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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FOUCAULDIAN ARCHAEOLOGY WITH REGARD TO LITERARY HISTORY

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Johannesburg, 1987.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

L. Graham

31 August 1987

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the coherence of the Foucauldian archaeology as a method of discursive analysis and scrutinizes the possibilities it holds for a materialist literary history. The analysis of Foucault's archaeologies of the asylum, the clinic and the human sciences traces the manner in which the archaeology dissociates itself from the domains of Marxism and structuralism, and establishes its specific domain of operation. The conceptual apparatus constructed within that domain is scrutinized for coherence and the criticisms and misconceptions of the archaeology are discussed. The existing domain of literary history is analyzed and found to be in a state of crisis due to the epistemological weaknesses of empiricism and historicism that are uncovered at the level of the problematic. Foucault's concepts of a general history and of knowledge (savoir) are analyzed and found to be wrought in resistance to these weaknesses. Lastly, the study proposes directions for the historical analysis of literary texts through the application of the archaeology, specifically the concepts of the statement, the discursive formation and the episteme, to two literary texts showing the changes in the function of language between these texts and the epistemic configurations within which they participate.

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Introduction

The impact of Michel Foucault's work has extended over many disciplines from philosophy, social and political studies, history and discursive studies. His work falls into two main theoretical pursuits: the archaeology, which focusses upon the function of discourse: and the geneology which centres upon the concept of power in relation to discourse and the social institutions and apparatuses that propagate it.[1] This study undertakes to assess the cohesion and coherence of the archaeology on the theoretical level and the possibilities it holds for the practical analysis of literature.

The decision to scrutinize the archaeology for its points of application to literary discourse rather than to concentrate on the more recent geneological theory rests upon two related reasons. Firstly, the archaeology pertains directly to discourse and the analysis of its historical functioning, whereas the geneology is more contentious in its inclusion of the concepts of power and social regulation. The archaeology therefore remains on the level of discourse itself, and its conceptual framework is constructed to that end. Secondly, it is arguable that the geneology is constructed on the basis of the archaeological analysis of discourse, taking the conceptual framework constructed there as its point of departure into a new domain. It seems appropriate, therefore, that an assessment of the archaeology in terms of its possible contribution to the analysis of literature should be conducted as a prerequisite to an approach to a geneology of literary production.

This study falls into three parts which trace the stages that the research has followed. The first question one faces with

regard to the archaeology with its claims to novelty is that of where it came from. Thus the first part of this dissertation scrutinizes Foucault's early texts[2] which refer to themselves as archaeologies. These early works exhibit the modifications and the refinements that the archaeology as a methodology and a praxis underwent in order to demarcate its object and the theoretical domain specific to it. Here Foucault is apparently struggling to free himself from the constraints of the two major territories of Marxism and Structuralism which had hitherto dominated the analysis of discourse. The emergence of the archaeology through these early works to its form in The Order of Things[3] is important to the assessment of its claim to be operating within its own problematic or theoretical domain. Furthermore, the findings of The Order of Things as an archaeology of the human sciences inform much of the criteriology of The Archaeology of Knowledge[4] which appeared as the former work's postscript. This later work lays out the register of conceptual tools that facilitates the archaeological methodology as practiced in The Order of Things.

The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to the analysis of The Archaeology of Knowledge. Here the coherence of the theoretical architecture constructed in this work is scrutinized and evaluated as a prerequisite to an attempt to transfer it to the domain of literary discourse. The work, written as a theoretical postscript, was produced into the centre of critical polemics that erupted after The Order of Things, and as such, it is convoluted and complex in its organization. This leads to the admittance of 'grey' areas in which the articulation of such concepts as the statement and the discursive formation is not fully transparent. As these concepts are crucial to the praxis of archaeology, it was found to be necessary to extrapolate from the work itself and come to some decision as to how such a connection operates. Furthermore, the relationship of

the episteme - a concept of prime importance in The Order of Things - to the archaeology has been called into question by the critical reception of Foucault, and this too demanded attention before the question of the feasibility of the archaeology as a method of literary analysis could be posed.

Our approach to the domain of literary history finds the domain in disarray and crisis. The causes of this crisis are traced to the problematic that underlies the variety of methodologies employed there. Once these causes have been uncovered, it is clear that Foucault's archaeology operates antithetically to the traditional perspectives of literary history, and that a new concept of history and a new concept of knowledge such as those proposed by Foucault are necessary if one is to extract the historical analysis of literature from the impasse that it currently faces. To this end, the archaeology's points of departure from the traditional problematic of the history of ideas (under which literary history is subsumed[5]) are mapped and the consequences of this departure are scrutinized. This leads to the possibility of speaking of literature as a discursive positivity among other regularities in the archive. The importance of this is tantamount to the transference of the archaeological method to the domain of literature as it deconstructs the 'ivory tower' which has constrained the analysis of literary production, holding it separate from other discourses and maintaining its false innocence in the face of knowledge. Correlative to this, the acceptance of literature as discourse allows it to be analyzed in terms of the episteme.

On the basis of this, the conceptual apparatus of the archaeology - specifically the concepts of the statement, the discursive formation and the episteme - is employed with regard to the literary regularities of Henry Fielding's The Life of Mr. Jonathan

Wild the Great[6] and Laurence Sterne's The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy.[7] Our examination of these texts is necessarily cursory, for to conduct a full archaeological analysis of them would demand a study in its own right. However, it suffices to show some of the directions that an archaeology of literary texts would take through the employment of the statement, discursive formation and episteme.

The dissertation is necessarily open-ended, as a full application of the archaeology to literary texts requires a study in its own right. However, it is proposed that the ground for such an application has been prepared in that the close scrutiny of the criteriology of the archaeology has revealed it to be coherent and capable of surpassing the traditional methodologies of literary history by opening up a new domain for discursive analysis.

Notes

1. See Foucault, M. "The Order of Discourse" in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by R. Young, pp.48-78; originally published as L'Ordre du discours. Paris: Gallimard, 1971; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979; originally published as Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard, 1975; and The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by R. Hurley, London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1979; originally published as La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976.

2. See Foucault, M. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, translated by R. Howard, London: Tavistock, 1971; originally published as Histoire de la Folie. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1961; The Birth of the Clinic translated by A. Sheridan, London: Tavistock, 1973; originally published as Naissance de la Clinique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.

3. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences translated by A. Sheridan, London: Tavistock, 1970; originally published as Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard, 1966.

4. Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge translated by A. Sheridan, London: Tavistock, 1972; originally published as L'archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969.

5. One need only compare the work of such historians of ideas such as E. Cassirer The Philosophy of the Enlightenment translated by Fritz C.A. Koetln and J.P. Pettegrove, Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1951 and Hazard, P. European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing translated by J. Lewis May, London: Hollis and Carter, 1954 and The European Mind translated by J. Lewis May, New York: Meridian, 1963 to such literary historians as Legouis, E. and Cazamain, L. History of English Literature. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1967 to see the similarity of method.

6. Fielding, H. The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great in Jonathan Wild edited by D. Nokes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982 (1743).

7. Sterne, L. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy edited by G. Petrie with an introduction by C. Ricks, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967 (1759-1767).

PART I: The Early Works

1.1: An Archaeology of Silence: The History of Madness and Civilization

Michel Foucault began his intellectual training in philosophy, from which he moved into psychology and psychopathology. After teaching psychopathology, he published a short work entitled Mental Illness and Psychology.[1] This first work, which received little attention, gives an account of mental illness through the concepts of psychopathology. Foucault's next publication, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason[2] came out in 1961 after being presented as his doctoral thesis. This work was a reversal of the exposition offered in Mental Illness and Psychology, for in it the categories of psychopathology and its definitions of madness are rejected. Madness and Civilization is an analysis of Reason's domination of Unreason and the subjection of the latter to silence. What is at stake here, is that madness is no longer a fact of history which would amount to the imposition of a modern set of terms upon the past, but rather madness is a judgement that is historically constituted in the European setting. Foucault explains his intentions to analyze the present silence of madness in the face of the scientific privilege of psychiatry:

> "The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, could be established only on the basis of such a silence.
>
> I have not tried to write the history of that language,

but rather the archaeology of that silence."
(MC Preface pp.x-xi)

Such an endeavour, Foucault proposes, sets out to return to "that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself." (MC p.ix Preface) The book thus opens with a description of the exclusion of lepers in the Middle Ages, an exclusion which had a dual significance. Firstly, lepers were regarded as both dangerous, for the disease with which they were stricken was considered highly contagious; and wicked, as they had been severely punished by God in contracting the horrific disease. However, alongside this a second significance existed, that of a symbolic reminder of Divine power and the Christian's moral obligations of humility and charity. This duality was echoed by the spatial exclusion, the site, of the leprosariums which were to be found on the limits of the cities of Europe: far enough from social life to stave off danger but close enough to remind society of Divine omnipotence and Christian duty. At the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy became rare and the leprosariums fell empty. Their existence as sites of exclusion lay dormant for two to three centuries before a different form of Western culture utilized them again to exclude the indigent, the criminal and the madman:

> "With an altogether new meaning and in a very different culture, the forms would remain - essentially that major form of a rigorous division which is social exclusion but spiritual reintegration." (MC p.7)

During the Renaissance, the madman existed on the periphery of society. Driven from the cities, he wandered freely about the countryside or was entrusted to merchants who removed him from the city and took him on a quest for sanity along the waterways of Europe. Foucault's discussion of this period is centred upon

the image of the Narrenschiff, the Ship of Fools, that abruptly emerged in the literary and artistic landscape of the early fifteenth century. For Foucault, this phenomenon in Renaissance art "symbolized a great disquiet". (MC p.13) It is here, in the apprehension of madness by the visual arts and literature that the first signs of a division become apparent.

> "Between word and image, between what is depicted by language and what is uttered by plastic form, the unity begins to dissolve; a single and identical meaning is not immediately common to them.....Figure and speech still illustrate the same fable of folly in the same moral world, but already they take two different directions, indicating in a still barely perceptible scission, what will be the great line of cleavage in the Western experience of madness." (MC p.18)

In the visual arts, in the works of Bosch, Dürer, Grünewald and Brueghel, the fear of madness was expressed. With the collapse of the divinely ordered knowledge of the Middle Ages, images of bestiality that were once enmeshed in myth and moral illustration in the form of human values were released. These images became, in the Renaissance, symbolic of enclaves of forbidden knowledge, of man's inner qualities, of the threats and secrets of the world and of the tragic experience of madness. In literature, madness is apprehended with irony; if it is aligned with knowledge, it is as a punishment for a disordered science, not as the warden of a forbidden knowledge. Madness in literature rules "all that is easy, joyous, frivolous in the world". (MC p.25) It is linked to man's weaknesses, to his dreams and therefore to illusion. Madness is thus viewed from the safety of an elevated critical consciousness which watches its play over the surface of appearances, and illusions. The tragic depictions of the experience of madness invoking the world's end found in the painting of the Renaissance, and the critical consciousness of its literature that

praises folly from a safe distance form the two poles of the early Renaissance experience of madness. Gradually, the latter form supersedes the former, drawing the depiction of madness in from the peripheral position it held in relation to life until in the early seventeenth century,

> "it occupies, by preference, a median place; it thus constitutes the knot more than the denouement, the peripity rather than the final release. Displaced in the economy of narrative and dramatic structures, it authorized the manifestation of truth and the return of reason." (MC p.32)

In this way, madness becomes a web of error and illusion under the spotlight of Reason. It loses the threatening tragic power that accompanied it in the paintings of the fifteenth century, and in its disarmed state, it enters the Age of Reason, bound to the critical consciousness of discourse.

> "By a strange act of force, the classical age was to reduce to silence the madness whose voices the Renaissance had just liberated, but whose violence it had already tamed." (MC p.38)

The historical event which marks the sudden disappearance of madness from the life of the society is the establishment of the Hôpital Générale in 1656. Within a few decades, workhouses, Zuchthäuser and hôpitaux generaux had sprung up in nearly every city in Western Europe. (MC pp.39-45) In these institutions, the indigent, the vagabond, the criminal and the madman existed as members of the same group, which was defined by a new mode of perception based on labour. The non-productive elements of society became threatening as regard both the moral censure against idleness and as a source of social instability. Foucault stresses that this "great confinement" cannot be regarded as the prescientific origin of the asylum. His is not an account of scientific progress, but rather of the birth of a space of confinement within which the sciences of man could refind themselves

through observation of the confined. At the beginning of the Classical Age, this space is not a medical one, rather it is politico-economic:

> "The unemployed person was no longer driven away or punished; he was taken in charge, (not)[3] at the expense of the nation but at the cost of his individual liberty. Between him and society, an implicit system of obligation was established: he had the right to be fed, but he must accept the physical and moral constraint of confinement. Therefore it (confinement) constituted one of the answers the seventeenth century gave to an economic crisis that affected the entire Western world: reduction of wages, unemployment, scarcity of coin - the coincidence of these phenomena probably being due to a crisis in the Spanish economy." (MC pp.48-49)

By the end of the eighteenth century, the collective group of the confined had begun to divide. The poverty-stricken were freed from the moral confusion which bound them to criminal elements and the insane as poverty became a phenomenon specific to economics. Now the poor who were willing to work for low wages were regarded as essential to the nation's wealth. With the sudden upsurge of industrial growth, the indigent were once more called upon to play a part in society. The 'prisoners', those who had forfeited their liberty in toto, were still thrown together. Foucault denounces the claims of a nineteenth century positivism to have been responsible for initiating the division between the guilty criminal and the innocent madman. It was not a call from society's Reason, but rather the violent protestations of the criminals which drew attention to the mixing of insanity and criminality. The criminal objected to this state of affairs as the madmen in their midst became a symbol of their humiliation. They demanded a separation between themselves and those trans-

gressors of the laws of Nature, who were perceived as wild beasts. In this manner, madness was singled out and recognized for its specific features. It became circumscribed for a perception that would finally apprehend it as an object of knowledge. With the transfer of the notion of labour from the realm of morality to that of economics and potential wealth, the perception of confinement changed from social necessity to gross error. The insane, now severed from the indigent and the criminal and specified as an object, were subjected to the prevailing notion of rehabilitation and cure. Foucault's discussion of the English Quaker, Tuke, and the French rationalist, Pinel, centres upon the importance they placed upon medical intervention. The physician was more a juridico-moral figure than a scientist, emphasis being placed upon his trustworthiness rather than his scientific status. Because his curative power rests upon the authority of order, morality and the family structure as the bastion of bourgeois society and its values, it was these that came into play within the doctor - patient relation. The last nexus of transformation that Foucault discusses, is Freud. Freud exploited the structure that enclosed the physician by emphasizing the doctor - patient relation.

Foucault's analysis of the history of Reason's domination of Unreason concludes with a discussion of the forms of the Other which have escaped the moral confinement he has traced in his analysis. The "mad" painters Goya and Van Gogh and the "mad" poets and writers Sade, Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Nerval and Artaud indicate the experience of unreason which contests the limits of society, of reason and science. However, in his conclusion, Foucault tentatively sounds the limits of what we recognize as the history of Western culture. Within this history, a history dominated by Reason, identity presides in the articulation of the collective "we", the purveyors of that culture. However, consequent upon this identity is a set of exclusions which demarcate that culture and its history as finite. It is towards this

limitation that Foucault's analysis of the opposition of reason/same and unreason/other as the summation of identities and exclusions tends:

> "What realm do we enter which is neither the history of knowledge, nor history itself; which is controlled by neither the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence of causes, since causes have value and meaning only beyond the division? A realm, no doubt, where what is in question is the limits rather than the identity of a culture." (MC p.xi)

In this regard, Foucault asserts that the history of madness is the history of the possibility of history.[4]

It is on this assertion that Derrida focuses his persuasive argumentative challenge of the presuppositions of Foucault's history of madness. For Derrida, Foucault's intention to writing a history of madness itself is "the greatest merit, but also the very infeasibility of his book".[5] A contradiction at the very root of this intention certainly appears to undercut the project. On the one hand, Foucault intended madness to be the subject of the book in both the senses, that it is the content matter and also the speaker, telling of its experiences in its own terms and not in those of Reason, or of psychopathology, for those are the terms of its objectification. Derrida observes, however, that throughout Madness and Civilization, madness is linked to silence, and that this history of madness, or archaeology of silence, is a history of silence. It is here that Derrida finds that the infeasibility of the project becomes apparent, for to write a history is to employ the language of order. Although Foucault is intent upon denouncing the historical guilt of Reason, he is implicated in this trial by his use of the logic of language. "Order is then denounced within order". Thus argues Derrida,

> "... the silence of madness cannot be said, cannot be said in the logos of this book, but is directly, metaphorically,

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> "... the silence of madness cannot be said, cannot be said in the logos of this book, but is directly, metaphorically,

> made present by its pathos - taking this word in its best sense. A new and radical praise of folly whose intentions cannot be admitted because the praise of silence always takes place within logos."[6]

But Derrida's arguments regarding the philosophical presuppositions of Foucault's book do not amount to a rejection of it. Rather, Madness and Civilization is regarded as illuminating the crisis that exists in philosophy whereby reason is "madder than madness" in its attempts to overcome the danger of unreason by burying origins under the rubric of objectivism.[7] Derrida's arguments regarding the contradiction rooted in the stated intention behind the book are not denied by Foucault. On the contrary, in the preface to the French original, Histoire de la Folie, Foucault acknowledges that the task is "no doubt and doubly impossible" because, on the one hand, it sets out to reconstitute "the dust of actual suffering, of senseless words anchored by nothing in time";[8] and on the other, the task is reliant upon the use of language which by its nature, is complicit in the exclusion of madness, in denouncing and mastering it. But what is of interest here, is the probing of the limits of writing. Foucault's historical analysis illuminates and therefore questions the status of discourse itself, as a vehicle of objectivization and exclusion.

Roland Barthes also recognizes the deep seated contradiction in Foucault's stated intention:

> "The history of madness could be 'true' only if it were naive, i.e., written by a madman; but then it could not be written in terms of history, so that we are left with the incoercible bad faith of knowledge. ...each time men speak about the world, they enter into a relation of exclusion, even when they speak in order to denounce it."[9]

Madness and Civilization, according to Barthes, is of interest because it shows decisively that knowledge is never innocent, that the pursuit of knowledge simultaneously incorporates a "taking

of sides". Foucault's history of madness, in not relying upon nosography, treats madness in terms of a relational reality. His retracing of the division between reason and unreason, uncovers the nexus of functional relations combining the identities of reason and culture in history to the exclusion of madness. Madness is therefore not a natural, 'transcendental' category, but a space beyond the limits of cultural acceptance. Barthes regards Foucault's analysis of this space as a construction of a sign system in which certain signifiers are grouped into 'sense units' and excluded from society. Foucault's diachronic narrative operates simultaneously to reconstruct these sense units which define the period. The linkage of the economic crisis and the coincident "great confinement" for example, is a signifying link by which the sense unit vagabond, indigent, criminal, madman is formed.[10]

This explanative relation of socio-economic phenomena to the changes in the perception of madness and its status within society is particular to Madness and Civilization. The two major shifts or discontinuities of the history of madness - the birth of the house of confinement and the proposed 'liberation' of the mad by Tuke and Pinel - are clearly associated with the economic conditions of society. The emergence of the Hôpital Général is regarded as a response to the economic crisis of that time and to the emerging bourgeois notion of the imperative of labour, while the sudden loss of faith in the necessity of confinement is perceived as contingent upon the newly formed capitalist conception of the necessity and importance of poverty in the increasingly industrialized landscape of the early nineteenth century. In this early book, the causal relationships of economic practices to other social practices is distinctly Marxian. In his later works, Foucault is rarely as explicit about the causal relationship between the economic conditions of society and superstructural practices; these are problematized rather than accepted

as a backdrop to the historical action focussed upon.

Despite this difference between Madness and Civilization and the later works, a number of features apparent in this book are precursive of Foucault's developed historical methodology. The first methodological proposition of Foucault's analysis is that within a mass of phenomena, a specific problem exists; in this case the origin of the division between Reason, culture, history and Unreason, non-meaning and non-being; and the functional relationships that bind them in various forms. Foucault grasps historical events, hitherto unaccounted for, as a set of discontinuous units governed by an economy, a coherence which pervades throughout the system. In this regard, a certain nexus of relations, or a locality may be circumscribed and analyzed.[11]

A second feature which prevails throughout Foucault's work is that his historical analyses are focussed upon events marking ruptures in the fabric of history. In Madness and Civilization, two major points of discontinuity are highlighted - that initiating the analysis of Unreason in the Age of Reason, the "great confinement"; and the disruption which severs the perception of madness from our present perspective, the 'liberation' of the mad by philanthropists which was not a procedure of freeing at all, but the process by which the madman became an object of the specific sciences of psychology and psychiatry. These two events marking the irreparable discontinuity of the history of the perception of madness are described, and explained with reference to the socio-economic conditions of European society of the respective periods. However, Foucault's depiction of the various forms that the perception of madness took are not explained, and the question of why these forms appeared rather than others is left untouched. This problem of the conditions of possibility becomes a focus in his later work.

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Contingent upon Foucault's emphasis on the discontinuity of history,

is the comparative nature of his analyses. In Madness and Civilization as in the works that would follo. it, Foucault's methodological procedure for distinguishing the point of rupture relies upon the constant comparison of the elements of discourse and practice from one moment in history to the next. In this way, the transformation of these elements in relation to one another may be traced within a continuity on the one hand, and across the breaks that separate one form of perception from another. It is through the comparison of forms residing on either side of the break that the various structures of perception are reconstructed. In this respect, Foucault is similar to Serres[12] in his most basic methodological presuppositions.

Serres' work, which is best described as 'comparative structuralism', is characterized by the presence of two or more discourses which are simultaneou ly scrutinized on the level of their structure. Serres' method of dealing with texts may be called 'encyclopaedic' as it deals with a spectrum of knowledges that appear in a number of distinct discourses - scientific, philosophical, mythical and literary. Likewise, Foucault's Madness and Civilization, and the later works in which the archaeology is developed, move from scientific to philosophical and literary discourse without erecting a hierarchy of discourse based upon the scientific/non-scientific distinction. Madness and Civilizatior exemplifies this: the work is framed by discussions of literary representations of madness, while the material providing information for the main body of the book ranges from medical and philosophical treatises to sermons, letters and memories. Both Foucault and Serres reject the history of science as a history of progress, and in so doing, do not treat the texts which they analyze according to any criterion of truth-value. In this regard, classical medical treatises are not regarded as the ideological or pre-scientific precursors of true sciences; on the contrary, all texts, both modern and outdated, are subjected to the same critical gaze. There is no hierarchy of discourse based upon an allotted truth-value, none are placed

above others or on the periphery of others. All discourse, whether philosophical, literary or scientific, are systems which articulate a common set of problems that emerge from the immediate, often unreflective experience of a period.[13]

Serres rejects the claims of French positivism with regard to its ability to analyze science through reflection upon its history. He shows that this history of science is in reality either the history of a science to the exclusion of others, or a general history of rationality.[14] In place of this history of science, Serres analyz[illegible] scientifi[illegible] discourses in relation to other types of disc[illegible] rder to show that all spheres of knowledge in a certain [illegible]iod are isomorphic, that they are all models of the same structure. Foucault's history of madness bears similarities to this kind of project, for his history undercuts the notion of a history of science by parenthesizing the terms in which madness is spoken for by science and by treating not a pre-given scientific object, madness, but the changing relations of Reason and Unreason by which that object is constructed.

Madness and Civilization may thus be regarded as the first formative sketch from which Foucault was later to develop the archaeology as a method of the historical analysis of discursive events. It is significant that in this book, Foucault probes the boundaries of history and philosophy, and in so doing, he finds himself questioning the status of discourse itself posed as a "simple problem of elocution".[15] In probing the limits of Reason in the hope of catching a glimpse of the "sovereign enterprise of unreason", he finds himself at the limit of culture and therefore of rational thought. It is a space which Foucault cannot escape, for to do so would be to forsake the project of a history and relinquish the ability to speak at all. Madness is always the 'beyond' of language; wherever there is madness, language and discourse is somewhere else. Hence Foucault found

himself in an impasse, in which language and the practice of writing poses the essential problem. In the books that followed Madness and Civilization this problem became increasingly focussed upon as Foucault realized the central importance of discourse and the function of language.

1.2 Space/Language/Death: The Birth of the Clinic

> "This book is about space, about language, and about death ..." (BC p.ix Preface)

This opening to The Birth of the Clinic[16] indicates that there is a certain continuity between Madness and Civilization and this book which first appeared in French in 1963. The concept of space was utilized in the earlier book with regard to the institution of confinement - the space of madness to which Foucault could find no access but which taunted him as that which lay on the other side of the limits of thought. Here it is the space of the body - a readily available object to the gaze of the medical doctor that attracts his interest. In this later book, the attraction of the absolute limit again comes into play; no longer as the limit to philosophy and history, but as the very finitude of being - death itself. Yet a new element, language, now appears between these two notions. Language has come into focus in its own right; that is to say, it is not relegated to the wings by the problem focussed upon in the project, but the central core of the project itself.

This emergence of language as the pivot of Foucault's history of clinical medicine coincides with a subterranean shift in his approach. In Madness and Civilization, the focal point of the book is only superficially "madness itself"; more precisely it is a fundamental otherness that circumscribes society. Hence the work constantly proceeds towards a point which is unattainable,

since madness is regarded as a dark, enigmatic experience, an unknowable quality. As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out:

> "It is only a slight distortion of the text to substitute 'madness' for 'the word of God' and apply Foucault's own criticism of hermeneutics .. to his suggestion that madness is a deep secret experience, masked by rationality and discourse, of what it is to be human."[17]

While the space that was to be charted in Madness and Civilization was one which is beyond actual experience, the space which Foucault is concerned with in The Birth of the Clinic is empirically available in that it is the space of the body and the epistemological configurations that are superimposed upon it. Foucault's book traces the mutations of these configurations that occur over the space of the body; from the medicine of symptoms to anatomo-clinical medicine.[18]

The book opens with the comparison of two passages quoted from Pomme and Bayle; the former who wrote in the mid-eighteenth century and the latter in the 1820's. The astounding difference in the language and the perception of the diseased body in these two quotations offsets the substance of the book. In the first of these, medical perception is governed by an o[illegible]ation process of external, and therefore visible, combi[illegible]ns of symptoms. Language and the object, words and things are related in an exteriority; that is, by a representative function in which the symptoms which occur on the exterior surface of the body represent disease as opposed to health. The exerpt from Bayle's writing is typical of anatomo-clinical medicine, in which the space of the body is penetrated by language. A new criterion of objectivity which is based upon a correlation of the visible and the expressible. This medical experience is governed by the distinction between normal and abnormal functioning which, in turn, is rooted in the advent of morbid anatomy whereby it is the corpse that is central to the clinical experience and which offers up knowledge of disease.

