

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. I confirm that an external editor was not used. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the Development Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. None of the present work has been submitted previously for any degree or examination in any other University.

The Emergence of Widespread Violence and Murders of Human Rights Defenders in the South Pacific Boundary of Colombia

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPJ - Committee to Protect Journalists

HRDs - Human rights defenders

IMF - International Monetary Fund

EPL - Ejército Popular de Liberación (English: People's Liberation Army)

M-19- Movimiento 19 de Abril (English: 19th of April Movement)

ODA - Official Development Assistance

UP - Unión Patriótica (English: Patriotic Union)

RWB - Reporters Without Borders

PRT - Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (English: Revolutionary Workers' Party)

FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (English: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

AUC - Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (English: Self-Defense United Forces of Colombia)

SAR - South African Republic

US - United States

URLs - Uniform Resource Locators

UBN - Unsatisfied Basic Needs

WB - World Bank

Introduction

Colombia's economic growth and the peace agreement signed in 2016 have generated wide interest in the international community. Two decades ago, this country faced the possibility of becoming a failed state (Chang, 2015). The current situation is significantly different. According to the figures of the World Bank Open Data (2017), the homicide rate has continuously been reduced since 2002. Furthermore, the size of Colombia's gross domestic product in its local currency unit has grown 512% since 1999 (see Appendix A. Chart 1: Homicide Rate & GDP Growth in Colombia). The international community has also received with interest the peace agreement reached between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian national government. The Security Council of the United Nations (2017, November 30) declared: "The peace process in Colombia has aroused great hopes and expectations throughout the world and continues to inspire those who seek to end conflicts elsewhere". In the same sense, The Economist magazine (2016, December 24) chose Colombia as its country of the year due to "this colossal achievement".

This enthusiasm for the political and economic changes in Colombia contrasts with the concerns that have arisen due to the increasing selective violence against human rights defenders (HRDs). In 1999, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 53/144 on HRDs. The resolution is based on internationally recognised human rights and principles. It declares: "the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (UNGA, 1999, p. 1). According to CINEP et al. (2018), the association as HRDs frame particular activities performed but also the recognition that these activities receive from the communities. This population is responsible for promoting the development of the communities, harmonising the organisation of the territory and building bridges between the state and the communities. In this sense, the UN Assistant Secretary-General reported in October of 2017 that "these attacks threaten the long-term stability that Colombia so desperately needs" (2017, October 9). Similarly, during the meeting of the United Nations Security Council held in New York on January 23, 2019, "the members of the Security Council reiterated their serious concern about the persistent pattern of assassinations of community and social leaders" (UNSC, 2019, January 23).

The homicide rates of HRDs seem to highlight weaknesses of the development trajectory of this South American state. In 2018, Colombia was the country with the highest number of murders of HRDs in the world (Frontline Annual Report, 2019). Since the signing of the peace agreement, there were 257 murders of HRDs (information compiled between November 2016 and July 2018) (CINEP *et al.*, 2018). The leaders of the indigenous and black communities were victims of 21% of these events of political violence. The information presented by CINEP *et al.* (2018) also reveals that 30% of these deaths occurred in the South Pacific region. Tumaco occupied the first position and Buenaventura the third position in the homicide ranking of social leaders. These places are the principal cities of the South Pacific region. This region has registered high levels of violence and the presence of diverse types of armed actors. The armed conflict in this territory has been framed by factors such as the occupation and dispossession of territories, illegal non-artisanal mining, and the forced eradication of illicit crops through aerial fumigation, among other issues (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia 2016a).

Before the beginning of the 21st century, the South Pacific region was considered a haven of peace (Agudelo, 2001). The 1990s was the gateway period for the entry of a harsh humanitarian situation in this territory. In that decade, the Colombian inhabitants experienced a complicated political situation. The birth of the Political Constitution of 1991 escalated the expectations about the role of the state. The constitutional recognition of Colombia as a multicultural and multi-ethnic nation was understood as an oath of well-being for the cultural groups of this Republic (Agudelo, 2001, Oslender, 2009; Pardo, 1999; Restrepo 2001, 2002). Also, this was a period in which the frontal war against the powerful Colombian cartels allowed the military and economic strengthening of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups. These armed groups became important military structures. They controlled different areas of the national territory. The war against drug cartels spawned a new generation of less powerful "mini-cartels". They sought guerrillas and paramilitaries to protect their narcotics operations (Agudelo, 2001). But, in the South Pacific region, the appearance of confrontation between the national army, the guerrilla and the paramilitaries, was delayed compared to other areas of the country (Agudelo, 2001; Hoffman, 2007). Although at present, the rates of generalised violence have decreased notably in different territories of Colombia, this is not the case in the South Pacific region.

Currently, the concern over the increase in homicides against HRDs has created a debate between the government, state institutions, civil society organisations, the media, humanitarian agencies, and international organisations. The ongoing discussion on this social phenomenon of violence has centred on questions of who is responsible for these murders and the systematic nature of these crimes (Ball, Rodriguez, & Rozo, 2018; CINEP *et al.*, 2018; INDEPAZ, 2018). The discussions on the systematic nature of this phenomenon involve logics of the judiciary system to highlight the possible existence of crimes against humanity. According to CINEP *et al.* (2018), the typology of these crimes focuses on two requirements: a generalised and systematic attack against a population and the existence of a preconceived plan. These types of attacks are based on a policy or strategy of a particular organisation or state. The predominant rationality of the studies that have addressed the attacks on HRDs employ approaches to violence based on the rational-choice theory (Ball, Rodriguez, & Rozo, 2018; INDEPAZ, 2018; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2017, 2018; We are Defenders report, 2018) and the research agenda promoted by the dominant institutions of development (Bensted, 2011; Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014; Stein, 2008). Therefore, these investigations do not clearly consider the development environment that frames these events of violence and the appearance of armed struggles in particular regions.

The approach of cultural pluralism takes into account the historical dynamics behind the scenarios in which the problems of development and conflict take place. The importance of this conceptual framework for this research relies on the possibilities it offers to locate how historical competitions for power create territorial boundaries where the political, social and economic development is delayed, and armed confrontations erupt (Tajudee, 2015; Dodeye, 2015). In cultural pluralism, both roles of the state and the identity are crucial to explaining problems related to the complex political and social environments vulnerable to the phenomenon of violence (Toffolo, 2003). The role of the state explains the political dynamics of why the institutions of the state support particular groups while disallowing others. The notion of identity provides a typology of cultural groups that frame competition for power. Through the concept of cultural entrepreneurs (Young, 1979, 1982), this theoretical framework also allows us to address the role of HRDs. Cultural entrepreneurs are not only responsible for expanding the resources of solidarity within a community, but also for articulating its shared history and traditions, with factors of social mobilisation towards political power. Therefore, this theory is interesting to

understand the development scenario in which the armed conflict and the murders of HRDs thrive.

This research focus on exploring the historical dynamics of the competition for power that framed this boundary of Colombia, in which not only armed groups and illicit economies flourished, but also the murders of HRDs.

This research scope covers the South Pacific boundary of Colombia. The selected territory is composed of three subregions: The Departments of Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca (see Appendix B: Map 1). The South Pacific region is located on the border between the Andes mountain range and the Pacific Ocean (see Appendix C: Map 2). The territories of the South Pacific region share a geomorphological environment called the Pacific basin. Dense humid, tropical rainforests cover the Pacific basin. This is the largest rain forest on the Pacific border of South America. In this territory is concentrated the world's highest levels of precipitation and 10% of the biodiversity of the planet. The region is populated predominantly by black people (descendants of African slaves who were transferred at the time of the colony to work in gold mines). The total population is 898.624 people; blacks make up 64% of the people, "mestizos" account for 34% and indigenous people for 2% (see Appendix D: Chart 2). The biodiversity richness of the area contrasts with the fact that their communities experience the highest level of unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) and poverty in Colombia. In contrast to the main cities of the country (Bogotá, Medellin and Cali) where the average of UBN is 10.7%, in the South Pacific region it is 64%. Approximately 64% of the population does not have public sewerage service, 62% do not have access to potable water, 95% do not have a formal job, and the multidimensional poverty index is 80%. (Escobar 2003; Galvis, L., Moyano, L., & Alba, C., 2016; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016a).

The analysis contains five chapters. I start by discussing the predominant rationality of the studies and humanitarian reports that have addressed the attacks on HRDs. This first chapter also refers to the nuclear concepts of Crawford Young's theoretical framework, called Politics of Cultural Pluralism. This approach provides a consistent structure for the investigation of identity vectors and social patterns that are involved in the process of social conflict and state-building. Then, I use the cultural pluralism approach to provide a historical explanation of the social

conflicts in the Pacific region between 1572 and 1818. This second chapter analyses the sovereignty of the colonial state in this territory. In the third chapter, I explore the political scenario in which the violence began to grow between 1819 and 1990. It centres on understanding the type of development created by the elites of the postcolonial in the region. Afterwards, I employ the cultural pluralism framework to understand why the 1990s was the period that allowed the entrance of the armed conflict and the murder of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia. This fourth chapter centres on exploring features related to the vulnerability of armed conflict that experienced in this particular boundary. In the fifth chapter, I present the findings and discussions. This final chapter explores how the analysis of the marginalisation and the causes of the armed conflict assist in framing the perspective of how these acts of selective murders took place in the territorial scope of the present study in the 2000s. Finally, I present some ideas as conclusions.

Problem Statement

The high murder rates of HRDS have raised concerns about the long-term stability of Colombia's development trajectory. The humanitarian literature that addresses these violent events has spotlighted explanations around the regional presence of the armed actors, possibly responsible for these murders. Nevertheless, this literature does not shed light on how the characteristics of development in these territories, have influenced not only the emergence and maintenance of armed confrontation but also the murders of HRDs. In the predominant humanitarian literature of Latin America, the political dynamics of colonialism and modernity are perceived as radically different (Almario, 2009). This perception does not allow us to comprehend cultural controls and the trajectories of power that overlap in the emergence of widespread violence in the South Pacific region of Colombia and the murders of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs). The humanitarian literature is dominated by a research agenda which assumes that facts by themselves describe the realities behind the problems of violence and development (Bensted, 2011; Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014; Stein, 2008). The theory of Collier ignores issues related to the causes, dynamics and meanings of the complex political and social environments in which armed struggles thrive (Williams, 2015).

The humanitarian literature indeed reveals at the grassroots level the functioning of the armed groups and the economic interests involved in the selective murders and the confrontation that is taking place in the South Pacific region of Colombia. However, the persistence of the conflict, even though different armed groups have disappeared, links the territorial development with the phenomenon of violence.

The purpose of this research is to apply the framework of cultural pluralism to understand the incursion of the armed conflict into the South Pacific region of Colombia between 2001 and 2010. This research also attempts to explore how the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights creates a contradiction with the legal and illegal armed groups that are present in this territory.

Main Research Question

- How does the marginalisation of the South Pacific boundary of Colombia contribute to the emergence of widespread violence and murders of HRDs in the 2000s?

Sub questions

- How does the cultural pluralism framework explain the emergence of widespread violence and the murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s?
- Why does the widespread violence and murders of HRDs erupt at a particular historical point in the South Pacific Region of Colombia?
- How does the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights create a contradiction with the legal and illegal armed groups that were present in this territory in the 2000s?

Methodology

This study explores the existing literature on the subject of violence and development in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The study uses desk research for reviewing secondary analyses and gathering historical trends and facts identified in existing literature, which support the basis of the analysed data in response to the research questions of this study. Janet Heaton (2008, p. 15), states that “secondary analysis can be used for two main purposes: it can be used

to investigate new or additional research questions; alternatively, it can be used to verify the findings of previous researches”. Thus, this report follows a process of research that comprises tasks of review, classification and synthesis of relevant material to address the problem of investigation.

The primary data that form the basis of the following discussion are academic literature, humanitarian reports, policy papers, cartographies, databases on political violence and the national media of Colombia. The information was collected internally through the use of library documents and externally through scholarly online databases such as Jstor, Ebsco Host and ProQuest, among others. Besides, it was requested to Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, the historical archive of the risk reports issued for the coastal populations of the Departments of Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca.

This study is based on a methodological design, where the analysis of the data involves the use of qualitative methods to select the central secondary sources. The methodological design of this study included a data collection process that aims to highlight the crucial and historical role that Colombia’s nation-state played in the promotion of the armed conflict and the murders of HRDs that emerged in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. Christopher Lamont (2015) refers to qualitative methods as strategies for the analysis and collection of data that are not based on numerical data only. In this study, the sources selected are coded and collected in line with the research questions and a list of themes defined in the conceptual framework of this research design. Ran Greenstein, Benjamin Roberts, and Ari Sitas (2003, p. 50) states that “qualitative research is oriented towards studying processes over time rather than outcomes”. Therefore, this study used a qualitative method to analyse and interpret critical historical dynamics of development that were identified in the sources, following the logic of the methodological design that addressed the main research question and the three sub-questions.

Firstly, the design contemplates the reproduction of a conceptual framework that tends to create categories of analysis to frame and delimit the complexity of the phenomenon of violence in the Pacific boundary. The conceptual framework in which is based this case study is also known as “border theory” (Toffolo, 2003). The main categories forming the basis of the following analysis are the exploration of cultural markers, legacies of the colonial state, homogenisation projects,

processes of social mobilisation, melting pot metaphors, and suppression of minorities, the state-building process, the state power distribution and the role of discourses (Toffolo, 2003). In this sense, this research focuses on identifying these main categories through the exploration of historical dynamics in the South Pacific region. The political analysis of colonialism and modernity allowed the study of cultural controls and power trajectories that overlapped to explain the course of violence in this territory (Almaro, 2004, 2009; Hoffman, 1997, 2002, 2007; Tajudeen, 2015; Toffolo, 2003; Young, 1979, 1982, 2004).

Secondly, the methodological design involves characterising how the nation-state framed the South boundary of Colombia. In this part, the study focuses on exploring how the nation-state created an environment of vulnerability that explains the causes of the armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia. Greenstein *et al.* (2003) argue that qualitative research reports give the reader a sense of the social environment. Hence, the characterisation that is presented in this methodological design is based on the main categories of the cultural pluralism framework to forge a prospective analysis of history. Through this structuralist conceptual framework, the analysed information seeks to establish which groups are located on the boundary, how the power operates at the South Pacific territory and the nature of the space that separates the social groups. The information explored also attempts to understand how and why the South Pacific boundary is maintained (Toffolo, 2003). Thus, the analysis of this case study takes into consideration the types of cultural differentiation and the dichotomy between modernity and traditions prevalent in this territory (Toffolo, 2003).

Thirdly, the design incorporates a discussion of the facts put forward by the humanitarian literature in relation to the dynamics of power and the three demographic sectors identified through the cultural pluralism framework. This discussion forms the basis of the data analysed to structure scenarios of development that assist in explaining why the armed conflict and the murders of HRDS occurred in this territory of Colombia in the 2000s. Heaton (2008) argues that the secondary source analysis in qualitative research points out variances in the epistemological roots of qualitative research, and across different backgrounds of inquiries. In this third part, although the main data forming the basis of this discussion are humanitarian reports, the section that concerns the social demographic groups involves mainly interviews conducted with HRDs, civil authorities, commanders of the national army and fieldwork observations that were included

in the humanitarian literature studied (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c).

Fourthly, the methodological design comprises framing a perspective of how the nature of the historical dynamics of development led by the nation-state assisted in creating environments conducive to the violence that arose against HRDs of this boundary in the 2000s. The fourth part focuses on analysing the relationship between the events of violence against the population that is the object of this study and the three social sectors regarded in the previous part of this methodological design. In the final part of this design, the analysis of this relationship is carried out in two sections.

In the first section, this study highlights common aspects within the identified sample of cases of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. The murder cases of this sample are included in a database (see Appendices Q and R). Twenty-one cases of political homicides constitute the database. The selection of the population classified as HRDs was reached mainly, exploring the list of victims of socio-political violence in Colombia that was developed by the Colombian Commission of Jurists (2004, 2008, 2012). The cases of murders selected were based on commonalities that were explored, following postulates of the pattern of a cultural entrepreneur identified by Young (1979, 1982), the definition of 'community leader' developed by CINEP *et al.* (2018), and the Resolution 53/144 of 1999 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (see Introduction).

The role of the database of murders of HRDs is to provide the primary data that forms the basis of the following analysis of the period in which the violence proliferated in this boundary of Colombia. The 21 cases included in the database contain variables that indicate the type of leader, the location and date of the murder, and the possible culprit for the crime (Appendix Q. Database A. Sample of Murders of HRDs which occurred in the South Pacific region of Colombia between 1997 and the 2000s). The database also includes Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) that specify the location of sources consulted that support the selection of each of the murder cases (Appendix R. Database B. URLs of the Sources Consulted).

In the second section, this study attempts to highlight how the state plays a central role in understanding this phenomenon of political violence against HRDs in the South Pacific region.

In this section, the methodological design takes involves characterising three scenarios that build the perspective of how the nature of the historical dynamics of development led by the nation-state assisted in creating environments conducive to the violence that arose against HRDs of this boundary in the 2000s. The common aspects identified through the sample of murder cases are the primary guides that led to exploration that characterises the three scenarios. The analysis of the scenario that concerns the central perspective of this study also involved the use of the findings of the case study of "Vulnerabilities and Threats to the Human Rights of the People and Communities" carried out by the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman's Office of Colombia (2014b).

Methodological Limitations and Ethical Issues

This study has limitations to explain the economic rationality in this armed conflict. The study's aim is not to solve methodological problems associated with the structural analysis of the cultural pluralism framework. William (2015) asserts that although the cultural pluralism framework explains the macro-level processes, it experiences difficulties to justify what is happening at the grassroots level. The economic rationalities accurately analyse processes of the calculation of costs and benefits made by the armed groups involved in this armed confrontation.

The study also had limitations due to the time, distance and costs of moving to the South Pacific region of Colombia. These limitations produced difficulties to identify the possible permeability factors that could exist between the different categories that involve this conceptual framework and to establish empirical research that assists in demonstrating the operability of this methodological design based on Young's theoretical approach.

Therefore, the study does not involve ethical risk issues, as it is done with secondary written sources only.

First Chapter: Literature Review and Theoretical framework

1.1 Literature Review

The section draws attention to the development notion supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the theory of Paul Collier, and the cultural pluralism framework. Firstly, I state that the link between violence against HRDs, armed conflicts and development has not been sufficiently considered in the field of Development Studies. Secondly, I analyse the relevance of the phenomenon of violence in the analyses of the primary institutions of development. Thirdly, I explore the notion of development supported by the WB and the IMF and how Collier's theory fit in this development notion. Fourthly, I review the limitations of the development notion promoted by the international donor community and Collier's approach to addressing the research question. Fifthly, I suggest that the cultural pluralism framework is a useful approach to understand the development environment in which emerged the violent struggles and the murders of HRDs in the South Pacific boundary. Sixthly, I analyse the humanitarian reports that account for the violence against HRDs and the armed conflict in this territory of Colombia. Finally, I seek the advantages of the academic literature of the South Pacific region to employ the cultural pluralism framework.

The homicides against HRDs in the context of armed conflicts are events related to the phenomenon of violence that have not been analysed entirely in the field of Development Studies. Most of the identified academic literature focuses on risks associated with the work of defending human rights. The risks studied analyse factors such as the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the different types of security strategies used to protect the life and integrity of HRDs (Wiseberg, 1991); debates on international arenas around national and international regulations and their practical scope to effectively protect these populations (Landman 2006); psychological effects and social and material challenges faced by HRDs (Roy-Grégoire & Hamilton, 2016); psychological aspects of how is forged the personal identity of the people who uphold human rights (Ansolabehere & Vázquez, 2017). However, the development environment that frame these events of violence have not been clearly studied in the academic literature reviewed.

Traditionally, the problems of violence were treated as second category issues in the analysis of the dominant institutions of development (North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2013; World Bank, 2011). However, the states that face repeated cycles of criminal and political violence are clearly laggard, their economic growth is in danger and their human development indicators have stagnated. Internal armed conflicts and civil wars are responsible for countless complex humanitarian situations. Civil organizations and international systems of states since the end of the Second World War, have consistently led actions to counteract these forms of violence. From analysis and interventions to avoid internal conflicts and civil wars, lessons have been learned about the complexity of this phenomenon. Some of the factors related to internal conflicts and post-conflict phases are repeated cycles of violence, problems of governance and political stability (World Bank, 2011). The lessons learned suggest that: firstly, conflicts are not isolated and can prolong over time or repeat after brief periods of peace. Secondly, forms of conflict and violence can threaten the national development. Also, the countries that have contracted peace agreements, have subsequently struggled with high rates of crime and violence. This could compromise the developmental expectancies of these states, interfering with the stability of these peace agreements. Thirdly, different forms of violence reflect relationships between criminal organisations, armed groups, political movements, private companies and state security forces. Fourthly, the "lack of progress" is a severe risk of triggering the conflict again (World Bank, 2011).

Although violence was treated as a second category issue, this phenomenon has progressively captured the attention of development institutions. Currently, armed conflicts are considered a critical cause of underdevelopment and perpetuation of poverty (Murshed & Zulfan, 2009). For the dominant institutions of development, the existence of violent confrontations displays failed political systems that cannot perform essential governmental functions (De Zeeuw, 2001). In this sense, the 2011 World Development Report states that legitimate institutions and government systems (good governance) are essential to deal with cycles of violence and guarantee citizen security, justice and employment (World Bank 2011). This approach to development is based on a global logic in which modern, Western, "Weberian" state institutions are ideal models to be adopted by developing states (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016). The preponderance of this theory of modernity and development is grounded on:

Weber's study of the role of Puritan asceticism in the rise of Western capitalism was read by American scholars as a thesis on the rise of capitalism on the basis of Protestant values, which gave the American brand of capitalism—if not the 'American dream' as such—a new legitimization vis-à-vis its Marxist critique (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016, p. 1471).

The international donor community is dominated by a development assumption that supports a theoretical agenda led by institutions such as the WB and the IMF. Howard Stein (2008) states that within the WB and the IMF, there is a dominant influence of neoclassical trained economists. The neoclassical theory is related to individualistic logics, where there is not only rational and predictable behaviour (based on market forces) but also a set of predetermined rules. Stein (2008) also argues that the neoclassical theory is linked to five subcomponents: homo-economicus, methodological individualism, acceptance of equilibrium as a natural state, rational deduction and axiomatic reasoning. The development perspective of the WB and the IMF is intolerant of other alternative justifications (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014; Stein, 2008). Thus, the dominant notion of development is “rigid adherence to the deductive and formal methods of mainstream neoclassical economics which, supposedly, only need to be applied to specific fields among them economic development” (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014, p. 4).

The recommendations of Collier to deal with armed conflicts have been supported by institutional agendas of the WB and the IMF (Bensted, 2011). The literature of the 1990s focused mainly on the hypothesis of opportunism (greed) against injustices (grievances) for the explanation of armed conflicts (Galido, Restrepo, & Sánchez, 2008). Collier's interpretations of greed place emphasis on the role of rent extractions as a necessary condition for the viability of conflicts. According to this point of view, the armed confrontations reflect the competition to control the rents of natural resource extractions. The followers of Collier suggest that the best way to deal with armed conflict is to fight more with the incentives associated with greed, rather than with development (Galido *et al.*, 2008). Collier's analyses are based on the rational-choice theory and on the understanding that all human beings behave like a homo-economicus. This approach assumes that the factors that influence the potential behaviour of an actor are measurable (Bensted, 2011). Thus, Collier's recommendations to address violent confrontation in developing countries fit tightly with the notion of development promoted by the WB and the IMF.

In Collier's analyses, the social narratives about inequality, lack of democracy and ethnic divisions are not a causal factor of the conflicts. Collier (1998, 2004 in, Galido *et al.*, 2008) points out that greed, instead of the injustices generated by poverty, are the factors that explain the causality of violent conflict. The supporters of this explanation argue that there is no direct link between the armed struggles and the political, social and economic exclusion. This approach focuses mainly on how internal armed conflicts interrupt the development and perpetuate poverty. In this sense, Collier and his associates (2003 in, Galido, Restrepo, & Sánchez, 2008) highlight the role of the "poverty trap". The concept of the trap focuses on how war not only destroys lives and human capital but also deteriorates social values, economic conditions and social services of the state, among other issues (Galido *et al.*, 2008; Murshed & Zulfan, 2009).

The approach promoted by the WB and the IMF does not seem useful in understanding the outbreak of violence and murders of HRDs (at a particular time in history) in the South Pacific region. The notion of development sponsored by the international donor community assumes that the facts themselves describe the realities behind the problems of development and violence. The followers of this interpretation do not take seriously the detail that politics necessarily operate in an ideological world where the options are strategic and relative, not unequivocal and absolute (Toffolo, 2003). On the other hand, the analyses developed by Colliers do not take into account the historical conditions that forge the outbreaks of violence. Dodeye U. Williams (2015) asserts that Collier ignores the structural, economic and political processes in which armed confrontations erupt. The recommendations of Collier for the resolution of armed conflicts also have a limited focus on both roles of the state and of identity. Williams (2015) exposes the structural failures of the economist theory of violence that Collier situated in a dominant position in scholarly debates of the 1990s and 2000s. These failures establish limits to clarify and provide effective strategies for prevention, intervention and peace resolution. Collier's theory is fragile in explaining issues related to the causes, dynamics and meanings of the complex political and social environments in which armed struggles thrive. In this sense, Cris Toffolo (2003) encourages us to emancipate ourselves from the bureaucratic theories of politics and the formal and deductive methods of neoclassical economics.

The framework of cultural pluralism is more useful than Collier's explanations for understanding the scenario in which the systematic nature of the armed conflict and the murders of HRDs take

place. The cultural pluralism framework moves out from the theoretical orbit of the dominant institutions of development. This approach has a conceptual framework that rejects the assumption of development institutions in the sense that the state is neutral, hence, able to play a role of a mediator vis-à-vis of cultural conflicts (Toffolo, 2003). In the cultural pluralism framework, the states often acquire a cultural identity by addressing their concerns about the fragmentation of power and defining who their allies are. Toffolo (2003) argues that in this theory the state plays a crucial role in the promotion of armed confrontations because of its functions in connecting the international security concerns with the national cultural environments. This approach analyses how the state discourses support particular cultural groups while disallowing others. The internal logic of social discourses is what drives the construction of identity between individuals within specific social groups (Williams, 2015). Thus, the framework of cultural pluralism faces the paradigm of modernisation and its assumption that a homogenous and unified nation-state system is essential to build a modern solid state.

The framework of cultural pluralism resonates with a branch of the structuralism research (Toffolo, 2003). In this approach, social categories are not natural, inevitable or invariable because they are not in the genes. Toffolo (2003) states that cultural pluralism is rooted in an epistemology where the social and cultural definition of the human can be linked to a reconverted vision of the rational. This epistemology addresses the continued existence not only of cultural identities but also of intercultural relations.

In the framework of cultural pluralism, the interpretation of historical events is fundamental for the analysis of the phenomena of conflict and development. The historical dynamics show how the interests of actors and political processes interact to create an environment conducive to violence (Williams, 2015). Epistemologically, the historical exploration of events, confrontations and negotiations allow for characterisation of the political practices of the state (Tajudeen, 2015). Through historical analysis, this approach allows us to identify constructed master cleavages in particular societies, narratives of political entrepreneurs, and control mechanisms used by dominant social groups in the colonial and postcolonial phases. This conceptual framework also allows us to locate the political problem faced by new states due to the unfulfilled democratic promises made at the time of independence (Toffolo, 2003). In this sense, Salami A. Tajudeen

(2015) highlights the need to understand how historical competitions have forged armed confrontations and have delayed political development and growth in some territories.

The humanitarian aid is a sector within the Official Development Assistance (Patel, Roberts, Guy, Lee-Jones & Conteh, 2009). The humanitarian reports on Colombia addresses information related to the violence against HRDs. The articles written by non-governmental organisations are based on a systematic collection of data that aims to show that there are realities that have not been recognised by the state. Although these documents seek to prove (through deductive methods) the systematic nature of violence against HRDs, the outcomes do not display meaningful explanations of this issue (Ball, Rodriguez, & Rozo, 2018; INDEPAZ, 2018). On the other hand, the reports developed by state institutions and the platforms of grassroots social organisations focus (among other issues) on national and international regulations to protect HRDs and failures related to the security schemes offered to these populations. The latter mentioned reports suppose that the behaviour of the government does not agree with the logic of the Weberian state institutions (Marcha Patriótica, Cumbre Agraria, Indepaz, & Heinrich Böll, 2018; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2017, 2018; We are Defenders report, 2018). Therefore, these humanitarian reports do not shed light on how the development promoted by the nation-state is linked to the outbreak of murders of HRDs.

The humanitarian reports of the armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia have been strongly influenced by the work of Collier. This humanitarian literature focuses on the functioning of armed groups, the economies in the war that support the persistence of the violence in this region, statistical rates of the humanitarian situation (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014), the aerial fumigation and the prime national armed responses of the state to illicit crops and illegal armed groups (Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013). Following notions of Collier's work, the reports on the South Pacific region basically display a dense analysis of the competition between armed groups to control the resources of the illegal economies to explain the viability of the conflict. The complicated humanitarian and poverty situation is understood as a consequence of the violent struggles. This literature does not significantly address the role of the state in the promotion of violence in this Colombian territory. Concerning the historical context of violence, the humanitarian documents do not provide inquiry into the previous periods of the outbreak (CODHES, 2013, Human Rights Watch, 2015, 2018, International Humanitarian

Organizations, 2012). Nonetheless, the structural inquiries carried out by the Ombudsman's Office of Colombia (2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c) and the National Centre for Memorial History (2015) contemplate a different analytical approach. These inquiries address historical trajectories and mobilisation processes led by the civilian population (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009). Thereby, most of the humanitarian literature on the South Pacific region responds to the guidelines of the theoretical agendas promoted by the dominant institutions of development.

In contrast to the explanatory logic of the humanitarian reports, the academic literature on the Pacific region has allowed for the identification of reasons why the political, economic and social development has been delayed in this territory and why violence has arisen. The relevance of this academic literature accounts for the following aspects: Firstly, it examines the history of this territory to comprehend its current socio-spatial configuration (Aprile-Ginset, 2004; West, 1957). Secondly, the literature explores how the governance practised by the Spanish colonial state contributed to framing this boundary (Almario, 2009; Guevera, 2014). Thirdly, these academic works explore the sovereignty developed by the independent state and the political relevance of the communities of this territory at the national level (Burgos, 2003, González, 2015). Fourthly, anthropological scholars have analysed how development worked not only to forge a scenario of cultural contestation and identity construction but also to explore how social mobilisation emerged (Agudelo, 2001, Friedman and Arocha, 1986, Hoffman, 1997, 2002, 2007; Wade, 2009). Fifthly, publications that address the geographic transformation of the war in Colombia and its connotations in this marginal territory of Colombia have emerged (Oslender, 2009; Villa, 2004). Finally, some academic publications on the South Pacific region employ cultural pluralism to explain the complexities of the social and political development in this area (Almario, 2009, Hoffman, 1997, 2002, 2007, Pardo, 1998, Restrepo, 2001, 2002, Wade, 2009).

