

CHAPTER 1

1. Background: EU Relations with the Developing Countries

The demise of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created new topics on the agenda for various democratic advocates in the international system that became dominant in the post-cold war period. Issues of democracy, good governance, security and human rights became more prominent in a wide range of policy documents. Thus, the post-Cold War period has been characterised by massive waves of transitions from one-party to multi-party political systems, which can be described as global democratic revolutions. This has been defined as a global trend of democratisation that changed the political systems and institutional arrangements of many countries.¹ The post-Cold War period was accompanied by the resurgence and spread of democracy across the world. This can be described as the diffusion of democratic principles in which the democratic countries spread their tentacles to other parts of the world.

The spread of, and movement towards democracy was not confined to one territory; rather it was a worldwide phenomenon that reached many parts of the world such as Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Huntington and others have defined the various revolutions as the third wave of democratisation that created a host of new democracies. According to Schmitter, this wave of democratisation started in Southern Europe and eventually spread to other parts of the world such as Latin America and Africa.² It involved radical political transitions due to pressure to promote political liberalisation in most of these countries. The third wave of democratisation involves the transition to and consolidation of the adopted elements of the democratic system.³ It encompassed the demise of authoritarian regimes and installation of pro-democracy regimes as its advocates offer to help build democracy. Democratic norms such as multi-partism, periodic

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave", in *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 2. No. 2. (1991): 12- 13.

² Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimension of Democratization Europe and the Americas*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 37.

³ Lise Rakner and Rocha A. Menocal, *Democratization Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned. Working Paper 1*. (The Advisory Board for Irish Aid. 2007), 7. According to Huntington, the third of Wave of democratization was preceded by the first (1820s) and second (World War 2) wave of democratization which exposed various countries to democratic principles and which were previously characterised by authoritarian regimes, violation of human rights and no respect of the rule of law.

elections, citizen participation, and freedom of speech, among other elements were the main focus of the wave of democratisation.

With the advent of the third wave, some authoritarian regimes in Europe, Asia and Latin America were replaced by democratic political systems.⁴ Most of the authoritarian regimes affected by the third wave of democratisation were seen as failed experiments hence they lost legitimacy locally and internationally.⁵ These regimes were characterised by poor electoral policies, corruption, abuse of human rights, limited citizen participation and a failure to meet the needs of their citizens. This motivated many pro-democracy countries and institutions and human rights groups to foster democratic reforms in these countries.

Most of the actors in the democratisation process had become more interested in individual rights, plural politics or multi-party systems and opposed authoritarian regimes. According to Huntington, bureaucratic empires, oligarchies, aristocracies, regimes with limited suffrage and communist parties were all touched by the wave of democratisation.⁶ The majority of the actors in the democratisation process perceive the aforementioned core values as the defining features of a successful democratic transition. Improved citizen participation, and regular, free and fair elections among other elements of democracy define a successful transition to real democracy. The actors involved in this process of transformation normally focus on the promotion or propagation of these norms.

Actors such as the USA and several European countries (Britain, France, Germany and Norway) were largely involved in the democratic transition process. They were involved in countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Senegal, Sudan, Panama, Grenada, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic among others. Also, institutional actors such as the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various non-governmental organisations have also been directly and indirectly involved in promoting democratic development particularly electoral processes and multi-party politics. These actors' have supported judicial reforms, the holding of periodic elections, constitutional

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century*. (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21.

⁵ Huntington, *Democracy's Third Wave*, 13.

⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century*, 12-13.

reforms, voter-education campaigns and the strengthening of institutional capabilities of the recipient countries.

Financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank became actively involved in making political democratisation a pre-condition for financial assistance.⁷ Economic or financial assistance was granted on condition that the recipient country is willing to engage in democratic reforms or the promotion of political pluralism. This signified the involvement of democracy advocates in the third wave of democratisation, particularly in the countries mentioned above. For instance, the EU in DRC, Tanzania and Ivory Coast has supported electoral reforms through the provision of aid meant to facilitate such reforms.

The EU is an important player in Africa and through its vast network of relations with countries such as Ivory Coast, Algeria, Malawi, South Africa and others has been one of the most influential external actors in propagating and universalising these norms in the developing world, Africa in particular. As one of the largest world donors, the EU has maintained its relations with most African countries as it continues to provide aid to them. The EU has missions and delegations in most of the African countries, thus it has established itself in the majority of these countries.

With the aid of the EU and other external actors involved in democracy promotion, there has been an increased diffusion of liberal democratic ideas to various countries. Molomo illustrates that the spread of these ideas or principles has led to the opening up of political systems (political liberalisation), fostered regular elections, civil participation and human rights protection among other elements of the democratic political system.⁸ The commitment, persistence and motives of the EU in the democratisation process were succinctly illustrated by the EU's External Relations Commissioner Ferrero B Waldner in 2006 when he stated that, *"we believe democracy is inherently valuable and universally desirable. And we are morally obliged to foster those values in our international partners"*.⁹

⁷Huntington, *Democracy's Third Wave*, 17.

⁸Mpho Molomo, "Electoral Systems and Democracy in Botswana", *40 Years of Democracy in Botswana 1965-2005*, ed. Maundeni Zibani (Botswana: Mmegi Publishing House, 2005), 29.

⁹European Union, "Remarks on democracy Promotion by EU's Commissioner Ferrero Waldner", *European Union*, <http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en-6574-en.htm>. (accessed October 20, 2014).

As such in its international relations with African countries, the EU has attached democratic conditionality to any form of assistance granted to them so that there can be reforms towards democratisation. With respect to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU believes that it has an obligation to significantly contribute to democracy, human rights and the promotion of the rule of law in developing countries.¹⁰ The Treaty explicitly draws the organisation's attention to democracy, respect of human rights and the international law. The EU has therefore played a significant role in the third wave of democratisation through promoting electoral reforms, multi-party systems and other core principles of democracy.

Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty also allow the EU and its Member states to promote, consolidate and protect such democratic values.¹¹ It provides the basis for EU's involvement in democracy promotion hence it has persistently fostered democratic reforms around the world, particularly in developing countries in its attempt to promote liberal democracy. The promotion of democracy can then be described as a spectre that has haunted the majority of undemocratic countries in an attempt to change their political systems and consolidate their electoral processes. According to Huntington, democracy leads to stability and peace and this has motivated many of the democracy advocates to push for reforms in most of the aforementioned countries.¹²

The EU's efforts in democracy promotion and its presence in most African countries is based on agreements such as the Lome Conventions (1-4) (1975-2000) or the ACP-EU Partnership Agreements which have been amended and are now known as the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs).¹³ The Lome conventions were meant to promote cooperation on development, economic policy, democracy promotion, trade and industrial development. However, the conventions (particularly the Lome 4 Convention) have gradually been amended and now have a political dimension that seeks to address democracy,

¹⁰ Julius Byaruhanga, "EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda. Africa Challenge Foundation", 2012. <http://www.uni-osnbruck.academia.edu/juliusByaruhanga.2012>. (Accessed September 15, 2014). Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*, 11.

¹¹ Elmar Brok, "Introductory Remarks: The European and Democracy Promotion", in *World Wide Promotion of Democracy: Challenges, Role and Strategy of the European Union. Proceedings of a Conference Organized by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*. (Brussels: KAS, 2007), 14.

¹² Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century*, 29.

¹³ Gordon Crawford, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Case of Ghana", in *Polis Working Paper No. 10*. (London: School of Politics and International Studies. 2004), 5.

human rights, respect of the international law and good governance.¹⁴ Through these amendments, there has been a shift from the traditional economic partnership to a relationship that addresses democratic, human rights and political issues.¹⁵ The partnership between the EU and most of the developing countries now focuses on democracy, human rights and good governance as the cornerstone of their relationships. The Cotonou Agreements also define these democratic principles as the essential elements of the ACP-EU relations.¹⁶

These agreements have clauses or articles as mentioned above that put democracy, human rights and good governance at the core of the relations between the EU and ACP countries. To show that democracy and good governance are at the epicentre of the EU-ACP relations or EU foreign policy towards the developing countries, Article 5 of the Lome IV Convention states that “*respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law which underpins relations between ACP states and the community and all provisions of the convention and governs the domestic and international policies of the contracting parties, shall constitute an essential element of this convention*”.¹⁷ EU’s foreign policy towards the developing countries particularly in Africa emphasizes or focuses on democracy and good governance.

Also, Article 5, 9 and 366a among other articles of the Cotonou Agreement affirm and allow the EU to promote human rights, democratic principles, good governance and rule of law.¹⁸ According to the Cotonou Agreement, any country that has violated human rights or democratic principles can be suspended from the partnership agreement. In the Cotonou Agreement, Article 9 states that “*the community shall provide support for the political, institutional and legal reforms and for building the capacity of public and private actors and civil society in the framework of strategies agreed jointly between the state concerned and the community*”.¹⁹ This reaffirms the commitment of the EU in democracy promotion through the ACP-EU Partnership or relations.

¹⁴ Gabrielle Hezekiah, “The Cotonou Agreement Explained”, *Trade Wins: Critical Issues For Business*, Vol. 1. No. 7. (2001): 1-12.

¹⁵ Andris Zimelis, “Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership: A Misguided Approach to Development? *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46. No. 3. (September 2011): 389.

¹⁶ Zimelis, *Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership*, 389.

¹⁷ Rye G. Olsen “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and For What Reasons?” *Africa Affairs*. Vol. 97. (1998): 344.

¹⁸ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 5.

¹⁹ European Commission, *ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (The Cotonou Agreement)*, 22.

Democracy promotion in Africa and other parts of the world underlines the relationship between the developed countries and various institutions particularly the EU and developing countries. This is evident in most trade agreements such as the African- Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) - European Union Agreements which have articles and clauses that seek to promote democracy through their relationship. To show that the partnerships are meant to promote democratisation, Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement states that “*the partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, process of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law and good governance*”²⁰. As shown below, these clauses stress the importance of democracy and human rights as fundamental guidelines in their relations.²¹ As such, the EU has attached democratic conditions as a priority and seeks to ensure that countries such as Malawi, Burundi, and Tanzania have reformed their political systems. It uses normative instruments such as financial aid and access to the EU market to foster the growth of democracy in the developing countries.²² If the agreement is violated, the EU has the right to suspend its relations with the recipient country.

The EPA is a stable partnership between the European Union and the developing countries which seek to formulate viable trade and economic relationships between them. These can be defined as binding bilateral contracts between the EU and African countries.²³ With increased interests in engaging with the developing countries, the EU initiated economic partnership negotiations with them to promote development, trade and employment among other areas in Africa. The agreements are seen as part of the development agenda for the ACP countries that seek to boost foreign direct investment, attract local investors and foster better economic conditions.

Signing or agreeing to the agreements with the EU would mean that African countries would have a guaranteed market access to the EU thereby promoting trade integration. The agreement states that the developing countries should also open their markets to European goods and

²⁰ European Commission, “ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (The Cotonou Agreement)”, *Official journal of the European Communities*. 21 September 2012, <http://www.acp.int/content/acp-ec-partnership-agreement-agreement-de-cotonou> (accessed September 15, 2014).

²¹ European Union External Action, “The EU and Human Rights”, <http://www.ecas.europa.eu/humanrights/index.en.htm>. (accessed October 22, 2014).

²² Zimelis, *Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership*, 390.

²³ Stephen McDonald, Stephen Lande and Dennis Matanda, *Why Economic Partnership Agreements Undermine Africa’s Regional Integration*. Wilson Centre and Manchester Trade Collaboration, 2013. 1-6.

services to ensure a mutual reciprocal relationship.²⁴ According to Czapnik, EPA promotes development, reinforces Africa's regional integration thereby leading to sustained economic growth in Africa.²⁵ Referring to the case of Ivory Coast²⁶ in 2014 during the EPA negotiations, Czapnik states that Ivory Coast knew that a failure to sign the agreements would mean that the country would lose the benefits of free trade with the EU (that is, free quota, free access to the EU market). This would eventually hinder the Ivorian industries and affect its exports to the EU. Considering the economic situation in most African countries, the recipient country will have no option except to sign the agreement.

Taking the benefits of signing the EPAs into consideration, the EU requires the African countries to meet certain criteria such as improving human rights conditions and creating prospects for good governance and democratic reforms. In these partnerships and negotiations, the EU has an upper hand and hence it imposes its own conditions or criteria that it can use to allow African countries access to their markets. Upon meeting these conditions, the recipient countries can be promoted to another level in its relationship with the EU. For instance, Cape Verde in 2011 graduated from the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative to the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) and gained access to the EU markets.²⁷

The GSP is an initiative which gives the beneficiaries or countries that have implemented core international conventions particularly on governance, environment, democracy and human rights access to EU markets.²⁸ According to the EU, the scheme allows developing countries exporting to its market to pay less or no duties on their products. However, failure to meet democratic and human rights conditions would mean that it will lose its status in the GSP. According to the European Commission all ACPs that have signed the EPAs benefit from these trading activities and more flexible and advantageous rules of origin which allow them to use cheaper and more innovative inputs from some of the countries.

²⁴ McDonald, Lande and Matanda, *Why Economic Partnership Agreements Undermine Africa's Regional Integration*. 1-6.

²⁵ Ben Czapnik, "Economic Partnership Agreement: Cote d'Ivoires EPA: Between a rock and a hard Place", *Bridges Africa Trade and Sustainable Development News and Analysis on Africa*, Vol. 3. Issue 5. June 2014. 17-19.

²⁶ Ivory Coast is one of the African countries which have been engaged and continue to work with the EU, it has received aid from the organizations and it is also under the EU sanctions list

²⁷ Czapnik, *Bridges Africa Trade and Sustainable Development News and Analysis on Africa*, 17-19

²⁸ European Commission, "Cape Verde Secures Access to EU Markets and Boosts its Development", European Commission, 9 December 2011, <http://www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=763>. (Accessed February 2015).

At the core of the EU's foreign policy there are three main principles: democracy, human rights and good governance.²⁹ This has also been stressed by Ceriani S Filiberto, the EU ambassador to Tanzania when he said that “*democratization, promotion of human rights, good governance are at the core of the EU's identity and constitute key objectives of its foreign, security and development policies. They are not only a moral imperative but also the best guarantor for stability and prosperity which brings high dividends in terms of trade, security, economic and human development*”.³⁰ The EU's commitment to democracy promotion can be supported by its concerted efforts in the DRC, Nigeria, Kenya, Niger, and Algeria; where it has invested in democracy through the provision of aid to support civil society and electoral reforms.

In North Africa, the EU's efforts in promoting democracy are also based on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)³¹ which values the importance of democracy and human rights in the EU's neighbourhood region. The EU has encouraged North African countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco to promote and implement democratic principles such as electoral reforms. The EU has also been prominent in Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. With the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF), the EU has provided development assistance or aid to these countries so that they can promote development in their communities.³²

In countries such as Libya (2011), Ivory Coast (2004-2013), Somalia (2010) and South Sudan (2014) the EU applied sanctions and used aid with strict conditions to induce democratic reforms within the domains of these countries. These countries are described as undemocratic states because they are characterised by poor electoral policies and the non-existence of various democratic principles as aforementioned. In these cases, sanctions were used as an instrument to induce democratic reforms. It has also introduced the European Initiative for Development and

²⁹ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*, 11.

³⁰ United Nations Development Program, “UNDP and EU Funding Agreement Signed in Support of democratic Empowerment in Tanzania”, United Nations Development Program, 21 January 2014, <http://www.tz.undp.org>. (accessed August 29, 2014).

³¹ The ENP is a framework that guides the Union's relationship with countries to the East and South of the European Territory. Some of the Countries in the South and East seek to become a member state of the Union and strengthen their relations. Countries in North Africa that belongs to the EU's neighborhood are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Through this framework, the EU provides these countries with financial assistance to foster democratic and economic reforms. Institutionalization of such reforms will lead to more financial assistance from the Union.

³² Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 11.

Human Rights (EIDHR) which is a strategy meant to support its democracy promotion activities in developing countries.³³

Critics of the externally influenced democratisation argue that many of these externally supported transitions have resulted in fragile democracies and were infrequent and characterised by uncertainty.³⁴ Carothers argues that these efforts resulted in or led to the establishment of feckless pluralism and dominant power politics that inhibit the shift towards true democracy.³⁵ The transfer of power to other political parties and competitive politics remains a rare phenomenon in these countries.

However, and in spite of this criticism, it is also generally acknowledged that there has been a significant change or successful transition away from the old forms of politics such as one-party systems towards multiparty democracies. Countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Sudan among others that received external support from the EU did not all experience successful transitions to stable multiparty politics while others have since been on a steady transition. Countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria have shown signs of democracy such as holding regular elections but no significant developments towards real democracy have been made. In countries such as Kenya, the DRC and others the transition process was unsuccessful.

