necessarily translates into

actual policy.[18] Zimbabwe's decision to freeze producer prices would also be attributed to the state's fears of large pay-outs to food producers during periods when financial resources were limited. What USAID producer price policy does suggest, at the very least, is a lack of coherence with earlier ZASA efforts designed to increase smallholder incomes.

With escalating costs of agricultural inputs, and a stagnant maize producer price remaining despite inflation, farmers with adequate land holdings and equipment in the country began to look at alternatives to food crop production. Large-scale commercial grain producers were further dissuaded from maintaining their productive food base through the establishment of a two-tiered pricing structure in 1986 which overtly discriminatory against white farmers. While the measures were eventually modified, the initiative served to undermine commercial farmers' confidence in state-controlled commodities, fuelling further diversification into tobacco, soya beans and, more recently, horticulture and game ranches. The combination of poor producer prices, increasing costs associated with food production and the introduction of minimum wage legislation increased the demand for labour-saving agricultural machinery at the time of the United States CIP. As the Director of the CFU asserted,

> The ability of commercial farmers to diversify their productive base, and to cultivate row crops, has been significantly enhanced by the U.S.-sponsored CIP.[19]

The shift away from low-valued State-controlled crops to higher priced agricultural commodities by large-scale commercial farmers since independence was noteworthy as illustrated in Figure 1. Maize production by large-scale commercial farmers precipitously

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
[18] For a study of this in relation to the World Bank, see Mosley *et. al.* (1991a and 1991b).

[19] Interview, Mr. D. Hasluck, 20 August 1992. Mr. Hasluck is a tobacco farmer.

during the 1980s. By 1991, large-scale commercial farmers were producing more tobacco and soya beans, combined, than maize. Tobacco production levelled off as large-scale commercial farmers attempted to consolidate their holdings. The two most important factors for successful tobacco production was adequate storage and curing facilities, and mechanized equipment.[20] The former needed to be expanded before tobacco production could increase further. The Operations Director of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association argued that investments in storage and curing facilities by commercial tobacco producers had been significant since 1990 and that the industry was poised to dramatically increase production by 1994.[21]

Figure I: Large-Scale Commercial Farm Production

(In Thousands of Tons)



Source: Commercial Farmers' Union

[20] Interview, Mr. R. Walton, 30 July 1992.

[21] Interview, Mr. R. Stenson, 27 January 1993.

Sachikonye (1992: 90) has shown that this process of diversification out of maize production accelerated in 1992. The large-scale commercial sector had only planted 78,000 hectares of maize as opposed to 125,000 the previous year. While part of the reason for this could have resulted from cropping decisions based upon predictions of drought, it needs to be stressed that large-scale commercial farmers had good irrigation systems. As the effect of the 1992 drought became apparent, large-scale farmers offered to put their irrigated land under maize production in an effort to reduce the government's dependence upon imported maize. The offer was viciously manipulated by some government officials who felt that this was further evidence of the white agricultural community blackmailing the country. The incident indicated that white farmers had the capability to grow far more maize for the country than was currently being produced by the sector. The commercial sector's diversification away from food crops was especially important as Zimbabwe's ability to remain self-sufficient in food was increasingly dependent upon Communal Area farmers in the more vulnerable regions of the country.

The shift away from maize production was accompanied by declining sales to the Grain Marketing Board from white commercial farmers. Much of their remaining maize was being traded between households and retained as stockfeed. This trend accelerated in 1993, despite the attractive pre-planting producer price of Z$900 per tonne. The shortage of stockfeed in 1992 had a devastating impact on cattle and dairy production, while food scarcity resulted in a vibrant informal market for maize between large farms. As one commercial farmer related, "[maize] will be worth far more than Z$900".[22] The large-scale commercial farming community's contribution to the country's wheat supply increased. This

[22] Interview, Mr. D. Hasluck, 20 August 1992.

could be partially attributed to the importation of combines under the CIP although it cannot be proven. It appears that CIP-procured equipment was not used to sustain the large-scale commercial farming community's contribution to national food supplies, as envisioned by USAID.

This is not to argue that white farmers in Zimbabwe did not contribute to the national economy. In fact, the opposite is more accurate despite the reduced levels of food that were produced on commercial farms. Tobacco was an extremely important, and regular, foreign exchange earner. In 1992, tobacco was one of the few sources of foreign exchange for the country outside of foreign aid. The crop was sold for U.S. dollars at the Tobacco Auction, even though tobacco farmers received Zimbabwe dollars for their crop. The foreign currency se by tobacco farmers was a critical source of hard currency for a country, and government, with limited foreign reserves. Zimbabwe's ability to procure food on the international market, at US$1500 per ton, during the 1992 drought, was certainly enhanced by tobacco farmers' contribution to the nation's foreign reserves. At one level, export-led growth was promoted by USAID. In the case of Zimbabwe, however, USAID attempted to prevent such an outcome in relation to tobacco by targeting agricultural equipment at commercial food producers. Ironically, USAID's attempts to undermine Zimbabwean maize production (whether successful or not) invariably pushed commercial food producers into other, more valuable crops such as tobacco, that could compete with the United States. This highlights, once again, the unintended contradictions which emerged from US development policy.

Mechanized equipment also allowed the commercial farming sector to bring previously underutilized land into production and increased the productivity of commercial farm workers. Increased productivity masked a fundamental shift in the nature of commercial

agricultural employment however. Permanent employment was replaced by an increased emphasis on non-permanent labour.[23] By 1989, fewer permanent workers were employed on large-scale commercial farms than non-permanent labourers. Moreover, the increased productivity of workers was accompanied by a decline in the ratio of workers to cropped area, from 0.47 to 0.37 (Loewenson 1992: 50).

The link between increased mechanization and changes in employment status are suggested in Figure II. Loewenson's (1992) study of plantation agriculture in Zimbabwe highlights how mechanization exacerbated the already vulnerable condition of commercial farm workers as their contracts were subsequently shortened. Wages in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector stagnated, and there were indications that women were increasingly engaging in prostitution to augment family incomes on commercial farms. In addition,

> It appears that one of the side-effects of the trend towards increasing the capital-intensity of production has been that it has enabled employers to counter some post-independence socio-economic interventions. This is exemplified in the extent to which the setting of minimum wages has contributed to the displacement of labour by capital. The increasing resort by employers to non-permanent forms of labour has facilitated employers attempts to increase their control over labour, while rising input costs have been used to justify the lack of expenditure on social and environmental improvements on farms (Loewenson 1992: 64).

The reason for this insecurity stemmed from the disproportionate amount of income that poor households spent on food. The average wage of farm workers was simply not sufficiently adequate to meet household needs. Despite the government of Zimbabwe's professed support for workers, real wages in the country had not increased since 1982, nor had they kept pace with inflation (see Mlambo *et. al.* 1991: 56). Significantly,

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
[23] Non-permanent labour in Zimbabwe was classified under five broad categories - seasonal, contractual, casual, special and part-time. For a discussion of the terms of these contracts, see Loewenson 1992: 50, Table 4.1.

> Minimum subsistence food needs were valued in 1983 at Z$65.89 when agricultural minimum wages were only 76 per cent of this amount. From the 1986 surveys, the total monthly food value consumed by households (including grown and foraged foods) did not reach more than three-quarters of the estimated average minimum subsistence food needs of Z$97.98 in any household at any time in the year (Loewenson 1992: 74).

While some commercial farms did offer higher wages to their workers, these were largely offset by increases in consumer prices and the costs associated with school fees and health care.

Figure II: Employment in the Large-Scale Commercial Farming Sector

workers (in thousands)



Source: World Bank 1991: 52


Health conditions on commercial farms were a further cause for concern in relation to the welfare of farm workers. While the Riddell Commission had argued that there was a great deal of disparity between the conditions of commercial farm employees on different

farms, the Commission's overall findings were that the situation on commercial farms was "below an acceptable standard of human decency" (Riddell 1981: 42). The Commission noted that research conducted at five of the better farms in Bindura found levels of malnutrition and undernutrition among workers' children to be between 50-99 percent (Riddell 1981: 42). This situation had not changed since independence when Loewenson (1992: 75-6) found, more than a decade later, that the incidence of malnutrition and undernutrition were greater on commercial farms than in any other sector of the economy. These findings were reinforced by Tagwireyi (1990: 63), who argued that commercial farm workers were the group most vulnerable to malnutrition and food insecurity in the country. Worker vulnerability had, in the final analysis, been exacerbated by the dramatic transformation of employment status on commercial farms. Tractors secured under the CIP could have played an important role in facilitating this transformation.

These changes in the nature of employment in Zimbabwe's commercial farming community cannot be blamed on USAID. Minimum wage legislation certainly had an impact. The World Bank (1991: 52) estimated that between 58-74 thousand workers lost their jobs as the result of these new laws. USAID did however assist large-scale commercial farmers through the CIP at a particular time when the demand for agricultural equipment could have offset some of the losses resulting from these changes in legislation. Commercial farmers were able to maintain their viability with the assistance of CIP equipment, despite losses in employment to black farm workers and the resultant decline in household income.

But USAID also claimed that the losses in agricultural employment due to the importation of labour-displacing technologies were offset by employment gains in processing industries. This assertion appears somewhat dubious as illustrated in Figure III and cannot

Figure III: Employment in Zimbabwe
(in Thousands)



Source: First Merchant Bank

be substantiated from ZASA/CIP assessments.[24] Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector saw a slow increase in employment from independence, although most notably after 1987. Soya bean production is predominately an industrial crop, and *could* therefore account for *some* of the increases in industrial sector employment. Such modest gains in manufacturing employment certainly do not justify Odell *et. al.*'s (1991: 50) assertion that losses in agricultural labour were offset by gains in the industrial sector. In fact, there were important indications that the contribution of white farmers to the deepening of linkages between

[24] Riddell (1990a: 10) cogently argues that data from sub-Saharan Africa is not only unreliable but that "the degree of inaccuracy cannot easily be judged". Data related to the manufacturing sector is especially problematic given the inconsistencies in methodology employed by international agencies. Statistics in relation to the manufacturing sector must therefore be used with extreme caution.

agriculture and industry was decreasing.

Riddell (1990b: 338) argued that "over 50 [percent] of all manufacturing gross output, value added, employment, capital stock and exports originates in just three-sub-sectors: foodstuffs, chemicals and metal products". Other manufacturing ventures which were dependent upon agricultural linkages included textiles, clothing and footwear, and beverages and tobacco. The links between these industries and commercial farming in Zimbabwe however diminished. The agro-industrial link between commercial milling and food crops, such as maize, was significant in Zimbabwe yet, as demonstrated earlier, the decline in large-scale commercial production of maize was notable. Increased wheat and soya bean production has partially, but not completely, offset this decline. Ninety-eight percent of tobacco was exported as an unprocessed commodity, which, though important to the nation's foreign currency reserves, did not have a direct positive impact on Zimbabwe's industrial potential.[25] Likewise, horticultural exports added very little value to the Zimbabwean economy. Finally, cotton production among large-scale commercial farmers also declined. Agricultural support for Zimbabwe's textile industry was therefore being buttressed by African producers as opposed to white farmers.[26]

USAID was noticeably mute on the issue of tobacco, although the reasons for this were readily apparent. As shown earlier, USAID programmes were designed with the intention of balancing recipient needs with U.S. interests. USAID was specifically prohibited from assisting tobacco farmers as this would increase competition between the United States

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[25] Interview, Mr. R. Stenson, Operations Director, Zimbabwe Tobacco Association, 27 January 1992. Also see Riddell (1990b: 365).

[26] Data from the Commercial Farmers' Union and the Grain Marketing Board confirm that African production and subsequent sales of cotton to the Cotton Marketing Board was significantly larger than the contribution made by large-scale commercial farmers.

and Zimbabwe. A more comprehensive assessment of the CIP would have shown that USAID failed to protect U.S. interests. USAID assessments therefore disguised this fact by concentrating their analysis on other crops that were not a threat to U.S. farmers.

> Communal farmers, lacking viable alternatives, remained in these crops (maize and cotton), but since the mid-1980s, commercial farmers increasingly have focused their attention on profitable markets for products such as flowers, fruit and vegetables air-freighted to Europe. They also have concentrated their efforts on other high-value crops such as soyabeans, coffee and nuts such as macadamia (Odell *et. al.* 1991: 32).[27]

This, as demonstrated above, was misleading. USAID staff in Harare were well aware that the CIP equipment was instrumental in allowing commercial producers to re-engage in tobacco production. As Mr. Mushauri comments, "of course the tractors have been used for tobacco production. These farmers are making a logical choice between profitable and unprofitable ventures".[28] Such an admission would have raised the ire of powerful interests in the United States however, especially considering that Zimbabwe now exported more unprocessed tobacco than the United States (see Figure IV).[29] In fact, the United States increased the amount of land that U.S. tobacco farmers were allowed to devote to tobacco production in an effort to re-establish its export position ***ahead*** of Zimbabwe. Subsidies to American tobacco producers increased as well. The Operations Director at the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association was unconcerned, however, as tobacco farmers investments

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[27] A reduction in the level of European soya bean subsidies, which raised concerns about a "trade war" between the United States and Europe, had little effect on Zimbabwe. The level of subsidy that will most likely remain in place following a settlement to the dispute will still undermine Zimbabwean soya beans on the international market.