Overall, the literature review explored the dominant notion of development promoted by the WB and the IMF, Collier's theory and the cultural pluralism framework to understand the emergence of an enabling environment for the armed conflict and murders of HRDs. Until now, the reasons behind the killings of HRDs have not sufficiently explored in the field of Development Studies. Similarly, although the causes and consequences of conflicts have progressively received the attention of the dominant institutions of development, the phenomenon of violence has not been at the centre of the thematic agenda of these institutions. The WB and the IMF have privileged a

notion of development rigidly adhered to deductive and formal methods of mainstream neoclassical economics. Collier's analyses, based on the theory of rational choice and on the assumption that human beings behave as homo-economicus, were strongly supported by the central institutions of development. These analyses point out that greed related factors explain the causality of conflict instead of the political, social and economic exclusion. Collier's economist theory of violence reached a dominant position in scholarly debates of the 1990s and 2000s. Likewise, the humanitarian reports have addressed the violence against HRDs and the armed conflict in this region of Colombia. These reports respond to the guidelines of the agenda supported by the international donor community. Collier's theory and the notion of development promoted by the WB and IMF, nevertheless, have underestimated structural hallmarks behind the complex scenarios in which armed struggles thrive. This research suggested that the framework of cultural pluralism is useful to explore the complexities of development that were forged in the South Pacific region before the outbreak of violence. The relevance of this theoretical framework is based on its attention to the role of history, the state and the identity vectors involved in the context of conflicts. Besides, the scholarly literature on the South Pacific territory is useful to employ the cultural pluralism framework. This literature addresses not only historical and geographical factors but also the dynamics of governance and social mobilisation.

In the next section of this chapter, this research develops a conceptual framework to address the research question. This analytical framework is based on the work of Young (1979, 1982, 2004). According to Tajudeen (2015) and Toffolo (2003), Young was responsible for placing cultural pluralism in the academic debate on development and conflict.

1.2. The Cultural Pluralism Framework

Cultural pluralism is the analytical framework that organises this research. It provides a typology of culture which explains the competition for political power. This conceptual framework inquiries into the identity vectors that alter social patterns that are involved in the process of social conflict. Three ideas guide this analytical exploration. Firstly, the notion of the state frames the analysis of plurality. The state provides the boundaries where social groups interact and characterise themselves and other groups. Secondly, the approach relies on the need to identify two or more social groups' interacting. The competition, interaction and conflict among

the social groups define the patterns of political conflicts. Thirdly, the identification of social groups ground on commonalities or affinities shared by individuals belonging to a particular group (Young, 1979).

Identity is a subjective phenomenon. According to Crawford Young, it has the social role of developing awareness and a sense of individual belonging to a given community. This identity awareness originates in a system of common symbols or collective cognitive processes that shape the perception of reality. The interaction processes with "significant others" give shape to identity, in the sense that it makes distinctions between social groups about cultural and physical features (1979). The identity processes are prone not only to develop stereotyped perceptions of social groups but also to set expectations of their behaviour. A crucial feature of cultural identity is that it reveals variations in the intensity of the common consciousness. In other words, "not all cultural segments have the same degree of collective solidarity" (Young 1979, p. 44).

Intensity exposes degrees of cultural mobilisation. The variation of intensity within a cultural group accounts for the density of its internal communication and the ideologization. Within the framework of cultural pluralism, a particular social group forges the strengthening of its ideology through the dissertations of its traditional virtues, singularity and future destiny (Young, 1979). The ideology serves to articulate common history and traditions, with factors of social mobilisation towards political aspirations. Cultural groups take into account their current reality of disadvantage compared to other relevant groups. The emergence of a strong identity intensity depends on cultural entrepreneurs who can expand the resources of solidarity within a community. Thus, in the framework of cultural pluralism, identity has the social role of defining the individual conscience of the members and the collective social response to structural conditions of marginalisation. Young argues that definitions of cultural pluralism are "particularly apt to occur when a group comes to feel itself relatively deprived in relation to other significant reference groups" (1979, p. 39).

Of the types of cultural differentiation within the framework of cultural pluralism, this research addresses as organisational principles, ethnicity and race. In the Pacific region, these principles frame the state based on its colonial legacy. They serve as drivers for social encounter and collective conflict (Young, 1982).

Ethnicity refers to the defining attributes of ethnic commonality that may involve territory, political unit, language, shared cultural values or symbols (Young, 1979). Consciousness is central to defining ethnicity. Ethnic myths refer to symbolic ancestors to understand the ideology of commonality and genealogical awareness. It entails the possibility of achieving strong degrees of consciousness. “The very vocabulary in which ethnicity is articulated is suffused with the intimacy of kinship” (Young 1982, p. 74).

In the transition phases of the state (to be explained later), ethnicity is subject to different connotations. In the postcolonial state, while implementing the nation's construction design, the ruling elites sought to replace the ethnic categories with those based on the nation-state (Young, 1979, 1982). Indeed, national elites avoided using ethnic languages to develop public content. The dominant strata in the state viewed ethnicity with suspicion. They discouraged the development of ethnic associations, which were generally tolerated by the colonial rule. Young argues that “cultural entrepreneurs who use such structures as a base for the elaboration of ethnic ideologies are thereby denied a crucial organisational resource” (1982, p. 84). Thus, politicised ethnicity is a potential threat to the prevailing order. The state machinery (through socialisation agencies such as schools and the media) plays an essential role in spreading the idea of nationality tied to the power structure.

In the current state, the process of "modernisation" has positively affected ethnic (cultural) groups. According to Young (1982), the diffusion of education increases levels of social awareness and, thus, encourages the articulation of cultural groups. He argues that “the extension and intensification of communication networks bring individuals within reach of broader collectivities; thus, an ethnic affiliation that may have been highly localised becomes extended over a broader zone of cultural affinity” (Young 1982, p. 89).

Race is a cultural differentiator based on the legacy of stereotypes and prejudices developed by the Europeans during the expansion of colonial states. This stereotyping process is relevant in maintaining conditions of discrimination and is based on “conspicuous physical differentiation, especially skin pigmentation and facial characteristics” (Young 1979, p. 49). Nonetheless, the racial solidarity in the struggles against the colonial legacy has become a powerful ideology.

In the colonial state, all the inhabitants within the territory acquired a race classification. The racial composition of the territories shaped the geographic subdivisions that were crucial in the institutionalisation of the colonial government. Over time, race categories formed a sense of collective self-consciousness. Social classification reflected a sense of unequal opportunities for mobility of the racial strata (Young, 1979). From this classification emerged a race consciousness that was important in the nationalist response to colonialism and subjugation. The uneven distribution of opportunities gave rise for collective grievances. According to Young, “those groups that suddenly discovered themselves scorned as backwards, and threatened with subordination, mobilised themselves socially and politically to claim their share of the "national cake" (1982, p. 80).

Cultural identity is subject to social change and cultural mobilisation. Firstly, the increase in the exchange network that accompanies the modernisation process intensifies the social competence at both individual and group levels (Young, 1979). Secondly, mobility and status are unevenly distributed within societies. The former refers to objective realities and subjective perceptions. The latter indicates not only the economic criteria but also the symbolic controls of the high social hierarchies. According to Young (1979), "the relative well-being of one group serves as a reference point and aspiration level for another" (p. 99). Thirdly, the main cultural strategies for raising social status are the emulation and awareness of the identity group (Young, 1979). The emulation strategy accounts for situations in which cultural hierarchy patterns are rigid. In this sense, individuals and groups emulate communities with higher ranks to improve their situation. The identity awareness strategy involves conditions where the social hierarchy has weakened. So, social improvement can be perused “by mobilisation of communal identity, reinforcement of differentiation, and [a] culmination of economic, social, and political resources to alter the distribution of advantage” (Young, 1979, pp. 100-101).

1.2.1. The State and its Transition Phases

In the approach of cultural pluralism, the state is an institutional structure superimposed upon the diverse cultural populations of the third world (Young, 1979). It is the “authoritative arena” that defines the space for cultural encounter and conflict. The state addresses two levels. The first level responds to the matrix of institutions through which the rule is implemented. The second

level of the state refers to the dominion of ideology. The ideological domination not only reveals the authority of the dominant group in which the supremacy of the state rests but also how they affirm their legitimacy (Young, 1979, 1982).

Territoriality and sovereignty are two main properties of the state. The first refers to the historical transition in the definition of territorial boundaries where administrative rules are implemented. The second points to the prerogative condition of exercising authority over populations within a delimited geographic space. But Young affirms that absolute sovereignty over a territory "only exists in theory" (1979, p. 68).

For this conceptual framework, the states in the third world experience three transitional phases of conflict and social change. These phases are the colonial state, the independent (postcolonial) state and the contemporary state.

The colonial state system implied a new notion of territoriality and a brutal rupture with pre-established forms of government. It involved the establishment of borders, the military occupation, the restriction of the movement of people, and the institution of a monetary system (Young, 1979, 1982, 2004). The imposition of the colonial system also revealed the existence of communicative arrangements which materialised in the rituals and artefacts of everyday life, such as flags, coins, uniforms, postage stamps and the imposition of official languages (Young, 1982). The rules of the colonial state embodied the imperative of hegemony over the dominated populations, and their character was primarily military. Through the military regulations, the colonial empires imposed their dominion, expanded the dispossession plans and forged extractive economic enclaves. Also, the colonial state largely ignored cultural patterns in the subjugated societies (Young, 1982).

Over time, the colonial state needed new components to incorporate its ideology and external legitimacy. The notion of the "civilising mission" was the ideological apparatus for this aim. The military character of the colonial state was merged with educational systems that included Christian evangelisation and Western culture. These systems supported the establishment of new forms of property rights, the application of contracts and the alienation of the labour of indigenous and Afro communities. Thus, the new ideological apparatus affirmed extractive economies for the "common benefit of civilisation" (Young, 1982).

The colonial state profoundly restructured the pre-colonial patterns of social stratification. Europeans governed the social hierarchy. They assumed dominant roles in government bureaucracy, economic enclaves and evangelistic missions. According to Young (1982), the colonial state (in its early stages) took measures that impeded the access of local elites to the means of wealth accumulation. These measures were aimed at protecting European hegemony over colonial revenues. The colonial state, however, was not able to fully impose its dominance, and several areas were not clearly under its administrative control.

A new class took shape in the shadow of the colonial state. For Young (1982), this class pointed to the locals who connoted their relative proximity to the European world and their distance from the mere 'native' people. The people of this social class used European languages and Western education and religion. They became a crucial subaltern power to achieve political order for the hegemony of the colonial state (Young, 2004). On the other hand, the natives were relegated to the lowest social strata. The racial categories drove the social classification in the colony. The classification involved stereotypes such as "industrious or lazy; valorous or timorous; receptive or antipathetic to the imported culture of the coloniser; faithful allies or rebellious adversaries to colonial authority" (Young 1982, p. 79). The new order provided the conditions for the expansion of the colonial state.

The legacy of the colonial state framed its postcolonial successor in several ways (Young 2004). Young argues that the "colonial states, in truth, were the antithesis of national states [in Europe]; they were alien entities, instrumentalities whose *raison d'être* was domination" (1982, p. 75).

The second phase of conflict and change is the postcolonial state. In this phase, the premise of independence was critical. It contemplates a load of symbolism related to the capacity to free oneself from the subordination exerted by the colonial oppressor. In independence, local-regional communities were articulated through struggles for autonomy. In the postcolonial state, however, there was an intense awareness of the fragility of power. The

National elites struggled to achieve stability in governance. Thus, the new power groups were forced to apply new political formulations for the construction of a unitary state (Young, 1979, 1982).

Nationalism is a socio-political formulation of identity. In the postcolonial state, the notion of the nation was incorporated (Young, 1982). It implied the need to build solidarity based on a new legitimacy and with the task of achieving territorial unity. This process was not the result of a harmonious integration between the plurality of cultural identities within a territory. Instead, it was a process of identity homogenisation around a national project. The identity project of the nation-state system was linked to the cultural frameworks of the dominant elites. The oath of well-being for the citizens of this territory was the discursive foundation of the new legitimacy (Young, 1979, 1982, 2004). The purpose of the nation-state project was to build loyalties toward the leaders of the independence process.

The leaders belonged to cultural groups that were close to the European colonial rulers. They reached a dominant position in the new order (Young, 1982). They achieved rapid empowerment as a state bourgeoisie. The members of these cultural groups were the principal intermediaries in the uneven articulation between the postcolonial state and the industrial world. The coupling of the bourgeois state with the industrialised world offered this social group a privileged position for its empowerment. As a racial category, they obtained a higher status and higher levels. Thus, the type of development of the postcolonial state was related to the positioning of privileged groups (Young, 1982).

The power of the nation-state system was developed as a consequence of three main factors (Young, 1979): Firstly, the escalation in expectations about the role of the state as a provider of public services. Secondly, the increase of the capacities of the state institutions to penetrate the peripheral regions. Nevertheless, Young argues that "in most cases, [these capacities] sharpened the disparity between the state arena and subordinate socio-political zones" (1979, p. 73). Thirdly, the role of the international system that influenced the maintenance of order within the nation-states.

The contemporary state is the last phase. It refers to a scenario where modernisation not only provides the possibility of empowering cultural groups, but also the emergence of new social conflicts. The feasibility of new disputes is a consequence of the competition for political power between different cultural groups. Furthermore, the competition reveals levels of inclusion and exclusion of regions and social groups in the national public agenda. It fosters new patterns of

cultural self-awareness. Thus, certain elites may fear that, through competition, their privileged position in the state will be affected (Young, 1982).

In the current state, four economic sectors that are useful for understanding violence in the Colombian Pacific region may appear. Young (1982) argues that the people who participate in these four sectors share a weak collective consciousness.

The “informal sector” represents a large proportion of the urban population in many cities. It accounts for small-scale activities based on conditions to obtain enough to survive. This condition inhibits the social mobilisation of this group. For Young (1982), people of this class group can be considered as “unemployment lumpen-proletariat”.

The “magendo sector” refers to an economy organised around black markets. It flourishes in the decadence of the state (Young, 1982). This economy grows due to the lack of integrity in the management of public affairs. The magendo is a crucial social category because there are people involved in this economy in the Pacific region.

The “petty bourgeoisie” represents a lower middle class that includes state employees such as secretaries and nurses, among others. In the current state, the petty bourgeoisie no longer has great prestige as in the post-colonial state. The availability of more educated people obstructs the mobility of this class for high-level positions. In general, they have low wages. The petty bourgeoisie, however, has job stability and, thus, is more fortunate than other social sectors.

The “peasantry” refers to an economic group of small landholders. The state has not provided the provision of public services to improve their businesses. The lack of opportunities has made people in this economy enter the channels of the magendo market. This type of farmer must be differentiated from those farmers with political access to the state bourgeoisie, who belong to high social strata (Young, 1982) (see Appendix W. Concept Map 1. The Cultural Pluralism Framework).

Second Chapter: The Colonial State in the Colombian Pacific Region (1572-1818)

In Latin America, the political dynamics of colonialism and modernity are perceived as radically different (Almario, 2009). This perception does not allow us to see sociocultural controls and power trajectories that overlap between different time periods. Furthermore, this perception does not allow us to identify the social patterns of encounter and conflict that took place in the Colombian Pacific region. This chapter analyses the sovereignty of the colonial state in this territory. It explores the dynamics of imposition and resistance among cultural groups that took place in the colonial period. The analysis focuses on three trajectories. I begin by reviewing the break with pre-established lifestyles in this region. Then, I analyse the experiences of occupation that allowed the survival of the communities settled in this rain forest of Colombia. Finally, I examine the connotations that the South Pacific territory had for the political elites in the colonial state.

According to Arturo Escobar (2010), indigenous people populated the territory that is now known as the Colombian Pacific region, around 1000 BC. Anthropological studies register the presence of dispersed settlements and low population density. Around that time, from the coastal zone to the high areas of the Andes mountain range, different indigenous tribes were present throughout the Pacific territory. Chroniclers affirm that in any native settlements there were not more than five houses (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004).

The territoriality property of the colonial state in the South Pacific region represented a historic transition to frame new administrative boundaries. This territory was administratively assigned to the Governorate of Popayán, and its capital city was also called Popayan (it is located in the Andes mountain range). Three provinces divided the South Pacific territory. Raposo included the villages of Buenaventura, Calima, Raposo and Yurmanguí. Micay had a small and highly dispersed population. In the province of Barbacoas, there were the villages of Barbacoas, Iscuandé, Tumaco and Guapi (Almario, 2009; Aprile-Gnisset, 2004; Samudio, 2010). (see Appendix E. Map 3).

The new form of territoriality established by the colonial rulers implied a brutal rupture with the indigenous communities' pre-established forms of government. The Spanish conquest generated a catastrophic impact on the native inhabitants of this territory. The conquerors enforced their dominion over the natives, arguing a racial superiority. They imposed their control through the use of weapons. The military operations resulted in the capture of aborigines. The captured aborigines were exploited exclusively in mining enclaves (Almario, 2009). These enclaves were found mainly in the coastal areas, but they entered their economic extraction model in the middle zones of the main rivers (see Appendix E. Map 3). The colonial rulers established slavery habitats in areas under their control (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). The enclaves of slaves and the armed confrontation with the Spanish army to control the Pacific territory meant severe restrictions on the mobility of indigenous natives. The Spaniards did not respect any principle of sociocultural order. The conquerors exercised the prerogative condition of ownership over the conquered lands and deprived the natives of rights under the denomination of slaves.

In this zone of Colombia, the colonial state could not fully impose its sovereignty. The Spanish military campaigns did not have the same success in the South Pacific region as in the other areas. Due to the resistance of the natives, the colonial armies only managed to control the territory in a limited way, two centuries after their arrival on the continent. During military operations that took place between the XVI and XVII centuries, aboriginal populations retreated to the densest rain forest areas of the Pacific region. The violent confrontation produced a marked depopulation of the coastal zones and the main rivers of the Colombian Pacific basin (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). Thus, territorially, the South Pacific region became a cultural boundary differentiated from the rest of the country. In this territory, the Spaniards had difficulties in enforcing total domination (Almario, 2009).

The governance practised by the colonial state allows us for the identification of a dichotomy. Firstly, an invading army that imposed in a violent model of territorial control. This model was exercised through the slavery system. Secondly, the presence of indigenous people who fought to preserve their freedom. This situation led the indigenous communities to quickly forge a model of parallel government in the Pacific territory that tried to dissolve the rules imposed by the colonial state (Almario, 2009).

The sovereign-colonial apparatus sought to affirm the extractive enclaves in the South Pacific region. Between the centuries XVII and XIX, the second cycle of settlements were established. This cycle exposed a process of settlement represented by enslaved Africans brought by the Spanish colony. The enslaved Africans were exploited in the gold mines (Escobar 2010). The need to have black labour was accounted for by the following reasons. Firstly, the brutality of the colonial regime produced a significant reduction in the number of indigenous people. Secondly, the native-indigenous was stereotyped as hostile and weak (Burgos, 2003; Rodríguez, 2008). Thirdly, the intervention of the Catholic missions against the genocide that the native communities were facing.

The establishment of extractive enclaves was pursued to finance the institutionalisation of Spanish sovereignty. After the tragic and forced diaspora, African populations were also exploited exclusively in mining activities. Due to the high cost of the slaves, the colonial rulers sought to maximise the performance of the African labour force. They only worked in the extraction of metals. The black population was the primary capital in the inventories of goods of the colony. The price of slaves could reach up to 90% of the total cost (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). Due to the arrival of the Africans, the captured natives were assigned to new tasks. They were engaged in logistical activities such as agriculture, food supply, construction of canoes and informal settlements, and in fluvial transportation (Almario, 2009; Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). In the Colombian Pacific region, primitive accumulation operated classically, through aggression, capture and dispossession of the natives (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). Thus, the forced labour of the indigenous and black communities produced wealth for the conquerors.

The mines formed a conglomerate of communities. In those communities, the foremen and the slaves lived alongside each other. In the colonial state, there were approximately 65 gold mines throughout the territory. These were accessible and potentially prosperous mining enclaves. In the province of Raposo, there were 16 enclaves, in Barbacoas 35, and Micay 14 (Almario, 2009; Aprile-Gnisset, 2004; Samudio, 2010). Unlike in the other regions of Colombia, in the Pacific region, the agrarian model organised around the "haciendas" (farms with large territorial dimensions) was not established (Almario, 2009). Therefore, the colonial ruler in the Colombian Pacific region imposed an economy of gold extraction only but scarcely took advantage of the resources offered by the rainforest (see Appendix E. Map 3).

In the South Pacific region, the sovereignty of the colonial state was eroded due to its weak capacity to control the communities. The weak organisation of labour facilitated the escape of the indigenous and Afro labour force (Almario, 2009; Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). The African populations soon understood the strategy of "cimarronismo" used by the natives. It consisted of clandestine settlements located in dense jungle areas with difficult accessibility. In both conditions, as slave and cimarron, the black and indigenous populations achieved a harmonious inter-ethnic way of life. The Africans, besides, emulated the lifestyle of indigenous communities to survive in the Colombian Pacific territory (Aprile-Gnisset 2004).

During the expansion of the colonial state, the Spanish rulers developed a cultural differentiation of people based on biases and stereotypes. They imposed an arbitrary classification in society, where social privileges were based on racial profiling. In Latin America, the racial stratification worked in the following way (Young, 1979, pp. 83-84): In the highest rank were the Spaniards. They occupied the most important positions in the government and the Catholic Church. The "criollos" held a lower level of preponderance. They were descendants of the Spaniards who were born in the colonised lands. Although they had access to both clerical and governmental positions, their real possibilities for social mobility were limited by the presence of pure Europeans. In America, new racial groups emerged as a product of miscegenation. "Mestizos" (white and indigenous), "mulattos" (black and white) and "zambos" (black and indigenous) were in the third segment of the racial classification. They received payment for their work, but they were still regarded as impurity or inferiority. Below them were the indigenous people. They were exploited in haciendas and mines ruled by the Spaniards and criollos. And finally, the black population was enslaved and forced to work in mines and plantations. The black slaves did not have rights at all.

The rules of the colonial state aimed at institutionalising the sovereignty of the dominant strata. These rules embodied the racist ideology of the Spanish conquerors. They dealt with the establishment of roles, the delimitation of territories and the discipline of bodies (Guevara, 2014). The law forbade white people to live among indigenous people. Analogously, the indigenous and black populations could not live among the Spaniards. The restrictions established in the contract of "pure blood" specified that only Europeans or their descendants could get public positions, study in elite schools and enjoy civil rights. Marriages between

different races were prohibited (Guevara, 2014). According to colonial laws, documents signed by indigenous people, mestizos or blacks were declared worthless (Burgos, 2003). Thus, the colonial rulers established different social classes and fermented hatred and rivalries among them (Burgos, 2003).

Ethnic and racial connotations assisted in framing the territories and gave political relevance at the national level (Raleigh, 2010). In the Colombian Pacific region, a significant process of miscegenation did not occur. A census of 1795 reported the demographic composition of the Pacific territory, two centuries after the arrival of the colonisers. According to Oscar Almario (2009), the original size of the indigenous population was reduced by 88%. They accounted for 12% of the population. The black community represented three-quarters of the total population, including the slaves and the "cimarrones". In this region, there was a shortage of the white population (Spaniards and criollos). Whites accounted for 5.4% and clerics 0.1%. This population was distributed as follows (Almario, 2009): In Raposo, there were 4,519 inhabitants (Buenaventura had a small and scattered population). In Micay there were 1,464 people. In the province of Barbacoas, there were 13,172 inhabitants concentrated mainly in Tumaco with 4,119 and in Barbacoas with 6,618 people. Thus, the reader can notice that in this rain forest there was not only a weak occupation of the white elites but also of the ecclesiastical and bureaucratic authorities. (see Appendix F. Map 4. Racial census of the South Pacific region in 1797).

The racial connotation of the South Pacific region is also a crucial factor in understanding the level of development of this territory. In this region, the urbanisation processes did not materialise. During the colony, no urban centre was developed. Jacques Aprile-Gnisset (2004) states that this situation was not only affected by the small size of the populations but also because they were dispersed. Their exchange networks operated without market centres. In the self-government systems of the black and indigenous communities, the presence of tangible power centres was not necessary. The slave mining system also did not contribute to the development of cities in the region. The owners of the mines were only in transit (Aprile-Gnisset, 2004). In Popayán and places with a white population, the resources obtained in the mining enclaves were invested. The mining enclaves linked to the villages of Tumaco, Barbacoas and Buenaventura created legacies for the later development of the main urban centres. Thus, the process of urbanisation that took place during the colony reveals that the dominant elites had

little interest in established in the region. Almario (2009) asserts that the political geography and political economy of the South Pacific region could not be more pathetic after 250 years of colonial domination.

The colonial institutions forged a brutal and dehumanised regime; however, the colonisers showed a certain condescension to the indigenous communities. At the end of the colonial period, and because of the extermination of the natives, the "Law of the Indians" developed the figure of "resguardo" and "cabildo" (Burgos, 2003). The first category had a territorial connotation and the second refers to a political organisation of the aborigines. This law prohibited the slavery of the natives. The indigenous people were confined to areas where they did not rival the interests of the Spaniards. The lands assigned to the indigenous people, in general, were not very suitable for agriculture. Through the institution of the "resguardo", the indigenous population lost contact with the colonisers. But countless reports mention that the colonisers did not respect this law (Guevara, 2014). The cabildo and resguardo are still relevant today (Young, 1979).

The criollos were the subaltern cultural group of power that led the process of overthrowing the colonial state. They grew up in the shadow of the invading force and savoured the privileges granted by the Spanish sovereign. Tatiana Jiménez (2013) argues that the process of independence led by the criollos had a bourgeois character. This cultural group did not have a deep commitment to transforming the vertical patterns of injustice established by the Spaniards (Jiménez, 2013). Instead, they wanted to occupy the dominant position to enjoy as the privileges that the colonial rulers were depriving them of. Their interest in independence concealed ideas of superiority over mestizo, indigenous and black cultural groups. The criollos took advantage of the fact that Napoleon had invaded Spain (Young, 1979).

Overall, the analysis of the territorial and sovereign properties of the colonial state in the South Pacific region exposed the dynamics of a violent and excluding regime framed by a racist ideology. The dynamics of encounter and conflict between ethnic and racial groups that took place in the colony allows us to characterise the foundations of the role of the Pacific region within the state. This role has different connotations according to the particular interests of each cultural group. On the one hand, the Europeans and the criollos showed interest in benefiting

from the extraction, but not in the colonisation of the Pacific territory. Two factors confirm this trend: Firstly, forged urbanisation processes were not significant. Regarding the settlement processes, the most dynamic consisted in establishing unstable mining enclaves. Secondly, there was a weak presence of ecclesiastical, military and bureaucratic authorities in this inhospitable territory. So, it is clear that the colonial rulers were aware of the challenges of boosting the extractive economy and exercising controls over the populations.

On the other hand, the black and indigenous communities managed to resist the domination of the slave system. This system presented fissures that were used by individuals from these communities to free themselves. Free communities settled in deep areas of the Pacific jungle and formed a parallel society to the colonial rule. In this way, colonial rule in the Pacific region had left two important legacies for the postcolonial order: an extractive economy and a dispersed settlement that was ethnically and racially differentiable.

Third Chapter: The Post-Colonial State in the South Pacific Region (1819 – 1990).

The legacy of the colonial state is the benchmark that supports the explanation of the historical marginalisation of the South Pacific region of Colombia. This benchmark is the interplay of controls that explain the cultural process of identity formation in the independent state. In the process of identity formation, particular groups forge the strength of their own identity through dissertations around the virtues of their traditions, singularities and future destinies (Young, 1979). The purpose of this chapter is to employ the cultural pluralism framework to understand the political scenario in which the widespread violence in the South Pacific region of Colombia began to emerge between 1819 and 1990. The chapter centres on exploring the formation process of sovereignty forged by the elites of independence to analyse the political development of this territory. Five sections structure this chapter. The first section reviews the way in which the postcolonial state elites developed new political formulations through the discourse of national identity to create a unitary state. This part centres on how the leaders of the independence faced the fragility of power experienced once their colonial rulers were overthrown. The second section explores the way in which the sovereignty of the independent state sharply demarcated the South Pacific boundary. This part centres on how indigenous and black communities defined themselves through the pattern of development for the region that was established by the state institutions. The third section studies the processes of identity mobilisation that began to emerge in the territory. The fourth section reviews the manifestations of violence that were experienced during the period 1819-1990.

As a starting point, the research examines the sovereign property of the independence state in Colombia. Once the colonial order was overthrown, the elites of the new nation-state faced deep fears of sovereign fragmentation. The fragmentation fear had as a backdrop a complex and irregular geography, rudimentary roads to articulate the different regions of the country, and a tradition of regional autonomy established in the colonial period (Gonzalez, 2015; Hernandez, 2012). The independence process was formalised in 1819. The rupture of the relationship with the Spanish coloniser showed that there were not a single criolla elite, but several regional elites

with their own interests (Gonzalez, 2015). The rupture with the external ruler also revealed the lack of capacity of the national elites to exercise authority over the independent territory. According to Jorge Hernandez (2012), the real power of the regional rulers was more significant than the national government. This trend prevailed for decades. On the other hand, the central government lacked the financial means to create a powerful state. Hernandez (2012) states that local elites (primarily large landowners) fought against the payment of taxes.

The fragility of power revealed levels of inclusion and exclusion of regions and social groups in the national public agenda. Fernán Gonzalez (2015) states that leaders of the independence privileged the articulation with the elites of the eastern centre of Colombia. The national elites excluded regions such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the interests of the Liberal and Conservative political parties increased the fragility of power. The bourgeois elites that belonged to these political parties promoted a long, violent confrontation. This confrontation left a national economic crisis and the inability to meet the needs of the excluded regions (Piccoli, 2005). As a consequence, the territory inherited from the colony was divided due to the fragility of power. The new limits represented the beginning of Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama as nation-states.

The sovereign fragility of the postcolonial state to achieve political unity was evident. The history of the nation-state in Colombia is a chronology of multiple wars and conflicts. Between the XIX and XX centuries, there were eight wars on a national scale (Hernandez, 2012). However, the matrix of institutions through which rule has been implemented has operated continuously for more than two centuries (Ronderos, 2014). In this context, the state institutionalised the cultural boundary of the South Pacific Region.

Leaders of the independence developed a nation-state project to achieve solidarity in the regions — the project aimed to face the fragility of power. The national project enforced new political formulations to build a unitary state. The independence leaders through the new political formulations identified “patterns of continuity” between the new nation and the political-administrative organisation that had operated in the colonial state (González, 2015). The identified patterns of continuity focused on the identity of the criollos as dominant racial groups. These dominant racial groups offered the possibility of achieving “unity” despite the isolation of

the regions and the difficulties of transport and communication. Thus, the leaders of the independence pointed at articulating regional powers in such a way that the transformations that occurred with independence did not put at risk the privileges of those who dominated the separate areas. Gonzalez (2015) asserts that the nation-state project centred on the network of powers in the independent territory (understood as Colombia), however, these powers did not homogeneously cover the entire country.

