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The missionary as government agent on the Eastern Frontier: 1818-1830

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Chapter II

The prelude to Lord Charles Somerset's system of control of the Eastern Frontier through missionary agency

Beyond the frontier at Klaar Water (Griqua Town) lay the London Missionary Society station which had been founded in 1804 by Anderson and Kramer. There was an understanding between the Government and these missionaries that they would co-operate and attend to the wishes of the Colonial authorities at all times, and they had done so, to Caledon's satisfaction (1). But exactly how far such co-operation was to extend without creating dissention between the missionaries and the Colonial Government the events of 1814 were to show.

By 1814 it once again became necessary to take strong preventive measures against the depredations of the Kaffirs (2). For this purpose the Hottentot Corps was to be augmented (3) and it was found that practically the only source of recruits was the farm labourers (4). The Landdrost of Tulbagh had expressed his doubts about removing such labour; it would cause the Boers great inconvenience and prejudice cultivation (5). The ultimate implication was that the Boers would not accept this imposition kindly, and Cradock was too keenly aware of Boer feelings to give them anopportunity of displaying their animosity openly (6). It had been against this very tendency which he had worked for the past three years.

The solution to the problem seemed to lie in exacting a levy from the inhabitants of Klaar Water and its surroundings, where there seemed to be a plentiful supply of men (7). Early in 1814, therefore, Sir John Cradock, after receiving the opinion of the

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(1) Clinton, p. 76.
(2) Theal (Records), IX, pp. 324-325.
(3) Ibid., p. 326.
Philip, II, pp. 61-62. Letter reproduced, no date.
(4) Philip, II, p. 61.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Theal (Records), IX, p. 326.
(7) According to Campbell's report of 28th January, 1814, at any rate (Theal (Records), IX, p. 318). 291 men and 310 boys are listed; but only 30 or 40 were born in the Colony and many were aged (Theal, op. cit., p. 318).

landrost on the undesirability of stripping the Boers of farm labour, wrote to Anderson demanding a levy of men for service in the Colony (1). After trying to raise the levy Anderson replied that he had been unsuccessful (2). Hardly more than a week later Lord Charles Somerset took over office as Governor at the Cape (3) and the result was a peremptory letter to Anderson dated 27th May, informing him that unless he complied with the demand all communication between the Colony and the missionary station would be considered at an end (4).

Somerset's reasons for the ultimatum seem to be contradictory to his demand at first sight. He expressed the desire to see "acts of industry among the Hottentots". He wanted to "get them to labour" (5). Therefore it is logical to assume, on a superficial analysis, that his substitute for the idleness which he believed to exist in the missionary institutions, was service in the levy. This apparently muddled reasoning was not the result of an irrational dislike of missionary labours as such (6). The motives for his abruptness must be sought elsewhere (7). To seize the opportunity of using a discussion on Hottentot levies for expressing strong views on idleness amongst institution Hottentots would make it seem, in the first place, that Somerset, as a personal whim, disliked idleness as such - which indeed seems to be the case (8). But where it was offered as a reason for the non-materialisation of the requisite Hottentot levies, one has every reason to also suppose that it was not the fact that the levies did not materialise which piqued Somerset. It was, in the ultimate analysis, neither the alleged idleness of the Hottentots at missionary institutions, nor the fact that the levy did not materialise which caused Somerset so

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(1) Philip, II, pp. 61-62. Letter quoted: Colonial Secretary to Anderson.
(2) Philip, op. cit., p. 62.
(3) 6th April, 1814 (Walker (History), p. 130).
(4) Philip, II, p. 62.
(5) Ibid., p. 63.
(6) If we accept at face value his expressed intention that he did not mean to act against missionary exertions (Philip, II, p. 63).
(7) The argument which follows must be read in close connection with the preceding discussion in Chapter I.
(8) On Walker's judgement at any rate: (History), pp. 156-157.

much misgiving; it was the fact that the missionaries had no control over the members of their flock; it was because, when asked by the Boers to supply labourers, they replied:

"We can do no more than exhort them to labour" (1).