[28] Interview, 28 October 1992.

[29] The United States clearly exported a greater amount of tobacco, in the form of processed cigarettes, than any other country in the world. Nevertheless, the U.S. lost its position as the second largest unprocessed tobacco exporter, behind Brazil, to Zimbabwe.

in storage and curing facilities would ensure its export status behind Brazil.[30]

Figure IV: Unprocessed Tobacco Exports

(in Thousands of Kilograms)



Source: Zimbabwe Tobacco Association

The shift in commercial crop production since the mid-1980s indicates considerable flexibility for mechanised farmers. They were, in the end, able to take advantage of emergent marketing-opportunities. Yet, the expressed intention of USAID's joint initiative was to reduce the gap between commercial producers and the "neglected majority". Commercial farmers were able to effectively alter their cropping patterns to take advantage of

[30] Interview, Mr. R. Stenson, 27 January 1993.

opportunities presented either by the government or through alternative avenues, as in the case of tobacco. Undercapitalized Communal Area farmers, and farmers in the former Purchase Areas, did not enjoy this degree of flexibility. They were constrained by factors such as land, access to machinery and food availability, which would have enabled them to more effectively accumulate. Mechanized farmers were consequently able to accumulate more effectively than farmers whose production decisions are constrained by factors such as poor land or a limited capital base. It is hard to see how a programme designed with the expressed intention of reducing the economic gap between "commercial" producers and "traditional" farmers could have achieved this objective given the degree of support the former sector had received, not only historically, but through programmes such as USAID's CIP and ZASA.

4.5 Conclusion

Commodity Import Programmes could play a useful role in meeting some of the significant capital and financial needs of structurally weak developing economies. Africa's manufacturing and agricultural prospects were in many ways constrained by outdated and inefficient machinery. Development interventions designed to address such problems were certainly required, especially if Africa's developmental potential was to be fully exploited. But these programmes did not operate in a vacuum. As the evidence from Zimbabwe suggests, issues of race and class could often be exaggerated, despite the pressing need to redress such disparities in an economy which had been distorted by policies which exacerbated these social divisions and tensions.

Despite praise for USAID's CIP in Agency evaluations, the programme failed within the limited framework articulated even by USAID. While U.S. agricultural machinery was

procured, it was not enough to save Allis-Chalmers from a foreign buy-out for instance. Moreover, the machinery was indeed used by recipients for tobacco production, which allowed Zimbabwe to displace the United States as the second largest exporter of the unprocessed commodity. The commercial sector's contribution to national food supplies declined precipitously and the important linkages that previously existed between commercial agriculture and industry were, in the process, eroded. Finally, the decision to assist the private sector and commercial farmers through the CIP did not facilitate a reduction in the gap between the commercial and traditional sectors, but rather contributed to the growing disparities between them. This is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

FOOD INSECURITY AND GRAIN MARKETING IN GOKWE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will concentrate on the impact that a USAID-funded grain depot has had on the residents of Gokwe, a vulnerable Communal Area in Midlands Province. Gokwe is classified under agro-ecological Natural Regions III and IV, and was specifically mentioned by the Riddell Commission (1981: 36) as a priority area for marketing extension. Farmers in the region had access to four USAID-funded depots. Food shortages were a common occurrence. Households were predominantly male-dominated as most of the families who had moved into Gokwe did so to engage in full-time agricultural production. Consequently, Gokwe serves as a valuable case study because of the inhabitants' reliance upon agricultural production for their livelihood. It is these farmers who were intended to be the principal beneficiaries of the depot extension programme.

Research was conducted in Gokwe from February 1992 - June 1993. Informal interviews with local residents from different parts of Gokwe, as well as depot personnel, government and AGRITEX officials, Agricultural Finance Corporation employees, and store-owners were augmented by 157 formal interviews conducted on a random basis within the Gwanyika Plateau region of Njelele Ward III. Njelele comprised approximately 800 households and lies between 50-70 kilometres from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) depot in Gokwe. This Chapter moves the study from the broad aspects of development policy to focus on the specific context of Njelele in order to better understand how exogenous aid interventions affect recipient communities.

It will be suggested that, while smallholders throughout Zimbabwe wanted better access to markets following independence (see Bratton 1987), the problem was not simply that of marketing and output, as USAID and the Zimbabwean government assumed. Through its assistance programme, USAID expanded the scope of the previously existing marketing system into rural areas which historically enjoyed greater autonomy from centralized authority. More importantly, the experiences in Njelele suggest that the extension of marketing services, which had historically been developed to serve white commercial farmers, was not necessarily appropriate for all areas. The benefits accruing to smallholders from the construction of grain marketing depots, while registering impressive figures at the national level, actually exacerbated the insecure condition of rural consumers in ***food deficit regions*** of Zimbabwe. Food insecurity in these areas was a constant feature of Zimbabwean society despite the praise heaped upon the country for its agricultural achievements. USAID's intervention was especially devastating during periods of drought such as 1992. A major problem was that USAID and the government oversimplified the dynamics of rural relations and agricultural marketing and ignored the underlying problems associated with African poverty and insecurity. USAID's claims of impressive gains in agricultural production must be reassessed in the light of increasing food insecurity experienced by many smallholders in areas of USAID-funded grain depots.

5.2 Success?

The marketing programme in Zimbabwe was judged a success by both the government and USAID. In proclaiming the intervention a success for Zimbabwe, USAID marshals some impressive national figures. Since independence, the relative contribution made by smallholders to national agricultural output has increased dramatically. In 1982,

USAID claimed that,

> ...in spite of the drought (1982-84), during which food grains had to be imported, Zimbabwe's policy to increase the levels of market participation by smallholders has been successful. This is shown most dramatically in the ever increasing percentages, now 57% and 45% respectively, of the nation's marketed maize and cotton crops which originate in the smallholder sector. Comparative figures for 1978 were 9% and 19% respectively. (USAID 1982: 2)

These percentages rose after 1988. African farmers' marketed sales of maize and sunflower to the GMB were 68 and 96-98 percent respectively for the 1990-91 season (Govereh *et. al.* 1990: 160). Smallholder contributions to national food supplies since independence bolstered Zimbabwe's reputation as the agricultural success of Africa. Exports of food to the sub-region were a consistent feature of the post-independence era, and donors suggested that other countries had much to learn from the Zimbabwean-model.

Part of the explanation for the significant increase in smallholder production related to the greater marketing opportunities available to smallholders since independence. Moreover, areas ravaged by war, such as Gokwe, benefitted from the stability of the new order. Crops could be planted without fear of destruction in conditions of civil war. Households in areas such as Mangwende and Chibi established new holdings and replanted previously abandoned fields (Rohrbach 1988: 311). Seed and fertilizer packages were distributed free of charge to resettlement farmers, while improved seed varieties were made readily available to farmers in outlying areas. Agricultural extension agents began concentrating their efforts on Communal Areas. Sunflower and millet, crops predominantly grown by African farmers, were included as controlled crops in 1983 and 1984 respectively. The improved prices offered were further incentive to sell, and the first two years of independence were characterised by above average rains. At first it was cheaper for farmers to sell their maize to the GMB and purchase subsidized urban-refined meal than to withhold

stocks for household consumption and pay local grinding fees.

An additional factor that should be stressed was that large-scale commercial farmers diversified their productive base away from poorly-priced food crops, such as maize, to higher paying crops such as tobacco and soya beans as well as horticulture and game ranching. Rohrbach *et al.* (1990: 104) claimed that large-scale commercial maize production declined by more than 40 percent after 1985. Sachikonye (1992: 90) demonstrated that diversification out of maize production accelerated in 1992 as the large-scale commercial sector only planted 78,000 hectares of maize as opposed to 125,000 hectares the previous year. The percentage of sales to the GMB by black farmers would naturally have risen given the dramatic decline in sales from large-scale commercial farmers. The diversification away from grain crops was significant as Zimbabwe's ability to remain self-sufficient in food was increasingly dependent upon Communal Area farmers in the more vulnerable regions of the country.

Finally, a small sub-sector of African producers, largely concentrated in the better farming regions of Mashonaland Central, contributed disproportionately to the African percentage of marketed maize and sunflower. According to Jayne *et al.* (1991: 16), Mashonaland producers "have accounted for 80 percent of *per capita* smallholder maize deliveries to GMB since 1980, even though they constitute only 22 percent of the smallholder population and 25 percent of the maize area planted in the smallholder sector" (also see Moyo 1986: 187, and Weiner 1988: 69). Only two of the 24 USAID-funded depots were constructed in Mashonaland Central - Rushinga and Kachuta.

What the national figures disguised, in addition to the relatively small percentage of African producers who bolstered Zimbabwe's production figures, was that vast areas of Zimbabwe were periodically unable to meet local food requirements. Six out of Zimbabwe's

eight provincial districts were consistently deficient in food supplies (Jayne *et. al.* 1990: 49). Chronic malnutrition, which afflicted 30 percent of Zimbabwean youth in 1990/91 was the largest killer of children between the ages of two and five years (Rukuni 1990: 4-5; also see Republic of Zimbabwe 1991: 17).

This point is not contentious despite Zimbabwe's agricultural "success". USAID, among others, recognized that most Zimbabwe smallholders exhausted their household supplies of food between September and December, even in a good year.[1] Deficit households in vulnerable Natural Regions had to secure food through alternative channels once their supplies of food were finished. Food could be obtained through informal networks between households, purchased directly from GMB depots and urban-refined meal procured from local retailers, or a combination of these. The extension of depots to previously neglected regions of Zimbabwe primarily affected smallholder food security in two ways. First, in areas closer to urban centres and better served by tarred roads, the extension of depots increased rural consumers' dependence on high-priced commercially-refined meal. This served as a check on both household welfare and income as many vulnerable households spent a disproportionate amount of their earnings on food. Second, in more isolated regions such as Gokwe, food sold to the GMB was exported out of the area without mechanisms available to ensure the re-importation of reasonably-priced foodstuffs. As a result of Zimbabwe's imperfect marketing system, many rural households were unable to secure food at an affordable price from alternative sources once their household stocks were depleted.

This resulted in the paradoxical coexistence of overflowing silos and debilitating hunger. The situation called for a reexamination of the entire system and USAID's claim to

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[1] Interview, Mr. Ted Morse, USAID Mission Director, Harare, 8 April 1993.

success. Previous chapters explored some of the implications that a unidirectional marketing system has on small-scale producers in food deficit regions of Zimbabwe. The argument was that USAID did not simply assist the Government in bringing neglected areas into the wider Zimbabwean economy through the construction of depots. It also extended and strengthened a specific marketing system which was detrimental to vulnerable households in food deficit regions of the country The following section builds upon the earlier analysis of grain marketing in post-independence Zimbabwe by concentrating on the impact of ZASA on the outlying districts of Gokwe.


5.3 USAID-Funded Grain Depots in Gokwe

In Gokwe and the surrounding area, ZASA funds were used to construct one Primary Marketing Depot in Gokwe centre, two seasonal depots in Zhombe and Nembudziya, and a rural depot in Sanyati as the map on the following page illustrates.

As mentioned earlier, Gokwe saw a large influx of people since the reduction of tsetse fly in the mid-1960s. Households from more crowded Communal Areas came to Gokwe and increased the demand for food in the area. A distinguishing feature of Gokwe as its multi-cultural influx. An unusual mix of Shona, Ndebele and Tonga speakers became integrated within the area. As a result, political and social relations in Gokwe were articulated in a manner that differed from other parts of the country which were not as ethnically integrated. Patron-client relations crossed ethnic boundaries in a manner that differed from other regions, while kinship networks were not as localised because many people who moved to Gokwe had extended families in other regions of the country. An underground market in land was clearly evident although rarely discussed, which added to the complexities apparent in Gokwe.

The FAO, which began a programme designed to assist AGRITEX in Njelele Ward

III estimated that on average, Njelele residents were able to achieve yields of 1.5 tons of maize per hectare, 0.6 tons of cotton per hectare, and 0.5 tons of sunflower per hectare. Local AGRITEX officials claimed that the FAO figures were too high.[2] Moreover, disparities between households were critical. There was a wide range of soils evident in Njelele, but the plateau areas were extremely rocky and therefore difficult to cultivate. Water resources were scarce and undeveloped.



[2] Interview, Mr. Peter Maposa, 15 June 1993.

Historically, deficit families in Gokwe survived through a variety of coping strategies.[3] Cash transactions and labour exchanges were the principal means by which deficit households were able to secure food during periods of shortfall prior to the introduction of the GMB to Gokwe. Poorer households assisted surplus families in the harvesting of maize, sunflower, groundnuts and cotton in exchange for food. These families received 2-3 bags of maize per hectare, depending upon the crop harvested. For surplus producers, accumulation was secured in multiple ways. Once local markets were saturated, surplus producers transported their remaining stocks to Kadoma or KweKwe for sale to the GMB. Further sources of income were direct sales of sunflower to Lever Brothers of Harare and United Soap in Bulawayo. In addition, cash transactions in the area and remittances from family members engaged in employment outside Gokwe contributed to capital accumulation for farmers in the area. This income enabled some to diversify their economic activities into areas such as transport and milling. What these transactions and other research discussed earlier suggest was that, despite USAID's assumptions about a stagnant economy, producers in neglected areas were involved in the wider Zimbabwean economy.