In the independence, the oath of well-being of the nation-state project pointed to the criollos as dominant cultural groups. The discourse of national identity was the primarily political formulation to build loyalties towards the leaders of the independence process. The purpose of this discourse was to overcome the legacies of colonial localism and the dispersion of regional power. In the first phase of the national discourse, the symbolic representations of power and citizenship were reserved for social groups that knew the secrets of Western civilisation (Gonzalez, 2015). According to González (2015), the foundations of this discourse were in fragments of the famous "Letter from Jamaica" by the liberator Simón Bolívar. The letter showed the criollos as the prevailing cultural group. In the letter of Jamaica, Bolivar asserted that "we are neither Indians nor Europeans, but an intermediate species between the legitimate owners of the country and the European usurpers" (Gonzalez, 2015, p. 52). Thus, the ruling elites' state project was based on an identity discourse linked to the cultural frameworks of the criollos. The national state project sought to unify the regional elites.

The development logic of the postcolonial state adopted the representations of the first phase of the national identity discourse. This discourse allowed the elite of the early republican period (relatively poor, small and scattered) to draw cultural boundaries between the "civilised and literate" people from the rest of the illiterate populations (black, zambos or indigenous) (Gonzalez, 2015). The logic of the development of the national discourse forged a cultural map (see Appendix C. Map 2). The descendants of Spanish whites were located in the high and cold areas of the interior of the country. On the other hand, blacks, zambos, and indigenous people were in low and hot lands. They were regarded as barbarians (Gonzalez, 2015). Thus, the development of the post-colonial state focused on connecting the main high areas of the Andes mountain range and providing public services to these populations. In this new order, the state supported the criolla elites to become a powerful bourgeoisie.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the cultural entrepreneurs of the criollos crystallised the second phase of the national discourse. The second phase of the national identity discourse offered the possibility of achieving a more linked and homogenous political formulation. The new political formulation of identity faced the sovereign fragility through the notion of "miscegenation". The miscegenation notion referred to the mestizo and mulatto cultural groups (Gonzalez, 2015). Guevara (2014) asserts that the new formulation of identity allowed the construction of a community that was imagined as homogeneous, mestizo and united by a shared past. The welfare oath of the nation-state project pointed to the mestizo and mulatto as subaltern cultural groups. Mulattos and mestizos were considered superior to the indigenous, blacks and zambos because they were the result of a genetic link with the white elites. These cultural groups also had the peculiarity of their American origin. This population was part of the colonial struggles for autonomy. They procure rights recognised in the independence period. According to González (2015), the incorporation of mulattos and mestizos into the discourse of national identity benefited them, not only by enabling them to gain access to the literary sectors but also to achieve relative access to the state structures of power. Thereby, the national discourse in its second phase made it possible to formulate a state project in which the power fragility inherited from the colony lost strength.

The rules of the postcolonial state aimed at institutionalising the sovereignty of the dominant strata. At the beginning of the new social order, the postcolonial state developed legal norms that neglected the rights of certain racial groups (González, 2015; Guevara, 2014). The State's response to slavery was delayed. In 1821, the law of "manumission of births" established that only the children of slaves born after that year would be considered free. Nonetheless, blacks continued to be victims of marginalisation. The abolition of slavery in Colombia was only approved in 1851 (Guevara, 2014; Burgos, 2003). Although this legislation prohibited slavery, it did not grant rights to the territories where these populations lived, nor did it grant differential rights to them as a cultural group (April-Ginset, 2004). The landowners continued to treat blacks as slaves although they had acquired freedom. The condition of having no land and being in need of work facilitated their brutal exploitation. After the establishment of the legislation that abolished slavery, the state forgot the black communities for more than a century (Burgos, 2003).

In the postcolonial state, the sovereignty of ruling elites sought to replace ethnic institutions with those based on the cultural frameworks of the criolla elites. The criollos decided to cut the "negative aspects" of the colonial past that condemned Colombia to backwardness. Based on the premises of liberalism and the free market, the elites of the new order sought to erase the rights to land given to indigenous communities by the "Ley de Indias". The Law of October 11, 1821, created the conditions for the lands of indigenous peoples to be subject to private property regimes (Burgos, 2003). The regulations established by the postcolonial state generated a progressive deterioration of the country's indigenous reserves (resguardos), located in the mountain ranges. Furthermore, the dominant strata settled in the mountains stigmatised the indigenous people. The ethnic group was stereotyped as lazy, indolent and stupid (Guevara, 2014).

The project of national identity to achieve territorial unity did not generate a harmonious integration between the plurality of cultural groups in the independent territory. The institutionalised sovereignty of the dominant elites disregarded the presence of cultural groups. The indigenous and black communities were victims of negative racial and ethnic connotations. The Colombian constitution of 1886 established the origin of the republican government. This constitution reaffirmed the denial and indifference to racial categories. The constitutional system of norms was based on a monocultural conception (Burgos, 2003). This constitution affirmed that in Colombia there was only one population, one God, and one type of family. The constitution also declared that the public administration was at the head of the central state. The sovereign established in the post-colonial state had territorial effects.

Overall, the national identity discourse incorporated broader segments of the population within the power structure of the state (Young, 1982). The national discourse sought a new legitimacy to broaden the base of allegiances towards the criollos. This discourse integrated the image of a "melting pot". The melting pot image referred to a semantic condition where all racial differences disappeared, and a new identity appeared (González, 2015). This discourse of identity, however, favoured the interests of the criolla elites. The inclusion of new subaltern groups took as a reference the location of the power of the dominant strata. The presence of mestizos and mulattos was increasingly widespread in the main urban centres of the high areas of the Andean mountain range. In this way, the discourse of national identity allowed the

consolidation of a system of racial stratification rooted in the legacy of the Spanish colony. The identity discourse built a notion of relative equality among the populations of the interior of the country, while it paradoxically marginalised the blacks, the zambos and the indigenous people.

3.1. The South Pacific Boundary

The way in which power has operated, the nature of space and the role of the state in the installation of institutional capacities to contain the demographic transformations experienced in this area help to understand why this particular boundary has been maintained. The perennial way in which the sovereign elites exercised the power of the state towards the populations of this territory, shaped the regional development of the South Pacific of Colombia. The sovereignty with racist connotations that existed in the colonial period continued operating in the postcolonial period. The purpose of this section is to explore the way in which the sovereignty of the independent state sharply demarcated this regional boundary. This section centres on how indigenous and black communities defined themselves through the pattern of development for the region that was established by the state institutions. I began by exploring the way in which the environmental characteristics of the area assisted to forge the identity of black and indigenous inhabitants. Then, I review how the national elites addressed the demographic transformations that occurred in this territory.

The national state project forged marginalised territories. The indigenous and black communities in the South Pacific territory were not included in the national project led by the criolla elites. The cultural groups that remained in the marginalised regions were the descendants of the enslaved populations in the colonial state (Guevara, 2014). The lack of inclusion of these cultural groups into the national political agenda had consequences for the South Pacific region. The indigenous and black populations did not benefit from the role of the state as a vehicle for the development of their territory. The sovereignty established by the criolla elites created territorial conditions of marginalisation and isolation. In these conditions, the indigenous and black people formed their identity.

Under the dynamic of power forged by the independent state, the isolated conditions of the South Pacific rain forest assisted in the survival of the indigenous and black communities. The indigenous communities managed to survive, reproduce and reconstitute themselves as a cultural

and political organisation (Almario, 2009). Between 1797 and 1870, the number of indigenous people grew by approximately 39% (Almario, 2009, Hoffman, 1996). The black communities also experienced remarkable growth of the population during the XIX century. The black population increased by approximately 92% between 1797 and 1870 (Almario, 2009; Hoffman, 1996). According to Almario (2009), this population growth was due to the fact that the black communities achieved a silent and extensive colonisation of the lowlands of the South Pacific territory.

The common history and the traditional virtues of indigenous and black communities served to define their identity as marginalised cultural groups. The shared cultural values and symbols represent some of the attributes that define the ethnic communality. Young (1976) argues that “cultural identities contain [symbols or] set of representations of reality” (p. 142). In the context of the marginalisation of the South Pacific territory, ethnic and racial communities forged cultural symbolisms to address the complexities of the rain forest. In addition, the black communities assimilated indigenous ancestral knowledge to take advantage of the environmental diversity that this area of the country possesses. According to Almario (2009), the population growth that was experienced in this territory was mainly due to the capacity of the black communities to assimilate this ancestral knowledge. Through these symbolisms, ethnic and racial cleavages crystallised knowledge not only to classify plants and animals but also to identify the vital and reproductive cycles of the species present in the territory. In the South Pacific region of Colombia, the river symbolism plays a crucial role in representing the reality experienced by Indians and blacks (Hoffman, 2007). Odile Hoffmann (1997, p. 99) presents the symbolism of the river as follows:

An inbreeding unit [...] people living in the same river are considered a single community (West, 1957: 88). Recently, Oslender (1999 and 2001) has insisted on the symbolic, social and political function of the 'river' as spatial unit, and speaks of the 'logic of the river' and of 'localised identities' to explain the existence of ethnic mobilisation.

The identity of the black and indigenous communities is based on the territorial devices developed for their adjustment into this area of Colombia. In the process of forming the identity of these communities, the territorial marginalisation of the South Pacific jungle was a crucial aspect. Hoffmann (1997) affirms that the original link with the local territory was a fundamental

aspect of forming the identity of these two communities. When comparing the colonial phase with the postcolonial one, two historical trends were identified concerning the South Pacific territory. The first historical trend refers to the settlement pattern. The second historical trend refers to the economic relationships in the region. These territorial and historical trends had effects on the identity formation of the indigenous and black people.

The first historical trend points to the continuities in the pattern of settlement inherited from the colonial period. The "dispersed villages" and "river-jungle" were two patterns of settlement that persisted in the post-colonial period. These patterns continued operating until the middle of the XX century (April-Ginset, 2004). The pattern of dispersed villages refers to the fact that the villages were predominant as a type of habitat, and the economy was basically for subsistence (Almario 2009; April-Ginset, 2004).

New groups of black communities migrated to the South Pacific region. The people of this racial migration adjusted themselves to the pattern of dispersed villages. That migration occurred amid the late abolition of slavery and the brutal exploitation of which racial groups continued to be victims in other parts of the country. These communities followed the path travelled by the "cimarrones" in the colonial era (April-Ginset, 2004). Thus, the reader may notice that the black and indigenous population sought their freedom and autonomy long before the normative dispositions established by the Colombian State.

In terms of territorial settlement in the South Pacific region, the river - jungle pattern is another crucial point of reference in the identity of the indigenous and black communities (Almario, 2009). The river-jungle pattern also favoured the spread of blacks and indigenous people into the coastal areas of the Colombian Pacific region during the XIX and XX centuries (April-Ginset, 2004). The coastal areas had been depopulated due to the military pressure exerted by the colonial armies.

The second historical trend points to the changes in the economic relationship in the territory. In the postcolonial state, gold mining was no longer the economic area that led the development in the South Pacific region (Hoffmann, 1997). Mining activities lost importance and never recovered the relevance of the colonial phase (Almario, 2009). At the end of the XIX century, the mining enclaves showed signs of exhaustion. Under these exhaustion signs, traditional

techniques of gold exploitation began to be inefficient. In the South Pacific region, to reactivate the mining enclaves it was necessary to import machinery that the criolla elites could not afford (Leal, 2008). The weakening of the mining enclaves was also a consequence of the abolition of slavery (Almario, 2009; Leal, 2008). This situation led to an increase in the depopulation pattern of white groups in the Colombian Pacific region.

In the independence, indigenous and black communities reconverted their economic profile, from miners to peasants of the rain forest. The patterns of settlement in the rain forest of the South Pacific region formed the development of a subsistence economy that did not produce large surpluses for the market (Almario, 2009). The rivers were used for fishing, small mining and as a river transport system. The harsh conditions of the rain forest restricted hunting and agricultural activities. Agriculture was limited to the valleys of the rain forest near the villages. The extraction of wood and the subsequent fluvial transport to the Pacific Ocean was an economic activity that increased in the territory (Leal, 2008). In this sense, April-Ginset, (2004) states that the dynamics of the economic conditions of the Pacific territory was typical of a pre-capitalist model.

Hoffmann (1997, p. 22) describes the territorial adjustment of black communities into the South Pacific region in the XIX century:

The black populations took advantage of the change of rules imposed from the centre, in the mid-nineteenth century, to invent and consolidate a specific model of survival, where habitat, production and culture were combined according to routes unknown and neglected by whites, in spaces (until then) not coveted and perceived as hostile by the dominant society. They built the Pacific, appropriated it both physically and symbolically, through a series of practices ranging from agriculture to the selective exploitation of some forest fruits, through rules of distribution and control of resources much more subtle and versatile than the traditional property, typical of white society.

The state's role in installing institutional capacities to contain the demographic transformations experienced in this region is crucial to understand the high levels of vulnerability that characterise the territory. The territorial changes that occurred in the South Pacific region did not receive significant attention from the state. The national criolla elites wanted to govern these territories inhabited by black and indigenous communities from the Andean cities (Hoffman, 1997). Concerning the South Pacific region, the elites that were located off the coast were in

charge of the matrix of institutions of the nation-state. The national government did not decisively promote the establishment of public infrastructure to support internal (endogenous) territorial development (Hoffman, 1997). The population growth of Buenaventura and Tumaco (and of all the populated centres of the South Pacific region) was not subject to state support for the provision of schools, hospitals and public services. The marginalisation in which the population of Tumaco and Buenaventura grew will be the “breeding ground” used by the armed actors to intensify the conflict in the future.

In the South Pacific region, the population has grown significantly since 1851, increasing the population rates between 1870 and 1918. The main demographic changes took place in Barbacoas, and the ports of Buenaventura (ex Raposo) and Tumaco. Barbacoas experienced a stagnation of its population rates since the abolition of slavery in 1851. Since 1851, the population rates stagnated at approximately 9,000 inhabitants. Thus, Barbacoas lost the relevance it had had in the colonial state as a mining enclave.

Buenaventura and Tumaco were established as the two main urban centres and ports of the South Pacific territory. They became cantons where ports and some urban sectors of the coast were installed (Hoffman, 1997). Such ports have the crucial resemblance of being the mouth of important rivers that interconnect different areas of the Pacific jungle.

The national elites positioned Buenaventura as the main port centre of the country. In 1905, this port became the main urban centre of the South Pacific region and its population was estimated at 45,029 inhabitants (Hoffman, 1997). The port of Buenaventura connected the main productive areas of the interior with the Pacific Ocean. However, local communities did not benefit from the flow of goods in this harbour. For April-Ginset (2004), the demographic growth of this locality is not a product of its economic wealth. Instead, the migratory flows were a consequence of the harsh conditions experienced by the black populations in the rain forest.

Tumaco was established as the second most important city in the South Pacific region. In 1918, the population of Tumaco was estimated at 9,500 inhabitants. With the arrival of the whites, some wealth appeared. Some of the whites had Italian, German, British and Chinese nationalities (Hoffman, 1997). Unlike the colonial phase, in the postcolonial period, this minor migration of whites took Tumaco as their place of residence. Certain sectors of this white population began to

establish some connections with the political elites of the interior of the country. In this city some local roads, schools, hospitals, churches, cemeteries, electric power, sawmills and harbours were installed (Hoffman, 1997).

The growth of the ports of Buenaventura and Tumaco predicted changes in the dispersed settlement pattern. These two ports became poles of regional development. The growth of the population of these two port cities announced structural transformations in the spatial organisation and socio-productive distribution of the region (Hoffmann, 1997). The two ports were the only places in the South Pacific region connected by land roads to the interior of the country. In Tumaco, modern plantations and haciendas were established around the road. They were administered from the interior of Colombia (Hoffmann, 1997). As a consequence, the port cities of the South Pacific region became (for future generations) poles of demographic attraction for migration, work, access to a few public services (health and education) and, in some cases, these cities were used as a second home (Hoffmann, 2002).

Since the mid-twentieth century, Colombian development models have assigned to the Pacific region, the role of extracting raw materials for the centre of the country and abroad. Under the extractive model, the white population became a business elite in Tumaco. They owned the sawmills and dominated the economic relationship with the black communities for the extraction of wood from the rain forest (Hoffmann, 1997). In 1959 the national government promulgated the Second Law of "Forest Reserve". William Villa (2004) argues that with this Law the Pacific territory was assumed as immense wooded land without population. This law was used by logging companies to intervene in the region by obtaining permits granted by the State (Agudelo, 2001). In 1961, besides, the central state created the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute. Hoffman (1997) argues that this institute only regularised the property rights of white investors. In contrast, the black communities were just given technical support for some cultivated plots, but without recognising property rights over them. Thus, the state biased the legal access of black and indigenous communities to territorial property.

The development models promoted by the central elites not only affirmed the marginalisation of the way of life of the black and indigenous communities but also supported the intervention of external private agents. In the 1970s there was an acceleration in the arrival of external agents.

Fishing and shrimp companies, oil palm entrepreneurs and mining projects intervened in the region (Agudelo, 2001). In the South Pacific region, palm oil and shrimp companies appropriated the suitable land for these economic activities, located near the main roads. The methods of land appropriation included not only the state support but also the use of violence. Eduardo Restrepo (2002) states that the producers of oil palm and shrimp were responsible for forced displacements and homicides against blacks and indigenous people. Therefore, private agents (connected to the dominant national elites) obtained the best quality and located land, and controlled the labour force in the region. Hoffmann (1997) presents an illustrative diagnosis of the development of the South Pacific region:

"In the Pacific, each hydrographic system forms an economically independent, almost isolated basin (IGAC, 1983: 91). The roads of terrestrial communication are disjointed among themselves, and only in Tumaco [...] does the consolidation of agrarian spaces begin to have momentum (id.). Tumaco has a greater territorial action radius than Buenaventura, which functions as a port enclave, but on the coast in general, there is no functional region, it is a disorganised and peripheral space, whose position in the national economy is to produce some raw materials [...] (id.92). This document ends by referring to the lack of adequate regional development and the enormous dependence on [...] Cali". (p.26)

In general, the way in which power has operated, the nature of space and the role of the state in the installation of institutional capacities to contain the demographic transformations experienced in this area, helped to understand how this particular boundary was demarcated. The postcolonial state was the political arena that laid the foundations for new cultural encounters and conflicts in the South Pacific region. The territorial transformations that occurred in the postcolonial period explain the establishment of two opposing identities and perspectives of development. The black and indigenous communities forged fluvial and agricultural mechanisms to colonise the rain forest. On the other hand, the white and mestizo populations led an extractive economy. These opposing perspectives of development have coexisted until now and were the beginning of new conflicts and violence in the South Pacific region (Hoffman, 1997). Therefore, the state had played a crucial role in allowing further confrontations to be forged. The matrix of the institutions of the nation-state not only promoted the external appropriation of the lands but they also failed to address the demographic transformations that occurred in this region.

3.2. The Emergence of Mobilisation in the South Pacific Region

In the framework of cultural pluralism, the scope and intensity of interactions within social groups strengthen their cultural identity. The cultural identity has the role of expanding the bonds of collective solidarity among members of particular social groups. The strengthening of collective solidarity and, therefore, of cultural identity is a consequence of the existence of greater social interaction in groups (Young, 1979). The purpose of this section is to study the process of identity mobilisation that began to emerge in the South Pacific territory. It seeks to understand how intensive levels of collective solidarity and cultural affinity began to appear within indigenous and black groups. It begins by exploring the conditions of disadvantage that framed the identity consciousness that began to rise among the inhabitants of the region. Then, this section examines significant drivers of modernisation that arose in this territory and increased the levels of collective solidarity and cultural affinity. Finally, it explores mobilisation reference points that were interpreted by cultural entrepreneurs to strengthen the identity of the communities of the South Pacific region of Colombia.

Until the 1970s, black and indigenous communities had not developed identity discourses to confront their situation of marginalisation. Restrepo (2002) states that the rhetoric of identity did not exist in the South Pacific region. The lack of a strong cultural identity was made evident not only by the absence of a clear socio-organisational process but also by the lack of strategies to interact with other social and institutional actors. Nonetheless, the sovereignty imposed by the criolla elites led to conditions in which ethnic and racial communities began to become conscious of their disadvantaged situation. Hoffman (2002) argues that rupture processes began to build around the loss of land and autonomy, but also because of lack of attention to their needs. In other words, the postcolonial state promoted conditions of marginalisation under which indigenous and black communities developed degrees of identity consciousness.

The structural condition of marginalisation led by the nation-state is a crucial dynamic for the emergence of an identity consciousness among the black and indigenous people. They began to become conscious that the ineffectiveness of state institutions was jeopardising the historical conditions that allowed their survival in the territory. The marginalisation produced bonds of solidarity among the inhabitants of the region due to the following realities that showed their

disadvantaged situation. Firstly, the development policies for the Pacific region were limited to regularising property titles for white investors (Hoffman, 1997). These policies provoked distrust among the communities. The black and indigenous populations were vulnerable of land dispossessions (Hoffman, 2002; Restrepo, 2002). Secondly, the migration of racial and ethnic communities over the lowlands of the South Pacific territory encountered limitations. Restrepo (2002) argues that these limitations were due not only to the onslaught of extractive capital but also to the intensity with which the resources of the rain forest began to be exploited. Thirdly, the development models led by the national elites did not generate enough stable jobs. The unemployment caused discontent among the population of the region (Hoffman, 2002). Besides, the state institutions did not support the model of colonisation of the rain forest forged by blacks and indigenous people. Thus, the indigenous and black communities became aware that the historical conditions that allowed their existence and reproduction were at risk.

The lack of credibility in the central state was another reason for the emergence of identity consciousness. This lack of credibility of the criolla elites uncovered the fact that the mobility and status of social groups were distributed unequally within the state. In the 1970s, the indigenous and black communities demanded the arrival of developmental policies for the Pacific region. The leaders of the national elites responded to these demands with a state discourse that pointed to the geostrategic importance of the area (Agudelo, 2001). The speech also recognised the conditions of marginality in the access to public services that the inhabitants of this territory experienced. In the centre of the country, large infrastructure plans were developed to improve the road, river and maritime interconnections of the Pacific region (Agudelo, 2001). The materialisation of these plans, nevertheless, was never completed. Young (1979) argues in this regard that definitions of cultural pluralism tend to occur when particular communities begin to feel deprived of rights in comparison to other significant groups.

The process of modernisation played a crucial role on increasing the intensity of identity awareness among the inhabitants of this territory. The demographic transformations that occurred were an essential driver of the modernisation of this territory. According to Young (1982), the modernisation encouraged the social cohesion of cultural groups. These demographic transformations increased the kinship networks and the identity consciousness. In the South Pacific region, sectors of the black community migrated to the port cities of Tumaco and

Buenaventura in search of education and job opportunities. With their arrival in the cities, the racial inhabitants experienced new models of territoriality (Hoffman, 2002). The black migration forged dynamic relationships between the inhabitants of the ports and rivers (Hoffman, 2002). The consolidation of migration networks allowed the strengthening of cultural affinity networks. These networks played a fundamental role in increasing a collective awareness. In this region, the inhabitants began to talk about the black re-colonisation of Tumaco (Hoffman, 2002). Thus, the extension and intensification of communication networks brought a broader common affiliation. The demographic transformations were a driver of the process of modernisation in the South Pacific region. This driver extended the identity consciousness of communities over a wider area of cultural affinity.

The civilising mission was another driver of the modernisation of this territory. Hoffmann (1997) reports that the first missionaries, who began to intervene in the region in a determined manner, arrived at the beginning of the XX century. The intervention of the Catholic mission assisted in intensifying the identity consciousness of local communities. The civilising mission started to increase the exchange network that accompanies the modernisation process of identity awareness. The civilising duties developed by the missionaries encountered oppositions coming from the white elites settled in the South Pacific region. The evangelistic practices of the representatives of the Catholic Church were not limited to religious affairs (Restrepo, 2002). The missionaries also proposed to improve the conditions of development experienced by the communities. Over time, the Catholic missionaries would take a stand in favour of strengthening the collective identity of the ethnic and racial communities. According to Restrepo (2002), the position assumed by the members of the church was a crucial antecedent in the intensity of the identity awareness that began to emerge among the black and ethnic inhabitants of this territory.

The emergence of a strong identity awareness depends on cultural entrepreneurs who can expand the resources of solidarity within a community (Young, 1979). Since the 1970s, a group of anthropologist scholars began to act as cultural entrepreneurs. Although these scholars were in the centre of the country, they understood the disadvantaged position in which the ethnic and racial communities were in comparison with other social groups. According to Hoffman (2002), the scholars' work focused on singularising the status of the black and indigenous inhabitants to transform the condition of invisibility in which these populations found themselves in the nation-

state. The homogenising discourse of “mestizo national identity” was the point of reference through which these cultural entrepreneurs began to struggle against the national establishment. For Nina Friedman and Jaime Arocha (1986, in Wade 2009), the mestizo national identity discourse produced logics of marginalisation and invisibility. This marginalisation was reflected in the limited coverage in education, work and public services offered to communities in the Colombian Pacific region. Friedman, Arocha, Agudelo, Hoffman and Peter Wade were some of the most noteworthy scholars and cultural entrepreneurs that took part in favour of the rights of these communities.

In the cultural pluralism framework, the groups that precipitously identify themselves as backward and threatened with subordination, mobilised themselves socially and politically to claim their share of the "national cake" (Young, 1982). In Colombia, the cultural entrepreneurs began to identify referents for increasing the mobilisation of the racial and ethnic groups of the Pacific region toward political rights and aspirations. These mobilisation reference points were part of what was occurring at international and national levels. The cultural entrepreneurs interpreted this process of modernisation and the mobilisation references for strengthening the collective solidarity and the cultural identity of communities in this territory.

The recognition of the Pacific region as a priority conservation area was a crucial national reference in the process of modernisation experienced by the indigenous and black communities. This recognition facilitated the institutionalisation of negotiation scenarios in which international conservation organisations participated, the incipient institutions of the nation-state for environmental matters, and national social organisations (Restrepo, 2002). As a result of the negotiations, the Colombian Pacific region was declared one of the most biodiverse areas on the planet (Restrepo, 2002). Thus, in the midst of discussions of the environment and sustainable development, the wild coast of Colombia for the first time began to have recognition in the matrix of state institutions as an area of environmental priority.

The recognition as environmental priority area was a mobilisation reference point that assisted in aligning the ideological rhetoric of communities in the Colombian Pacific region. This discursive recognition paid attention to the way of life of the indigenous and black communities as being responsible for having facilitated the protection of this priority area (Restrepo, 2001). The

recognition gave room to cultural entrepreneurs and brokers to discuss the singularity of the devices of territorial appropriation developed by indigenous and black groups. The rhetorical strategy consisted of relating the territorial appropriation devices with conceptions of environmental protection.

Discourses that demanded the defence of the environment began to arise within the communities arose to guarantee their physical and cultural survival. The groups settled in the Colombian Pacific region started to defend their forms of production, as being respectful of nature. They also began to claim rights over the territory for their protection. Thus, the environmental identity rhetoric began to spread over the region and increased levels of collective solidarity and cultural affinity among the indigenous and black people.

The struggles for the adjudication of territorial rights were another national reference point for the process mobilisation that began to emerge in the South Pacific region. In the North Pacific region arose an organisation of black peasants of the Atrato River called Peasant Integral Association of the Atrato (for its acronym in Spanish, ACIA). This process of mobilisation in the North Pacific territory began to emerge with the accompaniment of Catholic priests and missionaries who also acted as cultural entrepreneurs for the political rights of the black communities (Restrepo, 2002). According to Restrepo (2002), this was the first experience in which a black community linked the identity rhetoric strategy to claim territorial rights to the state.

The process of mobilisation of indigenous peoples and their negotiation with the state was another reference point for the cultural entrepreneurs. This population conquered territorial rights related to the institution of the *resguardo*. Oscar Garzón (2017) states that this negotiation allowed indigenous groups from outside the South Pacific region to achieve collective territorial rights. In this process of mobilisation and negotiation, the indigenous peoples obtained territorial rights in the departments of Putumayo and the Amazonia. The total area adjudicated represented 59,825 square kilometres. According to Garzón (2017), the negotiation allowed a new perception of the ethnic communities in the postcolonial state. Roberto Pineda (1997, in Garzon 2017) states that through this negotiation, the postcolonial state began to perceive the indigenous people as

protectors of the forest. So, this process of mobilisation and negotiation gave ethnic groups a higher status than black communities.

The black political mobilisations against the sovereignty exercised by the South African Republic (SAR) and the United States (US) were international reference points in the mobilisation process to strengthen the cultural identity of the communities in the South Pacific region. The racial nature of the political system of the SAR and the US was being confronted by racial liberation movements that had intensified their efforts to transform their disadvantaged situation. These mobilisations initiated an unprecedented struggle for racial equality and social justice (Olzak and Olivier, 1998). According to Susan Olzak and Johan L. Olivier (1998), “as political and economic barriers of separation in both countries begin to break down, levels of racial competition for citizenship rights, equal treatment in public settings, and other forms of protests increase” (p. 273). In Colombia, in the 1970s, groups of black students, mainly inspired by the black activism of the US and the anti-apartheid movement, began to increase their communication networks and created groups of black cultural activists. (Wade, 2009). The Colombian black movements as a mobilisation strategy tended to use an inclusive definition of blackness, which was interpreted as "black" (negro- in Spanish). However, this interpretation did not have high levels of identity affiliation (Wade, 2009).

In general, in the South Pacific region, there began to emerge a process of mobilisation which increased the levels of solidarity and cultural affinity among the indigenous and black inhabitants. One of the reasons used to explain the increasing levels of cultural identity that began to emerge was the disadvantaged situation in which the black and indigenous populations found themselves. The communities not only realised that the historical conditions that enabled their existence and reproduction were at risk, but they also understood that due to their cultural stereotypes, their people were plagued with limited opportunities to benefit from the resources and institutional services offered by the postcolonial state. Also, the failures of the criolla elites in fulfilling their promises generated institutions based on the lack of credibility in the state. Another reason for understanding the growing levels of cultural identity that arose was the emergence of modernisation drivers, such as the civilising mission and demographic transformations. A third reason that followed these levels of cultural identity was the emergence of cultural entrepreneurs, mainly represented by anthropology scholars and members of the

Catholic religion. These cultural entrepreneurs assimilated knowledge from mobilisations coming from national and international spheres to awaken the mobilisation in the South Pacific territory of Colombia. In the next section, this chapter reviews the dynamic of violence experienced in this territory between 1819 and 1990.

3.3. The Haven of Peace

Until the 1990s, the South Pacific region was considered a haven of peace (Agudelo, 2001). In this territory, the armed confrontation did not have the intensity recorded in other areas of Colombia between 1819 and 1990. The conditions of the dispersed settlements of the communities did not result in strong tensions around land ownership (April-Ginset, 2004). The violent death rates in the South Pacific region were significantly lower compared to the mortality that occurred due to the armed wars in the other areas of the country. Agudelo (2001) quoted Camilo Echendia (1998) to argue that a significant volume of studies related to the mapping of the armed conflict, as well as studies on humanitarian statistics, described the entire region as "nonviolent".

The region saw sporadic violent events, such as those that occurred in other areas of Colombia due to armed confrontations in the XX century. Besides, in the Pacific region there were not a significant number of violent events related to the civil war that took place in a period known as "La Violencia". It was a brutal period of violence that took place in Colombia between the 1940s and the 1950s (Agudelo, 2001). This civil war was based on the sectarian confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative parties (Oslender, 2009).