The political system being promoted by the EU has institutional arrangements that promotes citizen participation in making political decisions by means of competitive struggles for the people's vote and is characterised by multi-party systems.³⁶ The political system enhances political participation of various actors in the society (political pluralism) and also reduces internal disputes thereby inhibiting civil wars.³⁷ As indicated above in Ambassador Filiberto Ceriani's statement democracy is also seen as the guarantor of a peaceful society that leads to a stable and secures international system. This is attributable to the EU's belief among other factors that undemocratic countries or fragile and poorly governed states are prone to terrorists influence, violence and cause threats to international security.

³³ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*, 8.

³⁴ Laurence Whitehead, "Democratization with the Benefit of hindsight: The Changing international Components", in *The UN role in promoting Democracy: Between ideals and Reality*, ed. Newman E & Rich R (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), 135.

³⁵ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 13. No. 1. (2002): 11-12.

³⁶ Carothers, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, 5-21.

³⁷ Carothers, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, 5-21.

The EU Member of Parliament Brok Elmar further insists that “*democracy, good governance and respect for human rights are not the norm for most countries outside the EU. However, these values are the cornerstone of peace and human development. Without them, security and modernization will simply not be possible*”³⁸. He also adds that the EU is devoted to democracy promotion because without democracy there would be serious insecurity problems and challenges for the EU³⁹. Democracy promotion has therefore become part and parcel of the security agenda that forms the foreign policy of the EU in its engagement with the African countries to ensure peace. The EU counter terrorism strategy paper also indicates and stress that the promotion of democracy help to prevent the spread of terrorism and threats in the international system.⁴⁰

The democratic transition process involves construction; destruction and reconstruction of political systems as the EU seeks to support a political system which it believes to be the ideal system and which must be followed by all nations. This has been stressed above by Ferrero B Waldner where he states that the EU believes that democracy is universally desirable hence it should be spread to other parts of the world. Since the outcome of this process is characterised by uncertainties, the recipient countries respond to it differently leading to a series of ups and downs in the transition process. Some countries accept the democratic norms being promoted by the EU and some reject the norms thereby leading to a series of uneven outcomes along the continuum of democratisation. Accepting or rejecting these norms depends on the extent to which those particular countries seek to work or engage with the EU in the long run.

According to Huntington, the waves and calls for democratization by these actors have resulted in various democratic transitions in which some of the recipient countries of external democratic support are left stuck in the process while some of them have completely failed and reverted back to authoritarian or oppressive regimes.⁴¹ A scholarly analysis of democratisation in Africa shows that countries like the DRC, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, Central African Republic (CAR), and Congo among other African countries have failed to move to stable multiparty systems while some countries such as South Africa have enjoyed sustained transitions to young democracies.

³⁸ Brok, *Introductory Remarks: The European and Democracy Promotion*, 13-14.

³⁹ Brok, *Introductory Remarks: The European and Democracy Promotion*, 13-14.

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy Document*. (Brussels. 2005): 9.

⁴¹ Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century*, 41.

Countries that have failed in the democratisation process experience various consequences such as limited access to the media, fragmented opposition political parties, fraudulent electoral activities, violence and poor citizen participation. These shortfalls reflect gaps or inconsistencies in the democratisation process. For instance, elections in DRC continue to be affected or marred by violence and serious irregularities in the electoral processes.

1.1. Research Question

Such inconsistencies in the outcomes of democracy promotion efforts on the African continent raise a number of interesting questions and it is currently unclear from the literature, why in some African countries, transition occurred while in others efforts of the external actors failed to trigger a sustainable transition to democratic rule. What factors on the African political landscape, can help us explain the observed differences in democratic outcomes across a number of African countries affected by the EU's democracy promotion efforts on the continent? Why despite enjoying external support for democratisation, have some African countries failed to transform while others succeeded?

1.2. Aims and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the EU in promoting democracy on the African continent. It will thus explore the EU-Africa agreements including some of the bilateral agreements to establish the extent to which the EU pursued democracy promotion on the continent. These include the EU-Africa trade agreements, CPA, EPAs, aid agreements particularly Official Development Assistance (ODA). By determining the conditions attached to these formal agreements, we can determine not only the instruments and mechanisms that the EU has employed in promoting democracy in Africa but also how it has made use of these instruments in engendering or cultivating a democratic ethos and principles on the continent. The paper will explain how the EU has engaged African countries in an attempt to induce democracy and it also looks at some of the countries and how they adopted and responded to the democratic principles. Thus, it will examine conditions or factors in these countries that might have led to various outcomes of the democratisation process.

Additionally, this research paper seeks to explain the inconsistencies in the outcomes of democracy promotion efforts undertaken by the EU on the African continent and also establishes

how the EU among other external actors⁴² promotes democratic transitions in the developing world, particularly in Africa. It will unpack various mechanisms or instruments (whether persuasive or coercive) that are employed by the EU in promoting democratic transitions on the continent. The persuasive approach involves non-coercive means such as signing of agreements with democratic prescriptions that need to be followed for the success of the agreement. In contrast, the coercive approach involves the use of force through sanctions and military interventions to induce democratic reforms in the recipient countries. For instance, it has applied sanctions on Libya and Ivory Coast and pursued a more persuasive approach in South Africa.

The paper will look at areas or indicators such as judicial reforms, voter education campaigns, election support, and election monitoring where the EU has played a critical role in the democratisation process. The EU has financially supported electoral processes of various countries and in some instances strengthened the opposition political parties. It has funded elections in Tanzania, Mali, DRC and Burundi among other developing countries. To understand the role of the EU, the paper will also look at the EU's commitment to democracy promotion by unpacking its contribution in the areas above. Looking at the above roles of the EU among other external agents, the examination allows the researcher to trace its progress in the democratisation of these countries by looking at the extent to which there is a positive improvement towards democratisation or whether there are failures on the continent. It will look at elections, transparency, civil participation, human rights, access to information and judicial systems as indicators to assess the success or failures of the democratisation process. That is, it will trace the democratic transition process using these indicators. This would help identify what caused different outcomes in some of the African countries.

1.3. Rationale

The literature about democratisation on the African continent does not provide a coherent understanding regarding why some African countries successfully transformed from one-party dictatorships while others failed or backslid into undemocratic practices. As such, many African

⁴² External agents or actors in this paper refer to actors outside the borders of the countries under study. For instance, these actors include EU, UN, World Bank, USAID, and IMF among other actors. These agents have played a significant role in the democratization process in many African countries such as Morocco, DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Mali among other African nations.

countries, policy makers, but also external efforts to promote democracy on the continent are dependent on a trial and error type approach with no knowledge of what conditions are more conducive for successful democratic transformation. Findings from this paper will help clarify and hopefully lead to improved future efforts in democracy promotion on the continent. Currently, there is still a glaring deficit in understanding the best way to promote democracy in Africa. This research would be useful in terms of guiding policy towards more successful promotion of democratic norms and principles.

This study is also intellectually stimulating as it focuses on issues such as inconsistencies in democracy promotion outcomes which have largely been observed without much effort to explain or understand it. Thus, the research will assist more than just domestic policy makers and their advisors but also the international community when addressing issues around the deficiencies of democracy in Africa. The wisdom gained from this study may assist or determine how future democratic interventions strategies are designed. Findings from this research paper will significantly contribute to current scholarship and debates on African democracy and politics by offering new insights regarding the improvement of democracy promotion efforts in Africa.

1.4. Analytical and Methodological Approach

Regional organisations such as the EU with its member countries particularly the Great Britain and France have a long history of relations with the African continent which can be attributed to a traditional bond between them which is not easily breakable. The bond with the EU member countries is based on their colonial relations which continue to tie them together. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the EU established itself as one of the leading promoters of democracy around the world. The EU has become a novel force pushing for democratisation in many parts of the continent. It is one of the actors that have gradually upgraded and strengthened its democracy promotion policies through a set of initiatives such as the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, Cotonou Partnership Agreements, European Endowment of Democracy, EU Strategy for Africa, and European Union Foreign and Security Policy

(EUFSP)".⁴³ Therefore in terms of democracy promotion efforts, the EU has a large footprint on the African continent that merits an investigation.

It has been involved in various countries, big and small and across the length and breadth of the continent, including Lesotho, the DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar among others. However, due to time constraints and space limitations, this paper will focus on a few representative case studies selected from the continent to retain regional balance. The case studies represent West Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa and East Africa. As aforementioned, these countries have also experienced EU's influence through its democracy promotion mechanisms and have had varying outcomes. Thus, these case studies may be helpful and provide insights into their domestic political developments and illustrate what role the EU played in these processes.

The research paper will use a case study research method to gain insight into the role played by the EU in the democratisation process of Ghana, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Morocco. Case study based research enables the researcher to analyse the complexities of specific cases as this will produce detailed findings. This enhances our understanding of how the EU engaged and shaped the democratisation process in the above case studies. The method is a type of ethnographic or interpretive research that involves intensive research and a detailed study of each particular area.⁴⁴ Such an intensive study on the cases would enable us to understand different perspectives within a complex context and obtain information that to a certain extent enriches the current literature.

It identifies the type of interventions made by the EU, and then assesses the outcome in each case. This involves the use of process tracing of the developments in each of the four selected case studies, thereby building a detailed account of the events under study. Through process tracing, the research seeks to intensively look into each case study (Ghana, Morocco, Uganda and Zimbabwe) and how the outcome of the democratisation process has been shaped. The researcher will compare the outcome in each case, the method of intervention used and the

⁴³ Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie, "The European Union's Promotion of External Democracy: In Search of the Plot", *CEPS Policy Brief. No. 281*. (CEPS 13 September 2012): 1.

⁴⁴ Donna M. Mertens. *Research and Evaluation in Education and Psychology. Integrating Diversity with Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods*. (2nd ed) (London: SAGE, 2009): 237.

responses of the recipient countries to understand how they led to variations in outcomes. This enables the researcher to identify factors that explain the variations in the outcome.

The research paper will use both primary (excerpts, speeches, manuscripts and official documents) and secondary material when conducting the research. These sources provide insight on what has been written on the role of the EU in the democratisation of African countries particularly Morocco, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Ghana and what are the factors causing different outcomes are.

The research will look at EU's involvement in these recipient countries in the democratisation process as the independent variable (IV) and review the ways in which it engaged them (for example, in a persuasive or coercive manner) in the process as the depended variable (DV). This will explain how outcomes such as successful (outcome 1) and failed democratic transition (outcome 2) came about.

1.5. Conceptualization

1.5.1. Successful Democratisation

For the purpose of this research paper, successful democratisation is herein defined as a process in which societies peacefully transform into stable democracies characterised by full citizen participation and good governance. These societies also enjoy regular, free and fair elections, multi-party systems, freedom of expression and association. Countries with these characteristics constitute cases of successful democratisation. For instance, section one of chapter two looks at Ghana and Morocco as case studies of relatively successful democratic transition under the auspices of the EU.

1.5.2. Failed Democratisation

In this study, failed democratisation denotes societies that have failed to transform into stable democracies, became stagnated and eventually reverted back into authoritarian regimes and are characterised by election violence, abuse of human rights, unfair elections and poor citizen participation among other factors. Thus, this paper will look at cases that have serious election irregularities, violation of human rights, restrictions on civil society and ordinary citizens and

categorise them as failures. The second section of chapter two looks at Zimbabwe and Uganda as cases showing copious empirical evidence of a failed transition process.

1.6. Chapter Outline

The next chapter (two) will unpack all the case studies that have experienced external support and pressure to implant democracy in their political systems. It is divided into two sections, Section one contains the case study of Ghana and Morocco which shows positive developments towards attaining democracy. Section two explores the case study of Zimbabwe and Uganda which did not successfully transition or faced obstacles in the process of democratisation. Chapter three seeks to critically analyse how the EU has engaged with these countries and identifies factors that could have led to variations in the outcomes of the democratization. This will further understanding of the process of democratisation by revealing mechanisms and factors behind the outcomes in each case. This will be followed by chapter four which gives a general discussion on the outcomes of democratic experiments or promotion. It will explain whether the findings dispute or challenge the existing body of knowledge on democratisation. Finally chapter five will consist of the limitations to the study, recommendations and conclusion. It briefly explains how the research has been carried out and what was the rationale and objective of the study.

CHAPTER 2

2. Introduction

This chapter seeks to look at the role of the EU in each particular case, and instruments used and political power changes between the political elites and outcomes of the democratic efforts of the EU. The chapter is divided into two sections in which the first section represent cases that have successfully transitioned or are showing signs of true democracy while the second section consist of cases in which the transition to democracy has failed. Section one looks at the case of Ghana and Morocco and how the EU has promoted democracy in these countries. Furthermore, it looks at the instruments or approach used by the EU in promoting democracy in each case study. Section two looks at the case of Zimbabwe and Uganda and explains the role of the EU in these cases. The chapter therefore looks at the outcomes of the process of democratization in these case studies and identify factors that have led to such outcomes.

2.1. Section one: The Case Study of Ghana

Ghana gained independence from the European colonization in 1957 and it has a population of approximately 26, 5 million. Its independence motivated other African countries to fight for their own independence from the colonial bondage in which they were tied up by colonial masters such as Britain and France. Ghana lies in the Western part of the African continent and it is one of the African countries that have received external pressure and support to democratize particularly from the EU in the early 1990s onwards. In West Africa, Ghana is a good case that has peacefully experienced democratic transition and it can be used as a blue print to explain why democratization is failing in some countries while successful in some. External influence in Ghana has played an important role in the development of democracy in Ghana and its transition to a stable multi-party and electoral democracy. Ghana has made significant progress in the democratization process which continues to be hailed by many scholars, policy makers and politicians.

Prior to the democratic transition in the 1990s, Ghana experienced serious human rights violations, illegitimate elections, corruption, repression of the media and civil society and banishment of political parties, serious military coups that vehemently distorted its political

trajectory. Haynes illustrates that military coups in the late 1960s in Ghana led to the inception of unconstitutional or undemocratic rule since most ruling parties such as the Rawlings administration were not elected into office but they imposed themselves.⁴⁵ Crawford also described Ghana's political landscape as characterised by a “*series of alternations between authoritarian and notional democratic rule, with three periods of elected government and three of military rule between 1957 and 1992*”⁴⁶. Its political landscape from independence to early 1990s was characterised by various political leaders with different ideologies but with a one party political system or an authoritarian government that dominated the political history. The coming of the Rawlings party into office through a military coup clearly explains that the political landscape of the 1970s and 1980s was characterised by instability and inconsistencies. The administration overthrew the Limann government in the 1980s through a military force which was democratically elected.

Research on Ghanaian politics indicates that President Rawlings of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) banned political parties so that they can refrain from mobilizing people and hold political campaigns between 1982 and 1992.⁴⁷ The opposition parties were not allowed to openly air out their grievances or ideas that oppose the Rawlings administration. As such, these parties were constantly under surveillances as a way to monitor their speeches and movements. Rawlings administration was regarded as unelected and illegitimate because it came into power through a military coup, discouraged press freedom and controlled civil society activities among other restrictions.

Rawlings administration ruled Ghana for over a decade (1981-1993) and the ruling was undemocratic as it was against the participation of other political parties. This was accompanied by prosecution, killings and imprisonment of opposition leaders such as Safu Adu and Boahen among other actors who were pro-democracy.⁴⁸ The Rawlings administration believed that multi-

⁴⁵ Jeff Haynes, “Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects”, *The World Quarterly: Democratization in the Third World*. Vol. 14. No. 3. (1993): 451.

⁴⁶ Gordon Crawford, “Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid (1997-2003)”, in *Polis Working Paper No. 8* (London: School of Politics and International Studies, 2004), 3.

⁴⁷ Haynes, *Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects*, 452. The PNDC came into power through a military coup in the 1980s. It overthrown the People's National Party (PNP) which was an elected government and had failed the Ghanaian economy and caused untold suffering. The PNDC was a military dictatorship when it came into power. In the 1990s, it changed its name from PNDC to NDC.

⁴⁸ Haynes, *Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects*, 458

party political systems is a way of promoting serious corruption and self-aggrandizement behaviours in the government which would then affect the functions of the government and its reputation.⁴⁹ He also noted that the multi-party political system had contributed to the economic downfall in the 1970s; hence sticking to a one party state was the only option for his government. Prior to the 1990s democratic transitions, the Rawlings administration demonstrated that Ghana was not interested in multi-party politics and would not adopt it as a political system.

2.2. EU and Ghana's Relations

Ghana has long standing relations with the EU and its Member countries that ranges from economic, cultural and political relationships. EU's presence in Ghana and other African countries is based on agreements such as the Lome Conventions (1970s-1990s), the new ACP-EU Partnership Agreement which is known as the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the EPAs.⁵⁰ In Ghana, EU has substantially emphasized and encouraged governments and its political elites to promote good governance, implement democratic principles, respect rule of law and promote human rights. It has provided development assistance or aid to Ghana through the European Development Fund (EDF), the financial instrument of the Cotonou Agreement and bilateral aid from its member states.⁵¹ According to Ralli, under the 10th EDF Ghana received approximately €455.34 million intended to promote governance, democracy and poverty reduction among other issues such as transport development.⁵² EU's assistance to Ghana was intended to promote democracy, good governance, human rights and has played a significant role in the democratic transition process.