Other crops grown in small quantities included sorghum, groundnuts and soya beans. Yields were low according to the FAO. The overwhelming majority of families interviewed in Gokwe supplemented their diets and incomes with small vegetable gardens, which were largely controlled by women. Fifty-two households in the Gwanyika region constructed fish ponds with the assistance of AGRITEX during the early 1990s. These ponds were used for the domestic consumption of bream, but many were planning to expand

[3] Most of the following information was gathered during informal discussions with elders and AGRITEX officials in the area. Further research would however be required to gain greater insight into the nature of the following exchanges and arrangements.

their operations in order to market fish to the local community. Bee-keeping was another potential source of income, although only one Gwanyika households had directly engaged in this productive activity.

Social differentiation within Gokwe generally, and Njelele in particular, was clearly evident. Two percent of Njelele residents were considered by residents to be wealthy, 15 percent comprised a relative "middle class" in the area, while 68 percent were considered poor or extremely poor. The remaining 15 percent were classified by Njelele residents as ***simbe*** households, which loosely translates as "lazy". Wealthy farmers were well capitalized, had access to greater resources and land than their neighbours, and usually engaged in activities that mitigated their dependence upon agricultural sales, such as transport or the ownership of a store. "Middle class" households depended disproportionately upon agricultural production for their livelihoods, and were generally surplus producers. Their condition was however tenuous. Many expressed a desire to alter their dependence on agriculture but were consistently unable to diversify. Poorer households occupied most of the worst land in Njelele and were undercapitalized. The majority of these households were consistently unable to meet their yearly food requirements.

Simbe households often had large holdings but their plots were rarely cultivated. This included the kraal-head of Gwanyika. He occupied 13 hectares of land which remained idle and his poverty was apparent. His role in community matters had declined in the 1980s as decisions on land allocations, which historically had fallen under his jurisdiction, were increasingly decided through direct sales in the community or through the local Village Development Committee (VIDCO). However, the kraal-head had attempted, with some success, to reassert his authority over land transactions in the area. This process was strengthened by President Mugabe's efforts to reactivate traditional leadership in rural areas

in order to buttress his flagging support. Many people supported the kraal-head's efforts and were attempting to reactivate former relations that heralded a "better time".[4] Indeed, his children were surreptitiously fed by neighbours because "it is not their fault that their father is lazy".[5]

Remittances to Njelele declined dramatically during the late 1980s as urban costs rose and household members outside of Njelele were retrenched. Many people formerly employed outside Njelele returned home as alternative employment opportunities diminished, thus increasing the pressure on already limited food supplies. Families that historically used remittances to pay for local food were fundamentally affected by increased unemployment in Zimbabwe.

Land in Njelele is of poor quality and, as indicated above, large areas are concentrated in the hands of more wealthy households. The poorer members of the community quietly contended that land needed to be redistributed there as well as within the wider Zimbabwean context. Household plots ranged from one hectare to over 80 hectares, but the average was between 4-10 hectares.

Relations between the government and residents of isolated Communal Areas following independence were not static. A growing bureaucratic infrastructure in Gokwe served to displace kraal-heads and chiefs, although they were beginning to regain some of their influence in 1992/3 in Njelele. A constant, but negative, reminder of the influence of the government was the extension of Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) agents to isolated communities. The notorious Fifth Brigade was stationed in Gokwe following their

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[4] Interview 97, 4 September 1992, Njelele.

[5] Discussion with interpreter, who was one of those feeding the kraal-head's children, 1 September 1992, Njelele.

activities in Matabeleland, reinforcing the coercive presence of the state in Gokwe.

In important ways though, the Government was quite weak. Residents of Njelele had little access to Government representatives. The local MP never visited the region and the administrative infrastructure established at Gokwe Growth Point had very little impact on the lives of Njelele farmers. There was, in fact, little dialogue between Government and rural farmers. The most visible sign of the Government for most Gokwe farmers was AGRITEX, which was understaffed and overextended. This limited the amount of agricultural extension advice that was disseminated in the wider Gokwe region. NGO activity in Njelele was non-existent until 1992, when an irrigation scheme was constructed by the District Development Fund with funding from an unnamed British donor. The scheme elicited a great deal of anger within the community as plots were allocated to the local councillor's village only. Farmers could not identify channels through which such grievances could be addressed. Credit was simply unavailable, as the sub-branch Manager of Gokwe's Agricultural Finance Corporation office confirmed in an interview.[6] Even if credit were available the interest rates deterred the overwhelming majority of households in Njelele who said "(we) are afraid of the interest".[7] One informant argued that "(there is) no profit from AFC loans".[8] USAID's emphasis on credit under ZASA had no demonstrable impact in Gwanyika. In fact, problems associated with credit in the area had caused frustration for farmers.

Njelele experienced numerous changes as a result of the introduction of a centralized marketing facility in the region. While farmers throughout the Communal Areas clearly

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[6] Interview, Mr. J. Mangozho, 28 April 1992, Gokwe. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of Gokwe farmers to discuss their debts.

[7] Interview 82, 3 September 1992, Njelele.

[8] Interview 28, 20 May 1992, Njelele.

wanted better access to centralized markets at independence, the marketing system imposed on Gokwe residents was experienced as harmful. Residents of Njelele had a different conception of markets and the causes of their poverty than either USAID or the Government. While there was no single view to the question of what a market was, as one's socio-economic position in Njelele as well as one's age and gender clearly affected the response, some general points were discernable. In relation to USAID's assumptions about "traditional" farmers, there appeared to be a greater appreciation by respondents both of consumption and output. As one respondent stated, "we sell [to the GMB], but there is nothing here to buy".[9] Women especially pointed out that the supply of basic commodities (from foodstuffs such as beans, cooking oil and maize meal, to necessities such as clothes) were rarely, if ever, available in the wider Gokwe area. Family members had to travel to Gokwe centre to secure these goods, if they were available. Such trips required a full day because transport in the area was limited to one ZUPCO bus that left at approximately 6:30 AM and returned by 9 PM, at a cost ranging, in 1992, from Z$2-3.71 each way. If the goods required were unavailable in Gokwe the day had been wasted. The manager of Gokwe's Farmers Co-Op cited numerous instances of farmers making the journey into town only to find that seed, fertilizer or foodstuffs were unavailable.[10] Njelele residents concurred. As one farmer stated, "These occasions are a lot. We can't get maize at the shops [in Gokwe centre], especially in October when we usually run out of our maize".[11] The trip had to be repeated at great cost in both time and money.

There was also a sense among surplus producers who used to sell their excess

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[9] Interview 97, 4 September 1992, Njelele.

[10] Interview, Mr. J. Chindove, 17 May 1992, Gokwe.

[11] Interview 148, 5 January 1993, Njelele.

produce within the local neighbourhood that they had lost control of their surpluses since the imposition of a depot facility in the region. Previous marketing options were perceived to be no longer available. As one respondent argued, "we used to have a say in the sale of maize, but farmers do not have a say now".[12] At one level, such comments reflected the increased cash needs of local residents that necessitated the sale of crops through state-controlled marketing channels rather than locally. With the increasing costs associated with school fees, health care, agricultural production and daily upkeep, households which produced surpluses and historically sold locally in Njelele were instead selling to the GMB out of necessity. "What choice do I have? Maize is our bank. If a child becomes sick, or school fees are due and we need cash, we have to sell."[13]

More significantly, farmers expressed anger over the loss of their sunflower market to the GMB. Gokwe had consistently produced the largest volume of sunflower in the country. Before the 1983/4 season, Gokwe residents sold their sunflower directly to representatives of Lever Brothers and United Soap. Once the GMB became the sole buying agent of sunflower in 1983/4, this market disappeared. "We used to sell to [Lever Brothers or United Soap], but now there is only the GMB."[14] Prices for sunflower were subsequently determined in Harare rather than between private interests and Gokwe smallholders; farmers lost an important marketing alternative. This suggests how bilateral development support channelled through the government was not neutral. The government was able to extend its influence into outlying areas with the assistance of bilateral donors as well as to subvert local initiatives through the operation of a particular development effort, in this case the local

[12] Interview 31, 20 May 1992, Njelele.

[13] Interview 5, 19 May 1992, Njelele.

[14] Interview 50, 2 September 1992, Njelele.

GMB depot.

Significantly, the extension of price controls, through the GMB, to previously uncontrolled crops such as sunflower, was a condition attached to ZASA by USAID. Unless the conditions applied to ZASA were adhered to, the second and third tranche of USAID support would have been withheld (USAID 1982: -3). In an evaluation of ZASA, USAID commended the government for the "addition of new smallholder crops to the list of controlled commodities, which gives them a guaranteed market" (USAID 1988: 3). Yet Gokwe farmers had previously had a secure market. Ironically, the former relationship between Lever Brothers, United Soap, and Gokwe farmers exemplified what USAID purported to endorse. In this case, USAID support for government-set producer prices was actually inconsistent with Agency policy elsewhere. A new pricing logic had been imposed that was seen by residents as a cause of their economic problems. Their ability to secure the highest price for their sunflower, through interactions between Lever Brothers and United Soap, was undermined by the introduction of a grain depot in the area and sunflower becoming a controlled crop.

Households which sold to the GMB were frustrated by their inability to accumulate adequate resources to secure their family's economic and social foundations. The price offered for maize did not keep pace with inflation, the rising cost of living and the increased expenses associated with agricultural production. As one respondent declared, "when [we] sell to the GMB there is no money,"[15] whilst another reiterated, "there is no money at the GMB".[16] *No* household interviewed whose ***primary*** source of income was the GMB had

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[15] Interview 34, 20 May 1992, Njelele.

[16] Interview 36, 20 May 1992, Njelele.

bought an agricultural implement, such as a scotch cart or a plough, for over five years, *even* if they identified the lack of such implements as a major constraint on their ability to increase production. In fact, the more vulnerable households in the area had slowly sold their productive assets, such as cattle and agricultural implements, in order to send their children to school or to eat. Permanent, rectangular houses with tin roofs had last been constructed in the 1970s. The last automobile bought by a "middle class" producer in Njelele was purchased in 1982. Accumulation in Njelele appeared to have been checked since the early 1980s.

Finally, deficit households in Njelele clearly became more susceptible to food shortages with the introduction of the GMB depot in Gokwe. Prior to independence, food deficit families had provided a more favourable market for surplus producers as the costs associated with the sale of grains to the GMB in Kadoma or KweKwe were excessive. One reason for the increased vulnerability experienced within Gokwe generally and Njelele specifically was the slow erosion of inter-household links which were historically utilised to better ensure local food security. The disintegration of inter-household trading networks was the result of larger processes affecting farmers throughout Zimbabwe. Amin notes that the implementation of the 1982/3 stabilization programme, under the stewardship of the World Bank and IMF, had facilitated increased sales to the GMB from Communal smallholders as a means to offset wage freezes and the increased cost of food. The result was greater food insecurity in Communal Areas.[17]

It is critical to demonstrate who was selling to the GMB, however, as evidence presented above suggests that the number of households selling their surpluses within the

[17] Cited in Friedmann (1992: 381).

local area had dramatically declined during the previous ten years. Of those farmers interviewed, 32 claimed that they sold food crops within the area prior to the introduction of the GMB depot in Gokwe. In 1992, only three of the farmers who used to sell their surplus stocks locally were consistently able to sell their food to deficit households in Njelele. In effect, deficit households saw their market for foodstuffs dramatically reduced.

Research indicated that the "middle" and poor strata of producers, whose alternative sources of income were limited and who depended disproportionately upon agricultural production for their yearly income, were primarily responsible for the Njelele contribution to the Gokwe GMB. Efforts by farmers to improve their position by devoting more land to higher-valued cash crops were consistently frustrated by poor weather and inadequate access to processed food. Seventy-seven percent of those interviewed who tried to increase the amount of land devoted to sunflower, cotton and groundnuts over the previous three years, reverted back to low-value food crops following the 1992 drought. Some poor households with little outside sources of income sold to the GMB in order to meet short-term cash requirements, even if these sales fundamentally threatened household food security. Respondents continuously claimed that they had "no alternative" but to sell to the GMB.[18] Some households which produced nominal surpluses, or poor households with already deficient supplies of food, sold grain supplies in *excess* of what would have been required to sustain the family until the following harvest. Although such sales resulted in the household's inability to meet its own requirements at the end of the season, many explained that this was unavoidable. Consequently, households either reduced food intake, became dependent upon erratic Government relief, or sold productive assets to acquire food which further

[18] Eleven surplus households stated they had "no alternative" but to sell to the GMB. One farmer (Interview 36, 20 May 1992, Njelele) stated that the "GMB is our only market".

undermined their future agricultural viability. "There is nothing we can do (about this)," one farmer contended. "We have to sacrifice to get food."[19] Decisions to forfeit food to send a child to school occurred. This decision was based upon the perception that the sacrifice would enhance the long-term prospects of the household. Such decisions had their own consequences. The impact of reduced food on the educational potential of a child was one, combined with limited academic resources in the area. Up to 1993, no child from Gwanyika has successfully passed their "O" levels.[20] Fewer girls atte ded secondary school, and those who did were often the first to be withdrawn from school if a household could no lo ger afford to pay fees for all their children.