The violence that implied territorial dispossession and overexploitation, however, was not absent in this territory. Since the 1970s, this violence was motivated by large loggers, palm-oil croppers, shrimp producers and other avid entrepreneurs interested in land and cheap labour (Agudelo, 2001). With the increase in the phenomenon of drug trafficking in the 1980s, the drug cartels made investments in tourist residences which were also used as a hiding place. The cartels even invested in sawmills, in cargo boats and fishing projects. Through these investments, the cartels laundered drug money. However, the oil palm producers demanded that they not be confused with those responsible for these illegal activities. Also, they stressed that their rights in the territory were granted by state institutions (Hoffman, 2002).

Guerrilla groups appeared in the region in the 1970s. The guerrillas assumed the territory as a zone of refuge (Agudelo 2001). By the end of the 1980s, the control of the guerrillas reached lands of Timbiqui and López de Micay (Department of Cauca) and areas near Barbacoas (Department of Narino) (Agudelo 2001). The insurgents settled in essential rivers. In the absence of institutions of the nation-state, the guerrilla groups developed capacities to regulate the social relations of the inhabitants of this rain forest. The presence of guerrilla nuclei in the vicinity of the black and indigenous communities did not produce significant alterations of public order (Agudelo 2001). Hence, the descendants of enslaved groups, who resisted the sovereignty imposed by the colonial state, began to have contact with armed insurgent groups that fought against the postcolonial state.

Until now, this chapter employed the cultural pluralism framework to understand the political scenario in which the widespread violence in the South Pacific region of Colombia grew. It focused on recognising the sovereignty forged by the elites of the postcolonial state to analyse the socio-political transformation experienced by the communities of this region. Initially, I explored the new political formulations developed by national elites, through the discourse of national identity, to create a unitary state. Subsequently, I analysed how the sovereignty of the independent state developed the South Pacific boundary. Next, I examined the process of identity mobilisation that began to arise in this boundary. Finally, I reviewed the manifestations of violence that were experienced in the South Pacific region between 1819 and 1990.

Overall, this chapter focused on how the sovereignty and territoriality of the postcolonial state were forged in the South Pacific region. Concerning the sovereignty, the leaders of independence developed a state project that resisted the fragility of power inherited from the colony; through political formulations incorporated into the discourse of national identity. The speech established a new system of racial stratification. This system built a notion of relative equality among the population of the interior of the country, maintaining the marginalisation over the black and indigenous territories. Regarding the territoriality, the South Pacific region faced a process of autochthonous development, and its communities experienced a precarious presence of the institutions of the central State. The indifference of the central state towards the South Pacific territory remained rooted in the connotations of racial segregation. The sovereignty established by the Criolla elites created territorial conditions of marginalisation and isolation.

In the South Pacific region, a tense scenario began to grow based on antagonistic mechanisms of territorial appropriation. The regional transformations that occurred in the postcolonial period revealed opposing identities and perspectives of development. The black and indigenous communities forged fluvial and agricultural mechanisms to colonise the rain forest. The white and mestizo populations, on the other hand, led an extractive economy. The matrix of the institutions of the nation-state not only promoted the external appropriation of the land but it also did not address the demographic transformations that occurred in this region.

Under the dynamic of power forged by the independent state, bonds of collective solidarity and cultural identity began to emerge between the communities. The communities not only realised that the historical conditions that allowed their existence was at risk; but they also understood that, due to the negative racial connotations, their populations had limited opportunities to benefit from the resources and institutional services offered by the state. In this regional context, the civilising mission and the demographic transformations acted as drivers of modernisation. In this context, there also appeared cultural entrepreneurs mainly represented by anthropology scholars and members of the Catholic Church that began to awaken the mobilisation in the territory of the South Pacific of Colombia. The cultural entrepreneurs focused their attention not only on the singularity of the territorial appropriation devices of the indigenous and black communities in a priority conservation area but also on mobilisations at national and international spheres. Finally, the South Pacific boundary experienced few manifestations of violence in comparison with other regions of Colombia between 1819 and 1990. However, the violence displayed through territorial dispossession and over-exploitation was not absent. Besides, the investments of the drug cartels appeared in the region and the guerrilla groups used the territory as a refuge area.

Fourth Chapter: On the Gateway Period to the Violence in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 1990s.

This chapter sets out to employ the cultural pluralism framework to understand why the 1990s was period that allowed the entrance of the armed conflict and the murder of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s. The chapter centres on exploring features related to the vulnerability of armed conflict that experienced this particular boundary (Young, 1979). This conceptual framework allows for the study of specific scenarios in which the nation-state played a crucial role in promoting four dynamics of vulnerability. This chapter is composed by four sections. The first section reviews the way in which the communities escalated their expectations about the role of the state. The second section explores how the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state worsened the disparities of well-being between the state arena and its contradictory socio-political zones. The third section centres on how the nation-state connected international security concerns with its national cultural environment. The fourth section reviews how the armed conflict entered into the South Pacific boundary.

In the early 1990s, Colombia experienced a complicated political stability situation in which the national elites developed critical political reforms. The political situation was framed by events such as: Firstly, the central state begun to develop social and political reforms to decentralise the political power and increase the provision of public services (Galindo *et al.*, 2008). These reforms allowed for the establishment of local and regional elections and a system of economic transfers from the central state to be administered by the territorial governments. Secondly, the elites of the nation-state negotiated the first political demobilisation with a guerrilla group called "Movimiento de 19 de Abril" or M-19 (19th of April Movement). This guerrilla group demanded the laying down arms if the state created a National Constituent Assembly to open political representation. This political demobilisation also facilitated the demobilisation of the People's Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación - EPL), the Revolutionary Workers' Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores - PRT) and the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (Movimiento Armado Quintín). Nonetheless, the communist guerrillas known as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) and the

National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) continued in the armed confrontation. Thirdly, the main drug cartels challenged the state and declared war on the elites that had ruled Colombia for decades. These cartels were powerful. According to Bruce M. Bagley (2012, p. 183), "apart from the traffickers in the United States, Colombians derive(d) the greatest benefit from the world drug trade than any other nationality in the Western Hemisphere". During the struggles against these drug traffickers, the Colombian government decided to align itself with the anti-drug policies of the United States (US). This political alignment took as a point of reference that the US perceived drug trafficking mainly as an external threat to its national security. On the other hand, in the US, drug trafficking cartels occupied a critical position on the political agenda due to the significant increase that this country was experiencing in the consumption of drugs, as well as in drug-related crimes. With the support received from the US, the Colombian government managed to capture or kill notorious drug traffickers such as Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and Carlos Lehder, to name a few. Finally, the country was facing widespread events of political violence. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1997 in, Cepeda, 2006), the balance of violence perpetrated against the political movement called Patriotic Union (UP) produced an estimation of 5,000 people who were killed, disappeared and tortured. Furthermore, three presidential candidates (who were participating in democratic election of 1991) were victims of the murders (Jaime Pardo Leal, UP, Bernardo Jaramillo - UP, Luis Carlos Galan -Liberal Party; and Carlos Pizarro - M19).

In the early 1990s, the communities in the South Pacific boundary increased their expectations of the role of the nation-state. The student movement in the main cities of the country appropriated a political pact made with the M-19, with the purpose of promoting the election of a National Constituent Assembly. A diverse group of 70 representatives were elected to the Assembly to develop a new Political Constitution. Among the persons chosen were delegates of the demobilised guerrilla groups and member of the ethnic minorities. The Political Constitution of 1991 was implemented with the aim of crucially transforming the ideological domain of the state and the matrix of institutions that enforced the rules. One of the main principles that the new political constitution declared was the "pluriethnic" and multicultural character of the nation (Restrepo, 2002). The indigenous communities were considered part and parcel of the search for

a new order adjusted to the regional and environmental characteristics of the country. According to Agudelo (2001), the state supported this constitutional change based on the need for sustainable development and policies to protect the environmental wealth of Colombia. Thus, the 1991 Political Constitution granted territorial, political, economic and educational rights to indigenous peoples (Restrepo, 2002).

Unlike the indigenous population, the black population did not have representatives in the National Constituent Assembly (Restrepo, 2002). This lack of political participation motivated huge mobilisations of the black communities for territorial, cultural and socio-economic rights. The mobilisations of the black communities were based on a strategy of emulation of the indigenous communities (Hoffman, 2007, Restrepo, 2001, 2002). According to Young (1979), the emulation strategy accounts for situations in which cultural hierarchy patterns are rigid. In this sense, individuals and groups emulate communities with higher ranks to improve their situation. The identity awareness strategy involves conditions where the social hierarchy has weakened. So, social improvement can be perused “by mobilisation of communal identity, reinforcement of differentiation, and [a] culmination of economic, social, and political resources to alter the distribution of advantage” (Young, 1979, pp. 100-101).

In the South Pacific region, the emulation strategy of the black inhabitants was based on the process of mobilisation that began to emerge in the 1970s (see Chapter Three: The Emergence of Mobilisation). This strategy took into account the similarities between the territorial appropriation devices of the indigenous and black communities. These devices had facilitated the protection and recognition of this boundary of Colombia as a priority protection area (Restrepo 2001, 2002). The mobilisations based on the emulation strategy materialised in the Transitory Article 55 of the 1991 Political Constitution and thereafter in the Law 70 of 1993. Law 70 redefined the relationship between the nation-state system and the black communities. It granted collective rights over land and political rights to black communities in the Pacific region (Oslender, 2009). Specifically, Law 70 imposed duties to the nation-state on titling “las Tierras de las Comunidades Negras” (the Lands of the Black Communities) and to institutionalising “Los Consejos Comunitarios” (the Community Councils). The community councils were in charge of managing the collective lands. Therefore, Law 70 granted the same rights for both the black communities and the indigenous communities for the first time.

The identity pattern adopted by the black communities, emulating the identity discourse of ethnic communities, brought stimulating expectations in the search for greater material well-being and social status. According to Restrepo (2001, 2002), Transitory Article 55 was the catalyst of black mobilisation in the South Pacific region of Colombia. In this boundary, with the support of the Catholic Church, anthropologist scholars, and the incipient presence of NGOs, the black communities began to organise themselves under the logic of “territory”. With the legal changes of the early 1990s, this territory was understood to be under a new jurisdictional situation. The new situation contained conditions for accessing specific rights, concerning land, political representation and education (Hoffman, 2007). The territory designated geographic spaces, where local communities could claim collective property titles and political participation based on their ancestral occupation and traditional practices of relating to the environment (Restrepo, 2002). In this sense, throughout the rivers of this region of Colombia, organisational processes emerged where the local population strengthened its identity, appropriated the discourse of the black community and planned regional strategies. Among other issues, these strategies referred not only to the legal mechanisms of relating with the nation-state but also to the forms of resistance against the dispossession of lands and the adverse effects of the extractive economies (see Chapter Three). Thus, the 1991 Political Constitution, Transitory Article 55 and Law 70/93 brought stimulating expectations to the black communities. They inferred that the changes in the legal framework would allow for the transformation of the racial and classist way in which the national elites have been managing Colombia in the last two centuries.

4.1. Worsening of Welfare Disparities between the State arena and the South Pacific Boundary

Although the new legal framework of Colombia generated hope among communities of the South Pacific region in the 1990s, the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state worsened the disparities in well-being between the populations of the Andes Mountain range and the indigenous and black communities. In comparison to the main cities of the country (Bogotá, Medellín and Cali) where the average UBN was 10.7%, in the South Pacific region, it was 64% (see Appendix G. Map 4: UBN Incidence and Its Spatial Distribution in the Municipalities of the Pacific region of Colombia). In Bogotá, the coverage of aqueducts, sewage and garbage collection was 99.7%, 99.7% and 99.8% respectively (see Appendix H. Chart 4:

Coverage in Aqueduct, Sewerage and Waste Services). On the other hand, in the South Pacific boundary of Colombia, approximately only 36% of the population had public sewerage service, 38% had access to potable water, 5% had a formal job, and the multidimensional poverty index was 80% (Galvis, L., Moyano, L., & Alba, C., 2016). This situation matched the trend identified by the cultural pluralism framework. According to Young (1970), countries of the third world during the XX century increased the accumulation of resources of power in the central institutions of the state and sharpened the contrasts with their opposing socio-political zones.

In the 1990s, Buenaventura and Tumaco forged a cluster of social vulnerabilities. According to Hoffman (2007), due to the lack of public services and employment opportunities, the rural areas of the South Pacific region were able to retain only 25% of the female population and 33.3% of the male population. A significant proportion of women migrated to these two ports on the Pacific coast of Colombia since their children could have access to the public health care and education system. In these two places, approximately 45% of the females were the head of a family (Hoffman, 2007). Stephan Klasen, Tobias Lechtenfeld and Felix Povel (2011, p. 26) states that "female-headed households are often thought to be disadvantaged regarding the access to land, labour, credit and insurance markets, discriminated against by cultural norms and suffering from high dependency burdens, economic immobility and the 'double day burden' of the women heading them". Secondly, the male youth population created migration flows between Tumaco, Buenaventura and Cali, looking for job opportunities. In Cali, this population settled in marginalised areas. The former city was one of the main epicentres of the prime drug-trafficking cartels of Colombia in the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the lack of economic resources, the youth began to participate in criminality. However, this population had to return regularly to the main ports of the South Pacific boundary in search of refuge, since their lives were in danger due to the criminal struggles they suffered in Cali. It was estimated that almost 50% of the youth people returned to Buenaventura and Tumaco (Hoffman, 2007). In these two cities, the crime also began to grow. Thirdly, the national army confronted coca growers in the Department of Putumayo in the late 1990s, and these farmers migrated to Tumaco. The rural population of Tumaco soon became involved in the illegal cultivation of coca crops, succumbing to its profitability of (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b). Almarino (2004) states

that it was an exogenous crop that was not part of the agricultural tradition of the blacks and indigenous people, which profoundly altered ecosystems due to the manipulation of chemical products and introduced social values of capitalism that began to break the ties of solidarity among the rural inhabitants of this part of Colombia. Therefore, the persistent marginalisation of the region and the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state incubated social sectors without a commitment to the state and without means to guarantee a dignified life.

In the 1990s, the decentralisation assisted in empowering local political groups that inherited the predatory behaviour of extractive institutions that ruled the region before the recent constitutional changes. James A Robinson (2013, p. 2) states that “extractive political institutions are made up of two important dimensions. First, they allocate political power narrowly. Second, they feature a central state that is not strong in the sense that it cannot provide key public goods”. In the South Pacific Region, before the decentralisation reforms, the electoral politics centred on clientelist and corrupt management that assisted in strengthening “gamonal” bosses linked to the Liberal Political Party (Agudelo, 1999; Hoffman, 1999, 2007; Romero, 2014). Although the decentralisation policies assisted in fragmenting the political power of the Liberal Political Party, the new local elites were descendants of the local rulers that governed this territory since the beginning of the XX century (Hoffman, 2007). In the 1990s, the vote buying was a generalised political practice that was kept in this boundary of Colombia (Agudelo, 1999; Hoffman, 1999, 2007). The decentralisation did not produce a massive redistribution of political positions and it did not generate new electoral balances either (Hoffman, 2007). Soon, different mayors of this territory were involved in corruption scandals and were persecuted by the judicial institutions (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014). Furthermore, the decentralisation fragmented the direct relationship between the territories and the central state. Pardo (2014) affirms that decentralisation produced a type of representation in the public administration of these municipalities, which was the exclusive responsibility of the local mayors. The decentralisation also exacerbated the little interest of the national government in intervening in this territory. Therefore, the decentralisation created political dynamics of predatory behaviours and isolation that strengthened the contrasts between the material well-being and social status of the populations in the Andes mountain range and the one in the South Pacific boundary.

4.2. The Role of the International System in the Preservation of the Nation-State

Since the mid-1990s at the national level, guerrilla groups not only strengthened themselves militarily in marginal territories of Colombia, but they also extended armed controls to regions of interest of the dominant national elites. The frontal war against the powerful Colombian cartels preceded the military and economic strengthening of the guerrilla groups that took place in the 1990s (Agudelo, 2001). The guerrillas became important military structures that controlled different areas of Colombia. The FARC managed to attack institutions of the nation-state through military actions such as the destruction of barracks, assaults on police stations, restrictions on local politicians and the mass capture of soldiers and police officers, among other issues (Agudelo, 2001). Forrest Hylton (2010, p. 107) states that “the FARC attacked major Colombian military bases in the south in 1996-1997 using battalion-sized detachments”. These insurgent groups also managed to take control of strategic transit zones, such as the vital Bogotá - Buenaventura corridor.

The war against the drug cartels spawned a new generation of less powerful "mini-cartels". They requested the protection of their narcotics operations from the FARC. This request coincided with a process in which the FARC's leaders had decided to collect taxes from drug producers and traffickers. According to John Oti (2014, p. 3), "under the new policy, the FARC began charging a tax of 10 per cent per kilogram on the cocaine base, a crude form of cocaine produced from coca leaves and chemical substances that later turns into powder cocaine in laboratories of the rain forest. Likewise, control over the coca fields helped the FARC to gain control over the local peasants who saw the cocaine crops as a source of income. Thus, the strengthening of the FARC revealed the limited capacity of the institutions of the nation-state system to control the lifestyles of the inhabitants of the marginalised territories.

On the other hand, the paramilitary group known as Self-Defense United Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) also strengthened themselves militarily in relatively marginal territories (see Appendix I. Map 6. Change in the Territoriality of the AUC between 1997 and 2002). The genesis of the AUC was an organisational process between political and economic elites to confront the expansion of guerrillas in their territories of economic interest. The regional elites reacted to the lack of state protection and the uprising of the guerrillas by

supporting the paramilitary organisations (Ronderos, 2014). Subsequently, the paramilitaries were supported mainly by farmers, large landowners and drug traffickers. Then, the paramilitaries used the revenues of drug trafficking to expand into more prominent territories of the country (González *et al.*, 2003). Besides, the AUC competed actively with the guerrillas for the unequal access to new wealth, obtained by taxing coca leaf crops and the commercialisation of the coca base. The fact that the members of the AUC participated in the drug trafficking business resulted in confrontation between them and the guerrillas over the control of these economies in regions that were not a priority for the national elites. In the regions of open armed confrontation, the dynamics of the war produced a generalised scenario in which the guerrillas assumed control over rural areas and the paramilitaries over urban areas (Restrepo, 2005).

Under a scenario in which the guerrillas and paramilitary groups strengthened their military controls and economic capacities, the international system of states became interested in the situation of fragility within which the national army of Colombia had to face the conflict. Colombia in different international arenas was catalogued as a failed state. In 1998, the presidential candidate of the Conservative Party of Colombia, Andrés Pastrana, came to power announcing a peace platform, where he promised to exchange a militarised zone of 16,200 hectares to establish a negotiation process with the FARC (Hylton, 2010). This peace negotiation failed in the middle of several events, which included: 1– Repeated messages from the guerrilla and the national government to stop the negotiation process. 2- The resignation of 14 high-ranking military officers, the Minister of Defence and the High Commissioner for Peace. 3- The economic strengthening of the FARC through coca resources. 4- The FARC implemented extensive plans for the kidnapping of civilians and state officials. They targeted not only prominent politicians and businesspeople from regional and national elites but also peasants and children. 5 – The FARC also implemented generalised plans of forced recruitment and installed landmines in several marginalised territories.

The failed peace negotiation and the lack of capacities of the national army assisted the elites of the nation-state in connecting international security concerns with its domestic cultural environment. The failed negotiation was attributed to the fact that the FARC used the territories offered by the state for the wrong purposes. They turned them into an empire of coca crops, a hiding place for the kidnapped military and civilians, and a platform to launch military

operations against other regions of the country (Tamayo, 2018). Furthermore, the FARC was able to advance militarily to the main cities of the country located in the Andes mountain range and put at risk the political and economic control of the national elites in these areas. In this sense, the national government initiated a diplomatic strategy to request the support of the international community to face its severe crisis. On the other hand, the government of the United States recognised the increasingly close relationship that existed between the drug trafficking business and the Colombian armed conflict (Duro, 2002). The fact that the guerrilla groups were involved in drug trafficking activities was the port of entry for the participation of the US in this violent dispute. Charles Wilhelm, head of the Southern Command, stated that the justification for the United States to support the Colombian government was that its national army could not respond to the country's challenges (Duro, 2002). The "Plan Colombia" (Colombia Plan) became the mechanism through which the US began to support the modernisation of the national army. Through this plan, "Colombia became the leading recipient of US military and police assistance, replacing Turkey [in 1999]" (Chomsky, 2001). The military program included arms, military training, and intelligence infrastructure, among other components. Thus, the elites of the nation-state sought the support of the US, relating this to the circumstance that the FARC put their control at risk in the Andes mountain range and with the fact that the guerrilla groups were involved in the drug business.

4.3. The Commencement of the Armed Conflict in the South Pacific Boundary of Colombia

In the 1990s, the national army had a limited presence in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The Colombian Navy was in charge of this territory (Godoy, 2007). The Pacific Naval Force had its headquarters at Buenaventura. In the South Pacific boundary, the navy had operational control over the naval base in Bahía Malaga (Department of Valle del Cauca), the Marine Corps Infantry Brigade in Buenaventura (Department of Valle del Cauca), and the Marine Corps Fluvial Brigade in Tumaco (Department of Narino). According to Eliecer Buritica (former marine in the South Pacific region), although the naval base in Bahía Málaga had a sophisticated military infrastructure, this armed force was in charge of approximately 83,000 square kilometers and its military capacity was not sufficient to control this extensive territory (E. Buritica, Personal Communication, January 11, 2019). In this sense, Almario (2004) argued that although Bahía

Málaga had a modern military base, this military complex did not produce any territorial advantage to control the increase of illicit crops and the displacement of the armed conflict to this region.

The fact that there were no significant amounts of coca crops in the South Pacific region, kept the territory marginalised of the armed conflict in the early 1990s. At this point, it is important to note that the FARC considered the South Pacific of Colombia as a rear-guard region. In this territory, the population did not experience the effects of the armed conflict as dramatically as were occurring in other areas of the country (Agudelo, 2001). But it does not mean that the indigenous and black populations were not facing other effects of the armed confrontation. Initially, the members of guerrilla groups came from different regions of the country. But, to the extent that the illegal armed group settled in the territory, it began to incorporate the native inhabitants. Thus, civilians became victims of widespread and systematic forced recruitment plans. As a result of the fact that the extent that the armed groups involved more local inhabitants in their lines, the locals were not only victims of the war, but also became perpetrators (Agudelo, 2001). In the plans of the guerrillas to overthrow the national government, the proselytising strategies lost relevance.

The paramilitary was the armed group that began to challenge the guerrillas' territorial control over the Pacific region. From the North Pacific region, the indigenous and black communities felt the threat posed by the AUC as an armed group. In this part of the Pacific region (this territory currently corresponds to the Administrative Department of Chocó), local communities' experienced brutal violence (Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004; Sanchez, 2004). This paramilitary group used the strategy of not directly confronting the members of the guerrilla. Instead, its military plan consisted of exterminating the civilian supporters of the guerrillas. This plan involved violent actions such as numerous massacres, murders, territorial dispossessions, and forced displacements, among other events of violence (Agudelo, 2001). According to Carlos Rosero (2002 in Almario, 2004), the forced displacements occurred as soon as the state granted collective titles to the black and indigenous communities. Furthermore, the armed conflict generated distrust and affected the ties of solidarity between the black and indigenous communities in the North Pacific region of Colombia (Sanchez, 2004).

In the late 1990s, the escalation of the internal armed conflict began appeared as an obstacle to the ethnic communities' expectations concerning the rights recognised by the state in the South Pacific boundary of Colombia. Armed groups, cartels and smugglers targeted the complex geography of the Pacific region as a strategic corridor between the centre of Colombia and the Pacific Ocean (Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004; Hoffman, 2007). These criminal organisations started to use the Pacific territory as a vital corridor for drug trafficking, mobilising troops, and extracting raw materials. Around this corridor, an economic market was created based on the income that produced the illegal activities. The Pacific territory offered clandestine conditions to distribute these illicit economies throughout the region. The presence of the national army was too minimal to cover the complexities of the area. In this scenario, the guerrilla groups obtained a strategic positioning because they had arrived before and did know how to control the rivers and their populations (Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Hoffman, 2007; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c). The first identified murder of an HRD took place in Tumaco in 1997. Francisco Hurtado (Representative of the Black Community Council of Alto Mira y Frontera) was assassinated in the hamlet of El "Pital" when he was completing the required census to have access to the collective land title (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Mena, 2016). Hurtado was also struggling against the harmful effects of the extractive economies in its territory (Mena, 2016). Thereby, the communities of the South Pacific region began to feel the armed conflict was imminent.

The historical dynamics of marginalising the South Pacific revealed the oppressive incompetence of how the state reacted to protect local communities in the South Pacific region against the risks represented by the armed conflict. The ports of Buenaventura and Tumaco were the epicentre, where the armed conflict entered into the Pacific region. The arrival of the AUC in Buenaventura, Tumaco, and Barbacoas coincided with mass displacements from surrounding rural areas (Almario, 2004; Arboleda, 2004; Berube, 2004; González, 2004; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016c). In these municipalities, the crime began to grow and moved to the urban areas in the presence of weak national army. The national armed forces reacted only to the vicissitudes of the conflict with the guerrillas, but not to guarantee the safety of the cultural communities in these cities of the South Pacific region (Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004).

High levels of social vulnerabilities arose in Buenaventura and Tumaco grew. The legacy of marginalisation in these ports revealed historical institutional fallacies related to the national identity discourse and its racist aspects (see Chapter 3). These institutional fallacies also displayed the limited capacity of the state to prevent armed confrontation. For González *et al.* (2003) these limited capacities depicted the state's role in resolving conflicts, providing opportunities, influencing society, alleviating poverty, democratising the power, and preventing and prosecuting predatory behaviours. Arturo Escobar (2003) describes the situations that followed this armed incursion as the process that turned the Pacific region into a bloody theatre of violence. He argued that it was the most significant aggression against ethnic communities in the last 150 years in Colombia (Escobar 2003).

Until now, this chapter employed the cultural pluralism framework to comprehend the reason why the armed conflict and the murder of HRDs appeared in the South Pacific region in the 1990s. The chapter focused on exploring the role played by the nation-state in promoting four dynamics of vulnerability. Firstly, I analysed the way in which the communities escalated their expectations of the role of the state. Secondly, I explored how the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state worsened the disparities of well-being between the state arena and its contradictory socio-political zones. Thirdly, I focused on how the nation-state connected international security concerns with its national cultural environment. Finally, I reviewed how the armed conflict entered the South Pacific boundary.

Overall, the 1990s was the gateway period that allowed the confrontation that emerged in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. In the 1990s, the state played a crucial role in the promotion of the armed conflict because it created conditions of development similar to those anticipated by the theoretical framework of Young (1982). Firstly, Colombia experienced a complicated situation in which the national elites developed critical political reforms. The 1991 Constitution implemented ideological transformations, and the indigenous communities were considered an integral part of the search for a new socio-political order. The lack of political participation of the black communities motivated large mobilisations, targeting territorial, cultural and socioeconomic rights. These mobilisations materialised in the Transitory Article 55 of the 1991 Constitution and after that in Law 70 of 1993. In the South Pacific region of Colombia emerged organisational processes where the local population strengthened its identity, appropriated the

discourse of the black community and planned regional strategies. Thus, the new legal reforms brought stimulating expectations to the black and indigenous communities. They inferred that the changes in the legal framework would allow for the transformation of the racial and classist way in which the national elites have been managing Colombia in the last two centuries.

Secondly, although the new legal framework of Colombia generated hope among the black and indigenous communities of the South Pacific region in the 1990s, the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state worsened the disparities in well-being between the populations of the Andes Mountain range and the indigenous and black communities. Under the structural conditions of marginalisation of the South Pacific region, in Buenaventura and Tumaco appeared a cluster of social vulnerabilities. 1- A significant proportion of the female rural population migrated to these two ports on the Pacific coast of Colombia and became the head of a family. 2- The male youth population created migratory flows between Tumaco, Buenaventura and Cali, and they began to participate in crime. 3- The rural communities of Tumaco succumbed to the profitability of coca crops that had migrated from the Department of Putumayo. 4- The decentralisation policies only assisted in empowering local political groups that inherited the predatory behaviour of the extractive institutions that ruled the region before the recent constitutional changes. Thus, the persistent marginalisation of this boundary and the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state created social sectors without a commitment to the nation-state.

Thirdly, the elites of the nation-state sought the support of the US, relating this to the circumstance that the FARC put their control at risk in the Andes mountain range and with the fact that the guerrilla groups were involved in the drug business. Through the resources channelled by Plan Colombia, the US supported the modernisation of the national army with logistical and financial assistance to put in place plans to combat drug trafficking. Therefore, the Colombian army was another armed actor that began to target the South Pacific region as an area in which its enemies strengthened their financial and military strategies.

Finally, the historical dynamics of marginalising the South Pacific revealed the oppressive incompetence of how the state reacted to protect local communities in the South Pacific region against the risks represented by the armed conflict. Armed groups, cartels and smugglers targeted

the complex geography of the South Pacific region as a strategic zone between the centre of Colombia and the Pacific Ocean. The presence of the national army was too minimal to cover the complexities of the area. The violence appeared as a threat to the ethnic communities' expectations concerning the rights recognised by the state. Thus, the HRD of the Black Community Council of Alto Mira y Frontera was the victim of murder in Tumaco, when he fought for collective rights over land.

Fifth Chapter: Research Findings

This study sets out to apply the cultural pluralism framework to understand the emergence not only of the armed conflict but also of the homicides of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s. In this sense, this chapter aims to explore how the analysis of the causes of the armed conflict assists in understanding these acts of selective political violence took place in the territorial scope of the present study. The homicides against HRDs in the context of armed conflicts are events related to the phenomenon of violence that have not been analysed entirely in the field of Development Studies. Nonetheless, the humanitarian aid sector has developed significant amounts of humanitarian reports on Colombia and this particular region, which address information related to the violence against HRDs in the context of the armed confrontation. The predominant rationality of the humanitarian literature that has considered the attacks on HRDs employed approaches to violence, based on the rational-choice theory and the research agenda promoted by the dominant institutions of development, such as the WB and the IMF (see Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review).

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) is engaged in the humanitarian aid sector and it provides assistance, which targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries (OECD, 2018). The ODA and the international donor community are dominated by development assumptions that support an ideological agenda led by institutions such as the WB and the IMF (see Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review). Fine and Saad-Filho (2014, p.4) affirm that this agenda promotes a dominant notion of development that rigidly adheres "to the deductive and formal methods of mainstream neoclassical economics which, supposedly, only need to be applied to specific fields among them economic development". During the 1990s and 2000s, the agenda of the WB and IMF promoted a development perspective, which was intolerant of alternative justifications, and which assumed that facts by themselves describe the realities behind development problems (Bensted, 2011, Fine and Saad-Filho, 2014, Stein, 2008).

Consequently, the recommendations of Collier to deal with armed conflicts were supported by institutional agendas of the WB and the IMF (Bensted, 2011). Collier situated his economist

theory of violence in a dominant position within scholarly debates of peace and conflict. Although this theory did not significantly address the role of the state in the promotion of violence; it did put forward rational-choice concepts to understand economic rationalities in the armed conflicts, which justify through deductive and formal methods what it was happening at the grassroots levels (to see Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review). In this sense, the work of Collier strongly influenced the humanitarian reports on armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia. Following Collier's work, these fundamentally analysed the persistence of conflict in the region as arising from competition between armed groups to control resources in the illegal economy (see Chapter 1: Literature Review).