According to Crawford, EU played a significant role in the 1996, 2000 and 2008 presidential elections; its support among other donors such as the UNDP has mounted to \$12, 6 million which covered more than half of the election total costs.⁵³ The EU funded the 2008 elections through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). It also deployed an Election Observer Mission in 2008 (EOM) to assess the campaign period, pre-election

⁴⁹ Haynes, *Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects*, 456.

⁵⁰ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 5.

⁵¹ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 11.

⁵² Elena Ralli, "Ghana to Receive Additional Financial Aid From the EU", October 29, 2012, <http://www.neurope.eu/article/ghana-receive-additional-financial-aid-eu>. (Accessed August 28, 2014).

⁵³ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 11.

preparations, observe the voting process, counting and the tabulation of results.⁵⁴ Benita Ferrero Waldner the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy said that the EOM “*strengthens confidence of all electoral stakeholders in credibility of all stages of the electoral process and in the democratic structures in the country*”.⁵⁵ This confirms EU’s commitment to promote electoral democracy, good governance and human rights in Ghana and others parts of the African continent. In 2004, the EU also made substantial contributions in strengthening Ghana’s democracy through supporting the parliament and district assemblies.

Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah noted that the EU supported the Electoral Commission of Ghana to support the smooth running of electoral process.⁵⁶ It also funded various organizations that significantly contribute to the democratization process such as Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). The EU is therefore seen as contributing to democracy building, consolidation and sustenance through its electoral assistance agenda in Africa.⁵⁷

The development assistance has conditions attached to it which include political reforms among other reforms and these contributed to the transition process in Ghana. EU’s money to Ghana fostered good governance, promoted institution building and decentralized governance.⁵⁸ This has led to the introduction of district assemblies which promoted decentralised citizen participation and decision making at the district levels. According to Crawford, it facilitated the functioning of district assemblies, offered training programs for over 1000 district officials and up to 8 800 district assemblies among other democratic development issues.⁵⁹ External actor’s support or democracy assistance particularly from the EU has been credited for the successful democratization of Ghana. Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah further argues that such support has brought Ghana in the right path towards democratization.

⁵⁴ European Commission, “EU Deploys Election Observation Mission to Ghana”, *European Commission*, November 2008, <http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release-ip-08/1674-en.htm> (Accessed September 1 2014).

⁵⁵ European Commission, *EU Deploys Election Observation Mission to Ghana*

⁵⁶ Gyimah-Boadi E and Theo Yakah, *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance. Working Paper No. 2012/40* (UNU-WIDER, April 2012), 7-9.

⁵⁷ Dimpho Motsamai, *The EU’s Electoral Assistance: Perceptions of African Democracy Building* (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2010) 5.

⁵⁸ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 12.

⁵⁹ Crawford, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 12.

The EU played an important role in building credible electoral systems in Ghana and strong political parties. In the process of promoting democracy, the EU has supported extensive voter education programs, voter registration system, and sponsored the civil society and other democratic activities thereby contributing to the existence and sustenance of a democratic system in Ghana. As aforementioned, the EU has also played a key role in strengthening the role of the parliament, capacity building and also supported the civil society so that it can take part in the democratization process.

Through financial support, the EU among other external actors strengthened domestic opposition parties and the civil society thereby mounting pressure for a return to democratic rule on the PNDC.⁶⁰ Also, through the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC)⁶¹, the EU represented by the EC fostered political reforms as it allowed political parties and candidates to air out their grievances, to both observe the voter registration processes, polling process and vote counting among other activities that help sustain the development of democracy.⁶²

The EUs support to the civil society organization (CSO) is based on the belief that CSOs are fundamental elements in the democratization process. Hearn believes that the CSO help in democratic consolidation through advocating for pluralism and total institutionalization of democratic norms within the society and at state level.⁶³ The CSO are also recognized as fundamental actors in the democratization process as they shape the relationship between the state and society, improve accountability of state personnel and deepening the values of democracy. It can be noted that the EU has played a significant role in liberating the CSO from the grip of the state which had continuously undermined its role and it has enhanced its (CSO) effectiveness in the democratization process.

⁶⁰ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 4-5.

⁶¹ The IPAC is an initiative which was established in 1994 and was chaired by the EC and other representatives from the ruling parties. The initiative allowed the political parties to engage in political dialogues, discuss election related problems and come up with viable solutions on how to address those problems. The Initiative has made fundamental contributions to the development of democracy in Ghana. It fostered transparency among other democratic elements in Ghana's political landscape. Its contributions can also be attributed to EU support to its existence and functionalities. See Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, P. 7.

⁶² Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 7.

⁶³ Julie Hearn, "Foreign Aid, Democratization and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, Ghana and Uganda" in *Discussion Paper 368*. (Institute of Development Studies. 1999), 14.

2.3. Ghana's Democratic Transition in the 1990s

From the early 1990s, the Rawlings administration faced increased pressure for democratisation from domestic, the EU and other external actors. The EU and its member states played a significant role in the democratization of Ghana. As aforementioned, the EU was involved in electoral support, voter education campaigns, constitutional reform, judicial reforms, strengthening of the media, and civil society thereby contributing to successful democratization.⁶⁴ Domestic actors in Ghana that facilitated the democratization process include the media, civil society which were rejuvenated by the influence of the EU and its Member states.

Having gained support from the EU, the domestic actors exposed and denounced illegitimate behaviours in the government such as corruption, cases of electoral fraud and raised awareness among the citizens thereby enhancing the push for democratization. Due to these pressures, the Rawlings administration developed interests and adopted the multi-party political system in mid-1992 and showed concern and interests for democratization.⁶⁵ This was accompanied by political reforms, introduction of district assemblies due to the decentralization of power.

Haynes also illustrated that the introduction of district assemblies was a starting point towards the development of democracy in Ghana.⁶⁶ The creation of the district assemblies was defined as a way “to promote popular participation and ownership of the machinery of government by devolving power, competence and resources to the district level”.⁶⁷ Participation of the people in daily business of the government is one element that defines democratization; hence the willingness of the PNDC to promote civil participation shows their commitment in the democratization process. It promotes the decentralization of administrative duties in the government and allows the election of members representing that particular district.

According to Crawford, the democratic transition was characterised by unprecedented and “peaceful transfer of power between political parties” in the subsequent elections that is after

⁶⁴ Crawford, *Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid*, 2-13.

⁶⁵ Haynes, *Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects*, 454.

⁶⁶ Haynes, *Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects*, 456.

⁶⁷ Crawford, *Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid*, 16.

the 1992 Rawlings electoral victory.⁶⁸ Gyimah-Boadi writes that Ghana's move to multi-party political or democratic systems has been successful and it will continue to move towards full democratization compared to other African countries which have experienced democratic reversals or stagnation.⁶⁹ This has also contributed to the peaceful transfer of political power between various political parties in Ghana's political landscape during the elections particularly the December 2000 elections.⁷⁰

The successful and peaceful transfer of power in these elections marked a positive step towards democratic consolidation⁷¹ and this also indicates that the democratic processes of Ghana has qualitatively improved compared to other African countries under the auspices of the EU. Ghana's electoral processes are now highly competitive because the banishment of political parties had been lifted, a vibrant civil society has been established and also civil-military relations have been democratised to ensure a peaceful relationship between the military and society.⁷² Due to external pressure for democratization, the civil society and the media are now allowed to monitor political activities of party leaders and monitor the military and other organs of the security sector.

Adding to the notion that democracy has significantly improved in Ghana, the literature shows that due to external support, the parliament has emerged as a key institution of democratic governance in Ghana. Research shows that the parliament has increasingly become active in institutionalizing transparency and combating corruption and embezzlement of funds. This has promoted public accountability by holding individuals and institutions who have abused state funds accountable for their dishonesty.⁷³ The existence of multiparty politics has been exhibited in subsequent elections in the post-1992 period; various political parties are now able to take part in day to day business of the government.

According to Gyimah-Boadi, the development of multi- party political system in Ghana is shown in the subsequent elections which were highly contested due to competition between parties such as the National Democratic Congress (NDC) (former PNDC), United Front Party

⁶⁸ Crawford, *Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid*, 3.

⁶⁹ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 1.

⁷⁰ Crawford, *Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid*, 3.

⁷¹ Crawford, *Democratization in Ghana: Assessing the Impact of Political Aid*, 10.

⁷² Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 1- 2.

⁷³ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 9.

(UFP), Convention Peoples Party (CPP), People Heritage Party (PHP), the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and other parties.⁷⁴ The NDC and NPP are now equal in strength. The one dominant party system has vanished and now different parties co-exist with other political parties. The functionalities and coverage of the media has also improved. It now has the capacity to report on activities related to electoral violence and fraud among other activities.

Relaxation of restrictions on the civil society and media has catapulted the development and growth of democracy in Ghana. Research on Ghana's politics show that Ghana now has over 136 newspapers, 50 television stations and 146 radio stations among other forms of media.⁷⁵ According to a review by AfriMap in 2006 Ghana was ranked 34th in the world and fourth in Africa on the Press Freedom Index.⁷⁶ The 2010 Index also shows that Ghana had moved from fourth position to number one in Africa and this shows a great improvement in press and media freedom.⁷⁷ The current constitution in Ghana allows equal access to political parties by the state media. The ability of the media and civil society to foster democracy in Ghana can be attributed to the role of the EU which played a significant role in building their capacity.

Despite significant improvements towards democracy in Ghana, there are loopholes in its political systems that have raised questions against the commitment and role of the external actors (EU) among other agents of democratization. Gyimah-Boadi finds out that government accountability is not yet convincing and also lacks transparency thereby posing challenges in Ghana's political landscape.⁷⁸ His paper shows that tight security has been maintained on information pertaining to the President, ministers of state and parliamentarians among other government activities.

⁷⁴ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 12.

⁷⁵ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 16.

⁷⁶ AfriMap, "Ghana Democracy and Political Participation", in *A Discussion Paper* (Dakar: The Open Society Initiative for West Africa. 2007), 5.

⁷⁷ African News, "Ghana Ranked Top in Africa for Press Freedom", *African News*, 14 May 2010, <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com-content>. (Accessed on 23 February 2015).

⁷⁸ Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah *Ghana: The Limits of external Democracy Assistance*, 3.

2.4. The Case Study of Morocco

Morocco lies in the Northern part of Africa and it is one of the Arabian countries that have received external support and enjoyed close ties with the EU through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) action plans and its financial instruments such as EDF. It is also officially known as the Kingdom of Morocco and is described as a constitutional monarchy made up of an elected parliament. Its population is approximately 33, 1 million (2013) and has got a blended culture made up of Arabs, Sub-Saharan Africans, and indigenous Berber and European elements. The monarchy holds large amount of executive and legislative powers that allows the King to appoint and rebuke councillors and other government officials. It has made some progress towards achieving democracy in the North African region as it has made an outstanding performance compared to other countries in that region.

Since its independence in 1956 from the French protectorate, Morocco has been ruled by a monarchy which was characterised by heavy concentration of power in the hands of the King.⁷⁹ The King retained much of the executive power and influenced decision making in the parliamentary decision making process. During the reign of King Hassan, the monarchy was untouchable, no individuals, civil society organizations were allowed to openly critique the monarchy.⁸⁰ Dennison et al writes that journalists, activists among various organizations were prosecuted, imprisoned and exiled for openly reporting or airing any grievances against the King.⁸¹ Political opponents were abducted, tortured, disappeared and imprisoned during the reign of King Hassan. The Moroccan political systems allowed other political parties to exist but their operations were limited. Ottaway and Riley argues that the King had the authority to appoint and dismiss the cabinet or dissolve the parliament.⁸²

The political parties were ineffective since the King had more power in controlling all state affairs and making decisions. The King used divisive strategies to cause tensions between different parties thereby making them ineffective in bringing change or when pushing for

⁷⁹ Kristina Kaucsh, "Morocco", in *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood?* Ed. Richard Young (Spain: FRIDE. 2008), 11.

⁸⁰ Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and Jose I Torreblanca, "A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic Revolution in Morocco". *Policy Brief* (European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2011), 5.

⁸¹ Dennison, Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 3.

⁸² Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, "Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?", in *Carnegie Papers No. 71* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 4.

democratic reforms.⁸³ Political opposition parties which were seen as threatening were closely monitored thereby de-activating them and making them ineffective. They were not allowed to challenge the Kings authority. The King and his close allies are described as the ruling elite or the Makhzen which controls decision making in the government and controls the civil society.⁸⁴

Ottaway and Riley describes the Makhzen as a network of traditional monarchical institutions which is made up of the elite, regional and provincial administrators.⁸⁵ According to the European Commission there are many shortcomings that characterised Morocco's political trajectory. For instance, it was characterised by lack of respect for the constitutional principles of the separation of powers, limited powers for the government, weak political parties and lack of independence for the judiciary.⁸⁶ These shortcomings were attributed to the dominance of the ruling elite or the Makhzen which possessed wide ranging powers and continued to hold on power.

2.5. EU and Morocco's Relations

EU and Morocco have developed long standing relationships which have significantly contributed to a gradual move towards true democracy in Morocco. According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU seeks to support Morocco's economic, political and democratic reforms.⁸⁷ Morocco has established close relationships with the EU and its member states based on strong trade ties, diplomatic links and cooperation on war on terror due to the vulnerability of the region to terrorist attacks.⁸⁸ Morocco is regarded as an important partner in the war on terror or fight against terrorism in the region; hence this has solidified its relationship with the EU and other actors such as the USA which also play an important role in combating

⁸³ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 5.

⁸⁴ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 11- 12. The Makhzen is the governing body or institution which is made up of the ruling elites i.e. the King and royal notables among other close allies in the government. It is a network of power holders and privileged citizens in the government. It is also known as the sultan's government and has got the authority in administering its activities. The Makhzen allows the King to function or act as a monarchy and also as the chief executive. Being part of the Makhzen was key to social mobility, access to economic benefits and security.

⁸⁵ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 4.

⁸⁶ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 1- 16.

⁸⁷ European External Action Services, "EU-Morocco Relations", *European External Action Services*, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/morocco/index.en.htm>. (Accessed July 25, 2014).

⁸⁸ Dennison, Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 2.

terrorism in the region. The EU therefore played a significant role in the region in an attempt to contain terroristic behaviours and promote stability in the region and at home.

The EU-Morocco relationships are bound by the Association Agreement which emphasizes on the observance of human rights, democratic principles, economic freedom and the need to open a regular political dialogue in bilateral and international contexts on issues of common interests.⁸⁹ The EU also established the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2002 which is an initiative based on the principles and values of democracy, rule of law and promotion of human rights.⁹⁰ The ENP is one of the most important instruments that have been used by the EU and EC to promote democracy and human rights in Morocco and other countries within the region. According to Kaucsh the ENP enables the EC to promote capacity building in public administration, decentralization, promote access to justice and adherents to international conventions in the member states.⁹¹ Adding to the above, Khakee argues that the EU-Morocco Action Plan seek to promote the administrative capacity, reduce corruption and foster reforms in the judicial or justice system.⁹²

The ENP also seeks to deepen and promote sustainable democracy in Morocco and other countries that fall within the EU's neighbourhood through promoting free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association among other elements of democracy. The EC supports the attainment of these principles of democracy through providing funding for the implementation of the projects or initiatives. For instance in 2007, Morocco was the first country among other ENP partners to receive additional funding totalling €28 under the Governance Facility.⁹³ This facility is granted after meeting certain conditions such as that the recipient country has made progress in the field of democracy and human rights.

In Morocco, the EU supported and monitored elections in 2007 which were seen by international observers as the most transparent elections in the Moroccan history.⁹⁴ The 2007 elections were

⁸⁹ European External Action Service, "The Association Agreement EU-Morocco", *European External Action Services*, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/morocco/association-agreement/index.en.htm> (Accessed July 28, 2014).

⁹⁰ European External Action Service, *The Association Agreement EU-Morocco*

⁹¹ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 16.

⁹² Anna Khakee, "Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco", *FRIDE Project Report Assessing Democracy Assistance*. (May 2010): 3.

⁹³ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 20.

⁹⁴ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 11.

also recognised as the first elections to be observed by international Electoral Observer Mission.⁹⁵ The observer Mission was funded by the EU and it also supported domestic NGO Electoral Observer Committees.⁹⁶ Most of these NGOs are funded by the EU through the EIDHR as the EU seeks to deepen democracy in Morocco's political structures. Such contributions have been recognised as positive developments towards the establishment of democracy in Morocco. Following recent constitutional reforms and in support of an improved electoral framework, Catherine Ashton the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy insists that the EU "*will continue to encourage the shift and effective implementation of these comprehensive reforms. Moroccan citizens remain at the centre of this process*"⁹⁷. This reflects the EU and EC's commitment to the promotion of democracy in Morocco as a member of the ENP.