The more vulnerable households in Njelele resorted to new strategies in order to sustain themselves. Many desperate families manipulated traditional practices, such as lobola, in order to secure resources necessary to sustain themselves. A Marondera resident recently travelled to Gokwe in an effort to gain custody of his twelve year-old daughter. His wife's family had demanded an additional payment of Z$4,000, despite the fact that he had paid lobola 12 years earlier. When he could not pay, the family "reclaimed" his wife, who was remarried to a wealthy individual in another part of the country.[21] Some now believed that they had been better off prior to Independence. This was the context of their efforts to reinvent tradition by re-activating networks and alliances with people such as the kraal-head.

In the final analysis, only a handful of producers in Njelele were able to withhold grains from the GMB, and their ability to reproduce themselves was made possible through entrepreneurial activities outside of farming. One household head virtually monopolized

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[19] Interview 7, 19 May 1992, Njelele.

[20] Interview, Headmaster of Gwanyika Secondary School, 2 December 1992.

[21] Discussion in Gokwe centre, 31 August 1992.

transport in the local area, a service that had been secured prior to independence. These activities financed his food storage capability. At the end of the season he was the primary source of food for deficit households in Njelele. Farmers in the community were compelled to employ his services to transport maize and sunflower to Gokwe and cotton to Kadoma. Transport fees ranged from Z$3-6 per bag for maize and sunflower and from Z$25-35 per bale of cotton, depending on the locality of the homestead within Njelele. His plot of over 80 hectares had been procured by "buying people out."[22] Resentment against his dominance of the local economy was tempered by people's dependence on him for transport. He and another wealthy farmer largely dictated VIDCO decisions in the area, and ensured that their candidates were elected to important posts on the Committee. He was the only significant source of employment in the area, hiring eight full-time employees and four seasonal employees. The rest of the labour was supplied by members of two families who lived within the homestead.

As more farmers were forced to sell to the GMB, the transporter's position was further entrenched. His wealth, secured through local dependence on his transport services, allowed him to sell grains to deficit households at a premium price. Food could be secured through credit arrangements with him, which strengthened his position in the area. As a result, he did not have to sell to the GMB at the established producer price. Rather, he was able to wait until the end of the year and could charge higher prices for unprocessed maize. In 1992 he sold maize at Z$105 per 91 kg bag while the GMB producer price was established at Z$50.

Other sources of local food included a former government official, who opened a

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[22] Interview 17, 19 May 1992, Njelele.

bottle-store in the local township and invested in a grinding mill in 1991. Only one other household surveyed consistently sold maize in the area, instead of to the GMB, but his supplies were generally quite low. The evidence suggests that there was greater competition between surplus households in the area prior to the introduction of the USAID-funded depot as food supplies were initially sold in Njelele. With fewer farmers able to withhold surplus stocks, the cost of locally produced food had risen dramatically. Thus, the introduction of a statutory marketing authority into this rural area had undermined the local market as well as food security. Equally important to food security was the loss of "middle class" surpluses from the area, which excluded the handful of wealthy farmers who continued to sell in the area.

The terms of exchange between surplus and deficit households were also transformed. Numerous respondents from deficit households indicated their desire to work for food, but were unable to secure employment as the priorities of surplus households shifted away from food to cash labour-arrangements. As one poor farmer stated, "they ["middle" and wealthy farmers] no longer hire us".[23] Some surplus producing households which had historically exchanged food for labour would have liked to continue with such practices, or to have sold to deficit households, but their ability to engage in this type of interaction had been constrained by their desire to meet short-term cash requirements. A stall-owner in Gokwe centre had indicated that he could not afford to wait until later in the year to collect what poorer households owed him. Food for labour agreements had short-term costs that many could not afford. The stall-owner instead sold to the GMB despite his

[23] Interview 68, 3 September 1992, Njelele.

preference for other alternatives.[24] Another option available to deficit households had been to become financially indebted to the handful of wealthier households, who could afford to withhold their surplus stocks. Indebtedness to local shop-owners also grew in order for households to meet their food requirements at the end of the season.

This situation was compounded by the fact that commercially-refined meal was not available to Njelele store owners. National Foods and the Midlands Milling Company, the principal suppliers of maize meal to Gokwe, only transported refined meal along the KwaKwe to Gokwe road. *No* delivery was made directly to Njelele, according to local store owners. Deficit households which could not afford local maize therefore had to travel to Gokwe centre to purchase small quantities of urban-refined meal. The erratic supplies of urban meal brought into Gokwe centre were sold at extortionate prices during 1992. As is evident elsewhere in Africa, few costumers actually paid the controlled price established by the government for basic commodities. In Zimbabwe, the official selling price for a 20 kg bag of Roller Meal was Z$15.02 at the beginning of 1992. In Gokwe centre, the selling price ranged from Z$24-30 during 1992/3; in Zhombe the price at local stores is Z$31.58. In Nkayi, one store owner argued, "Do people think I am the U.N.? I must travel to Gweru to buy maize meal. How can I sell it [at the controlled price]?"[25] In effect, households which sold 91 kg bags of maize to the GMB the previous season, at Z$24.55 if they could deliver it directly without the services of the transport families, could not even purchase a 20 kg bag of refined meal from the money they received. The staple was simply out of reach to the most insecure households. By July 1993, the cost of a 20 kg bag of Roller Meal exceeded

[24] Discussion in Gokwe market, 24 March 1992.

[25] Discussion with store-owner, 30 November 1992, Nkayi.

Z$34, as consumer subsidies on maize meal were removed. Desperate households resorted to eating roots, grass and dogs in the larger Gokwe area during 1992.[26] A teacher in Nembudziya indicated that many families in the area were adding grass to the limited amount of maize meal they had in order to add "substance" to their food.[27] Many households in Gokwe were forced to sell productive assets and reduce intake in order to survive until the 1993 harvest.

But some, including USAID, might claim that these were forces beyond the immediate purview of marketing. Surely USAID could not be held responsible for the changes in Zimbabwe that necessitated the sale of grains to depots at the expense of deficit households in Gokwe or Njelele? In fact, it could be argued that the establishment of a depot in the area had been beneficial to local residents, beyond the obvious advantages it meant for local transporters, and that the GMB became an important source of cash to members of the local community at a time when alternative sources of income were limited. There is some merit to this argument. The GMB was indeed an important source of income for families who needed to meet short-term cash requirements related to school fees, health care and general household expenses.

It should also be remembered, however, that one of the main reasons many Gokwe farmers lacked alternative sources of income from agricultural production was that the Government expropriated the sunflower market. But the argument masks the larger issues of food security in the country. As argued earlier, the grain marketing system was designed to channel maize out of rural areas to urban centres. Consequently, urban consumers were

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[26] *Sunday Times*, 17 May 1992.

[27] Interview, Mr. O. Machingura, 17 May 1992, Nembudziya.

fed with grains from deficit regions *at the expense of food security in rural areas of Zimbabwe*. White maize, secured from areas such as Gokwe, was available in Harare well after reports began to circulate of Gokwe residents eating grass. Table 5.1 illustrates the magnitude of the withdrawal of maize from the USAID-funded depots in the Gokwe area since their construction after independence. The market for food that had historically been available to deficit households had been eliminated as a result of the marketing extension programme funded by USAID. The problem was that the construction of GMB depots was not combined with any programme related to distribution. Both USAID and the government were responsible for neglecting this crucial aspect of supply and demand. In 1992, GMB stocks were transported and sold to urban Zimbabweans. Rural needs were not taken into account.

The impact of USAID's intervention was exacerbated as the effects of the 1992 drought were felt by households in Njelele. Agricultural output was a fraction of normal production, and many households in the area had depleted their meagre stocks by September. The few households which had sold surplus stocks within Njelele earlier in the year had ceased to do so by October as their supplies became threatened. Maize was unavailable in the area because it had been removed from the local USAID-funded grain depots in order to feed urban consumers. As the full magnitude of the 1992 drought in southern Africa became apparent, efforts to secure desperately needed maize increased. Depots that still had maize were targeted by businesses, farmers in other regions, and entrepreneurs. The situation was so severe that stores in the urban centres had to enlist the assis ance of riot police in order

Table 5.1: Maize Intake and Outflow, 1982-1992*											
	1982@	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Gokwe Depot											
intake	182,949	106,963	9,040	263,001	372,353	411,785	26,854	436,459	451,896	205,432	147,442
outflow	182,949	106,963	9,040	263,001	372,353	411,785	26,854	436,459	451,896	205,432	140,033
balance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,389
Nembudziya											
intake						n.a.	39	56,288	104,004	2,871	20,810
outflow						n.a.	39	56,288	104,004	2,871	20,810
balance						n.a.	0	0	0	0	0
Zhombe											
intake						n.a.	58	101,213	145,118	73,353	10,595
outflow						n.a.	58	101,213	145,118	73,353	10,595
balance						n.a.	0	0	0	0	0
Sanyati											
intake									50,896	912	6,635
outflow									50,896	912	6,6 5
balance									0	0	0
Total Outflow	182,949	106,963	9,040	263,001	372,353	411,785	26,951	593,960	751,914	282,568	177,073

* - 91 kg bags of unprocessed maize; @ - denotes agricultural year beginning 1 April 1981 and ending 31 March 1982; ***Source: Grain Marketing Board***

to control hungry crowds. Gokwe was one of these depots, as the GMB was in the process of transferring the maize to commercial millers. A large majority of the 7,389 bags of maize listed under the 1992 "balance" (see Table 5.1 above) was transported out of Gokwe. Spot interviews with private lorries leaving the Gokwe depot indicated that the maize would be going to areas as far as Binga near Lake Kariba, Masvingo, Bulawayo, Harare and even Namibia. In addition, Shirichena Milling Company, which had recently been established at Gokwe Growth Point, was processing maize for consumers in Gokwe centre, Bulawayo and the Harare high-density suburb of Highfields.[28] The marketing of 177,073 bags of maize from the Gokwe area and the erratic supply and prohibitive cost of replacement meal from commercial millers exacerbated the tenuous condition of smallholders in the area.

In theory, individuals could have purchased bags of maize directly from GMB Primary Depots, although it is important to stress that individuals ***could not*** procure grains from rural and seasonal depots such as Nembudziya, Sanyati and Zhombe. Producers in those areas travelled to the Primary Depot to secure a bag of maize for household consumption. In addition to the increased strain the loss of food from the area placed on poorer households, it also elicited anger as members of Njelele were aware that the GMB depot in Gokwe had been "full" earlier in the year.[29] In this way, respondents claimed that the maize they had delivered to the GMB in 1991/2 *was* available for purchase at the beginning of the 1992/3 season. "I know it (maize) is no longer there because I tried to buy at the GMB (in April)."[30] In an earlier interview, a local farmer expressed concern over the cost of local maize from

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[28] Interview, Mr. R.H. Zemura, Director, Shirichena Milling Company (Pvt) Ltd., 8 April 1992, Gokwe.

[29] Interview 40, 21 May 1992, Njelele.

[30] Interview 48, 2 September 1992, Njelele.

the transporter. He had decided it would be cheaper to buy from the GMB. In a follow-up interview, he explained that the GMB "had none [maize]" and that he had had to sell one bull in order to buy maize from the transporter.[31]

The problem was more than simply one of distribution. The extraction of food crops from Gokwe had not been replaced by reasonably priced and readily available processed foodstuffs. Significantly, if the issue of distribution had been rectified, and Njelele residents could have secured access to foodstuffs at a reasonable price, and the GMB would effectively have become a "white elephant". Njelele residents consistently expressed their preference for growing cotton, groundnuts and sunflower, but did not engage in this productive activity for reasons linked to the limited food available in the area. As one respondent claimed,

> Selling maize, the price is not that satisfactory. The seasons are not suitable for maize. People here do not like to grow maize but we have to. I would only grow sunflower and cotton if I could buy maize at a fair price in the shops. Its far much better to grow crops that will generate income.[32]

Data collected from Gwanyika area appeared to confirm this statement. Eighty-eight percent of the households interviewed would have shifted production away from maize to higher-valued cotton, sunflower and groundnuts, if they could have been sure of procuring adequate foodstuffs from local shops.[33] The inadequate distribution network affected poor households most, as we have shown. Local producers spoke of the need to establish sunflower and groundnut processing industries in the area, which could have significant employment and income effects for Njelele residents. As one proponent of the scheme

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[31] Interview 41, 21 May 1992 and 4 September 1992, Njelele.

[32] Interview 148, 5 January 1993, Njelele.

[33] Ninety-one percent of male headed households indicated that they would switch to higher-valued crops such as cotton, sunflower and groundnuts, while 80 percent of the female-headed households would change their productive practices.

declared, "Why should we export our sunflower and groundnuts? We should be exporting cooking oil and peanut butter instead".[34] Some Njelele residents saw potential in development projects which would have required significant changes in marketing, state-community relations, and the distribution of food. The ability to engage in these rural industrial projects would have required capital, which was not available in the area, as well as adequate supplies of food. If an adequate distribution system were implemented, Njelele farmers would begin to change their cropping patterns.[35] This would have the potential to improve smallholder income.

