

# Perspectives in Education

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# Perspectives in Education

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## DISCUSSION

### Little Pedagogic Monsters<sup>1</sup>

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L I Bertyn

I previously complained to you about didactic books, but I clean forgot about the worst of all: writings on education itself. On didactics, pedagogics, comparative education — there's a whole list, because it's a virile subject that scatters its blessed little progeny everywhere.

To read something written by an educationist is a weird experience. The practitioners of this subject believe that one has mastered something as long as you can give it a pompous definition. They refrain from using ordinary words, since the reader will then realise how little substance there is to their literary product.

They call it a science. Or a 'field of knowledge'. A field of knowledge with its own 'cosmological grounding', and a 'transcendental-empirical' approach according to J T de Witt in his eulogy of H J S Stone, recorded in the new *Journal of the Human Sciences*.

If one acquires the language of these people, one can embroider for pages an idea which could be expressed in a few sentences, or perhaps in a few letters. There doesn't even have to be an idea. Their language is self-propelled — and so profound that no-one can grasp it. The principle is simple: the more difficult the words one uses, the more difficult one's subject. After a while, it is so difficult that one can't write about it in Afrikaans anymore. Then — o joy! — one fabricates words that *look* like Afrikaans words, little monsters and unnatural growths with Afrikaans names.

Can they talk, these educationists, can they write! One can read their work as one pleases: slowly, quickly, or after three plates of onion soup, but all one hears is an empty rustling. The paper actually blanches while you read.

In that same academic journal, I saw a piece from W A Landman with the

title 'A few thoughts about a life-perspectival admissible lesson course.' I am gripped by apprehension. One doesn't know what lies ahead, but one knows it's going to be something awful.

And indeed, Landman doesn't disappoint: 'Fundamental Pedagogics has demonstrated that, by means of revealed and ordered lesson course essentials, the transition can be made to the actualisation of a life perspective, which education in its deepest being actually is.'

Fundamental Pedagogics. Lesson course essentials. Actualisation of life perspective. These are the words Landman writes down — without him exploding in shame, without his bookcase, which probably contains pedagogic literature only, falling on top of him in protest.

He continues, indefatigably and sagaciously. Child-centrism. Operationalisation. Knowing that an adult must earn his keep in this way really saddens me.

For me, school was a building with long corridors, where my life was made bitter for twelve years. But not for Landman. 'A school', he writes, 'can be described as an institution that cannot be negotiated or thought away, where . . .' — whereupon follows a sixteen point definition (and you can see how I am already getting infected by his style.)

It takes him until point twelve to divine that children must also *learn* something there. For the remainder, as far as he's concerned, it's about being-human, about discovering meaning, about modes of existence. 'That the school is indubitably a necessary place for the realisation of life-perspectival, animating educative teaching of life principles, is, in the same way, obvious.' Hear — hear!

Obvious therefore that children must learn life principles — and not, for example, how to distinguish a readable sentence from an unreadable one. I'm warning you that within ten years the first year intake at the universities will consist of illiterates with life-valuable, life-compulsory and life-surrendering life principles.

Enough! Dr Jaap Steyn can stop worrying about the perpetuation of Afrikaans. Afrikaans is already dead. And it is not the man in the street that murdered it. It is the academics, the educationists, that have, in their unappetising potage of high learning and high principles, stewed him into a pulp.

#### NOTE

- 1 What follows is a fairly literal translation of a literary column in *Beeld* 11/11/82.

## Shadow Boxing

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Johan Muller and Mary Crewe

*The only way beyond Althusserianism  
is through it, not round it*<sup>1</sup>.

We should be grateful to Elaine Lee for bringing Althusser's notions of ideology and the 'subject' back into play<sup>2</sup>. Decisive concepts like that must, like sound currency, stay in circulation for their value to be realised. Through communal exchange, they either appreciate or depreciate. The notions have been sharply criticised by Marxists and non Marxists alike. Most of the critics are morally indignant at the way in which Althusser seems to dismiss 'Man' as a factor in social explanation and this is Lee's central point against Althusser. Edward Thompson first fulminated in the name of humanism, with Perry Anderson trying to set the record straight<sup>3</sup>. Simon Clarke and company repeated the charge some years later with Tony Bennett trying to rebutt<sup>4</sup>. Our own modest attempt two years back to establish the notion of the 'subject' is by-passed by Elaine Lee, so we feel obliged to try again to nail down this continuing 'scandal'<sup>5</sup>.

At any rate, the passage of years and exchanges has sharpened the point, and the importance of the category of 'subject' in theoretical analysis of ideas and action is, to us at least, unambiguously clear.

One recalls that in Plato's cave, people with their backs to the light mistook the shadows that they saw on the wall for real men and women<sup>6</sup>. Their discussion of those shadows was therefore based on a chimera. In this fairy tale, Plato makes an important distinction between common-sense discourse, or *doxa*, and critical discourse or *gnosis*. Critical discourse presupposes a rupture from the definitions and connotations of common sense in order to discover the essential conceptual coherences that make up knowledge. This Platonic distinction has saddled rational thought with one enormous virtue and one equally portentous drawback. Both are important for understanding what Althusser is doing, and what 'subjects' are and are not.

First the virtue. The distinction provides the reason why anyone who takes analytical work seriously should also take seriously the distinction

between *doxa* and *theoria*, the visible and the intelligible, commonsense categories and theoretical categories. It is poor analytical practice to collapse the two. 'Persons', 'individuals' and 'agents' are all common sense categories, at least as used by Lee. The 'subject' as used by Althusser is a theoretical category not equatable with them. The first obvious advantage of this distinction between 'subject' and 'individual' is to allow that each undeniably 'real' person enacts more than one 'subjectivity' in the course of his daily round. Tony Bennett puts it rather well:

To argue (as Althusser does) that the individual constitutes a site on which contradictory subject positions may be inscribed does not belittle real individuals or their struggles. On the contrary, it underlines their complexity. Fulminations against such a position in the name of 'real people' when all that has been attacked is a philosophical category . . . are, in the end, less quixotic than inept<sup>7</sup>.

The 'subject' is not a causal notion; nor is ideology. They are theoretical *organising notions* enabling us to rank in importance the elements operating in a given situation. When I drop a stone from a tower, I explain the occurrence in terms of gravity operating on molecules. It is nonsense to ask what happened to the real stone. But what about free will and autonomy some will ask. Don't they count? Of course they count — for real persons. But they are not organising notions; they do not help us rank elements in a given situation. On the contrary, they are themselves notions to be ranked in any account. When, for example, will autonomous thought stand the greatest chance of rupturing the dominant pattern of common sense in a society? During periods of 'generalised ideological crisis', is the Althusserian Laclau's answer. During such times, the unity of discourse is under attack, and the contradictions in that unity are more likely and able to be cogently criticised. Since the 'subject' is the organising notion for the unity of the discourse, irruptions of autonomy are also likely to be accompanied by a felt 'identity crisis'<sup>8</sup>.

This brings us to the major drawback of the Platonic distinction. Because of the powerful dialectic being postulated between *doxa*/falsity and *gnosis*/truth, an epistemological frame is set up of an individual who relates to his world in a false or a true way. In line with the Marx of the *German Ideology*, Althusser initially made a similar distinction, between ideology and science — and has been in retreat from that position ever since<sup>9</sup>. It is this notion of ideology Lee rightly attacks, but wrongly attributes to at least the later Althusser. Althusser's ISA article presents a sustained attack on this particular notion of ideology; for very good reason<sup>10</sup>. In the first place, it returns us to a notion of a unitary person who

either has or has not got false consciousness. We have already discussed why Althusser discards such a unitary analytical object. Secondly it draws us strongly towards an idealist notion of ideology. This renders the concept of ideology particularly peripheral and ineffectual. It also predisposes a reductionist view of how 'ideas' come to be distorted (either because of the 'economic' or 'class' position of the person, or because of his/her 'immaturity'). Thirdly and most importantly, the notion of 'true' or 'false' consciousness implies that the world exists in a form in which it can be known in experience, a position ineluctably associated with Empiricism.

As we know, the flaw in the Empiricist theory of meaning is that it conceives of a world (of facts) independent of theoretical discourse. All Post-empiricist positions postulate a concept to mediate between the visible and the intelligible, the two most popular being language and theory itself, both pre-eminently *discursive* notions. Althusser's mediatory concept is the 'imaginary', and it too is a discursive notion. Lee's attempt to read the 'imaginary' in common sense terms is analogous to reading Newton's gravity concept of attraction in romantic terms. At the first level, the notion of the 'imaginary' simply indicates that we experience the world via some *image* because we can never experience it cold. In other words, the world is encountered through a necklace of meanings, not 'as it is'.

Neither experience nor ideology are in a relation of correspondence or non-correspondence with reality. The 'imaginary' is simply the historically specific way in which historically real persons live their conditions of existence, *as if they could experience reality cold*.

Lacan's original use of the term is admittedly a little more insulting — at a certain phase of personal development (the so called mirror phase), the partially developed 'subject' identifies with the mythical unitary ego-self in an attempt to master the world that has shattered in the encounter with language and its possibilities<sup>11</sup>. The bid for mastery is a false solution, says Lacan. 'Healthy persons' ultimately come to realise their plural subjectivity as they live their lives through different chains of signifiers (Lacan's terms) different interpellations (Althusser's term) or different discursive formations (terms used by Foucault, Laclau and other post-structuralists).

The difference for Althusser is that there can be no 'healthy persons' only 'healthy social formations'. In capitalist society, we all live our conditions of existence in particular (imaginary) ways. We are always in ideology, simply because we can never be in reality, which in turn is because we are 'condemned to meaning'. At this point we will simply indicate that rational (or 'scientific') discourse for Althusser is the kind of discourse which is reflexively aware of who is speaking; is aware of the 'subject' who articulates the discourse; and who engages in a discursive

practice that aims to de-centre it (himself/herself) from the discourse. And for that reason, it is also, in its best guises, *playful* discourse, and profoundly un-authoritarian. 'Who speaks and why' is always challengeable, and the best challenges are those that send themselves up too.

Doxa, as we have seen, is discourse which takes the 'I' completely for granted. Elaine Lee's paper is a particularly eloquent example of this kind of discourse. In line with Althusser, we will not look for some kind of weakness in her, the speaking 'subject', but situate her kind of discourse in a particular historical context which makes that kind of talk so very obvious and likely.

The position bears one more re-statement: Althusser's theoretical anti-humanism is a resolute attempt to eliminate the doxological category of the unitary individual, not from life or even from class struggle, but from theoretical discourse.

The 'anti-humanism' I am concerned to defend does not seek to *abolish* men . . . but to problematise the category of subject . . . It challenges the notion of subject as a unitary self-experience, a presence-to-self in the single and continuous space of consciousness<sup>12</sup>.

Actually, by emphasising the 'imaginary' Althusser emphasizes not the fantasy aspect of life but on the contrary, its *active encounter*. We actively engage our social formation through structured paths — we buy liquor from our own race counter, we own property or not, we attend certain universities, hold certain jobs, we quite specifically enact the different ideological relations of our society every day. That active encounter and its meaningful enactment is either *for* the prevailing web of social discourses and the social relations they pre-figure (in which case Althusserians call it reproductive) or it is *against* that pattern of social intercourse (in which case it is ruptural)<sup>13</sup>.

We want to say in conclusion that this epistemological wrangle has diverted attention from South Africa's specific 'field of subjects' for long enough. Althusser has opened up the theoretical space for thinking the frighteningly real terms of our psycho-social oppression, as well as for thinking ways of combatting it. It is quite certain for Althusser and for us that any theorising that takes the category of unitary individual and his appurtenances — 'autonomy', 'freedom', 'will' — as theoretically central, runs the grave risk of mystifying a very concrete oppression and of trivialising the way in which it could be opposed.

## NOTES

- 1 Tony Bennett 'The Not-So-Good, the Bad and the Ugly' *Screen Education*, 36, 1980, p 130.
- 2 Elaine Lee 'Ideology and the Individual' see this issue of *Perspectives in Education*.
- 3 E P Thompson *The Poverty of Theory, and other essays*, London: Merlin Press, 1978.  
Perry Anderson *Arguments Within English Marxism*, London: NLB, 1980.
- 4 Simon Clarke et al *One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics of Culture*, London: Allison and Busby, 1980.  
Tony Bennett *op cit*.
- 5 Johan Muller and Mary Crewe 'Subjects and Subjection: a comment' *Perspectives in Education*, 5, 2, 1981.
- 6 Thanks to Penny Enslin for reminding us of the fruitfulness of this allegory.
- 7 Tony Bennett *op cit*, p 127.
- 8 Ernesto Laclau *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, London: Verso Press, 1979, p 103.
- 9 Louis Althusser *Essays in Self-Criticism* London: NLB, 1976, p 1.  
See also Tony Richardson 'Science, Ideology and Commonsense' in Sally Hibbin (ed) *Politics, Ideology and the State*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978.
- 10 Louis Althusser 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, London: NLB, 1971. (See especially the Section entitled 'On Ideology', pp 149-173).
- 11 For a fairly clear account, see Jacqueline Rose 'The Imaginary' in Colin MacCabe (ed) *The Talking Cure: essays in psychoanalysis and language*, London: Macmillan, 1981.
- 12 Paul Hirst 'The Necessity of Theory' *Economy and Society*, 8, 4, 1979, pp 431-432.  
See also his 'Problems and Advances in the Theory of Ideology' in *On Law and Ideology*, London: Macmillan, 1979.
- 13 For this distinction see Ernesto Laclau 'Populist Rupture and Discourse', *Screen Education*, 34, 1980.