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No longer is the medical gaze the "speaking eye" focussed upon the body's surface where the combination of symptoms exposed there are available to interpretative description; rather it is the objective gaze upon the "invisible visibility" of the space of the corpse now dissected, opened to view and so also to language. The medical gaze, now reliant upon death for the space of the body and the course of disease inscribed upon it to become available to description, objectifies the body of the individual in its claims to scientificity. This linkage of the body, death and knowledge, Foucault argues, reveals medical practice as the foundation of the human sciences. It is the first means of studying man as an object where he is also the knowing subject. When death was introduced as the a priori of medical knowledge, the Aristotelian law prohibiting scientific discourse on the individual fell away. Death constantly reminds man of his limit, his finitude, but it is also exorcised through the positive power that it authorizes, the positive power of discourse on "that technical world that is the armed, positive, full form of his finitude". (BC p.198) Contingent upon this is the theme of death and the individual that pervade what is generally called Romanticism. The dark, secret interiority of the individual is opened in the same movement as that in which man found the means to obtain positive knowledge of himself:

> "... is it surprising that the figures of knowledge and those of language should obey the same profound law, and that the eruption of finitude should dominate, in the same way, this relation of man to death, which, in the first case, authorizes a scientific discourse in a rational form, and in the second, opens up the source of a language that unfolds endlessly in the void left by the absence of the gods." (BC p.198)

These two themes link The Birth of the Clinic more to Foucault's next major work, The Order of Things than to its predecessor, Madness and Civilization. In this next work, Foucault was to

write an archaeology of the human sciences, and in so doing, further scrutinize the configuration of language, death and the knowledge of the individual in modernity.

The importance of the practice of writing is undoubtedly apparent in the opening discussion of Bayle and Pomme. Yet the treatment of discourse in The Birth of the Clinic is distinctly different from that in its predecessor. In his Preface, Foucault includes a short discussion of the short-falls of commentary:

> "Commentary questions discourse as to what it says and intended to say; it tries to uncover that deeper meaning of speech that enables it to achieve an identity with itself, supposedly nearer to its essential truth; in other words, in stating what has been said, one has to re-state what has never been said." (BC p.xvi)

The similarity of the project of Madness and Civilization to this description of commentary is clear, for Foucault's history of madness was indeed a search to uncover a deeper meaning, an unsaid or silence through the speech (parole) of those who addressed the object of Unreason or madness. The terms Foucault uses in his description of commentary are significant, for they point to his appropriation of structuralism which was in wide circulation at that time. He suggests that:

> "... to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified over the signifier ... Signifier and signified thus assume a substantial autonomy that accords the treasure of a virtual signification to each of them separately; one may even exist without the other, and begin to speak of itself: commentary resides in that supposed space." (BC p.xvi)

Foucault, having rejected the practice of commentary, attempts a "structural analysis" of the discourse of medical experience. Such an analysis, he believes, will avoid the failures of commentary, for the facts of discourse would be "treated as events and functional segments gradually coming together to form a system". The treatment

of discourse as function is explained further:

> "The meaning of the statement would be defined not by the treasure of intentions that it might contain, ... but by the difference that articulates it upon the other real or possible statements, which are contemporary to it or to which it is opposed in the linear series of time. A systematic history of discourses would then become possible." (BC p.xvii)

In the same year that Foucault's book was published, Roland Barthes' essay "The Structuralist Activity" appeared.[19] The parallels between Foucault's prefatory note regarding method and Barthes' thoughts on structuralism are significant. Barthes points out that structuralism is an activity which has as its goal the reconstruction of an object in such a manner that the rules of the object's functioning are manifested.[20] This activity involves two operations, namely dissection and articulation. The object is dissected to discover "certain mobile fragments whose differential situation engenders a certain meaning".[21] These basic elements have no meaning in themselves, but are parts of the syntactical chain producing meaning, and thus a change affecting an element affects a change in the whole. This bears a great resemblance to Foucault's "functional segments' which together may be articulated into a system. A further similarity that may be found in Barthes' essay and Foucault's notion of a structural analysis of discourse, is the importance of difference. The operation of articulation which binds the dispersion of objects into a system is not a homogenizing process. The elements of the system are governed by rules of association which are based not upon identity alone, but upon the difference that dictates their dispersion. Another point at which Barthes' essay and Foucault's prefatory notes are comparable is their assigning of importance to the analysis of the possibility of meaning. Barthes proposes:

> "Ultimately, one might say that the object of struc-

> turalism is not man endowed with meanings but man fabricating meanings, as if it could not be the content of meanings which exhausted the semantic goals of humanity, but only the act by which these meanings, historical and contingent variables, are produced."[22]

Likewise, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault is not concerned with the truth value of the discourses he analyzes, rather his project "sets out to disentangle the conditions of its history from the density of discourse". (BC p.xix) Foucault continues:

> "What counts in the things said by men is not so much what they may have thought or the extent to which these things represent their thoughts, as that which systematizes them from the outset, thus making them thereafter endlessly accessible to new discourses and open to the task of transforming them." (BC p.xix)

As medical perception, like psychiatry, possesses a history, it cannot possess an absolute Truth. It is here that Foucault's analysis begins to take on its own uniqueness. Unlike the majority of structuralist writings, Foucault's works emerge out of the questioning of present systems, a questioning which is directed at their historical conditions of existence. In this way, his analyses are focussed upon the ruptures that occur in the apparently continuous thread of the histories, of madness and the clinic. What is at stake in these analyses and what differentiates them from structuralism per se, is that the structures being scrutinized are not stable and atemporal, but in the throes of rearticulation.[23]

In this regard The Birth of the Clinic is an attempt at determining the historical conditions of possibility of modern medical experience, of both its practice and its discourse and the manner in which these interrelate within the space of the body. The search for a means by which the secret experience of the "other", madness, might be charted had led Foucault to the problem of

language. His first major publication had approached this problem through a type of hermeneutics, the only method that could attempt to plumb the depths of such an illusive subject. The Birth of the Clinic reveals a change of direction. The tools of hermeneutics are rejected, and in their place, the terms of structuralism are utilized. Yet the project itself is not strictly in keeping with the more widely accepted notion of a structuralist activity, for the point of interference that Foucault utilizes is not the system or structure itself, but the historical interstices at which one structure gives way to another. Already, in this work, Foucault is moving towards a clearer definition of the archaeology as a specific method of analyzing discourse. This movement is encapsulated in a question Foucault poses:

> "Is it not possible to make a structural analysis of discourses that would evade the fate of commentary by supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what has been said, but only the fact of its historical appearance?" (BC p.xvii)

This treatment of the fact of discourse as a specifically historical event removes the archaeological analysis from that of structuralism, from the constant play of the signifier and the signified. The discursive event is apprehended at a level where the relations governing its possibility of appearance may be traced. Its meaning and truth-value are relegated to the periphery as the focus of the analysis is upon the conditions of its production. The archaeological method treats all discourse, both archaic and modern, at this level where it is regarded as a meaningless object. Here, what seems as incomprehensible as Pomme's "language of fantasy" is to modern medical experience, is found to be within a systematic order of its own, separated from the present configuration of knowledge by an irreparable scission.

1.3: Words and Things: The Order of Things

Three years after The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault published his major work The Order of Things.[24] Foucault regarded the work as the study of "a relatively neglected field", (OT p.ix) as historians of science had hitherto concerned themselves with the exact sciences of mathematics and physics. Foucault's work centres upon the empirical sciences, philology, biology and political economy. The range of the project together with the novelty of the claims that are made in it, lent the work an immediate attraction to critics on both sides of the Atlantic, and it was undoubtedly this work that drew the attention of Anglo-American academics to the work of Foucault.[25]

In a foreword to the English edition, Foucault offered the following account of his aims in The Order of Things:

> "What I wished to do was to present, side by side, a definite number of elements: the knowledge of living beings, the knowledge of the laws of language, and the knowledge of economic facts, and to relate them to the philosophical discourse that was contemporary with them during a period extending from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century." (OT p.x)

This concern with the articulation of knowledge and discourse is not surprising given the nature of Foucault's earlier work. However, it does appear that a shift has taken place between The Birth of the Clinic with its concern with language and the knowledge of the body and The Order of Things in which discourse appears to predominate. The question arises as to whether discourse replaces language as a concept, or whether the treatment of the practice of writing and speaking in the two works is the same, and that the change in terminology amounts to a mere clarification. The latter proposition seems to make more sense if one returns to the comparison of Bayle and Pomme in The Birth of the Clinic, for Foucault's treatment of these exerpts is in

the light of the transformation of medical discourse and is not in terms of a linguistic analysis. It is important to note that in the foreword to the English edition Foucault disclaims any relation to structuralism. The terminology of structuralism in The Birth of the Clinic is no longer in evidence in The Order of Things and it is possible that "language" has likewise been replaced by the more exact term "discourse" with an emphasis upon the function of language rather than its structural analysis in order to maintain the distance that Foucault inaugurates between his own work and structuralism.

At the point of articulation of discourse and knowledge, Foucault posits the concept of the episteme, or the "epistemological field" in which discourse and knowledge find their conditions of possibility. As in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault problematizes the emergence of a discourse and questions it not for its truth-value or meaning in relation to a real referent, but regarding the possibility of its appearance. The episteme is the subterranean level at which these conditions of emergence may be apprehended:

> "In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice." (OT p.168)

Thus it is upon the level of the episteme that the relations between the discursive practices of empirical sciences and philosophical discourse will be inscribed. The episteme is thus a space in which knowledge is constituted and in which it is sustained by discursive practices operating as a set of historical rules regulating the production of discourses.

Foucault's point of departure is thus radically different from that of traditional historians of science. Whereas histories of science describe what Foucault calls the "negative" unconscious of science, and describes as "that which resists it, deflects it,

or disturbs it", (OT p.xi), the archaeology is proposed as a description of the 'positive' unconscious of knowledge. Through this distinction, Foucault refers somewhat obliquely to the specificity of the archaeological level, at which no account is taken of the consciousness of any individual scientist or the effects of influence or tradition. In positing the episteme, Foucault claims to focus purely at the level of discourse, yet through the comparative analysis of different positivities of knowledge, he attempts to reveal their shared conditions of emergence and mutation.

The subtitle of the book, An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, indicates the problem towards which Foucault is working. The Order of Things is structurally similar to Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic since all three end with the discussion of a modern problem which is the point of interference from which the book results. Foucault's procedure is thus the delimitation of a problem, from which he embarks backwards through time in order to trace out the conglomeration of relations that constitute that problem. In the case of The Order of Things, it is the present inefficacy of the human sciences that is the impetus behind the book. Thus in each of the epistemes - the Renaissance, Classical and Modern - Foucault traces the configuration of the subject in relation to knowledge and discourse.

1.3.1: The Renaissance Episteme

The Order of Things begins it archaeological analysis of the human sciences with a discussion of the conditions of knowledge in the Renaissance. This epistemic configuration is shaped by the notion of resemblance which governed the network of correspondences between words and things. Knowledge was therefore the discernment of such connections. Foucault describes the semantic web of the

Renaissance in terms of four principle figures: convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, sympathy and antipathy which operate as forces in tension. Together these figures define the space of resemblance in which man occupies a central position:

> "He is the great fulcrum of proportions - the centre upon which relations are concentrated and from which they are once again reflected." (OT p.23)

Man is thus a privileged point in that he occupies the site most saturated by these relations of resemblance, but it is only as the grid through which the figures of resemblance enter knowledge that Man is central in this network.

The first principle of Renaissance knowledge was that a Divine order was operative in the world, which could be uncovered by knowing the order of resemblance. This knowledge of similitudes was gained through signs left by God which had to be recognized and interpreted. The centrality of Man in this order facilitated the acquisition of this knowledge. All things in the world have a signature which, when deciphered, would provide the place of the object in the order of the world, revealing its function and meaning. The sign system of the Renaissance was thus ternary, consisting of its meaning content, its signature and its relative position to other things as a similitude. Man occupied his privileged position only by virtue of his God-given power to recognize the signature, synthesize similitudes and interpret the meaning of the object.

As nature was considered divinely ordered, so too was language ordered in a direct relation of resemblance to things in the world. Words existed as absolute and transparent signs for things, but this order of language mirroring the order of things had been fragmented as a result of the Fall. The function of knowledge in the Renaissance was thus that of reconstructing the signs of the world and language in order to reacquire total knowledge. The form of discourse that facilitated this reconstruction was commentary,

which called into being beneath the existence of things and words another more fundamental discourse paramount to a Primal Text inscribed by the hand of God. Knowledge was thus caught between the Primal Text it sought to attain, and the confusion of the world; between the infinity of interpretation and the never-ending search for resemblances. It is this problem of how the sign is linked to the signified that heralded the Classical episteme as a new configuration of knowledge whose answer was the analysis of representation.

At the juncture between the Renaissance and the Classical epistemes, Foucault places Cervantes' Don Quixote:

> "With all their twists and turns, Don Quixote's adventures form a boundary: they mark the end of the old interplay between resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations. . Don Quixote is not a man given to extravagance, but rather a diligent pilgrim breaking his journey before all the marks of similitude. He is the hero of the Same." (OT p.46)

Quixote's travels constitute a search in the world for the forms of similitude that will prove that what his books say is true. In his deciphering of the world, he finds that the language of the world and that of his books do not correspond; that resemblances and signs are not aligned. In this world of differences between the word and the thing, Quixote's similitudes tend towards madness in their deception, yet also towards the visionary or poetic. With the splitting of signs and similitudes in the Classical episteme, language breaks with the word to enter a space of its own as literature while resemblances are relegated to the realm of madness, imagination and delusion. Between them, a new field of knowledge based upon identity and difference opens. It is this effect that Don Quixote illuminates as it portrays a world in which signs and similitudes are in play with identity and difference.

1.3.2. The Classical Episteme

Foucault posits an 'epistemic break' or a rupture between the Renaissance and Classical configurations of knowledge at the turn of the seventeenth century. Resemblance, once regarded as the touchstone in the pursuit of knowledge, is now regarded as error, and relegated to Baroque art with its "trompe-l'oeil" painting and drama of comic illusion. While resemblance was rejected, the act of comparison was maintained as a form of knowledge. The Classical episteme was organized by two types of comparison: measurement, which entailed the division of the whole into parts according to a common unit upon which arithmetical relations of equality or inequality were ascertained; and order which established series of elements from the simplest unit to the most complex. This new space of knowledge thus no longer questioned the being of things, but problematized how they could be known.

The sign system of the Renaissance split down the middle with the dissociation of comparison from resemblance. On the one hand, the link between the sign and the signature broke as the notion of the signature became vestigial in the Classical configuration of knowledge. This allowed arbitrariness, and the sign became a tool of analysis by which identity and difference could be discerned. On the other hand, similitudes, now split off from signatures, became mere natural repetitions in the order of things. Consequently, where the Renaissance sign system had been ternary, with the expulsion of the signature, the Classical sign system is binary, consisting of a duplication of representative functioning within the sign itself.

The first relation of representation is that of an indication, or the relation of thought to the object in the world. This relation encloses a second relation, in which the sign, the word or trace, has no content or function other than that which it

represents - the representation of the representation of the object of thought. In this duplication, the sign is effaced as it is co-extensive with thought as a whole. Because of this, no theory of signification was possible in the Classical episteme. There is complete transparency between the sign and its content, language and thought are co-extensive:

> "... one might say that language in the Classical era does not exist. But that it functions: its whole existence is located in its representative role, is limited precisely to that role and finally exhausts it. Language has no other locus, no other value than in representation ..." (OT p.79)

Language as a logical, successive process, plays a decisive role in knowledge through organizing thought. As language is co-existent with the space of representation and as it represents all representations, it is the element of the universal, the model upon which the empirical sciences find their foundation. Foucault summarizes the relation of language and knowledge in the axiom "To know is to speak correctly". (OT p.87) However, language is knowledge only in the unreflective form. It is the primary break with the immediate, and thus the initial step towards the verification of each word and each relation within which it participates. In this regard, the Classical science of general grammar took as its object not language, but discourse, for discourse "is merely representation itself represented by verbal signs". (OT p.81) Consequently, the Renaissance activity of commentary which constituted a search for meaning, is replaced by criticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the function of the sign is problematized, so that the analysis of discourse in the Classical episteme questions the sign in terms of precision and appropriateness.

As the sign system is open to arbitrariness, probability and combination are introduced into Classical analysis. This together

with the transparency of language and its co-extensiveness with knowledge is the basis for the taxonomic table within which the empirical sciences are organized. This table, in which the totality of signs are properly ordered according to identity and difference, makes possible the analysis of things in the world as it is the condition of possibility of the Classical general science of order. This space of signs delimited by, on the one side, mathesis as the science of calculable order of simple to complex units, and on the other, by genesis as the analysis of the hidden continuum of being into empirical series of development. In the case of the latter, investigations were not geared towards the material transformations of the word, but concerned with the constancy of the signification, (OT p.109) as words were not situated in the table according to a temporality, but had their locus in a tropological space in which they could reveal the relations of things in the world.

At the centre of the Classical table of representation is the name, which organizes all Classical discourse as the end towards which all discourse strives:

> "... to speak or to write is not to say things or to express oneself, it is not a matter of playing with language, it is to make one's way towards the sovereign act of nomination, to move, through language, towards the place where things and words are conjoined in their common essence, and which makes it possible to give them a name." (OT p.117)

In naming, human nature transforms the confusion of nature into identities, through imagination and memory, and differences inscribed within the table of knowledge as sequences of representations. Yet this function of human nature to name does not open a space specific to Man. Representation exists for the Classical spectator who is himself effaced from discourse or table of knowledge. Man appears in Classical knowledge only

as an element among other tabulated elements. Foucault argues that:

> "... in the Classical age, discourse is that translucent necessity through which representation and beings must pass - as beings are represented to the mind's eye, and as representation renders beings visible in their truth." (OT p.311)

Hence it is not human nature, consciousness or Man, but discourse which duplicates and expresses the representations that organize the table of knowledge.

As with the discourse of the empirical sciences, Classical literature strives towards the ultimate clarity and precision of the name. (OT p.118) Foucault perceives this movement towards nomination in the language of the constrained confessions of Richardson's Pamela to the violent life of Sade's Juliette. All Classical literature is situated between the figure of the name and the name itself, so that its task, underlying its affected refinement of new figures to name the same thing, is that of finding at last the name of that which has never been named before,

> "... those secrets of the soul, those impressions born at the frontier of things and the body ... Later Romanticism was to believe that it had broken with the previous age because it had learned to name things by their name. In fact all Classicism tended towards this end ..." (OT p.118)

Thus Romanticism, for Foucault, straddles the epistemic break between Classicism and the Modern, containing elements of both configurations of knowledge. However, Foucault does not elaborate in this regard, rather he focusses upon the work of the Marquis de Sade in which he finds the limits of the Classical episteme. In these works, desire is explored within the sequential ordering of Classical discourse. The series of scenes in Sade's novels form a tabulation of licenticiousness in which every conceivable form is named. Thus, in these texts, Foucault finds:

> "It is no longer the ... triumph of representation over

> resemblance; it is the obscure and repeated violence of desire battering at the limits of representation." (OT p.210)

Sade', is the last discourse which attempts to name, but in so doi', it takes nomination to infinity by naming everything. The name becomes both the fulfillment and the substance of language, and it is this that places Sade's work at the limit of the Classical episteme. Once the order of representation disintegrates, the elements of Sade's discourse - violence, life, death, desire and sexuality - escape and extend beyond the dimension of the table of representation.

1.3.3: The Modern Episteme

The condition of possibility of the Classical table of representation upon which knowledge was ordered, was the assumption of the continuum of being within the space of the table. This continuum was not questioned, or more exactly, it was not questionable, in the Classical episteme because being coincided with representation and was therefore transparent in the epistemological framework of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Foucault posits an epistemic break at the turn of the nineteenth century in which the Modern episteme emerges as a distinct epistemological framework, which may be envisaged as a new stratum in the history of the empirical sciences. This epistemic rupture is marked by the problematization of the notion of the continuum of being within representation.

The first modern attempt to overstep the limits of representation was made by Kant:

> "The Kantian critique ... questions representation, not in accordance with the endless movement that proceeds from the simple element to all its possible

> combinations, but on the basis of its rightful limits. Thus it sanctions for the first time that event in European culture which coincides with the end of the eighteenth century: the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation. That space is brought into question in its foundation, its origin and its limits ..." (OT p.242)

With the focus of Classical criticism upon the foundations of representation, the field of representation appears as a metaphysics:

> "Criticism brings out the metaphysical dimension that eighteenth century philosophy had attempted to reduce solely by means of the analysis of representation. But it opens up at the same time the possibility of another metaphysics; one whose purpose will be to question, apart from representation, all that is the source and origin of representation, it makes possible those philosophies of Life, the Will and the Word that the nineteenth century is to deploy in the wake of criticism." (OT p.243)

With the dissolution of the space of representation, two new forms of thought emerge. The first questions the conditions of the relation between representations from the point of view of the being or object represented, whether this object is the force of labour, the energy of life or the power of speech. The conditions of existence of these objects become the basis upon which the conditions of possibility of experience and its representation are sought. The second form of thought questions the possibility of the relation between representations and appeals to the transcendental field of the subject, the analysis of which uncovers the basis of possible connections between representations. This line of thought in which the subject determines in its relation to the object the possible conditions of experience, identifies the conditions of possibility of the

object with the conditions of possibility of experience. Thus labour, life and language exist outside knowledge as transcendentals. The modern space of knowledge is thus characterized by an irremediable split between analysis and synthesis, and is thus fragmented along two axes - that of the being of objects and that of the transcendental subjectivity:

> "... the thought that is contemporaneous with us, and with which ... we think, is still largely dominated by the impossibility, brought to light towards the end of the eighteenth century, of basing syntheses in the space of representation, and by the correlative obligation - simultaneous but immediately divided against itself - to open up the transcendental field of subjectivity, and to constitute inversely, beyond the object, what are for us the 'quasi-transcendentals' of Life, Labour and Language." (OT p.250)

These quasi-transcendentals, which become the objects of the empirical sciences, are formulated outside the table of representation, in the gaps that existed beyond its sway. In this regard, Foucault perceives the transformation of empirical knowledge from Classical to Modern as an "inversion", a movement from within the constraints of the space of representation to that space beyond it. These objects of the modern empirical sciences are thus not evolved from their classical counterparts. Life, for example, is a specifically nineteenth century concept, the emergence of which is separated from Classical natural history (and its object, the order of beings) by a rupture on the archaeological level. The modern biological perception of organic structures, whose processes during life are traceable after death, introduces the dichotomy of life and death into knowledge.[26] Likewise, in Classical analyses of wealth, the object, wealth, was regarded as the representation of the exchange of objects of desire, but with the demise of representation, political economy was constituted with the novel concept

of labour, which involves production time. as its object. In both cases, the mutations from Classical to Modern involve the formulation of the modern object of empirical science outside the space of representation and the introduction of a temporal orientation. The organizing force that deploys knowledge in the Modern episteme is thus no longer spatial order, but history. In the modern configuration of knowledge, history is both a body of knowledge - the empirical investigation of events - and the mode of being of empiricity itself. (OT p.219)

The collapse of representation had similar effects upon language. In Classicism, language was an immediate unfolding of representations - the transparent medium through which thought and being were linked. In the Modern episteme, it was liberated from this site dictated by representation and acquired a being proper to itself:

> "From the nineteenth century, language began to fold in upon itself, to acquire its own particular density, to deploy a history, an objectivity, and laws of its own. It became one object of knowledge among others, on the same level as living beings, wealth and value and the history of events and men ... To know language is no longer to come as close as possible to knowledge itself, it is merely to apply the methods of understanding in general to a particular domain of objectivity." (OT p.296)

Constituted outside the limits of representation, the philological positivity no longer regarded the word as attached to a representation except in so far as it is a part of the grammatical organization by which means language defines its own coherence. Four theoretical threads indicate the constitution of philology. The first of these concerns the way a language is characterized internally and distinguished from other languages. Secondly, with Rask, Grimm and Bopp, language was treated as a totality of phonetic elements and scrutinized for internal variations. A

theory of the root developed which became a definite, limited method of analysis in place of Classical general grammar's endless regress towards primitive language. Here, language is no longer perceived as rooted in 'things' but in the speaking subject. Lastly, languages were scrutinized for their proximity and grouped accordingly into systems of kinship. Hence language in the nineteenth century was no longer a condition of knowledge existing outside of knowledge as a consequence of its position relative to representation, but was demoted to being a historical object of which knowledge is attainable through analysis.

This demotion was compensated for in a variety of ways. Firstly, since it is a necessary medium for any scientific thought, there was in the nineteenth century, a wish to neutralize it so that it would exactly reflect non-verbal knowledge, and a symbolic language transparent to thought could be devised. Secondly, language as an object with a historical reality was regarded as the vehicle for "unspoken habits of thought" (OT p.297) and unconscious norms of tradition. Hence, the nineteenth century saw the revival of techniques of exegesis which attempt to perceive all that is being articulated through words. Foucault finds examples of this in the works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. (OT p.298) Philology, as the emerging study of language thus contained a critical value, "as the analysis of what is said in the depths of discourse, (it) has become the modern form of criticism." (OT p.298)

The last means of compensation that Foucault perceives, is the appearance of literature in the sense of the isolation of a form of language as "literary". He situates the birth of literature

> "... at the beginning of the nineteenth century, at a time when language was burying itself within its own density as an object and allowing itself to be

> traversed, through and through, by knowledge, it was also reconstituting itself elsewhere, in an independent form, difficult to access, folded back upon the enigma of its own origin and existing wholly in reference to the pure act of writing." (OT p.300)

Literature and philology are twin figures in contestation with each other, for where philology investigates the being of language, literature releases language in its being and allows it to play endlessly. The function of literature in the nineteenth century was to become "progressively more differentiated from the discourse of ideas, and (enclose) itself within a radical intransitivity". (OT p.300) It becomes the manifestation of a language that refers to itself alone, addressing itself to the affirmation of its own existence, designating nothing but itself:

> "... it addresses itself to itself as a writing subjectivity, or seeks to re-apprehend the essence of all literature in the movement that brought it into being; and thus all its threads converge upon the finest points - singular, instantaneous, and yet absolutely universal - upon the simple act of writing. (OT p.300)

Language, which under the reign of representation all but disappeared except for its apprehension in the form of Discourse, re-emerges at the turn of the nineteenth century as an object of knowledge in its own right under the focus of philology, as an organism whose opaque depth is to be plumbed by exegesis for the laws of its historical reality, and as an isolated form that manifests nothing but its own being. Language reappears, therefore, but is immediately fragmented in its function.