The government was in a difficult position. The private sector had proved unable to distribute processed food to more vulnerable areas such as Njelele. Calls to deregulate retail prices have pushed the cost of basic foodstuffs beyond the means of most ***rural*** consumers. Redress would have required ***greater*** state involvement in the distribution process. It would also have meant offering high producer prices to farmers in better maize producing areas so as to ensure that these regions produced adequate food for the country. Such a policy would have allowed farmers in vulnerable maize-growing regions to diversify into higher-valued agricultural production, better suited to their respective areas. The cost of food would have had to be kept low, and the supply assured, in order for an effective shift to higher-valued cash crops to occur in areas such as Gokwe, implying higher government subsidies and transport costs. These ideas were fundamentally antithetical to the "free market solution" advocated by influential institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and USAID however. Moreover, it was contrary to the grain market reform programme USAID was trying to

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[34] Interview 111, 2 December 1992, Njelele.

[35] The cost of processed food in the area would have to be low enough to ensure that the diversification into other crops was successful however.

implement in Zimbabwe (USAID 1991).

More importantly, the principal goal of surplus producers in Njelele was to ***distance*** themselves from their reliance on the local depot. Most farmers believed that accumulation would have been better ensured if they could have avoided the GMB. Most could not. The few who were able to "exit" the official marketing system dramatically increased the economic gap between themselves and the rest of the community. The more secure households in the area could only maintain their reproductive capability through the pursuit of activities in addition to farming, such as transport, informal milling, or ownership of a store. Households almost solely dependent upon agricultural production did not have this security. While no family was wholly dependent upon agricultural production in Njelele or elsewhere, the point is that, for many families, alternative sources of income outside of farming generally supplemented the household's yearly income rather than served as an alternative avenue for diversification. "Success" in Njelele was therefore defined as diversifying one's marketing base away from a reliance on the GMB. Farmers who were locked into the marketing system contended that they were unable to accomplish this goal or provide a more solid foundation for their families due to their reliance upon the GMB.

The desire of surplus producers across the socio-economic spectrum in Njelele to "exit" the official marketing system was readily apparent. As one respondent claimed, "this drought has taught us. We will never give the GMB our maize".[36] Another argued that "no farmer will ever sell to the GMB again".[37] In fact, few surplus producing households in Njelele planned to sell to the GMB during the next season, regardless of the harvest and in

[36] Interview 48, 2 September 1992, Njelele.

[37] Interview 83, 3 September 1992, Njelele.

spite of the high pre-planting producer price offered by the government. Households wanted to store two years worth of food crops; the remainder they wanted to resell in the area. Many realized that it was better to withhold grains and resell in the area, as the condition of vulnerable households heightened tensions between richer and poorer households in the community. Farmers were hoping to reactivate trading networks used prior to the introduction of the Gokwe depot in 1982. As one "middle class" farmer explained, "there is a market here [in Njolele], we have just forgotten about it".[38]

The ability of surplus producers, especially Njelele "middle class" and some poor farmers, to exercise this option was limited. The "peasant option" (Ranger 1985) or "exit option" (Hyden 1983) had always been romanticised. Small-scale producers' economic foundations remained weak and the GMB will continue to be an important source of income for farmers despite producers' desire to distance themselves from the marketing institution. Interestingly, women tended to highlight this point. As one respondent claimed, "He [her husband] always says he does not want to sell to the GMB, but every year he does. We sell to the GMB, and we suffer".[39]

One important alternative suggests itself. Prior to the 1992 drought, Njelele stores began purchasing maize from surplus producers. The maize was then resold, and milled in the area, although at a high price. Store-owners *could* become a more important source of income for local residents *if* they were able to pay farmers at the beginning of the season and consequently offer farmers an alternative to the GMB. But in 1993, sales to local store-owners had largely occurred because of debt. In July 1993, store-owners had stockpiled

[38] Interview 103, 4 September 1992, Njelele.

[39] Interview 48a, 2 September 1992.

maize as repayment for debts incurred in 1992. Farmers sold their last bags of maize to local store-owners at Z$15 (per 91 kg bag) during 1992. One store-owner sold 20 litre tins of maize for Z$32 in December 1992. He proposed selling the maize he received from debtors at an even higher price once Njelele residents ran out of maize in 1993. Few could afford this without further decapitalization. The sale of maize to local store-owners could have only become a viable alternative to the GMB if farmers in the area were able to re-establish themselves, an unlikely prospect in the short-term.

The poorest households of Njelele, who had seen their ability to procure food from local sources diminish since independence, offered a complex explanation of their predicament. Most of the poorest households were consistently unable to market any crops, regardless of the producer price. Usually their plots were too small, or their household requirements too large for them to sell. These families most often expressed concern over the decline in inter-household exchanges that historically sustained them during both good and bad years. They often claimed that it was "better under [Ian] Smith". When asked why, the invariable response was "because we could always eat".[40] This statement, while instructive, should be interpreted cautiously. Such pronouncements did not mean that Njelele residents preferred the former system, but it does show that the perception held by the government that it would play a transformative role in the rural areas was not shared by the residents of Gokwe. The statement highlighted some of the frustrations felt by many black Zimbabweans whose condition had not fundamentally changed since independence. What this statement also indicates was that people believed that foodstuffs were always available in the area ***before*** the expansion of the grain marketing system to Gokwe. The GMB was

[40] Interview 9, 19 May 1992, Njelele.

seen as a significant source of government intervention in people's lives. Food security would remain tenuous, and people's ability to improve their condition would continue to be elusive. Ironically, given their condition, Njelele residents were vulnerable to short-term, politically motivated interventions, such as the distribution of food under the ZANU (PF) banner, that could have had important implications for the democratic process in the country.

As a consequence, resentment and anger directed at both the government and the GMB by Njelele residents grew. The loss of grains that was so clearly evident in Gokwe as a whole, and Njelele in particular, was readily apparent to the most vulnerable households in the region. They knew that surplus households in the area sold grains to the GMB rather than to them, and that the GMB had grain early in 1992. They also knew that maize was no longer available, and that their situation would deteriorate further as the 1992 famine continued to unfold.

Any assessment of a development intervention should be judged, in the final analysis, by the amount of space it creates or eliminates for those most affected. Gokwe farmers saw their marketing options decrease, through the expropriation of the sunflower market by the government and the transformation in the nature of inter-household exchanges which historically ensured a greater degree of food security for deficit households. Accumulation appeared to have been checked while a process of decapitalization undermined the long-term viability of many poor households. But Gokwe farmers were by no means passive victims in the unfolding situation. While Gokwe farmers contended that options had been taken away from them, they attempted to create space for themselves. Efforts to diversify, to distance themselves from the GMB, had been made, despite the constraints faced by most resource-poor households. Fish ponds had been constructed in the hope that this would become a viable marketing option in the short-term. Vegetable gardens had increased in size,

with important implications for women. Discussions on rural industrialization, though limited to a small number of people, had begun to spread. Most importantly, questions pertaining to government accountability had been raised.

In light of the Gokwe findings, Ferguson's hypothesis on the impact of donor - state development interventions must therefore be expanded. Development programmes can often undermine the legitimacy of a government. If schools are without adequate supplies, clinics without drugs, or fees introduced and increased, the legitimacy of the state is inevitably questioned. Likewise, legitimacy is eroded when a government depot is increasingly viewed as robbing people of their food and their ability to accumulate adequate resources. ZANU (PF) credibility in rural areas, the supposed backbone of the ruling party, was clearly eroded. President Mugabe's already tenuous popularity in the region declined further during his 1993 "meet-the-people" tour in Gokwe. During his speech to people in Gokwe, President Mugabe promised all destitute Gokwe farmers free ploughing services and crop packages. Gokwe was then allocated two tractors. AGRITEX officials maintained that it would take two tractors over five years to accomplish the task promised by the President. Both tractors had broken down before any Njelele resident had received this service. Despite claims in the media to the contrary, crop packages were inadequate. Njelele residents received enough seed and fertilizer for one hectare of maize. Over 55 percent of Njelele residents were engaged in "zero tillage" techniques, as their draught power had either been sold, had died, or were too weak to be used for ploughing. Only six of the 157 farmers interviewed could utilize their entire fields in 1993/4 because of the fact that seed was unavailable in the area. Resentment increased despite the paucity of alternatives to the existing regime.

5.4 Conclusion

Gokwe is only one area of Zimbabwe. One must therefore take cognizance of differences between regions within the country, and the effect that marketing had on these areas. Evidence from Drinkwater (1992) suggests that some depots were used for residual purposes during particularly good years. Excess stocks could be sold at these depots without the grave threat to food security which characterised Gokwe. Further changes in the political economy of Zimbabwe might however necessitate a re-examination of Drinkwater's findings. The effects of the country's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), introduced in the early 1990s, required larger sales to the statutory body in an effort to mitigate the increasing costs associated with the programme. Rural communities dependent upon remittances from family members were devastated by rising unemployment and the increased costs of urban living incurred by relatives. The decline or outright loss of this support adversely affected food security as smallholders became increasingly dependent upon agricultural production for household income.

There were also suggestive indications from other parts of Zimbabwe that the problem of food insecurity and agricultural marketing were directly linked. Since 1985, USAID had financed a SADCC food security study that included extensive analyses of the causes of food insecurity in vulnerable regions of the sub-continent (see Rukuni 1990). The overwhelming conclusion of the USAID-sponsored study was that, despite differences between regions, the extraction of food crops from vulnerable regions of Zimbabwe had exacerbated the plight of deficit households. The evidence from Gokwe coincides with these conclusions.

Importantly, the role of USAID in the marketing programme was not recognized in recipient areas. No respondent was able to identify USAID as the funding organization

despite their frustration with the U.S.-funded GMB depot. The development institution which dictates the terms of the intervention and funds the construction of these depots is removed from criticism ***because it is viewed by the recipients as a government initiative***. Ms. Patricia Buckles, Director of USAID/Harare's Project Design and Implementation Division, claimed that USAID played an instrumental role in increasing smallholder contributions to the national food supply. Yet she refused to accept any responsibility for the shortcomings of ZASA as it is a "Government of Zimbabwe project".[41] Consequently, USAID was able to claim "success" and absolve itself from criticism and accountability due to the nature of donor - recipient assistance programmes.

At one level, there is justification for Ms. Buckles' claim as the operation of the GMB is the government's responsibility. But USAID was by no means a benign actor in the unfolding marketing process. They were, in fact, intricately involved in the evolution of the programme. USAID attempted to influence pricing policy and was involved in the siting of numerous depots throughout Zimbabwe.[42] The Agency was able to show Congress impressive agricultural figures from Zimbabwe while demonstrating that the allotted money had been well spent. Infrastructure had been constructed that could be identified in photographs. The history and nature of grain marketing and the effect of this intervention on household food security became irrelevant given the narrow goals and definition of "success" espoused by the U.S. Indeed, USAID succeeded within the absurd theatre of United States development assistance despite the silent costs to the recipients of this joint U.S. and government intervention.

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[41] Interview, 19 August 1992, Harare.

[42] Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, former USAID Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer, 28 October 1992, Harare.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

This study has explored the dynamics surrounding the implementation of a USAID-supported grain marketing extension programme. The programme, initiated in 1980 following Zimbabwean independence, extended the scope and operations of the Grain Marketing Board into areas of the country historically neglected by the previous minority regimes. As was argued, the amount of African-produced maize sold to the GMB increased dramatically after 1980. This increase was partially attributed to the GMB extension initiative as farmers clearly had better access to the statutory marketing system after 1980.

Yet, despite the dramatic increases in the contribution of African-produced maize to the GMB, households in food deficit regions of the country continued to be food insecure. Evidence presented from Gokwe, as well as other national studies, suggested that the reason for this situation stemmed from the nature of maize marketing itself (see Chisvo *et. al.* 1990; Govereh *et. al.*; Jayne *et. al.* 1990 and 1991; Matiza *et. al.* 1989, Mlambo 1989; Rohrbach 1988; and Rukuni 1990). It was argued that maize produced and sold to the GMB in food deficit regions of the country was transported out of these areas and processed in urban centres. The processed maize meal was then sold in urban centres or, if transported back to food deficit regions, was sold at exorbitant prices. Local grain markets had broken down and farmers in Gokwe expressed dismay at their inability to accumulate resources. The drought of the early 1990s further exacerbated the dilemma facing food insecure households in isolated parts of the country.

This chapter explores ways in which this programme's impact should be judged. The chapter begins with an overview of a structural adjustment programme designed by USAID to address the challenges faced by food insecure households in grain deficit regions of the country. The programme was approved by the Zimbabwean Government shortly after the author completed his field work in Gokwe so the impact of this programme on residents in the study area cannot be determined. Important design and impact questions are however raised. This is followed by an overview of USAID's re-engineering efforts which are designed to make the institution more effective and "results- oriented".[1] Questions are again posed, and possible ways forward suggested based upon the findings of this study.

