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Campbell, J.

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TITLE: **The Americanization of South Africa**

BY: **J. Campbell**

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I. Introduction

The title of this paper comes from a 1901 book by W.T. Stead, entitled The Americanisation of the World. A British reformer and editor of the London-based Review of Reviews, Stead is perhaps best known to historians as the author of If Christ Came to Chicago, one of the era's most celebrated exposes of urban vice. Fewer may realize that Stead spent several years in the 1890s in South Africa, where he was a close confidante of Cecil John Rhodes. Exposure to South Africa played a germinal role in The Americanisation of the World, in which Stead argued that the United States was destined to displace Great Britain as the world's pre-eminent political, economic and cultural power. In contrast to contemporaries such as F.A. McKenzie, whose 1902 book, The American Invaders, urged action against the "armies of American entrepreneurs conquering British markets," Stead saw the United States' global expansion as irresistable. The choice for Britain's rulers was whether to defy the inevitable and thereby to consign themselves to global irrelevance, or to accept the majority of their one-time colony, forging an Anglo-American commonwealth that would secure for all time the primacy of the virile Anglo-Saxon race.(1)

In his Victorian fastidiousness and his reforming zeal, his fascination with the occult and his blunt Social Darwinism, W.T. Stead stands as the quintessential product of the late nineteenth century Atlantic world. Fittingly, it was the Atlantic that ultimately claimed him: he perished on the Titanic. Yet he was also prescient. The traditional diplomatic animosity between the United States and Great Britain did give way in the twentieth century, if not to an Anglo-American commonwealth, then at least to an Anglo-American entente -- an entente that facilitated the United States' emergence as a world power while preserving for post-imperial Britain a global influence that its economic and political stature no longer warranted. Stead was also correct in foreseeing some of the ways in which the world would be "Americanised" in the twentieth century, transformed, for good or ill, by the awesome economic, political and cultural might of the United States. Last but not least, he recognized that this transformation would be registered nowhere more dramatically than in South Africa.

An American arriving in South Africa today can scarcely help but be struck by how familiar it seems. South Africans, black and white, drink Coca Cola, eat Kentucky Fried Chicken, and spend exorbitant sums on Nike shoes and sportswear. They shop in sprawling suburban malls, modelled on American prototypes and offering a dizzying array of American commodities. The local cineplexes carry the latest Hollywood blockbusters, while television, which the apartheid state prohibited until 1976, serves up an endless stream of American commercial programs. The same process is evident in the realm of politics. While South Africa's history as a British colony is reflected in the country's parliamentary system and its renewed membership in the Commonwealth, many of the controversial political issues debated in South Africa today -- federalism, judicial review, minority rights, affirmative action, the funding priorities of "historically" white and black universities -- revolve around concepts appropriated (some might say misappropriated) from American political discourse.

Examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely, but the point is clear. Over the course of the twentieth century, the United States has displaced Great Britain as South Africa's political, economic and cultural metropole. The object of this paper, and of the larger project of which it is a part, is to historicize that process.

Before proceeding, it may be useful to confront a few potential objections. To highlight the American presence is not to imply that the United States is the sole foreign influence on South Africa, nor is it to deny the profound imprint of other societies -- not only of Great Britain but of Germany, France, Australia, India, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Israel, even Brazil, which was a formative influence on architects and town planners during a critical period in the 1930s and '40s. The chief challenge in a project like this one is to maintain a due sense of proportion, to avoid the temptation, already evident in some of the available literature, of "proving" one's case through the endless accumulation of anecdotes. To avoid this pitfall, one must attend not only to those realms in which the American presence has been prominent but to those in which it has been attenuated or absent. The current vogue for American-branded sports paraphenalia, for example, has thus far done little to challenge the dominance of the traditional British games: soccer, cricket and rugby. (Aggressive marketing by the National Basketball Association has inspired the creation of a local professional basketball league, but it remains to be seen whether the sport will catch on or whether it will wither and disappear, as baseball did in the 1920s and '30s.) Education offers an even better example. While the last century has seen innumerable attempts to apply American pedagogical ideas to African education, the education of white South Africans, save for a brief flirtation with "progressive" education in the 1930s, has remained typically British, or at least typically British-colonial. Even with the imposition of a "Christian Nationalist" overlay in the 1950s and '60s, white schoolchildren continued to wear blazers, to play cricket and to suffer the occasional caning; while their university counterparts faced syllabi and examinations modelled on Oxbridge and designed to secure British-recognized credentials. With the recent introduction of so-called "outcomes based" education, this may be changing, but in the meantime it may help to account for some of the more obvious "gaps" in the process of Americanization, from white South Africans' relative ignorance of American literature to the persistence of distinctly British professional cultures in fields such as law, medicine and accountancy.

This qualification points to another. In a society as riven by racial, class, ethnic and generational cleavages as South Africa, the process of Americanization has inevitably been uneven, contingent and contested. Manifestly, U.S. influence has been most marked in urban areas, pre-eminently in Johannesburg, which is, in a more than figurative sense, a product of American inspiration and invention. Yet America has also permeated the platteland, from the Ford trucks that were once a ubiquitous feature of highveld farms to the dog-eared copies of Readers' Digest and National Geographic that still litter local surgeries. Americanization has often assumed a generational character, with young South Africans, black and white, appropriating American music, fashion and even slang as a means to distinguish themselves from their more conservative, more British elders. One of the universal laments of older South Africans today is of a kind of transatlantic generation gap, between parents steeped in Enid Blyton, radio and the 1947 royal family visit and children nurtured on the latest American music video. Last but not least, the process has been distinctly racialized. While both black and white South Africans have proved extraordinarily receptive to American culture, they have typically embraced different aspects, while entertaining profoundly different ideas about the nature and relevance of American experience. Indeed, part of the interest of a project like this one lies precisely in the interplay of black and white visions of America.

Even when one finds unequivocal evidence of American influence on a given group or groups, one needs to be careful drawing conclusions. The great popularity of American western films in postwar South Africa, amongst both black and white audiences, is obviously a significant datum,

but it tells us nothing in itself about the mechanisms by which such movies were introduced to South Africa or about what they meant to those who flocked to see them. The same might be said of shopping malls, the vogue for Tuskegee-style industrial education, or the impact of the Cosby Show, which had the bizarre distinction, during the twilight of apartheid, of being the highest rated show among white South Africans. In short, "Americanization" involves process of reception -- of selection and reinterpretation -- as well as of transmission. While the vast differences in national size and power have often made it difficult for South Africans to resist American penetration, it would be misleading to portray them as helpless victims of American imperialism. Often, they have actively sought out American goods, ideas and images, grafting them onto their own experiences to produce new ways of understanding and acting upon their worlds. One of the chief challenges for international historians is to do justice to these myriad moments of refashioning, without succumbing to the simplifications of "cultural imperialism" on one hand or unfettered agency on the other. In today's brave new world of globalization, Marx's famous dictum is more pertinent than ever: people make their own history, but not exactly as they choose.

The final potential objection also pertains to issues of selectivity and balance, but in a different way. Put simply, why pick on South Africa, when Americanization is so obviously a global phenomenon? What country today is not plagued by Coca-Cola, Nike, CNN, Baywatch or other manifestations of Generica America? Fair enough. But even if one concedes the point, the historical particularities of the process in different societies are surely worthy of careful analysis. As it happens, South Africa is something of a special case. In few if any societies in the world did the process of Americanization begin so early; in few if any has it been so thoroughgoing, so replete with irony, or of such central historical significance. As George Fredrickson and other historians have shown, the shared fact of white supremacy has produced some extraordinary parallels between the United States and South Africa, while providing a foundation for a host of transatlantic encounters, real and imagined. When the 1939 Mixed Marriages Commission convened -- to take a singularly obnoxious example -- its first act was to dispatch a representative to the U.S. Library of Congress to find American precedents. (For the record, the researcher found over a hundred anti-miscegenation laws on the books, in thirty-seven different states.) The authority of American experience was similarly invoked in dozens of other arenas: in the elaboration of segregation; in the creation of radio and television broadcasting; in the process of suburbanization; in the birth of a local advertising industry; in the cultivation of popular tastes in music, dress and interior decoration; in inter- and intra-racial debates over political strategy and tactics; in the creation of apartheid-era bantustans; in the political negotiations that culminated in the end of apartheid; and in innumerable ongoing debates about the future. All of which is to say that the Americanization of South Africa is not just a figment of the historians' imagination, nor just another case of American cultural imperialism. It is a deeply rooted, complex, contested historical process, with profound significance for South Africa's past, present and future.(2)

II. Antecedents

Perhaps the first thing to be said is that the American presence in South Africa is not new. Individual Americans surface throughout South African history, often in the most paradoxical or portentous places. The leaders of the 1807 Slagtersnek uprising, whom later generations of Afrikaner Nationalists would embrace as martyrs, were prosecuted not by an Englishman but by a Dutch-speaking American, Jacob Cuyler, from Albany, New York. (Hence the Eastern Cape

city of Albany.). The voortrekkers who set out into the South African interior three decades later were accompanied not by their own ministers -- contrary to later mythology, the local Dutch Reformed Church refused to sanction the Great Trek -- but by an American, the Rev. Daniel Lindley, who left his post at the American Zulu mission to accompany them. ("The cheapest, speediest, easiest way to convert the heathen is to convert the white ones first," he explained in a letter to his supervisors.) During the American Civil War, the Confederate raider Alabama did a booming business in Cape waters, seizing one Union vessel right in Table Bay, an episode memorialized in one of South Africa's most enduring folksongs, "Daar Kom Die Alabama."(3)

Such anecdotes are more or less familiar to South African historians. What historians have been somewhat slower to recognize is the substantial commercial foundation upon which such encounters took place. Direct links between the North American colonies and the Cape stretch all the way back to 1698. In the decades that followed, traders in New England and Cape Town conducted a sporadic trade, often in defiance of both British mercantilist and Dutch East India Company regulations. New England slave ships, en route from Madagascar, often stopped at the Cape to take on provisions, leaving a portion of their human cargoes as payment. Transatlantic commerce began in earnest in the years after American independence. Upwards of two dozen American ships per year put in at Cape Town in the 1780s and '90s; today's Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, a tourist mecca modelled on San Fransisco's Fisherman's Wharf, stands very near the site of what Capetonians two centuries ago called "the American wharf." Dutch and French Huegenot settlers in the Cape ate American grain, built homes out of American timber, and aged wine in American-made barrels, some of which was later quaffed in New England taverns. Commerce swelled still further with the onset of the Napoleanic Wars, as American merchants reaped the advantages of neutrality. For a brief period in the early nineteenth century, the United States stood as South Africa's largest trading partner.(4)

The boom of the Napoleanic era proved shortlived. The formal annexation of the Cape by Britain in 1806 led to a series of new commercial restrictions, culminating in a special Order in Council barring U.S. ships from access to African ports. The impact of the new policy, the first of many attempts to protect the South African market from American predation, was redoubled by changes in the United States. In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson, afraid that some incident on the high seas might draw the United States into European war, imposed a unilateral embargo on foreign trade. In the event, the embargo did not prevent the outbreak of the War of 1812, but it did succeed in bringing traffic between the United States and South Africa to a virtual standstill.

Ironically, however, the developments of 1806-07 helped lay the foundations of future engagement. British annexation of the Cape paved the way for large scale white settlement, dramatically enlarging the potential market for future U.S. producers, once they were finally readmitted to South Africa in 1830. In turn, Jefferson's embargo, together with the war and the new tariff regime that followed it, precipitated the beginning of America's industrial revolution, and with it a robust demand for South African primary products. By the 1830s and '40s, hundreds of U.S. whalers plied South African waters, harvesting the spermacetti that lubricated the humming machines of Lowell and Chicopee. The wool boom that transformed the Cape economy in the mid-nineteenth century was propelled by American manufacturers, who purchased between and a third and a half of local annual wool production. The United States also provided an insatiable market for South African skins and hides. A single firm, the G.S. Holmes Company, the first American firm to open operations in South Africa, shipped over 200,000 hides per year

from the Cape to Boston in the 1850s. Many Union soldiers in the American Civil War wore boots manufactured from South African leather and slept beneath blankets woven from South African wool, which helps to account for the presence of a Confederate raider in Cape waters.(5)

Some of the United States' surging industrial output found its way back to South Africa. While paltry as a percentage of total American exports -- historically, South Africa has accounted for roughly one per cent of total U.S. foreign sales -- this commerce had a significant impact on South Africa, concentrated as it was in a few sectors in what was still a relatively small market. The U.S. farm implement industry, one of the bellwethers of American manufacturing, quickly secured a local monopoly. Cyrus McCormick's reapers were available in South Africa in the 1850s, just a few years of their introduction in the United States. The market for ploughs was likewise dominated by American imports, sold through local agents and sporting such brandnames as the Yankee, the Eagle and the American Planet, Jr. Barbed wire, at once the most prosaic and the most profound symbol of colonial rule, was likewise imported from the United States, beginning in the 1870s. By century's end, Americans supplied virtually all of South Africa's sewing machines, typewriters, bicycles,cash registers, cameras and canned meats. American dominance was perhaps most conspicuous -- and certainly most enduring -- in fuel oils, initially in kerosene and later in gasoline and petroleum lubricants. If nineteenth-century South Africa had any equivalent to today's ubiquitous Coca Cola can, it was the bright red five gallon tin with the Standard Oil logo.(6)