This study seeks to move out from the theoretical orbit of the humanitarian reports on armed conflict, in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The theoretical intention involves outlining the ways in which the cultural pluralism framework contributes in recognizing how the dynamics of marginalisation of the South Pacific boundary influenced the emergence of widespread violence and murders of HRDs in the 2000s. The study also uses scenarios. The scenarios help to explain how social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created contradictions with the legal and illegal armed groups that settled in this territory. Thus, the following discussion focus on the application of the cultural pluralism framework to understand the historical dynamics of the competition for power that characterized this territory, wherein not only the armed conflict and illicit economies flourished, but also the murders of HRDs.

The analysis and interpretation of data are carried out in four parts. I start by referring to the cultural pluralism framework to understand how the nature of the historical dynamics of development made it possible for the nation-state to create an environment of vulnerability. This part discusses how the legacies of marginalisation contributed to the emergence of armed conflict in this territorial boundary. The first part also demonstrates how the pattern of vulnerabilities to armed conflict highlighted by Young's theoretical framework (1979, 1982, 2004), shows the role that the state played in the promotion of the violence that emerged in the 1990s. I then discuss the facts put forward by the humanitarian literature in relation to the dynamics of power and the three demographic sectors identified through the framework of cultural pluralism. The second part focuses on highlighting how these sectors provided a

breeding ground for the brutal violence that took root in the 2000s. Next, I discuss how the nature of the historical dynamics of development led by the nation-state assisted in creating environments conducive to the violence that arose against HRDs of this boundary. The third part concerns the central standpoint of the analysis that outlines the response to the third research question. The third part comprises of an analysis of the relationship between the events of violence against the population of this study's focus, and the three social demographic sectors. The third part also involves exploring how the models of government promoted by the central elites contributed to scenarios conducive to the violence against representatives of civil organizations in this territory. Lastly, I outline the broad findings of this chapter of results and discussions.

With the aforementioned in mind, this research report tries to show that: the homicides against HRDs in the context of armed conflicts are events related to the phenomenon of violence that provide crucial clues, which have not been entirely addressed in the field of Development Studies. On the other hand, the cultural pluralism framework contributes to identifying the dynamics of development that are not sharply considered in the humanitarian reports that follow the research agenda of the dominant institutions of development. Furthermore, this theoretical approach provides fitting enlightenment on how the development promoted by the nation-state could be linked to the outbreak of the widespread violence and murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s.

5.1. The Cultural Pluralism Framework and the path to Emergence of Widespread Violence in the 2000s

This result chapter in the first part employs this theoretical framework to understand how the nature of the historical dynamics of development made it possible for the nation-state to create an environment of vulnerability that explains the causes of the armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The first research question asked: "Why does the widespread violence and murders of HRDs erupt at a particular historical point in the South Pacific Region of Colombia?" This involved analysing academic and humanitarian literature to determine if the historical trends of discrimination and marginalisation of the state towards the communities in this Colombian boundary contributed to delay its territorial development. A related research

question asked “Why the 1990s were a gateway period that allowed the entrance of the armed conflict and murders of HRDs in the 2000s?” This related research question involved following the pattern identified by Young (1979, 1982, 2004) as a risk related vulnerability of armed conflict in particular boundaries. This pattern allowed for the study of particular scenery in which the sovereign of the nation-state promoted four dynamics of vulnerability: firstly, the communities escalated their expectations of the role of the state; secondly, the pattern of development driven by the institutions of the state worsened the disparities of well-being between the state arena and its contradictory socio-political zones; thirdly, the nation-state connected international security concerns with its national cultural environment (Young, 1979). In the above condition of institutional development, it was highly likely that the state contribute to make this territory vulnerable to the rise of the widespread violence.

To sum up the discussion of the data in response to the first research question: “Why does the widespread violence and murders of HRDs erupt at a particular historical point in the South Pacific Region of Colombia?” The findings that involved the historical study of the dynamics of development, contemplated the interpretation of the markers and main categories that form the basis of the analysis of the Cultural Pluralism framework (see Methodology and Theoretical framework). This interpretation considered three periods that correspond to the state sovereignty. That is, (i) the colonial state (from 1572 to 1818), (ii) the post-colonial state (from 1819 to 1989) and (iii) the modern state (in the last decade of the XX century). The analysis of the latest period considered not only that this was the period in which the foundations of the modern state of Colombia were established, but also that it was the period in which an environment of vulnerability was created that allowed the appearance of the armed conflict and murder cases of HRDs. The following section explains the historical dynamics of the emergence of violence in the three periods of the state.

(i) The Colonial State

The exploration of the colonial period showed that the Spanish sovereignty established the foundations of the treatment that the nation-state has given to the South Pacific region (See Chapter 2). The conqueror-imposed sovereignty based on a racist ideology and exclusionary regime. Between 1572 and 1818, the colonial rulers showed interest in benefiting from the

extraction of gold, but not in the colonisation of the South Pacific territory (Almario, 2009; Aprile-Gnisset, 2004; Rodríguez, 2008). On the other hand, the black and indigenous communities managed to resist the domination of the slavery system. These communities fought to liberate themselves and established a parallel society in broad areas of the rain forest in this region (Almario, 2004; Burgos, 2003, Guevara, 2014).

(ii) The Post-colonial Period

During the first period of the post-colonial period (from 1819 to 1889), the leaders of independence movement developed a state project based on a system of racial stratification that instituted a notion of relative equality among the population of the interior of the country, maintaining the marginalisation and discrimination over the black and indigenous territories (Hernández, 2012; González, 2015; Guevara, 2014). The sovereignty practised by the elites of the nation-state framed the South Pacific boundary of Colombia between 1890 and 1989. On this boundary, a tense scenario of antagonistic mechanisms of territorial appropriation began to emerge (see Chapter 3: The South Pacific Boundary).

The regional transformations that occurred between 1819 and 1989 revealed the existence of opposing identities and perspectives on development (Almario, 2009; April-Ginset, 2004; Hoffman, 1997, 2002, 2007). The black and indigenous communities established fluvial and agricultural mechanisms to colonise the rain forest. The white and mestizo populations, on the other hand, led an extractive economy. The nation-state's matrix of institutions not only promoted the external appropriation of the land, but they also failed to address the demographic transformations that occurred in this region in the 1970s (see Chapter 3: The South Pacific Boundary). Under this context, bonds of collective solidarity and cultural identity began to emerge between the communities. The indigenous and black populations not only realised that the historical conditions that allowed their existence was at risk, but they also understood that, due to the negative connotations attributed to their race, their populations had limited opportunities to benefit from the resources and services offered by the state (Agudelo, 2001; Hoffman, 1997, 2002; Restrepo, 2002, Wade, 2009). Although this boundary of Colombia experienced few manifestations of violence in this period, the investments of the drug cartels appeared in the region and the guerrilla groups used the territory as a refuge area since the 1970s

(Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Hoffman, 2007; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c).

(iii) The Modern State

The 1990s was the gateway period that allowed the confrontation that emerged in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. In the 1990s, the state played a crucial role in the promotion of the armed conflict because it created conditions of development similar to those anticipated by the theoretical framework of Young (1982) (see Chapter 4). Firstly, the local communities escalated their expectations about the role of the state. Secondly, the national power operated at this territorial boundary not only marginalising black and indigenous communities but it also incubating social sectors without commitments to the state and without means to guarantee a dignified life. Thirdly, the state did not address the fact that different armed groups targeted the complex geography of the South Pacific region as a strategic area for military and economic purposes (Agudelo, 2001; Almario, 2004; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Hoffman, 2007; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c). Finally, the national government connected the international security concerns with its national cultural environment (see Chapter 4).

In the late 1980s, Colombia's political stability was affected by a critical situation of violence that involved different drug cartels, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. In 1991, the state developed a new Political Constitution to overcome the overwhelming armed confrontation. The 1991 Political Constitution offered a legal framework that expanded the participation of different social groups and recognized the diversity of the Colombian population (Agudelo, 2001; Hoffman, 2007; Restrepo, 2001, 2002). Besides that, the state through Law 70 of 1993 granted autonomy and territorial rights to the black communities of the Pacific region of Colombia (Agudelo, 2001; Hoffman, 2007; Restrepo, 2001, 2002). Promptly, the inhabitants of the South Pacific region led social mobilisations to address not only the recognized rights but also to search for greater material well-being and social status. Thereby, as it is indicated by Young's theoretical framework (1979, 1982), the black and indigenous populations increased their expectations about the role of the state. These populations inferred that the normative changes would transform the racist form in which the national elites have governed Colombia in the last two centuries.

In the 1990s, the main ports of the South Pacific region, the population experienced not only high rates of poverty, destitution and unsatisfied basic needs but also a limited access to domiciliary public services such as health and education (see Section 4.1 and Appendix G). Although the nation-state institutions had increased its capacities to penetrate the peripheral regions, the pattern of development driven by the national elites sharpened the disparity between populations settled in the Andes mountain range and in the South Pacific region. The persistent marginalisation of the region incubated social sectors without a commitment to the state and without means to guarantee a dignified life (Almario, 2004; Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Hoffman, 2007). Besides this, the decentralization only assisted in empowering local political groups that inherited the predatory behaviour of extractive institutions that ruled the region before the recent constitutional changes (See Chapter 4).

The possibility of the internal armed conflict appeared as a threat to the ethnic communities' expectations concerning the rights recognized by the state. Armed groups, cartels and smugglers targeted the complex geography of the South Pacific region as a strategic zone between the centre of Colombia and the Pacific Ocean. The difficulties in accessing this rain forest and the limited presence of the national army to cover the territory offered clandestine conditions for the different types of violent actors. The rivers and estuaries offered opportunities to be used for the mobilization of troops, the smuggling of weapons and as a refuge area. The dense forests also offered a hidden environment for the expansion of illicit crops, drug trafficking and the extraction of raw materials (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013). Besides that, the guerrilla groups had learned to control the rivers and their populations (see Sections 3.4 and 4.3)

In the international arena, there were concerns about the lack of capacities of the Colombian state to confront the threats represented by drug cartels and guerrilla groups. The force of the international system was crucial in supporting the national institutions to recover the public order. Through the resources channelled by the Plan Colombia, the US supported the modernization of the national army with logistical and financial assistance to put in place plans to combat drug trafficking (Chomsky, 2001; Duro, 2002; Hylton, 2010). Thus, the Colombian

army was another armed actor that began targeted the South Pacific region as an area in which its enemies strengthened their financial and military strategies (see Section 4.3).

In summary, the analysis showed that the South Pacific region experienced a precarious condition of institutional development and it was highly likely that marginalisation by the nation-state would contribute to making this region vulnerable to the emergence of the armed conflict in the 1990s. The political analysis of the colonial, post-colonial and modern states showed cultural controls and power trajectories that overlapped to explain the precarious situation of development in this region of Colombia. The state building process played a crucial role in the historical trends of power that overlap in the marginalisation of this territory. This process revealed nuances of why the matrix of state institutions did not address the vulnerability factors experienced by the communities of this region in the 1990s. In this boundary, the black and indigenous groups experienced a precarious presence of the institutions of the central state. The indifference of the central state towards the South Pacific territory remained rooted in the connotations of racial segregation. Thus, this territory faced a process of autochthonous development. By the late 1990s, the sovereignty established by the Criolla elites had created territorial conditions of marginalisation and isolation in which the armed conflict and the assassinations of HRDs emerged.

The findings of this research's first part were critically analysed in several existing studies of the academic literature that links the delayed development in the South Pacific boundary with the historical discrimination and marginalisation promoted by the nation-state (see Chapters 2 and 3). This study's findings contrast with the predominant rationality of the humanitarian literature (see Introduction and Literature Review), which does not clearly consider how the historical drivers of the development in this region contributed to frame the outbreak of the widespread violence that involved the murders of the HRDs.

5.2. The Armed Conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s: social realities behind the facts identified by the humanitarian reports

This result chapter in the second part characterizes social realities behind the facts identified by the humanitarian. These characterizations follow the pattern of social sectors analysed within the cultural pluralism framework. These characterizations seek to approximate the understanding of

why the armed conflict and the murders of HRDS took root in this territory of Colombia in the 2000s. The second research question was: “How does the cultural pluralism framework explain the emergence of widespread violence and the murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia? This second research involved confronting the strength of the findings identified by the humanitarian reports on South Pacific region with the ones identified through the analysis of the three social sectors illustrated by the cultural pluralism framework. The main data forming the basis of this discussion is humanitarian reports on areas of the South Pacific region that addressed this decade (see Methodology).

The second part is discussed in three phases. Firstly, I focus the facts identified by the humanitarian reports through deductive and formal methods used in the agenda of the dominant institutions of development. Secondly, I highlight the connection between the complex environment in which the armed conflict prospered and the “lumpenproletariat”, “peasantry”, petty “bourgeoisie” and “magendo”¹ sectors. Thirdly, I assess the facts identified by the humanitarian reports on South Pacific region in relation to the dynamics of development and the social sectors distinguished through the cultural pluralism framework.

5.2.1. Facts identified by the humanitarian literature about the Armed Conflict in this boundary in the 2000s.

In the first phase, this study focuses on the facts identified by the humanitarian reports that addressed the violence in this region of Colombia in the 2000s. These reports fit logically with the theories of Collier and the deductive and formal methods used in the agenda of the dominant institutions of development. This humanitarian literature identifies facts of the violence in this territory, seeking functionalist aspects that are intimately related to the processes of economic calculation of costs and benefits, carried out by the armed groups that were involved in this territorial confrontation. These facts reveal aspects that are based on the hypothesis of opportunism (greed) against injustices (grievances) to explain the causes of the armed conflict in

¹ The characterisation of the magendo sector was not included in the central analysis of this research report since the connotations of this social group have high levels of permeability with the aspects that were framed in the characterisation of the other three sectors or groups. This permeability hindered the operationalisation of the characterisation of this social sector in the purpose of this study. The Appendix J contains an approximation to the magendo sector in the South Pacific region in the 2000s.

this boundary. To summarize the discussion on the facts identified by the humanitarian literature, the following four facts highlight the main drivers that explain the course that took the violence in the South Pacific region in this decade.

(i) The increase in drug trafficking played a crucial role in the viability of violence.

The coca crops migrated to the South Pacific Region from the Department of Putumayo. The migration of coca crops was a consequence of the military offensive that the national army initiated through the “Plan Colombia” (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b). Since the period in which the crops had migrated, the number of hectares planted increased continuously and the South Pacific of Colombia probably became the region of the world that produced the largest amount of coca paste (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c). Almario (2004) states that, according to the military analysis of this period, the resources mobilized by the Pacific region represented approximately 70% of the profits required by the irregular forces (guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug traffickers) to finance the war against the nation-state. The greatest number of coca crops planted in this region was found in the municipalities of Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas, with 5.065, 4.433, and 1.681 hectares planted respectively in 2010 (see Appendix K. Map 7: Density of coca cultivation in Colombia in 2010). These municipalities are located over the only two road corridors that exist in the area. Although in the other municipalities of the South Pacific region a significant amount of coca hectares is also produced, the production is proportionally lower than in Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas.

The strategic position of the Departments of Cauca, Narino and Valle del Cauca favoured the cultivation and commercialization of narcotics (Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c). The ports of Buenaventura and Tumaco played a crucial role in the drug trafficking business. In these ports all phases of cocaine production were developed. These phases include the coca crops; the preparation of the base paste; and the transformation of the base paste into cocaine hydrochloride. A large number of laboratories were also installed in these two municipalities (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b). In these places the leaves of coca were stored, crushed and dried. These laboratories

were also used to develop chemical processes in which the crushed leaf was mixed with gasoline, acetone, ammonia, caustic soda and sulfuric acid to produce coca paste base.

(ii) The presence of the armed groups converged with the increase of the illicit crops.

The guerrillas slowly withdrew from the centre of the country to the municipalities of the South Pacific region, seeking refuge and achieving a crucial influence in the rural area. The paramilitary groups also entered into the zone and consolidated their presence mainly in Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas. The paramilitary incursion unleashed a wave of violence in the territorial dispute with the guerrillas (see Section 4.3 and Appendix L. Map 8). After the mobilization of the paramilitary groups, several armed structures arose that caused different confrontations between them and the guerrillas for the control of illicit economies (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c). As of 2006, there was a deployment by the national army to tackle the FARC, which had strengthened in this area since 2000, and to occupy the space left by the demobilized paramilitaries (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016c).

(iii) The logic of armed confrontation can be linked to disputes over the control strategic corridors.

The strategic corridors offered advantages to control the illicit economies and occupy a privileged position to lead the war (see Appendix L. Map 7. Strategic Corridors in Nariño between 1990 and 2008). The corridors were the primary source of mobility in the area since they formed a complex network that was distributed throughout the South Pacific geography (See Chapter 4). They also allowed the connection between the interior of the country and the Pacific Ocean. These corridors were used to transport chemical compounds to make drugs, weapons and cocaine, among other illicit items (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c).

(iv) The humanitarian reports showed that the competition to control the rents of drug trafficking increased the violence rates.

The intervention of the armed groups brought all kinds of acts of violence such as homicides, massacres, tortures, forced disappearances, forced displacements, gender-based violence,

minefields, mobility restrictions and looting, among others. In the South Pacific region, the homicide rate grew constantly between 2000 and 2010, while the national homicide rate dropped steadily (See Appendix N: Chart 4). The highest murder rates were registered in 2001 and 2006. These peaks of violence coincided with the paramilitary incursion and the emergence of new armed structures after the leaders of the paramilitary groups negotiated their demobilization with the state. According to the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences of Colombia (2007), in Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas in 2006 the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 151, 124 and 61 respectively. Besides that, it is estimated that 85% of homicides were committed against people ranging from 17 to 34 years, and of this percentage, the highest number of victims was between 17 and 24 years (Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013).

5.2.2. The Pattern of Social Sectors and the Armed Conflict in the South Pacific Region in the 2000s

In the second phase, this study focuses on characterizing social realities behind the facts identified by the humanitarian reports. These characterizations follow the pattern of social sectors analysed within the cultural pluralism framework. These characterizations seek to approximate the understanding of why the armed conflict and the murders of HRDS took root in this territory of Colombia in the 2000s. The second research question was “How does the cultural pluralism framework explain the emergence of widespread violence and the murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia?” The exploration of historical dynamics that preceded the period of the outbreak of violence provided insights into the character of the socio-political dynamics that made it possible for the nation-state to create an environment conducive to violence (See Chapter 4). The social pattern identified by Young’s (1982) cultural pluralism framework involved understanding the development field as a dynamic area of knowledge. Young’s theoretical framework boosted the analysis of a highly contested phenomenon in international politics that it has been incorporated into several investigations across the social sciences and in the field of development studies (see Literature Review).

The cultural pluralism framework moves out from the theoretical orbit of the dominant institutions of development. In this approach, the feasibility of new disputes revealed levels of inclusion and exclusion of regions that might foster new patterns of cultural self-identification. In this case study, the pattern confronts how Colombia's national elites promoted dynamics of

marginalisation that contributed to the emergence of three demographic segments being highly conducive to participating in and exacerbating the pace of violence. These three new social sectors spotlighted in the conceptual framework share the characteristic of having both, weak collective consciousness and weak commitment to the state's matrix of institutions.

In this boundary of Colombia, the lumpen-proletariat sector, the peasantry sector and the petty bourgeoisie sector seem to be a determining factor in the permanence and exacerbation of violence. These social sectors have meaningful economic and political connotations for the purpose of studies in the field of development studies and peace building processes. The political conditions of these social sectors have been analysed extensively in development literature (Young, 1979). In the South Pacific territory, the three demographic sectors participated actively and in diverse ways in the illicit economies and in the multiple strategies of war performed by the armed groups. Thus, through the social pattern identified by Young (1982), this research highlighted the links between the nature of these three social sectors and the course of the violence that took place in this Colombian boundary in the 2000s.

To summarize the discussion about the social realities behind the facts identified by the humanitarian reports, in the second phase characterizes a cluster of three demographic sectors that were a breeding ground for the brutal violence that took root in the main cities of the South Pacific region in the 2000s. The primary data that form the basis of the following analysis are interviews and fieldwork observations included in the humanitarian literature studied (see Methodology).

(i) The Lumpenproletariat Sector

In the region, a large proportion of the urban population conforms to the social pattern regarded as the "unemployment lumpen-proletarian sector". The connotations of the unemployment lumpen-proletarian sector were identified mainly among the young black population located in Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas. The limited opportunities faced by this population forced them to pursue enough to survive with unwavering determination. Therefore, it seems that the structural marginalisation of the nation-state made this population highly vulnerable to succumbing to illicit economies and armed actors.

The Diocese of Tumaco (2009, p.39) gave the following account from the observation of the dynamics wherein the lumpenproletariat resided during the period in which widespread violence emerged:

Currently, it is known that the son is still a child or a young man that left his studies looking to be part of the bonanza, and now he walks with a gold chain and expensive sneakers, a wad of money and a weapon in his pocket... It is also known about the young woman who is dazzled by the money that awaits her after the sale of her body, the young man in the neighbourhood who takes drugs to learn to kill; the brothels that open their doors in the last corners of the rivers... During 2008, we observed the new pyramid scheme businesses with people expecting exorbitant rents, while the morgue in the cemetery was not enough for so many corpses. We also saw teenage gangs of in Satinga and the children who slept in the streets of Tumaco. Those things ten years ago were unknown on this coast of Nariño.

Among the population with connotations of the unemployment lumpen-proletarian sector there was a concentration of 85% of the murders (Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013). The population in this demographic segment was extremely involved in armed structures that emerged after the demobilization of the paramilitary groups and which abounded in Buenaventura, Tumaco and Barbacoas. These armed structures extensively controlled the local economy, charged extortion, imposed "overcharges" on trade in agricultural products and decided who could enter goods in the marketplaces. The neighbourhood stores were also forced to pay surcharges. These forms of rent extraction recruited many young people into activities of extortion (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia 2014, 2016b, 2016c. Males from 14 and 16 years of age began to be employed to receive the payments of the local inhabitants (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c). These extortion activities encouraged youth could violently coerce the victims. On the other hand, in these three cities of the South Pacific region, the competition among the armed structures that emerged after the demobilization of the paramilitaries created territorial confrontations (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016b, 2016c). The territorial confrontations revolved around disputes to ensure control of areas where armed structures could monopolize the profits of extortion and the management of other illicit activities. The confrontations produced "invisible borders" between the neighbourhoods populated mostly by people characterized as

lumpenproletariat. The armed structures defended their control within these borders with cruelty. Within these highly marginalized urban areas, black youths were used as sentinels to control the entry or exit of people in these borders and informants faced a serious risk of losing their lives (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c).

The increase in illicit economies influenced changes in the daily lives of women in the South Pacific region, which contributed to the rise in prostitution. With the arrival of coca crops, there was a loss of values among the young black women (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b). In the region, many brothels were created where minor girls were involved, mainly from urban areas. Sexually transmitted diseases grew among the female segment of the lumpen-proletarian sector. This population belonged to households that experienced extreme economic difficulties which inhibited them from guaranteeing their survival (Galvis et al., 2016). More than 20% of the women in Tumaco, Buenaventura and Barbacoas lived in markedly crowded conditions (Galvis et al., 2016). The notorious increase of members of the national army, armed groups and people seeking to be employed in the illicit economies, made the female black youths highly vulnerable to criminal cycles. Also, Galvis et al. (2016) affirm that this region became the territory of Colombia in which the women had the highest possibility of being victims of homicide in 2010. This last point highlighted by Galvis et al. (2016) has a logical coherence with the development environment in which black women grew up in these two cities in the 2000s.

In the region, there were many types of brothels. Prostitution activities were very profitable due to the large amounts of money circulating in these municipalities (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014). In different family-styled houses located near educational institutions, young female students were contacted with clients in search of sexual services. In the famous brothels located in the centre of these cities, the girls were also sexually exploited without the civil authorities being able to contain this phenomenon. In the rural areas, brothels were set up in the vicinity of the settlements of illegal miners that began to emerge (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014). The "raspachines" (scrapers), peasants dedicated to scraping the coca leaf were also clients of these brothels. It seems feasible that a high proportion of women in this demographic segment were victims of

violent practices in the context of the armed confrontations. Kidnapping practices appeared in the most marginal neighbourhoods. Besides this, the girls were introduced to use drugs to facilitate their captivity in the brothels from which the armed groups profited (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009).

(ii) The Peasantry

In the South Pacific region, the social sector regarded as “peasantry” by Young (1982), played a dynamic role in the fact that this boundary produced the most abundant amount of coca in Colombia in the 2000s. The lack of opportunities made the people of the rural areas vulnerable to entering into the channels of the magendo markets (Young, 1982). The people of this demographic segment were not the subject of the support of the nation-state institutions. The territories of both peasants, black and indigenous, lacked any type of infrastructure to make their agricultural activities profitable. Indigenous and black people had developed territorial devices for their adaptation, which made possible the proliferation of coca crops in the rural areas. The peasants of this forest were able to reproduce the crops in climatic and topographic conditions that made it difficult not only for the aerial fumigation and manual eradication efforts (Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2016b) but also for the possibilities of the state’s security agencies to exercise military control. Although members of the indigenous and black communities succumbed to the profitability of coca crops, the armed actors also violently coerced these communities to plant in their territories (Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013; Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2016b). The situation became particularly brutal when landmines and unexploded ordinances were installed in the indigenous and black territories.

(iii) The Petty Bourgeoisie

The “petty bourgeoisie” in the South Pacific boundary was mainly composed of the owners of commercial establishments, NGOs’ staff and public employees. In the ongoing violence, the petty bourgeoisie no longer had the prestige of two decades ago. Nonetheless, the population of this demographic sector had higher levels of job stability and, thus, was more fortunate than other social segments in the 2000s. Since the armed struggles emerged, the petty bourgeoisie experienced the burden of facing this violent panorama and was the victim of acts of violence that included hired killers and even explosive grenades.

The decentralization process which started with the 1991 Political Constitution created administrative dynamics that limited the nation-state's direct intervention (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014; Romero, 2014). The decentralization limited the intervention of the state to directly use only the national army and certain bureaucrats for the purpose of linking national policies with the local authorities. The limited capacity of intervention created administrative dynamics of isolation that strengthened the contrasts between the material well-being and social status of the populations in the Andes mountain range and the one in the South Pacific boundary. The remarkable isolation helped to multiply patrimonial practices in the face of the state that was permeated by the swelling informal domains (Young, 2004). The new political context assisted in empowering local political groups, creating what Achille Mbembe calls "private indirect government" (as quoted in Young, 2004, p. 46).

In this boundary, the local political groups inherited the predatory behaviour of the extractivist political institutions that have ruled the region for approximately four centuries. Soon, this predatory behaviour was revealed by the state's index of fiscal performance (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014). The local map began to be crossed by disciplinary mechanisms of the national political economy, which diluted the authority of the local governments. These disciplinary measures classified the local administrations of the South Pacific region, under a transitory fiscal rule, that constrained their possibilities for managing public resources (Agudelo, 1999; Hoffman, 1999, 2007; Romero, 2014; Pardo, 2014). Between 2001 and 2010, the nation-state, through the use of the disciplinary mechanism, not only limited the access of the local governments of this boundary to the national public resources but also sought to evade the responsibility of guaranteeing the priority rights granted to the indigenous and black communities by the Political Constitution of 1991 and Laws 60 and 70 of 1993. Nonetheless, although the South Pacific region experienced dynamics of isolation, the Political Constitution of 1991 protected a resource system specifically located for the education and public health sectors that created a diffuse presence of the state (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014).

In the 2000s, the armed groups contributed to reinforcing the dynamic of isolation in this territorial boundary, by co-opting public officials in the circle of influence of the local mayors. The resources of the illicit economies became involved in different political campaigns and were

used to bribe different officials from the judiciary investigation system and regional police (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014; Romero, 2014). The co-optation strategy of local officials by the armed groups was used to protect logistical aspects of the drug economy and its associated activities. The co-opted local political system also helped to isolate the communities by preventing them from going to state institutions to process the difficulties they faced in the territory (Hoffman, 1999; Pardo, 2014; Romero, 2014). Besides that, through the strategy of co-optation of the local politics, the armed groups tried to prevent the communities' claims about the violent situation and social crisis in this territory, which could be resolved by greater intervention by institutions of the nation-state.

With the aforementioned in mind, in the last phase of this section, the study discusses the facts put forward by the humanitarian literature in relation to the dynamics of power and the social segments identified through the framework of cultural pluralism. The findings of the humanitarian literature were based on analysis of economic rationalities in the armed conflict of the South Pacific region in the 2000s. The humanitarian literature pointed out greed factors that linked the predatory behaviour of the armed groups with the competition to control the rents of the illicit economies that appeared in this boundary. The majority of the studies on the humanitarian situation showed that the increase of illegal crops was crucial in both, the rise of armed groups and the increment of the rates of violence. The humanitarian literature explained the scenario of confrontation in the South Pacific region as an issue of greed factors and economic rationalities, in which the central driver of the violence was the abundant amount of coca crops that flourished in this boundary. However, the cultural pluralism approach assisted in providing theoretical explanations for the phenomena of violence in the South Pacific region that was not clearly analysed in the humanitarian literature. The lens of the cultural pluralism framework helped in highlighting three social demographic segments that grew under chronic conditions of structural marginalisation. The findings pointed to a pattern of social sectors that provided evidence that the nation-state played a crucial role in making the classified population highly vulnerable to succumbing into the cycles of violence. In this sense, the humanitarian literature failed to address the decisive role performed by the state in creating three social segments that were a breeding ground for the emergence of widespread violence. These three demographic segments in the South Pacific region need to be taken into consideration for the

purpose of studies and interventions in the fields of development studies and the peacebuilding process. The findings of this study show that, although it's a fact that the abundant amount of coca crops that flourished in this territory was a crucial driver of the armed conflict, the extreme marginalisation and poverty persuasively contributed in the course of widespread violence that emerged in the South boundary of Colombia in the 2000s.

5.3. The Violence against HRDs in the South Pacific Region of Colombia in the 2000s

The third part is comprised of the analysis of the relationship between the events of violence against the population that is subject to this study, and the social sectors addressed through the lenses of Young's cultural pluralism framework. In this final part, I discuss the perspective of how the nature of the historical dynamics of development led by the nation-state assisted in creating environments conducive to the violence that arose against HRDs of this boundary in the 2000s.

The last research question was: "How does the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights create a contradiction with the legal and illegal armed groups that are present in this territory?" The third research question involved interpreting how the nature of the historical dynamics of development depicted in the previous sections made it possible for the nation-state to create an environment conducive to the violence that emerged against HRDs of the South Pacific region in the 2000s. Addressing the question involved not only inquiring into the identity factors that alter the patterns of violence in social confrontations, but also inspecting the dynamics of identity awareness that flourished in this territory (Young, 1979, 1982). Finally, answering the third research question involved analysing the relationship between the events of violence against the population that is subject to this study, and the three characterized social sectors that grew in this boundary and were identified through the of the cultural pluralism framework (see Chapter 1: Theoretical framework). The main data forming the basis of the following analysis is the identified sample of cases of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region in the 2000s (see Methodology and Appendices Q and R).