6.2 Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme

USAID provided a US$5 million grant to the Government of Zimbabwe to implement the "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" (USAID 1991). The programme is designed to

> support the [Government of Zimbabwe] in the implementation of grain marketing policy reforms required to achieve its strict adjustment objectives. The program will contribute toward the improvement of rural consumer welfare by supporting a [Government of Zimbabwe] initiative to move grain marketing towards a competitive, lower cost system by reducing market controls and allowing expanded private participation in the grain trading system. (USAID 1991: i)

The specific goals of the programme are to:

1. increase deficit household access to grain in deficient areas of the country;

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[1] At the time of writing, USAID is finalising their re-engineering frameworks at both international and country levels. As a result, there is no documentation on the re-engineering process. The author has however been fortunate to be involved in USAID's re-engineering process as the organisation that he currently works for in South Africa is a recipient of USAID financial support.

2. reduce the contribution of domestic grain trading losses to the national budget deficit by ten percent (from Z$23.8 to Z$21.4 million);
3. increase the number of private traders purchasing maize from the GMB and re-selling the grain through various (unspecified) channels in deficit regions of the country by at least ten percent;
4. increase the number of informal traders operating in urban areas and in specific rural areas (again unspecified);
5. contribute to the decline in informal and formal processed maize meal prices in food deficit regions of the country;
6. increase the number of informal sales by the GMB to informal buyers by at least 20 percent;
7. reduce the amount of grain moving from the GMB depots into the cities and back out to the rural areas in the form of commercial maize meal;
8. to make more grain and straight-run meal available to consumers and traders in urban areas; and
9. expand the scope for intra-rural trade and expand the scope of private millers in deficit regions of the country. (USAID 1991: 1-26)

The US$5 million would be used as a mechanism to reduce the powers of the GMB and create the space for small-scale, informal millers to purchase, process and resell the maize both in their local areas and in neighbouring food deficit regions. The GMB would have had to establish an autonomous Board of Directors who would no longer be accountable to government alone. The GMB would also have to, in the end, become more commercially viable. This would be done, in part, by reducing the transport costs incurred by the GMB, who would no longer be solely responsible for the transport of maize to urban centres for

processing. Commercial millers would have to increasingly collect maize at distant GMB depots, which would dramatically increase their costs. Informal millers would consequently be advantaged.

USAID (1991: 42) highlighted a range of possible winners and losers under this scheme. The winners included households in Natural Regions III, IV and V, whose food self-sufficiency would improve as a result of this programme; households in semi-arid regions of the country who would benefit from a decline in the cost of processed maize which would still have to be transported to the area; rural villages in general as more income would circulate in these areas as a result of this initiative; and the GMB and Exchanger who would have their respective deficits reduced. Urban-based commercial millers would be the main losers in this scheme according to USAID (1991: 42).

The initiative was based on a sound understanding of some of the problems faced by households in food deficit regions of the country, although USAID's contribution to this problem (the expansion of grain depots under ZASA) was not mentioned in the PAAD. As this study has suggested, creative mechanisms were required that ensured that processed maize meal was readily available in food deficit regions and affordable to vulnerable households. One way to tackle this problem would be to reform the grain marketing system, as USAID had done with this initiative.

Structural adjustment programmes are undoubtedly controversial. As Mosley *et. al.* (1991a and 1991b) have demonstrated, no country has fully implemented a World Bank-financed structural adjustment programme. The reasons for this are complex but can be attributed to a combination of the inability of the state to meet all of the requirements set out in a structural adjustment programme as well as the ability of the state to continuously renegotiate the terms of the programme in ways that, at times, serves to protect and

strengthen the state vis-a-vis civil society. In contrast to World Bank or IMF-financed structural adjustment programmes, structural adjustment initiatives funded by bilateral donors tend to be more limited in scope. As the "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" demonstrates, the initiative is designed to liberalise the maize marketing system by challenging what appears to be the root cause of the problem, the GMB. Unfortunately, the programme was designed and implemented in a vacuum and makes the incorrect assumption that the underlying reasons for food insecurity can be overcome simply by reforming the GMB.

Efforts to reduce the authority of the GMB, while valuable in many ways, would not by itself spark a revival of informal millers who would unproblematically process and sell maize meal in deficit regions. The evidence presented earlier suggests the opposite as Shirichena Milling, which was used as a model of the nascent informal yet commercially-oriented milling sector by USAID, contributed to the extraction of grains from Gokwe to urban, wealthier parts of the country. Shirichena was in many respects hegemonic in Gokwe during the early 1990s and was by no means selling processed maize to residents of Gokwe at an affordable price. Nor was Shirichena willing to transport food to semi-arid regions of the country unless they received a subsidy from the government.[2]

USAID's Mission Director argued that the reason why Shirichena could sell maize meal at such high prices in Gokwe, or transport the food out of the area altogether, was because "There's not enough competition yet".[3] Perhaps, but what was particularly alarming

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[2] Interview, Mr. Zemura, Director, Shirichena Milling Co., 13 April 1993.

[3] Interview, Mr. T. Morse, 8 April 1993. A transcript of the meeting with Mr. Morse is included in Appendix One, along with a subsequent letter to Mr. Morse from the author and USAID's response to my queries. The meeting of 8 April 1993 was difficult and degenerated as the author pressed Mr. Morse on matters of impact.

about the meeting with the USAID Mission Director was his inability to indicate where the "competition" was to come from, how it could be supported or how, in practice, food was going to be delivered to deficit regions of the country at an affordable cost simply by reducing the powers of the GMB.

More importantly, the evidence presented earlier suggests that efforts to transform the nature of maize marketing would have a greater chance of success if such efforts were done in a manner that also created the necessary space for farmers in areas like Gokwe to diversify their productive base. Efforts to transform the GMB alone would not be very effective given the range of problems faced by farmers and deficit households in areas like Gokwe whose capacity to purchase or secure access to processed maize meal had declined throughout the 1980s. As alluded to above, the government might have to play a greater role in the distribution of processed maize meal if it was to be delivered to deficit regions at a reasonable price. This role could be indirect however as the government should not be responsible for the actual delivery of maize. Liberalizing the maize marketing system could be combined with efforts to support informal millers, in the form of credits, tax incentives and/or loans. This might help a competitive and responsive rural-based milling sector to emerge. Further incentives could be offered to millers who transported and sold processed meal in deficit regions at a reasonable (and possibly pre-determined and subsidised) price. If such a system was effective, agricultural pricing policies could be reconsidered in a way that allowed farmers throughout the country to produce crops that are environmentally-appropriate and of high value. While complex, it appeared clear that one of the main challenges facing the government was to find ways in which farmers could produce crops that increased their income. In some places of the country, like Goromonzi, it might be prudent to support maize production, while in other areas like Gokwe, farmers would welcome the

opportunity to diversify into higher valued cash crops like sunflower, cotton and groundnuts as long as they had secure access to affordable maize meal throughout the year. Exploring these possibilities will undoubtedly create other challenges for policy makers. The intention is not to be prescriptive but rather to illustrate ways in which a more considered approach to the problem of maize marketing and food insecurity might yield the desired, and laudable, results set out by USAID.

6.3 Measuring Results

USAID's re-engineering efforts are based upon the correct assumption that the development institution must shift its emphasis from demonstrating to Congress and the American public that it has spent its allocated money properly to demonstrating that USAID's resources have led to measurable development results. This is a critical step forward for the institution.

For over 40 years, USAID has had to provide massive documentation to Congress to show that resources have been spent in line with Congressional stipulations. Now, USAID will have greater scope to develop country-specific programmes that meet local needs and are in line with specific government objectives. Importantly, the starting point in each country is a clear assessment of what capacity USAID has to address a host of development challenges and how the institution's scarce resources can best be utilised to meet those challenges. Difficult choices are being made in Missions throughout the world, and programmes and organisations historically supported by USAID are being phased out if they are not in line with USAID's revised country strategies. The process, at least in South Africa and Zimbabwe, has been open and transparent, and USAID has engaged in a lengthy process of consultation with government, NGOs and broader civil society to develop appropriate

programmes that are in line with broadly accepted country strategies and within the financial and technical capacity of USAID.

The challenge USAID now faces is to develop a set of locally-specific development indicators that will accurately measure the impact of their interventions. This has proven to be difficult however. Part of the tension comes from the legacy of USAID and Congress interactions. USAID staff are currently meeting Congressional leaders in Washington, D.C. to "sell" their programmes. Developing a set of locally-specific development indicators that ***makes sense*** to Congressional leaders who are, in many cases, hostile to international aid, is proving difficult.

More importantly, there are significant tensions within USAID that will undoubtedly shape efforts to demonstrate measurable "results". USAID will have to show that the objectives established during the development of the country strategy have been met during the stipulated time frame or future funding from Congress will be suspended. The danger here is that USAID staff will develop a set of simple indicators that will ensure that they sustain their funding but, in the process, masks impact.

To illustrate, ZASA was assessed by independent evaluators as a success for a host of reasons described above. These included the expansion of the maize marketing system to isolated areas of the country and the increased contribution of African-produced maize to the nation's food supply. Yet, as was also demonstrated, USAID funded research as well as the findings of this study suggest that the expansion of the maize marketing programme had an adverse impact on household food security in large parts of the country. As the interview with the Mr. Morse illustrates (see Appendix One), USAID distanced itself from the findings of Jayne *et. al.* (1990 and 1991) despite the fact that USAID funded the research. Moreover, USAID staff were consistently willing to accept credit for the positive aspects of the

programme yet failed to take any responsibility for ZASA's shortcomings, as demonstrated earlier. The "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" is an initiative that is designed, in many ways, to undo the damage caused by ZASA. Despite this, USAID remained silent on their responsibilities for the problem.

Questions could also be asked about how the impact of the "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" would be reported back to Congress. USAID could demonstrate a decline in the GMB deficit and may even be able to demonstrate that the cost of maize meal in Natural Regions III, IV, and V has decreased. USAID might also demonstrate that the number of private traders purchasing maize from the GMB and re-selling the grain through various channels in deficit regions of the country has increased by at least ten percent, although no baseline data on this subject was collected by USAID. They will have a more difficult time proving that the number of informal traders operating in urban areas and in specific rural areas has increased as a result of their reform programme. Moreover, they will have difficulty proving that the reform programme expanded the scope for intra-rural trade and expanded the scope of private millers in deficit regions of the country, again because no baseline data was collected prior to the initiation of the programme. Finally, and most importantly, extensive research will be required to demonstrate that deficit households are more food secure as a result of this initiative. As indicated above, USAID has shown reluctance to accept research findings that suggest that their interventions have had a detrimental impact or that all of their objectives have not been met. It is unclear whether this will change, especially considering the fact that research which questions USAID programmes could undermine future funding from Congress.

This research has shown that development interventions are shaped by numerous factors unforeseen by donors, the state and the recipients of development support. There are

numerous intangibles in the development process and rarely does one development institution fully shape the outcome of a development programme. The challenge faced by USAID is to develop a set of indicators that accurately measure change; demonstrate who is benefiting from a particular programme, who is not and why; and highlight spin-offs and unforeseen consequences that have affected the outcome of an initiative.

Most importantly, USAID should become more humble in its approach to development. Perhaps it is more important to recognise the limitations of development programmes and create an environment of critical reflection that leads to more considered interventions in the future rather than designing ambitious programmes and a set of indicators that may be "provable" but do not accurately reflect impact. In South Africa, USAID hopes to prove to Congress that they have increased the participation of women in the development process. The measure they are currently considering is to count the number of women present at meetings and show that this number is increasing. This, in the end, may convince Congress to allocate more money to the USAID Mission in South Africa but hardly reflects the impact "women" have on the decision making process, or whether "women" are the main beneficiaries of the subsequent development intervention. The greater development challenge would be to find ways to show which women are participating in a programme, what impacts such programmes had on different classes of women and how such programmes provided broader benefits to the household, neighbours or the larger village, and how these programmes reshaped (however slightly) gender relations within the area. USAID is not, at present, considering such questions. The challenge facing development practitioners and researchers is to find creative ways to shift USAID, and Congress, in this direction.

APPENDIX ONE

Interview - Ted D. Morse
USAID Mission Director/Harare
8 April 1993

EDB: When did you first join USAID?

T. Morse: October 1990 in Harare. Thirty three years ago was when I first joined.

EDB: Can you tell me what some of the more important changes in USAID have been over the past 10-15 years? From the documents I have read, there seems to be an increasing shift towards more targeted interventions directed at the private sector as well as an increase in the reliance of the Agency on policy reform initiatives. Is that accurate?

T. Morse: You need to look at those in terms of twenty five year changes. If you go back to where AID was the Marshall Plan, in Europe after WWII, then you look at how we approached Asia and Latin America and ignored, basically, Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, you look for pendulums, swinging trends. When you say you see the policy and you see the private investment thrust, if you go back to what was done in Asia back in the 1960s, you will see that that was very very much a part of the policy in Asia and Latin America. When AID came into Africa, it had to adjust, if you will, to more people level institution building rather than policy reform kinds of things. The governments here were still very state-controlled, they were not ready to loosen up on the controls on the private sector. It was adjusted as it came down through here in the 1970s and 1980s. So, as you said earlier, AID is not monolithic. The development problems are not the same in any continent or any country *at any time*. So, you almost have to look at how it is adjusted over quarters of centuries.