But let us return to the general configuration of modern knowledge to see where these various forms of language are situated with regard to the human sciences and the emerging figure of Man. The Modern episteme is, as we have seen, instituted by a rending of the two-dimensional, continuous fabric of representation. The new

configuration that emerges is characterized by three axes which occupy a new three-dimensional space: the axis of the 'pure' sciences of mathematics and physics (the transformation of which in the mutation of knowledge from Classical to Modern stretches beyond the scope of The Order of Things); the axis of the empirical sciences of linguistics, political economy and biology which take as their objects of knowledge language, labour and life; and the axis of the post-Kantian philosophy of the transcendental subject which takes as its object the problems of the validity and conditions of knowledge. It is the split between the empirical sciences and the philosophy of the transcendental subject that interests Foucault, for it is in the space opened by this split that he situates the human sciences. Suspended above linguistics, political economy and biology are the human sciences of literary studies, sociology and psychology respectively. These are held in suspension in this space by the relations they share with the empirical sciences and philosophy: on the one hand, they borrow the methods of the empirical sciences and on the other, their object is taken from the post-Kantian philosophy of the transcendental subject. Hence, in the constitution of the human sciences is an implicit tension which accounts for their instability and heterogeneity.

Contingent upon this deployment of the human sciences within the Modern episteme is Foucault's critique of the sovereign Subject, a critique which necessarily elucidates the arguments Foucault makes with regard to the inefficacy of those sciences that take as their object the new epistemological figure of Man. In the Classical episteme, there was no space specific to Man, as he existed within the space of the table of representation as one element among others. A science of Man was excluded as human existence was contained in the nexus of representation and being. This is best exemplified by the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum", in which Classical language as discourse reveals the linkage between representation and being. As long as the continuum of represen-

tation in language existed, the mode of being of "cogito" could not be interrogated. The rent of the fabric of representation that occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century coincided with the appearance of Man as a possible object of knowledge, and was thus the condition of possibility of those modern sciences that take this figure as their object.

The inability of the human sciences to attain a real level of scientificity rests in the figure of Man around which they gravitate. Man operates as both the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge in these positivities, and it is this that is the tension upon which the human sciences are constituted and upon which they continually falter. The quasi-transcendentals of Language, Labour and Life which are the objects of philology, political economy and biology respectively are replaced by Man in literary studies, sociology and psychology. Man reflects upon himself, for it is he that speaks, that labours and lives:

> "... (Man), as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of a being who is already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him. All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidarity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature, a face doomed to be erased in the course of history. Man's finitude is heralded ..." (OT p.313)

As knowing subject and knowable object, the figure of Man faces in two directions. He is determined as finite by the empirical sciences, yet he also determines the forms and possibilities of knowledge which are fixed in philosophy. Through his mediation of the determinations of the empirical sciences upon him and his determination of the conditions of knowledge, Man claims total

self knowledge on the basis of his finitude. Finitude is thus both the limitation and foundation of knowledge in the human sciences. However, the duality of the figure of Man - his status of transcendental subject taken over from post-Kantian philosophy and his finitude as an empirical object - leads to the endless oscillation of the human sciences between defining him with regard to his finitude and the analytic of that finitude on the basis of what Man is. It is to this that Foucault refers when he speaks of Man as an empirico-transcendental doublet. The crisis of the human sciences lies in the double nature of Man, for he can claim neither the immediate transparency of a "cogito" or transcendental category, nor the place of an object capable of acquiring self-knowledge.

In the Modern episteme, Man's ability to think himself is crucial to his definition, but this self-consciousness is not attainable as a spontaneous form of knowledge:

> "Man and the unthought are, at the archaeological level, contemporaries. Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, ... an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely, yet in which it is also caught." (OT p.326)

Thought thus becomes, as Nietzsche and Sade perceived, a "perilous act" (OT p.328) in which it moves towards unthought in an effort to bring it under the sway of thought. However, this attempt continually transforms the mode of being of Man, and renews the oscillation of his analyses between the transcendental and empirical poles of his existence.

With the collapse of representation, the inversion of Classical knowledge as formulated within the space of a table gave way the Modern episteme which has a temporal rather than spatial

orientation. While the new, formed objects of knowledge; Language, Life and Labour, acquired their own historicities, Man's relation to his origin was likewise problematized. This origin is not so much his beginning as the manner in which he articulates himself upon the already historically constituted background of Life, Labour and Language. Against this background which endlessly recedes in the face of empirical investigation, Man is always already there. It is therefore his own ability to temporalize that facilitates the possibility of time and history:

> "... it is in him that things (those same things that hang over him) find their beginning: rather than a cut, made at some given moment in duration, he is the opening from which time in general can be reconstituted, duration can flow, and things, at the appropriate moment, can make their appearance." (OT p.332)

Hence Man is both the product of history whose origin is irremedially obscured, and the source of that history. His inability to recover his origin serves as an empirical limitation, echoing his finitude. However this limitation is also the transcendental source of History, the beginnings of which continually retreat before empirical investigation.

The Modern episteme is thus dominated by the figure of Man who takes over from language as discourse as a condition of knowledge. On the one hand, the analytic of the human being presents him as a finite and determined object, yet on the other, as the transcendental subject operates as a centre which regulates knowledge. In this respect, modern knowledge is doomed to an endless movement between the empirical and transcendental limits that pivot about the central figure of Man. Foucault argues that the present state of knowledge on the archaeological level is that of a new transformation in which a passage out of the impasse of the Modern episteme is currently opening:

> "For the entire modern episteme - that which was formed

> towards the end of the eighteenth century and still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge, that which constituted Man's particular mode of being and the possibility of knowing empirically - that entire episteme was bound up with the disappearance of Discourse and its featureless reign, with the shift of language towards objectivity and with its reappearance in multiple form. If this same language is now emerging with greater and greater insistence in a unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so, is this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is now about to topple and that Man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon." (OT pp.385-386)

Thus the contemporary structuralist sciences, such as Lacanian structural psychoanalysis,[27] Levi-Strauss' ethnology[28] and structural linguistics from Jakobson to Greimas,[29] are for Foucault the primary, faltering steps of evacuation from the Modern episteme as their focus upon language or signifying systems as objects of knowledge contain no site specific to Man. Yet Foucault himself is not content to remain within the dubious boundaries of the structuralist project as his own methodology clearly shows. Instead, he situates structuralism historically, within the Modern episteme from which the Foucauldian project launches itself.

1.4 Conclusion

The three projects of Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things that we have discussed thus far appear as disparate and dispersed fragments flung across the total field of knowledge. Indeed, they appear as disconnected as the entries in Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia which Foucault

quotes in his Preface to The Order of Things, for where the entries in the Chinese encyclopaedia seem to have no reasonable relation with each other, so our chronological description of Foucault's works seems to present an entry into a new domain with each work discussed. However, to attempt to impose a causality upon the chronological appearance of these three books would be to misrepresent the complexity of relations they have with each other. Conversely, an attempt to discern a ready-made system would lead to the same result. Even so, in the comparative reading of these texts, important areas of divergence and coherence appear which must be taken into account. It is from these that we may start in answering the question of what Foucault means by referring to his historical analysis of the asylum, the clinic and the human sciences as "archaeologies".

Firstly, a distinction that begs to be made is that Foucault is a historian of knowledge, but not a historian of science. In Madness and Civilization, the modern space of the asylum, the knowledge that pervades it and which apprehends the madman as object, is scrutinized for its historical constitution, while in The Birth of the Clinic, the emergence of the space of the body as the object of knowledge constituted in and consituting the modern clinician's discourse is investigated with regard to the changing function of language. Lastly, The Order of Things traces the historical relations that converge to admit the emergence of the human sciences. In each case, it is not the science itself that is the object of historical description; the concepts of psychiatry, clinical medicine and the human sciences are not accounted for in terms of their truth and their development towards a closer or more exact approximation of reality. Hence there is no duality of ideology/prescience and science in Foucault's work, for the aim of the archaeologies is not to trace the development of a science from its pre-scientific and error-laden prehistory. Rather, Foucault's studies are focussed upon the point at which discourse is

epistemologized, and at which knowledge becomes knowledge as such, articulating a discourse which is both constituted by and constituting its object with respect to norms of verification and coherence. Thus, although Foucault's histories bear resemblances to the histories of science produced by Bachelard and Canguilhem,[30] the point of interference that he takes is entirely different.

Despite this difference of focus, the histories that Foucault proposes contain a concept of historical knowledge that resembles Bachelard's in its utilization of the concepts of discontinuity, rupture and dispersion among others. Bachelard's discontinuous history of science is based upon a philosophy of knowledge that is pluralistic in that the history of science is written with regard to an endless confrontation between the old and the new. That which has been rejected continues to exist at the periphery of extant knowledge in the form of a circumscribing outline. Foucault utilizes this pluralistic notion of knowledge, for although his histories do focus upon sites of discontinuity, he does not regard these ruptures as absolute, completely cutting that which precedes from that which follows. Rather, in focussing upon these sites of epistemic rupture, Foucault's histories are comparative in that they are structured around the 'then' and the 'now', showing the transformations that have occurred in terms of the rearticulation of discursive and epistemological relations. This focus upon moments of sudden and quite radical transformation does not necessarily have as its correlative the notion that Foucault is an historian whose theory of history is founded upon discontinuity alone. In an interview,[31] Foucault indicated that his archaeologies do not reject the concept of continuity in toto, for a discourse may undergo a gradual transformation that persists for a great length of time before it undergoes a sudden and radical change which takes place within a short period of time. Foucault does not deny the continuity of transformation by focussing upon these points of radical

change, but delimits his analysis:

> "My problem was not at all to say 'Voila, long live discontinuity, we are all in the discontinous and a good thing too', but to pose the question, 'How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?'"[32]

These "sudden take-offs" are not considered to have emerged _in vacuo_, but have their conditions of possibility in the old configuration of knowledge, and therefore, in concentrating upon "discontinuities", or points where a radical transformation occurs, Foucault's archaeology does not amount to a complete dismissal of continuity in history. Rather, Foucault's emphasis upon radical transformations implies a critique of continuous history, which attempts to homogenize and unify events into a single sequence based on chronology and governed by causality. This type of history suppresses contradictions within a discourse and effaces discontinuities. Thus, what is at stake is, on the one hand, that Foucault, in concentrating upon moments of discontinuity, does not deny continuity in history, and on the other, that the archaeology's emphasis upon these moments contains an implicit critique of continuous history, for the archaeology operates in the opposite direction insofar as it liberates contradictions that occur within a discourse in order to map the points of transition in their constitution.

Foucault's work, we have seen, is characterized by a fascination with limits, a concept which operates correlatively with language. For Foucault, "limits" refers specifically to the limits of knowledge that function in any given spatio-temporality. In _Madness and Civilization_, Foucault attempts to probe the limits of history and philosophy, but flounders upon the question of his own ability to speak of these limits as they are scrutinized with

regard to the Other. The Birth of the Clinic takes up the question of the function of language in relation to knowledge and finds that language obeys the same laws as knowledge in the constitution of the space of the body as an object of knowledge. Here, the limits of human existence, finitude and death, are again found to be bound to the function of language, as language as such is always situated near to the limits of intelligibility. His configuration of language and knowledge is scrutinized further in The Order of Things, in which it is the central thread. In this work, Foucault's critique of the human sciences as bodies of knowledge intent upon an analytic of finitude challenges modern thought's attempt to incorporate limits within a theory of knowledge[33] by centring upon the figure of Man. Each book thus attempts to reveal the limits of knowledge, not in order to undo them, but to transgress them. It is clear, in this regard, that the trials of Madness and Civilization were vitally important in the formulation of the archaeology as practice. In this work, the archaeology emerges as a critical practice of historical analysis insofar as it attempts to transgress the limits imposed by modern anthropocentrism, and reveals the relativity of what is accepted as true. This aspect of Foucault's work is maintained and refined in his later work, particularly The Order of Things, wherein concepts hitherto accepted as empirically concrete, are shown to be historically constituted.

In his probing of the limits of knowledge, Foucault found himself constantly facing the question of the function of language, and it is towards an elucidation of this that his archaeologies tend. In Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic, his interest is focussed increasingly upon the interstices between the discursive and non-discursive relations that articulate knowledge, discourse and the institutions of the asylum and the clinic. In the first of these works, the function of language remains peripheral to the project, plaguing it as a perplexing problem limiting the feasibility of the project yet it remains a problem not readily

drawn into focus itself. The later work situates the function of language in the midst of its endeavour to trace the emergence of modern medical perception. The exerpts from Pomme and Bayle, with their total difference in perception although they are separated by a period of fifty-six years, frames the project of The Birth of the Clinic, for it is this "mutation" in discourse that Foucault seeks to describe. Yet his description as an attempt at a "systematic history of discourses" combines on the one hand a flirtation with structuralist concepts and terminology and on the other, a movement towards a specific method of analyzing discourse that is not entirely structuralist. In the latter case, this work is a watershed, since it contains the first steps towards an archaeology concerned with the function of language and its practice. Thus The Birth of the Clinic is more of a structuralist analysis of the mutation of medical discourse than a structural analysis as such. Foucault's interest in language is not the same as that of a structuralist who focusses upon the meaning and forms of language. Rather, Foucault seeks to uncover the function of language as a practice, and his utilization of structuralist concepts thus contains a distortion by which they are made to fit in with this concern with language.

This interest in language as discourse and its association with knowledge emerges in its most explicit form in The Order of Things. In this work, Foucault is concerned with the mutations that occur in the positivities of philology, biology and political economy. The Foucauldian positivity is established as the positive existence of documents by which the practice of writing may be analyzed for the rules that operate in the formulation of coherent propositions. These rules are not readily apparent or visible in the documents themselves, and Foucault therefore posits that they must be reconstituted by the historian. The historian's practice is thus not that of grasping the empirically available facts of the world which lie awaiting his attention, but a critical practice to which nothing is given except the positive existence of discourse itself. Foucault's

reconstruction of the rules regulating discursive practice is based on the descriptive materials of the positivity of discourse itself, not upon the intentions that lay beyond it as the truth of history or upon abstract formal axioms. In this way, Foucault situates the archaeological analysis between the practice of writing itself and the rules that govern this practice. Foucault's analysis of the positivities of philology, biology and political economy is not concerned with the development of truth or objectivity within these bodies of knowledge, but is situated at the limits of the documents, at the point of which the discursive practice becomes capable of regulating the coherence of what is said through the imposition of rules for the formation of propositions. Hence the importance of language in The Order of Things rests in the opening of the archaeological space between the discursive practice and its rules of formation.

The crucial role of language in The Order of Things has led many of Foucault's commentators and critics to believe that his project was a structuralist history. Undoubtedly, Foucault does share features with structuralism, the most important of which is a concern with language and the rejection of the philosophy of the subject. Structuralism emerged in France in the early 1960's as a rejection of phenomenology and historicism.[34] In rejecting the philosophy of the subject and a history based upon causality and teleology, structuralism effected a break between language and consciousness, problematizing forms of language as such by regarding them not as the expressions of a speaking subject but as a system of meaning. Foucault's archaeologies similarly reject the notions of the subject as an organizing principle and of continuous history organized by causality. However, these similarities are insufficient evidence for the labelling of Foucault as a structuralist. Rather The Order of Things is the culmination of Foucault's attempts to find a new domain apart from those chartered by the two main pillars of twentieth century thought, namely Marxism and Structuralism.[35] In our discussion of Madness and Civilization, we

noted that Foucault encountered history as a complexity of socio-historical relations and that his linking of events causally had the touch of a Marxist's simple explicitness. Yet in his attempt to analyze the limits of History, Foucault confronted an inability to speak, an inability which problematizes the Marxist's reliance on the reconstruction of socio-economic relations as a means of explanation. Hence Foucault finds himself faced with the problems of discourse and its historical function. However, this new set of problems does not lead him into the camp of the structuralists. In his next work, his analysis of the manner in which the body becomes an object of knowledge cannot hinge upon the inherent meaning of language or its structure in relation to its object. Rather, it is the formation of discourse and its function that demands attention. Thus, Foucault's works cannot be comfortably situated in either domain. The Order of Things opens a new domain which Foucault calls the "archaeology" where the positive existence of language as discourse is analysed for the rules regulating discursive practice. This territory which Foucault describes as existing between the practice of writing and the rules governing the formation of that practice requires new analytical tools that are not readily apparent in The Order of Things and it is probably this lack of exposition of methodology that lead so many to identify the text as structuralist. In order to rectify this and to dissociate himself from structuralism for once and for all, Foucault produced a post-script to The Order of Things in which the archaeological tools are elucidated and the territory of the archaeology is mapped. It is to this that we must turn in our scrutinization of the claims of the archaeology to be a specific mode of analysis with its own object and point of insertion with regard to discourse.

Notes

1. Foucault, M. Mental Illness and Psychology Transl. A. Sheridan. New York: Harper and Row 1976; originally published as Maladie mentale et personnalité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954.

2. Foucault, M. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Transl. R. Howard. London: Tavistock; originally published as Histoire de la Folie. 1971 Paris: Librairie Plon, 1961.

3. There appears to be an error in the text quoted here, as without the inclusion of "not" the sense of the sentence is lost. I have taken the liberty of including it.

4. cf. Descombes, V. Modern French Philosophy. Transl. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; and Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Sussex: Harvester, 1982.

5. Derrida, J. "Cogito and the History of Madness" in Writing and Difference. Transl. A. Bass, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. p.33.

6. ibid, p.37.

7. ibid, pp.63-65.

8. Translated from Histoire de la Folie, Preface of the original edition. Paris: Plon, 1961 by Shoshana Felman in her article "Madness and Philosophy or Literature's Reason", in Yale French Studies, 52, 1975, pp.206-28; p.214.

9. Barthes, R., "Taking Sides" in Critical Essays, transl. by R. Howard; Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1972 p.170.

10. ibid, p.166.

11. This "cutting through" procedure is reminiscent of Bachelard's "coupure epistemologique". See Said, E; Beginnings, Intention, Method; New York: Bask Books, 1975 p.325 for a discussion of Bachelard and structuralists, with whom Foucault is grouped in regard to this methodological procedure.

12. See Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, transl. and edited by J.V. Harari and D.F. Bell; London and Baltimore: John Hopkins U.P., 1982 which contains a selection of essays from the Hermes series. This is a valuable introduction of Serres work to the English-speaking world.

13. cf. Foucault, M., "Two Lectures" in Power/Knowledge edited by C. Gordon; New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. pp.81-82.

14. cf, Descombes, V. Modern French Philosophy, p.89.

15. Translated from Histoire de la Folie, Preface to the original edition; Paris: Plon, 1961 by Shoshana Felman in her article "Madness and Philosophy or Literature's Reason" in Yale French Studies, 52, 1975, pp.206-28; p.214.

16. Foucault, M. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, transl. by A. Sheridan; London: Tavistock, 1973; originally published as Naissance de la Clinique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. All references to The Birth of the Clinic will be indicated by the abbreviation BC followed by the page number

17. Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. Michel Foucualt: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. p.12.

18. I have not given a summerized account of Foucault's project in The Birth of the Clinic for two reasons: because it is not essential to the discussion, and because an attempt to summerize this book i almost impossible as its detail is of great importance, its form is tightly-knit and the terms it employs are specific to medical field.

19. Barthes, R. "The Structuralist Activity" in Critical Essays, pp.213-220. For a broader understanding of Barthes' structuralism, see also his Image, Music, Text, translated and edited by S. Heath, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977; Writing Degree Zero translated and edited by A. Lavers and C. Smith, New York: Hill and Wang; 1968; The Pleasure of the Text translated by R. Miller, New York: Hill and Wang, 1975; and of course, S/Z, translated by R. Miller, New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.

20. ibid, p.214.

21. ibid, p.216.

22. ibid, p.218.

23. A Sheridan in his Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, London and New York: Tavistock, 1980; argues that even in this early work, Foucault cannot be labelled a structuralist without a distortion of either the label or misappropriation of his work. He argues that the terms "structural", "sign", "signifier", "signified" and "code of knowledge" are "applied loosely, almost tantologically". (p.90) Although Foucault cannot be regarded as truly structuralist in this work, the consistency existing between Barthes' usage and Foucault's does not make Sheridan's perspective to be altogether acceptable.

24. Foucault, M. The Order of Things. Transl. by A. Sheridan. London: Tavistock, 1970; originally published as Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard, 1966. All references to this work will be indicated by the abbreviation OT followed by the page number.

25. It was only after the translation of Les Mots et Les Choses that Foucault's earlier works were made available in English. This is some indication of the impact of The Order of Things in the English-speaking world.

26. cf. our discussion of The Birth of the Clinic. particularly p.24.

27. See Lacan, J. Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis. translated with notes and commentary by A. Wilden. (Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1981). Another useful text is Lacan, J. Ecrits: A Selection. translated by A. Sheridan, (London, Tavistock, 1977) which contains a selection of essays representative of Lacan's contribution to Freudian psychoanalysis.

28. See Levi-Strauss, C. The Savage Mind (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) and The Raw and the Cooked. translated by John and Doreen Weightman (London, Cape. 1970).

29. See Jakobson, R. Selected Writings (4 vols) (The Hague, Mouton, 1962-) and Greimas, A.J., Semantique Structurale (Paris, Larousse, 1966). For an overview of structuralist writing, see Hawkes, T. New Accent Series, Structuralism and Semiotics (London, Methuen, 1977); Kurzwell, E., The Age of Structuralism: Levi-Strauss to Foucault, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980; Coward, R. and Ellis, J., Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject. Boston and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977; T. Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, and The Function of Criticism, London: Verso, 1984, R. Scholes, Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction. New Haven and London: Yale U.P., 1974 and Sturrock, J. (Ed) Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to Derrida. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

30. See, for example, Bachelard, G. The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind. Transl. by G.C. Waterston; New York: Orion Pres., 1969; and The Poetics of Space, Boston: Beacon, 1969; and Canguilhem, G. On the Normal and the Pathological, Dordrecht, Reidal, 1978.

31. Foucault, M. "Truth and Power" in The Foucault Reader, ed. P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p.54.

32. ibid, p.54.

33. See Lemert, C.C. and Gillan, G. Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. p.133.

34. This is a commonly accepted proposition; see for example Sheridan, A. Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth p.204; Lemert, C.C. and Gillan, G. Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression, p.21 and Descombes, V. Modern French Philosophy for the history of French thought in which Foucault is situated.

35. See our discussion of The Order of Things (pp.55-63) and the conclusion to The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock, 1972) in which Foucault discusses the obstacles besetting Marxism and Structuralism. Furthermore, see the Foucault/Poulantzas debates in Poulantzas, N. Political Power and Social Classes London: Verso, 1968 pp.99-123 and State Power Socialism London: Verso, 1978 pp.146-153; and Foucault Power/Knowledge New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

PART II: The Archaeology of Knowledge

Three years after The Order of Things first appeared in France, a postscript to it entitled The Archaeology of Knowledge[1] was published in which the analytical method employed in the earlier book was elucidated. The work operates as both a discourse on the method of the archaeology as well as a polemical discourse, a dialogue with the background murmur of critics and commentators. These two threads interweave to give the work its unity, as Foucault, through invoking the misunderstandings concerning The Order of Things and addressing them directly, begins to lay down the conceptual instruments of the method employed therein. The polemical style of the book dictates the order in which the concepts of the archaeology are presented. This leads to convolutions, repetitions and returns, in which Foucault summons the discursive unities employed by the history of ideas only to banish them from the space of discourse, thus allowing the construction and the substantiation of the archaeological concepts. This dominance of the polemical over the methodological discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge has as its consequence the movement from discursive formations to statements and back to the operation of discursive formations. It is necessary here to extract the methodological claims of the book and to order them so that their relation to one another may be readily ascertained. The polemics Foucault wages against the history of ideas will be taken up later with reference to literary history specifically.

2.1: The Statement

Foucault distinguishes his mode of analysis through defining its object, the statement, as an entity distinct from unities such as the sentence and the proposition. He begins this endeavour by positing at the most general level the existence of enunciations, or emittances of a group of signs which have spatio-temporal individuality. These are unrepeatable events for although the same group of signs may be emitted on several occasions and in several different contexts, they are not equivalent verbal performances as their spatio-temporal co-ordinates are unique. The individual act that reveals the enunciation as a specific act of language is the formulation. The formulation fixes the group of signs in its spatial and temporal specificity and describes it in relation to an author. The next level upon which verbal performances or enunciations may be described is that of the sentence and proposition. These are units obeying the laws of grammar and of logic respectively. Here the individualizing co-ordinates that specify the moment of the enunciation and its materiality are of little import, and the main focus is upon the obedience of the group of signs to the system of laws that regulate grammatical and logical formulation. These units, recognized and accepted as sentences or propositions, are repeatable forms for the uniqueness of their moments of emergence are not taken into account. Foucault posits a fourth level upon which the enunciation may be described; the level of the statement. The statement is the modality of existence of a group of signs which emphasizes the types of relations existing between the group of signs and a domain of objects, of a subject as opposed to the author of a formulation, its relations to other verbal performances and its materiality.

The statement differs most radically from the sentence and proposition as these latter are analyzed as units, whereas the

statement is conceived as a verbal performance which is the site of operation of the enunciative function. In this regard, Foucault's use of the word has two simultaneous senses: the predominant sense is that of the mathematical function, a variable which exists in relation to other variables in terms of which it is expressed or on which its value depends; whilst the secondary sense is that of an implied activity. The sentence and proposition are analyzed as static entities which exist indifferently to the spatio-temporal emergence of the group of signs which are scrutinized according to their adherence to the laws of logic and grammar. However, the analysis of the statement accounts for its relations to objects, subjects, other verbal performances and its material support. The group of signs as a statement is operational and dynamic in these relationships. The statement-function cuts vertically through the levels of the enunciation, formulation and the sentential and propositional level, and is both anterior to these levels of description, yet operative upon them. A sentence may be a statement, yet they are not equivalent, for the statement may incorporate elements which are foreign to this unit such as an algebraic formula. Likewise, the proposition and the statement differ although a group of signs may fulfill the criteria of both, for a proposition "No one heard" found in a novel is equivalent to the proposition "It is true that no one heard" found in the transcript of a court case. These two are not the same statements, however, because the statement is susceptible to material, temporal and spatial differences. In this way the statement is a more specific concept when a group of signs are analyzed historically. Foucault places the statement anterior to the level of the sentence and the proposition because of this historical or spatio-temporal focus and claims that the statement as a function, describable only in and through its relations to a domain of objects, the subject, other verbal performances and its material support, determine whether a group of signs fulfill the criteria that define a sentence and a proposition, whether the enunciation obeys the laws of grammar

and logic.