In engaging the Moroccan Monarchy into the democratization process, the EU has used aid and the agreements aforementioned as its main instrument to foster democratic changes or reforms in the country and region at large. In 2009 the EU through the EC granted Morocco €205 million as development aid. Looking at the aid granted to Morocco and most countries in the EU's neighbourhood, Timo Behr notes that there were no strict conditions attached to the aid due to its deep social, political and economic ties.⁹⁸ He has described EU's approach to Morocco and other countries in the Mediterranean region as the soft power approach. The approach is characterised by giving aid with no strings attached to the recipient. Khakee argues that the democratic victors could not press hard in fostering the institutionalization of democracy in Morocco because some of the EU Member countries have close ties with the Makhzen.⁹⁹ This has contributed to the persistence of the EU's soft power approach in Morocco's democratization process and hindered growth of democracy in its political structures.

However, the EU has recently reviewed the ENP and Human Rights policy and adopted the hard power approach so that it can be effective in deepening sustainable democracy in the region.

⁹⁵ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 11.

⁹⁶ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 11.

⁹⁷ European Union, "Statement by EU High Representatives, Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Stefan Füle on Elections in Morocco", *European Union*, 26 November 2011, <http://www.europa.eu/eudocs/cms>. (Accessed on 23 October, 2014).

⁹⁸ Timo Behr, "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?", *Amsterdam Law Forum*. Vol. 4. Issue. 2. (2012): 76.

⁹⁹ Khakee, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco*, 12.

According to Behr, in the revised policies towards the Mediterranean region, the EU sets out an approach that emphasizes on political conditionality which allows the recipient to receive more aid on the condition that they do move towards democratic reforms.¹⁰⁰ Thus, financial aid will be granted in accordance to the country's performance or progress towards high standards of democratic reforms, human rights and governance.

As indicated in Behr's article, meeting these conditions or administering the democratic reforms will be met with rewards in form of financial aid, mobility and market access to the EU region.¹⁰¹ The EU has pledged to support the transition process in Morocco and enhance the capacity of the CSOs as they play a significant role in democratic reforms. Adding to the above, Behr indicates that the EU through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has pledged to provide approximately €2, 5 million to the Mediterranean countries which include Morocco that demonstrate willingness and commitment to and application of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economies.¹⁰² The EU has therefore used various approaches in attempt to engage Morocco in the democratization process and foster democratic reforms.

2.6. Morocco's Democratic Transition from the 1990s

Compared to other Arab nations in the Mediterranean region, Morocco has significantly displayed a positive move toward democracy even though it can still be labelled a facade democracy. It is recognised as more stable, more advanced and democratic than other countries in the North African region. The European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity reports that under King Mohamed VI, the Moroccan government has made some great strides towards democracy as there seems to be a positive development towards more democratic and liberal values in Morocco.¹⁰³ The political system has changed as the highly centralised monarchy has slowly devolved or transferred some of its powers to the parliament. The human rights

¹⁰⁰ Behr, *The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring*, 82.

¹⁰¹ Behr, *The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring*, 83.

¹⁰² Behr, *The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring*, 83.

¹⁰³ European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, "Morocco", *European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity*, June 04, 2014, <http://www.europeanforum.net/country/morocco>. (Accessed October 28, 2014).

conditions have improved and the government has admitted that it has abused human rights and now seeks to promote these rights.¹⁰⁴

Apart from improved human rights, participation of the civil society has increased and the government gave some leverage to the media.¹⁰⁵ Dennison et al indicates that in 2004, the King introduced a family code that gives women great marriage and child custody rights and that the government has refrained from unnecessary arrests and torture of its people particularly of the opposition parties. Restrictions on discussing government related issues for example corruption in the government have been lifted.¹⁰⁶

Since the EU has endowed much of its resources in promoting electoral democracy, Dennison et al also illustrate that there are now various political parties that take part in the elections and parliament.¹⁰⁷ The literature on Moroccan politics proves that the parties regularly rotate in power and through the assistance of the EU; elections in Morocco have been recognised as free and fair compared to other countries in the Mediterranean region. Despite undemocratic behaviours in Morocco, both King Hasan 2 and Mohamed V1 have shown their commitment in opening up the political system.

Research on the Moroccan politics indicates that Hassan 2 voluntarily fostered a dialogue with the opposition parties in an attempt to bring them into government. Ottaway and Riley argue that the King wanted all the parties to take part in the discussion concerning the electoral laws, conduct of elections and the relationships between the palace and political parties.¹⁰⁸ He introduced an initiative called the *alternance* which has been described as an initiative meant to promote democracy from within. Zemni and Bogaert describe the coming in or incorporation of other political parties into government and electoral process such as the Istiqlal and Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) through the process of *alternance* “as a success for the

¹⁰⁴ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Dennison, Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ottaway M Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Dennison Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 6.

monarchy's inclusive and consensual approach of the new political game"¹⁰⁹. It brought in a new blood in the political landscape.

Morocco's political landscape is now characterised by various political parties such as the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), National Rally of Independence (RNI) and Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM).¹¹⁰ The presence of various political parties in Morocco shows that it has accepted the principle of pluralism or multi-party political system and it also shows that the government is committed in implementing political reforms and move towards democracy. Undoubtedly, such progress represents an achievement towards a stable and democratic society.¹¹¹ With respect to the EU, qualitative differences between King Hassan and Mohamed's government show that there is a change towards democratization. Ottaway and Riley described the positive change that took place in Morocco as real since the country has become politically more open.¹¹² They wrote that issues which were once denied a platform for public debate can now be easily debated as the media has been freed.

To prove that Morocco has out-competed its Arab neighbours in terms of development towards democracy, Totten notes that the country established various policies such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) without a regime change and it has released political prisoners to foster democratization in the country.¹¹³ The Commission was established to investigate human rights abuses, torture and killings since Morocco's independence. King Mohammed VI reformed various laws so that they can suit some of the international conventions.

Such developments or improvements rarely exist in Morocco's Arab neighbours and this has made it an outstanding candidate showing progress towards attaining democracy. Apart from acknowledging the flaws of the government, the King established the Independent Arbitration Panel (IAP) which looked or investigated human rights abuses and ensure that the victims were

¹⁰⁹ Sami Zemni and Koenraad Bogaert, "Morocco and the Miracles of Democracy and Good Governance", in *UNISCI Discussion Papers. No. 12.* (ISSN 1696-2206, 2006), 108.

¹¹⁰ European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, *Morocco*, 1-8.

¹¹¹ Dennison Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 4.

¹¹² Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 8.

¹¹³ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 8.

compensated.¹¹⁴ In 2003, the panel had compensated approximately four thousand victims. These changes reflect a positive gradual development towards democratization. This can be attributed to the fact that Morocco is a close EU partner and it has signed various agreements and treaties which have clauses that promote democracy.

Although progress has been recorded, Moroccan politics show that the state still has more power and controls some activities of the media and civil society organizations. Dennison et al has indicated that it is far from being a constitutional monarchy since power is concentrated in the Kings hands.¹¹⁵ The King is more influential in appointing certain members of the government or parliament. This has contributed to protests and uprisings in the 2010 Arab Springs. Adding to the above, the recent literature shows that the election turnout has dropped due to people's dissatisfaction with the Kings concentration of power.

2.7. Conclusion

This section looked at the role of the EU and its engagement with Ghana and Morocco and how it shaped these countries's democratic trajectory. It looked at the mechanisms used by the EU, response of these governments to such mechanisms and changes that took place during the transition period. The discussion identified some of the factors which led variations in the outcome when compared with other cases under study.

2.8. Section Two: The Case Study of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe lies in the Southern part of the African continent and it gained independence from the British in 1980. It is a landlocked country with a population of approximately 14, 15 million as of 2013. Zimbabwe is one of the Southern African countries which have for a long time been under the influence of the EU in its attempt to foster democratization in Zimbabwe's political structures. Since its independence President Robert Mugabe has been the leader and he is also known as the champion for anti-imperialism or anti-Western ideologies by many African countries and scholars. Most academics and politicians describe him as an authoritarian leader who has undermined efforts to transfer power to other leaders or parties.

¹¹⁴ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 7.

¹¹⁵ Dennison Popescu and Torreblanca, *A Change to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic*, 5.

The Zimbabwean Post-independence period has been characterised by social unrest, economic downfalls, and political upheavals, disillusionment of the civil society and increased use of violence by state apparatus against supporters of the political parties. The 1990s has been described as a period marked by increased initiatives by President Mugabe and his regime to erode the space for political opposition, to function and consolidate the dominance of Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF).¹¹⁶ This has been accompanied by the use of violence against opposition parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and increased persecution of its members. The use of violence in the Post-independence period led to a gradual loss of legitimacy of the Zimbabwean government particularly due to the role played ZANU PF in Zimbabwean politics. It has lost legitimacy both at local, regional and international levels. For instance, in 2004 Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader and his supporters were accused of treason by the Zimbabwean government.¹¹⁷

Adding to the above, the democratic and political landscape in Zimbabwe changed as civic activities declined or lost momentum because the ruling party- ZANU PF had dominated the social-economic and political space. Due to its dominance, it denied other political parties, social groups and organizations to operate individually without consent from the government.¹¹⁸ The literature supports that the government closely monitored the activities of civil society organizations and has expanded its efforts to contain, frustrate and neutralize many civic organizations. Lack of space for civil society participation has increasingly caused antagonistic relations between the Zimbabwean government, EU and its member countries particularly Britain which has critiqued the government for its undemocratic practises. This has drawn the attention of many politicians and activists from the USA, EU and within Zimbabwe to demonstrate against the government.

¹¹⁶ Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), "Zimbabwe: ZANU PF hegemony and its Breakdown 1990-1999", *EISA*, January 2008, <http://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zimoverviews5.htm>. (Accessed October, 15 2014). ZANU PF is the most dominant political party in Zimbabwe; it has been in power as the ruling party for decades. The party has dominated the Zimbabwean government i.e. in the parliament it has more seats than other political parties. It has used violence during elections periods to intimidate and undermine the influence of other parties particularly the MDC. For instance, in 2008 elections, violence was used to get rid of MDC

¹¹⁷ Diplomats Handbook Organization, "Zimbabwe: From Hope to Crisis", *Diplomats Handbook Organization*, July 26, 2007, <http://www.diplomatshandbook.org.pdf/handbook-zimbabwepdf>. (Accessed December 19, 2014).

¹¹⁸ Edward Shizha, Michael T. Kariwo, *Education and Development in Zimbabwe: A social Political and Economic Analysis*, (Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2011), 112.

Prior to the rise of the MDC in 1999, Zimbabwe was a one party state which did not allow the existence of other political parties and it resisted democratic ideas especially from the Western countries. Henceforth, ZANU PF increasingly castigated foreign political interventions especially western perspectives and it has described these perspectives as imperial and self-serving. Existing literature supports the argument that opposition parties were not able to air out grievances or protests against the government and this has led to the marginalization of opposition parties and civil society organizations.¹¹⁹ The major opposition party (MDC) is closely allied to the Western countries noticeably Britain, Australia, Germany and the USA which have financially supported it. Its alliance with the West has motivated the Mugabe regime to discredit the party as a sell out; hence it has been critiqued and persecuted. European Union support to MDC has strained its relations with the Zimbabwean government because it failed to remain neutral and this did not auger well with the ruling party.

Due to increased intolerance of the participation of the civil society and opposition parties, the government introduced various repressive legislative acts such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002 which led to the dissolvment of independent or private media.¹²⁰ The Act reduced freedom of expression both for the private media society and the citizens at large. The act prohibited citizens from giving comments with or without intention especially when the person does not have reasonable grounds to take that position and which promotes disorder.¹²¹ Passing, writing and using abusive or false statement about the President or office of the President was also prohibited under the act and would lead to a serious punishment.

POSA led to the banning of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Cable News Network (CNN) news channels among others in Zimbabwe as they had the potential to disseminate information against the government. The literature supports that government officials, teachers and health workers who were suspected of being against the government, working with and supporting the opposition were dismissed from work. This increasingly disillusioned the citizens

¹¹⁹Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), *Zimbabwe: ZANU PF hegemony and its Breakdown*, 1.

¹²⁰Sue Onslow, *Zimbabwe and Political Transition*. (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011), 8.

¹²¹Kare Vollan, *Zimbabwe Presidential Elections 2002, NORDEM Report 05/2002*, (Norwegian Institute for Human Rights, 2002), 7.

and draws the attention of the international community to address the situation. It can be noted that ZANU PF created conditions or a platform for the imposition of sanctions by violating human rights, use of violence and downgrading of opposition parties and led to increased discontentment. It has undermined majority of the democratic principles that makes up a stable society.

2.9. EU and Zimbabwe's Relations

In Zimbabwe, the EU implemented various mechanisms in an attempt to promote democratic principles such as human rights, good governance, transparency, rule of law and free and fair elections in the country. In response to undemocratic acts such as repression, abuse of human rights, election irregularities and lack of freedom in Zimbabwe, the EU imposed sanctions or restrictive measures in 2002 against the Zimbabwean government.¹²² The literature notes that the sanctions were imposed to force the government and some individuals who were considered as responsible for the abuse of human rights and taking part in election manipulation to change their behaviours and be held accountable. The measures imposed on Zimbabwe include the suspension of government to government cooperation, targeted measures against individuals and companies and an arms embargo.¹²³ Direct financial assistance from the EU to Zimbabwe was abruptly suspended as a means to constrain the government and force it to reform so that it can continue to receive aid.

The Euro-centric perspective¹²⁴ supports that sanctions were imposed to influence ZANU PF and force it to transform, change its policies and not as of form punishment or retribution.¹²⁵ The EU defines its action on Zimbabwe as a mere objective reaction to undemocratic and local human rights conditions and not a personal or political subjective move. It states that its primary objective is to put an end on the deterioration of the democratic and human rights situation,

¹²² European External Action Service, "European Union Relations with Zimbabwe", *European External Action Service*, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index.eu.htm>. (Accessed July 16, 2014).

¹²³ European External Action Service, *European Union Relations with Zimbabwe*

¹²⁴ The Euro-centric perspective explains the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe from a European perspective and the reasons why they were justified. It defends the imposition of sanctions by the EU and USA in early 2000s. It states that sanctions were justified as they were not meant to punish the government officials and Zimbabweans at large but they were meant to peacefully foster democratic reforms.

¹²⁵ Medial Hove, "The Debates and Impacts of Sanctions: The Zimbabwean Experience", *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, Vol.3 (2012), 74.

ending political violence and abolish restrictions on the international media.¹²⁶ The Euro-centric approach adds that sanctions were imposed based on the accusations that ZANU PF has violated human rights, of white farm invasions, election fraud and demolition of tens of thousands of low-income homes through Operation Murambatsvina (clean-up) and persecution of advocates.¹²⁷ In contrast, the Afro-centric¹²⁸ school of thought also suggest that such coercive instruments were imposed as a counter-measure to the genuine Land Reform Program which led to the expulsion of White settlers from the farms by the War Veterans and other indigenous people in Zimbabwe.¹²⁹

The EU gained political influence in the Zimbabwean affairs through the Cotonou Agreement in which it conducted various consultations with the government as a strategy to persuade the government to end political violence.¹³⁰ Articles 96 and 97 acts as the basis for a consultation procedure that will further determine the type of instruments to be used in a particular case.¹³¹ The sanctions were imposed based on Article 96 of the agreement which permits the EU to promote democracy and good governance on developing countries and failure to do that will invite sanctions, suspension or punishment from the Union. In the course of these consultations, the EU election observers were denied access into Zimbabwe in 2002 parliamentary election and this did not auger well with the EU and drastically led to the initial implementation of targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime.¹³²

Suspending direct funding to Zimbabwe did not mean that the EU has completely turned its back against Zimbabwe. A report published by the South African Broadcasting Cooperation (SABC)

¹²⁶ Jan Grebe, "And they are Still targeting: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe", *Africa Spectrum Journal* Vol. 45, No. 1, (2010), 11.

¹²⁷ Mediel Hove, "The Debates and Impacts of Sanctions: The Zimbabwean Experience", *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 3 (2012), 74.

¹²⁸ The Afro-centric approach is a school of thought that states that the developed countries seek to continue their dominance in developing world and protect their interests. The approach has been used by Ndakaripa M in which he shows that 71 cases under sanctions 49 of these cases were developing countries. He concludes that developing countries have continuously suffered from increased dominance from the developing countries. He used this approach in comparison with the Eurocentric approach towards sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. See Ndakaripa Musiwaro, "Sanctions or Targeted Restrictive Measures?: The USA and EU Sanctions on Zimbabwe 2001-2010", Accessed on 05 May 2013. <http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/.../Musiwaro-Ndakaripa-full-paper.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Hove, *The Debates and Impacts of Sanctions*, 74.

¹³⁰ Grebe, *And they are Still targeting: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe*, 9.

¹³¹ Zimelis, *Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership: A Misguided Approach to Development?*, 390.