EDB: Do you think that the changes that you are talking about, and the potential that AID will be abolished, do you think that what may reconstitute itself as the United States' development arm will concentrate on private sector initiatives and policy reform?

T. Morse: Foreign aid is not popular with the public, and because it is not popular with the American public there is no constituency for it. I think that the body politic at home, and I mean the Executive and Legislative branches, is going to have to say, "Where can you sustain, over a long period of time enough popular, people level support in the US, for what kinds of objectives." You must structure a foreign assistance program to reflect

what can be sustained by the American people and through their elected officials and through their leadership. Certainly in Africa there is a stereotype that it is a disaster-prone area and therefore in Africa what you should be doing is basically famine mitigation and disaster preparedness. I think that is such a narrow, incorrect stereotype that it is going to be unfortunate if that drives it. There is another group that says, look, our historical and economic roots are in Europe. We are going to have to recreate the Point Four Marshall Plan, but this time not for western Europe but for eastern Europe, and we are just going to have to write off the rest of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia because they are not that important to us. I think that that debate still has to go on in America.

EDB: I was speaking with former Ambassador Swing and Marshall McCallie in South Africa. They did not tell me that USAID was potentially going to be dissolved, but they did say that half of USAID's Africa budget will be going to South Africa once there is a new political dispensation. What are your thoughts on this?

T. Morse: No, that is too high. We have doubled it from $40 million to $80 million. The budget for Africa is roughly $800 million. That is ten percent now, it may double from $80 to $160 million. I do not think you are going to see it in concessional aid. I think you are going to see that come in such things as housing investment guarantees for low-cost housing because that is such a high priority need. You are going to see that there may be some concessional loans as opposed to grants because they have a repayment capability over time that can absorb loans instead of grants. That would be my reaction. We took two and a half years to develop the $75 million low cost housing scheme in Zimbabwe that was just announced in the papers. He (USAID housing officer in South Africa) is going to try and compress that into a year period and have it ready to go in the transitional period in South Africa.

EDB: I have sent a number of letters to Ms. Buckles that I have also forwarded to you. In those letters I expressed some reservations with the original CIP and ZASA. I expressed concern over the allocation of agricultural machinery to the white farming community at a time when the Government was, rightly or wrongly, trying to redress the agricultural imbalances characteristic of the Rhodesian era. In addition, I stated that this policy was particularly troubling when there was clear evidence of an emerging, viable black agricultural community, the Purchase Area farmers, who clearly required access to such machinery. I have had an interview with Mr. Joshua Mushauri who agrees with many of my concerns over these programs. I realize that these programs were designed and implemented prior to your arrival in Harare, but I would be interested to hear your reaction to my concerns.

T. Morse: **I think it was well designed and well targeted for this reason. The Government was not in a growth phase, but they decided not to destroy the productive base of the economy. If you look at the model of what happened in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 versus what happened here from 1980-85, it was a very conscious decision. Mugabe made it clear under reconciliation - he wanted the white commercial productive base to stay if they could live under his leadership, unlike in Angola and Mozambique where they were just chased away. He had to focus heavily on redressing the social inequities and imbalances that took place, that he inherited. The beauty of the CIP was this. It allowed the foreign exchange to be used by the productive sector to maintain the productive base so that it did not slip into an Angolan or Mozambican kind of stagnation and regression. They needed that. Not just the farmers but the miners and the manufacturers so that the productive sector would not collapse. With the local currency generations you could get what happened, which was a conscious policy - tremendous expansion of the smallholder agricultural, tremendo expansion of the education, tremendous expansion of the services to redre the social imbalances. If you look at this table and you see in terms of th large-scale commercial versus the small-scale, communal and resettlement, you will see that the declining productivity [of the large-scale commercial farmers] when they were up here in the millions and came down to the 200,000 and 400,000s, as the large-scale commercial farmers got out of it and in exchange for which, which you saw in terms of the production over here by the small-scale and communal sector, went up significantly whereas a percentage of what they were producing was... there was another chart that I can't put my hand on. Anyway, to me it did what you have to do - preserve the productive sector but expand the social base, and it did both.**

EDB: At one level I agree with you. The commercial farmers who have received these tractors express their satisfaction with them, and indicate how the tractors were important for them in their efforts to diversify out of low-value crops such as maize into higher-valued tobacco, soyabeans, and horticulture. My concern, which is echoed by Joshua Mushauri, is that there was an undercapitalized small-scale commercial sector, comprised of black farmers who had been discriminated against under the previous authorities, who did not have access to the agricultural machinery they needed to solidify their tenuous position in the country. Why couldn't USAID have designed a programme that addressed these concerns with the same implements that were targeted at the large-scale white farming community?

T. Morse: **I do not think that they could have made as efficient use of these machines, at that time. They needed time for the selection process, the training process, for the expansion, for land access, for water. The tractors by**

themselves were one small input, they had to be fitted in to a different base. The point that the small farmer production could increase from when they were only doing 20 percent of the maize production to the point where they were up at 70 percent, marketed, was a hell of a success of both strategies in our opinion.

EDB: USAID in the PAAD documents made it very clear that tobacco production was not to be supported because Zimbabwean tobacco competes with U.S. unprocessed tobacco. Yet, as you demonstrate, the large-scale commercial farmers have diversified into tobacco with, in the final analysis, the assistance of tractors supplied under the CIP. The farmers who I have spoken to explain how US CIP tractors were "instrumental" in allowing them to move back into tobacco. Now from a development perspective this is great. You are using your tractors to enhance and exploit opportunities that exist. As far as the United States is concerned, and people like Jesse Helms who's especially concerned that Zimbabwe is out-exporting the United States in tobacco, is that a problem for you in relation to the CIP?

T. Morse: I would have to look at the numbers. I am too far out of it to know how many tractors went to farmers that are diversified, how many went to tobacco producers. I do not have the background.

EDB: Could you explain to me your present maize marketing reform program in Zimbabwe?

T. Morse: Basically, we feel that the marketing of all agricultural products needs to be liberalized, needs to be freed up, and be market-oriented and responsive to market forces. For reasons of both getting the GMB off of such a drain on the Government because of its expensive way of marketing, and by changing the marketing pattern so that you can actually deliver cheaper food into the rural areas for the people who are producing it, so that it does not have to go through a centralized marketing board, you can also get an expansion of employment by people who are then growing through the maize trade, the agriculture trade, as rural traders, rural millers, rural truckers, rural input people that it is the right policy. Our own approach is to have non-project assistance to support policy reform which is based on extensive research before the Government and the "eleven clients" in grain marketing. The research that they are all doing on what is in their interests, the pace of reforms and the strategy, and the costs and the benefits, and what has to be done to move is what we are supporting. Research in grain marketing and prices, and then supporting the policy reform with non-project assistance followed by targeted interventions through the Zimbabwe Business Development Project, the Zimbabwe

Advisory Project, the Zimbabwe Training Projects, capitalization opportunities so that you can see that small black businesses in the rural areas can pick up on the openings, the policy reform openings, that are there, these guys can move into because they are real, they are not just on paper.

EDB: It seems that a good deal of the policy positions come from the UZ/MSU Food Security Programme you sponsored.

T. Morse: We stopped that two years ago.

EDB: I know, but some of the policy positions did come from their work? For example, Tom Jayne argues that the removal of restrictions on trade between regions is necessary to address questions of food insecurity...

T. Morse: You are talking about Tom's work for the World Bank and CIDA. That's where he did that work, not for us.

EDB: One of the things that I think he was concerned with is the limited scope of your reform initiative in relation to liberalising trade between Natural Regions IV and V only...

T. Morse: The end game over time when people can implement reform, you have to be sure that people can implement reform. Its just not going for a theoretical, hypothetical everything is free-market at one time. You have to phase it in a way that people can implement it. I do not think that there is any disagreement with the CFU, the ZFU, the GMB, the AMA, the Minister of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, ourselves. Anybody. What the end game is, the strategy to get there is the difference between an academic's approach that Tom might look at versus an operational person who has to be sure that you are not screwing up the economy.

EDB: I have a question related to Shirichena Milling Company. The Company's Director, Mr. Zemura, talks quite favourably of you. Did you push for them being licensed?

T. Morse: I don't even know if he's licensed. What we were interested in is that he produces mills. He not only produces them, he sets rural millers up. He trains them. He shows them how to market. So that you're relying on the private sector to get into filling the gap that we expect to be left by the Grain Marketing Board. He 's just one of what we hope will be hundreds of smaller millers.

EDB: Mr. Zemura also says that you're funding some of the training that I think you mentioned earlier. Are you also funding capital expenditure?

T. Morse: No.

EDB: So how is the small scale milling community going to emerge?

T. Morse: Suppliers credit on his part, I think, where he is financing the capitalization of people who want to buy them. I think that's where it is. On others, there's now probably twenty different schemes that people can go into that we refer them to. We don't have to have direct U.S. Government intervention.

EDB: How is food going to move from a surplus area to a deficit area like Gokwe, which is a deficit area, at a cost that is affordable to resource poor, vulnerable households in that area?

T. Morse: How is he going to move in there? Are you talking about fiscally or the economics of it?

EDB: The economics of it. How do you see it evolving because I know where the maize belt is, and the people in Gokwe who I have been interviewing are clearly trying to get out of maize production. They don't want to grow maize in this area. They want to buy it. They can't buy it because National Foods and Midlands Milling company bring up very little. They bring up about 400, 20 kg bags of maize meal a month for a community of 80,000 people. Shirichena has come into this area and now there is a little more maize, but the price of maize meal from Shirichena is significantly higher.

T. Morse: There's not enough competition yet.

EDB: There's not enough competition yet, I agree. So my question is how do you think maize from surplus areas is going to be able to get to areas like Gokwe at a competitive price considering Shirichena effectively has created a rural monopoly now? I recognize its the beginning of a process, but he's the only game in town and he's charging prices that most people can't afford.

T. Morse: Then they should not pay them.

EDB: Well, they don't pay him and they don't buy the maize meal, and they remain insecure.

T. Morse: **No, they've got options. I think the economic models would show that as there is profit to be made and if its that high a profit other people are going to try to get into it and as they come into it, they're going to get the competition and they're going to drive down the price because then its not just the three big millers coming in there, and not just the one you mentioned. You're going to draw others into there. In the mean time, if its that expensive for them, then maybe people will go back in to growing maize. You say they have a preference for eating the maize meal, but we are finding that through taste preferences between super refined and roller meal and then hammer milled, straight run, then people will switch when the prices is as low as only 11 percent differential. If they're switching on 11 percent, they are price sensitive. People will move, and that's what we're banking on. If you deregulate so that the movement can come and go, and people can continue to grow. Gokwe is not an area that is so depleted of rain and soil and cattle that they couldn't grow that. More importantly, our own strategy is that they should not be totally dependent on just maize. They should also be dependent on sorghum and millet. People said that they wouldn't go back to sorghum and millet. We've had a tremendous response on the sorghum. A tremendous outcry.**

EDB: They brew it though.

T. Morse: **No, that stuff is not the stuff we brought in because it won't brew. The tanning quality is as such that it won't. Be that as it may, the tremendous outpouring of people who will ask for more of the drought resistant seed because the seed that ICROSAT and we developed over the last eight years at quite an expense down in Matopos will out-produce maize even under a normal rain fall now, not just drought and of course under drought conditions it really out produces it by as much as 45 percent.**

EDB: The point I'm trying to get across is in Gokwe, 87 percent of the family's I've interviewed, and I've talked to Agritex people, and I've gone to other areas to confirm the generalization of this, devote a disproportionate amount of their land to maize because they can't buy it. What they're trying to do is what you're trying to do as well in many respects. They want to diversify out of maize. They want to grow sunflower, groundnuts and cotton. They can't do that because the price of maize is too much and the supply is irregular.

T. Morse: **Or that the price return from the sunflowers is not high enough or the groundnuts is not high enough for the farmer to buy it. Because, you have to admit that there is, in the market in Gokwe, you can buy commercially milled, commercially distributed maize meal.**

EDB: Well, you can and you can't. The people from Njelele will get on a bus and go into Gokwe which takes them in at 6 a.m. and brings them back at 9 o'clock at night to buy a bag of maize meal and there's none there.

T. Morse: None there when?

EDB: Usually toward the end of the month.

T. Morse: Look, you are coming to a place when the country had no food. I wouldn't consider anything until after this harvest is in the market that you would say that that is typical. You're going to have to cut off because I've got people waiting.

EDB: The point is according to the people in the area, according to Agritex, according to the store owners who I've interviewed, this is not actually unusual. Commercially-refined maize meal is simply not available in most rural areas during periods of peak demand. People run out of food anywhere between September and December.

T. Morse: Always.

EDB: Yes, even during good years. I know...