Since the statement is not a unit, it cannot be described independently of its actual practice and operation as an enunciative function. Again, it is distinguishable from the sentence and proposition as its relation to what it states is not superimposable upon the sentence's relation to its truth-value or its referent. The statement is related to a referential which exists as a domain of possible objects that may be designated and described in the statement, and the relations between those objects that the statement may forge. (AK p.91) The level of this relation between the statement and its referential is that of the enunciative level as opposed to the grammatical and logical levels, and it is here that the articulation of objects and their relations produced in the statement define the possibilities of a meaningful sentence or a truthful proposition. The enunciative level is anterior to the grammatical and logical levels for a description of the statement in its relation to its referential does not entail the search for meaning or verification, but describes how a meaningful sentence or verifiable proposition is enunciated by analyzing the dispersion of possible objects and their relations which admit the existence of these units.

The statement is distinguishable on the basis of its specific relation to a subject. The subject differs from the originating author whose relation to his enunciation is one of production. The subject's relation to the statement is not external as is the author's to his enunciation, but rather that of "an empty function" (AK p.93) which does not refer to an individual, but a space which is filled by any individual when the statement is formulated. The individual thus does not remain in a constant relation to a series of statements formulated in a conversation, a novel or even a mathematical treatise, but is in a variable relation according to what position it is necessary for him to occupy if he is to be the subject of that statement. Hence the

place of the subject of a statement may be filled by different individuals whereas there is only one author of a formulation. The specificity of the level of the statement and the ability to describe it, is demarcated by this description of the subject-function:

> "If a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called 'statement', it is not therefore because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them into some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be assigned. To describe a formulation qua statement does not consist in analyzing the relations between the author and what he says ..., but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it." (AK p.95-96)

Together with the referential and the subject-function, the statement is describable in relation to an associated domain or enunciative field within which it is related to other statements. Just as the statement is anterior to the sentence and the proposition, so the enunciative field is anterior to the context of sentences or propositions. The condition of possibility of the context as the contextual relations that operate upon sentences in a novel as distinct from those in a scientific treatise may only be revealed against the background of a more general relation between the formulations, which Foucault posits as an entire verbal network which shares the modality of existence of the statement. Thus, unlike the sentence or proposition which may be recognized as such although its appearnace is regarded as autonomous and independent, the statement may only be described by being situated among others which it borders or presupposes. Foucault clarifies this nexus of the vertical relation between statement and sentence and horizontal relation of statement to enunciative field:

> "If one can speak of a statement, it is because a

> sentence (a proposition) figures at a definite point, with a specific position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond it." (AK p.99)

The statement's definitive relation to an enunciative field is one instance of its material existence. One may again distinguish the statement from the sentence and proposition on the basis of this fourth characteristic. For a sentence or proposition to exist, its materiality necessarily refers to its surfaces of inscription or point of utterance and the contextual variations that allow its recognition as such a unit. A sentence appearing as a slogan on a poster has differing criteria of recognition than if it appears in a conversation for the surface of inscription of the one and the utterance of the other are bound within different contexts which delimit the acceptability of the group of signs as a meaningful sentence. However, the statement is not only characterized by its materiality, but constituted by it. For a statement to exist, it must have "a substance, a support, a place and a date". (AK p.101) Unlike the sentence inscribed on a poster and that uttered in conversation which may or may not be accepted as the same unit of meaning, these groups of signs if they are to be considered as statements cannot be the same as the four constitutive elements of their materiality necessarily distinguish them.

Although this constitutive materiality of the statement generally precludes its reactualization in a variety of contextual instances, Foucault does admit that under strict conditions the statement can be repeated. These conditions he groups under 'the rule of repeatable materiality'. The first of these conditions refers to the possibilities of reinscription and transcription. In this case, a group of signs occurring in different editions of the same book may be treated as the same statement, as the changes that occur in the positions of the signs are neutralized by the general element of the book, by which is meant the status it has as an

object within the nexus of institutional and economic relations. The second type of repetition that is permitted is that which occurs within a certain domain of statements in which the statement which is repeated maintains a set of relations to the other statements with which it appears. The affirmations that the world is round, for example, remain the same statement if its use and reinvestment, its possibilities of verification and the field of experience to which it refers are equivalent. Hence the statement is repeatable within a field of stabilization, in which it enters equivalent networks of relations and where it obeys the same rules of application. However this field of stabilization also delimits the threshold beyond which a new statement is to be recognized, as it is then positioned in a new network; the relations it participated in with other statements and the rules of application it obeys being no longer equivalent to those of its predecessor. Lastly, the statement may be repeated in a particular field of use. The most obvious example of what is meant here is the translation of a sentence from one language to another. The words and the syntax change, but the information content of both remains the same, as does the use to which they are put. Hence, although two different sentences may exist, if they are treated as a statement, it is constant and therefore repeatable.

To conclude, the statement, although its threshold of existence is the existence of signs, is more than a mere series of traces or sounds, more than an object produced, manipulated and transformed by speakers. Rather it is an operative field in which a set of relations which are the conditions of the group of signs functioning are made apparent. These relations are constitutive of the statement: its relation to what it states is one binding it to a domain of objects governed by a principle of differentiation: its subject as an empty function sets into motion another set of relations that delimit the possibilities who may speak and what position must be occupied if an individual is to be the

subject of the formulation; the statement exists only in relation to others and is situated by these relations in an enunciative field, and finally its materiality - its status, possibilities of transcription within a network and its possibility of reuse - secures it in a specific site in relation to institutional supports.

2.2: The Discursive Formation

Foucault cautiously draws the distinctions between the statement and the sentential and propositional units at every turn, for in order to specify the level at which the archaeological analysis intervenes, the autonomy of the statement with regard to the levels of enunciation, formulation and grammatical and logical units had to be secured. The "site" of the statement is offerred as fixed upon two planes: vertically, cutting through these other levels of description so that the statement is both present on them yet not immediately apparent, hence it has a 'quasi-invisibility' in that it is implied in other linguistic analyses yet never explicit; and it is horizontally situated as a terrain in which the statement retains its integrity, and in which it appears as a set of relations binding it to its constituent elements and to other statements. The statement is situated upon its specific level by mapping what Foucault calls the discursive formation, which may be provisionally defined here as "the general enunciative system that governs a group of verbal performances". (AK p.116) This system is operative upon enunciations as one amongst others, such as logical, linguistic and psychological systems, which govern the enunciation at their appropriate levels.

In the broadest of terms, the linkage between the statement and the discursive formation is analogous to the sentence's relation to a text and the proposition's relation to a deductive argument as a whole. The discursive formation is then a group of related

statements, in the same way as the text is consituted by a number of related sentences. But the analogy breaks down once the relations of the regularity of statements to the discursive formation are brought into focus, for whereas the regularity of the sentence is defined by grammatical laws and the proposition by the laws of logic, the statements' regularity is defined by the discursive formation itself with no interference from a pre-existent system. The two sides of the relation exist in a state of absolute reciprocity so that the description of either one will reveal the specificity of the other, or to put it as Foucault does: "The two approaches are equally justifiable and reversible. The analysis of the statement and that of the formation are established correlatively." (AK p.116) The implications of this are discernable from the correlations that may be drawn between the analytical categories that Foucault utilizes in his description of the statement and those outlined for the description of discursive formations, both of which are organized around the concepts of object, subject, fields of co-existence and succession, and the materiality of discourse, or that which brings into play the relations of discursive to non-discursive practices. In this respect, the archaeological description of verbal performances as statements undertakes to uncover the discursive formation, or reciprocally, the discursive formation is that in which the relations between statements which occur in a visible group may be described and differentiated in a system of dispersion. The rules of this formation are the conditions under which the elements of this system - objects, subjective modalities, concepts and thematic choices - are formulated and maintained or under which they are modified or disappear. On the basis of this, we may make a further clarification of Foucault's term discourse. On the broadest and most general level, discourse refers to a group of verbal performances. It is a term which operates upon the level of formulations, referring to a group of acts, and also upon the sentential and propositional level, upon which the enunciations

of the discourse are deemed acceptable as meaningful and logical or not. For the archaeologist, discourse refers to enunciations insofar as they are statements which may be assigned a shared modality of existence in terms of the analytical categories of object, subject, fields of co-existence and materiality, that is, statements that belong to the same discursive formation are regarded as a discourse.

The discursive formation is analyzed in four directions, as is the enunciative function or statement. The first of these traces the formation of objects according to the relations established between three coordinates which Foucault designates as the surface of emergence, the authorities of delimitation and the grids of specification. Surfaces of emergence are those social and cultural spheres where a discursive formation initially finds its impetus, such as the family, the religious community and the organization of labour which operated in tandum to precipitate the nineteenth century object of madness in the discourse of psychopathology. These surfaces of emergence were not necessarily new, but their organization differed sufficiently to be discontinuous from that of the eighteenth century. The authorities of delimitation to which Foucault draws attention are those of institutional recognition of who may appropriate and speak about an object. Madness, for example, in the nineteenth century, became an object for primarily the medical profession; together with the legal and religious authorities. All of these institutional bodies are constituted by a group of individuals who, imbued with a certain knowledge and implicated in a certain practice, are recognized as authorities on that object. This, by the same token, necessitates an exclusion of other individuals not authorized to speak, such as the mad themselves are discovered to be silenced in the nineteenth century.[2] Lastly, grids of specification operate as systems of the division of the object, such as 'madness', into related or contrasting classifications of type.

These three coordinates are bound together in a specific relationship which makes for the possibility of the formation of a discursive object. They do not operate outside of specific relations to each other, and it is these relations to which the archaeologist gives his attention, for the discursive object admitted by this complex arrangement does not enter into a pre-existent discourse which designates and then classifies it. Rather, the discourse and the discursive object are initiated in one and the same movement, so that the arrangement of the relations between these coordinates forms the possibility of a discourse which constitutes the object. The object of discourse is thus not what the discourse speaks about as a real referent existing in the real world of objects, but it is that which exists in a reciprocal relation with the discourse which constitutes it and which it initiates. In order to secure this differentiation between the discursive object and the referent, Foucault distinguishes three types of relations. Primary relations exist independently of discourse between institutions and practices and may not be expressed in the formation of discursive objects. Secondary relations occur within discourse connecting concepts, relating institutions and objects in a manner which may or may not correspond to the real or primary relations, but which exist in regard to the real as reflexive relations. These secondary relations do not coincide with the relations which make possible the objects of the discourse in which they occur, which Foucault specifies as discursive relations This third type are neither internal nor external to the discourse, but exist at the limit of discourse in the sense that they:

> "determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, classify them, explain them, etc. These relations characterize not the language (<u>langue</u>) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but

discourse itself as a practice." (AK p.46)
Hence discursive relations are not those which link words and the concepts and objects they deploy, but underlie them and determine this linkage as the conditions of possibility of existence of objects, concepts and strategies. The discursive object is indissociable from its discourse, wherein it is formed in the positive conditions of a complexity of relations that operate as rules of formation of the object and thus as rules specifying that discourse.

The second direction of the analysis of discursive formations is that which investigates the formation of enunciative modalities, or the uncovering of laws operating anterior to the act of formulation. Foucault is at pains in this instance, to distinguish the archaeological analysis of the originator of discourse from these modes of analysis having recourse to a transcendental subject or a psychological subjectivity, both of which function as unifying or synthesizing concepts. In preference to this unifying function, the subject is treated by the archaeologist in a way which 'decentres' it, displacing it from the position into which it was installed by nineteenth century post-Kantian thought.[3] In The Order of Things, Foucault discusses the subject in terms of its installation as a central idea which controls thought at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He thus argues that it should be situated alongside metaphysical concepts such as God and logos, and in his own analytical practice, he disperses the subject by treating it as a function expressed as a series of relations that traverse the space of discourse. These enunciative modalities are formulated around three questions: that of the status of the subject; the site within an institution from which the discourse emerges and its point of application, and the position of the subject in an information network. These statuses, sites of emergence and application and the positions of the subject are described as groups of relations that exist within the discursive formation. The status of the speaker, his authority to offer a certain discourse,

involves a system of differentiation in which he is situated in relation to other individuals whose similar status is acquired through the application of criteria of competence, knowledge and a relation with an institution. Likewise, a description of the institutional site from which the discourse emerges and its point of application in that institution situates it in a documentary field in which it enters relations with other discourses, and the positions of the subject in an information network relates him to domains of objects about which information circulates among a group of authorities. The categories of the subject are not described in isolation to each other, but in the complexity of their relation to each other, the arrangement of which is established by the specific discursive formation within which they form a system or regularity.

The discursive formation is described with regard to the formation of concepts. The archaeologist does not investigate the conceptual apparatus of a discourse in order to trace its progression towards a true representation of its object, in order to reconstruct out of the dispersion of its history a deductive edifice, but takes the preconceptual level as the point of interference of his analysis. It is here, Foucault argues, that conceptual formation appears on the discursive level. In this instance, the concepts themselves are not of interest and therefore not described in themselves, but the rules governing their construction and their modification within the statements of a certain discourse and the organization of the field of statements in which they occur warrants description.

Once again, Foucault posits three coordinates whose orchestration directs his analysis of the organization of statements with regard to conceptual formation. Firstly, forms of succession of the statements may be analyzed for their internal order of their reasoning, of inferences, implications and descriptions - which Foucault terms "the various orderings of enunciative series" (AK p.56): for their types of dependence, such as what may be deduced or thought

probably from what was observed and described; and for the 'rhetorical schemata' by which groups of statements are combined into successive descriptions which compose the text. If these forms of succession may be uncovered operating within the text, the second coordinate, forms of co-existence, shifts the analysis towards intertextuality. A 'field of presence' is constituted by those statements formulated elsewhere but activated in the discourse through criticism, discussion and judgement of them. A second field, that of concomitance, is constituted by the statements which concern other domains of objects and which therefore belong to another type of discourse, yet appear in the discourse being investigated. Last, Foucault posits a field of memory which contains redundant statements reactivated in the discourse by relations of transformation and discontinuity. The last coordinate which Foucault introduces is that of the procedures of intervention which are definitive of a discursive formation. Hence, the slippage between two discourses is described with relation to the methods of rewriting, transcribing and translating statements from one discourse to another, and the types of transformations that accompany these interventions.

The last direction of the analysis of discursive formations is that of the formation of strategies, that is, the themes and theories of a certain type of discourse that are formed by "certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation." (AK p.66) Because these strategies are organizations of concepts, objects and enunciative modalities, a number of strategic choices may coexist at any moment and two or more mutually exclusive theoretical architectures may appear simultaneously or in succession. The archaeological analysis of strategies concentrates upon possible points of diffraction within the discourse: the coexistence of two objects, concepts or enunciative types which are incompatible with or contradictory to each other may appear in the same discursive formation so as to form an

alternative one to the other; or the elements of the stategic choice may be equivalent, yet their organization may offer several alternatives. In this respect, the disperson of objects, concepts and enunciative modalities are not seen as constituting anomalies, but as forming discursive sub-groups.

Apart from possible points of diffraction, strategic choices within a particular discourse may be governed by the "economy of the discursive constellation",[4] or the relations between concomitant discourses. These external relations may regulate a certain discourse, and operate to exclude statements which would otherwise be possible. Foucault posits that a discursive formation:

> "... does not occupy therefore all the possible volume that is opened up to it of right by the system of formation of its objects, its enunciations, and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete, owing to the system of formation of its strategic choices." (AK p.67)

Lastly, strategic choices are affected by the function of the discourse in the realm of non-discursive practices, by the constraints of its rules placed upon the discourse, processes of appropriation by a specific set of individuals, and by the possible positions of desire in relation to the discourse. In the latter case, Foucault argues that although literary discourse is the most obvious example of this relation, it is not the only one, for so-called 'scientific' discourses such as those on wealth, language and nature are also associated in a particular relation to desire.

2.3: The Articulation of the Statement and the Discursive Formation

At this point, with the constituent elements of the statement described on the one hand and those of the discursive formation on the other, the question of how these two categories which are central to the

Foucauldian analysis are orientated with respect to each other must be posed. We began our discussion of the discursive formation with the analogy of the statement's relation to the discursive formation as superficially similar to the sentence's relation to the text. However, that analogy, though it offered a good point of departure, broke down once the specific statement - discursive formation relations were traced. Indeed, the articulation of these two analytical categories needs to be brought more into focus and discussed in more depth than Foucault offers.

Foucault's conception of discourse is consistently portrayed in terms of a series of layers or strata. The statement is distinguished from other units or groups of signs by defining the levels upon which the group of signs may be apprehended, from the broadest and most flexible level of the enunciation, to the formulation which ties the group of signs to an act made by a certain individual or consciousness, to the level upon which the group of signs is analyzed for coherence in terms of logical and grammatical laws, finally to the level of the statement upon which the archaeological analysis of the group of signs takes its point of interference. In Foucault's discussion of this stratification it is clear that relations operate not only upon each of the levels he has separated out, but on the vertical axis, so that a group of signs may fulfill the criteria of each stratum and thus may be scrutinized in a variety of ways. The specificity of the analysis of the statement is derived from the vertical relations it enters with the levels posterior to it and from the relations specific to its level that give it value as a function. However, Foucault asserts that:

> "To describe a statement is not a matter of isolating and characterizing a horizontal segment; but of defining the conditions in which the function that gave a series of signs ... an existence, and a specific existence, can operate." (AK p.108)

Here Foucault stresses that the archaeology does not refer to a concrete object per se but to a set of relations or conditions. These conditions, that of the emergence of objects, the position of the subject, the succession or coexistence of the statement in connection with other statements and its materiality, thus operate in a relation of verticality anterior to the enunciation as a mere group of signs, and may be apprehended upon the enunciative level as a specific level of description which they traverse. The linkage between statements and their discursive formation is a horizontal relation, occurring upon the enunciative level, for the discursive formation is, at the most basic level of definition, the characterization of a group of statements. The four systems of formation that together define the discursive formation are set in relation to each other as a second stratification, or "a vertical system of dependence" (AK pp.72-73) which delimits the conditions of possibility of the appearance of certain objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. A set of relations thus operates from the anterior level of the formation of objects to the level of the formation of strategies, whereby the formation of an object mediates the rules of formation of enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. Likewise, a strategic or theoretical choice may moderate the formation of concepts, enunciative modalities and objects, so that a set of relations operating from the posterior level to the anterior level are established. These reciprocal relations which modify the four systems of formation are maintained by the discursive practice, yet are at the same time constituent of it. This double set of reciprocal relations is clarified in Foucault's definition of the system of formation:

> "By system of formation, then, I mean a complex group of relations that function as a rule: it lays down what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for such and such an enunciation to be made, for such and such a strategy to be organised. To define a system of formation in its specific individuality is therefore

> to characterize a discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of a practice." (AK p.74)

We may from this develop the following picture. The statement as a function cannot be described on its own: it is expressed through the relation of variables which prescribe its position in a network of other statements:

> "There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistence, effects of series and succession, a distribution of functions and roles." (AK p.99)

This grouping of statements is mediated by the regularity of the discursive practice which in a reciprocal movement determines the character of the discourse constituted by the group of statements. The analysis of the discourse as a system of formation articulates discursive events with series of events occurring in the socio-cultural and institutional spheres, the discursive practice with non-discursive practices. Given this configuration of statement, discursive practice and discourse, Foucault now proceeds to unravel the complexity of relations that lend such entities as concept, object, subject and theory or theme the appearance of concrete, empirically available or 'real' existence. Here is the point which distinguishes the Foucauldian treatment of discourse from other forms of analysis. If the objects, concepts, subject and theories of a discourse are treated as given wholes, then the analysis of the discourse is caught upon the level of describing the objects themselves, the representational values of the concepts as true to its object, and the theory or theme's value as meaningful. In short, the analysis of the discourse resorts in this respect to the analysis of what it speaks about, what it means. What Foucault's archaeology does, and this is perhaps why it is well-named, is to sift apart the levels inherent in the discourse until the stratum at which these objects, concepts and strategies may be revealed as groups of relations, and not as concrete unities.

He posits that this level at which these elements are not analyzed in themselves (for their truth or meaningfulness) is the level upon which their rules of formation are exposed in the integration of such diverse elements as institutions, techniques, social groupings and perceptual organizations.

Hence the interaction of the statement and its discursive formation may be spatialized according to the vertical and horizontal relations that characterize Foucault's conception of discourse. We may say that the relation of statements constituting a discursive formation occurs upon the same level, the enunciative level. This is the horizontal relation between the statement and those that surround it in the discursive formation. Yet as we have already noted the description of the statement in itself does not wholly depend upon a certain horizontal plane, but one which is traversed by vertical relations of its conditions of possibility, which reside anterior to the statement itself. Likewise, the criteria of their relationship to the discursive formation are set upon a vertical axis. In this regard, the question of whether Foucault's assertion that the analysis of the statement and that of the discursive formation are correlative must be posed. In fact, if one attempts to superimpose the four categories of the statement and those of the discursive formation, one finds that each of the four elements of discourse are treated similarly. In both the analysis of the statement and that of the discursive formation, the object itself is not assigned overriding importance, but what is sought is the principle of its differentiation in a domain of possible objects, and, likewise, the subject is not regarded as an authority or originator, but is decentred and dispersed among a set of relations. In his discussion of the formation of concepts, Foucault parallels his criteriology for the analysis of the associated domain - both focus upon forms of succession, simultaneity and coexistence within a discursive network. Lastly, the formation of strategies and the materiality of the statement are

bound together as the analysis of either is focussed upon the status of the verbal performance in relation to the institution, the way in which it is utilized and appropriated. Because of this correspondence between the domains of the enunciative function and the directions of the analysis of the discursive formation, Foucault's assertion that the two analyses are interchangeable in that they both take as their point of interference the specificity of the enunciative level as a level of description is coherent with the scheme that he has introduced. The enunciative level is that upon which statements and their regularity in a discursive formation may be mapped, but the analysis of these two entities incorporates the description of the vertical relations which have been described above.

2.4: Rarity, Exteriority and Accumulation

Having constructed this three dimensional spatialization[5] of the archaeological analysis of discourse, Foucault takes one further step to dissociate his mode of analysis from a hermeneutical perspective under which it may be subsumed if one regarded the elements of the statement and those of the discursive formation as the 'unsaid' lying behind the manifest discourse, the silence that must be made to speak of what is really meant in the discourse by interpretation. This leads to the organization of texts into a unity which, together with techniques, practices and institutions contemporaneous with them, expresses a single 'great uniform text' which underlies the diversity of the discursive events themselves and to which they owe their real meaning. This totalizing and unifying analysis is clearly antithetical to the archaeology which claims to function upon the level of what is said, of the discursive events themselves. In order to dissociate the archaeology from this analysis based on interpretation, Foucault introduces these three elements, 'rarity',

'exteriority' and 'accumulation', as the directions for the treatment of the statement operating to oppose the directions of unification or totalization.

Rather than posit a single unifying meaning to which the diversity of discourse is reduced and which has as its correlation the inevitability of a plenitude of meaning resulting from the infinite regression of commentary which seeks to uncover the single universality of meaning, Foucault posits a principle of rarity, and proposes that:

> "In this sense, discourse ceases to be what it is for the exegete: an inexhaustible treasure from which one can always draw new and always unpredictable riches; a provio[illegible]ce that has always spoken in advance, and which enables one to hear, when one knows how to listen, retrospective oracles: it appears as an asset - finite, limited, desirable, useful - that has its own rules of appearance, but also its own conditions of appropriation and operation."
> (AK p.120)

Since the mode of existence of discourse that Foucault proposes to analyze is one of spatialization, a dispersion of statements bound within a specific system of formation, there is the correlation that this space is not entirely filled but constituted by absences as well as the presence of statements. The basic principle of this rarity is thus that "everything is never said", that in the formation of certain statements, others are excluded, as that which is formulated occupies a certain site within this discursive space. The analysis of statements in their rarity takes into account that the enunciative field is incomplete and not "like the air we breathe, an infinite transparency" (AK p.120) which may be endlessly traversed.

Similarly, Foucault posits a principle of exteriority in opposition to the conception that analysis can be directed towards an

interiority, a founding consciousness of an originator. Statements are situated in a field of dispersion in which they exist anonymously, as objects, and may thus be treated in terms of "it is said" rather than through the assignment of an individual's psychological, biographical and sociological background. In the latter case, the discursive realm is vacated as the analysis quests after an explanation that is seen to be rooted in the processes taking place in the consciousness of a transcendental subjectivity. The archaeology, on the contrary, remains within the discursive space it sets out to map, revealing the dispersion of statements therein with no recourse to a unifying subject as an origin, for the enunciative domain is autonomous in this respect. In effect it is this domain that defines the positions of the subject, and not the subject as an origin which defines the unity of the text.

Lastly, in place of the search for a lost origin (where its meaning is supposed to lie) which is revealed by invoking through interpretation the forms of memory hidden within it from the act of formulation, Foucault introduces a principle of accumulation in accordance with which the archaeological analysis is motivated in the opposite direction. Statements are not described through the tracing backwards from the finished product to the moment of inception, but rather with regard to the use to which they are put, their conditions of recurrence and reactivation, and their possibilities of transformation. The archaeology in accordance with the principle of accumulation thus traces the statement from the moment it is said through to its present mode of survival. It is treated in the form of a specific addivity which Foucault explains with reference to mathematical statements. These, he argues,

> "... are not added to one another in the same way as religious texts or laws (they each have their own way of merging together, annulling one another, excluding one another, complimenting one another, forming groups

> that are in varying degrees indissociable and endowed with unique properties)." (AK p.124)

The emergence of a certain statement affects the relations that others in that discourse have with one another. Consequently, the forms of addivity of a group of statements are not constant through time, but may offer up new configurations within which statements are resituated, reactivated or destroyed.