To abuse the missionaries with charges that their flock must produce acts of industry was an excuse to cover the underlying reason: Somerset's determination to exert the fullest possible control of Government throughout the Colony and along its frontiers; and the obvious place to begin was beyond the frontiers of the Colony, where, far from the watchful eye of Government, discomposure could be perpetrated and disorder spread before it could effectively be checked (2). The situation along the Eastern Frontier was unhappy; in spite of Cradock's measures Kaffir marauding continued and farms were being abandoned (3) and the uncontrolled extra-colonial missions were too near the troubled area for safety.

When Dr Philip outlined his case against this attempt on the part of Somerset to coerce the Grique Town mission in the matter of levies, he inadvertently admits the very conditions which justified Somerset's actions.

> "How could the colonial rulers expect to obtain from a missionary without authority, from a people without laws and without government, just emerging from the lowest state of barbarism, what, in the most enlightened and patriotic nations, can only be effected by the strong arm of power" (4).

Such were the very conditions which were anathema to Somerset.

A similar reason is apparent in the suppression of the Bushman mission of Erasmus Smit (who had established an institution at Toverberg in 1814), and that of Corner at Hephzibah (which was established a little later) (5). In the first place the establishmen

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(1) Philip, II, p. 63 (Extract from Anderson's Journal relating to an interview with Somerset).
This was not the only occasion on which the fact that missionaries could do no more than "exhort" their flocks piqued Somerset. See p. 32 below.
(2) Macmillan (C.C.Q.), p. 132.
Macmillan recognises that the threat of disorder was "a more serious allegation" than the failure to provide a levy; the wording of his text seems to imply that not only Somerset but Cradock also was involved in the attempt to control Klaar Water.
(3) Theal (History), pp. 322-323.
(4) Philip, II, p. 64.
(5) Clinton, p. 103 ff.

of the missions "seems to have been unusual if not irregular" (1). In 1815 Landrost Stockenstroom of Graaff-Reinet was reproving Smit for apparently enticing tame Bushmen from "their present of obtaining support" and abandoning "these persons to whom they are now so useful" (2). Further, such a practice was to be discouraged

> "because it is evident that it creates enmity betwixt you and the inhabitants of the Colony who will look with a jealous eye on your plan, and instead of assisting you, hinder the work as much as they can; and still you must acknowledge that you cannot be without assistance of the neighbouring farmers. Experience has taught it in the disobedient conduct of the Bastaards, which arises out of the consciousness that they can escape the punishment of the law whenever they please .... Though tumult and sedition may be stifled for a time, it will break out at last, with more vihence than ever, where there is not a strong arm to quench the flame" (3).

And events in the isolated valley of the Bavians' River impressed upon the authorities the necessity of preventing the extra-colonial missions from embroiling the frontier in what might well become a general revolt against British authority. Four days before Stockenstroom had drawn Smit's attention to the danger of the way in which the affairs of his institution might promote violence. Frederick Cornelius Bezuidenhout resisted Lieutenant Frans Rousseau and twelve Hottentot soldiers who had come to apprehend him for contumacy (4). He was shot dead and the Slachter's Nek rebellion was precipitated (5).

The effect of this rebellion upon Lord Charles Somerset was decisive as regards his future attitude towards the Eastern Frontier. He regarded it seriously in the light of the previous general insurrections which had taken place under the former British and Batavian regimes, fearing that it might precipitate another such revolt (6). He thereupon put "the strongest

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(1) Macmillan (C.C.S.), p. 128.
(2) Ibid., p. 129.
(3) Ibid., pp. 129-130.
In 1820 Stockenstroom informed Campbell that it was not the stations themselves, nor even the danger of assembling Bushmen so near the frontier, that he objected to, but the way in which the stations were run (H.A. Reyburn in "The Critic", July, 1935, pp. 207-208.)
(4) Theal (History), I, pp. 290-291.
(5) Ibid., p. 291.
(6) Theal (Records), XI, p. 4.

authority" into the hands of Lieut-Colonel Cuyler, the officer commanding on "this remote frontier" (1). The rebellion had the same electric effect upon other officers on the frontier who became more aware of the need for sharp authority over possible trouble centres. It was Stockenstroom, who, in 1817, wrote to Smit very much in the vein which one tends to associate with the notorious Colonel Cuyler:

> "Continual complaints are being sent in respecting persons who have run away from their masters being kept at your institution ... It is impossible that I can endure it any longer to see that my authority as well as that of the Governor are trodden underfoot" (2).