T. Morse: Always. Look here, there are people who don't produce a twelve months supply. So what's you're point?

EDB: My point is that when they have to go buy it in Gokwe centre, that maize meal is, for the majority of the period not there because National Foods and Midlands Milling don't bring it out there. This is why I'm saying the restructuring programme that you're talking about, I agree with. You have to get people in these areas who are going to ensure a supply so people can diversify out of these crops, out of maize. The point that I'm making is that Shirichena right now has priced himself out of the market for most vulnerable people. He is not solving the problem of food insecurity in the area.

T. Morse: Then people should not buy from him.

EDB: Well they can't buy from him even though they want to.

T. Morse: He won't stay in business very long will he?

EDB: No, he will be able to feed Gokwe Centre, and he also takes his food to Bulawayo and Highfield.

T. Morse: **But he won't stay in business very long if people aren't going to buy from him.**

EDB: But he does bring it to towns that buy it from him.

T. Morse: **What's you're point?**

EDB: My point is that from September to the next harvest there is a very small supply of maize in the area. That's because it's being transported out of there entirely. Again, Tom found this over 3 or 4 years,

T. Morse: **You don't have to quote Tom. I mean Agritex has got data on this for every year going back for thirty years that there are areas here where they don't produce a twelve month supply of domestic consumption let alone enough that they can sell out of it. So I don't understand your point?**

EDB: My point is that in order to get food into the area from surplus regions its going to have to be brought in consistently at a cost that people can afford. I'm still not sure how that's going to work.

T. Morse: **Don't you have any faith in the market forces?**

EDB: I have a lot of faith in the market forces. But let's say you sell maize meal at Z$1700 a ton which is what most people will say it will be if you took away the subsidies. Nobody in Gokwe can afford that. So how are they going to be fed?

T. Morse: **They can either grow their own then because its a lot better for them and stop diversifying out.**

EDB: O.K. but then they are completely vulnerable.

T. Morse: **Not necessarily.**

EDB: Well, its a poor maize growing area.

T. Morse: **If its a poor maize growing area, don't grow maize. Why do you think this stuff is here (sorghum and millet). What do you think this is?**

EDB: O.K., but what you're saying is they should be growing more maize.

T. Morse: **They will. People are not going to sit there and starve to death. They're going to switch.**

EDB: To what?

T. Morse: They're going to switch either to the groundnuts or to the sunflower or to the cotton and buy it at a price they can afford it, or they're going to switch over and start going back to sorghum, millet, and rapoko and eating the small greens. Anyway, you can debate this forever.

EDB: Sure, I still don't really see how the system is going to work to be honest with you.

T. Morse: Come on back in three years and see if it worked.

EDB: Well, I'll do my best to monitor it for the next three years.

20 April 1993

Mr. T. Morse
Mission Director
USAID/Zimbabwe
1 Pascoe Avenue
P.O. Box 6988
Harare

Dear Mr. Morse:

I would like to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet with me the other day. The interview was extremely helpful.

As promised, I have enclosed a copy of our discussion for your review. I would appreciate any further comments you may have in relation to our discussion.

I have a number of questions that I would appreciate your thoughts on, as the interview was shortened due to your tight schedule. If you could send your comments to the address below, it would be appreciated.

1. Does USAID bear any responsibility for the problems associated with the Grain Marketing Board, and other parastatals, given the large degree of support these institutions received under ZASA?

2. While I recognize that, at one level, your comments on the dramatic increase in maize sold to the GMB by communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial farmers is impressive, could it not be argued that a situation has emerged where African producers are, for various reasons, producing low-value commodities while large-scale commercial farmers are concentrating their efforts on higher-valued crops such as tobacco, soya beans, and increasingly horticulture? I want to be clear on this point - I by no means *blame* USAID for this. My point is only that USAID claims that the gap between large-scale commercial farmers and African producers would be rectified through programmes such as ZASA and the original CIP. How are we to measure this?

3. Could you clarify who the "eleven clients" in grain marketing are?

4. While I agree with you that the idea of liberalizing the grain trade is important (and relatively uncontentious), I still am uncertain as to how grain is going to move from food surplus to food deficit regions at an affordable cost to vulnerable households. The issue is far more complicated than simply growing your own maize, or switching to sorghum and millet, as you know. Farmers throughout this country, especially in the poorer Natural Regions, are trying to diversify into crops that will secure them the highest return *and* are better suited to their

environmental conditions. Farmers in Gokwe, Zaka, Nkayi, and Nembudziya (for example) do not want to grow maize. They want to grow sunflower, cotton and groundnuts, and buy maize. They do not like the taste of millet or sorghum meal, although that may change if the varieties USAID supports are truly acceptable. They are constrained by their inability to procure food at a reasonable cost or because food is unavailable in outlying areas of the country. Therefore they grow maize, despite the vulnerability of this crop in these regions. Commercial millers will readily concede that their deliveries of maize meal to outlying areas of the country is largely token, stemming from the problems with subsidies and the lack of incentives to bring food, at a reasonable cost, to places far from central milling points. This, in fact, seems to be the whole reason for a decentralized system. The problem is that farmers in vulnerable Natural Regions will still have to produce their own food, thus stifling efforts to diversify, unless food can be consistently brought in from surplus regions. Again, how is food going to move into deficit regions at a cost that is affordable to families with limited resources?

5. Could you provide me with more information in relation to the sorghum and millet program USAID is supporting? Specifically, I would be interested to know the levels of USAID support for the initiative, and the location where the experimental plots are located.

6. What role does the State have in your maize marketing reform initiative, besides buying maize and selling it to whoever wants it?

7. You state that the reform initiative is based on extensive research - could you provide me with your findings? You also state that African producers are selling 70 percent of their commodities to the GMB. Could you give me your sources for this information?

8. Mr. Zemura, Director of Shirichena, told me that he has not been able to sell any of his grinding machines because of the economic problems faced by the country. He also says that the start-up cost for a small-scale milling operation would be well over Z$500,000. Who is going to be able to afford such an initial outlay given the situation in the country? Moreover, if the response by the private sector to the liberalization of maize marketing is slow, as is already apparent, what will be the consequence of USAID's reform initiative? What contingency plans are there? How is there going to be adequate competition in rural areas given the fact that, to date, the only rural private sector response is Shirichena? How do we fill the gap between liberalization and response? This, to me, is critical, if we are to move beyond the hypothetical realm of free-markets to an adequate response to the problem of food insecurity in this country.

9. Mr. Zemura is not financing the capitalization of any millers, as you argue. You do mention that "there's now probably twenty different schemes that people can go into that we refer them to." Could you supply me with a list of these schemes, plus the name of the contact person at each, so that I may follow this up?

10. Finally, on Shirichena. I think Mr. Zemura is a tremendous businessman, yet I fear that he is doing exactly what the private sector will do. He sells maize in Gokwe at an extremely high

price. You say that this is because there is not enough competition (see my concerns on the emergence of more millers above), and that people will not buy from him in Gokwe. They do not. He will not go out of business because he is selling Gokwe-produced maize meal in KweKwe, Bulawayo, Highfield and elsewhere. This is, in fact, exactly what the GMB was doing - buying maize in deficit areas and selling in city centres because rural households cannot afford the price. This does not address the issue of food insecurity in rural areas, and evidence suggests that it exacerbates the situation. Shirichena has no intention of selling maize in outlying areas of Gokwe, because households can't afford it (he states this emphatically in my discussions with him). Consequently, Shirichena exports food to urban areas that can afford it. This is how the private sector works, but it unfortunately does not address the problem of food insecurity faced by the plethora of rural households that do not grow a twelve month supply of food. How is such a situation to be rectified? Incidently, Mr. Zemura will not go out of business because farmers will sell *directly* to him at low prices because he pays them cash up front and farmers can therefore avoid AFC repayment.

Thank you for your time and consideration. I look forward to your responses, and hope to hear from you at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,

Edward D. Breslin

Address:

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June 2, 1993

Mr. Edward D. Breslin
Department of Political Studies
The University of the Witwatersrand
P.O. WITS
Johannesburg 2050
South Africa

Dear Mr. Breslin:

Thank you for your April 20 letter to which you should have received an interim reply on April 23 from my Administrative Assistant Mrs. Fribley.

The staff and I have spent many hours talking with you about your research and we hope that some of this has been helpful to you. However, the press of the A.I.D. business for which we are accountable unfortunately precludes spending more time on your research.

Good luck in your academic endeavours and your future work.

Sincerely yours,

Ted D. Morse
Director

Phones 720630/720739/720757
Country Code 263, City Code 4
Telex No. 24428 ZW
Fax No. 722418

APPENDIX TWO

QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW RESULTS

Research for this dissertation was conducted in the Gwanyika Plateau region of Njelele Ward III between February 1992 - June 1993. One hundred and fifty seven formal interviews were conducted as part of this research.

The formal questionnaire was administered during each interview and was used to establish a basic baseline. The questionnaire was short and provided the foundations for further discussion that highlighted the changing nature of marketing and food security in the village.

The formal questionnaire is included on the following page. This is followed by the data results. Interviewees were not asked what quantities were produced for each crop as the pre-test demonstrated that this was difficult to determine with any accuracy. Moreover, while income sources were explored, the amounts received from each income source were not discussed for reasons of privacy.

It should be noted that much of the historical information contained in the dissertation, and especially in Chapter Five, was gathered through extensive conversations with elders, local leaders, interviewees and AGRITEX officials. It is not possible to place these conversations in tabular form. The outcomes of these discussions are contained in the body of the dissertation.

Formal Questionnaire

Interview Number: _____
Interviewee: _____
Interpreter: _____
Name of household: _____
Household Head (if different from interviewee): _____
Number of Hectares: _____
Date of Interview: _____

		Yes	No
1.	What types of crops do you produce on your land?		
1.1	Maize		
1.2	Sunflower		
1.3	Cotton		
1.4	Groundnuts		
1.5	Sorghum		
1.6	Soya Beans		
1.7	Vegetables		
1.8	Pumpkins		
2.	Is your land fully utilised (outside of land left fallow)?		
3.	Have you produced a maize surplus in the last three years?		
4.	Do you sell/exchange maize?		
5.	If yes, where do you sell/exchange maize?		
5.1	GMB		
5.2	local residents		
5.3	store owners		
5.4	other		
6.	In the past, were you able to sell/exchange surplus maize locally?		
7.	Have you taken a loan from the AFC?		

8.	Have you tried to diversify the crops you grow?		
9.	If yes, have you been able to sustain these changes in your crop mix?		
10.	How do you prepare your field?		
	10.1 mechanised plough		
	10.2 animal plough		
	10.3 zero tillage		
11.	What agricultural implements have you purchased over the last five years?		
	11.1 basic tools (example: hoe)		
	11.2 scotch cart		
	11.3 plough		
	11.4 improvements on storage facilities		
	11.5 fencing		
12.	What agricultural commodities, besides crops, have you sold in the last five years?		
	12.1 agricultural implements		
	12.2 livestock		
	12.3 land		
	12.4 household labour		
13.	What sources of income are available to the household?		
	13.1 Remittances		
	13.2 Sales of agricultural goods to statutory marketing agency		
	13.3 local agricultural jobs		
	13.4 sale of home made goods		
	13.5 other		
14.	Can you purchase maize meal from local shops all year long?		

15.	Can you purchase maize meal from local surplus producers all year long?		
16.	Would you diversify your crop mix if you could purchase maize meal locally?		

INTERVIEW RESULTS

		Yes	No
1.	What types of crops do you produce on your land?		
1.1	Maize	157	0
1.2	Sunflower	98	59
1.3	Cotton	101	56
1.4	Groundnuts	66	91
1.5	Sorghum	19	138
1.6	Soya Beans	122	35
1.7	Vegetables	157	0
1.8	Pumpkins	133	24
2.	Is your land fully utilised (outside of land left fallow)?	6	151
3.	Have you produced a maize surplus in the last three years?	36	121
4.	Do you sell/exchange maize?	152	5
5.	If yes, where do you sell/exchange maize?		
5.1	GMB	149	3
5.2	local residents	3	149
5.3	store owners	19	133
5.4	other	7	145
6.	In the past, were you able to sell/exchange surplus maize locally?	32	125
7.	Have you taken a loan from the AFC?	2	155
8.	Have you tried to diversify the crops you grow?	102	55
9.	If yes, have you been able to sustain these changes in your crop mix?	23	79
10.	How do you prepare your field?		
10.1	mechanised plough	2	155
10.2	animal plough	69	88

	10.3 zero tillage	86	71
11.	What agricultural implements have you purchased over the last five years?		
	11.1 basic tools (example: hoe)	127	30
	11.2 scotch cart	0	157
	11.3 plough	0	157
	11.4 improvements on storage facilities	15	142
	11.5 fencing	8	149
12.	What agricultural commodities, besides crops, have you sold in the last five years?		
	12.1 agricultural implements	73	84
	12.2 livestock	102	55
	12.3 land	2	157
13.	What sources of income are currently available to the household?		
	13.1 Remittances	29	128
	13.2 Sales of agricultural goods to statutory marketing agency	157	0
	13.3 local agricultural jobs	14	143
	13.4 sale of home made goods	49	108
	13.5 other	17	140
14.	Can you purchase maize meal from local shops all year long?	0	157
15.	Can you purchase maize meal from local surplus producers all year long?	0	157
16.	Would you diversify your crop mix if you could purchase maize meal locally?	130	19

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