III. 1880-1903

a. Americans and the Mineral Revolution

As significant as these early linkages may have been, the process of "Americanization" began in earnest only with the mineral revolution. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, followed a decade and a half later by the opening of the Witwatersrand goldfields, ignited in southern Africa the most compressed and ferocious industrial revolutions in the history of the world. The last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth brought incessant economic and political upheaval, punctuated by a botched coup, the last great imperial war and a sweeping imperial reconstruction that laid the foundations of South Africa's infamous racial state. Significantly, these transformations coincided with sweeping changes in American life, particularly in the scale and scope of economic activity. Economic consolidation, abetted by new organizational and management techniques, enabled American businesses to reduce competition, enhance labor productivity and increase profits. While the process is popularly associated with Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust or the rise of Carnegie's U.S. Steel, one of the industries in which these changes were first registered was hard rock mining. Across the American West and later the world, pick-wielding prospectors were displaced by vast, highly capitalized mining operations, overseen by educated, professional mining engineers. Schooled at new institutions like Yale's Sheffield School and the Colorado Schools of Mines, as well as at the more established Freiberg School of Mines in Germany, this new class of "scientific" miners possessed expertise in mineralogy, metallurgy, chemistry, engineering and management, all to extract the greatest possible amount of ore at the least possible cost.(7)

By the late nineteenth century, American mining engineers were spread across the globe, from Nevada to Australia, California to Peru. Southern Africa drew them like a magnet. Kimberley was home to at least a thousand Americans, the most famous of whom, Gardner Williams,

doubled as U.S. consul and chief operating officer of Cecil Rhodes' DeBeers Company. Williams quickly recruited a staff of Americans, including his son, who eventually succeeded him at DeBeers. Together, these expatriate engineers radically transformed diamond production, through the application of steam power, the introduction of underground stoping and new techniques for crushing and sorting. Easily twice as many American engineers found their way to the goldfields of the Witwatersrand, which posed many of the same technical problems as the hard rock mines of Nevada. By the mid-1890s, over half the mines on the Rand were managed by Americans, and a chain of new cities had sprouted along the Reef, with names like Denver, Cleveland and Florida. Rhodes in particular had great faith in American engineers, employing dozens in his Consolidated Gold Fields company, and many more in Rhodesia, where he dreamed of opening a "second Rand." One disgruntled engineer in Rhodesia complained that it was impossible to get a job without an American accent.(8)

In the wake of the engineers came a motley collection of American journalists, entrepreneurs and adventurers, all eager to sample life in the world's latest, greatest boom town. National Geographic, Harpers, Scientific American and the North American Review all carried articles on life on the goldfields in the 1890s, emphasizing the important role played by Americans. Mark Twain passed through Johannesburg in 1896, during the world tour described in Following the Equator and More Tramps Abroad. Americans established Johannesburg's first hotel, its first steam laundry and its shortlived horse-drawn tram system. One U.S. expatriate made a handsome living importing used stagecoaches from California. Americans even dominated the Rand's criminal underworld: the so-called "Bowery Boys," a network of Eastern European Jewish pimps expelled from their base on New York's Lower East Side in 1894, relocated to Johannesburg and quickly cornered the local prostitution market.(9)

Ultimately, however, it was American mining engineers who left the most profound imprint on Johannesburg; indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that they built South Africa's gold industry. It was an American, John Hays Hammond, chief engineer of Consolidated Gold Fields, who first persuaded skeptical Randlords that the unprecedented investments required for deep level mining could be made to pay, notwithstanding the low grade of ore. Hammond's judgment was confirmed by Hamilton Smith, an engineer from the Nevada silver fields who was brought out by the Rothschilds in 1893 to assess the Witwatersrand; and by George Becker, head of the U.S. Geological Survey, who produced the first comprehensive surveys of the Witwatersrand complex three years later. The list goes on and on. Hennen Jennings, who had worked with Hamilton Smith in Peru, became chief consulting engineer for H. Eckstein and Company. It was he who introduced to South Africa the newly discovered McArthur-Forrest cyanide process, making it possible to release gold from its quartzite amalgam and saving the deep-level industry from an early demise. William Russel Quinan built South Africa's explosives industry. Ethelbert Woodford, chief engineer for the Transvaal Republic, drafted the Witwatersrand's first safety codes, a somewhat ironical distinction in light of the industry's appalling mortality rates. The founders and first presidents of the South African Association of Engineers and Architects and of the Chemical and Metallurgical Society of South Africa were both Americans, as was the first vice president of the Chamber of Mines, an umbrella organization formed by the mining houses in order to centralize recruiting and squeeze down labor costs. As historian Eric Rosenthal long ago observed, "The importance of the services rendered by American engineers in the development of the Rand can hardly be overestimated. Upon their signatures to reports capital was raised and shares rose to several times their nominal value." Mark Twain, an old digger

himself, put it more pungently. "South Africa seems to be the heaven of the American scientific mining engineer. He gets the choicest places and keeps them."(10)

Given their obsession with efficiency, American mining engineers were virtually unanimous in their disdain for the Transvaal Republic government, which they regarded as a lot of corrupt, backward bumpkins. The chief impediment to South Africa's development, opined one, was "the general inability of the Boers to understand capitalism, industrialization and progress." The role of Americans in the 1895 Jameson Raid, Cecil Rhodes' shambolic attempt to overthrow the Kruger government, is well known. John Hays Hammond was sentenced to death for his participation, escaping execution only after representations by President McKinley (whose son was living in Johannesburg) and the payment of a massive fine by Rhodes. Americans also played a central role in the 1897 Transvaal Industrial Commission, a comprehensive survey of the needs and prospects of the mining industry, grudgingly conceded by Kruger. The most compelling testimony came from William B. Hall, a former chief engineer of the State of California brought out by the mining industry to address the problem of water supply. Hall stressed the need for thoroughgoing government fiscal and administrative reforms, arguing at once for a removal of undue "industrial burdens" and for positive state support to satisfy the "imperative necessities" of private industry. It is worth noting, in passing, the uncanny similarity between Hall's prescription and the bromides dispensed by American management consultants in South Africa today, a century later. Two years after Hall testified, South Africa was at war.(11)

Ironically, the fact that the gold fields were initially under Boer rather than British control proved a boon to American exporters. While products imported into the Transvaal from Britain were subject to hefty duties, a persistent grievance of the Randlords, products from the United States entered duty free. This fact, combined with the technical superiority of American mining equipment, ensured that most of the capital goods required by the growing industry came from the United States. The elevators and skips that carried men and machines underground and hoisted ore back to the surface were supplied by Otis Elevator, which had been established just a few years before. Electricity underground was supplied by generators from General Electric, one of the first American companies to create a South African subsidiary. The Ingersoll Corporation enjoyed a monopoly on rock drills, while Fraser-Chalmers supplied many of the massive stamp batteries needed to pulverize the gold-bearing reef. Steel for rail lines and headgear, the cyanide used in the recovery process, even the Oregon pine used for timber packs and for floors and ceilings in miners' houses, came from the United States.(12)

In keeping with our earlier admonition, it is important to note the limitations of American penetration. The flood of people and products from the United States was focused on the Witwatersrand and obviously not characteristic of South Africa as a whole. Great Britain still outstripped the United States in the total value of exports to South Africa and, with occasional brief exceptions, would continue to do so for the next eighty years. Finance capital remained emphatically British, thanks to a tangle of British, U.S. and Cape laws that prevented American banks from opening branches in South Africa. The absence of U.S. banking facilities, in turn, inhibited large scale investment by American capital. Aside from a consortium which briefly held the concession to build the rail line from the Transvaal to Lorenzo Marques, Americans played no role in the explosion of railroad building in industrializing South Africa. (In the late 1880s, George Washington Williams, the pioneering African American historian, came to explore investment opportunities on behalf of robber baron Collis Huntington, but nothing came of the

venture.) More surprisingly, mining capital remained almost exclusively European, despite the enormous contributions Americans made to the industry in terms of technical and management expertise. No American mining house arose on the Rand, a fact that sharply distinguishes the South African case from, say, Rhodesia, Zambia or the Congo, where American mining capital would come to wield enormous economic and political power. The obvious exception, the massive Anglo-American Corporation, launched in 1917 with the help of J.P. Morgan and Herbert Hoover, is more apparent than real. By 1930, most of the American interests in Anglo had been bought up by De Beers' Ernest Oppenheimer, who, with his descendants, would build the company into South Africa's most successful enterprise. Leaving aside activity by individual U.S. investors, who gradually awoke to the virtues of South African gold shares, American capital entered the South African mining industry on a large scale only in 1957, when a consortium led by Charles Engelhard secured a major interest in the Rand Mines Group.(13)

Yet even admitting these qualifications, there is no gainsaying the growing American presence in South Africa; indeed, one would be hard pressed to find any society in which the United States secured such a firm early foothold. One can also already begin to detect certain broad and enduring contours in the American presence in South Africa. First and most obvious was the impact of American commodities: not only capital equipment for the mines but high-end consumer goods -- ploughs, cameras, barber chairs, later automobiles and gramophones -- for which there was an insufficient local market to sustain an internationally competitive industry. Such goods were typically imported by South African firms on an agency basis. Less concretely, U.S. influence had registered itself in the realm of knowledge, expertise, industrial technique -- what American engineers a hundred years ago called "science," and what a management consultant today might call "information" or maximizing utilities."

The growing American presence in South Africa did not go unnoticed by South African authorities, especially by the imperial officials sent out to "reconstruct" the Transvaal after the South African War. Visionaries like W.T. Stead might speak of Anglo-American ententes and the inevitability of America's global rise, but for Lord Milner and his minions the United States was a rival, intent on stealing a prize purchased with British blood. One of Milner's first acts was to impose a special "permit system" on interior travel. The policy, which in essence barred non-imperial citizens from entering the Transvaal or Orange Free State, prevented American mining engineers and entrepreneurs from re-establishing themselves on the Rand. (The system had the additional benefit of curtailing the movements of African American missionaries of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, which entered South Africa in 1895 and immediately attracted thousands of converts from European missions.) Milner also moved to stem the flow of American imports, which had swelled to unprecedented levels in the immediate aftermath of the war. By the end of 1903, the four South African colonies had been gathered into a customs union, with uniform tariffs -- tariffs to be rebated in the case of commerce within the British Empire. U.S. trade with South Africa plummetted under the terms of this new "imperial preference" policy; American grain sales, a staple of the transatlantic trade for a century, were wiped out almost completely. To be sure,the policy was not airtight. Several U.S. companies qualified for imperial preference by incorporating themselves in Canada. American firms continued to dominate the oil and farm equipment industry, as well as the emerging automobile market. Unquestionably, however, Milner's intervention slowed the process of Americanization, while drawing a newly united South Africa firmly into the orbit of the British Empire.(14)

b. Popular culture

Before ending this section, it is worth looking briefly at one other sector. While it is impossible in a short paper to do justice to the complexities of nineteenth century popular culture, suffice to say that South Africans, black and white, had already begun to exhibit their apparently insatiable appetite for American performance styles. The most popular form of mass entertainment in the late nineteenth century, save perhaps for the circus, was the minstrel show, an American import, in which performers in blackface aped the music and comic antics of an imagined slave South. As early as 1848, "Joe Brown's Band of Brothers" arrived in the Cape, becoming, in a contemporary historian's words, the "first band of vocalists to give South Africans a taste for nigger part singing." The 1862 visit of the celebrated Christy Minstrels sealed the popularity of the genre. For all its manifest racism, minstrelsy was a complex form, susceptible to different readings, and it enjoyed great popularity among black as well as white audiences, just as it did in the United States. Indeed, it experienced its most enduring popularity among the Coloured community in the Western Cape, the one population in South Africa with direct experience of enslavement. The annual parade begun in 1888 by Coloured minstrel troupes in Cape Town survives to this day in the greasepaint and parodic pageantry of the city's "Coon Carnival."(15)

With the eruption of the Witwatersrand, the cultural traffic with the United States exploded. While minstrelsy remained popular, a host of new musical idioms -- spirituals, ragtime, Tin Pan Alley -- found their way to South Africa, borne on a flood of inexpensive American sheet music. The taste for African American sacred music was encouraged by the appearance of Orpheus McAdoo's Virginia Jubilee Singers, an offshoot of the celebrated Fisk University Singers, who stopped in South Africa during an 1890 world tour. So sensational was the reception that the Singers toured twice more, ultimately performing over a thousand concerts in virtually every city in the region, often to racially mixed audiences. Vaudeville, which served in South Africa as in the United States as a waystation between minstrelsy and Hollywood, made its appearance in the first years of the twentieth century. At venues such as Johannesburg's "Empire Palace of Varieties," opened in 1903, South Africans could enjoy the latest music and antics from the United States, as well as that extraordinary new novelty, the "kinetoscope," all on the same bill. South Africa even hosted a touring Wild West Show, run by a man named Texas Jack and featuring a young cowboy named Will Rogers. By ironic coincidence, the visit by this beloved comic who "never met a man he didn't like" overlapped with the visit of another who never met a man he did: W.C. Fields, who arrived with a touring American vaudeville troupe.(16)