In the third part of this final chapter, I will try to discuss how the social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created a violent contradiction with the

legal and illegal armed groups that were present in the South Pacific region. The third part will be discussed in two sections. In the first section, I will depict the sample of murder cases of political violence against HRDs that occurred in the 2000s. In the second section, I will characterize three scenarios that frame how this contradiction produced the dynamics of political violence observed in the first decade of this new millennium. The first scenario highlights the violent contradiction that appeared between the mobilization led by representatives of black rural communities and armed groups that penetrated the Mira river basin in Tumaco. This scenario is the central standpoint of the analysis that outlines the response to the third research question. The other two scenarios show circumstances of violence that are subsidiaries of the situation analysed in the first scenario. Although the murder cases discussed in the last two scenarios do not directly involve mobilizations in defence of collective territorial rights, these homicides of HRDs show two clusters of social leaders that faced violent situations in proximity to the first scenario.

5.3.1. Sample of Cases of HRDs Killed in the South Pacific region

In this section, the study presents an approximation of the sample of cases presented in the database (see Appendix Q). A sample of HRDs killed was identified and it includes one case that occurred in the 1990s and 20 cases that occurred in the 2000s (Appendix S. Chart 5. Municipalities and Numbers of HRDs Killed by Year). Out of the total murder cases that occurred in the 1990s and the 2000s, 81% of them took place in the municipalities of Tumaco and Buenaventura. The other homicides occurred in rural areas of Barbacoas and Santa Barbara (Department of Narino). In the other 10 municipalities of this region of Colombia, no cases of this political violence occurred, according to the database (see Appendices B and Q). In Buenaventura, all the murders were identified in the urban area. In Tumaco, although 44% of all its murder cases had representatives that had ties to urban areas, the majority the representatives killed had ties to the rural areas. In this sense, this sample shows a significant concentration of the murders in three zones. The first zone involves the rural area of Tumaco and the other two zones involve urban areas in Tumaco and Buenaventura.

This sample also shows the dominant impact of this political violence on three groups of HRDs assassinated. Out of the total murder cases that arose in the South Pacific region, 71% of them targeted clusters of the population regarded as the representatives of black rural communities,

journalists, and representatives of organizations of victims of the violence. The other 29% corresponds to a dispersed group of the type of leaders regarded as representatives of indigenous communities, student representatives, trade unionist and representatives of the Catholic Church (see Appendix T. Chart 6. Type of Leader Killed).

Finally, the exploration to the sample of cases included in the database also shows commonalities between the type of leader murdered and the dates of these crimes. The analysis of this relationship reveals the following facts: Firstly, all the murder cases of journalists took place in the urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura, during the three first years of the 2000s. Secondly, all the murder cases of legal representatives of organizations of victims occurred in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2007 and 2010. Thirdly, the violence against rural representatives of black communities persisted throughout the 2000s. Fourthly, the sample of murders that includes by leaders of indigenous communities, student representatives, trade unionist and representatives of the Catholic Church was not sufficiently representative for establishing possible patterns between the two variables (type of leader and date of murder) (see Appendix U. Chart 7 and Appendix V. Map 12. Georeferencing of the murder scenarios of HRDs in the South Pacific Region in the 2000s).

5.3.2. First Scenario

The first scenario of violence against HRDs corresponds to the contradictions that arose between the social mobilization of black communities in defence of collective territorial rights and the illegal armed groups that were present in the South Pacific region. This scenario points to a territory of Tumaco that is located specifically between the basin of the Mira River and Tumaco - Pasto road (near the Republic of Ecuador). In this scenario, the selected homicide cases concern rural representatives of the black communities. These black rural cultural entrepreneurs played a crucial part in the identity awareness that had emerged and which was responsible for the creation of a system of common symbols or collective cognitive processes that shaped the perception of reality in this boundary of Colombia in the 2000s (Almario, 2004; Hoffman, 1999, 2002 2007; Restrepo, 2001, 2002, 2005, Young, 1979, 1982). In the 1990s, the identity traits adopted by black communities brought stimulating expectations for greater material well-being and social status (see Chapter 4). The findings of this study involved discussing a central

scenario that allowed for highlighting a pattern of black rural leaders, who led a collective process to overcome marginalisation and poverty through speeches that demanded the defence of their ancestral territory to guarantee their physical and cultural survival (see Appendix Q. Database A).

The political rights granted by the state through Law 70 of 93 had generated expectations in line with the historical aspiration of achieving land ownership in this location. Law 70 gave the possibility, that the black population organized around community councils could be the beneficiaries of land titles. To obtain these titles, the community councils had to prove not only the traditional occupation of the land but also that these areas were not being contested in terms of ownership by other social actors (Hoffman, 2007). The leaders of the communities settled on this boundary fought for these political rights, defending their methods of production, as respectful of nature.

In the first scenario, the cases of violence against rural representatives of the black communities involved the social sector regarded as “peasantry” by Young (1982). In this boundary of Colombia, the peasantry played a dynamic role in the homicides that emerged since this territory produced the most abundant amount of coca in Colombia in the 2000s (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014, 2016b, 2016c). Furthermore, the lack of opportunities made the rural population vulnerable to entering into the channels of the magendo markets (see Chapter 5, part 2). The mobilizations led by the black rural representatives in defence of granted collective territorial rights contended with the fact that the areas that involved the peasantry sector became immersed in a constant armed confrontation to control the resources of coca crops among other illicit economies. Under the set of circumstances observed, it is likely that the HRDs that had participated actively in defence of these territorial rights became the target of the armed groups to control economies that were exploited in the basin of the Mira River in Tumaco. Out of the total murders of representatives of black communities that took place in the 1990s and the 2000s, 71% of them were linked to this scenario.

By the mid-2000s, the territories of the Community Councils of Alto Mira and Bajo Mira became the epicentre of massive arrivals of peasants from other parts of the country who were engaged in coca cultivation (Diocese of Tumaco, 2009; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia,

2014b). In this period, the state's matrix of institutions clearly failed to fulfil the political oaths proclaimed through the Political Constitution of 1991 and Law 70/93. Throughout the 2000s, the Colombian state was not able to establish a zone of environmental priority and sustainable development. In the Mira river basin's eastern zone, the state allowed the development of an environment in which the FARC imposed its military control through the use of arms and a peasant local council. The highest amount of coca crops was produced in Tumaco (see Appendix O: Map 10: Coca crops in Tumaco in 2006).

In the first identified scenario, the black communities became aware that the historical conditions that allowed their existence and reproduction were at risk. In one instance, the extensive cultivation of coca crops produced a dramatic devastation of the primary forests in the eastern zone of this scenario. In this sense, the Ombudsman's Office of Colombia (2014b) identified the territorial conflict between the black community councils and peasant coca croppers, as the main open scenario of political violence in Tumaco. On the other hand, in 2005, the demobilization of the AUC left spaces for territorial empowerment that produced new violent competitions among the armed groups that emerged after the demobilization agreement between the paramilitary groups and the central state. In the second half of the 2000s, the armed confrontation between the post-demobilised armed groups and FARC over the territory that was left by the AUC also produced a significant amount of civilian victims in the rural area of the western zone of the Mira river basin (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014b). Nonetheless, it is important to note that although the humanitarian impact of homicides and forced displacements increased dramatically, it was concentrated mainly over the Pasto - Tumaco road in the period 2006 – 2010 (see Appendix P: Map 11: Concentration of homicides and forced displacements in Tumaco between 2006 and 2010).

To sum up the analysis of the data in response the third research question, this first scenario identifies the central point of how the social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created a clash of interests with the legal and illegal armed groups that were present in this territory. The clash of interests led to a violent confrontation between the groups. This scenario displays that the state played a crucial role in developing an environment conducive to the assassination of HRDs, who advocated the collective territorial rights granted in

the Mira river basin in the 2000s. In sum, the first scenario analysed revealed that there was armed confrontation between the HRDs and armed groups. The representatives used the state's legal framework in defence of their territorial rights became the target of the strategies of war of armed groups, which controlled profits of illicit economies. The state's institutions of security and justice timidly addressed the requests of protection from black rural leaders of this boundary. The strengthening of the armed conflict revealed that institutional system of the nation-state did not safeguard the lives the inhabitants of this marginalized territory. In this serious humanitarian scenario, the marginalisation of the black communities revealed that the national elites did not commit themselves to transform the ideological domain of the state and the matrix of institutions that had applied the rules in the last two centuries. Thus, the lack of support of the state's central institution contributed to the increasing risk of violence that finally appeared and which was experienced by the populations of this region. In this sense, this study presents a sample of significant cases of political violence that targeted representatives of black rural communities and were carried out by armed groups in Tumaco. The homicides of these HRDs confirmed the concern of these communities which was that the historical conditions that allowed their existence and reproduction were at risk. This situation also increased the lack of commitment of the population to the national institutions of the state.

In the first scenario, one murder case of a black rural HRDs was identified in the 1990s and four in the 2000s. All these cases of political violence coincided with the period when the state granted land titles to the political organizations. The first case of murder occurred in the late 1990s when this HRD was complying with the requirements to claim ownership over the collective land title of the Community Council of Alto Mira y Frontera. This rural representative was also struggling against the harmful effects of the extractive economies in its territory (see Appendix Q. Database A: Case 1). In this community council, the coca growers had migrated to this rural area, and they began to produce worrying environmental impacts by the end of the 1990s (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014b).

On December 23, 2002, the nation-state granted the collective title No. 002515 to the community of "La Nupa" (INCODER, 2011). In this decade, the first murder case was on December 12, 2002 and the victim was the founding representative of this Community Council (see Appendix

Q. Database A: Case 6). The fact that this leader was cruelly murdered showed not only the guerrilla's intention to violently control this territory, but it also provoked mistrust within the community about the real possibilities of exercising the rights granted by Law 70 of 93.

The other three cases of violence against HRDs took place in 2008. The Community Council of “Alto Mira y Frontera” received the collective land title No. 00525 on March 8, 2005. Furthermore, the resolution 0397 of 2006 increased the extension of the land in possession of this community council (INCODER, 2011). Nonetheless, two representatives of the community of Alto Mira y Frontera were murdered on January 14, 2008 and October 7, 2008 (see Appendix Q. Database A: Cases 14 and 18). The Diocese of Tumaco (2009) pointed to the FARC as the possible culprit of these two crimes.

Finally, the consulted sources blamed an armed group, which arose after the demobilization of the AUC, as the possible culprit of the homicide against the representative of the Community Council of “Bajo Mira y Frontera” (see Appendix R. Database B: URLs of the Sources Consulted). He was slaughtered in the rural hamlet of “Candelilla de La Mar” on June 26, 2008 (see Appendix Q. Database A: Case 16). This HRD was not only working in this community council but also in the Diocese of Tumaco and in the Secretariat of Health and Social Care of Tumaco. The state had granted the collective title No. 046 this community on July 21, 2003 (Diocese of Tumaco, 2009).

5.3.3. Second Scenario

The second identified scenario of violence against HRDs corresponds to the confrontation that occurred between journalists and the AUC in the South Pacific region between 2000 and 2003. In this scenario, the study focuses on murder cases that occurred in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura. The examination shows that in 60% of the cases, this paramilitary group appears as possible culprits in these murders and in 40% it is not clear who is the accused. Although this scenario centres on journalists, its solution includes a grey case of one female representative of the Catholic Church. In the second scenario, the selected cases of violence involved the petty bourgeoisie. This social sector corresponds to members of local political groups that inherited the predatory behaviour of the extractive institutions that ruled the region since the colonial period (see Chapters 2 and 3). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state applied policies of

decentralization that had worsened the lack of interest of the national governments in intervening in this region of Colombia (see Chapter 4). The lack of intervention by the nation-state produced a scenario where the black political groups increased their local power significantly, and the patrimonial practices also increased remarkably. Thus, the local politicians saw the state as an opportunity to fill their pockets with money.

The relationship between the AUC and the local political groups could be understood under the logic of a mutual interest in affirming the isolation and marginalisation of the communities of the South Pacific region. In Tumaco and Buenaventura, the petty bourgeoisie was linked to the armed control strategies imposed by the AUC at the beginning of the 2000s (Pardo, 2014; Romero, 2014). Thus, this study points to the idea that this paramilitary group co-opted official sectors of the petty bourgeoisie not only to isolate and protect the logistical aspects of the drug economies but also to obstruct the demands of the communities for the intervention of the state to defend their collective territorial rights. In this study, I argue in this study that the cases of murders of journalists were aimed at avoiding the visibility of the alliance between local officials of the state and the AUC in these two cities. In the second scenario, the acts of violence sought the isolation and protection of acts of corruption, illicit drug economies and the violence against the black communities that defended their territorial rights.

To sum up the analysis of the data in response to the third research question, the following murder cases support the information included in the second scenario that addressed this question. The first case of murder against a journalist took place in Tumaco on September 4, 2000 (see Appendix Q. Database A: Case 2). This case involved a reporter who participated in conservation processes of native species in coordination with the black community councils in the South Pacific region. In the second case on April 27, 2001, the correspondent of the communist weekly “Proletarian Voice” was murdered in Tumaco (see Appendix P. Database B: Case 3). This crime was confessed by members of the AUC-liberating block, during the demobilisation agreement they established with the nation-state. In Tumaco, the grey case corresponds to one representative of the Catholic Church (see Appendix Q. Database A: Case 4). Although this HRD was well known for her work in supporting the mobilizations of black rural communities to defend their collective territorial rights, the sources consulted reported that this

murder was aimed at stopping their complaints about the possible relationship between the members of the AUC and officials of the national army (see Appendix R. Database B: Case 4).

The other two murder cases of journalists took place in Buenaventura in 2001 and 2003. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) states that Heriberto Cárdenas Escudero, 51, died from gunshot wounds to his head and chest (see Appendix D: Case 5). His son and brother died two days after all of them were the victims of four armed assailants who were wearing hoods and burst into the home of this journalist on November 14, 2001. In the sources consulted, the AUC appeared as possible culprits in the murder case 5. During the second week of July 2005, the CPJ also visited Buenaventura with the company of a commission of delegates of Reporters Without Borders (RWB), the Press and Society Institute, the Solidarity Centre of the International Federation of Journalists and the Foundation for Press Freedom. The delegates of the United Nations also accompanied this commission that visited this boundary of Colombia in which they worked as observers. RWB stated that these organizations decided to visit Buenaventura because they were concerned about the murder of William Soto Cheng in December 2003 (see Appendix Q. Database A: Case 9), but also because they were concerned about the little information that had been published at the national level, about the serious situation of violence that was occurring in this Colombian boundary (see Appendix R. Database B: Case 9).

5.3.4. Third Scenario

The third identified scenario of violence against HRDs corresponds to the clash of interests that arose between the legal representatives of the organizations of black victims, armed groups that emerged after the demobilization of the AUC and urban militias of the FARC in the South Pacific region of Colombia in 2007 and 2008. The study also centres its attention on the analysis of the urban areas of Buenaventura and Tumaco. In the sources consulted, the possible culprits in the cases of murders that are presented in this scenario, were not clearly identified (Tumaco / Buenaventura – 2007 / 2008). Here, the selected homicide cases concern legal representatives of black victim organizations. In this scenario, these legal representatives were committed to mobilizations based on principles of truth, justice and reconciliation. These mobilizations opened the possibility of achieving the rights granted by Law 1448 of 2011, also known as the Law of Victims and Land Restitution. However, the National Plan of Integral Attention to the Population

Displaced by Violence (Decree 205) and the legislation for the population victim of violence have located the representatives of victims' organizations as a key stakeholders in the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric since 2005 (Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia, 2005).

In the third scenario, the study focuses on analysing how the mobilization of black urban representatives in defence of the victims of the armed conflict clashed with the illegal armed groups that were present in the urban areas defined before. The third scenario presents a second related environment of development and violence that was formed under the shadow of the humanitarian issues that produced the war in the rural areas of the South Pacific region in the 2000s (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2014, 2014b, 2016b, 2016c). Between 2000 and 2005, the population defined by the state as "victims of the violence" had increased dramatically in Tumaco and Buenaventura (Diocesis de Tumaco, 2009; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013). Many families left the rural areas of the South Pacific region and came to these cities as a result of the violence that produced disputes over the control of coca crops. In this sense, this scenario shows a situation that is highly related to the violent confrontation that occurred between the armed groups and the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights that was presented in the first scenario.

To sum up the analysis in response to the third research question, the third scenario shows that the state also promoted an environment conducive to the assassinations of representatives of organization of victims in Buenaventura and Tumaco after 2005. In these two cities, the cases of violence against the leaders of victims involved the set of circumstances of the social sector regarded as "unemployment lumpen-proletarian" by Young (1982). By the mid-2000s, the lumpenproletariat sector was broadly embedded in dynamics of violence in this boundary. The population of this demographic segment represented a large proportion of the urban population who participated in armed structures that emerged after the paramilitary demobilization. These structures competed to control the criminal economies and created brutal, widespread confrontations. The lumpenproletariat segment was also the victim of the highest rates of murders and was heavily pressured by extreme poverty (Galvis, L *et al.*, 2016; Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Hoffman, 2007; Molinares & Le Paliscot, 2013). In urban areas of this scenario, the post-demobilization armed groups extensively controlled the local economy,

charged extortion, imposed "overcharges" on trade in agricultural products and decided who could enter goods in the marketplaces (see Chapter 5, Part 2). In this sense, it was clear that the nation-state had not been able to provide enough security to these two cities and that it did not have reliable democratic institutions in these places either. Nonetheless, without addressing the violence, this population was subjected to in this scenario, the national government enacted decree 205 of 2005. The purpose of this decree was to strengthen the processes of mobilization of victim organizations, following the administrative logic of the decentralization models that the state promoted since the early 1990s (see Chapter 4). This decree established a system of participation between representatives of these civic organizations, officials of the municipalities and members of the national army. Therefore, under the set of circumstances described, the nation-state promoted a scenario in which the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric led by victim organisation's leaders clashed violently over the fact that the urban militias of FARC and post-demobilization armed groups had great control over the marginal areas and the illicit economies of these two ports.

In the third scenario, a sample constituted by four significant cases of political violence that targeted representatives of victim organisations was identified during the 2000s. All these cases of political violence coincided with the fact that they occurred when the matrix of institutions of the nation-state had decreed the National Plan of Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence and had created local platforms for the participation of organisations of victims in both cities. In this scenario, the first murder case took place in Tumaco in 2007 (see Appendix Q. Case 12) and the other three in Buenaventura in 2008 (see Appendix Q. Cases 12, 15, 17 and 19). Although these murder cases were registered in several databases of political violence, they had not been the object of academic analyses that addressed the South Pacific region (see Appendix R. Cases 12, 15, 17 and 19). Furthermore, one grey case was identified in the third scenario (see Appendix Q: Case 13). Although this young black leader was not part of any platform of victim organisations, this murder involved dynamics of cruelty that were seen in areas populated predominantly by the lumpen-proletarian demographic segment. Case 13 corresponds to a student's representative, who was killed in Buenaventura on November 6, 2007. Amnesty International (2008, p. 56) reported that "his face had been burned with acid and his

genitals had been cut off'. This student leader had been seen days before in a zone that was under the control of a post-demobilized armed group.

Up to this point, this study has outlined three scenarios that explain how the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created a conflict of interest with the legal and illegal armed groups that were present in the South Pacific region and this led to violent confrontations. The analysis of these configurations was undertaken in two parts. In the first part, this study presented a statistical approximation for the sample of cases included in the database. The analysis of this sample showed a substantial concentration of the murders in Buenaventura and Tumaco. Unlike Buenaventura, in Tumaco, these murder cases affected not only the urban area but also the rural area of this port. The analysis of this sample also showed a prevailing impact over three clusters of HRDs killed (representatives of black communities, journalists, and representatives of organizations of victims). Finally, the approximation to the sample of cases included in the database also showed commonalities between the type of leader murdered and the dates of these crimes. These commonalities are represented in the following three facts:

- 1- The cases of representatives of black communities in Tumaco were the central cluster of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region. These cases of political murders persisted along of the 2000s.*
- 2- All the murder cases of journalists took place in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2000 and 2003.*
- 3- All the murder cases of representatives of organizations of victims occurred in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2007 and 2010.*

These three commonalities were the main stakes that guided the exploration that was discussed the following scenarios. Addressing this exploration involved not only inquiring into the economic vectors that alter the patterns of violence in the South Pacific region, but also inspecting the dynamics of identity awareness that flourished in this territory. The study then presented three scenarios that helped explain how the social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created violent confrontations with the legal and illegal armed groups that were present in the South Pacific region. In the second part, the analysis of these contradictions also involved presenting scenarios that explain how the nation-state created environments conducive to the violence that emerged against HRDs in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. In this sense, this study showed three scenarios that share a similar pattern which is

that the state had created socio-political environments, in which its institutions do not fulfil the expected performance to dynamically support the rights granted within the framework of their sovereignty.

The first scenario highlighted how the law enacted by the state in favour of the black communities' right to land clashed with the interests of armed groups. This in turn led to violent confrontations between the communities and the armed groups. This scenario pertained to territories located over the basin of the Mira River in Tumaco (Narino). These contradictions were visible between representatives of black community councils, on one side, and guerrillas, paramilitaries and post-demobilization armed groups, on the other side. This scenario also highlighted a pattern of black HRDs killed, who led a collective process to overcome the marginalisation and poverty through speeches that demanded the defence of their ancestral territory to guarantee their physical and cultural survival.

Secondly, the first scenario showed that the cases of violence against rural representatives of the black communities involved the set of circumstances of the peasantry sector. The Mira River Basin was the territory that produced the most abundant amount of coca crops in Colombia in the 2000s. The contradiction framed in the first scenario describes how the mobilisations lead by the black rural representatives for defending the rights granted by the collective land titles, contended with the fact that the areas that involved the peasantry sector became immersed in a constant armed confrontation to control the resources of coca crops among other illicit economies. In this scenario, the extensive cultivation of coca crops produced a dramatic devastation of the primary forests in the eastern zone of Tumaco. Furthermore, these illegal armed groups had imposed their dominion over this drug trafficking business.

On the other hand, the regional transformations that produced the coca crops showed the existence of opposing identities and perspectives of development between the armed groups and the black community councils. Law 70 of 93 had generated stimulating expectations in the black communities concerning the historical aspiration of achieving land ownership in this location. This law addressed claims of the mobilisation of these communities that had related their territorial appropriation devices to conceptions of environmental protection. The leaders of the communities settled on this boundary fought for these political rights, defending their methods of

production, as respectful of nature. However, the Colombian state was not able to establish a zone of environmental priority and sustainable development in the 2000s. In this sense, the analysis presented in the first scenario showed that the nation-state created an environment conducive to the violence that appeared. It failed not only on its mission of preserving the collective rights of the community councils, but it also failed in fulfilling its responsibility of protecting the life and safety of the representatives of these black communities that fought for these land property titles.

Finally, the first scenario presented five murder cases that support the idea that in the Mira river basin of Tumaco, the nation-state created an environment conducive to the violence against black rural representatives that occurred in the 2000s. These five cases of murder coincided with the date when each community obtained the title that recognized its political organizations and its lands, and the murders were near this period. In this scenario, the guerrillas of the FARC were the main culprits of these political murders. Moreover, it seems feasible that this guerrilla group promoted the creation of a community committee led by peasants within the territory of the Community Council of "Alto Mira y Frontera", to deprive the representatives of this black community of the political rights that the state had granted them on these days.

In the second section, this study presented two more scenarios that discussed how the contradiction between the representatives of the black communities and the armed groups. These other two scenarios (see Chapter 5, Part 3: Scenarios Two and Three) showed circumstances of violence that are subsidiary to the situation analysed in the first scenario. Although the second and third scenarios showed two instances of violence and murder cases that were not strictly linked to the mobilizations in defence of collective territorial rights; they did show two instances of violence that included other two clusters of social leaders who faced situations of violence in proximity to the first scenario that involves the collective territorial rights.

Additionally, these other two scenarios also showed situations in which the role of the nation-state allowed the emergence of environments conducive to violence. In these two scenarios, the state had created norms that did not receive enough support from its central institutions in a context of great violence. The state also had created norms that pointed to the population of this peripheral zone of Colombia. This lack of support showed weaknesses within the structure of the

state and put the lives of the other two types of HRDs that were the focus of this study in the last two scenarios at high risk.

Firstly, the second scenario focused on the murder cases of journalists that took place in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2000 and 2003. Secondly, this scenario estimated that the events of violence against journalists could have involved the petty bourgeoisie social sector. In these two cities, this social sector corresponds to members of local political groups that had inherited predatory behaviour of the extractive institutions that have ruled the region since the colonial period. Thirdly, the second scenario presented a situation that begun by the late 1980s, where the state applied policies of decentralization that created an environment in which black political groups increased their local power significantly, but they were not truly articulated in the agendas of priorities of the national institutions of Colombia. Fourthly, in the second scenario this research found that the lack of intervention of the nation-state's institutions worked as a breeding ground for the promotion of patrimonial practices among the black rulers. The local politicians saw the state as an opportunity to fill their pockets with money, and they forged strategic alliances with the AUC in this sense. Fifthly, the study proposed the idea that the relationship between the paramilitaries and the local political groups was supported over a mutual interest in affirming the isolation and marginalisation of the communities of the South Pacific region. In this sense, it was assumed that the cases of murders of journalists aimed to avoid the visibility of the alliance between local officials of the state and the AUC in these two cities of this boundary. Therefore, it is feasible that this dynamic of violence sought to avoid the visibility of acts of corruption, drug trafficking and the violence that arose against the members of the community councils. The isolation of these two populations allowed both the local politicians and paramilitaries to obtain valuable spoils of the illegal resources circulating in this Colombian territory. Finally, the second scenario presented four murder cases and one more grey case that supported the idea the state created an environment conducive for the violence that appeared against journalists in Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2000 and 2003.

Lastly, the third scenario involved the murder cases of legal representatives of organizations of black victims that took place in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura in 2007 and 2008. Firstly, this scenario estimated that the events of violence against representatives of victims could have involved the set of circumstances of the “unemployment lumpen-proletarian” social

sector. In these two cities, this social sector was broadly embedded in the dynamics of violence. The population of this demographic segment represented a large proportion of the urban population who not only participated in structures of the post-demobilization armed groups but in the FARC. Secondly, the third scenario presented a situation in which the nation-state through the National Plan of Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence (Decree 205/2005) and the legislation for the victims of violence had placed the representatives of victims' organizations as key stakeholders in the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric. This scenario also showed that the mobilization led by the representatives of organization of victims opened the possibility of achieving the rights granted by Law of Victims and Land Restitution of 2011. Thirdly, in the third scenario, this study proposed the idea that the nation-state promoted an environment in which the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric led by victim representatives clashed violently with the fact that the urban militias of FARC and post-demobilization armed groups had great control over the marginal areas and the illicit economies in these two places. Finally, the third scenario presented four murder cases and one more grey case, which sustained the idea the state created an environment conducive for the violence that appeared against legal representatives of organizations of victims in Tumaco and Buenaventura in 2007 and 2008.

5.4. Broad Findings

This study set out to apply the cultural pluralism framework to understand the emergence of armed conflict but and the homicides of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s. Hence, this result chapter aimed to explore how the analysis of the causes of the armed conflict contributed to the emergence of the political murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region.

In the final chapter, this study attempted to depart from the theoretical orbit of the humanitarian reports of the armed conflict discussing the South Pacific region of Colombia. The chosen analytical trajectory established a method to recognize how the marginalisation dynamics of the South Pacific boundary that influenced the emergence of widespread violence and the assassinations of HRDs in the 2000s. The findings of this study involved structuring scenarios, which supported the angles that explain how the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in

defence of their collective territorial rights created contradictions with the legal and illegal armed groups that settled in this territory. This analysis is based on the application of Young's theoretical framework called cultural pluralism (1979, 1982, 2004). The theoretical framework was used to understand the historical dynamics of competition for power that framed this territory, in which not only the armed conflict and illicit economies flourished, but also the murders of HRDs. The analysis and interpretation of data were carried out in four parts.

In the first part of this result chapter, I employed the theoretical framework to understand how the nature of the dynamics of development made it possible for the nation-state to create an environment of vulnerability that explains the causes of the armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia. This historical analysis of development dynamics discussed the three periods, corresponding to the sovereignty of the colonial state (from 1572 to 1818), the post-colonial state (from 1819 to 1980) and the modern state (in the last decade of the XX century). The analysis of the last period considered not only that this was the period in which the foundations of the modern state of Colombia were established, but also that it coincided with the creation of an environment of vulnerability that allowed the appearance of the armed conflict and murder cases of HRDs.

In the colonial period, the Spanish sovereignty established the foundations of the treatment that the nation-state has given to the South Pacific region. Its conqueror armies imposed a sovereignty based on a racist ideology and exclusionary regime. The governance practised by the colonial state in the Pacific region left important legacies for creating the territorial conditions of marginalisation and isolation, which the black and indigenous communities have experienced. In this period, the sovereign-colonial regime promoted an extractive economy and a dispersed settlement that was ethnically and racially differentiated. In other words, the colonizers showed interest in benefiting from the extraction of gold, but not in the colonization of the South Pacific territory. Nonetheless, the black and indigenous groups managed to resist the domination of the slavery system. These populations fought to liberate themselves and established a parallel society in broad areas of the rain forest of the South Pacific region.

In the post-colonial period, the independent state affirmed the legacies of marginalisation that contributed to framing this territorial boundary. During the Republican period (from 1819 to

1886), the leaders of independence developed a state project based on a system of racial stratification that instituted a notion of relative equality among the population of the interior of the country, maintaining the marginalisation and discrimination over the black and indigenous territories. The lack of inclusion of these cultural groups into the national political agenda had consequences for the South Pacific region. Stated differently, the marginalisation and discrimination consequences were the main effects that showed how the type of sovereignty practised by the elites of the nation-state contributed to the vulnerability of boundary of Colombia.

During the XX century, a tense antagonistic development in terms of territorial appropriation began to emerge. On the one hand, the white and mestizo populations promoted an extractive economy. Moreover, the nation-state's matrix of institutions not only promoted the external appropriation of the land, but they also failed to address the demographic transformations that occurred in this region along this century. On the other hand, the black and indigenous communities established fluvial and agricultural mechanisms to colonize the rain forest. Under this context, bonds of collective solidarity and cultural identity began to emerge between the ethnic communities in the 1970s. The indigenous and black populations not only realized that the historical conditions that allowed their existence was at risk, but they also understood that, due to the negative connotations attributed to their race, their populations had limited opportunities to benefit from the resources and services offered by the state. Additionally, addressing the purpose of this study, it is significant that the reader be aware that although this boundary of Colombia experienced few manifestations of violence throughout the post-colonial period, the guerrilla groups began to use the territory as a refuge area since the 1970s, and the investments of the drug cartels appeared in the region since the 1980s.

In the third period, although the central elites agreed on the establishment of a modern state in Colombia, they also promoted an environment of vulnerability that allowed the appearance of the armed conflict and the homicides of HRDs in the South Pacific region. The Political Constitution of 1991 created a foundation of development ideals that were weakly implemented by the modern state. This constitution aimed to crucially transform the ideological domain of the state and the matrix of institutions that enforced the rules. On the other hand, the 1990s were also a period during which a harbinger for the confrontation that emerged in the 2000s in the South

Pacific region. The interpretations of the dynamics of development in the 1990s that explained the role the nation-state played in the promotion of the generalized violence in this territory. It followed the pattern of vulnerability of armed conflicts that areas similar to this boundary of Colombia experienced (Young, 1979, 1982, 2004).

