

**“Indo-Mozambicans in Maputo:
Oral Narratives on Identity and Migration from 1947-1992”**
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Abstract

The objective of this study was to explore universal questions of migration and identity in the context of the particular history of Mozambique’s population of Indian subcontinent residents (herein referred to as “Indo-Mozambicans”). Migration, both voluntary and involuntary, was an ethnographic entry point to explore Indo-Mozambican agency, citizenship, location, and ethnic belonging in the Mozambican national context over the 20th century. In controlling the identity group (Mozambicans of Indian subcontinent origin), geographic space (in Lourenço Marques before 1974 and Maputo after 1975), and temporal lens (1947-1992), this doctoral thesis argues that four historical punctuations forced migratory patterns and ethnic identity formations to emerge among Indo-Mozambicans. Those punctuations are 1) the end of the British empire in India and the subsequent partition of India and Pakistan in 1947; 2) the end of the Portuguese empire in India, with the annexation of Goa, Daman (also spelled Damão), and Diu (also spelled Dio), in 1961; 3) the independence of Mozambique from Portugal in 1975; and 4) the civil war of Mozambique from 1977 to 1992.

These historical markers instigated the use of migration and identity shifts as survival tools to cope with a protracted period of uncertainty. Oral narratives drawn from the country’s capital, Maputo, illustrate that migratory experiences splintered the larger Indo-Mozambican community into smaller sub-identity groups, cultivated intergroup conflict that previously did not exist, and heightened non-Indo-Mozambicans’ already ambivalent animosity towards the larger Indo-Mozambican community. Indo-Mozambican migratory history was further weaponized against them to justify their exclusion from the prevailing national narrative. As a result, Indo-Mozambican diversity is poorly understood. Some subgroups contested social exclusion and negotiated national belonging, despite their consistent permanence in Mozambique. Others mobilized religion and ethnic origin to claim multiple citizenships and retain their rights to stay or return to the country after security was restored in 1992. Further still, as a result of competing colonialisms, a significant segment of Indian citizens was deported in retaliation for Indian annexation of the Portuguese colonial territories in India. Findings situate Lusophone experiences within the context of subaltern studies, but outside the context of Anglophone metanarratives on transnational migration, and thus challenge existing knowledge of multi-racial societies and post-colonial states, especially in Africa.

<u>Section 1 - Introduction</u>	
Introduction	3
Ch. 1 - Methodology and Research Practices	11
<u>Section 2 – Descriptive Chapters (Chronology & Terminology)</u>	
Ch. 2 - Names as Data, Identity and Migratory Markers	30
Ch. 3 - An Oral History of Indo-Mozambican Life from 1947-1992	41
<u>Section 3 – Findings Chapters (Identity, Politics, and Permanence)</u>	
Ch. 4 - Indo-Mozambican Institutions: Hindu Interactions with the State	75
Ch. 5 - The Making of the Self and Others Among Transnational Merchants	95
Ch. 6 - Politics of Paternity: Mulatos, Mestiços, and Muslims	130
<u>Section 4 – Conclusion</u>	
Ch. 7 - Conclusion – Malleable Identities & Imagined Communities	148
Annex 1: Glossary	160
Annex 2: Timeline	162
Annex 3: Demographics & Statistics	165
Annex 4: Contemporary and Historic Maps	167
Annex 5: Questionnaires	172
Bibliography	186

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Section 1 – Introduction

Close to home

In 2013, from the comfort of my mother's living room in the United States of America (U.S.A.), I crafted the beginning of a research question that I thought I could successfully answer over my anticipated two-year stay in Mozambique. Now, looking back, I can see the irony of the fact that I was "home" (I haven't actually lived in my hometown in over twenty years) when I set out on this ambitious journey to learn more about how the Indian and Pakistani Diaspora made Mozambique "home." Earlier that year, I had left where I was living in New Delhi to visit Maputo for two weeks of vacation. Immediately, I was taken aback by how many Indian faces were in the crowd. Indeed, the families gathered along December 10th Avenue in Maputo reminded me of the families gathered around Gateway of India in Mumbai. By then, I lived in New Delhi for two years and had visited Pakistan before that. Academically and professionally, I am invested in the Indian subcontinent and its communities abroad, but Mozambique was the last place that I had expected to find them. Despite having read what I had thought at the time was a lot about Mozambique, I was unaware that, according to a 2000 report by the Indian government, there were approximately 70,000 Mozambicans of Indian-origin.¹ Although I have never found official data on Mozambican residents or citizens of other South Asian origins, like Pakistani or Bangladeshi, I have anecdotally heard that their numbers have grown over the last decade. In this way, I became eager to learn more about the arrival and inclusion of people of Indian subcontinent origin in Maputo.

From 2014 to 2017, I conducted archival and ethnographic research to identify Indo-Mozambican (Mozambican residents of Indian-subcontinent origin) migration waves and to analyze the layers of identity that emerged in reaction to twentieth century events of geopolitical significance to the Indian Ocean and Lusophone worlds. When I began this work, I certainly did not know as much about Portuguese colonial history as I had initially thought I did. As such, my initial fieldwork biased events in the Anglophone world. Specifically, I expected migratory shockwaves from British imperial independence movements and the end of British colonialism to be causally linked to Indo-Mozambicans' use of migration as a survival tool to cope with the uncertainty in their own national context. More specifically, I had anticipated that the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the independence of India in 1947, the founding of Bangladesh in 1971, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972, and the end of South African apartheid in 1994 would all prove to be relevant events for Mozambicans. Research proved, however, that British colonial and post-colonial markers were less relevant than Portuguese ones. The historical marker that emerged as the most important in the study was one that, prior to beginning this research, I had not known existed: the end of the Portuguese empire in India (1952-1961), with the *de facto* Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 1954 and the subsequent annexation of the remaining enclaves in 1961. It took almost a year to recognize my initial errors and to course correct, and the current study details both the process and the product of centering Lusophone histories within the dominant context of Anglophone scholarship. In so doing, this thesis contests metanarratives on

¹ Singhvi, L.M. (2000), "Other Countries of Africa," Report of the High level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, pp. 89-109. Accessed on Jan 5 2014. <<Indiandiaspora.nic.in>>

national belonging and migration in Africa, which assume British colonialism as their grounding reference.

Despite colonial impediments to their citizenship and migratory rights, the diverse members of the Indo-Mozambican community used migration as a coping mechanism to make individual choices about citizenship, location, and ethnic belonging in a progressively insecure political landscape. As such, Indo-Mozambican identity was not well-defined before 1947; and, thus, diversities within the group were not in dispute or on public display until much later in the century. Becoming Mozambican was an iterative process; forced migration and ascribed identities played a significant role in Indo-Mozambican (re)definitions of location and nationalism. Not all Indo-Mozambicans who contemplated emigration actually did it; not all who did it did so voluntarily; and some subgroups had the same limited access to emigration as Black Mozambicans. There were others still who secured their personal and commercial safety by exerting their agency to voluntarily emigrate in and out of the Indian Ocean world, Lusophone territories, and southern Africa. Divergent migratory choices splintered the larger Indo-Mozambican community into smaller sub-identity groups, cultivated intergroup conflict that previously did not exist, and heightened non-Indo-Mozambicans' already ambivalent animosity towards the larger Indo-Mozambican community. This study attempts to explain the diversities among Indo-Mozambicans by articulating their divergent identities and how those identities were instrumentalized to empower some and impede others' migratory choices.

Indo-Mozambicans are no monolith. True to the region, Indo-Mozambicans were and still are part of a diverse cohort of Indian Ocean migrants that have used "Indian Ocean circulations" to create transnational networks and build global identities.² There are a myriad of diverse sub-identity groups and migratory experiences represented among them. As with any national minority, ascribed and assigned identity definitions diverge, one from the other. Defining who was Indo-Mozambican and to which sub-group s/he might belong was vital to this study. Therefore, Chapter 2 describes the reasons why I coined the term "Indo-Mozambican" and outlines other related nomenclature that appears in popular and scholarly use. It also confronts how identity group names reflect social distancing between endogenous and exogenous groups of Indo-Mozambicans. Thereafter, Chapter 3 presents a chronology of Indo-Mozambican lived experiences. Readers will see that sub-group names are frequently used, but fluidly defined. In effect, Mozambicans verbalize inaccurate phenotypes and perpetuate vocabularies of stereotypes. I argue that this practice is perpetuated because state and social rhetorics do not sufficiently include or value the lived experience of Indo-Mozambicans within the country's post-colonial narrative, which foregrounds African nationalist perspectives. After a series of findings chapters, the final chapter, Chapter 7, argues that the pervasive misnomers are emblematic of Indo-Mozambican exclusion from the national narrative, in which Indo-Mozambicans are labeled as immigrants or outsiders.

The findings chapters separate the diversities of experience and migratory agency among different sub-identity groups. Each chapter features a different sub-group and highlights how they navigated colonial and post-colonial challenges throughout the 20th century. Throughout, I argue that Indo-Mozambicans are perpetually framed as foreigners or immigrants who are tolerated as residents, but are not fully integrated as citizens. In the findings chapters, I dedicate as much time

² Bertz, Ned. *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania*. University of Hawaii, 2015, p. 1.

to comparing Indo-Mozambican sub-groups against one another as I do in comparing them with Mozambique's Black and White citizenry. Thus, I have relied heavily on oral accounts from Mozambicans of all races to articulate their memories of national identity, belonging, and citizenship. Though I understand, academically and theoretically, that racial groups are malleable social constructs, experience in the field has shown me that colonialism hardened racial definitions and codified the ways in which residents of Mozambique were allowed to live their lives and govern their futures. "Black" and "White" were hardened legal and social categories that have continued well into the post-colonial era. As such, I capitalize these terms throughout this text to emphasize the rigid identity labels imposed on people subject to those racial definitions.

Chapter 4 investigates the experience of Indo-Mozambicans through the lens of their religious and civic associations. This section unravels the institutional history of Maputo's Hindu Association, the *Comunidade Hindu*, by examining the constituency and statutory changes that it underwent in order to avoid state persecution throughout the 20th century. This chapter analyzes migration and identity fluctuations as a result of the internment and deportation of Indian passport holders in 1961-62 and Mozambique's post-independence religious restrictions, which were implemented after 1975. Chapter 5 then focuses on merchants who exerted migratory agency in order to maintain what Aihwa Ong calls "flexible citizenship,"³ which allowed them to maintain multiple residencies and to secure access to international markets. Indo-Mozambican merchants experienced significant backlash because of their real and perceived privileges in both the colonial and post-colonial periods. Their merchant identity was gravely imperiled by the socialist policies of 1975-1985 that significantly curtailed private commerce. Finally, Chapter 6 highlights how Indo-Mozambicans disrupt Mozambique's dominant Black/White racial and colonial narrative. Their ambiguous colonial legacy complicates their post-colonial inclusion. I argue that it is people of mixed-race and Indo-Mozambican origin who most clearly challenge notions of Mozambican national belonging, precisely because they do not fit within the predominant Black/White binary. This chapter draws heavily on oral histories from Indo-Mozambicans of mixed-race, herein called *mestiços*. This group rarely ever emigrated from Mozambique. Rather, their permanence in the country was similar to that of Black Mozambicans, but they were often socially framed as more privileged than my research proved to be true. Therefore, I argue that Indian subcontinent cultural identity was weaponized against all Indo-Mozambicans to deny them full inclusion into Mozambique's national narrative.

As a racial minority in my own country, I appreciate the opportunity that this research provided me to make sense of deeply intimate accounts of human identity. I framed the Indo-Mozambican experience within literature on subaltern identity and transnational migration, but admittedly with my own Americas-centric paradigm of race and culture. Given my origins and my education, these are the social constructs of race that I understand best. Multi-racial societies include citizens and residents that embody loyalties and challenge identities upon which different countries define their forms of nationalism. While I offer conclusions through a racial prism, I challenge scholars with a firmer knowledge of post-colonial studies to use these findings to further explore the role of competing and overlapping colonial legacies in post-colonial nation building. Mozambique can be placed within the context of Asian sites like the Philippines (with Spanish and then U.S. domination) and African sites like Namibia (with German and then South African domination) that experienced competing colonialisms and neo-colonialisms through a series of

³ Ong, Aihwa. *Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Duke University Press, 2006.

implementing administrations. Scholars from these regions may see nuance and dynamism where I have blind spots. As an attempt to address that reality, I privilege space in this thesis for the voices of Indo-Mozambicans themselves.

Oral stories collected here highlight the importance of Portuguese colonialism on individuals' lived experience. Reliable information about Indo-Mozambicans is best found where researchers rarely look: around grandparents' dinner tables, in old family albums, in personal diaries, and within the records of family businesses. I believe these stories are best told by the people who lived them. As an academic, I give primacy to oral stories as data because it is important for me to "let the subaltern speak,"⁴ in Gayatri Spivak's terminology. This methodology implores scholars of what Oonk calls "heritage studies" to allow marginalized people to tell their own stories.⁵ I hope to have contributed to scholarly approaches in migration studies by having explored Indo-Mozambican domestic and material cultures, as well as the civic associations and family businesses that were established to serve their communities. Inevitably, this data set incorporates memory lapses and cultivated reimaginations. Memory represents inaccuracies and biases of similar measure to those found in archival data. I use memory to interpret and contextualize those very archives, and I offer first-person narrative accounts to counter balance colonial records, which are known to marginalize and de-legitimize the lived experience of the marginalized and colonized.

Goolam Vahed and Surendra Bhana executed a similar feat in their 2015 biographical study of Indians in Natal. In collecting over 200 biographies of early traders, they accepted historical inaccuracies in the second and third generation narratives they collected. Their collection provided "personal and family details of traders to illustrate their active participation in community affairs." In this thesis, I have used similar details to create the opposite effect. Herein, I use archival data to identify inaccuracies in oral narratives (and oral narratives to identify inaccuracies in archival data); I also create space for contradictory oral narratives to contest one another on an individual level and still operate and co-exist as part of a diverse collective. Indian Diaspora scholars may wonder what is the novelty of this thesis, and I would argue that it is applying this simple biographical approach – a common method of collecting Asian experiences in post-colonial British Africa – to post-colonial Portuguese Africa, where such narratives are less common.⁶

Vahed and Bhana confront the fact that memory is neither wholly accurate, nor linear. From this thesis' confrontation with the same, readers will soon recognize that there is very little reliable data—scholarly or statistical—on Indo-Mozambican diversity. In addition to identifying and cataloguing new primary source data, I used secondary source data to unravel identities that are socially inseparable. For example, I drew upon secondary sources from Mozambique, Portugal, South Africa, India, Pakistan, the U.S.A., and Canada for relevant information on Indo-Mozambican life. I am particularly indebted to the work of Antonio Rita Ferreira, Valdemar Zamparoni, Susana Pereira Bastos, and Joana Pereira Leite, whose published work addresses

⁴ Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "'Can the Subaltern Speak?': Revised Edition, from the 'History' Chapter of Critique of Postcolonial Reason." *Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an Idea*, edited by ROSALIND C. MORRIS, Columbia University Press, 2010, pp. 21–78. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/morr14384.5.

⁵ Vahed, Goolam and Surendra Bhana. *Crossing Space and Time in the Indian Ocean: Early Indian Traders in Natal a Biographical Study*. Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2015, p.VII.

⁶ Ibid, 4-5.

various segments of the Indo-Mozambican population over the 19th and 20th centuries. Through their scholarship, I was able to quickly identify novelty in my own research. Here, I present findings that dissect sub-group experiences by religion and citizenship. It was along these lines that I could most clearly articulate the long-term effects that instability had on the migration patterns and identity formation among Indo-Mozambicans. While I have tried to present individual stories as part of a collectivist and linear narrative, readers may find that this thesis reads like a patchwork quilt. This style reflects the complexity of the Indo-Mozambican community itself and mirrors the diversity of the individuals who contributed to this project.

Location

The main protagonist in my research is the very capital city of Mozambique, as this geographical space is the physical and emotional foundation upon which lived-experiences in the city are anchored. As Lefebvre said, “(Social) space is a (social) product;”⁷ Mozambique’s capital is a very complex product. In 1898, the capital of the country was transferred from Mozambique Island (Ilha de Moçambique) to Lourenço Marques (LM). LM went by that name until independence in 1975. By 1976, it was renamed Maputo. Both names identify the same city. Swampy, uninhabited areas outside municipal boundaries in 1947 had become residential areas within the city limits by 1992 and middle-class suburbs by 2014. Here, when the city is referred to as LM, it signals the fact that Mozambique was still under the Portuguese colonial regime. When Maputo is used, I refer to post-colonial, independent Mozambique. I retained the usage of both names in accordance with the time period referenced and thus can easily identify the prevailing government structure. Where I quote respondents throughout the study, I retain the naming conventions that they verbalized. Naming the city is just one of many instances in which popular jargon was inconsistently defined and applied. Some research participants, for example, were careful to say LM whenever the pre-independence period was discussed and careful to say Maputo thereafter, as if signaling that the city was significantly different and substantively transformed from one era to the next.

Some participants loosely intertwined the city’s names. While this habit could be innocently interpreted as a memory lapse, I inferred that the persistent use of LM by some participants in the study was an act of political defiance to reject the post-colonial regime. In the immediate post-colonial period, state censorship and surveillance infused small acts – like calling the city of Maputo “Lourenço Marques” – with significant political meaning. Today, now that the term LM has fallen into disuse within Maputo, I saw some participants use it with a tone of resistance, a wink and a nod, to infer that their colonial experience (LM) was better than their post-colonial one (Maputo).

Homi K. Bhabha’s framework in *The Location of Culture* was of great help to me in negotiating the layered meanings of a singular location over time. This text helped me to argue that contested naming conventions are a battleground for political agency.⁸ As a result of colonial segregation, these contestations were politicized negotiations. I chose to exclusively gather narratives from LM/Maputo, because I believe that they most reflect the national discourse on Indo-Mozambican belonging in the 20th century. While there have always been significant pockets

⁷ Lefebvre, Henri. *The Production of Space*. Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991, p. 27.

⁸ Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. Routledge, 1993.

of Indo-Mozambicans throughout the country, narratives from the capital differed from those captured from the peripheries. Outside the capital, interpersonal relationships lubricated social interactions and undermined the strict implementation of state policies on migration and economic participation. Experiences outside LM/Maputo are only included here when they offer comparative value.

By virtue of my methodological choice to conduct research exclusively in Maputo, the research sample was comprised of people who did not emigrate permanently, if at all. Thus, I situate the very site of intellectual discourse about migratory agency within the liminal context of Indo-Mozambicans who stayed behind. Migration served as an ethnographic entry point to discuss with Indo-Mozambicans how their family members and communities maneuvered identity politics in order to manage their continued presence in Mozambique through the uncertainty and violence of the 20th century. Indo-Mozambicans' consistent residence in Mozambique, referred to here as "permanence," was not the result of migratory apathy. Rather, staying behind was the result of actively implementing survival strategies to stay in the country. While permanence is not analogous to patriotism, in many ways, national belonging in Mozambique is popularly discussed as a question of those who stayed in the country through its turmoil. In that regard, I argue that Indo-Mozambicans appeared and disappeared from the national narrative in spite of the reality that many Indo-Mozambican sub-identity groups remained deeply socially imbedded, economically invested, and permanently resident in LM/Maputo throughout the 20th century. The questioning of their loyalty is part of a legacy of distrust inherited from Indo-Mozambican complicity and privilege within the Portuguese colonial structure. The post-colonial state and society have not known what exactly to make of these Indo-Mozambicans who continue to call Mozambique home.

Distribution of Professions by Racial Groups in Lourenço Marques in 1890⁹

Racial Groups and Professions		Yellow %	Indian %	White %	Black %	Total/Activities %
Agriculture and Fisheries		11.1	0.0	88.9	0.0	1.9
Operations and Artisan		0.0	20.4	76.1	3.4	9.7
Construction and Public Works		31.0	7.0	61.9	0	7.8
Commerce and Banking		3.4	50.0	44.3	2.2	35.3
Transport and Communication		0.0	0.0	93.5	6.5	8.5
Service and Administration		0.0	23.0	72.6	4.2	12.9
Domestic Service		1.1	27.0	25.9	45.5	9.4
Non-professional		.7	6.2	71.1	21.9	14.1
Population Total		4.1	26.6	59.6	9.6	100

Source: Zamparoni Adaption (1989), by Maloa

British Indian Population in Mozambique in 1890¹⁰

Place (from north to south)	Population
Ibo	100
Mozambique District	250
Mozambique Island	350
Parapat	250
Quelimane	300
Sofala District including Beira	250
Delagoa Bay (Lourenço Marques)	250
Delagoa Bay Interior	500
Crews of dhows	200
Sepoys	200
Total	2,650

Source: RTCDM 1890. P.12

Highlights by author, N. Allen

Population LM 1894-1928¹¹

	1894	1928	Var.
Europeans	591	8988	15.2
Indians	226	3010	13.3
Indo Brit	136	1342	9.86
Indo Port	90	1668	18.5

Statistic of Individuals by Muslim Religion – District of Lourenço Marques 1907

	Portuguese Shia	Portuguese Sunni	British Shia	British Sunni
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⁹ Maloa, Joaquim Miranda, 137.

¹⁰ Oishi, Takashi. "Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. P. 6-7

¹¹ Leite & Khouri, 32.

Lourenço Marques circumscription	10	424	14	516
Manhiça circumscription	1	0		
Sabié circumscription	1	39	0	68
Total	12	463	14	584

Population of Mozambique District in 1908¹²

Nationality	Europeans			Asiatics			Africans	Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male/Female	
Portuguese	373	48	421	190	5	195	360000	360616
British	12	0	12	563	57	620	0	632
German	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
French	4	8	12	0	0	0	0	12
Other	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Total	400	56	456	753	62	815	360000	361271

Source: RTCPM1908. P.40

(Highlights by Author N. Allen)

Population of LM/Maputo – does not include Matola (1940-2013)¹³

Year	Total Population	African Population
1940	68,223	45,632
1950	93,265	57,755
1960	178,546	122,460
1970	378,348	300,495
1980	755,300	*
1997	946,312	*
2001	1,074,645	*
2013	1,209,993	*

¹² Oishi, Takashi. "Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. p. 6-7

¹³ Morton, David Simon. "Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times." Diss. U of Minnesota, 2015. *Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times*. University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Web. <<http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/181959>>. P 7.

Mapa 1. Localização Geográfica



Fonte: Pelouro de Infraestruturas

Mapa 2. Divisão Administrativa do Município de Maputo



Fonte: Pelouro de Infraestruturas

Municipality of Maputo's 2007 Report: *Perfil ESTATÍSTICO de Maputo 2004-2007*¹⁴

¹⁴ Mozambique. Município de Maputo. Conselho Municipal de Maputo. *Perfil ESTATÍSTICO do Município de Maputo 2004-2007* (Maputo, 2007)10-11.

Chapter 1: Methodology and Research Practices

When I began this study three years ago, I asked how people of South Asian origin living in Mozambique's capital were affected by 20th century changes in the Indian Ocean nexus between India, Pakistan, and Mozambique. In response, interviews and data have shown that during the 20th century, four historical markers served as catalysts for migration and identity articulations among Indo-Mozambicans: (1) the end of the British Empire in 1947, (2) the end of the Portuguese empire in India in 1961, (3) Mozambican independence from Portugal in 1975, and (4) the Mozambican civil war from 1977-1992. Migratory choices splintered the larger community into smaller sub-groups, bred intergroup conflict, and heightened Black and White Mozambicans' pre-existing animosity towards the larger Indo-Mozambican community.

My original research question betrayed an ignorance about the diversity of lived experience that I would find in Maputo. As the research unfolded, my areas of inquiry were less historical and more sociological in nature. For instance, Indo-Mozambicans in LM/Maputo served in roles as colonial agents, political activists, economic stakeholders, cultural allies, and migratory casualties at various times throughout Mozambique's contemporary history. Amongst Indo-Mozambicans, I found the greatest diversities along citizenship and religious fault lines. Archival data also reflected political rivalries and social distancing along these lines. Similarly, interview respondents of different religions and citizenships shared markedly different memories about their experiences navigating the city over the same time period.

I set out to share findings relevant not just to Mozambique, but to global scholarship on Afro-Asian encounters in predominantly Black spaces. Emerging literature on citizenship among racial/ethnic minorities in post-colonial Africa is challenging Western narratives on migration. Yet, I deeply sensed that the omission of the Indo-Mozambican experience in Maputo, specifically—and Mozambique as a whole—was a deliberate and localized void. Persistently, I asked myself: How is a population that is, even today, very socially visible, economically dominant, and politically connected simply absent from its own national narrative even today? Particularly, why are Indo-Mozambicans still absent from the nation's *contemporary* scholarship? I struggled to overcome archival data that was both inaccurate and incomplete, as well as academic disinterest in understanding the construction of Indo-Mozambican social and transnational networks. These challenges made the study all the more rewarding when I was able to find new bodies of data and give academic voice to Indo-Mozambican experiences.

This thesis is a collection of personal experiences, including interviewees' perceptions of and interactions with me. I could not spend three years asking others about their identity without identifying myself. I identify as Black American, but not African or Mozambican. Over seven generations of my family have identified as African-Americans, descendants of unknown slaves of unknown origin. Casually, we call ourselves "just Blacks," since, unlike other hyphenated Americans, we have to identify with a continent and a color. We do not know our ancestral country of origin. I consider the U.S. my only nation. My lack of immigrant ancestry or familial ties elsewhere is a badge of honor that I use to defend my nationality; and my family's permanence in the U.S. is, for me, a point of pride. Yet, American identity for many outsiders is based on a narrative of immigration. This is not a narrative that I share.

That said, for the better part of a decade, I have been an expatriate. My privileged migratory positionality makes me an outlier in the larger dialogue on global migrants. This positionality is relevant to this particular study, because it best explains my personal curiosity about what it would be like to have the option to permanently emigrate away from national insecurity and social uncertainty, without being perceived as a refugee. If political, social, or economic structures were oppressively unbearable and one had the choice of another country where one was ostensibly entitled to admission by ethnicity, birthright, or religion, why would a person choose to stay behind? Life experience has shown me that these are questions that most Americans do not think are relevant to them. With the exception of African Americans who went to Liberia in the 19th century, and others who went to Ghana and elsewhere in the 20th, most African-Americans did not have enough knowledge of their origins to consider the possibility of a return to an imaginary or ancestral homeland. If we knew our country of origin, I often wonder if African-Americans would go “back home,” if we knew where “home” was. Given U.S. realities, were “home” not an imagined, mythical place, but rather a specific location saturated with genealogical ownership, I imagine that some of us would exercise that migratory privilege. Perhaps with the rising popularity of DNA ancestry kits, more of us will have enough knowledge of our past to reconsider the location of our futures.

My bias at the beginning of this study—and even now—is that to have that choice to voluntarily return “home” would be to hold an enviable position. My personal assumptions reflected directly on the research question. From the very beginning, I assumed that if national minorities have an ancestral home and the choice to return at any time, then they would exercise it during downturns. My personal opinion has always been that just having the choice to return to a place where one *belongs* is a powerful privilege.

I assumed that respondents in this study would share my bias and articulate why, in fact, they did not exercise their assumed privilege to leave Mozambique. By virtue of the fact that primary source interviews were conducted exclusively in Maputo, this study offers a specific history of those who chose to either stay behind or to go and come back. By the end of the study, I realized that staying behind in Mozambique was an active migratory choice, on par with the choice to emigrate; it was not a passive, default, or casual state. Like my attachment to the United States, attachment to Mozambique is a strong identity marker for many Indo-Mozambicans. Findings here imply that migration is fluid enough to encompass all types of movement, including permanence. Permanence for one person can also facilitate flexible citizenship for other members of their transnational families and commercial networks. Those who stay behind often act as anchors of stability for family and friends abroad. I hope that this study illuminates these blind spots in migration and diaspora scholarship: Who stays behind? Why? And what is the experience of these anchors?

Methods

This study draws largely on triangulated data. First, I gathered archival data from national and municipal archives, located in three different locations: the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (Baixa-Downtown), the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (University of Eduardo Mondlane), and the capital city’s legal records (Predio Macau). These sources document civic association records, religious groups’ correspondence with government actors, and civil lawsuits. Second, I

drew heavily on secondary source data that falls within three broad geographical categories: Mozambican history, Lusophone anthropology, and Indian Diaspora studies. The last and most heavily cited references were primary source data gathered from semi-structured interviews. Interviewees lived in Maputo and were between the ages of forty and ninety at the time of interview. All held memory of living in the nation's capital during some part of the period between 1947-92. The sample represents a diverse intersection of nationality, gender, and religion, but I categorize them into three groups: (1) Indo-Mozambicans who resided in Maputo at some point between 1947-92, (2) intellectuals and socio-political actors who contextualize the larger domestic realities, and (3) members of Indo-Mozambican civic associations.

Within the text, I have given a heavier weight to these narratives, above all other data sources. They form a body of otherwise unexplored knowledge and they merit sufficient space for academic examination. In crafting a thesis that asks that Mozambicans tell their own stories, I have engaged these narratives of memory with a bias of trust. I only refute narratives when there is contradictory data or when other narratives counter the universality of an individual participant's memory. As a methodological choice, I have chosen not to dedicate space in finding chapters to describing existing literature for the sole purpose of presenting the Lusophone experience as a marginalized anomaly. I utilize regional and Anglophone narratives only when they affirm and validate the marginalized experiences of Indo-Mozambicans. Doing so allowed me to normalize the Lusophone (rather than Anglophone) experience by removing Mozambican narratives from the margins and re-positioning them as the centerpiece of the larger discourse on Indian Ocean migration.

The abundance of research gathered here was a self-imposed overcompensation for my own lack of confidence with the subject matter. To my research contacts, I am an African-American woman and a self-identified Muslim agnostic. It is well known that I am married to a black, Christian Mozambican and I was working for the U.S. government in Mozambique (on completely unrelated issues) at the time of fieldwork. As such, I expected serious barriers to access willing respondents. In response, I planned to work through a local research assistant who is a member of the target demographic, but that plan proved ineffective for a variety of reasons. After having employed both an Indo-Mozambican woman to assist me with transcriptions and an African-American man to assist me with archival research, I realized that neither could fill the responsibility that was rightfully mine: to gather the oral narratives. When I asked my Indo-Mozambican research assistant if she thought it best for her to join me on an interview that she had arranged, she told me clearly that this was *my* project and that respondents would want to talk directly with *me*. Further, she hinted that her presence would likely break down the interviewees' willingness to speak honestly for fear of being known to her or her family, and thus fear of being judged. She felt that it was likely that interviewees would speak more openly with me, as a foreigner, than they would with any Mozambican, especially another Indo-Mozambican. Her certainty on this point was in and of itself an education to me. It also meant that I could not hide behind her presence. Making the mistake of doing so would ill affect the data. So, when I finally steel myself to step out from behind my computer to meet respondents directly, the rate of rejection was surprisingly minimal, and I was overwhelmed by individuals' willingness to tell their own stories.

Participant receptivity had a snowball effect. Many respondents referred me to other participants, and individual interviews often led to follow-up intergenerational conversations. All the participants accepted being interviewed and contributing to the study, while well aware of my larger reasons for being in the country. I had also expected to break out my meager verbal Hindi skills; but, aside from a few laughs with *Rama*, a Gujarati respondent who spoke fluent Portuguese, there was no need. Linguistically, this demographic has a strong command of English and Portuguese. As a native speaker of the former and a fluent speaker of the latter, my only remaining challenge was my own lack of self-confidence. In short, every tool that I had considered an asset and every barrier that I had considered insurmountable proved irrelevant in equal measure.

Archives

In addition to primary source interviews, I drew heavily from archival data that discussed the lived experience of Indo-Mozambicans in the 20th century. That said, the archival data that is available in Mozambique is problematic. First, it is difficult to access. The national archive is housed in three separate spaces, that only remain open until 4:00 p.m. on weekdays. All three sites are located in Maputo, but they lie in different parts of town. It was never clear where one should look for a particular body of information. While one research assistant dedicated himself to finding data in two locations, I focused on the third. Further, once I gained access and indeed found relevant materials, the process of copying the documents was expensive; foreign researcher copying fees were well over ten times the cost for local researchers. Further, there was no option to check out materials. Even secondary sources were closely guarded.

In 2015, I met with the Director of the National Archives to get a better sense of what the archives contained. To overcome the administrative hurdles, I worked very closely with a librarian at the archive in Baixa, and I am forever indebted to her for her flexibility with my never-ending searches. This Baixa archive was predominantly filled with secondary sources that could only be searched using one computer, which was operated by an attendant. Every four to six weeks, over the course of three years, I revisited the Baixa archives for hours at a time to try new searches and to scour bibliographies in the hopes that some new information could be found. This exercise was hit or miss.

The documents retrieved from the archives on the UEM campus were gathered by the American research assistant. Fluent in Portuguese, he faithfully visited the archives during my working hours, searching for periodicals and government correspondence for any indication of Indo-Mozambican interactions with the state. This exercise uncovered over five hundred pages of documentation between Indo-Mozambican affinity groups and the Portuguese government. These documents demonstrated how group identities and migratory pressures were articulated and brokered with national powers. After reviewing institutional correspondence, he painstakingly gathered articles from the national newspaper *Noticias*, uncovering opinion editorials by Indo-Mozambicans expressing their positions on the disintegration of the Portuguese empire and reports of Indo-Mozambicans engaged in witchcraft. While I rarely cite periodicals in the thesis, they were helpful to determine how reliable interviewees' memories were about events like the execution of Gulamo Nabi in 1983 and the deportation of Indian citizens in 1962.

Last, on a lead from Antonio Sopa, renowned historian and archivist, I pursued access to the little known municipal legal archives, hoping to locate civil case files regarding the disposition of property owned by Indian citizens expelled after Indian annexation of Goa, Daman, and Diu in 1961. With unexpected speed, I gained access to case ledgers and then to three file rooms full of scattered legal papers. I spent about a week reading the ledgers and writing down cases of interest, simply based on the names of the defendant and plaintiffs. Having been forewarned that the legal archives had fallen into disuse after the Portuguese left the country in 1975, I did indeed find that most of the documentation had been kept exactly as the Portuguese left it up until that point. Files dated until around 1976 were well organized and neatly stacked by year. The binding was tightly affixed, and the dust on the cover pages indicated that no one had touched them since they were originally placed. However, after the late 1970s, files were bound, but completely disorganized. Some were kept in a room obstructed by broken furniture, making those documents entirely inaccessible. Cases were unbound on the floor throughout the storage rooms, and some pages showed the wear of termites and water damage. Although cases from some years were scattered amongst those from completely different decades, I did find some interesting individual case files up until the late 1990s. I did not locate any files about seizures or auctions of displaced Indian citizens' goods, but I did learn about the insularity of commercial disputes and the prominence of the Indo-Mozambican business community.

Finding what I was looking for in the archives would have allowed me to contextualize oral stories gathered in this study, which tell of family businesses being confiscated and communal spaces being seized and repurposed. I wanted details about the value of Indian and Pakistani businesses and investments in Mozambique in the 1960s; such historical data could settle debates about who actually won these auctions and stood to gain from the expropriation. Had I found what I was originally looking for, this thesis would have had a chapter that looked similar to Nayan Shah's *Stranger Intimacy*, which used "law as an archival repository, a form of knowledge and reasoning, and strategy of governance... to interpret the experiences of marginalized and aggrieved communities..." Because I found nothing in this archive on the expropriations, I simply share the oral narratives I gathered as I received them. Further, because the legal archive's content proved irrelevant to the lived experience of Mozambicans in this study, I treat the legal archive as a body of work consulted rather than work cited.¹⁵

In consulting these files, I was reminded of the importance of naming—not just as part of my academic exercise of understanding the usage of vernacular terms, but also as a critical aspect of understanding the relevance of archival data. For example, I quickly discovered that Hindu names were those easiest to identify. Christians and Muslim names less so. Goan Christians and White Portuguese share names that are virtually indistinguishable. Effectively, files on João Ferreira (John Smith) could be relevant to Indo-Mozambicans or not. Without photos or context, it was impossible to know. Both held Portuguese passports and, on paper, could not be differentiated. Similarly, Indo-Mozambican Muslims were equally difficult to differentiate from Black Muslims. One differentiating marker, however, was that Indo-Mozambicans regularly added the suffix "ji," "gy," or "jee" (designating respect and roughly translating to "sir") to both Hindu and Islamic last names. Therefore, I made educated guesses and assumed that a "Mussagy" was likely to be an Indo-Mozambican who had adapted the Islamic name "Mussa" to include the

¹⁵ Shah, Nayan. *Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law in the North American West*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. p9.

respectful suffix. Similar adaptations like “Cangy” (from the name ‘Khan’ + ji) or “Jevanji” (“Jeevan” or “Jivan”+ ji, meaning “life” in Hindi or “young person” in Urdu) indicated a possible Indo-Mozambican. After re-visiting these files three times over the course of one week, I photographed over eight hundred pages of relevant case files for use in this study.

Among these records were commercial disputes between large companies and individual suppliers, individuals filing for bankruptcy, jilted employees seeking unpaid wages, and requests for the seizure of goods used as collateral for unpaid loans. The remainder were generally family-related civil records. They showed divorce, birth, and death registrations, as well as depositions littered with family drama. Over three hundred pages of case files were gathered from these archives. Their content was a novel contribution that supports Gijsbert Oonk’s assertion in his book *Settled Strangers* that scholarly data on Indians in East Africa is usually skewed towards narratives of business success.¹⁶

Interviews

I used an ontologically constructivist and epistemologically interpretivist approach to collecting and organizing this research project. Most semi-structured conversations with Indo-Mozambicans were held over multiple sittings and were based on a prepared research questionnaire (see Annex 4). Two participants completed the questionnaire in writing, in addition to our conversations. Other interviews with social and political actors were rarely structured. Research participants were all aware of the premise of the study, and sampling snowballed. While most respondents were open to direct attribution, I preserved anonymity as much as possible by using pseudonyms for respondents, particularly Indo-Mozambicans, whenever possible. Where any respondent requested anonymity, it is noted. Cultural memories are assembled here chronologically by themes of transnational identity, contested citizenship, and national belonging.

Research was heavily weighted towards qualitative data gathering methods, with semi-structured interviews being the bulk of the data incorporated into this final thesis. Consent was verbal. Over time, these interviews evolved away from the questionnaire altogether and were more successful as informal conversations. Except for one interview that was conducted by a research assistant, I conducted all of the interviews. About half of these conversations were conducted in the presence of the person who referred the informant to the study. This dynamic facilitated casual, family-oriented, and inter-generational interactions; my husband participated in interviews with *Mae*, *Aisha*, *Ibtihaj*, and *Saadiq*.

The small group structure of these conversations had its advantages. To begin with, informants often rehashed old memories and cross-referenced experiences together, in order to confirm details. I also believe that many of the sensitive parts of the conversation never would have been divulged without the presence of an intimate instigator. Usually, I would begin the conversation, though I was not the primary leader of the dialogue. Group conversations were intergenerational and took place in interviewees’ homes. Family photos and identification cards, among other examples of material culture, were voluntarily contributed. (Family-centered material

¹⁶ Oonk, Gijsbert. *Settled Strangers: Asian business elites in East Africa (1800-2000)*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2013. pp 63-110.

culture was also a valuable data source that I wish I could have explored even further.) I allowed natural conversation to take place and only redirected it when subject areas central to the research were not being covered organically. I also interjected when I was confused about the protagonists in their narratives. One-on-one interviews lasted 1-2 hours. Group interviews were double. In seven cases, interviewees were re-interviewed. In one case, this was due to a technical malfunction of my recording device. In the other cases, either the original conversation required follow up, or the interviewee offered to facilitate an interview with another person. As a result of this snowball effect, these interviewees participated in more than one interview sitting.

Much like the triangulation of archival data, the oral data was collected in parts, and I divided informants into these primary categories:

1. Mozambicans of Indian subcontinent origin resident in LM/Maputo at some point between 1947-1992
2. Researchers/intellectuals/socio-political actors who contextualized the larger domestic realities
3. Civic association representatives

The majority of the oral stories that I collected fell within the first category, but the actors in the second group were vital to contextualizing the narratives captured from the first category. Contradictions and confrontations between narratives from participants in the first two groups were helpful to address some of my own research biases.

Interviews with Target Group#1: Mozambicans of Indian Subcontinent Origin Resident in Maputo at Some Point Between 1947-1992

I collected oral narratives of twenty-four individuals in this category. This amounts to well over seventy hours of taped conversations and innumerable pages of transcripts. The sample was not deliberately limited to account for gender, religion, or nationality, but the sample had gender parity. Six individuals were interviewed multiple times, due to the intergenerational snowball interviewing effect previously noted. Some informants provided their religious affiliation: Seven Muslims, seven Hindus, and six Christians identified a religious affiliation. Only one person admitted to not having Mozambican nationality at all and to retaining their Indian nationality. I believe that another interviewee also shared this same arrangement, though it never arose in our conversation. It is worth noting that, until recently, Mozambique banned dual nationality. India still does not permit it. Pakistan has limited restrictions, and Portugal has no restrictions on multiple citizenships.

Interviews with Target Group #2: Non-Indo-Mozambican Researchers/Intellectuals/Socio-political Actors

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Interview</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Profession/Expertise</i>
Nazar Abbas	Sept/Oct 2016 (Email)	Pakistani	In Maputo 1986-1990 as Pakistani Embassy's Deputy High Commissioner

Yussuf Adam	Multiple over 2016 and 2017	Mozambican	Academic
Maria Branquinho	Feb 2016	Mozambican	Researcher
Antigo Combatente*	Nov 2015	Mozambican	FRELIMO ex-combatant
Mia Couto	Feb 2016	Mozambican	Author
Celso Muianga	Feb 2016	Mozambican	Literary researcher (Fundação Fernando Leite Couto)
Dr. Ines Raimundo	April 2017	Mozambican	Geographer/Social Scientist
Antonio Sopa	Feb 2016	Mozambican	Historian and Archivist
Dr. Alda Saide Macaringue*	April 2017	Mozambican	Historian
	2016-2017	Mozambican	Academic; ex-FRELIMO soldier, forcibly relocated as part of Operação Produção

*requested anonymity

The interviews conducted with this group were done to either understand the social landscape of specific periods of time or to ask where to seek data sources. This group was the only one that encapsulated the perspectives of non-Indo-Mozambicans who circulated in LM/Maputo throughout the same time period as Indo-Mozambicans in Target Groups 1 and 3. Conversations with Target Group 2 were rarely structured. Rather, I simply opened with a brief description of my research question, and conversations evolved naturally. Layers of sources and context were offered in free form, though I did ask specific questions of individuals when I was aware of their expertise. For example, readers will hear from Dr. Raimundo because I asked her about the social ramifications of FRELIMO's economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s. She has been both a participant and an advisor, painstakingly reading multiple drafts and correcting various inaccuracies within them. In each group, I found willing collaborators who helped me dissect the research question and offered feedback on preliminary findings. It was primarily through this group that I explored hunches, was told to seek new sources of data, and was challenged not to assume American tropes.

Interviews with Target Group #3: Indo-Mozambican Affinity Groups & Civic Institutions

While I initially intended to visit multiple LM/Maputo-based affinity groups in order to understand their organizational and institutional histories, I was not able to do so successfully. Unintentionally, though, I visited the three oldest Hindu organizations in the country. The oldest Hindu temple in the country is located in Ilha de Moçambique (visited Nov 2016), the second oldest is the temple in Salamanga (visited Jan 2016), and the most relevant for this study is the

Ved Mandir and the Hindu Association in Maputo (*Comunidade Hindu*, visited multiple times April-May 2017).

I was welcomed into both the *Salamanga* and *Ilha* temples by priests who were originally from India. Both had been in Mozambique for over a decade, but seemed to lead very insular lives. They spoke little Portuguese, so I practiced my meager Hindi. That bought me goodwill, but it was not highly effective, as both priests predominantly spoke Gujarati. In both places, the Hindu community had diminished significantly, and the temples were used as excursion destinations for Hindus from neighboring cities or for curious foreigners like me. The temple in Maputo, however, was only accessible to Hindus. While I could not access it, I was welcomed into the Hindu Association's other spaces, like its administrative offices, its school, and the recreational area. It was in the recreational area that I watched the Holi ceremony with a Muslim, Indo-Mozambican friend whom I knew from Delhi (the granddaughter of *Mae*, daughter of *Aisha*, who readers will become very familiar with throughout the study). While we did not participate in the religious ceremony, which included circling a blazing pyre, we did participate in the secular portion of the festivities.

Through multiple visits to the Maputo-based Hindu Association, I learned about the organization, as well as its structure and connection to other Hindu associations throughout the country, in India, and in Portugal. With the help of the current administrators, I was introduced to male elders within the institution. Many had lived through the institution's heyday, as well as times of its closure. What was supposed to be a large convening meeting where I could speak with everyone at one time about the institution quickly became a meeting that no one showed up to. Instead, the lead administrator coordinated a series of individual interviews between me and the elders. Personal rivalries amongst the elders was the reason given as to why they would not agree to sit down together, even for this research purpose. In this case, the individual interview format, I believe, benefitted my work, as I imagine that a group interview would have been rehearsed and restricted by group censorship. This awareness brought to mind again those early conversations with my Indo-Mozambican research assistant, when she had hinted that having other Indo-Mozambicans present at interviews might sully the quality of individual responses. Nevertheless, it was through these individual conversations that I was able to decipher some of the fault lines within this community, namely nationality, ancestral origin, and economic status. Drawing together these composite threads, I trace the history of the *Comunidade Hindu* in Chapter 5.

Literature Review

This study comes from a deep desire on my part to understand the complex dualities that ethnic minorities present to projections of national identity. In this context, Indo-Mozambican dualities were often framed as a tension between being perceived as privileged minorities and perpetual foreigners. As a result, much of my early readings tackled minorities' rights, immigration and assimilation in multi-ethnic societies, indigenous diversity, as well as national identity in post-colonial studies. Some of the texts I drew on were theoretical, such as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Gayatri Spivak "Can the Subaltern Speak?," while others used case studies to illustrate lived experiences from around the globe, like Richard van der Ross' 2015 book about the political history of Coloured people in South Africa and Sverker Finnström's 2008 book *Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda*. They all offered frameworks for imagining Indo-Mozambican circumstances in the larger context of

South-South migration. Further, these texts address diversities among people of color in multi-ethnic societies where Whites are a minority.

During my first visit to Mozambique in 2013, I was made to understand that Indo-Mozambicans embodied privilege. Sometimes, it was framed as economic privilege, justified by small businesses that mysteriously thrived during times of economic downturn. Other times, it was framed as migratory privilege, as justified by multiple passports and residencies. And, last, there was a sense that racial and/or ethnic privilege allowed them to lay claim to superiority over Black Mozambicans. These lines of thinking on privilege converged to define what I now understand to be Indo-Mozambicans' particular history with Homi K. Bhabha's "*Location of Culture*"¹⁷. Location and privilege frequently intersected in my research—both in the archival documentation and the oral histories—requiring that my literature review reflect a survey of interdisciplinary understandings on economics, migration, and ethnicity.

I also consulted Achille Mbembe's text *On the Postcolony* and found it helpful to frame post-colonial continuities of the colonial state's political and economic domination. Mbembe's focus on primarily Anglophone and then secondarily Francophone African countries, however, underscored for me the need to think of my study as operating on multiple registers. If leading African scholars ignore or dismiss Iberian colonial experiences on the continent, then the five Portuguese-speaking and one Spanish-speaking countries of Africa become subaltern, even within the marginal texts and recent scholarship that evaluates Africa from within Africa. In the case of this study, re-centering Lusophone studies in southern and eastern Africa raises questions of the political and economic impact of South Africa's hegemonic role within the regions, and it questions the merit of established hierarchies of geography and language within dominant scholarship on and about the continent. For example, I would argue that within Anglophone Africa, Lusophone bodies of knowledge are equally as marginalized as indigenous language sources. No doubt, this hierarchy in elite scholarship parallels my understanding of lived experiences in Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola, where non-English speakers aspire, but struggle, to seek modes of physical and economic mobility outside of Portugal's neo-colonial ambit. I tried to keep in perspective these relationships of linguistic legacies and colonial hierarchies within Africa, when thinking of Indo-Mozambicans' temptations and fears to consider South Africa, and other Anglophone African countries, as a migratory destination to cope with local insecurity during the colonial and post-colonial periods.¹⁸

Although this study analyzes a specific group's use of migration as a coping mechanism, it does not in any way insinuate that this group held exclusive use of the tool. In fact, migration was a primary driver of the Portuguese colonial economy. In this regard, contemporary Mozambican histories have been particularly useful for their socio-economic value. It is hard to find a historically accurate text about Mozambique that is not economic in nature. Credible colonial histories tackle the colonial government's forced labor regime. Mozambicans also fled into what is now Zimbabwe to escape the State's system of conscripting — for unbearably low wages — Black men to work on either Portuguese-owned farms or in South African mines. The national histories that were produced by the University of Eduardo Mondlane are useful in framing

¹⁷ Bhabha.

¹⁸ Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

colonialism as an economic force, rather than a cultural one.¹⁹ These texts discuss national rhetoric and migratory beliefs among the different Black indigenous populations. They merely acknowledge the existence of Indo-Mozambicans, but do not speak to their origins or their diversity. Similarly, they minimize diversity among Whites.

I had to imagine Indo-Mozambicans in the negative space between the Black population and the White. I found myself wishing there was a Mozambican version of Nancy Isenberg's *White Trash: The 400-year Untold History of Class in America*, a text that retraces U.S. national history to do extensive cultural research on the diversity behind the term "White." Isenberg dissected the meanings of the racial term "White" to understand who has been allowed to self-identify and assimilate. As far as I am aware, there is no Mozambique-specific text that excavates the history of assimilation and immigration that produced the country's White citizenry. I relied on military histories to corroborate civilian testimony of intense insecurity during the war; these texts also helped me understand the intricacy of solidarity networks among southern African Whites. William Finnegan's book, *A Complicated War*, for example, outlines solidarity among Whites in the form of military cooperation between Whites in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Mozambique during Mozambique's civil war. Post-colonial Mozambique's color blind, socialist politics made it a fascinating site for economic and cultural research. Not only was the regional economy oppositional to Mozambique's post-independence socialism, but Mozambique's neighbors were also dominated by Anglophone, pro-White regimes that were outright antagonistic to Mozambique's successful self-rule; one must ask if the country's failed Marxist ambitions were not only due to poor governance, but also because it was landlocked by capitalism.

To understand this intersection among race, economy, and politics, I drew heavily from M. Anne Pitcher's *Transforming Mozambique*. Her text reads like a lamentation of the failure of FRELIMO's Marxist-socialist ambitions. Pitcher gave nuance to the levels of economic intervention taken by FRELIMO in the period between 1977 and 1985. It is worth noting that while most Western scholars say the civil war started in 1977, Mozambican scholars like Dr. Raimundo say it began in 1976. Herein, I continue to use the 1977 marker, because it is already so well-documented in existing English-language scholarship; however, it should be noted that Mozambicans attest that the war began earlier and I trust that they experienced incidents well before the violence reached foreign attention. In evaluating this war time period, I considered Pitcher's works in juxtaposition to Jeanne Marie Penvenne's myriad of texts about the inner workings of the Mozambican port and cashew economies early in the 20th century. Penvenne's texts examine racialized, migrant, and low-wage Mozambican labor in the context of Indian Ocean and southern African trade.²⁰ With few exceptions, economic investigations of Mozambican nationalism and its emergent political independence included scant mention of the crucial role of Indo-Mozambicans in the colonial and post-colonial maritime economy.

I learned of Indo-Mozambicans' role in Mozambique's pre-colonial maritime trade and coastal economies through Cyril Hromník's doctoral thesis on the participation of Goans in Portuguese enterprise in the Mozambican interior. Michael Pearson's research extends discussion

¹⁹ Hedges, David Ed. *História de Moçambique. Vol. 2: Moçambique no Auge do Colonialismo, 1930-1961*. Maputo: Livraria Universitária, 1999.