Given the fraught racial history of American performance, each of these popular forms carried diverse, racially-inflected meanings, making them susceptible to appropriation by diverse groups in South Africa. While whites flocked to the new vaudeville houses and pounded out the latest Scott Joplin rags on their parlor pianos, American performance styles clearly had the most profound impact on Africans, particularly among the population of educated, urban blacks. For this small, embattled community, caught in the ebb tide of nineteenth-century liberalism, American, and especially African American, cultural forms became crucial emblems of sophistication and urbanity. Each new performance style from America spawned a host of African imitators -- the Jubilee Singers alone spawned dozens of local troupes -- as well as a variety of new local traditions. Some of these new forms, such as iRagtime and ikhunzi, stayed close to their American roots (ragtime and "coon" songs) even as they were rendered in vernacular languages (in this case isiZulu). Others, such as "marabi," were dizzyingly syncretic, blending

traditional African musical forms with a host of nominally "white" styles, from Salvation Army brass bands to Tin Pan Alley to Afrikaans tikkie draai. Yet whatever the precise amalgam, there is no questioning the popularity of American music or its profound impact on the culture and imagination of black South Africans.(17)

Thus for blacks as well as whites, the decades after the mineral discoveries represented a watershed in the process of Americanization. Through the long, dark decades to come, the idea of black America, disseminated through books and word of mouth, cinema and sermons, music and television, would continue to exercise African imaginations, offering a kind of foil for articulating a diverse array of aspirations and grievances. To be sure, this process of identification was selective, partial, uneven. Older identities persisted. Indeed, the group most susceptible to black America's appeal -- educated, permanently urbanized Africans -- was also historically the most Anglicized. One of the central challenges for future students of African culture and politics will be to understand the different ways in which these self-proclaimed "progressive" Africans grafted African American idioms and styles onto the aspirations and assumptions they had imbibed in European, mostly British, missions. Again, however, one should not allow the qualifications to vitiate the point: black South Africans, like their white compatriots, were becoming Americanized.(18)

IV. 1919-1938

a. Transatlantic movements

If the aftermath of the South African War marked the end of the first phase of South Africa's "Americanization", the aftermath of World War I marked the commencement of the second. As several historians have noted, the 1920s brought a sharp rise in intellectual and cultural traffic between South Africa and the United States. Among African Americans, the decade was marked by surging interest in Africa, expressed in movements such as Garveyism and the Pan-African Congress, as well as in the work of such Harlem Renaissance writers as Alain Locke, Langston Hughes and Countee Cullen. This interest was more than reciprocated by Africans, for whom black American music, dress and even hairstyles remained important markers of sophistication and urbanity. One can scarcely read an issue of Umteteli wa Bantu, a Johannesburg-based newspaper underwritten by the Chamber of Mines and aimed at South Africa's small black middle class, without encountering some article about black America, usually accompanied by the "lessons," implicit or explicit, for Africans. Leaders of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, the largest black popular movement in South African history to that time, routinely invoked the authority of black American experience; I.C.U. founder Clements Kadalie went so far as to affect an African American accent. His contemporary, Wellington Buthelezi, sometime Garveyite and founder of the so-called "American School" movement, went still further, inventing an entire African American alter ego: Dr. Butler Hansford Wellington of Chicago. In several districts of the Transkei, the efforts of I.C.U. organizers and local Garveyites merged with independent Christianity and indigenous eschatological traditions to ignite a millenarian movement, revolving around the idea of African American liberators in airplanes raining fire from the sky.(19)

As in the post-Boer War period, reports of such irruptions provoked considerable alarm among South African authorities, who went so far as to publish an ordinance forbidding African Americans from entering the Union. Yet paradoxically, many of these same officials were themselves evincing new interest in black America. Not surprisingly, official interest focused on

the system of "industrial education" associated with Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute, a regime which promised to enhance "native usefulness" without inspiring unwelcome political aspirations. The "American model" also played a crucial role in the elaboration of segregationist ideology, as historian John Cell has shown. While the material circumstances of South Africa differed radically from those in the Jim Crow South, southern segregation provided Union policymakers with a useful model for reconciling and rationalizing a diverse and in some ways contradictory set of imperatives and policies. Long after segregation's liberal patina had faded, the habit of looking to U.S. race relations for insight and confirmation would persist.(20)

South African officialdom's penchant for American "solutions" was encouraged by a small but influential coterie of American and American-educated white liberals that coalesced in Johannesburg in the early 1920s. No one better epitomized this stratum than Ray Phillips, a representative of the Boston-based American Board of Missions and a trained social worker. Alarmed by the poverty and anomie he saw in the black locations and slumyards mushrooming along the Witwatersrand, Phillips supported a host of initiatives designed to "moralize the leisure time" of Africans, many of them drawing on American experience. He was a founder member, for example, of the Johannesburg Joint Council, a discussion forum modelled on the interracial councils of the American South. He also produced a regular column on black America for Umteteli wa Bantu, using the examples of men like Booker T. Washington and George Washington Carver to demonstrate the superiority of "cooperation" over "confrontation." His most celebrated achievement, however, was a scheme to introduce "clean, wholesome pictures" in mine compounds, a move that he credited with forestalling a violent confrontation between black and white miners during the Rand Revolt of 1922. For nearly fifteen years, Phillips himself "carefully censored ... every foot of film," eliminating not only "vulgar or suggestive" material, but any films that "did not convey an elevating or ennobling picture of Western Civilised Life..."(21)

The efforts of Phillips and his colleagues were seconded by American philanthropic capital, which was drawn into African work as an extension of its interest in American race relations. The liberal South African Institute of Race Relations was first established with a grant from the Carnegie Foundation. The Phelps-Stokes Fund sponsored an endless series of tours and exchanges in the interwar period, dispatching American experts to investigate South African conditions while underwriting the education of carefully selected Africans in American colleges (also carefully selected). Such initiatives were intended not only to promote American-style solutions to South Africa's vexed "race problem," but to recapture the mantle of America and African American experience from its African claimants, to channel surging popular interest in black America in "constructive," non-political directions. The highwater mark of such efforts came with the first Phelps-Stokes Commission on African Education, which toured the continent in 1923 to tout the virtues of racial cooperation and Tuskegee-style industrial education. In a delightful collision of competing interpretations, James Aggrey, an American-educated African who was the Commission's sole black member, was frequently mistaken for a Garveyite by African audiences. Expecting a call to arms, Africans listened in bewilderment as Aggrey launched instead into his famous piano metaphor, to describe the sweet music that prevailed when black and white keys were played in harmony.(22)

b. Manufacturing capital and the birth of a consumer culture

All of these characters -- Wellington Buthelezi, Ray Phillips, James Aggrey -- are more or less familiar to South African historians. What has been largely overlooked is the material base on which this swelling intellectual and imaginative traffic rested. Put differently, one of the reasons that the United States bulked so large in the imaginations of white and black South Africans is because of the proliferation of American people and products in the country. As historian David Kennedy has shown, the outbreak of war in Europe represented a windfall to American producers, who not only fed and supplied the belligerents but gained a foothold in colonial markets previously dominated by the British. While Kennedy focuses on Latin America, his insight applies equally to Africa, particularly South Africa, which by 1915 had become the United States' fifth largest overseas market. Trade accelerated still further after the war ended. With the British economy mired in depression, it was left to American exporters to answer pent-up South African demand. In 1920, the total value of U.S. exports peaked at over $60 million; for a brief moment, the United States stood yet again as South Africa's largest trading partner. So enticing was the prospect that American investors began to consider direct investments in the South African market. "There are splendid openings here for energetic men with sufficient capital to finance the undertaking and employ the large forces of cheap native labour found in most parts," the U.S. consult in Cape Town declared in 1921. Two years later, the Ford Motor Company launched Ford, South Africa, using Ford, Canada as an intermediary in order to qualify for imperial preference on imported components. By the end of 1923, the first Model-T had rolled off the company's assembly plant in Port Elizabeth.(23)

The entrance of American capital was facilitated, paradoxically, by the 1924 election of the Nationalist-Labour "Pact," a rabidly anti-imperialist government explicitly committed to enhancing South Africa's economic independence. One of the Pact first moves was to enact the 1925 Tariff Act, which raised customs and duties on imports to unprecedentedly high levels. The object of the act was not only to stem the flow of overseas commodities but to nurture a local manufacturing industry, reducing the influence of the despised, pro-British mining houses while providing increased employment for "civilised labour" -- i.e. for the poor and working class white voters who had voted the Pact into office. In most particulars, the act succeeded: manufacturing industry grew spectacularly, eventually outstripping mining in its contribution to national GDP; hundreds of thousands of white workers, male and female, secured decently-paid work in match factories, canning works, automobile plants, textile mills and later in the embryonic steel and chemical industries. Whether the act enhanced South Africa's long-term autonomy, however, is a different question. As Richard Hull has shown, the new tariff regime had the effect of forcing overseas firms with an interest in South Africa either to abandon the local market or to establish their own manufacturing subsidiaries inside the country. Over the next fifteen years, dozens of U.S. corporations chose the latter course. For the first time, American capital began to enter South Africa in substantial amounts.(24)

In 1926, General Motors' new South African subsidiary broke ground for an assembly plant in Port Elizabeth, just down the road from its chief rival, Ford. By 1927, Chevrolets, Pontiacs, Oldsmobiles and Buicks were rolling off the line. International Harvester opened an assembly plant in Durban in 1928, consolidating its domination of the local agricultural implements market. The influx of American capital was especially pronounced in toiletries and health and beauty aids, perhaps the fastest growing consumer industry in the United States at the time. Bristol Myers, Johnson and Johnson, Colgate-Palmolive and Gillette all launched local subsidiaries in the years

between 1925 and 1931. Once unleashed, the flow of American investment continued, undeterred by the onset of depression or by a series of major political realignments in South Africa. The economic boom that followed South Africa's withdrawal from the gold standard in 1933 prompted another spurt of investment, as U.S. corporations raced to enter what Businessweek called "one of the most spectacular markets in the world." In 1936, Firestone, which had recently secured new sources of raw rubber in Liberia, established South Africa's first tire factory, inevitably in Port Elizabeth. Coca Cola arrived in 1938. By the end of that year, the book value of American direct investment in the country exceeded $70 million.(25)

Even with the investment of the 1920s and '30s, total U.S. direct investment in South Africa continued to lag far behind investment from Great Britain. Yet American capital had a disproportionate impact, concentrated as it was in manufacturing, the most dynamic sector of the economy. Like their predecessors on the diamond and gold fields, the American engineers and managers who came to South Africa in the 1920s and early 1930s brought with them a wealth of new, "scientific" techniques. Assembly line production, time and motion studies and other techniques of so-called scientific management were all introduced in South Africa by Americans. These innovations in production were accompanied by even more revolutionary innovations in the realm of consumption, or marketing. Someone, after all, had to buy the output of all these new, prolific factories. Particularly in a society like South Africa, where extreme maldistribution of wealth radically reduced the size of the aggregate local market, the future of manufacturing capital hinged less on productivity than on persuading people to consume.(26)

The devices employed by American capital in the 1920s to close the widening gap between production and consumption are familiar enough to historians: "installment plans" (what South Africans call "hire purchase"); free samples; the introduction of "yearly models" (an innovation pioneered by General Motors and initially resisted by Henry Ford); the endless elaboration of superficial differences in functionally similar products. Advertising blossomed as a professional industry, complete with its own associations and journals, as well as its own vernacular, cribbed from the developing science of psychology. (The standard 1920s work on advertising, Propaganda, was written, appropriately enough, by Sigmund Freud's American nephew.) Ultimately, of course, such initiatives did not forestall the Great Depression, but they did help to consolidate a culture of consumption, in which individuals' status, personal happiness, even identity came seemingly to hinge on possessing this or that commodity. By significant coincidence, this culture was most entrenched in precisely those industries that entered South Africa in the 1920s and '30s. American automakers, for example, invested enormous sums in advertising, extolling the latest advances in style and comfort. Advertising bulked even larger in the health and beauty aid industry, where demand was highly elastic, if not created from whole cloth. To sell deodorant and mouthwash, for example, it was first necessary to alert consumers to the perils of "body odor" and "bad breath."(27)

Given South Africa's elaborate tradition of labor repression, historians have naturally focused their attention on production, leaving consumption as something of an historiographical orphan. Yet even a cursory glimpse at the sources suggests that South Africa too experienced experienced a significant shift in the nature and meaning of consumption in the interwar years, with American capital and technique playing central roles in the process. The auto industry offers perhaps the best example. Given South Africa's size and the considerable distances between cities, the country's love affair with the automobile was probably foreordained, but it was American

automakers who first fueled the romance. Like their American parents, Ford and General Motors used advertising to associate their products with wealth, sophistication and personal freedom. (In G.M.'s case, advertising was also used to associate the company with the "civilised labour" policy: during the Pact years, all G.M. ads included the legend: "100 per cent. White Labour.") Both automakers introduced a range of makes and models, not only to cater to different segments of the market, but to encourage buyers to express their individuality by choosing particular models, colors and features. The annual release of the new year's models -- timed, as in the United States, to precede the actual arrival of the new year -- became a national event. Dealers from across South Africa descended on Port Elizabeth to pick up the new cars and then set off on a cavalcade across the country, stopping in cities and towns to display their wares. As popular enthusiasm grew, many of South Africa's major newspapers introduced weekly "motoring" sections, keeping subscribers abreast of the industry's latest advances in efficiency and comfort. (The motoring section remains a feature of South African daily newspapers to this day.) Through such techniques, American auto manufacturers soon controlled over 90% of the South African market.(28)