The final abuse hurled at Erasmus Smit as his mission was being closed down was a reiteration that Stockenstroom would not have anyone under his jurisdiction "to trample under foot Government's commands", and, finally, that Smit's conduct had created

> "irreconcilable hatred between the aborigines and the farmers" (3).

Thus was the battle joined between Lord Charles Somerset and the extra-colonial missions for a definition of their relationship to the Rule of Law (4), and the altercation with Anderson illustrates the plight of the extra-colonial missionary who refused to

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(1) Theal (Records), XI, pp. 4-5.
(2) Macmillan (C.C.Q.), p. 130.
See also the opinion of the 'Synod' (Macmillan, op. cit., p. 93).
(3) Macmillan (C.C.Q.), pp. 130-131.
(4) An analysis of the situation of the L.M.S. stations in 1818 is interesting in that it shows the preoccupation of the Government with those nearest the trouble centre of the Eastern Frontier.

Lovett, I, pp. 536-538, contains the following list:
(also see map: Lovett, op. cit., facing p. 481)

Bethelsdorp (founded 1802)
Griqua Town (1802)
Stellenbosch (1802)#
Tulbagh (no date of foundation given)#
Bethesda (1808)
Caledon Institution (1811)
Hoogo Kraal (1813)
Theopolis (1814)
Thornberg (Toverberg) (1814)
Bethany
Peace Mountain (1815)
Kaffraria (1816)
Hepzibah (1816)
Lattakoe (1817)
Cape Town

#Although these constantly appear in the Society's Reports they seem to be sustained by the Rhenish Missionary Society. (Lovett's comment), but see Du Plessis, p. 141, footnote (2).

accept Somerset's demands. Anderson, apparently, had made the utmost efforts to raise a levy (1). When he put the demand to the people of the institution and pointed out the consequences of failure to comply he realised that nothing but force was adequate to the task he had at hand. Such force was not for him to exercise and, as he put it, "quite contrary to the principles upon which the L.M.S. do act" (2). To any form of compulsion to achieve the objects of the Colonial Government Anderson would not resort, and he was supported in his stand by the missionaries as a body. At a meeting held at Graaff-Reinet in August, 1814, the ministers stated their position in relation to the demands made upon missionaries by the Colonial Government. They pointed out that it was the wish of the Missionary Society to

> "always endeavour to meet the wishes of that Government under which they prosecute their labours, and from which they receive protection or support, when this can be done consistent with their character as missionaries, and without endangering their work in general" (3).

Accordingly Anderson had done his duty in not resorting to compulsion and had thus acted in accordance with the above principle. Such a course was the only one open to a missionary, "especially those beyond the Colony:- more would endanger their success." Nay more, it would endanger their lives (4).

/There ...

(continued from p. 27)

> Of the extra-colonial institutions founded during Somerset's time only four were near enough to the Eastern Frontier to cause unrest. Of these Toverberg and Hepzibah were closed by 1818 and the mission in Kaffraria was virtually a Government outpost. Theopolis, the foundation of which was assisted by Cradock, was the nearest "intra-colonial" mission to the Eastern Frontier. A special reason for its foundation may have been to promote law and order in that area. (See above, p. 20, footnote (1)). Griqua Town was in a process of being coerced by Somerset (Clinton, pp. 102-103) but was, in any case, fairly far removed.

p. 28

(1) C.O. 67/12, Anderson to Colonial Secretary, 11th June, 1814. (This letter has been misfiled and is found in the C.O. volume for 1815).