2.5: The Archive

The description of statements according to the principles of rarity, exteriority and exclusion reveal them as having a paradoxical existence as both objects and events that are dispersed within a certain discursive space or a limited space of communication which Foucault calls a positivity. The positivity characterizes the unity of statements through time, and it is within this space that dispersed statements may be revealed as belonging to the same discursive formation or to another, perhaps co-existant or successive, discursive formation, both of which exist as divisions within this space. The positivity is made possible by the historical *a priori*, or the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice. Foucault designates the *a priori* "historical" in order to clearly distinguish it from the Kantian formal *a priori*: what is meant by the *a priori* in this case "is not a condition of validity for judgement, but a condition of reality of statements". (AK p.127) It takes into account that the reality of statements, of discourse, is constituted not only by meaning and truth but by a specific history that belongs to those statements or that discourse alone.

The archaeological space in which statements are dispersed is thus differentiated according to specific rules and practices, forming positivities of discourse according to their historical *a prioris*.

All these systems of statements, these regularities, together constitute the archive. In keeping with his basic premise that language is an act, Foucault's archive is not an inert store of all of a culture's textual productions, but the system that makes the emergence of statements as unique events possible; the system of their enunciability, of their functioning and of their transformation. It defines the level at which discourses are differentiated by their practices, causing "a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular events, as so many things to be dealt with and manipulated". (AK p.130) Hence the archive cannot be completely described, even though it is finite in that it is constituted by all the statements that have been formed. In this respect, the archive forms the "general horizon to which the description of discursive formations, the analysis of positivities, the mapping of the enunciative field belong". (AK p.131) The analyses of these regularities - of the multiplicity of relations that govern the grouping of statements and their division within this horizon - does not propose to find a point of origination hidden beneath the discursive level; instead its purpose is to remain upon this level of the mode of existence of that which is said, and describe "discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive". (AK p.131) Foucault has often referred to himself as an archivist, and to the archaeology as the analysis of the archive, for it is in this extended space of discourse that Foucault postulates the play of rules determining the appearance and disappearance of statements within a culture. Foucault's own archaeological histories may then be conceived as focussing upon certain delimited localities within the archive, within which the play of discursive rules are traced with regard to a particular positivity, governed by a particular discursive practice.

The generality of the archive is best understood with regard to Foucault's distinction between 'connaissance' and 'savoir', both

of which are translated into English as 'knowledge'. Connaissance denotes for Foucault a particular corpus of knowledge or a discipline, whereas savoir is used to define knowledge in general. Foucault clarifies the distinction in these terms:

> "By 'connaissance' I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. 'Savoir' refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to 'connaissance' and for this or that enunciation to be formulated." (AK fn p.15)

Foucault's regularities of statements - discursive formations and positivities - do not constitute disciplines or connaissances, but are conceived on the basis of savoir. The linkage is clear if one compares Foucault's clarification of the distinction between connaissance and savoir given above and what he defines as the analysis of positivities:

> "To analyse positivities is to show in accordance with which rules a discursive practice may form groups of objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices. The elements thus formed do not constitute a science, with a defined structure of ideality; their system of relations is certainly less strict ... They are that on the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) propositions are built up, more or less exact descriptions developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed. They form the precondition of what is later revealed and what later functions as an item of knowledge or an illusion ..." (AK pp.181-182)

When Foucault speaks of knowledge, he thus distinguishes it from science, for although a science is a body of knowledge, there are bodies of knowledge independent of science. Knowledge is therefore that produced by a discursive practice, in the formation of a domain of objects, of enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies of use and appropriation. On the basis of this,

Foucault distinguishes between scientific domains and archaeological domains; the former referring to the space of a connaissance governed by formal rules in the production of propositions, whilst the latter refers to savoir, the space of knowledge in which scientific, philosophical and literary texts are treated the same on the basis that they may operate according to the same rules of formation.

Within this archaeological territory, a delimited locality in the archive, which may be seen as the site of operation of the Foucauldian history, the discursive formation may be traced as it passes across what Foucault terms "thresholds" indicating different levels of formal systemacity. Each of these thresholds offers a point of interference of historical analysis. The lowest level at which a discursive formation is systematized, is at the threshold of positivity, at which a "single system for the formation of statements is put into operation" (AK p.186) and when a discursive practice gains its individuality. The threshold of epistemologization is crossed when the operation of a discursive formation dominates knowledge through claims of validation and norms of verification. The threshold of scientificity is crossed when the discursive formation and its epistemological figures obey formal laws of construction in formulating statements as well as the archaeological rules of its practice. The histories of science that take this threshold as their point of interference are exemplified by G. Bachelard and G. Canguilhem. These histories trace the discourse's movement from pre-science to science, and is necessarily concerned with oppositions of truth and error, scientificity and non-scientificity. Foucault terms these histories as epistemological. Lastly, when the scientific discourse is able to "define the axioms necessary to it, the elements that it uses", (AK p.187) its legitimate propositions and transformations, it crosses the threshold of formalization. The model that Foucault uses to exemplify a discourse which has crossed this level of rigorous systematization is mathematics,

and the historical analysis of such a discourse is "recurrential", such as the history of mathematics as undertaken by Serres.[6] The way in which a particular discursive formation passes through these thresholds, its transitions through them in either direction, or across several of them at once, constitutes the specific history of that discourse. It is at these levels positivity/epistemology that Foucault focusses his analysis. The Order of Things describes the epistemologization of the parallel discourses of philology, biology and political economy, which give rise to the same epistemological figures almost simultaneously. The complexity of relations that exist between these positivities and which facilitate this coexistence of epistemological figures in each of them is thus the episteme. Foucault regards a history of discourse at this level as an archaeological history, one which uncovers how discursive practices give rise to a body of knowledge that may or may not attain the thresholds of scientificity and formalization. In positing the archaeological history of discourse at the level of epistemologization, Foucault provides an analysis that is free of the restriction of the science/non-science opposition. Rather than circumscribing the analysis, the science/non-science, or science/ideology opposition is included in that which is to be investigated along with the criteria of scientificity itself, as the archaeology traces the shifts that the discursive practice undergoes in order to be constituted as such, to formulate epistemological figures in so far as the discursive practice gives rise to a body of knowledge, and the implementation of the criteria to which it must adhere if it is to assume the status of a science. What the archaeology focuses upon, therefore, is not those elements that a science has sloughed off in order to constitute itself as such, but the modifications that a discursive formation and its positivity have undergone. The archaeology thus sets out to:

> "... reveal between positivities, knowledge, epistemological figures, and sciences, a whole set of differences, relations, gaps, shifts, independences, autonomies, and the way in which they articulate their own historicities

on one another." (AK p.191)

Foucault's interest does not lie with the epistemological question of truth and error in relation to knowledge. The intricate articulation of discursive practices and knowledge are formulated precisely to evacuate the domain of investigations based upon the science/non-science/ideology distinction. In order to distinguish the field of analysis in which the archaeology operates from such investigations, Foucault introduces the distinction between 'connaissance', knowledge which is articulated with science, and the more flexible concept of 'savoir' with which he is working. This opens the archaeological field of analysis to include any discursive practice, whether scientific, philosophical or literary.

The Archaeology of Knowledge presents us with a new register of concepts which are proposed as descriptive constructions by which the archaeology functions as a mode of discursive analysis. A comparative investigation of these concepts reveals the basic theoretical tenants that underlie the archaeology as a practice. These we may enumerate as the discernment of levels upon which discourse operates and upon which it may be analyzed, the fragmentation of unities, the dissolution of traditional oppositions and the focus upon functions and relations.

Foucault elucidates the concept of the statement by breaking down the verbal performance into constitutent level of operation upon which it may be appropriated. This reveals the variety of ways in which discourse may be analyzed: as a formulation originating from a concrete individual which is analyzed according to interpretative methods; as a linguistic unit of truth or meaning which is the object of structuralism, and as a statement - the level upon which the archaeology finds its point of interference. Discourse is thus regarded as having a variety of modes of being. Likewise, Foucault posits that it has a variety of historical analyses which are situated at a series of levels or

thresholds of formal systematicity at which discourse may be analyzed for its acquisition of a set of rules of formation, epistemologization or scientificity. In this way Foucault delimits the space of the archaeology as separate from epistemological and recurrential historical analyses by situating it with regard to these other types of histories of knowledge.

This discernment of levels of appropriation of verbal performances and their histories as discourses amounts to the fragmentation of Discourse and History as supposed concrete entities. This fragmentation of empirical unities pervades the whole of Foucault's project. In his description of the statement and its correlative, the discursive formation, the unities of subject and object are presented as false. Rather than speaking of the subject or the object, Foucault presents a web of relations that form what appears to be a unity, and it is the archaeologist's task, he proposes, to unravel these relations in a rigorous description of the statement or discursive formation. The 'subject' of a verbal performance is not external to it if it is to be treated as a statement, because the concept of the statement is constructed in a space distinct from hermeneutics which has recourse to a transcendental subjectivity which is external source of verbal performance and from structuralism which excludes the problem of the subject altogether. Rather the subject is dispersed within the discursive formation as a number of positions and functions within discourse itself. Concepts and theoretical strategies are also not taken at face value, but are shown to be a mass of relations of succession, co-existence and reactivation. These relations that provide the positive conditions for the existence of objects, subject-functions, concepts and strategies also decompose the traditional opposition of the discursive and non-discursive, as they exist at the limit of discourse, combining into a set of rules which are imminent to a discursive practice's formation.

This facilitates the incorporation of institutional, political, economic and cultural relations where they affect the formation of discourse. Similarly, the opposition of scientificity and non-scientificity is redundant to the concerns of the archaeology, as the decomposition of the unities of concepts and theoretical strategies into sets of relations relativize the formal criteria of scientificity and truth through the historical analysis of the discourse in which those relations are to be found.

Foucault accomplishes this discernment of levels of functioning, fragmentation of unities and decomposition of traditional oppositions through perceiving discourse in terms of a practice. This appropriation of his object as the practice of writing concentrates the analytical gaze upon the rules that sustain and regulate the act of writing. These rules are not themselves visible in the discourse under scrutiny, but must be constructed from the relations and functions that are dispersed within the tissue of discourse. The statement as the site of the enunciative function is thus analyzed according to the web of relations by which objects, subject positions and so on are formulated. These relations may be seen to be variable according the spatio-temporal existence specific to that statement. The discursive formation as the correlative of the statement, is the space in which a dispersion of statements is analyzed for the sets of relations that operate as rules for the formation of those statements. These rules, according to which objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies are formulated, collectively constitute the historical a priori which is the condition of existence for statements occurring in a particular positivity. The combined positivities of a particular period form the archive in which the conditions of knowledge (savoir) are accessible, as it is here that the comparative analysis of positivities, showing the rules according to which discursive practice forms its enunciations, objects, concepts and theoretical strategies, may be conducted.

The archaeology is thus a method of discursive analysis that neither deploys the subject as a transcendental category nor excludes the subject entirely, but traces it and other empirically 'given' entities as a conglomeration of relations and functions that exist in discourse and which become apparent when Writing is regarded not as an object, such as a system, but as a practice. The site of operation of such an analysis is thus the space between discursive practice and the rules that sustain and regulate it, and it questions a discourse at the level of its existence as a practice situated among other statements and discursive formations as practices within the archive. In this respect, the archaeology of knowledge, since it traces conditions of knowledge to the generality of the archive which is historically delimited and since it treats all statements in all positivities at the level of their spatio-temporal materiality, that is, their specific historical emergence, relativizes knowledge and the function of language. Hence, the archaeology as a mode of discursive analysis distinguishes itself from structuralism through a return to history in which, because language and knowledges have histories specific to them, there are no absolute truths. Furthermore, because language and knowledge are historically constituted, there can be no form of objectivity which is invariable. The archaeology does not, therefore, attempt to analyze discourse in order to uncover models in the system of language that might be applied elsewhere, but rather, discourse is analyzed in itself. Foucault regards the difference between the archaeology and structuralism in these terms:

> "I am at the difference from those we call structuralists for I am not very interested in the formal possibilities offered by a system like language (la langue). Personally, I am above all haunted by the existence of discourses, by the very fact that speaking has taken place as events in relation to their original situation, and that they have left behind traces which continue to exist and exercise,

> in their very subsistence internal to history, a certain number of manifest or secret functions."[7]

Foucault does not approach questions of the meaning or forms of language itself, but proposes an analysis that intricately articulates language, knowledge and history in its treatment of discursive practices.

Despite the differences between structuralism and the archaeology enumerated here, many critics and commentators[8] have attempted to subsume the latter under the former with regard to The Order of Things, and to discern a break or total change in direction between that book and The Archaeology of Knowledge. The basis for their arguments is that the central concept employed in The Order of Things is thereafter discarded, and that it has no place in the conceptual framework elucidated in The Archaeology of Knowledge. It is thus to this question that we turn in order to test the coherence of Foucault's project in The Order of Things with the conceptual framework offered in The Archaeology of Knowledge.

2.6: Conclusion: The Articulation of the Episteme and the Archaeology

In the first part of this thesis in which the archaeologies were discussed, it was proposed that the archaeology as a method did not emerge ready-made and complete, but underwent a series of refinements between Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things. However, it was also seen that these refinements do not constitute substantial 'breaks' between the works, but rather shifts in emphasis that occur as Foucault becomes more and more fascinated by the configuration of knowledge and discourse. Foucault himself was aware of this, as he writes in the introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge:

> "At this point there emerges an enterprise of which my earlier books ... were a very imperfect sketch. An enterprise by which one tries to measure the mutations that operate in general in the field of history; an enterprise in which the methods, limits, and themes proper to the history of ideas are questioned; an enterprise by which one tries to throw off the last anthropological constraints; an enterprise that wishes, in return, to reveal how these constraints could come about. These tasks were outlined in a rather disordered way, and their general articulation was never clearly defined. It was time that they were given greater coherence - or, at least, that an attempt was made to do so. This book is the result." (AK p.15)

Despite this statement which definitively binds The Archaeology of Knowledge to the earlier works, some of Foucault's critics have determined to find a discontinuity between them. The basis for these arguments is invariably the specious linkage between the episteme and structuralism, and their logical form generally follows the deduction that as Foucault rejects structuralism as a blanket term under which his analysis may be placed, he therefore must relinquish the concept of the episteme in order to validate the separation of the archaeological analysis from structural analyses. Brodeur accounts for the supposed disappearance of the concept of the episteme in these terms:

> "Now it happened that structuralism, with which Foucault had become identified, was progressively transforming itself, after having borne its fruits, into what appeared at best as an abstract form of ideology and at worst as an empty fashion. Thus Foucault, in L'archéologie, as is evident in the conclusion of that book, is very eager to dissociate himself from what structuralism had become. It may well be that he thought

> that this might be most efficiently achieved in discarding one of the most obviously structuralist of his methodological concepts, that of the episteme."[9]

Likewise, Dominique Lecourt places some emphasis on the "very remarkable absence"[10] of the episteme in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Lecourt regards this book as something of a paradox, for although it proposes to undertake a methodological review of the earlier works, it jettisons "their principal component".[11] He proposes that Foucault realizes the error inherent in the structuralist aspects of the episteme, and, under "the thick growth of new words" and the "renewed luxuriance of the style of The Archaeology of Knowledge, attempte to extricate himself from the ideological impasse of structuralism. What is finally at stake in Lecourt's account of the book, is that Foucault, in straying from the fold of Marxism, finds himself trapped in ideology; and having realized this, reactivates the Marxist concepts "in displacement", so that The Archaeology of Knowledge becomes an elaborate disguise for its writer's return to historical materialism.[12] In keeping with this argument, Lecourt asserts that "a decisive dividing line between The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things"[13] is established by the introduction of the category of discursive practice into the later work. This notion is reiterated by Cavallari:

> "While (The Order of Things) was centred primarily on a conception of discourse as object, product, and configuration, ... (The Archaeology of Knowledge) implied an important step toward the effective incorporation of the notion of discursive practice - that is, an idea centred on the categories of activity, of active production of utterances, and hence an idea inevitably linked to the themes of materiality."[14]

Undoubtedly, the spectre of Marxist-Structuralist polemics is at work in this regard, and it may be the case that this notion of the sudden appearance of the category of discursive practice

in The Archaeology of Knowledge is founded upon the proposition that the concept of the episteme - a concept seeped in structuralism and as such antithetical to the Althusserian category of practice - was purged as ideology, facilitating the appearance of discursive practice as a scientific category. However, this notion is unfounded for two reasons. Firstly, the category of discursive practice is far from lacking in the earlier works: The Order of Things, as Sheridan[15] points out, "is about little else"; while The Birth of the Clinic analyzes the myriad of relations between a discursive practice constituting the body as object and its corresponding non-discursive practice in the clinic; and similarly, in Madness and Civilization, the discursive practice constituting madness as an object is scrutinized in relation to the emergence of non-discursive practices in the asylum.

The second reason for rejecting the notion that the episteme was necessarily jettisoned before the archaeology was able to incorporate the category of discursive practice leads us back to the complexity of misunderstandings that surround the concept of the episteme itself. The basis of our argument here is that far from being absent from the exposition set out in The Archaeology of Knowledge, the concept of the episteme is its raison d'être, that the book is in fact a rigorous elucidation of the procedure by which the episteme is uncovered. The structure of the book itself suggests this. In dealing with the discursive formation first, Foucault confronts problems that emerge from those disciplines

> "... so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in content ... that we call the history of ideas, or of thought, or of science or of knowledge." (AK p.21)

After suspending notions that conspire in the theme of continuity such as traditions and evolution and rejecting the apparent unities of the subject, object, science and discourse that characterize these disciplines, Foucault establishes "an

entire field (that) is set free" (AK p.26) in which the dispersion of statements may be apprehended in their proper occurrence. From the mapping of this liberated field, the archive, and the regularities that function within it, Foucault moves on to describe the articulation of discourse and knowledge. The hinge pin of this articulation is the concept of discursive practice, as Foucault makes quite clear when he writes:

> "there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice, and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms." (AK p.183)

The description of this discursive practice/knowledge (savoir) juncture involves the analysis of the regularities of discourse, of discursive formations and positivities, in relation to the epistemological figures that emerge there, and this is, indeed, the analysis of the episteme. The description of discursive practices and that of the episteme are correlative, for the description of one leads to the uncovering of the other, as is apparent in Foucault's second definition of the episteme:

> "By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems." (AK p.191)

It is clear from this reciprocity that exists between Foucault's concepts of discursive practice and of the episteme, that it is utterly specious to argue that they are mutually exclusive. In fact, the description of the regularities of discourse given in The Archaeology of Knowledge is the "methodological signposting" (AK p.16) that Foucault felt was lacking in The Order of Things, which gave rise to the multitude of misrecognitions of the episteme and consequently his project in that work, for what was at work there was precisely this discursive practice/knowledge configuration, named the episteme.

Foucault's rejection of structuralism as an apt label for his mode of analysis thus cannot be seen in terms of the substitution of discursive practice for the episteme, but the question still remains as to whether the analytical tools he constructs in The Archaeology of Knowledge are related to structuralism. Although this question has been approached above, and it must be allowed that discussion at length is necessary to dispatch it, let it suffice, however, to make a few more observations in this instance. The term 'Structuralism' has been applied to describe a great variety of theorists' work, from Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology, Althusser's scientific Marxism, Lacan's psycho-analysis to Barthes' erotic criticism, to name but a few. However, each of these theorists operate in recognized disciplines, something that cannot be said of Foucault. In fact, Foucault's aversion to this particular label probably springs from the impossible endeavour of structuralism, in which it has attempted to institute itself as a specific discipline in the form of semiotics or the science of signs, yet it has always been faced with its inability to mark out a space specific to it. It is a generic term necessarily attached to something else. However, for the sake of simplicity, if one were to regard structuralism as that which attempts to analyze signifying systems and the production of meaning in those systems, we find a clear distinction between this and the work of Foucault. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault constantly draws distinctions between language and discourse through the differentiation of the statement from sentential and propositional units. His interest does not lie in the function of language as a signifying system producing meaning but as the basis of discursive practice producing knowledge, and his concern is not with how meaning is constructed, but with the conditions affecting the emergence of statements.

Apart from a supposed interest in language, other points of

connection that are regarded as characteristic of both structuralism and Foucault are an interest in the structure of unconscious thought, the severence of the production of meaning from the private experience of the subject and a conviction that the text can be studied exclusive of the realities of the text's production, the emphasis being upon the laws governing the textual system's functioning. However, as we shall see, Foucault does not offer in the episteme a reconstruction of the thought of an age, and, although he does displace the subject as a transcendental category, he does not relegate it to the margins, but fragments it into a set of relations operating from different points within discourse. Lastly, as regards the text, we shall see later that Foucault's treatment of the text is not as a system in itself. In short, there is no direct relation between the structuralist endeavour to apply a linguistically based model and the Foucauldian archaeology.[16]

One of the foremost misconceptions that emerged in the critical wake of The Order of Things is that the work attempted to present a theory of cultural totalities. Maurice Cranston dismisses the book in terms of "something employed to explain everything, ends up explaining nothing",[17] whilst Hayden White agrees that "Foucault aims at a system capable of explaining almost anything".[18] Indeed, Foucault does refer to the episteme in The Archaeology of Knowledge as an "inexhaustible field" and an "indefinite field of relations". (AK pp.191-192) However, this is not a denegration of the concept that appeared so dominantly in The Order of Things, but the couching of the concept in its broadest terms. The episteme as it appears in The Order of Things does not refer to the incefinite field of relations that is opened up by the archaeological history, but it is in specific reference to the positivities defined by the discursive practices of general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth and their corresponding mutations into

linguistics, biology and political economy. Hence Foucault cannot be said to be attempting to provide a system of universal explanation. As Foucault points out in an interview:

> "I have never had the intention of doing a general history of the human sciences or a critique of the possibility of the sciences in general. The subtitle to The Order of Things is not 'the archaeology', but 'an archaeology of the human sciences'."[19]

Foucault makes two important points here: firstly, that the episteme as it is constructed in The Order of Things is open to extension, that the archaeological analysis of the positivities being scrutinized is not a closed or final picture of the mutations they undergo; and secondly, that the analysis undertaken in this work is merely one of a number of possible histories of the human sciences.

Jean Piaget[20] criticizes Foucault for the "homogenization" of all sciences in the concept of the episteme. Piaget attests to the assertion that biology remained "arrested at the taxonomic level", but argues that Foucault's eighteenth century episteme cannot account for the progress of mathematics and physics beyond this level. He finds that the most glaring error of which Foucault is guilty, is that he bases too much on synchrony, and it is for this reason that his work becomes "too easy prey for history".[21] As regards the first charge, that the episteme is insufficient to describe physics and mathematics in the eighteenth century, we have already seen that this was not Foucault's purpose, and that the extension of the episteme to incorporate these formal sciences is possible even though The Order of Things does not venture into this sphere of relations. However, the second charge opens a new set of problems. Piaget conceives of Foucault's epistemes as totally discontinuous blocks governed by "conceptual archetypes":

> "His epistemes follow upon, but not from one another,

> whether formally or dialectically. One episteme is not affiliated with another, either genetically or historically ..."[22]

This, Piaget argues, devalues history and genesis, and consequently, where Foucault has promised an epistemological structuralism, he merely supplies structures that are arbitrarily constructed as he relies "on intuition and substitutes speculative improvisation for methodological procedure". Thus the epistemes are "mere diagrams, not transformational systems".[23]

If Piaget's view of the episteme as a totally, discontinuous, arbitrary structure represents one extreme of the critical spectrum, the other extreme is occupied by those critics and commentators who attempt to find some principle governing the transformation from one episteme to the next. Hayden White goes so far as to contend that:

> "... Foucault does have both a system of explanation and a theory of the transformation of reason, or science, or consciousness, whether he knows it or will admit it or not."[24]

White finds Foucault's epistemes analogous to Vico's "cycles through which consciousness passed", and through this analogy, he finds that Foucault's epistemes have an implicit Vichian system of explanation. Vico[25] argues that there are four principle tropes - metaphor, metonomy, synecdoche and irony - from which all figures of speech are derived and which, when analyzed, provide for the understanding of the phases of consciousness which pass in the evolution of civilization. Through the study of human artifacts, he discerned four such phases through which any civilization, such as that of Ancient Rome or European Christianity, pass. The cycle begins with the age of gods, in which man is but one step away from his natural state of bestiality. In this phase of social evolution, the family comes into being, wherein, alongside bonds of kinship in the organization of the family, there exist bonds of servitude.

These latter bonds between kinsmen and their servants are the point of emergence of the next phase, in which the conflict between patricians and plebians, kinsmen and serfs, splits society into two classes - the patricians joining forces to protect and preserve their position and rights against the plebians who mutiny in the pursuance of their own betterment. Gradually, this class struggle leads to the admittance of the plebians to the rights once held solely by the patricians, to give rise to democratic or free popular republics. This new phase of social evolution Vico calls the age of men. Finally, the social solidarity, discipline and respect for law that had maintained the patricians is eroded in an age of decadence, in which a slackening of public spirit occurs through the relief of all people of their public responsibility. Thus the civilization is prone to internal breakdown or external conquest.

The key to understanding the development of civilization was for Vico the poetic wisdom of man, or 'sapienza poetica', which is operative in the myths and symbols created by man. Hence Vico asserted that an account of the development of reason could only be made comprehensible through the scrutiny of human artifacts, the major medium of which is language. Language is thus the moulding principle of such an account, as its use is the determining principle of the social structure. To follow these changes in language is to understand how change occurred in human society, for man constructs himself and his world according to the communicative means at his disposal. In this regard, Vico argued that human nature itself is not a constant, but will vary according to the phase of social structure dominant at the time. However, because myths and symbols constituted 'imaginative universals' in that they are the creations of 'sapienza poetica', human artifacts are able to reveal the intentions harboured in the minds of men. Vico thus proposed that the understanding of man differed substantially from the understanding of nature, for whereas natural phenomena may only

be described and classified, man-made phenomena could be understood by grasping these intentions, by reconstructing what was going on in the minds of men.