As in the United States, the search for new customers gave rise to a professional advertising industry, serviced by its own trade journal, South African Business Efficiency, launched in 1934. Dedicated to propagating modern advertising technique among South African retailers, the journal included a regular column offering "Critical Commentaries on Current Advertising," as well as features on topics such as "Sales Organization and Management," "Principles of Profitable Advertising," and "Marketing Methods -- Old and New." Dozens of local agencies emerged, proclaiming their expertise in particular techniques or markets. One of the largest firms, African Advertising Contractors, was owned by an expatriate American, and all faithfully followed American tactics, striving to endow particular commodities with an air of distinction, leisure, youth or sex appeal. (Surely the most blatant evidence of American technique was the proliferation of advertisements featuring women in undergarments, a development that scandalized at least some potential customers.) At risk of overstating the point, one can see in South Africa in the 1920s and early '30s not only the emergence of a consumer culture, but of an enduring association of Americanness with certain forms of personal consumption and display.(29)

Needless to say, this new consumer ethic was not uniformly embraced; on the contrary, its spread was uneven, contested and shaped by all of South Africa's myriad racial, class and ethnic fault lines. Not surprisingly, most early mass marketing campaigns were directed at English-speaking whites, a population which was, by South African standards, not only cosmopolitan, but disproportionately urban and affluent. The premier medium for reaching this market was Outspan, the most prominent of a new generation of mass circulation weekly magazines that appeared in South Africa in the years after World War I. Like the American Saturday Evening Post, on which it was apparently modelled, Outspan was a lavishly illustrated affair, which offered wholesome, general interest articles while zealously excluding any reference to "politics." Designed to appeal to the entire family, the magazine included features on health, fashion and physical culture; cooking and romance; game parks and golf; movies, music and dance; a regular column for youngsters ("At the Children's Outspan); and a virtually endless stream of articles on automobiles ("Motoring Etiquette," "When an Engine Lacks Power," "Motoring Days of Yesteryear"). Each issue also included literally hundreds of advertisements, for everything from imported "Frigidaires" ("...truly modern. It saves work, worry, money and time ... with every

corner of every compartment chilled to the scientifically correct degree") to Odo-Ro-No underarm deodorant for women ("Dancing, tennis, riding -- why should your enjoyment of them be spoiled by that horrid, nagging doubt -- the doubt of your personal daintiness...?"). Revenue from the ads enabled publishers to reduce the cover price, making the magazine affordable to thousands of new readers. Taken as a whole, Outspan conjured a vision of the South African good life, American style -- a vision of material progress, ample leisure and domestic comfort, unruffled by financial insecurity or political dissension.(30)

Among African readers, Umteteli wa Bantu played a broadly similar role, though in radically different circumstances. Founded by the Chamber of Mines in the early 1920s to wean "responsible" African opinion away from militant organizations like the I.C.U., Umteteli targetted an emergent black, urban "middle class." The problem for the paper, and indeed for the target group itself, was how to distinguish members of this class from other Africans. Given the reality of urban segregation, entrenched in the 1923 Natives' (Urban Areas) Act, as well as the ongoing political assault against all forms of African accumulation and autonomy, members of this aspirant elite lived cheek by jowl with the working class and urban poor, often in equally parlous circumstances. In such a context, consumption acquired enormous personal and political significance. Dress, hairstyles, leisure activities, furniture, even the bric a brac that cluttered one's sitting room, became coveted markers of difference, purchased even at risk of falling perilously into debt. In keeping with this priority, Umteteli devoted considerable column space to advertisements, peddling pianos, patent medicines and everything in between. The influence of the United States, mostly implicit in Outspan, was utterly explicit in Umteteli. Not only did the paper carry regular columns on the achievements of African Americans; it also routinely invoked black America in its advertisements, presenting this record or that beauty treatment as the "latest" thing from the United States. One enterprising miller ran a regular ad touting his product as "the best American mealie meal."(31)

Afrikaners presented an even more complex case. Over the first quarter of the twentieth century, Afrikaners poured into cities, driven from the land by the accelerating capitalization of the countryside. While many, indeed most, of these first generation urbanites were poor, they also represented a substantial potential market. This market, moreover, was virtually untapped; well into the twentieth century, many Afrikaners still routinely manufactured necessities -- candles, dresses, shoes -- that urban English-speakers tended to purchase. Developing this market became one of South African manufacturing capital's most urgent priorities. This priority, however, ran afoul of another. As Isabel Hofmeyr has shown, the first decades of the twentieth century represented a pivotal period in the history of Afrikaner Nationalism. The Second Language Movement, the emergence of Malan's National Party, the 1914 Rebellion (and the public outcry over the execution of rebel Jopie Fourie), the creation of Helpmekaar, the first Afrikaans-medium high school in Johannesburg -- all these events reflected and advanced a growing sense of volkskap, of shared nationhood and identity. Like nationalists in other places and times, Afrikaner Nationalist ideologues viewed commerce with a jaundiced eye. The flood of alien commodities sapped Afrikaner vigor and independence; it smacked of 'Englishness'; it diluted the national distinctiveness that was God's gift to all peoples. The comments of Die Huisgenoot, the largest circulation Afrikaans weekly, were representative: "Our biggest daily papers, the cinemas, the school system, the language of our courts, the shops with their fashions and merchandise, the furniture in our house are all bastions and agents of a foreign culture which claims for itself the right to overrun and conquer the world." In the years that followed, Afrikaner Nationalists would

coin a revealing neologism for this alien plague: "bioskoopbeskawing," or movie culture.(32)

Fortunately for Die Huisgenoot (which, like Outspan, was sustained by advertising revenue), the imperatives of nationality and consumption could be reconciled. The solution, as Hofmeyr suggests, lay not in resisting commerce so much as in incorporating it, by identifying certain forms of consumption and leisure as authentically Afrikaans. Die Huisgenoot itself led the campaign, helping to establish through its advertisements, articles and illustrations the boundaries of legitimate consumption in everything from meat to movies, furniture to fashion. A regte Afrikaner would not eat marmelade, but he would eat "Gold Reef Konfyt" or, to take a slightly more contemporary example, "Ouma" Rusks, still made according to grandmother Grayvenstein's old Karoo recipe. Thus did the process of Americanization infiltrate even those quarters that were most overtly hostile to it. Indeed, one might even suggest that Afrikaner intellectuals had, for a brief moment, outrun the wizards of Madison Avenue, who, in their rush to sell tomorrow's product today, had yet fully to grasp the vast commercial possibilities of yesterday.

c. American mass media: music and movies

As the lament of Die Huisgenoot suggests, the development of an American-inflected consumer culture was intimately related to the rise of mass media. In the quarter century that followed the creation of Union in 1910, South Africa was transformed by powerful new forms of mass communication, from advertising and mass circulation weekly magazine to gramophone records, radio and Hollywood movies. Each of these new media became a crucial agent of Americanization.

The complex interrelationship between Americanization, consumption and media is limpidly illustrated by the "gramophone" -- Thomas Edison's inexpensive, mass produced device for reproducing recorded sound. It is difficult to know when the first gramophone arrived in South Africa, but by the early 1920s, local periodicals carried regular advertisements for dozens of different models, all available on convenient installment plans, some for as little as £5 total. Initially, the industry ran on an agency business, with local outlets carrying a particular line of machines -- Columbia and "His Master's Voice" were the largest -- along with that company's catalogue of 78 rpm records. Weekly bulletins and advertisements in such periodicals as Outspan alerted customers to the latest recordings to reach South African shores. In the late 1920s, two of the premier recording companies in the United States, Gallo and Columbia, opened South African, vastly expanding the availability of American records. South Africans, of course, had long exhibited a taste for American musical styles, promulgated by touring groups and sheet music. Now they had direct, immediate access to the latest sounds from America.

While American popular music appealed to South Africans across the racial and class spectrum, it continued to have its greatest resonance among Africans, especially among urban blacks, who had long looked to the black America for stylistic cues. Gramophones and personal record collections quickly became markers of status and discriminating taste, much as pianos in the parlor had been for a previous generation of mission educated Africans. Not surprisingly, African consumers evinced a special affinity for African American artists, hundreds of whom were recorded in the interwar years by U.S. companies for the so-called "race records" market. Yet they also seem to have been quite open to some white American artists. If personal memoirs and recollections are to be believed, an African audiophile's record collection in, say, the late 1930s was apt to include not only African American standards -- Bessie Smith, Louis Armstrong, Duke

Ellington, Paul Robeson, Fats Waller -- but also Benny Goodman, Glenn Miller and other exponents of "swing," George Gershwin, and crooners like Bing Crosby, as well as "Dixie" pioneers like Jimmy Rodgers, whose yodeling style hearkened back to the slave "hollers" of his native Mississippi even as it laid the foundation of country and western.(33)

In making American music widely available to both black and white audiences, U.S. record companies made a profound contribution to South African popular culture in the interwar years. But they also did something more. Impressed with the growth of the local market, both Columbia and Gallo began to record local musicians, mostly in London at first but later at newly opened studios in Johannesburg. Pace Afrikaner Nationalists, but the enduring popularity of folksongs such as "Sarie Marais" and "As die Maan se strale op die berg val" may owe as much to Columbia Records, which included them in its 1930 Afrikaans Records series, as to ancestral "tradition." The emergence of a South African recording industry had an even more profound impact on African music, helping to spawn a host of new local idioms. Tragically, many of these vintage records appear to have been lost -- as Christopher Ballantine notes in Marabi Nights, a pioneering study of the roots of South African jazz, neither Gallo nor the newly established South African Broadcasting Corporation bothered to maintain archives of African recordings -- but those recordings that survive reveal an astonishingly eclectic range of styles and influences, from early examples of isicathamiya, the Zulu migrant choral tradition that survives today in the work of Ladysmith Black Mambazo, to marabi, the vanishing urban syncretic form that had enlivened the shebeens and stokvels of early Johannesburg's teeming slumyards.(34)

While most African popular musical styles of the interwar years preserved elements of indigenous musical traditions, they also universally incorporated American and African American styles. Mbaqanga, for example, the "African jazz" tradition that dominated urban African music in the 1930s and '40s, was a self-conscious blending of marabi and American swing. Its most celebrated exponents -- groups like the Jazz Maniacs and the Harlem Swingsters -- expressed their identification with America not only in their music, but in their names, their dress, their swagger. The mimetic process was even more complete in groups such as the Manhattan Brothers or African Inkspots, who became renowned for their polished, note for note renditions of popular recordings by the Inkspots or Mills Brothers. In this vibrant urban world, comparison with the American original became, in Ballantine's words, "the ultimate stamp of approval." Indeed, so accomplished were the famous Merry Blackbirds that African audiences routinely refused to believe that they were, in fact, African.(35)

The swelling popularity of American, and especially African American, music was intimately connected to the rise of another, even more emphatically American medium: the cinema. Techniques for capturing movement on film were first perfected in the early 1890s, and by 1895 the "peep show" or "nickleodeon" had become a popular novelty in most American and European cities. With the perfection of motion picture projectors by Thomas Edison in the United States and the Brothers Lumiere in France, it became possible to display films to large audiences. Moving pictures -- usually single-reel affairs, lasting perhaps a minute -- became a regular attraction in vaudeville programs, and later in dedicated theaters. Dozens of different exhibitors found their way to South Africa in the years around the turn of the century, touting films made in the United States, Germany, France, Britain and even in South Africa itself. (The South African War has the distinction of being history's first war captured on film.) At the time, there were no uniform specifications in the industry, and different exhibitors employed slightly different

technologies, one of which, the "bioscope," became the generic South African term for cinema. By 1910, it was clear the moving pictures were no passing fad, and the lineaments of a major new industry had begun to emerge. Technology was standardized; "directors," some working in multi-reel formats, began to explore the new medium's narrative possibilities; several large studios emerged, to bring the different facets of production and exhibition under one roof. Searching for a climate that allowed year-round filming, many of these studios settled in a new suburb on the edge of Los Angeles: Hollywood.(36)

It is fitting that a medium so global in its reach and influence was born of a global diaspora. The progenitors of Hollywood were virtually all Jewish immigrants, products of a mass migration that in the years between 1880 and 1914 carried upwards of five million men, women and children out of the ghettoes of Eastern Europe to cities across the Atlantic world, from London to New York, Buenos Aires to Johannesburg. Many future movie moguls found their way to New York's teeming Lower East Side, where they first worked as hawkers and street peddlers. It was here that they developed their extraordinary insight into the tastes and aspirations of their adopted countrymen. It was here also that they first experienced the wonders of moving pictures, in the "nickleodeons" that swept through New York's immigrant districts in the last years of the nineteenth century. By wedding the magic of this new technology to their own genius for selling, they became peddlers of dreams. By the 1920s, the industry they had built represented not only the most sophisticated mass marketing machine in human history, but a crucial medium for promoting American values of consumption and leisure, at home and abroad.(37)

Isadore W. Schlesinger, the man whose name would become synonymous with South Africa's cinema industry, epitomized this stratum. A dapper, diminutive man, he was born in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1871, one of nine children of Jewish parent. He arrived in the United States, inevitably on New York's Lower East Side, thirteen years later. While his father, Abraham, scratched his way up to own a cigar store and, eventually, an immigrant bank, I.W. established himself as a "merchant," peddling everything from hair combs to insurance policies. In 1894, shortly after becoming naturalized as an American citizen, he embarked for South Africa. What prompted him to go remains mysterious. Family tradition retails a familiar immigrant tale of a boy determined to make good, leaving a note for his bereaved parents pledging to return as a rich man. The tale may be true, but it is also worth noting that his departure coincided precisely with a New York state commission into urban vice, the triumph of an anti-Tamany Hall ticket in municipal elections, and a mass exodus of Jewish criminals, the so-called "Bowery Boys," from the Lower East Side to the Witwatersand.(38)