## ARTICLES

### Metagogics: A New Discipline

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J H Coetzee

#### 1 Introduction: motivation for change

On the question to students: Are you satisfied with the present name, work procedure and implementation of History of Education, the answer was firmly negative. Some of them even called the discipline 'histerical' education because (according to them) the traditional approach burdens the student with a mass of irrelevant facts. Pienaar draws a paradigm in this regard by saying (translated): 'It is like getting lost in a forest without seeing any trees'<sup>1</sup>. According to Van Dalen<sup>2</sup> many student and lecturers in Europe and in South Africa feel that a change or innovation has become imperative. The mutual consensus is that the name and methodology of History of Education has become obsolete and antiquated. '... there exists a Historical Education which is strictly spoken not worth its name' (translated)<sup>3</sup>. The name itself is virtually an anachronism. In some instances a new designation for the subject has already been formed. The University of Pretoria (Prof F Potgieter) uses the name 'Historiese Wordingskunde' which freely translated means a study of becoming. The University of Potchefstroom changed the name of their department to 'Temporele Opvoedkunde' while Pienaar of the University of Port Elizabeth propagates the term 'Temporaliteitspedagogiek'. According to Potgieter man is always becoming (changing) and therefore the educationist needs knowledge which clarifies the essence of man's existence in reality; knowledge which can never be provided by a historical perspective alone. Potgieter emphasises a multi-disciplinary approach within a system context in this regard: that is within the context of total becoming<sup>4</sup>. To Pienaar the most important time perspective of Temporal Pedagogics is the future perspective, which implicitly includes change-in-time<sup>5</sup>.

The need for change was also felt at Unisa and Venter<sup>6</sup> suggested the name 'Metapedagogics' as a possible substitute for Historical Education. It is, however, a pity that nothing constructive has happened since then except that a 'free hand' was given to lecturers of the BEd course in 1980 to introduce a 'new' methodology in the Department of History of Education. metapedagogics was again mentioned at a departmental discussion, though the author proposed the name Metagogics and motivated his proposal by indicating that Metapedagogics only refers to child guidance and excludes courses like the BEd and Diploma for Tertiary Education. The lecturers of the BEd course then realised that a name had been found for the new methodology. Since then thorough research has been done to justify Metagogics as an independent discipline and as a substitute for History of Education (which however includes the methodology of the latter). Furthermore a firm understanding has been given that the name will be changed this year.

To conclude this introduction: on the whole it is accepted that leading agogicians in South Africa and overseas agree that the name and methodology of Historical Education have become outdated and that change or innovation is now necessary. The author, however, does not want to give the impression that a study or research of past educational events should be totally abolished. Nevertheless it must be emphasised that the interest in the subject has reached an alarmingly low level<sup>7</sup>. And the question still remains: Why did change become necessary or what are the reasons for it? Answers to this question will be given under the next heading.

## **2 Reasons for the collapse of historical education**

Although Venter<sup>8</sup> mentioned a few reasons for the collapse prior to the fifties, the author and other educationists are of the opinion that those reasons are still valid and that many more can be added:

The field of study of History of Education is too limited because it deals with material of the past education situation only. Toffler<sup>9</sup> advises in this respect: 'The future represents a starting point for change at all levels'.

Many lecturers have insufficient knowledge about its principles and methodology and even if they do have adequate knowledge, they do not implement it in practical research and teaching.

Great uncertainty and doubt exist about the usefulness of the discipline in the training of teachers. 'Research is educational

to the extent that it can be related to the practice of education'<sup>10</sup>. In many training colleges in Britain History of Education is an obsolete discipline.

Great competition is experienced from other part disciplines which characterise experimentation, statistics, relevant scientific methods and solving of present problems.

Historical Education has stagnated with regard to its methodology because only the historical method is normally used which Pienaar calls a 'method-monism'<sup>11</sup>.

The present pragmatic world tendency (also in agogics) stresses the short and long term validity of all disciplines. '... doubts have been raised as to its (Historical Educational research) value and relevance in a world reaching out into space and more than ever concerned with the problems of the present and future'<sup>12</sup>. The present world and life view is one of dissatisfaction with outdated conventional customs. This does not mean that relevant traditions and norms ought to be abolished, but rather that aspects which are outdated, unpractical, etc. should be changed. Because change is an ontological phenomenon History of Education is also liable to change. Time, money and manpower are so valuable that they dare not be wasted on research for the sake of research.

With this in mind one must consider the increasing inability of History of Education to unite past, present and future; ie to become practical and valid.

Textbooks are written in a style that reflects history while the agogic is pushed to the background. Education seldom forms the nucleus of scientific research and description.

Historical Education rarely participated in discussions of and seldom contributed to solutions for (present) educational problems.

As has already been mentioned, the concept History of Education is virtually a contradiction in terms. History refers to the past while education (becoming) is future orientated. However, the future is being regarded as the most important time perspective. After all, the further one probes into the past the more obscure the information becomes which in turn leads to a greater separation of the past situation from present

reality, making it the more difficult to bridge the gap between past and future. If one delves into M- and PhD-theses on library shelves, it becomes evident that in the (practical) application of historico-educational methods of research the problem-approach has very seldom been taken as a point of departure for research. To outline this weak application in detail would involve offending colleagues personally. However, the evidence is freely available. This fact leads to the conclusion that the present problem situation (seldom) played a vital role in the research. This is not strange because the term 'history' as we know it today is derived from the German word *geschehen* which means: what has happened. Can anybody then object when Stenhouse<sup>13</sup> says: 'Once we are in time there is no account of the present'? Between that which has happened and the description thereof there is always distance, with the result that the description may become a subjective interpretation of what has happened. This in turn results in another problem. 'The same events and personalities are likely to be interpreted in different ways by different writers because they belong to different social systems'<sup>14</sup>.

Another reason for the collapse of History of Education is to be found in the generally accepted fact that technological and social changes are always ahead of education and that the social life undergoes a more rapid transformation than the educational reality.

If there exists in the reader's mind any doubt as to the validity of these reasons, the following remarks of well-known educationists will serve to substantiate the given reasons:

Langeveld: 'If one wants to know more about the history of education . . . then there are shelves stacked with books of divergent merits, but they (the books) are seldom satisfactory' (translated)<sup>15</sup>.

De Wolf: 'One would think that History of Education should have developed in the course of time, but reality shows a different picture. Only the greatest optimist will call the state of affairs promising'<sup>16</sup>.

The Frenchman, Foucault says: 'It is a discipline of fluctuating languages, of shapeless works, of unreal themes. The analysis of opinions rather than of knowledge, of errors rather

than of truth, of types of mentality rather than of forms of thought . . . The history of ideas then, is the discipline of beginnings and ends, the descriptions of obscure continuities and return, the reconstruction of development in the linear form of history'<sup>17</sup>. Boulding agrees with Foucault in this respect but also advises us as to what should be done: 'Even though the information obtained from the past may be limited, it is still so large in volume that unless there is some method of organisation and selection it will produce noise rather than knowledge . . . Knowledge is achieved by the orderly loss of information, not by piling bit on bit'<sup>18</sup>.

In Holland, Noordam speaks of History of Education as 'a neglected chapter' while Joseph Dolch of Germany calls it a 'dying discipline'<sup>19</sup>.

Viljoen: 'A lot of what has been published on this subject could just as well have been done by historians'<sup>20</sup>.

Basson<sup>21</sup> also stresses the fact that when students were asked to list subjects in order of popularity all subjects with a historical connotation appeared at the bottom.

Barnard<sup>22</sup> remarks that the problems experienced in teaching History of Education can be ascribed to the antipathy that exists as well as to the fact that it is regarded as unimportant.

It is then evident that change is imperative. To the author's mind Historical Education should be substituted with Metagogics.

### 3 Metagogics: concept explanation

Metagogics is derived from the word *metabletica* used by Prof J H van den Berg of Holland. But in its original concept *metabletica* is derived from *metaballein* which means *to change something* (through the intervention of somebody) and *metabanein* meaning *to change* (spontaneously without intervention). Only the prefix *meta* is retained to indicate change, viz. change with the objective to improve and is therefore future orientated.

The second part of Metagogics (agogics) is derived from the Greek *agein* meaning *to guide*. This concept includes guidance to the child (*pais*), the adult (*aner*) and old people (*geron*). Agogics then is a collective noun for *peda-*, *andra-* and *gerontagogics*. Through assimilation *Meta + agogics* becomes Metagogics. It is evident that Metagogics is a more suitable and descriptive term because guidance is synonymous with intervention or interference with the objective to change and/or guide a person in need of

guidance in such a manner that in future guidance will become obsolete.

#### 4 Change and innovation

Change is not only ontological, it is pre-ontological because even before man was created, change (actually innovation) took place: a world was created out of nothing. It can without doubt be accepted that since the creation not only man, but actually everything is still becoming or changing. Because man is the only being that can be educated, it is evident that becoming in an educational sense should be studied within the context of change. This implies that the historic perspective becomes less relevant because the agogic reality (the present) changes constantly in order for the future to become more meaningful. But Metagogics does not only imply change. It also emphasises innovation. To change means to make something different, but not necessarily new. Change has no purposeful or planned characteristics because it happens spontaneously and is motivated by crises, conflicts or stagnation. Innovation on the other hand is not evolutionary but is a purposeful, willed or planned action. Innovation means to create something totally new and different to that which already exists. The objective is always to satisfy future needs and ensure maximum efficiency through the application of all available potential and sources.

Because Metagogics wants to change or innovate with regard to the entropic situation, it is now clear why Metagogics possesses the characteristics of both change and innovation. To achieve this goal effectively, Metagogics takes cognisance of different types of change as propounded by Havelock<sup>23</sup>, ie substitution, alteration, addition, restructuring, elimination and reinforcing. Apart from this, change and innovation should always satisfy the following specific characteristics:

It should always be communicative, ie it should always address the researcher, educator, educationist and the person in need of change and innovation.

It should eliminate complexity in the entropic situation: it should solve the problem.

Change and innovation should in some way be compatible with existing views otherwise resistance will increase even more.

The cost factor should be taken into account, ie change and

innovation should be brought about economically. To comply with this demand Metagogics should always consider the factors that influence change and innovation. These factors are economics, science and technology, demographic factors, value changes, political and ideological factors etc. Of even greater concern are the personal factors which encumber change and innovation more than anything else. These factors are self-competence, self-esteem, dogmatism, authority, fear and meanace. Huberman<sup>24</sup> calls these encumbering factors, input, throughput and output factors. These resisting factors are also experienced at tertiary level, but fortunately Metagogics contains positive creative characteristics and is in a position to encounter these problems with the objective of changing or innovating to the advantage of agogics. The following advice by Toffler should always be borne in mind: 'We are stuffing the heads of the young (and students) with products of earlier innovations rather than teaching them how to innovate'<sup>25</sup>.

## 5 Future perspective

'... the future is something that happens to somebody else ... the heavy emphasis on the past ... conveys a false message about the future ...'<sup>26</sup>. It is very unfortunate that many people come to realise and accept the truth of this statement rather late in life. We are living in an era where the emphasis has shifted from the past to the present and future. Because Metagogics primarily deals with change and innovation in educational perspective, it stands to reason that the future will be regarded as the most important time perspective. Many authors share this point of view: 'futures and the study of them has become a discipline within the educational community'<sup>27</sup>. Another author described his view in more specific terms: 'Faith in the future has indeed a very great survival value'<sup>28</sup>. This is absolutely true, and indeed, can we as educationists and as Christians hold another view? We all live for tomorrow. We buy insurance policies, contribute to pension funds, buy our children's clothes a size or two bigger so that they will fit next year too, etc, etc: we live the future today and what is education other than preparation for the future? How then is it possible that the future is being neglected in our scientific research? The pace at which change and innovation occur in all spheres of human life, demands that man should think and plan ahead and at the same time emphasises that past experience is no longer valid enough to rely on for future orientations and actions. De Vries emphatically remarked (translated): 'If the present is

becoming separated from the past at such a pace that man cannot learn from the past what is needed anymore, then the road ahead which everyone has to follow can only be tackled with the eyes fixed on the possibilities that the future offer'<sup>29</sup>. From this point of view Metagogics can be characterised as 'Futurology' because it emphasises the future more than the present and past. It must however be emphasised that Metagogics does not reject a historic study of the problem. Metagogics still probes into the past in order to detect the invariants which, in co-operation with present data, help to solve the present problem and to verify the future guidelines. 'The first and almost obvious application of science to practice rests on the capacity of predictions to provide us with information about the context of action. The second application of science to practice works through the possibility of applying general laws to the problem of predicting the outcomes of specific acts'<sup>30</sup>. Metagogics as a new educational discipline therefore demands introspection from each and everyone regarding his thoughts, life and world views, judgements, values and norms, in order to determine how these are being implemented in education as a discipline and in practice. The serious educationist should never be unfaithful to himself when it comes to his educational intervention and scientific research.

Metagogics not only strives to provide a short term solution by solving the present problem but also wants to plan ahead and anticipate the necessary steps for preventing the entropic situation in future (long term). The future then should always be regarded as most important if a meaningful agogic situation is to be created. 'The objective is not to predict the future, but to regulate it'<sup>31</sup>. Guidelines should, however, only be given after thorough research into the present and the past has been completed. But because education is anthropocentric future guidelines are not very readily detected: Man will always remain an 'open possibility enroute' and therefore unpredictable. In conclusion the author quotes what De Vries<sup>32</sup> remarks: '... (research) during the last quarter of the 20th century showed that a responsible future dimension should be built into the pedagogic thoughts, educational practice and educational planning of the educationist to ensure that the preparation of the youth will answer to the demands as set by the future' (translated).

## **6 Problem approach**

Metagogics and the problem approach are synonymous because, 'research is the formal systematic application of scientific methods to the study of problems'<sup>33</sup>. A problem or a suspicion that something is wrong is the point of departure for all research<sup>34</sup>. Landman<sup>35</sup> also remarks: 'The

point of departure . . . is a meaningful problem and that is the reason why all research starts as soon as possible and secondly also to justify research in the light of the significance of the given problem' (translated).