²⁰ Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican strategies and struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. London: Currey, 1995.

of economic inclusion from the interiors to Mozambican ports. “Interactions between Africa and India have been recorded far back in prehistory. This was a bidirectional exchange of commodities, ideas, and peoples,” reads Rahul Oka and Chapurukha Kusimba’s text on the intersectionality of Indian and African experience along the Indian Ocean.²¹ Texts like theirs and Kenneth Robbins’ *African Elites in India* discussed the pre-colonial connection that we still see today in modern day India, including the legacy of Siddis in Gujarat and African soldiers in Mughal art. These Africans, still present in India today, are believed to be descendants of this bidirectional exchange with East African countries, including Mozambique.

I read much of Allen Isaacman, but I did not find his work relevant to my target population. Instead, I relied heavily on texts like A. Rita Ferreira’s articles, which speak specifically to the Indo-Mozambican experience. Ferreira’s work most thoroughly investigates the presence of Lusophone Asians in Mozambique, adopting a lens of the commercial and inter-oceanic ties between Omani-Arabs in Zanzibar and Indian merchants in Mozambique. Thus, his codification of Arab and Indian ethnicities forms much of the basis of my naming charts in Chapter 2. His texts harken back to economic reasons why these individuals from the Indian subcontinent came to Mozambique in the first place. Valdemir Zamparoni’s more recent paper on Indo-Mozambican histories and identities was equally as rich, and certainly more relevant to the realities of the latter half of the 20th century. Joana Pereira Leite has her own body of scholarship on Indo-Mozambicans that is heavily cited here; she, too, was a reader of this thesis and offered vital commentary. Texts like Perreira-Leite & Khouri’s investigation of *Ismaili* merchants in Mozambique takes readers back through time (1880s through 1980s) by investigating the intersection of economics and migration through family narratives. Because the *Ismaili* community was so insular and difficult to access, I drew heavily from their study’s findings.

Throughout my work, I also investigated a body of English literature written by foreign, female workers who came to Mozambique to help build local capacity after independence. As insider-outsiders, Stephanie Urdang, Sarah Lefanu, and Elisa Fuchs, managed to compose work that is part memoir and part sociology in their recollections of the 1975-1985 period, when Mozambique was heavily reliant on foreign experts. These young volunteers came from all around the world, though mainly from Europe, and their written legacies offer insight into a foreigner’s perspective on that period. While none of these texts address Indo-Mozambicans specifically, all of these authors gave special attention to the experiences of Mozambican women, as a marginalized population among the masses. This body of scholarship put into perspective the fragility of Mozambican independence and the difficulties of its emergent national identity.

Readers will also see that I credit new scholarship, like Marta Jardim’s doctoral work on Gujarati-origin women in Inhambane and Joaquim Maloa’s doctoral dissertation on the use of urban space. Both Jardim and Maloa are Brazilian scholars. I also used local research, such as Maria Branquinho’s ethnographic study of Goans in Katembe, to understand how civic associations were affected by nationalization; and I used Diogo Moço’s thorough doctoral study of Portuguese prisoners of war “Prisioneiros na Índia: 1961-1962” to triangulate the inconsistency between data from the archives in Mozambique and reports in secondary sources from India. In this way, my work speaks to and is part of this contemporary, global body of (as yet) unpublished

²¹ Oka, Rahul C. and Chapurukha M. Kusimba. “Siddi as Mercenary or as African Success Story on the West Coast of India,” *India in Africa. Africa in India: Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms*, Indiana: 2008. Print. P. 207

scholarship on Mozambique's role in the Indian Ocean world. Dr. Raimundo referred me to Maloa's work when I struggled to grasp the segregation of Indo-Mozambicans by neighborhood in LM/Maputo. When I reached out to learn more about their findings, Branquinho gave me a hard copy of her paper, and Marta quickly emailed me hers. Were it not for these young scholars' willingness to share their work, this thesis would not have been as comprehensive or accurate.

Other texts like Oonk's study and Shiva Naipul's literature served as points of comparison to contextualize the Indo-Mozambican merchant experience within those of Indian merchants throughout East Africa. Texts like *Coolitude* by Marina Carter and Khal Torabully, explored the dominant narrative of the Indian Diaspora experience of "coolies," those subject to the waves of low-wage labor migration created in the late 1800s as a result of British colonial indentureship; and, outside of the region, stories like Niranjana Tejaswini's *Mobilizing India: Women, Music, and Migration between India and Trinidad* from the Eastern Caribbean also reflect the British post-colonial perspective on Indian migration. To my mind, though, these texts have little relevance to the migratory experience of Indo-Mozambicans. In Mozambique, there were no "coolies." For example, Indo-Mozambican migration to Mozambique was neither large-scale nor state-organized. Livelihoods and lifestyles were vastly different between British colonialism and Portuguese colonialism. In large part, Indian and Pakistani arrivals to Mozambique acted as privileged commercial and governmental interlocutors between White colonials and Black subjects. Further, there was no contractual temporality placed on migrants' stay in Mozambique; there were no commitments of return to adhere to or to anticipate.

One particular Indo-Mozambican group, Goans, have a long body of biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies that I referred to extensively throughout the chapters on the Goan experience. Silvia Bragança's biography of Aquino de Bragança's life, *Battles Waged, Lasting Dreams*, and Oscar Monteiro's *De Todos se Faz um País*, are well-known titles in Mozambique. Self-published family narratives, like the autobiography of Delia Maciel, also offered inside perspectives of the lived, migratory experience of Goans in Mozambique. Finally, narratives like Ladis da Silva's *The Americanization of the Goans* and Pundlik Gaitonde's *The Liberation of Goa* spoke specifically to the Goan role in their own de-colonization.

Regional studies (Southern/East African, Lusophone, and Indian Diaspora literatures) and area studies scholarship also grounded the thesis. The first area that I consulted were those studies that describe the depth and breadth of African and Indian relationships. The bulk of my bibliography can be attributed to authors who focus on British colonial Africa – Botswana, Tanzania, Kenya, among others. However, such texts were—by far—the least referenced in my findings. Similarly, contemporary Indian texts on partition and Indian demographics were valuable for their historical references, but they are also rarely referenced in this thesis. Fictional works like Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* focused on the partition and the sectarian violence that ensued shortly thereafter. I found texts like Gayer and Jaffrelot's data-driven book on present-day Muslim marginalization useful to understand how, after 1947, sectarian divisions hardened on the subcontinent; these references helped me contextualize the divisions between the same religious groups in Mozambique after 1961. Last, books like Lion König's *Cultural Citizenship in India: Politics, Power, and Media* and Emma Tarlo's 2003 *Unsettling Memories: Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi* provided useful frameworks to theorize instability and the role of silence and self-censorship in managing nation-state building in the post-colonial era.

Secondary source material about Asians in Africa was useful for its comparative value, even when such texts revealed dissimilarities with the Indo-Mozambican experience. Texts about Kenyan and South African Indians, for example, were available in English and focused on African countries that were previously British colonies, though they did not parallel the Lusophone colonial experience. Even rarer still were sources that mentioned LM/Maputo, often referred to as Delagoa Bay. In my readings, only Andrew MacDonald's work provided detailed analysis of Indo-Mozambican cross-border commerce between Delagoa Bay and Durban during the 20th century. While they are not always cited, the work of contemporary scholars on Africa, like MacDonald, Oonk, Finnström, Pearson, Luise White, Bertz, and Macgonagle helped me analyze tensions in the process of post-colonial identity making: traditional vs. modern, tribal vs. regional, and ethnic vs. national identities.

To draw parallels in lived experience and scholarship, I consulted work on the Coloured and Indian communities in South Africa. Vahed and Bhana, Nyamnjoh, Van der Ross and Bahadur form part of that body of literature. On the whole, those South African experiences did not mirror those of Indo-Mozambicans. Future comparative research must address why that is the case, when South African and Mozambican peoples of color share strong ancestral and migratory linkages. In terms of scholarship, I generally find South African based scholarship on cultural demography fascinating, but myopic; like work produced in the West and global North, such narratives tend only to be situated within a national context, rather than in discourse with regional and transnational experiences. Unfortunately, this feeds into the existing criticism that South Africans generally see the continent in binary terms: South Africa and the rest of Africa. Even when not authored by a South African, scholarship produced within the scope of South African academia inevitably shares that implicit bias. Throughout this study, I have seen South African culture-focused scholars use Mozambique as a footnote to make larger claims about South African communities of color; they have done so with varying degrees of success and accuracy.

For example, I question Vahed and Bhana's claim that in the 1800s slaves from India came to South Africa indirectly through Mozambique (among other countries).²² Nothing in my fieldwork leads me to believe that there was a population of enslaved Indians in Mozambique. For Lusophone scholars, the notion of Indian slaves in Mozambique runs counter to existing knowledge about Indo-Portuguese leadership in administering the Portuguese colonial enterprise, including running the lucrative sale and transport of Black slaves from and through Mozambique. Yet, it is certainly possible that enslaved people from India *could* have lived in or transited Mozambique. I could speculate about numbers and the role of British concessionary companies operating with Portuguese colonial permission. Nevertheless, if such a topic were well-researched and such a trade presented in scholarly work, it would contribute new and welcomed findings about colonial Mozambique's cultural demography. Yet, since Vahed and Bhana's reference is just a footnote in an overall narrative that centers South Africa, the authors do not interrogate if, how, and why Mozambique had "slaves from India" in the first place. In my view, these loose ends in existing literature present an opportunity to bridge multiple gaps across the continent. Co-authored, future scholarship can first address the gap between lived experiences among racial minority groups residing in different countries on the continent, and, secondarily, the knowledge gaps in scholarship re-produced throughout the continent about those same groups.

²² Vahed and Bhana, p5.

Similarly, I struggled to fill the intellectual gaps in race theories from Lusophone and southern African literatures; neither fully synced with the Mozambican social reality. Seeking to compensate for this gap, I traced the parallels between Brazilian race politics and Mozambican colonial politics. I gave space to Gilberto Freyre's analysis of the Brazilian race theory, Lusotropicalism, which I think is more relevant to Mozambican reality. I further discussed race privilege among Indo-Mozambicans and people of mixed-race, and I heavily referenced Melissa Nobles and Rebecca Reichmann, two American scholars who investigated race relations in colonial and contemporary Brazil. I contrasted their work with work on miscegenation in the U.S. to make sense of Mozambique's racial construction.

In keeping with this line of social science pedagogy, I did a fair amount of reading on ethnographic research methodology, as well, expecting to take an interdisciplinary approach by blending methodological practices from history and cultural studies. My advisors, however, offered me the alternative of ethnography, which allowed me to overcome my own concerns about writing myself too much or too little into the oral histories. Michael Jackson's *The Wherewithal of Life*, Rebecca Walker's *Enduring Violence*, and Lila Abu-Lughod's *Writing Women's Worlds* provided examples of scholarly texts that foreground oral histories as data. These texts allowed me to re-imagine my positionality as a researcher and to shift away from a historical writing voice. Ethnography allowed me to take a critical approach toward my interviewees' positionalities as well. In order to consider those dynamics, I re-read Katherine Boo's *Behind the Beautiful Forevers*, which is perhaps one of the most acclaimed and most criticized long-form journalism pieces on the urban poor to come out in recent years. Her work easily doubles as ethnography. I tried to learn from Boo what *not* to do. While I try to foreground interview narratives, I also discuss the difficulties of consent, memory, and censorship when telling them.

The literature review is as exhaustive as time and scope permit. There are other bodies of work that I did not consult that could also potentially be relevant. For instance, I only tapped archives in Mozambique, not in Portugal, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, or India. Further, I did not include vernacular language resources (Urdu, Hindi, or Gujarati), though I imagine that there is a body of Gujarati literature that could offer great value. I preference Indian secondary sources over Pakistani ones, principally due to lacking information about where to find Pakistani scholarship on these issues. I also relied on Indian Diaspora literature, rather than on African Diaspora and Jewish Diaspora literature, which are also pertinent to any study on migration. Finally, I do not have nearly as many Mozambican writers in my bibliography as I do foreign ones. All of this is true. As I stated at the outset, my work contributes to a small body of literature that exists on a 50-year period. This thesis just scratches the surface of Indo-Mozambican migratory experience and national identity formation. I hope future scholars can consult these bodies of untapped literature to offer new and relevant findings.

Conclusion

The final arguments of this thesis are much larger than the original research question. In asking about the identity shifts, migration patterns, and survival mechanisms of Indo-Mozambicans from 1947 to 1992, I really ask whether or not permanence allows immigrants and their descendants to become full citizens? At what level does an ethnic minority group get to belong socially, politically, and economically? It seems that groups' time in country does not automatically bestow belonging. Miscegenation does not, either. Some people never belong,

because the metanarrative of national, political history is based on an origin story that they are not part of. Further, discussing racial integration and ethnic plurality in Africa is much more complicated than population statistics suggest. Mozambique is just one example, but it is not the only one where minority groups look monolithic from the perspective of the majority. I am confident that a greater look at African diversity, through scholarship that foregrounds lived experience and oral narratives, will reveal many communities that have been miscategorized or misunderstood.

The interviews here told many different stories. When they were juxtaposed against one another, I often asked myself how respondents lived in the same city and at the same time but experienced life so differently. Those diversities are offered here, so that readers can witness the divergences among the Indo-Mozambican experiences of the 20th century. Interviews were supplemented by deep archival research at multiple national and municipal archive sites. Archival records illuminated local memories of historical events, such as the Indo-Mozambican monetary contributions to the families of fallen Portuguese soldiers after the 1954 Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. None of my interviewees remembered that event. Not once did it come up in conversation. So, while colonial records had their failings, I found the archives in Mozambique valuable for capturing historical markers beyond the scope of Indo-Mozambican memory or lived experience. These lived experiences were shared not just in words, but also in material culture. For concerns of consent and integrity of anonymity, I chose not to include the family photos, colonial identification cards, personal diaries, etc. that were offered to me by respondents. I was likewise overwhelmed by the hospitality of interviewees like Silvia da Bragança who opened her home, spoke to me for hours, and allowed me to photograph her deceased husband's, Aquino da Bragança's, personal artifacts. I was and remain deeply grateful for the level of openness and the quality of education offered to me by all the respondents.

Further, I would like to disclose that I did make one exception to my otherwise strict adherence to Indo-Mozambican anonymity; I did this because the material data provided during the three interviews that I had with Salim Sacoer made it impossible not to reveal him as my source. With his consent, I do a deep dive into the commercial records of his family business, N.M. Sacoer, in Chapter 5. Although Salim appears throughout the study, he is most exposed in this chapter on merchant identity. His family's business records showed an extensive list of deportees to India after Goan annexation in 1961. Sacoer allowed me to share his company's records here, but I present only a small part of what he provided. I hope to tackle these records more extensively in future research. It is the Sacoer records, coupled with the archival records from the civil cases in the municipal legal archive, that lead me to believe that business records would reveal a great deal about Indo-Mozambican families, transnational networks, and economic survival.

Ultimately, the bodies of research that I investigated were diverse and interdisciplinary because my original research question blossomed to require it. Thus, I fully explored the research question from every possible angle. I was deeply concerned about getting it wrong, which is so easy to do with the craft of ethnography. Beyond that, I wanted to set an academic example in showing that people of color can responsibly create space to proliferate the stories of other people of color, particularly groups to which they do not ascribe. This issue is one that U.S. academia still struggles to overcome. People of color tend to silo research along lines of self-ascription, while White researchers are allowed the emotional and academic space to analyze subjects and groups

to which they do not identify. I hope this work follows in the footsteps of Vijay Prashad's *Everybody was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity* to bridge a solidarity gap in academia. Black-writing-Brown and Brown-writing-Black experiences should not be an anomaly. I hope that—even if I did get some of it wrong—my scholarship is sound enough to have pushed the envelope, creating space for marginalized voices to be acknowledged and elevated as knowledge producers.

Section 2: Descriptive Chapters

Chapter 2: Names as Data, Identity and Migratory Markers

Dissecting geopolitical uncertainty in the context of this study required discussion of a specific series of events that unfolded in both the Lusophone and the Indian Ocean worlds. The peoples of the Indian subcontinent and Mozambique found themselves deeply intertwined within one another's national and economic orbit throughout the entire period of study: 1947-1992. What they called themselves and others was constantly in flux. During this period, Indo-Mozambicans experienced five different self-rule movements; some were considered independence and others annexation. Thus, naming nationality became an important factor in national and self-identity. Even those who stayed behind in Mozambique found their nationality in question, perhaps making them Mozambican in social terms, but Pakistanis or British or Portuguese by citizenship. Names mattered. The choice to use one nationality as an identifier (or not) became a question of political and migratory identity. Such names identified not only where an individual was currently located, but also to where one could eventually relocate.

Throughout this study, I confronted naming on a number of levels. First, I looked to the official terms of the census to determine which categories were in use over this period. While, in the late 1800s to early 1900s, the term "Asians" or "Asiatics" in the Census of Mozambique included a significant Chinese population, during the periods before and after that the terms were understood to encapsulate only those from the Indian subcontinent. This term predominantly included South Asians who identified very differently. The British passport holders were predominantly, but not exclusively, Hindu. The Portuguese represented an amalgam of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. And Pakistani nationality was united under Islam. The catchall rubric of "Asians," and even its subset "Indians" simply underestimates the layers of ethnicity, citizenship, and religious identities represented among the population I call "Indo-Mozambican."

State-imposed terms like "Indians" and "Asians," with their obvious misappropriations of "Arabs" and "Muslims," are historically inaccurate. My usage of over a dozen autogenous terms that arose in data collection proved similarly unsustainable. I was concerned that I would not understand connotations and would, in turn, reproduce stereotypes. Further, these labels appear malleable and their meanings inconsistent. For these reasons, I adopted the term Indo-Mozambican. It is an artificial and exogenous term created for the purpose of this study, but it is the most accurate and neutral term I could devise. It is adapted from the colonial term "Indo-Portuguese," which was used to denote a Portuguese citizen of Indian origin. This adaptation accounts for all residents in Mozambique (citizenship not defined) regardless of their specific Indian subcontinent ancestry. "Indo-Mozambican" is not a term used in common or academic parlance, thus it is not burdened by misaligned definitions of nationality, caste, class, or religion. If this term has a failing it is that it speaks of diverse subcultures using terminology that gives primacy to their collective geographic origin. ("Indo" refers to the Indian subcontinent, not the Indian nation-state.) I understand that individuals might argue that other identity markers, like language or religion, hold more importance for their self-identity than this geographical marker. I recognize the criticism, but accept the term's utility for this study.

Although the study itself adopts the term Indo-Mozambicans, readers should use this section as a guide to understand the heritages conjured when respondents use terms like *Luso-Indiano* (Indo-Portuguese), *monhê* (Muslim with Arab or Indian features), *mulato*, *mestiço*,

Indiano (Indian), *Paquistanes* (Pakistani), *Indo-Portugues*, *caneco* (Goan), *banyani* (Gujarati or Swahili Indian merchants) or *Goês* (Goan) in their narratives.

Naming Nationality

In light of 20th century uncertainties throughout the Indian Ocean and in the Lusophone world, Indo-Mozambicans in the capital faced social and economic pressure to define and declare their loyalties. Most often, loyalties were brokered through citizenship decisions. Other times, declaring belonging was defined by identity markers like religion, profession, or caste. After the fall of the British empire in India in 1947, while Indo-Mozambicans had the option of shifting from British citizenship to Indian or Pakistani citizenship, most retained their British citizenship. After the end of the Portuguese empire in India in 1961, some Indian citizens in Mozambique shifted to Portuguese or Pakistani citizenship. Others were not allowed to change citizenship and were deported from Mozambique to India. With the end of Portuguese colonialism in 1974, Portuguese citizens could become Mozambican citizens. If they chose to retain Portuguese citizenship, they had to depart Mozambique. The civil war that lasted until 1992 had encouraged some Mozambican citizens to seek refugee status in current day Zimbabwe and South Africa. Indo-Mozambicans also fled to South Africa, but most chose to assert forgotten claims to Portuguese, British, and Pakistani citizenships; and these were just some of the citizenship shifts that presented options to migrate towards economic opportunities and away from political uncertainty. Indo-Mozambicans relinquished, retained, or acquired citizenship in accordance with such survival-based thinking.

Those who lived in LM after 1961 found that internal divisions among Indo-Mozambicans were accentuated and made visible to exogenous gaze as never before. The events of 1961 and 1974 were times when Indo-Mozambican subgroups experienced varying degrees of forced migration. Those who had a choice to stay in country and weather the uncertainty, in spite of multi-layered options to evade it, were in many ways more privileged than those forced to depart. The previously cordial business dealings among different Indo-Mozambican subgroups indicated unity to outsiders, both White and Black. This appearance of unity was largely born out of ignorance. Though most commercial spaces were integrated, Mozambicans lived in racially segregated residential areas of the city. Indo-Mozambicans also lived in highly segregated spaces, even segregated from one another by subsects. Hindus, Christians, and Muslims lived in separate neighborhoods and navigated urban spaces from different vantage points. As government insecurity increased, so did departures and deportations shift neighborhood demographics.

“The ultimate measuring stick for commitment and loyalty emerged at the eve of African independence,” Oonk declared in relation to East African Asians; yet this only rings relatively true for Indo-Mozambicans.²³ While East African Asians in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania first confronted this issue of demonstrating loyalty through citizenship in the 1970s, Indo-Mozambicans had confronted it well before, during the years leading up to the 1961 annexation of Portugal’s Indian colonies. Elderly Indo-Mozambicans remembered that, as tensions unfolded in the late 1950s, it became evident that Portugal and India would clash over Goa, Daman, and Diu. At the time, they did not understand how deeply they, in Mozambique, would be personally affected. Additionally, at the precipice of Mozambican independence, the Indo-Mozambican

²³ Oonk, 206.

community's predominantly Muslim and Christian populations even further sub-divided their loyalties and re-defined their identities through yet another wave of emigration and accompanying citizenship shifts. These geopolitical clashes and conflicting colonialisms, triggered migratory and identity shifts in colonial subjects. This brings us back full circle to the social and political value of naming Indo-Mozambican identities over time.

Sub-group names in academic literature

Studies that predate this one often begin with a similar conundrum of how to refer to Indo-Mozambicans. Throughout Jagjit Mangat's 1970 book *A History of the Asians in East Africa, ca. 1886 to 1945*, he uses "Indians" and "Asians" interchangeably. In Oonk's *Settled Strangers* (2013), we hear about "East African Asians," "Asian Africans," and "South Asians in East African colonies." None of these names seemed applicable to this study. As I battled with how to codify the names that I heard in oral interviews, I kept returning to A. Rita Ferreira's 1985 essay "Moçambique e os Naturais da Índia Portuguesa," a roadmap to understanding Indo-Mozambican identity nomenclature. His work outlined the variety of name usage for what he referred to as "Natives of Portuguese India." This categorization of Indian subgroups in Mozambique is by far the most exhaustive and has served as my signpost throughout this study.²⁴

Ferreira succinctly broke down the economic activity and migratory history of prominent sub-identity groups. In his work, group names emerge uncontested and are explained through a historical lens. Names like "mouros" (Moors) and "baneanes" (also spelled Banianes or Banyans) are thrown around with minimal explanation, leading me to believe that he had the benefit of an audience with a shared sense of meaning around these terms. Where clarification comes, it is imbedded within subheadings that are easy to translate, but hard to connote. For example, subheadings begin (in translation) "The Hindus of Mozambique (generally 'Banianes')" (p.627), "The Maometanos (generally 'Mouros')" (p.633), "The Ismailis (generally 'Cojás')" (p.636). Banian, the term, corresponds to a Hindu merchant caste, and the latter terms are what Claude Markovits calls subsets of the Muslim community; "...in Western India most Muslim businessmen belonged to three sects, the *Bohras*, *Khojas*, and *Memons*, themselves divided into subsets. Community life existed within the framework of the subset and the feeling of a 'Muslim' identity cutting across sectarian differences was slow to emerge."²⁵ If complicated sectarian differences defined religious subsets on the Indian subcontinent, it was no wonder that, in the diaspora, migrant communities' iterative process of adapting labels to suit their fluid identities abroad was oversimplified by exogenous groups who made generalizations and adopted terms that did not always apply. As I read Ferreira, I found myself asking for and by whom were these terms "generally" used? Did the namers and the named agree on connotation and definition? How can one verify authenticity?

In his 29-page essay, sixteen different names were used for Indian subgroups in Mozambique. This is in addition to the regional designations between the Portuguese territories

²⁴ Rita-Ferreira, A. "Moçambique e os Naturais da Índia Portuguesa." *Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga – Memórias* 25 (1985): 617-648.

²⁵ Markovits, Claude. *Indian Business and Nationalist Politics 1931-39: The indigenous capitalist class and the rise of the Congress Party*, Cambridge (1985): 23.

(i.e. “Baneanes from Diu” p.623) and religious qualifiers (i.e. “The Goan Catholics” p.636). He also included caste names:

To better understand the main aspects of the Hindu presence in Mozambique, I will highlight: a) Between the Hindus of Damão and Dio there are, respectively, 36 and 25 castes; b) The Brahmans of Goa subdivide themselves in five castes; c) The Maratha, that correspond with the ancestral Kshatriya, constitute two castes and were exempted from many obligations, because of their predominantly military activities. . . .²⁶

He continues to letter L, with reference to regional, class, and caste differences at each point. The names listed below are those that I found in Ferreira’s work. As far as I am aware, these names were initially ascribed to Indo-Mozambican sub-groups, and some were later accepted. The meaning, religious affiliation, and usage notes are my own.

Table 1: Names used in Rita-Ferreira’s Literature

Name in Portuguese	Meaning in English	Religion	Notes on usage
Mouro(s)	Moors	Muslim	Describes commercial traders
Baneane(s)	Banyans	Hindu	Describes commercial traders
Indiano(s)	Indians	Not specified	Describes commercial traders
Monhé(s)	No known translation	Not specified	Described as an umbrella term used for both “baneane” and “mouro” (p. 624)
Manzane(s)	Mahajan (derived from Gujarati)	Hindu	Origin of the word described as the name for an industry specific business association; could be membered by a caste (p626); common in Diu
Canarins or Canarim	Canary (or Canarians)	Christian (assumed Catholics)	Misnomer used to describe Goans; Misnomer because this accurately describes people living in the Canary

²⁶ ibid, 626-7.

			Islands—off the South West Coast of Portugal—who have no known ethnic or religious connection to Indo-Portuguese
Homen(s) de chapéu	Hat men	Christian (assumed Catholics)	Includes Europeans, Goans and mixed-race
Homen(s) de touca	Cap men	No specified religious affiliation	Includes Afro-Indians and Indians
Afro-Indiano(s)	Afro-Indians	Muslim	Assumed meaning matches name
Coja(s)	Khojas	Muslim	Adherent of Aga Khan
Ismaelita(s)	Ismailis	Muslim	Adherent of Aga Khan
Goes(es)	Goans	Catholics	Specifically from the territory of Goa; Employed in public service, military, business and land owning
Castiço(s)	Mixed-caste	Not specified	Assumed meaning matches name
Mestiço(s)	Mixed-race	Not specified	Assumed meaning matches name
Luso-Indiano(s)	Lusophone-Indian	Not specified	Assumed meaning matches name
Indo-Portugues	Indian-Portuguese	Not specified, but closely affiliated with Christians (Catholics)	Assumed meaning matches name

In the shadow of Ferreira’s work, I struggled to record the vernacular labels that arose in my three years of fieldwork, particularly fearing that explaining them to an unfamiliar audience could distract from the over-arching argumentation of this study. Valdemir Zamparoni’s 2000 study, “Monhés, Baneanes, Chinase Afro-maometanos: Colonialismo e racismo em Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, 1890-1940*” is often quoted in the prefaces of academic works that focus on one Indo-Mozambican subgroup or another. Because his work and mine attempt to tackle the urban collective, I drew heavily from Zamparoni’s analysis on the relationship between names and social segregation in LM/Maputo:

In Lourenço Marques, aside from the Africans, one of the most segregated communities was the *monhés*. I do not know of a clearly established etymology for the term. However, Father Daniel da Cruz associated it as “muenhe, owner, boss, sir.” In spite of this definition,

this epithet had, and still carries, a certain depreciative charge and was used, popularly, to designate the various cultural groups of Indian origin, except the Christian Goans who tried to behave like Europeans.

The term encompassed both *Baneanes*, Hindus, mostly from Gujarat, and *Moors*, followers of Islam, whether they were Omani or from India under British rule. In the documentation of the Portuguese administration the term *monhé* is not current and sometimes the distinction is made, but, in general, all Indians are classified as *Asians*, so that, today, we can not always distinguish with the desired rigor, such socio-racial categories.²⁷

Over the course of this study, I heard Indo-Mozambicans call themselves Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Portuguese, British, Indian, Pakistani, Mozambican, Goans, and mulatos. I heard non-Indo-Mozambicans call them these and many more names (see Table 2). In identifying these names, I was able to dissect how sub-groups related to specific historical migration patterns, ethnic origins, social hierarchies, and phenotypes. Without understanding these naming patterns and meanings, my findings would not have materialized. More importantly, I would not have grasped the social function that names served in signaling national loyalties, migration patterns, and citizenship. Below, I have outlined the colloquial names for Indo-Mozambican subgroups as they were used in daily speech. These terms do not have clear definitions or consistency over time.

Table 2: Names for Indo-Mozambicans that I Encountered in Literature and Colloquial Speech

Name in Portuguese	Meaning in English	Nationality	Connotation in Present Day Maputo
Baniani	Banyan	Mozambican	Neutral: Descendants of 15 th or 16 th century Indian Businessmen, typically from the North of Mozambique; infrequently used.
Canarim	Of Indian Portuguese origin (Goa, Damão or Diu)	Mozambican	Neutral: Indo-Portuguese; infrequently used.
Caneco	Of Indian Portuguese origin (Goa, Damão or Diu)	Mozambican	Neutral to Negative: Indo-Portuguese, but principally Goan with dark features and of humble means
Goês	Goan	Indian	Neutral
Guzurati; Gujarati	Gujarati	Indian or Mozambican	Neutral
Indiano	Indian	Indian	Neutral

²⁷ Zamparoni, Valdemir. "Monhês, Baneanes, Chinas e Afro-maometanos: Colonialismo e racismo em Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, 1890-1940*." (1999): Departamento de História da Universidade Federal da Bahia. Web. 20 June 2017. <www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/zamparoni.rtf>.

Ismaili; Ismailita	Ismaili (Adherent of Aga Khan – Shia, Islam)	Not designated	Neutral: Often connotes a member of an exclusive, private and privileged group of Muslims who adhere to this branch of Islam. Are assumed to be wealthy and liberal. Do not wear identifiably Islamic dress, except during the holy month of Ramadan.
Mestiço	Mixed-Race	Mozambican	Neutral to Negative: Primarily used to denote generations of mixed-race parentage, esp. with Black mixes; often used for people who are phenotypically more proximate to Black in hair texture and skin color
Moçambicano	Mozambican	Mozambican	Neutral
Monhé	No translation	Mozambican, Indian, Pakistani, or from an Arab nation	Negative: Describes a strict Muslim who has Arab or Indian features, typically wears traditional Islamic dress including Kufi, Abaya and/or Niqab; viewed as racist towards Africans, socially exclusionary, economically strong and possibly involved in clandestine businesses; in recent years also includes recent immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh
Mulato/a	Mixed-Race (Principally for Black and White mixes and the other mixes (mestiço) are with different races; this is fluid, however.	Mozambican or Portuguese	Positive: A privileged group that has White relatives and shares White features, eye color, hair, skin color. Neutral: Primarily used to denote generations of mixed-race parentage, esp. with a White parent. Also used for anyone who is at all of mixed-race, regardless of the ethnic mixes. Negative: Connotes a privileged group that has White features and typically doesn't associate socially with Blacks
Paquistânês	Pakistani	Pakistani	Neutral to Negative: See Monhé (also spelled Monhé)

Case Study: The Meaning, Uses, and Implications of “Monhé”

The tables above organize my understandings of the meanings of frequently used terms. Oral histories have taught me that meanings change based on context, as well as the origin or age of the user. Throughout the research period, I focused heavily on the term ‘Monhé’ (also spelled monhê) because I had heard it used in so many different contexts that, even now, I do not really know what it means. Marta Jardim’s work includes this definition: “Monhé (moç.): synonym of Moor, from Swahili; Islamized African (Northern Mozambique); actually, an individual originally from India or Pakistan, Muslim (cf. Péliissier: 1994).”²⁸

The more I read and talked with people, the more that I found this definition to be both oversimplified and hotly contested. While it appeared in Jardim’s work as a neutral term, I never saw it appear that way in daily speech. Therefore, in search of a better understanding of the term’s social and migratory implications, I inquired specifically about its contemporary and historical usages, soon discovering that asking questions about the term opened up layers of understanding not just about that specific term, but also others like “caneco” and “baneane,” which were equally as nebulous and contentious.

Throughout my field work, *monhês* were consistently depicted as rude and dismissive of anyone else who was not also *monhé*. At no point was the term ever used in a positive way. Even on a visit to Mozambique Island, when I spoke about my study with a foreign friend who had resided on the island for many years, he asked me quizzically what I thought about *monhês*. I answered that it was not easy to tell who was actually a *monhé*, and he put down his glass of wine, declaring that he found them to be the most rude and entitled people that he had ever encountered. According to him, they regularly destroyed property, were unabashedly disrespectful, and were crudely racist against Blacks. With time, I understood that rarely would anyone be called a *monhé* to their faces and only when non-*monhês* were offended would they use the term to refer to said perpetrator. This term was powerfully contentious, then, because it was deeply entrenched in negative emotion.

According to David Morton’s doctoral thesis, this belief that *monhês* were undesirable—particularly within the confines of a modern, integrated city—was even held by high level government officials. *Monhês* were perceived as socially backward in ways that were considered uncouth and selfish in the shared confines of a cosmopolitan cityscape like LM/Maputo:

During [President Samora’s] speech, while listing the do’s and don’ts of making a home in the City of Cement—such as not bringing livestock into buildings—the president instructed future tenants to not hang their colorful *capulanas* (Mozambican sarongs) outside their apartments. “Otherwise the city will look as if it belongs to *monhês*,” a common though pejorative term for Indian and Arab Muslims.²⁹

²⁸ Jardim, Marta Denise da Rosa. *Cozinhar, adorar e fazer negócio: Um estudo da família indiana (hindu) em Moçambique*. 2006. Universidade Estadual de Campinas, PhD Dissertation., p. 362.

²⁹ Morton, David Simon. "Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique’s Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times." Diss. U of Minnesota, 2015. *Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique’s Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times*. University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Web. <<http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/181959>>. p. 258.

Even before Mozambique's independence, the term *monhé* was used in a nebulous way by the Portuguese colonial administration. Marta Jardim's work builds on Zamparoni's (2000) study and highlights the fact that "the Portuguese administration, although using the Asian term generically for populations of Indian origin, makes use of terms considered pejorative, such as 'monhé', for Muslim Indian; 'Baneane' for Hindu Indian, and 'Goes' for Catholic Indian."³⁰ Joaquim Maloa's 2016 doctoral thesis follows this line of thought and adds that *monhés* were also subject to state-led discrimination, in addition to pejorative speech:

As a consequence of excessive racialized urban segregation, Lourenço Marques grew into an urban duality, both from a constructed and social point of view, with a clear division between racial groups (White and Black) and two different ways of life, urban and legal. This dual structure tended to include Asians living in Mozambique. Although the Asian term is used in the colonial Censuses, it represented four distinct communities: Chinese, Hindus, Mohammedans and Baneanes, the latter originating mainly from Guzarate (India).

The Muslims and baneanes are called by Mozambicans as monhé. In fact, these also suffered the racial biases of the colonial administration...³¹

Whenever I tried to systematically peel back the meaning of the term *monhé* with informants, I was offered multiple, contradictory definitions. *Monhé* was co-defined by other contentious terms like *caneco* and *baneane*. When I asked Camila (a Goan Christian) what *monhé* meant, she said, "Those were prejudiced terms created during colonial times. The Muslim Indians were 'monhés' and the Goans were 'canecos.' I don't know where it comes from. People use those terms not as an offensive term. In those times it was used as an offensive term, but now it's not."³²

In our initial conversation, Salim used the term before I had the chance to ask him what it meant. He began, "I was in the Portuguese army. I was first sent to Boane and then to Chimoio. We didn't know what specialty they were going to give us. We left in buses to Boane. We were thirty, and there were also thirty men from the army military; they check up on the military. When we got there we saw an armored car. They asked what us *monhés* were doing there. They thought we had a lot of money to be there." I asked him to unpack what they were insinuating. He explained that they were wondering why Salim and his mates had not bribed their way out of combat service. Salim said this practice was commonplace for *monhés* during this time and he took pride in defying the stereotype. In our next conversation, I asked him specifically to define the term *monhé*. He too answered the query by comparing it with other terms:

S: Monhé is a term that comes from when the Arabs had kids on the Island of Mozambique. Their looks were not Indian. They were a mixture of Arabs and Africans. The Portuguese people use monhé towards us in a way to deteriorate our image. I don't feel affected, but surely I would say that monhé means the son of an Arab and a Mozambican.

³⁰ Jardim, p. 61-2.

³¹ Maloa, Joaquim Miranda. "A Urbanização Moçambicana: Uma proposta de interpretação." Diss. Universidade de São Paulo, 5 Aug. 2016. Web. 20 May 2017. <http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-05082016-155420/pt-br.php>, p. 132-3.

³² Camila. Personal Interview. 2016.

NA: So the implication is that they are Muslim or Indians of any kind?
 S: All Indians. They didn't know how to call us.
 NA: I found it interesting how they use the different terms. Monhé is used a lot. Banyan is used a lot in the north.
 S: Do you know what Banyan means?
 NA: I know the word, but not how it's used here.
 S: In India it is very hot. They use those sleeveless shirts and they call that banyan. Here we used to wear it when it's very hot. That is called banyan. They hear Indians speaking about banyans and the name stuck.³³

In our conversation, author Mia Couto offered his explanation of the term:

MC: I think that one impression that I got was that there was a word to say Indians, and it was monhés. As you may know, monhé is coming from the word "mwene."
 NA: m-w-e-n-e?
 MC: Yes. Mwenes were the religious leaders of the Muslim communities. From the beginning there was a mixed identity for the White guys, for the guys that were ruling at the time. So they called monhés all the Pakistanis and Indians. In the Portuguese time, there was this special category that was very strong in Mozambique. You couldn't find it in Angola or other Portuguese colonies. They were called the canecos. . . . So, I'm talking about this special group inside the Indians. These guys were not called monhés. They were disconnected.
 NA: So, is caneco a term that you can call someone and they won't be offended? Or is it a term that they called themselves?
 MC: Well, only joking. It's not a polite term. It's not offensive, but it's not polite. The others are the Indians, the monhés. Even the guys that have Arab origins. It's different from South Africa. They receive a lot of guys to work at the sugar cane plantation and mines. Not here. Here, they all come to work in the commercial sector. They have their own shops. They have created their special society, because they preserve so much of their structure and links. They are not so dependent on the State. They have their own underground State. People have this perception that they took much more than they deserved, because they are not giving. There's some prejudice around them. There's a difficulty to understand why they are not susceptible to the social and political crisis.³⁴

While individual definitions differ, there was consistent co-dependence between identity names. Sub-group names were defined in juxtaposition. In Gabriel Mitha Ribeiro's 2012 article, translated "It is a shame to be Mulato," he discusses experiences of people of mixed-race by contrasting the term *mulato* with the term *monhé*. He concludes by defining them as coterminous:

The best way to categorize the "mulatto" attitude is to associate it with other proximate racial groups, namely "monhés", "baneanés" or "canecos" (the so-called "Indians"). In Mozambique, this rainbow of skin colors permits the obstruction of a broad frontier and

³³ Saco, Salim. Personal Interview. 2017.

³⁴ Couto, Mia. Personal Interview. 2016.

very difficult definitions between black and white, it becomes impossible to resort to rigid categorizations. . . .

From a mundane incident in the city of Maputo (2010), I registered a symbolic expression: Whoever screwed over this “mulatto” had to be a “monhé.”

By this I mean to emphasize that one of the simplest definitions of the “mulatto” is that of not being “monhé” and vice-versa. The two terms are widely used in common-sense discourses in Mozambique without overlapping. At the cognitive level they are categories of social thought, because they present themselves as mutually exclusive. What may be debatable is the range of attributes of each of these categories. If the “intermediate” skin color (neither black nor white) is ever taken into account in common sense evaluations, it is always weighed by the saliency conferred on other attributes. They emphasize the behaviors and attitudes considered dominant in each segment, especially those connoted with religious beliefs and practices. The “monhé” is associated with the Islamic religion or Hindu and are originally from or are descendants of Indian people. The “mulatto” is represented as a (sub) Christian product of the West. Beyond the exogenous / immigrant component in both cases, it is that the “mulatto,” among blacks, is recognized as an obvious miscegenation with blacks. Therefore, from the perspective of the majority, neither of them being “blacks,” the “mulattos” tend to be represented more as “ours” [accepted as part of the black in group] and the “monhés” much more as “other” or exogenous.³⁵

I revisit the tension between *mulatos* and *monhés* in Chapter 6. Beyond the interwoven definitions, there are no clear meanings. Fueled by stereotypes and stigma, many of the names used for Indo-Mozambicans carried both an ascribed and an assumed social value. Further, the implications of migratory and ethnic identity are imprecise. The academic definitions and the oral narratives presented here show contradictory definitions—are *monhés* only Muslims or also Hindus? Are they from modern-day India or colonial India? Due to the diversity of experience across Mozambique, as well as the genuine diversities amongst Indo-Mozambicans, these assumed categories are as much misnomers today as they were in the past.

The problematic relationship between naming and belonging is important to tracking how Indo-Mozambican subgroups shifted identities and locations to cope with 20th century uncertainties. Indo-Mozambicans may be socially proximate to non-Indo-Mozambicans—Black and White—but they are not integrated into Mozambican society in such a way that would validate their full membership into the national landscape. The controversy around the naming of Indo-Mozambican subgroups—whether accurate or imprecise, endogenous or exogenously defined—shows just how much this ethnic minority and its subordinate groups are considered insider/outsiders in Mozambican society. They are acknowledged, but not well understood.

³⁵ Gabriel Mithá Ribeiro, « “É Pena Seres Mulato!”: Ensaio sobre relações raciais », *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* [Online], 23 | 2012, posto online no dia 26 Julho 2012, consultado no dia 29 Setembro 2016. URL : <http://cea.revues.org/583> ; DOI : 10.4000/cea.583, p 25-6.

Chapter 3: An Oral History of Indo-Mozambican Life from 1947-1992

This study confronts a minority group's omission from the national narrative. I do this first by identifying instances of their inclusion and second by collecting scholarly data to illuminate their absences. When I explained my work to another scholar, he put it simply: "You are trying to explain how and when Indians appear and disappear from the nation."³⁶ I would add that, in addition, I probe who benefits (and how) from these appearances and disappearances. Indo-Mozambican appearance in Mozambique's cultural *mélange* has long been assumed to be the status quo, but the disappearance of their diversities signals, for me, a disregard for their diversities. In the three years that I spent in Mozambique and the two in India, I was acutely aware of the value that both nations place on origins: regional, cultural, familial, etc. Both are highly codified societies where clans and castes are known, parentage is valuable, and language groups easily identify outsiders. I struggle to believe that the intersection of both nations would result in a population that is not subject to a hyper vigilance toward origins. I assume that the lack of novelty around Indo-Mozambican migration normalized their collective presence over the centuries; however, their individual experiences in Mozambique were reduced to mundane allegory in well-established meta-narratives of Afro-Arab trade. Until Mozambican independence, it was the Portuguese—not Mozambicans or Indo-Mozambicans—who crafted these narratives. Perhaps that colonial legacy is partially to blame for the appearance and disappearance of Indo-Mozambicans in written records. I assumed the oral records would somehow contest the written. My experience has been that while oral histories sometimes contest colonial narratives, at other times they perpetuate and reinforce them.

Mozambican national memory holds dear the mythical origins of Mozambique and India's interconnectivity. In recounting oral histories, Mozambicans of all heritages regularly share that Indians and Arabs (referred to interchangeably) have been arriving on the Mozambican coast via the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden since well before the 13th century. It is said that South Asians and Arabs came to the geographic region known today as Mozambique well before indigenous African kingdoms there shared any sense of ethnic unity or solidarity. In layman's terms, Indians were said to have been in Mozambique since before Mozambique was *Mozambique*.

This history must be reviewed in context. Both archival data and oral lore throughout Southern Africa are riddled with the liberal interchanging of "Arab" with "Indian," "Arab" with "Muslim," and "Indian" with "Muslim." Such misnomers mar academic work and cultural analysis alike. For instance, the records that I drew from were largely Portuguese colonial records, so the disappearance of accurate group names could be a symbol of colonial ignorance about their rivals. Consequently, the terms "Arab" and "Indian" are assumed euphemisms in the Mozambican (and Southern African) context and are rarely historically documented as separate peoples with distinct ethnic identities. Obviously, calling an "Arab" an "Indian" is as much a misnomer as calling all Muslims Arab; they are not inherently synonymous. This interchange of inaccurate names is problematic because, as this study shows, origin stories became less authentic and more anecdotal over time. Moreover, identity group names hold cultural and migratory significance. The misuse of terminology with regard to Indo-Mozambicans makes it harder for contemporary academics to

³⁶ Rogers. Social sciences workshop Conversation. 2018.

retrace an accurate historiography now. In lived experience, the misnomers signal Indo-Mozambicans' lack of agency to define themselves and an exogenous ambivalence towards them.

Scholars like Cyril Hromnik and Michael Pearson have studied the role of Arab and Indian traders in developing port cities and expanding the economic reach of coastal trading posts into the interiors of what we now know as Tanzania and Mozambique. Traveling merchants traded in animal horn, skins, gold, and ivory, in exchange for beads, cloth, and spices along the Swahili coast. This account of pre-colonial Indian arrival, which is both inherently linked to Arab arrival and to Indian Ocean trade, is taken for national fact. The findings of this study, however, lead me to believe that this origin story is an example and a bi-product of the imagined Indian community in Mozambique. In effect, Indo-Mozambican origins are both fact and fiction. Their confirmed presence is fact, but all of the fiction that remains unconfirmed matters to this study, because origin stories are so deeply important to asking and answering questions of identity and migration; origin stories are even more important when unpacking the role of myth-making in the emergence of national identity.

Some regional historians say that the first Indian traders to Mozambique were actually from Oman, an extension of the Swahili Coast sultanate.³⁷ Most say that the first person the Portuguese met upon arrival in *Ilha de Mozambique* (Mozambique Island or *Ilha*), the country's capital before 1898, was an Arab Muslim named Mussa bin Bique; some say he was Arab, others say Muslim, and others still say Indian. In many of my conversations with respondents, I asked what they knew of Indians in Mozambique, and most began by naming Mussa bin Bique or identifying *Ilha* as the principal site of Indian-Mozambican encounters. Yet logic has led me to wonder if, due to *Ilha*'s proximity to Zanzibar, where the population is predominantly Black and Muslim, proof has ever been found to argue that bin Bique was actually "Indian" or "Arab." Throughout my research, I have asked others if they, too, question this identity issue, and they admitted that they have never pondered the thought that bin Bique could be Black. This is just one of the many assumptions about the origins of Indo-Mozambicans that remain uncontested today.

Were Mozambique's equivalent of a founding father found to be Black, how might Mozambique's national narrative shift? How would Mozambique's moniker as an inclusive and diverse nation change? How would Indo-Mozambicans' sense of intrinsic national belonging adapt, were the nation's origin story to reveal their historic absence? Would Black Mozambicans contest Indo-Mozambican inclusion even more if Indian arrivals were discovered to be more recent? If Mozambique and India's cultural connections were not perceived as primordial, but, rather, remnants of recent globalization, could Indo-Mozambicans continue to claim space, privilege, and social access to Mozambique's economy? Would a shift in the origin story create a shift in contemporary narratives?

While I do ask these questions in earnest, this study can only speculate about the answers. On its own, it cannot fill the gap in knowledge about Indian-Mozambican intersectionality from the 13th to the 21st century. Moreover, it likewise cannot fully address the silences and assumptions made about that intersectionality. Instead, it will excavate many historical assumptions, problematizing these elements when they go unfounded. All of these elements, the real and the

³⁷ Hromnik.

imagined, are used as data here; hopefully, future researchers will re-examine and re-imagine these findings in order to venture academic answers to these larger social questions.

This chapter presents oral narratives chronologically, so that readers can observe how contemporary history is simultaneously framed and fragmented through orality. In this chapter, national memory and lore confront lived experiences of state intervention in as accurate a depiction as can be captured in an academic text. Herein, the four migratory flashpoints of the 20th century are 1) the end of British colonialism in India in 1947; 2) the invasion and annexation of Goa, Daman, and Diu by India in 1961; 3) the independence of Mozambique from Portugal in 1975; and 4) the civil war of Mozambique 1977-1992—anchor the lived experience of respondents. Different Indo-Mozambican heritages emerge within the context of competing colonialisms and post-colonial legacies. The appearance and disappearance of identity group solidarity shows how geopolitical flashpoints forced migratory shifts that impacted Indo-Mozambican sub-identities, citizenships, and sense of national belonging.

Before the Beginning: Indo-Mozambicans in the Capital Before the 20th Century

Before the 20th century, Indo-Mozambican identity was not an identity in dispute. Instead, Indo-Mozambicans were understood to encompass privileged migrants of diverse origins and religions. They embodied uncontested access to opportunity and capital within a colonial structure that relied heavily on their skills. Goans of middle class and high caste origins, for example, were typically employed as administrators for the British and Portuguese governments. They were educated and often bilingual, making them key stand-ins for European colonial authorities. Moreover, job opportunities abroad provided a means for upward mobility that was scarcely available in India's densely populated cities. Mozambique and India did not share ties of colonial indentureship, as took place between India and other former British colonies like South Africa and Trinidad. Thus, the migratory relationships between Mozambique and India were voluntary and individually orchestrated. State-sponsored migration was principally accessed by mid-level colonial managers and skilled technicians, and many Indo-Mozambicans were colonial collaborators and colonizing agents, rather than subjects of colonial labor.

Population LM 1894-1928³⁸

	1894	1928	Var.
Europeans	591	8988	15.2
Indians	226	3010	13.3
Indo Brit	136	1342	9.86
Indo Port	90	1668	18.5

British Indian Population in Mozambique in 1890³⁹

Place (from north to south)	Population
Ibo	100

³⁸ Leite & Khouri, 32.