Whatever the circumstances of his departure, Schlesinger arrived in Johannesburg and found his way to a bicycle shop owned by two Americans. (Johannesburg at the time was in the midst of a bicycle craze, with policemen and criminals alike whizzing about on two wheels.) According to tradition, he asked the proprietors for a job, saying, "I'm good at selling things." To test the proposition, the men entrusted him with a large consignment of American chewing gum, an unfamiliar novelty that they had found impossible to sell. Schlesinger returned a few days later having sold the lot, an achievement noted in passing by Mark Twain. From chewing gum Schlesinger graduated to insurance, and in the years before the South African War he accumulated a small fortune as a travelling agent for the Equitable Insurance Company of New York. By the time of his death half a century later, this astonishingly neglected figure had parlayed that initial stake into the Schlesinger Organization, a vast empire of ninety companies that embraced, at

various times, insurance, banking, real estate, advertising, agriculture, hotels, newspapers, radio and, most importantly, cinema.(39)

One of the keys to Schlesinger's success was his genius for applying in South Africa methods and techniques developed in the United States. His African Realty Trust, for example, developed some of the first of South Africa's leafy white suburbs, including Mount Pleasant in Port Elizabeth and Orange Grove, Parkmore, Parkhurst and the "prestige" suburb of Killarney in Johannesburg. Following a model pioneered by American developers a generation before, African Realty sold lots on a monthly installment plan, promising buyers all the comforts of country living combined with proximity to the city. In 1926, Schlesinger launched the African Broadcasting Corporation, South Africa's, and indeed the continent's, first radio network. (A.B.C. was amicably handed over in 1936 to the newly established South African Broadcasting Corporation.) He even revolutionized South Africa's citrus industry, through the introduction of time and motion studies, assembly line packing, and American refrigeration technology. The list of Schlesinger's American-inspired innovations goes on and on, from South Africa's first amusement parks to an abortive attempt to introduce commercial aviation, from a chain of American-style "drugstores" (complete with soda fountains) to the creation of the Miss South Africa pageant.(40)

It was Schlesinger's career as a movie mogul that best exhibited his distinctively American genius. In 1913, he bought The Empire, a failing vaudeville house in Johannesburg. In the space of just a few years, he built that investment into African Consolidated Theatres, which, with its associated companies, dominated South Africa's cinema industry until 1956, when the Schlesinger Organisation sold its movie interests to Twentieth Century Fox. Like his counterparts in Hollywood, Schlesinger was quick to recognize the value of vertical integration, of bringing production, distribution and exhibition all under one roof. Indeed, he went further than most American studios, creating companies to oversee theater catering, film advertising, even the production of newsreels that accompanied features. He also foresaw the triumph of sound film, and, while others dithered, secured valuable sound patent rights in South Africa and Great Britain. The heart of Schlesinger's domain was Johannesburg's Commissioner Street, South Africa's "Great White Way," which featured Broadcast House, headquarters of the ABC radio network, and three massive movie theaters, the Empire, His Majesty's and The Colisseum, which between them seated more than six thousand people. Like the contemporary "picture palaces" of New York or Los Angeles, Schlesinger's theaters pandered to dreams, offering not only movies and fine dining but a variety of luxurious appointments, from arches and classical statuary to the famous vaulted ceiling of the Colisseum -- "the atmospheric theatre" -- painted to resemble the night sky. For generations of South Africans, the "evening out" for dinner and a movie became a cherished weekly ritual -- a ritual that, with the delayed advent of television, persisted far longer in South Africa than the United States. When television finally arrived in the 1970s, South Africa boasted the eighth largest movie audience in the world.(41)

Initially, Schlesinger supplied his theaters with imported films, but with the wartime interruption of European film production and the simultaneous, sharp rise in American rental costs, he established African Film Productions to make films locally. While many of these early productions have been lost, it is clear that Schlesinger again followed his familiar strategy of marrying American techniques to South African materials. In the case of movies, this task was made easier by the fondness which American filmmakers had already begun to show for South African -- especially "Zulu" -- themes and settings. No less a figure than D.W. Griffith directed

an early film on South Africa, entitled "The Zulu's Heart" (1908), in which a Zulu chief, mourning the death of his child, spares the wife and children of a white settler. At the other end of the spectrum stood a film like Pathe Freres "Rastus in Zululand" (1910), in which Rastus, a stock minstrel figure, is shipwrecked in South Africa and forced to choose between a Zulu chief's cooking pot or marrying his homely daughter. (He chooses the pot.) The impact of Hollywood's South Africa was registered clearly in one of the first African Film Productions' releases, "A Zulu's Devotion" (1916), which starred Schlesinger's future wife, Mabel May, and which, judging from the evidence of reviews, precisely followed the plot line of a U.S. film of the same year, "The Kaffir's Gratitude." In both films, Africans reward the white men who saved their lives with loyalty and devoted service. Presumably, the American film had been intended as a commentary on appropriate race relations in the U.S., but the message was equally congenial to white South African audiences.(42)

Fortunately, African Film Productions' two most successful films do survive: "Die Voortrekkers" (entitled "Winning a Continent" in its English version), released in 1916; and "Symbol of Sacrifice," released two years later. Both were historical epics, on South African themes. Though credited to Harold Shaw, an American director whom Schlesinger had recruited from Hollywood, "Die Voortrekkers" was the creation of its scriptwriter, Afrikaner Nationalist historian and ideologue, Gustav Preller. Hard as it may be to imagine for anyone who attended a South African school in the half century between 1938 and 1988, the travails of the Great Trek -- the murder of Retief by the treacherous Dingaan, the sealing of covenant at Blood River, the tortuous ascent of the Drakensberg -- were not always central to South Africans', or even to Afrikaners', historical imaginations. It was Preller who made them so, and "Die Voortrekkers" marked the culmination of his quest. "Symbol of Sacrifice," was similar in scope, if not in politics. Co-directed by Schlesinger himself, it told the heroic story of the British men and women who settled in the Eastern Cape in the 1820s. While of less obvious historical significance, the film in its time was perhaps even more topical, appearing at a time when South African soldiers fought in Europe alongside their British bretheren.(43)

The themes may have been South African, but both films bore the unmistakeable imprint of Hollywood, not only in their historical subjects and epic scale, but in their racial subtexts, which, as Peter Davis has suggested, paralleled precisely those in D.W. Griffith's epochal "Birth of a Nation," which had been released to unprecedented acclaim and denunciation in 1915. Like Griffith's horrifying masterpiece, Schlesinger's films juxtaposed faithful and perfidious blacks, projecting a future of peace and patronage for the former and extermination for the latter. (Ironically, Griffiths himself had first indulged this theme in a South African setting, in "The Zulu's Heart.") Both Schlesinger films also faithfully recapitulated Griffith's message of white reconciliation, personified by the helpful Dutchman in "Symbol of Sacrifice" and, less plausibly, by the supportive Englishman in "Die Voortrekkers." Taken together, the two films function -- and were conceivably intended -- as South Africa's "Birth of a Nation," heralding a bounteous future for white South Africans once they had put aside their intra-racial animosity and embraced their shared identity and destiny.(44)

Schlesinger's first films included some commercial successes; "Die Voortrekkers," in particular, attracted record crowds, despite objections in some quarters that it subverted the war effort. Both films also did substantial overseas business, helping briefly to establish South Africa as a significant center of the developing industry. Subsequent Schlesinger productions, however,

lost money, victims both of dwindling overseas interest and of the restricted local market. African Film Productions continued to churn out one or two films per year, but the vast majority of movies released in South Africa, from the 1920s on, came from Hollywood.(45)

In South Africa as in the United States, the emergence of cinema generated enormous controversy, with critics proferring ever more ominous predictions about the new medium's baleful effects on the individual, family and nation. In substance and tone, such attacks were virtually identical to those showered on the film industry in America, but they were inflected in distinctively South African ways. How could the superiority and reputation of "white civilization" be upheld when Hollywood filmmakers insisted on representing white people in the worst possible light -- as gangsters and adulturers, prostitutes and thieves? Would impressionable "natives" be capable of distinguishing reality from the what they saw on the silver screen? The 1910 decision to ban the film of the recent Jack Johnson - Jim Jeffries fight inaugurated eighty years of racialized movie censorship.(46)

Afrikaner Nationalists were particularly uneasy with "bioskoopbeskawing," focusing not only on its moral corrosiveness but on its tendency to dissolve divinely ordained differences between nations. In the late 1930s, leaders of the Broederbond commissioned an investigation, published by Nasionale Pers, into ways to harness cinema's extraordinary power, to make a medium that was "volksvreemde" (alien to the people) "volkseie" (the people's own). Largely at the instigation of Afrikaner Nationalists, a succession of South African governments from the 1930s to the 1970s maintained a lucrative subsidy system for South African films, particularly for films in Afrikaans, essentially guaranteeing a profit for anyone with a movie camera. Yet while the system did help to sustain a small local industry, it did not upset the dominance of Hollywood. As late as 1969, a full 98% of South African films were imported from overseas, the vast majority from the United States. Ironically, most of the dozen or so low-budget features produced annually by South African filmmakers were bound for that most American of venues, the drive-in theatre.(47)

There was an even deeper irony here. The same Afrikaner Nationalists who decried "bioskoopbeskawing," who warned of the poison of America's commercialized, mongrelized culture, would, when they came into power in 1948, pursue policies that would draw South Africa ever further into the American embrace.

V. 1945-1963

a. American imports, investments and the making of apartheid

One pattern should already be clear. From the Napoleanic era through the First World War, economic relations between the United States and South Africa were shaped by wars and the political upheavals that inevitably followed them. It is thus not surprising that World War II and its aftermath would have a profound effect on U.S.-South African relations. On the surface, this was a period of sharp divergence between these two racially tortured societies. In the United States, the war ushered in a period of unprecedented economic advance for African Americans, as well as a widespread assault on the intellectual and moral status of "racism" -- a newly minted term of opprobrium, first used to describe the horrific fallacy of Nazism. Equally significantly, the late 1940s saw the beginning of a political realignment that would bring the cause of civil rights into the center of the Democratic Party agenda. In 1947, Harry S. Truman became the first American President to address a meeting of the National Association for the Adancement of

Colored People. Later in the same year, the Truman administration published To Secure These Rights, a manifesto that pledged to use the power of the federal government to prevent violations of blacks' civil rights. In 1948, the year that the National Party came into power in South Africa on a platform of "apartheid," Truman desegregated the American Armed Forces by executive order, and inserted a Civil Rights plank in the Democratic Party platform, prompting a walk-out by so-called Dixiecrats. To be sure, the administration's embrace of the cause of racial equality was prompted as much by expediency as by principle; leaders in Washington had already recognized their acute vulnerability on the issue in the global propaganda war with the Soviets. Yet even with this qualification, there is no doubting the significance of these initiatives in setting the stage for civil rights victories of the 1950s and '60s. With the enactment of the Voting and Civil Rights acts in 1964-65, the United States was committed in law, if not always in practice, to the principle of non-racial citizenship.(48)

Needless to say, circumstances could scarcely have been more different in South Africa. While the war years had produced many of the same structural transformations -- accelerating urbanization, the large scale movement of black workers into secondary industry, increasing black assertiveness -- the political denouement was directly opposite. In May, 1948, Daniel Malan's National Party came to power on a platform of apartheid. The years that followed brought population registration, the Immorality and Mixed Marriages acts, group areas, separate amenities, Bantu Education, intensified urban influx control, rural labour bureaux, forced removals and an intensifying assault on all political opposition. Yet paradoxically, these years of divergence produced a dramatic intensification of economic, cultural and political links between the United States and South Africa.