¹³² Grebe, *And they are Still targeting: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe*, 9.

illustrate that the EU diverted or channelled aid or financial assistance through the CSOs.¹³³ The aid was accompanied by strict conditions which were meant to foster democratic reforms in the country. Since 2002, the EU has provided approximately € 1, 5 billion in development assistance.¹³⁴ With the inception of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009, the EU has also provided over \$1 billion financial assistance with special attention to supporting democratic institutions and rebooting the economy.¹³⁵

Aid to Zimbabwe was granted on condition that the country should reform its security institutions, have free and fair elections, respect the rule of law, promote good governance, free the media and allow foreign election observers to come in from different countries. Since 2009 the EU has also engaged with the Zimbabwean government through various political dialogues which led to the establishment of an Interim Partnership Agreement (IEPA) which attempt to initiate comprehensive deals between these actors and reinforce democracy.¹³⁶ These agreements enable the EU to push for good governance, multi-party elections, free and fair elections, citizen participation among other elements or democratic principles. These engagements were meant to stimulate the acceptance and promotion of the democratic values pushed by the EU.

The EU aid Commissioner Louis Michel said that, *“I will encourage the rest of the international donor community to make it clear today that it is ready to provide substantial and immediate assistance to Zimbabwe in the wake of a transition towards democracy”*.¹³⁷ A scholarly analysis of the above shows the EU used a carrot and stick approach which allows the Union to provide support upon meeting some of the conditions prescribed on the aid package. The approach seeks to encourage a positive change in Zimbabwe’s political landscape. Providing aid on certain conditions such as changing or moving to democracy clearly explains the commitment of the EU on democracy promotion in Zimbabwe and other countries in Africa. These conditions force the recipient countries or induce it to adopt democratic principles.

¹³³ South African Broadcasting Cooperation, “EU announce Roadmap on Zimbabwean Aid”, *South African Broadcasting Cooperation*, <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/5e20450042fbc7509c9e9f85990ad8/EU>. (Accessed September, 2014).

¹³⁴ South African Broadcasting Cooperation, *EU announce Roadmap on Zimbabwean Aid*

¹³⁵ European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), “Zimbabwe: Democracy Assistance”, *European Partnership for Democracy*, <http://www.epd.eu/?page-id=5825>. (Accessed September 17, 2014).

¹³⁶ European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), “Zimbabwe: Democracy Assistance Resource Page”, *European Partnership for Democracy*, <http://www.epd-eu/?page-id=5825#toggle-id-3>. (Accessed 22 February 2015).

¹³⁷ Devex, “EU Promises Conditional Zimbabwe Aid”, *Devex*, July 06, 2008, <http://www.devex.com/news/eu-promises-conditional-zimbabwe-aid-55461>. (Accessed 16 July 16, 2014).

Apart from channelling aid through the NGOs or Civil Society Organization, the EU also financially supported the CSOs as they play a significant role in strengthening democratic institutions. According to Charamba, the EU funded organizations such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), and Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) and National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) among other organizations.¹³⁸ As mentioned above, the EU derives its mandate from the Cotonou Agreement which also allows it to facilitate CSOs activities towards democratization.

With regards to the MDCs alliance with the EU or western countries, the EU funded opposition parties particularly the MDC in its attempt to bring a regime change in Zimbabwe's political landscape. The EU has therefore devoted some of its money in funding international and local organizations that promote democratic principles, human rights, good governance and empowerment of women and youth around the world particularly in Africa. It wants the Zimbabwean government to become accountable, responsible to its citizens, transparent and respect the rule of law. It has tried and explored all the avenues that will lead to the attainment of the above goals of its democratization mission in Zimbabwe.

2.10. Zimbabwe's Democratic Transition from the 1990s

Recently the EU has eased its stance on Zimbabwe and changed some of its policies towards the government. It gradually lifted some of the sanctions based on the report that ZANU PF has made some progress in implanting democracy and its sustenance and promoting the rule of law.¹³⁹ However, a wide range of researches on Zimbabwean politics and democratization concludes that the democratization process has failed in its attempt to foster democracy in the country. Zhangazha reports that some NGOs are discontented with the progress made by the EU in pushing for democracy in Zimbabwe as these NGOs hold the view that the government failed to put in place mechanisms that wholly ensure accountability, transparency, and sustain democracy.¹⁴⁰ Civic participation, freedom of speech and association continue to be undermined

¹³⁸ George Charamba, "The Democracy Façade of Politics of Regime Change", *The New African Magazine*. No. 462 (2007), 26-36.

¹³⁹ Wongai Zhangazha, "EU Warms up to Progress in Zimbabwe", *The Independent*, <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/06/06/eu-warms-progress-zim/>. (Accessed September 17, 2014).

¹⁴⁰ Zhangazha, *EU Warms up to Progress in Zimbabwe*

since the Public Order Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act still exists in the constitution. These acts and clauses were not adequately addressed when the constitution was amended in 2012-2013. The government has seldom attempted to enhance such principles. Citizens attempting to protest continue to face persecution by the state apparatus, this alienate and demotivate people to practise their rights.

The EU failed to bring about a regime change, transparency, good governance, electoral democracy, citizen participation and real democratic reforms. Increased rate of corruption shows that there is no improvement in governance and transparency. The governing party remain the dominant political actor above other political parties as the opposition parties continue to be weak and ineffective in their performance. Looking at the trends towards democratization, Makumbe concluded that Zimbabwe has reverted back to authoritarianism since it faced setbacks in its transition to democracy.¹⁴¹

In the course of the transition process, violence escalated against the ordinary citizens and opposition parties which were continuously denied space to campaign. Makumbe states that Zimbabwe “*has moved several steps backwards since 2000 in terms of the democratization process*”¹⁴². This is widely shown in various instances where violence was used to control people and intimidate them. Reports also illustrate that the recent elections in Zimbabwe (2008 and 2013 elections) were accompanied by serious irregularities despite the acknowledgement made by SADC that they were free and fair.

In support of how democratization has failed in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye notes that holding regular elections and having an increased number of political parties cannot be equated to a development towards true democracy.¹⁴³ The opposition parties have remained weak, their participation in the political landscape has failed to bring positive change and also the CSO has limited influence in the day to day politics of the government. Sachikonye understood democracy

¹⁴¹ John Makumbe, “The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe: Assessing Political Social and Economic development since the Dawn of democracy”, in *Zimbabwe the Country Report* 119. (Centre for Policy Studies. 2009), 1.

¹⁴² Makumbe, *The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe: Assessing Political Social and Economic development*, 2.

¹⁴³ Lloyd M. Sachikonye, “Political Parties and the Democratic Process in Zimbabwe”, in *Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Research Report No. 16*, (Johannesburg: EISA, 2005), 9.

development as moving towards a rule based and more consensual participatory type of politics which he finds as non-existent in the Zimbabwean political landscape.¹⁴⁴

To support Huntington's thesis on how states revert back to authoritarianism, Makumbe states that Zimbabwe transformed into a fascist state instead of democracy in which the legislation is used as a mechanism to oppress people.¹⁴⁵ The regime has shown reluctance toward political liberalization, hence it has tightened its stance against democratic forces and pro-democracy opposition parties. It can be noted that Zimbabwe has moved further away from democracy as it has violated the principles of the democratic system it is supposed to be implementing. A scholarly analysis of the failure of democracy in Zimbabwe raises many eyebrows with regards to what caused the failure since the local people and international community are advocating for democracy.

Due to its anti-imperialism attitude, the Zimbabwean government resisted the efforts of the EU to democratise. It believes that the EU with some of its member countries particularly Britain are not genuine donors but they have hidden agendas such as securing resources. Zimbabwe also endured the impacts of the sanctions on its economy, this has also contributed to the resistance the government had against the EU democratisation process.

2.11. The Case Study of Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa and was ruled by the British during the colonial era up to 1962 when it gained independence. It is one of the most populated countries in the World. The current President is Yoweri K Museveni and he has ruled Uganda since 1986 when he came into the office through a successful insurgency. Uganda has closely maintained its ties with the EU and its Member states. These ties have significantly contributed in shaping Uganda's political landscape. It is a major recipient of external support or funding for democratization and economic development among other projects.

Uganda increasingly came in the international fora due to various undemocratic practises that have drawn the attention of a multitude of local, regional, international actors in attempt to address the democratic deficit. Soon after its independence in 1962, democracy failed to emerge

¹⁴⁴ Sachikonye, *Political Parties and the Democratic Process in Zimbabwe*, 9.

¹⁴⁵ Makumbe, *The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe*, 9.

in its political landscape, instead Uganda was characterized by serious upheavals as a result of conflicts for political power between Kabaka Mutesa 2, Idi Amin Dada and Dr Apollo M Obete.¹⁴⁶ From 1964 to 1980 there were no elections held in Uganda and dictators like Idi Amin Dada severely abused human rights and ills such as torture and detention became a daily norm during his presidency. The political landscape was characterised by a one-party political system, abuse of human rights, election irregularities (1980 elections), lack of citizens and civil society participation.

According to a report published by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Uganda's post-independence history has been characterised by inconsistencies in its political landscape due to lack to of an effective government.¹⁴⁷ The report illustrate that multiparty democracy at this stage was very fragile to the extent that political pluralism failed to exist.¹⁴⁸ This strengthened the belief of a single political system as politicians such as President Museveni purports that multi-party systems promote particularism, sectarianism or divisional politics. Hence, Museveni introduced the movement system which he regarded as not a political party but a movement seeking to promote unity from village to the national level between all the ethnic groups. When President Museveni came into office with his National Resistance Movement, he castigated multi-party political system and strengthened the existence of a single party in the country's political landscape.¹⁴⁹ With the advent of the movement political system, a no party system prevailed in Ugandan political landscape.

Additionally, Uganda has historically been divided between northerners and southerners ethnic groups. According to Barkan, the majority of the southerners are the Baganda which is the richest group and retain some degree of autonomy above others.¹⁵⁰ Marjoke argues that the Baganda ethnic groups have dominated the political history and have delivered most of the government officials.¹⁵¹ Fault lines between these groups have necessitated conflicts as other

¹⁴⁶ Angelika Klein, Yusuf Kiranda and Regina Bafaki, *Concepts and Principles of Democratic Governance and Accountability: A Guide for Peer Educators*. (Kampala: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011), 29.

¹⁴⁷ Yusuf Kiranda and Mathias Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*. (Kampala: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010), 17.

¹⁴⁸ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 17.

¹⁴⁹ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 18.

¹⁵⁰ Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*, 4-5.

¹⁵¹ Oosterom Marjoke, "Ethnic and Political Diversity in Uganda. Central Themes to the Knowledge Programme", found at: <http://www.hivos.net/hivos-knowledge-program>. (Accessed October 23, 2014).

groups seek to abolish the dominance of the Baganda. Marjoke further states that Uganda has suffered from ethnic fragmentation as there is no sense of nationalism among the political elites.¹⁵² Such ethnic divisions have also shaped Ugandan politics from all angles since its politics cannot be dissociated from the ethnic background.

Ugandan political landscape can be described as based on patronage politics or neopatrimonial politics which is a system that undermines the existence of a viable democracy and various political officials in the government. Under this system, selections into the office are based on allegiance of the official to be elected to the party. Rubongoya argues that for a democratic project to be successful it requires the political elites to depart from neopatrimonial politics as this hinders democratic development.¹⁵³ According to Clapham in Mkandawire, neopatrimonialism is a “*form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational legal lines*”.¹⁵⁴ It is whereby the government officials use their power to acquire state resources and distribute them to other people (ordinary citizens and government officials) to buy their support so that they can remain in power.

According to Barkan various government officials received 5 million Ugandan shillings from the President in 2005 to support him.¹⁵⁵ All candidates from NRM were paid to ensure that Museveni retains power and remain in the office. Barkan describes Ugandan government as “*an authoritative patronage based regime*”.¹⁵⁶ This is attributable to the idea that Ugandan politics is characterised by a mixture of personal and public life. Private life of the government officials shapes or influences their public lives when they are in the office. It is described as highly personalised politics in which everything is tied up on personal positions of the elites.¹⁵⁷ This limits the political space for other parties and CSOs. A report by the Freedom House also shows

¹⁵² Marjoke, *Ethnic and Political Diversity in Uganda. Central Themes to the Knowledge Programme*, 1.

¹⁵³ Joshua B. Rubongoya, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.

¹⁵⁴ Thandika Mkandawire, *Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of the Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections. Working Paper 1*, (Stockholm: Institute for Future Studies, 2013), 6.

¹⁵⁵ Joel D. Barkan, “Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability”, in *A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) African Program*. (Washington: CSIS, 2011), 10-11.

¹⁵⁶ Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*, 1

¹⁵⁷ Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*, 2.

that some political parties are denied the right to register their parties, the leaders of the opposition parties are being harassed and lack access to the state media.¹⁵⁸

Adding to the above, opposition political parties had no freedom to host political rallies and this led to poor political competition thereby enhancing the dominance of Yoweri Museveni.¹⁵⁹ The KAS report identifies that the President prohibited opposition party political activities, banned them as they were not allowed to participate in elections and mobilize people. As mentioned above, prohibition of multi-party system was justified on the ground that it will cause ethnic divisions or exacerbates sectarianism thereby causing conflicts.¹⁶⁰ He was against politics based on ethnic lines or played on the ethnicity card. In most African countries which are and were once authoritarian a single political party is seen as a system that will promote national unity. The multi-party system was regarded as inappropriate or inapplicable in Uganda's political landscape.

The Museveni's government also delayed the establishment of the constitution that will act as the foundation for sustainable democracy. Even upon its establishment, the constitution was ambiguous as it denied political parties the freedom to fully participate in elections among other activities.¹⁶¹ The political parties were not allowed to get involved in the mainstream political activities of the state thereby enhancing the domination of the NRM. It governed or ruled the country for 20 years under a no-party political system.¹⁶² Museveni's administration regarded the no-party system as democratic and transparent. Restricting the formation of parties based on ethnic lines caused controversies and most opposition parties disqualified his credentials because the system denied the full participation of other political actors. Even though the government gradually changed its policies towards other political parties, the elections that took place in 1996, 2001 and 2006 were fraught with irregularities, vote rigging and election manipulation as

¹⁵⁸ Freedom House, "Uganda Freedom in the World 2013", *Freedom House*, 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/refport/freedom-world/2013/uganda#VEoK2LY08Y>. (Accessed October 16, 2014).

¹⁵⁹ The President Yoweri Museveni has been in office since 1987 and has drastically shaped the country's political atmosphere. He has implemented policies that have grossly hindered democratization. For instance, in the 1990s after the establishment of the constitution in 1995, opposition political parties were restricted to host campaigns and all activities against the Museveni government were banned. In the beginning, the President was against multi-party systems based on the belief that it would lead to serious divisions in the society since they are formed on ethnicity positions.

¹⁶⁰ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 48.

¹⁶¹ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 20.

¹⁶² Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 21.

claimed by the opposition parties.¹⁶³ Such observations invited various actors such as the EU to address these problems.

2.12. EU and Uganda's Relations

Uganda is a fundamental partner of the EU in its attempt to promote peace and stability in Africa particularly in the East African region. The EU has applied various mechanisms in Uganda in the establishment and consolidation of its democracy. The literature shows that through the EIDHR, the EU seeks to promote and support democratic principles such as human rights, free and fair elections, civil society participation, and rule of law, accountability, bill of rights and transparency in Uganda.¹⁶⁴ To foster free and fair elections, the EU in 2001 and 2006 deployed election observers to monitor elections and report election irregularities. It has also supported the local election observers in attempt to avoid election manipulation.¹⁶⁵

The main intention of the EU in monitoring these elections was to promote multi-party democracy in Uganda. The 2008 country strategy paper shows that the role of the EU in the 2006 elections was to ensure that other parties do take part in the elections and also to strengthen multiparty democracy.¹⁶⁶ The EU has therefore played a significant role in restructuring the legal framework, electoral laws, providing civic education and ensuring efficiency in electoral administration and allowing the total participation of all political parties.¹⁶⁷ Apart from that, Byaruhanga notes that the EU has utilized various instruments which include but not limited to development aid, EIDHR, general cooperation and funded projects focusing on the development of civil society to foster democratization in Uganda.¹⁶⁸

In 2008, Uganda and the EU signed a Country Strategy Paper and the National Indicative Program (NIP) that was aimed at making approximately €439, 000,000 available to Uganda for

¹⁶³ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 20-22.

¹⁶⁴ Julius Byaruhanga, "EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda. Africa Challenge Foundation", *University of Osnabruck*, 2012, <http://www.uni-osnabruck.academia.edu/juliusByaruhanga>. 2012. (Accessed October 15, 2014).

¹⁶⁵ European Commission, "Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Program 2008-2013", *European Commission*, <http://www.ec.europa.eu/development/icentre/repository/cspio.eu>. (Accessed September 18, 2014), 23.

¹⁶⁶ European Commission, "Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper and National", 11.

¹⁶⁷ European Commission, "Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper and National", 11.

¹⁶⁸ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda. Africa Challenge Foundation*, 7.

the period 2008-2013.¹⁶⁹ The funding was meant to support focal areas such as transport and rural development and non-focal areas such as democratic governance, civil society and human rights protection projects. Looking at the non-focal areas, the EU focused on governance, human rights, access to justice, fight against gender based violence, multiparty democracy and supported decentralization.¹⁷⁰ It has also funded these projects through the EDF budget line in which it has provided over \$30 million to improve the quality and functions of the Ugandan governance institutions.