³⁹ Oishi, Takashi. "Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. P. 6-7

Mozambique District	250
Mozambique Island	350
Parapat	250
Quelimane	300
Sofala District including Beira	250
Delagoa Bay (Lourenço Marques)	250
Delagoa Bay Interior	500
Crews of dhows	200
Sepoys	200
Total	2,650

Source: RTCDM 1890. P.12

Highlights by author, N. Allen

Population of Mozambique District in 1908⁴⁰

Nationality	Europeans			Asiatics			Africans	Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male/Female	
Portuguese	373	48	421	190	5	195	360000	360616
British	12	0	12	563	57	620	0	632
German	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
French	4	8	12	0	0	0	0	12
Other	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Total	400	56	456	753	62	815	360000	361271

Source: RTCPM1908. P.40

Highlights by author, N. Allen

Population of LM/Maputo – does not include Matola (1940-2013)⁴¹

Year	Total Population	African Population
1940	68,223	45,632
1950	93,265	57,755
1960	178,546	122,460
1970	378,348	300,495
1980	755,300	*
1997	946,312	*
2001	1,074,645	*
2013	1,209,993	*

Research conducted by Antonio Rita Ferreira, Cyril Hromnik, Allen Isaacman, and Manfred Prinz address the expansive history of Indian and Mozambican migration and trade before

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Morton, David Simon. "Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times." Diss. U of Minnesota, 2015. *Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times*. University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Web. <<http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/181959>>. P 7.

the 20th century. An excerpt from Manfred Prinz's "Intercultural Links between Goa and Mozambique in their Colonial and Contemporary History: Literary Mozambiquean [sic] Traces," most adequately summarizes the pre-20th century connections:

The community of the *prazeiros* was in the 18th century, largely of Indian descent. They who received *aforamentos* or titles to property, were residents of a lower status in Portugal, inhabitants of Zambeze, poor, *degradados*, mulata women of European soldiers and Asians of Goa. . . . One sees the growing presence of Indians and the predominance of them in the market (ivory, gold, against cloth and musingas) with East Africa already before the Portuguese colonization during the century, in the Gulf of Cambay, through Daman and Diu in the commercial contacts that were associated with the foundation of the Muslim sultanate of Gujarat in 1392, the sultanate that attained the zenith of its authority at the end of the 15th century, during the reign of Mahmud I, which started in 1458. The Portuguese, after they had eliminated the Swahili Arabs of the African market with the support of the leading Africans, continued rivals of the Indian merchants in such a way that between 1640 (year of the independence of Portugal from Spain) and 1752 (year of the reforms of Marquis of Pombal, giving independence of Portuguese East Africa from the Viceroy of India) the Portuguese Crown conducted a commercial policy between a free market and a commercial monopoly. . . . The Portuguese preferred the more agreeable lands of Brazil, Goa and other parts of Africa, while the Goans, mainly after the independence of East Africa from the Viceroy of India in 1752, and the abolition of the customs system, extended their commercial power to the Zambeze Valley, establishing an important economic position.⁴²

In the Portuguese colonial context, Indo-Mozambicans bridged the economic, social, and geographic gaps that defined Mozambican society under colonial rule. It is colloquially said that Mozambique experienced a "delayed colonization," due to the low numbers of Portuguese who actually colonized the country and their poor penetration into the interior.⁴³ As Ferreira explained above, to fill in the gaps, Portugal had a long-standing policy of courting and compensating administrators from their Indian colonies to govern the African colonies. As a result, migration from the Indian colonies to Mozambique was deeply entrenched by the 20th century.

In our conversation about the role of Indo-Mozambicans in the national landscape from 1947-1992, Mia Couto, began with his understanding of Indo-Mozambican *prazeiros*:

MC: *Prazos* are the territories that they delegate with a *prazo*, medium to long-term agreement, which is the meaning of *prazo*. *Prazo* means deadline. They encouraged guys coming from India, this special category of *canecos*. The difference was that these *canecos* should be Catholic guys, should have had Portuguese education, in other words, he should not be an Indian. . . . The most Portuguese as possible. In some cases, they had created a psychological character. It's very interesting, because there was a group—a special race or

⁴² Prinz, Manfred. "Intercultural Links between Goa and Mozambique in their Colonial and Contemporary History: Literary Mozambiquean Traces," *Goa and Portugal: Their Cultural Links* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1997), 111-127.

⁴³ Isaacman, Allen F. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution*, (Ann Arbor: UMI Books on Demand, 1972), 17-63.

something—that was these canecos. In literary terms, they were very rich, because they have a very interesting and conflictuous history. They are Indians that don't consider themselves Indians. So, they were Indians that were rejecting their Indian side. They were going to show themselves more Portuguese than the Portuguese themselves. They are fundamentalist Catholics. They were in Africa and they were refusing also to become Africans, so they are in between something that doesn't exist.

NA: Yes, between ideals in some ways.

MC: Between some empty territories, between shadows. Because they were in between everything, they were such foreign identities.⁴⁴

Parallel to the socio-economically privileged Indo-Mozambicans whom Couto mentioned, there were also longstanding Indian fishing communities in coastal towns. Although they were of humbler means, their arrival in Mozambique is said to pre-date the merchants' arrival, and their continued presence in regions like Katembe and Inhambane has come to define those regions. The presence of the Goan fishing communities in the capital's extension in Katembe certainly predates that of many other Indo-Mozambican groups in the capital. Katembe Goans are largely insular and are reported to maintain many traditional Catholic Goan rituals and traditions.⁴⁵ A large number of Indo-Mozambican residents in the capital that I met throughout the period of study originally migrated from fishing villages into the city to either advance in the fisheries industry in Katembe or to work in jobs in town. These fishing groups were typically regarded as lower class. Many families had long since integrated into and identified with African communities through miscegenation or neighborly approximation.

Just months before her death, Conceição spoke candidly with me about her own experience living in Mozambique. As the daughter of Goan parents who moved to northern Mozambique from Guinea Bissau in 1963, Conceição had particular insights, especially as her father was an agronomist for the Portuguese government. Specifically, she recalled the continuation of caste divisions between mainland and Katembe Goans:

C: Goans were public servants, like in the notary, some doctors, some fishermen. In Goa, there was a tradition of passing jobs on to their children. Now it's different. From Katembe they were fishermen, and they don't mix up with civil servants. This started to decrease after independence.

NA: Were they all Catholics?

C: Yes.

NA: So, the only thing separating them was the social position?

C: Yes. I remember my parents would socialize with people from Agriculture, people from the Department of Finance, but not with the fishermen. The fishermen's wives would cook for us in parties. They are very good cooks.⁴⁶

Aside from fishermen and the public servants, other categories of Indo-Mozambicans were compensated handsomely for their presence on agricultural plots as overseers or in fringe towns

⁴⁴ Couto, Mia. Personal Interview. 2016.

⁴⁵ Branquinho, Maria. "Processos de construção de identidade sociocultural: o caso da comunidade Goesa da Catembe" Bachelor's thesis, Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane, 2003.

⁴⁶ Conceição in discussion with the author, March 2016.

as merchants and money lenders.⁴⁷ Traders and small-scale merchants hailed from all religions and castes, but most were from the Gujarat region of British India. They were welcomed into existing networks of small, well-established Arab and Indian trading posts in the interior of Mozambique that dated back to the 1700s and remained distant from Portuguese political and economic interference. Most Indo-Mozambican families started small-scale grocery stores, called *cantinas*, and were known as *cantineiros* (shopkeepers) in interior towns. Isolated from other commercial outlets, *cantineiros* controlled the availability and price of basic necessities. The living arrangement in the interior had a lot of hardships, but there were also economic advantages to such businesses that operated as small scales monopolies.⁴⁸

Willing to barter produce and raw materials at profitable exchanges, Indo-Mozambican merchants later transported their cheaply obtained goods to British colonial companies that controlled large tracts of Mozambican land for agricultural production or to port cities where export options yielded huge gains.⁴⁹ Whether in small-scale produce or large-scale cashew production, Indo-Mozambican merchants adeptly acted as economic and geographic middlemen and earned handsomely as a result. With reliable transportation, first through personal vehicles and later through colonial railways (*Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique*), Indo-Mozambican *cantineiros* (and their networks of import/exporters and manufacturers) throughout the country led and later controlled Mozambique's commercial life. *Ismailis*, Muslim adherents of Aga Khan, shared a similar trajectory. Some arrived in the 1880s, but a larger group arrived in the early 1920s.⁵⁰ Before Mozambican independence, they were largely drawn to small-scale commerce that grew with each generation to become large-scale manufacturing and industrial businesses.

Indian Population in Mozambique in 1907-1908⁵¹

Place (from north to south)	British Indian	Portuguese Indian	Total
Mozambique Island	206	180	386
Mozambique District other than Island	620	195	815
Quelimane district	131	N/A	131
Chinde	73	22	95
Beira city	N/A	N/A	411
Beira district	N/A	N/A	693
Lourenço Marques	678	728	1406
Total	1708 +	1125 +	3937

Source: RTCPM1907, Table 3 on p. 13, Table 4 on p.20; RTCPM1908, p. 21, Table 7 on p.39, a table on p.40

Highlights by author, N. Allen

⁴⁷ Hromník, Cyril A. "Goa and Mozambique: the participation of Goans in Portuguese enterprise in the Rios de Cuama, 1501-1752." (PhD dissertation, Syracuse, 1977), 57.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 50-65.

⁵⁰ Leite, Joana Pereira, and Nicole Khouri. *Os Ismailis de Moçambique: Vida Económica no Tempo Colonial*. (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2013), 13-29.

⁵¹ Oishi, 292.

Distribution of professions by racial groups in Lourenço Marques in 1890⁵²

Racial Groups and Professions	Yellow %	Indian %	White %	Black %	Total/Activities %
Agriculture and Fisheries	11.1	0.0	88.9	0.0	1.9
Operations and Artisan	0.0	20.4	76.1	3.4	9.7
Construction and public works	31.0	7.0	61.9	0	7.8
Commerce and Banking	3.4	50.0	44.3	2.2	35.3
Transport and Communication	0.0	0.0	93.5	6.5	8.5
Service and Administration	0.0	23.0	72.6	4.2	12.9
Domestic Service	1.1	27.0	25.9	45.5	9.4
Non-professional	.7	6.2	71.1	21.9	14.1
Population total	4.1	26.6	59.6	9.6	100

Highlights by author, N. Allen

These were the principal sub-groups of Indo-Mozambicans in Maputo at the beginning of the 20th century. They all had different citizenships, due to competing colonialisms. Portuguese immigration regulations for the Ultramar (Portuguese overseas colonial territories) allowed liberal means to residency, but limited means to citizenship. Yet, socially, all Indo-Mozambicans lived within an intermediary space wedged between African natives (understood to be racially Black) and European colonizers (understood to be racially White). While this study does not fully address the specificities of Portuguese colonialism, it is important to understand certain particularities as they relate to this study.

First, colonial law provided for two branches of legal cover: one for Africans (divided into regulations for natives and regulations for assimilated persons) and one for Europeans. Asians, regardless of the status or country of their citizenship, were considered Europeans under colonial law, though they were socially treated as subordinate to Whites and superior to Africans. Mahmood Mamdani describes this as the legal division between *settlers* and *natives*.⁵³ Colonial legal separations had distinct ramifications for urban labor and urban spaces. Through an intricate system of taxation, labor conscription, and forced emigration, African law was designed to

⁵² Maloa, Joaquim Miranda. A urbanização moçambicana: uma proposta de interpretação/ Joaquim Miranda Maloa; orientadora Vanderli Custódio. –São Paulo, 2016. 380f., 137.

⁵³ Mamdani, Mahmood. “Race and Ethnicity as Political Identities in the African Context.” *Keywords: Identity*. New York: Other Press (2004), 18.

perpetually subject natives to prolonged and recurring periods of forced labor (called *chibalo*).⁵⁴ To avoid *chibalo*, natives resorted to migration as a means of resistance and evasion. In his text, *Violent Becomings*, Bjorn Bertelsen notes that as “*actual trajectories or lines of flight*,” migration was a key part of the Mozambican colonial reality.⁵⁵ Thus, migration—coerced or voluntary—has been (and remains) an integral component in Mozambican discourse around agency between the individual and the State.

Second, because colonial laws additionally segregated urban spaces by race, native Blacks were kept exclusively in the peripheries of cities. They were only granted limited access to the urban centers (cement cities; *bairros de cimento*) for low wage day labor in European dominated spaces like the seaport and domestic homes. Similarly, Europeans were prohibited from residing in native areas (reed cities or *bairros de caniço*) and from performing African-designated jobs.⁵⁶ This history is significant for Indo-Mozambicans because they were afforded the same privileges as Whites by law, but they were not precluded from traversing the physical and social divide between the African and the European urban spaces. Thus, Indo-Mozambicans uniquely embodied sociospatial shifts that almost no other group possessed. It was a unique privilege to act as situational insider-outsiders or ethnic brokers based on individual choice. During the period between 1947 and 1992, however, Indo-Mozambicans residing in Maputo faced increasing social and economic pressure to define themselves, and declare their loyalties within Mozambique’s evolving national context.

1947: Coping with the End of the British Empire in India: New Landscapes for Migration and Citizenship

Before 1947, citizenship on the Indian subcontinent was a tripartite of European nationalities: French, British, and Portuguese. Additional choices emerged after partition: Indian and Pakistani. Indo-Mozambicans of Portuguese citizenship did not experience a migratory or identity shift as a result of the emergence of new nations across the Indian Ocean. However, for a small minority of Indians and Pakistanis, Mozambique (and other East African countries) served as a site of sanctuary from the violence and insecurity of India and Pakistan’s self-actualization.

Seated in Maputo’s Café Continental, Juman, a Muslim woman born in British India in 1941 retold the story of her arrival in Mozambique in 1948. She was one of the eldest people I spoke with and the only one who articulated a direct migratory link to the events of 1947. Others whom I interviewed speculated that their fathers or grandfathers had come to Mozambique around this same period, but only Juman stated that in fact her arrival in LM was because of the end of the British Empire in India:

It was bad for everyone, Indians and Pakistanis, because it was a very violent independence. It was not an independence like Mozambique. . . . When independence came

⁵⁴ Allina, Eric. *Slavery by any other name: African life under company rule in colonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012.

⁵⁵ Bertelsen, Bjorn Enge. *Violent becomings: state formation, sociality, and power in Mozambique*. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 84.

⁵⁶ Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. *African workers and colonial racism: Mozambican strategies and struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. (London: Currey, 1995).

[to British India] we became enemies. They started attacking each other's houses, doing bad things to each other. I was only six years old, but I remember certain things. After independence, we came to Mozambique. My grandparents had a lot of money. They had manufacturing plants for cooking oils. Until 1950, we stayed here, and after that we went to Pakistan. . . . My grandfather had this cooking oil and soap business and so he was very wealthy. He is the one who sent money so we could take care of our passports, because by then we had gone to Bombay. When they killed Gandhi, we were there. We lived there for almost six months, because we couldn't arrange the passports. When we completed the arrangements, the whole family got in a boat and came here. My grandfather gave us everything. My father didn't do well here, so in 1950 we went back to Pakistan. We came here in 1948 and we left in 1950.⁵⁷

Juman's family story reflects much of what Nazar Abbas, the previous Deputy Chief of Mission of the Pakistani High Commission (1986-90), summarized in some of his previously published writings on the history of relations between Pakistan and the Portuguese overseas colony of Mozambique:

Under the Portuguese colonial rule there was no let or hindrance in the movement of people between Mozambique (declared an overseas province of Portugal) and the Portuguese enclaves in India. Merchants from Diu had settled on the island of Mozambique in early 1800s. Hindus from Diu, Sunni Muslims from Daman, others from Goa, migrated to Mozambique as small traders, construction workers and petty employees. Many Gujaratis moved from South Africa to Mozambique in the latter half of the 19th century. None of these subcontinent people were from the present day Pakistan. Even after the Independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947 there was no known Pakistan passport holder living in Lourenço Marques or any other part of Mozambique.⁵⁸

The lack of Pakistani passport holders in Mozambique, however, did not mean that Indo-Mozambicans were not affected by the political circumstances that partitioned the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the 1940s was a popular decade for travel between India, Pakistan, and Mozambique, though few discussants aside from Juman specifically pointed to the end of the British Empire or the creation of Pakistan as definitive causes for travel. I speculate that, while some academics attribute this 1940s migration wave to World War I, it is more likely that it was related to Indian independence, partition, and the founding of Pakistan. Herein, the oral stories about the events of the late 1940s coincided with the 1947 marker. While, I was not able to locate records specific to the Ultramar, I draw from Bertz' *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania*, in which he used Indian passport records to track Gujarati transit across the Indian Ocean. The late 1930s showed growing numbers of Indian travelers, but the "post-Second World War era as a boom time for migration from India to East Africa...the postwar months were indeed a period characterized by migration out of a subcontinent increasingly seen as headed for partition." In Rajkot, he found that from August through November 1944, 215 passport applications were filed. In 1946, 3,000 applications were filed and in 1947, the last year that the register was filed, 3,400 travel requests were made.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁷ Juman. Personal Interview. 2016.

⁵⁸ Abbas, Nazar. "Pakistanis in Lourenço Marques." *Memoirs of an Ambassador*. (Karachi: Manzil, 2015).

⁵⁹ Bertz, 35-37.

end of the British empire in India sparked distinct migratory shockwaves that deeply impacted east African, and subsequently Indo-Mozambican, migratory trajectories.

For example, Salim, whom we met in Chapter 2, recounted the fascinating story of how his family business came to be. (We will revisit Salim more in Chapter 5.) His grandfather, Aboobacar Suleman, was from a small village named Dhrol in the state of Gujarat and had moved to a similarly small village in South Africa. Sibling rivalry led his brother to leak to the authorities that Suleman did not have legal status to reside in South Africa, so in the 1920s, Suleman fled to Lourenço Marques:

S: [Suleman] started working for somebody. There were two brothers. One of them went away to Pakistan. One of the brothers stayed. . . . After a while, my grandfather opens a shop where now is the old Mozambican bank. So, the other brother, he also wanted to go back to Pakistan, so he asked my grandfather if he wanted to keep the shop. My grandfather says “No, I’ve got my shop already.” So, he threw the keys to my father.

NA: Do you know what year this is? Is this 1940s or 1950s?

S: No, earlier. Maybe 1940s. But, I’m speaking about my grandfather, he came earlier. My father was born in 1926. [During] ‘45- ‘46, he went to get married in India. So, it must be around that time when my father took over the shop.⁶⁰

Around this late 1940s period, Jose also recalled that his father came to Mozambique. I suspected that his Christian family from Ribandar, Goa would be least likely affected by the end of the British empire, since Goa, Daman, and Diu remained firmly under Portuguese rule. However, his father’s work as a public servant was very much dependent on avenues for gainful employment within European colonial government administrations. In our conversation in the library of the national radio station, Jose hypothesized that his father took proactive steps to secure employment in anticipation of the changes to come:

My father was an assistant notary for many years, since he came here in 1945. I think at that time there was the problem of war and that’s when many of these migrations started—exits from one place to another. I think the problem of war weighed heavily on where to go. Independently, I believe, in the end you need a good job, the best employment, and in Goa things were a bit difficult. The time of war must have pushed my father’s move here. These were the explanations that he gave.⁶¹

Jose’s process of realization through verbalization recurred throughout the study with other informants. Because of my provocation, many respondents seemed to re-examine individual memories from their childhood and, for the first time, they presented conclusions within a collective narrative of Indo-Mozambican migration waves. Like Jose, they extrapolated from decades’ old conversations with elders the larger reasons why their parents’ or grandparents’ lives took specific turns at specific points in time.

In an intergenerational conversation with Mae, born in Inhambane in 1937, and her three daughters born in Maputo in the 1960s, Mae explained that she was raised as an African, although

⁶⁰ Sacoer, Salim. Personal Interview. 2018.

⁶¹ Jose. Personal Interview. July 2016.

her Hindu father migrated from Diu. Her mother was a Muslim African from Inhambane. Mae and her siblings were raised as such, even though her father never converted religions. She is what her daughters call a *mulata*, a woman of mixed-race ancestry, but what I would specifically call *mestiça*: a woman of mixed Black and Indian ancestry. Mae explained that around 1944, her father wanted to take her and her sister to India, but her mother refused. She believed that her mother feared that her father would never return. So, her father visited alone.

In early 1946, Mae's father passed away, and she would never get the chance to know her Indian relatives or see her fatherland. Even now, her family wonders if this Indian grandfather wanted to visit for nefarious purposes of abducting his children and raising them in India, or if he simply hoped to instill some of his cultural heritage in children he had permitted to be raised without any connection to their Indian roots.⁶²

As a researcher, my questions were of a different nature. First, I contemplated the question of agency. Specifically, I wonder if he was aware of his impending demise? If so, had he hoped to establish a firmer link between his ancestral and adopted homes by exposing his children to both? Second, I questioned his migratory motives, as they relate to identity shifts of the time. I wondered if, in anticipation of the changing landscape in the Indian subcontinent, he wanted his children to lay eyes on an India that would, in a few short years, be completely transformed; perhaps he understood that his ancestral Diu would be forever altered. Or, perhaps he did intend to return—with or without his wife, but with his children—to a liberated India. These conversations on memory raised more questions than answers, but trends in experience from these narratives show that the late 1940s triggered many travel stories. The theme of movement around this period suggested that 1947 and the surrounding years experienced a peak in Indo-Mozambican migrations.

1961: Surviving the End of the Portuguese Empire in India: Migratory Agency, Forced Identity, and Coping with Colonialism

The end of the Portuguese empire in India was definitively the most transformational moment in the 20th century for Indo-Mozambican migration patterns and identity formation. Group identification became vitally important during this period, and stratification among Indo-Mozambican sub-groups took on drastically different proportions. I first confronted this dynamic when I—as most English-speaking scholars do—referred to the events of 1961 as the independence of Goa. I quickly learned that anyone who called the events of 1961 the *independence* of Goa surely did not have their roots in Portuguese colonialism. This independence narrative aligns closely with a British Indian or post-colonial Indian perspective, and it was completely oppositional to the perspective of the affected natives of these enclaves of Goa, Daman, and Diu. In my field work, I was often corrected by Indo-Mozambicans of Goan and Diu heritage, who asked that I use terms like *Indian annexation* and *Indian invasion*. They were deeply offended by the insinuation that forcibly joining India was in any way a state of independence, and they argued that annexation to India was not the same as self-rule; nor was annexation the will of the Portuguese colonial people. These were teachable moments for me, and I have adapted my language since. More importantly, I got the sense that the agency participants exerted in these moments of correction were profoundly redemptive. In exerting their agency with me, they were

⁶² Mae in intergenerational discussion with the author, October 2016.

addressing both the misnomer and political suppression that they had begrudgingly accepted for decades.

My impression is that the silence surrounding 1961 caused certain Indo-Mozambican intergroup rivalries to fester. Moreover, it created a permissive environment to deny Indo-Mozambican's integral role in the nation's evolution. Through honest and intimate conversations about this volatile period, Indo-Mozambicans revealed a great deal of diversity of experience among them. From their accounts, I now better understand the shifting identities of those who were forced to migrate and those who were permitted to stay behind. These migratory stories showed the situational (urban vs. periphery cities), coercive (state-mandated policies vs. family pressure), and circumstantial elements (parents' [in]ability to choose citizenship) that dictated individual trajectories. It seemed universally true to me that for those who were not forced to flee, there was a genuine ignorance at best and general obliviousness at worst about just how devastating internment and deportation of Indian citizens truly was for those subjected to it. Hindu Indo-Mozambicans' sense of belonging within the wider Mozambican society was particularly damaged. Not surprisingly, residual bitterness from this period of powerlessness re-emerged throughout my discussions about Indo-Mozambican participation in politics, economy, and society after Mozambican independence and their civil war. Deni's remarks about Muslim opportunism and Tania's obstinate retorts to her former handler showed that even today the memories of that period invoke deep resentment.

As a second generation Mozambican of Portuguese origin born in Beira in 1955, Mia Couto shared his childhood memories of this time period with me, as well. His account included his current understanding of the historical landscape of Africa in the mid-century:

I remember when Goa was invaded by the Indians, the Portuguese guys made some retaliation here against that community. They generalized all Indians. They were taken to concentration camps; this was in 1962. Nobody wants to talk about that time. Some of them [Indo-Mozambicans] are afraid. It's a risk that they don't want to take. Most have more than one nationality. I was in Beira, and they used the soccer stadiums. There are stories that their shops were assaulted by the Portuguese authorities. You should consider that that was in 1962. At that time, there were movements in Africa that were preparing something very similar, organizing themselves to become independent. It was a bad example to have parts of the empire become independent.⁶³

Since the end of the British Empire, de-colonization in the Portuguese empire seemed imminent. As the 1950s came to a close, in bilateral fora, the Indian government officially raised the topic of ending Portuguese colonialism in India. Portuguese insistence that ceding its Indian holdings was not up for discussion led to increasing hostility among the two nations. The stalemate had direct ramifications on Indo-Mozambicans' migration, identity, and citizenship.⁶⁴ On December 18, 1961, the Indian government launched "Operation Vijay," a well-organized military operation that resulted in the invasion of the three remaining enclaves. Portuguese soldiers were outnumbered and forced to surrender to Indian authority. Despite Indian reports of less than a handful of casualties, according to Diogo Moço's doctoral study about Portuguese prisoners of

⁶³ Mia Couto in discussion with the author, January 2016.

⁶⁴ Silva, Ladis Da. *The Americanization of Goans*. (Toronto, 1976), 50-52.

war, “Prisioneiros na Índia: 1961-1962,” Portugal’s military police calculated 1,018 people as dead, injured, or disappeared. Countermeasures were taken throughout the entire Portuguese empire and, according to Moço, ultimately 2,274 Indo-Mozambicans were interned in Mozambique.⁶⁵ Based on the maritime records of N.M. Sacoar in Chapter 5, I believe Moço’s numbers are inaccurate and too low. His figures contrast sharply with those found in the 1963 edition of *Africa Today*, which reported that 15,000 Indians were arrested or interned throughout the country.⁶⁶

Nevertheless, Portugal’s geopolitical game of chess treated Indian citizens in Mozambique as pawns in an overall strategy to protect its dying empire. According to Fernando Amado Couto’s comprehensive book, *Moçambique 1974: O Fim do Império e o Nascimento da Nação*, the Portuguese government undertook a census of Mozambique’s Indian-origin population and, in December 1961, began constructing internment camps to house anticipated deportees. The Portuguese colonial administration hoped that the threat of imprisoning Indo-Mozambicans throughout the country would pre-empt Indian military invasion. Many people of Indian subcontinent origin resided in Mozambique, but the Portuguese mistakenly assumed that most were Indian citizens. Thus, their numbers of anticipated deportees erroneously included thousands of Indo-Mozambicans, who were actually Portuguese, British, and South African citizens. They could not be interned as a deterrent to Indian State intervention. Additionally, Amado Couto’s text reported that by the time “Operation Vijay” took place, most of the internment camps were not complete.⁶⁷ Official rhetoric says that when India held captive Portuguese soldiers as prisoners of war, the Portuguese government retaliated by rounding up Indian passport holders and interning them in the partially constructed camps, football stadiums, and train stations throughout Mozambique.⁶⁸ In lived experience, respondents reported that this was a time of fear and factionalism. The interned were originally told that they were being housed in camps for their own protection, to prevent Portuguese backlash. It is unclear when, exactly, detainees were informed that they were actually being deported, rather than protected.

Afraid that the end of the Portuguese empire was near, Portuguese repression plagued civil society. Sometimes the threat was state-led violence, like internment. Otherwise, there was widespread suspicion that ordinary Portuguese citizens might retaliate with vigilante justice. This climate caused particular anxiety within different Indo-Mozambican subgroups, even those who were not Indian citizens. Jose shared that:

There was a certain apprehension in relation to what was happening in Goa. The war of the Indian Union alerted the colonial [Portuguese] government to many things. Therefore, many Indians that were here were placed in cantonments downtown near the train station. No one really understood why, probably for their own safety.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Simões Roque Moço, Diogo Manuel. *Prisioneiros na Índia 1961-1962*. (PhD diss., Universidade de Lisboa, 2012), 55.

⁶⁶ Special Correspondent. “Indians in Mozambique.” *Africa Today* 10, no. 2 (February 1963): 12-13.

⁶⁷ Couto, Fernando Amado. *Moçambique 1974: O Fim do Império e o Nascimento da Nação*. (Lisboa: Editorial Caminho, 2011).

⁶⁸ Ibid, 27-28.

⁶⁹ Jose in discussion with the author, July 2016.

The stories collected about this time period show a stark difference in memory between those who were subject to internment and those who were not. Those not subject to internment, like Jose, expressed vague recollections about why and how events unfolded. In fact, many Black and White Mozambicans whom I spoke with had never heard of the 1962 deportations. Those subjected to it remembered clearly the experience of being held in the camps, though they all admit to being too young to fully understand why they were there. It was through our conversations that respondents verbalized their experience in the camps, unpacked their transnational identities, and confronted their lack of agency at the time. All of the memories shared here are recollections of Indo-Mozambican children of Portuguese nationality who stayed in camps with their Indian citizen parents.

Tania, who spent most of her childhood outside of LM, openly reminisced with me about her experience of confinement in the small beach town of Vilankulos. Over an espresso at Café Perola in downtown Maputo, Tania spoke in fluent English about how 1961 affected her family both then and now. Interned in an otherwise quiet coastal village, her entire family was forced to confront the changing geopolitical landscape and to redefine their citizenship to stay in Mozambique:

T: [My father] came with the British passport and my mom was Indian, because she came later. The relationship with India was all right at that time and then Nehru came and took Goa, Diu, and Damão. I think he sent all the Portuguese away. I heard from a chef that was working for the Portuguese army. He says that Nehru was telling them that they better leave and that the territories were his. The Portuguese just kept saying “Yes,” but didn’t do anything; so Nehru invaded. Then he sent all the Portuguese with their belongings away. My sister was born on the day that they took Goa, Damão, and Diu.

We had two different Muslim families [in our town]. One was the municipals and the other one was smaller and more local. Now he got married to a local Black Mozambican, but was holding an Indian passport. On the time of the invasion, they took all of us to a house. The other Muslim guy was with us. I was five or six and didn’t have a clue of anything. I had to stay with a policeman. He was my keeper. We were in a village, always playing outside. I remember all my friends calling me to go play and I told him that I was going to play. He said that I couldn’t. I asked him why not and he just told me that I had to stay there. My dad’s boss came there and asked them to consider that my mother had a baby. There was no facility there for a baby. All the Indians were expelled from the country. After 6 months, all that were in those houses and had Indian passports got expelled. . . .

NA: Is your family Hindu?

T: Yes, they are. . . . After a week we were released. That’s why my sister[’s birth] was registered with a delay of one week.

NA: So the only person that would’ve been considered to go back [to India] was your mom, because she was the only one with the Indian passport, right?

T: Then, the first notice of suspension was to mom. They never addressed it to dad. They know that if they send the wife, everybody would go. My dad’s boss went to speak directly to the governor, who was sort of the President of Mozambique. He used to rule Mozambique. He had connections because he was empowered by the President of Portugal. So he was basically the representative of Portugal here. He explained that my

dad was not involved in politics and that he came when he was fifteen years old, having later gone to India to get married. All the kids were born here and he was working here. Then he said it was all right.

NA: So they basically just looked the other way?

T: Yes. Then they came again after two years. Another notice came for my mom. This was the time that my mom had a British passport. After the [Mozambican] independence I used to see the policeman who was with us at that house and would ask him [in a sarcastic tone] how he was now with the independence.⁷⁰

In LM, both Ibtihaj, a Muslim, and Rama, a Hindu, had a less intimate experience with confinement, but they shared narratives similar to Tania's. Both used the Portuguese translation for "concentration camps" to describe their internment sites in 1962. Ibtihaj's childhood memories were particularly striking, even though she was just three or four years old when she went to live in a camp in Matadouro, in downtown Lourenço Marques. Although her biological mother was Mozambican, the mulata daughter of an Indian father and a Black Mozambican mother, Ibtihaj was raised by her stepmother who hailed from Pipodara and her father born in Ghandar—both Gujaratis and both Indian passport holders. Most of her immediate family members went to the camp. Over multiple conversations in their home in Maputo, my husband and I talked with Ibtihaj and her husband Saadiq about her experience in the camp:

I: It was in the railway station. . . . It was there where my parents were interned. First, [the authorities] came to charge them at home. Afterwards they seized our house. That's what they did. No one could enter. So, I stayed with my siblings. My older brother was married. So, me and my younger brother stayed with my older brother and my sister-in-law. . . . I stayed in the concentration camp for two or three months with my parents, but they stayed there longer. We [she and her siblings] had to leave because we had Portuguese nationality. We were born here in Mozambique. . . . I think [my parents] stayed five or six months, if I'm not mistaken. They stayed that whole time. . . . Since they had Indian passports, they did not want to go to India because all of the Hindus were being returned, no? Well, all Indians.

. . .

S: But those who were Portuguese stayed. Because [later] her father and step-mother opted to be Portuguese, they ended up staying [in Mozambique].

I: So [my parents] stayed, they didn't go. They wanted to take us, because I was the girl. There were five boys and me, the only girl, and my younger brother. . . . So, they took us to that camp where we stayed interned. And frankly, we were fine. I can't say we were treated poorly, because we had food. They gave us food and everything. I stayed there for three months with my brother. We left because I had to study and I was in school. I did not want to miss school. My brother too. So, we left.

NA: There wasn't any violence?

I: No, I am not going to lie. I didn't see violence. I was young. At that time, I did not see violence. We had food. They brought us food. We had military guards who protected us. Each of us who were interned had a military guard. So one group stayed one week and then left. Then came another group, like that, successively. . . . When it came time for Muslims to fast, many Muslims here helped and sent food to those of us interned. . . . We weren't

⁷⁰ Tania. Personal Interview. 2017.

mistreated or anything. We also had visiting hours, so family members could come and converse openly. We were free in there, but we couldn't leave whenever we wanted.⁷¹

Ibtihaj noted that when her parents were released they were lucky enough to return to their home in tact and her father's barbershop untouched. Both properties had been cared for by an uncle. Rumor had it that interned Indians without family to care for their properties returned to find their places ransacked or looted.⁷² This lucky save was perhaps not luck at all. Reflecting on our conversation a year later, I now question how exactly Ibtihaj's parents were given the choice to obtain Portuguese citizenship and avoid deportation. Though it went unexplained at the time, I now understand that Muslims could assert citizenship options to prevent deportation, obtain Portuguese or Pakistani citizenship, and resume their lives in Mozambique. Those same choices were not reported by Christians or Hindus.

The most vulnerable Indo-Mozambican sub-group through this period was Hindus. Indian passport holders were overwhelmingly Hindu merchants. The majority of Christian Indo-Mozambicans held British or Portuguese citizenship. Muslims appealed to their local Mozambican religious community for refuge and to the Pakistani government for reprieve. Hindus, in contrast, were considered to be Indian loyalists by definition and were disproportionately represented among the scores of Indian nationals forced into internment camps and subsequently deported. Unlike Tania's father who successfully sought the patronage of a Portuguese benefactor, most Hindu, Indian passport holders residing in the capital found no such ally. The majority was summarily deported, drastically reducing their number within the remaining Indo-Mozambican population.

Rama, born in 1952 in LM to Gujarati merchant parents, responded to my detailed research questionnaire with her daughter's English translation assistance. Rama explained that her father first immigrated to Mozambique in 1942 "because [he] had relatives in Mozambique. That's one of the reasons and he saw good opportunity for business. He wanted to live here forever. He liked Mozambique, but had to leave because of the [1961] war. [He] was forced to leave by the Portuguese government back in Lourenço Marques."⁷³ She further described her family's stay in a camp in Matola before being deported from Mozambique to their ancestral village of Porbandar, Gandhi's birthplace, in 1961:

1961, the end of Portuguese rule in Goa. It was a very important date of my life and my family's. This year, we were forced to leave Mozambique/Maputo to be deported to India. This year the colonist country Portugal had made an agreement with the Indian government that if Portuguese had to leave India-Goa, so would the Indians living in Lourenço Marques (Maputo now) leave their country. I was only nine years old and was dependent on my family. Both my parents were Indian and therefore I had to leave the country. We were force [sic] to live for six months, before going to India, in a secure place/building by the Portuguese government. Thereafter, we were directly deported to India in a ship. We

⁷¹ Ibtihaj and Saadiq in discussions with the author, Oct 2015.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Rama. Questionnaire. 2015.

reached India in twenty-two days. Our house in Lourenço Marques/ every property my father owned was sealed and taken by them.⁷⁴

Eventually, Rama returned to LM in 1977, after she got married to a fellow Indo-Mozambican whose family had also been deported. They returned to Mozambique to revive their families' businesses. At the time of our correspondence, she and her immediate family were deeply entrenched in the Indo-Mozambican business community and were visible members of the local Hindu Association. She reported that the rest of her family had never returned to Mozambique.⁷⁵

Similarly, Deni, an active member of the business and Hindu religious community, found himself the only remaining member of his family residing in Mozambique by the time we spoke in his shop in 2017. The son of a Hindu tailor who came to Mozambique in 1920, Deni recalled how, at age seventeen, he and his older brother saved their father's business and coped with Portuguese colonialism, all while his parents and younger siblings were deported to India. His recollections not only illuminated the rupture that this caused to his immediate family, but they also articulated the ways that 1961 definitively divided the previously united Indo-Mozambican community in the capital. Interestingly, commercial spaces were where these divisions were most publicly displayed. This resulted in distinct economic outcomes for those who survived the period:

D: My father must have been fifty-five years old [at the time that he was deported].

NA: So your parents spent their whole lives here?

D: Their whole lives. They stayed here because they considered this their country. They never thought that things like this could happen. They stayed almost three months in the concentration campus, until they regularized the situation. In India, they had the same situation. They sent them to concentration camps and they seized all of the property of the Indians. Here almost all of the property ended up under the control of the Portuguese. Here there were two factors: there were Indians who were Hindu and Muslims. The Muslims were lucky that time. The Embassy of Pakistan gave them passports.

NA: In 1961 and '62, they were changing their passports?

D: Yes, that's why they stayed here. We [Hindus] were all kicked out. The Portuguese didn't know who was Indian or Muslim. The Muslims put up signs with the Portugal flag in all of their homes and stores to symbolize that they were friends of Portugal. This was to distinguish between the Pakistanis and the Indians. We had to stay in the concentration camp until they sent us away. Each person had to buy their own ticket back to their country. Many people did not have money. The little that they had was pooled together and they helped each other to buy tickets.

NA: At that time, approximately how much did it cost?

D: It was not expensive. It cost two or three thousand escudos because it was not a luxury ship. It was a cargo ship that had sleeping quarters. The trip took twenty-eight days.

NA: How did they live when they got back [to India]?

D: Each person had their family there. They accepted their family members from here. They did not have money. They had nothing. Not even the Government of India gave them anything. Afterwards, they created an association for Indians who came from Mozambique. The government gave [help] to some and not to others. Up til now, some are still waiting

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Rama and daughter. Voice message to author. Sept 2016.

to receive [help]. For example, in my case, I had three sisters and one brother who were all younger than me. My brother must have been three years old and my sisters seven or eight. They all went with my parents. My older brother and I stayed behind because we were born here. But beyond being born here, we had to request residency from the government of Portugal. Afterwards, the Ministry published a note that authorized permanent residence.

NA: At that time there was no permanent residence?

D: At that time, the colony was Portuguese. We had Portuguese passports, but to have residency, we had to request it, despite having been born here. Afterwards it came out in the Official Bulletin that we had authority to permanently reside here. After that, they created the Commission to Liquidate the Assets of Indians where they now issue identity cards, near Interfranca. They seized Indian stores and the sale was announced in the newspaper. Whoever wanted to buy it, could. It was like an auction. We went to speak with the lady there to explain that our parents were sent away and we didn't have anything. We were destitute. We showed interest in keeping our parents' store. We filled out the form and she gave us preference. My brother and I bought it and we are still here today [where our chat took place].

NA: So, no one had the choice to stay Indian or become Portuguese?

D: No, it wasn't a choice. Even though my parents had lived here for fifty years, they had to leave. . . .

NA: With all the stores closed, how did this change the environment in the city?

D: It was a bad environment. The Muslims just laughed. They bought the majority of the Indian stores. They became more privileged. They had that luck. We were lucky to just be able to buy back our parents' store.

NA: How long were the camps open? One year?

D: A short time. Within three months they resolved the problem. For accommodations, they went to look for food in the stores of the Indians. They had keys to all the stores. The Portuguese government did not spend any money.⁷⁶

Joana Pereira Leite and Nicole Khouri's in-depth study of the *Ismaili* community in Mozambique supports Deni's lamentations that the exodus of Indians from the country benefitted Indo-Mozambican Muslims. After my third visit to his store, Salim revealed that it was at that very store that deportees purchased ship tickets to return to India. Dating back to the late 1940s, Salim's family business held exclusive rights to sell tickets in Delagoa Bay for passenger transit along the British shipping lane that passed from Durban through Lourenço Marques and Beira and on to Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mombassa, and Bombay. Other stops included port cities that I had grown familiar with from my talks with Indo-Mozambicans: Porbandar in Gujarat, Mormugao in Goa, and Karachi in Pakistan. I will revisit these voyages more closely in Chapter 5, but it was tickets sold by Salim's father for the S.S. Karanja (Trip 83) and the S.S. Kampala (Trips 96 and 97) that would seal the fate of thousands of Indian citizens who had once been a major part of Mozambique's vibrant commercial life. For me, there is irony in knowing that an Indo-Mozambican Muslim merchant, representing a British company, directly profited from Portugal's deportation of Hindu merchants back to India. These competing British and Portuguese colonialisms and layered legacies of Indian post-colonialism articulated themselves in rivalries among their local interlocutors, Indo-Mozambican merchants of different nationalities and religions. While I once assumed that Deni and Salim's commercial endurance until today was the

⁷⁶ Deni. Personal Interview. 2017.

result of parallel experiences, I now understand how divergent their personal and commercial journeys truly were.

Becoming Mozambican: Nation-building as a Matter of Citizenship, Loyalty, and Principle

A military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974 brought Mozambique the victory that its independence fighters had been aiming for since they had established themselves in 1962, the same year that the Portuguese government had deported Indian citizens from Mozambique. The independence fighters went by the name “The Mozambique Liberation Front,” or its Portuguese acronym, FRELIMO, and organized themselves as a nationalist movement in Tanzania in 1962. FRELIMO led military attacks against Portuguese installations throughout the country and used anti-colonial arguments to advocate for a peaceful political resolution from the international community. September 1974 would usher in the ceasefire between Lisbon and FRELIMO that eventually led to Mozambique’s independence on June 25, 1975.

English language research conducted by Stephen A. Emerson, Sarah LeFanu, Stephanie Urdang, Elizabeth MacGonagle, William Finnegan, Elisa Fuchs, and others detail the unraveling of the Portuguese African empire, the realization of Mozambican independence, the participation of international and domestic actors in the founding of the nation, and the devastating effects of the civil war. In capturing Indo-Mozambican remembrances of the period between 1974 and 1992, I drew heavily from these works to contextualize the captured stories.

This period also encompassed a number of historical traumas. Many of the voices included here were individuals in their adolescence at the founding of the nation and came of age along side the country. Each one was deeply touched by this period—no matter the neighborhood they lived in or in what spectrum of society they circulated. However, the group that proved to have the most negative recollections of the time was Goans. The events of 1961 were mostly *about* this group, but those events least affected this group because they retained Portuguese citizenship. Goa was both a geographical and ideological battleground for the Lusophone de-colonization process. Yet, Goans living outside of Goa did not see their citizenship rights curtailed. Their location and loyalties were not called into question. In contrast, I think it is safe to say that 1974-75 was as traumatic for Goans as 1961-62 was for Hindu, Indian passport holders. At each period, a specific sub-group was vulnerable to geopolitical shifts resulting from competing and dissolving colonial structures. Goan migration and identity shifted sharply as a result of Mozambican independence.

In February 2017, I met with Antonio. We sat opposite one another across an oversized metal desk covered in scientific reference papers. Immediately, I assumed that this interview would be bureaucratic and that his tone would be detached. Instead, his intimidating posture faded as he took me back to his childhood in Maputo’s working class neighborhood of *Alto Maé*. More so than anyone else I interviewed, Antonio was unequivocal about the racial and class divides that splintered the city at that time:

A: I was a child at the time that Mozambique became independent. I was eleven years old, but I remember a bit. I remember a little bit before independence. Lourenço Marques was divided. There were poor Goans who lived in Alto Maé. And the Goans who identified more with the Portuguese and had more economic possessions were the ones who lived in

Polana. My parents just began to have a little bit of money when my mother started to work. They started to worry about our education. My two brothers are doctors.

NA: At the time of your youth, were there divisions between the various groups?

A: Yes, there were. There was a social discrimination, by income, by the neighborhoods where people lived. After independence, this was eliminated little by little, until the majority of the Goans who lived in the chic areas left for Portugal. The same happened in poor neighborhoods. They felt more Portuguese.

NA: With regard to Mozambican independence, I would like to know more about the environment in Lourenço Marques. Was there tension or anxiety?

A: Before independence, there was a lot of tension. Whites were the people most targeted by the Blacks, not us Indians and Goans. There was a strong racial tension. We were afraid of what could happen. [My family] no longer lived in Alto Maé. We lived in an area called Liberdade [Liberty]. In 1974, we returned to Alto Maé. There were those who wanted independence and those who did not, especially in the city. There were more people who were of White origin. But with time, the first government of Mozambique was multiracial.

NA: Did people believe in this multiracial policy?

A: We believed in a multiracial Mozambique for everyone who earned independence.⁷⁷

I asked Mia Couto specifically why he thought Mozambique took such a racially inclusive approach to nationalism after independence. I speculated that something about Portuguese colonialism and its residual elements of Lusotropicalism made it unique in the southern African region, known for racial segregation and violent xenophobia. I wanted to know why Mozambique's approach to inclusion was so exceptional in light of the regional African independence movements that preceded it. He explained:

MC: The difference between Angola and Mozambique was that the Portuguese created a special elite in the case of the assimilados [assimilated people]. These were Black and mulato guys that behaved like the Portuguese. Portugal did this because they had a very weak capacity to be here and needed to delegate to local guys. The local elite was the representation of the colonizers. The second difference is that when Mozambique reached independence all the land was nationalized. In Mozambique, it wasn't only independence—it was a revolution. Some of the Indian guys ran away. The liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola came across racial problems. In FRELIMO, there were two lines that were fighting for power within the movement. There was a line that believed that only Black people should be considered 100% Mozambican. The other line, led by Samora Machel believed that identity did not have to do with race.

NA: Who was leading the “Only Blacks” line?

MC: It was a guy called Simango and another guy. . . . After the independence, it was forbidden to talk about racial groups; we are all Mozambicans. That lasted for the first fifteen years after independence. Some people grew up believing that race is not an issue. The only issue that I remember after the independence was that the sons of the White, Mulato, and Indian guys were not sent to the civil war. Some people were asking about why this was happening.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Antonio. Personal Interview. February 2017.

⁷⁸ Mia Couto in discussion with the author, January 2016.

This sense of ambivalence about the role of Indo-Mozambicans in the new nation can not be underestimated. Like Couto and Sacoor pointed out, Indo-Mozambicans were suspiciously absent from the infantry, in spite of obligatory military service. Suspicions of their lack of loyalty to the country were largely grounded in examples like these, in which they continued to negotiate their citizenship in ways that allowed them to stay in Mozambique without being subject to the same sacrifices and responsibilities of Blacks. Furthermore, Indo-Mozambican complicity in the colonial project also raised resentment, particularly among Black Mozambicans, about Indo-Mozambican entitlement to equality in post-colonial Mozambique.

This social suspicion stood in stark contrast with national rhetoric around racial inclusion. Throughout the socialist period, rumor grew about the complicity of Indo-Mozambicans in state-led violence and the black market economy. One non-Indian interviewee who was part of FRELIMO since its origins in Tanzania said, “You know what they say. If you’re in a room with a snake and a *caneco* (a derogatory term for a Goan), which one do you kill first? You kill the *caneco* first, because you don’t know which side he’s on.”⁷⁹

Conceição shared her understandings of internal government politics. She had been studying law in Portugal in 1974 when the Carnation Revolution began. Soon after Mozambican independence, she came to Mozambique to complete her law degree and to help establish the country’s legal system. She explained, “I started working as a public attorney. I was twenty-one when I went to Tete. I was already the judge of a whole court. It was a lot of responsibility. For me, it was an experience. . . . Not only were we judges, but we were tasked with creating new courts in the districts.” I asked specifically about her experience as a Goan within the post-colonial government. Her answer, like many of the other experiences of Indo-Mozambicans I spoke with, transcended politics and quickly became personal:

C: When the Lusaka agreement was signed, there was a transitory government that was appointed from September ‘74 to June ‘75. Samora Machel started his triumphal reign. When he started his trip from Rovuma to Maputo, addressing the people, you could see that he was charismatic, he could attract attention. Everybody was so happy, because they were finally going to be independent. The people that were here—the Portuguese, Indians, etc.—were intrigued. They wanted to know who this man was, what he was saying. Sometimes he addressed people in a funny way. He was telling the people to forget about the griefs and the tensions. Some people would get offended by how other people saw them. For example, Indians were known for going to the beach and roasting chickens or roti. The people that got offended got on a plane and left. Mostly White people. Some of the Indian people went to London. They are migrants almost by nature. . . .

NA: I want to hear a little bit more on your take on diversity at the time of independence.

In Mozambique, they didn’t get as conservative as Uganda. How was FRELIMO’s speech?

C: Inside FRELIMO, there are guys who don’t like White people. Sometime after independence, they started talking about it in circles. The circles weren’t closed at that time. The rumors reached the president that Whites did not mix up with Blacks and vice-versa. The president once addressed that in a public speech. He explained why they didn’t get along, saying that Africans like porridge and the Portuguese like codfish. The

⁷⁹ Anonymous discussions with the author, April 2016.

Portuguese like red wine and the Africans like tontonton [an alcohol made from sugar cane]. He said that the problem was cultural.

NA: What about the people that were neither White nor Black? How do they fit into this? What about the Chinese?

C: The Chinese left. Mozambique was communist and so they had China's support. The Chinese people here heard that Mao Tse Tung was coming and left. The Chinese were very simple. The Indians—some left and some stayed. The fishermen stayed here. The civil servants were the ones that went to Portugal. The professionals didn't like communism either. My parents decided to stay in Quelimane while people were leaving Quelimane. They applied for Mozambican nationality, but then they started to see their friends leaving. We were so disappointed because we thought they would stay. I remember speaking to my mother and asking why they were leaving. She said that all of her friends were leaving. At the end of '77 they left. [Now] I think they made a good decision. They were educated in colonialism and it was hard for them to accept another system. . . . For the first years after they left, none of us [their children] contacted them, because we were disappointed.⁸⁰

True to Conceição's account, by the time Mozambican independence arrived in 1975, many skilled workers had already departed and most of those that remained would leave shortly thereafter. When asked if Indo-Mozambican flight had anything to do with fearing Mozambique would employ a Uganda-like policy to expel Asians, Jose confirmed that it was a concern. Despite the fact that President Machel and the FRELIMO government provided public assurances, Indo-Mozambicans were still aware of the persistent inter-ethnic hostilities at the core of society. Jose said:

There was fear, yes, when we heard the news of the expulsion of Indians in Uganda [in 1972]. Here there was a certain apprehension. Could this happen here? Independent of the fact that my parents came from Goa, what was for sure was that in that moment India was in question. Was there a [hypothetical] way for the Portuguese government to say that those who originated from Portuguese-India were untouchable? To say, we will leave them alone and deal with the others? No. . . . The big problem that happened here in 1975 when independence was declared was that there were demands on people that were here—regardless if they were Portuguese, Goans, Indians, or of Asian origin. The majority of people, because they did not know what it was to be independent, they were looking for other places to live. And where would that space be? The colony. So, most people went to Portugal or some went to neighboring South Africa. . . . Independence brought with it a big separation of families, friends, etc. For example, in my family, I am Mozambican and my brother is Portuguese. He decided to go because he did not know how his future would be here.⁸¹

Conceição and Jose's experiences show the ambivalent relationship between political rhetoric and social reality for many Mozambicans of Goan origin. As previously acknowledged, this sub-group held a long-standing tie with the Portuguese government and was considered duplicitous actors in colonial politics. Conceição herself had actually reverse migrated—from

⁸⁰ Conceição in discussion with the author, March 2016.

⁸¹ Jose in discussion with the author, July 2016.

Portugal to Mozambique—to help with the new legal system, but, as the daughter of a previous colonial administrator, her intentions were questioned. Quickly, she found herself implicated by that colonial legacy and the subsequent emigration choices of her relatives. Assumptions were made about her because of her *caneco* ascription, despite her actual contributions and demonstrated loyalty to the new nation. My talk with her unraveled the complicated positionality of the Indo-Mozambican individual within the shifting citizenships of families and the shifting identities of nation-building.