The problem always resides in the present and should never be looked at from a historical point of view only. What Venter<sup>36</sup> means by the term 'problem-historic' approach remains uncertain. If it means to study a 'past-problem', or if it means researching the present problem in an historical perspective only, then it would be a waste of time in both cases. Only after the problem as it occurs in the present situation has been investigated thoroughly can an historic observation be made. In this way two sets of data can be compared, invariants can be detected and an inference can be reached in order to solve the problem and to propose future guidelines. Therefore, the problem approach makes research meaningful and without trying to solve or correct the entropic situation no change or innovation would take place and no future perspectives would be possible.

## 7 Multidisciplinary work procedure

One might argue that this cornerstone should rather be part of the methodology. It is, however, accepted that the agogic reality should never be researched or studied from a single point of view only. The truth is that the educational reality has come about through the intervention of many other disciplines. Reality can never be an agogic reality only. 'Interdisciplinary co-operation is essential in the relatively new field of human engineering or 'human factors' . . . that deals with ways . . . so that they match human capacities and limitations'<sup>37</sup>. To Metagogics the multidisciplinary view is more than a method and/or procedure. It is an essential part thereof. Without this multidimensional view the educationist or metagogician for that matter will never be able to research reality in its entirety in order to change or innovate or to supply guidelines, because without this cornerstone he will always have doubts about the outcome of his research. A true educationist will never rely on a one-sided(educational) view only. Metagogics acknowledges the fact that a problem never exists in isolation, but rather in a group context 'What we need is not so much a "universal genius" as a broad base of "mutual understanding" . . . For us it is essential to remember that man's future destiny will be achieved not by science alone, but by science as a part of the whole'<sup>38</sup>. An educational problem then never excludes interaction from disciplines like sociology, economy, psychology, religion etc. By incorporating these and other independent disciplines Metagogics unites what scientists have artificially separated.

The multidimensionality also implies the system theory. This is in fact a

natural phenomenon because reality as a macro system embraces different micro systems, all of which are exercising influence on education or which are being influenced by education. The multidisciplinary view (including the system theory) is in this view an indispensable part of Metagogics.

## **8 Invariables (laws)**

It is a characteristic of human beings that they exist according to fixed principles which can be called invariants, laws or even values or norms. 'In topics where there is a general consensus on values research findings seem to be particularly effective . . . But when basic assumptions are challenged, then research seems to lose its relevance or at least is not readily accepted'<sup>39</sup>. This quotation substantiates the statement under the previous heading concerning the verification of conclusions from a multidisciplinary point of view. Principles, norms and values taken from society, religion etc act as invariants in the agogic situation. They are the guiding lights in our intervention with the man in need of education. To be able to detect invariants Metagogics actually studies the variants (in the past and present) because they were and are responsible for the entropic situation. To correct the entropic situation and to present future guidelines invariants are indispensable because they become the criteria by which verification can be done. Metagogics also takes cognisance of and uses the invariants of other disciplines — even to establish whether an educational invariant is in fact an invariant. Metagogics declares emphatically that agogic problems cannot be approached, verified or solved by using agogic criteria only because education is a micro situation (event) in a macro reality. 'Formulating generalisations — conceptual schemes — that explain phenomena is a major goal of scientists . . . Their ultimate goal is to seek laws of the highest generality — laws of the utmost comprehensiveness'<sup>40</sup>.

It is imperative that invariants be detected because man does not exist seriatim: there is always continuity. Each period shows unique and specific characteristics (invariants) pointing to the interrelatedness by which the agogic situation can be verified and the hypothesis can be tested.

## **9 Corrective measures**

Metagogics does not want to produce or enhance informative thoughts only for the benefit of students and contemporaries, but wants to supply corrective measures with regard to the future: metagogics is a 'futurological' science. Corrective measures imply that the entropic situation be corrected and or changed after the solution has been found, ie to transform the entropic situation to an ectropic one. This all happens in co-operation with the problem approach, multidisciplinary view, system

theory and the detection of invariants in order to prevent the entropic situation in future. Corrective measures then are the outcome, result or 'last word' of research, viz the functionalisation of the inferences. If corrective measures are not taken the research was fruitless. This aspect is therefore an inseparable part of the future perspective. The future guidelines to be presented are the corrective measure which are to be instituted.

## 10 Conclusion

Metagogy is based on a solid foundation which in all respects can be scientifically justified. If a 'traditional' educationist in History of Education should ask why a historic view does not form one of the cornerstones of Metagogy, then the answer is simple: to probe into the past, is only a way or method of searching for data regarding the present problem.

Metagogy can truly say that all its basic elements are actively involved and implemented and that they do not just exist in theory. Without them, Metagogy cannot be justified or implemented as a scientific discipline.<sup>41</sup>

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- 30 L Stenhouse *op cit* p 105.
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- 38 *Ibid* p 14.
- 39 P Broadfoot and J Nesbit 'The impact of research on Educational Studies' in *British Journal of Education Studies*, Vol XXIX, June 1981, p 117.
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## Thinking, Education and the Brain Lateralisation Hypothesis

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### Mel Siff

The hypothesis that the left and right hemispheres of the brain each handle distinctly different cognitive functions has had a profound effect on the psychology of education. This latter-day phrenology has enjoyed considerable success in the hands of commercialised educators whose courses in 'holistic' education, creative thinking, speed learning, 'mind dynamics' and related fields have not yet saturated the management training and publications market.

So well has this brain lateralisation doctrine been promoted that most educated laymen are able to state that the left brain manages logical, linear, mathematical, verbal processes, whereas its right counterpart controls intuitive, artistic, musical, non-verbal processes. Some are even able to quote that Robert Ornstein has been one of the most prominent popularisers of the neurosurgical findings of Sir Wilder Penfield and Professor Roger Sperry<sup>1</sup>.

Many of the analytical techniques are also common knowledge. Damage to or removal of tissue from different regions of the brain has been correlated with measurable loss of motor, speech or cognitive function. Electrical stimulation of specific areas has been shown to elicit or disrupt comprehension or production of written or spoken language.

It does not require great insight to notice the similarity between left-brain/right-brain functions and the male/female, light/dark, sun/moon, yang/yin, positive/negative symbolic dichotomies of Eastern religious tradition. This analogy is precisely what early lateralisation popularists developed. The atmosphere of Gestalt and humanistic psychology provided further fuel for the theory that humans are wasting their cognitive potential by thinking partially, logically, 'vertically' or in other 'left-brain' modes.

Thinking and holistic education movements sprang up overnight to promote the merits of 'right-brain' thinking and they have been with us ever since. The 'lateral' or 'low-probability' thinking courses of de Bono<sup>2</sup> have enjoyed unprecedented success, as have the thinking courses of Buzan<sup>3</sup>, though to a lesser degree.

No authoritative, extensive scientific studies have yet proved the superiority of any of these types of educational system over the traditional ones, even those practised in ancient Greece. It is clear that any highly organised and well presented system followed by adherents with sufficient motivation will enjoy definite success, even if the system is based on a faulty scientific foundation.

This is precisely what appears to be emerging from the latest brain research. Gevins and colleagues at the University of California School of Medicine in San Francisco have repeated the early electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of brain function, but with superior instrumentation and more rigid control over artifacts such as muscle twitch, altered breathing and eye blinking. They have concluded that, under these controlled conditions, no evidence whatsoever can be found for lateralisation of different cognitive functions<sup>4</sup>.

In fact, it appears as if many theorists and promoters of certain thinking systems have not distinguished adequately between perception and cognition. Any task that can be performed spontaneously without effort or deliberation can be regarded as perceptual rather than cognitive. In many cases, any improvement in apparent thinking performance may be due to regular practice transforming a cognitive task into a perceptual one through sheer familiarity with similar tasks.

The concept of visual familiarity indeed has a bearing on the issue of visual literacy, since the maturity of the viewer has been shown to have a profound influence on perception, rate of decoding and understanding. The immature viewer tends to rely on phonetic cues in reading, whereas the mature viewer concentrates on useful word features such as first letter, word length and context<sup>5</sup>.

It is not only EEG studies which depose the lateralisation doctrine. Measurement of blood flow patterns within the brain has also shown that the nature of the mental activity does not alter left-right symmetry, although blood flow patterns do change<sup>6</sup>. In general, it has been noticed that, even in the simplest mental tasks, rapidly changing electrical patterns occur which involve both sides of the brain.

What then of the apparent evidence that lesions in certain brain regions disrupt specific functions? Gevins stresses that it is incorrect to localise arithmetic, for example, in one area just because damage there produces an inability to manipulate numbers. All that can be stated is that the damaged area is critical for arithmetic procedures. Brain damage studies and electrical stimulation probes of specific regions seem to reveal little more than critical nodes in highly complex circuits which interconnect numerous subsystems in the brain.

The left-right, bicameral brain model evidently is a vast over-

simplification of human psychophysiology. For instance, a four-component, quadricameral brain model comprising the left and right hemispheres, the mid-brain and the cerebellum would offer a more complete theoretical foundation for describing human thinking.

The mid-brain needs to be included alongside the two hemispheres in any brain model since it contains vital subsystems involved with emotion and motivation, which are important to many learning processes. The hypothalamus in particular provides the essential link between the central nervous system and the endocrine system. The hippocampus, also in the mid-brain, has been implicated in fulfilling a central mapping role in the brain. O'Keefe and Nadel have proposed that the left hippocampus plays a critical role as an internal semantic map which stores the relationship of words to one another. The right hippocampus is postulated to have a specific function in the cognitive mapping process by providing a spatio-temporal framework in which items are stored. The hippocampal mapping nodes presumably assist humans in navigating purposefully through the memorised internal maze of concepts and events in somewhat the same way in which rats use their hippocampal maps to locate themselves in an external maze<sup>7</sup>.

The cerebellum warrants inclusion in this quadricameral model since it has been implicated in motor control and emotion. Moreover, the cerebellum has a characteristic ultrafast electrical rhythm of frequency 200-300 Hz, superimposed on which is a low amplitude component of 1000-2000 Hz. Incoming stimuli in particular generally decrease the amplitude of the basic cerebellar rhythm, so the cerebellum cannot be dismissed as a mere motor control system.

The importance of motor activity in the overall thinking and learning process, however, should not be underestimated, since all speech, eye-movement, writing and breathing involve muscular activity.

Lateralisation disciples also err in assuming that simplicity in thinking is superior to complexity. For instance, de Bono states that '... lateral thinking is concerned with finding new, simpler and more effective ideas ...'<sup>2</sup>. Salter at the University of Edinburgh, however, maintains that simplicity has won its false supremacy because of the restrictions in time and money that are frequently placed on tasks by politicians. Failure or difficulty is wrongly attributed to complexity, when the cause is inadequate expenditure of time, effort or money<sup>8</sup>.

Salter challenges any experts to produce examples of the success of simplicity in any field of human endeavour on the basis of the following criteria:

the entire sequence of events from start to finish must be examined;

each method or system must be compared with those competing with it, those it replaces and the later one which will replace it.

Paradoxically, a great deal of training in 'lateral thinking' depends on highly organised, logical techniques, involving geometric models or linguistic mnemonic devices. Consequently, much of what has been labelled 'lateral thinking' is actually more efficient, sequentially programmed 'vertical thinking'. Similarly, Buzan's 'Mind-Maps' which are really a modified form of the well-known flow chart, retaining language labels and linearly organised patterns, certainly do not implicate purely 'right-brain' processes.

These negative findings concerning brain lateralisation in cognitive processes, though casting doubts on the credentials of commercial training courses based on this doctrine, suggest that motor activity and emotion may play essential roles in the learning process.

This proposal finds apparent support in the fact that brain lateralisation effects are observed when muscular activity is not eliminated from the experimental conditions used to examine EEG records of laboratory subjects. Moreover, Broca's speech area located at the back of the left temporal lobe and concerned with articulation, vocabulary, grammar and inflection, sits beside the motor areas which coordinate the speech organs such as the lips and tongue. The structure and function of these regions, together with those of Wernicke's speech area, has led some researchers to suggest that decoding of speech may be related to the movements used to make the sounds or subvocalisations of speech.

Furthermore, the very thought of movement and certain mental visualisations causes all motor systems — the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and the motor cortex — to become active before any movement begins<sup>9</sup>. In addition, a specific brain rhythm (the mu rhythm) of about 9 Hz is blocked in advance of any physical movement by tactile stimulation or by mental intention to move. There is also an increase in muscle tone and other activity of the cerebral cortex, such as the 'orientation response' and 'expectancy waves', preceding commencement of a motor response<sup>10</sup>.

The confusion of signs of motor activity in the EEG with indications of specific types of mental activity therefore implies that appropriate movement patterns may facilitate optimum utilisation of different brain subsystems in all mental processing. The discovery of 'pleasure' centres and natural opiates (endorphins and enkephalins) in the brain may provide a further theoretical foundation for motivation in the learning process and the 'eureka' sudden discovery phenomenon.

The success of the 'Total Body Response' method of learning a new

language by physical enactment of words or sentences may offer some corroboration for these speculations.

The field of motor activity has usually been relegated in educational institutions to physical education. Findings emerging from neuropsychological research, however, indicate that overt or covert motor processes associated with visual, vocal and writing muscles also play a significant role in cerebral processing and in the construction of consciousness. Kinaesthesia, man's true sixth sense, may yet become appreciated as one of the most important senses in the evolution of human intelligence.

#### NOTES

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## Ideology and the Individual

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Elaine Lee

*Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abusive language have so long passed for mysteries of science and hard or misapplied words have by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance and a hindrance to true knowledge.*

*(John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 'Epistle to the Reader').*

This paper examines Althusser's theory of ideology, its relationship to 'conceptual schemes', and the implications of both for the individual<sup>1</sup>.