As in 1914, the outbreak of war in Europe ignited a boom in U.S. - South African trade. Between 1938 and 1941, the American share of South African imports doubled, from less than twenty to nearly forty percent. By the end of 1941, the U.S. had again displaced Britain as South Africa's largest trading partner. Even more remarkably, tiny South Africa had risen to become the United States' fourth largest foreign market. During the war, no less than ten American shipping firms offered regular service to South Africa, from half-a-dozen different ports. The ships returned loaded with strategic minerals such as vanadium and platinum, as well as with gold, which, through a special arrangement with the Bank of England, was shipped directly to the United States to cover South African and British lend-lease obligations. Private American investment swelled during the same period, from about $50 million to nearly $140 million. As in the pre-war period, the bulk of new investment was in petroleum and manufacturing industry, with mining still a distant third.(49)

Transatlantic traffic increased further at war's end, just as it had in the aftermath of the First World War. With the British economy moribund, American commodities poured into South Africa. Total American sales, which had increased threefold between 1938 and 1945, doubled again in 1946-47, to more than $400 million per annum. American investment kept pace, with several American companies opening or expanding operations. Goodyear Tire, for example, which had marketed its products in South Africa for more than three decades, opened a factory in 1947 in Uitenhage, not far from the factory opened by its rival, Firestone, a decade earlier. (General Tire opened its factory two years later, giving the Port Elizabeth area a trio of American tire plants.) The flow of investment capital was encouraged by the influential Fortune magazine, which hailed South Africa as "one of the latter-day world's amphitheaters of ante-Delanian [i.e.

pre-Roosevelt] rugged individuals." While acknowledging that South African prosperity hinged on labor repression, the magazine also noted the country's "fantastically low operating costs," which created "opportunity and to spare for venture capital."(50)

Fortune's assessment was shared by the U.S. government, which saw in South Africa's appetite for American commodities and capital a perfect complement to the American economy's need for overseas markets and investment outlets. Significantly, U.S. policymakers were unconcerned by the rising Afrikaner Nationalist challenge to the United Party government of Jan Smuts. Indeed, a 1945 State Department report suggested that the Nationalists' antipathy to Britain might play into American hands. "Americans would try to break down the walls of Empire preference from the outside while the Afrikaners would seek to do so from the inside," the report projected. "[T]he Nationalist ideal of a South Africa independent, economically and politically, is obviously in accord with the American hopes of freer world trade without discrimination."(51)

The State Department's prediction came true, though the process was more complicated than anyone had anticipated. Malan's National Party government was indeed determined to assert South Africa's autonomy from Britain. Shortly after coming to power, it announced that South Africa would no longer market its gold through the Bank of England, overturning a system in place since the South African War. Instead, the country's entire gold output from 1948 was shipped directly to the United States, to pay for the flood of American imports, the value of which peaked at nearly half a billion dollars. In that most portentous of years, South Africa's two and a half million whites consumed around 4% of total U.S. exports. Far from heralding a new era of transatlantic trade, however, the surge of American imports precipitated a balance of payments crisis, a crisis made worse by the flight of British capital in the wake of the election. Late in 1948, an alarmed government imposed a battery of new import restrictions, including high tariffs, local content rules and outright prohibitions on certain non-essential consumer goods. Over the next two years, the value of American exports to South Africa fell by more than seventy-five percent, while the American share of the South African import market fell by half.(52)

Yet even as it stemmed the flow of American imports, the Malan government welcomed American investment with open arms. Like their predecessors in the Pact, a quarter century before, the Nationalists who came to power in the late 1940s were anxious to build up South Africa's manufacturing base, as part of a deliberate policy to enhance national autonomy, expand white employment and reduce the influence of mining capital. They were particularly anxious to acquire new technology and management techniques, with an eye to encouraging the growth of an Afrikaner bourgeoisie. The obvious answer lay in the United States. While a few Nationalist leaders warned of the dangers of replacing one imperialism with another, the Malan government set out to attract American investment capital, waiving tariffs and license fees on companies with local subsidiaries while retaining the Smuts government's generous policies on taxation and repatriation of profits. In effect, the Nationalists in 1948 did deliberately what their predecessors in the Pact had done half wittingly in the 1920s, compelling companies with an interest in South Africa's expanding market to set up operations locally.

The result was a torrent of new American investment. Virtually overnight, direct investment in South Africa increased threefold, until it represented a third of U.S. private investment in Africa as a whole. By the end of the 1950s, it more than doubled again, until it represented over half of American investment on the continent. More than forty American firms, including such giants as

Timken Bearings, Dow Chemicals, John Deere, IBM, Kellogg, Quaker Oats and 3M, established local subsidiaries in the five years after 1948. A host of others expanded operations. American auto manufacturers, for example, opened new assembly facilities, in response to state restrictions on the importation of finished vehicles. In 1953, Mobil Oil built South Africa's first oil refinery, enabling the country to process locally more than a quarter of its annual fuel requirements. The investment surge was most dramatic in pharamaceuticals, an industry dominated before the war by German firms. Thirteen American pharmaceutical companies opened South African subsidiaries in the late 1940s and early '50s; no less than ten manufactured their products locally. So conspicuous was the influx that the American Department of Commerce began to issue an annual publication on South Africa for potential American investors, touting the country's commitment to "capitalism and individualism," as well as its political stability and quiescent labor climate.(53)

In cultural terms, American manufacturing capital had a less obvious impact in the 1940s and '50s than in the 1920s, if only because so many American products were already available locally. Kellogg's Corn Flakes were new, but South Africans had long been familiar with Quaker Oats, as they were with Timken bearings and John Deere tractors. Yet there is no gainsaying the significance of American investment and innovation. Birdseye Corporation, for example, introduced South Africans to frozen food, an innovation made possible by the explosion in the (American-owned) home refigerator industry. The whole phenomenon of processed food, which swept across South Africa in the 1950s, was quintessentially American, designed as it was to simplify and accelerate consumption. Perhaps the most portentous new arrival was IBM, which established a South African subsidiary in 1953 and began to market its then state-of-the-art 5000 series computer a year later. In the decades that followed, American computer companies -- and IBM in particular -- would revolutionize the working lives of South Africans as fundamentally as American mining and manufacturing engineers had transformed the lives of previous generations. In direct and indirect ways, American corporations helped to underwrite apartheid South Africa's extraordinary (and extraordinarily skewed) rates of economic growth, and thus to solidify the initially tenuous political grip of the National Party.(54)

From the perspective of American capital, of course, such considerations were secondary to profits. And make no mistake: investments in apartheid South Africa paid off spectacularly, generating rates of return that were consistently the highest in the world. How could one not make money in a country in which annual GNP growth, between 1948 and 1970, averaged nearly six percent, a country with a burgeoning white consumer market and cheap, politically disenfranchised black labor? In 1950 alone, the percentage rate of return on U.S. direct investment in South Africa was 27%. In the mid-1960s, it still hovered around 20%, more than half again higher than in Japan, which ranked second in the world, and nearly three times higher than in Canada, which ranked third. One former managing director of an American company in South Africa recalled a thirteen year streak in which his group won the trophy that the parent company awarded annually to the international subsidiary generating the highest returns on investment. Even in the early 1980s, as apartheid crumbled and economic growth stagnated, U.S. companies still reported an average annual rate of return of 18%.(55)

b. Uranium and the Cold War

The United States' deepening economic involvement in apartheid South Africa was accompanied by a profound change in the political relationship between the two countries, to the point that one can begin meaningfully to speak of the U.S. as South Africa's political metropole. This process was inseparable from the Cold War. Where previous American administrations had tended to view relations with South Africa through the prism of Great Britain, the Truman administration and its successors saw them unequivocally in East-West terms. By those lights, South Africa represented a vital ally. Not only did it command the Cape sea routes, but it also produced thirteen of the twenty four minerals listed in the U.S. strategic stockpiling program, some of which were available nowhere else outside the Soviet bloc. Many of these minerals -- vanadium, platinum, manganese -- were vital to American military production. Most importantly of all, South Africa possessed vast supplies of uranium, conveniently embedded in the gold-bearing conglomerates of the Witwatersrand.(56)

As historian Thomas Borstelmann has shown, postwar American policymakers viewed control of uranium ore supplies as the key to national survival in the Atomic Age. As early as 1944, American geologists associated with the Manhattan Project had determined, in Borstelman's words, "that South Africa had the world's largest undeveloped reserves of uranium ore capable of early commercial development." The importance of these reserves escalated in the first years of the Cold War, as the Truman administration embarked on a massive bomb building program. By 1947-48, shortages of uranium ore had already become the "limiting factor" in bomb production. Worse still, the Belgian Congo mines from which the United States obtained the lion's share of its ore were fast being depleted; by most projections, the supply would be exhausted by the early- or mid-1950s. In this context, the Truman administration was understandably anxious to ensure that the Witwatersrand's uranium deposits would not only be developed, but remain securely in Western hands. In June, 1948 -- one month after the National Party's accession -- negotiations commenced between the South African government, the local mining industry and the "Combined Development Trust" of the United States and Great Britain. The eventual agreement, signed in November, 1950, guaranteed the Western alliance a monopoly over local uranium production. In exchange, the United States committed to design, build and finance six uranium processing plants, the first of which opened in late 1949. In the twisted logic of Cold War, one of the most unfree nations in the world had become a bastion of the "Free World."

The Malan government was rewarded handsomely for its cooperation. In February, 1951, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United States would henceforth give "the most sympathetic consideration" to South African requests for military equipment, despite a confidential C.I.A. report that stated that "South African military planning, to a degree unknown in North Atlantic Treaty states, focuses on the basic requirement of internal security." At the same time, the U.S. used its considerable influence in the United Nations to shield South Africa from international censure, by forestalling and, if necessary, vetoing, anti-apartheid resolutions. (This policy, as Acheson himself conceded, had the additional advantage of denying a precedent to those who wished to introduce the subject of American race relations on the floor of the U.N.) On those occasions when international pressure became irresistable -- as it did, for example, after the Nationalist's harsh suppression of the 1952 Defiance Campaign -- the American delegation to the U.N. elected to abstain.(57)

Most importantly, the 1950 uranium agreement gave South Africa unprecedented access to American capital, the bulk of it channelled through international agencies such as the World Bank and Export-Import Bank. It is worth looking closely at this process, if only to contrast the largesse of the American government and its international proxies during the early apartheid years with their extraordinary stinginess today, when a democratically-elected government struggles to redress apartheid's legacy. In January, 1951, two months after the uranium agreement was signed, the World Bank announced a $50 million loan to the South African government, $30 million of which was earmarked for ESCOM, the state-owned electricity supplier, and $20 million of which was intended to modernize the country's transportation network. Lest there be any doubt that the loan represented a deliberate shift in American policy, a consortium of eight American commercial banks unveiled a $30 million dollar loan to the South African government on the very same day. A few months later, the Ex-Im Bank granted a $35 million loan to the mining industry to facilitate the uranium processing project.(58)

Once the floodgates had been opened, American capital continued to pour into South Africa. Of the nearly $200 million in Ex-Im grants, loans and credits to Africa between 1946 and 1955, roughly $150 million -- seventy five percent -- was directed to South Africa. Over sixty percent of World Bank investment in Africa over the same period likewise went south of the Limpopo. Some of this money was specifically earmarked for uranium production. American capital and technicians built South Africa's first uranium processing plant, as well as the country's first nuclear facility at Pelindaba, the same facility at which South Africa would later build the atomic bomb. The bulk of international assistance, however, was used by the Nationalist government to build South Africa's vaunted modern infrastructure. World Bank and Export-Import Bank money overhauled the country's road network, modernized its harbor facilities, funded new rail lines and rolling stock and vastly increased the productive capacities of ESCOM and ISCOR, the state-owned power and steel producers. While all of this investment could be justified in terms of ensuring the speedy delivery of uranium ore to American bomb manufacturers, U.S. policymakers and their international proxies fully understood its importance in underwriting apartheid South Africa's robust economic growth.(59)

Policymakers in Washington were not, of course, oblivious to apartheid, nor to the ways in which American policy, and the policies of U.S.-dominated international lenders, solidified National Party rule. On the contrary, they regarded South African racial policies as an ethical embarassment and a distinct political liability, especially in an epoch of accelerating decolonization and intensifying Cold War competition for "Third World" loyalties. Such concerns, however, were not enough to counterbalance the United States' growing economic stake in South Africa or the overriding imperative of uranium. A 1951 State Department policy paper put the matter succinctly: "it is in our interests to maintain friendly relations with South Africa because of strategic considerations and also because South Africa represents a good market for our products." This calculus was doubtless confirmed by what Borstelmann calls the "deep sense of cultural and racial identity" which State Department officials felt with white South Africans. In few other countries in the world did visiting American officials feel so at home, a testament not only to the broad similarities between the two societies, but to the pervasiveness of American commodities and culture in the white, predominantly urban circles within which they travelled. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, a Texan, returned from a visit in the 1950s enraptured with the "progressive spirit and dynamism" of Johannesburg, which boasted "an atmosphere more like Chicago than Africa."(60)

For their part, National Party leaders were quick to grasp the rules of engagement in this Cold War world, positioning South Africa as a reliable American ally, a vital cog in the Western alliance. The Malan government, like the Smuts government that preceded it, petitioned for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it dispatched pilots to participate in the 1948 Berlin Airlift. South Africa was also one of the first nations to commit troops to the American-led United Nations' intervention in Korea in 1950. At the same time, the government invoked the specter of communist subversion to justify its all-out assault on political dissent at home. Indeed, the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act -- passed, significantly, the day after the communist invasion of South Korea -- pushed anti-communist logic even further than the contemporaneous McCarran Act in the United States, by empowering the Minister of Justice to act against any individual or organization whose activities, in his estimation, tended to advance the interests of communism.

The deepening relationship between the United States and apartheid South Africa reached a kind of climax in the early 1960s. In March, 1960, South African police fired on unarmed African demonstrators in the "model township" of Sharpeville, killing sixty nine and wounding over two hundred. The massacre provoked an international outcry and the first of many bouts of emigration fever, as whites fled a seemingly inevitable cataclysm. While the United Nations debated an international ban on South African products -- the United States, predictably, vetoed the resolution -- international, especially British, capital flooded out of the country. In all, over a quarter billion rands in investment left South Africa; gold and foreign exchange reserves fell by nearly sixty percent.