This research report identified three vulnerability factors which contributed to revealing the crucial role that the state played in the promotion of the armed conflict and the political murders in the South Pacific region in the 1990s. Firstly, the new legal framework (the 1991 Constitution, Transitory Article 55 of the 1991 Constitution and Law 70 of 1993) brought stimulating expectations to the black and indigenous communities in this territory. In this sense, the inhabitants of this boundary led social mobilizations to address not only the recognised rights but also to search for greater material well-being and social status. These communities increased their expectations about the role of the state. They inferred that the changes in the legal framework would allow for the transformation of the racial and classist way in which the national elites have been managing Colombia in the last two centuries. Secondly, while Colombia's new legal framework generated hope among ethnic groups in the South Pacific region in the 1990s, the pattern of development promoted by the state institutions worsened the disparities in welfare, between the populations of the Andes mountain range and the populations of the Pacific lowlands of Colombia.

Under the structural conditions of marginalisation of the South Pacific region, in Buenaventura and Tumaco, there appeared a cluster of demographic social sectors not only without commitments to the state but also without means to guarantee a dignified life and who succumbed to the profitability of illicit economies. There also appeared local political groups that inherited the predatory behaviour of the extractive institutions that had ruled the region. Thirdly, this result chapter holds that in the 2000s, the Colombian state connected international security concerns (about its high production of coca base) with its national cultural environment. This was done through logic of a militarized and narcotized agenda known as Plan Colombia. Through this agenda, the US supported the modernization of the national army with logistical and financial assistance to put in place plans to combat drug trafficking. This agenda not only contended with the backdrop of the rights that the state granted to the communities in this

territory, but it also exclusively positioned the region as an area in which the guerrilla groups strengthened their financial and military strategies.

In this sense, these three vulnerability factors contributed to revealing the despotic incompetence of how the state reacted to protect local communities in the South Pacific region against the risks represented by the armed conflict. Armed groups, cartels and smugglers targeted the complex geography of the South Pacific region as a strategic zone between the centre of Colombia and the Pacific Ocean. The presence of the national army was too minimal to cover the complexities of the area. Thus, the violence appeared as a threat to the ethnic communities' expectations concerning the rights granted to them by the state.

To summarize, the political analysis of the colonial, post-colonial and modern state showed cultural competition and power trajectories that overlapped to explain the precarity in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The indifference of the central state towards the South Pacific territory remained rooted in the connotations of racial segregation. In this sense, the South Pacific region faced a process of autochthonous development, and its communities experienced a precarious presence of the institutions of the central state. In the 1990s, the sovereignty established by the Criolla elites created territorial conditions of marginalisation and isolation in which armed conflict and the murders of HRDs thrived in the South Pacific region in the late 1990s.

In the second part, this chapter, I discussed the facts put forward by the humanitarian literature in relation to the dynamics of power and the three demographic sectors identified through the framework of cultural pluralism. The purpose of this comparison was to determine the meanings of the explanations of these two analytical perspectives to build the structure of the development scenarios, which help to visualise the crucial role that the state had in the promotion of the armed conflict that exploded in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. These scenarios also had the purpose of addressing the dynamics of violence that occurred and the murder of HRDs that occurred in this territorial boundary in this period. Arturo Escobar (2003) described the beginning of the 2000s as the period that turned the Pacific region of Colombia into a bloody theatre of violence, where the most significant aggression against the black communities occurred since the colonial period. In this sense, in the second part of this chapter, I tried to

identify some of the links between the phenomena of conflict represented in humanitarian reports on the South Pacific region (concerning this decade) and the dynamics of development promoted by the Colombian nation-state (identified through the lens of the cultural pluralism framework).

This result chapter in its second part aimed to characterise social realities behind the facts identified by the humanitarian reports, following the pattern of social sectors described in the theoretical framework of this research report. This part was discussed in three phases. Firstly, I focused on the facts identified by the humanitarian reports through deductive and formal methods used in the agenda of the dominant institutions of development. Secondly, I highlighted the relationship between the complex environment in which the armed conflict prospered and the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie sectors. Thirdly, I contested the facts identified by the humanitarian reports with the dynamics of development and the social sectors distinguished through the cultural pluralism framework.

In the first phase, the humanitarian reports conducted an analysis that explained the functioning of armed groups, the economies in the war that supported the persistence of the violence, statistical rates of the humanitarian situation, and the main national armed responses of the state against the illegal armed groups and illicit crops. This analysis linked the predatory behaviour of the armed groups and the increase of the hectares planted in coca as the main drivers of the violence. In this way, the humanitarian reports identified the following four facts, concerning the armed conflict that occurred in the South Pacific region in the 2000s.

- 1- *The increase in drug trafficking played a crucial role in the viability of violence.*
- 2- *The presence of the armed groups converged with the rise in the illicit crops.*
- 3- *The logic of armed confrontation can be linked to disputes over the control of strategic corridors.*
- 4- *The competition to control the rents of drug trafficking increased the rates of violence, having a predominant impact on the youth.*

In the second phase, these four facts were key clues that guided the exploration. This exploration also involved the analysis of the pattern identified by Young (1982) about the three social sectors or demographic segments that are narrowly associated to the dynamics of marginalisation promoted by the nation-state. This pattern of social sectors symptomatically grows in this type of boundaries. Therefore, the second phase focused on characterizing social realities attached to the three sectors that are behind the facts identified by the humanitarian

literature. Thus, in this phase, the study characterized a cluster of demographic segments that were a breeding ground for the brutal violence that emerged in the main cities of the South Pacific region in the 2000s.

Firstly, the lumpenproletariat sector was widely engaged in the dynamics of violence in Tumaco and Buenaventura. The population of this demographic segment was the victim of the highest homicide rates, and it was heavily pressured by extreme poverty in the 2000s. The lumpenproletariat sector accounted for a large proportion of the black urban youth population, who participated in the post-demobilized armed groups since the mid-2000s. These armed groups achieved enormous control over local economies, extorting street vendors, imposing surcharges on trade in agricultural products, controlling the small-scale drug trafficking and driving female sex trafficking, among other illicit activities. These armed structures competed to control the criminal economies and created brutal and generalised confrontations in these two port cities mainly. The territorial confrontations revolved around disputes over the control of areas where these armed structures could monopolise the profits of these illegal economies.

Secondly, the peasantry sector played a progressive role in the fact that this place became one of the regions of the world that produced the largest amount of coca crops. Although the peasantry sector accounted for a significant amount of the black and indigenous people, this sector also involved the massive arrivals of mestizo peasants from other parts of the country who were engaged in coca cultivation. This huge migration began after the national army militarily confronted coca growers in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá in the late 1990s. On the other hand, the black and indigenous peasantry sector had developed territorial devices for their adaptation, which made possible the proliferation of coca crops in the rural areas in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. They were able to reproduce coca crops in climatic and topographic conditions, which made unproductive the state's efforts to eradicate these illegal bushes. The population in this demographic segment succumbed to this illicit economy because their territories lacked the infrastructure to make their economic activities profitable. Furthermore, this population also was the victims of armed groups that coerced them to plant in their lands.

Thirdly, the lens of the cultural pluralism framework assisted in highlighting the social dimensions of the petty bourgeoisie sector in the South Pacific region. In this boundary, the

nation-state created conditions of isolation which helped to empower mainly local political groups and to multiply patrimonial practices. The state's fiscal performance index revealed these predatory behaviours and patrimonial practices. In the 2000s, the local map was crossed by disciplinary mechanisms of the national political economy, which diluted the authority of the local governments. In this decade, the armed groups also contributed to reinforcing the dynamic of isolation in this territorial boundary, by co-opting public officials in the circle of influence of the local mayors. The resources of the illicit economies became involved in different political campaigns and were used to bribe various officials from the judiciary investigation system and the regional police. The armed groups used the strategy of co-opting local officials in order to protect the logistics chain of their drug business. Through this strategy, the armed groups also tried to isolate the communities from the state institutions, intimidating the communities to refrain from putting violence and social emergency in this territory into the hands of officials of the judicial system, the Ombudsman, organizations that advocate human rights or the media.

In the last phase, this study discussed the validity of the findings identified by the humanitarian reports on South Pacific region with the ones in the analysis of the three social sectors reached through the cultural pluralism framework. This comparison led to the creation scenarios of development that assist in explaining why the armed conflict and the murders of HRDS emerged in this territory of Colombia in the 2000s. On one side, the humanitarian literature through deductive and formal methods of the dominant research agenda revealed facts and technical data at the grassroots level that framed the rational behaviour of the armed groups and economic interests involved in the confrontation that took place in this region of Colombia. This literature revealed four notorious facts as leading causes of the persistence of the armed confrontation in this region. On the other side, the cultural pluralism framework assisted to critically consider the developmental environment that framed the emergence of armed struggles on this particular boundary of the coffee state. This theoretical approach made it possible to discuss a pattern of three social sectors that emerged in this region. Indeed, this approach assisted in framing explanations about the causes of the development of these social sectors in this region that had a logical coherence with the analyses carried out by the structuralist theories.

Taking into account the previous discussion, this research argued that these humanitarian aid reports did not shed enough light on how the development promoted by the nation-state could be

linked to the outbreak of the widespread violence and murders of HRDs. The humanitarian literature that addressed this boundary of Colombia highlighted explanations around economic rationalities in the violent confrontation, which justified through deductive and formal methods what was happening in terms of the regional presence of the armed groups and the possible locations of the culprits for these murders. Despite this explanation, this literature nonetheless, did not account for how the historical dynamics of development that made this territory vulnerable to the emergence of the widespread violence which was experienced by that the communities in this region. This literature also did not explore sufficiently how these dynamics created environments and scenarios conducive to the violence that arose against the representatives of these communities in the 2000s. In this sense, these humanitarian reports seem weak in explaining issues related to the causes, dynamics and meanings of the complex political and social environments in which armed struggles thrive.

In the third and final part of this result chapter, I discussed how the nature of the historical dynamics of development lead by the nation-state assisted in creating environments conducive to the violence that arose against HRDs of this boundary in the 2000s. The third part involved the analysis of the relationship between the events of violence against the population that is subject to this study and the three social sectors described in the previous response. The third part also involved exploring how the models of government promoted by the central elites contributed to framing scenarios conducive to the violence against representatives of civil organizations in this territory. The question that guided the exploration in this third part was: "How did the social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights create contradictions with the legal and illegal armed groups that were present in this territory? Addressing this question compromised of not only inquiring into the economic vectors that alter the patterns of violence in social confrontations, but also inspecting the dynamics of identity awareness that flourished in this territory.

The analysis of the contradictions in response to the third research question was carried out in two sections. In the first section, this study presented a statistical approximation for the sample of cases of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region in the 2000s and which were included in the database. The role of the database of murders of HRDs was to provide the primary data that formed the basis of the following analysis of the period in which the violence in this boundary of

Colombia arouse. The approximation to this sample showed a substantial concentration of the murders in Buenaventura and Tumaco. The analysis of this sample also exhibited a prevailing impact over three clusters of HRDs assassinated: representatives of black communities, journalists, and representatives of organizations of victims. Furthermore, the analysis of the sample of cases in the database also revealed commonalities between the type of leader murdered and the dates of these crimes. These commonalities were represented in the following three facts:

1- The cases of representatives of black communities in Tumaco were the central cluster of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region. These cases of political murders persisted throughout the 2000s.

2- All the murder cases of journalists took place in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2000 and 2003.

3- All the murder cases of representatives of organizations of victims occurred in urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2007 and 2010.

These three commonalities were the main stakes that led to the exploration that discussed the following scenarios. These scenarios supported the angles that explained the way in which the identified contradictions highlighted the realities of development in this boundary, which were behind the facts that were identified through the sample of cases of HRDs murdered in the 2000s. The analysis of these contradictions also involved representing scenarios that explain how the nation-state created environments conducive to the violence that emerged against the population targeted by this inquiry. Therefore, this study in the second section outlined three scenarios that explore how the social mobilization of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created contradictions with the legal and illegal armed groups that settled in this territory.

The first scenario highlighted the cycle of violence against black rural HRDs in the Mira river basin of Tumaco during the 2000s. The Mira basin is located in the southernmost point of the South Pacific region, and it was probably the territory where the highest amounts of coca crops were produced in Colombia. The first scenario involved the pattern of analysis of the peasantry sector and the fact that this place was the epicentre of massive arrivals of mestizo peasants from other parts of the country who were engaged in coca cultivation. The extensive planting of coca crops produced dramatic devastation of the primary forests in this geostrategic basin of Tumaco, not only for the economic interests of the armed groups but also for the social and economic

development of the ethnic population of this city. The first scenario also involved Law 70/93 and how the social mobilisation of the black rural communities in defence of their collective territorial rights created contradictions with the use of land of the armed groups that were present in this boundary. In the first scenario, the FARC guerrillas were probably the main culprits of the violence. Indeed, it seems feasible that this guerrilla group promoted the creation of a community committee led by mestizo peasants within the territory of the Community Council of "Alto Mira y Frontera". This strategy sought to deprive the representatives of this black community of the collective land title that the state had granted them by the time when their representatives were murdered. In the context of this armed confrontation that took root in this region, this study found that the rural representatives who actively claimed the participation of the state in defence of their territorial rights became the target of the war strategies of the armed groups that controlled profits of illicit economies in this zone.

The second scenario highlighted the dynamic of violence that journalists experienced in the municipalities of Buenaventura and Tumaco between 2000 and 2003. These two port cities had the largest population and received the highest amount of public resources as a result of the policies of decentralisation that the nation-state began to put in place since the late 1980s. The second scenario involved the pattern of analysis of the petty bourgeoisie sector and that fact that in these places, black local political groups' inherited long legacies of predatory behaviours, increased their regional power significantly, and their concerns were not genuinely articulated in the agendas of priorities of the national institutions of Colombia. The paramilitary group called AUC was the main culprit of the violence in these places. This paramilitary group co-opted local political groups to isolate the communities from the intervention of the national institutions of the state. The isolation of these two populations allowed both the local politicians and paramilitaries not only to obtain valuable spoils of the illegal resources circulating in this Colombian territory but also to marginalise the ethnic communities. In the second scenario, this study found that the dynamics of violence against journalists aimed to avoid the visibility of the alliance between local officials of the state and the AUC. Therefore, the alliance between these two groups focused the violence on journalists to avoid the notoriety of acts of corruption, drug trafficking and the violence that emerged against the black rural HRDs.

The third scenario showed the pattern of violence against representatives of victim organisations in urban areas of Buenaventura and Tumaco between 2007 and 2008. These two cities had a large number of young people living in a situation of extreme poverty, which was broadly embedded in the dynamics of violence. The third scenario involved the set of circumstances of the lumpenproletariat sector and the fact that the poverty and legacies of violence pushed them to participate in widespread disputes to achieve control over local economies. In these territories, the members of the armed groups obtained profits through the extortion of street vendors, the imposition of surcharges on trade in agricultural products, the control of the small-scale drug trafficking and driving female sex trafficking, among other illicit activities. The third scenario also involved the fact that the nation-state through the legislation for the victims of violence had situated the representatives of victims' organisations as critical stakeholders in the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric. In this scenario, the guerrilla's urban militias and post-demobilisation armed groups were accused of being the main culprits of the homicides. In this sense, this study found that the nation-state promoted an environment of development in which the methods of restoration of the social fabric led by the Decree 205/05 clashed violently with the fact that armed groups had great control over the marginal areas and the illicit economies. Primarily, the third scenario involved the contradiction that emerged between the process of reconstruction of the armed conflict with the controls and recruitment strategies established by the armed groups in the two major cities of the South Pacific region of Colombia.

To précis the analysis of the data in this chapter's third part, the study of these three scenarios showed a similar pattern: the state had created socio-political environments, in which its institutions did not fulfil the expected performance to dynamically support the rights granted within the framework of their sovereignty. The first scenario identified the central perspective of how the social mobilisation of ethnic communities in defence of collective territorial rights created a violent contradiction with the legal and illegal armed groups that settled in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. The analysis in this scenario revealed that the state played a crucial role in developing an environment conducive to the assassination of black rural HRDs, who advocated for the collective territorial rights granted in the Mira river basin of Tumaco. In the context of this armed confrontation, the first scenario framed how the rural representatives who actively claimed the participation of the state in defence of their territorial rights become the

target of the war strategies of the armed groups that controlled profits of illicit economies in this zone.

The other two other scenarios displayed how the contradiction, which concerned the third research question, produced different dynamics of political violence observed in the South Pacific Region in the first decade of this new millennium. The other two scenarios showed circumstances of violence that were subsidiary to the situation analysed in the first scenario. Although the second and third scenarios displayed two dynamics of violence and murder cases that were not strictly linked to the mobilisations in defence of collective territorial rights; they did frame two dynamics of violence that included other two clusters of social leaders who faced situations of violence in proximity to the contradiction that involved the collective territorial rights. These other two scenarios also displayed the circumstances in which the role of the nation-state allowed the emergence of environments conducive to violence since it had created norms that did not receive enough support from its central institutions in a context of great violence. These norms gave crucial roles to the representatives of this peripheral zone of Colombia to enhance the development of the social fabric in this highly biodiverse territory. These laws opened the possibilities for these HRDs to lead social mobilisations to address not only the recognised rights but also to search for greater material well-being and social status. In this sense, the leaders of this region increased their expectations about the role of the state.

Nonetheless, the humanitarian scenarios that produced armed conflict in the 2000s showed the existence of opposing identities and perspectives of development between the armed groups and the HRDs. These scenarios also showed that the national elites did not commit themselves to transform the racist perspective through which they have governed the matrix of institutions of the state in this boundary. These institutions timidly supported the requests of protection of the population targeted in this study. This lack of support showed weaknesses within the structure of the state and put at high risk the lives of the other two types of HRDs that were identified in the last two scenarios.

Overall, this final chapter discussed how marginalisation explains the causes of how the state promoted not only an environment of vulnerability that allowed the emergence of the armed

conflict but also an environment conducive to the dynamics of violence that flourished against HRDs in the South Pacific region in the 2000s.

With the aforementioned in mind, in this research report that the homicides against HRDs in the context of armed conflicts were events related to the phenomenon of violence that provides crucial signs, which have not been entirely addressed in the field of Development Studies. The cultural pluralism framework contributed to identifying the dynamics of development that were not sharply considered in the humanitarian reports that followed the research agenda of the dominant institutions of development. The cultural pluralism framework thus provided fitting enlightenments on how the development promoted by the nation-state could be linked to the outbreak of the widespread violence and the murders of HRDs in the South Pacific region in the 2000s.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to understand the emergence of widespread violence and homicides of HRDs in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s. When considering the reasons behind this armed conflict and the political assassinations, it became clear that the dynamics of marginalisation of this territory played a crucial role in the emergence of these phenomena of violence. The predominant literature that addressed this period of struggles in this region was humanitarian reports. Although these reports on the South Pacific region presented deductive and formal methods of the dominant research agenda that revealed facts and technical data that framed the rational behaviour of the armed groups and the economic interests involved in this confrontation; they did not address the significant way in which the state contributed to the promotion of these forms of violence. This study focused on highlighting the central role that the state played in these phenomena of conflict and development. Hence, I argued in this research report that the nation-state promoted not only environments of vulnerability that allowed the emergence of the armed confrontation but also the scenarios of development that led to the homicides of representatives of the civil society.

Main Findings of the Study

The main finding of this case study compromised four methodological objectives addressed in this research. This study identified three scenarios that frame the perspective in which the marginalisation promoted by the nation-state contributed to the emergence of the murders of HRDs that took place in the South Pacific boundary of Colombia in the 2000s. Documenting, analysing and depicting these scenarios was the last objective defined in the methodological design of this research report. The three scenarios represented the central evidence to support the argument that the cultural pluralism framework provided fitting enlightenment to understand how the development promoted by the nation-state could be linked not only to the emergence but also to the persistence of these violent phenomena. The representation of these three scenarios focused on organising and highlighting the main features of the evidence included on a database that contained the identified sample of HRDs killed in this decade. Through the analysis of the sample of murders, this study identified the following three commonalities, which were the main

guide to select the type of dynamic of violence depicted in each of the scenarios considered above.

Firstly, the cases of representatives of black communities in Tumaco were the central cluster of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region. These cases of political murders persisted throughout the 2000s. Secondly, all the murder cases of journalists took place in the urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2000 and 2003. Thirdly, all the murder cases of representatives of organisations of victims occurred in the urban areas of Tumaco and Buenaventura between 2007 and 2010.

The set of circumstances that were taken into account in these scenarios comprised 71% of the total cases of political homicides identified in this period in the South Pacific boundary. The analytical exploration that made it possible to draft these three scenarios of selective violence converged in a similar situation: the state had created socio-political circumstances, in which its institutions did not fulfil the expected performance to dynamically support the rights granted within the framework of their political dominion. The marks left by these political murders evidenced not only a high concentration of these cases in this boundary of Colombia, but also that the main victims were representatives of the mobilisations of the black communities.

The findings included in the three scenarios also involved the analysis of the contradictions that arose between the mobilisations led by the social organisations of this territory and the armed groups that settled there in the 2000s. In this sense, this study in each of the scenarios made an inquiry into the set of circumstances and contradictions, where the violence occurred against the leading three clusters of HRDs killed in the South Pacific region.

Addressing these contradictions compromised not only of inquiring about the economic vectors that altered the patterns of the violence in the armed confrontation of this region of Colombia, but also inspecting the dynamics of identity awareness that flourished there. Furthermore, depicting these contradictions involved the analysis of how the set of circumstances experienced by the lumpenproletariat, peasantry and petty bourgeoisie sectors in this boundary of Colombia, contributed to understanding the events of violence against the population that was the objective of this research. The cultural pluralism framework provided analytical tools to understand the

emergence of these social sectors, exploring the power trajectories and the legacy of marginalisation that overlapped in the history of this territory.

The findings of this study contribute to existing knowledge on the phenomenon of conflict and development by providing analytical evidence that helps to understand the crucial role that the nation-state played in the pattern of political violence that emerged in the South Pacific region of Colombia 2000s. In the characterisation of the scenarios considered above, this study found that: the state norms enacted through Law 70/93, Decree 205 of 2005 and the decentralisation policies of the 1990s violently stoked the contradictions that existed between the armed groups and the perspectives of development led by three types of HRDs killed. Specifically, the three state interventions helped to fuel the bloodshed that was experienced by representatives of black rural organisations, representatives of victim organisations and journalists. The law, decree and policies analysed in each of the scenarios were three types of expected governmental regulations that the matrix of institutions of the state enacted, addressing the mobilisation in which the three leading groups of HRDs killed had participated. Although the mobilisations led by these representatives sought to improve the welfare and social status of their communities; these mobilisations clashed with the fact that guerrillas, paramilitary and post-demobilised armed groups had settled in this territory and imposed their military controls over the populations and the economic dynamics that arouse in this boundary of Colombia.

The primary findings of this study explained the causes of the phenomenon of political violence that arose in the South Pacific region in the 2000s, as a result of institutional changes implemented by the nation-state. In the three institutional changes implemented by the state, this study found that the national elites were not really committed to the transformation of the dynamics of marginalisation that the ethnic groups had experienced in the last two centuries. The lack of commitment of the state in these interventions resulted in contradictory and risky effects, that allowed the emergence of development environments, where there was the highest concentration of civil representatives killed in this decade. The lack of state commitment, together with the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Colombian history, shaped the political violence that arose in this marginalised place in Colombia.

In the three scenarios, this study found that the promised state regulations increased the expectations of these leaders about the role of the state. The norms gave crucial roles to the representatives of this peripheral zone of Colombia to enhance the development of the social fabric in this highly biodiverse and marginalised territory. The Decree 205/05, Law 70/93, and the 1990s decentralisation policies opened the possibilities for these HRDs to led social mobilisations to address the recognised rights, and to influence the state's institutions to address the poverty, violence and the predatory behaviours that afflicted this region. However, in the exploration of the three scenarios, this study converged in similar context: the institutions of the state did not fulfil the expected performance to dynamically support the rights granted to the black populations in the South Pacific region through the considered interventions.

The institutional changes implemented by the state increased the expectations of the three types of representatives on the state institutions, in a context of great violence. These interventions assisted in providing evidence for the contradiction that existed between the territorial controls imposed by the armed groups and the perspective of development that involved the rights granted to the social groups of this boundary. The murders sought to avoid the state intervention which potentially put at risk the local power obtained by guerrillas, paramilitaries and post-demobilised groups in the ports of Tumaco and Buenaventura mainly. In this sense, the considered decree, law and the decentralisation policies acted potentially as a catalyst for the selective political assassinations that occurred in this territory of Colombia. In the three scenarios, this study identified a relationship between the peaks of the violence and particular moments of these state interventions in which the nation-state had supposedly granted rights to the cultural groups of this region.

In the three scenarios, this study found that the emergence of the politically risky environments was the result of institutional failures generated by state interventions. This result confirmed that it was the right choice to depart from the agenda and rationality that followed the humanitarian reports, which addressed the armed conflict in this region of Colombia in the 2000s. When considering the reasons behind the map of political violence in this territory, this study noticed that the assumptions of the economic theories of the armed conflict were not enough to explain the complicated scenarios in which this phenomenon prospered. In contrast to the rational-choice approach, I identified that the homicides against HRDs were events that provided crucial clues

that pointed out the role of the state. The leaders' killings were a consequence of institutional failures caused by the disconnection between the aims of three specific interventions of the nation-state and the institutional support that they received to make their implementation a success. The effects of this disconnection were the factors that explained the emergence of environments conducive to the political violence experienced in the communities of the South Pacific region. In this sense, the study observed that exploring the role of the state was a more accurate approach for understanding and addressing the phenomena of violence in this territory.

To be precise, in this particular territory of Colombia, the case study identified the central commonalities of the political homicides that emerged, addressing three scenarios, where their social environments were highly sensitive to the developmental purpose of the state norms previously considered and to their implementations. The phenomenon of political violence was the result of institutional interventions linked to a legacy of marginalisation of this territory populated by black and indigenous people mainly. In the three scenarios, the homicides revealed institutional flaws that explained the emergence of widespread violence as a result of the persistence of the lack of state commitment to provide protection, justice and well-being to the black communities settled in the lowlands of the South Pacific region of Colombia.

As was mentioned in the argument of this study, the state played a central role in the emergence of the HRDs murders and armed conflict in this study's territorial scope. The third objective of this study was to investigate the social realities behind facts identified by the humanitarian reports. This study observed that the humanitarian literature did not critically consider the role that the nation-state played in the appearance of this huge phenomenon of violence that had not occurred in this region since the colonial period. The reports showed only slight relations between the war and the state intervention to understand the causes of the confrontation in this region.

Most of the analysed humanitarian literature pointed out the relation between the predatory behaviour of the armed groups and the vast migration of coca crops as the main driver to explain the violence that took root in the South Pacific region in the 2000s. The humanitarian reports identified the fact that the increase of the hectares planted in coca was crucial in both the rise of armed groups and the increment of the rates of violence. Nevertheless, they did not critically

assess how the legacies of marginalisation and the environments of vulnerability contributed to explaining the growth of the illicit crops, the rates of murders and the empowerment achieved by the three-armed groups considered above. The humanitarian studies focused on presenting the causes of the confrontation as a result of factors related to greed, following the theories of Collier (Galido et al., 2008; Bensted, 2011) and the agenda of the dominant institutions of development (Bensted, 2011; Fine & Saad-Filho, 2014; Stein, 2008). These reports illustrated the advancement of this armed struggle, providing in-depth analyses of the strategic position of this region and the disputes between the armed groups to control the rents of the coca crops that flourished in this decade. Thus, this study found that most humanitarian reports tended to exclude the role of the state in explaining the causes of the conflict that arose in this Colombian territory.

It is complicated to get away from the role of the state in the purpose of recognising the structural factors that made it possible for the coca crops and the armed groups to prosper in the South Pacific region of Colombia. This study noted that the focus on the lumpenproletariat, peasant and petty bourgeoisie sectors provided a more in-depth understanding of the role of the state in the violence that appeared only in the 2000s, rather than the justifications delivered by the humanitarian reports. In this region, the study observed that:

Firstly, the lumpenproletariat sector was the victim of intensive strategies of forced recruitment and was deeply immersed in urban territorial confrontations that revolved around disputes over the control of areas where these armed groups could monopolise the profits of the drug-trafficking in low scale and other illicit economies that emerged. Secondly, the peasants were extensively involved in the cultivation of coca. They succumbed to this economy not only because their territories lacked the infrastructure to make their economic activities profitable but also because they were victims of armed groups that coerced them to plant in their lands. Thirdly, the petty bourgeoisie was co-opted by the armed groups in order to protect the logistics chain of their drug business and to isolate the local communities from the intervention of the nation-state institutions. Furthermore, the policies that began by the late 1980s to decentralise the political power failed to truly articulate the needs of the black political groups in the priorities of the national institutional agenda and produced what Achille Mbembe calls “private indirect government” (as quoted in Young, 2004, p. 46). The decentralisation policies created a condition

of isolation that helped to empower the local political groups and multiply their patrimonial practices in the middle of administrative domains of the state that were permeated by dynamics of corruption.

The drug business and the conflict erupted in a period when the pattern of development promoted by the state institutions worsened the disparities in welfare, between the populations of the Andes mountain range and the populations of the Pacific lowlands of Colombia. In this decade, the national elites of the state were able to reduce the homicide rates continuously and to increase the size of the economy in the Andes zone mainly. This situation revealed that the national army did not have enough commitment to protect the interests of the entire population, but only those of certain privileged cultural groups. Similarly, as in the considered three scenarios that focused on the epicentres of the phenomenon of political violence in this decade, this study found that the growth of the three social sectors converged notably in Buenaventura and Tumaco. In this sense, instead of the justifications presented by the humanitarian literature, this study found through the pattern of sectors analysed in the South Pacific region of Colombia in the 2000s that: although it is a fact that the abundant amount of coca crops encouraged the competition between the armed groups, the role of the state, contributed significantly to forge the social sectors that were a breeding ground for the widespread violence that emerged. The nation-state promoted institutions and dynamics of marginalisation that made the lumpenproletariat, peasant and petty bourgeoisie sectors highly vulnerable to succumbing to the cycles of violence experienced.

The humanitarian reports did not consider in detail how the historical dynamics of development that preceded the period of the outbreak of the armed conflict, could explain the role played by the state in turning Colombia's Pacific region into a bloody theatre of violence. Different humanitarian reports identified the fact that the implementation of the Plan Colombia in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá produced an evident migration of coca crops to the South Pacific region that coincided with the time when the armed conflict appeared in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, these reports did not take into account how the legacies of state marginalisation produced adverse environments of development to explain the reasons for the eruption of the violence in this boundary in the 2000s.

This study's second objective was to investigate how the nation-state created an environment of vulnerability that explains the causes for the emergence of the armed conflict in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The primary data forming the basis of the analysis defined by the second methodological objective of this study was academic literature on the Pacific region and Colombia. The analysed scholarly sources employed the cultural pluralism approach and institutionalism theories that allowed this study to identify reasons why the political, economic and social development has been delayed in this territory and why violence has emerged (Almario, 2009; Galido et al., 2008; Hoffman, 1997, 2002, 2007; Pardo, 1998; Restrepo, 2001, 2002; Wade, 2009).