Superficially, it seems as if there are a number of points where the Foucauldian archaeology and the Vichian account intersect. However, upon a closer analysis, Hayden White's analogy proves specious, for these supposed points of intersection which Hayden White takes as the basis for his argument, namely the categories of man, language and history, are entirely different in the work of Vico from that of Foucault. First, let us take the category of man and his guises as consciousness, reason and 'thought'. Although Vico, like Foucault, does not regard human nature as a constant, he does rely upon the transparent quality of language to offer an understanding of the minds of men, of the various forms that consciousness takes. Although Vico does not install human nature in general as a constant and transcendental figure, he does substitute a part of it, namely man's poetic wisdom, as a metaphysical principle, which on the one hand, governs the progression of civilization, but which on the other hand, is subject to shifts itself in that it changes its content, yet not its form. As we have seen, Foucault's projects are motivated by the endeavour to decentre the subject and the various forms it takes, and to analyze it in its dispersion in discourse. In the Foucauldian archaeology, there is therefore no place for man. It is an analysis that takes no stock of human intentions, for its object is not the history of forms of consciousness, thought or reason. What, then, one may ask, is the object of the archaeology? This brings us to the second category of difference between Foucault and Vico. Foucault's archaeology offers a mode of analysis of discourse, in and for itself. Vico's investigation is of language as the vehicle of human creation and the window through which the historian may view the phases of consciousness of civilized man, which is a

decidedly Classical endeavour and one which cannot be homogenized with the modern conception and analysis of language, let alone with the Foucauldian appropriation of discourse as it has been discussed above. Finally, the Vichian concept of history is nothing but antithetical to the archaeology. Vico's phases of the development of civilization each have its root in its predecessor. They constitute an evolution which is predetermined and inevitable as the course which any civilization must run from its birth through to its decay and death. As we have already noted, this evolution is governed by a metaphysical principle through which it is also made comprehensible. The Vichian history is a linear and continuous progression that begins from the Book of Genesis and professes to explain all facets of human life. It is precisely against this type of history that The Archaeology of Knowledge is written. Foucault posits in place of a genesis, a dispersion; against the continuity of time, he argues for a set of discontinuities or ruptures which involve the conjuncture of specific events, and against the notion of explaining totalities, he proposes that, far from offering an explanation that encompasses all phenomena of a given period, only a description of a specific and localized set of relations is possible. Hence, where Vico proposes history, Foucault proposes an anti-history - a claim which we shall take up later. What is at stake here, is that Hayden White's analogy is without ground. The episteme cannot be likened to Vichian "cycles through which consciousness passed", for the episteme is neither a cycle nor does it pretend to reconstruct the consciousness of the past. Rather than the reconstituted "system of postulates that governs all the branches of knowledge (connaissances) of a given period", (AK p.191) the episteme is the condition of possibility of epistemological figures in discourse. The description of the episteme thus focusses, not upon the propositions made and held as true in a certain period, but upon the relations

imposed upon discourse, which facilitate its appearance and which also constrain and limit it. Where Vico interprets human artifacts of the past in order to reach behind them and reconstruct the intentions of the creative consciousness of each age, Foucault rejects interpretation and the notion of the Subject in order to describe discourse and the discursive relations that regulate the appearance of epistemological figures in each episteme.

It is clear, then, that Hayden White builds his analogy linking Vico and Foucault on the employment of the categories of the Subject, language and history, but as we have seen, this basis of his argument is the misrecognition of the function of these categories in Foucault. Indeed, White in his summing up of The Order of Things as "an important interpretation of the evolution of the 'formalized' consciousness of Western man"[26] reveals the three areas in which the archaeology is misapprehended: interpretation refers more to the "meaningful" sentence rather than the archaeological statement, evolution is a concept of history purged from Foucault's anti-history and finally, Foucault does not present a thesis concerning consciousness, but tracing the transformations of discursive regularities. These areas of misrecognition and confusion are found in the works of a number of other critics and commentators of whom we shall take only a few.

P. Major-Poetzl[27] proposes to find a binary principle at work in the arrangement of the epistemes. She suggests that the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries represent interpretative modes of knowledge whilst the Classical and Contemporary epistemes are representative of formalist systems. From this she concludes:

> "Foucault's history of Western thought may then be regarded not as a series of unconnected ruptures

> between periods, but as an endless oscillation between two modes of thought."[28]

Like Hayden White, Major-Poetzl regards The Archaeology of Knowledge as a "science of thought",[29] but where White imposes on the seeming radical discontinuity of the epistemes a tropological system akin to something of a natural progression of the civilized mind, Major-Poetzl imposes a system of periodicity, in which change is accounted for in terms of a predetermined pendulum-like movement between two poles, which operate as the essences of the ages of the civilization. Akin to this interpretation of the Foucauldian archaeology, is the thesis put forward by David Carroll. Carroll argues that the episteme is the organizing principle of Foucauldian history, and as such is the "subject" of the archaeology, as it is a form of collective consciousness. Correlative to this proposition, Carroll proposes that the episteme is experienceable. Carroll asserts that "there is a decidedly Hegelian aspect to Foucault's analysis".[30] The episteme is regarded as determining:

> "... the possibilities and limits of any period or context; and when these possibilities have been realized, when the space has been saturated, then a break occurs and a new episteme is born with the process beginning anew."[31]

Two misconceptions characterize this view of the Foucauldian archaeology, and both attempt a rearticulation of it with notions of traditional history which Foucault attempts to sever from his own work. First, Carroll regards the episteme as an organizing principle and "subject" - a view which amounts to reinstating a centre or metaphysical category where Foucault has initiated a decentring. However, Carroll's thesis is not acceptable because he conflagrates the episteme with representation and order in regard to the Classical episteme, and regards them all as a singular form of consciousness. In this respect, he transforms the episteme into something like the

Hegelian Ideal. This leads to the second point of divergence between the Foucauldian archaeology and the interpretation of it by Carroll - the notion of history. Carroll regards the episteme as a self-contained process of evolution, the seed of which is contained in its predecessor, and which endures through a process of growth towards a final decay. It is not surprising that if the episteme is viewed in these terms, Foucault's analysis might be regarded as Hegelian.

Common to all the interpretations thus far discussed, is the inclusion of the category of consciousness in some form in the make-up of the episteme or the archaeology as a whole, and the attempt to find some principle of connection or continuity at work in the discontinuity from one episteme to the next. This is no coincidence, for, if the archaeology indeed does uncover structures of consciousness or thought, then the ostensible radical discontinuity between epistemes poses a problem. Consciousness or thought surely does not undergo radical change without cause. In the "Foreword to the English edition" of The Order of Things, Foucault stresses the problem of causality and causal explanation is suspended, the work therefore being an attempt "to describe the combination of corresponding transformations that occur in the empirical sciences." He continues:

> "It seemed to me that it would not be prudent for the moment to force a solution I felt incapable, I admit, of offering: the traditional explanations - spirit of the time, technological or social change, influence of various kinds - struck me for the most part as being more magical than effective." (OT p.xiii)

If one regards Foucault's description of the transformations affecting the empirical sciences as one based upon change in consciousness, the suspension of causality and explanation diminishes the import of the thesis as a history. The novel approach instigated by the work is negated as it is drawn back

towards the traditional notions of history and its articulations with the transcendental Subject and causality, both of which are glaringly absent from this work. It is perhaps for this reason that these critics feel compelled to find in the 'unsaid' of The Order of Things some principle of homogeneity or determinism at work in the ordering of the epistemes, to posit some principle of continuity in the ruptures that separate them, whether it be a principle of natural progression of the civilized mind, a periodicity governed by alternate forms of consciousness, or the elevation of the episteme itself to a deterministic principle to which all phenomena may be traced back to in a relation of causality. What seems to be essentially at stake here, is that these critics have taken the meat of the episteme but rejected the bones of the archaeological concept of history which gives it shape. Instead they reinsert the traditional conceptions of history into the body of The Order of Things. No doubt, they thus perceive a different animal to that for which Foucault would take responsibility!

But what, then, is the episteme? In an interview in 1968 Foucault explained his use of the term 'archaeology' in regard to the episteme:

> "By 'archaeology' I wish to name not a discipline exactly, but a field of research, which could be described as follows: In any society, the knowledge, the philosophical ideas, the ordinary day-to-day beliefs, and, moreover, the institutions, the commercial and political practices, the social customs - all these lead us back to a certain implicit episteme which belongs to that society. This episteme is profoundly different from the knowledge found in the scientific books, the philosophical theories, the religious apologetics, but it is what makes possible the appearance at a given moment, of theories, beliefs, practices."[32]

The episteme is thus an intricate part of the archaeology and cannot

be spoken of except with respect to the mode of analysis which uncovers it. The second point to which Foucault draws attention, is that the episteme is not an empirically available entity, but constructed in the analysis of a combination of positivities, so that the configuration of knowledge that the episteme reveals is not that which the discourses speak of themselves, but that which makes possible the emergence of such propositions and through which they are assigned meaning and truth value. Although it may appear from the broad spectrum of institutional and discursive categories that Foucault lists, that the episteme is all-inclusive, in the practical application of the episteme in The Order of Things, it is not the description of a social totality. It is presented here as a theoretical concept and couched in its broadest terms as that which extends across all discursive practices. However, in practical terms, the simultaneous and comparative analysis of all discursive formations functioning at any one time or within a particular period is hardly possible. Hence, Foucault posits that the same episteme exists for all discursive practices at any time, but in the practical application of the concept, it will appear through a local analysis of related positivities and will transform according to those included in the analysis. In this regard, the episteme is a heuristic concept, for it facilitates the uncovering of the relationships and junctures that characterize related discourses, yet at the same time, is postulated as a flexible configuration that may be uncovered further in the analysis of other discursive practices. In short, the episteme as a theoretical postulation is an open, inexhaustible field of relations that unite the discursive practices of a certain spatio-temporality yet its efficacy in practice lies in the localized analysis characteristic of the archaeology. The episteme is thus coherent with Foucault's concept of anti-history as opposed to history, or of a general history as opposed to a total history to which we now turn in

a comparative description of the archaeology with regard to literary history.

Notes

1. Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Transl. by A. Sheridan. London: Tavistock, 1972; originally published as L'archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969.

2. See our discussion of Madness and Civilization.

3. See above, pp.34-39. The "decentring" of the transcendental subject which informs the Foucauldian project and can be seen to have its roots of theoretical validity in The Order of Things.

4. An example of this principle of determination is the role of the discourse of General Grammar in the Classical episteme The general theory of representation as proposed by general grammar operates as a model in the Classical discursive constellation of the empirical sciences.

5. That Foucault's thought is pervaded by concepts of space is widely acknowledged. P. Major-Poetzl has attempted to situate Foucault in the "contemporary" episteme in this regard by showing that this aspect of his work constitutes a redefinition of space which is to history as Einsteinian relativity is to physics. See P. Major-Poetzl: Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History. Sussex: Harvester, 1983; and "Questions of Geography" in Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge. pp.68-69.

6. See for example "The Origin of Geometry" in Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy. pp.125-133.

7. Quoted in Lemert, C.C. and Gillan, G. Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression. p.21.

8. See Brodeur, J.P. "McDonnell on Foucault: Supplementary Remarks" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 17; No. 3, Sept. 1977 and Lecourt D. Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault. London: NLB, 1969. pp.555-568.

9. Brodeur, J.P. "McDonnell on Foucault: Supplementary Remarks" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17; No. 3, Sept. 1977, p.559.

10. Lecourt D. Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault. London: NLB, 1969. p.188.

11. Ibid.

12. Lecourt may be taken as a leading example of the Marxist's reaction to Foucault. See also Cavallari, H.M; "Savoir and Pouvoir: Michel Foucault's Theory of Discursive Practice" in Humanities in Society: on Foucault, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1980, pp.55-72; Cavallari reiterates Lecourt's argument that Foucault forsakes structuralism and in so doing, retraces his steps towards historical materialism:
> "... it is worth noting that Foucauldian descriptions of discursive practice may be seen to coincide partially with some of the fundamental formulations of historico-dialectical materialism ..."(p.57)

13. Lecourt, D. Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault. London: NLB, 1969. p.106.

14. Cavallari, H.M. "Savoir and Pouvoir: Michel Foucault's Theory of Discursive Practice" in Humanities in Society: on Foucault. Vol. 3; No. 1, Winter 1980, p.57.

15. Sheridan, A. Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth. p.214.

16. See Petit, P. The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, p.59. Petit argues "there is nothing in ... the archive ... to correspond to the sentence in language ... the linguistic model cannot be pressed in (this) area."

17. Cranston, M. "Michel Foucault" in Encounter. No. 30, 1968, pp.34-42. p.42.

18. White, H.V. "Foucault decoded: Notes from Underground" in History and Theory 12 (1973) pp.23-54. p.49.

19. Foucault, M. "Questions on Geography" in Power/Knowledge. p.65.

20. Piaget, J. Structuralism. Transl. and ed. C. Maschler. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

21. ibid, p.154.

22. ibid, p.135.

23. ibid, p.135.

24. White, H.V. "Foucault decoded: Notes from Underground" in History and Theory 12 (1973) p.49.

25. Vico, G. The New Science. Transl. by T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1968.

26. White, H.V. "Foucault decoded: Notes from Underground" in History and Theory 12 (1973) p.49

27. Major-Poetzl, P. Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Towards a New Science of History. Sussex: Harvester, 1983.

28. ibid, p.199.

29. ibid, p.196.

30. Carroll, D. "The Subject of Archaeology or the Sovereignty of the Episteme" in M.L.N. 93; 4 May 1978. pp.695-722. p.702.

31. ibid, p.707.

32. Quoted and translated by Cranston, M., in his article "Michel Foucault", from Foucault's interview with Raymond Bellour, published in Les Lettres Francaises, March 21, 1966.

PART III: Towards an Archaeological Historiography of Literature

In an incisive article entitled "The Fall of Literary History",[1] René Wellek registers the failures of literary history as a discipline capable of coming to terms with its object. There can be little doubt of the validity of Wellek's pronouncement that the field has declined and fallen into crisis through the realization that notions of progress or development are illusionary.[2] The lack of methodological direction that besets the literary historian may be compared, according to Roman Jakobson, to "police who are supposed to arrest a certain person, arrest everybody and carry off everything they find in the house and all the people who pass by chance in the street. Thus the historian of literature appropriates everything - the social setting, psychology, politics, philosophy. Instead of literary scholarship we got a conglomeration of derivative disciplines".[3]

The task of this section is to transpose the Foucauldian archaeology as a method of discursive analysis into the sphere of literary texts. However, before this transposition can be effected in a meaningful manner, the existing conditions of knowledge related to the literary domain must be traced. This is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, to be true to our stance, it must be admitted that the terrain of historical literary study is already complexly inscribed and thus these inscriptions cannot be ignored in the transference of archaeological concepts for fear of offerring a mere tautology. Our second reason is perhaps more important, for if one is to regard oneself as a student of texts, the form of knowledge that exists before a transference of archaeological methodology and aims must be understood so that the efficacy of the archaeology and the validity of Foucault's claims can be fully ascertained, as the requirements of an intelligible method and

material form of knowledge will have been gathered from the analysis of the obstacles and impasses besieging the traditional domain.

3.1: The Crisis of Literary History

Although Wellek essentially retracted his thesis towards a literary history in "The Fall of Literary History",[4] his earlier work, especially his and A. Warren's Theory of Literature[5] has become something of a touchstone in the field. For this reason, it offers a good point from which to begin an analysis of the conditions of knowledge that operate in the traditional domain of literary history.

Wellek asserts in this work that history appears as a "meaningless series of events" or a "meaningless flux of change", a disorder which may be unravelled through its relation to a norm. This relation mediates between the individual work and the general historical process of which it is a part in such a way that the autonomy and individuality of that work is not impaired. His supporting argument for this proposition is as follows:

> "Only then can the apparently meaningless series of events be split into its essential and its inessential elements. Only then can we speak of a historical evolution which yet leaves the individuality of a single event unimpaired. By relating an individual reality to a general value, we do not degrade the individual to a mere specimen of a general concept but instead give significance to the individual. History does not simply individualize general norms (nor is it of course a discontinuous meaningless flux), but the historical process will produce ever new forms of value, hitherto unknown and unpredictable. The relativity of

> the individual work of art to a scale of values is thus nothing else than the necessary correlative of its individuality."[6]

This scale of values is provided by history, so that a 'logical circle' is apparent in which the historical process produces the scale of values by which it is to be judged in return and ordered into periods of literary history. This logical circle is unavoidable, Wellek claims, if the process of history is to be made intelligible.[7]

This process of reasoning by which an absolute principle is obtained from history and then reimposed upon it as an ordering principle is pertinent to many other theses of literary history. The list is endless, but we may take a few examples to illustrate the point. This process of reasoning linked to the idea of the autonomy of literary history as found in Wellek was already evident in H. Wölfflin's Principles of Art History.[8] a pioneering text in art history which has formed the basis of theses in literary history such as the work of David Lodge, Strich and W.T. Jones.[9] Wölfflin proposes that a 'visual schema' or 'visual denominator' underlies a variety of works that appear at a certain time, and it is these universal forms of representation that define the epoch or period. The possibilities of an epoch are formulated according to the opposition of basic stylistic elements which gain ascendancy over each other alternately giving rise to a historical periodicity. Like Wellek, Wölfflin contends that the historical process is made intelligible through grasping the essential elements of its inner logic or 'inner necessity'.[10] These elements themselves are extracted and reinvested in the history of those works as a principle of organization.

Whereas Wellek and Wölfflin propose anonymous histories in which norms, values, standards and visual possibilities govern as universals, Ernst Gombrich[11] proposes a subject-centred art history which strongly advocates the importance of the idea of art as a

human activity. Although Gombrich is concerned mainly with art history, the method and conceptions he employs permeate the domain of literary history and may be found entombed already in such works as Legouis and Cazamian's History of English Literature.[12] Gombrich proposes:

> "... 'works of art' are not the result of some mysterious activity, but objects made by human beings for human beings ... everyone of their features is a result of a decision by the artist."[13]

Gombrich's history of artists is organized by artistic initiative and periodized according to generations. The organizing principle of such a history is thus originality, the peaks of which are represented by the 'great' artist. This is apparent in his view of nineteenth century art:

> "The history of the nineteenth century, as we usually see it today, is really the history of a handful of such sincere men whose integrity of purpose led them to defy convention, not in order to gain notoreity, but so they might explore new possibilities undreamt of by previous generations."[14]

Thus although Gombrich's conception of history is entirely at odds with those of Wellek and Wölfflin, the same process by which history is organized is at work. Gombrich sifts through the chronological order of historical events in order to define points of originality from which a period or 'generation' of repetition ensues. Thus a principle - that of creative innovation - is extracted from the works and reinvested in order to demarcate a generation as a time period grouping several artists.

Although Wellek does not countenance any reference to socio-economic and political history in order to explain change in literary history, Wölfflin and Gombrich admit this as a second avenue after innovation and the inner logic of the historical process. This avenue often takes overriding precedence over others for Marxist historians such as Lukács[15] who regards the specificity of literature as lying in

its relation to the 'substructure'. Literature is reduced to a 'reflection of reality'[16] which falls into the ideological and is therefore explicable in terms of the socio-economic forces that underlie historical events. Whereas many Marxist theorists rely too heavily on the base-superstructure model for explanations of so-called artistic endeavours, linking such endeavours directly to the class struggles, as for example Nicos Hadjinicolaou does in Art History and Class Struggle,[17] Arnold Hauser[18] manages to balance the methodological tools of a Marxist approach with the concerns of the domain of art history. The mediation between society and the work of art is described by Hauser in these terms:

> "Culture serves to preserve society. Spiritual creations, traditions, conventions, and institutions are but ways and means of social organization. Religion, philosophy, science and art all have their place in the struggle to preserve society."[19]

All the elements of a Marxist elucidation are there - ideology, society and the struggles that occur therein. Hauser regards works of art as historical products of societies, and artists are situated in specific socio-historical contexts in which they act according to the socio-economic relations, often unconsciously and without intention. Class situations and interests are proposed as an objective, institutional structure which affect the production of 'art' rather than subjectively varying mental conditions. Despite these hallmarks of Marxist analysis, Hauser suggests:

> "... it would be a mistake to suppose that social conditions produce the forms in terms by which the artistic revolution expresses itself, these forms are just as much the product of psychological and stylistic as of sociological factors."[20]

In this regard, Hauser is concerned with how much of the work is attributable to 'personal initiative'.[21] This is to be analyzed with reference to social presuppositions, Hauser suggests, for to preserve the individuality of every phenomenon in the history of

literature or art means that the historian is limited to purely descriptive accounts of the historical process, a return perhaps to Wellek's 'meaningless flux of change'. Hauser argues that systematic research aims to establish the common character of a multiplicity of objects in order to make these more manageable for analysis and more comprehensible. In this respect, one needs a standard by which to compare works and judge the representative significance of each for history. Hauser proposes that this standard is style.

This notion of period-style which is sought in the texts and then deployed as a standard relies upon the same process of thought found in Wellek, Wölfflin and Gombrich. A group of texts of a given time segment of history are analyzed for common aesthetic traits which are then imposed as the qualitative principle of the formation of those texts. If we take Hauser's definition of style:

> "Historical structures such as tradition, convention, level of technique, prevalent artistic effects, current rules of taste, or topical subjects set objective, rational, superpersonal goals and bounds to the irrational spontaneity of psychological functioning, and in co-operation with this latter produce what we call a 'style'",[22]

and compare it with Wellek's definition of the period as a normative system:

> "... a time section dominated by a system of literary norms, standards, and conventions, whose introduction, spread, diversification, integration, and disappearance can be traced",[23]

it is clear that we have come full circle. So one could go on, taking up other such theories and theses that occupy the domain of literary history, or art history for that matter, and the list of those that rehearse the process of abstracting such organizing principles as those elucidated here would grow endlessly. One need only take up such varied offerrings as in the Proceedings of the

Seventh Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, volume 2^{24} to find that the process of abstraction is embedded on the level of the problematic of the field of literary history and that it therefore permeates through much of the work carried out in that field.

Let us restate the process by which these theories operate in terms of a conception of knowledge, for, after all, the activity is bound within a discipline professing to know texts. The conception of knowledge within the domain of literary history is constituted by a process which takes place between a subject and an object, the relation between these given unities defining in turn the theoretical field in which 'to know' is the abstraction by the subject of the essence of the object. Louis Althusser describes this operation as the basis of the empiricist conception of knowledge:

> "To know is to abstract from the real object its essence, the possession of which by the subject is then called knowledge. Whatever particular variants this concept of abstraction may adopt, it defines an invariant structure which constitutes the specific index of empiricism."[25]

As Althusser makes clear, the problem with such a conception of knowledge is its treatment of the object as constituted by essential and inessential elements. In the abstraction of the essential element, the inessential is stripped away, purged and eliminated to reveal the essence in its pure form. The formation of the organizing principle of literary history involves the isolation of such an essence and the elimination of the supposedly inessential elements which are considered as veiling the 'true' nature and intelligibility of history. However, the process thus employed is invariably and necessarily circular by virtue of the aim of their studies. The essential features of the real object of criticism is sought through the separation of essence from the inessential, and to complete the circle, this essence is reapplied to the historical object of analysis with the aim of defining this object as a whole. The

conception of the organizing principle thus is the point of interaction between historical and critical studies of 'art'. If one can extract the essence of 'art', one can know art, and therefore one can know its history. The organizing principle is both the essence of the object and the means of the intelligibility of its history.

From this, it is clear that there is a double emphasis on the event itself; firstly as that which contains the essence of its own existence, and secondly as the constituent of history. The event is the single level at which the traditional approaches to literary history propose to operate, and whatever extrinsic factors are taken into account, they are regarded as contingent upon the identity of the event. The event as the real object of knowledge is regarded as containing the knowledge of itself within itself as a hidden essence. Thus the object takes on a new existence - the existence of its own knowledge which implies that the event as object is able to self-elaborate.

In order to make the event speak of itself, the historian relies upon the practice of interpretation. The text is translated through interpretation into a commentary which paradoxically professes to reveal the content of meaning unchanged yet at the same time, stripped of the inessential ornamentation that conceals its meaning. The economy of the text is thus simultaneously revealed and destroyed, as the event as object is with the same movement elucidated by its fragmentation into essential and inessential elements. Pierre Macherey points out the inherent contradictions of such a practice:

> "Interpretation is a repetition, but a strange repetition that says more by saying less: a purifying repetition, at the end of which a hidden meaning appears in all its naked truth. The work is only the expression of this meaning, an ore which must be smelted to extract its precious content."[26]

The practice of interpretation is thus a process of abstraction which is endlessly repeatable, since as we have seen, the element regarded as constituting the essence is not the same for every interpreter. Hence literary history becomes a mere tautology as each interpretation of history and literary events appropriates the object only partially with the weight of the study placed first in one place and then in another and so on ad infinitum.

At the heart of the empiricist conception of knowledge lies the misconception that the real object is the object of knowledge. However, as we have seen, the real object is conceived as being constituted by both essential and inessential elements, the former of which is the object of knowledge. Thus two objects become apparent when the object is questioned: the rough and impure real object and the purified essential object of knowledge. The fundamental fault of the empiricist conception of knowledge therefore lies in the process of knowledge itself which simultaneously creates and negates the distinction between the real object and the object of knowledge.

These misconceptions and contradictions in the treatment of the object are not apparent in the empiricist field of knowledge because the concept of the object is not questioned but assumed to be an 'obvious' unity or a 'given' in that it is concrete and empirically observable in the real. Likewise, the subject is assumed as obvious. Appearing under the guises of consciousness, reason and thought, the subject of knowledge occupies a position from which all of history may be commanded in an act of self-consciousness. Just as the author as subject operates as the principle of the unity of a group of works, as the point of their genesis, so the knowing subject becomes the principle of the unity of history and the centre of its being in that the process of knowledge organizes the chaos of the past into a meaningful and progressive continuity. The literary historian is thus situated

in an empirico-transcendental site from which he is engaged in the empirical analysis of human representations determined by the labour of writing, the repetitions of desire and the constraints of language, and yet implicated in the transcendental through the process of abstracting an Absolute which organizes history. This places the practice of literary history in the modern space of knowledge as it is mapped in The Order of Things.[27] The literary historian occupies the site of Man in that space, and he is thus forever caught between the premise that Man is finite and its correlative that his representations are entirely knowable, and the problem of the validity of that knowledge. For this reason, he attempts the impossible in attempting to regard the transcendental category of philosophy in order to overcome the characterization of his knowledge of finitude while simultaneously gazing at the representations of Man's finitude. This accounts for the continual oscillation between the analysis of literary texts and the reapproximations of them made on the theoretical level that characterizes the traditional endeavours of literary history.