What is 'Ideology'? Listed below are some of the descriptions of ideology and its functions found in Althusser's works:

- 1 It is well known that the expression 'ideology' was invented by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy and their friends, who assigned to it as an object the (genetic) theory of ideas. When Marx took up the term fifty years later, he gave it quite a different meaning, even in his early works. Here, ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group (ISAs p 262<sup>2</sup>).
- 2 In considering such transformations (a social revolution) a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out (from Marx's preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, quoted in ISAs p 264.).

- 3 Ideology is a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence (ISAs p 264).
- 4 . . . the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology in so far as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects (ISAs p 270).

It might be as well to start with as clear a picture of the nature of ideology as we are permitted to draw by Althusser before proceeding with an examination of some of the problems that arise from such definitions.

A fairly common understanding of the concept is that offered in the first quotation: the 'system of ideas' held by men, though this might be understood in a fairly negative sense as associated with 'prejudice' or 'bias'. Marx's definition takes the 'system of ideas' one step further, and places ideology in the context of the class struggle — it is the class struggle in the realms of thought and ideas. Jorge Larrain points out that Marx's concept went further than the usual religious connotations, subsuming 'all forms of *distorted consciousness within itself*', thus emphasising the negative connotations of the term, while indicating its 'reference to historical contradictions in society'<sup>3</sup> (my italics).

On the foundations thus laid by Marx, Althusser proceeds to build up a more complete — and complex — structure, justifying his procedure by a rather convoluted reference to descriptive theory (ISAs p 249). His starting point (in an apparent effort to be more precise than Marx in linking ideology with the class struggle) is that, in addition to the Repressive State Apparatuses described by Marx, the State has a second line of defence in 'Ideological State Apparatuses' (the Church, education, culture, the family, and so on), which, despite ostensibly pertaining to the private domain, are seen by Althusser as part of the apparatus used by the ruling class to maintain its own power, and to reproduce the social relations of production, though functioning by ideology rather than by the violence associated with the RSAs. The distinction between private and public is dismissed as part of bourgeois ideology, thus justifying the use of the term 'State'.

As Althusser has indicated that the ISAs function by ideology, he then finds it necessary to outline a theory of Ideology (capital 'I') in general — to find a scientific definition of Ideology as a structure, in order to elucidate common factors and issues relating to particular ideologies (which, referring back to Marx's concept, are always rooted in the class struggle). Such individual examples of ideology, however, are not the object of interest. In an attempt to be 'scientific', Althusser offers an overarching explanation of Ideology (because this is what scientists do: they do not confine themselves to the particular, they offer general explanations,

general characteristics, which may be used to identify the particular). His most basic premiss is expressed in the third of the quotations above; the 'imaginary relationship', which, I presume, means the relationship people THINK they have to their conditions. Explanations for why men require this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence are examined, and Althusser finds that 'all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production . . . but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production' (ISAs p 266). Although this is not a satisfactory explanation, we are not offered any further explanation, an assumption which I must obviously try to explain. In the first place, the 'great ideological mystification' has no author, it is not instigated by a clique; it *imposes itself*:

. . . we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognise that every 'subject' endowed with a 'consciousness', and believing in the 'ideas' that his 'consciousness' inspires in him and freely accepts, *must 'act according to his ideas'*, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice (my italics; ISAs p 268).

The structure of Ideology imposes upon the individual and guides his or her actions. Althusser talks of actions inserted into practices, which are governed by rituals (hence giving a material existence to ideology). Where a single individual is concerned, 'the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus *from which derive the ideas of that subject'* (my italics; ISAs p 269).

To reiterate, then: ideology involves an 'imaginary relationship' to real conditions, BECAUSE individuals derive their ideas FROM the material ideological apparatus — and MUST act according to 'his' ideas'. Hence Althusser is able to make the comment that 'World outlooks' 'constitute an illusion', although alluding to reality (ISAs p 265).

Althusser has thus moved from any concept of 'ideas' resulting from 'consciousness', since such ideas are determined by the ideological apparatus; the individual — the 'subject' — is the PRODUCT of ideology:

. . . the subject acts in so far as *he is acted* by the following system (set out in order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his beliefs.

He is inexorably 'interpellated' by ideology, and hence we come to the final quotation listed initially: that 'all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects'.

The notion that we are controlled by Ideology is one likely to cause consternation or even confusion to anyone suffering from the illusion that he or she (whilst perhaps recognising some degree of 'self-determination') is possessed of 'free will' and 'consciousness'. One's feeling of 'freedom' in respect of choice, behaviour or action, is illusory — one *feels* free but is in fact found by ideology: is 'acted by' the system.

Althusser denies the possibility that man can be an 'originating subject'; history itself is a 'process without a subject' — a proposition which will be examined later. In 'Marx and theoretical humanism' Althusser refers to the 'ridiculous concept of man', and he refuses to

... root the explanation of social formations and their history in a concept of man with theoretical pretensions, that is, the concept of man as an ORIGINATING SUBJECT, one in whom originate his needs . . . his thoughts . . . and his acts and struggles . . . For when you begin with man, you cannot avoid the *idealist* temptation of believing in the omnipotence of liberty or of creative labour — that is, you simply submit, in all 'freedom', to the omnipotence of the ruling bourgeois ideology, whose function is to mask and to impose, in the illusory shape of man's power of freedom, another power, much more real and much more powerful, that of capitalism<sup>4</sup>.

Clearly, 'idealist' notions of freedom, liberty and autonomy are merely part of bourgeois ideology, and not part of any moral or ethical system relating to values which could be universal. The notion of 'morality' is negated<sup>5</sup>.

Let us return to Althusser's comment that 'World outlooks constitute an illusion'. An idealist could be categorised as a prisoner of bourgeois ideology — his opinions regarding freedom and so on are not based on reason but on illusion — on ideology (of which he/she as an individual is not conscious). The question that philosophers might pose — what determines which world view we shall hold? — becomes virtually rhetorical: we are *already* predisposed to one or other world outlook. How do we acquire this predisposition? — by Ideology; ISAs are the means by which the dominant class asserts its own ideology, ensuring subjection by 'massive inculcation' of the ruling ideology. Whether the ISAs are the cause of this, or merely the means by which the ruling class prevents any 'escape' from its ideological clutches, I am not sure, for Althusser has also stated that we are '*always-already*' subjects of Ideology.

Whether or not we accept THIS view would depend upon the Ideology by which we have been interpellated, of which we are an always-already subject. The question that must be raised therefore is HOW we acquire our 'world views'. These can be seen either as related to *determining* social, economic and ideological factors, or we can see development as *influenced*, as opposed to determined, by such factors, without necessarily negating traditional concepts of moral consciousness (while at the same time admitting the influence of social traditions, inherited traditions, family influence, economic position and so forth).

A rejection of the Idealist position does not necessarily preclude a notion of values which are not relative, or a notion of man as a moral being, capable of 'strong evaluations', as opposed to those subjects described by Althusser who are interpellated — called by name — and who are then bound by and to the interpellating ideology, becoming subjects of the subject, whose only free will is that exercised in freely recognising their subjection to the 'ideas' that they ascribe to their 'consciousness'; that is, they *submit freely* to the commandments of their Subject, be it God or de Gaulle. Once 'in Ideology' subjects can only act within it, they are bound by it. They 'live' their ideologies, 'not as a form of consciousness, but as an object of their world — as their "world" itself'.

How do we become 'always-already' subjects of ideology?

In the Althusserian account, no one is aware of being in ideology, because one is always a subject, even before birth: no one can be outside ideology. The family is the initial formative structure. Althusser refers to Freud, who shows that individuals are always 'abstract', noting the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a birth:

... it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived . . . this familial ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly structured, and that it is in this implacable and more or less 'pathological' . . . structure that the former 'subject-to-be' will have to find 'its' place. ie 'become' the sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance (ISAs p 273-4).

This is followed by the rituals of rearing, and education. Johan Muller and Mary Crewe have recently pointed out that Althusser has acknowledged his indebtedness to Lacan for his notion of the subject, but point out that Lacan 'locates the crucial interpellative moment in the child's acquisition

of language'. Their description of the process indicates that interpellation is attributable to the *discursive structure* rather than by economic structures<sup>7</sup>. This raises two points: the first is that Althusser, as a Marxist, is virtually committed to 'economic' causes and hence has a problem here, but the second point is of greater relevance for this paper, and that is that LANGUAGE is obviously a crucial factor in the development of a child's identity and ability to identify himself as an individual.

If language is a crucial factor in the development of a child's identity it is necessary to ask whether this is in fact an ideological development — with the associated concept of the family as a REPRESSIVE apparatus. At a fairly frivolous level I am not certain that this development can be classified as ideology, for as defined by Althusser, this entails *obedience* to the ideology. Obedience is not a habit normally associated with toddlers or teenagers! In order to assert themselves as separate individuals, children need to question and/or contradict their parents (the old 'swing of the pendulum' or reaction against the philosophy of the parents by each generation, so that a 'radical' generation (such as the 1960s) follows a 'conservative' generation (the 1950s)?). At an anecdotal level (outside any theory or theoretical structure) it is also perhaps illuminating to give examples that illustrate exceptions to the rule (of the Family as ISA) which indicate that the family is not a particularly efficient ISA. Tony Benn, alias Lord Anthony Wedgwood-Benn, is a very public example of an individual who has not conformed to Family ideology; a private example is of a Family that has produced an anthroposophist-anarchist, a social-democrat, and an ultra conservative (which produces a mental image of the distraught Mother Hen when one of her 'chicks', a duckling, takes to the water!). Any study of the English and other civil wars will show families divided, brother fighting against brother, father against sons. Yet the possibility exists that such exceptions prove the 'rule' — that the parents of apparent rebels can take comfort in the old saying that anyone who is NOT a rebel at 18 needs his or her head read, but a rebel of 40 need HIS head read; in other words, the young settle down and conform, conservative forces re-assert themselves. Is this where we see ideology asserting itself — in conformity? But such a possibility would not appeal to Althusser, for if we are to take into account psychological factors, there are too many variables to produce a satisfactory overarching 'scientific' theory — there are many factors which influence children within the family: position within the family (the eldest sibling is likely to be given more responsibility and to become more responsible; a factor that influenced the USA's selection of astronauts), whether parents are authoritarian or not, and so on.

It is therefore necessary to examine an alternative view of the development of the child, one that is not influenced by such variables, but

that might help to get the issues already raised into a clearer perspective, that is, HOW we develop a 'world view'. Hamlyn and Morrow discuss the development of the child in terms of his/her acquisition of concepts. Language again becomes the focal point, for the conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing paragraph is that it is very difficult to bracket language and ideology and Family into one neat category. Yet in learning a language, the child IS developing a world view, and it is essential to examine the differences between Hamlyn's account and Althusser's account fairly closely, for these differences would appear to have considerable significance when one proceeds to look at the consequences for individuals.

One of the main differences between the 'ideological' explanation and the 'conceptual scheme' explanation is that Althusser sees men as dominated by ideological structures, in fact the products of such structures (and perhaps it is valid and useful to add here that the reality of the mechanism is the reproduction of the relations of production — always qualified by that 'in the last instance' Althusser uses to avoid the accusation of predeterminism if the Base is seen as overtly determining the Superstructure). In order to reproduce the social relations of production, and maintain their economic dominance, the ruling class MUST employ the ISAs to ensure subjection to its ideology, to ensure continued surpluses. In the last instance then, individuals, through ideology, are in fact economically determined. Where does Hamlyn's account diverge from such an account, and are there any similarities? As indicated above, Hamlyn does NOT see individuals as predetermined by Ideology, and the development of a 'conceptual scheme' is not related to overt economic factors (which is not to say that they have NO influence). Yet Hamlyn too is opposed to Idealism or any view that our view of the world can be simply subjective, and he states that 'we cannot get outside our concepts'. Are Hamlyn's 'concepts' any relation to Althusser's 'ideology'? Although Hamlyn states: 'We have as human beings some power of thought, that is clear enough,'<sup>8</sup> is he in fact contradicting Althusser — who does not deny 'thoughts' to individuals but merely places them under the control of ideology?<sup>9</sup>

Hamlyn's position is to some extent outlined in the following excerpt where he indicates that although our conceptual schemes are to be objective, this is related to our 'given' form of life (in a general sense). Conceptual schemes do indeed affect our views:

(which) may suggest that we might have had other views, that we might have developed a conceptual structure different from that we have developed in fact . . . But it's no use

pretending that we could have any conception of what this might have been like; our form of life is, Wittgenstein says, the given . . . It is not the case that the possibility of such differences in forms of life or sensibility implies a merely subjective view of the world. We can raise the question of what is objective or otherwise only within the conceptual scheme that we have, given our form of life, since to ask whether something is objective is to ask whether it is objective as a such and such. To have classified something as a such and such is already to have invoked and applied a set of concepts; we cannot get outside these concepts altogether . . .<sup>10</sup>

That initial superficial resemblance to Althusser's ideology, and to his theory of recognition — that individuals are 'hailed' by Ideology and cannot have other views, their 'form of life' too is in a sense 'given' — is still there, but with an important divergence: concepts are GENERAL, they are not specific to class, to economic position or whatever, for Hamlyn states that 'if a concept is to exist at all . . . there must be some general agreement about its understanding and that includes the understanding of how it is to be applied'<sup>11</sup>. 'General' is the operative word; language is the basis for conceptual schemes, and it is something people have in common unlike the *particular* ideologies which would apply to Althusser's subjects. There is a gap between language and the world which has to be crossed in applying language to the world, but it is the only means we have of understanding our world and our experiences; our experiences contribute to our understanding, and through understanding our experiences become meaningful. Experience has been described by Perry Anderson as the 'crucial medium, in which men and women convert objective determinations into subjective initiatives', experience is 'the junction between 'being and consciousness'<sup>12</sup>.