The EU has also strengthened the development and capacity of the civil society. According to Byaruhanga, the EU supports the civil society, public and private-sector, non-profit organization, national and regional parliamentary bodies which play a fundamental role in the democratization process.¹⁷¹ The CSO have been funded under the program called Civil Society Capacity Building Program (CSCBP) in which €7, 9 million have been donated or made available for the effective functioning of the civil society.¹⁷² A vibrant, vocal and effective civil society is important in sustaining the growth of democracy. The country strategy paper also insists that the EU seek to support their advocacy, service delivery programs and participation in decision making both at local and national levels.¹⁷³

With respect to the above, Byaruhanga states that promotion of pluralism (multi-party system) both at the national “*political level and at the level of civil society*” is one of the objectives of the EU in which it has shown its commitment through providing financial support.¹⁷⁴ Decentralization helps promote civic engagement through well-established systems of consultation with the citizens and non-state actors such as the NGOs. In promoting the freedom of expression, the EU has advocated for the lifting of restrictions on the operations of the media. It supported free press and for the respect for the rights of freedom of association and assembly.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁹ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 1.

¹⁷⁰ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 23.

¹⁷¹ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*. Africa Challenge Foundation, 7.

¹⁷² Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*. Africa Challenge Foundation, 7.

¹⁷³ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 26.

¹⁷⁴ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*. Africa Challenge Foundation, 11.

¹⁷⁵ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*. Africa Challenge Foundation, 11.

The EDF has played a pivotal role in the democratization process in Uganda. The 9th EDF and budget line supported decentralization programs in Uganda with the intention to foster local governance through poverty resource monitoring and enhancing local governance.¹⁷⁶ Looking at the above, the EU has continuously engaged itself with the government of Uganda to promote a political system which is characterised by checks and balances, credible system of representation and effective multi-party system. A system with checks and balances helps ensure accountability and transparency.

2.13. Uganda's Democratic Transition from the 1990s

The Ugandan government has made significant strides towards the institutionalization of democratic principles in its political systems. It has made a big improvement that has been hailed by various actors in the international systems. Despite such an improvement, Uganda's progress towards real democracy is slow and highly questionable as it lacks total citizen, civic and opposition party's participation in its political landscape. It has incorporated various political parties or became a multi-party political system but it has not developed to a real democracy. It lacks true structures of a democratic system shown above. Considering that Uganda received a substantial amount of support from the EU among other actors, the lack of sufficient progress raises questions such as why is there slow progress towards democratization. Its elections continue to be characterised by irregularities and manipulation.

However, it is also important to highlight the progress that has been made so far before addressing factors behind the slow progress. Due to EU's presence in Uganda, a positive picture towards democratization has been displayed even though there are still some visible loopholes that need to be addressed in its political landscape. The transition towards democracy in Uganda can be described as more optimistic than it was before. According to the KAS report, the government has implanted basic democratic standards and the elements of political competition through the establishment of multi-party political system.¹⁷⁷ Since 1995 the constitution has been gradually modified to suit the demands of the democratic promoters in the country as it now accepts other parties to take part in elections and the civil society to participate in decision making.

¹⁷⁶ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 24.

¹⁷⁷ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*. 22.

Due to pressure for democratization from various actors, multi-party democratic system was formally introduced in Uganda in 2005 when the government held a referendum which brought about competitive elections in 2006 with a number of parties that took part in the elections.¹⁷⁸ Various parties such as Conservative Party, Democratic Party, Uganda's People's Congress and Forum for Democratic Change now exist and have a say in the parliament. The constitution now provides a legal platform for the respect of human rights, freedom of association and independence of the media among other elements of democracy. According to Klein, Kiranda and Bafaki the current constitution of the government of Uganda gives people the right to choose their own political party under free and fair electoral conditions.¹⁷⁹ This is mentioned in Article 69 of its constitution.

The Ugandan government has established various institutions that lay the foundation for the success of the democratization process. According to Hearn, the government has created institutions like the African Centre for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture of Victims (ACTV), Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) and the Ugandan Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre (EHEDOC).¹⁸⁰ These organizations are human rights based institutions which independently monitor and carry out investigations on human rights violation. They get funding from various organizations and countries within the EU umbrella.

Since the 2006 elections other political parties are now allowed to make decisions in the parliament and they now chair key committees such as the public account committee.¹⁸¹ In addition to the progress made towards democratization, the 2008 Country Strategy Paper reports that the parliament has approved constitutional amendments which include the protection of human rights, abolishing the limits on the presidential terms and abolishing restrictions on the operation of the media.¹⁸² It also shows that there are now various registered civil society organizations and the media has increased its coverage as there are now over a hundred of radio stations and newspapers.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ Kiranda and Kamp, *Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda*, 21.

¹⁷⁹ Klein, Kiranda and Bafaki, *Concepts and Principles of Democratic Governance and Accountability*, 31.

¹⁸⁰ Hearn, *Foreign Aid, Democratization and Civil Society in Africa*, 13.

¹⁸¹ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 11.

¹⁸² European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 11.

¹⁸³ European Commission, *Republic of Uganda-European Community- Country Strategy Paper*, 11.

With respect to the above, Byaruhanga describes Uganda as a democratically governed entity but he further acknowledges that there are some democratic challenges that still needs to be addressed such as laws on homosexuals, civic participations and minor election irregularities.¹⁸⁴ The 2008 country strategy paper also indicates that the opposition parties are still weak and this has enhanced the dominance of the governing party (Museveni administration) in running the daily state business and elections campaigns.

As indicated above, participation of the citizens and opposition parties continue to be restricted as the army and police use violence against them. Human rights continue to be violated, elections are not fair and restrictions on the civil society continue to be in existence. Even though Uganda has developed to a multi-party political system, it has not yet established structures of electoral democracy in its political landscape.

2.14. Conclusion

The discussion looked at the role of the EU in the case of Ghana, Morocco, Zimbabwe and Uganda. It explored what the EU has done in its efforts to promote democracy in these countries and it addressed the mechanisms or instruments used in each case to foster democratization. The research looked at the persuasive and coercive mechanisms that were both used in its attempt to push for democratization. It has used these mechanisms simultaneously in the case of Zimbabwe and Uganda and applied a more persuasive approach in Ghana and Morocco. The discussion reviews that most recipient countries both under study (Zimbabwe and Uganda) and other African countries have castigated the coercive mechanisms used by the EU in promoting democracy and have illustrated that such mechanisms hinder progress towards attaining real democracy.

The paper has also looked at the EU relations with its African partners and reviewed that it has a long standing relations with these countries. It has engaged with these countries particularly through the ACP, Cotonou Agreements, and EPAs signed by most of the African counties and the EU. Despite enormous efforts by the EU through aid, advice, grants and imposition of sanctions, progress towards attaining democracy in Zimbabwe and Uganda is not convincing as the outcomes remain uncertain. However, there are signs of hope in Ghana and Morocco since

¹⁸⁴ Byaruhanga, *EU Democracy Promotion in Uganda*. Africa Challenge Foundation, 1-18.

these countries have made some progress and continue moving forward towards full democratization. Even though there are still loopholes in the nature of their democracy, the progress made is fundamental and cannot be ignored.

CHAPTER 3

3. Analysis: Understanding EU's Role in Democratic Transitions in Africa: Success and Failures

Democracy promotion in Africa is tainted by uncertainties and inconsistencies that have left many policy makers at the centre of confusion. It is characterised by successes and failures in some cases as shown above and this can be attributed to various factors in each case study. The EU has initiated various projects and utilised a range of coercive and persuasive instruments such as conditional aid, sanctions, political dialogues and trade agreements to foster democratisation on the recipient countries. Some of the initiatives or projects in which the EU is involved include election observation, declarations, election support, voter education, supporting civil societies through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU also used political dialogues as a means of persuading governments of the cases under study to comply with its demands for democratisation. Political dialogues with the ACP countries are held through the Cotonou Agreement and EPAs and these seek to persuade the recipient countries to reform their democratic policies.

Looking at the above instruments or mechanisms used to further democracy development it can be noted that the EU used a similar approach in each case. But the use of the approach depends on the intensity of democratic deficit in that particular case and the attitude of the political elites towards the EU in democracy promotion. In the case of Zimbabwe and Uganda where there is a gross deficit of democracy and it faces resistance from the political elites it has used sanctions and conditional aid in an attempt to enforce democratic principles. The instruments used in such engagements by the EU rarely differ across the continent because the majority of the countries can be described as undemocratic.

The differences in the application of the instruments speak to the idea that socialisation can occur through persuasive or coercive ways as shown in the case studies. The socialisation process of the cases under study occurred in different way. For instance, a persuasive approach has been used in Ghana and Morocco while a coercive one was used in Zimbabwe. In the case of Ghana,

the EU has maintained a persuasive stance because its political elites were willing to engage with the EU, by adopting and implementing its democratic principles into their political landscape.

The EU held regular political dialogues with the Ghanaian government in an attempt to improve their trade and economic relationships. In these dialogues the EU persuaded officials from Ghana to implement democratic principles so that they can have more trade and economic benefits from such relations. Through these dialogues, Ghana currently has full duty free and quota free access into the EU markets under the Access Regulation scheme because it has significantly improved in terms of its democracy and governance.¹⁸⁵ The willingness of these elites calls upon the EU to pursue a soft approach in its engagement with the recipient country to promote democracy. However, the EU in Zimbabwe has used sanctions and strict conditional aid on Uganda in its attempt to promote democracy in the political landscape of these countries.

This is also attributable to the notion that the Zimbabwean government and ZANU PF regime were unwilling to engage the EU in its democratisation process. Zimbabwe refused to have its policies and practices dictated by foreign actors and it has maintained a strong anti-imperialism stance against the Union. This can be attributed to the belief the government has about the Union and its member countries that they have hidden agendas such as extracting minerals and other resources thereby hindering development of the country. Land grabbing by the Mugabe regime disappointed and violated the interests of the EU and this eventually attracted sanctions on Zimbabwe. The Ugandan political elites have shown incompetence towards the democratisation process and in some instances diverted money meant for reforms to other commitments. As such acceptance of the norms in Ghana and Morocco made it easier for the EU to propagate the democratic values.

Using such different instruments or mechanisms in these cases resulted in different outcomes (failure in Zimbabwe and success in Ghana) because of the different ways in which the political elites responded to such mechanisms. The Zimbabwean government responded by implementing policies that constrain citizen participation, freedom of speech and association and denied the EU access to its elections. The government rejected to implement some of the democratic principles which the EU had been advocating. It rather introduced policies such as POSA and Access to

¹⁸⁵ European Union External Action, "EU Relations with Ghana", European Union External Action, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ghana/index.en.htm>. (Accessed on 23 February 2015).

Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) that constrain civic participation, freedom of speech and association among others. In response to the measures taken by the Zimbabwean government, the EU continued to put more sanctions to force the government to change its behaviour or improve democracy and human rights conditions. In contrast, Ghana promoted citizen participation through increased decentralization of duties, enhancing freedom of press, civil society and various political parties. These kinds of responses to the instruments used by the EU have had an effect on the outcome of the democratisation process thereby causing variations in the outcomes.

Adding to the factors leading to variations in outcomes of the democratisation process, the EU's presence in Zimbabwe, Uganda and other African countries particularly where there is a democratic deficit can be questioned. The commitment of the EU to the democratisation of these cases is not absolutely altruistic but it has some covert agendas that also contribute to variations in the outcome of the process. In cases such as Zimbabwe and Uganda, the EU seeks to promote democracy and implant a political party that is more democratic (but in most cases the party seeks to promote economic interests or access to resources for the Union and its member states). The EU has been labelled as a self-interest seeking agent intended to pursue its interests and not to promote genuine democracy. For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe the EU has shown dissatisfaction with the ruling government and party.

This speaks to the Afro-centric approach which illustrate that sanctions were imposed to get rid of the Mugabe regime and pave way for the Movement for Democratic Change. Such kinds of interests cause negative resistance thereby leading to the failure of the democratic mission. The Zimbabwean government refused to allow the EU to penetrate its internal affairs thereby causing a slowdown in democratic development since the EU was no longer able to take part in areas such as electoral democracy. The EU relations with the Zimbabwean government has for a long time been antagonistic and tense thereby leading to negative outcomes due to the coercive nature (sanctions) of its approach towards the latter. The availability of certain agendas in the democratisation process also determines the approach of socialisation that the democratic victor can use. In cases where it faces resistance (Zimbabwe), the EU has used coercive socialisation but in cases where (Ghana and Morocco) it did not face any form of resistance it deepened the

use of the persuasive model. The application of such instruments plays an important role in shaping the outcomes of the democratisation process in Africa.

The agents of democracy promotion seek to have total influence in the politics of the recipient country hence they support political elites that allows them to permeate in their internal politics. In the case of Zimbabwe and Ghana, the EU worked with leaders or political elites who are pro-democracy with the intention to outwit anti-democratic elites. In the case of Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai has been used to further democratic ideas and to deepen the institutionalisation of these norms. In the Ghanaian case, the Rawlings administration has been used to continue pushing for democratisation and other parties that came after the term of its administration showed their commitment to democracy. It is for this reason that the EU seeks to promote democracy in countries where the present political system does not auger well with its intentions or meet the principles of democracy. This has been seen in the Zimbabwean and Ugandan case where the EU has imposed democracy in attempt to change the political systems of that particular recipient country. These mechanisms can be described as negative instruments that cause or contributed to variations in the outcomes.

The case of Uganda and Zimbabwe also illustrate that coercive mechanisms lead to the implantation of artificial democracy that leaves the country in a fragile position with a high probability to revert back into authoritarianism, violence, corruption and chaotic election processes. It is artificial in the sense that the political elites are not willing to adopt such principles hence in cases where they adopt some of the principles they do not fully implant or institutionalise those principles into their political landscape and governmental institutions. For instance, in the case of Uganda and Zimbabwe the governments acknowledge the principle of freedom of speech, association, free and regular elections and citizen participation but they continue to undermine such principles. The governments (Zimbabwe and Uganda) do recognise such principles in their constitution but in some cases where their citizens seek to practice freedom, they have been persecuted, tortured and some disappeared.

The promotion or improvement of democratic principles by governments of Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Morocco invite more financial support from the EU. These countries are persuaded to reform and promote the democratic principles so that they can obtain more financial support. For instance, due to improvements in the democratic status of Morocco, it has gained a status

into the Governance Facility which is accompanied by an increase in aid from the EU due to improvements in democracy and human rights conditions. In 2007 Morocco received additional funding of approximately €28 million from the Governance Facility which rewards countries that have made progress towards democratisation.¹⁸⁶ As noted earlier, Ghana also has free access to the EU market under the Access Regulation scheme. These agreements act as mechanisms to induce the recipient country to adopt the democratic principles which are enshrined in the agreement thereby resulting in successful socialisation of the actor or recipient country as elaborated in the socialisation thesis. This significantly determined the outcome of the democratisation process.

Coercive engagements have detrimental effects especially when the force imposed on political elites do not auger well with them. For example, in the case of Zimbabwe the coercive engagement has led to negative results or limited progress towards democratisation. The form of engagement by the EU in the process of democratisation greatly determined the outcome as it also affects the response of the political elites in that country.

The use of conditional aid by the EU in Uganda and Zimbabwe has resulted in serious negative outcomes that hindered democratisation. Aid granted with political conditions attached to it is meant to further democratic reforms and ensure the success of the aid. Political conditionality is used to address non-compliance in most cases hence these actors withdrew their support from countries that fail to meet demands for democratisation.¹⁸⁷ This further undermined progress towards attaining democracy since the governments are left financially crippled and rarely have money to use for democracy promotion. A further analysis shows that political conditionality is characterised by coercive elements in it which may lead to instability in the recipient country thereby undermining democratic development.¹⁸⁸

Ghana's successful transition to a democracy has been shaped by various factors. The domestic environment which is accompanied by relatively few ethnic disputes created a conducive atmosphere for the growth of democracy in Ghana. The domestic environment was favourable for democratic development to take off and this was accompanied by the presence of a willing

¹⁸⁶ Kaucsh, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood*, 19.

¹⁸⁷ Carolyn Baylies, "Political Conditionality and Democratization", *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 22. No. 65. (1995): 321-327.

¹⁸⁸ Baylies, *Political Conditionality and Democratization*, 328.

and committed group of political elites. It can be acknowledged that the Rawlings administration was committed to the growth of democracy hence it accepted the democratic norms being sold to them by the EU and embarked on a democratic transition process. They were willing to cooperate with the EU and other actors involved in the process of democratisation. Upon the adoption of the democratic principles, the PNDC embarked on reforming the electoral system and the constitution among other areas important for democratisation to take place. This has led to the development towards real democracy in Ghana and this has made it an outstanding case under the influence of the EU.

This has contributed to variations in the outcomes of the democratisation process. The commitment is shown in the administration's willingness to reform the political system, and the relaxation of restrictions on the media and civil society. It also allowed competitive politics and freedom of speech among other areas of democracy development. The willingness and commitment of the political elites in Ghana made it easy for external democracy assistance to be successful.