All of this is familiar enough to historians. What is less often observed is the role of Americans in containing the panic. In late 1960, a consortium of American investors, led by Charles Engelhard, a mineral and chemical industry baron with close links to the Kennedy administration, arranged a $150 million loan for the South African government. A few weeks later, the World Bank and the IMF stepped in with loans totalling more than $40 million, pumping up South African reserves and calming nervous investors. American corporations also helped to calm the waters. In May, 1961, the South African government funded a twenty page insert into the New York Times, aimed at potential investors. The insert included lavish testimonials from the managing directors of both Coca Cola and General Motors, both of which announced substantial new investments. "My corporation does not idly play with this kind of money," the director of Coca Cola declared, referring to a $3 million investment in new bottling facilities. "We believe in South Africa and the new plant is a demonstration of faith on our side." Buoyed by such support, the South Africa economy weathered the crisis, and embarked on a decade of unprecedented economic growth. By the end of the 1960s, American direct investment topped $1 billion.(61)

The ironies in all this are palpable. At the very moment that the United States began tentatively to confront the problem of racial inequality, it was deeply implicated in the elaboration of apartheid in South Africa. Stranger still, the resources that poured into South Africa in the 1950s in the name of western values of individualism and free enterprise underwrote a dramatic increase in state ownership and control of the economy, a process particularly evident in the steel and energy industries. The situation was equally ironic from the South African perspective. A rabidly nationalist government, intent on asserting its autonomy from imperial Britain, pursued policies that drew South Africa into the embrace of imperial America. This process, in turn,

precipitated a remarkable about-turn by African nationalist political leaders, many of whom had historically found solace and support in an imagined American connection. In his 1958 presidential address to the Transvaal branch of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela denounced "the idea of making quick and high profits, which underlies all the development plans launched in Africa by the U.S.A."

"The big and powerful American trade monopolies that are springing up in various parts of the continent, and which are destroying the small trader, the low wages paid the ordinary man, the resulting poverty and misery, his illiteracy and the squalid tenements in which he dwells are the simplest and most eloquent exposition of the falsity of the argument that American investment will raise the standards of the people of this continent."

It would take another forty years for the irony of that particular peroration to become apparent.(62)

V. The 1970s and today

I have carried on far too long, without yet even getting to my final two periods. The first begins in the early- and mid-1970s. Had I more time, I would explore in details three crucial developments. The first, which I can note only briefly, is the suburbanization of economic life -- what one might call, only half facetiously, "mallification." The erection of the first shopping malls in the 1970s -- malls modelled on American prototypes and, in several cases, designed by American firms -- heralded an extraordinary spatial reorganization of South African urban life, a process embracing commerce, consumption and, increasingly, white collar work. The upshot of the process, which has accelerated since the collapse of Group Areas and influx control in the 1980s, is a new, eerily American peri-urban landscape of shopping mall and cluster housing, interspersed with fast-food outlets and landscaped corporate office parks, all bound together by a network of multi-lane roads.(63)

The second obvious terrain of Americanization in the 1970s was, of course, television. Historian Rob Nixon has explored the Afrikaner Nationalists' long refusal to keep this quintessentially American medium out of South Africa, and the combination of circumstances that caused them ultimately to relent. Suffice to say, that much of what they feared -- an avalanche of American commercial programs, promoting values foreign to "the South African way of life" -- has come to pass. Between the high costs of local production and the South African boycott by the British union Equity, an increasing percentage of American shows appeared on South African screens. The most successful -- Rich Man, Poor Man, Dallas and Dynasty -- were not only American in origin but served further to entrench South African (and especially white South African) assumptions about American wealth and power. Even the vaguely countercultural shows that began to appear in the 1980s -- Miami Vice (dubbed into Afrikaans, as Misdaad in Miami) and the Cosby Show -- portrayed an America of astonishing material comfort. As in many other countries, the rain of American shows stifled the growth of a local industry, a problem that continues to this day. According to current SABC figures, it costs at least sixteen times more to produce a local hour-long drama than to license one from the United States -- the difference, say, between four or five hundred rands per minute and upwards of eight thousand rands per minute.(64)

The third process was financial or, more accurately, political-financial. Facing slowing growth rates, continuing capital outflows, a massive increase in state spending (defense spending alone increased more than 1000% in the 1970s), and a dangerously low level of domestic savings (itself an artifact of American-influenced consumption patterns amongst white South Africans), the Nationalist government did what any government would do in the circumstances: it borrowed money. Increasingly, large-scale government capital projects were funded through short-term loans from American commerical banks, which offered far lower interest rates than those available locally. In 1974-5, for example, Citicorp lent $150 million to ISCOR, the steel parastatal, and another $30 million to ESCOM, to aid in the development of nuclear power. The need for short-term money increased after the Soweto uprising of 1976, which prompted another bout of capital flight. By the early 1980s, more than forty U.S. banks had made substantial loans to the South African government, the total value of which peaked at $4.7 billion in 1984.(65)

One ironic consequence of this dependence on American commercial loans is that the South African government found itself vulnerable to the swelling pressure for disinvestment in the United States. Facing growing political pressure at home, New York banks refused to roll over South African loans in 1985, precipitating a run on the South African rand so destructive that the South African government was forced temporarily to suspend all foreign exchange transactions. When the definitive history of the end of apartheid is written, this chapter will loom large. For present purposes, the episode is significant as perhaps the final step in the century-long process by which the United States displaced Great Britain as South Africa's cultural, political and economic metropole.

Which brings us to the present. Perhaps not surprisingly, the years since 1994 have accelerated the process of Americanization, while introducing a raft of new ironies and paradoxes. The ongoing process of privatization of the television industry has, if anything, increased the predominance of American shows and movies, but the "demographics" of the shows has changed dramatically. Determined to shed its reputation as a bastion of "white" South Africa, the SABC in particular has saturated the airwaves with African American situation comedies, including several which most Americans have probably never heard of. Precisely what messages are being absorbed by South African viewers is, as always, a difficult problem, but it seems safe to say that images of black Americans sitting in middle class homes and in college fraternities and sororities have a particular impact on South Africa's rapidly growing black middle class. At the same time, images of African American ghetto life, transmitted through rap, hip hop and movies such as "Boyz in the Hood" and "Wild Style," have permeated township life, giving rise to a self-consciously Afro-American-style gang culture. Just as the leading criminal gang in 1950s Sophiatown, the Americans, drove tailfinned American sedans, sported zoot suits and listened to jazz, so today do gangs in the "Coloured" Cape Flats affect African American speech, sport American-flag "do-rags" and "tag" buildings with neon tributes to gangsta rapper Tupac Shakur. And just as the visit of the McAdoo Jubilee Singers spawned a host of African imitators in the 1890s, so has the recent entrance of hip hop given rise to local bands such as Blade, Vulcan and the all-female Ghetto Luv.

As always, these inroads in the realm of "culture" have been accompanied by important political and economic changes. While the promised flood of American investment in post-apartheid South Africa has not materialized (despite the current government's slavish devotion to a U.S. and World Bank mandated structural adjustment program), the post-1994 years have seen

the entrance of new U.S. investors, as well as the return of some old investors. Perhaps the most portentous is the arrival of McDonald's Corporation, not only because of McDonald's status as the largest (and surely one of the most notorious) private employer in the United States, but also because of what the McDonald's regime implies in terms of speed, standardization and the structure of domestic life.

The post-apartheid years have also brought increased political traffic between the United States. The A.N.C.'s election campaign in 1994 was managed by President Clinton's house pollster, Stanley Greenberg, himself the author (back in his academic days) of an important comparative history of the United States and South Africa. Deval Patrick, Clinton's advisor on race relations, has played a central role in helping South Africa's Ministry of Labour to draft affirmative action codes, and in providing the computers that the Ministry will need to interpret incoming data. (Embattled defenders of affirmative action in the United States might be forgiven for wondering whether such computers were available because of the dwindling home market.) Vice President Al Gore has made a series of trips to South Africa, and chairs with his counterpart, Thabo Mbeki, a new, permanent U.S. - South African Commission. President Clinton himself arrived in early 1998, finding in the august presence of Nelson Mandela a welcome respite from domestic scandal. During his visit, Clinton extolled open markets and stressed that the future of U.S. relations with the country and the region lay in "trade, not aid." Americans, he opined, owed South Africans nothing. What, one wonders, do South Africans owe the United States?

1.) F.A. McKenzie, The American Invaders (London, 1902), quoted in Thomas J. Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870-1914 (Kent, 1978), pp. 94-95. On Stead, see Estelle W. Stead, My Father: Personal and Spiritual Reminiscences (London, n.d.).

2.) Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission on Mixed Marriages in South Africa (Pretoria, 1939), pp. 41-49. For studies of parallels and encounters, see George Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York, 1981); Fredrickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (New York, 1995); John Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (New York, 1982); and J. Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa (New York, 1995).

3.) Eric Rosenthal, The Stars and Stripes in Africa, 2nd edition (Cape Town, 1968), pp. 23-28. Lindley's statement is quoted in Robert Kinloch Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York, 1997), p. xviii.

4.) Richard W. Hull, American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement (New York, 1990), pp. 2-15; Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 13, 39-48; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, pp. 13-14. On Cape Town's Waterfront, see Nigel Worden, "Unwrapping History at the Cape Town Waterfront," Public History 16, 2 (1994), pp. 33-50.

5.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 25-27; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, p. xix. On American whalers in southern African waters, see Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 52-58.

6.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 38-39, 69-77, 119-120; Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 222-224. Perhaps the most influential of these American commodities was the Singer sewing machine, which revolutionized working and domestic life in countries all over the world; see Robert B. Davies, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World: Singer Sewing Machines in Foreign Markets, 1854-1920 (New York, 1976).

7.) Clark C. Spence, Mining Engineers and the American West: The Lace-Boot Brigade, 1849-1933 (New Haven, 1970). Probably the best examplar of this new class was John Hays Hammond, who studied at Yale and Freiberg, before making his fortune in the American West and in South Africa; see Hammond, The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond, 2 vols. (New York, 1935). On the transformation of American life in the late nineteenth century, see, inter alia, Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order (New York, 1976); and Alfred DuPont Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 1977). On the wages of South Africa's mineral revolution, see Charles van Onselen, "The World the Mineowners Made: Social Themes in the Economic Transformation of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914," in Studies in the Social and Economic Transformation of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1910, vol. 1, New Babylon (London, 1982).

8.) For a contemporary portrayal of Kimberley from an American perspective, see "Life on the Diamond Fields," Harpers New Monthly Magazine, Feb., 1873, pp. 325-326. See also Gardner Williams, The Diamond Mines of South Africa (New York, 1902); G.R. Bozzoli, Forging Ahead: South Africa's Pioneering Engineers (Johannesburg, 1997), pp. 59-62; and Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 121-128, 131-135, 228-229. (The last mentioned pages include a list of American place names in South Africa.) On Rhodes and Americans, see Hammond, Autobiography, pp. 217-240, and passim. For Americans in what became Rhodesia, see Frederick Russell Burnham, Scouting on Two Continents (Phoenix, 1994, orig. pub. 1926); and Mary and Richard Bradford (eds.), An American Family on the African Frontier: The Burnham Family Letters, 1893-1896 (Niwot, 1993). The final comment is quoted in Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (London, 1976), pp. 137.

9.) Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 132-133; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 67-69, 89-90; Enid De Waal, "American Black Residents and Visitors in the S.A.R. before 1899," South African Historical Journal 6,1 (1974), pp. 52-56. On the "Bowery Boys," see Charles van Onselen, "Prostitutes and Proletarians, 1886-1914," in New Babylon, pp. 118-135.

10.) Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 131-135; Bozzoli, Forging Ahead, pp. 49-54, 62-73. Twain's comment is quoted in Massie, Loosing the Bonds, p. xxi. On Quinan and the explosives industry, see A.P. Cartwright, The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries, Ltd. (Cape Town, 1964). On deep-level mining, see Hammond, Autobiography, pp. 291-306.

11.) The fullest account of Americans and the raid is Hammond, Autobiography, pp. 309-429, ff. See also Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee, pp. 21-68; and Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 141-148. Hall's testimony is discussed in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," in P. Bonner (ed.), Working Papers in Southern African Studies, vol. 2 (Johannesburg, 1981), pp. 65-67.

12.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 69-77; Enid De Waal, "American Technology in South African Gold Mining before 1899," Optima 33,2 (1985), pp. 88-96.

13.) Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 137-140; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 24-25, 36-37, 65-66, 77-82, 218. On the rise of Anglo-American, see Duncan Innes, Anglo: Anglo-American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (New York, 1984), pp. 75-96.

14.) Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee, pp. 91-110, ff; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 120-123. On state policy toward the A.M.E. Church, see Campbell, Songs of Zion, pp. 150, 222-226.

15.) On minstrelsy, see Robert C. Toll, Blacking Up: The Minstrel Show in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1974). On minstrelsy in South Africa, see Veit Erlmann, African Stars: Studies in Black South African Performance (Chicago, 1991), pp. 27-32; and David Coplan, In Township Tonight: South Africa's Black City Music and Theatre (Johannesburg, 1985). For Joe Brown's Band of Brothers, see Coplan, p. 38; and Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, p. 168. For the impact of the Christy Minstrels, see Cape Argus, August 21, 1863, August 26, 1863, and November 2, 1873. (My thanks to Prof. Erlmann for these and other references.)

16.) On the McAdoo Singers, see Erlmann, African Stars, chapter two. On vaudevillians and other contemporary entertainers, including Rogers and Fields, see Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895-1940 (Cape Town, 1972), pp. 1-40, 149 n.3, 327; and Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 157, 172-173. On the sheet music industry, the global impact of which is still under-appreciated by historians, see R. Charles Hamm, Yesterdays: Popular Songs in America (New York, 1983, orig. pub. 1975).

17.) On 'coons' and ragtime, see Erlmann, African Stars, pp. 59-68, 112-155. On marabi, see Coplan, In Township Tonight, pp. 94-110; and Christopher Ballantine, Marabi Nights: Early South African Jazz and Vaudeville (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 3-7, 18-19, 23-28.

18.) See J. Campbell, "T.D. Mweli Skota and the Making and Unmaking of an African Petty-Bourgeoisie," paper delivered to the History Workshop conference, Johannesburg, February, 1987.