As a result of Mozambican independence from Portugal, the semi-voluntary exodus of the mid-1970s was ongoing from 1974 until approximately 1978. Anecdotally, city residents reported that those who held European citizenships departed independent Mozambique courtesy of “24/20.” This was a state-implemented practice that gave those who did not want to adopt Mozambican nationality or subscribe to FRELIMO policies twenty-four hours to depart with only twenty kilos of luggage for the journey. Fashioned as a choice, 24/20 is still remembered, particularly by Indo-Mozambican families with Portuguese citizenship, as forced exile. No written documentation exists to support the affected families’ claims that their departures were state-mandated, but an abundance of oral stories support emigrants’ reports that they experienced verbal and physical harassment that instigated their departure.⁸² According to Pitcher’s 2002 book, *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000*:

Those who remember the initial years after independence recall with trepidation what was known as the 24/20 order. One Portuguese man who has lived in Mozambique all his life and been connected to private business interests stated that, after Frelimo took power, people whose only sin was that they owned businesses were arrested and threatened with immediate expulsion. In order that they would not leave the country completely empty-handed, those under arrest would “upgrade” their situation to a 24/20 order by selling their possessions to the police or by declaring what property they owned during the colonial period. Having declared their assets and transferred some of their material goods over to the police, former businessmen would quickly pack their bags.⁸³

The Goan segment of the Indo-Mozambican community was divided between those desperately searching for routes to emigrate and those deeply invested in staying. Among those who stayed, some were invested in participating in the nation-building process. Camila, an academic born in LM to Goan parents explained that her mother was a Goan-born nurse who emigrated to Beira onboard the “Barco Karanja” in 1954. (I later connected the fact that Salim’s father sold passenger tickets for the same liner, S.S. Karanja.) Camila’s Catholic mother was a fervent supporter of Mozambican independence. In 1975, she and her husband relocated from Angoche to LM, where she worked in the Central Hospital in nursing, obstetrics, and gynecology. She was part of the 19th century influx of nurses from the Goan School of Medicine who came to Mozambique to improve hygiene and sanitation in the health care system.⁸⁴ Her insistence on attaining Mozambican citizenship was a matter of principle. She had seen the unequal medical

⁸² Dr. Ines Raimundo. Personal Conversation. 2018.

⁸³ Pitcher, M. (2002). *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000* (African Studies). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 47.

⁸⁴ Rita-Ferreira A., p. 640.

care and poor living conditions for Black Mozambicans throughout the country. These inequalities did not endear her to the Portuguese.⁸⁵ Camila explained:

In 1961, Goa was still Portuguese at that time. My mother wanted to be Mozambican. She had Indian nationality. When Goa was annexed to India, they gave her twenty-four hours to decide. If she decided to take the Indian nationality, she had to return to India. She couldn't return and had to renounce her Indian nationality to become Portuguese. She was very mad, and told us that whenever she had the first chance to drop the Portuguese nationality, she would. So, when Mozambique became independent, she had no questions about it. She decided to be Mozambican.⁸⁶

With regard to the experience of Muslim Indo-Mozambicans, Nazar Abbas' *Memoirs of an Ambassador* is a rich resource. He dedicated a chapter to his assignment in Maputo from 1986-90, and the text opens with some background on the diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and Mozambique, as well an explanation of the mystery behind Mozambique's many Pakistani passport holders who have never lived in Pakistan:

Our Embassy in Maputo, where I was now posted as Deputy Head of Mission, was opened in 1976 soon after Mozambique's independence on June 25, 1975, from the Portuguese colonial rule. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, had ordered the opening of the Mission in this newly independent Third world African country headed by a charismatic socialist leader Samora Moisés Machel. . . . The Muslim Indians, who had been living in Mozambique for generations and knew no other country, faced a dilemma. They could not stay as Indians. They had no other country to go to. If they acquired Portuguese citizenship they would have to send their young sons and daughters for compulsory military service. . . . The foreigners, even if permanent residents, were however exempt from this rule. Since they and their forefathers were not of Pakistani origin, had never even seen Pakistan and did not speak Urdu or any other Pakistani language—Gujarati was their mother tongue and they spoke Portuguese as their second language—they could not apply for Pakistani citizenship. In this desperate situation they thought of appealing to the Pakistan government. They sent a delegation of their prominent persons to Pakistan. They called on President General Ayub; explained their predicament and requested that they be granted Pakistani nationality and passports. They argued that they would stay on in Mozambique, where they were well settled and were living for generations, will not be a burden on Pakistan and may even be of some help in promoting trade and other relations of Pakistan with Portugal. Further that, had they been in India at the time of partition many, if not most, of them would probably have migrated to Pakistan and would now been [sic] Pakistanis any way. President Ayub Khan acceded to their request. All such Muslims, of Indian background who wished to become Pakistanis were directed to apply to the Pakistan Mission in Tanzania where they were issued Pakistani passports. After the independence of Mozambique on June 25, 1975 these Pakistanis could have acquired Mozambican nationality but the Independent Mozambique retained the rule of compulsory military service and there was a civil war. So the Pakistani passport holders did not opt for the

⁸⁵ Maciel, Delia das Dores Ataíde Lobo. *Fragmentos da Minha Vida*. Maputo: UEM, 2003, p. 25-71.

⁸⁶ Camila. Personal Interview. July 2016.

change. They continue to stay on just as before, as permanent residents but holding Pakistani passports.⁸⁷

As Deni's narrative illustrates, Muslim access to multiple citizenships did not go unnoticed by other Indo-Mozambicans. In fact, Hindus and Christians resented what they perceived as a manipulation of citizenship, believing its primary purpose was to avoid civic duties. Saadiq, Ibtihaj's husband mentioned above, was a *mestiço* born in 1955 in LM to Mozambican parents of native Shangan and Indian origins. His strong self-identification with his royal Shangan origins caused him to distance himself from many within the Indo-Mozambican community, who he said looked down upon him for his inability to speak a native Indian language or to identify direct Indian lineage. He is Muslim, but also a traditional Shangan healer. Specifically, he spoke of resenting Mozambican racial divisions that privileged European and Indo-Mozambicans and allowed those groups to avoid the undesirable civic obligations required to build their new African nation. He also aligned himself with Black perspectives whenever racial issues arose, like racial disparities within the Mozambican military:

S: [Racial prejudice] always exists. It's something that's not official. This is my reading, my vision. Have you ever seen a mulato soldier?

NA: No.

S: Have you ever seen an Indian soldier?

NA: No.

S: Have you ever seen a Black soldier?

NA: Yes.

S: A White?

NA: No.

S: There aren't Whites? Indians? There aren't mulatos [in Mozambique]?

NA: There are.

S: Why don't they do their military service?" [he said with indignation]⁸⁸

His explanation suggested that Blacks accepted a self-ascribed inferior status. In mixed settings, he said, Black Mozambicans assumed that members of other racial groups were their superiors and not their equals. Collating Mia Couto and Nazar Abbas' words above, I now understand that the real answer is much more complicated than that. FRELIMO loyalists believed that complying with the well-meaning aspects of state-led social policies was a matter of principle. Abbas' previous excerpt contrasted this perspective and showed that evading Mozambican (and Portuguese before it) military service was a key factor in Indo-Mozambicans' successful appeal to Pakistani authorities for citizenship. As a researcher, I was struck by how regularly it was omitted from cultural memory that Indo-Mozambicans (then called Indo-Portuguese) were conscripted into obligatory Portuguese military service. For example, both *Saadiq* in 1965 and *Salim* in 1972 were conscripted. Whether of their own volition or contrary to their own ideologies, they actively fought against FRELIMO and its aims for Mozambican independence.

In 1975, Maputo was the seat of power for FRELIMO's elected president, Samora Machel (the first President of Mozambique from 1975-1986). As Conceição's case illustrated, Machel

⁸⁷ "Pakistanis in Lourenço Marques." *Memoirs of an Ambassador*. Manzil Publications, 2015.

⁸⁸ Ibtihaj and Saadiq in discussion with the author, October 2015.

surrounded himself with intellectuals of all colors and backgrounds, so long as they agreed to support his ideologies about the future of Mozambique. Abbas noted, “In my time, Mozambique's Finance Minister—member of FRELIMO [the ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for Liberation of Mozambique)]—was Mr. Abdul Majeed. Both his parents carried Pakistan passports.”⁸⁹ Samora, as he is affectionately called, filled cabinet and foreign ministry positions with intellectuals of all races who demonstrated loyalty and dedication to the socialist uplift to the new nation. Samora coined the phrase “Mozambican socialism,” basing his political rhetoric in racial and economic equality. Yet, there was significant social resistance to this imposed unity, a completely foreign concept in Mozambique up to that point. The contradictions of this period abounded.

LM residents remembered post-independence Maputo as a site of great hope and severe censorship. While many celebrated Samora as a president, they recalled the overall government of the First Republic (1975-1986) with less enthusiasm. At the time, it was considered heresy to question FRELIMO or its socialist project. Most questions, however, were perfectly logical ones, elevated by failing economic policies that ill-affected small and medium-sized business owners and the working middle class. Most Indo-Mozambicans who remained in country after independence fell into these categories. They coped, using self-censorship, and remained quiet about the difficulties and perceived injustices, in the hopes that silence would minimize allegations of treason or suspicion against them. Now, decades later, many in this study opened up about their disillusionment.

Initially, there were pockets of disagreement about government policies, but overall, there was a sense of hope that the sacrifices would eventually be worthwhile. Yet, just years after independence, discontent with the socio-economic state of the country was widespread, but rarely vocalized. Jose’s sentiments best summarized the frustration of the time of independence and the beginning of the civil war: “We had a big problem when socialism brought us to the point of complete degradation. It doesn’t make sense that the State has to sell safety pins. Samora realized this very late and the result was policies he implemented in 1980, five years after taking power, because he could see that the machinery didn’t work.”⁹⁰

In addition to dissatisfaction with the economy, Saadiq conversed with me about the State’s increasing dysfunction. Not only were families first divided by migration, but also those who stayed behind found their loyalties and their citizenship constantly questioned by state and social actors. Social pressure to conform to new norms of national unity dampened the initial hope of genuine integration. To implement the policies of its newly independent government, FRELIMO used tools very similar to those applied during Portuguese colonialism. For example, the pass laws that granted Africans limited access to European dominated urban centers (cement cities, or *bairros de cimento*), re-emerged in the form of national ID cards that served much the same purpose. Saadiq shared:

After independence, this conversation we are having now, we could not have. I could not say anything bad about FRELIMO or independence. If they heard, if anyone heard, I would be put in jail. Even the utmost secrecy was not enough. It was a son who ratted on his

⁸⁹ Nazar Abbas. Personal Email. 27 October 2016.

⁹⁰ Jose in discussion with the author, July 2016.

father, a father who broke his son's confidence. It was coexisting with distrust. . . . After independence, there came a time when FRELIMO said, "Are you Mozambican or Portuguese?" There were these Blacks, Chinese, Whites, mulatos, and they all left. They didn't want to be Mozambicans, and they didn't accept independence. . . . This affected everything. From the social standpoint of a family, this divided families and households. A husband didn't want to leave, but a wife did and she left. Or vice-versa. It divided couples. It divided families, many families. For example, I'm an independent [Mozambican]. I want to go to the theatre for a matinee with my wife and daughter. In the streets, they have military asking for my national identity card. My wife has hers, but my daughter and I didn't bring ours. I'm imprisoned and sent to [jail]. This happened here in Mozambique, just for not carrying your national ID card.⁹¹

From independence to President Machel's death in 1986, mention of cultural, religious, or ethnic differences was socially censored, but unspoken divisions were still pervasive. "Racial" or "tribal" speech was shunned as anti-Mozambican and anti-revolutionary. It was considered incendiary and xenophobic. Acknowledging physical or even ancestral differences was dissuaded, not just through legal channels, but through social stigmas, as well. Yet, sentiments of distrust, especially between Blacks and Indo-Mozambicans persisted, principally because of resentment towards Indo-Mozambicans' ease in avoiding many of the undesirable sacrifices placed on the average Mozambican in the post-independence era.

While Samora introduced Marxist-Leninist policies with good intentions, many FRELIMO policies were wildly unpopular. The newly independent government took European socialist policies and implemented them with little consideration for local realities. This was perhaps further compounded by the fact that Mozambique was, as yet, unfamiliar with self-governance. The 1983 policy, "*Operação Produção*" (Operation Production) allowed the government to forcibly remove seemingly unemployed city dwellers to unproductive farmlands across the country. Those who were removed were not always unemployed or uneducated; instead, some had simply forgotten their identification cards at home when the military arrived. Even those who were unemployed had serious reason to be, considering the employment vacuum left by the stalled, nationalized economy. According to M. Anne Pitcher, the government only intervened in companies that had been abandoned: "[O]ut of a total of approximately 1,675 companies existing throughout the country at the time of independence, the state was only involved in approximately 319 companies in key sectors of the economy by 1977. . . . By 1982, only 27 percent of firms in industry, commerce and agriculture remained private; the rest had become state enterprises (*empresas estatais*) or continued to be "intervened" in (*empresas intervencionadas*)."⁹² The unsustainable and poorly thought-out internal migration policy only further worsened the economy and weakened popular support for FRELIMO's leadership. Even so, discontent was only expressed publicly many decades later—particularly after the end of Mozambique's sixteen-year civil war.

Speaking of things unsaid, it is important to note that it is only exogenous researchers who name the 1977-1992 Mozambican conflict as a "civil war." In contrast, few among this study's interviewed sources used that term. As Dr. Raimundo pointed out to me, the Mozambican government then and now still does not recognize the conflict that raged from 1977 to 1992 as a

⁹¹ Saadiq. Personal Interview. 2017.

⁹² Pitcher, p. 40-44.

civil war. In parlance of the time, the official names for the conflict were either “acts of armed bandits,” “the war of destabilization,” or “the sixteen years’ war.”⁹³ When I referred to this period as a civil war, conversants responded knowingly, though when they were not otherwise prompted by me, most of them simply called it “the war.” At the time, many national leaders believed that, by naming the conflict a “civil war,” the government would give undue legitimacy to the opposition, RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), which had fractured off from FRELIMO in the late 1970s. In this way, by using official rhetoric and continued censorship to minimize public knowledge of the conflict, the Mozambican government successfully kept the country’s war hidden from the international community for nearly a decade before the death toll rose to undeniable figures.

In 1986, with a tanked economy and a guerilla war underway, President Machel and thirty-three other national leaders died in a mysterious plane crash. Among the thirty three casualties were Machel’s Goan-born advisor Aquino da Bragança and the Indo-Mozambican Press Secretary, Muradali Mamadhussein.⁹⁴ Conspiracy theories abound about who was really behind the crash, but Mozambique has never done a serious or independent investigation. Additionally, there is little written about how society and government coped in the immediate aftermath of Samora’s death. For instance, former Pakistani diplomat, Nazar Abbas recalled what happened in diplomatic circles:

[A] state funeral had to be arranged . . . but the country was so impoverished that its government did not have any financial resources to pay for the stay and food of foreign dignitaries and delegations. The [Mozambican] government had no choice but to beg. All the diplomatic missions, UN and international organization offices in Maputo, including our embassy, received a circular letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting “Emergency help” for the mourning ceremonies. . . . A similar appeal was addressed to the local business community, of which Pakistanis formed a large and important part. As we learnt from our local friends, [the] Pakistani community made a significant contribution by vacating scores of their residential apartments, which they handed over to the government for accommodating foreign guests. For a couple of weeks, these Pakistanis [along] with their families, shifted to stay with friends and relatives. Some Pakistani businessmen made cash and material contributions also. The Government of Mozambique deeply appreciated and acknowledged the valuable support extended by the Pakistani community.⁹⁵

It is unclear if Pakistanis willingly volunteered their homes, or if they feared that not doing so would create a backlash. More than likely, it was a combination of both. The Pakistani community’s affluence stood in stark contrast to the average Mozambican’s lifestyle at this time. The years between independence and 1992 were marred by shortages of food and essential services. For instance, Abbas recalled that, although the government stores were required to remain open, they were practically empty.⁹⁶ For those in Maputo, the late 1980s and early 1990s were remembered more for the shortage of electricity and foodstuff, along with acts of physical violence outside of the city limits. Indeed, news of massacres and fighting in the center and north of the

⁹³ Dr. Inês Raimundo at UEM presentation, March 2017.

⁹⁴ Ussene, Naita. Personal Email. Aug 2018.

⁹⁵ Abbas.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

country contributed to a sense of general uncertainty. For Indo-Mozambicans with business and family ties throughout the country, life was particularly precarious; yet, Black Mozambicans still associated Indo-Mozambicans with privilege and wealth.

By the time that war was acknowledged in the mid- to late-1980s, Maputo was seeing yet another influx of internally displaced people from the provinces. Within the Indo-Mozambican community, this internal wave included people from Indian cultural strongholds like Salamanga and Inhambane, both a few hours' drive outside of Maputo. Those Mozambican families who live in Maputo today often trace their family's arrival in the capital to this period when internal migration was used as a tool to cope with violence and political unrest throughout the country.

In this vein, during the summer of 2016, Mae's daughter, Aisha, shared her experiences with me while sitting in her outdoor patio. She was born, she told me, in LM in 1964 and explained that her Hindu great-grandfather came with his cousins from Diu and married her grandmother, a Black woman of Islamic faith. Aisha recounted her young adulthood in Maputo, "How the war started I don't remember. . . . [Y]ou would visit ten houses in one day and you would find all the tables empty. You could not travel. Go to Matola and you have to come back before 3:00 p.m., because there were shootings in Matola. You would have power for two hours each day. Then people fleeing the conflict zones filled Maputo as they migrate here and stay here and grow roots. The city wasn't prepared, so there was suffering with so many people in town."⁹⁷

Although many researchers contend that the civil war never reached Maputo, in comparison with the havoc that it wreaked in other parts of the country, Indo-Mozambicans in this study provided differing accounts. In addition to food shortages due to natural disasters and the flawed economic regime, violence was a menacing reality. Aisha explained in her own words:

[RENAMO attacked] in Matola, exactly in the city of Machava, Liberdade. It was close. [RENAMO] was everywhere. And if they didn't attack, it was simply because they didn't want to. They had all they needed to do it. We were without power all day. The power station is here, just at the bridge to the toll gate. They blew that up. We heard a loud explosion, and the lights went off. . . . families lost track of each other. My colleague had family in Inharrime. At that time, communication was practically non-existent. She heard that there in Inharrime, she [had] lost two brothers. We were shocked. It touched us a lot. But, there are so many stories. The [Indo-Mozambican] owner of the bottle store on the corner of Eduardo Mondlane [Avenue], in front of the electricity office, even today she is not sure if her father is dead or alive. He was a trucker. He went on a trip and suddenly the family heard that he died. But, until now, no one is sure. They haven't found the body. We have stories like that, stories that were very close and affected us a lot in those days.⁹⁸

In the years shortly after independence, Rama had returned to Maputo as an adult after having been deported as a child. When prompted by the questionnaire, she wrote about her experiences from the civil war:

⁹⁷ Aisha. Personal Interview. 2016.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

1977/1978: I came back to Maputo-Mozambique. I was married then. The following year of and during the civil war were the most dreadful {sic} and scary. There was scarce food, lights, gas, almost everything. We could not travel to any near city by car for example Xai Xai because there were attacks by the opposition party. A lot of people I know were killed in this incident. Factories were burned down. We had to stay in long queues to get something [to eat or buy]. . . .

1992: The year the civil war ended. We were relieved and happy because its [sic] almost was as we got our Independence back. We could live peacefully and our minds were more relaxed. We had the mind now to concentrate in the business and family's future. Thing [sic] weren't easy. We struggled a lot, but still the worry of being killed was over.⁹⁹

Participants in this study explained that, though the conflict had officially ended with the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in 1992, the end of the civil war came with little fanfare and was regarded with cautious optimism. They remembered that when peace was declared internationally, little in the capital had changed. What became noticeable was the slow introduction of consumer goods and the gradual decrease in violence along the main transportation arteries into the capital. Around this time, Aisha fondly remembered drinking Coca-Cola and chewing gum for the first time. In this kind of spirit, I had anticipated that 1992 would have been met with enthusiasm by many Indo-Mozambican expatriates and would have triggered a wave of return to the country. Instead, I heard only a vague mention of a slow trickle of returnees who were making their way back in the mid- to late-1990s, after stability had indeed become more consistent. Most returnees, though, came back after years had passed without violent incursions and after positive ties with the post-apartheid government in neighboring South Africa had improved Mozambique's economic prospects.

Conclusion

Within Mozambique and throughout this study, it is apparent that value-judgments have been made about Indo-Mozambicans' use of migration and identity as political and social tools. Rather than confirming or denying these perceptions, my intention in this study is simply to examine them, as individual strands in the social fabric of colonial and post-colonial Mozambique. The initial objective of this study is to capture and collate the ethnographic migratory history of Mozambique's largest ethno-racial minority and to better understand how migration contributed to who they are and how they are perceived within the national context. I was curious to understand how visible and vulnerable ethnic minorities remembered a sustained period of unprecedented social, political, and economic pressure in their country of residence; and, as such, this study has proven to be as much about memory, as it is about migration. The cultural memories in this study are the foci of academic debates over the primacy of agency vs. structure in controlling the social construction of identity over time. In lived realities, these South-South migratory memories produced questions of communal loyalties, defined otherwise fluid group identities, mapped ever-changing urban spaces for connective interaction, and ruptured notions of minority groups' role in nation-building.

In the face of 20th century uncertainties throughout the Indian Ocean and in the Lusophone world, Indo-Mozambicans residing in LM/Maputo faced social and economic pressures in order to define and declare their identities. Political, cultural, and economic transitions on the national level made individual survival and coping strategies all the subtler to identify. Self-ascribed and externally appointed community names interlaced these collected narratives in ways that illustrated the intersection of migration and identity, and challenged me, as a researcher, to decipher meanings and connotations over time.

The interviews here demonstrated how pre-1947 internal divisions among Indo-Mozambicans were acknowledged within the larger Indo-Mozambican community, but were not publically displayed to outsiders until they had become politically foregrounded by the events of 1961 and 1974. As different Indo-Mozambican subgroups cleverly manipulated identity, citizenship, and migration in order to cope with the insecurity facing their families, each subgroup charted a different migratory trajectory, based on individual agency and options for citizenship.

While most interviewees did not individually verbalize experiences with racism, the archival data and the collection of oral narratives show that between 1947 and 1992 there were constant demands that Indo-Mozambicans to locate and name themselves for African and European gazes. This study, though, centered on those Indo-Mozambicans whose allegiances were localized and whose coping strategies reflected their permanence. It is through *their* gaze that I saw how other Indo-Mozambicans' choice to migrate was perceived.

The individuals included here circulated in the same urban center at similar times, yet reported dissimilar experiences. Affinity and religious groups reported rivalries amongst them. A climate of suspicion forced Indo-Mozambicans to be adept at picking sides only when they understood the consequences. Instead, most erred on the side of silence and self-censorship in order to ensure their economic and social survival. In retrospect, the choice to migrate was reflected upon by most here as no choice at all. Deni felt he had to stay in Mozambique to support his deported family. Moreover, in one of my very first interviews, I asked why Aisha she never fled Mozambique during the years of national independence and the subsequent civil war; and her words stood in the background of all of my future interviews and would reappear in varying renditions by others throughout the course of my field work. She said in an unwavering tone, "I had the opportunity to pack my bags, but when it actually came time – I don't know if it was just youth, or some other reason, I don't know—I would say, 'My home is here, not there.'"¹⁰⁰ I heard similar tales of attachment and permanence over the three years that I lived in Mozambique. The Indo-Mozambicans whom I spoke with had long since embraced Mozambique as their mother country and had weak, if any, ties outside of the country.

In conclusion, the oral histories of Indo-Mozambicans who stayed behind from 1947-1992 demonstrated the fact that constant negotiations of location and loyalty allowed them to manage their positions up and down the social hierarchies that they confronted on a daily basis. This study has just scratched the surface of subaltern identity and transnational migration within Maputo's specific urban context, yet the content reveals the fault lines of identity and tripwires of migration used by Indo-Mozambicans as coping mechanisms in the 20th century. This study offers oral histories that speak to this particular history and contribute largely omitted experiences to

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Mozambique's national narrative. A thorough review of the nation's overall history reveals the existence of an Indo-Mozambican population, framed by mercantile connections and transnational ownership over South-South migration throughout the Indian Ocean. Indo-Mozambicans form a distinctly powerful group that has always been present in Mozambique. In national rhetoric, they are rarely identified as immigrants—no matter how recently they arrived or their actual citizenship status—but that labeling does not mean that they socially belong. The education and wealth of Indo-Mozambican families in relation to both Black and White nationals made them colonial interlocutors between the two racial groups, as well as between the metropole and other areas of the colony. Those who were agents of the Portuguese colonial administration before 1947 found themselves vulnerable and visible minorities after 1961 and 1974; and they and their descendants still in Mozambique struggled to integrate into the post-colonial society on the basis of economic and racial equality. Overall, different subgroups exhibited distrust with one another at the same time that Black and White Mozambicans tried to understand Indo-Mozambicans' nascent role in the post-colonial nation, after generations of colonial complicity.

Section 3 – Findings Chapters

Chapter 4: Indo-Mozambican Institutions: Hindu Interactions with the State

The permanence of Indo-Mozambicans in the national capital was not a default choice or the result of migratory apathy. Instead, staying behind was the culmination of successfully implemented survival strategies to maintain residence in LM/Maputo, despite multifaceted attempts by the State to force or incentivize their emigration. The government's official position towards Asians in general and Indo-Mozambicans in particular changed frequently over the five decades in question. Multiple data sources were needed to explore the interactions between the various renditions of the Mozambican colonial and post-colonial state and the plethora of Indo-Mozambican sub-identity groups. Each manifestation of government ushered in changes to the national landscape, and those changes affected different Indo-Mozambicans in distinct ways. With these histories in mind, I focused my fieldwork on collecting documents about civic and religious associations. Mbembe argues that civil society organizations not only allow representation to “publicly crystallize” among members of a marginalized group, but such organizations exist to push back against state power that tries to control, limit, or otherwise negatively affect the represented group.¹⁰¹ In this chapter, I have collected documents internal to civil society organizations: member registrations, official correspondence, and government appeals on behalf of members. How identities were articulated and civic organizations framed their advocacy shifted based on state-sanctioned power structures and changing demographics, and institutional documents revealed the difficulties of maintaining a representative civil society organization in the capital. The strategies employed to maintain membership and institutional goals underscored the larger difficulties that Indo-Mozambican communities faced in their attempt to maintain their presence in the country.

Originally framed as educational or fraternal institutions, civic organizations evolved over time to become a valuable tool of cultural representation and agency for Indo-Mozambicans. Organizations' daily activities served the educative function of perpetuating ethnic continuity, especially in performing arts, language acquisition, and religious traditions. The cultural value of such organizations for diaspora groups was particularly vital for individual self-affirmation. Throughout the late 20th century, organizations positioned themselves as interlocutors between the State and their individual members. Under the auspices of such advocacy, organizations' records show the power imbalance held by federal state actors—both in the Portuguese colonial period and under the independent Mozambican post-colonial leadership. This chapter focuses on cultural memory around these institutions and the official strategies employed by these institutions to stay resilient in the face of instability.

Institutions as Battlegrounds for Transnational Identity Affirmation

In order to understand the importance of representational institutions, it is important to understand the demographics of people whom they impact. For instance, Joaquim Maloa's 2016 thesis entitled *The Urbanization of Mozambique: A Proposed Interpretation* offers a short summary of both the demographics of LM and the socio-spatial divides of the early 20th century:

The 1894 census identified among LM residents around 38 Chinese, distributed between 23 in Downtown and 15 in the Central District, principally in commerce and crafts. Also,

¹⁰¹ Mbembe, pp. 38-39.

there were 245 Indians, which corresponded to 23.14% of the White population of LM; among them 151 were Muslim and 59 were Hindu. In 1928, the number of Asians grew to around 1974 residents. . . . The urban nucleus of Lourenço Marques grew as a space of “ethnic segregation,” according to Mohammad A. Quader (2004), in enclaves—neighborhoods with racial, cultural and social distinctions (European and Asian). Valdemir Zamparoni (1998) wrote that, in the city, the hierarchy of races translated into territorial separation of bodies.¹⁰²

Distribution of Professions by Racial Groups in Lourenço Marques in 1890¹⁰³

Racial Groups and Professions		Yellow %	Indian %	White %	Black %	Total/Activities %
Agriculture and Fisheries		11.1	0.0	88.9	0.0	1.9
Operations and Artisan		0.0	20.4	76.1	3.4	9.7
Construction and Public Works		31.0	7.0	61.9	0	7.8
Commerce and Banking		3.4	50.0	44.3	2.2	35.3
Transport and Communication		0.0	0.0	93.5	6.5	8.5
Service and Administration		0.0	23.0	72.6	4.2	12.9
Domestic Service		1.1	27.0	25.9	45.5	9.4
Non-professional		.7	6.2	71.1	21.9	14.1
Population Total		4.1	26.6	59.6	9.6	100

Source: Zamparoni Adaption (1989), by Maloa

Statistic of Individuals by Muslim Religion – District of Lourenço Marques 1907

	Portuguese Shia	Portuguese Sunni	British Shia	British Sunni
Lourenço Marques circumscription	10	424	14	516
Manhiça circumscription	1	0		

¹⁰² Maloa, Joaquim Miranda. “A URBANIZAÇÃO MOÇAMBICANA: Uma proposta de interpretação.” *Urbanização moçambicana: uma proposta de interpretação*, UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO, UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO, 5 Aug. 2016, www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-05082016-155420/pt-br.php. Accessed 20 May 2017, p. 133-4.

¹⁰³ Maloa, Joaquim Miranda, 137.

Sabié circumscription	1	39	0	68
Total	12	463	14	584

Population of Mozambique District in 1908¹⁰⁴

Nationality	Europeans			Asiatics			Africans	Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total		
Portuguese	373	48	421	190	5	195	360000	360616
British	12	0	12	563	57	620	0	632
German	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
French	4	8	12	0	0	0	0	12
Other	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Total	400	56	456	753	62	815	360000	361271

Source: RTCPM1908. P.40

(Highlights by Author N. Allen)

The charts above show that, at the turn of the 20th century, “Asiatics,”—a group which included Chinese, Arabs, and Indians—outnumbered Europeans in the Mozambique district, but “Indian” professionals represented about half of the White professionals in LM. This territorial-based segregation on the basis of race incentivized individuals to create ethnic enclaves throughout the city. Even within the small cohort of Indo-Mozambicans in the capital, individuals of various ethnicities circulated in the same urban areas, but rarely developed integrated inter-ethnic or inter-racial relations. Groups co-existed in proximity, however, in spite of prioritizing in-group bonds. Valdemir Zamparoni’s 1999 study explores colonial racism towards Asians in LM in the early 20th century. He investigates the proliferation of community groups as a coping mechanism for Asian isolation.¹⁰⁵ I argue that affinity and religious institutions also emerged to advocate for their constituents and broker intergroup rivalries. For a city so small, by population and space, LM/Maputo’s proliferation of fraternal organizations was an institutional representation of the fractured and diverse identities within the Indo-Mozambican population.

Susana Pereira Bastos’ work on identity construction in the Portuguese Empire speaks to LM/Maputo’s principal Hindu organization, the *Hindu Comunidade*, and its clever political shifts over time. It was well understood that social and political conflict could not be directly addressed—in words or deeds—without severe reprisal from the state. Thus, the institutional shifts she observed within the *Comunidade* were both a reflection of and a reaction to the pressures placed on individuals to cope with residing in a society that they felt was confrontational to their very presence. Bastos’ words best summarize and contextualize the tactics that the *Comunidade* and its members employed to address such realities:

¹⁰⁴ Oishi, Takashi. “Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. p. 6-7

¹⁰⁵ Zamparoni, Valdemir. “Monhés, Baneanes, Chinas e Afro-Maometanos: Colonialismo e racismo em Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, 1890-1940*.” 1999, www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/zamparoni.rtf. Accessed 20 June 2017, p. 210.

Conscious of the advantages that could accrue from their definition as close collaborators of the regime, Hindus periodically gave the Portuguese state «proof», exhibited in the Portuguese and British press, of their gratitude and political subordination. Among the most highly recognized were the confirmation of racial and religious tolerance as a moving force of the Portuguese Colonial Empire, the inclusion of Portuguese language instruction among the basic objectives of the main Hindu association in the colony (created in Lourenço Marques in 1933) and, more importantly, the numerous demonstrations of deference, admiration and homage to the Colonial Government (for instance, by placing portraits of the highest political figures of the time in the main hall of the Veda Mandir, inaugurated in the capital city of Mozambique in 1938).

Despite the fact that the leaders of Hindu associations preferred, in public, to make statements such as «we Hindus see the Portuguese as the most welcoming of all the lords of the land», the majority of the Hindu population recognized that there was much discrimination of Whites towards Indians.¹⁰⁶

Just as Indo-Mozambican institutions served as mediums of in-group affirmation, they also served as advocacy vehicles to seek benefits from the State. Jeanne Marie Penvenne's text *African Workers and Colonial Racism* is an exhaustive study on urban employment and racism in Mozambique. While her study focuses on transactional “belonging” within Mozambique's Black/African groups, her analysis extends accurately to the experience of Indo-Mozambicans residing in LM/Maputo. In-group belonging served as a source of social currency, lubricating interpersonal relationships and, subsequently, reaping transactional benefits for the represented community.¹⁰⁷

In addition, ethnicity emerged as a relational base from which individuals negotiated identities and competed over scarce resources and privileges. In the urban context, intelligence, capital, shelter, and, most of all, jobs were highly sought after resources. The knowledge and use of language, religious affiliation, and neighborhood networks figured into any individual's ability to claim resources. Membership in sports groups, social and church associations, or mutual aid and savings groups at the workplace could also foster claims of belonging and thereby provide avenues of information exchange and dependency.¹⁰⁸ Claims of shared belonging to a specific group could further be used to establish a patron-benefactor relationship with individuals who controlled access to greater resources.

¹⁰⁶ Bastos, Susana Pereira. “«In Mozambique, we didn't have apartheid», Identity constructions on inter-Ethnic relations during the «Third Portuguese Empire».” *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, no. 9/10, 2006, p. 14.

¹⁰⁷ Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican strategies and struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. London: Currey, 1995.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 9.



Encyclopædia Britannica

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Dadra-and-Nagar-Haveli/media/149537/128960>

For example, India's 1954 invasion of two Portuguese colonial enclaves, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, provided an opportunity for Indo-Mozambicans to claim Portuguese belonging in exchange for protection against reprisal. While it was not mentioned in the oral stories that I collected, this invasion was well-documented in the national archives. Documents from civic organizations showed overwhelming support for the Portuguese colonial state and disgust at India's incursion. Further, although civic association documents suggest that most of the supporters were Indo-Mozambican Muslims, self-identified as Ismailis and Pakistanis, there were also records of large monetary donations made by Hindu groups to support the families of fallen Portuguese soldiers. In multiple provinces in southern Mozambique, Indo-Mozambican Muslims and Hindus joined funds and sent joint donations to state organizations. For example, one 1954 document N 2142/A-26a showed a combined total of 65.195,00 escudo donated from the *Comunidade Indu* (25.000,00), *Comunidade Maometana* (34.550,00) and the *Pebane* area populations (5.645,00)¹⁰⁹, representing, respectively, a Hindu, Mahommedian, and Pebane neighborhood association.

Given what is now known about living conditions in Portugal's Indian colonies, these contributions would seem counterintuitive. Therefore, I would hypothesize that a significant number of the Indo-Mozambican members of these organizations were originally from under-resourced colonies that largely neglected basic social services for their local Indian population. In

¹⁰⁹ N2142/A-26a SA/ML – Adito ao ofício N 2116/Aa26a) de 10 de corrente. Dated Sept 14 1954.

Damão, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli, Portuguese presence and investments were minimal in comparison to the educational and economic infrastructure established in Goa. Further, Indian residents in all the colonies were expected to seek jobs and education outside of their enclaves in order to make a living and survive beyond subsistence. In talking with an interviewee who declined to be taped, he admitted that when his family first came to Mozambique from Diu, they had to teach themselves Portuguese because they only spoke Gujarati.¹¹⁰ His story illustrates how weak the colonial markers were in these areas and how far from assimilated the Indians in these enclaves really were. Without a doubt, the lack of opportunity in these enclaves led many residents to leave India for Mozambican shores in the first place. Colonial marginalization, coupled with transnational displacement, incentivized civic associations to create safe spaces for in-group solidarity in Mozambique. As the 1954 donations suggest, the initial focus on solidarity later shifted to a focus on strategic relationship-building between minority groups and the mainstream political apparatus.

Indo-Mozambican Religious Organizations and Their Members

Over the late 20th century, some of the prominent Muslim organizations with large Indo-Mozambican membership included the Aga Khan Building (founded in 1941¹¹¹ and rebuilt in 1968¹¹²), the *Escola Mahometana* (also spelled “Maometana,” translated as the “Mohammedian School” inaugurated in 1903)¹¹³, and the Central Mosque on Rua da Gavea (built in 1887). Archival data shows their constant interaction with the state on a variety of levels, such as requesting financial sponsorship, soliciting government participation in events, and seeking permission to build or rebuild parts of its edifice. Oral narratives and archival records also show that these institutions supported members in exploring and affirming their ethno-religious identity, as well as expanding their commercial footprint.

Ibtihaj was the only interviewee whom I spoke with who had attended the Escola Mahometana. The daughter of an Indian father and a Black Mozambican mother, Ibtihaj was in fact raised by her father and her Indian stepmother—both Indian citizens until 1962. Her experience as one of eighty students in the school in the 1960s was deeply connected to her Indo-Mozambican Muslim identity and her father and stepmother’s insistence that she inherit as much Indian cultural identity as possible:

I: When my father registered me in the school on Queen Dona Leonor street in front of Casa Fabião, in Alto Maé, I went dressed in pants and a shawl [traditional Indian dress]. Two days later, the teacher, who was a Portuguese professor, said to me “After today, you can not dress like that. You have to come with a short dress. Do not wear a shawl or

¹¹⁰ Anonymous discussions with the author, April 2017.

¹¹¹ “Maputo Jamatkhana evokes a long history of Ismailias in Mozambique.” The.Ismaili. 2 April 2008, <https://the.ismaili/our-culture/maputo-jamatkhana-evokes-long-history-ismailis-mozambique>. Accessed 9 March 2019.

¹¹² “Edifício de Sua Alteza Aga Khan – Comunidade Muculumana Ismaelita – Maputo (1).” *Houses of Maputo*, 25 April 2015, <http://housesofmaputo.blogspot.com/2015/04/edificio-de-sua-alteza-aga-khan.html?q=aga+khan>. Accessed 9 March 2019.

¹¹³ Zamparoni, Valdemir. “Monhés, Baneanes, Chinas e Afro-Maometanos: Colonialismo e racismo em Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, 1890-1940*.” 1999, www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/zamparoni.rtf. Accessed 20 June 2017, p. 214.

pants. Only come wearing a dress.” I said, “Ok.” I went home and told my father. . . . My father, on that very day, registered me in the Escola Mahometana, there in the Community Mahometana, because there we could go dressed in pants and shawls. It was a Muslim community. They taught Gujarati. They had professors on one side who taught Gujarati and on the other side they had Muslim mullahs that taught Islamic things— how to make Salat, we studied the Qurán, we learned how to obey the Qurán, these things. On the other side, they taught Portuguese and there was a room with a Portuguese professor. I still remember my teacher’s name, Virgínia Amélia Vaz Martins. She was the professor and the director of the same school.

NA: Was the school mixed with people of Indian origin and Blacks too?

I: No, at that time, they could not enter. It was just Indian Muslims, only. Neither Whites nor Blacks could enter.¹¹⁴

This declared exclusivity of the *Escola Mahometana* would later evolve towards full integration, but at the time of Ibtiḥaj’s youth, Indo-Mozambican Islamic organizations served only Indo-Mozambican clientele. The school’s religious element was just one component of its mandate, but perhaps not even the most important. Instead, the physical spaces allowed individuals to bring together the transnational elements of their identities in a self-affirming and culturally exclusive environment.

Indo-Mozambican Islamic organizations also served as banking and lending institutions for their members. Joana Pereira Leite and Nicole Khouri’s 2013 in-depth study of the *Ismaili* community in Mozambique explored how the deportation of Indian citizens from Mozambique after the Indian invasion of Goa in 1961 created a window of commercial opportunity for *Ismaili* business owners. Quite a few *Ismailis* took advantage of loans through the Aga Khan organization to purchase abandoned businesses that had been seized from Indian passport holders, mostly Hindus. Businesses were cheaply auctioned off by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Leite and Khouri’s text reads, “Take note that the Goan crisis, forcing the expulsion of Hindustani merchants from the colony, offered new business opportunities for *Ismaili* families (reference). In fact, oral sources outside of the [*Ismaili*] community attest that it was at interesting prices that some *Ismailis* acquired establishments that had belonged to Indian citizens, who had been forced to abandon the colony.”¹¹⁵ Data showed that despite the forced removal of Indian passport holders from the country, during just the decade between 1960 and 1970, the capital city’s population grew from 178,565 to 383,755, presenting a strong customer base for resident business owners to expand and profit.¹¹⁶ As the example of the *Ismaili* commercial solidarity shows, civic institutions did not prioritize acting in concert with other Indo-Mozambican institutions. Instead, institutional membership was siloed, and benefits were distributed primarily among in-group members.

In contrast to Indo-Mozambican Muslims, who hailed from a variety of Indian subcontinent locations and nationalities, Goan civic organizations were uniform in religious affiliation, geographic origin, and Portuguese nationality. Their organizations focused less on education, since they had already been grounded within the Portuguese educational and cultural curriculum back

¹¹⁴ Ibtiḥaj in discussions with the author, October 2015.

¹¹⁵ Leite, Joana Pereira, and Nicole Khouri. *Os Ismailis de Moçambique: Vida Económica no Tempo Colonial*. (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2013).

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 103.

in Goa. Instead organizations were more focused on culture and caste. Similar to the Muslim groups, Goans had multiple institutions that represented different segments of this sub-community. Yet, each institution served as a site for cultural affirmation, a safehaven for Goan customs in their diaspora.

Caste divisions were also mirrored in the civic organizations that were created to represent these stratified sub-communities. Maria Branquinho's 2004 unpublished ethnographic research study entitled *Socio-Cultural Identity Construction of Goans in Catembe*, is particularly insightful in that it shows that Goans regarded as part of the lower class resided in periphery neighborhoods and established their own representative religious organizations in those neighborhoods to meet their local needs. Branquinho's study articulates how nationalization and independence in 1975 deconstructed established rituals and communal spaces in ways that are still felt today amongst Katembe's fishing community. For example, before independence, Katembe Goans would worship in the chapel of the local Goan Club, but after independence the club was seized by the Mozambican State and made into a public school. Katembe Goans retained a small community center, so they converted that into a church. In so doing, they avoided the expensive and time-consuming trip to the Maputo Cathedral on the mainland, the city's primary site for Catholic worship. While their worship at the national Cathedral could satisfy their religious needs, it would not satisfy their quest for a culturally exclusive location to encourage in-group comradery and to retain caste-specific traditions. The state-imposed requirement for racial integration rendered their makeshift church only partially fitting for their needs. As Branquinho states, "Behind all this was Goan interest in creating a worship service of its own, as a way of affirming and distinguishing its socio-cultural identity."¹¹⁷ Eventually, ad hoc local Goan clubs, like the Clube de São Pedro and the Clube da Nossa Senhora das Mercês, emerged in Katembe for particular Goan ceremonies and festivals. Yet, most of these clubs were not officially recognized, and members feared that formal interaction with state officials would jeopardize the clubs' existence.

Although Goans' regional identity was inherently conflated with their religious identity, their secular divisions were equally as divisive. When I spoke with 81-year-old Joaquim at a waterfront café in Maputo, he rattled off a number of Goan organizations that existed in LM/Maputo in the 20th century. He further explained that, while it was possible to be a member of multiple organizations, it was not common. Each institution had a different purpose, membership, and geographical coverage area within the city:

J: Goans had their clubs. There was the Casa de Goa (House of Goa), which was where the Art Museum is now [on Ho Chi Min Avenue]. The other was the Clube Desportivo Indo-Português (Indo-Portuguese Sports Club) that was near the police station in what is now Estrela Vermelha (a neighborhood named "Red Star"). Another was in the area of Escola Manyanga (Manyanga School). It was called the Casa da Cultura (Culture House). Before that it was the Associação dos Operários (the Workers' Association)....
NA: What were the differences between them?

¹¹⁷ Branquinho, Maria. *Processos de construção de identidade sociocultural: o caso da comunidade Goesa da Catembe*. BA diss., Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2003, p 31-35.

J: Those that were in Operário were mainly people who worked in that area, but there were other cultures too. Elites were in the Casa de Goa. In the Clube Desportivo it was those who played sports.¹¹⁸

These Goan organizations no longer exist today. After Mozambican independence, Goan institutions largely dissolved under the pressure of policies that promoted national unity and demonized religious and ethnic distinctions. Moreover, as many Goans departed Mozambique in the years surrounding its 1975 independence, those Goans left behind in Maputo had difficulty advocating for and maintaining their institutions, given their severely diminished numbers.

In contrast to the Goan Christian and Indo-Mozambican Islamic organizations, the institution known today as the *Comunidade Hindu* (referred to here as the *Comunidade*) was the singular institution that represented the Hindu community in the capital. Its singularity makes it ripe for in-depth research on how this particular organization navigated changing transnational pressures and domestic policies. For over a century, it was the only organization to represent the Hindu community in the nation's capital, and it is the third oldest Hindu religious and cultural institution in the country, after the temples on Mozambique Island and Salamanga.

The *Comunidade Hindu* fits within what Steve Vertovec would call the Hindu Diaspora. In his 2000 book, *The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative patterns*, he explains the interconnectivity of Hindu and Indian identities: the fact that intersectionality lay at the very heart of the permanence of LM/Maputo *Comunidade*, as an institution. Further, he notes that:

Hinduism is generally not a proselytizing faith (while there are certain sects within the Hindu fold that do indeed proselytize). According to *Encyclopedia Britannica Online* (which now has an entry on "Hinduism outside India"), Hinduism does not seek converts from abroad "because of its inextricable roots in the social system and the land of India." Bhikhu Parekh (1993:140), too, underscores an "acute sense of rootedness," characterizing the relationship between Hinduism and India—a relationship that, Parekh believes, makes Hinduism "an ethnic religion."

Not all Indians are Hindus of course, but practically all Hindus are Indians (Nepalese and Balinese Hindus being obvious exceptions).¹¹⁹

As the relationship between colonial Portugal and independent India became increasingly confrontational over Portugal's continued colonial presence on the Indian subcontinent, Indian citizens became targets of the Portuguese colonial state. For the Portuguese colonial government, members of the *Comunidade* represented the Indian rival, not simply because many of its members were Indian citizens, but also because Hinduism itself was seen as an exclusively Indian identity marker. Social distancing strategies were devised to dis-associate the organization from its perceived loyalties to India. Members hoped to establish cultural ties of belonging with the Portuguese to ward off xenophobia and reprisal. Results were mixed. Even after the end of Portuguese colonialism, similar questions of Indo-Mozambican national loyalty were raised by the independent government.

¹¹⁸ Joaquim in discussion with the author, April 2017.

¹¹⁹ Vertovec, Steven. *The Hindu diaspora: comparative patterns*. London: Routledge, 2006. p. 2-3.

Case Study – The Evolution of the Comunidade Hindu in LM/Maputo

Mozambique Island Hindu Temple



Photos author's own (2016)

Salamanga Hindu Temple



Photos author's own (2016)

Lourenço Marques/ Maputo Ved Mandir Hindu Temple



Photos author's own (2017)

The founding members of the LM *Comunidade* were working, middle-class men who had arrived in Mozambique in the late 1800s and early 1900s to work as merchants, masons, and builders in LM. Initially, the *Comunidade*'s purpose was to serve this small segment of the Indo-Mozambican community in Hindu religious practice, as well as to teach Gujarati language. Most Hindu Mozambicans hailed from the former Portuguese enclave of Diu, as well as from the former

British-Indian state of Gujarat, making Gujarati their mother tongue and a critical part of their ethnic identity. They represented a diverse mix of citizenships, with those from Diu being Portuguese and those from Gujarat being British, and some later becoming Indian. The Hindu *Comunidade* passed membership on through family lines and many married, as caste and religiously appropriate, through in-group connections. The institution also welcomed recent Indian arrivals, particularly new brides from India and other parts of East Africa.

In the early 1920s, Hindu parishioners joined their money and established the *Ved Mandir* as simply a place of worship, on par with the temples that had preceded it in other parts of the country. As published in the Official Bulletin (Series 8), on 21 Feb 1925, the statutes of the *Nova Associação Hindo de Lourenço Marques* (The New Hindu Association of Lourenço Marques) were shared with the public. Its goals were to 1) promote the moral and intellectual development of its members; 2) defend the legitimate rights and legal interests of Hindus, without regard to nationality, creating a place of worship, a hospital and a pharmacy; 3) spread moral instruction through schools, conferences, reunions and literary propaganda; 4) give protection, assistance and repatriation to members and their families whenever they do not have the means, as well as for any Hindu individual in need due to unemployment or other such circumstances; and 5) establish a lending library, for the use of members and their families, and entertainment activities that are compatible with the financial means of the *Nova Associação Hindo*: sports games, etc. that are not contrary to the laws and ways of the country.¹²⁰

Eventually, the *Comunidade* expanded to include cultural education. According to the *Comunidade*'s website and Facebook page, this cultural element was founded as the *Associação dos Trabalhadores Hindus "Bharate Samaj"* (*Association of Hindu workers—Indian Society*) in 1932, and shortly after became a legally recognized institution.¹²¹ The Official Bulletin from January 1933 named the *Bharate Samaj*'s goals as very similar to those established by the 1925 manifestation: a) provide members with education, instruction and recreation, based in a day school, to be attended by minor descendants of the members, and an evening school for adults, who will receive primary education in Portuguese and Gujarati language, the sacred doctrine of the Vedas, the establishing of a small library for use by members and their families, and a playground; b) assist members and their families in case of illness, by establishing an infirmary where they can receive treatment; c) assist members who are unable to sustain themselves and their families due to unemployment or other unforeseen circumstances; d) assist widows and children of deceased members; and e) defend the rights and legitimate interests of members.¹²²

Later, the cornerstone was laid by Swami Bhawani Dayal Sanyasi on the 1933 Vedic center; and by 1943, members had broken ground on the new Indian School construction. The building was inaugurated in 1945. Thereafter, the space became known as the *Bharat Samaj Ved Mandir*, uniting its mixed-use purposes within its very name. Soon after, *Bharat Samaj* began to absorb the aftershocks of geopolitical shifts in the Indian Ocean region, and it began to take on new names

¹²⁰ "Estatutos da Nova Associação Hindo de Lourenço Marques," Boletim Oficial de Mocambique, 21 Feb 1925, p 2.

¹²¹ Comunidade Hindu de Maputo – Hindu Samaj. Facebook homepage.

<<https://www.facebook.com/pg/comunidadehindu.maputo/about/?ref=page_internal>> Accessed on: 14 Feb 2017.

¹²² Estatutos da Associação dos Trabalhadores Hindus "Bharate Samaj." Boletim Oficial de Moçambique n. 2, 14 Jan 1933, p. 12.

and institutional aims to manage the changes of Indian independence in 1947, the annexation of Portuguese India in 1961, Mozambican independence in 1974, and the Mozambican civil war from 1977 to 1992.¹²³

Before 1947, citizenship on the Indian subcontinent was a tripartite of European nationalities: French, British, and Portuguese. I am not aware of any Indo-Mozambicans who were French nationals. For Indo-Mozambicans who were Portuguese citizens, the emergence of new nations across the Indian Ocean did not trigger a migratory or identity shift. For the once British, however, additional citizenship choices emerged after partition: Indian and Pakistani. The 1940s was a time ripe for travel between India, Pakistan, and Mozambique, and many Indo-Mozambicans trace their family origins in Mozambique to travelers who migrated around this 1947 benchmark. Although pre-1947 internal divisions among Indo-Mozambicans were acknowledged within the larger Indo-Mozambican community, they were not publicly displayed to outsiders until they were politically foregrounded by the events of 1961 and 1974. As different Indo-Mozambican subgroups cleverly adapted their identity, citizenship, and migration to cope with the instability facing their subgroups in Mozambique and on the Indian sub-continent, it became clearer that each group had a different trajectory, based on individual agency and options for emigration.