It can be seen, therefore, that people can mean things by words only if words in general have meaning, and a usage that is recognisably normal. Experience is an essential part of this development. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by Morrow:

. . . children are not born with a conceptual scheme — that is something which develops gradually in an interpersonal context . . . the child is dependent on those around him, not merely physically but also in relation to his developing understanding of the world and himself . . . gradually he develops the capacity to make his own judgements, gradually he becomes a participant in authority relations with others . . . In so far as his development is in the direction of more

adequate rationality he comes to realise that nothing is ever so because someone says it is . . . he comes to realise that no persons or groups of persons have a monopoly of The Truth, and that he, along with other persons needs to use his own judgement . . . Rationality is not the product of natural growth, like a plant, but nor is it the product of the imposition of a dogma from outside, it develops gradually in an interpersonal context . . . Rationality (of which autonomy is a central characteristic) is a critical tradition, usually politically unpopular for it contains the potential that what is widely taken for granted might be rejected.<sup>13</sup>

The central concepts for Morrow are clearly autonomy and rationality — both of which are denied by Althusser, for they would be part of the ‘illusion’. Morrow, on the other hand, rejects the possibility that ‘rationality’ can be imposed by dogma from the ‘outside’.

Clearly, therefore, ‘conceptual schemes’ and ‘ideology’ are not even close relations, and are most distinct in the METHOD by which they are acquired — the one imposes itself, the other on the contrary grows with you, and allows for autonomy and the use of ‘own judgement’. While there are several ‘particular ideologies’ that will impose themselves, ‘concepts’ are general and do not allow for class differences. While this is somewhat more than a ‘dictionary definition’ of words, as the complex inter-relationship between concepts must be traced, the rules are never ‘merely subjective or idiosyncratic’<sup>14</sup>, yet give scope for that personal judgement mentioned by Morrow, for while we are unable to step outside our concepts, such concepts are developed in relation to norms, but ‘such norms are not always conformed to’<sup>15</sup>, and, while it may be understood that there are limits to understanding, it cannot be assumed that these have been reached.

Language is something that we have in common with all other human beings, even where the language spoken is different, our ‘given form of life’ in this world ensures some common understanding. It is only in translations that we find the ‘gaps’ in our language — and they are surprisingly few. Similarly class differences pose no serious barrier to communication, for the concepts used will be general, regardless of the ‘class struggle’. There is no language specific to an ideology. What might differ, even substantially, would be the ATTITUDE towards such concepts as ‘police’, ‘profit’, or even ‘pit’. I am tempted to place ‘attitude’ tentatively in the category of ‘ideology’, but clearly it is not going to be possible to link concepts with class, ‘conceptual schemes’ with ‘ideology’. Concepts might be seen as the raw material for thought: the ‘weapons’ of rationality, but

ideology is restrictive, 'mystifying' and not conducive to the development of any critical faculties. Conceptual development, we have seen, depends on more than dictionary-type 'meaning'; understanding will only develop after plotting complex inter-relationships between concepts. Obviously this will be affected by the level of cognitive development of different individuals, so that some conceptual schemes will be much more limited than others, yet the same set of rules will apply whenever any individual grasps a particular concept; he or she will understand by it much the same as others understand.

The conclusion that has to be drawn from the above is that conceptual schemes are not synonymous with Althusser's ideology, although both are seen to contribute to some sort of world view and both depend on a discursive structure out of which we are not able to step. The differences are radical: while everyone HAS a conceptual scheme, or for Althusser, everyone is IN ideology, the former is not as restrictive as ideology, there IS scope for creativity and original thought.

There is virtually no scope for original thought or for morality in Ideology — human consciousness is seen as its EFFECT, rather than its source. Although the ideological structure is not seen as the SUM TOTAL of the working of individual consciousness, it is seen rather like people in a railway compartment: they might choose to have lunch now or later, to read a book, sleep, or engage in discourse — but they are confined by and to the train, and they are not able to alter either its speed or destiny — the rails are the real controlling factor; the 'ideology' of the analogy.

A final remark in concluding the first part of this survey, which has attempted to examine HOW we acquire either conceptual schemes or ideologies and to evaluate the relationship that might exist between them, concerns the concept of 'concepts'. We have seen that Morrow and Hamlyn emphasise that understanding is based on concepts, which have inter-personal criteria. Althusser's use of this term indicates a rather different interpretation of concepts:

... the mode of historical existence of individuality in a given mode of production is not legible to the naked eye in 'history'; its concept too must therefore be CONSTRUCTED, and like every concept it contains a number of surprises the most striking of which is the fact that it is nothing like the false obviousness of the 'given' — which is merely the mask of current ideology<sup>15</sup>.

Referring to the Soviets' 'recourse to Humanism', Althusser said: 'these conditions have hindered the development which was indispensable if Marxist theory was to acquire precisely those concepts demanded by the

new problems: concepts that would have allowed it to pose these problems today in scientific, not ideological terms.' 'Alienation' is described as a concept without any 'status', and he continues, 'Marx never regarded a mode of political behaviour as directly assimilable to a historical CATEGORY, that is, to a CONCEPT from the theory of historical materialism: for if it does designate a reality, it is not its concept.' History is no more than an ideological concept: while it does designate a set of existing relations, it does not provide us 'with a means of knowing them', unlike a scientific concept. Such usage is to my mind convoluted and idiosyncratic! It would not meet Hamlyn and Morrow's criteria.

Althusser is of course claiming to be producing a scientific account of the forces which direct Society — hence the emphasis on the 'scientific' nature of Marxism as opposed to 'ideological concepts'. This gives rise to a certain tension in his work for he has had to attempt a balance between his desire to have scientific explanation (which is also Marxist) and the essentially theoretical issues such as 'Subject', 'subjects', 'interpellation', and so on, that are part and parcel of his account of Ideology — such ideas cannot be seen to be Ideas. They had to be given a material existence. The really real subjects of Society and individuals, however, are of little immediate concern to Althusser except in so far as their existence is necessary for that of Ideology: 'There is no practice except by and in an ideology, there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects': this is the role of concrete subjects. Subjects recognise that they are subjects:

And Moses, interpellated-called by his Name, having recognised that it 'really' was he who was called by God, recognises that he is a subject, a subject OF God, a subject subjected to God, a subject *through* the Subject, and subjected to the Subject. The proof: he obeys him . . . (ISAs p 276).

While on the subject of subjects, I want finally to consider the implications for individual consciousness of both 'ideology' and 'conceptual schemes', and this will tie up those loose threads and references to this subject that are scattered throughout the paper where we have seen Althusser's rejection of rationality and morality as 'bourgeois illusions' created by ideological factors.

. . . it is in ideology (as the locus of political struggle) that men become conscious of their place in the world and in history, it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed in altering the 'lived' relations between them and the world, and acquiring that new form of specific unconsciousness called 'consciousness'.<sup>16</sup>

This is linked to the 'recognition' function of ideology — to you and me it is obvious that we are individuals, this is what Althusser calls a 'primary obviousness', and

. . . like all obviousnesses, including those that make a word 'name or thing' or 'have a meaning' (therefore including the obviousness of the 'transparency' of language), the obviousness that you and I are subjects — and that does not cause any problems — is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect (ISAs p 271).

History itself is a 'process without a Subject', and Althusser refers to the 'ridiculous' concept of man, with his pretensions to being an originating subject or even the subject of History. This of course has been indignantly denounced by E P Thompson, who objects equally strongly to Althusser's 'anti-humanism'.

Althusser might perhaps claim that he was not quite eliminating the concept of 'men' as a 'foreign body'<sup>17</sup> but rather eliminating the BOURGEOIS concept of men, for he does say that 'if Marx does not start out from man, which is an empty idea, that is, one weighted down with bourgeois ideology, it is in order finally to reach living men . . . to grasp the laws which govern both their lives and their concrete struggles'<sup>18</sup>.

He explains that Marx's sympathy with the exploited led him 'to abstract from concrete individuals and to treat them theoretically as simple "supports" of relations'<sup>19</sup>. Marx has similarly shown us that what

. . . in the last instance determines a social formation, and allows us to grasp it, is not any chimerical human essence or human nature, nor man, nor even 'men', but a *relation*, the production relation, which is inseparable from the Base . . . this relation is not a relation between men . . . a psychological or anthropological relation (but) between groups of men and *things*, the means of production<sup>20</sup>.

The production relation distributes men among classes and attributes means of production to a class, and while men are naturally parties to the relation, they are 'parties to it and held within it — "supports" or "bearers" of a function in the production process' (ibid.) But it is not Marx or Althusser who is responsible for this situation, it is 'capitalism', and thus Althusser might not accept Thompson's accusation that in making men mere 'supports' of the system, Althusser is doing precisely what 'vulgarised bourgeois Political Economy' *tried* to do during Marx's lifetime, that 'much of the history of the British working class . . . can only be understood as a heroic (even 'moralistic') REFUSAL to be reduced to being supports of the

reasons and necessities of capital'<sup>21</sup>. Althusser perhaps did not place sufficient emphasis on the fact that the 'supports' he was describing were not HIS creation, but that of the bourgeoisie: 'Man as a free subject, free man as a subject of his actions and his thoughts, is first of all man free to possess, to sell and to buy, the subject of law.'<sup>22</sup> It might well be the case that ultimately Althusser envisages a different type of man with the classless society — but it would appear that there is a problem in reconciling this with his theory of ideology, and in reconciling THAT with the Class Struggle.

How does the theory of Ideology fit in with our ultimately really-free Man who has cast off the Bourgeois Illusion? Althusser's whole complex structure of ISAs Ideology (and ideologies) is offered as an explanation of how the ruling class reproduces the social relations of the forces of production, and how they maintain their dominance. Ideology is all-pervasive; we are all always-already subjects, even before birth. It is a weapon of the ruling class, it is also a necessary element in all social practice. Yet the usefulness of Ideology as a means of understanding society seems to conflict with Althusser's desire to link it to the Class Struggle, because we are not told what the practical effect is on the working class of the ruling class's attempt to achieve hegemony through Ideology and the ISAs. There appears to be no mechanism for change; what happens to the Revolution if workers are successfully conned by Bourgeois Ideology? (beliefs in democracy and so on).

As Rachel Sharp points out, 'people are already ideologised and cannot just be taught how inadequate their ideologies are, given that their ideologies are their lives, and to an important extent, themselves'<sup>23</sup>. Thompson takes this a stage further: '... all human projects, endeavours, institutions, and even culture itself, appear to stand *outside* of men, to stand *against* men, as objective things, as the 'Other' which, in its own turn, moves men around as things. In the old days, the Other was then named 'God' or Fate. Today it has been christened anew as Structure'<sup>24</sup>. Thompson attacks Althusser's 'structuralism', and Larrain too points out that at least for Marx 'structures are themselves the *result* of man's practice'<sup>25</sup>. Perhaps unintentionally, Althusser indeed seems to have moved quite away from man, and his Ideology has taken on a life of its own.

Yet morality is not that easily equated with Ideology; Thompson points out that every class struggle 'is at the same time a struggle over values; and that the project of socialism is guaranteed 'BY NOTHING — certainly not by 'Science', or by Marxism-Leninism — but can find its own guarantees only by REASON and through an open CHOICE OF VALUES'<sup>26</sup>. His position is obviously far closer to that of Hamlyn and Morrow, for it can be seen that the development of conceptual schemes aids rational judgement, and is

associated also with a scheme of values. They would be unlikely to support Althusser's relation of 'true morality' with that which is best for the working class, as ordained by Science and the Party Theoretician.

Values are neither 'thought' nor 'hailed'; they are lived, and they arise within the same nexus of material life and material relations as do our ideas. They are the necessary norms, rules, expectations, etc., 'learned' (and learned with feeling) within the 'habitus' of living; and learned, in the first place, within the family, at work, and within the immediate community. Without this learning social life could not be sustained, and all production would cease. This is not to say that values are independent of the colouration of ideology; manifestly this is not the case, nor how, when experience itself is structured in class ways, could this be so? But to suppose from this that they are 'imposed' (by a State!) as 'ideology' is to mistake the whole social and cultural process . . . Moreover, values no less than material needs will always be a locus of contradiction, of struggle between alternative values and views-of-life. If we say that values are learned within lived experience and are subject to its determinations, we need not therefore surrender to a moral or cultural relativism . . . Men and women argue about values, they choose between values, and in their choosing they adduce rational evidence and interrogate their own values by rational means. This is to say that they are AS MUCH BUT NO MORE determined in their values as in their ideas and action, they are AS MUCH BUT NO MORE 'subjects' of their own affective and moral consciousness as of their general history. Conflicts of value, and choices of value, always take place . . . Historical and cultural materialism cannot explain 'morality' away as class interests in fancy dress, since the notion that all 'interests' can be subsumed in scientifically-determinable material objectives is nothing more than utilitarianism's bad breath.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, as with Morrow, ideology is by no means excluded, but it is placed in a more restricted role (cf Linda Chisholm's view that, on the contrary, it is 'too restrictive to be wholly satisfactory'<sup>28</sup>). Althusser allowed a precise (scientific?) definition of ideology to evade him by allowing it to become too broad — *everything* became ideological, man was denied subjectivity; the theory became diffuse and amorphous, infringing on areas clearly outside its domain (viz Muller and Crewe's 'discursive structure', HOW language is learned or conceptual schemes developed). It had no

beginning and no end; IT became truly the 'process without a Subject'! Frankenstein comes to mind — the scientist loses control as his invention takes on a life of its own. Ideology, then, must be brought back under control; it must be given interpersonal criteria (and perhaps considerable progress has been made in this direction by Larrain, Therborn, Sharp, Giddens, and so on).

It remains to ask why and how Althusser's attempt to 'develop a methodology for Historical Materialism', to explain systematically the forces which direct Society, failed (Bensusan, informal 'Notes'). This could have resulted from tension resulting from his Marxism on one hand (necessarily anti-Idealist, whilst 'scientific' and 'materialist') and his own theoretical interest which developed an internal logic of its own (as with the coherence theory of Truth?) (this reminds me of the Ethno-methodologist position that 'if it's tidy, it's wrong' — because it's HUMAN activity we are dealing with, and can we really account for and wrap social activity up so neatly?). Althusser uses Marx's own statements as a springboard, leaping to new levels — which do not mix comfortably with the original (Thompson refers to Althusser's 'pretended reverence for what Marx intended to say, but, unaccountably, forgot'<sup>29</sup>).