A third concept which remains unquestioned in the epistemological field of literary history is that of historical time. Once more, like the object and the subject of knowledge, time is introduced as having an immediate empirical existence. The simplicity of such chronologically-based evolutionary histories such as Legouis and Cazamian's History of English Literature[28] has long since fallen into disrepute[29] and historians such as Rene Wellek have realized the need to confront the complexities of history, as he writes:

> "What is needed ... is a modern concept of time, modelled not on the metric chronology of the calendar and physical science, but on an interpenetration of the causal order in experience and memory. A work of art is not simply a member of a series, a link in a chain. It may stand in relation to anything in the

> past. It is not only a structure to be analyzed descriptively ... It is a totality of values which do not adhere to the structure but constitute its very nature. All attempts to drain value from literature have failed and will fail because its very essence is value."[30]

Despite Wellek's dismissal of chronology as a basis for historical study, he does not question the concept of time that is operative in such histories. The elements of obviousness are still present in phrases such as "causal order" and "totality of values" remain. Both the histories Wellek attacks and the history he proposes take over misconceptions from the Hegelian notion of historical time. For Hegel, historical time is the mere reflection in the continuity of time of the essence of the historical totality. This essence is for Hegel the moment or present of the development of the Idea. If we substitute Wellek's value for Idea, it is clear that the concept of time in Wellek's argument is indeed Hegelian.

Althusser in Reading Capital[31] isolates two essential characteristics of Hegelian historical time; the homogeneous continuity of time and the contemporaneity of time, or the category of the historical present. The homogeneous continuity of time is the reflection of the continuity of the dialectical development of the Idea. We can see that Wölfflin advocates this conception in its entirety, but other historians of the art forms have found this idea to be problematical in its direct application because of the Hegelian 'end of history' thesis. However, their modifications of this conception of the historical process have been mainly on minor issues. They remain true to this Hegelian thesis as they still treat time as a continuum which may be divided according to a periodization corresponding to a succession of one totality after the other. The periods that are traditionally accepted are believed to accurately divide the continuity of time according to clearly definable

moments of development, or 'presents'.

This leads us to Althusser's second isolated characteristic - that of the 'contemporeity of time', the historical present. This he finds to be the cordition of possibility of the notion of a homogeneous continuity of time. His argument is as follows:

> "... if historical time is the existence of the social totality we must be precise about the structure of this existence. The fact that the relation between the social totality and its historical existence is a relation with an immediate existence implies that this relation is itself immediate. In other words: the structure of historical existence is such that all the elements of the whole always co-exist in one and the same time, one and the same present, and are therefore contemporaneous with one another in one and the same present."[32] (His emphasis)

He proposes that this type of structure of the historical existence of the social totality allows an "essential section" to be made. This Althusser describes as "an intellectual operation in which a vertical break is made at any moment in historical time".[33] This section reveals the 'present' in such a way that all the parts of the whole may be viewed in an immediate relation to one another which expresses their essence, as these parts of the whole existence in a co-presence. It is specifically the 'spiritual' unity of this totality that allows this operation, as this unity is that of an expressive totality. This means that all the elements of the whole are expressions of the whole and thus of the essence of that whole. Althusser describes the Hegelian totality as that which:

> "has a type of unity in which each element of the whole, whether a material or economic determination, a political institution or a religious, artistic or philosophical form, is never anything more than the presence of the concept with itself at a historically

determined moment."[34]

It is clear from Althusser's elucidation of the implications of the Hegelian concept of historical time, that it is not only the Romantic-aesthetic school of historians who utilize the essential section in the form of the 'spirit of the age', but that its arch-enemy; the Marxist historian is implicated in the same gesture. Lukács, for example, sees literary history as a "moment" of general history in the sense that the former is a reflection of the struggles that give impetus to the latter.[35] This implies that all social practices express the historical essence of the time. Such attempts to explain the emergence of a text or a period through the incorporation of socio-cultural evidence finds their philosophical basis in the Hegelian notion of expressive causality, which is inextricably connected to this view of the social totality. Socio-cultural evidence is used to gain an insight into the present of the literary endeavours under analysis and thus supplies the knowledge of the historical essence, be it class struggle or 'spirit'. In short, this notion relies upon the self-consciousness of the present and literature is analyzed as a form of this self-consciousness, as an expression of it.

For Althusser, this conception of history is by definition historicist. Foucault refers to it as total history, the definition of which he phrases in terms of a distinction with his own concept of general history:

> "A total description draws all phenomena around a single point - a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of dispersion."[36]

It is clear that Foucault proposes his own project as that which is in opposition to the traditional endeavours of literary history. The archaeology as the methodology of that history becomes a method of resistance, the terms of which are the basis for

Foucault's claim that he has evacuated the traditional domain of histories of culture and thought. It is to these terms of resistance that we turn in order to test Foucault's claim that the archaeology is not embroiled in the same conglomeration as the history of ideas, of culture and art.

3.2: The Archaeology as a Method of Resistance: Memory and Counter-Memory

Traditional literary history is formulated through the empiricist conception of knowledge, which is defined by the acceptance of 'given' unities. The subject of knowledge, the object and the notion of time are not questioned because of their obviousness. The aim of such a history is to reconstruct the totality of the past as the memory of the present. History thus becomes an act of remembrance, a backward gaze from the vantage point of the present, from which the entire horizon of the historical domain may be viewed in a gaze down the tunnel of time. In this conception of knowledge, one finds, as Walter Benjamin writes, "time filled by the presence of the now".[37] From the place of the subject of knowledge, history appears as a continuous association of memories, the knowledge of which is possible through the self-consciousness of each moment in the continuum. The gaze of the historian is rather like a beam of light from a searchlight that traverses the domain, illuminating the ages of Man in a succession. Man is thus both the subject and the object of history, and the process of knowing that history is aimed at reconstituting the past moments of Man's development in a series of continuous memories.

In order to secure the difference between this empiricist or total history, Foucault offers the concept of counter-memory as the basis for historical knowledge. Whereas memory emphasizes

temporality and succession, counter-memory spatializes history in order to reassert the possibilities of discontinuity. Rather than attempt to return the totality of the past to memory, counter-memory concerns the topography of carefully delimited localities in which a relational network of discursivity is uncovered. History is thus regarded as a multi-layered space in which events are dispersed according to the specificity of their conditions of possibility which must be activily exhumed. The object of knowledge is thus no longer the assumed unity of a text or group of texts but the relations of discursivity that enabled such a text or texts to appear. Likewise the subject of knowledge no longer resides upon the vantage point of the present, passively awaiting the self-consciousness of history to reveal knowledge in the form of a return of memory, but is separated from the events of the past by irreversible ruptures and discontinuities. History is no longer a continual progression towards ourselves in the present, but a series of discontinuous rearticulations and reconfigurations. The concept of counter-memory thus rests upon the deconstruction of the obviousness of temporality the subject and the object.

The formation of the concept of counter-memory as that which distinguishes general history rests upon two interrelated methodological decisions. The first of these is a rejection of Hegelian concepts and categories of thought that seeks to constrain the anarchy of history through dialectics and a belief in the possibility of a synthesis. The second decision that Foucault makes becomes the basis for the archaeology, that is the decision to describe the differences that are liberated with the suspension of categorical thought. He contends:

> "... it was necessary to free ourselves from Hegel - from the opposition of predicates, from contradiction and negation, from all dialectics ... The most tenacious subjection of difference is undoubtedly that maintained by categories.... (which) create a

> condition where being maintains its undifferentiated repose at the highest level. Categories organize the play of affirmations and negations, establish the legitimacy of resemblances within representation, and guarantee the objectivity and operation of concepts. They suppress the anarchy of difference, divide differences into zones, delimit their rights, and prescribe their task of specification with respect to individual beings. On one side, they can be understood as the a priori forms of knowledge but, on the other, they appear as an archaic morality, the ancient Decalogue that the identical imposed on difference. Difference can only be liberated through the invention of an acategorical thought."[38]

The endeavour to formulate the archaeology as a mode of historical analysis is synonymous therefore with this invention of acategorical thought.

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault begins with exactly this project, for he suspends the homogenizing notions of tradition, development, evolution, spirit and influence which are the hallmarks of Hegelian categorical thought.[39] These principles of classification and assumed unities are the conditions of possibility of continuous history which itself is regarded as pre-existing the process of knowledge. From our previous discussions regarding total history's reconstruction of memory, it is clear that the knowing subject occupies a transcendental position with regard to the historical domain, and for this reason Foucault argues that the suspension of the categories of total history and the decentring of the Subject are necessarily correlative:

> "Continuous history is the indispensible correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the

> promise that one day the subject - in the form of historical consciousness - will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode."[40]

The literary historian thus utilizes the categories of tradition, development and evolution as the apparent means by which all phenomena may be brought into a coherent whole and by which this totality may be apprehended and explained. The position that the historian takes in relation to the material of which he wishes to gain a knowledge is defined by the history that he undertakes. This position is, for Foucault as it is for Althusser, that dictated by the empiricist conception of knowledge.

The Subject also operates as a part of the material analyzed in the form of the author. Traditional literary history relies upon the author as a principle of the unity of a group of works and as the point of genesis of those works. The author is regarded as important in the search for an explanation of the content of the works, hence biographical and psychological data, and social experiences such as class position are invoked together in a single gesture towards the author as the creator of otherwise enigmatic events. The author as creator is the node of intersection of spiritual or idealist and materialist elements. He is the mediator between society and art, yet also the spring of the creative urge, the gifted perpetrator of the 'spirit of the times'. In the effort to uncover a causality capable of explaining the emergence of the work, literary critics and historians have been caught oscillating between these two poles, referring to the author's socio-cultural environment or his experience of life, and when this does not account for every facet of his work, the individual's creative initiative is invoked to account for the remainder.

Thus the author is accorded both an empirical and a transcendental status, from which he exerts a unifying force over his work and, conversely, to which the unity of meaning is attributable. Foucault contends that the author as subject is relied upon as a concrete unity. This unity operates to elide the dispersion of history:

> "Governing this function (of the author) is the belief that there must be - at a particular level of an author's thought, of his conscious or unconscious desire - a point where contradictions are resolved, where the incompatible elements can be shown to relate to one another or to cohere around a fundamental and originating contradiction."[41]

This founding contradiction which cannot be resolved is that unstable ground upon which the author stands in relation to his experience of empirical existence and to his intentions in representing that experience.

Since Foucault rejects the sovereignty of the Subject,[42] the apparent unities of the book and the oeuvre are rejected in its wake. In the domain of traditional literary history the problem of how the individual text is to be situated within the period and the general continuum of history, is recurrent. This problem is rooted in the designation of the book as an 'obvious' object, the unity of which is the centre of its individual value. Thus the sovereignty of the book is to be protected at all costs, especially when that individual value is aligned with creative value. This initiates a return to the founding function of the Subject. In questioning the unity of the Subject, finding it a falsification and disentling it into a series of variable relations that comprise the enunciative function, Foucault brings into question the unity of the book and the oeuvre. Instead of a concrete object, Foucault finds a myriad of relations that stretch beyond the inner coherence of the book. This set of relations forming the referential,

are variable as the referential is relative to the discursive network in which it is situated. Likewise, the question of what is to be included in the oeuvre, the problem of qualification - grids of specificity, authorities and institutional constraints - collapses the myth of the oeuvre's self-evidence. The acceptance of the oeuvre as an a priori form of knowledge is objectionable as it refers back to the homogenization of categorical thought which admits the presence of the Subject:

> "One is admitting that there must be a level (as deep as it is necessary to imagine it) at which the oeuvre emerges, in all its fragments, even the smallest, the most inessential ones, as the expression of the thought, the experience, the imagination, or the unconscious of the author, or, indeed of the historical determinations that operate upon him. But it is at once apparent that such a unity, far from being given immediately, is the result of an operation; that this operation is interpretative ....."[43]

The operation of interpretation thus assumes a point of genesis that is explanative of the book or oeuvre. This fundamental beginning is reconstituted in memory through the synthesis of oppositions such as society/individual, tradition/text and experience/intention. These oppositions collapse when the unities of the Subject as creative source and the object - book, of the 'moment' of history and the expressive totality of societal experience, are pulverized. In their place, Foucault finds multitudes of relations of difference dispersed in the multi-leveled space of discourse. It is in this space that Foucault constructs the conceptual apparatus of the archaeology.

It is clear that the archaeology is not to be subsumed under the history of ideas as the projects undertaken by general and total histories are opposed.[44] Where total history seeks to

impose continuity and unity through locating points of genesis, general history allows the free play of difference and dispersion. Where total history reconstructs memory through synthesis, general history allows differentiation and divergence by acknowledging the space of discourse. This counter-memory requires, Foucault contends, a new kind of thought:

> "The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction; thought of the multiple - of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity; thought that does not conform to a pedagogical model (the fakery of prepared answers), but that attacks insoluble problems - that is, a thought that addresses a multiplicity of exceptional points, which are displaced as we distinguish their conditions and which insist and subsist in the play of repetitions."[45]

This claim that Foucault makes for a new thought or new process of textual knowledge is a heady one. It has been seen to function effectively in The Order of Things which is, I have argued, the work in which the archaeology is employed in its truest form in that it is here that it appears free of the tendencies towards Marxist or structuralist concepts and strategies which were apparent in the earlier texts. However, the positivities analyzed in The Order of Things function in substantially different ways to the body of texts that fall under the umbrella term of 'literature'. The question remains as to efficacy of this new process of knowledge and the conceptual apparatus it engenders in the space of this peculiar discourse.

3.3: Literary Discourse and Knowledge

Although Foucault does not focus upon literature to any great extent in his archaeologies, literary texts occupy particular sites with regard to knowledge (savoir) which is consistent in the three books. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault situates the first sign of the rupture between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in the division of the visual arts and literature's perception of madness.[46] Since the sixteenth century, two conceptions of madness are found in literature. On the one hand, the majority of texts remain at a distance from madness, judging it from the safety of the rule of reason; whilst on the other, a few texts express what Foucault calls the "tragic or comic experience of madness"[47] - the madness which has escaped confinement by rational discourse as found in the works of Bosch, Artaud and Nietzsche. In his attempt to probe the limits of reason, Foucault returns to the latter expressions of madness in his conclusion for it is these that teeter on the outermost limits of what may be said. Likewise, in The Order of Things literary texts are situated at the moments of transformation described in the work, at the limits of the epistemes. Between the Renaissance and the Classical, Foucault places Cervantes' Don Quixote in which the limits of resemblance are played off against Classical discourse of representation, with the result that the search for similitude appears to enter the realm of imagination, illusion and madness. Sade holds sway at the juncture of the Classical and the Modern, at which the limits of classical discourse are buffeted violently by the upsurgance of desire. Finally, Foucault turns to Nietzsche, Nerval, Artaud and Mallarmé in his discussion of the modern episteme, as it is in the work of these writers that Foucault anticipates, but as yet cannot define, the birth of a new episteme.

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In all cases, literature can be seen to be intricately related

to the changing configurations of knowledge that are under analysis. It is in literature that Foucault consistently uncovers not only the epistemological figures of the time, but more importantly, he finds the change of relations of savoir most obvious. Literature does not need to heed the present's dictum on Truth, and thus the contradictions of the play of resemblance and the real world as in Don Quixote or the insanity of infinite representational possibilities as in Sade are more readily accessible to literary discourse than to others whose relations to the discursive object are more rigidly institutionalized.

David Carroll[48] has argued that the literary texts in Foucault's archaeologies are "a subversive, disruptive form of 'literature'"[49] with which Foucault identifies his own critical perspective. These texts, Carroll argues, are both the source of Foucault's critical enterprise as well as its limiting condition. In the light of this argument, he says of Madness and Civilization:

> "The History of Madness narrated by Foucault would then be the culmination of this series of fictions (texts, paintings) that remain vigilant in darkness, that resist the obscuring clarity of rational philosophical discourse. In other words the darkness of the night in which they are rooted is the source of its critical clarity; this is the reason it is able to describe both sides of the division, to describe the extra-discursive silence of madness as well as the confining discursiveness of reason."[50]

These texts are then regarded as "outside history", and are regarded as "meta-archaeological texts"[51] which lie outside the different epistemological configurations that are traced by the archaeology of madness. Carroll finds the literary texts in The Order of Things to have the same function of source and delimitation with regard to the archaeology, and concludes:

> "It is as if the hidden purpose of The Order of Things is to highlight the radical nature of those disruptive texts that escape archaeological classification and are thus extra-epistemological. In this sense, The Order of Things would be as much about the disorder of these disruptive texts and everything that escapes determination by an episteme, as about the order of words or things determined by the episteme."[52]

From this perspective, Carroll therefore argues that these literary texts cannot be included in the archaeological enterprise, but that they stand in relation to its critical gaze as a "sovereign form of discourse" which is an escape route by which the archaeology bypasses the "traps set by history, philosophy, literature and politics."[53]

Carroll's arguments find tneir foundation in a number of misapprehensions concerning the archaeology's relation to the episteme. Primarily he advocates the view that the epistemes are totally discontinuous, having no possible set of relations in common. Although Foucault acknowledged that The Order of Things does allow one to understand the epistemes as totally discontinuous blocks, such a notion, as we have seen, is dispelled in The Archaeology of Knowledge. But more importantly, the literary texts sited at the points of transformation between epistemes bear witness to the fact that such transformations are not total disjunctures. Don Quixote and the works of Sade contain elements of both configurations which clash with each other. Foucault's discussion does not place them outside configurations of knowledge, but rather shows the heterogeneity of epistemic elements they contain. His reference to Artaud and Nietzsche are not with regard to their disruption of traditional rationality per se, but of their incongruity with the modern episteme. Foucault invokes them, therefore, as the site from which one might anticipate the

emergence of a new episteme. When Foucault speaks of the "sovereignty of these experiences"[54] in reference to the work of Bataille, Blanchot and others, he does so not to place them outside history, but rather in regard to their transgression of the modern epistemic configuration. He contends that one day they must be assimulated and he means this as a movement into a new episteme.

Carroll assumes that the function of the literary texts in Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things is equivocal, however what he has in fact done, is transpose the conditions of the earlier book onto the later book. In our discussion of Madness and Civilization,[55] we found that the insurmountable obstacle that led to the infeasibility of the book was what Foucault called the "simple problem of elocution",[56] in other words, the impossibility of speaking outside the bounds of reason and history. In this work, therefore, the literary texts discussed by Foucault are implicated in his dubious attempt to speak of the Other. However, in The Order of Things, this attempt has been cast aside, and the function of literary texts in this work cannot be seen in the light of the earlier work. On the contrary, these texts are discussed in terms of epistemic shifts, and are shown to be participants in knowledge. As the function of language in these texts is that characteristic of the different epistemes. One last point must be made in this regard: Carroll writes that Foucault

> "... has argued that his own critical perspective is not determined by any particular epistemology or ideology and that it is situated outside or at the limits of history itself."[57]

Undoubtedly, we have seen Foucault's interest in limits to be a basic component of his project, but Foucault cannot be understood to have situated his project beyond the limits of history. This endeavour amounts to an impossibility as is clear from our earlier discussion of Madness and Civilization. However, that Foucault situates his work at the limits of history is an entirely different

proposition, as this is feasible given the assertion in the conclusion to The Order of Things that the present is a moment of transformation.

What Foucault's use of literature in his work does show is that literature is in knowledge, and has specific relations of its own to historical knowledge. Together with this, Foucault's analysis of these texts is seen to operate on the same level as the works which are embroiled in the positivities of natural history, the analysis of wealth and general grammar. They are not included as illustrations of what was transforming in literature alone, but within the configurations of knowledge that support the bodies of knowledge that became the human sciences, configurations that delimited certain functions of language. The common ground where the analysis of the 'scientific' pursuits of natural history, the analysis of wealth and general grammar may be aligned with that of literature, is the concept of savoir that Foucault proposes as the knowledge that interests the archaeologist. It is at the level of savoir that the conditions of knowledge that are necessary for this set of discursive practices to exist. Thus, although the three positivities under analysis make claims to the status of Truth as institutionally recognized disciplines or connaissances, at the level of savoir, the conditions of their possibility coincide with those of literary discourse. An essential difference between the positivities of scientific pursuits and literary discourse is thus clear here. Whereas the former install themselves as connaissances with claims to Truth, literary discourse remains at the level of savoir in its relation to knowledge. By remaining at this level, literature is not constrained by the authority of connaissance - both institutional and intra-discursive - and thus need not address a single object nor conform to the recognized appropriation of an object. Rather, it is a parasitic discourse in this sense, in that it takes over the verified objects of other discourses and treats them according to the rules of its own discursive economy.

This economy, however, is still implicated in savoir, in its configuration of possibilities and its transformations. Thus literary discourse, by its situation in the space of savoir, is nomadic, traversing this space and alighting where it will. It reactivates the verifications and validations of conaissances in the margins through referential relations that situate it in the broader discursive network of the archive, and the episteme. Literature as a nomadic discourse may also activate discursive relations from a variety of localities and in so doing, may reveal nexes of contention, of transformation, of reversal or rupture.

It is this feature of literature that draws Foucault's interest, and which he reveals in The Order of Things by placing certain literary texts at the points of transformation of epistemic configurations. What is at stake in this situation of literature in The Order of Things, is that this discourse is able to reveal the transformations of discursive relations with great clarity because it is not confined by the authorities that control the production of Truth in discourses of conaissance.

Thus we may conclude that literature is in knowledge. Whereas discourses of conaissance present themselves as objects of knowledge in that they aspire to disseminate knowledge in the form of Truth; literary discourse, by making no claim to the status of conaissance, is immediately analyzable as an object in knowledge (savoir). Although literature is non-referential since it makes no claim to speak of a real object in terms of verification; it does appropriate and disseminate the conditions of knowledge tnat make possible the discursive objects of conaissances. The consequence of this is that literary criticism and history cannot remain mesmerized by the illusive spectre of art for its own sake, but instead becomes invested with the historical knowledge of culture as a product of textuality.

Edward Said describes the new face of literary analysis in the light of the Foucauldian process of knowledge:

> "Criticism cannot assume that its province is merely the text, not even the great literary text. It must see itself, with other discourse, inhabiting a much contested cultural space, in which what has counted in the continuity and transmission of knowledge has been the signifier, as an event that has left lasting traces upon the human subject. Once we take that view, then literature as an isolated paddock in the broad cultural field disappears, and with it too the harmless rhetoric of self-delighting humanism. Instead we will be able, I think, to read and write with a sense of the greater stake in historical and political effectiveness that literary as well as all other texts have had."[58]

Such an argument for the situation of literary analysis in a "contested cultural space" where the historical import of textuality is at stake rests upon the concept of savoir, for it is this knowledge that pervades the space of discursivity and which enables the appropriation of all discourse at the same level. Since literature may be analyzed as an object in knowledge (savoir). it follows that the conceptual apparatus of the archaeology must be applicable in practice to literary discourse.

3.4: A Practical Application of the Archaeology to Literary Discourse

Between the publication of Henry Fielding's The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great (1743)[59] and Laurence Sterne's The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1759-1767)[60] is a period of a mere sixteen years. Yet these two fictional biographies, which

are often grouped together by traditional literary history in the same period,[61] apprehend the function of language, the position of the subject and the project of writing a novel in decidedly different fashions. It is points of disparity such as this, that interest the archaeologist, for one has what appears to be a possible point of rupture despite the chronological proximity of these two events. The set of discursive relations that operate within and anterior to these events and the transformations they have undergone from one event to the other demarcates a certain locality in the literary space where transformation[s] [in] the discursive practice may be investigated as regards t[he] [problem] of situating Sterne's novel, a problem that has perpl[exed] literary historians considerably.

Our analysis of these texts will have its emphasis on the concepts of the statement and the discursive formation, but will necessarily be incomplete. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the archive as the space of savoir and the horizon of the archaeological analysis admits the necessity of the tracing of inter-discursive relations between a literary text and the discursivities that border that text in terms of its objects' referentials or the adoption of strategies and concepts. This truly archaeological analysis of the two literary texts reaches beyond the scope of this thesis, but it will suffice to show the directions open to such analysis in this respect. The second reason is correlative to the first, as the aim of this textual analysis is to show the archaeological concepts at work and our emphasis remains with the possibilities of these concepts in a scrutiny of literature. We shall thus take each work in turn and analyze the type of statements and the epistemic figures that emerge in them, and from this situate the texts epistemically.

3.4.1: Jonathan Wild

"Roguery, and not a rogue, is my subject."[62]

Jonathan Wild appeared almost twenty years after the execution of the real individual, who was hanged at Tyburn in 1725. Wild was notorious for pioneering organized crime in London. His death was immediately followed by innumerable accounts of his life. Most of these accounts combined journalistic, biographical and fictional elements[63] and sensationalized the exploits of the criminal. Despite this, these accounts all had the 'real' individual as their referent to some degree.

Fielding's novel denies this referential relation to the 'real' or empirical individual, and introduces in its place a conceptual framework into which a type of human nature may be placed and evaluated. The object of the novel is encompassed in the introductory statement:

> "I do by no means intend in the character of my hero to represent (human) nature in general."[64]

The basis for such a statement is the classificatory doctrine of human nature that is exposed in the introduction. The "true sublime" consists of a fusion of the good and great in human nature, and raises such a being "above the order of this creation".[65] The "good" is described as that in which "our wonder ceases; our delight is lessened; but our love remains".[66] Lastly the "great" or "false sublime" is that in which "pride, ostentation, insolence, cruelty, and every kind of villainy" is found. It is this latter case that becomes the object of the novel.

The proposal of this classificatory grid of specification of human nature and the denial of any link between the novel and the real Jonathan Wild opens a space in which the language of ideas and the language of fiction interplay. It is in this space that the relation between the enunciative function and the object is operative. The

opening of Chapter III, which describes "The Birth, parentage, and education of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great" exemplifies this:

> "It is observable that nature seldom produces any one who is afterwards to act a notable part on the stage of life, but she gives some warning of her intention ... giving us warning, as it were, and crying:
>
> - Venienti occurrite morbo".[67]

The position of the subject or the enunciative function is that of the distanced observer of experience. This relation is uniform throughout the novel, and is reiterated in such statements as:

> "We must beg leave to observe that Nature is seldom so kind as those writers who draw characters absolutely perfect."[68]

In statements such as these, the site of the author-function remains above the action, resting on the authority of the earnest scrutineer of experience and the learned authority of a man of ideas adept at observation and discriminatory judgement:

> "We will endeavour ... to describe them all with as much exactness as possible."[69]

Observation, exact description and judgement demarcate the space in which the discursive object is constructed. The enunciative series of the novel is a series of scenes in which the experience of the false sublime is ordered from its genesis to its final "highest consummation of human GREATNESS".[70] The novel progresses towards a final tabulation of the characteristics of the false sublime:

> "Jonathan Wild had every qualification necessary to form a great man. As his most powerful and predominant passion was ambition, so nature had, with consummate propriety, adapted all his faculties to the attaining those glorious ends to which this passion directed him.