During the 20th century, the end of the Portuguese empire in India in 1961 was definitely the most transformational event for Indo-Mozambican migration patterns and identity formation. As the 1950s came to a close, the Indian government officially raised with Portugal the topic of ending Portuguese colonialism in India. As outlined in Chapter 3, Portuguese insistence that ceding its Indian holdings was not up for discussion led to increasing hostility among the two nations and, ultimately, directly placed Indo-Mozambicans in the center of a geopolitical clash of colonialisms.¹²⁴ On December 18, 1961, the Indian government launched “Operation Vijay,” and annexed Portugal’s remaining colonies on the Indian subcontinent. Diogo Moço’s study reported that over 2,000 Indo-Mozambicans were deported from Mozambique¹²⁵. My research in chapter 5, however, found that roughly that number were deported from LM alone; though it falls outside the scope of this thesis, I know that there were deportees from northern cities like Beira and Ilha and thus conclude Moço’s numbers to be underestimated. Exact numbers notwithstanding, it still remains unclear if the deportations were used to facilitate a prisoner swap for Portuguese soldiers captured by the Indian army or if they were orchestrated solely in reprisal for annexation itself.

In Mozambique, group identification became vitally important during this period, and divisions among Indo-Mozambican subgroups deepened. The most affected Indo-Mozambican subgroup through this period was the Hindus. Indian passport holders were overwhelmingly Hindu merchants, who had few allies within Mozambique. The majority of Christian Indo-Mozambicans were of British or Portuguese citizenship; Muslims appealed to their local Mozambican religious community for refuge and to the Pakistani government for reprieve. Hindus, however, were considered to be Indian loyalists by definition and were disproportionately represented among the scores of Indian nationals who were forced into deportation camps. The majority were forcibly removed, drastically reducing their population and strength in LM/Maputo thereafter.

¹²³ Comunidade Hindu de Maputo – Hindu Samaj. Facebook homepage.

<<https://www.facebook.com/pg/comunidadehindu.maputo/about/?ref=page_internal>> Accessed on: 14 Feb 2017.

¹²⁴ Silva, Ladis Da. *The Americanization of Goans*. (Toronto, 1976), p. 50-52.

¹²⁵ Moço, 55.

In order to cope with the geopolitical changes of the time, the *Comunidade* changed its name and stated purpose multiple times to ensure its own survival as an institution and to solidify its value as a cultural site in the Mozambican national context. The loss of a significant portion of its membership signified a failure in the institutional framework, such that it could not protect its members or broker a compromise to prevent their forced removal. After the previously held territories of Goa, Damão, and Diu were forcibly integrated into the Indian Republic in 1961, the *Comunidade* officially distanced itself from India. According to members of the advisory board with whom I spoke, after 1961 the remaining *Comunidade* members were principally Hindus from Diu who maintained their Portuguese nationality and thus were able to continue on in Mozambique under Portuguese rule. This period of bifurcation by nationality subordinated the institution's founding pan-Hindu mission. An organization once united under religion found itself abruptly splintered along fragile fault lines of nationality.

By 1968, the organization was known as the *Associação Luso-Ariana de Maputo* (the Luso-Arian Association of Maputo). The Official Bulletin from that year shows a marked shift away from its founding goals and an approximation towards Portuguese acculturation and assimilation. The November 1968 document reads: “Associação Luso-Ariana de Maputo, founded on 14 January 1933, under the denomination of the Associação dos Trabalhadores Hindu <<Bharate Semaj>>, is an association of a sporting, recreational, cultural and benevolent character.” It goes on to outline its goals, which for the first time show both nationalist assimilation and Portuguese political alignment. Its advocacy elements are likewise eliminated, such that the document explains its goals as follows:

- a) Spread to its members education, instruction and recreation, developing in them a sports practice and facilitating for them distraction and culture, b) Delivering primary education in Portuguese language, c) Stimulating and assisting members in their initiatives to manifest their national and collective interests and to promote their moral virtues and the progress of the Portuguese Nation, d) Assist members and their families in cases of illness, establishing the necessary assistance services, e) Assist members who are unable to sustain themselves and their families due to unemployment or other unforeseen circumstances, f) Assist widows and children of deceased members.¹²⁶

In order to show alliance with Portuguese nationalism and the State, the *Comunidade* showed social distancing from the Indian subcontinent; in 1968, the *Comunidade* focused on promoting Portuguese language and culture, abandoning its 1933 commitment to Gujarati and Vedic education. The re-naming of the *Comunidade* was also very important. The 1968 name change served two purposes. First, since the original Aryan people were believed to be from India, have spoken Sanskrit, and practiced Hinduism, the name was an historically accurate reference to Indo-Mozambicans' cultural and religious identity that shifted attention away from Hinduism, which was seen as a divisive cultural symbol of Indian national identity. Second, the name shift served the purpose of aligning with the White Portuguese elements of society that were holding steadfast to the last years of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. After years of Nazi and Fascist references to the Aryan race, the term “Aryan” remained attached to White and Caucasian identity. The connotation signaled an approximation towards the Portuguese State and its White supporters and a distancing from the growing Brown and Black peoples around the world who aimed to dismantle the last vestiges of

¹²⁶ “Portaria n21 600.” Boletim Oficial de Moçambique n. 48, 30 Nov 1968, p. 1712.

colonial empire; most directly, the new name distanced the *Comunidade* from the Indian State, Indian leadership of the non-aligned movement, and Indian moral support for African nations seeking independence. Despite the *Comunidade*'s attempts to remain politically aligned with governing powers and to reassure the State that the *Comunidade*'s education and cultural aims were completely apolitical, the organization and its membership continued to be regarded with wary suspicion by the Portuguese government.

The combined name changes and goal shifts served to pivot the organization away from its founding principles of cultural and religious education, as well as advocacy for the legal rights of its members. Instead, the assimilationist character of this particular institutional shift suggests a reactionary gesture to appease Portuguese colonial powers, who had, after all, by sheer political force, deported many of their members and seized all their assets. Perhaps, then, the shift was an acceptance of the organization's castration in this regard. Remaining members were well aware of the futility of any advocacy efforts, given the State's harsh stance on Indian aggression and anyone associated with it. Instead, they sought to preserve what was left of their organization and its membership, by taking an apolitical stance towards its members' rights and embracing cultural assimilation to Portuguese language and culture.

In anticipation of independence and the introduction of socialism, many people departed the country well before 1975 to secure their place in Portugal. The exodus of Portuguese passport holders from Mozambique spanned from approximately 1973 to 1977, and a significant portion of the *Comunidade*'s members departed during that time. According to the *Comunidade Hindu* of Lisbon's webpage, their activities were only ad hoc until 1975, when the decolonization of Mozambique brought over 9,000 members and 800 leaders to the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. By 1982, these Indo-Mozambican expatriates in Portugal secured legal rights to assemble, along with a building in which to continue their activities.¹²⁷

Meanwhile in Maputo, as of 1977, the institution's name was changed again to the *Clube de Desportos da Umbila* (The Sports Club of Umbila). This change was prompted by the independent government's completely oppositional stance to religious or ethnic divisions. This new name cloaked the identity of its membership, reducing the organization to a sports club. Sports clubs typically identified with a location, but I am unaware of a neighborhood or region with this name. "Umbila" itself is a type of wood indigenous to Mozambique. I have not found any particular reason why this name was chosen, or its strategic significance in any other terms other than to completely divorce the organization from its ethnic and religious identification. If the 1968 shift to remove advocacy and Indian identity were gestures to appease the Portuguese government, this latest shift to remove all elements of identity was even more sterilizing. As with those before it, this pre-emptive name change did not protect the organization from state aggression.

Deni, an active member of the small business and Hindu religious communities, was the only remaining member of his family residing in Mozambique by the time we spoke in his shop in 2017. The son of a Hindu tailor who came to Mozambique in 1920, Deni recalled how he, aged seventeen, and his older brother saved their father's business and coped with Portuguese colonialism, all while his parents and younger siblings were deported to India in 1962. His

¹²⁷ Comunidade Hindu of Lisbon. *Quem Somos*. 2016. <<<http://www.comunidadehindu.org/quem-somos/>>> Accessed on: 2 July 2017.

narrative also described other moments of seizure of the *Comunidade*'s buildings, which had not previously been explored in the archival and historical documentation that I had found. Further, he explained how, through interpersonal relationships with powerbrokers, the *Comunidade* was able to regain its physical spaces and still maintain a relationship with the state. Much of this process harkens back to Penvenne's analysis above, which attests that ethnic belonging held currency in navigating access to State and communal resources. Finally, his narrative began to address questions of nationality that emerged in the late 1980s. We see the *Comunidade* as an organization that shifted from a pan-Hindu platform that disregarded nationality in 1925, to a pro-Portuguese organization in 1968, to a 1980s institution conflicted by the limitations of Mozambican nationality, and finally to the community that is today, focused on (re)negotiating its relationship with Indian nationality and diasporic belonging:

D: In 1975, there was independence. Samora Machel gained power. The first encounter we had with him in the presidency, he said that Mozambique was free and independent. Whoever was born in Mozambique was Mozambican. There was religious freedom but with an orientation towards FRELIMO [the ruling party]. We could not independently make our own places of worship. We had to come together and become a religion. The Christian council unified and became one. The Muslim community divided into three: Comunidade Mahometana, the Islamic Council, and the Islamic Congress. The Comunidade Hindu became one from the Rovuma to Maputo [throughout the entire country]. We were always called to the General Assembly. There was a proximity with the government. They treated us as equals. . . .

The ideology of Samora Machel was very good, but poorly interpreted. . . . Communism is very good when it's interpreted correctly. But here it was used for opportunism. . . . The schools closed, were nationalized. Anything you wanted to do required requesting authorization. There was a school that was Portuguese, but when there was the program of Damão and Diu [I assume this means Indian invasions between 1950s and early 1960s], many Indians could not take care of the school and the Portuguese government nationalized it. They gave us only a big room to hold our religious ceremonies. When FRELIMO came, they did the same thing. In 1982, we fought to maintain it. We expressed to the government our interest in having an installation to pass on to the next generation. We sent a letter to Graça Machel [the first lady]. But the story was the same. They said that we could not keep the installation where the Portuguese school was located because children from the neighborhood were already studying there. The only solution was the construction of a new school for the kids. At that time, there was no money for that. We only had enough to eat. At that time there was a doctor [assumed to be a member of the Comunidade] who treated the Mayor and he spoke to him about the issue. He explained that this would be difficult for us. After that, we gained new installations that were given to the Comunidade Hindu. . . . Our community is small. In the whole country, there are only 1500 or 3000 Hindus, maximum. I mean those who were born here.

NA: So how was it in 1982?

D: We got our new installations. We started the Comunidade Hindu.

NA: This was a group of how many people?

D: We were about 20-25 people. We were young. We had help from the government. There was a Department for Religious Affairs. When the Indian Embassy [High

Commission] opened, we went to them for assistance whenever there were difficulties. They sent books.

NA: The Indian government helped?

D: This was much later. I went to India to drop my mother [with relatives] and I brought back books from pre-Kindergarten to 4th grade. We had to make photocopies of the books. When we opened in 1982, we had 500 students. Now in 2017, we only have five. Now the majority of the 500 alumni are doctors, engineers and economists. Today we are proud of that sacrifice.

NA: The Comunidade receives outside funding?

D: No. Once we were called to the Ministry of Justice, because they wanted to know how we sustained ourselves. It was by donations. Until now, no one has helped us.

NA: So, there is no connection with the [Hindu community] outside of the country?

D: They say that we are Mozambicans. Even though we are of Indian origin, we are Mozambican. They say they cannot help. The new government of India is getting closer to us a bit. Now that they have the OCI [Overseas Citizenship of India] card. With this card, we can always go to India whenever we want; we can live there without a visa.

Many people who have a connection with India already have the card.¹²⁸

Just as the institution's educative purpose and its unifying powers came under suspicion from the Portuguese (pre-1975), so it did under independent Mozambican (post-1975) leadership too. Despite exhaustive review, I was not able to nail down the exact dates or justifications to explain why, but shortly after Mozambican independence, the *Comunidade's* activities were suspended and its building was seized again. The institution's current website and oral stories attest that at the time of nationalization, after Mozambican independence, the headquarters building was seized by the government and converted into a public school, "Escola Primária Sá da Bandeira." It was only in the late 1980s, with the creation of the national Department of Religious Affairs, that members were able to appeal to have their building returned to them, which did not take place until 1998, when Hindu merchants and activists' efforts combined to successfully restore ownership back to the Hindu community for its original purpose.¹²⁹ Since then, the institution has been back in Hindu hands under the title of the *Comunidade Hindú de Maputo*.¹³⁰

The singularity of the *Comunidade* as the only Hindu association in town made it a fixture of cultural life for Indo-Mozambican Hindus. This same singularity made it an easy target for state-led repression. In speaking with Deni, I learned that he was an active member of the *Comunidade* and had been part of the movement to return the *Comunidade's* building back to members in the 1990s. According to his memories, the *Comunidade* did not dismantle during the period that its physical space was seized. Rather, it was an organization without a specified location. Members offered their homes to host rituals and ceremonies, and the members also represented the Indo-Mozambican Hindu community whenever the state officials or its members required it.

For *Comunidade* members, past and present, the institution itself holds significant socio-cultural value and is a physical reminder of their struggle for permanence, inclusion, and

¹²⁸ Deni in discussion with the author, July 2017.

¹²⁹ Pereira, Cristina. A heranca de Kalidas. <<<http://www.buala.org/pt/cidade/a-heranca-de-kalidas>>> Accessed on: 5 Oct 2017.

¹³⁰ Comunidade Hindu de Maputo. Quem Somos <<<http://www.chmoz.org/pt/sobrenos/>>> Accessed on: 3 Oct 2017.

representation. The constant circulation of members in this space allowed for socio-cultural continuity within this same community that cyclically fell under state scrutiny. This transnational space was arguably the only non-familial site of belonging afforded to LM/Maputo's Indo-Mozambican Hindus.

Conclusions in Context

The history above shows the *Comunidade's* oscillating bouts with allegiance to and distance from the State. Rhetorical performance in speeches recorded this community's continued reference to the superiority and racially inclusive stance of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa. The contradictions in their actions and the logical sentiment of the day leads me to believe that they did not genuinely believe everything they espoused, but instead understood and valued the currency of rhetorical alignment. It was through political maneuvering and exerting group agency that Indo-Mozambican Hindus survived the changes of the late 20th century and preserved their institution for future educational, religious, and cultural use. For the *Comunidade*, serving as a unifying body made it easy for interlocutors to access this minority group. This singularity, however, also made the *Comunidade* vulnerable to state-sponsored aggression. Pro-active steps to change the institution's name and purpose did not convince state actors of the organization's neutrality. Yet, despite its diminished membership and sporadic expropriations, the *Comunidade Hindu* is the only Indo-Mozambican organization that survived until today with its original purpose and membership demographic intact.

As demonstrated by this particular history of the *Comunidade Hindu*, Indo-Mozambican civic associations held deep socio-cultural value for Indo-Mozambicans in LM/Maputo. Through these collective organizations, Indo-Mozambicans served as advocates in ways that perhaps would not have been possible at the individual level. Not only did these institutions represent ethnic and religious identities, but they also served to perpetuate cultural continuity in the diasporic context. The particular changes to the *Comunidade* over time are just another lens through which to analyze the coping mechanisms and survival strategies generally embraced by Indo-Mozambicans in order to maintain their presence in Mozambique's urban capital, despite multifarious state actions to incentivize their departure and diminish their presence over the 20th century.

In conclusion, the socio-cultural value of civic and religious associations in Maputo was deeply important for Indo-Mozambicans. Not only did these institutions serve as safe spaces for members to manifest transnational ethnic and religious identities, but they also served as producers of cultural continuity for future generations. For outside communities, even those that were Indo-Mozambican, but not of the same sub-identity, these organizations stood as unifying bodies that allowed for easy access to commune with an otherwise small group of disparate individuals who were otherwise socially and physically segregated in Mozambique's urban spaces.

In comparison, Islamic Indo-Mozambican institutions had multiple organizational bodies that have survived until today, though they have largely become ethnically integrated. Thus, they have lost the exclusive nature of their Indo-Mozambican ethnic and regional origins. Similarly, Goan institutions were condensed and absorbed into multi-racial Catholic organizations that are similarly now divorced of their transnational and ethnic components; in fact, the *Comunidade*

Hindu is the only organization that has been able to retain both its original purpose and its membership demographic.

During the late 20th century, the Indo-Mozambican community in LM/Maputo absorbed the aftershocks of four particular geopolitical shifts in the Indian Ocean and the Lusophone world: Indian independence in 1947, the annexation of Portuguese India in 1961, Mozambican independence in 1975, and the Mozambican civil war from 1977 to 1992. Representational organizations changed their name, membership, and purpose over this period to ensure their institutional survival and to solidify their transnational cultural significance. Institutional resilience was manifested by Indo-Mozambican associations of varying faiths, although forced migration under Portuguese colonialism and forced integration under African socialism successively threatened organizations' ability to operate effectively as ethnic organizations. Such ethno-religious organizations attempted to help their constituents overcome pervasive vulnerability and to gain access to highly coveted political capital whenever it was available. Individual members' oral narratives articulate how ethnic sub-identity was defined and divided as political and social shifts in the Indian Ocean and Lusophone worlds collided in the late 20th century. Indo-Mozambican associations served as transnational sites where ethnic identity and migratory agency were cyclically constructed and deconstructed in order to respond to and cope with federal power structures and local demographics.

As a final thought, I suggest a different point of departure for future scholars: one that examines the meta-structures of political organization and socialization that Indo-Mozambican people were subjected to, such that they felt that adapting their representational organizations could bring some kind of relief or refuge from both the colonial and post-colonial governments. In doing so, I am brought back to a question raised by Mahmood Mamdani with regard to the ethnic genocide in Rwanda: "In what ways did nationalism build on the colonial political edifice, instead of transforming it?"¹³¹ Similar to Mamdani's discussions, I offer the *Comunidade's* experience as "illegitimate inhabitants," both before and after independence. As another example, I also offer Goans' fall from grace from favored colonial agents to exiled equals. Both identity groups were defined as much by colonial policies as by their ethnicities. Debates about Indo-Mozambican national loyalty in the post-colonial period refer back to these colonial legacies, and the perceived threat to the state posed by ethnic minorities goes back to their colonial status as ambiguous settlers. Specifically, Mamdani would argue that *settlers*, as a political term, includes racial groups that encompass the master race (White) as well as subject races (Asians, Colors, Arabs, etc.). As such the concept of *settlers* contrasts with that of *natives*, who include indigenous ethnic groups.¹³² The independence government's socialist rhetoric was a reactionary counterbalance to these racist and repressive colonial policies. In contrast, post-colonial unity came at the expense of freedom of expression, particularly for ethnic minorities whose visibility made them vulnerable to suspicions of subversion. Today, it is easy to see that post-colonial nationalism in Mozambique was equally as damaging to Indo-Mozambican communities and their institutions as Portuguese colonial policies were previously. More scholarship should focus on the parallels between the two seemingly opposing colonial and post-colonial political structures and their shared suspicion of Indo-Mozambican people and similar suppression of civic advocacy within their institutions.

¹³¹ Mamdani, 18.

¹³² Ibid, 10.

Chapter 5: The Making of the Self and Others Among Transnational Merchants

The global conversation about Asian migrants is not just one about the movement of people, but also about the movement of capital. Trends in transnational trade among this cohort show how long and deep the ties of maritime trade are between Asia and its trading partners, even its less famous ones in the global South and the Indian Ocean rim. Yet, Asian economic actors in Africa have a negative reputation. That reputation is expressed in rumors about their ability to navigate multiple economic spaces without fully integrating themselves into any particular social construct or any singular regulatory framework. This transnational fluidity is facilitated by layers of permissive legal and economic structures, both in their home and adoptive countries. Yet, for having both the intelligence and fortitude to actively maneuver these seemingly convoluted meta-structures, Asian merchants take a certain level of ownership over the levels of suspicion that both the state and the people in their adoptive countries impose upon them. In navigating obtuse business regulations throughout inhospitable investment climates, Asian merchants are anecdotally and infamously known for managing unscathed, particularly where nationals have failed. The economic intermediary space that Asian merchants occupy bridges the gap between formally regulated commerce and the needs of the lowest level consumer; they bridge a supply chain that typically positions state-regulated commerce in the hands of a powerful (White) elite and leaves the lowest level consumer among a (non-White) non-elite in order to find lower quality goods and accessible prices within the informal economy. In this way, the same flexibility that allows Asian merchants to act as economic intermediaries is often identified as precisely why they will never integrate socially. This chapter explores the Indo-Mozambican merchant class at the national, municipal, community, and individual levels. I argue that, although their mobility is the source of their economic success and political resilience, it is also why Indo-Mozambicans are regarded suspiciously by outsiders and are marginalized from belonging to the post-colonial national identity.

Indo-Mozambican merchants are just one cohort in a larger global network of transnational Asian merchants. Despite being incredibly diverse, Asian merchants share many of the same features. I draw heavily from Aihwa Ong's descriptions of Chinese merchants and investors in her book *Flexible Citizenship*. If divorced of their nationality and location, many of her words could easily be applied to Indo-Mozambican merchants of the 20th century. For instance, she defines "flexible citizenship" as "the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. In their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relation to markets, governments, and cultural regimes."¹³³ Flexible citizenship, though embodied in an individual's multiple passports or citizenship rights, actually manifests itself at transnational (including diaspora), national, and familial levels. It is at these levels that individuals define themselves and others, understand their spheres of influence, and materialize transactional relationships for economic benefit.

Having multiple citizenships and passports facilitates transnational logistics and practices. Merchants' ability to cross borders and to travel freely allows for the same easy transit of their

¹³³ Ong, 6.

goods and services. With fortified social networks in various countries, transnational merchants are able to insure their businesses against certain domestic volatility by having unfettered access to alternative markets. Hedging bets, shifting operations, and pivoting to new industries are survival and exit strategies that form a sound business model; however, regularly employing these strategies does not bode well for forging enduring relationships or assurances of national loyalty. Those who choose to access these strategies become what Susan Ossman would call “serial migrants [who] are identified by their passages across the most blatant of borders and most basic of maps: they cannot be studied ‘in context.’”¹³⁴ Similarly, Ong’s concept of “flexible citizenship” offers merchants and their families temporary residency rather than permanent integration into the countries, cities, and communities in which they find themselves. Never being affixed to one market and its specificities means serial migration, maintaining multiple citizenships or residencies, and accumulation of wealth along the way. Unlike migrants who have the intention to settle, the Asian merchant model uses migration as a means to the end of wealth accumulation, not to the end of making a home—at least, not in any static sense of the term. While I would agree with Ossman that Asian merchants, as serial migrants, cannot be studied in the context of their rather temporary geographies, I would argue that Asian merchants can be studied in the context of their professional identity.

For the transnational merchant, citizenship is not a declaration of national loyalty or social belonging, but rather serves as a migratory form of insurance against political and economic instability.¹³⁵ Expanding from the individual, transnational merchants often rely on the strategic positioning of family members to act as force multipliers, extending business networks into new markets beyond the reach of any individual’s personal sphere of influence. Transactional relations can then be elevated and/or demoted based on their economic effectiveness. In this study, the sense of who is considered part of the “One,” the “Self,” or the “Subject,” is determined by multiple factors of economic success. When power shifts at the geopolitical level, certain destabilized groups (e.g., religious, ethnic, gender, family, nationality or citizenship) from accessing capital, engaging in trade, or turning a profit, a new process of Othering commenced. I think it is best to work backwards in time to evaluate how the Indo-Mozambican merchants whom I met in my fieldwork described group definitions and the community divides that they experienced throughout the 20th century.

In my experience, this process of centering the transnational migrant as the “Self” makes defining the “Other” a perennial and subjective process of elimination. Specifically, the process is an elusive effort to give names to shifting negative spaces. I concur with Simone de Beauvoir’s 1949 study that asserts that, “no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself.”¹³⁶ But, when the “One” is a multiplicity of identities, as is the case of the flexible citizen, his or her positionality as the subject is perpetually problematic; and the “Other” is not based on a static duality, but it is dynamic and complicated by varying layers of

¹³⁴ Ossman, Susan. *Moving matters: paths of serial migration*. Stanford University Press Stanford, California, 2013. p 3.

¹³⁵ Ong, 1.

¹³⁶ de Beauvoir, Simone. *The Second Sex*. Marxists Internet Archive,

Unknown. <<https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/2nd-sex/introduction.htm>> Accessed on 2 Jan 2018.

citizenship and perceived loyalties embodied in the individual merchant's transactional relationships.

As I look back on the period of study (1947-1992), it is clear to me that the Indo-Mozambican merchant, as a flexible citizen, was a shifting Self. The strategic ability to leverage relationships for business interests is posed in Ong's 1999 text as the primary driver of flexible citizenship for elite Chinese merchants. After having already accumulated a certain level of wealth, Ong's merchants acquired and retained various residence and citizenship rights for the express purpose of further capitalist wealth accumulation. In her work, flexible citizenship is a tool of the elite: a higher order sense of selfhood that holds particular agency. While Indo-Mozambicans were settlers with privileges, most were not among the colony's most elite members. Instead, their flexible citizenship was largely a by-product of Indian subcontinent migration at a time of waning Portuguese imperialism. Therefore, Indo-Mozambicans' multiple layers of citizenship were the residual effects of competing colonialisms that ultimately acted upon them, as ex-colonial subjects. The unequal opportunities and sporadic windows to obtain or renounce citizenships were not experienced as positive expressions of migratory agency, but rather negatively—in the same way that exile and statelessness are viewed as negative and imposed outcomes.

In this study, individuals accumulated citizenship rights due to forced displacement. In fact, most Indo-Mozambicans today were born to parents who did not have citizenship rights in Mozambique at all. Rather, these parents possessed fragile rights to residency, while children born in the Portuguese colonies accumulated that colonial citizenship and inherited other rights to their parents' nationalities as well. So, while Ong's definition is applicable to Indo-Mozambican merchants today, the social context of elitism around Indo-Mozambican flexible citizenship is not fully applicable to the 20th century. Indo-Mozambicans did not acquire multiple citizenships after having already possessed a level of wealth. Instead, their migratory realities throughout the 20th century demonstrate the fact that flexible citizenship allowed merchants to instrumentalize mobility as a survival tool to escape forced migration and to weather bouts of political upheaval. Those who survived have, later in life, thrived economically because of their multiple citizenships. Certainly, many have accumulated a level of wealth that has since allowed them to benefit from an elite lifestyle, but neither that lifestyle nor its accompanying wealth were the initial drivers of their acquisition of flexible citizenship.

The Merchant Middlemen and the Context of Time

1992: Transnational Marriages

As of 1992, the typical Indo-Mozambican owner of a small or medium-sized family-owned enterprise was a male, particularly one who shared ownership rights with other male relatives. The intergenerational and patriarchal nature of their businesses, however, greatly benefited from transnational marriage schemes that allowed family conglomerates to form across borders. From conversations with male members of the *Comunidade Hindu* in Maputo, for instance, I gathered that many of the wives of the elders of the community hailed from Hindu communities in neighboring African countries. As members of the same caste, daughters of merchants in South Africa and Tanzania, for example, married aspiring or second-generation merchants in Mozambique, and these marriages extended and strengthened transnational business networks. In

these cases, Indo-Mozambican women often conducted the “front of the house” management of businesses, while their male relatives held ownership.

Narratives from Mozambique paralleled closely those found in Vivek Bald’s research of early Indian male immigrants to the U.S. In his book, he says “The peddler’s impressive mobility – their capacity to move goods and money back and forth across thousands of miles – depended upon the presence and the work of women at every node on their network...”¹³⁷ Bald credits women of all races, who became romantically entangled with Indian merchants, with the commercial success of those migrant merchants. From the narratives of mestiço families in Mozambique, I believe that Indo-Mozambican forefathers also benefited from love and business interests on both sides of the Indian Ocean. Whether it be Indian or Pakistani wives on the Indian subcontinent making handicrafts for sale or indigenous Black wives building relationships with local producers or tribal leaders, male Indian merchants were able to stay “globally mobile,” while benefiting from the business acumen of less mobile women in their lives who likely knew very little of each other’s existence.¹³⁸

The contemporary realities of Indo-Mozambican flexible citizenship and capital accumulation offer transnational marriage as a wealth and resilience-building mechanism. Marital relationships functioned as mechanisms to create, expand, and recover transnational business networks. In particular, the case of Rama comes to mind. I was introduced to her through her daughter, Radia, a regular presence as the cashier and the only English-speaker in their popular family store in downtown Maputo. After talking to Rama, I learned that her father owned a business in LM before the events of Goan independence forced him out of Mozambique and back to India. She and her husband, both Portuguese-citizen children of Indian-citizen deportees, returned after Mozambican independence to try their luck at business success; and, eventually, Rama became a Mozambican citizen. As she described it, the decision to return was mutually reached between her and her husband. Today, Rama, her husband, her sister and brother-in-law, and one of Rama’s daughters (Radia) all operate a thriving textile business in Maputo. Radia has mentioned an uncle who runs a similar textile shop across town, and she said her sister is a doctor in the United Kingdom, no doubt another branch to their transnational network.¹³⁹

In my experience, women play active roles as members of the Indo-Mozambican merchant class. As is the case in marital customs for all Indo-Mozambicans, regardless of religion, women are expected to relocate from their homes and join their husband’s families. In this African context, unlike in some Indian subcontinent contexts, I recognized that these women did not become estranged from their biological families; I believe that these sustained relationships have benefitted Indo-Mozambican merchants significantly. Marital connections turned would-be rivals into associates, creating new opportunities to diversify investments rather than compete over existing gains. Among Indo-Mozambican merchants, kinship links seem to supersede other ties of belonging at the religious, community, or national levels; and perhaps, this trend is due to the fact that their kinship linkages are held strong through matrilineal connections. Given the plethora of

¹³⁷ Bald, Vivek. *Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013, p 75.

¹³⁸ Bald, p 89.

¹³⁹ Radia. Personal conversation. 2016.

passports in any given family today, the Indo-Mozambican “Merchant Self” is typically defined narrowly along family, not national, ties.

1975: New Socialism for Old Capitalists

Looking back on historical data from the time of Mozambican independence in 1975, Indo-Mozambican merchant identity went through a crisis in the period between the Carnation Revolution in 1974 and the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992. No longer was the Indo-Mozambican merchant valorized for providing goods that were otherwise unavailable to Black Africans who were unable to access White Portuguese commercial spaces. Instead, the socialist economy vilified that intermediary role, and the new Mozambican citizen was fashioned as antithetical to that merchant identity. The State equated citizenship and residency, largely removing permanent residents’ ability to reside in the country without holding its citizenship. Additionally, the independent Mozambican government did not allow multiple citizenships, thus making a zero sum game of both Indo-Mozambicans’ passports, as well as their national identity. Non-citizens’ land and properties were summarily seized by the government, while citizens’ land and property rights could be negotiated. Unlike in Uganda, which expelled Asians in 1972, property rights in Mozambique did not fall along sectarian or ethnic lines; instead, the fault line related to those who availed themselves of Mozambican citizenship and those who did not. Whereas passport pluralities had been utilized to weather the turmoil of the end of Portugal’s empire in India (1961), flexible citizenship was no longer an option at the demise of Portugal’s empire in Africa (1974). In the context of the new Mozambican State, citizenship was an emblem of national loyalty; and only citizens had the kind of rights and protections needed to create and maintain a successful business. By 1974, it was apparent that one could not reside in the country if s/he did not define oneself within the State’s socialist paradigm. Indo-Mozambican agency to redefine the “Self” and the “Other” was removed; the State provided those parameters and Indo-Mozambicans were forced to subscribe or migrate. Therefore, in 1974, this choice was existential.

Benedito Luis Machava explores FRELIMO’s post-independence quest for hegemonic legitimacy and the party’s process of criminalizing its citizenry for moral failures defined by Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology. FRELIMO specifically fomented fear mongering by leading campaigns to identify and punish economic and political traitors. Machava keenly identified belonging to the FRELIMO party as a requirement for likewise belonging to Mozambique’s post-colonial society. Those Mozambicans without party affiliation or ideological solidarity were demonized as traitors, treasonous enemies of both the Mozambican state and its people. Defining the traitor in this way redefined the “Self” and the “Other,” in terms of national loyalty:

Interestingly, the figure of the traitor is not the ‘other,’ the stranger or foreigner, but ‘potentially one of us,’ the enemy within. . . . Responsibility for the difficulties faced by Mozambique could not be attributed to the party and its leadership. It must necessarily be the work of an external aggressor (imperialism) supported by internal forces. . . . According to the ruling party, armed bandits, economic sabotage, social disorder, cultural obscurantism, and religious fanaticism were all manifestations of an internal enemy that was against the revolution and determined to bring about its failure.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Machava, Benedito Luis. *State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique* (1975-1983), *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37:3, p. 594.

Framed within this rubric, it is understandable how Indo-Mozambicans' long-standing merchant identity quickly became criminalized and stigmatized within this anti-capitalist paradigm. Indo-Mozambican merchants remaining in Maputo found that their city had become a minefield. They were part of the Self defined as the Mozambican populace, by virtue of having stayed in country and, ostensibly, supporting the political transition from colonialism to independence. Yet, at any moment their class and employment could be weaponized to label them an Other and to criminalize them as an internal enemy.

This political landscape was confusing for citizens navigating their positionality in the abruptly rigid moral and economic boundaries of post-colonial nation-building. Never before had the Mozambican State, or the Portuguese colonial government before that, established such hardened boundaries of movement and nationality. For many years, the State had viewed fluidity of movement, though not fluidity of citizenship, as a lucrative asset for national wealth. Under Portuguese colonialism, Mozambique's migrant labor into South Africa was a significant source of income generation for the State. Until independence, the porous borders facilitated capitalist wealth accumulation through low-wage labor migration; and this remained the case even as Mozambican migrants' labor rights dissipated in the face of South African economic and xenophobic pressures. Further, for Black Africans, citizenship, as such, was not a measure of intrinsic loyalty or belonging, because their Portuguese national belonging only entitled them to abridged citizenship rights in Mozambique. It was accepted that colonial borders were arbitrary. Overlapping colonial polities were misaligned from traditional communal boundaries that have kept Mozambicans connected with kin in South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) for generations. While the new national government did not have the means to invest in infrastructure to harden its borders in 1975, it did harden its ideological concept of *belonging* to Mozambique and the values that a Mozambican citizen was said to embody. In so doing, it made migration harder to access, both psychologically and legally.

From 1975-1992, the new Mozambican citizen was anti-colonial in spirit, but could be of any race or color. Prior citizenships also had no bearing on one's ability to become a Mozambican citizen. Shared socialist ideology was the currency that paid for access to a Mozambican passport. Many people, however, —Indo-Mozambican merchants included—did not see the value of a Mozambican passport. Until then, citizenships among Indo-Mozambicans were forced or imposed by colonial intervention. Yet, when confronted by the “24/20” policy, Indo-Mozambicans had to come to terms with their own agency. Even though the choices were limited, staying or going was still an individual choice that each person had to make. However, in my research, I did not find anyone who recounted having the wherewithal or agency to use this turning point to purposefully broaden or strengthen transnational networks. Instead, the choice to stay behind or to flee to Portugal was remembered as a game-time decision, based on where each individual had the strongest family ties and the best economic prospects. As an outside researcher, though, I saw a larger pattern among their collective decision-making. If Indo-Mozambican migrants were not ideologically bound to Mozambique's aspirations for self-rule, Indo-Mozambican civil servants and knowledge workers typically went to Portugal or the United Kingdom, while those with brick and mortar establishments stayed behind in the hopes that the post-independence government would allow them to retain some of their assets. Suffice it to say that, in 1975, Indo-Mozambican merchants, as a group, underwent yet another Othering process.

In 1975, then, the “24/20” policy decimated the merchant classes. Migration was limited to the individual Self and did not extend protections to property and assets. Leaving Mozambique meant leaving behind those same goods that could be useful to start afresh in an adoptive home. This period marked the exodus of most Portuguese passport holders, many among them of Indo-Mozambican origin. Indeed, according to Pitcher, “The rate of settler departure in the initial years after independence lends credence to claims that government measures were reactive rather than revolutionary. Most of the quarter of a million settlers had left Mozambique by 1976. Because they controlled key sectors of the economy, their exodus caused substantial negative economic effects.”¹⁴¹

1961: The Hindu Other

During the years around Mozambican independence, a diverse cross-section of Indo-Mozambicans left Mozambique and its citizenship behind for more flexible European citizenships. In my studies, however, I did not identify anyone who moved to the Indian subcontinent at this juncture. This pattern stands in stark contrast to the 1961 Indian invasion of Portuguese India, which resulted in the forced repatriation of Indian passport holders in Mozambique back to India.

There are a variety of differences between the migratory shifts of 1975 and 1961, but the most important difference is that evidence shows that only Hindus were forcibly deported in 1961, ostensibly because they were Indian passport holders. In 1975, however, all Indo-Mozambicans were given the option of becoming Mozambican citizens and staying in the country. Those who did not accept Mozambican citizenship had to depart. This dynamic is different from the situation in 1961, whereby that choice was abridged based on prior citizenship and religion. During both time periods, though, those Indo-Mozambicans who were affected had a short time to respond to state demands to define and declare their citizenship. All the same, Hindus in 1961 could not pivot in order to quickly create new citizenship alternatives for themselves, while Indian passport holders who were of Muslim or Christian faith found ways to become Pakistani or Portuguese, respectively, and to remain in Mozambique with legal residency. In creating a mechanism for flexible citizenship, such that they would not be displaced, Christian and Muslim Indo-Mozambicans became part of the larger national Self and were spared deportation in 1961 by their own agency; Hindus, due to a lack of the same agency, became the Other.

To be clear, in 1961, Indo-Mozambican merchants redefined the “Self” and the “Other” along religious lines. New identities were subsequently instrumentalized in order to advocate for citizenship rights. By lobbying transnational networks and promoting religious allegiances, Muslim Indo-Mozambicans, in particular, cleverly avoided being victimized by shifts in the Portuguese colonial regulatory framework. Further, Indo-Mozambican Muslims politicized their membership in the Islamic diaspora (the *Ummah*) to leverage that religion for Pakistani citizenship, which provided the secular benefit of continued Mozambican residence.

Whereas Muslim and Catholic Indo-Mozambicans manufactured and seized agency for themselves, Hindus were burdened by their perceived national loyalty to India and were unable to create similar options for themselves. Used as bait in a geopolitical struggle for legitimacy, Hindu

¹⁴¹ Pitcher, 38.

residents in LM were not given the option of permanence. Hindu merchants, therefore, rarely had time to properly pass on their assets to family or friends who happened to be Portuguese passport holders. Thus, their businesses were seized by the Portuguese colonial government and, with only rare exceptions, never returned to their original owner.

As stated previously, aligning with the Portuguese at this time was a strategic decision aimed at preserving residential permanence. Muslim shopkeepers articulated their loyalty to the ruling class by hanging pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic regalia in their shops. A strong pro-Pakistan stance was assumed to inherently signal an anti-Indian, anti-Hindu, and pro-Portugal stance. In classic “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” terms, those who displayed loyalty to the Portuguese colonial authorities were given the benefit of time and agency in the deportation process. As was the case with Ibtihaaj’s parents (Gujarati Muslims) and Camila’s parents (Goan Catholics), non-Hindu, Indian passport holders were able to convert to Portuguese citizenship and retain their residency rights in Mozambique. I was never able to find the exact numbers of Indo-Mozambicans who gained Portuguese citizenship at this time, but anecdotal evidence suggests numbers in the tens of thousands throughout the country. During my three years of research, however, I did not come across any non-Hindu who was forcibly removed from Mozambique as a result of the 1961 backlash.

What Portuguese citizenship was for Catholics, Pakistani citizenship was for Muslims; both allowed continued access to Mozambican residency. Herein, the process of Othering of members of the previously united Indo-Mozambican merchant classes went from politically rhetorical posturing for the Portuguese gaze to personal affronts that splintered Indo-Mozambican intergroup loyalties. Deni vividly recalled feeling as if the larger Indo-Mozambican community had turned its back on him and other vulnerable Hindus; he even further articulated feelings of betrayal by Indo-Mozambican Muslims who—in placing pro-Portugal and pro-Pakistan posters and insignia in their shops—drew attention to Hindu shopkeepers’ lack of the same. Portuguese loyalty, through Pakistani loyalty, was not an option for Hindus.

The process of “Othering” Hindus by the Muslim merchant class was not just moderated through articulations of Portuguese loyalty. They were also filtered through the government of Pakistan as an appeal for help from members of the global *Ummah*. Viewed through this lens, Pakistan’s very existence perhaps was crafted to meet the needs of Muslims in these very circumstances. Yet, from Nazar Abbas’ email correspondence with me, it seems that the Indo-Mozambican merchant class did not communicate its request to the Pakistani government as one grounded in the annexation crisis. Instead, it was framed as an attack on Islamic values. He explained the appeal as such:

I did not see any official documents, neither was any kept in the Embassy's record, but [I] learnt it from my senior colleagues that when India occupied the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Dev [Diu] in India in 1960—India and Portugal were technically, though not physically—at war, the immigrants from these enclaves living in Mozambique were served notice either to acquire the Portuguese nationality or leave the country because they were not allowed to live there as Indian nationals. The Hindus and Christians (if any) had no problem acquiring Portuguese nationality. But the Muslims among them had a problem. If they would take Portuguese citizenship they would be obliged to send their young girls

for conscription—2-year compulsory military duty, which they would not do. So they sent a delegation to Pakistan President Gen. Ayub, explained their predicament and pleaded for [him to] grant of [sic] Pakistani citizenship/ passport. Their argument was that were they living in India, being Muslims they would have migrated to Pakistan any way. But now they are living in Mozambique for generations and would continue to live there. They would not be any burden to Pakistan. So their request was accepted and our Mission in Dar-es-salam was instructed to issue them Pakistani passports.¹⁴²

There are a few glaring inaccuracies in Abbas' statement. First, annexation happened in December 1961, so the fallout did not take effect in Mozambique until early 1962. Further, this study has disproven the idea that Hindus, like Christians, were allowed to claim Portuguese citizenship. And, obviously, many Muslims decided not to go to Pakistan after 1947; India is now home to over 150 million Muslims. All the same, what can be made of the discrepancy between the newfound concern over conscription and what I was repeatedly told by Mozambicans who contributed to this study – that women were never forcibly conscripted? I am confident that the concern was never about female conscription at all, but rather about surviving instability through flexible citizenship. Understanding the loophole, leveraging communal narratives of victimization, and mobilizing their religious affiliation to acquire Pakistani citizenship at that particular moment in history was a cunning instrumentalization of identity that stabilized Indo-Mozambican Muslim's residence status during this particularly insecure period. Not only did this move to acquire Pakistani citizenship allow Indo-Mozambican Muslims to retain Mozambican residency, but the new Pakistani passport also expanded and formalized Indo-Mozambican Muslims' transnational networks through Pakistan to other parts of the Islamic world.

By remaining behind in Mozambique, merchants were able to acquire once Hindu-owned businesses at auction prices.¹⁴³ Muslim merchants' access to Pakistani passports at this 1961 juncture is largely credited as a moment of amplification, characterized by the strengthening of contemporary Indian Ocean transnational networks and stimulating pan-Islamic investment in Mozambique. As an exception to the instances before and after this moment, when Indo-Mozambican citizenship was the unintentional by-product of state-imposed shifts, in this singular circumstance, flexible citizenship was acquired through the deliberate and agile efforts of a well-educated elite. During the period between 1947 and 1992, this move to instrumentalize citizenship (i.e. still maintaining only one citizenship, although it provided options for alternative residencies) gave way to the subsequent proliferation of passport plurality among Muslim Indo-Mozambicans. In this way, they most reflect the true sense of Ong's "flexible citizenship" model. Today, many Muslim merchant families have members with passports from a variety of Muslim-majority countries like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, as well as from non-Muslim majority countries like South Africa, Portugal, and the United Kingdom (UK). Surely, individuals hold multiple citizenships, but families hold transnational networks. Family members' varied passports and subsequent residency and visitation rights facilitate voluntary migration and preferential transnational trade access; and transnational kinship networks offer economic insurance should geopolitical instability re-ignite forced migration.

1947: Refuge Against Forced Migration

¹⁴² Nazar Abbas. Email conversation. October 2016.

¹⁴³ Leite & Khouri, 103.

The evolutions in the Othering process of 1961 were what I had expected to see in 1947. At the time of British India's independence from Britain and the partition of independent India from the newly established Pakistan, however, transnational merchants in Mozambique provided a safe haven for those directly affected by forced migration. Juman's family story articulates this history. In 1947, most Indo-Mozambicans were either Portuguese or British passport holders. British passport holders in Portuguese colonial Mozambique were largely unaffected by changes in the legal and regulatory frameworks governing Indian subcontinent citizenship and migration. On the Indian subcontinent, much of the violence of partition was fueled more by sectarian rivalries, rather than by legal disputes over citizenship. Then, around 1947, such articulation of religious rivalries among Indo-Mozambicans was absent from verbal discourse. Instead, the year 1947 is remembered as a time of peace and prosperity for Indo-Mozambicans, especially merchants recovering from the economic instability of World War II.

Framed as the heyday of Portuguese colonialism, the 1940s (and the five decades prior) were really the time when Indo-Mozambican merchants arrived, got their start, and established thriving businesses in LM. The "Self" of Indo-Mozambican merchants was religiously inclusive during this time, despite 1947's limited pressures to declare loyalties by faith. Unlike indentured labor in neighboring British colonies, Indian subcontinent presence in Mozambique at this time was predominantly voluntary and among aspiring entrepreneurs in the merchant classes. Building on long-standing Indo-Mozambican merchant networks along the Swahili coast, new arrivals in the 1940s acted as merchant middlemen, bringing goods from the major cities of Ilha, Nampula, Beira, Quelimane, and LM into the desolate interiors of the country. After all, LM had just become a city in 1887 and the colonial capital in 1898. Indo-Mozambican merchants cornered the market on Blacks' commercial needs, exploiting moneylending and commercial debt, particularly among wage earners working in South African mines.¹⁴⁴ In the context of 1947, the "Self" was broadly and inclusively defined by Indian subcontinent origins (whether British or Portuguese Indian, whether Muslim, Christian, or Hindu); defining the "Other," however, was much more simple then. In 1947, LM's Indo-Mozambican merchants were pioneers in defining the commercial life of the nascent city that would soon become the most politically and economically viable in the country.

The Merchant Middlemen and the Politics of Location

The Nation

A review of Mozambique's national history shows an Indo-Mozambican population framed by mercantile connections and a deep sense of transnational ownership over South-South migration throughout the Indian Ocean. Here, I have attempted the academic exercise of dissecting an intersection, which is socially inseparable. Indo-Mozambicans form a distinctly powerful and nebulous group that has maintained a historical permanence in Mozambique dating back to the 13th century.¹⁴⁵ In the 20th century context, they have served as economic adversaries to Portuguese business interests, as well as political interlocutors between the metropole and the colony. This has made them both powerful social actors, as well as vulnerable and visible minorities.

¹⁴⁴ Leite & Khouri, 29-30.

In thinking about Indo-Mozambican positionality, I have drawn on Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak's 2007 conversation *Who Sings the Nation-State?*, where the issue of national minorities and belonging—both within the context of the state and society—is raised and explored. While these authors use heady and circular arguments to explore Hannah Arendt's academic framework, fundamental arguments are relevant to this study. Specifically, Butler states:

Arendt argues that the nation-state, as a form, that is, as a state formation, is bound up, as if structurally, with the recurrent expulsion of national minorities. In other words, the nation-state assumes that the nation expresses a certain national identity, is founded through the concerted consensus of a nation, and that a certain correspondence exists between the state and the nation. The nation, in this view, is singular and homogenous, or, at least, it becomes so in order to comply with the requirements of the state. The state derives its legitimacy from the nation, which means that those national minorities who do not qualify for "national belonging" are regarded as "illegitimate" inhabitants. . . . Here again, let us note that those modes of national belonging designated by "the nation" are thoroughly stipulative and criterial: one is not simply dropped from the nation; rather, one is found to be wanting and, so, becomes a "wanting one" through the designation and its implicit and active criteria.¹⁴⁶

Indo-Mozambicans form a national minority rumored only to represent about 2% of the national population.¹⁴⁷ As such, they do not form a unified or formidable political constituency. During the time period in question, they were regularly considered uncircumstantial to state-led electoral politics. Where they have mattered to the State and the nation is in their economic contributions. It is unknown how many businesses are owned wholly or partially by Indian and Pakistani descendants, but common knowledge brings to the fore their dominance of the manufacturing and trade sectors, as well as their significant stake in commercial agriculture—particularly in the cashew economy.¹⁴⁸ They maintain and have always had an outsized influence on the domestic economy. As mentioned above, their class and trade quickly went from essential to the colonial government to vilified by the post-independence government.

Dating back to pre-European colonial times, their most significant economic contribution was their role in bringing small-scale commerce into the interior of the country by establishing small grocery stores (called *cantinas*) in towns otherwise disconnected from the nation's mainstream commerce. These *cantinas* were more than just general stores. Often, they were the epicenter of rural life and a site of information exchange: connecting the center (the coasts, the capital, and the metropole) with peri-urban, suburban, and rural peripheries. Although Indo-Mozambican merchants were only criminalized in the period after independence, over much of the 20th century, economic spaces dominated by Indo-Mozambicans held a contentious positionality. These spaces were considered necessary evils by the local Black customers who were not allowed, either by the colonial government or their own impoverished condition, to create similar spaces of

¹⁴⁶ Butler, Judith, and Gayatri C. Spivak. *Who Sings the Nation-State?: Language, Politics, Belonging*. London: Seagull Books, 2007. P. 30-31.

¹⁴⁷ Antonio Sopa. Personal Conversation. 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. *Women, Migration & the Cashew Economy in Southern Mozambique 1945-1975*. James Currey, 2015.

their own. In addition, these spaces were also a source of agitation and business rivalry for White Portuguese business owners. So, while these commercial spaces served a crucial role in geographically, economically, and socially uniting Mozambican society, these spaces and their owners were often begrudged for their very existence. In this way, Indo-Mozambicans were simultaneously victims and agents. Indo-Mozambican merchants and their businesses bear a complex and complicated positionality in the country and in the capital, which is perhaps why their migration dynamics in LM/Maputo are so deeply integral to the shifting discourse on national identity.


The Urban Center: LM/Maputo

The suspicion and ambivalence surrounding Indo-Mozambicans is embodied in the merchants themselves, rather than the spaces in which they operated. Indo-Mozambican merchants were viewed as duplicitous actors: both employers and exploiters, service providers and rapacious arbitrageurs. Individuals' actions could be seen as simultaneously subversive and complicit; and this ambiguity has firmly placed Indo-Mozambican merchants in the center of national complexities, even though it is unclear whether they are protagonists with agency or victimized subjects. Complicating this dynamic even further, this ambiguity is interpreted by outsiders as willful on the part of Indo-Mozambican merchants. This lack of firm positionality is not consistently tolerated or rejected, either. Thus, Indo-Mozambican individuals are also begrudged for pandering to state-sponsored rhetoric to maintain their residence or to sustain their economic activities in LM/Maputo. Thus, the complex positionality of Indo-Mozambican merchants who have remained in Maputo makes these merchants uniquely positioned to trace this particular migration history of LM/Maputo.

In the larger context of considering economic spaces as centers and peripheries, one must place LM/Maputo as the middle ground in a corridor connecting Mozambique's provincial interior and northern port cities to South Africa's Mpumalanga-based industrial agricultural sector and Gauteng's mines and manufacturing sectors. Although I crossed the Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland borders dozens of times over the last three years, I had not seen the presence of Indian or Pakistani merchant establishments—new or old—in these border spaces. Yet, both Mozambican geographer, Dr. Ines Raimundo, and the historical archives show that Indo-Mozambican merchants straddled these border economies for generations. Among others, Asian smugglers were written about extensively in Andrew MacDonald's book *Colonial Trespassers in the Making of South Africa's International Borders 1900 to c. 1950*.