Macmillan voices the opinion that Anderson "failed, or refused" to raise a levy (C.C.C., p. 93).

(2) C.O. 67/12, Anderson to Colonial Secretary, 11th July, 1814.
(3) C.O. 55/52, Read to Colonial Secretary, 25th August, 1814.
(4) Ibid.

There was much to be said in favour of this argument; when the missionaries had commenced their work in that area they had been regarded with the utmost suspicion by the inhabitants of that area, fearful that they had been sent by the Colonial Government "to ensnare" them, and they had had to be weaned gradually to believing in the sincerity of the missionary enterprise (1). The situation was still delicate, and, as Read put it:

> "any compulsion on the part of the missionaries could but serve to do infinite injury both to their characters and cause" (2).

Anderson pointed out that the Colonial Government had no claim upon extra-colonial missions because they had failed to protect them in the past. In 1808, when Klaar Water was threatened by "the Kaffirs", the Landrost had informed Kramer (who had then been in charge) that the circumstances were undoubtedly unpleasant, but as the station was beyond the frontier the Government could do nothing for the missionaries (3). The missionaries had no cause to be grateful to authority which had failed them in the past and which now insisted upon demands which not only have jeopardised their Christian work but endangered their lives. Further, Anderson pointed out that he did not consider his people as subjects of the Colony (4). Why, he asked, had the Government allowed Campbell to make separate laws for Griqua Town when it was not considered independent of the Colony? (5). Finally, he admitted that the mission had received favours from the Government, but it had also assisted the Government (6).

Somerset's reply was typical. Expressing disapproval that the missionaries should have dared to question an order of Government, he offered Anderson two alternatives: either he would give up his

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(1) C.O. 55/52, Read to Colonial Secretary, 25th August, 1814.
(2) Ibid.
(3) C.O. 67/12, Anderson to Colonial Secretary, 11th July, 1814.
(4) Clinton, p. 101.
(Clinton's information on this subject exceeds the information in the sources in the Government Archives, Cape Town. Therefore he must be drawing from the L.M.S. Archives in London).
(5) Clinton, op. cit., p. 101.
(6) Ibid.

demand for soldiers or he would use force and bring the Hottentots within the Colony. In the first case the Government could no longer be considered as protecting the settlement (1). Anderson eschewed the second and pointed out that the past assurances and favourable replies of Government could mean nothing if they could be so easily negatived (2). Thereupon Somerset chose the first alternative and virtually abandoned Griqua Town to fend for itself for the present, possibly with the intention of forcing Anderson's hand (3). Naturally Anderson had been placed in a dilemma.

> "I find myself in a critical situation, as I have always considered it part of my duty as a missionary to act with the approbation of Government, which I have hitherto had the happiness to enjoy. I find it a painful task to stay here under the displeasure of His Excellency" (4).

This was not the first, nor would it be the last time, that a missionary during the Somerset regime had to choose whether he would serve God under the supervision of the demanding temporal authority or not serve God at all rather than submit to restriction which demanded more of him than his convictions allowed him to cede.

The crux of the Griqua Town dispute was that no mention was made of the real point at issue - that Somerset detested any cells where the long arm of his authority could not coerce. Somerset's nature (5) and the demands of the frontier (6) both demanded the enforcement of the authoritarian regime. At this altar humanitarianism must be sacrificed, if necessary. And for this purpose the internal affairs of the London Missionary Society played into his hands. Charges of irregularities relating to marriage on the part of the missionaries enabled the enemies of the L.M.S. to make the greatest possible capital against the Society; divided control of the Society by Dr Thom and Mr Read produced chaos and the deep-seated nature of the internal disorganisation and schism was

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(1) Clinton, pp. 101-102.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., pp. 102-103.
(4) C.O. 67/12, Anderson to Colonial Secretary, 11th July, 1814.
(5) See above, p. 22, footnote (1).
(6) See above, p. 26.

apparent when Dr Thom organised a "Synod" in Cape Town, in August, 1817, largely for the purpose of condemning the actions and politics of Read (1). With such a state of affairs reigning in the inner sanctum of the London Missionary Society's affairs in South Africa, it was to be expected that very little opposition could be expected to attempts by Lord Charles Somerset to mould the missions into the pattern of the authoritarian regime. The years between the visit of the Rev. John Campbell (1812-1814) and the coming of Dr John Philip (February, 1819) were the crisis years for the Society and it had no great central figure to draw the discordant elements together or take salutary measures to counter the more obnoxious behaviour of individual missionaries. Somerset exploited the opportunity to the full.