> He was extremely ingenious in inventing designs, artful in contriving the means to accomplish his purposes, and resolute in executing them: for as the most exquisite cunning and most undaunted boldness qualified him for any undertaking, so was he not restrained by any of those weaknesses which disappoint the views of mean and vulgar souls, and which are comprehended in one general term of honesty, which is a corruption of HONGSTY, a word derived from what the Greeks call an ass. He was entirely free from those low vices of modesty and good-nature ... His lust was inferior only to his ambition; ... His avarice was immense ... his rapaciousness was indeed so violent, that nothing ever contented him but the whole ... The character which he most valued himself upon, and which he principally honoured in others, was that of hypocrisy."[71]

The register of characteristics that define "greatness" is constructed around the name. "Great" and "Greatness" is the centrifugal point of the narrative. Hardly a chapter title passes without the inclusion of either word and hardly an incident is recounted without direct recourse to the nature of this being.

The object is broken down into its constituents and observed in operation upon various surfaces of emergence such as the family, marriage and business, as well as the legal and moral which are sustained throughout the novel. Wild is portrayed in all areas of social existence and each statement in the enunciative schema binds these spheres together in a movement towards naming the very nature of that existence. This taxonomy of qualities combine to designate "greatness", the general law of its being and the conditions under which it is knowable. But this is only one direction in which the enunciative series moves, the other is the

deconstruction of the object through a moral grid of specification. In this way, the components of the object are analyzed through comparison to its opposite, "goodness", as represented in the character Heartfree. Through the intersection of these two directions, the place of the name is secured. Thus the force of the discourse in its search for the proper place for the proper name can be epistemically situated in Classicism through its treatment of its object. Observation, analysis, comparison and mathesis combine in the task of designation.

In this designation, a dislocation of representation is present. Derivation, or a slippage of signifiers from their designated objects in the real world, occurs and the concept of the object is therefore distorted. It is here that the satirical elements of the novel find their source, as derivation here operates as a reversal of signifiers on the moral level; the false sublime and goodness occupy reversed places in the moral space of the novel, as do their related attributes of low and high action. In Book II, Chapter IX, the tender feelings of Mrs Heartfree towards her children and her distress over her husband's predicament are described as "low" in comparison to Wild's villainy:

> "These are circumstances which we should not, for the amusement of six or seven readers only have inserted had they not served to show that there are weaknesses in vulgar life to which great minds are so entirely strangers that they have not even an idea of them; and secondly, by exposing the folly of this low creature to set off and elevate that greatness of which we endeavour to draw a true portrait in this history."[72]

Through this semantic slippage, the internal relation of Classical representation between the Idea and the word is reversed, distorting the outward relation between thought and being in the world so drastically that the satirical attack on mis-representation is heightened. Thus the differentiation between the false sublime

and goodness is purposely unfulfilled in order to deepen the sense of illogicality of the mistaken synonomy between good and great.

The two main characters, Wild and Heartfree, are not developed as characters but remain as types, or conglomerations of opposing attributes which suspend the taxonomic grid of the experience of human nature through observation comparison and judgement. The discourse of Jonathan Wild endeavours to set names and attributes in their proper places in the table of knowledge of human nature. Truth is equivalent to the clarity of discourse, and the semantic reversals in the discourse represents the corruption of value in the corruption of words.

The discursive formation in which Jonathan Wild operates is immersed in the Classical episteme. Its rules of formation of its object and conceptual strategies are governed by the possibilities of representation - designation, derivation, attribution and articulation. The enunciative modality of its statements is formulated by the exclusion of the Classical observer from the table of representation to which it relates. The focus of the discourse is upon the name and the enunciative series defines a taxonomy which drives towards the ultimate clarification of experience to thought: to know is to speak correctly. In this novel, as Classical discourse, this speaking is not focussed by language itself, but by truthful representation.

3.4.2: Tristram Shandy

> "I wish either my father or my mother, or indeed both of them, as they were in duty equally bound to it, had minded what they were about when they begot me; had they duly considered how much depended upon what

> they were then doing; - that not only the production of a rational Being was concerned in it, but that possibly the happy formation and temperature of his body, perhaps his genius and the very cast of his mind; - and, for aught they knew to the contrary, even the fortunes of his whole house might take their turn from the humours and dispositions which were then uppermost: - Had they duly weighed and considered all this, and proceeded accordingly, - I am verily persuaded I should have made quite a different figure in the world, from that, in which the reader is likely to see me."[73]

Whereas in Jonathan Wild, the enunciative function maintains a distance from its object, in The life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy they slide into each other: the object being the speaking subject, the place of the speaker being that of the object. Tristram is both subject - "I" - and object - "me", and both the expression of inner self and the third person, the observer and the observed, the speaker and that which is spoken of.

From this whimsical beginning, the novel spins out into a chaotic play with language. Actions and conversations break off suddenly only to resume several chapters later after circuitous digressions; the past, present and future run together, the past overtaking the future and the future laying seige to the present:

> "- We'll not stop two moments, my dear Sir, - only, as we have got through these five volumes, (do, Sir, sit down upon a set - they are better than nothing) let us just look back upon the country we have passed through -
>
> - What a wilderness has it been! and what a mercy that we have not both of us been lost, or devoured by wild beasts in it!"[74]

This "wilderness" is the very depth and density of language, its obstinacy and incapacities. In Jonathan Wild, this "jeopardy

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of words"[75] does not present itself, as language as discourse is bound between knowledge or ideas and representation. The question of meaning is posed in terms of the precision of nomination, of thinking and speaking correctly. Tristram Shandy probes the problems of writing and speaking in ways that are inconceivable in Jonathan Wild. The table of representation has shattered, and the safety of discourse is lost in the liberation of language as an object. Time and space ordered by the table of knowledge are fragmented, and language, meaning and knowledge no longer appear commensurate with each other. Each character speaks and understands in his own "hobby-horsical" way: Uncle Toby's linguistic world is governed by the science of fortifications, whilst Dr. Slop's interest in obstetrics and Walter Shandy's own peculiar systems of thought pervade their grasp of meaning. Language is thus presented as fragmented according to their subjective grids of specification. Words, therefore, no longer retain their specific site within a table of representational value in which their clarity of meaning is secured, but are free to undergo slippage:

> "... - 'tis a pity, cried my father, putting my mother's thread-paper into the book for a mark, as he spoke - that truth, brother Toby, should shut herself up in such impregnable fastnesses, and be so obstinate as not to surrender herself sometimes up upon the closest siege -".[76]

While Walter battles to make sense of Slawkenbergius, in which words do not represent with clarity and precision, Uncle Toby latches upon the word "siege" and translates into his own linguistic grid. Within this grid, his response "Can noses be dissolved?" has meaning, yet located as it is within Walter's argument, it has no relation at all. Language is thus perceived as the human act of speaking, open to misunderstandings and misappropriations. Of this, Tristram is all to aware:

> "Now before I venture to make use of the word Nose a

> second time, - to avoid all confusion ... it may not be amiss to explain my own meaning, and define, with all possible exactness and precision, what I would willingly be understood to mean by the term ..."[77]

The Lockean procedure of controlling meaning through definition, which results in an exact correspondence of a word to an idea, is upstaged, for Tristram regards the process as one by which words are artificially restrained. As he tells Eugenius: "... to define - is to distrust". His definition is thus not so much an enclosure but a liberation of the word:

> "For by the word Nose, throughout all this long chapter of noses, and in every other part of my work, where the word Nose occurs, - I declare, by that word I mean a Nose, and nothing more, or less."[78]

Definition is insufficient, no matter how it is phrased and what its content, for by its very nature it is insufficient to its task as it cannot reach the depths of language that is opened through the collapse of representation.

The inability of language to represent with precision in the novel are glaring in the instances of Yorick's death, of silence and of particular movements. In these cases, Tristram resorts to visual alternatives - the black page[79] representative of death signifies a mystery that is fixed beyond the sway of words; Uncle Toby's humming as he read the letter containing the news of Bobby's death is represented by a number of dashes[80] and the movement of the corporal's stick in a flourish that is represented with a scribble.[81] Likewise, it is the density of language that confounds Uncle Toby in his attempts to describe the manner in which he was injured. He too withdraws from the realm of words, supplementing his language with maps and the bowling green upon which he designates through exact reconstructions of events.[82]

With the fracturing of the table of representation, language as

co-extensive with that space and as a logical successive process loses its privilege as the organizing principle of ideas. In Tristram Shandy, the succession of scenes is that of a complexity of temporalities. Time is no longer the linear succession of ideas, as Walter following Locke contends, as the continuum of being which was the condition of the Classical table is fragmented. In its collapse, the confusion of history wells up, threatening to swamp Tristram:

> "My mother, you must know, - but I have fifty things more necessary to let you know first, - I have a hundred difficulties which I have promised to clear up, and a thousand distresses and domestic misadventures crowding in upon me thick and threefold, one upon the neck of another, ... - Of all the perplexities a mortal author was ever seen in, - this certainly is the greatest, ..."[83]

The simultaneity of events crowd and disrupt the process of signification which cannot represent that immediate experience of memory. Hence the temporality of fiction is thrown out of joint, and the novel's aspiration to represent life is reduced to an absurdity:

> "I am this month one whole year older than I was this time twelve-month; and having got, as you perceive, almost into the middle of my fourth volume - and no farther than to my first day's life - 'tis demonstrative that I have three hundred and sixty-four days more life to write just now, than when I first set out; so that instead of advancing, as a common writer, in my work with what I have been doing at it - on the contrary, I am just thrown so many volumes back ..."[84]

The space of the novel is cluttered with the fragments of experience freed from the table of representation, their existence no longer analyzable according to the sequential ordering

appropriate to that table. Rather they circulate about the consciousness of Tristram himself. The upshot of the above passage is that Tristram attempts to represent the entirety of consciousness just as it is presented to him in the simultaneity of imagination and memory. His inability to do so in what James Swearingen refers to as the "single blinding flash of the syllable"[85] is consequential upon the limits of language as logical sequence. Time in the novel is thus necessarily repeated as events are interrupted and characters left suspended in conversation or action in order to "... bring up the affairs ... to the same period"[86] where these affairs have the same temporality. The function of the subject, Tristram, is thus constantly changing as he meets the rival necessities of representing diachronically the recognition of sequence on the basis of his immanent experience of memory or thought, and of representing these experiences synchronically.

Whereas the enunciative series of Jonathan Wild is ordered by the sequentiality of discourse's representational power, Tristram Shandy is organized around the consciousness of the subject which attempts to represent itself fully. The epistemological figure of Man thus appears as the centre around which experience is ordered: on the one hand, spatially, as the sequence of scenes refers to the movement of consciousness, and on the other, temporally, as it is the subject's immanent experience of sequence that governs the succession of events. From the first words "I wish", the subject constitutes himself as the seat of desire, introduces himself into the realm of language as the source of language and thus sets himself in the centre of the novel. Foucault contends that Man's attempt to think himself reveals him as a being that is already anticipated by life, language and labour as contents of knowledge that are exterior to him. This is apparent in Tristram Shandy: for although Tristram introduces himself as the speaking subject, language operates throughout the novel as that which precedes the speaker, and

which is never fully within the subject's control. Hence the misunderstandings or battles with words as exemplified by Uncle Toby's misconstruction of "siege" reveals language as not only part of the subject's singular linguistic universe - his "hobby-horse", but as that which is exterior to him, defining the limitation of his being yet impossible to grasp. Thus, Man or consciousness can never fully apprehend itself, and Tristram is therefore faced with an infinite regression of representation, or an infinity of language.[87]

Contingent upon the construction of Man or consciousness in the realm of knowledge is the introduction of his finitude. Indeed, the proximity of death hounds consciousness throughout the novel: Tristram nearly dies at birth, he suffers the ravages of consumption and the threat it poses in that it might end his life before he has completed the book, and the deaths of Yorick, Bobby and Toby's brother, Le Fever combine to make death as prominent a figure as the subject himself. In Volume VII, the two meet face to face:

> 'Now as for my spirits, little have I to lay to their charge - nay so very little ... that on the contrary, I have much - much to thank 'em for: ... in no one moment of my existence, that I remember, have ye once deserted me, ... in dangers ye gilded my horizon with hope, and when DEATH himself knocked at my door - ye bad him come again; and in so gay a tone of careless indifference did ye do it, that he doubted of his commission -
>
> ' - There must certainly be some mistake in this matter", quoth he
>
> Now there is nothing in this world I abominate worse, than to be interrupted in a story ..."[88]

Death as finitude hangs over consciousness, enclosing and limiting

it, as it does the work of language. Yet language has a dual relation with death; on the one hand, death is the limit of language, the end to what may be said, and on the other hand, death lies at the centre of language's proliferation, for language serves to postpone death.[89] Tristram fights against the ravages of the "vile cough" of consumption, and runs from death to the Continent, "for I have forty volumes to write, and forty thousand things to say and do".[90] Thus with the emergence of language in its own right between the things said and the person speaking, it enters a dual relation with death against which it struggles and on the basis of which it multiplies itself.

It is at the emergence of this relation that Foucault situates the appearance of the modern space of literature:

> "The space of language today is not defined by Rhetoric, but by the Library: by the ranging to infinity of fragmentary languages, substituting for the double chain of Rhetoric the simple, continuous, and monotonous line of language left to its own devices, a language fated to be infinite because it can no longer support itself upon the speech of infinity. But within itself, it finds the possibility of its own division, of its own repetition, the power to create a vertical system of mirrors, self-images, analogies. A language which repeats no other speech, no other Promise, but postpones death indefinitely by ceaselessly opening a space where it is always the analogue of itself."[91]

Thus modern literature occupies the site at which "books are all recaptured and consumed".[92] Tristram Shandy occupies such a site with its reactivation of statements from Locke, Deventer among others, its inclusion of religious and legal statements, and the numerous digressions in which tales lifted from else-

where are recounted. Such a work, therefore, does not test the limits of the book, but approaches the Library space of modern fictional discourse in which language, having acquired its own density, plays to infinity.

3.5: Conclusion

From our cursory examination of the formation of objects, concepts, strategies and enunciative functions of Jonathan Wild and Tristram Shandy, it is clear that the possibilities of appearance of these two regularities of statements are decidedly different. Jonathan Wild is epistemically based within the possibilities of representation that characterizes general grammar, the analysis of wealth and natural history in the Classical episteme. The formation of the object and the relation between the discursive object and the enunciative function are typical of the taxonomic savoir of the episteme. Likewise, Tristram Shandy's conditions of formation can be seen to be decidedly Modern in the appearance of the speaking subject as object, and the concepts of death and language as an object of density. These two regularities form only a pair of nodes within the discursive field of relations that are operative in the literary production of the eighteenth century. The uncovering of all the relations that operate between these two points in the archive would require a study in its own right to do the archaeological method of discursive analysis justice, but our discussion of these two novels does allow for a few conclusive remarks.

Most apparent from our discussion, is the fact that the archaeology and the episteme are necessarily inter-dependent. The analysis of statements in terms of objects, concepts, strategies and enunciative functions leads to the situation of texts within an epistemic configuration. The rules of formation that the archaeology aims to

uncover are governed by the possibilities of discursivity that are available in the configuration of knowledge of that specific spatio-temporality. The utilization or realization of these possibilities does not necessarily amount to an homogenization of textual production. Rather, the enunciative modalities that are operative in different regularities may reveal mutations or internal transformations of discursive relations giving rise to different but simultaneous discursive formations. Thus the rules of formation evidenced in Jonathan Wild are not universally applicable to other regularities of statements that find their conditions of appearance in Classical savoir. An analysis of these other literary statements would lead to a discernment of different realizations of epistemic possibilities and a rearticulation of discursive relations into unique rules of formation. From this, co-existent discursive formations would be definable.

The linkage between the employment of the archaeological concepts and the construction of epistemic configurations finds its basis in the two related concepts of savoir and discursive practice. Savoir as the level of knowledge that underpins and supports the formally accepted Truths of a particular time is the level upon which the episteme is uncovered, and upon which discursive relations combine into the rules of formation of objects, concepts and strategies. These are actively utilized in the production of discourse as practice. The concept of discursive practice is thus inextricably linked to the concept of savoir, for the practice of writing is an activity engaged in knowledge in that the possibility of what may be said is governed by savoir. The implications of this are profound for literary studies, for no longer can literature be analyzed for its own gratification alone. The scope of literary analysis is broadened to include the ramifications of the dissemination and circulation of knowledge in society. As statements do not exist in vacuo, so the positivity of literature cannot be analyzed without regard to its place in the archive. This reinstates the importance of the concept of the episteme, which is formulated

through the comparative scrutiny of the deployment of savoir in different discourses.

Foucault's archaeology thus offers a tightly knit framework for the analysis of discourse in terms of history and knowledge. The question remains as to whether the archaeology offers literary students an avenue out of the impasse of traditional literary history. In our analysis of the problematic of traditional literary history, it was found that the principles of such analysis rest upon out-moded conceptions of history and knowledge, namely historicism and empiricism. The archaeology is formulated in resistance to these conceptions, and, as it is clear in The Archaeology of Knowledge, sets out to reformulate the concepts of history and knowledge in terms which are excluded by the problematic of the history of ideas under which literary history is subsumed. Where the history of ideas postulates homogeneity, genesis and continuity of memory, Foucault anticipates difference, dispersion and counter-memory. In place of an emphasis on temporality and categorical thought, the archaeology proposes spatiality constituted by a multitude of levels upon which and across which relations of difference are interwoven. In place of the homogenizing force of the speaking subject, the archaeology situates discourse as practice, so that the analysis of discourse remains at the level of anonymous statements which are scrutinized for their conditions of appearance in terms of the rules of its practice rather than in terms of the interpretation of meaning.

It is on the basis of the reconstruction of history as general history in opposition to total history, and of knowledge as relations of savoir as opposed to categorical thought that the archaeology as a method of discursive analysis is formulated. The statement defies the search for intended meaning, as the discursive formation denounces the homogenization of discourse on the basis of temporality. Likewise, the positivity as

situated in the archive ordains an approach to literature as a discursive practice analyzable in terms of its relations in knowledge (savoir). Finally, the concept of the episteme binds together the function of discourse as historical practice with the concept of savoir, of knowledge on the level of what may be said in a particular spatio-temporality. In this respect, the episteme is the hinge-pin of the archaeological framework of knowledge / discourse / history.

The reconstitution of the concepts of history and knowledge and the methodological framework that is subtended by these newly wrought concepts opens up new directions for the analysis of literature. Not only does the archaeological concept of savoir allow for the situation of literary discourse in knowledge, but literature appears as the discourse most ready to reveal the relations of savoir in that it makes no claims to the status of conaissance. Rather, it remains at the threshold of positivity which the archaeology takes as its domain of application. Lastly, it is clear that the archaeology cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of the history of ideas, but operates as a method of resistance to the pitfalls that have plagued that discipline. As such, it opens up a new terrain with new possibilities for the materialist analysis of literary discourse. In this regard, a reassessment of the Great Tradition of literary production is not only possible, but necessary if literary analysis is to finally leave the cloisters of its own contemplation and to yield a knowledge of the functioning of literature as a discursive practice implicated in savoir.

Notes

1. Wellek, R. "The Fall of Literary History" in The Attack on Literature and Other Essays. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982 pp.64-77.

2. ibid, p.77.

3. Quoted in Wellek, R. "The Fall of Literary History", p.65.

4. Wellek, R. "The Fall of Literary History", p.75.

5. Wellek, R. and Warren, A. Theory of Literature, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980. See also Wellek, R. Concepts of Concepts, edited by S.G. Nichols, Jnr. New York: Yale University Press, 1968; and Wellek, R. Discriminations: Further Concepts of Criticism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970.

6. Wellek, R. and Warren, A. Theory of Literature, p.257.

7. ibid.

8. Wölfflin, H. Principles of Art History, London: Dover Publications, 1950.

9. See for example Strich, F. Deutsche Klassik und Romantik: oder Vollendung und Unendlichkeit, Munich: 1922; Jones, W.T., The Romantic Syndrome, The Hague, 1961 and Lodge, D., "Historicism and Literary History: Mapping the Modern Period" in New Literary History, 10, 1979, pp.547-555.

10. Wölfflin, H. Principles of Art History, p.17.

11. See Gombrich, E. The Story of Art, London: Phaidon Press, 1950; and Meditations on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art. London: Phaidon Press, 1963.

12. Legouis, E. and Cazamain, L. History of English Literature, London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1967.

13. Gombrich, E. The Story of Art, p.12.

14. ibid, p.381.

15. See Lukács, G. The Historical Novel, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976. Also Goldmann, L. Towards a Sociology of the Novel, London: Tavistock, 1975 and Escarpit, E. Sociology of Literature, London: Frank Cass, 1971.

16. See Wellek's attack on Lukács' "obsessive frequency" of the use of the term in "The Fall of Literary History", p.68.

17. Hadjinicolaou, N. Art History and Class Struggle, London: Pluto Press, 1978.

18. See Hauser, A. The Social History of Art, Vol. I, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951 and The Philosophy of Art History, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

19. Hauser, A. The Philosophy of Art, p.6.

20. ibid, p.14.

21. ibid, p.197.

22. ibid, p.210.

23. Wellek, R. and Warren, A. Theory of Literature, p.265.

24. Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Volume 2 Part I, edited by E. Kushner and R. Struc, Stuttgart: Bieber, 1979.

25. Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. Reading Capital, London: Verso, 1979, p.94.
see also Althusser, L. For Marx, London: Verso, 1979 in which his arguments regarding the break Marx made from the process of abstraction illuminate his propositions in Reading Capital.

26. Macherey, P. A Theory of Literary Production, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p.76.

27. See our discussion of the modern episteme as described above, pp.29-39.

28. Legouis, E. and Cazamain, L. History of English Literature, London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1967.

29. See Wellek's arguments against evolutionary history as an example, especially his article "The Fall of Literary History".

30. Wellek, R. The Attack on Literature, p.75.

31. Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. Reading Capital.

32. ibid, p.94.

33. ibid.

34. ibid, p.95.

35. See Lukács, G. The Historical Novel.

36. Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.10.

37. Benjamin, W. "Thesis on the Philosophy of History" in Illuminations, edited by H. Arendt, translated by H. Zohn, Fontana 1973-1977, p.263.

38. Foucault, M. "Theatrum Philosophicum" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977. p.180.

39. See our discussion above (pp.80-82) in which Foucault is seen to pulverize the traditional categories of thought as a prerequisite to the construction of the archaeological concepts.

40. Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.12.

41 Foucault, M. "What is an Author?" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, p.128.

42. The rejection of the sovereignty of the transcendental subject is a thesis that informs much of Foucault's work. See our discussion of The Order of Things pp.34-39, and Foucault's "What is an Author?" in which this thesis is addressed with regard to the subject as author.

43. Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.24.

44. See our discussion of The Archaeology of Knowledge, specifically pp129-142.

45. Foucault, M. "Theatrum Philosophicum" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p.185.

46. See our discussion of Madness and Civilization above, p.3.

47. Foucault, M. Madness and Civilization, p.285. See also our discussion above, pp.6-7.

48. Carroll, D. "The Subject of the Archaeology or the Sovereignty of the Episteme" in M.L.N., 93:4, May 1978, pp.695-722 and "Disruptive Discourse and Critical Power: The Conditions of Archaeology and Geneology" in Humanities in Society, Vol. 5, Numbers 3 and 4, Summer and Fall, 1982, pp.175-200.

49. Carroll, D. "Disruptive Discourse and Critical Power: The Conditions of Archaeology and Geneology", p.181.

50. ibid.

51. ibid.

52. ibid, p.183.

53. ibid, p.197.

54. See Foucault, M. "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p.38.

55. See our discussion of Madness and Civilization in this regard, specifically, p.12.

56. See the Preface to the original Histoire de la Folie, Paris: Plon, 1961.

57. Carroll, D. "Disruptive Discourse and Critical Power: The Conditions of Archaeology and Geneology", p.175.

58. Said, E. The World, the Text and the Critic, London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1983. p.225.

59. Fielding, H. The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great in Jonathan Wild edited by D. Nokes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982, (1743).

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61. See for example, Legouis, E. and Cazamain, L. History of Englisn Literature, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1967; Watt, I. The Rise of the Novel, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957 and Price, M. The Restoration and the Eighteenth Century in the series The Oxford Authology of English Literature, General Eds: F. Kermode and J. Hollander, New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

62. Fielding, H. op cit. p.29.

63. See for example Daniel Defoe's The True and Genuine Account of the Life and Actions of the Late Jonathan Wild, also in Jonathan Wild, edited by D. Nokes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982 (1725).

64. Fielding, H. op cit. p.29.

65. ibid, p.32.

66. ibid.

67. ibid, p.144.

68. ibid, p.178.

69. ibid, p.70.

70. ibid, p.211.

71. ibid, pp.215-216.

72. ibid, p.111.

73. Sterne, T. op cit. I; i; p.35.

74. ibid, VI; i; p.338.

75. ibid, II; ii; p.108.

76. ibid, III; xli; p.243.

77. ibid.

78. ibid, III; xxxi; p.225.

79. ibid, I; xii; p.62.

80. ibid, V; ii; p.346.

81. ibid, IX; iv; p.576.

82. ibid, II; ii.

83. ibid, III, xxxviii; p.240.

84. ibid IV; xiii; p.286.

85. Swearingen, J.E. Reflexivity in Tristram Shandy New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977, p.100.

86. Sterne, T. op cit. V; v; p.353.

87. See Foucault, M. "Language to Infinity" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, pp.51-67.

88. Sterne, T. op cit. VII; i; p.459.

Foucault, M. "Language to Infinity" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, pp.51-67 and the above discussion of death and language in The Birth of the Clinic, pp.14-15.

89. See Foucault, M. "Language to Infinity" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, pp.51-67 and the above discussion of death and language in The Birth of the Clinic, pp.14-15.

90. Sterne, T. op. cit. VII; 1; p.460.

91. Foucault, M. "Language to Infinity" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p.67.

92. ibid.

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