Thus he uses Marx's concept of ideology as 'distorted consciousness' to make the assumption that *all* human consciousness is distorted, and this is why ideology took on its all-encompassing role: the battle that was previously presumed to exist between Ideology and Reason became an outright victory for Ideology — for its 'fifth column' undermines Reason (which is predetermined by Ideology). Yet we need to look back at that analogy of the people in the train, which was not complete — the restrictions on the travellers is itself an illusion. PEOPLE built those railway lines with a deliberate purpose, and the travellers, though not personally the builders, have freely chosen to travel to a *known* destination.

In opposition therefore to Althusser's 'structuralism': 'we are STRUCTURED by social relations, SPOKEN by pre-given linguistic structures, THOUGHT by ideologies . . . and ACTED by history's script'<sup>30</sup>, man needs to be restored to the centre of his world, to be allowed the potential to be rational and autonomous. Let us look again at the very first quotation in this essay: 'Ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group' which, together with Marx's refinement, offers a clear limitation for the concept: it is within ideological forms, such as the political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic, that men become conscious of the class struggle, and fight it out.

(And so be it?)

## NOTES

- 1 I am not attempting an examination of the *concept* of 'Ideology' which has been very competently carried out by Jorge Larrain, and which is still the subject of heated debate in the pages of *Radical Philosophy*. I have restricted this examination to Althusser's work since in many respects it is this work that has stimulated the debate; it is the *source* from which many ideas have sprung; despite the fact that even the majority of marxists have rejected the theories put forward by Althusser; their negative reaction in fact serves to indicate the importance of his positive contribution in bringing 'Ideology' into prominence, into making people aware of the importance — and potential — of this concept as an explanation of social forces.
- 2 Louis Althusser 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Here, and throughout, I refer to this paper as ISAs.
- 3 Jorge Larrain *The Concept of Ideology* London: Hutchinson 1979, p 33.
- 4 Louis Althusser 'Marx and Theoretical Humanism' in *Essays in Self-Criticism*. London: New Left Books 1978, p 205.
- 5 It might be useful to give some brief consideration to those philosophical notions that Althusser has dismissed. What are the traditional concepts of 'free will' and 'consciousness'? Hunter Mead relates these to 'determinism', 'indeterminism' and 'predeterminism' (the last two having some link with the Idealist and Naturalist schools of thought). Predeterminism can be associated with Eastern philosophies based on a fatalistic outlook (Kismet), although Marxism has been accused of this as well — certainly the foregoing quotation from Althusser intimates that 'capitalism' is ultimately a predetermining factor: a 'fixed' destiny. The idealist/indeterminist position rejects determinism in any form: choices are based absolutely on free will and intuition, on reason and ideals. Here, par excellence, man is seen as the originating subject. 'Determinism' (where choices are free but not arbitrary) is a half-way stage between the 'fixed fate' and 'totally free' positions. It is part of the Naturalist reaction against 'Idealism'. Man is seen as something more than merely a complex of stimuli and responses — we are morally responsible and self-determining in that our actions are the result of our character and habits, which are affected but not determined by external forces. Actions have *causes*, free will cannot exist in a vacuum — the behaviour and conduct of most people can be seen to be consistent and dependable and this in itself results from social factors. There is thus a process of interaction between man and his society. H Mead *Types and Problems of Philosophy*. (1946).
- 6 Louis Althusser 'Marxism and Humanism' in B R Cosin (ed) *School and Society* London RKP 1971 p 233.
- 7 Johan Muller and Mary Crew 'Subjects and Subjection: a comment' in *Perspectives in Education* Vol 5, No 2, June 1981. See pp 119-120.
- 8 David Hamlyn *The Theory of Knowledge* London: Macmillan, 1970 p 6.
- 9 Althusser is not particularly concerned with the thoughts of individuals as such, but it is certainly of interest to see how others have followed his lead: Rachel Sharp has developed from his theory of ideology certain assumptions regarding individual consciousness:  
'. . . the individual subject is not the sole source or even the most important source of his own thoughts. Thoughts are mediated through language and ideology . . . Ideas are thus embedded in and interpreted through ideology . . . It is clear that a model which explains changes of consciousness in terms of mere reason, argument and logical discourse is quite inadequate . . . Our thought involves thinking WITHIN our assumptions rather than thinking ABOUT them . . . communication consists of elaborate, stereotypical,

routinised utterances where the content is highly predictable . . . Our ideas are already prepacked for us by our language, and stereotypes built into the language in such a way that the possibility of thinking outside these very narrow limits is remote or haphazard . . .' (*Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling*, 1980 pp 113-116).

- 10 Hamlyn *The Theory of Knowledge* p 72.
- 11 *Op cit* p 21.
- 12 Perry Anderson *Arguments Within English Marxism*. London: New Left Books, 1980 p 17.
- 13 Wally Morrow 'The Nature of Education'. Paper read at the Kenton Conference, November 1979 pp 25-26.
- 14 Hamlyn *op cit* p 67.
- 15 Althusser *Reading Capital* London: New Left Books 1975.
- 16 Althusser 'Marxism and Humanism' in B R Cosin (ed) *School and Society*. London: RKP 1971 p 233.
- 17 E P Thompson 'The Poverty of Theory' in *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* London: Merlin, 1978 p 336.
- 18 Althusser 'Marx and Theoretical Humanism' in *Essays in Self-Criticism* London: New Left Books, 1978 p 205.
- 19 *Op cit* p 200.
- 20 *Op cit* p 201.
- 21 Thompson *op cit* pp 339-340.
- 22 Althusser 'Marx and Theoretical Humanism' p 198.
- 23 Rachel Sharp *Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling* London: RKP 1979 p 114.
- 24 E P Thompson 'The Poverty of Theory' in *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays*, London: Merlin, 1978 p 345.
- 25 Jorge Larrain *The Concept of Ideology*, London: Hutchinson, 1979 p 160.
- 26 Thompson *op cit* p 363.
- 27 Thompson *op cit* pp 367-368.
- 28 Linda Chisholm 'Ideology, Legitimation of the status quo and history textbooks in South Africa' in *Perspectives in Education* Vol 5 No 3 November 1981 p 135.
- 29 Thompson *op cit* p 360.
- 30 Thompson *op cit* p 345.

## ‘Marxism and Morality’: A Critique — Toward Social Agapism?

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Leon Benadé

Moral philosophy has been and continues to be a subject for debate in a number of intellectual camps, not least that of historical materialism. This subject is of such a problematic nature that even within these intellectual camps there exists fertile ground for fiery debate. Tony Skillen, a British Marxist, some years ago wrote an article called ‘Marxism and Morality’<sup>1</sup>, in which he articulates one position within Marxism. This position maintains that morality, like the class society, will fade away once the class struggle has reached its logical conclusion and that morality will die precisely because it is only a function and creation of the class system, serving to uphold and perpetuate that system. It is my argument that this should not necessarily be so, and that Marxism is itself a moral vision. I want to argue that within a theoretical practice of Marxism, one can in fact accommodate a moral view. Furthermore, because morality is conceived of here as a component of social theory, it is feasible to suggest that any account of education should consider this vexed notion of morality, a consideration which arises due to the implicit links between education and society, and hence between education and social theory.

The broad concerns of this paper will be with the ‘Marxist’ notion of morality as expressed by Skillen. He also raises certain issues regarding individual agency, and I would like to consider this issue in a wider context. Lastly, I would like to advance some ideas which are best expressed as a concern with ‘social agapism’.

Skillen gives an account of morality which is so polemical that it leaves one in no doubt as to what he believes:

Marx spoke with contempt of morality, is said to have burst out laughing at the mention of the word, and claimed . . . ‘The communists preach no morality at all’<sup>2</sup>.

He goes on to explicate, and concludes that

. . . morality is one of the (real) evils of class society, and especially of capitalist society<sup>3</sup>.

He notes somewhat later that

. . . morality is the missionary advance party of capitalism's divide and rule attack<sup>4</sup>.

Finally, after having given a resumé of 'the situation' in Britain in the seventies, Skillen notes that the ruling class is to roll out the artillery, and that:

. . . Morality is going to be recharged for an assault, into the homes and schools. It seems to me important that socialists confront this . . .<sup>5</sup>.

At least two things become apparent here. First, Skillen associates the articulation of 'morality' with the class system, and especially with capitalism; and secondly, he makes a logical step in saying that morality expresses the interests of the dominant class. Before considering these, let me briefly focus on at least one problem with Skillen's account of morality. Earlier in his paper, he makes the assumption that morality is an historically specific ideology. Now Marx wrote in an historically specific time and location which differs somewhat from that in which Skillen wrote in 1974, and in which I write in 1983. One need only make an historical study of England in the first fifty years of the 19th century to realise the extent of the desperate struggle in which workers and factory-owners were locked. One stake of this struggle was certain ideological forms generated by the aristocracy and growing capitalist class, forms which are notably sited in Victorian conceptions of morality. (See for example Thompson<sup>6</sup>, Briggs<sup>7</sup>, and Lawson and Silver.<sup>8</sup>)

The moral imprecation to 'pull yourself up by your own bootstraps', the workhouse system, the Poor Law and the utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham bear stark witness to the attempts by the dominant class in 19th century England to perpetuate their moral control over the working class. It was in this context that Marx wrote. The move which Skillen makes is to extrapolate Marx's vision of 19th century English 'moral codes' to 20th century England and beyond, so that Skillen unwittingly makes this an *historically timeless* concept; that is, a vision which holds good for all times, all epochs, all societies. Clearly this is in conflict with both historical and dialectical materialism. It seems to me therefore that Skillen's concept of morality is static. This argument will become clearer as the paper proceeds.

This brings me back to the notions of morality under capitalism, and of morality as an expression of dominant class interests. I fail to see why capitalism should be any more an evil order than those which preceded it. The only reason for the constant reference to it is that it was of capitalism that Marx evolved such a scathing analysis. What seems far more important

is to consider whether the morality which Tony Skillen situates in the capitalist arena is the same type of morality which existed prior to the development of capitalism, and that which exists today. In other words, is what Marx and Skillen call 'morality' an historically specific concept (as they say it is), or is it historically timeless (as I seem to have argued earlier)? I would like to argue now, but only develop later, that what they have termed 'morality' is a misnomer for what we might want to call 'obfuscatory ideology', that is, a system of concepts handed on to the dominated group as a way of perceiving reality. This system serves to cloud and obscure the vision of that dominated group. It is this 'obfuscatory ideology' which, I believe, is historically specific. This is not to ignore the possibility that aspects of morality can be used unscrupulously to obscure. But I want to argue that 'morality' is both a different concept, and an historically timeless one at that.

A reading of Tony Skillen's paper will reveal his strong adherence to the view that morality is an expression of dominant class interests, and that the stronger use morality to justify, legitimate and perpetuate their continued supremacy. I noted earlier that the Victorian conceptions of morality generated by both aristocracy and the rising capitalist class were deployed in such a manner as to perform those functions just mentioned, deployed in such a way that the working class would 'accept their lot' and generate the wealth by which the capitalist grew fatter and stronger. For Skillen (and others), this process continues to the present, and on these grounds needs to be defeated. What is taking place here is not morality, but 'obfuscatory ideology'. Now, although I am going to pick up these ideas in more detail a little later, it might help to say that the latter category would most surely serve the interests of the stronger, but that the former, deployed objectively, should serve not the stronger, but all. So, morality cannot serve the interests of the dominant class, nor be an expression of these interests, because it serves the interests of all.

The second broad area in Skillen's paper which should receive attention refers to notions of individual agency in relation to morality. For Skillen, morality

... characteristically rests on an assumed 'individualism' — egoism, selfishness, anti-sociability, at the core of human nature<sup>9</sup>.

He goes on to say that

... the individual is (thus) seen as what morality has to control<sup>10</sup>.

Now while the first statement could be partly correct, the second must

surely be false. I say partly correct of the first statement, because I think Skillen is using 'individualism' in a narrowly defined sense. 'Individualism' can be taken to refer to such notions as 'uniqueness' and 'characteristics unique to one person'. While such characteristics might well include the negative ones suggested by Skillen, they can just as easily include positive ones such as a concern for others, selflessness and sociability. By this token, it seems just as easy to argue that 'morality' is based on such positive qualities as it is to argue Skillen's line. It all seems to depend on the argument one wishes to advance. The kind of account of 'morality' which I am gradually building is one which would like to argue that morality is based on the positive qualities unique to each individual. If I accept this line of argument, then Skillen's second statement is taken care of: there would be no need for 'morality' to 'control' the individual, unless Skillen wanted to be accused of promoting the very negative characteristics on which he says morality is based. Skillen's second statement is invalid at another level too. Morality is not intended to control individuals, but to constitute and *adjudicate the relations between individuals*. I am aware that this commits me to a *statement of prescription*, whereas Skillen is operating more at the level of *description*, but critical social theory should seek not only to describe, but to change society.

Another of Skillen's statements about the workings of morality sounds like a sulk:

... it is 'up to the individual' to measure up to 'what is required'  
 ... failing to do this ... signifies a fault in him; that is ... he is to blame<sup>11</sup>.

Now while this may be true of 'obfuscatory ideology', it cannot be of 'morality', as conceived in this paper. Besides, up to which point can an individual *not* be said to be responsible for his own actions? Do we adopt some or other fashionable psychological theory to suit Skillen, and say that so-and-so cannot be held responsible for such-and-such, because it was (albeit indirectly) the fault of his family, school, community, society or government? It would furthermore appear that Skillen is distorting Marx, because although Marx decried such individualistic traits as competitiveness (as this leads, in the wider social formation, to the acquisitive ethos), he surely believed that in a 'better' world, the individual would be able to assume greater responsibility for his own actions, forging his own history. It is this very potential of all individuals to create their own history which leads me to believe that Skillen is on the wrong track. He ends up arguing for a very limited conception of individual agency. Possibly without having realised it, Skillen has opted for an Althusserian notion of individual agency. This is a notion which would suggest that the individual is a mere

subject of ideology, a 'bearer' of functions, a faceless pawn swept along by the tide of history<sup>12</sup>.