Further, Salim's business records contain ship manifests from the S.S. Karanja (Trip 83) and the S.S. Kampala (Trips 96 and 97) that show some Indo-Mozambicans who identified their home as Ressano Garcia, a border town between South Africa and Mozambique. Ressano Garcia is a town situated on the border between South Africa and Mozambique, just an hour north of the border with Swaziland. The border crossing there is named after the town on the Mozambican side, but on the South African side, it is named Lebombo. It sits approximately eighty-three kilometers from LM/Maputo in what today is just an hour and half drive on a well-paved road. One can only imagine the travel time that was required in the early 1990s, with war still waging, much less in the 1940s, with weak colonial infrastructure. Ressano Garcia and Namaacha, a border town farther south, were important economic satellites in the East African trade and migration corridor. Indo-Mozambican merchants largely occupied these otherwise vacuous, intermediary

spaces. In so doing, they connected economies, cultures, and countries. Ressano Garcia resident Amratlal Bhuralal was destined for Karachi on the S.S. Karanja (Trip 106) in 1966 and passengers 100-107, a family with children ranging from ages thirteen years to eleven months, traveled on the S.S. Kampala (Trip 98) in November 1962.¹⁴⁹ While records do not confirm travelers' occupations, oral accounts establish that there was little formal industry in these areas other than small-scale trading posts and *cantinas* established by individual entrepreneurs.



<https://www.wildernesstravel.com/trip/madagascar/zanzibar-to-durban-expedition-cruise>

¹⁴⁹ N.M. Sacoor. Business Archives. Reviewed 2018.

were constantly remembered as places where merchants did business, where they lived, and where they dare not enter.

Many oral histories that I collected throughout this study harkened back to the neighborhood divisions that articulated spaces for only specific Indo-Mozambican subgroups. While their narratives only began to display the hardened intergroup rivalries and tensions in the post-1961 period, the way that interviewees described parts of town as segregated spaces only for certain types of Indo-Mozambicans caused me to re-consider if an Othering process had begun well before 1961. Perhaps that earlier process was not as stigma-laden. As Joaquim, a LM native of Goan origins, said in his interview, “There was always a separation between the Hindus of India and the Muslims of Pakistan, but the city did not have an area for each of them. There was mixing.”¹⁵¹ The city was and still is relatively small, and the Indo-Mozambican minority within the capital is even tinier; yet, the ways in which subgroups remember the city is vastly different. It is as if they lived in close proximity, but they were never integrated. I asked Joaquim about his understanding of spatial divisions between Goans, and his response was moderated by class and profession:

NA: Were there always separations between the Goans in Maputo and Katembe?

J: Separations, not really. Maybe because they were fishermen [in Katembe] they liked being closer to the sea. Some came to the city, but later they returned [to Katembe]. They had wooden houses built on stilts. At that time the houses were made on stakes, with parquet, wood, and zinc.

NA: But today it seems to me that there is a stronger connection [between Goans in Maputo and Katembe].

J: Yes, today many people come to Maputo and others go there [to Katembe].¹⁵²

Though of a younger generation, Antonio’s understandings of how Goans organized themselves closely mirrored Joaquim’s understanding. Laden with stereotypes and stigmas, Antonio’s response defines the spatial segregation as a professional choice, symptomatic of the educational and cultural separations between the Goan elite and the lower class Katembe communities:

A: I was a child when Mozambique became independent. I was eleven years old, but I remember a little bit. I remember that before independence, Lourenço Marques was divided. There were poor Goans who lived in Alto Maé. And the Goans who identified more with the Portuguese and were better off economically, they lived in Polana.

NA: Goans from Katembe also fit into this or no?

A: They fit, but they are another kind. Look, Goans from Katembe were the ones least interested in studying. We could say that we [Goans] were part of the Portuguese elite, maybe because we studied and were we taking notice of how we were suffering and we united with the independence regime. Goans from Katembe were a little different. They are descendants of fishermen and they came precisely to do this. Their insertion into the

¹⁵¹ Joaquim. Personal conversation. 2017.

¹⁵² Ibid.

city was not at all easy. They easily integrated themselves into Katembe, where they could keep their boats.¹⁵³

When discussing Salim Sacoor's memories of LM/Maputo's urban spaces from his childhood, he launched into an explanation of segregated Indo-Mozambican neighborhoods and the Indo-Mozambican subgroups that resided in each:

NA: Did you and your family always live in Lourenço Marques?

S: Yes, always here [in downtown LM/Maputo]. My father and grandfather were taking care of the shop. There is a big building across from our shop where we used to have a shop, and our house was just behind it. I was always there. If you ask me about Alto Maé, I don't know. I only went to play soccer.

NA: It's interesting because when I was asking about where the different communities lived in the city, one person told me that all the middle income Goans lived in Alto Maé and the fisherman lived in Katembe. Were there different places in the city where people organized themselves?

S: All the Hindus had shops in Guerra Popular. They lived in Alto Maé, some lived around the shop. Their temple was there. For them it was better because you didn't need a car. There were buses and all the facilities to move around. The guys who earned a lot of money went to Xipamanine to deal with Africans there. My father stayed here. He was of middle class, but all of my friends thought we were millionaires.¹⁵⁴

Xipamanine was and still is a very important urban commercial space.¹⁵⁵ Vendors sell everything, but specialize in second hand goods. There are some brick and mortar retail stores that sell clothes, food, and household goods. The most established businesses in that neighborhood still are owned by Indo-Mozambicans. Multi-generational family businesses have thrived in this area and it is those families' oral stories that hold much of the local knowledge about temporal changes to that urban landscape. Xipamanine and Chamanculo share this characteristic of intergenerational families carrying deeply valuable municipal memory. In Xipamanine, I conducted an interview with three generations of women in Mae's family, including three of her daughters (one being Aisha), and her granddaughter. Specifically, we discussed LM/Maputo's neighborhoods:

NA: Do you remember in which neighborhoods most Indians lived?

M: Right here in Xipamanine. This was the neighborhood of the Indians. Of all of the stores only one was Chinese. The other stores were all Indian.

NA: But did they come later or were they already here when you came to this neighborhood?

M: They were already here.

One of Mae's daughters contributed: The owner of Baruana, his first store was here in Xipamanine and then he expanded to downtown, for example. This means that I, for the most part, had the feeling that this area was all Indian. I don't know if that was true in my

¹⁵³ Antonio. Personal Interview. 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Salim Sacoor. Personal Interview. 2017.

¹⁵⁵ "O primeiro 'Bairro Indígena' no Xipamanine, dos anos 20 á actualidade (actualizado)." *Houses of Maputo*, 16 October 2015, <https://housesofmaputo.blogspot.com/2015/10/o-primeiro-bairro-indigena-no.html?view=classic>. Accessed 5 February 2017.

mother's time. [In my time] there was only one Chinese person, who was from [the family of] Martins. The children of Martins had a store on the corner there. But the rest were Indians, the owners of the shops were Indians. After independence is when things started to mix more. Many people already had stores. And because of independence many people left their things behind and went away, ran away.

NA: And the Indians who had stores in this area also lived in this area?


M: Yes. It's always like that. The stores function this way: a store in the front, a house in the back.¹⁵⁶

Again, these memories are not presented here to contest an established truth, but rather to present the difficulties of defining identity, especially as it relates to urban space over time. Indo-Mozambicans regularly stereotyped each other or generalized about the ways that members of other religions or classes lived. Their language and memories self-segregated and relegated Otherness to those who did not share the same profession, class, education, or religion. Yet, in a city that only reached one million inhabitants in the 1980s, many of these individuals were not very far removed. More importantly, Indo-Mozambican merchant presence at all socio-economic levels became frontier markers of spatial territories, and thus identity signifiers. Those who operated in downtown operated in White spaces and identified sympathetically with Portuguese colonial policies and agents, whereas those who operated in markets like Xipamanine and Chamanculo tended to live much more proximate lives with Blacks as customers and neighbors. In families like Mae's, Blacks and Indians intermarried, creating not only inter-racial, but also inter-religious families. (See Chapter 6.) As a result, these businesses and families could be considered an indication of cultural identifications in that neighborhood.

A deep dive into the history of Sacoor's family business shows how fragile the economic fault lines between Indo-Mozambicans were defined, re-examined, and weaponized throughout the 20th century. Sometimes those identity (re)definitions of "Self" and "Other" resulted in the separation of families, but for families like Sacoor's these dispersals were part and parcel of their business' commercial trajectory.

¹⁵⁶ Mae in intergenerational discussion with the author, October 2016.

Salim Sacoor & N.M. Sacoor: A Business Case Study (1947-1975)



N.M. Sacoor, Lda. Business Envelope (Photo author's own 2017)

In 2017, Salim Sacoor and I spoke extensively, over three sittings on multiple days, and countless exchanges of emails and articles. He was a wealth of information, as well as the utter embodiment of the oscillations of the Indo-Mozambican merchant identity. Having been connected to Sacoor through a contact at the *Comunidade*, I was admittedly suspicious of what possible value a conversation with an Indo-Mozambican Muslim could have for my then focus on the city's Hindu community. Moreover, our conversations held no linearity, and it was only after digesting his narratives days after our conversations that I understood the implications of his lived experiences on the overall landscape of Indo-Mozambican identities and migratory patterns in LM/Maputo. As a primary source of data in the fieldwork, both he and his family business were, for me, valuable and ambivalent actors:

S: I was educated. My parents gave me a lot of knowledge. One of my uncles used to invite a Pakistani guy to read the *Reader's Digest* and explain to him, so I used to go there and listen to the stories. That made a difference in my life because I could write very well, translate from English to Portuguese. I was the only one who could speak to anyone. . . .

NA: I am trying to figure out between 1947 and 1992, the different groups that were here. When you look at Indian studies in this region, there is little spoken about Mozambique.

S: You know why! When they were deported, they didn't have a choice. Those with money took everything and opened their shops there [in India]. The ones who did not have money left their kids here [in Mozambique]; they lived next to us. This is why when I post on Facebook now, people who I don't know thank me because their father is in the photo.

NA: I imagine a lot of people remember things, but don't have pictures or documents.

S: On the Hindu side there is nothing.

NA: So you were here in the city through all of independence. What was that like?

S: I was in the Portuguese army. I was first sent to Boane and then to Chimoio. We did not know what specialty they were going to give us. We left in buses to Boane. We were 30, and there were also 30 men from the army military; they check up on the military. When we get there we saw an armored car. They asked what us 'monhês' were doing there. They thought we had too much money to be there.

NA: Why? Do they [monhês] pay not to go [to war]? When did you finish in the army?

S: That's a secret. In '72 I was in the army. In '73 I was in Manica, then '74 we were sent to Moeda. The biggest attack that FRELIMO did was in January of 1974; I was there with my camera. I don't care about a gun.

NA: You stayed for a while after independence?

S: For three years.

NA: What made you go?

S: Remember the Muslims. When they were put in concentration camps [in 1961], they changed to Pakistani. All their kids are Pakistani. They were Portuguese when all of their problems were over. When the army time came, they were changed to Pakistani again. That is not fair. It's because they don't want their kids to go to the army. My father told me "we live in a Portuguese country, we are Portuguese; when they have problems, you go and fight." In three years [at war], I had a lot of experience. Two soldiers died on my lap. We [Portuguese army] stopped Mozambican White side independence. We told them that we wanted our country independent in the right way... [After independence] we had to make a choice: either Mozambican or Portuguese passport. They were harassing me [to decide]. So my father told me to decide what I wanted. After two months, a law came out that stated that anyone with a Mozambican father or mother that opted for another nationality had 24 hours to leave the country.

NA: But your parents stayed here?

S: Yes, they had Mozambican passports. So we first had a choice to make with regards to nationality, and then after two months, they bring this new law. Then I came back to look after my father and my mother. I applied for the Mozambican nationality. They sent a law that anyone who was caught in that system could become Mozambican again.

NA: How long were you gone?

S: I went away in 1977 and came back in 2002. When I left, my father was fifty-two years old. When I came back, I was fifty-two years old.¹⁵⁷

As has been presented in previous chapters, Sacoór is a third generation Indo-Mozambican merchant, a moderate Muslim, and a writer. His civic engagement takes place through media, rather than politics. For instance, he speaks on radio and talk shows about different cultural and religious issues of relevance to Mozambicans. He was born in LM as a Portuguese citizen, but the turmoil of the 20th century had unique effects on Sacoór's personal life. The turmoil forced him to fight in the Portuguese army against Mozambican independence and later leave for Portugal in 1977. He, like many former Portuguese soldiers in the wars for African independence, later lamented his participation in a war he did not believe in.¹⁵⁸ Yet, he was proud of the military's role

¹⁵⁷ Salim Sacoór. Personal Interview. 2018.

¹⁵⁸ Cabral, Adalino and Eduardo Moyane Dias. *Das Guerras Africanas à Diáspora Americana: entrevistas Com Emigrantes Portugueses Nos Estados Unidos Que Participaram Nas Guerras De Africa*. Rumford, RI: Peregrinação Publications. 2002 Print.

in thwarting Mozambique's White settler community's efforts to seize power, rather than having it transferred from the colonial government to FRELIMO and the Black majority it represented. He spoke of his peacekeeping role when clashes between the White settler and Black majority reached a fever pitch at the Radio Club of Mozambique following the signing of the Lusaka Accords in September 1974. Although Sacoer was born in Mozambique, he spent most of his life as a Portuguese citizen, acting in their interest and benefitting from the privileges that that national identity offered.

Sacoer's personal narrative offers a microcosm of the labyrinth of identity formation of young Indo-Mozambican men from 1961 to 1975. As the son of an Indo-Mozambican Muslim merchant, he was socio-economically privileged. Speaking English and Portuguese allowed him to straddle the British and Portuguese colonial worlds, and to maintain close relationships with Indian-origin subjects of both powers. As a Portuguese subject himself, he remained in LM throughout 1961, as Hindus were interned and expelled. In fact, it was his father's company that sold return tickets to India to deported Indian passport holders. While one might expect this to be a problematic confrontation of "Othering" for him, I did not get that impression from his narratives. He did not see himself, or his family, as having benefited undeservingly from the downfall of Hindus. Instead, he saw his family's dealings as honest and forthright within the context of commerce at that time. He did not speak of price gouging or predatory business practices towards the soon to be exiled, but he did remember the desperation of the deported. A Hindu neighbor's frantic departure led to Sacoer's father taking ownership of the man's home and absorbing the man's young, Portuguese-citizen daughter in the Sacoer family as an honorary member.

Like much in this study, Sacoer's recollections shed a complicated light on the serial becomings of the "Self" and the "Other" amongst the Indo-Mozambican merchant communities in the late 20th century. I expected Sacoer's experiences during this time to reflect a hardened identity solidarity with other Indo-Mozambican Muslims, but this honorary aunt seemed to open an aperture in Sacoer's consciousness, allowing him to explore his loyalties beyond those that were socially imposed. Further, I had anticipated that he would "Other" Hindus in 1961 and assign civic selfhood to Portuguese citizens in 1975; but, it was not that simple. After 1961, Sacoer shared sincere sympathies with Hindus. Moreover, he expressed disgust at the flexible citizenships employed by fellow Indo-Mozambican Muslims, viewing their appeal for Pakistani citizenship as manipulative and contemptible. For him, the calculating move to be Pakistani only on paper was a demonstration of their rootlessness and lack of moral principle; a false identity taken up by people who had chosen to make a transactional relationship of their citizenship.

Despite the fact that he intimately observed the deportations that separated families and communities after Indian annexation in 1961, Sacoer's true rupture of the Self happened along with Mozambican independence. Having fought in the Portuguese army against Mozambican independence, he had much to consider. Further, despite his pacifist leanings, he took solace in the justification that, by 1975, he and his countrymen were not oppositional to the Black majority. Instead, circumstances had shifted, such that the Portuguese army was safeguarding a very fragile Mozambican independence from White, Portuguese colonialists. As his story evolved, I realized how his sentiments about belonging were deeply connected to his own troubled relationship with his personal beliefs and civic obligations, as a colonial settler conscripted to defend Portuguese colonialism in his birthplace. While his personal story helps unravel the post-1961 period, the

stories that he told of his family's business history helped me to better understand the tensions of belonging and loyalty among Indo-Mozambican groups throughout the 20th century.

Aside from Salim's personal identity and migrations, a deep dive into his recollections of his family business, the N.M. Sacoor Company, also illustrates the intermediary role and duplicitous reputation of transnational Indo-Mozambican family enterprises in LM. Dating back to the late 1940s, Salim's family business held exclusive rights to sell tickets in Delagoa Bay for passenger transit along the British shipping lane that passed from Durban, through Lourenço Marques and Beira, to Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mombassa, and Bombay. Salim's father sold boarding tickets for the S.S. Karanja (Trip 83) and the S.S. Kampala (Trips 96 and 97), ships that repatriated thousands of deported Indian citizens. This stood as yet another example of an Indo-Mozambican Muslim merchant economically benefiting from the deportation of Hindus.

No one knows exactly when N.M. Sacoor, Lda. was founded, but Salim believes it was around the 1920s. Around this time, Salim's grandfather, Aboobakar Suleman, came to Mozambique from South Africa. Salim does not know where his grandfather was originally from, but I assume that it was the Gujarat region of India. Specifically, Salim mentioned that Aboobakar's brother had notified the police that Aboobakar was residing illegally in South Africa. When Aboobakar was expelled, he came to Mozambique, though no one knows why. It is true, though, that Aboobakar spoke and wrote English, so he was highly employable when he arrived. He landed a job at N.M. Sacoor, Lda. an electrical fixtures company located at Consiglieri Pedroso in LM and later opened his own business in what was once an area of orange groves, but where the Bank of Mozambique building stands today.

Around 1947, one of the brothers who originally owned N.M. Sacoor, Lda. left for Pakistan. Finding no buyers for his store, the remaining brother asked Aboobakar if his son (Salim's dad, whom Salim refers to as "Young Sacoor") would like the business. For reasons that are still unclear, the owner left the business to Young Sacoor upon the owner's departure. Many years later, Young Sacoor went to Karachi to find the old owner and made a point of paying him for the store. Young Sacoor acquired full legal ownership of the store and some sense of moral redemption in repaying that unspoken debt; and the business thrived under Young Sacoor's leadership.

Due to its central location near the port in the commercial district, the store was popular in the business community. Young Sacoor heard from his contemporaries that the Delagoa Bay Agency was looking for an English-speaking merchant with established credentials to be its local agent and to provide vending and ticketing services for the British India Steam Navigation Company. Under the banner of N.M. Sacoor, Lda., Young Sacoor became that agent in Lourenço Marques, where the S.S. Kampala and S.S. Karanja transited the route from South Africa, through Mozambique, to Tanzania and Zanzibar, then on to Karachi, Bombay, and Goa.

This ticketing service eventually became the Sacoors' primary business. Although the family was Muslim and well known to various local Islamic organizations, the shipping business was seen as a critical service provider for Indo-Mozambicans of all religions. After all, Salim reported that it was the only passenger shipping route connecting Mozambique to the Indian subcontinent. Business records show that meticulous care was dedicated to designating the

religious dietary restrictions of each passenger; and, up until the 1960s, passengers with Hindu last names were just as likely to disembark in Karachi as they were to disembark in Goa or Bombay. Similar intermixing of religious identities and destination happened with other religious groups as well. The annexation of 1961, however, was a turning point for this harmonious dispersal.

As already stated, businesses became battlegrounds for religious identity and, thus, citizenship rights; N.M. Sacoer, Lda. was moreso a theater for this than anywhere else in town. In retaliation for Indian invasion, Portugal ordered all Indian passport holders to be detained and later deported. Salim remembered:

Panic spread throughout the city. Policemen broke into the houses and shops to look for those with an Indian passport, so they could be arrested and taken to a concentration camp, located near the C.F.M. [LM train station]. Then came the expulsion order from Portugal, so the race was tremendous for the purchase of tickets at N.M. Sacoer, Lda. and purchases were made standard regardless of the friendship they had with Young Sacoer when the order was implemented.¹⁵⁹

He also remembered that the soon to be expelled tried to sell their homes and stores. They were willing to accept significant losses because they needed the money to purchase their return tickets and the financial capital to start life anew in India, where they had few and distant ties. Many deportees left behind their younger children because the children born in Mozambique had Portuguese citizenship and passports. The children that were old enough to do so tried to gain ownership of their parents' possessions in the hopes that they could be the anchor for their parents' future return.

Salim recalled that, during this period, some Hindus were insulted in the streets by non-Hindu Indo-Mozambicans, even though those were the very same aggressors who had just recently been Indian passport holders themselves. When deportations had initially begun, there were also a good number of Muslims holding Indian passports among the detained. As he remembered it, events evolved such that a community of elite Muslims sent a delegation to Kenya in order to approach the Pakistani Embassy to help them, by giving them Pakistani citizenship. He said that even a member of the Pakistani Embassy in Kenya's staff came to LM to deliver the passports. (By Abbas' account, it would have been the Pakistani Embassy in Tanzania that provided this service.) Nevertheless, Indians, particularly Hindus, lost their properties in short order.

Sacoer did not remember exactly how many deportees had used his transportation services, but my count of names in his ledger showed that approximately 2,469 people took the S.S. Karanja and S.S. Kampala from LM to India between January 1962 and July 1963. While it is unclear how many of these people were, in fact, deportees, I would guess that the majority were. The shipping records show two trips of note. The August 1962 voyage of the S.S. Kampala that had 628 ticketed passengers and the January 1963 voyage of the S.S. Karanja/ Sirdhan had 1550.

One man among these thousands would change Salim's family forever. He remembered the story told to him by his father about how his aunt Lena had come into the family. He said that a Hindu neighbor came to purchase a return ticket for the S.S. Karanja in order to go back to India.

¹⁵⁹ Sacoer, Salim. Personal interview. 2018.

Young Sacoor had asked Lena's father about the home that he was leaving behind and had inquired what would happen to it. The man said, "Sacoor, if you want my home, you are the owner. I don't want any money. I just ask that you promise to look after my daughter, who is your neighbor. Do you accept this deal?"

Young Sacoor quickly accepted the deal. In his interview, Salim explained that that is the same house that his family lives in today. Auntie Lena was treated as a sister to Young Sacoor, so he could offer her what Salim called "protections." I understood that to mean that she was absorbed into Young Sacoor's family, where I assume she disguised or diminished her Hindu identity, and was publically regarded as a member of the Indo-Mozambican Muslim community. She assumed the position of paternal aunt to Young's children, and she lived in Mozambique until the time of her death. It is unclear whether she was ever able to reconnect with her biological family or to return to India to see them. Salim has fond memories growing up with his Hindu-Muslim, interfaith family. And, although he understands his blended family to have come through friendship and philanthropy, his family's relationship with Aunt Lena and her father could very well be viewed as predatory and opportunistic. I understand it to be somewhere in the middle of the extremes—decidedly transactional.

Salim's oral account in LM/Maputo embodies the constant iterations of Self and Othering that were transacted between individuals and communities within the Indo-Mozambican populace of the 20th century. Power shifts within the subsets of the Indo-Mozambican population forced individuals, families, and businesses to stay ever agile and flexible with identifications and affiliations. Moreover, state-imposed policies triggered these identity shifts, adding more political pressure to already fragile inter-group social relationships. Both Salim's personal and business stories show that experiences in the urban center, as well as the repercussions for self-identifying, were quite divergent for different religious and citizenship groups. Although most of the Indo-Mozambicans whom I interviewed were present for the events of 1961 and 1974, they all remembered the times differently—based on their religion, location in the city, family's profession and class, their nationality or access to other nationalities, and their age. For those who remained in the city after 1961 and 1974, relationships and allegiance along newly formed fault lines of power made all the difference in surviving this period of political instability, weathering the economic downturn, and maintaining permanence in Mozambique and residency in LM/Maputo.




N.M. Sacoor company records: Post card of the S.S. Karanja

A black and white photograph of a steamship, the M.S. Kampala, sailing on the water. The ship is viewed from the side, showing its dark hull and white upper decks. A prominent funnel with a black and white horizontal stripe is visible. The ship has multiple masts and rigging. The text 'B.I.S.N. CO. LTD.' and 'M.S. KAMPALA' is printed in the bottom right corner of the photo. The photo is mounted on a light-colored card.

[illegible]

Note: Indian Independence was declared and the partition of India and Pakistan started Aug 15, 1947.



*N.M. Sacoor Business records: British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd Feb 1959 - Sept 1963
(Photo taken by author 2017)*

15
S. S. Kampala Viagem 96

No	Nome	Idade	Sexo	Profissão	Data	Local	Estado	Outros
1	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
2	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
3	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
4	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
5	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
6	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
7	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
8	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
9	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
10	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
11	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
12	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
13	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
14	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
15	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
16	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
17	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
18	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
19	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
20	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
21	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
22	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
23	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
24	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
25	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
26	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
27	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
28	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
29	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
30	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
31	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
32	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
33	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
34	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
35	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
36	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
37	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
38	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
39	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			
40	Y. J. A. P. P. P.	45	M	Comerciante	1962			

*N.M. Sacoor Business records: Page 15 of 15 listing passengers on S.S. Kampala's Aug 1962 voyage
(Photo taken by author 2017)*

S. S. *O. aransa*


Viagem 82

Data Jan 7 1968

12

NO	DATA	N.	Bando n°	NOME	Espécie
10-12-67	✓	151	1	Dendroica striata	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	152	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	153	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	154	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	155	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	156	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	157	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	158	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	159	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	160	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	161	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	162	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	163	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	164	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	165	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	166	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	167	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	168	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	169	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	170	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	171	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	172	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	173	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	174	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	175	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	176	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	177	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	178	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	179	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	180	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	181	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	182	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	183	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	184	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	185	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	186	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	187	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	188	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	189	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	190	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	191	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	192	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	193	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	194	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	195	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	196	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	197	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	198	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	199	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967
10-12-67	✓	200	1	Parus rufus	15-12-1967

Mundo	Nº	Tubérculo	Bando n°	OBSERVAÇÕES
				201 010 00000 00000
				202 00000 00 20100
				203 00000 00 20100
				204 00000 00 20100
				205 00000 00 20100
				206 00000 00 20100
				207 00000 00 20100
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				240 00000 00 20100



Gulamo (Goolam; Gulam) Nabi: An Individual Case Study (1974-1992)

For the purposes of this study, I investigate how one Indo-Mozambican, Gulamo Nabi (also spelled Goolam or Gulam), is seen as an object of the Machel government's efforts to establish national identity and unity under the rubric of Mozambican socialism. According to State rhetoric, capitalism was a social scourge. Those who took part in its supply chain were both enemies of the new socialist economy and enemies of the emergent egalitarian Mozambican identity. Indo-Mozambicans could belong to the national identity if they subscribed to the State's socialist policies. But, this new government's lack of appetite for trade and commerce immediately made Indo-Mozambican merchants enemies of the State and vulnerable members of society. The decade following independence proved socialism's limitations and the government's inability to properly manage privatized businesses. As shortages of basic goods grew, poverty and civil war ensued. In short, during the two decades after independence, Indo-Mozambican merchants became the most-valuable social lepers in Maputo. They could get access to food and middle class staples, but at great risk to themselves and at high costs to their customers. Gulamo Nabi is perhaps one of the most infamous Indo-Mozambican figures of the 20th century, because he dared to take the risk and failed.

Ask any Mozambican above the age of forty about Gulamo Nabi, and the person's response will tell you if they empathize with the outcomes meted out to him, or if they resent the regime for its iron fist. His death illustrates how questions of capitalism, loyalty, and belonging were problematized for the Indo-Mozambican merchant after Mozambican independence in 1975. He stands in national memory and looms large in national lore, shrouded by suspicion and ambivalently regarded by some as the architect of his own demise. These sentiments are heavily political. Thus, responses and reactions to Nabi's story highlights the ways that Indo-Mozambicans, in general, and Indo-Mozambican merchants, in particular, have been considered ambivalently as both "wanting" citizens and the "enemy within" the nation-building process.

The Gulamo Nabi case highlighted Mozambique's untenable economic system that advocated for collective sacrifice and scarcity as integral to a process of nation-building. In the mid-1980s, I would argue that Indo-Mozambican merchants were still regarded as both insiders and outsiders, even though the State had long-since espoused anti-racial, anti-class rhetoric.¹⁶⁰ Solidified by law 3/79, the Machel government codified a penal code that criminalized predatory capitalism. By 1983, those same laws were strengthened under the 5/83 law in order to enforce even tougher penalties of public flogging and execution for those same transgressions. In Nabi's

¹⁶⁰ Biale, David, et al. *Insider/Outsider: American Jews and Multiculturalism*. University of California Press, 1998.

* Excerpts from 5/83: "*Within our society there are bandits who are not armed; the smugglers, Speculators, hoarders, saboteurs, those who commit assault, kidnappers, evildoers, abusers of minors, drug traffickers, dealers of contraband, night club operators, tricksters, and slanderers, those who write pamphlets, thieves and fomenters of negligence, disorganization and indiscipline. These kinds of bandits provoke hunger, shortages of production, maldistribution of goods and corruption, to create economic chaos and social disorder, instability to the well being of citizens, particularly in the urban centers.*"

Art 1. The penalty of lashings will be applied to actors, accomplices and those who cover up crimes of this nature:

A) Crimes against the safety of the people and the state

case, he violated the established authority of the State; and in turn, that State reacted with the full vehemence of its ideology and judicial system. State-authored national identity rhetoric ensured social proximity and political pacification but, beneath that very thin veneer of polite adherence to unity, economic hostilities and social distancing of the colonial era lingered between different ethnic groups. Some would argue that Nabi's case presented the State an opportunity to enforce its homogenizing rhetoric by punishing outliers who threatened their unifying project.

According to the 1983 coverage of the case in the *Noticias* newspaper, 31-year old Nabi had been brought up on charges of undermining the national economy. Later, he was condemned to the death penalty and killed by a public firing squad in Hulene Plaza in Maputo. The crime for which he suffered this fate was the fact that he had been apprehended with large quantities of Mozambican shrimp from Beira that had been flown to Maputo through the national airline and then driven in the Nabi's car (i.e. by his personal driver) to a warehouse in Maputo. Later, the boxes were transported to Swaziland. In order to accomplish this chain of movement, Mozambican customs and immigration officers at the land border in Namaacha had been bribed, although the Mozambican news and legal coverage does not indicate that any action was taken against the officers. Further, upon his return, the driver had transported televisions and videotapes back to Mozambique for sale. Under the law 3/79 and law 5/83, the driver, Zacarias Chitara, was condemned to twelve years of prison and forty-five lashings, while Nabi was charged with economic sabotage for retaining goods for speculation—in other words, price gouging.¹⁶¹ At the time, shrimp was considered a national good that could not be privately bought or sold without government regulation; and the quantities found made authorities confident that the shrimp was for illegal export. Nabi was tried and convicted of being an active member of an international smuggling ring that trafficked contraband throughout southern Africa. He got the death penalty. When Nabi was shot by firing squad, he was not alone; he died with five other criminals. Three of them had beaten a Greek bakery owner to death in an attempted robbery, while the remaining two

B) *[Candonga] contraband in all of its forms, namely, speculating and hoarding, crimes against public supply, illegal distribution and traffic; and contraband.*

C) *Armed robbery, organized or gangs of evildoers*

D) *Robbery*

E) *Rape and Abuse of Minors*

Art 2. When a particularly egregious political, economic or social crime happens, or when the prior criminal acts or the defendants' lack of remorse requires it, the courts can decide to apply a penalty of lashings against those involved in the following crimes:

- *Theft*
- *Voluntary homicide*
- *Rape*
- *Grooming, Inciting or Using a minor to commit crimes*
- *Drug trafficking*
- *Charging exorbitant prices, disproportionate to the type and nature of the services provided*

Article 3.

3. The crime of lashings will not be meted out to those condemned to death.

¹⁶¹ Thomaz, Omar Ribeiro. "Raça, Nação e Status: histórias de guerra e relações raciais em Moçambique." *Revista USP*, no. 68 (2006): 252. Accessed May 4, 2016. doi:10.11606/issn.2316-9036.v0i68p252-268, p. 209.

were armed bandits who had assaulted private citizens and committed repeated armed robberies in Gaza province.¹⁶²

In order to contextualize this time in Mozambican history, one must understand that socialism was serving as a leveling tool to unify Mozambicans of differing languages, tribal affiliations, and regions. Individual sacrifice through the abstention of commercial enterprise and dedication to collectivist development was seen as integral to the post-colonial national identity. In fact, independence brought with it the ideology of creating a new type of citizen, termed the *homem novo* (the new man). According Sarah LeFanu's 2012 book *S is for Samora*, "The liberation war had been fought not to swap one set of rules for another, but to free the Mozambican people from the evils that were bred by colonialism, which included, as Samora put it: ' . . . bribery, corruption, immortality, theft, nepotism, favours to friends, favouritism, individualism, servility, prostitution, banditry, unemployment, begging, orgies, drunkenness, drugs, the destruction of the family, social breakdown, insecurity and fear. The *homem novo* stood in the front line of the war against old evils. He was virtuous in thought and deed. He sacrificed private pleasure for political duty, and he led by personal example.'¹⁶³ Therefore, it was within this social narrative that Gulamo Nabi was viewed by the national government as a threat to social stability. He stood in juxtaposition to the *homem novo* and, frankly, everything that the new government rhetoric expected of citizens. In this way, the government perceived his actions to be an affront to everything that it stood for and feared that leniency in that particular case would snowball to create a permissive environment for others engaged in similar illegal commercial enterprises.

While the laws remained clear, however, society was divided about just how fair it was to enforce them. There were those who sympathized with the government, principally because the law addressed a socio-economic inequality that had long been ignored. These sympathizers held tightly to the belief that Indo-Mozambican merchants had regularly taken advantage of their commercial ties in the Indian Ocean rim to smuggle and racketeer in Mozambique. Further, Nabi reportedly intended to use profits from the sale of Mozambique's high quality and expensive tiger and king prawn to purchase luxury commercial goods that would later be sold in Mozambique, undermining the State's anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist policies yet again. In the April 1983 *Tempo* article, government representative Gaspar Zimba reiterated to journalists the fact that everything from contraband sales to armed robbery was a genuine threat to the safety and well-being of Mozambican citizens. He highlighted the fact that laws and penalties must be meted out in order to ensure that the intentions of the revolution and that national independence in general would triumph—though over what, specifically, remained unclear:

The People pay. It's the People who are robbed. The peaceful citizens are killed. There are hundreds of thousands of children without milk and bread, because the milk and bread are on the black market. Because of this, we declare "Death to the candongueiros" [black market merchants, smugglers, etc.].¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² F.M. "Condenados a morte seis bandidos." *Revista Tempo*, 4 April 1983, p 3.

¹⁶³ LeFanu, Sarah. *S is for Samora: a lexical biography of Samora Machel and the Mozambican dream*. Scottsville: U of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012. P. 85.

¹⁶⁴ "Justiça popular pune exemplarmente: Fuzilados seis bandidos no Hulene" *Revista Tempo*. 17 April 1983. pp. 8-9.

He went on to describe how some might say that Nabi had only robbed, but not murdered anyone. They might argue that he should not have received the same punishment as murderers. However, Zimba explained that the black market value of shrimp was a large sum, in the context of the country's ongoing food shortages: "When a baby does not have milk because he was robbed and the baby dies of starvation, we won't consider the thief a murderer? Let me ask you present: How many tons of rice, fish, and meat does one ton of shrimp buy?"¹⁶⁵

Indeed, issues related to food security at that time were complex. For instance, just a year before Nabi's case, the FRELIMO government had implemented a policy of forced migration, whereby anyone residing in an urban center (principally Maputo, Beira, or Nampula) who was un- or under-employed was forcibly removed to agricultural lands in Niassa and Cabo Delgado. As the cities became saturated with internal migrants, the fields that could grow food in order to sustain the city dwellers had lain fallow. The pressure to provide food, as well as education, health, and social services to city dwellers weighed heavily on the bankrupted State. In Carlos Domingos Quembo's book *O Poder do Poder*, Quembo explains the criteria for relocations. "All of those of who had been honestly unemployed, or dishonestly ("vagrants," "candongueiros," and "hustlers"), under-employed and single mothers without jobs should be transferred." Here, "candongueiros" is defined as "those who live off of speculation of goods. Those who bought goods at the locally government subsidized stores and resold goods at inflated prices on the informal market."¹⁶⁶ Thus, the economic tenets that Nabi's case defied were already being harshly policed by the State in other heavy-handed, albeit impractical, ways.

With the benefit of hindsight, one could ask why the State had not developed its own fisheries industry to address food shortages and malnutrition, as well as the lack of State funds. Instead, the State punished private enterprise, even when it had no capacity to exploit those resources itself. I believe that Nabi was punished not just because of his crime, but also for humiliating the government by virtue of inadvertently highlighting its inability to monetize national resources and to provide basic services. His business operations demonstrated how inept the State really was and how easily service gaps could be filled by non-governmental actors.

At the same time, the black market was accepted by many as a necessary evil. Although private trade fundamentally tarnished the government's posturing about citizen ownership over national means of production, the State held steadfast to socialist policies, even as malnutrition and unemployment worsened. For many merchants and their desperate customers, government intervention had gone too far and had impeded national productivity. Basic goods—even those nationally harvested like shrimp—were nowhere to be found in the poorly-run government shops.

The Nabi case fed a long-standing animosity toward the immigrant merchant community, in general, and the Indian *cantineiro* specifically. These small business owners had access to goods and extended that access to poor consumers at a predatory profit. Seen through the lens of a necessary evil, during the years when the Machel government blindly promoted an economic philosophy despite its obvious failings, Nabi and other Indo-Mozambican merchants like him did not garner sympathy when they were eventually caught. Instead, the punishment of one was seen

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Quembo, Carlos Domingos. *O Poder do Poder: Operação Produção e a Invenção dos <<Improdutivos>> Urbanos no Moçambique Socialista, 1983 – 1988*, 2017, p 18.

as just due for all the others who had profiteered from their unequal access to flexible citizenship and external capital. Ostensibly, Nabi was made an example of by the State to discourage other merchants and speculators. But, I also feel that his death was a form of government-sanctioned street justice, meted out to assuage the masses' sense of economic victimization by such merchant middlemen.

In the court of public opinion, there are those who believe that Nabi was not innocent, but the penalty was too harsh. It struck them as barbaric and neo-colonial to insist on such a harsh punishment for a relatively minor crime. It also seemed too good to be true. If Nabi were the ring leader of a smuggling organization, as the government was projecting, then he would have been protected from this level of scrutiny somehow. The corrupt infrastructure within the government and civil society would have somehow come to pre-empt his capture in the first place. In this national context, one only gets caught if they have fallen out of favor. So, for many within the Indo-Mozambican community itself, he was seen as a mid-level merchant being scapegoated for the crimes of someone higher up—who, rumor had it, was most likely not of Indian subcontinent origin.

Nabi's case escalated to become an international human rights concern. Dr. Raimundo shared that the oversimplified news stories of executions over shrimp reached international audiences who saw the punishment to be a human rights violation. Raimundo said rumors abounded that Muslim majority countries were turning against Mozambique, because of its unwillingness to pardon Nabi. It was rumored that the *Ummah* believed that if Mozambique could kill a Muslim for something as simple as shrimp, the country did not merit political alliance or assistance. In response, Mozambicans feared what that could mean for the budding economic and political ties that Mozambique was forging with North African nations. Further, rumors about Muammar Al Qaddafi and other Muslim leaders aligning with anti-FRELIMO forces stirred a narrative about the transnational strength of kinship ties among Mozambicans of Indian and Pakistani origin. Raimundo explained that, "There was this reading that said the [civil] war started to worsen in Mozambique and Qaddafi was supporting the rebels because of Gulamo Nabi."¹⁶⁷ Whether or not it was true, there was the perception that the transnational positionality of Indo-Mozambican merchants was both a valuable asset and a dangerous liability for the Mozambican State.

There are few indications that the Nabi case caused irreparable ripples in the international sphere; but domestically, his case was then—and still is—used to mark a turning point in public opinion about the nation's socialist policies. Even today, a myriad of Portuguese language blogs debate the case and defend Nabi against what are now perceived as puritanical economic and criminal policies.¹⁶⁸ According to Stephanie Urdang, 1984 "was the year that Frelimo extended the death penalty to cover other crimes besides treason. In April, a man found guilty of large-scale prawn-smuggling, Goolam Nabi, and two thieves who'd robbed a bakery were publicly executed by firing squad. Samora seemed to have stepped off his own moral path and lost his way."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Dr. Ines Raimundo. Personal Interview, 2016.

¹⁶⁸ Nini Satar. "Podridão da justiça moçambicana (3)" EKEKHAYI YOWANI - A VERDADE DE CASA, 24 Nov 2015, Accessed June 2017.

¹⁶⁹ Lefanu, 192-193.

Nabi's 1983 case problematizes the notion of suspicious, flexible citizen during a time when government institutions fought to harden borders, strengthen economic policies, and define national identity. Not only was the entire mode of small commerce affected by the State's position, but individuals like Salim and Nabi really had their multiple identities contested. For Nabi's part, he is remembered and framed under various identities—principal among them, his merchant identity, since it was the primary driver of his criminal case. Yet, his identity as a Muslim was also instrumentalized to advocate for a pardon. Ultimately, his national identity as a Mozambican citizen made him singularly subject to Mozambique's regulatory frameworks.

By 1983, the window of choice about citizenship had largely closed. Those, like Sacoore, who felt their prospects to be stronger outside of the country, had already taken advantage of the post-independence migratory wave in order to depart. Instead, those like Nabi, who had committed to permanence in Mozambique, found that, although they were welcome to stay in the country, their economic identity—as integral to the country's livelihood—had been diminished and vilified by government actors. In this way, those without the flexible citizenship to flee or seek international intervention, like Nabi, were forced to comply with failing State policies or be punished for non-compliance. There were consequences for both.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to explore the interconnected nature of Indo-Mozambican commercial success and their (perceived or real) failures at social integration. Beginning with a theoretical framework related to transnational Asian migrants, I outlined the regional, national, municipal, business, and individual articulations of how flexible citizenship and merchant identity actually manifested in LM/Maputo from 1947-1992. In this way, the entire chapter is a conversation about positionality and shifting identities under the rubric of shifting geopolitical urgencies. As part of the Swahili coast, Mozambique hosts LM/Maputo as the connector between Mozambique and South Africa, such that Indo-Mozambican merchants were an intermediary between the Black majority and the White minority. In addition, intergenerational merchant businesses over time and one merchant's execution in particular are presented here in order to articulate the ways in which loyalty and suspicion were framed to characterize Indo-Mozambican merchants as economic middlemen, geographical gatekeepers, and disloyal citizens.

Under Ong's theoretical framework of flexible citizenship, Indo-Mozambican merchants can be placed within an identity group that is not correlated with a phenotype. Instead, their work—as traders, business owners, and merchants—takes precedence over their cultural identity. In 20th century Mozambique, the flexibility to access goods, capital, and transportation across national borders was economically beneficial. Further, Indo-Mozambican merchants were able to take advantage of familial links to capitalize on business opportunities. However, at various times during nation-state formation, identities were imposed and hardened; and that same transnational flexibility became socially vilified and legally criminalized.

From 1947 onward—which was perhaps the most open and welcoming years for all non-Black identities—Indo-Mozambicans of diverse backgrounds found niche financial opportunities. Once pressurized by unraveling geopolitical events, processes of Othering occurred within the Indo-Mozambican community itself. Religious and citizenship divisions became the basis of

migration patterns and fragile, new identities. The subgroup of Indo-Mozambican Muslims, for example, emerged stronger and more powerful than ever, after they had galvanized that identity so as to create an outlet to access flexible citizenship through Pakistani citizenship. Their articulation of selfhood through this political maneuvering was beneficial for them and reciprocally detrimental to the now Othered Hindus. Hindus were not just expelled by Portuguese authorities, but were ostracized within the larger Indo-Mozambican identity. This period reinforced the public perception that merchants were disloyal, even amongst themselves. Merchants prioritized permanence and prosperity of their businesses over personal relationships. Needless to say, non-Indo-Mozambican outsiders registered the disunity.

The permanence of certain Indo-Mozambican groups could be explored more widely, but within the context of merchants, it is important to see that their problematic relationship with the Black masses well predates the installation of FRELIMO to national power. Those Indo-Mozambicans merchants who survived to maintain permanent residence in LM at the choke point of 1961 soon meet another turning point in 1974. The end of the Carnation Revolution, the Lusaka Accords, and Mozambican independence were tumultuous events that opened an aperture for all Mozambican residents to re-imagine their lives and their loyalties. Remaining in the country after 1975 presupposed an ideological belief in the egalitarian society that FRELIMO had espoused throughout the struggle for independence. Yet, for Indo-Mozambican merchants, those tepid assurances offered no comfort or protections, especially in light of other regional models from Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa, where visible merchant minorities found themselves unceremoniously expelled or economically segregated. This issue is important because there was the assumption that with their decision to stay in Mozambique, Indo-Mozambican merchants placed their national identity above their economic one. However, over time, and through Salim's departure in 1977 and Nabi's execution in 1983, we see that this merchant identity was powerfully difficult to shed.

In Salim's case, the intergenerational nature of his family's business reproduced multiple Otherings. The company came to his grandfather's ownership when Indo-Mozambican Muslims voluntarily left for Pakistan. I assume that they left in order to be part of the new nation, but Sacoor himself offered no explanation. This very act of emigration set in motion a series of chain reactions that changed the landscape of Indo-Mozambican life in LM/Maputo forever after. In 1962, Sacoor's business was the epicenter of the Othering process between Hindus and Muslims. It is through his company that Hindus purchased their return ticket after being expelled. The Sacoor family business surely earned well from the departures, though Sacoor, himself, was able to see how degraded and hypocritical relationships had become through his relationship with Aunt Lena. Perhaps Sacoor was able to Other both Indo-Mozambican Hindus and Muslims, because of the primacy of his Portuguese national identity at that time. It seems to me that he had a love/hate relationship with Portuguese identity. For Sacoor, civic engagement was an important identity marker. It was a sign of national pride and loyalty. Yet, much of his acts of allegiance were to his Portuguese identity. What does that actually mean for how he is perceived as a Mozambican citizen today? Today, I believe, he is seen primarily as a merchant, secondarily as an intellectual, and thirdly as an Indo-Mozambican. He has distanced himself from the Muslim community, despite being a practicing Muslim. In the hierarchy of identities, it would be hard to ascribe a fixed primacy of one identity or another to Salim and N.M. Sacoor, Lda. Instead, their flexible allegiances managed to keep them both versatile and integral to the ambivalent story of what it means for an

Indo-Mozambican to have a successful business in the tumultuous period around Lusophone independence movements.

Just a few years after Mozambican independence the window for emigration closed. Anyone who remained in Mozambique after this period—and until roughly 1992—with the signing of the peace accords, was assumed to share similar values and expectations of post-colonial government. There was also the expectation that ideological believers would take on a social and/or political role to improve governance and quality of life. Yet, by the early 1980s, it was apparent that socialism had its failings. Privatized companies were crumbling due to mismanagement, and the government stores were experiencing marked shortages. Further, RENAMO had begun its violent attacks, and those who had money had no place to spend it. As a result, those with transnational commercial ties began to believe that it was worth the risk to re-engage in trade. What the government tried to label a black market, some would argue was just an innocuous informal market, similar to those that have always existed. The only difference was that *now* those engaging in such trade were dealing with a protectionist regime that criminalized such actions. Retail arbitrage, like what Nabi was executed for, had been monopolized by Indo-Mozambican merchants for centuries. That very role had been previously seen as part of the nation's successful integration with the Indian Ocean world, but abruptly in the post-independence period it was seen as a neo-colonialist avenue to further exploit and extract the nation's wealth. Merchants were depicted as social pariahs, who had no social contract to benefit their compatriots. Even today, this lack of Indo-Mozambican civic participation is still used to highlight Indo-Mozambicans as what Gayatri Spivak and Judith Butler would call “illegitimate inhabitants.”¹⁷⁰

Indo-Mozambican merchants were made an example of and the State's execution was seen, by Blacks, as one of the few times that justice was served against this powerful and wealthy minority. Yet, for many this was also an example of FRELIMO's moral compass being off-kilter. FRELIMO's commitment to ideology undermined its citizen's ability to reap any benefits from that very ideology. Like the cases of single mothers who were erroneously swept up in raids to fill the re-education camps throughout the country, I believe that the Nabi execution is seen today as one of the Machel government's miscalculations in public policy and misuse of state power. To have killed a Mozambican citizen over shrimp may have met an immediate call for vigilante retribution, but that very punishment has signaled to me that the height of distrust had been reached between Indo-Mozambicans and the State. Fundamental to this is the assumption made by the government that all those still remaining in Mozambique were united under forced socialist ideology. However, by the 1980s, most of them had grown disheartened and tried to retreat to their pre-independence livelihoods. For Indo-Mozambican merchants, this meant a return to their trading roots. The return, however, was met with government efforts to forcibly solidify its legitimacy through more, not less, repressive tactics.

Therefore, I agree with M. Anne Pitcher's analysis that FRELIMO's attempt to stave off neo-colonial capitalism in the 1980s was framed by competing and complicated rivalries. She argues that it was not simply a question of foreign versus national capital, but rather of “fragmentations within the two groups and alliances that cut across the national-foreign divide. . . . They are between manufacturing and agro-export firms and commerce. They are between north

¹⁷⁰ Butler, Judith, and Gayatri C. Spivak. *Who Sings the Nation-State?: Language, Politics, Belonging*. London: Seagull Books, 2007. p. 31.

and south, between Indians and Black Mozambicans, between manufacturers and consumers, and between owners and workers.”¹⁷¹ The unsettled state of economic affairs became both political and individual. The Cold War rhetoric that pitted Marxist communism against Western capitalism became deeply personal in Mozambique’s post-colonial period. Time and distance now allows academics to describe these as mere economic rivalries, even though this time was characterized by existential divides that threatened individuals’ safety and hardened national loyalties.

Legitimacy and loyalty play vital roles in identity formation. Yet, identities tend to be activated when they hold value to the individuals and communities they represent. As the paradigm of flexible citizenship shows, nationalities are accessed based on their transactional ability to deliver profits and business opportunities. For Indo-Mozambicans, this framework held true only until the historical punctuations of 1961 and 1974 forcibly narrowed access to citizenship benefits. With the end of permanent residency and privatization of assets of Indian passport holders in Mozambique, merchants who could become Pakistani or Portuguese made every effort to do so. Their very residence in the city proved them to be survivors. Many others were unable to access such flexible citizenship alternatives and were removed from the city altogether. Indo-Mozambican permanence in Maputo also indicates to me that their merchant identity was still their primary identity. Families split and passports changed, all so that possessions could be kept and lifestyles could be maintained. By 1974, Indo-Mozambican merchants were predominantly Portuguese citizens, but many believed the allure of taking part in a new egalitarian society, as Mozambican citizens. The new citizens held ideological sensitivities, but they did not forget about the economic opportunities that such a space could possess nor their sense of loyalty to their merchant identity. This reality is domestically framed as a failing of Indo-Mozambicans to declare and demonstrate loyalty to a singular national identity, but I understand it now—with the benefit of data over time—as a failure of the State to understand the strength of transnational identity linkages, especially those solidified by long-standing, intergenerational, capital transfers. One’s individual choice to be a citizen of one country or another does not inherently supersede one’s obligations to preserve the “Self” and continue familial responsibilities that ensure commercial opportunities for one’s self and families for generations to come.

¹⁷¹ Pitcher, 167.