> "The frontiers of this colony," wrote Somerset to Bathurst in January, 1817, "will ever afford the most important points to which the attention of a Governor here must be called ...." (2).

And uncontrolled mission institutions beyond the frontier were the greatest obstacles in dealing with the problems which the frontier presented. Not only were the extra-colonial missions to be discouraged, but Somerset saw no good reason for the continued existence of institutions within the Colony:

> "Every day fresh missionaries are arriving, (3) ... it is problematical whether any benefit has been yet derived from their exertions (the Moravians excepted) within the boundaries, while it is evident that the Colony has suffered materially from the establishments which have been set on foot beyond what are deemed the limits of this settlement" (4).

It is clear that it was not so much Somerset's failure to draw from the institutions sufficient men to protect the frontier (5) which caused him to view the missionaries with disfavour, but the

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(1) Macmillan (C.C.S.), pp. 92-94.
(2) Theal (Records), XI, p. 252.
(3) Somerset obviously did not control the sourceof missionaries or he would have prevented them from embarking for the Cape Colony.
(4) Theal (Records), XI, p. 254.
Clinton, p. 111, in quoting this despatch, omits the words "(the Moravians excepted)". These words assist in determining Somerset's motives. (See below, pp. 33-34).
(5) The letter to Bathurst of 23rd January, 1817, makes this quite plain (Theal (Records), XI, p. 254).

fact that in the north Bastaards

> "flocked to the institutions without the settlement, where they are under no control whatever" (1).

On visiting these institutions the Bastaards were regarded as members or followers of the institutions. The missionaries beyond the Colony did not regard themselves as liable to colonial interference. Therefore when alleged members of the institutions plundered distant tribes and trafficked with the booty the missionaries

> "assert that they have no power of repressing these evils but by exhortation" (2).

It was this apparent helplessness of the L.M.S. missionaries who indulged in the tendency towards disorder and who did nothing but appeal to the culprits instead of using force (3) which rankled in Somerset.

He expressed this view strongly to Bathurst:

> "That English establishments should exist on our border, not liable to colonial laws and regulations, cannot be satisfactorily explained to the colonists, who are themselves strictly prohibited from passing that frontier, which they daily see the native Bastaards do unrestrained, and to which their slaves desert with impunity. I own I am disposed to think that no further encouragement should at present be given to missionary establishments <u>beyond</u> the boundary; there is ample field for exertion confined to their professed objects within it, and that with respect to those already formed, it should be clearly made known to them that they must be liable to the same laws and regulations as are binding upon the other British settlers in this province, and

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(1) Theal (Records), XI, p. 254.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Somerset himself believed in force as the ultimate arbiter. He indicated to Bathurst that whatever attempts were made to inculcate peaceful feelings into the Kaffirs through missionary endeavour aimed at uplift and civilisation, such attempts must be "supported by that prudential strength which shall tend to overawe the restlessness of our hostile and wily neighbours" (Theal (Records), XII, pp. 198-199, Somerset to Bathurst, 22nd May, 1819). Force and coercion were always the ultimate means for beating the frontier into the orderliness which he demanded. Whatever schemes Somerset had for promoting the Rule of Law on the frontier, he never lost sight of the use of force. His treatment of Gaika, in spite of the fact that missionaries were attempting to inculcate Civilisation and thereby promote law and order, clearly proves this. (See below, p. 73).