My final concern in this paper is to elucidate what I mean by 'social agapism', and the role I believe it can play in social and political life. It is 'social' because it is part of a social theory, one which is based partly on a materialist critique of the world around us. It is 'agapist' to the extent that it is based on a normative belief and faith in the positive social good which can be generated by an espousal of universal love.

There are certainly problems attached to agapism. The notion of a universally loving attitude might sound like a version of utilitarianism, but although the agapist must at least be basing his view on something like the greatest good *of all*, he is proposing a richer and more positive characterisation of what the 'greatest good' consists in. This raises thorny problems about practical application. Frankena<sup>13</sup> raises the distinction between the rule-agapist and the act-agapist. The latter, he says, can be regarded as living by no rule other than the imperative to love. When such a person is faced by a situation, he decides which would be the most loving manner of proceeding. The rule-agapist on the other hand, has a set of love-embodying rules, which are applied to all situations. However, this distinction is too neat. It seems that the agapist approaches any and every situation with a number of sets of love-embodying rules in his mind, and these are tempered by experience. Faced with a situation, the agapist has to ask: what is the most *life-giving and loving* manner of proceeding here? Very often, the agapist is going to find that the issue is not cut and dried, but that it is mushy and that certain moral imperatives have to take priority over others.

It is apposite to consider what 'love' might consist in. It is considered to be a way of life which permeates one's social existence at all levels. At one level, it implies a selfless respect for all, and a desire to see that the good of all is being advanced — without denying these things to oneself. At another level, it implies the ability to see the inconsistencies in the material conditions of oneself and of other with a view to changing such conditions. Love is an attitude which, by its very action, enables individuals to perceive contradictions, whilst its propagation is itself the result of the exploitation of those contradictions — the cracks in the capitalist edifice — by those who propagate love. It is this practice which should create and accompany change, learn from contradictions and change these, and which should favour all in general and none in particular. This should hold even for a 'new' society which, if found lacking, should similarly be subject to change. So far, I have established that as a social agapist, my prime concern is to love (and I hope to be loved in return). This imperative informs me in such a way that I look at the world in a manner which calls on me not to allow the

world to remain as it is, but to attempt to improve on it. Let me make two propositions: (a) individuals are dynamic in their dialectical relationships with each other and with reality, which means that the world will always be in a state of flux; (b) but we have to realise that individuals are imperfect, and can only realise a semblance of perfection (this is a normative proposition of mine, which cannot be 'proved'). This imperfectibility will encroach upon the attempts of individuals to attain the utopian state of true and complete happiness. So, although the world is in constant flux, real conditions of existence are not as amenable to change. In looking at the world, the agapist has to decide why this should in fact be so, that is, why it is that conditions of existence are often kept as they are by some to the disadvantage of others with a view to securing the continued pleasure of the former group. Having got this far, it is for the agapist to define and decide upon strategies for her own personal life and activities within that world which are going to best advance the objective good of *all*. The social agapist thus has a *moral obligation* to act in this manner, because of the imperative to love. If this set of actions includes challenging the existing status quo — as it must, because that status quo will inevitably be the expression of the attempt of some to gain dominance over others — then, it would seem to me, the social agapist has no choice, but to act in that way.

Although I have come closer to locating the practical activities of the social agapist, it is still difficult to obtain purchase on the depth or extent of 'love'.

This could be the thorniest issue of all. One argument would be to locate the bounds of 'love' in revelation. The problem here is that religion is a potentially divisive and sectarian concept which separates and divides people of one faith from people of others. Besides, so much activity occurs between churches which jostle for legitimacy that the bounds of love would be based on a shifting marsh of conflicting notions. Possibly a more desirable alternative is to base 'love' on a system of morality. Now it seems to me essential to argue for a very strong sense of morality, because as I argued earlier, it should be a *historically timeless* concept. If I can say this, then I can argue that this leaves little room for arguments of a relativist nature, that is, that morality means one thing here, and another there. The notion of love is universal, can be applied universally, and found universally, regardless of the historical development of any one group.

The system of morality which comes close to what I am trying to get a purchase on is Thomism. Thomism is a system of morality which can exist independently of revelation (although Aquinas did believe that revelation added depth to this system). Furthermore, one of its attractive features is its historically timeless nature. Like many philosophers, Aquinas distinguishes between actions and movement, saying that only the former fall within

morality. Nevertheless, acts (of love, for example) need not be empirically observable, and so he makes a distinction between interior and exterior acts. One has to have the *intention*, *will* and *desire* to love, as well as the *faith* in the power of love before one can live a loving life. For Aquinas, every individual wants to realise 'good', that is, the best for herself and for others. Of course, what this good is, is a problematic issue, but if we can assume that the objective 'good' comprises the most positive and most healthy situation possible under the circumstances, then love would be geared to attaining such 'good' both for the individual and for all others with whom the individual might come into contact. But of course, for one person such 'good' might be defined as carnal pleasures, whilst for another, 'good' will refer to a spiritual or transcendental good. In the case of the former, objective love should enable the individual to be in a position to exercise self control over his life, and yet allow him to satisfy his pleasures. The typical 20th century male who leads the 'macho' life of an errant playboy may be realising what he believes is his 'good', but certainly is not acting in a *life-giving* and *loving* way to those who have the misfortune to come into contact with him.

What I have said in connection with Thomism<sup>14</sup> will, I hope, have filled out a little my idea of 'social agapism'. Let me pass a few concluding comments. First, I think I have made clear how and why I see 'morality' as an historically timeless concept. By contrast, I believe that what Skillen calls 'morality' is in fact 'obfuscatory ideology'. I say 'obfuscatory' because, although ideology serves to obscure, the kind of ideology of which Skillen speaks is *doubly* obscuring to the people it is intended to dupe because it *dresses up* as 'morality'. This ideology is most certainly historically specific, because its forms, nature and practice change with the historical development of a people. In the second place, I hope I have laid to rest the idea that morality is based on the negative characteristics of individuals. To the extent to which morality can be said to be based on the individual, it is based on her positive aspects and it serves to realise the best for both that individual and all the others with whom she comes into contact. Morality is thus not a mechanism for externally controlling individuals, but for constituting and adjudicating the relations between people. Where external control is exerted, it is sure to be the function of some or other ideological form or apparatus in society.

Skillen provides an account of morality which is inappropriate, inadequate, and which does little justice to what many other people believe Marx meant. Marxism is itself a moral theory, which reacts indignantly to the reprehensible structures inherent to the capitalist system. To deny this is to commit a serious conceptual error. It is precisely this kind of error which Skillen commits.

## NOTES

- 1 Tony Skillen 'Marxism and Morality' in *Radical Philosophy*, Vol 8, 1974.
- 2 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 11.
- 3 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 11.
- 4 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 14.
- 5 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 15.
- 6 E P Thompson *The Making of the English Working Class*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963.
- 7 Asa Briggs *The Age of Improvement 1783-1867*, London: Longman, 1959.
- 8 John Lawson and Harold Silver *A Social History of Education in England*, London: Methuen, 1973.
- 9 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 12.
- 10 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 12.
- 11 Tony Skillen *ibid* p 12.
- 12 This is possibly a crude characterisation of Althusser's notion of agency which is contested by some social theorists. See for example Paul Hirst 'The necessity of theory' in *Economy and Society*, Vol. 8, no 4, 1979 and David Bensusan 'The Individual Versus the Subject' in *Perspectives in Education*, Vol 6, No 3. November 1982.
- 13 William Frankena *Ethics*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p 57 ff.
- 14 See for example F C Copleston *Aquinas*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1955 and Anthony Kenny *Aquinas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980 for a fuller treatment of the work of St Thomas Aquinas.

## Curriculum Innovation: The Case of Bophuthatswana

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David Agar

Although Bophuthatswana is a particular case, at a general level one can draw strong parallels between it and other African states which have gained independence. Typically, at independence, these states have had the following things in common: a colonial heritage, an education system inferior in quality and quantity, and economic and financial problems typical of third world countries. With the gaining of independence the following have become priority areas in restructuring the education systems:

- a The maintenance and strengthening of a sense of nationhood or national unity with its implications for language and the content of geography and history particularly.
- b Providing the type of education both in quality and quantity which had been denied (eg 1961 Conference at Addis Ababa — the commonly expressed decision of Ministers of Education in African countries was six years compulsory and free education for all children by 1980, entry of 30% primary school children into secondary schools and the provision of higher education for up to 20% of those who complete secondary education)<sup>1</sup>.
- c A movement towards meeting the need for high level manpower (popular pressure for adopting the curricula content similar to that of European schools; manpower needs were also seen as linked with shortages of science and mathematics graduates so there has been emphasis on strengthening and modernising mathematics and science at all levels)<sup>2</sup>.

Much of the restructuring has relied on outside financial aid and the aid of outside experts. Generally the approach has been rationalist: a masterplan for educational reform being conceived of at the centre and communicated to the periphery (ie the central-periphery model and its variants, like the research, development and diffusion model, have been the major strategies of innovation used). Such an approach is based on three major assumptions:

- a the innovation exists, fully realised in its essentials, prior to its diffusion;
- b diffusion is movement of the innovation from the centre out to its ultimate users;
- c directed diffusion is a centrally managed process of dissemination training and the provision of resources and incentives<sup>3</sup>.

Schon articulates the major problem of this model in the following way: when the central periphery system exceeds the resources or energy at the centre, overloads the capacity of the radii or mishandles feedback from the periphery, it fails; ie its success depends on the infrastructure technology (men, materials, money and information) and the capacity for generating and managing feedback. Ruddock and Kelly<sup>4</sup> describe this more systematically: the success of the centre periphery model depends on translocation (getting materials and people to the right places at the right time), communication (getting across ideas), animation (getting the teachers enthusiastic) and re-education (changing teachers' attitudes and behaviours). These are progressively difficult to do, and, as Hawes notes, the infrastructures of African countries tend to be too poor to facilitate these activities, particularly as far as communication goes.

This innovation strategy lends itself, moreover, to power-coercive (change occurs via deliberate restructuring of the situation by the superordinate having the necessary authority) methods. When the innovation is on a large scale, a masterplan, as has been the case in Africa, this has meant mandatory methods where the political and administrative powers rely on their legal power position and their bureaucratic structure to implement innovations. Often this means compulsory universal adoption.

Hawes<sup>5</sup> points out that there are two fundamental ways by which the goals of authorities are made public: through political announcement of national policy and philosophy and its application to the education system (eg Tanzania) or some form of consensus through a commission, review or national symposium.

Education for Papagone is a masterplan for the reform of Bophuthatswana. It has been made public through a Commission, a crucial part of their recommendations being legislation of an Education Act to replace the 1973 Act and articulate a new National Education Policy. The general intent of the Act is:

... to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive system of education ... to ensure that the institutions have the legal right, resources and opportunities to establish such procedure for administration and control. both

centrally and in the community as will lead to the realisation of the national ideal Papagano . . . ensuring that education is made available to all those children and adults who stand in need of it<sup>6</sup>.

Education for Papagano thus follows, generally, the central periphery model. Priority areas of:

- a Maintenance and strengthening a sense of national unity (Chapter 6 paragraph 2.4 Education for Papagano — national cohesion and unity, creative renewal, purposeful reconstruction, the reconciliation and interdependence of individuals and peoples as well as faith and confidence in its people and future).
- b Improvement in the quality and quantity of education (Chapter 7 paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 — equal opportunity and accessibility of education for all — compulsory and free primary education by 1984).
- c Manpower needs (Chapter 6 — to equip the individual for productive work . . . productive and progressive activities . . . closer relationship to the world of work . . . accepting the challenge of innovation and modernisation in order to meet the manpower requirements of the community and the nation) are those stressed by other African countries as well.

At a general level the forces at work bringing about change spring from the granting of independence: ridding the nation of poor quality and quantity of education and at the same time promoting national unity and satisfying the needs for modernisation (people's attitudes and manpower needs). The particular course these changes take is, however, a result of Bophuthatswana's peculiar circumstances.

Jaff<sup>7</sup> points out that the political rationale of Bophuthatswana is unique — her independence was imposed from without and is not based on the expression of popular ideology (unlike most African states whose independence was founded on a unity of purpose). Education in other African countries has been seen as a door to the better life and higher living standards (an economic concern) but also has been a means by which leaders have directed national society (a political concern). In Bophuthatswana the Commission has paid attention to the first concern but has had to create the second in the concept of Papagano. This is a mild expression of national unity rather than an expression of political rationale (unity and independence).

Bophuthatswana's independence does entail an ideological shift from white supremacy to self-determination. But, control of finance, justice, interior, education, agriculture, forestry, roads and works, while South Africa retains control of defence, external affairs, internal security, posts,

railways, immigration, currency control, banking and customs, means real administrative power in only certain areas. Essentially political control is still in the hands of South Africa. Self-determination may be seen as a front whereby Bophuthatswana's leaders may be seen to be in control and thus responsible for educational, economic and even political outcomes while in reality South Africa still controls much and therefore shares in such responsibility

Economically Bophuthatswana suffers from severe restraints as well. Primarily these consist of the present economic conditions and thus job opportunities within the country, which are poor (the country is largely a subsistence farming community with limited opportunities in mines and small, poorly developed towns), the fragmented nature of her geography and her geographical situation (proximity to the largest mining, industrial and urban complex in South Africa). Although the Bophuthatswana government may be seen as attempting to improve conditions (for example the reduction of land ownership units from 500 000 to 5 000 and the consequent switch in emphasis from subsistence to cash crop and scientific farming), it is only realistic to assume that a major source of income for the country in the foreseeable future will remain that of migrant labour (here considered to be a systematised exploitation of capitalist labour power, the independent states being seen as reserve labour areas and the concomitant border industry/decentralisation policy being seen as attentive to migrant labour control — an alternative to migration — ie an overall mechanism for producing and controlling cheap labour<sup>8</sup>).