Chapter 6 – Politics of Paternity: Mulatos, Mestiços, and Muslims

In Mozambique, I argue that it is people of mixed-race and Indo-Mozambicans who most clearly demonstrated a challenge to national belonging. The diversities of an inter-racial society present a citizenry that embodies loyalties and identities upon which new countries define emergent nationality. In times of uncertainty, it is non-binary groups—like Indo-Mozambicans and those of mixed-race—who are most mobile, visible, and vulnerable. Yet, in general terms, when confronted with circumstances of domestic insecurity, these two groups have been perceived to react in opposite ways. Mozambicans of mixed-race have had a strong minority that have politicized inequality and forged a vocal civil rights movement. This stands in stark contrast to those who have identified as Indo-Mozambican, who have been said to take a de-politicized stance. Throughout this chapter I problematize these political labels and present counterfactual data represented by those who intersect both realities: those of mixed origins that include Indian ancestry.

The overlapping and albeit incomplete racial paradigms from the Americas do not capture the full truth of Mozambican race relations. I use Brazilian and U.S. paradigms as a basis for understanding the primary argumentation of this chapter: those who do not fit within the Black/White binary test definitions of national belonging. This argumentation falls in line with Biale's assertion that "intermarriage—an inevitability in any open society—has created individuals whose very being subverts any politics of monolithic identity."¹⁷² I would take this thinking a step further to say that non-Black and non-White immigrants also present the same challenge to the State.

Mozambique's race relations are a complex web of social hierarchies that most Mozambicans will deny even exist. As an outside researcher, I had to create a paradigm to understand the racial and ethnic hierarchies that I observed in Mozambique. To begin with, I understand Mozambique's racial context to be a hybrid of the U.S. *Black/White binary* and Brazil's *Racial Paradise*. The former, I will summarize as a narrative of racial hierarchy that largely excludes non-Black people of color to depict a linear racial duality as tension between Black versus White people.¹⁷³ In the U.S., White identity expanded over the 20th century to include immigrants, like Italians, Irish, Jews, and Latin Americans. Black identity in the U.S., however, has been more monolithic. U.S. narratives on Black identity have been more monolithic around color and stagnant about immigration status.¹⁷⁴ The one-drop rule ensured that any person with any African ancestry (even "one drop" of Black blood) was legally labeled and racially categorized as Black (and socially regarded as inferior to Whites). This label was placed on descendants of slaves, free Blacks, and new immigrants alike. Further, by labeling vastly different mixtures of ancestry as Black, U.S. understandings of race have only recently begun to fully confront racism against non-black people of color and black/brown immigrants. Scholars in the late 20th century began to dissect definitions of Blackness masked under the broad sweeping term. This static paradigm on Blackness reduced the complexities of U.S. race relations to a linear and dichotomous spectrum

¹⁷² Biale, David, et al. *Insider/Outsider: American Jews and Multiculturalism*. University of California Press, 1998, p. 30.

¹⁷³ Perea, Juan F. "The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Thought," 10 *La Raza L.J.* 127 (2015). Available at: <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/blrj/vol10/iss1/3>

¹⁷⁴ Biale, p. 2-4.

between Black and White races, suppressing the diversity among Blacks and introducing the phenomenon of passing, whereby some light-skinned Blacks denied their ancestry in order to live as Whites. In contrast to the U.S. paradigm, Brazil has a highly nuanced color, rather than racial, spectrum.

Brazil's racial paradigms have largely been misunderstood by foreigners who have used the nation's dynamics for comparative value with the U.S., thus casting aside much of the domestic nuance. I draw heavily from Melissa Nobles' *Shades of Citizenship*, Anthony Marx's *Making Race and Nation: A comparison of the U.S., South Africa, and Brazil* and Rebecca Reichmann's *Race in Contemporary Brazil* for their interpretations of Brazil's social context, racial categories, and manifestations of color discrimination. Although Brazil is the country said to have the second largest population of African descendants, those of darker skin are still the most socio-economically disadvantaged. In Brazil, it is widely accepted that most Brazilians (except some descendants of World War I refugees) bear African heritage, so discrimination is not based purely on racial ancestry. Instead, colorism is more pervasive. In 1982, Alice Walker defined colorism as "prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race people based solely on their color."¹⁷⁵ There have been few race-based laws in Brazil. Yet, color hierarchies were socially imposed such that, among this large populace of African descendants, the lighter skinned had more opportunities and better living standards than their darker compatriots; Reichmann even documented disparities among siblings of different hues.¹⁷⁶ Unlike the static nature of race in the U.S., dynamism allowed Brazilians to self-identify as Black or White, based on both phenotype and class. The same person could identify as Black to indicate their poverty and later as White to indicate their wealth. In short, "money 'whitens,' the lack of 'darkens.'"¹⁷⁷

It is often noted that in Brazil, no Jim Crow-like laws of racial exclusion existed. Racial hierarchies were socially imposed just as often by self-censorship as by White exclusion. Perception of color and socio-economic class are important to Brazilian codifications of race. This stands in stark contrast to the U.S.'s hardened racial distinctions based on ancestry. In short, one could hide their African ancestry and perhaps "pass" as White, but otherwise a phenotypically Black person in the U.S. can never—despite their wealth—stop being categorized as racially Black.¹⁷⁸ In Brazil, social interactions, phenotype, and economic standing could allow a Brazilian to situationally self-identify along a convoluted racial network; it is not a linear dichotomy. Brazilians employ a range of intersecting terms to define themselves in relation to others and these self-identified terms are not always the same as those that they are ascribed.

Where both the U.S. and Brazilian paradigms fail to capture Mozambican realities is in their blind spot on race in a Black majority space. Colonialism in Africa also compounded the oppression of racial discrimination, slavery, and labor domination. In Mozambique's capital, colonialism was implemented through racial segregation and forced labor. Similar to the U.S.'s

¹⁷⁵ Norwood, Kimberly Jade, "If You is White, You's Alright..." Stories about Colorism in America, 14 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 585 (2015), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/8.

¹⁷⁶ Reichmann, p 9.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 243.

¹⁷⁸ Williamson, Joel. *New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States*. New York: Free Press. 1980, pp. 13-14.

hardened separations between Blacks and Whites, Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique implemented pass laws to limit racial integration and impede cohabitation. Social aspects of the urban Mozambican landscape also incorporated the Brazilian racial paradigm of colonialism, whereby racial miscegenation was a tool of social control. Race-mixing, therefore, was framed as a civilizing mission that benefitted Blacks. In truth, though there were genuine loving relationships amid largely transactional ones, as miscegenation was a popular colonial tool to approximate to and emotionally control the Black population.

In Africa—where colonialism dominated Black lives and Black labor—miscegenation does not equate to the erasure of Blackness as a race or the erasure of Black people as a social presence. For the sake of clarity, throughout this chapter, I adopt the definition of miscegenation articulated in Joel Williamson’s *New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States*: “‘Miscegenation’ is meant to include a broad range of intimacy, from the most ephemeral interracial sexual contacts to marriage and children. It includes the mixing of blacks and mulattoes as well as the mixing of whites with either blacks or mulattoes.”¹⁷⁹ Much like underlying diversity hidden in the term ‘Black’ in the U.S., those called ‘mulattoes’ (*mulattos* or *mulatos*) in Mozambique had vastly different experiences and ethnic ancestries. However, being of mixed-race in LM/Maputo indicated an approximation to privilege. Power dynamics within families often perpetuated the idea of powerful, intelligent, and paternalistic White fathers who improved the station of dependent, licentious, and opportunistic Black mistresses. Social aspects of the urban Mozambican ethnic landscape incorporated the Brazilian racial paradigm of colonialism whereby racial miscegenation was a tool of social control, with the eugenics-bound goal of ethnic cleansing and social Whitening.¹⁸⁰ In common parlance, inter-racial families were depicted with the White parent as a benefactor, improving the living standard of the Black parent and their offspring; race-mixing was framed in this way as a civilizing mission.

In Mozambique’s majority Black context, miscegenation could not meet the eugenicists’ goal of social and genetic Whitening of the population. Instead, I argue, miscegenation posed the opposite construction: It was a tool to shake the stigma of being a foreigner. Specifically, it allowed non-Blacks to assimilate and approximate to indigenous, Black culture. Marrying or procreating with a Black person allowed Whites, Asians, and other immigrant groups to demonstrate domestic loyalty, cultivate local networks, and create cultural proximity with indigenous Mozambicans. With the passing of generations, mixed-race families crafted fluid national, ethnic, and racial identities. David Biale called these “composite identities.”¹⁸¹ Many leveraged such identities to access what Aihwa Ong calls “flexible citizenship” (i.e. multiple citizenships, residency statuses, and global capital facilitated through transnational, familial networks).¹⁸² Flexible citizenship and domestic belonging were unequally distributed among mixed-race people. Children of White-Black parentage (*mulato*) accessed both Mozambican and European citizenships. Most children of Indian and Black heritage (*mestiço*) lost access to Indian citizenship. Indo-Mozambican parents of mixed-race children, however, earned greater social acceptance and national belonging as Mozambicans—even when they retained Indian, Pakistani, British, South African, or Portuguese citizenship or residency.

¹⁷⁹ Williamson, xii.

¹⁸⁰ Reichmann, 44-49.

¹⁸¹ Biale, 9.

¹⁸² Ong.

Labeling Mozambican Mixes

As addressed in Chapter 2, there is a wide-reaching a vocabulary of terms and names to define mixed-race identifications that is inaccurate and inadequate. My attempts to fulfill an academic exercise of defining malleable groups, phenotypes, self-identities, and ascribed identities (that have themselves changed over time) continue to feel inadequate. Even so, they are an earnest attempt to broach a discussion about belonging and identity among people who are, themselves, deeply conflicted about both issues.

According to the 1872 Brazilian census, there were categories based on color (i.e., White, *preto* [Black], and *pardo*) and categories based on ethnicity (i.e., *caboclo*). These terms evolved and became more complex over time, as new terms were added and old ones fell into disuse. A summarized excerpt of the census categories of the late 19th to 20th centuries should offer a glimpse into the racial and ethnic identity networks in the Lusophone world. Note that wherever “Indian” is used here the term refers to Native Americans or Amer-Indians:

Pardos were those offspring of the union of *pretos* and whites; *caboclos* were the indigenous population, and their descendants. . . . Reflecting a concern about miscegenation, the second general Brazilian census, in 1890, published data on color and civil status that used the terms white, *preto*, *caboclo*, and *mestiço*. . . *mestiço* referred exclusively to the union of *pretos* and whites, and *caboclos* were still determined by ancestry. . . . The 1940 census, the first of a series of modern censuses, established the color categories of white, *preto*, *pardo*, and yellow (the term indigenous was added in 1991). The *pardo* category, which in the censuses of 1872 and 1880 had been reserved strictly for *mestizos* of *preto* and white origin, became a catch-all for persons who did not fit the *preto*, white and yellow variables. . . . In 1950, interviewers were instructed that the *pardo* category should include Indians, *caboclos*, *mulatos*, *cafusos* [a term applied to those of black Indian origin], and others.”¹⁸³

In the U.S. context, the one-drop rule made official and legal vocabulary of race relatively simple when discussing African descendants. Although southern states in the U.S. adopted terms like octaroon and quadroon to describe those with Black great-grandparents and grandparents, respectively, most mixed-race people were referred to as *mulato*, a term that typically describes “people in whom the mixture of black and white is visible. . . . Offspring of [miscegenation between American Indians and Negroes] were usually called mustees, a term derived from the Latin American word *mestizo*, often used to indicate a person of European and Indian ancestry.”¹⁸⁴ U.S. definitions have largely been static. The Brazilian context, however, was much more fluid. Using Eviatar Zerubavel’s theories on collective memory, I would argue that, in Brazil, the State employed “mental bridging” to fabricate “uninterrupted” identities. These social groups were perceived to be contiguous over time or assumed to be the same entity despite historical ruptures in the definitions of terms and self-identifications of people labeled by those terms.¹⁸⁵ As such,

¹⁸³ Piza, Edith and Fulvia Rosemberg. “Color in the Brazilian Census.” *Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Inequality*, edited by Rebecca Reichmann, 1999, pp 37-52.

¹⁸⁴ Williamson, xii-xiii.

¹⁸⁵ Zerubavel, p. 39-40.

Brazil's malleable codifications of mixed-race persons offer a parallel with Mozambique's malleable codifications of both mixed-race persons and people of Indian and Pakistani origin. Names and terms suggest some semblance of continuity. "In providing us with some sense of *permanence*, they help promote the highly reassuring conservative illusion that nothing fundamental has really changed."¹⁸⁶ Yet, the identity composition—self-ascribed or imposed—of group members refutes such a linear narrative.

Despite the fact that Mozambican's colonial spatial and legal structures resemble some of the hardened racial segregation of the U.S. racial binary, the social experience of race and race-mixing in Mozambique was very similar to that of Brazil. Due to my own curiosity about the depth and variation of labeling, I exhausted particular care and attention in my field work to ask about interviewee's ancestry and, then, the subsequent labels used to describe their ethnic and racial composition.

Rather than presenting a chart as I did in Chapter 2, I will share here a lengthy excerpt from Naya, who tried to describe the different terms used to describe people of mixed-race origin by working backwards from the mixes in her own family. She, herself, was of mixed-race origin, and he descended from a family of mixed-race individuals who had intermarried for many generations. While describing four generations of her family, she traced her ancestors' migration from India, Afghanistan, China, and Europe, through Zimbabwe, to Mozambique. As the result of diverse mixes, Naya struggled to use a singular term to describe herself. While attempting to differentiate the ascribed terms for different non-African groups present in Mozambique, she confusingly admitted that she is *mulato*, *mestiço*, and *monhé*, although she is often considered as *Indian* by outsiders and described as fitting the aesthetic of a *cafuso*. I left our conversation no less confused about the inaccuracy of phenotypical labels, but more deeply attached to the notion that these ethnic and racial terms are co-defined:

Naya: I know that my dad's mom was the daughter of an Afghani. My dad is from Tete. So, his mom's Dad was from Afghanistan and his mom's mom was a mixed-race of Indians and Africans. So I'm the 4th generation. And then my dad's dad's dad was also from India, Gujarati side of India, and then he got married to my grandmother who was the daughter of an Afghani and an African. And I know that my dad's dad, due to trade, he ended up in Tete because things in India were not so good. So he was just here for something like five years. He left his first wife in Gujarat in India with three sons and then he moved to Tete for better conditions. Since he was alone, he was looking for the second wife. My dad's mother was divorced. She had a small baby, my aunt, who is sixty-five now. She was also divorced, so they arranged the marriage. So the Gujarati grandfather and my mixed-race grandmother got married through an arranged marriage. They're Muslim. She was the second wife. My grandfather used to come here I think on a ship—I don't know how—and then he opened this small grocery shop and then he got married. He only did the Nikkah [Islamic religious wedding ceremony]. Since he was already married in India, he couldn't get a civil marriage. So they did a Nikkah. They moved in together and then what happened is that my grandmother, she was a farmer, she'd sell fresh stuff from her farm and my grandfather would take that money from her and would send it all to India. Can you believe

¹⁸⁶ Zerubavel, p. 41.

that? [Instead of getting divorced, Naya's grandmother agreed to live in a separate house away from her husband and his first wife, who eventually joined them in Mozambique.]

. . . The kids [Naya's father and his siblings] used to get along, but my dad's stepmother did not like him because of the mix. You know what happened is that the Indians here, the Muslim community is a bit racist. We have mixed-races. We don't speak Indian and we wear sleeveless clothing. And they can be very discriminatory. They say, "Yeah, she's not Indian. She doesn't speak Indian. Look at how she dresses and you know she's mixed. Her mom was not a real Indian." And you know they're very discriminatory with any other races besides Indian. That's what the stepmother was to my dad and my aunts and my grandmother. She would tell her husband, "How could you get married to a woman that's a mixed race? Her mom is Black and her father is Afghani. Why? They are not even Indian. They are not part of our culture. They are not our race and she doesn't speak Indian."

My mom's background is that she speaks Chinese. She's Indian. She's got White. She's got Black in the family. My mom's mom was born from a half-Chinese and a half-White and an Indian. And I know that her grandfather was a Chinese guy, a "comerciante" [merchant]. He used to sell "makojojo" [sea worms]. I don't know where he was from, but his name was Won Chang. She was the daughter of the China guy, the sea worm seller, and a Black woman. And then my mom's dad is the person that I don't know much about. I heard my mom tell me that he was the son of a White guy from the [Portuguese] colony. One of those bad guys. They said he used to whip people. [He] was mixed with an Indian woman. Half Indian. He had blue eyes.

NA: I can't tell you how many conversations I have had about defining "Mulato," "Monhê," and "Mestiço."

Naya: . . . You know what? I'm considered "Mulata" because I don't speak Indian. I am and I'm proud of it. But usually "Mulato" is when there is a mix between Black and a White. That can generate other "Mulatos." As long as she's got a bright skin and curly hair that's a "Mulato." Me, I'm considered Indian, but I'm not Indian. I'm "Mulata," because I'm mixed-race. In our community, I'm considered "Mulata," because I don't speak Indian, but others that are not in our community see me as an Indian. . . .

Then you have the "Mestiço," it's like mixed. That would be me. "Mestiço" would be people that have mixed races, but they don't understand what "Mestiço" is. They usually don't use that term that much, but I'd just use "Mestiço" instead of "Mulato."

NA: Because "Mulato" is typically a Black and a White mix? So "Mestiço" is any other mix?

Naya: Yes, "Mestiço" is any other mix—like me, I am a "Mestiça" because I have mixed-race in my blood.

And then we have “canecos.” “Canecos” are Goan descendants. Like me—dark skinned and black hair—that’s “caneco.” And then we’ve got the “cafuso.” “Cafuso” is like dark skin, but a bit kind of Afro hair. That’s called “cafuso.”

NA: But are any of these considered derogatory or it’s just considered like aesthetic? Would you say that a person is cafuso to offend them or would you say it because that’s just how they look?

Naya: That’s how they look. That’s the terms they are given according to the skin color.

NA: And how do you define “Monhê”?

Naya: “Monhê” it’s me. “Monhê” is Indians that are born in Mozambique. They have to be Muslim. And then you have got the “Banianis.” The “Banianis” are the Hindus. “Banianis” are the Hindus that were born in Mozambique. But it’s just very pejorative sometimes. “Monhês” are not very much liked, they are very unsocial. They are only social within their community.¹⁸⁷

Naya’s retracing of her intergenerational ancestry illustrates why any codification I could produce would be wholly inadequate. Terms to describe Indo-Mozambican mixes are both a question of memory and self-identification. The subtle differences in phenotype and hair texture could trigger a different vocabulary, especially when knowledge of ancestry is purely anecdotal. As migration has resulted in transcontinental families, migration even within the nation of Mozambique has left individuals’ true origins much of a mystery. In the absence of genetic testing, terms about racial and ethnic blends try to guess aesthetic and ancestry. Straight hair and language abilities somehow made even a mixed-race Indian *more* Indian than others of the same mixed-race parentage. Naya constantly points back to her inability to speak an Indian-native language as proof that she is not Indian. I dared not tell her that there are many Indians and Pakistanis her age currently living on the subcontinent and throughout the diaspora who do not speak a regional or native language, but who do not doubt their ethnic identity. Yet, throughout this study, I found that language abilities were repeatedly used to socially verify the Indian subcontinent ancestry of mixed-race people. While not having language capabilities signaled a distance from perceived authenticity as an Indian or a Pakistani, it also signaled deep integration into Black Mozambican life.

It does not surprise me that labels and language come forward as proof of belonging, especially when ethnic identifications are so fungible. Over and over again, it was through the confusion of what to call people that I learned more about how each individual wanted to be viewed, how permanent they want to be perceived, and how much they wanted to belong to mainstream Mozambican society. Labels of mixture, like *mulato*, *mestiço*, and *misto* all trigger social understanding that individuals are of mixed-race, but still native to Mozambique. In Mozambique, *mulato* usually means a mix between Whites and Blacks, and *mestiços* usually means a mix between Black and others, and *misto* is a catch-all term that I have never really heard in common parlance. All three terms identify the mixed-race person as born in Mozambique. An *Indiano*, by contrast, is an immigrant, a foreigner outside of the mainstream Mozambican

¹⁸⁷ Naya. Personal Interview. 2016.

assimilation networks. One who describes him/herself as *Indiano* is assumed to have no aspiration of Mozambican integration. Calling a Mozambican-born individual an *Indiano* strips them of their Mozambican nationality. And, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss people of Pakistani origin in detail, but the *Paquistanes* label signals new immigrant status and holds an even more negative connotation than *Indiano*.

How Blacks Perceive Others

Here, I raise the perceptions of a Black Mozambican in an investigation of the problematic dialectic around inclusion and labels. The conversation was specifically about the perception of Indo-Mozambicans as Others or foreigners. Social integration, Teresa argued, was at the heart of Mozambican national belonging and that Indo-Mozambicans were perceived to make less effort to integrate than, say, the Portuguese. The excerpt below comes from my prompting her to talk about the expulsion of Indians from Mozambique in 1961-2 and why this historical event is not more prominent in the national narrative:

T: No one talks about Indians. The sense is, the Indians even though they are Mozambicans, to some extent they don't act it. We don't feel that they are really Mozambicans. That's what we talk about when we label them "Indians." Unlike some White people we don't call "White," we call "Mozambicans."

NA: Why?

T: Because for us, we feel they are not Mozambicans. They are not part of us.

NA: This is interesting, because in many cases outside of Lourenço Marques/Maputo, even in the capital, [Indo-Mozambicans] are more in the neighborhoods where Black people live—for example, in the shops, the stores. They may separate, but they live closer than White Portuguese people.

T: They still behave as Indians and not Mozambicans. They don't marry with Mozambicans. This is one of the concerns we have.

NA: That they don't intermarry? I find it fascinating, because there are so many people who I've met who are Black and Indian mixes. They still consider themselves as Indians if you ask, but they are what you guys would call mulatos. What it sounds like to me is. . .that once they become mulato, they become Mozambican.

T: Because [Indo-Mozambicans] don't mix, they live apart. They continue to have all their traditions. Because all they want from us is business.

NA: What about the big figures? You have got Marcelino dos Santos. You've had public figures that were Indians that were pro-FRELIMO, pro-Mozambique.

T: Yeah, that's a good question. From my point of view, I think [Indo-Mozambicans] decided to separate from us [Blacks]. They were welcome, but they were not really involved. They were not part of our culture. They don't even speak our local languages. But the Portuguese they did and some are still speaking them. [Indo-Mozambicans] have their rituals and that's ok, but the fact is they don't mix with us.

NA: And when they mix with you, they became something totally different. They are no longer seen as Indians.

T: The Portuguese? They mix with us and we see them like us.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ Teresa. Personal Interview. 2017.

This rich conversation is best tackled in parts. First, there is the notion of racial-mixing—both in cultural practices and in family composition—as a key factor in immigrants’ national integration. Teresa denies that Indo-Mozambican miscegenation alone can cause integration or assimilation. To belong, Indo-Mozambicans must learn local languages and adopt native customs, not just have inter-racial children, live in Black neighborhoods, or have a commercial presence. Although she admits that only some Whites have achieved this level of integration, she does not concede that any Indo-Mozambicans have. Second, she raises and I explore questions of labeling. She verbalizes the main argument of this chapter when she explores the labels used to valorize exceptional Whites who earned the prized label of “Mozambican;” she excludes Indo-Mozambicans from the prize, on the basis of generalizations. Exceptionalism is granted to mixed-race people with White forefathers; but she excludes Indians and Pakistanis from any possibility of such integration. She dismisses examples of Indo-Mozambicans whose social and political contributions are well-documented. Next, this question of language, as the currency of cultural authenticity or basis for ex/inclusion, re-emerges. Although Mozambique is not like South Africa, where native languages are official languages, native languages still remain important social markers of cultural belonging among different tribal groups, even among younger generations who live in urban centers. Just as Naya had explained that people of Indian subcontinent origin are expected to speak a national language from the subcontinent to be accepted as “Indiano,” Teresa is also saying that individuals living in Mozambique must speak an indigenous Mozambican language to be accepted as Mozambican.

Further, Teresa’s ascribed exclusion of Indo-Mozambicans from the national narrative reinforces the insularity of their communities. There is a long heritage of intermarriage between Indo- and Black-Mozambican families, particularly among Muslims. I would argue that generations of intermarriage among *mestiços* was likely the result of having been excluded from full social acceptance on both sides of their ancestry. Last, this conversation touches on the layers of complexity surrounding the public perception of the de-politicized Indo-Mozambican, in spite of examples of politically active Indo-Mozambicans in recent memory. There is an imbedded hypocrisy here, as the similarly few examples of politically active *mulatos* created the public perception of their entire group’s social activism. Indo-Mozambicans are not afforded the same level of social inclusion or political capital for their civic engagement.

Politics of Identity: Mulato Politics and Indo-Mozambican Invisibility

There is a lot of overlap and tension between Indo-Mozambicans and Mozambicans of mixed-race because they do not fit within Mozambique’s Black/White binary. As a result, their ability to assimilate and integrate are constantly questioned. Both groups fall outside the linear racial spectrum, yet they are often presented as polar opposites with regard to political activism. I concur with Biale and Galchinsky’s assertion that the politics of identity “too often assumes that a monolithic and inherited identity should dictate political action.”¹⁸⁹ Further, I consider such actions to be a measure of an individual’s convictions around their imagined and real ethnic equities in the context of evolving national identity.

Noémia de Sousa (poet activist) and the Albazine family (journalist activists) are oft-cited examples of *mulato* leadership in the struggle for racial equality during the colonial period,

¹⁸⁹ Biale, 9.

particularly as they lived in the Mafalala neighborhood of the capital city. Just at the boundary of the cement city for Whites, Mafalala was the nearest reed city for Blacks. Under the cloak of night, forbidden interactions were known to happen between thrill-seeking White men, and Black women with limited financial opportunities. Black men were only allowed to leave Mafalala during the working day if they could provide a pass to prove their employment. This labor segregation by day and miscegenation by night produced mixed-race children who lived with their Black mothers in the reed city. White fathers in the cement city were known to provide for their children from afar. Some kids were sent to Portugal at their fathers' expense. However, *mulatos* lived a bifurcated existence, and some indeed did use their privilege to speak out against colonial inequalities. This revolt is similar to that experienced throughout Latin America, where it was the children born in the colonies to European fathers who most visibly campaigned against colonial hypocrisy. As in colonial Latin American societies, in Mozambique it was unclear if *mulatos* were fighting for racial equality for all or just their own access to withheld privileges of Whiteness. In either case, *mulatos*' vocal protests were the beginning clamors of Mozambique's anti-colonial movement.

The stereotype of the activist *mulato* goes back to these 1920s figures and stands juxtaposed to the persistent image of the de-politicized *Indiano*. These characterizations persist today, despite the reality that there have been numerous and highly visible, politically active Indo-Mozambicans throughout the late twentieth century. These characterizations persisted in spite of examples like Aquino da Bragança and Oscar Monteiro, both high-level Indo-Mozambican political advisors. Whereas a similarly small number of *mulatos* took on civic leadership, *mulatos* in general have been credited with the positive stereotype of having a penchant for politics and a vested interest in equality. In contrast, Indo-Mozambican anti-colonial figures were framed as exceptions, not representative of most Indo-Mozambicans' political interests. The notion that Indo-Mozambicans are immigrants with external loyalties continues to be an undercurrent in the contemporary social and political narrative.

I would argue that Indo-Mozambicans, including *mestiços*, are no more or less politically active in LM/Maputo than any other group. Also, as relative to their national population, Indo-Mozambicans are perhaps over-represented in national politics and the economy. The label of foreignness, however, serves to discredit their contributions. That same label is used to dismiss even their political actors as exceptional and in no way representative of the larger community. If that gaze holds for Indo-Mozambicans, it should also hold for *mulatos*. Nevertheless, there is a double standard. White privilege fuels the double standard's inherent positive association for *mulatos*. Juxtaposing the full inclusion of *mulato* contributions with the minimal inclusion of Indo-Mozambican contributions into the national narrative further reinforces the Black/White binary in Mozambican race relations and a social preference for Whiteness.

In Mozambique, the phenomenon of miscegenation was gender-specific. By and large, during the colonial era, mixed families overwhelmingly had Black, native mothers and immigrant fathers. This dynamic was attributable to single, male migrants outnumbering their female counterparts. Oral narratives also confirm that immigrant women did not arrive single. They were already destined for marriage to a suitor based in Mozambique. Therefore, there was an inherent power to the race and nationality of that immigrant paternal figure, whom I call the "forefather." The politicization of the *mulato* in Mozambique is often compared to the de-politicization of the Indo-Mozambicans, including *mestiços*. I argue that *mulatos* were emboldened to challenge their

inability to access the full range of privileges entitled to Whites. Born to White forefathers, they felt that paternal patronage would protect them from political reprisal. During the colonial period, even when *mulato* resistance was met with state reprisal, punishment was usually exile to Portugal. Consequences for a *mestiço*, though, were vastly different. Their exile could be to the cocoa farms of São Tomé, not to the metropolis of Lisbon. Additionally, in the interviews that I conducted for this study, many *mestiço* children of Indian forefathers had a sense of rootlessness. With the exception of Goans, the departure of Indian-origin forefathers from the subcontinent was a permanent rupture. Children of White Portuguese forefathers—many of whom maintained transnational ties to their native towns—were connected to a European homeland. *Mulatos* retained both flexible citizenship and privilege within the Portuguese colony of Mozambique; *mestiços* had limited social privilege in the colony and only a small minority were rumored to have access to their paternal citizenship.

During times of political instability, power of ancestry was mobilized to define each group—mixed-race persons and Indo-Mozambicans—as a “separate class, one represented as not belonging to the country of residence.”¹⁹⁰ *Mestiços* did not have flexible citizenships to facilitate their flight. And in 1961, over 2,000 Indian passport holders (many of whom had spent the majority of their lives in Mozambique) were interned and forcibly deported in retaliation for India’s annexation of Portugal’s colonies on the Indian subcontinent. Even when Indo-Mozambicans were born in Mozambique or had managed to reside in-country for generations, despite war and deportations, they were still socially dismissed as immigrants.

Indo-Mozambicans have never shed the stigma about their *Indiano* forefathers and they are always vulnerable to being socially considered foreigners, or immigrants, in spite of their permanence in Mozambique throughout many generations. In this way, their colonial legacy complicates their post-colonial inclusion. The perception that ethnic minorities are a threat to the State and to society goes back to colonial times; Mahmood Mamdani would say *settlers*, as a political term, includes racial groups that include Whites, as the master race, and subject races (Asians, Colors, Arabs, etc.). *Natives* include indigenous ethnic groups.¹⁹¹ The independence government’s socialist rhetoric was a reactionary counterbalance to these racist and repressive colonial policies. Post-colonial unity in multi-ethnic Mozambique, however, never fully addressed the belief that subject races were complicit in colonialism and so the independent nation still suspects them of disloyalty and self-interest.

Mestiço Families, Intermarriage, and Permanence

Experience shows that in Mozambique, inter-racial marriage was not nearly as forbidden or uncommon as stigma assumes. Susana Pereira Bastos’ 2006 text “In Mozambique, we didn’t have apartheid: Identity constructions on inter-ethnic relations during the Third Portuguese Empire” offers insight into Hindu forefathers among *mestiços*:

Whether they opted for new migratory projects after the decolonization process, or they remained in Mozambique, the identity narratives that center upon interethnic relations during the colonial period always refer to a first phase of insertion, when sexual

¹⁹⁰ Sassen, Saskia. *Guests and Aliens*. New Press, 2003.

¹⁹¹ Mamdani, 10.

relationships between Hindu Gujarati men and local women (adhering to traditional religions or Islam) were very frequent, and resulted in the birth of descendants who were known as «mistos» [mixed] or «mestiços» [half-breeds]. However, only exceptionally the offspring of these relationships were integrated in the Hindu religion. Even in those cases in which the relationship was maintained, these children usually were integrated in the mother's family and mostly grew up as Muslims. As is often stressed by our informants, the situation of those who grow up «between two influences, that of the father and that of the mother», or those who end up «being neither one thing nor the other» is usually repulsive to the average Hindu.¹⁹²

In the case of Mae, she and her husband were third generation *mestiços*. I asked if she considered herself an immigrant, and she affirmed, “I was born in Mozambique.” She further explained that her father was a Hindu who had immigrated from Diu, India. He had married her Black Mozambican mother in Inhambane. Thereafter, he had continued to practice Hinduism, while Mae’s mother remained Muslim and raised the children as Muslims. Mae said she always identified as Mozambican, never as an Indian, because her father did not teach them anything about Hindu culture or share anything about his past in Diu. Mae’s story is common. When talking with leaders of the Maputo’s Hindu religious organization, *Comunidade Hindu*, I asked more about this. One administrator said, “I bet if you go back far enough, every Indian Muslim here has some Hindu ancestor.”¹⁹³

In both Mae and Saadiq’s families, members attested that they are fully integrated into Mozambican society and they have proven their national loyalty by never having emigrated. Despite their perceived access to migratory escape during the time of independence in 1974, for example, these family members felt a sense of permanence to Mozambique. They had no alternative. They did not speak an Indian-subcontinent language, had no living memory of paternal relatives, and they were all deeply dismissive about a permanent return to India. I would argue that their father’s own sense of distance from his birthplace passed on an inherent knowledge of no return to his descendants. In contrast to the children of White Portuguese forefathers, the children of Indian forefathers needed to accept and abide by Mozambican culture and politics or they could very well end up politically and socially stateless. For better or for worse, *mestiços*’ permanence in Mozambique was not up for negotiation. Yet, their national loyalty was regularly questioned. Even today, this group struggles with an unfulfilled request for social belonging and integration.

Saadiq and Ibtiqah are Muslim *mestiços* who intermarried. Their experiences illustrated how their individual senses of belonging affected their adoption or abandonment of certain national identity markers during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Ibtiqah’s native, Black biological mother abandoned her Indian-immigrant father. She was raised by her Indian step-mother and her Indian father. Ibtiqah spoke Gujarati fluently and watched Bollywood movies. She went to Islamic school for her education. She acknowledged that in many ways she was accepted as fully Indian. It was only at her wedding when the invitation included her biological mother’s name that friends and family realized that she was *mestiço*.

Saadiq, of a similar ancestral composition, took great pride in his mixed heritage and fully

¹⁹² Bastos, 14.

¹⁹³ Meeting with *Comunidade Hindu* Administrators. 2017.

acknowledged his African roots. He grew up with his Black family members. Though he was Muslim, he also practiced his native religion. His royal heritage offered a sense of personal pride, as well as a narrative to validate his national belonging. From that sense of ancestral belonging, he disproved many stereotypes about *mulatos*, *mestiços*, and *Indianos*. He shared the fact that he was deeply offended by being asked why he never left Mozambique in the 1970s. Saadiq attested then, and now, to his loyalty to Mozambique:

I never knew my [Indian] grandfather. I don't know if my father even knew him. My grandmother, my father's mother, was from the Tembe tribe. She was the niece of the last king of Ka Tembe, Unguanaze Tembe. I don't know what happened to the population, but the King fled to the province of Natal in South Africa. I'm not sure if it was because of tribal wars. My grandmother is the daughter of the youngest brother of Unguanaze Tembe. What they called Lourenço Marques, in the 1950, 40s, 30s, 20s, was called Delagoa Bay. These Indians, my grandfather, I believe, was a travelling merchant. So, where did he spend the night? He stayed in the house of the tribal chief. When he arrived there, he messed around with the girls of the local tribe to not be bothered by other groups. He is the Inconuana, the son-in-law of the king, the son-in-law of the local chief.

The majority of *mestiços* in the south, on our maternal side, we are Mamotos, Nhacas, Mphungues, of tribal chiefs. This was so that they would not be bothered by the rest of the population. The White, the Indian, that was the son-in-law of the Chief [and] was respected. My father was born in Natal. My grandmother would come to LM on occasion. But when her husband left her, she brought her kids to LM. They are children of Hindus, of an Indian. Even today, 90% of Africans think every Indian is the same bag of flour. But they have their castes, religions. They are all Indian, but they are all different.

So, my grandmother brought her kids here, and here they became Afro-maometana. Afro-maometana was a school of Muslims. So, they converted my dad and uncles and aunts to the Muslim faith, but their origins are Hindu. My uncle was born in 1905. My aunt must have been born in 1908. My dad was born in 1910. . . .

Why did I not leave and go to Portugal? What connected me to Portugal was only colonization. I have nothing to do with Portugal. My origin is Indian and, aside from this, the father of my mother was Dutch. I have nothing to do with Portugal. But this thing existed, and always will exist, where people look at me and upon seeing someone of a different race or a different color—because the race is the same, the human race—they will ask me, “Why didn't you leave?”

Saadiq was offended by being typecast as someone who would flee his country. He said he had met people in Portugal who claimed to be Mozambican loyalists, but who refused to leave Portugal. He asked rhetorical questions about whether or not those people's Mozambican identity was questioned the same way that his was. He never regretted his decision to stay in Mozambique, but he did lament not having allowed his wife to teach their children Gujarati. He understood that speaking a native language—native Indian or native Mozambican—would be used to ascribe an identity claim. He felt that learning Gujarati would make his children feel superior to other *mestiços* who, like himself, had grown up disconnected from Indian cultures and lived outside the

boundaries of acceptance as an *Indiano*. I wonder if his children *had* shown more affinity to their maternal connection to India rather than their father's native roots, if that reality would have provoked further doubts about Saadiq's own national allegiance. The politics of perpetually defending and negotiating one's nationality defies the rhetoric of racial inclusion upon which Mozambican independence was founded.

Saadiq and Aisha are similar in that both had no specific knowledge of their Indian forefather. When I asked why she had never left Mozambique during the civil war, Aisha said she never identified with anywhere else. When the opportunity presented itself shortly after independence, she responded with a strong sense of national loyalty:

A: When the time came [to flee], I said to myself, "My home is here, not there."

NA: Where were you planning to go?

A: We were going to go through Swaziland to South Africa. From my generation, many people did this. Many emigrated. Once my high school did a visit to Namaacha around 1978. All you had to do was go down past the barrier and enter Swaziland. Some of my classmates did that.

NA: Did anyone in your family ever think to go back to India or to Portugal?

A: No, no one. Some cousins on my mother's side went, but the majority stayed here.

NA: Went to India?

A: No, Portugal. No one went to India.

This lack of Indian connection is part of *mestiço* identity. It is also what proves their permanence and loyalty to Mozambique. Their heritage is not a network of loyalties that can be mined for flexible citizenships. *Mestiços* have Indian-forefathers who hail from a variety of different backgrounds, but who offered little to no information about his family on the subcontinent. Their descendants inherited that void. Despite constant projection of foreignness upon them, this research shows that *mestiços* are less mobile than both *mulatos* and other Indo-Mozambicans. *Mestiços* are part of an imagined community based on genuine ancestry. What binds them to each other is their shared imagination, syncretic customs, and generations of interfaith tolerance. I hypothesize that their local kinship relationships grew stronger in the face of wider out-group rejections. These rejections also hardened justification for cultural reproduction through intermarriage. This composite identity of *mestiços* is a uniquely Mozambican creation, the result of uniquely Mozambican social realities.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first tried to tackle the definition of miscegenation and the subsequent racial labeling—self-identified and ascribed—present in descendants. The confusing vocabulary is not just a series of misnomers, but it is due to the absence of a theoretical framework to discuss race relations in a multi-racial, post-colonial African society. While South African literature would seem the most relevant at first glance, the political legacy of apartheid is too unique and the cultural heritage of the Coloured population is also too geographically specific to apply to the Mozambican experiences central to this study. So it is through the words of Indo-Mozambicans who self-identify as mixed-race that I tried to explain the layered dimensions of phenotype and ancestry that are employed in social settings to define identity and to project national loyalty. I conclude the chapter

by trying to understand the perceived differences among mixed-race people, particularly why those with Indo-Mozambican ancestry have to prove they belong in Mozambique while those with White ancestry are assumed to belong.

This chapter was difficult to write because I tried to debunk a variety of historically unfounded generalizations that have been socially employed to deny non-Black and non-White Mozambicans full belonging to the Mozambican national identity. Individuals who do not fit within the Black/White racial binary test narratives of Mozambican diversity and national belonging. Belonging for these non-binary groups is constantly contested; they are often compared to and pitted against one another. For example, a handful of *mulato* activists have been used to claim that all miscegenated people are more loyal and socially integrated than Indo-Mozambicans; the social currency that *mulatos* gain from this positive stereotype masks the fact that many mixed-race individuals are politically apathetic. Conversely, Indo-Mozambican political activists and public servants have had their legacies dismissed, and they have been dis-incentivized from taking on visible roles. These comparisons distract from the unsettling reality that racial and ethnic minorities are socially labeled as foreigners, despite their citizenship, political engagement, or long-time residence in Mozambique. The persistent gaze of foreignness undermines the integrity of Mozambique's multi-racial society, and I have attempted to understand why this phenomenon persists.

The “Othering” of the Indo-Mozambican is a fascinating thing to watch because it stands in the face of the historical verbiage that points to Portuguese colonial shipping records that logistically lead one to conclude that Indians have always been in Mozambique. Without contemporary scholarship to investigate historical claims, generalizations pervade in spite of other truths.

Despite their physical permanence, their miscegenated ancestry, and even their politically vocal few, Indo-Mozambican *mestiços*, in particular still struggle to be socially accepted as full citizens. Saadiq's overwhelming burden proof of national loyalty was just one of many examples I came across in my fieldwork. I found *mestiços* to be the Indo-Mozambican group most attached to the country. They were also less mobile than other Indo-Mozambican groups, and they often felt just as culturally distinct from other Indo-Mozambican groups as they felt from Black and White Mozambicans, as they related most closely with *mulatos*. From a migratory perspective, that they did not travel very far—even in times of insecurity. In spite of *mestiços*' lack of multiple citizenships and relatively limited access to the financial capital to relocate, Black Mozambicans projected upon *mestiços* a sense of migratory affluence. In so projecting, *mestiços* were often identified as *Indiano*, to indicate their foreign-ness, a connection with transnational networks they did not actually possess.

In particular, *mestiços* still struggle to be socially accepted as full citizens. They are often misidentified as *Indiano* to emphasize their foreign heritage and to insinuate transnational networks that most do not actually possess. I argue that *mestiços*, like many others of Indo-Mozambican heritage, can rarely shed the stigma of their *Indiano* ancestry and are always vulnerable to being socially labeled as immigrants. During the colonial period, miscegenation and political activism were tools to integrate. Post-colonial national identity, in contrast, was formed

in reaction to colonial realities that privileged settlers over native Blacks. In reaction, post-colonial society has demonstrated an ambivalence and distrust towards those once privileged groups.

In this context, the *mestiço* community in LM/Maputo is largely self-sustaining, reinforced by local family connections and solidified through a maze of traditional events and ceremonies geared at keeping relatives connected. The insular focus on family has been used to criticize *mestiços*' lack of social integration with outsiders. It is also used to support the belief that *mestiços*, and other Indo-Mozambicans, are not politically active.

I would argue that Indo-Mozambicans, as well as *mestiços*, are no more or less politically active in LM/Maputo than any other group. Further, as relative to their national population, Indo-Mozambicans are, perhaps over-represented in national politics and economy. The gaze of "foreignness," however, serves to discredit their contributions. That same gaze is used to dismiss even the exceptional political actors, as in no way representative of the larger community. If that gaze holds for Indo-Mozambicans, it should also hold for *mulatos*. Nevertheless, the double standard persists.

When viewed within the ambit of linkages across the global South, Indo-Mozambican *mestiços* are part of a much larger community of mixed-race Black and Indian communities around the world. Vivek Bald's 2013 book *Bengali Harlem* discusses the migratory patterns of single Indian men to the U.S. and their offspring with Puerto Rican and African-American women. Like in Mae's family, these mixed-race children were raised within their maternal cultures and, as result, associated more closely with that culture than their paternal Indian or Pakistani one.¹⁹⁴ In Trinidad and Tobago, this racial mix is called *dogla*, and their associations are perhaps more simplified because Blacks and Indians almost exclusively comprise the nation's population. The social implications of being *dogla* have shifted from the colonial to post-colonial era, in which political parties are divided precisely along opposing sectarian lines – Black versus Indian.¹⁹⁵ While specific experiences differ based on national context, it is an important area for future Indian diaspora and culture scholarship to consider *mestiços*, as a minority within the minority of their national context, but as part of a larger global cohort. My understanding from even cursory review of scholarship about these communities is that though they are continents apart they have much more in common than one might assume.

I conclude with final thoughts about the Indo-Mozambican *mestiço* community within its own national context. As a majority Black, but multi-racial society, Mozambique's nationalist rhetoric espouses full political equality of citizens of all racial groups; social integration, however, for both new and old immigrants (and their non-binary descendants) is still individually negotiated. Now firmly past the post-colonial transition, scholars in Mozambique would do well to research and define for themselves the applicable paradigms of race and social hierarchy. Such analysis demystifies localized processes of social and political nation building. Without a fuller academic

¹⁹⁴ Bald, Vivek. *Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013, pp.49-93.

¹⁹⁵ Niranjana, Tejaswini. *Mobilizing India: Women, Music, and Migration between India and Trinidad*. Duke Univ. Press, 2006.

analysis of how social hierarchy is formulated and mobilized in post-colonial Mozambique, ethnic minority groups—including Asians, mixed-race groups, naturalized citizens, and children of immigrants and refugees—can not be properly understood within their migratory contexts, incorporated within the national narrative, or fully considered Mozambican citizens. Further, such analysis would contribute to African perspectives in global dialogues on diversity and migration in modern societies and young democracies.

Section 4: Conclusion

Chapter 7 – Conclusion - Malleable Identities & Imagined Communities

When I started this study, I thought I knew the answers to the questions that I had originally posed. I thought I knew the questions that I had posed were the right questions to ask. Now, after three years of research and writing, I realize that the questions I had originally asked were not the right ones. When I first visited Maputo in 2013, I looked around and saw Indians (and their descendants) and Pakistanis (and their descendants) all over Maputo: as shop owners, at religious institutions, even as protagonists in recent literature. As I read Albie Sachs's *Running to Maputo* I realized that the man who died in Sachs's car bomb attack had an Indo-Mozambican surname.¹⁹⁶ Digging around for information about the plane crash that killed President Samora Machel, I realized that Aquino da Bragança was not the only Indo-Mozambican who died in the incident. Muradali Mamadhussein, a Press advisor, had also perished. As I realized that Indo-Mozambicans were pervasive and permanent in Maputo, I understood that studying them and their contributions to their country of residence would offer a new site for knowledge. It would contribute to the abundance of Indian diaspora scholarship already in social and academic use. My study, I resolved, would not just focus on migration patterns, but on the politics of belonging. In anchoring the study in the Lusophone world, over the Anglophone, I knew that this focus would create novel research results that could be applicable to many bodies of literature.

Literature on the Indo-Mozambican population started with 13th-15th century Portuguese records and Arab travel logs from the Swahili coast. These narratives captured the presence of monsoon migrant fishermen, those absorbed within the Arab merchant population, and the Goan elite who ran the *prazos* and the *feiras* that sold slaves and ivory. The history is documented. Whether or not those narratives are accurate is up for debate. But, the period after the 17th century to the present is a knowledge desert. There is still much to learn about which parts of Mozambique were sites for settlers and why. It is as if Indo-Mozambicans' origin story was assumed to continue unchanged into the present day. In my research, I question why that is, and I hypothesized that overlapping and competing colonial narratives, between British and Portuguese records, simply did not dedicate attention to a minority within their colonial subjects. Regardless of the cause, the contemporary presence of Asians, in general, and Indo-Mozambicans, specifically, is understudied and misunderstood.

Despite Indo-Mozambicans' overwhelming presence in Mozambique's origin story and their permanence in the country's urban economy, Mozambicans who do not share Indian subcontinent origins have an ambivalence about whether or not Indo-Mozambicans really belong in Mozambique. Black and White Mozambicans openly acknowledge the presence of their Asian compatriots, but they also speak of them as a distant Other. Somehow, Indo-Mozambicans are described as not being fully Mozambican. Even before Mozambique was independent, there was the belief that they were not fully Portuguese either. Throughout this study, Indo-Mozambicans were spoken about with caveats and parenthetical phrases. For some, Indo-Mozambicans could be Mozambican only to the extent that they were passport holders. For others, they knew of Indo-Mozambicans who had lived in the country their entire lives, but were, in fact, not Mozambican citizens. Or there were also the Mozambicans who used their residence or citizenship to exact certain business privileges. All of these expressions of Mozambican-ness were couched as

¹⁹⁶ Sachs, Albie. *Running to Maputo*. New York: Harper Collins, 1990. Print.

definitions of State legitimacy; they held no bearing in a discussion of social integration or national identity.

All of these realities were important social and political elements that I did not fully grasp when I set out to mark Indo-Mozambican presence, chart their migration, catalogue their sub-identities, and investigate their responses to insecurity in the 20th century. It was years after beginning this study that I re-read Mahmood Mamdani's work and understood its relevance beyond post-colonial British Africa. In his chapter, "Race and Ethnicity as Political Identities in the African Context," he argues that "ethnicity as a cultural identity is consensual, but when ethnicity becomes a political identity the legal and administrative organs of the state enforce it."¹⁹⁷ What has made this work so incredibly fascinating, and incredibly difficult, is the conflation—over time—of Indo-Mozambicans' consensual cultural identity with their shifting political identity. Further, as Eviatar Zerubavel, says in *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*, there is a social tendency to underestimate the power of time, and to assume a continuity among cultural groups or institutions, though members have changed and the socialization processes of the times were different.¹⁹⁸ In trying to force a narrative of linearity across chronology, I was constantly confronted by the multiple and fractured identities of Indo-Mozambicans. It took time for me to understand and accept those duplications and contradictions as data, rather than hindrances to writing a coherent narrative on cultural continuity.

I began my study with the events of 1947, because I naively believed that it was a beginning. For a variety of reasons, I expected that the religious divide of partitioning the subcontinent would create visible fault lines among the diaspora communities outside the subcontinent. I expected that the division of theology would also be reflected in a division of ideology and, thus, identity. Although all of that may be true, 1947 is really hard to analyze. Using oral histories as the centerpiece of my study meant that I needed to find living witnesses to that period. Those witnesses also needed to remember the time and, subsequently, be willing to discuss it. There are very few people in Maputo whom I was able to interact with who had any recollection of this period and its impact on Mozambique. The one person that I did find was Juman; and, when I sat down to talk with her, I was still in a phase of exploring my own positionality with regard to this work.

I was apprehensive to talk with her because I was preoccupied with how much she would tell me if I didn't look like me. Now, I can reflect on this as a question of methodology, but at the time it was more a question of being perceived as an outsider asking sensitive questions about a visible and vulnerable minority. Of course, now I realize that this is just the reality of doing ethnographic work. But then, I wondered if I would hear more, if she would tell me more, if I would understand better, if I would get the references, or if she would elaborate further if she and I had shared an identity? Moreover, I wondered, too if this work was sociology, rather than anthropology? How would my work change if she and I were the same kind of insider-outsider? Over time, I discovered that the assumption that I needed to identify was actually getting in my way. My respondents appeared to offer genuine recollections of their own experiences; local

¹⁹⁷ Mamdani, p. 7.

¹⁹⁸ Zerubavel, p. 37-43.

researchers suggested that perhaps they did so precisely because they did not fear intergroup animosity or social backlash from me, as an ethnic outsider and a foreigner.

Nevertheless, when I sat down to speak with Juman, I found it extremely fascinating to hear that Mozambique was a place of refuge and not a place of division. To hear that there had already been a well-established community of Indo-Mozambican Muslim merchants dating back to the last 1800s forced me to reconcile that 1947 was no beginning. Juman's story was an example of using business ties for family reunification. That transnational connection that brought Juman to Mozambique in 1946, essentially as refugees escaping the dangerous migration route between India to Pakistan, would become mythologized and politicized to allow an entire generation of Indo-Mozambicans to claim Pakistani citizenship after Goan annexation in 1961 and the end of Portuguese colonialism in 1975. As she tells it, dozens made Juman's journey; and, indeed, research now shows that thousands used her story to make an identity claim just decades later. Ironically, when Pakistani citizenship was mobilized in the 1960s, it was with the aim of maintaining Mozambique as a place of residence. Mozambique continued to be the preferred site of permanence, though multiple citizenships offered privilege, flexibility, and mobility. It took years after my conversation with Juman for me to process just how important her story would be to the development of my study and the historical narrative of Indo-Mozambicans in LM/Maputo.