As in the point previously discussed, related to the emergence of the three politically risky scenarios, this study observed that the state promoted institutional failures and legacies of marginalisation which produced the armed conflict that arose in the Southwestern region of Colombia. In particular, the study noted, through the cultural pluralism framework, that the process of identity formation of the Colombian national elites and their ideological predominance in the state, helped to understand why the state institutions promoted the environments of development and vulnerability that allowed the emergence of the widespread violence in this boundary.

In the South Pacific region, the vulnerability emerged as a result of the disconnection between the aims of political reforms promoted by the state and the institutional support that they received to make their implementation a success. In the late 1980s, the national elites promoted critical reforms to address the complicated situation of political stability that country experienced. These reforms recognised the racial diversity of Colombia and the crucial role represented by black and indigenous groups for the development of the state. Nonetheless, this study identified that in the 1990s, the state institutions timidly addressed the mobilisations and development perspectives led by the black and indigenous communities of this region and, therefore, promoted three dynamics of vulnerability similar to those anticipated by Young (1982).

The marginalisation and institutional failures disclosed how the state promoted the vulnerability and the increasing risk of violence that finally appeared. Firstly, the state's interventions through the 1991 Constitution, Transitory Article 55 of the 1991 Constitution and Law 70/1993 brought stimulating expectations to the black and indigenous communities. They inferred that the changes in the legal framework would allow for the transformation of the racial and classist way in which the national elites have been managing Colombia in the last two centuries. Secondly, while Colombia's new legal framework generated hope among the black groups, the pattern of development promoted by the state institutions worsened the disparities in welfare, between the populations of the Andes mountain range and the populations of the Pacific lowlands of Colombia. Under the dynamics of marginalisation promoted by the state, in this region appeared social sectors not only without commitments to the state institutions, but also without means to guarantee a dignified life and who succumbed to the profitability of illicit economies. Thirdly, the Colombian state addressed international security concerns about its high production of coca crops, under the logic of a militarised and narcotised agenda. This agenda not only contended with the backdrop of the rights that the state granted to the communities in this territory, but it also exclusively positioned the region as an area in which the guerrilla groups strengthened their financial and military strategies.

Although the South Pacific region was considered a haven of peace, it was experiencing the growing risk of violence. This study found that violence began as a result of the increasing danger that state institutions did not adequately address. Firstly, in the 1970s and 1980s, the investments of the drug cartels appeared in the region and guerrilla groups began to use the territory as a refuge area. Secondly, in the early 1990s, paramilitary groups confronted the guerrillas for territorial control over a neighbouring and similar area called the North Pacific region. Thirdly, in the South Pacific region since 1997, the military agenda of the Plan Colombia produced massive arrivals of mestizo peasants from other parts of the country who were engaged in coca cultivation. Fourthly, simultaneously, different types of armed groups, cartels and smugglers targeted the complex geography of the South Pacific region as a strategic zone between the centre of Colombia and the Pacific Ocean, where there was a minimal presence of the national army. Finally, guerrillas and paramilitary groups linked the extreme vulnerability of the population of Buenaventura and Tumaco and the privileged position of their ports for the

cultivation of coca and its international trade in the late 1990s. These ports were the epicentre, where the armed conflict entered finally into the South Pacific region. The arrival of the paramilitary groups in this region coincided with the period in which the widespread violence described appeared.

The legacies of state governance helped to understand the relationship between widespread violence and the structural vulnerability of the South Pacific region. The dynamics of marginalisation towards this territory revealed the process of identity formation of the Colombian national elites and their ideological dominance in the state. Although the 1990s was the gateway period for the confrontation that emerged in this territory in the 2000s, it took four and a half centuries to the state to develop the environment vulnerability that experiences the black and indigenous communities of this region. The marginalisation showed why in this region, the country lacked the capacities to contain and overcome the armed conflict by providing accountable protection, justice and well-being to the black communities settled in the lowlands of this territory of Colombia. Through the analysis of the dynamic of development promoted by the state during the colonial period (from 1572 to 1818), post-colonial (from 1819 to 1980) and modern period (from 1990 onwards), this study found cultural competitions and power trajectories that overlapped to explain the precarity in this region. The indifference of the central state towards this Colombian territory remained rooted in connotations of racial segregation. The ethnic communities experienced a process of indigenous development in which they lacked the state institutional support to overcome the precarity and thus, achieve the well-being of its inhabitants.

As identified by Young (1979, 1982), this case study found a close correlation between the vulnerability of this particular boundary and why the state support specific groups while disallowing others. The perennial way in which the sovereign elites exercised the power of the nation towards the populations of this territory, shaped the regional development of the South Pacific of Colombia. The study corroborated the ideas of Galido et al., (2008), who suggested that in the marginalised zones of Colombia, the armed conflict was fuelled: firstly, by the initial conditions of exclusion. Then, the nation-state institutions reproduced inequitable environments of development. Lastly, in those territories appeared rent-seeking activities. Hence, these circumstances led to the incursion and intervention of armed groups to control the illicit

economies in these regions. The results of this study contributed to explaining the despotic incompetence of how the state reacted to protect the black and ethnic communities in the South Pacific region against the risks represented by the armed conflict.

The first objective of this study was implementing a conceptual framework for framing and depicting the complexity of the phenomenon of violence in the South Pacific boundary. The theoretical framework in which was based on this case study is known as The Politics of Cultural Pluralism or border theory (Toffolo, 2003). The relevance of this theoretical framework was based on its attention to the role of history, the state and the identity vectors involved in the context of conflicts. The main categories employed in this analysis were the exploration of cultural markers, legacies of the colonial state, homogenisation projects, and processes of social mobilisation, melting pot metaphors, and suppression of minorities, the state-building process, the state power distribution and the role of discourses (Young, 1979, 1982, 2004; Toffolo, 2003). Through this structuralist conceptual framework, this study identified which groups were located on the boundary, how the power operated at this territory, the nature of the space that separated the social groups, and how and why the South Pacific boundary persisted. Furthermore, this study found that cultural pluralism framework was useful to analyse scholarly literature on the South Pacific territory that addressed the role of the state to explain the development in the South Pacific region of Colombia and the course of its violence.

Contributions and Suggestions of the Study

The findings of this case study contribute to the literature in the field of Development studies in the following way:

Firstly, this case study provides evidence that the murders of HRDs might function as an indicator to recognise critical social problems and institutional failures considered by the literature in this field, to explain the causes of the emergence and persistence of violence in certain zones. The findings of this study present analytical evidence that contributes to explain the relationship that exists between the patterns of violence against HRDs, the armed conflicts and the role of the state. Although the literature in the field of Development Studies provides enough evidence of how the role of the state explains the causes of armed conflicts, it has not inquired sufficiently into how the role of the state contributes to understanding these political

murders in the context of armed confrontations. Therefore, the analysis of homicides against HRDs in the context of armed conflicts have not been explored sufficiently by the studies in the field of development.

Secondly, this case study contributes to the field of Development Studies by confirming in another context, the findings and the vast literature in the field that have generated the crucial role that the state and the politics of cultural pluralism play in explaining phenomena of violence and development. These theoretical approaches provide explanations of the causes of these phenomena, which have been highly tested in the scholarly arenas of Africa and incorporated into several investigations across the social sciences. Hence, this allows us to find lessons for the South Pacific region of Colombia from experiences in institutional interventions that have been used in processes of mitigation, reparation and the overcoming of violence in Africa and elsewhere, and which have been analysed by studies in the field of development.

Thirdly, this case study offers literature of this field a valuable opportunity to broaden the understanding of this territory of Colombia that has been vastly affected by the effects of the violence. A large proportion of the reports and the humanitarian literature dealing with the phenomena of violence in this region are dominated by assumptions that fit logically with the theories of Collier and the deductive and formal methods used in the agenda of the dominant institutions of development. A significant problem with some of the reports and humanitarian studies led by this research agenda is that they assume that facts by themselves describe the realities behind the issues of violence and development. These reports also suppose that the nation-state's institutions have been neutral in the role of mediation vis-à-vis the social and cultural conflicts experienced in the South Pacific region. The humanitarian literature indeed identifies facts of the violence in this territory, seeking functionalist aspects that are intimately related to the processes of economic calculation of costs and benefits. These facts reveal at the grassroots level the functioning of the armed groups and the economic interests involved in the selective murders and the confrontation that is taking place in this Colombian boundary. However, the humanitarian literature does not shed enough light on how the dynamic of development promoted by the nation-state could be linked to the outbreak and the persistence of the widespread violence and murders of HRDs. Thus, this literature has not sufficiently explored

how the dynamics of development promoted by the state has created environments of vulnerability and precarity that has been conducive to the violence that emerged in this territory.

Although these reports and humanitarian studies could be considered grey literature, they are a valuable source of information due to the uniqueness of their contents and the data analysed. The vast amount of humanitarian studies on this region offer an outstanding possibility to the inquiries in the field of Development Studies of enhancing the understanding of the causes, dynamics and meanings of the complex political and social environments in which the armed struggle thrives in this particular boundary. Therefore, this case study offers a valuable opportunity to researchers in this field to broaden the understanding of violence in the South Pacific region of Colombia, by contrasting the variances across the different backgrounds and epistemological roots of inquiries considered in this research report.

Overall, the findings of this case study suggest the need to move beyond the simple fact that in the South Pacific region of Colombia there are armed groups and illicit economies. The findings indicate the need to focus more on the role of the state and its institutions to understand not only the armed conflict and the homicides of HRDs that emerged in this region, but also to establish institutional interventions conducive to overcoming this phenomenon of violence that persisted after the 2000s. The persistence of the conflict and the political murders, even though different armed groups have disappeared, reveals that the state and the development of this territory play a crucial role in this phenomenon of violence. As was stated by De Zeeuw (2001), this study found that the existence of violent confrontations displays failed political systems that cannot perform essential governmental functions.

The findings of this study suggest the need to find an innovative and dynamic approach not only to monitor the phenomena of violence analysed in this inquiry but also to evaluate the nature and extent of impacts stemming from the interventions of the state. If drug trafficking and armed groups demand an active response from the country, the social sectors identified in this study also demand equally attention to address the phenomena of violence that arose in this zone that is populated by black and indigenous people. The findings of this study suggest that the armed clashes show failures associated with the lack of capacity of the nation-state institutions to transform racist legacies that have existed since the colonial period. Hence, the persistence of the

precarity and the armed conflict reveal the discriminatory perspective through which the elites of the state have continued affirming their legitimacy in this boundary of Colombia.

This case study serves as a basis for future researchers interested in addressing the concerns about the enormous phenomenon of murders of HRDs that triggered the peace agreement signed in 2016. This reason also motivated me to conduct this investigation and to concentrate my attention in this territory. In the South Pacific Region of Colombia, the homicides of representatives of civil organisations and the armed conflict emerged fifteen years before the establishment of the peace agreement. Since the 2000s, this zone of the country presents some of the worst statistics in terms of HRDs killed. In this case study, the causes that explain the persistence of this phenomenon of violence is associated with historical legacies of marginalisation and exclusion promoted by the elites of the state.

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
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
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Appendices

Appendix A. Chart 1. Homicide Rate & GDP Growth in Colombia




Note. Reproduced from The World Bank (n.d.). Retrieved April 6, 2019, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CN?locations=CO>



Note. Reproduced from The World Bank (n.d.). Retrieved April 6, 2019, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=CO>

Appendix B. Map 1. Municipalities of the Subregions of Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Nariño




Subregion of Nariño	
1. San Andrés de Tumaco	6. Olaya Herrera
2. Barbacoas	7. Francisco Pizarro
3. La Tola	8. Roberto Payán
4. Magüí	9. Santa Bárbara
5. Mosquera	10. El Charco

Subregion of Cauca
11. Guapi
12. Timbiquí
13. López

Subregion of Valle del Cauca
14. Buenaventura

Note. Reproduced from “Problemática humanitaria en la región pacífica colombiana” [Humanitarian problems in the Colombian Pacific region] by Ombudsman's Office of Colombia (2016a).

Appendix C. Map 2. The Pacific region



Note. Reproduced from “The Production of “Geographies of Terror” in Colombia’s Pacific Coast Region” by U. Oslender, 2008, *Latin American Perspectives*, p. 86.

Appendix D. Chart 2. Ethnic population in the South Pacific region in 2015

Population of the Colombian Pacific region		Black population	Indigenous population
Subregion of Nariño	418 968	264 814	14 439
Subregion of Valle	407 675	271 060	2 645
Subregion of Cauca	71 981	47 507	1 663
Total	898 624	583 381	18 747


Note. Reproduced from “Problemática humanitaria en la región pacífica colombiana” [Humanitarian problems in the Colombian Pacific region] by Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, 2016a.

Appendix E. Map 3. Mining enclaves in the Pacific territory during the colonial state




Note. Reproduced from “Popayán: The unity of the diverse. Territory, population and settlement in the province of Popayán, 18th century” [La unidad de lo diverso. Territorio, población y poblamiento en la provincia de Popayán, siglo XVIII] by M. Herrera Ángel, 2009, p. 28

Appendix F. Map 4. Racial census of the South Pacific region in 1797



Note. Reproduced from “Popayán: The unity of the diverse. Territory, population and settlement in the province of Popayán, 18th century” [La unidad de lo diverso. Territorio, población y poblamiento en la provincia de Popayán, siglo XVIII] by M. Herrera Ángel, 2009, p. 151

Appendix G. Map 5. UBN Incidence and Its Spatial Distribution in the Municipalities of the Colombian Pacific region, according to the National Census of 1993




Note. Reproduced from “The persistence of poverty in the Colombian Pacific and its associated factors” [La persistencia de la pobreza en el Pacífico colombiano y sus factores asociados] by Galvis, L *et al.*, 2014. P 63

Appendix H. Chart 3. Coverage in Aqueduct, Sewerage and Waste Services in 2005

Department	Aqueduct (%)	Sewerage (%)	Waste (%)
Total national	83.0	73.0	77.0
Bogotá	99.7	99.7	99.8
Valle	81.0	87.1	88.3
Atlántico	99.9	75.4	86.6
Cauca	71.7	64.5	58.5
Nariño	84.2	52.5	57.0
Magdalena	88.0	51.7	56.0
La Guajira	85.8	46.1	60.2
Córdoba	87.6	35.7	54.2
Sucre	97.5	45.3	49.2

Note. Reproduced from “Economies of the Colombian Pacific” [Economías del Pacífico Colombiano] by Vitoria de la Hoz J. 2008, p. 148

Appendix I. Map 6. Change in the Territoriality of the Self-Defense United Forces of Colombia (AUC) between 1997 and 2002



Note. Reproduced from “The violence’s privatization in Colombia and the AUC (Self-defenses United of Colombia): From the self-defenses to the counterinsurgent paramilitarism and criminal” [La privatización de la violencia en Colombia y las AUC: de las autodefensas al paramilitarismo contrainsurgente y criminal] by García Pérez P. 2015, p. 24

Appendix J. Approximation to the Magendo Sector in the South Pacific Region

Although the notions of the magendo sector presented levels of permeability that hindered the operationalisation of the characterisation of this social sector in the purpose of this study; nonetheless, this sector might have the following form in the South Pacific region in the 2000s:


The magendo sector comprised illegal miners, oil thieves and pirates who arose in the territory. This social sector grew in a context of state decadence, where the lack of integrity persisted in the management of public affairs. The economic surpluses of illegal activities led to the appearance of greedy values, which favoured individual interests over community interests. The Diocese of Tumaco (2009, p. 47) shows an illustrative description based on fieldwork observations concerning the greedy values that arose during the period in which the violence had emerged:

In record time, immersion in the "bubble" economy of coca managed to crack the social fabric of the Pacific Coast [...], which for centuries had sustained people and families within a network of relationships that helped resist, live and get ahead during good and bad times. Basic traditional values of support for members of the Afro-extended family have collapsed in front of the "money god" with its merciless and unscrupulous laws.

Firstly, the illegal mining activities appeared in different rural areas of the three subregions of the South Pacific boundary since the second half of the 2000s mainly. Unlawful capitals financed these activities. The armed groups controlled the mining enclaves and demanded a percentage of the resources extracted. The mining activities employed extraction techniques in which were used dredgers, backhoes and uranium in different rivers in this rain forest. The extraction techniques used in these enclaves enabled the procurement quantities of gold that would not have been possible to get through artisanal extraction techniques used by black communities a decade ago. The armed groups controlled violently the population involved in this economic activity. They also performed acts of violence against the ethnic communities that used to extract gold and platinum through artisanal mining techniques, in areas near the mining enclaves controlled by them. Therefore, the mining activities posed a severe risk to the viability of this area of environmental priority and of the old artisan mining institutions that were forged by the communities of this boundary. Even more, these activities became a potential risk to the safety of people living in those zones. Secondly, the theft of oil was carried out with illegal valves connected to the trans-Andean oil pipeline in Tumaco. The illicit extraction of crude caused environmental damages. This crude oil was later refined through artisanal techniques. The petrol was used not only for the processing of coca base paste but also to provide gasoline-electric power generators, motor boats and hedge trimmer employed in the cocaine industry of the South Pacific region in the 2000s. Thirdly, the piracy activities emerged in the off-shore area of the South Pacific territory. The pirates sailed over waters of the Departments of Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Narino. The pirate organisations were responsible for hundreds of sea assaults. The primary victims were fishing and touristic medium-size ships and motor boats. The intercepted vessels were victims of range robberies such as boats' engines, communication systems, fishing stocks and personal objects. The pirate crews accounted for a black population, who knew how to produce violence and had rifles and revolvers to do it.


Another activity that might be analysed through the pattern of the magendo sector was the shipping of cocaine. The transportation of coca involved different territorial stages in exporting the product. The harbours of Tumaco and Buenaventura became important centres of the international cocaine trade. The drug trade used vessels of various drafts that sail by these ports. In the region, it was even built narco submarines powered by electric power that could move up to three tons of cocaine.

Appendix K. Map 7. Density of coca cultivation in Colombia, 2011



Note. Reproduced from “Monitoring coca crops” [Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca] by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime P. 2012, p. 12


Appendix L. Map 8. Geographical Continuity of the Confrontation in the South Pacific region in the 2000s




Note. Reproduced from “Geography of confrontation and violence” [Geografía de la confrontación y la Violencia] by Observatorio de los Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario en Colombia. 2012, pages 2, 4, 5, 10.

Appendix M. Map 9. Strategic Corridors in Nariño between 1990 and 2008

Strategic Road Corridors




Strategic fluvial




Note. Reproduced from “Corridors and strategic territories of the Colombian armed conflict: a priority to be territorialized in the geopolitics of the armed actors” [Corredores y territorios estratégicos del conflicto armado colombiano: una prioridad por territorializar en la geopolítica de los actores armados] by Salazar, L. 2010, pages. 25, 26

Appendix N. Chart 4. Homicide Rates in Colombia, Buenaventura and Tumaco
Homicide rates in Colombia and Tumaco, and Coca Crops in Tumaco between 2000 and 2012




Homicide rates in Colombia and Buenaventura 1991 - 1993.




Note. Reproduced from “Dynamics of the armed conflict in Tumaco and its humanitarian impact”. [Dinámicas del conflicto armado en Tumaco y Buenaventura y su impacto humanitario] by Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2014, P, 27

Appendix O. Map 10: Coca crops in Tumaco in 2006



Note. Reproduced from “Vulnerabilities and Threats to the Human Rights of the People and Communities” [Los riesgos de reclamar la tierra: vulneración y amenazas a los derechos humanos de personas y comunidades]. By Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, (2014b, p. 22)

Appendix P. Map 11: Concentration of homicides and forced displacements in Tumaco between 2006 and 2010



Note. Reproduced from “Vulnerabilities and Threats to the Human Rights of the People and Communities” [Los riesgos de reclamar la tierra: vulneración y amenazas a los derechos humanos de personas y comunidades]. By Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, 2014b, p. 23)

Appendix Q. Database A. Sample of Murders of HRDs occurred in the South Pacific region of Colombia between 1997 and the 2000s

Case	Year	Month	Day	Name	Province	Municipality	Specific Locat	Type of leader	Organisation	Possible Culprit
1	1997	2	12	FRANCISCO HURTADO	Nariño	Tumaco	Hamlet of El Pital	Representative of black communities	Black Community Council of Alto Mira y Frontera	Unknown
2	2000	7	4	MARISOL REVELO	Nariño	Tumaco	Urban area	Journalist	Radio Mira & Teletumaco	Unknown
3	2001	4	27	FLAVIO BEDOYA	Nariño	Tumaco	Urban area	Journalist	Voz Proletaria	AUC
4	2001	9	19	YOLANDA CERÓN DELGADO	Nariño	Tumaco	Urban area	Representative of the Catholic Church	Pastoral Social de Tumaco	AUC
5	2001	11	14	HERIBERTO CÁRDENAS ESCUDERO	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Journalist	Freelance	AUC
6	2002	12	2	JOSÉ ARÍSTIDES RIVERA	Nariño	Tumaco	Hamlet of La Playa de La Variante	Representative of black communities	Black Community Council of La Nupa	FARC
7	2003	4	8	ANA CECILIA SALAS CUERO	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Trade Unionist	SINTRANGOBERNACIONES	AUC
8	2003	7	4	OTONIEL CASTILLO TORRES	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Trade Unionist	Port of Buenaventura	AUC
9	2003	12	18	WILLIAM SOTO CHEN	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Journalist	Litoral Pacifico	Unknown
10	2006	8	9	JUAN DONALDO MORAN	Nariño	Barbacoas	Village of Altaquer	Leaders of indigenous communities	Indigenous Reserve of Chagüí Chimbuza	National Army
11	2006	8	9	BLANCA ADELAIDA ORTIZ	Nariño	Barbacoas	Village of Altaquer	Leaders of indigenous communities	Educational Institution of Kuesbí Montaña	National Army
12	2007	8	9	MIGUEL OROZCO	Nariño	Tumaco	Urban area	Legal representative of black victim organisations	Unknown	Unknown
13	2007	11	16	ELTON BRAYAN RIASCOS	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Student Representative	Instituto Técnico Industrial	Unknown
14	2008	1	14	PABLO GUTIÉRREZ	Nariño	Tumaco	Hamlet of El Pital	Representative of black communities	Community Action Committee- Hamlet of El Pital	FARC
15	2008	5	6	JOSÉ GUILLERMO SOSA NEIRA	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Legal representative of black victim organisation	Unknown	FARC
16	2008	6	26	FELIPE LANDAZURY	Nariño	Tumaco	Hamlet of Candelilla de La Mar	Representative of black communities	Black Community Council of Bajo Mira y Frontera	Post-demobilization armed groups
17	2008	7	1	MARTA CECILIA OBANDO	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Legal representative of black victim organisation	Asociacion de Mujeres Desplazadas del Barrio San Francisco- Asodefran	Unknown
18	2008	10	7	ARMENIO CORTEZ	Nariño	Tumaco	Urban area	Representative of black communities	Consejo Comunitario - Alto Mira y Frontera	FARC
19	2010	7	17	JAIR MURILLO	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Urban area	Legal representative of black victim organisation	Fundacion Integral Pacifico Nariense (FIPAN),	Post-demobilization armed groups
20	2010	7	25	ARBEY MANCILLA OBANDO	Nariño	Santa Barbara	Village of Fenicia	Representative of black communities	Black Community Council of Copdiconc	Unknown
21	2010	7	25	EFREN OBANDO ORDONEZ	Nariño	Santa Barbara	Village of Fenicia	Representative of black communities	Black Community Council of Copdiconc	Unknown


Appendix R. Database B. URLs of the Sources Consulted

Case	Name	URL 1	URL 2	URL 3	URL 4
1	FRANCISCO HURTADO	Diocesis de Tumaco. (2009). ¡ Que nadie diga que no pasa nada! Balance No.1. - Page 61	Ortega, J. M. (2016). Pensar la paz... solo cuando tenga la tierra. REVISTA CONTROVERSIAS, (206). Page., 11	https://verdadabierta.com/zona-para-las-farc-condimento-de-lios-de-tierras-en-tumaco/	
2	MARISOL REVELO	https://www.ifex.org/colombia/2000/07/11/periodista-de-television-asesinada/es/	http://www1.sipiapa.org/caso-simpunidad/sip-lamenta-asesinato-de-periodista-colombiana/	https://cpj.org/data/people/marisol-revelo-baron/	https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1219636
3	FLAVIO BEDOYA	https://verdadabierta.com/ex-para-confiesa-asesinato-de-periodista/	https://vidassilenciadas.org/victimizas/23398/	https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-3550926	https://caracol.com.co/radio/2001/04/28/judicial/0988437600_077294.html
4	YOLANDA CERÓN DELGADO	https://evangelizadorasdelosapostoles.wordpress.com/2017/09/26/historia-personajes-afrocolombianos-yolanda-eron-delgado-1958-2001/	https://verdadabierta.com/las-preguntas-detras-del-asesinato-yolanda-eron/	https://verdadabierta.com/la-hermana-yolanda-eron-una-resistente-a-la-violencia-en-tumaco/	https://www.justiciaypazcolombia.com/el-caso-de-la-hna-yolanda-eron-delgado/
5	HERIBERTO CÁRDENAS ESCUDERO	https://vidassilenciadas.org/victimizas/24643/	https://www.radiomacondo.fm/destacado/un-pacifico-notan-pacifico/	https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-675687	https://cpj.org/data/people/heriberto-cardenas-escudero/
6	JOSÉ ARÍSTIDES RIVERA	https://www.asfcana.ca/actions/blogue/acompamamiento-en-el-consejo-comunitario-de-la-nupa-parte-1/	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7Me8OkmP7QMJ:www.ramwan.net/restrepo/documentos/coflcto-borrador-restrepo.pdf+&cd=10&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:nL-AwmrzPPEJ:casamemoriatumaco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/balance1.pdf+&cd=6&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	
7	ANA CECILIA SALAS CUERO	https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Sentencia110013104056201100042.pdf	https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp-content/uploads/Sentencia-Rad.-2009-00132.pdf		
8	OTONIEL CASTILLO TORRES	https://www.nocheyneblia.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/28/Niebla28.pdf	https://vidassilenciadas.org/victimizas/28060/	http://historico.elpais.com.co/paionline/notas/Julio072003/B407N1.html	


9	WILLIAM SOTO CHEN	https://flip.org.co/index.php/es/informacion/noticias/item/978-asesinado-periodista-en-buenaventura	https://rsf.org/es/noticias/el-valle-del-cauca-con-miedo-informar	https://caracol.com.co/radio/2003/12/24/judicial/1072220400_085931.html	https://caracol.com.co/radio/2003/12/24/judicial/1072220400_085931.html
10	JUAN DONALDO MORAN	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:32F1t9Umj-kJ:https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/documentos/10184/566854/Auto%2B004%2Bde%2B2009.rtf/009be992-4d08-43f6-8789-d2fb3e113307+&cd=10&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	https://vidassilenciadas.org/victimzas/32338/	http://www.ccajar.co/?LA-FUERZA-PUBLICA-COMPROMETIDA-EN	
11	BLANCA ADELAIDA ORTIZ	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:32F1t9Umj-kJ:https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/documentos/10184/566854/Auto%2B004%2Bde%2B2009.rtf/009be992-4d08-43f6-8789-d2fb3e113307+&cd=10&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	https://vidassilenciadas.org/victimzas/32338/		
12	MIGUEL OROZCO	http://www.viva.org.co/cajavirtual/svc0251/articulo05.html	http://forjandofuturos.org/documentos/boletin-informativo-sobre-restitucion-de-tierras octubre-2010_fundacion-forjando-futuros.pdf	http://mesanacionaldevictimzas.blogspot.com/2011/12/restitucion-sin-garantias.html	https://vidassilenciadas.org/hechos/22606/
13	ELTON BRAYAN RIASCOS	http://historico.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Julio072003/B407N1.html	https://caracol.com.co/radio/2007/11/16/judicial/1195222020_507687.html	https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/amr230232008eng.pdf	

14	PABLO GUTIÉRREZ	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:URqGVb7lDroJ:https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/CONPA.docx+&cd=2&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/los-afros-no-la-tienen-facil-columna-579760	http://pensamientocolombia.org/print-preview/?id=41154	https://lasillavacia.com/historia/el-asesinato-con-el-que-acusan-las-farc-de-romper-la-tregua-51019
15	JOSÉ GUILLERMO SOSA NEIRA	https://diastura.blogspot.com/	https://eprints.ucm.es/18074/1/T34228.pdf	https://www.alainet.org/active/45942	http://rebellion.org/noticia.php?id=127031
16	FELIPE LANDAZURY	http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/En-el-bajo-Mira-en-Tumaco-y-en	http://www.redcolombia.org/index.php/regiones/sur-occidente/narino/202-nariasesinado-miembro-de-la-junta-del-consejo-comunitario-del-bajo-mira-y-frontera.html	Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.	http://podion.org/es/protagonistas/Afrodescendientes/felipe-landazuri-1967-2008
17	MARTA CECILIA OBANDO	http://www.viva.org.co/cajavirtual/svc0251/articulo05.html	http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2008/comunicados2008.php3?cod=15&cat=73	http://www.dhcolombia.com/spip.php?article606	https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-onu-rechaza-el-asesinato-de-defensora-de-desplazados-buenaventura
18	ARMENIO CORTEZ	https://elrebelde.mediosalternativos.blogspot.com/2015/08/asesinato-de-lider-de-congreso-de-los.html	https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:URqGVb7lDroJ:https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/CONPA.docx+&cd=2&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=za&client=avast	https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/los-afros-no-la-tienen-facil-columna-579760	http://pensamientocolombia.org/print-preview/?id=41154
19	JAIR MURILLO	http://colectivoagrarioabyayala.blogspot.com/2011/02/en-los-ultimos-meses-han-sido.html	http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimas-seccion/desplazados/3482-la-impunidad-del-caso-de-jair-murillo-lider-de-desplazados-de-buenaventura	http://www.viva.org.co/cajavirtual/svc0251/articulo05.html	http://www.pacificocolombia.org/videos/jair-murillo-in-memoriain/52
20	ARBEL MANCILLA OBANDO	https://www.es.mnesty.org/uploads/media/ACCION EN COLOMBIA.pdf	http://nomadesc.blogspot.com/2010_07_01_archive.html		
21	EFREN OBANDO ORDONEZ	https://www.es.mnesty.org/uploads/media/ACCION EN COLOMBIA.pdf	http://nomadesc.blogspot.com/2010_07_01_archive.html		

Appendix S. Chart 5. Municipalities and Numbers of HRDs Killed by Year




Appendix T. Chart 6. Type of Leader Killed



Appendix U. Chart 7. Number and Type of HRDs Killed by Year in Tumaco, Santa Barbara, Barbacoas and Buenaventura

	Tumaco	Santa Bárbara	Barbacoas	Buenaventura
1997	1 representative of black communities			
2000	1 journalist			
2001	1 journalist and 1 Catholic nun			1 journalist
2002	1 representative of black communities			
2003				1 journalist and 2 trade unionists
2006			2 leaders of indigenous communities	
2007	1 legal representative of black victim organisations			1 Student representative
2008	3 representatives of black communities			2 legal representatives of black victim organisations
2010		2 representatives of black communities		2 legal representatives of black victim organizations.

Appendix V. Map 12. Georeferencing of the murder scenarios of HRDs in the South Pacific Region in the 2000s



Appendix W. Concept Map 1. The Cultural Pluralism Framework