Politically and economically Bophuthatswana is unique. The political restraints mentioned above can be seen as negative forces controlling the direction of change (ie making it politically conservative); the relative economic independence making economic development within the country a possibility, but this development being a slow process, the country still relying on migrant labour and thus still being tied to South Africa — a positive force accounting for the direction of change in the education system.

The remainder of this paper examines selected areas of change as envisaged by the Commission by contrasting these with the Tanzanian experience. Finally it examines briefly the realism of such changes in terms of the forces that have brought them about and in terms of the central-periphery model of curriculum development on which they are broadly based.

The age at which children go to school, the amount of time spent there and the disposition of that time have the greatest bearing on learning that is provided and planned for them<sup>9</sup>. While both Tanzania and Bophuthat-

swana aim at education expansion (compulsory free education) in the former this is confined to a primary phase and in the latter to both primary and middle school. At the same time the age of entry in Tanzania has been raised while in Bophuthatswana it has been lowered so that children may enter school at the age of six.

In essence this restructuring serves the same ultimate purpose — it is a means of achieving a more effective link between education and employment, so school-leavers are old enough to take up productive work when they leave school. It can also be seen as a means of offering basic education to a greater number of the nation's children by ensuring that they stay at school to complete it (this lowering of the drop-out rate must be seen in combination with qualitative improvements such as lowering the teacher pupil ratio, removing double sessions, equalising the distribution of school facilities etc). However, the productive work envisaged and the society in which the young adults are to live, in each case, are totally different. In Tanzania the child is expected to take his place in an Ujamaa community — a stable, rural, traditional and poor society. Education here is assimilation into a pre-existing and unchanging socialist society. In Bophuthatswana on the other hand these phases of education are aimed at making the child literate and modern, giving him a base for further education and training in either a secondary high school or in the non-formal education system. The skills needed to cope with the problems of living in society are seen as preparing the child for a period of rapid social change and a future full of new challenges (page 30 paragraph 1), contributing to the economic and social development of the country. In complete contrast to Tanzania, the aim of education in Bophuthatswana is to change (modernise) the pupils and thus change the society.

As should be expected these different purposes have a direct influence on the content of the curriculum. In Tanzania the type of things taught in primary schools 'should be determined by what the child ought to know — that is the skills he ought to acquire and the values he ought to cherish if he is to live happily and well in a socialist and predominantly rural society'<sup>10</sup>. Thus each school is seen as a farming community, part of the community at large — literacy, numeracy and general education relevant to life in a non-mechanised socialist community form the content of the curriculum. This applies not only to primary school but higher education as well<sup>11</sup>. Secondary school must not be simply a selection process for university, colleges and so on; it must be self-sufficient and prepare people for life and service in the villages and rural areas of the country — further education for the selected few must be education for the service of many.

Papagano is no great curriculum innovation — it is rather a slight modification — a move to child-centredness — than a change in structure

and content. At the primary level the content of the curriculum is to remain virtually the same — minor changes are recommended in environmental studies, history and geography, to make them more relevant to Bophuthatswana's situation (page 35 paragraph 6.2.5). The syllabus of the middle school (standard 5-7) is to continue the broad, general education started in primary school (grade 1 to standard 4). However, it is seen as vital at this stage to introduce broad areas of differentiation (eg at least one practical subject, broadly technically oriented in urban areas and agriculturally oriented in the rural areas). Development studies is to take the place of geography and history in standard seven — this is basically a course in education for citizenship. Hawes notes that this is typical of curriculum content in countries where education is seen as a path to modernisation, ie at this level education becomes pre-vocational (differentiated) and introduces education for citizenship (development studies).

At all levels the idea of development spirit inherent in the concept of Papagano is stressed. For example:

there has been too much passivity on the part of the pupil — emphasis will more and more have to be on activity, participation, problem solving, individual responsibility — all those issues which are essential to the modernisation of the mind (page 36 paragraph 6.3).

High school (standard 8-10) is seen as a direct preparation for senior certificate or matriculation. Differentiation is again the key to content and as full a range of directions and subjects as possible and relevant are to be included. '... it is from these young people that the skilled manpower, the administrators, the teachers, the political and social leadership must come' (page 42 paragraph 2.2). A main objective of education at secondary level must be to prepare the young person for entry into the adult world and to fit him for participation in society. Again, in contrast to Tanzania:

the school should not look at the past or even at the present for its concept of the kind of adulthood ... rather it must look to an uncertain future in which change has become its chief characteristic ... in educational terms therefore they will need to learn to think, to reason, to make judgements and to apply the scientific method to the facts at their disposal ... above all they will need to learn adaptability and creativity in response to new ideas and new situations ... school must stress the need for an underlying emotional and spiritual stability which comes from Christian faith and ... prepare young people for the world of work (with implications in terms of diversity, differentiation, vocational preparation and guidance).

Education for self-reliance and Papagano both make reference to community and agriculture in the curriculum. Whereas in Tanzania these are the core of the content, in Bophuthatswana their inclusion in the curriculum seems almost incidental. Agriculture is not to be taught as a subject in primary or middle schools 'but positive attitudes towards land, ecology and conservation should be built into the study of such subjects as general science, biology and geography'. Agricultural science should be offered as a subject in the high school only where it is relevant, where there are opportunities for practical work and where a qualified teacher of agriculture is available. Agriculture is thus reserved for tertiary education and is seen in the context of total modernisation where agriculture is looked upon in scientific and cash crop terms rather than a means of subsistence.

Hawes examines language instruction in ten African countries<sup>12</sup> and makes the following points which seem relevant here. Firstly language embodies culture. As such, teaching in mother tongue provides a vital link between home and community education and school education. Secondly, competence in English is seen by parents and pupils as an unquestioned asset for learning and employment. Lastly, some subjects, especially mathematics and science, embody western thought patterns and translating them from English to an African language may lead to fundamental misunderstanding.

In looking at the curriculum plans for Tanzania and Bophuthatswana, the former's choice of instruction in Swahili and the latter's choice of instruction in English from standard three, reflect directly the purposes of their education system, ie in the former the child is educated to fit into the existing community and in the latter education is seen as the means of entering the modern, industrial and technical world. In Bophuthatswana's case this is further enhanced by the inclusion of Afrikaans — modernisation is seen to be linked with a continued relationship with South Africa.

The last area selected for discussion is that of examinations. In Tanzania's case: 'There is no reason why we should not combine an examination, which is based on the things we teach, with a teacher pupil assessment of the work done for the school and community. This would be more appropriate for selecting entrants for secondary schools than the present, purely academic, procedure'<sup>13</sup>.

In the case of Bophuthatswana the new examination system is as follows:

Primary school: Standard 4 Examination:

An objective, economical and easily applied evaluation of basic literacy and numeracy which will provide (a) a certificate

of fundamental competency for those leaving school at this stage, and (b) a test of readiness to go on to the next stage for those proceeding to the middle school.

Middle School: Standard 7 examination:

This would be limited to a basic test in competency in the languages, mathematics, general science and development studies, which would provide (a) a school leaving qualification for those going no further and seeking work, (b) a basic requirement for admission to high school, and (c) the basic admission requirement for further full-time vocational training in the trades and other practical directions.

High school: Standard 10 examination:

It is recommended that the Senior Certificate/Matriculation examination of the Joint Matriculation Board of RSA be adopted as the final examination at the end of High School...<sup>14</sup>

This heavy certification and academic orientation must be seen in connection with the employment framework envisaged, ie there is a direct relationship between such an approach to examinations and the job market.

The aims of educational change in Bophuthatswana are thus the expansion of education at all levels, the modernisation (from traditional, inferior, to Western, superior) of people through education, the meeting of manpower needs which the process of modernisation will create, and attempt at relevance (by emphasising black rather than white culture in history, geography and development studies). In Tanzania expansion is confined to primary education, socialism or African Humanism replaces modernisation and relevance is seen as total self-reliance in the context of an agricultural destiny. In the former the forces bringing about change are largely economic, in the latter they are political.

Papagano must be seen

... as an attempt to formulate the kind of education that would complement that of the wider South African system. The planners envisage no radical social engineering — no attempt has been made to change the system from that of the traditional white model. What is perhaps envisaged is a more efficient and successful way of linking the systems than hitherto (eg the phasing in of stages of compulsory education and the identification at all stages with South African standards of competence and quality etc).

Perhaps too it should be seen as the kind of system that will perpetuate the

present system of black leadership by providing the civil servants and administrators to staff the homeland bureaucracy<sup>15</sup>.

One may detect a critical tone in the above quotation — criticism based on the conservatism of the proposals in Papagano and their likelihood of perpetuating the status quo. The direction of the proposals may however be considered fairly realistic. As Foster's view<sup>16</sup> implies:

- a Bophuthatswana is already involved in an exchange economy and the growth of urban areas — the provision of education is highly correlated with these and other indices of modernisation.
- b It must be conceded that a major function of schools in developing countries is the selection, allocation and recruitment of people for the supply of upper and middle level technical and administrative positions. Poor African states with large population growth rates have to survive by maximising educational returns. Such maximisation often implies that the gap between lead and laggard segments of African populations must temporarily become greater as development proceeds.
- c It is all very well to speak of the development of newly adopted curricula, but, for the masses, traditional offerings still constitute what they believe to be synonymous with education, and innovation is still regarded with suspicion. Western traditional schools, typical of the South African system of education, stress the notion of individualism and competitive effort. African parents, because of their exposure to this type of education, endorse it and see schools as the instrument of individual opportunity, the way to a better life and better standards of living.

In the light of these considerations, such conservatism is more likely to succeed, whereas the radical attitudinal changes essential for the success of a proposal like 'Education for Self-reliance' are more likely to fail.

Conservatism cannot of course be equated with success. The ultimate success of Papagano must depend on its manner of development and dissemination as much as its content. The problems inherent in the central-periphery model of curriculum development on which it is based have already been articulated. Ultimately such problems lead to gaps between central plans and local realities. In Bophuthatswana's case this can only be enhanced by her fragmented geography. Fortunately Papagano is a tentative statement of intent and recommendation rather than a fully fledged attempt at educational planning. Elements of decentralisation can thus be introduced, infrastructure technology development taken into account, a more cautious assessment of the possibilities of rapid development and modernisation made, educational alternatives can be

tried and experiments performed. Overall the gap between central plans and local realities can be narrowed if the teacher is asked to do a manageable job within his intellectual capacity (to give him confidence), if the teacher is given support and practical advice and if short-term goals are identified which seem worth teaching (to gain the genuine interest and enthusiasm of the teacher)<sup>17</sup>.

#### NOTES

- 1 F E Auerbach *Measuring Educational Development in South Africa*, Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1979.
- 2 H Hawes *Curriculum and Reality in African Primary Schools*, London: Longman, 1979.
- 3 B McDonald and R Walker *Changing the Curriculum*, London: Open Books, 1976.
- 4 J Ruddock and P Kelly *The Dissemination of Curriculum Development*, London, NFER 1976.
- 5 Hawes *op cit*.
- 6 *Education for Papagano*, Report of the National Commission of Education, Republic of Bophuthatswana, 1978.
- 7 Ros Jaff 'Education for Papagano' in *Perspectives in Education* Vol 5, No 1, March 1981.
- 8 Jaff *op cit*.
- 9 Hawes *op cit*.
- 10 J K Nyerere *Education for self-reliance* Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1967.
- 11 In connection with the reduction of élitism.
- 12 Hawes *op cit*.
- 13 Nyerere *op cit* p 16.
- 14 *Education for Papagano op cit* p 25.
- 15 Jaff *op cit* p 25.
- 16 P Foster 'Education for self-reliance: a critical review' in R Jolly (ed) *Education in Africa*, London: Heinemann, 1969.
- 17 Hawes *op cit*.

## Notices

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- 1 This is the first issue of *Perspectives in Education* to be typeset, and from Volume 7 Number 2 it is to be a refereed journal.

Volume 7 Number 1 (this issue) has been sent complimentary to some readers but from the next issue we can no longer send the journal to those who have not subscribed. Address all correspondence about subscriptions to:

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- 2 Sheila Schlesinger has left South Africa and we would like to record our thanks to her for serving on the Editorial Committee and, particularly, for her management of the distribution of this journal over the past few years.

Shirley Pendlebury has joined the Editorial Committee in place of Sheila Schlesinger.

## List of contributors

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## Information for Contributors

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The Editors will welcome contributions in the form of comments on local events or questions, original articles, discussion of articles published in previous issues, reviews, items for the 'Notices' section, and so on.

Contributions should be sent to:

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Contributions should not ordinarily exceed 3 000 words in length, and should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double spaced, with ample margins. Three complete copies should be submitted. Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is explicitly requested.

There is to be no separate 'Bibliography'. References should be kept to a minimum. All notes (which includes 'footnotes' and references) are to be numbered consecutively in the text (in Arabic numerals, in parenthesis, on the line of the text), and should be listed at the end of the article, as 'Notes'. Titles of papers or chapters cited are to be enclosed in quotation marks; titles of books are to be underlined. Examples:

### NOTES

- 1 Carole Pateman *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- 2 PF Strawson 'Freedom and Resentment' in *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays*, London: Methuen, 1974, pp 15-23.
- 3 L Althusser 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in B J Cosin (ed) *Education, Structure and Society*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, see p 81.

Substantial quotations (more than about 3 lines) should be indented. shorter quotations should be enclosed in single quotation marks. Omissions from a quotation should be indicated by three dots.