As noted earlier, the EU also used persuasive means to promote democratisation in Ghana. Its presence and commitment is reflected in its long lasting relationship with Ghana which is based on their economic and trade ties. It has institutionalised these relationships through agreements such as the ACP states, Cotonou Agreement and EPAs.¹⁸⁹ Through the Cotonou agreement, the EU has engaged with the Ghanaian government by conducting various consultations with the government in attempt to appease the political elites and channel their thinking into democratic development. An analysis on the success of the transition process in Ghana shows that the use of a persuasive and not coercive approach to Ghana by the EU contributed to such a great improvement in the process. EU's contribution to the transition process in Ghana has been largely based on these agreements which led to the provision of aid or financial support to the civil society and electoral systems. The kinds of persuasive engagements with the government of Ghana encourage the political elites to adopt and reform the liberal ideas. This is contrasted to the Zimbabwean case which was characterised by coercive engagements.

¹⁸⁹ Carothers, *The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion*, 7.

Economic development in Ghana has also contributed to the success in some areas and in others it has hastened its transition process. In democracy promotion, the level of economic development is an important aspect or a pre-requisite that determines the outcome of the democratisation process. Ghana in the early 1990s went through a quick economic recovery process which led to reduced poverty levels, inequalities and improved living standards. The World Bank report 1993 states that “by 1991 Ghana’s economy was about 40 percent larger than it was in 1984”¹⁹⁰. The research finds that economic development creates stable conditions that allow the installation of democratic principles thereby leading to a successful transition process.

During economic instabilities in the 1980s Ghana faced serious social unrest which contributed to some of the military coups during that period.¹⁹¹ But upon the inception of an economic recovery program, economic growth was restored, and real incomes improved thereby contributing to democratic development. Economic development reduces tensions between the government and its citizens thereby promoting the installation of democratic principles to avoid causing disappointments with its citizens. This has contributed to Ghana’s successful democratization under the influence of the EU.

Looking at the Zimbabwean case, the coercive mechanism used by the EU, lack of commitment of the political elites and poor economic development has contributed to its failure in promoting sustainable democracy. In terms of the mechanism used to induce democratic reforms, the EU has used sanctions which can be described as a coercive negative instrument. Sanctions contributed to the collapse of the economy thereby stimulating negative responses from the government of Zimbabwe in rejecting the imposed ideas to foster democratisation by the EU. Sanctions have reduced the capital inflow, flow of aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), closure of companies, unemployment and the shortage of basic commodities among other impacts. The negative responses directed to the EU support the literature which states that the efforts of these actors have received a backlash that has further contributed to the failure of democratic growth.

¹⁹⁰ Mohammed Awal, “Ghana: Democracy, Economic Reform, and Development, 1993-2008”, *The Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*. Vol. 14. No. 1. (2012): 99.

¹⁹¹ Awal, *Ghana: Democracy, Economic Reform, and Development*, 98.

This shows that using coercive means to induce democratic reforms is not an option as it worsens the situation and further hinders the development of democracy.

The sanctions destroyed the economy to the extent that governance deteriorated thereby increasing corruption and lack of transparency. For instance, the living standards, service delivery and availability of basic commodities deteriorated. The sanctions affected the government's policy making capabilities as its efforts to control the situation were obstructed due to these sanctions. As indicated above, economic development is of great importance to the development of sustainable democracy. Economic development provides opportunities to the citizens and incentives to improve the welfare of the citizens thereby establishing peaceful relations with the government.¹⁹² The continued economic collapse in Zimbabwe has greatly contributed to the failure of the EU's efforts to promote democracy.

Poor economic development posed serious challenges to the extension of democracy in Zimbabwe as it caused tensions between the government and its citizens.¹⁹³ In such an environment, sustainable democracy cannot automatically develop because of the antagonistic relations between the government and its citizens.¹⁹⁴ Such conditions promote corruption, exacerbate poor governance and lead to violence and abuse of human rights. Corruption, poor governance and violence are the major signs and symptoms of deficiencies in democracy. Violence can be attributed to the notion that the government uses it as a mechanism to control its citizens as they revolt against it due to economic conditions. This depresses the growth of democratic institutions and practices.

The failure of the democratisation efforts in Zimbabwe can also be attributed to lack of commitment or willingness among the political elites towards the growth of democracy. With the advent of increased pressure to democratise, the government and its officials increasingly implemented policies or regulations that oppose the development of democracy or what the EU has been advocating. As shown above, the government introduced acts such as POSA which

¹⁹² Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, *Cost and Causes of Zimbabwe's Crisis*. (Centre for Global Development, 2005), 1-2.

¹⁹³ Lloyd M. Sachikonye, "Between Authoritarian and Democratization: The Challenges of a Transition Process in Zimbabwe", in *Occasional Paper 1*. (Centre of Political and Historical Studies on Africa and the Middle East), 8.

¹⁹⁴ Sachikonye, *Between Authoritarian and Democratization: The Challenges of a Transition Process*, 8.

restricted freedom of speech and also continuously banned the participation of civil society. Opposition parties were further constrained and denied space to host campaigns.

The Zimbabwean government has been reluctant to institutionalise political liberalisation; instead it facilitated violence by ignoring the rule of law.¹⁹⁵ Even though there are several opposition political parties in Zimbabwe, they are weak and easily oppressed by the dominant political party (ZANU PF). There is insufficient commitment to multi-party politics as these parties are continuously persecuted and denied freedom in their operations.¹⁹⁶ To support the findings the literature indicates that most of these political elites in the government “*do not walk the talk as they talk democracy but employ undemocratic means to remain in power*”.¹⁹⁷ Lack of commitment has contributed to the consolidation of the authoritarian system thereby halting progress towards democratic transition.

The lack of commitment among the political elites is further reflected in the inclusive government formed in 2008. The elites persistently slowed down progress towards institutionalising democratic reforms through reforming the security sector and the constitution. The process of reforming the constitution caused tensions between the political parties and this was accompanied by limited citizen participation in the process. Despite increased support and pressure for democratisation, there is no positive change towards attaining civil participation, increased transparency, accountability and protection of human rights among other democratic principles. These factors among others contributed to the failure of the transition process in Zimbabwe.

In Uganda both mechanisms have been used to foster the acceptance and institutionalisation of democratic principles. Aid to Uganda has been provided under strict conditions and the EU has also signed various agreements such as the country strategy paper and the National Indicative Program which allows consultative dialogues between the Union and the government of Uganda. However, such mechanisms have resulted in poor development in terms of democracy since the government of Uganda is unwilling to and slow in implanting and promoting the practice of democratic principles.

¹⁹⁵ Makumbe, *The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe*, 10.

¹⁹⁶ Sachikonye, *Between Authoritarian and Democratization: The Challenges of a Transition*, 9

¹⁹⁷ Sachikonye, *Between Authoritarian and Democratization: The Challenges of a Transition*, 9

The presence of neopatrimonialism or patron-client politics has also significantly hindered the growth of democracy in Uganda and contributed to the lack of progress in the democratisation process. It has now been over two decades but the Ugandan government has not gained democratic legitimacy or authority. The case of Uganda reflects that the President used the resources to remain in office through distributing them to some of the government officials who in turn voted for him to stay in office. Neopatrimonialism is characterised by and perpetuates corruption, dominance of the elite group, rent-seeking behaviours and violence. Aid from donors was then used to ensure that the President continue gaining support from other government officials. This perpetuated the embezzlement of funds and leads to the concentration of power in the hands of the elites who controls the state thereby halting progress towards democracy.

The concentration of power in the hands of the few denies other social groups (for instance, the civil society, opposition political parties and individuals) access into the decision making process. This has also enabled the President to massively control the police and military which plays an important role through intimidating people and suppressing protests or mass movements. This research shows that protesters in Uganda have been persecuted, tortured and in some cases they have disappeared. This has undermined the efforts of the EU to install democracy in Uganda's political landscape and contributed to a failure of the democratization process.

Increased personalisation of politics in Uganda can be attributed to lack of deep commitment among the political elites towards transition process because they fear being removed from their official positions. Like Zimbabwe, lack of commitment has contributed to lack of progress in the transition process. Lack of commitment and reluctance toward democracy is reflected in Museveni's concentration on his survival in Uganda's political landscape and the total ignorance of the existence of other political parties and his role in discrediting democratic principles. Due to personalisation of politics in Uganda, the political landscape has become less accommodative and the government has increasingly become an authoritarian entity that poses threats to other opposition parties.

Museveni's regime undermined the growth of democracy due to its anti-democratic behaviours as shown above. Museveni indirectly controlled the Judiciary because he has the capacity to appoint officials that support or are loyal to him. As shown in the literature, "*for some time now,*

*the President has remotely controlled the Judiciary through political appointments and opposition politicians have accused the President of staffing the Judiciary with cadre judges. They have often pointed at Justice Steven Kavuma, the acting chief Justice and acting deputy Chief Justice as one such cadre judges because prior to the high-profile appointments he was an NRM loyalists and junior minister for defence”.*¹⁹⁸

The President has exercised his powers in shaping the role of the judiciary towards his political interests thereby undermining judicial reforms which are basic elements of democracy. He has replaced independent judges or officials who have the ability to challenge him with those who are compliant to his demands.¹⁹⁹ Officials such as Attorney General Mulenga attained office as the Supreme Court Judge as an NRM cadre. The President seeks to put in place judges who can be loyal to him and promote the interests of the NRM for years. Such conditions in the Ugandan political landscape do not lead to democratisation rather it cripples efforts to institutionalise principles of democracy thereby leading to unsuccessful outcomes.

Government officials who seem to be against Museveni’s ruling or disloyal to his office have been dismissed from the government. This shows lack of commitment towards the democratic transition process. Political elites committed to democracy promotion should be seen reforming the political systems, enhancing participation of other parties, promoting transparency and good governance among other values of democracy. Given these loopholes in the Ugandan political system, it can be concluded that the government acknowledges some of the principles of democracy but continued to undermine them as well. Uganda has become a multi-party state but the opposition parties have been down trodden, persecuted and the elections continue to be dominated by Museveni’s party. It has only shown gestures of democratic transition but with no further consolidation of the democratic system. Rather there is a sharp decline in Uganda’s political governance due to increased torturing, persecution and disappearance of political actors and citizens.

These ethnic divisions have also contributed to lack of progress towards democratisation as Ugandan political life is based on ethnic lines. It has become less accommodative and failed to

¹⁹⁸ Edward Ssekika, “How Judges cut Museveni Wings”, The Observer, August 08, 2014, <http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option%3Dcom-content%26viewDarticle>. (Accessed October 22, 2014).

¹⁹⁹ Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*, 8.

iron out ethnic divisions since power has become more concentrated on Museveni himself and his ethnic group. He has failed to address the issue of national identity in his country and this has continuously caused tensions between ethnic groups particularly the Baganda from the south and the northerners. Each political elite favours particular ethnic groups at the expense of others and this widens the gap between these groups. They have negatively manipulated ethnicity since the politicians play the ethnicity card to obtain personal interests and political gains. Political stability is unlikely because of these multi-ethnic divisions which have led to the dominance of one ethnic group in Uganda's political history. These kinds of fault lines contribute to future conflicts and lack of progress in the democratisation efforts of the EU in Uganda.

In Morocco, the Association Agreement and ENP have been used to further the institutionalisation of democratic norms in this country. As shown in the case study of Morocco, the EU has largely utilised the soft power approach before it reviewed its policies of engagements with the country. No strict conditions were attached to aid or funding received by Morocco due to its deep social, political and economic ties with the union. The approach used by the EU contributed to the positive outcome in its democracy promotion efforts in the country. This approach allows the recipient and political elites to adopt or buy the ideas being sold to them without being threatened. Compared to the case of Zimbabwe and Uganda where the EU has heavily relied on the hard power accompanied by sanctions and strict conditional aid, the political elites have become dissatisfied with the promoters of democracy hence they have resisted or backlashed against them.

In the case of Morocco, without willingness and commitment of the political elites in the country, democratic development would have been uncertain. The Monarchy has shown great commitment and willingness in establishing and consolidating democracy in the development of an open political system. This is shown in the Kings (Hassan 2 and Mohammed V1) decision to incorporate opposition political parties into government and electoral process.

The various initiatives introduced by the Moroccan government can be described as an attempt to promote home-grown democracy and as a process of opening the political system.²⁰⁰ Even though there was external pressure, the voluntary establishment of the *alternance* initiative

²⁰⁰ Zemni and Bogaert, *Morocco and the Miracles of Democracy and Good Governance*, 105.

shows the monarchy's willingness in reforming the political system. In the 1990s, the monarchy embarked on reforming the political system. The idea or initiative of the *alternance* was not imposed on the King (Hassan 2) but he independently made that decision since he believes that it is a good idea to incorporate other parties into government.²⁰¹ This sets the platform for the implementation of the democratic principles which have been advocated by the EU thereby leading to positive developments towards the transition process. King Mohammed also describes himself as the King of the poor not of the elite, hence he has shown interests and commitment in promoting democracy to meet the needs of his people.²⁰² Commitment and willingness of the monarchy is one of the variables that have greatly contributed to such great improvements in the consolidation of democracy in Morocco.

²⁰¹ Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 6.

²⁰² Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition*, 7.

CHAPTER 4

4. FINDINGS and ANALYSIS

The process of democracy promotion in Africa has led to various heterogeneous outcomes which have raised questions about external democracy promotion. Variations in the outcomes show that democracy is not like a highly contagious virus that can affect every recipient during its diffusion process. Looking at each case study, this research shows that there are multiple factors both internal and external that determined the outcome of the democratisation process. The failures recorded in Zimbabwe and Uganda cannot wholly be attributed to EU's coercive means or mechanisms but there are also internal forces that contributed to the outcome. The multiple factors hereby refer to preconditions which prominent scholars who write about the democratization process in Africa had foreseen.

Countries used in this research paper experienced external pressure to promote democracy but surprisingly cases such as Zimbabwe and Uganda did not develop fully fledged democracies while Ghana and Morocco show signs of progress. The cases of Zimbabwe and Uganda shows gestures of democracy which are mixed by anti-democratic elements which continue to hold back progress. This speaks to the literature which posits that countries that have experienced external pressure to foster democratisation have entered a political grey zone which is characterised by a mixture of democratic and authoritarian political systems or elements.

Countries in the grey zone experience democratic deficits such as abuse of human rights, restriction of the civil society and uncertainty in elections. Some of the factors include the level of political will and commitment among the political elites in the recipient countries, the form of engagement (coercive or persuasive means), the level of economic development, cultural heterogeneity, a lack of coherence in the EU's activities, and the degree of availability of funding. These factors have led to inconsistencies in the outcome of the process and these speak to ideas which have been elaborated by a number of scholars who critique external democracy promotion.

4.1. Form of Engagement (Coercive Imposition or Persuasion)

The research finds that the EU in cases such as Zimbabwe and Uganda has used coercive means to impose democracy in these countries. The coercive imposition of democracy posed serious challenges to the democratic transition process because the elites in these countries rejected the ideas of the EU and continuously critiqued it thereby halting progress towards democratisation. It is difficult for the EU to promote or establish its ideology in other societies where it has no jurisdiction. This causes negative responses from the recipient particularly countries which are anti-imperialistic. Such backlashes affected the legitimacy of the EU and its democratic efforts. In Zimbabwe the EU used sanctions to implant and force the government to reform its policies but this has been castigated as the worst form of imperialism. Such forms of resistance or backlash has hindered efforts of the EU in the democratization process and led to unsuccessful outcomes.

The coercive imposition of democratic principles is tantamount to the belief that local democratic norms such as no to gay rights are irrelevant or ineffective. It undermines the internal processes of democratic transition. Jump starting democracy in these countries does not auger well with internal political processes. This has resulted in violence and corruption as democratic norms pushed by the EU failed to settle in the local political structures of Zimbabwe and Uganda. This also speaks to the literature which shows that some of the instruments used to establish democracies are at times self-devastating thereby resulting in negative outcomes such as severe human rights abuses. It can be noted that it is unlikely for imposed democracy to succeed because the recipient states resent and resist forces of democratisation from the outside. This speaks to the ideas illustrated by Whitehead in the literature of external democratization which shows that democracy promotion from outside is an uncertain undertaking.²⁰³

Also, pressure to democratise the political systems may affect their economic development thereby leading to a major failure of democratic efforts. For instance, economic sanctions may hinder economic development thereby undermining transition process. These kinds of mechanisms or instruments have exacerbated conditions that sustained corruption, embezzlement of funds and lawlessness thereby hindering democratic development. This speaks to

²⁰³ Whitehead, *Democratization with the Benefit of hindsight*, 141-147.

Wucherpfening idea which states that economic development leads to democracy, hence without such a precondition, democratic development may fail to take off.²⁰⁴ This also supports the notion that the survival rate of imposed democracy is limited and it has little effect on the target state.²⁰⁵ This has contributed to the failure of the democratisation efforts in Uganda and Zimbabwe thereby causing inconsistencies in the outcomes of the process.