> that their establishment should be considered as forming part of the nearest district to them under the control of the local magistracy, and make them answerable to colonial law. Such a measure will again bring under control the numerous Bastaards who now exist by the plunder which they acquire with impunity, and while it will restore labourers to this community, it will not prevent their receiving that instruction which the missionaries profess to give them, and which is so desirable should be more extensively diffused through this Colony" (1).

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(1) Theal (Records), XI, p. 285, Somerset to Bathurst, 23rd January, 1817.

All extra-colonial missions at this time were of the L.M.S., but a comparison with the Moravian institutions within the Colony is interesting. It may be profitably argued that the favour with which Somerset viewed the Moravians can be traced to their subservience to his authority. Marais examines the differences between the L.M.S. and the Moravian missions in order to account for the favour which was lavished on the Moravians in comparison with the distaste with which the L.M.S. missionaries were viewed (p. 145 ff.). What emerges from this scrutiny of the Moravians, throughout, is that their work presented a neat, ordered and subservient pattern in comparison with a disordered and recalcitrant tendency on the part of the L.M.S., e.g.

> "The Moravians ... seemed to understand the need of discipline and of training the Hottentots to regular habits of work ..." (p. 147).
> "... it was a society organised for production and the solution of social problems" (p. 147).
> "The Moravians exercised strict supervision over their Hottentots ..." (p. 148).

The attitude of the Moravians towards authority in general was one which would be dear to Somerset's heart. They indicated their attitude of complete subservience towards him in a letter which Schmidt wrote in September, 1814 (and perhaps Schmidt had realised by what yard-stick Somerset measured the work of missions):

> "We have laboured under much anxiety since His Excellency did us the honour of visiting our settlement fearful that His Excellency may not have found (according to the fullest extent of his expectations) that order, modesty and civilisation, which form part of the duties of our calling ..." (C.O. 55/42, Schmidt to Somerset, 22nd September, 1814).

Little wonder, then, that Somerset constantly implied that the Moravians were acceptable missionaries within the Colony (Theal (Records), XI, pp. 253-254).

The Moravians also satisfied Somerset's craving that "dependent people" must work (Walker (History), p. 157). When there was unemployment at the mission the inmates hired themselves out as ploughmen (C.O. 55/42, Schmidt to Somerset, 22nd September, 1814). By doing this they would also be contributing towards an orderly society (See above, pp. 15-16).

The fact that the L.M.S. station at Bethelsdorp, which came in for the greater part of the criticism of the colonial authorities, suffered initially from a poor geographical situation, whereas Genadendal was favoured in this respect

"In short," as Walker puts it, "he shared Janssen's fears that these stations might prove Caves of Adullam lacking the Davids essential to their tranquility" (1).

Somerset was, however, merely paying lip service to missionary enterprise as such. Barely six months before he had refused Barnabas Shaw permission to establish a mission station inside, or outside, the Colony, when Shaw had requested to be allotted a situation where missionaries were needed (2). If it were desirable that instruction should be "more extensively diffused throughout this Colony", in January, 1817, it is difficult to account for the sudden change in the needs of the Colony during a period of half a year. Once again we are forced back on to the explanation that Somerset regarded all missionaries as disruptive elements in his plans for arranging the affairs of the frontier and controlling it in all its varying moods. The one way in which this could be done was by tightening his hold on the extra-colonial missions. To satisfy the demands of the humanitarian spirit by allowing fresh missionaries to proceed to Kaffirland would allow him to kill two birds with one stone. If the missionaries were well-controlled they could co-operate in the task of managing the Eastern Frontier where the continual undercurrent of marauding had not ceased since Cradock's time (3) and where some measures had to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the offers which had been made by the rebels of 1815 who had fled into Kaffirland and tried to solicit Gaika's aid against the Colony (4).

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(continued from p. 33)

(Marais, p. 147) does not concern us in the formulation of Somerset's relations with these institutions. We are concerned with the effects of the institutions upon the outlook of Somerset, not with an analysis of why these institutions presented the picture they did.

p. 34

(1) Walker (History), p. 157.
(2) C.O. 4838, p. 454, Colonial Secretary to Shaw, 6th August, 1816.