19.) For the changing place of Africa in black American political and intellectual life, see Alain Locke (ed.), The New Negro (New York, 1969, orig. pub. 1925); and Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa (New York, 1974), pp. 229-282. For reverberations in South Africa, see Robert A. Hill and Gregory A. Pirio, "'Africa for the Africans': The Garvey Movement in South Africa, 1920-1940," in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds.), The Politics of Class, Race and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa (London, 1987); Robert Edgar, "African Educational Protest in South Africa: The American School Movement in the Transkei in the 1920s," in Peter Kalloway (ed.), Education and Apartheid: The Education of Black South Africans (Johannesburg, 1984); Helen Bradford, A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa (New Haven, 1987), pp. 213-245; and Campbell, Songs of Zion, pp. 299-304.

20.) On the American model and South African segregation, see Cell, Highest Stage of White Supremacy. On industrial education, see J. Campbell, "Models and Metaphors: Industrial Education in the United States and South Africa," in Ran Greenstein (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on South Africa (New York, 1998).

21.) Tim Couzens, "Moralizing Leisure Time: The Transatlantic Connection and Black Johannesburg," in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness, 1870-1930 (London, 1982); Baruch Hirson, "Tuskegee, the Joint Councils, and the All-Africa Convention," in Collected Seminar Papers of the Societies of Southern Africa, vol. 10 (London, 1980). Phillips' most important works are The Bantu are Coming (London, 1930) and The Bantu in the City (Lovedale, 1936). For samples of his journalism, see Umteteli wa Bantu, March 10, 1926, August 21, 1926. For his film scheme, which was supported by the Union Native Affairs Department and later carried on by the Native Recruiting Corporation, see Peter Davis, In Darkest Hollywood: Exploring the Jungles of Cinema's South Africa (Johannesburg, 1996), pp. 9-11; and Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 1870-1930. Among the other initiatives to which Phillips lent support were the Bantu Men's Social Centre and the Carnegie Foundation's Non-European Library. He opposed an attempt to introduce baseball, on the grounds that the game was "too highly organized" for the simple "Bantu"; see Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 181-182.

22.) On the Phelps-Stokes Fund, see Thomas Jesse Jones, Education in Africa: A Study of West, South and Equitorial Africa by the African Educational Commission, under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund (New York, 1922); Kenneth J. King, Education and Pan-Africanism: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford, 1971); and Campbell, "Models and Metaphors." The standard work on Aggrey remains Edwin Smith, Aggrey of Africa: A Study in Black and White (London, 1929). In a speech at Lovedale, Aggrey noted how Africans frequently approached him to ask about the arrival of Garvey's fleet; see Smith, p. 122.

23.) David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980); Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 138, 153, 365.

24.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 132-134. On the Pact, protection and the growth of South African manufacturing capital, see D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, 3rd edition (Cape Town, 1973), pp. 116-142, 236-239; and Robert H. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960: An Historical Materialist Analysis of Class Formation and Class Relations (Brighton, 1979), pp. 177-244.

25.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 138-140, 182-189, 369. On G.M., see Eric Rosenthal, The Rolling Years: Fifty Years of General Motors in South Africa (n.p., 1976). On Coca-Cola, see Affinity Advertising and Publishing CC, Brands and Branding in South Africa: Key Success Stories (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 68-69. The comment in Businessweek in quoted in Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993), p. 49.

26.) See Belinda Bozzoli, The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa, 1890-1933 (London, 1981), pp. 190-200, and passim.

27.) On advertising and the rise of a consumer culture in the United States, see Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity (Berkely, 1985); and Richard W. Fox and T. Jackson Lears (eds.), The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980 (New York, 1983). On Freud's nephew, Edward Bernays, see Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward L. Bernays (New York, 1965).

28.) The G.M. ads appeared regularly in Outspan; see below. Special thanks to Glenn Adler for information on the early history of the South African automobile industry.

29.) Articles cited are from South African Business Efficiency 1,10 (Sept., 1934). The complaint about indecent advertisments is from S.A.B.E. 1,11 (Oct., 1934), p. 327-328. African Advertising Contractors became part of the Schlesinger Organisation; see below.

30.) The first issue of the journal announced "the avowed intention of The Outspan to introduce no politics," see Outspan, March 4, 1927, p. 3. The quoted advertisments are from Outspan, March 4, 1927, p. 46; and December 19, 1930, p. 60.

31.) I pursue this theme further in Campbell, "T.D. Mweli Skota and the Making and Unmaking of an African Petty Bourgeoisie." On urban areas legislation and its impact on elite accumulation, see Rodney Davenport, "African Townsmen? South African Natives (Urban Areas) Legislation Through the Years," African Affairs 68,1 (1969), pp. 95-109; and Davenport, "The Triumph of Colonel Stallard: The Transformation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act Between 1923 and 1937," South African Historical Journal 2,1 (1970), pp. 77-96.

32.) See Isabel Hofmeyr, "Building a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature and Ethnic Identity, 1902-1924," in Marks and Trapido, The Politics of Class, Race and Nationalism. The quoted passage is on p. 110.

33.) Ezekiel Mphahlele recalls the return of migrant workers from the city to his northeastern Transvaal village, dressed in the latest urban fashions and bearing gramophones and American recordings. "At Christmas-time, Jeemee Roe-Jars (Jimmy Rogers), then in fashion, yodelled plaintively from various parts of the village." Mphahlele, Down Second Avenue (London, 1959), p. 22. Rogers recorded on Zonophone, which later introduced a line of Zulu records for the South African market. See Ballantine, Marabi Nights, pp. 4-6, 12-23; and Erlmann, African Stars, 93-94. For a listing of Zonophone "Dixie" recordings, see Outspan, March 28, 1930.

34.) Ballantine, Marabi Nights, p. 3. For a listing of Columbia's Afrikaans Records series, see Outspan, June 27, 1930, p. 28. On isicathamiya, see Veit Erlmann, Nightsong: Performance, Power and Practice in South Africa (Chicago, 1996); and Coplan, In Township Tonight, pp. 65-73. To sample the eclecticism of the period, listen to "Aubuti Nkikho," recorded in London in1930 by pioneering jazz impressario Griffiths Motsieloa and included in the casette accompanying Ballantine's Marabi Nights. While the tune preserves elements of marabi, it also utilizes "Dixie" yodelling and imitation Hawaiian guitars, apparently played by two Afrikaans musicians working in the same studio at the time.

35.) Ballantine, Marabi Nights, pp. 3-16. (The quotation is on p. 15.) See also Coplan, In Township Tonight, pp. 113-139, ff.

36.) On cinema's origins, see Robert Sklar, Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies, 2nd edition (New York, 1994), pp. 3-64. For the introduction of the medium to South Africa, see Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 1-95.

37.) Andrew R. Heinz, Adapting to Abundance: Jewish Immigrants, Mass Consumption and the Search for American Identity (New York, 1990), pp. 210-218; Sklar, Movie-Made America, pp. 40-47.

38.) For a person of his stature -- he was, by some calculations, the largest employer of labor on the African continent -- Schlesinger is a remarkably elusive figure. The fullest account of the man and his organization is in John R. Shorten, The Johannesburg Saga (Johannesburg, 1970), a book which unfortunately includes neither footnotes nor

bibliography. My thanks to David Gainer for generously sharing materials and insights on Schlesinger.

39.) Shorten, Johannesburg Saga, pp. 365-366, 631-638; W.J. De Kock and D.W. Kruger (eds.), Dictionary of South African Biography, vol. 2 (Cape Town, 1972), pp. 632-633; L.E. Neame, City Built on Gold (Johannesburg, n.d.), pp. 181-182, 207-208, 227.

40.) Shorten, Johannesburg Saga, pp. 342-346; Neame, City Built on Gold, pp. 229-230, 236. On the citrus industry, see A.P. Cartwright, Outspan Golden Harvest: A History of the Citrus Industry (Cape Town, 1977); and Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 195-199. On the beginnings of radio broadcasting, see Eric Rosenthal, 'You Have Been Listening...' The Early Years of Radio in South Africa (Cape Town, 1974); and Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli and Johan Muller (eds.), Broadcasting in South Africa (New York, 1989), pp. 24-28.

41.) Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 199-231; Neame, City Built on Gold, pp. 181-182; Trevor Philpott, "The End of an Innocent Age," The Listener, July 8, 1976, p. 4. On the advent of television, see below.

42.) See Davis, In Darkest Hollywood, pp. 8-11, 14-19, 124-128. Not surprisingly, "A Zulu's Devotion" was one of the first films Ray Phillips selected for his mine compound cinema circuit; see Mark Beittel, "Mapantsula: Cinema, Crime and Politics on the Witwatersrand," Journal of Southern African Studies 16,4 (1990), pp. 751-760.

43.) Davis, In Darkest Hollywood, pp. 128-141; Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 310-320. On Preller and "Die Voortrekkers," see Isabel Hofmeyr, "Popularising History: The Case of Gustav Preller," paper presented to the African Studies Institute seminar, Johannesburg, August, 1987.

44.) Davis, In Darkest Hollywood, pp. 128-135. Of course, Johnnesburg was not Hollywood, and the antagonisms explored in the films had yet to be resolved politically, as those in Griffith's "Birth of a Nation" had been. The filming of "Die Voortrekkers" was dogged by controversy, as well as by a full-scale riot between the Afrikaner and African mineworkers hired to reenact the battle of Blood River.

45.) "Die Voortrekkers" attracted 15,000 customers per week after its local relcase; see Hofmeyr, "Popularising History," p. 3. For a catalogue of South African productions, as well as annual lists of the country's most popular films, see Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 195-197, 228-230, 251-253, 307-341. See also the weekly African Consolidated Theatres advertisments in Outspan.

46.) On censorship, see Gutsche, History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 283-306; and Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London, 1989), pp. 9-28. For parallel developments in the United States, see Sklar, Movie-Made America, pp. 161-174. Despite censorship, black South Africa soon blossomed into a major cinema market -- a market, moreover, with distinctively Americanized tastes. See Davis, In Darkest Hollywood, pp. 20-59.

47.) On the subsidy system, see Tomaselli, Cinema of Apartheid, pp. 29-51. On Afrikaner Nationalist attempts to harness the medium, see H. Rompel, Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk, 2 vols. (Bloemfontein, 1942).

48.) To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Commission on Civil Rights (New York, 1947). See also Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973); and Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, pp. 64-68.

49.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 200-202; Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, p. 49.

50.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 126, 210. Fortune's endorsement is quoted in Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, p. 72. One index of the tightening links between the U.S. and South Africa was the 1947 arrival of Pan-Am, which marked the beginning of commercial air service between the countries.

51.) Quoted in Borselmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, p. 49.

52.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 205-209, Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, pp. 96, 105-106.

53.) See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Investment in Union of South Africa: Conditions and Outlook for United States' Investors (Washington, 1954). On American investment, see Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 223-225; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, pp. 76-78, 112; Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, pp. 96-97; and William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa (New York, 1986), pp. 73-83.

54.) Hull, American Enterprise, p. 212; Affiliated Advertising, Brands and Branding, p. 115.

55.) Massie, Loosing the Bonds, p. 274; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 210, 250, 319.

56.) The argument in this paragraph, and in the several that follow, follows Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle. See also Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, pp. 212-215; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 213-217; and Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited, pp. 105-110, 130, 138.

57.) Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, pp. 164, 187-188.

58.) Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, p. 165; Hull, American Enterprise, p. 204. For a pioneering

analysis of the role of American state and private grants and loans in Africa, and in South Africa in particular, see W. Alphaeus Hunton, Decision in Africa: Sources of Current Conflict, 2nd. edition (New York, 1960), pp. 76-90, and passim.

59.) Rosenthal, Stars and Stripes, p. 215; Hull, American Enterprise, p. 204. It is worth noting that most of the World Bank and Export-Import Bank funds not destined for South Africa went instead to Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. For a breakdown, see Hunton, Decision in Africa, p. 87.

60.) Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, pp. 158, 190, 199.

61.) On the United States and South Africa in the aftermath of Sharpeville, see Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited, pp. 187-203; Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 245-255; and Massie, Loosing the Bonds, pp. 88-89, 169-170, 214-215. (The statements by Coca-Cola and G.M. are quoted on pp. 88-89.). For the post-Sharpeville economic boom, see Houghton, The South African Economy, pp. 209-229.

62.) Quoted in Massie, Loosing the Bonds, pp. 78-79.

63.) Nigel Mandy, A City Divided: Johannesburg and Soweto (Johannesburg, 1984), pp. 68-76, and passim. On the ongoing process of suburbanization in post-apartheid South Africa, see K. Beavon, "Nearer My Mall to Thee: The Decline of the Johannesburg Central Business District and the Emergence of the Neo-Apartheid City," paper presented to the Institute for Advanced Social Research seminar, Johannesburg, October, 1998.

64.) Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television (Pretoria, 1971). See also Rob Nixon, Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World Beyond (London, 1994), pp. 43-76; and Trevor Philpott's four-part series on the coming of television in The Listener, July 8-29, 1976.

65.) Hull, American Enterprise, pp. 266-267, 297-309, 349; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, pp. 93, 170, 204, 368, 500, 591-593. In 1986, as in the aftermath of Sharpeville, a South African deputation hastened to the United States, visiting the State Department, the I.M.F. and nineteen commercial banks to plead for new investment capital, as well as for patience in paying existing loans. In contrast to the earlier period, they received no satisfaction.