Success has been recorded in Ghana and Morocco where the form of engagement has been more persuasive rather than coercive. Persuasive mechanisms or engagements employed in Ghana and Morocco have contributed to the successful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic country or it hastened the transition process. Through persuasion, the political elites are likely to adopt and implement the democratic principles without facing any resistance.

4.2. Level of Economic Development

The research finds that poor levels of economic development in Zimbabwe and Uganda have undermined the democratic efforts of the EU and contributed to the failure of the democratisation process. Poor economic development leads to inequalities between citizens, corruption and leaves societies prone to violence as citizens continue to criticize the government. It also perpetuates poor governance and exacerbates the lack of transparency in the government. This is supported by the literature which shows that there is a positive relationship between economic development and the growth of democracy.

A higher level of economic development leads to or is followed by a higher level of democracy in a particular country. Poor economic development simultaneously forces people to protest against the government which then led the government to implement stringent mechanisms to regulate their citizens. The state apparatus for instance in Zimbabwe and Uganda have been used forcefully to prohibit protests and persecute people for any form of activism against the government. This research finds that these approaches have been used to control the masses through constant surveillance of their daily activities, intimidation, and persecution for exposing underhand activities of the government officials.

²⁰⁴ Julian Wucherpfening, "Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited", *Living Reviews in Democracy*, Vol. 1. (2009): 2

²⁰⁵ Fritz, *Imposing Democracy to Ensure the Peace*, 1.

The media has been controlled in Uganda and Zimbabwe by the government to shape the thinking of the people through ensuring that they refrain from watching contents that critique the government. This undermined freedom of speech, association and electoral democracy thereby hindering development towards democracy. This also supports the literature which argues that democratisation is nurtured by economic development. It further shows that “*economic development increases the receptiveness of the type of norms and values that mitigate conflict penalize the extremist groups and reward moderate democratic parties*”.²⁰⁶ Economic development creates a favourable environment for the development of democracy as it also promotes good governance thereby fostering transparency and accountability.

Equality between groups or classes in society is fundamental as it reduces the probabilities of violence. This can be reinforced by the idea that new democracies or democratic regimes are likely to survive in countries which are economically developing as there will be equality between the classes and this prevents the majority of the citizens from insurgent activities.²⁰⁷ This research shows that most poor countries are characterised by wide income and welfare gaps between the classes and they have been exposed to tyranny. This has affected the transition process to democracy in Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Economic development is regarded as a pre-requisite for the growth of democracy to take place because it creates opportunities for democratic reforms to happen. Research on the case of Ghana shows that it has economically improved since the 1990s and this has been accompanied by positive changes towards democratic transition. The economic downturn in Zimbabwe has continually led to poor practice regarding democratic principles. Also, due to poor economic development, funds for democracy promotion are channelled to other activities which have nothing to do with democratic transition process. This has been shown in Uganda where funds for democratization have been used to buy support among NRM members and other governments’ officials by President Museveni. In response to the practices by the Ugandan government, the EU has reduced its financial support to the government. This has hindered the transition process thereby leading to inconsistencies in the outcomes.

²⁰⁶ Wucherpfening, *Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited*, 2.

²⁰⁷ Wucherpfening, *Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited* 1-9.

The recipient countries should have high or favourable levels of economic development so that money meant for democratisation can only be channelled to that end. This has led to the failure of democratic efforts in these countries. High levels of corruption and lack of transparency triggered by poor economic development undermines the practice of democratic principles. The level of economic development led to inconsistency in the outcome of the democratisation process.

4.3. Political Will and Commitment of the Political Elites

The level of political will and commitment among the political elites in the recipient country has led to various outcomes. Even though it is not sufficient it is a necessary requirement that facilitates the adoption and implementation of the democratic principles. In countries such as Zimbabwe and Uganda, limited political will and commitment towards democratic development has played a significant role. This research shows that, instead of implementing democratic principles, these countries have put in place laws or regulations that constrain the process of democratisation. They have allowed the state apparatus to constrain citizen participation, freedom of speech, freedom of association among other principles. The mechanisms or processes for facilitating the transfer of power have been undermined and this also shows that democracy has little space in the structures of these countries. The availability of domestic support from these elites complements the efforts of the EU or democracy advocates thereby leading to successful democratisation.

In cases where there is no commitment, the political elites are likely to resist pressure towards democratisation thereby leading to failures in the process. The political elites seek to protect their interests and this means that if democracy would impede their interests then they will reject it but if it protects their interests they will accept the norms imposed upon them. This is shown by Huntington in the literature “*if they want democracy, they will produce and get democracy*”.²⁰⁸ The development of democracy in most recipient countries can therefore be attributed to the onus of the political elites as they can allow its germination or decay.

The EU cannot bring positive democratic changes without domestic support particularly from the political elites. The political elites are supposed to be enhancing political pluralism, allowing

²⁰⁸ Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century*, 36.

citizen participation, electoral democracy among other principles of democracy. Progress made in Ghana can be attributed to the commitment of the NDC officials and other government officials who accepted and implemented principles of democracy into their structures. They favoured transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system and have shown commitment towards the transition process.

Successes recorded in Morocco can also be attributed to the commitment shown by the Makhzen to move towards democracy. The Monarchy has shown great commitment and willingness in establishing and consolidating democracy in the Moroccan political landscape. This is shown in the Kings (Hassan 2 and Mohammed VI) decision to incorporate opposition political parties into government, electoral process and other democratic reforms.

The research shows that the attitude and decisions of the political elites in that particular country is of great importance to facilitate a shift towards democracy. This may be explained by an analogy which says that *“you can take a donkey to the river but you cannot force it to drink”*. This means that the democracy promoting agents can socialise the recipient country and expose it to democratic norms but you cannot force them to change their political systems if they are not ready and do not want to. They will follow what they are used to doing and maintain their own mind-set and this affects the transition process. The success of the process depends on or requires strong commitment from the internal political forces which includes the political elites among other factors.

In countries like Uganda and Zimbabwe where political will and commitment are lacking, the elites have critiqued the EU. In some instances, NGO and activists advocating for democracy have been persecuted thereby hindering the transition towards democracy. Democracy needs strong domestic support and a favourable domestic environment. Most political leaders in other African countries not interested in democratic principles have rejected and resisted pressure to democratisation. This has contributed to variations in the outcomes and such findings strongly affirm to the existing literature on democracy promotion.

As mentioned in the literature by Whitehead, commitment on the part of the advocates of democracy is also questionable.²⁰⁹ Due to focus on security and economic concerns of most of

²⁰⁹ Whitehead, *The International Dimension of Democratization Europe and the Americas*, 13.

the democratisation agents, commitment of the EU to democracy promotion is very weak and continues to be diluted. He defined the commitment as weak and hypothetically absent. In other words, the promotion of democracy by the EU has become a blessing in disguise as the agents pursue their security and economic interests. This has stalled democracy development in most of the African countries thereby leading to inconsistencies in the outcomes of the democratic process.

4.4. Neopatrimonialism

The presents of neopatrimonialism or patron-client politics has significantly hindered the growth of democracy in Uganda and Zimbabwe among other African countries and contributed to the lack of progress in the transition process. The government officials have used their power to acquire state resources for their own selfish interests such as buying support so that they can remain in power. In these cases some officials have financially benefited and ordinary citizens in the case of Zimbabwe have been given farming inputs towards the election period by ZANU PF as a strategy to strengthen support from the rural population. This has undermined the change of government or the shift of power to other political parties and the development of electoral democracy. Upon receiving such resources from the political elites or parties, the beneficiaries are left with no option except to vote for that party. This undermines the transfer of power to other parties particularly those that have no or little resources.

Neopatrimonialism is characterised by and perpetuates corruption, dominance of the elite group, rent-seeking behaviours and violence. This perpetuated the embezzlement of funds and it led to monopolisation and concentration of power in to the hands of the elites who controls the state thereby halting progress towards transition in Uganda, Zimbabwe and other countries in Africa. In Uganda and Zimbabwe people gain access to high offices based on allegiance to the ruling party or the President.

Selection of government officials based on allegiance has superseded the effort to and hindered the national aspirations of moving towards democracy. This research finds that these officials get rewarded for their loyalty when it is perceived as being unquestionable. Officials with opposing views are not tolerated and in most cases as shown in the case of Zimbabwe and Uganda such officials have been sucked out. Most of the officials elected on the card of allegiance seek to

please the ruling party or the President and do not improve democracy in their country or the lives of the citizens. They have been selected to rubber stamp the status quo of the ruling party thereby hindering progress towards real democracy. This has led to variations in the process because in some cases like Ghana officials are selected through a transparent voting system.

4.5. Lack of Coherence in the EU Approach

The EU consists of various countries which have colonial attachment to their colonies and strong interests in some of the countries in which the EU operates. This research shows that the Union's engagement with African countries has not been effective due to bilateral engagements arranged by the Member countries outside the Union's mandate. Countries such as France operates in the Francophone and Britain in the Anglo-American countries have significant personal ties with their colonies and seek to remain influential or to have control over them. Some of these bilateral relationships barely mention democracy promotion in their clauses and in cases where it is mentioned the commitment is not convincing.

These individual countries pursue their interests that at times contradict with the EU's democratisation efforts. For instance, in Zimbabwe some Members of the Union favoured sanctions while some did not vote for sanctions. This shows a lack of coherence. This has generated resentments and resistance or backlash against the EU and hindered the democratic transition process. With that, the process has been unsuccessful as the EU fail to deliver its goals on democracy promotion. This has been described as political patronage in which the colonizer seeks to maintain its networks of privilege in the recipient country.²¹⁰ It shows that the commercial, historical ties between the European nations and African countries have affected the process thereby causing inconsistencies in the outcome of the process.²¹¹ The European countries seek to maintain their interests in these countries and it can be argued that these relationships have stalled progress in terms of the democratic transition process.

²¹⁰ Kippin, *European Union Policy Integration and Democracy*, 8-10.

²¹¹ Kippin, *European Union Policy Integration and Democracy*, 10.

CHAPTER 5

5. Limitations, Recommendations, Conclusion and Bibliography

5.1. Limitations

The democratisation of African countries is not only for the EU but it involves various actors from across the world that also use the same instruments used by the EU. Hence I had challenges in wholly attributing the success made in Ghana and Morocco to the role played or contributions made by the EU. It was impossible to quantify the role played by the EU or its contributions. This is because there are various external forces that have participated in democracy promotion in Africa. These actors include the UN, USA, CIDA, Canada, Norway and Netherlands among other external actors. It's difficult to differentiate whether the success made in these countries is a result of the EU or CIDA. The sample size was also kept small for management purposes due to the limited time frame, pressure and scope of a structured master's thesis. It could have looked at the whole of the African continent to clearly assess the success and failures of the democratic transition process. The size of the sample affected the representation of the findings and generalisation of results in terms of the inconsistencies in the outcomes of democracy promotion in Africa by the EU. A larger size sample would have been preferred to improve the generalisation of the findings. It was also not possible to hold interviews with representatives from these case studies and the EU because of insufficient financial resources.

5.2. Recommendations

This paper recommends that democratisation must be promoted by the local or from within because external efforts rarely create or cause sustainable democratic reforms. Democracy promotion has to be a home-grown phenomenon in which the locals cultivate their own style of democracy that suits their societal needs or norms. The approach used by the EU and other actors tends to be insensitive to local cultural, political and economic systems in each recipient country and this further hinders democratic transition process.

Externally driven democracies are in most instances left stuck in the process of democratization and eventually revert back to violence, abuse of human rights and corruption. If behaviour of the recipient countries has been changed because of the pressure or incentives used, they are likely to

readopt their old system of behaviour when the incentives have suspended. Democracy must therefore come from within because enforcing democratic principles from the outside may not auger well with domestic norms and values. It should also be pioneered by strong and willing political elites.

For instance, in some societies same sex marriages are regarded as acts of abomination to the society hence enforcing such kind of principles or rights may cause internal threats and further lead to the persecution of the homosexuals as this practice tends to violate certain societal norms and values. If democracy grows from within, it considers the norms and values at the heart of the society or that speaks to the interests of the society. External forces of democracy promotion rarely consider local societal norms and values, hence imposing norms that contradict these local norms guarantees failure at some stage in the transition process.

This paper also recommends that the advocates of democracy must refrain from using coercive mechanisms because they hinder the development of democracy. These coercive mechanisms generate forces of resentment and resistance thereby undermining democracy in the recipient country. It is therefore necessary to use persuasive mechanisms that engage with the elites in a diplomatic way without causing tensions between the advocates of democracy and the elites of the recipient country. Persuasive measures are more likely to be successful than coercive mechanisms. The elites and some politicians are likely to accept and implement the democratic principles if they are not forced. A persuasive approach enables positive socialisation to take place which will result in a positive outcome.

Additionally, the recipient countries should create social structures that allow the equitable distribution of power resources, participation of citizens and other institutions such as civil society. These social structures further the allocation of resources to unprivileged groups and allow them to support and make reforms. If there is a strong domestic support, democracy promotion is likely to thrive or succeed. This paper further recommends that the democratic advocates must continue to invest in democracy promotion initiatives through constant funding. This will allow the quick development of institutions that will sustain democracy.

In cases where it is imposed, democratic advocates are recommended not to immediately push the recipient countries to reform their system. Some countries need time to successfully reform.

This paper therefore recommends the democratic advocates to practice strategic pacing and sequencing in the promotion of democracy. This involves gradually reforming the system or facilitating the reforms step by step without force to cause immediate or abrupt changes. When strategic sequencing and pacing is practiced, the recipient country is likely to take in proper norms and will have time to practice or learn the democratic principles. This speaks to the literature which considers the democratic transition process to be a social learning process which does not happen abruptly but in stages.

This paper also recommends that most of the African countries should refrain from old fashioned political activities such as neopatrimony as this inhibits progress towards democracy. Government officials elected on the card of allegiance do not work to meet the interests of the society at large but please their leadership.

5.3. Conclusion

It is no doubt that the process of democratization in Africa has produced uneven outcomes that have left many policy makers, advisors and institutions in a state of confusion on how to address the inconsistencies. The outcomes of this process are determined by both internal and external factors. The aims of this paper were to explain why in some African countries, transition occurred while in others efforts to trigger a sustainable transition to democratic rule have failed. Thus, this paper explained the inconsistencies in the outcomes of democracy promotion efforts undertaken by the EU on the African continent particularly in Ghana, Zimbabwe, Morocco and Uganda.

To this end, the paper examined the role of the EU in promoting democracy on the African continent. The paper gave a detailed explanation of the EU relations with its former colonies in Africa and explored its role and commitment in democracy promotion. It explored the EU-Africa agreements including some of the bilateral agreements to establish the extent to which the EU pursued democracy promotion on the continent. These include the EU-Africa trade agreements (Lome Conventions), Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) EPAs, aid agreements particularly Official Development Assistance (ODA).

This research paper looked at how the EU has engaged with the countries under study or the mechanisms used to foster democratisation in these cases. It has looked at both coercive and

persuasive mechanisms used in the cases under study. Under the coercive mechanisms, the paper looked at sanctions and the conditional aid that has been used in Zimbabwe and Uganda to foster democratic transition. The EU also used persuasive form of engagements and these include political dialogues between the EU and countries under study in which the former persuaded their political elites and presented some benefits to them if they agreed to reform their political systems. Reforming their political systems would lead to increased access to the EU market through free exportation of goods.

To explain the inconsistencies, the paper used two case studies that show failures or were unsuccessful in the transition process and two cases that show success of the process. It looked at the democratic transition process of Ghana, Zimbabwe, Morocco, and Uganda. The research carried an intensive analysis of each case study through process tracing and assessed the progress towards democracy from 1990 to 2010. The paper looked at the role of the EU in each case study towards promotion of democracy and how the outcome has been shaped. It also looked at areas such as judicial reforms, voter education campaigns, election support, and election monitoring where the EU has played a critical role in the process. The EU has financially supported electoral processes of various countries, funded the civil society and in some instances strengthened the opposition political parties.

The paper finds that there are various external and internal factors that have led to such inconsistencies in the outcomes. Factors such as level of economic development, political will and commitment of the political elites, the form of engagement, lack of coherence in EU's policy framework and neopatrimonialism contributed to the state of affairs. The EU has used a coercive imposition of democratic principles in cases such as Zimbabwe and that has contributed to the failure of the democratic transition process. In Ghana, commitment and political will of the elites and economic development have contributed to the success of the democratic efforts. These factors have caused different outcomes of the transition process.

This paper will help clarify and hopefully lead to improved future efforts in democracy promotion on the continent. The research will assist more than just domestic policy makers and their advisors but also the international community when addressing issues around the deficiencies of democracy in Africa. The wisdom gained from this study may assist or determine how future democratic interventions strategies are designed. Conclusively, findings from this

research paper will significantly contribute to the current scholarship and debates regarding African democracy and politics through introducing some insights which could help improve the success of democracy promotion efforts in Africa.

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