Somerset was paying lip-service, whatever his true beliefs, in that he professed to foster Christianity and did not. But at heart he may well have believed that the missions were teaching sincerely (see below, p. 58, footnote (4)); nevertheless, whatever spiritual good the missions were achieving their temporal role irked him.

(3) Theal (History), I, pp. 322-323.
(4) Philip, I, pp. 162-163.

Somerset's point of view was put to Read by the Colonial Secretary in a letter dated 23rd August, 1816:

> "You cannot but be aware how anxiously His Excellency has laboured for the reestablishment of peaceful relations between the Colony and the neighbouring tribes, and with what strictness he has prohibited all offensive measures against the Caffre people and His Excellency does not hesitate in saying, that his greatest hope in permitting a missionary establishment to pass into Caffraria, contrary to the policy antecedently adopted, has been with the view of ensuring its co-operation in putting a stop to that system of plunder which has kept the frontier so long in a state of ferment" (1).

There was no chance, Somerset believed, that by concealing the extent of the depredations, any reform on the part of the Kaffirs would come about; if, however, he had it within his power to point out specific facts to chiefs in such a manner that they could not deny the truth of the complaints made against them, the possibility of reform on their part was not remote (2). Therefore such missionaries as proceeded into Kaffirland were required to communicate "from time to time" either with the Magistrate of the Frontier District or directly with the Colonial Office on the subject of robberies committed by the Kaffirs or in connection with complaints which the chiefs might have against the colonists (3). The Colonial Secretary pointed out that

> "It is only by having an intimate knowledge of these matters, that His Excellency the Governor can direct efficacious measures for checking the atrocities that are so frequently the subject of remonstrance from the frontier" (4).

Hence, taking the opportunity offered him by the eagerness of Joseph Williams of the L.M.S. to proceed to Kaffirland as a missionary, Somerset granted him permission to proceed to Gaika's territory in February, 1816 (5). The essentially politically utilitarian aspect of the appointment of Joseph Williams as missionary in Kaffirland was acknowledged not only by Dr Philip (6)

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(1) C.O. 4838, p. 475, Colonial Secretary to Read, 23rd August, 181
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) C.O. 4838, p. 262, Colonial Secretary to Read, 14th February, 1816.
The exact location was near Fort Beaufort (See below, p. 62, footnote (1)). On the detailed map of the Eastern Frontier it is marked as "Kat River Station" (See folder).
(6) Philip, II, pp. 162-163.

but by William Shaw as well, who saw the Government concession of allowing Williams to proceed to an extra-colonial situation as

> "influenced by political considerations affecting the peace of the frontier" (1).

And so it came to pass that the seeds sown during the formation of the first missionary society at the Cape, and during the establishment of relationships between the missionaries and General Dundas, bore fruit. But the relationship was not wholly in Somerset's favour as yet. He had granted Williams permission to proceed to Gaika's territory in February, 1816 (2), and had only voiced his requirements to Read in August of the same year (3), after Williams had established himself in Caffraria (4). Experience was to teach him that the predisposition of missionaries to preach instead of report for the Government tended to be predominant where the missionary was not sufficiently "briefed" beforehand and made well aware of his obligations. He did not make the same mistake again (5).

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(1) Shaw (Story). Part II. p. 88.
See also: Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry (Theal (Records). XXI. p. 315).

(2) See above. p. 35. footnote (5).

(3) See above. p. 35. footnote (1).

(4) Williams arrived at the spot fixed for the mission station in July, 1816 (Philip, II. p. 166).

(5) i.e. with the appointment of John Brownlee and William Richie Thomson. But the additional factor which caused Somerset to tighten his grip on Williams' successors was the necessity for greater control of chiefs through missionaries in order to effect the reduction of the garrison earmarked for frontier supervision. The reduction of the garrison had only been hinted at by Bathurst in 1816 but by 1817 it was accomplished (See below. p. 37).