Juman's memory come from her childhood. There are certain impressions that a child has that are vivid and valuable, even in spite of the dispersions one might cast about the accuracy of childhood memories. Scholars have reflected on the fragility of memory. Accepting a certain measure of historical inaccuracy, I understand oral narratives to be powerful for understanding identity, social dynamics, and collective memory. When we talked about her memories of coming to Mozambique, Juman did not give the country of Mozambique a place in her story. Her migration narrative was more a discussion of push factors out of India and the dangerous route to Pakistan. What mobilized her family was not an expectation of a better life in Mozambique. They were not aspiring to be part of an adopted community or assimilating into a foreign culture. She did not speak of understanding privileges and rights. Instead, Mozambique was a vague space that would facilitate her safety and unification with her family. It was not intended to be an adopted homeland.

As she recalled it, there were no misgivings about moving to Africa. I found this to be very powerful counter narrative that, as of the 1940s, Africa could be a site of salvation, a site of rebuilding. It was not a continent of refugee-sending countries. Instead, countries like Mozambique received refugees, as well as voluntary and involuntary migrants. That recent reality around African migration stands in stark contrast to present-day narratives that would tell otherwise. Juman's story, both for its place as the earliest in my chronology, as well as for the insights her substance and silences offered, presented powerful counter narratives for framing African migration, in general, and Mozambican migration, in particular.

It might seem odd that of all the elders I spoke with for this study, only Juman had any narrative that touched on partition. I realize now that the other elders came from a very different lineage. Jose, for example, is of Goan ancestry. As a Portuguese citizen, the division between India and Pakistan, the break between British India and these new countries, was out of sight and out of mind. Portuguese citizenship sheltered Jose from feeling the impact of those extremely turbulent geopolitical shifts. And, as the entire Indian subcontinent was swept up in changes of citizenship,

leadership, and identity, the Portuguese enclaves were somehow protected from that insecurity and, as result, were stuck in time.

That temporal permanence, of course, was later disrupted in the latter 20th century, as the newly created identity of independent India begins to harden around the idea that it must liberate the remaining colonial vestiges that share the subcontinent. Leaving behind the Portuguese enclaves in 1947 is, for independent India, a stain on its own national identity. India's inability to liberate Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Haveli, through negotiation, resulted in its use of military power. The Indian military forcibly annexed the enclaves after diplomatic talks failed. Yet, at a social level, it is easy to understand that Indian citizens who were liberated after 1947 found it abhorrent for their nation to accept continued Portuguese colonialism. Thereafter, the citizenry galvanized their sense of personal responsibility to spark Indo-Portuguese activism, and it was liberated Indians who tried to grow the notion of ethnic solidarity among Indo-Portuguese. Goans, for example, argue that their idea of activism was self-rule, not annexation. Indo-Mozambicans of Goan origin said that 1961 marked the beginning of Indian colonialism. Decades later, when I spoke with Indo-Mozambican interviewees of Goan origin about this time, they forcefully corrected my use of "independence." The misnomer used to describe the events of 1961 was incredibly offensive to them, and I later changed my entire approach to interviews about that time. Now, I discuss it as an annexation after a military invasion—language that seems neutral and historically accurate.

For Goan-origin interviewees, 1961 was a narrative of their victimhood. They were made helpless by the Indians who invaded their homeland and forced annexation. In Mozambique, they demonstrated their loyalty to the Portuguese colonial power, even though some did not agree with Portugal's retaliatory policy to deport Indian passport holders from Mozambique. In contrast to the events of 1974, which were based in a willful choice of independence and national liberation, 1961 was a time of forced identities underscored by layered positionalities. Goan annexation was fashioned as liberation by citizens of India, but popular sentiment among Goan Mozambicans was that India's idea of liberation was an imposed form of neo-colonialism. Although there were certainly people both within the enclaves and out (particularly in the Bombay area), who wanted annexation, there is strong evidence that Goans wanted their own independence. So, I came to understand that, as far as my respondents were concerned, "liberation" was as strong a misnomer as "independence." One could argue that these enclaves were to India and Portugal what Kashmir is to India and Pakistan today. These local histories of failed independence and forced annexation counter celebratory post-colonial metanarratives in Africa and Asia; further, they raise the possibility that recently liberated countries can also become neo-colonial actors.

When I started this study, I was completely oblivious to the events of 1961 and their importance on Mozambican migration and identities. It was only through multiple oral histories, as well as Portuguese language sources, that I was able to grasp the fact that the internment and deportation of Indian passport holders in Mozambique had even happened. Many respondents spoke interchangeably about the deportations in 1962 and the exodus of 1972-1976, as if they were the same thing. Even more complicated, English language resources about Mozambique did not speak about 1961-2 in any capacity. So, I did my best to track down primary source documents (not periodicals) to learn more about this forgotten migration. What I found in the Portuguese colonial records of Indo-Mozambican civic associations were records of incursions that pre-dated

even the successful 1961 invasion. Although I had not expected these association documents to yield much more than an insight into numbers of association members, they surprisingly became a roadmap to discovering that 1961 was a continuation of what had been its precursor in 1957 with the annexation of Dadra and Haveli. The geopolitical conflict between India and Portugal had reached its climax in 1961, only after years of tension and failed diplomatic negotiation between the two countries.

More specifically, the association records of 1957 showed that after Portuguese infantrymen were killed during an Indian incursion into Dadra and Haveli, Indo-Mozambicans had sent money to the families of fallen Portuguese soldiers. Hindu and Muslim associations donated to the Portuguese state's philanthropic funds; and I imagine that as a major conundrum and a serious test of belonging. The Indian assumption that Indo-Portuguese required an identity awakening became extremely problematic throughout Portugal's Indian Ocean colonies. With regard to the members of the associations, I cannot shake the idea that, in light of impending insecurity, they felt the acute sense to demonstrate a token of loyalty to their colonial master, to pre-empt local backlash. But even if they genuinely felt sympathy for the fallen soldiers and supported the continuity of Portuguese colonialism, it is clear that in the few years leading up to Indian annexation, Goans experienced pressure to choose between imposed identities. As with 1947, the annexation of Goa raised questions of how a migrant is affected by identity shifts in their homeland, though I still ask myself whether distance protects migrants from such changes or makes them even more vulnerable.

I can confidently say that 1961 was the most impactful historical rupture in Indo-Mozambican identity and migration during the 20th century. I would venture to guess that it extends beyond the 20th century, but I would welcome other scholars' exploration of that assumption. Among the Indo-Mozambican community at large, and the Goan descendants, specifically, these tensions of identity played out in fascinating ways. The rupture of 1961 forced Indo-Mozambicans to articulate their identities—both self and socially ascribed. The layers of positionality in Mozambique seemed to take shape among Goans even more so than those of Damão and Diu. Goans in Mozambique largely rejected the Indian identity, but also had to question their loyalty to Portugal, also a colonial master. They were careful not to publicly display any disappointment with Portugal's heavy-handed removal of Indian civilians. Doing so could mean their social ostracization in Mozambique. All of these dynamics played out under a rubric of power imbalance and political insecurity.

Indo-Mozambicans were not allowed to be agnostic. They were required to declare themselves publicly, first to the police state in declaring their citizenship, nationality, religion, and local assets to justify their continued existence in LM/Maputo. Even thereafter, people had to justify their identities in a court of public opinion; and in so doing, they outed each other. Those who could say that they had citizenship in Portugal were absent from the police stations and internment camps, for example. They were not subject to further inspections and the seizure of their goods, in the same way that British and Indian passport holders were. Their absence was publicly felt. Indian citizens who were subject to the deportation proceedings felt segregated and isolated. Perhaps, their expectation of Indo-Mozambican solidarity was based in an imaginary shared identity, which turmoil revealed was not authentic. This sense that shared identity and solidarity *should* exist was a strong undercurrent in my fieldwork and, ultimately, my findings.

From 1961, the manipulations of citizenship became fully visible. At that time, Indo-Mozambicans advocated for claims to become Pakistani citizens, seeking refuge in that citizenship despite never having prior interest. For instance, Nazar Abbas' 2014 "Friday Times" article detailed how Indo-Mozambican Muslims crossed identity lines and geographic barriers to appeal to General Ayub in Pakistan for citizenship. Ultimately, they got their visas from the Pakistani Embassy in Tanzania.¹⁹⁹ As these were Pakistanis who did not speak Urdu, who had never been to Pakistan, and who had no intentions to ever go, once again, Indo-Mozambican Muslims instrumentalized their religion to make it a tool to facilitate their citizenship.

These divisions of identities came to pass in the wake of 1961. Indian annexation was when I saw the Indo-Mozambican sub-identities defined, hardened, and publicly articulated. There were the people who identified as of Goan-origin, who largely knew nothing about the internment camps and deportation proceedings that affected Hindu, Indian passport holders. In contrast, the respondents of Hindu faith remember the events vividly. The importance of those events has been passed down intergenerationally. Entire families were splintered by the removals. It is at this time that the perception of LM/Maputo as a safe haven became retractable. Hindu respondents relayed feeling like helpless scapegoats, whose elders had played by colonial rules but fell victim to competing colonialisms nevertheless. They lost trust in Portugal *and* India. Generations later, the skepticism towards government remains palpable among Hindu Indo-Mozambicans. The question of their national loyalty to Mozambique, I believe, has to be contextualized within this history of violated trust.

For their part, Indo-Mozambican Muslims went through their own self-articulation process, and they have been deeply criticized by Portuguese and Indian passport holders for their strategic claims to Pakistani identity. The oral narratives continue to leave me questioning whether loyalty to Pakistan, and the Islamic faith that it is founded on, emerged before 1961 or after. So the narrative goes that there were genuine rights to Pakistani citizenship for Indo-Mozambican Muslims, just no immediacy to claim them. The year 1961, then, sparked that immediacy and forced an articulation of that existing loyalty. In my own experience, though, it is hard to say that with conviction. Many people saw getting Pakistani citizenship as a tool to avoid certain obligations and to sidestep adverse state policies, particularly military service. Since the 1960s, though, I would argue that in spite of their reasons for obtaining that citizenship, a loyalty since developed around Pakistani nationality and identity. These Indo-Mozambican Muslims with Pakistani citizenship also avoided much of the upheaval of 1975 because they were not Portuguese citizens by 1974, and they were not the target of the initial anti-Portuguese backlash.

I now see that Indo-Mozambicans and Black Mozambicans saw these years as signposts for different events. In 1961, Goa was annexed and until late-1962 Indo-Mozambicans were being deported. For Black Mozambicans, 1962 marks when FRELIMO was formed in Tanzania. Incursions started soon thereafter. For Indo-Mozambicans, 1974 was the latest in a string of geopolitical events that destabilized their citizenship and 1975 forced them to choose their residence based on where they could reestablish normalcy. For Black Mozambicans, 1974 signaled the success of FRELIMO's efforts and 1975 marked their full liberation from colonial oppression.

¹⁹⁹ Abbas, Nazar. "Pakistanis who have never seen Pakistan." The Friday Times. [Pakistan] 2014 Jan 10. <<http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/pakistanis-who-have-never-seen-pakistan/>>> Accessed on Feb 5 2017.

Indo-Mozambicans and Black Mozambicans lived in proximity, but did not share the same points of view about historical events, because such events affected them differently.

In the lead up to 1974's Carnation Revolution, which was soon followed by 1975's independence of Mozambique, there was a foreshadowing of FRELIMO's impending military success. There is a social contract believed to be held between the people of Mozambique and the post-colonial State, which was principally comprised of FRELIMO veterans. Even today, the power brokers who command respect are those people who fought for independence. There is a sense of national pride and debt owed to "antigo combatentes" (veterans of the liberation war). They are framed as the ones who sacrificed to give others freedom. Indo-Mozambican's lack of military service is sensitive subject in the conversation on their belonging. The agitation that crops up about Indo-Mozambicans and their lack of participation in the military really comes from this period between 1961 and 1974. The low number of Indo-Mozambicans among the antigo combatentes cast dispersions about Indo-Mozambican claims of entitlement to belong in the post-colonial nation.

When I talked with Mia Couto about this period, he also discussed the fact that FRELIMO had gone through its own debate about whether or not it would include a multi-ethnic platform to its rhetoric or if it would take a pro-Black, Africa for Africans model. As he explained it, there was a Simango faction that favored the latter, and the Machel rhetoric took the former. Machel's model was inclusive of ideological subscribers and rejected a racial binary. The predominant ideology was moving away from capitalism and embracing socialism. Ultimately, the FRELIMO party adopted the Machel ideology.²⁰⁰ The internal battle within FRELIMO set the external stage for a multi-ethnic and racially inclusive Mozambique, but it emerged on the heels of Uganda's Asian expulsion in 1972.

I had anticipated Indo-Mozambicans to hold the events of Uganda in close memory, but there proved to be a number of factors that mediated that. Among the cohort of Indo-Mozambicans who were aware of the expulsion there, there was a strong sense of fear that the same could happen in Mozambique. Yet, my fieldwork also gave me the impression that Mozambicans lacked basic news about things happening in the region. I am unsure if that pattern was part of a deliberate colonial policy or simply the result of linguistic isolation, but ultimately respondents' narratives about that time oscillated between complete ignorance about the Ugandan expulsion and absolute fear of it happening in Mozambique. I found both answers to be equally as common, which leaves this question of interconnectivity between Mozambique and its Anglophone neighbors open for future scholars to explore.

The independence of Mozambique sparked an exodus. Many of those who left were Indo-Mozambican. All religious groups took their leave of the country. Goans, for their part, went through a displacement that, for them, was framed similarly to the expulsion of Indian passport holders in 1961. I would argue that that is an overstatement, largely because Goans were at least given a choice of citizenship in 1975; but they remember this migration as highly coerced. By 1975, there was still a small Hindu minority who were Portuguese passport holders. Their already small community was subjected to yet another rupture, as many seized the 24/20 rule to depart Mozambique and twice migrate to Portugal. In fact, the website of the Hindu Association in Porto

²⁰⁰ Couto, Mia. Personal Interview. 2016.

and Lisbon indicates that those associations only exist because of the 1974 expatriations from Mozambique.²⁰¹ And even those few remaining British passport holders of Indian origin also took their leave of Mozambique and retreated to Britain, South Africa, and/or Rhodesia. My focus, however, was not so much on those who migrated, but on those who stayed behind.

What I came to understand of those who stayed behind was that those whose businesses were traditional brick and mortar establishments tried to stay. Those who had more flexible, mobile capital tried to remove it as soon as they could and expatriate their wealth elsewhere, mainly in Portugal. My conversations with the *Hindu Comunidade* indicate that no one went to India at this time, and very few went to South Africa. The vast majority of émigrés went to Portugal and then Britain. Instead, those who stayed behind, regardless of their reasons, were expected to adopt a sense of jubilation at the prospect of establishing a new socialist identity for their country.

Obviously there were some who genuinely subscribed to government mantras, but many—Indo-Mozambicans included—were skeptical. Some felt jilted by the hardline of citizenship that did not leave open the door to maintain the transnational ties that had bound families for generations. Others felt that the 24/20 policy was essentially the same as the Ugandan expulsion, though not based explicitly on racial rhetoric. Indeed, I felt that they had begrudgingly watched family members and friends leave and experienced that same sense of resentment in having to stay; everyone felt trapped. Those who stayed behind did not feel that they could make a successful life in Portugal and they also hoped that they could be the anchor for their family's future return. In the immediate term, they did not feel that they would be welcome in Portugal. The model of twice migrants of British East Africans who fled to Britain offered a sour example. It is my understanding that many people stayed behind in Mozambique for fear that the same could happen to them in Portugal.

The years after 1974 were followed by the implementation of socialist policies of President Machel. The policies were deeply preoccupied with rehabilitating and re-educating the population to become productive, socialist actors. Poorly implemented national policies like “Operação Produção” undermined those efforts and eroded public trust. Censorship became the antidote. People stopped talking about what was going on and they avoided debating differences, especially differences of opinion. The multi-ethnic inclusion was seen as a top down policy. The Machel government and his political speeches showed that he made it legal to police speech, especially speech about difference. Distinctions, even when absent of a value judgment, were understood to be punishable by law. I got the sense that in this environment, Indo-Mozambicans made every effort to minimize their identities and curtail activities that could be perceived as divergent. Even those of Indian or Pakistani lineage who identified as mixed-race seemed to latch on to this *mulato* or *mestiço* identity to strategically distance their Indian subcontinent identity markers.

To openly identify as Indo-Mozambican was to self-identify as an “Other” to the nascent and fragile Mozambican “Self.” This “Self” was so weak at the time that the State demanded Mozambican citizenship as an exclusive identity, in hopes that other cultural markers would disappear or diminish. In the conversation on multi-ethnic inclusion, to be of Indian or Pakistani origin was framed as more threatening than being *mulato* or *mestiço*. Speaking native languages and identifying as a hybrid with indigenous communities were seen as demonstrations of

²⁰¹ Meeting with Administrations. 2017.

belonging. *Mulatos* ' belonging to Mozambique and their citizenship rights were less debated than those of Indo-Mozambicans.

Mulatos, as a term, came to include many different mixtures. Whereas the Hispanic-colonial context gave way to codified vocabularies of caste that included *mulatos* (Black and White mixes), *mestiços* (Native and White mixes), and *Criollos* (Whites born in the colony), in Mozambique what developed was the inconsistent use of *mulato*, *mestiço*, and *mixto* (mixed) to explain a people of vastly different lineages. There were no defined separations of meaning in these mixtures and no means of requesting proof of authenticity. Terms were associated more with phenotype than parentage. In effect, the vast majority of urban LM/Maputo residents of Indian subcontinent origin could pass for *mulatos* without much debate and live with much less public scrutiny. Indo-Mozambicans' oscillations with citizenship, though often sparked by external threats to their person or livelihood, were—and still are—seen as cause for suspicion, at best, and proof of disloyalty, at worst. For this population, their Mozambican citizenship, national identity, and loyalty to the nation are always being questioned.

Dating back to the early 1920s, *Mulatos* in Mozambique have had a long history of speaking truth to power through literature. The anti-racist poetry of Noémia de Sousa and the writing of João Albasini are part of this legacy. The *mulato* middle-class was vocal in fighting for equality, but they were also accused of advocating for their own privilege. What this means for Indo-Mozambicans who might have passed for or been likened to *mulatos* is that their silences identified them as *not* politically active. They were painted as politically disengaged and disconnected from social movements. Nothing obliges anyone to be engaged, but Indo-Mozambicans, above other non-binary groups, were stereotyped as being deliberately outside the political process. For the gap between expectation and reality, Indo-Mozambicans have been socially vilified. Even politically active Indo-Mozambicans or *mestiços* (*mixed Indo-Mozambican and Black*), like Marcelino dos Santos and Aquino da Bragança have not reversed the negative public perception of the de-politicized Indo-Mozambican. I am sympathetic to these optics; though research has shown that Indo-Mozambicans have a long and sordid history with being targeted by colonial and post-colonial governments. I think the expectation that they would vocalize their political position, in support of any regime, is unrealistic. Their community is small. The solidarity among sub-groups is not as cohesive as Blacks and Whites assume. They are visible minorities, and most rely on their mobility, not their nationality, to provide long-term stability.

The Gulamo Nabi case remains a poignant one. What I found most telling about the Nabi case was that there was no public appetite to defend Indo-Mozambican interests. Although most people survived the socialist years because of black markets, no one came to Nabi's defense when he was criminalized for his own involvement. I have never experienced economic and political realities that would drive a government to penalize shrimp smuggling with death. I can only assume, then, that the quantities in question and the expected uses of his earnings were the principal driver for such a harsh penalty. For instance, I try to understand this scenario by swapping out King shrimp and Tiger prawn for rhino horn or ivory tusk. In such an instance, I can imagine the environmental impact and the concern over funding criminal networks. Only in this context is it understandable why Gulamo Nabi is framed as such an unsympathetic character. I am still uncomfortable with the silence around the other members of the smuggling ring who were supposedly never prosecuted. It is interesting that those who came out in Nabi's defense were

representatives from Libya, an Islamic State, not from Mozambican locals. Anecdotally, this kind of external advocacy is said to have had a precedent in Indira Gandhi's appeals to the FRELIMO government to spare Indian fishermen in Mozambican waters. Nevertheless, this criminalized merchant identity was very closely correlated with being a foreigner and being defended only by an external power, as well as by acting in contrast to accepted rules and norms that governed the national sphere in Mozambique.

Moving forward, I had expected that 1992 would be the turning point; it was then that Indo-Mozambicans in exile first understood that it was safe to return. However, I had erroneously believed that the people that I was seeing in the streets in 2014 were returnees, but—with few exceptions, like Salim Saco and Rama—that simply was not the case. Very few people whom I met during my fieldwork had ever emigrated from Mozambique at any point in their lives. The importance of this realization is that it debunks the idea that 1992 ushered in an immediate shift of development and security. For Mozambique's most visible minority, however, 1992 did not give them the confidence that they or their interests would be protected. So, what I found fascinating was that the migrations away from Mozambique by Indo-Mozambicans was largely permanent. Those who left rarely came back. Those who stayed behind continue to sustain the contemporary composition of the Indo-Mozambican population of today (though Hindus and Muslims continue to marry partners from India, Pakistani, the Gulf States, and the Southern African region).

During the time of my research, kidnappings and ransoms of Indo-Mozambicans, as well as Indian and Pakistani passport holders, remained a pervasive menace. The reasons for this pattern are beyond the scope of this study, but this phenomenon leads me to believe that Mozambique in the 21st century is not any safer for Indo-Mozambicans than the 20th century. The assumptions of wealth of this visible minority continued to make them a target for petty crime, even when political crime had dissipated. Although a sense of physical safety proliferated the national landscape, targeted threats against the Indo-Mozambican community continued even after 1992. It should go without saying that there are many Indo-Mozambicans today who do not live in Mozambique, precisely because they fear for their safety due to these assaults. I will never know how these attacks affected my findings, but I do believe that they made it harder to access Indo-Mozambican Muslims. I imagine that such attacks made people turn inward, forced them to only circulate where they felt safe, and to be weary of newcomers.

Despite all of these challenges, I could never have accomplished this study without access to Indo-Mozambican interviewees and their willingness to share intimate memories. Their narratives, passed down through the generations and relayed to me in the modern day, “account for *time as lived*, not synchronically or diachronically, but in its multiplicity and simultaneities, its presences and absences, beyond the lazy categories of permanence and change beloved of so many historians.”²⁰² I believe their memories—whether wholly accurate or not—were honest to their recollections. More so than their memory gaps, I was most concerned that this body of lived experience was absent from contemporary national narratives. Indo-Mozambicans being framed as Others within the larger national context does a disservice to the overall history of Mozambique. Not talking about Indo-Mozambicans in their full diversity means that gaps in contemporary history are left unexplored: internment, deportations, censorship, etc. The disparate affect of state policies and social justice systems on national minorities have gone uninvestigated in

²⁰² Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 8.

Mozambique. For me, in minimizing the culture of the nation's most visible ethnic minority, the post-colonial State undermined its own rhetoric of ethnic unification. Because Indo-Mozambican sub-narratives are not dealt with in relationship to national meta-narratives, I have to ask if Mozambique is genuinely a multi-ethnic society.

There are gaps in the national narrative that can be filled by looking at the sub-narrative of Indo-Mozambicans' experiences in the country. Were future scholars to explore other national minorities, like Chinese-origin Mozambicans in the 19th century, perhaps other rich elements of the nation's history would also be uncovered. What national minorities experience in times of forced insecurity and migratory instability could be understood as individual responses to government policies and adversarial social pressures. In this particular study, I hoped to take the temperature of all of these particular elements, by investigating only four pivotal moments in recent history. I leave open the possibility that there are many more moments worth exploring.

I welcome, and have many suggestions for, future collaborative scholarship that could expand on this thesis. Future research should endeavor to delve more deeply into the Pakistani nexus. This study did not yield many oral stories from Indo-Mozambicans who identify as Pakistani, but surely they exist. As an additional area to expand this research, I think any future examinations of cross-border migrations between LM/Maputo and South Africa must address illegal trade and transit in both directions. Anecdotally, I heard much about the Nataal-Delagoa Bay connection, though I did not have the capacity to focus on it. By centering my study on the stories of those who remained in Maputo, I accepted that I would not get reliable data about that other route. Similarly, this study was not meant to illuminate the experiences of those who left Mozambique for Portugal, India, or elsewhere. This study is a contribution to understanding the permanence of those left behind or those who returned to Mozambique between 1947 and 1992. This study could be a point of departure for comparative scholarship about those who emigrated.

Last, I would challenge future scholars, particularly Mozambican ones, to tackle the intertwined history of Indian and Arab identities in East Africa. The 13th century to current day narratives conflate these two identities as if they were synonymous. Although they are closely related, I would argue that they are not the same. Very different lineages could be dissected in much the same way that this study has done with regard to Indo-Mozambicans in the capital. The narrative of ambiguity is both a cause and an effect of the distancing of Indo-Mozambican identity from the badge of Mozambican belonging. The carelessness with which these Asian and Middle Eastern cultures are conflated and overgeneralized is indicative of their perceived Othering to the Mozambican Self. The overgeneralization persists in the etymology of terms used to describe, define, and identify various Indo-Mozambican sub-identity groups. It is also done with a mind to phenotype, without a care to authentic parentage or offensive connotation. Historical inaccuracy about people of these lineages is ingrained in national mythology, down to the country's origin story of Mussa bin Bique—who no one has seriously investigated. He is interchangeably touted as Muslim, Arab, Indian, a ruler, a merchant, a local villager, and, yet and still, the progenitor of the nation's name. One should ask if the Indo-Mozambicans of today are descendants of those original families, or if this mythology is being capitalized upon by new migrants who do not actually share any ties. In understanding migration, I wonder if this imagined identity has generated an assumed right to flexible citizenship for people who share a phenotype, but no genetic or genealogical claim.

of authenticity. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Indian and Arab permanence in the country is well documented and that their contributions—for better or for worse—are valuable to explore.

I conclude by placing this study within an African context, where memory is very long and often transmitted orally. Family, genealogy, and origin stories matter. Mozambicans, in particular, regularly identify themselves by who their grandparents are, which serves the same purpose as the West African custom of asking where one's umbilical chord is buried. These questions about the names of ancestors, where they are from, where *you* are from, are deeply important. They are not mere social pleasantries. In places like Mozambique, families and neighbors replace the State in providing basic social services. Ancestry matters for land rights and inheritance. Claiming space and entitlement to permanence is deeply connected to names and ancestries. For Indo-Mozambicans to have a mythology, but not to have a lineage, is an important distinction. It matters because in these geographies, being present is not the same as belonging. Being tolerated is not the same as being welcomed. Being welcomed and belonging entails proof of genealogy and both are earned through assimilation. This study, therefore, contributes to understanding how the global South, and African nations in particular, incorporates immigrants as ethnic minorities and absorbs them into a national identity. Identity differences that fall outside the Black-White binary can be strategically instrumentalized either to trigger unrest or to seek solidarity. Indo-Mozambicans have examples that go in both directions.

Annex 1
Glossary

Term	Definition
Candongueiro/candonga	Informal vendor/the black market
Cantina/cantineiro	General store/shopkeeper of a general store
Carnation Revolution	The military coup that overthrew the authoritarian regime in Portugal. 25 April 1974.
Chibalo	Conscripted/forced contract labor
Delagoa Bay	A euphemism for LM/Maputo. Actually corresponds to Maputo Bay today.
Diaspora	A dispersed population who share a geographic origin; term is particularly used for those whose migration or dispersal was forced or coerced.
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique The Liberation Front—political party and independence movement
Catembe/Katembe	Neighborhood of Maputo that can be reached by boat from downtown; Maputo Bay
Lusaka Accords	1984 ceasefire agreement signed in Zambia between Angola and South Africa during the Angolan Civil War; an attempt the end Second Congo War
Mafalala	Reed city/Neighborhood for Blacks in LM/Maputo nearest downtown
Nikkah	Religious marriage for Muslims
Operação Produção	A 1983 post-independence policy in which Mozambicans deemed “unproductive,” (i.e. unemployed, underemployed, single mothers, uneducated or otherwise undesirable people were forcibly removed from overcrowded cities and relocated to community farms in rural areas of the country)
Post-colonial studies	The study of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism on affected cultures and nations
RENAMO	The Mozambican National Resistance; a former militant group and current political party that stands in opposition to FRELIMO
Subaltern studies	The study of any person considered a minority, marginalized or inferior. Typically centered on postcolonial and post-imperial societies. This work particularly came from South Asian scholars in the late 1970s

Transnational migration	settlement across international borders whereby settlers maintain connections with their country of origin and their new country
Ummah	Islamic Diaspora
Xipamanine	A famous neighborhood and market in LM/Maputo where many Indo-Mozambican vendors reside and work

Annex 2
Timeline

VI Century	Believed to be the period in which the region of Sofala was founded by the Persian dynasty of Sassanidas
X Century	Sofala is referred to in documents by Persian Ibn Shahriyar and the Arab Al-Mas'udi
1154	Arab source stated that gold and iron is transiting Sofala
XVI Century	Probable establishment of the Sultanate of Angoxe (also spelled Angoche) by refugees of Quiloa (also spelled Kilwa)
1505	Portuguese establish a market—fort of Sofala
1507	Portuguese establish a market—fort of Mozambique Island
1511	Portuguese attack Angoxe, where the Arab-Swahili have formed a nucleus of resistance and used Zambeze (river) as a means to penetrate the interior
XVII Century	The first Hindu Temple constructed on Mozambique Island, by order of the Viceroy of India, Sebastian de Morais
1721-30	Market of Holland in the bay of Maputo is established
1752	The Portuguese markets and commercial depots in Mozambique were transferred to the administrative dependence of Portugal, separated from the colonial possessions of India and its Viceroy
1762	A written document referred to the exit of 1100 slaves from Mozambique in that year
1765	A document referred to the existence of 100 “Prazos” (plots of land held by Portuguese colonials for a specific period of time) in Mozambique
1815-20	Annually 15-20 thousand slaves departed Mozambique
1836	First abolition of traffic in slaves
1840	Now only 46 “Prazos” in Mozambique
1842	New abolition of traffic in slaves
1869	Slavery is abolished in the Portuguese colonies
1875	The first labor code; in the south, Mozambicans emigrate to Natal
1877	Emigration is officialized to Natal and the Cape (assumed to encompass what is today both Eastern and Western Capes)
1884-5	Berlin Conference divides Africa among European powers
1887	Construction of the Lourenço Marques—Transval railway
1898	The capital of Mozambique was relocated from Ilha de Moçambique to Lourenço Marques
1908	Shree Ram Hindu Temple in Salamanga is constructed
1909	Convention between Portugal and the Transval about the use of the port of LM and Mozambican labor
1914-1918	1 st World War; in Mozambique (1915-18) contributed over 12,000 African soldiers and 90,000 workers. During this period, there were records of rural uprisings against military and administrative penetration of the Portuguese.
1945	The Hindu Temple <i>Bharat Samaj Ved Mandir</i> in LM is inaugurated.

1948	Apartheid began in South Africa.
February 1950	Government of India approached the Portuguese government about the future of Portugal's colonies in India. Portugal asserts that overseas territories are integral to the Portuguese nation and identity.
1952-1954	Dadra and Nagar Haveli , two landlocked Portuguese exclaves in India, were isolated from Portuguese access and eventually annexed by India.
16 June 1960	Massacre of Mueda occurred when Makonde nationalists were killed by Portuguese administrators after Makondes were invited to publically present their grievances.
December 1961	India invaded Goa in a military operation named Operation Vijay. India annexed Goa, Daman, and Diu.
1962	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was founded as a nationalist movement in Tanzania to resist Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique.
1965	Indo-Pakistani War (seventeen-day war)
1965	Rhodesia is declared a state by Ian Smith.
3 February 1969	Founding President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, is assassinated in Tanzania.
1970	Operation Gordian Knot was the largest Portuguese military campaign to quell anti-colonial infiltration by FRELIMO fighters.
1971	Bangladesh Liberation War
26 March 1971	Independence of Bangladesh
August 1972	Idi Amin expelled Indians from Uganda.
April 1974	Coup d'état in Lisbon (Carnation Revolution) ended Portuguese fascism and colonialism.
7 September 1974	Counter-coup launched by Portuguese settlers in LM in response to Lusaka Accords signing and the naming of FRELIMO as the ruling, post-independence party.
20 September 1974	Joaquim Chissano named Prime Minister of FRELIMO transitional government.
1975	Maputo's population is approx. 250,000 people. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO; <i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i>) is established with the sponsorship of the Rhodesian Intelligence Services.
25 June 1975	Mozambique declared its independence after a year of transitional government.
February 1976	The city of Lourenço Marques was renamed Maputo.
1977	Mozambican civil war (16 years war) began between RENAMO and FRELIMO.
1979	Rhodesia disassembled and Zimbabwe established.
December 1981- January 1982	Ministry of Interior led campaign against smuggling. 550 arrests made. Convicted sent to re-education camps.

June 1982	President Machel implements pass law requirement for travel document for internal travel (guia de marcha); imposes curfew on Maputo residents.
1983	Legal amendments were made to law 2/79 to create 1/83, which stated that smuggling and armed assaults were punishable by the death penalty.
1983	Maputo's population was approximately one million people.
May/June 1983 – May 1988	Operação Produção (Operation Production re-education camps implemented). More than 50,000 people were forcibly relocated to rural camps in underpopulated parts of the country.
1 April 1983	Goolam (Gulamo) Nabi was sentenced to death by firing squad.
17 April 1983	Goolam (Gulamo) Nabi was publicly executed by firing squad in Hulene (with 5 other convicted men).
16 March 1984	Nkomati Accord (non-aggression pact between Mozambique and the apartheid government of South Africa) was signed in Komatipoort, South Africa.
19 October 1986	President Machel dies in mysterious plane crash in Mbuzini, South Africa. Among the thirty-four passengers that died on the flight, Aquino de Bragança, scholar of Goan origin, and Muradali Mamadhussein, Press Secretary, also perished.
4 October 1992	Rome Peace Accords were signed to end the Mozambican civil war (16 years war) between FRELIMO and RENAMO.
27 April 1994	Apartheid ends in South Africa.

Annex 3 Demographics and Statistics

Distribution of Professions by Racial Groups in Lourenço Marques in 1890²⁰³

Racial Groups and Professions		Yellow %	Indian %	White %	Black %	Total/Activities %
Agriculture and Fisheries		11.1	0.0	88.9	0.0	1.9
Operations and Artisan		0.0	20.4	76.1	3.4	9.7
Construction and Public Works		31.0	7.0	61.9	0	7.8
Commerce and Banking		3.4	50.0	44.3	2.2	35.3
Transport and Communication		0.0	0.0	93.5	6.5	8.5
Service and Administration		0.0	23.0	72.6	4.2	12.9
Domestic Service		1.1	27.0	25.9	45.5	9.4
Non-professional		.7	6.2	71.1	21.9	14.1
Population Total		4.1	26.6	59.6	9.6	100

Source: Zamparoni Adaption (1989), by Maloa

British Indian Population in Mozambique in 1890²⁰⁴

Place (from north to south)	Population
Ibo	100
Mozambique District	250
Mozambique Island	350
Parapat	250
Quelimane	300
Sofala District including Beira	250
Delagoa Bay (Lourenço Marques)	250
Delagoa Bay Interior	500
Crews of dhows	200
Sepoys	200
Total	2,650

Source: RTCDM 1890. P.12

Highlights by author, N. Allen

Population LM 1894-1928²⁰⁵

	1894	1928	Var.
Europeans	591	8988	15.2
Indians	226	3010	13.3
Indo Brit	136	1342	9.86
Indo Port	90	1668	18.5

²⁰³ Maloa, Joaquim Miranda, 137.

²⁰⁴ Oishi, Takashi. "Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. P. 6-7

²⁰⁵ Leite & Khouri, 32.

Statistic of Individuals by Muslim Religion – District of Lourenço Marques 1907

	Portuguese Shia	Portuguese Sunni	British Shia	British Sunni
Lourenço Marques circumscription	10	424	14	516
Manhiça circumscription	1	0		
Sabié circumscription	1	39	0	68
Total	12	463	14	584

Population of Mozambique District in 1908²⁰⁶

Nationality	Europeans			Asiatics			Africans	Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male/Female	
Portuguese	373	48	421	190	5	195	360000	360616
British	12	0	12	563	57	620	0	632
German	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
French	4	8	12	0	0	0	0	12
Other	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Total	400	56	456	753	62	815	360000	361271

Source: RTCPM1908. P.40

(Highlights by Author N. Allen)

Population of LM/Maputo – does not include Matola (1940-2013)²⁰⁷

Year	Total Population	African Population
1940	68,223	45,632
1950	93,265	57,755
1960	178,546	122,460
1970	378,348	300,495
1980	755,300	*
1997	946,312	*
2001	1,074,645	*
2013	1,209,993	*

²⁰⁶ Oishi, Takashi. "Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s-1930s." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50.2 (2007): 287-324. Web. p. 6-7

²⁰⁷ Morton, David Simon. "Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times." Diss. U of Minnesota, 2015. *Age of Concrete: Housing and the Imagination in Mozambique's Capital, c. 1950 to Recent Times*. University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Web. <<http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/181959>>. P 7.

Annex 4 Contemporary and Historical Maps

Contemporary


Map 1 and 2. Mozambique. Município de Maputo. Conselho Municipal de Maputo. *Perfil ESTATÍSTICO do Município de Maputo 2004-2007*. Maputo, 2007.

Mapa 1. Localização Geográfica




Fonte: Pelouro de Infraestruturas

Mapa 2. Divisão Administrativa do Município de Maputo




Fonte: Pelouro de Infraestruturas

Map 3. 2019 Maputo City map by neighborhood. by Danilo Alane.




Historical

Map 5. Lourenço Marques, 1876.²⁰⁸



²⁰⁸ Zamparoni, Valdemir. "A morada do homem e o mundo da mulher": trabalho, gênero e raça numa sociedade colonial, Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, nas primeiras décadas do século XX." <http://www.desafio.ufba.br/gt3-010.html#b3>. Accessed 8 March 2019.

Map 5. 1964 Town Plan of Lourenço Marques. Copyright C.A. Vieira da Silva



Annex 5
Questionnaires (Portuguese and English)

Identidade Própria:

- Qual é o seu nome?
- Qual é a sua idade? Em que ano você nasceu?
- Qual é a sua filiação religiosa?
- Qual é o seu país de nascimento / nacionalidade?
- Em que bairro você mora?
- Qual é o seu nível de escolaridade? Profissão?
- Quantas pessoas vivem em sua casa? Descrever as relações.
- Qual foi o nível de educação/profissão da primeira pessoa em sua família a vir para Moçambique?
- A quanto tempo você pessoalmente vive em Moçambique? Maputo, especificamente?
- Você se identifica como imigrante em Moçambique? Se assim for, por que e de que geração?
- Com que nacionalidade ou grupo étnico você se identifica?
- Quando foi a primeira vez que você lembra de identificar-se como tal?
- Quando foi a primeira vez que você lembra de alguém ter o identificado com este grupo ou nacionalidade?

Por favor, utilize o mapa na página seguinte para identificar e datar o seguinte (usando lápis de cor):

- Onde você nasceu:
- Onde você já viveu por mais de um ano:
- Onde você reside actualmente:
- Onde sua mãe nasceu:
- Onde sua mãe reside actualmente / viveu até à hora da sua morte:
- Onde seu pai reside actualmente / viveu até à hora da sua morte:
- Onde o seu cônjuge nasceu:
- Onde o seu cônjuge já viveu por mais de um ano:
- Onde o seu cônjuge reside actualmente:
- Identificar as áreas no mapa onde você se sente ligado, mesmo que não tenham sido previamente identificados. Explique por que:

Se necessário, vários mapas podem ser fornecidos e rotulados com as distinções acima citadas.



Descreva brevemente como a sua família veio a residir em Moçambique (se for o caso, por que especificamente em Maputo)?

Resumidamente, descreva por que você, pessoalmente, ter residido em Moçambique até agora (se for o caso, por que especificamente em Maputo) e por que você optou por não migrar para outro lugar?

Por favor, faça uma lista dos países nos quais você tenha residência e/ou cidadania (ou seja, você tem um passaporte e/ou o equivalente a um DIRE):

Você ou algum membro de sua família mais próxima já fez um pedido de asilo? Se sim, em que país e em que ano?

O que, em particular, fez você/sua família migrar para Moçambique, em vez de um outro país?

Quando você ou sua família migrou para Moçambique, quanto tempo você/sua família pretende ficar?

Você pretende passar o resto de sua vida em Moçambique? Por favor, explique sua resposta.

A maioria da sua família/amigos compartilham o mesmo background de migração ou origem étnica como você? Por favor, identifique o background/origens dos seus amigos mais próximos:

Por favor, faça uma lista de qualquer/todas as línguas que você fala.

A maioria dos seus amigos/familiares listados acima também falam estas línguas, em sim, por favor descreva:

Você ou alguém de sua família mais próxima envia dinheiro ou bens para a alguém no subcontinente Indianoo? Se assim for, o nome da cidade, país para onde são enviados e o seu relacionamento com o destinatário:

Alguma vez você já exerceu o seu direito de voto em Moçambique? Quando? Por quê? Por que não?

Você é membro de qualquer partido político em Moçambique?
Alguma vez você já exerceu o seu direito de voto no seu país de origem étnica? Quando? Por quê? Por que não?

Você é membro de qualquer partido político em seu país de origem étnica? O que você considera ser o seu país de origem e por quê?

Nomeie os países nos quais passou pelo menos um mês durante os últimos 5 anos:

Identidade Ancestral:

- Sabe quando seus antepassados emigraram do subcontinente Indianoo? Qual geração imigrante você é para Moçambique?
- O que você sabe de seus antepassados e da sua casta, classe, profissões, funções religiosas no subcontinente Indianoo/historicamente?
- Você participa actualmente em quaisquer rituais, tradições e/ou práticas que estão ligadas a aspectos de sua identidade/afiliação ao subcontinente Indianoo?

Identidade Contemporâneo social:

- O que você sente que faz de você um membro da nacionalidade/etnia acima mencionada? Existem rituais, tradições ou práticas que você segue que você acredita que lhe conectam com essa identidade?

- Quantas vezes você se comunica com amigos e parentes que vivem no país de origem étnica por si declarado? Quais são as formas de comunicação que você usa (e-mail, telefonemas, fax, SMS, WhatsApp, facebook / twitter, etc.)?
- Existem práticas que você segue no seu país que você acredita que também sejam praticadas no subcontinente hoje?
- Você já viajou para o subcontinente Indianoo? Porquê / Por que não? Com que frequência e com que finalidade? O quão da sua identidade está relacionado a ligações contemporâneas que você tem com o subcontinente Indianoo, ao contrario de laços históricos?
- Em Maputo, você é normalmente identificado por outros como sendo de origem do subcontinente Indianoo? Por favor, explique por que ou por que não.
- Você já foi vítima de discriminação/racismo/violência étnica como resultado de sua origem no subcontinente Indianoo?
- Você acredita que você ou alguém de sua família imediata tem sido sempre o alvo de crimes, como resultado de sua origem no subcontinente Indianoo?
- Quais são as suas impressões sobre o subcontinente Indianoo contemporâneo, especialmente as cidades/países onde você tem raízes ancestrais?
- Você é um membro de um grupo religioso, de negócios, civil, comunitário, ou de actividade? Se assim for, por favor de fazer uma lista.
- Você, seus pais, e/ou o seu cônjuge possuem imóvel próprio? Se assim for, por favor, o nomeie as cidades/países.
- Quantas vezes você faz o seguinte (anualmente)?
 - Vai a um local de culto
 - Visita o centro comunitário
 - Tem uma refeição fora da sua casa
 - Tem uma refeição em um restaurante
 - Participa de eventos culturais
 - Vai para bares /pubs / clubes
 - Vai para cafês/ lounges
 - Vai ao ginásio ou pratica desportos em grupo

Experiência Histórica Sócio-Política:

- Onde você estava quando os seguintes eventos aconteceram? Como você se lembra desses eventos? Como é que cada um desses eventos afectou-o e/ou a sua família/amigos mais próximos?

- A divisão da Índia e do Paquistão em 1947
- A morte de Muhammad Ali Jinnah, em 1948
- A morte de Mahatma Gandhi em 1948
- O fim do domínio Português em Goa em 1961
- A morte de Jawaharlal Nehru em 1964
- O surgimento de Bangladesh no Paquistão Oriental em 1971
- A expulsão ordenada a dos asiáticos do Uganda em 1972
- A independência de Moçambique de Portugal em 1975

- O início da guerra civil Moçambicana em 1977
- A morte de Samora Machel em 1986
- O fim do apartheid na África do Sul 1990-1993
- O fim da guerra civil Moçambicana em 1992

Qual dos eventos históricos listados acima teve o maior impacto para sobre você pessoalmente e por quê?

Por favor, descreva como qualquer um dos eventos acima listados afetou as suas decisões migratórias, seja para ficar ou para sair de Moçambique.

Existiram outros eventos históricos que influenciaram suas decisões de migração, seja para ficar ou para sair de Moçambique? Se assim for, por favor, nomeei-as e diga por quê.

Existe alguma coisa que eu não perguntei que você acredita ser relevante para se discutir, com relação a como você se auto-identificar (eticamente/nacionalmente)?

Existe alguma coisa que eu não perguntei que você acredita ser relevante para discutir, com relação ao padrão de decisões migração da sua família?

Quaisquer outras declarações/comentários:

Questionnaire (English)

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican* **NAFEESAH ALLEN**

Self Identity:

- What is your name?
- What is your age? What year were you born?
- What is your religious affiliation?
- What is your country of birth/ nationality?
- What neighborhood do you live in?
- What is your education level? Profession?
- How many people live in your home? Describe relationships.
- What was the education level/profession of the first person in your family to come to Mozambique?
- How long have you personally lived in Mozambique? Maputo, specifically?
- Do you identify as an immigrant to Mozambique? If so, why and of what generation?
- What nationality or ethnic group do you identify with?
- When is the first time you recall identifying yourself as this?
- When is the first time you recall having someone else identify you with this group or nationality?

Please use the map on the following page to identify and date the following (using colored pencils):

- Where you were born: _____
- Where you have lived for more than one year: _____
- Where you currently reside: _____
- Where your mother was born: _____
- Where your mother currently resides/lived until time of death: _____
- Where your father currently resides/lived until time of death: _____
- Where you spouse was born: _____
- Where your spouse has lived for more than one year: _____
- Where your spouse currently resides: _____
- Identify any areas on the map where you feel connected, even if not previously identified. Explain why:

If necessary, multiple maps can be provided and labeled with the above named distinctions.

Questions adapted from various sources including:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
http://www.itisf.it/COMENIUS/comenius_13/pdf/final_questionnaire.pdf

Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican*
NAFEESAH ALLEN



Briefly describe how your family came to reside in Mozambique (if applicable, why specifically in Maputo)?

Briefly describe why you personally have resided in Mozambique until now (if applicable, why specifically in Maputo) and why you have not chosen to migrate elsewhere?

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
http://www.itisff.it/COMENIUS/comenius_13/pdf/final_questionnaire.pdf
Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican*
NAFEESAH ALLEN

Please list the countries for which you have residency and/or citizenship (i.e. you have a passport and/or the equivalent of a DIRE): _____

Have you or any member of your immediate family ever filed for asylum? If so, in which country and in which year?

What in particular made you/your family migrate to Mozambique, instead of another country?

When you or your family migrated to Mozambique, how long did you/your family intend to stay?

Do you intend to spend the rest of your life in Mozambique? Please explain your answer.

Do the majority of your family/friends share the same migration background or ethnic origin as you? Please identify the background/origins of your closest friends:

Please list any/all languages that you speak.

Do the majority of your friends/family listed above also speak these languages, if so, please elaborate:

Do you or anyone in your immediate family send money or goods back to anyone on the Indian subcontinent? If so, name the city, country where they are sent and your relationship to the recipient:

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
http://www.itisff.it/COMENIUS/comenius_13/pdf/final_questionnaire.pdf
Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican*
NAFEESAH ALLEN

Have you ever exercised your right to vote in Mozambique? When? Why? Why not?

Are you a member of any political party in Mozambique? _____
Have you ever exercised your right to in your country of ethnic origin? When? Why?
Why not?

Are you a member of any political party in your country of ethnic origin? _____
What do you consider to be your home country and why?

Name the countries you have spent at least 1 month in during the last 5 years:

Ancestral Identity:

- Do you know when your ancestors emigrated from on the Indian subcontinent? What generation immigrant are you to Mozambique?
- What do you know of your ancestors and their caste, class, occupational, religious roles in the Indian subcontinent/historically?
- Do you currently participate in any rituals, traditions, and/or practices that are tied to aspects of your Indian subcontinent identity/affiliation?

Contemporary Social Identity:

- What do you feel makes you a member of the nationality/ethnic group mentioned above? Are there rituals, traditions, or practices that you subscribe to that you believe connects you with this identity?
- How often do you communicate with friends and relatives who live in your stated country of ethnic origin? What forms of communication do you use (email, phone calls, fax, SMS, Whatsapp, facebook/twitter, etc.)?
- Are there practices that you subscribe to in your home country that you believe are also practiced on the subcontinent today?
- Have you traveled to the Indian subcontinent? Why/Why not? How frequently and for what purposes? How much of your identity is related to contemporary connections you have with the Indian subcontinent, versus historical ties?

Cultural Expression and Membership:

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
http://www.itisff.it/COMENIUS/comenius_13/pdf/final_questionnaire.pdf
Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican*
NAFEESAH ALLEN

- In Maputo, are you typically identified by others as being of Indian subcontinent origin? Please explain why or why not.
- Have you ever been a victim of discrimination/racism/ ethnic-violence as a result of your Indian subcontinent origin?
- Do you believe you or any of your immediate family has ever been the target of crime as a result of your Indian subcontinent origin?
- What are your impressions of the contemporary Indian subcontinent, especially the cities/ countries were you have ancestral roots?
- Are you a member of any religious, business, civic, community, activity group? If so, please list them.
- Do you, your parents, and/or your spouse own property? If so, please name the cities/countries?
- How often do you do the following (on an annual basis)?
 - Attend a place of worship
 - Visit a community centre
 - Eat a meal outside of your home
 - Eat a meal in a restaurant
 - Attend cultural events
 - Go to bars/pubs/clubs
 - Go to cafes/lounges
 - Go to the gym or play group sports

Socio-Political Historical Experience:

- Where were you when the following events happened? How do you recall these events? How did each of these events affect you and/or your immediate family/friends?

- the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947
- death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948
- death of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948
- the end of Portuguese rule in Goa in 1961
- death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964
- Emergence of Bangladesh from East Pakistan in 1971
- Ordered expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972
- Mozambican independence from Portugal in 1975
- the beginning of the Mozambican civil war in 1977
- death of Samora Machel in 1986
- the end of apartheid in South Africa 1990-1993
- the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
http://www.itsff.it/COMENIUS/comenius_13/pdf/final_questionnaire.pdf
Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

This image shows a full page of blank, lined paper. It features approximately 28 horizontal black lines spaced evenly across the page, typical of standard notebook paper. The lines are thin and extend from the left edge to the right edge. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the page.

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
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This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

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Nafeesah's graduate research questionnaire from Diaspora study at IGNOU, New Delhi

Questionnaire: *Becoming Mozambican*
NAFEESAH ALLEN

Were there other historical events that impacted your migration decisions, whether to stay or to leave Mozambique? If so, please name them and why.

Is there anything that I haven't asked that you believe is relevant to discuss, with regards to how you self-identify (ethnically/nationality)?

Is there anything that I haven't asked that you believe is relevant to discuss, with regards to your/your family's migration pattern/decisions?

Any other statements/comments:

Questions adapted from various sources including:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115910/occ92-questionnaire.pdf
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This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal blue ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

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